Turkey's Europeanization Process and Its Impact on the

Consolidation Process of Turkish Democracy in the Post-Helsinki

Era (1999-2007)

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ABSTRACT

TURKEY'S EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CONSOLIDATION PROCESS OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-HELSINKI ERA (1999-2007)

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This study is an attempt to analyze the impact of the political Europeanization of Turkey upon accelerating and promoting the process of democratic consolidation in Turkey. By taking into account the ongoing relations between Turkey and the European Union, the central aim is to shed light on the role of the EU on facilitating consolidation of democracy in Turkey. At the same time, it will also examine the persistent limitations of the EU anchor in successful initiation of reforms on the road of democratic consolidation. In this respect, the ultimate goal is to assess to what extent the EU anchor could be a determining factor in the process of democratic consolidation in Turkey in the case of when the strong domestic commitment begins to diminish. In this context, this study proposes that there is a causal relationship between the EU's positive stance towards Turkey's bid for EU membership and the process of the consolidation of Turkish democracy, but this causal linkage alone is not strongly enough to ensure the full consolidation of Turkish democracy because of the temporary nature of the EU's positive stance and the inherent problems of Turkish democracy such as weak and inefficient civil society due to strong-state tradition, high degree of political polarization stemmed from the center-periphery cleavage, the strict secularism understanding of the Kemalist institutions hindering the well-functioning of democratic system and the interventionist stance of the military regarding the political issues.

Key Words: Consolidation of Democracy, Turkish Democracy, Turkey-European Union Relations, Political Europeanization

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPALILAŞMA SÜRECİNİN HELSİNKİ SONRASI DÖNEMDE (1999-2007) TÜRK DEMOKRASİSİNİN PEKİŞTİRİLMESİ SÜRECİ ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma; Türkiye'nin Siyasal Avrupalılaşmasının Türk demokrasisinin pekiştirilmesi süreci üzerindeki hızlandırıcı ve teşvik edici etkisini analiz etmeye çalışan bir teşebbüstür. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği ile olan tarihsel ilişkilerini dikkate alarak, Avrupa Birliği'nin Türk demokrasisinin sağlamlaştırılması sürecindeki yardımcı ve destekleyici rolüne ışık tutmak bu çalışmanın ana amacıdır. Aynı zamanda, bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği çapasının demokratik pekiştirilme yolunda başarılı reformları teşvik etmekte, süre gelen kısıtlamalarını incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, nihai amaç: Avrupa Birliği çapasının Türk demokrasinin pekiştirilmesi süreci içinde; özellikle halk desteğinin azaldığı süreçte; ne derece belirleyici faktör olduğunu değerlendirmektir. Bu kontekst içinde, bu çalışma şunu iddia etmektedir: Avrupa Birliği'nin, Türkiye'nin AB tam üyelik isteğine karşı olumlu tutumu ile Türk demokrasisinin pekiştirilmesi süreci arasında nedensellik ilişkisi ve bağlantısı vardır; fakat bu nedensellik ilişkisi tek başına Türk demokrasisinin tam olarak pekiştirilmesi için yeterli değildir; çünkü AB'nin Türkiye'nin tam üyelik isteğine karşı olumlu tutumu geçici bir karakteristiğe sahiptir, ayrıca Türkiye'nin iç dinamiklerinden kaynaklanan siyasal sorunları, örneğin: güçlü devlet geleneğinin neden olduğu sivil toplumun zayıflığı ve etkisizliği, merkez-çevre kırılmasından kaynaklanan yüksek derecede siyasal kutuplaşma, sıkı ve kısıtlayıcı laiklik anlayışının, ve Türkiye'de askerin siyasi sorunlara karşı müdahaleci tutum ve davranışları demokratik sistemin tam manası ile pekiştirilmesi önünde engeller teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasinin Pekiştirilmesi, Türk Demokrasisi, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, Siyasal Avrupalılaşma

For My Sister Demet Yarlı with Love

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, within the context of the long-sought aspiration of Turkey for EU membership, Turkey showed the great reform efforts to align its political and legal system with the standards and practices of the European Union. Hence, as taking into account to the impressive reform efforts of Turkey to reach conformity with the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria in the period between 1999 and 2005, it is fair to argue that Turkey experienced a "silent revolution"[1] process in which the progressive developments came to the fore in the realm of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and minority rights. In this context, one of the underpinning factor behind "the silent revolution" of Turkey was the positive stance of the EU towards Turkey's aspiration for EU membership which initially emerged with the decision of the European Council at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 granting Turkey to the candidacy status and disappeared with the beginning of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU on October 3, 2005. The EU's strong commitment to Turkey's aspiration for inclusion to the EU in the period between 1999 and 2005 empowered the pro-EU bloc in Turkey; whereas caused to decline in the political significance of the nationalist anti-EU bloc in Turkey (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007: 237). This domestic power rearrangement among the pro-EU and anti-EU block in Turkey made contribution to Turkey's ability to carry out the progressive reform process that render Turkey to eliminate major shortcomings embedded in the Turkish political and legal system and also to reach

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[1] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?", 2004:.6. Retrieved from: http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/

conformity with the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria (Keyman and Öniş, 2004; Öniş, 2006). In addition to the EU's adopted positive stance towards Turkey's bid for EU membership, domestic events played the determinative role in terms of empowering the pro-EU bloc in Turkey over the nationalist anti-EU circle which made Turkey able to carry out the impressive EU-inspired reforms in the realm of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and minority rights. In this context, the negative impact of devastating twin financial crisis was the major event that increased the political significance of the pro-EU circle in Turkey. As a result of the negative impacts of the 2000-2001 twin economic crises in Turkey, the living standards of Turks have tremendously deteriorated due to the several factors such as increasing unemployment rate, rising inflation rate and decreasing purchasing power. In a result, Turkish public, dealing with the severe impact of the economic crises, has begun to be more concerned with the material benefit of Turkey's EU membership. Hence, in the wake of the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 due to growing supports of Turkish public for Turkey's accession to the EU, the political significance of the anti-EU block considerably tarnished; whereas Turkey's European vocation significantly increased (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007; Öniş, 2006). Under this circumstance, the political authorities in Turkey began to adopt more pro-EU stance. Hence, Turkey enacted the EU-demanded reforms that enhanced the quality of democratic system and the human rights regime in Turkey. Moreover, another landmark event that increased the political significance of the pro-EU circle in Turkey was the 2002 national elections that brought the AKP into the government as a single-majority government (Keyman and Öniş, 2003). When the AKP government came into the power, it has preferred to be the prominent component of the pro-EU coalition in Turkey and began to advocate Turkey's quest

for EU membership in order to increase its questionable political legitimacy and its chance of political survival (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007; Narbonne and Tocci, 2007). The AKP government's vague commitment to Turkey's aspiration for its own sake has extended the boundaries of the pro-EU circle in Turkey. Under the leadership of the AKP government, the pro-EU circle in Turkey gained the considerable political significance in Turkey's march towards accession to the EU. As a result, thanks to the favorable domestic power configuration in Turkey reinforced by the positive attitude of the EU towards Turkey's bid for EU membership in the period afterwards of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey launched its history's the most revolutionary reform process as adopting the EU-induced legal and constitutional reforms in a wide range area from enhancing the basic rights and liberties to curbing the power and influence of military in the Turkish politics. Therefore, if one thing is certain, it is that, Turkey's reform process under the EU membership incentive and the appropriate domestic power arrangement in favor of pro-EU circles made serious contribution to enhancement of Turkish democracy. Hence, Turkish democracy has moved towards becoming the more pluralist and inclusive governing system in which the democratic norms and values in Turkish political system have been strengthened and deepened (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Öniş, 2006). However, to what extent these legal amendments make contribution on Turkish democracy to become "the only game in town" is questionable. Therefore, in this study, the major aim is to assess what extent Turkey's political Europeanization makes contribution to the consolidation process of Turkish democracy. In this context, this study mainly endeavors to realize how far Turkish democracy is away from becoming "the only game in town" in which no one can imagine acting outside the boundaries of the democratic system.

The Structure of the Thesis

This study is the case study employing the theory of consolidation of democracy in order to display that how far Turkish democracy is away from consolidation of democracy. Also, being as a case study, this contribution tries to create the causal path between the variables of EU's positive signal to Turkey's bid for EU membership and the process of consolidation of Turkish democracy in explaining the recent problems of Turkish democracy and the recent slowdown in the EU-related reform process. In this vein, in the first chapter, as a theory-oriented case study, this contribution endeavors to bring the very scattered theory of consolidation of democracy in much more compact and applicable form in order to use it in evaluating the impact of Turkey's European transformation process upon the development of Turkish democracy with the lens of the theory of consolidation of democracy in the fourth chapter. Therefore, in the first chapter, the relevant literature regarding the democracy and consolidation of democracy is analyzed carefully. In the second chapter, in order to realize the domestic-internal reasons behind the limitations of the political Europeanization to ensure the full sense of consolidation of Turkish democracy, the history of Turkish democracy is analyzed with the intention of detecting the inherent domestic-internal problems causing the problems of consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Because the history of Turkish democracy was constituted by several democratic breakdowns and subsequent restorations; and also the military coups manifested the shortcomings of the Turkish political system causing to the emergence of the problems of consolidation of democracy; in the second chapter of this thesis, the military breakdowns and following transition period are specifically analyzed. In this vein, this study argues that the root causes of the persistent democratic problems of Turkish democracy are *the strong state tradition*

preventing the creation of lively and vigorous civil society, *center-periphery cleavage* causing to arise of political polarization, *the deinstitutionalization of the party system* as a barrier to the effective political participation and representation, *the strict Kemalist understanding of secularism* and *the omnipresent role of the military* in Turkish politics preventing the well-functioning of democratic system in Turkey. In the third chapter, within the context of the political Europeanization, the relationship between Turkey and European Union is examined with the purpose of displaying when the European Union is able exert its system transforming impact over Turkey and how this system transforming impact of EU affects Turkey's political transformation. As a result, in the third chapter, the relevant literature explaining the history of Turkey-EU relations is analyzed. Moreover, the statements made by Turkish officials and the Commission reports are used as additional resources of the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, within the context of democratic consolidation theory with special reference to system transforming impact of the EU, this thesis evaluates Turkey's reform efforts to fulfill the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, in the fourth chapter, the constitutional and legislative changes since the Helsinki Summit of 1999 including the EU harmonization law packages, the adopted new civil and penal code are examined. Hence, in the fourth chapter, annually prepared "Regular Reports on Turkey's Progress toward Accession" are used as a primary source in order monitor democratic developments made in Turkey on the road of the EU accession. Finally, the conclusion tries to show the limitations of the EU anchor in terms of triggering Turkey to undertake necessary steps eliminate its democratic deficits and to consolidate its democracy in actual sense.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF DEMOCRACY AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

1.2 The Conceptualization of Democracy

Because the consolidation process of Turkish democracy within the context of EU integration process is the primary subject of this study, it is fair to begin with providing the conceptual and theoretical framework of democracy and democratic consolidation. At first, it should be pointed out that in the academia there are numerous scholarly studies regarding the concepts of democracy that can easily fill a library. In this vein, Bernard Crick argues that there is no political concept that has been more used and misused than that of democracy (Crick, 2002). Moreover, Robert Dahl claims that democracy is among the most "contested concepts" that have been discussed for about twenty-five hundred years (Dahl, 1998: 2-3).

Furthermore, since the major alternatives to democracy collapsed and/or eventually lost their legitimacy in the eyes of human kind, in the practices approximately every regime today has been claiming to be democratic despite the actual imperfections of their political system and institutions in terms of providing truly free politics (Dahl, 1998). One of the main reasons behind this fact is that many various meanings have been attached to the word of democracy depending on changing times and places. At that point, Dahl claims that as a concept, democracy itself has been contributing to confusion and disagreement because democracy has meant different things according to different people at different times and places

(Dahl, 1998: 3). Hence, although it has been debated for a long time from the Ancient Greek time to the present, the growing body of scholarship regarding democracy has been not able to reach a universal definition of the democracy yet and also the universal indicators, and measuring of democracy in academia has been lacking. However, the approaches regarding democracy in the literature might be categorized into three main groups: substantive, procedural and process-oriented definitions of democracy (Tilly, 2007: 7).

1.1.1 The Main Approaches to the Definition of Democracy

The first, the substantive definition of democracy mainly focuses on the conditions of life and politics a given regime promotes such as promoting human welfare, individual freedom, security, equity, social equity, public deliberation and peaceful conflict resolution (Tilly, 2007: 7). In this sense, Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda claim that substantive democracy is a process that has to be continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which affect society (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997: 62). However, regarding the substantive definition of democracy, some serious concerns have been raised in academia. In this vein, Charles Tilly asked the question if a given regime is unsuccessful in promoting economic welfare but its citizens enjoy reasonable equality, is it possible to think of this regime as more democratic than a fairly wealthy but severely unequal regime (Tilly, 2007: 7-8)? Therefore, it is fair to argue that there is a difficulty in handling tradeoffs among the deserving principles of substantive approach defined as necessary conditions to consider a given regime democratic.

The second, the procedural definition of democracy recognizes a narrow range of governmental practices to determine whether a regime qualifies as democratic. At that point, Bollen and Paxton argue that when the body of scholarship related to the procedural democracy is analyzed carefully, it is seen that three notions with regard to democracy become remarkably significant: competition, participation and a set of basic rights and political liberties (Bollen and Paxton, 2000: 59-60). In this sense, some observers of the procedural definition of democracy have just focused on the electoral contest and participation as indispensable part of the definition of democracy. According to their understanding, there has to be free and fair competitive elections which are held regularly including the mass participation of citizens that produce changes in governmental personnel and policy (Schumpeter, 1970: 272- 273). Such Schumpeterian conceptions risk committing what Terry Karl calls "the fallacy of electoralism". Because the procedural definition of democracy emphasizes much more on contested elections, such kind of definition leave other dimensions of democracy out of account. Also, the procedural definition of democracy ignores the degree to which multiparty elections may exclude significant portions of the population from contesting for power or advancing and defending their interest, or may leave significant arenas of decision making beyond the control of elected officials (Karl, 1995: 72-86).

On the other hand, Collier and Lewitsky advocate that among the observers of procedural democracy with the aim of advancing the Schumpeterian definition of democracy, there is a general tendency to define democracy in a manner that political liberties are sine qua non for a democratic regime (Collier and Lewitsky, 1997: 433-434). Although some observers of the procedural definition of democracy tried to add the presence of political liberties as criteria for definition of democracy, it would

not be mistake to argue that the procedural definition of democracy has still included some serious shortcomings while just concentrating on electoral contest, participation and political liberties. For example, in order to qualify a regime as democratic, there has to be effective civilian control over the military. The armed forces have to be subordinated to the civilian authority (Burnell and Calvert, 1999: 3). Moreover, while just emphasizing political liberties, the procedural definition of democracy fails to stress the importance of ensuring social, economic and cultural and human rights.

The third, the process-oriented approach to democracy, as a much more dynamic view, differs significantly from the substantive and procedural definitions of democracy while paying more attention on identifying the process, mechanism or paths that lead to the creation of democratic regime. In this sense, the process-oriented definition of democracy attempts to classify some minimum set of process that must be continuously in movement for a situation to qualify as democratic while defining the requirements of ideal democracy and clarifying the possible threat for the durability of democracy. At that point, I would like to point out here that, as a more advantaged and dynamic theoretical view, the process-oriented definition of democracy shall be used as a theoretical framework of this study. In the section below, the basic criteria for a democratic process, the institutional requirements of a democratic system and the possible threat to a democratic regime will be explained.

1.1.2 The Criteria for a Democratic Process

Robert A. Dahl argues that there are required at least five standards in order to talk about democratic governance and establishing political equality among people in determining the policies of the association. The first, Dahl argues that in order to

have democratic governance, "effective participation" is one of the required criteria of ideal democracy which brings about equal and effective opportunities for all members to take part in the decision making mechanism. In this sense, citizens can participate in the decision-making process through representatives in the parliament that are elected through electoral contest. The second criteria defined by Dahl is "voting equality" which means that every member has an equal and effective opportunity to vote and also all votes must be counted as equal. This criterion is also crucial to ensure the minority rights and bring about the rule of law in a given democratic regime while eliminating the difference among citizens from the varied segments in the society. The third criteria is the existence of "enlightened understanding" which means that within a reasonable limit as time, each member has equal and effective opportunities for learning about the existing relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences. The fourth criteria of a democratic process is to have a chance to exercise final control over the agenda which means that the members have to have an exclusive opportunity to define the matters included in the agenda. The last criterion for the democratic process is the inclusion of adults which means that adult permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens for exercising final control over the agenda and that adult members are treated as equal in terms of performing citizenship rights. In nutshell, democracy provides opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults (Dahl, 1998: 37-38).

1.1.3 The Requirements of Institutions of the Representative Democracy

Although there is no universally identified requirements for democracy, Robert Dahl's criteria for democracy are the agreeable criteria for a working process of democratic regimes' institution, a series of a regularized interactions among citizens and officials (Diamond et. al, 1995: 6-7). It is also pointed out here that R. Dahl used the word "polyarchy" rather than democracy to indicate a representative liberal democracy. While doing so, to analyze and compare the really existing democracies without implying that such countries achieved the ideal democracy becomes possible.

Dahl's polyarchy involves seven major characteristics which are required to exist in order to define a given regime democratic:

> 1. Elected Officials: control over the government decisions about policy is constitutional vested in elected officials.
> 2. Free and Fair elections: elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
> 3. Inclusive Suffrage: practically, all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
> 4. Right to run for office. Practically, all adults have the right to run for offices in government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.
> 5. Freedom of Expression: citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order and prevailing ideology.
> 6. Alternative Information: Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and protected by laws.
> 7. Associational autonomy: to achieve, including listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1989: 221).

1.1.4   The Potential Threat for Democracy

Dahl listed five major threats as sources of main concern about the stability of the democracy. (1) If there is a lack of control of military and police by elected officials, there would be a problem from the point of the stability of the democracy. Also, (2) if there are cultural conflicts among the society, the stability of democracy would more likely be destroyed and also sub-cultural pluralism would increase the possibility of the destruction of the democracy. In addition, (3) as an essential condition for democracy, there has to be no strong foreign control against to democratic development and stability of democracy in a country. If a country is subject to intervention by another country hostile to democratic government, democratic institutions are less likely to develop in that country. Moreover, (4) if democratic values and beliefs are not shared by people commonly, the stability of democracy is under the threat. Therefore, democratic values, beliefs and culture must be spread among the society in order to endure democracy. (5) In the absence of modern market economy and society, the stability of democracy would more likely be eroded (Dahl, 1998:146-158).

1.2   The Conceptualization of Consolidation of Democracy

Before starting on any debate regarding the conceptualization of the notion of consolidation of democracy, it should be pointed out here that in the literature a considerable distinction was made between *the transition to democracy*, or the beginning of the establishment of a democracy, during which politics is fluid and democracy not guaranteed, and *consolidation of democracy*, when democracy becomes "the only game in town" (Grugel, 2002: 3; Linz and Stepan, 1996: 5). O'Donnell and Schmitter claim that transition is the interval period between the

authoritarian regime and the consolidated democracy. According to them, transition basically initiates with the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and ends when a relatively stable arrangement of political institutions in a democratic regime is installed (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). In this sense, Linz and Stepan attempt to answer the question of when the transition to democracy completes like following:

> A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure (Linz and Stepan, 1996:3).

In addition, O'Donnell claims that the end of transition period does not automatically bring about the consolidation of democracy. As an alternative explanation, he develops the two-transition approach which proposes that there exits a large grey area between the moment of completed democratic transition and that of democratic consolidation. O'Donnell argues that conceptualizing the process of consolidation of democracy implies two transitions:

> The first transition is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the consolidation of democracy, or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a democratic regime… The second transition will not be any less arduous nor any less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government to a democratic regime are uncertain and complex and the possibilities of authoritarian regression are numerous (O'Donnell, 1992: 18).

1.2.1   The Notion of Transition of Democracy

Paul C. Manuel rightly claims that the issue of democratic transition and democratic consolidation are both conceptually and empirically different from each other. Whereas "transitologists" seek to discover the origins of a democratic regime, "considologists" concentrate on identifying the variables that keep a democratic

regime vigorous, stable and durable (Manuel, 1996: 1-2). According to transitologists, there is the zone of transition that is defined as the period of authoritarian regime collapse, authority void, and the eventual creation and installation of a new democratic regime. Also, they claim that the zone of transition is highly under the control of political factors (Huntington, 1985: 254-279). Moreover, transitologists advocates the idea of that the outcome of transition period depends generally on the choices, strategies, calculations and miscalculations of the relevant political actors (Manuel, 1996: 2).

One of the well-known transitologists, P. Schmitter, argues that transitions from autocratic or authoritarian regime can lead to diverse outcomes. The first possible outcome might be a regression to autocracy. The past democratization waves pointed to a regression to previous authoritarian regime as the most probable outcome of the transition period of the new democracies. Few countries have been able to reach an ideal democratic regime on their first attempt through strictly linear and incremental means. Within this group of countries, some countries have been faced with the oscillation between autocracy and democracy for prolonged periods like in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador. The second possible outcome is the formation a hybrid regime that does not satisfy the minimal procedural criteria for political democracy but that does not regress to the status quo ante. The third, possible outcome seems to be the most dangerous and the most probable for democracies of the last wave of democratization. In such a regime, all minimal criteria for democracy are respected such as competitive elections and liberal freedoms including multiple political parties, independent interest associations and active social movements. However, the rules of the democratic regime have not been internalized by social and political elites. When certain opportunities present

themselves, major actors of the regime can violate the basic principles of democracy for their own sake. The fourth possible outcome is the most desirable that is the consolidation of democracy in transitive democracies (Schmitter, 1995: 15-17).

Schmitter also claims that type of democracy will depend significantly but not exclusively on the mode of transition from autocracy which particularly influences the identity and power relations of actors. At that point, it is useful to emphasize the possibility of "birth defects as an outcome of conjectural circumstances that surround the moment of regime change" (Schmitter, 1995: 18). In this vein, it is useful to provide Alfred Stepan's paths toward democratization. Stepan identifies eight distinctive paths leading to the end of authoritarianism and the beginning of creating democratic regimes which are: internal restoration after external re-conquest, internal reformulation, externally monitored installation, democratization initiated from within authoritarian regime, society led termination party pact, organized violent and Marxist-led revolutionary war (Stepan, 1986).

Dankwart Rustow analyzes the moments of democratic political change and set out four necessary conditions for a successful transition to democracy: (1) national unity as a background condition; (2) a prolonged and unresolved elite power struggle; (3) a decision by key political elite to open the political process to civil society and (4) the habituation by civil and elite sectors to democratic practices (Rustow, 1970: 337-363). At that point, it should be clarified here that the fourth conditions settled out by Rustow is much more related to the notion of consolidation of democracy and to create more stable and persistent democratic regime while building positive and deeply felt commitment of support at the elite and mass levels for the democratic process.

1.2.2 The Notion of Consolidation of Democracy

As stated by Andreas Schedler, in the immediate aftermath of democratic transition, to ensure the stability and persistence of democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing it (Schedler, 1998:91). Moreover, if the recently established democracies of the world, that successfully complete their democratic transition period, are not able to consolidate their democracies, these new democracies will most probably face the risk of diminishment and deterioration of the quality of democracy and eventually recession to autocracy (Diamond, 1999: 64-65). Because of this reason, both political scientists and political actors in new democracies have been increasingly interested in what has come to be called democratic consolidation. As a result, most of the scholars working on the concept of democracy are chiefly concerned about identifying the strategies, institutions, and actors that will strengthen the democratic political institutions, improve their political functioning, and generate more active, positive and deeply felt commitment of support at the elite and mass levels that might be called as a consolidation of democracy (Schedler, 1998, 91: Diamond, 1999: 65).

On the other hand, it is fair to argue that to conceptualize the notion of consolidation of democracy properly is a really difficult task because as a concept, consolidation of democracy itself is nebulous phenomenon (Pridham, 1995: 167). At that point, Schedler correctly claims that one of the fundamental issues about the concept of consolidation of democracy is related to the fact that every one makes his own definition of consolidation of democracy according his perception and the context in which he stands. Because of this reason, since its inception, the concept of consolidation of democracy has remained nebulous. In other words, the meaning that people ascribe to the notion of democratic consolidation depends on where they

stand and where they aim to reach. It varies according to the contexts and the goals people have in mind (Schedler, 1998: 92).

1.2.2.1 Agreeable Definitions of Consolidation of Democracy

Although as compared to the notion of transition of democracy, to define the consolidation of democracy seems much more difficult, in the academia the most widely accepted definitions of consolidation of democracy have been put forward by some of the respectable academicians such as Przeworski, Linz, Diamond, Valenzuela, and Stepan. The first, Adam Przeworski make his mostly accepted definition of consolidation of democracy like following:

> A situation in which democracy becomes only game in town, when no one image acting outside democratic institutions, when all loser want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost. Democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing, that is, when all relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interest and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions (Przeworski, 1991: 26).

In line with the democratic consolidation definition of Przeworski, Linz argues that a consolidated democratic regime is one "in which the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is no any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to vote the action of democratically elected decision makers" (Linz, 1996: 158). Larry Diamond's consolidation of democracy is similar to those of Przeworski and Linz. Hence, Diamond argues that democratic consolidation is a process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all political actors either on mass level or elite level believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. Political competitors began to regard democracy as "the only game in

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town", the only viable framework for governing the society and advancing their own interests. At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus on the legitimacy of the constitutional system (Diamond, 1999: 65). Moreover, according to Samuel Valenzuela, the absence of political crisis and of destabilizing elements and the existence of durable democratic settings are not enough criteria for defining whether one democracy is consolidated or not, though these criteria are excessively demanded criteria for the notion of democratic consolidation particularly by the advocator of the minimum notion of the consolidation. Valenzuela argues that the establishment of a consolidated democracy or "efficiently functioning of a democratic regime" involves in part a confirmation and strengthening of certain institutions, such as the electoral system, revitalized and newly created parties, judicial interdependence and respect for human rights (Valenzuela, 1992: 58).

Moreover one of the influential and more comprehensive formulations of consolidation of democracy has been put forward by Linz and Stepan which has been generally used, modified and advanced by other political scientist. This famous definition is like following:

> Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no major actors of the regime spend their resource in order to attempt to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or turning the violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.
>
> Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when the majority of public opinion share the idea of that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a complex society and when the support for anti-democratic forces remain in negligible level or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
>
> Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces are alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to the

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resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16).

1.2.2.2 Approaches to the Study of Democratic Consolidation

In the academia there is a common acceptance that two approaches to defining the consolidation of democracy have been prevailing, named as maximalist and minimalist notions of consolidation of democracy. A maximalist notion would emphasize the internalization and habituation of the democratic norms and values among the majority of citizens through a fairly long socialization process. On the other hand, a minimalist approach stresses the importance of widespread presence of the free and fair elections held on regular interval. However, it is fair to argue that both maximalist approach and minimalist approach have included the theoretical shortcomings. If the maximalist approach moves forward to extreme, in the world there is no democratic regime considered truly consolidated. On the other hand, the minimalist approach runs the risk of "electoralism" or equating the democratic consolidation simply with holding free and fair elections while carrying significant limitations (Özbudun, 2000: 2).

As parallel to the argument of Ergun Özbudun, Hyug Baeg Im claims that in definition of democratic consolidation, to use the just nation of the institutionalization of the competition is insufficient and a broadened conception of democratic consolidation is needed. He advocates that "in addition to regularly contested free and fair elections, for a democratic consolidation guarantee of basic civil rights for citizens, accountability and responsiveness from its leaders, civilian control over the military power and Tocquevillian social democratization are required features need to be involved in the system"(Im, 2000: 23-24). Therefore, the

minimalist approach has to include the superiority of civilian authorities over the nonelected ones, as well as broad respect and effective guarantees for the basic civil liberties (Özbudun, 2000: 2-3).

As an alternative explanation of the approaches to define the consolidation of democracy, Schedler four-fold classification regimes, named as authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy and advanced democracies. If the countries do not have the sine qua features of democracy such as inclusive and competitive elections and civil liberties and freedom, those regimes are classified as authoritarianism. Also, a country that has civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections, can classified as liberal democracy. The electoral democracy is a regime that is used to identify the countries which hold inclusive, clean and competitive elections but fail to provide the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy. The term advanced democracies is used to the describe a type of democracy that presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of liberal democracy, and therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than many new democracies(Schedler, 1998: 91-92). On the basis of this four-fold classification of democracy, Schedler attempt to identify the approaches regarding the consolidation of democracy like following:

> Those scholars who look (fearfully) from electoral or liberal democracy to authoritarianism equate democratic consolidation with avoiding an authoritarian regression, a "quick death" of democracy. Those who look (hopefully) from electoral or liberal democracy to advanced democracy equate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening, with advances in the quality of democracy. Those who look (with concern) from liberal democracy to electoral democracy equate democratic consolidation with avoiding a "slow death" of democracy, the erosion of certain fundamental democratic features. And those who look (impatience) from electoral democracy to liberal democracy equate democratic consolidation with completing democracy, with supplying its missing features (Schedler, 1998: 92).

