Alliance Formation under the Unipolar Structure: the Case of Turkish-US Alliance in the Second Gulf War

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the questions of who will ally with whom for what reasons under the unipolar structure of international relations. In the unipolar system, units can be classified into two main groups according to the two different effects of the system on these two groups of units. On the one side, the superpower might follow both status quo and transformative policies, since its loyalty to the status quo depends on its own preferences. On the other side, secondary states in the system have to consent to the status quo since they lack the proper source of revising the system according to their wishes or adjusting their relative positions in the system. Unipolarity compels the units to the sensitivity against the danger of instability that creates a chaotic environment which may produce unmanageable problems. So, the states in the unipolar system will ally against the instabilities rather than balancing power or threat as earlier alliance formation literature used to claim. The source of the instability in the system determines the alliance formation policies of the states. If instability arises from a secondary state, both superpower and others form large coalitions to bring the stability back in. If instability arises from the superpower, others attempt to restrain it through using soft policies. The hypotheses developed in this study are examined in the context of Turkish-US alliance negotiations before the Second Gulf War.

Keywords: Alliance Formation, unipolar structure, instability, Second Gulf War, Turkish-US Alliance

ÖZET

Bu çalışma uluslararası ilişkilerin tek kutuplu yapısında kimin kiminle hangi sebeplerden dolayı ittifak kuracağı sorularını araştırır. Tek kutuplu sistemde, birimler sistemin bu birimler üzerine etkisine göre iki ana grupta sınıflandırılabilir. Bir tarafta, süper-güç, statükoya sadakati kendi tercihine dayandığından dolayı, hem statükocu hem de dönüştürücü politikalar izleyebilir. Diğer tarafta ise, sistemdeki ikincil devletler sistemi kendi arzularına göre değiştirecek veya sistem içindeki göreceli konumlarını düzeltecek kaynakların eksikliğini duyduklarından statükoya razı olmak mecburiyetinde kalırlar. Tek-kutupluluk birimleri yönetilemeyecek sorunlar üretebilen kaotik bir ortam yaratan istikrarsızlığın tehlikelerine karşı duyarlı olmaya zorlar. Dolayısıyla, tek kutuplu sistemde devletler daha önceki ittifak oluşumu literatüründe iddia edildiği gibi gücü veya tehdidi dengelemektense istikrarsızlığa karşı ittifak kuracaklardır. İstikrarsızlığın kaynağı devletlerin ittifak oluşturma politikalarını belirler. Eğer istikrarsızlık bir ikincil devletten kaynaklanırsa, hem süpergüç hem de diğerleri istikrarı geri getirmek için geniş koalisyonlar oluştururlar. Eğer istikrarsızlık süpergüçten kaynaklanırsa, diğer devletler yumuşak politikalar kullanarak onu engellemeye çalışırlar. Bu çalışmada geliştirilen hipotezler İkinci Körfez Savaş'ı öncesi Türk-ABD ittifak görüşmeleri bağlamında incelenir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İttifak oluşumu, tek-kutuplu yapı, istikrarsızlık, İkinci Körfez Savaşı, Türk-Amerikan İttifakı

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS   Airborne warning and Control System

DLP   Democratic Left Party

JDP   Justice and Development Party

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC   National Security Council

RPP   Republican People's Party

UN   United Nations

UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection

Commission

UNSC   United Nations Security Council

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem and Aim of the Study

This study is about the origins of alliances under the unipolar system. It seeks answers to the questions as these: How does the unipolar structure shapes states' alliance decision? For what reasons, states choose to ally under the unipolar structure? Who will ally with whom under the conditions of unipolarity? What strategies do states employ in the practice of their alliance decisions? In short, the main of the study is exploring the alliance formation process under the unipolar structure.

The collapse of the bipolar structure and the break down of the Soviet Union left the US as the only superpower in the system. This unexpected change created the unique unipolar international system of modern times. The US found itself in an unprecedented position of preponderance. In a short period of time, it appeared that not only the US foreign policy makers but also the students of international relations were unprepared for such a substantial, sudden, unexpected transformation in the system.

Based upon the balance of power understanding, neorealist theories of international relations would not expect the transformation of the system into unipolarity (Waltz, 1979: 118). According to the logic of neorealism, simply any great concentration of power would be balanced automatically since this

concentration would threaten others, so the system of international relations would include at least two poles. However, as recognized also by most neorealists, the demise of the Soviet Union "transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity" (Layne, 1993: 5).

This unexpected change raised the critics against the neoralist theories' predictions (Lebow, 1994; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Russett, 1993; Schroeder, 1994; Vasquez, 1997). Responses by the neorealist scholars to their critics have followed two ways of argumentation. On the one side some scholars like Huntington rejected to define the system as unipolar. Instead, he argues that the current system of international relations represents a "uni-multipolar" structure with single superpower and several regional powers (Huntington, 99; Joffe, 95).

On the other side, other neorealists, with a greater majority, even though recognize the unipolarity (Waltz, 2000: 27), they argue that it is a temporary period and will not last long. While Krauthammer named the system as a "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer, 90/91), Layne preferred to use the term of "unipolar illusion" (Layne, 93). Waltz, as the founder of neorealist theory, naturally sharing the same claim, wrote that neorealist theory predicts that "balancing of power by some states against others recurs… [So it] is better at saying what will happen than in saying when it will happen" (Waltz, 2000: 27). However, some neorealists did not hesitate to make estimations. Christopher Layne predicted that this "geopolitical interlude will give way to multipolarity between 2000 2010 (Layne, 1993: 7). However, these sorts of arguments seemed far from convincing the critics. Some scholars like Wohlforth argue that unipolarity is the most stable structure and may endure for a long period, criticizing the neorealist tendency (Wohlforth, 99). He proposes recognizing the structure of current international system, instead of

rejecting or ignoring it. However, neorealists continue expressing their usual arguments in their responses.

It seems that this debate will last longer than the unipolarity itself. So, the aim of this study is not engaging into this mentioned deadlock debate. Beside that, it mainly aims examining the dynamics of this "extraordinary" international order and its effects on the alliance choices of its units. For this reason, the study will not focus on the debate about the title of the new system. Such an approach does not require skipping the nature of the system. Instead it requires a comprehensive definition of its basic characteristics. One may call this system unipolar, while others call multipolar or uni-multipolar. However, there is something common to all these different approaches, the existence of an international system, which is quite different from its predecessors. So, instead of undertaking an effort to give a correct name that is mutually respected, this study tries to determine the main tenets of the system simply accepting the term unipolarity for the sake of addressing the difference of the new system from the previous ones.

In other words, this study takes the current international system as given by the process of end of the Cold War. So, in short, this study mainly aims investigating the effects of the unipolar structure on the alliance choices of the states in the system.

1.2 The Necessity of Investigating Alliance Formation under Unipolarity

Investigating the motives behind the alliance choices of the states in the unipolar system is important for two reasons. Firstly alliances have always been an important part of international relations under different types of polarities. Secondly, there is a real gap in the literature of alliance formation under the unipolar structure.

Firstly, alliances are one of the most basic foreign policy tools of the states and the study of alliance formation is a necessity for that reason in every time period and for all types of international systems. George Liska clearly pointed out this necessity three decades ago in his leading study on alliance policy, arguing that "it is impossible to speak of international relations without referring alliances" (Liska, 1962: 3).

Even the most powerful states in history have always looked for alignments with other nations. Alliances and counteralliances were the daily events among the major powers of Europe in the multipolar system of eighteenth century, which is defined by Morgenthau as the golden age of balance of power politics (Morgenthau, 1993: 205). The bipolar system of Cold War was also based on the strict alliance commitments. The two superpowers of the system did not refrain from fighting for their allies in distant parts of the world. As Glenn Snyder puts it "international politics, indeed all politics, involves an interplay of conflict and cooperation" (Snyder, 1997: 1). So, without the study of alliances, students of international relations cannot understand at least the remaining half of their field.

Secondly, there is further necessity to study alliances especially in the unipolar structure. As pointed out above, "no doubt, the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue" about the polarity of the current structure (Layne, 1993: 51). Of course, history will judge the validity of one side's arguments. However, temporary or stable, just the existence of the unipolarity requires studying alliance formation. As Waltz also puts, "variations in number that lead to different expectations about the effect of structure on units" (Waltz, 1979: 162). Let's take both of them in order to put the necessity of alliance formation studies in the unipolar structure.

For the current time, unipolarity has been standing for more than fifteen years. Despite the shortness of this period in the whole history of international relations, it is worth to study alliances in unipolarity for two simple reasons. On the one side, if the unipolar structure will endure as a stable system for a long time, then the study of alliances in the unipolar system is required in order to explain the dynamics of this extraordinarily new system. Current unipolarity in the system stands as the unique example of the modern times. From the beginning of the Westphalian system, the world had experienced both multipolar and bipolar structures. So, one can easily reach many alliance formation studies for both periods. However, due to the uniqueness and newness of the unipolarity, new studies are necessary to explain how the unipolarity affects states' alliance decisions.

On the other side, if the unipolarity is recognized as a temporary period which will at the end turn into multipolarity or bipolarity, again the study of alliances in the unipolarity is important. Consider that even tomorrow the system will transform into multipolarity or bipolarity, this transformation will be the outcome of alliances among the states. In order to provide such a transformation a group of states have to come together and combine their capabilities against the center of the unipolarity. In other words, turning from unipolarity to another international system will be based upon the formation of alliances. For this reason, even if the unipolar structure is a temporary period, studying alliances are worth to understand the dynamics of expected return of multipolarity.

1.3 Previous Studies of Alliance Formation

Since there is a substantial alliance literature; it seems that there is need to make a clear clarification for the purposes of this study. Firstly, some of this literature is

irrelevant to the formation process of the alliances. They mainly deal with different aspects of the alliances rather than concerning with the origins of alliances. For example, the theory of collective goods focuses on the distribution of burdens among the members in existing alliances, and was especially well developed in the 70's and 80's for the case of NATO alliances (Rood and McGowan, 1976; Bennett et al., 1994; Conybeare, 1994; Gates and Terasawa, 1992; Goldsmith, 2003; Kupchan, 1988). However, it does not address the origins of alliances like the founding factors of NATO. There are also problems about their applicability for pre or post bipolar system, since they mainly reflect the great numbers of alliance commitments in a coalition and the difficulty of managing these large coalitions.

One promising explanation to the alliance policy comes from the ranks of game theory. Some authors, by adopting n-person rational decision making procedure, analyze security dilemma condition that is encountered by decision makers. The trade-off between the forming a coalition and staying out of a coalition is the main subject of literature (Snyder, 1984; Emerson and Ordeshook 1986; Zagare and Kilgour, 2003). In order to have a clear illustration of the decision making units they isolate the units from historical context as a purely rational actor. This high purification and oversimplification requires, as claimed by Walt, excluding some other factors of alliance formation like "perceptions, ideology, and geography." These game theory studies can be evaluated as operating in the traditional balance of power literature and a part of this literature.

The studies of statistically oriented scholars are another example of such partial approaches. They usually try to develop theories about the effects of alliances on the likelihood of war. Their main aims are to determine the causes of war rather than determining the causes of alliances (Levy, 1981; Leeds, 2003; Smith, 1995). By

building large numbers of historical empirical data sets, they test the correlation between alliances and wars. However, these complicated indices and specified mathematical models miss the political process that will take an important part in this study.

The formation process of alliances is generally studied by the realist scholars. These studies are conducted on different levels of analysis ranging from domestic level explanations (Barnett and Levy, 1991; Haas, 2003; Suzanne and Lemke, 1997; Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Siman and Gartzke, 1996) to unit level (David, 1991; Reiter, 1994; Schweller, 1994; Shroeder, 1994), and from dyadic level (Gibler and Rider, 2004; Morrow, 1991; Snyder, 1997) to the systemic level (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987). The first three levels, though presenting important parts of alliance studies, do not provide explanations about the effects of unipolar structure that is the specific aim of this study. For this reason, this study again will be content with the brief review of these sorts of approaches. Merely systemic level explanations can provide important clues to explain the alliance choices in the unipolar structure.

Systemic level explanations can be grouped into two main camps. First is the balance of power theory (Waltz, 1979). Second is the balance of threat theory (Walt, 1987). However, as easily observed from their publishing dates, these studies and their derivatives are far from explaining the unipolar dimension. Neorealist scholars insistently continue ignoring the unipolar structure as explained above. According to the balance of power theory, alliances are formed to limit the rise of the most powerful state in the system, so states automatically ally with the weaker side of two coalitions (Waltz, 1979: 126-128). However, as recognized by most scholars, in the current structure of international relations, there are not two coalitions. There is only

one superpower at the center of the unipolar structure. For this reason, it seems that the neorealist balance of power theory is not applicable to the current structure.

On the other side, balance of threat theory as a refinement of balance of power theory argues that alliances are not formed against the material power alone. Beyond that, alliances are formed against the most threatening unit in the system. Walt defines the threatening actor with three additional factors to the power. These are, in addition to the power, offensive capabilities, offensive intentions, and geographical proximity (Walt, 1987: 21-26). According to this logic a state chooses to join the state or group of states against the threat. However, this study represents a world view of Cold War bipolar structure which was based upon a common threat perception. It seems that it was applicable to that context, instead of being timeless. It was especially good at explaining, for example, alliance choices of West European states at the beginning of Cold War. According to this logic West European states preferred to ally with the US against the Soviet Union, although the US was far more powerful than the Soviet Union. The reason for that was the geographical proximity and perceived offensive intentions of the Soviet Union. Balance of threat theory seems to be depended upon the conjecture of Cold War. Furthermore, this theory tells nothing about the unipolar structure as in the case of balance of power theory. So, this study will try to fill this gap in the structural study of alliance literature.

1.4 The Argument of the Study

This study mainly argues that alliances under the unipolar structure are formed against not power or threat, instead they are formed against *instability*. They appreciate the stability more than anything due to the systemic constraints of unipolarity.

Based on the current literature on unipolarity (Pape, 2005; Wohlforth, 1999; Wilkinson, 1999), it can be defined on three pillars which are *the existence of a sole superpower operating on the global scale with a more central role, the absence of a counter power, and the difficulty of forming a counterbalancing coalition.* As a consequence of failure of the other states in the system to balance, in one way or another, unipolarty came into scene. Under these circumstances, as claimed by Wohlforth balancing of the only superpower by a single state does not occur due to the high costs of competing with the superpower (Wohlforth, 1999). Forming counterbalancing coalitions, even if not impossible, as claimed by Robert Pape, it is difficult to form due to the difficulty of timely coordination of alliance policies of a great number of states (Pape, 2005). In other words, balancing the superpower is quite difficult even if not impossible.

Beyond that, free from immediate threats to its security, the superpower finds itself in a favorable position which decreases the constraints and increases the opportunities of the system for the superpower. For this reason, the types of the states in the unipolar structure can be classified into two main groups: the superpower and others. Being in an unrivaled position is naturally favorable for the superpower. So, main stream realist theories expect from the superpower to savor its position in the system and favor the status quo. According to neorealists, the dissatisfactions of the one or more other states are expected.

Interesting part is that: the other states in the system are also in the status quo position and none of the possible rivals demand revision in the system by challenging directly the position of the US. Both the superpower and the others are in status quo positions. However, their reasons are different. Superpower prefers the status quo, since it is positioned at the top of the system. Others have to consent to it, since they

cannot dare to challenge the superpower. In other words, it is a matter of obligation rather than being a matter of preference. So, the secondary states in the system are obliged to follow status quo policies or soft policies since they have no tools in their usage to revise the system according to their own ends. The only option available for them is to achieve an evolutionary change that will make them available to stand against the power of the superpower. On the other side, superpower does not have to follow always status quo policies. Due to the lack of rivals, the superpower might follow policies to improve its position in the system.

The secondary states' lack of sufficient capabilities to follow revisionist policies creates their sensitivity against the instabilities. These states assess the any instability as the most important and close threat to their position in the system. If an untimely instability occurs, they lack the necessary tools to manage the dangers of it. It seems that only the superpower has, to some extent, the possibility of managing the instabilities. So, only the superpower might carry out a transformation in the system. In such a case, the unipolar structure impedes balancing the superpower. Under these circumstances, a secondary state is enforced either to ally with the superpower or reject to ally with it due to the absence of available allies. Both choices shelter different risks. On the one side rejecting the superpower, especially if there is a demand from it, can draw its aggression. However, on the other side, allying with the superpower might cause the loss of autonomy in the sake of nothing since a secondary state will be less appreciated by the superpower.

1.5 Methodology of the Study

In this study, I will employ a case study approach that will investigate the Turkish rejection of an alliance commitment to US in a possible war against Iraq after a long

process of alliance negotiations. It is used as an explanatory case of the model developed about the alliance formation under the unipolarity. I selected the case study method due to the three main reasons. First, this study not only tests other theories that depend on substantial empirical data sets but also tries to develop an understanding of alliance formation in a new world order. It requires in-depth analysis and detailed information. Secondly, since the time period of this research is limited to the contemporary world order that comprises nearly one decade, as a matter of fact, we have not too many examples of alliance formation attempts that can provide data sets.

Through a survey of the events in this process, using both primary and secondary sources, I will try to identify the motives behind the Turkish decision. Such an identification will give us the opportunity to make a comparison among different theories of alliance formation. All of the theories which will be elaborated in this study, while sharing some common grounds, emphasizes different variables. For example, while one focuses on the threat perception of the states another focuses on interest compatibility between the actors and so on. By determining the motives behind the rejection of an alliance we will be able to decide the strengths and weaknesses of the present theories of alliance formation. This study will give us the opportunity to reach a decision about which variable those outlined in the following literature review section is the most important with its special character of our case.

Why the Turkey-US Case?

This case is worth to study due to its capacity to reflect the relations of the dominant power of the world with its old partners from the bipolar world. Even though, both Turkey and the US are part of a formal alliance commitment which is defined for the

particular aims of NATO for approximately fifty years, Turkey and US were unable to ally for an out of area operation in Iraq after the end of the Cold War and bipolarity. In the Cold War period, Turkey as a secondary power almost always needed US security umbrella and followed a close relationship with US. Turkey was balancing the Soviet threat by allying with the US. Turkey's bandwagoning the US policies was the main image between the relations of these two states.

According to some analyses, this alignment did not end by the end of Cold War; on the contrary it developed into a relationship of "strategic partnership" especially after the First Gulf War "in the late nineties" (Guney, 2005: 345). However, it is obvious in our case that Turkey denied acting according to the requirements of a strategic partnership, even if such a partnership is present. As put above, in a unipolar system, although, secondary states have only limited number of alliance options, and an alliance with the dominant power as a strategic partner seems beneficial at the first glance, Turkey rejected to ally with the superpower. It is interesting that a secondary power was bandwagoning insistently one of the two superpowers, though it had an alternative to ally with, however, it denied to bandwagon when it had no other alternative to balance the US. This study will investigate and try to explain this interesting and complicated non-alignment behavior.

For this case study, the research has three main objectives. First, it will try to develop an understanding of alliance formation in a unipolar system by comparing the current theories for our case. Second, it will try to place the alliance or nonalignment perspective of a secondary state like Turkey. Third, it will reach a decision about what factors shaped Turkey's non-alignment decision. In order to achieve the three tasks that are the main reasons of this research in our case, the

research will draw on information from both primary sources which are composed of five interviews and archival published sources which reflect on the existing literary and documentary material related to the subject.

In order to reach a correct conclusion on factors determining the alliance choice of a secondary state in the post Cold War, unipolar system, interviewees are selected according to two criteria. The first one is interviews with the people who served in the positions of decision maker for Turkey. The second is interviews with opinion makers in Turkey.

For the first part interviews are held with Prof Ahmet Davutoglu, the Chief adviser to the Prime Ministry of Turkey, retired General Edip Baser, and retired Ambassador Guner Oztek who served as the Turkish Ambassador in Kuwait during the First Gulf War. The aim of the interviews for the first part is to reach the correct information through the firsthand who took part in the alliance negotiations and evaluating the perceptions of the officials in the Turkish foreign policy. These interviews tried to generate a clear picture of the process far from speculations and also the opinions of the officials.

The study also includes interviews held with the influential journalists in Turkey. In order the provide a place for the alternative ideas on the issue, the journalists are selected from the supporters of the allying with the US, contrary to positions held by the official Turkish position. For this reason, two interviews held first with two influential columnists recognized with their knowledge about Turkish foreign policy and displayed sharp positions both during and after the Turkish rejection to ally with the US, namely Cuneyt Ulsever from Hurriyet and second with Cengiz Candar from Bugun.

The study uses key variables of the alliance formation literature in the interviews. In order to determine the positions of our samples these key variables will be entrenched in the questions. These interviews are based on eight interrelated questions and discussions which determine the nature of the process. First, how do you define the structure of international system as a multipolar or a unipolar system? This basic question aims to reveal the polarity perception of the interviewees as a starting point to define the framework of the interview. If they define the system as multipolar, this means that they have other foreign policy partners than the US in their mind. If they define as unipolar, this means that they are looking for the best way of foreign policy in which considerations about the dominant power rank top.

Second, in such a system, what are the policy options for Turkey, and how would you characterize Turkey's choice? This question is asked to understand whether the interviewees consider alternatives other than balancing and bandwagoning. Transcending the problem or hiding from the problem as Paul Shroeder addressed or nonalignment may be seen as alternative policy choices. This question like the first one defines the general framework of the interview for creating a common language.

Third, (based on the answers given to the first two questions) according to some, rejection of the proposal means rejecting to ally with the only superpower and its strategic partnership. Turkey followed a foreign policy apart from the US. Do you think that Turkey has the enough power to sustain such a policy in its region? If yes, what are the components of this power? If no, what are the short comings of Turkey as a regional power? This question is asked to reveal opinions of the interviewees about the ability of a regional power to act independent from the dominant power in a unipolar system.

Fourth, what was the most important threat before, and after a possible Iraq War? US declared a war against global terrorism which is ranked as the main threat for US. It decided to engage to the Middle East in order to establish a new order that will increase the security of its superpower status by intervening the autocratic regimes of the Middle East that are supposed to be the shelter of the global terrorism. Turkish rejection of the proposal means that Turkey does not share the same with US. These both states differ in their threat perceptions. So, it will be meaningful according to Walt's balance of threat theory to identify threat perceptions of both states.

Fifth, do you think Turkey is a status quo power or a revisionist power? Randall Schweller criticizes Walt as taking only the defensive part of alliance formation. He argues that states also display opportunistic behaviors. In order to reach the motives behind the decision of Turkey, we need to decide that it was seeking an opportunity or it was trying to protect the status quo in its region. This question also will provide us the answer of the compatibilities of Turkey's regional and US's global interests. If they are both status quo states they will give priority to the stability and if they are both revisionist they will both try to change the situation in the Middle East according to their own interests. But, if one is status quo the other is revisionist they will have different expectations for the future of the region and for their own interests.

Sixth, do you think that Turkey believed the success of US land troops in Iraq War? Christensen and Snyder argue that the last major war and its consequences might be effective on the alliance decisions of the states. In the First Gulf War US did not carry out a land based operation. There was a huge debate in Turkey about the success of a US land based operation. Another side of this debate was about the

possibility of a US war in Iraq without a second front from Turkey. Some analysts, was claiming that the US could not carry out a land based operation without this second front from North. So, the success expectation of this war was a variable all on its own.

Seventh, what would be the cost of a bandwagoning and at present what are the costs of nonalignment for Turkey? This question is a simple cost benefit analysis which tries to measure the rationality of Turkish decision. After approximately three years, which policy is decided as the most promising for Turkey? Was the first decision a beneficial decision which will be repeated in a possible same situation?

Eighth, what were the differences for Turkey between the Afghanistan and Iraq War? In Afghanistan Turkey allied with US without any demand, and in Iraq Turkey denied to ally in spite of high press from US. This question is used to evaluate the effect of the geography in the alliance decision.

Secondary Sources: In addition to the primary data collected from the five interviews, the research also includes investigation of secondary sources. The investigation focuses on two different time periods. First one is the period before the license proposal that goes to the 9/11 incident when US declared war against terrorism and Iraq as a shelter for the terrorist movements, the second period is after the rejection of the proposal. For the investigation of the first period, the study includes and examines the statements that are published on the daily publications of journalists as opinion makers and official documentary for the decision makers before the rejection of the proposal. For decision makers part official declarations and publications and web pages of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Military Forces will be examined. For opinion makers part earlier publications of the

determined journalists will be examined. The first part is examined from their statements before the rejection of proposal, and the second part is gained through the interviews in order to analyze the consistency of the statements comparatively according to time.

After the three years, just a few scholarly works published on the issue. These works can not be evaluated as detailed studies. However, some studies published by some foremost journalists in Turkey. At the current time, five books are published (Yetkin, 2004; Balbay, 2004; Bila, 2004; Yavuz, 2006; Erimhan; 2006). These studies offer detailed flow of events during the process. Furthermore, Fikret Bila in his book published secret official documents of the negations between Turkey and the US.

1.6 Organization of the Study

The succeeding chapter aims to clarify different types of alliance formation studies according to their units of levels. While reviewing a complicated number of explanations based on different levels, it especially focuses on the systemic level explanations since the study concerns with the effects of a specific international structure on alliance choices. So, the study pays more attention to defensive realism, offensive realism, balance of threat and soft balancing approaches.

