

**European and American Policies over Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict in Comparative Perspective: 1993-2003**

by

Şaziye Burcu Giray

**A Thesis Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of**

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Koç University

September 2006

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his (or her) knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed

Şaziye Burcu Giray

ABSTRACT

Transatlantic differences over the main global issues have been a constant item of discussion in the academic circles. A significant part of these discussions have been devoted to the diverging approaches of Europe and the United States over the Israeli-Palestinian question due to the centrality of the conflict in the Middle East and the importance of the region in world politics. Aim of this thesis is to examine to what extent there is a transatlantic split regarding the positions of the United States and the European Union concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also aims to have a better understanding of the causes and origins of the different policies conducted by the two sides of the Atlantic. In this respect, divergences and convergences of American and European foreign policies will be analyzed. Finally, prior to analyzing the significance of the split for the future of the conflict and the region, whether the transatlantic split is bridgeable or not is going to be discussed.

Keywords:

European foreign policy, American foreign policy, Transatlantic relations, Israeli-Palestinian conflict

ÖZET

Temel küresel sorunlar üzerindeki transatlantik farklılıklar akademik çevrelerde çok sık tartışılan bir konu olma özelliği taşımaktadır. Orta Doğu bölgesinin dünya politikasındaki yeri ve İsrail-Filistin uyuşmazlığının bölge içindeki önemi düşünüldüğünde, bu tartışmaların önemli bir bölümü Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Filistin sorununa yaklaşımlarına ayrılmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, İsrail-Filistin uyuşmazlığı konusunda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki fikir ayrılıklarını yakından incelemektir. Bu çalışma ile hedeflenen bir diğer amaç ise, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki politika farklılıklarının nedenleri ve sonuçları hakkında daha sağlam bir anlayış geliştirmektir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma kapsamında transatlantik politikalar arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıklar detaylı olarak tahlil edilmiştir. Son olarak, transatlantik farklılıkların önemi konusunda fikir yürütmeden önce, bu farklılıkların çözümlenme olasılığı tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Avrupa dış politikası, Amerikan dış politikası, Transatlantik ilişkiler, İsrail-Filistin uyuşmazlığı.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is based on a research that was made possible through the help of many individuals. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Şahnaz Yılmaz, for her wise and valuable counsel throughout the research. I will always be grateful to her for her continuous encouragement, confidence and moral support.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my second supervisor, Yonca Köksal, who provided valuable information and insight. Her sincere support and constructive criticisms throughout this study have been a major source of inspiration. I am grateful to Soli Özel not only for his valuable contributions and guidance as a member of the thesis committee, but also for standing as a role model for me in terms of his teaching and academic expertise.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents. It would be impossible to adequately acknowledge my father's support all along the way. Therefore, this study is dedicated to his memory with love, admiration, and longing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	13
2.1 Historical Background of Transatlantic Relations	13
2.2 Transatlantic Relations over the Arab-Israeli Dispute	16
2.2.1 The Birth of the Modern Middle East	16
2.2.2 Retreat of Europe, Rise of the United States	25
2.2.3 From End of the Cold War to Oslo	33
CHAPTER 3. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: THE AMERICAN WAY AND THE EUROPEAN WAY	37
3.1 Introduction.....	37
3.2 American Foreign Policy	41
3.2.1 American Foreign Policy Making and Its Implications	42
3.2.2 American Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Interest and Strategies	50
3.3 European Foreign Policy	53

3.3.1 Historical and Theoretical Background of European Foreign Policy.....	54
3.3.2 Foreign Policy Making: The European Way	58
3.3.3 European Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Interests and Strategies.	61
3.4 Conclusion	64
CHAPTER 4. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT FROM OSLO TO ROADMAP: THE LONGEST DECADE	68
4.1 The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process.....	77
4.2 The United States and the Middle East Peace Process.....	83
4.3 Euro-American Divergences and Convergences	85
4.3.1 European and American Visions of Israeli-Palestinian Peace	85
4.3.2 Centrality of the Conflict	93
4.3.3 Transatlantic Actors and the Conflicting Parties	97
4.3.3.1 Israel and the Transatlantic Actors.....	97
4.3.3.2 Palestinian Authority and the Transatlantic Actors.....	107
4.4 Transatlantic Relations and the Palestinian Question: Prospects and Challenges	113
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION.....	120
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	136

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In June 2000, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi stated that America and Europe belong to one family. Yet, he might have forgotten to add that being the members of the same family does not necessarily imply having good and peaceful relations. Being in disagreement is an indispensable part of being in the same family and neither Europe nor the United States are an exception to that.

Today, on a wide spectrum of issues ranging from the environmental concerns to the fight against terrorism, Europeans and Americans disagree. But if one needs to name the one region that they have the fiercest disagreement, without question, that would be the Middle East. Nuclear policies of Iran, the war on Iraq, methods to cope with international terrorism, and relations with the State of Israel might be named as some of the few issues that strain the transatlantic relations. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict deserves special attention as an issue that affects the gap on the two sides of the Atlantic. Since its emergence in the second half of the 20th century, yet having its roots from late 19th century, the dispute between the Arabs (Palestinians) and the Israelis (Jews) have attracted an enormous global focus. Europe and the United States have been two significant international actors that had shaped the course of the conflict with varying degrees of importance throughout different time periods.

Aim of this study is to analyze the causes and the origins of the transatlantic split over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to develop a comprehensive account of the Euro-American convergences and divergences over the dispute. This study also

aims to present solid ideas about the bridgeability of the split and what would happen if the two sides of the Atlantic fail to sort out their differences.

In order to have a better understanding of the argument presented in this study, one needs to be clear about the meanings of concepts such as Europe, the European Union, European foreign policy, American foreign policy, the Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the transatlantic relations.

To begin with, transatlantic relations is a concept invented to define the cultural, political, socio-economical, military and political relations between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, namely the United States and Canada on one side, and countries of Europe on the other side. However, this study purposefully excludes Canada in order to develop a more intense focus on the relationship of the United States and Europe, speaking of which, only refers to the member states of the European Union at the time under question. In other words, Norway, though it has played a significant role in the peace process, is excluded as well as other European states that are not the members of the Union. It is also noteworthy that, in order to prevent a possible confusion, the term European Union will be used for post-Maastricht era, 1992 and afterwards, while European Community will be used for the discussion of the period prior to the Treaty on European Union.

European foreign policy is another controversial concept that needs to be clarified. As it will be more apparent in the upcoming chapters, this term will sometimes be used to refer to the diverging and converging foreign policies of the influential European states, such as United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, and sometimes it will be used to refer to the official lines of the European Political Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. American foreign policy, on the other hand, stands as a relatively clearer concept since it

encompasses the official actions of a single nation state. Yet, acknowledging the complex nature of foreign policy making in the United States will remain as a challenge that needs to be confronted.

The difficulties faced in order to produce a precise definition of the Middle East stand as one of the biggest nightmares of the studies conducted on this area. Prior to moving into the lingering debates concerning the boundaries of the region, it needs to be mentioned that, there has been a broad consensus on the idea that the term Middle East reflects a European-centered perspective based on a view of globe from Europe and the United States.¹ In order to provide a historical account of the usage of the term Middle East, Bernard Lewis (1994: 3) informs us that this term was invented in 1902 by the American naval historian Alfred Thayer Maran, to refer to the area between Arabia and India, with Persian Gulf in its center. In addition to Lewis, Peter Mansfield (1991: 1) argues that the term Near East was used to designate Turkey, Balkans, Levant and Egypt before and during the First World War while the term Middle East was used to refer to Arabia, the Gulf, Persia (Iran), Mesopotamia (Iraq), and Afghanistan. Mansfield adds that, following the collapse of the Ottoman Turkish Empire by the end of the First World War, the term Middle East had gradually transformed into a concept that encompasses both. On the other hand, David Fromkin (1989: 16) establishes a connection to the “Great Game” in order to describe the region and he reaches to a definition that includes Egypt, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Arab states of Asia, Soviet Central Asia, and Afghanistan. To refer to a more recent definition, in a preparatory working paper for the June 2004 G8

¹ One of the most significant works that deserves to be mentioned within this framework is Edward Said’s renowned book *Orientalism* which focuses on the concept of Orient “as an integral part of European material civilization and culture”. Said argues that “Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institution, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” (1979: 2).

Summit, American administration has described the region as including the Arab states, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. To sum it up, as Hourani et al (2004: 2) rightfully argue, to define Middle East is arbitrary. How one determines what to include and what to exclude in a proper definition depends on the boundaries, content, and the purpose of the research under consideration. First of all, how to call this region depends on one's position. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the Middle East is defined as encompassing the Arab actors of Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and non-Arab states of Iran, Israel, and Turkey. However, other states in the region will also be mentioned when it is required.

Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli-Palestinian conflict are other confusing yet prominent concepts. While the former refers to the disputes between Israel and the Arab states in the region, the latter specifically focuses on the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The facts of the past impose the usage of the first term since the Palestinians were virtually missing from the conflict until the mid 1960s. However, starting with the Six Day war, Palestinians had decided to take the matters into their own hands while the influence of other Arab states started to fade out, but continued to be relevant. Both terms will be used in order to prevent possible misunderstandings.

After clarifying some terminological issues, one needs to address some potential shortcomings of this research. First of all, this study is based on two main issues of concern, namely the transatlantic split and the Israeli-Palestinian question. It aims to produce an in-depth analysis of the impact of the former over the latter. Observing this, one may argue that the own dynamics of the latter is overlooked or

even sacrificed for the sake of the former, though this is hardly the case. Transatlantic relations are given priority in order to have a stronger focal point.

Second, one may question the relevance of post-Oslo era as the main time period that is going to be analyzed. This choice may be justified on several grounds. First of all, the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century proves to be a watershed for the global politics. With the demise of the Soviet Union, all the actors analyzed in this research went through a remarkable transformation. This is specifically the case for the European Union which saw an opportunity to play a more influential role in the global arena, or even to be the second superpower, though it definitely failed to fulfill this premature prophecy. The end of the Cold War also significantly changed the dynamics of the Middle East since the Soviet Union was the main supporter of many Arab regimes in the region. This period was also characterized by the United States' appearing as the sole superpower of the system.

Main questions that will be addressed throughout this study can be outlined as:

1. To what extent is there a transatlantic split concerning the positions of the United States and the European Union regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
2. What are the causes and origins of the different policies conducted by the two sides of the Atlantic and what is the significance of the conflict for the United States and Europe?
3. What are the divergences and convergences of American and European foreign policies? In this respect, what are the interests,

objectives and the instruments of the United States and the European Union on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and what are their successes and failures?

4. What is the importance of the transatlantic split for the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and what prospects the narrowing of the gap would bring to the settlement of the dispute?

One of the heated debates in world politics has been whether Europeans and Americans come from different planets. However, prior to discussing this, one should admit that the transatlantic alliance has already proven to be the most significant and long-lasting alliance among the all international alliances of our century. It has succeeded to continue even after the annihilation of the common threat that had caused the creation of the partnership in the first place. However, it has been recognized that this alliance was not a crisis-free one. Even throughout the Cold War, the divergences between Europe and the United States had been revealed on various issues including but not limited to the German rearmament, establishment of the European Defence Community, Suez Canal crisis, French withdrawal from the military wing of NATO, war in Vietnam, Kennedy's Grand Design proposal, Kissingers's call for the Year of Europe, Ostpolitik, and Euro missile crisis during the 1980s. However, despite all the crisis, divergent perspectives and rising tensions, pillars of the Alliance had survived. Differences were contained and covered by the greater and more imminent concern of the Soviet threat. Neither Europe nor the United States had lost their commitment to the Alliance as a whole in spite of the fact that voices of skepticism and opposition had been frequently heard from both sides.

End of the Cold War was a remarkable turning point in the history of the alliance. Since the common threat had vanished, one would have expected the alliance to vanish with it. These expectations had been discredited since the transatlantic alliance survived on most areas due to the insecure environment in Europe following the disintegration of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, another common threat enabled the partners to conceal their differences on the Middle East. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait froze the transatlantic split in the Middle East and Europe demonstrated its solidarity with the United States. However, transatlantic tensions continued its very existence especially on the approaches of the two actors towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In an influential article published in 2002, Robert Kagan (2002: 3-6), inspired by a famous best-seller on relationships, had argued that Americans were coming from Mars, while Europeans were coming from Venus, which means that they no longer share the same views on main issues in international politics. He had continued that, due to the shifting equation of power on the two sides of the Atlantic, Europe and the United States had also shifted their perspectives and strategies. Europe had adopted the strategy of the weak while the United States had adopted that of the strong. To further exemplify this point, America has produced a tendency to quickly resort to use of military force due to its uncontested strength in that arena while Europeans avoid and condemn the use of military means and stress on diplomacy, international law, and international institutions. Similarly, Americans are more in favor of unilateral action while Europeans insist on the virtues of multilateralism. He had finally argued that, this current state of affairs was far from being transitory with its deep roots.

On the other hand, authors like Geoffrey Kemp and William Wallace had presented different ideas on the nature of the transatlantic relations. Kemp had rejected the idea that the Americans and the Europeans were from different planets and he had argued that the difference between them was coming from the fact that the Americans are from a single nation, five thousand miles away from the Middle East while the Europeans are a composite of different nations and next-door neighbors to more than 230 million people (Kemp 2004: 163). Similarly, William Wallace (2001: 16-17, 30) had argued that Europe will remain as the indispensable partner of the United States since the *similarities between Washington and Brussels are greater than the differences*. Wallace had furthered his argument that whatever the divisions are, Americans and Europeans share the same political and social values. However, they have different interpretations of liberal traditions due to their different histories, political traditions, and geographical positions. Therefore, conflicts between two actors are not as severe as Kagan argues. United States and Europe aim to achieve the same goals through different means. What is required is a better understanding of each others' characteristics. To sum it up, even though the academics agree on the existence of a split, they mainly disagree on the duration, extent, and the nature of the transatlantic differences. Disagreements seem to be less severe on the causes and the origins of the split.

There are many causes that underlie the different approaches and different records of the two sides of the Atlantic. Diverse historical experiences that two actors had gone through might be named as one of them. History has been a burden on Europe concerning its relationship with the peoples of the Middle East. The haunting legacy of the colonial era had pushed the Europeans to keep a low-profile in the settlement of the conflict, while the United States had been free from such a

constraint. United Kingdom and France deserve the most of the credit for this historical burden. As Ben Soetendorp (1994: 94) had put it, United Kingdom and France prove to be the two states that have the longest history of involvement in the Middle East among the European countries and for many years they were held responsible for the situation. However, impact of the past claims is to be multifaceted. As Nonneman (2003: 141) argues, while former colonial ties had left a bitter influence on the region, it had also left a legacy of personal, linguistic, and economic links.

Another cause behind the transatlantic differences concerns the diverse mechanisms of foreign policy making. It has been argued by Philip Gordon (1998: 75) that to compare European foreign policy to that of the United States is not a fair one since the former represents twenty-five nation states with their own identities, interests, bureaucracies, problems and agendas while United States, more or less, has a relative coherence in making its foreign policy given that it is a single nation-state. In other words, United States is better positioned to pursue a successful foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to that of the European Union. Largely intergovernmental structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy hinders an effective European stance in the region. However, contradicting opinions have also been presented. For instance, Muriel Asseburg (2003: 183) had praised the European Union on the basis of its concise, progressive and unified policies in contrast to incoherent positions of different American presidents.

As it has been articulated by Geoffrey Kemp (2004: 164-167), there are some other reasons that are specific to Europe which influence the foreign policy pursued by the European Union. First of all, Europe is much more connected to the Middle East in geographical terms. While United States is located in a distant position to the

Middle East, Europe is separated from the region only by Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, Europe is directly vulnerable to the security threats rising from the region including, but not limited to, illegal migration, terrorism and drug trafficking. In addition to that, Europe is dependent on the Middle East in terms of its energy resources. Therefore, Europe, geostrategically and economically, has large stakes in a secure and stable Middle East and has a lot to lose from their absences.

Another important difference that reflects in the divergent approaches of the two actors is the fact that the two continents are host to people that represents two sides of the conflict. While the United States is populated by six million Jewish citizens who have the ability to influence the American foreign policy through various groupings, Europe is home to almost fifteen million Muslims whom had learned to integrate into the decision making structures of their hosts.

Finally, one needs to point out to the crucial importance of the transatlantic split on the future of the peace process. One may surprisingly notice the similarities between the Middle East and the Europe. While the former had earned a name for being the troubling-child of the second half of the 20th century, the same title, undoubtedly, belongs to the latter for the first half of the same century. Both regions had suffered, and one of them is still suffering, continuous unrest and turmoil, social upheavals and economic disasters, and military conflicts that produced humiliating defeats and memorable victories. While Europe, through a successful and ongoing integration process which has been rendered possible by the security umbrella and economic protection provided by the United States, managed to triumph over its demons, the Middle East is still struggling with them. As the most poisoning and central issue in the region, Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs to be settled for a secure

and prosperous Middle East. The long history of the conflict had demonstrated that the dispute may only be solved by the willingness of the domestic actors, though it has been proven that the external pressures and incentives had greatly contributed to that willingness. Even though neither Americans nor Europeans may bring peace for the people of the region, they may make a significant difference through their diplomatic, military, political, and economic power. A peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the dispute would also contribute to better relations on the two sides of the Atlantic.

This study has been organized as following. After a general introduction which presents the main questions that will be discussed throughout this study and provides a brief but select literature review, historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be examined as well as a historical analysis of transatlantic relations and transatlantic policies over the conflict. This chapter will analyze the historical setting of the split in order to have a better understanding of the divergent and the convergent policies pursued by the United States and the European Union. Designated timeline for the historical background will begin with the Colonization and the First World War and will extend into inter-war years, post-Second World War and Decolonization, establishment of the State of Israel, 1956 Suez Crisis, Six-Days War, Yom Kippur War, the civil war in Lebanon, and the first Intifadah. However, the main focus of this study will be on post-1948 period, following the establishment of the State of Israel. On those historical events, my emphasis will be on the European and American approaches during those periods. Declaration of Principles in Oslo will constitute the last step of my timeline.

Different mechanisms of foreign policy making on the two sides of the Atlantic will constitute the main concern of the following chapter. However, it

should be noted that the aim of this study is not to analyze the foreign policy making in the United States and European Union. Instead, these processes will be used as an instrument in order to understand the origins of the divergent approaches of the two actors. Prior to elaborating on the each actor separately, I will raise the central question of whether it is adequate to compare the European foreign policy to that of the United States. Theoretical and historical aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the policies of predominant European powers on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be followed by the analysis of the foreign policy making in the United States. Main interests and strategies of the transatlantic actors concerning their positions on the Middle East will also be examined.

In the following chapter, which will be essential for my main argument, I will attempt to focus on the policy differences between the United States and Europe after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. I will focus on the points that they disagree on and the causes of these disagreements. The way they approach to the basic issues in Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as their objectives and instruments that they employ to obtain those objectives will be analyzed. This chapter will also attempt to demonstrate the significance of the transatlantic disagreements over the conflict and it will aim to provide an analysis of the prospects and challenges regarding the healing of the transatlantic rift.

The Roadmap issued by the Middle East Quartet in April 2003 will set the end point of the period that I take into account. However, the dynamic nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not be neglected and the significant developments following the declaration of the Roadmap will also be discussed in the concluding chapter. Furthermore, basic findings of this study will be summarized and presented. Main questions that were provided in the first chapter will be addressed.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To provide a historical background for the Euro-American relations over the Arab-Israeli conflict proves to be a challenging yet significant task. Its significance stems from the fact that the history is the source of several differences that the alliance faces today. To have a better understanding of the Americans' and the Europeans' past on the region would enable us to develop a more insightful look at its current situation. In this respect, I will attempt to present a concise historical account of the transatlantic relations and a historical record of the transatlantic relations over the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.1 Historical Background of Transatlantic Relations

Nature of the relations between the United States and Europe can be best described as one of ambivalence which is characterized by conflict and cooperation, affection and disaffection, admiration and resentment (Ryan 2003: 3). The fact that the United States was an outgrowth of Europe further complicated the relations. While Europeans belittled the Americans for lacking a strong faith and past, for being individualistic, shallow, culturally inferior, bumptious and materialistic; Americans did not abstain from expressing their hatred towards notions that they had associated with Europe such as imperialism, hereditary aristocracy, monopoly and feudalism. However, it was also true that Americans respected the Europeans for their culture, elegance and social prestige. While Europe turned out to be the Mecca of American artists, Europeans praised Americans for their self-improvement and voluntarism.

European intellectuals such as Goethe and Tocqueville expressed their admiration for America on various occasions (Duignan and Gann 1994: 1-5).

Ambivalence proved to be dominant in the political affairs as well. In the late 18th and 19th centuries, the United States was hostile to Europe and considered itself to be in a superior and exceptional position. With a great turn in the end of 19th century, United States appeared as an ally in the First World War and Second World War and turned out to be the decisive force in both (Ryan 2003: 4).

In June 6, 1944, which was later to be commemorated as D-Day, U.S. troops landed on Normandy in order to join the liberation efforts of the continent. By the extensive military capabilities of American army, victory was soon achieved. United States, who had learned from its mistakes from post First World War era, committed itself to the reconstruction of the continent and to its security from the Soviet threat.

Soon after the victory, mechanisms were established to promote security of Europe in order to enable it to prosper. Serving to this purpose, NATO was found to keep Soviets out, Americans in, and Germans down. Europe's safety and economic affluence was essential for American decision-makers, both "*as a moral duty and a matter of national interest*". An intimate alliance between the two coasts of Atlantic had emerged.

Despite the early years of honeymoon, it was soon understood that, this alliance was not a crisis-free one. Diverging approaches were exposed on several occasions, including but not limited to the controversial and emotional issue of German rearmament, establishment of European Defence Community, Suez crisis, French withdrawal from the military wing of NATO, war in Vietnam, Kennedy's Grand Design proposal, Kissinger's call for the Year of Europe, Ostpolitik, and Euro missiles crisis in 1980s. However, despite all the crisis, divergent perspectives and

rising tensions, pillars of the Alliance survived. Differences were contained and covered by the greater and more imminent concern of Soviet threat. Neither Europe nor United States lost their commitment to the Alliance as a whole in spite of the fact that voices of skepticism and opposition were frequently raised from both sides.

By the end of the Cold War, Soviet threat had bygone to be replaced by risks arising from unstable zones of Balkans and Eastern Europe. Therefore, as Kagan puts forward, war in the Balkans enabled Europe to prolong its forefront status (Kagan 2002: 7). However, those crises revealed the fact that Europe lacked the required military capabilities to emerge as a regional power, let alone as a global power. However, military failure of European Union in Balkans should also be considered under the light of the fact that 80 per cent of peacekeeping forces in the region, and more than 70 per cent of funds came from European Union, as William Wallace reminds us.

Throughout 1990s, Europeans continued to converge and diverge on world affairs. However, what turned the hidden transatlantic tension into an obvious reality was the America's decision to launch warfare on Iraq. According to some, this was a decisive moment for the Alliance and the European Union itself. Sparkling discussions became much more intensified by the mutual accusations and hardened rhetoric such as the infamous "Old Europe-New Europe" debate. Even though Bush's visit to Europe in February 2005 seems like cracking the ice, long-term consequences of transatlantic split over Iraq is likely to be more apparent in the coming years.

In order to conclude that part, it might be argued that even though United States and Europe devoted themselves to the survival of Alliance, a true harmony among them was best under question. However, those disagreements which were

swept under the carpet gradually came to the day light and became more crucial by the end of the Cold War and on the eve of Second War on Iraq.

2.2 Transatlantic Relations Over the Arab-Israeli Dispute

The historical background of the European and American involvements in the Middle East region in general and in Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, could be analyzed in three periods. The first period, encompassing two great wars, disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the early 1950s, is characterized by an imperialist Europe and a politically distant United States. The second period roughly concurs with the Cold War and it can be described as an era of European withdrawal and its replacement with the United States and to some extent with the Soviet Union. The last period starts with the end of the Cold War and it witnesses an unchallenged United States and a reassertion of European interests in the conflict. Since the most part of the third period is reserved for an in-depth examination in another chapter, the last period will be analyzed until 1993.

