Dual Identities, Dual Histories, Unique Statehood: Discussing Citizenship Formulations for the Re-integrated Cyprus

by

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
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and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,

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
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ABSTRACT

The United Nations has prepared a comprehensive resolution plan called the Annan Plans to re-integrate Cyprus. After numerous revisions a referendum was held simultaneously in both parts of the island in April 24, 2004. According to the results, Turkish Cypriots were in favor of the integration. However, the plan could not be put into force because of the fact that it was rejected in the South. So, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union representing the whole island.

This study, scrutinizes the historical process towards the Annan Plans on the axes of identity and citizenship beginning from the Ottoman administration. This scrutiny has indicated that two cultural identity groups have preserved the border between them while evolving in time. These identities are Greek/Hellen Cypriotness and Turkish Cypriotness. Language, religion, customs, and self-definitions are the main elements in the preservation of this dual identity structure.

The Annan Plans involve very detailed descriptions about the issues like federal structures and power-sharing for a re-integrated Cyprus by modeling Belgian and Swiss constitutional structures. However, the issues such as the impact of the re-integration on the communities and sustainability of a *united* Cyprus in parallel to the response to this impact have been neglected because of the fact that the purpose of the plans was to draw up the main framework.

The dissolution of the two identity groups, having minimal relations, to create a unique and homogeneous cultural identity, Cypriotness, does not seem as a basic necessity for the sustainability of the new state. The probability of the completion of this reconstruction process is also very low. Moreover, the free practice of cultural rights is a

basic right and necessity. Therefore, the aimed state must be designed in a way that it will facilitate the preservation of cultural contents and cultural reproduction. However, the re-integrated state would also need the sharing of some basic values and tolerant and consensual decision-making process mechanisms. For these reasons, the Cypriot citizenship must be constructed on a diversity which does not contradict with unity.

ÖZET

Birleşmiş Milletler Kıbrıs'ın yeniden birleştirilmesi maksadıyla Annan Planları adıyla anılan kapsamlı bir çözüm planı hazırladı. Bu plan çeşitli tashihlerden geçtikten sonra 24 Nisan 2004'te adanın iki tarafında eş zamanlı biçimde referanduma sunuldu. Sonuçlara göre Kıbrıslı Türkler artık birleşmeden yanaydı. Ancak plan Güney'de reddedildiği için uygulamaya konamadı ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin tüm adayı temsilen Avrupa Birliği'ne girdi.

Çalışma, Annan Planları'na gelen tarihsel süreci Osmanlı yönetimi döneminden başlayarak kimlik ve vatandaşlık eksenlerinde irdelemektedir. Bu irdeleme sonucunda adada, kendi içlerinde evirilmelere tabi olsalar da aralarındaki sınırı muhafaza eden iki kültürel kimlik grubu baskın olarak görülmüştür. Bu kimlikler Kıbrıs Rum/Helen ve Kıbrıs Türk kimlikleridir. Dil, din, gelenek ve öz-tanımlamalar bu ikili kimlik yapısının korunmasındaki temel unsurlardır.

Annan Planları, Belçika ve İsviçre anayasal yapıları örnek alınarak yeniden birleşmiş bir Kıbrıs için federal yapılar ve güç paylaşımı gibi konularda oldukça teferruatlı tarifler içermektedir. Ancak söz konusu birleşmenin halklar üzerindeki etkisi ve bu etkinin doğuracağı tepkiye paralel olarak Birleşik Kıbrıs'ın sürdürülebilirliği gibi hususlar, planların amacının temel çerçeveyi çizmek olması nedeniyle ihmal edilmiştir.

Birleşik Kıbrıs'ta etkileşimleri asgari seviyede bulunan iki kimlik grubunun tek ve homojen bir kültürel kimlik, Kıbrıslılık, bünyesinde eritilmesi yeni kurulacak devletin sürdürülebilirliği için gerekli olmamakla birlikte, bu yeniden inşa sürecinin tamamlanma ihtimali de bir hayli düşüktür. Ayrıca, kültürel hakların özgürce ifa edilmeleri temel bir hak ve ihtiyaçtır. Dolayısıyla, yeni kurulacak devlet kültürel içeriklerin korunması ve yeniden üretilmesine olanak verecek biçimde tasarlanmalıdır. Ancak, kurulacak devlet kimi temel

değerlerin paylaşılmasına ve halklar arası konsensüs ve toleransa dayalı karar verme mekanizmalarına da ihtiyaç duyacaktır. Bu sebeplerle Kıbrıs vatandaşlığı birlikteliği yadsımayan bir farklılık üzerine bina edilmelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık, Kimlik, Kıbrıs, Annan Planları

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL – Progressive Party of the Working People (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou)

CTP - Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi)

DISY - Democratic Rally (Dimokratikos Synagermos)

DIKO - Democratic Party (Dimokratiko Koma)

EDEK – United Democratic Union of the Center (Enie Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou)

EOKA - National Organization of Freedom Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston)

KATAK - Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu)

TMT – Turkish Defense Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)

TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti)

UBP - National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since the end of the Cold War, multiculturalism debates have taken a significant place in political science literature. The unitary, rational actor of the Cold War era, the nation-state, is now being challenged by the plurality of cultures, religions, languages, ethnicities and many other interrelated differences within its borders which are also being transcended with this complexity. The multicultural challenge under the name of *return of identity* posed political and social problems to most countries and was converted into violence in many places in the 1990's. Therefore, the trials for finding solutions of *managing diversity within unity* have recently intensified. For managing cultural diversity which escalated either because of immigrations or mobilizations of existing 'others', citizenship debates have transformed and taken new directions. Now, the notion has many more implications than just a legal relationship between the individual and the state.

This study elaborates on the relationship of citizenship and some dimensions of identity encompassing most importantly nationality and partially religion. It demonstrates that Cyprus, throughout its history after the Ottoman conquest in 1571, has been unable to build a unique community on it, although there was not a clear-cut geographical division between Turkish and Greek residents of the island until the Turkish military intervention in 1974. The major reason of this separateness had been the religious duality of the island regarding

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Orthodox Christian and Sunni Muslim faiths. The influence of this dual religious structure was not limited to the individual minds and hearts, but it was also visible in almost every aspect of social, political and economic life. The rise of nationalism as a political ideology in the European continent after the French Revolution spread to the island and revised the two identities while preserving their cultural borders. Today, the duality of identity between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is still a dominant phenomenon. So, this study examines and evaluates citizenship formulations for multinational societies and citizenship implementations in the multinational states of the current world. After this evaluation, this study will attempt to construct a citizenship model for Cyprus.

The introductory chapter begins with the definition of citizenship in political science literature. After discussing the notions of citizenship and nationality I will move on to briefly introduce multiculturalism debates, which will be elaborated deeper in my theoretical analysis chapter. After some introductory notes for citizenship and identity in Cyprus, the chapter goes on with the aims, methodology, and content of this thesis.

Turner (1993) defines citizenship as that set of practices (judicial, political, economic and cultural) which defines a person as a competent member of society and which as a consequence, shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups. The rights of citizens include mainly the rights to vote, to hold public office, to public education, to permanent residency, to own land, to travel, and eligibility for employment. Based on these premises, the citizenship literature evolved around the debate between liberal and civic republican discourses.

While liberal tradition was accused of weakening society in a way that will eventually cause anomie, the civic republican school is accused of dividing people

on the basis of communal inclusion/exclusions because of the fact that this school defines the community strictly and while doing this divides people as outsiders and community members. Beyond this traditional debate between the two schools of thought, the multicultural resurgence as a new phenomenon brings new problems to the existing literature.

Citizenship and nationality has a mutual relationship. Regarding citizenship, the members of an ethnic minority community might have different alternatives in various time-space combinations. They may place a lot of effort in trying to be citizens of their host state, or to stay outside of the majority by refusing citizenship, or to stay outside of the majority by refusing majority culture while accepting integration only via citizenship as a legal phenomenon. The majority community also faces a range of preferences regarding minority communities from strict exclusion to total inclusion in numerous forms. The state, mostly governed by the majority members, also includes the two alternative ways: inclusion or exclusion. The state either tries to assemble its citizens under one nation or it implements exclusionary policies for the 'strangers'. Citizenship and nationalism can continue a symbiotic life in that way. However, new forms of inclusion are possible and hotly debated in the citizenship-identity literature as well as in this study.

Nation-creation and nation-building are enabled with the construction of a national coherence through the processes of civic equality and standardization. However, according to Taylor (1997: 27), "nation building inescapably privileges members of the majority culture". The nations of the current nation-states are not 'given' and most of them were created in the last century. For the construction of these new nations some possible others were terminated (Wallerstein, 1998: 190). Up until recent decades, this process had not been debated intensely; but a new

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transition, namely increasing multiculturalism, in the citizenship literature brought the issue into the agenda.

Multicultural societies stem from basically three reasons. The first one is the mixture of mass immigration and the native population. The USA, Canada, Latin American countries and Australia are in that category. Secondly, some geographical and historical factors can cause multicultural societies. Belgium, Switzerland and Cyprus fall into that category. Lastly, enforced or intentional migrations can cause multicultural societies; but this third option differs from the first one. Here the newcomers cannot subordinate the residents. The remaining alternative for them is to stay as minorities. While the migration-receiving developed countries can fit this category, Cyprus can too because of the fact that some segments of the Turkish population of the island stem from the recent migrations from Turkey, and their rights to acquire citizenship status is a crucial part of the Cyprus problem.

Citizenship may appear as a solution pattern for the diversity within 'nation-states'; but in the conventional meaning, its purpose is unity. As a result of this goal, a linkage is built between nationality and citizenship as is stated above. On that path, the diversity of the society tries to be eliminated in two ways. Either the 'strangers' try to be assimilated into the majority as it is in the French type of *jus soli* citizenship, or strangers are excluded from the society by being rejected citizenship rights as it is in the German type of *jus sanguinis* citizenship.[1] Even integration via assimilation can be seen as disturbing for majority groups due to the demolition of national purity as in the German type of citizenship. Both approaches do not allow a peaceful coexistence of different cultures. In the developing countries, the problem is more serious because of its convertibility to widespread

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[1] For the detailed discussion of German and French models of citizenship, see: Brubaker, Rogers. 1998.

violent struggles. The lack of consolidated political institutions and boundaries and also scarce economic resources are the main reasons behind that conflict that is apart from the 'Western world'. Thus the question of 'unity' remains on the agendas of almost all states, even though the volume of emergency for solution varies.

According to Rawls (1999), the source of unity in modern societies is a shared conception of justice. The notion of shared values is a conventional claim on the unity of countries and the construction of shared values are advised to the societies which face secession or autonomy demands. These shared values include equality and fairness, consultation and dialog, accommodation and tolerance, support for diversity, compassion and generosity, attachment to the natural environment, commitment to freedom, peace, and nonviolent change. However, Kymlicka (1998: 180-181) does not agree with this claim, because shared values do not necessarily cause shared identities which are lacking between, for instance, Swedes and Norwegians. After these arguments, it clearly seems that shared values and also shared identities ease, though not guaranteed, the preservation of the unity of states and the coexistence of communities (on the shared grounds) within the borders of the state without causing unification across borders at least till today.

Many societies which see a virtue in their cultural purity try to define strict cultural identity borders. These societies both aim to homogenize the internal nature at the expense of individual autonomy and exclude outsiders even if they live in that society as a minority. The solution seems hard in the current situation; a Kantian perpetual peace in the *universal community* or Aurelliussian *cosmopolis* seems very far away at that moment. On that point, confessional systems might be an initial solution in the places where the differences have the capacity to convert into violent

conflicts; but in this system, solidarities of different communities are empowered and perpetuated; so, the implementation of confessional models might strengthen the identity borders which might convert into political borders. Therefore, tolerance remains as the unique alternative for the sustainability of political borders even for confessional systems. That means the state's rejection of a singular unique supreme culture which excludes some part of the population. In the current world this is difficult; but can be enabled by the development of transnational civil society organizations and the willingness of political decision-makers and community leaders in the process.

When we observe the Cyprus case, there seems some sort of fit to the mentioned debates and some sorts of sui generis characteristics. The Cyprus case has been in a long-term crisis where the end of the Cold War did not transform the nature of the conflicting arguments of the sides. Another distinct characteristic of the case is that the classical minority rights debates are not significant to understand the real situation of the island. The Turkish population on the island cannot be seen solely as a minority group because of both legal and historical reasons although it is numerically (20 percent of the overall population in 1960's). Firstly, the Turkish Cypriot population, both in the building constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and in the Treaty of Establishment in 1960 (and also in the recent Annan Plans[2] documents), has been an equal community to the Greek Cypriot community. Moreover, historically Turkish Cypriots have not carried a minority status for centuries.

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[2] The Annan Plan was firstly declared on November, 11, 2002 by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and then revised three times on December, 10, 2002, February, 26, 2003 and March, 29, 2004. The last version of the plans was declared on March, 31, 2004 in Burgenstock, Switzerland by Kofi Annan.

Finally, the multifaceted character of the actors in Cyprus is another complicated issue. Both communities on the island, the guarantor states, and questionably Cypriots who carry Cypriot identity as their primary identity in both communities, construct a different structure from individual citizen-state and minority group-state relations. Another sui generis specialty is the lack of grounds for constructing a Cypriot identity. The identities and belongings on the island are ethnic and religious. So there is not a dominant political desire to live together with the 'other'. Therefore, Turkish and Hellene nationalisms are far beyond the notion of Cypriot nationalism (Kızılyürek, 2002).

In the case of Cyprus, understanding the variables of the equation is very crucial before a solution is proposed. The communities on the island are not pure. In the Greek majority of the southern region, the possible desires of the future have been, until now, post-national integration in the EU; for Hellenic nationalism, direct ENOSIS with Greece; for another variant of Hellenic nationalism, an indirect ENOSIS via EU integration; for the sake of ethnicity based nationalism, the incorporation of Northern Cyprus via assimilation or ghettoization; again for the sake of ethnicity based nationalism, the exclusion of Northern Cyprus as a second option; for a non-ethnic based Cyprus nationalism (or patriotism), the integration with Northern Cyprus. The number of choices can be increased. Some of these choices can live together but some others are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist. The same heterogeneity exists also in the Turkish population of Northern Cyprus. There are also many differences existing between religious authorities and secular interest groups, among the interest groups and even among the political parties in both parts of the island.

In elaborating on the possible citizenship formulations in Cyprus, another tool might be the elaboration of similar cases such as Belgium and Switzerland. The proportion of Turks in the total population of Cyprus is similar to that of the French Swiss in Switzerland and a little less than Walloons in Belgium. Both these two countries could take successful steps in managing their diversity with various citizenship models and some other constitutional reforms. While the federal republic in Switzerland is solving the problem, in the Belgium case the tensions between the Dutch-speaking Flemings of the north and the French-speaking Walloons of the south have led to constitutional amendments which has granted these regions formal recognition and autonomy and also federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch establishing the ground for the solution.

The mixture of various identities based on ethnic, religious, and ideological variables makes the citizenship issue much harder in Cyprus. Although citizenship was a unifying element in Cyprus, the conflicting identities took an important role for the conflicting interests of the two nations and in demolishing the Cypriot state. Now the island has two alternatives if it will unite again. The first option is a consociational system meaning a power-sharing for a distinct range of matters in a way that the communities are treated as units within which decisions are taken democratically but between which decisions can only be made through consensus. The second option is federalism without consociationalism. This option requires a sufficient physical separation of the communities to ensure that each of them is dominant in at least one federated unit. With the addition of federation into the equation, the route begins with the citizen and proceeds following the line from municipality to state, and from state to the State. Thus the formulae over Cypriot

citizenship might benefit from the notions of pluralist nationalism, parallel citizenship, differentiated citizenship and some other related models.

The variety of citizens in terms of ethnicity and religion is increasing highly because of cross-border movements of people and the broadening of borders via integrations, and also the resurrection of silent minorities. These processes are creating a dilemma between individual based liberal citizenship and communal identities. Both are very important. On the one side, it is vital to keep people together in heterogeneous societies; because the secession or disintegration is not an ultimate solution for the fact that it is nearly impossible to create totally homogeneous, pure societies, and secession might cause violent conflicts. On the other side, it is very hard to keep people under the umbrella of the same political unity because of diverse identities. For the creation of a political togetherness, cultural unity might be a crucial factor, but it is ethically and practically questionable to try to construct a new unique common identity or to convert identities to 'less harmful' forms for a desired political consequence: unity. Problems do not end at that point, because while trying to preserve community rights we can not neglect individual rights within the communities. To be able to solve this dilemma, post-national citizenship, constitutional patriotism and differentiated citizenship are some of the most significant propositions. However, we do not have an all-embracing theory for every case.

1.2 Aims

In the citizenship literature, we encounter multicultural/multinational citizenship theories on the one side and some practices of these theories such as Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada on the other side. Cyprus has mostly been neglected in

the debates of multicultural/multinational citizenship and studied in the framework of conflict-management and conflict-resolution disciplines. My aim here is to understand the potential of a solution for uniting the divided Cyprus from the aspect of citizenship literature while not underestimating the significance of conflict-based studies. This is not so easy, especially when the April 2004 referendum is taken into account. However that event showed me the reason behind the failure can be overcome with some revisions and refinements of the Annan Plans in a way that will provide new opportunities and clarifications about Cypriot citizenship for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

In the study, my aim is not to find a formula based on an artificially constructed identity. Conversely, I think a reunified Cyprus citizenship can be implemented without ignoring or discriminating existing religious-ethno-linguistic identities. It is not easy to achieve this aim with the probability of ending up with a citizenship remaining only in legal ground without reflections on the social and civil life. However, the notions of constitutional patriotism, differentiated citizenship, plurinational democracy, liberal integrationalism and consociational government theories might have the potential to explain the Cyprus case partially. An exact explanation can be possible with a combination of these theories fitting to the specific problems of the island.