As an alternative classification of the approaches to defining consolidation of democracy, David Collier suggested that approaches to defining consolidation fall into three categories: actor-centered, event-centered, and institutional external or internal:

> 1. The actor-centered approach focuses on the willingness of significant actors to work within democratic rules.
> 2. The event-centered approach looks at elections or constitutional ratification as markers.
> 3. An internal institutional approach focuses on the degree of institutionalization, while an external approach concentrates on the duration of new political institutions and the extent of meaningful changes therein.

1.2.2.3 Sine Qua Non Conditions of a Consolidated Democracy

Five interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions are put forward by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan as sine qua non conditions of a consolidated democracy. Linz and Stepan claim that in addition to the state which is absolutely indispensable condition of a consolidated democracy, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist. First, the conditions must exist for contribute to the development of *free and lively civil society* which attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interest. Second, there must be a relatively *autonomous and values political society* which includes the core institutions of democratic regime such as political parties, elections, electoral rules political leadership, interplay alliances and legislatures. Thanks to the establishment of democratic political society, democratic government might be controlled and monitored by society. Third, there must be the *rule of law* to ensure legal guarantee for citizens' freedoms and independent social life. In this sense, Linz and Stepan claim that in order to ensure the exact civil society and political society explained above, the rule of law embodied in a sprit of constitutionalism is an obligatory

condition that bring about a working procedure of governance and guarantee for freedoms and liberties (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 7-10)

The three conditions presented above are the prerequisite of a consolidated democracy. The next fourth and fifth conditions proposed by Linz and Stepan are the supportive conditions for these three conditions to trigger the developments ensuring the creation of truly a consolidated democracy. The fourth, there must be *state bureaucracy* that is usable by the new democratic government. This condition is a supportive condition for satisfying the previous three criteria- civil society, political society and the rule of law. Fifth, there must be *institutionalized economic society* as the final supportive condition which requires a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions and regulations that mediate between state and market. Also, certain degree of state intervention into market is necessary to regulate the market to increase the efficiency of the market economy (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 7-13).

1.2.2.4 Supportive Conditions for Democratic Consolidation

Hyug Baeg Im proposed a set of conditions as the supportive conditions for democratic consolidation which are required for developments increasing the prospect for consolidation of democracy in a given regime. First, the presence of *ethnic homogeneity* is considered as one of the important supportive conditions for consolidation of democracy. In the absence of the ethnic homogeneity, the social disorder or political instability of the regime due to ethnic based conflict are more likely to come to the fore. Because of the ethnic diversity within the society, legitimization of democratic procedure at the varied segment of the society and the creation of social capital and trust among the different parts of the society become

much more difficult. Therefore, ethnic homogeneity is the liability for a country that tries to consolidate its democracy. The second, *religious tolerance* is a contributing factor for democratic consolidation. Particularly in the realm of respecting for and protecting of the minority rights, religious tolerance is an essential dynamic behind the consolidation process. In the absence of the religious tolerance within a given regime, to grant the religious and cultural rights/freedoms to the minority groups is the challenging task for a government ruling a country. Therefore, in the absence of religious tolerance, a given country might face with the problems of consolidation of democracy. The third, *an effective state* is a required as supportive condition for consolidation of democracy while ensuring the universal realization of citizenship by the rule of the law. The fourth, as a supportive condition for democratic consolidation, *civilian control over the military* has to take place. Unless military tutelage and reserved domains are eliminated, the democratic regime can not be classified as a truly consolidated democracy (Im, 2000: 26-32). Regarding to the fourth supportive condition for consolidation of democracy, Valenzuela puts forward the more explanatory argument of that thanks to using the tutelary power by political and social actors, the broad oversight of the government and its policy decision would be exercised while claiming to represent unclearly formulated fundamental and enduring interests of nation state. Valenzuela means that a regime can not be considered a consolidated democracy if those who win elections for forming government are placed in state power and policy making positions that are subordinate in this manner to those of non-elected elites (Valenzuela,1992: 60). Moreover, as another supportive condition in democratic regimes, *executive accountability* has to be ensured through monitoring the activities of the executives by the legal institutions in order to realize government and legislative compliance

with the constitution to protect human rights and to safeguard against corruption and abuses of power. Also, it should be pointed out that the oversight over the executives and legislatives must be exercised exclusively by the legal institutions on the basis of constitution and other basic laws. No other actors different than judiciary can exercise overview while applying tutelary power (Valenzuela, 1992:63).

1.2.2.5 Obstacles to the Democratic Consolidation

Im identifies some serious structural obstacles to democratic consolidation. In this regard, first, low institutionalization of political society poses serious challenges to consolidation of democracy. In terms of institutionalization of political society, a new democracy's political parties, electoral campaigns, and representative organizations have to be able to articulate, aggregate, and represent the interest of their constituencies in the political arena. The second, weak constitutionalism is another major impediment to consolidation process of a democratic regime. In the absence of the constitutionalism, the establishment of the rule of law in order to ensure legal guarantee for citizens' freedoms does not seem possible. Therefore, any political liberty associated with democracy can not be enjoyed without the constitutionalism. In this sense, a given new democracy, that completes successfully the transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracy, has to change the previous undemocratic constitutions through drafting, revising and ratifying a new democratic constitution. The third, the underdevelopment of civil society is also another serious problem for consolidation of democracy. In order to consolidate democracy, the building and enhancing the vibrant and vigorous civil society are essential task for new democracies. Because the civil society has contributed the diffusion of civic and democratic values throughout the whole society such as

interpersonal trust, tolerance, cooperation and participations, in the case of the serious lack of free and lively society electoral democracy is more likely to face with the regression to autocracy. The fourth, delay of welfare democracy main obstacles for democratic consolidation. The state apparatus and civil associations have to be able to provide social welfare services in order to keep the social and economic equilibrium within the society through using different means of welfare policies such as minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and industrial accident insurance. Hence, the delay of welfare going along with significant degree of economic inequality poses serious challenges to consolidation of democracy (Im, 2000: 32-40).

1.3 Conclusion

Democracy, as simply the rule of people and a system for choosing government through free and fair electoral competition at regular intervals, is seen as the best realizable form of the government which ensures the best prospect for accountable, responsive, peaceful, and good governance while keeping the system under the control of people through competitive elections (Diamond, 1999: 2-3). At that point, I would like to remind Winston Churchill famous quote of that "democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time" (from a House of Commons speech on Nov. 11, 1947). This famous dictum of Churchill, which implies that democracy is the best realizable form of the government, constitutes the main the normative standpoint of this study. Also, as another normative claim of this study, it shall be proposed that everyone deserves to live in conditions of self-esteem, patience and respect which might become possible under the democratic regime.

Moreover, it should be clarified once again here that this study takes the issue of defining democracy through using the view of the process-oriented approach. I would like to point out here that when the notion of democracy is used throughout this study, it means to a regime involves the components like following: there have to be fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which practically all the adult population is eligible to vote; the armed forces have to be subordinated to the authority of elected civilians: there has to be the mechanism of horizontal accountability in order to constrain the power of executive branch by providing autonomous power of other government institutions; cultural, ethnic, religious and minority groups are not prohibited from expressing their interest in the political process or speaking their language or practicing their culture; citizens also have a right to form relatively independent political parties, independent associations and movements with the aim of having the appropriate channels for expression and representation; there has to be alternative sources of information to which citizens can freely access; individuals also have substantial freedoms of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petitions; people are equal under the law; there has to be independent, non discriminatory judiciary that protect individual and group liberties effectively and there has to the rule of law that protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture and unjustified interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also organized nonstate or anti-state forces (Diamond, 1999: 11-12).

Moreover throughout this study, the maximalist notion of consolidation of democracy –not extreme form of it- is preferred to explain the consolidation process of Turkish democracy on the road of the EU accession. Therefore, this study will examine the stabilization, routinization, internalization, and habituation of the

democratic procedures and norms at the elite, organization and mass level. Also, constitutional and legal reforms launched by Turkey, and their impact on the institutionalization of democratic norms and standards are primary subjects to careful analysis of this study with the aim of realizing whether the impact of EU accession process contribute the avoidance from the erosion of certain fundamental democratic features; the increase of the quality of democracy with supplying its missing features in the realm of the civil and political rights and civil military relations; and eventually to the process of making democracy "the only game in town".

CHAPTER II

THE CEASELESS TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NEVER-REALIZED CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY: THE HISTORY OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY WITH THE RECURSIVE REGIME BREAKDOWNS AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSITIONS

The most foremost writers of the concept of consolidation of democracy have reached a compromise on the argument that the full sense of democratic consolidation takes place in two phases: the transition phase; and the consolidation phase. In the first phase, the authoritarian regime is replaced by the democratic one in which free and fair elections begin to be held in a regular term and a government comes to power as a direct result of these free and fair elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, 1992). In the second phase, democracy becomes "the only game in town" in which the major political actors deem that there is no any alternative to democratic processes to reach the power. Also, in the second phase, there does not exist any political crisis or destabilizing elements which create the risk of regression to the authoritarian rule (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Schedler, 1998; O'Donnell, 1992). However it should be pointed out that there is a large grey zone between the phase of democratic transition and the successful democratic consolidation. In this grey zone, politics is fluid and democracy is not guaranteed. Hence, there exists uncertainty about the fate of the democratic regime because of the persistent possibilities of authoritarian regression (O'Donnell, 1992; Grugel, 2002; Linz and Stepan, 1996).

On the basis of this theoretical framework, this thesis argues that Turkey has been quite successful in completing the first phase as of carrying out the successful breakdown of an authoritarian regime and transition to the electoral democracy. In this regard, since the first free, fair and general elections of 1950, despite the periodic regime breakdowns, Turkey has successfully held free, fair and competitive elections to determine the political authority which would obtain the right of governing the state. On the other hand, due to the peculiar-internal factors and its historical legacy of Turkey such as the strong state tradition, the center periphery cleavages, the deinstitutionalization of the political party system, Jacobin style strict secularism understanding, and the strong influence of military in politics; Turkey has remained in the grey zone more than fifty years (Lewis, 1994; Özbudun, 2000; Kalaycıoğlu, 1999; Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1969, Heper and Keyman, 1998, Özbudun, 1996). While remaining as a prototype of procedural democracy for more than a half century, Turkish democracy has been unable to take the necessary steps in order to move towards the second phase of democratic consolidation.

2.1 The Reasons Causing the Stagnation of the Turkish Democracy in the Grey Zone

2.1.1 The Historical Legacy of the Ottoman Empire over the Turkish Politics

One of the major reasons, causing to the stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the grey zone of the process of consolidation of democracy, has been the persistent historical legacy of the Ottoman strong state tradition which has continued to affect Turkish political system in a negative way hindering the emergence of the democratic developments that would enhance the quality of the democratic system in Turkey. Because Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire's strong, centralized,

and highly bureaucratic state tradition, state apparatus were overdeveloped in a way that impeded the emerging of lively and vigorous civil society in Turkey (Özbudun, 1996, Özbudun, 2000). Hence, as a consequence of the legacy of the Ottoman strong tradition upon the Turkish political landscape; the internal dynamics other than state apparatus, have always remained insufficient to be an engine for the required democratic reforms in the Turkish political system which makes Turkish democracy a consolidated democracy in which any political actor can not imagine acting outside the boundaries of the democratic political system in order to reach the political power (Heper, 1985; Heper, 1992; Heper, 2000). Moreover, as stated by Henri Barkey, the presence of strong state tradition is one of the leading factors behind the common authoritarian inclination among the Turkish ruling elitists (Barkey, 2000). The authoritarian tendency of the ruling elites prevents the growth of the intra-party democracy in Turkish political system; although the presence of the intra-party democracy is one of the major prerequisite for the development of democratic political culture and institutionalization of the political system. Also, as a consequence of the existing authoritarian tendencies among the ruling elites, the uncompromising political attitudes have emerged in Turkey's political landscape which has fuelled the political polarization and fractions in Turkey. At that point, it should be highlighted that the mounting political polarization and fraction originated from the uncompromising attitudes of the political leaders have been the major reasons behind the each regime breakdown carried out by the Turkish armed forces. In a nutshell, due to continuing influence of the Ottoman state tradition over the Turkish political landscape, the civil society has remained inherently weak, passive and inefficient in order to become the main engine engendering the domestic democratic transformation of Turkey in which the democratic values, norms and

practices have been internalized and socialized by the major segments of the Turkish society (Kubicek, 2001, Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007). Also, because of the Ottoman legacy, the political leaders inclined to rule their political parties in an authoritarian manner without providing the opportunity for flourishing of any elements of the intra-party democracy, there is a lack of the intra-party democracy which has been the main barriers on the way of the internalization of democratic cultures by Turkish citizens and even the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

2.1.2 Center-Periphery Cleavage in the Turkish Politics

One of the peculiar internal factors that hinder the democratic developments in Turkey and caused to the stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the grey zone of the consolidation of democracy process has been the ongoing center-periphery cleavage in the Turkish politics. As the main political cleavage in Turkish politics, the center-periphery division in Turkish politics was basically fuelled by religiosity and anti-statist of tones of the periphery; and the nationalist and the secular values of the center (Mardin, 1973: 169-190, Kalaycıoğlu, 1999; Özbudun, 2000). In this vein, one of the foremost academicians of Turkish politics, Ergun Özbudun argues that "the origins of the Turkish party system lie in a center-periphery conflict which pitted a nationalist, laicist, cohesive state elite against a culturally heterogeneous, complex and even hostile periphery with religious and antistatist overtones" (Özbudun, 2000: 81). In addition to differences in the values of the center and periphery, it is the fact that the both side of the cleavage never attempted to understand one another' values, they always approached the each other's values with suspicion. As stated by Levent Gönenç, the political actors in Turkish political landscape has trapped in a vicious circle fuelled by the center-periphery conflict in which the center always approached

the periphery's values and actions with suspicion and the periphery confirmed this suspicion by seizing in every opportunity to challenge the center's values and norms. As a result, the persistent mutual distrust takes places in Turkish politics between the center and the periphery which impedes the emergence of the social consensus to push the political authorities in Turkey to carry out the required political reforms that would increase the quality of Turkish political system (Gönenç, 2006: 7). Therefore, the cleavage between center and periphery has always one of the major problems of on the way of the democratic consolidation of Turkish democracy. With respect to center-periphery conflict, it should be pointed out that the center-periphery rapture contributed the rise of the political polarization and fractions when the politicians and the political system failed to meet the changing the socio-political and socio-economic demands of the society. This caused to the emergence of the deadlock in the political system. In a nutshell, the ongoing center-periphery cleavage in Turkish politics has been one of the major problems of Turkish democratic system taking place due to Turkey unique historical legacy. The presence of the center-periphery conflict prevents the society and even political parties and other state institution to reach a compromise to carry out further democratic reforms enlarging the boundaries of the democratic system in Turkey (Mardin, 1969; Mardin, 1973; Keyder, 1987).

2.1.3 Low Level of Institutionalization of Political System

The existence of low level of institutionalization of political system is one of the serious structural problems that caused to stagnation of a given political regime in the grey zone of the consolidation process of democracy (Im, 2000; Linz and Stepan, 1996). In this vein, this thesis argue that one of the main reasons behind the stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the "grey zone" between "transition to

democracy" and "the consolidation of democracy" is the existence of high degree of factionalism, political polarization and fragmentation among the major political parties which is both the outcome and reason of the absence of the required level of stability and recurrence in patterns of behavior of Turkish political parties. The characteristic electoral volatility and fragmentation in Turkey, particularly in the period between 1950 and 2002, resulted in the low level of political institutionalization in Turkey which prevented Turkey to take the required steps to eliminate the democratic deficits (Hazama, 2007; Özbudun, 1996; Özbudun, 2000).

Moreover, it should be pointed out that in the period afterwards the successfully ending the first phase of the consolidation of democracy; in the civilian rule, the political parties in Turkey remained unsuccessful to reach the political pact that would be an engine for progressive changes in the democratic system which was previously structured by the outgoing military regimes in accordance with their authoritarian understanding. Due to primarily electoral concerns originated from high degree of electoral volatility and also fear from the reaction of the military stemmed from the traditional role of military as a vanguard guardian of the Kemalist regime, the center parties in the both left and right axis refrained from creating political cooperation with each other to make required changes in the political system to remove the authoritarian ruins of the outgoing military regime (Özbudun, 2000). As a result, the political regime causing to political polarization and political factionalism have remained unchanged until the beginning of the EU integration process. Hence, the high degree of political polarization and factionalism emerging due to the deinstitutionalization of the party system in Turkey have been the endemic structural problems of Turkey that hinders the democratic developments in Turkey.

Furthermore, it should be highlighted that because of the absence of the required level of institutionalization in Turkish political system and also inherent weakness of Turkish civil society, the horizontal and vertical accountability has never been built upon the Turkish political parties and politicians. Hence, internal dynamics other than political parties remained unable to monitor and limit the power of the politicians (Şimşek, 2004: 49). This situation caused to the emergence of the corruptionist and clientalist political system in Turkey which has negatively affected the credibility of the political system (Heper and Keyman, 1998). In the absence of the credibility of the Turkish political system, the political parties have also remained inefficient to take the progressive steps to upgrade the democratic regime in Turkey. In addition, because of the low level of political institutionalization, the political participation, representation, civic education of citizens and training of new leaders for political leadership could not achieve the expected level that triggers the democratic developments engendering the full sense of democratic consolidation in Turkey.

2.1.4 The Military's High Degree Influence over the Turkish Politics and its Periodic Intervention

Also, this study argues that one of the major factors that causes to stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the grey zone is the high degree of military influence over the Turkish politics. As a consequence of the mission of the vanguard protector of the Kemalist regime, Turkish armed force periodically intervened into the democratic rule which unwittingly resulted in deinstitutionalization of the political system, high degree of political fragmentation and electoral volatility that latter make contribution to the rise of the political polarization and fractions during the civilian rule in the

period afterwards the restoration of the democratic system (Özbudun, 2000; Çarkoğlu, 1998). Moreover, the existence of the credible threat of the military intervention as the unique perpetual democratic deficient of Turkish democracy poses serious threat to consolidation of democracy. In the presence of the credible military intervention threat, the political parties becomes unable to undertake the required steps for making required changes in the political system. The inability of Turkish political parties prevented Turkey moving towards the second phase of the consolidation of democracy. In this vein, Ali Çarkoğlu claims that the military intervention to the politics with purpose of rebuilding the stability of the political system while accusing the high fragmentation and polarization of the Turkish political system has been the major reason leading up to the deinstitutionalization of the political system in Turkey that hinders the consolidation of the democracy in Turkey. As an unexpected consequence of each military intervention into the politics, the level of electoral fragmentation and volatility have been increased which later make contribution to rise of the political fraction and political polarization among the political parties (Çarkoğlu, 1998: 544-571).

In line with the argument of the Çarkoğlu, Ergun Özbudun argues that the stabilization of the electoral behavior is an element of consolidation of democracy and in the absence of the stability of the electoral behavior, the electoral democracies would be less likely to consolidate its democracy, because the political parties are more likely to compete with each other rather than forming a coalition for required democratic developments. For the Turkish case, Özbudun claims that high volatility in the electoral behavior took place in Turkish politics, primarily because of the frequent intervention of the military to the politics which hamper the institutionalization of the parties in Turkey (Özbudun, 2000: 78). As a result, the

roots of the political parties into the society have remained weak which prevent the proliferation of the democratic political culture in Turkey which is one of the prerequisite of the consolidation of democracy.

Because of its peculiar internal factors and historical legacy such as strong state tradition, center periphery cleavages, the inappropriate level of institutionalization of the party system, and strict secularism understanding, and the high degree of autonomy of the military and its powerful role in politics, Turkey have remained in the grey zone for more than a half century and Turkish democracy has been unable to move towards the second phase of the process of consolidation of democracy. Therefore, it is reasonable to analyze the history of the Turkish democracy to understand the root causes of these democratic problems that prevent Turkey to consolidate its democracy. In this vein, in the rest of the chapter, the military interventions and subsequent democratic restoration will be examined with the details of the reason leading up to the democratic breakdowns and the following transition to democracy process under the control of the military power holders.

2.2 The First Transition to Democracy in the History of Turkish Democracy

Aftermath of two failure in attempt to the transition to multi-party system during the era of Kemal Ataturk, in an actual sense the transition to multi-party system took place in year of 1946, with the establishment of the Democrat Party and National Development Party and their participation to the general elections of 1946 (Teziç, 1976). However, as a result of the first multi-party general election the power holders of the authoritarian regime continued to hold the political power and to govern the state. The political power of the authoritarian single party was not transferred to the new political parties which actually happened in the history of the Turkish

democracy as a result of the general elections of 1950 (Özbudun, 2000). Therefore, this thesis argues that the first actual transition to democracy did not come to the scene automatically with the establishment of the new multi-party system in Turkey. Moreover, this contribution claims that the shift to the multi-party system is the beginning of the process of the first transition to democracy. Hence, the period between 1946 and 1950 is described as a transitional period in which the process of transition to democracy took place gradually. In this period (between 1946 and 1950), the reformers within the government party and the moderates within the opposition parties put strong commitment to make required changes in the political regime that would lead up to the establishment of the actual transition to democracy (Özbudun, 2000). On the basis of this argument, in this part of the chapter, at first hand, the reasons leading up to the creation of the multi-party system will be discussed. The second, the result of the general elections of 1950 will be examined. The third, the path during the Democrat Party government leading up to the first democratic breakdown will be analyzed.

2.2.1 The Factors behind the Genesis of the Process of Transition to Democracy: Transition to the Multi-Party System

Although the students of the Turkish politics puts forward various arguments about the factors that encourage the authoritarian power holders to take the decision of shifting the political system into the multi-party system through allowing the political participation of the newly emerging political parties into the competitive elections, there are three main factors that commonly highlighted by the scholars as a major reason behind the introduction of the multi-party system in Turkey: (1) the

international settings, (2) socio-economic transformation of Turkish society during the course of 1940s, and (3) the nature of the existing authoritarian regime.

2.2.1.1 The International Climate Triggering the Democratic Developments

The international climate emerging in the period afterwards the World War Second was an important external factor pushing Turkey to make required reforms on its political regime to realize the transition to democracy. The Second World War was ended uncontested victory of the western world against the fascist axis powers. This led to the spread of the idea of that democracy was the highest form of political and social organization with its major components of equality, sovereignty, participation, and rule of law. As a result of the spread of the democratic ideas all over the world, several states experienced the transitions from authoritarian rule to the democratic regime which was called as the second wave of democracy (Huntington, 1991). Under this international climate, İsmet İnönü had a keen commitment for Turkey to take a part in newly emerging international architecture, particularly being involved in the creation of the United Nations. In this regard, in order to become eligible to participate into the newly emerging international architecture, the states had to have a political regime on the basis of will of people. Therefore, from the point of Turkey, it was necessary to make transition to democracy, because democracy was the new valid rule of the game in international arena. Moreover, the emergence of the communist Soviet Russia threat is another factor that enforced Turkey to create much more close relation with the democratic West. In a nutshell, in order to be a contributor of the establishment of the international institutions emerging after the Second World War, Turkey had to espouse democratic principles called as a new rule of the game and also Turkey deemed necessary to initiate the democratization

process in order to safeguard itself from the Soviet threat (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Özbudun, 2000; Huntington, 1991).

2.2.1.2 Social Change in Turkey as an Engine to Transition to Multi-party System

2.2.1.2.1 The New Urban Educated Class Demanding Political Liberalization

Associated with the developments in the international context, Turkish politics began to move towards becoming more effective parliamentary system. In the vein, emerging a new group of educated urban class within Turkey began to claim that they had enough capacity to play the game according to the new rules in both international and domestic arena. Hence, they became one of the main engines behind the transition of Turkey from authoritarian regime to the multi-party based procedural democracy. In this regard, it should be pointed out that these new urban educated people obtained an opportunity to come to the political sphere thanks to the transformation of the Turkish society from the traditional order to the new modern community due to social transformation of Turkey related to the socio-economic developments in the course of the 1940s (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Lewis, 1961). The new urban educated people's strong will of practicing democracy in both domestic and international arena was one of the internal factors contributing the establishment of the democratic regime in Turkey. The liberalization reforms or called as democratization reforms, which corresponded to the demands of these urban educated people, were primarily carried out by liberal groups, called as reformers, within the RPP leaded by İsmet İnönü insisting on the start of a multi-party system in Turkey (Özbudun, 2000). Moreover, a dissenting group within the RPP, which latter created a new political party, the Democrat Party, also raised serious demands

regarding the further liberalization in the political regime in order to bring Turkey up to the level western countries. The reformers and splinters in the government party, the RPP were the politicians included in the emerging the urban and educated class which was domestic engine for transition to the multi-party system. (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Lewis, 1961; Özbudun, 2000)

2.2.1.2.2 The New Economic Class Demanding Economic Liberalism

As a consequence of the socio-economic developments and the uneven distribution of income in Turkey during the World War II; the new economic circle, constituted by new industrial and commerce class, began to take place in the economic sphere of Turkey. This newly emerging economic circle pursued a different economic vision than that of the single party regime. Because the etatisim that was followed by the single-party regime as an official state policy directly clashed with the interests of this new economic group, they began to exert pressure over the government to make economic reforms to ensure much more liberal, entrepreneur-oriented economic policies through lessening the etatism. Hence, the demands and their pressure over the government might be considered as one of the major socio-political reason behind the transition to the democratic rule in Turkey (Zurcher, 1997). Because the economic policies of the RPP were not capable of articulating the interest of the newly emerging business class, the establishment of the new political parties with new economic visions different than statism was political necessity to welcome the interests of the new pressure groups within the society. While being aware of this socio-economic development within the society and the rising discontent of the new economic classes; İsmet İnönü, the head of the state and the exclusive power holder of the single party era, allowed to the creation of the new political parties which

would bring about the new economic expansion into the political sphere (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Karpat; 1959).

2.2.1.2.3 The Sense of the Exclusion in the Periphery due to Kemalism and Uneven Economic Distribution

Another reason preparing the ground for transition to the multi-party system was the prevailing sense of exclusion among some segments of the society which considered that their interests were not represented in a full sense within the political realm due to restriction imposed by the Kemalist ideology. In this sense, it should be pointed out that particularly three major principles of the Kemalism: secularism, nationalism and etatism, played a considerable role in the creation of the sense of exclusion and discrimination among the some parts of the society which were never supported and internalized by some segments of the society (Abadan-Unat, 1979). Within the context of the center-periphery cleavage, the main problem generated by the Kemalist ideology causing to arise of the feeling of exclusion is associated with the principle of strict secularism restricting the religion into the private sphere without providing any room in the public sphere (Heper and Güney, 2000). From the standpoint of the conservative segments of the Turkish society, the Jacobin style of strict secularism understanding was the major obstacle to articulate their religious-based political demands in the political realm; because since the establishment of the Republic, as a part of the Kemalist elites' strict secularism understanding, all sort of references to Islam were gradually removed from the public domain and also Islamic values were replaced with the principles of the Kemalist ideology (Yavuz, 2000; Jenkins, 2003). Moreover, in peculiar to the Kurds, constituted the major part of the periphery, both secularism and nationalism constituted the problem for the continuity

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of their value system on the basis of their religious and ethnic identity (Barkey and Fuller, 1998). Therefore, it is fair to argue that from the point of the whole periphery, regardless of their ethnic diversity, the basic principles of the Kemalist ideology present problem to represent their values and interest in the political realm. As a result, within the context of the center-periphery cleavage, the sense of exclusion and discrimination took place in the periphery which caused to the decline in the support of the periphery towards the central political authority that caused to the emergence of the power vacuum in the periphery from the point of the single party regime. This situation was the major factor triggering the emergence of the new political party in the political sphere which would try to fulfill the political vacuum of the single party regime on the periphery through following policies relaxing the strict secularism and ultra-nationalism.

Moreover, the social discontent which was nourished by the feel of exclusion and discrimination on the basis of the cleavage between the values of the center and periphery was enlarged by the negative socio-economic impact of the World War Second that gave way to the emergence of the uneven income distribution. Under the unbalanced national income distribution, the purchasing power and the life standards of the people in the periphery became deteriorated in considerable amount because of the policies of the authoritarian single-party government to finance the burden of the World War II such as the enacting the National Defense Law and Agricultural Products Law. Hence, to encourage the formation of new political parties, which would have a new political vision relaxing the Kemalist ideology without harming the spirit of the Kemalism and a new economic vision that could welcome the needs of the periphery, was a political necessity to eliminate division within the society due to center-periphery cleavage; and also to decrease the economic discontent in the

periphery caused by the negative impact of the World War II (Abadan-Unat, 1979:

Karpat, 1959; Zürcher; 1997).