2.2.1 The Birth of the Modern Middle East

Middle East, as we know it today, is a product of European colonialism represented by United Kingdom and France. It was the imperialist agendas of these two countries that designed the map of the modern Middle East and draw the lines of the protracted conflicts. It was the legacy of this period that shaped the future perceptions of the regional actors. Therefore, a better grasp of the Middle East prior to 1950s is required to understand the origins of the disagreements that the region faces today.

Middle East was dominantly an Ottoman territory until the beginning of the First World War. The road to war witnessed a rising trend of nationalism in the Arab

provinces of the Empire, partly due to the years of Arab resentment under the Ottoman rule and partly due to the provocative activities of the Britain in the region. In an interesting fashion, seeds of Arab nationalism coincided with the emergence of another nationalist project, namely Zionism. The pogroms and persecutions in Europe and Tsarist Russia, and the pressures that emerged with the rise of nationalism forced European and Russian Jewry to seek other places to live. Although the lands of Canaan was a part of their collective memory and although in each Passover Jewish people concluded their prays as “Next year in Jerusalem”, until the late 1930s, their main destination was the United States, for its prosperity and welcoming nature, rather than the bare lands of Palestine that no longer promised to be a land of milk and honey. However, it needs to be noted that, although they were small in number, the Jews that preferred to settle in Palestine by the end of the century were equipped with a strong desire of statehood.

Even though the Great War changed the entire Middle East, three developments that occurred throughout the war require further analysis for the significant place they earned concerning the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In order to provoke the Arab population against the Ottoman administration, the British High Commissioner for Egypt Sir Henry McMahon successfully appealed to the frustrated nationalist sentiments of the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali. From July 1915 to March 1916, these two figures exchanged letters to settle the terms for a united Arab state for the post-war era. At the end, British diplomat assured Sharif Hussein that an enormous Arab Kingdom were going to be established in the region in return of the Arab support during the war. On the other hand, another negotiation was going on between the French and the British diplomats. On February-March 1916, British Member of Parliament Sir Mark Sykes and former French Consul-

General of Beirut Charles Francois Georges-Picot concluded an Anglo-French agreement, later to be known with their surnames, in which the territories promised to Hussein were shared between France and Britain, and Palestine was internationalized.

Finally, by November 1917, a document to be known as Balfour Declaration was announced. Addressed from British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rotschild, the Declaration expressed British government's support to the establishment of a national Jewish homeland in Palestine. For many years, Balfour declaration was perceived as one of the sources of legitimacy for the existence of the State of Israel. Although its contribution to Israel's legitimacy is debatable, the Declaration undoubtedly complicated the matters in the region. These three controversial and contradicting promises proved to be significant for the future of the conflict since they had an enormous effect on the images of the European powers in general and United Kingdom in particular across the Middle East, but especially among the Arabs who believed that they were betrayed by the Europeans. As Rosemary Hallis points out, the way in which the British and French maneuvered and schemed to carve up Ottoman domains even before that empire had collapsed gave them a reputation for subterfuge and double-dealing (Hallis 2005: 311). Especially the Balfour declaration generated angst and resentment in the Arab population for promising to give away the Arab lands to Zionists.

The Great War turned out to be longer and more challenging than the European powers had previously assumed. On the eve of the war, Europe ruled the vast majority of world's territory and population. European industry, science, and culture had dominion over the older but weaker civilizations in China, Islamic world and elsewhere (Oudenaren 1997: 106). By the end of the war, European landscape

was totally transformed. Europe witnessed the collapse of three empires, namely the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire; a totally defeated Germany, and dramatically weakened United Kingdom and France.

In the Middle East, Arab leaders were disappointed by the conditions that the war had created. United Kingdom and France failed to meet Arabs' expectation for a unified Arab Kingdom. Instead, those regions found themselves under a new kind of colonial rule under the name of mandate.

The Middle East that emerged after the end of the First World War was an Anglo-French creation. Algeria was a French colony, Morocco and Tunisia were protectorates, and Syria and Lebanon were held as mandates under the League of Nations. Although Egypt had its independence, it was still under the British influence. Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq were also under the League of Nations mandates. Across the entire Middle East, only three states managed to avoid any form of colonial status, which were Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (Rogan 2005: 29-30).

While the weakened powers of Europe were shaping the future of the Middle East, the United States had only limited involvement in the region. Even though Woodrow Wilson had introduced his Fourteen-Points with the hope that those principles were going to be the organizing principles for the post-war era, United States witnessed drastic changes at the end of the war.² With a new president, Harding, America preferred to turn back to its continent and to leave the post-war

² Fourteen Points were outlined by Wilson to the Congress on 8 January 1918. Some of these principles had a general nature, such as to prevent secret agreements between countries, to conduct diplomacy and negotiation in front of the public, freedom of the seas and trade, removal of economic restrictions, general disarmament and establishment of an international institution that would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all nations (Fromkin: 1989, 258). The most significant one concerning the future of the Middle East was the promotion of principle of self-determination, the idea that each and every nation ought to have the right to determine its own governmental structure.

settlement to Britain and France. The Treaty of Versailles was never ratified and the United States refused to be a member of the League of Nations, creation of which was proposed by the president of America, Woodrow Wilson.

Most significant engagement of the United States in the Middle East in that era has been King-Crane commission established under the auspices of President Wilson, which aimed to undertake an official investigation on the conditions existing in the ex-Ottoman territories. Oberlin College President Henry Churchill King and Chicago businessman Charles R. Crane served as the commissioners.³ Report was made public by 1922 and its recommendations were contradictory with the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement. Report did not have any impact on the region, since it was simply ignored by the French and British policy-makers.

Even though the United States had no practical influence in the region, it was interesting that the Americans were viewed by sympathy by the Arab leaders. Wilson principles, with its themes of self-determination, equality and independence, were enthusiastically met by the Arab leaders. As Michael C. Hudson points out, since the main American activities in the region were limited to trade and missionary activity, they were seen as “good people, untainted by the selfishness and duplicity associated with the Europeans.” Arabs had even indicated that, if they could not gain their independence, they would rather be governed by the United States than by Britain or France (Hudson 2005: 285). To put it in simpler terms, this was an age of innocence for the Americans. Therefore, United Kingdom and France continued to be the most influential actors in the region though their power was not equal to what it used to be prior to war.

Throughout the mandate era, United Kingdom was in charge of the lands of Palestine. As it has been stated in Article Two of the mandate document signed in July 1922:

“The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.”

The following article of the mandate document had also obliged Britain to encourage local economy, so far as circumstances permit. However, the Zionist and Arab inhabitants of Palestine were not equally situated for statehood. First of all, Zionists in Palestine were composed of European Jewry who had only one ideal in their mind: statehood. They were brightly-educated intellectuals who had a comprehensive understanding of diplomacy and who were familiar with the European understanding of diplomacy. They also had important connections in London and Paris, which they did not refrain from utilizing. Even though they were smaller in number, they were more coordinated and better organized, due to their dedicated and focused leaders. On the other hand, Arab population held the marks of centuries of Ottoman rule. Since they were considered as a part of the Muslim millet within the Ottoman system, they did not have any experience of statehood and they lacked their own para-state structures. More significantly, Arab community was divided along many fault lines. While the rulers were divided between two powerful families, Husseinis and Nashashibis, the most important division among the ordinary

people were between peasants and urban population. Another dividing line was age, as the young population positioned itself against the old members of the Arab community. Therefore, even though Arabs seemed to be advantageous in the first glance, Zionists were better positioned for statehood.⁴

1930s proved to be a time of nightmare for British policy-makers regarding the situation in Palestine. They had to reconcile the contradicting demands of simultaneously increasing Jewish and Arab nationalism in the region. Increasing number of *aliyot*⁵ to the lands of Palestine from Europe and Soviet Union following the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Europe was another cause of concern due to its effects on the delicate demographic conditions in the mandate area.⁶ Skyrocketing Jewish population and simultaneously emerging nationalisms of two people accelerated the already existing clashes between the Zionists and Arabs in Palestine.

Accumulated unrest reached its peak by 1936 which gave way to Great Arab Revolt that lasted for three years. After many reports, British administration decided to limit the influx of Jews running away from Europe and immigrating to Palestine. Finally, in May 1939, British White Paper was announced. Under the White Paper, Palestine was envisaged to be independent within the next ten years and the Arabs would have to approve Jewish immigration after a five-year quota was filled, and

⁴ Regarding the lack of coordination and effective administration on the Arabs' side, two political organizations need to be specifically mentioned which are the Arab Executive and the Arab Higher Committee formed respectively in 1920 and 1936. Even though these organizations had been generally supported by the public, they were not recognized to be representative by the British governments on the ground that their leaders were not elected by the population at large and that these organizations were opposed to the principles embodied in the Mandate which included the Balfour declaration (Lesch 1973: 21).

⁵ *Aliyot* is the plural form for *aliyah* which could be literally translated as "ascent" and refers to the migration of Jews to Palestine/Israel.

⁶ At the beginning of 18th century, the population of the Jewish community was 6,000 out of 400,000. During the first *aliyah* (1882-1903) 25,000 Russian Jews, running from the pogroms, arrived to the Holy Lands. Another 30,000 settled in throughout the second *aliyah* (1904-1914). The third and the fourth waves occurred between 1919-1928. However, it was the fifth *aliyah* (1929-1939) that drastically changed the demographic structure of Palestine. During these years, 250,000 Jews arrived in Palestine (Jones and Murphy 2002: 9-10).

extensive restrictions would apply to the purchasing of land by the Jews from Arabs. Neither Zionists nor Arabs accepted the paper (Lesch 1973: 40). Declaration of the White Paper placed Zionist leaders in a tough situation. Jewish organizations in Palestine needed British support for their survival against the Arabs, but they were also supposed to be in cross with the British administration for the concessions they asked for in the white paper.⁷ Confusion had averted by Ben Gurion's genius formula of "fighting the war as there is no White Paper, and fighting the White Paper as there is no war."

The Second World War, as it did everywhere else, transformed the dynamics of the Middle East in general and Zionist-Arab encounter in particular. Holocaust changed the entire image of the Jews around the world and convinced the international community that the establishment of a Jewish state was justified and inevitable. In contrast to the post-First World War era, United States did not turn back to its isolationist policies and decided to remain in World politics. As the European powers, totally devastated by the consequences of the war, were finally coming to terms with their weaknesses, the Cold War parameters started to settle. However, throughout the early 1940s, the United States preferred to follow a hands-off policy in the Middle East since it believed that the United Kingdom and France were strong enough to protect the western interests in the region vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. Therefore, conflict was not an initial concern of the Americans while the containment of the Soviet Union had the first place among the priorities of the United States in the region.

⁷ The British White Paper of 1939 proved to be a controversial document that failed to satisfy neither Arabs nor Jews. The Jewish community disliked the section on immigration which proposed to limit the Jewish immigration to 75,000 for the next five years and made it subject to the approval of Arabs for the following years. Besides, the White Paper had asserted a restriction on the purchasing of Arab lands by the Jews. On the other hand, the Arab Higher Committee also declined the White Paper on the basis that it did not contain a guaranteed time-limit and, as Lesch (1973: 40) argues, mostly because Hajj Amin al-Husseni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, had rejected it. The White Paper was explicitly forbidding his return to Palestine.

Another important development that occurred throughout the war was the shift of the Zionist activities from Paris and London to Washington. Even though Palestine had appealed many Jews during the war, the majority of the migrants preferred to live on the other side of the Atlantic. However, the influence of Jewish lobby in the United States in 1940s should not be exaggerated. As Michael Hudson (2005: 289) reminds us, there was a bitter debate on what position the United States should assume on the questions concerning a future Jewish state in Palestine. Although the pro-Zionist lobby was gaining influence in domestic politics, the Executive Branch officials were aware of the global and regional implications of an American supported Jewish state.

In 1947, United Kingdom, aware of its ineffective and disadvantaged position in Palestine, referred the Palestine question to the United Nations which came up with the Partition Plan that divided the mandate lands into two separate states. After long debates and a controversial voting, the United States used its leverage to persuade Haiti, Liberia, and Philippines to vote in favor of the Resolution which rendered the acceptance of the Plan possible. U.S.A. also became the first country to recognize the newly established state of Israel on 14 May 1948. Under the presidency of Truman, the United States launched two initiatives in order to spread its influence in the region. These two attempts, the Middle East Command and the Middle East Defense Organization were rejected by the Arab states. the Baghdad Pact, a quite ephemeral British effort with similar characteristics, also failed to appeal to its targeted states and remained limited to Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran.

Developments analyzed within this phase prove to be significant for the Middle East in general and Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. This time period witnesses the introduction of the modern state system to the Middle East. What is

known as the Middle East today has been largely shaped throughout these years. When we examine the basic trends of this era, we observe that while the great powers of Europe, the United Kingdom and France, were influential during the most part of this period, they were significantly weakened by two consecutive world wars and they were no longer able to be a decisive actor in the Middle East, especially by 1950s. However, the vacuum that emerged after their withdrawal was going to be filled soon by the United States.

2.3.2 Retreat of Europe, Rise of the United States

The second half of the 20th century was characterized by the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, namely the Cold War, influencing the world politics for fifty years. The Middle East was not immune to the effects of the Cold War. As the European powers of United Kingdom and France lost their sphere of influence in the region, they were replaced by the United States and, to some extent, the Soviet Union.

This era also witnessed a dazzling process of integration in Europe and radical changes in the state system of the Middle East. Revolutions followed one another in the region and radical regimes appeared in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria even though their radical aspects were significantly diminished in the aftermath of the June war of 1967. As a result of these radical transformations as well as the escalating animosity with the Soviet Union, American interests in the region started to diversify. While the prominent concern of the United States in 1940s and 1950s was to contain the Soviet Union, especially after the Suez Canal crisis and the June war, maintenance of the survival of the Jewish state emerged as another objective of the American administrations. In addition to Israel, protection of conservative

regimes in the Middle East, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia also appeared as an American concern.

Another theme that was introduced into the agendas of American and European foreign policies, with varying levels of influence, was the secure and cheap flow of oil from the oil-producing countries of the region. However, the most important change on their foreign policies was the fact that a peaceful and satisfactory settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged as a significant issue for the American foreign policy. Another important development of that period has been the gradual cooling-off experienced by the Europeans and the Israelis concerning their bilateral relations. Especially after the oil shock in 1973, European countries adopted an increasingly pro-Arab stance on the settlement of the dispute which led to strained relations with the state of Israel.

Suez Canal crisis in 1956 proves to be a turning point concerning the position of the European powers and the United States. France and United Kingdom, both for their own reasons, perceived Nasser's Egypt as a cause of instability and insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa.⁸ The military attack launched by Israel and supported by Britain and France urged the United States and the Soviet Union to intervene in the situation and the crisis ended with the retreat of Israel, Britain and France. Suez crisis clearly demonstrated that the days of Europe in the Middle East were over. As a result of the European weakness exposed by the crisis, the United States concluded that the United Kingdom and France would no longer be eligible to protect the Western interests in the region and as a consequence of this understanding, the United States decided to take the matters into its own hands and

⁸ The opposition of the United Kingdom and France to the nationalization of Suez Canal mostly resulted from the fact that this situation would deprive them from an important source of revenue. On the other hand, France was also worried about the support provided by Nasser to the uprisings in Algeria while the United Kingdom considered Nasser as a threat to British interests in Iraq and Jordan (Soetendorp 1999: 94).

took over the role of security guarantor in the region (Blackwill and Stürmer 1997: 3). This replacement of guarantor was significant since the United States had perceived the Arab-Israeli conflict as a potential source of military confrontation with the Soviet Union while France and Britain had approached the conflict as a local dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Soetendorp 1999: 96).

Even though the Suez Canal crisis was the ultimate point of humiliation for Britain and France, it did not cause a great surprise. European weakness and ability to control its own destiny had become obvious after the destruction of the Second World War. Post-war economic problems, rise of nationalism in the colonies, declining political and economic value of possessing colonial territories and domestic weaknesses had made it too costly to remain as a colonial power. Therefore, the historical process that had started during the First World War was completed by mid 1960s and decolonization was fulfilled. As Europe turned its energy and attention to its own affairs, the United States and the Soviet Union took over the mantle of being a global power (Oudenaren 1997: 108-109).

Another demonstration of American willingness to be influential in the Middle East appeared only one year after the Suez Canal crisis. In January 1957, President Eisenhower announced the Doctrine which is named after himself in order to assure that the United States would use armed forces upon request in response to imminent or actual aggression from Communist forces in the Middle East. The first recipient of the Eisenhower doctrine became Lebanon in 1958.

Almost a decade after the Suez crisis, Israel's position as a strategic and military asset for the United States rather than a liability was reinforced by the swift and clear victory of the Israeli army against the joint forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in June 1967. As Joe Stork (1993: 132) has put it, 1967 "confirmed Israel's

utility to Washington”. United States turned out to be Israel’s critical external security partner and Israel became the largest recipient of American security assistance (Blackwill and Stürmer 1997: 66).

War of 1967 also had severe consequences for Israeli-French relations. Before 1967, France was a significant arms supplier to Israel and the two countries were cooperating in a nuclear research program. However, Charles de Gaulle had different priorities for France. He needed the friendship of the Arab world in order to handle its Algerian problem and he was relieved by the fact that the work on the nuclear bomb was completed. Therefore, he felt free to impose a military embargo on Israel which put this state into a tough situation since almost all the Israeli aircraft were of French origin. After 1967, France adopted a pro-Arab stance on the conflict and embraced the French version of Resolution 242 which demanded a complete withdrawal from the entire occupied territories. France continued its demand to be influential in Arab-Israeli dispute and de Gaulle proposed Four-Power Talks among France, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and the United States. Even though the Americans reluctantly agreed to initiate talks within the framework that the French had suggested, Four-Power Talks failed to produce any results (Soetendorp 1999: 97-98).

While de Gaulle was trying to restore French influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger years in American foreign policy was about to begin. Even though Kissinger was the National Security Advisor under the presidency of Nixon, he soon became the Secretary of State by replacing William Rogers. During Kissinger’s tenure of 1973-1977, the Arab-Israeli conflict became a top foreign policy priority. Israeli-American relations continued to progress with a series of

agreements in 1971 which expanded the already prodigious American military support to the Jewish State (Stork 1993: 133).

1970 witnessed the emergence of an important development in the European integration process. Members of the European Community agreed on the establishment of European Political Cooperation, in Simon Hix's (1999: 342) words, "to add a political dimension to economic integration". It also needs to be mentioned that the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the first and most prominent items on the agenda of European Political Cooperation. Especially after the June war, Israel was no longer perceived as "a progressive democracy establishing a European style state while Palestinians were seen as suffering under colonial occupation in an anti-colonial age". The most detailed exchange of views at the very first meeting of EPC in November 1970 was on the situation in the Middle East (Musu and Wallace 2003: 104).

Creation of the European Political Cooperation coincided with the increasing dependency of Europe and, some extent, the United States on Middle Eastern oil. The United States had started to get involved in Middle East oil with the Red Line agreement in 1928, but as Michael Hudson points out, oil did not acquire a strategic security dimension until the Second World War. Secure supply of cheap Middle East oil became an American concern due to declining reserves in the United States and the need to reconstruct western economies (Hudson 2005: 288). However, Europe was more dependent on the Middle East oil than the United States. In 1960s, Europeans had hoped to shift from a coal-based energy economy to nuclear power. But the rising costs and uncertainty of nuclear power and availability of cheap oil from Middle East led to a European dependence on oil (Musu and Wallace 2003: 103).

In 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, in response to Nixon administration's decision to rearm Israelis and to grant them US \$ 2.2 billion of military aid pushed Saudi Arabia to apply a selective oil embargo which was soon to be followed by other oil producers. Even though it was not the first time that they had attempted to use oil as a political weapon, this time circumstances were in favor of oil-producing states due to the western dependency on Middle East oil. Arab states created three categories of states. In the first group there were the friendly states which were not subject to any kind of embargo. In the second group there were the enemy states which were subject to a total embargo. In the third group there were in-between states which suffered various cutbacks. Among European countries, Netherlands was in the second group and other countries were heavily influenced by the embargo which soon reflected into the political realm.

Only few days after the embargo, the Nine issued a joint political statement that favored the Arab position. In the declaration, member states rejected the acquisition of territory by force and stressed the necessity of Israel to withdraw from the lands that it had occupied since 1967. They also acknowledged the right of each state to live in peace and security. However, what was groundbreaking in this document was their reference to the Palestinian people by asserting that legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account. Two days after the statement, Arabs decided to stop 5 per cent cutback to the member states with the exception of Netherlands (Soetendorp 1999: 101).

After 1973, Europeans increasingly supported Arab positions in the conflict. In 1974, they referred to the Palestinians once again as the Palestinian people. In 1975, they stated that a Middle East settlement should include the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to the effective expression of their national identity

which could involve a territorial base. In 1976, they openly endorsed the idea that Palestinians have the right to have their own homeland. In 1977, they reaffirmed their position towards the creation of a Palestinian state even though they refrained from making any reference to Palestine Liberation Organization. Nevertheless, German Chancellor Willy Brandt openly met with Arafat in Vienna in 1978 and France officially recognized the political legitimacy of PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Soetendorp 1999: 101-103).

On the other hand, Americans pursued a different policy. The Oil shock had urged Kissinger to put an end to his foreign policy which was ignoring and isolating the Palestinians and pushed him towards mediating in the conflict. It also needs to be mentioned that, prior to the oil crisis, American approach to Palestinians had remained one of marginalization and denial of the Palestinian movement and subordination of Palestinian representation to Jordan. After 1973, it has been acknowledged that Palestinians should be incorporated to a negotiated settlement (Stork 2003: 134-136). However, approach of the United States to PLO has remained unchanged. In 1975, United States committed itself not to negotiate with PLO without Israeli approval or until PLO accepted 242 and recognized Israel's right to exist. Kissinger initiated his shuttle-diplomacy with the goal of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. In contrast to Europe, which preferred a comprehensive settlement, Kissinger believed that a step-by-step strategy would serve better since the key demands of Arabs and Israelis were not compatible. Kissinger managed to achieve two Israeli disengagements in 1974 and 1975 (Soetendorp 1999: 104).

Election of Carter in 1977 brought a temporary change to American foreign policy. In contrast to Kissinger, Carter did not favor a partial solution and he asked

for a comprehensive peace agreement and he was willing to talk with the Palestinians and even with PLO. Unlike Nixon's position on the conflict, Carter even pronounced the need for a Palestinian political entity (Stork 1993: 137-138, Soetendorp 1999: 104). However, at the end of 1977, after the rejection of the peace process by PLO, Carter changed his entire rhetoric and declared himself as opposed to an independent Palestinian state. In 1979, talks between Egypt and Israel were concluded with an Israeli-Egyptian-American peace treaty in Camp David which sent shock waves to the Arab world.

Even though the Europeans, especially French, attempted to get involved in the peace process, they were continuously excluded by Kissinger. After the conclusion of Camp David accords, Europe decided to adopt a wait-and-see approach but continued to assert the right of Palestinians to have a homeland. Pro-Arab position of European approach to Arab-Israeli conflict culminated in the announcement of Venice Declaration in June 1980. Reasserting the need for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Venice Declaration endorsed a settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and which acknowledged the *right to existence and to security of all States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people*. It also stressed the right of Palestinians' to self-determination. Declaration of Venice constituted an important step by suggesting that the PLO should be associated with the negotiations and by discrediting the Israeli settlements as illegal under international law.

Even though the Declaration had strong pro-Palestinian remarks, it failed to please the Palestinians who regarded the statement as the product of American blackmail while Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, a Polish Jew who had lost

his entire family in the Holocaust, referring to the Munich Agreement of 1938, called the declaration as *a Munich surrender*. Consequently, Venice widened the gap between Israel and Europe by pushing Israel to disqualify the Europeans as honest brokers (Musu and Wallace 2003: 105).

