

**THE BOURGEOISIE AND MODERATION: THE CASE OF POLITICAL
ISLAM AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY**

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This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

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and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects and that any and all revisions
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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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Osman Şahin

ABSTRACT

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The dominant Kurdish movement and political Islam in Turkey have displayed different patterns, which is also visible in two important political parties these movements have produced. While the pro-Kurd DTP has failed to integrate into the mainstream Turkish politics and moderate its discourse and goals, the Islamist AKP has shown a willingness to be a part of mainstream politics and tried to prove their difference from radical wings of political Islam. This paper is an attempt to explain this variance by investigating a possible role of the bourgeoisie in respective political parties. I argue that the bourgeoisie can be moderating force under certain conditions; thus, transforming the radical movements if it is allowed to play central roles. In addition, I suggest that the presence of such a class within the leader cadre of the AKP might be one of the reasons of its moderate stance whereas the lack of such a class within the DTP might have contributed to the stalemate in the Kurdish question.

Keywords:

Turkey, political Islam, the Kurdish Question, the bourgeoisie, moderation, democratization, political parties, toleration,

ÖZET

BURJUVA VE İLİMLİLİŞMA: TÜRKİYE’DE POLİTİK İSLAM VE KÜRT SORUNU

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bugünün Türkiye’inde, bu hareketleri temsil eden ana akım partilerin karşılaştırılmasından da anlaşılabilceği gibi, politik İslam’ın ve ana Kürt hareketinin izledikleri yol açısından önemli farklılıklar gösterdiği tartışılabilir. Bir tarafta İslamcı AKP’nin kendisini radikal İslami akımlardan ayırmak için ve legal politik hayat ile entegre olmak için çabalarına şahit olurken; öbür tarafta bu hedeflere ulaşmakta başarısız olmuş Kürtçü DTP partisini görmekteyiz. Bu araştırmada bu farklılığının sebeplerinden birinin burjuva sınıfı olup olmadığı araştırılmaktadır. Burjuva sınıfı, belirli koşullar dahilinde, radikal hareketlerin ılımlılaşmasında roller oynama potansiyeline sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma, AKP’nin lider kadrolarında burjuva sınıfına mensup insanlar bulunurken; bu sınıfın DTP kadrolarında bulunmamasını bu farklılığın ihtimal dahilindeki sebeplerinden birisi olarak önermektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Türkiye, politik İslam, Kürt Sorunu, burjuva, ılımlılaşma, demokratikleşme, politik partiler, hoşgörü

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish question and political Islam have become two central reference points in modern Turkish politics, which have been the focus of attention for the academic community especially after the 1980s. Although there may be points of disagreement, most scholars accept the proposition that the Kurdish movement and political Islam in Turkey have followed different paths during their course of evolution, which is evident in the policies of the political parties that these movements have produced.

Political Islam in Turkey has been significantly more successful than the Kurdish movement in integrating into mainstream Turkish politics. On the one hand, we are able to see the legalization and transformation of political Islam in several ways--i.e. governments of Islamic parties in Turkey; Islamic civil society organizations, and the rise of an Islamic capitalist class. On the other hand, compared to the impact of the armed wing of the Kurdish movement, the PKK (the Kurdistan Worker's Party), Kurdish political parties have only marginal influence in leading the Kurdish movement. Moreover, the main actors in Turkish politics have perceived legal Kurdish political parties as an extension of the PKK. In this context, this research is an attempt to understand why Islamist parties in Turkey have been able to integrate into mainstream Turkish politics while Kurdish political parties have performed poorly on this account. The main goal of this research is to understand whether the absence or weakness of the bourgeoisie within the most important Kurdish political party, *Demokratik Toplum Partisi* (Democratic Society Party, DTP) is one of the reasons for its lack of integration with the mainstream Turkish politics.

At this point, I need to admit that the research is not able to show of a direct influence that the bourgeoisie has on either Kurdish political parties or on Islamist parties. Still, there is a rich literature showing the effect of the bourgeoisie on democratization of various countries, which I shall talk about later in this section. Hence, for now, we can assume that the bourgeoisie are a plausible influence for transition to democratic regimes or moderation of claims by ethnic groups.

In addition to that, this study aims to investigate political Islam and the Kurdish question from a different perspective. The literature on political Islam and the Kurdish question in Turkey generally focuses on Turkish modernization and its implications. According to the literature, the Kurdish question and political Islam are reactions to Turkish modernization and the Turkish citizen envisaged by the Republican elite during the 1920s and 1930s. Zürcher (2003); White (1999); Gülalp (1995); Aydınğün and Aydınğün (2004); Kirişçi and Winrow (2002); Cemal (2005); Bozarslan (2005); Dağı (2005); Mardin (1993 and 2003); İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci (1999); Özoğlu (2004); and Yavuz (2001) are some of the prime examples of this approach to the Kurdish question and political Islam in Turkey. Indeed, these studies have shown that the centralization and secularization in Turkey during the late 19th and early 20th centuries had important implications for political Islam and the Kurdish question in Turkey. Yet, these studies focus too much on the political context that these political groups are embedded in and the cultural aspects of the issues. Moreover, most of these studies do not put sufficient emphasis on the heterogeneity of these identity groups in terms of their class structure.

This research, however, differs from previous research in several respects. I argue that these movements are not homogenous bodies. There are several social classes within these movements. All of these social classes have their own interests, values and ways of policy-

making. Moreover, some of these social classes have greater organizational power and access to policy-making bodies while other lacks such power. This is especially evident in the case of the Islamist bourgeoisie within the Islamic movement in Turkey. Thus, we can argue that the Kurdish movement and political Islam in Turkey have their own dynamics; and they are not only reacting to their environment but also pro-active bodies acting independently of their environment. Lastly, this research bears a political economic posture focusing on a possible role of the bourgeoisie in transformation of the Kurdish and Islamist political parties.

This research will be organized as the following: The first section of this chapter is an attempt to clarify some key terms. Terms like moderation, identity, democratization, and the bourgeoisie are defined in order to present the audience what I mean when I use these terms. The second section of this chapter explains methodology I use and how the data was collected for this research. The last section of this chapter elaborates more on my hypothesis.

The second chapter of this research provides the audience with the background of Islamic and Kurdish questions while also giving a brief history of the Turkish modernization and the chronology of modernizing reforms. In addition, this chapter explains how Islamic and Kurdish questions of Turkey have evolved.

The third chapter presents the results of the data I have collected. It provides us with the results of the survey data, and I compare the Southeast of Anatolia and Central Anatolia in terms of their socio-economic structure. In the last chapter, I present some preliminary conclusions.

1.1 Operational Definitions

Moderation is one of the terms I will be using frequently. Somer (2008) provides a base definition of moderation. According to Somer, moderation is the credible denunciation of violent

methods and willingness to cooperate and compromise with actors on the other side of the conflict. He then qualifies this definition by adding two more dimensions: low incentives to defect common knowledge, and having conceptual flexibility and inventiveness to bridge cognitive gaps. Especially, the latter qualification to his definition is significant. By this, Somer implies actors' ability or willingness to bridge cognitive gaps between two groups. For instance, he says, Turkish actors may perceive Kurdish identity as an ethnic identity short of external sovereignty whereas Kurdish actors may have an understanding of Kurdish identity as an ethnic identity which has a right to sovereignty. These cognitive gaps may impede cooperation, and trying to overcome these cognitive gaps is a characteristic of moderate actors. Calhoon (2006) also indicates that bridging cognitive gaps is an important sign of moderation. He states that every effort for political moderation includes a civic action intentionally undertaken to mediate conflicts, conciliate antagonisms, or find middle ground between two opposing camps.

Whereas Somer and Calhoon emphasize the importance of mediation and negotiation for political moderation, Wickham (2004) focuses on the importance of a specific will to be an actor of normal politics for moderation. He names this tendency as *ideological moderation* that is the abandonment, postponement, or revision of certain extreme goals, which allows a movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of "normal" competitive politics. Wickham says that ideological moderation entails a shift toward commitment to democratic principles, including peaceful alternation of power. He argues that, thanks to ideological moderation of their ideological positions, various Islamist parties have formulated new interpretations of Islamic texts that privilege ideas of pluralism, representation, and human rights. This moderation gave these Islamist parties the opportunity to be partially integrated into mainstream politics (in the case of the AKP), or present themselves as a democratic force (in the case of Wasat Party). In

this sense, Wickham suggests a commitment for democratic norms to be significant for moderation.

Although these definitions of moderation supply us with good insights on the concept, they still lack a focus for different kinds of moderation: that is *political and social moderation*. In this context, I try to develop a distinction between political and social moderation. Social moderation refers to categorical bridging between different identity groups, which is the willingness of actors to hold multiple identities, and actors' inclination to not only to cooperate; but also to integrate with people from other identities. Social moderation is:

- i) willingness to bridge categorical gaps (boundaries of identity) by negotiation and mediation, which results with:
- ii) a willingness or openness to hold multiple identities (e.g. a Kurd may define himself as a Turkish citizen while he also expresses his ethnic roots)
- iii) presence of an inclination to cooperate and integrate with people from other groups

Whereas political moderation is:

- i) willingness to bridge cognitive gaps (in terms of political goals and claims) by negotiation and mediation
- ii) denunciation of violence and actor's willingness to stay in legal realm in his/ her actions
- iii) an inclination to revise or abandon goals that conflict with mainstream politics, and commitment to democratic principles.

Two other terms I refer frequently in this research are *democracy* and *democratization*. Schumpeter (2003: 5-12) uses a minimal definition of democracy and democratization. According to Schumpeter, democracy is a system in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote. The process of acquiring power is regular, free, and fair elections. Then, democratization is social and political transformations leading to the establishment of free, fair, and regular elections in a given polity.

However, Dahl (2003: 48-51) finds this approach to the definition of democracy insufficient even though he acknowledges the centrality of elections in democracies. According to Dahl, democracies include three major phases: the voting period, the prevoting period, and the postvoting period. In order to be defined as a democracy, some pre-requisites should exist in every period. For instance, during the voting period, there should be at least three conditions: (1) every member of the society should have a right to vote, (2) every vote should have the equal weight, (3) the alternative with the greatest number of votes should be declared as the winner.

Yet, these three conditions do not amount to a real democracy without the presence of two more conditions during the prevoting period. Dahl explains these two conditions as (4) the right to vote freely for any alternatives and (5) freedom and ability to reach identical information about the alternatives, which requires freedom of press and expression.

Lastly, Dahl argues every polity needs three more conditions during the post-voting period in order to be named as democracy. These pre-requisites are (6) change of elected executives if they lose the majority of votes, (7) the orders of elected executives are executed when they are in power, and (8) maximization of popular sovereignty and political equality in the interelection stages. According to Dahl, these eight conditions can hardly be completely present in real world situations. Thus, he invents a new term, polyarchy, for the organizations and states

which reach the limit set by these eight pre-requisites. For Dahl, polyarchy is a function of consensus by actors on the eight norms, other things remaining the same.

Diamond (2003: 32-39) also argues that the minimal definition of democracy does not sufficiently acknowledge other characteristics of a democratic regime. He explains that such definitions ignores other dimensions of democracy, and privileges elections over other dimensions. Then, he says that more comprehensive discussions of democracy and democratization should include at least three dimensions: organized contestation through regular, free, and fair elections; rights of all adults to participate in the process; and *presence of civil liberties* [emphasis added]. It is the third dimension on which Diamond focuses. He asserts that a better discussion of democratization should entail elements of civil liberties. These civil liberties include freedom of association, protection from arbitrary power of the executive, subordination of military to the authority of elected officials, freedom of expression and press, protection of minority rights and culture, equality before the law, and establishment of check-balance mechanisms within the polity (e.g. an independent judiciary).

Therefore, in this research democratization does not only imply consolidation of regular, free, and fair elections with universal suffrage; but also establishment and protection of civil liberties in a society. Using such a definition helps us also evaluate democratization at two different levels: *initial democratization* (establishment of regular, free, and fair elections with universal suffrage rights) and *further democratization* (establishment and consolidation of civil liberties). This research refers to the consolidation of this latter level since there probably will be little disagreement if one say that Turkey is a democratic country in terms of the first level whereas its democracy is problematic in terms of the second level of democratization.

Another key term is *the bourgeoisie*. Kocka and Mitchell (1993: xi) define the bourgeoisie as the upper layers of the mercantile, financial, industrial and propertied middle classes. Following the same tradition, Huber and Stephens (1999) describe the bourgeoisie as the owners of the principal means of non-agricultural production in capitalist societies.¹

Huber and Stephens (1999: 759) explain that although numerous scholars, especially Marxist analysts, cast the bourgeoisie in the role of promoting democracy, bourgeois support for democratization is far from unconditional. Indeed, the literature review of the field yields a similar conclusion, and shows that the bourgeoisie support moderate values and democratization under certain circumstances – mainly independence or fear from the state, weakness of the working class, and lack of access to polity.

Although I will elaborate more on these conditions in the following pages, at this point it is beneficial to remember the conditions laid down by Moore (1993) on the relationship of the bourgeoisie to democratization.

As Moore explains, the bourgeoisie in England acquired progressive qualities only with the presence of certain conditions. Those included their independence from the Crown via the growing notion of immunity from arbitrary rule of the ruler, their ability to suppress the English peasantry with enclosures of the land, commercialization of agriculture thanks to existence of a market in nearby towns and transportation opportunities, and their alliance with independent town dwellers against the Crown (1993: 14, 19, 419, 422, 425- 426 430-431). Hence, the landed aristocracy transformed itself, and acquired the characteristics of a progressive force, which is

¹Even though these orthodox definitions supply us with sufficient clarity on the subject, we still are left with the decision of how to classify professionals such as doctors, lawyers, or engineers who possibly possess foreign language skills, financial power, and organizational skills due to their high earnings and university education. For the sake of simplicity, I will classify these professionals as the members of bourgeois in this research while keeping in mind the theoretical distinction of Marxist between the entrepreneurs and professionals.

supportive of democratization. The absence of these conditions, according to Moore, would take England from the path of democracy to the path of fascist regimes (Germany and Japan) or communist regimes (the Soviet Union and China).

However, the bourgeoisie support for democratization can take various forms, namely revolutionary and evolutionary forms. In fact, the bourgeoisie in Moore's analysis included the example of the former form - in the case of France - whereas North and Weingast (1989) also remarks the role of commercially minded and propertied interests in the Glorious Revolution, which resulted with institutional limitations against the King's arbitrary power.²

The bourgeoisie also have a high level of integration with the outside world, which is evident in their knowledge of foreign languages, travels to foreign countries, and their views about international organizations such as the EU. In fact, this quality is a proof of their independence from the state as well. Moore argues that one of the factors making the bourgeoisie a democratic force in England was their export orientation. He argues that the English bourgeoisie were not producing arms or luxury goods for the state. Instead, they were producing for the export market, which in turn eliminated their tendency to support the status quo (1993: 38, 424).

Identity is another term of which the academia fails to converge on a common definition. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006) try to introduce a more precise definition of collective identity and ethnic identity, which can solve issues of consistency, clarity, and coordination in literature on identity politics. Abdelal et al. perceive two notions to be salient for the definition of collective identities: *content and contest*. They argue that content (constitutive

²However, the conditions in Turkey promote the presence of an evolutionary bourgeoisie, who would support moderation and democratization via evolution rather than revolutionary means. For reasons see Appendix B.

norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models) describes the meaning of identity while contest refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of identity. The notion of contestation especially seems to be promising since it captures flexibility of identity and how people perceive it at different times at different levels. Their success is showing how everyday and unconscious contestation among members of a group remakes and revises the meaning of identity. Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 4) also give us a similar definition. They argue that identity as a category of practice is used by actors in some everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities, how they differ from other people, and what they share with other people. Hence, identity is the answers given to the questions of “Who am I?”, “Who should I be?”, and “What kind of person I want to be?” Our answers to these questions determine borders of our groups, meaning of belonging to a particular identity, and how we define outsiders.

In this context it is possible to define *identity politics* as the process of mobilizing people for recognition of certain rights or for empowerment of a group of people via the recognition of their cultural, historical, or physical differences. Bernstein’s (1997: 537) findings also support the presence of these dynamics in identity politics. According to Bernstein, identity politics may be analyzed in three levels. The first one is “*identity for empowerment*”, in which activists draw on existing identities or construct a new one in order to mobilize people; “*identity as goal*”, in which activists challenge stigmatized identities, seek recognition for new identities as goals of collective action; and “*identity as strategy*” [emphasis added] in which identities are deployed in order to confront the dominant culture, or in order to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the dominant culture by challenging the dominant culture’s perceptions about the minority culture.

1.2 Methodology and Data Collection

In this research I argue that, under certain conditions, the bourgeoisie has a tendency to hold moderate values in social, economic, and political arenas. Moreover, I argue that the bourgeoisie can be a progressive force pushing for democratization or moderation in the claims of identity groups. Lastly, I propose that the lack of bourgeoisie or its weakness can be among the reasons for the lack of integration and moderation for the major Kurdish political party.

Hence, the methods I use should determine the values of the Islamic and the Kurdish bourgeoisie on issues like political and social moderation and if the bourgeoisie is present or strong (numerously) within the ranks of the DTP and *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AKP).

In this respect, I have used three main methods. One is a survey consisting of 23 questions conducted with the Kurdish and Islamic business people. I decided to conduct the survey with members of businessman associations in order to measure the bourgeoisie values on several issues including democratization and toleration. There were several advantages of this option. These people were concentrated in the cities I chose; therefore, it became possible for me to do the survey in relatively short period of time and by staying in the limits of the research budget. Moreover, businessmen perspectives on democratization and other identity groups are important for us because, due to their socioeconomic status in society, these people are likely to be members of the bourgeoisie that I defined earlier.

The questions in the survey were specifically designed to measure the perceptions of the target groups on issues such as ethnic and religious identity, Turkey-the EU relations, problems of Turkey, and democratization. There were also questions designed to clarify the economic

status and business structure of the respondents. I chose two cities to conduct this survey: Diyarbakır, one of the most important cities in the Southeast Anatolia that is predominantly Kurdish, and Konya, a city in the Central Anatolia that is predominantly conservative and politically pro-AKP. I worked with *Diyarbakırlı İşadamları Derneği* (DİSİAD, Businessmen of Diyarbakır Association) in Diyarbakır and with Konya branch of *Müstakil İşadamları Derneği* (MÜSİAD, Association of Independent Businessmen). DİSİAD has 89 members, and I randomly chose 19 members of the DISIAD for this survey. I was able to conduct the survey with 16 members while the remaining 3 were out of town during my visit to Diyarbakır. The Konya branch of the MÜSİAD has 203 members. Before going to Konya, I randomly chose 40 members with whom I would conduct the survey³. However, I was able to meet 22 members while the remaining 10 members were out of town while 4 of them did not want to be involved in the survey. In addition, 4 of the members asked me to conduct this survey with them a couple of days later. Unfortunately, I was not able to do so due to limitations of time, difficulty of transportation, and limited budget. As a result, I was able to reach 84% of the sample in Diyarbakır while I was able to reach 55% of the sample in Konya. The ratio in Konya may seem low compare to Diyarbakır; still, I was able to reach more than 10% of the Konya MÜSİAD, which is enough to draw some generalizations about the respective group.