As mentioned before, the study aims to look at the Cyprus issue from the aspect of citizenship theories by going beyond the perspectives of previous studies of conflict management/resolution theorists. For that purpose, the gaps of the 1960 constitution and the recent Annan Plans are investigated. In order to fill these gaps, some refinements and revisions of the Annan Plans regarding citizenship are proposed in this study. The Annan Plans have very detailed regulations on the

upper part of the issue, but at the level of citizenship rights and obligations, and cultural matters there seem many unclear points. So, this study goes beyond a sole descriptive study with its role in terms of future policy implications.

This study focuses on the identity levels from individuals to communities, and also to Cyprus and tries to formulate a citizenship account encompassing these identities. After a brief description of the current situation of identities on the island, the aim is to consider the best suitable citizenship implementation on the island while recognizing the multi-level picture of identities from an individual-level to the state. The Annan Plans considered this on the basis of co-existence, however the plans could not be successful not only because of the lack of political decision-makers' willingness; but also the lack of willingness in the public opinions. A viable citizenship uniting the current dual political structure of the island is expected to fill the gap in the citizenship understanding of the Annan Plans. My route is directed to the limits of co-existence and identities. The question of "by respecting both the individual and community rights, which citizenship mechanism can ensure the peaceful coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations?" is the focal question of the study. The study aims to propose a solution for the identities in tension on the ground of a reformulated Cyprus citizenship.

1.3 Methodology

To understand the Cyprus case, the theories from liberal to communitarian; from post-national to multiple and to differentiated citizenships are all significant. However, here the point is to find out to what extent they can give us the citizenship formula for a re-integrated Cyprus. It is not exactly possible to reconstruct a Cyprus

citizenship on the basis of one single theory because of the sui generis characteristics of the identity related issues on the island. A theory fitting to the case is a hybrid citizenship theory built upon the formulae evaluated in the third chapter of this study.

This study is mainly a single case study which combines the citizenship debate with conflict management/resolution literature over Cyprus while trying to go beyond conflict literature. For that purpose, the evolution of citizenship in Cyprus is taken into account from a historical narrative approach. However, in the fourth chapter, the study goes out of its general tendency and uses a comparative approach using Belgium and Switzerland which have being debated for decades in citizenship literature and are relatively 'mature' issues of the literature.

The primary sources of this study are various legal codes such as international treaties, constitutions, and parliament laws from the 1960 Constitution to the Annan Plans. Beyond the theoretical literature of identity and citizenship, the history of identity in Cyprus, and the legal codes of Belgium and Switzerland; I benefited very much from my personal observations in Cyprus, visits to the local newspapers, civil society organizations and universities. Besides, I made a very productive interview with the former President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktash. Unfortunately, I could not make observations in the Southern part of the island except for some short talks with a few Greek Cypriots who were passing to the North through the UN zone in Nicosia/Lefkoshe with daily permissions. All these personal experiences helped me improve my abstract ideas on identity and citizenship in Cyprus.

The study combines two literatures, ethnicity-identity oriented conflict management/resolution and citizenship (liberal, socialist, cosmopolitan,

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communitarian, civic republican, multiculturalist citizenship literatures); so, these two literatures are my secondary sources. For the elaboration of the case, Cyprus; the political and social history of Cyprus and the current issues in these spheres are also investigated in the study. Because the study includes vast literatures of related but distinct disciplines, the sources are studied selectively in evaluating the literatures. Another hybridism of the study can be seen in its interdisciplinary character. While the main path of the study is on political science, international relations orientation is not neglected when analysis required it.

Together with primary (the legal codes) and secondary sources (the citizenship and conflict-resolution literatures), my observations in Cyprus also open a broader insight for the study. The interview with Rauf Denktash, and other interviews with the members of civil society organizations and political parties, and academicians have contributed to the opportunity of facing the identity related issues closer. After the explanation of the current situation and historical background of ethno-linguistic and religious identities on the island, the comparative consideration of Cyprus with Belgium and Switzerland has enabled me to position case-specific data on the extensive theoretical debates.

1.4 Content

Following the introductory chapter, this study consists of four chapters. Chapter II entitled "Historical Background of Identity and Citizenship in Cyprus" begins with the politics and identity (regarding ethnicity/nationality and religion) in Cyprus in the Ottoman period (1571-1878). In this era, the Millet system is the main focus for the fact that its legacy has succeeded right up to today. The era is also important

because of the fact that the enosis[3] demands of the Greek Cypriots began towards the end of the Ottoman administration period. The British administration period is the second era of the chapter. In this period, Turkish nationalism and Turkish Cypriot demands for the separation of the island were seen for the first time. The period after the foundation of the Cyprus Republic is analyzed both on a historical chronology that considers both sides and through the legal texts regarding Cypriot citizenship. Post-1974 (Turkish military intervention) and post-1983 periods (the foundation of TRNC - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti*) are the following sections in the chapter. While the chapters demonstrate the internal fragmentation of the two nations on the island on the axis of left-right spectrum, the main claim of the chapter is that the island has had two nations with divided geographies for 31 years, different languages, religions and cultures and also with antagonistic memories. So, taking these ingredients into account in a re-unified Cyprus is very significant in formulating a new Cyprus citizenship.

Chapter III entitled "Theoretical Approaches to the Citizenship in Multicultural Societies" underlines the fact that managing multicultural societies is seen as both controversial and problematic in the citizenship literature. The chapter discusses only democratic solutions for the peaceful co-existence of multiple and plural societies in terms of ethnic identity. Democratic majoritarianism is not thought as a possible solution for the Cyprus case in the chapter, so it was simply ignored. The main debate is between republican and multiculturalist solution proposals. Lijphart, Horowitz, Kymlicka, Young, Parekh, Habermas and Walzer are the some of the thinkers whose formulations are examined and discussed in the

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[3] The word means union in Greek and refers to the incorporation of Cyprus to Greece.

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chapter. The citizenship model in a re-united Cyprus Republic will be discussed on the grounds of some crucial theoretical models such as 'constitutional patriotism', 'pluralist democracy', 'differentiated citizenship', and the core assumptions of consociational and liberal integrationist democratic theories.

Chapter IV is entitled "A Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Citizenship: The formulation of a multicultural citizenship regime in Cyprus". Cyprus is not a unique place hosting a multi-national population and trying to integrate them. Many other places all over the world have passed through this route, some successfully. In some places confederation/consociationalism, in some federalism, and in some others unitary formulas have been tried. Some countries have tried territory-based distinctions and some identity-based distinctions while some others rejected any distinction other than constitutionally given individual rights. It is too hard to claim a universal solution for all cases, but the evaluation of some similar countries like Belgium and Switzerland will illuminate my research for a sustainable united Cyprus citizenship formula. These two cases are explained in relation to the Cyprus issue. Both of the cases were shown as a model for Cyprus in the Annan Plans. But even if they were not mentioned in the plans, they would still have been very important in developing a Cyprus citizenship. The Annan Plans, sponsored by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, tried to build a viable Cyprus Republic trying to solve demographic, governmental, territorial and constitutional problems between the North and the South parts of the island. However, the citizenship proposal of the plans has not been deeply discussed in literature. The chapter elaborates on the Annan Plans in that respect. Individual and communal roots of the citizenship, basic rights and responsibilities, minority statuses and some other related subtitles are discussed in elaborating the citizenship

model of the Annan Plans. After investigating the position of the citizenship model in the Annan Plans theoretically and comparatively, I propose a citizenship model based on a synthesis of the citizenship theories for multinational societies and current citizenship implementations in multinational states for Cyprus. The model rests on the Annan Plans with some modifications.

The conclusion chapter gives the main points of the chapters very briefly and summarizes the Cypriot citizenship model proposed in the previous chapter. It shows the strengths and weaknesses of the study to facilitate the researches of similar future studies.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND of IDENTITY and CITIZENSHIP in

CYPRUS

2.1 Introduction

The first step in shaping the perception of the historical background in Cyprus is to identify the space-time coordinates. The perception of history as a totality surely enables us to see the 'big picture'. However, specialization on specific time and space coordinates gives us the information of single events and persons in detail. In this chapter, I have tried to identify a medium-scale period in historical consideration and a single place, Cyprus since the late Ottoman period.

History, in fact, is the story of humanity in all aspects of communal life. Regarding different interests, it is possible to study political, social, economic, juridical, architectural, medical or any other aspects in Cyprus history. Hence, the second step in narrowing the history, this chapter focuses on social, political, and partially economic paths in examining the route of Cyprus history.

A third step in the chapter is the interpreting process. Different readings of history enable us to see the different – sometimes parallel, intersecting, or/and contradictory - processes from the perspective of different actors. Once we clarify our unit of analysis in history such as social class, gender, civilization, race, nation, or any other group of (conscious or unconscious) community; we often construct a dialectic relation between these units. This chapter studies the history of religious/national identity in Cyprus. In this regard, the main units of analysis in this

study are Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, this separation between the two communities does not require a conflictual interpretation of history inherently. As it is demonstrated in the chapter, although the difference and distinctiveness of these two communities is an enduring character, the conflict does not dominate the whole period that is studied in this chapter.

The self-perceptions of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, interactions among them, and citizenship regulations which kept them together at least politically until 1974 are the main topics of the chapter. The chapter examines these topics beginning from the late Ottoman period, but the main focus is on the post-independence period of the Cyprus Republic and hereafter.

2.2 Ottoman Administration: Co-existence of separate identities

The Ottomans captured Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571. Ottoman rule brought emancipation to the Orthodox Church when compared to the previous period. The Venetians left and Muslim immigrants from Anatolia settled on the island. According to Islamic Law, when a non-Muslim country is captured by a Muslim country, non-Muslim residents are either allowed to emigrate or to accept an agreement and to live under the conditions of this agreement (Aydın, 1995). Thus, non-Muslim subjects of the state are guaranteed to live in security forever, but not having the same status with Muslims. The remaining choice is accepting Islam. Many Latinos and some Greeks converted to Islam in Cyprus. On the other hand, Orthodox bishops were allowed to return to their sees. The absence of an Archbishop was a source of disorder according to the Ottoman administration principles, so one was appointed by Istanbul and recognized as Ethnarch, the head of the community and the representative of its people. Since the 1670's, he has also

been given the responsibility of imposing and raising taxes. The position of Ethnarch prepared the ground for the importance and respect of the Church for the Greek Cypriots.

The legacy of the Ottoman period was neither a common life based on shared social, judicial and moral grounds nor an antagonism having the potential for violent conflicts; it was the peaceful coexistence of separate communities on the same island, even in the same villages, especially until the second quarter of the 19th century. The enduring reality of the identity question has been combined by ethnic and religious identities since the conquest of the island by the Ottomans. Until now, Muslim-Turkish and Orthodox-Greek identities have remained as the two basic identities on the island. However, the durability of the identities has not stuck to single, one-dimensional patterns. Until recent periods religious roots of the identities were more significant than ethnic-linguistic roots. While the biggest transformation was experienced among Turkish Cypriots with the civic nationalist projects of secularization, linguistic purification and educational reforms in the 20th century, Greek Cypriots combined primordial ethnic myths with religious social structure.

The main reason for this religious determination of identity was the 'Millet'[4] system of the Ottoman administration. The Millet system was separating the Ottoman society in accordance to religious divisions. Muslims constituted the 'Ruling Nation' (*Millet-i Hakime*) and the rest was the 'Ruled Nation' (*Millet-i Mahkume*). The Church of Cyprus was recognized as 'ethnarch' and gained administrative and economic authority over the Orthodox subjects of the island although it did not comprehend autonomy in today's terminology. This privileged

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[4] Although 'millet' is used as the equivalent of 'nation' in contemporary Turkish, the term was indicating religious divisions rather than ethnic or racial divisions in the Ottoman era.

position provided the loyalty of the Church to Istanbul. For instance, the Church opposed even the 1839 *Tanzimat* reforms of Istanbul government which strengthened the position of non-Muslim subjects (Kızılyürek, 2002).

The approach of Neo-classical Hellenism, which flourished in Greece, tended to build a national identity on the axis of Ancient Greece. This tendency excluded the component of religion and the Byzantine Empire from national identity. On the other hand, the Hellen nation must have included all Orthodox people according to the Ecumenical Orthodoxy with its Patriarchate in Istanbul. The principal enemy of the Patriarchate was not the Muslims; but the Catholics and the modernity of the west, particularly its secularism (Pollis, 1997: 87). However, while Balkan people strived for their own national consciousness and nation-states, each Balkan nation started to form its own national church. As a result of this process, Patriarchate was ideologically incorporated to the Greek nation-state and adopted an idea of nation on the Hellen-Orthodox synthesis. Under these circumstances, the spoiled relations between the Patriarchate in Istanbul and Greek Church began to improve. The Patriarchate recognized the Greek Church officially in 1850. This process deepened the reconciliation of Greek nationalism and religion.

Greek Cypriots imported Hellenic nationalism from motherland Greece, especially after the independence of Greece in 1829. The University of Athens which was formed in 1837, attracted many Hellenic students from Ottoman territories including Cyprus. These students began to propagate Hellenism among large masses when they returned to their homes. This process continued in the 20th century. For instance "one of Sofronis and Kiprianos, among the first students who were sent to the Theology Department of the University of Athens with

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scholarship, one being archbishop and the other the Metropolit of Kition would have served for enosis for long years" (Kızılyürek, 2002: 54).

2.3 British Administration: From divide and rule strategy to state-building

The division of the Millet system continued in a different form under the British administration period. "Village administrative councils were segregated and handled community affairs separately, with specially formed Joint Councils for the adjudication of matters common to both groups"(Calotychos, 1998: 5-6). 82 years of British rule had taken no significant step to create harmony from separate Greek and Turkish identities. Although the members of the communities were living side by side in mixed places or very close in neighboring places, inter-communal antagonism was increasing. For linguistic and religious reasons, the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had been separate before British rule and remained so during it (Bryant, 1997: 56). However, even if it had been intended, it was too difficult to construct a new Cypriot identity immune from religion, ethnicity and history. In fact, the source of critiques for the British administration are not about its insufficiency or unwillingness for social engineering to construct a 'Cypriot' identity, but its failure to sustain the existing duality in peace and harmony.

Just after having been the state doctrine of Greece in 1844 the Megali Idea (Great Idea), an idea about the resurrection of the territorial expanse of the Byzantine Empire, gained many supporters among Greek Cypriots. "This support was felt especially in city ports such as Larnaka and Limasol where a newly emerging middle class was meeting with capitalism and European ideas. On the other hand, nationalist ideas were much weaker among traditional political and economic elites of Nicosia" (Kızılyürek, 2002: 76). The annexation of the island

by the British in 1878 bolstered the demands of enosis by Greek Cypriots. In the year of 1900, there were seven newspapers printed on the island and the newspapers were yearning for the motherland Greece. Even the name of the most liberal one of the seven was Enosis (Kızılyürek, 2002: 79). Although the motherland relinquished Megali Idea[5] for a while after the Minor Asian Catastrophe (1919-1922), Greek Cypriots lost nothing from their enthusiasm for enosis under the British administration.

Cyprus was declared as a Crown Colony in 1925 just after Turkey relinquished all its rights over the island in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Although Cyprus had already been out of Turkish interest in the *Misak-ı Milli* document of 1920 the Istanbul Parliament and this document put Turkish Cypriots out of the political authority of Turkey officially, the Anatolian Catastrophe of Greeks was a great event for Turkish Cypriots and relieved them from their fears of enosis for a while. Without the support of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots preferred to be in close cooperation with the British administration against the Greek majority of the island.

Although the Greek Cypriots have a fragmented political life, enosis was the least common denominator to take political decisions. So, although the socialist party AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People, *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*) differed in many political issues from the Church and was competing for the leadership of Greek Cypriots, the party demanded a national referendum under the supervision of the UN to prove the scale of enosis demands on the island in November 23, 1949. This referendum was made in 1950 by the Church with the support of AKEL. The referendum which was boycotted by Turks

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[5] Megali Idea means the Great Idea in Greek and refers to the aim of the uniting all Greeks.

showed that 95.73 percent of the participants were in support of enosis. Although AKEL united with the Church in political goals, the Church distanced itself from a common struggle with AKEL and despite the fact that AKEL was struggling together with Turkish workers for economic and labor rights; it could not develop common political goals with Turkish labor (Kızılyürek, 2002: 93). Therefore, while sharing some political goals of the Church and Greek Cypriot nationalist groups, AKEL was accused of being communist and non-nationalist time to time by nationalist groups.

The referendum results were echoed also in Greece. With the new archbishop Makarios III in 1950, Greek Cypriots began to pressurize over Greece public opinion to make concrete actions for enosis. "Makarios embodied the union of church and state. For the religious Greek Cypriot leader, enosis clearly meant a spiritual homecoming" (Drath, 2003: 304). Within this warming political climate, a Cyprus-born anti-communist former colonel in the Greek army, Grivas, was invited to Cyprus to join in the struggle of enosis. He formed an organization arranging violent acts and named his organization EOKA (National Organization of Freedom Fighters, *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*). The organization made its first armed action on April 1, 1955. Thus, an alignment was formed among the Church, nationalist Greek Cypriot intelligentsia and EOKA to achieve enosis.

The intensifying anti-colonial demands of the Greek population of the island with the dream of enosis pushed the Turkish population closer to the British administration. The Millet system had already divided the two societies of the island, but the increasing demands for enosis created a new phenomenon, antagonism, between the two societies. "There was no university in Cyprus, no

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private business partnerships between Greeks and Turks, virtually no intermarriage. The one institution that was shared - the trade unions - had been substantially (though not entirely) torn apart by the pressures of the anti-colonial struggle" (Kyle, 2005). Escalating violent acts by EOKA against the British administration and the Turkish Cypriots pushed the Turkish Cypriots into violence. TMT (Turkish Defense Organization, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*) was formed to retaliate against the EOKA operations.

Turkish Cypriots developed their nationalism as a defensive contra-nationalism against enosis demands. Differently from the Greek population, Turks were not led by a religious authority. The name of Turk instead of Islam and using Turkish Civil Codes were becoming popularized by demands from the British administration, especially by Turkish intellectuals of Nicosia (Kızılyürek, 2005: 230-231). Kemalist ideology which indoctrinated a modern version of Turkish nationalism in Turkey spread, especially among the Turkish intellectuals from Nicosia/Lefkoshe. The first affective organization against enosis, KATAK (Cyprus Turkish Minority Association, *Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu*) was founded in 1943. Fazil Kucuk became the unique leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. His main purpose was to attract the attention of Turkey to the island.