On the other hand, by 1981, United States had a new president. Reagan demonstrated his strong pro-Israeli approach in his first press conference in which he stated that the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were not illegal and that he had no sympathy toward the Palestinians. He also gave free hand to Menachem Begin who initiated the invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, an act which the United States neither condemned nor criticized. In 1982, Ronald Reagan issued his peace plan which referred to Palestine problem as more than a question of refugees and opposed Israeli settlements. His plan was rejected by both sides (Stork 1993: 139-141).

Outbreak of the first *Intifada* in 1987 across the occupied territories changed the entire image of Israelis and Palestinians across the international community. Portraits of Palestinian children throwing stones to Israeli tanks, and Israeli soldiers responding with an unequal force and brutality caused an international shock and created pressures on the United States to push Israel to a more compromising position. Short term fruits of *Intifada* soon appeared. Next year, in 1988, American administration decided to talk to PLO declaring that it had renounced terrorism and accepted 242 (Smith 2005: 232). On the other hand, Europe was also influenced by the coverage of *intifada* in media. European Parliament denied finalization of three protocols on Israel's trade and financial relations with the European Community (Hollis 2005: 322).

2.3.3 From End of the Cold War to Oslo

Soviet Union's decline in 1980s and its ultimate collapse in 1991 transformed the global politics on an unprecedented scale. Fifty years of Cold War ended with the triumph of the United States and the Western world while the republics constituting the Soviet Union announced their independence and people of the Soviet-backed regimes in Central and Eastern Europe rebelled against their Communist rulers.

Impact of the end of the Cold War was not limited to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but extended to a larger geography. The fact that the United States had emerged as the sole and unchallenged superpower in world politics had some global consequences. To begin with Europe, it might be argued that the collapse of the Moscow-supported regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had significant implications for Western Europe. After forty-five years of separation, Europe finally became reunited. This reunification between the Western and Eastern Europe evoked questions concerning European identity and security (due to the unforgettable memories of "German menace") and the future role of Europe in world politics. Elimination of the Soviet threat also led the Europeans and the Americans to reconsider the pillars of the transatlantic alliance.

Demise of the Soviet Union also transformed the geopolitics of the Middle East, since some of the Arab regimes in the region had lost their principle advocate and aid supplier and the United States remained as the only hegemon in the region. Removal of one superpower from the Middle East also gave rise to a debate concerning whether Europe would be eligible to emerge as the second influential power in the Middle East. Another important consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the massive immigration of the Russian Jewry to Israel which caused a significant change in demographic conditions. In terms of Europe-United

States-Middle East triangle, as Robert Satloff (1997: 8) puts it, end of the Cold War had two implications. First of all, it lifted off the Cold War constraints that had previously restricted European activity and secondly, it produced a rethinking of European security that led many Europeans to focus as much on the south as on the east.

Even though the disintegration of the Soviet Union had fueled hopes for a new era that was going to be crisis-free, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 proved to point to the opposite direction. The United States, backed by a strong coalition including the Arab states, forged a military attack to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait. Throughout the Gulf War, West European governments showed solid support to the United States through effective military forces and financial contributions.

Gulf crisis proved to be a significant point in the timeline of the conflict. Powerful position of the United States in the international arena and the unprecedented coalition of Western and Arab armies created a perfect environment to move forward an Arab-Israeli settlement. It also needs to be mentioned that, even though some Arab states had supported United States against Iraq, Arab world in general deeply resented the fact that the United States seemed to be more sensitive when the sovereignty of a tiny sheikhdom with oil was challenged while dispossession and oppression of the Palestinian people were left to linger without any intervention (Soetendorp 1999: 110, Stork 1993: 144). Therefore, a pressure existed on the United States to step into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which led Secretary of State Baker to start preparations for an international conference. His efforts produced the convening of Madrid Conference in November 1991 with the participation of the European Union, United States, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and

Jordan. Even though PLO was excluded from the negotiations, Palestinians not associated with PLO was allowed to participate through the Jordanian delegation which had occurred for the first time in the history of the conflict.

Although PLO was not permitted to join the conference, one might argue that, in an ironic fashion, it was the PLO and Arafat that turned out to be the most advantageous actor in the aftermath of the Gulf war. Even though Arafat had sided with Saddam against its principal financial sources, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, at the end, Palestinians were represented in Madrid (Smith 2005: 233).

In the background, Europe, which was surrounded with momentous events in the Central and Eastern Europe, had moved one step further in its long path of integration by the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. On the other hand, the European Union attended the Madrid conference as the chair of the working group on regional economic development and the co-chair of four other groups that discussed the issues of water, environment, disarmament, and the Palestinian refugees.

Unfortunately, talks at Madrid soon reached to a deadlock with an Israeli Likud government rejecting Palestinian self-rule and any form of territorial concessions. However, by 1992, both the United States and Israel had new administrations. Yitzhak Rabin's Labor government which was more motivated to peace than Yitzhak Shamir started secret talks with the Palestinians under the Norwegian umbrella. These secret negotiations resulted in the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. Oslo peace process, the most promising one in the entire record of the peace attempts in Arab-Israeli conflict, officially started with an unforgettable moment of hand-shaking between Clinton, Arafat and Rabin in front of the White House.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:

THE AMERICAN WAY AND THE EUROPEAN WAY

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the diverse mechanisms of foreign policy making in the United States and the European Union. By doing so, this chapter intends to reach to a better comprehension on the causes of the transatlantic differences. In order to do so, definition of foreign policy and foreign policy making will be initially provided, which will be followed by the significance of different mechanisms of foreign policy making on the two sides of the Atlantic. After that, foreign policy making system in the United States will be analyzed which will be followed with that of the European Union.

To provide an adequate definition of foreign policy proves to be a challenging task due to the dynamic and complex nature of world politics. One may argue that to produce a definition of foreign policy used to be easier in the century that we left behind due to the smaller number of the actors involved and less international interaction. Therefore, there has been a lack of agreement on how to define foreign policy and what needs to be included in the term. Many analysts have focused on the policies that states declare, the decisions taken within the administrative circles, the processes by which governments arrive at policies and decisions, and the actions actually performed by the governments. In this respect, Russett and Starr have described foreign policy as the output of state into the global

system and a set of guides to choices being made about people and things beyond the boundaries of the state (1996: 162-163).

From another perspective, Charles Kegley (1996: 7) describes foreign policy as the “goals that the nation’s officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them”, and he ignores non-state entities and nongovernmental agents by limiting his definition to a specific nation and the officials of that nation. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam (1999: 5) partially compensates the weakness of this definition by arguing that foreign policy “is the process by which a sovereign nation determines, promotes, secures, and advances its national security interests, its ideals, and the well-being of its citizens as it interacts and deals with other sovereign nations and non-state actors”. Therefore, Ohaegbulam recognizes the existence of non-state actors but only on the one side of the equation and he continues to limit the foreign policy making to a particular nation state. However, this approach is understandable since this is a novelty in international relations that have only few examples, most important of which is the European Union. In this respect, a recently made definition by Christopher Hill would enable us to understand the new definition of foreign policy in a more contemporary manner. According to Hill (2003: 3), foreign policy is:

(...) the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. The phrase ‘an independent actor’ enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the EU; external relations are ‘official’ to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanisms of the state or enterprise while also maintaining parsimony with respect to the vast number of international transactions now being conducted; policy is the ‘sum’ of these official relations because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign policy.

Besides foreign policy, another important concept is foreign-policy making which proves to be less problematic to define. Foreign policy making could be

defined as a given structure and process in which decision makers and foreign policy makers are authorized to influence foreign policy choices. Making of foreign policy constitute the first stage of foreign policy while the implementation of the foreign policy decision constitutes the second stage.

There are several causes of the transatlantic split over the peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such as different historical backgrounds, diverging perspectives on some critical issues and the non-uniformed interests and strategies. Causes originating from different historical accounts of the United States and the European Union concerning the region had been already analyzed. Another important cause of the transatlantic split involves the different mechanisms of foreign policy making in the United States and the European Union. These two actors, throughout the process of policy making, are influenced by distinct mechanisms, actors, processes, values and considerations. They enjoy different/similar advantages and suffer different/similar disadvantages. Therefore it is highly relevant to understand how foreign policy is made and implemented in the European Union and the United States in order to have a better grasp of the different foreign policies pursued by these two entities. For example, tensions between inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism, one of the main concerns of EU foreign policy makers, have no equivalent in US foreign policy while the uneasy relation between the presidency and the congress is nonexistent in EU structures. While US foreign policy making is widely influenced by the pro-Israeli lobby, Europe is mainly concerned with its Arab communities. While US policy makers command large resources of military and economics, EU foreign policy makers suffer from the difficulties of reconciling different economic and financial perspectives and from the lack of a strong and credible military force.

It needs to be mentioned that, however, purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed and an in-depth account of foreign policy making process for the European Union and the United States, which would be an impossible task to handle within the limited boundaries of this study. Purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how different foreign policy making mechanisms adopted by the European Union and the United States affect the foreign policies they pursue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Even though one of the dimensions of this chapter concerns the comparison of foreign policy making processes of the European Union and the United States, such a comparison requires few caveats. According to Philip Gordon (1997/1998: 74-75), to compare foreign and security policy of the European Union to that of the United States is inadequate since “CFSP is more limited, its mechanisms and procedures have been in place for only a short time; and obstacles to foreign policy cooperation among longstanding sovereign states with their own histories, perspectives, interests, and bureaucracies are obvious.” However, one should not exaggerate the limits to this comparison. As it has been previously mentioned, there are a number of disadvantages in foreign policy making that both the United States and the European Union are subjects to. For example, like the European Union is constrained with thorny task of reconciling diverse interests and agendas of its constituent nation-states, US policy makers is constrained with equally critical issue of balancing the interests of various ethnic groups, business groups, and interest groups. Therefore, to understand how foreign policy is made in Brussels and Washington would enable us to have a more accurate account of foreign policies pursued by these two entities.

3.2 American Foreign Policy

American foreign policy decisions are the products of a complex mechanism that involves a range of actors including the president, Congress, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, media and various interest groups. Beyond these agencies, values and beliefs that have been shaped throughout centuries have an impact on the making of American foreign policy regardless of the decision makers. Aim of this chapter is to provide an account of the significance of the American foreign policy making mechanism on American foreign policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The mechanism of foreign policy making in the United States is a complex and dynamic one. Even though the executive branch encompassing the president, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency seem to make and implement all the significant policies, this is rarely the case. Without underestimating the role of the executive branch, the legislative represented by the Congress also holds a very critical position within the policy making structures. The constitutional design which divides the responsibility of foreign policy between the executive and legislative, merged with the pluralist nature of the American society contributes to the complexities of foreign policy making. Besides the executive and legislative agencies, the American foreign policy has been heavily influenced by the power of the media and interest groups. Furthermore, the making of foreign policy in the United States suffers from the dilemma between the comparatively recent need for a strong global leadership and constitutionally established purpose of balancing the powers of the executive branch with that of the legislative branch. Beyond the domestic structure and the

constitutional design, the external factors that occur in an autonomous environment, such as globalization, the end of the Cold War and the rapid improvements in information technology, also limit or expand the opportunities of American foreign policy.

3.2.1 American Foreign Policy Making and Its Implications on the Middle East

Decisions taken by the American foreign policy mechanism reflect the results of a complicated and dynamic structure. Foreign policy of the United States concerning Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be seen as an exception to that. Making and the implementation of the American foreign policy on the conflict depends on many factors, including but not limited to, the external context, domestic setting, governmental structure and individual assessments. It also needs to be mentioned that these variables prove to be interconnected and supremacy of one over the other varies. To argue that it is one of these factors that determine the American foreign policy, be it the President, the Congress or the Jewish lobby, would be an oversimplification of the decision-making processes.

Within the executive branch of the American government, president proves to be the most influential figure concerning the decision-making mechanisms. As Hudson (2005: 296) puts it, the president is the key actor in the shaping of the Middle East policy who is aware of the fact that the policies he pursues in the region could have a significant positive or negative effect on his political future in terms of the chances of reelection or the legacy that he will leave behind. In this respect, the previously formed assumptions of the president concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gain additional significance. As Henry Kissinger also argues, “convictions that leaders formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will

consume as long as they continue in the office” (Ohaegbulam 1999: 76). It is true that the main purpose of the American foreign policy is to uphold American national security interests, but how these interests are defined and perceived depends on the assumptions of the policy elites. Each president has his own interests and choices of issues on which to concentrate. Truman’s recognition of the Jewish State in 1948 despite the counter opinions of his close advisers or Clinton’s decision to focus on the peace process rather than the situation in North Korea in the last days of his presidency might be given as examples.

Besides the presidency, the other institutions within the executive branch also possess considerable influence over the Middle East policy. The Department of State, as the principle organizer of foreign policy, is another leading institution even though its power over policy making had gradually diminished since the expansion of the executive bureaucracy to include Department of Defense and National Security Council. However, the State Department in general and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in particular continue to have influence over the making and implementation of American foreign policy. The main purpose of the Department is “to protect American political, commercial, and cultural interests by maintaining correct relations with parties thought to be dominant on the region” (Spiegel 1985: 6). The State Department is generally perceived to embrace a more pro-Arab stance compared to the position of the Congress. The numerical supremacy of the Arab states in the region and the energy interests of the United States might enable us to explain the pro-Arab position of the State Department. The fact that the Department has to consider the American interests and concerns in a much broader Arab world

and it has to deal with the pressure rising from twenty-two Arab states on the issues concerning the Middle East contributes to the policy choices of the Department.⁹

The Department of Defense, due to the considerable presence of the American military throughout the Middle East, also holds a significant place in American foreign policy concerning the region. The Department seeks to reconcile the contradicting policies required by the threats to energy supplies in the region, the importance of the Arab states and special relationship with Israel. Even though the Defense Department was against the recognition of State of Israel in 1948 on the basis that such a decision would threaten the oil supplies located in the region and create new opportunities for Soviet influence by antagonizing the Arab states, it adopted a more pro-Israeli approach during the 1960s and 1970s due to the increasing cooperation between the two countries (Spiegel 1985: 5).

The influence of the National Security Council is largely determined by the personal skills of the National Security Adviser. While National Security Advisers such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice had proven to leave their imprints on the American foreign policy through the doctrines and initiatives that they had envisaged concerning the region and the promotion of peace process, others had failed to do so. Besides, following several examples, one may argue that this post has functioned as a stepping stone for becoming the secretary of state. While the fundamental objective of the executive bureaucracy is to provide information and advice to the president and assist him in making and implementing American foreign policy, the large number of people involved in these institutions stands as an important constraint over the presidential decision making. The sheer number of departments means that many different

⁹ Personal interview with Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi, İstanbul, Koc University, December 15 2005.

perspectives must coexist while the personal rivalries and ambitions compound the problem of organizational fragmentation (Nathan and Oliver: 1994: 4).

The U.S. Congress is another institution with significant influence over the American foreign policy concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As it has been previously mentioned, the legislative branch was constitutionally designed to play a counterbalancing role vis-à-vis the powers of the executive branch. Therefore, the division of foreign policy making responsibilities between the Congress and the White House is a constant source of tension between the legislative and the executive. Both houses of the Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate, is heavily involved in the making of the American foreign policy on the Middle East through various committees and subcommittees on foreign relations, international relations, energy and natural resources, Middle East and Central Asia, finance and security. These committees work through operating funds, employ several aides, hold hearings on specific issues and seek to legalize their positions through bills. In contrast to the executive branch of government, the Congress is more accessible by the public. They are more open to be influenced by the lobbies and other organized interests. Pro-Israel lobbies, due to the support of the voting constituencies behind them, exert a pervasive influence over the Congress which results in regular authorization of enormous financial and military aid to Israel (Hudson 2005:296).¹⁰

Even though the executive and the legislative branches are the principal institutions of foreign policy making in the United States, the influence of various interest groups on these actors should not be ignored. Among these groups, Jewish

¹⁰ Israel currently receives about \$3 billion per year in economic and military grants, refugee settlement assistance, and other aid.

lobby, Arab-Americans and the Oil industry deserve to be examined as the most influential ones concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Among the interest groups mentioned above, it is the Jewish lobby that possesses the most significant power over the decision making structures in the United States. Representing more than six million Jewish Americans, pro-Israeli Jewish lobby has gained a well-deserved reputation for initiating and supporting pro-Israeli policies both in the executive and legislative branches of the American government. Besides the lobbying activities of the Jewish-Americans, there has been a broad support in the American society in support of the pro-Israeli decisions. Several reasons might be mentioned concerning the American sympathy towards Israel. First of all, the horrors of the Holocaust had persuaded the American society towards the need and justification for a Jewish state where the Jewish people could live in security. Therefore, it might be argued that the American support for Israel had initially begun as a moral commitment rather than a political calculation. However, as a second source of support, following the transformation of Israel from a liability to an asset after 1967, pro-Israeli decisions started to gain strategic, military, and political characteristics. Third, throughout most of the peace process, Israel has been perceived to be more inclined towards peace while the intransigence of the Arab states had created a discontent in the American people. Finally, the religious affinity of Christianity concerning the Jewish state has been determining over the American society (Ohaegbulam 1999: 277). Many Christian groups in the United States support Israel on the theological basis that perceives the return of the Jews to the Holy Land as a fulfillment of Bible.

Among the Jewish groups that support Israel, AIPAC proves to be the most visible one that combines its decades of experience in influencing both the Congress

and the White House with its ability to channel money and votes in election campaigns (Hudson 2005: 297). Even though the American Jews constitute only 5 per cent of the population, they enjoy certain advantages that place them in a privileged position. First of all, the Jewish Americans represent one of the oldest communities comprising the American nation. Second, Jewish community has a better record of contributing to political campaigns than other ethnic groups and they are more active in politics and especially in presidential campaigns which urge presidents to maintain good relations with the Jewish community (Spiegel 1985: 7). Third, Israel provides a singular focus for the mobilization of the pro-Israeli lobbies which enables them to devote their resources to a single country. Fourth, although their number is not significant compared to 10 million Latinos and 20 million African-Americans, the Jewish community demonstrate a high participation in elections and Jewish voters are mostly located at states with large electoral votes which are likely to affect the overall voting results (Nathan and Oliver 1994: 200). Finally, Jewish groups are highly organized and well-financed and they work through extensive and powerful local and state level networks that enable them to have greater influence over American foreign policy.

The impact of the Jewish lobby, however, should not be exaggerated and it should not be perceived as the sole reason behind the pro-Israeli policies of the American government. First of all, even though Israel is and likely to remain the key strategic ally of the United States in the Middle East, since Camp David Accords in 1978, the American government had started to pursue a more evenhanded policy concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that period, the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby failed to prevent the arms sale to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Following the first *Intifada*, the American public opinion started to adopt a less pro-Israeli approach due

to the treatment of the Palestinians by the Israeli forces, which occupied the international agenda due to the extensive coverage of the issue by the media (Ohaegbulam 1999: 277, Nathan and Oliver 1994: 203). Besides, it needs to be mentioned that not all American Jews are in favor of the existence of the Jewish state, let alone the policies of this state. On a theological basis, the establishment of Israel has been a source of controversy and discontent among some Orthodox Jewish communities who strongly believed that the creation of Israel through the hands of ordinary people is a blasphemy since such a state could only be divinely created by the coming of the Messiah. A Jewish state which is not created by the Messiah is accepted as a heretic establishment.¹¹

To better illustrate the limits of the Jewish lobby on American foreign policy, there have been many occasions where the pro-Israeli lobby had failed. Following the Gulf War, Israel turned out to be a serious problem for the president who tried to maintain an uneasy Arab alliance against Saddam Hussein. In September 1991, Bush administration refused to release \$ 10 billion in loan to Shamir government for housing construction. This biggest crisis between the United States and Israel ended only after the beginning of the peace process. AIPAC, despite its powerful status, could not affect the course of events and even though Bush had lost the support of the Jewish community, he won support from anti-foreign aid constituency (Nathan and Oliver 1994: 203, 322).

The American-Arab community is another group that seeks to influence American foreign policy concerning the Middle East in general and Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. However, it is clearly observed that their impact on the process is not as strong as that of the Jewish lobby. One of the causes for this

¹¹ Jewish Anti-Zionists are gathered under different organizations such as Neturei Karta, Satmar and True Torah.

inefficiency is the fact that, in contrast to the Jewish Americans, American-Arabs constitute a less homogeneous group comprising many different origins such as those coming from Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. Therefore, it is difficult for the Arab community to speak with a single voice unlike the Jewish lobby which has to concern about only one country. As Joseph Baroody, one of the former presidents of National Association of Arab-Americans, argues, the Arab lobby “can not represent the Arabs the way the Jewish lobby can represent Israel since the Israeli government has one policy to state, whereas (the Arab lobby) couldn’t represent the Arabs even if (they) wanted to” (Spiegel 1985: 7).¹² Besides its heterogeneous nature, the Arab lobby lacks the financial resources and the organizational skills that the Jewish lobby enjoys. Therefore, American-Arab Anti Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab equivalent of AIPAC, exerts limited influence on American foreign policy compared to the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby.

On the other hand, ADC is not the only organization that seeks to endorse Arab interests in American foreign policy. The oil industry, due to its interests in oil producing Arab states, supports stable, moderate and pro-American regimes throughout the Arab world together with other industries, such as banking and construction that conduct business in the region (Spiegel 1985: 7). American Petroleum Institute, representing more than 300 oil companies, is one of the strongest organizations that campaigns to advance the interests of the oil-producing states in the Middle East.

¹² National Association of Arab Americans was founded in 1972 to promote Arab interests in American foreign policy until its merge with the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).

3.2.2 American Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Interests and Strategies

One may argue that the events following the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces were quite ironic. The Iraqi war in 1992 became the first demonstration of the political, diplomatic, military, and economic strength of the United States as the only global superpower and the Middle East became the first region for American foreign policy to display its uncontested supremacy. On the other hand, the same Middle East used to be the most contested area of the American-Soviet rivalry throughout the entire Cold War. And it was during the Cold War that the American foreign policy interests in the region had fully developed.

Prior to the end of the Second World War, as it has been discussed in the previous chapters, American involvements in the Middle East were limited to trade and missionary activities. However, since the very beginning of the formation of the Cold War structures, the Middle East was an indispensable part of the American and Soviet agendas. It has even been argued that the Cold War has been launched in the Middle East by the tensions over Soviet withdrawal from Iran and with Soviet demands on Turkey and Greece that resulted in the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. Throughout the Cold War period, American foreign policy in the region was shaped by two concerns: the principle of the containment of the Soviet Union and the protection of the oil resources. To that end, United States sought to establish alliances with various regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Pahlavi's Iran, Turkey, post-Nasser Egypt, and Israel. On the other hand, the United States aimed to protect the conservative Arab states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, against the aggression of the radical Arab regimes sponsored by the Soviet Union such as Nasser's Egypt and Syria.

By the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the notion of containment lost its validity in American foreign policy. However, security of the energy resources in the region continues to be an important foreign policy consideration of the United States regarding the Middle East. Even though the United States import only 10 per cent of its oil from the region, disruptions in oil production and transition prove to have damaging effects on the American economy. Besides that, financial interests of the American oil companies in the region also force the United States to provide secure and unhindered flow of oil (Khalilzad 1997: 196, Satloff 1997: 10). To that end, United States seeks to pursue a policy that would protect the stability of the Gulf area and establish alliances with main oil producers of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.¹³

Another important interest of the United States in the Middle East derives from the central role played by this region in global peace/disorder and in/security. As regard to this, the poisoning effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the regional stability urges American foreign policy to promote the peaceful settlement of the dispute. As it has been previously mentioned, Israeli-Palestinian conflict is used as a pretext for Arab regimes that spend a large amount of their national budget on defense expenditures and act reluctantly toward democratization. Besides, the religious themes of the conflict feed the fundamentalist groups all around the world. The United States seem to be aware of the fact that the peace in globe goes through Jerusalem. Therefore, promotion of regional prosperity and stability is a fixed item of American foreign policy agenda concerning the region.