The second method of inquiry was an investigation on the background of two political parties: the DTP and *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP, Justice and Development Party). The goal of this research was to determine the presence of the bourgeoisie among the decision-making bodies of respective parties. In this context, I looked for variations in three dimensions,

³ In order to assure randomness, I have obtained the list of members from the MUSIAD and the DISIAD. Then, I have selected every fifth person (beginning with the first name on the list).

which were their foreign language skills, education levels, and occupational backgrounds (four subgroups for occupational backgrounds: self-employed, ex-bureaucrats, business people, and professionals). These three variables were chosen deliberately since education level, occupational background, and knowledge of foreign languages are important determinants of one's perceptions about the world and politics. I claim that the higher one's education level and financial power, which is correlated with his or her occupation, the higher his or her tendency to hold moderate values on social and political issues. I also wanted to get information about their knowledge of foreign languages since ability to use foreign languages efficiently is important for communicating with the outside world and to be integrated with the world. By measuring the variation on these variables, it is possible to determine the presence and strength of the bourgeoisie within the establishment of these two parties.

After identifying the variables, I had to decide my sample size. The AKP has 69 founders, and I was able to examine all of them since sample size was small and it was easy to reach their background via the website of the AKP and other resources. The DTP, however, has 418 founders, and the DTP website did not contain any information concerning backgrounds of their founders. Therefore, I made a random selection of 84 people (20% of the DTP founders) out of 418 DTP founders⁴. Then, I contacted the headquarters of the DTP in Ankara in order to obtain the information about the backgrounds of my sample on education level, knowledge of foreign languages, and occupation.

The last method of inquiry was the content analysis of *Yeni Gündem*, which is a pro-Kurd and pro-DTP daily newspaper. Content analyses of newspapers are useful methods in

⁴ In order to guarantee randomness in this research, I have facilitated from the method I used for selecting my cases for the survey.

understanding how the claims and perceptions of identity movements change throughout time. By using the research design constructed by Dr. Murat Somer in his project on political Islam and pro-Islamic conservative newspapers, I defined some key words that would help me to understand the Kurdish movement's perceptions on six main themes: electoral democracy; nationalism; human rights; social, cultural, and religious pluralism; group identity and definition, and political pluralism. Moreover, I extracted judgments from the articles and news published on the same issues. The goal of this research design is to observe the DTP's perceptions on these issues. The best way to conduct such a project was to investigate and interpret every issue published by Yeni Gündem. Yet, such a research would probably take several months, and we would need several people to work on this project. Hence, by using a feature of Excel, I chose 65 (2.5%) days randomly between January 1, 2000 and July1, 2007, which I thought would be enough to capture the changes the dominant Kurdish movement went through, if there were any, during this period.

A major weakness of this project was the lack of such investigation for a pro-AKP newspaper in order to see the evolution of the AKP and the dominant political Islamist movement. Actually, I decided to use Dr. Somer's investigation on pro-AKP, *Yeni Şafak* in order to achieve such a comparison. Unfortunately, his research was still incomplete at the time I was writing this paper; therefore, I am not able to use this data. So, I decided to focus on content analysis of Yeni Gündem since there are a plenty of data and secondary resources I can benefit from on the evolution of political Islam and Islamist parties in Turkey.

These methods of inquiry have the capacity to provide us with the knowledge in three dimensions. With the survey method I aimed to determine the Islamic and Kurdish bourgeoisie's values, whether they hold moderate values as I have claimed while also comparing these two

groups with Turkish society and DTP voters. The goal of the background research on party founders was to determine if the bourgeoisie was present in the leading cadres of the DTP and the AKP and to provide clues about their relative strength within these political parties. Finally, the content analysis aimed to understand the dominant Kurdish movement's values on issues like human rights, democracy, identity, and nationalism. I also wanted to see how the Kurdish movement's perceptions on these issues have evolved during these past seven years.

1.3 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis

The world of the Cold War can be interpreted as the world of bipolar ideological contestation. It was the clash between socialism and capitalism defining the course of politics, relations among nation-states and also among people. Yet, the end of the Cold War, as Kymlicka and Shapiro (1997) rightly diagnosed, unleashed even deeper and multiple cleavages among people.

In this new world, ideologies, class origins, and nationalities became insufficient to define the difference between "us" and the "other". Once the political structures that suppressed ethnic and religious identities of people had dissolved, the way people could define themselves and the other has radically changed. The loyalties of people have shifted from sources such as nation, ideology, and class to sources like religion, ethnicity, and gender. Society, once thought to be homogeneous, became a terrain of tension in which multiple sources of loyalty interact in the public space and sometimes clash with each other. In this context identity politics has become one of the central points of reference by which students of political science understand the world. Moreover, there is always a risk that identity politics give rise to conflict, causing devastating human tragedies. It is crucial to investigate when and under which circumstances

identity politics may increase the likelihood of violence. At the same time, it is vital to examine how the demands of identity politics in social, cultural, and political-economic areas can be addressed within democratic systems.

In this context, I will be trying to shed light on the dynamics of identity politics and its inherently contentious nature by looking at two important problems in Turkish political life: the Islamic movement and the Kurdish. In particular, I will be dealing with the contentious nature of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, and why major Islamist parties avoided violent means to assert their claims and moderated their claims and goals over time, while the Kurdish parties of Turkey were not able to break their organic ties with the terrorist organization, the PKK. Drawing from the literature on modernization theory and political economy, I will try to find out if the presence of a strong bourgeoisie independent from the state has moderating and democratizing effects on identity movements.

Classical modernization theory holds that democratization movements in countries are the result of social and cultural changes, including urbanization, occupational specialization, and higher levels of education levels, which are the products of industrialization (Ross 2001: 336). Inglehart (1997: 8-11) explains that industrialization is linked with specific processes of sociopolitical change. He states that economic development caused by industrialization is linked not only with urbanization and rationalization of institutions but also broader cultural, social and political changes, democratization being as one of the possible results. Nonetheless, Inglehart argues that democratic systems are not the only outcomes of modernization. According to Inglehart, there are some alternative outcomes of modernization along with democratic system, most prominent examples being fascism and communism. Moore (1993) also claims that modernization does not necessarily lead to democracy. Authoritarianism is the other option

where a coalition of the state, a landed aristocracy, and a medium size state-dependent bourgeoisie exists. He says that countries having passed a critical stage of industrialization are likely to end with authoritarian states if such a coalition exists. Other influential works such as Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) have similar reservations about the basic premises of modernization theory. Przeworski and his colleagues argue that their investigation of several countries in terms of several criteria⁵ during the period of 1950-90 yielded that an increase in GDP per capita caused by modernization is not an influential factor for transition to democracy. However, they assert higher levels of GDP per capita will prevent these countries slipping back to autocratic regimes once they complete democratic transitions.

Still, there is substantial literature showing the relationship between democracy and modernization. For example, Epstein et al. (2006) argue that Przeworski et al. (2000) miss an important point by excluding partial democracies in their investigation of regimes and classifying countries either democratic or autocratic. They show that if we also include partial democracies as a new category in our analyses, higher levels of GDP per capita encourages transitions to democracy while decreasing the danger of slipping back to autocracy once transition is achieved. Boix and Stokes' (2003) investigation of pre-WWII and post-WWII, as well, yields that the impact of GDP per capita rise on democratization is significant during both periods although its significance much stronger during the prewar period. By using the theoretical framework developed by Przeworski and his colleagues, they investigate the relationship between democratization and increase in GDP per capita at two levels: whether higher GDP per capita

⁵ To classify the regimes they observed democratic or authoritarian, Przeworski et al. (2000) looked for the presence of four basic criteria: if the legislature is elected by free and fair elections; if there is more than one political party running for power; if the executive is elected; and if an incumbent regime has lost power previously, then, the regime is democratic. Otherwise, they classify the respective regime as an authoritarian one.

increases the likelihood of transition to democracy (endogenous theory) and whether higher levels of GDP per capita prevents democracies slipping back into autocratic regimes once transition is completed (exogenous theory). They conclude that Przeworski et al.'s research only recognizes the premises of exogenous theory while rejecting endogenous democratization. However, they claim, their investigation confirms the positive correlation at both levels.

There are also studies showing the importance of a market economy and in turn its importance in creating the values that support liberal ideology in a given society. Mousseau (2002) shows the existence of a correlation between the rise of a market economy and values such as tolerance, equity, support for rule of common law, and individualism. He argues that it is not poverty that creates collective-autocratic values in a society. It is the mixed-clientelist economies, which create social origins of collectivism, reduce empathy for out-groups, and distort truth in favor of the in-group. He says that what define these economies are reciprocity, gift-giving, and the patron-client relationships. In this type of economy, economic relations are enduring, and economy is based on explicit social linkages such as kinship and ethnicity. In contrast, in market economies mutual obligations are enforced by the existence of contracts, and cooperation implies no obligation beyond the one stated in the contract. Once the contract has been signed the parties act as equals contrary to the patron-client relations. Moreover, it is not the persons but institutions that are enforcing parties to honor their obligations. As a result, a sense of trust emerges in the market economy that is beyond kinship ties. As the market economy develops, values of universalism, respect for the rule of law, tolerance, and equity emerges in the society.

Several other studies also points out a link between democratization, modernization and various social classes. Moreno (1999: 118, 119) draws attention to this link by arguing that class

and education play a role in defining individuals' orientation vis-à-vis policy-making and political systems, and it is the position of these classes, which will affect the character of the political system during the transition process. At this point, the position of privileged classes such as the elite or the bourgeoisie bears particular importance since these groups - thanks to their strategic positions in powerful organizations - are able affect political outcomes substantially. Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1991: 8-31) define these elite as the principal decision-makers in political, economic, and social organizations and movements in a society. Therefore, he says, their consensus and solidarity around democratic values greatly enhances chance of survival of democracy and chances for consolidation of democracy. Shin (1994) also emphasizes the significance of a substantial consensus among the elite on the rules of the democratic game and the worth of democratic institutions for the growth of democratization and democratic consolidation.

Another study by Fevre, Denney, and Borland (1997) explains the link between the social classes and their role in disseminating the ideas in the societies. Fevre et al. argue that many of the ideas are produced in a small circle of intellectuals. However, intellectuals are not capable of disseminating their ideas and transforming the society along with principles of their ideas. Therefore, they need an agent to convey their ideology on their behalf. Fevre et al. explains that it is the status groups who act as the agents of intellectuals spreading their ideas out. They give the example of the Welsh middle class, which disseminated the nationalist ideas formed in small intellectual circles to a greater portion of the Welsh society on behalf of the intellectuals during the formation of the Welsh nationalism.

In this context, it is possible to see the bourgeoisie as the class disseminating the ideas produced in intellectual circles, as well as the elite having the capacity to be the driving force for

democratization. Indeed, there are various influential works in the field pointing out the middle classes or the bourgeoisie as the classes championing democratic values, tolerance, equity, and rule of the law within societies.

For instance, Lipset (1959) explains that, in modern industrial societies, authoritarian predispositions and ethnic prejudice flow from the lower classes rather than from that of the middle and upper classes. He suggests that low status and low education predispose members of lower strata to support extremist and intolerant forms of political and religious behavior, while tolerance and support for diversity increases as we move up the stratification ladder. As society prospers economically, they no longer tolerate extremism and repressive regimes, which is equivalent to an appreciation of tolerance and democratic values. These premises offered by Lipset in 1959 were supported by various works produced later on.

For example, Moore (1993) argued in his seminal work that in European history an independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. He summarized his thoughts by saying “*No bourgeois, no democracy*” [emphasis added]. According to Moore, in countries like England, it was the commercialization of the landed aristocracy, which was the decisive force influencing the evolution of politics and policymaking. Westby and Braungart (1966) also explains that their research on student activists in universities shows students coming from lower middle-class families as more likely to support far-right ideologies while the students coming from upper-middle-class families are more likely to support peaceful means. They conclude that it was the students coming from middle and upper classes who opposed the war in Vietnam. They argue that students coming from lower-class backgrounds feel less secure, and feel threatened by the presence of minorities or any intervention to the system, which make them intolerant to diversity and more conservative in

terms of political liberties while the offspring of the middle classes and upper classes avoid these anxieties thanks to their socioeconomic position in their societies.

In another work, Huber and Stephens (1999) explain that capitalist development stimulates democracy because capitalist development shifts the balance of power by weakening the power of landlord classes and strengthening the subordinate classes. In their work, social classes are the main agents of democratization. They state that the bourgeoisie are one of the classes contributing to democratization by insisting on their share of power in the form of parliamentary control of the state, especially in Europe. Still, they have reservations on the role of the bourgeoisie. According to Huber and Stephens, the bourgeoisie were hostile to further democratization when their interests seemed threatened. Nevertheless, they conclude that it was the bourgeoisie that played the leading role in the full democratization of three important cases: France, Switzerland, and Britain. In these three cases, the common denominator was the absence of a politically active working class at the time of democratic transition.

Bellin (2000) also says that a long tradition in political science puts social classes as the main agent of democratization. Capitalist classes, in this context, have been pointed out as the agent of democracy. However, she agrees with Huber and Stephens on the point that it is not wise to accept the bourgeoisie as champions of democracy without any qualification. She says that capitalist classes support democracy when they perceive democratic institutions to be advancing their interests. According to Bellin, dependence on the state and the presence of other social forces (a strong and politicized working class in particular) are two variables explaining the bourgeoisie attitudes vis-à-vis democratization. Enthusiasm for democracy has an inverse relationship with these two variables. Bellin asserts that capitalist classes were pro-democratic in South Korea and Brazil in 1980s because their dependence on the state was declining and,

especially in the case of South Korea, their fear of other social actors was diminished as a result of economic development.

Parsa (1995) states a similar thesis in his comparison of Iran and Philippines. According to Parsa, entrepreneurial classes have the capacity to lead democratic transitions under certain conditions. He indicates that the bourgeoisie supports democratization if they are economically independent from the state in areas like access to capital and import licenses; if there is no external threat (i.e. the working class); if they have little or no access to polity; and if they have the capacity for collective action. He argues that the concentration of the Filipino entrepreneurial class in the agricultural sector made them marginal actors in the democratization of the Philippines. He says that the agrarian upper class of the Philippines played a conservative role in the Philippines and sided with Marcos for a stable government and favorable agricultural prices. However, in Iran the bazaaris were excluded from the polity, had economic independence from the state, and had little fear from the working classes while the Filipino bourgeoisie suffered from guerilla activities of communist groups. Therefore, he concludes that the bourgeoisie in Iran supported democratization and they were critical of the Shah regime, while the Filipino entrepreneurial class played a marginal role in democratic transition of the Philippines.

Hsiao and Koo (1997) investigate the link between capitalist classes and democratization in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan. They assert that economic development expands the size of the middle classes, which already discontented with authoritarian rule, results in a social class demanding greater political freedom and participation in policy-making. They explain that in South Korea, the intellectual segment of the middle class produced an anti-regime ideology that influenced the political orientation of the mainstream middle class. Then, the Korean middle class forced the politicians to seek alternative ways of decision-making, and led the civil society

movements. In Taiwan, the middle classes led the opposition movements like they did in South Korea, and liberal intellectuals of the middle class (such as university professors) disseminated pro-democratic assessments by turning public opinion against anti-democratic measures of the state. In both cases, Hsiao and Koo conclude that middle classes played their dual roles as a *demanding force* and a *stabilizing base*.

Cardoso (1986) is another author confirming the link between the bourgeoisie and democracy. He contends that the Brazilian bourgeoisie decided to weaken their ties with the feudal powers during the late 1970s and 1980s. He then argues that the business community of Brazil opted for a stance that was critical of authoritarianism and supportive of a controlled transition to democracy. He thinks that the role played by the private sector was crucial for the political liberalization of Brazil, but he also says it was a limited role at the same time. It was crucial because if they had allowed themselves to be absorbed by the state, there would have been fewer concessions over liberalization. It was limited because the Brazilian the bourgeoisie was merely one group among many actors pushing for democratization.

Therefore, the bourgeoisie can be a progressive force given the presence of certain requirements. Independence from or absence of a fear of the state, weakness of a revolutionary working class, and lack of access to polity are important determinants of the bourgeoisie's attitude vis-à-vis democratization and moderation. Than the next question is if the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie have these qualities that would make them support democratization and moderate values.

As the historical survey of the Kurdish movement and political Islam in Turkey will demonstrate in the next chapter, lack of access to polity has been one of the most important problems of the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey. Major Kurdish and Islamist

political parties were closed down by the state on the grounds that these political parties use Kurdish and Islamist identities for violating the principles of secular and unitary state. Even the AKP faced a danger of closure by the constitutional court despite the fact that it was able to secure more than 40% of the votes in the 2007 elections. The lawsuit was still going on at the time of writing this thesis. In addition, several state actors including ex-prime ministers and the Army generals have declared that they have no desire to establish relations with people from these identity groups.

For example, Tansu Ciller explained in 1993 that she had a list with the names of 63 Kurdish businessmen who supported the PKK. She also stated that the state would take action against these collaborators as soon as possible. Indeed, the following months witnessed mysterious murders of several Kurdish businessmen in Turkey (Yalçın 1998). In another instance, Michael Rubin stated that, in his several interviews with the Turkish Army officers, the Army indicated that it would not buy products from Ülker for its conscripts- a leading soft drink and biscuit company supposedly supporting political Islam in Turkey - so as not to subsidize Islam in Turkey (Rubin 2005: 8). Moreover, the state did not have any objections to bring down Islamic capitalists whenever it deemed it necessary. In 1997, the case of the Kombassan Holding became a major focus of attention for the state authorities and the Turkish public. Kombassan Holding, the most important member of MÜSİAD and a bastion of Islamic capital, suffered major inspections by the Ministry of Finance, National Intelligence Agency, and Committee of Free Market right after a National Security Committee decision advertising political Islam as the most important danger for the Turkish Republic (Müderrisoğlu 1997).

Hence, the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey lack access to polity in Turkey, and they have reasons to be afraid of the state. In addition to that, the Islamist and the

Kurdish bourgeoisie are products of the post-1980 era in which the economy went through major transformations. Buğra (1998, 524) and Öniş (2004) explain that post-1980s constitutes an era in which the traditional role of the state in economy had been revised, and old protectionist regimes were discredited. Therefore, the new bourgeoisie of Turkey was less dependent on state resources and protectionism to conduct their business. Buğra also notes that only a small portion of the MÜSİAD members were present in the pre-1980 period, which supports the fact that these companies do not enjoy the state support and protectionism that older firms had enjoyed.

Lastly, the post-1980s witnessed a systematic erosion of the power of leftist ideologies and the working class. Boratav (2007) argues that, in the post-1980 period, Özal perceived the “disciplining” of the working class and curtailing of workers’ wages as two fundamental tenets of his economic program. It was a period, as Boratav says, aimed at eradicating the power of trade unions and labor movement. Indeed, the initial statement of General Evren, the head of the 1980 military coup further supported this new era in Turkish politics. In his statement, Evren compared his salary with that of a waitress and criticized the freedoms that trade organizations enjoyed in Turkey.

The new regime acted quickly to transform the society along new principles. Fox (2007, 35-38) says the following days of the 1980 coup witnessed the imprisonment of union leaders and members. Laws regulating labor rights also underwent radical changes. New laws required the trade unions to get official permission to organize meetings or rallies. Furthermore, worker unions were required to invite the police to these meetings, who videotaped these rallies and meetings. Also, the right to strike was severely restricted. Fox states that current rate of unionization in Turkey is around 13%, and about 9% in the private sector. Fox explains that this figure was around 22% in 1975.

The antagonism of the state elite vis-à-vis labor has continued although the pressure on trade unions was relaxed to some extent. The state crushed the rallies of labor unions in 2007 and 2008 Labor Day celebrations because of the unions' stated desire to rally at the Taksim Square in Istanbul. After these occasions, the prime minister described the union leaders and protesters as communist looters harming Turkish society.

It is in this context that the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey have significant incentives to be moderate and supportive of democratization. They are independent from the state. In addition, they do not face an immediate danger coming from other classes such as a revolutionary working class. Moreover, in the past, they have faced important problems with accessing to polity.