2.2.1.3 The Nature of the Existing Authoritarian Regime

According to Özbudun, ideological and organizational characteristics of the RPP were more close to the liberal democratic tradition rather than communist and fascist single party regimes. For instance, as being different than single parties in the communist or fascist regimes, the RPP had approached to the every kind of social, political and economic events with a positivist-rationalist mentality which made it different than the other single parties in the communist or fascist rule. Thanks to this feature of the RPP, the nature of the RPP was suitable to question and criticize the existing political regime that was already applied. As a result, when the leaders of the RPP had faced with the new socio-economic challenges, they preferred to seek other alternative ways to ensure the Kemalist goals in a more effective ways. In this sense, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the leadership of the RPP began to deem that competitive political system would be best way to solve the rising socio-economic problems and achieve Kemalist goals (Özbudun, 2000). In this vein, Feroz Ahmad claims that the Kemalist elite persistently denied any affinity with fascism. According to Ahmad, Turkey always endeavored to remain different than the fascist regimes in Rome and Berlin. While espousing the nineteenth century idea of progress, the Kemalist regime in Turkey recognized the rule of law and the importance of the constitutional state. In addition, the Kemalist regime never denied the universality of the civilization, and it never rejected the rationalism, individualism, and the fundamental equality of man and ethnic groups. Because of all these reasons, the Kemalist regime had always had the characteristics of transitional

regime which prepared the required ground for transition to a liberal political and economic system, although it reflected some elements of the authoritarian regimes (Ahmad, 1981a:159-163).

Moreover, Frederick Frey argues that the Republican People's Party (RPP henceforth) never became a party that was engaged in the mass mobilization of the people to enrich its popular base and legitimacy in the eyes of people. According to Frey, the RPP did not endeavor to gain the support of the low classes while being as an example of the cadre party in which elites at the center and local notables at the provinces dominated the party government (Frederick, 1965: 40-43). Therefore, it is fair to argue that this situation is directly reflection of the social Darwinist and elitist understanding of the leaders of the RPP. As a consequence of this kind of elitist understanding, the mass was always considered as an uneducated and unconscious group of people which were always open to the every kind of speculations coming from the different power sources. Because of this reason, the leaders of the RPP deemed that it was necessary to keep the mass under their rigid control through using different communication channels. In this vein, the education system was seen an instrument to spread the Kemalist doctrine within the mass. However, in some cases these channels remained insignificant to extend the Kemalist doctrine into the periphery which never espoused the some particular principles of the Kemalist ideology such as secularism and nationalism. The RPP's strong commitment to keep the mass under their strict control and also the efforts of the channels of the Kemalist ideology to extend their ideology into the periphery without paying attention to the demands of those people created the social discontent which was a political opportunity for the newcomers in the political sphere to take root in those neglected part of the society. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the RPP's cadre party nature and

its neglect of the demands, interest, and values of the mass unintentionally contributed the establishment of the multi-party system (Zürcher, 1997).

2.2.2 The End of the Process of Transition to Democracy: The General Elections of 1950 and the Peaceful Power Transition in Turkish Democracy

In an actual sense, the democratic transition took place in Turkey with the landslide victory of the opposition party, the Democrat Party, in the general election of 1950. In this general election the DP received the 53 % of the popular vote and gained considerable majority within the parliaments as receiving 416 seats out of the 487 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Zürcher, 1997: 231, Weiker, 1963; Lewis; 1961). Hence, with the result of general election of 1950, the political power was transferred from the authoritarian power holders to newcomers in a smooth and peaceful way. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the end of the process of the first transition to democracy in Turkish took place successfully as a consequence of the general election of 1950.

At that point, it should be emphasized that the first transition to democracy in Turkey took place without rupture under the previous authoritarian regimes' constitutional system. The power was not transferred to the opposition as a consequence of any internal violent upheaval, external threat or military intervention, but as a result of the general election under the unchanged constitutional system (Özbudun, 2000: Abadan-Unat, 1979, Zürcher, 1997). Therefore "Turkey's first transition to democracy experience conforms to the reform mode of transition" stated in the literature (Özbudun, 2000: 17-18). Moreover, as stated by Ergun Özbudun that Turkey's first transition to democracy experience is an important historical case supporting the hypothesis of that a transition is possible only when the soft-liners are

stronger than in both the government party and opposition parties. In this regard, it should be highlighted that when the transition process was initially started in Turkey with the establishment of the multi-party system, the hard-liners were in powerful position in the government party, the RPP. However, over time the hardliners in the RPP represented by Recep Peker and his followers had lost their power. Also, the extremists within the Democrat Party (DP henceforth) did not persist on making politics within the DP and left the DP. As a result, the splinters from the DP formed a new political party, the Nation Party in 1948. Thus, in both the government party and opposition party, the moderates came to the power that contributed to the success of the reform mode of transition in Turkey (Özbudun, 2000: 18-19).

Although transition process was led and controlled by the power holders of previous authoritarian regime, they had some concerns about incoming era in the Turkish politics especially related to some traditionally sensitive issues such as the preservation of the secular nature of the state and the territorial integrity of the state; and the protection of the social and political cohesion (Özbudun, 2000; Abadan-Unat; 1979). However, the concerns of the previous authoritarian regime's power holders did not obstruct to the transition process. In this regard the firm commitment of İnönü to democracy played an important role in the success of the transition process. İnönü also personally intervene into the relation between the governing party and opposition party when the tension between the government and opposition was raised (Özbudun, 2000).Moreover, during the transition period, İnönü pushed the liberals to gain more political power over the hardliners who had been willing to preserve previous privileged position of the RPP against other political parties. As a result, hardliner members of the Republican have been eliminated from important positions in the party government which prepared a ground for the preparation of a

new election law mostly meeting the demands of the Democrat Party. In the elections of 14 May 1950, which was held according to the new election law, the Democrat Party gained the landslide victory and reached the majority in the assembly. Thus, thanks to election results of 1950 national elections, the transition process ended with the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition party (Özbudun, 2000).

2.2.3 The Turkish Democracy in Grey Zone Turning back to the Authoritarian Regime: The First Military Coup of 1960 and its Major Reasons

The first true competitive elections without any consent in Turkish politics took place in 1950 which resulted in the landslide victory of the former opposition party of Democrat Party. As a result, Turkish democracy successfully ended the process of transition to democracy and entered into the grey zone between transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy. However, Turkish democracy's first journey under the Democrat Party government in the grey zone could not move towards the consolidation phase but even ended with the military takeover. In this part of the chapter, the factors that prevented the Turkish democracy from being consolidated and caused to the military coup will be discussed. Before embarking on the reasons behind the military intervention of 1960, the brief information will be presented about the Democrat party while paying attention to its leadership cadre, popular base and general policy during its term of government in the period between 1950 and 1960.

The Democrat Party led by a group of politicians who experienced their political socialization within the RPP as members of the National Assembly and latter gained considerable amount of parliamentary experience in the period between 1946 and 1950 as leader cadres of the opposition party (Özbudun, 2000). Although in

the general elections of 1950, the DP received supports form the various segment of the society; lower classes, particularly, peasants constituted the most significant part of the DP's popular base due to the reasons cultural, political and economic terms (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000; Harris, 1970). Because of this reason, when the Democrat party came to the power, it favored to make cultural and religious gestures such as funding mosque buildings, installing Koran-programs on the radio, increasing the number of vocational religious high schools which welcomed the expectation of lower class, particularly, the peasants (Abadan-Unat, 1979: 15). As a result, the DP consolidated its popularity among the lower class thanks to positive impact of these political and cultural gestures over the popular base. Moreover, as a part of the strategy to strengthen its tie with the electorate base, the DP tried to increase the power of the local leaders by encouraging them to take responsibility for solving the problems between the citizens and bureaucrats. This leaded to elimination of the previous felling of exclusion among the lower classes during the RPP government as lower class living in periphery began to take a part within the Turkish politics like in the involvement of the lower class into the politics in the Green revolution (Abadan-Unat, 1979: 15).

Thanks to the consolidation of its electorate base through various gestures in the first four-year term in the government, the Democrat Party gained an even more decisive election victory in the general elections of 1954 as gaining 490 seats out of 535 Assembly seats (Zürcher, 1997; Harris, 1970). As a result of the 1954 general elections, due to the high degree of the DP majority in the Parliament and the absence of the institutional check and balance system over the activities of the DP, the political polarization increased tremendously in this second four-year governmental term of the DP government (Özbudun,2000). Because of the absence

of the check and balance system over the policies of the DP, in the second four-year governmental term the DP found a suitable political atmosphere to undertake some authoritarian measures to decrease the power of the opposition against the DP government. In this regard, as authoritarian measures applied during the second the DP government, the press censorship came into the force; the judges and university professors forced to retire through the enacted laws; and also the restrictive regulations began to be applied that create limitations on the involvement of small parties into the politics. These were all the wrong policies of the DP which lead to path towards regime breakdown in 1960 (Zürcher, 1997; Abadan-Unat, 1979; Karpat, 1972).

2.2.3.1 Major Reasons behind the Military Intervention of 1960

One of the main reasons behind the first military coup of 1960 is the Democrat Party's political tactics and strategies leading to emergence of *a high level of political polarization* within the society. Although the Democrat Party came into the power as a single-party majority government, they continued to act as an opposition party and followed antagonistic and discriminative strategies towards the supporters of the RPP (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000; Abadan-Unat; 1979). Hence, the antagonistic policies and actions of the Democrat Party highly divided the society into two camps: the supporters of the Democrat Party and the oppositions to the Democrat Party. In this sense, one of the important root causes of the implication of the antagonistic tactics is the Democrat Party's primary intention to preserve its internal party solidarity as mobilizing their popular base against to RPP (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000). At that point, it should be pointed out that the initial political socialization of the leaders of the DP occurred within the RPP during the single party

era, the leaders of the DP were the former members of the RPP which had positivist-rationalist mentality. As a result, the leadership of the DP was less likely to have the absolute oppositionist minds towards the supporters of the RPP, although they had inherited a lot of attitudes, norms, and institutions which emerged under the single-party regime and were convenient with the nature of the single party regime rather than with competitive political system (Özbudun, 2000; Abadan-Unat, 1979). However, the popular base of the DP claimed that they were excluded from the politics due to ultra-secular and ultra-nationalist policies of the RPP government in the single party era. Therefore, as being formerly excluded parts of the society from the politics during the single party era, the popular base of the DP had pushed the DP to have opposition mentality against the RPP supporters. Under this circumstance, the DP leaders considered that the anti-RPP tactics within their discourse and politics would be beneficiary for the sake of their political interest to keep the party's popular base in cohesion and to sustain the party's internal unity (Rustow, 1991; Özbudun, 2000; Zürcher, 1997). However this consideration caused to the radicalization of some part of the society that damaged the existing social cohesion within the society. Under this condition, the primary objective of the military regime was to eliminate the political polarization and division within the society emerging during the DP era due to antagonist approach towards the RPP supporters.

On the other hand, the tension between the governing party of the DP and the opposition party of RPP had begun to increase due to the actions of the DP directly contradicting with the interests of the urban workers, intellectuals and other supporters of the RPP. Moreover, when the popular support towards the DP began to decline due to socio-economic developments, the political elites of the DP began to apply some restrictive political means to oppress the rising oppositions against the

economic and social policies of the DP (Rustow, 1979: 92). Moreover as stated by Lombardi, when the DP encountered with the increasing political opposition, the DP responded to those opposition through changing the legislation in authoritative way to restrict the freedom of expression and freedom of press which caused to raising discontent within the society against the DP government (Lombardi, 1997: 191-215). As a result, the press censorship came into the force; the laws were enacted to force judges and university professors to retire; and also the some restrictive measure was taken in the election laws that made the involvement of small parties into the politics difficult. These are all the inappropriate policies of the DP which lead to path towards democratic breakdown in 1960 (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Özbudun, 2000, Karpat, 1972).

As a reflection of the increasing social discontent within the society, the student demonstrations began to take place against the policies pursued by the DP government. Consequently, the DP asked the military to quell these student protests on the behalf of the government. However this demand coming from the DP to oppress the protests through using power was interpreted as sign of reverting back to the authoritarian rule existing in the single party era. Therefore, as argued by Lombardi, the progressive military officers in the Turkish military began to consider that the DP and its reactionary policies were the main obstacles standing on the development bringing Turkey more close to the traditional primary objective of modernization and westernization. As a result, the military officers began to deem that it was necessary to overthrow the DP from the government in order to provide a new momentum to the modernization trend in Turkey through rebuilding damaged social cohesion within the society (Lombardi, 1997: 204-205).

Another very important factor triggering the military intervention was the ongoing conflict between the DP and the public bureaucracy during the Democrat Party government. Because public bureaucracy remained loyal to the tradition of the single-party regime and showed significant resistance to the activities conducted by the DP to consolidate its own political power, the DP perceived the public bureaucracy as an obstruction on the process of consolidating their power (Özbudun, 2000). Therefore, in second four-year term, aftermath of relatively consolidation of their political power, the DP began to apply policies to curb the power of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the DP began to exert authoritarian pressure over the bureaucracy through enacting the laws forcing the bureaucrats to retire. In addition to that, bureaucratic groups including both civilian and military bureaucrats lost their social status, prestige, political influence and also economic power under the DP government. The relative income of the bureaucrats declined dramatically during the DP government due to the inflationary policies of the DP (Zürcher, 1997). Because of all these reasons, all bureaucratic groups began to have negatives attitudes towards the DP regime. Hence, when the coup d'état was carried out by the military, both military officers and civilian bureaucrats quickly accepted the legitimacy of the military intervention (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000).

Moreover the DP's anti-statist and anti-planning economic policies particularly formulated on the basis of the populist and ballot box concerns caused to the deterioration of the whole Turkish economy that eventually collapsed in the economic crisis of 1958. As a negative impact of the economic crisis and general economic deterioration upon the society, the general discontent within the society had tremendously increased against the DP government (Zürcher, 1997: Özbudun, 2000). In this regard, Cem Eroğul claims that when the general discontent associated

with the economic decline in Turkey began to be voiced louder, the DP began to apply more authoritarian measures to press the voice of the discounted segments of the society (Eroğul, 1987: 112-113). This authoritarian attitude of the DP against the opposition prompt the Turkish military to take the administration of the state in order to make required socio-economic reforms which would decrease the socio-economic and socio-political discontent emerging within the majority of the society during the DP era (Eroğul, 1987; Özbudun, 2000; Abadan-Unat,1979).

2.3 The Second Transition to Democracy in the History of Turkish Democracy under the Military Rule:

2.3.1 The First Regime Breakdown: The Military Coup of 1960

On May 27, 1960 the Turkish armed forces took over the administration of the state through overthrowing the DP government as a consequence of the efforts of the low ranking military officers. However in order to attribute the legitimacy to the Coup and gain the legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the office of the presidency was offered to senior general Cemal Gürsel by the power holders of the Military Coup (Abadan-Unat, 1979). One of the significant features of this military coup, which makes it different than its counterparts in the Latin America, was its short duration. The military regime taking place aftermath of the military coup of 1960 was very short lived. The military commanders preferred to remain in the power for only 18 months; then they transformed the political power to the civilian politicians as quickly as possible (Özbudun, 2000). In other words, the democratic regime was restored within reasonably short time period as compared to the democratic breakdowns and subsequent restorations in the Latin American counter parts (Zürcher, 1997).

2.3.1.1 The Reason behind the Shortness of the Military Regime of the 1960 Coup D'état

As imposed by the Kemalist doctrine, the Turkish military force always tries to keep away from the politics. The Kemalist ideology thought that the separation of military and political affairs is necessity to keep the internal integrity of the military and to maintain the discipline of the military officers (Tachau and Heper, 1983). On the basis of this doctrine, aftermath of the required restorations in the political regime, the military commanders returned back to their barracks with the aim of preserving its one of this significant feature of being a professional and unpartisan (Abadan-Unat,1979).

The second reason behind the shortness of the military rule was the existence of opinion difference within the military regarding the goals and policies of the military regime. Because of this reason, if the military commanders had preferred to extend the term of their office in the government, this would have been harmed the solidarity of the military. In this sense, the military regime endeavored to make required reforms on the political institutions such as Constitutions, the electoral law and political trials which were the goals settle down commonly without any consent before the military takeover took place. As military commanders began to deem that they achieved their primary goals defined before the military coup, they preferred to transform the governmental power to the civilians (Abadan-Unat, 1979).

The third reason behind the short duration of the military rule of the 1960 military coup was the strong commitment of the civilian politicians to return back the democratic regime as soon as possible. In this sense, the remaining political parties displayed significant will to end the military regime and to rebuild democratic rule in

Turkey. In this vein, the pressure coming from the civilian politicians led to convention of the Assembly in January 1961 (Zürcher, 1997).

2.3.1.2 Reforms on the Political Institutions under the Military Regime of 1960

First of all, it should be pointed out that aftermath of the 1960 military intervention, the Turkish military acted as an institution what Samuel Huntington called "reformist" (Huntington, 1962: 33). While confirming with the Huntington's reformist model of military regime, the military junta carried out the vital political, social and political reforms with the purpose of protecting the social, economic and political order in Turkey which were previously deteriorated due to wrong policies and strategies of the DP government (Tachau and Heper, 1983). Among these vital reforms, *the preparation of the new constitution* was the most important reform of the military junta through which the military regime restructured the political regime and social order in accordance with their mind settings. In this regard, the primary objective of the newly prepared constitution was to establish political and legal checks and balances system over the government to prevent the possible "tyranny of the government" in the following civilian rule (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Abadan-Unat, 1979). In terms of creating political check and balance system, the new constitutions brought a political innovation into the Turkish politics which was the establishment of the *bi-cameral parliamentary system*, including upper house and lower house. The bicameral parliamentary system contributed to the creation of high degree of control over the governmental activities. Moreover *the separation of legislative and executive power* in the place of concentration of power in the hands of Turkish Grand National Assembly was established with the 1961 Constitution which

was also a part of the strategy of military to create political check and balance system over the executive power (Tachau and Heper, Özbudun, 2000, Zürcher, 1997).

Moreover, the 1961 Constitution safeguarded the basic rights and freedoms like in the western model of liberal democracies and also played a function to *enlarge the political rights and freedoms* in a way to encourage groups and institutions other than political parties to engage with the politics. In this regard, the 1961 Constitutions played a contributive role to make the universities, the radio and television authority more autonomous and to encourage the business and other association to be more active political participator (Zürcher, 1997). This situation contributed the establishment of the social and political check and balance over the governmental authority. Moreover, it should be highlighted that through assurance of the greater freedoms, the previous politically insignificant groups began to involve in the political affairs that contribute to mitigation of the effects of the party hegemony in politics (Dodd, 1992).

As the most libertarian Constitution of Turkey, the 1961 Constitution provided unprecedented political and social freedoms and rights for the Turkish citizens, particularly for labor class, that would contribute directly the emergence of the vertical accountability of government. In this sense, particularly labor class gained certain social, politic and economic rights such as right of forming trade unions thanks to the libertarian nature of the 1961 Constitution. Therefore, the influence of the labor class over politics had tremendously grown that contribute to the creation of restriction upon the previous unchecked power of the government. Because governments began to take the interests of the labor class while formulating the economic policies, it was fair to argue that the vertical accountability of the government was increased through growing political influence of the labor class

(Dodd, 1992). Moreover, another significant reform of the military regime of 1960 was the establishment of *the National Security Council* (hereafter NSC) as a new institution in the political system that paved way the military to exercises political power over the civilian politicians (Zürcher, 1997). The NSC was one of important "exit guarantee" of the military that was established by the military junta with the intention of eliminating the risk of re-emergence of the conditions facilitating the military interventions and to protect their legacy over the politics during the next democratic regime (Özbudun, 2000: 116-117). The National Security Council could began to play an important role in Turkish politics as institutionalizing the role of the military in politics which provide an opportunity for the military to exercise significant political power over the elected governments (Harris,1988; Özbudun, 2000). The decisions regarding the important issues of Turkey other than security matters such as social, economic, political affairs began to be taken by the governments through taking consultation of the military. Because the NSC interprets security matters so broadly, other important social, political and economic events began to be involved in the interest area of the military due to the idea of military not leaving these issues into the sole responsibility of the elected officials (Harris, 1988).

2.4 Turkish Democracy Staying in the Grey Zone during the Course of 1960s and the Second Regime Breakdown of 1971

2.4.1 The First Four-year Governmental Term in Period between 1961 and 1965 afterwards the Restoration of the Civilian Rule

One of the major aims of the military junta of 1960 was to bring more malleable civilians into the government which would never challenge the political and constitutional order that the military junta established (Dodd, 1992; Tachau and

Heper, 1983). As viewing the RPP more malleable civilians, the military junta of 1960 considered that the RPP government in the following electoral democracy would contribute to maintenance of the status quo in the realm of political and economic structure. Also the military junta considered that the possible RPP would played a positive role in implementing the political and constitutional ground rules introduced during the military regime of 1960. In other words, according the calculation of the military regime, the Republican People's Party government would win the general elections in the civilian rule and the 1961 Constitution and the reforms coming up with the new constitution would be implemented more properly (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Zürcher, 1997). However, the first general elections following the military rule held in 1961 did not produce the outcome that the military regime desired. The RPP was able to receive only 36.7 of the general votes. Approximately two-thirds of the general vote went to the political parties claiming that they were the successors of the DP. Under these conditions, the RPP forced to create several coalition governments with other political parties in the assembly. However these coalition governments, formed in the period between 1961 and 1965, were exactly far from the desire of the outgoing military regime to create governmental stability and implementing the reforms enacted by the military junta of 1960 through the political and constitutional amendments (Zürcher, 1997).

To put in detail, aftermath of the restoration of the civilian rule in the year of 1961, the first coalition government was constituted by the RPP and Justice Party (the JP hereafter) under the heavy pressure of the military. This first coalition led by İsmet İnönü was interpreted as "a marriage of convenience, not love" (Zürcher, 1997: 261). Therefore, this coalition between two major political parties was short lived due to high divergence of the opinion particularly about the amnesty of the

former DP politicians. Aftermath of the failure of this forced coalition government between the RPP and the JP, the RPP formed coalition governments with other two minor political parties in the assembly. Due to high fractions in the government, this second İnönü was also short lived. And then, the JP's leader, Ragıp Gümüşpala, attempted to form a government, however he failed. After this unsuccessful government formation attempt, İnönü formed third İnönü coalition with the independents in the Assembly, but this minority could not be long lived. As a result, new general elections were held in the years of 1965. To put in a nutshell, the four-year governmental term aftermath of the restoration of the civilian rule in the period between 1961 and 1965 was quite different than the expectations of the ongoing military regime which primarily wanted to set political order and governmental stability. Due to the introduction of the proportional election system, the smaller political parties could enter to the assembly which caused to fragmentation within the parliament that deteriorated the governmental stability (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000).

2.4.2 The Single Party Government in the Period between 1965 and 1969

In the Turkish politics, one of the significant election achievements was obtained by the JP in the general elections of the 1965. After series of unsuccessful coalition governments in the early 1960s; with the elections results of the 1965 general elections, the JP founded an opportunity to come the power as a single-majority government for four-year legislative term while receiving approximately 53 % of the general votes and correspondingly absolute majority (Zürcher, 1997). In these general elections, "national remainder system", allocating parliamentary seats almost exactly according to the distribution of votes, was applied as an election system

which provided political opportunity for the small political parties to take a part in the Parliament (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). As a result, in the history of the Turkish politics, for the first time one ideological party found an opportunity to gain seats in the parliament. As a representative of the socialist ideological party, the Workers' Party of Turkey achieved to enter in the assembly with 15 deputies (Zürcher, 1997: Özbudun; 2000).

Moreover following the general elections of 1965, the splits occurred within the RPP. The splinters from the RPP preferred to form a more centered political party, the Reliance party led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, while the RPP restructured its political orientation towards more radical leftist platform with the purpose of receiving the support of more radical leftist groups within the society. The RPP began to emphasize on social justice and equality as targeting to mobilize the votes of workers and people living in the shanty towns with hoping the election victory in the coming general elections (Zürcher, 1997).

2.4.3 The Reasons Preparing the Ground for the Coup by Memorandum in 1971
In the late 1960s, the political structure in Turkey became increasingly polarized and fragmented and even radicalized. In this regard, one of the reasons behind *the rising political radicalization* was the splint taking place within the RPP which had adopted a left-of center stance in July 1965 and went to become more radicalized through increasing the central party discipline aftermath of the splint (Dodd, 1992: 22). As a result, the left-wing political parties contributed to the rise of the fragmentation in the political sphere. Moreover, as similar to the fragmentation of the left, the right experienced political fragmentation with emergence of the new rightist political parties (Zürcher, 1997). One of the major reasons behind the political polarization

emerging in the late 1960s was the abolition of "the national remainder system" which previously allowed the small political parties to represent the interests of its followers in the parliamentary ground. However the abolition of the national remainder system prevent the marginal groups from parliamentary participation that would lead to radicalization of these marginal political parties which began to engage in politics in the streets rather than in the parliamentary that caused the rise of the political violence in the late 1960s (Dodd, 1992; Zürcher, 1993; Özbudun,2000).

In the late 1960s, Demirel adopted two main strategies in order to preserve the JP's internal party cohesion that contributed the acceleration of political polarization in Turkey. Demirel's political strategies unwittingly led to the way for the military intervention as triggering the emergence of the uncompromising political attitude in Turkish political landscape. The first strategy of Demirel was to emphasize the Islamic character of the JP. The second one was to make strict anti-communist propaganda. As a natural consequence of these two strategies, the JP adopted a strict discriminative approach towards the civilian bureaucrats who were the supporters of the leftist political parties. Also, the JP government tried to purge the leftist or pro-Republican people's party civil servants from the state cadres through using the governmental power. This discriminative approach increased the polarization within the society that facilitated the conditions for the military intervention (Zürcher, 1997).

Due to the rising political fragmentation, polarization and radicalization in the political sphere, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, *political violence had been escalated in the streets* which began to be seen in the form of bombing, robbery and kidnapping in Turkish politics. One of the major reasons behind the initial escalating political polarization was the student movements, mostly fed by the Marxist,

Leninist, anti-imperialist leftist ideologies which latterly faced with the violence from the militant rightist group. The meet of the leftist political violence with the rightist political violence raised the political tension in society too much that made the military intervention inevitable to curb the ongoing anarchy in the streets and to rebuild social order within the Turkish society (Özbudun, 2000). Shortly, before the military intervention of 1971, Leftist militant students kidnapped US service men, attacked American targets and robbed banks. The rights militant groups were in attempt at murder to the professors (Zürcher, 1997). Moreover, although the Islamist groups preferred to remain out of the ongoing political violence in streets, they began to criticize more aggressively and openly the secular nature of the state and the Kemalist ideology. These were all socio-politics developments that facilitate the coup by memorandum in 1971 (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000, Tachau and Heper, 1983).

In addition, in the 1960s Turkey witnessed the important socio-economic transformation because of two important internal factors: (1) Import substitution based industrialization; and (2) urbanization (Zürcher, 1997). In this vein, it should be highlighted that the level of industrialization in 1960s was not enough to create necessary employment for the growing population in Turkey. As another socio-economic development in the 1960s, Turkey experienced high degree of urbanization including mass wave of emigration (Geray, 1969). However, the people emigrating from rural to urban were unable to find jobs in the cities due to insufficient rate of industrialization in Turkey. This unemployed people, mostly living in shanty towns, began to enter into the marginal political groups which latter started to use political violence as a political mean to express their socio-economic and socio-political demands (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000). Furthermore, in terms of conducting the

political violence, the cooperation took place among socially, politically and economically disadvantaged lower class people including students, workers and unemployed people. At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the political authority in Turkey was powerless to curb escalating political violence arising from the campus and streets based on the youth movement militancy. Hence the military intervention became inevitable to rebuild the destroyed social order in Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Tachau and Heper, 1983).

To sum up, from taking the advantage of the liberal political atmosphere emerged afterwards the libertarian 1961 Constitution's entry into the force, the radical groups both within the left and right wing gained political influence in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s. However, the radical groups gaining growing political power began to use the political violence as a political mean to express their political interest as a reaction to the lack of parliamentary representation due to the abolishment of national remainder elections system. Hence murders, kidnappings, bombing, and bank robberies began to take place in Turkish politics as a consequence of the extremist youth movements during the late 1960s. At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, social cohesion and order in Turkey were fundamentally deteriorated and it reached a point that the government party the JP was unable cope with extremist and anarchic activities of the youth movements sternly. Therefore the Turkish armed forces decided to promulgate a memorandum with the aim of enforcing the government to resign (Zürcher, 1997; Tachau and Heper, 1983).

