Turkey's Future Possible Contributions to European Security

Through its Participation

in the EU Crisis Management Operations

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed   Osman Şengül

ABSTRACT

This study mainly scrutinizes the existing arguments in the literature which claim that Turkey will have a large positive influence on the future of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and, hence, European security by making huge contributions to its crisis management missions, both civilian and military. This critical exploration of Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through its participation in the ESDP missions (after its prospective full accession to the European Union - EU) is done by making use of the following three variables: (1) Turkey's record of participation in the EU crisis management operations up to now and the reasons behind its level of involvement in them so far, (2) its motivations in taking part in these missions thus far, and (3) the compatibility of its foreign and security policies with that of the EU. The result of this exploration seems largely -*albeit* not totally- positive. As a result, it is argued that, even though Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through its participation in the EU crisis management operations after its full accession to the EU will be substantial and incomparably larger than its contributions to them so far, these same contributions will never be immune from certain limits and, thus, never be "unconditional" and "solely for the sake of ESDP or European security".

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, ESDP, European security, EU crisis management operations, Common Foreign and Security Policy, peace operations, NATO, United Nations.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, temel olarak, literatürde var olan Türkiye'nin hem Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nın (AGSP) hem de Avrupa güvenliğinin geleceğinde Avrupa Birliği'nin sivil ve askeri kriz yönetimi operasyonlarına büyük katkılar yapmak suretiyle büyük bir pozitif etkiye sahip olacağı yönündeki iddiaları irdelemektedir. Bu, Türkiye'nin gelecekte (yani Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) tam üye olduktan sonra) Avrupa güvenliğine AGSP misyonlarına katılmak yoluyla yapacağı olası katkılara dair eleştirel tetkik aşağıdaki üç değişken kullanılarak yapılacaktır: (1) Türkiye'nin şu ana kadarki AB kriz yönetimi operasyonlarına katılma sicili ve bu operasyonlara katılma derecesinin arkasında yatan nedenler, (2) bu misyonlarda şimdiye kadarki yer alma motivasyonları, (3) ülkenin dış ve güvenlik politikalarının AB'ninkilerle uyumu. Bu tetkikin sonucu büyük oranda, her ne kadar tamamen olmasa da, olumlu gözükmektedir. Sonuç olarak iddia edilmektedir ki, Türkiye'nin Avrupa güvenliğine AB kriz yönetimi operasyonlarına katılmak yoluyla gelecekteki olası katkıları hem genel olarak hem de şu ana kadarki katkılarına kıyasla çok büyük olacak olmasına rağmen, bu olası katkılar hiçbir zaman "sınırsız", "koşulsuz" ve "sadece AGSP ya da Avrupa güvenliği uğruna" olmayacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, AGSP, Avrupa güvenliği, AB kriz yönetimi operasyonları, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, barış operasyonları, NATO, Birleşmiş Milletler.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC – EU Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)

AMIS EU Supporting Action – EU Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

AMM – Aceh Monitoring Mission (EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh – Indonesia)

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU – African Union

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

BLACKSEAFOR – Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force

Br. Gen. – Brigadier General

BSEC – Black Sea Economic Cooperation

CAR – Central African Republic

CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization

CESDP – Common European Security and Defense Policy

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CivCom – Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

CMI – Crisis Management Initiative

CNP – Congolese National Police

CoC – Committee of Contributors

CSCT – Classical Security Complex Theory

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

D-SACEUR – Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

EC – European Community

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EDA – European Defence Agency

EDC – European Defence Community

EDF – European Development Fund

EFP – European Foreign Policy

EMP – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

EMU – European Monetary Union

ENP – European Neighborhood Policy

EPC – European Political Cooperation

ESDI – European Security and Defence Identity

ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine – EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

EU BAM Rafah – EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the PT

EU COPPS – European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support

EUFOR Althea – EU Military Operation in BiH

EUFOR RD Congo – EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC

EUFOR Tchad/RCA – EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and the CAR

EUJUST LEX – EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

EUJUST Themis – EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia

EULEX Kosovo – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EUMC – European Union Military Committee

EUMS – European Union Military Staff

EUPAT – EU Police Advisory Team in the FYROM

EUPM – EU Police Mission in BiH

EUPOL Afghanistan – EU Police Mission in Afghanistan

EUPOL COPPS – EU Police Mission for the PT

EUPOL Kinshasa – EU Police Mission in Kinshasa in the DRC

EUPOL Proxima – EU Police Mission in the FYROM

EUPOL RD Congo – EU Police Mission in the DRC

EUPT Kosovo – European Union Planning Team in Kosovo

EUSEC RD Congo – EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC

EUSR – European Union Special Representative

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau – EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau

FHQ – Force Headquarters

FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GAERC – General Affairs and External Relations Council

GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

GoI – Government of Indonesia

GPPO – German Police Project Office

HCFA – Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement

HHG – Helsinki Headline Goal

HoM – Head of Mission

ICG – International Crisis Group

IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons

IFOR – Implementation Force

IOC – Initial Operational Capability

IPU – Integrated Police Unit

IR – International Relations

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

ISS – Institute for Security Studies

JDP – Justice and Development Party

JHA – Justice and Home Affairs

LI – Liberal Intergovernmentalism

MD – Mediterranean Dialogue

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

MINURCAT – UN Mission in the CAR and Chad

MINUSTAH – UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MoND – Ministry of National Defence of Turkey

MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MPFSEE – Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

NPE – Normative Power Europe

NTM-I – NATO Training Mission-Iraq

OHQ – Operational Headquarters

OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference

OpCdr – Operation Commander

Operation Artemis – EU Military Operation in the DRC

Operation Concordia – EU Military Operation in the FYROM

PA – Palestinian Authority

PCP – Palestinian Civil Police

PfP – Partnership for Peace

PM – Prime Minister

PSC – Political and Security Committee

PT – Palestinian Territories

QMV – Qualified Majority Voting

RCP – Rafah Crossing Point

RRF – Rapid Reaction Forces

SAP – Stabilization and Association Process

SEA – Single European Act

SFOR – Stabilization Force

SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SSR – Security Sector Reform

TACIS – Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States

TEU – Treaty on the European Union

TIPH – Temporary International Presence in Hebron

ToA – Treaty of Amsterdam

TSK – Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı

UN – United Nations

UNAMID – UN/AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur

UNAMIS – UN Advanced Mission in Sudan

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNICOM – UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group

UNIFIL – UN Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIIMOG – UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

UNMIBH – UN Mission in BiH

UNMIK – UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL – UN Mission in Liberia

UNMIS – UN Mission in Sudan

UNOMIG – UN Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOSOM II – UN Operation in Somalia

UNPROFOR – UN Protection Force in BiH

UNSC – UN Security Council

USA – United States of America

WEU – Western European Union

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Question

The significance of Turkey for European peace and security throughout the Cold War is a well-acknowledged fact. Turkey's contributions to the European security system during those years as a European NATO ally defending the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO or the Alliance) are hard to deny. With the words of Chris Patten (2007), "Turkey was critical to Europe in the cold war. For 40 years, it stood lonely guard on the south-eastern third of [NATO]'s frontline, paying the price in military-heavy government and delayed development"[1]. However, the contributions of Turkey to European peace and stability in the new international environment after the Cold War and especially its future possible benefits for the European security have come to be scrutinized and debated upon - especially among European policymakers- in the post-Cold War era, particularly after Turkey was granted the prospect of full membership to the European Union (EU or the Union) at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (Bilgin, 2001; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Desai, 2005).

This study focuses on one aspect of this debate: the possible contributions that Turkey would make to European security in terms of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) after it becomes a full member to the EU in the future. Namely, Turkey's potential impact on European security by its future possible commitments to the EU *crisis management operations* will be explored. In fact, the study will try to respond to the following question: To what extent and depending on which conditions will the claims that Turkey would largely contribute to European security through ESDP (in the form of participating in military and

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[1] Also, as very well expressed by Olli Rehn in a lecture given at Helsinki University on 27 November 2006, Turkey had been the only NATO ally that had a shared border with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, thereby having had to confront the Red Army and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet during the course of this time period.

civilian crisis management operations undertaken by the EU) after its prospective full membership to the EU will be realized?

As such, a number of Turkey's potential positive influences on European security -especially on the security of the EU- are stated in the literature on Turkey-EU relations (with respect to the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU), on some crucial EU official documents, and on speeches of prominent political figures both from Turkey and the Union itself. These stated contributions can appropriately be grouped under three categories: (1) those related to Turkey's geostrategic position, (2) those stemming from Turkey's being a crucial *regional power* effective in promoting peace and stability in its neighborhood, and (3) those emerging as a result of Turkey's being a considerable civilian and military power, which is expected to be important for ESDP and its crisis management operations.

To start with Turkey's geostrategic position, the country is situated in a geography which has a unique feature in the world of combining three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa) and of constituting an intersection point among four of the most strategic regions of the world for European security (the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean). As such, utilizing the terminology of *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective* report of the European Commission (2004a), Turkey's future membership to the EU carries a considerable significance for Europe regarding the issues of "energy, transport, and border management".

To commence with the energy issue, Turkey is located in a region where 71.8% of the proven gas and 72.7% of the proven oil reserves of the world are present (from where around 60 percent of European oil demand is met), one of the most secure and appropriate routes to transfer them to the European markets being nowhere but the Turkish territories[2] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey - MFA, 2008d; Dunay, 2004; Karaosmanoğlu, 2001). Turkey's

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[2] Also, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 report, more than 70% of all of the proved oil and natural gas reserves in the world belong to the countries which are located adjacent to Turkey in the regions like the Middle East, Eurasia, and North Africa, by the end of 2006.

accession to the EU, bearing also in mind that the country is evolving into *an energy hub* in terms of the energy supply to the Union (Rehn, 2006), could not only lead the EU to have a safer and easier supply of these resources but also increase its options for obtaining energy supplies thereby diminishing its dependence on, for instance, Russian oil and natural gas (European Commission, 2004a; Rehn, 2007c; Gül, 2006; International Crisis Group - ICG, 2007). As very nicely pointed out by Rehn in a speech delivered in Istanbul (2007b), "[b]ecoming a true energy bridge, Turkey [could] provide new routes for energy imports and enable new producer countries to supply oil and gas to the EU".

As for the "transport modes", Turkey is a major transit route for land, air and naval transportation between the EU and the regions like the Middle East and Central Asia; which puts it in a central position in terms of *communication and trade* in its region. When Turkey enters into the EU, its current "role as a corridor for road, rail, air, maritime, and pipeline connections between Europe and its southern neighborhood" would come to be more important and upgraded, thus improving the transportation networks between these regions; causing ultimately a better and stronger integration of -for example- the Mediterranean region into the Union, economically (European Commission, 2004a; Dunay, 2004).

In terms of the border issues, Turkey is already a significant partner of the EU in combating the threats related to border management such as illegal migration, drugs and human trafficking, or organized crime (Verheugen, 2007). Turkey's accession to the EU, in this respect, is expected to enhance the prospects of more efficient and effective border management in the region in that the cooperation in terms of drug trafficking, illegal and irregular migration, human and arms smuggling, and fight against terrorism would substantially increase between the EU and Turkey; which will ultimately render Europe a safer place against these modern security threats which are fed mainly from the countries and regions surrounding Turkey (European Commission, 2004b; ICG, 2007; Çomak, 2006;

Demiralp, 2003). In other words, as stated by Desai, "Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against these ever-growing 'soft-threats' through beneficial cooperation in [Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar]" (2005: 378).

As regards Turkey's possible contributions to European peace and security by means of its existing regional influence, it is key to point out that Turkey is a pivotal country in its region playing an influential role in promoting peace, security and stability "from the Balkans up to China, as well as from Morocco up to Iran" (Dunay, 2004; Desai, 2005). Several special characteristics of Turkey can be considered as the reasons behind the country's being a powerful and credible *regional actor* which has positive transformative impact on its vicinity. To start with, Turkey possesses historical affinity and cultural ties with many of its neighbors going back to the years of Ottoman rule. It has also been engaging in close economic, political and cultural relations with its neighboring countries and regions starting especially from the early 1990s, causing it to forge increasingly stronger economic, political and cultural ties with its neighbors (Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Ferracuti and Nones, 2007)[3]. Moreover, Turkey -by its being a modern, secular and democratic country with an almost hundred percent Muslim population- has been setting a unique example for the other Islamic countries, especially those in the Middle East, by demonstrating them the fact that the values of democracy, the rule of law, secularism and the respect for human rights are universal norms that can exist in any country regardless of its culture or religion (Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Rehn, 2007c; Demiralp, 2003; ICG, 2007)[4].

Furthermore, Turkey has been an active member of a number of international organizations ranging from the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and

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[3] For a quite detailed and illuminating account of how and on the basis of what kind of policies Turkey has improved its relations with its neighbors since the early 1990s, see Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Gözen, 2003.

[4] Indeed, in the words of the Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Tayyip Erdoğan in a 2005 speech, "Turkey is the best example of how a nation that has embraced the faith of Islam can support democracy based on secularism and implement advanced democratic norms"; which, according to Rehn (2007a), renders the country as a good model of democracy for the Islamic World, thereby enabling it to play a constructive role in preventing the Clash of Civilizations.

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and Council of Europe to the Stability Pact for South-East Europe and the Islamic Conference Organization (European Commission, 2004a), which has provided the country with a considerable international credibility and influence stemming not only from the roles it has played in these institutions but also from the experiences it has gained functioning under the auspices of or in cooperation with them for many years. Finally, Turkey has opted for building constructive relations with the countries in its region particularly after the Cold War; by trying to integrate the countries of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Central Asia into the Western World; by giving substantial significance to *regional political dialogue* in the form of participating actively in the "regional co-operation fora" such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); by taking part in a number of international peace keeping operations undertaken under the auspices of the UN and NATO in its vicinity; by trying to play a mediating role in the deepest disputes of the world like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; by taking crucial responsibilities in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan initiated in 2001 and in the stabilization efforts in Iraq since 2003; and by pushing hard -especially in recent years- for the amelioration of its relations with its neighbors like Greece, Armenia and Syria (Gözen, 2003; European Commission, 1998-2003, 2004c, 2005, 2006).

Given the above-noted extremely salient set of features of Turkey which have helped it become a significant regional power, and considering that the interests and positions of Turkey and the EU are mostly parallel to and compatible with each other with respect to most of the problematic regions and countries that are surrounding Turkey[5]; Turkey's prospective membership to the EU would contribute to the latter's security in three major ways. First of all, Turkey's accession to the EU would show, in particular to the Middle Eastern countries, that the EU is indeed an inclusive international entity based on *multi-cultural values*, standing

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[5] For a detailed and good account of how the security interests and foreign policy positions of Turkey and the EU are mostly similar in various regions surrounding Turkey see, Emerson and Tocci, 2004; European Commission, 2004a.

in an equal distance to all religions including Islam; which could raise sympathy in the Moslem countries towards the *tolerant* EU, thus setting a more suitable ground for the European values to be welcome by them (Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Gül, 2007; Erdoğan, 2003; Demiralp, 2003).

Secondly and concomitantly, membership of Turkey to the EU will open various novel avenues for the latter to get engaged in and shape various problematic regions of the world such as the Balkans, North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia thanks to the existing and increasing leverage of Turkey upon these geographies; which would lead the EU to be able to deepen its relations with these regions, thus enhancing its power, influence and credibility on them (Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Dunay, 2004; Buharalı, 2004; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; Gül, 2006). More specifically and practically, for instance, Turkey's membership to the EU would extend the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to new territories, as Turkey's current neighbors would directly become the neighbors of the EU; or with Turkey's accession, the EU could potentially use its *multiple programs of assistance* such as PHARE, TACIS or MEDA in pertinent countries and regions more effectively, thanks to Turkey's special relations and ties with them as well as its logistical and institutional capabilities (Emerson and Tocci, 2004). Consequently, with the membership of Turkey, the EU could become a much more influential stabilizing factor in these regions, contributing more effectively to their democratization, economic development and integration to the global world; which would in turn lead it to gain a greater weight in world affairs as a stronger candidate to become a true global actor (European Commission, 2004a; Andoura, 2006; Verheugen, 2007; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; Dunay, 2004).

Thirdly and perhaps most saliently, the EU-member Turkey would have a chance to become a true model for the religious and authoritarian Islamic countries of the world due to its Muslim population and robust commitment to Western values of democracy, secularism,

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law; showing these countries that Islam is actually compatible with western –and the EU's- values (European Commission, 2004a; Rehn, 2006; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; Moustakis, 1998; Verheugen, 2007). As a result, Turkey could become a stronger bridge between the Islamic countries and the western world (including the EU itself), thus facilitating the dialogue between them, by demonstrating to the world that Islam and other religions as well as the East and the West can co-exist peacefully and harmoniously; which in turn would help replace the thesis of the *Clash of Civilization* with that of the *Alliance of Civilizations* (Rehn, 2007a; Dunay, 2004; Erdoğan, 2005-2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; Verheugen, 2004; Gül, 2006).

With respect to the last set of Turkey's stated possible contributions to European security in the literature, namely those that would occur through its participation in ESDP; Turkey is a considerable military and civilian power both *able* and *willing* to make huge contributions to *crisis management* missions of the EU whether conducted with recourse to NATO facilities or by the Union itself (Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Yılmaz, 2007; Buharalı, 2004; Nas, 2003; Lesser, 2001). Turkey has the potential to contribute remarkably to European security through the structure of ESDP mainly because: (1) it, with its roughly 800.000 troops constituting 27% of all the forces of European allies within NATO, maintains the 6th largest standing army in the world and second largest standing army in NATO after that of the United States of America (USA or the US)[6] (European Commission, 2004a; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Çayhan, 2003); (2) the Turkish armed forces are "well-trained, professional and efficient, and constantly modernizing themselves" being quite experienced in engaging in low-intensity warfare and conducting *peace* as well as *crisis management* operations under various international forces (including those of the EU itself) with their extensive previous records in the regions ranging from the Balkans to the Caucasus and

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[6] See Appendix A for a detailed data provided by NATO website demonstrating the size of Turkish armed forces together with that of the other NATO countries from 1980 to 2003.

Africa; not to mention their extremely favorable logistical and technical strengths (Dunay, 2004; Çayhan, 2003; Karaosmanoğlu, 2001; Gasparini and Silvestri, 2007; Gül, 2003); and (3) Turkey is a country which makes large amounts of military expenditures amounting, for example, to 4.9% of its GDP in 2003; and is one of the major recipients of conventional weapons in the world[7] (being expected to spend some $150 billion for defence within the next three decades), which is particularly noteworthy regarding the decreasing levels of defence expenditures even in major EU countries[8] (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, 2007; European Commission, 2004a; Ferracuti and Nones, 2007).

Turkey is also a *willing* country in terms of providing ESDP with its extensive support; as manifested in its commitments to European security through its close cooperation with the UN and NATO since the early 1950s and especially after the end of the Cold War, including its significant engagement in the crisis response operations undertaken by these international organizations; in its participation in recent EU-led operations; and in its offers to the EU countries of giving a considerable backing to the newly emerging concepts of rapid reaction forces (RRF) and battle groups (Nas, 2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2000). One should also bear in mind that Turkey has had a great influence in European security by holding a central position in NATO, thereby having the right to veto in the North Atlantic Council in determining the EU's involvement prospects in any crisis management operation (Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Gözen, 2003). As a result, it is fair to argue that Turkey's accession to the EU would have a great positive impact on European security because mainly of its detrimental role to play in the success of the ESDP project, in general; and success or even feasibility of EU-led *military* and *civilian* missions, in particular (Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Nas, 2003; Ergüvenç, 2007).

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[7] Indeed, Turkey was reported to be the 9th largest importer of major conventional weapons in the world between the years 2002 and 2006, accounting for the 2.8% of all the world imports during that period (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute -SIPRI- Yearbook, 2007).
[8] See Appendix B for a detailed data on defence expenditures of Turkey compared to those of the other NATO member countries between 1980 and 2003.

As noted before, this dissertation will focus on the third aspect of Turkey's possible contributions to the European security system, as elaborated on the literature reviewed above; namely on the possibility of its future positive impact on it through its participation in the ESDP operations. Accordingly, it will mainly *scrutinize* the *existing arguments* that Turkey has got the potential to have a large and decisive positive influence on the future of ESDP (and, hence, European security) by being both *willing* and *able* to make huge contributions to its *crisis management* missions, both civilian and military; and, as a result, it will extensively contribute both to ESDP and European security. This *critical exploration* of Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through its participation in the ESDP missions (after its prospective full accession to the EU) will be done by making use of or relying on three variables: (1) *Turkey's record of participation in the EU crisis management operations up to now and the reasons behind its level of involvement in them so far*, (2) *its motivations in taking part in these missions thus far*, and (3) *the compatibility of its foreign and security policy with that of the EU, concerning especially the conflict-ridden countries or regions surrounding Turkey and also carrying significance for the security of Europe*, a factor underlined -indeed- by the European Commission itself (2004a).

Regarding the first variable, each of the 21 civilian and military crisis management operations conducted by the EU so far will be examined, with a special focus on the questions of whether Turkey has participated or not in these operations and to what extent it has contributed to such missions in which it has been involved. The second variable will be examined relying on the existing literature on Turkey's contributions to *peace operations* so far; and the factors having been influential in Turkey's decisions of engagement (or non engagement) in the EU's ESDP operations up to now will be attempted to be extracted and explored. The third variable, lastly, will again be explored based on the existing literature, but this time on the literature concerning Turkey-EU relations (supported also by the official

documents produced by the pertinent institutions of both Turkey and the EU). As such, the degree to which the foreign and security policies of Turkey and the EU are compatible regarding the crisis-torn countries/regions where the EU has launched crisis management operations so far or is likely to do so in the future will be found out and revealed.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a relatively *objective* and *non-speculative* account of the potential contributions of Turkey to the European security architecture under the ESDP framework, if and when the country joins the EU in the future; by making *sound* and *detailed* analyses and arriving at *constructive* conclusions. In fact, many Turkish and European politicians, diplomats and scholars talk about Turkey's huge prospective positive impact on European security *in general*, after its full membership to the Union in the future; but without giving satisfactory evidence to support their claims. This study, instead, will focus on just *one specific* aspect of Turkey's possible contributions to European security -*the added value that it will provide to the Union in its crisis management operations under the ESDP framework*- and try to put forward whether or to what extent this *specific* prospective contribution can be realized in the future and depending on which conditions.

The originality and importance of this thesis come to the fore exactly at this point. It will be a significant contribution to the literature on European security as well as that on the Turkey-EU security relations in the sense that it will be one of the very few studies which confines itself to a *specific aspect* of Turkey's potential contributions to European security (the ESDP operations aspect), and will be the first attempt to focus on the country's future possible impact on European security through its participation in and contributions to the *EU crisis management operations*. Hence, it will also be the first study examining specifically the Turkey's record of participation in and contributions to the EU crisis management missions so far. Moreover, this dissertation will not only be one of the few studies attempting to examine and analyze all the ESDP operations (together) undertaken by the EU up to now, but also be

the *most up-to-date* work elaborating on all these missions. Furthermore, this study also seeks to make theoretical contributions to the literatures on ESDP and Turkey-EU security relations (albeit more modestly) in that it will attempt to offer a novel (constructivist) explanation for the emergence of ESDP and will directly as well as explicitly tackle -for the first time- with the question of Turkey's motivations in participating in the ESDP operations thus far.

Finally, this dissertation also carries some salient and *practical* positive bearings for Turkey-EU relations in that thanks to its detailed and relatively more objective analysis of the issue of interest, it could provide any reader (including politicians, public officials and academics both in Turkey and the EU) with the necessary and accurate knowledge as to how much Turkey will come to be an asset for the EU's ESDP efforts and future security in case that it gains a full membership to the Union. Moreover, as expressed by Müftüler-Baç (2007) very well, the studies such as this one might appeal to the citizens of EU countries and change their attitudes towards Turkey's full membership to the Union. As such, "[i]f the [European] public perceives that Turkey provides new benefits for the current [security] problems Europe faces, then it might be less reluctant towards Turkey's accession" (16).

It would be timely to note before concluding this section that, of course, the membership of Turkey to the EU will not be a total asset for the Union in terms of its security and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as ESDP. Turkey's membership will certainly entail several significant costs or problems for the EU in this regard. As such, for instance, decision-making within the EU on foreign and security policy issues will become more complicated; the EU will become more likely to get engaged in the most conflict-ridden and unstable regions of the world; and it will be directly exposed to fundamentalist Islam by becoming neighbor to many Islamic authoritarian regimes of the Middle East (Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Desai, 2005; Andoura, 2006; Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Bağcı, 2000). Moreover, Turkey's accession to the EU could constitute a "double-edged sword" for the European

security in certain respects. To specify, as expressed very nicely in the European Commission's *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective* report, the fact that Turkey's membership to the EU would serve to bring peace and stability to the Middle East, could bring about the simultaneous risk of destabilizing the EU itself via its getting more likely to deal directly with the "difficult political and security problems of the region" (2004a: 12). However, since the aim of this thesis is to explore the extent of the future possible contributions of Turkey to European security through ESDP, but not to make a comparison of Turkey's possible costs and benefits for the EU in order to reveal which one is outweighing the other, the discussions of the possible costs will not be made any further.

1.2 Methodology

As noted above, this dissertation will explore the issue of Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through its participation in the ESDP operations, by utilizing three variables: (1) Turkey's past and present record of participation in and contributions to these operations, (2) Turkey's motivations in participating in these missions so far, and (3) present as well as (expected) future foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU. In elaborating upon *each* of these *three* variables, the *historical institutionalist "path dependency" logic* will be inspirational as well as influential; and, thus, will be benefited from. Accordingly, the first variable -which is the main variable of this study- will be explored in the major analytical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4), where all the 21 EU crisis management operations will be examined and analyzed in detail with a special focus on Turkey's amount of participation in them so far. Once the *record* of Turkey's participation in these missions is revealed, the reasons behind the country's (satisfactory or unsatisfactory) performance in getting involved in these missions will be discerned and declared; on the basis of which future projections as to Turkey's potential contributions to

European security through its taking part in the ESDP operations after its full accession to the EU will be made.

The second and third variables (the *side* or *supportive* variables of this thesis), on the other hand, will be explored (with the same *"path dependency" logic*) in concluding chapter in two separate sections right before the above-mentioned *future projections* are made (Section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, respectively) in order to complement these future predictions. As such, regarding the second variable, the motivations of Turkey in participating in the EU crisis management operations so far will be elaborated upon and extracted from literature. Then, these *existing motivations* of Turkey in engaging in the EU's ESDP missions will be used in order to highlight the country's future motivations in participating in these operations after its full accession to the EU. As for the third variable, similarly, the current level of foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU will be explored in and extracted from the literature; the findings of which will be used to see the future possible amount of such *compatibility* after Turkey's full membership to the Union. At the end, the results of the analyses of these *two side* variables will be added to analyses of the *first (major)* variable, and *concrete* as well as *grounded* future projections regarding Turkey's potential contributions to European security through its involvement in the EU crisis management operations after its full accession to the EU will be made.

As also implied above, this study will largely make use of primary sources (official documents issued or produced by the pertinent authorities and institutions of the EU as well as of Turkey) during its examination of the EU crisis management operations through the lenses of *Turkey's record of participation* (namely, the first) variable. In its exploration of the other *two supportive* variables, on the other hand, it will mainly benefit from secondary sources; namely, from the literatures on *Turkey's participation in (international) peace operations* and on *EU-Turkey foreign and security policy compatibility.*

1.3 Definitions

For the sake of eliminating possible confusions as to the meaning of certain concepts throughout the thesis, four major *conceptual clarifications* will be made here. These are going to be on the notion of *foreign policy of the EU*, on the concept of *European security* as employed in this dissertation, on the terms used to name *international crisis interventions*, and on the proper way of designating the EU crisis management operations themselves.

To begin with the first term, it is quite obvious that this study will focus on the 2nd pillar of the EU, namely the CFSP pillar; simply because it is going to make its analyses mainly on the EU's ESDP structure and the civilian as well as military operations conducted under that mechanism. This may imply to the reader that the thesis takes the EU's foreign policy as (just) the CFSP pillar of the EU. This is not the case, though. This study, instead, adopts a broad definition of foreign policy (both in general and with respect to the EU), making use of Karen Smith's conceptions of foreign policy and EU's foreign policy. As such, the notion of *foreign policy* is defined in this study as "to mean the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state [or the EU] and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actor in question" (Smith, 2003: 2). Foreign policy, in this sense, is a "political or security-related" concept, although its tools might be as diverse as to include the utilization of certain economic instruments. Parallely, although *foreign policy* of the EU is mainly related to and associated with the 2nd pillar of the Union's structure, this study does not consider the EU's foreign policy only as the product of its CFSP mechanism. Instead, the EU's foreign policy is understood here as a "cross-pillar" concept, the other pillars of the EU (the European Community – EC, and JHA) being part of the process of producing foreign policy for the Union via their different instruments employed in order to conduct external economic relations or fight against international crime, respectively.

The second major conceptual clarification has pretty much to do with the research question of this study, that is, "Turkey's possible contributions to *European security* through the ESDP

missions, if it should become a full member to the EU in the future". The problem here is the question of: what is meant by *European security*? Indeed, Turkey's full membership to the EU would contribute *basically* and *directly* to the *security of the Union* (but not to the security of *Europe*) from various angles elaborated upon above, including the ESDP missions which are the direct focus of this thesis. However, as very well articulated by Waever (1998; 2000), with the end of the Cold War, the European politics has evolved from one which had been composed of "several competing centers" to one which is based on one single centre –that's the EU- and "concentric circles around [that] EU centre". The EU has become central for the European security in general in three aspects: (1) it has provided the European continent with a single center, thereby altering the shape of the European politics from a balance of power structure to a core-periphery system; (2) it has functioned as a disciplining mechanism for the Central and Eastern European countries, thus contributing largely to their security; and (3) it has become a security exporter in various countries and regions around Europe by directly intervening in erupting conflicts (Waever, 1998; 2000). Therefore, as also noted by Larsen (2000), the European security has become very much connected to the EU's security, both of them getting dependent on each other since 1989. Consequently, the direct possible contributions of Turkey's EU accession to *the security of the Union* will simultaneously be its direct or indirect contributions to *European security*. Since the latter concept encompasses the former, this study opts for using the notion of *European security* as the central term. Moreover, the notion of European security refers, for the purposes of this study, to the whole Europe including Western, Central and Eastern parts, and the Balkans due to the fact that Turkey's participation in the ESDP missions which are held in the most crisis-ridden parts of the world is likely to enhance the security of all of these territories.

As far as the terms related to the international crisis interventions are concerned, there is a huge confusion in terms of the meaning and utilization of these concepts for several reasons.

First of all, as noted by Smith (2003), there has been an inflation of concepts pertinent to dealing with international crisis situations, since the early 1990s. The notions of "preventive diplomacy", "preventive action", "conflict prevention", "conflict management", "crisis management", "crisis prevention", "conflict resolution", "peace making", "peace keeping" and "peace building" have all come to be employed in describing more or less similar types of crisis situations and interventions. Moreover, as underlined by the 2001 ICG report named *EU Crisis Response Capability*, the terms of "conflict" and "crisis" in the abovementioned phrases are generally used interchangeably in the public discourse and official documents, just as the terms "management", "prevention" and "response" are done. Furthermore, the definitions of the above-noted concepts do not totally overlap between different international entities, leading the same terms to mean different actions under different organizations. For instance, "peace-making" in the EU usage corresponds to "peace enforcement" according to the UN terminology, both meaning military action taken in order to resolve international conflicts; while "peace-making" in the UN *parlance* refers to non-military actions or measures to deal with international crises (ICG, 2001).

Finally and more specific to the EU case, the definitions that are officially adopted by the Union in order to describe international crisis interventions are incomplete and used inconsistently in the EU's documentation (ICG, 2001); which is quite manifest, for instance, in the European Commission's annual progress reports on Turkey (Progress Report -or Reports- hereafter) where the terms "conflict prevention", "peace keeping" and "crisis management" are utilized without any conceptual definition or clarification. To give a specific example, the 2001 and 2004 Progress Reports use the concepts of "conflict prevention", "peace keeping" and "crisis management"; and of "crisis management", "crisis operations" and (international and UN) "peace keeping" within two consecutive paragraphs and even in

the same paragraph, respectively, without defining these concepts and specifying at least their conceptual differences (European Commission, 2001, 2004c).

In order to minimize possible negative analytical repercussions of these above-noted terminological ambiguities regarding the international crisis interventions, both in general and in the EU case in particular, this dissertation will employ -for its own analytical purposes- two terms in calling such interventions: *crisis management operations/missions* and *peace operations*. The first term, (*civilian*[9] or *military*) *crisis management operations/missions*, will be used in referring to or naming all the crisis interventions undertaken by the EU; and the reason for choosing to utilize this term is the fact that it is the most widely used concept in the EU *parlance* in designating such missions. The terms *ESDP operations/missions*, *EU operations/missions* and *EU crisis management activities/efforts* will also be benefited from in referring to the same EU crisis intervention activities especially in order to diversify the language throughout the thesis. The second term (*peace operations*), on the other hand, will be utilized -inspired by and slightly modifying Güngör (2007: 18,19)- in referring to all types of international crisis interventions undertaken by the *other* international organizations or entities *than* the EU such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE especially in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, as for the proper designation of the EU crisis management missions themselves, the EU has launched 21 crisis management operations up until now. Among these missions, 20 have been undertaken under the framework of ESDP (meaning that the Council of the European Union -Council of the EU- has been responsible for the conduct of them), whereas one (the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine) has *exceptionally* been launched and run by the European Commission within the framework of the EC's Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program (hence, not under the ESDP framework). Therefore, this study will generally refer to all the EU missions as "EU crisis

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[9] The term "civilian", which is and will be frequently employed in the phrases such as "civilian crisis management operations" throughout the thesis, is used in order to give the meaning of *non-military*. As such, a "civilian crisis management operation" is a mission carried out by police forces, judges, or other civilian experts.

management operations/missions". However, it will also call these operations sometimes as "ESDP operations/missions"; but by being totally aware of the fact that the 20 (but not all 21) of them are *ESDP missions,* indeed.

Before concluding this section, the research question of the thesis in general should also be made more understandable. This is mainly because it raises the following question: Turkey has *already* contributed to European security both in general and in particular through its partaking in the ESDP missions; so, why does the research question seek to elaborate on the country's possible contributions to the EU's security *after* its full accession to the Union? Of course, Turkey has always been significant for European security since WWII and has contributed to it in plenty of ways via various means. More specifically, it has also participated in several ESDP missions and served to enhance the security of Europe. However, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's role in the European security system has gradually eroded (Gözen, 2003). Turkey, once holding the "central position" in the European security architecture as an indispensable member of NATO, has moved to a "midway position" after the Treaty on the European Union had come to effect (TEU or Maastricht Treaty), upon which it has become an associate member in the Western European Union (WEU) which was to serve as "the security and defence pillar of the EU integration". As a last move, with the launch of ESDP at the end of the 1990s, Turkey's role in securing Europe has been further downgraded to the "marginal position" where it was kept out of the European security architecture by getting excluded from the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP operations. As a result, although Turkey has participated in and contributed to several ESDP missions so far, thus helping enhance European security, it has done so in a reluctant way by limiting its contributions as much as possible due to its concerns over its own security caused by its exclusion from the decision-making mechanisms of these operations (Gözen, 2003). It is for this reason that this dissertation attempts to highlight Turkey's contributions to the

ESDP mechanisms after its full membership to the EU, when the country could fully utilize its potentials in participating in the ESDP missions; thereby gaining a chance to commit its resources more willingly for the security of Europe.

1.4 Existing Studies

There are not so many studies in the literature elaborating on the question of *Turkey's possible contributions to European security* and there is not even a *single* study concentrating *specifically* on its potential contributions to the Union's security through the crisis management operations of ESDP. There are still, however, significant works on the *potential contributions question* which are mostly approaching the issue *generally* by focusing on Turkey's future positive impact on the CFSP and ESDP, thereby trying mainly to find out whether Turkey would be a security *asset* or *liability* for the EU after its full membership to the Union. Most of these studies hold a fully or predominantly optimistic position regarding the impact of Turkey's accession to the EU on the latter's security. Although there are a few *skeptical* accounts which stress Turkey's potential security burdens as much as its possible added-values to the security of the Union, there is not a completely or remarkably negative approach in the literature at all. Some of the major studies which deal completely or partially with the issue of *Turkey's potential contributions to European security* will be examined here in order to demonstrate the exact position of this thesis in the literature.

To start with the studies focusing on the *possible contributions* issue broadly, by holding a positive/optimistic stance and by elaborating on the question as a sole or major theme, Müftüler-Baç has produced two important articles in 2000 and 2007 which tackle mainly the question of Turkey's potential contributions to Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) after its accession to the EU. In both articles, she approaches the contributions issue *generally* by examining, in the earlier work, Turkey's significant

geostrategic position, military capabilities, and its impact on the EU's security policy through its leverage in NATO Council and, in the latter one, Turkey's "bridgeness" between Europe and Islam, its military capabilities, and its geostrategic position and regional influence in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Caucasus. Although, she mentions –in both articles- some potential negative impacts of Turkey's membership to the Union on the latter's security, she concludes very positively in general by portraying Turkey's future EU membership as a significant asset for the Union's security. Demiralp (2003), in his article assessing the "added value" of Turkey's EU membership to its CFSP, approaches the issue rather comprehensively by highlighting Turkey's future possible contributions to European security in almost every aspect including ESDP, energy supply, the new security threats such as terrorism or organized crime, and peace and stability in the Balkans or Middle East; by putting special emphasis on Turkey's geostrategic position and its constitution of an anti-thesis for the theory of the Clash of Civilizations. He concludes by implying that Turkey's membership to the EU is a *key* factor for the latter's becoming an effective international actor in the future.

