GOOD MOTHERS AND WISE POLITICIANS?
NATIONAL FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG WOMEN IN TURKEY AND JAPAN

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

In this study I examine why women's formal political participation to national political institutions has been similarly low in Turkey and Japan. Although these two countries may seem irrelevant cases in terms of their economic and social attributes, a closer look at the gendering of the national context in these countries uncovers striking similarities regarding women's inclusion to the public sphere visible. I argue that the most consequential similarity between the two countries in this regard has been the definition of "who" can participate in politics, and "how" participation should be carried out, both definitions taking a male individual as point of reference in the two countries. Citizenship in both countries is highly gendered, the distinction between female and male citizenships being reproduced through disciplinary processes within the juridical system, education, social security, labor-market, and practices of national defense in both countries. Within such a context, I argue women in Turkey and Japan are usually unable to invest in social capital gathering within predominantly male political communities, which limits their recognition and access to formal political institutions. I furthermore ask what happens after women participate in formal politics, how women parliamentarians construct their agencies, and how they experience formal politics in Turkey. Relying upon the interviews I conducted with thirteen female parliamentarians in Turkey and World Values Survey conducted in Japan and Turkey, I find that active promotion of gendered citizenships become as significant as resources in enabling/disabling women's formal political participation.

Keywords: women's representation, political participation, gender, Turkey, Japan

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye ve Japonya'da kadınların ulusal düzeyde formel siyasete katılımlarının hangi nedenlerden dolayı düşük seviyelerde seyrettiğini incelemekteyim. Her ne kadar bu iki ülke ekonomik ve sosyal nitelikleri nedeniyle oldukça farklı örnekler gibi gözükseler de, ulusal sistemin cinsiyetleştirilmesine daha yakından bakıldığında kadınların toplumsal alana katılımı açısından iki ülke arasında çarpıcı benzerlikler bulunmaktadır. Çalışmada, kadınların siyasete katılımı konusunda bu iki ülkenin arasındaki en belirleyici benzerliğin siyasete "kimin" ve "nasıl" katılacağı tanımları üzerinde bulunduğunu ve her iki örnekte de siyasete katılan bireyin bir erkek birey olarak kabul edildiğini savunmaktayım. Zira iki ülkede de vatandaşlık ileri derecede cinsiyetlendirilmiş olup; hukuk sistemi, eğitim, sosyal güvenlik, istihdam politikaları ve milli savunmanın kadın ve erkek vatandaşlar arasında bir ayrıma gitmektedir. Bu çerçevede Türkiye ve Japonya'daki kadınların, büyük çoğunlukla erkeklerden oluşan siyasi kümeler içerisindeki sosyal sermayeden faydalanamadığını savunmakta ve bu durumun kadınların formel siyasete erişimlerini engellediğini önermekteyim. Çalışmanın bir sonraki aşamasında, kadınların formel siyasete girdikten sonra kadın siyasetçilerin kendilerini ve formel siyaset deneyimlerini nasıl oluşturdukları konu etmekte ve formel siyasete girdikten sonraki aşamaya bir ilk bakış sunmaktayım. Bu şekilde, cinsiyetlendirişmiş vatandaşlıkların ne şekilde kadınların formel siyasete katılımını kolaylaştırdığını/engellediğini Türkiye'de on üç kadın parlamenterle yaptığım mülakatlar ile Japonya ve Türkiye'de yapılmış Dünya Değerler Anketi'ni (World Values Survey) kullanarak incelemekteyim.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kadın temsili, siyasete katılım, toplumsal cinsiyet, Türkiye, Japonya

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

"Why do you compare Turkey with *Japan*?" is a question that I frequently encountered for the past fifteen months. People don't ask me this because they cannot bring Turkey and Japan together, on the contrary everybody has given me a reason why it actually might be a good reason to do such a comparison. I think the most common guesses were "coming from the same origin", "geishas and harem concubines", and "being late bloomers of Westernization". But from all of the justifications I have heard, my favorite was the similarity on traditions of male wrestling.

Although similarities between wrestling in Turkey and Japan has not been formulated into a comparative inquiry yet, in reality there has been numerous studies comparing Turkey and Japan. Scholars have compared these two countries with regards to their modernization processes (Esenbel, 1999; Ward and Rustow, 1964), their secularization processes (Bellah, 1958; Yumiko, 1999) as well as cultures (Güvenç, 2002). But after nearly fifty years after the first comparative studies on Turkey and Japan, there still remains one very visible phenomenon that has escaped a comparative examination: women's low levels of formal political participation[1].

[1] I use the term "formal political participation" rather than "women's representation" in the study. I prefer not to use "women's representation" because although there is evidence that increase in women in political institutions raise the number of women-friendly and gender-equal policies (IDEA, 2005), throughout my interviews with female parliamentarians in Turkey I confronted that women do not have to enter politics to represent women.

Turkey and Japan share very low levels of women's formal political participation in national and local parliaments, as it can be observed from Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1: Ratio of Female Representatives in Formal Political Institutions in Japan

	Japan
House of Representatives (Lower House)	9.4% (45 our of 480)
House of Councilors (Upper House)	18.2% (43 out of 242)
Local Assemblies	8.8%
Prefectures	6.2%
Cities	13.1%
Towns and Villages	5.9%
Special Ward Assemblies of Tokyo	21.8%

(Bochel and Bochel, 2005; Gender Equality Bureau, 2007)

Table 2: Ratio of Female Representatives in Formal Political Institutions in Turkey

	Turkey
National Assembly	8.9% (50 out of 550)
Municipal Councils	1.6%
Provincial Councils	1.4%

(KA-DER, 2008)

In Japan, women constitute 9.4% of the House of Representatives (Lower House) seats and 18.2% of the House of Councilors (Upper House) seats (IPU, 2007). Currently, there are 43 female parliamentarians in the 242-seat Upper House and 45 female representatives in the 480-seat Lower House in Japan (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007). In Turkey the number adds up to 8.9% of the unicameral National Assembly, 50 parliamentarians in the 550 seat uni-cameral assembly (KA-DER, 2007). In the local political domain, Japanese women amount to 8.8% of local assemblies, 6.2% of councilors in prefectures, 13.1% of councilors in cities and

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While nearly half of the parliamentarians argued that they wanted to voice women's concerns (among other issues), the other half strongly argued that they did not wish to be defined solely as representative of women. It seems as their experience was more about "formal participation" than "representation." This observation impelled me to use "formal political participation" rather than "women's representation" in the study. Thus when I use the term "formal political participation", I use it to describe the processes women go through to hold seats in national (and local) parliaments.

5.9% of councilors in towns and villages (Bochel and Bochel, 2005)[2]. Women representatives in Turkey in the local level amount to 1.6% in municipal councils and 1.4% in provincial councils (KA-DER, 2007).

This is interesting because Turkey and Japan seem very diverse. Japan has the second largest economy in the world, ranking 8th in the 2006 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008). Turkey ranks as the 84th. The GDP per capita in Japan is around 31.267 dollars while the GDP per capita in Turkey is around 8.407 (UNDP, 2008). Japan is a post-industrialist country with an aging population while Turkey is a developing country with a very young population. The list of differences between Turkey and Japan may be longer, but the lack of women's participation in national and local parliaments is one of the most visible similarities between these two diverse countries.

World Values Surveys show that such low participation of women can not be entirely explained by the lack of interest in politics among women. This data demonstrates that there is a certain level of disinterest, yet both the levels of interest and the difference between the amounts of interest reported by men do not clarify why women's formal political participation is scarce.

Table 3: Interest in Politics among Women in Turkey

	Total	**Male**	**Female**
Very Interested	8.4	11.7	5.1
Somewhat Interested	31.8	36.9	26.7
Not Very Interested	25.8	26.3	25.3
Not At All Interested	34.0	25.1	43.0
Total	3394 (100%)	1716 (100%)	1678 (100%)

(World Values Survey Turkey, 2001)

[2] The figures are higher in Japan only if big cities are taken into consideration where women's access to local seats seems to be easier (Bochel and Bochel, 2005), 21.8% of special ward assemblies of Tokyo and 16.3% of the assemblies in major Japanese cities are represented by women (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007).

Table 4: Interest in Politics among Women in Japan

	Total	Male	Female
Very Interested	15.9	22.5	10.0
Somewhat Interested	47.7	49.0	46.5
Not Very Interested	31.1	24.0	37.4
Not At All Interested	5.3	4.4	6.1
Total	1339 (100%)	630 (100%)	709 (100%)

(World Values Survey Japan, 2000)

The Survey data suggests that in Japan, 56.5% of women report at least some interest in politics. The figure is 71.5% for men in Japan, the margin between the political interests of men and women is 15% which does not explain the vast difference between women and men representatives in formal politics. The interest level is lower among women in Turkey, around 31.8%, while the interest among men is 46.6%. This data from World Values Surveys support the findings of Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak (2003) that interest in politics is relatively lower in Turkey for both sexes. Levels of interest is low for *both* sexes and similar to the Japanese case, the 14.8% margin does not explain the vast difference between the ratios of male and female representatives in formal political institutions. Thus, with the guidance of these observations, I start my study by arguing that the low levels of interest in politics does not offer a sufficient answer to the question why formal political participation of women is low in both countries. Thus, I look at the construction and operation of formal political participation processes in both countries to examine how and where women can access formal politics, and how gendered exclusionary processes work within formal politics.

With regards to examining formal political participation processes, I seek answers of two main inquiries in this study. The first is whether there are any commonalities between formal political participation processes in Turkey and Japan that hinder women's access to

formal politics. For this purpose, I carry out a mini-case study of women's formal political participation on the national level in Turkey and Japan. It is a mini-case study because I compare and contrast the findings from the interviews I conducted with female parliamentarians in Turkey not with a wide review of literature on Japan. I examine the construction of public and private agencies/domains in Turkey, and examine the gendering of citizenship patterns and practicing of the governmentality which privileges male access to the public domain after the modernization periods in these two countries in order to assess their impact on women's formal political participation.

The second inquiry in the study is about the agencies female politicians in Turkey perform. By using the interviews I conducted with female parliamentarians in Turkey, I examine female parliamentarians in Turkey they define themselves as political agents, and how they interact with political systems and political actors. Analyzing their experiences and definitions, I explore the significance of resources such as education and employment, and observe how they construct their agencies through gendered processes of political participation.

My main argument in this study with regards to Turkey and Japan is that material and social differences between the two countries are offset by the construction and strong promotion of gendered citizenships in Turkey and Japan. I argue the gendered diversification of private and public domains has been an active interest of political elites from modernization periods of late 19th century, and both have pursued this diversification through centrality of family and women's role in the household ever since. The execution of modern governmentality in both countries has similarly established the "timelessness" of the family-nation, and defined the legitimate female citizenship as that prioritizes its duty in the

household. Disciplinary processes within systematization of education, labor-market regulation, and practices of national defense have promoted similar hegemonic masculinity and femininity in Turkey and Japan. These disciplinary processes consequently led to the diversification of citizenships on a gendered (along with ethnic and socioeconomic) basis, promoting a certain ideal of "political agent" who is male, and who directly participates in the national defense of the nation, either through the labor market or the military. Thus a rationale privileging male participation to politics has defined the exclusionary rules of formal political participation in both countries, isolating many forms of political agency by women while allowing a selected few to pass through.

With regards to my second inquiry on women parliamentarians in Turkey, I argue that the highly personalized nature of Turkish politics (meaning relative lack of standardized processes for candidacy, and party politics depending strongly on personal relationships) require women politicians to work much harder to familiarize themselves to the party authorities. The small groups of women who access formal politics are usually those who have proved themselves to the male political authorities by working hard in/for the party cadres long before candidacy, and those who exhaust familial networks to access formal politics. Related to their experiences in formal politics, they define education and employment as crucial for political participation for women, not necessarily in terms of material resources, but in terms of personal experience that carried the implication of differentiating them from other women.

Before initiating, it is necessary to note two aspects of the study. First is that I use the term "formal political participation" rather than "women's representation" throughout the study. The second is that focus of the study being limited to formal political participation,

participation to parliaments/assemblies, on the national level. Having explained the first before, I should explain why I limit my study to participation to parliaments, and more specifically, to national parliaments.

1.2 WHY NATIONAL FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?

With regards to formal political participation, numerous scholars argue overemphasis upon voting and other electoral activities leads to underestimation of women's political involvement in alternative modes of participation, such as organizational protest and grassroots community activity in which women have always been active (Welch, 1977; Schlozman et al., 1994). These arguments are also evident in Japan where women carry out significant amount of grassroots activity (LeBlanc, 1999). However I start my study with the presumption that formal political participation matters regardless of the prevalence of other modes of participation. Alternative modes of participation would be effectual for coming closer to an inclusive system of widespread public contestation (Dahl, 1971) or to a deliberative democracy (Young, 2002), but for those who want to take place in the national parliaments, gendered exclusionary processes within formal political participation are still critical. Furthermore, gendered deprivation of using the right of participation is a democratic impediment in nature. For the women who aspire to take part in national assemblies, it is still critical whether their chances of exclusion over success are higher.

There seems to be evidence signifying that exclusion of women from formal politics still matters. First of all, several studies show that in both countries there is an impetus for increasing the number of women in politics. Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak (2003) state that 80.8% of women (and 74.3% of men) in Turkey believe the number of women in politics in lower

than it should be while 33.8% of women stated that they would consider actively participating in politics if they believed "the political life was open to women" (Kalaycoğlu and Toprak, 2003:13). Although there is not a parallel study on Japan, Martin (2004) and LeBlanc (1999) argue that there is a general dissatisfaction among Japanese women regarding participation in politics, stating that women in Japan are frustrated with Japanese politics since they believe the barriers of political participation to be "gender specific" (Martin, 2004:4)[3]. Taking these findings into consideration, I initiate my study by arguing that access to formal politics as a means of political participation continues to carry importance, and examinations on the perceived gendered exclusions within participation processes are still critical.

I limit my study to participation to national formal politics because both countries are exceptions to the local-national divide (Bochel and Bochel, 2005), the ratio of women in local parliaments being lower than that in the national level. Although local politics are indeed very important, the lack of women in the relatively more accessible domain of local politics signify that there is an overall setback in the participation of women to formal politics in both countries. As Gupta (2006) suggests, there is an inherent bond between the construction of politics in the local and national domains, which constrain a treatment as if they are separate and "coherent spatial units" of their own (Gupta, 2006:220). There is a great amount of transfer of agencies, legitimacies, processes, operations, and meanings between the two levels. This complicates treating participation in one level as an entirely different process than the other, especially in countries such as Turkey and Japan where women's participation in the local domain follow the national trend rather than autonomously surpassing it. Hence I limit

[3] Political alienation is evident for both sexes in Japan (Richardson and Flanagan, 1984) but Martin (2004) argues that alienation is more distinctive among Japanese women because they perceive the barriers to participation to politics as gender specific.

my inquiry to women's formal participation within the national scale to examine women's formal political participation in these two countries.

1.3 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

There are five remaining chapters of the study. In the second chapter, I define the three main themes I use in the study, namely "gender", "state", and "patriarchy." I explain how I link them to each other throughout the study to examine the interplays between women and formal politics. I elaborate on "citizenship", "governmentality", and "discipline", explaining their significance within this interplay. In the second section of the chapter I lay out the frame of the study and explain the stages under which I compare Turkey and Japan. I place the relevant literature within the frame of the study, elaborating on gendered constructions of modernization and nation-states. I present how I approach the resources aspect of political participation in the study in light of the literature.

The third chapter lays out my research method and why I preferred to use these techniques. I explain how I chose the individuals with whom I conducted interviews for my research and what kinds of questions I asked. I clarify why I use World Values Surveys in several parts of the study, and which questions I examined.

The fourth and the fifth chapters constitute the two parts of a single analysis. In the third chapter, I start by examining the modernization periods of Turkish and Japanese nation-states to observe the construction of the political system and the construction hegemonic masculinity/femininity. After defining what significance the family being the basic unit of the society carries for diversification of private and public, I question whether Turkish and Japanese political elites have endorsed exclusionary practices in terms of political

participations of citizens. In the last section of the chapter, I examine the relationship between national defense and female sexuality, arguing the privileging of male citizenship has damaged the autonomy of female agency (and female sexuality) in both countries. Thus I try to offer a snapshot of the context where women in Turkey and Japan construct their agencies and participate in politics.

The fifth chapter takes off where the fourth chapter leaves, and the analysis continues with an examination on the construction of electoral and political party systems in Turkey and Japan. I look at how political systems operate on a highly personalized basis and what kinds of sources women exhaust to access formal politics in these countries. I question how they define and utilize educational and professional sources and whether such attributes cause women parliamentarians to differentiate between themselves and others. I finalize my study by examining what kinds of discourses and agencies women politicians in Turkey construct during our interviews to observe some of the experiences of women participating in formal politics.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

2.1 EXAMINING FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Examining formal political participation is not as easy as it seems from the first glance. The question why women's formal political participation is so low has numerous aspects, one needs to examine not only source inefficiencies and socioeconomic patterns, but also how political participation has been carried out historically and by whom in a certain context. It is necessary to explore how individuals might relate themselves to politics and why they position politics close or far from themselves. While institutional conditions such as electoral systems, sources, and employment/education patterns matter, they need to be placed in their historical contexts to understand their deeper effect than empty pockets at the time of election.

Consequentially, this study is an attempt at building a thicker analysis of formal political participation of women. To thicken the analysis, I look at the historical contexts through which identities, gendered hierarchies, definitions of state and politics come to being along with assessing the significance of institutional constraints. For that purpose I utilize multiple methods and resources, namely open-ended interviews I conducted with female Turkish parliamentarians, a wide review of literature on Japan, and World Value Surveys. The large-N quality of the World Value Surveys (and other survey studies carried out by several scholars/institutions) is enriching in the sense that they provide a bigger outlook in addition to the thirteen interviews I conducted for this study. By bringing these multiple layers with

varying scopes together, I aim to capture different aspects of formal political participation of women.

In this chapter, I first review the methods used in previous studies and relate them to my project. Then I explain the methods I utilized and how I organized them.

2.2 METHODOLOGY IN PREVIOUS STUDIES

Previous studies have examined different aspects of women's political participation using numerous approaches. None have compared Japan and Turkey and relatively few made a distinction between the local and national aspects of formal participation to politics. The case-specific studies accounted for how political behavior might be constructed and manifested among Turkish female politicians (Arat, 1989); political participation among female dwellers of slums in the Istanbul region (Wedel, 2001); grass-roots activity and local participation among Japanese housewives (LeBlanc, 1999); voting patterns of female Japanese electorate (Martin, 2004); constraints of Japanese female political participation (Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Maeda, 2005); how political activity is constructed among Japanese women (Pharr, 1981); how Japanese female candidates won lower house elections (Aiuchi, 2001); political interest and party support among women in post-war Japan (Patterson and Nishikawa, 2002). Within this selected literature; scholars used multiple methods according to the question at hand and they utilize both qualitative and quantitative methods in relation to how they approach their inquiries.

Scholars who utilize a qualitative method have opted for either interviews that were based on a number of open-ended questions or field studies. They all trace women's political agency by asking mostly different questions. One of the most referenced works in the

literature on Japan, the study of Susan Pharr (1981) on "political women" in Japan uses open-ended interviews with Japanese women in order to understand the stories behind their politicization. Her sample includes young women who are actively interested in politics or who work for political groups outside the state structure, but not female politicians. How and why they choose to involve themselves in politics in different degrees is the main question Pharr examines throughout her interviews.

Yeşim Arat (1989) also begins with a similar question, but her focus is solely on parliamentarians. In the study Arat (1989) conducts interviews with eighteen female parliamentarians, ten male parliamentarians and twelve representatives from local parliaments in order to provide a complete picture of how political participation is gendered in different levels. Arat's (1989) research offers the most comprehensive glance to female formal political participation because she traces a wide set of issues, from political socialization (in the family) to electoral attitude with regards to female candidates. Thus the aspects she examines vary from familial background and employment to election campaigns.

In her small-N study, Masako Aiuchi (2001) examines the experience of three women who had run as challengers to the powerful male candidates for the Lower House elections in different districts. She conducted interviews with these female candidates to examine whether there were any common patterns for success among these cases.

Field studies on political participation of women are relatively limited in both Japan and Turkey. Reporting on her data from a longitudinal field study in two slum neighborhoods in Istanbul, Heidi Wedel (2001) examines how women in these neighborhoods experience, define and participate in politics. Wedel (2001) conducts both informal interviews and utilizes a "participatory-observatory method" (2001: 60) in order to familiarize herself with her the

social practices and particular meanings within the communities. Robin LeBlanc (1999) utilizes the same approach in her again much-referenced work on grass-roots political activity of Japanese housewives. LeBlanc (1999) spends eighteen months in a Tokyo neighborhood, meeting with local housewives and reporting on her informal meetings with them in different occasions.

Numerous other studies used different survey data in order to make inferences about women's political preferences. Most of these studies look at the electoral behavior and political opinions reported by women (and sometimes, men). While examining the voting patterns of the female Japanese electorate, Martin (2004) utilizes both Japanese Political Consciousness and Behavior (JABISS) Dataset and 1993-1996 Japan Election Study II (JES2) Dataset in order to understand the political positioning of Japanese female electorate. Patterson and Nishikawa (2002) account for women independents while working on opinion poll data. These studies follow a more statistical approach to their questions at hand, usually examining voting patterns rather than tracing the process of either the construction or manifestation of political behavior.

Each of these studies was influential on my study not only in terms of their content, but with regards to their approaches. Although the time and financial constraints of this study did not allow me to conduct a field study[4], the studies by Pharr (1981) and Arat (1989) on women's political participation have been especially guiding for this study through their use of open-ended interviews. The questions they posed to their participants have been guiding for

[4] A field study would be very enlightening in order to examine the formal participation periods of women if the study was to be carried out in a longer period of time. It could enable me to observe how female politicians encounter politics and other political actors (for example during their candidacy) and would allow me to observe how they do politics. On a downside, the time necessary to select the female candidates whose experiences will be reported on, obtaining approval and following them during election campaigns would most probably be longer than a period of ten months. I try to incorporate some reflections on the attributes of the spaces that I conducted my interviews, believing it might give the reader a (albeit very limited) snapshot. A field study nevertheless remains as a useful and relatively unpracticed approach in future studies on this question.

this study and unless very necessary, I tried not to ask the same questions as Arat (1989) to the respondents because her study was already very detailed and explanatory on political socialization, educational (and socioeconomic) background, family lives and interaction with voters that female (and male) politicians went through. Thus, although I had some similar questions on family life, political socialization and interaction with voters, I tried to learn about how my respondents defined their agencies and their experiences in the formal political domain to provide another outlook to women's formal political participation in Turkey.

Although all of these studies were very enlightening for me in terms of content and methodology, there were no comparative studies on women's formal political participation on either Japan or Turkey. But carrying out a comparative study necessitated me to search for multiple tools in order to collect my data.

2.3 HOW TO RELATE: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY AT HAND

Although I benefit from many of these studies at one point throughout my analysis, two attributes of this study required me to develop my own set of tools to tackle the question I had at hand. The first attribute it purely methodological while the second is more a preference of approach with regards to its fit to the question. First, in purely methodological sense, I thought in a small-N comparative study I could carry a thick analysis of my question, something I could do better with a qualitative approach. While quantitative studies provide valuable information on electorate behavior and political tendencies and surveys prove to be especially useful to observe the general trends in a group of people, female political participation in Turkey and Japan has been so low that the question inevitably requires a vertical look rather than a large-N approach.

The second, and more significant, reason why I use a mainly qualitative approach is because my goal was to observe how women politicians defined the different aspects of formal political participation. Although I had help from a wide review of the literature to lay out the contextual conditions that hinder women's political agency, it would enhance my analysis to observe how women politicians themselves accounted for these conditions. Political participation entails the definition of politics by individuals as well as how it is practiced in the greater context. Participants define their political identities in diverse terms, their struggles are more complicated than the lack of sources and the discourses they adopt are also representative of their positions in the political domain. The data that would provide me the outlets for such a thick analysis could be best obtained through a qualitative approach. Thus I utilized open-ended interviews as my primary technique and bolster it by quantitative data when necessary.

A third reason for choosing multiple techniques was simply because I did not always have the same type and amount of data with regards to both countries. Thus I examine the Turkish case relatively more thoroughly and then observe how it relates to a Japanese example as a mini-case. To serve this purpose, I utilized several types of sources which were consistent with my question. The reflections from my interviews with female representatives in Turkey were mostly compared with a comprehensive literature review on Japan. When necessary, I bolstered or provided new evidence from the World Value Survey data for both countries.

2.3.1 DIGGING DEEP: INTERVIEWS WITH FEMALE PARLIAMENTARIANS

Contextual conditions affect political mobilization but political participation is also a personal act. Although candidacy patterns and the social conduct of political relationships in a country

can overall have several characteristics, the process of formal political participation is a personal experience. As Wedel (2001: 63) argues in her study, I chose to conduct interviews for they would provide me the chance to observe "the biographical factors that enable or disable political participation" by making the interviewees construct the personal experiences they have had during [the period of political participation]. Thus, it was incremental for me to listen to the stories of women who became representatives and learn about those who couldn't. This is why I chose to conduct interviews with female parliamentarians, (former) members of women's branches and party members.

2.3.2 "WHO" OF THE STUDY: SELECTING FEMALE PARLIAMENTARIANS

I contacted several parliamentarians to interview them after two considerations. At first I thought it would be enlightening to document the experiences of female parliamentarians who appeared in Turkish politics recently. Arat (1989) had interviewed women with academic and political backgrounds, and had argued that these groups of women were the selected elites. Thus I wanted to examine whether the women who newly joined political cadres from different parts of the country had different stories, specifically women coming from numerous Anatolian cities and women with less professional experience if such cases existed.

But the sample pool was insufficient in terms of its representation of various ranges of socioeconomic backgrounds. There has been a rise in the number of women after the 2007 election but the current female representatives in the Turkish National Assembly are coming from similar backgrounds to those who have previously served in the Assembly. Although many of them come from cities other than Istanbul and Ankara (metropolitans that have proved to be more open to female candidates through decades) and coming from numerous

other Anatolian cities (some that had not had female representatives ever or had only once), they all have had a certain professional experience and college degrees. The impression from the interviews was that most of them were either successful professionals who were relatively known in their communities or coming from prominent families of Anatolia. Currently, there are several female representatives in the Assembly who are under the age of 40-45 which is also a relatively rare occurrence. But their professional and educational backgrounds still make them an elite group of women. Thus my first selection process was not effectual in the sense that the sample pool was rather homogeneous.

The second selection process then became a matter of selecting respondents from the widest representation of cities and parties, respective to their ratios in the Parliament. Currently only twenty-five of eighty-one cities in Turkey have female representatives. Only three of these twenty-five cities have four or less seats in the parliament, meaning women have been elected from larger cities with a relatively larger amount of seats in the parliament. (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir constitute 20 of 50 seats all by themselves.) Thus I contacted female representatives from all parties in the Parliament and those who were coming from twelve different cities.

I conducted interviews with a total of 13 women between February 2008 and April 2008 in Istanbul and Ankara. All of the interviewees were serving representatives in the Turkish National Assembly and the other three were not. My sample for the 13 national representatives was drawn in order to include at least one woman politician from all sides of the political spectrum in Turkey. I contacted right, center-right, center-left and left parties, namely Justice and Development Party (JDP) from center-right of the spectrum which had the largest number of female representatives in the parliament at that time, Republican People's

Party (RPP) and Democratic Left Party (DLP) from center-left, Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) from right and Freedom and Solidarity Party (FSP) from left side of the spectrum as well as the Democratic Society Party (DSP). All except Freedom and Solidarity Party had at least one female representative in the parliament at the time of my interviews.

All of the women interviewed were college graduates and professionals, only two out of fifty female representatives do not have a college degree in the Turkish parliament[5]. Among my interviewees there were lawyers, architects, academicians, businesswomen and all were practicing their profession prior to candidacy. Their ages varied, but they were within the 30-60 age category, women in their mid-thirties being the largest group. Although they all had professional backgrounds, they were coming from different parts of the country, but from relatively bigger and more prosperous cities nevertheless. This was also partly because female representatives are coming from bigger cities in Turkey which is a common trend to that of Japan (Bochel and Bochel, 2005).

The regions respondents were coming from varied. While one came from Black Sea region, one came from South Anatolia, one from South East region (who had lost in the 2007 elections), three were from the Aegean while two were from Central Anatolia and the six representatives were elected from (different cities in) Marmara region. I did not purposely select cities, but contacted representatives from as many different cities as possible. But since securing appointment with parliamentarians was a rare occasion, I could conduct interviews those who rather "gave in" to my continuous requests for interviews.

The careers of the respondents in formal politics varied as well. One of them had lost in the 2007 elections; eight of them were serving their first terms in the Assembly (from different

[5] Both of these representatives are from the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Although I contacted these individuals to conduct interview with them, for the reasons that will be elaborated upon later, I could not succeed in securing interviews.

parties) and the remaining four were serving their second or third. Four had previous experience in local assemblies while the other did not. Six of them had previously worked in the Women's Branches of their party (this was the trend in one party only) previous to their elections and three of them were at the time members of their Party Boards. Thus their experiences in their parties and in politics varied while the trend of incorporation to the party lists after working for the Women's Branches was an observable trend for one party.