In this vein, I argue that the rise of an Islamist bourgeoisie was among the factors moderating both the policies and claims of the AKP. This novel class in political Islam might have motivated the leaders of the movement to display more pro-system values, which has been materialized in the AKP, the moderate Islamist Party of Turkey governing Turkey. It was in their interest to have a more pro-system and moderate Islamist party since their economic position and business relations required stable relations with the outside world, especially with the European Union. Moreover, they perceived democracy and toleration as merits facilitating their expression of Islamic identity in the public sphere.

By contrast, the dominant Kurdish movement and Kurdish parties failed to experience the transformation political Islam has been going through, and Kurdish political parties failed to become an integrated part of legal Turkish politics. Therefore, both Turkish elite and society have perceived the Kurdish question as a security problem, a framework under which reaching a solution is even more difficult to achieve. In this context, I argue that the absence or weakness of

the bourgeoisie within the dominant Kurdish movement and main Kurdish political party may be among the factors (along with others, such as obstacles in front of the expression of the Kurdish identity and culture) accounting for the lack of a similar democratic transformation within the Kurdish political parties.

CHAPTER 2

TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

The scholarly community accepts that modernization of contemporary Turkey is a process that began in the early 19th century Ottoman Empire (Zürcher 2003, Dağı 2005, Berkes 1998, Küçükcan 2003, and Mardin 2003). For instance, Berkes (1998) argues that “the doors to the West were thrown wide open in 1839”. Nevertheless, the major and most radical steps for modernization came only with the Republican era.

Moreover, these reforms aiming towards modernization had significant repercussions on the Kurdish question and political Islam in Turkey. In this chapter, I will try to understand these influences by investigating the reforms and their effects in the Republican Turkey. In addition, I will try to show, briefly, how the Kurdish and the Islamist movements evolved and changed their goals in different periods of the modern Turkish history. While doing this, for the sake simplicity and clarity, I will investigate the Republican reforms under two headings: centralization and secularization. A third section will focus on the Republican elite’s efforts to inventing the modern Turk since this period is especially important in terms of its effects on the Turkish society. Then, I will try to elaborate how these reforms affected everyday life, focusing primarily on Kurds and Islamic lifestyle.

2.1 Secularization

In the early Ottoman period, religion was the most important signifier of a person’s identity both in the eyes of administrative units and in the eyes of his neighbor. He was a

Muslim, Jew, Orthodox, or Catholic before being a Greek, Turk, or Kurd (Davison 1954: 844). These separate religious entities were named as *millets*, and non-Muslim millets were allowed certain rights such as practicing their religions freely, choosing their religious leaders, and controlling matters such as divorce, marriage and education of their offspring.

Yet, the millet system underwent significant changes beginning with the Rescript of Gülhane (Zürcher 2003: 52). Although somewhat ambiguous in the rescript, the principle of equality before the law regardless of religion was granted to all subjects of the Sultan for the first time. The Edict was assessing a regular system of assessing and levying taxes, and an equally regular system for the levying of troops and the duration of their service. Similar reforms detaching religion from the state apparatus had continued until the collapse of the Empire⁶. However, the process of secularization gained its real momentum with the dawn of the new Republic.

Atatürk believed that civilization is a whole, and that one cannot take its material part while ignoring its non-material side (Berkes 1978: 517). At this point, it is possible to infer that Atatürk was affected by the thoughts of the early Young Turk ideologues such as Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet who blamed Islam and its reflections on the Muslim civilizations for the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, it was obvious that the new state elite would take immediate measures to change the old life styles inherited from the Ottoman past even if it meant complete rupture in some areas of life. Parallel with this aim, Küçükcan (2003: 475) explains, the Kemalists had begun to restructure state and society, and introduce society to a

⁶ For more information on the secular reforms in the Ottoman period, see: Berkes, Niyazi. 1978. “*Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*” [Modernization in Turkey]. Doğu Batı Yayınları: İstanbul. Also see: Ortaylı, İlber. 2000. “*İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*” [The Longest Century of the Empire]. İletişim: İstanbul

sense of belonging to a newly defined Turkish nation that would replace the previously defined Ottoman identity. Islamic ulema were the main opponent to this new source of loyalty since the country had become a more homogenous place in terms religions as a result of the WWI and the Independence War.

Secularizing the state and society along with the new principles was quick to come. The Caliphate was abolished in 1924 along with the institution of Şeyhülislam, and the educational system was secularized in the same year with the Law on the Unification of Education. In September 1925, *tekkes* (religious communities) and *türbes* (tombs of sacred people) were closed down, and a dress reform replaced the fez with western-style hat or cap. In 1926, the European calendar was adopted as were the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code. In addition to these, in 1928, we see the removal of the clause from the constitution, which made Islam the official state religion. The same year also witnessed the adoption of the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic alphabet the Ottomans were using. Zürcher (2003:194) perceives these acts as a direct attack on religious symbols and replacement by symbols from the Western world. Moreover, the new Republic gave women the right to run and vote in municipal elections in 1930, whereas they entailed the same rights for national elections in 1934. Additionally, Sundays replaced Fridays as the official holiday of the week in 1935. In order to bolster these reforms and create the ideal citizen the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) and Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) were created for educating common people according to the reforms introduced. As Hermann (2003: 267) explains, these reforms pushed autonomous Islam, the main rival to a secular Turkish identity project, out of the public sphere for a long time.

2.2 Centralization

Efforts to centralize administration and increase the power of the center at the expense of local powers were other major dimensions of the Turkish modernization. After WWI and the Independence War, all that was left from the old Empire was Anatolia and a small fraction in Europe. Compared to the Ottoman Empire, the new Republic had to deal with a smaller territory, and the population living on this territory was much more homogeneous in terms of religion and ethnic composition.

In such an environment, centralization became a more achievable goal. Köker (1995: 51) explains that, contrary to the Western republican tradition of autonomous local self-government, local politics in contemporary Turkey have been created by and for the central state. He argues that the catastrophes of the 19th century created a sense of distrust for the periphery in the ranks of the Ottoman elite. This feeling of distrust was also inherited by the Kemalist regime. In fact, events like the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, the revolt of Ağrı Dağı in 1930-31, and the Dersim rebellion of 1937 have served as good reasons for increasing the centralist tendencies of the state.

As Yavuz (2001: 8) points out, these revolts were perceived as signs of danger to the national integrity of the state, which resulted in a polarization between the center and the periphery in which the center sees the periphery as a danger that should be controlled by all means. According to Zürcher (2003: 178, 179) and McDowall (2004: 191), the Republican elite prohibited the public use and teaching of Kurdish, and insisted on the sole use of Turkish in courts in 1924. Moreover, the Turkish parliament passed the *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* (Law on the

Maintenance of Order) in 1925, which empowered the government to ban any organization and publication that may cause disturbance to law and order.

The new elite were also aware of the fact that communication with the periphery was an important part of any centralization efforts. Zürcher (2003: 204) says that railway building was the most significant investment in the early years of the Republic. Eight hundred kilometers of track were laid between 1923 and 1929, and another eight hundred were still under construction in 1929.

The state's desire to protect central core and empower it vis-à-vis periphery is still an important motive factor in contemporary Turkish politics. Article 125 of the 1982 constitution states that the establishment and duties of local administrations are regulated and defined by central authorities (Constitution of the Turkish Republic 2007). Moreover, the second chapter of the Law on Financial Administration and Control of Public Administrations (2007) states that it is under the authority of the central government and the governors appointed from the center to regulate and supervise provinces' budgets while the third chapter of the same law indicates that it is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance to supervise the regulation and expenditures of public administrations' budgets.

2.3 Awakening the 'Turk'

Kadıoğlu (1998) asserts that Turkish identity is not a product of "who is the Turk?" but is the product of "who should be the Turks?" In other words, Turkish identity is a product of a social engineering process run by the Republican elite. Therefore, she argues that the end of the Ottoman Empire witnessed to the birth of a new state, which was looking for its nation. Kasaba (1997: 23, 24) also says that the Republican elite saw themselves as the most important force for

change. For them, society was a project in which the people living in Turkey were the objects of their experiment. Kasaba compares the Republican elite with the Jacobins who dominated France in 1793-94 "...in terms of the puritanical zeal with which each approached the task of remaking their respective state and society." Therefore, now that the elite had captured the Turkish state, it was time to invent the Turk.

Although this view have some truth in it, it is important to remember that some sort of Turkish consciousness was present in Anatolia even before the dawn of the new Republic. The Young Turks had carried out important policies to awaken a Turkish identity especially following the Balkan Wars, after which we see a salient homogenization of the Empire in terms of religious and ethnic identity since the lost Balkan territory was predominantly Christian and Slav. In addition, substantial Muslim and Turkish population immigrated to Anatolia from the Balkans and Caucasia during the same period. Moreover, the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War created a sense of distrust for other ethnic and religious identities, and it is possible to discern these signs of this distrust even in the contemporary Turkish Republic.

İttihat ve Terakki (Committee of Union and Progress, the CUP), party of the Young Turks, took important steps in various areas in order to create a new solidarity. For instance, the CUP began to intervene in the economy after 1913, and they abolished all capitulations unilaterally in 1914. Within this framework, it is important to note the Muslim boycott of 1913 that was supported by the Turkish Hearts, an intellectual club supporting Turkish national movement. Muslims were advised to purchase from their co-religious shopkeepers and to boycott imported goods. Moreover, the CUP had begun to increase the tariff levels for imported goods in order to protect the national economy. In addition, they encouraged the Muslim population to form an Islamic bourgeoisie by using the extraordinary situations of WWI so that

they could replace the Christian bourgeoisie of the Empire. They also obliged the Christians and the Armenians to use Turkish in the administration of their business (such as official correspondence and official accounting) and on their shop windows, and to hire Turks onto the boards of their companies. Lastly, 80 new joint stock companies were founded with the active support of the CUP between 1916 and 1918 (Zürcher 2003: 129-135; Toprak 1994: 259-266).

This period witnessed an interest in Turkish nationalism at an ideological level as well. For instance Turkists from Russia were active in the Empire. Yusuf Akçura, being one of these Turkists, had especially been influential among the Turkist circles by disseminating the idea of the unification of the Turkic peoples of Anatolia and Asia. During WWI, the CUP actively supported this idea in order to draw support from the Central Asian Turks for the Ottoman war against the Russian Empire. The CUP also founded an organization named as *Halka Doğru* (Towards the People) in 1917. This organization concentrated on Anatolia as the Turkish heartland, and idealized the culture of the Turkish peasants.

Nevertheless, even the homogenization of Anatolia in the 1910s and 1920s and the attempts made by the Young Turks towards the establishment of some sort of solidarity did not make the job of awakening Turkish identity easier for the Republican elite. Zürcher (2003: 171, 172) explains that the Great War had brought hundreds of thousands of Muslim (mainly Turkish) refugees to Anatolia while several hundred thousand of Christians (mostly Armenian) were deported from Anatolia during the same period. Mutual massacres between the Muslim and the Armenian populations of Anatolia were also responsible for the decrease of the Armenian population living in Anatolia. Moreover, under the provisions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, about 900,000 Orthodox Greeks left the country in exchange for Muslims from Greece who numbered around 400,000. As a result of these exchanges and emigrations, the Christian

communities had shrunk almost completely. The Armenian community had shrunk to about 65,000, and the Greek community was down from 2 million to 120,000. Nonetheless, the remainder Muslim population was hardly defining themselves as Turks, and their main source of loyalty was still Islam.

In order to bolster the creation of a Turkish identity at the societal level, the state elite took various measures. While trying to answer the question “who should be the Turks?”, one of the first steps the new elite took was a decision to create the secular citizen. As Kasaba (1997: 28) explains, the new nationalist ethos found the position of Islamists inherently incompatible with its civilizing mission. In his words, “In their discourse, Islam became an all-purpose bogey representing everything that reform, progress, and civilization were not.” Karpaz (1959: 53,54) asserts that the individual whom the Republican Elite wanted to create was a rationalist, anti-clerical, and anti-traditionalist approaching matters intellectually and objectively. This made secularization an obligation not only in matters related with the state but also in the everyday lives of people. Lewis (1968: 265) makes another point about the importance of secularization for the Kemalist elite. He argues that even though the Ottoman reforms had decreased the power of the ulema class significantly, this class retained great power and influence over society. A large part of education was under their control; the law related with family and personal matters were under their jurisdiction. In addition, they were the only group with the cohesion, organization, and the power, which could challenge the authority of the new leadership in the country. Berkes (1978: 533) also thinks that the state elite perceived the religion under the disguise of *tarikats* (religious brotherhoods) as a power centre that might impede the nation-building process. Hence, secularization of the state and society had become one of the earliest

goals of the state elite. The secularizing reforms I noted in one of the previous sections were aimed towards this goal: creating the secular citizen by *redeeming* society from Islam.

Kirişçi (2000), Vardar (2004: 94), and Kirişçi & Winrow (2002: 98-112) say that the Republican elite had emphasized a type of citizenship that would be defined on the basis of civic virtues and territory. Güllalp (1995) also indicates that the basis of Kemalist nationalism was territorial nationalism, which resembled to the original Ottoman nationalism in many ways. The Turkish people were defined as those living within Turkey's territory. Yet, this emphasis weakened over time, especially after the 1925 period. It was replaced by a more ethno-cultural one, which attached importance to homogeneity and ethnicity. I will elaborate on the reasons for this change in the attitudes of the state elite in following sections, but now, I will continue with the elite practices after 1923, in which the Republic was declared.

Karpat (1959: 49) explains that events such as WWI and widespread secularization left the Turkish nationalism as the only predominant ideology in Turkey. Yavuz (2006: 6) states that the loss of cosmopolitan character of the Empire together with huge territories in the Balkans and the Middle East left its imprint on Turkish political culture. This transition resulted in the promotion of a secular-nationalism that did not tolerate diversity and insisted that all inhabitants become Turks. Barkey & Fuller (1998: 10-13) states that İnönü, Atatürk's successor after his death, declared in a speech in 1925 that they are all nationalists, and nationalism is their only factor for cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements cannot have any influence. The inhabitants of the Republic must be turkified at any price, and those who oppose the Turks must be annihilated. In this respect, write Barkey and Fuller, the terms "citizenship" and "citizen" were equated with Turkishness in the 1924 constitution. Therefore, the Kemalists

decided to emulate the “homogenous” states of the West by attempting to build the center at the expense of the periphery.

Özbudun (1998: 153, 154) also notes that even though the Kemalist movement had used a pluralist discourse during the Independence War, it became clear after the establishment of the Republic that the locus for the Republican elite was Turkish nationalism. The program and the charter of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in 1927, and the Kemalist Party holding power till 1950, demonstrate this inclination. The party defined itself as a republican and populist organization, which believed that the most important bond among citizens is the unity at the level of language and ideas. It was the fundamental goal of the RPP to make Turkish language and culture dominant at the societal level. Therefore, towards the end of the 1920s the Kemalist elite were envisaging a Turkishness based on cultural unity, which automatically excluded those who did not accept the culture imposed upon them.

In this vein, the state elite used several means to create the ‘Turk’ they had envisaged. Aydıngün & Aydıngün (2004) says that the state elite effectively used language and standardized education to support the establishment of a Turkish identity. They explain that among the elements of culture, language is the one providing an index of culture and most symbolic of that culture, which makes it one of the prominent parts of one’s identity. They state that a movement called *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) affected the Kemalists deeply. *Genç Kalemler* was a movement established in the late Ottoman period. Their main concern was language, and they perceived it as a living organism around which a national sentiment and mobilization of people could be realized.

Motivated by the *Genç Kalemler*, the state elite actively promoted Turkish language among the people. In 1928 the Latin alphabet was adopted instead of the Arabic alphabet, since

Mustafa Kemal thought the Arab alphabet was incompatible with the Turkish language. At the same time; he was aiming to completely break from the Ottoman past by denying one of the Empire's most important heritages that is written language, Ottoman. Following this, the Turkish Language Institution was established in 1932, and the Sun-Language Theory was launched in 1935. This theory claimed that all languages stemmed from Turkish. Campaigns such as “*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş*” (Citizen, Speak Turkish) were also supported by the state elite during this period (Zürcher 2003). In a speech, Atatürk stated that language is one of the most obvious characteristics of a nation, and those who say “I am Turkish” should speak Turkish. He further indicated that if a man who does not speak Turkish claims loyalty to the Turkish culture and community, it would not be correct to believe him.

In addition to these, the Law on the Unification of Education was enacted in 1924, which was a major step in the creation of Turkishness and secularization. With this law all medreses and any further obstacle in the way of educating the populace was eliminated. With this law Turkish had become the only language of education.

White (1999: 80-82, 89) argues that this emphasis on unity was propagated with several slogans such as ‘*bir parti, bir ulus, bir lider*’ (one party, one nation, and one leader) or ‘*Türk’ün Türk’ten başka dostu yoktur*’ (The only friends of a Turk is a Turk). White explains that this emphasis on uniformity is evident even in the 1990s. Articles 26 and Article 28 of the 1982 constitution gave the legislature the powers to adopt laws prohibiting the use of certain languages. In this environment, he states, citizenship was not inclusive of those who attempted to display their identities other than the one offered to them by the state.

The Republic also witnessed the establishment of *Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*, later *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Society for the Study of Turkish History), in 1932 in order to boost the study of

Turkish history. In its first congress held in Ankara, the “*Turkish Historical Thesis*” was propounded. This thesis claimed that the Turks originally living in the Central Asia migrated to the other parts of the world as a result of famines and droughts, and they created other civilizations of the world. Among the examples of these civilizations, the thesis included Sumerians and Hittites (Zürcher 2003: 201). The state elite also encouraged research on the anthropological characteristics of the Turkish history, and it became an obligation to be a pure Turk in order to study in War Academies (Özbudun 1998: 157).

The Sun-Language theory, various campaigns, historical thesis, and various slogans used during the early years of the Republic served the goal of glorifying Turkish history. With these policies the Republican elite wanted to foster an enthusiasm for Turkish history and culture. In this context, the mystification of Turkish history and the Turks was a way to make people proud of themselves and their history. Nonetheless, it is also important to remember that these policies were also signs of the beginning of an ethno-nationalist project in Republican history.

The place of woman also occupied a significant place in the new conceptualization of Turkishness. The symbolic value of women had carried out a crucial role within the modernization of the Turkish identity. Secor rightly pointed out the concept of veiled women played a significant role in Western Orientalism. They were the symbol of the erotic, barbaric, and backwards East. Therefore, the emancipation of women and the need to unveil her became an important issue for those envisioning a new Turkish identity. (Secor 2002: 5, 6) As a result, the elite acted with enthusiasm to construct a new political and cultural identity for women.

The elite achieved significant reforms in accordance with their goals. The single-party regime granted women equal rights of inheritance and divorce with the new Civil Code of 1926, as well as banning polygamy. The elite granted them the right to run and vote in municipal

elections in 1930 whereas the same rights were extended to national elections in 1934. Furthermore, primary education became compulsory for both men and women, which in turn contributed to the enrollment of women in various education institutions including universities. In addition, physical segregation of men and women in schools were abolished gradually. (Kabasakal Arat 2003:57, 58)

Mustafa Kemal himself displayed his support for these reforms with certain symbolic acts. For instance, he purposely adopted girls in a highly patrimonial society to show his support for the reforms. In addition, his wife Latife was the first woman to unveil herself. Meanwhile, he also expressed his sympathy towards the emancipation of woman several times in the public domain. For instance, in one of his speeches he stated that: “If we need science and technology for our social structure, we need to give equal rights to women as men.” (Savcı 1973: 172).