In another quite broad analysis of Turkey's potential impact on the future of European foreign policy, Emerson and Tocci (2004) delve deeply into the question of Turkey's future possible contributions to European security, besides their exploration of the foreign policy compatibility between the EU and Turkey in eleven pre-selected geographical theatres. After elaborating on the various possible assets that Turkey will provide for the EU's future security such as its geographical position, influence in its neighboring countries and regions, civilian and military capabilities, and its Islamic and -at the same time- democratic polity; they conclude that "Turkey stands to be an unequivocal asset for the EU's external policies" (1), by serving a "bridgehead" and "spearhead" for the EU in extending its influence and values in the chaotic and unstable regions of the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Buharalı (2004), in his study evaluating mainly the foreign policy compatibility between

Turkey and the EU in terms of the European Security Strategy (ESS) document, also deals with the *Turkey's future impact on European security* issue by attracting attention to Turkey's civilian, military and diplomatic capabilities and experience in contributing to the international security, and its vital geographical location as well as ties with and leverage on its near abroad. Additionally, he demonstrates specifically that Turkey's membership to the EU will help the Union to better cope with the modern security challenges stated in the ESS such as global terrorism, failed states and regional conflicts. He concludes at the end that the full membership of Turkey is a crucial determinant of the future development of CFSP and ESDP as well as the EU's possible global actorness.

Regarding again *optimistic* and *general* accounts, but those exploring the *potential contributions* question as a sub-theme, Moustakis (1998), writing upon the Brussels European Council of 1997, evaluates the validity of Turkey's membership application to the EU by focusing on the possible costs and benefits of its EU membership for both the country itself and the Union. He also deals with Turkey's future possible contributions to the EU's security in this study and argues that Turkey carries significant potential to enhance the Union's security in the future thanks to its bridging position between Europe and Middle East both strategically and culturally, and its stabilizing role in its neighboring volatile regions like the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. Karaosmanoğlu (2001) deals with the future of Turkey-EU relations in terms of ESDP by also paying some attention to transatlantic dimension. He focuses on military strength and experience of Turkey as well as its invaluable geostrategic position which carries great potential of contributing to European security in terms of military power projection, energy security and protection against the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and concludes that Turkey carries great prospects to enhance the EU's security, which in turn empowers its hands in its journey towards EU membership. Bilgin, in two consecutive articles (2001, 2003), tackles more with the rhetoric developed and used by

Turkish policymakers in the post-Cold War period in order to make a case for Turkey's full membership to the EU than the question of Turkey's concrete possible contributions to the Union's security in the future itself. However, even though she finds the Turkish policymakers' substantial emphasis on Turkey's potential contributions to European security through its military capabilities and geographical position in advancing Turkey's membership claims quite wrong and out-of-date, she follows Karaosmanoğlu (2001) and agrees with his arguments underlining Turkey's military and geostrategic potentials in contributing to the Union's future security.

Gözen (2003) elaborates on the question of Turkey's possible contributions to *European security architecture* in his rather illuminating work on the Turkey-EU-NATO relations, where he approaches the *possible contributions* issue from a reverse angle. Being totally aware of Turkey's geostrategic and military significance for the European security, he focuses on the possible costs that the exclusion of Turkey from the ESDP mechanisms would entail for the EU's future security and claims that the future of the European security architecture and ESDP is dependent upon the level of Turkey's inclusion into the ESDP structures. Çomak (2006), in another salient work, scrutinizes the future evolution of post-Cold War European security architecture and the role of Turkey in this process. After discussing in detail four security scenarios produced and speculated for the future security system of Europe and establishing the vitality of Turkey for the European security, she reaches the conclusion that regardless of which scenario would be realized in the future the significance of Turkey for the European security will last via its various sustained contributions to it.

Lastly, a recent ICG report on EU-Turkey relations (2007) deals with the *contributions* question by concentrating mainly on ESDP, energy politics, and Turkey's alleged role as a *model* between Europe and Islamic world. Drawing, overall, a positive picture as to the Turkey's future impact on EU's external policies, the report concludes in the energy issue

-for instance- that "[t]hough Turkey's EU membership would not guarantee Europe's energy supply [due to the problematic nature of producing countries like Russia and Iran,] a Turkey rejected by the EU would mean less energy security [for Europe]" (8). It is also noted in the report that even a deterioration in Turkey-EU relations since 2005 due mainly to the Cyprus dispute has influenced the EU security rather negatively, with significant repercussions for the future of ESDP, EU-NATO strategic dialogue, and Europe's image in the Islamic World.

As far as the studies which approach the *contributions* issue again broadly but with a more cautious and skeptical stance concerned, the *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective* report (2004a) prepared by the European Commission in order to constitute a basis for its *Recommendation* report (2004b) evaluates the impact of Turkey's membership to the EU and its various policies. The first part of the report, dealing with Turkey's potential impact on the EU's external policies from several angles, concludes that "Turkey's accession brings both advantages and challenges [for the EU]" (12). Though the report acknowledges Turkey's possible contributions to the Union's security in terms -for instance- of ESDP, energy politics or the EU's geostrategy; it stresses that the membership of Turkey also entails important costs for the EU and that the amount of Turkey's foreign and security policy contributions will be dependent upon the degree of its foreign policy alignment with the EU in the future. Andoura (2006), in an assessment of the EU's absorption capacity towards Turkey's membership, takes a rather similar position with the Commission's abovementioned report by delineating Turkey's future membership both a potential asset and a liability for the EU, its exact contributions being dependent again on its future foreign policy compatibility with the Union. Desai (2005), finally, deals with the same issue by analyzing Turkey-EU relations in three respects: the compatibility of strategic cultures and security perspectives between the EU and Turkey, Turkey's likely contributions to the European Security System as defined by himself, and the amount of *trust* in Turkey-EU relations. After drawing a mixed

picture in terms of all the three factors by emphasizing, for example, the *double-edged sword* quality of some of the alleged possible contributions of Turkey to the EU's security, he concludes that it is quite hard to label Turkey's EU membership either as an "opportunity" or a "risk" for the future security of the Union.

There are also a few studies in the literature which approach the *contributions* issue with a different methodology by focusing just on *one specific* aspect of the EU's security and trying to highlight Turkey's future impact on it in this respect. Politi (2007), for instance, deals with "geostrategic" influence of Turkish membership to the Union's security policies. After elaborating basically on Turkey's geostrategic position/influence and examining the factors - the future developments in the USA, Russia, the EU and the Wider Middle East - which will be quite determinant in the future amount of Turkish geopolitical value; he portrays some scenarios for Turkey and its relations with the above-noted actors and concludes that regardless of which scenarios would be realized in the future, Turkey's geostrategic value will either be retained or enhanced. So, the membership of Turkey to the EU will entail distinct geostrategic benefits for the geopolitical role and influence of the latter. In two other studies, Ergüvenç (2007) and Ferrocuti and Nones (2007) focus on military capabilities, defence procurement and defence industrial cooperation aspects of European security. Both articles elaborate mainly on Turkey's military/defence capabilities as well as current level of military and defence convergence/cooperation between the EU and Turkey, and argue that Turkey's future membership to the EU will be rather advantageous for the latter in terms of its military power. They, moreover, hold the EU responsible for the lack of further progress in Turkey-EU military cooperation, and call for Turkey's integration to the EU's security and defence institutions like European Defence Agency (EDA) even before its full accession to the Union.

This thesis has got significant differences from the two sets of studies reviewed above. The first set of works, which approach the *potential contributions* issue *broadly* by focusing on

Turkey's possible contributions to European foreign and security policies, are featured by their being *too general*. Since, in these studies, possible contributions in several policy fields are simultaneously tackled with, analyses done are not detailed enough and the findings as well as future projections come normally to be weakly-founded, rarely going beyond commentaries on Turkey's future impact on European security. The second set of works which deal with the *contributions* issue by concentrating on *one specific* aspect of European security policy, on the other hand, are well placed to produce more detailed analyses as well as more grounded findings and future projections. However, there is no work among these studies examining the future possible impact of Turkey's EU membership on the latter's security by focusing on the ESDP operations aspect of European security policies. Moreover, generally speaking, almost all the studies in the above-reviewed literature tackle openly or intrinsically with the question of whether Turkey's EU membership would entail an "asset" or a "liability" for the latter's CFSP/ESDP.

This study, by contrast, differs from the first group of above-examined works by its *specific* focus on a certain aspect of the EU's security policies -ESDP operations aspect- and its detailed analysis and grounded future projections as to the *potential impact* of Turkey to the EU's security as regards this *specific* aspect. It differs from the second set of works, on the other hand, mainly by its concentration on the crisis management missions aspect of ESDP; an issue which has not been studied with the methodology of the second group of studies reviewed above, so far. Finally, this thesis differs from all the other works examined above by its approach to the *contributions* question. To specify, it focuses on the crisis management aspect of ESDP -which is usually claimed to be a field through which Turkey will largely and decisively contribute to European security after its full EU membership- and scrutinizes whether and to what extent these claims are likely to be realized. Namely, instead of trying to assess whether Turkey will be an *asset* or *liability* for the future of European security, this

thesis strives to uncover whether, to what extent and depending on which conditions will Turkey be an *"asset"* (as generally alleged in the literature) for the future of CFSP/ESDP.

1.5 Organization

Following this introductory first chapter, the dissertation will continue with the theoretical part which will attempt to build a solid theoretical background for the later chapters and analyses. This will be done in three subsections, whose focus will -respectively- be the different theoretical accounts for ESDP, the explanations for the emergence of it, and the impact of ESDP on the EU's international identity (or role).

The third chapter will seek to set a historical background for the study in (again) three subsections which are focusing, respectively, on the history of the CFSP/ESDP; the history of Turkey-EU relations as regards the CFSP/ESDP; and, the history of Turkey's contributions to international peace and security under different international entities in various formats.

Chapter 4 is going to be the major analytical chapter of this thesis, in which 21 crisis management operations undertaken by the EU thus far (either on its own or in collaboration with NATO) will be examined and analyzed *systematically* in order to put forward how much Turkey has participated in and contributed to the EU crisis management missions up to now and which dynamics have been influential in its performance of taking part in these missions.

Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude the dissertation by: (1) making future projections as to the likely contributions of Turkey to the European security through its involvement in the EU crisis management operations, after its full accession to the Union in the future; (2) attempting to give some policy advice to the Turkish foreign and security policymakers regarding their existing policy of trying to enhance Turkey's EU membership bid by stressing the country's potential contributions to ESDP in the future; and (3) making certain recommendations to the researchers studying or intending to study the issue of Turkey's future potential impact on European security, in general, and its such impact on the ESDP operations, in particular.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Different Theoretical Approaches to ESDP

ESDP can be deemed one of the most significant and promising developments in the recent European integration history, with its crucial impacts particularly on the changing nature of European security architecture and the European integration process in general. Yet, it is still a field which is remarkably under-theorized (Forsberg, 2006; Bono, 2002). Moreover, the existing insufficient amount of theoretical studies on European defence suffer from being either produced before the launch of ESDP or not linked well to the current theoretical discussions in the International Relations (IR) or comparative politics (Forsberg, 2006). Although there is a substantial literature already emerged on ESDP, it could not go very much beyond creating works describing some key decisions on and certain issues related to ESDP like its impacts on the transatlantic relationship or military capabilities improved under it (Bono, 2002). The reasons for this theoretical inadequacy in the ESDP literature can be different such as that ESDP is a fairly novel phenomenon or that the emergence of ESDP was unexpected and taken as abnormal by the major IR and integration theories, which has caused them to take some time to respond to this new development. Nevertheless, the problem is already and still there: "research on the ESDP has been theoretically weak and empirically superficial, it has been neither systematic nor cumulative, and has suffered from presentism and a lack of focused debate" (Forsberg, 2006: 2).

Although ESDP has been poorly theorized so far, it is hard to deny that the major existing (meta)-theories of the IR still shed some lights on the security and defence integration aspect of the EU. As such, the three major meta-theoretical approaches in the International Relations studies -Rationalism, Social Constructivism (Constructivism), and Reflectivism- which have also penetrated into the field of EU integration (Smith, 2000; Christiansen et al, 1999; Rieker, 2004;

Pollack 2001; Smith, 1999) are useful in explaining ESDP with its quite significant aspects like its emergence, its impact on EU's international identity and actorness, or its future.

Rationalism, among these meta-theories, is the most materialist one. Ontologically, it tends to privilege materialism or *hard facts*; meaning that it pays norms, identities and social structures little or no attention. Epistemologically, it favors positivism in the form of causal explanations and theory-testing. It is an agent-centered approach in that it privileges agency over structure, considering the nation-state as the most salient or even the sole international actor (Rieker, 2004; Checkel, 1999). As for its position towards institutions, rationalism takes institutions as "(formal or informal) rules of the game that provide incentives for rational actors to adopt certain strategies in pursuit of their (exogenously given) preferences" (Pollack, 2001: 234).

Reflective theories -namely, critical theory, postmodernism, feminism and normative theory- can be considered as the *opposite pole* to rationalism in IR (Smith, 2000). Considering *theory* as being the constitutive element of social world, these theories challenge the positivism of rationalist approaches, and instead favor interpretative accounts. Reflectivism, moreover, opposes or rejects the basic assumptions of rationalism such as empiricism, naturalism or behavioralism. It also rejects rationalism's focus on nation-state as the main unit of analysis, taking different units or referent objects for their analysis such as the women in the case of feminism or the identity in the case of post-modernism. As such, reflective theories offer a much broader agenda for both the IR and the EU studies (Smith, 2000; Checkel, 1999).

Social constructivism, lastly, is the meta-theory considering the international relations as being composed of socially constructed facts which are themselves created by human agreement (Adler, 1997). Epistemologically, it favors interpretative and qualitative methods of inquiry over theory-testing, albeit not totally rejecting the latter (Rieker, 2004). It is "less interested in causal explanations and more interested in interpreting and examining how structures and agents interact and are mutually constitutive" (Rieker, 2004: 4). As for the institutions, constructivists

adopt a broader definition, adding intersubjective understandings and informal norms to the formal or informal rules of rationalists. Moreover, they give much more prominence to institutions than rationalists do in that institutions, for them, constitute the actors by shaping not only their incentives but also their preferences and even identities (Pollack, 2001).

Rationalism, as such, has been the dominant approach both in IR discipline and in the literature on European integration (Smith, 2000; Checkel, 2003). This is the case mainly because, thanks to its views on politics and power, rationalism is very well suited to deal with the policy agendas of national governments. Indeed, it asks quite relevant and practical questions about the nation-states as well as the EU relating to their facts, thereby delimiting the political realms to be explored. Rationalist approach is far from being impartial in explaining the EU and its specific policies, though. Due to its limited notion of politics and bases of social theory, it faces serious problems in accounting for European integration and its several very important aspects such as the issues related to the transformative impact of the EU on its member states (Smith, 2000). Reflectivism, on the other hand, has represented the opposite meta-theoretical position in the IR literature since the early 1980s and offered, for instance, explanations in certain significant aspects of EU integration which has been ignored by rationalist theories such as the questions of inclusion, exclusion or othering as well as the gender issues in European integration. However, it has never managed to form a unified single theory which could challenge or create an alternative to rationalist orthodoxy (Smith, 2000; Christiansen et al, 1999). More specific to the EU studies, reflectivism has not been able to produce much research on European integration, leading to the fact that there are quite a few examples of truly reflective studies on the EU today. Moreover, except postmodernism, social constructivism carries more potential to deal with and enhance reflectivist research agenda in the EU integration studies than reflective theories themselves do (Christiansen et al, 1999; Smith 2000; Forsberg, 2006).

As for constructivism, it has become another dominant meta-theory of the IR in the 1990s through the process called "constructivist turn" in the international relations discipline. It has also become one of the two dominant meta-theoretical approaches in the EU integration literature (together with rationalism) during the second half of the 1990s. As a result, it comes to seize the middle ground between rationalist and reflective theories both in the IR and EU integration studies (Christiansen et al, 1999; Pollack, 2001; Smith, 2000; Smith, 1999; Adler, 1997; Katzenstein et al, 1998; Checkel, 1999). As Adler (1997) nicely points out, constructivism has stood very well between rationalism and reflectivism by striking a quite salient and well-suited balance between materialism and idealism on the one hand, and structure-based and agency-based approaches promoted by these meta-theories towards the social world, on the other (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1999).

By considering the ideas and norms as constitutive elements of political realm rather than just intervening variables as proposed by rationalists and by being based upon intersubjective understandings and discourses, social constructivism has offered a deeper and different way of studying the EU integration, thus managing to account for the transformative impact of EU integration on the European state system and its members by way of changing the interests, behaviors and identities of the latter (Christiansen et al, 1999; Smith, 2000; Checkel, 1999; Smith, 1999). Moreover, in contrast to reflective theories which have had serious problems on conducting research on EU integration, social constructivism has proved its ability to produce both theoretical and empirical research on the EU, studying the issues such as "polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language" (Christiansen et al, 1999: 528, 538; Smith, 1999; Pollack, 2001).

As a result, constructivism has managed to become a major challenge for and alternative to rationalism in both the IR and EU integration literatures, despite the fact that rationalist accounts still dominate these studies. As such, with its consideration of social, cultural and ideological

factors as the major causal variables in explaining international relations, constructivism is leading to the emergence of the next great division in the IR and EU studies by becoming a rival to rationalism which attributes little or no attention and significance to these same variables (Pollack, 2001; Checkel, 2003; Christiansen et al, 1999; Smith, 2000; Katzenstein et al, 1998; Smith, 1999; Checkel 1999). That's why, in the remainder of this section, the two major rationalist theories (neo-realism and liberal intergovernmentalism) and social constructivist approach will be focused on in order to set a theoretical background for ESDP.

Neo-realism is mainly based on the works of Kenneth Waltz and it can be deemed a modification or up-date of realism -the dominant theory of IR for the last five decades- by putting greater emphasis on the systemic level of analysis (Rosamond, 2000). As such, it shares basic assumptions of realism. Accordingly: (1) states are the major actors operating in an anarchic and self-help international system where this anarchical structure is the main factor shaping state behavior; (2) states are mainly concerned with the issues of survival, security and power, thereby tending to act as rational and unitary actors, to obtain military forces in order to defend their vital interests, and not to cooperate with one another because they can never trust the intentions of other states; and (3) existing international institutions are ineffective in promoting international cooperation because they are created by the nation-states in order to serve their national interests and, thus, have no autonomy, which leads to the fact that multilateral cooperation can only emerge when the interests of the great powers in the system converge in that direction or when a common threat for several countries emerge in the international systemic level (Smith, 2000; Rieker, 2004; Rosamond, 2000). Neo-realists, additionally, stress the importance of *international structure* and *relative gains*. They argue that international relations as well as the issues of conflict and war cannot simply be accounted for by referring to the human nature or domestic characteristics of nation-states, but can be explained by the international structure. They also assert that nation-states are mostly concerned with

relative gains -"their position in the international system relative to their main rivals and potential enemies"- which tends largely to restrict the prospects for international cooperation (Hyde-Price, 2006: 222; Rosamond, 2000).

Since the process of European Integration was an attempt to overcome the anarchy among the European nation-states and a way of conducting politics emphasizing consent and governance rather than power politics among European countries, it has constituted an anomaly for the (neo)realist theory from the very beginning (Smith, 2000). Moreover, as the (neo)realists have focused on systemic level explanations in international relations, they have not very much interested in the international institutions such as the EU which were attempting to do politics at other levels than the systemic one. As a result, (neo)realists tended to account for the EU integration process by placing it in the international context and treating it like an epiphenomenal consequence of the international system (Rosamond, 2000; Pollack, 2001). Hence, the (neo)realists explained the emergence and subsequent advancement of European integration on the basis of the context of the Cold War; stressing its major characteristics such as bipolar structure, superpower rivalry, common Soviet threat and security umbrella provided by the USA for the European allies (Waltz, 1979; Rosamond, 2000; Pollack, 2001).

Consequently, some (neo)realists led by Mearsheimer (1990) envisaged that the end of the Cold War would have negative influences for the future of cooperation among EU countries, attenuating the prospects for further European integration (Rosamond, 2000; Pollack, 2001). Once this prediction proved wrong with the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the EU and increased the prospects for European Monetary Union (EMU), neo-realism was challenged seriously; as a result of which Grieco attempted to amend neo-realism in order to better account for the European integration (Pollack, 2001; Smith, 2000). He tried to elucidate the intensification of the EU integration process in the early 1990s by his *voice opportunities thesis*, arguing that further integration occurred in the EU mainly because it was carrying certain

common benefits for all the member countries and because the weaker members of the Union sought to control the power of the strongest ones through further institutional cooperation (Grieco, 1995, 1996; Smith, 2000; Rosamond, 2000; Pollack, 2001).

According to neo-realists, to modify slightly the arguments of Rieker, the EU as such does not and would not probably have any common security policy (2004). It does not have a common security policy because: (1) the nature of political, security and defence cooperation throughout the EU history has been intergovernmental where inter-state bargaining and the unanimity principle has prevailed in decision-making (Pijpers, 1991; Rieker, 2004; Glarbo, 1999); (2) the EU has not yet been able to develop sufficient military capabilities in order to make it an effective international security actor; and (3) as the view and policy divisions among EU members during the Iraqi war of 2003 demonstrated rather obviously, national interests still prevail in almost all of these countries especially when an issue of high significance is on the agenda (Rieker, 2004).

The EU would not have a security policy, on the other hand, for two major reasons. First, the EU is governed by its member states which have delegated only limited powers and autonomy for the EU institutions. The national interests and especially sovereignty of the member states are still of utmost salience for them. Considering also that the realms of security and defence belong to the *high politics* and constitute the core of nation-state sovereignties, the emergence of a common EU security (and defence) policy seems quite unlikely, maybe forever (Rieker, 2004; Ojanen, 2006; Glarbo, 1999; Bono, 2002). Second, even if a common EU security policy becomes likely to be formed, it will require a convergence of national interests in order, let's say, to balance the US power in international politics or defend the EU against a Soviets-like common threats. But, it is hard not only that such incentives for the EU to develop a common security policy could emerge in the future, but also that the EU countries facing such incentives could act uniformly by ignoring their -then- national interests (Rieker, 2004).

As for Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), it is a rationalist theory which was developed during the early 1990s in a series of articles by Andrew Moravcsik and revised in 1998 in a book called *The Choice for Europe* again by him (Pollack, 2001). It was both an attempt by Moravcsik to modify and improve neo-liberalism so as to reach a better explanation of European cooperation process (Smith, 2000) and a grand theory aiming to explain the history and nature of the whole European integration process within a multi-causal framework (Schimmelfennig, 2004). More specifically, as of 1998, Moravcsik's LI is composed of three middle-range theories knit together under a broad rationalist framework, which are "a liberal theory of national preference formation, an intergovernmental theory of bargaining, and a [newly added] theory of institutional choice stressing the importance of credible commitments" (Pollack, 2001: 232). As being a rationalist theory, LI shares with the neo-realists their basic assumptions that nation-states are the major actors in international relations, they are unitary and rational players of global politics and anarchy prevails in international system and influences the behaviors of states (Smith, 2000; Rieker, 2004). It also has got two major differences from neo-realism in that in LI "national preferences are assumed to be domestically generated and not derive from a state's security concerns in the international system and … bargaining power is determined by the relative intensity of preferences and not by military or other material power capabilities" (Pollack, 2001: 225; Rosamond, 2000).

According to Moravcsik, European integration evolved historically as a result of five instances of "grand bargains", all of which took place either for the sake of trade liberalization or of monetary cooperation: the Treaty of Rome, the consolidation of the Common Market in the 1960s, the founding of the European Monetary System, the Single European Act (SEA), and the Treaty on European Union (1998). Three factors, for him, have been determinant in these great bargains, thus accounting for the process of European integration since 1955; which are economic and commercial interests of member states, relative bargaining power of them in the

negotiations (especially of strong ones), and the desire to increase the credibility of interstate commitments. The first factor has been the most influential one in that the major drive for the EU integration throughout the EC/EU history has been the convergence of national economic and commercial interests of the member countries. The second factor has also been rather salient in the EU integration history mainly because the fundamental problems and distributional conflicts among the EC/EU members have been resolved through tough inter-state bargaining, the outcome of which has been dependent upon nothing but relative power of the member states. Lastly, the third factor has come to the picture in the implementation process of the conclusions of the big bargains. The members of the EC/EU have delegated parts of their sovereignty to international institutions -by adopting qualified majority voting in decision-making or by granting certain powers to the Commission- in order to secure the compliance of other members to the decisions taken during the grand bargains, thereby enhancing the credibility of pledged commitments (Moravcsik, 1998)[10].

As regards ESDP, it is fair to note that LI does not deal very much with the security issues, and it is more concerned with economic interests and matters (or economic integration) than security cooperation (Rieker, 2004; Forsberg, 2006). Yet, since it is a rationalist theory sharing many assumptions with neo-realism, LI can be considered to share the broad argument of neo-realists that the EU does not have a common security (and defence) policy and that it is hard for the Union to develop security cooperation in the foreseeable future (Rieker, 2004). However, since LI is based upon neo-liberalism, which diverges from neo-realism on its view about the future course of European integration process by envisioning it more optimistically[11] (Smith,

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[10] For a detailed second-source account of LI see Schimmelfennig, 2004; and Rosamond, 2000: 136-147.

[11] Indeed, liberals and neo-liberals see the future of EU integration as more of a cooperation than conflict. Although, they view the emergence and development of the EU as a by-product of the Cold War international context just as the neo-realists interpret it, liberals and neo-liberals diverge from the latter in their views on the future prospects for EU cooperation in that they think EU integration process is likely to continue -maybe with an increasing pace- in the post-Cold War world, due mainly to the rising democratic governance and interdependence among EU member countries, the attained level of institutionalization in the EU so far, and the lack of likelihood of war in the continent which relaxes the *relative gains* problem in the EU politics (Pollack, 2001; Smith, 2000).

2000; Pollack, 2001), it can also be said that LI looks at the future prospects for a European security cooperation more positively. As such, Liberal Intergovernmentalists (at least some of them) would claim that a common security (and defence) policy could be possible in the EU in the future, if the interests of member states (especially the strongest ones) should converge in that direction; and this policy could last until these overlapped interests happen to diverge for some reason at sometime (Rieker, 2004).

Constructivism is the third meta-theoretical approach in the IR which can shed some lights on European security integration. Most literally, it can be defined as "a truism that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices" (Risse, 2004: 160). As such, it concentrates upon social ontologies like rules, norms, institutions, intersubjective meanings, discourse, collective identity formation, communicative action and epistemic communities (Christiansen et al, 1999), and seeks to elucidate how these factors influence the behaviors, interests and identities of political actors (Checkel, 2003; Diez and Wiener, 2004). Accordingly, constructivists argue that the interests and preferences of political actors (including nation-states) are not exogenously supplied by international structure, as neo-realists suggest; rather, they are shaped and altered by cultural, discursive and ideational factors such as political culture, social context or discourse, namely by social interaction (Risse, 2004; Kolodziej, 2005; Rosamond, 2000; Checkel, 2003).

Two characteristics of social constructivist thinking deserve special attention here for the purposes of this study overall. First, constructivists propose that agents and (social) structures are mutually constitutive (Risse, 2004; Kolodziej, 2005; Diez and Wiener, 2004) in the effect that "agents are bound by structures, but they are also capable through action of altering the structural environment in which they operate" (Rosamond, 2000: 172). In other words, norms, rules or ideas created by agents shape (or form) social structures which in turn influence and delimit the interests, preferences and identities of these same agents (Kolodziej, 2005). Second,

constructivists' social realities exist only as long as there is *human agreement* on them, meaning that these realities are subject to change (Christiansen et al, 1999). That's to say, interests and identities of political actors are not fixed and timeless -as (neo)realists claim- because of the fact that both these interests/identities and the political actors themselves are social constructs which are limited to a certain time-frame and susceptible to change. Related more directly to this thesis, constructivists treat the individual and state security also as social constructs open to reformulation over time by actors upon changing conditions (Kolodziej, 2005).

According to constructivists, multilateral cooperation is a derivative of social interaction as well as collective identity formation instead of liberal intergovernmentalists' intergovernmental bargaining. State interests and preferences are not fixed and independent from social context (Rieker, 2004). Therefore, for them, "[the EU] integration can be understood as a result of a common world view, the establishment of common institutions and the development of capacities, rules, norms, and standards that are likely to influence the member states" (Rieker, 2004: 6). As a result, for constructivists, the EU has not simply been developed by nation-states on the basis of their national interests via tough negotiations; but the Union and its membership has had a deep impact on the behaviors, interests and identities of its members. More specifically, the EU has both determined the range of choices lying in front of the member states, and influenced substantively how the members have defined their interests, preferences and identities (Risse, 2004).

Constructivists' views on ESDP contrast sharply with those of rationalist theories. Namely, contrary to neo-realism and LI which have a rather negative stance towards the issue of and prospects for European security integration, constructivists approach to ESDP quite positively and argue that the EU has already developed a common security policy of some sort, and this has been the case despite the continued position and interest divergences among the major EU members on certain hot issues like Iraqi war of 2003 (Rieker, 2004). Responding in a sense to

rationalist criticisms on ESDP, constructivists substantiate their claims with two major arguments. Firstly, the EU has already obtained certain amount of autonomy from the member states. Common norms, rules and institutions have gradually emerged in the EU, transforming and limiting the sovereignty of members of the Union. Consequently, the EU has come to "constrain and influence the agendas and understandings of security policy in the member states" (Rieker, 2004: 9).

Secondly, for constructivists, the EU is already an international security actor both militarily and in broader terms. As such, the EU and member countries have already obtained significant military capabilities and willingness to use them in the form of civilian and military crisis management operations or of supporting the UN or NATO military undertakings such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cooper, 2003; cited in Rieker, 2004). The EU is also a significant player in the international politics in broader sense thanks to its external influence on third countries through its enlargement policy or trade/development cooperation (Rieker, 2004). What's more, to modify and update Rieker's (2004) argument, the EU launched ESDP at the end of 1990s; operationalized it in early 2000s; adopted the ESS document in 2003; undertook nearly two dozens of civilian and military crisis management missions so far; which are all signaling a quite promising future for ESDP, as interpreted by constructivists.

Social constructivism, as elaborated upon here, captures a significant place in the theoretical framework of this dissertation. Although -just like any other IR or European Integration theory (or meta-theory)- it can hardly account comprehensively for the emergence and development of the CFSP and ESDP, which are both complex institutional mechanisms comprising of intergovernmental as well as supranational elements (Bronstone, 2000; Mawdsley, 2004) on its own, it can and does explain certain crucial aspects of these policies. As such, salient constructivist themes are and will be observable throughout this thesis. To start with, in contrast to rationalist theories' suggestions that European security integration does not exist and

will remain so in the foreseeable future, this study -inspired by constructivism- accepts that the EU does have a sort of common security and defence policy which has got salient potential for further flourishing in the future. Secondly, this dissertation comes up with an explanation for the emergence of ESDP based on constructivist thinking and premises. Accordingly, as will be detailed in the next section, the European security and defence policy cooperation emerged in the 1990s, as a response to changes in international relations (context) brought about by the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes triggered by this development in the security concept/conception. More specifically, a new security environment and new security threats have emerged after the Cold War, which have caused ideational changes in the EU's security conception, leading to the emergence of ESDP as a direct part of a novel security discourse of *full-fledged struggle with the new security challenges*. Thirdly, this study also considers ESDP, following Waever (2000) as contributing to the EU's newly emerging international/external identity. Fourthly, this thesis accepts and relies on new/broader conception of security as opposed to the neo-realists' quite narrower perception of the notion treating it just as a mater of military power, capabilities and war; which makes possible for this study to focus on the crisis management operations conducted under ESDP as a *new way* of dealing with novel security challenges for the EU. Finally, as opposed to (neo)realists who reject or at least devalue the *civilian* and *normative* power aspects of the EU and its international identity (Hyde-Price, 2006), this dissertation captures a constructivist stance by accepting and believing in the *civilian and normative power EU*.

Declaring constructivism as an important theoretical approach in this study, of course, does not mean that the value of other theoretical accounts which are trying to explain European security and defence policy cooperation are ruled out or discarded. Indeed, there are other theories and approaches which are very useful in accounting somewhat for the CFSP and ESDP.

This dissertation, indeed, does recognize all of the added-values the other theories bring to the explanation of European security and defence integration process.

To substantiate the point made above, neo-realism and LI are particularly useful theories in elucidating the ineffectiveness, incoherence and inefficiencies of the EU as a global actor in international relations, including the pertaining problems and weaknesses of CFSP/ESDP (Rieker, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2006). Moreover, although these theories generally deny the existence of common security policy of the EU, there are still a few accounts based on them which admit the phenomenon of ESDP and try to account for it[12].

Neo-functionalism of Haas, another rationalist theory of European Integration, also carries some explanatory power for the emergence and development of ESDP, though originally it could not foresee the emergence of it due to its belief that *spill over effect* would not amount to drive the European integration into the security and defence fields (Ojanen, 2006; Forsberg, 2006; Bono, 2002; Treacher, 2004). Neo-functionalism and its notion of *spill over* do account for the emergence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and CFSP, and makes it easier to comprehend the emergence of ESDP (Treacher, 2004; Rosamond, 2000). To reverse the emphasis in Treacher's (2004) argumentation, ESDP would not have been devised "without the integration culture that had emerged among the Member States during the Union's first four decades" (50) and the EU could not have developed a military dimension "without first having been an economic, political and social actor with deep integrative foundations" (65).

New institutionalisms[13], again among rationalist theories, are also among the approaches which help explain the CFSP and ESDP. Historical institutionalism, for instance, is very useful in understanding ESDP thanks to its notion of *path dependency* in that it argues that past bargainings done and decisions taken under the CFSP framework are internalized in pertinent

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[12] In their neo-realist analyses, for instance, Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) and Barry Posen (2006) are elucidating the emergence of ESDP as "a function of systemic changes in the structural distribution of power" in global politics (217) and as an attempt to balance the US power in a unipolar international system, respectively.
[13] For a detailed classification and explanation of them see Pollack, 2001 and 2004.

EU institutions and influence the subsequent policy-making processes under the CFSP, thereby rendering the emergence and functioning of ESDP more understandable (Mawdsley, 2004). Similarly, there are a few rational choice institutionalist accounts like that of Wolfgang Wagner (2003)[14] which focus on CFSP/ESDP and strive to elucidate them or their certain aspects.

Last but not least, the governance approach to the EU, which began to gain prominence towards the end of 1990s (Hooghe and Marks, 2003), carries also some significant potential to help account for the CFSP and ESDP. Focusing on multi-level governance and policy networks in the EU decision-making, this approach treats the EU as a unique polity (a new type of domestic polity) which cannot fully be explained by the IR-inspired European integration theories. Considering these theories as complementary and bringing them together in different combinations in different levels of analysis, and trying to account for the complex system of EU policy making relying also on comparative politics (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Peterson and Bomberg, 2003; Jachtenfuchs, 2003); this approach promises further and maybe better explanations for the CFSP and ESDP because it basically "allows us to conceptualize the evolution of [CFSP and] ESDP by looking at the roles of a variety of actors located at the national, supranational and transgovernmental levels without assuming … [a] hierarchy among the different levels of analysis" (Bono, 2002: 13)[15].

Before concluding this section, one last rather crucial theoretical point should be made about this dissertation in general. Although it credits the value of *(social) constructivism* in better accounting for ESDP and its emergence than other theories of the IR, and although it carries significant *constructivist themes* overall such as its recognition of the existence of ESDP and EU's *normative* as well as *civilian* powers; this thesis methodologically relies on "historical institutionalism" and especially its "path dependency logic". As such, in its analyses as regards

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[14] Wagner (2003), for example, concentrates on European crisis management policy, describing it as a "fast coordination game", and then questions whether more supranationalization of the EU institutions could make this policy and relatedly CFSP more effective, suggesting at the end the extension of the usage of the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in crisis management decision making in the EU.

[15] See Smith, 2004, for a good analysis of CFSP based on (multi-level) governance approach.

each of its *three* variables, this study *first* explores Turkey's past and existing record or situation with respect to that specific variable (like past and current amount of Turkey's participation in and contributions to the EU's ESDP operations) and, *then*, seeks to make future projections based on the findings of this exploration. Moreover, the analyses of this study relies almost totally on either *primary sources* such as official documents or *secondary sources* such as existing literatures like the one on Turkey-EU relations, which has not much to do with the constructivist methodology. Lastly, as will be demonstrated in Section 5.1.1, *constructivism* is particularly weak or inadequate in explaining the motivations behind Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations so far; which is, indeed, better accounted for by other alternative theories such as *neorealism* or *liberalism*.

2.2 Understanding the Emergence of ESDP

Although, as mentioned above, there is not much theoretical analysis of ESDP in the literature, one can still identify three major strands of explanations for the emergence of ESDP, each of them relying on the IR theories: (1) ESDP as a natural outcome of the EU integration process, (2) ESDP as a result of EU's balancing intentions and actions against the USA, and (3) ESDP brought about by the "practical needs of crisis management in a changed security environment" (Forsberg, 2006: 10).

The first explanation is based on the mixture of the theoretical approaches of federalism and neo-functionalism. Federalists' contribution in the explanation comes from their belief that the decision-makers of the EU intends ultimately to establish the Union at least as a new type of international entity that have managed to integrate even in the fields of security and defence which are the last bastions of sovereignty of nation-states. Neo-functionalists, on the other hand, contributes to the explanation by making use of their "spill over" idea, working in this case as signifying the ultimate expansion of EU integration process from economic and political matters

to security and defence issues. This strand of explanation is observed, for instance, in Etzioni (2001) who argues that the current levels of EU integration cannot be sustained unless it is carried forward towards further integration, let us say, in the political matters.

The second explanation for the emergence of ESDP, is rooted in (neo)realist thinking which considers common external threats as the major (or even sole) motivation behind defence cooperation among nation-states. As such, it suggests that ESDP is the result of EU-US rivalry in world politics where the former attempts to balance the power of the latter. Posen's account of the emergence of ESDP constitutes a good example for this explanation. Accordingly, ESDP is a result of the EU's attempt to balance the US hegemonic power in the unipolar structure of world politics, though the US does not pose any direct security threat for the EU itself (Posen, 2006)[16].

Despite Forsberg's (2006) avoidance from delineating a specific IR theory, the third explanation for the emergence of ESDP is also based on neo-realist approach (Bono, 2002). Exemplified by Treacher's (2004) account, this explanation suggests that ESDP is a function of the transformation of the international system with the end of the Cold War and the eruption of external crises in Europe (like those in Yugoslavia) which demonstrated the EU countries the nature of the newly emerging security environment in the continent. As it is, these structural changes -the end of bipolarity which had not been leaving enough room for the development of an autonomous European security and defence policy, and the flourishing of new exogenous threats like those in Balkans- indicated to the EU members that the need to cooperate in security and defence matters is, in a sense, a requirement of the new security environment unleashed in Europe after the Cold War, for their own security and security interests.