I contacted every potential respondent by phone at first. After I introduced myself to the secretaries of the representatives, I sent a one page information note regarding my study and what type of questions I asked. Since the functioning of the Assembly did not enable for setting up appointments even the week before, I was usually asked to call two days before the interview to ask for a slot. Cancellation of appointments in the last minute was not an uncommon thing, but once I entered the offices of the representatives, the task became fairly easier.

2.3.3 TWO RESERVATIONS OF THE INTERVIEWS IN THE STUDY

The interviews I conducted for this study is useful for several reasons. First, although women's formal political participation in Turkey has been examined before, the interviews I conducted are the latest in terms of presenting a snapshot to the experiences of female parliamentarians after the steep increase in the amount of female parliamentarians after the 2007 elections. Furthermore, the sample I worked with is representative of a good range of parties, including right, centre-right, centre-left and left parties. In the sample, there are members of party administrations, women's branches, local parliaments and newcomers, with provide a wider variety of experiences in terms of prior professional and political experiences. In these aspects,

I believe my sample is a good first-attempt to update the data on women's formal political participation in Turkey.

The data I obtained from the interviews is worthy of examination within the Turkish context, but it should also be handled with two reservations in mind. First of all, due to the time and financial constraints of a Masters thesis, I did not have the option to conduct similar interviews in Japan. This unquestionably creates a asymmetry with regards to abundance of data between the two cases, yet a comprehensive review of the literature of women's political participation in Japan has been helpful to fill some of the gaps. There are numerous studies that examine the representation patterns of women in Japan (see Tomoaki, 1993; Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Maeda, 2005; Takeda, 2006; Eto, 2007) and examine limited case studies (Aiuchi, 2001). Thus, this study compares and contrasts the findings of these studies, but gives a relatively more comprehensive account of the Turkish case.

The second reservation that should be kept in mind while evaluating the findings is that the lack of experiences of Kurdish female parliamentarians in the Turkish political domain. Although I have contacted every party and those which are not currently represented in the National Assembly, I could not secure an interview until the time of the writing of this study[6]. At the time of my interviews, many of the female members of DSP were facing charges in relation to their remarks on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Former affiliations, including marriages of female parliamentarians of DSP have become a nearly commonplace issue of contention in Turkey after their entrance to the Assembly which inevitably has put women

[6] For two months I contacted the office of each parliamentarian twice and contacted at least three members of each party in the Assembly. Since I had succeeded in conducting interviews with four out of the five parties in the Assembly except for Democratic Society Party (DSP), I contacted eight out of the eight female parliamentarians of the Party. Four out of eight rejected my appointment two requests reasoning a tight schedule in two different time-spans, three out of eight did not return my numerous requests through telephone and fax while the remaining member did not show up for her appointment.

who openly endorse a political stance on their ethnic identity in a very fragile position. Thus, it is more or less understandable in the sense that I was specifically inquiring to document their own individual politicization and participation processes as an unknown outsider.

Another reason that restricted access to the female members of DSP was the relatively different composition of their schedules. As far as the framing of media of the activities of the female members of DSP goes, their schedules were really busy. Most of them actually lived in their city of representation and made visits to these cities every week. These visits were not solely a matter of personal preference on the accounts of the representatives, but it was also shaped by the different constitution of their relationship with their voters. One of my observations was that representatives who appointed themselves to be "base politicians", meaning forming a closer network of communication between their community and themselves, voicing the concerns of their cities more than more general issues of debate, were the ones born and raised in their constituencies. It required for representatives to visit and actively work in their constituencies more than the others. This was especially the case for all of the female members of DSP. It has been much harder to secure appointments with parliamentarians that do not live in either big cities or those who were representing the cities that they were born and raised in. Most of my other interviewees were either coming from big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara which made them more accessible for my research. The case was somewhat different in the case of DSP members since they actually had a close connection with the community of their city and the type of "base politics" they preferred to adopt. Thus, one of the very frequent answers I got was that they were in their constituencies, and once they were in Ankara, their schedules were very tight.

All in all, this lack of accounting for the experiences of female representatives openly acknowledging a bond between their political identity and their ethnic background creates a limitation for the study. Thus, it can be considered women who are represented in the Turkish case in this study are those women who do not have a conflict with the "Turkishness" or ethnic Turkish identity that the Republican ideology historically promoted. In other words, these are the women who define themselves as ethnically Turkish. The Republican ideology was an issue of contestation on numerous occasions, especially during debates with representatives from JDP, yet these contestations were more of a matter of socio-economic hegemony or lack of religious freedom.

2.3.4 CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEWS

The duration and location of interviews changed from interview to interview. I visited the National Assembly in Ankara six times, different party headquarters and once the house of one representative. The appointments were rather hard to secure, it entailed long hours of waiting in hallways and sometimes approaching the representatives on their way. But once they either met me personally in the hallways or read the information notes that I had sent them by fax earlier, nearly all of the female representatives were very receptive towards my questions. Apart for one instance, none refused to comment on any of my questions, yet some questions such as those regarding party leadership and their initial contact with the party were usually less specific in nature. Thus some of the representatives were relatively more prone to "circumvent" such questions. In one sole instance this displeasure was brought up and I was asked to take out my questions regarding their personal aspirations to become a party leader. This was an interesting instance since the person I was interviewing was one of the few people

who was granted candidacy with a primary election rather than appointment. Her story was significant for she had possibly dealt with the base group of the party in order to come first at the primary election, a rare occurrence in the case of a female candidate, yet she did not want to comment on this either.

Although I asked the same set of questions each time, the time the respondent had available for the interview and the duration of their answers varied. The shortest interview lasted around six minutes and the longest one hour and fifty-seven minutes; but most varied between twenty to forty minutes. Yet the duration of the interviews were not always representative of its content because an interview of 9 minutes could provide me more answers than one of thirty-seven minutes. One observation that could be drawn from the interviews is that the more women are experienced in formal politics, the more they seem to adopt a more "political" manner of engaging in dialogue with others. The more they were professional in active politics, the more creative they could be in vagueness of their answers. The most upfront answers came from the individuals who were serving their first terms in the Assembly. In one instance the attribute of "saying what I have in mind honestly" became a topic of discussion where one new representative mentioned to be her biggest disadvantage in politics. However, three individuals from JDP and RPP who had prior work on gender studies in separate parties were especially willing to provide me with enough time to answer all of my questions. Although at times the answers were meshed in general comments about the overall political climate in Turkey rather than their personal experiences, they all made note that their stories were important to document for they acknowledged themselves to be role models for other women aspiring to participate in formal politics.

2.3.5 DEFINING THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The questions in every interview were derivative of a core set of issues that I wished to observe. For each interviewee, I did a background research in order to tailor questions for the individual and in order not to burden the respondent with the task of introducing her background as well as to save time. The interviews were open-ended which enabled me to pose new questions if a remark was notable. If I had read a statement of particular importance in a newspaper or the individual had prior political experience in the local domain, I would make sure that I included those issues in the discussion. One common set of questions that I would work on is included in the Annex.

In terms of the answers I needed, it was important for me to observe how they defined themselves and their political experiences as well as to understand the tools they utilized to gain access to formal politics. Since, unlike Japan, independent candidacy was a very rare occurrence for women in Turkey, it was also crucial to try to map out their position within their political parties. In order to account for and place women's access to representation, I asked questions around eight themes. First was regarding the place of politics in the lives of the respondents prior to engaging in representation, their political socialization processes. Second, whether the role of educational and especially professional networks were effective in facilitating access to political actors, such as political parties. Third was whether they faced problems related to inadequate sourcing and how they managed to overcome these. The fourth was how they experienced and accounted for being a woman in formal politics and the fifth was about how they contacted, met, more generally attained access to political groups, mainly political parties. As a sixth point, I tried to understand how they were positioned within political parties and their interactions with other political actors. Following, I asked whether

they distinguished between formal and informal formulation of politics, namely social conduct of politics through in-party lobbies, late night dinners, etc. And finally, I ended my interviews by asking how they evaluated themselves as individual political actors.

As it is in Japan, Turkish politics operates through a highly personal manner rather than having a more bureaucratic formulation that allows dispensed decision making. Gaining access to politics through personal relations is highly likely which encourages the participants to invest heavily in forming and maintaining social relations. When the central authorities are strong and safety nets that would secure one from being arbitrarily disposable do not exist, this means the position of individuals is very fragile. Thus is may not be surprising that nearly all of the respondents gave relatively more vague answers when the dialogue dwelled on political parties. It is understandable that being a party member requires loyalty, but from all the questions in the interview, the questions pertaining to political parties were the easiest to dismiss or circumvent.

2.3.6 STUDY'S HELPER: WORLD VALUES SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

I use World Value Surveys to a small extent in the study as a secondary source of data. World Values Surveys are a rich source of survey data for social scientists worldwide, providing researchers cross-country data on many social phenomenon, including political and social values, perceptions on life, family, education, environment, and offering data on people's views on many different issues such as immigration, marriage, and gender roles. There have been four waves of surveys since 1981, numerous respectable scholars participating in the collection of survey data in over eighty societies (WVS, 2008).

I initially chose to utilize World Values Survey data because it would provide me information on importance of politics in the lives of the respondents, interest in politics, political actions including signing petitions, joining boycotts, attending demonstrations, unofficial strikes, confidence rates on the parliament, the government and political parties, and women's membership in local/national political groups as well as traits that were defined as "necessary for a woman." The opportunity to compare data for Turkey and Japan conducted by using same questionnaires would be a great advantage. Second, the number of surveys is very well beyond of my reach. There have been 1681 female respondents to the Survey in Turkey and 729 female respondents in Japan, giving me a wide sample to work with. As a last advantage, the Surveys offered me an opportunity to include male respondents if a broader examination became necessary.

But after analyzing the data, I came across the fact that the questionnaires utilized in Japan and Turkey differed, and the different questions were some of the most critical for my comparison. The Japanese questionnaire has left out the questions on belonging to local political actions, political parties, unpaid work for political parties or groups, active/inactive membership of political parties, and the questions regarding "necessary traits in a woman"[7]. This limited the use of World Values Surveys in the study to a significant extent, in the sense that these could be very useful for comparison of Turkey and Japan.

I analyzed the rest of the raw data through the statistical software, SPSS Version 15.0; using answers gathered in Japan in 2000 wave and in the 2001 wave in Turkey. The questions that I used are chosen out of those who are related to the study from the Integrated Questionnaire of World Value Surveys (WVS, 2007), mainly questions on interest in politics

[7] I contacted the group the World Values Survey web-site has shown as the investigators for Japanese surveys to ask why such questions were left out from the Japanese questionnaires. But at the time of writing of this study, I haven't recevied any reply from either of the individuals I had contacted by e-mail.

(among men and women), and confidence rates in political institutions (for men and women) to have a sense of people's stances on formal political institutions overall.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONTENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Many scholars have previously searched for similarities between Japan and Turkey (see for comparative studies on Turkey and Japan, Bellah, 1958; Ward and Rustow, 1964, Turgut, 1984; Güvenç, 2002; Esenbel, 1999). But regardless of numerous enlightening studies and strikingly diverse conditions of these two countries today, women's formal political representation has been the one topic that escaped a comparative inquiry. Although industrialization and numerous other aspects of "modernization" have made great impact on the lives of women from both countries, their ongoing isolation from formal politics can at the same time signal a continuing confinement of women's political agency. Thus, in this study I aim to uncover on what common grounds women in Japan and Turkey confront and experience obstacles in formal political participation. To examine this question, I formulate a diagram (Figure 1) and employ the relevant literature in subsequent levels of analysis. Through this diagram I link multiple facets of formal political participation and compare the Turkish case with the Japanese case under these sub-titles.

In this chapter, first I explain the content of the three central terms of the study and how I link them, "gender", "state", and "patriarchy". Later on in the section, I lay upon some of the problematic intersections of "gender" with "state" relevant to this study. In the second part of the chapter, I elaborate on how I organized the study around Figure 3.1 and the bases of comparison between Japan and Turkey.

"Gender" is the social organization of sex difference (Caraway, 2004) which shapes and alters social (including political) processes women take part in. Related to my multilevel analysis of formal political participation, I try to assess how gendered social processes produce, reproduce, assist or hinder women's formal participation in interconnected but multiple domains such as family, citizenship, political systems. State is interconnected to effects of gender for it is the main organizer of power relationships (Connell, 1990). Thus formal political participation needs to examine the interplays between individual women and state, power relationships and the greater context which gives these interplays a gendered nature. I propose that it is important to examine how the path of formal political participation may be altered through women's historical inclusions to the public sphere and through their positions in gendered power asymmetries in multiple domains.

Formal political participation is a consequence of the gendered processes in multiple domains because it is affected by numerous conditions. Traditional practice and actors of politics in a context become as significant as the insufficiency of material sources for women's formal political participation. How hegemonic femininity and masculinity have been constructed historically in a specific context is as critical as for accessing politics as the effect of educational and employment patterns of women. Although all of these multiple domains are interconnected, I analyze them one by one in the second part of this chapter around Figure 3.1. These domains are also the aspects that Turkish case will be compared with the Japanese context in the following chapter.

3.2 THE LEGO PIECES: CENTRAL THEMES OF THE STUDY

In this section, I define how I use "gender", "state", and "patriarchy" in the study. I start by elaborating on these themes, then in the second part of the section I look at some of the critical tensions among the intersections of these phenomena relevant to this study.

3.2.1 PROCESSING "GENDER"

Gender is the social organization of sex difference (Caraway, 2004). Very simply, it is the cause of differences of experience when men and women go through the same processes. Gender as a categorization of femininity and masculinity creates social differences of experiencing the world between men and women, a social difference that is based upon a dual categorization of biological traits. Thus the difference between men and women is not "a 'real' social difference between men and women, but [it is a] mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic positions or their membership in ethnic and racial collectivities" (Yuval Davis, 1997:9). Taken as such, gender is a process-altering (or process-differentiating) condition that has creative and transformative character.

But gender as a process-altering difference does not stand alone. It is intersectional (Hill Collins, 1998) in the sense that it operates with other conditions and only make sense when the other attributes of the individual are also taken into consideration. The differentiating effect of gender changes in relation to other attributes of the individual, thus differentiating the experiences of individual woman in addition to differentiating the experiences of individual women and men. Experiences between men and women may differ, yet the differences of a working-class woman might resemble the experiences of a working-class man more than the

experiences of an upper-class woman. Socioeconomic background, ethnic identity, race and even space alter the impact of gender. An upper-class woman in Scandinavia may experience "womanhood" much differently than an upper-class woman in Turkey, nearly making the intersectionality of gender similar to a chemical experience in which the quantity and addition of different materials result in compounds in different colors. In the end, it becomes impossible to talk about a single "woman" or "woman's experience" due to the multiplicity of positions, experiences and agencies. "Women" cease to be treated as a monolithic categorization due to the inexistence of universally or nationally identified, shared and homogeneous practices or preferences between women (Harding, 1986).

Intersectionality of gender is significant also because it differentiates how individual women manage to overcome power inequalities as well. The preference and limitation of tools for struggle is important because formal political participation becomes struggle for women in contexts where the political system privileges male authority over female agency. How women can overcome their exclusion differs with regards to their individual traits – some can exhaust traditional means such as utilizing familial connections, some can compensate for their lack of traditional means by making their expertise indispensable for political elites, some can found their support through advocacy in their constituencies while some struggle and lose. Regardless of the outcome, this is a dynamic process in which the devices individual women can utilize differ due to being women of different attributes.

Gender is a personal phenomenon affecting individuals, but at the same time it is a collective phenomenon (Connell, 1990) in the sense that relatively general institutionalizations (such as state, ethnicity, race, economy, or military) can also bend, alter, terminate or bolster the effects of gender as well. State as (not the only but) the main institutionalization of power

(Connell, 1990) creates gendered consequences through its regulations most of the time, through its dispositions such as social security programs, conscription laws or its hegemonic femininity/masculinity. Categorizations of institutionalized communities (such as nations, armies, laborers) make gender a collective phenomenon in the sense that the differences they will experience individually is defined collectively. While men will join the army, women will stay out. While men will be included in social security programs, their wives will benefit from social security through their husbands. While women will be the carriers of the essences of nations, men will be the agents of modernization (Chatterjee, 1993). While individual experience of gender will vary from individual to individual because of the intersectional operation of gender, it may also carry a collective attribute in its creation. When it is a matter of shared inclusion/exclusion/categorization, gender carries a collective quality as much as it is an individualistic in experience (Connell, 1990).

If gendered processes can also be a result of operations on collectivity, then gender has an inherent bond with those institutionalizations of power that may produce gendered outcomes. State as the main bearer of collective regulations becomes a site of gendered consequences which is also the case for formal political participation. How gender is operationalized through state practices and discourses is critical in determining categorizations and exclusions of individuals which I look at in the next section.

3.2.2 GENDERING "THE STATE"

Feminism has no widely agreed theory of the state (MacKinnon, 1983; Connell, 1990) but scholars have continuously examined how gender is related to the state practices, institutions and discourses (see Connell, 1990; Kenney, 1996; Randall, 1998; Waylen, 1998; Brown,

2006). In this study, I link the definitions of Connell (1990) and Brown (2006) to the analysis of Foucault (1995) on "discipline". In other words, I argue in this study that the state is three things: First, it is a combination of multiple forms (Brown, 2006). Second, it is the main disciplinary authority, ranking individuals under hierarchies in order to utilize them for a "rational" purpose, such as economic prosperity, security or procreation (Foucault, 1995). Third, it is the main organizer of power relations (Connell, 1990).

When something is this widespread and diffused, imagining what it looks like becomes difficult. What IS the state that has an inherent stake in many of gendered processes? Here I use the explanation of Brown (2006: 191) that, the state is "not a thing, system or subject, but a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules and practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another". The state I narrate in the study has multiple forms and multiple powers. The eminence of the "state" as the central authority and the eminence of its rationality is a historical and dynamic process, reproducing and changing itself through history in relation to the needs of the times. The state is dynamic in the sense that its duties, discourses, operations as well as its institutions may change in time.

In the time-span of this study, from early modernization periods of Japan and Turkey, to current times, the authority of state was critical for several aspects related to gendered formulation of formal political participation. First, state regulations define how individuals can participate in formal politics. Establishment of parliament, elections, constituencies, representation terms are all bounded with regulations of the state. Second, as Connell (1990) argues, state regulations define the gendered division of labor within its institutions and in the wider community through its operation, discourses and practices pertinent to hegemonic

masculinity and femininity. Its rationality categorizes male and female individuals, defining their contribution to the nation. State regulations define who can be a bureaucrat, a mother, a soldier, a caregiver, a politician and it promotes who should do what. Those who are feminine (very crudely, having female body parts) should ensure the continuity of the nation while the masculine should provide security and, in the unofficial post-colonial cases of Japan and Turkey, achieve material modernization, industrialization and economic progress (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Chatterjee, 1993). The division of labor of feminine and masculine citizens constitute the center around every other activity is placed – one should not engage in activities that may wander them away from their primary duties in the nation. Through promotion of hegemonic masculinity and femininity by the state, categories of gender relations are generated (Connell, 1990). Thus, where state operates becomes the main domain where many gendered processes emanate.

Third, and maybe most fundamentally, through the identifications, practices and discourses of the state, "citizens" out of masses are created. It is the center of continuous nation-making, in the sense that it is the central authority for defining what it means to be a Turkish/Japanese woman/man, and which groups of people are aliens. It defines the boundaries of citizenship, defines legitimate and forbidden practices of citizenship by disciplinary processes, by punishment of the wrong conduct as well as the gratification of the right (Foucault, 1995). It molds its equal and functionally interchangeable citizens (Gellner, 1983) to utilize them for several purposes. Citizens benefit from the economic and political perks of being citizens, but at the same time this identification brings gendered roles and responsibilities as male/female citizens. All in all, the state becomes a site for creation as much

as regulation, diversification and generation of new categories of gendered experiences of citizenships and nationalities.

But why do state institutions and practices engage in such categorizing activity? In the modern nation-state systems where economic and social progress is more valuable than territorial gains, the governing principle of statehood becomes the effective use of resources, things and people as Foucault (1991) argues. The need for progress (bringing power, security and prosperity) requires good use of all kinds of sources – including things and people. The proper exploitation of sources is such rationality, the governing principle of modern statehood, the "governmentality" of modern states (Foucault, 1991). The rational principle of government is essential for the "prosperity of the state and the nation", meaning their continuation in the future.

Gender has a critical function within governmentality. The effective use of sources includes people, and one of the most important duties of people as any other source is to create other sources. Within this utilitarian logic, diversification of women and men on the basis of their biological potential for procreation is crucial. If women can bear children, their primary contribution is creating the future nations. Sexual encounters other than heterosexuality will not be handy in reproducing the future generations. Consequently the modern state regulations strictly define legitimate and illegitimate (and lawful/unlawful) sexualities, banning homosexuality in the early periods of modern nation-building (Taga, 2003). In a sense, sexuality and its proper practice becomes a matter of governmentality through adoption of modernity. Rationality of government makes creation and promotion of hegemonic masculinity and femininity crucial to impel each male/female citizen adopt their diverse practices of being useful for the nation as good citizens.

Consequentially, such disposition of individuals as "resources" within modern governmentality thus requires promotion of certain different feminine and masculine "duties" in the nation. Here, the term "hegemonic masculinity/femininity" I use throughout the study becomes relevant. "Hegemonic masculinity" or "hegemonic femininity" in this sense refers to a set of masculine and feminine roles which create prototypes of regular and legitimate masculine or feminine individuals. These prototypes are historical in nature, changing and reproducing in response to the needs of the times as well as being created and reproduced through constant power struggles between groups and individuals. In other words, hegemonic masculinity (or femininity) is "a particular variety of masculinity [or femininity] to which others – among them young and effeminate as well as homosexual men- are subordinated" (Hearn, 2004:57). Such processes of gendered categorization of individuals also create "tacit and covert relations of power" (Butler, 2000:14), not only between those of the opposite sex but also between those of the same sex who conform into these prototypes and those who do not. Through differentiation of citizens in relation to their biological traits makes it possible to govern procreation, promote or control reproduction as well as to regulate, legalize or illegalize certain types of sexualities in the modern nation. These prototypes are "hegemonic" not only because these gender prototypes permeate into every regulation and discourse of the state institutions, gendering every policy pertaining to family and employment, to social security and education and found the base of a disciplinary practice on the subjects of the state, but also because by their normalization through policies, media, discourses and practices they also create consent (Hearn, 2004). Jurisprudence, systematization of security, education and formulation of social security along with other tools give citizens a sense of their positions towards the state and towards each other and create an "everyday understanding of social

relations" (Butler, 2000:13). Thus, individuals define themselves and make their decisions by going through such gendered disciplinary processes[8].

Individuals also acquire the attributes to become citizens through such disciplinary processes. The way "citizenship" is used in the study embraces more than the legal regulations of citizenship, widening its meaning to the positioning of individuals with regards to the state. It comes to existence through the interplay of what the rationality state and execution of governing needs its citizens to be and how individuals operate within/against these ideals. Thus the consequences of citizenship are less about the juridical content of citizenship and more about what Butenschon (2000) names "politics of citizenship". It is defined, embraced and practiced through one's incorporation to the disciplinary processes that make up the state.

How citizenship is defined and practiced is also a gendered process which makes it critical to observe the intersection of "citizenship" with gender in a specific context. (see Yuval Davis and Anthias, 1989; Yuval Davis, 1997; Kandiyoti, 1989; Connell, 1990). For example, men have become citizens through the practice of serving in the army in Turkey (Altınay, 2004) while women in Turkey are excluded from this practice. Similarly, while men carry out the duty of citizenship through incorporation to white-collar labor force in Japan (Mackie, 2002), women are mostly excluded from such jobs because of the formulation of the white-collar employment in Japan, due to the work conditions being extremely hard to manage with women's duties in the household. What men and women need to undertake to be good citizens differ and such difference also distinguishes between male and female citizenships,

[8] As Hearn (2004) and Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argue, the content of hegemonic masculinity (and femininity) can change over time. These are very dynamic concepts in the sense that they come with their certain set of conflicts, conflicts with those who do not conform to these prototypes, who wish not to conform to these prototypes, those participate and those react against them. This is why they are also open for change, although it might require time and power to alter these prototypes. Thus, although they might be very prevalent and powerful, the hegemony of such prototypes would not be homogeneous or monolithic processes.

and sometimes, in a hierarchical fashion (Altınay, 2004). In this sense, citizenship becomes an instrument of power distribution more than a set of legal rights and requirements (Butchenson, 2000).

Another significant attribute of citizenship in relation to gender is its dynamism. Similar (and intrinsically related) to the state, citizenship is a historical institution. Its meaning and practice of citizenship may change over time and those external to citizenship may become internal through time. The first example for this definition would probably be suffrage, but incorporation to citizenship may also happen in a subtler, but more profound way as well. While women may be enfranchised, this might not always result in equality of citizenship in the ideological sense – men as warriors, politicians, judges and workers still constitute the "primary citizens" of the state (Altınay, 2004). But being a fluid institution, the hierarchy of citizenship may as well change over time, and encompass new identities. Altering gendered processes through activism, participation and legislation, it is possible to create room for new belongings. This historical potential makes citizenship a fluid concept, "a movable metaphor of 'belonging' and 'inclusion' that is deployed at different times for various purposes" (Carver, 1998:16) along a gendered categorization and a gendered bundle of practices.

One last aspect of the relationship of gender with the state is its duality. While the state regulations and institutions create and reproduce gendered processes, gendered processes have an impact on the constitution of the state along with state practices and discourses in return. It is an interaction that has transformative power for both sides, gendered processes carrying the potential for alteration of the regulatory practices and discourses which constitute the state. This progressive capacity of gendered processes is one of the reasons why low formal

participation of women matter. Reactive gendered processes may carry the potential for change in power asymmetries and within the interplay between women and state. Such instances materialize the complex interaction between the state and women that can neither be described as "top-down" nor as a "bottom-up" process (Randall, 1998).

3.2.3 PATRIARCHY AS RATIONALE?

Patriarchy in this study refers to "as the privileging of male and elder rights and the use of kinship structures, morality, and idioms to legitimate male and elder privilege (Joseph, 2002:174). The relevance of patriarchy with gender seems clear, patriarchy as legitimization of male and elder authority help lay the foundation for gendered power inequalities. Certainly, patriarchy is not a key to all problems with gendered inequalities; other individual/collective conditions complicate the simple operation of the duality between masculinity and femininity. The specific type of masculinity in the patriarchal context is as hegemonic to other kinds of masculinities as much as it is subordinating in terms of femininity. Furthermore, when socioeconomic, ethnic or racial attributes fare more significant within a specific context, the effect of patriarchy (and masculinity) may diminish, resulting in the subordination of groups of men to groups of women. When patriarchy consists of the privileging of elder rights, it also means subordination of young individuals regardless of sex to the elderly, resulting in a hierarchy where young women constitute the lowest end of the triangle.

With the reservation above in mind, I argue in this study that patriarchy is nevertheless very prevalent in low formal political participation of women. This is because the rationale of discipline (or governing) in Japan and Turkey has constructed and historically reproduced a hierarchy depending on male and elder privilege, the core attributes of Joseph's (2002)

definition of patriarchy. Disciplinary processes (of the state, educational and judicial systems, economy, military and formal political participation) have disseminated the hierarchical superiority of male and elderly rule. Those who rule do not necessarily have to be elderly men, but the individual who wish to govern needs to incorporate itself to the masculine operation of such processes (including obtaining the support of male and elder authorities within those processes).

From the definition of Joseph (2002), patriarchy have two critical characteristics: one, privileging of male (and elder) rights and two, the use of kinship structures to legitimate male and elderly privilege. Both Turkey and Japan have a gendered character in terms of differentiating between women and men by privileging male access to the public domain in their governmentality in the sense that execution of statehood in both cases have showed an unfriendly bias towards any kind of women's mobilization that was out of the limitations of the state with regards to how far women can go (Bozkır, 2000; Wilson, 2006). Execution of modernization in both countries have promoted female modernization through the motto "good wife, wise mother" while men became the main agents of modernization. The promotion of centrality of family through the execution of governmentality in both countries by regulations on natality, employment, education and social security naturalized the gendered power inequalities (and gendered division of labor) in the family through privileging of male (and elder) authority.

Through definition of authority in masculine terms, Japan and Turkey have developed into customarily patriarchal contexts. Women and those men who could not incorporate themselves into this patriarchal mode of operation were left out. Thus the Japanese and Turkish states (and other types of institutionalizations such as business sector or political party

systems) have developed into "masculinities without intentionally or overtly pursuing the interests of men" (Brown, 2006:193). The actual predominance of men in politics has become a side-factor, although a significant one, of the general formation of the governmentality that privileges male access to the public domain. In both countries there have recently been some effort made to catch up with the gender equality discourse after internationalization of the issue (Osawa, 2000; Arat, 2000). But such efforts (including those of the state) have been insufficient due to their liberal approach rather than aiming to terminate the conditions that actually produce the underlying supremacy and legitimacy of male exercise. Apart from the state institutions, men have been the decision makers of nearly all big, organized institutions such as political parties, businesses, bureaucracy and military which defined reason of nearly any type of systematization and practice in masculine terms.