Third chapter constitutes the main theoretical part of this study. In accordance with the gaps explained in the literature review chapter, after offering a commonly used definition of unipolarity, it tries to develop a model explaining the effects of unipolar structure on state behaviors, then to answer the questions of for what reason who will ally with whom under the unipolar structure.

In the fourth chapter, the Turkish-US alliance negotiation process before the Second Gulf War is examined as an explanatory single case. It tries to explain the reasons behind the Turkish non-alignment decision with its long standing partner, despite high levels of pressure.

In the last chapter, the theoretical and analytical framework, the content of the study and the findings of the research are summarized. The main points and arguments discussed in previous chapters will be emphasized. Prospects for future studies will be developed.

CHAPTER II

ALLIANCE FORMATION LITERATURE

The studies of alliance formation can be grouped into two main camps, on the one hand as balance of power theories and on the other hand as the ciritcs of balance of power theories, due to the abundance of the balance of power based approaches in the alliance formation literature. A further classification can be made according to the levels of analysis used in these approaches. Firtsly, the critics of balance of power approach base their explanations on domestic and dyadic level variables which are ignored and also unit level variables which are not ignored by the balance of power approaches. Secondly, balance of power theories operates on two different levels: unit level and systemic level explanations. The unit level explanations constitute the oldest form of balance of power theory defined as the classical realism. Also the neo-classical realist explanations can be put into this group. The systemic level explanations, on the other side, represent the writings of structural realists. A last distinction can be made among their derivatives including defensive, offensive and soft balancing approaches. Table 2.1 is drawn to clarify this complex structure of the different approaches.

Table 2.1 Alliance Formation Literature

Critics of Balance of Power			Balance of Power				
Domestic Level	Unit Level	Dyadic Level	Unit Level		Structural		
			Classical Realism	Neo-Classical Realism	Defensive Neorealism	Offensive Neorealism	Soft Balancing

2.1 Explanations Based on the Domestic Political Variables

These sorts of explanations argue that domestic politics plays an important role in the alliance formation process. Systemic level variables fail to explain some cases due to the ignorance of domestic political constraints. Although most of the domestic political level explanations of alliance formation build their theories upon the criticisms of the systemic level explanations, they appears to be the complementary part of rather than being a substitute for systemic level explanations. A few summary of these arguments based on the prominent writings may be helpful serving to understand at least under what conditions they are relevant or irrelevant explanations of alliance formation.

By comparing the frequency of the external threats to the survival of states and threats to the stability of governments, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy (1991: 370) find that internal threats especially for the weaker states are frequent than external threats, so the main concern for the governments of these states is protecting the regime. Since the external balancing has the possibility of adversely affecting the domestic political interests or vise versa, leaders of weaker states prefer external balancing considering the domestic conditions. They externally balance the internal threats and internally balance the external threats. Since alliance formation for the weaker states means sacrificing its authority to some degree, allying with an external

power requires at least the following four systemic components: the degree of the perceived external threat, the availability of international allies, the nature of the security guarantees and economic or military resources that allies might provide (Barnett and Levy, 1991: 395). If the system is flexible enough that enables the weaker states alternative alignment opportunities that may provide the necessary measures of protection from the perceived external threat, the leaders of weaker state assess the situation worth of allying. Otherwise, they avoid from allying since they do not want to give up some part of their sovereignty.

On the other side some analysts argue that preferences of these decisionmakers should be assessed not only on the pragmatic level also on their foundational principles. Mark Haas (2003) argues that ideological variables have a more profound effect on desicionmaker's alliance decisions. Even in threatening security environments the decisions of the leaders are shaped according to their ideological threat perceptions. "Greater the ideological similarities among states' leaders, the more likely they are to see one another's success as supports to their primary domestic objectives of acquiring and maintaining political power, and thus the greater the incentives pushing these leaders to ally with one another" (Haas, 2003: 35). Since the leaders view the interest of some as complementary, while believing the other are devastating, they will move closer to the complementary side in order to protect their ideologies (For other treatments of the argument see: Werner and Lemke, 1997; Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Simon and Gartzke, 1996).

Some of the ideologically oriented alliance formation literature relies on some specific ideologies. On the one side democratic peace literature argues that the democratic institutions increase the possibility of cooperation among the democratic liberal governments while restricting the possibility of wars (Doyle, 1986; Risse

Kappen, 1995; Dixon, 1994; Russet, 1993). Since the disputes among the liberal governments tend to delegitimize violence, the liberal governments are inclined to cooperate for the solution of international institutions.

Using the similar domestic level variables Steven David reaches to different conclusions. He examines the alliance decisions of third world governments. According to him ideology has nothing to the in the third world countries (David, 1991a; David 1991b). The leaders of these states base their decision of alliance formation to the pragmatic preferences for the stability of their own regime. While in Barnett and Levy's account this pragmatism was making closer the similar ideological orientations in David's account ideological similarities are used by the leaders of third world governments as an instrument to alleviate or suppress the dangers against the stability of their own government. Domestic opposition is alleviated by the allying with the friend of opposing group at the external level. When the external threat becomes more series than the internal one opposing group is used to alleviate the external threats. In other words, "omnibalancing" is the balancing of external threat with the internal threat, and balancing of internal with the external.

2.2 Explanations Based on the Unit Level Variables

Although the examples of unit level variables commonly found in the classical and neo-classical accounts of balance of power theory, some examples of this level can be found in the historical critiques of balance of power. One of the most prominent examples of this literature which are built upon the explanations of anamolies in the balance of power theory with is the learning theory by Dan Reiter. He uses a quantitative method with historical evidences by evaluating the realism and

concludes that it is ahistorical. He compares the learning theory with realism, where realism proposes that states ally in response to changes in the level of external threats; the learning theory advanced by Reiter proposes that states develop alliance policy in accordance with lessons drawn from the historical experiences. According to this theory, "decision makers draw lessons from past experiences to help cope with difficult choices" (Reiter, 1994: 491). His theory is developed with two different fields of decision analyses: social psychology and organization theory. By proposing different data sets from different periods he illustrates that the alliance choices of decision makers are driven by the formative experimental learning.

Reiter examines the causes of minor states' preference for alliance formation or remaining neutral. Through entering into an alliance commitment a minor power benefits from the "extended deterrence and military assistance in the event of war, at the expense of raising the risks of being involved in wars of no direct interest to the nation" (Reiter, 1994: 495). On the other side neutrality may provide the opportunity of avoiding the involvement in an event of war decreasing the possible number allies when needed in an event of direct attack. Since in the systemic wars minor power are more dependent to the efforts of major powers than major powers are, due to their inability to protect themselves in systemic war against the major power, experienced systemic wars are formative events that determine minor powers' decision either to ally or remain neutral (Reiter, 1994: 497).

2.3 Explanations Based on Dyadic Level Variables

Dyadic level explanations simply rely upon the trade off understanding between the alliance partners. Two sides while negotiating over the terms of an alliance benefits differently from each other. While one side increases its authonomy in the

international system the other side benefits from the security that is provided by the other side. According to this view traditional alliance formation literature of balance of power is based upon the capability aggregation model (Morrow, 1991; Siverson and Star, 1994).

In order to claim that the reason for the states to ally with the others is to aggregate their powers against a potential hegemon or threat requires defining two sides of the alliance negotiation as equal partners. If there is a huge difference among the relative powers of the two sides, then the addition of the less powerful side would not be helpful to counter the potential aggressor. So, balance of power theory can be applied only to the alliances among the major powers whose additional power are meaningful. When the relative powers of the two sides are not equal different states offer different means for the alignments. Morrow defines these sorts of alliances as asymmetric alliances. He (1991: 909) argues that "the asymmetric alliances are easier to form and last longer than the symmetric alliances."

The incentive for the stronger side to enter into an alliance is increasing its authonomy in the system by receiving concessions, such as military bases or the coordination of foreign and domestic policies which are offered by the weaker side and increases the stronger side's freedom of action. On the other side, stronger side offers security for the weaker side, while the stronger make concessions from its own security (these alliances may drag the powerful into unnecessary conflict) in order to achieve its aim of expanding its authority in the system.

Douglas Gibler and Tony Rider (2004) in their critics of autonomy security trade of model bring back the foreign policy interests back into trade off model. While in Morrow's trade off model security and autonomy are defined substitutable goods, they define these two concepts as often being complementary. For this reason,

states do not always give up one of them for the sake of acquiring the other. Both states may be seeking authority and security at the same time. So, instead of applying the security autonomy trade off, they propose to examine the level of compatible interests among the sides. Such an approach may give a more accurate portrayal of alliances.

They discuss this issue in four parts. First, if, the distribution of capabilities within alliance is concentrated and the level of agreement among alliance members is compatible, such an alliance will be dominated by one power. These asymmetric alliances are formed in order to provide extended deterrence. While the smaller gains security, the stronger side gains few tangible benefits in exchange and more intangible benefits such as protection of similar interests and war avoidance like US position in NATO during the Cold War.

Second, when the capabilities of the alliance is concentrated in the hands of one side and the interests are to some degree incompatible (that is not the full incompatibility), this low level of agreement makes it difficult to form alliances. However, if it is formed it provides the tangible benefits like military bases and geostrategic positions for the stronger side.

Third, if the powers of the both sides are roughly equal and they have some compatible interests, they form alliances in order to provide security for both sides. These sorts of alliances represent the traditional balance of power alliances. Fourth when states with roughly equal powers and divergent interests, it is difficult to form an alliance like in the second type. However, in the second one due to the difference of relative powers of the sides, powerful side has the opportunity to press to form of an alliance. Since the powers of both sides are not enough to impose an alliance,

these type of alliances focus on the limited issues of division of territory and neutrality in the coming war.

These reviewed theories of alliance formation on three different level of analysis seem to provide important clues for alliance formation. However, as one can easily observe all of these explanations has little to say about the effects of unipolarity. While the domestic and unit level explanations seems to be complementary rather than being an alternative to systemic theories and applicable to some specific conditions, dyadic level explanations are static and ignoring the effects of structural changes in the international system.

On the one hand, domestic level explanations do not capture the full process of alliance formation. They mainly deal with the one side of alliance formation, and argue that without considering the effects of some domestic variables the explanation of alliance formation will fail. These explanations of alliances appear to be complementary for the systemic level explanations. For instance, Barnett and Levy (1991: 370, the emphasis is added) admits this position by declaring that "internal threats to government rule provide *additional incentives* for state leaders to seek an external alliance" They are not the main incentives on the alliance behavior. These variables can only operate under specific conditions. If the privileged effects of the system soften states can give high priority to the domestic level. A further issue is the dependency of these theories to some specific areas. When Barnett and Levy use the case of Egypt alliance decisions in a period defined with low level of competition in the Cold War, David examines third world leaders' alliance decisions which are bound only to the third world politics.

On the other hand, although dyadic level theories claim to explain both systemic and non-systemic level alliances, they fail to consider the systemic changes.

They ignore the polarity as an effect on the alliances. They only consider the relative power positions of the two sides. The negotiation process is extrapolated from time and space into a static bilateral negation. The differences in a multipolar, bipolar or unipolar system and their effects on the availability of alternative alliances are ignored. These bilateral theories turn to be the explanations of alliance decisions of two perfect actor under perfect conditions. However, alliance negotiations between two states are not so much far from the concerns of other units. For instance, while shifting alliances and flexible system of the multipolarity was providing many alternatives for the units, strict bipolar structure was enforcing the states to seek strict alliances. These two conditions are accepted by many analysts and the effects of third, in other word the effects of unipolarity, are waiting to be theorized.

2.4 Balance of Power Theories

The balance of power literature will be reviewed below in a more broad form than the approaches outlined above since most of the traditional literature relies heavily on balance of power theory and the main aim of this study is to determine the constraints of the international system on alliance formation decisions. This literature will be reviewed in a linear historical perspective due to its long historical journey from eighteenth century Europe to the end of the bipolar world system and refinement efforts by classical studies of distinguished scholars during this long journey. Examining this historical linear journey is especially important for the purposes of this study which tries to find an understanding of alliance formation in a new international system that is ignored by the advocates of this literature.

2.4.1 Classical Realism Based on Unit Level Variables

The most comprehensive explanations of alliances can be found in the classical studies of George Liska, Robert Rothstein, and Hans Morgenthau (Liska, 1962; Rothstein, 1968; Morgenthau, 1993). Morgenthau (1993: 197) defines alliances as "a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple state system." Since states' primary objective is to maintain and improve their relative power position in a multiple state system which is characterized as a struggle for power, they have the follow one of the three policy alternatives.

Firstly, they resort to "internal balancing"-to increase their own power- in order to deal with the issues relying on its own resources. When internal balancing option is not available, then they turn to the second best option, which is external balancing-adding the power of other nations to their own power, in other words allying with the others. This option is a matter of expediency rather than being the matter of principle, because this option has its side effects. Forming an alliance with others requires establishing a community of interests which may limit the foreign policy flexibility of the states due to the commitments made during this formation process. If the advantages of forming an alliance outweigh the burden of these required commitments, a state will choose to ally. Otherwise, states prefer to rely on "internal balancing" based on their own resources in order to avoid alliance commitments.

If both of these options are not available, thirdly, states try to block formation of alliances against them by their rivals in the relative gains rivalry. Given such a configuration, two of three options are related two the issue of alliance formation, so determining the advantage of forming an alliance will help explaining under what conditions states from alliances. According to Morgenthau (1993: 199), alliances are

formed against a common enemy because of the blanket character of the enemy-
casus feoderis-, and they require community of interests which are:

> distinguished in five different ways according to: their intrinsic nature and relationship, the distribution of benefits and power, their coverage in relation to the total interests of the nations concerned, their coverage in terms of time, and their effectiveness in terms of common policies and actions. In consequence, we can distinguish alliances serving identical, complementary, and ideological interests and policies. We can further distinguish mutual and one sided, general and limited, temporary and permanent, operative and inoperative alliances.

We can interpret these statements as determining factors of a nation's alliance decision. If the interests of two sides are in harmony in respect to the five measures outlined above, then they will decide to ally. In a balance of power system, the main cause of this harmony is the existence of a potential hegemon. Self interested nation states seek to maintain the balance to protect and/or increase their national interests. At a minimum, one state, if it is satisfied with the status quo, would preserve its interests by stopping a raising potential hegemon with the help of forming alliances. At a maximum, one state, if it is not satisfied with the status quo and wants the revision of the system proper with its own interests and impede the domination of the counterpart. In such a system, states as international actors form alliances with one side which suits best to their interests.

Classical realists derive their alliance formation theories from the interests of units interacting in the system. In these unit level explanations, compatibility of interests and intentions of the states determine the outcome of the interaction among the states, regardless of the coercive effects of the international structure. States wish to balance others in order to protect their relative position in the system. Such an explanation grants almost a complete independency to the states from the effects of international structure. They are concerned or constrained by only their relative

position, and completely free to choose the side that suits best to their interests. Regardless of whether the system is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, they choose one side to ally and successfully apply their policy. It seems that classical realist theories of alliance formation fail to explain the effects of polarity on alliance decisions.

In this balance of power understanding, states are assumed as acting intentionally. They "consciously" decide to ally with one side for "preserving the balance of power". This is apparent in the first of four definitions of the term by Morgenthau (1993: 181): namely, "a policy *aimed* at a certain state of affairs". States aim to uphold balance of power is an important assumption which is refused and defined as reductionism by neorealists as outlined below.

2.4.2 Explanations Based on Systemic Level Variables

Neorealism

Neorealists, on the other side, derive their explanations from the effects of the system on the interacting units in it. According to Waltz's structural realism, balance of power is not the outcome of intentional actions of the states to preserve the balance. This is a distortion of theory which "arises when rules are derived from the results of states' actions and then illogically prescribed to the actors as duties" (Waltz, 1979: 120). To infer rules from the observed results of their actions is an error. In order to explain this error he (1979: 120) recalls his famous economic analogy:

> In a purely competitive economy, everyone's striving to make a profit drives the profit rate downward. Let the competition continue long enough under static conditions, everyone's profit will be zero. To infer from that result everyone or anyone, is seeking to minimize profit, and that the competitors must adopt that goal as a rule in order for the system to work, would be absurd.

For Waltz, balance of power is an outcome of structural constraints which is composed of two requirements: that is anarchic order and units wishing to survive (Waltz, 1979: 121). If balance of power is assumed to be the outcome of state motives, then theory turns to be a descriptive one, and loses its predictive power. Classic works make assumptions about the interests and motives of the states, rather than explaining them. This sort of explanations turn to be the classification and description of the historical reality and explain what happened. In contrast, a theory should explain why a certain similarity of a behavior is expected from similarly situated states. Waltz argument can be summarized with seven interrelated concepts: anarchic structure, self help system, competition, emulation, sameness, survival, balancing. In an *anarchic* system units *compete* with each other to provide their *own security*. This competition requires the *emulation* which produces the *sameness* of the units. These same and competing units *balance* the counter coalition in order to *survive*.

The dangerous effects of anarchic system forces states to seek alliances with the weaker side rather than the strong due to the two reasons. First, states are mainly concerned with their survival instead of maximizing power, differently from the classical balance of power theories. In neorealist account, power is a means, not an end. States rarely pursue offensive ends since it is a too serious business in such a dangerous area. They generally prefer to join the weaker side of two coalitions. Second, the outcomes of international affairs are difficult to predict for the states. Because of this uncertainty which gives them the opportunity to protect the status quo and their relative position, they try to balance a potential hegemon until it reaches to an unchallengeable position. If and only if these two points are ensured, in other word, they achieved their survival and the winning side is clear, then they may

bandwagon. He finds that states form balance of power whether they wish or not. Because, competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors. So, they will balance against power.

His structural study, as he also claims, is an effort to seek a more parsimonious and systemic theory of international relations in realist paradigm. For this reason, he excludes the unit level explanations of alliance formation by rejecting the intentionality in the decisions of actors in order to transform the various independent variables into a unique independent variable that is the structure of international system and, consequently, he decreases the number of variables used to explain the alliance formation. He achieved his aim of developing a parsimonious structural theory by sacrificing the predictive determinacy, and causing many anomalies on the foreign policy dimension.

Waltz criticizes the old alliance formation idea that a balance of power system requires at least three or more players and declares that this is a false assumption. He (1979: 118) claims that even in a two power system the politics of balance continue. His writings revise the old balance of power theory of a multipolar world and transform it into a theory of a bipolar world. His minimum number of balance of power is two that enables the theory of balance of power to become an explanatory tool of Cold War politics. With this refinement of balance of power theory, he claims that the realist paradigm will be able to explain the international politics independent from time and space. As a structural theory of international politics, it will be applicable in all times and spaces since he assumes that the international politics will never become unipolar due to the effects of balance of power dynamics. When a power seeks world domination other power or powers will balance it.

By the end of the Cold War neorealism is exposed to tough critics. The discussion inclined toward the polarity of the system and the claims of the structural realism about the polarity so the reliability of realist paradigm. While scholars tried to develop explanations for the new world order others argued the failure of structural realism to predict both the end of the Cold War and its applicability in the new international system. The discussion turned into a struggle between the different paradigms about the success of structural realism as a theory. But few studies have done, especially on the subfields to explain the foreign policy decisions of the states in the new international system.

In the alliance formation literature this short coming is quite clear. Although some studies have been conducted, these studies ignored the structural constraints of the new international system. While some studies accepted the new system as a multipolar system and turned to the explanations of the pre-bipolar world, others accepted the change in the nature of the system, but they did not try to evaluate the conditions of the new system. Even if they named the new system as a unipolar world, some advised to accommodate their multipolar based studies to the bipolar and unipolar periods. Glenn H. Snyder, for example, in his comprehensive study *Alliance Politics*, published in 1997, and one of the most recent studies in the field, accepts that he (1997: 3) makes "no claim that for the theories applicability to the post Cold War World." and advocates that "bipolar and unipolar periods can be quite easily accommodated from a multipolar base." The crisis that is experienced in the study of alliance formation can be easily observed by only taking a glance to the cases of new studies. Most of them choose the cases of the historical multipolar eras (Christensen, 1997; Groth and Randall, 1991; Haas, 2003; Lindley, 2004; Fritz and

Sweeney, 2004; Narizny, 2003; Owen, 2005; Press, 2005; Schweller, 2004). Only few studies include contemporary cases.

Balance of Threat

One of the most compelling and comprehensive studies before the end of the Cold War was the theory of balance of threat which was developed by Stephen Walt and a refinement of Waltz's structural balance of power theory and still remains as the most promising theory that examines the origins of alliances (1985; 1987; 1988).

Stephen Walt, in his study on the alliance formation issue, agrees with most of these propositions, however, broadens Waltz's parsimonious theory. He argues that although power is an important factor in the balance calculations of states, it is not the only one. States will ally with or against the most threatening power. The term balance of power is not a sufficient one to explain some cases. He develops a broader term: that is balance of threat which includes four factors: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intensions.

The first of these factors, namely aggregate power, is approximately the same with the Waltz's concept of material capabilities. So, he agrees with Waltz finding in that aspect. The latter three factors give the tools for a broader explanation of alliance behavior. If the explanation is based on only the aggregate power of the units, it can not explain why the west European states decided to join the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union, although the United States was in a more powerful position. This anomaly can be explained by the help of balance of threat theory which explains that west European countries did not perceive any threat from the United States, while they perceived the Soviet Union as an expansionist state. So, they decided to balance the most threatening power.

The second factor deals with the geographical position of states. According to his view, small states bordering a great power may be particularly vulnerable so that they choose to bandwagon rather than balance, especially if their neighbor has demonstrated its ability to compel obedience. If a country will be in a position of deciding to ally with one of two possibilities, it chooses to ally with the distant one since its neighbor is most threatening.

The third factor is about the offensive capabilities of a potential aggressor. According to this proposition, states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable only of defense. These are an important source of threat for one country. If a country, say A, did not have enough capabilities for a possible offensive attack on B, B would not be threatened by A. Consequently, B would not join an alliance against A. However, on the other side, if the military power of B to small relative to A, and if the sum of B's military capabilities and a possible ally's military capabilities are not enough to defend themselves, B, this time, chooses to join with the source of threat.

The fourth factor deals with the offensive intensions of the other countries. A state may have a high extent of aggregate power with enough offensive capabilities and also it may share the same border with a weak country. But, if the weak country is sure about the military intentions of that powerful neighbor, it does not seek to balance since it does not perceive that powerful country as threat for its survival. The relationship between Canada and the United States may serve as a good case to explain this proposition.

He also gives secondary factors like ideological solidarity, bribery, and penetration. Although these are secondary factors, they might serve to preserve and enhance the incentives as a leverage for alignments that already exist. If states feel

that they are fairly in a secure position they may follow their ideological orientations when they decide to balance or bandwagon. Bribery and penetration are the tools of a powerful state to manipulate alliance decisions of the weaker states. However, they are not the cause of alignments; they are only results and weak tools of alliance formation, not independent factors.

He (1987: 17) defines balancing "as allying with others against the prevailing threat" and bandwagoning as allying "with the source of danger". While on some circumstances balance of threat theory reaches the same conclusions with Waltz's neorealist balance of power theory, on some circumstances, it reaches different conclusions. Like Waltz, Walt finds that balancing, not bandwagoning is the dominant tendency in international politics. The reasons for this conclusion are also similar to Waltz's reasons. States prefer balancing, because as a strategy it is safer than bandwagoning in an anarchic structure full of danger and uncertainty. Because in peace times states still have an opportunity to alter the behavior of the threatening side by deterring the aggressor, they prefer balancing in peace times.

On the other side, in war times they choose to bandwagon in order to decrease the negative consequences of a possible defeat. Differently from Waltz, he argues that weaker states are more likely to bandwagon since they contribute to the alliances relatively small strength and have no decisive effect to achieve the task of balancing against the other side. Because they cannot affect the outcome, with the exception of special circumstances and more vulnerable to the pressures, they choose the winning side. Finally, if there is an excessive number of available allies, states will try to ride free. On the other side, absence of the required number of allies will drag the states, especially the weaker ones to bandwagon in order to accommodate the imminent threat.

It seems that Walt's balance of threat theory dominates the literature of alliance formation. His theory has been applied to many cases both by himself and others and also serves as the main ground for many new theories of alliance formation. However, these new attempts focus either a historical period or sui generis subregions like Middle East instead of seeking the systemic factors behind the alliances in that region (Garnham, 1991). These studies mainly remain partial and also on the dyadic level which focuses on the bilateral relations of the states. They do not take into account the effects of a new international system. On the other side, some studies remains on the systemic level, they deal with and do not go further than the polarity issue without relating the effects of polarity to the alliance formation (Mastanduno, 1997).

Offensive Realism

John J. Mearsheimer's offensive realism is accepted as the rival variant of the Kenneth Waltz defensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001). Like Waltz, he derives the behaviors of the states from the systemic constrains. Unlike Waltz, he supposes that international system does not enforce states to behave in defensive terms. Contrary, to survive in a self help system states can defend their security best when they remain ready to seize an opportunity that arises from the system. Therefore, states prefer the offensive means as the strategy of survival. From this assumption, Mearsheimer derives two strategies of alliances. Threatened great powers are more likely to balance or to buck-pass. In his account, states do not choose between balancing and bandwagoning.