Forsberg (2006) also evaluates these three explanations according to their relevancy and explanatory power. As such, the first explanation is the weakest one in accounting for ESDP on

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[16] Hyde-Price's (2006) account of the emergence of the ESDP can also be considered under this second type of explanation. Even though his explanation also rests on a regional structural factor -balanced multipolarity in the EU after the Cold War-, he basically considers the ESDP as " the response of EU member states to the uncertainties of US security policy in the context of global unipolarity" (230).

its own, which has been declining in relevancy and importance since the early 1990s, helped by the enlargement waves of the EU. The second explanation is more powerful than the first one, accounting for certain aspects of ESDP such as the defence industrial cooperation of EU members under ESDP. It is also gaining prominence after the 2002-2003 discord (or even crisis) in transatlantic relations. Yet, it is far from elucidating ESDP by its own, having several explanatory weaknesses such as its problematic assumption of a unity of position and interest among the EU member states towards the USA and its policies, which is central in its *balancing* argument. The third explanation, lastly, is the most powerful and comprehensive one among all. It is not only the best account of the emergence of ESDP but also the one which is substantiated most strongly by the statements of prominent ESDP representatives and the actual behavior of the EU. This explanation again does not suffice to account for the emergence of ESDP by its own, but gets stronger only when it incorporates the major insight of the first explanation which is the fact that ESDP could not have been launched without the background of the previous stages of EU integration in other fields.

The remainder of this section will devise and provide a fourth explanation for the emergence of ESDP based on constructivist thinking, without denying or replacing the first three. Having recognized their explanatory value and sharing also some points with the third explanation like the impact of the changing security environment after the Cold War, it will just try to present an *alternative*, *broader* and *more comprehensive* account for the emergence of ESDP, especially if it is supported by the main above-noted insight of the first explanation. Thus conceived, ESDP was rendered plausible and emerged with the impact of the changes in international politics brought about by the end of the Cold War. The neo-realist security conception of the Cold War faded away and a new understanding of security emerged which is based on a broader notion of security and new security threats. ESDP came to existence exactly after the EU had adopted this newly emerging security conception, and witnessed an ideational change by developing three

discourses as a response to this structural sea change in the international security politics. ESDP, namely, emerged mainly as the military dimension of EU security policy, being a part of the abovementioned new security discourse.

During the Cold War world of bipolarity, power politics as well as inter-state rivalries and conflicts; the (neo)realist theory had prevailed in the IR, and hence a (neo)realist notion of security in the world. This traditional/old/narrow conception of security was characterized by state-centrism, dominance of military security concerns, centrality of military threats and the use of force, national security as the sole understanding of security, and security mostly conceived in the sense of survival (Buzan, 1991; Haftendorn, 1991; Rotschild, 1995; Miller, 2001; Baldwin, 1997; Floyd, 2007; Möller, 2000; Buzan et al, 1998; Goldman, 2001; Newman, 2001; Rieker, 2004). Accordingly, international system was anarchic where there was no reliable supreme/supranational entity (including effective and trustable international institutions) which was to provide security for all the states in need of it. Thus, nation-states were the major actors in this self-help international structure, responsible for their own security. They were also the almost exclusive *referent object* of security, thereby being considered as the target of almost all international threats. As a result, *national security* was the sole understanding of security whose main premises or virtues were *independence*, *sovereignty* and *territorial integrity*; any threats against whom could lead the states to go to war against each other. Threats to national security in this state-centered conception normally were coming from other nation-states, be it their neighbors or great powers with substantial capabilities and broader interests in many parts of the world. These threats were mostly military threats generated by the possible use of force by other nation-states based on their national interests, and the natural response to such threats was again a military one in the form of deterring the enemies through armament (possibly of nuclear weapons), forging or participating in diplomatic or military alliances, and ultimately waging

wars (Miller, 2001; Haftendorn, 1991; Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al, 1998; Goldman, 2001; Rotschild, 1995; Möller, 2000; Floyd, 2007; Baldwin, 1997).

Three developments in the international politics with the end of the Cold War have substantially undermined and weakened this traditional/narrow notion of security (Newman, 2001; Miller, 2001; Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al, 1998; Rothschild, 1995; Nye, 1990). The first such development was the changes emerged in the international structure that took place upon the demise of the Cold War and their repercussions. Accordingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its military power terminated the bipolarity of international relations, thereby ending the military confrontations and competitions among the superpowers and their allies. Military power/security both lost its relevance and salience, and faced changes in its nature in that the old/Cold War (possible) interstate conflicts and wars were replaced by the prospects for and instances of domestic violence and conflict. In the unfolding so-called "hegemonic world" of Miller (2001), the USA emerged as the major and unchallenged power, possessing extensive military strength and capabilities with no serious rival and military threats; resulting in the rise of new/non-traditional security challenges –that are previously shadowed by military security issues- in the agendas of the USA and other nation-states (Miller, 2001; Buzan et al, 1998; Newman, 2001; Buzan, 1991; Rothschild, 1995).

The increasing scale of globalization and its impact on the international security environment constituted the second factor explaining the fading away of the old conception of security after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought about the intensification of global production, investment and finance as well as deregulation of national economies, as a result of which the market economy has extended to almost all countries in the world. Moreover, the revolutionary improvements occurred in technology, transportation and communications led nation-states to be very well aware of each other and their problems. Consequently, economic, political and cultural interdependence increased substantially among countries, which resulted also in the emergence

of *security interdependencies*. These developments triggered changes in the security notion, altering the nature of threats and vulnerabilities that states face. As such, security concerns started to become "more about the consequences of how the open international system operates" (Buzan et al, 1998: 211) exemplified, for instance, by the rise of economic security issues in salience as a result of the various dangers posed by global trend of economic liberalization. International actors also grasped the increasing importance of multilateralism in this new context where it was getting more and more difficult/ineffective to act without cooperating with others (Buzan et al, 1998; Buzan, 1991; Newman, 2001; Miller, 2001; Nye, 1990; Rothschild, 1995).

Lastly, certain normative changes occurred after the end of the Cold War, related to and motivated by the first two abovementioned developments, which have had a crucial impact on the weakening of the traditional notion of security. With the impact of the unraveling of bipolar Cold War international structure and the rise of globalization; the power of nation-states began to decline; its core values of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity started to lose their significance; and new transnational values began to gain prominence both at individual and global levels. At the individual level, these were the values pertinent to human rights and needs; whereas, at the international level, they were the values or ideas such as democratization, spreading of market economy, protecting all humanity against environmental threats. As a result, for instance, the notion of "human security" emerged and began to penetrate into the agendas of international actors as a part of the new-wider notion of security[17] (Newman, 2001; Miller, 2001; Rothschild, 1995).

The above-noted developments which became observable at the end of the Cold War created the new international security environment in the 1990s; and with the observation, adoption and advocacy of academics and progressive policy circles in nation-states, international organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) of these developments and changing global

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[17] For a detailed account of the "human security" concept and its emergence/development as a part of the new-broader conception of security in the early 1990s see Gasper, 2005; Newman, 2001; and Kaldor et al, 2007.

security context (Buzan et al, 1998; Newman, 2001), a new conception of security emerged also during the 1990s. According to this new conception, international relations is marked by substantial *security interdependence* among the nation-states. Instead of the prevalent notion of *national security* in the traditional conception, it is the notion of *common security* that prevails in the new security environment in that there are global common threats to all human kind which cannot be addressed solely by individual national efforts, thereby requiring multilateralism and international cooperation to be effectively managed. Hence, international and regional institutions such as the UN and the EU are accorded a key role in confronting these threats and preserving international security. Moreover, the new conception asserts that together with the declining power and influence of nation-states in world affairs came the weakening of their core values such as independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; which resulted in the rise of new values or norms like human rights, economic prosperity, or environmental protection. Furthermore, the major threats to nation-states are no more coming from other rival states in the system but rather from non-state domestic or transnational sources exemplified by ethno-national or secessionist conflicts and by environmental pollution, organized crime or proliferation of WMD. Usually, nation-states themselves also pose threats to their citizens. Finally, the nature of modern threats and the necessary responses to cope with them are (mostly) no more military. While the threats are mostly economic, domestic-political and transnational in nature such as unemployment, terrorism, illegal migration, epidemics and global warming; the appropriate measures to confront them includes democratization, the promotion of civil society, economic growth and interdependence, and state-building (Miller, 2001; Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al, 1998; Nye, 1990; Möller, 2000; Newman, 2001; Floyd, 2007; Rothschild, 1995).

This new security conception, as such, is much broader and much more comprehensive than the traditional (neo)realist one. As very well expressed by Rothschild (1995), the security notion in the new sense emerged with the extension of the older version of the concept in four major

dimensions: (1) the concept was extended downwards from the security of nations to the security of individuals (or groups), (2) it was extended upwards from the security of nations to the security of international system (or biosphere), (3) the concept was extended horizontally to other security sectors meaning that it is widened from military security to political, social, economic or environmental spheres of security, and (4) the responsibility of providing and preserving security was extended towards all directions: *from* nation states *to* international institutions, regional and local governments, NGOs, market, press and public opinion.

In order to fully grasp the emergence of the new conception of security[18], one should also focus somewhat on how and by whom the older conception was modified and expanded so as to pave the way for the new one. The role of the academia in this endeavor is quite salient (Buzan et al, 1998). Hence, it is imperative here to elaborate on certain seminal works of the major academics in the IR discipline.

The comprehensive and broader conception of security was introduced by Ullman (1983) during the Cold War years (Miller, 2001), in a famous article criticizing the then US administration (the Reagan's presidency) and the previous ones ruling the USA since the end of WWII of adopting a quite narrow/military conception of security, considering only the external military threats as dangers for the national security of the country. In his definition of security based on threats, Ullman pointed out that "a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state" (1983: 133). Although he rested his definition of security on the traditional notion of *national security*, Ullman set the ground for new/wider conception of security by putting the security of individuals (or groups) to the centre and by explicitly

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[18] For a detailed analysis of the literal meaning and development of the concept of "security", apart from the "old-new conception of security" debates, see Baldwin, 1997; Zedner, 2003; Dahl and Lindblom, 1992.

delineating new forms of non-military security threats (external and internal) such as internal conflicts, natural disasters, epidemics, terrorism or environmental degradation (Ullman, 1983)[19].

Haftendorn (1991), in another quite seminal work, distinguished between three historical paradigms of security which have formed (usually with their mixture) the bases for prevailing security concepts/conceptions in every historical epoch including today's world. These were Hobbesian/(neo)realist paradigm of "national security", Kantian/liberal paradigm of "global security", and Grotian/institutionalist paradigm of "international security". For Haftendorn, the Hobbesian understanding of security (corresponding to the *traditional conception* in this study) had prevailed –most recently- during the Cold War and lost its relevance at the end of it; the Kantian notion of *global security* referring to "common security for the global community of men" (11) was yet to come, but it might come to prevail in the long run; hence, the Grotian conception of *international security* (despite its existing conceptual weaknesses) was offering the most reasonable and satisfying explanation for the global security environment that emerged with the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, this new security environment was characterized by a quasi-anarchical global system with increasing levels of regime and institution building. Though nation-states were still the primary actors of international politics, their security got closely interdependent and their actions were limited by (international) common rules and institutions. As such, although Haftendorn did not introduce new threats or new security spheres in her study, except suggesting in a tiny part that the notion of *international security* should be

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[19] Though the wider notion of security was put forward first by Ullman in 1983, as Ullman himself notes in his same article (1983), the attempts to broaden the traditional conception of national security began at the early 1970s with the efforts of various public interest organizations which were advocating a specific modern concern such as human rights issues or environmental problems, thereby trying to create public awareness both of the existence of non-military threats to individuals and groups, and of ineffectiveness of the use of military means by national governments to cope with them. Indeed, according to Rothschild (1995), the calls for an extended conception of security had been intermittently made since the end of WWII until the end of the Cold War. In her historical analysis of the new security principles of the 1990s, she goes even further to argue that the extended understanding of security of the 1990s was a characteristic of the period between the mid-1600s and the French revolution, and rooted in the liberal (security) ideas of the epoch; while the traditional conception of security mentioned above emerged as an historical innovation in Europe during the Napoleonic and Revolutionary Wars. As such, the new conception of security unfolded in the 1990s is actually older than the traditional conception in historical terms, and it was not a discovery of 1990s in itself, but just a rediscovery or revitalization of old historical principles in a new and appropriate international context.

improved by the addition of new dimensions of security to the concept, she still contributed to the new security conception by stressing the security interdependence in the current global politics, by ascribing a crucial role for international institutions in ensuring international security and by denying the old prominence of nation-states and national security in the newly emerging semi-anarchical global system.

Barry Buzan from the constructivist *Copenhagen School of security studies* (Floyd, 2007) introduced another broader conception of security, this time more systematically than the previous ones, in his 1991 book. Actually, his starting point was the traditional/(neo)realist conception of *national security* in that he admitted the central assumptions of the old conception that the structure of the international system was anarchic; nation-states were the major actors in this system; their major security concern was survival; *national security* was the central understanding of security; and military security was the heart of old conception of security. However, he then went beyond this traditional conception with an explicit purpose of widening the *national security agenda* in order exactly to render the concept of *national security* more meaningful, useful and practical. He did this basically by introducing four new security sectors -namely the political, economic, societal, and environmental ones- with their own various threats to national security, and by bringing two more units of analysis into the picture which are individual and systemic units (individual and international system) complementing the traditional state level of analysis. As a result, he managed to create "a broader framework of security" (20) as he intended to do, by broadening the traditional national security agenda so as to include five interwoven security sectors and three (linked) levels of analysis (three types of referent objects for security) encompassing all types of traditional and modern threats to national, individual and international security.

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (Buzan et al, 1998) in their influential book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, further improved the new understanding of security by both giving it a

more modern guise and by making the new-broader conception more coherent. The authors, in this book, basically adopted the new-wider notion of security as framed by Buzan (1991) and utilized this broader conception in order to improve and test the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) of Buzan himself. At the end, they both ended up with applying the CSCT to four new security sectors[20] and two novel levels of analysis mentioned above, and with developing "the new framework for analysis" in security studies based on the new-broader conception of security. Their approach to the notion of security differed from Buzan (1991) in two respects. First, while in Buzan (1991) the nation-state was the major referent object in all five security sectors (military, political, social, economic and environmental), in Buzan et al (1998) the individual and systemic units of analysis were brought more assertively into the picture together with the state level in all five sectors. Second, Buzan et al (1998) utilized the (radical constructivist) *securitization* theory of Ole Waever in their analysis in order to make their new-broader security agenda intellectually coherent in itself. Whereas, in traditional conception, the security notion was restricted into one sector (military one) but every threat in this sector was deemed to be a security issue; in the new conception of Buzan et al (1998), the notion of security was used for all five sectors but by being limited within each sector in that only the threats in each security sector that are *securitized* by the politicians and academics (and so on) in a way to go beyond regular policy agenda were considered to be security issues[21].

This new/broader/comprehensive notion of security has been discerned and adopted by the EU in the 1990s, stemming from its awareness and recognition of the new international security environment that came into existence after the end of the Cold War. As can be observed from the

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[20] Both in Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al (1998), there is ambiguity and incoherence with respect to the number of new security sectors. Especially in Buzan et al (1998), some parts of the study mention two traditional security sectors (military and political) and thus three novel ones (societal, economic and environmental), while some other parts delineate the old conception as monosectoral (with only military sector) and introduce four new security sectors. This study has accepted and used the latter approach due to the fact that it is more compatible with the traditional conception of security in general.

[21] For a detailed account of the *securitization theory* of Waever and how it is usually used to broaden the old conception of security thanks to its power to make any issue a security concern on the condition that a political actor calls it so and persuade some audience, see Waever, 2000; Floyd, 2007. In order to learn how exactly this theory is used to restrict the new notion of security and make it intellectually coherent, see Buzan et al, 1998.

EU's official documents such as the ESS, speeches of EU officials like the EU High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the works of many scholars, the EU recognized and internalized this newly emerging international context and the resulting new conception of security in almost its every single aspect such as the decline of military threats in the form of inter-state violent conflicts and the rise of domestic violence; the intensification of globalization; the emergence of non-military (non-conventional) security threats; the rise of new referent objects for security like the individual, Europe, or the world (all humanity); the emerging security interdependence in the world; the need to attribute a greater role for international institutions, rules and norms; the increasing importance of multilateral responses given to new forms of threats; and the erosion of the difference between internal and external security issues (Council of the EU, 2003a; Solana, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b; Larsen, 2000; Deighton, 2002; Rhinard et al, 2006; Ekengren, 2006; Duke and Ojanen, 2006; Kaldor et al, 2007). Solana's expressions in a 2005-speech astonishingly summarize the EU's acknowledgement of the new security context and understanding:

> We are living in a period of momentous change in the international system. Since the end of the Cold War, we have exchanged a world of dangerous certainties -the bipolar order built on a fragile balance of terror- for a world of unpredictable perils. We have moved from a state-based security paradigm to one where, increasingly, non-state actors present the greatest threats to our security and where solutions mostly transcend the power of the state. (2005a: 1).

As a response to this *recognized* newly unfolding international security environment and the parallel emergence of the new security conception, the EU witnessed the development of three discourses during the 1990s related to its security and security policy; which are observable in EC documents of the 1990s (Larsen, 2000), in Solana's speeches, ESS document and some scholarly works. The first discourse, as such, is *the rhetoric of the EU's obligation to become an active global player in the new security context.* Accordingly, the EU, which has already been a global actor in economic sense, should also assume greater role in the provision and promotion of international security, thereby coming also to be a global actor in political terms (Council of

the EU, 2003a; Solana, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003b, 2005a; Larsen, 1990; Rhinard et al, 2006; Ekengren, 2006). To exemplify, according to the ESS document (Council of the EU, 2003a); "Europe (the EU) should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (1), and only the EU "which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight" (11). Solana's words in a 2003-speech are also quite instructive in articulating this rhetoric: "As the EU grows to encompass 25 countries with some 450 million inhabitants producing one quarter of the world's GDP, we have a duty to assume our responsibilities for security -to our own citizens, to our neighbors and, more widely, for global security." (2003b: 2).

The second discourse emerged in the EU during the 1990s is *the rhetoric of* -what I call-*securing the EU via securing the neighborhood* (see, Council of the EU, 2003a; Solana, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003b; Larsen, 2000; Deighton, 2002; Duke and Ojanen, 2006: Rhinard et al, 2006). With the growing realization of intense security interdependencies in the new global security context, the EU has come to discern that "security in Europe also requires the transformation of vulnerable and damaged societies close to the borders of the Union into sustainable democratic states by fostering good governance, economic development and conflict prevention" (Deighton, 2002: 727). As such, the EU understood that its security is strictly dependent on the stability and well-being in its vicinity (and even in all around the world). This is fairly obvious when one considers the major security threats perceived by the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s in that in the EU security discourse of the 1990s three of the five main threats to EU security were instability in Central and Eastern Europe, in Russia and in the Mediterranean (Larsen, 2000) and that the modern security threats stated in the ESS -terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime- all require taking security measures beyond the borders of the EU by accepting the first line of defence abroad (Council of the EU, 2003a). This discourse can also be observed in the following quote from Solana: "Our task is to

promote an arc of well-governed states in our neighborhood with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations, creating a circle of good governance on the perimeter of the Mediterranean to the Caucasus." (2003b: 2).

The last discourse flourished in the EU -especially towards the end of the 1990s- is that of, again what I call, *full-fledged response to and struggle with the new security challenges emerged in the novel international security context.* According to this rhetoric, new global security environment and the resulting new/non-conventional/diffuse threats require a full-scale struggle with full range of civilian and military instruments at hand (see, Council of the EU, 2003a; Solana, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003b, 2005b; Larsen, 2000; Deighton, 2002; Rhinard et al, 2006). This discourse is best expressed in a paragraph in the ESS (Council of the EU, 2003a: 7):

> In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

It is with the impact of these three discourses that ESDP emerged at the end of the 1990s as a military dimension to the EU's security policy. While the first two discourses have had an *indirect* effect in the emergence of ESDP besides their impacts on the emergence of various other external policies of the Union such as the CFSP, the last wave of enlargement, the ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); the third discourse of *full-fledged struggle with the new security challenges* has had a direct influence in the birth of ESDP in that the new security environment was still involving military threats (albeit in the form mostly of domestic violent conflicts) (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al, 1998; Miller, 2001; Rothschild, 1995) and the EU was feeling the need to improve its civilian capabilities, which in turn led the EU to devise ESDP. As such, ESDP not only emerged as the military dimension of the EU's newly emerging security

policy, but also fulfilled the task of improving the civilian capabilities of the EU by adding the civilian crisis management missions to the EU's *civilian tool box*, hitherto consisting of the means such as enlargement policy or the development aid programs.

2.3 ESDP and the EU's International Identity

The end of the Cold War witnessed substantial changes not only in the conception of security but also in the understanding of power. The relevancy and significance of military power in organizing international relations declined, while other new forms of power rose in salience (Nye, 1990; Maull, 1990/91). Five developments that occurred towards the end of the Cold War were responsible for this shift in the power conception: (1) the rise of economic interdependence due mainly to the emergence of new types of communications and transportation, (2) the rise of new transnational actors such as trans-national corporations, (3) rising nationalism in weak states, (4) the diffusion of modern technology from the powerful states to weaker ones and from state to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, and (5) the changing nature of world politics causing the rise of new forms of transnational non-military threats and requiring novel responses besides the use of military force (the rise of the new conception of security as this dissertation recognizes it) (Nye, 1990). As a result, "a general diffusion of power" away from major powerful nation-states to the weaker ones and to non-state actors took place and other instruments than military force such as organizational/institutional skills or manipulation of interdependence gained importance (Nye, 1990; Maull, 1990/91; Maull, 2005).

It is in this context that new forms of power gained prominence, exemplified by the rise of *soft/co-optive/persuasive power* in international relations (Nye, 1990; Maull, 1990/91). According to Nye (1990), the *hard/command power* of "ordering others to do what [you] want" (166) has declined in salience and the *soft/co-optive power* of "getting others to want what you want" (167) has become more attractive. Namely, the hard power of carrots and sticks has come

to be replaced by the soft power of persuasion which is "the ability [of international actors] to secure … outcomes trough attraction rather than coercion" (Nye, 2003: 74), based on their sources such as cultural/ideological attractiveness, leverage in international institutions and the ability to influence the political agendas of other actors (Nye, 1990, 2003).

In addition to the rise of the notion of soft power in the conduct of international affairs in the post-Cold War period, which was originally observed specifically in and suggested particularly for the United States (Nye, 1990) or Japan and Germany (Maull, 1990/91) -but also being relevant in the case of the EU (Rosecrance, 1998)- there are other forms of power which have been on the rise since the early 1990s associated especially with the EU which are nothing but the conceptions of "civilian power" and "normative power".

The notion of "civilian power" was first employed in order to describe the international role/identity of the EC by Duchêne (1972). According to him, the EC was representing a different type of international actor (distinct from the two existing superpowers) (1972), conducting its external relations on the basis of being *long on economic power and relatively short on military power* (1973). Thanks to this distinctive "European way of ordering (regional) interstate relations" (Maull, 2005: 776), the EC/EU was representing a "civilian power" favoring economic and political instruments (civilian means) over military ones in maintaining its international conducts (Duchêne, 1972).

This *civilian power EU* concept was strongly challenged by Bull (1982), however, in his seminal work where he delineated the notion as a "contradiction in terms". He argued that the notion of the civilian power EC and the claim that *the utility of military force was in decline in Europe* were nothing more than illusions caused by the misinterpretation of the international affairs of the 1970s due to the détente period of the Cold War in those years. As such, Duchêne's-like claims were very much similar to the "idealist or progressivist interpretations of international relations of the 1920s" (150) whose shallowness was conceived during the 1930s

world of power politics. In the global conjuncture of the return of power politics of the 1980s, likewise, it was quite explicit that the significance of military power had not declined and that "the power and influence exerted by the [EC] and other such civilian actors [had been] conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control" (Bull, 1982: 151).

It was only with the end of the Cold War that the notion of *civilian power* regained significance and rose as a part of the new power conception. Maull defined the concept in winter 1990/91 as being composed of "a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on nonmilitary, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (92, 93) and utilized it in order to describe the international role/identity of Germany and Japan.

Hill (1990) also gave essential credit to the concept by comparing it to the utility of the notion of military power and the relevancy of power politics in the international affairs. He not only mentioned the limitations of the use of military force but also emphasized the relevancy of the concept of civilian power in general and the impact of civilian power EC in the world in particular. Lodge (1993), lastly, contributed to the development of the concept by adding a new dimension to its definition referring specifically to the EU, which was *the democratic control of foreign policy making* (cited in Stavridis, 2001). The notion, then, has gradually become widely credited, and employed to describe the EU's distinctive international identity and role; parallel to the shift in the EC/EU's role from being a junior partner to the USA in transatlantic relations against the Soviet threat to that of a civilian power of alternative way of conducting international relations (Maull, 2005).

The other new form of power pertinent to the EU and emerged in the post-Cold War period of changing power conception is the notion of *normative power* which was coined by Manners (2002) in his highly-echoed work in order to depict the international identity and role of the Union. Focusing on the case of the EU's promotion of *the abolition of the death penalty* in the world, he introduced the notion of Normative Power Europe (NPE) as an alternative and superior way of describing the EU compared to the older categories of civilian and military power. Manners argued that due to its particular historical development, its hybrid polity as the mixture of supranational and international forms of governance, and its particular political and legal creation as a political entity, the EU has obtained a distinctive *normative basis* in its international relations through the last 50 years; which in turn has pushed it to act normatively in global politics. The EU, as such, has not only come to be based on the norms like the primacy of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights as constitutive parts of its normative basis; but also tended to place these norms at the centre of its internal and external relations in the post-Cold War world. Namely, the EU has obtained the power to "define what passes for 'normal' in world politics" (253), which is originated not from "what it does or what it says, but [from] what it is" (252).

The notion of the *normative power EU* has, then, widely been welcome in academia and occupied a remarkable place in the literature over the EU's international role and identity. Many prominent scholars have admitted the relevancy and validity of the concept, but by approaching it critically. Nicolaidis and Howse (2002), writing at the same time with Manners, acknowledged that the EU has got a normative kind of power in the form mainly of projecting its own model of integration to the rest of the world, but added that "what is usually projected is not the EU as [it] is, but an EUtopia" (767). In order for the EU to enhance its normative power, they suggested, it should assure consistency between its internal and external goals as well as policies and act self-reflexively by making sure that it models itself on the EUtopia that it strives to project on to the

rest of the world. Sjursen (2006a) also admitted that there are normative (as well as civilian) dimensions in the EU foreign policy, but argued that "the 'normative power argument' needs to be further specified, scrutinized and accounted for" on the basis of certain definite criteria or assessment standards (236). She, then, went on to suggest that a possible criteria could be the EU's strengthening of cosmopolitan law besides international law, thereby trying to overcome power politics by stressing the rights of the individuals in addition to the rights of nation-states to equality. She concluded at the end that -even examined based on the proposed criterion- it is not that easy to judge that the EU is definitely a normative power.

Lerch and Schwellnus (2006), likewise, attracted attention to the lack of clarity in the NPE argument and sought to examine it by focusing on the justifications of the EU policies on the issues of death penalty and minority protection. They observed that while the former case supports the NPE thesis in all respects, the latter case does not constitute a good example for the NPE argument where the EU's normative power proved to be less effective and relevant. They concluded that "the EU is not necessarily 'normative by nature' [as Manners (2002) implied] – its normative power depends heavily on the interaction between its policy goals, means, and justifications, and therefore varies between various issue areas" (318). Bicchi (2006) similarly called for more sensitivity in labeling the EU as a normative power because the Union often spreads its norms in a Eurocentric and unreflexive manner -like in the Euro Mediterranean Policy case- where it promotes its own model (Europe) through the tendency of its institutions to export *institutional isomorphism* to other actors. Only in (a few) cases where the EU transfers its norms to other actors in an inclusive and reflexive manner, one can truly call it as a normative power.

Youngs (2004) again approached the NPE thesis by certain skepticism, albeit from a different angle. By combining the theoretical approaches of rationalism and constructivism and by focusing on the EU's human rights promotion policies, he demonstrated that the *normative power EU* is not a matter of *altruism*, as proposed by Manners (2002). On the contrary, he

maintained, "strategic calculations" and "instrumentalist security-oriented" motivations play an important role in the EU's norm-projecting policies. Diez (2005), finally, (again) recognized the normative power of the EU, but stressed that the normative power is not a unique feature of the Union, asserting that one can observe a similar power in the USA, for instance, in important episodes of its history. He concluded by calling for more reflexivity in the EU's normative policies, which will somewhat undermine but ultimately "rescue normative power from becoming a self-righteous, messianistic project that claims to know what Europe is and what others should be like" (636)[22].

It was exactly against this background that perhaps the most heated debate in the literature on the EU's international identity and role erupted. As such, the EU began to develop a military dimension -"defence dimension" as Smith (2000) calls it- in the form of ESDP starting towards the end of the 1990s despite the fact that we have been living in a period which have witnessed the above-portrayed changes in security and power conceptions. Namely, the relevancy of military force and threats both in general and particularly regarding the EU has been decreasing and the significance/applicability of the new forms of power such as soft, civilian and normative power especially for the EU has been on the rise. This seemingly puzzled situation gave birth to the questions of: Is ESDP compatible with the EU's existing civilian (normative) international identity (civilian/normative power EU image), or is it harmful and destructive for it? Concomitantly, is the "militarization of the EU" in the form of ESDP necessary for the EU and should it be sustained or furthered? Many prominent scholars have been involved in the debate

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[22] There are also a few important accounts in the literature which totally reject the idea of normative power EU such as that of Hyde-Price (2006) which argues that the so-called normative power EU is nothing but the Union's utilization by its most powerful member states as a collective hegemonic tool for shaping its external environment by combining the elements of soft and hard power, and which gives full support to the NPE thesis like that of Scheipers and Sicurelli (2006) which focuses on the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol cases and argues that the EU is a credible normative power and that the criticisms of NPE like its lack of consistency and reflexivity are either not founded or not diminish the effectiveness of the normative power of the EU, the major determining factor being the EU's existing commitment and conformity to international law.

taking the position either for or against ESDP with respect to its impacts on the EU's civilian international identity/image[23].

The claims that the civilian power image of the EU is in danger due to the militarization of the Union goes even back to the Cold War years when, in 1989, Tsakaloyannis argued that the EC had abandoned its civilian power image in the early 1980s upon the revitalization of the WEU by seven of the EC members in 1984, an idea which was also backed partially by Smith (2000). Zielonka, then, wrote in 1998 that the militarization of the Union started in 1997 had attenuated its distinctive international civilian identity; by claiming that NATO and the military forces of the member states were very much enough for the defence of the EU, meaning that attempts to militarize the Union was nothing but unnecessary. The real debate in the literature started, however, with the seminal work of Karen Smith (2000) which was directly written in order to make a case for the *civilian power EU,* and argue against ESDP and the EU's militarization.

According to Smith (2000), the EU's development of a military capability and *defence dimension* under the rubric of ESDP was not only unnecessary but also potentially harmful. It was unnecessary mainly because the ability to wield military force would not render the European Foreign Policy (EFP) more effective. This was due to the facts that most foreign policy does not have much to do with the use of force especially in the EU case which has got a major problem of forging a consensus before taking any foreign policy action; that the usefulness of the use of military instruments is dubious in intervening in domestic military conflicts of other countries; that the security conception and threats have changed in the post-Cold War World decreasing the relevancy and utility of military power in general; and that the actual and potential

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[23] The debate in the literature mostly circles around ESDP and the EU's civilian international identity, but it also reaches to the NPE literature and takes the form of *ESDP and the EU's normative international identity*. Since the notions of "civilian power" and "normative power" are closely related, as can be discerned from Manners' (2002) construction of the NPE argument on the basis of the "civilian power" concept and literature, or Diez's (2005) consideration of "civilian power" as a form of "normative power", this study uses the notion of the *"EU's civilian international identity"* in general in this part of the thesis and utilizes the adjective of "normative" only when it is necessary to make a distinction.

conflict-ridden parts of the world are not that suitable for a future possible EU military intervention. The militarization of the EU under ESDP would, moreover, be harmful for the Union because of the facts that it could trigger a "security dilemma" in Europe alarming the neighboring countries like Russia; that it could wreak a division in the security and defence of Europe by excluding non-EU-member European countries from ESDP and thus from the security matters of the continent; and most importantly that it would end the image of the *civilian power EU* because it "would signal the end of the EU's … contribution to a different kind of international relations, in which civilian instruments are wielded on behalf of a collectivity which had renounced the use of force among its members and encouraged others to do the same" (28), which is currently becoming the case. Smith suggested at the end that possible alternatives to the development of ESDP could be the Union's concentration on long-term conflict prevention efforts by improving its civilian instruments; its giving priority to increase the UN's capacity to intervene in crisis situations; and, as a last resort measure, its separating the EU and WEU, enlarging the latter to include any willing European country and leaving the security and defence tasks to this organization, thereby preserving the civilian identity of the EU.

Treacher (2004) continued this line of argument by standing against the militarization of the EU claiming that ESDP signifies "an opportunity lost for the Union to become a new form of forward-looking, non-military credible and effective international actor as distinct from the traditional State approach" (66). Smith (2005) again elaborated on the issue and sharpened her arguments by announcing that "the EU is no longer a civilian power" (1). After defining an ideal civilian power image based on four criteria -civilian means, civilian ends, using soft power to fulfill the ends, and civilian/democratic control over foreign, security and defence policymaking-and stating that the EU has never managed to become something like an ideal type of civilian power except maybe a short period of time in the early 1990s; she argued that due to the EU's

acquisition of military capabilities under ESDP, intended ultimately to support its diplomacy by force, the "civilian power EU is definitely dead" (11).

Sjursen (2006b), then, implied that the development of military means by the EU through ESDP carries the danger of weakening the EU's civilian international posture, by making the EU look more like the traditional great powers. Wagner (2006) concentrated on the usually neglected fourth dimension of a civilian power as pointed out by Smith (2005), namely that of the civilian/democratic control of the EU's security and defence policy, and concluded that although ESDP has not disrupted the civilian control of the EU's security and defence policies, it does have weakened its democratic control by creating a *democratic deficit* in the security and defence realms, thereby risking the distinctive civilian power identity of the EU. Finally, Manners (2006a, 2006b) evaluated the impact of ESDP on *the normative power EU* and concluded that although in theory the EU's taking military action does not necessarily harm its normative power (image), ESDP as developed in reality by the EU especially since the launch of the military operations and creation of the ESS in 2003 -signifying a shift of the Union's security policy from the path of long-term efforts of *sustainable peace* to that of robust crisis interventions around the world- is weakening and endangering the future of the EU's normative power (image) [24].

The second strand of argument in the *ESDP and the EU's civilian identity/image* debate has also been backed by several very well-known academics, although their number is relatively smaller than that of the proponents of the first position. As such, it is fair to claim that the idea that the militarization of the EU does not endanger the EU's civilian power image goes back to

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[24] Three other accounts should also be examined here, albeit their arguments differ somewhat from the others above. Deighton (2002) and Mawdsley (2004) asserted that the militarization of the EU through the ESDP undermines the EU's distinctive civilian international identity, but they still kept the room open for a common security and defence policy either because the EU needs it for strategic purposes like its current security needs (Deighton, 2002) or because the EU's military cooperation would be beneficial for international security unless it becomes an end in itself (Mawdsley, 2004). Sangiovanni (2003) also stood against ESDP as regards its impact on *the civilian power EU*; though not from an identity/image, but from a "power" perspective. She maintained that the EU has got a "comparative advantage in non-military conflict management" (200) and that ESDP leads the Union to ignore its (this) greatest strength, by diverting its scarce resources away from its civilian aims. As such, she recommended that instead of investing in a European military force, the EU had better "improve its ability to act where it can make a difference, namely, in the realm of non-military crisis management" (201).

Lodge (1993) who proposed that a civilian power can be expected to limit the use of force, but not to abandon or eliminate it (cited in Stavridis, 2001). Therborn, then, furthered this line of argument in 1997 by claiming that "without the backing of force and a willingness to use it, 'Europe' is unlikely to become a normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic and social institutions they should have" (380). Maull (2000) also made a crucial contribution to the debate by arguing that Germany remained a civilian power even after its participation in the NATO air attacks in Kosovo in 1999 mainly because its aims were civilian such as ceasing the atrocities there, and it pushed for multilateralism and UN Security Council (UNSC) involvement throughout the process. Namely, for Maull, the use of force is not necessarily incompatible with the civilian power identity of an international actor (like the EU).

Larsen (2000) gave a crucial support to this position in his article where he examined EC texts in the 1990s and observed a common EU discourse on security. Accordingly, the EU constructed itself in the 1990s as a *civilian power*, demonstrated by its promotion of the liberal values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms (civilian ends) by capitalizing mainly on political and economic means (civilian means). The EU's newly emerging defence capacity was not directly linked, in the discourse, to solving concrete problems or serving to the EU's concrete policy goals; but was only referred to *indirectly* as a means to strengthen the Union's international identity, *thereby* helping enhance the EU's security. Larsen extended his arguments in 2002 to include the post-1998 period (witnessing the emergence of ESDP) and suggested that the EU continued to construct itself as *a civilian power* despite its acquisition of military capabilities mainly because political and economic (civilian) means continued to occupy a central position in the EU's tool box in enhancing (again) civilian aims.