The antagonism and heating political conditions triggered by EOKA terror acts on the island attracted close attention of the motherlands, Turkey and Greece. While Greece was proposing the demographic weight of Greeks on the island as the main reason for enosis, Turkey's evidences about the illegitimacy of enosis demands were the very close distance between Turkey and Cyprus in terms of geopolitical considerations and three centuries of administration experience until the annexation of the island by the British. Under these conditions, neither would

Greece accept any solution impeding enosis nor would Turkey accept any solution

opening a gate to a complete or partial enosis.

Escalated inter-communal violence and violent acts against British

administration obliged Britain to accept the independence of Cyprus together with

international dimensions. Cyprus was recognized as a sovereign state by virtue of a

constitution and three treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and

the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on August 16, 1960.

"Drafted by the Greek and Turkish governments, and not by the Cypriot

themselves, it [1960 constitution] contained in it provisions for segregation at all

levels between the Greek and Turkish communities, thus making the constitution

virtually unworkable" (Zarocostas, 1980: 108).

2.4 Post-Independence Developments: One state, two nations

The 1960 constitution has in fact a *sui generis* form when compared to the

constitutions of other countries over the world. Its durability was guaranteed by the

guarantor countries, namely Turkey, Greece and Britain according to the Treaty of

Guarantee which was accepted as having the same authority as that of the

constitution. These countries recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial

integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs

established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.[6] Moreover, the first subsection

of the Article 182 of the Constitution does not allow any amendments of the Basic

Articles.[7] Thus the only possible way to change the Basic Articles of the

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[6] Treaty of Guarantee Article 2: "Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution..."
[7] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 182-1: "The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich

Constitution is with an agreement of the sides of the 1959-60 Agreements. However, even the rest of the constitution is not easily changeable. Two thirds of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives must vote for the change to amend any article of the Constitution other than the Basic Articles.[8] The Basic Articles of the Constitution have both a national and international character because of the references both from the constitution to Zurich, Guarantee, Alliance Treaties and from these treaties to the Constitution. Thus, the making, change, abolishment and implementation of Cypriot constitution were internationalized (Özersay; 2002: 46).

The Constitution does not emphasize a Cypriot nation or public, instead it mentions about Greek and Turkish communities. While the Greek community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church"[9], the Turkish community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems".[10] In the third subsection of the Article 2, the remaining population of the Republic had individually been allowed to choose one of these communities to participate in. The minorities of the island, Maronites, Armenians and Latinos - which comprised, in total, less than 5 percent of total population - chose to participate in the Greek Community in the bi-communal structure. Any religious group was granted

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Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal."

[8] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 182-3: "Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish Community."

[9] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-1.

[10] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 2-2.

recognition if the number of their members exceeded one thousand and of which at least five hundred became, on such a given date, citizens of the Republic.

The Communal Chambers were formed regarding the divided histories and life styles of the communities. The Chambers had competence, within constitutional limits, to exercise legislative power solely with regard to the matters such as all religious matters, educational, cultural and teaching matters, the composition and instances of courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters, imposition of personal taxes and fees on members of their respective Community in order to provide for their respective needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their control[11] and also some administrative rights.[12]

Although Community Chambers seem to have autonomy within the limits of the Constitution, this centrifugal characteristic was controlled, or at least attempted to be controlled with the Article 100 of the Constitution: "A member of a Communal Chamber before assuming duties as such in the Communal Chamber and at a public meeting thereof shall make the following affirmation: *"I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus."* Moreover check and balances were maintained with some other Articles: "The President of the Republic with regard to the Greek Communal Chamber and the Vice-President of the Republic with regard to the Turkish Communal Chamber may, within fifteen days of the receipt by him of any law or

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[11] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 87-1.
[12] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 89-1.

decision passed by the respective Communal Chamber, return such law or decision to such Chamber for reconsideration".[13]

The Communal Chambers have both executive and legislative powers which are shared with the House of Representatives and Ministries. Thus, the Republic is compared to the federal states because of the fact that the real balance was between Community Chambers and the institutions at the center in a similar situation to the balance between the executive and legislative branches in federal states (Özersay: 2002: 46). This federation was basically on a communal basis, but there were also some regional regulations in the Constitution like creation of separate municipalities by the Turkish inhabitants in the five largest towns of the Republic (Nicosia/Lefkoshe, Limassol, Famagusta/Gazimagusa, Larnaca and Paphos).[14]

The Cyprus Republic had a divided sociological and judicial demographic view, though not geographically in the pre-1974 period. However this division was not just insular and it linked the divided communities to the 'motherlands', namely Turkey and Greece. According to the Constitution, the official languages are Greek and Turkish.[15] Although the Republic had its own flag of neutral design and color, "the Communal authorities and institutions shall have the right to fly on holidays together with the flag of the Republic either the Greek or the Turkish flag at the same time".[16] "The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have the right to celebrate respectively the Greek and the Turkish national holidays".[17] Moreover, each of the Greek or Turkish Communities have the right to receive subsidies from

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[13] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 105-1.
[14] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 173-1 (the continuation of the separate municipalities would have been decided by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic within four years according to the same Article).
[15] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 3-1.
[16] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 4-3.
[17] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 5.

the Greek or the Turkish Government for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to communities respectively.[18] Also "where either the Greek or the Turkish Community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or clergymen for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall have the right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to meet its needs as the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively may provide".[19]

Before the possibility of consolidation of the newly independent state, Makarios proposed to Vice-President Kucuk thirteen amendments to the constitution on November 30, 1963. The Turkish side did not accept the amendments on the basis that that they would have solved all outstanding issues in the Greeks favor. The President and Vice-President would lose the right of veto; the necessity for separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members for the passage of certain laws, including taxes, would go, so would separate municipalities; the ratio in the public services and in the army and police would be the same as the ratio of the population; the Public Service Commission would be smaller and take decisions by a simple majority; the separate Greek Communal Chamber would be abolished (though the Turks could keep theirs); and the administration of justice would be unified so that a Greek could not demand to be tried by a Greek judge and a Turk by a Turkish judge. "It must be said in favor of these proposals that they streamlined the administration and removed many of the features that laid stress on whether a Cypriot citizen was Greek or Turkish. But from the Turkish Cypriot point of view they removed almost all the props to their claim to be the

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[18] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-1.
[19] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 108-2.

'co-founders' of the Republic and demoted them to the status of a minority" (Kyle, 2005).

The proposal of amendments was commented on as being the first step towards enosis by Turkish Cypriots after the independence and some street protests were organized. The escalating tension was followed by violence. Various para-military attacks against Turks in Larnaka and Nicosia/ Lefkoshe were arranged. TMT took over the defense of Turks and again inter-communal violence began. "There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia and Nicosia/ Lefkoshe. Food and medical supplies had to be shipped in from Turkey" (Kyle, 2005). Makarios's consent for the British intervention from the Sovereign Bases produced a cease-fire in Nicosia/ Lefkoshe, an exchange of hostages, and the establishment of the 'Green Line', a neutral zone in the capital between the Greek and Turkish areas which became a demarcation line between north and south in 1974 and has existed until today. From 1963 clashes continued and Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the Government and other organs of the Republic. By 1960, only 126 villages and towns were mixed, and in 1970 only 48 of the 602 Cypriot settlements could be classified as mixed (Kliot and Mansfield, 1997). In the following years until 1974, Turkish Cypriots were squeezed to the defended enclaves that occupied only 3% of the island (Bamanie, 2002). Turkey had intended to carry out a military operation twice, in 1964 and 1967, but had to give up this idea because of international considerations and was sufficed with warning attacks. In 1967, Greek soldiers on the island and Grivas had to return back to Greece as a result of Turkish insistence.

At a conference in London, three guarantor states and two communities declared their demands. Makarios proposed minority rights for Turks and the Turkish side claimed that the December fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. These opposite demands naturally could not meet on a point and there was no agreement in London. Within this chaos, Grivas was sent back to Cyprus to command the mainland Greek troops and not long before he had also taken over the National Guard. Turks were squeezed in enclaves. The Cyprus Government imposed an economic blockade against the enclaves, which was modified as a result of the UN and Red Cross pressures to let in quotas of food.

On April 21, 1967 a group of colonels took over power in Greece and democracy was overthrown. This was the peak point of the tension between Greece and Makarios. Makarios soon accepted the impracticality of enosis. On July 15, 1974, the National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the Government, attacked the presidential palace and announced that the Archbishop was dead. Nicos Sampson, former EOKA militant and leader of the 1963 assault on the Turks of Ornorphita gained the presidency within that chaos.

2.5 1974 Military Operation: From *enosis* claims to *taksim* claims

The 1974 Turkish military operation following the coup in Cyprus changed politics not only in Cyprus. The junta collapsed in Greece and power was again transferred to the civilians under Constantine Karamanlis. In Nicosia/ Lefkoshe, Nicos Sampson gave up the Presidency in favor of Makarios's constitutional deputy, Glafkos Clerides. James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, arranged a conference of the three guarantor powers in Geneva. A declaration was issued in

Geneva proposing that the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended, the Turkish enclaves should immediately be evacuated by the Greeks, and a second conference should be organized in Geneva including the representatives of the two Cypriot communities to restore peace and re-establish constitutional government. Before the second Geneva conference met in August, international sympathy which had excused Turks in the first attack returned back towards Greece where democracy was restored. Within hours after the conference broke up the second Turkish attack began. Turkey rapidly occupied even more than had been asked for at Geneva. "It brutally transformed the situation from an argument over how the intermingling of two different populations was to be regulated - by minority rights, by power-sharing, or by devolution - into a different kind of argument, one about what sort of federal link could be built between territorially separate communities" (Kyle, 2005). The Turkish capture of 37 percent of the island and 160.000-180.000 refugees out of a total community of 500.000 from the north to the south created a traumatic mood for the Greek Cypriots.

Clerides openly acknowledged that it would be immediately necessary to accept a federation based on two communities and two regions which was acceptable for Turks. "Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7, 1974 and immediately resumed the Presidency, declaring that Clerides had 'demonstrated an over-enthusiasm for making concessions'" (Kyle, 2005). The Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus in 1975 and Rauf Denktash was elected President. The Constitution, which was prepared by the Founder Parliament, was accepted by 99.4% of the Turkish population. Clerides resigned from his position in April 1976 and Tasos Papadopulos was appointed in place of him. This division between the rightist

politicians formed a political legacy which still continues between DISY (Democratic Rally, *Dimokratikos Synagermos*) which was found by Clerides in 1976 and DIKO (Democratic Party, *Dimokratiko Koma*) which was found with Kyprianu's leadership and was led by Papodopulos afterwards. DISY was not perceived nationalistic by the pro-Makarios front and was even earmarked as NATO's spy by AKEL from time to time.

After several ineffective rounds of negotiations under UN supervision and support, Makarios and Denktash met twice in Lefkoshe/Nicosia in February 1977 and agreed on some guidelines for future negotiations. A few months after the agreement, Makarios died of heart failure. Spyros Kyprianou, who was to be his successor and would eliminate Clerides in the 1978 presidential elections with the support of AKEL, could not take risks to open a gate to confederation and Denktash was benefiting from the passing time. Although the 1979 Agreement accepted a federation consisting of two regions with two communities, "one party, in this case the Greek Cypriots, who want a strong central government, accused the other of producing a constitutional draft which is appropriate for a confederation and not a federation. The other party, who wanted a weak central government, reproached the first with seeking a unitary state and calling it a federation" (Kyle, 2005).

2.6 Post 1983 Developments: Together Again?

In 1983, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared to the world. Its main two differences from the Republic of Cyprus formed in 1960 were its secular character and nearly mono-ethnic demographic structure. It is a democratic and

secular Republic according to its constitution of 1985.[20] The official language of the Republic is Turkish.[21] In this nationally pure country, the constitution granted freedom of conscience, religious faith and opinion to every individual.[22] However, the practice of these freedoms was to be controlled by the state. "Religious education and teaching is carried out under the supervision and control of the State".[23] The right of acquiring citizenship was granted to the individuals who "acquired citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus under Annex D of the Treaty of Establishment of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and were ordinarily resident in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the 15th November, 1983; acquired citizenship of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus before the 15th November, 1983; shall be citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".[24]

The detailed information about the TRNC citizenship takes place in the Citizenship Law which was accepted by the Republican Assembly of the TRNC during its session on May 21, 1993. The impact of memories of the pre-1974 period on the northern part of the island can be traced in this law. "Persons who have made investment … and have performed or likely to perform, extraordinary services in science, politics and cultural sectors; … who have taken part in 1974 Peace Operation and their spouses and children; and the widows and children of those killed in the Peace Operation; … who have rendered services after August 1, 1958 in the cadres of the Turkish Resistance Organization in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"[25] shall become citizens of the TRNC without requiring the

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[20] The Constitution of TRNC, Article 1.
[21] The Constitution of TRNC, Article 2/2.
[22] The Constitution of TRNC, Article 23/1.
[23] The Constitution of TRNC, Article 23/4.
[24] The Constitution of TRNC, Articles 67/1a and 67/1b.
[25] The Citizenship Law of the TRNC, Article 9/1.

satisfaction of conditions such as residence or good conduct under previous paragraphs.

The Turkish Cypriot economy, after the division of the island, had many problems despite the direct and indirect economic aids of Turkey. Turkish immigrants from Anatolia to the island in the post-1974 period, created a division in the Turkish part of the island. Now being Cypriot or not was a defining difference among the Anatolian rooted Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots began to underline their Cypriot identity (Kızılyürek, 2005: 20). The isolation over the north part of the island and economic hardships caused many Turkish Cypriots to emigrate. In contrast to 16,500 Turkish emigrants from the island between 1955 and 1973, 45,000 more emigrated from 1974 to 1999. On the other hand, as of 1980 there has been a net in-migration of Greek Cypriots due to the economic recovery and subsequent development of the country despite high emigrations in the previous periods (Theophanpus, 2000). CTP (Republican Turkish Party, *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi*), the first opposition party of Turkish Cypriots which has existed in the political arena since December 27, 1970, became the voice of anxious and unsatisfied Turkish Cypriots. Since 1983 when TRNC was founded, UBP (National Unity Party, *Ulusal Birlik Partisi*) had the biggest public support and Denktash won all presidential elections over two decades. However the opposition parties were complaining about Turkey's support for Denktash.

On the Greek side, AKEL was becoming more and more uncomfortable with nationalist discourses of DIKO and EDEK (United Democratic Union of the Center, *Enie Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou*). Yorgos Vasiliou who was a successful businessman won the 1988 elections as an independent candidate with the support

of AKEL and EDEK against Clerides. AKEL again became the determinant of the election results. Following his election as president of Cyprus in February 1988, Yorgos Vassiliou restarted negotiations with Rauf Denktash in Geneva with the call of Perez de Cuella the General Secretary of the UN. The negotiations failed again. Denktash insisted that both sides should be recognized as having sovereign status as a precondition. Vasiliou was more moderate than Kyprianu on federalism debates. On the other hand, Denktash's demands were slipping to a confederal solution from federalism. Denktash began to speak about the existence of two peoples, rather than communities in Cyprus, implying that the Turkish Cypriots had the right of self-determination and that they were entitled to establish an internationally recognized state. "In his words, 'there is no single representative government in Cyprus and no homogeneous Cypriot nation, but two sovereign peoples identified on the basis of ethnic origin, language, cultural tradition and religion'" (Kyle, 2005).

Greek Cypriots scraped off the uncompromising image with Vasiliou leadership. However this shift in Greek Cypriot leadership created new balances in political life. While the Church, DIKO and EDEK strengthening their critiques; Vasiliou was gaining full support of Clerides and AKEL. Another political demarcation among the parties was drawn with the application of a Cyprus government[26] in the name of the whole of Cyprus to the EU (then EC) for full membership in 1990. In this demarcation AKEL found itself alone in criticizing the application. In that environment, Clerides won the 1993 presidential elections with the support of DIKO. For the first time pro-Makarios and anti-Makarios right met.

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[26] Today, Cyprus has two political entities. South Cyprus is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus by all member states of the UN except for Turkey. Turkey recognizes only TRNC as a state. In this study, Republic of Cyprus and Southern Cyprus is used interchangeably in different contexts in the post-1974 period.

Though Clerides was known for his moderate political ideas for the Cyprus problem, in his period nationalist education was spread in South Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2005) and S300 missiles, which were bought form Russia, and were planned to be situated on the island heated the debates with both TRNC and Turkey.

The General Secretary of UN, Kofi Annan wanted a meeting of the sides in Cyprus without any preconditions in a report which was presented to the UNSC by him on June, 22, 1999. UNSC drew up the general solution framework consisting of unique sovereignty, unique citizenship, and unique representation in the international arena in the decision of 1250 and invited the sides of the problem to start the negotiations in the decision of 1251.

While Cyprus was approaching EU membership, AKEL declared his support for Tasos Papadopulos in the 2003 presidential elections. Thus, the Church, EDEK, DIKO and AKEL united for a common purpose. On the other side of the island, the Turkish population was anxious about their future. Their demands for peace and membership of the EU were increasing especially after the 1999 Helsinki Summit where the membership of Greek Cypriots became definite. Denktash's reluctant attitude for the Annan Plan, which was calling for the creation of a loose bi-zonal federation, weakened the public support for him. In the deputy elections of 2003 the groups supporting the Annan Plan process passed hardliners. Although the Turkish side voted in favor of the Annan Plan in the referendum of April 24, 2004, the Greek side rejected it with 76 percent of votes and joined the Union after one month. CTP gained 44.5% of the votes in the 2005 elections and the Turkish side totally dropped its uncompromising image. Lastly in the

presidential election of 2005, Denktash did not become a candidate and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Prime Minister and leader of CTP, became president.

Now the Turkish side is willing to find a solution with moderated demands much more than previous administrations. However the kind of solution is not easy to be met by the sides. The two alternatives for a solution are partition or reintegration. The second alternative is much more probable, but in which form? A unitary state is not acceptable in any form by Turkish Cypriots and does not fit the political and sociological circumstances of the island. A reintegration with a confederal structure cannot be accepted by any Cypriot Greek political party. The remaining option is a federal reintegration, but its content will be debatable as it is in the Annan Plans.