I analyze Japan and Turkey under Joseph's (2002) definition of patriarchy also because the use of kinship structures to legitimate male and elderly privilege has been another central characteristic of both contexts. Family in Japan and Turkey has been supported by the state regulations, practices and discourses historically, being promoted through discourse and practice continuously after the establishment of the modern nation-state. Prioritizing the family over the individual consequentially led to kin relationships becoming key to social, political and economic life (Joseph, 2002). Since the core of the society is family, each individual (regardless of sex) identified themselves through their family membership and security; social resources became generated from family relations (Joseph, 2002). The stress on being a part of a community which is usually depicted as "families" rather than "partnerships" or "cooperation" is widespread in both countries which also assisted the transition of familial modes of conduct to the public domain (Joseph, 2002). When "family" is the primary (and

most valued) means of bonding and identification, then the institutions outside the family resemble families to ensure members' adhesion and loyalty to themselves, big business in Japan being one example (Allison, 1994) and the political parties in Turkey being another.

The relationship of gender to such prioritization of kinship structures is two-fold. First, family and kinships structures contain power asymmetries and gendered hierarchies which become naturalized or are commonly overlooked when family and kinship structures are valorized and promoted as the traditional essence of a nation. The promotion of kinship structures regardless of its malfunctions or inequalities perpetuate the patriarchal hierarchy in the family which make the family another space of struggle for women (as well as men who are subordinated to the authority of elders of the family). Furthermore, the discourse on and promotion of the family as a traditional phenomenon put "family" in a ahistorical vacuum, avoiding a critique of the predicaments of its construction.

Second, the kinship structures that patriarchy prioritizes are relevant to gender because of their "fluid" character (Joseph, 2002). In other words, through the centrality of family as the basis of collectivity, familial modes of operation transfer to the public domain where they become useful for conducting relationships between people who are not genealogically related. There is a certain transition of kinship structures to public domain which centralizes kinship in all spheres of social activity (Joseph, 2002). Such patriarchal modes of operation that found "distribution of resources on the basis of highly-personalistic, face-to-face relationships grounded in kinship" (Joseph, 2002:179) are also prevalent in the public (including the political) domain in Japan and Turkey (see for Japan, Stockwin, 1999). This is significant because the transfer of the kinship structures within the familial domain consequently legitimize hierarchies, inequalities and the authority of the hegemonic masculinity in the

public domain. There is certain fluidity between the private and public domains, contrary to the dual characterization private and public domains. Thus, similar to Joseph's (2002) arguments on women in Lebanon, the blurred boundaries between the private and the public transfer the familial power inequalities to the public domain, and women in Japan and Turkey too experience civil society as another site of struggle rather than a space of liberation.

Joseph (2002) also notes that the transfer of kinship practices to the public domain is not a one-way process. The support patriarchal familial modes of operation gain from their prevalence in the public domain bolster the practices, hierarchies and power asymmetries in the familial domain in return. Patriarchy thus follows a circular path, creating itself in multiple domains while binding private and public domains rather than separating them (Joseph, 2002). Such conceptualization of patriarchy assumes diverse patriarchal relations operating in multiple spaces, avoiding the trap of overgeneralization.

3.2.4 THREE THEMES IN THE BROWN BAG

In the study, I use three main themes, "gender," "state" and "patriarchy" and link several other themes, such as "governmentality", "citizenship", and "discipline" to these in order to analyze women's formal political participation. I use gender as a social categorization that has creative and transformative character within processes. I link the state to gender by arguing that the multiple forms of the state are the main organizers of power, and main creators of gendered processes. State is also relevant to this inquiry because the gendered nature of the governmentality political elites who have held authority have adopted is critical in privileging certain types of power, such as male and elderly authority. Thus, although the governing

individuals change, the rationale of governing can privilege masculinity over femininity, which gives each processes shaped by the rationale a patriarchal character.

After defining the main themes of the study, I lay out the frame of the study by explaining how I examined formal political participation. I employ relevant literature on each level of the frame I use, depicted in Figure 1.

3.3 CONSTRUCTING FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: FRAME OF THE STUDY

In this study, I aim to make a thick analysis of formal political participation. This is because formal political participation is embedded in a multi-level context which influences the individual who participates (or not). It is as closely connected to how legitimate political agency has historically been established, to the kinds and meaning of sources such as education and employment. The context may also affect the acquisition of such sources, what kinds of jobs women fill in a labor market or whether there are any additional networks that can aid women with regards to necessary sources may depend on the general political system of the country. Initiating my examination from this argument, I sketch a diagram that I believe may provide a blueprint for analyzing formal political participation (Figure 1).

I start this section by explaining the rationale behind the frame of the study. There are six sections to the frame which I explain one by one with the relevant literature.



Frame 1: Frame of Analysis and Sections of Comparison

3.3.1 EXAMINING THE FRAME

I analyze formal political participation of women and draw out the ideological and practical similarities between Japan and Turkey within six sections. The frame is a triangle in the sense that it starts from the most general to most specific and from collective (to the greatest extent) to individual (to the greatest extent). All sections, regardless of their order, constitute certain contextual and institutional aspects. I lay the foundation of the Japanese and Turkish contexts starting from the first section and then examine how other conditions such as political party systems, employment and education and agency are positioned with regards to this background. Thus, there are inherent connections with these sections with each other, the fact that they all have an impact on each other makes the borders of the sections of the triangle fluid rather than sharp and rigid.

In the first section of the frame, I look at how modern nation-state building processes after 19th century in Turkey and Japan defined citizenship, masculinity/femininity and how the official discourse position women and men within the modern nation. I give a picture of how women were incorporated to modern nation-states in Turkey and Japan. Such an analysis is critical for formal political participation because it defines legitimate masculinity and femininity within the national context as well as the rationale of the modern political systems in Turkey and Japan. The positions women are placed in and how women react to these modern political systems found the base of their journey to formal political participation (or the lack thereof).

The second section builds on the first one by looking at how the strong states that evolved during the modernization periods in Turkey and Japan shaped the disciplinary

processes which produce gendered citizenships and practices. Through these two sections a significant phenomenon emerges, abolishment of female sexuality in order to legitimize the transfer of the female agency to the public domain as laborers, professionals and politicians. I observe the exclusion of female sexuality in the third section by examining how "national defense" is defined and practiced as a disciplinary process in Turkey and Japan.

The fourth section of the frame is an assessment of the political party and electoral systems in the two countries. I look at the historical constructions of these two systems and how they operate. I link this analysis to the terms education and employment become meaningful within the police systems of Turkey and Japan. I review resource insufficiency under this section because first, resources are more varied than only financial sources and second, through the interviews I observed that at times insufficiency of resources may also be compensated through exhaustion of professional qualifications. How female politicians utilize their professional and educational backgrounds and the impact of this use in the reproduction or alteration of the system is thus critical to evaluate the significance of education and employment.

The last piece of the puzzle is about how agency is constructed, defined, reproduced and transformed by female politicians in Turkey. In this section, I look at the impact of the greater context on the agency of female politicians in Turkey by analyzing the interviews. How they juxtapose themselves and other women (and men), how they define their political identity and how they overcome the obstacles in the system constitute my focus. In this section, positions of women politicians with regards to hegemonic discourses, femininity, the state, the political party systems and other political actors show how the context plays a role in their practices are analyzed to complete the picture.

3.3.2 GENDERING MODERN NATION-STATE: LITERATURE ON THE CONTEXT

In the first three sections of the frame, I analyze how gender, state and patriarchy relate to modern nation-state building processes in Turkey and Japan. For these sections, I build my analysis on women's incorporation to modern nation-states and formal political participation in these two countries on several studies (see Altınay, 2000; 2004; Chatterjee, 1993; Durakbaşa, 1998; Foucault, 1991; 1995; Joseph, 2002; Kandiyoti, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1997). In the following sections I elaborate on the theoretical bases that I examine women's incorporation to the modern nation-state building periods in Turkey and Japan through the foundations of modern nation-building processes, diversifications of feminine and masculine roles within these nationalist projects and the complicated relationship between female sexuality and nation-state.

The initiation of analysis on women's formal political participation needs to go as far as the modernization periods of Japan in early 19th century and Turkey in late 19th – early 20th centuries. These periods in the histories of Turkey and Japan are decisive of the means as well as the limitations of political participation of citizens, and the systematization of the "governmentality" in both countries (Foucault, 1991). These periods of modernization and systematization were not coincidental. The radical changes taking place in Western Europe (and North America) proved definitive for both countries, initiating an epoch of unofficial semi-colonialism within their borders[9]. Since the modernization periods, there has been

[9] I argue that Turkey and Japan had "unofficial semi-colonial periods" for several reasons. First, both countries had a vast amount of foreign intervention, in economic and political sense. While the foreign intervention on the economy went as far as the establishment of foreign public debtor institution (Düyun-u Umumiye) in 1881 in the Ottoman Empire, collecting a wide range of taxes in compensation for the foreign debt the Empire had accumulated over the decades (see for Turkey, Zürcher 1993). Japan also saw direct occupation after its defeat in the World War II, its modern state institutionalization owing much to the Allied Powers (Dower, 1993; Stockwin, 1999). The second reason why I argue that Turkey and Japan are unofficial semi-colonial countries is that the

promotion of inclusion of women into the public domains (see for a brief outline, Jayawardena, 1989). But, more consequentially, there has also been a clear distinction of how men and women should be incorporated to the modern nationalist ideals and distinction of the ideal practices of male and female citizens in relation to their value as "resources" in the modern rationale of Japanese and Turkish governmentality.

For countries such as Turkey and Japan which have refashioned themselves radically, incorporation of women into modern nation-building projects becomes significant. Altınay (2000) argues that the relationship between nation-building projects and women is two-fold. Firstly, there is an egalitarian promise within the anti-imperialist nationalist projects (such as those in Japan and Turkey) that help women bind themselves to such projects. With the transformation of traditional and subjugating institutions, there is a promise of emancipation for women. However within the second phase of the actual practice of nationalist projects, this promise is forgotten and thus women are expected to return to their "fundamental" roles as bearers of "traditional" culture and caregivers of future generations. The incorporation of women to the modern nationalist ideal is evident, but there is clear divergence between *how* men and women serve the same ideal (Altınay, 2000).

Chatterjee (1993) examines how men and women serve such modern national ideal in post-colonial countries. As stated above, Turkey and Japan have never been colonial countries. However their historical legacies bear the brunt of both defeat and intervention at some point, Turkey after World War I and Japan during/after World War II. The critical similarity of

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radical modernization periods that they initiated in order to "catch up" with the Western powers. Although they were not former colonies, the impact Western modernization left in Japan and Turkey was such that modernist elites in both countries instigated rather strict and authoritarian modernization (and nationalization) projects to catch up with the Western European countries after late 19th centuries to mid-1900s (Zürcher, 1993; Stockwin, 1999). Thus both countries share the two most decisive characteristics of actual former colonial countries which I base my argument.

experience between the post-colonial countries and these two countries is that both Turkey and Japan had to adopt the "flexibility of mind to embrace the very enemy they had sought to expel" (Stockwin, 1999:16) because they desperately wanted to catch up with the Western countries at the same time. The strong urge to stay independent, but to adopt Western-style modernization to prosper put Turkey and Japan in one of the most characteristic paradoxes of being a post-colonial nation.

Another decisive similarity to Chatterjee's (1993) analysis on post-colonial nationalism is that the elite nationalist cadres defining themselves (and the nation) not through similarity, but through difference with the nations of the Western world in Turkey and Japan. Elite nationalist cadres in both countries advocated the preservation of their indigenous characteristics (depending on how they defined these) while modernizing (Arat, 1998; Stockwin, 1999). Thus a separation of "inner" and "outer" domains emerge, the inner domain containing the indigenous essence of the nation (the source of difference) and the outer domain containing adoption of Western modernity (the source of progress). Chatterjee (1993) argues that this separation also causes the roles and spaces of female and male members of the nation to diversify. The hegemonic discourse defines the primary duty of female citizens as being the bearers and caregivers of the future generations as well as the carriers of the indigenous "essence". Men, on the contrary, arise to the roles of modernizers, leaders, entrepreneurs, fathers and husbands, in short, the authorities of the material outer world *and* their families. Legitimacies of agencies are diversified along with the lines of gendered national roles. Although women's inclusion to the public domain is promoted as laborers at the same time, they are not equals of men in this domain due to their primary (and natural) duties as sacred mothers of the nation above any other profession they might take on (Chatterjee, 1993).

When women are the "natural" beings in the society for their capacity to bear children, the rule of effective use of sources delineates women's primary duty around this activity. The biological difference between men and women with regards to childbearing become the main basis of gendered diversification of individual roles in the nation, control of female sexuality turning into one of the main political (and economic) concerns of the state. Consequential to promotion of continuity of future generations, modern jurisprudence naturalize heterosexuality and legal institutionalization as the law and the norm (Kandiyoti, 1997). As the natural bearers, then, women's incorporation to modern nation-building processes entail the debate on female sexuality. Apart from the diversification of male and female domains, handling of female sexuality within such nationalist endeavors make nationalist processes inherently gendered. Modernization brings with itself the rationale of effective governing in which every person is a resource (Foucault, 1991), the resource for assuring the future of the nation and to provide laborers to the market becoming the female individuals of the nation. Through its "effective" utilization, control of women's sexuality thus becomes instrumental for "a good use" rather than emancipation of women's will (Yuval Davis and Anthias, 1989). This control on female sexuality is a collective political endeavor as much as it is individualistic. Promotion of women as the "natural child bearers, thus natural caregivers" through state discourse and practice, through education, through societal networks and through the women-unfriendly labor market naturalizes this notion. A life-cycle positioned on the role of caregiver for women becomes the norm and only natural (Kandiyoti, 1997).

Apart from its rationality, there is also a critical discursive character in the diversification of women's role in the nation. The "common origin" notion that founds the base of the nationalist discourse in countries like Turkey and Japan (where ethnic

homogenization continues to be a widespread discourse in spite of the increasing body of immigrants, see Yoshino, 1998) puts women and female sexuality in a risky position. The political interest in controlling female sexuality is thus supported on the basis of protecting the homogeneity of the nation as well as to maintain the discursive duality of "us and them" with other nations (Yuval-Davis, 1997). The control on women's sexuality does not necessarily mean limitations on childrearing, for Turkey and Japan, such control is usually (and currently) executed as the opposite. However, regardless of limitation or promotion of childrearing, the consequence is the diversification of male and female citizenships and the practice of gendered discipline in the modern nation.

Other than the distinctions that modern nation-building brought to female and male roles, I examine sexuality in another aspect that I believe to be critical for women's public agency, hence formal political participation. First, the establishment of a disciplinary process for women through female sexuality is critical for their public agency (Durakbaşa, 1998). Emphasis the Republican ideology placed on women's morality and modesty necessitate staying clear from any reference to sexuality in the eminence of women in the public as professionals (and politicians). This can be regarded as a disciplinary process in the sense that it provides a clear blueprint of propriety and constraint even when women go out of their familial domains. Such a disciplinary practice aiming at women's sexuality and morality also existed in the Japanese modernization period which the governments chose to implement through widespread campaigns of education in both countries (Durakbaşa, 1998; Inoue, 2003).

All in all, experiences of modernization, nation and state-building processes become gendered processes through their design and execution. They discipline individuals into gendered roles which consequently ranks them in hierarchies. I examine what kinds of

experiences modern nation-building processes created for women in Turkey and Japan and how these experiences altered their chances of formal political participation. But apart from the historical constructions and practices of gendered citizenships, how "the rules of the game", in other words, the institutional pathways to formal political participation should be examined. For this purpose I lay out the relevant literature on formal political participation in the next section.

3.3.3 GENDERING ELECTIONS, PARTIES AND RESOURCES

Formal political participation is embedded in the historical establishment (and reproduction) of the political system, how political participation has been historically executed and by whom in a country. Such contextual characteristics in a country consequently lay the foundations for the institutional means of formal participation (such as electoral and political party systems, denotations of educational and professional background as well as the social/financial resources). Through exhausting these means, participating in elections, utilizing familial networks or acquiring necessary funds men and women are elected. But the groundwork of simple electoral processes is inherently gendered, being artifacts of the greater context.

There have been numerous scholars bringing forward different hypotheses to account for the low representation levels of women to parliaments; such as the hindering role of traditional women's role, the inability to raise necessary funds for election campaigns (Epstein, 1981) and the skeptical view of women by the electorate (Epstein, 1981). The distinct processes of social learning and political socialization as well as the issue of constructed preferences have been debated (Schlozman et al., 1997). In this study, I utilize the studies of Norris (1993; 1995), Lovenduski (1993) and Stromquist (1995) as well as the

comprehensive report of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance on "Women in Parliament" (IDEA, 2005) because these studies specifically examine the impact of electoral and political party systems and follow a comparative approach and qualitative approach (the edited book of Norris and Lovenduski (1993), *Gender and Party Politics* is a collaborative study of examinations on the gendered consequences of electoral and party systems in countries of Europe and North America).

In the study, Norris (1993:313) notes that there are three significant characteristics of an electoral system with regards to creating gender imbalances. First is the ballot structure, in other words whether there is a party list or a single candidate in a constituency. Norris notes that (1993:314) in single member constituencies parties may believe to carry an "electoral risk" with female candidate under the single candidate system. But under proportional systems the parties have a "rational incentive to present a balanced ticket" (Norris, 1993:314) since it is a small chance that parties lose votes because of the inclusion of female candidates to the list.

The second characteristic of a woman-friendly electoral system is the district magnitude, in other words, the number of seats per district. The third is the degree of proportionality, namely the allocation of votes to seats (Norris, 1993:313). Consequently, examining several systems show that women do best under multi-member constituencies with a high number of seats per district and hence, under party list systems (Norris 1993, IDEA, 2005).

From these findings, establishment of an electoral system that would be friendlier to women seems to be the one with most number of candidates that people can freely choose from. But Norris (1993) also notes that proportionality by itself would not be necessary to compensate for other factors that enable women to pursue political careers in the first place.

Political systems that allow the regeneration of the traditional, systems with relatively lower incumbency turnovers (Norris, 1993), those lack or have few additional outlets for representation, as the case in many unitary states (Norris, 1993), and systems to which access is limited both socially and financially, lacking merit-based or (fair) primary elections for candidates can not be compensated for the mere existence of proportionality.

The purpose of political parties is to facilitate access to formal political domain (Lovenduski, 1993). Thus multi-party systems have favored women's participation by increasing electoral competition and representation of new ideologies (Sainsbury, 1993; IDEA, 2005). But when party systems depend more on social relations than formal procedures, depend more on centralized and closed decision-making systems than decentralized organization and the prominence of gatekeepers is higher, than such political party systems do not provide favorable conditions for many women (Norris, 1993)

Similar to the electoral system, political party systems reflect the greater operationalization of gender in a context. How women incorporate themselves and to which political parties (and why) is critical to explain women's formal political participation. How can they exhaust their qualifications? What kinds of networks they might exhaust? Which women are embraced by the party rather than many others? How does being a party member affect women's agency? All of these points should be examined in order to understand the complicated interplay between political parties and women's formal political participation.

3.3.4 EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND SOURCES: QUALIFICATION OR DIVERSION?

Education is crucial for analysis on women's political participation for three reasons. For one, education is one of the biggest and by itself the most systematized process of socialization

(Stromquist, 1995). There is strong emphasis on the influence of formal education policies (Gümüşoğlu, 1998; Kaplan, 1999) because formal education is a prolonged systematic indoctrination that teaches the individual (predominantly at a very young age) how to define their and others' roles along with what is acceptable in a specific society. Textbooks and curricula provide students a shared sense of duty for women and men with regards to their responsibility as citizens of a state and help position "the outsiders" from this national domain (Stromquist, 1995; Kaplan, 1999). Embracing the official (state-sponsored) rationale of gendered, ethnic and socioeconomic hierarchies, education defines and diversifies the acts of citizenship.

The second and more materialistic impact of education is on employment patterns. The duration and the type of education is effectual for the type of jobs held, which consequently determines the available financial resources women may use to participate in elections[10]. The concern regarding sources is especially pertinent for Japan and Turkey because running for office continues to be an expansive endeavor in both countries, limiting the chances of formal participation of women (Eto, 2001, KA-DER, 2007). Predominance of certain sectors in women's employment, large populations of unpaid family-workers among women, the ratio of unemployment among women who participate in the labor force, demands of employers in the market count as much as women's overall participation to labor market (Dayıoğlu, 2000). The acquisition of sufficient resources thus depends on participation in the labor force, but depends also on the type of participation. Thus the placements of women in the labor market and what

[10] It may also be the case that women who normally have a shortage of financial sources may compensate for this lack with their professional qualifications or familial networks. These are two options that came up within the interviews. I elaborate it further in Chapter Five, when I discuss the interviews. But for now it is possible to say such compensation does exist. Yet it is limited in scope, which diminishes its effectiveness for women to a great extent.

the labor market wants to attain from female labor in a country becomes extremely crucial for any analysis of women's formal political participation.

The third impact of education is its effect on categorizing women among themselves. Wedel (2001) in her ethnographic study on women in three slum neighborhoods of Istanbul observes that women with less formal education can also play prominent political roles among female groups in the local context. But the predominant portion of women in Japan and Turkey who could become politicians has had higher education (Arat, 1989; Takeda, 2006). If high levels of educational background are a prerequisite (or criteria of preference of parties) for candidacy, then education may also have an exclusionary quality among women. It may become a basis for segregation as a type of cultural capital (Foucault, 1986), not a technical expertise but as a social "qualification" that is above many other attributes women with less formal education can actually possess.

Apart from formal education, families and different public spaces (school gardens, peer groups, activity clubs etc.) may also have substantial effect in political socialization (Verba et al., 2001; Pharr, 1981, Arat, 1989). There are some connections in relevant studies between political women in Japan and Turkey and their backgrounds as members of politically interested and aware families (Pharr 1981; Arat, 1989) or several women reporting influence from a parent while constructing political identities (Pharr, 1981; Arat, 1989).

3.4 CONCLUSION

To examine women's formal political participation in Turkey and Japan, I use certain descriptions of "gender", "state", and "patriarchy" as the main themes. I observe the gendered implications of the modern rationale which Turkish and Japanese political elites adopted

through nation-state building processes, which necessitate linking "governmentality", "discipline" and "citizenship" to the main themes of the study.

I formulate my inquiry on a triangular frame, analyzing women's formal political participation with a multi-level approach. The formulation of the modern governmentality in Turkey and Japan and the placement of family within this rationale found the base of my analysis. Then I look at the hegemonic femininity, and its implications for women's role in the family and the nation, arguing that disciplinary processes such as education, employment, and practices of national security develop citizenship into gendered hierarchies. Privileging of male access to the public domain through governmentality also helps shape electoral and political party systems around the male citizen as the primary agent, creating exclusionary processes in terms of women. Education and employment gain numerous meanings through this context, becoming distinctions among women rather than being mere material capacities or insufficiencies. Thus, I argue that women's formal political participation is a composition of multiple gendered processes, given shape by both the overall historical and national context as much as the institutional formulation of formal political participation.

CHAPTER 4

PUTTING WHITE AND RED IN CONTEXT: ANALYZING FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1)

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Many of the words previously related to the concept of "womanhood" in the Japanese and Turkish contexts would be very similar. "Tradition" is probably the most voiced word of the group. Another of such common words is the saying "good wife and wise mother". These words give one a sense of constructions of femininity and citizenship in these two contexts, yet they fall very short of actually explaining why women's formal political representation continue to exist on such low levels in both countries. Then, how can we explore this common phenomenon in these two diverse countries?

In order to discover what the commonalities that cause low female representation in Japan and Turkey could be and their possible effect, I look at the placements of women within the historical context, meaning the larger historical backdrop that gives meaning to institutional formulation of Japanese and Turkish states, nations and ideologies. Following Figure 3.1, I explain the general context in which hegemonic femininity, citizenship and agencies are constructed and examine the significance of institutions such as political party systems, sources and education/employment patterns by placing them in this context. Within the contextual examination; I elaborate upon how modern-nation states have historically interacted with women, how the interplay between familial domain and political domain affects women's public agency, how the strong state practices in Japan and Turkey constitute

conflicting gendered citizenships and how female sexuality is positioned within women's political agency. Then I observe the meanings and functions employment and educational patterns take on as well as the electoral and political party systems to assess their impact within the context.

In this chapter, I initiate the comparison (and elaboration) on Turkey and Japan by laying out the historical construction of states, nations, citizenships, political agencies in these two countries. In the first section, I look at the reform processes of late 19th century in the Ottoman Empire (and later in the early 20th century by Republican reformists) and in Japan to examine how the political elites of the times constructed "modernity" and its gendered consequences in relation to the state, nation, citizenship and family. In the second section of the chapter, I examine the emergence of the "modern states" as strong, highly disciplinary states in Japan and Turkey, and their impact on gendered categorization of male and female citizenships. As the most prevalent manifestation of systematization of discipline in Japan and Turkey, I compare the "national defense" discourse and the critical similarity of its gendered execution in two countries. In the last section, I discuss the conflict between female sexuality and the public agencies adoption of "modernity" legitimized in Japanese and Turkish contexts, and why female sexuality is an inherent part of any analysis of women's formal political participation.

There are several main arguments regarding the context that construct states, nations, citizenship, femininity and masculinity in Japan and Turkey that I examine throughout this chapter. First, although its material conditions have been vastly different, state regulations and practices in Japan has had promoted similar notions and has created femininity and masculinity similar to those in Turkey. The hegemonic masculinity and femininity through

which state policies regulating employment, social rights, education and national security have been shaped by different actors in both countries have been rather parallel, depending primarily on the male citizen in terms of public maintenance and disciplining the female citizen into roles mainly defined by the responsibilities they hold in the private domain. Thus while the incorporation of women to the public domain has existed through decades, women's inclusion to this domain as laborers or politicians was rather complementary (and secondary) to their contribution to the nation as private agents, specifically as refined mothers and wives. State policies, hegemonic discourses, promotion of patriarchy, formulation of economy and electoral systems in Japan have offset the effect of vast difference of sources on women's formal political participation. If women wished to attain public agency, the exhaustion of sources emanating from the private domain has been the most legitimate option for women for both countries. Thus, in both countries women who could break into formal politics have been very much concentrated into certain groups, such as wives or daughters of elite or respected families of a certain region. Political authority in Japan and Turkey assembles in a close-circuit defined through socioeconomic privileges, familial background, business connections, party cliques and masculinity which gives politics (hence the electoral system) an exclusionary character.

The historical modernization processes from late 19th to early 20th century in Turkey and Japan defined women's incorporation to modernization by promoting a certain role for women in the nation states. Modern states both in Japan and Turkey have been created in a relatively shorter span of time with "West" as a blueprint for the Japanese and Turkish nationalists (Bonnett, 2002; Stockwin, 1999; Zürcher, 1999). This provided familiarity to the contexts in which the experiences of Japanese and Turkish women came to existence as well

as the female mobilization provoked by modern nationalist discourses in both countries. In addition to defining sexual/social roles between male and female bodies, militarism and patriarchy in both countries brought forward similar patterns of identification and submission through the promotion of similar social values. I start by examining the execution of modernization projects in these two countries, and gendered implications of modern statehood that followed.

4.2 CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE GENDERED MODERN STATE IN JAPAN AND TURKEY

In the most basic sense, the difference between the Japanese and Turkish states under a political economy viewpoint is that Japan is a small, developmental state (Öniş, 1991) whereas Turkey is a rather larger state. Japan is a small state in the sense that it has a relatively smaller body of state workers and institutions (Muramatsu, 1996) whereas the state in Turkey is literally bigger in composition of institutions and workers. But from a gendered perspective Japan, similar to Turkey, has historically promoted patriarchal codes of conduct that deprive women of the social and cultural facilitators for political agency. The execution of governmentality of both states strongly endorsed disciplining (and diversifying in a utilitarian logic) members of the society into male and female citizens. Thus I start my examination from the modernization periods of these two countries in which political elites of the times have shaped the rationality of state and society.

Modernization of state structures in both of these countries after the 19th century has created similar backgrounds for women in Japan and Turkey. Both countries went through modern nation-building periods where elements from the Western civilization and elements

from their indigenous traditions were selected to constitute the foundation of modern nations. The practice of "selection" (Chatterjee, 1993) during the process of modern nation-building periods of Japan and Turkey, selection of "the building blocs" of the society, selection of what needs to be changed and what stays intact, selection of what is Japanese or Turkish, selection of what is modern or not, founded many of the norms that women still compromise or conflict with in order to function as political agents.

Certainly, the attributes which reformist elites (and later the society) deemed to be Japanese and Turkish evolved in time, going through continuous restructuring rather than one finite period of nation-building (Walby, 1996). But where femininity stands within the rationale of government in Turkey and Japan, in state policies, formulation of economy and ideological preference has stayed more or less intact. Through the "national duties" modernist elites embedded in hegemonic masculinity and femininity, male and female citizenships in each context diversified. Incorporation of women to the modern nation-states thus became a front of limitation as well as legitimization, a front of conflict and negotiation. This larger context of power, state and gendered citizenships thus founded the basis of women's formal political participation.