The most powerful support for ESDP with respect to the EU's civilian identity came from Stavridis (2001) who strongly argued that the EU's obtaining a military dimension is not only compatible with its *civilian image* but also a *necessity* for the Union to become a "real civilian

power" in the world. After criticizing the scholars who took a position against ESDP as focusing just on the *civilian means* side of the Duchêne's two-dimensional civilian power definition, he stressed the second dimension which was the *pursuit of civilian ends* and asked "what if military means were necessary to uphold civilian values [or ends]" (12). He then, in a sense, answered that "the use of military means can be of a civilian type if it promotes human rights and democratic principles" (17). After asserting that having military means enhances the credibility of an international actor and broaden its policy options, he defended the position that the EU, without military tools available for emergency situations like the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, can hardly go beyond having just an *international presence* (but not actorness) as explained by Hill (1993). That's to say, it can become at most a *civilian force à la Maull* (2005)*, but not a *civilian power*. He concluded by arguing that the militarization of the Union has rendered the notion of *the civilian power EU* even more relevant and useful, and by warning that the EU -in any case- must favor non-military means over the military ones and be very careful in utilizing its military capabilities.

In another seminal work, Whitman (2002) asserted that the civilian power of the EU should not just be assessed on the basis of the *means* criterion and examined the union in the post-Cold War period in terms of the factors such as *structural power*, *identity* and *process* besides its *instruments of implementation*. He observed that the EU has retained and even strengthened its civilian forms of power in the whole post-Cold War period; it has prioritized them over other forms of power; and has preserved its civilian international identity, military capabilities has been built in order just to be used as a last resort mainly to back up other forms of power. He concluded at the end that ESDP as developed by the EU after 1998 is compatible with the conception of *the civilian power EU* and that "civilian power Europe still has empirical and theoretical purchase when the EU is considered in the context of the contemporary international relations of Europe" (23).

Lastly, Diez (2005) suggested regarding specifically *ESDP and the EU's normative power image* discussion that "normative and military power are not necessarily incompatible" (635), and it is possible sometimes that normative power is backed and underpinned by military force, thereby facilitating the spread of pertinent norms. But, the EU should also be cautious and act reflexively in building up its military capabilities in that its normative power should not be reduced to or dominated by its military power[25].

Though it is obvious that both sides of the debate have got strong arguments to defend their positions, this study maintains that the second line of argument is more convincing and realistic. Therefore, in parallel to its view of ESDP as a product mainly of the *full-fledged response to the new security challenges discourse*, this thesis argues that *the EU's developing a military dimension in the form of ESDP is not only compatible mostly with its civilian (and normative) power identity but also helps strengthen this image.* As such, ESDP underpins the civilian power of the EU by adding significant novel (civilian) tools such as civilian crisis management operations to the Union's civilian tool box and enhancing the credibility of the civilian power EU by creating the possibility of backing its civilian power with the use of military force (but in order just to promote certain civilian ends). Moreover, thanks to the ESDP missions, the EU can be claimed to have become a more effective civilian/normative power in that it has undertaken crisis management operations in the conflict-laden or crisis-ridden countries (generally starting with a military mission and continuing with the civilian ones), through which it has managed to pull these countries towards the remit of its such power by helping to stabilize them via relieving

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[25] Maull (2005) should also be considered in this second strand of argument in *ESDP and civilian power EU* debate because he claims that the EU definitely owns a civilian international identity even today after it has launched ESDP. According to him, the EU cannot be called a *civilian power* because it is not a "power", but not because it is not "civilian". Indeed, the EU has got a distinctive civilian identity and exerts a considerable civilian and normative impact in the world. However, due to facts that the EU has traditionally not concerned very much with ensuring its own collective security, that it does not care much about its autonomy with respect to powers like US or Russia, and that it does not pursue active power-enhancing policies; it cannot be deemed as a "power", and should more correctly and alternatively be called a "civilian force". He stressed at the end that the EU's developing military capabilities do not harm its civilian image, and indeed it should build such capabilities, but only to be used in the "contingencies at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks" (797), namely, without daring or amounting to compete with other global players (great powers) on their terms.

their crises; thereby rendering these countries open to the influence of its civilian and normative powers. Namely, ESDP operations enable the EU to project its civilian/normative power to the countries in conflict or crisis; which, otherwise, can hardly be influenced by this power (see the FYROM case, as a very good example for this phenomenon, in Sections 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.4, and 4.2.1.5). Having pointed out that, the reason for this dissertation's favoring the second strand of argument in the above-elaborated debate over the first one is three-fold.

Firstly, the first position in the debate almost exclusively focuses on the *means* dimension of the civilian power definition, as provided by Duchêne (1972, 1973), Maull (1990) or by Smith (2005), and additionally misinterprets this dimension. As a result, it considers the *civilian power* notion completely incompatible with having military capabilities, which is quite misleading as demonstrated by Maull (2005). The second position, on the other hand, brings the *ends* dimension to the picture, hence reads the notion of civilian power more broadly and comprehensively, thereby managing to come up with healthier and more founded interpretations. The *means* dimension of the definition is also conceived in the second position more correctly, in line with Maull's (2005) claims stating that civilian powers are called *civilian* mainly because they are trying to "civilize" international politics by striving to change inter-state relations for the better on the basis of their own democratic politics, but not because the use of military force is not relevant to their civilian endeavors. The notion of *civilian power*, therefore, "does not describe any inability or unwillingness to use military force; rather it suggests the specific way in which military force will be applied -never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit of 'civilizing' international relations" (781). Duchêne's original definition of the concept also supports this argument because he was perfectly aware that the EC did have military power (Maull, 2005) and he did not close the door for the EC of the occasional use of military force in his original definition (Stavridis, 2001), which is indeed quite explicit from his depiction of the EC as "a civilian group of countries long

on economic power and relatively short on armed force", but not -for instance- as *a civilian group of countries relying exclusively on economic power*.

Secondly, the first strand of argument exaggerates the scale of the militarization of the EU, misleadingly presenting ESDP as a *defence dimension* which is shifting the Union from its current civilian power posture to a future "military power EU". The second line of argument overcomes this problem and provides a healthier picture of ESDP by attracting attention to the implementation of the CFSP and ESDP so far and *the EU's security discourse* in the 1990s and beyond. Whitman (2002), for instance, argues that contrary to the fears that the EU would lose its civilian international identity after the TEU with the creation of the CFSP, the subsequent record of the WEU activities was quite compatible with the EU's civilian power role. He also demonstrates that ESDP was formally launched in 1999 with a very limited collective defence aim and that its strictly intergovernmental structure is likely to last for the foreseeable future. The record of the ESDP operations since 2003 also supports this position of *ESDP's compatibility with the EU's civilian power image* in that the Union's crisis management missions have predominantly been *civilian* and its civilian capabilities have also been improved substantially under ESDP. Larsen (2000, 2002), also presents a more realistic picture of ESDP by focusing on *the EU's security discourse* and claiming that despite the formulations of the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) signifying an ultimate defence role for the EU and its becoming a military power, the EU's security discourse has continued to be a *civilian power discourse* with the use of military means in the EU's security policy remaining just as a *residual option*.

Thirdly, the arguments in the first position against the necessity of ESDP and about the impact of it on the *civilian power EU* are mostly not well-founded. To give specific examples from the most ardent supporter of the first strand of argument, Smith's (2000) claims (or predictions) that ESDP could not be effective in intervening in military conflicts in the third countries, that there is almost not any appropriate conflict-torn country or region where the EU

could suitably intervene in, and that the creation of ESDP could create a "security-dilemma" in Europe have been proved wrong by the record of ESDP since 2003. Moreover, one of the reasons she provided against the creation of ESDP, which was its irrelevancy in the new security environment of the post-Cold War World where the salience of military power is in decline, is indeed why exactly the EU needs and has developed a military dimension in the 1990s as demonstrated in the previous section (ESDP as a part of full-fledged struggle with new/variegated international security threats). Lastly, her suggestion to save the *civilian power EU* by militarizing the Union under a separate WEU structure does not seem to work because there is almost nothing new in this argument compared to the EU's security and defence structure in the 1990s (before the emergence of ESDP starting in 1999), when the Union's civilian international identity was again seen in danger.

To conclude, the "civilian-military power spectrum" devised by Smith (2005) where the left end represents a pure civilian power and the right end represents an ideal type military power, all the other positions in between giving a certain combination of civilian and military power; provides a very good means to express the exact position of this study in the *ESDP and the civilian power EU* debate. This dissertation recognizes that the emergence of ESDP might have a negative impact on the international civilian identity of the EU -especially in terms of the civilian means, the use of soft power, and the democratic control of foreign policy making criteria of Smith's definition- thereby shifting the EU's position in the spectrum to the right (nearer to the military power end). However, even with this putative shift, this thesis maintains that the EU is still by far in somewhere in the left half (civilian half) of the spectrum, thereby still representing a significant and influential civilian power; with its predominantly civilian means also prioritized over the use of military ones, its civilian objectives and discourse, and its still remarkable amount of soft power (see also here, Council of the EU, 2003a; Solana, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2005b).

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY

3.1 Historical Evolution of CFSP and ESDP

Although the EU was designed from its very inception as an economic cooperation and integration project, the prospect for adding a political and security dimension to the Union has almost always been on the minds of European leaders existing even during the very early days of integration (Missiroli and Quille, 2004; McCormick, 2005). This was rather evident in the attempt of certain European countries like France to create a European Defence Community (the EDC) with quite ambitious goals of creating a *common European army* and a *European minister of defence,* which was proposed in 1950 and signed as a treaty in May 1952, but eventually failed due to the opposition from Britain, Italy and West Germany and rejection of the treaty by French National Assembly in 1954 (McCormick, 2005). Although this failed attempt to add a political dimension to the Union caused a considerable retreat of such ideas for about 15 years, it gave a crucial insight as to the future and ultimate shape of the Union.

A prospective political and foreign policy role for the EU came to the fore once again in the Hague Summit of 1969 -this time with a much more modest agenda and gradualist approach- where the EC leaders asked foreign ministers to work on the issue of enhancing the level of political cooperation (Smith, 2003; Dinan, 2005). The foreign ministers of the EC-6, then, approved the Luxembourg Report leading to the formation of the EPC in 1970. According to this project, which was kept outside the Community as a total intergovernmental entity (McCormick, 2005), foreign ministers of six member countries would meet regularly (two times per annum) "to coordinate their positions on international problems and agree common actions" (Smith, 2003: 39). Even though the EPC was adopted by EC members as a

salient institution and formally recognized by them with the SEA of 1987, the security and defence functions were constantly kept outside the Community's remit, by being left either to NATO or to the member states themselves (Missiroli and Quille, 2004).

However, the developments such as the divisions among the EC members over the issue of giving military support to the US-led multinational campaign during the first Gulf War, significant conjectural changes in Europe upon the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 (McCormick, 2005), and the conflicts emerged in former-Yugoslavia in the early 1990s revealing the Community's lack of capability to effectively intervene in crises (Watanabe, 2005) urged the EC countries to give more salience to the foreign policy cooperation issue and rendered a need to revise the EPC system inevitable. As a result, the EPC was replaced by a more robust foreign policy project named the CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which was indeed "the first treaty to contain provisions anchoring the Union's responsibilities in the field of security" (Watanabe, 2005: 6) by defining -albeit generally and vaguely- certain foreign policy goals such as *the promotion of international cooperation* or *the preservation and strengthening of international peace and security* (Smith, 2003; Dinan, 2005).

The TEU also gave the CFSP the eventual prospect of formulating a common defence policy, "which could in time lead to a common defence" in the EU (Missiroli and Quille, 2004: 115). However, since for the time concerned the EU members were not ready to cooperate in the security and defence realms these issues were postponed to the future and the EU accepted to request the WEU -a defence organization formed in 1948 with Brussels Treaty and revitalized in 1984 after long years of idleness- to plan and implement defence related activities on behalf of the EU if needed (Watanabe, 2005). Shortly after the signature of the TEU, the foreign and defence ministers of this WEU organization met together in Petersberg, near Bonn in June 1992 and issued a common declaration which created the famous *Petersberg tasks* comprising *humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis*

management tasks, including peacemaking to be fulfilled by the military forces of the WEU member countries under the remit of this institution, which was supposed to preserve peace and security in Europe but by not resorting to traditional measures of territorial defence such as war-waging (Missiroli and Quille, 2004; Smith, 2003).

The CFSP had initially had a successful record: a culture of foreign and security policy cooperation emerged among the EU member countries as demonstrated by several *common strategies*, *joint actions* and *common positions* reached by them on the regions or countries like the Balkans, the Middle East, Russia and Ukraine (Missiroli and Quille, 2004; McCormick, 2005); the EU countries managed to help develop good neighborly relations and solve the border and minority problems in central and eastern Europe with a *stability pact*; they undertook the administration of the war-torn city of Mostar between 1994-96 in Bosnia (Smith, 2003; Missiroli and Quille, 2004); and the EU became a significant international actor displayed by the attendance of the president of EU Commission to the G8 meetings, by the opening of diplomatic representations in Brussels by almost all countries in the world, and by the number of Commission's representations exceeding 130 world-wide (McCormick, 2005).

The problems and limits of the new project, however, became obvious, when the EU could not play a significant role in preventing or ceasing the conflicts that emerged in the Balkans; it could basically do almost nothing to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and could not take any action over a Turkish-Greek dispute in the uninhabited Aegean island of Kardak/İmia in 1996 (McCormick, 2005; Smith 2003). These surfaced weaknesses led the EU countries to make new arrangements in the CFSP with Amsterdam Treaty of 1997; which created a post of High Representative of CFSP, incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the EU *acquis* thereby getting the WEU more closely associated with the EU, founded a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit under the Council secretariat to help the EU foresee foreign crises, and decreased the use/influence of unanimity voting in the CFSP decision-making by introducing

the mechanism of *constructive abstention* and by allowing the use of *the QMV* after the adoption of a *common strategy* in a particular foreign policy issue (Dinan, 2005; Wallace, 2005; McCormick, 2005). However, the defence policy was again kept out of the EU's agenda. Once the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99 erupted upon which the EU could not give a robust response and only the USA under the rubric of NATO could engage in decisive military action solving the problems by pushing the Serbs out of Kosovo, it became obvious that the time of a radical change in CFSP arrived (Missiroli and Quille, 2004).

When 1998 came and the Kosovo crisis emerged displaying the feebleness of the EU in acting upon crises necessitating military intervention, it was understood that the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) framework -created under NATO in 1994 in order to let the WEU to conduct crisis management operations via Combined Joint Task Forces in situations of lack of NATO desire to get involved in- was not meeting the needs of EU countries anymore and that a security and defence policy within the EU framework should have been established (Watanabe, 2005). As a result, with the government change in Britain of 1997 and the new PM Blair's more desire to devise European capabilities of crisis management (Dinan, 2005), the British and French leaders met in St. Malo (France) in December 1998 and released the St. Malo declaration. The declaration in a revolutionary manner called for the EU to build up "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises". The EU, however, would "take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged" and should possess all the necessary structures and capabilities as such, but "without unnecessary duplication" (St. Malo Declaration, 1998). At the Cologne European Council of June 1999, held at a time right after the end of the Kosovo campaign, the EU members declared that they were committed to make the Union play a greater role in international affairs and that they were aiming at giving the

EU the "necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence" (European Council, 1999a). Namely, it was made known that the EU incorporated the tasks previously handled by WEU to its own body, thus marking the elimination of WEU and creation of ESDP under the auspices of CFSP (Missiroli and Quille, 2004).

The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 portended another crucial turning point for the creation of ESDP in that it set the Headline Goal for capabilities development for ESDP, established new EU institutions to help manage ESDP, and set the beginning of *civilian aspect of crisis management* endeavor of the EU under ESDP. *First,* Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) declared that the EU would have founded a Rapid Reaction Force by 2003 consisting of 50-60.000 troops, deployable within 60 days with necessary naval and air support components, and sustainable in the ground for at least one year. *Second,* the Summit established crucial novel institutions such as Political and Security Committee (PSC) which was to "deal with all aspects of CFSP" including ESDP, European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (European Council, 1999b), which were all formally to be established by the Nice Treaty of 2000. *Lastly,* the Helsinki Summit defined *civilian crisis management* as relying mainly on police missions and "decided on an action plan for creating a rapid reaction capability in the field of civilian crisis management". This project of *civilian aspect of crisis management* was set to course and formalized with the Santa Maria da Feira European Council of June 2000, which created the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) and set the headline goal for civilian crisis management aiming at the accumulation of 5000 civilian police personnel by 2003, a thousand of which would be deployable within a period of 30 days (Hansen, 2004: 175).

After the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000 and Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001 where the EU countries made commitments to

satisfy the needs in order to fulfill the HHG (Wallace, 2005), the Laeken European Council of December 2001 declared that "the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations" (European Council, 2001), thereby activating ESDP (Çayhan, 2003). ESDP became fully operational at the end of 2002 when -in 12-13 December- the Copenhagen European Council approved the terms for the EU to make use of the NATO facilities in EU-led military crisis management operations and when (in 16 December) the NATO and EU released a joint declaration by which a NATO-EU strategic partnership was forged and the *Berlin Plus* arrangements -letting the EU to use NATO's *military planning and command facilities as well as assets and capabilities* (hereafter either *NATO facilities* or *NATO assets and capabilities*)- were agreed upon[26] (Wallace, 2005; Howorth, 2005). As a result, the EU-led crisis management operations immediately began with a civilian mission in 1 January 2003 when the EU Police Mission replaced the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia Herzegovina and continued with the first EU-led military operation -Operation Concordia- in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) launched in 31 March 2003 which replaced NATO force over there by utilizing NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus agreement (Missiroli and Quille, 2004; Wallace, 2005).

Around the same time that ESDP was put into action in early 2003; ironically, the CFSP experienced a significant backlash when the USA resolved to undertake a military operation against Iraq (Menon, 2004; Dinan, 2005). The crisis divided the EU members into three camps: Britain, Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and many of the Eastern European candidate countries being supportive of the US policy; Austria, Germany, Belgium, France

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[26] Under this "Berlin Plus arrangements" which came into force on 17 March 2003, the EU could benefit from NATO resources in three major ways separately or all combined: (1) it could make use of NATO military planning capacities, (2) it could demand that NATO would make available a *NATO European command option*, meaning that the Alliance would help command an EU-led military operation by generally making its Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SACEUR) available for being appointed as the EU operation commander and by letting the EU to establish its Operation Head Quarter at the NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium; and (3) it could request the use of military assets and capabilities of NATO (Council of the EU, 2004; NATO, 2008).

and Greece becoming harsh opponents; and Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden remaining neutral (McCormick, 2005: 218). However, as expressed by Menon (2004) quite convincingly, the Iraqi crisis did not bring the end of CFSP and ESDP; but to the contrary it "has served to relaunch ESDP on a firmer footing than beforehand" (648). As such, in June 2003, the High Representative of CFSP -Javier Solana- issued a *security strategy paper* named *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (namely, the ESS); which was approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003. This document "set the new general parameters for future common external action" (Missiroli and Quille, 2004: 118) for the EU by defining the potential threats to European security as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (European Council, 2003).

Then, on the basis of this strategy document, a new headline goal was adopted by the European Council of June 2004 entitled the Headline Goal 2010 envisioning that the EU countries would be able rapidly and decisively to conduct the whole range of crisis management operations written in the TEU by 2010 (EU Council Secretariat, 2006). It, furthermore, envisaged that the "battlegroups" -the minimum militarily effective, coherent, rapidly deployable and credible forces suitable to be dispatched both in *stand-alone operations* and in *the initial phase of bigger operations* (EU Council Secretariat, 2007)- would be formed consisting of about 1500 troops each (including necessary support) and deployable within 15 days, generally in response to UN request. 7 to 9 such groups were targeted to be created by 2007, which would substantially increase the EU's capability to cope especially with the new security threats defined by the ESS document (Watanabe, 2005)[27].

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[27] The EU managed to devise a *one single Battlegroup Concept document* in October 2006. This Battlegroup Concept reached its full operational capability by 1 January 2007, meaning that the EU has gained the ability to launch and undertake "two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations" almost simultaneously (EU Council Secretariat, 2007: 1-2).

Finally, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional Treaty) was signed by the EU members on October 2004, which was to bring crucial improvements to the CFSP and ESDP such as the creation of a position of *foreign minister* for Europe, the formation of the mechanisms like *enhanced cooperation* for security and defence matters or institutions like the EDA, and the extension of the scope of the Petersberg tasks (Diedrichs, 2005). Despite its rejection by France and the Netherlands in 2005, thus being unable to come into force, the treaty in general showed the readiness of the EU members to further cooperate in the fields of security and defence.

This intention to improve the cooperation in the foreign and security policies of the EU has -indeed- recently resurfaced when the EU leaders signed the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007; which is to amend *the Treaty establishing the European Communities* and *the Maastricht Treaty*, and to replace the Constitutional Treaty *per se*. The Lisbon Treaty mostly maintained the foreign and security policy provisions of the Constitutional Treaty by "revamp[ing] … the existing arrangements for the CFSP/ESDP" in the EU (Whitman, 2008: 8); by, for instance, granting a *legal personality* to the EU; allowing *enhanced cooperation* in security and defence matters within the Union; or creating an *EU Foreign Minister-like* post (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) with concomitant wide-ranging powers, albeit not carrying this symbolic name (Whitman, 2008; de Vasconcelos, 2007; Mersin, 2007). Even though the EU has very recently experienced another *ratification crisis*, when the Lisbon Treaty was rejected by Ireland in a referendum held in 12 June 2008 -after it had been ratified by 18 EU member states until that time- (Radikal, 14 June 2008; Zaman, 14 June 2008); the general intention of the EU and its member countries to overcome this newly emerged political stalemate, and enhance the foreign and security policy cooperation of the EU is still there.

3.2 A History of Turkey-EU Relations as regards the European Security System

When Turkey became a full member to NATO in 1952, it also automatically became a part of the European security architecture. Since then, its security and defence policy has been based on its NATO membership, namely its commitments to the security of the Alliance. In time, as Turkey's position accelerated within NATO, its importance for the European security order became more and more obvious, rendering it a necessary and crucial actor in ensuring European peace (Gözen, 2003). Since Turkey has always considered the European security as a whole like an *indivisible phenomenon*, it has not only regarded NATO with its immense power, capabilities and experience as the major organization responsible for protecting the European security system but also has tried hard to become a member of every security organization related to European peace and security like OSCE and Council of Europe (Çayhan, 2003; Gözen, 2003; Çomak, 2006). Likewise, Turkey tended to see any security organization or arrangement established for the enhancement of European security as a supplement to NATO but not a rival or alternative to it, including the ESDI and then ESDP projects emerged during the 1990s. Given this background, once the EU began to develop ESDP as a part of European security architecture, Turkey has desired and strived to become a respectable member of this institution as well (Gözen, 2003; Nas, 2003; Bağcı, 2000).

Following its application for the full membership to the EC in 1987, Turkey also applied for the WEU membership in 1988. Just like its EC application, Turkey was not given a clear membership prospect for the WEU at that time (Doğan, 2003). However, after the end of the Cold War and with the unfolding of the new international security environment, the WEU devised an *associate membership status* and invited Turkey -together with Norway and Iceland- to join the organization as associate members in 1992 (Udum, 2002), which were to be followed by Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic in 1999 (Cebeci, 1999). These countries were not offered full WEU membership mainly because the EU intended and decided at

Maastricht to make the full membership to the WEU dependent upon a country's full membership in the EU (Bağcı, 2000). However, "[t]hough not a perfect and fully desirable position for Turkey, [associate membership status still] provided a respectable connection for Turkey in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO" (Gözen, 2003: 26).

Thanks to this *associate membership* status, Turkey gained the position of a "*de facto* full membership" in the WEU by having a "privileged access" to decision-making mechanisms of the institution (Doğan, 2003: 6), thus getting closely anchored in the European security system. As such, (1) Turkey obtained the opportunity to fully participate in the WEU Council meetings and the gatherings of its working groups (except those of the Security Committee) under specified conditions; (2) it gained the right to speak and submit proposals during these meetings; (3) it became associated with the WEU Planning Cell via special arrangements possessing the right to nominate officers to this body; (4) with respect to military operations, Turkey could participate in WEU military activities -operations, exercises and planning- on the same grounds as the full members, once it committed forces to these missions; (5) due to its NATO membership, Turkey was *directly* included in the *planning* and *preparation* of all EU military operations capitalizing on NATO assets and capabilities; (6) Turkey could also get involved fully in the WEU armament activities as well as in the WEU's "subsidiary bodies" such as the Parliamentary Assembly, the Satellite Centre, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the WEU telecommunications system (Cebeci, 1999; Tocci and Houben, 2001); lastly, Turkey's security concerns were taken seriously and respected in that the WEU did not give *security guarantees and defence commitments* to its full members in their possible disputes with NATO member countries, thus assuring to stay neutral in a possible conflict between Turkey and Greece (Gözen, 2003; Cebeci, 1999)[28]. Therefore,

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[28] Turkey's position as an *associate member* within the ESDI system and the WEU was also including some crucial flaws such that it was not made a party to the Brussels Treaty which was constituting the legal basis of defence partnership under the WEU; it was not included in the security guarantee given under the 5th article of the Brussels Treaty, its status and pertinent rights being restricted to non-Article 5 activities of WEU; it could be

unsurprisingly, Turkey got rather disturbed once the EU began to develop ESDP, terminating the WEU and not taking a good care of the status of non-EU European NATO Allies (associate members of the WEU like Turkey) under the new security arrangement.

Once the EU incorporated the WEU to its own body taking over its functions and giving them to the newly emerging ESDP structure starting with the Cologne Summit of 1999, Turkey faced the threat of losing its privileges in WEU originated from its associate member status. This decision not only entailed the termination of Turkey's participation in the WEU decision-making mechanisms due to the elimination of this institution from ESDI process but also excluded Turkey and other non-EU NATO members from the decision-making process of ESDP. According to the new arrangement, decision-making under ESDP were limited only to the full members of the EU regardless of their importance for or interest in the European security issues[29], whereby a country like Turkey could be denied participation in decision-making regardless of its crucial and longstanding place in European security system (Gözen, 2003); which meant nothing but Turkey's holding the drums (just like in its Customs Union experience), while the EU countries were striking the drumsticks (Ergüvenç, 2007: 77).

With the Council of the EU's becoming the new decision-making organ for the implementation of *Petersberg tasks* under ESDP, Turkey and the countries alike were literally put at the margins of the European security system. These countries were granted *consultative functions* in the new decision-making, planning and implementation procedures, which rendered them downgraded to the *contributor* status (Gözen, 2003). Even if NATO facilities were to be utilized, the non-EU members of NATO could not partake in making a decision to

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denied to participate in WEU meetings when majority of the WEU members (or half of them including the presidency) oppose its involvement; and it could not block the decisions taken by the WEU council thereby lacking a chance to object to possible undesired activities undertaken by the institution (Bağcı, 2000; Cebeci, 1999). However, the association conditions of the WEU were still (generally) favorable for Turkey, especially as compared to the participation arrangements under ESDP (Tofte, 2003; Çayhan, 2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2000).

[29] As such, the non-NATO EU member countries -Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden- could fully participate in the ESDP mechanisms and operations despite their *neutral* positions for decades since the beginning of the Cold War and their related lack of experience in security and defence issues; which was quite an unfair treatment for the non-EU European NATO Allies like Turkey (Gözen, 2003; Howorth, 2005).

where, when and how to launch a military operation (Tofte, 2003; Udum, 2002). Moreover, these countries were excluded completely from non-military aspects of crisis management (Orhun, 2000) as well as from participating in the European military exercises and the activities of the (then) WEU "side-institutions" like the Satellite Centre or the ISS (Tocci and Houben, 2001).

As regards the specific arrangements on Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations under the new ESDP regime, permanent and regular consultations between the EU countries and non-EU NATO members were envisaged during peace-time (Terzi, 2004). At the pre-operational phase of a crisis, the dialogue and consultations between the EU and non-EU European Allies would be intensified so as to make sure that the former takes into consideration the security concerns of the latter (Doğan, 2003). As far as the operational phase is concerned, non-EU European NATO Allies could automatically participate in the EU military operations conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, while these same countries could take part in the EU missions not capitalizing on NATO facilities only upon an invitation by the EU with a council decision based on unanimity. In any case, once non-EU members of NATO contribute to an EU operation automatically or upon an invitation, they would have equal rights and obligations in the day-to-day management of the operations through their participation in the Committee of Contributors (CoC), but would not be allowed to partake in the *political control* and *strategic direction* of these missions (except voicing their views via CoC) which were to be undertaken by the PSC of the EU (Terzi, 2004; Doğan, 2003).

These arrangements were disappointing and unacceptable particularly for Turkey among other non-EU NATO members because; (1) in contrast to Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic which were to become full EU members in the near future and Norway and Iceland which were not aspiring for EU membership, Turkey was desiring -but not allowed to- have

accession to the EU in the foreseeable future, thereby being kept outside the European security system; (2) unlike any other non-EU members of NATO, Turkey was situated in a region which was quite vital for the European security system and was rather volatile and crisis-ridden; and (3) unlike the other countries, Turkey's Europeanness was widely questioned (Doğan, 2003; Yılmaz, 2007).

In spite of all these negative aspects of the new arrangements, Turkey generally endorsed the ESDP initiative. This became quite obvious when Turkey made a rather generous offer to the EU countries -in 2000- to participate in the HHG project by providing "a mechanized brigade of up to 5000 soldiers, 36 F-16 warplanes, two transport planes and a small flotilla of ships" (Udum, 2002: 93); thereby ranking *fifth* in contributing to the HHG among all the other contributors (Sarıibrahimoğlu, 22 June 2007). However, Turkey also had got some serious concerns with respect to this new ESDP initiative. First of all*,* the exclusion of the non-EU European NATO Allies from the ESDP decision-making mechanisms constituted a severe violation of the fundamental principles of *transparency*, *inclusiveness*, and *indivisibility of European Security* for Turkey, according to whom these principles must be the guiding tenets of European security system including the ESDP itself (Aykan, 2005; Udum, 2002). Secondly, for Turkey, the EU should have respected the Washington Summit Consensus, namely the conclusions of the Washington NATO Summit of 1999 which declared that the WEU *acquis* would be the basis of the future development of the European security architecture thus giving necessary credit and recognition to the concerns of non-EU European NATO members (Gözen, 2003; Aykan, 2005; Yılmaz, 2007; Udum, 2002).

Thirdly, most of the regions where the EU was likely to launch a crisis management operation under ESDP -from which Turkey was sidelined- were the regions or countries surrounding Turkey. Indeed, 13 out of 16 *hotspots* which might concern European security were located in Turkey's near vicinity. Therefore, any ESDP operation undertaken in one of

these regions would have a direct impact on Turkey's national security (Udum, 2002; Terzi, 2004; Doğan, 2003). Lastly, Turkey was seriously concerned that under ESDP, from which Turkey was excluded, Greece and the Greek Cypriots (after their accession to the Union) could dare to use the improving military capabilities of the EU against herself. Namely, Turkey was anxious that the EU might intervene in a conflict in the Aegean or Cyprus against Turkey and Turkish national interests (Udum, 2002; Terzi, 2004; Çayhan, 2003, Howorth, 2005; Tofte, 2003).

It was against this background that Turkey decided in 1999 to *veto* the *Berlin Plus* arrangements until its concerns regarding ESDP would be eliminated (Çayhan, 2003; Tofte, 2003; Nas, 2003). As such, Turkey's major demands from the EU were five-fold: (1) regular participation in daily planning and consultations on the issues pertinent to European security; (2) full and equal involvement in the decision-making and implementation processes of all EU operations undertaken with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities; (3) participation in the "decision-shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities" (Terzi, 2004: 115); (4) an EU guarantee assuring that ESDP and European military power would not be used in bilateral disputes between EU and NATO members such as a possible Turkish-Greek discord (Tofte, 2003); and (5) the EU's capitalizing on NATO facilities in accordance with the NATO Washington Summit provisions –namely, not permanent and automatic access, but access upon a case-by-case decision by NATO Council (Tofte, 2003; Udum, 2002)[30].

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[30] From the perspective of the EU, Turkey was acting rather arrogantly by opposing almost all restrictions as regards its participation in ESDP and by impeding and damaging NATO-EU collaboration in ESDP and at the same time in enhancing European security. It was perfectly normal and understandable for the Union that Turkey could not be granted full and equal rights of participation in the new ESDP decision-making and implementation mechanisms simply because ESDP was a European project and Turkey was not a member of the EU (Aykan, 2005; Çayhan, 2003). However, the Europeans were missing a critical point according to Çayhan (2003) that ESDP was not a domestic European policy like Common Agricultural Policy and European Monetary Union which are mostly and strictly concerning the EU itself. On the contrary, ESDP was an external policy which had a direct bearing on whole Europe including Turkey, having a significant impact on its national security; which, in turn, was justifying its willingness to get involved in the new European security arrangement.

Turkey's veto prevented the EU from having a guaranteed access to NATO facilities, which in turn rendered the operationalization of ESDP rather difficult. The problem could only be solved in December 2001 -a few days before the Laeken Summit where ESDP was declared (partially) operational- with Ankara Document agreed upon by Britain, Turkey and the USA after long deliberations (Çayhan, 2003; Tofte, 2003). Accordingly, the concerns of Turkey were relieved by three significant concessions of the EU: (1) "an intensive consultation procedure would be applied whenever Turkey's security interests [were] at stake due to an EU operation, or when an operation in Turkey's [*near abroad* was] under discussion"; (2) "the EU military forces [autonomously or relying on NATO resources] would not intervene in conflicts between NATO and EU members", in this case between Turkey and Greece (Çayhan, 2003: 48); and (3) despite Turkey's conceding that the EU could have automatic access to the NATO's *planning facilities* in conducting military missions, the Union's access to NATO's *strategic assets* and *capabilities* would be conditional upon unanimous approval of the North Atlantic Council -where Turkey was holding a veto power- on a case-by-case basis (Aykan, 2005). After this deal, the issue of ESDP's access to NATO facilities became an internal affair of the EU when the Greeks, disappointed by the above concessions, had to cease hiding behind Turkey and vetoed the *Berlin Plus* initiative for about one more year (Çayhan, 2003; Aykan, 2005; Tofte, 2003).

Finally, at the end of more than three years of diplomatic struggle since the Cologne Summit of June 1999, the *Berlin Plus* arrangements could only be agreed upon in December 2002; when all the deadlocks were eliminated, the NATO Council and the EU Council approved the deal, and then released a joint declaration through which a NATO-EU strategic partnership was forged by 16th of December (Tofte, 2003; Doğan, 2003; Howorth, 2005; Nas, 2003). According to this declaration, the decision-making autonomy of the EU under ESDP was preserved via Turkey's participation in the autonomous EU operations being kept to be

conditional upon invitation by the EU's Council of Ministers, albeit -this time- after an "enhanced consultation" procedure with Turkey. However, Turkey's participation in an EU operation undertaken with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities was to be assured by the EU, including the planning and preparation phases of the mission (Aykan, 2005). An additional concession was also extended by the EU in the declaration entailing that the EU operations relying on NATO facilities were only to be open to the participation of the EU countries which were also either NATO allies or partners, leading to the exclusion of Cyprus and Malta from NATO-EU partnership (Aykan, 2005; Terzi, 2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; Tofte, 2003) After the finalization of pertinent institutional arrangements by 17 March 2003 - namely, the adoption of the *Berlin Plus* agreement- the EU managed to launch its first military operation under ESDP (EUFOR Concordia) in Macedonia on 31 March 2003, with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (Doğan, 2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2007; NATO, 2008).

3.3 History of Turkey's Contributions to International Security

Committed highly to the preservation and promotion of international peace and security, Turkey has been an active participant of *peace operations* and *crisis management missions* for more than 50 years -and especially for the last 20 years- under various international organizations such as the UN, NATO, OSCE and most recently the EU[31] (Gruen, 2006). It has also managed to launch successful regional security initiatives in the South-Eastern Europe

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[31] Although Turkey's participation in *peace operations* started in 1950, the Country's active involvement in such operations commenced towards the end of the Cold War (in 1988). This distancing of Turkey from *peace operations* undertaken (solely) by the UN throughout the Cold War can be explained by several factors:
(1) Turkey's inevitable concentration on its own security and defence during the Cold War owing to its being a direct part of the then's *bipolarity* by serving as the south-eastern flank of NATO against the Soviets, (2) the constraining impact of the Cold War international security environment on the medium-sized powers like Turkey whose security and defence policy had to remain confined to the imperatives of its NATO membership; (3) the concentration of UN *peace operations* during the Cold War either on the Middle East (7 out of 13 missions) - towards which Turkey had been pursuing a *policy of non- engagement*- or on the distant parts of the world (like Asia or Latin America), in which Turkey had got no significant interest to get involved; (4) the "Korea syndrome" emerged in Turkey related to the troop deployments abroad like the famous "Vietnam syndrome" of the US; and lastly (5) Turkey's relatively stable neighborhood -especially the regions with which it has got historical, ethnic and cultural ties like the Balkans- during the Cold War compared to the post-Cold War years (Bağcı and Kardaş, 2004; Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006; Güngör, 2007).

and Black Sea areas. Turkey has contributed substantially to peace operations both in terms of civilian/military capabilities and financial as well as logistical support, missions having been ranged from crisis management operations to humanitarian relief, search-and-rescue, monitoring and border missions in various parts of the world.

Ever since the Korean War (of 1950-53) and especially since towards the end of the Cold War, Turkey has been contributing to the UN peace keeping efforts consistently in a substantial manner (MFA, 2008f). Some of the main UN operations in which Turkey has taken part up to now as well as its contributions to these missions are as follows: Korean War participated with a brigade of 4.500 soldiers; UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) between 1988-91 with 10 staff; UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group (UNICOM) between 1991-2003 with 75 staff; Operation Sharp Guard in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992-96 with naval assets; Operation Deny Flight in BiH between 1993-96 with an F-16 squadron; UN Protection Force in BiH (UNPROFOR) between 1993-95 with 1450 troops including necessary support; UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II) between 1993-1994 with more than 300 soldiers[32], with a Turkish General commanding the operation for more than a year; and UN Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) between 2000-2001 with a military advisor (MFA, 2008g). Turkey has also contributed to UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with five military observers and to UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with four ones[33] (MFA, 2008f).