The attempts to create the modern Turk were also bolstered by several institutions at the societal level. In 1932, the Kemalists founded *Halkevleri* (People’s Houses) in towns and *Halk Odaları* (People’s Rooms) in large villages. Under the strict control of the state elite, the goal of these institutions was to spread nationalist, positivist, and secularist ideas throughout the country (Zürcher 2003:188). According to Öztürkmen (1994), these institutions fulfilled the function of mediating the ideas, reforms and images promoted and produced by the new regime while exerting control over social and cultural activities at the local level. Some classes to be undertaken in these institutions were language, history, sports, fine arts, and theater. Even if these institutions were highly ideological places, they also had some success since some prominent names of Turkish literary society, like the world-famous novel-writer Yaşar Kemal, were educated in these institutions. Another institution founded in 1924 with the similar goals was Türk Kadınlar Birliği (Union of Turkish Women). Yet, this institution was closed down in

1935 after they protested the Nazi regime in Germany and wanted to convene an international congress without conferring with the RPP.

2.4 Political Islam during the Republican History

In order to understand the rise of political Islam in Turkey, it is important comprehend the role Islam and Islamic actors had played in the Ottoman Empire. Islam as a religion does not only regulate the religious lives of believers, but it also regulates economic, political, educational, and social lives of its believers (Berkes 1978: 528). Mardin (1993: 78, 93) agrees with Berkes by stating that Islam has several characteristics that make it an all-inclusive recipe for its disciples. He states that Islam is a normative religion that protects the individual by including him in the *ümmet* (Islamic community); prescribing general structure of the society; and protecting the integrity of the society in the absence of institutions. This latter feature of Islam is especially important for us to understand the significance of tarikats in the Ottoman society.

The Ottoman Empire was a classical Islamic society in certain respects. It was an Islamic state in which the Sultan, the head of the state, also served as the caliph who theoretically held spiritual authority over all Sunni Muslims (Küçükcan 2003: 475). In this Islamic Empire, Muslims were the privileged group, and the ulema class had important political powers within the state establishment. Therefore, Islam was not only a religion; it was also the most important signifier of a Muslim's identity. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire embraced this signifier as an ideology regulating his life. For instance, tarikats and tekkes were one of the building stones of this Islamic identity while carrying out important regulative and authoritative roles in the Empire.

According to Mardin (1993), tarikats and tekkes were the institutions in which Turks reconciled the basics of traditional Turkish life with the Sunni Islam. Moreover, through the established rules, these bodies regulated life in important areas such as the economy. For instance, *Ahiler* (guild of tradesmen) in Anatolia were followers of the Bektaşî order, and they were careful about following the rules of the Bektaşî order in their businesses. Another example Mardin (2005) provides is the Nakşibendis in the 19th century. He explains that Nakşibendi networks crisscrossed the whole Anatolia in this century, and these networks assumed political roles such as intervening in inter-tribal conflicts when the Ottoman Empire was weakening.

By undermining this framework with secularizing reforms, the Ottoman elite and the Republican elite had paved the way for a reactionary political Islam in Turkish political life. Gülalp (1995) perceives the rise of Islamist political movements in Turkey as a product of the frustration caused by modernization. Especially the loss of Muslim's superior status as a result of political and legal modernization, which instituted formal equality, caused them to rise as a conservative force resisting reform.

The Islamists, beginning with the Tanzimat, had begun to respond to the challenge posed by modernization in several ways, since the program of the Ottoman bureaucracy and the Republican elite questioned the validity, functionality, and relevance of Islam in social life (Dağı 2005: 22, 23). They moved into a defensive position against the modernizing elite, and they claimed that it was not Islamic civilization, but the deviation from the true Islam that had caused the weakening of the Empire. For them, the possibility of a civilizational shift meant an abandonment of Islam, and a polarization between Islamists and westernizers has increased since these reforms swept them away the centers of political and social order.

Zürcher (2003: 70, 100) argues that the Islamic reaction to the reforms became visible especially after the Edict of 1856. An attempt for a *coup d'état* by Islamists broke out in the Bosphorus in 1859, and Syria in 1860, in which Muslims committed communal violence against non-Muslim communities. Zürcher explains that the Muslim reaction to the reforms has continued throughout the 1870s. The most important reactions of the political Islam against the reforms during the Ottoman Empire occurred in April 1909. Frustrated by the Young Turks' reforms, conservative religious circles (lower ulema and sheikhs of the dervish orders) had begun demonstrations with the beginning of Ramadan in 1908 demanding the prohibition of photography, the closure of bars and theaters, and restrictions on the freedom of movement of women. Following these demonstrations, an armed insurrection broke out in the capital on April, 12 1909 in the name of the restoration of Islam and the Shariah rule. Faced with this surprise attack, the Young Turks went underground or fled the capital while the rebels killed twenty Young Turks. Nevertheless, the revolt was suppressed in April 24 by the *Hareket Ordusu* (the Action Army), which was put together in Macedonia by the commander of the Third Army, Mahmut Şevki Pasha.

The reforms aimed at secularization were more dramatic and top-down during the early Republican era. Nevertheless, we are not able to see a direct confrontation of the Islamists and the state elite during these early years due to a well-organized state and tarikats' strategy of going underground. Exceptions include the Menemen incident in 1930, in which Islamists killed a young military officer named Kubilay, and the establishment of the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Partisi* and the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party, SCF). Although established with Atatürk's blessing, these parties became the rallying point for conservative religious groups

in a short period of time. Eventually, both parties were closed down, the former by the state and the latter by its founders, under the allegations of supporting Islamist movements.

During the same period, the *Nursi* movement founded by Sait Nursi in the 1930s became an important Islamist movement. After the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, Nursi was resettled in Isparta along with other prominent Kurds of the era. He was arrested several times between 1935 and 1953 using religion for political goals. From the 1920s onwards, he laid down the ideas he preached in several booklets and brochures, which were collected and known as *Risale-i Nur* (Message of Light). In his writings and preaches, he invited Muslims to unite under the God's authority, and study modern sciences in order to use them for the advance of Islam.

During the one party period of 1923-1945 political Islam was suppressed, and Islamists were not able to rally around an Islamist political party. Yet, the multiparty period beginning with 1945 signified a new era for political Islam. The first Islamist party of the Republic was founded in 1946 under the title of *İslam Koruma Partisi* (Party of Islamic Defense). Another party was founded five years after under the name of *İslam Demokrat Partisi* (Democratic Party of Islam). Both of these parties were closed down by the state after their establishment based on accusations of political use of religion. While these two parties are the first examples of Islamist parties in Turkey, almost everyone will agree that the first salient Islamic party of Turkey was the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) of 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, which perceived Islam as incompatible with the secular order in Turkey. (Heper 2003: 130; Atacan 2005; Dağı 2005; Doğan 2005: 423) The party was closed in 1971 on the basis that it violated constitutional norms and secular principles. After one year later, the same cadre established National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*), which received 11.8% and 8.6% of

the votes in 1973 and 1977 elections respectively. This party also participated in the National Front coalitions of Demirel, thus establishing itself as an important actor in Turkish politics.

After the 1980 military coup, the Army decided to use Islam as a weapon to eradicate the strength of the extreme rightist and leftist ideologies in Turkey. In parallel with this goal, the state gradually relaxed the pressure on political Islam and the expression of Islamic identity. For instance, the number of *İmam Hatips* (religious schools which train imams) was increased, and classes about religion became obligatory in primary and high schools. With the help of these policies and the lift of the ban on political leaders in 1987, we witnessed a salient and steady rise of political Islam in Turkey.

The Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*), founded in 1983 under the leadership of Erbakan, participated in 1991 elections, and they received 16.9% of the votes thanks to their cooperation with the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*). During the following elections in 1995, the WP acted alone, and received 21.4% of the votes which made an Islamist party victorious for the first time in Turkish politics. Yet, the coalition government of the WP with the center-right True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*) was a total disappointment, and Erbakan was forced to resign after the post-modern Coup of February 1997. Eventually the Constitutional Court closed this party in 1998, and its MPs transferred to the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*). The Virtue Party however shared the fate of its predecessor in 2001, and was again closed by the constitutional court. This time, however, the closure the Virtue Party resulted with two new parties. The traditional wing established the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) and the younger and more liberal wing established the AKP. This division would become one of the turning points in the history of political Islam.

The history of Islamist political parties in Turkey has also witnessed a visible evolution of an ideology and the evolution of how politics can be conducted by Islamic politicians. Traditionally, the fundamental tenet of political Islam in Turkey can be gathered under the umbrella of the National View (*Milli Görüş*), which is a blend of a blessing for the Ottoman past, a counterattack against cosmopolitanism, and an emphasis on Islamic virtues and nationalism (Dağı 2005: 24). Their message combines this nationalist-religious tone with populism and a promise of a break with the pro-Western stand of Turkey, including its relations with the IMF and the EU (Somer 2006: 31; Doğan 2005: 423; Dağı 2005: 24).

Both the NOP and the NSP had a dominant Islamic discourse and they considered both national and spiritual development to be of great importance. They saw market capitalism and integration with world markets as harmful for the Turkish economy and nation, since their voters were mostly the petty bourgeoisie and traders of Anatolian cities and towns who were supposedly considerably affected by the integration with the world markets and modernization of the economy. They conceived the West as the mother of all evils, and perceived the European Economic Community as a Christian Community that was aimed at the exploitation and Christianization of Turkey. According to them, what Turkey needed was to take the technology of the Western world while protecting and emphasizing the Islamic characteristics of Turkish society.

This continuity in ideology was observable in the post-1980 era although salient moderation was perceivable in issues such as the Customs Union, the IMF, and democracy. For instance, in 1995, the Welfare Party and the True Path Party coalition prepared a balanced government program in terms of EU affairs. This program stated that the government would work towards empowering the ties between the EU and Turkey by considering cost-benefit

balances within the framework of relations of equal states, and without sacrificing the national and cultural interest of the Turkish state. Nevertheless, Erbakan, the prime minister of the era, continued to emphasize the Islamist outlook of his government by visiting countries like Iran and Libya. He also met with leaders of important tarikats and cemaats in a dinner given at the official residence of the prime-ministry.

However, the real signs for moderation have only come with the Virtue Party after the Welfare Party was closed down. Western values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law became a part of the new party's discourse (Dağı 2005: 27-28). There is no doubt that the desire to avoid future closures of their party, and the desire to lift the political ban of Erbakan after the closure of the WP, played an important part in adoption of a new discourse. In fact, they even sued Turkey in the European Human Rights Court on the basis that the closure of the WP and the political ban on Erbakan were undemocratic and unlawful. These signs of moderation were important; but today it is inside the AKP where most of the commentators show as the radical rupture from the National View tradition.

Heper (2003) states that the AKP has displayed stronger pro-system features since its inception compared to its predecessors. Doğan (2005), Hale (2005), Dağı (2005), and Somer (2006) also confirm this change in the AKP's stance towards policy-making. For example, the leader of the AKP, Erdoğan, stated that full membership to the EU is one of the priorities of the AKP. Furthermore, both Erdoğan and other leading members of the AKP have declared several times that their party is not an Islamic party. Instead, they refer to themselves as conservative/democrats, and they emphasized their resemblances with the Christian Democrats in Europe. They even applied to the Christian Democratic group in the European Parliament, and they became a member of the European Christian Democrats.

Hale (2005) confirms the existence of some parallels between the AKP and the Christian Democrats on issues like moral values, international attitudes, and educational issues. The moderation is highly visible in the AKP party program as well. According to Somer (2006), the AKP program downplays the importance of religion, unlike the WP and the Felicity Party. Individual and human rights, economic and democratic reforms, and the EU integration are the salient topics in the AKP program while these issues were undervalued or simply nonexistent in other Islamic parties. In contrast to the AKP, the Felicity Party makes emphasis on collective interests, national interests, and a traditional national view. In addition to that, unlike their predecessors, party leaders of the AKP deny usage of religion for political purposes. In the AKP party program (2007), the words “religion” and “religious” were used sixteen times, and there is no reference to being Muslim and Islam as a religion in this text. Moreover, there is a strong emphasis on laicism. On page six, they state that laicism is one of the bases of democratic life, and it assures freedom in a society. In this context, it is possible to assert that the AKP experience is a radical rupture from the traditional political Islam in Turkey.

This transformation of Islamic parties was also accompanied by the rise of an Islamic civil society. Islamic actors have been enthusiastic to participate in civil life by establishing civil society organizations beginning in the early 1990s. Eager to establish civil society organizations with Islamic values, these organizations are also keen to internalize the liberal democratic values of the West (Çaha 2001). Kadioğlu (2005: 25-26) also supports this position by arguing that Islamic type organizations do not deny autonomy to their members. She gives the examples of Islamic women who defend use of the headscarf because of their own convictions rather than pressure from outside groups.

Among the examples of this kind of civil society organizations, one can include the *Müstakil İşadamları Derneği* (Association of Independent Businessmen- MÜSİAD) and Mazlum-Der (an Islamic human rights organization). Interestingly, one of the first activities of the Mazlum-Der was in taking action for the protection of the imprisoned leftists' rights. Although their main focus has been the promotion of the headscarf and the protection of rights of students with headscarves, they have also been active in the Kurdish question, unresolved political murders, women's rights, lost people, and human rights violations in prison. Thus, they protected their Islamic outlook while also increasing their reputation as a human rights association. (Kadıoğlu 2005: 34-36)

The realm of civil society organizations were not the only area in which Islamists appeared as active participants. Daily matters related with popular culture such as fashion has also become a terrain in which Islamists actively took part and have shaped their environment. Navaro-Yashel (2002: 225-228) explains that Islamists transformed the marketplace in Turkey by marketing veiling accessories as a fashion commodity. Veiling is one of the most important symbols of political Islam in Turkey, especially for Islamist women. Prior to the 1980s, the Islamist women bought their clothes from the cheap shops located in the backstreets of neighborhoods inhabited by Islamists. This situation has gradually changed after the 1980s.

The traditional colors of the overcoats were black, dark blue, dark green or brown but were replaced with more fashionable colors, and Islamist women had begun to use colors such as purple, light pink, and lavender for their coats. The female Islamist students carefully matched the color of their headscarves to that of their overcoats, and silk headscarves replaced cotton ones. The companies selling veiling clothes also wanted to appeal to their potential customers with fashion shows, in which famous models presented the latest trends in veiling. By this

transformation, the Islamist women give important clues about the new Islam and the Islamist women. First, the new Islamist woman is self confident about herself, and she is not afraid to differentiate herself from the rest. Second, the new Islamists are not afraid of being a part of the marketplace.

The historical survey of political Islam and Islamist political parties in Turkey shows us that we observe a visible transformation of the political Islam in Turkey by broadening their appeal and changing their values while keeping their Islamic outlook simultaneously. During their transformation, the main actors of political Islam have become more willing to tolerate other groups, abide by the rules of the legal system, and communicate with other identity groups. It is this change that makes Islamist political parties a legal and compatible actor of the system in the eyes of a substantial part of Turkish society and numerous political actors in Turkey.

2.5 The Kurdish movement in Turkish History

Contemporary Kurdish nationalists argue that Kurdish nationalism has its roots deep in Ottoman history. However, Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish nation as significant phenomena are relatively new in the history of the Middle East, although Kurdishness as an ethnic and territorial category existed for a long time. Various scholars have discussed that contrary to the claims of the 20th and 21st century Kurdish romanticists; there was no phenomenon such as Kurdish nationalism in the 19th century (Özoğlu 2004: 69; van Bruinessen 1992: 267; Zürcher 2003: 176; and Yavuz 2001: 3-5). Indeed, there are at least three reasons justifying their argument.

One of these reasons was the Ottoman millet system. The millet system was based on religious divisions within the Empire. The Kurds, being predominantly Sunni Muslim, were part

of the privileged Muslim millet. Barkey & Fuller (1998: 6) explain that as a part of the Islamic community, Kurds were members of the social and political core of the Empire along with Turks and Arabs. As part of this Sunni community, Kurds were treated as a distinct group in the Empire by the Sultan. Kurds were allowed to establish a number of independent principalities and *emirates* (fiefdoms), and they were autonomous in their internal affairs in exchange for providing soldiers and paying taxes to the Sultan. Especially Kurdish notables who had strong ties to the Sultan, because of their autonomy and the institution of the Caliphate, prevented nationalist movements from growing within the Kurdish community (van Bruneissen 1992: 269).

Loyalty of the Kurds had continued even when the Empire was losing power on all fronts. The Kurdish population of the Ottoman Empire stayed loyal to the Sultan in 19th and 20th century when the Empire was shaken from within by the nationalist aspirations of various ethnic groups in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Arab Peninsula. The feeling of being the part of the Sunni millet did not disappear after Istanbul was invaded and the Caliph became a captive of the occupation forces. Bozarslan (2005: 97) states that the Kurds perceived the war as a *jihad* (religious war against non-Muslim communities or states) against invaders and Christian (Greeks and Armenians) communities. Their priority was not to establish a Kurdish state, although they were conscious of their Kurdishness during this period. Instead, they understood the war as the war of rescuing the Caliph, the leader of the Muslim world.

The second reason for the absence of Kurdish nationalism in this period was the autonomy of the notables and religious leaders of the Kurdish areas. Özoğlu (2004) argues that the autonomy given to the Kurdish notables hindered the emergence of a cohesive Kurdish identity during the Ottoman period. The feudal structure and the geography of the Kurdish areas were already preventing the establishment of a Kurdish identity. Moreover, the autonomy given

to the notables weakened the chances of a Kurdish movement since the Ottoman elite consciously or unconsciously let the Kurdish notables compete with each other, which in turn divided them even further. Özoğlu also nicely shows that riots that were presented as the signs of Kurdish nationalism were actually reactions to the centralization attempts of the center. For instance, he argues that the Bedirhan Revolt of 1847 was provoked by the new administrative policies of the Tanzimat period. He says that the new policies were dividing Bedirhan Pasha's land and weakening his authority. After the revolt was suppressed, Bedirhan Pasha was not condemned to death, but instead sent to Crete as an administrator.

At this point, it is important to note that while not completely successful in breaking down the feudal structure in the region, centralization beginning with the Tanzimat weakened the Kurdish notables. Later on, the power vacuum created by this weakening was filled by religious leaders and tarikats, which increased the political power of Islam. In the following years some of these religious leaders would play important roles in fomenting new riots (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 7). Especially, the *Nakşibandis* (a religious order) played important roles after the weakening of the Bedirhan Pasha.

The third reason for the absence of a Kurdish movement aiming independence was the Armenian factor. Bozarslan (2004: 91, 98-100) points out that the existence of the Armenian community as the common enemy/ other was the third factor for the lack of Kurdish nationalism, especially in the late period of the Ottoman Empire. In this period, he claims that being Kurdish was a way of showing their Ottoman and Muslim characteristics. In this environment the Kurds always chose to cooperate with the center against the Armenians, since they saw the Armenian community as a danger for the unity of the Empire, as *kafir* (infidels), and as a threat to their own interests. Being aware of this fact, Turkish leaders such Kazım Karabekir, an influential army

general, actively promoted the Islamic brotherhood and the Armenian fear in order to guarantee the loyalty of the Kurdish notables.

Yet, the fall of the Empire and the establishment of a new Republic became a turning point for the Kurdish movement. These three bonds linking the Kurds and the Turks have disappeared one by one as a result of historical events and a series of reforms. For example, WWI and the Independence War resulted in the removal of the Armenian population from the Kurdish populated areas. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians emigrated, were departed from the country, or died during the course of war. By the end of the Independence War the Armenian community had shrunk to 65,000. While this made the Kurds the dominant group in the east of Anatolia, it also resulted in the disappearance of the common enemy of the Turks and the Kurds (Zürcher 2003: 177). Hence, for Turks and Kurds, the incentive to act together was diminished significantly.