2.7 Conclusion

The historical, sociological and political realities of the island demonstrate two distinct communities sharing no language, no religion, and no culture. While the inter-group patriotism and out-group hatred produced conflict, these identities were also reproduced by conflict in past decades (Doob, 1986). Ideologies of freedom in both sides are now predominantly ethno-national (instead of prior religious character) and exclusive ones (Bryant, 2001: 893). One side's gain is perceived as a loss by the other side. While the Greek part of the island is still using Turkish names of places together with Greek names for the fact that it claims to represent all the island including also the Turkish population; in the northern part of the island where the Greek population was dislocated, previous Greek place names have been changed with current Turkish names. Some churches in the north were converted into Mosques while some others are now museums or still churches.

Hence, the signs of Greek presence in the North have been mostly erased over three decades.

The exclusive identities did not prevent some interactions between the northern and southern parts of the island. There are even some interactions, between these states neither of whom diplomatically recognizes the other, such as "an informal agreement between the two sides in 1974, according to which the Turkish Cypriots supplied the south with 500.000-600.000 liters of water from the Morphou area while the Greek Cypriots provided the north with electricity" (Kliot and Mansfield, 1997: 508). In his last months Denktash surprisingly opened the Green Line for day-time cross-border visits. "Trust remains a rare commodity in Cyprus. Yet, according to the polls, Cypriots born after 1974 are less prejudiced than their parents toward the other side" (Drath, 2004: 349). This young generation brought a more moderate government and president to power in the north.

A current depiction of the island shows us today the Turkish Cypriots are willing to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. In this shift in the northern part of the island, the transformation of identity in a pure constructivist manner cannot be seen as a unique reason. The weariness of the isolation and its serious economic impacts on the ordinary citizen of the TRNC are as important as the transformation and moderation of religious, ethnic and cultural identities of, especially, young Turkish Cypriots. In sum, the referendum in April 2004 proved that the majority of Turkish Cypriots are not rejecting a solution including re-integration with the South. However, the re-integration does not mean the return of mixed villages and towns. The Annan Plans proposed a unified Cyprus with two regions: demographically Greek dominated south and demographically Turkish dominated north.

On the southern part of the island, the Greek population is comfortable and now has an internationally recognized state belonging to only Greek Cypriots. Since May 2004, Greek Cypriots have also been EU members representing the whole island. A re-integration means the sharing of political power and recognition of the Turkish authority in the north. Moreover public pools demonstrate that Greek Cypriots are not much inclined to live together with Turks because of historical memories. So, the separate identities seem enduring even after a possible reintegration of the island.

History shows us even though all political parties can be classified in a left-right spectrum, the gist of the identity question is shaped by the combination of ethnicity, religion, culture and historical memories. While the leftist parties are more moderate to their counterparts in the other side of the island, even they cannot oppose to the core nationalist claims of their nation, with the exception of radical leftist parties and organizations which do not have sufficient public support to be represented in the parliaments.

A resolution satisfying both sides at the same time is impossible because of the fact that one side's gain is perceived as a loss by the other side. The mental constructions of ordinary people in Cyprus have such strong roots regarding ethnicity, religion and historical memories. Additionally, the citizens on the island have grown up with patriotic feelings based on moral principles. Thus the existing identities are being reproduced continuously. All the clues throughout history demonstrate that it is not consistent to insist on neither full political separation nor totally political re-integration of Cyprus.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL APPROACHES to the CITIZENSHIP in

MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES

3.1 Introduction

The discussion of 'diversity in unity' is one of the focal issues in contemporary political theory. Especially in the last two decades, the literature on the issue of managing diversity with the instrument of citizenship flourished in the political science discipline. However, there are a wide range of arguments on the issue. I grouped these arguments under the titles of some specific theoretical schools including socialism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, civic republicanism, and multiculturalism.

It is certainly an oversimplification to divide the literature so strictly that it becomes possible to explain the whole narrative with a few grand theories of politics. There are many thinkers who use the arguments of more than one school, and there are also some others who do not accept all the arguments of the school to which I assigned them. Lastly, it can be easily argued that, in fact, most of the literature is covered by hybrid schools of thought involving cosmopolitan socialists and cosmopolitan liberals; or liberal multiculturalists and civic multiculturalists etc. However, the 'ideal types' that I will describe here make the theoretical complexity of the literature much more understandable.

Almost all the theoretical schools and theorists that are examined in this chapter use the notions such as race, nation, ethnicity, identity, culture, conflict,

and citizenship. For a healthy discussion of arguments, I will begin with the definitions of these critical concepts. The concepts and arguments discussed in this chapter are mostly debated in nationalism, ethnic conflict, multiculturalism, and citizenship literatures. The characteristics of these notions that are discussed in these interrelated literatures vary in different definitions and open a way for different solution patterns for accommodating difference. For instance, if we define the notions of ethnicity, nation, and race strictly, we make it impossible to reshape these cultural groups. If we define them as totally flexible, then community engineering gains a vast range of possibilities. Considering this statement, the definitions of these groups, identity, culture, and citizenship make multicultural or multinational states either a living reality or just a utopia.

The chapter begins with the definitions of the mentioned notions. Then, the positions of various theoretical schools are examined extensively in varying degrees (regarding their weight in the multiculturalism debates). After the elaborations of socialist, liberal, cosmopolitan, and communitarian schools; civic republican and multiculturalist schools are examined more extensively than the previous ones. All the theoretical schools are considered together with their critiques. Finally, the chapter ends with the concluding remarks.

3.2 Critical Concepts

In this part, the most significant terms of multicultural citizenship literature like race, ethnicity, nation, identity, culture, conflict, and citizenship are debated. The definitions of these terms either facilitate of harden the implications of multicultural citizenship.

3.2.1 Race, Ethnicity and Nation

Race, nation and ethnicity are three concepts to define different kinds of human communities. They all share some characteristics like transcending the individual human in time and space dimensions in varying degrees. However, they differ from each other in many aspects and these differentiating definitions vary both among and within the theoretical schools. The first one of these concepts, race, is the most unwelcome self-definition among the three and almost always associated with racially hierarchy-building biological standards rather than cultural traits (Kellas, 1991: 5; Spinner, 1994: 19).

The definitions of nation vary vastly. However, the most attached characteristics of nations are sharing a distinct ethnic identity (Mann, 1995: 44), being connected to a particular territory (Miller, 1995: 27; Tamir, 1993: 66), occupying a homeland (Oommen, 1997: 21; Smith, 2001: 13), having common myths (Smith, 2001: 13), sharing a history or common memories (Mann, 1995: 44; Miller, 1995: 27; Smith, 2001: 13; Tamir, 1993: 66; Yack, 1996: 208), having a common public culture (Miller, 1995: 27; Smith, 2001: 13), having a single economy (Smith, 2001: 13), performing common rights and duties (Smith, 2001: 13), speaking the same language (Gökalp, 1999: 22; Oommen, 1997: 21; Tamir, 1993: 66), a critical level of communication (Oommen, 1997: 21), adopting the idea of self-determination (Nodia, 1994: 11), or claiming its own state (Mann, 1995: 44), sharing a loyalty and solidarity (Brubaker, 2004: 116), adopting common moral sentiments or religion together with fitting to a common decency (Gökalp, 1999: 22), sharing common practices (Miller, 1995: 27; Yack, 1996: 208), and the consent of in-group members (Tamir, 1993: 158; Yack, 1996: 208).

Ethnicity might be seen as a unit or a transformed type of nation. It might have the characteristics of sharing some cultural attributes (Diamond and Plattner, 1994: xvii; Miller, 1995: 19; Spinner, 1994: 25) and sharing a common origin (Diamond and Plattner, 1994: xvii; Miller, 1995; 19). As it can be understood from the definitions, the characteristics of the nation and the ethnic group seem mostly overlapping. However, ethnicity might be seen as more pervasive (Kellas, 1991: 4), not political sovereignty-seeking[27] (Spinner, 1994: 28), and being far away from the historical homeland (Kymlicka, 1995: 14; Oommen, 1997: 21; Smith, 2001: 12). The inclusion of the homeland linkage within the differing characteristics, for instance, makes immigrants the members of an ethnic group not a national minority (Kymlicka, 1995: 14; 2001: 54, 59, 242; Spinner, 1994: 25).

Many more classifications based on these definitions are possible. One classification might consider the 'authenticity' of nations about whether their existence covers all of the known history, or they were deliberately created (Kymlicka, 1995: 76), invented (Gellner, 1983), or imagined (Anderson, 1991) communities. These claims are highly related to the arguments on behalf of or in opposition to the durability of nations. While Gellner (1995: 3) is arguing that nations are generated from local cultures with the industrialization; in a similar way, Mann (1995: 44) states that nations have primarily developed in response to the development of the modern state. According to Kymlicka (1995: 184), although nations[28] did not always exist, national identities, to some extent, must be taken as given; because although the characters of the identity is open to dramatic changes, the identity itself, "sense of being a distinct national culture", is highly stable. So, the internal cultural fragmentations are not sufficiently deep to prevent

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[27] In contrast, Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1991: 264) sees ethnicity as carrying a dual character encompassing aspects of both meaning and politics.

[28] Kymlicka uses the term 'societal culture' as equivalent of nation (Kymlicka, 1995: 18).

people from sharing national identity which underpins their political institutions (Miller, 1995: 159). But ethnic groups are much more vulnerable to the change as groups divide, merge, erode, aggregate, and redefine themselves over time (Diamond and Plattner, 1994: xvii-xviii).

Another classification might be made on a linear spectrum. This taxonomy draws the boundaries of the nation as either flexible or immutable, or in a point between the two margins. When the shared practices (mostly in a given territory) are privileged in the definition of nation, a nation can include diverse ethnic origins in our perceptions and understandings. When the ethnic origin is privileged in the definition, then only sharers of the common descent are entitled to be accepted into the *volk*. The first kind of definition might be labeled the French conception of nation which entails a universalist, rationalist, assimilationist, and state-centered account. The second kind of definition might be labeled the German conception of nation which entails a particularist, organic, differentialist, and Volk-centered account (Brubaker, 1998: 138).

The importance of nations is seen in their potential to give a capacity to individuals to transcend their limited personalities in time and space. This feature might also be composed by other totalistic value-giving identities such as civilizational,[29] religious or ideological communities, but nations have been the strongest one for the last two centuries. As a result, nation becomes a very important source of personal identity (Coleman and Higgins, 2000: 66; Miller, 1995: 82).

The definition of nation drives co-nationals towards different forms of nationalisms. So, "no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible" (Hall,

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[29] Huntington (1993: 23) defines civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and broadest level of cultural identity".

1995: 8) and to be simply a nationalist is impossible, but a liberal, socialist, conservative or some other kind of nationalist in the right or left (Kedourie, 1993: 84; Miller, 1995: 188). While Nodia (1994: 4) sees nationalism in opposition to the idea of democracy, Fukuyama (1994: 24) argues that moderate nationalism can contribute to the success of democracy and Kymlicka (2001: 39-40) argues that a liberal form of nationalism is possible and does not attempt to coercively impose a national identity on those who do not share it.

Smith (2001: 9) defines nationalism as "'an ideological movement of attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'". For these three ideals - namely, national autonomy, national unity, and national identity - nationalism drives the in-group members to make some inclusions and exclusions. These inclusion/exclusions are determined in accordance with a specific meaning of nation and nationalism.

Following French and German conceptions of nations, civic /social nationalism and ethnic nationalism also idealize different types of nations. While the former is related to adopted cultural elements and granted rights, the latter characterizes individuals with their specific identities and the culture of the bounded group (Kellas, 1991: 53; Shafir, 1998: 17). Not the same, but a similar separation of nationalisms is on their cultural and political characters. While almost all kinds of nationalisms include cultural objectives; from the political understanding, nationalism gives legitimacy to the state (Gellner, 1983: 1; Kellas, 1991: 1) and it is largely a doctrine of self-determination (Kedourie, 1993: 23; Kellas, 1991: 6).

A similar term to civic nationalism is patriotism. It is generally defined as a special affection or loyalty of one's to its country and group, mostly nation (Kedourie, 1993: 68; MacIntyre, 1995: 210). However, this loyalty differs from that of nationalism with the adoption of tolerance and universal human rights (Canovan, 2000: 277). Therefore, it can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups (Brubaker, 2004: 121).

3.2.2 Identity and Culture

Although an argument might claim that modern societies are organized around the market place of anonymous and disconnected strangers (Turner, 2000: 27), people might still perform different roles in their fragmented lives and feel a loyalty to different communities of people based on their ethnic origin, living culture, social class, gender and so forth. The three groups, namely, races, ethnic groups, and nations constitute the basics of a specific kind of culture and identity. A person's (ethnic or national[30]) identity may be seen as its categorization into specific human communities regarding ethnic and national affiliations. For some scholars, this categorization is imposed from above, by the authorities; for others identity "designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as human being" (Taylor, 1994: 75) and 'a form both of self-awareness and self-formation' (Tully, 2000: 219).

Either it is imposed on the individual from above or is formed by the individual itself, identity matters for people. In either circumstance, it enables the person to feel sameness, commonalty and sharing in a particular community. The

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[30] Race is not mentioned here because of the peculiarity of the term of 'racial identity', and doubtful existence of living racial communities.

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perceptions of identities are constituted, in part, by perceptions of difference and sameness. Therefore, identities, over time, are vulnerable to the 'processes of redefinitions and counter-definitions' and processes of negotiations, transformations, and interactions (Ivison, 2000: 128; Parekh, 2000: 124; Shachar, 2000: 72). Thus, the identity choices eliminate structurally imposed identity clichés and identity obtains a voluntaristic dimension (Offe, 1998: 127). However, this instability of identity does not mean its evaporation. Although modernization makes contemporary polities increasingly heterogeneous, identity based on nationality and ethnicity will not be eclipsed by modernization (Oommen, 1997: 21).

In an extensive context, culture can be defined "as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs" (UNESCO, 2002). When culture is attached to the collective identity, it refers to the distinct customs, perspectives or ethos of a group or association (Kymlicka, 1995: 18) and a historically created system of meaning and significance (Parekh, 2000: 143). As Kymlicka (1995: 76) states, nations share a unique culture; though including many subcultures - that encompasses both public and private spheres, is concentrated territorially, and based on not just common memories and values – nations have a shared language together with common practices and institutions.

Culture is very important for individuals for various reasons. As Tamir (1993: 36) states, "membership in a national culture is part of the essence of being human". Cultural membership provides us an intelligible context of choice and a secure sense of identity and belonging to an ongoing community (Kymlicka, 1995:

105), and, in fact, it shapes our self-identity and structures the individual's personality giving a content to it (Kymlicka, 1995: 89; Parekh, 2000:156). Moreover, culture gives its members a sense of rootedness, existential stability, and ease of communication (Parekh, 2000: 162).

Once the nation is identified as equivalent to a specific type of culture, we face a dilemma on the cultural demographic characters of states. States become either monocultural or multicultural. The monocultural perspective might be criticized for the imposition of a constructed homogeneous culture over various cultural groups in a given state. However, for Miller (1995: 133), this critique perceives only the identities of groups, which are smaller than state-nations, as authentic; on the other hand, "the group identities themselves are socially constructed".

Glazer (1994: 236) calls the states, whose populations do not share a unique culture, as *multiethnic states*. In most of these states a sort of subordination exists between various cultural groups in terms of political and economic strengths. When different cultural communities have a balance in the political and economic hierarchy, the idea of integration or assimilation to a common form becomes inconceivable. Lijphart (1981: 356) lists the characteristics of 'completely plural societies' as those: (a) existence of identifiable segments, (b) possibility of measuring the size of segments, (c) a perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between political, social, and economic organizations, and (d) the coincidence of party and segmental loyalties in a way that "an election is a segmental census". Because ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security and a source of trust to the group members in the *divided societies*, the political parties are organized along with ethnic lines (Horowitz, 1994: 49).

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Kymlicka (1995: 10-11) brings a sub-categorization to cultural diversity: multinational and *polyethnic* societies. National minorities arise from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state and wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture and demand autonomy or self-government to ensure their survivals; while ethnic groups wish to integrate into the larger society, participate in central institutions and be accepted as full members of the larger society. As Miller (1995: 20) states, even nations having originally exclusive character may embrace a multitude of different ethnicities in time. Even in the relatively homogeneous and developed states, plural identities complicate the picture (Keating, 2004: 27). Some kinds of cultural complexity may enhance the probability of conflicts among separate cultural groups.

3.2.3 Conflict

In multicultural states, especially in the multinational ones, divergent group demands threaten not only trials for construction of a country-wide solidarity, but also the political stability and survival of states. Jenne (2004: 732) lists these demands along a continuum of challenge from moderate claims of affirmative action, demands for linguistic or cultural autonomy, goals of regional autonomy, to the most extreme demands of secession or irredentism. In the process of confronting these demands, when democratic elections produce ethnic exclusion, undemocratic reactions to it can be expected (Horowitz, 1994: 45). Conflicts become possible over the reasons of language rights, internal boundaries, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration

and naturalization policy, and even national symbols (national anthem or public holidays).

Ethnic conflicts might stem form structural, emotional, or just cultural reasons. Some structural reasons are strength of stateless nationalisms, density of intermingled nationalities, defensibility and legitimacy of state borders (van Evera, 1994: 25), political instability in the center, mixed democratic and autocratic features, a large country population, and territorial factors (water, distance etc.) (Fearon and Latin, 2003: 81). Emotions, historical memories, and myths can exacerbate the violent implications of the existing tensions. In other words, "strategic interactions between and within groups can produce environments of fear in which ethnic tensions and conflicts can grow (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 56). Once the conflict has begun, radicalization is driven by perceptions of relative power between the minority and majority (Jenne, 2004: 734). Besides structural and emotional reasons of conflict, elites of the identity groups also take a part in the formation and escalation of conflicts (Jenne, 2004: 731; Midlarsky, 2003: 49). A bridge can also be built between structural and emotional reasons of conflict and more complicated conflict sources might be derived.