Turkey has also given a significant support to the civilian UN peace operations by contributing to them with important amounts of police officers. As of November 2007, it has

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[32] Besides its troop contributions, Turkey played a rather crucial role in the execution of this operation thanks to the appointment in April 1993 of Lieutenant General Çevik Bir as the *first force commander* of UNOSOM II by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghalli (Bağcı and Kardaş, 2004).
[33] Turkey has also contributed to the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) (a *multinational observer force* in the city of Hebron/El Halil in Palestine) since February 1997, its current contribution being five civilian and military personnel serving as observers. It has been one of the six countries that have been participating in this mission. Turkey has also suffered from an unfortunate casualty in this mission, when one of its observers were killed in an armed attack in 2002 (Gruen, 2006; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı - TSK, 2008).

contributed to UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with 131, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with 31, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with 28, and UN Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) with 20 civilian police personnel, just to mention a few major operations. As such, Turkey ranks 10th in the world in contributing to UN civilian peace keeping missions, with its police forces currently serving in eight such operations (MFA, 2008f).

More recently, Turkey has become a part of the UN Standby Arrangements System (in 2004) which was founded "in order to provide the UN with instant peacekeeper deployment ability in case of a threat to international peace and security". It declared to contribute to the System with 1000 staff comprising both military and civilian personnel deployable within two-to-four weeks in case that a need emerges (MFA, 2008f). Moreover, upon a decision taken by Turkish Parliament on 5 October 2006, Turkey took part also in UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a Turkish Engineering Construction Unit comprising 237 military and 24 civilian officials and a frigate, an underway replenishment vessel and two corvettes, total Turkish contributions amounting to around 1000 personnel among a total of nearly 13,500 international staff from 30 different countries participating in the mission (Turkish General Staff, 2008b)[34]. With this last and most recent contribution, as of November 2007, Turkey's contributions to the UN peace keeping missions all around the world amounted to 750 troops, 225 police officers and nine military observers, not to mention nearly 5800 Turkish military and civilian officers as well as gendarmerie serving in the UN-mandated operations undertaken by the NATO, OSCE and the EU (MFA, 2008f).

Turkey also carries the unfortunate honor of holding the second rank in terms of the troop casualties suffered during the service to international peace under the UN umbrella (MFA, 2008g). Last but not least, Turkey is a candidate country for the non-permanent UNSC

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[34] For a very good and detailed account of Turkey's participation in UNIFIL including the public discussions prior to the decision of the Turkish Parliament to send Turkish military and civilian personnel to the operation, see Gruen, 2006.

membership for 2009-2010 period. Having a seat in the Security Council lastly in 1961, it has recently been running an active campaign in order to be elected for the membership during the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly in 2008 (MFA, 2007).

Turkey has also made remarkable contributions to international peace through NATO, by participating in military operations, humanitarian missions and training programs. It has always maintained one of the largest armies among the Allies, currently having the biggest armed forces among the European NATO members and second biggest military power in NATO after that of the USA. With such a huge army as well as military assets and capabilities, Turkey has partaken in numerous NATO operations so far, attending all of them conducted in the Balkans since 1995 (MFA, 2008g). Accordingly, it contributed to NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia with a total of 1.300 civilian officers and soldiers (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). It partook in the operation of KFOR in Kosovo with 752 troops[35] and operations of *Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, and Allied Harmony* in Macedonia (MFA, 2008g; Doğan, 2003). Additionally, Turkey took part in various humanitarian missions undertaken by NATO such as those conducted in 2005 upon the Hurricane Katrina in the USA and earthquake in Pakistan, by providing logistical support such as the assignment of C-130 type cargo planes for NATO command in order to transfer urgently needed materials to the regions of catastrophe (TSK, 2008).

Moreover, Turkey has also been playing an active role in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) formed in 1994 with the aims of "contributing to regional security and stability, achieving better mutual understanding and dispelling any misconceptions between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners". As a part of this initiative which consists of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Mauritania; Turkey carried out the task of Contact Point Embassy in Jordan for 2001-2002 period reassuming this task in 2005 for two

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[35] Turkey's contribution to KFOR is reported to be 994 troops by Bağcı and Kardaş (2004). Turkey also supported NATO's air bombardment campaign of 1999 in Kosovo (preceding the establishment of KFOR) with 10 F-16 warplanes.

more years and currently undertaking the same task in Morocco for the 2007-2008 period, and it kept the Turkish Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Centre in Ankara available to all MD countries for courses promoting the *spirit* of Mediterranean Dialogue (MFA, 2008g; Turkish General Staff, 2008a)[36]. Finally, when NATO member states resolved in Istanbul NATO Summit 2004 to assist Iraq by training its security forces, a NATO Training Implementation Mission for Iraq was formed in July 2004. Turkey, very much interested in this mission, which was later to be named NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), has assigned 2 officers to this body to serve in Iraq. It has also undertaken the training of more than 110 Iraqi personnel in Turkey since the outset of the initiative (MFA, 2008g).

To have a closer focus on the NATO's probably the most important and recent operation in which Turkey has taken a part, NATO took over the UN mission in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003 by assuming the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. It was to be the first NATO operation carried out outside the Euro-Atlantic region. It was a very challenging operation for the Allies due to its being undertaken in a remote and harsh geography, which would necessitate considerable amounts of human, financial and military sources. The aim of the operation was to assist the Afghan government in establishing a security environment in the country starting with Kabul so that the reconstruction of the city and the country could be achieved more safely and rapidly. As a major NATO member and a country with strong historical as well as cultural ties with Afghanistan, Turkey gave a large support to ISAF. It assumed the leadership of the Force, first, between June 2002 and February 2003 when it was under the UN command, with about 1400 soldiers. Turkish support continued after ISAF was shifted to the NATO command in August 2003 in that Turkey assumed the leadership of ISAF VII operation between February-August 2005 for an additional six months with more than 1400 troops. Currently, under the

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[36] This PfP Training Center was established in 1998 in Ankara within the framework of the NATO's PfP Initiative launched in 1994. Since 1998, the Center trained around 7000 peacekeepers from 65 countries, by arranging 236 courses and nine seminars (MFA, 2008f; Turkish General Staff, 2008a)

new structure of ISAF divided into five regional commands, Turkey has assumed the leadership of the Central Command in Kabul jointly with France and Italy on a rotational basis (by leading the Command between April-December 2007); which will continue until August 2008[37]. Besides the military contributions of Turkey to ISAF, Hikmet Çetin –the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly- served in Kabul between January 2004 and August 2006 as NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan (MFA, 2008g; TSK, 2008; Müftüler-Baç, 2007).

As for the OSCE, which is the biggest regional security institution in the Eurasian-Atlantic area composed of 55 states, Turkey has been an active member of OSCE since its establishment in 1975 by backing its peace efforts. It hosted, in 1999, the OSCE Summit Meeting in Istanbul where the documents like the Charter for European Security and the revised Vienna Document were signed and adopted; which, in turn, constituted a turning point in the history of the organization by forming a basis for future OSCE actions. It also supported the OSCE initiatives such as Conference on Interaction and Confidence building in Asia, with the aim of sharing the OSCE experience of preserving and promoting international as well as regional peace and security with non-OSCE countries (MFA, 2008c). Turkey, lastly, took part in various OSCE missions like those in Georgia, Kosovo or Macedonia by deploying civilian staff (Ziyal, 2004).

In spite of the fact that the EU has excluded Turkey from the ESDP process -totally from the decision-making mechanisms and partially from the planning and implementation procedures- Turkey has demonstrated a considerable amount of interest in the EU crisis management operations under ESDP as well, which have been in place since January 2003. It

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[37] Due to its still being a mostly *conscript* force, the Turkish army has been particularly convenient and successful in ISAF (just like some other *peace* or *crisis management* operations such as those conducted in Balkans). Thanks to this *conscript* nature of the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish soldiers "could provide a reflection of the Turkish society" and, thus, be welcome by Afghan citizens due to their perceived cultural affiliation with Turkey and Turkish troops. Consequently, the Turkish soldiers could, for instance, patrol Kabul streets even without armaments or opened and operated Kabul airport without facing any serious trouble (Ergüvenç, 2007: 82).

has participated in 7 out of 21 EU crisis management missions so far, whether civilian or military, undertaken by the EU both under the *Berlin Plus* agreement and autonomously. Indeed, Turkey contributed many such operations like *Proxima* in Macedonia and the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina more than most of the EU members did (see, Section 4.5; MFA, 2008g; Müftüler-Baç, 2007). Moreover, Turkey declared her intention, in May 2005, to devote troops to the battlegroups. Accordingly, it will contribute -together with Romania- to the formation of the Italian-led battlegroup which is scheduled to be formed by the EU in the second half of 2010, by providing soldiers as well as assets and capabilities (Ferracuti and Nones, 2007).

Turkey, finally, has succeeded in launching "groundbreaking initiatives to create a web of regional cooperation mechanisms" in its neighborhood. The major such initiatives include: (1) the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE) established in 1999 with the objective of improving the security conditions in the Euro-Atlantic region and promoting cooperation, good neighborly relations and interoperability among the countries of South-Eastern Europe; and (2) the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) founded in 2001 with the participation of all littoral countries to the Black Sea -Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey- with the aim of "contributing to friendship, good relations and mutual understanding in the region through the enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces of the littoral countries". Besides leading their creation, Turkey has also played a rather active role in these initiatives and contributed largely to the maintenance of peace and stability in its vicinity (MFA, 2008g)[38].

As can be discerned from the discussion above and as also mentioned earlier, Turkey seems to be both an *able* (with its immense civilian and military power) and a *willing* (with its longstanding dedication to enhance international peace) country in contributing to

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[38] See also MFA, 2008a, for a detailed account of the development of the BLACKSEAFOR.

international and European security. It has also got huge *experience* in contributing to international peace efforts (including the European ones) so much so that its experience of participating in peace operations dates back to the early 1950s, an impressive record compared to the nascent ESDP crisis management efforts which are taking place just for the last five years. Therefore, it seems obvious from these indicators that -as many politicians, academics and analysts have already pointed out and asserted- Turkey has got great potential to contribute to the EU crisis management activities, after its full accession to the EU.

This prediction has also been fostered by the fact that the EU's security and its ESDP project *per se* have been adversely affected even by a certain amount of deterioration in the Turkey-EU relations since 2005. In fact, the EU-Turkish relations has been strained since that time due mainly to the Cyprus dispute and the EU's *enlargement fatigue* as well as rising concerns in the Union on Turkey's ongoing democratic weaknesses and relatively less developed economy. This development, in turn, has directly had crucial negative bearings on European security in general and ESDP in particular, which became clearly observable since 2007: (1) it damaged the NATO-EU strategic dialogue on security matters thereby adversely affecting the EU's planned civilian operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, (2) Turkey has withdrawn from the Headline Goal 2010 of the EU referring to a specific reason of the EU's not sufficiently crediting the Turkey's declared contributions to the initiative, and (3) an EU-Turkey Security Agreement and the process of Turkey's involvement in the administrative procedures of the EDA remained stuck (which can be deemed harmful also for Turkey)[39] (ICG, 2007). Most recently, as a culmination of this process of strained relations between Turkey and the EU both in general and particularly in the realm of security, Turkey rejected

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[39] For a more detailed account of the deteriorating Turkey-EU relations and its negative repercussions on ESDP and EU-NATO strategic partnership (as well as somewhat on Turkey) especially since 2007, see Güvenç, 8 June 2007; Kurt, 14 August 2006; Kurt, 25 May 2007; Kurt, 8 June 2007; Kurt, 9 June 2007; Radikal, 15 November 2005; Radikal, 23 May 2007; Radikal, 8 June 2007; Sarıibrahimoğlu, 22 June 2007; Today's Zaman, 11 June 2007; Turkish Daily News, 11 June 2007; Turkish Daily News, 5 December 2007; Zaman, 7 June 2007a; Zaman, 7 June 2007b; Zaman, 8 June 2007.

the EU's invitation to involve Turkey in its military crisis management operation launched in Chad and Central African Republic in early 2008, by pointing to its not being included in the command and control mechanisms of the operation and to the fact that Greek Cypriots were contributing troops to the mission (Radikal, 8 March 2008).

This study, however, believes that Turkey's future possible contributions to ESDP -and, through it, European security- should be scrutinized more deeply and analyzed more critically so that these *potential contributions* claims and predictions could be reassessed; but this time in a more objective and grounded way. It is for this reason that the next chapter will focus on all the EU crisis management operations, completed and ongoing as well as civilian and military, launched so far; and seek to explore and reveal the degree of Turkey's involvement in them (in terms of both the number of such missions it has participated in and the amount of contributions it has made to them) in order to highlight and foresee the country's possible contributions to ESDP operations after its full membership to the EU. The analyses of the next chapter will also be supplemented in the conclusion part by the findings of an examination of the literatures on Turkey's past and present motivations of involvement in *peace operations* and on Turkey-EU foreign policy compatibility, in order to produce more well-founded future projections.

CHAPTER 4

EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AND TURKEY

4.1 General Overview of the Operations

The EU has launched 21 crisis management operations so far, since the operationalization of ESDP at the very end of 2002[40]. Among these missions, 9 have been completed; while the remaining 12 are still continuing. *Completed operations* are (according to their *date of launch* from the past to the present) as follows: EU Military Operation in the FYROM (Operation Concordia), EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC (Operation Artemis), EU Police Mission in the FYROM (EUPOL Proxima), EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis), EU Police Mission in Kinshasa - DRC (EUPOL Kinshasa), EU Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan -AMIS- in Darfur (AMIS EU Supporting Action), EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh - Indonesia (Aceh Monitoring Mission or AMM), EU Police Advisory Team in the FYROM (EUPAT), EU Military Operation in Support of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) - (EUFOR RD Congo). *Continuing* operations, on the other hand, can be sequenced (according to the same criterion mentioned above) as follows: EU Police Mission in BiH (EUPM), EU Military Operation in BiH (EUFOR Althea), EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo), EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories - PT (EU BAM Rafah), EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine), EU Police Mission for the PT (EUPOL COPPS), EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), EU Police Mission in the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo), EU Military Operation in the Republic of

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[40] As also mentioned in the first chapter of this study, all these operations are *EU crisis management missions*, but 20 among them (except the EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine) are *ESDP operations*. This is the case because the EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine is a mission exceptionally launched under the auspices of the EU Commission within the framework of the EC's TACIS program, while the other missions have been undertaken by the Council of the EU under the ESDP framework.

Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), European Union Rule of Law

Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), and EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform

in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)[41].

TABLE I			
Status Time Launched	Completed	Continuing	# of Missions
2003	- Operation Concordia - Operation Artemis - EUPOL Proxima	- EUPM	4
2004	- EUJUST Themis	- EUFOR Althea	2
2005	- EUPOL Kinshasa - AMIS EU Supporting Action - Aceh Monitoring Mission - EUPAT	- EUSEC RD Congo - EUJUST LEX - EU BAM Rafah - EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine	8
2006	- EUFOR RD Congo	- EUPOL COPPS	2
2007	…	- EUPOL Afghanistan - EUPOL RD Congo	2
2008	…	- EUFOR Tchad/RCA - EULEX Kosovo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	3
# of Missions	9	12	21
Note: In all the tables, missions within any "cell" are sequenced *from the top to the bottom* according to their *time of launch* from the past to the present.			

As can be seen in Table I above, completed operations were all launched between 2003

and 2006, while the *dates of launch* of the continuing missions disperse to all years. The most

"fertile" year in terms of the commencement of the EU operations has been 2005, with nearly

40% of all the missions launched in that year (8 out of 21). 2003 and 2008 are the years

ranking second and third in terms of the number of ESDP operations started in a year, by

witnessing the launch of 4 and 3 operations, respectively. Lastly, the years 2005 and 2003

have been the periods when most of the *completed* crisis management operations were put in

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[41] This study mostly respects the official names of the EU crisis management operations as presented in the webpage of the Council of the EU (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g). However, it modifies some of the missions' names in accordance with the official documents related to these missions -such as the joint actions establishing them- in order to give or offer more *understandable* and *standardized* "full names" to the operations.

the ground (7 out of 9 missions), while the same years for the *continuing* crisis management operations have been 2005 and 2008 (7 out of 12 missions).

Type of Mission / Continent Deployed	Civilian		Military		# of Missions
Africa	- EUPOL Kinshasa - EUSEC RD Congo - EUPOL RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	- AMIS EU Supporting Action	- Operation Artemis - EUFOR RD Congo - EUFOR Tchad/RCA		8
Europe (Western Balkans and *Eastern Europe*)	- EUPM - EUPOL Proxima - *EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine* - EUPAT - EULEX Kosovo		- Operation Concordia - EUFOR Althea		7
Asia (South Caucasus*, Middle East°, South-East Asia˘ and West Asia˜)	- EUJUST Themis* - EUJUST LEX° - Aceh Monitoring Mission˘ - EU BAM Rafah° - EUPOL COPPS° - EUPOL Afghanistan˜		…		6
# of Missions	15	1	5		**21**

Note: In all the tables with the "continent deployed" variable, sings are used near the names of the regions and missions in Asia for marking which mission(s) corresponds to which region in this continent. Similarly, in Europe, Eastern Europe is written in *italic* together with the mission which has been undertaken in that region.

As Table II shows quite well, a great majority of the EU crisis management operations launched so far have been *civilian missions* (15 out of 21), while only about one-fourth of all the ESDP missions have been *military undertakings* (5 out of 21). Among these military operations, 3 have been *autonomous* EU missions (those conducted in Africa); while 2 have been undertaken with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (those launched in Europe). There has been only one *hybrid* mission combining civilian and military components at the same time, which was the AMIS EU Supporting Action undertaken in Darfur from July 2005 to December 2007. As far as the continental distribution of the EU operations is concerned, three continents have been the arena for the ESDP missions thus far; which are Africa, Europe

and Asia. Africa has been the continent which hosted the greatest number of EU crisis management operations (8 out of 21), followed closely by Europe (7 missions) and Asia (6 missions). Regionally, Western Balkans and Central Africa have been the most significant locus of the ESDP operations by hosting 6 missions each[42]. The country which has been the subject for the greatest number of EU missions up to now has been the DRC (with 5 missions), which is followed by the FYROM that hosted 3 (completed) operations so far. In each of the continents noted above, the number of the civilian crisis management operations conducted by the EU surpasses that of the military operations undertaken there. The continent which has become the theatre for the greatest number of civilian ESDP missions has been Asia (6 operations) which is also marked by its not having hosted any military EU mission up until now, while Africa has been the continent where the EU has undertaken the largest number of military operations (3 thus far).

As can be discerned from Table III below, Africa has witnessed the launch of the EU crisis management missions every year from 2003 to 2008 except the year 2004; 2005 having been the year when the greatest number of EU operations was initiated in the continent (3 out of 8 missions). Europe has hosted the biggest number of EU missions in 2003 (3 out of 7 operations), all conducted in Western Balkans; followed by the year 2005 when 2 ESDP missions were grounded in the continent. In Asia, half of all crisis management operations undertaken by the EU were launched in 2005 (3 out of 6 missions), whereas the years 2003 and 2008 have been the periods when no *single* EU mission was initiated. Finally, 2005 has been the *boost year* for Africa and Asia in terms of the launch of ESDP operations, witnessing the initiation of 3 operations in each; while the same year for Europe has been 2003 (again with the launch of 3 missions), the very year in which the ESDP missions overall started.

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[42] Although the EU sources do not categorize the crisis management missions in Africa based on regions, but they instead do so on the basis of countries; one can still consider the DRC, Chad and CAR as Central African states (see, CIA World Factbook country profiles here: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and, thus, say that the EU has launched 6 crisis management operations in Central Africa, so far.

TABLE III				
Continent Deployed / Time Launched	__Africa__	__Europe__ (Western Balkans and *Eastern Europe*)	__Asia__ (South Caucasus*, Middle East°, South-East Asiaˇ and West Asia˜)	# of Missions
2003	- Operation Artemis	- EUPM - Operation Concordia - EUPOL Proxima	…	**4**
2004	…	- EUFOR Althea	- EUJUST Themis*	**2**
2005	- EUPOL Kinshasa - EUSEC RD Congo - AMIS EU Supporting Action	- *EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine* - EUPAT	- EUJUST LEX° - Aceh Monitoring Missionˇ - EU BAM Rafah°	**8**
2006	- EUFOR RD Congo	…	- EUPOL COPPS°	**2**
2007	- EUPOL RD Congo	…	- EUPOL Afghanistan˜	**2**
2008	- EUFOR Tchad/RCA - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	- EULEX Kosovo	…	**3**
# of Missions	**8**	**7**	**6**	**21**

The rest of the chapter will, first, *systematically* examine all the 21 EU crisis management operations (launched so far) in detail with a special focus on Turkey's participation in and contributions to these missions, and then, analyze the patterns of Turkey's participation in these operations by focusing on different features of these missions (their continental location, time of launch, and civilian/military character). The EU crisis management operations, as such, will be examined *in an order* devised on the basis of *three criteria*: (1) the continents where they have been dispatched, (2) the *chronology* of the *time of launch* of the operations in a continent, region or country *from the past to the present*, and (3) the regions or countries of their deployment within each continent. Accordingly, the examination will be done continentally (based on the 1st criterion above), starting with Europe and followed by Africa and Asia (the examination order of the continents being determined on the basis of the 2nd criterion). Within each continent, operations will be grouped and elaborated upon according to the regions or countries of their deployment (3rd criterion); the *chronology* of the *time of*

launch of the missions being used either in determining the order of examination of regions/countries within each continent or in setting the same order for the missions conducted within each region/country (2nd criterion).

4.2 EU Crisis Management Operations in Europe

4.2.1 Western Balkans

4.2.1.1 EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - BiH (EUPM)

Alongside its overall commitments in the stabilization of BiH since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, the EU launched the EUPM in this country on 1 January 2003, replacing the UN's International Police Task Force there. It was *not only the first-ever crisis management operation undertaken by the EU under the ESDP framework, but also the first civilian mission conducted by the Union*. Established by the Council of the EU Joint Action of 11 March 2002 (Council Joint Action, hereafter) following an invitation by the BiH authorities and a subsequent the UNSC Resolution welcoming a future EU engagement in BiH in early March 2002, the EUPM was deployed with an initial mandate of three years, until the end of 2005. Its first Head of Mission (HoM) was the Danish commander Sven Christian Frederiksen who was to serve under and in close liaison with the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in BiH, Lord Ashdown. Headquartered in Sarajevo and having an initial number of 24 monitoring units co-located within various medium and high level police structures in BiH, the mission aimed in line with the general goals of Annex 11 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement at raising the existing police standards in BiH by founding sustainable policing arrangements under the ownership of BiH authorities in accordance with the best international and European practice; through undertaking monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities on Bosnian police (Council Joint Action, 2002/210/CFSP; EUPM Website, 2008a; Council of the EU, 2008; March 2006; Grevi et al, 2005; ICG, 2005).

Upon an invitation by the BiH authorities in October 2005, the EU decided to establish a follow-on mission to EUPM with an adjusted mandate and size as well as with a new duration of two years from January 2006 to the end of 2007, which was founded by a Council Joint Action adopted on 24 November 2005. Also called EUPM II, the *refocused* mission was to create a professional, sustainable and multiethnic police service in BiH, operating in line with the highest European and international standards; especially in the field of fighting against major and organized crime (Council Joint Action, 2005/824/CFSP; Council of the EU, March 2006; EUPM Website, 2008a; Council of the EU, 2008f). EUPM II was to be led by an Italian HoM, Brigadier General (Br. Gen.) Vincenzo Coppola who succeeded Kevin Carty -the HoM of EUPM from March 2004 to the end of 2005, following the death of the first HoM Frederiksen in January 2004 (Council of the EU, March 2006; ICG, 2005).

Most recently, the mandate of the EUPM was extended for two more years (from January 2008 to the end of 2009) with a Council Joint Action adopted on 19 November 2007, following a further invitation by the BiH authorities in September 2007. As such, the EUPM will mostly continue to implement its existing mandate, this time with an additional special focus on improving the relations between the BiH police and prosecutors (Council Joint Action, 2007/749/CFSP; EUPM Website, 2008a). The cost of the EUPM for the EC budget was envisaged, initially, to be €14 million for the start-up expenses, added by an annual running cost of around €20 million for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 (Council Joint Action, 2002/210/CFSP). The cost of the mission for the year 2008 to be covered by the Community budget, on the other hand, is some €15 million (Council of the EU Decision – Council Decision, 2007/791/CFSP).

During its first phase, the EUPM was composed of more than 500 police officers from 33 countries (Grevi et al, 2005; Radikal, 2 January 2003; Council of the EU, 2008f). As of April 2003, for instance, the exact size of EUPM was 536 police officers, 442 (about 80%) of whom

were provided by the (then 15) EU member states and 94 (around 20%) by the non-EU contributing countries (Grevi et al, 2005). Turkey contributed to EUPM, at this stage, with 12 civilian personnel (6 police officers and 6 gendarmeries) (MFA, April 2008; March 2008), by making the 10th largest contribution to the mission together with Poland (according to the April 2003 figures given by Grevi et al, 2005), surpassing the contributions even some of the prominent EU countries like Greece, Portugal, Belgium or Austria. Turkey's contribution to EUPM II (a smaller force than the mission at its first stage, comprising some 200 international civilian staff), on the other hand, numbered 4 civilian personnel (MFA, March 2008; April 2008; Council of the EU, 2008f). Most recently, in its 3rd phase, the EUPM consists of 198 international civilian personnel (police officers and international civilians) as of 27 June 2008; Turkey's contributions being 10 personnel (8 police officers and 2 civilian staff) (EUPM Website, 2008b), making it the 5th largest contributor to the mission -together with the Netherlands- out of a total number of 32 contributing countries.

4.2.1.2 EU Military Operation in BiH (EUFOR Althea)

As a part of its overall approach towards BiH aiming to drive the country closer to the European integration through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and providing the country with a perspective of full EU membership in the long run, the EU launched *its second mission in BiH* -this time a *military operation* (a UN Chapter VII mission)- in 2 December 2004 by taking over from NATO's SFOR there (EU Council Secretariat, 29 November 2004; Council of the EU, December 2005d). The EUFOR Althea, as such, has constituted *the largest EU crisis management operation as well as the most complicated military undertaking conducted by the EU so far*, with its initial troop strength of 7000 soldiers (equivalent to the size of SFOR just before its termination) derived from 33 countries (EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2007; Council of the EU, December 2005d; Grevi et al, 2005; ICG,

2005). The mission was established with the Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004, which followed the NATO decision taken in its Istanbul Summit of June 2004 envisaging the termination of SFOR in BiH by the end of that year and the subsequent UNSC Resolution 1551 of July 2004 welcoming the EU's intention to undertake a military operation in BiH starting by the end of 2004 (Council Joint Action, 2004/570/CFSP). The EUFOR Althea was, then, put in the ground upon the Council Decision of 25 November 2004, which was adopted three days after another UNSC Resolution (1575) authorizing the EU to launch a multinational stabilization force in BiH for an initial duration of 12 months as a legal successor to SFOR (Council Decision, 2004/803/CFSP).

The EUFOR Althea's specific objectives were to create deterrence, to ensure continued compliance with (Annexes 1.A and 2 of) the Dayton/Paris Agreement as well as to contribute to stability and the secure atmosphere in BiH. Due to its being an EU-led crisis management operation under the *Berlin Plus arrangements*, the EUFOR Althea was to operate with recourse to NATO facilities, its Operational Headquarters (OHQ) being situated at NATO's SHAPE in Mons and its Operation Commander (OpCdr) being appointed as General John Reith (UK) who was also the D-SACEUR of NATO (see, p.76 in Section 3.1). Major General A. David Leakey (UK), on the other hand, was appointed as the EU Force Commander of the mission, who was to serve in the EUFOR Althea's Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Sarajevo (Camp Butmir). Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative in BiH under the Dayton/Paris Agreement, was also appointed as the EUSR in BiH. Common costs of the EUFOR Althea were initially foreseen to be €71.7 million, to be funded under ATHENA; a mechanism established by the Council of the EU in February 2004 for financing the costs of the EU military operations through contributions from EU member states on a GDP-based key[43]

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[43] While the common costs of the civilian EU crisis management operations are funded from the CFSP budget (under the External Relations item of the Community budget); common costs of the *operations with military or defence implications* are financed (since 2004) through ATHENA, a mechanism founded by the Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004. However, due to the restrictive definition of *the list of common*

(Council Joint Action, 2004/570/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, 29 November 2004; February 2008a; Council of the EU, December 2005d).

Following a Council Decision adopted in December 2006 relying on the positive evolution of the security environment in BiH, the EUFOR Althea went through a transition process during 2007, through which the size of the force was scaled down to some 2500 troops; but without losing its robust military presence by keeping over-the-horizon reserve forces in BiH and by retaining its capacity to respond to any possible security challenges in BiH territories. The mission, currently operating under General John McColl (OpCdr) and Major General Ignacio Martin Villalain (Force Commander) who are working in liaison with the current EUSR in BiH, Miroslav Lajcak, continues to fulfill its responsibilities under the UN mandate by trying *to maintain and enhance the stability and security in BiH*; its mandate having been prolonged for a further 12 months by the UNSC Resolution 1785 in November 2007, most recently (EU Council Secretariat, February 2008a; Council of the EU, 11 December 2007; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2008; Autumn/Winter 2007; Spring/Summer 2007).

As also mentioned above, during its first phase, the EUFOR Althea's about 7000-large force was provided by 33 countries, 22 EU member states (except Denmark, Cyprus and Malta) and 11 third states (Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey; alphabetically) (EU Council Secretariat, 29 November 2004; Abellan, 2007). After the completion of transition of the mission in 2007, the EUFOR Althea's around 2500 troops were composed -by February 2008- of the forces provided by 29 countries; 24 EU member states (still excluding the same countries, but including Bulgaria and Romania) and 5 third states (Albania, Chile, the FYROM, Switzerland and Turkey) (EU Council Secretariat, February 2008a). Turkey's

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costs by the Council of the EU, these common costs of a military operation do not exceed 10% of its total costs. Therefore, most of the expenses of an EU military undertaking (costs of personnel, etc.) are directly financed by countries participating in a particular mission on the basis of the principle of "costs lie where they fall" (EU Council Secretariat, June 2007b); meaning, for instance for the case of the personnel costs, that the countries are responsible for bearing the salaries, allowances and the travel expenses of the staff they send for the mission.

contributions to the mission have been substantial since its very inception. Initially, Turkey contributed to the EUFOR Althea with about 400 troops and gendarmerie (for Integrated Police Unit – IPU functioning as a part of the mission) (SIPRI, 2004; MFA, 2008e). More lately, its contributions to the mission numbered some 255 military and civilian personnel (48 gendarmerie assigned to serve under IPU) (MFA, April 2008; 2008b; TSK, 2008). Currently, as of 11 June 2008, 28 countries take part in the EUFOR Althea (23 EU members and 5 non-EU countries), by constituting together a force of 2173 troops. Turkey's contribution to the mission is 242 troops (EUFOR Althea Website, 2008); and with this figure, it is the 2nd largest contributor to the mission (by supplying more than 10% of all the forces in the ground) after Spain; surpassing even the EU-member countries like Italy, France, Germany, and Poland in committing soldiers to the mission.

4.2.1.3 EU Military Operation in the FYROM (Operation Concordia)

In line with its general commitment to FYROM, aiming at the country's getting closer to the EU through the SAP by its becoming a peaceful, prosperous and democratic country located in a region full of other stable countries; the Union undertook its *first-ever military operation in FYROM (its 2nd crisis management mission overall)* starting from 31 March 2003. Launched upon the invitation of the FYROM authorities in January 2003 and based on the UNSC Resolution 1371 of September 2001 welcoming the Ohrid Framework Agreement (the political accord which resolved the conflict between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs in FYROM) and its full implementation especially by the EU, the mission took over from the NATO operation *Allied Harmony.* Deployed for an initial duration of 6 months; the mission was to be conducted under the Berlin Plus arrangements which were finalized right before the start of the operation, on 17 March 2003 (see, p.86 in Section 3.2). The Operation Concordia, as such, was to draw on NATO assets and capabilities, its OHQ being located at SHAPE and

its OpCdr being Admiral Rainer Feist (Germany) who was also the D-SACEUR of NATO. General Pierre Maral (France) was appointed as the Force Commander, who was to work (together with the OpCdr) in close liaison with the EUSR in FYROM, Mr. Alexis Brouhns. The mission was established by the Council Joint Action of 27 January 2003 and launched by the Council Decision of 18 March 2003. Its anticipated cost for the EU for its initial 6-month mandate was €4.7 million. The objective of the Operation Concordia was to enhance the stable and secure environment in FYROM in order to enable the government to implement the Ohrid agreement (Council Joint Action, 2003/92/CFSP; Grevi et al, 2005; Council of the EU, 2008d; ICG, 2005; Council Decision, 2003/202/CFSP; Council of the EU, 2003b).

Following a letter of invitation from the President of FYROM, Mr. Trajkovski, in early July 2003; the Council of the EU extended the Operation Concordia *with the existing mandate and legal framework* for a further 2,5 months until the mid-December 2003, with the Council Decision of 29 July 2003. For this additional period, the OpCdr of the Concordia remained Admiral Feist; whereas the Force Commander French General Maral was replaced by the Portuguese Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, parallel to the decision of the Council of the EU to take over from France its *framework nation* responsibilities at the FHQ level exercised throughout the first phase of the mission. After attaining successfully its aim of helping forge stability and security in FYROM, the mission was concluded on 15 December 2003 succeeded at the same day by the civilian EU mission of EUPOL Proxima (Council Decision, 2003/563/CFSP; ICG, 2005; Grevi et al, 2005).

Operation Concordia took place with the participation of 27 countries, 13 EU member states of the then EU-15 (except Denmark and Ireland) and 14 non-EU contributing countries involving Turkey[44], which all together provided a total of 357 troops (Grevi et al, 2005; ICG 2005). According to the data provided by the Council of the EU, Turkey participated in the

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[44] Shortly after the start of the mission, on 29 April 2003, Canada informed the EU authorities that it would no longer participate in the mission, and its decline of further participation was approved by the Political and Security Commitee (PSC) of the EU on 17 June 2003 (PSC Decision, FYROM/4/2003).

mission with 10 military personnel (Grevi et al, 2005), thus ranking the 9th among all the troop-sending countries. It was, at the same time, the 2nd largest contributing state after Poland among the 14 non-EU contributors. For the Turkish sources, on the other hand, Turkey's contribution to the Operation Concordia was 11 soldiers (TSK, 2008; MFA, March 2008; April 2008; Ziyal, 2004). As such, Turkey made the 8th largest troop contribution to the mission together with Austria, its ranking among the 14 third states remaining the same.

4.2.1.4 EU Police Mission in the FYROM (EUPOL Proxima)

As a part of its broad policy towards the FYROM, trying to assist the authorities of the country in their efforts to get closer towards EU membership and in line (again) with the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001; the EU launched a civilian crisis management mission (*its second civilian operation and fourth ESDP undertaking, in general*) in FYROM on 15 December 2003. Code-named EUPOL Proxima, the mission was established by the Council Joint Action of 29 September 2003 for an initial mandate of 12 months, as a follow-on mission to the Operation Concordia. On the basis (again) of the UNSC Resolution 1371 of 2001 and the invitation by the PM of the FYROM -Branko Crvenkovski- of mid-September 2003 calling for the EU to deploy a civilian mission for an enhanced EU role in policing in the FYROM; the EU was to further improve the security and stability in the country, thereby allowing the FYROM government to implement the Ohrid Agreement more effectively. Led initially by the Belgian HoM Bart d'Hooge, the EUPOL Proxima was headquartered in Skopje. The mission was to operate through co-location of EU senior advisers and police officers in the central Headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of FYROM in Skopje and the regional headquarters in Skopje, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Ohrid (including co-locations at the sub-regional and police-station levels) in order fully to convey the international policing expertise of the EU staff to the local civilian authorities; thus promoting

European standards of policing there (Council of the EU Fact Sheet; Council Joint Action, 2003/681/CFSP; Council of the EU, 2008h; ICG, 2005; Grevi et al, 2005).

Upon an invitation by the PM of the FYROM Hari Kostov dated 1 October 2004, the Council of the EU prolonged the mandate of the EUPOL Proxima for another 12 months until 14 December 2005 with the same objectives, tasks and structure; with a Council Joint Action of 22 November 2004. Accordingly, the mission was going to continue with its activities of monitoring, mentoring and advising the FYROM police in order to (1) help improve the consolidation of law and order in the country involving the field of fighting against organized crime; (2) support the police reform in the country; (3) assist the local authorities in the process of the creation of a FYROM border police; (4) enhance public confidence in FYROM police; and (5) improve the cooperation of FYROM authorities with neighboring countries in the area of policing (Council Joint Action, 2004/789/CFSP). Jürgen Scholz from Germany was appointed as the new HoM for the second phase of EUPOL Proxima, with a PSC Decision of November 2004 (Proxima/2/2004). The common costs for the extended mandate of the mission to be financed by the Community budget were some €16 million, with which the total cost of the EUPOL Proxima amounted to some €31 million from its inception to its termination (Council Joint Action, 2004/789/CFSP; 2003/681/CFSP). The mission was completed on 14 December 2005 (Council of the EU, 2008h), after the EU conducted a review of the security situation in FYROM and achievements of the EUPOL Proxima that far, reaching the conclusion that the mission had *successfully completed its mandate* by attaining its objectives (Council of the EU, 19 December 2005; Solana, 2005).

The EUPOL Proxima consisted of some 200 unarmed international civilian personnel (police officers and civilians) supported by some local staff. The mission was to be guarded by a small *armed protection element* comprising about 30 police officers. The mission's staff was coming from the today's 27 EU member countries and 8 third states, including Turkey

(Council of the EU Fact Sheet; ICG, 2005). Turkey's exact contribution to the mission was 10 civilian personnel (6 police officers and 4 gendarmeries) (MFA, April 2008; March 2008).