The importance of survival of the State of Israel might be given as another goal of the United States in the Middle East. This fact derives from both domestic

¹³ In this respect, conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors used to have drastic consequences through the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979.

and external causes. Internally, as it has been previously mentioned, Israel enjoys a large support and sympathy of American public opinion due to various reasons and it benefits from the significant backing of the pro-Israeli Jewish lobbies in Washington. On the external side, since 1967, Israel had proved itself to be not a liability but an asset for the American interests in the region. Despite the existence of numerous disagreements between the two countries, both are aware of the fact that they need each other in the thorny dynamics of the Middle East.

To sum it up, a peaceful and sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a high priority for American foreign policy due to several reasons. First of all, settlement of the conflict removes one of the American concerns towards the free flow of oil from the region. Second, the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian peace would significantly reduce the tensions in the region and would minimize the influence of fundamentalist discourse in the regional politics. It would deprive the local autocrats an important excuse for not implementing democratic reforms and it would contribute to the general well-being of the people by relieving national economies from a critical burden of military spending. A prosperous Middle East, as Zalmay Khalilzad (1997: 198) puts it, would be beneficial to Americans by creating an important market for the United States, by stabilizing the region, and by increasing regional economic growth. Finally, end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be the best remedy to Israel's security concerns and would remove a source of tension in Israeli-American relations.

Therefore, considering the American interests in the region, the time and energy invested by the United States to present and implement a sustainable peace plan that would satisfy both parts is not surprising.

3.3 European Foreign Policy

Since its foundation, the nature and success of the European integration had been a source of controversy and debate among the academics. Even though the purpose of the founding fathers of the European integration was to bind the people of the continent with common policies that would lead to a common destiny, it took a long time for the Union to extend the integration from an economic basis to a political one. It has been observed that, the process of integration had been faster and smoother on politically insignificant issues while it had slowed down on issues related to the realm of “high-politics.” Within this framework, to start and advance the integration of foreign policies of the member states into a single foreign policy in the name of the Union has been a constant theme of the agenda since 1960s even though this process had been solidified only after the end of the Cold War by the beginning of the 1990s.

Prior to examining the foreign policy mechanism of the European Union, one needs to clarify the nature of European Union’s foreign policy. From the perspective of a skeptic, the European Union might be conceived as an ineffective and incomplete actor which has very limited influence on third countries and on international issues (Smith 2003:1). This perception of EU as a weak actor might be exemplified with the failures of the European Union to take action in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq. However, it would be an inadequate approach to totally ignore the occasions in which the EU had succeeded to act as a single foreign policy actor. For instance, humanitarian aid also proves to be the strength of the Union where the European Union manages the distribution of aid through Humanitarian Aid Office in regions such as Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and

various parts of Africa. The European Union had also achieved some relative success in initiating policies for the regions that concerns the Union through Barcelona Process or European Neighborhood Policy.

As it has been previously mentioned, within the rapidly changing structures of world politics, the notion of foreign policy is no longer a privilege possessed by the nation states alone. The fact that the non-state actors might also involve in foreign policy is illustrated by the example of European Union where 25 nation-states manage to merge their interests and strategies into a single one.¹⁴

3.3.1 Historical and Theoretical Background of European Foreign Policy

1989, as many prefer to put it, was the *annus mirabilis*, the year of miracles, for the people of Central and Eastern Europe, who had finally freed themselves from the Soviet domination. This would also apply to the governments of Western Europe who believed that the time had come for Europe to be a strong, independent and unified actor. However, year of miracles soon turned into *annus horribilis*.¹⁵ Early years of optimism soon gave way to horrors caused by the ghosts haunting the humanity from its past: ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, war and hatred resurrected in the middle of Europe. In this sense, one may argue that Common Foreign and Security Policy was created as an attempt to deal with the difficulties confronting Western Europe in its immediate neighborhood of Central and Eastern Europe. Revolutions and ethnic conflicts in the region, reunification of Germany, and the

¹⁴ There has been a substantial increase in the volume of academic studies dedicated to understand the foreign policy of the European Union and the unique place that it holds in international relations. Karen Smith's *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (2003), *The European Union As A Global Actor* (1999) by Bretherton and Vogler, *International Relations and European Union* (2005) by Hill and Smith, and Brian White's *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (2001) could be named as some of the academic endeavors to analyze this phenomena.

¹⁵ Terms *annus mirabilis* and *annus horribilis* have been respectively coined by British poem John Dryden and Queen Elizabeth II in order to refer to 1666 and 1992.

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, therefore the elimination of the Cold War constraints, gave Europe a true opportunity to pursue a foreign policy of its own.

CFSP had been officially established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as the Second Pillar along with the Community and the Justice and Home Affairs pillars. It was mentioned that “the Union shall assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.” In addition to that, Treaty had also set the objectives of the CFSP as:

“To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders, to promote international cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹⁶

As it was introduced in Maastricht, the CFSP possessed two policy instruments which were “common positions” and “joint actions.” Authority to decide rested in the Council for both and consensus was adopted as the mechanism to decide with the softening influence of the informal constructive absenteeism. The European Parliament was not, again, given a role even though Presidency of the Council was committed to consulting the Parliament and answering all Parliamentary questions concerning CFSP. In this sense, the CFSP, similar to its

¹⁶ Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union, is available online at <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>

predecessor, was clearly established as an intergovernmental branch. However, intergovernmental aspects of the initiative were relatively mitigated by Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, in which constructive absenteeism was formalized as well as the use of qualified majority vote. It also introduced “common strategies” as the third instrument. However, the most significant novelty introduced by Amsterdam was the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP (Hix 1999: 343-345). Nevertheless, the CFSP remained essentially intergovernmental.

Besides its intergovernmental nature, another weakness of CFSP lies in the multiple actors involved in it which are the member states, Council, High Representative, various Special Representatives, Commission and the Parliament. All those institutions have their own agendas, interests, problems and solutions, and bureaucracies which stand as an obstacle against an effective common policy. Unratified European Constitution proposes the end of the Pillar structure and incorporation of pillars into the Union. In this respect, it envisages the establishment of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, a post which merges High Representative of CFSP and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

To say a few words on the record of CFSP, it would be appropriate to argue that it was a mix of successes and failures. Throughout its brief history, CFSP had produced a number of common positions, joint declarations, and joint actions. It became successful in some foreign policy issues such as sending observant to the elections in Russia, conducting the humanitarian aid and administration in Bosnia, negotiating and implementing a stability pact, providing a crucial aid to the Palestinian Authority, and playing an effective role in non-crises situation (Gordon 1997/1998: 87, Hix 1999: 347, Smith 2003: 1). However, it failed to take action in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda and was only able to penetrate in a supplementary role.

It failed to overcome the capability-expectation gap. And finally it demonstrated an embarrassing split in the war on Iraq in 2003. Today, European Union stands for almost half billion people and \$ 8 trillion combined GDP. It is the giant of global economy. However, it is not capable of transferring its assets into the making of a successful, effective, and coherent foreign policy. If EU succeeds in uniting its diplomatic and military potential, it can challenge the United States as the “lone superpower” and it can make a difference in Middle East peace process and it can create a balance in the NATO alliance (Gordon 1997/1998: 75).

Emergence, persistence and success of a European common foreign policy are threatened by many challenges. Some of these challenges rise from external factors while others result from domestic weaknesses. The fact that the outsiders (other international institutions and nation states) had learned how to make use of the divisions within the European Union, in other words the way that they divide and rule, stands as the most threatening external challenge (Hill 1998: 47). However, concerning the common foreign policy, the real challenges exist within the Union. First of all, one may argue that the European Union lacks a common identity which renders the articulation of common interests and strategies thorny, if not impossible at all. Therefore, discussions on important foreign policy decisions revolve around national interests which are challenging to reconcile and harmonize. In other words, the insistence of national governments to pursue their foreign policy interests proves to be the biggest challenge (Smith 2003: 3). It should also be remembered that members of the EU adopt different models for foreign policy behavior since they represent a variety of geography, size, wealth, and historical roles (Hill 1998: 47). Second, the common foreign policy of the European Union suffers from the lack of an overall coherence in policy formulation and an inadequate articulation between

policy making and policy implementation (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 187). Third, the foreign policy instruments employed by the European Union are fundamentally civilian ones. In other words, despite the current attempts to constitute a European army, the Union does not possess its own military instruments and relies on the facilities and resources provided by the member states and NATO assets. Finally, as a consequence of the shared power between the commission and member states, the European Union is ill-equipped to act swiftly in the making of foreign policy.

3.3.2 Foreign Policy Making: The European Way

Since the Maastricht agreement in 1992, the European Union functions through three pillar structure which consists of Community pillar, Common Foreign and Security Pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. Even though all three pillars are involved in the making of the European foreign policy, only first two pillars will be examined since the foreign policy decisions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are mostly produced within these two pillars.

To begin with the Community pillar, it should be argued that two of the Union's most powerful foreign policy instruments fall under the authority of first pillar which are the capacity to enter into international agreements and the provision of financial assistance to the third parties. The fact that the EU is the largest trading bloc in the world and one of the largest aid donors contribute to the significance of the Community pillar (Cini 2003: 230).

The European Union concludes three types of international agreements under the Community pillar which are the trade agreements (the most limited one), cooperation agreements (more comprehensive than the trade agreements), and association agreements (the most extensive in scope). In order to negotiate and

conclude an agreement, the European Union Council authorizes the Commission to open the negotiations with the third country/international organization. The Commission carries out the negotiation in consultation with the Council and the Council concludes the agreement by qualified majority vote for trade and cooperation agreements, and with unanimity for the association agreements. European Parliament is not involved in the trade agreements while it is consulted prior to the conclusion of cooperation agreements and its consent is required for association agreements (Cini 2003: 231).

Concerning the CFSP pillar, European Council sets the broad guidelines and the Council of Foreign Ministers takes decisions to implement them. European Commission is fully associated with the process while the European Parliament is authorized to make recommendations but the views presented by the European Parliament do not have to be integrated into the final decisions. There are four different instruments adopted within the CFSP pillar. General guidelines are involved in matters with defence implications, common strategies are to be adopted in areas where the member states have significant common interests, joint actions are designed to address specific situations where operational action by the Union is perceived to be required, and common positions express the approach of the EU to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.¹⁷

The High Representative for CFSP is another dominant figure in the making and implementation of foreign policy decisions. A post introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and put into force in 1999, the office is held by the Secretary General of the Council, currently by Javier Solana, former physicist, Foreign Minister of Spain (1992-1995), and Secretary General of NATO (1995-

¹⁷ Further information on the functioning of the CFSP is available online at http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm

1999). The formal duty of the High Representative is “to assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on the behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries”.

To sum it up, it has been observed that the European Union stands as a very unique actor in the realm of international relations. It presents a success story in creating a common foreign policy out of the separate foreign policies of 25 member states, while it suffers from obvious weaknesses in terms of policy formulation and implementation. However, it might still be argued that the European Union has a foreign policy, as it has been defined as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations” (Hill 2003: 3), with its unique structures of decision-making and policy implementing. An examination of this mechanism indicates that the foreign policy pursued by the European Union is the result of a long and thorny process that involves in a number of EU institutions and individual member states. Even though the principle of supranationalism is observed in technical and day-to-day issues, the notion of intergovernmentalism applies to the most critical and significant foreign policy issues which constitutes a challenge for the process of European integration in the realm of foreign policy. The Council and the European Council, two intergovernmental entities in which unanimity and voting are indispensable parts of decision-making, prove to be the most powerful institutions within the making of the foreign policy in the name of the EU. The Commission holds the second place while the Parliament, the only elected body in the EU, is the least significant actor. Therefore, the practice of

intergovernmentalism controls the decision-making mechanism which makes it harder for the European Union to assert itself as a real actor in world affairs.

3.3.3 European Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Interests and Strategies

Prior to elaborating on the interests and policies of the European Union in Middle East, one needs to point out to the heterogeneous nature of the European Union. Since the European Union represents 25 nation states with different sizes, geographies, historical backgrounds, political considerations, and economic necessities. Therefore, as Eberhard Rhein rightfully argues, European interests in the Middle East, or in any other region or issue, are not completely homogenous but they are influenced by specific yet not always identical national choices and strategies (Blackwill and Stürmer 1997: 51). For example, while countries like Finland and Sweden do not have the same extent of interest in the region as Spain, France and the United Kingdom do. France is more connected to North Africa and Lebanon, while Italy has maintained a special relationship with Libya due to their colonial pasts and historical ties. Netherlands had developed closer relations with Israel, while Greece had preferred to keep the distance and Germany, resulting from its traumatic past, had adopted a delicate policy towards the Jewish state (Satloff 1997: 21).

In December 2003, the European Council approved a significant document, prepared under the supervision of Javier Solana, concerning the perception of new security threats and the ways to handle them.¹⁸ Titled as *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, the document was opened by optimistic remarks that the European continent “has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.”

¹⁸ The full text of European Security Strategy is available at http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g (retrieved at January 18, 2005)

However, this optimistic tone gave way to a precautionary one by arguing that “Europe still faces security threats and challenges” which is connected to the global security environment. Therefore, conflict, within or outside the Europe, is perceived as the biggest threat to the security of Europe since conflicts not only destroy infrastructure but they also cause criminality, hinder investment, and prevent normal economic activity. Within this framework, specific attention is devoted to the Middle East conflict, along with other regional conflicts, due to the significance of the region in general, and Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, for the European Union for several reasons.

First of all, especially after the last enlargement, Middle East is in the immediate neighborhood of Europe. There are no natural borderlines between the two regions like an ocean. Europe is separated from the Middle East only by the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey (Kemp 2004: 164). Therefore there is a physical proximity between two regions which makes a closer interaction inevitable. Due to this geographical proximity, Europe is directly and highly vulnerable from the security risks rising from the region such as flow of illegal migration, organized crime, and drug- and human-trafficking. Therefore, it would be plausible to argue that, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, issues relating to both high and low security are at stake.

Second, there are deep yet bitter historical ties between the Europe and the Middle East which has been shaped during the years of colonialism. With few exceptions, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, almost all the people in the region were once under the colonial rule of either United Kingdom or France, and to a lesser extent, Italy. Furthermore, most of the states in the region were created by the European powers. These problematic linkages are claimed to have two contrasting

effects in the region. They had a negative impact on the image of Europe in the region and they caused distrust and nationalist reactions among Middle Eastern people on the involvement of Europe in the conflict. On the other hand, those colonial years also left a legacy of a personal, linguistic and economic links which might be useful for Europe (Nonneman 2003: 141). Therefore, Europe wants to address the traumas of the colonial era in order to be a credible and trustworthy actor in the region. As Herman de Croo puts it, Europe must go beyond the opposition between the Roman-Catholic-Hellenistic civilization and the Arab-Muslim one, overpassing the regards on the crusades.¹⁹

European dependency to the energy resources in the Middle East stands as the third factor. Even though European governments had hoped to rely on new sources of energy in 1960s, such as nuclear power, both the rising costs and ambiguity of nuclear energy and the availability of oil from the Middle East had resulted in the dependency of Europe to Middle East (Musu and Wallace 2003: 103). Furthermore, it might be argued that Europe is largely dependent on the energy resources of the Middle East more than any other region is. Europe is the biggest importer of oil and gas in the world and half of the energy consumed in the continent is imported (this figure is expected to be 70 % in 2030), most of which comes from the Middle East and North Africa.²⁰

Along with the factors mentioned above, another important reason for the significance of the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian conflict derives from the fact that Europe is home to millions of Muslims who are connected to the Middle East

¹⁹ Personal Vision about Euro-Arab Relations and Peace in the Middle East” , available at <http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=&lang=en&doc=1703&highlight=croo>

²⁰ Full text of the European Security Strategy is available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

with deep and emotional ties. Currently, 15 million Muslims reside within the borders of the EU (Kemp 2004: 171).²¹ Even though the Muslim community in Europe is concerned with the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it should be kept in mind that most of the Muslims have immigrated from the countries in North Africa, such as Algeria and Morocco, therefore they are neither attached to nor involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the Jewish community of the United States is.²²

3.4 Conclusion

A closer and critical examination of American and European interests concerning the Middle East and their policy guidelines regarding the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals that the policy makers in the European Union and the United States share similar, if not identical, concerns and considerations. First of all, the security of energy supplies is of fundamental importance for both actors, even though the extent of energy dependency varies. As it has been previously mentioned, Europe is accepted to be more dependent on Middle East oil compared to United States. Second, the lack of stability and prosperity in the region constitutes a significant concern for both United States and European Union. However, considering the geographical proximity of Europe to the Middle East, the European Union is perceived to be more vulnerable to the security risks and spill over effects emanating from the region. Seeking to promote stability and welfare in the region

²¹ Number of Muslims residing in Europe varies across the continent. For instance 4,5 million Muslims live in France and constitute the most numerous Muslim community in Europe to be followed by 3,2 million Muslims residing in Germany. Muslim community in the United Kingdom constitutes 2 per cent of population with 1,1 million Muslims. More information on the Muslim populations in EU countries is available on CIA World Factbook to be retrieved from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

²² Personal interview with Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi, İstanbul, Koc University, December 15 2005.

and to ensure the security of energy resources, both the United States and European Union are aware of the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict is easily justifiable when one thinks about the fact that the conflict is directly related to the problems of the region and it has a poisoning effect on them. In other words, endurance of the conflict exacerbates the other problems in the region and therefore, its elimination would hopefully contribute to the improvement of the regional stability and prosperity as a whole. To think in bolder and broader terms, it is even argued that the peace in world goes through Jerusalem. In this respect, one may construct a metaphor that the Arab-Israeli conflict is like a piece of stone that blocks a huge river from flowing freely. Once the stone is successfully removed, the river will find its course. One may question the relevancy of the arguments revolving around the centrality of the conflict regarding the regional and global peace. Why it is not feasible to involve in other problems without resolving the sensitive issue of Palestine? Völker Perthes (2003: 92) offers a comprehensive answer to that question by arguing that the several Arab regimes in the region are hiding behind the conflict with Israel and refusing to initiate domestic reforms by pointing that they are in a state of war and conflict. Therefore once the conflict is resolved, this pretext would lose its validity. Furthermore, prolonged conflict legitimizes a system of allocations in which military share of the budget overweight the social schemes, economic reforms, and educational reforms. Besides that, the continuing conflict stands as a rhetorical motivation for the Islamic and nationalist extremists all around the region.

Consequently, a peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Israeli Palestinian conflict is observed as a high priority for the policy makers in the United States and the European Union. In this respect, both entities advocate a two-state solution in

which an independent Palestinian state would coexist next to a secure and recognized Israel. However, due to their diverging historical involvements in the region and the separate mechanisms they follow in foreign policy making, Europeans and Americans disagree on several points concerning the resolution of the conflict.

Considering the dynamics of policy-making, American foreign policy proves to be a dispersed one stuck between the requirements of global leadership and constitutionally designed checks and balances. Even though the Executive in general and the president in particular is acknowledged to be the most dominant actor in decision-making, they do not exercise unlimited control over the process and they are constrained by the legislative branch and by the pressures exerted by the interest groups and lobbies that adopt diverging approaches regarding the future of the conflict. However, despite some structural weaknesses, American foreign policy is an existing reality that has the capacity to implement its policies and decisions, probably more than any other national or international actor could do.

The notion of European foreign policy, on the other hand, is in itself causes controversy. Even though the Union has a foreign policy, the commonality of this foreign policy and its efficiency in implementation is highly problematic. Therefore, one may argue that the biggest obstacle against the emergence and maintenance of a common, influential and coherent European foreign policy is the internal weaknesses of the Union. The intergovernmental nature of decision-making mechanism in the EU as well as the expectation-capability gap hinders the creation of a successful and consistent European foreign policy. On the other hand, one should not fail to notice the strong potential that the Union possesses with regards to forming a common foreign policy. Karen Smith classifies two groups of stimuli that exert pressure on

the EU that pushes the Union to pursue a more effective foreign policy. External incentives constitute the first group and encompass external factors such as international interdependence and globalization. The notion of international interdependence, through creating an environment in which acting together as a bloc prove to be more effective than taking unilateral actions, requires the EU to forge a common foreign policy. In a similar pattern, the harsh reality imposed by globalization stands as an essential motivation since member states are aware of the fact that it is no longer possible for the states to exercise meaningful control over several issues. On the internal side of the debate lies the theories of neo-functionalism and constructivism which argue that integration will proceed through a process of spillover from the economic realm of integration to the more vital area of foreign policy integration and that actors' interests and identities will gradually change and amalgamate through the process of cooperation (Smith 2003: 5-9).

CHAPTER IV

**TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT FROM OSLO TO ROADMAP:
THE LONGEST DECADE**

Ten years from the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 to the announcement of the Roadmap by the Middle East Quartet in 2003 prove to be the longest decade in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This period witnessed the beginning of the Oslo peace process, its early implementation, gradual decline of the process to be followed by the outbreak of the second Intifada and the rise of violence, and finally formation of the Quartet and the declaration of the Roadmap. It was in this decade that an Israeli prime minister was assassinated by an Israeli extremist, a historically misfortunate incident that shook the internal dynamics of the Jewish state and resulted in a domestic instability that produced three governments within five years. It was in this decade that two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center and drastically changed the political dynamics everywhere, including the Middle East. It should also be noted that, this era has started with a peace process initiated after the war on Iraq and it ended with another peace process launched after another war on Iraq. In other words, it was a decade of tranquility and violence, hope and despair hand shaking and war launching, peace process and Intifada. Aim of this chapter is to present an in-depth analysis of the European and American policies regarding the key issues of the peace process in the decade following the signing of Oslo accord. To that purpose, a brief historical record of this period will be initially presented and it will be followed by a general overview of Euro-American policies between 1993

and 2003. A detailed examination of convergences and divergences displayed in the policies of the transatlantic actors will constitute the next step to be followed by a comprehensive assessment of the prospects and challenges awaiting the transatlantic actors.

Declaration of Principles was mediated under Norwegian umbrella and it was signed in the White House lawn, at the presence of the American president Bill Clinton, on 13 September 1993. Oslo accord presented an agenda for negotiations rather than a full agreement (Shlaim 2005: 246). On the other hand, it also provided a timetable for staged Palestinian autonomy in West Bank and Gaza, mutual recognition between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and provisions on economy and security (Sicherman 2002: 157). Even though it refrained from touching upon some critical issues such as the situation of the Jewish settlements in West Bank and Gaza, boundaries of a future Palestinian state, return of the Palestinian refugees that had left, or forced to leave, Palestine in 1948, and the final status of Jerusalem; Oslo agreement proved to be a momentous point in the history of the conflict by establishing formal relations between the combatants. Two letters exchanged between Chairman Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, as well as the celebrated image of the handshake between two men, constituted one of the historic and unforgettable moments of the century-long conflict. It should also be underlined that the Oslo agreement was established upon an unprecedented compromise between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For the first time, both sides acknowledged that they have to engage in territorial compromises in order to end the dispute.

Following the declaration of Oslo peace process in September 1993, two committees were formed in order to discuss the implementation of the accord. After four months, in February 1994, Cairo agreement was signed between Shimon Peres

and Yasser Arafat in which consensus was reached on general principles and on border crossings. This deal was followed by two consecutive agreements signed in May and August. While former presented a three-stage plan in order to enhance the Palestinian self rule, the latter has focused on the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority in education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, popularly named as Oslo II, was signed in 28 September 1995 in Washington. This agreement constituted a significant step within the Oslo process due to its comprehensive scope and the crucial issues that it covered. First of all, Oslo II envisaged elections to be held for a Palestinian Council and the delegation of legislative authority to this council. It also provided the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from regions largely populated by the Palestinians. Territories were divided into three areas by Oslo II. Areas named as A was under exclusive Palestinian control while exclusive Israeli authority was provided in area C. Regarding area B, it was decided that Palestinians were going to be in charge of civilian matters whereas security was going to be provided by the Israelis.