Another source of the ethnic conflict might be the identity itself. According to Huntington (1993: 22), the fundamental source of conflict will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic; but cultural. In that form, identity conflict poses the most difficult type of conflict to be resolved or managed peacefully. Hence, the absence or isolation of the bearers of other identities (ethnic cleansing) or full assimilation (linguistic, religious, ethnic) of minorities becomes the main goal (Offe, 1998: 120).

Every conflict has its own unique history and circumstances which must be taken into account for a workable solution (Kymlicka, 1995: 1). Institutions might have the capacity of mitigating conflicts and tensions. Demonstrations of respect, power-sharing, elections engineered to produce the interdependence of groups, and the establishment of regional autonomy and federalism are important confidence-building measures and in result, causes stability and peace (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 42). Hence, stability in ethnic relations might be provided with some regulations. However, workable regulations such as the range of the guarantees, the allocations of resources vary in specific circumstances. The main framework of these varying regulations can be found in citizenship literature for multicultural societies. Thus, citizenship itself is an instrument to prevent conflict.

3.2.4 Citizenship

In a basic definition, citizenship is an ensemble of rights, entitlements and obligations that is given to the person by virtue its membership in a particular community and determines an individual's access to social and economic resources with certain privileges, protections and also limitations (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 7; Ivison, 2000: 126; Kelly, 1995: 89; Patten, 2000: 193; Turner, 2000: 23). Following Aristotle, Ignatieff (1995: 55) divides citizenship into two modes, active and passive modes which are the equivalent of governing and obeying. Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 30-31) goes one step further and makes a triple separation. Hence, citizenship is (a) a legal status defined by a panoply of civil, political, and social rights as well as a relatively small number of duties, (b) an identity as a member of one or more political communities, and (c) an activity or civic virtue embodied by participation.

3.3 Theoretical Schools

The main concepts encircled by the framework of citizenship are perceived as having vast differences by different theoretical schools of political theory. These different perceptions and understandings lead different accommodations of multiple identities by socialist, liberal, cosmopolitan, communitarian, civic republican, and multiculturalist schools. Although such a strict categorization seems to be ignoring the commonalities between the schools, and fractures within the schools, it facilitates the understanding of main paradigms.

3.3.1 Socialism

The Socialist School perceives the expansion of citizenship as the incorporation of new groups to the political community. Marshall (1998: 94, 102) makes a three-part division of the expansion of rights: (a) civil rights encapsulating individual freedoms, (b) political rights encapsulating the rights such as voting and representation, and (c) social rights encapsulating economic welfare and security. He concluded that social citizenship and the capitalist class system are at war. From a similar perspective, Fraser and Gordon (1998: 126) argued that there can be no democratic citizenship without social rights. However, differing from strict communism, Marshall (1998: 110) considered inequalities among citizens as tolerable within a fundamentally egalitarian society.

The Classical Marxist approach both criticized and greeted the nation-formation process. On the one hand, nations were worth criticizing, because national identities were obscuring class conscience. On the other hand, nations were worth greeting, because they were a step in the evolution from the particular

towards the general. Therefore, once the nations were established, socialists have traditionally perceived minority rights in a hostile way. However, 'bigger is better' is not a commonly accepted norm in this school and decentralization of power is symbolized with the slogan of 'small is beautiful'. [31]

The main critiques to the socialist school are basically directed to the class conflict and internationalism arguments. Shafir (1998: 15-16) argues against Marshall's thesis that "the history of modern citizenship is more extensive than the history of industrial class conflict since it also contains the struggles of national, ethnic movements, women, and minorities". The second critique underlines the importance of particular civic loyalties and commitments attached to the 'geography of emotions'. That's why socialist internationalism had difficulty in creating a sense of solidarity without place. "Political attachments need memories and collective memories need a location where these common rituals can be enacted" (Turner, 2002: 49).

3.3.2 Liberalism

Since the classical liberals like Hobbes and Locke, liberal thinkers have mostly evaluated politics from the perspective of a social contract principle that determines the individual and state as the units of politics and proposes a limited individual freedom for the sake of individual security. From the perspective of classical liberalism, individuals are capable of transcending group identities, defining and redefining their own ends, and reshaping their identity. The primary goal of liberalism is the individual liberty which necessitated the equality of opportunity. From this premise, Rawls (1999: 7) proposes an equal distribution of

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[31] Also the name of the book written by E. F. Schumpeter.

resources unless an equal distribution of these goods would be to the advantage of the least favored. This distribution is arranged among individuals within a society that is "conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies" for equal people in a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good (Rawls, 1998: 66). Hence, there is no place for the community in the basic structure of society. Following classical liberals, Rawls (1998: 63) perceives individuals as "independent from and not identified with any particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends".

Liberalism conceives a neutral state in its relations with cultural collectivities by determining minimally general rules of conduct and letting people to choose their own ways of life. This neutrality is provided by the separation of the public and private spheres. While the private sphere lets people free to join specific cultural groups, people act as citizens in the public sphere which is a unified and universal space (Schnapper, 2002: 5). Hence, citizens remain as equal and free persons (Rawls, 1998: 59). For many liberals, especially in the left, some unequal arrangements can be prepared for the goal of individual equality such as affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. But, these arrangements are thought as temporary regulations. A permanent differentiation is denied in this school. In that perspective, group rights might be granted after the questions of (a) whether these rights do actually benefit, or protect the best interest of the group members and (b) whether non-members can justly be expected to pay the costs of group privilege (Offe, 1998: 133-134).

For many thinkers like Mazzini, Herder, Kymlicka, Miller, Tamir[32] etc. in fact, liberalism and group loyalties are not mutually exclusive. For Spinner (1994:

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[32] These thinkers are identified not with classical liberalism, but hybrid theoretical schools such as liberal nationalism or liberal multiculturalism.

13), liberalism may weaken ethnic identity, but this does not mean that it will destroy ethnicity. Miller (1995: 192) does not see liberalism and nationalism as opposing ideologies of value systems while he considers nationalism as the ideology of states, not sub-state units. Tamir (1993: 33) uses the term 'liberal nationalism' to state the togetherness of "both the liberal virtue of self-authorship and the national virtue of embeddedness". This term captures personal autonomy and individual rights together with membership to particular communities.

The main critiques of the liberal approach about collective identities and rights are its ignorance of collective dimension, fantasy of state neutrality, and absolutizing liberal values. As Patten (2000: 195) states, survival is too difficult for distinct cultures in the liberal state because of the liberal ignorance of cultural recognition claims. The neutrality thesis of the liberal approach is attacked from two fronts. On the one hand, the state, in fact, was never as culturally neutral as liberals proclaim (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 48). On the other hand, in the case of an existing morally neutral state, neutrality tends towards the dissolution of social bonds (MacIntyre, 1995: 226). Moreover, Kymlicka (1995: 69) argues that color-blind rights of liberal neutrality cannot provide individual freedoms, because individual freedom is tied to membership in one's national group. A third critique of liberalism is not limited with classical liberals, but is aimed also at liberal nationalists and multiculturalists. According to Parekh (2000: 109-110), liberals such as Rawls, Raz and Kymlicka absolutize liberalism, although the good life can be lived in several ways, some better than others in certain respects. Therefore, liberals need to distinguish between a universal and liberal moral minimum.

3.3.3 Cosmopolitanism

The main goal of cosmopolitanism is that "political communities should widen their ethical horizons until the point is reached where no individual or group interest is systematically excluded from moral consideration" (Linklater, 1998: 57). Cosmopolitan arguments have accelerated in the last decades because of the rapid transformation of social and political structures. This transformation is both a fact which is going on and a project which aims to reconstitute current exclusionary political communities. Main pillars of this project are creating social relations which are more universalistic, less unequal and more sensitive to cultural differences (Linklater, 1998: 7-9). So, transnational and global structures challenge the classical nation-state and 'bounded universality of national citizenship' (Falk, 2000: 6; Soysal, 1998: 190). While globalization is bringing hybridization, diversity and heterogeneity to the front, cosmopolitan citizenship proposes a citizenship model characterized by cool loyalties and thin patterns of solidarity (Turner, 2002: 58).

The challenge of transnational factors is interpreted from two perspectives in the cosmopolitan school. Soysal (1998: 194) anticipates the replacement of nationhood by universal personhood and replacement of national rights by universal human rights in the emerging post-national model. However for Turner (2002: 57), cosmopolitanism does not mean that one does not have a country or a homeland, but includes 'a certain reflexive distance' from that homeland. In parallel with Turner's statements, Kymlicka (2003: 358) states that responsibilities to all humanity can and must be in accordance with national identities. Hence, cosmopolitan virtue proposes respect for both our own cultural context and other cultural values.

Critiques of cosmopolitanism are mainly based on the arguments over the primacy of particular rights and of particular places. According to Miller (1995: 78), preference in basic rights must be given to fellow-countrymen. Moreover, an accusation of a nation-state as a form of constraint is also a weak argument, because the enlargement of a political entity does not imply any deepening of citizenship rights (Aron, 1994: 289). A second branch of critique of cosmopolitanism is aimed at the claim of transcending particular identities. Contrary to the expectations of post-national and cosmopolitan theorists, Harty and Murphy (2005: 101) argue that "national identities continue to be strongly linked to a particular territory and, more specifically, to a desire for ownership and governance of that territory". Therefore, even in an imagination, a politically unified world loses its collective identity and political will and harms democratic mechanisms (Schnapper, 2002: 13).

3.3.4 Communitarianism

In opposition to liberal atomist understanding of the individual, communitarianism positions the individual within a particular community with strong bonds. Thus, communitarians emphasize with the groups that share a common culture and tradition, and the solidarity within these groups. People identify themselves socially and most of their social bonds are imperishable and acquired involuntarily (Oldfield, 1998: 78). Moreover, these social persons recognize that they have duties. Oldfield (1998: 82) chooses the word of 'friendship' to name the relationship that must exist between individuals for community to work and, in fact, this bond between individuals creates the community itself. Walzer (1990: 7-11) also underlines the importance of public life besides opposing strong

particularism. He classifies the communitarian critiques of liberalism within two categories. But, these two criticisms suggest two different and contradictory arguments against liberalism, because the two cannot be right at the same time. The first critique is aimed at the liberal image of an individual who is absolutely free, unencumbered, and on his own. Therefore, a liberal society shares no political or religious tradition and becomes the arena of fragmentation, while the community is the home of coherence, connection, and narrative capacity. According to Walzer, this first critique contradicts with a second critique which argues that our connections are not mere 'market friendships', voluntarist and self-interested in character as many liberals argue, but mostly passed on and inherited. Besides being contradictory in nature, these two critiques sum up the content of communitarianism.

The main critiques to communitarianism might be grouped under the names of originality and fragmentation issues. As it can be seen in Walzer's statements, the content of communiatarianism is formed with liberalism critiques. According to Spinner (1994: 12), besides being the most promising current alternative to liberalism, communitarianism does not yet provide much of a constructive alternative to liberalism. The most applied critique to communitiarianism is on its fragmenting affect. Communitarians mostly focus on the attachments to subnational groups such as family, neighborhoods, and associations. As Sandel (1984 quoted in Kymlicka, 1995: 92) states "the nation proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared self-understandings necessary to community". Hence, the suitable mode of communication is based on not national, but local level. However, for Kymlicka (1995: 93), the meaningful context of choice takes place in the national culture. On the other hand Schnapper (2002: 7) calls even

Kymlicka a communitarian, and asks that "how can the public recognition of difference escape a process of endless cultural demands which could eventually lead to social fragmentation?". Shafir (1998: 12) criticizes Oldfield and Sandel's communitarian views of subnatioanal groups from a different angle and states that it seems mildly naive to suggest that professions have a common identity, stable membership, shared values, a common language, and acknowledged authority. The common point of critiques is that "communitarian democracy has been linked with rigorous policies of exclusion" (Bader, 1995: 221).

3.3.5 Civic Republicanism

Civic republican school focuses on geographically bounded political communities, because it sees politics as the only arena that we can hope for solidarity (Walzer, 1994: 186). Hence, the privilege is given to the common good, not to the individual or subnational groups. Civic virtue is a central concept for the civic republican school. It refers to the desire of citizens to further the public good over their private ends (Philip, 2000: 173). Hence, the concept of 'civic' differs from civility, the former oriented toward public solidarity, and the latter toward private individualism (Kelly, 1995: 89). However, civility is not excluded totally and exists in accordance with civic character. Walzer (1994: 176-182, 185) lists the expectations from the members of a political community by harmonizing the concepts of civic virtue and civility. For Walzer, we expect from citizens (a) some degree of commitment or loyalty not to the fatherland, nation, state, but to a particular kind of state, to the republic, (b) to defend their country, (c) to obey the law with certain decorum, namely civility, (d) to be tolerant of one another, and (e)

participate actively in political life. Therefore, Walzer argues a balance of civility and civic virtue as an appropriate form.

While emphasizing civic bonds, civic republicans challenge both liberalism and communitarianism, because civic republicanism sees political community neither as an aggregation of individuals nor as a conjunction of identity-constituting groups (Beiner, 1995: 14). The only thing we can share is the republic itself (Walzer, 1994: 185). Despite these commonalities, the civic republican school is a long way away from a unitary depiction. Especially on the issue of identity, the republican school can be divided into two subcategories as Habermas's 'cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism' whose loyalty is to a new supranational polity and Viroli's 'rooted republicanism' (or patriotism without nationalism) whose loyalty to one's own particular polity (Canovan, 2000: 279). Constitutional patriotism will be examined below as a separate issue, but the loyalty- and identity-related arguments of civic republicanism are worth considering before detailed examinations of republican concepts and arguments.

Oldfield (1998: 80) argues that, in a political community what is shared is identity, born in part from self-determination, and in part from a common history, language, or territory; so, political solidarity and cohesion stem from the equality of a shared identity. However, according to Viroli (2000: 268), while republican patriotism has a cultural dimension, it is primarily a political passion based upon the experience of citizenship, not on common pre-political elements such as being born in the same territory, sharing the same race, language, religion, and customs. Hence, ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship can all be seen as identities with different bases. While citizenship is an instrument of equality in democratic states, ethnicity and nationality are often invoked by states to confer or deny equality

(Oommen, 1997: 38). According to Offe (1998: 122), democracies are not defenseless against potentially disruptive politics of difference. Strengthening the foundations of a liberal political community based upon individual and equal rights, and promoting the republican self-recognition of the political community are the two pillars of this defense.

The civic republican school gives significant prominence to participation. Hence, citizenship is not only a legal status, but it is also lived through participating in public dialogues and negotiations over the governance of the political community. These citizenship activities enhance solidarity and the sense of belonging to the republic. However, unsupported individuals cannot be expected to engage in practice. Therefore when the activities of 'citizenization' are unavailable, the members of a political association remain subjects rather than citizens (Tully, 2000: 216). While the subject only obeys, the citizen rules and is ruled by being "a participant in determining the laws by which he was to be bound" (Pocock, 1998: 40). Thus, republicanism is a form of 'collective self-government' based on some notion of the public good (Walzer, 1994: 176-82). The public good is not an unattainable ideal because of the multiplicity of interests. "As citizens learn to counter the arguments of others, they may even find themselves persuaded by these arguments" (Spinner, 1994: 55).

Civil society is another concept mostly pronounced by civic-republicans. It is identified with institutions and associations that are not controlled by the state but that serve the public in many ways (Spinner, 1994: 40). It is the vital instrument for the survival of participation. "Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state" (Walzer, 1995: 162), because the civility that makes democratic politics

possible can only be learned in the associational networks (Walzer, 1995: 170). Because of these utilities of civil society, institutions that are part of civil society must be open to all if we are to have equal citizenship (Spinner, 1994: 44) and additionally, citizenship must be localized.

Civic republicanism prefers the notion of patriotism rather than nationalism. Republican patriotism is a mostly preferred way of enabling unity and survival of the political community in the republican school. It refers to political, not social, allegiance (Beiner, 1995: 8). According to Viroli (2000: 273), republican patriotism differs from civic nationalism for not being a product of rational consent for an allegiance to historically and culturally neutral universal political principles, but being a passion to the way of life of a particular republic.

Habermas (1995a: 264) uses the term constitutional patriotism as the proper name for republican patriotism. He argues that the connection between republicanism and nationalism is only historically contingent and not a conceptual connection. Thus, "the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society". At the same time, such a communicative pluralism must be supported with deliberations within the decision-making bodies which are open for and sensitive to the influx of issues, value orientations, contributions, and programs originating form their informal environments (Habermas, 1995a: 269-70). The constitution has a focal role in creating this communicative plurality. It acquires the procedural sense of establishing forms of communication that provide for the public use of reason and a fair balance of interests. For the acquisition of this sense, both liberal freedoms and rights of political participation must be

encompassed in the medium of law (Habermas, 2001: 771). Because "democracies are neither self-founding nor self-enforcing" (Offe, 1998: 116), the unifying bond in the constitutional republican democracies consists of a shared practice as the rational understanding of the text of the constitution (Habermas, 2001: 775).

The critiques to the civic republican school focus on the issues of the ignorance of ethnic loyalties, over-enthusiasm on the capabilities of citizens, and deficiencies of constitutional patriotism. According to Schnapper (2002: 3), there is a strong historical link between the nation and citizenship. Therefore, a society based on values and institutions of citizenship is in fact as improbable a form of organization as it is fragile. This historical link is so strong for Ignatieff (2000: 265) that even civic republicanism in the US and other ideal models has ethnic contents. Moreover, the civic ideal actually creates a more insidious 'logic of exclusion' than the ethnic one by suppressing reference to real ethnic inequalities and exclusions (Coleman and Higgins, 2000: 67). Another related issue to the expectation of dominating ethnic loyalties is the over-enthusiasm of this demand, "it demands too much from citizens" (Oennen, 2000: 290).

Canovan (2000: 290) criticizes both rooted republicanism for the fact that our real problem is the tension between particular loyalties and universal principles, and cosmopolitan republicanism for the fact that despite abstract norms, this school takes for granted the existence of historic political communities (Canovan, 2000: 286). However, the critiques to the cosmopolitan (constitutional) patriotism are not limited by this and mostly repeat the general critiques against the civic republican school.