Another break between the Turks and the Kurds was the result of secularizing reforms. Sunni Kurds were one of the privileged ethnic groups in the Empire since they were the part of Sunni millet. Therefore, being Muslim was the most important determinant of their identity, and they were loyal to the Caliph in Istanbul. In addition, the centralization policies beginning with the Tanzimat weakened the notables in the region while strengthening religious leaders and tarikats as a political force. By abolishing this link with secularization, the Kemalist elite unconsciously paved the way for Kurdish nationalism. For instance, the leader of the 1925 Kurdish rebel, Sheikh Said writes in a letter sent to the Kurdish leaders:

“Before we had the common caliph, and he was giving our religious society the feeling of being one with the Turks. Now the Caliph is gone, all we have is the Turkish pressure.” (Bozarslan 2005: 109)

In addition, the institution of Sheikh and the tarikats were playing political roles in the region. Therefore, it is understandable to see a harsh reaction against the abolition of the Caliphate and the ban on tarikats. This point should also be included in the causes of the revolt of Sheikh Said, who himself was an influential Nakşibendi sheikh.

Centralization of the administrative activities and the imposition of a new identity were other reasons for the establishment of Kurdish nationalism. Events like the Balkan wars, the Sevres Treaty, and various revolts in Menemen and the Eastern Anatolia made the Turkish state paranoid about the intentions of the periphery. Therefore, the state increased its control in Eastern Anatolia at the cost of the Kurdish notables and religious leaders.

Moreover, the imposition of a new identity prevented the expression of the Kurdish identity in public realm. Kirişçi (2000), Vardar (2004: 94), and Kirişçi & Winrow (2002: 98-112) say that, prior to 1923, the Republican elite had emphasized a type of citizenship that would be defined on the basis of civic virtues and territory. Mustafa Kemal even declared that Kurds would have some sort of local autonomy where they were in majority (Barkey & Fuller 1998: 9). Yet, the Kemalist elite abandoned these policies beginning with the second half of the 1920s. The emphasis on civic virtues were weakened and replaced by what Vardar (2004: 94) defines as a notion of citizenship, which is a combination of an inclusive contractual political citizenship and exclusive ethnic citizenship. There is no doubt that the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, the 1930 Mount Ararat Rebellion, and the 1937-38 Dersim Rebellions had contributed this strident turn in nationalist discourse of the new Republican elite (Olson 2000: 69, 93). In addition to these, the international environment in 1930s, most prominently the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, encouraged the Republican elite to adopt a more ethno-cultural version of nationalism.

After the Sheikh Said revolt of 1925, the emphasis on homogeneity and the desire to control the Kurdish regions gained even further impetus. The Law on the Maintenance of Order came into force, and the Army suppressed the Revolt after the leaders of the revolt were executed. The state closed down the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party) that was established in 1924 under the allegations that members of this party supported the revolt. Therefore, the Republican elite were able to deal with a more homogenous parliament in terms of ideology during the legislation of certain reforms and policies. From this point onwards, the emphasis on the ethnic side of being Turk as well as the pressure on the expression of the Kurdish identity intensified. For instance, the elite eliminated the word ‘Kurd’, and Turkish names replaced Kurdish towns for children and towns (Saatçi 2002: 557).

After the suppression of the Dersim revolt in 1938, we see a tranquil political era across the region in terms of Kurdish nationalism. Especially the during the 1960-80 era, we witnessed what Yavuz (2001) defines as the secularization of the Kurdish question through socialism. As a result of the worldwide mobilization of leftist ideologies, the Kurds had begun to interact with socialist ideology. Meanwhile, the spread of universal education and the liberal constitution of 1961 gave the Kurdish intellectuals opportunity to shape Kurdish identity. According to Barkey & Fuller (1998: 15), Kurds thought that, as the inhabitants of the most underdeveloped region in Turkey, they would most benefit from the liberation of Turkey from the capitalist and imperialist powers. The leftist movement, aiming to expand its base, took advantage of this view of the Kurdish intellectuals by stressing upon Alevi and Kurdish issues. For instance, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (Labor Party of Turkey), known as TİP, openly suggested in 1970 that there was an ethnic problem in Turkey. Therefore, during 1960s and 1970s, it is possible to argue that the Kurds did not openly promoted Kurdish nationalism, and chose to become a part of the leftist

movement (especially the Alevis). Nonetheless, it was these movements from which the most violent Kurdish revolt was born.

Eventually the nationalist aspirations of Kurds were renewed, and from this point onwards the Kurdish question has become a reference point for Turkish politics. Among the factors that contributed to the revitalization of the Kurdish question after the 1980 coup, we can mention a couple of reasons. First, the 1980 coup implied the collapse of the Republican notion of citizenship that emphasized duties of the citizens and neglected the language of rights. The collapse of the Republican citizenship gave rise to the resurgence of ethnic and religious identities of the people of Turkey albeit in new and remade forms. The transformation of the Turkish economy from a closed model to liberal model; the end of the Cold War and visible ethnic movements surrounding Turkey; increasing civil society movements and the crisis of the organic societal vision of Turkey were among other contributing factors to the revitalization of the Kurdish question in Turkey. (İçduygu and Keyman 2004: 7-8)

In addition to these reasons, we can also add the harsh policies of the 1980 coup. By eradicating the power of the left, the junta released the Kurdish nationalist aspirations embedded in the leftist movements. Moreover, the leftist Kurds who were jailed in prisons and took refuge in Europe formed the core of the new wave of Kurdish nationalism. (Yavuz 2001; Cemal 2004; and Fuller & Barkey 1998) These developments presented themselves as the birth of a violent separatist movement, the PKK terrorist organization that succeeded to politicize a substantial part of Kurds around a common identity regardless of their religious and tribal roots.

According to Kutschera (1994: 12), PKK was a Marxist-Leninist movement strongly committed to an armed struggle to establish an independent Kurdish state. He writes that the PKK is “very much a reflection of refusal of successive Turkish nationalist regimes to

accommodate Kurdish aspirations for cultural and political autonomy.” It was formed in the mid-1970s under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, then a student in Ankara University. The PKK’s first major attack occurred in 1984 on gendarme forts. From this point onwards, Turkey found itself in a catastrophe that would last for decades. By 1999, the undeclared civil war in the Southeast and the East of Anatolia resulted in more than thirty thousand deaths. As many as three thousand villages were destroyed, and around three million people were internally displaced. (Gunter 2000: 850) In addition to these costs, this civil war is also costly in terms of economic situation. There is no doubt that the military expenses have contributed to the fragility of the Turkish economy throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

This limited warfare with the PKK continued in the East and the Southeast of Anatolia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but the Turkish state declared military victory over the PKK in the late 1990s. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was expelled from Syria in 1998, and was captured in 1999 in Kenya. After his capture, Öcalan declared a ceasefire. He ordered the PKK militants not to attack the Turkish soldiers and to leave the country for their bases in Northern Iraq. Nonetheless, skirmishes between the Turkish Army and the PKK/ KADEK, the PKK changed its name to KADEK at the beginning of the 2000s, has begun in 2004 although the intensity of clashes are minor compared to the 1980s and 1990s.

The 1990s and 2000s also witnessed the establishment of several Kurdish parties as new actors in Turkish politics. Beginning with the Democratic Party (DEP) in 1990, there have been various political parties that were explicitly defending Kurdish interests. After the DEP, the People’s Labor Party (HEP), People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), Democratic Society Party (DEHAP), and the current Democratic Society Party (DTP) were attempts of voicing the Kurdish question through political platforms.

Yet, all of these parties, except the DEHAP and the current DTP, were closed down by the constitutional court on the grounds of violation of the constitution and the principle of unitary state⁷. Moreover, none of these parties (except the DEP in 1991 thanks to their coalition with the SHP) got their candidates as MPs in the Turkish parliament. Yet, when they achieved this once in the 1991 elections, it did not take too long for the constitutional court to impeach these MPs and imprison them.

Two important problems that these parties face in Turkish politics since their inception have been their alleged links with the PKK and 10% national threshold in elections (Barkey 1998; Cornell 2001). Turkish authorities and the public opinion never perceived these parties as legitimate actors in the system. More importantly, these parties have never been able to break their ties with the PKK and its leader Öcalan, even though in recent years there has been some sort of moderation in the public discourse they use (Sahin 2007).

Indeed, several statements of the Kurdish political leaders confirm the organic link between the PKK and the Kurdish political parties. For instance, Hatip Dicle, leader of the first Kurdish party DEP, explained in 1994 that the PKK attack, which left five military students in Tuzla train station, should be considered normal because these students are enemy soldiers for the PKK (Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information 2008). In another instance, Tunceli mayor, Songül Erol Abdil from the DTP, blessed a PKK woman suicide bomber, who killed seven Turkish soldiers in 1996, as the pioneer of the woman freedom movement (Radikal 2007a). Again in 2007, the DTP mayor of Batman said that the PKK militants are the most honorable people of this country. Moreover, the DTP spokesman stated that they see the PKK and its leader Öcalan as the leader of their movement. In addition, he

⁷ www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/SPK

explained in the same speech that Öcalan's offer of democratic solution to the Kurdish question is the basis of their policy-making (Radikal 2007b).

The results of our content analysis of the pro-DTP Yeni Gündem also provide us with important clues about the link between the PKK and the dominant Kurdish movement in Turkey. To recapitulate, I investigated 65 issues of this newspaper between 2000 and 2007. In these 65 issues, I identified 77 news stories that were related to Kurdish nationalism. These news stories are important in the sense of showing the organic link between the PKK and the DTP.

Table 2.1

the PKK's Leadership of the Kurdish Movement		
Positive	39	50.70%
Negative	0	0%
Neutral	1	1.20%
No Reference	37	48.10%

The content analysis also confirms that the dominant Kurdish movement perceives the PKK as the natural leader of the movement, which makes it understandable why the DTP leaders denied accepting the PKK as a terrorist organization in several occasions contrary to calls from several Turkish political actors. This emphasis on the PKK leadership increases significantly after 2004.

Table 2.2

the PKK's Leadership of the Kurdish Movement (2004-2007)		
Positive	28	62.20%
Negative	0	0%
Neutral	1	2.22%
No Reference	16	35.58%

After 2004, there were 45 news stories carrying out nationalistic tone, and 62.2% of the news stories claimed the PKK as the leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The next table is important in that it shows the dominant Kurdish movement's position vis-à-vis the Turkish state.

Table 2.3

Enemy/ Rival		
Turkish Republic	33	42.90%
Army	3	3.90%
the West	5	6.50%
Turk	5	6.50%
Fascist	7	9.10%
Other	9	11.70%
No reference	15	18.50%

53.3% of the news stories identified the Turkish Republic⁸ (42.9%), Turk (6.5%), or the Army (3.9%) as the enemy of the Kurds. Lastly, an imagined territory called Kurdistan was an

⁸ In Yeni Gündem, Turkish Republic is generally referred as either Turkish state or T.C. When referring to the state, the usage of Turkish Republic in the news stories is seldom. Especially, the abbreviation T.C. bears negative connotations in the minds of the dominant Kurdish movement sympathizers.

important part of the Kurdish nationalistic discourse. 29.8% of the news stories since 2000 used the word Kurdistan once or more to indicate a territory belonging to Kurds. Interestingly, in some of the news stories, the authors were using the word “South Kurdistan” for referring to the Kurdish dominated Northern Iraq and “Northern Kurdistan” for referring to the predominantly Kurdish Southeast Anatolia, which shows that a unified Kurdistan is still one of the goals of the Kurdish movement.

An investigation of the Kurdish movement and major Kurdish political parties shows that the relationship between the state and Kurdish political actors has been a contentious one. While recognizing the effects of the policies of the state actors and other political actors, we should also recognize the significance of the internal structure and some crucial mistakes of the Kurdish political actors. As I have shown, the Kurdish parties have been unable to break their ties with the PKK and they have failed to become parties addressing to the whole Turkey. Furthermore, the violence in the region has escalated in recent years, which diminishes the hopes for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question and integration of the major Kurdish political actors into the system in the short-run.

CHAPTER 3

LOOKING FOR THE BOURGEOISIE: VALUES AND THE STRENGTH OF THE BOURGEOISIE

Survey of the Kurdish and Islamic movements' history suggests that the Kurdish political parties have failed to realize the transformation Islamist parties underwent. As the content analysis and public discourses of the prominent leaders have shown, political Islam and Islamist parties in Turkey display important signs of moderation whereas the dominant Kurdish movement and Kurdish party still perceive the PKK/ KADEK as the leader of their movement. In other words, Islamist political parties in Turkey have displayed moderation and adjusted to democratic principles better than the Kurdish political parties have.

My main hypothesis states that it is the absence or weakness of the bourgeoisie within the Kurdish political parties that may be one of the reasons for their lack of their integration into mainstream Turkish politics. In this context, I should explore the Kurdish and the Islamic bourgeoisie along two dimensions.

The survey I conducted in Diyarbakir and Konya investigates the perceptions of the target groups on issues such as ethnic and religious identity, the EU-Turkey relations, problems of Turkey, and democratization. The goal is to understand if the Kurdish and the Islamic bourgeoisie hold the moderate values that I believed them to have. I also tried to understand if the integration with the world increases the likelihood of businessmen to have a more moderate stance.

The research on the background of the party founders, the DTP and the AKP, aims to investigate whether the bourgeoisie are represented within these respective parties. If the survey

reveals out that the bourgeoisie is likely to have moderate views in the areas democratization and toleration of different identities, then the presence of the bourgeoisie in party politics may have a moderating effect on the claims and goals of the respective political movements and parties.

3.1 Survey with the Businessmen of DISIAD and Konya MÜSİAD

Our first tables are designed to provide a general idea about the business structure of our target groups:

Table 3.1

	DISIAD	MÜSİAD
Businessman	62.50%	31.80%
Merchant	18.75%	0%
Industrialist	0%	45.40%
Self-Employed	0%	9.10%
Engineer	6.25%	9.10%
Retired	6.25%	0%
Lawyer	0%	4.54%
Not Indicated	6.25%	0%
Total	100%	100%

According to Table 3.1, 81.25% of the DISIAD members defined themselves as either businessman or merchant. For MÜSİAD, 77.2% of its members indicated that they are businessman or industrialist when asked to state their occupation⁹. Hence, I can say that a

⁹ Actually, among those who defined themselves as engineer, retired, or lawyers, there were shopping-mall and construction company owners. Nevertheless, I did not include them in categories of businessman, industrialist, and merchant in order not to distort their answers.

substantial part of the subjects conform to the definition of the bourgeoisie I have used in this paper.

Table 3.2

Share of Import-Export in the Total Business Activities						
	0%	0%-10%	10%-25%	25%-50%	50%-75%	75% or over
DISIAD (%)	62.5%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	6.25%	6.25%
MÜSİAD (%)	27.3%	13.6%	18.2%	18.2%	13.6%	9.1%

Table 3.3

What is the Frequency of Being Abroad per year?					
	Never	1 or 2 times	3 or 4 times	Per month	More than per month
DISIAD	12.5%	56.3%	0%	12.5%	18.7%
MÜSİAD	13.6%	27.3%	45.5%	9.1%	4.5%

Table 3.2 demonstrates that 72.7% of the Konya MÜSİAD members have import-export activities whereas 37.5% of the DISIAD members have business relations with the outside world. Table 3.3 explains that 86.4% of the MÜSİAD members travel abroad at least 1-2 times per year, whereas 87.5% of the DISIAD members visit 1- 2 times per year or more. *Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu* (Turkish Statistics Institution) (2008) explains that, in 2007, only 12.7% of the Turkish citizens visited abroad¹⁰. Hence, it is possible to argue that members of the MÜSİAD

¹⁰ Ideally, it would be better to compare the figures for the DISIAD to those of the DTP voters. However, these figures are not attainable. In 2007, 8,937,660 Turkish citizens visited abroad. However, it is highly probable that these statistics also include people who visit abroad more than once per year. Therefore, the actual number of citizens visiting abroad is likely to be lower than this figure.

and the DISIAD may be more open to influences coming from international level due to their frequent visits and intense relations with the outside world compared to the rest of Turkish society.

The rest of the data should be evaluated in two dimensions: political and social moderation. Our next table gives us clues about the businessmen’s perspective on the main problems of Turkey. I ask the respondents to give a score between 0 and 5 for the options listed below¹¹ for the question of “What is the most significant problem of Turkey?”.

Table 3.4

What is the Most Significant Problem of Turkey?¹²		
	DISIAD	MÜSİAD
Economy	3.62	4.59
Terrorism	2.18	4.50
Democratization	4.00	3.81
Future of Iraq	2.31	3.68
Unemployment	3.31	3.68
International Terror	0.75	3.18
Relations with the EU	2.68	3.00
Disparities among the Regions	3.56	2.95
The Veiling Issue	0.75	2.68
Definition of Laicism	0.62	2.59
The Kurdish Question	3.81	2.54

¹¹ 0: not important; 5: very important

¹² Our scale is set between 0 and 5 for this question. 0: not important at all; 5: very important

Increasing Extreme Nationalism	2.18	2.31
Religious Recidivism	1.00	1.40

Members of MÜSİAD identify economy as the most significant problem with a score of 4.59. Terrorism ranks second with the score of 4.50, and democratization follows terrorism with 3.81. For the members of the DISIAD, democratization is the most important problem in Turkey with a score of 4.00. The Kurdish question and economy follow democratization with the scores of 3.81 and 3.62 respectively. Intuition may suggest that the Kurdish businessmen would consider the Kurdish question as the most important problem of the Turkish politics. Yet, it scores 0.19 point less than democratization and 0.19 more than economy. In this context, it may be possible to suggest that the DISIAD members think democratization, economy, and the Kurdish question are related with each other, although we need a broader investigation before reaching this conclusion.

For MÜSİAD, the scores of the veiling issue and the definition of laicism can be considered as interesting. Among thirteen problems, the veiling issue ranked ninth and the definition of laicism ranked tenth. There are two ways to interpret these results: The MÜSİAD members either perceive these problems as a part of a broader context, which is democratization, or these problems are not as important as we used to think for Islamist businessmen.

Whereas democratization is one of the most important issues for businessmen in both associations, a research conducted by Carkoglu and Toprak (2007: 48) named “Religion, Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey” yields completely different results in terms of the

priorities of Turkish society¹³. When asked to state the most significant problem in Turkey, respondents chose unemployment as the number one problem in Turkey (38.2%). Issues related to democratization were marked only by 7.1% of the respondents¹⁴. Therefore, both of the groups score higher than Turkish society in terms of their concern for democratization; hence in one of the important parts of political moderation, which is commitment to democratic principles.

In another question, I ask the businessmen to identify their support for the EU membership. Eurobarometer 67 (2007) indicates that, in autumn 2006, only 54% of the Turkish public considered the EU membership as a good thing. Below are the answers of our respondents for the question of “What do you think for a possible Turkish membership to the EU?”.

Table 3.5

Support for the EU Membership	
DISIAD	MÜSİAD
4.56	3.40

The results suggest that support for EU membership is well above the Turkish average in both groups, at 4.56 for the DISIAD members and 3.40 for the MÜSİAD members. Furthermore,

¹³ This survey conducted for the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation in 2007 is one of the few studies that were useful for comparing my survey results with. Unfortunately, in some of the questions, they did not classify the respondents in terms of their party preferences or ethnic origins whereas they indicate ethnic origins or party preferences of their respondents in other questions. Hence, I was not able to compare the DTP voters and the DISIAD members in some of my questions. In those cases, I compared the answers of the DISIAD members with those of the Turkish public, which is an important weakness of this research and definitely is not the ideal approach.

¹⁴ In fact, only 0.8% of the respondents stated that democracy is the most important problem in Turkey. However, I also included other issues such as human rights, lack of an opposition, and bribery/ unlawfulness as parts of democracy question since I use a broader definition of democracy and democratization in this research.

this support for the EU membership increases when I control the answers for the businessmen with import-export activities.