Because no other great powers can be assured of US intentions, they have been balancing or buck-passing since the end of the cold War. According to this

logic there are four buck-passing tactic: pursuing cordial relations with the potential hegemon, maintaining cool relations with the potential buck-catcher, building up one's military so as to make the potential buck-catcher a more attractive target for the potential hegemon, and allowing, or even facilitating, the growth in power of the potential buck-catcher so that it can more effectively contain the potential hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001: 156-158).

Buck-passing is a more attractive strategy than balancing since it gives the opportunity of free riding. Threatened states are reluctant to form balancing coalitions against potential hegemons because the costs of balancing are likely to be great. The more powerful the dominant state is relative to its foes, however, the less likely it is that the potential victims will be able to pass the buck among themselves, and the more likely it is that they will be forced to form a balancing coalition against the aggressor.

2.5 Return to Unit Level Variables and Neo-Classical Realism

2.5.1 Chain Ganging or Buck Passing

As an effort to increase the explanatory power of Waltz's structural realism Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990) argue that Waltz's theory is ultra parsimonious and must be "cross fertilized". Like Walt, they try to explain the anomalies in the international system by adding a minimal number of variables from security dilemma theory (Jervis, 1978) and perceptual theories (Van Evera, 1984) to derive a "historically" accurate account of alliance formation in multipolar systems. Their aim is to "rescue Waltz's theory from its predictive indeterminacy" (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 146) in the area of foreign policy. This tendency

demonstrates that there is a tension between Waltz's theory and those who apply it in their practical research agendas.

Waltz's theory predicts only multipolarity predisposes states to either of two actions, one is balancing which tends to be predominant, the other is bandwagoning. But, it does not provide any prediction under which circumstances which one of these strategies will be adopted by the states. To predict which of these two policies will prevail, the authors complicate Waltz's theory by adding two variables, namely security dilemma theory and perceptual theories. They use the term chain ganging instead of balancing and buck passing instead of bandwagoning. Their definitions for both concepts are different from Waltz's and Walt's definitions. The term of chain ganging is defined as "unconditional balancing behavior" when buck passing is defined as "strategy of limiting liabilities".

According to their theory, in a multipolar system, states pass the buck when they perceive defensive strategies are superior to the offensive. These perceived defensive advantages arise from civilian control or defensive lessons of history especially the last major war. In contrast, states prefer chain ganging when they perceive offensive strategies are superior. This perceived offensive advantage arises from military authority or offensive lessons of history. In a bipolar system, neither buck passing nor chain ganging occurs because superpowers do not need security interdependence and can not ride free (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 165).

Their explanation of why they firstly focus to the mulpolarity and secondly to bipolarity is similar to many realists after the end of Cold War. They expect the world will become more multipolar by the end of bipolarity (1990: 140). After assuming the potential reemergence of multipolarity, they argue that it is significant to explore the effects of this multipolar system. By drawing lessons about the

perceptions of policymaker's before the two World Wars, they propose to mitigate these explains to the possible state behaviors in "multipolar structure" of the post-Cold War era. Although their theory published sixteen years before that is the approximate date of end of bipolarity, reemergence of the multipoarity is still absent.

They use these theories in explaining the alliances before the two world wars. Like most of the literature, they also analyze the formation of alliances in a multipolar system and give only limited attention to the bipolar system, and ignore unipolarity. Although their studies published in 1990, their study does not include contemporary issues. It is composed of two extreme cases that took part in a multipolar system. The figure that is illustrated in the study is the best example of ignorance of an international system that is neither multipolar nor bipolar. This theory mainly deals with the irrational two extreme alliance decisions that cause war.

2.5.2 Balance of Interests

Randall L. Schweller is also interested with the question of whether states ally more often with the weaker or the stronger side in a conflict. While international relations scholars have traditionally accepted the view that states balance against threatening increases of power, he tries to show that, practitioners through the ages have held a bandwagoning image of international politics. He criticizes the balance of threat theory of Walt as taking only the defensive motives behind the alliance formation decisions. According to his claim (Schweller, 1994: 74), Walt mistakenly assumes that "bandwagoning and balancing are opposite behaviors motivated by the same goal: to achieve greater security". This is a too narrow definition which excludes the offensive side of alliance formation and includes only the defensive side of it. A broader definition of bandwagoning is needed to explain the opportunistic behaviors

of the states. States bandwagon not only for the threat considerations, but also for the gains. By adopting a different definition of bandwagoning he argues that "it is far more wide spread than Walt suggests" (Schweller, 1994: 101). He proposes the term balance of interest instead of balance of threat.

Balance of interest theory is a two level explanation; one is at the unit level, the other at the systemic level. Although, Schweller (1994: 104, emphasis is added) challenges to balance of threat theory, at the systemic level, he does not obviously differ from Walt's theory that adds some intentional variables (like aggressive intentions) to the pure material capabilities based theory of Waltz:

> At the systemic level, balance of interest theory suggests that the distribution of capabilities, by itself, does not determine the stability of the system. More, important are the *goals and means* to which those capabilities and influence are put to use: whether power and influence is used to manage the system or destroy it; whether the means employed to further such goals threaten other states or make them feel more secure. In other words, the stability of the system depends on the balance of revisionist and conservative forces.

As easily understood from these statements, intentionality of the actors is emphasized with only one difference from balance of threat theory that is claimed to take into account only defensive considerations behind the alliance formation. Another question about the systemic level explanation can be raised that to what extent this explanation can be accepted as a systemic explanation. Especially, the last sentence of the quoted passage shows that the stability of the system is derived from the characters of the units, not from the structure of the international system.

At the unit level, according to balance of interest theory, the most important determining factor behind the alliance decisions is the "compatibility of political goals" (Schweller, 1994: 88) which are derived from two general characteristics of states in the international system, and according to their standings toward the system.

The first one is revisionist powers and the second is status quo powers. This explanation is a clear departure from Waltz's structural theory towards classical realists like Morgenthau and called neo-classical realism which mainly focus on the foreign policy dimension turning to the unit level.

2.6 Soft Balancing

Although the reasons for the development of the soft balancing concept are not directly related to the issue of alliance formation, it is essential to understand the position of balance of power theories and arguments of its proponents in the new world order. Since unipolarity is an outcome and indicator of the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the lonely superpower, soft balancing argument as a type of balancing proposition is an attempt to explain the state behaviors in an international system which is dominated by one state and did not predicted by the traditional balance of power theorists. If, contrary to the prediction of traditional balance of power theory, the international system turns to be a unipolar system, how states deal with the substantial power of the superpower?

This basic question is the source of soft balancing concept. In a system of imbalance, allying against the dominant power is a too costly national security strategy for the second-tier states. So, reviewing this concept may give important clues for properly evaluating the alliances in unipolarity that makes counterbalancing difficult. According to this logic, external balancing, counter alliances in other words, is not an available strategy for second-tier states. Instead of using the measures of hard balancing like arms races and alliance formations, second-tier states in the unipolar era use different measures of soft balancing against the aggressive unilateral foreign policies of the superpower.

By the end of the Cold War, most of the realists expected the turn of bipolarity into multipolarity. Against the increasing criticisms, some realists like Waltz (2000: 27) argued that it is a matter of time that will not last long (Krauthammer, 1991) while others defined the unipolarity as an "illusion."(Layne, 1993) Although time passed unipolarity had not given way to multipoarity and it appeared to remain longer than many realists have expected. Among the many explanations why a counter coalition have not formed by the great powers of the system up until now, an increasing number of analysts seems to argue that this absence of counterbalancing is related with the nature of the superpower of the system.

According to the proponents of the soft balancing argument, US have drawn a portrait of benevolent hegemon or at least remained harmless (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Walt, 2002; Kelley, 2005). Soft balancing concept seems to arise from this assumption about the intentions which play an important part in balance of threat theory. Because the other great powers do not feel the bad intentions of the US, they do not need to balance the US power. If the perception of the others for US changes, they will feel insecure and try to balance US power.

Contrary to the general argument about the relative strength of the US that is supposed to be unchallengeable, proponents of soft balancing argument argue that the substantial US power is not free from balancing. Even a huge power, like US can be balanced with some different measures from the traditional ones. It seems that there are two preconditions for the soft balancing. First one is superpower's aggressive foreign policy that transforms the benevolent or harmless image of the US. Second one is unilateralism in the implication of these foreign policies. The other great powers and also some regional powers display "active efforts… to delay

frustrate, and undermine" (Pape, 2005: 43) aggressive and unilateral foreign policies of the superpower by using "international institutions, economic statecraft, and adhoc diplomatic arrangements…to limit the use of US power in the short term and establish the crucial conditions for more ambitious balancing efforts in the long term" (Pape, 2005: 44). If the dominant power continues to its aggressive and unilateral policies soft balancing will intensify. Even if soft balancing cannot resist to the dominant power in the short run, it may increase the costs of US foreign policy and decrease the number of future possible allies for the US.

The most important outcome of soft balancing is the possibility of the evolution of these soft balancing efforts into hard balancing coalitions. However, according to soft balancing argument, the superpower is able to avoid from soft balancing. For this end, the dominant power should display an image which illustrates the US as a benevolent and multilateral power.

The current international system is at the early stages of soft balancing. Proponents of the argument use four general cases for their empirical support. The first is Russia's increasing strategic relations between China and India. The second is Russia's support for the Iranian nuclear program. The third is efforts of the European Union to increase its military power. The fourth and the most common case is the opposition against the US in 2003 Iraq War. This study is also examines an important part of this fourth case. Turkey's territorial denial for the deployment of the US forces from the North is evaluated as soft balancing by Turkey against the US.

The criticisms of the soft balancing concentrate on two points (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005; Lieber and Alexander, 2005). Firstly, it is criticized because of its empirical weakness. The cases used by the proponents of soft balancing can be better explained with some other alternative explanations. After explaining these cases by

some domestic, regional and economic dynamics it appears that these cases are not related with a global consensus against the superpower, but they are sui generic and should be explained according to their own dynamics.

Secondly, the concept of soft balancing is an attempt to stretch balance of power theory to encompass an international system in which traditional counterbalancing among the major powers is absent. It is an effort to make the old balance of power theory by exerting pressure fit into an international system that is far from the expectations of the theory. So, "the discussion of soft balancing is much ado about nothing" (Lieber and Alexander, 2005: 109).

Although these criticisms address to plausible alternative explanations, they suffers from two problems. First they are far from presenting a new complete understanding, although they propose alternative explanations. These alternatives seems to be partial explanations whereas one can explain one case, the other is not applicable. Second they pay little attention to the effects of international structure. Soft balancing argument deals with the major power behavior in a unipolar world.

However, criticisms do not provide any clue for the effects of unipolarity on the state behavior. Even if the behaviors of the states are sui generic in a unipolar system, it is worth of explaining how and in what direction and why unipolarity affected the states' behavior, so it became sui generic. Even its name is not soft balancing, what is the name of the general tendency of these states in opposition to the US foreign policies in the last period? This study is an attempt to capture some part of these questions. The next chapter will examine the policy choices of second-tier states in this unipolar era.

CHAPTER III

ALLIANCE FORMATION UNDER THE UNIPOLAR

STRUCTURE

This chapter, firstly, defines the unipolar structure as an international system with the existence of only one global superpower with a more central role, absence of a counter great power operating on the global level, and the difficulty of forming counterbalancing coalitions against the superpower. Secondly, it attempts to develop an understanding of how does the unipolar structure affect states' behavior. In order to have a dynamic model, it is argued that the effects of the unipolarity on state behaviors can be divided in two groups: given positions and probable policies. According to this classification, policy alternatives of both superpower and the secondary states are evaluated. The third section tries to explain what sorts of outcomes the unipolar system produces for the alliance policies. The fourth section examines the question of against what the states in the unipolar system ally. In the fifth section the question of who will ally with whom is evaluated under certain conditions. Finally, a summary of the hypotheses developed are given at the end of the chapter.

3.1 The Nature of the Unipolar System

Since the aim of the study is determining the outcomes of the new system, the reasons of the formation of the unipolarity will be regarded as given by the process of the Cold War. By the collapse of the bipolar structure, the world has faced the first unipolar structure of modern times. Defining such a sui generic phenomena seems as a difficult task to achieve. For this reason, this study tries to introduce a definition of the unipolar structure building on common usage in the current literature and observation.

Although different analysts supply different definitions, they more or less emphasize three similar points which constitutes the definition of the unipolarity in this study. First is the existence of one superpower with a more central role. Second is the absence of a great power with enough capabilities to balance the sole superpower. Third is the difficulty of forming counter balancing coalitions. Following these three nearly common points in the literature, unipolarity can be simply defined as *the condition of the existence of a sole superpower operating on the global scale with a more central role, the absence of a counter power, and the difficulty of forming a counterbalancing coalition.*

Firstly, unipolarity requires the existence of only one superpower which is much more powerful than the others. Its relative position in the distribution of capabilities among individual states pushes the superpower to the centre of the structure due to its uniqueness in the system "with global reach" (Wilkinson, 1999: 142). As Wohlforth argues (1999: 39) centrality of the superpower is the key peculiarity to the unipolar structure.

Secondly, in the unipolar structure no state in the system can individually stand against the only superpower. According to Robert Pape's definition (Pape, 2005: 11) "the distinct quality of a system with only superpower is that *no other*

single state is powerful enough to balance against it." If one state could afford balancing against the superpower, then the system would not be a unipolar one, rather it would be a bipolar system as in the case of the Cold War. In other words, in the unipolar structure internal balancing does not work. States desiring to balance the superpower has only one difficult option.

Thirdly, external balancing, in the unipolar system, is still a viable option despite its difficulties to form. Here, a distinction between international systems should be made clear for a reliable definition of unipolarity. According to Wohlforth's (99: 9) definition unipolarity differs from both multipolarity and bipolarity. Nevertheless, it also differs from a global hegemony. It is a structure with higher level of power concentration than multipolar and bipolar structures, however, lower level of concentration than a hegemonic structure. With the same logic Robert Pape (2005: 11-12) also argues that unipolar structure differs from hegemonic systems. He draws a table illustrating the difference between balance of power systems and hegemonic systems:

Table 3.1 International Systems with One Strong State (Pape, 2005: 12)

| Balance of Power Systems		Hegemonic Systems	
Mulitpolarity ←——————→	Unipolarity	Hegemony ←——————→	Empire

Despite the difficulties of forming balancing coalitions for two reasons, first the coalition would require the participation of most or possible even all of the lesser major powers and second the difficulty of forming this coalition with so many units, forming such a coalition is not impossible. When considered the difficulty of forming

even bilateral alliances, states which are willing to form a coalition with the participation of a great number of partners requires combining the interests of them into one basket, then managing the coalition towards one direction.

It seems that unipolarity stands somewhere between hegemony and bipolarity. In other words, the ordering principle of the system is still anarchy and the units are functionally same. These are the first two characteristics of Waltz's definition of the international structure. They seem to be remaining in the unipolar structure. However, the third part of his definition which is the distribution of capabilities across units seems to be transformed sharply. In his recent article he (2000: 5-6, emphases are original) argues that changes of polarity did not transform the system, by separating the changes *of* the system and changes *in* the system. However, in his famous book, *Theory of International Politics* he was arguing that "the structure *of* a system changes with changes in distribution of capabilities across the system's units" (79: 97, emphasis is added).

With the same logic, Gilpin defines the changes of the distribution of the capabilities as a change in the interaction level that means the changing character of alliances, weapons so and so forth. The issue of change in the distribution of capabilities is a change in the system or of the system can be debatable, but it is unarguably obvious that "variations in number that lead to different expectations about the effect of structure on units." In other words, concentration of power in the hands of two or more states affects the states foreign policy choices differently than the foreign policy choices of the units affected by a unipolar structure.

In order to explain the varying effects of the system on the units, one should make clear the three elements of a system (units, interactions, and the structure) and their operating process in the system. Waltz draws a figure in order to explain the

effects of the system on the interaction of the units. By using this figure and adapting it to the unipolarity, the different effects of unipolarity on the interaction of units can be explained. Waltz (79:100) illustrates the international system as seen in figure 3.1:

Figure 3.1 Structure, Interactions, and Units

The circle represents the structure of international system. The external three elements represent the units. The internal three elements represent the interaction among the units, in other words, the distribution of capabilities. The functioning of such a structure can be summarized as the following. As easily observed, the system is formed by the units, in turn system affects the units, and furthermore system affects the interaction among the units. The existence of the units produces the

structure and their behaviors produce the interactions among units. In Waltz's own words, "causation runs from structures to states *and* from states to structure" (Waltz, 1997: 914).

Structure affects both interactions and units. So, the system which is formed by the units influences both the units and their interaction. In this figure, actors exist as units outside the circle which represents the international structure. The interaction network of these external units defines the structure whose outcomes become the reason of the unit behaviors. Units deterministically fall under the rule of the system which is based on the distribution of capabilities. Although the units form the system, in turn their behaviors are determined by the system. In this way, units may have to behave differently from they wish at the first stage because of the constraining effects of the system. They become subjects to the system which is produced by them, however, may dictate opposite outcomes to them. In this anarchic structure, units move according to their relative position in the distribution of capabilities.

If the distribution of capabilities across the units changes substantially, like in the case of turning from bipolarity to unipolarity, so the nature of the influence of the new distribution and the reactions of the units to the new circumstances will change. Turning from bipolarity to unipolarity will change the behaviors of the units, as most of the systemic analysts recognize, as simply the turning from multipolarity to bipolarity changed the behaviors of the units. The changing nature of the distribution of capabilities and functioning of the new system can be defined as illustrated in the figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Structure, Interactions, and Units under Unipolarity

While the anarchic structure and the functionally sameness of the units remains same as in the first figure, the significant change takes place on the part of distribution of capabilities. The greater circle still represents the anarchic structure. The medium circle represents the only super power. Lastly, the smaller circles represent the other units. Since the structure of the international political system has remained anarchic, the greater circle is directly adopted from the first figure.

Since the most significant change occurred in the distribution of capabilities, the interaction among the units are redesigned according to the dynamics of the unipolar system. That is illustrated by a medium circle which intersects with the structure. Notice that, one of the units differently from the other units has a more *central* role than the others in the system. It is not external to the system. By the collapse of the balance of power, as the only great power it has moved to a more central role. It has absorbed and internalized the distribution of capabilities by a

substantial concentration of power and substituted to the place of distribution of capabilities. However, functionally it is still a unit interacting in an anarchic system, not in a hegemonic system. So, it only intersects on some points with the structure, it does not directly capture the structure.

What does this position mean? It means that although it is still affected and constrained by the system, it also has effects on the system to some degree. As the only superpower it does not face constraining effects of a counter coalition, however, in an anarchic system it is not an empire. Interaction across the units does not form the balance of power anymore; instead the lonely superpower emerged as the managing and reproducing unit of the unipolar, imbalanced structure. While the other units are exposed to the constraints of unipolar structure more than bipolar or multipolar structures without the opportunity of constraining the superpower, the only superpower is subject to any opposition less than multipolarity and bipolarity.

For example, in Cold War two superpowers were in strict competition for their areas of influence. While the US was engaging in some sort of policy in any region of the world, it had to be calculating the Soviet Union's position in the system. The end of the Cold War "left considerably more room to maneuver" for the US (Mastanduno, 1997: 57) by liberating it "from the ropes of bipolarity" (Joffe, 2003). This position gives the superpower the chance to manage and reproduce the international system. By establishing bilateral relations with the others it manages the unipolar system and these bilateral relations impede the possibility of forming a counter coalition increasing the reproduction power of superpower for the continuity of unipolarity. As shown in the figure the units demanding to interact with the other parts in the system faces with the position of the superpower. Notice that they have little opportunity to interact directly with each other without interacting with the

superpower due to its central place in the system. The relationship among the other units is defined according to their relation with the superpower. So, this study divides the units into two parts, one is the only superpower the other is secondary states.

In this figure the other units are represented by the smaller circles which are sprinkled around the structure. They are circles differently from Waltz's figure. In his figure they are represented by points which ignore the role of domestic politics and unit level variables. Although this study will not focus on these two levels because of its main goals of focusing on the effects of unipolarity, it is worth of illustrating the possible effects of these two levels.

Dividing the units in the system into two groups as superpowers and others may seem as an oversimplification. Of course, these other units also have differing relative positions in the distribution of capabilities. However, this simplification is needed to illustrate that the superpower is the only great power operating on the global scale. They may be positioned according to the distribution of capabilities on the regional level.

It is clear that there is a substantial capability difference between for example China and Togo. However, when compared to the U.S. on the global scale the power variations between these two secondary states do not matter, since both of these states can not operate on the global scale. Differing capabilities of these different secondary states are shown by the variations on the largeness of the circles. Distribution of capabilities among these secondary states can be influential only on the regional level and when the systemic superpower does not participate to the regional issues. However, when the superpower engages into a region, the distribution of capabilities among the regional states will automatically shift through the substantial capabilities of the superpower.

Totally, the end of the Cold War presented a system which is roughly illustrated in the figure. One may argue that how this system born out. However, for the sake of examining the alliance choices in a unipolar world, this study recognizes this system as given by the process of Cold War. In sum, the high power concentration in the hands of a unit brought it into a more imbalanced and central role in a system which made difficult for the others to counter balance. This is defined as the unipolar international system. So, what outcomes does unipolarity produce on the behaviors of the units will be examined in the next section.

3.2 The Outcomes of Unipolarity on State Behaviors

In what ways do the states in a unipolar system react and interact? In order to answer this question the outcomes of the unipolarity on the behaviors of two types of states will be examined in two different stages in order to get a dynamic explanation of the state behavior in the unipolar system. In structural studies, it is common to attribute static characteristics to the states in the system. Structural analysts identify the units in the system with *a priori* assumptions and develop their theories by building upon these static assumptions. For example, Waltz's defensive realism assumes that states are security maximizing actors. Following from this logic, all attitudes of the states are evaluated from the defensive perspective. Behaviors of the states arise from the security motives.

As correctly argued by Schweller, such an understanding ignores the opportunistic aspects of state motives (Schweller, 1994: 74). The static assumption of Waltzian theory is addressed as its most significant problem that is "a tension between Waltz's theory and those who apply it in their practical research agendas" (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 137).

On the other side, for example, Mearsheimer's offensive approach assumes that states behaviors are motivated by offensive intentions since "the great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 35). So, the states follow offensive strategies. However, this approach ignores the defensive dimensions of the units' behaviors. It compels the analyst to look for offensive motives behind even the most defensive state behaviors.

Some analysts, on the other side, like Schweller, try to overcome this static identification problem by applying the separation between revisionist and status quo states. However, such an approach faces another kind of problem that is to become too much dynamic. Since the characteristics of the units are derived from the unit level by ignoring systemic effects, they become too much dynamic and so descriptive. If one chooses to name a state in the system as a revisionist or status quo state by only examining the unit level characteristics, he or she has to focus all states in the system separately that makes developing a theory difficult.

Even one can classify all states in the system into one of the two groups; his identifications carry the risks of being descriptive and subjective. Such an approach can describe the states in the system correctly, but when one state encountered by systemic constraints, it might have to behave contrary to its desires. Consider that one state might be willing to change the status quo, but due to strict structure of the international system, it might have to follow status quo policies.

Furthermore, the classification of the analyst would not be value-free. Mutual-identification of the both sides in the Cold War, not only by states but also by analysts of both sides, as the devil is a good example of such subjectivity. Another example may be the general tendency in American society to identify US policies as benevolent. Ido Oren interestingly explains how the image of the Germany before the

two world wars changed in American academic world after US-German political rivalry (Oren, 1995: 148).

In order to avoid the tension between the extremely static a priori assumptions and too much dynamic descriptive classifications, this study proposes to classify the states in the unipolar system according to their position in the distribution of capabilities by distinguishing the behaviors of the states into two stages. First of these stages is the given positions of the states in the system. Second stage is the probable policies of the states in the system. Separating these two stages creates an opportunity to draw a more dynamic illustration of state behaviors. Combining them gives the behaviors of the states.

In the first stage one state might be given a status quo position by the international system; however it might be also available to follow revisionist policies as a response to systemic opportunities or imperatives. On the other side, one state might be willing to transform the system; however, it might be lacking the necessary tools because of the systemic constraints. High power concentration of power in the hands of one superpower in the unipolar system requires making such a separation.

As defined above the central position of the superpower gives it the opportunity of overcoming some systemic constraints, while enforcing others to follow status quo policies even if they wish to change the system or their position in the system. The varying behaviors of the states in the unipolar system can be explained by the help of this separation. The unipolar context with its substantial power concentration allows making this separation. So, the study does not claim the applicability of this separation to the multipolar or bipolar structures. It mainly depends on the unique context of unipolarity that is high qualitative and quantitave power concentration in the hands of the only superpower that stands on the centre of

the unipolar system. However, without this separation in the unipolar structure, the behaviors of the states in the system can not be explained by both a priori assumptions and descriptive classifications. Although "the international structure provides opportunities and constraints that shape state behavior significantly," "they do not determine it entirely" (Mastanduno, 1997: 52). As Schroeder argues, (Schroeder, 1994: 129) "a theory that holds that states are differentiated within the system solely by their relative power position cannot possibly deal successfully with this history or its outcome, any more than Newtonian physics can work for quantum mechanics. This neo-realist assumption…make[s] it, for the historian at least, unhistorical, unusable, and wrong." For example, defensive approaches seems to be unable to explain the offensive policies if the superpower decides to use its ability to follow such offensive measures. On the other side, offensive approaches can not explain the absence of a challenging actor against the superpower.