Although Ottoman political elites had initiated several reforms (although to a milder degree) aimed at Western-style modernization of government and jurisprudence from the early 19th century, Esenbel (1999) in his study argues that the Meiji restoration period of 1868 in Japan has more similarities with the radical modernization and nation-building period of Republican Turkey. In a prior work, Ward and Rustow (1964) take a longer period of Turkish modernization for their comparison with Japan, widening it from 1908-1928. But these studies focus on the initial periods of modernization in both countries, analyzing the transfer from

"pre-modern" modes of government and economy to parliamentary systems and industrialization. But, looking at the effects of modernity on gendered agency in Turkey and Japan require me to handle the comparison within a wider period of time because the subsequent decades have also altered the gendered implications of modernity in both cases. Thus I initiate my analysis of modernity in the Japanese case with the Meiji overtake in 1868 and continue to the next period after the writing of the 1947 Constitution of Japan since this second period of "adjustment" has been significant for it altered the jurisdictional framework on familial, civil, and employment matters to a significant extent[11]. I employ modernization as a period between 1868 to late1940s in Japan and as a period between late 19th century to early 1940s in Turkey.

Before "modernization" in Turkey and Japan, regimes of military nature governed both countries which meant discipline and order had been two of the central notions of governing. The Ottoman Empire, an empire conducting relations with many other powers due to its location and territorial acquisitions, gathered under a strong Sultan who had depended on his army for both governance of its vast territories and governance at home. The Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) also derived authority largely from its military class while the role of the sovereign Tenno (Emperor) was more limited, at least relative to the Ottoman Sultans (Hall, 1964). Hence it may not be surprising that a core group of younger military elites initiated the modernization processes in both countries, giving the modern nation-building processes of Japan and Turkey a militarist characteristic from the beginning. This characteristic would help

[11] For instance, there are several significant differences between the 1898 Civil Code and 1947 Constitution of Japan in terms of their provisions of family (White, 2002). Although both were endeavors in service of promoting certain types of families, they were diverse in the sense that the 1947 Constitution noted the equality of sexes in a marriage, although diminishing its practical effect in other regulations on employment or civil law (White, 2002). The Turkish Republican Revolution modified the Constitution, civil laws and the like in a shorter period of time, though similar to Japan, the totality of the jurisdictional reforms fell short of being gender equal.

lay the foundation of the diversification of female and male citizenships in terms of the type of participation they make to the national defense in the future.

Territorial boundaries of Japan was smaller than those of the Ottoman Empire but Japan had several economic and political advantages that proved to be very consequential for the future: It had the necessary capital accumulation that was utilized through late 19th and early 20th century to build a national industry, the necessary human power with its 35 million population in 1868 while the Ottoman Empire had 25 million in its most prominent days stretching out to three continents (Esenbel, 1999:23) and about ten times the literate individuals of Ottoman Empire in 1868 (1999:22). The fourth advantage was that although Japan was forced to open her ports in 1854 to Western countries which started her (unofficial) semi-colonial epoch, Japan continued to rise as a strong country after defeating China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, until a devastating period in 1940s. At around the same time, the Ottoman Empire started to shrink nearly to the borders of the Turkish Republic, losing a significant part of its capital accumulation and a part of its educated subjects along with its vast territories. In economic terms, industrialization, literacy and economic prosperity from the start differentiated the Japanese endeavor of modernization from that in Turkey.

In political terms, the most critical differences between Turkey and Japan were the authority of the Sultanate and the autonomy of religion, in addition to the multi-ethnic composition of the Ottoman Empire. The Meiji cadres of Japan imbued the long feeble institution of Tenno to present it as a national symbol of unity and discipline for the people (Ward and Rustow, 1964) while transferring its right to rule to themselves in practice. As Bellah (1958:4) argues, the Meiji reforms "used the central value of loyalty to the emperor to legitimize the immense changes they were making in all spheres of social life…" Furthermore,

the Tenno was given a divine character embracing a mixture of multiple religions to bolster the loyalty of the nation to this institution (Yumiko, 1999). This was very different from the conditions the Turkish modernizers were in. While the Meiji leaders established their authority (and a new patriarchy) over a duality of the feeble Emperor and the strong Meiji rule, Turkish modernizers had the potent authority of and loyalty to the Sultanate to overcome. In addition to the authority of the Sultan, religion had an organized and autonomous authority in the Ottoman Empire (Ward and Rustow, 1964). Although modernization was radical endeavors in both countries, not only in terms of political, but also in terms of its religious ventures[12], the detachment and termination of the old system was more radical in case of Republican Turkey.

Still, there were several similarities consequential in terms of women's positions in the society in the future. First was the fact that both Japan and the Ottoman Empire had been left out of the era of formation of Western nation-states and overseas colonialism throughout the 18th and 19th century. Thus, the Meiji restoration period and the Ottoman and Turkish modernization periods were initiated by modernist elites who drafted an image of Japanese and Turkish states and nations by looking at the modern and wealthy states of Western Europe. Second, both countries "had long been sovereign and independent and had been forced to develop a group of specialists charged with the conduct of national administration" (Ward and Rustow, 1964:453), signifying the strength of an elite bureaucratic group in both cases. These bureaucratic bodies had gradually developed over centuries and they had long consisted of groups of educated elites (Ward and Rustow, 1964). Thus both of these revolutionary endeavors were not bourgeois upheavals in the European sense, an upheaval to which both men and women could join and fight together (for Japan, see Stockwin, 1999; for Turkey, see

[12] The Japanese modernization had a rather bloody venture on religion as well (Yumiko, 1999). But, unlike Turkey this venture aimed at congregating the society under Shintoism (also where the authority of Tenno originated) while strictly abolishing other religious beliefs such as Buddhism.

Zürcher, 1999). Rather the elitist approach of these autonomous (and liberated after 1923 in the Turkish case) professional cadres isolated women, which helped the establishment of an exclusionary and gendered rationale of governing in Turkey and Japan. Third, the role of leadership was very much similar in terms of their principles of governing. The modernizing leaders in both countries were coming from military backgrounds and in both instances "specialization into categories of leadership did not exist" (Ward and Rustow, 1964:451), meaning the same elite cadres organized every aspect of modernization. In both countries, male leaders pursuing "modernity" initiated the formulation of "governmentality" for rational use of resources, which included the use of things and people for prosperity (and security, inherent in the goal of prosperity). A rationale crafted by male leaders in countries which historically excluded women from authority developed to be a masculine ideology of governing. The elites founded the Turkish and Japanese state institutions on this exclusionary rationale of modern governing, which manifested this rationality in its projects, regulations and categorizations. Consequently, as the "natural" (Yuval-Davis, 1997) beings, the primary roles women should take to be useful ("patriotic") citizens diversified on the basis of their biological attribute of childbearing. All in all, women benefited from these modernization periods asymmetrically and were positioned differently than men throughout nation-building processes.

For Turkey and Japan, these nation-building processes were far from merely importing the West which gave modernizing projects in both countries a creative nature. First of all, West was itself a term, an ideal. What "West" consisted of and what was valuable within that ideal was defined by the modernizing intellectuals of those times (Bonnett, 2002). But what is maybe more important was how the West was incorporated into the modernization projects.

The process of incorporation is significant and creative because the modernizing elites chose to incorporate their ideals of the West by "creating new ethnocentric stereotypes of self and the other" (Bonnett, 2002:168) rather than entirely replacing ideals of "West" with "indigenous" identities.

The creative character of nation-building practices in Japan and Turkey is especially important with regards to their consequences for women because the synthesis of the "West" and the "indigenous" provided women a novel "national" identity. The fact that elite cadres did not intend modern women to be neither fully indigenous nor fully Western, there was confusion in both countries about what to make of women within this new nation, resulting in several conflicting ideas and regulations (see for Turkey, Kandiyoti, 1991; see for Japan, Garon, 1993). As women were both the bearers of future generations and transmitters of culture as the primary caregivers, women's modernization was in a fine line, theirs was an identity that should neither become entirely Westernized nor actually stay indigenous. These ideal identities for "women" and "men" came to existence by ideological selection processes through which creative nation-building projects were conducted (Chatterjee, 1993).

Modernist elites in Japan and Turkey have continuously advocated that in order to prosper without losing their national identity, nation should keep their "essence" or never become "entirely Westernized" no matter how much their economy, institutions or ideologies take after the "modern countries" of the West (see for Japan, Germer, 2006; see for Turkey, Durakbaşa, 1998). For the Turkish Republicans this essence was found in the Turkish culture before the Ottoman Empire (Kandiyoti, 1991) while for Japan it was a combination of traits political elites defined as indigenous (Stockwin, 1999). In this sense, the modern nation-state

building processes in Turkey and Japan have a commonality to those of post-colonial nations that Chatterjee (1993) analyzes in his study.

In relation to this indigenous essence, regulation of women (and female sexuality) became one of the main concerns of the modern nation-state. Women were the "natural" beings of the society; they could bear children (Yuval-Davis, 1997). How Turkish and Japanese elites defined the role of women in modern governmentality owed much to this biological trait of women. First, since they could bear children, they could also bring them up. Second, since women could give birth and bring children up, they could also transmit the indigenous national essence to the future generations[13]. Women in this case had a central role within the modern nation-states, but a diverse role than those of males, who were the executers of modernization. In this sense, the domains women and men would inhabit diverged, women becoming agents of a private domain while men became the actors of the public world.

One of the most critical similarities between Turkey and Japan in terms of such diversification of private and public agencies is how both cases handled the private and placed it within the general society. The regulations and practices state and political authorities in both countries have historically been actively engaged to prioritize family, shape the private and those inside it. Above anything state policies in both countries have been pro-natalist, and promoting marriage (Watanabe and Iawata, 1989. Cited in Taga, 2003:132; see for Turkey, Kandiyoti, 1991). State promotion of the family and the "good wives wise mothers notion through social security policies, civil law, regulations on employment, measures to eliminate

[13] Chatterjee (1993) argues that the essence that women are believed to possess is itself a fictive creation. This argument is validated by the Japanese and Turkish examples. First and foremost, the "essence" has been a set of qualities that modernizing elites themselves defined and redefined. It is itself a modern creation of nationalism. Second, positing such an eternal essence exists is a primordial suggestion that leaves no space for any further explanation or criticism. The existence of such an essence pins women into certain roles that are themselves unchangeable.

familial violence (or the lack thereof), official discourses, monitoring of official historiography and systematized education in Turkey and Japan integrated women into modernization by educating them but domesticating them as the main agents of the private domain at the same time[14] (see Arat, 1998; Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994; Jayawardena, 1989; Toska, 1998; Ueno, 1994; Wilson, 2006; White, 2002). Within the detailed regulation of the private, there has been clear division of labor inside the household as well as a division of labor between private (female) and public (male) agents (Allison, 1994; Arat, 1998)[15]. In this sense, it is not surprising that literacy and education campaigns the state officials fervently pursued after 1872 in Japan and 1924 in Turkey[16] carried the imagery of "good wives and wise mothers" as their core achievement (Jayawarenda 1994; Arat, 1998).

Regulations on employment and on social security in Turkey and Japan bolstered the feminine ideal the education systems disseminated. In both countries, governments had called women out to participate in the labor market during war times (and these were more widespread campaigns in Japan due to the more advanced position of Japanese industries at

[14] The practices of Japanese state with regards to women's modernization were unlike those of the Turkish state at first. In the early stages of Japanese modernization period, the Japanese authorities were very careful to ban women from implementing reform laws and punishing those women who did, examples including punishing women who cut their hair as short as men were obliged to at the times (Wilson, 2006). Those things deemed "traditional" was literally inscribed on the bodies of women in Japan in early stages of Meiji period. This has never been the case in the Turkish modernization period at any time. But the Japanese experience started resembling the Turkish case after late 19th century, when women were designated to carry the traditional essence of Japaneseness through modernizing themselves as "good wives and wise mothers".

[15] Allison (1994) points out one very significant aspect of Japanese families, the absence of father from the house. Japanese white collar workers are working very long hours and continue socializing after hours with fellow colleagues which distance them from the home to a great extent. Women organize their days around children's education, social activities, and if they work, their job in a more liberated fashion. This is very different than the Turkish case. But I argue that this does not differentiate the gendered implications of the household for Turkish and Japanese women. This is because as Ishii-Kuntz (1993) argues in her study, Japanese women keep the authority of the father viable in the home in their daily practices and daily interactions with children. She examines how mothers discipline their children by referring to "tell their fathers" (Ishii-Kuntz, 1993: 50), even in the cases that Ishii-Kuntz states such an authority of father does not actually exist. Although Japanese women may have greater freedom to socialize, women of households nevertheless seem to adopt a discourse that keeps the male authority (and gendered hierarchy) in the household alive. In this sense, I think the inexistence of fathers does not distance the Japanese experience from the Turkish case in terms of familial hierarchies.

[16] Education of women had been an point of debate much earlier than this period, however universal literacy have been promoted after 1924 and onwards much strongly in the modern Republic.

the time), especially when the male labor was scarce (Kandiyoti, 1991; Wilson, 2006). But women's employment validated the separation between female and male citizenship, the laws on employment and social security designating the male worker as the primary provider of the household while women were to be unpaid caregivers. This systematization of male and female duties placed women's (relatively cheaper) labor as a secondary source for the labor market and for the family income, while prescribing women's employment as an activity that does not pursue higher career achievements in both countries (Arat, 1998; White, 2002). Thus, in modernization for women meant the promotion of a specific gender role and ended up as a disciplinary practice that disregarded any agency other than the prescribed feminine agency as either secondary or irrelevant. In other words, what modern nation-building processes in Turkey and Japan defines as "femininity" was in the end "an acceptance of a new patriarchal order" (Chatterjee, 1993:129) where the older male authority was dismantled by the new male elites. Thus the question became not whether women were incorporated to the public domain, but how they were actually incorporated (Pateman, 1995).

4.3 REGULATING THE FAMILY AND THE MODERN FEMALE

In another point of view, disciplining women into modernity, but at the same time limiting them to the household and promoting subservience to men in the family gave the new male leaders in Turkey and Japan *somebody* to rule. The legitimacy of the sovereignty of Japanese and Turkish men (those in the political cadres and fathers of households) was legitimized through their authority over women. In a sense, the new male leaders of the Turkish Republic (and Meiji Japan) were also breaking away from the old patriarchal system that subordinated them and constructed a new system that authorized them, while keeping the gendered power

asymmetries between masculinity and femininity intact (see for Turkey, Kandiyoti, 1991). The rewriting of history and reorganization of the society under modernism and nationalism enabled placement of certain mannerisms as "indigenous", hence "traditional." Those discursively constructed as "traditional" consequently became ahistorical, hence natural. Family is one of such institutions which the founding elites of Turkey and Japan argued to constitute the basis of their societies (Yoshino, 1998; McVeigh, 1998). Turkish and Japanese nationalist elites (and their successors) promoted the centrality of family, overlooking the gendered power asymmetries in the family. Thus masculine privilege in terms of authority within governmentality in both countries found its basis in the central element of the society and the masculine rationale of governing bolstered the patriarchal power asymmetries in the family in return. The centrality of family in Turkey and Japan thus enhanced the value of familial modes of conduct in these countries. And similar to Joseph's (2002) analysis of familial patriarchy, promotion of family as the central unit of organization helped transmit familial modes of conduct and the gendered power asymmetries in the family to the public domain in Turkey and Japan.

There have been several consequences of centralization of the family and defining women's agency in the nation-state through her duty in the household. First, this differentiation between female and male (public) agencies shaped official historiographies in both countries, neglecting women's political agency prior to their inclusion in the nation-state by suffrage. For example, such a categorization between legitimate private and public agents influenced the content official historiographies, social security and employment policies in Turkey and Japan. Albeit limited to elite circles of women, women's movements during modernization periods in both countries had adopted political arguments including suffrage

and participation of women to politics (Jayawardena, 1986; Toska, 1998; Bozkır, 2000; Wilson, 2006), which has been a historical fact that has continuously escaped any mention within the writing of the official historiography in both Japan and Turkey. Such women's groups had a significant amount of interaction and sometimes conflict with the modernizing elites and the governments of the times, at time resulting in their criminalization, as had happened in abolishment of women from participating into political meetings by the Police Law of 1908 (Wilson, 2006). Nezihe Muhiddin and the first political party ever established in Turkey under her leadership, Turkish Women's Party, similarly carried out a political women's movement who had clear political arguments, such as granting of suffrage to women and changes in the Civil Code (Zihnioğlu, 2003). The precursors of Turkish Women's Party were multiple women's magazines and literary journals which had rooted the first feminist arguments in the late periods of the Empire (Çakır, 1996), which signifies the existence of autonomous women's agency in the public domain before the granting of suffrage to women by male leaders of the new Republic. However, in connection to the creation of the modern femininity in both countries, such autonomous women's groups in Japan and Turkey were mostly neutralized, yet after number of disputes with political women who wished not to renounce their arguments (Wilson, 2006; Bozkır, 2000). The initiation and later destruction brought by the World War I also triggered the reflection of some of these efforts to social causes which converted a number of women's groups to social organizations. Those groups (and their women leaders) who did not renounce political activity were either criminalized and excluded from the domain of politics as had been the case in Japan (Wilson, 2006), or neutralized after a series of interventions to reform such women's groups as in the case of Nezihe Muhiddin and Turkish Women's Party (Bozkır, 2000). Thus, the first ever party in

Turkey was reformed into women's branches of the Republican Party after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, after Nezihe Muhiddin was excluded from the administrative cadres of the Women's Party (Bozkır, 2000). But what is also significant for both cases has been the approach of governments to political women's groups in the sense that apart from the denial of access, the overlooking of such autonomous women's agency during writing of the official historiographies. Both Turkish and Japanese official historiographies excluded women's autonomous agencies throughout the 19th and during the 20th centuries[17]. This exclusion is significant for women in these countries because the official historiography has promoted the idea that women were indifferent (and outside) to the politics as well as placing the state as the authority which thinks of its women before themselves.

What was interesting with regards to this historical twist was that, among the women parliamentarians I interviewed for the study, even the few who argued it was important for them to "represent women", none referred to politicization of women prior to the Republican period. While some accounted for their political backgrounds starting from suffrage during the single-party period, the others presented the warm stance to women by their parties as a turning point for women's incorporation to politics. Women's political relevance initiated with men's acceptance of women into politics in either case, and women actively built their political identities around this male gatekeeper - female newcomer notion which the official Turkish historiography.

[17] Kandiyoti (1991) argues that the abolishment of autonomous women's movements such as establishment of Turkish Women's Party of Nezihe Muhiddin as a corollary of the general policy on minimizing any type of autonomous movement in the earlr periods of the Republic. Thus the "neutralization" of this autonomous women's movement may not be specificially directed at women's movement but to any type of movement (Kandiyoti, 1991). But I think it is also critical that official historiography overlooked any sign of an autonomous women's movement, and the writing of the Republican (and Ottoman) history devoid of any sign of this female agency. Although such annihilations might have been to bring the society together, overlooking these agencies (including the female agency) within the official historiogprahy reflects the general outlook of the Republican ideology with regards to women (see Altınay, 2004).

Second, prioritizing women's agency in the private domain required women to arrange all other identifications as secondary to their duties as mothers and wives. All other duties, professional, political, social needed to be organized such that they would not disable women from carrying out their primary duties in the household. This rationale has founded the educational and employment regulations in both countries. In other words, women confronted a dilemma by being primarily private agents and then trespassing to the public domain as laborers/professionals. Women's incorporation to the labor force was promoted in war years in the two countries (Kandiyoti, 1991; Wilson, 2006), and it is especially critical now in Japan with the future decrease in the working-age population (Osawa, 2000). But the social security policies have been designed around the male breadwinner and binding women to their working husbands for social security (see for Japan, Osawa, 2000; see for Turkey, Türkonfed, 2007). So even if women participated in the labor force, the types of jobs they found were either part-time so that they will not lose their social security rights via the male breadwinner of the house, or unsecure jobs that opted for female (hence, cheap) labor. The type of women can hold while maintaining their roles as primary caregivers are usually part-time and low-paid in Japan (Ueno, 1994) whereas the types of jobs (already a small number of working) women in Turkey hold are again low-paid (or unpaid) jobs (Türkonfed, 2007) which women carry out while maintaining their duties in the household at the same time. Thus, women's agency in the labor market shapes into a secondary source for the family budget than pursuit of individual careers (White, 2002; Arat, 1998).

Under the circumstances where women can benefit from social programs through their husbands, where professions prioritize male workers rather than female workers (and wages),

and in two societies which still highly believe the necessity of marriage in one's life[18], familial life proves to be more advantageous and sometimes obligatory option for women as well. The social and financial benefits of creating families may also explain why women choose to stay in marriages or why 87.3% of women in Japan and 75.2% of women agree that "being a housewife is just as fulfilling" (WVS, 2007).

If family is to be maintained, then women's incorporation to the public domain necessitates arrangement of the public agency so that duties in the private domain will not be forgotten. Thus, the best way to trespass into the public domain becomes acknowledging the priority of women's duties in the family and maybe trespassing under the identity women undertake in the private domain. In other words, participation should be to the extent that it did not interfere with what is expected of mothers and wives (Martin, 2004). Relevant to the "patriarchal bargain" argument of Deniz Kandiyoti (1989), women who wished to incorporate themselves the public domain first had to make sure not to forget their duties in the household. This meant that even if they adopted a public persona, as laborers, professionals, activists or politicians, they still needed to carry out their duties as mothers and wives. In short, incorporation of women to the public area becomes more of a trespass than full acknowledgment of their legitimacies as public agents.

In this sense, Kandiyoti's (1989) term "patriarchal bargain" holds for Japan in addition to Turkey. In a country where women have been historically marginalized from mainstream politics, women's grassroots political activities under the banner of "motherhood" have had a significant amount of support (LeBlanc, 1999; Takeda, 2006). This support indicates that identification of women through their roles in the private may enable them to even engage in

[18] World Values Surveys in Turkey and Japan show that marriage is still a highly regarded institution. While 88.5% of women and 90.8% of men in Japan disagree that "family is an outdated institution", the ratios of disagreement are 91.7% for women and 91.3% for women (WVS, 2007).

politics – with the assumption that they will uphold their duties in the household while doing so.

The necessity of arranging other activities while maintaining private duties manifests itself in women's formal political participation as well. Kubo and Gelb (1994:134) show that "the average age for women in political office in Japan 50.4, indicating the continuing obstacles to office holding for mothers of young children in Japan." In the last nine years, the average age for women in national politics has been 45.6 (TBMM, 2008) while the average age of female representatives in the National Assembly has dropped from 48.7 in 1999 to 43.9 in 2008. This means a larger portion of women with relatively younger children. Thus, it is important to observe how female politicians in Turkey positioned their duties in the private domain to their aspirations for political office.

This complicated duality of private and public identities materialized in the interviews I conducted for the study. Similar to Iwai Tomoaki's (1993) documentation of female Japanese parliamentarians of 1989, my interviews show that formal political agency usually means overworking of women between their families and political duties. The predominant argument was that finding time for their responsibilities in the home and family for a woman politician was nothing but "normal" – finding time (even if it means overworking) was the best endeavor. As one representative noted, keeping a political career and handling familial duties was "like a dinner table, without the salad or the desert the dinner would be lacking." All married female parliamentarians stressed that their husbands supported their political endeavors, but predominantly, questioning family and womanly duties such as motherhood was certainly not a matter of debate. In another instance, a statement of a female parliamentarian (who was in the top rank in her profession before she went into politics

several years ago) about how she managed her familial duties during the election campaign was illustrative of how women juggle their private identities with their public aspirations:

> The first lesson I learnt, you need to take care of how you will feed yourself during election campaigns and in politics. Of course, I had difficulty at home, because I didn't know it at the time. My husband was always supportive of me, but I went home late at night, and my son was in college at that time. So I wake up early in the morning, I cook, I put the dish I cooked to the fridge, my husband comes and eats it, and at the same time I am cooking something for myself to take it with me on the road [during the election campaign], I cook a cake or something. But I arrived at 1 a.m. that night, I woke up early, I was very tired, so it was very hard.

As this anecdote suggests, although this individual was one of the highest ranked professionals at the time of her election campaign, she was responsible of taking care of the household. Thus the support male members of the households of women parliamentarians seem to be more psychological than material. Aiuchi (2001) states that in Japan, wives of male politicians tend to participate in formal politics by maintaining relations with (especially female) voters in the constituency and one might assume that she would also take care of the household while her husband is attending parliament sessions. But my interviews make it possible to assume that women's formal political participation is more tiring and complicated because of the need to keep up with feminine duties as primarily private agents while pursuing political aspirations.

Promotion of the centrality of the family is also significant in terms of its impact on the formulation and execution of political relationships in these two countries. The personalized nature of Japanese and Turkish politics owes much to the transmission of familial modes of operation to the political domain in the sense that both prefer close personal relations to impersonal, systematic use of merit. Yet men and women in Turkey and Japan utilize such personal formulation of politics to different extents. Men can exhaust personalized operation

of politics through their familiarity in communal or professional networks, as well as exhausting familial networks if they are members of politically or influentially prominent families. The types of jobs men in Japan work in, including higher-rank offices in the bureaucracy and big business enables them to transfer to politics more easily, especially if the trend of "former bureaucrat-current politician" in Japan is considered (Stockwin, 1999). The primary identification of women through their families (Joseph, 2002) becomes useful within personal politics because both in Turkey and Japan, the exhaustion of familial networks is one of the primary pathways to formal political agency for women (see for Japan, Kubo and Gelb, 1994; see for Turkey, Arat, 1989). Wives or daughters of prominent former politicians or well-known figures in both countries still constitute a good portion of female parliamentarians, as was the case for three out of the thirteen of the female parliamentarians I conducted interviews with for the study. One of them was coming from a prominent party in her constituency while the other two were close relatives to authority figures in their parties. Familial connections are so important that female candidates in Japanese local elections usually feel the need to cloak their party identifications in order to benefit from their familial and community networks to the greatest extent (Kubo and Gelb, 1994). Thus identification through family becomes a pathway for formal politics, but at the same time it is a rather limited option in terms of the amount of individuals who are actually coming from such families.

The patriarchal content of familial modes of conduct is consequential also because through the transmission of such type of relationships and values to the public domain, patriarchal hierarchy is thus transferred and reproduced in the public domain (Joseph, 2002). The legitimization of familial power inequalities and male authority on decision-making becomes a blueprint for practice in the public domain by providing a sense of who makes the

rules, on what premises the rule-making authority is held and who abides by these rules. While women's position as subordinates in familial relationships is transferred out of the private domain to the public sphere, this subordination is in return bolstered in the family through its legitimization in the public sphere. The subordination of women at home and women's subordination in the labor market, more generally the public domain, bolster each other simultaneously. Yet I had the chance to observe a possible rupture in such a gendered cycle of subordination in one of my interviews. One representative who had worked in the establishment of the Women's Branch of their party recalled what a member of the Branch told her after she was elected for the local parliament. She informed the representative that his husband's attitude towards his wife changed; he "started listening to what his wife was saying." And although very symbolical, the husband "started holding the door for [his wife] for the first time in their marriage". The acknowledgement of this woman's agency in the public sphere had helped to amend the conventional gender hierarchy in the familial domain.

Unless there is intervention by women and the state with its institutions and discourses, the state and family can continue to empower each other in their power disparities and divisions of labor that adversely affect women in Japan and Turkey. The masculinized rationale of governing in Japan and Turkey keeps multiple inequalities alive, including the power disparities in the familial domain. It is not uncommon practice that leaders in both countries have referred to women as "baby machines" (BBC, 2007) or promoted giving birth to three children (Radikal, 2008). Economy in both countries are formulated by keeping women's labor unsecure, underpaid (or unpaid) as well as not counting the immense load of work carried as familial caregivers. Although Japan is need of increasing incorporation of female labor force due to the fast aging and decreasing demographics, the Equal Employment

Act of 1986, amended in 2007, has proved inadequate in preventing indirect discrimination of women. Furthermore division of employment options between career and non-career tracks has been argued to systematize women's incorporation to the labor market through secondary or unsecure positions (Fujimura Fanselow and Kameda, 1994; Osawa, 2000). All in all, an increase in sources in Japan is offset by the antidemocratic nature of division of sources within the familial, civil and economic domains as well as the division of labor normalized by patriarchal practices and discourses. This phenomenon is one of the most common similarities between source-abundant Japan and developing Turkey.