Table 3.6

Support for the EU Membership (Businessmen with Import-Export Activities)	
DISIAD	MÜSİAD
4.83	3.68

Comparison of tables 3.5 and 3.6 displays that the support for the EU increases from 4.56 to 4.83 for the DISIAD members and from 3.40 to 3.68 for the MÜSİAD members. Some may argue that the support for the EU is higher among the businessmen with foreign trade activities due to economic prospects of the EU membership. In order to understand this phenomenon, I ask the businessmen what would be the most important benefit of a possible EU membership for Turkey.

Table 3.7

What is the most important benefit of a possible EU membership for Turkey?¹⁵					
	Economic Development	Democratization	Security	Modernization/ Westernization	Other
DISIAD	18.7%	75%	0%	6.3%	0%
MÜSİAD	36.5%	50%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%

¹⁵ Unfortunately, I was not able to reach a survey asking a similar question to those supporting the EU membership in. As a result, I could not compare the answers of the businessmen to those of the Turkish public and the DTP voters.

As table 3.7 makes it evident, the businessmen see democratization as the most important contribution of the EU membership. 75% of the DISIAD members see democratization as the most important contribution of an EU membership whereas this figure stands at 50% for the MÜSİAD. Economic development ranks second for both groups with 18.7% for DISIAD and 36.5% for MÜSİAD. These results are consistent with my premise that the bourgeoisie may have an inclination to support and appreciate democratization under certain conditions. When we refine our results for the businessmen with import and export activities, the support for democratization is even stronger.

Table 3.8

Businessmen with Import-Export Activities						
	What is the most important benefit of a possible EU membership for Turkey?					
	Economic Development	Democratization	Security	Modernization/ Westernization	Other	Total
DISIAD (%)	0%	83%	0%	17%	0%	100%
MÜSİAD (%)	31.3%	56.1%	6.3%	0%	6.3%	100%

On the one hand, those perceiving economic development as the major contribution of EU membership have declined for both groups: from 18.7% to 0% for DISIAD and from 36.5% to 31.3% for MÜSİAD. On the other hand, we see a significant increase in the share of those who consider democratization as the major benefit of a possible EU membership; from 75% to 83% for the DISIAD and from 50% to 56% for the MÜSİAD. Two possible conclusions we can infer from these figures are the following: (1) when businessmen's integration with the world increases via import-export relations, their concern for democratization increases as well probably due to the impact of the Western values on their worldviews (2) those with export and

import activities are more vulnerable to the lack of stability and democracy since instability causes declines in their volume of trade. Table 3.9 suggests a support for the former premise.

Table 3.9

What is the Most Significant Problem of Turkey? (Businessmen with Import-Export Activities)		
	DISIAD	MÜSİAD
Economy	3.50	4.50
Terrorism	3.00	4.62
Democratization	4.00	4.18
Future of Iraq	2.00	3.81
Unemployment	2.16	3.81
International Terror	1.16	2.81
Relations with the EU	2.50	3.18
Disparities among the Regions	4.16	2.87
The Veiling Issue	0.50	2.87
Definition of Laicism	0.33	2.68
The Kurdish Question	4.16	2.37
Increasing Extreme Nationalism	2.33	2.25
Religious Recidivism	1.50	1.25

When we ask the businessmen with import-export activities to evaluate the problems of Turkey, we see that economic problems are the ones of greatest concern, albeit we observe a slight decrease from 3.62 to 3.50 for DISIAD and from 4.59 to 4.50 for MÜSİAD. Yet, these decreases are insignificant given their small amount. However, two other changes deserve more attention. We see that for MÜSİAD the score of democratization increases from 3.81 to 4.18. At

this point, we can recall the findings of Carkoglu and Toprak research, which shows that only 7.1% of the Turkish society sees problems related to democratization as the most significant issues in Turkey.

The other point is the increase in the score of terrorism as a significant problem for DISIAD, from 2.18 to 3.00. These findings also support my proposition that integration with the world compels people to care more for democratic values and denounce violence as a means to reach their goals that are important for political moderation. This is an important figure in the sense of suggesting their rejection of violent means for political goals. Hence it is possible to argue that businessmen with relations with the outside world seem to care more for the values of the outside world, have a preference for more democratic regimes, and denounce violent means.

Another set of questions in this survey aim to measure the businessmen's willingness to hold multiple identities, tolerate, and integrate with people from other groups that are significant for social moderation. In the next table, I simply ask the respondents to score their affinity for each option.

Table 3.10

I feel myself like_____. Please score every option.¹⁶		
	DISIAD	MÜSİAD
Türk	1.19	3.90
Citizen of Turkey (Türkiye Vatandaşı)	4.69	4.04
Muslim	2.81	4.90
Kurd	4.31	0.50
Turkish Citizen (Türk Vatandaşı)	1.94	3.13
Someone from Turkey (Türkiyeli)	2.13	3.09
Alevi	0	0.09

The table explains that the Kurdish character of the DISIAD members and the Islamist character of the MÜSİAD members are very important parts of their identities. For the DISIAD, being Kurdish gets a score of 4.31 whereas being a citizen of Turkey outweighs being Kurdish with its score 4.69. The third highest score is the category of Muslim with a score of 2.81. In the Carkoglu and Toprak survey, 57% of the subjects who voted for the DEHAP (predecessor of the DTP) in the last elections described themselves as Kurdish when asked how they would primarily describe themselves. Only 4.4% of the respondents stated that they primarily define themselves as a citizen of Turkey whereas 20.4% indicated that they would chose the Muslim category for their primary identity (45). It seems apparent that only a minority of the DTP voters chooses being a citizen of Turkey as their primary identity, whereas the same category is the

¹⁶ In this question, I used a scale between 0 and 5. 0: not at all; 5: I certainly feel so. In this question, two categories may look alike: *Citizen of Turkey* (Türkiye Vatandasi) and *Turkish Citizen* (Türk Vatandasi). However, I deliberately chose these categories. The term “Turkish Citizen” may carry ethnic connotations for people whereas Citizen of Turkey softens the power of this association with ethnicity. Indeed, the results also suggest the possibility of such an association at least for our respondents.

most important one for the DISIAD members by far. It is a sign showing the businessmen’s willingness to hold an identity that avoids strict boundaries between “us” and “them”, which is a significant tendency towards social moderation. It is also important in the sense of showing their openness to hold multiple identities in the public realm.

A Muslim identity is the most important identity held by MÜSİAD members with its score of 4.90, followed by being a citizen of Turkey with a score of 4.04. The third highest score is a Turkish identity, and its score is 3.90. In Carkoglu-Toprak (from now on CT) research (44), 44.6% of the Turkish society defines themselves first as Muslim, 19.4% as primarily Turkish, and 29.9% first as a citizen of Turkey. Therefore, a Muslim identity is the most important part of both the MÜSİAD members’ and the Turkish society’s identity, although this emphasis is more strongly pronounced in the case of MÜSİAD members. Nevertheless, the MÜSİAD members score higher than Turkish society in one term that is their willingness to be a part of a citizenship project embracing different primordial identities under the umbrella of being a citizen of Turkey. Indeed, it is a prominent characteristic of both MÜSİAD and DISIAD members, which can be appreciated as a sign of social moderation. The next question aims to measure the businessmen’s perceptions vis-à-vis interaction, toleration, and integration with people from other identity groups.

Table 3.11

Do you think that national, ethnic, or religious identities of people will affect your business affairs with these people?		
	Yes	No
DISIAD	0%	100%
MÜSİAD	0%	100%

The answers of our respondents in table 3.11 state that the businessmen do not perceive the identity of their customers or business partners as an obstacle for building economic relations with them. For instance, two of the MÜSİAD members stated that they have problems with the policies of Israel in the Middle East, but they explain that this situation does not prevent them from doing business with the Israeli businessmen. In another set of questions, I tried to learn respondents' attitudes vis-à-vis different identity groups in their private lives.

Although the CT research does not ask the same question, they asked their subjects with whom they would like to work in their business life. 25% of the respondents indicated that they would like to work with devout Muslims, 33.7% preferred their fellow countrymen, and 37.9% preferred people with the same worldview as their partners in business (62). Obviously, these figures are insufficient to make precise judgements. Still, based on these findings, it is possible to argue that the Turkish society is not as tolerant as the businessmen in DISIAD and MÜSİAD in terms of interacting with people from different identities, worldviews, and religious choices in their business life.

Table 3.12

Is national, ethnic, or religious identity of your friends important?		
	Yes	No
DISIAD	6.3%	93.7%
MÜSİAD	9.1%	90.9%

Results obtained from table 3.12 are also encouraging in the sense that only 6.3% of the DISIAD members and 9.1% of the MÜSİAD members expressed that ethnic, religious, or national identity of their friends matters for them. When we compare these results with the CT

research, it becomes even apparent that the businessmen in DISIAD and MÜSİAD are more open to interact and tolerate with people from different identities than the Turkish society is.

The CT research does not have an identical question to the one I have used in my research. Yet, one of their survey questions asks the subjects if they would object becoming neighbors with people from different identity groups; namely a family from a different sect, a Kurdish family, a Jewish family, an Armenian family, a Greek family, an atheist family, and a gay couple (50). The results are 75.2%, 71.4%, 60.5%, 57.4%, 56.6%, 50.7%, and 33.3% respectively. The figures demonstrate that, compared to Turkish society, the members of DISIAD and MÜSİAD have a greater inclination to interact and tolerate with people from other identities; thus having a higher tendency to hold moderate values in social realm.

The last two questions are designed to measure the businessmen willingness to integrate with people from other identities. Table 3.13 presents the results for the question “Is national, ethnic, or religious identity of your child’s husband/ wife important?”

Table 3.13

Is national, ethnic, or religious identity of your child’s husband/ wife important?		
	Yes	No
DISIAD	37.5%	62.5%
MÜSİAD	95.5%	4.5%

It is evident from the table that the businessmen’s willingness to integrate with people from other identity groups is far weaker compared to their willingness to tolerate other identities in their public life. On the one hand, 37.5% of the DISIAD members and 95.5% of the MÜSİAD

members stated that the identity of their offspring's wife or husband matters to them. While this tendency is weaker for the DISIAD members, only one of the MÜSİAD members expressed that he did not care about the identity of his daughter-in-law or son-in-law. On the other hand, the CT research explains that in 2006 27.3% of the DTP voters and 50.5% of Turkish society opposed their child's marriage with a non-Muslim or a Muslim from a different sect (57). These figures are significant in the sense that they show, compared to the DTP voters, the DISIAD members are less willing to integrate with people from different identities. This trend is stronger in the case of MÜSİAD when we compare their answers to that of Turkish society, 95.5% for MÜSİAD and 50.5% for Turkish society.

Hence, it is possible to infer that the businessmen display two inverse trends in terms of social moderation. The DISIAD members are more willing to tolerate and interact with other identities compare to the DTP voters whereas the DTP voters' willingness to integrate with other identities is stronger than in it is in the case of DISIAD. The same inclination is present in the case of MÜSİAD as well. Its members are open to tolerate other identity groups and interact with them in social realms when we compare them to the rest of Turkish society, while their tendency to integrate with different identities is visibly weaker compared to the attitudes of Turkish society. Below is the table showing businessmen's answers towards accepting people from different identity groups as their son-in-law or daughter-in-law.

Table 3.14

If my child marries with a/ an _____, I will support him/ her. (Please evaluate score every identity group given)¹⁷		
	DISIAD	MÜSIAD
Jewish	0.60	0
Armenian	0.80	0
Greek	0.20	0
Kurdish	4.80	1.89
Muslim	4.80	4.95
Alevi	2.40	0
Arab	1.80	1.78
European	1	0.36
Christian	0.60	0.11
American	0.20	0.05

The score of 4.95 explains that the MÜSIAD members have an obvious tendency to accept the category of ‘Muslim’ as the appropriate candidate for their children’s future spouse. The Kurdish category follows the category of ‘Muslim’ with the score of 1.89, and the ‘Arab’ category ranks the third with the score of 1.78. Categories of Armenian, Jewish, Greek, and Alevi receives 0 while all the other categories received scores below 1. I expected the Muslim

¹⁷ In this question, we used a scale between 0 and 5. 0: totally disagree; 5: totally agree. In this question, 2 of the MUSIAD members, who say that identity of their offspring’s spouse is important, refused to score the identities we give in the question. Hence, I divided the total scores of every identity group with 19 in order to obtain the scores for MUSIAD.

The table is prepared according to the evaluations of 5 members of the DISIAD and 19 members of the MUSIAD since the remainder of the members stated that they refused to answer the question.

category to receive a high score, but what was unexpected was the ranking of Kurdish and Arab identities, given that the majority of these identity groups are also Muslim. These scores may be the evidence for the sectarian approach of the MÜSİAD members when it comes to integrating with people from other identities.

It may also mean that “*being Turk*” may be another characteristic the MÜSİAD members prefer for their potential daughter-in-law or son-in-law. At this point, I should also admit that I made a mistake by not including the category of “Turk” in this question, which prevents us from making more precise judgments on this issue. Another interesting point was the score the ‘Alevi’ category received. The MÜSİAD members gave higher scores to categories of European, American, and Christian while the Alevi category—which is predominantly Turkish and Kurdish—received the lowest score 0. The score Alevis received shows the importance of being Sunni for the MÜSİAD members. The other categories, Greek, Armenian, and Jewish, are the traditional others for the Muslim since these categories belong to other religions. Therefore, it is understandable why they receive the lowest score, “0”.

For the DISIAD, two categories, “Kurdish” and “Muslim”, received 4.80 while the Alevi identity received 2.40. The Arab identity followed these two categories with a score of 1.80. “American” and “Greek” identities received the lowest score 0.20. Jewish, Armenian, Christian, and European identities have scores of 0.60, 0.80, 0.60, and 1 respectively. It seems that like their colleagues in the MÜSİAD, the DISIAD members also think that the religion of their child’s spouse is significant, and their emphasis on Kurdishness was not unexpected.

Drawbacks of the DISIAD members about the Armenian identity are understandable given that the Armenian category had been “the other” for Kurds as well during the late Ottoman period and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. For the low score of the Greek identity, it

is possible to argue that the DISIAD members associated themselves with the Turkish identity by perceiving the Greeks as the other. Another possible explanation would be the persistent memories of the Turkish Independence War. Kurds and Turks fought together against the Greeks in this war, and the memories of this war may still be alive among the Kurdish businessmen. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to generalize these premises given the small sample size, and there is a need for a specific survey aiming to measure their perceptions on this issue before making broader generalizations.



Our survey with businessmen suggests that the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey are socially and politically more moderate compared to DTP constituency and Turkish society. The only exception is their sectarian approach when it comes to integrating with people from other identity groups. Nevertheless, I can safely argue that comparison of the DISIAD members with DTP voters and Turkish society, and the comparison of the MÜSIAD members with Turkish society, displays encouraging results for the high potential of social and political moderation within the bourgeoisie ranks. The scores we obtained are consistent with the thesis that the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey support democratization and they have a certain level of toleration for the presence of other identity groups within the society. Moreover, the survey demonstrates that the bourgeoisie is likely to hold more moderate values in areas of democratization as their integration levels with the world increase.

The survey supports the view that the bourgeoisie can be a stimulating power for the moderation of the respective political parties. Therefore, it is important for us to understand whether the bourgeoisie has been an influential power within the ranks of the biggest Kurdish party, the DTP, and the main Islamic party, the AKP. In this context, our research on the background of the party founders bears particular importance.

3.2 Backgrounds of the Founders of the AKP and the DTP

I will try to understand the backgrounds of party founders by looking at three variables: foreign languages skills, education levels, and occupational backgrounds (four subgroups for occupational backgrounds: self-employed, ex-bureaucrats, business people, and professionals). Our measurements on these four variables will help us to understand if these parties accommodate the bourgeoisie in their decision-making bodies.


Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the education levels of the AKP and the DTP founders, respectively.




The figures display that 91% of the AKP founders are university graduates while only 27% of the DTP founders are university graduates. As a matter of fact, the majority of the DTP founders were graduates of primary schools and only a few of them were high school graduates.

The bourgeoisie have a high level of integration with the outside world, which is evident in their characteristics such as their knowledge of foreign languages, frequency of travels to foreign countries, and their views about international organizations such as the EU. Having a higher level of education facilitates the acquisition of these characteristics. As one moves up in education level, it is more likely that this person will also have more financial power, higher chances of mobility, and more opportunity to possess foreign language skills and interact with the outside world and ideologies/ ideas. In this sense, it is possible to state that the founders of the AKP score better than their colleagues in the DTP since their education levels are significantly higher than the DTP founders.


Next figures present the data about the foreign language skills of the party founders.






Compared to the DTP founders, the AKP founders seem to possess better foreign language skills. The discrepancy between the two groups is certainly significant. On the one hand 41% of the AKP founders have the ability to speak one foreign language, while 29% of them possess at least two foreign languages skills. On the other hand, only 8% of the DTP founders have the ability to speak a foreign language while 92% have no foreign language skills. As I emphasized earlier, foreign language skills are an important means for communicating with the outside world and following the ideologies/ ideas, agenda, and policy-making in the outside world. In other words, foreign language skills are an important means to keep up and integrate with the world.

There seems to be important differences between two groups in terms of their occupational background as well. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 are presenting data about the occupational backgrounds of the AKP and the DTP founders.





The AKP and the DTP founders present significant differences in terms of their occupational backgrounds. 29% of the AKP founders are business people while only 1% of the DTP founders are business people. 53% of the AKP founders are professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and pharmacists who are likely to earn high levels of salaries or monthly profits in Turkey. For instance, the Ministry of Health states that average salary for a doctor will be around 14.000 YTL (9.655 \$ in current prices) in 2008 after the implementation of new regulations (Ihlas News Agency 2008).

54% of the DTP founders are professionals; yet, a significant portion of this group is retired primary or high school teachers and students who are likely to be members of the lower middle classes due to their low earnings. According to Eđitim Sen (2006), the average salary for a teacher is only 820 Turkish liras (594 \$ in 2006 prices), and this salary could compensate for only 43% of the expenses of a family with four members.

17% of the AKP founders are high-level ex-bureaucrats while none of the DTP founders are ex-bureaucrats. Lastly, 1% of the AKP founders are self-employed whereas 45% of the DTP founders belong to this group. The data presented shows that the founders of the AKP are more

likely to belong to the upper-middle and upper classes of Turkey while the founders of the DTP are likely to be members of the lower-middle and lower classes of the Turkish society. These figures also indicate that the AKP founders are more likely to belong to the bourgeoisie in Turkey while the DTP founders are less likely to possess the characteristics of the bourgeoisie due to their low earnings. These figures may have explanatory value in terms of foreign language skills of respective parties' founders as well since those who have financial power are more likely to receive foreign language education in university, or after the university by using their own funds.

Our research on the background of the party founders explains that there are important differences between the AKP and the DTP founders in terms of their education levels, foreign language skills, and occupational backgrounds. The AKP founders have higher education levels, better foreign language skills, and higher earnings compare to their colleagues in the DTP. Hence, the AKP members have had considerably higher chances of belonging to the upper-middle and upper classes than the DTP founders have, which makes them better candidates for being members of the bourgeoisie. In addition to that, their foreign language skills and better financial conditions may allow them to travel to and interact with the outside world; thus absorbing various ideas and ideologies, whereas members of the lower classes tend to be less exposed to outside views. Indeed, a classical study by Lipset (1959) also defends similar views.

According to Lipset (1959), authoritarian tendencies and ethnic prejudice flow more readily from the situation of lower classes than from that of the middle and upper classes. He explains that, due to their low status and low education levels, members of lower strata are more likely to support extremist and intolerant forms of political and religious behavior while, tolerance and support for diversity increases as we move further up the stratification ladder.