4.2.1.5 EU Police Advisory Team in the FYROM (EUPAT)

On the basis of the UNSC Resolution 1371 of 2001 and upon the consent of the FYROM government, the EU initiated another civilian crisis management mission in the country, following on from the EUPOL Proxima which was concluded by the EU in mid-December 2005. The EUPAT, as such, was *the third and last ESDP mission undertaken by the EU in FYROM territories*. The mission was established by the Council Joint Action of 24 November 2005 for a 6-month duration starting from 15 December 2005. The mission was to cover the period between the end of EUPOL Proxima and the start of a planned EC project financed by Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS) program which would concentrate on the implementation of police reform in the field by providing technical support to FYROM police. The HoM of the EUPAT was Jürgen Scholz who was to serve under the guidance of the EUSR in FYROM, Erwan Fouere. The EUPAT was to operate through a headquarters in Skopje, one central co-location unit at the FYROM Ministry of Interior, and some mobile units co-located throughout the country (Council Joint Action, 2005/826/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, December 2005; Council of the EU, 2008e; 19 December 2005; Abellan, 2007).

The objective of the EUPAT was to further assist the FYROM authorities in their efforts to create an efficient and professional police service on the basis of European standards of policing. The EU police officers were to reach the above-noted goal by monitoring and mentoring the FYROM police on specific priority issues in the areas such as border police, fighting against organized crime and corruption, accountability, and public peace and order. The mission was to pay particular attention to (1) implementation of police reform in the

field, (2) police-judiciary cooperation, and (3) professional standards as well as internal control. The anticipated cost of the mission for the EC budget was to be €1,5 million. Completed on 14 June 2006, the EUPAT involved some 30 *police advisers* supported by about 20 local staff (Council Joint Action, 2005/826/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, December 2005; Council of the EU, 2008e; Abellan, 2007; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006). *Probably due to the rather small size of the mission, the Council of the EU did not call for contributions by other countries than the EU member states* (see, Council Joint Action, 2005/826/CFSP). As such, *Turkey could not participate in the EUPAT* (TSK, 2008).

4.2.1.6 European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)

The EU -having already given a substantial financial backing to Kosovo via its becoming the largest donor to Kosovo by allocating about €2 billion so far- has also backed Kosovo politically; by expressing its full support to the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo, initiated with the appointment of the UN (Kosovo) Status Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in November 2005 upon the UNSC Resolution 1244. The EU also declared at the very beginning that it would actively get involved in the process, including the possibility of its undertaking *civilian crisis management operations* in Kosovo. With its general intention to give Kosovo an EU (integration) perspective, the Union established the European Union Planning Team in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) on 10 April 2006 with the aim of planning for a future possible ESDP rule of law mission in Kosovo (to be initiated after a status settlement). Launched with an initial mandate of 8 months till the end of December 2006 and with an initial budget of some €3 million, the EUPT Kosovo began to be deployed at the end of April 2006 (Council Joint Action, 2006/304/CFSP; Council of the EU, 2008i; February 2008c; EUPT Kosovo Website, 2008a; Council of the EU, 12 December 2006).

Led by Casper Klynge (Denmark) and headquartered in Pristina, the EUPT Kosovo was initially (until 31 December 2006) composed of 25 civilian personnel serving in four teams: the office of the Head of EUPT Kosovo, Police Team, Justice Team and Administration Team. At the end of its initial mandate, the EUPT was reinforced so as to be composed of 40 international civilian staff working under the same four-team structure and, then, has been extended four times by the Council of the EU. Its current size, by the March 2008, is about 70 international staff (Council of the EU, 12 December 2006; 12 June 2007; 11 December 2007; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006; Spring/Summer, 2007; Autumn/Winter 2007; Council of the EU, 2008i). With this latest extension, the EUPT Kosovo was required to conclude its preparations for the launch of an EU rule of law mission in Kosovo until 14 June 2008 when its mandate would be completed. By then, the total cost of the EUPT Kosovo was to reach some €80 million since its inception (Council Joint Action, 2008/228/CFSP).

As a culmination of its efforts to support Kosovo, the EU has most recently established the EULEX Kosovo with the Council Joint Action of 4 February 2008, with an initial mandate of 28 months. Launched with a subsequent Council Decision of 16 February 2008, the mission was set to become operational at the end of a 4-month build-up period, during which the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) would continue to exercise its executive authority based on the UNSC Resolution 1244. The EULEX Kosovo would, then, take over from UNMIK (which would be terminated after transferring its administrative powers to the Kosovo authorities); but without assuming its executive powers, except holding some limited executive functions in the areas like investigating and prosecuting serious and sensitive crimes. During the build-up period, the EUPT Kosovo was to fulfill the task of preparing the EULEX Kosovo to reach its full operational capacity by the mid-June 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2008/124/CFSP; Council of the EU, February 2008a; 2008i; Limdal, 2007). Due to be led by the HoM Yves de Kermabon appointed by the PSC Decision of 7 February 2008

(EULEX/1/2008) who was to serve under the guidance of the EUSR Kosovo, Pieter Feith (from 4 February 2008 to 28 February 2009); the EULEX Kosovo was to build its main headquarters in Pristina backed up by local and regional offices across Kosovo and to be composed of the HoM and its staff, police, justice and customs components; the last three of which would serve through co-locations in the appropriate Kosovo institutions at appropriate levels (Council Joint Action, 2008/124/CFSP; Council of the EU, February 2008b).

The broad objective of the EULEX Kosovo is to support the Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and functional judicial and administrative system on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and in line with European standards. To this end, the mission is to assist the Kosovo institutions, law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in their efforts to attain sustainability and accountability and in further improving and underpinning an independent multi-ethnic justice system as well as multi-ethnic police and customs service in Kosovo; guaranteeing that these institutions are immune from political interference and that they are operating in accordance with international standards and best European practices. The mission is to attain its goals through monitoring, mentoring and advising the judicial and administrative bodies in Kosovo on all areas pertinent to the rule of law, particularly on the police, judiciary, customs and correctional services; its priority issue areas being corruption, fighting against organized crime and the protection of minorities. The common costs of the EULEX Kosovo is foreseen to be about €205 million for the first 16 months, starting with its launch with the Council Decision of 16 February 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2008/124/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, June 2008h; Council of the EU, February 2008a).

Once it attains its full operational capability, the EULEX Kosovo will be composed of some 1900 international police officers, judges, prosecutors, border and customs officials - *primarily* seconded by or recruited from the EU member states and institutions (Council Joint Action, 2008/124/CFSP)- and around 1100 local staff; thereby constituting *the largest*

"civilian" EU crisis management mission so far (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008h; Council of the EU, February 2008a; EUPT Kosovo Website, 2008b; Limdal, 2007). *Turkey, invited by the EU to participate in the mission as a third state, has recently decided (after long internal and external deliberations trying to relieve its concerns about the modalities of its participation in the mission) to contribute to EULEX Kosovo initially with 32 police officers* (MFA, April 2008; March 2008). Turkey, currently, is among the four non-EU contributing countries to the mission (together with Norway, Switzerland and the USA), which continues to be in its deployment phase (Council of the EU, 16 June 2008).

4.2.2 Eastern Europe

4.2.2.1 EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine)

As a part of its overall commitment to assist to enhance security and stability in Eastern Europe, especially through the ENP (Council of the EU, 2005; December 2007a), the EU launched its *first-ever and only crisis management mission in Eastern Europe* in Moldova and Ukraine at the end of 2005. Following a joint letter sent by the presidents of Moldova (Viladimir Voronin) and Ukraine (Viktor Yushchenko) in June 2005 asking the EU for additional assistance in capacity building for border management (including customs) on the entire border between Moldova and Ukraine (including the part between the separatist Transnistrian region of Moldova and Ukraine); the Union established the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the *European Commission,* and the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments on 7 October 2005 (Council of the EU, December 2007a; 2008a). Launched on 30 November 2005 for an initial mandate of 2 years (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine Website, 2008), the mission has constituted an "exception" in the EU crisis management efforts in that, instead of having been undertaken by the Council of the EU under the ESDP framework, it has been operating under the auspices

of the EU Commission (and its implementing partner United Nations Development Program - UNDP); the Council of the EU having been playing just a supportive role through the *Border Team of the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova* which has been contributing to improve border cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine at the Transnistrian region (Council of the EU, 19 December 2005; 18 June 2007; MoU Document, 2005; EUBAM Brochure, 2008).

The EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine has been led by the Hungarian Major-General Ferenc Banfi (contracted by the EU Commission and serving also as the senior political adviser to the EUSR for Moldova) from the very beginning of the mission, who has been working in close liaison with the EUSR for Moldova (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b; Autumn/Winter 2006; Council of the EU, December 2007a; MoU Document, 2005) who was Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged from the start of the mission to the end of February 2007 and has been Mr. Kálmán Mizsei since 1 March 2007 (Council Joint Action, 2005/776/CFSP; 2007/107/CFSP; 2008/106/CFSP). The mission operates through its headquarters in Odesa and 6 field offices on the border between Moldova and Ukraine as well as in Odesa Port. It also has got 4 advisers on the issue of risk analysis serving in Chisinau and Kyiv (EUBAM Brochure, 2008).

The aim of the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine has been to "build confidence and strengthen cross-border co-operation and the exchange of information between the two countries and to help them to progress towards European standards of border management" (Council of the EU, December 2007a: 2). The mission is technical and advisory, and not carrying any executive powers (EUBAM Brochure, 2008). It tries to reach its abovementioned goal by assisting the authorities of Moldova and Ukraine (via providing them with advice and training) in enhancing the capacity of their common border and customs services in detecting and precluding smuggling, customs fraud and trafficking (Council of the EU, 2008a).

During its initial mandate of two years, from 30 November 2005 to 30 November 2007, the common costs of the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine were €20.2 million; funded during its

first 6 months from EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism and during the remaining 18 months (and also afterwards) under the EC's TACIS program (Council of the EU, December 2007a; 12 December 2006). At the beginning, the mission consisted of 120 civilian personnel: 69 high ranking customs, border and police experts sent by EU countries supported by 50 local staff (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b). It was reinforced in July 2006, after which it comprised 175 civilian staff: 101 from EU countries and 74 provided by Moldova and Ukraine (Council of the EU, 12 December 2006; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006). The mission has recently been prolonged for an additional 2 years (from 1 December 2007 to the end of November 2009) upon an exchange of letters among the parties prolonging the mandate of the MoU (Council of the EU, 18 June 2007; MoU Document, 2005), for which its budget is set to be a total of €24 million. Most recently, by January 2008, the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine was composed of 233 civilian personnel; 122 of whom were coming from 22 EU countries and 3 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and 111 of whom were provided by Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine Website, 2008; EUBAM Brochure, 2008). *Turkey was not invited by the EU authorities to take part in the mission and, thus, has not participated in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.3 EU Crisis Management Operations in Africa

4.3.1 EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC (Operation Artemis)

After having followed the security situation in the Great Lakes Region and particularly in the DRC closely for years, engaged in the efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in the country since 1996[45], and supported fully the peace agreement signed in December 2002 in Pretoria establishing a transitional government in the DRC; the EU, at the end, established a

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[45] The DRC had plunged into two successive regional and civil wars since 1996, in 1996-1997 and in 1998-2002, resulting in large human sufferings (caused both by state armed forces and rebel groups) as well as the weakening or even dismantling of the state institutions (Council of the EU, June 2006b; June 2006a).

military crisis management operation in the country with the Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003 to be launched by the Council Decision of 12 June 2003 (Council of the EU, 2008c; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a). Deployed for about 3 months as a *bridging mission* between the UN operation MONUC (then having hard times in the DRC) and a reinforced MONUC II (to be launched with a Chapter VII mandate), Operation Artemis was *the first EU crisis management operation undertaken outside Europe as well as its first-ever autonomous military mission* (ICG, 2005; Abellan, 2007; Council of the EU, June 2006). It was also *the EU's second military operation in general and first ESDP mission dispatched in Africa.*

Launched on the basis of the UNSC Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003 authorizing, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the deployment of a temporary multinational stabilization force in Bunia town of the Ituri province (Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP; Council Decision, 2003/432/CFSP); the mission was grounded in the DRC in a security context characterized by an escalation of violence, major human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing, which in turn was threatening to halt the DRC peace process and destabilize the whole Great Lakes Region (Grevi et al, 2005; Council of the EU, June 2006b). France being its *framework nation,* Operation Artemis was to be led by the EU Force Commander Thonier serving under the EU OpCdr Neveux; who were to work in close cooperation with the EUSR in the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello. The mission's OHQ was located in Paris and the FHQ was situated in Entebbe (Uganda), with an outpost in Bunia (Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP; Grevi et al, 2005; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a).

The broad objective of Operation Artemis, as set out in the UNSC Resolution 1484, was to stabilize and enhance the security situation in Bunia and ameliorate the humanitarian situation in the town. To that end, the mission was to protect the internally displaced persons living in the camps in Bunia, to secure the Bunia airport, and if the need arisen, to ensure the safety of the civilian population, the UN staff as well as the humanitarian presence in the town

(S/RES/1484, 2003). The common costs of the mission to be charged to the EU member states (except Denmark) was €7 million (Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP). After having generally achieved its goals, by ceasing the violence in Bunia, enhancing the security of internally displaced persons there, and contributing to the improvement of security situation in the wider Ituri province through air monitoring activities as well as limited but effective operations conducted outside Bunia (Council of the EU, June 2006b; ICG, 2005); the Operation Artemis was completed officially on 1 September 2003 by transferring the full responsibility in the town to the reinforced MONUC (II) which was to continue its work more powerfully with a wider mandate and a force of 18,000 troops (Grevi et al, 2005; ICG, 2005).

Overall, some 1,800 troops served in Operation Artemis, most of whom were provided by France (Grevi et al, 2005; Abellan, 2007). Seventeen countries participated in the mission, 12 of which were the EU member states (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK) and 5 of which were non-EU contributing countries (Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Hungary and South Africa) at the time of the operation (ICG, 2005). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, hence, did not participate in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.3.2 EU Police Mission in Kinshasa - DRC (EUPOL Kinshasa)

In response to an official invitation by the DRC transitional government in October 2003 asking for the assistance of the EU in forming the Integrated Police Unit (IPU)[46] within the Congolese National Police (CNP) as envisaged by the Pretoria Agreement of December 2002; the EU decided to undertake (in close coordination with the UN) its *second mission in Africa overall and first civilian crisis management mission in the continent,* in the DRC, to be

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[46] The IPU was to comprise 1008 Congolese police officers whose task was to protect the transitional government in the DRC and its institutions during the transition process. Its training and equipment costs were to be covered by European Commission's European Development Fund (EDF), CFSP budget and the contributions of the EU member states (EU Council Secretariat, 28 April 2005; Council of the EU, October 2006; Grevi et al, 2005).

established by the Council Joint Action of 9 December 2004. Deployed with an initial mandate of 12 months (until 31 December 2005) and an initial budget of some €4.37 million, the EUPOL Kinshasa was officially initiated on 12 April 2005. The HoM was the Portuguese Superintendant Adilio Custodio who was to serve under the guidance of the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello (Council Joint Action, 2004/847/CFSP; Council of the EU, October 2006; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a; Grevi et al, 2005).

The EUPOL Kinshasa was designed to serve through co-locations in the IPU chain of command at appropriate levels in order to attain its objective *of* monitoring, mentoring and advising the formation and initial functioning of the IPU ensuring that it was operating in accordance with the best international policing practices. The mission also tried to underpin the management capacities of the IPU, undertook a training program for the Unit (from February to November 2006) and advised on the reform and reorganization of the CNP via participating in the activities of a think-tank in the DRC created for that purpose (Council Joint Action, 2004/847/CFSP; Council of the EU, October 2006).

Upon the prolongation of the transition period in the DRC for one additional year until 30 June 2006 -with the delay of the presidential elections from June 2005 to June 2006- and following an invitation by the DRC President Kabila in October 2005, the Council of the EU decided in November 2005 to extend the mandate of the EUPOL Kinshasa for one more year until 31 December 2006 (Council of the EU, October 2006; 19 December 2005; June 2006b). Meanwhile, the mission was reinforced starting from June 2006 (until March 2007) with the aim of strengthening the coordination of the police crowd control units in Kinshasa during the electoral process in the DRC (Council of the EU, 12 December 2006). After having been prolonged one last time by the Council of the EU on 7 December 2006, the EUPOL Kinshasa ended on 30 June 2007 (Council Joint Action, 2006/913/CFSP), to be followed on by the EUPOL RD Congo thereafter. The mission completed its mandate successfully by

contributing remarkably to the peaceful transition of the DRC to democracy, especially during the electoral process in the year of 2006 (Council of the EU, 2008g).

The EUPOL Kinshasa consisted of 29 international civilian staff provided by 6 EU member countries and 2 non-EU contributing states. Exact contributions from these countries were 12 personnel from France, 6 from Portugal, 4 from Italy, 2 from the Netherlands, 2 from Belgium, 1 from Sweden, 1 from Canada and 1 from Turkey. During the reinforcement process mentioned above, the mission was underpinned by 29 additional civilian staff, the exact composition of whom was 11 French, 1 Dane, 1 British, 13 Angolans, 2 Malians and 1 Rumanian (Council of the EU, October 2006). The Turkish personnel seconded for the mission was from Turkish gendarmerie (MFA, April 2008).

4.3.3 EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo)

As a part of the transition process initiated by the Pretoria Agreement of December 2002 which envisaged, among other things, to create a restructured and integrated Congolese army, and following an invitation by the government of the DRC in April 2005 calling for the EU assistance for their security sector reform (SSR); the Union launched its *third crisis management operation as well as its second civilian mission in the DRC* on 8 June 2005. Established with the Council Joint Action of 2 May 2005 for an initial mandate of 1 year (until 2 May 2006), the EUSEC RD Congo was to be led by the French General Pierre Michel Joana who was to serve under and in close cooperation with the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello. The HoM Joana was also to act in liaison with EUPOL Kinshasa and the other international actors involved in the DRC such as MONUC (Council Joint Action, 2005/355/CFSP; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b). The mission had to pursue two broad objectives: (1) to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security in their efforts to achieve a successful integration of the Congolese army; and (2) to

promote security policies in the DRC on the basis of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democracy, transparency, the principles of good governance, and international humanitarian law. The mission was to operate through an HoM office in Kinshasa and the experts assigned to serve in the most critical Congolese security sector institutions such as the private office of the Minister of Defence, the army general staff, and the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Council Joint Action, 2005/355/CFSP; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a; EU Council Secretariat, 23 May 2005).

The mandate of the EUSEC RD Congo was initially prolonged by the EU for about 14 months until 30 June 2007, with the Council Joint Action of 25 April 2006 (2006/303/CFSP). Then, following the presidential elections in the DRC in 2006 (signifying the end of the transition process in the country) and the establishment of a new government in February 2007 (which was highly committed to reform the security sector in the DRC), the mission was extended one more time for 12 months until 30 June 2008 by the Council of the EU, with the Joint Action of 12 June 2007 (2007/406/CFSP; Council of the EU, 18 June 2007). Most recently, the mandate of the EUSEC RD Congo was extended (and broadened) for an additional 12-month period to last until 30 June 2009, with the Council Joint Action of 26 June 2008 (2008/491/CFSP). With this last extension, the common costs of the mission from its inception are to reach some €24.5 million by the end of June 2009 (Council Joint Action, 2005/355/CFSP; 2006/303/CFSP; 2007/406/CFSP; 2008/491/CFSP). The EUSEC RD Congo was led by the HoM Michel Sido from 1 March 2008 to the end of June 2008 -after the resignation of Mr. Joana in December 2007 (PSC Decision, EUSEC/1/2008)- who served under the new EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, Roeland Van de Geer, who had succeeded Mr. Ajello with a Council Joint Action of 15 February 2007 (2007/406/CFSP). The mission has, however, been headed by the new HoM, Jean-Paul Michel since 1 July 2008; who replaced Mr. Sido upon his resignation on 23 June 2008 (PSC Decision, EUSEC/2/2008).

The EUSEC RD Congo was initially composed of a small team of 8 experts *who were to be seconded by EU member states and institutions* (EU Council Secretariat, 23 May 2005; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a). Parallel to the "Chain of Payments" project undertaken by the mission starting from the early 2006 in order to improve the financial administration of the Ministry of Defence of the DRC, thereby ameliorating the payments system of the DRC army; the mission was underpinned by the secondment of 35 additional civilian and military experts especially in the financial realm, in 2006 (Council of the EU, October 2007; 19 December 2005; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006). The mission's size during its mandate from July 2007 to June 2008 numbered some 40 experts (Council of the EU, October 2007). The mission's latest size by June 2008, on the other hand, was some 46 personnel (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008d). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, hence, did not participate in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.3.4 EU Military Operation in Support of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) - (EUFOR RD Congo)

As a part of its overall commitment to facilitate the transition process in the DRC, the EU decided to undertake *its fourth crisis management mission* in the DRC in order to support the MONUC during the parliamentary and presidential elections which were to take place in the country during the summer 2006 (Council of the EU, June 2006a; 27 April 2006). Code-named the EUFOR RD Congo, the mission was embarked upon following a UN invitation in December 2005 and with the full agreement of the DRC authorities, and it was mandated by the UNSC Resolution 1671 of 25 April 2006 (Council Joint Action, 2006/319/CFSP; Council of the EU Document I). The objective of the mission was to assist the MONUC in securing the DRC during its historical elections (Council of the EU Document I), which were going to be the first democratic elections in the country for more than 4.5 decades after it gained its independence in 1960 (Council of the EU, October 2007). The mission was established by the

Council Joint Action of 27 April 2006 and was launched in 12 June 2006 with a Council Decision taken at the same day. It was to last *four* months starting from 30 July 2006, the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, when the mission would also reach its full operational capability (Council Joint Action, 2006/319/CFSP; Council Decision, 2006/412/CFSP; Council of the EU Document I; Council of the EU, 12 December 2006).

The EUFOR RD Congo was authorized by the UNSC Resolution 1671 to: (1) assist the MONUC to handle a security situation, should the MONUC experience serious troubles in doing so; (2) help protect the civilians against physical violence in its deployment areas; (3) enhance the airport protection in Kinshasa; (4) guarantee the protection of the personnel and installations of its own forces; and (5) conduct "limited" operations in order to save the Congolese people in danger (S/RES/1671, 2006). As being an *autonomous* EU military crisis management mission (*second autonomous ESDP military operation overall*) (Council of the EU, June 2006a), the EUFOR RD Congo was to be planned and coordinated at the strategic level from its OHQ located *in Potsdam* (Germany) and managed at the tactical level from its FHQ situated in Kinshasa at the airfield N'Dolo (Council of the EU Document I). Directed by a German OpCdr Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck and a French Force Commander Major General Christian Damay, serving under the guidance of the EUSR Aldo Ajello; the mission was to cost €16.7 million for the EU, to be financed through the ATHENA mechanism (Council Joint Action, 2006/319/CFSP; Council of the EU, June 2006a; Abellan, 2007). The EUFOR RD Congo was terminated by the EU on 30 November 2006, after fulfilling its mandate by contributing to the successful conclusion of the election process in the DRC (Council of the EU, 12 December 2006; January 2007).

The EUFOR RD Congo mission consisted of some 1450 troops (Abellan, 2007) in two components: (1) an *advance element* of 400-450 military personnel deployed in Kinshasa, and

(2) a *battalion-size "on-call" force* over the horizon stationed in Libreville (in the neighboring country, Gabon) to be rapidly dispatched to the DRC following an EU decision, should a need arise (Council of the EU, 27 April 2006; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006a; Council of the EU Document I). The mission was composed of troop contributions by 22 countries: 21 EU member states and Turkey, which was the sole non-EU participating country (Council of the EU Document III). Turkey contributed to the mission 2 military personnel - one to serve in OHQ in Potsdam and the other to work in a component of the FHQ in Libreville- and one C-130 type military cargo plane with its 15 crews to serve from 21 July to 1 December 2006 in Libreville/Gabon (TSK, 2008; MFA, April 2008; March 2008).

4.3.5 EU Police Mission in the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo)

Following the conclusion of the transition process in the DRC with the elections held in summer 2006 and the subsequent formation of the new government in the country in early 2007 which was rather enthusiastic about reforming the Congolese security sector, the EU decided to launch *its fifth* and *last crisis management mission in the DRC so far* starting on 1 July 2007 as a follow-on mission to EUPOL Kinshasa. Mandated initially for one year until 30 June 2008; the new *ESDP police mission with an interface with the system of justice* - EUPOL RD Congo- was established by the Council of the EU with the Joint Action of 12 June 2007, upon the consent of and invitation from the Congolese authorities received by the EU in early June 2007. Portuguese Superintendent Adilio Custodio (the HoM of EUPOL Kinshasa) was decided to lead the new mission as HoM, under the guidance of the EUSR in the Great Lakes Region, Roeland Van de Geer. The mission was to cost €5.5 million for the EC budget. (Council Joint Action, 2007/405/CFSP; Council of the EU, October 2007; 18 June 2007; 11 December 2007).

The EUPOL RD Congo was concerned primarily with the reform of the police domain of the security sector of the DRC, but by also paying some attention to the reform of the justice component of it. The mission aimed at supporting the SSR in the DRC, by contributing to Congolese efforts of reforming and restructuring the CNP and its relations with the justice system; through monitoring, mentoring and advising the Congolese authorities in the fields of policing and justice. More specifically, its objective was to support the Congolese authorities in reforming and restructuring the CNP and also in ameliorating the overall functioning of the Congolese criminal justice system via a "justice interface" (Council Joint Action, 2007/405/CFSP; Council of the EU, 18 June 2007; 11 December 2007; October 2007). Headquartered in Kinshasa, the mission was to operate through teams of police and legal advisers at strategic and/or operational levels (as well as administrative support teams) serving primarily in Kinshasa, but with a possibility of deployment to other parts of the DRC (Council Joint Action, 2007/405/CFSP).

Operating already in close cooperation with the EUSEC RD Congo, as foreseen in its founding Joint Action of 12 June 2007, the EUPOL RD Congo was considered by the Council of the EU to get merged with the former so that the two could become a single mission following the end of the mandate of both of them on 30 June 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2007/405/CFSP; Council of the EU, 11 December 2007). However, just like the EUSEC RD Congo, the EUPOL RD Congo was also extended (with a broader mandate and increasing focus on the Eastern DRC) for a further 12-month period until 30 June 2009, by the Council of the EU with a Joint Action of 23 June 2008; which is to cost about an additional €6.9 million for the EC budget (2008/485/CFSP). The mission has comprised 39 international personnel provided by 8 EU countries and 2 *third states* (Angola and Switzerland) as well as 9 local staff; being composed of police officers and experts in the fields like security, criminal justice, human/children rights in armed conflicts and public information (Secrétariat du

Conseil de l'UE, Juin 2008; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2007; Council of the EU, 1 July 2007; 11 December 2007). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the EUPOL RD Congo and, thus, has not participated in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.3.6 EU Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan -AMIS- in Darfur
(AMIS EU Supporting Action)

Following the eruption of an armed conflict between two local rebel groups and the Sudanese Government in Darfur in 2003, and its subsequent escalation; a massive humanitarian crisis broke out in the country, adversely affecting some 2.5 million people in the form of human losses, destruction of villages as well as crops and livestock, creation of about 1.85 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and bursting epidemics. On 8 April 2004, the conflicting parties in Darfur signed a cease-fire agreement called Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement (HCFA); after which the African Union (AU) embarked on its "first full-scale peace mission" ever, named AMIS, on 28 May 2004 in Darfur; by deploying an initial number of 150 military observers. Originally aiming at monitoring the observance of the HCFA by the conflicting parties, and thus improving the overall security situation in Darfur; the mission was expanded by the AU on 20 October 2004 -with an enhanced mandate- to some 2,300 soldiers and 800 police officers, thereby becoming AMIS II. The AMIS II was, then, expanded one more time in April 2005, increasing its capacity to some 6,200 soldiers and 1,500 police officers (Council of the EU, December 2005a; Council Joint Action, 2005/557/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, January 2008c; Dorenbos, 2007).

Both the EU and its member countries backed the peace efforts of the AU in Darfur since January 2004 with various measures such as: (1) extending political, financial and personnel support to the Abuja peace talks process and to the works of the Ceasefire Commission, (2) assisting the AMIS from its very inception by sending EU military observers, and (3) contributing bilaterally to the AMIS by sending military planning experts to support the AU's

operational planning capacities (EU Council Secretariat, October 2005; January 2008; Dorenbos, 2007). Upon an invitation by the AU in April 2005, the EU decided in May 2005 to launch *its most comprehensive mission deployed so far* (including both civilian and military components at the same time) to be undertaken in Darfur province of Sudan. Established with the Council Joint Action of 18 July 2005 and named the *AMIS EU Supporting Action*, the mission marked *the first EU crisis management operation conducted in cooperation with the AU and the first as well as sole "civilian-military" ESDP mission undertaken up to now* (Council Joint Action, 2005/557/CFSP, Abellan 2007). The objective of the mission was to "ensure effective and timely EU assistance to support the AMIS II" mission in order to "support the AU and its political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan" (Council Joint Action, 2005/557/CFSP); thereby trying to bring peace and stability to the region (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b).

Deployed for an initial duration of nearly 6 months until 31 December 2005, the AMIS EU Supporting Action was to be coordinated by the EUSR for Sudan -appointed by the Council Joint Action of 18 July 2005- and a team of EU civilian and military advisers assisting to him. As such, Pekka Haavisto (since July 2005) and then Torben Brylle (since May 2007) coordinated the mission with the assistance of the EU Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) (the ACC) which was composed of a political adviser, a military adviser, and a police adviser to the EUSR. The military adviser to EUSR was to coordinate the military component of the *AMIS EU Supporting Action*, while the police adviser to him was to lead the civilian component of the mission (Council Joint Action, 2005/557/CFSP; 2005/556/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, January 2008c). The mission, as such, supported the AU by fulfilling a wide range of tasks like provision of military equipment and assets; extension of planning and technical assistance to AMIS II chain of command; deployment of additional military

observers; training of African troops, police officers and observers; and provision of strategic and tactical transportation (EU Council Secretariat, October 2005; January 2008).

The AMIS EU Supporting Action was concluded on 31 December 2007, following the end of the mandate of AMIS II and its replacement by a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID); whose size was envisaged to be about three times more than that of the AMIS II (namely, some 20,000 troops and 3,800 police officers) and whose costs were to be covered by the UN (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008c; Dorenbos, 2007)[47]. The EU's support for both the AMIS and AMIS II from June 2004 to the end of 2007 amounted to more than €300 million for the Union (financed from the African Peace Facility of EDF); not to mention the bilateral contributions of EU member states (financial and in kind) of about €200 million during the same period (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008c). Initially, 16 police officers, 11 military observers, and 19 operational and logistic planners provided by the EU countries served in the AMIS EU Supporting Action (EU Council Secretariat, October 2005). Whereas, the EU's personnel contributions to the mission towards the end of its mandate numbered 29 police officers as well as 12 operational and logistic planners (EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2007). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, hence, did not participate in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.3.7 EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)

As a continuation of its efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur province of Sudan (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008a), the EU decided to undertake a *bridging* military ESDP mission in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (CAR) in order to "dampen the

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[47] Upon the request of the AU in March 2007, the Council of the EU decided with the Council Joint Action of 23 April 2007 to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) -a mission to be deployed by the AU in Somalia for 6 months to contribute to the stabilization there- by providing planning experts to assist temporarily to the military planning cell of AMISOM at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. The EU deployed this supportive planning element to AMISOM under the auspices of AMIS EU Supporting Action (2007/245/CFSP).

humanitarian consequences of the Darfur conflict [in these countries] and reverse the destabilization of extremely fragile states in neighboring Chad and CAR", with a view to handling the regional negative ramifications of the crisis in Darfur (Tull, 2008: 2). Named the EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the mission was mandated by the UNSC Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 approving the establishment of the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) and was established by the Council Joint Action of 15 October 2007, with the agreement of the authorities of Chad and CAR (Council Joint Action, 2007/677/CFSP). Mandated for 12 months (starting with its reaching of its Initial Operational Capability - IOC) to last until March 2009, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA aimed *more specifically* at: (1) protecting around 450,000 Sudanese and CAR refugees as well as Chadian displaced persons living currently in the eastern Chad, at the border of Sudan (236,000 Darfur refugees, 173,000 Chadians displaced from Western Sudan and 45,000 CAR refugees); (2) easing the delivery of humanitarian aid to these people as well as facilitating the free movement of humanitarian personnel serving in the region by enhancing the security situation there; (3) creating favorable conditions for the efforts of reconstruction and development targeting the region; and (4) supporting the MINURCAT by helping protect its staff (including their freedom of movement), equipment, facilities and installations (Council Joint Action, 2007/677/CFSP; Tull, 2008; EU Council Secretariat, January 2008a; Council of the EU, December 2007b; Frenken, 2008).

Launched with the Council Decision of 28 January 2008 (2008/101/CFSP), the EUFOR Tchad/RCA has constituted the EU's *5th and last military operation so far* (Council of the EU, December 2007b) and *19th crisis management mission in general*. The mission has been led by the EU OpCdr Lieutenant General Patrick Nash (Ireland) and Force Commander Br. Gen. Jean-Philippe Ganascia (France). *The EUSR for Sudan*, Torben Brylle, has been mandated by the Council of the EU to work in liaison with Mr. Nash and Mr. Ganascia, and to provide *the*

latter with political guidance especially on the issues carrying a regional political dimension (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008a; Council Joint Action, 2008/110/CFSP). Being the 3rd *autonomous* EU military operation launched so far, the mission has been led (at the OHQ level) from the French OHQ at Mont Valérien (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008a); its FHQ being located in Abéché in Eastern Chad (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008b). The common costs of the mission to be financed through ATHENA, is anticipated to be some €120 million (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008b; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2008).

The EUFOR Tchad/RCA, which managed to reach its IOC by 15 March 2008, will be composed of roughly 3,700 troops; once it attains to its Final Operational Capability, (presumably) by the end of summer 2008. With 14 EU countries participating in the operation at the field level, 18 taking part in theatre and 22 at the OHQ level, the mission has marked the EU's *most multinational military operation conducted in Africa thus far* (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008b; January 2008a; Frenken, 2008). Most recently -by July 2008- some 3100 troops are already deployed at the theatre of operation, 1686 of whom are provided by France; the other significant contributors being Ireland with 414, Poland with 304, Austria with 171, Sweden with 141 and Italy with 100 troops (Council of the EU, 2008b; Council of the EU Document II). *Turkey declined to participate in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA by rejecting the invitation of the EU due mainly to the latter's unsatisfactory and inadequate efforts to include Turkey in the planning and preparation processes of the mission* (MFA, July 2008; April 2008; Radikal, 8 March 2008).

4.3.8 EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)

In line with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted by the EU-Africa Summit of 8-9 December 2007 in Lisbon which considered the promotion of peace, security and stability both in Africa and Europe as a major strategic priority, and following an invitation by the Guinea-Bissau

government on 10 January 2008; the EU established its *first ever (civilian) crisis management mission in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau* in support of its SSR, with the Council Joint Action of 12 February 2008. Code-named the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, the mission was launched on 16 June 2008 with an initial mandate of 12 months to last until 31 May 2009. Juan Esteban Verástegui was appointed as the HoM by the PSC with a decision of 5 March 2008, who is expected to lead the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau in cooperation with the other international players operating in the country such as the UN, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau (Council Joint Action, 2008/112/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, February 2008b; Council of the EU, 16 June 2008; PSC Decision, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau/1/2008).

The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is to advice and assist the authorities of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau in their efforts to reform the security sector of their country "in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy" adopted by the authorities of Guinea-Bissau in November 2006 (Council Joint Action, 2008/112/CFSP). More specifically, the mission aims at: (1) assisting the local authorities through advice and active contribution in the preparation of detailed resizing/restructuring plans for the Guinea-Bissau armed forces, (2) assisting in the same way the Guinea-Bissau authorities in developing detailed plans for reorganization/restructuring of their police structures, (3) advising them in their efforts to create an effective local criminal investigations capability, (4) advising on the Interpol National Central Bureau in Guinea-Bissau, and (5) supporting the local authorities in their efforts to arrange short-term training activities for their Judicial Police (EU Council Secretariat, February 2008b). Headquartered in the capital of Guinea-Bissau, Bissau, the mission is to attain its objectives operating mainly through the office of the HoM and advisers assigned to work with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force of the country as well as with the Judicial Police, the National Interpol Office, the Prosecution

Services, and the Public Order Police in Guinea-Bissau (Council Joint Action, 2008/112/CFSP). Expected to cost €5.65 million for the EC budget, the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is composed of some 39 civilian and military advisers in the fields of police, justice and armed forces *(to be seconded primarily by the EU countries and institutions)*; 21 of whom are seconded by 6 EU countries and 18 of whom are provided by local authorities (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008c; Council Joint Action, 2008/112/CFSP; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2008). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, thus, does not participate in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.4 EU Crisis Management Operations in Asia

4.4.1 South Caucasus

4.4.1.1 EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis)

As a culmination of its increasing attention to and engagement in the South Caucasus, manifested by the appointment of an EUSR for the region (Heikki Talvitie) in July 2003, by an explicit emphasis in the ESS document of December 2003 on the need for a stronger EU interest in the region, and by its decision to include the three countries of the region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) in the ENP in June 2004; the EU established *its first ever ESDP rule of law mission* and *third civilian crisis management operation in general* in Georgia with a Council Joint Action of 28 June 2004 (Council Joint Action, 2004/523/CFSP; Council of the EU Fact Sheet, October 2004; Grevi et al, 2005). Responding to the invitations, first, by the Georgian President Michail Saakashvili of April 2004 and, then, by the PM of Georgia (Mr. Zhvania) of 3 June 2004, the Council of the EU launched the mission on 16 July 2004 for a mandate of 12 months (Council of the EU Fact Sheet, October 2004; Council of the EU, December 2005b). Code-named the EUJUST Themis and to be led by a *female* HoM, Ms. Sylvie Pantz (from France) who would serve under the guidance of the EUSR Heikki Talvitie

(Council of the EU Fact Sheet, October 2004), the mission was designed to operate through a headquarters in Tbilisi and experts co-located at the central positions in the Georgian political and justice system such as the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Council, the Council of Justice, the Prosecutor General's Office and the Public Defender's Office (Council Joint Action, 2004/523/CFSP; Council of the EU Fact Sheet, October 2004).