In sum, this study defines the foreign policy behaviors of the states as shown in the table 3.2. First, although stemmed from the different sources, both the superpower and the secondary states are given status quo position. Second, while it enforces secondary states to follow status quo policies, it may enforce the superpower both to support international system by status quo policies to protect its position in the system and to restore the international system by restoration policies to intervene to the irregularities of the system. The reasons for the first stage determine the type of policies in the second stage. Dividing the behaviors of the states into positions and policies facilitates the theory to make dynamic predictions instead of general static nature of structural theories. Otherwise the theory would be exposed to high levels of determinism due to its lack of capability to predict change in the system. If the theory has been constructed according to the static positions of

the units in the system, then it would not be able to explain the instabilities and conflicts in the system.

Table 3.2 Given Positions and Probable Policies

	Given Positions	**Probable Policies**
Superpower	Status Quo Position	Status Quo Policies
		Restoration Policies
Secondary States	Status Quo Position	Status Quo Policies
		Soft Policies

3.2.1 Given Status quo Positions

Status quo Superpower

The first outcome of unipolar structure on the state behaviors is the transformation of both the superpower and the others, although motivated by different reasons, into status quo positions. Lets firstly consider the position of the superpower and its reasons to become a status quo power. As the natural and direct conclusion of unipolarity, it is not surprising that the only superpower, standing on the highest point of the system, to be satisfied with its position in the international order.

Common understanding and the history show that states prefer to be the leading power, if possible the most powerful or at least necessary levels of security. Although different approaches, give different answers for the question of the main goals of a state, they all meet on a common point. On the one side, offensive

approaches define state goal as power maximizing. On the other side, defensive approaches argue that states' main goals are security maximizing. However, both of these approaches agree on that being the most powerful state of the system is preferable to any distribution of capabilities. It is not only preferable, but also the most desirable. While one side argues to struggle for this end the other side argues that struggling for this end may cause insecurity. But, if it is given, both sides would be pleased. So, superpower's status quo position is not surprising. "In short, we should expect the dominant state to savor the unipolar moment" (Mastanduno, 1997: 55). It would be surprising if the others were also in favor of the status quo like in the case of unipolarity.

Status quo Secondary States

Secondly and interestingly the other states in the system also display status quo positions. In literature it is common to separate the states in the system into two groups as revisionist and status quo powers. According to this division, a revisionist state or a group of states wants to revise the system against the position of the victorious, status quo powers. The most famous example of the revisionist position is the desires of Germany before the two World Wars. German desires for the revisionist policies find its definition by the statement of Kaiser Wilhelm II who argued for "a place in the sun".

According to this logic in all international systems some states are satisfied with their position, while some states reject their position and try to increase their autonomy in the system. For this reason, they form counterbalancing coalitions. Based on this argument, realist theories did not expect a unipolar structure. Concentration of power in favor of one state would automatically produce

dissatisfied states which would desire to alter the status quo by forming coalitions or fighting against the possible hegemon. However, this has not occurred for fifteen years.

Two approaches seem to be dominating the literature on the absence of counterbalancing efforts by the secondary states. Firstly, institutionalists argue that since the contemporary international institutions with their constraining and binding effects provide security for the others against the dominant power (Ikenberry, 2001). According to this sort of argument, it seems that the secondary states rely on the international institutions, so they do not need to balance the dominant power.

Secondly, and more commonly, some scholars find the reasons at the nature of the dominant power. They derive their argument from the assumption about the unique historical, cultural, and geopolitical characteristics of the U.S. as an international actor (See Walt, 2005 for historical and cultural characteristics and see Levy and Thompson, 2005 for geopolitical characteristics). According to this logic, differently from many other international actors U.S. stands as a benevolent power through out its whole history. So, the others did not perceive the U.S. as a threat for their interests. The US might remain as the imbalanced dominant power if it remains benevolent. When it becomes a threat for the secondary states, they will begin counterbalancing effort against the U.S.

Although, one can direct many critics to these explanations, this study will focus on only one aspect which is common to both of them. The two ways of argument falls the same sort of mistake by conflating the terms of the ability to balance and the desire to balance. Despite varying level of explanations, their reasons seem nearly same. They both explain why the secondary states do not want to balance against the superpower. They ignore the fact that even if they want to

balance the superpower they can not do it. They draw a picture as if the secondary states can balance the US, but they choose not to do so since they are satisfied with their position and agree on the rules of the system. This study, on the other side, advises to recognize the reality of inability of the secondary states to balance the US. Without recognizing this reality, logical reasoning based on the biased assumptions can not explain why the secondary states display revisionist positions.

Two fundamental reasons which are used in the definition obviously explain why the secondary states have to be in a position of status quo in the unipolar system. First is the substantial concentration of power with a high margin which hinders displaying revisionist positions. General understanding would expect the challenge of the others since the high power concentration of the power would threat their interests. This proposition would be arguably correct, if one or more secondary states had enough power to challenge the superpower, but have not decided to balance the superpower and increase their authority in the system, since they agree with the superpower on the main terms of the international order.

Such an argument would first require the existence of one or more great powers with the capability to challenge for the revision of the system. These sorts of arguments appear as referring characteristics to a nonexistent actor. If one or more great powers were present, then arguing their goals would be logical. They ignore the most fundamental requirement of being revisionist that is the emergence of a great power which is dissatisfied with its position in the international order. Revisionism stems from the tension between the high amount of power and relatively low position of status. Otherwise, desiring a status and autonomy in the international order without the required amount of power might be too costly. As Gilpin states (1981: 51) "there have been many cases throughout history in which states have forgone

apparent opportunities to increase their power because they judged the costs to be too high."

Cognizant of their shortcomings, secondary states in the unipolar system can not dare in challenging the international order to increase their authority. The unipolar system forces these states, out of necessity, to consent to their position in the international system. As Wohlforth sets (99: 18) because of the dominant position of the US in all the key leading sectors, "any effort to compete directly with the US is futile, so no one tries". Unipolarity existentially and by its definition drives the secondary states to display status quo positions. Notice that they are not defined as supporter of the status quo. They might be arguably whether the supporter or the enemy of the status quo. However, they have to be the follower of the status quo unarguably. It is not an issue of preference it is an issue of absolute necessity that gives the opportunity of generalizing. "The disparity of power deters others from challenging it" (Layne 2004: 106).

Second reason of the status quo position of the secondary states is the difficulty of coordinating a counterbalancing coalition. One may argue that even if there is no great power to challenge the authority of the global superpower then why the other states attempt to build alliances against the superpower. Although it is not an impossible option, it includes certain difficulties. It firstly requires building bilateral relations between the secondary states independent from the superpower and secondly forming and managing substantial numbers of partners.

Firstly, the superpower, as the only globally operating actor, has much more relations with one country than any other actor in the system due to its central position in the system which is illustrated in the figure 3.2. Economically, militarily, and culturally the superpower can manage and reproduce the system because of the

absence of a challenging economic, military, and cultural gravity center. Although the existence of some regional economic, military, and cultural powers can be influential in their region, their space is strictly defined by superpower's actions and intentions. When the superpower engages to the region more effectively, it can transform the regional order. However, this is not to say that the superpower can change the order in all regions at the same time like an empire. It is to say that if it chooses to engage more effectively into a region, it can decisively change the status quo in the region.

Even without a direct engagement the superpower plays an important role in all regions. For example, U.S. is considered an important part of Middle East politics, an important element of regional calculations for China in South Asia, for Russia in Central Asia. It is obvious that US has more ties with two neighboring countries than they have between themselves. Furthermore, the ties among the regions have been broken. A powerful actor of one region has too weak relations with a powerful actor of another region. As a practical example, T.V. Paul (Paul, T.V., 2004: 15) sets that "Although China, Russia, France, and Germany may have some inclination to balance US power, they are not eliciting cooperation from regional states." Potential allies such as India are looking for the ways of maintaining better relations with the United States because Washington can offer them more by way of economic and politico-military support and ideological affinity.

Secondly, it is commonly recognized that the smaller number of partners in an alliance the easier managing and forming. "Most historical alliances in fact have had only two members" (Snyder, 1997: 12). States choose to ally with the smaller number due to the reason that the nature of the alliances requires making commitments and concessions which, in turn, contrary to the reasons of the alliance,

may increase the risks of insecurity in defensive alliances and decrease the amount of gains shared by the participators in offensive alliances. Defensive alliances are formed in order to increase the security of the partners against a threat. Since greater number of partners are difficult to manage, one of the partners' behavior or its desires which are not so much vital for the others may drive the other partners to an unnecessary conflict.

As a commonly used example, Austrian desire for the revenge of the prince and its ultimatum to Serbia before the First World War dragged all the great powers into a long and great war due to the strict and vast alliance system (Stoessinger, 1998: 5). Also in the bipolar era, strict and broad structures of the alliances produced the containment policies and domino theories which caused some unnecessary conflicts in far regions of the world (Snyder, 1991: 8).

In the case of bipolarity the superpower and in the case of multipolarity one or more of the great powers more or less to some degree had the ability to coordinate these alliances against their rivals. However, in a unipolar system to coordinate a counter coalition against the only superpower of the system without the leadership of a great power is more and more difficult than was in these two cases. Coordination of the relations among the partners requires the capabilities of a great power. When the difficulties of coordinating the conflicting NATO members like Turkey and Greece for the US is considered why the secondary states in the unipolar system do not display revisionist positions and do not dare in balancing the superpower appears meaningful.

3.2.2 Probable Policies

While the previous section defined the natural positioning of the states, this section defines the varying policies available for the both sides. Such discrimination is useful in order to explain the varying policies of the actors, although they are positioned in the same way. System might position the units in the same way, but again the system might channel the states to pursue different policies from their positions due to the varying reasons and types of systemic constraints.

After defining the positions of both superpower and the others as the status quo positions, then it comes to discuss the available policies for the both groups. Both the superpowers and the others defined in the status quo position as an outcome of unipolarity. While on the one side the superpower stands in a status quo position based on its preference, on the other side secondary states have to accept the status quo position out of necessity. These differing reasons produce different outcomes for both sides. While the superpower has the advantage of being both supporter of the status quo and revisionist due to the absence of a rival, the secondary states has only the option of being recognizer of the status quo due to the dictates of the unipolar system. So, system gives the opportunity of being both revisionist and status quo positions to the superpower, it does not give the opportunity of following revisionist policies for the secondary states.

Probable Policies for the Superpower

Compared to the secondary states in the unipolar system and to the bipolar or multipolar systems, the superpower has the opportunity of pursuing both status quo and revisionist policies in the unipolar system. Common understanding expects the superpower to follow status quo position since it benefits most from the unipolarity as explained in the section about the positions of the states in the system. Because the

superpower created the existing order and takes the lion's share, it is likely to be the status quo power of the first rank. It more than anyone else has a vested interest in preserving it (Schweller, 1994: 101). However, this has not to be the case for two main reasons. First of them is related to the reasons which positioned the superpower as a status quo power. Second is related to the nature of the unipolarity that increases the maneuvering space of the superpower.

Firstly, the superpower desires the continuation of the system because it is the most benefiting actor from the unipolarity. In other words, it supports the system as long as these benefits continue to come in great amounts. Superpower's adherence of the status quo depends upon its own preferences. However, what happens if these benefits break to come or even the structure harms the superpower. That is not an impossible condition since the anarchic structures always carry some risks differently from the hegemonic systems. So, the position of the superpower as a status quo power in the unipolar system does not require the constant adherence of status quo policies on the side of the superpower as in the case of bipolarity and multipolarity. As Gilpin puts it when a hegemon finds its primacy threatened, then it may pursue a strategy that is "to eliminate the source of the problem" (Gilpin, 1981: 191). Under some conditions that will be evaluated below, it may follow some policies which are stemmed from the necessities of restoring the international order.

Notice that the term of restoring is used instead of revising. Since the concept of revisionism is related to the position of the new emerging power, it is better to use the concept of restoration for the unipolarity. The revising state does not challenge the international order to have a place under the sun. It seeks the ways of increasing its present authority in the sun.

Secondly, in the bipolar and multipolar periods, dominant powers are drawn as the status quo powers under all circumstances due the possibility of an emerging revisionist power. The status quo positions of the dominant powers in these two periods are based on the static exogenously given assumptions as earlier mentioned. They always have to protect the international order and their position in it despite the harmless effects of the order.

For example, in the multipolar era of nineteenth century, Britain, though it is the strongest unit of the system, was defensively playing the role of the balancer in order to protect its position against the emerging powers. Also in bipolar era, both superpowers were far from putting new openings into practice since they were too much interested with the behaviors of the other side.

However, in unipolarity relatively independent position of the superpower makes it available for it to restore the international order. Possessing an undisputed preponderance of power, the superpower "is freer than most states to disregard the international system and its incentives," because the system is built around US power (Wohlforth, 1999: 8). The superpower, in the unipolar system, gains maximized foreign policy autonomy, since security threats to the superpower are minimized (Mastanduno, 1997: 60). While comparing constraints on the US during the Cold War and post-Cold War, Mastanduno gives interesting examples about the effects of polarity on the superpower behaviors. He writes that (Mastanduno, 1997: 57) when the international constraints on the US lifted by the unipolar structure, the US found more room to follow episodic policies:

> The US response to the break up of Yugoslavia is instructive. If that break up occurred during the Cold War, managing the ensuing conflict would have been an immediate and overwhelming priority for US foreign policy…In contrast, the collapse of Yugoslavia after the Cold War left the United States with considerably more room to maneuver. As the single dominant power, the United States was free to redefine the problem over a

five-year period." In Somalia, the United States moved quickly from a humanitarian mission to a more ambitious nation-building exercise, but abruptly ended its efforts after taking relatively light casualties in a firefight.

In order to explain these dynamic conditions for the possible policy choices of the superpower requires making a separation between the position of the superpower in the system and policies available to the superpower. The static approaches were to some degree able to explain the policies of the units through the static illustrations of the positions of the units. In bipolar and multipolar eras great powers almost always had to give high priority to their security due to the existence of the possible challenging coalitions.

In the unipolar era, absence of a counter power or powers and the difficulty of forming counterbalancing coalition complicate the issue of determining the nature of differing policies of the superpower. Determining its policies by basing the analysis only on its position would cause to one to expect that the superpower would always follow status quo policies. However, absence of the close threat to the position of the superpower produces a broader area of movement that is restoration policies or status quo policies.

So, what determines what sort of policy will be carried out by the superpower? Whether the superpower follows restoration or status quo polices is shaped by the systemic requirements, not by the desires of the superpower. System enforces the superpower to follow restoration or status quo policies. Although the superpower occupies a high margin of the system, it does not capture the whole system. That means it is still exposed to the effects of the uncaptured area which is displayed in figure 3.2 produces irregularities.

The best and the nearest example of this situation is observed in the 9/11 incidents and by the policies of the "rogue states". These incidents stemmed from the

external zones of US area of influences. In this respect US reactions, as in the form of Bush doctrine, against these incidents can not be evaluated as only stemmed from the neoconservative foreign policy desires like some analysts inclined to do. Such an approach ignores the effects of the uncaptured part of the system on US foreign policy. In his comparison of the two terms of the Bush government, John Levis Gaddis (2005: 2) correctly argues that "the basis for the Bush's grand strategy, like Roosevelt's, comes from the shock of surprise attack and will not change. None of F.D.R.'s successors, Democrat or Republican, could escape the lesson he drew from the events of December 7, 1941… Neither Bush nor his successors, whatever their party, can ignore what the events of September 11, 2001, made clear."

In this respect, Iraq War can be addressed as the turning point in the US foreign policy, since this war "is the United States' first preventive war" (Pape, 2005: 25). Arguing that the US decided to follow revisionist policies in order to increase its authority in the system because of its assumed goals and desires independent from the systemic effects would be incorrect. On the contrary, the US reacted against the harmful parts of the system of which it has organized, dominated in a great extent and from which it expects to benefit. Although the styles of reaction may change according to the preferences of the governments or the leaders, as explained in the next section, the policies aiming to restore the international order remain constant.

Probable Policies for the Secondary States

Since they have only little opportunity to change the international system or to increase their authority in the system, the secondary states can not dare to challenge like a revisionist state. They might desire a higher position in the system or they might be satisfied with their position. However, in both cases they are enforced to

follow status quo policies since they have not the ability to challenge. Cognizant of these shortcomings, they have to consent to the given position. Otherwise, they can face heavy costs. They know that they have little opportunity to change the system in their favor. It is not accidental that the leaders of the challenging secondary states named to be mad. Saddam and Kim Jong II, both are presented in the international arena as the mad dictators.

However, being unable to achieve beneficial transformations that would improve the positions of the secondary states does not necessarily require following pacifist status quo policies. Beyond that they might explore for the ways of gaining more desirable ends without risking their present position. They cannot militarily, revolutionarily, directly, and single-handedly compete with the superpower. Instead they prefer using soft strategies that are peaceful, evolutionary, indirect, and multilateral policies.

Firstly, unipolarity by the definition refers to the high power differentiation between the superpower and the others. Under such circumstances, any secondary state, even if it deserves to improve its position in the system, will not prefer military measures. Furthermore, in a crisis situation secondary states as the weaker actors support peaceful solutions since their relatively minor influence in power based solutions.

Secondly, the lack of appropriate tools of changing the global order compels secondary states to follow evolutionary policies instead of revolutionary ones. If a state cannot emerge as a revisionist state with the required material capabilities, then the only option available for it is expecting and striving for an evolutionary transformation in its favor. Without gathering enough power to stand alone in the

transformation process to improve its position in the system, it has to wait for an incremental change.

For example, before the two World Wars, correctly or mistakenly, the leaders of Germany believed the possibility of changing the power configuration in the system by a revolutionary war due to the approximately equal power parities that is many times defined as the uncertainty of the multipolar systems (For a discussion of such misperceptions ans miscalculations see: Schweller, 2004). However, the leaders of secondary states in the unipolar system, due to the clear power differentiation, seem as being aware of the possible risks of such revolutionary attempts. This incremental evolution of international system can be observed in the diplomatic maneuvers of secondary states and their bargainings with the superpower.

Thirdly, secondary states trying to improve their positions in the system avoid directly opposing the superpower. Attempts of even evolutionary changes should not draw the attention and anger of the superpower. If they do not want to be the target of the superpower then they should refrain from directly targeting it. All efforts of performing such cunning policies should take into account the position of the superpower. In other words, secondary states might try to make a hole in the system in their favor as much as possible and as secretly as possible.

Fourthly, secondary states prefer multilateral policies in order to restrain the unchecked power of the superpower. Especially in a crisis situation, due to its unique power monopoly, superpower, more than anyone else, has the opportunity of being on the winning side. For this reason, secondary states want to tie the uncontrolled power to measures. International organizations seem as the most suitable ways of tightening the "ropes on Gulliver" (Joffe, 2003: 4).

Similar arguments are made by the proponents of soft balancing. According to their views, second-tier states use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine US policies (Pape, 2005). Despite the similarity of the strategies of both used in this study and in soft balancing arguments, this study differs in arguing that these strategies cannot be evaluated as a form of balancing for although recognizes the softness part.

In order to assess such strategies as a form of balancing, one should have the clear evidences of opposition against the state that is balanced. Proponents of soft balancing broaden the concept of balancing to include even the strategies that are not related to the potential hegemon. According to Brooks and Wohlforth (2006: 190), "by [their] definition, any state's acquisition of any level of capabilities of any kind (including non-military) that enhances in any way its bargaining position vis-à-vis any other state in any policy area (including those unrelated to security affairs) constitutes balancing."

Furthermore, external balancing requires coordinated behaviors different actors. However, under unipolarity, strategies of second-tier states mainly suffer from the difficulty to coordinate their policies. The strategies that are not interrelated with each other on a common cause cannot be named as balancing. It is better to use the term of soft policies.

Actually, the use of soft policies by the weaker states is not something new in international relations. In every period of world politics from the days of Thucydides up to now, weaker states almost always developed similar strategies. The strategies of weaker Melians, against the stronger Athenians in The Peloponnesian War include many similarities with the policies of second-tier states under unipolarity. Probably, the main difference the unipoalr system and the system of Ancient Greek city states

is the more acute power differentiation of unipolarity that produces the lack of alternative partners against the stronger side. The Melians had the opportunity of allying with the Spartans. However, the unipolar structure compels second-tier states to be content with using soft policies rater than balancing.

3.3 Alliance Formation

Since the main aim of the study is to explain who will ally with whom under what conditions in the unipolarity, considering the three parts of the question separately seems to be helpful. First part will focus to answer the question of what does the unipolarity bring for the alliance policy. The answer for this question will be adopted from the nature of the unipolarity that is defined above. Second part will try to explain the motives behind the alliances in the unipolar structure. Also this part will be adopted from the *nature of the unipolarity* section. Third part will explain under what conditions who will ally with whom. This part will be adapted from the section about the outcomes of the unipolarity on state policies.

What is new for alliance policy?

The unipolar system to some extent has changed the nature of the alliances on three aspects which should be kept in mind during the study alliances. The clues for these changes can be found in the definition of the unipolarity. This study defines the unipolarity as the existence of the only superpower with more central role, absence of a counter power, and the difficulty of forming counterbalancing coalitions. Such a definition produces two particular changes in the alliance policy and a change in the study of alliances. First one is the existence of the superpower as participant directly or indirectly in all alliance attempts in all regions. Second one is the absence of an

alternative alliance partner for a secondary state. Third one is the need for reconceptualization of alliance strategies according to these two realities.

Firstly, in the unipolar system the only superpower in one way or another seems to be a part of an alliance directly or indirectly both on the global scale and the regional scale. If the turning from bipolarity to unipolarity is a change within the system as stated by Waltz or an interaction level change as put by Gilpin (1981: 43), it will require the change in the nature of the interaction among the units. The collapse of the other pole and turning from bipolarity to unipolarity means the absorbation of the distribution of power. This is a substantial change in the interaction level that gives the superpower its central role in the system. When the other units interact within the system their action has to pass through the US central position as illustrated in the figure of unipolar structure. As shown in Waltz figure the interaction among the units were taking place in the structure.

However, in the unipolar system this interaction level is occupied by the existence of the single superpower. The intersecting part of the superpower with the structure shows its central role. The other units are enforced to interact with the superpower first, especially in crisis times, if they want to build relation with the other units due to presence of the superpower in all conflicts of unipolarity. Without building ties with the superpower, it is difficult for the secondary states to contact with each other, even it is not impossible. By managing and reproducing the system, the superpower defines the nature of the relations among other units. Even if they interact among themselves independent from the influence of the superpower in the stable periods, they determine their positions according to the superpower's position when they need to ally against a threat in crisis times. The superpower on the other side almost always intervenes to the crisis areas in order to protect its central role.

So, even if the secondary states interact among themselves, in the times of "expediency" when alliances are required as put by Morgenthau (1993: 197), they will have to interact through the central position of the superpower.

As a globally operating actor, the superpower will have relations with all regions in the system. It is not surprising. Furthermore, if there is no other power that can block the efforts of the superpower to enter into an area of influence as in the case of bipolarity, the superpower will have the opportunity of constructing and managing relations with the many regions. The separation of the area of influences in bipolar Cold War period is a commonly used statement. Both USSR and the US as the two globally operating superpowers were in a competition of gaining regional partners. When the US wanted to construct better relations with a specific country or region, it was facing the USSR efforts. By the collapse of the USSR, the US found itself free from the effects of a counter power. While the regional countries were calculating the strategies of the both superpower, these countries are now calculating only the US strategy in the region.

In any conflict or in any friendship developing in one region the US is directly or indirectly involved. As repeatedly stated in the National Security Documents, the US feels the necessity of involving in all regions of the world for the protection of the US position. George W. Bush clearly identifies this perception, in the introduction part of last National Security Document of March 2006, by arguing that the US needs to struggle for its security and opportunity in any region that extend as far as "from the streets of Fallucah to the subways of London" (2006: 1-2). Since the superpower seeks to protect its interests in all regions of the world with this perception in mind, it will be part of all alliances directly or indirectly. If any incidents in one region seem to be less threatening or less promising for the

superpower's position, it may choose to display its influence indirectly by using partners from the region. On the other side, if it believes the necessity of directly engaging, it may choose to form alliances. In both cases, the superpower plays a central role for the alliances. The superpower almost always will be a part of an alliance if it is formed.

Secondly, in the unipolar system, the secondary states will have no alternatives to ally. The alliances of the multipolar eras are defined as being more flexible than the bipolar era. The reason for such a definition stems from the availability of alternative partners. In multipolar systems, states have more than two alternatives to ally. So, they had the opportunity to shift their alliance choices. However, in the bipolar system states were joined strictly to one of the poles due to the lack of a third option. Even if some states like India declared their neutrality in the Cold War their positions were not recognized as a promising alternative strategy of alliance.