2.4.4 The Second Regime Breakdown: The Coup by Memorandum in 1971

Under the worsening political and social situation, the military memorandum of 12 March 1971 was promulgated which demanded a strong and credible government to

end the rising anarchy and to carry out the reforms in accordance with the Kemalist vision (Zurcher, 1997). Moreover the armed forces urged the civilian politicians to take the required measures to eliminate the anarchy and to carry out the reforms in the Kemalist sprit, otherwise, if the urgent demands of the military were not welcomed by the civilians, the army would deem necessary to exercise its constitutional duty and take over state administration for the benefits of the Turkish states (Momayezi, 1998; Hale, 1990). Officially the military tried to attribute the legitimacy and justification into the this undemocratic intervention carried out by memorandum while emphasizing on the ground that the government was driving the country into the anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest, with the consequence that the future of Turkish republic is seriously threatened (Zürcher, 1997: Özbudun, 2000; Tachau and Heper, 1983).

Regarding the "coup by memorandum", some of the scholars argue that the coup by memorandum was the culmination of the worsening political situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to growing political violence within the society, fragmentation of political parties, and weak and ineffective government (Tachau and Heper, 1983, Momayezi, 1998). On the other hands, some students of the Turkish politics claim that the military intervention by memorandum took place because of the opinion conflict within the military between the moderates officers and radical officers. Hence according to these students of the Turkish politics, the military memorandum of 1971 was the last minute maneuver of the top commander of the military to prevent a radical coup advocated by the radical officers within the military (Özbudun, 2000). Özbudun claims that once top commander of the military established control; it forced radical officers to retire quickly including five generals, one admiral, and thirty five colonels on 17 March (Özbudun, 2000: 33).

Whether this military intervention happened due to the rising social and economic discontent or the conflict within the military was not important from the point of the Turkish democracy. The important point for the Turkish democracy was that this military intervention was another breakdown in the democratic civilian rule as the military enforced the elected government to resign (Hale, 1990). Aftermath of the declaration of the memorandum, as a reaction to the ultimatum, the Demirel government resigned from the government within one day. Following the resignation of the JP government, Nihat Erim formed a new government called as an above party government or technocratic government. The Erim's government was constituted by five ministers from the JP, three ministers from the RPP, and fourteen technocrats from outside the parliament that primarily set out three major goals which are to deal with the political violence, to make constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the power of the executive branch, and to carry out the social reforms on the basis of the 1961 Constitution (Özbudun, 2000: 33-35). Of three major goals, the Erim's government successfully achieved its first two objectives. The political violence was ceased in a short period of time thanks to the rigid measures to form social order. Also, the Constitution of 1961 was revised extensively in 1971 and 1973 which strengthen the power of the executive branch. And also, the constitutional amendments curbed some certain civil liberties perceived as responsible for the emergence of political extremism and violence. On the other hand, the Erim's technocratic government failed to achieve its third objective; they were not able to carry out social reforms due to both composition of the National Assembly and military (Zürcher, 1997: 271-274).

To sum up, the military intervention of 1971 ending with parliamentary elections in fall 1973 was considered as a half military coup in which military did not

seize state power directly; instead, military preferred to remain behind scenes enforcing the civilian politicians to take the necessary step in order to eliminate the political violence and to rebuild the deteriorated social, political and economic order through carrying out the social, politic and economic reforms (Özbudun, 2000; Tachau and Heper, 1983; Zürcher, 1997). In this vein, the Erim government in the period between 1971 and 1973 amended 44 articles of the 1961 Constitution within the scope of three defined objectives: to curb the political violence, to strengthen the power of the executive branch in relation to legislative branch, and to make the social reforms. The amendments in the 44 articles of the 1961 paved the way to restrict the scope of civil liberties, to end the autonomy of the universities and of radio and TV, to limit the freedom of the press, to curtail the powers of the Constitutional Court in order to increase the power of the executive branch, to enlarge of the powers of the National Security Council and to introduce National Security Courts with the aim of curbing the political violence (Zürcher, 1997, pp. 272-73).

2.5. The Reasons leading up to the Regime Breakdown for the Third Time: the Military Coup of 1980

2.5.1 Political Polarization in the late 1970s

As one of the major reason preparing the ground for military intervention, the political polarization within the society in the late 1970s began to take place in the Turkish politics which was accelerated primarily by the widening ideological difference of the political parties in the political sphere (Tachau and Heper, 1983). Because of the personal rivalry between the leaders of two major center parties, the JP and RPP had the uncompromising political attitude towards the establishment of

coalition government which played a contributive role to increase the ideological gap between the rightists and leftists within the Turkish society (Zürcher, 1997; Tachau and Heper, 1983).

Two major political parties' unwillingness of forming a strong coalition government paved the way for the small and radical right-wing political parties to exercise inappropriate political power in Turkish political landscape whereas some small leftist political parties were unable to voice their political preference in the parliamentary ground despite the strong supports coming from youth groups. As being a partner of the coalition governments, the rightist extremist small political parties' ability to influence decision making mechanism leading up to the acceleration of political polarization within the society (Zürcher, 1997) In this regard, Ergun Özbudun claims that the experiences of many developing democracies have demonstrated that anti-regime parties might be permitted to be involved into the political competition as opposition parties and they can be tolerated as long as they stay in opposition; on the other hand, their entry to the government lead to collapse of the regime like in the case of the Turkey before the military intervention of 1980 (Özbudun, 2000: 36). The inability and unwillingness of two major mainstream parties, the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party to form a political collaboration provided an opportunity for two radical rightist parties including Ultra Nationalist National Action Party (the NAP hereafter) and Islamist National Salvation Party (the NSP) to exercise enormous and inappropriate political influence over the politics within the National Parliament (Zürcher, 1997). Hence, the NAP and NSP obtained an enormous place too heavy on the system to be handled by democratic means. In this sense, NAP and NSP began to engage with the infiltration partisans in to a variety of government agencies. Also, when the RPP came to the

power, it tried to replace the partisans of the rightist political parties with the leftists partisans. Therefore the political polarization beginning in the political sphere spread into the civilian bureaucracy (Özbudun, 2000: 36; Tachau and Heper, 1983:.24; Zürcher, 1997). Moreover the increasing polarization within the society undermined the capacity and efficiency of public bureaucracy and eventually at the end of the 1970s, the public bureaucracy became to be unable to work due to changes in cadres of bureaucracy with every change in the government. Thus, the partisanship became a norm in the civil service in the late 1970s and each new government purged the old cadres and assigned their own partisans in the bureaucracy (Zürcher, 1997). Hence the spread of the political polarization into different segment of the society was the major reason preparing a ground for military intervention as being one of the main driving forces behind the escalation of the political violence.

2.5.2 Political Violence and Terrorism in the late 1970s

During the late 1970s, political violence became one of the most important problems of Turkey that the governmental authorities were unable to deal with sternly. Primarily due to rising political polarization in the political sphere and its spread into the governmental agencies were the major reason in acceleration of the political violence conducted by a number of the extremist youth groups on the left and the Grey Wolves on the rights (Zürcher, 1997: 275-277). In the second half of the 1970s these extremist groups began to struggle with each other in order to get the control of the streets and campus and these group had no trouble to find and recruit the youngsters because in this period the youths had few or no business career due to deteriorated socio-economic structure in Turkey and the failure of the higher education system (Zürcher, 1997: 276).

Moreover, the political violence starting as youth struggle for taking the control of the campus and street, began to take a variety forms with enlarging scope such as acts of sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, occupation and destruction of workplaces, and bombings (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000). Also, another form of the political violence was to massive outbreaks of communal conflict in several provincial cities on the basis of the inter-ethnic such as Kurdish-Turkish and inter-sectarian such as Sunni-Alleviate cleavages. It is also quite important that rising political violence in the late 1970s began to target public figures such as members of parliament, ex-prime minister, prominent journalists, and university professors. The political assassination of the prominent public sphere caused the rise of indignation within the society. As a result of the enlarging scope of tide of political violence with a variety forms, by the summer of 1980 the rate of political killings had become an average of over twenty per day by the summer of 1980 (Tachau and Heper, 1983:25). Hence in the second half of the 1970s Turkey experienced the death of five thousand people and the wound of fifteen thousand people due to mounting political violence including the forty nine radical leftist groups and a. The total loss in the late 1970s due to the growing political violence and terrorism was near to Turkey's loss in independence war (Özbudun, 2000: 35). Because the governmental authority was unable cope with the ascending tide of political violence and terrorism, the political authority of the governments was transferred to the state security forces via enacting to the martial law in several disputed regions of the country which entail the restriction or suspension of the civil liberties with the purpose of eliminating the growing anarchy and terrorism. However, the martial law remained inefficient to contain the violence because of the infiltration of the both leftist and rightist partisans into the security forces. As a result, full-scale military intervention became inevitable

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to curb the political violence and terrorism and to rebuild social cohesion (Özbudun, 2000; Zürcher, 1993; Yeşilada, 1988).

2.5.3 Socio-economic Developments in the 1970s as a Triggering Factor for Political Polarization, Political violence and even the Military Intervention of 1980

Because of both external and internal factors, Turkish economy in the 1970s had witnessed severe economic crisis with the negative socio-economic impacts such as massive unemployment; high rate of inflation; and the emergence of the shortages of basic consumption goods and black market that were associated with the poor performance of the Turkish economy, the persistent balance of payment deficits and inappropriate foreign currency policies of Turkey in the course of 1970s (Zürcher, 1997). As a consequence of the economic crises in Turkey, social unrest had been raised in a great extent which became one of the main sources of the political extremism and political violence. Also, the inability of the governmental authorities to cope with the growing economic crisis led to the deterioration of the political authority and the loss of the legitimacy of political parties in the eyes of people that gave way to the rise of the political violence and terrorism taking its root from the ascending social unrest and a lack of strong political authority.

As an internal factor of the economic crisis; the failure of the inward looking, import oriented economic policies in the 1970s came to the scene which was the primary reason lying behind the rise of the social unrest in the course of 1970s. The ongoing import substitution industrialization policies in the 1970s failed to provide the required incentives for the domestic industry to upgrade their manufacturing strategies in order to reach the required level of competiveness to compete with the foreign rivalries, instead the domestic industry enjoyed to exercises the advantages of

the protective economic policies such as high import tariffs and quotas. Rather than conducting and tracking the technological developments in manufacturing process and raising the quality of the products, the domestic industry in Turkey always seek to governmental rents and economic subsidies from the government. Thanks to protective measures on the import, domestic industry in Turkey never felt that it was necessary to open their business to the world markets in order to increase their profits. Because of this reason, when the domestic market reached its limits, the domestic industry began to face financial difficulties to continue their business operations. This also led to the rise of unemployment. Moreover it should be pointed out that the domestic industry in the 1970s failed to produce its own technology and remained depended on technology transfer from the foreign countries as well as import of the crucial inputs for production. Therefore, when Turkish economy experienced to foreign currency shortages particularly due to worldwide economic crisis on the basis of the oil crises, the depended domestic industry in Turkey began to witness severe economic crisis due to absence of the import of the required inputs and technology transfer for production (Zürcher, 1997; Özbudun, 2000). In a nutshell, because of the inefficiency of the Import substitution industrialization, Turkey experienced the severe economic crisis which brought about destructive socio-economic impacts over the society such as massive unemployment and poverty. Hence these socio-economic developments prepared a ground for the military intervention while feeding the political violence and terrorism.

One of the prominent external factors behind the economic crisis of Turkish economy in the course of 1970s was the destructive impact of the oil crisis of 1973-74 and 1979-80 over the Turkish economy. Because Turkey was highly depended on the import of the oil as a source of energy, the Turkish industry was highly sensitive

to the oscillation in oil prices. The increase in the oil prices directly escalate the cost of the production which caused to decline in demands. As a result, the production capacity of the Turkish industry had been declined tremendously which resulted in massive unemployment and high level of inflation. Moreover with decline in the production capacity of the Turkish industry, Turkey's foreign currency shortages had been raised. Therefore governments in Turkey preferred to apply import restriction as measure to solve the foreign currency shortages. However, this restriction on the imported goods led to the emergence of Black market which tremendously damaged the even distribution of wealth in Turkey. Consequently, the sellers in the black market structure began to make more profit whereas the state became poorer due to loss in the tax revenue under the black market economic structure (Zürcher, 1997; Tachau and Heper, 1983). Also, the purchasing power of the ordinary citizens had been reduced due to rising inflation and black market. As a result, the rift between the poor and rich segment of the society was widened. Uneven wealth distribution fuelled to the social unrest which contributed to the escalating political violence. Moreover it should be pointed out that there are chicken-egg relations between the worsening economic conditions and the escalating political violence in Turkey during the 1970s. The economic crisis fuelled to social unrest that contributed the escalation of political violence. On the other hand, the growing political violence in the form of sabotage of the factories, bombing the workplaces harmed the economic activities and caused the serious industrial slowdowns, shortages of consumers good and emergence of black market and inflation which were the major reasons behind the social discontent fuelling the political violence (Özbudun, 2000).

2.5.4 The Fear among the Military Officers Regarding the Possibility of the Military Coup Carried out by Junior Military Officers

Some students of the Turkish politics argue that one of the major factor triggering for military coup was the presence of the fear among the military that continuing political, social and economic instability might lead to a military coup carried out by a low ranking military officers within the outside of the scope of hierarchical order like similar to the Greek Colonels' coup of 1967. Moreover, the enacting martial law was seen as a major cause for the politicization and polarization of the military. In this vein, aftermath of the military takeover, the military regime made some cleanse in the military cadres. Some of the officers were purged after the coup. This situation partially supports the idea of fear among the high ranking officers about the possibility of military intervention carried out by low ranking officers (Ahmad, 1981b: 5-24; Özbudun, 2000). Whether this argument about the polarization and polarization of the military was true or not, this was undeniable truth that before the coup took place, as compared to other state institutions, one of the most homogenous institutions was the military in which the already existing political polarization in the political sphere was unable to spread in a great extent. After the military coup, the military dissolved the all political parties and banned the members of the former political parties from engaging with the politics without any exception while seeing the former political parties and their politicians as responsible for the emergence of anarchy and civil violence (Zürcher, 1997). The military's attitude towards the former political parties and their politicians was evidence supporting the argument of that there was no fragmentation in the military in a great amount before the military intervention of 1980 (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 25).

To sum up the root causes of the military intervention of 1980s can be summarized as fragmentation and polarization in the political sphere and its spread into other social sectors; the absence of decisive authority on the part of the government and the loss the credibility of the political parties in the eyes of the people; the escalating political violence and terrorism in the campus and street; the economic crisis and its socio-economic impact creating the social unrest. Therefore, Ergun Özbudun's argument of, that the pattern that led up to the 1980 military intervention was similar to that of 1971 military intervention with much larger and alarming scale, is quite fair (Özbudun, 2000: 35). The failure of the political parties and their leaders to dealt with the rising a variety of the problems of the country made the military intervention inevitable, because the political parties before the military intervention were quite far from having the sufficient capacity and authority to curb the political violence and terrorism and to make necessary reforms to restructure the socio-economic and socio-political structure with the aim of the solving the ongoing problems of Turkey that caused to the rise of the social, political and economic unrest within the society. Under this circumstance, the Turkish military forces had been the sole institution having enough capability to deal with the growing problems of Turkey in the realm of economy, politics and security during the course of 1970s.

2.6 The Transition to Democracy under the Control of the Military Regime of 1980-1982

2.6.1 The Elimination of Political Violence and Terrorism

The military intervention of 1980 took place due to the failure of the governments to deal with the growing socio-economic problems, and the mounting domestic political

violence and terrorism fueled by increasing political polarization and fragmentation. Hence, the military regime began to deal with root causes of the raising political violence and terrorism. In this vein, the military regime attempted to eliminate socio-economic and socio-politic problems leading the anarchy and social disorder in the course of 1970s. In this regard, as viewing the political system, political parties and their leaders were responsible for the emergence of the social, political and economic problems leading up to the military intervention, the military dissolved the parliament; deposed the government; lifted the immunities of the deputies; arrested the political leaders; abolished the political parties from engaging with the politics; suspended the radical trade unions suck as DİSK; and dismissed the mayors municipal councils (Zurcher, 1997: 292). Aftermath of declaring a state of emergency, generals directed their attention to find the people involving in the political violence and terrorist activities in the late 1970s which caused the emergence of the conditions close to the civil war. Therefore a wave of arrest swept across the country with the intention of completely ending domestic violence. Hence, the military regime arrested 150,000-200,000 individuals during the military rule and by 1983 they put 35,529 persons into the jail (Yeşilada, 1988: 351). As a result of the military regime's effort to suppress political violence and terrorism, the politically motivated terrorist attacks diminished in a considerable degree with great human and social and political cost (Zürcher, 1997: 94).

2.6.2 The Efforts of the Military Regime to Restructure the Turkish Economy

As stated in the previous part in detail, Turkey's experience with the severe economic crisis in the course of 1970s due to both external factors and internal factors, which led up to the emergence of the worsening socio-economic situation

such as massive unemployment and widespread poverty and the severe decline in the purchasing power of the people, prepared a ground for the military intervention while fuelling to the political violence and terrorism indirectly. Because of this reason, when the military came to the power, they gave priority to find the appropriated solutions to the economic problems. In this vein, the military regime favored to give acceleration to the economic reforms which had already began to be launched by the January 24 Economic programs of the National Front Coalition in accordance with the advice of the IMF, while declaring their adherence to the January 24 Economic Decisions as the only realistic feasible way to solve the endemic problems of the Turkish economy and even revitalize the Turkish economy (Zürcher, 1997). Therefore, thanks to strong commitment of the military towards the harsh measures to move towards export oriented liberal economic policies from the protective import-oriented economic policies, the reform program had gain certain acceleration. Hence, stabilization and structural adjustment program of 24 January was implemented in a full sense under the military regime in the period afterwards September 1980 (Taymaz, 1998). Some of the experts argue that the IMF's advice to adopt neo-liberal policies in the place of import-oriented economic policies was not easy to implement. Without strong political authorities and unity of the society and political elites, it is not possible to implement the reform programs in a full sense. From this point of view, the military regime's effort to curb the political violence and build the social unity and the adherence to the reform program was a chance for revitalizing the Turkey economy on the basis of the neo-liberal principles (Zürcher, 1997, Ulugay, 1983; Özbudun, 2000).

2.6.3 The Restructuring of the Political System during the Military Regime through Preparing a New Constitution: The Promulgation of the Constitution of 1982

Within the scope of the military's efforts to restructure political system in order to prevent the recurrence of the crisis of the political system in the subsequent civilian rule like in the case of the pre-1980, the new constitution was prepared in a much more authoritarian nature by a constitutional committee headed by Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı (Özbudun, 2000). At that point it should be pointed out that there was always discontent in the military regarding the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution which was always considered as responsible for the proliferation of the extremist groups within the society and their anarchic activities that harmed the social cohesion. Because of this reason, when the military regime came to the power, it paid considerable attention to the preparation of the new constitution in an authoritarian sprit which would prevent the politicization of the different segments of the society (Ahmad, 1985; Yeşilada, 1988; Zürcher, 1997). In this line, the new Constitution inclined to give the state extensive powers to restructure the deteriorated social and political order. Moreover, the position of the president within the new political structure was strengthened by the Constitution of 1982 through giving the President the powers of appointments: the members of the Constitutional Court, the State Supervisory, the Chief of the General Staff, members of the Institute of Higher Education, one-fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor, members of the Supreme Military Court of Administrations, and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Yeşilada, 1988: 352).

The military's approach to the politics can be described with its slogan chanted during the military regimes: "Leave politics to the politicians". As a consequence of this approach, the new Constitution included several provisions posing serious restrictions on the civil and political rights such as freedom of thought, expression, press and assembly. Moreover, the new constitution stipulated that the basic civil and political rights could be annulled, suspended or limited on the grounds of protecting the national interest, public order, national security danger to Republican order and public health. Moreover, with the objective of ensuring the depoliticized society in which people other than politicians, institutions other than political parties could not engage with the daily politics, the military regime directed its attention to control interest associations and to keep them out of the political sphere. In this regard, the political involvement of the interest associations and their corporation with the political parties were banned by the provision in the new constitution that regulating the functions and compositions of the trade unions, professional organizations and voluntary organizations. Particularly, trade unions were weakened considerable amount through banning political strike, national strike and solidarity strike of the trade unions. Moreover, within the scope of depoliticizing the associations, the new constitution curbed the autonomy of the higher education institutions through Articles 130-132 of the new Constitution that was also legal base of the establishment of the Higher Education Council (Zürcher, 1997, 295; Özbudun, 2000: 58; Yeşildağ, 1988: 354, Ahmad, 1985: 214).

2.6.4 The Completion of the Process of Transition to Democracy: The General Election of 1983 Bringing about the "Guided Democracy"

Because the military considered that the old political parties and the their leaders were responsible for regime breakdown which took place due to the pre-1980

anarchic social structure and unstable political system, the military regime attempted to exclude these political parties and their leaders from participating into politics in the coming civilian rule. As a result, when the military regime took the decision of returning to civilian regime with the November 6, 1983 general elections, they asked the new politicians to form new political parties as excluding the whole former political parties and their leaders from political sphere. Moreover the military regime exercised strong influence over the formation process of the new political parties through making compulsory to take the approval of the National Security Council in order to become eligible for participating into the general elections In this regard, it should be pointed out that the main aim of the military is to ensure the long-term stability of the new civilian rule, therefore, the military favored to put limitation on the political pluralism during the formation of new political parties because in the pre-1980 period one of the major problem of the Turkish democracy was the existence of too much pluralism that made the political system unable to work (Yeşilada, 1988; Zürcher, 1997). In this vein, the National Security Council prohibited the new parties that have ties with pre-1980 political parties. Also, students and teachers are prohibited to be included the process of the formation of the new political parties. The National Security Council reviewed the newly formed political parties' by-laws and their lists of the founding members. As a result, among newly formed fifteen parties, three of them could get the approval of the National Security Council to participate to the national election of 1983 (Yeşilada, 1988; Özbudun, 2000). Eventually these three political parties competed with each other in the national election of 1983 which resulted in the landslide victory of the Motherland Party led by Turgut Özal receiving the 45 % of the general votes. Thanks to the new electoral system established by the military regime that was heavily

weighted in favor of majority, Turgut Özal's Motherland Party gained the majority in the assembly and came to the power as a single-party majority government (Zürcher, 1997). Hence, with transfer of the political power from the National Security Council to the Motherland Party, Turkish democracy completed its fourth process of transition successfully

2.7 Conclusion

Although some of the students of democratization in the academia have an inclination to classify Turkish democracy as a product of the third wave of democracy, Turkish democracy has to be classified as the second wave of democracy; because as explicitly displayed in our analysis regarding the history of Turkish politics, Turkey completed its first process of transition to democracy successfully as a result of the national election of 1950 in which political power was transferred from the authoritarian power holders to the Democrat Party in a smooth and peaceful way without facing with any internal upheaval or resistance. On the other hand, although Turkey completed its first transition to democracy in the year of 1950, more than fifty years Turkish democracy has been not consolidated yet in an actual sense. Turkish democracy has been stagnated into the grey zone of the process of consolidation of democracy between "transition to democracy" and "consolidation of democracy" because of Turkey's endemic democratic deficits such as the presence of the strong degree of military autonomy and the high involvement of military into the politics, the absence or the weakness of lively and vigorous self supporting, autonomous civil society required for monitoring and limiting the state power and ensuring the participatory citizenship, the problematic election system far from functioning to produce meaningful and extensive political competition and political

representation, and the absence of democratic culture among the state and political elites that produces uncompromising political attitude for further democratization. In this regard, this thesis argue that Turkey's peculiar internal factors and historical legacy which are strong state tradition, center periphery cleavages, the deinstitutionalization of the party system, strict secularism understanding, and the high degree of autonomy of the military and its strong influence over politics causing the deinstitutionalization of political system were the major reasons behind the persistent democratic deficits of Turkish democracy. Hence these internal factors and unique historical legacy of Turkish democracy might be held responsible for the stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the grey zone of the process of consolidation of democracy and also eventual periodic regime breakdowns carried out the Turkish armed forces.

Because the history of Turkish democracy was constituted by several democratic breakdowns and subsequent restoration; in this chapter of thesis, the military breakdowns and following transition period are analyzed in a detail in order to realize the root causes of the persistent democratic problems of Turkish democracy. In this vein, it is fair to argue that one of the significant feature of the regime breakdowns is that the military in Turkey preferred to intervene into the political sphere when it considered that the democratic regime in Turkey departed from the straightway due to wrong policies of the political parties which triggered the rise of the political polarization and fragmentation in both social and political sphere harming the social cohesion, social order and the essence of the political regime in Turkey. As result, the military exercise unrestricted power over the politics through breaking the democratic regime by military coups (Özbudun, 2000). Moreover, in the civilian rule following the military intervention, the political parties in Turkey

remained insufficient to reach a common political consensus for making required progressive changes on the democratic structure with the purpose of consolidating Turkish democratic system. This sort of uncompromising attitude of the Turkish political elites is also another reason forcing the Turkish military to intervene into the politics through the military coups. In this vein, it should be highlighted here that as one of the structural problem of the Turkish politics, the high degree of political polarization and factionalism fuelled by the uncompromising attitude of the Turkish political elites might be showed as a major factor contributing to hinder the democratic developments in Turkey and also prompting the military to take over the government.

In addition, on the basis of the analysis of the history of Turkish democracy, this contribution reaches the conclusion that the Turkish military produces two contrasting picture from the point of the consolidation of democracy. The first, as being a major carrier of reforms that restore the social and political cohesion within the Turkish society, the military has a function to bring Turkey in line with the standards of the Western civilization. In this vein, the military officers in Turkey had inclination to stay in office for a short time period in period following the military coups. During the military regime, the primary mission of the Turkish armed forces is to restore the democratic regime as quickly as possible while carrying out the required the reforms. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the Turkish military is committed to a democratic form of government while never denying the legitimacy of the democratic regime. On the other hand, with an undemocratic nature, the military in Turkey intervened into the democratic regime and caused to the breakdowns of the democratic rule (Heper and Aylin, 2000; Özbudun, 2000). Furthermore, the military in Turkey has continued to exercise its power over the

civilian politics through using institutional channels while enjoying the strong autonomy. These undemocratic features of the military prevent Turkish democracy from becoming "the only game in town". Moreover, the credible military threat always deters the political parties to form a pact to make reforms for further democratization which would fall well beyond the limits of the Kemalist ideology. In this regard, it should be pointed out that ultra-nationalist and ultra-secular interpretation the Kemalist ideology and its adaptation into the political system by the military regime poses the challenges to the consolidation of democracy while preventing the emergence of democratic developments especially regarding the minority rights. Moreover, ultra-nationalist and ultra-secular interpretation of the Kemalist doctrine in its usage on the real politics widens the cleavage between the center and periphery. As a result, the sense of exclusion and discrimination in some segments of the society takes place that harms the social and political cohesion leading up to decline in the legitimacy of the regime makes the possibility of democracy to become the only game in town impossible.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: THE LONG AND THORNY PATH OF TURKEY TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE PROSPECT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

Because one of the central arguments of this contribution is that there is a strong linkage between Turkey's European vocation and the evolution of Turkish political system in accordance with European standards and procedures, it is fair to analyze the relationship between Turkey and EC/EU in historical perspective with the intention of detecting the major events affecting Turkey's aspiration for EU membership either positively or negatively. Moreover, to examine the turning points within the Turkey-EU relationship either triggering or hindering the political evolution of Turkey according to the EU standards and practices makes contribution to the academic efforts dealing with to realize what extent Turkey's aspiration for being recognized as European countries influences the Turkey's transformation under the system transforming impact of the EC/EU. In this vein, this part of the thesis attempts to analyze Turkey's relationship with the EC/EU relations within the context of political Europeanization while dividing Turkey-EU relations into three parts. The first part consists of the historical analysis of the evolution of Turkey-EU relations from the beginning of Turkey's application for associate membership in the EC in 1959 to the official recognition of Turkey's candidate status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999. This period might be named as insignificant Europeanization period in which system transforming effect of the EC/EU remained insufficient to induce the transformation of Turkey. Hence, EC/EU could not exert its system

transforming impact over Turkey due to slow track relationship between Turkey and the EC. Generally, in this period, the relationship between Turkey and the EU remained limited to the economic matters because Turkey needed to tackle with domestic-internal socio-economic and socio-political problems and Turkish governing elites could not pay the required attention on taking the progressive step that would bring Turkey closer to the EC. The second period covers the relations in the period between the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the Brussels Summit of 2004 in which the European Council decided to open up accession negotiations with Turkey on 3, October 2005. In this second period between 1999 and 2004, Turkey's European vocation reached its zenith thanks to the provided clear EU membership prospect for Turkey. Hence, Turkey carried out the reforms process within the context of fulfilling the requirements for EU membership which led the political Europeanization of Turkey. The third period includes the historical analysis of Turkey-EU relations in the aftermath of the Brussels Summit of 2004. In this recent period, Turkey's reform efforts have lost its momentum due to domestic-internal problems such as Kemalist resistance to ongoing political Europeanization and the loss of the AKP government's reformist zeal due to the presidential election crisis in April 2007 and the re-election concerns in July 2007. Moreover, the continuing uncertainty surrounding questions of Turkey's eventual inclusion to the EU as a full-member has caused to the slowdown in Turkey's political Europeanization.