The broad objective of the EUJUST Themis was to support the Georgian Government in its efforts to reform the criminal justice system of the country and to enhance legislative procedures there in order to bring them in line with the international and European human rights standards (Grevi et al, 2005). More specifically, the mission aimed at helping the Georgian authorities in their efforts to develop a "horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stakeholders within the [Georgian] criminal justice sector, including the establishment of a mechanism for coordination and priority setting for the criminal justice reform", in full cooperation and coordination with EC and other international actors' programs (like those of OSCE or the Council of Europe) being implemented in the country (Council Joint Action, 2004/523/CFSP; Council of the EU Fact Sheet, October 2004).

The EUJUST Themis attained its main objectives and successfully completed its mandate on 14 July 2005, after it had successfully assisted the high-level working group -formed by a presidential decree in October 2004 responsible for developing a strategy for reforming the Georgian criminal justice system- in devising the *reform strategy* to be submitted to the Georgian Government by May 2005. Both the Government and the President of Georgia, then, expressed their satisfaction with the strategy (in May and June 2004, respectively) and declared their willingness to implement it (EU Council Secretariat, 22 July 2005; Council of the EU, December 2005b). Even after the termination of the EUJUST Themis, the EU continued with its efforts to assist the Georgian authorities in the reform process of their

criminal justice system, by reinforcing the team of the EUSR for South Caucasus for six months with the purpose of supporting the full implementation of the prepared reform strategy (Council of the EU, 19 December 2005; December 2005b).

The common costs of the EUJUST Themis for the EC budget had been slightly more than €2 million. *Due to its limited size and specific context, only the EU member countries were allowed to participate in the mission (*Council Joint Action, 2004/523/CFSP). Accordingly, the mission consisted of 13 civilian experts seconded by 11 EU countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden), and 14 local staff (Abellan, 2007). *Therefore, Turkey did not take part in the mission.*

4.4.2 Middle East

4.4.2.1 EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)

As a part of its overall commitment to the security, stability, unity, prosperity and democracy of Iraq and upon an invitation by Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the then PM of the elected Iraqi Interim Government, the EU launched *its first ever (civilian) crisis management mission in the Middle East* on 1 July 2005 (Council Joint Action, 2005/190/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g). Established by the Council Joint Action of 7 March 2005 for an initial mandate of one year (starting after a planning phase of about 3 months) and code-named the EUJUST LEX; the mission constituted *the first EU "integrated" rule of law mission ever*, *"integrated"* in the sense that the EU aimed through this mission to address all the crucial criminal justice areas (in Iraq) such as police reform, judicial reform and prisons reform together and at the same time (Council Joint Action, 2005/190/CFSP; White, 2005). To be led by Stephen White -a former senior UK police officer having substantial experience in handling high-risk security situations- who was appointed as the HoM on 8 March 2005, the EUJUST LEX was to operate through a Coordinating Office in Brussels (which was to host most of the mission

team) and a small but still significant Liaison Office in Baghdad (Council of the EU, July 2007b; EU Council Secretariat, June 2007a; Council Joint Action, 2005/190/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g).

The EUJUST LEX, whose broad aim has been to underpin the rule of law and the respect for human rights in Iraq (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g), was designed specifically to "address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and mid level officials" from the police, judiciary and penitentiary in order to "improve the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the different components of the Iraqi criminal justice system" (Council Joint Action, 2005/190/CFSP). During its first phase -namely, the first 12-month mandate- two courses were offered under the mission in various EU member countries, which were a *senior management course* and a *management of investigation course*. The initial target was to train over 700 Iraqi senior judges, police officers, investigators, prison officials, and prosecutors through these courses (White, 2005).

Upon the request of the Iraqi Transitional Government, the mandate of the EUJUST LEX was prolonged for 18 months in 12 June 2006, until 31 December 2007, and its scope was expanded. In this second phase of the mission, a wide range of additional single-disciplinary (specialist) training courses as well as work-experience secondments in the EU countries for the Iraqi police and penitentiary officials were offered (EU Council Secretariat, October 2007; Council Joint Action, 2006/413/CFSP; Council of the EU, July 2007b). The mission was, lastly, extended by the Council of the EU in November 2007 for an additional period of 18 months until 30 June 2009; during which it was going to continue with its activities of offering integrated and single-disciplinary courses as well as work-experience secondments for the Iraqi officials (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g; October 2007). By 15 May 2008, a total of 1483 Iraqi judges, investigating magistrates as well as senior police and penitentiary officers had been trained through 62 integrated and thematic courses and 12 work-experience

secondments. The common costs of the EUJUST LEX will reach to some €30 million by the end of its current mandate, at the end of June 2009 (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g).

From the very beginning, the EUJUST LEX was envisaged to be composed of international civilian staff seconded *only* by the EU countries or institutions, and some local staff (Council Joint Action, 2005/190/CFSP). As such, the mission consisted of some 21 personnel; 16 of whom were provided by some 10 EU countries and located in the Coordinating Office in Brussels, and 5 of whom were local experts located in the Liaison Office in Baghdad (Abellan, 2007). Currently, in its third phase since 1 January 2008, the mission comprises 26 staff seconded by 14 EU countries and 4 local staff (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008g; Council of the EU, 14 January 2008). *Turkey, despite its expressed intention to partake in the mission, could not participate in it due to the fact that the EU did not envision to include third states in the mission and, hence, did not invite Turkey to get involved in it* (MFA, March 2008; April 2008; July 2008).

4.4.2.2 EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories – PT (EU BAM Rafah)

Upon Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in the PT in September 2005, the presence of the Israeli Government at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) came to an end; which resulted in the terminal's general closure for crossings (between the Gaza Strip and Egypt) except some exceptional situations (Council Joint Action, 2005/889/CFSP; Potter, 21 May 2006). Then, on 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) concluded *an agreement* on "facilitating the movement of people and goods within the [PT] and on opening an international crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border that [would] put the Palestinians in control of the entry and exit of people"; which consisted of two different documents, namely, *Agreement on Movement and Access* and *Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing* (Agreement Document, 2005: 1). Following the Agreement's designation of the EU as the *third party* responsible for

the observance of the appropriate functioning of the RCP in accordance with the above-noted documents, and consecutive letters of invitation sent by the PA and the Israeli Government on 20 and 23 November 2005 calling for the EU to engage in the RCP through the launching of an ESDP mission, the EU established the EU BAM Rafah with a Council Joint Action of 25 November 2005, to be launched on the same day, for an initial duration of 12 months (Council Joint Action, 2005/889/CFSP; Agreement Document, 2005).

To be led by an Italian HoM, Major General Pietro Pistolese, serving under the guidance of the EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b); the EU BAM Rafah constituted *the first civilian crisis management operation launched by the EU in the PT*. The mission, as such, aimed at providing a "third party presence" at the RCP in order to assist and support (in cooperation with the EC's institution building programs in the Palestine) the opening of the RCP and fostering confidence between the Israeli Government and the PA (Council Joint Action, 2005/889/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, February 2006). The common costs of EU BAM Rafah to be covered by the EC budget were foreseen to be about €7.6 million for the remainder of 2005 and all 2006 (Council Joint Action, 2005/889/CFSP). The mission's mandate has been extended three times so far: (1) in November 2006 for 6 months until 24 May 2007; (2) in May 2007 for 12 months until 24 May 2008, upon the requests of both the PA and the Israel; and most recently (3) in May 2008 for 6 months until 24 November 2008; the common costs of the last two extensions having been calculated to be €7 million (Council Joint Action, 2007/359/CFSP; 2008/379/CFSP). The mission is still headed by the Italian HoM, Mr. Pistolese, under the guidance of Mr. Otte, from Belgium (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2008).

The EU BAM Rafah's functioning has not been that smooth and unproblematic as it is demonstrated by these consecutive extensions, though. The mission could only be kept fully operational during the first 7 months of its mandate from 25 November 2005 to 25 June 2006,

when some 280.000 passengers were able to cross through the RCP. After the Israeli Soldier Gilad Shalit's capture by the Hezbollah militants in a cross-border raid on 25 June 2006, the RCP has been closed for regular operations and come only to be opened on an exceptional basis. Despite substantial efforts by the EU BAM Rafah to resume the normal operations at the RCP, the Crossing Point could only be kept open for 83 days between 25 June 2006 and 13 June 2007, leading only about 165.000 people to cross border. Moreover, upon the deterioration of political and security conditions in Gaza (a process culminated in the taking over of the control of the Gaza Strip by Hamas on 14 June 2007), the RCP was closed in 9 June 2007; as a result of which the HoM of EU BAM Rafah, Mr. Pistolese, temporarily suspended the mission's operations at the RCP on 13 June 2007. The mission, then, went into a process of temporary scaling down till the circumstances get normalized in the region, but by preserving its full operational capability in Gaza and by keeping it available for deployment at short notice (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008a; Council of the EU Fact Sheet, December 2007; Council of the EU, 15 June 2007; 7 July 2007; Hardy, 12 July 2006; BBC News, 15 June 2007).

Initially, the EU BAM Rafah consisted of nearly 55 police officers from 15 EU countries; designed to reach some 75 officers once it would attain its full capacity (EU Council Secretariat, February 2006). The mission's current size, on the other hand, is 27 civilian personnel; 20 of whom are provided by 8 EU member countries and 7 of whom are local staff (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008a). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, hence, has not participated in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.4.2.3 EU Police Mission for the PT (EUPOL COPPS)

In line with its long-standing commitments (both economic and political) to the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and the PA (Grevi et al, 2005; EU Council Secretariat, January

2008b); the EU, first, established the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) on 20 April 2005 with an exchange of letters between the, then, Palestinian PM Ahmed Qurei and the EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte. Founded on the basis of the European Council of June 2004 which declared the "readiness of the EU to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity", and designed to operate under the office of Marc Otte (Council Joint Action, 2005/797/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, January 2008b); the EU COPPS was to support the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in terms of its *immediate operational priorities* and its *longer-term transformational change* (EU COPPS Hand Out, 2006). After the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of July 2005 which decided that the EU's support to the PCP should continue *as an ESDP mission* based on the existing works of the EU COPPS, the Council of the EU adopted a Joint Action on 14 November 2005 establishing the EU Police Mission for the PT (or the EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support - EUPOL COPPS) as a follow-up mission for the EU COPPS (Council Joint Action, 2005/797/CFSP; EU COPPS Hand Out, 2006; EU Council Secretariat, January 2008b).

Started on 1 January 2006 with an initial three-year mandate until 31 December 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2005/797/CFSP), the EUPOL COPPS marked *the first ever police mission undertaken in the PT by the third parties* (Grevi et al, 2005). To be led by the HoM Jonathan McIvor (from UK) under the guidance of the EUSR Marc Otte (EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b), the mission was headquartered in Ramallah with further field elements in Gaza and the West Bank (Council of the EU, December 2005c). The EUPOL COPPS, as such, aimed at helping establish effective and sustainable policing arrangements in the PT under Palestinian ownership and in line with the best international standards, by also cooperating with the EC's institution building programs and international actors operating in

Palestine. More specifically, the mission was mandated to: (1) support the PCP in its efforts to implement the Police Development Program through advising and mentoring the senior officials of the PCP, (2) coordinate and facilitate the EU, EU Member State, and international assistance to the PCP, and (3) give advice to PCP on police-related Criminal Justice matters (Council Joint Action, 2005/797/CFSP). The common costs of the EUPOL COPPS totaled €8.9 million by the end of 2007 (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008b) and are anticipated to reach to some €15 million by the end of 2008 (Council Decision, 2008/482/CFSP). Since 1 January 2007, the mission has been led by Mr. Colin Smith again from the UK (PCS Decision, EUPOL COPPS/1/2007; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2007).

The EUPOL COPPS was initially composed of some 33 unarmed civilian personnel seconded *mainly* by the EU countries (EU Council Secretariat, November 2005; EUMS, Spring/Summer 2006b). However, following the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006 where Hamas won an unexpected victory and subsequent statements delivered by the Quartet, the mission was scaled down to 11 personnel seconded *mainly* by the EU member states (Council of the EU, 12 December 2006; BBC News, 26 January 2006; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006). Only after the foundation of the Salaam Fayyad government in the PT, the EU decided in July 2007 to *expand* and *re-engage* the EUPOL COPPS (Council of the EU, 11 December 2007); as a result of which the mission came to be composed of 32 civilian staff -27 European and 5 local personnel- by January 2008 (EU Council Secretariat, January 2008b). The mission's current size by June 2008, on the other hand, is 31 civilian personnel; 26 of whom are seconded by 15 EU member countries as well as by Norway and 5 of whom are local staff (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008f). The most serious obstacle before the EUPOL COPPS preventing it from carrying out its mandate effectively -namely, the Israel's non-accreditation of the mission- was overcome on 24 December 2007, when the Israeli Government extended diplomatic accreditation to the mission (Council of the EU, 11

December 2007; 28 December 2007; 16 June 2008). *Turkey intended to participate in the mission starting from its EU COPPS phase with one police officer. However, since the mission could not attain its ultimate capacity, the Turkish officer could not be dispatched to the field* (MFA, March 2008; April 2008).

4.4.3 South-East Asia

4.4.3.1 EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh - Indonesia
(Aceh Monitoring Mission or AMM)

After three decades of armed conflict and violence, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM) came to seek a "peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable" solution to the disputes between one another due mainly to the impact of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2004 in Indonesia and the tsunami disaster of December 2004 (Council of the EU Background; Grevi et al, 2005). The peace talks between the parties were, then, opened in January 2005 in Helsinki under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an NGO led by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and financed by the European Commission. At the end of 5 rounds of negotiations, the GoI and GAM managed to agree on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to be signed on 15 August 2005 (EU Council Secretariat, May 2006; Council of the EU Background). Following the MoU's envisaging the establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission by the EU member states and contributing countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to monitor the implementation of the commitments done by the GoI and GAM in the MoU and in line with the general commitment of the EU to "promote a lasting peaceful settlement to the conflict in Aceh", the Union established the AMM with a Council Joint Action of 9 September 2005 upon the demand and approval of both parties to the MoU (Council Joint Action, 2005/643/CFSP; MoU Document, August 2005). "Designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace

agreement set out in the [MoU]" and attended by five ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) as well as two non-EU European countries (Norway and Switzerland) besides the EU member states, the AMM became operational on 15 September 2005 for an initial duration of 6 months under the lead of the HoM Pieter Feith who would be assisted by two deputies from the EU and one from ASEAN (EU Council Secretariat, May 2006; Council Joint Action, 2005/643/CFSP).

Being *the first (civilian) EU crisis management mission undertaken in South-East Asia and also the first cooperation with the ASEAN countries in the field of crisis management*, the AMM was mandated to: (1) monitor the demobilization of GAM by monitoring and assisting it in the decommissioning and destruction of its ammunition, explosives and weapons; (2) monitor the relocation of the non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops of the GoI out of Aceh; (3) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members into Indonesian society and political system; (4) monitor and support the human rights situation in Indonesia; (5) monitor the process of legislative change; (6) rule on disputed amnesty cases between the GoI and GAM; (7) investigate complaints about and alleged violations of the MoU and rule on them; and (8) ensure the liaison between the two parties (Council Joint Action, 2005/643/CFSP; EU Council Secretariat, May 2006; December 2006). The AMM was to fulfill these tasks through its headquarters in Banda Aceh, 11 geographically distributed *district offices* throughout Aceh undertaking monitoring tasks, and 4 mobile *decommissioning teams* responsible for the collection and destruction of GAM weapons (Council Joint Action, 2005/643/CFSP; AMM Press Office, September 2005; November 2005). The AMM was extended two times: first, for six months until 15 September 2006, and then for a final duration of three months; both of them upon the invitation of the GoI supported also by GAM. The mission was, then, terminated successfully on 15 December 2006, following the local elections in Aceh held on 11 December. With this last extension, the common costs of

the AMM reached to some €10.8 million (EU Council Secretariat, May 2006; December 2006; Council of the EU, September 2006; 12 December 2006; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2006).

Besides its general success of bringing peace and stability to the Indonesian province of Aceh, after 30 years of constant armed conflict costing 15.000 lives, tens of thousands of displaced people and economic as well as political instability; the AMM also achieved concrete successes by fulfilling all the tasks it was assigned in the MoU (Council of the EU, July 2007c). As such, the decommissioning of GAM weapons and the redeployment of the non-organic military and police forces of the GoI out of Aceh were fully achieved by 5 January 2006; the Law on the Governing of Aceh was enacted by the Indonesian parliament on 11 July 2006 to be signed by the President on 1 August; and, the first ever direct local elections took place in Aceh in December 2006, where former combatants of the GAM were allowed to compete as independent candidates (EU Council Secretariat, December 2006).

At the very same day of the signing of the MoU, an 80-staff-strong Initial Monitoring Presence was deployed in Aceh on 15 August 2005 by the EU and ASEAN contributing countries as well as Norway and Switzerland in order to cover the period from 15 August 2005 to 15 September 2005 when the AMM was to be fully deployed (EU Council Secretariat, May 2006). The AMM, after its full deployment, comprised 219 international unarmed staff; 128 of whom were provided by the EU countries as well as Norway and Switzerland and 91 of whom were sent by the five ASEAN contributing countries (AMM Press Office, September 2005; Grevi et al, 2005). Parallel to the well functioning of the peace process in Aceh, the size of the AMM was scaled down to 36 monitors during the last 3 months of its mandate from 15 September to 15 December 2006 (EU Council Secretariat, September 2006; December 2006). *Turkey was not invited by the EU to take part in the mission and, thus, did not participate in it* (MFA, July 2008).

4.4.4 West Asia

4.4.4.1 EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)

In line with its general approach towards Afghanistan, seeking to attain a "secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic" country having a future "free from the threats of terrorism, extremism and organized crime", and following a received letter of invitation from the Government of Afghanistan dated 16 May 2007; the EU established the EUPOL Afghanistan *-its first ever (civilian) crisis management mission in the country-* with a Council Joint Action of 30 May 2007. Set to become operational on 15 June 2007, after a planning phase starting on 30 May; the mission was initiated with a three-year mandate to last until on 30 May 2010 (Council Joint Action, 2007/369/CFSP). Headquartered in Kabul and backed by a support element in Brussels, the EUPOL Afghanistan was initially to be led by the German HoM Br. Gen. Friedrich Eichele (replaced by the German Br. Gen. Jürgen Scholz starting from 1 November 2007) who was to serve under the guidance of the EUSR for Afghanistan, Mr. Francesc Vendrell (from Spain), whose terms of office will last until 31 August 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2007/369/CFSP; 2008/481/CFSP; PSC Decision, EUPOL AFG/1/2007; EUMS, Autumn/Winter 2007; EU Council Secretariat, May 2007). The common costs of the mission to be covered by the EC budget were foreseen to be €43.6 million for the period between 15 June 2007 and 30 September 2008 (Council Joint Action, 2008/229/CFSP).

Established within the broader context of international efforts to enable the Afghans to take responsibility for law and order, and built on the works of the former German Police Project Office (GPPO) as well as other international efforts in the areas of police and the rule of law in Afghanistan; the EUPOL Afghanistan aims at contributing to the foundation under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements in Afghanistan, ensuring appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system in the country; while,

at the same time, keeping with the existing policy advice and institution building work of the EC, EU countries, and other international players there. Moreover, it will back the Afghan efforts to reform their policing system *towards a trusted and efficient police service*, functioning in line with the international standards as well as on the basis of the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The mission is to reach its objectives through monitoring, mentoring and advising at the levels of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, central Afghan administrations, regions and provinces (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008e; Council Joint Action, 2007/369/CFSP). The EUPOL Afghanistan, as such, will seek to develop a joint overall strategy of the international community in Afghanistan in the field of police reform and to coordinate the police reform efforts of the participating countries. It will also seek to address counter narcotics as a general and cross-cutting theme (Council of the EU, 18 June 2007).

Initially, the EUPOL Afghanistan consisted of about 160 police officers as well as law enforcement and justice experts deployed *at central level* in Kabul, *at regional level* in the five regional police commands and *at provincial level* in provinces in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (EU Council Secretariat, May 2007; Council of the EU, July 2007a). More recently, by May 2008, the mission comprised 218 civilian personnel, 141 of whom were provided by 18 EU member countries and 3 non-EU contributing countries (Canada, Croatia and Norway) and 77 of whom were local staff. The size of the EUPOL Afghanistan is expected to increase; given the Council's expressed intention to double the number of the staff of the mission, declared on 26 May 2008 (EU Council Secretariat, June 2008e). *Turkey has not participated in the mission so far, although it is evaluating to partake in it with 4 police officers in the future* (MFA, April 2008; July 2008).

4.5 Turkey's Participation in the EU Crisis Management Operations

The examination of Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management missions (whether it has participated or not in a certain operation, and if participated, with how much contribution or commitment it has done so) under the light of four variables that were utilized in section 4.1 (*status of a mission* -its being a completed or continuing operation-, *time of launch of it*, *the continent it is deployed* and *the type of mission* -whether it is civilian or military one) reveals rather interesting findings as regards *the patterns of past and current participation of Turkey to the EU crisis management operations*; which, in turn, can be used also in envisioning the country's *future possible* contributions to such missions after its prospective full membership to the Union (which will be done in next chapter).

As Table IV shows quite well, Turkey has participated in 7 crisis management operations among a total of 21 that have been launched by the EU up to now (1 out of every 3 missions).

TABLE IV			
Turkey's Participation / Status of Mission	Missions **participated**	Missions **not participated**	# of Missions
Completed	- Operation Concordia - EUPOL Proxima - EUPOL Kinshasa - EUFOR RD Congo	- Operation Artemis - EUJUST Themis - AMIS EU Supporting Action - Aceh Monitoring Mission - EUPAT	9
Continuing	- EUPM - EUFOR Althea - EULEX Kosovo	- EUSEC RD Congo - EUJUST LEX - EU BAM Rafah - EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine - EUPOL COPPS - EUPOL Afghanistan - EUPOL RD Congo - EUFOR Tchad/RCA - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	12
# of Missions	7	14	**21**

Four of these operations in which Turkey has taken part were already terminated by the EU, whereas the 3 of them are still ongoing. Namely, the number of EU crisis management

missions in which Turkey is currently involved is only 3, out of 12 such operations (1 out of every 4 continuing EU missions). As such, it is fair to conclude that *Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations thus far has been "significant", but "still limited"*.

As far as the continental (and regional) distribution of Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations is concerned, as revealed by Table V, the continent which has witnessed the greatest amount of engagement by Turkey in terms of the EU crisis management activities is Europe, where Turkey has participated in 5 out of 7 EU crisis management missions undertaken so far. Within Europe, the Western Balkans has a unique place as regards the Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management missions in that Turkey has been involved in every crisis management operation undertaken by the EU in the region thus far; except a small-size and short civilian (police) mission that took place in the FYROM from December 2005 to June 2006, the EUPAT (see the mission in p.109). Namely, Turkey has taken part in 5 out of 6 EU operations launched in the region up to now, thereby marking the Western Balkans as the region which has been best in attracting the attention and involvement of Turkey as regards the EU crisis management activities. Europe and the Western Balkans (in it) are also unique in terms of *the amount of* Turkey's *contributions* to the EU crisis management operations in which it has partaken so far. As such, Turkey has made its largest commitments to the EU crisis management operations which have been undertaken in this continent and region; manifested, for instance, in its currently being the 5th largest contributor to the (civilian) EUPM out of a total number of 32 contributing countries (see the mission in p.100), and in its currently ranking as the 2nd largest contributor to the (military) Operation Althea out of 23 EU and 5 non-EU contributing countries, by providing more than 10% of all the 2173 troops in the ground (see the mission in p.102).

TABLE V			
Turkey's Participation / Continent Deployed	Missions **participated**	Missions **not participated**	# of Missions
Africa	- EUPOL Kinshasa - EUFOR RD Congo	- Operation Artemis - EUSEC RD Congo - AMIS EU Supporting Action - EUPOL RD Congo - EUFOR Tchad/RCA - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	8
Europe (Western Balkans and *Eastern Europe*)	- EUPM - Operation Concordia - EUPOL Proxima - EUFOR Althea - EULEX Kosovo	- *EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine* - EUPAT	7
Asia (South Caucasus*, Middle East°, South-East Asia˘ and West Asia˜)	…	- EUJUST Themis* - EUJUST LEX° - Aceh Monitoring Mission˘ - EU BAM Rafah° - EUPOL COPPS° - EUPOL Afghanistan˜	6
# of Missions	7	14	**21**

Both in terms of the number of operations it has participated in and the amount of its contributions to these missions, Turkey's record of involvement in the EU crisis management missions in Africa and Asia (and the regions within them) has been much worse than that in Europe and the Western Balkans. As such and according to again Table V, Turkey has taken part only in 2 out of 8 EU crisis management operations conducted in Africa; while it has been involved in *none* of the 6 such missions undertaken in Asia, so far. Turkey's contributions to these missions have also been considerably more modest than its contributions to the missions launched in Europe in that it provided only 1 civilian personnel out of 29 (and out of 58 from June 2006 to March 2007) in EUPOL Kinshasa and only 2 military personnel out of some 400-450 in EUFOR RD Congo (see p.117 and 121 for the missions, respectively).

TABLE VI			
Turkey's Participation / Time Launched	Missions **participated**	Missions **not participated**	# of Missions
2003	- EUPM - Operation Concordia - EUPOL Proxima	- Operation Artemis	4
2004	- EUFOR Althea	- EUJUST Themis	2
2005	- EUPOL Kinshasa	- EUSEC RD Congo - EUJUST LEX - AMIS EU Supporting Action - Aceh Monitoring Mission - EU BAM Rafah - EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine - EUPAT	8
2006	- EUFOR RD Congo	- EUPOL COPPS	2
2007	…	- EUPOL Afghanistan - EUPOL RD Congo	2
2008	- EULEX Kosovo	- EUFOR Tchad/RCA - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	3
# of Missions	7	14	**21**

As for the Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations regarding the date of launch of them, as demonstrated by Table VI, Turkey has participated in at least one EU mission every year since 2003 (when the first ESDP mission was put in the field), except the year 2007. 2003 has also been the year when Turkey took part in the largest number of EU crisis management missions in a year so far (3 out of 4 operations launched by the EU in that year). The year 2005 constitutes paradoxes and deserves special attention here mainly because it is the worst year in terms of Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations (initiated in a year); despite the fact that it is the best year in terms of the EU's crisis management record itself, by witnessing the launch of 8 out of all 21 EU operations. As such, in 2005, Turkey was *only* involved in 1 among these 8 EU crisis management missions launched; in spite of the fact that this year is the period when the EU opened the *accession negotiations* with Turkey.

TABLE VII			
Type of Mission \ **Turkey's Participation**	**Missions participated**	**Missions not participated**	**# of Missions**
Civilian	- EUPM - EUPOL Proxima - EUPOL Kinshasa - EULEX Kosovo	- EUJUST Themis - EUSEC RD Congo - EUJUST LEX - Aceh Monitoring Mission - EU BAM Rafah - EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine - EUPAT - EUPOL COPPS - EUPOL Afghanistan - EUPOL RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	15
Military	- Operation Concordia - EUFOR Althea - EUFOR RD Congo	- AMIS EU Supporting Action	1
		- Operation Artemis - EUFOR Tchad/RCA	5
# of Missions	**7**	**14**	**21**

Finally, as can be discerned from Table VII above, among the 15 civilian crisis management operations launched by the EU so far, Turkey has only participated in 4 (slightly more than 25% of them); whereas it has taken part in 3 military crisis management operations initiated by the EU up until now, out of 5 such missions (60% of all EU military operations). Accordingly and broadly speaking, *it seems that Turkey has demonstrated larger tendency to partake in military EU crisis management operations than the civilian ones so far*. Moreover, another important pattern observed from Table VII is the fact that Turkey has participated in all the 2 military ESDP operations that have been conducted *with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities* thus far (Operation Concordia and EUFOR Althea), while it has *only* taken part in 1 out of 3 such missions that have been undertaken *autonomously* by the EU itself (EUFOR RD Congo).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING ANALYSES AND REMARKS

Building on Chapter 4, its findings and analyses as well as the previous three chapters, this last part of the dissertation will conclude the study by doing three major things: (1) it will try to foresee the future potential contributions of Turkey to the EU crisis management operations -and, hence, to European security- after its possible full accession to the Union in the future; (2) it will make a policy proposal to the Turkish foreign and security policymakers as regards the issue of *Turkey's potential contributions to ESDP* and Turkey's bid for the full EU membership; and (3) it will seek to show some possible new or additional avenues for the other researchers in researching on the issue of Turkey's future possible contributions to the European security both in general and in terms of the ESDP (operations), in particular.

5.1 Looking at the Future

Before moving on to the major part of both this chapter and the thesis overall, which will try to make future projections as to the possible contributions of Turkey to the ESDP (operations) after its full membership to the Union, two other important variables should be elaborated upon in addition to the major variable that was examined in Chapter 4 (namely, the variable of *Turkey's past and present record of participation in the EU crisis management missions*). These two relatively less significant (but still very helpful) variables -which will lead this dissertation to make more balanced and grounded future predictions as to Turkey's potential contributions to European security through ESDP- are *Turkey's motivations in participating in the EU crisis management operations so far* and *present and (expected) future foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the European Union.*

5.1.1 Turkey's Motivations in Participating in the EU Crisis Management Operations

As also pointed out in Chapter 1, due probably to the fact that ESDP and its crisis management operations are fairly new phenomena (the former has existed since 1999, while the latter has taken place since 2003); there is no satisfying literature (even) on the crisis management operations of the EU, not to mention such a literature on Turkey's (past, present and future possible) contributions to these operations and the one on Turkey's motivations in participating in these missions (see, p.10, 11). However, there is, indeed, a modest literature dealing with the issue of Turkey's (past and current) contributions to *peace operations* conducted mainly by the UN, NATO and OSCE and its motivations in doing so; which can be drawn on in such a way as to give some insights about Turkey's motivations in participating in (and contributing to) the crisis management operations of the EU *per se*.

The works of Bağcı and Kardaş (2004), Gruen (2006), Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) are good examples of this literature. They are all dealing with Turkey's past and present participation in and contributions to *peace operations*[48] undertaken primarily by the UN -but also by NATO and the OSCE (by also touching upon one or two ESDP missions very shortly)- especially in the post-Cold War era, and its motivations in participating in these missions. The works of Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) are especially *significant* and *distinct* compared to other studies in terms of accounting for the motivations of Turkey in participating in peace operations in that they manage to go beyond offering some *explanatory factors* trying to account for Turkey's past and present contributions to these missions (as done by Bağcı and Kardaş) or noting Turkey's motivations of involvement in *just* some of these missions (as done by Gruen only as regards UNIFIL and ISAF). These studies, instead, attempt to elucidate the contributions of Turkey to peace operations in general by offering some *theory-based* explanations, which renders them rather valuable in

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[48] "Peace operations" is the term employed by all the above-noted studies except that of Gruen in naming all types of international crisis interventions undertaken primarily by the UN in the post-Cold War era.

the sense that their explanations, as such, are very much conducive to be used in accounting for Turkey's motivations *also* in participating in the *EU crisis management operations*. It is for this reason that these *pieces* by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) (especially the former one due to its quality of being the *more precise and compact version* of the latter) will be utilized here in order to shed some lights on the motivations behind Turkey's participation in and contributions to the EU crisis management operations so far.

In their rather valuable work which analyzes the "transformation of Turkey's security policy" in the post-Cold War era, Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) -and also Güngör (2007)- talk about three strands of explanations (each possessing a theoretical basis) which are all trying to account for the motivations of Turkey in (increasingly) participating in the peace operations mostly undertaken by the UN since the end of the Cold War. Categorized by the authors as the *traditional (neo)realist (regional) security-related explanation*, the *domestic politics-based explanation* (a *liberal* explanation in the sense that it credits and stresses the influence of domestic factors on the nation-states' foreign policy behavior), and the *ideational explanation*; the first two of these accounts are elaborated upon as the existing explanations for Turkey's motivations in getting (increasingly) involved in peace operations in the post-Cold War era, while the last one (also the *constructivist* one, despite not being called by the authors as such) is offered by the authors themselves as a *new*, *fresh* and *superior* explanation for the same phenomenon.

According to the first strand of explanation, the (*neo)realist security-related* one, Turkey's participation in peace operations in the post-Cold War era has been motivated by its *security needs* and *interests*. Parallel to the *systemic changes* ushered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union such as the radical changes in the political and strategic environment surrounding Turkey or the outburst of ethno-national conflicts in Turkey's neighborhood (like those in the Balkans and the Caucasus); Turkey has founded itself increasingly vulnerable to regional

security threats and, as a result, begun to consider engaging in peace operations (and also improving its peace keeping capabilities) as an "effective security strategy" to alleviate its security concerns regarding these newly emerging security challenges (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006: 477, 472). Turkey, thus, saw its participation in peace operations as a *security measure* that should be taken against both the rising *hard-security threats* and the various newly flourishing *soft-security challenges* increasingly threatening the country after the Cold War.

The second line of explanation (the *liberal domestic politics-based* one), on the other hand, accounts for Turkey's active participation in peace operations since the beginning of the 1990s as a function of *ethnic lobbies* and their activities in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey has (increasingly) taken part in peace operations in the post-Cold War era due mainly to the influence exerted by ethnic lobbies on the Turkish foreign and security policymakers. Namely, as the ethno-national conflicts and wars emerged in Turkey's neighborhood since the early 1990s have erupted in countries or regions (such as the Balkans or the Caucasus) with which Turkey has got robust cultural, historical, religious and ethnic ties and since Turkey is populated with considerable number of Turks who had migrated from these countries or regions to Turkey; these events have been carried rapidly and effectively to the Turkey's security discussions (and agenda) by the ethnic lobbies, thereby evoking extensive public (as well as political) concern and attention in Turkey. Consequently, the argument goes, Turkey has decided to send forces to peace operations.

Lastly, the third *constructivist-ideational* strand of *explanation* -as elaborated upon and also offered by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006)- suggests that the main motivation of Turkey in participating in peace operations of the post-Cold War era has been "the ideational need to be recognized as a member of the Western international community". As such, Turkey's involvement in these operations has been nothing but an "identity-constructing activity" for Turkey in that through its participation in such operations the country "has tried to reinforce

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its eroding Western identity" (472). To specify the argument, the developments emerged with the end of the Cold War such as the NATO's gradual loss of its European/Western character and the reluctance of the EU to give Turkey a clear EU membership perspective as well as its exclusion of Turkey from ESDP (and hence from the European security system) have rendered the credentials of Turkey's Western identity rather questionable and indeed *questioned*. Parallel also to the transformation of the nature of peace operations themselves after the Cold War by gaining an ideational dimension in the form of their becoming "Western security initiatives contributing to Western security by helping to transform conflict-laden areas in line with liberal-democratic norms" (474), Turkey has embraced peace operations as an effective means of re-establishing its weakened and disputed Western identity. As such, "Turkey simply wanted to be seen as aiding the leading Western powers in their efforts to project the constitutive norms of the West onto non-Western areas through peace operations" (483), thereby reconstructing its Western image.

Although Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) -and also Güngör (2007)- do not totally reject the relevancy and merit of the first two explanations in accounting for Turkey's motivation of having been involved in peace operations after the Cold War, they still find them as "unconvincing" and "limited". According to them, the *(neo)realist security-related explanation* seems inadequate owing to the fact that the security threats Turkey has had to face after the Cold War has not been "compelling" and "vital" enough to urge Turkey to preserve and enhance its security via getting involved in peace operations, especially if one considers the powerful Turkish army capable of deterring the threats coming from its near abroad. Moreover, this line of explanation, for them, cannot account for why Turkey has actively partaken in peace operations such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan where it did not have salient and clear-cut *security interests*. The *(liberal) domestic politics-based explanation*, on the other hand, is weak and inadequately convincing for these authors for

three major reasons: (1) the impact of ethnic lobbies on Turkey's decisions to send troops for peace operations is hard to prove and the issue has not been dealt with academically so far, (2) this account cannot explain why Turkey has sent troops to the operations in countries or regions with which Turkey does not have (much) historical, cultural, and ethnic ties such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Lebanon, and (3) the impact of public opinion in foreign and security policy making in Turkey has been limited.

Therefore, Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) -and also Güngör (2007)- present the third line of explanation accounting for the motivations behind Turkey's active engagement in peace operations since the early 1990s (the *constructivist-ideational explanation*) as the most *convincing* and *explanatory* account, superior to the previous ones. According to them, the fact that "many locations to which Turkey sent peacekeeping units [in the post-Cold War era] did not directly affect Turkey's security in the traditional neo-realist sense" can only be elucidated by the *constructivist-ideational explanation* in the sense that Turkey's participation in these operations have been motivated by its desire to "bolster [its] Western/European Identity" (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006: 480). As such, Turkey's active involvement in many peace operations after the Cold War like those undertaken by the UN, NATO and *the EU* in the countries like Somalia, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and *Congo* can best be explained by the country's *ideational* motivation of *re-establishing* its Western Identity.

Taking the above-elaborated *theory-based* categories presented by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) as a reference point and examining the issue of Turkey's participation in the *EU crisis management operations* through the lenses of them not only give rather salient and interesting insights as to the Turkey's motivations in participating in and contributing to the *EU missions,* but also produce both theoretical and practical implications or findings quite significant for the purposes of this dissertation. Indeed, an attempt to understand the motivations behind Turkey in participating in the EU crisis

management missions by utilizing the *(neo)realist security-related*, *(liberal) domestic politics-based* and *constructivist-ideational explanations* reveals a rather different (and, even, opposing) picture than the one drawn by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) with respect to Turkey's participation in the mostly-UN-led peace operations in their works. As such, a revisit to the *continental and regional distribution* of Turkey's participation in the ESDP missions (Table V and the pertinent analysis in Section 4.5) shows that the first two of the above-mentioned explanations -*the (neo)realist security-related* and *(liberal) domestic politics-based* ones- seem to be very much *relevant* and *explanatory* as regards the motivations behind Turkey's participation in and contributions to the EU crisis management operations up to now, while the third explanation -the *constructivist-ideational* one- looks like being the *least significant account* in explaining the same phenomenon.