An active counter-force to the jurisdictional regulation of the gendered domains of agency has been the active participation of women's groups since late 1980s in both countries. Groups advocating several causes and executing numerous projects on domestic violence (Arat, 2000; Altınay and Arat, 2007), on women's political participation to local and national parliaments (Eto, 2001; Takao, 2007), and several other women's groups have kept up with the international developments on women's issues, especially those administered by the United Nations. UN activities and conventions on women such as the Beijing Platform and CEDAW have had influence on the policy formulation in Japan and Turkey after 1990s after the active advocacy women in Japan carried out (see for Japan, Osawa, 2000). Women's groups in Turkey have also fervently voiced concerns regarding domestic violence, social security, gender equality, political representation of women, accomplishing change by the reforms in the laws pertaining to violence in the family, the Civil Code and the Criminal Code after late 1990s and early 2000s (Altınay and Arat, 2007) as well as women's organizations under the leadership of KA-DER carrying out the most successful campaign in terms of women's representation before 2007 elections. Thus the past two decades have demonstrated

that familial (and public) issues became an area of contestation between women's groups and the state, women's groups developing into an important element of the analysis of gendered consequences of continuous nation-making. But although the impact of women's groups on jurisdictional amendments for gender equality has risen in the past two decades in Turkey and Japan, the women's groups in both countries are facing a tradition of "strong state", which makes their endeavors relatively more challenging.

4.4 STRONG STATES AND FEMALE SUBJECTS?

I argue in this study that one of the reasons why women's formal political agency in Japan and Turkey resemble each other is because both Japanese and Turkish states are strong states. What I define as a strong state is the state institutions and their practices being directly and indirectly pervasive in the lives of citizens to a significant extent. The rationale of governing in Turkey as well as in Japan requires frequent state intervention on the daily lives of individuals as citizens. Although these intervention might be carried out by different means in Turkey and Japan, the similar consequence is the reproduction of hegemonic femininity/ masculinity and gendered hierarchies of the family and the society.

Whether Japan is a strong state or not has been questioned several times in the literature. Haley (1993. Cited in Muramatsu, 1996:19) argues that the Japanese state can not be regarded as a strong state because although Japanese laws define jurisdictions, many of these laws do not contain penalty provisions. Furthermore, it is considered to be a small state with a small body of state workers, utilized to the maximum degree possible (Muramatsu, 1996). State projects in Japan since World War II have been mostly carried out through private

institutions and industries through contracts, a practice that has been adopted in Turkey only for the last decades.

But all evidence to the contrary, similar to the Turkish state, the practices and ideology of the Japanese state endorses enables naming the Japanese state as a strong state. The practices of the Turkish and Japanese states differ in the sense that the detailed multiple jurisdictions of state institutions in Japan regulate the daily practices of its citizens to a very comprehensive extent (Muramatsu, 1996). Many quotidian aspects of the lives of Japanese citizens are meticulously systematized by state jurisdictions. This is especially consequential for women because the regulations usually fall into areas that are under the female share of labor, such as provision of children's education and home economy. Education is systemized and regulated in a great detail in Japan for it is one of the most important sources of economic prosperity. The role of mothers within children's education and maintenance of the household is consequently regulated in a detailed manner, from attending obligatory PTA meetings (White, 2002) to designing each month what mothers need to put into their children's lunchboxes (Allison, 2000). And contrary to Haley's (1993. Cited in Muramatsu, 1996:19) argument, inexistence of penalty does not always mean that jurisdictions are overlooked. It is no coincidence that the stress on discipline and order is one of the cores of the education ideology adopted by the meticulously programmed Japanese education system, ensuring the implementation of these provisions by the individuals to a good extent (McVeigh, 1998). Thus, the widespread jurisdictional power of the Japanese state institutions and the promotion of discipline create a sense of the strong state without necessarily having a great number of institutions like Turkey.

The Turkish state, on the contrary, has a large body of state workers and number of institutions. But what makes the Turkish state strong is its ideology along with the brute force it does not hesitate to exert on its citizens. From the ban on freedom of speech to the prominence of the army in its politics, the Turkish state regulations define the boundaries of daily personal act. However there are also attributes that Japan and Turkey share with regards to their dispositions as strong states. One of the two most significant commonalities is maybe the ideologies of the two states with regards to governing. Both Turkey and Japan share the perspective that state must be strong to get anything accomplished (for Japan, see Williams, 1994. Cited in McVeigh, 1998:48). In this sense two countries share the tradition of "people for the state" rather than the other way around. While Japan required mobilization of its citizens for industrial and economic progress, Turkey kept its citizens alert for mobilization against threats to the state and territorial integrity through decades. In both cases, there is a strong disciplinary practice by the state, aiming to discipline the citizens in order to govern "effectively". Similarly, Abe et al (1994) defined the stance of the Japanese state towards its citizens as "paternalistic benevolence", postulating the dismissal of sharing power with the citizens. This stance is also reflective of the rationale of governing the Turkish state institutions adopted, limiting the chances of citizens for deliberation on and alteration of state practice.

Dismissal of power sharing with citizens subsequently limits the agents that can engage in politics, isolating individuals from the sphere in which those defined as authorities deal with formal politics. I argue that Turkey and Japan carry on the exclusionary political decision-making patterns which the founding fathers in both countries had practiced earlier on during modernization. The hegemonic masculinity that the founding fathers themselves manifested

limits participation to politics, for men who do not conform to this ideal (in ethnic or socioeconomic sense) and for women who do not have the chance to exhaust the few options for political access such as coming from prominent families. In Turkey and Japan where state institutions through their dispositions reproduce the authority of hegemonic masculinity, those (including women) who are not within the confines of this masculinity are as a result left out of the formal political domain.

This exclusion results in frustration in both countries. Several scholars note that a Japanese citizens report feeling powerless to influence political processes (Richardson and Flanagan, 1984; Martin and Stronach, 1992), while Martin (2004) finds that this perception among women is stronger since they see the such barriers as gender specific. Although World Values Surveys demonstrate that confidence rates in political institutions in Turkey are higher than those in Japan[19], the volatility (in terms of party preference) and decline in party identification Sayarı (2002) analyzes may also point to a certain sense of inefficacy among Turkish citizens. The frustration among citizens in terms of lack of efficacy points out that, mediums for participation is insufficient, manifesting an exclusionary rationale of authority and governing rather than founding the base for a more open and participatory definition of politics.

Second similarity between Turkey and Japan with regards to consequences of strong statehood is its effect on female citizenship. When political decision making is exclusionary, the definition of what constitutes politics (hence what is worthy of attention) depends on the rationality of those who govern. Japanese and Turkish politicians have long utilized this descriptive capability to women's expense. Although state regulations in both cases intervened

[19] World Values Surveys show that confidence in the parliament is 43.9% in Turkey whereas it is 17.1% in Japan. The confidence in the government (reported in 2001 for Turkey and reported in 2000 in Japan) is 36.5% in Turkey and remains in 22.7% in Japan.

in the familial domain to a great extent, the governments have chosen to overlook certain problems in the familial domain as well. As Haley argues for Japan, it has also been the case in Turkey that what can be labeled "private" activity are "those areas that the state chose to exclude from its regulatory reach rather than a realm to which its authority could not extend" (Haley, 1991:27. Cited in McVeigh, 1998: 62). Thus "private" in the eyes of the state institutions were those that they did not chose engage through policies or those they did not comment on. Domestic violence has been one of the most critical phenomena that Turkish and Japanese state institutions had continuously defined as "private". Both countries started confronting this issue (in somewhat limited approach) only one and a half decades ago, after the insistent protests of the feminist groups in both societies and the internationalization of the subject under the promotion of United Nations (and for Turkey, the European Union) (for Turkey, see Altınay and Arat, 2007; for Japan, see Gender Equality Bureau, 2007; WOM, 2001).

The exclusionary practice of defining what is political in Turkey and Japan has been consequential for women in these countries also in relation to the hierarchy between male and female citizenships. The types of duties women and men carry out differentiate between male and female citizenships. As I argued above, citizenship is gendered in relation to women's biological capacity to give birth. But what is similar for Turkey and Japan is that subsequent to diversification, a ranking occurs between male and female citizenships (see for Turkey, Altınay, 2004; see for Japan, Mackie, 2002). As Altınay (2004) argues for Turkey, in Japan too, modern rationale of governing ranks male and female citizenships in relation to their incorporation of "national defense." There is visible promotion in each case of the incorporation of male citizenship to national defense where female citizenship is directly or

indirectly excluded from these practices. I argue this exclusion is critical because as Frühstück (2003:4. Cited in Germer, 2006:53) argues for 19th century Japan, the hierarchical ranking of male/female citizenships, and the disciplinary processes inherent in defense practices in both countries also aim to "colonize female sexuality", putting the female sexuality in control of and in service to male sexuality. This colonization of female sexuality consequently legitimates the subordination of female citizenship to its male counterpart, and challenges the autonomous disposition of female sexuality by female agents.

4.5 "NATIONAL DEFENSE" AS DEFENSE AGAINST FEMALE SEXUALITY?

Another significant contextual similarity between Japan and Turkey is the role national defense plays in not only differentiating, but also in ranking male and female citizenships. Although the content of defense changes in each context, both in Japan and in Turkey national defense is one of the most important political matters. Regardless of the nature of the service, defense of the country requires continuous mobilization of and sacrifice from citizens. Thus the contributions of male and female citizens to the national defense constructs a hierarchy of citizenships through the service male and female citizens carry out for national defense in Japan and Turkey (see for Turkey, Altınay, 2004).

Certainly, the content of national defense changes considerably between Turkey and Japan. Although Japan has serious military capabilities, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that Japan will never maintain military forces for belligerent purposes. Contrary to Turkey where national defense is primarily defined through territorial integrity, Japanese policy of national defense depends on the pursuit of security through maintenance of economic power. As Richards Samuels (1994) argues, Japan's ideology on security is based on the belief

that “it is the nation that must construct security and defend its citizens from losses of skills and wealth, losses that can be as devastating as the losses of territory” (Samuels, 1994:3).

But, regardless of the content of the “act” of national defense, what brings Turkey and Japan together is the similar role labor market and the military plays in differentiating between male and female citizens, and disciplining them into a hierarchical relationship. There is close proximity between the agency constructed in the military in Turkey and the agency constructed in the labor market in Japan.

Several similarities establish this proximity. First, the rationale of each practice is “defense”, be it through military or economic means. It directly incorporates the individual taking part in continuous nation-making. Second, the practice is a very disciplinary process, including its discourse and its execution. Ueno (1995. Cited in Taga, 2003:132) argues the discourse used within businesses in Japan is derivative of military practice, entailing common terms such as “corporate warrior/soldier”, “market-strategy” or “advance guard”. Taga (2003) furthers this argument by stating the military image in Japan has survived in the masculine field of economic war. The similarities in the execution of these disciplinary processes are also evident. Altınay (2004) argues that the celebrations which people send their friends to their term in the military constitute one of the rituals of “becoming a man.” Dasgupta (2000) notes the media attention given to the entrance ceremonies of various companies in Japan every year. In each case participation to military/business signifies the initiation of “manhood”, such ceremonies do not position women as the “participant”. The induction processes new employees go through in secluded locations for about a month which consist of “a strict daily regimen of morning wake-up calls, lights-out at night, meal-times, bath-times” (Dasgupta, 2000:195) very much resemble the military experience. In each case, there is a disciplinary

process that familiarize men with each other and teach them similar modes of correct conduct/performance (hence, masculinity). Furthermore, the qualities businesses expect from their employees resemble those of military to a great extent: "loyalty, diligence, dedication, sacrifice, hard-work" (Dasgupta, 2000:193). The exhibition of these qualities are continuous in each case, everyday for the Japanese white-collar employee and the Turkish man the minute the duty calls after his conscription term is over. In this sense, hegemonic masculinity in both cases are very much related to the military discipline, and define masculinity (and citizenship) through participation of defense.

Apart from the similarities between the discourses and practices, the third commonality between the Turkish and Japanese experience is the effect of participation to national defense differentiating male and female citizenships. Men's direct participation to military in Turkey and the white-collar work in Japan valorizes male citizenship while subordinating the female citizenship through its exclusion from these practices (see for Turkey, Altınay, 2004). This exclusion is reflective of the state policies on the division of private and public agencies as well as the primary identification of women through their placement in the family. In other words, multiple institutions of both states, including institutions on health, employment, social security and defense in each case promote the reproduction of this gendered hierarchy between citizenships. The Turkish state policies conscribe each male citizen from a certain age, and as Altınay (2004) argues, while women have been allowed to enter military academies in 1992, the official discourse and practice has promoted the military to be a male domain[20]. The Japanese state policies on education and employment have strongly promoted the

[20] Currently the number of women officers in the Turkish Armed Forces is reported by Turkish Permanent Delegation to NATO (2006) to be 3%. This is also somewhat reflective of how the perception and practice of military service is gendered in Turkey. In a similar fashion, the Japanese state also allowed women to enter Defense Academies after 1992 (Kubo and Gelb, 1994).

incorporation of young people to the white collar work through detailed systematization of the education and employment system. But there has been a clear preference on the type of white collar employee, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1986 has in practice resulted in the clear separation of female and male employment pattern (Ueno, 1994). Although the law offered two types of employment patterns, career-track and non career-track, the duration and the amount of work the career track required from each employee resulted in female workers choosing non-career track from the start (and working as "office ladies" rather than "salarymen".) Thus the state policy in each case differentiates between the type of contribution that is expected from the male and female citizens with regards to national defense. They both promote the active exhibition of loyalty from men, while women's contribution to national defense becomes of a secondary significance, or more of an indirect contribution in relation to their duties as caregivers of future generations of (corporate) soldiers.

As stated above, differentiation of female contribution defines the "first class citizenship" (Altınay, 2004) in the masculine body, placing female citizenship in a secondary position. As legitimate agents of the outer domain, male citizenship in each case becomes the first class citizenship through men's direct contribution to the national security. While in Japan the male citizen becomes the first class citizen through incorporation to white-collar work (Mackie, 2002), male citizenship becomes superior through obligatory conscription and serving for the army even for a limited time in Turkey (Altınay, 2004).

I argue positing female citizenship is critical for women's public agency for two reasons. First of all; the prioritization of hegemonic masculinity privileges male authority, as well as legitimizing the placement of the female sexuality in service of male sexuality. As warriors and providers of the nation, masculinity's access to those below it becomes

legitimate. Frühstück (2003:4. Cited in Germer, 2006:53) argues for Japan's militarization in late 19th and early 20th centuries, that the "powerful rhetorical figure" of defense was not only utilized for concrete military mobilization but was also used to execute the "internal colonization" of female sexuality, thus controlling and abolishing its autonomy. I argue that this authority for access to female sexuality continues today through incorporation of men to the hegemonic masculinity by military and white-collar work, and materializes in both countries in certain spaces. While sexuality of women who are married with children are constrained within the confines of their homes, sexuality of "other" women are presented to the service of male citizens, such as hostess clubs workers in Japan (Allison, 1994) and prostitution in both countries. Anne Allison (1994) examines the case of hostess clubs in Japan where educated young women serve male white collar workers, not as sex workers but as female figures as temporary companions with an unattainable sexual reference. Similarly, both states tend to overlook prostitution by limiting them to certain spaces. In each case, hegemonic masculinity disciplines men into being subordinates to the ultimate hegemonic authority (the boss or the commander) while this subordination make these male citizens superior to female citizens at the same time. The privilege male citizenship through direct participation to disciplinary practices of national defense legitimates placement of the female sexuality in service to the male sexuality, either through domesticating (and secluding) it or confining it within specific public spaces[21]. Legitimization of control over female sexuality consequently problematizes the relationship between women's public agency and sexuality.

[21] In reality, prioritization of hegemonic masculinity (and male citizenship) is itself a conflicted process. As much as it subordinates female sexuality and female citizenship, reaching the expectations of this hegemonic ideal seems to be a tension-ridden struggle for men as well. Allison (1994), Altınay (2004), Dasgupta (2000) and Taga (2003) all underline anxieties that men experience in placing themselves in relation to these hegemonic masculinities in Japan and Turkey. Considering the prevalence of former white-collar workers (including bureaucrats) within male politicians in Japan, it might be that men who can participate in formal politics are actually those who are relatively more successful in performing this masculinity. This is the same for Turkey,

4.6 FEMALE SEXUALITY AND AGENCY IN JAPAN AND TURKEY

It seems that female sexuality, unless it is kept secluded and domesticated, might become problematic for public agency (hence formal political participation) of women in Turkey and Japan. I suggest this in light of the hegemonic femininity posited on "good wife and wise mother" notion which both state policies have promoted for decades. Chatterjee (1993) argues that in relation to women's capacity give birth; post-colonial nation-making projects identify women as the carriers of indigenous essences, and this identification gives "femininity" a spiritual quality. Chatterjee furthers this argument by adding that after their incorporation to the nation, women now could go into the public domain but "the spiritual signs of her femininity" would mark her demeanor, dress, and other personal traits (Chatterjee, 1993:130). Such spirituality enables women to enter the public domain, but it also makes exhibition of female sexuality problematic. It thus becomes necessary to do a "fine tuning" of femininity up to the borderline of exhibition of female sexuality. The "motherhood" role with which the Turkish and Japanese nation-building projects identified women is similar to what Chatterjee (1993) is suggesting in the sense that motherhood is a "pure" and "sacred" identity. As have been the case in Japan, women as mothers (and daughters) can enter the public domain in Turkey as well, but such identification also constraints the freedom to exhibit female sexuality. Moreover, legitimization of women's public agency through the "motherhood" identity further makes adoption of alternative female agencies in the public domain (such as the agency of young single women, sex workers, etc.) controversial and illegitimate (see for Japan; Takeda, 2006).

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meaning men who do not go through conscription are not allowed to enter elections. But although men's conformity to hegemonic masculinity is a complicated process that should be kept in mind, diversification and under-valorization of female citizenship takes place nevertheless.

Hiroko Takeda (2006) argues women's political agency through motherhood constrains women as much as isolating other women from legitimate political agency. Within such respectable agency there is no room for other groups of women, including the ones who exhibit female sexuality out in the open. Similarly, I had the chance to observe how female sexuality was interpreted as a threat to female political agency during one of my interviews. After reading a statement of a former head of a women's branch in a party about keeping the names of the female candidates in the dark intentionally in case these women were to become subject to slanders of indecent affairs, I inquired this representative on this party decision. The representative explained their decision as "This [having indecent affairs] was something that a male candidate could recover from, but a woman certainly couldn't." It seems that reference to sexuality is a more critical "deal-breaker" for women candidates than male candidates, making the line women parliamentarians work with even thinner than it already is.

The challenging task of obscuring sexuality until it may no longer become a threat for women's public agency was something I observed in the demeanors of the female representatives during the interviews as well. Durakbaşa (1998) argues in her article that Turkish women in the early times of the Republic used to armor their public persona with an asexual quality in order to function as equals in the public. From my experience, it seems that there has been a slight change in attitudes of Turkish female representatives nevertheless. They look much more feminine than their precedents; Tansu Çiller of Turkey was different in the sense that her attire and manners were much more feminine than any female politician before (Ağduk-Gevrek, 2004). To an outsider, current representatives resemble the imagery of Çiller rather than adopting an asexual imagery. But similar to Tomoaki's (1993) account on the newly elected female parliamentarians of Madonna Boom of 1989 in Japan, Turkish female

parliamentarians I interviewed seemed to "strive not to be overly conscious of being a woman" (1993:107) to assert their equality in the formal political domain. Apart from four representatives (three of them had prior work in gender projects or women's groups), all respondents made it clear during our discussions that they did not wish to be identified as *woman* politicians. Many of them underlined that being women was not the reason why their parties endorsed them, and although "they were more sensitive to social issues", they did not wish to "specialize in women's issues". In every case, a fine tuning of womanhood and individuality (hence equality) was necessary.

In this arrangement of legitimate public agencies and sexualities, female representatives not only stay clear of any reference to sexuality, but they also make the effort to behave in a more feminine manner through their gestures and speech (they never raise their voice even when they are angry about the subject matter and are always courteous and kind), they do not always position themselves as asexual. It seems that women representatives keep their sexuality in check more through their subtle and reticent manner while starting to disengage themselves from an asexual disposition. And while Turkish women cloak any reference to their sexuality through their manners in order to be legitimized as public agents, Japanese women do this by taking on motherhood as an identity to voice their political arguments. The "good wife and wise mother" ethos through which gender relations and nation was constructed by Japanese and Turkish modernizers had put women in altruistic and virtuous (thus, asexual) positions. Japanese women utilized this unthreatening identification as a starting point for political mobilization while this did not happen in Turkey. Although several female representatives during the interviews mentioned motherhood as one of their

personal attributes, most do not refer to motherhood as an attribute founding their mobilization.

Regardless of how they accomplish obscuring their sexualities, women in Japan and Turkey adopt modest and reticent stances in order to be legitimate public agents. Whether they wear white aprons while working for women's associations (Wilson, 2006) or make the effort to use a courteous manner while talking to strangers, the content of female agency should be devoid of any threat of women's sexuality to be legitimate[22]. The prohibition on the exhibition of female sexuality (along with other sexualities except for male heterosexuality) through clothing and manner rendered women free to leave the home, yet given them a new restraint and responsibility of self-control over their sexuality (Durakbaşa, 1998).

The sanctioning of women's sexuality in the public domain differentiates between women in Japan and Turkey as well. Between those who conform to their proper gender roles and those who do not, there is a thin line separating women who are "virtuous" enough to be legitimate public agents and those who are castigated. The asexual nature of the ideal of "good wives and wise mothers" is compensated within specific and secluded domains of prostitution and women trafficking in both countries. While the sexuality of wives and mothers of the nation is secluded, the sexualities of particular groups of foreign or local women are thus put into service of male sexuality in both countries.

The "comfort women" issue the Japanese state has been forced to confront in the last two decades is one example to this unconstrained exercise of male sexuality within specified and closeted spaces[23]. The state assistance of prostitution within red-light districts for

[22] Wilson (2006) presents the white aprons as a tool to bolster the image of unity and a classless society during war years in Japan.

[23] The "comfort women" issue is related to the state's assistance to setting up Japanese and Korean women to "serve" as prostitutes for foreign troops and traders. Although the issue has been brought back to the landing of

foreigners after 1858 and pressure on women to "serve there for the sake of the nation" (Takamure, 1954-1958:508-509. Cited in Germer, 2006:59) has both provided areas for a foreign currency profit-making scheme (Germer, 2006) *and* areas for the fulfillment of male sexuality. Such contracted utilization of female sexuality was regarded beneficial to prevent general humiliation and "feminization" of Japan (Germer, 2006:61) while the women who were pressured into prostitution were mostly coming from poorer regions and families of the country (Germer, 2006).

The visible differentiation of the state between women regarding their sexuality is evident through such cases and prostitution continues to be very problematic regarding the relationship between Japanese and Turkish states and women who perform sexual labor. Prostitution has been banned in Japan since the Anti-Prostitution Law of 1956; however tacit recognition by zoning regulations has been widely known (Mackie, 2002). Prostitution is legal in Turkey although registration and complying with the health regulations (such as controls) are mandatory. However Turkey also became a hub of woman trafficking through which a wide group of foreign sexual laborers are exploited.

One very interesting case regarding the stance of Turkish state towards its sexual laborers is of Ayşe Tükrükçü, a female sexual laborer who wanted to stand for the 2007 elections as an independent candidate from Istanbul. In her own words, Tükrükçü explained her motive for candidacy as to make the women who are "sexually exploited by force so that other women's chastity would be secured" heard (NTVMSNBC, 2007). Her argument regarding the state and parliamentarians' disregard for the slavish positions of sexual laborers was disregarded once more by the City Election Board which denied candidacy to Tükrükçü

Portuguese in 1543; it has been subject of debate more often regarding prostitution during the Asia-Pacific War and US occupation. The subject became matter of debate in 1990s after the Japanese state faced compensation charges and feminist historiography started flourishing in Japan (Germer, 2006).

stating that her profession constituted an infamous crime. However along the many crimes mentioned by the law, sexual labor is clearly not in the list. Tükrükçü entered elections after appealing to the decision, but she lost the elections although she had received a considerable amount of vote.

4.7 CONCLUSIONS: BUILDING THE BASICS

Japan and Turkey are similar cases with regards to women's formal political participation for several contextual reasons. These contextual similarities also found the basis on which political and electoral systems are constructed, how employment and education patterns are given meaning and how women's agencies are constructed in Japan and Turkey.

The first very consequential similarity between Japan and Turkey is the content and effect of their respective modern nation building processes on women. Stemming from similar concerns and sharing similar aspirations, Japanese and Turkish modernist elites executed a creative project of shaping ideal feminine and masculine citizenships, formulating a political system that is exclusionary in terms of participation and established a state system which differentiates between what is political (thus male) and what is social (thus female). In this picture, women in Japan and Turkey were sideliners rather than frontrunners, a status bolstered by the promotion of male economic agent and masculine national defense in both countries. The modernization periods in both countries fell short of terminating inequalities in the familial and public domain, on the contrary how modernization has been taken up in these countries ended up supporting gendered modernizations and unequal citizenships in practice.

The second similarity between Japan and Turkey is how women were incorporated into modern nation-building projects. Women became one of the foci of modernization however

women's modernization had an agenda of its own. Enlightenment came with the promotion of women's primary roles as "good wives and wise mothers" of Japan and Turkey which defined women as agents of the private domain above all other identifications they might undertake. While men became the actors of the material, modernizing world, women were defined to be the carriers of indigenous essence of their nations. Their agency in the public domain was only to be legitimized if they submitted to their primary roles as mothers, wives and caregivers of the familial domain, in continuity of Kandiyoti's (1989) "patriarchal bargain".

Another very significant commonality between Japan and Turkey is the limitations the female agency entailed. Through modern nation-building processes of Japan and Turkey, female sexuality came to signify a source that should be utilized for procreation under the regulation of the state institutions and should be kept in check for the establishment and continuity of male privilege. Thus, in addition to legitimizing their public aspirations by submitting to their roles in the familial domain, women were expected to stay away from exhibiting and referring to their sexualities. In both countries, women who can attain political representation has been women who either relatively succeeded to overcome certain obstacles or those who exhausted what the patriarchal families, economies or states regulations have provided them.

All of these points found further similarities on political and electoral systems, effects of education and employment on women's formal political participation and female agencies. In the next chapter, I examine how these contextual and institutional conditions effect women's representation.

CHAPTER 5

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CONTEXT: ANALYZING FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2)

5.1 INTRODUCTION: DISSECTING POLITICS, RESOURCES AND AGENCY

The rationale underlying modern governmentality helps distribute certain roles among citizens and delineate their domains of primary responsibility. Practices within education, economy, jurisdictional regulations and others socialize and discipline individuals into performing gendered citizenships, and they construct their identities through the disciplinary processes they go through. In this chapter, I examine how the definition and execution of governmentality and gendered notions within national ideologies influence the construction of electoral and political party systems. I try to understand what type of a disciplinary practice electoral and political system become in each national context. Similar to its impact on the identification processes of citizens, rationale of modern government effects the creation of specific rules of participation, including definitions of who can participate and how. I argue in this chapter that although several institutional arrangements change between the Turkish and the Japanese cases, the rationale underlying political participation systems creates important similarities hindering or assisting women's formal political participation.

In this chapter, I first look at how the rationale of the national context shaped (and gendered) electoral and political party systems in Turkey and Japan. Then in the second section, I examine what kind of meaning and importance these national contexts endow education and employment for women's political participation, and how women politicians in

Turkey and Japan utilize these meaning while constructing their agencies. In the last section I trace how women parliamentarians define themselves and their place in formal politics, to understand how they interpret their place in formal politics, and in the greater national context.

5.2 RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS IN TURKEY AND JAPAN

Political party and electoral systems are as contextual as they are institutional. They are contextual because the delineation of constituencies and voting systems are themselves political decisions. Political party systems are closely related to the political environment and conduct within a country, reflecting the general modus operandi of politics in Japan and Turkey.

The argument that Turkey and Japan present examples to comprehensively intervening practices by the state institutions are observable with regards to the construction and operation of electoral and political party systems in these countries. This is because there are few channels of political participation in both countries, and those that exist may prove to be exclusionary for many women and men. While exclusion from formal political participation is evident for both sexes, the ratios of women holding offices in both countries also show that formal political participation continues to be a greater chasm for women nevertheless. In this section, I explore how this exclusion occurs through the characteristics electoral and political party processes have come to possess.

Japanese electoral system owes much to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which has been the sole party in power for 38 years, until 1993. The long reign of Liberal Democratic Party has especially been critical because its elite cadres and the rationale LDP cadres have

demonstrated has influenced how politics operate in Japan. The elite cadres of LDP, hence Japanese politics have contained a group of former bureaucrats, former big business employees, and men who had a wide community support in different regions of the country (Stockwin, 1999). The prevalence of men coming from prominent backgrounds in Japanese politics and the exclusion of other groups of individuals, including men without similar professional backgrounds or women shaped a certain prototype of Japanese politician figure. Relevant to attributes of this prototype, scholars writing on Japanese politics have referred to the "three-bans" necessary for winning elections in Japan as being "ji-ban", meaning organization, "kan-ban", meaning being well-known or having widespread popularity, and "ka-ban", meaning bag or money (Kubo and Gelb, 1994:133). This type of politician also fit the hegemonic masculinity embodied in the "salarymen" figure, bolstering the divide between private and public/political even further. The importance of "three-bans" also explains why the LDP has continually opted for selecting well-known female figures such as actresses, reporters, and entertainers who had the support of large groups for candidacy as its only female candidates throughout decades (Kubo and Gelb, 1994).