Despite the relative strictness of the Cold War alliance policy, it was obviously more flexible than the alliances of the unipolarity. Despite the strict alliance structure of the bipolarity, at least there was another superpower which could be a partner or a balancing tool for a secondary state. The Egyptian governments' alliance strategy during the Nasser period can be given as an example to illustrate what does the existence of a possible counter alliance partner mean (Barnett and Levy, 1991: 380-381). During the Cold War, despite the difficulties of changing alliance partner due to the deep ideological cleavages, the secondary states in the system could pragmatically approach the other side. However, in the unipolarity, even if one of the secondary states is dissatisfied with the policies of the superpower,

it has no alternative to negotiate the issue. It has only two options which will be examined below, to follow.

Moving from the first two points, this study argues that the unipolar structure brought such comprehensive changes in the nature of the alliance formation strategies that need to be conceptualized according to the requirements of the new system. As put in the second chapter of this study, analysts employed many different concepts to define the possible strategies of the states in alliance formation. These concepts range from balancing to bandwagoning, from hiding to transcending, from chain ganging to buck passing. First, a general evaluation of these concepts, second an evaluation of these concepts according to the requirements of the unipolar system shows that using these concepts in the bipolar or multipolar systems were difficult due to their conflated usages, however, in unipolarity it is impossible to use these concepts with their present meanings. So, clearer and more common definitions to varying approaches should be developed to explain the alliance strategies like joining one side or rejecting one side, especially in the unipolar system.

Firstly, present alliance formation strategies seem to be too much conflated. While one concept argues for a certain behavior of an alliance in one study, the same concept can be meaning totally the opposite in another study. For example the most famous concept of balancing means different alliance strategies in different studies since "there are as many balance of power theories as there are balance of power theorists" (Lemke, 2004: 72). While Waltz defines balancing as joining against the powerful side, Walt defines the same concept as joining against the threatening side. What sort of difference these two definitions can form? It interestingly turns to naming the same state behavior as balancing while the other names it as bandwagoning. Consider that state A will join state B if it perceives state C as a

threat according to Walt. So, he will name A's behavior as balancing of C. At the same time, if we consider that B is the most powerful side, then Waltz would define State A's behavior as bandwagoning. As a real world example, so, the behaviors of the West European states during the Cold War era should be defined as a bandwagoning in Waltz, while it is named as balancing of the USSR threat by Walt. As Levy (Levy, 2004: 29) puts "while the balance of power concept is one of the most prominent ideas in the theory and practice of international relations, it also is one of the most ambiguous and intractable ones."

The same confusion is valid for bandwagoning. Allying with the powerful side or threatening side can be named as balancing according to their differing definitions. Further, Schweller argues that Walt's definition of the concept of bandwagoning is "too narrow- as giving it into threat". According to his view, "in practice however, states have very different reasons to choose balancing or bandwagoning. The goal for bandwagoning is usually self extension: to obtain values coveted". By doing so he broadens the concept of bandwagoning as including the offensive side of the alliances, however, at the same time he further makes the concept more and more complicated. Although these three approaches argue different reasons for the same behaviors, all of them use the same concept according to their ends. This makes difficult to arrive at a common understanding on the issue and confuses the reader. Instead of using well defined specific concepts they adopt the concepts, but making it upside down.

Thanks to the certainty of the unipolar system which gives the existence of the superpower in all alliances at the global or regional level and the absence of an alliance alternative for others, differently from the other international structures, the alliance strategies in the unipolar system can be overly simplified as joining to the

superpower or rejecting to join to the superpower. In other words, under the unipolar structure there are two alliance strategies: to be or not be with the superpower. If a secondary state wants to form an alliance, it has no chance of participating to an alliance against the superpower. The only option for this state is to reject to join the alliance led by the superpower. The third part of the definition of the unipolarity that is the difficulty of forming counterbalancing coalition is consciously excluded, because if this difficulty could be overcome then the structure of the international system would no more be unipolar. It would turn to a bipolar one.

3.4 Allying against Instability

The previous long discussions about the nature of the unipolar system and its determinative effects on the behaviors of the states, clearly reaches to the conclusion that states, in the unipolar system, do not ally against the power or threat or for gaining opportunities as the earlier alliance literature have argued. However, states ally against instability since the nature of the unipolar system requires the states to be sensitive against the instabilities which will worsen the position of the states under the defined circumstances. Since both the superpower and the secondary states are positioned as status quo states, their sensitivity for the protection of the international system is not surprising. The interesting part of this sensitivity comes from the ranks of the secondary states. However, with the explanations for their reasons-that is their inability to balance the superpower-to be positioned as status quo states is not illogical. It is something like choosing the better than the worst.

In this study, instability refers to the disappearance of both peacefulness and durability. Deutsch and Singer (1964: 390) define stability as "the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics [so that] no single nation becomes

dominant, most of its members continue to survive, and large scale war does not occur." It requires the maintenance of the existing relative power configurations among the units. Under a stable system, states interact with one another in ways permitting at most gradual changes, instead of sudden and/or fundamental transformation which might define the relations among the units according the rules of new power configuration.

Because instability in any region or on the global arena can produce change, both the superpower and the others perceive this change as the primary threat to their current position in the system. On the one side, secondary states do not want a change in the system because of the two reasons. First, they are far from the enough power to manage any crisis with their own power. Second, they have no partner to combine their capabilities beside the superpower.

Firstly, no secondary state in the unipolar system has enough power to challenge. They do not only dare to change their position in the system, but also do not want any attempt to change the status quo. The reason for that position is their lack of enough power to transform the system and to control the direction of the change according to their desires. Cognizant of their shortcomings, they know that any transformation of in the system carries high amounts of risks since it will function out of their control. If they were able to control to some degree and expect some benefits from this transformation they would not be in a position of status quo. Even if the incident takes place between two secondary states with high amount of power in favor of one side, this powerful side also can not dare to change the status quo since the high probability of the superpower intervention. These sorts of states have to calculate the superpower intentions.

Even Saddam Hussein tried to measure the intentions of the US before the occupation of Kuwait. However, he failed to measure the intentions of the US when the US ambassador incorrectly declared that the US would not intervene to the issues among the Arab states. However, at the end of the day, the superpower as the central status quo state in the system did not let Saddam to change the status quo in his favor. This miscalculation about possibility of the neutrality of the superpower was the outset of Saddam's suicide. This example is important to show the central role of the superpower, even in the minds of a leader like Saddam who is described as a mad and the necessity for the secondary states to consider the outcomes of revisionist policies.

Secondly, even one or more secondary states in the system combine their capabilities, although it is difficult not impossible, it seems to closer to impossible as far as they have not overcome the central role of the superpower by a perfect coordination of foreign policies. If they can coordinate their policies in this perfect sense, the system turns to be a bipolar system which is characterized by a competition of area of influence. Considering the difficulty of forming such a perfect and broad collation, the secondary states in the system seems be recognizing the realities of protectionist policies. As a consequence, they do not want any instability around themselves. The stability ranks as the highest goal of the secondary states at the absence of the ability of transforming the system according to their own interest.

On the other side, the superpower as the most benefiting unit from a stable unipolarity, if it is not the source of instability and aiming a global or regional change, it actively resists to any attempt that seeks to change the international status quo. Even if the superpower has the ability to transform the system, it will not be a revision of the system but a restoration in the system to acquire high levels of

security. In the unipolar system seeking security beyond the stability is a privilege which belongs only to the superpower. However, using this privilege requires sacrificing some cost even for the superpower since restoration efforts will attract the reactions of the secondary states. Even these secondary states can not form counter the efforts of the superpower; the restoration policies of the superpower can form the grounds to overcome the difficulty of forming broad coalitions in the long run by building common enmity against the restoration policies of the superpower.

3.5 Who will Ally with Whom?

While the motives of the alliance formation in the unipolar system are derived from the nature of the system which requires a high level of sensitivity against the instabilities, alliance choices of the states in the unipolarity can be derived from the outcomes of the system. This study argues that both the superpower and the secondary powers are given status quo positions by the unipolar system. However, while the structural reasons for the secondary state's position as the status quo states enforce them to follow status quo policies, the reasons of the superpower might enforce it either to support the status quo or to restore the international order. Since the units in the unipolar structure ally against the instabilities in the system, two types of alliances might be formed according to the sources of instability. First one is the instability produced by any region of the world. Second one is the instability stemming from the policies of the superpower.

Firstly, despite the obvious dangers of the instability for the secondary states in the unipolar system, it does not mean that the world is fully stable. Based on different reasons, like manipulated miscalculations as explained in the case of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, or old disagreements as the legacies of the bipolar system,

regional instabilities can occur. Under these circumstances, regional secondary states which can be directly affected and the superpower feel disturbed from this instability. So, both the regional states and the superpower want to bring the stability back. Although, regional powers can bring the stability back, the superpower will not be sure about what sort of stability will come back. So, it chooses to directly intervene to the regional instabilities by undertaking the responsibility. The first Gulf War and the Bosnian War appear to be the most important cases of these sorts of alliances. The superpower leads to a broad coalition to bring the stability back. The secondary states choose participating to these stabilizing operations in order to control the process of stabilization if the region is important for their future foreign policy goals. On the other side, some secondary states do not assign any value to the region and follow passive policies.

Secondly, if the superpower follow restoration policies, the secondary states will reject to ally with the superpower since this sort of instability will not bring any interest for them, rather than reducing their autonomy. Engagement of the superpower to the restoration policies will disturb the instability probably in favor of the superpower that is an increase in superpower's autonomy. States might choose to ally with the superpower in order to control the changing status quo. However, since the reason of this superpower intervention is not bringing the stability back, further transforming the status quo in favor of the superpower, the superpower will be reluctant to share its autonomy in the future status, if it believes the likelihood of the success. If and only if, the superpower recognizes the absolute necessity of allying with the others, it agrees to share its autonomy. So, allying with the superpower without any autonomy increase becomes meaningless and harmful since it will cause a decrease in the autonomy of the secondary state. Of course, the secondary states do

not want the transformation of the status quo in their disadvantage. However, unavailability of the alternative alliance partners against the superpower's policies drags the secondary states to seek desperately the ways of blocking the transformation and expect for the possibility of the transformation of the order in their own favor accidentally.

Despite their efforts to prevent the occurrence of a transformative process, secondary states in one way or another might have to face with the insistence counterefforts of the superpower to change the status quo. Under these circumstances, secondary states have to make a decision between two alternatives. First is to be with the superpower, although they are reluctant. Second is not to be with the superpower, despite the risks of opposing the superpower. It seems that both alternatives are worse than the other for the secondary states. So, they need to produce a third way which at least ameliorates the harmful effects of both. For this reason, secondary states when faced with an unavoidable change, if possible, try to gain appropriate tools of managing the transformation or, if not possible, appeasing the superpower for their opposition.

In order to gain the tools of managing the transformation, secondary states use diplomatic bargaining. However, due to the high amounts of power in the hands of the superpower, it avoids from sharing its autonomy. Based on its capricious policies, it favors, sui generic alliances which serves as an asset rather than loads liabilities. Allies are not so much appreciated by the superpower under the unipolar structure. On the other side, secondary states, since they are already reluctant to the change, without gaining some concessions to increase their autonomy, do not want to display unconditional loyalty. However, they avoid from directly opposing the superpower. They try to soften their position as much as possible.

According to Wohlforth (1999: 8), "the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive." However, allying with the superpower, not only for the defensive reasons, but even also for the spoils, means the acceleration of an undesired transformation. "Bandwagoning dynamics move the system in the direction of change" (Schweller, 1994: 92). For this reason, it does not meet the expectations of the secondary states about the preservation of the status quo.

Furthermore, under the unipolar structure, there seems to be no common threat that obliges the secondary states to ally unconditionally with the superpower as in the case of bipolar structure. In contrast, they, "when not faced with a significant threat, are free to follow their interests" (Fritz and Sweeney, 2004: 286). Under the unipolarity, no one is more dangerous than the superpower with its greatest capabilities to their security. So they need to carefully calculate their alliance decisions.

When encountered such an annoying situation of to be or not to be with the superpower, secondary states cautiously wants to determine the terms of each scenarios. In their negations with the superpower, they tightly bargain on "the scope of their commitments, the amount of forces to be contributed in what contingencies, and the like" (Snyder, 1997: 3).

During the process of alliance formation, not only in unipolar but also in multipolar and bipolar structures, loss of autonomy is the most fundamental issue. "When alliances are formed, the state must sacrifice some measure of its autonomy in foreign and military policy to its allies" (Schweller, 2004: 170). Especially under the unipolar structure, the trade off between alliance and autonomy becomes clearer, since the inability of any state for balancing the superpower internally based on its

own resources. Under multipolar and bipolar structures the superpower was not alone. At least one or more actors were able to standing against any potential hegemon. The uniqueness of the possible alliance partners compels secondary states waiving more autonomy than as in the case of bipolarity and multipolarity. The lack of alternatives increases both the possibility and the degree of losing autonomy for the secondary states. So, it is not surprising that the secondary states when negotiating with the superpower will be cautious and demand concessions from it instead of granting concessions especially when they are reluctant to the ally with a superpower whose actions carries transformative aims.

However, the waiver of autonomy by the superpower is also a far possibility since any secondary state is not appreciated as much as it expects. The cohesiveness of an alliance requires mutual dependence. When the mutual dependence is low, as in the case of power asymmetry between the superpower and any second-tier state under unipolarity both the formation and the management of an alliance will be fragile (Snyder, 1997: 31). As Kelley (2005: 153) puts "power asymmetry may give the stronger party greater capability to go it alone. The weaker actor is therefore in a conundrum: Unwilling to accept inequitable 'take-it-or-leave-it' policy solutions, yet unable to balance against the other actor militarily"

The extreme asymmetry of the unipolar power configurations encourages the superpower to prefer sui generic alliances which do not create long term liabilities instead of permanent alliances which might restrain its flexibility. Especially when the aim of the superpower is to create a new design in the system, such permanent commitments are believed to unnecessary impediments. Schweller argues a similar situation for multipolarity. According to him (1994: 94) "sometimes the revisionist leader is stronger than opposing status quo coalition. In such cases, the revisionist

leader does not require the active assistance of the junior partner. Instead, it seeks to prevent or block the formation of a powerful status quo coalition." The power configuration in unipolarity represents the best case for this argument, due to the clear power asymmetry among the superpower and secondary states. If it is the single superpower and also aiming to restore the system, then expecting from the superpower to grant concession to the partners which are lees appreciated seems meaningless. Unique power generates capricious policies and caprice produces sui generic alliance tendencies. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld's words reflect the high levels of self-reliance of the superpower. He stated that "the mission determines the coalition, and not the other way round" (Quoted in: Joffe, 2003: 4).

However, the leaders of the secondary states have not the same luxury. The secondary states' relative weakness makes their alliance decisions crucial to determining whether or not it is involved in the war and, if it is involved, how it will fare (Reiter, 1994: 497). Since they are aware of the fact that "alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 33), they need to assess cautiously the outcomes of their decisions for their security needs that are quite different from the superpowers'.

The security needs of the superpower and the secondary states should be considered separately. By the end of any temporary alliance on specific issue, secondary states in the system have to deal with their own specific security needs. Despite the centrality of the superpower in the system, it is not the only actor. Any second-tier state also has to calculate the positions of the other second-tier states. When the reasons to ally with the superpower ends, it will continue interacting with others economically, diplomatically so and so forth. To what extent it can trust in a superpower that favors issue specific and sui generic alliances. Furthermore, such

alliances might function as a tool of management and control of the smaller partners (Schroeder, 2004: 196).

So, a secondary facing with these circumstances, despite its all efforts, has to make a decision between allying and not allying with the superpower. The amounts of its vested interests determine its decision. If the amount of vested interests at risk during any transformation exceeds the expected risks of allying with the superpower outlined above, then it chooses not to ally with the superpower despite the risk of drawing its anger. This state might have too much to lose due to its geographical proximity and historical ties to the transformation area. Secondary states do not operate on the global scale as the superpower. So, their interests focus generally to some specific areas.

For example, Russia focuses on the Eurasia, while Japan focuses on Asia Pacific region. So, their approach to the policies of the superpower about these specific regions will differ. Egypt will probably be affected from a transformation in the Middle East more than Poland or Australia would be. For this reason, Australia might choose displaying an image of supporting the US policies in the Middle East in order to gladden the superpower. On the other side, for Egypt gladdening the superpower is likely to be more costly than ignoring its own security needs. As a possible outcome of a sui generic alliance, abandonment of the region by the superpower leaves it alone against the realities of the region.

The high levels of power asymmetry between the partners under the unipolarity make the stronger side more capricious and supporter of sui generic alliances, while it makes the secondary states less appreciated and insecure. So, despite risks of drawing the anger of the superpower, they choose not rely on the alliances which increases the control of the superpower instead of being a

meaningful partnership. Superpower offers an assistantship instead of an equal partnership. As Garnham puts (1991: 65) "bandwagoning makes a country's future security dependent on the continued goodwill of the dominant state." Therefore, policymakers choose allying with the superpower only if their state does not directly face with the outcomes of the transformation.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that secondary states do not value the risks of not allying with the superpower. Instead they prioritize their own security needs to the risks of damaged relations superpower that is believed to be repaired in another sui generic partnership. They generally expect that the diplomatic costs of opposing the superpower will be minor (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005: 98).

2.6 Summary of Hypotheses on Alliances under Unipolarity

1. General form: Under the unipolar structure, states facing instabilities will probably want to ally with others to oppose the states starting the instabilities.

2. If instability arises from a secondary state, both superpower and others are likely to form large coalitions to bring the stability back in.

3. If instability arises from the superpower, others are likely to attempt to restrain it through using soft policies.

4. If these attempts fail, then secondary states are most likely to face with two alternatives: to be or not to be with the superpower.

5. If the security of any state facing with this dilemma is directly threatened by this transformation, it is more likely to prefer being external to the transformation, despite the possibility of drawing the anger of the superpower

6. If and only if its security is not directly threatened by the transformation, a secondary state chooses to gladden the superpower.

CHAPTER IV

THE TURKISH-US ALLIANCE

Although they experienced some disagreements on some tactical issues, for approximately fifty years, Turkey and United States maintained their strategic alliance. During the Cold War, Turkey served as a critical base facility for the US containment policy, while, US provided a security umbrella for Turkey against the communist threat.

The end of the Cold War signified the removal of the old security considerations and restraints which lies at the heart of the partnership. However this removal did not necessarily mean the end of the partnership. Two sides remained to play their roles in NATO alliance in accordance to their new roles. Moreover, "in 1991 a new phase opened in the Turkish-American relationship, referred to as an enhanced partnership" (Guney, 2005: 345).

On March 1, Turkish Parliament voted for a motion which would permit the US to open a Northern Front from Turkish territories in 2003 Iraq War. Approval of the motion by the Turkish Parliament was highly expected due to long-term partnership between these two countries. However, the decision of the Parliament was contrary to the expectations and announcing Turkey's lack of support to its long standing ally. Turkey and the US, despite some temporary disagreements on some specific issues, had generally exhibited harmonious alliance relations for nearly a half century. However, on March 1, Turkey perhaps for the first time was rejecting

the insistent demands of its greater partner despite the risks of damaging the relationship. Examining the reasons behind the unexpected Turkish decision might reveal the alliance strategies of the secondary states in the unipolar structure. For this reason this chapter tries to examine the reasons behind this decision and revealing the strategies of Turkey while performing its policies.

The chapter mainly argues that the main concern of Turkey during the decision-making process was the stability. In a unipolar system which is characterized with the centrality of the single superpower with its capability to project high levels of pressure on others and absence of possible alternative partners, despite the pressures from the US and the absence of any other partners, Turkey decided to stand outside of the "coalition of willing" in Iraq, rather than allying with the US. Turkish decision in this direction, despite all the risks of rejecting its long standing partner, was a product of significance of the stability for Turkey. The stability was so much important for Turkey that it, hopelessly, also by accepting the risks of US anger, strived for a peaceful, or a multilateral, or an evolutionary solution. Standing on its region as a relatively well-positioned actor, Turkey perceived a power-based, unilateral, and revolutionary transformation in its region as a risky process which might drag both Turkey and its region into the instabilities of which the outcomes would be gloomy for a regional and secondary state.

On these days, there were two possible scenarios. The US-led operation would either succeed or fail. In the first case, if the US was able to carry out its addressed goals, the fate of both Turkey and the region would be depended strictly upon the US intentions due to its uniqueness in the international system. Even if Turkey took its side together with the victorious US, this time Turkey would have to wait for US's benevolent intentions. In the second case, the failure of US-led

coalition might have brought a process of conflicts near to its borders. So, the both scenarios were more risky than the current status from Turkey's perspective. For this reason, tried to do all it can in order to stop the approaching instability. However, it could not overcome the unproductive circle of unipolarity based on the centrality of the US and remoteness and ineffectiveness of other actors. In fact, if Turkey succeeded in these efforts the structure of the international system would no more be unipolar. It would be the date of transition from unipolarity to bipolarity.

In this way or another, Turkey simultaneously and synchronically explored the ways of gaining manipulative power through negotiating the terms of an alliance with the US. As a better than the worst option, the main logic behind that effort was that if you cannot stop it, then strengthen yourself with the tools for managing the instability or at least decreasing its harmful consequences. Since the best way of achieving this goal was increasing its effectiveness in the alliance, Turkey performed firm negotiations despite the pressures from the US for an immediate decision of support. However, this effort again did not meet Turkish expectations due to the nature of unipolarity.

In almost all alliance studies, alliances are recognized as the trade off between autonomy and security. States give up some piece of their autonomy to form alliances for their security or vise versa. However, in this case both sides were demanding an increase in their autonomy. While Turkey was demanding guarantees for the continuation of its appreciatedness after the war since it was afraid of unilateral commitment which would make Turkey just an assistant to the US, the US was demanding unconditional commitment since its self-confidence based on its uniqueness in the system naturally made it capricious. Since the US preferred a sui generic alliance, Turkey was less appreciated. On the other side, since Turkey was

concerned with the risks of the transformation, it preferred mutual and equal commitments or at least to be appreciated more than the US did. Under these conditions, contrary to the expectations during the negotiation process, not the rejection of Turkey, but the alliance would be surprising. However, it should be recognized that this unexpected decision did not occur easily. Turkey did whatever it can do in order to soften its position against the US.

In the succeeding section, a chronological background will be given. The second section examines the reasons of the significance of the stability in Turkish foreign policy by comparing its two different positions against two different US policies. The third section tries to reveal the efforts of Turkish Government against the approaching instability. The last section, aims to explain Turkish effort to gain the necessary tools of managing the inescapable instability.

4.1 Background

Turkish-US relations generally fall to either bipolar or uni-polar periods. In the multi-polar eras, there were only diplomatic weak ties both in the Ottoman period and early republic period. In other words, Turkey and the US begin to their continual relations with the start of the bipolar era. These new relations, in a short period of time, crowned by a strict and long term alliance which has continued more than a half century. For this reason, the relations between Turkey and the US can be classified in two different systems of international structure. First is the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Second is the uni-polar structure since the collapse of the Communist Bloc.

4.1.1 Bipolar Period

Since the nature of the bipolar structure is characterized by the threat perceptions of the states, generally, the studies on Turkish-US relations tend to explain the relations between Turkey and the US from the same perspective. The commonality of perceived threat from the Soviet Union seems to be the most important factor behind their long partnership. As the reason of the alliance, changes on the degree of the perceived threats from the Soviet Union, also determined the strictness or the looseness of the partnership. From this point of view, according to the profile of the relations, this period also can be classified into three different stages. The first stage was the period of strict alliance between 1945 and 60. The second stage was period of relative autonomy between 1960 and 1980. The third stage was the second period of strict alliance between 1980 and 1990 (Oran, 2001). These three stages overlap with the degree of competition profile of the Cold War. When the degree of competition in the bipolar system, Turkey and the US seems as approaching each other and when it softens the alliance between Turkey and the US seems as loosening.

Just after the end of the Second World War, Turkey faced with the Soviet demands. In 1945, the Soviet Union rejected to prolong the Soviet-Turkish Non-Aggression Treaty, demanded the revision of Montreux Treaty. Furthermore, in the Soviet press some territorial demands on the northeast Turkey were being discussed (Tellal, 2001: 503-504). Increasing Soviet pressure on Turkey produced the active efforts which continued approximately one year to find international support. At this point, sharpening struggle between the US and the Soviet Union provided for Turkey the expected partnership. The first US support for Turkey was the symbolic visit of the Missouri Battleship (Kirisci, 2000: 69). In April 1946, this symbolic support was formalized by the Truman Doctrine (Erhan, 2002a: 529). Although the Truman

Doctrine was an immediate remedy for Turkish anxieties, Turkey was looking for a more institutionalized partnership instead of unilateral commitments. For this reason, Turkey was exploring the possibility of being a member of NATO. But, the expected invitation from NATO was not received. The Korean War was perceived as an opportunity by the Turkish leaders and Turkey sent troops to fight under the UN command in order to attract NATO's appreciation (Erhan, 2002a. 546). After being admitted to NATO, on January 18, 1952, Turkey did not give up pursuing active policies in the Western Bloc. In the Middle East, Turkey undertook the responsibility of increasing the Western influence through playing an active role for the establishment of Baghdad Pact in 1955 (Uslu, 2000: 214).