Even though several agreements were concluded between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, implementation of these agreements was far from being perfect. Israel maintained its strategic control over West Bank and Gaza while Arafat largely failed in preventing terrorist activities, mostly committed by Hamas, against the Israeli citizens living in Israel proper. Economic situation of the Palestinians exacerbated despite the enormous volume of international aid (Sicherman 2002: 158). Even though these factors constituted significant obstacles against the peace process, the fatal blow to peace attempts was the assassination of the Israeli Prime

Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, only one month after the declaration of Oslo II. Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin as the Prime Minister and he was willing to keep in track with the process but his endeavors were severed by the electoral victory of Likud and Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 which should not be seen as a surprise due to the fact that the peace deal between Rabin and Arafat in 1993 has caused a strong division among the Israeli society and its components, especially regarding the recognition of PLO and withdrawal from the territories, has played into the hands of Likud and other nationalist and religious parties in the right wing. Even though a Gallup poll conducted in September 1993 had demonstrated that 65 per cent of the Israelis were pleased with the peace accord, increasing number of Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians within Israel proper has significantly transformed this situation and it has created the suitable conditions for the victory of Likud.²³

Netanyahu had won the elections with a security-oriented campaign which was based on the rejection of land-for-peace formula, a principle which constituted the heart of the Oslo spirit. Instead, he came up with the slogan of “making a safe peace” which was accompanied with the idea that “if they give, they will take; if they do not give, they will not take”. Foreign policy guidelines of his government explicitly stated a firm opposition to a Palestinian state, to the right of return and to the dismantling of the Jewish settlements. He also asserted full Israeli sovereignty over the entire Jerusalem (Shlaim 2005: 254). Netanyahu’s main weapon in his campaign was the mantra that the Palestinian entity was not performing its

²³ On 5 October 1995, Rabin introduced the Knesset a comprehensive survey of the peace deal and his strategy regarding the peace process. His speech was constantly interrupted by catcalls from the opposition and some Likud members opened black umbrellas as a reminder of Neville Chamberlains’s appeasement policy at Munich. Few days later, Netanyahu organized a demonstration in Zion Square in Jerusalem during which thousands of Israelis protested Rabin and accused him of accepting the dictates of the *terrorist* Arafat.

obligations rising from the agreements; and therefore Israel was not obliged to implement its part of the deal. Even though it would be accurate to argue that both sides committed major breaches regarding the agreements, Israeli breaches were both more numerous and more substantive (Pundak 2001: 33).

According to the timetable set by agreements, 1996-1999 was supposed to witness the complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and the negotiations on final status. Instead, Israeli government failed to abandon the territories that were planned to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority and rejected to fulfill its promise of freeing Palestinian prisoners. Netanyahu delayed the permit to build the airport and maritime port in Gaza and prevented the monetary transfers to the Palestinians thus denying the Palestinian Authority an important financial source. Besides, Israeli government continued to build new settlements rather than dismantling them. By demolishing Palestinian houses, imposing curfews, confiscating Arab lands, humiliating Palestinians living in the territories; Netanyahu pushed Palestinian people and international community to question whether Israel would be a partner to peace. His final decision to open an archeological tunnel near the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem was another act of unfaithfulness to peace process. On the other hand, the Palestinian leadership failed to stop anti-Israeli propaganda through radio, press, television and schoolbooks. They demonstrated an obvious reluctance in collecting illegal weapons and in reaching an agreement with Israel on the de facto growth of their police force, and most significantly, Arafat failed to undertake a wholehearted approach in fighting against terrorist organizations (Pundak 2001: 33). To cut a long story short, following Rabin's murder, both Israelis and Palestinians cheated on the Oslo spirit and mutually undermined the basic principles of the already fragile peace between the two people.

Following the deterioration of peace process, Clinton was urged to intervene. He called Netanyahu and Arafat to Washington and he assumed a more active role in retrieving the negotiations. American intervention resulted in Hebron Accord in 1997 and Wye Plantation Memorandum in 1998. While the former divided the city of Hebron into an Israeli and Palestinian zone, the latter required Israel to retreat from more territory in West Bank. These two agreements put Netanyahu in a difficult position at home and resulted in his defeat in 1999 elections against the Labour's candidate Ehud Barak. However, Barak came to power with only 26 seats out of 120 in Knesset. In other words, he had to rule an uneasy coalition composed of parties and groups with distinct political orientations.

Even though he was portrayed as a politician willing to talk peace with the Palestinian Authority, Barak years witnessed increasing violation of Oslo process committed by the both sides. Barak government accelerated settlement activities which was an explicit betrayal to the Oslo mentality. Besides, he refused to transfer territories to the Palestinian Authority and contributed to the miserable conditions in which Palestinians were living in by increasing restrictions on Palestinian movement, by continuing humiliation and mistreatment in Israeli checkpoints, by destructing Palestinian houses, and thus increasing poverty and unemployment among the Palestinians. Furthermore, the fact that the Palestinians were severely suffering from water shortages during the summer months while water was abundant in the nearby Jewish settlements which were recently built on territories emptied through the demolishing of the Palestinian houses flamed the distrust of Palestinian people towards Israel. However, Israeli government was not the sole institution to blame for the misery of the Palestinians. Increasing corruption in the Palestinian structures and disappointing rule of the Palestinian Authority resulted in the rise of

tensions between the Palestinian streets and Palestinian rulers while the latter hope to overcome this impasse by blaming Israeli government for every problem in Palestinians' lives (Pundak 2001: 34-35).

It was under these conditions that Arafat and Barak were summoned to Camp David in July 2000, however these talks resulted in failure. Barak argued that his flexibility on many issues made him the best Israeli politician that Arafat would encounter while Arafat believed that he could hold out for better terms. Barak had gone far, but not far enough for Arafat and Clinton failed to bridge the gaps and he failed to demonstrate a fully evenhanded policy regarding the American attitude towards the Israelis and Palestinians (Sicherman: 2002: 164-165). In Camp David, Israeli Prime Minister Barak proposed a peace deal based on the establishment of a separate Palestinian state over the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank. However, Israel was going to keep the large settlements next to the 1967 border. Regarding the West Bank, Israel was going to preserve its sovereignty over the 20.5 per cent of the area. Barak also accepted the return of Palestinian refugees with a major qualification that the return would only be allowed within the family reunification and number of the Palestinians to be repatriated was limited to 500 per year. On Jerusalem, Barak undertook a historic step and agreed to the partition of the city, a decision that any previous Israeli prime ministers had dared to take. Palestinian representatives were largely in disagreement on how to respond to Israeli offer and while some suggested accepting the deal since it was a historic opportunity for ending the conflict, others argued for its rejection since they perceived it as a compromise, especially regarding the right of return of the refugees and Muslim rights over Jerusalem. In addition to the divisions within the Palestinian delegation, Arafat also felt the pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia not to compromise

Muslim rights over Jerusalem. Under these circumstances, Arafat failed to demonstrate leadership and he rejected the proposals offered by Israel without presenting his own proposals. (Shlaim 2005: 256). Barak put the blame on Arafat for rejecting a historic opportunity to end the conflict; Arafat argued that he has rejected to compromise the basic natural rights of the Palestinian people, right of return of the refugees as the most central one. Arafat returned home as a hero, even though he has not gained anything, while Barak faced domestic turmoil on his return to Israel, an uproar which had started on the eve of his departure for Camp David. With whom the responsibility lies for the failure of the summit proved to be an intense and controversial question. Each side has blamed the other for leading to the failure of the talks and different accounts were presented regarding the summit. While Robert Malley and Hussein Agha have argued that Bill Clinton has consistently sided with Ehud Barak, the Israeli prime minister, in a joint article with Benny Morris, have responded that he has presented a very generous offer in Camp David but that Arafat has repeatedly rejected the Israeli proposals and that he had consciously chosen to resort to violence in order to push Israel towards further concessions. Dennis Ross, Clinton's special envoy to the Middle East, agreed with those who blame Arafat by arguing that the Palestinian Chairman has failed to display any capacity to reach a permanent status deal. On the other hand, Ron Pundak, an American diplomat who has been directly involved in the peace process, demonstrated a more evenhanded and balanced perspective by arguing that both the Israelis and Palestinians, along with Americans, were responsible for the failure of the Camp David summit.

Collapse of the peace talks at Camp David initiated a countdown to the outbreak of violence. The expected trigger for the next round was Ariel Sharon's visit to Haram al-Sharif on 28 September 2000, accompanied by hundreds of Israeli

security guards, which was a deliberate disregard for the sensitivity of Muslims and Palestinians. This provocative act was the last drop and riots broke out in Palestinian territories and in Israel which soon turned into a full-scale Intifada which was going to be named after al-Aqsa (Shlaim 2005: 257). It also needs to be mentioned that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, which gave the implicit signal that Hezbollah had succeeded in pushing Israel towards retreat through violence and resistance, and violence promoted by Arafat with the hope that a prospective Intifadah, similar to its predecessor, may cause another breakthrough in the conflict and may exert pressure on the United States to force Israel to come up with a better offer for Palestinians. In other words, Arafat believed that Intifadah might achieve what diplomacy failed to achieve.

Only within months, it was no longer a secret that the Oslo peace process, which was bleeding for a long time, was shattered into pieces. On December 2000, Clinton engaged himself in a last attempt to broker a deal and declared his parameters to replace Camp David formulations.²⁴ Following that last move, Palestinians and Israelis began to negotiate in Taba but no agreement was reached. Following the February 2001 elections in Israel, Likud headed by Ariel Sharon came to power and Sharon firmly announced that talks were not going to be resumed unless Arafat ends violence. Tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians escalated into an unprecedented degree during the spring of 2002. United States, which was accused of disengaging from the peace process since September 11 attacks, felt the urge to step in and Quartet was formed in 2002 between the United

²⁴ Clinton's parameters were mainly based on Camp David proposals that included Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), Israeli sovereignty over the Western wall and Jewish Quarter, an international force to be positioned in the Old City of Jerusalem, Israeli control over the return of Palestinian refugees, and Israeli maintenance of 4-6 % of the West Bank to be compensated with an equal sized territory from Gaza.

Nations, Russia, European Union and the United States. After the intense discussions among the parties, Roadmap was declared by the Quartet in April 2003.

The failure of the Oslo peace process has initiated an intense debated regarding the causes of the failure. Some have argued that the process was destined to failure from the very beginning because of its inherent shortcomings and in particular because it did not address any of the core issues in the conflict. Both sides have contributed to this failure by undermining the mutual trust. Israelis had failed to fulfill its side of the deal while the Palestinians resorted to violence. On the other hand, the Americans, as the only actor that has the capacity to influence Israelis, failed to exert sufficient on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories (Shlaim 2005: 258). The traditional approach of the American foreign policy was to adopt the position of the Israeli prime minister and this was demonstrated most extremely during the Netanyahu government and continued throughout Barak's tenure. With time, Clinton developed a more profound understanding of the Palestinian position but this understanding was eroded by the Palestinian behavior at Camp David. At the end, it might be argued that there was a true opportunity for peace but it was wasted through miscalculations and mismanagement of the entire process. Palestinian side reached the conclusion that the Israeli public and politicians were not prepared to pay the necessary price for peace while the Israeli side believed that the Palestinians were twisted on destroying the state of Israel.

4.1 European Union and the Middle East Peace Process

European Union's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on Middle East peace process has been gradually shaped since 1960s and its involvement has consistently increased in 1990s. Following the signing of Oslo accord in September

1993, European Union has initially assumed a supporting role in the peace process through its financial support to the peace process and to Palestinian Authority and through its attempts to achieve regional stabilization by multilateral formulas. In addition, European Union has accelerated its relationship with the conflicting parties on a bilateral basis. Main purpose of the EU in these early years might be put as creating an environment in which the peace process might have a chance to accomplish itself. In other words, Union's early approach was based on the assumption that the peace process was going to unfold without serious disruptions. However, as it has been previously analyzed, mid 1990s proved that assumption to be inaccurate. Therefore, following the deterioration of the peace process and its ultimate collapse in late 1990s, European Union started to assume a more independent and political role and started to assert itself on issues that were directly related to the process itself rather than dealing with the matters that remain to be in sidelines. This new European approach was demonstrated and solidified by the visits of European politicians to the region and consecutive declarations and resolutions by several institutions of the EU. Besides, new positions were created in order to increase European involvement in the peace process such as the post of EU Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. Finally, EU was included in Middle East Quartet which was established in 2002 with its objective to produce a sustainable solution to the conflict.

Since the beginning of the Oslo peace process, EU and the member states have been the largest donors of financial support to Palestinian Authority, to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and to the Middle East peace process. Main purpose of the assistance has been to create the conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region by promoting Palestinian economic, social, political and

security sector reforms, by providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and by bringing Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors together.²⁵ In addition, financial aid provided by the EU had three specific purposes. First of all, it aimed to convince the Palestinian people that peace process should be supported and to create an incentive to neutralize the radical positions through the help of economic development and ameliorated living standards. Second, financial assistance intended to prove that the creation of a democratic and viable Palestinian state is in the best interests of Israel. Finally, it aimed to reduce the animosity between the two communities and to bring reconciliation through joint projects at civil society level (Asseburg 2003: 175). The fact that the EU has been the biggest donor to the region has made it quite visible in the peace process and more assertive in its effort to play a more active role in the peace process. Member states did not conceal their intention to help the Palestinians to establish their own state (Soetendorp 1999: 112).

In addition to the enormous volume of financial assistance, European Union has also engaged itself in an attempt to promote regional stability and prosperity which would create the most suitable environment for the peace process to be accomplished. The most notable example of these initiatives has been the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), or widely known as the Barcelona process.²⁶ To begin with, it needs to be mentioned that the Barcelona process was not a mechanism created to specifically deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Launched in 1995, the EMP intended to establish a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles of respect for human rights and democracy. It envisaged the creation of a free-trade area between the EU

²⁵ More information regarding the European Union's involvement in the Middle East peace process is available in http://www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm

²⁶ More information on EMP is to be found at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/

and its partners and among the partners themselves which would contribute to regional prosperity. This dimension of the partnership has been promoted by substantial EU financial support. Its final purpose was to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and to develop free and flourishing civil societies. Regarding the conflict, both Israel and Palestinian Authority were included in the partnership. Even though Israel was not eligible for bilateral funding due to its high national income, it has been involved in various EMP activities concerning civil society, youth exchange programs, and participation of Israeli universities in various forums. On the other hand, Palestinians had also enjoyed the benefits of the partnership on several fields. Besides, as it has been constantly mentioned in EU documents, the EMP has been the only regional multilateral forum where all the parties to the conflict are included in. Therefore it has provided the parties an opportunity to gather and discuss on a regular and institutionalized basis.

The basic principle behind the Barcelona Process was the European conviction that the root causes of instability in the Mediterranean region were economic underdevelopment and social inequality, and that these issues needed to be tackled collectively within a multilateral framework. In other words, one may argue that the EMP reflected the increasingly widespread idea of considering security not merely in military terms and of the significance of addressing the long term causes of conflict (Peters 1998:72). However, the EMP has not been conceptualized as a framework for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and it did not have the required instruments to do so. It was designated in a way to complement and support the peace process. It aimed to provide a framework in which the Mediterranean countries, including Israel and its Arab neighbors, would be able to establish trust

and improve their relations in the political, economic and societal spheres through economic development and regional integration. Peace-building and regional stabilization were defined as long-term objectives (Asseburg 2003:179).

Almost a decade after its launching, the ambitious objectives outlined in the Barcelona Declaration have largely failed to materialize. This failure has also been acknowledged by the European Union itself. In a review document issued in 2000, the European Commission had stated that “difficulties in the Middle East peace process have slowed progress and limited the extent to which full regional cooperation could develop. Not only are the countries in the region very different in terms of political systems and levels of economic development, but some are much more affected by the evolution of the peace process than others. Willingness to cooperate more actively with neighbors has been held back by the politics of the peace process”. The Commission has concluded that “deadlock and slow advances in the Middle East Peace Process, albeit separate from the Barcelona Process, has a retarding effect on regional cooperation in general. These shortcomings were so substantial as call into question the political determination of both sides to achieve the goals they set in 1995”.²⁷ On the other hand, the proponents of the process view achievements such as the Association Agreements, the growth in trade, the framework for dialogue at the political level, the mobilization of funds for the region, and the establishment of a series of networks connecting groups from civil society, as highly significant (Peters 2004: 6).

As the peace process started to decline in mid 1990’s, it became obvious that these mechanisms were not sufficient and a major shift gradually occurred in the Union’s approach towards the conflict. European Union made no secret of its intent

²⁷ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, Brussels Com (00) 497 final, 6 September, 2000, available online at http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ministerial/eu_communication.pdf

to emerge as an independent actor rather than a complementary one. EU increased the amount of the financial assistance and it assumed a more political role in its relations with the combatants. In that period, the principle aim of EU was to prevent the Palestinian Authority from total collapse and to motivate the reform process within the Palestinian Authority. Several politicians from the member states visited the region and displayed explicit solidarity with the Palestinians. This new stance of EU was reinforced by official declarations and conclusions by EU institutions including but not limited to Berlin declaration in March 1999, Nice declaration in December 2000, Laeken declaration in December 2001, Barcelona declaration in March 2002, Seville declaration in June 2002, Copenhagen declaration in December 2002 and Brussels declaration in March 2003.

Even though the European Union had undergone a significant progress in forming and implementing a common position with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the effectiveness of these policies and the influence of the Europeans over the conflict have been, at best, in question. There has been no doubt that EU has been successful in developing a very consistent policy regarding the key issues of the conflict such as Palestinian self-determination, Israeli settlements in occupied territories, situation of Palestinian refugees and status of Jerusalem. However, the European Union has failed to back up its declaratory policies with concrete strategies and actions. More significantly, EU has not been successful in overcoming the deep Israeli suspicion of Europe. In spite of the fact that EU was successful in offering a forum for dialogue between the parties and that specific EU officials such as Javier Solana and Miguel Morationos, High Representative for CFSP and Special Representative to the Peace Process respectively, had put their best efforts in the settlement of the conflict, EU has failed to assert itself as an influential player.

4.2 The United States and the Middle East Peace Process

American involvement in the settlement of the conflict has displayed a clear fluctuation between different administrations. To begin with, even though the credibility of the United States as the traditional peace-maker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been damaged by the fact that the Oslo accords were accomplished under Norwegian umbrella, the fact that both Israelis and Palestinians were keen on signing the document in the White House lawn at the presence of the American president had demonstrated that American prestige has been recovered. Following the ceremony in September 1993, Clinton administration became heavily involved in the monitoring and implementation of the peace process.

As the peace process started to decline by assassination of Rabin in 1995, the United States decided to take a much more direct and active role in Israeli-Palestinian talks and President Clinton devoted his time and energy in the survival of the peace process. He personally intervened to bring both Netanyahu and Arafat to Washington and he created the suitable environment for them to spend time on the peace talks and both the Hebron accord in 1997 and Wye Plantation Memorandum in 1998 were brokered by the American administration. On the other hand, the CIA became a significant supervisor of the Israel-Palestinian Authority security cooperation and assisted Palestinian Authority for extensive training of the Palestinian police in counter-terror operations (Sicherman 2002: 161-162).

Another striking feature of the Clinton administration regarding its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the warm and positive attitude of the White House towards Arafat. During Clinton's presidency, Arafat was received in the White House for thirteen times and in December 1998 Clinton was invited to

address the Palestinian assembly in Gaza where he expressed his support for Palestinian statehood.

Clinton's support to the peace process continued throughout Barak's tenure between 1999 and 2001, both on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks though the latter had failed. Frustrated by this failure, Clinton was less willing to assume a role in another negotiation. However, he knew that the American disengagement from the peace process would exacerbate the already fragile situation into an unprecedented degree. Besides, considering the fact that he was going to leave the White House in few months, he was aware that this could be his last chance to intervene in order to put peace process back in track which would contribute to his political legacy. As it has been already explained, talks at Camp David proved to be unsuccessful, even though Clinton continued his efforts to resume peace process by declaring Clinton parameters but he failed to receive a constructive response from the conflicting parties.

George Bush's arrival to the power in 2001 and September 11 attacks clearly transformed the nature of the American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To begin with, it might be argued that neither Bush nor his administration was interested in an American role to be assumed to bring peace in the Middle East. Therefore, Bush preferred to keep a low profile on Palestinian question. Following the terrorist attacks in September 11, American foreign policy immediately and intensively got focused on Afghanistan and war against terrorism. During this period, Bush administration was heavily criticized for disengaging from one of the most dangerous conflicts in the world. Pressures from the international community and the realization that the seeds of terrorism they are fighting against in Afghanistan are to be delivered through a powerful and emotional propaganda that puts

Palestinian question in its core urged American foreign policy to re-engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within this framework, the most groundbreaking move of the Bush administration was president's speech in June 2002 in which he addressed the Palestinian question and reemphasized the American interests in the settlement of the conflict.

In order to avoid heavy criticism on the multilateral nature of the American foreign policy in the Middle East, president Bush took the lead in creation of a Middle East Quartet composed of the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia which aimed to mediate the peace process. Bush administration's attempts to revitalize peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians speeded up in 2003, following the American invasion in Iraq, which resulted in the declaration of the Roadmap for peace in April 2003.

4.3 Euro-American Divergences and Convergences

Divergences and convergences presented by the European Union and the United States regarding the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be categorized under three groups. These are their perspectives regarding the basic guidelines of the final status, their perception concerning the centrality of the conflict and their relations with the conflicting parties.

4.3.1 European and American Visions of Israeli-Palestinian Peace

An analysis of the American and European policies demonstrates that the United States and the European Union embrace similar visions considering the final status of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Transatlantic actors agree on how a final settlement should look like. To begin with, both the United States and the European Union are

committed to a two-state solution which could be reached through the land-for-peace formula. This two-state solution envisages the establishment of a Palestinian state that peacefully co-exists with a secure and recognized Israel. Both actors have repeatedly stated that the Israeli-Palestinian peace must be based on the principles enlisted in United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.²⁸ Another common transatlantic point of reference has been the understanding reached by the conflicting parties in Madrid conference and guidelines specified by the Saudi peace plan of 2002.²⁹ Both the United States and the European Union also agree that the peace between Israelis and Palestinians should be complemented with Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks and it must lead to an Arab-Israeli peace in general.

As it has been already explained, support for the establishment of a Palestinian state has been a significant point of convergence among the Europeans and Americans regarding the final status of the Palestinian. Besides, both acknowledge that a Palestinian state could only be established through intense and comprehensive reforms to be undertaken by the Palestinian Authority. In this respect, while the European Union focuses on the importance of Palestinian institution building, the United States had developed an approach which emphasizes on the significance of leadership change. In his historic speech in 24 June 2002, President Bush expressed his “vision of two states, living side by side in peace and security”, and he adds that this “requires a new and different Palestinian

²⁸ Euro-American emphasis on a peace agreement based on Resolution 242 requires to be clarified. As it will be further discussed, there have been many policies endorsed by the United States that undermine the basics of this Resolution such as the American approach to the issue of Jewish settlements.

²⁹ Saudi plan was a peace initiative proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2002. It was based on Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 boundaries and establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states and recognition of Israel. A brief summary of the initiative is available in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1844214.stm

leadership”.³⁰ In other words, Bush openly calls for removal of Yasser Arafat and his replacement with a new leader as a prerequisite for a future Palestinian state.

Besides the fact that the United States and the European Union share similar perspectives on the final status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace, they have also succeeded in transforming this convergence into a document that includes the basic guidelines that would lead to the settlement of the conflict. Named as “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, or as it is widely used, the Roadmap was designed to reach a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and it aimed to provide clear phases, timelines, target dates and benchmarks in order to progress towards peace. The Roadmap foresees a final settlement that is to be negotiated between the parties, which will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The Middle East Quartet, composed of the United States, Russia, European Union and United Nations, was rendered responsible of the implementation and the monitoring of the Roadmap. Besides producing the first joint peace plan, the Quartet has also served to coordinate European positions by helping to avoid unilateral initiatives from major European powers that have tended to diminish the United States’ confidence in Europe as a real partner (Kaye 2004: 27).