According to Miller (1995: 189), constitutional patriotism does not provide the kind of political identity that nationality provides nor does it give the citizens

any sense of the historical identity of the community. He argues that "the national identities that support common citizenship must be thicker than constitutional partiotism implies". Habermas's theory of constitutional patriotism separates the notions of nation and citizenship in order to develop the notion of a post-national form of citizenship, but for Schnapper (2002: 11), this 'utopia' is false, because human society is not made up solely of legal subjects or citizens.

3.3.6 Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism refers to the doctrine that cultural diversity is valuable in itself (Raquejo, 1999: 261) and should be recognized as a permanent and valuable part of political societies (Tempelman, 1999: 17). As a part of multiculturalism, multicultural citizenship can be defined as the framework of policies supporting multicultural arrangements within the national institutions by integrating diversity into citizenship. Therefore, rights are not only provided for individuals, but also for cultural groups beyond tolerance (Shafir, 1998: 19). The content of multiculturalism literature emphasizes especially recognition, group-specific rights, differentiated citizenship, power-sharing, federalism, self-determination, and secession rights.

Considering the increasing ethnic plurality of current nation-states, we face two alternatives: coexistence and secession. Coexistence is possible in two forms: coercive or consensual. Multiculturalists prefer the consensual form of coexistence except for a few arguments underlining secession. For Eriksen (1991: 264), the multiethnic nation-state is no contradiction in terms and may indeed be a viable and stable political entity. Many multiculturalists base their arguments within the liberal paradigm (Kymlicka, 1995; 2003; Raquejo, 1999; Tamir 1993 e.g.), and

quite a few argue beyond liberalism (Parekh, 2000). The main legitimacy of multiculturalism lays in its emancipating role for access to the culture, specifically to a societal culture. From a liberal point of view, access to societal cultures contributes to people's autonomy, because people are deeply connected to their own culture (Kymlicka, 1995: 94).

Multiculturalist thinkers advocate the recognition of distinct national identities; because recognition is a vital human need (Taylor, 1994: 76), accommodates one's identity-related needs and promotes the maintenance of identity-groups (Patten, 2000: 201), and promotes a sense of solidarity and common purpose in a multination state (Kymlicka, 1995: 189). Moreover, "nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor, 1994: 75). However, as Habermas (1995a: 263) states, "legally granted relations of recognition do not reproduce themselves of their own accord, but rather require the cooperative efforts of the active praxis of citizens".

The majority of the multiculturalist thinkers argue for the group-specific rights. This feature sees cultural group rights beyond universal and egalitarian human rights. The basic support for these rights is proposed by Kymlicka (1995: 52). Based on a liberal defense of minority rights, he states that individual freedom is tied to membership in national groups, and that group-specific rights can promote equality between the minority and majority. Tamir (1993: 42-43) sees these group-specific rights as part of both individual and communal rights, because they consist both of the right of individuals to choose their national identity and their right to adhere to the national culture of their choice. The inclusion and participation of every citizen in social and political institutions sometimes requires

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the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences (Young, 1995: 177). Young (1995: 176) formulates this differentiation of rights with the term of 'differentiated citizenship' which is "the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship".

Differentiated rights gain importance especially in the cases where group difference can only be accommodated when the members have certain group-specific rights. Based on Young's initiation of these rights, Kymlicka (1995: 30-38) describes three types of special rights for distinct identity groups: polyethnic rights, special representation rights, and self-government rights. Polyethnic rights include a person being able to freely express their particularity. Special group representation rights make it less likely that a national or ethnic minority will be ignored on the decisions made on a country-wide basis. Lastly, self-government rights include devolving powers into smaller political units, so that a national minority cannot be outvoted by the majority on decisions that are of particular importance to their culture, such as issues of education, immigration, and resource development, hence create the phenomenon of competing nationalisms within a single state (Kymlicka, 2001: 37).

The descriptions of special rights vary for immigrant groups and national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995: 31; 2001: 54). While the group rights for immigrants facilitate their integration into the broader community, the rights for national minorities include multiple official languages, own-language education, special religious practices and customs and so on. A more strict separation of identity groups in the question of special rights is made by Offe (1998: 130-131). In opposition to Young's idea that all oppressed groups deserve special rights, he lists some conditions for deserving group-specific rights. In his calculation, a group

must be 'relevant' in quantitative terms, 'authentic' in terms of having clear indications of a distinctive life form, have 'allegiance' of most nominal members to it and 'compatibility' between the group's life form and the life form of the majority.

Another priority of multicultural citizenship is the emphasis on power-sharing institutions. "Power sharing, defined as practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society, can reconcile principles of self-determination and democracy in multi-ethnic states, principles that are often perceived to be at odds" (Sisk, 1996: vii). A specific type of power-sharing is multinational citizenship which gives equal recognition to the citizenship regimes of state and substate nations through a democratic argument for self-determination at the substate level and a revised conception of state sovereignty that is divided and shared (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 3).

The two major types of power-sharing are Lijphart's consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1979; Lijphart, 1981) and Horowitz's integrative liberalism (Horowitz, 1994). Consociational democracy involves proportionality in the parliament, proportionality in the civil service positions, broad-base coalitions, post-election elite negotiations, and mutual veto system; while integrative liberalism involves pre-election party coalitions, promotion of intraethnic competition, and interethnic dialogue. However, consociatioanlism is most likely to work if the segments (nations or ethnic groups) do not change in size or in importance relatively to one another, and the segments' leaders have the capacity to control the 'rank-and-file' (Kellas, 1991: 139). Lijphart (1979: 515) sees

federalism as a particularly promising method in implementing consociational principles.

Federalism can be defined most basically as a system dividing power based on mutual consent of regional or national groups and creating autonomy for these units. Hence, relations between citizens and the state are mediated by substate units. In this system, "neither the center nor the regions can amend the arrangement without mutual consent" (Sisk, 1996: 50). According to Bauböck (2000: 391), democratic federalism promotes the emergence of multiple identities which help to integrate diverse societies.

The notion of federalism is a door to self-determination. Self-determination can be defined as a kind of sovereignty that controls a portion of the state's territory and autonomy to design and implement the political rule. Self-determination includes "both an 'external' aspect -the right of a people to determine its international status- and an 'internal' aspect –the right of the population to choose its own system of government and to participate in the political process that governs it" (Lapidoth, 1997: 19). Thus, substate nations might engage in collective decision-making and determine their own laws, priorities and policies (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 80). Tamir (1993: 69) underlines two types of self-determination: a cultural version which preserves distinct existence of communities and a democratic version which provides the right of individuals to participate in the governing of their lives.

Beyond the harsh power-sharing debates lies the fear or desire of secession, because strict national or ill-structured federalism can potentially lead to secession (Sisk, 1996: 50-1). Harty and Murphy (2005: 13-4) see the reason of secession as a misleading idea that only states can enjoy sovereign rights. However, new

arrangements for organizing domestic sovereignty are possible. They refer to the solution of this false idea in multinational citizenship. Secession is also criticized for the reasons that interdependency and multiplicity of 'nations' and competing claims over territories. For Bauböck (2000: 392), "changing state borders should be regarded as a last remedy when other means have failed". However, secession is not seen always as a nightmare for states. According to Miller (1995: 188), there are good reasons for political divorce for two communities whose national identities are clearly distinct, as Norway and Sweden did in 1905 and as Czech Republic and Slovakia did in 1995. In parallel to Miller, Sisk (1996: 90) argues that if political divorce is relatively peaceful or 'velvet', there is no sound reason to insist on maintaining a state's boundaries as long as the outcome is sustainable, mutually acceptable to the parties, and expected to be internally democratic. However, the critical question is asked by Offe (1998: 117): "Which constituency is to decide on secession: the majority of the separatist part, the whole or concurrent majorities of both constituencies"?

Multiculturalism is especially criticized for the reason that it rejects the liberal neutrality. Fukuyama (1994: 27) asks the questions of what constitutes a legitimate group and who belongs to what group, and states that (following Kant's liberalism), "the only rational form of recognition is the impartial recognition of people as individual human beings rather than as members of this or that particular national group". Miller (1995: 148) also sees nothing beyond equal treatment for respect to minority cultures. Moreover, the damage of liberal neutrality causes an unjust distribution of resources. Some group members are asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of multiculturalism. Shachar (2000: 65) calls this phenomenon the paradox of multicultural vulnerability.

Another critique of identity dimension of multiculturalism is that this approach overly narrows focus on identity as singular and maltreats certain categories of group members, such as women, within their own identity groups (Shachar, 2000: 67-9). Some groups may have multiple ethnic identities, along with nonethnic identities, and some people may not have even a group-specific identity (Spinner, 1994: 178). Multiculturalism treats cultures as analogous to billiard balls, entirely separate from one another, having definite boundaries and internal homogeneity (Coleman and Higgins, 2000: 68).

3.4 Diversity within Unity

The main debate of citizenship literature for multi-national/cultural states is over the diversity within the unity. In any form of state, something must be shared for the stability and unity of the political framework. For Ignatieff (2000: 263), we can at least share an ethical attachment to certain rules such as mutual respect, tolerance, formal and substantive equality among individuals, commitment to the rule of law and democracy. According to Rawls (1998: 70), publicly accepting a political conception of justice that is independent from and prior to the concept of goodness can enable social unity and the allegiance of citizens to their common institutions. Parekh's list (2000: 236) of 'what binds us' is the longest one including a consensually grounded structure of authority, a collectively acceptable set of constitutional rights, a just and impartial state, a multiculturally constituted common culture and multicultural education, and a plural and inclusive view of national identity.

Requejo's answer (1999: 265) to the question of how can different people stay within one state is "constitutionalizing a plurality of ways of belonging to and

participating in the *polity*". Tamir (1993: 90) proposes a state of mind characterized by tolerance and respect of diversity for members of one's own group and for outsiders. Lastly, Parekh (2000: 206) underlines the importance of both unity and diversity and establishing a satisfactory relationship between them.

If we turn again to the multiculturalist school, we see that it is both criticized for the lack of a common base to sustain multinational states and appreciated for finding more appropriate forms of unity. Especially the thinkers from communitarian and civic republican schools see multicultural policies as responsible from declining solidarity and loss of the sense of common destiny among citizens. According to Beiner (1995: 7), the pluralist vision collects citizens in an aggregate of subnational ghettoes. Multicultural approaches overemphasize the cultural dimensions of citizenship and consequently underplay the importance of its democratic component which forms the normative core of our conception of multinational citizenship (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 3). As a result, multiculturalism – especially group-specific rights - erodes unity, by working at the expense of commonality (Miller, 1995: 140), permanently sectioning the society into ethnic groups by law (Glazer, 1994: 238), and alienating substate national identities (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 93).

Multiculturalist thinkers argue that empowered national consciousness does not weaken the unity of states, but support it. For Kymlicka (1995: 103-104; see also Patten, 2000: 204), there is no inherent connection between the desire to maintain a distinct societal culture and the desire for cultural isolation and the aim of self-government. Access to societal cultures enables smaller nations to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis. Conversely, lack of public recognition makes identity groups tend to be more defensive about their culture,

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and more fearful about the consequences of cultural interchange (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 37). Then, the politics of recognition rather than of assimilation provides the way of overcoming exclusion and alienation (Coleman and Higgins, 2000: 68). Parekh's statement (2000: 196) can summarize this thought: "Respect for their culture also earns their loyalty, gives them the confidence and courage to interact with other cultures, and facilitates their integration into wider society".

3.5 Conclusion

"We need a conception of citizenship that is more active than that of Rawls, less moralistic than that of the communitarians, and less demanding than that of Habermas. … What we need, therefore, is a more differentiated conception of citizenship that allows for the possibility that not all citizens possess all characteristics of citizenship in the same way". (Oonnen, 2002: 117)

If we try to symbolize the positions of the schools of political theory, it can be said that the socialist school focuses on internationalism, and political and economic egalitarianism. The liberal school underlines the importance of individual autonomy and freedoms, and perceives cultural group identities as inferior like socialism. The communitarian school thinks in a more local setting and sees a good person as equivalent to a good citizen. The civic republican school argues for overcoming identity restrictions by participating to the polity via deliberative methods. Lastly, the multicultural school evaluates identity as a positive asset and finds unity in diversity.

Every school of thought deserves regard from certain, but different perspectives. However, it is meaningful to debate the arguments developed by these schools for specific places and times. That's why; a discussion on the abstract norms and ideals of each school do not provide so much for concrete multicultural societies some of which are closely prone to violent ethnic conflicts.

None of the theoretical schools can find universal solutions for potential or active ethnic conflicts in the world, and is only claimed by a few. Here, the issue of 'specific circumstances' come to the front. Workable solutions for the problem of managing diversity within single political communities drive us to find multiple ways to do it. This multiplicity necessitates taking the degree of multiplicity, historical backgrounds, cultural similarities and differences and many other related factors into account.

The last two theoretical schools discussed in this chapter, civic republicanism and multiculturalism have great potential in formulating a multicultural citizenship regime in Cyprus. For a sustainable multicultural citizenship regime, a balance of unity and diversity is needed. So, a synthesis of civic republicanism and multiculturalism will be debated in the next chapter in the context of Cyprus.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMUALTION of a MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP REGIME

in CYPRUS:

A Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Citizenship

4.1 Introduction

Multicultural citizenship debates broaden our insight into developing a working federal framework for a re-integrated Cyprus. The literature of this debate gives us the notions which encircle the questions on identity and citizenship. However, it would be incomplete not to observe the constitutional and legal structures and their practice in consolidated multicultural societies. I have selected the cases of Belgium and Switzerland to compare and contrast with the Cyprus problem.

Switzerland and Belgium are generally seen as two model countries of multicultural citizenship. Both of the countries have long histories of multiculturalism. One other specialty that makes them crucial is their dynamic process. These two countries still modify their arrangements of multiculturalism when needed. For these reasons, the names of these countries are often pronounced for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. In the Annan Plans, these two countries are considered as models for Cyprus in some respects. For instance, in the Foundation Agreement of the plans, it is stated that the status and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its federal government, and its constituting states, is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons (art. 2-1). It is also stated in the plans that the role of constituting states

regarding external relations and relations with the EU, Belgium will be modeled (art. 2-2).

The chapter begins with the demographic structures of Belgium and Switzerland to demonstrate the range and distribution of multiple identities within them. It comparatively presents the numerical values of language and religious groups in these countries. Then it continues with the common, shared characteristics of these countries within their borders. After investigating what unites Switzerland and Belgium, the chapter looks for the answer of what internally divides these two countries. The next subtitle of the chapter is related to the constitutional structures in Belgium and Switzerland. Basic rights and responsibilities of citizens; the role of the political center in determining the political, social and cultural contexts; division of political authority regarding regions, communities and cantons; parliaments and chambers are all explained in order to understand the political context in which the citizens live. In the explanation of these subtitles, the Annan Plans are also explained where there are connections. Lastly, some ideas are proposed to form a functioning Cyprus citizenship based on the multicultural citizenship debates of the previous chapter and the implications of these debates in Belgian and Swiss contexts.

4.2 Demographics of Identity in Belgium and Switzerland

Both the populations of Belgium and Switzerland make up some numerical majorities and minorities in terms of ethnic origin and religions. Belgium, whose population is slightly more than 10 million, consists of 58 percent Flemish/Dutch-speaking majority, 35 percent Walloon population and less than one percent

German population.[33] The religious beliefs of Belgians crosscut language borders. 75 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and the rest is predominantly Protestant, but the ratio of Muslims including both citizens and non-citizen residents is increasing with new waves of immigration. An important side of Belgium demographics is related to the population growth rates. Similar to Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, the Flemish population of Belgium has more population growth rate than Walloons.[34]

The population of Switzerland is about 7.5 million and consists of a 64 percent German-speaking majority, 20 percent French-speaking and 7 percent Italian-speaking populations.[35] In terms of religion, 45 percent Roman Catholic, 40 percent Protestant, 4 percent Muslim and 2 percent Orthodox live in Switzerland.[36] As in Belgium, religious borders are not equivalent with ethnic borders in Switzerland.

Language is the key determiner of ethnic and cultural identity in both Belgium and Switzerland as it is in Cyprus. In Belgium and Switzerland, language is also drawing domestic political borders among communities.[37] Especially in Belgium, language has gained more territorialized and politicized meaning. These territorialized language groups are calling themselves nations and demanding increased political recognition and self-government powers through federalization of the political system. According to Kymlicka (2001: 213), federalization is both

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[33] Other ethnic groups are Italians 3%, Moroccans %1, French, Dutch, Turkish people less than 1%. Numbers include only Belgian citizens, not non-citizen residents. *Source*: http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Europe/belgiumg.htm

[34] The Flemish population has increased by 26% since the WWII while the ratio for Walloons is 17%. *Source*: http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/en/be2_pop.htm

[35] Other spoken languages are Romansch 0.5% and others 8%. *Source*: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/dienstleistungen/publikationen_statistik/statistische_ja hrbuecher/ stat__jahrbuch_der.html

[36] Also 9% none.

[37] The national languages of Switzerland are German, French, Italian and Romansh (Swiss constitution, art. 4); and in Belgium, constitutional texts are established in French, in Dutch, and in German (Belgium constitution, art. 189).

the cause and effect of the territorialization. As a result, these *multinational* countries are becoming federations of self-governing language groups. The impact of language in constituting communal identity stems especially from unilingual settlement of the communities. In Belgium, with the exceptional status of Brussels, French-speaking Walloons are residing in Wallonia in the south, Dutch-speaking Flemings are residing in Flanders in the north, and the German-speaking community along the Germany border. Swiss cantons are also predominantly populated by unilingual communities. Of the twenty six cantons, only four are linguistically mixed. The rest of the cantons have to adapt, in particular for schooling. For instance, a German-speaking family moving from Zurich to Lausanne must send their children to a French-speaking school (Steiner, 2001: 140).[38]

Although both Belgium and Switzerland has diverse societies, their diversity differs from that of Cyprus. Firstly, religion is a crosscutting cleavage in both countries. Both Walloon and Flemish communities involve Catholic and Protestant members heterogeneously. The same issue is also relevant for Switzerland as it can be seen in the cantonization process of the Jura region.[39] However in Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are homogeneous regarding language, religion, historical myths and memories etc. Another difference of these two countries from Cyprus is their peaceful (at least for the last century) history of dealing with diversity. On the other hand, the escalating violence since the early 1960s to the Turkish intervention in 1974 formed a feeling of historical hatred in the minds of many Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The last difference is related to the European perspective. Belgium as a member and the

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[38] In Belgium, minority language groups in any region are granted linguistic facilities receiving official documentation in their own language.
[39] See below, note 45.

centre of European Union and Switzerland as one of the centers of European civilization[40] are both among the most consolidated and institutionalized democracies in the world. However, democracy has settled in Cyprus only as recently as 1960 and was interrupted with the Greek military coup and the Turkish military intervention.