Secondly, after the honeymoon period of alliance, in the 60's and 70's both sides seemed to be following looser relations. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the US decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey without consulting with the Turkish government created the psychological shock on the Turkish side (Erhan, 2002b: 684). This crisis produced two different outcomes on the both sides. On the US side, it is perceived as a sign for the necessity of turning to more relaxed approach. On the Turkish side, it is perceived as sign for the necessity of multi-optional approach.

The succeeding events between Turkey and the US and the relaxed relations between the two superpowers contributed to this process. Especially, the Johnson letter in 1964 when Turkey was planning a military operation in Cyprus produced the second disappointment. In that letter, President Johnson was warning Turkey that the US might have leave Turkey alone against a possible Soviet attack (Erhan, 2002b: 686). The position of the US military personnel in Turkey, opium poppy issue, and

the financial aid issue can be enumerated as some of other problem areas between the two allies.

Lastly, Turkish intervention to Cyprus in 1974 created the deepest level in the partnership. The US Congress cut off the military aid (Erhan, 2002b: 706). In response to all these developments, Turkey tried to increase its diplomatic options. In addition to attending the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo in 1964, Turkey began to develop its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Firstly on the economic, then on the political issues, Turkey and the Soviet Union experienced a period of détente. Moreover, Turkish military observers in 1976 and 78 attended Soviet military exercises (Walt, 1991: 61-62). In 1975, due to the US military embargo, Demirel Government restricted the US access to a number of military facilities in Turkey (Erhan, 2002b: 707).

Thirdly, when the 'Second Cold War' began to spread, Turkey and the US began to strengthen their partnership. While the Islamic Revolution in Iran was attaching importance to Turkey in the US perspective, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reminded Ankara that the Soviet threat was still in use (Uzgel, 2002a: 34). In addition to the reinforcements of the NATO bases in Turkey and removal of the restrictions on the US, Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 between Turkey and the US. Turkish Military Government signed Rogers Plan which was granting the Greece the right to return back to the military structure of NATO (Uzgel, 2002a: 34-81).

4.1.2 Unipolar Period

The relations between Turkey and the US can be classified into two periods in the unipolar era. First one is a period of enhanced partnership. The second one is the

period of inharmoniousness. The end of the bipolar era and the removal of the Soviet threat did not deform the US Turkish alliance. However, it transformed the nature of relationship. The new relationship can be characterized as an enhanced partnership for the sake of international stability. In many crisis areas of 90's, Turkey and the US performed cooperative tasks under the UN or NATO umbrella. Glancing over quickly on these might be helpful to compare the Turkish US alliance in the Second Gulf War.

1991-2001: The Period of Enhanced Partnership

At the immediate end of the bipolar structure, two old allies faced with the first crisis of the unipolar era in the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Both Turkey and the US reacted to this challenge against the status quo nearly in the same way. Turkey was one of the first countries declaring its support for the coalition against Iraq to force it out of Kuwait territories. Even before the US demand reached to Turkey, (Candar, 2006) Turkish Government, especially with the special efforts of President Ozal, took the necessary steps against Iraq. In addition to closing Turkey-Iraq border and cutting off the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, Turkey also passed a government motion authorizing the government to participate in military action and for permitting the use of NATO bases by foreign armed forces (Guney, 2005: 345).

Also in the Balkans, Turkey provided support for the US led operations. Since it perceived the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Turkey embarked on an activist diplomacy that included participation in international peacekeeping operations (Sayari, 2000: 176). It welcomed the US-led effort to end the violence through the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.

After September 11 incidents, the US-led operation against the Taliban Government in Afghanistan formed a broad coalition. Despite its supporting declarations, Turkish forces did not directly participated in the war. However, Turkey undertook active responsibility in the peacekeeping force after the war. Former Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin served as the high level civil representative of NATO in Afghanistan (Radikal, 20.11.2003).

2002-2006: The Period of Inharmoniousness

Just after the end of the Afghanistan War, the possibility of a war in Iraq began to be voiced louder by Washington. Although Turkey was aware of the US plans about the Iraq, even before the Afghanistan, it faced with detailed and official US demands in September 2002 (Yetkin, 2004: 78). On September 1, 2002, during the Tarik Aziz's high level visitations, warnings of the Ecevit Government is a good indicator of in what level Ankara was cognizant of the seriousness of the US intentions. Turkish authorities warned the Iraqi regime to cooperate with the UN decisions for both their own well being and region, otherwise the US might have act even without the UNSC decision (Radikal, 01.10.2002).

During these days, Turkey was preparing for the November 3, 2002 elections which would change nearly the all political scene and its major players. After the elections, all the political parties in the National Assembly could not pass over 10% the lowest passing percentage for establishing a group in the parliament. Merely two parties (Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party) and especially JDP dominated the majority in the Assembly with 364 representatives. This number was sufficient even to change Turkish constitution. For this reason, instead of a fragile and weak coalition government, strong JDP government seemed

as a better partner for the US, in order the take the brave decision of allying with the US (Bila, 2004: 190).

On November 4, the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok went to US, and met with a high number of US authorities, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and his counterpart in US. Gen. Ozkok was expected to confer with US officials on the Iraq issue and reiterate Turkey's sensitivities and requests on the matter (Cumhuriyet, 04.11.2002). On November 8, during the Ramadan fast breaking arranged in host of the President Bush, Turkish Ambassador Faruk Logoglu was sitting on the left side of President, contrary to the usual practice in which the Saudi Ambassador has been sitting (Radikal, 09. 11.2002).

UN resolution on the same day, though "recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security", was far from paving the way of a military operation against Iraq. (see: http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm).

On November 16, due to the political limits of Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gul, was appointed by the President Sezer to form the new government. On November 20, President Sezer met with US President on the sidelines of NATO's summit in Prague, the Czech Republic. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell and other high-level officials were also present at the meeting in which Sezer conveyed Turkish concern over a possible operation in Iraq and underlined the importance of both Iraq's territorial integrity and greater regional stability (www.byegm.gov.tr).

Gul Government, on November 28 2002, won the vote of confidence which paved the way for the US to start the negotiation process with the new stable government. While the President Bush was engaging in active diplomatic support for Turkey's EU negotiations by calling the leaders of EU member states (Milliyet, 29.11.2004), Secretary of Defense Colin Powell was declaring the US intentions in preparing an economic support package to compensate the Turkish losses in the war.

The US "having been unwilling to put pressure on Ankara during Turkey's national elections, was fast losing patience, and Turkey's new government immediately found itself a target of Washington's intensified diplomatic attentions" (Park, 2004: 496). On December 3, Wolfowitz and Grossman arrived in Ankara with a three staged cooperation proposal composed of inspection of bases, preparation of bases in Turkey and the basement of approximately 60 thousands military personnel for the purpose of overthrowing the Iraqi regime (Yetkin, 2004: 100). Confused with such a sudden pressure, Prime Minster Gul asked for time since especially the last stage would require the decision of Parliament. If the first stage performed by the existing military personnel in the Turkish bases it would not require the Parliamentary approval. Otherwise, in accordance with the article 92 of Turkish Constitution, the new US military personnel could be permitted by the National Assembly. On the same time, Gul strongly emphasized that the permission for site inspection does not mean the automatic permission for the last two stages especially for the operation stage (Yetkin, 2004: 101).

On December 10, during his White House visit, Tayyip Erdogan treated like a President or Prime Minister even he was not a representative in the Parliament. During the approximately one hour meeting, the US side demanded Turkish support for the Iraq operation and declared its open and full support for Turkey's EU

membership. However, after the meeting, Erdogan's statements were informing the lack of harmony between the two sides (Radikal, 11.11.2002). He described the meeting was largely about the peaceful solutions on Iraq issue. Murat Yetkin (2004: 109) describes the meeting as a fiasco for the US side, since Erdogan seemed reluctant committing to support a military option with the US.

Despite the denial by Turkish General Staff and describing them as the 'routine' movements, on December 18, actions observed on the South coasts of Turkey reflected by the Turkish media as the permission for the site inspection (Sabah, 19.12.2002). However, according to the formal statement of Turkish Foreign Ministry, site survey on the bases started by January 13 2003 (Foreign Ministery Daybook, 158, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/NR/rdonlyres/0BF50F75-A50B-4A8D-981A-A4CB3C12BDB4/0/OCAK2003.pdf).

In the National Security Council meeting held on December 27, the Council recommended to wait for the report of United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (Radikal, 28.12.2002) emphasizing "the peaceful resolution of the problem on the basis of the legitimacy of the international law" (http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html).

A further recommendation of the NSC council was the necessity of conducting formal negotiations with the US in order to have written texts which would guarantee the rights of both sides (Radikal, 28.12.2002). For this reason, on late December the negotiations based on three commissions including military, political, and economic commissions started between two states. While on the one side keeping contact with the US, Turkish Government decided to follow a multi-dimensional policy to evaluate the reactions of regional states. Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, on January 4, 2003, started a regional tour including Syria, Jordan,

and Egypt. After the first tour, Gul secondly visited Saudi Arabia and Iran on January 11-12 (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/NR/rdonlyres/0BF50F75-A50B-4A8D-981A-A4CB3C12BDB4/0/OCAK2003.pdf).

At the same time, Turkish Government tried to contact with the Iraqi Government. On January 12, Minister of State responsible for the Foreign Trade Kursat Tuzmen, met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad to convey Gul's letter to Saddam (Radikal, 12.01.2003). The US demands from NATO against a possible missile attack from Iraq to provide the necessary military defense including AWACS early warning systems and Patriot missiles on January 15, rejected by some other NATO members, namely Germany, France, and Belgium (Radikal, 19.01.2003). As an outcome of Prime Minister Gul's regional tour, foreign ministers from six key Middle East countries, on January 23, held a summit in Turkey to seek a way to avert a US-led war in Iraq. The group of nations called on Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to be "more active" in his cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors (Hurriyet, 24.01.2003).

On January 26, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and Tayyip Erdogan met with US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Davos, Switzerland. During the meeting, Powell by increasing the pressure again said that Turkey should make a decision on its support for a prospective US-led operation against Iraq as soon as possible. Gul again replied that the decision on such an operation rested with the nation's Parliament (Milliyet, 27.01.2003). The report of UNMVIC on January 27 was far from legitimizing the war against Iraq arguing that there were no prohibited weapons in Iraq and more time was needed to complete the investigation (Radikal, 28. 01.2003). Under these circumstances, also possible Turkish decision to support the

US was getting more difficult when the Governments insistent emphases on the UN legitimacy considered.

However, the content of the report seemed as not affected the US Government. As usual in the whole process, this time, Richard Perle, the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board urged Turkish government using a threatening tone to make an immediate decision. He declared the disappointment of the US for Turkish delaying by arguing that "Ankara could miss certain opportunities if it fails to support Washington in a possible Iraq offensive" (Cumhuriyet, 28.01.2003).

Under the shadow of such a complicated period of time, National Security Council assembled on January 31. Although reflected by the Turkish media as a recommendation for permission for the deployment of US troops, actually in the text of press announcement there was no clear reference for that issue. The Iraq section of the announcement text was composed of four paragraphs in which the first three was directly repeating the emphases on the necessity of UN legitimacy and the willingness for a peaceful solution. Only the last paragraph reluctantly was recognizing the possibility of war for which Turkish government was being advised to take the necessary steps "to defend entirely Turkey's national interests." This statement seems too abstruse to derive the conclusion that Turkey would support the US. It was more about the than being about the permission. The other interpretation seems to be an outcome of seeing the defense of Turkish interests as only depended upon being together with the US. However, as observed at the end of Turkish decision, as claimed below this was not the case. Turkey did not see its national interest in pursuing harmonized policies with the US.

At this point of the process, Turkey still struggled for a peaceful solution. On February 3, through a secret operation, Iraqi foreign minister Naci Sabri and the

second man of Iraqi government Taha Yasin Ramadan brought to Ankara in order to persuade the Baath Government to reach a peaceful solution (Sedat Ergin, Hurriyet, 06.02.2003). However, this effort also failed because of the sharp policies of Iraqi government.

As a response, maybe, Prime Minister Gul stated that Turkey "had done its utmost to avoid the need for a possible US-led operation against Iraq but that now it would do what the nation's interests require. Turkey will support the US in such an operation." On the other side, the motion divided into two parts in the meeting of Council of Ministers on February 4. Turkey was still avoiding making direct commitments. The first part of the motion was related to the site preparation that was the second stage of the three staged partnership proposal. Despite the permission for site preparation, Prime Minister Gul again emphasized that this permission did not mean that the Turkey would permit for the deployment of US troops (Yetkin, 2004: 145). The motion that was granting the right of modernization of the bases to the US for a three months period approved by the Turkish Parliamentary on February 6 with 308 yes and 193 no (Turkish Foreign Ministry Daybook, February, 122, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/NR/rdonlyres/4DC42D46-4F41-4959-990C-AC6CBF6BE9CB/0/SUBAT2003.pdf).

Although these statements seems as supporting the arguments about the indecision of the government, as claimed below this study argues that these sort of words and also dividing the motion into two separate parts are used consciously by the government for gaining more time, and alleviating the US pressure.

On the same day, Parliament approved the motion, holding out an olive branch, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul said that he still had hope the Iraq issue could be resolved peacefully, without the need for a US operation. He also declared that

"we will work for peace in Iraq till the very last" (Aksam, 07.02.2003). Dick Cheney's call to Gul on the day of separation of the motion seems to be sourced from this reason. He was concerned with the reason of this unexpected separation especially before the feast of the Sacrifice in which the National Assembly would close down for a vacation. He also asked the possibility of the voting of second motion on February 18. Gul replied positively on the phone if the both sides reach and agreement on the terms of partnership, according to Yetkin, since Gul did not have a better word to say (Yetkin, 2004: 147-148).

However, from the Turkish perspective two sides were still far from reaching an optimal point of agreement. For this reason, foreign minister Yasar Yakis and state minister responsible for economy Ali Babacan arranged a visit to Washington on January 13. According to the outcomes of their contacts, Turkish government would decide whether to send the second proposal to the Parliament or not (Radikal, 13.02.2003). Not sending the proposal to the Parliament on the declared date can be evaluated as Turkey could not reach an agreement with the US until that date. Instead of sending the motion to the Parliament Prime Minister Gul on January 17 left for Brussels to attend a European Union summit on Iraq issue (Radikal, 18.02.2003). Tayyip Erdoagan on January 19 put Turkish position sharply by arguing the unacceptability of oral commitments (Radikal, 20.02.2003).

Under such complicated circumstances, suddenly, on January 24, just after the rumors about the weakening resistance of the government against the US pressure (Oktay Eksi, 18.02.2003), the motion brought to the scene for the signatures in the Council of Ministers, despite the news circulating on the Turkish media that the real problem was on the military issues (Radikal, 24.02.2003). The motion sent to the Parliament halted the discussions in the public about its content. It was

suggesting the permission of the National Assembly for, first the deployment of the Turkish Armed Forces in foreign lands, second the temporary disposal of the foreign troops composed of 62 thousands troops, 255 aircrafts and 65 helicopters for a six months period on Turkish lands for the purpose of conveyance towards foreign lands.

Before the voting of the motion the final critical turning point was the National Security Council meeting held on January 28. As an unusual example of Turkish politics, at the end of the NSC summit, the NSC offered no recommendation decision, as if there was no critical issue on the agenda (Hurriyet, 28.02.2003).

Under these circumstances, National Assembly voted for the March 1 motion. The outcome was confusing and interesting. Despite the majority of the votes in favor of the motion (264), it was not sufficient for the approval due to the internal regulations of the Turkish National Assembly. Despite the high levels of expectations for the approval, Turkish Parliament did not approve the motion.

4.2 Risks of Instability

Uselessness of Traditional Alliance Strategies

Unlike the earlier systemic explanations of the alliance formation literature this study argues that the secondary states in the unipolar system do not ally against the potential hegemon or against a threatening rival. When the unipolarity is already considered as a conclusion of the inabilities of the others to balance the most powerful actor in the system, it would be illogical to expect balancing behavior against the sole superpower of the system. So, the US stands as the only superpower of the unipolar era in which the other units can not dare to balance it. If the other

states were able to balance the US, then the system would not be a unipolar one as explained in the previous chapter.

According to this logic, for example, even if Turkey feels uncomfortable with the US power, traditional balancing seems to be never considered as a foreign policy strategy in Turkey and also in other secondary states. On the other side, the unipolar system does not represent a world which is characterized by the covering threat perceptions of Cold War. Contemporary world is not defined by two opposing and rival axis which in any time threaten each other's existential security. Turkey no more feels to follow policies of the US due to its fears rooted in the competence of bipolar structure. When there is no covering threat perception that unifies policies of the US or possibility of balancing the US for Turkey and others, what factors determined the alliance policies of Turkey?

4.2.1 Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviors during the Immediate End of the Cold War

Despite some changes on the tactical level, Turkish foreign policy strategy after the Cold War can be characterized as a policy of protecting both international and regional stability and also its existing position in the system. Since the very beginning of unipolarity, Turkey has acted in accordance with the argument that the secondary states under the unipolar system do not desire an untimely chaotic change in the system or in their region since the difficulty of managing that change with present power status.

From this perspective one may explain almost all alliance cases in which Turkey participated. Turkey provided an active support to the US led UN operation during the first Gulf Crisis of 1991 in the Middle East. In the Balkans, Turkey was

again in the coalition against the instabilities in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Lastly, Turkey supported the US in Afghanistan. Although all these cases in different regions of the world represent evidences of allying against the instabilities in the unipolar system, this study will focus on the last foreign policy decision of Turkey in the 2003 Iraq War in which Turkey rejected to support a new US led occupation. However, the other cases should be examined in order to have comparisons of Turkey's different alliance decisions which were motivated by the same reason. The main motive behind the alliance decisions of Turkey was the unwillingness against a chaotic instability.

However, in the first four cases Turkey allied with the US, while rejecting to ally with the US in the last case. Turkey's differing response for these two kinds of cases was rooted in the source of the instability. In the first four cases, Turkey perceived the incidents as sources of the instabilities which may affect even itself too. The US is perceived as the power bringing the stability back in. As Sabri Sayari (2000: 175) clearly puts, in Turkish foreign policy "there was growing apprehension about the possibility of instability spilling over into Turkey...Nevertheless, Turkey chose to exercise caution rather than risk involvement."

When the source of instability shifted towards the US, the nature of Turkish-US partnership also shifted from a loyal partnership to a distanced relationship. Larrebee and Lesser (2002: 183) predicted the shift even before the Iraq crisis broke down:

> Turkey and the United States may seek peace and stability in areas of shared concern, but policies differ. Iran, and above all Iraq, will be key questions in this regard. A tougher American stance in the Gulf, and especially a renewed military confrontation with Iraq or an effort to tighten sanctions, would be met with dismay in Ankara.

4.2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second Period

Turkey's primary concern before and during the Iraq War was the possible outcomes of the transformative US actions in its region. Prime Minister Abdullah Gul expressed the perspective of Turkey by writing that "Iraq is our close neighbor, and its future is inter-linked with the stability of the region" (Gul, 2004: 5). As one of the most important regional actor, Turkey seemed to be in favor of, even if not too happy with, the situation in both Iraq and Middle East for three main reasons.

Firstly, Turkey is accepted as one of the most important regional actors in the Middle East, especially in military terms Turkey seems to be the most powerful state in its region. According to Erickson, (Erickson, 2004: 36) "with the exception of the US, the UK, and France, the Turks have the most institutional combat experience in the world today." Despite the economic instabilities in the last periods with its economic and demographic potential, Turkey has the appropriate tools of increasing its regional power position if it catches up the necessary momentum in its development. Turkey's powerful position in its region put it in a position far from immediate threats. None of its neighbors appears to have enough power to threaten Turkey's existential interests.

Secondly, Turkey particularly did not perceive threat from Iraq. By the first Gulf war Iraq has been put into harmless position not only far from projecting power against Turkey, but also projecting power in its own territories. In fact, the no fly zone, as a buffer between Iraq and Turkey, not only decreased a possible Iraqi threat, but also increased Turkey's maneuvering space in its hinterland. Even if Turkey did not pleased with the undemocratic government of Iraq, it was at least unthreatening for Turkey. In the words of one official, "Turkey does not want democratization to bring instability to its neighborhood…why risk destabilization there" (Quoted in: Hill and Taspinar, 2006: 88).

Thirdly, after nearly fifteen years of military struggle against terrorism, Turkey had achieved too much against the PKK which was recognized as the most important threat against the Turkish security. As pointed out by Hill and Taspinar, (2006: 86) "Ankara has its own specific terrorist group to worry about. Al-Qaeda is a lesser concern for Turkey." It was newly feeling relieved against such an important threat. Park (2004: 499) clearly points out the Turkish concerns:

> Ankara's fear was that a war with Iraq could-whether by design, default or through opportunistic explotation of chaos and uncertainty-raise the risk of an enlarged, oil rich, and more autonomous (if not fully independent) Kurdish self-governing entity emerging in northern Iraqi territory. Ankara also entertained fears of a renewal of PKK activity in the chaos of war, a replay of the refugee crisis of 1991, and has asserted its guardianship towards the Turkmen ethnic minority in Northern Iraq.

Under the light of these three factors, Turkey faced with the US desires for the support of Turkey in a war which might have had harmful effects on the current position of Turkey. When Turkey found itself in a relatively relieving position, the US demanded support from Turkey in its policy of transforming the order in the Middle East. Under these conditions, Turkey faced a dilemma between allying with the US in order to transform the region and rejecting the only superpower. Although its close relations with the US for a nearly sixty years, Turkey decided to follow the latter policy. The reason for that decision was clear. Turkey without the necessary tools for its use to control a possible instability in its region, it was not sure what sort of outcomes this US transformative action would cause.

Here two alternatives come to mind. First one is the transformation of the regional order in favor of the US. Second one is the chaotic instability because of the unsuccessful transformation efforts of the US. In the first alternative, Turkey could not be sure about the consequences of the American transformation. The consequences of the change would be depended upon the unilateral intentions and

fairness of the US. Even the supporters of allying with the US recognize the possibility of these risks. Cuneyt Ulsever puts that "nobody could give a guarantee to the Turkish Government that the US would not cheat." In the second alternative, if the US would have lost the control of the developments, the region would be dragged into a chaotic situation which would be difficult to control both for Turkey and other regional states.

For this reason, Turkey's warnings before the war focused on the territorial integrity of Iraq and a possible struggle among the regional states to seize their control over the torn territories of Iraq. In other words, in both cases a unilateral change in the region would risk Turkish position. In the first option Turkey would be moving towards a passive position depended upon the US intentions and goodwill. In the second option, Turkey would be dragged into a chaotic instability. So, one should recognize that under the rule of unipolar structure which imposes only one partner to ally and inability to balance the superpower internally, since secondary states like Turkey has only minor effects on the foreign policies of the superpower, they do not want such a transformation without the existence of an alternative partner to ally or enough internal power to balance the US policies.

Otherwise, the existing situation in the system may transform into a less desirable form. So, they favor the existing situation to any possible transformation since they may affect the direction of the change only just a little bit. In other words, they prefer better than the worst option. This is the reason why Turkish government and other branches of the Turkish state so much emphasized the importance of the stability in the region. This emphasis was not only based on the foreign policy rhetoric, but also strongly felt by Turkish leaders. According to the retired General Edip Baser (2006), "this instability in the close neighborhood of Turkey was a clear

threat to Turkish interests as much as even a child on the primary school level could understand."

Similar anxieties and speeches do not only belong to Turkey. During the process, other concerned secondary states, for example like Germany, Rusia, and France, time and again declared their opposition to the US policies. In a comparison between Russian and Turkish attitudes Hill and Taspinar (2006: 87) argue that:

> They [Russia and Turkey] want the United States to appreciate that the broader Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia are full of weak states prone to ethnic and sectarian fragmentation in case of sudden regime change. Turkey worries that political upheavals will become the basis for more, not less, regional conflicts; while Russia sees an anti-Russian alliance emerging around the Black Sea, if not across Eurasia.

Of course, the purpose behind the opposing speeches of German, Russian, and French authorities was not to defend Saddam and his regime. They "place a high premium on stability in their neighborhood. They share an aversion towards potentially chaotic regime change" (Hill and Taspinar, 2006: 82). They were far from being decisive players in an incident taking place in the Middle East. They observed the American transformative movement as an increase in the American area of influence and as a strengthening movement of the already existing American influence. In the existing order of international system and their position in the system seems to be preventing them from intervening the affairs of the Middle East. Since Germany and France were far from being important players in the region as an alternative to American policies with only a small margin of negotiating capability in UN, they hopelessly displayed anti-war stances in order to stop a timeless transformation in the Middle East. Or else, they were not the supporter of the Baath Regime. All the actors mentioned "associate Iraq not with the war against terrorism, but with destabilizing chaos that has damaged their national interests-Turkey's more

profoundly" (Hill and Taspinar, 2006: 86), but others too, given their interests in Iraq.