3.1 In Significant Europeanization of Turkey in the Period between 1959 and 1999

3.1.1 Turkey-EC Relationship in the Course of 1960s and Insignificant Europeanization

3.1.1.1 Turkey's Application for Associate Membership in the EEC in 1959

The question surrounding the issue of Turkey's inclusion to the EU went back to 1959 when Turkey made an official application for associate membership in the European Economic Community only one year after the establishment of the Community and a month later following the Greek application for associate membership in the EEC. On the other hand, a year later after the application of Turkey; on May 27, 1960 Turkish military forces took over the governance of the state in Turkey through conducting the military coups and dissolving the Turkish parliament. The military intervention in 1960 caused to the deterioration of Turkey-ECC relations which resulted in the suspension of the diplomatic dialogue between Turkey and the EEC because of the sensitivity of EEC to carry out the politic and diplomatic dialogue with the democratic countries. However, after the withdrawal of the Turkish military from political scene to their barracks, free and fair elections was held in Turkey and the democratic parliamentary regime in Turkey was built once again . After the restoration of the democratic regime in Turkey within a reasonably short period of time, the coalition government led by Ismet İnönü took the necessary initiatives to improve the deteriorated relations with the EEC and to open the political and diplomatic dialogue with the EEC (Brusse and Griffiths, 2004: 18). Hence, the EEC responded Turkey's efforts to rebuilt mutual cooperative relationship in a positive way and the negotiations among Turkey and the ECC re-started once again with the intention of finalizing the associate membership of

Turkey in the EEC. In this vein, Turkey and the EEC signed the Ankara Treaty on 12 September 1963 which gave the associate membership status to Turkey as foreseeing the possibility of eventual membership when Turkey fulfilled the required conditions for membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 19). The Ankara Treaty of 1963 was quite important historical document as proving that Turkey's Europeaness was recognized by the EEC while affirming the eligibility of Turkey for membership into the EEC as and when Turkey fulfilled the requirements for membership. Hence, thanks to the Ankara Treaty, the long-standing doubts surrounding Turkey's Europeaness was disappeared (Müftüler-Baç, 1998).

Moreover, with respect to Turkey's first official application to the EEC for associated membership, it should be pointed out the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, which was fuelled by the past traumas and glories deeply embedded in the memory of the two sides, had played the foremost role in triggering Turkey to prepare an application for associated membership in the EEC. When Greece submitted its official application to the EEC, Turkey faced with the threat of being isolated from the European economic integration project (Brusse and Griffiths, 2004; Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994; McLaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003). Therefore, the Democrat Party government in Turkey immediately prepared its application and submitted it into the EEC just a month later then the Greek application. Moreover, it should be pointed out that Turkey's application for associate membership in the EEC was directly linked to Turkey's adopted pro-Western stance in the period afterwards the end of the World War Second. Turkey made this application with the intention of increasing its legitimacy in newly emerging international sphere and consolidating its position in the democratic western world (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003).

3.1.1.2 Turkey's Unsuccessful Response to the Conditionality Imposed by the Ankara Treaty of 1963 Due to Domestic-Internal Political Problems

Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty of 1963 states:

> As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance of Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.

While taking into account Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty, it is fair to argue that the EEC provided the clear encouragement for Turkey to conduct political and economic transformation process towards achieving conformity with the European norms, procedures and practices as creating explicit linkage between Turkey's eventual EEC membership and the performance of Turkey to fulfill obligations stemming from the Treaty (McLaren and Müftüler-Bac, 2003). However, in the course of 1960s, the provided incentives could not produce the expected outcome, that was the Europeanization of Turkey, because of the mounting political and social problems in Turkey in the course of 1960s. The prevailing socio-economic and socio-political problems created to the obstacle for Turkey to take any further step to fulfill the obligations stemming from the Ankara Treaty of 1963 which would render the creation of progressive relationship between Turkey and the ECC. Turkish politics in the course of 1960s was characterized by high degree of political instability due to weak coalition government in the first half of the 1960s and growing political fragmentation, polarization and even political violence in the second half of the 1960s. Moreover, the implementation of the import substitution industry based economic policies in Turkey was the major reason preventing Turkey from fulfilling the obligations stemming from the Associational Agreement such as reducing the import tariffs.

The socio-economic developments taking places in Turkey in the course of the 1960s indirectly affected Turkey's relationship with the ECC in a negative way. In this regard, the high degree of urbanization during the course of 1960s led to deterioration of social order resulting in the political violence in Turkey. The level of industrialization in 1960s was not enough to create necessary employment for the growing number of people emigrating from rural to urban. These unemployed people, mostly living in shanty towns, began to enter into the marginal political groups which latter started to use political violence as a political mean to express their socio-economic and socio-political demands. Furthermore, in terms of conducting the political violence, the cooperation took place among socially, politically and economically disadvantaged lower class people including students, workers and unemployed people. At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the political authority in Turkey was powerless to curb escalating political violence from the campus and streets stemming from the youth movement militancy (Abadan-Unat, 1979; Tachau and Heper, 1983). Under this circumstance, because Turkish political elites directed their all attention and energy to deal with serious ongoing internal problems, the level of the Europeanization in Turkey remained insignificant in the course of the 1960s due to slow track relationship between Turkey and the EEC.

3.1.2 The Cooling of the Turkey-EC Relationship and the Root Causes of Insignificant Europeanization of Turkey in the Course of 1970s

3.1.2.1 Additional Protocol of 1970

In the year of 1970, on the basis of the Ankara treaty of 1963, the additional protocol was signed between Turkey and the European Community with the purpose of expanding the Turkey's association with the European Community. The signed

additional protocol of 1970 was quite important historical document as setting out the clear timetable for the eventual custom union between Turkey and the EC, the harmonization of policy and liberalization free movement of people (Brusse and Griffiths, 2004: 19). The positive atmosphere emerged in Turkey's relationship with the EC as a consequence of the conclusion of the Additional Protocol of 1970. However, as time passed throughout the 1970s, this initial positive atmosphere began to change fundamentally due to both domestic-internal developments in Turkey negatively affecting Turkey's aspiration for inclusion to the EC and the crisis that the EC had experienced in the realm of economy in the course of 1970s.

3.1.2.2 The Military Intervention of 1971 in Turkey and Its Impact over the Turkey-EC Relationship

The positive atmosphere surrounding Turkey-EC relationship, emerging with the conclusion of the Additional Protocol of 1970, had begun to deteriorate immediately because of the regime breakdown in Turkey through the military memorandum of 12 March 1971. This military coup in 1971 manifested the shortcomings of the Turkish political system and deficiencies of Turkish democracy and led to the raising criticism of European governing elites regarding the Turkish political system. Due to sensitivity of the European state elites with respect to existence of the political system upholding the basic principles of democracy and human rights, the position and function of the Turkish military in Turkish political landscape began to be severely criticized by the European state elites who claimed that one of structural obstacles of Turkey hindering the close relationship with Turkey and the EC was the illiberal omnipresent role of the Turkish armed forces in Turkish politics (Müftüler-Baç, 2005).

3.1.2.3 Domestic Problems of Turkey in the Course of 1970s

The deterioration in relationship between Turkey and the EC, initiated with the military intervention of 1971 in Turkey, continued on throughout the entire 1970s because of significant internal and external developments preventing Turkey from undertaking the progressive steps to fulfill the requirements for creating the custom union foreseen by the Ankara treaty of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970. Thus, because of the failure of Turkey's to carry out the demanded progress bringing Turkish political system and Turkish economy in line with the standards of the EC, it is fair to argue that the 1970s were the missed the years from the point of Turkey's aspiration for inclusion to the EC (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). In this context, throughout the 1970s Turkey was primarily required to tackle with the ongoing domestic political problems such as growing political polarization and the political anarchy. These negative political developments in Turkish politics negatively affected the political stability in Turkey which prevented Turkish governing elites to undertake the necessary steps that would bring Turkey closer to the EC. Because most of the political parties and politicians in Turkey primarily concentrated on formulating acceptable solutions to the ongoing problems in the domestic politics, Turkish governing elites remained inefficient to formulate and conduct the foreign policy in the international relations that would bring Turkey closer to the EC.   Also, the required political dialogue between Turkey and the EC was not developed by the politicians of Turkey who gave their attention and efforts to solve costly and bloodshed ongoing political problems of Turkey in the course of 1970s. As a result, the common political commitment with respect to Turkey's inclusion to the EC did not take place in the domestic sphere of Turkey which caused to failure in improving

relations with the EC during the 1970s that would paved the way for the eventual accession of Turkey into the EC (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005).

3.1.2.4 The Military Operation to Cyprus in 1974 and Its Impact over the Relationship between Turkey and the EC

Moreover, in the realm of foreign policy, the developments regarding the Cyprus issue constituted the challenge to Turkey's desire for incorporation with the EC. In 1974, Turkish armed forces conducted the military operation to Cyprus with the intention of protecting the Turkish-Cypriot people on the island from the bloody operations of the Greek Junta. Although Turkey reached success in its military intervention to the Cyprus in 1974, it failed to convert its military success on Cyprus intervention of 1974 to the internationally acceptable political settlement which caused the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the European Community (Öniş, 2001; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). Moreover, ironically, following the Turkey's intervention to the Cyprus in 1974, the colonel regime in Greece collapsed and a series of democratization reforms took place in Greece which brought Greece closer to the EC. Furthermore, thanks to the progressive political developments in Greece in line with the expectations of the EC, Greece realized it aspiration for in 1981(Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). As a result, Greece's inclusion to the EC as a full member began to be major barrier on Turkey's road towards incorporation to the European Community because of Greece veto power within the EC's decision making mechanism. In this vein, in the aftermath of the Greek membership in the EC, Turkey began to experience a serious setback in its relations with the European Community due to ongoing bilateral conflicts between Turkey and Greece. Hence, it is fair to argue that the development regarding the Cyprus

questions served as a function pushing Turkey away from the EC membership prospect as causing to emergence of tensions in the relationship between Turkey and the EC due their diverged preferences and interest on the issue of Cyprus and also paving the way for Greece's EC membership (Narbone and Tocci, 2007; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005; Brusse and Griffiths, 2004).

3.1.2.5 Twin Oil Crisis of 1973-74 and 1979-80 and Their Impacts over Turkey and the ECC

One of the prominent external factors that negatively affected the relationship between Turkey and the EC in the course of 1970s was the destructive impact of the oil crisis of 1973-74 and 1979-80 over the economy of both Turkey and the ECC. In order to deal with the negative impact of the oil crises, both Turkey and the EEC itself adopted more protectionist economic policies which harmfully affected the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the ECC. Under the protectionist economic policies Turkey did not take the necessary actions to fulfill the requirements for establishment of the custom union (Brusse and Griffiths, 2004). Also, due to the negative impact of the twin oil crises the ECC did not provided the required encouragement for Turkey in the form of giving financial and technical aids to Turkey which would trigger the transformation of Turkey within the scope of the eventual target of realizing the custom union.

From the point of Turkey, because Turkey was highly depended on the import of the oil as a source of energy for production, the high degree rise in oil prices as a consequence of the twin oil crisis significantly affected Turkish economy in a negative way as causing the decline in the production capacity of the Turkish industry. The shrinking in the production capacity of Turkey brought about the

massive unemployment and high level of inflation. Moreover, with the decline in the production capacity of the Turkish industry, Turkey's foreign currency shortages had been raised. Therefore, governments in Turkey preferred to apply more strict import restriction as measures to solve the foreign currency shortages (Zürcher, 1997). As a result, due to the negative impact of the oil crisis over Turkey, as applying more protectionist economic policies, Turkey deviated in great extent from its path toward establishing the custom union with the EC which required Turkey to reduce import tariffs.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the restriction on the imported goods, which began to be applied in Turkey as a response the negative impact of the twin oil crises, led to the emergence of black market in Turkey in the course of 1970s. The emergence of black market reinforced by the rising inflation rates resulted in the serious decline in the purchasing power of the Turkish ordinary citizens. As a result, the rift between the poor and rich segment of the society was widened in the 1970s. The emerging uneven wealth distribution fuelled to the social unrest which contributed to the escalating political violence in the course of 1970s Tachau and Heper, 1983). Hence, due to raising social unrest fuelling the political violence, Turkish political system experienced a serious deadlock in the 1970s which negatively affect the Turkey's aspiration for EC membership because Turkish governing elites directed all its attention and energies to solve the growing internal political and economic problems and they were unable to make the necessary attempts to bring Turkey closer to the EC which would open the way for the eventual inclusion of Turkey into European Community (Müftüler-Baç, 2005).

3.1.3 The Shortcomings of Turkish Political System in the Course of 1980s as the Main Factors Preventing Turkey from Building the Closer Relationship with the EC

3.1.3.1 The Military Coup of 1980 and Its Impact over the Relationship between Turkey and the EC

On 12, September 1980, Turkish armed forces takeover the administration of the country because of several reasons which might be summarized as the fragmentation and polarization in the political sphere and its spread into other social sectors; the absence of decisive authority on the part of the government and the loss the credibility of the political parties in the eyes of the people; the escalating political violence and terrorism in the campus and street; the economic crisis and its socio-economic impact creating the social unrest (Zürcher, 1997). Hence, with the military of 1980 led by Kenan Evren, for the third time, Turkey experienced the regime breakdown in which the parliament was dissolved, the immunities of the deputies were lifted, the political parties were abolished from engaging with the politics, trade unions were suspended and the civilian mayors and municipal councils were dismissed (Zürcher, 1997: 292). Moreover, under the military rule, a wave of arrest swept across the country with the intention of completely ending domestic violence. Hence, 150,000-200,000 people were arrested during the military rule. By 1983, 35,529 persons were put into the jail (Yeşilada, 1988: 351). These undemocratic acts under the military rule encountered with the raising criticism of the European politicians which caused to the cooling of the relationship between Turkey and the EC. Because of the EC's growing sensitivity in the field of democracy and human rights, the relationship between Turkey and the EC experienced its severest deadlock in the aftermath of the military intervention of 1980 in Turkey. The EC decided to

suspend the financial aids given to Turkey and postponed indefinitely all further political dialogues with Turkey within the parliamentary EC-Turkey Association Council (Brusse and Griffths, 2004: 21-22).

Within the scope of the military's efforts to restructure political system in order to prevent the recurrence of the crisis of the political system in the subsequent civilian rule, the new constitution was prepared in a much more authoritarian nature by a constitutional committee headed by Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı. Hence, the new constitution of Turkey included serious illiberal elements restricting the political and civil rights which led Turkey to fail to uphold the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in line with the standards of Europe (Yeşilada, 1988). Under this state of affair, Turkey's prospect for membership had lost its significance in the course of the 1980s because of the growing reservation of the European elites about Turkey's inclusion to the EC on the ground that Turkey's shortcomings in the field of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were the major obstacles on Turkey's road towards accession to the EC as violating the very basic founding principles of the EC.

Moreover, the identity crisis emerged in Turkish politics during the 1980s which were marked by the militant Kurdish nationalism and the rise of the political Islam. The emerging identity crisis in the course 1980s have began to constitute the challenges to the secular and nationalist political regime ongoing in Turkey as a legacy of Kemalist doctrine. The political system in Turkey failed to incorporate these challenging political movements into the political system in a peaceful way while remaining within the boundaries of democracy and the rule of law. Hence, the political system in Turkey, which encountered with the anti-system political developments, experienced serious deadlock in the course of 1980s. This became the

major factor preventing Turkey from creating closer relations with the EC during the 1980s because Turkey could not conduct the reform process that would ensure the pluralist political system in accordance with the European standards due the presence of these challenges in Turkish political landscape. Moreover, Turkey adopted more restrictive and undemocratic approach to the solution of these problems which directly clashed with both the standards and expectations of the EC. As a result, in the course of 1980s due to undemocratic practices prevailing in the Turkish political system, Turkey remained being far from to conduct foreign policy which brought Turkey closer to the EC (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005).

3.1.3.2 The First Official Application of Turkey for Full Membership into the EC in 1987

Following the gradual domestic stabilization and economic liberalization in the aftermath of the military coup of 1980, Prime Minister Turgut Özal began to deem that Turkey had shared the security burden of Europe with its buffer state role in containing the Soviet Union threat for more than 40 years in the Cold War period, therefore, it is natural corollary that Turkey should have an opportunity to get benefited from European economic growth and the European integration process (Kutuk, 2006). Under this mindset, while just focusing on the economic dimension of EC membership; without preparing the appropriate groundwork on April 14, 1987 Turkey made its first official application for full membership into the European Community under the personal initiatives of Prime Minister Turgut Özal who were warned by the European elites to avoid making an application for EC membership due shortcomings of Turkey in the realm of democracy and human rights and the rule of law. However, Özal Government in Turkey did not take into consideration those

warnings stimulated by the European elites and submitted its membership application within relatively short period of time (Kutuk, 2006; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Narbone and Tocci, 2007). At that point, it should be pointed out that Turkish governing elites considered that the consolidation of democracy was a gradual transformation process that required fairly long time, in this vein, the EC membership prospect was a political chance for Turkey to eliminate deficiencies of its democracy. On the other hand, European ruling elites considered that democracy was sine qua non criteria for the candidate country to join into the European Community (Eralp, 2004). Hence, the European governing elites did not welcome Turkey's application for the membership due to problematic situation of democracy and poor human rights record of Turkey. In this context, in December 18, 1989 the European Commission prepared its opinion with respect to Turkey's accession to the EC in which serious economic and political problems existing in Turkey were highlighted as factors that had a potential of preventing Turkey from accession to the EC. The state of democracy in Turkey, the long-lasting dispute of Turkey with Greece regarding Cyprus issue, relative economic backwardness, the Kurdish question and problems related human rights were the cited problems prevailing in Turkey that blocked Turkey's inclusion into the EC (Müftüler-Baç, 1998: Müftüler-Baç, 2000). In the place of full membership, the EC offered the expansion of the association between Turkey and the EC and also realization of a custom union as foreseen by the Ankara Treaty of 1963 and the 1970 Additional protocol (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Eralp, 2004). On the basis of the recommendations of the European Commission, Turkey application was rejected by the European Community in 1989.

When the root causes of the EC's rejection to Turkish application, which were not explicitly stated in the opinion report of the European Commission, is

analyzed; it is noticed that one of the major reason lying behind the rejection to Turkey's application was the ongoing tense relationship between Turkey and the EC. The European politicians took into account the ongoing problematic Turkey-EU relations while evaluating Turkey's application for EC membership. In this regard, it should be highlighted that in the period following the military coup of 1980 in Turkey, the European Community-Turkish Association Council and the Joint Turkey-European Parliamentary Committee did not meet due to the suspended political dialogue between Turkey and the EC as a reaction of the EC to undemocratic government in Turkey that came to the power in Turkey through the military coup of 1980. Under this slow track relationship, Turkey was from being eligible to become EC membership (Eralp, 2004, Brusse and Griffiths, 2004). Hence, Turkey's first application for EC membership was rejected by the European Community.

Moreover, another factor behind the negative answer of the EC towards Turkey's application for the membership was the inappropriate timing of Turkish application. Because the EC recently began to launch the difficult process of digesting the Southern enlargement including Greece, Spain and Portugal which were relatively backward countries in terms of economic and democratic development, the timing of Turkish application was not appropriate to receive positive answer from the EU with regard to Turkey's application. Moreover, when Turkey applied to the EC for membership, the EC dealt with the issue of developing a common internal market by 1992. Therefore, the EC was not ready to begin another round of enlargement, especially one involving membership of a large and less economically developed country like Turkey which would bring significant economic burdens (Larrabee, IO Lesser, 2003). Furthermore, another factor causing

to emergence of the negative attitude of the EC regarding the Turkish application in 1987 was that as clearly displayed by the previous enlargement pattern of the EC, the EC usually welcomed the applications of the groups of countries which have close political and economical relations with each other, but Turkey applied as a single country. Hence, the probability of the acceptance of Turkey's application for EC membership was quite low (Eralp, 2004).

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the response of the European Community rejecting Turkey's application for EC membership negatively affected Turkey's long journey toward European integration as causing the rise of anti-European feelings in Turkey. As a consequence of the final decision of the EC regarding Turkey's application, the argument of that the EC was the Christian Club in which there is no room for Turkey had gained political significance in Turkish politics. This situation reinforced the raising anti-European feelings in Turkey (Eralp, 2005). On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the rise of anti-EC was not so much strong to cause Turkey to abandon its long-standing aspiration for becoming the part of Europe. However, Turkey's relationship with the EC turned to be slow track relationship and remained limited to the economic affairs. Hence, the relationship between Turkey and EC had become quite far from reaching the level sufficient to trigger the transformation of Turkish democracy and economy in the course of 1980s.

3.1.4 The End of the Cold War Era and its Impact over the Relationship between Turkey and the EC

3.1.4.1 The Emerging "New Europe" In the Aftermath of the Demise of the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold war period, the European Community/Union itself has been experiencing the serious evolution process in which the EU attempted to become more cohesive political and economic union having an effective common foreign and security policy. In this evolution process, the EU has begun to pay more enormous emphasis on standards of the democratic system and human rights as criteria for membership in the Union (Müftüler-Bac, 1998: 25; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). In this context, as a major step in its evolution process, in the Copenhagen Summit of 1993, the European Council formulated the required political criteria for the countries seeking for entry into the EC according to which it is necessary for the candidate countries to have the institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and respecting and protecting for minority rights (Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 234). Hence, within the post-Cold War context, the EU has defined a clear position that upholding the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law is the necessary criteria that the aspirant countries must fulfill in order realize their aspiration for EU membership. From this point of view, the transformation of the EU towards becoming depth political and economic union negatively affected Turkey's bid for EU membership because of Turkey's failure to reach conformity with the criteria of the EU in terms of upholding the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Müftüler-Bac, 1998).

3.1.4.2 The Demise of Turkey's Buffer State Role within the European Defense Structure and Raising Concerns of the Europeans Regarding the Turkish Political System

It should be pointed out that during the Cold War period Turkey occupied the buffer state role as a barrier to the Soviet expansionism protecting the whole democratic Europe from the Communist Soviet threat (Eralp, 2004). Because of Turkey's geo-strategic and geo-political importance from the point of the security of Europe in architecture of the Cold War period, the European politicians were not interested in the political shortcoming persisting in Turkey while forming close and strategic ties with Turkey (Müftüler-Bac, 1998; Eralp, 2004). However, under the changing circumstances associated with the eventual demise of the Soviet threat, the European Union began to pay more attention on the conformity with the Copenhagen criteria for the entry of the candidate countries. Hence, the European politicians began to be more critical of ongoing shortcoming in Turkish political system such as persistent human right violations and illiberal legal and political systems restricting the social, political, economic and cultural rights and freedoms in Turkey. Because in the post-Cold War era Turkey's position in the European order can be no more defensible on the basis of Turkey's function as the buffer state against the threat of the Soviet expansion; Turkey was required to undertake the serious steps to eliminate its persistent shortcomings in the realm of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respecting for and protecting minority rights (Müftüler-Bac, 1998: 243-244, Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 234). As a consequence of the end of the Cold war era, economic, political and social factors have gained importance in Europe's approach to Turkey. As a result, Turkey's relationship with the EU began to be more connected to Turkey's performance to achieve the conformity with the norms, rules and practices

of the European Union. At that point, it should be pointed out that until the emerging reform momentum within Turkey in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey failed to meet the demands of EU in terms of enacting the EU-induced political reforms. This situation negatively influenced Turkey's relationship with the EU. In a nutshell, it is fair to argue that the transformation of the EU in the post-Cold war period negatively affected Turkey's relationship with the EU due to growing tensions in bilateral relations stemming from the raising concerns of the EU about the quality of democracy and standards of human rights in Turkey.

3.1.4.3 The Raising Concerns within the EU with Respect to Turkey's Europeanness

Moreover, it should be pointed out that among the many Europeans, the sense of that Turkey is not really European has been very common. According to these Europeans, Turks are the significant other over which they defined their own identity. This perception of Turks as other of Europe is deeply embedded in Europeans' collective memory and colors European views of Turkey today (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Müftüler-Bac, 1998). However, this kind of perception of Turks lost its significance during the Cold war era due to strategic considerations against the Soviet threat. Particularly, with the end of the Cold War era and the elimination of the Soviet threat, the new doubts about Turkey's identity, culture and place in the Europe have been raised once again. This shift in priorities of Europe has highlighted Turkey's distinctiveness and raised new questions about where Turkey's fits into the "new Europe" (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003, Öniş, 2006). This situation negatively affected Turkey's aspiration for the EU because some of the European politicians began to

object Turkey's EU membership prospect on the ground of non-Copenhagen criteria such as the cultural and religious difference between Turkey and the EC/EU.

3.1.4.4 The Increasing Geo-Strategic Importance of the Central and Eastern European Countries for the EU and Its Impact over Turkey's Bid for EU Membership

As a consequence of the end of the Cold war period, geo-strategic and geo-political importance of the Central and Eastern European Countries had been raised for the security and stability of the EC which negatively affect Turkey's aspiration for the EU membership in the post-Cold war context (Müftüler-Baç, 1998; Eralp, 2004). With the dissolution of the communist regimes, the EC member states realized that the collapse of the communist regimes and subsequent worsening in the political and economic stability in the ex-communist countries would adversely affect the political and economic stability of the whole Europe. As a result, the EC directed their attention on the process of integration of Western and Eastern Europe. In this context, the EC began to launch a process of enlargement to meet the possible challenges raised from the regime breakdown in the Eastern European countries. In this climate, the Turkish application for full membership lost its significance for the EU whereas the geo-political importance of the Central and Eastern Europe has been relatively increased (Eralp, 2004: 63-64). This caused Turkey to fall behind the Central and Eastern European countries in its bid for EU membership which negatively affected Turkey's aspiration for EU membership and its relationship with the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 1998; Eralp, 2004).

3.1.5 The Establishment of the Custom Union between Turkey and the EU in 1996 and Its Insignificant Impact over Turkey's Europeanization Process

As foreseen by the Ankara Treaty of 1963 and the 1970 Additional Protocol, on March 6, 1995 the Custom Union agreement was signed and it came into effect on January 1, 1996. As initially stated by Turkish media, through signing the Custom Union agreement with the EU, Turkey had taken one more step to reach its objective of the EU membership whereas taking one more step away from the Middle East (Müftüler-Bac, 2000: 23). The performance of the Turkish economy aftermath of the Custom Union agreement has been quite significant to display the capacity of Turkey to adopt the economic requirements for full membership in the EU (Müftüler-Bac, 2005). Moreover, the entry into the force of the custom union agreement between Turkey and the EU in January 1996 led to the start of considerable economic integration between Turkey and the EU in the area of trade and investment (Hale and Avcı, 2002). Although Turkish governing elites considered that the entry into the force of the custom union was prelude for Turkey's EU membership march, it was far from being a factor leading up to the creation of the depth integration process including social, cultural and political integration between Turkey and the EU (Narbone and Tocci, 2007). In this regard, it should be pointed out that in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, the European rule making elites just focused on the economic dimension of the relationship with Turkey as undermining the developments in other areas that would ensure the transformation of Turkey in every aspects of life on the basis of the European standards (Öniş, 2006). As taking into account Turkey's large size, population, the level of development, religious and cultural difference as well as its failure to conform to the European norms regarding democracy and human rights, the European elites preferred to focus just on the well

functioning of the custom union as the basic mechanism to improve the relationship between Turkey and the EU, without linking the well functioning of the custom union with the issue of Turkey's full membership (Eralp, 2004; Öniş, 2006). Hence, the EU elites did not intended to put forth a clear EU membership prospect for Turkey in the aftermath of the completion of the custom union. This attitude of the European politicians hindered the transformation of Turkey in accordance with the European standards, norms and practices. In short, the establishment of the custom union did not produce sufficiently enough impulse on Turkish domestic political structure to push dramatic progressive developments that would bring Turkey far closer to the standards of the European Union.