To substantiate the argument above, the following facts can best be accounted for by the Turkey's security *needs* and *interests* in pertinent continents and regions; and by its cultural, historical, religious and ethnic ties with these places (and, the concomitant activities and influence of the ethnic lobbies in Turkey): (1) 5 out of all the 7 EU crisis management operations in which Turkey has been involved so far have been the ones undertaken by the EU in Europe and the Western Balkans in it; (2) Turkey has participated in 5 out of 7 EU operations launched in Europe and 5 out of 6 such missions initiated in the Western Balkans (a rather high level of participation, especially as compared to the country's involvement only in 2 out of 8 ESDP operations undertaken by the EU in Africa and in *none* of the 6 such missions conducted in Asia); and (3) the amount of Turkey's contributions to the ESDP missions launched in Europe has been considerably larger than that to the missions undertaken in Africa (see, p.146, 147). Thus conceived, the *(neo)realist security-related* and *(liberal) domestic politics-based* explanations seem rather *relevant* and *revealing* in accounting for the motivations behind Turkey's participation in the EU operations.

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The *constructivist-ideational explanation* (which is convincingly presented by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) and Güngör (2007) to be the most explanatory account of Turkey's motivation of involvement in the mostly-UN-led peace operations of the post-Cold War era), on the other hand, seems to be directly and concretely relevant in the "EU crisis management operations case" *only* in accounting for the motivation of Turkey in participating in the ESDP missions undertaken in Africa (Congo) -EUPOL Kinshasa and EUFOR RD Congo- where Turkey does not seem to have any (significant) strategic interest (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006; 480) and with which it has virtually no historical, cultural, religious or ethnic ties. This *constructivist* line of explanation might also lie under the cases of participation of Turkey in other EU crisis management operations (those in the Balkans), but only *intrinsically* and *indirectly*, seeming to be much less influential than the *(neo)realist* as well as *(liberal) domestic politics-based* accounts explaining them. As such, theoretically speaking, although constructivism (as a meta-theory) has been one of the two major theoretical approaches in the EU integration literature since the second half of the 1990s (see, p.30) and it (as a theory) is very powerful in the literature on ESDP (by better accounting for ESDP, in general, and the emergence of ESDP, in particular, than the other major theories of the IR such as neo-realism, LI or neo-functionalism; see, p.38-45); *it seems that it is not able to do a very good job in accounting for the issue of Turkey's past, current and future (possible) contributions to the ESDP operations, in general and in explaining the motivations of Turkey in participating in the EU crisis management operations, in particular*.

Having demonstrated the main motivations of Turkey in participating in and contributing to the EU crisis management missions so far as being the *(neo)realist security-related* and *(liberal) domestic politics-based* concerns (*constructivist-ideational account* carrying the least explanatory merit in dealing with the same issue); it will be timely, before concluding this section, to note the implication of this finding for the future possible contributions of Turkey

to the ESDP missions. Accordingly, it can reasonably be envisaged that the existing (limited amount of) *constructivist-ideational* motivation of Turkey in contributing to the EU crisis management operations will totally vanish once the country gain full accession to the EU in the future simply because an EU-member Turkey will no more feel the need to establish or re-establish its European/Western identity in the eyes of European or Western countries. However, the current impact of the *(neo)realist security-related* and *(liberal) domestic politics-based* concerns of Turkey on its decisions to get involved in the EU crisis management operations will continue to last (albeit with a decreasing salience) after the country's possible full accession to the EU. Therefore, it is fair to predict that *Turkey's future possible contributions to the EU crisis management operations (and, hence, to European security) after its full accession to the Union will not be "impartial" or "unconditional" mainly because Turkey's (by then) still relevant security-related and domestic-politics based considerations in participating in the ESDP missions will exert some limits on its ability to contribute to these operations only or mainly for the sake of the EU's interests or benefits.*

5.1.2 Foreign and Security Policy Compatibility between Turkey and the EU

In order to make better and more grounded projections as to the future potential contributions of Turkey to the European Security through the ESDP operations; the issue of current and future (expected) foreign and security (and also defence) policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU, an issue raised by the European Commission in its *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective report* (2004a: 11), should also be addressed. This section will tackle this issue -aiming to bring it to the analysis of Turkey's future possible contributions to ESDP- by focusing on three vital aspects of it: (1) the convergence and compatibility between the foreign, security and defence policy *strategies* of Turkey and the EU; (2) the foreign and

security policy convergence and alignment of the same actors; and (3) the convergence and compatibility of their foreign and security policy *identities/cultures*.

To start with the first aspect, the comparative examination of the *White Paper 2000* document prepared by the Ministry of National Defence of Turkey (MoND) and the ESS document approved by the European Council in December 2003 reveals clearly that *the foreign, security and defence strategies of Turkey and the EU are both convergent and compatible.* As such, *both the security conceptions as well as global threat perceptions of Turkey and the EU, and their adopted strategies to cope with these new security challenges are pretty much similar*. Regarding their *security conceptions* and *threat perceptions*, both of the actors seem quite aware of the new security conception and international security environment emerged, parallel to the flourishing of the process of globalization, in the post-Cold War era. Without totally ignoring the relevancy of the traditional (military) security threats, both actors seem to have realized the rise of new global security challenges which are "more diverse, less visible, and less predictable" (Council of the EU, 2003a: 3) and also "multi-directional, multi-dimensional and variable" (MoND, 2000: 34). While such new security threats for the European Security were designated as "terrorism", "proliferation of WMD", "regional conflicts", "state failure", and "organized crime" (Council of the EU, 2003a) by the ESS document; these novel challenges for Turkey were sequenced *very much similarly* as "regional and ethnic conflicts, political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles, religious fundamentalism, smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons, and international terrorism" (MoND, 2000: 34) by its (security and) defence strategy paper.

As for the *strategies* adopted by these actors, both Turkey and the EU seek to cope with these new threats in a quite similar way in that they share the same strategy or view that these novel security challenges -unleashed in the new international security environment after the

Cold War- should be dealt with by employing a combination of a wide range of instruments and measures, both civilian and military (see, Council of the EU, 2003a: 7; MoND, 2000: 34, 35). Turkey's Military Strategy, as expressed in White Paper 2000 for instance, seeks to back the (security and) defence policies of the country by pursuing four strategies -deterrence, collective security, *forward defence*, and *military contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises*[49]- (35); the last two of which not only constitute a departure from the previous Turkish defence strategies (hence signifying a change in Turkish foreign, security and defence policies) (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006: 483), but also mark a converging shift in Turkey's foreign, security and defence policy understanding towards that of the EU. Lastly, both Turkey and the EU realize and also stress the merit as well as significance of being a *security producing* actor by contributing to the promotion of peace and security both in near abroad and the world, *writ large*; and underscore the importance of *multilateralism* and *international cooperation* in dealing with new global security challenges (Council of the EU, 2003a; MoND, 2000: 34-35).

As regards the foreign and security policy convergence and alignment of Turkey and the EU *aspect*, it can reasonably be argued that *both the amount of compatibility of the Turkish and the EU foreign and security policies in "regional" terms and the alignment of the foreign policy of Turkey with that of the Union seem not only good but also promising*. To start with the foreign and security policy *compatibility* between Turkey and the EU *in regional terms*, the rather valuable work of Emerson and Tocci (2004) produces considerably strong and enlightening findings. The study focuses on 11 "major theatres of operation ... representing the core of the common foreign and security concerns of both the EU and Turkey" (10); *nine* of which are Turkey's neighbors either taken as countries or as sub-regional country

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[49] *Forward defence* should better be conceived here broadly as done by Oğuzlu and Güngör (2006) meaning the Turkey's realization in the post-Cold War era that "defence starts outside territorial borders and what happen in other countries does closely impact Turkey's security interests" (485); which is pretty much close to the EU's understanding of the nature of new threats and the proper way of defending itself against them (see here, Council of the EU, 2003a: 7).

groupings (the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and the South Caucasus) and *two* of which are the major powers having their own vested interests in these regions (the USA and Russia). For each of these countries or sub-regional groupings, the authors -first- assess the *convergence* of Turkish and the EU's foreign and security policy interests and objectives; after which they seek to foresee the future prospects of "complementarity" (or compatibility) of the two actors' foreign and security policies, both before and after Turkey's full accession to the EU. *The results they attain at the end of their analyses are rather positive*.

Accordingly, the *interests* and *objectives* of Turkish and EU foreign and security policies seem *fully* convergent in *seven* out of 11 abovementioned "geographical theatres of operation" (the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Central Asia, Iran, the Mediterranean, Russia, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf) and either *increasingly* convergent as in the Middle East and as regards the US or *potentially* convergent as in Iraq. The foreign and security policy interests and objectives of the two actors are *only* non-convergent (at least by 2004) in the South Caucasus. What is more, the future of foreign and security policies of Turkey and the EU looks *fully* "complementary" as regards *five* regional groupings (*the* Balkans, the Black Sea, the Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East). Furthermore, it is *potentially* "complementary" in other remaining "theatres of operation", where it carries certain future risks of *divergence* owing to some "special sensitivities" of Turkey regarding these countries or regions such as Kurds and Turkomans in Iraq or Turkey's historically strained bilateral relations with Armenia in the South Caucasus. Depending on the joint efforts of both Turkey and the EU during the former's pre-accession process to the Union, however; these possible risks of foreign policy *divergences* can be turned into opportunities, thereby realizing various avenues for future foreign and security policy cooperation between Turkey and the EU also as regards these above-mentioned countries or regions such as Iraq and the South Caucasus.

As for the *foreign policy alignment* of Turkey with that of the EU, Turkey began to align its foreign and security policy in line with the EU's "CFSP initiatives" such as common positions, joint actions, statements, declarations or démarches[50] after the Helsinki European Council of 1999 (European Commission, 2000), where it was granted by the EU the status of candidateship for the full membership to the Union. As noted by and can be discerned from the European Commission's annual progress reports on Turkey (1998-2003, 2004c, 2005-2007), Turkey has largely managed to align its foreign and security policy with that of the EU; especially regarding the countries or issues such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as stressed in the Progress Reports of 2001 and 2002), Iran (as emphasized in 2003, 2004 and 2007 reports), and terrorism as well as non-proliferation (as underlined in the 2005 report).

Despite this general success of Turkey in aligning its foreign and security policy along the lines of that of the EU since 1999, there are also some problems and impediments with respect to the country's foreign policy convergence with that of the Union. As such, as noted by the European Commission in its 2004 and 2005 Progress Reports on Turkey -due probably to Turkey's "special sensitivities" as regards certain neighboring countries or regions as well as certain issues as pointed out by Emerson and Tocci (2004)- the country's record of aligning its foreign and security policies with the CFSP initiatives like common positions and declarations had been significantly worse than that of other candidate countries. This had been the case especially as regards the issues pertinent to Turkey's vital foreign and security policy interests such as those related with the country's neighbors like Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraq; its neighboring regions such as the Balkans; certain Muslim countries; and the issues like human rights, democracy and the International Criminal Court. *Even though this looks like a pattern which will probably last in the future even after the Turkey's full accession to the EU* (especially if one recalls the fact that even the EU member states sometimes diverge starkly in

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[50] For a detailed definition and description of such *diplomatic foreign policy instruments of the EU*; see Smith, 2003: 60-64.

certain foreign and security policy issues as manifested obviously during the Iraqi War of 2003 – see, p. 76, 77 in Section 3.1), *it is reasonable to maintain that these problems of alignment of Turkey with the EU's CFSP will continue decreasingly*. Indeed, the signs of this became observable even in the 2006 and 2007 Progress Reports. Accordingly, the 2006 report notes "[a] closer alignment of Turkey's official position with EU positions in relation with Southern Caucasus and Central Asia" (73); while the 2007 report reveals that Turkey, by the time of reporting, had aligned itself with 45 out of 46 CFSP declarations issued in that year.

Finally, as far as the convergence and compatibility of the foreign and security policy *identities/cultures* of Turkey and the EU *aspect* is concerned, *it is a matter of fact that Turkey's foreign and security policy identity/culture has been in a process of transformation in recent years from its "hard security" origins or tradition towards a "soft security" stance; thereby getting more and more closer to the foreign and security policy identity/culture of the EU.* This is, indeed, very well captured and expressed by Emerson and Tocci (2004): "While in the past Turkish foreign policy had focused on the importance of military security and balance-of-power politics, it now increasingly appreciates the value of civilian instruments of law, economics and diplomacy, as well as multilateral settings in which to pursue its aims" (33). The most detailed and up-to-date analysis of the (let's say) *"softening"* of Turkey's foreign and security policy identity/culture is, however, offered by Oğuzlu (2007) who tries basically to demonstrate "to what extent Turkey's foreign policy identity has transformed from being a 'hard power' to a 'soft power' over the last few years" (81), by focusing especially on Turkey's relations with the Greater Middle East.

Accordingly, in the past, Turkey used to be a "hard power" by, concomitantly, pursuing a securitized foreign and security policy due to the impact of the factors such as its Kemalist legacy, the role of the military officers in establishing the Republic, the unstable and conflict-laden geography of the country, and the external developments in its neighborhood

(Karaosmanoğlu, 2000; cited in Oğuzlu, 2007: 84). Namely, "[d]eterrence of possible challengers, both internal and external, through the adoption of coercive strategies [had] coloured Turkey's past security practices" (Oğuzlu, 2007: 84). Turkey's having acted as a "typical hard power" in 1997 against the Greek Cypriots whose government declared in early that year its willingness to install Russian-made S-300 missiles to the island, or its such behavior in 1998 against Syria which had been hosting PKK terrorists in its territories including the leader of the terrorist group Abdullah Öcalan, can be given as the most illustrative examples of Turkey's traditional "hard power" foreign and security policy identity (Oğuzlu, 2007: 86, 87). However, this situation has increasingly changed especially since the early 2000s due to a mix of certain internal and external factors.

That's said, some internal developments occurred in Turkey especially since 2002 with the coming into power of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government. For instance, the new government has pursued a policy of "desecuritization" of the "previously securitized issues" like the "Kurdish problem", or adopted a "multilateral, cooperative [and] win-win approach" in its foreign policy; which have significantly enhanced the country's "soft power" (Oğuzlu, 2007: 88, 89). Additionally, certain crucial external developments have taken place either as regards the Turkey's relations with the West (the EU and the US) or with the Middle East, playing also a salient role in adding to the rise of the "soft power" of Turkey. As such, the EU's opening the accession negotiations with Turkey and its *attractive* impact on the Middle Eastern countries, the gradual "demilitarization" of Turkish politics (and foreign policy) with the urge of the EU in 2000s, or the election of a Turkish scholar for the position of the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in June 2004, can be counted among such developments (87-91). As a result, this apparent *"softening"* of Turkish foreign and security policy has born direct consequences regarding Turkey's relations with all its neighboring regions in general and the Middle Eastern countries in particular,

which has been rather manifest in its improving and "desecuritizing" relations with the countries ranging from Iraq (especially northern part of the it), Syria and Iran to Russia, Greece and the Greek Cypriots (92-95).

As regards the future of Turkey's rising "soft power" identity/culture, it can be inferred from Oğuzlu (2007) that it will depend to a significant extent on the unabated continuation of Turkey's EU accession process, resulting at the end in the country's full membership to the Union. As also implied by Ergüvenç (2007) Turkey's "soft power" will increase substantially (though he does not use the term "soft power") after its possible full membership to the EU in that, by then, "Turkey would feel less dependent on its military for its security" due mainly to the facts that (1) it would feel the support of "EU solidarity" in coping with the security challenges it encounters; (2) the most serious bilateral problems of Turkey like Cyprus or Aegean discords would be solved even before Turkey became a member to the EU, portending further "desecuritization" of Turkey's major foreign and security policy disputes; and (3) Turkey's image in the eyes of its neighboring countries would largely improve (78).

Just like in the case of the *"Turkey's motivations in participating in the EU crisis management operations so far"* variable that was elaborated in the previous section, the detailed examination of the *second side-variable* of this study –namely, the variable of the *"present and (expected) future foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU-* reveals mostly positive results as regards Turkey's future potential contributions to European security through its participation in the ESDP operations. As such, taking all the three *aspects* of the "*foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU*" variable examined above together, it is fair to conclude that *the foreign and security policies of Turkey and the EU are not only largely compatible at present but also seem highly likely to become more and more compatible in the future, both during the pre-accession period of Turkey to the Union and especially after the country's full membership to it.* However, again

just like the "motivations" variable, the "foreign and security policy compatibility" variable also shows that *Turkey's future possible contributions to the ESDP operations will not be immune from some constraints in that the patterns that are revealed by the second aspect of "FP compatibility" variable (namely, the patterns of Turkey's "special sensitivities" concerning its neighborhood and the parallel lack of its full alignment with the EU's foreign and security policies) are likely to put some limits on Turkey's full realization of its potentials in contributing to the ESDP operations even after its full accession to the EU.*

5.1.3 Turkey's Future Possible Contributions to European Security through its Participation in the EU Crisis Management Operations

As revealed before, with a record of participating in (only) 7 out of 21 EU crisis management operations launched so far and in (only) 3 out of 12 such missions currently on the ground, Turkey's involvement in the EU crisis management activities up to now has been *"significant"*, but *"still limited"* (see, p.145, 146 in Section 4.5). Indeed, this record of Turkey in taking part in the EU's ESDP operations does not seem very much *promising* for the country's potential contributions to these missions (and, hence, to European security), after its possible full accession to the EU in the future. However, *an elaboration on the reasons behind Turkey's "not very much satisfactory record of participation" in the ESDP missions thus far paradoxically shows that this currently "bleak" picture of Turkey's involvement in the EU crisis management operations is actually nothing but a powerful indicator and harbinger of its potential contributions to such missions (and, through them, European security) after its full accession to the EU in the future.*

Accordingly, the analysis of *Turkey's past and present record of participation in the EU crisis management missions* (the main variable of this study) done in Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the major reason for Turkey's *unsatisfactory* record of taking part in the ESDP missions so far has been the fact that *Turkey has not been and is not a full member of*

the EU. It seems quite obvious from the above-referred analysis that this *fact* has exerted significant *limits* -both concrete and direct (visible) and abstract and indirect (less visible)- on Turkey in participating in and contributing to the ESDP operations so far. Indeed, these *limits* on Turkey's involvement in the EU crisis management activities have been put by a rather crucial repercussion of the fact of *Turkey's not having been a full member of the EU*, a repercussion directly concerning both European and Turkey's security: *the exclusion of Turkey from the EU's newly emerging security and defence policy structure, ESDP; and negative bearings of this on Turkey and EU-Turkey security relations.*

Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in Section 3.2, the EU's efforts of creating a new security and defence policy mechanism to replace WEU starting with the Cologne Summit of 1999 meant for Turkey nothing but its loss of obtained privileges under the WEU regime and its exclusion by the EU from European security system. Turkey -previously enjoying the right to participate in the decision-making mechanisms of the WEU, in general, and its military activities, in particular; thanks to its *associate membership* status in the institution- found itself under the new ESDP structure as a *contributing country* endowed only with certain *consultative functions* in the new decision-making, planning and implementation procedures of it. Real participation in decision-making was reserved, under the new regime, only for the full members of the EU. As such, this new ESDP structure has brought a quite *unsatisfactory* and even *exclusionary* participation regime for Turkey in terms of the modalities of involvement in the EU crisis management operations. To sum it up, as regards the military ESDP missions, the new regime envisaged permanent and regular consultations between Turkey and the EU during peace-time; while, it foresaw the intensification of such consultations at the pre-operational phase of a crisis. As for the operational phase, Turkey was granted the right to automatically participate in the EU military operations which were drawing on NATO assets and capabilities, whereas its involvement in the EU's such missions

conducted *autonomously* was kept conditional upon an invitation by the Council of the EU extended with a decision taken by unanimity voting. Turkey, no matter it participates automatically or upon a Council invitation, was not allowed to take part in decision-making mechanisms of the EU's military operations to which it contribute forces. As far as the civilian ESDP operations are concerned, Turkey's participation was again made conditional on a unanimously-taken Council of the EU decision to invite the country to the mission; its participation in decision-making mechanisms of such missions being again precluded (A high-level official from the MFA, 21 July 2008).

This abovementioned new ESDP regime, as has been imposed by the EU, has significantly constrained Turkey's participation in (and also contributions to) the EU crisis management operations in two *concrete* and *direct* ways. First, due to the fact that Turkey's participation in the EU's *civilian* and *autonomous military* crisis management missions were made under *this new regime* dependent upon an invitation by the Council of the EU to be decided by a vote of unanimity, *Turkey could not be able to take part in many ESDP operations due mainly to its not being invited by the EU countries to do so*. As such, more specifically, Turkey has not participated in 11 EU crisis management operations so far (among a total of 14 EU missions in which it has not been involved) owing mainly to the fact that *it was not invited by the EU to take part in these missions*. These EU missions have been the *civilian* operations of the EUPAT in the FYROM, the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine, the EUSEC RD Congo, the EUPOL RD Congo, the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, the EUJUST Themis in Georgia, the EUJUST LEX in Iraq, the EUBAM Rafah in the PT, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia; the *autonomous military* operation of the Operation Artemis in the DRC; and the AMIS EU Supporting Action in Darfur as a both *civilian* and *autonomous military* mission. Turkey has not been able to get involved in these missions *either* because it was not invited by the EU *specifically* (despite the pertinent missions' being open to contributions by *third states*) as it

was the case in the operations such as the EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine, the Operation Artemis, the EUPOL RD Congo, and the AMM; *or* because it was not invited by the EU *generally* (meaning that the EU did not permit the participation of *any country* other than the EU member states themselves to the related operations owing to some special reasons such as the small sizes of those missions) as it is the case in the missions like the EUPAT, the EUSEC RD Congo, the EUJUST Themis, or the EUJUST LEX (see, the *participation paragraphs* or *parts* of each of these operations in the Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).

Second, the new ESDP regime has limited Turkey's participation in and contributions to the EU crisis management missions *concretely* and *directly* also because even the agreed modalities of Turkey's involvement in the ESDP operations noted above have not been settled by 100% in practice (thereby, resulting in disagreements between the EU and Turkey in their implementation) and because even these *unsatisfactory* and *exclusionary* modalities as envisaged by *this new regime* have not been operated by the EU properly so as to include Turkey in the planning and preparation phases of ESDP missions in a satisfying manner, *even consultatively*. To give specific examples, Turkey has not taken part in the EUPOL Afghanistan so far and has declined to participate in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA by rejecting the invitation extended by the EU to include the country in the mission *mainly because* the EU and Turkey have had some problems in interpreting and implementing the existing modalities of involvement of Turkey in the ESDP missions (especially relevant in the EUPOL Afghanistan case) and because the EU has not satisfyingly include Turkey in the planning and preparation processes of these missions (particularly the case for the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission) (see, MFA, April 2008; July 2008; Radikal, 8 March 2008 and Sections 4.3.7, 4.4.4.1). Moreover, Turkey has decided to partake in the EULEX Kosovo rather *hesitatingly* because of the same above-noted *concerns* it felt in deciding not to get involved in the Afghanistan and Tchad/RCA missions (especially its anxieties as regards the latter), and this

probably has also had a *negative and limiting* impact on the *size* of Turkey's declared contribution to the Kosovo mission (see, MFA, April 2008; July 2008 and Section 4.2.1.6).

Turkey's not being a full member of the EU and its concomitant exclusion from ESDP (especially from its decision-making mechanisms) seem also to have exerted serious -but, *more abstract* and *indirect* as well as *less visible*- limitations on Turkey's participation in the EU crisis management operations so far. To begin with, it can reasonably be argued that Turkey has felt excluded by the EU from the European security system under the new ESDP regime and, consequently, could not see itself as a part of the newly emerging European security architecture; which, in turn, has led the country not to feel attached and committed to the EU's nascent ESDP, thereby curbing its willingness to take part in its activities. Moreover, the facts such as Turkey's not being allowed to take part in the decision-making mechanisms of ESDP; its only being granted certain *consultative* roles in the planning, preparation and implementation phases of the ESDP missions; its having to leave the commands of Turkish civilian or military personnel sent for the ESDP operations to the European commanders; its not having any prospect of seeing a Turkish HoM, Military OpCdr and Force Commander being appointed by the EU to lead an ESDP mission; and (also) its not having any chance to see high-ranking Turkish civilian or military officers appointed by the EU to serve in the ESDP institutions such as the EUMC or the EUMS (A high-level official from the MFA, 21 July 2008), can all be claimed to have hindered both the *willingness* and *ability* of Turkey in getting actively involved in the EU's ESDP operations so far.

Last but not least, the facts like the EU's *still* inviting Turkey to take part in the ESDP missions as a "third country" (see, MFA, April 2008) or developments such as the EU's registering Turkey's declared contribution to the *Headline Goal 2010* as a "supplementary" force rather than as a *main force* (see, ICG, 2007: 6), can be maintained to have diminished Turkey's enthusiasm to participate in the ESDP missions; especially if one recalls that Turkey

has been aspiring to become a member to the EC/EU for almost *five decades*. These above-specified ramifications of "Turkey's not being a full member of the EU" and, hence, "its exclusion from the ESDP" (among many other similar ones which were not mentioned here) have *probably* had significant *limiting* impact on Turkey's involvement in the EU crisis management missions so far; both in terms of the *number* of missions it has participated in and the *amount* of contributions it made to the missions in which it has taken part.

Therefore, building on the discussions and analyses made above, it would be correct to suggest that *had Turkey been a full member of the EU and, consequently, a full part of ESDP by the beginning of 2003 when the ESDP operations were first put in the ground; its record of participation in these missions would have been much better (both in terms of the number of participated operations and the amount of contributions made to these missions) than its current (above-examined and referred) record of involvement in such missions.* Similarly, it can also be reasonably inferred from the above analyses that *Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through its participation in the EU crisis management operations after its full accession to the EU will be substantial and incomparably larger than its contributions to them so far.* It is more than enough just to think about the days when Turkey has managed to become a full member to the EU -by also coming to be a full part of the ESDP structure- in order to grasp the power of this argument. By the time that these days arrive, not only all the *concrete* or *abstract* limits that Turkey currently face in its security relations with the EU and in its participation in the ESDP missions (which were mentioned above) will have been eliminated, but also new opportunities or incentives for Turkey to actively engage in the EU crisis management operations will have emerged.

To start with the currently relevant *concrete limits*, by the time that Turkey becomes a full member to the EU: its existing exclusion from both the EU and ESDP (and also European security architecture) will end; Turkey will be able to take part in all types of EU crisis

management operations *automatically* without being subject to any institutional limitation like the current ones such as the requirement of getting an invitation for participating in certain missions; the problems that Turkey now experiences with the EU regarding the *modalities* of its involvement in the EU crisis management missions under the ESDP regime will all be eliminated; and the recently observed negative impact of deteriorating Turkey-EU relations (since 2005) on the relations of these actors as regards ESDP will not be the case anymore.

As far as the currently valid *more abstract limits* are concerned, since Turkey will become a full part of the ESDP structure, after its full accession to the Union: it will be part of all the decision-making mechanisms of ESDP and its crisis management operations; Turkish nationals will have a chance to be appointed as HoM, Military OpCdr or Force Commander in the ESDP missions and also have an opportunity to serve in high-ranking positions in the ESDP institutions such as the EUMC or the EUMS (for which Turkey has got a lot to offer thanks to its large experience in participating in the crisis management operations under various international entities like the UN, NATO or OSCE thus far; as was shown in Section 3.3); Turkish forces contributed to the ESDP missions will start to serve under the command of Turkish commanders; and, lastly, the currently discouraging practices such as the invitation of Turkey to the EU missions as a *third state* will not be relevant anymore. Owing to all these above-noted developments that will take place after Turkey's full accession to the EU, Turkey will not only see itself as a *part* of ESDP and the European security architecture by then, thereby coming to feel more *attached* and *committed* to ESDP and, hence, to European security; but also be likely to feel the *ownership* of ESDP and its crisis management operations, which, in turn, will lead the country to tend to get much more enthusiastically and actively involved in the EU crisis management activities.

Finally, as for the new *incentives* or *opportunities* that are likely to emerge after Turkey's possible full membership to the EU that will increase the tendency of the country to take a

more active part in the ESDP operations, a possible *synergetic* and *constructive* competition might show up between Turkey and currently very active participants of the ESDP missions such as France, Italy, the UK or Germany in order to become the *forerunner* of ESDP and its pertinent activities including its crisis management missions; which would not only urge Turkey to partake in these missions more actively, but also lead other countries to show larger interest in these operations within the context of competition with Turkey or one another.

Before concluding this section, one last very crucial point should be made in order to clarify the above-done future projections as to the possible contributions of Turkey to the EU crisis management operations after its full EU membership. *Turkey's future possible participation in and contributions to the EU's ESDP missions will never be immune from certain limits and, thus, never be "unconditional" and "solely for the sake of ESDP or European security".* As the analyses of *Turkey's motivations in participating in the EU crisis management operations so far* and *present and (expected) future foreign and security policy compatibility between Turkey and the EU* "variables" (that were done in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, respectively) revealed; not only Turkey's current *(neo)realist security-related* and *(liberal) domestic politics-based* motivations in contributing to the ESDP missions will likely to be relevant and influential (albeit with a decreasing power) even after its full accession to the EU, but also the country's current shortages of foreign policy compatibility and alignment with the EU (its "special sensitivities" concerning its neighborhood and parallel lack of full alignment with the EU's foreign and security policies) will likely to endure (again with a decreasing relevancy) even after its full membership to the Union. Therefore, *it should never be expected that Turkey would participate in "all" the ESDP operations with the "largest" contributions after its full membership to the EU. It might definitely not get involved in certain missions or might make minor contributions to certain other missions; which is quite normal, indeed.* However, *the point made by this thesis is that Turkey's future potential*

contributions to the ESDP operations after its full accession to the EU seem likely to be both "extensive" and much more "larger and substantial" than its contributions to such missions thus far.

5.2 Policy Recommendation

On the basis of the analyses and findings of this study, especially as expressed in the previous section, it seems that the use of the issue of "Turkey's future potential contributions to European security through ESDP (operations)" by the Turkish foreign and security policymakers as a *means* for the promotion of *Turkey's EU membership bid* is and will be both *rational* and *fruitful*. This seems to be the case for *three* reasons.

First, as revealed in Section 5.1.3 clearly, Turkey's future possible contributions to ESDP (and, hence, to European security) is not a *myth* or *fiction*. On the contrary, the country has got *real, concrete,* and *remarkable* prospects for contributing to European security through its participation in the EU crisis management operations in the future, after it is given the chance to become a full member to the EU.

Second, as also acknowledged and credited by the pertinent EU authorities and institutions (see, European Commission, 2004a; Andoura, 2006; Demirtaş, 13 November 2006), CFSP -and ESDP under it- not only constitutes one of the very few policy areas in which Turkey has accomplished the largest amount of alignment with the EU *acquis* so far and is expected to manage least problematic full alignment with the *acquis* in the future, but also marks a policy field (among some few others) through which Turkey is expected to make greatest contributions to the EU after its full accession to it (Müftüler-Baç, 2007).

Third, a policy of making use of the *Turkey's future possible contributions to European security through ESDP card* in promoting the *Turkey's full accession to the EU cause* seems very likely to work and pay off. As pointed out by Müftüler-Baç (2007), "the material benefits

of Turkey's accession to the EU in the security realm will have an important role in influencing EU member states' preferences and the public opinion in the EU" (15), leading them towards recognizing the salience of the Turkey's full membership to the Union for the latter's security in the future. In other words, "[t]he Turkish [potential] contribution to the EU in foreign and security policy could easily influence public opinion" in the EU (16) -and, hence, the preferences of the EU countries- in favor of Turkey's full accession to the Union.

Therefore, *this dissertation would suggest to the Turkish foreign and security policymakers that they could raise and emphasize the "future possible contributions of Turkey to the European security through its participation in the EU crisis management operations" -as a policy- in their efforts to enhance the prospects for Turkey's full membership to the EU in the future*. However, Turkey's future likely contributions to ESDP and European security should not be referred to *only* in the form of the country's potential contributions to the EU's "military crisis management" efforts and its "military security" (by *only* emphasizing Turkey's "geographical position" and "military capability"), as done by the Turkish policymakers so far; which is severely criticized by Bilgin (2001 and 2003). Instead, the Turkish policymakers had better underline *Turkey's potential contributions to European security through ESDP* in general; namely, in the form of the country's future possible added-values to be provided to the EU's "crisis management efforts" overall (both in military and civilian terms). Moreover, the Turkish policymakers should, of course, not concentrate all their efforts to promote the *Turkey's EU membership bid* on using or underscoring *Turkey's future potential contributions to ESDP card*; but they should also stress the country's likely contributions to the EU (after its full accession to it) in terms of the *other policy fields* such as the economy, in proportion to the expected size of the potential contributions of Turkey to the EU in these areas.

5.3 Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis has elaborated upon the question of *Turkey's potential contributions to European security (and also the EU's security) after its full accession to the EU in the future, by focusing specifically on the country's likely military and civilian contributions to the ESDP operations by then.* This was the *third* aspect of the question of *Turkey's future possible contributions to European security*, as was observed in the literature reviewed in Section 1.1. Just as this dissertation has concentrated on this *one single* (third) aspect of the question of Turkey's future possible contributions to European security and examined this aspect in detail critically; other studies can also be fruitfully conducted by focusing on the *other two aspects* of the *Turkey's likely contributions to European security question*, by trying to explore to what extent these *alleged contributions* of Turkey to the EU's security (as stated in the literature) are correct and likely to be realized. To exemplify, a study can be conducted exploring and scrutinizing Turkey' future possible contributions to European security after its full EU accession by focusing on its likely impact on the EU in terms of the *energy security* by then (*first* -"Turkey's geostrategic position"- aspect of *its potential contributions to European security question*), or another study can be done by concentrating specifically on Turkey's potential contributions to European security through its likely contributions to the dialogue between the Islamic and the Western worlds -including the EU itself- after its full membership to the EU (namely by elaborating on the *second* -"Turkey's being a crucial regional power"- aspect of the same question).

Additionally, there are also further avenues for research exactly on the subject of this study; namely, on *Turkey's possible contributions to European security through its participation in ESDP.* As such, *comparative* studies can be conducted by examining Turkey's past, current, and future (expected) contributions to European security through the ESDP operations in comparison with other candidate countries' (Croatia and the FYROM)

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same contributions to these missions and the security of Europe. Moreover, the contributions of (either one or more than one of) the EU countries, which became EU members in 2004 and 2007, to the European security through their participation in the ESDP missions *before* and *after* their EU memberships can be explored; the findings of which can be used to examine and highlight to what extent the Turkey's potential (expected) contributions to European security through ESDP could be realized and turned into real contributions, after its full accession to the EU.

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APPENDIX A

Armed Forces – Annual Average Strength (thousands of troops)									
Country	**1980**	**1985**	**1990**	**1995**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003e**
Belgium	108	107	106	47	42	42	41	42	42
Czech Rep.	…	…	…	…	54	52	49	40	35
Denmark	33	29	31	27	27	24	22	22	22
France	*572*	*560*	*548*	*502*	*420*	*394*	*366*	*355*	*356*
Germany	*490*	*495*	*545*	*352*	*331*	*319*	*306*	*295*	*285*
Greece	186	201	201	213	204	205	202	209	203
Hungary	…	…	…	…	51	50	49	44	45
Italy	*474*	*504*	*493*	*435*	*391*	*381*	*374*	*362*	*325*
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Netherlands	107	103	104	67	54	52	51	52	53
Norway	40	36	51	38	33	32	31	31	22
Poland	…	…	…	…	187	191	178	159	150
Portugal	88	102	87	78	71	68	68	69	68
Spain	*356*	*314*	*263*	*210*	*155*	*144*	*151*	*135*	*135*
Turkey	***717***	***814***	***769***	***805***	***789***	***793***	***803***	***816***	***823***
UK	*330*	*334*	*308*	*233*	*218*	*218*	*215*	*214*	*214*
NATO-Europe	***3501***	***3600***	***3508***	***3009***	***3028***	***2966***	***2907***	***2846***	***2777***
Canada	82	83	87	70	60	59	59	61	62
USA	2050	2244	2181	1620	1486	1483	1487	1506	1496
North America	***2132***	***2327***	***2268***	***1690***	***1546***	***1542***	***1546***	***1567***	***1558***
NATO Total	***5633***	***5927***	***5776***	***4698***	***4574***	***4508***	***4453***	***4413***	***4334***
Note: This table is drawn based on the data available at the NATO website.									
Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/table6.pdf.									

APPENDIX B

Defence Expenditures as % of gross domestic product (GDP) (based on current prices)									
Country	**1980-84** (Average)	**1985-89** (Average)	**1990-94** (Average)	**1995-99** (Average)	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003e**
Belgium	3.2	2.8	2.0	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Czech Rep.	…	…	…	…	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2
Denmark	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6
France	*4.0*	*3.8*	*3.4*	*2.9*	*2.7*	*2.6*	*2.5*	*2.5*	*2.6*
Germany	*3.3*	*3.0*	*2.1*	*1.6*	*1.5*	*1.5*	*1.5*	*1.5*	*1.4*
Greece	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.6	4.8	4.9	4.6	4.3	4.2
Hungary	…	…	…	…	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9
Italy	*2.1*	*2.3*	*2.1*	*1.9*	*2.0*	*2.1*	*2.0*	*2.1*	*1.9*
Luxembourg	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9
Netherlands	3.0	2.8	2.3	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Norway	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.2	2.1	1.8	1.7	2.1	2.0
Poland	…	…	…	…	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0
Portugal	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Spain	*2.3*	*2.1*	*1.6*	*1.4*	*1.3*	*1.2*	*1.2*	*1.2*	*1.2*
Turkey	***4.0***	***3.3***	***3.8***	***4.4***	***5.4***	***5.0***	***5.0***	***4.9***	***4.8***
UK	*5.2*	*4.5*	*3.7*	*2.7*	*2.5*	*2.5*	*2.5*	*2.4*	*2.4*
NATO-Europe	***3.5***	***3.2***	***2.6***	***2.2***	***2.1***	***2.1***	***2.0***	***2.0***	***2.0***
Canada	2.0	2.1	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
USA	5.6	6.0	4.7	3.3	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.4	3.5
North America	***5.3***	***5.6***	***4.4***	***3.2***	***2.9***	***2.9***	***3.0***	***3.3***	***3.4***
NATO Total	***4.5***	***4.6***	***3.5***	***2.7***	***2.5***	***2.6***	***2.6***	***2.7***	***2.7***
Note: This table is drawn based on the data available at the NATO website.									
Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/table3.pdf.									