Over the decades, Japanese electoral system has been altered numerous times in favor of the LDP and these alterations have resulted in widespread development of personalized, patron-client relationship between the voters and the candidates (Stockwin, 1999). LDP's reign is consequential not only because its cadres have been the forerunners of the promotion of traditional gender roles through policies, but also because how they practiced politics has created a mode of formal political participation in Japan proving exclusionary to many groups of women. The relative lack of systemized rules within the party and within the relationships with the constituents, political conduct has developed into a personalized character which

proved hard to compensate for women due to their under representation in big business/bureaucratic circles, and lack of authority in small communities (Kubo and Gelb, 1994).

Through the LDP rule, another central aspect of Japanese politics have come to be support groups, namely the "koenkai"[24]. The small constituency system drafted by LDP was specifically consistent with "koenkai" because being the only party, there were multiple candidates of LDP in each election. The existence of multiple candidates from the same party necessitated to build the largest group of supporters in the constituency, leading to establishment of patron-client relationship between politicians and voters in constituencies. (Stockwin, 1999). Having multiple candidates in a single constituency competing with each other consequently required highly personal and vastly expensive campaigns to distinguish one candidate from another, sometimes leading to criminal activity (Eto, 2007; Stockwin, 1999). Thus it is not surprising why it has been hard for female candidates who lack the professional, thus the financial advantages of most male candidates to incorporate themselves into Japanese politics.

Following the fall of LDP from its 38 years-long single party domination in consequence of voter exasperation with the conduct of Japanese politics and the rise of opposition parties after 1980s, the electoral system in Japan have been reformed in 1994 (Eto, 2007; Stockwin, 1999). Now the elections for the Lower House of the Japanese Diet (House of Representatives) are carried out by electing the 300 seats out of 480 by single member

[24] Koenkai are "personal support organizations" (Stockwin, 1999:98) which Japanese candidates have to submit in order to apply for candidacy in a political party. Koenkai are deemed indispensable to the election process because they provide each politician a base of support outside of the party (Ogai, 2001). Furthermore, These are very large groups of supporters, sometimes ranging to 1 million names (under Liberal Democratic Party requirements) which makes it hard for women to gather because of their under representation in big business networks, bureaucratic cadres, and as Kubo and Gelb (1994) point out, the prevalent male authority in smaller communities.

constituencies by plurality and electing the remaining 180 by a proportional representation system with closed party lists[25]. The unsuccessful candidates in single-member districts can be nominated for the remaining 180 seats under the PR system by the party as well. This reform is also in line with the increasing entrance of women into Japanese politics since the PR system is argued to help increase women's representation in general (Norris, 1993) and in Japan (Eto, 2007). But the reform has fallen short of dismantling the patron-client relationships that has been prevalent in Japan to provide more room for new women politicians (Eto, 2007).

The Turkish political system has had a similarly exclusionary character in the sense that central groups of elites have come to define the players and the rules of the political game since the early Republican period. Turkey supports a proportional representation (PR) system, yet as Norris (1993) also argues, the PR system falls short of compensating all of the other obstacles in the war of women's formal political participation. The execution of the PR system in the Turkish context has reflected the overall diversification between national male and female roles in the sense that the ranks of female candidates in the closed party lists have diminished the positive influence of the PR to a great extent. This may also bolster the argument of Arat (1989) that the PR system does not make much difference in Turkey, contrary to the international experience. Multi-member constituencies offer a chance for female candidates since the parties can show multiple candidates from one constituency (Norris, 1993), but the ranks parties list their candidates become very decisive in terms of candidates' chances of election. Even if one party can win seven seats in a constituency, this would not make a difference for the female candidate having been ranked by her Party in the

[25] Elections for the Upper House (House of Councilors) are carried out separately. The 146 seats out of 242 in the Upper House (House of Councilors) are distributed to multi-member constituencies and the remaining 96 are distributed by the PR system, which Norris (1993) finds to be more favorable for women's representation.

ninth slot. This is especially critical because although they might have the chance to win multiple seats, Turkish political parties nevertheless rank female candidates very low in their party lists, ranking in average only 3% of their candidates in the first three slots while ranking 45% of their female candidates in the last three slots (KA-DER, 2007).

There are several other differences and similarities between Japanese and Turkish electoral systems that should not be noted here. Probably the biggest consequence of the diverse electoral systems between Japan and Turkey is on the role of candidates during elections. As mentioned above, the single-member constituency systems and multiple candidates from the same party requires personalization of the electoral campaigns in Japan. This divergence is important because it changes how election campaigns are executed and the role candidates play in these campaigns. The candidate is recognized by the voters relatively more than they do in Turkey and while the party impact is still decisive; the individual candidate fares relatively more important in Japan. Japanese voters get to know the candidate more and the election campaigns stress the individual candidates as much as the party identification. While candidates from the same party compete against each other, the responsibility to gather the necessary funds to pursue an electoral campaign is more of an individual concern of the candidate rather than a concern for Japanese parties. Thus women in Japan who can not overcome the financial burden of candidacy most possibly would not be able to pursue a political career in the national domain.

On the other hand elections in Turkey are much more dependent on the party while the candidate has a secondary impact, especially in larger cities. As two representatives from two different parties during the interviews stated, “the wind of the party” is extremely important for any candidate in Turkey. Apart from the candidates in the very first ranks, people do not

always know who they are voting for. Thus the election campaigns become a matter of concern and expense for the Turkish political parties. If a party is expected to win a certain amount of seats, then it automatically increases the chances of a female candidate to win, unless she is listed far below the list. Since more elected candidates mean more seats for the party, then the parties back the candidates up to the full extent. At the other side of the picture, their party linkages are probably the most significant attribute of a male or a female candidate. Although they may be highly respected professionals, if the party loses, the candidates are bound to lose.

There are advantages and disadvantages of both systems. First of all, as mentioned above, the Turkish electoral system is a PR system in which closed party lists are very significant, but multi-member constituencies nevertheless provide relatively more chance for female candidates to get elected in relation to their rank in the list. Japanese parties are known mostly to nominate male candidates for single-member constituencies since men are more likely to have broad connections in political, economic and social networks (Eto, 2007). But as Japanese women have harder time either establishing themselves as party members and/or overcoming the financial burdens of their parties, Turkish women have the disadvantage of having to prove themselves to the party in order to be listed high enough in the party list (if they are listed). My interviews demonstrate that parties financially and campaign-wise promote female candidates in Turkey, but to the extent that the central authorities believe that individual female is "good investment" for the party, limiting this support to the relatively more widely known candidates in the larger cities[26]. The constituency of the candidate is

[26] What I observed during my interviews in terms of being a "good investment" among female representatives was mostly being highly educated and professional, thus respectable and "representable" among constituents. In politics, both male and female candidates indeed need to be good investments for their parties to be granted limited candidacy posts. Yet within the interviews, I came to observe the qualifications for being good investment

significant since parties usually have more funds to spend for larger cities, but the more well-known and respected the candidate is, the more easily she can convince her party to finance her candidacy. This was observable during the interviews to a good extent. In one instance, a relatively unknown newcomer from a big city remembered that she had spent around 25 million Turkish liras during her candidacy where she was in the middle rank in the party list. Another individual who had been known for her previous work outside the party was nominated from further below in the list in another big city, but contrary to the first respondent, she stated all the costs for her election campaigns were financed by her party. Both of these individuals were coming from big cities where parties have a larger financial pool to spend on the campaigns, but a relatively unknown newcomer, even if she is nominated in a big city, may have to spend more money for financing an election campaign. Thus, it seems that it is critical whether the party decides one candidate is a good investment or not, both to be nominated and to be financially supported. This gives party elites more authority in terms of candidacy relative to Japan.

These differences between the electoral systems and their consequences are important to distinguish between candidacy patterns, party-candidate relationships and the details between the contexts women function in. But the overall result is both systems being rather unwelcoming to women; with regards to consequences they are still similar. Regardless of the variations in their institutional characteristics, the national ideology on gendered citizenships has been influential on electoral systems in Turkey and Japan. In other words, the institutional

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may differ between male and female candidates. Women's chances of being granted candidacy posts depended heavily on their personal attributes (including educational, professional as well as familial background and "morality" in terms of one's distance to female sexuality as explained in the previous chapter), these attributes rendering the female candidates "good investment" in terms of the reverence (thus approval) constituents show for a candidate who is a woman. Although it requires another study, from my interviews it was clear that women needed to prove themselves within a larger set of categories in order to be granted even more limited candidacy posts women could hold.

formulation and the modus operandi of the electoral system resemble very much the national contexts which found gendered performances of citizenship. The gendered division of labor rooted in the governmentality in Turkey and Japan thus diminish the diversifying effect of institutional differences between themselves, resulting in legitimizing political agency on the male body while disciplining women out unless they can exhaust familial or professional privileges. I argue that both of these processes bring about low formal political participation of women because they share several characteristics that are results of the similarity of Turkey and Japan with regards to their national categorizations of gendered citizenships.

5.3 MEETING POINTS: MASCULINITY AND PERSONALIZATION IN POLITICS

There are two main similarities between the electoral and party systems of Japan and Turkey that significantly affect women's formal political participation. The first is the legitimization of the political agency on the male body. The second similarity between Japan and Turkey is the highly social and personal nature of political conduct.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the modernization in Turkey and Japan also brought the clear definition of the limitations of political participation of citizens to the modern nation-state. The space of political contestation has been rather constrained in both countries in terms of the insufficiency of participatory institutions in these unitary states, and the definition of the legitimate actor that can participate in these institutions. The legitimate actor in both countries have been a gendered construction in the sense that unless women could exhaust patriarchal familial networks or socioeconomic privileges such as professional backgrounds, they could not justify for legitimate political agency. Evidently political participation in both countries are limited in gender, ethnic and socioeconomic aspects, in the

sense that men who do not conform to hegemonic masculinity in Turkey and Japan would face exclusion similar to their female counterparts rather than political elites of both countries. But embodiment of legitimate public/political agent and the active promotion of governmentality which specifically differentiate between male (public) and female (private) agencies through multiple policy regulations in Turkey and Japan exclude a greater portion of women from formal politics nevertheless. For women's entrance to formal politics, it is incremental to justify one's agency through successful incorporation to masculine disciplinary processes within political systems. In other words, it becomes necessary to prove that one can work within patriarchal hierarchies in political parties, and that one has the right to participate, either through familial networks or presenting oneself as a "good investment" to the male authorities.

This was observable in my interviews as well. Women parliamentarians have either successfully utilized their familial connections (three respondents), or they had proved to the male authorities in their parties that they were hard-working, had good relations in their constituencies (six respondents) or their professional expertise would be useful to the party in terms of policy-making (four respondents). Indeed, these categories are most of the time overlapping, in the sense that all of the respondents coming from a prominent family had also worked for the party for a considerable amount of time after they became members of their parties by acquaintance. More than half of the members who had worked in different projects as experts (such as in finance, media, public relations etc.) for the party, had prior acquaintance of the party cadres before they were asked for candidacy. In either case, they were successful in terms of incorporating themselves to the disciplinary process that male authorities have formulated within formal politics. Although women have exercised active

agency in every sense, decision of male figures (in the family or in the political system) facilitated the access of women into politics (Arat, 1989).

Political participation for women in Japan requires the exhaustion of similar masculinized privileges. Since formal political agency depends heavily on networks and personal support groups in Japan, women who wish to participate in politics in Japan have to build a "koenkai" or support group either through inheriting familial networks or work very hard to make themselves a plausible alternative to the established politicians in their constituencies (Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Eto, 2005). Family connections are equally important in Turkey, but because of the need to prove themselves to the party prior than the public most of the time, any expertise women can make use for the benefit of the party can prove beneficial as well. In each case, for a party to accommodate and assist a female candidate, that individual needs to prove to the male authorities that she is a good investment for the party, either through family connections within political networks and in the constituency. If she lacks familial connection, her expertise and added value to the party can be decisive. Nevertheless, it is the centralized authorities dominated by men who decide the "feasibility" of each female candidate in both countries.

Attainment of political agency then becomes a process that usually occurs in a top-down fashion, by men electing those women who work very hard to make a contribution in order to justify themselves but also among the women who work, those who are seen fit are assisted. This male authority-junior female relationship has been characteristic of Turkish politics since the times of the Republican Revolution and has continued through decades as Arat (1989) also demonstrates. The formulation of politics is manifested in similar fashion in Japan as well (Gaunder, 2008). An increase in the top-down facilitation of women by male

authorities have been the common trend between Japan and Turkey, Junichiro Koizumi of Japan assisting an increase in women representatives during 2005 elections while Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey have promoted increase in the number of women candidates during 2007 elections[27]. Gaunder's (2008) argument on Japan that the effect of political leadership is significant in mobilizing women's climb within party cadres and national politics holds for Turkey as well. However such "philanthropy" has not been without its consequences for women, as elaborated below.

5.3.2 WE ARE A BIG (PATRIARCHAL) FAMILY: PROBLEMS WITH PERSONALIZED POLITICS

The second similarity between Japan and Turkey is the highly social and personal nature of political conduct (see for Japan, Stockwin, 1999). Political agency relies on personal relationships, family connections, community bonds and other social relationships formed in communal, business or bureaucratic cliques in both countries. In this sense, personalized relationships accumulate a significant amount of social capital in politics[28]. But benefiting from this capital requires individuals to invest in personal networks in terms of money, time, and personal support to gain access to such capital in the first place (Bourdieu, 1986). The conditions are so that in Turkey and Japan, women are not always in position to have the

[27] These leaders have supported such an increase, yet the increasing women's advocacy on women's representation and gender equality in Turkey and Japan within the last two decades has founded the base for the initiation of discussions on women in society. Thus, although several leaders have embraced a policy of increasing women's representation, the great effort shown by women's groups in both countries made the gender equality issues visible in the first place (see for Japan, Mackie, 2002; Eto, 2005; see for Turkey, Arat, 1998a, 2000; Altınay and Arat, 2007).

[28] Pierre Bourdieu defines "social capital" as "an aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possessions of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition, or in other words to members in a group, which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitled them to credit, in the various sense of the word (Bourdieu, 1986:51).

option for investing in these networks, which limits their options for formal political participation. In terms of financial assets, the position of female labor denies many women in both countries the necessary tools to invest in these personalized networks (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007; Türkonfed, 2007). In terms of professional networking, many of the women in both countries are left out of high-level offices within professions (such as bureaucracy and business) which male politicians work prior to politics (see for Japan, Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994; Türkonfed, 2007). As a compensatory tool for investment to social networks, women coming from prominent families have historically utilized this asset to access social capital (Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Arat, 1989). The identification of women through their families is also suitable for the hegemonic femininity which prioritizes women's agency in the household in both countries. Yet at the same time this asset is very limited in terms of its owners, the women who can actively utilize their familial connections are a minority.

All in all, the existence of personalized politics requires access and investment to social networks rather than the establishment of standardized rules of operation. As one female representative defined, the functioning of political processes lead to "the lack of principle and regulations in politics". Personal relationships with authority figures are important for post appointments as well as to exhaust the potential of networks to the greatest extent. As stated above, a good portion of the representatives I interviewed, eight out of thirteen had prior acquaintance to a local or national party authority before applying for candidacy. This certainly does not show that social conduct of relations always entail nepotism, but the relative lack of standardized rules and prevalence of social networks in politics requires much more investment on socialization all the same.

I argue that the personalized operation of politics is bound to the established centrality of families in both countries. Materializing Suad Joseph's (2002) analysis on patriarchy, the centrality of the family as the basic unit of personal organization has induced the transfer of familial modes of operation to the public domain in Turkey and Japan. In both countries, political relationships operate through face-to-face, highly personal interactions in a political domain where there are little standardized rules for promotion or punishment (see for Japan, Stockwin, 1999). This is critical for a big group of women in the sense that although male and female political elites may compensate for the lack of rules by incorporation to communal, professional, and political networks, a predominant group of women's access to such networks may be very much constrained. Without the necessary personal safety net, female newcomers might be the first ones to be sacrificed.

Personal relations between voters and representatives may fare more important in Japan than in Turkey during elections since candidate becomes as important as her party identification, women's access to representation is fared with social connections with the individuals, networks and parties nevertheless. Such personalized conduct of politics proves harder for women who need to break into established community, business and political networks that have traditionally supported men as representatives (Kubo and Gelb, 1994). The case in Turkey is somewhat different due to the loci of decisive personalized relations.

Personal relations within political parties in Turkey are significant with regards to candidacy, ranking in party lists and funding – in short, they are incremental for attainment of formal political agency. As in Japan, centered decision making processes within political parties render personal decisions much more important than bureaucratic procedures (see Stockwin, 1999). The personalized nature of decision making within parties also provide

gatekeepers with more power than they already possess in both countries. The leaders and the cliques around the leaders are strong, which are nearly always male in composition. Thus it is not always certain how and on what systemic grounds the decisions are taken, apart from its socially charged nature. One interesting example demonstrating how a woman could break into the obscure decision-making process of the party cadres was the case of a former academician who applied the party after working on gender issues for several years:

> "I applied for candidacy first in 1999 elections. I was going to the party doing [gender awareness] courses [for women in the party]. I went to the Party Leader and I said "I want to apply as a candidate from The City." He said "Good luck." He didn't say anything, do it, don't do it, we would support you, we won't support you, nothing. So I went out, talked to the [chair of the women's branches of The Party] about this. She said "Professor, don't ever quit your job at the university, if he didn't say anything to you that means even if you will be in the list, you will not be in a high enough rank. Nothing is promised to you don't ever quit your job."

After this incident, the representative nevertheless quit her job and started working in the campaigns of the Party. She recalled that she was the first to go to the party offices weeks before the election campaigns started, that she talked a prominent male candidate into taking her everywhere with him, that she always traveled with the male candidates while the other female candidates did not accompany the group. After her work in the party for several years, she was elected in 2002 elections and then listed her in a rather higher position from her constituency in the 2007 elections. She was a respected academician also active in civil society groups, thus qualified for the educational and professional criteria that female candidates have shared in Turkey, but this did not mean that she could climb up the candidate list with her qualifications. After her first term, she became one of the favorite candidates of her party, her work in her constituency had been her investment for the social capital of the networks within

her party. But during the elections that initiated her career, who made the decisions and how were in the dark.

Similarly, one of the primary observations during the interviews was that the female candidates not elaborating on how exactly they were ranked in party lists during elections. Either it was passed as an unnecessary detail or quickly and very superficially. When I inquired to learn more on how exactly they were listed, it was still not very clear how exactly they were ranked. This is also puzzling since one can not grasp whether they were really receptive towards any decision the central authorities made or whether they showed any effort to influence the decision-making process.

Somewhat contradicting above statements, Arat in her study on women representatives in Turkey argues that "unlike the patriarchal explanation led us to expect, the disproportionate power of men could be instrumental in initiating the individually endowed women into politics" (Arat, 1989:120). This is also something I observed throughout my interviews since three of the very qualified and successful female representatives had been directly assisted in politics by male authority figures. Furthermore, another group of three was previously in similar social circle with male party elites due to the acquaintances of their fathers or husbands. Thus the acquaintances these women had with male party elites were helpful in initiating their political endeavors.

But still, there should be three important reservations to this argument on male gatekeeper-female newcomer relationship. First of all, the authority to initiate women into politics is nevertheless helpful in some cases, but this facilitation in return legitimizes and bolsters the authority of male leadership as well as personalized operation of politics. Accepting the mere right to exert such an authority perpetuates the gendered norms of

authority within the political domain, regardless of its good use. Consequently, this assistance may also result in extreme loyalty and gratitude which positions women in a big brother-little sister dichotomy. Practicing loyalty and gratitude is by no means a passive stance; it is an active agency which requires diligent effort on relationships, projects, and discourse. During three of the interviews, I directly heard the words "being grateful" for having been given a chance by the male party leaders. In all three instances, what followed the arguments regarding being grateful was "working hard to deserve" the chance given to these representatives. Thus this gratefulness led to active effort in terms of agency, two of the three were working in their constituencies, and the third was working for one of the departments of the party. In this sense, gratefulness founded the base for active agency.

However, instances of gratefulness and active agency sometimes resembled extreme loyalty which seemed to constrain the agency of female representatives at the same time. Female parliamentarians with whom I conducted interviews with were most sensitive about handling questions on party leaders and parties. Out of ten respondents, only three answered the question on what they would like to do if they were to become a party leader. The three who answered positively had several points in their minds with regards to future party projects that they would initiate, but the answers of the remaining seven fell under two categories: they either answered "I am happy with our party leader." or commented that "Everybody thinks that they can be a leader, but it is much harder than it looks. Most of the people don't question whether they can accomplish being a leader or not." This was the only question that I was strictly told to strike out in one instance. It seemed female parliamentarians were reluctant most about their answers on party leaders and parties. Female politicians I interviewed work

next to their male counterparts, yet the prospect of even the most experienced women altering the leadership of their big brothers looked highly unlikely.

Their reluctance to voice a critical argument may also be related to the inexistence of rules that would protect them if necessary. Lack of principled and systematic conduct within political parties leave party members and candidates without a security net that they can protect themselves from arbitrary or close-circuit decisions. As I observed during the interviews, there are three ways women can compensate for the prevalence of personalized politics in Japan and Turkey. One, they seem to use their expertise in their professions to provide valuable service for their parties. They work hard to organize and administer party organizations and create new projects for the party. Several party members interviewed were invited to stand as candidates either after they worked on projects for the party (such as media campaigns or financial consultancy) or they were popular in the public (as the common Japanese practice of nominating media members, such as Yoko Komiyama of DJP or Yuriko Koike of LDP who also headed the Defense Ministry for 54 days in 2007).

Second, they can adopt a very committed manner, carefully staying reticent while doing whatever task is given by the party authorities, as discussed above. A third practice of compensation may be drawing support from the voters through adamant issue-advocacy. This seems to be a more common pattern in Japan where independent candidates can adopt and promote specific issues. Urban housewives in Japan have carried out successful grassroots movements such as environmental, welfare and pacifist projects since late 1960s (Takeda, 2006). Another example is Itokazu Keiko, an independent representative from Okinawa, has successfully implemented such issue-advocacy source. Having the support coalition of small opposition parties, Itokazu won a seat in 2004 and 2007 national elections after having served

in the local assembly in Okinawa. She has advocated a pacifist stance and strongly opposed Japan's plans to build a new military base for US marines in the country. Although this is a milder trend in Turkey, female parliamentarians carry out issue advocacy as well. For example three of my respondents have been active supporters of gender equality, one has worked in environmental and social projects, while one specialized in children's and educational issues. But what differentiates Turkish representatives is that Japanese independent candidates have won elections on single-advocacy cases.

Insecurity with regards to their future in parties and politics may lead women to compromise, engage in acts of loyalty and usually stay away from any type of opposition or criticism which is certainly limiting. There is sometimes gratitude and loyalty on the accounts of women who have been assisted by male authorities. The big brother-little sister or father-daughter relationship among politicians has been a visible characteristic of gender relations in the history of Turkish politics, starting with Mustafa Kemal as the ultimate father and stretching out to Süleyman Demirel of DYP in the 1990s and Tayyip Erdoğan of AKP during 2000s. Thus, as discussed above, the line between loyalty and fear of being left out or castigated is not very clear with regards to the relationship between female politicians and the male political authorities.

5.4 REPRESENTATION AS PROFESSION IN TURKEY AND JAPAN

Another similarity between Japanese and Turkish politics is how political representation is regarded by political agents. The incumbency turnover rates in Turkey and Japan seem to differ, Matland and Studlar (2004) estimating a 7.77% incumbency turnover per year since 1979 which demonstrates that elected individuals change relatively rarely in Japan. The

incumbency turnover in Turkey, contrary to Japanese example averages around 63.3% considering national elections after 1950 (Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008). This ratio signifies that incumbency turnover in Turkey is much higher than it is in Japan (or many of Western countries for that matter), individuals being elected changing rather fast in the Turkish case.

However where women's acquisition of seats is the matter, differences between the two cases in terms of incumbency turnover rates seem not to matter. In each case, career opportunities for women within national parliaments fall behind, even in the case of Turkey where the new seats available are mostly and for longer periods, held by male candidates rather than female newcomers. Such difference between low incumbency turnover (Japan) and high incumbency turnover (Turkey) does not seem to matter because, although new individuals may enter formal politics in both countries, the classes and social networks these individuals seem to come from do not vary significantly. As Sayarı and Hasanov (2008) argue, even in the 2002 and 2007 elections in Turkey where the highest incumbency turnover to date had been recorded (89.1% and 59.3% respectively), there has not been a fundamental change in the social profile of Turkish parliamentarians who had been elected for the past half century in terms of (relatively higher) educational attainment, age and social class. Sayarı and Hasanov (2008) also argue that the trend of disparity between the Turkish society and members of Grand National Assembly continues its eighty year existence which signifies the closure of formal politics in Turkey as well as persistence of certain types of individuals as "politicians". Japan is a similar case (and one with a lower incumbency turnover rate as well) in terms of the regeneration of the traditional in formal politics through perseverance of graduates of certain prestigious universities, members of higher bureaucratic cadres and big business groups historically holding seats in the parliament (Stockwin, 1999). The social capital accumulated

within such socioeconomic groups seem to matter to a great extent in Turkey and Japan, where women's access to such capital is constrained by their lack of educational or professional attributes. The lack of variety in the educational and professional backgrounds within my sample of interviewees may also demonstrate such limited access to formal politics in Turkey. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, I was not able to find a female parliamentarian who did not have a university degree or professional attainment prior to her candidacy to interview, my sample consisting of highly educated and professional female individuals in the end. The regeneration of the traditional does not only mean persistence of certain individuals in formal politics, but rather seems to signify perseverance of those who have the social capital to attain recognition within political cliques[29].

A second and very important reason why there is significant closure of political access and high "regeneration of the traditional" in both countries is that participation in formal politics being a very expensive endeavor. A significant attribute of Turkish and Japanese politics that also result in the regeneration of the traditional in politics is that early elections are very common in both countries. Ogai (2001) states that only one government out of twenty elections until 2001 served their full term. Similarly, out of the 14 elections since 1954, only one government served its full term in Turkey (Belgenet, 2008). The constant state of being

[29] This is also why I believe interviewing female parliamentarians from different parties and cities did not create vast differences between the accounts of individuals I interviewed with. The fact that all of the female representatives were coming from similar socio-economic backgrounds also neutralized the diversity of parties among women representatives. Although my respondents were coming from a variety of parties from left and right of the spectrum, and numerous cities, their political experiences were relatively more influenced by their positioning within the party and their relationships with male gatekeepers in these parties rather than diversifying from party to party or region to region. The cities they were coming from seemed to make a difference to a certain extent in terms of the available party funds for financing election campaigns, but coming from different parties did not differentiate between the political experiences representatives reported – the most evident differentiation between women regardless of their parties was how different they perceived themselves from other women who did not hold political posts. As I mention later in the chapter, the fact that the female representatives all had certain educational and professional attainments was the biggest reference of differentiation, a differentiation made by women among women, yet variety among parties did not seem to create much diversity between the accounts of interviewees.

ready for another election campaign requires continuous financial capability above all things. As one of the respondents had argued during one of our interviews, "In Turkey politics means getting ready for the next election the day after you win one." Thus, individuals who can gather significant sums of money in a given month may be limited, the number of aspiring women being even narrower due to their professional and educational status as well as lack of assets in both countries.

Under such constrained terms of formal political participation, women's places in formal politics seem to be more limited. There seem to be several access points for women that they can enter politics, such as exhausting familial connections and if they have exceptionally high educational and professional attainments, such attributes become useful for politically aspiring women as I observed during my interviews. However, the number of women who can utilize these options are very much constrained, seemingly more so than their male counterparts. And although exhausting familial connections seem to provide women with a number of advantages in terms of political attainments, the common practice of transmitting one's political capabilities to sons and daughters in Turkey and Japan (see for Japan, Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Eto, 2007) also strengthen the regeneration of the traditional patriarchy in these countries as well.

Once women enter politics, the chances of their durability are even more limited. There are female representatives who stay more than one term, but women who make careers out of politics is a very small community in Turkey. Between 1960 to 2007 (not including the 2007 elections), average term of service for a female representative is 1.4 terms (TBMM, 2007). The terms of female representatives are as in Table 5[30]:

[30] I calculated the terms from an official document sent to me in November 2007 by the Turkish National Assembly in response to my inquiry on the names, parties, and the terms of the female representatives who have

Table 5: Number of Terms Served in the National Assembly by Female Representatives

	Number of Female Representatives between 1960-2007
One Term	95
Two Terms	17
Three Terms	4
More Than Three Terms	5
Total	121 (representatives)

(TBMM, 2007)

As the figure shows, although the incumbency turnover rate is high in Turkey, 63.3% (Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008), the incumbency turnover rates among women is much higher than average, 78.5% of female parliamentarians falling out of turnover after one election. The majority of female representatives by far have served for only one term (95 out of 121), exiting formal politics faster than average. There are 26 representatives who served more than one term, seventeen of these representatives serving two terms. The political careers of the already sparse female representatives seem to be significantly shorter than those of male politicians in Turkey. Although this question can be handled in a separate inquiry of its own, this study indicates that this phenomenon may be related to personalized conduct of politics, the high tendency to regenerate the traditional through closed networks of male politicians, the political aspirations or circumstances of female representatives, or the embodiment of legitimate political agency on the male body.