Lastly, one can expect the bourgeoisie to be more influential than other social classes in decision-making bodies. This is because the bourgeoisie is expected to have better organizational skills and more financial power to spend for their goals. It is these educational and socio-economic advantages that allow the bourgeoisie to penetrate political institutions, parties, and other decision-making mechanisms whereas lower classes do not possess these characteristics. In other words, the bourgeoisie within the AKP can be a proactive group whereas the DTP founders are more likely to be passive within the decision-making mechanisms.

As the first step of our research, I conducted a survey with Kurdish and Islamic businessmen in order to measure their attitudes in areas such as identity, democratization, diversity, the EU, and the problems of Turkey.

The results display that democratization as a problem occupies a central place in the eyes of both groups (DISIAD: 4.00; MÜSİAD: 4.18) whereas unemployment is the most significant problem for Turkish society. Their support for the EU membership is well above the Turkish average, and these businessmen see democratization as the most important contribution of the EU project. Moreover, their appreciation of democracy as a norm increases as I control the sample for businessmen with import-export activities. Support for the EU membership, emphasis on democratization, and perceiving democratization as the most important contribution of the EU have increased when I looked at the answers of the businessmen with foreign trade activities, which shows that there is a positive correlation between holding democratic values and being integrated with the world. Hence, both groups are politically moderate in comparison to Turkish society.

In terms of identity and social moderation, we see that the most visible adherence of both groups is to their birth-given identities: Kurdish for DISIAD and Muslim for MÜSİAD.

However, being a citizen of Turkey bears particular importance for both groups, whereas the DTP voters and Turkish society do not perceive this category as an important part of their identity. For the members of MÜSİAD, it is the second most important source of loyalty while it is the most important source of loyalty for the members of DISIAD even surpassing Kurdish identity.

On the one hand, both groups have stated that they have no problem doing business or being friends with people from different national, ethnic, or national identity groups. On the other hand, the businessmen seem to express more willingness to interact with other identities in the public realm than the Turkish society as a whole

Nevertheless, almost all of the MÜSİAD members and almost 40% of the DISIAD members expressed that the ethnic, national, or religious identity of their child's spouse matters for them. The DTP voters and Turkish society have displayed more tolerance towards integrating with other identities when compared with the DISIAD members and the MÜSİAD members respectively. For both groups, being Muslim seems to be the most important attribute for their son-in-law or daughter-in-law. For the DISIAD members, a perfect combination is probably a Kurdish-Muslim spouse while the MÜSİAD members see the Kurdish identity as the second best alternative for their children. Yet, the discrepancy between the scores of the Muslim (4.95) and the Kurdish (1.89) category shows that being Muslim is not enough for the MÜSİAD members. Their ideal candidate would probably be a Turkish-Muslim one. Again, we cannot make certain inferences on this point since I failed to include the category 'Turk' for this question.

Still, the survey has shown that, vis-à-vis the DTP voters and Turkish society, the Islamic and the Kurdish bourgeoisie have a certain amount of toleration for diversity and care for individual freedoms making them socially and politically more moderate in important respects.

Their view on international organizations such as the EU is strongly positive and they see a positive correlation between the EU membership and democratization.

If both groups support democratization and tend to have politically moderate values, and if both groups have a certain level of toleration for other identity groups within the society; then, what accounts for the difference between the two political parties? At this point, the crucial difference may be the inclusion of the bourgeoisie as an influential political force within these parties. The second research has important findings for understanding this phenomenon.

Our evaluation of members of background of party founders shows that the bourgeoisie is the driving force in the ranks of the AKP whereas the DTP scores worse on this account. The bourgeoisie has not been able to enforce itself as a leading cadre in the DTP, which in turn has decreased their ability to influence policy-making in the dominant Kurdish party. In addition, these two researches imply that it is not an extremist stance of the Kurdish bourgeoisie on the matters of democratization and toleration of other identity groups, but their inability to enforce themselves as a significant political force within the Kurdish movement, which has failed to lead to moderation within the DTP. In this context, it becomes important to understand why the Kurdish bourgeoisie has been unsuccessful as a political force in the DTP, which can moderate the claims, goals, and the means.

To answer why, I will be looking at some possible explanations, namely:

- i)* The Kurdish bourgeoisie is numerically weak to enforce itself as a political force.
- ii)* The socio-cultural structure of the Kurdish dominated regions and the PKK factor prevents the rise of the bourgeoisie as a political power.

3.3 Socio-Economic Reasons

The socio-economic state of the Kurdish-dominated cities, specifically the cities in which the DTP was able to win seat in the parliament in 2007 elections, can give us clues about how strong the bourgeoisie can be within the DTP. In this context, I compare Central Anatolia¹⁸ and eight cities¹⁹ from which the DTP was able to acquire a seat in the Turkish parliament. Table 3.15 compares Central Anatolia and these eight cities in terms of their GNP per capita.

Table 3.15

2001 (Year)	Cities with MPs from the DTP	Central Anatolia
GNP per capita	\$1025	\$1582

Source: TUIK

As the table shows, in 2001, GNP per capita of Central Anatolia is 1.54 times higher than the GNP per capita in these eight cities, which also means better life conditions and standards for Central Anatolia. Indeed, the next figures also support this proposition.

Table 3.16

2000 (Year)	Southeast Anatolia	Central Anatolia
Average number of people for per household	6.48	4.83

Source: TUIK

¹⁸ In 2007 elections, the AKP has won 68.1% of the votes in the Central Anatolia.

¹⁹ In 2007 elections, the DTP was able to win seats for the parliament in 12 cities. Unfortunately, GDP per capita figures are not available for Batman, Iğdir, and Sirnak whereas I excluded Istanbul because the DTP won only 1 MP out of the 70 seats allocated for Istanbul.

This table above shows the average number of people per household in their respective regions. Again, Central Anatolia scores better compared to the Southeast. The next table displays Southeast Anatolia and Central Anatolia in terms of some basic socio-economic indicators.

Table 3.17

2004 (Year)	Southeast Anatolia	Central Anatolia
Number of students for per teacher	34	23
Number of hospital beds for every 100.000 people	132	233
Number of doctors for every 100.000 people	30	41

Source: TUIK

Unsurprisingly, Southeast Anatolia lags behind Central Anatolia when we compare both regions in terms of number of students per teacher, number of hospital beds, and number of doctors. These three tables are significant in the sense that the figures they present allow us to perceive the socio-economic gap between the two regions.

The socio-economic backwardness of the Southeast and the cities in which the DTP is strong has become visible with these figures, and it is evident that these cities are less likely to be fruitful places for a strong bourgeoisie capable of shaping the surrounding political, economic, and social environment. Nonetheless, I do not claim that there is no trace from the bourgeoisie in these cities. My experience in the region confirmed the existence of the bourgeoisie families; yet, these people are probably numerously weaker than their colleagues in the Central Anatolia. The

following tables can give us some clues as to why the bourgeoisie in Central Anatolia may be a stronger political force than their colleagues in these cities.

Table 3.18

Exports by, Province (000 US dollars)					
	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Diyarbakır	34 725	57 349	66 877	83 403	242 354
Van	7 462	13 415	15 306	9 535	45 718
Konya	275 556	419 985	493 532	688 723	2 096 042
Kayseri	639 617	702 969	751 660	973 209	3 067 455

Source: TUIK

Table 3.19

Imports by, Province (000 US dollars)					
	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Diyarbakır	10 880	16 347	18 312	34 345	63 384
Van	11 174	6 607	10 372	12 840	40 993
Konya	377 698	427 021	555 829	691 413	2 051 961
Kayseri	818 622	913 418	1 095 115	1 289 145	4 116 300

Source: TUIK

Tables 3.18 and 3.19 display the data on import-export activities of four chosen cities. Diyarbakir and Konya were the cities in which I conducted the survey. Kayseri is one of the most important cities of Central Anatolia in terms of population and economic activity. In the 2007 elections, the AKP won six of the eight seats for the parliament in Kayseri. Van is a major city in the east of Turkey, which is predominantly pro-DTP.

As the data shows, economic activity is significantly lower in Diyarbakir and Van than it is in Kayseri and Konya. During 2004-2007, the total exports of Diyarbakir and Van are only 13.7% of the total exports of Konya and 9.4% of the total exports of Kayseri. During the same period, accumulation of the imports in Diyarbakir and Van equals only 5.1% of Konya's imports and 2.5% of Kayseri's imports. Van and Diyarbakir exported goods totaling only \$30.555 million in the same period.

These tables can be interpreted as a sign that the businessmen of Central Anatolia produce, trade, and spend their earnings while economic activities in the East and the Southeast of Turkey seems to be considerably weak compared to Central Anatolia. When one looks at the import-export volume per capita, it becomes even more obvious why the bourgeoisie in the East and the Southeast of Turkey cannot be strong enough to influence policy-making in these regions.

Table 3.20

Exports per capita by, Province (US dollars, Population 2000)	
	2003-2007 (Export)/ 2000 (Population)
Diyarbakır	177.85
Van	52.10
Konya	956.15
Kayseri	3401.87

Source: TUIK

Table 3.21

Imports per capita by, Province (US dollars, Population 2000)	
	2003-2007 (Import)/ 2000 (Population)
Diyarbakır	46.51
Van	47.80
Konya	936.04
Kayseri	3881.72

Source: TUIK

Again, per capita figures prove that the volume of economic activity is higher in Central Anatolia compared to the predominantly Kurdish cities. For instance, exports per capita in Konya are 5.4 times higher than it is in Diyarbakır and 18.4 times higher than exports per capita of Van. The last table compares the Southeast and Central Anatolia in terms of possible qualitative differences between their manufacturing firms.

Table 3.22

2001 (Year)	Southeast Anatolia	Central Anatolia
Number of Manufacturing Firms	310	299
Number of Employees per Manufacturing Firm	91.9	137.4
Average Earnings of Employees	3362 YTL	6431 YTL

Source: TUIK

Although Southeast Anatolia accommodates a higher number of manufacturing firms, the firms in Central Anatolia have a higher number of employees. The average number of employees per firm is 92 for the firms in the Southeast whereas this number is 137 for the firms of Central Anatolia, which shows that firms in this region are bigger in scale compared to those in Southeast Anatolia. In addition, these firms are able to pay almost 2 times the salary to their employees. In 2001, the average salary of an employee in Southeast and Central Anatolia are 3362 YTL and 6431 YTL respectively. This figure implies several things.

One possibility is that the firms in Central Anatolia are more productive; therefore, they are able to pay better salaries. Or, the firms in Central Anatolia produce manufactured goods requiring higher skills, which oblige employers to pay higher salaries. In this case, we can see that the firms in Central Anatolia produce goods that are capital intensive while the goods produced in the Southeast are labor-intensive. Nevertheless, I am not in a position to make precise judgments about this phenomenon given my limited knowledge on the case, and this situation definitely deserves more attention and research.

Still, the data can give us some space to make judgments about the bourgeoisie. The data explains that socioeconomic conditions and level of economic activity may not allow the bourgeoisie to rise as a significant actor in political, economic and social life of the Kurdish populated areas while the Islamic bourgeoisie has been able to enforce itself as a strong actor of the dominant Islamist movement. The data also explains that why the Kurdish bourgeoisie is numerically small and qualitatively weak, while the Islamic bourgeoisie is strong and numerically large.

As we might recall, DISIAD has 89 members and the Konya branch of MÜSİAD has 203 members. This figure alone can give us ideas about the strength of the bourgeoisie in these two cities given that there is not a big difference between the populations of these two cities. According to Turkish Statistics Institution (2007), in 2007, Konya's population was 2,451,000 and Diyarbakır's population was 1,518,000.

3.4 The PKK Factor and Socio-Cultural Structure in the Region

Since its first attack in 1984, the PKK has been the main rallying point for many Kurds and Kurdish political actors. Since then, along with the Turkish state and the Army, the PKK has been the most influential actor shaping the Kurdish movement.

Somer (2004) indicates that the PKK's political strategy includes oppression of other actors for the articulation of their specific Kurdish interests; thus, either physically eliminating or driving out moderate actors from the scene. As a matter of fact, my observations in the region, statements of the PKK leaders, and the results of our content analysis also support this view.

For example, I went to meet one of the businessmen from the DISIAD in order to conduct the survey with him on the same day, which was the anniversary of Öcalan's capture by

the state. In order to protest the capture of Öcalan, the PKK forced local shops and businessmen to close their offices and shops in Diyarbakir for that particular day. When I went to the office of that businessman, I saw that his office was closed as well, and it was a little bit confusing since the businessman told me on the phone that I could come to his office to do the survey with him. So, I called him by phone, and told him I was in front of his office. He told me an office-boy would pick me up soon. After five minutes, someone let me through the backdoor of the office. In the office, the businessman and his employees were still working, but they were using the second floor of the office in which there were no windows. When I asked the businessman why, he explained that if he did not close down his office, the PKK militants or sympathizers might attack his office. Therefore, he said, he had to close his office and use the office floor without windows during the protest in order to avoid a possible attack by the PKK militants.

In other instances, the PKK threat to moderate actors was visible to the Turkish public as well. For instance, Cemil Bayık, a prominent leader of the PKK, threatened several Kurdish intellectuals on the PKK website because of these intellectuals' frequent appearance on Turkish televisions and the media. He named these people, including journalists, politicians, and writers, as traitors and collaborators of the Turkish state. (Milliyet 2007)

The content analysis of the pro-PKK Gündem also shows the dominant Kurdish movement's intolerance vis-à-vis other actors. Under the title of social, cultural, and religious pluralism, I investigated 186 news stories. Among these news stories, there were 7 references for the Kurds not supporting the PKK, and all of these references were negative. These news were using titles like "Kurdish collaborators", "remnants of feudalism", and "Kurdish reactionary forces" to define the Kurds not supporting the PKK. In addition to that, in the 125 news stories that I studied under the title of group identity and definition, I captured 10 news stories in which

words like traitors, Kurdish reactionaries, informers, and ‘those calling themselves Kurdish intellectuals’ were used for the Kurds acting outside the PKK circles.

Lastly, I found 119 news stories under the title of political pluralism. Only 10.9% of the news stories were making references about intra-group pluralism while 84% of the news stories were making references about pluralism in general. Moreover, 44.5% of the news stories were indicating a need for solidarity among Kurds. We can also recall that 50.6% of the news stories under the title of nationalism refer to the PKK as the leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement. These figures are important for discerning the dominant Kurdish movement’s attitude vis-à-vis diversity within the movement. These figures also tell us that the PKK and its followers denounce pluralism within the Kurdish movement while they seem to appreciate and tolerate pluralism in Turkey. This evidence makes it easier to understand why the Kurdish bourgeoisie has been unable to become a leading force within the Kurdish movement.

The Turkish state has displayed a visible intolerance not only to the radical actors of the Kurdish movement but also possible moderate actors. Barkey (2000: 101, 102) says that although the state under the government of Özal (former Turkish prime-minister and president) showed some signs of accepting the Kurdish political parties and some Kurdish actors as legitimate, these policies were destroyed after Özal’s death in 1993. Barkey argues that without institutions maintaining the momentum started by Özal, the state returned to the policy of confrontation and exclusion after 1993. During this period, the state refused to engage in dialogue with any members of the Kurdish movement including moderate actors who disavowed the violent methods of the PKK. There was also an increase in the extra-judicial killings and number of disappearances of those who were sympathetic to the Kurdish cause. Barkey states that some of these incidents were attributed to the fundamentalist terrorist organization

Hizbullah, which were supported by the state against the rise of the PKK. Therefore, the state did not only foster further violence, but also drove out moderate actors out of the scene. In addition to that, these policies helped the PKK to justify violent methods to protect the rights of the Kurds.

While the presence of the PKK and the state policies may be important obstacles preventing the rise of moderate Kurdish actors, persistence of the feudal elements is another reason that hinders the Kurdish bourgeoisie's rise as a significant political power. Van Bruinessen (1992), White (1998 and 2000), Özoğlu (2004), and Jwaideh (2006) assert that tribal and religious leaders have been significant political actors in the Kurdish regions since the Ottoman period. It was generally the leaders of the tribes and religious orders who rebelled against the central government in the history of the Kurds. For instance, Özoğlu (2004) states that it was the tribal and religious leaders of Kurds who were organized, especially in Istanbul, in order to promote a Kurdish identity and culture during and after WWI.

Indeed, most of the prominent leaders of the Kurdish uprisings, in the name of Kurdish nationalism or not, carried signs of religious or feudal titles in front of their original names. Botan Emirate of Bedirhan Pasha, Sayyid (a title used for people coming from the lineage of the Prophet) Ubeydullah, and Sheikh Said are just one of the few names who revolted against the Ottoman Empire or the Turkish Republic during the history.

Even though the power of these large landowners and religious leaders in the region has declined especially with the rise of the PKK, which, as a Marxist-Leninist organization, claimed itself to be an antithesis and opponent of these traditional actors and structures, they still play central roles in the economic, cultural, and social lives of those living in the Kurdish dominated regions. Van Bruinessen (1992: 16) explains that in the plains of Kurdish populated regions, the

land is still owned by a town-dwelling absentee lord, and the peasants of the plains were sharecroppers up until 1960s. White (1998) says that sharecropping still plays a major role in reproducing the political and the economic power of local landlords. White argues that the peasantry in the region has to make sharecropping arrangements with these large landowners because the land belonging to the peasantry is too small to provide even for the basic standards of living. Therefore, they depend on the landlord to provide their family's basic needs. Indeed, the distribution of land makes such arrangements a necessity for the Kurdish peasantry. According to White, in Diyarbakir rich absentee landowning families control 88% of land, although they constitute a mere 3% of the province's landowning families.

Such a socio-economic structure presents two important problems for the rise of the bourgeoisie as a political power for the Kurdish movement. As a result of this social structure, it is generally the charismatic leaders²⁰ who define the course of politics in the region instead of modern powers like the bourgeoisie (White 2000: 10). As a result, instead of rational calculation of interests, it is generally complete devotion to the leader or leaders' narcissistic character, which defines the course of political and social movements. The cults created in the personalities of Abdullah Öcalan and Sheikh Said are good examples of how charismatic leadership works and how other political powers within Kurdish society are undermined.

The second ramification of the social structure concerns economic activities in the region and its implications for the rise of a Kurdish bourgeoisie. The concentration of power in the hands of privileged landowner classes gives the landowners great leverage in the economic and political life of the region. In this economic structure, the rise of the bourgeoisie was blocked in

²⁰ Weber (1964) defines the concept charisma as certain qualities which set apart an individual from ordinary men and charismatic leader is believed to be endowed with superhuman, supernatural, or at least exceptionally specific powers or qualities.

two ways. Moore (1993) explains that existence of a powerful landlord class dependent on a large supply of cheap labor is significantly associated with problems for modernization and democratization. Thus, the landholders in the region, as the privileged class, prevented economic modernization in the Southeast by keeping the peasant in the plains and villages and impeding urbanization for a long time. Second, the economic activities heavily based on agriculture and stockbreeding prevented the flourish of an economic class, which followed its own interests independent from aghas, land, and the state.

As a matter of fact, it is possible to see the results of this socio-economic structure in Turkish political life. Some of the important Kurdish MPs in the Turkish parliament are members of these feudal families, who control the land in the Kurdish dominated cities. Prominent names include Sedat Bucak (ex-Urfa MP), Abdulkadir Aksu (ex-minister of Interior Affairs), Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat (the vice-president of the AKP), and Kamer Genc (Tunceli MP). It is possible to argue that these politicians draw an important support from their voters due to their socio-economic position in the region.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

In this research, I have argued that the weakness of the bourgeoisie within the DTP may be an alternative explanation for understanding the deadlock in the Kurdish question of Turkey.