4.3 Unity in Belgium and Switzerland

As it can be seen from the statements above, Belgium and Switzerland are divided with linguistic borders. However, both of the countries have functioning stable democracies. Constitutional arrangements are significant for this stability, but it is too hard for any country to preserve stability and political unity without having common identities. The distinguishing characters of these cases are the successful construction of common identities based on common historical memories and a shared public space which were lacked in Cyprus. Pillarization in Belgium and decentralization in Switzerland have fragmented the public space in these countries. However, according to Kymlicka (2001: 212), participatory democratic forums and procedures that cut across the religious, ideological and racial cleavages can be found both in Belgium and Switzerland.

Belgium has become one of the most stable countries of the world since its secession from the Netherlands in 1830. Although there is some sort of ethnic/national-based dissent in the country, Belgium has succeeded in managing its problems in an evolutionary route peacefully. The EU membership is an amalgamating feature of Belgian politics. Brussels is now the capital of both Belgium and Europe. Apart from the dual identity of ordinary Belgians as being

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[40] Switzerland has been one of the most stable and peaceful democracies of the world for the last century. Swiss civil codes are taken as model in many countries including Turkey.

both Walloon/Flemish/German and Belgian, being a European constitutes another allegiance for Belgians (Lefevbre, 2003: 111). The European perspective creates multilevel governance and it, at the same time, fragments the loyalties. That's why there is strong support for European integration among Belgian political elites and Belgian political parties (nationalist and non-nationalist) (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 106-7). The impact of Europeanness is so influential that even the separatist political elites support the EU membership and defend the idea of 'Europe of Regions'.[41]

Switzerland might be seen as a mononational state although it hosts various ethnic/national and religious communities. Swiss nationhood was constructed especially in the 19th century with the usual hallmarks of nation-building such as myths of origin like Helvetia (the mother of the nation), the resurrection of national heroes like William Tell, and so forth; so the Swiss today share a common national identity as being Swiss over and above their separate linguistic, religious, and cantonal identities (Miller, 1995: 94). These symbolic figures were omnipresent on postal stamps, on popular pictures and on hundreds of pub and inn signs (Linder, 1994: 17). Another unifying element of Swiss context is its emphasis on independence and neutrality. Throughout centuries, Switzerland has preserved its nonalignment status and showed an unwillingness to participate to international organizations. This specificity of Switzerland is one of the constituent elements of Swiss identity. Moreover, the tradition of direct democracy in Switzerland has contributed to common public space and constituted another side of Swiss identity as being the most precious element of its common culture (Linder, 1994: 17).

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[41] The webpage of a Flemish nationalist party, Vlaams Blok, can be visited for detailed information: www.flemishrepublic.org

4.4 Diversity in Belgium and Switzerland

Apart from unifying aspects of Belgian and Swiss identities, both of the countries have multinational structures, which are less explicit in Switzerland, and these identity groups have some kind of autonomy in sub-state levels. According to Kymlicka (2001: 26), both Belgian and Swiss governments encourage the sustenance of these societal cultures. However this process has not been on a smooth path. Both of the countries have long recognized their national minorities while having problems in admitting that they are increasingly polyethnic as a result of intense immigration especially from Asian and African countries (Kymlicka, 1995: 22).[42] The chapter neglects the polyethnic problems of these two countries to be able to make comparisons with Cyprus which does not have polyethnic problems resulting from immigrant ethnic groups. Therefore, my focus in this part is the peaceful accommodation of national minorities in Belgium and Switzerland.

To begin with the more problematic case, Belgium has more crystallized power-sharing instruments and geographical dissemination of its diverse communities. According to Glazer (1994: 236), language groups consider themselves so different that the idea of integration or assimilation to a common form is inconceivable in Belgium. As it was stated in the second chapter, Cyprus also has enduring duality of established identities and is similar to Belgium in this respect. Apart from the capital, Brussels, the regions have almost homogeneous populations regarding language-based identities. Again here, there is a similarity between Brussels and Nicosia/ Lefkoshe which was partitioned between the Turks and the Greeks. In the current demographic map of Cyprus, Nicosia/Lefkoshe is the unique city which hosts both communities although the city was partitioned

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[42] Belgium in 1990's had the second-highest percentage rates of foreigners in its workforce just after Switzerland (Lefevbre, 2003: 130).

between the communities with UN security zone, Green Line. The focus of Belgian debate centers around Brussels which hosts a predominantly Walloon majority and is an enclave within the Flemish region. According to Harty and Murphy (2005: 109), it might be hypothesized that Belgium could break up into two separate nations with Brussels becoming a European city-state and the capital of the EU.

After the Second World War, the Belgian government was reconstituted with the cabinets which included two or three of the social and political pillars which are liberals, socialists, and Christian socialists. However, since 1978 there has been no Belgian national political party; all parties were now regional, having split along linguistic lines (Lefevbre, 2003: 127). Today, some Flemish nationalist parties are pursuing the independence option. For example, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliante (*New-Flemish Alliance, N-VA*), formerly the Volksunie (VU) seeks a republican solution for Flanders as a member state within a 'confederal Europe'. On the other hand, Francophone citizens are not seeking further decentralization and would prefer to democratize existing federal institutions and citizen engagement (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 107).

Switzerland has a deeply fragmented demography in terms of religious and linguistic backgrounds. According to Kymlicka (2001: 26), Switzerland is an exception in its encounter with plurality. It has never made any serious attempt to pressure its French and Italian minorities to integrate into the German-speaking majority while all the other Western multination states have at one time or another made various efforts to assimilate their minorities, and only reluctantly gave up this ideal. An important similarity between Cyprus and Switzerland is the relationship between the fragmented identity groups in the domestic sphere and

their kin-states. Turkey and Greece are the kin states of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In all international negotiations regarding Cyprus, these kin states take a seat on the table and mostly define the policy programs of Cyprus from the motherlands. A similar situation was valid in Switzerland, but now its impact is not explicit. In the First World War, the majority of German-speaking Swiss identified with the German side whereas the French-speaking population sympathized with France (Linder, 1994: 4). Today, diverse identities of the Swiss still exist, but not in relation to the kin states of the past. Most Swiss are still aware of their cultural roots, and feel emotionally attached to the communes and regions in which they live with the exception of a small portion of the population change linguistic lines ((Linder, 1994: 64).

4.5 Constitutional Structures of Belgium and Switzerland

Both Belgium and Switzerland has functioning democracies based on multicultural rights and power-sharing instruments. Besides the tradition of co-existence through centuries, the constitutions of these countries draw up the framework of enduring co-existence. Basic rights-responsibilities, multilingual arrangements, state structure, communities-regions, the role of political centre, proportionality, chambers-parliaments, democratic process are all defined and explained in these constitutions.

4.5.1 Basic Rights-Responsibilities

Basic rights of the citizens are described as fundamental rights, civil rights and social goals (title 2) in the Swiss constitution and as economic, social and cultural rights (art.23) in the Belgian constitution. While the Swiss constitution provides a

wide range of rights equal for men and women regarding origin, race, sex, age, language, social position, lifestyle, religious, philosophical or political convictions (art. 8); the Belgian constitution underlines the rights of employment, social security, having decent accommodation, enjoying a healthy environment, cultural and social fulfillment (art. 23). Both Belgium (art. 30) and Switzerland (art. 18) guarantees freedom of language. Although both of the countries provide religious rights for the citizens, there is a crucial difference. While the Swiss constitution emphasizes the right of belonging to any religious community and to follow religious teachings (art.15), the Belgium constitution provides the freedom of worship (art. 19) while also emphasizing the right of staying away from religious ceremonies (art. 20).

In terms of political rights, both countries recognize the right to freedom of opinion. While the Swiss constitution is guaranteeing political rights (art. 34), the Belgium constitution details this article by underlining the freedom of press, peaceful gathering, and entering into association (arts. 25, 26, 27). Lastly, I will compare the social rights of these countries. Both countries have developed social security systems granting rights to pensions, health care, and medical aids (Belgium constitution, art. 23; Swiss constitution, art. 41, 111). However, in the Swiss case, we are also faced with responsibilities of the citizens beside rights. In the Swiss preamble, these responsibilities are renewing alliance to strengthen liberty and democracy, independence and peace in solidarity and openness towards the world; living diversity in unity respecting one another; being conscious of common achievements and responsibility towards future generations.

The Annan Plans also state that there will be no discrimination against any person on the basis of his or her gender, ethnic or religious identity, or internal

constituting state citizenship status. However, the plan limits freedom of movement and freedom of residence only where expressly provided for in this Agreement.[43] Greek and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other constituting state are granted the right of enjoying cultural and educational rights and being represented in the constituting state legislature. The minorities of the island including the Maronite, the Latin and the Armenian populations have the cultural and educational rights in accordance with international standards (The Foundation Agreement, art. 4; the drafted Constitution, art. 9).

4.5.2 The Role of the Political Center

Both Belgium and Switzerland has characters of checks and balances and also separation of powers in their constitutions beside their divided domestic authorities. Belgium was a unitary state until 1970. The state included three levels of power: the State, the Provinces and the Communes. However, the constitutional reforms of 1970, 1980 and 1988 have gradually modified this structure. The major steps of the establishment of the Belgian Federal State are the formal territorialization of the linguistic problem with fixation language borders, the obligation to have an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers in the government with constitutional reforms in 1970, and also the adoption of the principle of the double majority for all further institutional reforms (Lefevbre, 2003: 127). Since then, the Regions and Communities have become the main political and administrative units of the new Federal State, especially after the 1993 constitutional reform.

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[43] A similar application is valid for Aland Islands of Finland. The island hosts 25 thousand people who are predominantly Swedish-speaking. Finnish regulations limit the settlement on the island for the Finnish people.

Belgium has government and parliament at both national level and regional/communal levels. Although, Belgium is still a constitutional monarchy; its monarch chiefly bears a symbolic role and he symbolizes Belgian unity and its cultural past (Lefevbre, 2003: 129). As a result, legislative power is exercised collectively by the King, the Chamber of Representatives, and the Senate. The state is left with federal responsibilities regarding granting of naturalization, civil and penal responsibilities, state budget and accounts, the establishment of army quotas (art. 74). Today, the government acts as an arbiter between substate divisions.

According to the Swiss Constitution, The Federal Government is the highest governing and executive authority of the Confederation (art. 174). The main characteristics of Swiss executive are its long-time enduring stability conforming less with the classical concept of separation of powers than with the checks and balances (Linder, 194: 8). In terms of, legislation, Switzerland is a bicameral state and involves also cantonal parliaments and communal assemblies (art. 140 and 150). The number of cantonal representatives depends on population size in the National Council. The number of state councilors is the same for each canton in the Council of States. However, the crucial peculiarity of the Swiss central system is the absence of a monarchy, elected president or Cabinet Government as understood in the rest of Europe, instead the Swiss utilize the existence of an extensive use of referendum to initiate and ratify policies (Kellas, 2004: 141).

In the Foundation Agreement and drafted Constitution of the Annan Plans, the offices of the President and Vice-President of the Council shall rotate every ten calendar months among members of the Council. No more than two consecutive Presidents may come from the same constituting state (art. 2-d). The Office of

Head of State is vested in the Presidential Council, and it exercises the executive power. The composition of the Presidential Council shall be proportional to the population of the two constituting states, though no less than one-third of the members of the Council must come from each component state (art. 5-2). The Supreme Court which upholds the Constitution and ensures its full respect composed of equal number of judges from each community (Foundation Agreement, art. 6; the Constitution, art. 24).

4.5.3 Divided authorities over divided territories: Regions-Communities and Cantons

Both Belgium and Switzerland has multilevel governance mechanisms. While Switzerland is defined as a confederal state made up of 23 cantons (art.1), Belgium is a federal state made up of communities and regions (art. 1). While decentralization is maintained through cantonal divisions in Switzerland, we face a dual decentralization based on regions and communities in Belgium. Belgium has had four linguistic areas since the early 1960's. Three communities and three regions have had internal autonomy since 1973. However, the German-speaking community still does not have its own region.

The communities of Belgium are the French Community, the Flemish Community and the German Community (art. 2) and the regions are the Walloon region, the Flemish region and the Brussels region (art. 3). In the 4th article of the Belgian constitution, four linguistic regions are counted which are the unilingual French-speaking region, the unilingual Dutch-speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels Capital and the German-speaking region and "each commune of the Kingdom is of one of these linguistic regions". Although in the level of

municipalities in Wallonia or in Flanders, some types of semi-bilingual arrangements are observed; regarding jurisdiction, in the Flemish Region only the Flemish Community has jurisdiction and in the Walloon Region only the Francophone Community (and in a specific area the German Community) has jurisdiction. In Brussels, both the Flemish and the Francophone Community have jurisdiction (Boussetta and et. al., 2002:32). The borders of the four linguistic regions can only be changed or modified by a law adopted by a majority vote in each linguistic group in each Chamber (art. 4).

Regions and communities of Belgium have diverse competencies. While regions enjoy responsibilities on the matters related to territory such as public works, agriculture, environment, infrastructure and transportation; community responsibilities are related to the individual such as cultural and social matters. Thus, communities control pre-school and postgraduate education, as well as arts and art education, libraries, local linguistic matters, social programs including the issues like the integration of immigrants (Lefevbre, 2003: 129).

Belgium is still organized by religious/ideological and political pillars. However, the two major linguistic communities, namely Walloons and Flemings, have divided these pillars along with linguistic lines.[44] Each community in Belgium crosscuts these pillars and enjoys a kind of self-government with their distinct governments and parliaments. According to Offe (1998: 128), the instrument of limited self-government is a potentially powerful device of democratic self-consolidation through power-sharing and its result is a subnationally based bottom-up-federalism. However, this divided structure and power-sharing between the communities are not on a smooth path. The system is

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[44] As Lefevbre (2003: 123) underlined, these pillars had their own political parties, trade unions, employers' associations, health insurances, youth clubs, and so on; each was a vertically integrated, self-constrained subnational culture.

proceeding to a confederal union of regions from the current federal structure. While the federal authority is continuing to administer the most important social security programs; Flemish nationalists are demanding the decentralization of social security system. For Flanders, the wealthier of the two regions, the current regulations are causing the subsidization of the bad lifestyle habits of the poorer Walloon regions (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 44-45).

In the Swiss case, the unique diversification is territorial, but this territorialization was determined basically on the ground of linguistic and religious identities.[45] According to the Constitution, the Confederation respects the autonomy of the cantons. The autonomy of the municipalities is guaranteed within the limits fixed by cantonal law (art. 47, art. 50). Together with this diversification, a (unwritten) constitutional tradition guarantees political autonomy to 3000 communes whose variation in the degree of autonomy depends on cantonal law (Linder, 1994: 49).

The cantonal division of political structure in Switzerland causes the localized experience of cultural identities. The cantonization of politics is defined as 'decentralized democracy' (Oommen, 1997). The effects of decentralization are enhanced with a superlocal option, giving maximum autonomy to localized units, cantons (Sisk, 1996: 50). The making of politics at 'superlocal level', thus enhances the participation of various segments in the society to the political arena. The decentralized democracy together with consensual decision-making procedures in Switzerland, improves the conditions of negotiation and deliberative democracy.

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[45] The last canton of Switzerland, Jura, is a predominantly a French-speaking canton, but had been placed in the predominantly German-speaking Bern canton. Jura canton was formed in 1979 while being split into Catholic North and Protestant south which desired to remain a part of Bern (Kellas, 2004: 138).

A *suis generis* characteristic of Swiss constitution is related to the foreign relations. Although Article 54 underlines that foreign relations are a federal matter, Article 55 states that the Confederation shall inform the Cantons timely and fully, and consult them. Moreover, position of the Cantons shall have particular weight when their powers are concerned. In these cases, the Cantons shall participate in international negotiations as appropriate. The role of cantons goes beyond in the 56th article and the right of the Cantons is recognized to conclude treaties with foreign countries within the scope of their powers. In the domestic sphere, education, culture, and the regulation of relations between church and state are declared as cantonal matters (art. 62, 67 and 72). The cantons also have the right of designating their official languages (art. 70).

There are two important features of Swiss politics regarding the geographical spread of communities. The first one of these features differs very much from those of Cyprus, and the other resembles the case in Cyprus. The difference is that multilingualism, with the important exception of the Jura problem, never became as crucial as the question of religious minorities in Switzerland. On the other hand, there is an important similarity. Different cultures in Switzerland are separated from each other by the political autonomy and territorial boundaries of the cantons according to the 46 and 47th articles of the Constitution. Federalism thus provides a kind of horizontal segmentation which allows German-, French-, and Italian-speakers to live apart without bothering each other too much (Linder, 1994: 25). This homogeneity has been relevant for Cyprus since 1974 Turkish military intervention and the following partition of the island.

The Constitution which was drafted within the Annan Plans, states that Cyprus has two constituting states which are of equal status (art 2-1). These states

will have their own flags and determine their own holidays in addition to those of the federal state (art. 2-4 and 2-5). The official languages of Cyprus will be Greek and Turkish. All persons will have the right to address the authorities of the federal state in any of the official languages and to be addressed in that same language (art. 7-3). Although the Federal State has a single Cypriot citizenship, all persons holding Cypriot citizenship will also enjoy internal constituting state citizenship status (Constitution art. 10)

4.5.4 Parliaments and Chambers

The communities and regions in Belgium have their distinct parliaments. As the Constitution (art. 136) states "there are linguistic groups within the Brussels-Capital Regional Parliament". The governing bodies together form the United Governing Bodies, acting as an inter-community consultation and co-ordination organ. The Parliaments of the French Community, of the Dutch Community, and of the German community deal with cultural issues, educational matters and inter-community co-operation; in addition to international co-operation, including the drafting of treaties related to educational or cultural matters (art. 127 and 130).