From the perspective of Turkey, because of its geographical proximity to the crisis area, the possible instabilities at the end of the war included much more risks than only threatening the interests of a state like Germany or France (Ulsever, 2006). Beyond that as a regional state, Turkey would be exposed to the risks which might have endangered even the survival of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey was subject to American pressure. While the others were facing at most the danger of losing their interests in far a region of the world, Turkey found itself in the middle of the instability. And the US was insistent about Turkey's entrance into this instability.

On the other hand, Turkey had the opportunity to negotiate the issue with the US. In other words, Turkey tried to use this opportunity in order to manipulate the expected instability in its own favor when it had to cease to hope stopping the war (Candar, 2006). However, this also was not the case. In brief, the main reason behind the Turkish US disagreement was the incompatibility between the transformative desires of the US who was at the peak of its power and reluctance of Turkey who has not enough power against the US policies and was unable to find alternative partners. Despite this deep cleavage between the expectations of the two sides, Turkey obliged to negotiate by the US pressure. Before all else, one should recognize that Turkey's primary concern during the negotiations was to impede the war.

4.3 Turkish Strategies for Avoiding the Approaching Instability

In order to avoid the approaching instability, Turkey tried to do whatever it can do. For reaching a peaceful, or a multilateral, or an evolutionary solution without being dragged into a regional instability Turkey pursued a multi-dimensional policy based

on five different lanes and tried to operate these different tracks in accordance in order to reach its end of rendering an untimely, so unmanageable change. These lanes are: negotiating with the Iraqi government, efforts on the UN and NATO level, contact with the other UN Security Council members, meeting with the regional countries, and negotiating with the US. Efforts of five lane policy present the best evidence of how much Turkey considered the stability as important. The first four lanes will be examined in this section, however, the last lane which was the negotiation process with the US will be examined in the following section since the aims of this lane was not limited to the efforts of avoiding the instability, but also included the aim of managing the inescapable instability.

In many studies, speeches of the leaders are offered as the indicators of foreign policy objectives. Also in this case there are too many examples of leader speeches emphasizing the significance of stability. However, this study presents evidences not only from the speeches but also from the actions of the states, since the speeches may be subject to critics arguing that the speeches may not directly reflect the real objectives of the leaders. On the other side, actions of the leaders, if analyzed correctly, resembles the real objectives of the states. For this reason, when attempting to reveal the intentions of a state, one should observe the actions taken by that state rather than only focusing on the speeches of the leaders, even though these speeches includes many important parts of the issue. So, in order to explain Turkey's intentions which reveal the source of the rejection of the alliance, the above mentioned five lanes should be considered carefully.

4.3.1 First Four of Five Lanes

Negotiating with the Iraqi Government

In order to stop the occurrence of a war which would bring instability in the region Turkey followed an exhausting pro-active shuttle diplomacy to operate these five different tracks. Firstly, Turkey tried to establish contact with the Iraqi government. By increasing the contacts, Turkey tried to draw the Iraqi government which seemed as far from grasping the seriousness of the threat because of its dictatorial government, to a more realist point in order the reveal the threats which was really clear from the Turkish perspective due to Turkey's negotiations with the US.

According to Davutoglu, Turkey engaged in this attempt in order to obstruct the war, if possible, by taking some concessions from the Iraqi government that would form confidence for the Iraqi government before the international community. Turkey insistently proposed to the Iraqi government to provide the participation of the Kurdish and Shi'ite groups into the system, a closer cooperation with the reporter of UNMOVIC. Turkey also demanded very clear and open declarations from Iraq before the international institutions. For this reason, despite the risk of drawing American doubts, until the last stage, Turkey did not give up these efforts.

Kursat Tuzmen, the state minister responsible for Foreign Trade, visited Iraq with a substantial number of businessmen under the pretext of oil for food program which was being held for once in each six months. On January 12, Tüzmen met with Saddam directly. By reciprocal exchange of letters, Turkey again and again notified the Iraqi government about its anxieties. As a last chance, Taha Yasin Ramadan and Foreign minister Naci Sabri brought to Ankara on January 4, by the plane of National Intelligence Organization (MIT) (Hurriyet, 05.01.2003). Although these efforts failed to achieve its primary concern, and also this conclusion was highly excepted and expressed with the words of "the materialization probability is weak" in the

document prepared to brief the Prime Minister by the military and Foreign Policy Ministry (Bila, 2004: 266), Turkish insistence illustrates the degree of its discomfort about the instability.

Efforts on the UN and NATO Levels

Turkey also explored the possibilities of a solution without a war on the UN level. Turkish Government increased its contacts with UN General Secretary Kofi Annan. It can be argued that Turkey wanted to use the UN decisions in two forms. Firstly, as a basis for its anti-war and pro-stability attitudes and secondly waiting for either the UN would declare a resolution legitimizing a war against Iraq. By keeping the contact alive with the UN, Turkey for a long time tried to watch the status of international community. When the US demands reached to Turkey by the late November or early December, UN's position was still not clear. Turkey by adapting itself to some degree to the UN position, it passed over or alleviate the US pressure and used it as a tool of delaying its decision.

Secondly and more importantly, Turkey aimed to use the absence of the UN resolution as an alleviator for a possible rejection of the alliance. Even though Turkey appeared to be not considering the UN decision vital due to news circulating on the media about the negotiations with the US, at the proper time it did not give up using the necessity of the UN resolution. Even after the absence of UN decision was evident, Turkey did not feel the necessity of withdrawing from its negotiations with the US. When the government was continuing the negotiations, Turkish president Ahmet Nejdet Sezer and Turkish National Assembly Speaker Bulent Arinc insistently emphasized the necessity of UN resolution. Interestingly, their emphasis

seemed to be increasing the bargaining power of the Turkish government before the US pressure in its negotiations.

On the other side, more interestingly Turkey tried to transcend the issue into another international organization. Although nobody in Turkey seemed to be convinced about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Turkish government was warning the US for a possible missile attack. For this reason, on January 15, the US demanded AWACS early warning planes and Patriot missiles from NATO for the defense of Turkey against a possible Iraqi missile attack. However, the US could not find the support it expected. While the joint opposition of Germany, France and Belgium was angering the US, Turkey declared its tolerance towards their attitude. NATO was demanding the application of Turkey, but Turkey was not applying (Yetkin, 2004: 133).

While speaking about the possible risks of Iraqi missiles, Turkish actions before the NATO were directly opposite to the speeches of its leaders. It seems to be as an obvious contradiction. However, when the real intentions of Turkey considered, Turkish attitude was a well planned example of transcending the issue of a unilateral destabilizing war to a multilateral institution. With this transcending Turkey aimed to acquire at least one of two preferable interdependent outcomes. First one was to acquire the necessary tools and time to make the war difficult for the US or, if possible, to stop this unilateral destabilizing war. The second one was, if the first could not achieved, acquiring a broader cleavage in the UN in order to legitimize before the US its rejection of alliance and to alleviate the US pressure. In bilateral negotiations Turkey found itself in an isolated position before the pressure of the superpower.

Absence of an alternative partner for Turkey with its limited capabilities relative to the superpower left the Turkish government only minor maneuvering space. The two-sided negotiations turned to be a matter of take it or leave it. While Turkey did not want to take the first option, it would be costly to leave the superpower. Transcending the issue to the multilateral structure of NATO and the disagreement between the US and the others in NATO brought an opportunity for Turkey to share the burden of US pressure with the other NATO members. Furthermore, their rejection to provide security for Turkey presented by Ankara as a reason of difficulty of supporting the US for Turkey. Just the day after the rejection of NATO members, according to Murat Yetkin, Abdullah Gul in his letter to Bush emphasized the necessity of at least NATO support for the legitimacy of Turkish support when he was declaring that the Turkish government would not delay its decision (Yetkin, 2004: 134). By the discussions between the US and the others, Turkey gained time for the participation of others that could mean alternative partners for Turkey in its effort to stop the war by raising the voice of other supporters of stability and if possible forming an anti-war coalition.

However, the difficulty of forming timely counterbalancing coalitions in the unipolar system could not be overcome. This broadening cleavage between them gave Turkey the necessary time, partners, and excuse. Even though the acquired time and partners could not offer a solution in favor of Turkish desires that was obstructing the war, Turkey acquired an excuse for its future rejection. For this reason, Turkey, on the one side was mentioning about the possibility of an attack to its territory, and on the other side, it was not applying for the NATO defense. This presents an obvious evidence of Turkish efforts against a unilateral change in the region. The main motive behind the Turkish attitudes during the NATO discussions

was to prevent a unilateral war that would destroy the stability unilaterally or in a chaotic way or if it is not achieved at least to acquire an excuse for its avoidance to support the superpower.

Negotiating with the Other UN Security Council Members

Turkey increased its contacts with the UN Security Council member states which were close candidates of influential actors. For this end, together with other reasons, Tayyip Erdogan visited Russia on December 24, although it was a rare incident in the history of relations between the two states. On January 14, this time, he moved to China. This visit was also interesting due to the weak relations between China and Turkey considered. Erdogan carried out these visits as the leader of a newly founded and the winning party. However, beyond that, according to Davutoglu (2006), these visits were fulfilled in order to take the pulse of other UNSC member states.

Although for the current time, there is no information about the contents of the visits beyond the routine foreign policy declarations, it is nearly definite that it stemmed from a significant reason which compelled Turkey to contact with the actors with whom it has only weak relations until that day. For such a comprehensive effort one should really feel indisposed by the actions of another actor whose existence and policies in accordance with Turkish policies was rendering to establish relations unnecessary. However, when the policies of the US towards the stability changed, Turkish area of concern also changed. Discovering these two states which were ignored until that day and visiting both of them just in one month requires being more than a matter of chance.

These efforts can be evaluated as balancing attempts. It is clear that despite their parallel views about the war on Iraq, as a feature of unipolar structure they

could not overcome the difficulty of coordinating policies to form a timely balancing coalition. All of them declared their doubts about the US policies on Iraq; however, they were in separate pieces. So, their voices were volatile and far from forming a balancing bloc (Lieber and Alexander, 2005: 123). Hill and Taspinar correctly argue the same point:

> Behind the scenes, Turkish-Russian relations have steadily improved over the last decade, particularly after March 2003 with a tactical decision by the Turkish Foreign Misnistry and other parts of the Turkish state to explore a new rapprochement with Russia in Eurasia…To be sure, there is little strategic depth to any of these couplings, and none of these quasi-alliances have coalesced into opposing blocs with the implication of some future military threat.

Meeting with the Regional Countries

Fourthly, Turkey started an initiative among the neighboring countries of Iraq. On January 4, Prime Minister Gul started his Middle East tour firstly including Syria, Egypt and Jordan, then Iran and Saudi Arabia. On January 23, foreign ministers of these six regional countries attended the summit held in Istanbul. This summit was the first of following ten summits in the following three years. As explained by the foreign ministers of the participant states and also in the announcement of the summit, Middle Eastern countries aimed at reaching one of the two main reasons. First of them was if possible to form a regional forum in order to take all the necessary steps for a peaceful solution. Second was, if the first aim is not achieved and the war starts, to take the necessary steps to bring the stability back in Iraq and region (Yesiltas and Balci, 2006, forthcoming). The first one can be attributed as a balancing effort that could not be realized. The second one was an effort to decrease the possible harms of the instability.

Firstly, the US's Middle Eastern policy was clearly known through the Greater Middle East Project of the US. This project was proposing a transformation

in the politics of the Middle East (Candar, 2006). So, the regional governments were cognizant of the US objectives and nearly all of them except Turkey at most Syria and Iran were also under the threat of this transformation. The war on Iraq was perceived as the first step of an approaching transformation process. Turkey was being encouraged by the US to support it in this first step of which following steps would be aiming to transform all the other neighbors of Turkey. This means that the tornado series were close to the borders of Turkey and Turkey was proposed to play an assistantship role which would require de facto participation of Turkey in a total war against its almost all neighbors (Oztek, 2006). Such a bold decision would naturally require high amounts of guarantees from the leading power of the tornado series. As explained in the following section, for this reason, Turkey bargained firmly with the US. Turkey was swinging on a pendulum from one end to another. While it was bargaining with the US to increase the guarantees, it also explored possible alternatives like neighboring countries summit since the necessity of keeping different alternatives in use.

Under these circumstances, Turkish initiative came to the neighboring countries' rescue. As Yesiltas and Balci (2006,fourthcoming) have pointed out, "Arab states' main concern was the potential for a war resulting in long-term political instability throughout much of the Arab world that might have opened the door to widespread, and potentially uncontrollable, public anger."

Middle East in geopolitical terms is defined as a shatter-belt which means a region that is too much broken into parts by the conflicting interests and far from being cooperative. As a shatter-belt the relations among the states of the region seems to be much more conflicting rather than initiating such cooperative forums. If these shattered neighbors achieved to form such a cooperative initiative, it should be

the outcome of an important threat. Because of the US transformative policy which gave to some only a peripheric role like Turkey, or addressed some as one of the next targets like Syria (Suer, 2006), or ignored some like Jordan, perceived as a unilateral imposition by an external power to the fates of regional states.

However, this initiative cannot be described as a traditional balancing. It is an effort of balancing, perhaps soft balancing. The following day of the summit, Gul did not neglect to send a letter to President Bush. In the succeeding meetings, the regional minor states having closer relations with the US like Kuwait and Bahrain seems to be consciously invited in order to soften the position of the initiative against the US (Balci and Yesiltas, forthcoming). Furthermore, in the eighth meeting held in Cairo, the participation of the D-8 also provided for the same reason.

Secondly, these meetings aimed at preserving Iraq's territorial integrity, if it is unable to do something to stop the war. One of the most important fears of the regional states was the possibility of the occurrence of a process which could cause to tear Iraq sourcing from the competence among the regional states in an unstable environment. As a prototype of the region Iraq shelters many elements of the region, so conflicting interests of the regional states. Since created as an oil store by the British colonial government in order to combine two oil rich areas of former Ottoman provinces (Mousul and Basra) and a center between them (Baghdad) in the Middle East with a 'mad idea' by Churchill (Shlaim, 1995, 14), Iraq stands as an artificial state and includes very different elements like Kurds, Asuri Christian, Turcoman, Jews, Sunni and Shi'i Arabs (Ozcan, 2003, 7).

This artificiality makes Iraq open to both internal ethnic conflicts and external competence. Under the dictatorial rule of Sunni Arab minority, Shi'i and other groups of the country were being excluded from the government. In other words, the

stability of Iraq had been relying upon a dictatorial rule (Candar, 2006). When this rule suddenly falls, it could be difficult to keep these different elements in a stable order. It was a risky attempt. The risk of internal instability could have a stimulus effect on the interests of the neighboring countries. For example, the Shattul Arab waterline stands as a possible intervention area when the historical conflict between Iran and Iraq considered. Northern Iraq because of two reasons- first is the PKK activities in the region and second is the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state, was a serious issue for Turkey. The possibility of a Shi'i dominance could be perceived as a threat for the Sunni dominated countries like Saudi Arabia so and so forth. Furthermore, instability in Iraq could raise the investigation of the artificiality of the borders among the other Arab countries. Possible border disagreements could have a more destabilizing effect on the delicate status quo of the region.

During his visit to Syria, the words used by Abdullah Gul turned to be a slogan to explain the necessity of the stability and the risks of instability. He declared that "Iraq is like a pandora's box. This box should not be opened because it would be impossible to put everything back in that box again" (Zaman, 04.01.2003). For this reason, with the words of Davutoglu (2006) who was labeled as the architect of the initiative, "either the war broke or not, these meetings were planned to continue until Iraq would be *stabilized*." In brief these meetings and the announcements of them clearly indicates that the regional governments did not want a transformation that is imposed by a unilateral force. Even if a transformation is needed in the region they want this transformation should be in a peaceful and evolutionary way by the regional dynamics which would not require use of force.

These foreign policy movements on four different lanes support the idea that Turkey's main concern before the Iraq War was to protect the stability in the region.

For this reason, Turkey tried to persuade the Iraqi government to take the necessary steps to avoid a war, increase its contacts with the potential influential actors in the UNSC to increase the number of potential alternative partners, transcend the issue to the in international organizations to reach a multilateral process, and initiate a cooperative forum with the neighboring countries to prevent the instability or decrease the harmful effects of unavoidable instability. Despite the hardworking efforts, Turkey could not break the unproductive circle of the unipolarity, so the central role of the US in this structure. This offers a clear answer to the question of why, then, Turkey drew an image of a state seemed as willing to participate the war with the US by performing long negotiations. The study tries to answer this issue in the next section which examines the fifth and the most intense and important dimension of Turkish foreign policy before the war.

4.4 Negotiating with the US

Despite its efforts to break the unproductive circle of the unipolarity, Turkey had to face with this isolated negotiation process for three reasons. First one was the risks of directly rejecting the US demands. Second was the necessity of gaining time for a more desired solution. Third was to gain a preferable partnership with the US, if the first two failed.

Firstly, the US as the longest and the closest ally of Turkey was demanding Turkish support for its war. The US was so impatient that just five days after than the vote of confidence for the Gul Government, on January 5, Marc Grossman and Paul Wolfowitz arrived in Ankara. Confused with the US impetuousness, Gul demanded time by arguing that "we have just won the vote of confidence" (Yetkin, 2004: 100). In the succeeding days and mounts, the US side increased its pressure on Turkish

government. News coming from the Davos Meetings illustrates the seriousness of this pressure. Referring to the long partnership between the US and Turkey, Powell was arguing that the US has been helping Turkey for a long time, now it is Turkey's turn (Radikal, 27.01.2003). While the pressure was increasingly growing, it reached to the level of threat. The words of Mark Parris, the former US ambassador to Turkey was on a threatening tone. "Turkey must support the US, otherwise, Washington does not reply even your phone calls" (Zaman, 25.01.2003).

Under these circumstances, Turkish government seemed to be unable to reject directly the US demands. The US was using all the elements of its coercive power rooted in its central position under the unipolar structure. Turkish Government was unofficially obliged to create an impression of taking part in the willing coalition, even though this was the worst case for Turkey. For this reason, Turkish government while on the one side going on the negotiations with the US, on the other side it was exploring the ways of alleviating the pressure on the government. As the Prime Minister of a newly established government, Gul in his response to Grossman and Wofowitz after explaining the newness of its government, he also added that "even if we are a single party government, we need to persuade the National Assembly"(Yetkin, 2004: 100).

From the very first days of the negotiations until the last day, Gul government tried to tilt the liabilities of the reluctance to the National Assembly through emphasizing the democratic process which was declared by the US as one of the causes of the war against the Iraq. There are some arguments, especially by Cuneyt Ulsever, that Turkish government should have reject the US demands directly, if it was serious and determined about what it wanted to do. He (2006) argues that the Turkish government was hesitant and even had no foreign policy about Iraq.

However, continuous emphasis of the government on the necessity of the Parliament vote seems as a part of conscious policy of changing the direction of the US pressure, and alleviating it through using the same concept with the US that was democracy. If Turkish government rejected the US demands early and directly this would be a political rejection. However, by tilting the issue to the Parliament, the government had the chance of presenting the rejection as a reflection of collective mind in democracy.

Even though, this seems to US unconvincing, it provided the tools of avoiding the direct enmity of the US against the Justice and Development Party. According to Candar (2006), this strategy of the government really worked. Based on his personal friendship with Wolfowitz, he argues that the US Government was convinced that the JDP performed its liabilities against the US by voting in favor of the motion with its majority. This study argues that the real aim of the Gul government, in accordance with the other branches of Turkish foreign policy was avoiding to ally with the US. Otherwise, there were no restricting rules for the government to take a group decision in favor of the motion. If the government was really in favor of the motion, then the persuasion of the representatives would not matter. It must be recognized that the Parliamentary systems differs from the Presidential systems. In Presidential systems, the president never has an influence on the Congress that is comparable with the influence of the Prime Minister on the Parliament. So, comparing the motion of 1 March with for example Congress decision to veto the removal of military embargo to Turkey in the 70's makes sense only formally, but it informally indicates the reluctance of the government.

Although there had been too many examples of the speeches in favor of the motion by both Gul and Erdogan, a closer analysis reveals that actions taken by the

same leaders were obviously displaying their reluctance. According to Murat Yetkin, (2004: 173) "it can be argued that the government did not strived sufficiently to persuade the party group." On the voting day of the motion permanent undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry Ugur Ziyal and Chief Negotiator of the Turkish side Deniz Bolukbası whose talks could change the ideas of the representatives, although invited to the parliament, were not used to inform the representatives about the last situation in the negotiations with the US. "The government was acting as if not wishing the approval of its own motion" (Yetkin, 2004: 172).

The reason for this complicated relation between the speeches and the actions of the leaders seems as arising from the possible risks of rejecting the US. Actually, the conclusion of the voting was not a direct rejection. Interestingly, it was something between rejection and ramification. Although the number of the approval votes were higher than the rejection votes, according to the Assembly internal regulations, three more approval votes were required for the absolute majority. This means that 'the decision is not formed'. Notice that it was not a direct rejection. I want, but I can't. Following the same road with the government, as if it was a deliberate collective action with a well calculated number, the same attitude came into existence. Of course, to claim that this was a deliberate movement is illogical, however, it is interesting to symbolize Turkey's dilemma between risks of rejecting the US and the risks of instability. The National Assembly did not reject the US demands, but also did not approve them.

These paragraphs create an impression of a domestic level study since it has focused to the branches of Turkish government. However, it is in fact still on the systemic level. These are the reflections of the systemic level variables on the some

parts of domestic level. In this case, the study focused on just two institution, government and Assembly. However, this is not to say that this rejection was belonging to only these two institutions. This study argues that other institutions influential on the foreign policy strategies of Turkey shared the same reluctance, due to the systemic effects.

Let's consider the position of the Turkish Armed Forces. The position and the influence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) both in domestic and international politics of Turkey is a well known reality. However, during the negotiations TAF was extraordinarily "silent" (Yavuz, 2006: 189). Despite the existence of speculative arguments behind this silence about the aim of the TAF to direct the responsibility of rejection to the JDP government, these arguments do not go further than being speculative estimates. They might be true or not. However, the important part is that Turkish military also adapted a strategy similar to the government.

As the real sources for a scientific study, press expressions of the National Security Council offers better evidences for the attitudes of the military. Taking a closer look at the contents of the press expressions, illustrates the emphasis on the stability of the region and avoidance from the coercive, unilateral, and illegal transformation. In NSC meeting on December 27, 2002 "in the issue of a possible military operation against Iraq, the expectations of the US, especially from Turkey and the last developments are evaluated in the framework of Turkey's long term interests. The importance of the continuation of the necessary efforts for the *peaceful resolution* of the problem on the basis of the legitimacy of *the international law* and the *UN* decisions is emphasized" (http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html).

Although the January 31 2003 expression seems to be more detailed and presented by the Turkish media as a recommendation decision, it does not bring an advice to meet the US expectations. It nearly repeats the former one, and then recommends the government to take the necessary steps "to defend *entirely* Turkey's national interests" (NSC Press Announcement). There was no direct or indirect reference to the motion. The general tone of the expression did not differ too much from the announcement of the neighboring countries summit held in Istanbul. So, it can be argued that the position of the government and the military was as same as the declarations of two different institutions of which concepts seems as written by the same author.

The same image should be aroused the same view in Wolfowitz that he inorderly criticized the TAF in an interview with CNN-Turk. As an answer to the question of where Turkish and the US are standing in relation to each other, he replied:

> we ought to understand what went wrong, we ought to understand the nature of that disappointment and some of it has to do with, if you like, the U.S.-Turkish bilateral piece of it. But I think it's more helpful to think of the disappointment in terms of the failure to understand what was going on in Iraq. From a U.S. Turkish point of view there is good news and bad news. The good news is that a majority of the parliament did vote to support us in the things that we asked for. The bad news is that because of the procedural issues that wasn't a big enough majority to get it done and that many of the institutions in Turkey that we think of as the traditional strong support is the alliance were not as forceful in leading in that direction.

After then, according to Cengiz Candar who was one of the interviewers, (Candar, 2006) despite their omission, Wolfowitz insistently reminded to the interviewers to ask the address of the disappointment. To the question of "Which traditional alliance are you talking about? he replied, "Well, I think, you know which ones I mean, but I think particularly the military" (available at: www.dod.org).

The press expression of last meeting just before the voting of the motion was more interesting than the former one. The NSC was like unaware of the voting of the next day. Turkish media announced that there was no recommendation for the motion (Hurriyet, 28.02.2003). On the other side, the positions of the President Ahmet Nejdet Sezer and the speaker of the Parliament Bulent Arınc was so clearly contrary to the US demands that does not require a long discussion. Both of them declared their position in nearly all circles.

Secondly, the compulsion explained above turned to be perceived by Turkey as a tool of protecting the stability. Although the negotiations can be traced back to the period of Ecevit government, it can be argued that the essential part of the negotiations started by the Wolfowitz and Grossman visit just after the approval of the Gul government by the late November. Just after the establishment of the new government, the US authorities restarted to apply pressure which had been cut for a month because of the November 3 elections. In the late December, Ambassador Marisa Lino on the US side and Ambassador Deniz Bolukbasi on the Turkish side are appointed as the official negotiators of the political negotiations. This process can be described as a nearly three mounts period of negotiations between the two governments and a two months of negotiations by two qualified and official negotiators.