This research also endeavored to show that the presence of the Islamic bourgeoisie may have been one of the factors pushing the moderation of the Islamist political party, which has led to the cooptation of political Islam by the mainstream Turkish politics. However, the DTP has been unable to break its ties with the PKK. It is contention and violence instead of negotiation and compromise that defines the Kurdish question in Turkey. Moreover, the DTP is unwilling to free itself from its organic relationship with the PKK and its leader in the foreseeable future. In this context, the weakness or the absence of an influential Kurdish bourgeoisie can be an important reason contributing to the stalemate of the Kurdish question.

The survey conducted with the Islamist and the Kurdish bourgeoisie in Konya and Diyarbakır respectively has shown that the Kurdish and the Islamist businessmen hold relatively moderate values in areas of democratization, identity, and toleration of other identity groups in society. Moreover, our comparisons are consistent with the thesis that both groups are politically more moderate than the DTP voters and Turkish society, whereas the DTP voters and Turkish society scored better only in their willingness to integrate with other identities when it comes to social moderation. So, the businessmen seem to hold a capacity to contribute to the moderation of radical ideologies and political parties.

Thus, our research on the background of party founders of the AKP and the DTP has focused on the strength of the bourgeoisie within these establishments. This research has demonstrated that the bourgeoisie is an influential political force within the ranks of the AKP while the bourgeoisie scores worse in the case of the DTP.

Therefore, it became necessary for us to understand why the Kurdish bourgeoisie has been unable to assert itself in the most important Kurdish political party. I suggested several reasons to understand this phenomenon. First, socio-economic factors and weakness of economic activity prevent the flourish of a strong bourgeoisie in the region. The social organization of the Kurdish society and adherence to tribal and religious leaders are offered as other reasons preventing the rise of the bourgeoisie as a political force in the region. Lastly, the presence of the PKK and the unwillingness of the dominant Kurdish movement to tolerate pluralism (along the Turkish state) within Kurds hinder the Kurdish bourgeoisie's rise as a leading political force in the Kurdish movement.

While this study can be seen as a contribution to understanding the Kurdish question and political Islam in Turkey, I am aware of the fact that this research has some notable disadvantages. First, this research does not focus enough on the other possible reasons accounting for the transformation of political Islam and the AKP and other possible reasons of why the Kurdish question has been unable to transform itself. It is important to keep in mind that other factors such as the February 28 Process had considerable effects on the transformation of political Islam in Turkey. Likewise, one needs to remember that the state actors' focus on the military struggle with the PKK while overlooking the importance of cultural and political reforms are other important reasons for the alienation of the Kurds in Turkey.

Furthermore, a better research should also focus on other social classes more, such as the working classes, in order to understand if the bourgeoisie or another social class is the progressive class within these political parties. It is always possible that, vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie, other classes may be more moderate in terms of their political values. Indeed, in political science, there is a rich literature showing the positive effect of working class for democratization of countries.

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Survey Questions

Bu ankette sorulan sorular akademik bir araştırma için hazırlanmış olup hiç bir şekilde başka amaçlarla kullanılmayacaktır. Lütfen hiç bir şekilde cevap kağıdına isim, soy isim, ya da bağlı bulunduğunuz kuruluş ismini yazmayınız. Yardımlarınız için teşekkür ederiz.

1) Mesleğiniz:_____

2) Cinsiyetiniz:_____

3) Yaşınız:

- a) 25 altı
- b) 25-30
- c) 30-35
- d) 35-40
- e) 40-45
- f) 45-50
- g) 50 ve üstü

4) Aylık Geliriniz:

- a) 500 YTL ve altı
- b) 500-1000 YTL arası
- c) 1000-1500 YTL arası
- d) 1500-2000 YTL arası
- e) 2000-2500 YTL arası
- f) 2500-3500 YTL arası
- g) 3500 YTL ve üstü

5) Ülkenin en önemli sorunu sizce nedir? (0 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. Lütfen her şikkı değerlendirmeyi unutmayın. 0: hiç önemli değil; 5: çok önemli)

- a) Ekonomi _____
- b) Terör _____
- c) Kürt Sorunu _____
- d) Bölgesel eşitsizlikler _____
- e) Artan aşırı milliyetçilik _____
- f) Uluslararası Terör _____

- g) AB ile ilişkiler _____
h) Irak'taki belirsizlikler
i) İşsizlik _____
j) Demokratikleşme Sorunu _____
k) İrtica _____
l) Türban/Başörtüsü Sorunu _____
m) Laiklik tanımı _____
n) Diğer _____ (Değerlendirme ile birlikte yazınız)
- 6) Türkiye'nin olası Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine bakışınız nedir? Lütfen 0 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. (0: kesinlikle karşıyım; 5: kesinlikle üye olmalıyız)
- _____
- 7) Olası AB üyeliğinin en önemli getirisi sizce ne olacaktır? (Lütfen sadece bir şık işaretleyiniz.)
- a) Ekonomik gelişme
b) Demokratikleşme
c) Güvenlik
d) Modernleşme/ Batılılaşma
e) Diğer _____ (Yazınız)
- 8) Türkiye'nin dünyadaki müttefikleri hangi ülkeler olmalıdır? (Birden fazla şık işaretleyebilirsiniz.)
- a) ABD
b) Avrupa Birliği
c) Arap Ülkeleri
d) İran
e) Rusya
f) Çin
g) Diğer _____ (Lütfen yazınız)
- 9) Aşağıdakilerden hangi dilleri bildiğinizi lütfen belirtiniz. (Birden çok şık işaretleyebilirsiniz. Lütfen 1 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. 1: az derecede 5: çok iyi)
- a) İngilizce _____
b) Almanca _____
c) Arapça _____
d) Fransızca _____
e) Çince _____

f) Diğer: _____ (Lütfen yazınız)

10) Aşağıdakilerden hangisini daha çok kullanırsınız? (Lütfen 1 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. 1: hiç kullanmam; 5: her zaman kullanırım)

a) İş hayatında (yazılı):
Türkçe _____

b) Özel hayatta (yazılı):
Türkçe _____

Kürtçe _____

Kürtçe _____

Arapça _____

Arapça _____

Diğer _____ (lütfen belirtiniz)

Diğer _____ (lütfen belirtiniz)

c) İş hayatında (sözlü):
Türkçe _____

d) Özel hayatta (sözlü):
Türkçe _____

Kürtçe _____

Kürtçe _____

Arapça _____

Arapça _____

Diğer _____ (lütfen belirtiniz)

Diğer _____ (lütfen belirtiniz)

11) Lütfen sorudaki her şık için 0 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. Kendimi _____ hissediyorum. (0: hiç hissetmiyorum; 5: kesinlikle hissediyorum. Birden fazla şık işaretleyebilirsiniz.)

a) Türk _____

b) Türkiye Vatandaşı _____

c) Müslüman _____

d) Kürt _____

e) Türk vatandaşı _____

f) Türkiyeli _____

g) Alevi _____

h) Diğer: _____ (Değerlendirme ile birlikte yazınız. Örnek: Arap 3)

12) İş yaptığınız kimselerin ulusal, etnik, veya dinsel kimlikleri onlarla olan ilişkilerinizi etkiler mi?

a) Evet

b) Hayır

13) Eđer 12. soruya evet cevabını verdiyseniz; ařađıdaki kimliklerden hangisini tařıdığınızı dűřündüğünüz insanlarla daha rahat iř yapacađınızı dűřünüyorsunuz? (Lűtfen her řık iin 0 ve 5 arası bir deđerlendirme yapınız. 0: asla birlikte alıřmam; 5: ok rahat alıřırım)

- a) Yahudi_____
- b) Ermeni_____
- c) Rum_____
- d) Kűrt_____
- e) Műslűman_____
- f) Tűrk_____
- g) Alevi_____
- h) Arap_____
- i) Avrupalı_____
- j) Hristiyan_____
- k) Amerikan_____
- l) Diđer _____ (Lűtfen deđerlendirme skoru ile birlikte yazınız)

14) Arkadař olduđunuz kimselerin ulusal, etnik, veya dinsel kimlikleri onlarla olan iliřkilerinizi etkiler mi?

- a) Evet
- b) Hayır

15) Eđer 14. soruya evet cevabını verdiyseniz; ařađıdaki kimliklerden hangisini tařıdığınızı dűřündüğünüz insanlarla daha rahat arkadařlık yapacađınızı dűřünüyorsunuz? (Lűtfen her řık iin 0 ve 5 arası bir deđerlendirme yapınız. 0: asla arkadařlık etmem; 5: ok rahat arkadařlık ederim)

- a) Yahudi_____
- b) Ermeni_____
- c) Tűrk_____
- d) Rum_____
- e) Kűrt_____
- f) Műslűman_____
- g) Alevi_____
- h) Arap_____
- i) Avrupalı_____
- j) Hristiyan_____
- k) Amerikalı_____
- l) Diđer _____ (Lűtfen deđerlendirme skoru ile birlikte yazınız)

16) Bekar ocuđunuz var mı?

- a) Evet
- b) Hayır

17) 16. soruya evet yanıtını verdinizse eğer, çocuğunuzun evleneceği kimsenin ulusal, etnik kimliği, veya dini sizin için önemli midir?

- a) Evet
- b) Hayır

18) Çocuğumun bir olan bir insanla evlenmesi hakkında şunu hissederim. (Lütfen her şık için 0 ve 5 arası bir değerlendirme yapınız. 0: asla onaylamam; 5: hiç rahatsız olmam)

- a) Yahudi ____
- b) Ermeni ____
- c) Rum ____
- d) Kürt ____
- e) Müslüman ____
- f) Alevi ____
- g) Arap ____
- h) Avrupalı ____
- i) Hıristiyan ____
- j) Amerikalı ____
- m) Diğer ____ (Lütfen değerlendirme skoru ile birlikte yazınız)

19) Evli çocuğunuz varsa eğer, eşinin etnik ve ulusal kimliği ve dini nedir? Lütfen aşağıdaki seçeneklerden uyanları işaretleyiniz.

- a) Türk
- b) Müslüman
- c) Türk vatandaşı
- d) Kürt
- e) Yahudi
- f) Ermeni
- g) Rum
- h) Alevi
- i) Arap
- j) Avrupalı
- k) Hıristiyan
- l) Amerikalı
- m) Diğer ____

20) Evliyseniz lütfen aşağıda eşinizin etnik ve ulusal kimliği ve dini nedir? Lütfen aşağıdaki seçeneklerden uyanları yazınız.

- a) Türk

- b) Müslüman
- c) Türk vatandaşı
- d) Kürt
- e) Yahudi
- f) Ermeni
- g) Rum
- h) Alevi
- i) Arap
- j) Avrupalı
- k) Hıristiyan
- l) Amerikalı
- m) Diğer _____

21) İş hacminizin yüzde kaçını ithalat-ihracat faaliyetleri oluşturuyor?

- a) %0
- b) %0-%10
- c) %10-%25
- d) %25-%50
- e) %50 ve üstü
- f) 75 ve üstü

22) Yurtdışına ne sıklıkla seyahat ediyorsunuz?

- a) Hiç seyahat etmem.
- b) Yılda 1 veya 2 defa
- c) Yılda 3 veya 4 defa
- d) Ayda 1
- e) Daha sık

23) Eğer yurtdışına çıkıyorsanız seyahatlerinizde en çok hangi ülkelere/ bölgelere gidersiniz?

- a) Avrupa
- b) Ortadoğu/ Arap Ülkeleri
- c) Kuzey Amerika (ABD ve Kanada)
- d) Uzakdoğu Ülkeleri (Çin, Japonya, Tayvan, Güney Kore, vs.)
- e) Diğer _____

24) İthalat ve ihracat faaliyetleriniz en çok hangi bölge veya ülkelerle yoğunlaşıyor. (1: düşük yoğunlukla; 5: çok yoğun. Her şikkı işaretleme zorunluluğu bu soruda yoktur.)

- a) Avrupa ____
- b) Arap Ülkeleri____

- c) Orta Asya Ülkeleri____
- d) Amerika____
- e) Irak____
- f) İnan____
- g) Latin Amerika Ülkeleri____
- h) Akdeniz Havzası____
- i) Komşu Ülkeler____
- j) Diğer_____ (Lütfen yazınız)

Anket tamamlanmıştır. Lütfen isminizi anket kağıdına yazmayınız. Teşekkürler.

APPENDIX B

Why the Bourgeoisie in Turkey is Unlikely to be revolutionary?

As the research has discussed extensively, the bourgeoisie can be pro-democratic and pro-moderation given the presence of certain conditions. However, it is possible to ask that why we expect the bourgeoisie in Turkey to be moderate instead of radical/ revolutionary as they were in the case of French Revolution in 1789 (Hobsbawm 2002: 60-77 and Moore 1993) or in the case of Glorious Revolution (North and Weingast 1989). There are at least three reasons that compel us to think that the bourgeoisie in Turkey would have moderate tendencies rather than assuming a radical and revolutionary role.

First, various studies has shown regime type and state capacity influence the type of contentious politics considerably. Tilly (2006: 161) explains that the greater a regime's capacity and democracy, the more difficult it becomes for the radical contenders to form the bases of a revolutionary movement due to the difficulty of evading suppression by the state and availability of channels for peaceful mobilization in a democratic setting. Furthermore, he states that past experiences, shared memories of rebellions, and reactions of the regime to various mobilization types shape and limit the repertoire of contentious politics, and so open up new channels and modes of mobilization. McAdam (1990, pp. 36-59) also argues that movements and contenders are in constant interaction with their broader social and political environment. He asserts that political and social context of the polity bound the opportunities and means available to mobilizers. Indeed, Tarrow (2006) shows in his research on social movements, it was only with Gorbachev's policy of softening the regime's grip on civil society that contenders were able to initiate a radical program of extra-state activity, which proved to be detrimental for the communist regimes' survival first in Central and Eastern Europe, then in the Soviet Union.

Thus, we can safely say that the state capacity and past experiences in Turkish political history hamper the conditions for the success of a revolutionary movement in Turkey. The past experience shows that whenever the military elite perceives activities of different groups as dangerous for the Republic and the regime, they do not abstain from threat of action or direct intervention in order to suppress the activities of these groups. Examples include the 1960 military coup against Menderes government, the 1971 military note, the 1980 military coup, the 1997 postmodern coup against Islamist Welfare Party, and the ongoing military conflict with the PKK since 1984. Especially the 1980 and 1997 coups were important for understanding the military's attitude vis-à-vis actors' with radical goals and means²¹. Therefore, the past does teach the contemporary actors one lesson: The state elite reacts radical actors with radical means, which probably makes a moderate stance more attractive and rational for the bourgeoisie.

The second reason for the bourgeoisie's possible unwillingness for a revolutionary and radical stance is the presence of a certain level of democracy in Turkey. As Tilly has suggested, the presence of a certain level of democracy prevents the rise of revolutionary actors in two ways. First, the contenders are able to express their grievances via peaceful means such as media or protests rather than violent methods. Moreover, elections provide the opposition forces with the opportunity to replace the government without using radical means. Second, it becomes difficult for the contenders to convince a substantial part of the society for the necessity of a revolution since a democratic regime is more legitimate in the eyes of the society than an authoritarian one.

²¹ For more information on 1980 military coup, see: Cemal, Hasan. 1986. "Demokrasi Korkusu 12 Eylül Günlüğü" [Fear of Democracy: September 12 Diaries]. Bilgi Yayınevi: Istanbul. For a brief history of military coups in Turkey, see: Heper, Metin and Tachau, Frank. 1983. "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey". *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 16, No. 1: 17-33

If we recall our definition of democratization in this paper, we can remember the distinction between initial democratization and further democratization. Even though several interruptions had occurred, the Turkish democracy seems to be consolidated in terms of the first step that is institutionalization of free, fair, and regular elections with universal suffrage. There will be little disagreement if I proposed that the main problems in Turkish democratization derive from the second step, which would be the consolidation of civil liberties such as minority rights, freedom of press, and subordination of the Army to the authority of elected executives.

However, especially with the EU process, the Turkish state and political actors took important steps towards the establishment and consolidation of the second-level democracy in Turkey (Sahin 2007). Turkish governments have introduced several democratization packages following the EU decision to accept the candidate status of Turkey in 1999. Since 1999, the Turkish parliament has legislated nine democratic packages in parallel with the Copenhagen Criteria including limitations on the closure of political parties, abolishment of death penalty, abolishment of the State Security Courts, strict measures against torture, emphasis on gender equality, decreasing the number of representatives of the Army in some institutions like High Education Council, and relaxations of some of the limitations against minority foundations. The parliament also legislated a third democratization package that allowed education in different languages and radio and TV broadcasting in whichever mother-language, which were reforms aimed to appease the Kurds (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 2004: 8-10). In this manner the political environment in Turkey has become even more unfruitful for revolutionary actors whereas moderate/ evolutionary actors have more chances to be successful to realize their goals in an increasingly democratic environment.

The third reason is the integration of the bourgeoisie with world markets especially after the 1980s. Öniş (2004: 118-122) explains that the Turkish economy has witnessed a radical restructuring and reorientation beginning with the Özal period, which was in nature neo-liberal, export-oriented, and endorsing free trade. The Özal period, according to Öniş, not only signified a transition to democratic politics after the military 1980 coup; but also the rise of trade liberalization. As a result, the Turkish economy has experienced a steadily increasing level of trade activity with outside markets. The table below shows the volume of imports and exports of Turkey during 1995-2007.

Table B.1

Year	Exports (million \$)	Imports (million \$)
2007	107 272	170 063
2006	85 535	139 576
2005	73 476	116 774
2004	63 167	97 540
2003	47 253	69 340
2002	36 059	51 554
2001	31 334	41 399
2000	27 775	54 503
1999	26 587	40 671
1998	26 974	45 921
1997	26 261	48 559
1996	23 224	43 627
1995	21 637	35 709

Source: TUIK

As the table makes it evident, the volume of exports and imports has constantly increased. For instance, in 2007 the total of imports and exports was \$277.335 billion. CIA World Factbook (2008) indicates that the GDP for Turkey in 2007 was an estimated \$663.4 billion. Therefore, the foreign trade activity of Turkey is almost 42% of the GDP in 2007. The

survey I have done shows that, like the rest of the society, the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie in Turkey were not immune to this trend. If we recall one of our previous tables, this process will be clearer.

Table B.2

Share of Import-Export in the Total Business Activities						
	0%	0%-10%	10%-25%	25%-50%	50%-75%	75% or over
DISIAD (%)	62.5%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	6.25%	6.25%
MÜSİAD (%)	27.3%	13.6%	18.2%	18.2%	13.6%	9.1%

37.5% of the DISIAD members and 72.7% of the MÜSİAD members have import-export activities. It is not unexpected to see that a bourgeoisie integrated with the world via trade activities being critical of violence and radical means since political turmoil and instability would probably discourage foreign direct investment, hamper import-export activities, and decrease trust vis-à-vis Turkish economy, which in turn deteriorate the volume of business for the bourgeoisie.

Indeed, the statements of MÜSİAD and DISIAD on several occasions show the clues of such an approach. For instance, in July 2008, the president of MÜSİAD stated democracy, rule of law, and political stability are critical for sustainable development in Turkey. He also added that Turkey has higher chances for attracting foreign direct investment if political actors abstain from violent agitation for their political goals (MÜSİAD 2008). In another instance, DISIAD and MÜSİAD declared their support for a press statement, which expresses that violence, conflict, and radical means have been destructive for the country and the Kurds, and what needed is a negotiation agenda and adherence to democratic means if we want economic development and

social peace (EMO Diyarbakir 2008). Hence, it is possible to conclude that the Kurdish and the Islamist bourgeoisie appreciate stability and rule of law and they reject the use of more radical measures to seize power but incur greater risk. In conclusion, it is possible to argue that the bourgeoisie in Turkey cannot be revolutionary due to three factors: (i) state capacity and past experiences, (ii) presence of a certain level of democracy, and (iii) the bourgeoisie's high levels of integration with the world markets.