The members of the two Chambers of Belgium represent the Nation as a whole. The elected members of each Chamber are divided into a French linguistic group and a Dutch linguistic group respectively. The chambers of Representatives and the Senate are equally competent with respect to the constitutional revision especially on co-operation agreements between State, communities, and regions (art. 42, 43 and 77).

Swiss legislature is grounded on bi-cameral law-making. As Linder (Linder, 1994: 46) explains plainly, every proposition or bill destined to become

federal law has to be approved by a relative majority in both chambers. If the second chamber proposes changes, the bill is sent back to the first chamber before being returned to the second. If differences still remain, the chambers appoint an equal number of delegates to a joint committee which then tries to find a common solution. Should the committee's solution fail to be approved by one of the chambers, the bill does not go through. Hence, the decision-making procedure is called 'separate deliberation' (art. 156).

Apart from regional or communal divisions, referendum is the focus of Swiss democracy. All proposals for constitutional amendments and important international treaties such as the entry into organizations for collective security or into supranational communities are subject to an obligatory referendum (art. 140). This referendum requires a double majority of the Swiss people and the cantons. Moreover, most parliamentary acts and regulations are subject to an optional referendum. In such cases, 100.000 citizens who entitled to vote may propose a total revision of the Federal Constitution (art. 138). A parliamentary decision becomes law unless 50.000 citizens, within 90 days, demand the holding of a popular vote (Linder, 1994: 85). On the political issues of cantonal local levels, referendums provide the opportunity of political participation of ordinary citizens. The citizens reckon that they have the last word and they see their participation in the political decision-making process as meaningful.

The Foundation Agreement and the drafted Constitution in the Annan Plans forms a bicameral structure. A federal parliament composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, will exercise the legislative power. The Senate shall be composed of an equal number of Senators from each constituting state. The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed in proportion to population,

provided that each constituting state shall be attributed no less than one quarter of the seats. Decisions of Parliament shall require the approval of both Chambers by a simple majority (Foundation Agreement, art. 5-1; the Constitution, art. 20).

4.6 Thoughts on Citizenship in a Re-Integrated Cyprus

The Annan Plans explain the political structures and boundaries of the constituting states of Cyprus in a very detailed style. Federal structures such as power-sharing instruments and proportionality are also described very clearly. The framework drawn up by the plans seem very clear and smooth. However, in the practical sphere, the plans have some gaps to satisfy identity-based citizenship demands. Although the plan draws a clear-cut re-integration for Cyprus, identity-based demands in the case of co-existence in one state must not be ignored in the Cyprus case, because an enduring Cyprus Republic will be grounded on the consent of citizens who have separate ethnic/national identities which have strong roots in history and still endures today.

The main crux of the Cyprus problem is related to the definitions of the 'communities' of the island. The Annan Plans also use the ambiguous notion of community. This notion describes a mass, or crowd of people among which a sort of interaction occurs; but tells nothing more on the quality of the mass and the type of interaction within it. This definitional gap might easily lead to complexities and unrest for the co-existence of these two communities. As it is shown in the second chapter regarding the historical background of national identities in Cyprus, there are two distinct identities on the island. These two distinct identities are far from constituting a single Cypriot identity. The languages, life-styles, historical memories and myths of the communities are all so diverse in Cyprus to call both of

the communities solely Cypriot. There has been no Cypriot nation on the island, and at the moment there is no proof for the possibility of construction of this hybrid nation in the near future.

There are two nations in Cyprus with their own national characteristics. We may call them Cypriot; but it demonstrates where they live, not who they are. I argue for the existence of bi-national demographic structure of the island not solely by looking at the past. Surely, some nations might emerge and some others might dissolve in time. Therefore, the most significant indicator in determining which communities constitute nations and on which path the evolution of the nation proceed can be understood by looking for the self-definitions of the communities. In Cyprus, a Greek Cypriot knows that his/her identity differs form a Turkish Cypriot and vice versa. Surely, the two nations of the island are not culturally pure. Religious affiliations, political ideologies, geographical distances, urban and rural life styles, and in the case of Turkish Cypriots having Anatolian origin, all diversifies the clear-cut separation. However, these types of diversifications are visible within every ethnic group and nation. The elements in the definitions of nations demonstrate us the existence of two national communities on the island.

Then, why is the imposition of a unique nation-making so crucial in the Cyprus context? The main answer for this question is the fear of secession. Once we name a community as nation, we privilege this community and recognize some distinct rights which we do not recognize for any other community. This right is the self-government rights of nations. Here, I argue that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as being distinct nations, deserve the right of self-government. However, it must also be noted that, self-government rights are not equivalent to secession. Self-government rights in multinational states grant some forms of

political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction to the component nations. These rights ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of their people.

Secession becomes an alternative only when self-determination is impossible within the larger state (Kymlicka, 1995: 27). That's why, the Annan Plans are so crucial for the reintegration of Cyprus. As Sisk (1996: 50-1) demonstrates, strict national or ill-structured federalism can potentially lead to secession. The federal structure, proportionality and other power-sharing instruments in the Annan Plans must facilitate the coexistence of the nations on the island. Thus, Annan Plans can underline boldly what Harty and Murphy (2005: 13-14) argue that the secession stems from the misleading idea that only states have the monopoly of sovereign rights. Another misleading idea of the secession is the fears of secession as if it is a devastating monster. Despite the fact that the Annan Plans are expected to draw the most suitable basis for an enduring co-existence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; secession is still an alternative as long as the outcome is sustainable, mutually acceptable to the parties, and expected to be internally democratic (Sisk, 1996: 90). However, this option is far from being a case for Cyprus when the equal recognition and respect of the communities exist, and the two nations benefit from the cultural, social and political rights equally. When democratic elections produce ethnic exclusion, demands for secession and even undemocratic reactions to it can be expected (Horowitz, 1994: 45).

Self-governing institutions provide the community in question with a sense of security which might provide a platform upon which sufficient inter-group trust can be established that might in turn support cooperation in a second layer of shared-rule institutions (Harty and Murphy, 2005: 100). Hence, self-government

rights increase the people's motivation for participation in the policy-making process. It raises the cost of a successful secession and increases the benefits of association. Federalism with self-government institutions and self-determination rights form a multilevel, multidimensional governing process. This process has also an impact on the formation of multilevel identities which complicates the identity question and decreases the will and necessity for secession.

There are important critiques which cannot be simply ignored about citizenship-based solutions for multinational societies. As Miller (1995: 189) states, constitutional arrangements does not provide the kind of political identity that nationality provides nor does it give the citizens any sense of the historical identity of the community. In a similar fashion, Schnapper (2002: 11) also underestimates the role of a well-prepared constitution and legal arrangements in the multicultural societies by arguing that this 'utopia' is false, because human society is not made up solely of legal subjects or citizens. However, as it is agued above, the interchangeable uses of the notions like state, nation, self-determination is not possible any more. That's why, Cyprus citizenship looses its practicability and persuasiveness if it tries to construct a legal identity whose roots are not grounded in real identities. The purpose of Cyprus citizenship must be to formulate a differentiated citizenship based on the bi-national identity on the island. I believe that, the existence of two nations having separate self-determination rights and self-governing institutions within one state, in other words diversity within unity, is no longer impossible.

The way of formulating a differentiated citizenship in Cyprus passes through five steps. The first step of this formula is the full recognition of diverse national identities of the island, namely Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot

national identities. In the second layer, full respect to these identities is emphasized in all related legal documents. These legal arrangements must be implemented in daily life through the citizenization process which encompasses the promotion of tolerant and respectful socialization instruments like media, education curriculum etc. The third layer is making up autonomous cultural spheres for both national communities where the cultural authenticity could be preserved and cultural norms and life-styles could be passed onto future generations. At the next layer, intra-community cultural freedoms are not supported at the cost of inter-community relations. A tolerant and egalitarian interaction ground is stimulated between the communities by forming bridges like cross-cutting ideological groupings, civil society organizations, common ceremonies etc. At the last level, the possibilities for political autonomy, in this case, self-government rights are enhanced to be able to let stronger articulations of cultural orientations which possibly lead distinct ways of social and political life. These steps are the proposals to build a multinational citizenship regime; but the 'common' is as important as the 'distinct' in multinational societies. Therefore, the 'common' is also promoted in a multinational citizenship formulation.

Participation of citizens to a common public space and a functioning civil society has a crucial role for enduring multicultural policies. I agree with Walzer's argument (1995: 162) that only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. Therefore, both inter-community and intra-community decision-making processes must have a broad place for the participation of ordinary citizens in politics. The meaning of this participation process is broader than to participate in elections as a voter or to political parties as a member. It includes deliberation in the all spheres of political

decision-making. Deliberation facilitates the adoption of the most convincing and the strongest arguments which are shared in the public opinion. The role of referenda in the Swiss case might be a significant instrument to increase the participation of citizens for Cyprus. Beyond this, participation also necessitates civil society which will provide the citizens a place of activity out of pure political and economic relations.

As a result, federalism in Cyprus is proposed to be based on the self-determination rights of each nation on the island, but not ignoring the significance of common public space and the consensual decision-making in both inter- and intra-community relations. Therefore, federalism in Cyprus must promote the participation of citizens both to political mechanisms and civil society organizations to enlarge the possibility of deliberation. Self-government rights of distinct nations are very crucial to motivate the public to participate to an environment where people govern themselves. In this perspective, federalism can be seen as only one chapter in a broader theory of differentiated citizenship (Bauböck: 2000: 392); because differentiated citizenship can accommodate difference through special legal or constitutional measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship (Young, 1989:258 quoted in Kymlicka: 1995: 26). Thus, the multi-national/cultural citizenship regime in Cyprus is a synthesis of civic republican and multiculturalist schools with the emphasis on both the common and the diverse.

4.7 Conclusion

The contexts of political concepts and arguments differ in various space and time variations. Definitely, there are common features of multicultural societies and

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multicultural citizenship implementations. Therefore, it is a necessity to benefit from the experiences of Belgium and Switzerland to be able to offer a citizenship regime for Cyprus. However, the differences of the cases in terms of historical background and identity structures must not be underestimated. Therefore, strict copies of alien models might not find the possibility of resolution everywhere.

The Annan Plans have been prepared with some adaptations from Belgian and Swiss constitutions. That was partially a right method, because these two countries are the most similar and most successful multicultural cases from the aspect of Cyprus. However, it can easily be noticed that the citizenship regimes of these two countries are much more than legal regulations. They are the results of the experiences and traditions of country-specific contexts. It is argued in the study that there is a given bi-national demographic structure in Cyprus. So, the citizenship regime of Cyprus must be constructed upon this reality rather than identity-engineering.

Without shared, common practices; it would be an ultra-optimism to hope for a sustainable multinational state of Cyprus. Therefore, the citizenization process is important to motivate citizens to participate in the Republic. However, citizenization must not disturb genuine cultural spheres and violate cultural autonomies and the political rights of cultural/national communities. Thus, the institutions of citizenization are not taken into account as human engineering which transforms the cultural identities. A common public space which is enriched with referendums and civil society organizations have the ability to improve the conditions of deliberation both within the national communities and the federation. Thus, it might form a common and egalitarian public space which is the guarantee of sustainable and peaceful coexistence in Cyprus.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The thesis has aimed to provide a theoretical basis for the formation of a citizenship regime in a re-integrated Cyprus. The most recent efforts to reintegrate the divided political landscape of Cyprus have been initiated by Kofi Annan, the General Secretary of the United Nations. Intense studies and following negotiations focusing on the federal structures and power-sharing instruments for the, hopefully, emerging state the Annan Plans provide a genuine ground with all its details for a sustainable re-integration. Although the Plans were negotiated and revised in the process, the last version of the plan is still open to negotiation for both parties of the problem.

The thesis has aimed to build a bridge between the federal structures of the Annan Plans and the societal grounds of the divided political entities. The reason for this effort was the lack of clarity of the Annan Plans on the identity and citizenship notions and their possible reflections on the re-integration. Therefore, the thesis has included the historical background of national identities on the island, theoretical frameworks to deal with multiculturalism in the citizenship literature, an evaluation of the Annan Plans and some proposals of revisions and clarifications of the plans in specific, and a formulation of a multicultural citizenship regime in Cyprus.

After the introductory chapter which includes the aims, methodology and content of the thesis; chapter 2 is entitled as "Historical Background of Identity and

Citizenship in Cyprus". The chapter elaborated on the evolution of identity and citizenship in Cyprus in the Ottoman, British, Cyprus Republic, and post-1974 dual statehood eras. I argued that the island has two historically rooted and currently practiced national identities, namely Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities. This duality has been a legacy of the Ottoman Empire since its conquest of the island in 1571. The 'millet system' has compartmentalized the existing duality and perpetuated it by creating a dual system of cultural and administrational autonomies based on the distinction of Muslim and nonmuslim/dhimmi millets. The legacy continued in the British administration period between 1878 and 1960 as inter-communal interaction remained limited in this era. While the consciousness of nationality in the modern sense is spreading on the island, political self-determination demands have gained strength. The 1960 constitution created a bi-cameral and bi-municipal new state based on communal duality. Increasing inter-communal tensions and escalating violent acts led to a Greece-supported military coup and Turkey's military intervention which, as a result, partitioned the island into two demographically homogeneous nations with obligatory replacement of the population. As a result, the political entity in the north has become more and more institutionalized politically since the declaration of the foundation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. For the last four and a quarter centuries, the island has hosted two distinct national identities with their distinct languages, religions, traditions, limited inter-action, and most importantly self-definitions of the community members.

Chapter 3 aimed to elaborate on theoretical discussions over citizenship in multicultural/multinational societies. The chapter starts with the clarifications of significant definitions – such as race, ethnicity, and nation; identity and culture;

conflict; and citizenship - around which the discussions go on. I categorized the main arguments based on the relationship of identity and citizenship into various theoretical schools, namely socialism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, civic republicanism, and multiculturalism. I concluded that the classical proposals of socialism and liberalism are not sufficient anymore to deal with more heterogeneous societies because of increasing migrations and a resurrection of covered ethno/national identities. Therefore, I argued that different theoretical arguments might be more efficient and sustainable in various time and space contexts. In many situations, the context requires hybrid regimes; but overall, we need tolerance and respect of diversity. Therefore, the flourishing literature on multicultural citizenship will contribute very seriously to the discussions.

Chapter 4, "A Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Citizenship: Formulation of a Multicultural Citizenship Regime in Cyprus", has aimed to make comparisons of the demographics of identity and constitutional grounds for accommodation of the multicultural societies among Belgium, Switzerland, and Cyprus. Following the comparisons, it is argued that the Annan Plans can be strengthened if they are supported with a differentiated citizenship in Cyprus. This differentiation includes full recognition and equal respect for both national identities, namely Greek Cypriotness and Turkish Cypriotness; the citizenization process which encompasses the promotion of tolerant and respectful socialization instruments; the formations of autonomous cultural spheres for both national communities; the promotion of both intra- and inter- cultural freedoms and dialogue; the granting of political autonomies, in specific, dual self-determination and self-government rights; and also the promotion of the 'common' beside the

'separate'. I argued that the citizenship regime based on these layers will be peaceful, democratic, and sustainable. It will not provoke secessionist demands; but erode them. However, most importantly it will provide a cultural/social/political context in which citizenship rights will be practiced equally and in liberty.

The thesis has some strengths and weaknesses in dealing with the issue of multicultural citizenship in Cyprus. The most important strength of the thesis is its effort in being among the few studies considering identity and citizenship relationship in Cyprus. Most of the studies examining the future of Cyprus politics have been on the path of conflict-resolution and management theories. The rest of the studies are predominantly privileged structural solutions in terms of federalism. The importance of this thesis is in its role in providing a transitory bridge between identity and citizenship without ignoring the impact of federal structures.

Another strength of the thesis is its direction which does not aim to support cultural and democratic rights at the cost of unity. The thesis challenges the general understanding on the equation of national rights with secession. Therefore, a synthesis of republican arguments based on the participation and deliberation and multiculturalist ones based on self-government rights and differentiated citizenship is applied to a specific case, namely Cyprus, in the thesis.

The thesis has also some weaknesses. (Bi-) national identity was taken into consideration as a unique totality in the thesis. However, persons have multiple and even plural identities in reality. Identities based on gender, class, ideology etc. all give a meaning to the value systems of the bearers of these identities. Why I have selected especially national identities rather than the others in the formulation of a differentiated citizenship is that I have seen national identity as the most

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comprehensive and shared source of identity. This ideal type of 'national identity' might be perceived as a primordialist account of identity. But I acknowledge once more I have not perceived identities as frozen, but dynamic. This dynamism is reshaping the nature of national identities. However, from my point of view the border between the two national identities on the island is still enduring. The consideration of differentiated citizenship regarding only national identities is not sufficient. The differentiation might be enlarged for all significant identities, but this enlargement of differentiation is out of the context of this study.

Another weakness of the thesis is its stance which seems to undervalue the Cypriot identity. This common identity is probably adopted by some persons both in the south and north although quite a majority of the islanders are aware of their separate national identities. However, the impact of Cypriotness in the future must not be underestimated. If the parts of the island integrate, the citizens of TRNC will be also the citizens the EU. Thus, the layers of citizenship and governance will increase. This dimension is also lacking in the study as not to make crude predictions of the obscure future.

What can be said for further studies is that the two weaknesses, not giving the suitable place of various dimensions and layers of identity, were the issues beyond the scope of this study. However, in the future, the thesis could be enriched with studies elaborating on these two additional dimensions. The formulation of a more comprehensive differentiated citizenship – which will not exclude any discriminated group - could be completed by beginning where I finished off. Furthermore, after the integration, if it occurs, a more comprehensive study encompassing all the three citizenship layers, namely communal, Cyprus, and European citizenships, must be elaborated on.

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