Besides being merely a negotiation in which both of two parts demand something and both of two parts make some concession that will be examined below, one special characteristic of the negotiations requires more attention. When the continuous pressure for a quick decision considered, this three mounts period was a really long time and Turkey seemed to prolong the period as much as possible. On

his column Ertugrul Ozkok was announcing an intelligence based on the Standard Magazine about the calendar of base inspection and preparation. According to him, Turkey would let the US for the site preparation on 15 January (Hurriyet, 10.12.2002). This intelligence might be correct or wrong, and the content of the mentioned meeting is still contested. However, it is important to reflect the difference between the US expectations and Turkish response. After the long discussions, it seems that Turkey let the US one month later than the US expected.

On 16 January, the US authorities could begin merely site inspection which would take at least fifteen days. The same attitude can be observed in the formal negotiation process of Bolukbasi and Lino. The discussions between the two sides were including even the collar etiquettes of the uniforms of the US soldiers, value-added taxes of the spagetti and tomatoes which would be eaten by the US troops (Yetkin, 2004: 125).

The separation of the motion into two parts-first one was for the site preparation and the second one was for the transition of the US troops, can be mentioned as a last example of delaying efforts. Turkish government interestingly separated the motion into two parts. What was the reason behind such a decision? There might be both formal and informal reasons. However, it seems that it gave birth to two interesting outcomes. First, it caused an extra postponement of the important part of the permission that was the transit of the US troops. Second, the US after beginning the preparation of the military facilities became more dependent on the option of the transit from the North. Despite the continual warnings by the Turkish government that the passing of the first motion does not mean the automatic approval of the second one, the US with an exceeding confidence began to prepare

for the Northern Front. Insistent warnings of the Turkish government were really meaningful.

All of these examples support the idea that Turkish government tried to exploit the negotiation process in order to gain time which is argued in the theoretical chapter as one of the central difficulties in the unipolar structure to form a counter coalition or at least a preventive multilateral initiative. That time might have brought the other possible influential actors into the process. That would mean alternative partners for Turkey to collaborate for a peaceful solution and prevention of instability. That would mean the probability of persuasion of the Iraqi government to convince the international community for its collaborative actions which might oblige and convince the US for a peaceful solution. That would mean providing an opportunity for the intervention of the international organizations and a multilateral process instead of the unilateral US action which would be depended upon the US intentions which were difficult for Turkey to trust. In addition, perhaps postponement of the war until the summer in which fighting a war would be risky for the US on the desert, might have bring more time for the prevention of the war (Kelley, 2005: 159). The possibility of the war and its instabilities were so much frightening that Turkey strived exhaustingly even it was cognizant of the difficulty of achieving one of the above mentioned options.

Even if it seems that there was a conscious effort on the Turkish side against the US efforts for the urgency, it does not necessarily require the existence of a secret agenda of Turkish side. Davutoglu (2006), by emphasizing the good will of Turkey puts that:

> Turkish Government by trying to do its best laid the groundwork for the appearance of an international picture through the postponement of a motion up to March that would otherwise come in December...Turkey used the 'constructive ambiguity' in that three mounts period...Because of the

responsibility of the partnership, Turkey told its anxieties not only for the purpose of bargaining but also for persuading its long standing partner...Turkey foresaw the explosion of the chaos, the possibility of Iraq's disintegration after the war, and the difficulty of controlling this.

Thirdly and probably as the turning point of the issue, the negotiations with the US was perceived as an opportunity by Turkey. When all the efforts of Turkey to prevent the instability failed, Turkey faced with the painful central reality of the unipolar structure. Although it was essentially and primarily opposing any effort aiming an untimely transformation, Turkey, in the lack of alternative partners, had to negotiate the possibility of increasing its autonomy and manipulative power relative to the transformative superpower in the process of coming instability. If the stability could not be saved, then what should Turkey have do in the process of instability?

It seems to be the most determinative, critical and debated part of the process of the alliance decision. Despite its efforts, now it was the time of taking the US proposal or leaving it. In the interviews held during the preparation stage of this study, all the interviewees were sharing the idea about the dangers of instability. For all of them, the US actions against Iraq and region were at least undesirable at most terrifying. They only differed on the stage of appropriate strategy to overcome the dangers and decrease the harms of the inescapable chaos. After three years of the motion's voting, this issue still seems to be dominating the discussions on the issue. Did Turkey do the right thing or the wrong? The aim of this study is not evaluating the correctness or the outcomes of Turkey's alliance decision. On the contrary, the study aims to examine what factors determined the decision. For this reason, it will focus on the process which produced the current situation that is the rejection of the alliance.

When the war became unavoidable, Turkey, beside its early mentioned reasons, thirdly and lastly, negotiated with the US in order to decrease the possible harms of the instability. At this point, by increasing its manipulative power on the both planning and implication stages of the war together with the superpower might have provide an opportunity of not only decreasing the harmful effect of the transformation, but also the possibility of gaining the benefits of that transformation. Under such conditions, there was no reason for Turkish rejection. However, was the scene similar to that?

Since Turkey rejected to ally, one may reach the conclusion that the scene perceived by Turkey was not so brilliant to stimulate optimistic views. Furthermore, the negotiations appeared as decreasing the authority of Turkish side in comparison with the US side. Since forming alliances means the transfer of authority to some extend, the alliance must be based on common and certain grounds. Without the barter of some reciprocal concessions, according to the central principle of alliance formation, it turns to be a liability rather than an asset. Since the alliances risk "loss of autonomy, including having to fight for interests that are not one's own" (Snyder, 1997: 6), "alliances are matter not of principle but of expediency" (Morgenthau, 1993: 198). So, concessions should be reciprocal and worth to make. Otherwise, the states do not want to limit their authority.

For this reason, Turkish government, before all else determined its 'red lines' and demanded an increase in its autonomy for Turkish concessions and concessions from the US for the decrease in Turkish autonomy. Turkish concerns can be divided into two main groups, despite the existence of complementary and secondary issues. First one was related to the position of Turkey in the war and the second one was about the Iraq after the war.

For the first part, Turkish side was insistently asking some specific questions about the planning and implication stages of the war. However, according to Murat Yetkin, the US answers were not convincing for the Turkish side. "The American authorities were strictly concentrating to their own demands while avoiding to give concrete answers to the questions of the Turkish side" (Yetkin, 2004: 101) Even three days before the voting of the motion, the absence of a memorandum of understanding in the military issues was bothering Turkish military (Bila, 26.02.2002). Turkey was worried about commanding rights of the Turkish troops in the Northern Iraq, rules of engagement in a possible contact of Turkish troops with PKK militants, the weapons which would be given to the Kurdish Pesmergas by the US so and so forth. It seems that Turkey could not received convincing guarantees from the US side. Especially, "increasing concessions to the Kurds in Northern Iraq greatly contributed to this result" (Gorener, 2005: 6).

One of the most important issues about the lack of confidence on Turkish side was related to the number of troops which would pass from Turkish territories. The US was demanding to display more than 60.000 troops on the southeastern border of Turkey. Such a great number was terrifying Turkish policymakers. In the secret report prepared the Turkish Foreign Ministry and published by journalist Fikret Bila (Bila, 2004) it is argued that:

> by accepting these demands, Turkey will appear to be hosting an invasion power for 4-5 years and probably just Kuwait will be the second example…The increasing US presence in our country will gain a continuous character in conjunction with the US project to reconstruct the Middle East…The capacity of our country to develop policies which are peculiar to itself as an important regional power and the regional authority of our country will diminish.

The memories of the 'Operation Northern Watch' were still alive in the minds of Turkish policymakers. A much smaller number of foreign troops had constituted

one of the fundamental problems of Turkey in 1990's. While all the opposition parties were criticizing the governments about the extending the period of this force, they had to follow the same path with the previous governments (Uzgel, 2002b: 260-263). Now, the US was demanding to display a greater number of troops which was alerting Turkish officials as if Turkey would be invaded. As Barnett and Levy (1991: 375) argued, "The loss of autonomy also has an important domestic dimension. Extensive alignment concessions can involve substantial domestic political costs to the regime in power, particularly if these concessions involve the presence of foreign troops or are otherwise perceived as infringements on the sovereign independence of the state."

Probably, for this reason, at the start of the First Gulf crisis, "former President General Kenan Evren reportedly advised Ozal that unless you have it written down, you cannot trust the United States" (Larrabee and Lesser, 2002: 164). The lack of confidence on Turkish side against the US attitudes was not something special to the Second or First Gulf wars. One can easily reach a substantial literature on this issue in Turkish foreign policy. The lack of harmony between the Turkish realities and US determined NATO strategies, the harmful effects of these strategies to take Turkey away from its neigbours, ineffectiveness of Turkey on NATO decisions can be enumerated as some examples of long standing critics (Ozsoy, 1987: 80-81).

According to many analists, Turkish nonconfidence affirmed by the US actions especially after the war. Park (2004: 500) argues that "as the chaos and political uncertainty in Iraq persist, the prospect of the country's dismemberment is indeed increasingly seen by some Americans as both a possible and even desirable outcome as an alternative to civil war or to the emergence of an autocratic and possibly theocratic state."

For the second part, Turkey wanted to be informed about the future of Iraq after the war. What sort of policies would the US follow? Would territorial integrity of Iraq be saved? Disintegration of Iraq was the worst scenario circulating around, since it might bring the establishment of a Kurdish state (Kirisci, 1996). The status of Mousul and Kerkuk was another issue important for Turkey. Also in these issues Turkish authorities were not convinced. Abdullatif Sener's statements, on February 25, present interesting clues about the government's view of the progress made on the negations process. He put that "no nice gesture, no motion" (Radikal, 25.02.2003).

The US was demanding to ally with Turkey for a war which would probably drag Turkey into a chaos; however, it was not offering any instruments for Turkey to defend itself in the chaotic environment. The negotiations seemed as focusing on the economic compensation dimension. However, when the essential risks of the coming war considered, economic compensation was not sufficient to receive the Turkish support. It was something like entrance of a powerful gladiator into Collesium by stepping on a weaker one who is not covered by an armor and leaving it in the arena with some money without any guarantee. Under these circumstances, no rational human wants to help to the stronger gladiator. Even the stronger gladiator tries to coerce, the weaker one tries to appease it. So, what explains the behavior of the US?

Why the US rejected to grant some concessions? One answer to this question may be that the US did not consider the possibility of rejection. Of course the power asymmetry may give the stronger side, greater capability and self-confidence. When the two sides are not mutually dependent upon each other the stronger side makes only minor concessions. For obtaining higher concessions, the weaker side should be seriously appreciated by the stronger side. As Gorener (2005: 3) points out "the

preponderance of its military strength deludes the US into believing that it does not need allies."

This issue of the necessity of the Northern Front was a matter of serious, long debates in Turkey before the war. On the one side, some were arguing that the US could not start a war without Northern Front, so, Turkey should have bargain up to the final point. On the other side, some were arguing that the US was powerful enough to defeat Iraq without Turkey, so, Turkey as soon as possible ally with the US. However, it seems that this discussion was irrelevant under the conditions of unipolarity. If, the US really needed Turkish support, then it would make the expected concessions. If it did not need, then it would not make these concessions. If the US did not make the concessions, then Turkey, as explained above, would not ally with the US since it would avoid the position of the weaker gladiator. Adding up these three statements, one can reach the solution that either Turkey demanded more concessions or not, if the US really needed Turkish support, it would make the concessions. However, at the end, it showed that it did not need to too much. However, Turkey tried its chance. It can be argued that Turkey by this negotiation process tested the seriousness of the US authorities' statements in which they were claiming that the US could start the war without the Turkish support and it was not vital, though important.

Here, another question comes to mind. Why the US did not appreciate the Turkish support in an amount that Turkey demanded for allying? The reason again seems to be located in the nature of the unipolarity. With a military expenditure of nearly 581 Billion Dollars, every year, the US adds more than the nearest twenty countries to its existing military power (The World Fact Book). "If US defense spending proceeds as planned, this hyper-power by 2007 will invest more in defense

that all other countries combined" (Joffe, 2003). Lonely the greatness of the military power is sufficient or not for performing the task of democratizing Iraq can be debatable in another study? However, the extreme self-confidence that results from this substantial power is a reality. The statements of the US authorities before and during the war reflect their confidence. So, the success of achieving the final goal which was democratizing Iraq can be debated, however, the existence of the self confidence, and the success of military power in a war which was against Iraq was decisive.

Josef Joffe explains the US behavior based on this self-confidence as follows: "Moving unopposed and, then several military technological orbits above the rest, it needed merely, assistants, not allies. And so Secretary Defense Don Rumsfeld would famously proclaim that the mission determines the coalition and not the other way round. Alliance was now ad hoc and a la carte" (Joffe, 2003: 2). For this reason, when the US faced with the Turkish demands to increase its autonomy in a transformative war, it was reluctant to sacrifice the autonomy which was the reason of US transformative actions. In other words, the US demanded single-sided Turkish assistantship, did not offer a cooperation between two equal partners, or at least was far from responding to Turkish expectations.

Under these circumstances, it was really difficult for Turkey to accept the US proposal. On the one side, despite its struggle, a chaotic process was approaching. In order to overcome the side effects of the chaos, Turkey tried to increase its manipulative power and determinative role by seeking the possibility of forming at least a meaningful, if not an equal partnership. However, Turkey, unfortunately, after its all efforts on different lanes, was facing with the unipolarity's painful realities. On the other side, Turkey was worried about the risks of rejecting the US and being

excluded from the process of a transformation in its region. On the final stage, Turkey had to make a decision between being excluded or included. As a conclusion, it actually rejected to be dragged into the approaching instability as an assistant to the US in a position that renders Turkey weaker than it stands alone and external. Park (2004: 497) clearly reaches the same conclusion:

> As war approached, it became increasingly evident that there would be no regional groundswell of support for US-led action against Iraq. In any case, whatever the outcome of any war, Turkey would continue to inhabit the region, and would need to rebuild any fractured relationships with its neighbors, Arab and Iranian…Turks were concerned about the implications for regional stability of any new war with Iraq, and of its own potential isolation in the region. The crisis served as an acute reminder that Turkey is a Middle Eastern as much as it is a western state.

Also Gorener (2005: 8) emphasizes the same point by arguing that "It is in the interest of Turkey, both in terms of furthering integration with the EU and improving relations with neighbors south and north, not to associate itself with unilateralist policies of the US that draw much antagonism from the rest of the world." Otherwise, Turkey would have to face with the regional realities when the war came into an end. As pointed out by Al-Marashi (2005: 127) especially in Arab world "a common theme emerges that any regional initiatives taken by Turkey in conjunction with the US arouse distrust."

4.5 Alternative Explanations

Turkish rejection to approve the US's request for a northern front against Iraq became one of the most debated issues in Turkish-US relations. After approximately three years, a few thought provoking studies published, though the main concerns of these studies are related to the outcomes of the Turkish decision. (For example, see: Parris, 2005; Cagaptay, 2004; Gunter, 2005) Just a few and partial studies have

focused on the reasons. However, they generally examine the alliance from domestic and interaction levels. These sorts of arguments tend to assess the Turkish decision as a "failure" (Parris, 2005) of Turkish Parliament and Government or an accident based on a "comedy of errors" of two states (Rubin, 2005) on the interaction level.

In this paper, it is argued that such explanations of the issue ignore systemic effects which seem as the essential reason of the Turkish decision while domestic and interaction level explanations are complementary. On the domestic level, two arguments come forth: the Islamist background of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and its lack of experience and high levels of opposition in Turkish society against the US.

It is commonly argued that since JDP and its representatives come from an Islamist background, the leaders of JDP could not convince them to vote in favor of the March 1 motion that means to go to war against a Muslim country. A closer look at the process of negotiations between Turkey and the US reveals that not only JDP but also previous government whose greater partner was Democratic Left Party (DLP) had not displayed a different policy from JDP. The leftist Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was advising Abdullah Gul not to go to a war in Iraq (Bila, 2004: 192).

Not only the governments performing the negotiations with the US was opposing to support the US, but also all institutions influential on foreign policy making seemed as sharing the same ideas. The Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok time and again repeated the harmony between the positions of the Turkish Armed Forces and Gul Government (Turkiye, 14.01.2003). Also President Ahmet Nejdet Sezer and Speaker of Parliament Bulent Arinc more and earlier than any one else declared their opposition as explained above. Moreover, in that period, Gul Government was being assessed as the only supporter of the motion. On February 26,

two day after the motion dispatched to the Parliament by the Council of Ministers, the news that leaked out the media was informing the discomfort of the military on supporting the US and shocking the JDP members (Milliyet, 26.02.2003). In sum, it seems that the Islamist background of the JDP has little to do with the rejection of proposal. It was just a complementary motive behind the decision. Erickson (2004: 39-40) explains the similarities between the government and military as follows:

> The vote was a bellwether signal to America. But, more importantly, it signaled an important shift in Turkish military politics as well. Prior to votes of this sort in Parliament (examples include participation on UN or NATO peacekeeping missions and support for Coalition or NATO combat missions), the TGS often provides a recommendation to the Turkish Parliament. In this case, the Turkish General Staff sent a 'decision not to recommend' (a neutral stance, but one that clearly did not support the US…In effect, the Turkish military stood against the Americans and left the decision solely to the politicians.

Arguing that the rejection of the motion was a failure based on the lack of experience of JDP government also falls short to explain the reasons behind the rejection. As explained in many parts of this study, assessing the actions of both the Government and the other institutions foreign policy making as an unintentional process is a main fallacy. Instead of being a product of indecisive position of the Government, the whole process seems as being the outcome of well planned strategy that attempted to overcome the dilemma of rejecting the superpower and dragging into an undesired chaos.

Turkish society was also strongly opposing the US-led war on Iraq. Based on this information some analysts argue that Turkish Government failed to approve the motion due to people's unrest. In 2003, just 22% of Turkish society was supporting US led War against terrorism (Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2006). In the same survey, it is illustrated that this percentage fluctuates in Turkey. In 2004, it increased up to 37% and decreased down to 17% in 2005 and to 14% in 2006. Although it

shows a low level of support for each year, it seems that the view of Turkish public about the US-led war on terrorism depends upon the conjectural changes.

Furthermore, Iraq War effected the public opinion lesser than argued. The support was 30% in 2002 when Iraq War was not still on the agenda, and fell to 22% during the war. The war decreased the public support with just 8%. It seems that the low levels of public support served to soften the lack of Turkish support for the US, rather than being a primary cause of Turkish rejection. As argued in the preceding pages Turkish Government had the opportunity of showing public protests as an excuse against the US pressure. If Turkish Government really believed in the necessity of allying with the US, then it could ignore the public opinion as used to do in the Cold War (Erhan, 2002b: 690).

Another level of explanation argues the failure of both Turkey and the US to understand each others' needs. The main points of this argument emphasize the US arrogance during the negotiations and Turkish counterproductive strategies (Rubin, 2005). This study, on the contrary, argued that both sides was adequately aware of the strategies the other. The upsetting behaviors of the US illustrating Turkey as bargaining for horses was a tool of keeping Turkish Government under pressure for accelerating the process of permission rather than being thoughtless arrogances. On the other side, Turkish postponements served as the tools of Turkish strategy to impede the war and to gain more concessions from the US.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Any environment, populated with two or more than two units, serves as an area of interaction for its units. The international system also serves as an interaction environment for the nations in it, as simply forests served for animals, oceans for fish, and classroom for students. Furthermore, any interaction among the units requires a relationship of either friendship or enmity. However, its rationality which separates human beings from the other types of creatures makes this relationship more complicated. Human beings do not only conduct their interactions with their similars on a simple one to one relationship. Instead, they can achieve forming complex friendships against their enemies.

Because of this complexity, formation of alliances has been a key issue in the study of international relations in all periods. From the ancient times of the Greek city states, to the Renaissance Italy, political entities of an environment had resorted to alliances in order to deal with their adversaries (Sheehan, 1996: 24-29). In modern times, due to the increasing amount of interaction among the nation states, alliances gained a more complicated widespread form. In the multipolar structure of several centuries, alliances became an issue of daily events like "a sport of the kings" (Morgenthau, 1993: 205). In the less flexible and more disciplined bipolar structure of the Cold War, alliances gained continual and largely participated forms embracing

the whole globe which was divided into two main camps. In short, alliances have constituted an important part of international relations.

Today, the world policy represents a unipolar structure. So far, there has been limited focus on the issue of alliance formation in the literature. It is either ignored or at least passed over lightly. For this reason, this study, as a candidate to fill this in the literature, set out to accomplish two tasks. The first was to develop an understanding about the effects of the unipolar structure on the alliance choices of the states. The second was to explain the findings in a case study and to some extent test the applicability of hypotheses developed.

In the study, it is argued that the unipolar structure created a greater sensitivity against the instabilities. The main reason behind this sensitivity is their lack of appropriate measures of managing the process of instability. The strength and the centrality of the superpower in the unipolar structure make balancing the superpower impossible and forming counterbalancing coalitions difficult. So, they avoid following challenging policies. They content the status quo since it is better than the worst option or following soft policies against the aggressive superpower policies. Furthermore, they do not desire an instability that is triggered by others since it might trigger an unforeseen chaotic process that is difficult to manage single-handedly with their current weakness. Only the superpower has this luxury because of its unique position in the system with a high power gap relative to others.

From this discussion, this study derived six hypotheses of alliance formation strategies. Firstly, under the unipolar structure, states are more likely to ally against instabilities rater than to balance the power or threat as used to be claimed in the previos literature, due to the substantial power margins among the units. Following from the first, secondly, if an instability arises from a secondary state, others ally

around the superpower with broad coalitions to bring the stability back in. Thirdly, if the superpower is the source of instability, secondary states try to prevent the instability by using soft policies composed of peaceful, multilateral, evolutionary and indirect strategies. Fourthly, if these attempts of restraining the superpower fail, then secondary states face with two alternatives: to be, or not to be with the superpower in the transformation process. Fifthly, if the security of any state facing with this dilemma is directly threatened by this transformation, it prefers being external to the transformation, despite the possibility of drawing the anger of the superpower. Lasty, if and only if it has little to lose during the process of transformation, it may choose to ally with the superpower.

However, if these policies fall short to achieve their task, then the secondary states face with the dilemma of "to be or not to be" with the superpower. Under the conditions of unipolarity, despite the high levels of possible costs of not to be with the superpower, secondary states who are under the immediate threat of instability choose not to be with the superpower, while other secondary states who have not too many assets to lose in the process might prefer to be with the superpower.

Findings in the case study strongly support these arguments. Even a cursory exploration of the Turkish foreign policy during the whole unipolar period reveals the cautious policies of Turkey against the instabilities it has faced. Up to 2003 Iraq War, Turkey had been the supporter of the status quo in its close neighborhood while it was concentrating power. It has actively participated to the operations which were led by the US and would bring the stability back in. Although these periods briefly examined in the study since the scope of the study on a single case, it is important to test the first hypothesis of the study. Turkey participated into the broad coalitions led by the US to protect the stability.

In 2003 Iraq War, this study found that Turkey was again sensitive against the instabilities in its close neighborhood. However, this time, the source of the instability was the US. Turkey displayed endless efforts in order to prevent the instability by using peaceful, multilateral, and soft policies. By conducting negotiations with the US and Iraq, it searched the possibility of a peaceful solution that would prevent the instability. By keeping contact with the regional states, UN, and UN Security Council members, it searched through the possibilities of a multilateral solution which would prevent the instability or decrease its harmful consequences. However, during all stages, Turkey paid strong attention not to draw the US enmity.

When all these efforts failed and it faced with the constraints of the unipolarity, Turkey had to make a decision between to be or not to be with the US. Differently from other participants of "the coalition of willing", Turkey was under the immediate threat of the approaching instability. Poland, for example, had little to lose in this instability since it had little interests in the region. However, Turkey would directly meet the consequences. Furthermore, based on its position in the system, the US was offering too less for too much that was far from meeting Turkey's needs. For this reasons, despite the high levels of pressure from the US, Turkey rejected to ally with the US as kindly as possible.

It seems that the case evaluated in this study fits quite well to the hypothesis developed. Beside its strengths this study is still open to critics that are common to all single case studies. The adequacy of the single case study as a test for such a study can be questioned.

However, the character of this study required to use a single case study. This study aimed to study an era which is recognized by many scholars as an illusion and

ignored. It is not a study that tests several theories on several data. Instead it is a candidate to fill the gap in an infant area. So, it tried to explain all different processes took part during the decision making. It required in-depth analysis and detailed information. In other words, it gave priority to the explanatory dimension rather than the strict rules of testing a theory.

However, this does not mean that succeeding studies should follow the same methodology. On the contrary, further studies, especially comparing different cases in which the superpower follows status quo policies and the superpower following restoration policies. This study took only the latter since it offered the circumstances of testing all the three hypotheses developed and explaining all processes of decision making.

Another further study, enlarging the comparison throughout the spatial dimension, would certainly be useful. This study took the alliance formation process in a specif region of the world. However, studies comparing alliance formation processes of, for example, Middle East and Asia-Pacific may present important conclusions.

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