Even though the Europeans and Americans agree on the main guidelines regarding the final settlement, they assume diverging positions, or close positions with diverging degrees, over some significant issues that need to be dealt with in order to reach this final settlement. These points include the sensitive issue of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

³⁰ George Bush’s speech is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>

To begin with Jerusalem, Palestinians argue that Israel should withdraw from East Jerusalem and that East Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state while Israel, which has declared Jerusalem as its capital since 1948, has annexed the Eastern part of the city in 1967, and argues that the status of the city is not negotiable. However, by signing the Oslo Declaration, Israel has agreed that negotiations will be held over the future of Jerusalem. With regards to transatlantic policies it might be argued that the European Union has pursued a more explicit and consistent policy compared to that of the United States. While the European position has been officially expressed in a number of documents and declarations, Americans have chosen to avoid the issue as long as possible. However, it should be noted that, the European statements on Jerusalem are mainly declaratory expressions that aim to draw the contours of the European approach rather than articulating a technical proposal or a well defined and detailed position. European Union's policy on Jerusalem has been formulated in October 1996 through the Statement of the European Union on the Peace Process in the Middle East. In this statement, it has been emphasized that the issue of Jerusalem is subject to the principles endorsed in United Nations Resolution 242, which focuses on the unacceptability of seizure of territories by force. Therefore, EU does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. Therefore, even though the European Union does not produce a concrete plan regarding the status of Jerusalem, it succeeds in taking a clear and united stance on this controversial matter. On the other hand, the American position over Jerusalem demonstrates the tensions between the Congress and the Presidency. Even though the American administration have maintained a policy that the status of the city must be negotiated and that the both sides should refrain from unilateral actions, in 1995, the Congress had adopted the "Jerusalem Embassy Relocation

Implementation Act” which emphasizes the right of “each sovereign nation to designate its own capital under international law and custom”. This Act also points out that “the United States maintains its embassy in the functioning capital of every country except in the case of our democratic friend and strategic ally, the State of Israel”. The Act concludes that “Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic and religious group are protected” and “Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel” and “the United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999”.³¹ Even though the Congress has set a specific deadline for the transfer of Embassy to Jerusalem, Bill Clinton has repeatedly postponed the implementation of this Act considering that such a move would not contribute to the volatile situation in the region. Disappointed by constant postponing, the Congress has enacted another Bill in 2002 known as H.R 1646 or the Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003. Section 214 of this Bill states that “the Congress maintains its commitment to relocating the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and urges the President to immediately begin the process of relocating the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem”.³² However, it has been observed that, fearing to incite unrest, further hatred and mistrust in the Arab and Muslim societies in the middle of the war in Iraq, George Bush has not placed the issue of relocation in its agenda and similar to his predecessor he keeps postponing the move. In conclusion, while the European approach fails to present a concrete solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem and limits itself to general principles, it clearly refuses Israeli sovereignty over the holy city. On the other hand, American policy on Jerusalem

³¹ The full text of this document is available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r104:18:/temp/~r1043x1ZJ9:e0>:

³² The full text of this document is available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47091.pdf>

reflects the delicate balance between the Congress and Presidency and it fails to present a clear stance on this sensitive issue.

On Jewish settlements, the Palestinians claim that these settlements in the occupied territories are illegal under international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which states that the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into territories it occupies. Israel maintains that Jordan's 1950 annexation of the West Bank was not recognized by the international community, and therefore is illegal and Egypt has never claimed the Gaza Strip. Therefore Israel advocates that the two regions are not "occupied territories" and are not subject to the Geneva Convention. The international community, as reflected in U.N. General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, believe that these territories are occupied by Israel and that the Geneva Convention applies, which means that the Israeli settlements are illegal. Regarding the controversial issue of Jewish settlements, the EU has repeatedly stated that the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are major obstacles on the road to peace (Dieckhoff 2002: 5) and it has consistently opposed the settlement activities in the occupied territories. EU has explicitly and frequently declared that the expansion of settlements and related construction violates international law, inflames an already volatile situation, and reinforces the fear of Palestinians that Israel is not genuinely committed to end the occupation. EU also points out that the settlement activities threaten the two-state solution and renders the implementation of Roadmap physically impossible. However, Europeans had failed to abide with their positions. The most striking case illustrating European inconsistency on settlement policy has been the issue of the "rules of origin". Rules of origin has been a principle incorporated to the Association Agreement between

Israel and the EU and it envisages the preferential treatment of Israeli made products. However, some of these products have been produced in the settlements, and even though Europeans have opposed to the very existence of these settlements, the EU continues to expand this privilege to the goods originating from the settlements. In this respect, the European Commission has issued a statement in November 2001 specifying that these products should not benefit from the preferential treatment but this has not been applied.

American policy towards the Jewish settlements has also been mainly declaratory. During a news conference in 16 December 1996, President Bill Clinton agreed with the statement that the settlements were obstacles to peace. President George Bush has also put that the Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop and negotiated borders should reflect realities on the ground, meaning the Israeli settlements.³³ During his remarks to the U.S.-Arab Economic Forum in 29 September 2003, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs William J. Burns has stated that the settlement activity undermines Israeli interests as well as Palestinian interests since it threatens the future of Israel as a Jewish democracy and puts an enormous burden on Israeli economy.³⁴ On the other hand, it might be argued that even though the United States has opposed to the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories, it has failed to put real pressure on the Israeli governments to freeze and undo the settlement activities. For instance, on April 14, 2004, President Bush has stated that the negotiated borders should reflect realities on the ground, meaning the Israeli settlements.

³³ American policy over the settlements have been summarized at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47091.pdf>

³⁴ Full text of Burns' speech is available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/24793.htm>

Right of return of Palestinian refugees has been one of the most sensitive and controversial issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians argue that the Arab refugees have a choice between returning to their homes in Israel that they left during the 1947-1948 war or receiving compensation for the lost property. On the other hand, Israel argues that the Palestinians have abandoned their property voluntarily, and that the international community should provide funding for resettling the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries. The United States broadly concurs with the Israeli position that any return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip has to be subject to Israeli security needs and that any repatriation of refugees to Israel itself will be both nominal and in the context of family re-unification. On April 14, 2004, President Bush has openly stated that the Palestinian refugees should be settled in a Palestinian state and not in Israel, thus dismissing the right of return. In contrast, the European Union has sought to reconcile its stronger adherence to United Nations conventions on the rights of refugees and refugee repatriation with the constraints on those rights due to Israeli security and demographic concerns (Dumper 2006). In this respect, the European Union has consistently stated the need to reach a just, viable, realistic and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees while the United States has been more in line with the Israeli position. In a speech delivered in April 2004, George Bush has denied the Palestinians' right to return and he has argued that the refugees should be settled in the would-be Palestinian state rather than Israel.³⁵

As it has been hitherto explained, the European Union and the United States have succeeded in reaching a basic understanding on the broad guidelines for the future of the Palestinian question. However, they have failed to agree on some of the

³⁵ Full text of Bush's speech is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-4.html>

most significant and sensitive issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Regarding these controversial matters, the Americans have traditionally adopted the Israeli position while the Europeans have been closer to the Palestinian arguments. Without producing a joint Euro-American policy on Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and Palestinian refugees, there seems to be little hope for neither the improvement of the transatlantic relations nor the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4.3.2 Centrality of the Conflict

Another important source of friction between the United States and the European Union has been their perceptions regarding the centrality of the conflict. Even though there is no doubt that both actors agree on the significance of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they still differ on the extent that they prioritize the conflict in their foreign policy agendas. In other words, Israeli-Palestinian conflict occupies different places in their to-do lists.

As it has been previously mentioned, there has been striking differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations concerning their Middle East policy. The centrality assigned to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of these differences. During the Clinton administration, achieving a settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was made a foreign policy priority. Therefore, huge amounts of energy, time, and money were devoted to the peace process. However, President Clinton failed to achieve a result in his efforts and in 2001 George Bush initiated his hands-off approach to the conflict (Gordon 2003: 157-158). The reason that the Bush administration was tended to disengage goes to the heart of the problem and presents one of the most significant sources of the transatlantic split that the Americans have

a different perception of the role of peace process in the larger region than the Europeans (Kaye 2004: 28). While the European Union attaches great significance to the settlement of the conflict, the United States places it to a secondary position in its foreign policy considerations.

The centrality attached to the Palestinian question by the European Union might be observed in “the European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World” announced in 2003.³⁶ The European Security Strategy, a document that articulates the basic guidelines of the European Union’s international security strategy, identifies the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a strategic priority and states that the conflict has impact on European interests directly and indirectly. The document also expresses the European opinion that without a resolution to the Palestinian question, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East and that the European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. Besides the European Security Strategy, the importance of the conflict has been consistently pronounced by the European leaders. In an interview conducted by Al-Jazeera, Chris Patten argues that it is hard to imagine the Middle East reaching its full potential without a settlement. Patten had also put that “until there is peace between Israel and the Arab world, it will be hard to build the area of stability and prosperity that we want to see”.³⁷ Another statement that exemplifies the European sensitivity regarding the conflict came from German foreign minister Joschka Fischer who put that “a faltering peace process could jeopardize European interests and whatever happens in

³⁶ Full text of the European Security Strategy is available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

³⁷ Full text of the interview is available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8E49A89B-64B8-403F-8D35-B21DE7B45E1E.htm>

the Middle East might very well reverberate far beyond the region”(Boukhars and Yetiv 2003: 74).

In contrast to the European Union, the Bush administration had developed different priorities in its foreign policy and had placed the Iraqi issue and the reform in the Middle East on the top of its agenda. According to the Bush administration, regime change in Iraq would facilitate a solution to the conflict (Hudson 2005: 302) and a new democratic Iraq that would take the lead in solving the Palestinian problem through the recognition of Israel and thereby serve as an example for the Palestinians for good governance and peace making (Veliotes 2005: 4-5). The American policy makers had insistently argued that the threat posed by Iraq cannot be ignored and allowed to grow while peace is sought in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.³⁸ The Europeans have replied to this view that the American objective to transform the Middle East would never be reached if the more immediate and dangerous crises that have bedeviled the region are not addressed and resolved (Boukhars and Yetiv 2003: 75). In addition, in response to American disengagement from the Palestinian question in favor of the Iraqi issue, a French government official was quoted to say that “Bush’s advisers are obsessed with Iraq while we are obsessed about achieving peace. The important thing is to build a coalition for peace in the Middle East, not to build a coalition for war in Iraq”.³⁹In the same article, Javier Solana was reported to argue that “it would be very very difficult for the

³⁸ Report by the Heritage Foundation is available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/BG1575.cfm>

³⁹ New York Times, “Europeans Split with U.S. on Need for Iraq Attack, Citing Mideast as Priority” by Patrick E. Tyler, July 22, 2002 Monday

Europeans to back military action to remove Saddam Hussein without substantial progress towards creating a Palestinian state first.⁴⁰

The Euro-American differences regarding the significance attached to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cause damages on the transatlantic relations that go deeper than imagined. How does each side perceive the Palestinian question directly influences how they perceive each other. From the European side of the Atlantic, Europeans believe that the American foreign policy is obsessed with Iraq but passive and silent on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which, in European view, poses a greater challenge to the regional and international security. In an even more extreme perspective, George Bush is seen as possessed by the hawkish, pro-Israeli lobby in the United States and he is perceived to be more interested in elections and in taking his father's revenge by overthrowing Saddam Hussein rather than bringing peace and stability to the region (Gordon 2003: 155). On the other hand, Americans see a Europe which is unable to see that the road to peace goes through Baghdad and that continues to be over-occupied with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and refusing to see that other problems in the Middle East cannot and should not be frozen or made conditional on the settlement of the Palestinian question. On the extreme side, Americans accuse Europeans of using the conflict as a pretext to their inaction on Iraq and other issues in the region.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

4.3.3 Transatlantic Actors and the Conflicting Parties

Bilateral relations between the transatlantic actors of Europe and the United States with the conflicting parties of Israel and Palestinian Authority have been an area where the transatlantic split proves to be the widest and most significant. Aim of this chapter is to demonstrate an analysis of European Union and United States' relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority and, within this framework, to present an examination of Euro-American convergences and divergences.

4.3.3.1 Israel and the Transatlantic Actors

Even though Benita-Ferrero Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, had identified Israel as an important and natural partner and ally for the EU in one of her addresses in Tel Aviv, the relations between the Jewish state and the European Union are characterized by the existence of common values on one hand, and presence of a deep mistrust and lack of understanding on the other hand. As the Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom had pointed out, "Israel and Europe share a common cultural and social heritage, similar values, and a host of shared interests in all spheres".⁴¹ Beyond the ambiguous notion of shared values and common heritage, the European Union and Israel had developed a strong relationship especially with regards to trade and commercial sphere. Trade between Israel and Europe is organized on the basis of the Association Agreement and within this framework, the European Union is Israel's major trading partner. In 2001, the total volume of bilateral trade was € 24 billion with the inclusion of diamonds and in 2004, with the exclusion of diamonds, the total volume of bilateral trade was over € 15 billion. Thirty three per cent of Israel's exports went to the EU while forty per cent of its

⁴¹ Address by Silvan Shalom before the European Union Council of Ministers, 21 July 2003

imports came from the EU. EU exports to Israel reached € 12.75 billion while imports from Israel were € 8.6 billion. Besides that, under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, the European Union and Israel conduct free trade in industrial products and the two sides have mutually granted significant trade concessions for agricultural products.⁴²

Even though the Europeans and Israelis are committed to the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law and an open economy based on free market, the shared Israeli-European history is characterized by conflict as well as cooperation. As it has been examined in the previous chapters, Israel and Europe used to have closer relations throughout the most parts of the 20th century. In 1947, all European states have voted in favor of partition plan with the exception of Greece and United Kingdom, and until the June war in 1967, European countries, but especially France, were the main suppliers and supporters of the Jewish state. Relations started to deteriorate in early 1970's, both due to the changing European perceptions regarding Israel and use of oil as an economic and political weapon by the Arab states, and it reached into a crisis situation in 1980 by the Venice Declaration.

Between 1993 and 2003, in spite of the increasing and promising level of cooperation on many fields including the economic sphere, Europeans and Israelis confronted serious problems in their bilateral relationship. First of all, the European Union's position on the basic issues of the peace process made Israelis deeply opposed to a European role in this area. To begin with, as it has been previously mentioned, the European Union has consistently supported the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza and to that

⁴² More information on trade between the EU and Israel is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/israel/index_en.htm

purpose; the European Union provided an enormous financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to support the process of institution building within the Palestinian structures. In order to avoid Israeli criticism, the EU has expressed that its support for the creation of a Palestinian state should not be perceived as an indication of waning sympathy for Israel. The EU has elaborated on this point by arguing that the EU assistance to the Palestinians prevent the outbreak of a total collapse and chaos in territories and thus it contributes to Israeli security and prosperity since no state can flourish as long as it is surrounded by underdeveloped and hostile neighbors.⁴³

On the other hand, the European Union has been consistently critical of the Israeli policies in the occupied territories and the daily Israeli attitudes and mistreatment towards the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Besides, the European Union has opposed to the existence and expansion of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and it has repeatedly called Israel to stop building new settlements and to dismantle the existing settlements. In addition, the EU has supported the right of return of the Palestinian refugees in a rhetorical level and it has explicitly stated its opposition to the Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem on the basis on unacceptability of seizure of territories by force. To cut a long story short, the European Union has been generally more supportive of the Palestinian arguments in the peace process and it has largely assumed a pro-Palestinian position on basic issues. Furthermore, the pro-Palestinian position of the European Union was reinforced with the fact that this position was warmly welcomed by the Europeans. In a Flash Euro-barometer survey conducted in 2003, the majority of citizens in all member states (with the exception of Italy) have expressed their belief

⁴³ More information is available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/

that Israel presents a threat to the world peace. 59 per cent of the European citizens have agreed with this suggestion while the “yes” results were as high as 74 per cent in the Netherlands and 69 per cent in Austria. In Italy, 48 per cent of the respondents confirmed that they perceive Israel as a threat to peace while 46 per cent was opposed to this suggestion.⁴⁴ In another public opinion survey conducted across Europe by the Anti-Defamation League in April 2004, 15 per cent of those surveyed express their sympathy with the Israelis in the Palestinian question while 24 per cent had sympathized with the Palestinians. Besides, 59 per cent of the respondents were reported to view the Sharon government unfavorably and only 34 per cent had agreed that Israel truly wants to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians.⁴⁵

Even though the pro-Palestinian position of the European Union had a visible impact on the Israel’s perception of Europe, it has been the European approach to the suicide bombings as well as to the Israeli responses to the suicide bombings and the European media coverage of these incidents that had caused the most significant damage to the bilateral relations. Even though the European officials had explicitly condemned the suicide attacks, these declarations were not enough to appease the Israeli anger towards the European statements expressing some degree of sympathy and understanding towards the suicide bombers as Chris Patten’s interview with BBC News had indicated. In his interview, Patten has condemned Palestinian suicide bombings and he has added that “you do have to recognize, what is the political context in which young men and women strap bombs to themselves and go out to murder other young men and women”. He had also expressed his disapproval of Israeli tactics employed against the suicide bombings and he had accused Ariel

⁴⁴ The full text of Flash Eurobarometer 151 is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/iraq/doc/fl151_iraq_full_report.pdf

⁴⁵ Full text of the survey is available at www.adl.org/anti_semitism/European_Attitudes.pdf

Sharon of provoking an insane cycle in the region resulting in a cult of death.⁴⁶ In another statement, Patten had argued that Israel has effectively hijacked the war against terrorism and is deliberately destroying the Palestinian Authority for purposes that have nothing to do with trying to deal with suicide bombers.⁴⁷

Such European positions and statements have caused a general Israeli distrust of Europe and have resulted in Israeli disapproval of European initiatives regarding the Palestinian question. This situation had undermined the European efforts to establish credibility and to assert itself as an influential actor in the Middle East and else where. As a discussion paper prepared by Ben Gurion University points out, disagreements between Israel and Europe over the future of the peace process and developments in the region have led to a growing suspicion and hostility in bilateral relations. European criticisms of Israeli policies and strategies are interpreted by the Israelis as a proof of European bias in favor of the Palestinians and of the European hostility, and even anti-Semitism, towards Israel. In return, Europeans had assured themselves that the Israeli actions and intransigence has been the major obstacle for the peace in the region.⁴⁸

It is interesting to observe that both the Europeans and Israelis are committed to the development of a closer and friendlier relationship at the rhetorical and declaratory level while they continue to perceive each other with deep distrust and misunderstanding. Despite the mutual efforts of emphasizing on shared values and common heritage, neither Israel nor Europe had succeeded in defining these commonalities and in transforming these commonalities into the political sphere.

⁴⁶ “Patten: Sharon’s policies caused ‘cult of death’ ”, BBC News, 18 April 2002, available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1920853.stm>

⁴⁷ “Israel Has Made ‘A Sea of Blood,’ Says Arafat Aide”, The Times, 22 April 2002.

⁴⁸ Full text of the report is available online at <http://hsf.bgu.ac.il/europe/uploadDocs/iepnpgdjp.pdf>

Within this framework, the European Union needs to improve its image among the Israelis and has to convince them that the European declarations regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more than the wish-list of the Palestinians. Besides, the EU should be more effective in transforming its commercial power gained through trade relations into political influence that would contribute to the peace process.

In contrast to the grim nature of relations between Europe and Israel, the United States had traditionally maintained close and friendly relations with Israel. As it has been previously mentioned, the Israeli-American relations had gradually evolved from an early policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in 1948 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily powerful country with the United States.⁴⁹ The United States has been an advocate of the Jewish state since 1967 due to both domestic and strategic considerations and it has been generally supportive of Israeli policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Existence of a special relationship as well as a reciprocal understanding on regional issues and extensive strategic connections between the United States and Israel is beyond questioning.⁵⁰

One of the most significant aspects of Israeli-American relations has been the huge amount of financial assistance provided to Israel by the United States. Israel currently receives about \$3 billion per year in economic and military grants, refugee settlement assistance, and other aid. Until 1962, the American assistance to Israel was limited to economic development assistance which was made through small

⁴⁹ As it has been previously mentioned, the American support to the creation of Israel in 1948 was far from being popular especially in the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. However, President Truman was personally in favor of the creation of the Jewish state.

⁵⁰ Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, available online at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB82008.pdf>

military loans. In 1974, the United States started to assist the Israeli army through military grants and this practice has continued until that day. In 1996, Clinton offered \$ 100 million in aid for anti-terror activities, \$ 200 million for the Arrow anti-missile deployment and \$ 500 million for an anti-missile laser weapon. In 1998, economic aid was cut from \$ 1.2 billion to \$ 1.08 billion and military aid was increased from \$ 1.8 billion to \$ 1.86 billion for fiscal year 1999 and this pattern continued in the following years. In addition, in 2000 Israel received \$ 1.2 billion in military grants for implementing the Wye Agreement.⁵¹

As it has been previously mentioned, the American assistance to Israel proves to be a controversial issue both within the domestic politics of the United States and the bilateral politics between the two countries. First of all, the prodigious amount of the American aid has been heavily criticized within the American society and it has been a target of criticism among the anti-foreign aid groups as well as the oil lobby and the American-Arabs. Besides, the United States also provides extensive assistance to the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt foremost, which causes a serious problem in Israeli-American relations.

Even though the unique and indispensable position of Israel as a strategic partner and ally of the United States has been a constant theme of the American foreign policy in the Middle East in general and in Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, there have been significant differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations regarding their approach towards Israel's stance in the peace process. While the Clinton years in the White House had witnessed a more even-handed approach towards Israelis and Palestinians marked with the beginning of a more moderate attitude towards the Palestinian Authority and the establishment of a

⁵¹ Further information on the American assistance to Israel is available online at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB82008.pdf>

Palestinian state, the policies of Bush administration were explicitly closer to the Israeli positions. In one of her recent speeches, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has expressed her view that “Israel has no greater friend and no stronger supporter than the United States of America. The United States and Israel share much in common. We both affirm the innate freedom and dignity of every human life, not as prizes that people confer to one another, but as divine gifts of the Almighty”.⁵² She had even established an analogy between the United States and Israel by arguing that both countries were viewed with cynicism and skepticism at their establishment.

Upon his arrival to power, George Bush had made no secret of his pro-Israeli approach by demonstrating his support for the Israeli view that in the absence of a call by Arafat to renounce violence, little diplomacy could be conducted and that both Camp David proposals and Clinton parameters were off the table (Sicherman 2002: 171). Bush administration’s pro-Israeli position in the beginning was further reinforced after the attacks in September 11. After the attacks, it might be argued that the American foreign policy had shifted its focus to the threat posed by global terrorism to international security. In this respect, George Bush had openly declared America’s war against terrorism and soon he was convinced that the Israeli policies towards the Palestinian Authority should be regarded as another front of this war. Therefore, he continued and doubled the traditional American support for Israel by identifying prime minister Ariel Sharon as “a man of peace”, a statement that many Israelis and even Ariel Sharon himself would disagree with, and a struggler against the common terrorist threat. In this respect, Bush made it clear that the real problem in the peace process was on the Palestinian side (Hudson 2005: 298).

⁵² Full text of Rice’s address is available online at <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0505/S00359.htm>

The United States also continued to support Israel on the basic principles of the peace process. While declaring his support to the idea of a Palestinian state, George Bush was very sensitive to assure the audience that this would be conditional on the removal of the Palestinian leadership and reformation of the Palestinian Authority. Besides, as it has been previously mentioned, the American foreign policy makers were closer to the Israeli positions on key issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, and return of the Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, the United States had adopted the Israeli rhetoric regarding the suicide bombings and American policy makers made sure that they see the heart of the matter as the defense of a democratic nation-state in the face of a sustained campaign of terrorism.⁵³

One of the strongest criticisms of the international community to the United States regarding its relations with Israel was the argument that the United States was unable to put pressure on Israel in order to enforce it to involve in the concessions required for the survival of the peace process. However, these criticisms failed to influence neither Bush nor his administration since both were ideologically committed to Israel as a regional superpower and as a strategic ally of the United States. As Charles Hudson (2005: 302) had put it, a triple entente of neoconservatives, the Israel lobby, and Christian fundamentalists ensured that Israel, be it right or wrong, would not be seriously challenged by Washington.