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served since 1960s to 2007. While it is a very good source in terms of comprehensiveness, but all of the female representatives of the Assembly since 1960 fill up only three sheets of paper, nearly half of these representatives serving between 2002-2007.

5.5 BASE VS. POLITICAL PARTIES: WHO'S TO BLAME?

Throughout the interviews, several parliamentarians related the lack of women's representation in the Assembly to women's indifference to politics. As discussed in the introductory chapter, there is somewhat low interest in politics among Turkish women. But World Values Survey Turkey (2001) and the study of Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak (2003) demonstrate that interest in politics is low among men in Turkey as well, refuting the claim that low formal political participation of women is caused entirely by indifference. If there are women who are actually interested in politics but they can not pass through, then would the blame fall on the voters who are unfriendly to women candidates or on political parties?

In both countries, there seems to be a friendly environment for women candidates in terms of voter behavior. Both Aiuchi (2006. Cited in Eto, 2007:30) and Gaunder (2008) refute that there is a gender gap in Japan with regards to voter preference on male or female candidates. Similarly in Turkey, the UNDP study "Women in Politics" (2006) report that 82% of all the respondents want the number of women in politics to increase. Furthermore, 43% of voters approve a member of their families to participate in politics. The support varies among the individuals who they would want to participate in politics as in Table 6:

Table 6: Ratio of Support for Family Member in Politics

	Men	**Women**
Son	57%	60%
Daughter	47%	50%
Spouse	38%	49%

(UNDP, 2006)

Respondents support the participation of their sons the most, then their daughters, but the lowest support is on participation of spouses. But although the support for women's

entrance to politics is relatively lower, the ratios are not in a position to discourage parties from incorporating more female candidates to their ranks.

The support voters (and husbands) show for their wives was also what I came across while listening to the experiences of female representatives in Turkey during my interviews. First, all of the representatives were very certain that voters did not discriminate between them and others. My question on what they thought about entering predominantly male spaces such as coffeehouses and if they remembered any experiences in terms of their interactions with their constituents as a female candidate were always answered in a positive tone. In one instance, a young representative replied to my question as:

> "I will tell you that, when you come from the base (local) politics, you have less hardship. I never thought I wouldn't…to the coffeehouses, on the contrary I liked going there a lot. Because I have never encountered a negative experience. On the contrary, I think we live a lot of the advantages of being a woman. I mean, if you ring the bell they always open the door. If you want to go in, they always let you in. In that sense, I never encountered a problem. I don't know if it's a problem but, and this is a generalization, sometimes when you extend your hand, they don't want to shake it. But I don't think it is something that politics brings, it is general."

On the contrary, the anecdotes representatives recalled with regards to some hardships during their campaigns were mostly related to other political actors in their parties. Several mentioned that they had ran into problems with the male members of the local party offices while they were organizing women's branches, and one representative remembered how she opposed to the separate lobbying activities the party office had organized for male and female representatives, in the end joining the male candidates with their visits to the local merchants/businessmen. Their experiences with regards to gendered interactions were nearly always included other party members rather than their constituents. Second, as women who have already initiated their political careers, all female representatives during the interviews

were very favorable about the support of their families and husbands. As one representative stated:

> "Turkish men actually like their wives to become politicians. They feel proud when they see that other people respect their wives. It doesn't matter if it is local or national politics. They start treating their wives differently when they see that others respect her."

This is somewhat contradictory to the UNDP (2006) study, but previous study of Arat (1989) also offers evidence that for those women who are in politics, there has been support from their husbands in their political endeavors. From all the evidence, it seems that there is certain unease at first in terms of husbands' approach to their wives' political aspirations, but after a while this unease seems to alleviate. In relation to the example in the previous chapter regarding the representative whose husband started to treat her differently after she was elected to the local parliament, it might be the case that men find it favorable for their wives to become respected individuals. From the numerical data and my interviews, it might be safe to assume that local or national political elites encouraging aspiring women to participate in politics may actually help alter gendered subordination of women in the familial domain.

In light of this evidence, the stance of political parties towards women becomes more critical. The argument that women do not apply for candidacy is not accurate since the ratio of women who apply for candidacy and those who actually make it to the list is much lower, 414 out of 3086 female applicants (13.2%), than the ratio of men who apply for candidacy and those who make it to the party lists, 2886 out of 12239 (23.5%) male applicants (KA-DER, 2007). In this case, the argument that women are not given slots because they are not interested in politics becomes questionable. There is a large difference between both the mean numbers and percentages of the slots parties distribute to male and female representatives.

Thus the stance of parties with regards to female applicants becomes much more consequential than the voters' preferences with regards to lack of women's representation. The actual deadlock seems to be within the relationships and processes taking place with female candidates and other political actors, requiring a closer look to the disciplinary processes within political parties, at least in Turkey.

This significance of political party authorities in terms of women's access to formal politics enhances the gravity of the policies parties establish to increase the participation of women to politics. Arat (1989) argues in her study that there is not a strong correlation between party ideologies and openness of the party to women. This convergence between parties leaning left and right might be because none of the parties, either on the left or right, pursue women's inclusion as a matter of actual concern. There are varying degree of female members of parties, but the case in Turkey similar to Japan is that the sections women usually work in do not have any authority with regards to party decisions or recruitment (for Japan, see Kubo and Gelb, 1994). It is also the case for both countries that there are not concrete programs for inclusion of women to party ranks among any political party at the moment. There have been periodical increases in women's formal political participation but in both cases it remains to be seen whether this increase will continue in the long term without alteration of the masculine operation of political party systems.

5.6 ABLE AND JUSTIFIED: EFFECT OF EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN POLITICAL AGENCY

As I observed during the interviews, for women who want to participate in (personalized) political processes, education and professional background becomes a point of reference for

justification of political agency. Especially for women who do not use familial networks to incorporate themselves to social communities, education and professional background becomes critical to prove they can invest in the shared social capital. In this sense, while possession of educational or professional qualifications justifies women's political agency, it may also become the justification of women's exclusion.

Education, employment and political socialization processes in Japan and Turkey have certain similarities that are significant with regards to women's formal political agency. The effect of systematic education and the type of jobs women hold in the labor market on the reproduction of the gender hierarchy is significant in both countries. Educational and professional attributes diversify the experiences of women while distinguishing between those who can be incorporated to the political domain and those who can not. Although education is a reference point among political actors for distinguishing between women, political socialization seem to occur not primarily during education, but in the family in both countries. Furthermore, another important commonality between Japan and Turkey is the formulation of employment and women's economic status. In both countries, the jobs women hold are those which allow them to continue their primary duties as wives and mothers. Employment as well as social security legislation in both countries systematize around a rationale which presupposes the need for women to maintain their primary roles in the household, thus limiting the practicality of career attainments and financial security for women.

5.6.1 EDUCATION AS ACCESS AND DIVERSION

A collective group of Turkish film-makers, Filmist, released a documentary in 2008 titled "What a Beautiful Democracy!" on the election campaigns of six female candidates in 2007

Elections to document how women experience formal politics. While I very much enjoyed the documentary overall, there was a scene that brought my arguments with regards to education and political socialization in Turkey right before my eyes.

In this scene, there are three girls and three boys on the street. All of them are around seven or eight years of age, it seems that they are children who are playing outside their houses on a regular day. They are clearly playing with each other, but this is a different game. Three of the girls are at one side of the pavement while the three boys are at the other side. Girls are shouting with their fists closed on their sides, directly aimed at the boys: "C-H-P!" (RPP, Republican People's Party). The boys shout back: "Ak Parti!" (JDP, Justice and Development Party). Girls shout again, this time taking a step forward: "CHP!", and the boys lean forward and shout back: "Ak Parti!" They continue for a couple of times more, but in the end one of the girls says the last words to the boys with a very confident manner: "It shows who doesn't like the Republic!"

This scene was indicative of how family in Turkey has a substantive impact on political socialization. As Pharr (1981) argues for Japan, in Turkey too, the impact of political socialization is such that, most of the time it surpasses the effect of education on political socialization. I base this argument to my interviews where family has taken a part as the primary process and space of political socialization. Nine times out of thirteen, respondents initiated their answers to my question on the effect of their *education* in terms of their political aspirations by relating the political inclinations of their families. They all went into detail about their parents' political views as a reply to my question which signified that familial socialization fared more important than education in terms of politicization[31]. For them,

[31] As one respondent stated, political identification may be partly constituted through children overhearing daily discussions between adults since in both countries there the politics is usually in a fast-track and turmoil. But the

following their families' political ideologies was to be expected. Similarly, in one instance a representative from a center-left party felt the urge to explain why she was in a center-left party while her parents had a right-leaning political ideology. Political orientations of families were clearly of primary importance for the representatives themselves to explain their political stance. The process of self-identification through family as Joseph (2002) claimed was very much evident in this case.

Another aspect related to political socialization was the effect of parties on the political identities of the respondents. What I came across several times during the interviews was that there was a clear difference between the discursive clarity and specification of the political aspirations before representation and after representation. All of the respondent were politicizes to a significant extent, before they were elected. This is because all made it clear during the interviews that they would not want to represent another party; it seemed that their preferences with regards to their parties were only natural to them. But five times out of thirteen, the respondents did not talk about any prior political concerns and aspirations that impelled them to enter elections. They were clearly politicized individuals, they all had a certain respect for the leaders and politics of their parties, but it was not always easy to understand from the interviews what propelled them to make such a significant amount of effort to become politicians. Three of the five respondents reported that they found their party leader to be very successful and promising; while the remaining two respondents believed she would be a good candidate within the initiative to incorporate women in Turkish politics. On the other hand, their accounts on political aspirations and projects of the party were detailed and specific. They all were very clear about the party (and their) policies, and were very

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interest rates in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak, 2003) as well as political apathy in Japan (Martin, 2004) may contrast this argument. Although it is an intriguing argument, it should be examined further in order to uncover its underlying reasons.

assertive at times in terms of the rightfulness of these policies. Although all of the respondents were politicized people, entering active politics as party members furthered the political identity of the respondent. It seemed that "politics is learned" as one of the representatives remarked, and although this requires another study to observe whether this is the same for male representatives, political socialization continued in the party, somewhat continuous of the familial pattern.

In relation to the effect of family and political party on political socialization, education then becomes a complementary rather than primary process of political socialization. Moreover, the significance of education may shift in terms of its meaning for formal political participation. It might be a process of socialization, but not necessarily politicization, especially during systematized compulsory education. As mentioned, both countries had initiated fervent education campaigns after late 19th century which had the goal of enlightening women while at the same time socializing women into the notion of "good wives and wise mothers". Segregated gender roles are still perpetuated through compulsory education to a great extent by everyday practices in schools and educational tools in both countries to a point that it is hard to argue that girls would aspire to be political figures (Arat, 1998a; Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994; Gümüşoğlu, 1998). Thus the compulsory education in both countries serves as a strong tool of gendered socialization, but not necessarily political socialization.

However, the impact of higher education seems to differ. Pharr (1981) argues that among political women in Japan, higher education is significant with regards to political agency. My interviews demonstrate that the impact of higher education can be two-fold. From the statements of respondents, it seems that education has been important for them to

"formulate a political language", "Provide an outlook to the world", "to provide a method to use to solve problems", "to familiarize oneself with the social structure of Turkey". But these statements also signify that the impact of education has been more in terms of widening their social understanding and worldviews, but did not necessarily politicize them. While the politicization was defined much more in relation to the family, education provided them a chance to gain knowledge and advance in their careers.

It is possible to observe the second impact of education in women's participation to politics in Turkey, from an unlikely source, the YouTube. Ms.Didem Engin, a female candidate of RPP during 2007 Elections had posted a public notice during her election campaign on YouTube to introduce herself to her constituents. The public note starts as below:

> "My fellow viewers,
> Two of the bases of a healthy democracy in a country are that the voters accepting the program of their party and knowing the qualifications of the candidate they are voting for. Thus, I would like to introduce myself to you, and as the youngest candidate of Republican Peoples Party, I would like to inform you why I am interested in politics and what I would like to accomplish. I am here today before you, as a young Turkish person who has had a very good education both in Turkey and abroad, and as someone who has successfully executed project managements abroad. You can see my education and the economic, social and local projects I have executed in my resume (YouTube, 2008).

The place and significance Ms.Engin gave to education was very similar to what I came across during my interviews. Apart from the content of education, being a "person who has had a very good education" (preferably with a certain period abroad) was more essential for being a legitimate and deserving political representative. Thus, from this example and my interviews, the second impact of education appeared as its effect of diversifying between women who "should" and "should not" engage in politics. In five of the interviews, higher education as a matter of preference for women's political participation became a topic of

discussion. But the critical aspect of our discussions was that education as a matter of preference was more of a prerequisite for aspiring *women* rather than all aspiring individuals regardless of sex. The difference between male and female representatives in terms of educational background shows that the prerequisite of education is higher than that expected from male representatives (Arat, 1989; TBMM, 2007). In these five discussions, all of the respondents directly argued the need for education of women who wish to participate in politics. Similarly, twelve out of thirteen respondents thought that one of the primary reasons why their parties supported them was because they all have had higher educational (and professional) backgrounds. (The thirteenth respondent believed the reason why she was selected to the party administration was related to her previous work in the union.)

But this reference to respondents' educational backgrounds was not primarily important in terms of the technicality of education, but more in terms of education providing one a "social understanding". As stated above, the meaning of education (and related to that, professional experience) was "experience" rather than "expertise". There was a technical expertise that they believed to possess, but what differentiated them from other women was the difference in "social knowledge" that they gained through education. In this sense, education has become a type of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986), which had more social significance rather than founding a distinction of expertise among women.

During the discussions with five respondents who stated that higher education is necessary for women to participate in politics, the issue of "Politics School" which one party had initiated to "educate" women in order to increase their political became a topic of discussion. This project has been one of the few initiatives to increase women's participation to politics. However a prerequisite for joining the program was that holding a university

degree. The overall reply I received on the question why only women with higher educational degrees could participate in the program was that women who were currently interested in politics were those with a university education. If not, as three representatives stated, there were local positions (such as women's branches) which were "equally if not more political than national representation."

There are several dimensions to this argument. First, political interest is low in Turkey among women *and* men (Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak, 2003). Moreover, in line with Arat's (1989) findings, women representatives have had more education than their male counterparts on average and they are coming from the 3.9% group of all women in Turkey (KSSGM, 2007). Yet there were no distinctions made with regards to the educational levels of male politicians. Furthermore, although the lack of interest was given as a reason for women's low representation, there have been a larger proportion of female candidacy applicants which have been left out by party authorities themselves (KA-DER, 2007). Thus it seems that education serves more as a selective process among women who wish to participate in politics, and consequently becomes a reference of distinction for women politicians in terms of their position with regards to "other women." Higher education developed into one of the primary reasons why political parties chose a certain group of women above others. Elite women who become political agents thus were not only diversified from other women by their higher educational attainments, but also because political parties opt for female individuals who have higher educational attainments. Second, this reason of preference was one of the most important attributes which female representatives distinguished themselves from other women, turning education into a cultural capital which justified for their political agencies as women. For women, education justified their transfers from private to public domain, by helping

women compensate for gendered diversification of legitimate agencies through their higher educational attainments than their predominantly male counterparts.

Similarly in Japan, education is important in the sense that through education, one attains the prospect for a politically relevant career. Male representatives in Japan are usually coming from competitive bureaucracy or business cliques, which requires obtaining degrees from competent schools which predominantly male students enroll (although the number of female students in these institutions have been rising slowly for the past decade) (McVeigh, 1998; Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994, Gender Equality Bureau). Women as outsiders to these male social networks means although women's overall educational levels are higher than those in Turkey, they are still left out from political cliques. Since education rates are much higher in Japan than it is in Turkey[32], what creates a difference in Japan is where and under what specialty education has been completed. If one is a graduate of two-year colleges (which female students attend in Japan), then she has less chances of holding a job which has political outreach (Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994). Yet, when there is a certain average of educational attainment as in Japan, there is a smaller margin between those who are representatives and who are not. . However the margin between the elite women who become

[32] In comparison to Turkey, enrollment in education is much higher. Female literacy rate is 98%, enrollment to primary and secondary education is 100% while enrollment to tertiary education is 51% (World Economic Forum, 2006). Although the figures have risen since 1970s, the ratio of female students who continue to undergraduate education in Japan is 38.5% (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007). 12.4% female students choose two year junior colleges in spite of the recent decrease in their popularity (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007). Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008) makes the two cases comparable. While there is 100% adult literacy in women in Japan, the rate is 79.6% for Turkey. Furthermore, while there is 100% enrollment to primary educational institutions in Japan, in Turkey this rate is 93.3%, dropping to 68% during secondary education in comparison to Japan's 100%. The rate in Turkey falls to 26% for tertiary education, while gross tertiary enrollment in Japan is 52% (UNDP, 2008). It is observable that there is significant amount of difference in terms of educational attainments between women in Turkey and Japan. Although Turkey has an impressing variety regarding employment when highly educated women are examined, such women make up a rather elite group. As Dayıoğlu (2000) examines, the steepest rise in the participation rate to the labor market is seen after junior high school enrollment in Turkey which might explain the continuous existence of this small group of women in professional sectors since very early in the Republic.

representatives and those who are not is much greater in Turkey. Women in Japan may or may not access political cliques through professional status in relation to their educational qualifications, but unlike Turkey, they are not necessarily coming from a group of women who have nearly nothing in common with the rest of female citizens While education fares significant for women in Japan with regards to the quality of employment, little education means not only lack of political outreach but also means a lot less professional options for women, especially in an economy that has high unemployment rates as Turkey.

The significance of education for both cases is closely related to women's employment, in terms of their chances of holding certain kinds of jobs that have a link to political networks and providing them with a financial capability to invest in politics if they wish to do so. But employment, similar to education, acquires new meanings through women's utilization of their professional backgrounds. In the next section, I elaborate on the positioning of employment, both as a consequence of educational qualifications and as a stand alone factor for women's political participation.

5.6.2 OFFICE GIRLS/FAMILY WORKERS: EMPLOYMENT AND WOMEN IN TURKEY AND JAPAN

A common underlying reason why women can not benefit from the labor market in Turkey and Japan is how economy and its actors have been historically defined in both countries. In relation to their places in the inner domain as private agents, their primary duty and profession is to be mothers, wives and consequently, unpaid caregivers of the family (Chatterjee, 1993). It has been critical in both countries that through regulation of the labor market, women's entry into labor force should not to become threatening for their primary duties as mothers and

wives. Thus, one of the most decisive similarities between Japan and Turkey was that women's entry into workforce was facilitated in such a manner to reinforce their particular gendered division of labor between the private and public domains and bolstering the need for a family for financial protection.

The types of jobs women hold are critical since formal political participation (including applying for candidacy, lobbying for candidacy after the initial application to the party, financing electoral campaigns) require material sources (time and money) as well as the social sources (networking) provided by professional cliques. Furthermore, from my interviews, the location of candidacy mattered to a good extent in terms of financial sources that the party office could provide candidates; those in the larger cities had a more advantageous position since the party funds were much abundant in big cities. But regardless of the party support, every applicant needs to spend a good amount of money for entering formal politics.

However the types of women hold are relatively less advantageous, in both financial and networking aspects. Moreover, when women have no social security by themselves, their well-being and jobs are not secure, the services they can benefit from (such as child and elderly care) are scarce and their freedom is restricted. In this regard, Japanese and Turkish cases fall short of being advantageous for women's formal political participation in three aspects. First of all, the type of work done by women in both countries does not provide women with social security, enough pay or social networking that men benefit from. The work taken up by Japanese women are usually low paid, part-time jobs which might involve full time hours but still paid less without any benefits (Gelb and Palley, 1994). Although educational attainment is higher in Japan than it is in Turkey, the gender gap in wages in Japan

is bigger than expected, which signifies wide diversification between jobs held by men and women. Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008) shows that while estimated income parity in Japan is $40.000 for men it is less than half of it for Japanese women, lagging behind by $17.802. Although income parities are overall lower in Turkey, $12.368 for men and $4.385 for women, the difference between gender gap in income parities are smaller than the difference between Turkey and Japan in terms of educational employment. As Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008) shows, the ratio of estimated female to male income is 0.45 in Japan whereas it is 0.35 in Turkey, creating a smaller margin in terms of professional standing of women in the economy in spite of the bigger difference in educational attainment indexes. In Turkey, the primary underlying reasons for women's low participation to labor force is reported to be the lack of education, social security, social services for children and elderly along with low wages and discrimination among families and businesses regarding female employment (Türkonfed, 2007). The prevalence of agricultural sector in women's employment in Turkey (48% of all female laborers) along with prevalence of unpaid family workers (41% of all female laborers) is consequential for women's access to necessary sources for formal political participation.

Second, women's entry into labor force does not eradicate gendered division of labor in the private or in the public domain due to the kinds of jobs they can hold in terms of educational and professional capabilities. The Equal Employment Law of 1986 in Japan is a good example in terms of its demonstration of the complimentary stances of Japanese state institutions with regards to women's employment in this sense (Ueno, 1994). The Law outlawed gender discrimination in hiring yet diversified between two options of career-tracks, a career-track and a non-career track. The career-track required the employee to work longer

hours and for a long duration of years, at the same time career options without entering the career-track was very much limited. Thus what happened in the end was that women who knew they would be leaving work or could not work such long hours while caregiving at the same time, chose the non-career tracks which separated them from white-collar male workforce and given them a feeble financial security. Third, the social security policies adopted by Japanese and Turkish stated bind both employed and unemployed women to men in their families, especially their husbands, for social security. Both countries have adopted "male-breadwinner models" for social security policies which in order for women to benefit from social security, they should not hold a job themselves (Osawa, 2000). Since the jobs women are employed in do not provide adequate social security, they either need to stay unemployed or work in unsecure jobs with payments low enough to still benefit from male breadwinner's social security eligibility.

While labor participation rates are higher among Japanese women (48.3%) than in Turkey (27.7) according to the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008) both figures are relatively low. What is notable is that the ratio of female economic activity relative to those of men is lower in Japan (66%) than in Turkey (%81) (UNDP, 2008). Furthermore, the types of jobs women hold diversify groups of women among themselves. While the majority of women in Japan (77%) work in services sector, only 4% work in agriculture and 18% in industry (UNDP, 2008). The vast amount of women in Turkey work in agricultural sector (52% of women in Turkey) while 33% work in services and 15% work in the industrial sector (UNDP, 2008). As the figures show, the vast amount of agricultural employment might create a disadvantage for women in Turkey due to 41% of female workers are unpaid family workers, a trend relatively more common in the agricultural sector in Turkey (Türkonfed, 2007). Yet,

although 77% of women work in the services sector in Japan, the types of jobs hold seem to create another kind of disadvantage for women in Japan as well. As I mentioned above, the gender wage gap in Japan is around a considerable amount, 35% (UNDP, 2008), signifying a good amount of diversification of feminized and masculinized jobs in the service sector in the Japanese economy.

Once women enter the labor force, how they juggle their familial and professional duties seem to create a hindrance for strengthening their position in the market as well. Women in both countries have M-shaped employment patterns[33] which interrupts women's employment. Interrupted participation to workforce is consequential because when employers hire women with the prospect of losing them more easily than male workers. Thus women's employment clusters in jobs which are not secure or highly-paid, which is a disadvantage for both providing sources for formal political agency or networking. In each case, women's positioning in the labor market seems to be disadvantageous for large groups of women, while an elite group of highly professional women (who are currently serving as representatives in the Turkish National Assembly) seem to have a higher chance of attaining formal political agency.

Welch et al. (1994) argues that women's low representation is caused by women's occupational and educational status which makes them outsiders to the eligibility pool of candidacy. But within a highly individualistic systematization of politics, women's exclusion from politics is also related to their incapability to invest in social networks to a greater extent

[33] M-shaped employment means that while employment rates steeply increase for a certain amount of time, it reaches a peak and then steeply decreases. After a certain period of time, employment rates start to increase again, then decrease in relation to the individual's older age (Türkonfed, 2007). The ages that M shaped employment patterns occur is slightly different in Japan and Turkey. (Gender Equality Bureau, 2007; Türkonfed, 2007). However what is consequential is that in both countries employment rates drop sharply once young women are married and have children and they have interrupted employment patterns.

than the mere insufficiency of educational and professional assets. Apart from the interruption caused by marriage and childrearing, there are systemic inadequacies in the construction of labor market which is not compensated or ameliorated by the state regulations in both cases. Thus it appears that with regards to political representation, women in both countries are separated into two main groups. The groups of women who can actually participate in formal politics are a minority, usually either professional women, women coming from prominent families or women who have a background in politics in both countries. The second vast group of women is the ones who either work in unsecure/part-time jobs or unemployed although their educational backgrounds might differ between Japanese and Turkish cases.

5.7 CONSTRUCTING AGENCIES: LEGITIMACY, NOVELTY AND LOYALTY

In this section, I search for answers for the second inquiry in the study; on how exactly women define their own agencies within the Turkish context briefly depicted in the previous chapters. First, I start by illustrating where I conducted my interviews, the Turkish National Assembly, to embed the discussions in their particular space. In the next section I observe several aspects that seem to be relatively more prevalent in women's constructions of their political agencies using my interview data. I elaborate on how they accomplished accessing formal politics and how they interpret their own agencies. I examine the experiences of female representatives around three recurrent themes of the interviews, "hard work", "struggle", and "novelty". Then I look at how and why they might have defined their political agencies themselves around these themes. In the last section, I briefly look at the local agency women take up in Japan to observe its effect as a political agency.

5.7.1 FEMINIZED BUILDINGS/MASCULINIZED HALLDS: SPACE OF FORMAL POLITICS

I conducted most of my interviews in the Turkish National Assembly between February-April 2007. What I expected of an Assembly that has 500 male representatives and only 50 female representatives was that space to host a predominantly male community. I had once been to the Assembly for a school excursion, yet all I could remember were the orange leather seats that had made the headlines several years ago for being too unnecessarily expensive. Having lived in Ankara for 22 years, I had always thought the Assembly buildings looked gray and cold from the outside. I was sure that once I was inside, I would very much dislike the gender demographics of the complex as well. In short, I did not expect much from my trips to the Assembly.

But the space where the highest rank of Turkish politics is conducted is much more fragmented than I had supposed it would be. The constitution of the Assembly creates a space that different gendered hierarchies are in effect and intersection. There are four types of agents; the highest in the hierarchy are unsurprisingly the parliamentarians. The second tier is comprised of female parliamentarians who are much more silent than their male counterparts while they are passing by the halls. The third in the hierarchy is the biggest body of workers, advisors and secretaries who stay in the two residence buildings of the Parliament complex. The predominant portion of the advisors is male while nearly all of the secretaries are female. The fourth level consists of the body of service workers of the Parliament, who are dominantly male.

This space consists of multiple hierarchies because the relationships are not simply those of gender. While the male parliamentarians are revered much more within the dialogues of secretaries and within the daily encounters by the male service workers in the halls, female parliamentarians are still on a higher status than both male service workers and female secretaries. The power relationships are more complicated than the male boss – female secretary relationship, there are female bosses (parliamentarians) and female secretaries, there are female parliamentarians and male advisors, and there are female secretaries and male service workers. There are multiple gender dichotomies in the same space which builds a more complicated web of interactions than my presumption on male boss-female secretary prototype.

But there is also a significant phenomenon in the daily working of the Assembly – the bulk of the agents in action are male while those who stay and guard the buildings are female. The actual buildings that constitute the Turkish National Assembly are clearly separated into two large parts: over 275 offices that inhabit two female secretaries in each office and groups of men swarming the hallways and especially the lobby surrounding the General Assembly. This was more of a shock than an observation the first time I entered the Parliament. There were hundreds of men walking around, driving cars, talking outside the buildings, serving tea and standing in the hallways while the number of women in action was very little except for the lunch breaks. Men as representatives, as advisors (it is very rare to find a female advisor, even the female representatives holding offices as party heads of Women's Branches currently have male advisors), as the service staff and as outsiders who are there to lobby or to visit somebody make up the bulk of the bodies moving around. However the female secretaries have an additional (and key) role in the space of formal politics. They are unmoving, but their

lack of motion also signifies their status as gatekeepers. One can not reach the representatives without passing by them first.

In each office there are at least one, predominantly two female secretaries. They regulate the appointments and social contact of their representatives, but they also regulate the actions and the access of other staff workers and visitors in the complex by telling them where to go, what to do and who to talk. Although this is not directly related to this study, the function of the female secretaries does have significance with regards to the upkeep of formal politics, which is not solely for the reason that they answer the phones but because of their duties as gatekeepers.