3.1.6 The Process of 28 February 1997 in Turkey and Its Double-Faced Impact over the Political Europeanization of Turkey

From the viewpoint of Turkey's relationship with the EU, one of the historical events taking place in Turkey is the process of 28 February 1997 which generates two controversial impacts over Turkey's long journey toward accession to the Europe. Before embarking on these two controversial impacts, it is fair to give brief information about the 28 February process. First of all, the February 28 Process is a process considered as the half coup or post-modern coup conducted by the secular establishment in Turkey as a response to the anti-secularist activities and statements of the coalition government constituted by the Islamist Welfare Party and the center-right party of the True Path Party (Yavuz, 2000; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003) . The rise of the Islamist Welfare Party as the largest political party in the Turkish parliament and its way of formulating foreign policy including the enhancement of the foreign relations with the Islamic countries as an alternative the traditional pro-

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western foreign policy of the Turkish republic and the growing presence of the Islamic figures in social life alarmed the secularist elites and some segments of the society which has sensitivities about the secular nature of the state (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Lombardi, 1997). At that point, it should be highlighted that in the 28 February process, as a core constituent of the secular establishment in Turkey, Turkish armed forces played the considerably important role while exerting considerable amount of pressure over the coalition governments through the various pressure channels such as print and visual media organs and civil society organizations. As a result, the coalition government led by the Islamist Welfare party was ousted in June 1997 (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Özbudun, 2000, Müftüler-Bac, 1998). On the one hand, the overthrowing of the coalition government as a result of the pressure exerted by military took the severe criticism of the Europeans who considered that the role that the military played during the 28 February process directly contracted with the principles of the democratic system. This situation negatively affected Turkey's aspiration for EU membership as leading the EU to give negative answer to the application of Turkey for EU membership at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 (Müftüler-Bac, 1998) . On the other hand, thanks to the 28 February process, the political Islam drawn the required lessons and began to experience an important evolution process in which conservative Turkish citizens transformed themselves into the pro-European camp and begun to be strong proponents of Turkey's possible EU membership while viewing the EU membership as the important guarantee for their religious and political rights and freedoms which has positively affected Turkey's quest for EU membership in the medium term (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Patton, 2007).

From the point of Turkey's relationship between the EU, the first impact of the 28 February Process is the negative one hindering Turkey's march toward EU as opening the way for the EU to reject Turkey's application for EU membership in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 on the ground that the omnipresent role of the Turkish Armed forces constituted one of major obstacle to Turkey's inclusion to the EU as directly violating the standards of the EU with respect to civil-military relations (Müftüler-Bac, 1998). In a response to the decision of the European Council at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 excluding Turkey from the enlargement process, Turkey took the decision of freezing the political dialogue with the European Union until the Helsinki Summit of 1999 in which the European Council recognized Turkey's long-sought candidacy. Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that as taking into account the open intervention of Turkish military into the politics manifested during the 28 February Process, the European Council in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 decided to exclude Turkey from the enlargement which negatively affect Turkey's long journey towards achieving EU membership target because in the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey did not take any step with the intention of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria which would bring Turkey closer to the European Union. Hence, the growing dominance of the military in the Turkish politics associated with the February process noticeably harmed Turkey-EU relations and eventually Turkey's aspiration for EU membership as causing to emergence of the negative decision of the European Council at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 regarding Turkey's application for EU membership (Müftüler-Baç, 1998).

On the other hand, the second impact of the 28 February process over Turkey-EU relations is the positive one which has influenced Turkey's aspiration for

EU membership positively in the medium terms. In a response to the 28 February Process and the growing presence of the military in politics, the conservative Turkish citizens preferred to join into the pro-EU circle in Turkey while perceiving the EU anchor as safeguards against the restrictive acts of the military. As a result of the inclusion of the conservative Turks into the pro-EU circle, the power balance in Turkish domestic political forces turned on the side of the pro-EU circle which affects Turkey's march towards EU positively in the medium terms. Hence, the former constituent of the anti-EU coalition began to be main advocator of Turkey's aspiration for EU membership with the purpose of attaining legal and political safeguards against the acts of Kemalist establishment restricting their political, social, economic and religious rights and freedoms (Dağı, 2007). Moreover, it should be pointed out that in the aftermath of the February 28 Process, the popular will in Turkey was mobilized around the support for Turkey's quest for EU membership due to growing reaction to the intervention of military into the politics as well as application of measures restricting the freedoms on expressing identities (Patton, 2007). Therefore, in the aftermath of the 28 February Process, the pro-EU block began to be constituted by Islamists and liberal secularist which have willing to get rid of the illiberal political architecture of the 28 February Process (Patton, 2007, Larrabee and Lesser, 2003). Hence, enlargement of the pro-EU coalition government in Turkey as a consequence of the 28 February process positively affected Turkey's bid for EU membership.

3.1.7 The Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and Its Impact over the Relationship between Turkey and the European Union

One of the historical turning points in the relationship between Turkey and the EU came to the place as a consequence of the final resolution of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 excluding Turkey from the enlargement queue which seriously caused to deterioration of the positive atmosphere surrounding the relationship between Turkey and the EU that emerged with the completion of the custom union agreement between two parts in 1996 (Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 234). In the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, the European Council took the decision of opening up accession negotiations with the all eleven applicant countries including the Central and Eastern European Countries and Greek-Cyprus. Despite the Turkey's long-lasting association with the European Union and its more developed market economy than most of these applicant countries; in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the European Council rejected Turkey's application for the membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 21). Hence, as being the only rejected aspirant country, Turkey interpreted the EU's Luxembourg decision as unjust and unfair decision that was taken on grounds of religious and cultural difference. Moreover, some of the Turkish governing elites evaluated the negative decisions of the European Council with respect to Turkey's candidacy as the reflection of the Europeans' desire to turn the EU a "Christian club" (Kutuk, 2006: 275-277).

On the one hand, on the basis of the formal statements of the EU with respect to reasons lying behind the EU's rejection to the Turkey's application, it is fair to argue that one of the major obstacles to the inclusion of Turkey into the EU is the existing political system in Turkey including serious shortcomings in terms of upholding the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights which were

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connected to the problems of Turkish politics in the course of 1990s with respect to the treatment of the Kurds, the rise of the political Islam and the omnipresent role of the military (Bac, 1998: 256-257). Because the standards of Turkish democracy felt behind the standards of the EU, the rejection to the Turkey's application for the membership in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 might be interpreted as just and fair act. In this vein, one should remember that the EU has the position of that unless an applicant country satisfies the democratic requirements of the membership; it is not possible to realize the incorporation of this applicant country into the EU. Within this context, Turkey's application for membership was rejected fairly by the European Council due to failure of Turkey upholding the principles of the democratic system and enforcing the human right regime on the level of the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 1998; Müftüler-Baç, 2000). Moreover, the EU officials rejected all of Turkey's claims about discrimination of the EU in terms of treating Turkey's application for EU membership on the ground that the EU had not discriminated in Luxembourg as reaffirming Turkey's eligibility for membership, developing a European strategy, and inviting Turkey to the European Conference (Kutuk, 2006: 277).

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Turkey, the final resolution of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 excluding Turkey from the enlargement round of the EU was the discriminatory act of the EU employed in treating Turkey's application for EU membership (Eralp, 2004; Narbone and Tocci, 2007). Moreover, one of the reputable Turkish academician, Meltem Müftüler Baç argues that the European Council decision in Luxembourg Summit of 1997 with respect to Turkey's application for the membership is directly related the European officials reservation about Turkey's Europeanness or religion. In this sense, Turkey's identity has constituted the serious concern that might block the Turkey's inclusion to the EU

(Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 25). In line with the argument of Meltem Müftüler Baç, Turkish governing elites asserted that the European Union built "a new cultural Berlin Wall" between Turkey and the EU with the decision of the EU to exclude Turkey from the enlargement process on the ground of religious and cultural difference between Turkey and the European (Müftüler-Baç, 1998: 242). Under this mindset, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz decided to boycott the dinner that was to follow the summit, to which he was invited along with the heads of the EU states (Kutuk, 2006: 277). Moreover, in response to discriminatory attitude of the EU towards Turkey's application for EU membership, Turkey took the decision of freezing the political dialogue with the European Union as well as rejecting the pre-Accession Strategy offered by the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 1998; Kutuk, 2006). Moreover, Turkey proposed to the threat of withdrawing its application for EU membership and also projecting to integrate with the Turkish-Cyprus (Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 234).

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the exclusion of Turkey from the enlargement process resulted in deep disappointment and frustration among Turkish public which was convinced by the governing elites and mass media that Turkey was treated unfairly by the EU in the Luxembourg of 1997 on the ground of religious and cultural difference. As a result, a major nationalist backlash took place in Turkey which was also reflected in the results of the general elections of 1999 where two major nationalist political parties gained considerable amount of public support and became the principal partners of the coalition government retaining at the power in the period between 1999 and 2002 (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005; Kutuk, 2006). The tri-party coalition coming into the office with the emerging nationalist backlash did not show any significant effort to restore the deteriorated relationship between Turkey and the EU until they noticed the positive sign or progressive stance from the EU

with respect to Turkey's quest for EU membership which became more concrete with the decision of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 recognizing Turkey's long-sought candidacy for EU membership. Hence, this attitude of the tri-party coalition government negatively influence Turkey's process of Europeanization in the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999 in which any further step was taken by the coalition government to fulfill the requirements for EU membership.

In a nutshell, the decision of the Luxembourg Summit accelerated the rise of the anti-European feelings in Turkey fueled by the arguments of Turkish governing elites which was also reinforced by the media that in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 Turkey was treated separately from other candidate countries on the basis of the criteria different than those applied to the other candidate countries. In a response to the decision taken by the European Council of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the Turkish government decided to suspend all diplomatic and political relations with the EU. Therefore, Turkey-EU relations reached the lowest point in which there is no line of communication remained available between Turkey and the EU. Hence, the EU was unable to exert its system transforming impact over the Turkey due to the lack of communication channels which negatively affected Turkey's EU process as a consequence of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997(Eralp, 2005,Müftüler-Bac, 2000).

3.1.8 The Arrest of the Head of the Terrorist Organization of the PKK in 1999 and Its Unintentional Positive Impact over Turkey's Long Journey towards EU membership

From the point of Turkey's relationship with the EU, the arrest of the head of the terrorist organization of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya

was one of the significant turning points taking place in the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan unintentionally affected Turkey's relationship with the EU positively in the medium term as leading Turkey to carry out significant reforms in the fields on which Turkey previously could not make reforms due to security concerns. Following the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish nationalism and terrorist activities had significantly diminished in Turkey due to adopted a new strategy of the PKK to give up conducting the violent secessionist campaign in the south-east of Turkey as a political mean to achieve their political target (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). After the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK took the decision of continuing their struggle on the legal grounds through pursuing a policy of legalization of the Kurdish problem. As a part of their new strategy, the PKK eventually take the decision of the ceasefire unilaterally and then changed its name as the KADEK in order to gain legality and credibility in the eyes of people (Yavuz, 2000). Those developments taking place in the period afterwards the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan created a suitable ground in Turkey for conducting the EU-inspired right-based reforms in the Post-Helsinki period. In a nutshell, the decision of the PKK taken in the period afterwards the capture of the Abdullah Öcalan as of declaring the unilateral ceasefire, which manifested the eventual defeat of the PKK by the Turkish military, positively influenced the political and social order of Turkey that prepared an appropriate ground for Turkey to take further impressive steps to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria including the extension of the cultural rights of minorities such as introduction of teaching and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (Tocci, 2005).

With regard to the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, it should be pointed out that because the head of the terrorist PKK was arrested in the Greek Embassy in Kenya on February 15, 1999 by the Turkish authorities; in the international domain the prestige of Greece was damaged in a great extent that the position of Turkey has become far superior in relative to the position of Greece (Balcer, 2007). As a result, with the embarrassment of being country providing the shelter to the head of terrorist organization, Greece began to be required to abandon its uncompromising attitude towards Turkey. In this context, the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey attempted to form a political dialogue that would trigger the progressive developments in Turkish-Greek relationship, doing so, would prevent the potential escalation of conflict between Turkey and Greece (Kalaycıoğlu, 2003). Under this circumstance, in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece did not use its veto power against the application of Turkey for EU membership. Hence, Turkey attained the candidacy status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 thanks to the absence of the Greek objection to the Turkey's aspiration for EU membership. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the progressive developments in the period following of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan unwittingly affected Turkey's long-sought aspiration for EU membership in the medium term despite the raising short term nationalist backlash in Turkey. Because one of the great challenges to Turkey's inclusion into the EU was the previous negative approach of Greece towards Turkey's membership in the EU, the elimination of the possible Greece veto on the thorny road of Turkey toward eventual membership has increased the possibility of Turkey's accession into the EU thanks to the arrest of the head of the PKK in Greek embassy (Rumeli, 2005).

3.1.9 The Tragic Twin Earthquakes in 1999 on both Sides of the Aegean and Their Subsequent Effects over the Turkey's Relationship with Greece and the European Union

In the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999, one of the important developments were the devastating twin earthquakes taking place in both Turkey and Greece respectively in August and September 1999 as tragic events leading up the creation of the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in a more positive way. Thanks to the improvements in the relationship between Turkey and Greece in the aftermath of the twin earthquakes of 1999, the long-standing Greece objection to Turkish membership in the EU has been replaced with Greek support for Turkish membership. The progressive developments in the relationship between Turkey and Greece spilled over into the Turkey's relationship with the EU which positively affected Turkey's aspiration for EU membership (Kutuk, 2006; Rumelili, 2005).

Before embarking on the impact of the tragic earthquakes over Turkey's relationship with the European Union, it should be pointed that in the pre-Helsinki Summit period, one of the major obstacles to Turkey's inclusion into the EU was the uncompromising attitude of Greece towards Turkey which was stemmed from the ongoing bilateral conflict between Turkey and Greece with respect to the territorial waters, airspace and continental shelf in the Aegean and the presence of Turkey's troops in Cyprus (Aydın and Acikmeşe, 2007). Hence, Turkey strongly needed to achieve peaceful resolutions on the bilateral disputes ongoing between Turkey and Greece in order to eliminate its major obstacle on the road towards eventual EU membership because the principle of peaceful dispute settlement is the EU's one of the major criterion that a given country has to fulfill in order to become eligible for

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inclusion to the EU. Moreover, it should be pointed out that in the pre-Helsinki period, in many cases, Greece used its veto power card to block any progressive steps taken by the EU that would bring Turkey far closer to the EU. For instance, in the aftermath of the completion of the Custom Union, Greece blocked the resolution extending economic aids to Turkey to compensate Turkey's loss due to the adaptation of the Custom Union. Thus, in the period before the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece was the major obstacle to the Turkey's integration with the EU (Kutuk, 2006: Rumelili, 2005).

On the other hand, in the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the traditional approach of Greece towards Turkey's possible inclusion to the EU was fundamentally changed because of the impact of the tragic earthquakes which positively affected Turkey's long-sought aspiration for EU membership (Eralp, 2004; McLaren and Müftüler-Baç; Kubicek, 2002). In this regard, Bahar Rumelili argues that the broadcasting of the tragic images of the earthquakes led up to emergence of feeling empathy among Greek and Turkish populace. Moreover, Greek and Turkish earthquake rescue teams, other civil initiatives, and doctors worked shoulder to shoulder with each other under the highly emotional conditions in order overcome the burdens of the earthquakes which triggered the emergence of feelings of empathy and solidarity in both Turkish and Greek public (Rumelili, 2005: 47). As a reflection of the positive developments in the public level, the ruling elites in both sides took the necessary diplomatic steps and the reciprocal diplomatic visits took place which induced the closer relationship and rapprochements towards each other (Kutuk, 2006; Aydın and Acikmeşe, 2007). Under this positive setting, in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece did not choose to use its veto power against the European Council's decision of granting Turkey

candidacy status for EU membership (Rumelili, 2005; Kubicek, 2002). In a nutshell, the significant change within the approach of Greece towards Turkey came to place as a consequence of the twin earthquakes in Turkey and Greece taking place in the interim period between the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999 which made enormous contribution on Turkey's bid for EU membership as of Turkey's accomplishment to attain the candidacy status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

3.2 The Period Between 1999 and 2004: The Political Europeanization of Turkey under the incentive of EU Membership Prospect

3.2.1 The Helsinki Summit of 1999: The Start of the Actual Political Europeanization in Turkey

From the point of the relationship between Turkey and the EU, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 is a historical turning point as an event making the prospect of Turkey's EU membership a *less faraway aspiration* as well as triggering the start of the actual political Europeanization in Turkey (Öniş, 2006; Müftüler-Baç, 2005). In the Helsinki Summit of 1999, while offering Turkey the EU membership prospective on the condition to fulfill the Copenhagen political, the European Council set the appropriate mix of conditions and incentives for Turkey which encouraged Turkey to conduct the reforms in order to bring Turkish democracy and human rights regime in line with the standards of the European Union (Öniş, 2003; Öniş and Yılmaz; 2005). With granting a formal candidate status to Turkey at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the *credibility of the EU conditionality* in the minds of the both the policy-making elites of Turkey and the Turkish public has increased tremendously and reached a level enough to trigger the democratic developments in Turkey (Öniş, 2006). Hence,

thanks to Helsinki decisions, in the Turkish context, the EU has turned to be *the powerful external anchor* encouraging the internal change of Turkey in the direction more democratic state (Müftüler-Baç, 2005).

The decision of the European Council in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 is considerably significant event; because in its aftermath, Turkey-EU relations gained *"certainty"* which enforce Turkish ruling and state elites to carry out the EU-related reforms that will help Turkey to consolidate its democracy and to improve the conditions regarding the human rights, minority rights and the rule of law on the basis of the EU membership requirements set out in the Copenhagen political criteria (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). Furthermore, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 was really historic episode because it had the function *to eliminate the long-lasting ambiguity* on the issues of Turkey's inclusion into the EU as a full member while ending permanent debate over whether Turkey is a European country or not (Eralp, 2005). Hence, the EU's positive stance towards Turkey's quest for EU membership has become the main engine behind the political Europeanization of Turkey which is seen in the form of democratization of Turkey according to the Copenhagen political criteria. Since the EU membership perspective became far clearer from the standpoints of Turkey as a consequence of the European Council's positive resolution in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 regarding the Turkey's application for EU membership, Turkey began to carry out further impressive reform process in the realm of some sensitive issues in order to eliminate the persistent shortcomings in Turkey's political system (Müftüler-Bac, 2005).

Thanks to the decision taken in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey became a part of the same accession-partnership process as other candidate countries did and Turkey began to enjoy certain privileges stemming from the accession-partnership

such as attaining the financial and technical supports provided by the European Union in order to prepare the candidate countries for the actual membership (Eralp, 2005:1). Therefore, it is fair to argue that the decision taken in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 was quite important to *remove the double standards* employed by the EU while treating Turkey's application for the EU membership like in the case of the decisions of the European Council at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 regarding Turkey's application for EU membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). Hence, the decision taken in the Helsinki Summit is quite important to display a clear attitude of the EU to evaluate Turkey's bid for EU membership according to the same criteria which were applied in the case of the other previous candidate countries seeking for the accession to the EU. In a nutshell, with the Helsinki Summit of 1999, *the more open, inclusive and less discriminatory approach* began to apply for the Turkey's bid for the EU membership. This situation was perceived by the Turkish state and political elites as resolutions correcting the mistake made in the Luxembourg summit (Eralp, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2003).

Because Turkish governing elites perceived the Helsinki decisions as a positive maneuver of the EU to correct its mistake made in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, they have begun to show great efforts to carry out the EU harmonization reforms (the detail of democratization reforms in Turkey on road of EU membership is explained in the fourth chapter of this thesis). As a result, Turkey has experienced unprecedented degree of democratic openings over a short time period between 1999 and 2004 which considerably contribute to the consolidation process of Turkish democracy (Aydın and Keyman; Eralp, 2004). Thanks to the conducted EU-related reforms within the context of fulfilling the requirements for EU membership, Turkey has moved towards attaining *more open, pluralistic and multi-cultural political order*

(Eralp, 2005). At that point, it should be highlighted that the democratic reform process in Turkey has included the radical reforms regarding the sensitive areas in the Turkish context such as human rights, protection of minorities, improvement of judicial system and the role of the military. In the absence of the EU's transformative impact, Turkey would have not been able to make these reforms on these sensitive issues (Öniş, 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, Tocci, 2001).

While acknowledging the importance of the role of the EU anchor as an external actor encouraging the transformation of Turkish democratic system towards becoming more open, inclusive and participatory system; the significance of the domestic actors in Turkey affecting the momentum of the democratization process of Turkey has to be highlighted. In this sense, thanks to the Europeanization process in Turkey in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, pro-EU and pro-reform coalitions in Turkey have gained considerable amount of strength and they have become more dominant political force in the Turkish politics even before (Keyman and Öniş, 2004). As a result, pro-EU and pro-reform circles in Turkey have turned to be the main engine behind the recent reform process in Turkey on the road of EU membership target while displaying the strong commitment to reforms regarding the adaptation of the EU norms into the Turkish politics. In this vein, civil-society organizations have emerged as forerunners of the pro-EU coalition (Öniş, 2003; Öniş, 2006). Particularly business based civil society organizations have played contributive role to push the political authorities to adopt the reforms demanded by the European Union in order to enhance the quality of Turkish democracy and the human rights regime. Moreover, thanks to the Europeanization process in Turkey aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the very base of the pro-EU coalition in Turkey has been expanded and began to include the key parts of the state

bureaucracy. In addition to the inclusion of the key segments of the state bureaucracy into the pro-EU coalition in Turkey, the political parties in the Turkish politics began to be affected by the initiated Europeanization process and with a short time delay almost all political parties began to be the supporter of the abstract idea of the EU membership (Eralp, 2005; Öniş, 2006). As a reflection of this kind of changes in the attitudes of the political parties, the coalition government in Turkey in the period of 1999 and 2002, which was dominated by the two highly nationalistic political parties, was able to undertake certain steps to make required reforms in Turkey within the context of EU harmonization process. As stated by Ziya Öniş, because of the magnetism of the EU, the coalition government did not prefer to swim against the tide and it took the responsibility of making the some of the most far-reaching reforms in Turkish history (Öniş, 2006:7).

To sum up, the final resolution of the European Council in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 with respect to Turkey's application for EU membership brought about the actual breakthrough in Turkey's relationship with the EU; because for the first time Turkey was truly included in the EU's enlargement process as granting Turkey the candidacy status for full EU membership. Because Turkey's candidacy for EU membership is conditional on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria, the political authority in Turkey has paid considerable importance to initiate the political Europeanization of Turkey through introducing several constitutional and legislative amendments in accordance with the standards and expectation of the EU regarding the democratic system and human right situation. Moreover, because the Helsinki decisions had a function to remove the doubts around the issue of Turkey's Europeanness, Turkey-EU relations has gained certainty which help the pro-EU and pro-reform coalition to gain the strength in the political sphere. When

the pro-EU coalitions in Turkey gained political strength, Turkey became to be able to conduct impressive reform process regarding the several sensitive issues in which any changes would have not taken place, if the EU anchor did not play considerably important role to push to carry out the EU related reforms.

3.2.2 The Twin-Crisis of November 2000 and February 2001: Its Unintentional Positive Impact over the Europeanization Process of Turkey

Under the weak coalition government's rule, Turkey experienced the worst financial crisis of its history, called as the twin-crisis, in November 2000 and February 2001. As a result of the negative impacts of the 2000-2001 twin economic crises in Turkey, the living standards of Turks citizens have tremendously deteriorated due to the several factors such as massive unemployment, rising inflation rate and decreasing purchasing power. In a result, Turkish public, dealing with the severe impact of the economic crises, has begun to be more concerned with the material benefit of Turkey's EU membership. Hence, the supports of Turkish public for Turkey's accession to the EU have grown in a great extent as a consequence of unintentional impacts of the devasting twin financial crisis over the Turkish society (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007; Öniş, 2006). The growing supports of Turkish public have begun to be key factor behind the acceleration of the political Europeanization of Turkey because the political parties in Turkish political system, concerned with the maintenance of the public support for their political fates in elections, favored to give momentum the EU related reforms which were instrumental to attain the financial support of the EU that will increase the deteriorated living standards of the Turkish publics (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, Kubicek, 2004).

Even though twin-crisis of November 2000 and February 2001 took place in Turkey as a consequence of the deadlock of the financial and economic system in Turkey, one of the major reasons behind the devasting economic crisis is *the long-lasting patron-client and corruptive relationship* in Turkish politics and its negative burdens on the financial and economic systems (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). Therefore, the need to restructure the Turkish political system, in which there is no room for clientelist and corruptive relationship, became much more apparent for Turkey in order to achieve the stable and powerful economy. Because of this reason, the strong economy program, which was prepared under the keen directions of the IMF, included several political measures that would help Turkey to remove the political influence over the economy stemming from long-lasting patron-client tradition in Turkey. In other words, according to strong economy program, Turkey needed to upgrade its democratic system; otherwise Turkey would never achieve stable and strong economy free from the political intervention (Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 11).

The implication of the strong economy program should be reinforced by the adaptation of the EU related reforms in order to increase the transparency and the accountability of Turkish political system which emerged as the sole workable resolution to restructure the Turkish political system. To put differently, the restructuring of Turkish democratic system might be realized only through conducting the EU-related reforms that would help Turkey to enhance the quality of Turkish democracy, because without the EU anchor or the EU membership prospect, Turkey internal dynamics might remain inefficient to carry out the radical reforms that would change Turkish democratic system in direction towards more transparent and accountable system. Hence, within the context of Turkey's aspiration for EU

membership, thanks to increasing credibility of EU membership conditionality, the political authorities in Turkey have paid considerable efforts to the transformation of Turkish democratic system in accordance with Copenhagen political criteria which is also instrumental to build strong and stable economy in Turkey. In this regard, in the post-financial crises period, the active players of the economy such big business circles either internal or external, also strongly supported the introduction and continuity of the EU related reforms in Turkey because they considered that the EU related reforms would contribute the establishment of the political and economic stability in Turkey which are the primary prerequisite for economic development (Öniş, 2006; Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). In a nutshell, the adaptation of the EU-related reforms in Turkey motivated by the economic necessities coming up with the financial crisis made unintentional contribution on the process of Turkey's political Europeanization.

Moreover, the twin-crisis of Turkey in 2000 and 2001 are the crucial historical episodes in Turkish politics as unintentionally causing to *the decline in the influence of the anti-EU coalition* as well leading to the increase of the pro-EU coalitions' influence in Turkish politics. Because the crises created a massive wave of unemployment and high inflation rate, the potential material benefits of EU membership became more attractive for all segment of the society. Therefore, pro-EU and pro-reform coalition in Turkish gained political significance. Moreover, the anti-EU circles and their wrong policies were seen as responsible for the twin financial crisis, the anti-EU coalition in Turkey experienced the severe loss of political significance. Furthermore, because the big business and international investors are supportive of introduction and the continuity of the EU-related reform process and also their efficient implementation in complying with Copenhagen

political criteria in Turkey, the anti-EU coalition in Turkey lost their significance in Turkish politics. In a word, the rise of the political influence of the pro-EU coalition, in a parallel to the decline in the political significance of the anti-EU coalition in Turkish politics, became one of the chief domestic factors in Turkey behind the acceleration of Turkey's political Europeanization.

To sum up, as a result of the negative impacts of twin financial crisis in Turkey, the material benefit of Turkey's EU membership has become much more apparent and attractive for the Turkish publics dealing with the devasting impact of the financial crisis. Therefore, the supports of the Turkish publics for Turkey's accession to the EU have grown in a greater extent which pushes the political parties to conduct the EU-related reforms. Hence, in the Turkish context, one of the internal factors accelerating to the political Europeanization of Turkey in the form of the adaptation of EU criteria is the growing public supports for Turkish membership in the aftermath of the twin financial crisis. Moreover, in the post-crisis period, the governing elites in Turkey were required to introduce the EU related reform in order to build the more transparent and accountable political system which is the necessity for political stability of Turkey that leads up to the economic development as attracting more foreign investments and decreasing the public expenditures thanks to the removal of the patron-client relationship in Turkish politics. Furthermore, because the anti-EU coalition in Turkey was perceived as the sole responsible political forces in Turkey behind the emergence of severe economic crisis of 2000 and 2001, the twin economic crisis turned to be an unintentional golden chance for Turkey's integration with the EU while causing to decrease in the significance and influence of the anti-EU coalition which paved the way for the rise of pro-EU coalitions that gave impressive momentum to Turkey's reform process.

3.2.3 The National Election of November 2002 in Turkey and Its Positive Impact over the Europeanization Process of Turkey: The Political Revolution from below

The inability of the tri-party coalition government, composed by the Democratic Left Party (the DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) and the Motherland Party (the ANAP), to manage the negative impacts of the 2000 and 2001 financial crises during the crises period and their inefficiency to implement the harsh economy program in the aftermath of the crises led to increase the social unrest in Turkey. Because of the failure of the government parties to handle the economic crises in the both crises and post-crises period, the government parties experienced severe loss of political authority and the loss of the legitimacy due to mounting social unrest associated with the negative socio-economic impacts of the economic crises. These negative developments from the point of the tri-party coalition government in Turkey gave the way for the rise of a new pro-Islamic political party in Turkish politics, Justice and Development Party (AKP). In this regard, the general election of 2002 was a clear landmark historical event that gave opportunity for this newly emerging political party, the AKP, to come the power as a single party government (Keyman, 2003; Öniş and Keyman, 2003).