As it has been observed above, there have been remarkable differences concerning Israel's relations with the United States and the European Union. Even though the European Union possesses a significant commercial advantage in bilateral relations, it fails to transform its economic upper hand into an incentive in

⁵³ This information has been retrieved from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/BG1575.cfm>

political sphere regarding its position in the peace process. Furthermore, the Europeans are viewed by a deep mistrust and suspicion due to its approach to the basic issues of the Palestinian questions. On the other hand, the United States and Israel enjoy a special and close relationship based on several factors that have been previously examined and Israeli-American relations are further strengthened through the American stance on the peace process especially during the Bush administration. This simplification requires a caveat. Even though it might be generally argued that the European Union has a problematic relation with Israel while the United States enjoys a special relationship, this situation should not be caricaturized. It is true that the Israeli-European relations are troubled by many issues. But the two sides still share similar values and furthermore, they share the same geographic space and they are aware of the fact that they are both vulnerable to the volatility of the region and that they are in need of each other for the sake of stability and prosperity in their national homelands. Beyond that, Israel is increasingly criticized by the international community and it is widely acknowledged in Israel that the image of the Jewish state has changed compared to its early years. Since late 1980's, Israel is more identified with Goliath rather than David, a role which is identified by the Palestinians in the modern version of the biblical tale. Therefore, Israeli policy-makers know the disadvantages of standing in the global arena with only one ally. On the other hand, the Israeli-American relations are far from being perfect contrary to how it seems in the first glance. As it has been previously mentioned, there have been several crises in the history of bilateral relations which had visibly increased during the Clinton administration's involvement with the Netanyahu government. President Clinton had continuously disagreed with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's strategy of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and it has been argued that

Clinton was convinced that Netanyahu was deliberately delaying the peace process. Furthermore, several issues had continued to poison the Israeli-American relations during the Bush administration such as the American criticism of Israeli tactics against the Palestinians assumed to be engaged in terrorism.

4.3.3.2 Palestinian Authority and the Transatlantic Actors

Several aspects of the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the transatlantic actors, including the European and American positions over the key issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have been analyzed throughout the previous chapters. However, the financial assistance provided by the European Union and the United States to Palestinian Authority will be further examined alongside the divergent approaches of the transatlantic actors regarding the position and relevancy of Yasser Arafat.

As it has been already mentioned, the European Union is the biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority. European Community (EC) assistance to the Palestinians began in 1971 with EC's first contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Following the Venice Declaration in 1980, European assistance was diversified to be distributed through NGO projects in health, agriculture and education. From 1994 to the end of 2002, the European Union had committed approximately € 1 billion in grants and loans and € 500 million through its contributions to UNRWA. Furthermore, € 2.5 billion was channeled through bilateral EU member state assistance. Since the creation of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Palestinian Authority has also benefited from MEDA program which offers technical and financial support measures to accompany the reform of

economic and social structures. Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, the European Union has shifted its assistance from more long-term institution-building to urgently needed humanitarian assistance, support to refugees through UNRWA, and development assistance. From June 2001 to the end of 2002, a significant part of EC assistance was provided in the form of direct budget assistance to the Palestinian Authority. This support was directed towards securing expenditures such as public service salaries, social, educational, health and other core functions of the PA in the absence of regular monthly transfers of revenues from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. Besides, each month the European Union gives the Palestinian Authority € 10 million in direct budgetary assistance.

The United States has also been a significant financial contributor to the Palestinians but it has been observed that the American assistance has been smaller than that of the Europeans' and that the Americans have refrained from direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. From 1993 to 2003, the United States contributed \$ 757 million through the UNRWA and the American assistance to West Bank and Gaza has been approximately \$ 850 million. Furthermore, the United States has granted \$ 50 million in 2002 in disaster relief assistance in response to damages inflicted during the Israeli military operations in Palestinian areas in April-May 2002 and for the first time, \$ 20 million of this aid was made directly payable to the Palestinian Authority to enable the Palestinians to pay their electric bill to Israel and to be used for water, sewage and infrastructure improvements.

Throughout the past decade, the European Union has been repeatedly criticized for its extensive assistance to Palestinians on the basis of misuse of EU funds by the Palestinian Authority. There has been serious allegation concerning that

the EU funds were channeled towards Yasser Arafat's personal account and that the EU assistance has been diverted to organizations engaged in terrorist activities, specifically to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade that constitutes the military wing of Fatah. Therefore, connected to this claim, the European Union was accused of tacitly sponsoring suicide attacks through its financial assistance. The controversy surrounding the European assistance reached its peak in May 2002 when Steven Blumberg, an Israeli victim of Palestinian violence, filed a \$ 20.7 million civil suit against the European Union.⁵⁴ Few days later, Israel openly accused the Palestinian Authority for supporting terrorist organizations through the EU funds. Following this accusation, the EU immediately froze its funding activities and initiated an investigation regarding the use of EU funds. As a result of the investigation the European Commission concluded that no evidence was found suggesting that the EU fund was used for financing terrorist activities and the aid was unblocked by June 2002. Chris Patten declared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament that "After scrupulous examination of all the allegations that have been made, I can report to you today that there is no evidence for EU funds used for other purposes than those agreed. There is no reason to state that EU money has financed terrorism or bought weapons". He continued that "The documents presented to us by Israel do not prove that EU funds have been misused and there is no evidence that the PA budget as a whole provides funds for terror activities."⁵⁵

Another criticism regarding the EU aid has been the claim that the EU assistance was used to supply Palestinian school textbooks which included

⁵⁴ More information regarding the law suit is available online at <http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/06/01/lawsuit/index.html>

⁵⁵Statement by The Rt Hon Chris Patten, CH Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Brussel, 19th June 2002 - SPEECH/02/293. Full text of Patten's statement is available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_293.htm

expressions that provoke hatred against Israelis and Jews and that encourage anti-Semitism. This accusation was also dismissed by the European Union after a study conducted by Prof. Nathan Brown of Georgetown University. Furthermore, it has been announced that the EU funds have never been used to support school textbooks but, within the field of education, they were solely used to supply the salaries of school teachers and to help building schools. However, as a consequence of rising criticism, the European Union had restructured the mechanism of aid distribution. Since April 2003, various conditions were determined by the EU such as the presentation of invoices for the bills that the Palestinians had to pay.⁵⁶ In another official statement aimed to appease the international concern regarding the funds, it has been declared that “the EU support to the PA takes various forms (support to UNRWA, humanitarian assistance, development projects, budgetary assistance), each with its own monitoring mechanisms. All budgetary assistance is strictly vetted. The payments (€ 10million per month) are only transferred after the IMF has verified that the money has been properly spent according to the agreed purpose”.⁵⁷

Position of the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the peace process proved to be the most consistent area of divergence between the European Union and the United States, especially after the failed talks at Camp David. The Europeans and the Americans used to disagree both on the legitimacy and the relevancy of Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people. While the European Union, along with the United Nations and Russian Federation, favored Arafat as the Palestinian elected and legitimate leader of the Palestinians, the American administration during the

⁵⁶ A detailed account of the accusations and European responses is available at <http://www.caabu.org/press/briefings/EU-funds-to-PA-Briefing-Jan2003.pdf>

⁵⁷ Statement of the European Commission following allegations that EC funds have been misused by the Palestinian Authority Brussels, 6 May 2002. Full text of the statement is available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/news/me02_90.htm

presidency of George Bush viewed Arafat as an obstacle against peace and George Bush had consistently refused to meet him. While the European Union continued to engage with Arafat on the basis that he was a legitimately elected leader and that his marginalization in the peace process would make it more difficult to achieve progress in Palestinian reform (Kaye 2004: 28).

One might argue that the relations between Arafat and the American administration went through its golden age throughout the Clinton years. As it has been previously mentioned, Yasser Arafat was received in the White House for thirteen times, more than any other foreign presidents. Furthermore, Clinton himself visited the Palestinian territories and embraced the idea of Palestinian statehood in an address to a Palestinian assembly. However, as the peace process moved towards a deadlock, the American approach to Arafat gradually started to erode and following the breakdown of the peace talks in Camp David, Bill Clinton did not refrain to finger at Arafat as the primary cause of failure.

Bush administration's approach towards the Palestinian leader was definitely harsher than simply accusing for the deadlock of peace talks. President Bush consistently refused to meet Arafat and accused him of supporting terrorist activities. Furthermore, in his historic speech in June 2002, George Bush openly called for the removal of the Palestinian president as a precondition for the Americans to back the would-be Palestinian state. In his speech, President Bush argued that "Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born". Bush continued that "Today, the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority, and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements

with their neighbors, the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state”.⁵⁸

American administration’s approach towards Arafat became subject to increasing criticism from the European Union which continued to recognize Arafat as the legitimate and elected leader of the Palestinian people. In July 2002, the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi stated that Arafat was the only valid interlocutor for Israel and that it was up to the Palestinian people to choose their leader. Prodi continued that the result of a free election has to be accepted whether one likes it or not.⁵⁹ Prodi’s view concerning Arafat was generally embraced by the member states. Few days after Bush’s speech, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer declared that “the Palestinian people alone must decide on its legitimate leadership”, while Jacques Chirac argued that “It is for the Palestinians, and them alone, to choose their representatives”.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Chirac sent his newly elected foreign minister Dominique de Villepin to Ramallah to meet Arafat as a demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinian leader.

The Euro-American divergences regarding the position of Yasser Arafat caused significant damage to the transatlantic relations. When George Bush had called Arafat as the leader of a terrorist organization, the Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh declared her view that “this discussion about equating Arafat with terrorists is both inappropriate and stupid. It is a very dangerous policy” (Boukhars and Yetiv 2003: 73). Three years later after Lindh’s statement, the Secretary of State

⁵⁸ Full text of Bush’s speech is available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>

⁵⁹ Statement by Romano Prodi on the Situation in the Middle East, 3 April 2002. Full text of the statement is available online at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/ip02_489.htm

⁶⁰ Fischer’s statement was published in *Wall Street Journal Europe* in 26 June 2002 while Chirac’s statement was taken from *The Times*, published in 28 June 2002.

Condoleezza Rice reasserted the rightfulness of the Bush administration in its refusal to meet with Arafat since Arafat had valued neither Israel's security nor his own people's liberty. Rice continued that "There were those who ridiculed this principled decision as if the refusal to negotiate with a man who aided and abetted terrorism somehow revealed a lack of concern for peace".⁶¹

4.4. Transatlantic Relations and the Palestinian Question: Prospects and Challenges

As it has been hitherto explained, from 1993 to 2003 there have been several divergences and convergences between the United States and the European Union regarding their positions towards and perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it would be plausible to argue that a considerable degree of transatlantic split exists regarding the settlement of the key issues within the Palestinian question. Even though the existence of a disagreement between the Europeans and the Americans is beyond discussion, one may still question the significance and the repercussions of the Euro-American differences concerning the conflict. In other words, the challenges that would be faced with the prolongation of the split should be examined along with the prospects that would be introduced with the creation of a full transatlantic cooperation.

The European Security Strategy introduced in December 2003 identifies the transatlantic relationship as "irreplaceable". However, it is a fact that the Middle East conflict is an intermittent source of friction between the United States and the European Union and this friction is a matter of import since the stakes for everyone involved are substantial (Haass 1997: 61). Therefore, the European Union and the

⁶¹ Full text of Rice's speech is available online at <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0505/S00359.htm>

United States need to narrow the gap between their positions regarding the most central and urgent issues of the conflict such as the situation of the Jewish settlements and the status of Jerusalem. The transatlantic parties possess a valuable mechanism in order to bring their perspectives together. The Middle East Quartet, established in 2002 between the most significant external actors of the United States, United Nations, the European Union and the Russian Federation, needs to be further institutionalized in a way to create space for more regular and effective meetings among the members and it should be empowered in a way to afford more frequent consultation and more successful coordination. Throughout such mechanisms, the transatlantic actors will get the chance to learn to listen and inform each other on a regular basis.

The Roadmap, which has been fatally damaged since its announcement in April 2003 should be immediately revitalized with some significant revisions and both the European Union and the United States should emphasize that their responsibility in peace process is not merely limited to bring conflicting parties to the negotiation table and to force them to sign a peace plan but to strongly assert that they will continue to cooperate and coordinate both with each other and with the combatants and that they will continue to be the main actors in monitoring and enforcing the implementation of the peace agreements. Furthermore, transatlantic parties should reconsider the way that they deal with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to make sure that neither incentives nor coercive measures are overstressed. Especially for the case of Europe, a mixture of sticks and carrots should be adopted. It needs to be made clear to the Israeli and Palestinian policy makers that as long as they comply with the requirements of the peace deal and as long as they keep in track with the implementation of the peace plan, they will be

continued to be extensively rewarded. Similarly, the European Union and the United States should emphasize their stance that the parties to the conflict will be denied those rewards or they will be punished as long as they continue to undermine the provisions of the peace agreements. In other words, the transatlantic actors should assert their commitment to the principle that the peace-makers will be rewarded while the peace-breakers will be penalized.

Both the European Union and the United States should reconsider their relations with the conflicting parties and should look for ways to improve their relations with the Israelis and Palestinians respectively but the fact that the Europeans are closer to Palestinians while the Americans enjoy a special relationship with the Israelis should not be considered as a weakness but it should be transformed into an advantage through the use of these relationships in a complementary pattern. In other words, both parties should make use of the specific comparative advantages that enable them to perform certain tasks better than the others with their respective instruments. For instance the United States holds greater leverage with Israel while the Europeans enjoy greater credibility among the Palestinians, or the Americans are in a better position to bring military pressure to bear and offer security guarantees while Europeans could hold out the prospects of association and integration (Perthes 2004: 91). However, both sides should refrain from perceiving this complementary situation as a division of labor in order to make sure that they do not regard these particular strengths as taken for granted and fail to improve their deficiencies.

Another significant point that deserves to be mentioned is the argument that, considering the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, external intervention through transatlantic cooperation is definitely necessary but not sufficient to reach a final status since the achievement and implementation of a peace agreement truly

lies in the hands of the Israelis and Palestinians. In other words, the push exerted from the Europeans and the Americans are doomed to fail unless they are matched with an equally strong and sincere pull from the region.⁶² Besides full cooperation in transatlantic affairs, the success of the peace process depends on the government in charge of Israel, the power and influence of the Palestinian leaders over the Palestinian groups and the ability of Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers to be ready to compromise to reach a final. But more significantly, the success of the process depends on the ability of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to inform their societies on the costs and benefits of the final status and difficulties that will be confronted in the long and thorny road to peace as well as gains to be achieved. In other words, they should persuade their societies that peace requires compromise and compromise requires sacrificing.

In order to mend the transatlantic rift and to contribute to the peace process, the European Union and the United States are neither required nor expected to agree on every little single issue regarding the conflict but they need to reach a general agreement on the basic premises and they should develop a mutual understanding and respect that they might hold different ways of doing things. Furthermore, they should understand that they have different perceptions and backgrounds as well as different foreign policy making mechanisms. In this respect, the transatlantic parties should comprehend each other's weaknesses and should avoid abusing these weaknesses.⁶³ In order to repair the transatlantic split, the United States and the

⁶² To put it simply, it takes two to tango, however in the Palestinian question it may take more than two.

⁶³ This lack of understanding might be better comprehended through various examples. For instance, some Americans tend to stuck in Europe's past and use it as a weapon against Europe through establishing some false analogies related to the Munich Agreement. On the other hand, the Europeans seem to have very little appreciation for the demographic realities of the American society which is home to six million Jewish people. most of whom are connected to Israel through various ties and naturally concerned for the well being and security of the Jewish state.

European Union need to bridge the gap between the positions they hold in the key aspects of the conflict. To this purpose, the Europeans should continue to strengthen their relations with the Palestinian Authority while the Americans should continue to help the Israeli government to overcome its security concerns. On the other hand, the European Union should find a way to establish a healthier and stronger communication with Israeli government but more significantly with the Israeli society in order to appease their concerns over the alleged anti-Semitism attached to every action and decision of the EU. Equally significant, the United States should appeal to the Palestinian people to convince them that it does not act as the protector and the guardian of Israeli interests but it possesses the capability to adopt an evenhanded approach. Furthermore, the United States should persuade the Palestinian people that the honest and genuine purpose of the American administration is to build stability and prosperity in the Middle East and that the United States does not have a secret agenda behind its efforts. Considering that the Americans are currently involved in a highly disputed and locally challenged military and political action in Iraq, one may argue that the United States' job is more difficult than that of the EU in this specific aspect.

Another important issue that needs to be discussed within the attempts to make progress in the transatlantic relations and the peace process is the argument that the both sides of the Atlantic have to embrace multilateralism and they have to persuade, or push, the conflicting parties to do the same. The formation of the Middle East Quartet might be viewed as an important move as the first step towards further multilateralism among the external powers. It is true that there will be no security in the world without the United States but it is equally true that the United States will fail to find security without the world (Schori 2005: 277). Considering the

conflict, unilateral actions that would affect the final status such as the unilateral moves aimed at drawing the boundaries between the two entities or declaring premature statehoods should be avoided. Neither the United States nor the European Union should encourage or give a blank check to the conflicting parties regarding their unilateral moves.

Both the United States and the European Union should remain committed to the peace process and they should neither be discouraged with what is happening on the ground nor consider withdrawing from the process. In other words, the both sides of the Atlantic should remain engaged since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a simple bilateral conflict that the conflicting sides are able to discuss their problems within a civil framework but this is a century-long and complicated conflict that has gradually transformed into a personal vendetta between the two nations.

There is no doubt that the United States and the European Union need each other since neither possesses the ability to handle the problems of the Middle East conflict on its own. However, in order to accommodate with the changing dynamics of world politics, Euro-American partnership needs to be redefined since the survival of the partnership is crucial for the stability and prosperity of post-Cold war world (Wallace 2001: 34). In other words, the improvement of the transatlantic relationship and narrowing of the transatlantic gap is not only significant for the transatlantic actors themselves and for the conflicting parties but it would also have repercussions for global security. One of the lessons of the twentieth century is that the world is a much safer and more peaceful place when the Americans and Europeans cooperate (Asmus et al 2005: 20). Furthermore, one may argue that the west's credibility in the region depends on the seriousness, honesty, and efficiency of the American and

European efforts to contribute to a fair and sustainable settlement to the Palestinian question.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The vibrant and dynamic nature of politics in the Middle East makes it impossible to conduct a time-framed research without mentioning the developments that have occurred in the aftermath of the period that has been analyzed. Since the declaration of the Roadmap for peace in April 2003, Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued to run its course and the region has continued to witness rotating periods of tranquility and uproar. Furthermore, significant changes have been observed within the conflict since 2003 which might lead to fundamental transformations in the future such as the creation of the post of prime minister within the political structure of the Palestinian Authority and appointment of Mahmud Abbas as the first politician to hold this novel title in May 2003, death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 and his succession with Abbas in January 2005, Ariel Sharon's departure from Likud in order to establish Kadima and his subsequent health issues which required him to sign out of Israeli politics, the victory of Hamas in January 2006 elections to be followed by the success of Kadima, led by Ehud Olmert, in Israeli elections in March 2006. In this respect, several issues need to be pointed out prior to presenting the concluding remarks which are a general assessment of Roadmap and European and American reactions and policies regarding the construction of separation barrier and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

The Roadmap for peace is a time-tabled plan proposed by the Middle East Quartet with the purpose to introduce a negotiated solution the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Basic and concurring themes of the plan were the creation of an

independent Palestinian state, that has gone through an intense process of reformation and institution-building, existing next to a secure and recognized Israel which has frozen settlement activities and ultimately dismantled all settlements and has ended its occupation over the Palestinian territories. Another important feature of the Roadmap has been that it has elaborated on the measures sketched out by President Bush but also adding a performance-based timetable with phases that would lead to build the provisional state to be followed by negotiations for a final agreement by 2005. Other major additions were intended to emphasize the international nature of the peace process such as an international conference to facilitate the final status talks and an international monitoring mechanism to supervise and determine performance for the progress from one phase to the next. Even though it was initially the product of the Middle East Quartet, it was the Americans who presided over the original launching of the Roadmap in Aqaba, Jordan, in 2003 after the recognition of the plan by the Palestinian Authority and Israel.(Golan 2004: 39).

Three years after its announcement, a brief look at the situation in the Middle East reveals that the Roadmap had largely failed to fulfill what it has originally promised. Progress has not been achieved in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields and “a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” based on “the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors” is not reached by 2005. Neither Israelis are living in a more secure environment nor have the lives of the Palestinians normalized. Some part of this failure might be attributed to the nature of the document which stands as a good intended text decorated with expressions that

would sound favorable for both Israelis and Palestinians and filled with destinations, timelines, and target dates. Furthermore, it would be plausible to argue that the Roadmap has been deliberately designed to be ambiguous in order to persuade the conflicting parties to approve it (Kuttab 2003: 88).

The conflicting parties had made a promising start in the second half of 2003 by a ceremonial opening attended by Sharon and Abbas in which both leaders have expressed their commitment to peace talks. Next day, Israeli forces have withdrawn from Bethlehem followed by the transfer of authority to the Palestinians. However, by the end of 2003, the Palestinian Authority has failed to prevent terrorist activities while Israel has not pulled out of the occupied Palestinian areas and has not frozen its settlement activities. Therefore, the parties have failed to fulfill the first phase of the Roadmap. Next year, on 14 April 2004, President Bush wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon which demonstrated his expectations regarding the outcome of the final status negotiations. Bush's letter seemed to be in favor of Israel on two significant and disputed issues. With respect to final borders, the letter stated that "in light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion". Second, regarding the Palestinian right of return, Bush had expressed that "it seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state and the settling of Palestinian refugees there

rather than Israel”.⁶⁴ Even though these statements were conflicting with the underlying themes of the Roadmap, on 8 February 2005, Israeli and Palestinian leaders declared their continuing support to the Roadmap and in May 2005, President Bush, in contrast to his previous statements, reasserted his commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and he pointed out that the two-state solution must ensure the contiguity of West Bank since a state of scattered territories will not work.⁶⁵

The fate of the Roadmap has caused confusion and split among the people interested in the conflict. While some have argued that the peace plan has already been out of date due to the rising instability and escalation of the violence in the region, the others have claimed that it is still on the table. On the other hand, the European policymakers have constantly expressed their belief that progress on the Roadmap for peace and its two-state solution is impossible without U.S. leadership, but some contend that Washington has not done enough to get Israeli-Palestinian negotiations back on track.

Regarding two other significant issues that have developed in the aftermath of the Roadmap, namely the construction of the separation fence and the unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza and Northern parts of the West Bank, the United States and the European Union have displayed diverging perspectives.

With respect to Gaza disengagement, the European Union has perceived the withdrawal plan as a part of the Roadmap and it has pointed out to the significance of this step as the first removal by Israel of settlements built on Palestinian territories

⁶⁴ “From Bush, Mideast Words to Act On”, by Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Quandt, June 17, 2005, Washington Post, available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/16/AR2005061601379.html>

⁶⁵ Full text of Bush’s statement is available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050526.html>

seized in the 1967 war and thus offering a prospect of sustained peace in the region provided that the disengagement process leads to progress towards a viable Palestinian state living in peace and security with Israel. On the other hand, it has also been observed that the EU's optimism regarding the disengagement was a cautious one that did not gloss over the challenges and problems that might arise in the aftermath of the Gaza pull-out. For instance, the EU has posed some questions concerning the limited scope of the disengagement considering that the withdrawal from West Bank was not a part of the pull-out agenda. In one of her addresses in Israel, the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner has stated that in order to make the disengagement from Gaza meaningful for the Palestinians, there must be progress on issues like freedom of movement, borders, and trade facilitation. Waldner has continued that without addressing these problems Palestinians will not see tangible improvements in their living conditions and without tangible improvements in their living conditions, it would be very hard to convince them that there is a dividend to be earned from peace.⁶⁶ The EU has also stressed that any Israeli withdrawal must be done in cooperation and consultation with the PA and in keeping with the spirit of the Roadmap and Israeli settlers displaced from Gaza must not be transferred to the settlements in the West Bank.