They monitor each phone call and decide who to forward and who to kindly turn down. Thus it becomes very important to establish rapport with secretaries even before initiating a request for appointment. They look over each post and fax arriving at the office, including inter-parliament documents and sometimes send numerous posts to the trash straight before forwarding it to the representative. As I have been told a couple of times, they are "so used to receiving requests like mine, it is more of an arbitrary decision to forward it or not after speaking with the individual making the request". The amount of in-calls and requests parliamentarians get in consequence authorize the secretaries to work somewhat as primary screeners. Thus, sometimes it is actually them who decide whether something is important enough to be included in the agenda of the representative. If one hangs around for a while, it can also be witnessed how the framing of the requests change from matter to matter. The way secretaries pose the issue seems to have a direct impact on the decision to include in the agenda of the parliamentarian. The secretaries do not lose their position once there is a new election but re-assigned and unlike representatives they spend five days in the office, so they

are much more accustomed to the workings of the Parliament which provides them with a sense of ownership more than the female representatives themselves. It is also very visible in the way they own the spaces allotted to them, while secretaries over-personalize their desks and working space with personal belongings, most of the offices of the representatives are much emptier, usually lacking any personal items.

All in all, it can be argued that there is another dimension of the impact of women in the daily operation of politics. Similarly to the women's branches of parties working to provide votes for male candidates, literally the vast body of female labor is offered for service to a predominantly male body of politicians in the National Assembly. Although there is a clear hierarchy between representatives and service staff, the gender binaries were not as simple as one would believe in the beginning. The Assembly complex is divided by multiple gendered and hierarchical categories, male politicians and advisors, female politicians, female secretaries, male service staff, rather than being a monolithically masculinized complex. Thus the part of the complex where most of the interviews were conducted was a space mainly operated through women who regulated the occurrence of interviews as mine.

I think it is a significant aspect of formal politics, in the sense that although where actors do politics is extremely wide (their constituencies, their parties, people like me who interview them, people who come to their offices to bring them presents, their daily interactions with the taxi drivers, etc.), seeing how the Assembly operates gives one the sense that politics does not solely constitute the male-female parliamentarian dichotomy. The authorization of the female secretaries, how they enable or disable access to decision-makers, how female parliamentarians interact with other actors in the Assembly and even the fact that seeing female parliamentarians sitting in a couch in the foyer with men all around themselves

bring the female agency in question, and the complicated web of interactions women in formal politics carry as parliamentarians to life.

5.7.2 "YOU NEED TO WORK FOR IT": STRUGGLING IN FORMAL POLITICS

What one becomes accustomed to hearing through interviews with Turkish female politicians is that being a woman in politics is a struggle. It is not a trite comment, but a literal fact. Women, either as members of women's branches in different parties or as candidates, do most of the knocking on the doors of the voters in their constituencies. Although election campaigning necessitates every candidate regardless of gender meet with thousands of people, how women seem to participate in politics is deeply social. While they need to do politics in business groups, unions and parties, they do more of the work in feminine spaces of politics that include doing politics in houses, among women's meetings and in local gatherings. Making oneself requires a lot of effort and sometimes visiting people door to door, or as one representative put it, "making it your business every month to go to each of the 17 villages in the constituency."

The Japanese election system that puts the individual candidate in front simply requires getting to know people in order to convince them to know and vote for you. Considering that community groups and networks are very prevalent in Japan (which are usually tied to the very gender-blind Liberal Democratic Party) (Stockwin, 1999), a new female candidate needs to make herself known by the people (Kubo and Gelb, 1994). As women, they have another crucial disadvantage, they don't have wives. Again related to feminine spaces of politics, the success of a Japanese politician also depends heavily on a presentable wife who can maintain social relations with the people during her husband's term while he maintains relations with

the unions, financial cliques and professional communities (Aiuchi, 2001). A female candidate needs to do both, by herself.

In Turkey, the system is somewhat different because the political party is more important than the individual candidate herself. However from the interviews it seems that showing that a candidate works very hard becomes extremely important for central authorities to consider that woman as a candidate. If one is successful in taking attention to her activities, she is not only becoming a "face" in her party politics, but she is considered to be working *for* the party at the same time. For women who were not professionally working as consultants for parties before candidacy, this was the main path towards their selection by the party. From their accounts, they worked to organize women's branches in their cities, gave numerous gender equality speeches around the country, designed projects on environment, organized election campaigns (for other candidates). Some of them might have had an advantage such as having familial connections or prior acquaintance as well, but they all worked hard to organize party supporters and voters even before the prospect of being a candidate listed high enough to be elected. Regardless of the stress on the individual or the party, the hard work shown by women legitimates women's transfer from private to public, by both becoming useful for their parties, and by proving that they can actually work like a public agent.

Thus, it may not be surprising why women showed hard work, determination and never giving up during the interviews as traits that enabled them to create a political career for themselves. What was in continuity with Arat's (1989) study on Turkish female and male parliamentarians was that the women elected had worked in the party organization in at least one part of their political careers, either in women's branches or as consultants. But there is a critical detail of how women frame their work in politics. It is very hard to differentiate

whether the common argument, “If you work hard enough and don’t give up, you will achieve it” is so prevalent (ten out of thirteen respondents believed for women who work hard enough, their political aspirations would not be overlooked) because it spares the political parties from the blame of not supporting more women or whether because they come to believe it after their personal experiences. It is not very clear whether female parliamentarians argue that women would find themselves a place in formal politics if they work hard enough to not to blame their parties for not supporting women enough or whether they have come to see this is actually the case. It might be that it is probably both. As KA-DER representatives have argued during our interviews, there are also those who work too hard, but never actually “make it”. The division line between women who are listed high enough and the others below the line is drawn by hard work, but there might be an impact of personalized politics as well. As mentioned before, although all of the respondents have worked for the party at some point, seven out of the thirteen representatives had some kind of prior acquaintance to (local or national) party elites before candidacy. The hard work and dedication shown by the candidate are critical, as the experiences of the remaining six respondents demonstrate. Although the other seven had also worked very hard for what they have achieved, what distinguished them from other women who had worked as hard might be that their chance to utilize personalized networks to a greater extent.

Another aspect of hard work came up during the interviews was its reward. Several representatives who have had prior work in either local politics or women’s branches replied to my questions on “how one can transfer from local to national politics” by stating that every person does not necessarily have to attain a parliamentary position in the end. One of the most common comments about women’s formal political participation was that there were “equally

if not more" political positions for women who could not make it to national representation. They all wanted women to participate in politics, but there was no consensus whether national representation was necessary or not. There is sincere belief that if one shows the effort, she can get "somewhere." Their arguments about equally important and political posts in local or party domains might be related to their own experiences because the help the female and male parliamentarians get from female members of local women's branches during their elections and terms are very crucial. But there are three dimensions to this argument. First is that whether we can overlook a woman's desire to attain national representation by compensating it with another agency, regardless of its value. All of the respondents had worked very hard, but their work was acknowledged and rewarded by high enough ranks in party lists. Certainly not every applicant can be listed, but the amount and the ratio of male applicants who are granted candidacy is much higher than those of women. Thus for another woman whose work is not rewarded as such, arguing that there are other posts equally political might actually end up reproducing the gendered exclusion of formal politics.

The discussion of compensating hard work with posts other than national representation might also be in continuation of the distinction of women with regards to their educational and professional backgrounds. All female representatives believed that women should be incorporated to a greater extent to politics, yet there was also a distinction of who should be incorporated. Women aspiring to become national representatives should work hard, but they should also have had a rather high degree of education, and should be able to make use of "certain professional experiences". These experiences included having a profession, which all of the representatives found to be significant for their political success. Just like education, employment in nine out of thirteen interviews became a subject of discussion as a

prerequisite for realizing one's political aspirations, but the significance of employment was not only financial, but more in terms of social experience. Although four utilized their expertise for party policies, employment created a distinction of experience among women. One of the respondent's reply on my question overcoming financial burdens explains the overall tone of the nine interviews:

> I was already working as a lawyer [before entering elections]. I had my own business. Of course politics requires time, financing, there's a material side to it, emotional support, family support; all of them should be together. I think, this is why women have so much difficulty in politics. This is why it is left behind this much. First, one should stand on her own two feet. To be able to run a business. I mean, for a woman to be successful, she needs to spend her own money for politics. Of course maybe that person does not have a financial difficulty, maybe her family is financially well-off, that is not what I'm saying. But she needs to administer a business; she needs to be capable of doing critical thinking, to see the positive and the negative. I think that enhances the person a lot."

While women representatives themselves possessed a higher amount of cultural capital and invested in the social capital of party groups, they believed their female colleagues should be able to do the same. There was acknowledgement and respect to any kind of political agency women carried out, but this does not strike out the differentiation made in terms of national representation. In the words of one representative with regards to the "possibility of any woman doing what she has done [in terms of her political achievements]:

> "I think, we need certain experiences very much. Without certain experiences, I don't think that it is very right to take part in decision-making mechanisms. What I believe is that, we have certain interests; but we also have experiences. These two should be merged."

Female representatives value the work carried out by other female actors – but the essence of this remark was predominant during interviews. The subtle distinction between

"them" and "other women" in the early Republican era (Durakbaşa, 1998) seemed to persist in the sense that there was a diversification of "us", the women successfully incorporated to the system, and "them" those women should be "saved", "educated", or "incorporated." Although the current female parliamentarians had made much more emphasis on the argument that they represented all of the society rather than a chosen few, their self-positioning of themselves carried a distinction of social class. Just as Republican girls of Turkey trusted the Republic for women's advancement (Durakbaşa, 1998), for the current representatives the establishment (in this sense, women friendly party systems) was there. Women needed to exhaust it for themselves as they successfully did. Women should not turn away and give up just because they were not "handed" posts, but should stay and show effort for it by working within the party. Following the same logic, one representative's criticism regarding inter-party lobbying was carried out after 12 at night in informal meetings was interpreted by another representative as below:

> "I was told once by a former female minister that I should work in the Assembly during the day and at the same time be ready to have a conversation with the politician who toasts at night. I, personally, am not a person who does politics on such a level where such a dialogue takes place. I mean, I don't isolate myself from such meetings, but I stay for a short period of time. As I said, what I do afterwards is to produce policies on my technical knowledge and expertise. I work at night, doing research and reports that would be useful in some way. That type of informal politics in the character of Turkish politics but I don't think it constitutes the mainstream politics. I don't think a woman will have a glass ceiling just because she does not go to those kinds of meetings."

Four representatives out of thirteen reported to make use of their professional expertise to provide new projects for the parties, which also promotes their value for the party. But if the need to compensate for the informal nature of politics requires overworking of women, then gendered division of labor might be perpetuated within the political domain,

continue hindering women's formal political participation. The above comment is certainly important in the sense that a woman might not be given up just because she does not engage in informal politics. But women need to compensate for being newcomers to formal politics by providing new outlets for their parties through their diligent work on constituencies and projects. This hard work brings novelty to formal politics in terms of programs and discourses, but the legitimization of women's political agency through unequal share of work seem to reproduce the division of gendered citizenships.

5.7.3 LOYALTY AND NOVELTY IN "FEMININE POLITICAL DISCOURSE"

In continuity with the trend observed by Arat (1989), all of the interviewees were in favor of the increase of women in Turkish politics while reasons given varied between women engaging in politics for less materialistic reasons than men to women having a more detailed outlook. Three representatives among the group who had prior work in gender studies in either academia or civil society groups argued that "women's language" was needed to alter the discourse in Turkish politics. Their definitions of women's voice varied among themselves, ranging from voicing women's problems to having a more detailed and negotiable approach to conflicts.

While whether a "women's voice" exists or not, an observable trend in the interviews was that women parliamentarians brought novelty in terms of projects and outlets to Turkish politics. As I discussed above, they were preferences of their parties because they worked hard for themselves and for their parties at the same time. All respondents from the Justice and Development Party had organized and ran the women's branches since 2001 or 2002 in their cities prior to their candidacy. Four of them had prepared projects on their expertise, ran public

relations or election campaigns, organized environmental or social projects in their constituencies. In each case, women brought novelty in the sense that all of them either brought new policy or project outlets for the party or brought new members and voters.

In this sense, female parliamentarians were very active and successful in terms of bringing novelty and dynamism to their parties. But what is also observable from their discourses is that Turkish female representatives are rather modest about themselves and their manner towards other political actors. Although they are ambitious women and they certainly want and aim for the posts they occupied, there is also the sometimes mounting sense of duty and reticence. One representative's experience of how at first she did not oppose to the party picture where she was left by the side because she "did not want to come across as this person who opposes to everything, aggressive, difficult" makes one think about whether this tendency to stay silent would be shared among male candidates as well. The fact that they are very careful about not talking about their experiences as party members makes one question whether this is because they confront no problems or because they believe talking about challenges will haunt them in the future. Similarly, another representative who had been given the duty to organize the local women's branch of her party narrated how she was listed as the seventh candidate where the party did not even expect to win six seats. When I asked her whether she opposed to her rank as the seventh while the party did not expect to win six seats after working for about a year for the party, she answered that she did not by stating:

> "No, no. It didn't bother me at all because my party and my organization thought I deserved that slot. My duty was to work for the rank I was given. It was for me...a place I needed to work for. So I worked all the time. I mean, I, we never thought we would win anyway. We were a new party although people were very welcoming wherever we went."

There might be several reasons why the representative did not protest. It might be because she truly felt she did not have the right to occupy a higher slot or because she was truly insecure about her position with regards to the party authorities. However it might also be the case that objection was out of question out of loyalty and gratitude. The reason for reticence might be convoluted; it might involve insecurity, loyalty, sense of duty and gratitude at the same time. What is certain though from this comment is that there is a constraint on women's agency that should be examined further.

Similarly, fulfilling duty for parties was another aspect that set the tone of our discussions several times. In an extreme case, one representative responded all of the questions by stating how rightful and nourishing her party was, ending the interview after six minutes and strictly telling me to strike out the question on what she would like to do if she were to become a party leader one day. In three interviews what became a matter of discussion was the acknowledgment by representatives themselves that they were lucky women because their parties "properly benefited" from them. They defined themselves to be lucky to be properly "utilized" because their productivity did not escape acclaim and award. This signifies that women representatives might also be aware that other women who work as hard may not always be awarded. Education and professional background is imperative for selection of female candidates by the authorities, yet in personalized politics, not much seems to be for sure.

5.7.4 FAMILY TIES: UNJUST GENDER POLITICS OF EASY ACCESS

One of the unexpected aspects of the interviews was how the representatives interpreted utilization of familial networks in politics by women. The case in Japan is that famous or

women coming from prominent (especially politically prominent) families have much easier access to politics than others (Kubo and Gelb, 1994; Ogai, 2001). One widespread example is former foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka who is also the daughter of former Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka. The picture in Turkey is similar since the tradition of providing access to politics through fathers or husbands is still viable in Turkey. Three of the representatives I interviewed were also coming from politically prominent families; one was the wife of one of the leaders of a party. Another was a distinct example because she had met the cadres of the party through her sister, who was one of the advisors of one party leader. This is interesting in the sense that, this time a politically influential woman rather than a man was providing another access to formal politics. Just as Takako Doi of former Japanese Socialist Party had become a female gatekeeper for women in the 1989 elections (Gaunder, 2008), the sister of the representative had become a rare example of female authority providing access to another woman in politics.

It may be contemplated that accessing politics by exhausting familial ties is an easier task, and in numerous ways it is. For example, Makiko Tanaka had very little experience of leadership, only having led the Science and Technology Agency for a brief period, before being appointed Foreign Minister (BBC, 2001). But although there is a certain facilitation of accessing politics through familial networks, being a member of a politically prominent family also requires women to struggle for two reasons. First of all, even though a greater group of men in Japan and Turkey exhaust their familial connections to enter formal politics, it is women's entrance through the same door that stays a permanent footnote in discussions. Among newspapers, magazines and articles, Makiko Tanaka's name comes up as the daughter of a former prime minister more than her other characteristics most of the time. Similarly in

each interview I did, those women who entered politics through family channels became a topic of discussion.

Thus those women who exhaust familial channels struggle to legitimize their agencies. And it requires considerable effort to prove one's worth for a political post as was the case in two of the three mentioned interviews. Since both their ties to other prominent party members have been exposed, both women felt the need to explain their prior engagements with civil society groups and their accomplishments that lasted for a significant part of the interviews. (The third respondent was fairly open about her familial connection, stating "I am coming from a well-known family in our region, it must have made a difference too." in the beginning of our interview. In most of the interviews, the names of two other women representatives with whom I did not conduct interviews with were brought up to hint the type of political agency that was regarded as illegitimate. What was interesting is that the names of these two representatives were also brought up during the two interviews I conducted with women whose political access was facilitated by their familial connections. Yet it was stressed very strongly that what differentiated between the two "scapegoats" and the others was the fact that the representative interviewed had worked very hard to deserve her post. Even the women who themselves utilized same connections found the other two women to be trespassers in political domain. The need to legitimize familial connections was observable, although both of these women had worked for their parties for a long time regardless of their familial connection. Another side of the discussion on the easy access provided for women coming from prominent families is that the double standard these women confronted when many of the male representatives coming from prominent families are not subject to such scrutiny on their legitimacy as political agents.

A second obstacle women utilizing familial ties for political agency confront is how easy their replacements seem to be. Unless they make a mark in their constituencies and within their parties, which might be relatively harder since their political legitimacy is constantly questioned; their fate depends very much on how their party fares in the next election as well as the central decision to give these individuals another chance. Thus the struggle may be difference than others representatives experienced, but there is a struggle for legitimacy nevertheless.

5.8 BICYCLE CITIZENS IN A BULLET TRAIN NATION: MOTHERHOOD AND POLITICAL AGENCY IN JAPAN

Unlike in Turkey, housewives in Japan occasionally more concretely-how many hold local such as offices (Eto, 2005) yet political agency under motherhood, either through grassroots activities or formal local participation, requires time and money (yet to a lesser extent than formal participation in the national domain). In Turkey, grassroots activity is nearly inexistent due to vast amounts of unemployment, education and prevalence of activity networks. Thus formal political agency in both local and national domain is relatively attainable within professional women while unemployed housewives in Turkey and women working in unsecure jobs in both countries are left out of the picture.

Political agency as mothers is prevalent in Japan, yet the content of the agency and how women are incorporated to politics through such activity is problematic for several reasons. Although women's participation to grassroots politics in Japan is considered as compensation to women's lack of formal representation, this activity also carries the risk of overgeneralization with regards to Japanese women's political participation. Agency of

housewives under the role of "motherhood" has been interpreted to provide non-elite, unemployed women opportunity for political agency by several authors (Hasegawa, 1989. Cited in Takeda, 2006:194; Le Blanc, 1999). Yet, Ueno (1994) documents that housewives not needing to work has never exceeded 40% of all women in Japan while Takeda (2006) stating instances where husbands financing their wives' social/political activities exist.

Although local/grass-roots activities do require less financial source than national political endeavors, the amount of women who can provide the basic requirement of these activities render the generalization of the previous argument questionable. Contrary to the Turkish case, being a housewife in Japan may entail relatively better educational attainment and relatively better socioeconomic status most of the time. Thus, as Takeda (2006) states, the gender-specific pattern of women's participation to politics has served to maintain an ideal of classless society in which all women can participate in grassroots movements as housewives/mothers, rather than actually compensating for the lack of political representation of all groups of women.

With regards to women's definition of their agencies, mobilization through motherhood among Turkish representatives seems to be more rhetorical than in practice, unlike the Japanese case. Three of the representatives were single and without child, but the remaining ten were married and had children. Yet, unlike Japan, very few (only three out of 10) mentioned being a mother along with other personal attributes made their outlooks distinguishable from those of male politicians. This is in line with the greater disparity between Japan and Turkey on the prevalence of motherhood as a source of grassroots and political activity in Japan and the lack thereof in Turkey. Because the few women who mentioned motherhood as one of their distinguishable political attributes, they did not propose

any specific argument materializing their motherhood approach. Yet in Japan since late 1960s, women have demonstrated and organized under successful environmental, pacifist and consumer groups in direct relation and consequence of their duties as mothers. It seems that motherhood in the Turkish context is understood more to be a general feminine attribute rather than a source of mobilization for specific issues.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study started from a very limited initial version then grew into a bigger and hopefully more comprehensive endeavor towards the end. Two things caused this expansion, one, I figured out that formal political participation is a much more elaborate process than solely a combination of sufficient material sources and agent mobilization. The second was that I came to see; how individuals defined their own political agency after they enter formal politics was also very explanatory in terms of how women politicians themselves approached politics and other political actors. The qualifications, diversifications, and actions women politicians reported to matter was another aspect of women's formal political participation that still offered room for very fruitful research, especially in Turkey.

Thus this study somewhat grew out from its initial aim, and became a two-fold research in addition to its starting point, a comparative study of formal political participation among women in Turkey and Japan. Consequentially, I tried to examine two things in the study. My first inquiry was why women's formal political participation is on similarly low levels in Turkey and Japan, two countries with such disparate features. I looked for similarities between the two cases which hindered women's formal participation to national politics. In order to compare these two cases, I used a literature review on women's political participation in Japan and the same literature in Turkey as well as the thirteen interviews I conducted with female parliamentarians in Turkey in 2008. Expanding on my first question, my second

inquiry was to examine how women parliamentarians in Turkey participated in politics, and how they defined their own agencies. Using the interviews I conducted with female parliamentarians, I observed how they accomplished their political aspirations and how they positioned themselves within the Turkish political system.

The initiation of this study lies at the argument that formal political participation is a process that requires a multi-level analysis. The existence of sufficient financial and cultural sources does not automatically lead to an increase in women's political visibility – even if this was the case, then maybe Japan might have not been subject to this study. Formal political participation necessitates a thicker analysis because those who can participate and the institutional formulation of participation are themselves historical and contextual constructions. Thus the study starts by presuming that "formal political participation" first requires a definition of who can participate and how does participation happen. I argued in the study that what brought Turkey and Japan together is the similarity in this definition of who participates and how.

This similarity in terms of agents and processes of participation in Turkey and Japan is laid upon by several commonalities in Turkey and Japan. In an era when Turkey and Japan confronted the inevitability of incorporation to Western modernization, political leaders of both countries in late 19th and early 20th centuries adopt rationale of modern governing, fashioning their nations to the requirements of this new governmentality. What had proved to be extremely critical in this era is how political elites defined the placement of the family in these new nations, and how they situated male and female citizenships in relation to contributions to the new nation. The fact that modernization in both countries was carried out by potent educated male elite groups characterized the new governmentality in the sense that

in both countries it privileged male authority, both within family and in the public domain. In each case, women were active participators of modernization through their incorporation to national education and labor-market, but promotion of the centrality of family through educational and social policies at the same time defined the primary female agency as that pertinent to woman's "natural" duties within the household. Within the process of becoming citizens, disciplinary processes of citizenship such as education, social security, employment and participation to national defense has become gendered processes which in consequence diversified between legitimate roles for male and female citizens. While male citizenship diversified in terms of its contribution to the state and the nation as the political and economic agent, and the (corporate) soldier, the contribution of female citizen was primarily defined in relation to its duty within the familial domain. In relation to the diversification of male and female citizenships in terms of their legitimate area of duty, these gendered citizenships engaged in a hierarchical interplay. The prioritization of male citizenship by its promotion through recognition given to its legitimacy as the "public agent" consequentially subordinated female sexuality, placing it in service of the privileged male sexuality in both countries. Thus autonomous exercise of female sexuality in both the public and private domains grew limited in both countries, denouncing any women's agency referring to autonomous exhibition or exercise of female sexuality as inappropriate and illegitimate. In other words, a dilemma between domestication and liberation of women followed modernity in both countries, where it became both advantageous and obligatory for women to organize all other professional or social identifications so that the primary duty of "good wives and wise mothers" has maintained its vitality.

The modern rationale of governing in Turkey and Japan have also defined who can participate in politics and how. Participation in formal politics has similarly been a closed process in Turkey and Japan, allowing very few selected elite to pass through by its few access points. What rendered these closed political systems patriarchal was that access in both systems depend on the exhaustion of familial or public relationships that privilege masculine agency. Thus it is not very surprising that the most common acquisition of political relevance for women in Turkey and Japan has been to exhaust familial networks, which have been networks defined through the prominence of fathers or husbands in the family. Apart from such closeness of political system to newcomers out of prominent patriarchal networks, another attribute of formal political participation constraining women's access has been its personalized nature. One of the most critical requirements of political participation in Turkey and Japan has become heavy investment on the social capital accumulated through personalized relationships within political cliques. The political party systems owed much to this practice in the sense that in both countries political systems have lacked standardized procedures, depending on personal relationships to a significant extent. Within contexts contribution and access to social capital fared this significant, as primarily private agents who adjusted their lives around their duties within the household, women's educational, professional, social (and related to these attributes, financial) qualifications have disabled them to participate in elite groups participating in politics. The path for participation for women depended mostly on utilizing the "traditional" and the "patriarchal", by exhausting politically prominent familial networks which was also limited in terms of the number of women who possessed this option. The definition of political agent and political participation through capabilities of elite male cadres, led to an exclusionary political system in both countries

which women could not normally access. While the legitimate female agent became that in the household, the legitimate public (and political) agency developed into a masculine body in both countries. Thus, above all the material differences between Turkey and Japan, the historical formulation of the context in which rules and legitimate agents of political participation has been defined became much more critical than such concrete features of these two countries. In short, the gendered definition of the political agent/citizen and the exclusionary formulation of political participation have led to similar isolation of women from accessing formal politics in both Turkey and Japan, neutralizing most effects of the material differences between the two cases.

My second inquiry of the study proceeds from this point, asking how women position themselves within such a political system, trying to give a snapshot of what happens after women participate in formal politics in Turkey. What I found in light of my interviews with Turkish female parliamentarians was again an answer of multiple facets. Not falling into the trap of over-generalization of their multiple agencies, there were multiple points that surfaced more commonly than others in terms of how women politicians defined themselves. The first of these common aspects was that women politicians predominantly defined their access in terms of "hard-work" and "struggle", arguing that current political processes can be turned around for one's benefit by working hard. I argue within the personalized political system of Turkey, this argument is what these women themselves experienced as well as such an argument safeguarding their relationships with the party authorities. All of the women politicians I interviewed brought novelty in politics from where they came from, novelty in terms of discourse, projects or even if only as engagement of new (and mostly female) party members. But recognition by the male political elites required a great deal of "struggle", a

struggle which seems to be stemming not from the constituents, but mostly from the parties which are still very reluctant to offer new places to female candidates.

A second significant commonality throughout the interviews was the meaning and importance placed into "cultural capital". Women politicians I interviewed mostly justified their legitimacy in the predominantly male political domain through their educational and professional attributes. Meaning given to these attributes also makes a subtle differentiation between them and "other women", where education and professional experience is regarded as a "social experience" more than possession of an expertise. They bring novelty and new outlets to the political domain through new projects and their diligent work in their parties, but approval of male gatekeepers still fare very critical in terms of their chances of recognition and election. Thus, a distinction depending upon "experience" (educational and professional) seems to be offered by the female candidates to the party authorities as a reason for being a "good investment." Distinction between "them" and "others" was rather observable throughout the interviews, and although all female politicians desired to represent every individual regardless of sex or socioeconomic status, their identification of themselves resembled the stress the modern Republican ideology placed into education and openness to modernity while defining the enlightened Turkish woman. While (higher) education the justification of experience and respect, the importance given to the family as mothers and wives were very much prevalent, along with a certain distance placed with active and autonomous execution of female sexuality.

I believe that this study can be a good initiation for a broader study which would benefit most from the incorporation of interviews with Japanese women parliamentarians. The incorporation of male politicians in Turkey and Japan would also have made an extremely

interesting study. As far as I understood in the past fifteen months, there are numerous studies on women's participation to politics in Turkey and Japan but what is missing most is the accounts of these women parliamentarians themselves. I believe there is much more to explore in terms of women's experiences as political party members, because although the relationships female parliamentarians with voters are relatively more observable (and accounted for by the women parliamentarians themselves), how women function within personalized political parties remains in the dark. An analysis of the agency female candidates exhibit within their parties would be a very enlightening study, over the months (and over hours of interviewing) I have come to believe that the best way to carry out such a study would be to use an anthropological method. Another study might have been on why women parliamentarians serve one term, in other words not how they enter politics, but how they exit politics. As far as I understand from my research, maybe the richest data would be available on that matter.

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ANNEX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

I used this set of questions as a template, adjusting the questions in relation to the background research I carried out for each respondent before the interview. I sometimes added one or two questions to the set if I encountered a specific statement of the respondent in relation to her political experience or aspirations. If the respondent answered a question in one of the answers, I skipped that question.

1. Do you think your educational background has been influential in your aspirations to participate in politics?
    a. How do you think your professional background affected your political participation? (in terms of networking, social and financial support etc.)
    b. What led you to involve in active politics?
2. It seems that electoral candidacy in Turkey requires a notable amount of financial capability. How did you overcome this during your (first) candidacy?
3. How did your first candidacy happen?
    a. How did you first get in contact with your party?
    b. How did your rank in the party list happen?
4. I had once heard one female candidate stating that one of the hardest parts of her campaign was talking in the coffeehouses. Have you ever encountered certain events that challenged you as a candidate?
    a. As a female candidate?
5. Do you think women politicians confront challenges in politics in Turkey?
    a. Do you think women politicians confront challenges within parties in Turkey?
6. Which of your personal characteristics you believe to be relatively more important in terms of your political career?
7. If you were a party leader, what would you like to do?