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the introduction and implementation of the EU-related reform*s* were also important factors that accelerated the dissolution of the weak coalition government, governing Turkey in the period between 1999 and 2002 (Öniş and Keyman, 2003; Müftüler-Baç, 2005). Because of the adaptation of the EU related reforms, the fragmentation and rupture among the governmental parties increased in a great extent that brought Turkey into the election climate. At

that point, the importance of the adaptation of the third harmonization package has to be highlighted as a factor deepening the opinion divergence among the partners of the tri-party government. The third harmonization package was adopted under the tri-party coalition government on 2 August 2002 including the radical legislative changes such as the abolishment of the death penalty in peacetime and the introduction of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, which increased the difference of opinion among the coalition partners (Eralp, 2005; Müftüler-Bac, 2005). As a political consequence of the adaptation of the third harmonization package, the early elections in Turkey were held on 3 October 2002.

In the general elections of the November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) achieved a landslide electoral victory as getting 35.7 percent of the popular votes and gaining 66 percent of the parliamentary seats and being able to form a single-party majority government. Also, in the general elections of 2002, the Republican People's Party (the CHP) achieved to emerge from the ballot box as the single opposition party of having the seats in the Grand National Assembly while receiving 19.4 percent of the popular vote and gaining 34 percent of the parliamentary seats (Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 15). As stated by Senem Aydın and Fuat Keyman, the results of the general elections of 2002 was truly a political earthquake while throwing out three partners of the coalition governments from the parliament as well as ousting two opposition parties from the parliament. The results of the general elections of 2002 might be interpreted as the punishment imposed by the Turkish public over the existing political parties in the national parliament which were seen as the responsible for the ineffective and undemocratic governing structure on the basis of economic populism, clientelism, and bribery. As of result of the massive social unrest, the AKP gained considerable popular supports in the general

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elections which bring the AKP into the power as a clean and untried political party in Turkish political system (Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 15, Patton, 2007).

When the AKP government came into the power as a single majority government, it presented vague commitment to Turkey's aspiration for EU membership for the sake its political interest. As a result, within the context of fulfilling the requirements of Copenhagen political criteria, the reform process in Turkey has gained the far greater momentum. Because the AKP has attributed to top priority to launch the reform process that would bring Turkish political system in line with the European standards, a major breakthrough for Turkey's relation with the EU came to the place as a result of the general elections of 2002 with the emerging AKP government.

At that point, with regard to the AKP government's strong commitment to Turkey bid for EU membership, it should be highlighted that the AKP government has preferred to be the prominent component of the pro-EU coalition in Turkey advocating Turkey's quest for EU membership because of its will *to curb the influence of the military* over the political and public life in a greater extent which would *increase its chance of political survival* (Bracer, 2007; Patton, 2007). Moreover, AKP government has viewed Turkey's aspiration for EU membership as a mean to extend the fundamental rights in Turkey and to liberalize the strict understanding and implementation of Jacobin style secularism which meets with the expectations of its electorate base with regard to freedom of religion (Öniş, 2006). Therefore, when the AKP government came into the power as a consequence of the 2002 national elections, the EU-related reform process in Turkey gained certain momentum in which the political role of the military was dramatically curbed through legislative changes on the function and composition of the National Security

Council in favor of civilians in accordance with the standards of the EU with respect to the civil-military relations. Moreover, the AKP government enacted legislative changes in September 2006 imposing absolute civilian control over the military expenditure for the first time in the history of Turkey (Balcer, 2007). Furthermore, the fundamental rights were extended under the rule of the AKP government through the adaptation of the EU harmonization packages prepared on the base of the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. In a nutshell, from the point of the Turkey's political Europeanization process, the AKP's entry into the office as a single party majority government has become contributive factor accelerating Turkey's process for Europeanization which has been seen in the Turkish context in the form of the adaptation of the EU norms and standards that increased the quality of Turkish democracy and enhance the scope of the fundamental rights and liberties (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Balcer 2007).

Moreover, with respect to reform momentum in Turkey under the AKP government, it should be highlighted that the AKP government did not face any serious constraints that the outgoing DSP, MHP and ANAP coalition government confronted due to the nature of being coalition government. As being single-majority government, the AKP was able to concentrate single-mindedly on Turkey's bid for EU membership thanks to the absence of any constraints causing to the slowdown the reform process under the previous weak coalition government period because of the opinion divergence within the coalition partners with respect to the application of the political aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria. Hence, the AKP government has been able to accelerate the reforms process in Turkey that would pave the way for the realization of long-standing aspiration for EU membership. As stated by Meltem Müftüler Bac, while carrying out the EU-related reforms, the only

major constraint that the AKP government has faced was the negative attitude of the Turkish political and state elites towards the AKP government due to their suspicion about the Islamic roots of the AKP. Some of those skeptic political elites claimed that the AKP has a hidden Islamist agenda and on the basis of this hidden agenda, the AKP government preferred to launch the EU-related reforms in order to weaken the secular and Kemalist nature of the regime in Turkey (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 29). However, despite the doubts of the some Turkish state and political elites concerning the reform process in Turkey within the scope of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, the reform process gained greater momentum with the AKP government's strong commitment to Turkey's bid for EU membership. In this sense, the first two adaptation packages, which are the fourth and fifth adjustment packages of Turkey on the road towards EU membership, adopted by the Turkish Parliament under the leadership of the AKP in a very speedy manner in December 2002 with the intention of getting a clear date for the beginning of the accession negotiations from the EU in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002.

To sum up, the twin financial crisis of 2000 and 2001 were truly historic events in Turkish politics that trigger Turkish electorates to restructure Turkish political landscape as replacing old political parties with the new ones. In this regard, the national election of 2002 was a golden chance in the hands of the Turkish electorates to replace the old weak coalition government with the new and strong ones. The crisis of Turkish politics associated with the negative impacts of the twin financial crisis gave the opportunity to the newly founded AKP to come into the offices as a single- majority government. As a single-majority government, the AKP government has held the enough political capacity and capability to make contribution to Turkey's economic and political stability. Moreover, from the point

of Turkey's political Europeanization, the emergence of a single majority government in the place of weak coalition government is a positive development that would give certain momentum to Turkey's reform process. One should remember that during the tri-party coalition government in the period between 1999 and 2002, the reform process in Turkey was slow track because of their different political preference concerning the adaptation of the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria.

Despite the slowness in the adaptation of the EU-related reforms during the governmental term of the weak coalition government, the process of preparing and adopting the constitutional and legislative changes within the context of meeting the EU demands in the realm of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and minority rights accelerated the dissolution of the tri-party coalition government which brought Turkey into the election climate. As a result of the general elections of 2002, the AKP government obtained the political chance of forming a single majority government without any serious constraints causing to the slowdown of the reform process during outgoing weak coalition government period due the opinion divergence among the coalition partners. Hence, the AKP government preferred to speed up the reforms process in Turkey that would pave way for the realization of long-standing aspiration for EU membership (Öniş and Keyman, 2003; Eralp, 2004). When the AKP government came into power as a result of the November 2002 general elections, it attributed the serious importance to the Turkey's bid for EU membership with the purpose of increasing its legitimacy in the political ground against the secular circles in Turkish politics. In a nutshell, the reform process in Turkey, initiated under the weak coalition government, gained the impressive momentum in a great extent thanks to the results of the general elections of 2002.

The AKP government has intensified Turkey's reform process through enacting the number of legislative and constitutional changes that would enhance the quality of Turkish democracy and individual liberties with zero tolerance for torture as well as the lifting of the state of emergency in southeast Turkey. Despite the strong Islamist roots of the AKP and the prevailing concerns around the Islamic roots of the AKP among the secular segment of the Turkish society and international community, the AKP has been initially successful to present itself a moderate and centrist political party and to capture the ground which was previously occupied by both the center-right and center-left parties (Öniş, 2006). Thus, the AKP government gave tremendous momentum to pursue the EU related reform agenda with a greater of consistency and strong commitment than the previous coalition government with the purpose of consolidating their own position in the political sphere against possible threats from the hyper-secularist establishment in Turkey (Öniş, 2006: 9-12). One of the major reasons behind the AKP government's dominated position in the pro-EU coalition is connected to the AKP's political will to expand the boundaries of rights and freedoms including religious freedoms and to curb the political influence of the military that the popular base of the AKP government has demanded for a long time in the Turkish politics.

3.2.4 The Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and its Effect on Turkey's political Europeanization through giving Turkey the Conditional Date for Beginning the Accession Negotiations

After the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) came to the power as a consequence of the national elections of 2002, it presented the clear will and strong commitment to accelerate the reform process in Turkey within the purpose of

realizing Turkey's long-standing aspiration for EU membership. In this sense, in the immediate post-election period, in a swift and determined manner, the AKP government adopted a number of legislative and constitutional changes with the clear intention of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Hence, two harmonization packages took place in Turkey under the leadership of the AKP government in December 2002 right before the Copenhagen Summit with the purpose of attaining a clear date from the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 to start up the accession negotiations (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). In addition to reforms efforts to carry out the EU related reforms, the AKP government strived to use the diplomatic channels to get the support of the EU member countries for Turkey's bid for EU membership. In this line, the representatives of the AKP conducted high level diplomatic visits to the major capitals of EU with the purpose of taking the support of the EU member states for Turkey's will to get a clear timetable to start the accession negotiations according to decisions of the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 (Eralp, 2005). However, the AKP government's efforts did not produce the outcome that Turkey expected to get in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. At the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the European Council decided that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay"[2].

With respect to decision of the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 giving Turkey a conditional date to launch the accession talks, it is fair to argue that it generated initial disappointment in Turkey which expected to get the clear date to begin the accession negotiations. On the other hand, despite the initial

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[2] European Council (2002), Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December 2002.

disappointment of Turkey associated with the decisions of the European Council in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the EU related reform process in Turkey gained certain momentum in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 thanks to the conditional date to open up the accession negotiations. Hence, the decision of the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 turned to be truly historic decision that encouraged Turkey to carry out further democratization reforms. To put differently, while conditioning Turkey's membership into the Turkey's performance to fulfill the Copenhagen Summit, EU's membership conditionality became more far concrete in the Post-Copenhagen Summit which turned to be the primary factor accelerating transformation of Turkey in accordance with the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. As a result, under the appropriate mix of conditions and incentives provided by the European Council of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the political authority in Turkey has adopted the clear pro-European stance as increasing the speed of the reform process in Turkey. Hence, the process of political Europeanization in Turkey has gained certain momentum (Eralp, 2004; Eralp, 2005; Aydın and Keyman; 2004; Öniş and Yılmaz; 2005).

Within the context of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, it should be highlighted that the limits of American pressure over the decision making mechanism of the EU became much more apparent as a consequence the European Council's decision of giving Turkey a conditional date to open up the accession negotiations despite the significant US pressure over the EU to give the unconditional clear-cut date to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. Although Turkey's failure to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria in a full sense played the major role in attaining conditional date in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the decision of the European Council was more or less connected to the negative side

impact of the US pressure over the decision-making mechanism of the EU to integrate Turkey into the EU. Even though on the eve of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 the Bush administration imposed significant pressure through diplomatic channels over the EU to give the early date for Turkey to start the accession negotiations, the pressure over the EU's decision making mechanism in the course of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 caused to the emergence of unintentional outcome for Turkey. Moreover, as a consequence of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, it became far clear that Turkey's prospect for EU membership in a certain extent depends on its ability of adopting the EU related reforms and implementing the Copenhagen political criteria in a full sense. While acknowledging the limitations of the US support for Turkey's bid for EU membership, Turkish rule making elites preferred to accelerate the adaptation of the EU related reforms process in the period between 2002 and 2004. In this line, four democratization packages were enacted in the aftermath of Copenhagen Summit of 2002 in the period between 2002 and 2004 with the intention of fulfilling the Copenhagen Summit and eventually beginning to launch the accession negotiations as getting a clear date to start the accession in the Brussels Summit of 2004 (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005).

To sum up, thanks to the conditional decision of the European Council in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, Turkey actually encountered with more appropriate mix of conditions and incentives to carry out the EU related reforms that give considerable momentum to the reform process. With the intention of getting the clear date to start the accession negotiations according to decisions of the European Council at the Brussels Summit of 2004, the Turkish rule making elites single-mindedly concentrated on carrying out the EU-inspired reforms to satisfy the expectations of the EU. In this regard, in the period between 2002 and 2004, the

AKP government prepared four harmonization packages and one constitutional amendment package which enhanced the quality of democracy, increase standards of human rights and eventually brought Turkey's legal and political structure more close to standards of the EU. As a result, some of the radical reforms took place in the period between 2002 and 2004 including the abolishment of the capital punishment; the introduction of the possibility of the education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish; the improvements on the legal status of women; and decrease in the influence of the military over the political system (Bac, 2005, Balcer, 2007). In a nutshell, the conditional date given to the Turkey at the Copenhagen Summit turned to be one of the major factors behind the momentum of the reform process in Turkey in terms of fulfilling the political aspects of the Copenhagen on the road of Turkey for full EU membership.

3.2.5 The US Invasion of Iraq in 2003: One of the Major Factor Accelerating Turkey's Political Europeanization Process as Enforcing Turkey to Become Closer to the EU

From the point of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union, one of the turning points came to the scene as a consequence of the US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 which unintentionally brought Turkey far closer to the EU while weakening the long-standing strategic alliance between Turkey and the US. Thus, the US invasion of Iraq is a critical event to trigger Turkey moving further towards the EU. Because Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003 failed to pass the bill giving the authorization to the US to pass its troops to the Iraq over Turkish territory, the Turkish-US relations experienced its historical setback. Moreover, because of the arrests of eleven Turkish special armed operatives in the Northern Iraq by the US forces, the deadlock in the

Turkish-American relationship was reinforced in a great extent that Turkey's relationship with the US reached its historical lowest point. This situation became one of the major factors behind the acceleration of Turkey's political Europeanization while decreasing the political significance of the anti-EU circles in Turkish politics which paved the way for the emergence of the appropriate domestic context from the standpoints of the adaptation of the EU-related reforms in the realm of some sensitive issues such as cultural rights of minorities and the civil-military relations (Öniş, 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005).

At that point, it should be pointed out that one of the key components of the anti-EU coalition in Turkish domestic politics is the military–security establishment which previously perceived the US-Israel-Turkey triangle as an alternative to Turkey's integration into the EU. In the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq, as a consequence of the severe deterioration in the Turkish-American relationship, the military-security establishments in Turkey began to change their approach towards the relationship of Turkey with the EU and began to adopt more favorable stance towards the Turkey's quest for EU membership (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). *The transformation of the military establishment in favor of Turkey's integration with the EU* has become the positive developments taking place in Turkish politics that accelerated Turkey's political Europeanization; because as a corollary of the changes in the approach of the anti-EU coalition, the politicians became able to make required sensitive reforms in the realm of the civil-military relations in compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria such as imposing limitations over the powers of the National Security Council and creating control over defense expenditure (Öniş, 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). In this vein, as argued by Ziya Öniş, in the post-war context, the Turkish military's relatively neutral approach towards the

resolution of Cyprus issue on the basis of the proposal of the Annan Plan in 2004 was clear evidence confirming that the Turkish military have undergone serious transformation process, hence, it adopted more supportive approach to the Turkey's aspiration for the EU membership. Also, the military's silence attitude towards the democratic openings including the minority rights might be considered as a confirmation proving that the military was no longer the major component of the anti-EU coalition in Turkey (Öniş, 2006).

Moreover, one should remember that the decision of the Bush administration in the US to declare the war against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein in Iraq is the political maneuver for relieving the American public from the trauma of the tragic September 11 Attack in the US causing the loss of more than 3000 civilians. In this context, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack, the Bush administration adopted the unilateral security-oriented foreign policy for the sake of its national interest in expense of the collective interests of the international community as by-passing the international organizations and undermining the international norms and rules (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). Therefore, the declaration of the US to the war against the Iraq and its subsequent demand from Turkey to deploy the US troops in Turkish territory to pass Iraq should be evaluated as the natural outcome of the Bush administration's strong commitment to restructure the international system unilaterally according to its security-oriented interest.

Moreover, in the post-Iraqi war period, the US has needed to create close and cooperative relationship with the local power holders in order to eliminate the chaotic environment and to build the eventual stability in the region. In this context, the US created close ties with the local Kurdish power holders which led to the increase in the power of the Iraqi Kurds. However, increasing power of the Iraqi

Kurds thanks to their cooperation with the US is directly against the national interest of Turkey because growing power of Iraqi Kurds increases the likelihood of the establishment of the independent Kurdish state in the region which might affect adversely the stability of Turkey including approximately twelve million Kurds. Moreover, partly due ethnic ties with the PKK, the local Iraqi-Kurds gave allowance to PKK to settle down in the regions. The terrorists trained in the Iraqi territory cross the borders and conduct bloody terrorist actions against Turkish security forces. Hence, the strategy followed by the US in the period following the Iraqi War of 2003 to create the stability in the regions caused to the emergence of the developments that has been directly clashing with the national interest of Turkey. Therefore, in the post-war climate, it became far clear that Turkey's national interest is more likely to clash with the US interest. Hence, in the post-September 11 context, Turkey needs to pay far greater efforts on building more close relationship and strengthening the strategic ties with the EU without ignoring the needs to restore the cooperative relationship with the US (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). Moreover, if Turkey persists on carrying out the EU related reforms that would render the acceleration of the process of Turkey's integration into the EU, Turkey will become more democratic and economically stable country in its region; therefore, as a much stronger country, Turkey can show greater resistance to the unilateral demands of the Bush administration (Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 15).

To sum up, the US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 was one of the historical events that prepared an appropriate ground for closer relationship between Turkey and the EU while causing to the serious setback in the Turkish-American relationship associated with the parliamentary failure to enact the 1 March bill. As a foreign policy alternative in the place of strategic alliance with the US, Turkish foreign

policy-makers adopted the stance favoring Turkey's integration into the EU. In this context, the adaptation of the EU related reforms in Turkey gained certain amount of momentum in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which served as function bringing Turkey more close to the EU. Moreover, the resistance of the Turkish parliament to the Bush administration's unilateral demand from Turkey to deploy its troops in Turkish territory has made significant contribution to the increase of Turkey's prestige in the international domain while falsifying the argument that Turkey would act within the EU as Trojan horse of the US in the aftermath of its inclusion into the EU. Hence, the EU member states began to adopt more favorable stance towards the Turkey's bid for EU membership which triggered Turkey to increase the speed of the political Europeanization in the form of the adaptation of the EU-related reforms and their enforcement. Furthermore, the US invasion of Iraq and the clash of interest in the aftermath of the War displayed that Turkey might preserve its national interest in the Middle East only if it persists on continuing the EU-induced reforms that would help Turkey to achieve having more democratic governing system and stable economy. In a nutshell, with its all subsequent effects on Turkey, the invasion of Iraq led by the US is a truly historic event that made unintentional contribution to the acceleration of Turkey's political Europeanization which has come to the fore in the form of adoption and implementation of the EU related reforms.

3.2.6 The Brussels Summit of 2004: The Positive Stance of the EU towards Turkey's Impressive Reform Performance in Adopting EU-Inspired Reforms as Giving the Date to Begin Accession Talks with Turkey

Thanks to the more concrete EU membership prospect in the wake of the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and the growing support of Turkish public for Turkey's

integration to the EU in the aftermath of the twin financial crisis of 2000 and 2001, as a candidate country attaining the conditional date from the EU to begin the accession talks; in the interim period between Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and Brussels Summit of 2004, under the AKP government's vague commitment to Turkey's aspiration for EU membership, Turkey intensified its reform process in order to align Turkish political and legal system with the EU standards, norm and procedures and reach conformity with the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. The AKP government adopted a set of constitutional and legislative changes within the scope of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. These constitutional and legislative amendments introduced far revolutionary reforms in the field of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and minority rights. In this vein, through enacting series of legislative changes, Turkey enhanced the scope of the fundamental rights and liberties and also the scope of the freedom of thought, expression, association, and press was fundamentally extended. Hence, Turkey reached certain progress in the field of fundament rights and liberties which help Turkey to upgrade the quality of Turkish democracy. Moreover, the legislative and judicial barriers over the enforcement of the rule of law in a full sense were eliminated in Turkey. For example, the State Security Courts was abolished and the state of emergency was removed. Furthermore, in the realm of human rights, Turkey has achieved certain progress as demonstrating clear commitment to the fight against torture and ill-treatment in custody and eliminating the capital punishment. With respect to minority rights, Turkey has conducted unprecedented openings as extending the cultural rights of the minority groups such as introducing rights of broadcasting and teaching in languages other than Turkish, and also extending the scope of minority property rights. Furthermore, the power and influence of the military was in great

extent curbed and the standards of the civilian-military relations in Turkey brought close to the practices of EU member states. In a nutshell, in the interlude period between the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and the Brussels Summit of 2004, Turkey reached certain progress in terms of aligning its political and legal system with the European procedures while taking the Copenhagen criteria as a reference point for its reform process (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Öniş, 2006).

The unprecedented transformation of Turkey in the interim period between the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and the Brussels Summit of 2004 was praised by the EU elites. In this context, the EU Commission acknowledged Turkey's successful performance in terms of adopting the EU-related reforms in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. Hence, its regular report published on October 6 2004, the EU Commission recommended the European Council to start up accession negotiations with Turkey as claiming that Turkey has adequately fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. On the basis of the recommendation of European Commission to begin accession negotiation with Turkey, the European Council in the Brussels Summit on 17 December 2004, decided to open up accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. However, one should keep it in the mind that the decision of the European Council in the Brussels Summit of 2004 to begin the accession talks with Turkey was a conditional decision that required Turkey to sign a protocol to extend custom union agreement to the 10 new EU member states including the Greek Cyprus in order to become eligible to launch accession negotiations on October 3, 2005. Moreover, on the basis of the conditional decision of the European Council at the Brussels Summit, Turkey is required to modify its Penal Code in order to achieve conformity with the EU standards in this field (Kutuk, 2006: 279-280; Balcer, 2007; Müftüler-Bac, 2008).

3.3. A New Era in Turkey-EU Relations: The Slow-Track Relationship between Turkey and the EU in the Period Afterwards the Brussels Summit of 2004

3.1 Turkey's Reaction to Decisions of the European Council in the Brussels Summit of 2004 and Its Impact over Turkey-EU Relations

Turkey's initial reaction to the conditional decision of the European Council in the Brussels Summit of 2004 was positive; because for the first time Turkey succeeded to get a concrete EU membership prospect in its 45 years of thorny and difficult journey to become integrated into the EU as an equal partner of the EU integration project. On the other hand, the initial positive approach of Turkey turned to be wider frustration due to the special clauses in Negotiating Framework which was presented in Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels Summit of 2004 (Kutuk, 2006).

With respect to Turkey's eventual accession to the EU, some special clauses exist in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey as criteria for inclusions of Turkey to the EU which the candidate countries previously seeking for accession negotiations in previous rounds of EU enlargement did not encounter with. Hence, Turkey's initial positive response towards decisions of European Council of the Brussels Summit in December 2004 has turned to be wider disappointment in Turkey due to these special clauses added into negotiating framework peculiar to the case of Turkey's inclusion into the EU. As one of the special clause related to Turkish membership, in the negotiating framework, the nature of accession negotiations defined as an open-ended relationship by nature (Balcer, 2007). Moreover, the possibility of suspending the negotiations or eventual resumption were emphasized in the EU's official document of the Negotiating Framework presented in the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels of 2004, on the basis of the assumption that

if Turkey seriously violates the basic principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Kutuk, 2006). Furthermore, the EU pointed out that the EU can exert possible permanent restrictions in the some certain areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies, and agriculture. In addition, while taking into account the phrase of "the candidate country is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest bond possible" in the negotiating framework for Turkey, it is fair to argue that the EU implicitly pointed out the other options different than full-membership such as privileged partnership might become the prospective outcome of open-ended negotiations. These special clauses regarding Turkey's full membership in the EU have been perceived as the reflections of the restrictive and discriminatory attitude of the EU member states towards Turkey's willing to become the full member of the EU. Hence, the special clauses regarding Turkey began to be the chief factors causing the slow track relationship between Turkey and the EU in the aftermath of the Brussels Summit of 2004 (Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Balcer,2007).

Despite the emerging slow track relationship between Turkey and the EU in the aftermath of the Brussels Summit of 2004; Turkey showed efforts to fulfill the requirements for beginning to launch accession negotiations in the post-Brussels Summit period. In this context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted a new criminal code on June 29, 2005 in line with the EU standards and expectations with the purpose of achieving the actual start of accession negotiations on October 3, 2005. Moreover, within the scope the fulfilling the conditions set out by the European Council of the Brussels Summit of 2004, on July 29, 2005, the Turkish government signed a protocol that ensures to extend the custom union to the new ten

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new member states. As a result, the accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005 (Balcer, 2007).

3.3.2 The Beginning of Accession Negotiations on 3 October 2005

Thanks to the final decision of the European Council on 3 October 2005 to begin accession negotiations, Turkey and the EU begun to launch accession negotiations[3]. As a result, Turkey-EU relations entered into a new phase in which Turkey is more likely to encounter with difficulties and complexities due to possible interest divergence between Turkey and the EU on conditions of adapting the EU Acquis Communautaire which consists of more than 90,000 pages of official documents including European norms, rules, standards and practices (Müftüler-Bac, 2008). Moreover, Turkey, on the road of EU membership, might experience critical ups and downs during accession talks because Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU will not be limited to the negotiations of the Acquis Communautaire, but also negotiations of prospects for the resolution of the long-lasting disputes between Turkey and the EU member countries. Therefore, Turkey's claim for the accession to the EU is in a great extent dependent on Turkey's performance to adopt the Acquis Communautaire and also improvements in the solutions of the long-lasting disputes (Balcer, 2007)

On 3 October, 2005 the European Council made an amendment on the Negotiating Framework for Turkey presented in the Presidency Conclusions of the

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[3] After the accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005, the screening process of the Turkish legislation for compliance with the Acquis Communautaire took place and it was completed in June 2006. As a result, as of June 2006, the actual accession negotiations begun as opening the first chapter related to science and research. On the other hand, in December 2006, the EU decided to suspend the negotiations of the eight chapters due to Turkey's failure to extend the Custom Union agreement to Greek-Cyprus. However, the negotiations of other remaining chapters have continued between Turkey and the EU in a traditional way of opening up two chapters in every six months.

Brussels Summit of 2004 and the phrase of "absorption capacity" was inserted into the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. Therefore, in the case of the serious deadlock in the bilateral relationship between Turkey and any member states due to unresolved disputes, this member state is more likely to block Turkey's eventual accession into EU while arguing that the EU will not achieve the necessary "absorption capacity" to allow Turkey to become full-EU membership (Balcer, 2007). In a nutshell, while taking into account the prospective impact of those special clauses and the open-ended nature of negotiations, it is fair to argue that as time passed Turkey's unresolved disputes between EU member states would constitute obstacles to Turkey's actual accession to the EU. Therefore, during negotiation process, Turkey has to attribute greater importance to solution of the long-lasting disputes which have the capacity to hinder Turkey's inclusion into the EU.

Despite the opening up of the accession negotiations, still there exists uncertainty about the question of whether Turkey would ever be an eventual member of the EU due to highlighted open-ended nature of accession talks in the Negotiating Framework. Moreover, some of the major member states have significantly important reservations with regard to the eventual inclusion of Turkey as a full member of the EU on the political, economic and cultural grounds (Bac, 2008, Kutuk, 2006). As a result, some special clauses related to Turkey were included into the Negotiating Framework which gives the EU member states to have right to block Turkey's accession to the EU. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the fate of Turkey within the EU integrations process is not only dependent on the performance of Turkey in terms of adopting the EC acquis but also the preference of EU member states and Turkey's bilateral relationship with EU member states (Müftüler-Baç, 2008, Balcer, 2007).

3.3.3 The Reasons lying behind the Recent Slow-Track Relationship between Turkey and the EU Since the Beginning of Accession Talks: The Rise of Mutual Distrust

One of the major reasons behind the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations since the start of the accession negotiations on October 3, 2005 has been the rising mutual mistrust fuelled by several factors and events. In this vein, one of primary factor causing to arise of the mistrust in the Turkish side is the hesitancy of the EU member states to accept Turkey into the EU as a full-member. The reluctance of the EU member countries towards Turkey accession to the EU was clearly seen in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey in which the European Commission put very much emphasis on the open-ended nature of accession talks and highlighted the absorption capacity of the EU as a determining factor for Turkey's eventual accession to the EU. Hence, due to ongoing uncertainty surrounding question of Turkey's integration to the EU, Turkey's fear and doubt of that the EU would turn its cold back despite of Turkey's success in meeting the requirements for EU membership has increased tremendously. The rise of fears and doubts of Turkey with regard to the end result of accession negotiations has negatively affected the vague commitment of the AKP government to march towards accession to the EU. Therefore, in the period afterwards the beginning of the accession negotiations, the AKP government's eagerness to pursue EU-related reformist agenda has varnished. In the domestic politics, the AKP can no more cope with the raising pressure coming from the nationalist and anti-EU block as using the card of Turkey's long-sought aspiration for EU membership (Patton, 2007; Narbonne and Tocci, 2007). Because

of the absence of the credible EU membership prospect for Turkey, the AKP government has begun to be more reluctant to meet demands of the EU.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that in the period afterwards the beginning of accession negotiations, the EU's demands from Turkey with regard to Cyprus at the expense of Turkey's national interest have been another factor causing to increase in the fears and doubts of Turkey regarding the hidden motives of the EU's demands from Turkey. As a result, the resurgence of the Sevres syndrome embedded in cognitive map of Turks came to the sphere one again in Turkey which has negatively affected Turkey-EU relations as well as Turkey's performance to implement the EU-inspired reforms in a full sense. Moreover, since mid-2005, mounting terrorist actions of the PKK increased the nationalist backlash and the sensitivity of Turkish citizens regarding the territorial integrity of Turkey. Also, the French parliament passed the resolution criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide in October 2006 which also led to the rise of the anti-EU nationalist feelings in Turkey. Moreover, the possibility of holding a referendum for Turkey's entry into the EU by France is also another factor harmfully affecting the commitment of Turkey to persist on pursuing the EU-induced reform agenda. Under this circumstance, due to re-election concerns in 2007, in the period following the beginning of accession negotiations, the AKP government could not take the required steps in terms of enacting further EU-related reforms and implementing the previously enacted EU-related reforms efficiently. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the EU, Turkey's decreasing commitment to pursue the EU-related agenda, worsening security condition of Turkey associated with the rise of the militarist Kurdish nationalism, the increasing institutional resistance towards the full sense of enforcement of the EU-related reforms and its consequence of Turkey's

poor performance in implementing EU-inspired reforms are the major reasons fuelling the doubts and fears of the EU with regard to the eventual accession of Turkey as a full-member of the EU.