The United States, on the other hand, proved to have a more cheerful stance regarding the Israeli disengagement. In his letter to Ariel Sharon in April 2004, Bush has described the disengagement plan as “a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace”. President Bush also endorsed the plan as a positive step towards the Road map for peace and at a joint press conference with Ariel Sharon on April 11, 2005 he stated his support for Sharon's “courageous

⁶⁶ Full text of Waldner's speech is available online at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_675.htm

initiative” to disengage from Gaza and part of the West Bank and his willingness to coordinate the implementation of the disengagement plan with the Palestinians. However, he has also warned Israel against “any activity that contravenes the roadmap or prejudices final status obligations”.⁶⁷ The Bush Administration has argued that its endorsement of the Sharon plan was intended to revitalize the hindered peace process and, has asserted that all final status issues, including the return of Palestinian refugees, must still be resolved through negotiations between the parties to the conflict.⁶⁸

The construction of a separation wall in the occupied territories proved to be another issue of contention among the transatlantic actors.⁶⁹ As it was originally designed, the security fence was intended to build confidence between the protagonists by reducing the incidence of terrorist bombings by Palestinians infiltrating into Israel and thereby serving the cause of peace. In this respect, the wall was expected to follow the Green Line or armistice line of 1948 between Israel and the West Bank. However, it soon turned out that the fence was not approximating to the Green Line but it was digging deep into the West Bank (Hollis 2004: 194). The construction of the barrier proves to be a very controversial project. While the advocates of the wall perceive it as a necessary tool to protect Israeli civilians from terrorist attacks, the opponents argue that it undermines the international law, and regard it as an attempt to annexation of the land occupied by the settlements, and

⁶⁷ “Bush warns Israel over West Bank”, BBC News, 11 April, 2005, available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4431583.stm#

⁶⁸ Guy Dinmore and Harvey Morris, “Arafat Denounces US Support for Israeli Plan,” Financial Times, April 15, 2004; Judy Dempsey, “EU Pulls Back from Confronting US over Gaza,” Financial Times, April 18, 2004; Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Retreats from Bush Remarks on Sharon Plan,” Washington Post, May 5, 2004.

⁶⁹ The separation barrier refers to two different walls built in Gaza and West Bank. While the one in Gaza is not subject to debate since it goes along with the armistice line, the one in the West Bank has been a source of controversy. The wall which is discussed in this chapter refers to the latter.

more significantly, to pre-empt final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Those who are against the barrier has mostly focused on the route of the fence and its impact on the lives of the Palestinians who live nearby with specific emphasis on their freedom of travel within the West Bank and on their access to work in Israel. In 2004, the United Nations passed a number of resolutions and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which issued a ruling calling for the wall to be removed and the Arab residents to be compensated for any damage done. Israeli government, in return, had submitted a document stating that it did not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ and supporting its claim that the issue of the barrier is political and not under the authority of the ICJ.

The EU statements described the separation barrier as a complex series of walls, barriers, trenches, and fences, which in many places departs significantly from the Green Line. The EU has consistently put that it recognizes Israel's right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, but with the qualification that the separation barrier should not violate the territorial rights of the Palestinians. EU statements continue that Israel unjustly confiscates Palestinian lands and severely curtails movement and access in a manner which undermines the trust of Palestinians in the Roadmap process. The barrier route in and around East Jerusalem is identified as a particular concern since that it threatens the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. The EU is also alarmed by the designation of land between the barrier and "the green line" as a closed military zone. This is perceived as a de facto change in the legal status of Palestinians living in this area. Therefore the European Union repeatedly calls on Israel to stop and reverse the construction of the separation barrier inside the occupied Palestinian Territories, including in and around East Jerusalem.

With regards to the American approach to the separation wall, on July 25, 2003, President Bush has stated that “I think the wall is a problem. And I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel with a wall snaking through the West Bank”. The following year, referring to the issue of the barrier as a permanent border in the future, he expressed in a letter to Sharon on April 2004 that the wall “should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities”. On the other hand, it was the same letter in which President Bush endorsed the Israeli wall around Palestinian areas, approved Israel’s unilateral action in Gaza and the West Bank, rejected the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and said Israel’s occupied territory settlements should be recognized in final borders.⁷⁰

The relations between the two sides of the Atlantic proved to be one of the most interesting relations of all. One side of the equation was an offspring of the other and a relationship characterized by admiration and envy, compassion and hatred, mistrust and confidence gradually appeared and continuously evolved throughout the centuries. As the twentieth century was upon the humanity, the well-being of the both parties were threatened by a common enemy which led to a strong alliance among the two in which the offspring ran to rescue his parents for twice. Within the bipolar structure of world politics, the Europeans were more concerned with the project of European integration and European security that they were quiet relieved by the fact that the United States took the lead in global affairs and that the

⁷⁰ Further information on American policy regarding the separation barrier is available online at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB92052.pdf>

Europeans played a supporting role. Even though the Americans and Europeans continued to disagree on several issues throughout the Cold War, these disagreements were contained in the presence of an imminent Soviet threat. As the twentieth century was coming to an end, the cold war structures began to fade away and many Europeans started to vocalize their demands for a more assertive role for Europe in world politics and disagreements among the two sides of the Atlantic became more visible.

The Middle East in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular was one of the problematic issues that the United States and Europe had significant divergences. As it has been hitherto analyzed, there are several factors that cause and contribute to these differences. The impact of distinct historical experiences of the two actors in the region that lead them to produce separate historical narratives, dissimilar demographic constituencies and geographic conditions, and complex mechanisms of foreign policy making that are shaped through and influenced by different concerns. On the other hand, it has also been observed that core European and American interests in the region fundamentally remained similar. The regional security and stability, economic development and prosperity in the Middle East, cheap and uninterrupted flow of oil and security of other energy resources, commercial concerns of European and American corporations conducting business in the region, socioeconomic development that would limit the excessive amount of migration from the region and that would eliminate the deep causes of radicalism might be enlisted as some of the most central issues that bind the destiny of Europeans and Americans to that of the region. Considering the centrality of the prolonged conflict among the Israelis and Palestinians, the significance of the disagreements between the European Union and the United States regarding their

policies over the Palestinian question becomes more striking. It is also interesting to find out that, considering their similar interests and concerns, the transatlantic parties share a similar vision regarding the Middle East. In other words, they agree on how the final status in the region and in the conflict should look like but they disagree on how to get there from here.

At this stage, it would be useful to present a brief summary of the convergent and divergent policies pursued by the European Union and the United States regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First of all, the European and American policy makers envisage similar proposals concerning the final settlement of the Palestinian question. They both endorse a solution based on the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state existing next to a secure Israel that has been recognized by its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, the transatlantic actors share a common peace plan, Roadmap; and they are parties to a joint initiative, Middle East Quartet. On the other hand, while they agree on the general contours of the final status, they have some divergences on the sensitive issues of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.

It has been observed that the European Union and the United States agree on the central place occupied by the Palestinian question in world politics. However, it might be plausible to argue that, they attribute varying degrees of significance to the conflict regarding its position in the region. A brief analysis of official documents of the European Union as well as speeches and addresses of the European leaders reveal that the Israeli-Palestinian question is regarded as the mother of all conflicts. On the other hand, especially since September 11, the United States administration has developed a more intense focus on the fight against international terrorism and geographically it has shifted its attention to Baghdad rather than Jerusalem.

Furthermore, while the European Union largely embraces the idea that the settlement of the Palestinian question would contribute to the peace efforts regarding other conflicts, the United States endorses a similar perspective for Iraqi issue arguing that the regime change and democratic change in Iraq would contribute to the settlement of the Palestinian question and of the other problems threatening regional stability and security.

Another significant point of divergence among the transatlantic actors has been the nature of their relations with the conflicting parties. The European Union maintains strong relations with the Israelis and Palestinians through various mechanisms including but not limited to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighborhood Policy, multilateral working groups and bilateral arrangements. Even though both the Europeans and Israelis have eagerly asserted that they are united around several common values, it has been observed that the European Union-Israel relations have been characterized by misunderstanding and lack of trust despite the fact that the two entities have engaged in intense trade activities as well as cultural and youth exchanges. On the other hand, the European Union's involvement with the Palestinians proves to be less troubling. Even though there are several difficulties such as the European contentment regarding the failure of Palestinian leaders to advance in their efforts to reform and restructure Palestinian institutions, the European Union remains as the largest donor of the Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, a brief observation of the European policies regarding the key issues of the conflict reveals that the Europeans are closer to the arguments put forward by the Palestinians compared to that of the Israelis'.

In contrast to the European position, the United States maintains better relations with the Israelis and continues to have problematic relations with the

Palestinian Authority. American involvement with Israel is defined by prodigious financial, military and political support as well as strong cross-community ties and historical connections. However, it should be kept in mind that the Israeli-American relations are far from being perfect. There are several issues that may poison the bilateral relations and the Palestinian question stands at the top of the list. On the other hand, the United States tries to maintain good relations with the Palestinians through several programs that intend to support the Palestinian people especially regarding the economic realm. However, the quality of Palestinian-American relations is far from the level of the Israeli-American relations. In the past, position and relevancy of Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people was one of the issues that troubled the bilateral relations.

Regarding the degree of influence they exert on the course of the conflict, there is no doubt that the Europeans have undergone through a significant progress in producing and pursuing a common policy in the last fifteen years. European Union has visibly increased its engagement in the peace process both in political, economic and cultural areas. However, it would not be accurate to argue that the influence of the Europeans over the conflicting parties is equivalent to that of the Americans. Keeping in mind that a final and sustainable peace in the region is dependent on the local parties and the protagonists, it has been widely accepted that the external intervention is required to persuade the parties to compromise and to enforce them to fulfill the conditions of this compromised solution. In this respect, the United States, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, remains to be the only external actor that has the capacity to make a real difference in the conflict. However, the failure of the United States on several issues regarding the conflict indicate that being a superpower has its limits and that the United States need a real

partner, not a supporting actor, that would share the American burden in conflict resolution. European Union, with its strong connections in the region and with similar concerns that it shares with the United States, carries the potential to be a partner to the Americans in this thorny quest.

The United States and Europe share a long and intertwined history. The two main pillars of the modern transatlantic relationship, NATO and the European Union, were created in the aftermath of Second World War to deter the Soviet threat and to promote prosperity, security, and stability in Europe. The American Congress and successive American administrations have strongly supported both organizations as means to foster democratic states, reliable military allies, and strong trading partners. It has been stressed that the security and prosperity of the United States and Europe remain inextricably linked, even after the end of the Cold War. Both sides of the Atlantic continue to face a common set of challenges, including but not limited to countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Advocates of close transatlantic ties argue that neither the United States nor Europe can adequately address such diverse concerns alone, and that the track record shows that they can accomplish much more when they work together.

It has been asserted that the United States and Europe share common vital interests in the Middle East such as combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promoting peace and stability; ensuring a secure flow of oil; and guarding their economic and commercial interests. American and European policies to promote these goals often differ considerably. Despite the shared history, similar interests, and close economic ties, the transatlantic partnership has been fundamentally challenged in recent years as numerous trade and foreign policy disputes have emerged. Although Europeans are not monolithic in their

views, most states object to at least some elements of American policy on a range of issues, including Iraq, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the International Criminal Court, and climate change. Even though the European governments are not monolithic in their opinions on the Middle East due to their separate national viewpoints and interests, European perspectives have been shaped over time by common elements unique to Europe's history and geostrategic position. These different perspectives often result in the employment of disparate policies by the two sides of the Atlantic as they pursue their foreign policy agendas in the region.

A combination of factors lies at the root of Euro-American tensions on the Middle East. They include different historical experiences that cause Americans and Europeans to develop different historical narratives, demographic and geographic differences; the nature of economic ties with the region; divergent threat perceptions; growing external ambitions of the European Union; divergent mechanisms of foreign policy making and different views on the appropriate role of the use of force. Considering the recent transatlantic frictions on Iraq, it has been argued that these differences have been driven by personality and style differences among American and European leaders. Many Europeans viewed the Bush Administration as inclined toward unilateralism and largely uninterested in Europe. At the same time, analysts also blamed some European leaders, such as French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, for the recent difficulties due to the ways they expressed their opposition without due consideration of the implications for the broader transatlantic relationship. However, it would be more adequate to argue that the causes of Euro-American differences are deeper and structural, stemming from the end of the Cold War and exacerbated by the September 11 terrorist attacks,

which have widened the gap in American-European threat perceptions and policy preferences for managing those threats.

Following the failure of the Oslo process, Road map was launched by the Middle East Quartet. However, this moment of opportunity was lost. Even though the United States and the European Union have agreed on the desirability of a two state solution and they have accepted the road map as the best mechanism to realize this, they continued to pursue different policies on the basic pillars of the peace. Fatalism and paralysis dominated the Americans and Europeans and urged the former to wait for a shift on the Palestinian side while the latter expected for a change on the Israeli side. Since the beginning of the Road map, the European Union has begun to assume a significant political role in the peace process. Even though it should be noted that the European Union can not replace the primary role of the United States; with its capacity to express even-handedness in understanding the needs of the Palestinian side, the European Union can play an indispensable role in supplementing the efforts of the United States and in determining the priorities and direction of the peace process. In this respect, the leaders and decision makers of the European Union will have to appreciate the need to develop a more nuanced and coherent policy than those pursued in the past. To do this, a greater degree of coordination amongst the member states needs to be developed. In other words, Europe needs to overcome its own internal contradictions in order to emerge as a real external actor in the Middle East and else where.

Despite the significant degree of differences between the American and European policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no doubt that both sides are driven by a sincere concern about the negative impact of the continued violence and bloodshed in the Middle East. Even though a combination of factors

lead them to perceive conflicting parties through different perspectives, to prioritize different principles and to pursue different policies, one needs to avoid pessimism since the transatlantic actors are not destined to conflict with each other. Given their common strategic interests in the region, there is hope for the cultivation of an active and sustainable cooperation which would lead to the development of common strategic approaches and common policies. In this respect, the narrowing of the transatlantic differences over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stands as a litmus case for the both sides of the Atlantic. The United States needs to show the world that it has the willingness and capacity to work together with the international community in one of the most central conflicts in global politics while the European Union should demonstrate that the member states have the capacity to produce a common policy and that the EU has the capacity to assert itself as a truly powerful external actor. Furthermore, the bridging of these divergences would contribute to the situation in the Middle East by establishing favorable conditions in the region and by providing the right incentives to the conflicting parties. Besides, the settlement of the transatlantic split over the Palestinian question would show the world that one of the greatest alliances of globe was hurt but yet healed.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Amin, Samir and Ali El Kenz. 2005. *Europe and the Arab World: Patterns and Prospects for the New Relationship*. New York: Zed Books.
- Art, Robert J. and Seyom Brown. 1993. *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search For A New Role*. New York: Macmillan Pub. Co.; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International.
- Asseburg, Muriel. Summer/Autumn 2003. "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Politics* 8(2/3): 174-194.
- Boukhars, Anouar and Steve Yetiv. March 2003. "9/11 and the Growing Euro-American Chasm Over the Middle East", *European Security* 12 (1): 64-81.
- Brands, Henry W. 1994. *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East 1945-1993*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. 1999. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. New York: Routledge.
- Brewer, Thomas L. 1992. *American Foreign Policy: A contemporary Introduction*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Brown, Bernard E. 2002. "Are Americans from Mars, Europeans from Venus?", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 24: 481-489.
- Brown, Bernard E. 2004. "The United States and Europe: Partners, Rivals, Enemies?", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26: 129-138.
- Brown, Bernard E. 2005. "Roundtable Discussions on Repairing U.S.-European Relations", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27: 61-80.
- Browne William P. 1998. *Groups, Interests, and the U.S. Public Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Calabrese, John. Fall 2005. "Freedom on the March in the Middle East—And Transatlantic Relations on a New Course?", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16 (4): 42-64.
- Cameron, Fraser. Winter/Spring 2003. "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9(2): 116-126.
- Cameron, Fraser. 2005. "How Europe Views America", *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 51 (2): 83-95.

- Chomsky, Noam. 2004. *Middle East Illusions*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Curtis, Michael. 2004. "Anti-Americanism in Europe", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26: 367-384.
- Curtiss, Richard. 1982. *A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute*. Washinton: American Educational Trust.
- Dosenrode, Soren and Anders Stubkjær. 2002. *The European Union and the Middle East*. London; New York: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann. 1994. *An Ambivalent Heritage: Euro-American Relations*. Stanford: CA; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace: Stanford University.
- Everts, Steven. July 2004. "The Ultimate Test Case: Can Europe and America Forge a Joint Strategy for the Wider Middle East?", *International Affairs* 80(4): 665-687.
- Falk, Richard. 1993. "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East", Hooshang Amirahmadi. (ed.) *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives*. New York: State University of New York Press, 65-86.
- Freedman, Robert O. 2003. "The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Preliminary Evaluation", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 25: 505-511.
- Friedlander, Melvin. 1991. *Conviction and Credence: US Policymaking in the Middle East*. Boulder; Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers.
- Fromkin, David. 1989. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Avon Books.
- Gershowitz, Susan and Emanuele Ottolenghi. Fall 2005. "Europe's Problem with Ariel Sharon", *Middle East Quarterly* 12 (4): 13-23.
- Golan, Galia. Spring 2004. "Plans For Israeli-Palestinian Peace: From Beirut to Geneva", *Middle East Policy* 11 (1):38-51.
- Golan, Galia. 1991. *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Golan, Galia. 1992. *Moscow and the Middle East: New Thinking on Regional Conflict*. New York : Published in North America for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Gordon, Philip. 1998. *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

- Gordon, Philip. Spring 2003. "Bush's Middle East Vision", *Survival* 45 (1): 155-165.
- Gordon, Philip. Winter 1997/1998. "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", *International Security* 22(3): 74-100.
- Haass, Richard. 1997. "The United States, Europe and the Middle East Peace Process", Robert Blackwill and Michael Stürmer. (eds.) *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 61-79.
- Heller, Mark A. 1992. *The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Between Old Thinking and New*. Boulder; Colo.: Westview Press; Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post.
- Hill, Christopher. 1998. "Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP", Jan Zielonka. (ed.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*. Hague; Boston: Kluwer, 35-51.
- Hix, Simon. 1999. *The Political System of the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hollis, Rosemary. 2005. "Europe in the Middle East", Louise Fawcett. (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 307-326.
- Hopkinson, William. 2003. "The United States and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: Reasons Why They Should Work Together, Reasons Why They May Not", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 25: 481-497.
- Hourani, Albert, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson. (eds.) 2004. *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Hudson, Michael C. 2005. "The United States in the Middle East", Louise Fawcett. (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 283-305.
- Jones, Clive and Emma C. Murphy. 2002. *Israel: Challenges to the Identity, Democracy, and the State*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Kagan, Robert. June/July 2002. "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review* 113: 3-29.
- Katz, Mark N. Winter 2005. "Putin's Pro-Israel Policy", *Middle East Quarterly* 12 (1): 51-59.
- Kemp, Geoffrey. Winter 2004. "Europe's Middle East Challenges", *Washington Quarterly* 27(1): 163-178.

- Lewis, Bernard. 1994. *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lieber, Robert. 2002. *Eagle Rules? : Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twentyfirst Century*. Upper Saddle River, N.J. : Prentice Hall.
- Mansfield, Peter. 1991. *A History of the Middle East*. New York: Viking.
- Marfleet, Philip. 2000. "A New Orientalism: Europe Confronts the Middle East", Tareq Ismail. (ed.) *The International Relations of the Middle East in the 21st Century*. Hampshire: Ashgate, 260-293.
- McKay, David. 2005. *American Politics and Society*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Musu, Costanza and William Wallace. 2003. "The Middle East: Focus or Discord?", John Petersen and Mark Pollack. (eds.) *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the twenty-first Century*. London; New York: Routledge, 99-115.
- Myddleton, Richard. May 1997. "Pax Europe", *The Middle East Issue* 267: 9-11.
- Nathan, James and James K. Oliver. 1994. *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*. Baltimor, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Newman, David. July 2005. "The Israel-Palestine Conflict in the Post-Arafat Era: The Perspective from Israel", *Mediterranean Politics* 10 (2): 211-218.
- Nonneman, Gerd. Winter 2003. "The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe", *Review of International Affairs* 3(2): 131-152.
- Nonneman, Gerd. Winter 2003. "Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework", *Review of International Affairs* 3(2): 118-131.
- Ohaegbulam, Ugboaja.1999. *A Concise Introduction to American Foreign Policy*. New Yrk: Peter Lang.
- Organski, A.F.K. 1990. *The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Perthes, Völker. Fall 2004. "America's Greater Middle East and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue", *Middle East Policy* 11(3): 85-98.
- Peters, Joel. December 1998. "Europe, the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process: Competition or Convergence?", *International Spectator*, 33 (4): 63-76.
- Peters, Joel. April 2004. "Practices and their Failures: Arab-Israeli Relations and the Barcelona Process", Institute of European Studies. Paper 040402.

- Peters, Joel. 1999. "Europe and the Middle East Peace Process", Stelios Stavridis. (ed.) *The Foreign Policies of Southern European States*. London: Macmillan, 295-316.
- Primor, Avi. 2004. "The European Union and the Middle East: Mutual Indispensability", *Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics* 11(2): 18-25.
- Quandt, William, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch. 1973. *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*. Berkeley; London: University of California Press.
- Quandt, William. 1993. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. Washington: Brookings Institution; Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reich, Bernard and Stephen H. Gotowicki. 1994. "The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East", David H. Goldberg and Paul Marantz. (eds.) *The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rogan, Eugene. 2005. "The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System", Louise Fawcett. (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 17-39.
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z. 2001. "The Middle East in Russia's Strategic Prism", L. Carl Brown. (ed.) *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*. London; New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 75-95.
- Ryan, David. 2003. *The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Harlow: Longman.
- Russett, Bruce and Harvey Starr. 1996. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.
- Said, Edward. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Satloff, Robert. 1997. "America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s: Interests and Policies", Robert Blackwill and Michael Stürmer. (eds.) *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 7-41.
- Serfaty, Simon. Spring 2000. "Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East", *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 24: 56-61.
- Serfaty, Simon. 2004. "The Transatlantic Dimension", Fraser Cameron. (ed.) *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement*. London: Routledge, 135-148.
- Shannon, Vaughn. 2003. *Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Aldershot; Hants; England; Burlington: Ashgate.

- Shlaim, Avi. 1994. *War and Peace in the Middle East: A Critique of American Policy*. New York: White Books in Association with Viking.
- Shlaim, Avi. 2005. "The Rise and the Fall of the Oslo Peace Process", Louise Fawcett. (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 245-261)
- Smith, Karen. 2003. *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge: Polity; Malden: Blackwell.
- Smith, Charles. 2005. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", Louise Fawcett. (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 217-236.
- Smith, Michael E. August 2004. "Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy Making: Multi-level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy", *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(4): 95-136.
- Smith, Michael E. 2004. "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation", *European Journal of International Relations* 10(1): 95-136.
- Soetendorp, Ben. 1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and Practice*. London; New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Spanier, John. 1983. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. New York: CBS College Publishing.
- Spiegel, Steven. 1985. *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, From Truman to Reagan*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Stork, Joe. 1993. "U.S. Policy and the Palestine Question", Hooshang Amirahmadi. (ed.) *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives*. New York: State University of New York Press, 125-147.
- Taylor, Alan. 1991. *The Superpowers and the Middle East*. Syracuse; New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Tonra, Ben. 2005. "Conceptualising the European Union's Global Role", Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne. (eds.) *European Union Studies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 117-131.
- Veliotes, Nicholas A. Spring 2005. "Bush's Middle East: Second-Term Blues?", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16 (2): 1-10.
- Wallace, William. May/June 2001. "Europe, the Necessary Partner", *Foreign Affairs* 80(3): 16-35.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. April 2005. "The U.S. and Europe: Quasi-Allies", *Debatte* 13 (1): 21-24.

Whitcomb, Roger S. 1998. *The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.