CHAPTER IV

CONSOLIDATION PROCESS OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS UNDER THE CREDIBLE EU MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY

From the point of Turkey-EU relations, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 granting Turkey a candidate status on the condition of reaching the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria is a turning point. As a result, in the post-Helsinki period, thanks to the positive stance of the EU towards Turkey's bid for EU membership reinforcing EU membership prospect for Turkey, the EU's system transforming impact has became more influential in Turkey to trigger the domestic transformation of Turkey in accordance with the EU standards. In this vein, in the period afterwards the Helsinki Summit of 1999, with the clear intention of fulfilling the European Union's Copenhagen Political Criteria, nine reform packages and two constitutional amendment packages have been successfully adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in a swift and determined manner (Özbudun, 2004: 179). These legislative and constitutional amendments under the credible EU membership prospect contributes to improve the protections for fundamental rights and liberties, to strengthen the rule of law, to extend scope of the cultural rights of minorities, and to limit the autonomous power of the military (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 73-83). Hence, it fair to argue that as providing less faraway membership prospect, the

EU has began to exercise its prominent system transforming role over Turkish politics which encouraged Turkey to introduce the legal and constitutional reforms in upgrading and consolidating its own former democracy in accordance with the standards of the European Union (Öniş, 2006; Müftüler-Baç, 2005, Keyman and Aydın, 2004). At that point, it should be pointed out that to make reform on the some sensitive issues such as abolition of the death penalty and broadcasting and teaching in languages other than Turkish, curbing the power of the military in favor of civilian authority were seen as taboo in the period before the start of the political Europeanization process of Turkey because of the prevailing fear of the possibility of territorial disintegration and partition of Turkish territory along the line of ethnic divergence, called as Sevres Syndrome (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 80; Öniş, 2003; Kubicek, 2005). Hence, the EU anchor is one of the major explanatory variables catalyzing domestic transformation in Turkey in accordance with the EU standards, norms and procedures (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007). Apparently, these reforms played a major role in strengthening, deepening, and embedding the democratic norms and values in Turkish political system (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). However, to what extent these legal amendments makes Turkish democracy "the only game in the town" is unclear. In order to understand the impact of the legal democratic reforms over the consolidation process of Turkey, in the following sections, this paper examine the legal reforms and their impact over the consolidation process of the Turkish democracy by employing Linz and Stepan's definition of democratic consolidation.

4.1 The Evaluation of Turkey's Democratic Reforms Process by Taking into Account the Theory of Consolidation of Democracy

To better analyze the impact of the EU-related reforms on Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy within the context of fulfilling the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria in order march toward the EU membership, in this part of the chapter, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's definition of democratic consolidation is employed. The advantage of using this definition is that Linz and Stepan's definition of consolidation of democracy does not fall into the drawbacks inherent in the alternative minimalist and maximalist approaches to democratic consolidation (Özbudun, 2000: 6). Linz and Stepan assert that in addition to a functioning state apparatus – which is a *sine qua non* of a consolidated democracy:

> "Five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions
> must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated.
> First, the conditions must exist for a free and lively civil society.
> Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued
> political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal
> guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associated life.
> Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new
> democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutional
> economic society."(Linz and Stepan, 1996: 7)

4.1.1 Free and Lively Civil Society

Before embarking on the impact of Turkey's democratic reform process upon the creation of free and lively civil society in Turkey, it should be pointed out that the development of the civil society is contingent on the number of different factors such

as the general level of socioeconomic development, the characteristic of political culture, and the presence or absence of the strong state tradition (Özbudun, 2000: 125-145). In this context, before the adaptation of the EU-inspired reform process, Turkish civil society was inherently weak, passive, and inefficient under the strong control of the state partly due to inappropriate socio-economic development of Turkey and also more particularly due to the persistent historical legacy of the Ottoman state tradition over the Turkish politics. (Kubicek, 2005: 366). As a consequence of the legacy of the Ottoman strong tradition over the Turkish political system, the civil society remained insufficiently strong to be an engine for the required democratic reforms in the political system in order to achieve a consolidated democracy (Heper, 1992; Heper, 2000). Moreover, the Kemalist legacy of the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of the early republican period, in which the governing elites endeavored to keep the associations under their strict control with the purpose of keeping the national integrity, was another historical factor in modern Turkey hindering to enhancement of the associational life and development of civil society organization (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007: 84; Kubicek, 2005: 367; Özbudun, 2000: 129-130).

In addition to the legacy of the history over the weakness and inefficiency of Turkish civil society, the Constitution of 1982 and Law on Associations, which included the restrictive clauses with respect to the civil society and associational life, were additional significant factors preventing the development of Turkish civil society with the capacity and capability of influencing the decision making mechanism in Turkey (Özbudun, 2000, Aydın and Keyman, 2004). On the other hand, the traditional weakness and inefficiency of civil society which were often attributed to the strong-state tradition in Turkey and the bureaucratic-authoritarian

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nature of the early republican period, have began to disappear with the political Europeanization of Turkey in which Turkey endeavored to align its political and legal system with the EU standards, norms and procedures through adopting a set of constitutional and legal amendments. In this context, constitutional amendments in the area of freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom assembly, and freedom of press have created much more appropriate legal infrastructure for Turkish civil society to play further active roles in creation of more inclusive and pluralist political system as channelizing more efficiently the interests of the Turkish public into the decision making mechanism. Moreover, the new Law on Associations adopted in November 2004, contributed to decrease the possibility of state intervention into the civil society activities and to enlarge the scope of the freedoms accorded to civil society organizations which have paved the way for the proliferation of the civil society organization through eliminating the legal barriers existing on the previous Law on Associations (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 80). Moreover, the adaptation of a new Penal Code in 2005 provided additional legal progress for Turkish civil society over which they have begun to enjoy greater freedom than ever before. With respect to development of civil society organizations in Turkey, the opinion of the European Commission stated in its 2007 Progress Report affirmed the progressive impact of the new Law on Associations and the new Penal code over the associational life in Turkey. In the Progress Report of 2007, the EU Commission declared that the legislative progress in Turkey has lead up to the emergence of the positive developments with respect to Turkish civil society organizations as claiming that Turkish civil society organizations become more vocal and better organized organizations with increasing number and variety (European Commission, 2007).

On the other hand, in line with the argument of Kubicek, this thesis argue that time is needed to internalize and socialize the legal improvements extending the freedoms to accorded to civil society organizations. Hence, over time, the developments in the realm of free and lively society will make significant contribution to the prospect of consolidation of democracy in Turkey as and if Turkish society organizations begin to internalize the legislative improvements and actively get benefitted from the adaptation of new laws regulating the activities of civil society organizations giving permission to use financial funds provided by the organizations from abroad (Kubicek, 2005). As a result, thanks to the legal progress with respect to the civil society organizations paving the way for the increasing number and variety of civil society organization with the opportunity of using the increasing available funds, the contribution of Turkish civil society to consolidation of Turkish democracy would more likely to reach conformity with the theoretically proposed role of civil society in contributing to consolidation of democracy by Diamond et. al. While utilizing the legal advancements in the realm of freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of press, freedom of thought and expression, and the new Law on Association that increases available financial funds for Turkish civil society organizations as eliminating the previous legal barriers embedded in the former Law on Association blocking to obtain the financial resources provided by foreign organizations, Turkish civil society is more likelihood to act in the near future as an important actor playing more effective role in monitoring and limiting the state power and keeping officials accountable to the public; in motivating political participation; in increasing civic education of citizens and spreading the norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, and accommodation; in enhancing the representativeness of democracy by providing additional channels

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beyond political parties for the expression of a wide variety interests including those of historically marginalized groups; and in taking more active role identifying and training new leaders who at some point may cross over into the political arena and broaden its pool of leadership talent (Diamond et. al., 1995: 26).

With respect to growing influence sphere of Turkish civil society, the success of the lobbying activities of Turkish civil society in the level of Brussels in the period before the Brussels Summit of 2004 to enforce the EU to give a clear date for Turkey to begin accession negotiations might be proposed as the early sign displaying that the capacity and capability of Turkish civil society has been growing enough to influence the decision making mechanisms. Moreover, in the domestic context, the civil society enforced the political authority in Turkey to adopt further impressive right-based EU-related reforms as adopting the strong discourse of democracy, human rights and liberties and calling for more democratic reforms. Particularly business based civil society organizations played contributive role to push the political authorities to adopt the reforms related to the criteria of the European Union (Öniş, 2006: 7; Keyman and Düzgit, 2007: 75). Hence, Turkish civil society has began to play the more active role in influencing decision making mechanism and shaping policies which has made significant contribution to both Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy and Turkey's quest for EU membership through engaging with the lobbying activities in both international and domestic level.

On the other hand, the remaining legal problems and inappropriate implementation of the EU-inspired reforms enlarging the borders of freedom of expression, freedom of thought and press might be evaluated as impediments hindering the progressive developments in the realm of civil society which has the potential of contributing to the creation of free and lively society in Turkey. Since the

mid-the 2005, the endemic deficiencies of Turkey democracy in the realm of freedom of thought and expression have recently revitalized due to increasing institutional resistance to the implementation of democratic reforms despite the previous adopted legal reforms enhancing the quality of Turkish democracy. In this context, the prosecutors have begun to use the remaining illiberal legal codes of Turkish legal system in order to impose the restrictions on the freedom of expression, thought and press. For example, Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code has been actively used by the prosecutors to limit the freedom of thought and freedom of expression. In this context, Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink and Elif Şafak were prosecuted on ground of Article 301 of Turkish Penal. Those intellectuals faced with the charge of that they were insulting Turkishness and Turkish state and nation through their speeches and press (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007: 236). Moreover, the major part of the Turkish judiciary has preferred to apply the legal changes to the cases in a more restrictive interpretation that caused to the emergence of the barrier on the full implementation of the EU-inspired reforms. Therefore, the democratic reforms have remained on the book without efficient enforcement in the country which adversely affected Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy because in a great extent the consolidation of Turkish democracy depends on the full sense of implementation of the EU-inspired reforms that would help Turkey to create more inclusive, pluralist and participatory democratic regime in Turkey (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 78-80).

In a nutshell, in the current conjecture, the civil society has not yet reached far enough capacity and capability to shape policy and to address social, economic and political problem due to remaining legal barriers on the freedom of expression and thought; but with the maintenance of the positive trends initiated with Turkey's EU transformation process with respect to civil society and the internalization and

socialization of the EU-related reforms regarding the freedoms and liberties, Turkish society would reach enough capability and capacity to take a more active role in determining policies according to the social, economic and political problems of Turkish citizens. Thus, with the growing power and capacity, the civil society would more likely to make noticeable contribution to enhancement of the political accountability and representativeness of Turkish political system, and the increase in participation into the political system which would bring about the progressive developments contributing to the consolidation process of Turkish democracy in the near future.

4.1.2 Political Society

First of all, it should be pointed out that the according to the foremost political scientist Huntington, a given country having a longer and more experience with democracy is more conducive to reach a consolidated democracy than the one having a shorter and more distant experience (Huntington, 1991:270-271). In this context, despite the chronic military intervention, as a second-wave of democracy, Turkey has had the certain advantage of experiencing representative democracy more than a half century; while holding recursive free and fair elections in which the universal suffrage has been applied and more than one parties have competed with each other in order to come the power. Hence, thanks to the fairly long history of experiencing the representative democracy, Turkey has been relatively more conducive to reach a consolidated democracy (Özbudun, 2000: 6). On the other hand, the omnipresent role of the Turkish military force stemming from the mission of vanguard guardian of the Kemalist regime; the interventionist stance of the Turkish armed forces regarding various issues considered fall into the scope of national security and also

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the chronic military takeovers when it deemed it is necessary to preserve the national security and social cohesion have been the major impediments hindering the developments strengthening the relatively autonomous and valued political society in Turkey. Hence, it is fair to argue that the lack of civilian control of the army before the launch of the EU-inspired reform process in Turkey has been the major obstacle preventing Turkey from reaching a lively and autonomous political society. On the other hand, the EU-inspired reforms carried out in Turkey in the realm of civil-military relations affording to subordinate the military power to the civilian authority made certain contribution to the creation of the autonomous political society while considerably curbing the power and influence of the military over the political sphere and the political life. On the other hand, despite the progress in the field of the civil-military relations thanks to the adaptation of the EU-related reforms, the military in Turkey is not fully subordinated to the control of the civilians. Hence, in the section below, the legislative and constitutional amendments enacted in Turkey in the realm of civil-military relations are analyzed in order to assess the developments in Turkey to bring the civil-military relations more close the standards of the EU and reach the conformity with the theoretical framework of consolidation of democracy with regard to civil-military relations.

4.1.2.1 The Impact of the Legislative and Constitutional Amendments in the Realm of Civil-military Relations over the Prospect for the Establishment of Autonomous Political Society

4.1.2.1.1 The Changes in the Function and Composition of National Security Council

The Constitutional amendments of 2001 made a significant change in Article 118 which regulates the duties, functions and composition of the National Security

Council (NSC hereafter). With this amendment, the number of the civilian members of the Council was increased from five to nine while the number of the military representatives remains at five while including the deputy prime ministers and the minister of justice. Furthermore, paragraph three of Article 118 was amended with the aim of highlighting that the role of the National Security Council decisions is limited to recommendation (European Commission, 2001: 19). Moreover, the seventh reform package adopted in July 2003, introduced the legislative amendments regarding the role of the military in Turkish politics as modifying the role of the Secretary General of the NSC and abolishing the executive powers the Secretary General of the NSC. Moreover, with the seventh reform package, the NSC has begun to meet once every two months instead of meeting every month. Furthermore, the procedures to appoint the Secretary General of the Council were changed by the seventh reform package that pave the way for a civilian to be appointed as a Secretary General. Hence, in August 2004, for the first time, a civilian was appointed as NSC Secretary General. These were the legislative amendments making changes to institutional power of the military which were brought by the seventh reform package within the intention of subjugation of the military into the civilian control (European Commission, 2003: 19). Because the National Security Council was one of important institution in Turkish politics through which the Turkish armed forces exercised noticeable pressure on the civil politicians regarding various issues deemed to fall into the scope of national security, the legislative amendments strengthening the advisory nature of the NSC and chancing the composition of the NSC in favor of civilians have been important legal progress curbing the power of the Turkish military in the political sphere and increasing the prospect for creating the relatively

autonomous and valued political society in which military power is fully subordinated to the civilians.

4.1.2.1.2 The Removal of National Security Court: Elimination of the Influence of the Military over the Judiciary System and the Civilianization of Judiciary System

On 7 May 2004, the second constitutional reform package eventually abolished the State Security Courts in Turkey which were established by the Constitutional amendment of 1973 and were re-activated by the military regime of 1980. Also, some of their competencies were transferred to newly created Heavy Penal Courts (European Comission, 2004: 15-16) Hence, with this amendment in the 2004 Constitutional Reforms, one of the important institutions inherited by the military interventions was totally eliminated in line with the idea of bringing the framework of civil-military relations in Turkey closer to practice in EU Member States and also to increase the efficiency and the independence of the Turkish judiciary (European Commission, 2004: 12).

4.1.2.1.3 Enhancing Budgetary Transparency of the Military Expenditures

Turkish military had granted a privilege by the exclusion from the judicial control of the Court of Accounts thanks to the constitutional amendment of 1971. This privilege began to be eliminated from the Turkish legal system though the adaptation of the EU-inspired reforms. In this context, the Seventh harmonization package in 2003 brought the probability of auditing of accounts and transactions of all types of organisations including those concerning the state properties owned by the armed forces by the Court of Auditors with the request of parliament. Also, the

constitutional amendments enacted in May 2004 removed the exemption of the "state property in possession of the Armed Forces in accordance with the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defense" (European Commission, 2004: 22). On the other hand, as cited by the European Commission in its Progress Report, there exist some remaining problems with respect to ensuring the full parliamentary oversight over the military expenditures and enhancing the budgetary transparency of the military expenditures. The European Commission asserted that "the Parliamentary Planning and Budget Committee review the military budget only in a general manner. It does not examine programs and projects. Furthermore, extra-budgetary funds are excluded from parliamentary scrutiny" (European Commission, 2007: 9). However, despite the remaining problems ensuring the full parliamentary oversight and creating the transparency of military expenditures, more or less Turkey achieved progress in the realm of curbing the power of the military over the military expenditures. Hence, Turkey took progressive steps to align its civil-military relations with the practices of the EU member states.

4.1.2.1.4 The Removal of Military Representatives in the Civilian Bodies

The representatives of the National Security Council in civilian body of the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) have been removed through the adaptation of the 6th Harmonization Package of 19 July 2003 which brought the amendment to the Article 6 of the Cinema, Video and Music Works (European Commission, 2003: 18-19). With the Constitutional amendments of 2004 to the Article 131 of the Constitution, the member of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), who was selected by the Chief of General Staff, was removed. Therefore, the Higher Educational Boar is totally civilized (European Commission, 2004: 23). Thus, as a consequence of the

constitutional and legislative amendments with regard the military representatives in the civilian boards, the institutional influence of the military over the civilian higher boards was permanently removed and Turkey took the progressive step to reach conformity with legal framework for educational, and art and broadcasting institutions.

4.1.2.1.5 The Evolution of Turkey's Reform Efforts in the Realm of Civil-Military Relations from the Lens of the Prospect for Creation of Autonomous and Valued Political society

In the realm of civil-military relations, it is certain that Turkey has made significant progress through enacting serious legislative changes with the purpose of aligning civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states and subordinating the military power to civilians in a full sense. In this context, legislative amendments brought serious changes on the function and composition of the National Security Council considerably curbing the influence of the military in the political sphere as changing the composition the NSC in favor of civilians, changing the procedures to appoint the Secretary General of the Council and converting the NSC into the advisory body. Moreover, through the enacting further EU-related reforms, the State Security Courts removed, and the influence of the military over the judiciary system was eliminated and the civilianization of judiciary system was ensured. Furthermore, the legislative and constitutional changes within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in the realm of civil-military relations facilitated the enhancement of the budgetary transparency over the military expenditures as imposing the full parliamentary oversight upon the military spending. Furthermore, thanks to the democratic reforms with regard to the military representatives in the

civilian boards, the institutional influence of the military over the civilian higher boards was permanently eliminated as removing all military representatives from the civilian boards and Turkey reached the level EU in terms of the regulation of education, art and broadcasting. In a nutshell, these were the legislative amendments considerably decreasing the institutional power of the Turkish military. Hence; these legislative amendments were important steps towards reaching the full subjugation of the military into the civilian control. Therefore, these legal progresses made noticeable contribution to the prospect for the relatively autonomous and values political society in Turkey which is the sine qua non condition for consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, as stated by Meltem Müftüler Bac, in Turkey the military's traditional omnipresent role and interventionist stance role do not stem only from its power and influence on the institutions (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 27). Because of this reason, to make changes on institutional power of the military is not strongly enough to ensure democratic framework of civil-military relations in Turkey as proposed by the theory of consolidation of democracy. Therefore, time is required for the actual internalization and socialization of the legal amendments in the field of the civil-military relations and their positive impact on Turkey's process of consolidation of democracy.

On the other hand, it is fair to argue that despite the progress in the field of the civil-military relations, the military in Turkey is not fully subordinated to the control of the civilians due to remaining problems in the legal framework with respect to civilian control of the military and in the practice stemming from the improper socialization of legislative progresses. In this vein, one of the remaining problems with the subordination of the military to the civilians is the limited power of the Ministry of Defense in controlling the military. The Chief of the General Staff

continues to report to the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law defining the role and duties of the Turkish military is the remaining legal barrier on the full subordination of the military into the civilians because this law granting the military a wide margin of maneuver through which the military is more likely to exercise the influence over the political sphere (European Commission, 2005: 12). Moreover, via informal mechanism, Turkish military continues to exercise its influence over the matters other than military matters. As making the public declarations to express their opinions regarding the political, social, and foreign policy matters, senior military members directly violate with the standards of the democratic model civil-military relations (European Commission, 2007: 9). In this context, on April 27, 2007, the Turkish military officials made statement via the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to express their opinions with respect to the presidential election crisis. In this issued public statement, the Turkish Armed Forces declared that Turkish Armed Forces continue to keep their strong resolution to carry out their duties stemming from the laws in order to protect the unchangeable principles of the Republic (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007: 120-121). In some circle, this statement is perceived as a threat against the government and an open intervention to the political sphere; hence, this statement is so-called as e-coup. Without dealing with the question of whether this declaration might be considered as a threat to the government and a kind of military coup or not; this study argues out that this statement issued via the official website displayed that the civil-military relations in Turkey have been far from reaching conformity with the EU standards. Also, the position of the military in Turkey does not conform to the principles of consolidation of democracy in which the military single-mindedly concentrate on their duties

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regarding the security matters. Hence, it is fair to argue that there remained much that Turkey has to do in order to bring the civil-military relations to the standards of the EU and the concept of consolidation of democracy.

4.1.2.2 The Presidential Election Crisis of 2007: The Impact over the Prospect of the Development of the Political Society in Turkey

Because the Presidential election crisis of 2007 manifested the weakness of the political society in Turkey particularly due to the autonomous role of the Kemalist establishment within the state sphere preventing the progressive developments that would ensure the development of the autonomous and valued political society in Turkey; in this section, the presidential crisis of 2007 and the subsequent constitutional package adopted by the AKP as a response to the presidential election crisis are analyzed with the intention of assessing the impact of the recent political crisis over the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

Even though in its five year governmental term between 2002 and 2007, the AKP government has followed liberal, reformist and pro-European Union politics, the suspicion prevails in the secular establishment of Turkey regarding the existence of the hidden Islamic agenda of the AKP and the Islamic dissimilation of the AKP government which fuelled the tension between the Islamist circle and secular circle (Patton, 2007: 349). In this context, with the end of the seven year-term of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the beginning of the election process of the next president of the Turkish Republic, the traditional tension between the Kemalist circle and Islamist circle came to the surface and it reached its peak point (Aydın, 2007: 19). In this context, in April 2007, Turkey witnessed the important political crisis because of the growing tension between the Kemalist circle and Islamist circle. Within the

context of the presidential election process, as a resistance to the prospect of the election of the new president coming from the political Islam tradition as evolving out of the National Outlook Movement, the secular establishment in Turkey put forth constant efforts to block the process of the presidential election through using undemocratic means. In this context, as the vanguard guardian of the Kemalist regime, the military played an important and undemocratic role in preventing the election of Abdullah Gül by issuing a memorandum. The statement of the Turkish armed forces with regard to presidential election process enforced the Constitutional Court to take the decision on April 28, 2008 annulling the first round of the presidential election held on April 26, 2008 on the technical ground that two-thirds majority for a quorum was absent in the first round of the presidential election process (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007: 121). As a result of the blockage of the presidential elections with the undemocratic efforts of the Turkish military and the illiberal decision of Constitutional Court, Abdullah Gül withdrew its candidacy; the AKP government decided to hold early elections in July 2007 and adopted the number of constitutional amendments (Yavuz and Özcan, 2007: 121).

A package of constitutional reforms was proposed by the AKP government on May 2007 as a response to the presidential election crisis emerged as a result of the resistance of the secular establishment in order to block the election of a candidate evolved out the political Islam tradition. This package was accepted in the public referendum of October 2007. The entry into the forces of this set of constitutional amendments is important from the point of the prospective development of the political society in Turkey because Constitutional amendment package introduces the election of the President by popular vote for a renewable term of five years and also it reduces the government's term of office from five to four

years. Moreover, with this Constitutional amendment, minimum age for a person to be elected to parliament was lowered from 30 to 25 years. These are all positive legal developments that would trigger the development of political society and eventually contributed to consolidation of democracy while increasing political accountability thanks to shortening the term of government and rising participation of people with lowering the minimum age to be eligible to be elected as a parliamentarian (European Commission, 2007: 6). On the other hand, it should be point out that from the perspective of the prospective developments enhancing the political society in Turkey; the ten percent threshold in the general elections, required for political parties to enter into the Turkish Grand National Assembly Parliament, is the remaining problem in Turkey's political structure that has to be dealt with in order to increase the political participation and efficient political representation in Turkey. It should be pointed out that Turkey's ten percent threshold in the national elections is very high as compared to the thresholds applied in the European parliamentary systems. Hence, as the remaining legal barriers on the full sense of political participation and representation, a national threshold of 10% should be changed in a way to ensure optimal representation and to motivate political participation in Turkey (European Commission, 2007: 6-7).

To sum up, this thesis argues that the Presidential election crisis of 2007 clearly displayed that political society in Turkey have not reached the enough maturity to be the engine of Turkey's democratization process due to undemocratic interventionist stances of Kemalist establishment in Turkey including the military and judiciary which prefer to intervene to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy when they deem that there are the political issues and developments challenging to their Jacobin understanding of secularism. Hence, the recent

presidential election crisis is an instrumental to clearly demonstrate that in Turkish context one of the major impediments to consolidation of democracy is the uncompromising attitude of the Kemalist circle in Turkey and its authoritarian interpretation of secularism. On the other hand, unwittingly the presidential election crisis of 2007 made contribution to the prospect of the political society and the consolidation process of Turkish democracy as triggering the AKP government to enact the constitutional amendments which increases the political participation, accountability and representation in Turkey.

4.1.3 The Rule of Law Ensuring Legal Guarantees for Fundamental Rights and Liberties

In the realm of the rule of law, Turkey have had an advantage of having a fairly long history of constitutionalism and rule of law, their historical roots went back to the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 in the Ottoman Empire era (Özbudun, 2000: 6-7). Therefore, the situation of the rule of law in Turkey has been fairly more conducive to make contribution to consolidation of democracy. Moreover, it should be pointed out that even before the start of the EU-induced reforms, in the Constitution of 1982 regarding the rule of law there were certain provisions strengthening the legislative independence of judiciary as providing the secure tenures and pay for judges and prosecutors. Moreover, according to legislative infrastructure in Turkey, judges and public prosecutors may be disciplined only by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors composed mainly by senior judges and appointed by the President of the Republic (Özbudun, 2000: 6-7). This is the positive peculiarity of the Turkish Judiciary system which has already existed before the launch of the EU-related reforms guaranteeing the rule of law in Turkey.

Also, within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey carried out the impressive reform process bringing certain legislative progress enhancing the rule of law in Turkey such as the removal of the State Security Courts and the State of Emergency which ensured the rule of law enhancing the fundamental freedoms of Turkish citizens. In the section below, the detail analysis of legislative and constitutional amendments regarding the enhancement of the rule of law is provided in order to assess the impact of the legislative progress on consolidation of Turkish democracy.

4.1.3.1 The Removal of State Security Courts

The State Security Courts (DGM) was established by the constitutional amendment of 1973 under the authoritarian directions of the military with the intention of enhancing the state authority over the different segment of society and eventually eliminating the anarchy. Because these courts were established as a response to the chaotic conditions of the early 1970s fuelled by political violence, these courts included the elements reflecting the authoritarian attitude of the military regime. In this context, State Security Courts was established as mixed courts composed of civilian and military judges and public prosecutors. The main intention of the State Security Courts was to try crimes against the security of the State and ensure the social order (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 31-33). Because the civilians were tried by military judges and prosecutors over the State security Courts, the composition and duties of the National Security Court as being mixed court directly violated universal and impartial norms of the rule of law. In this context, the European Court of Human Rights declared that the presence of a military judge in the National Security Court panel was in conflict in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

(European Commission, 1999: 9). As a part of Turkey's reform effort to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria, with the intention of eliminating military judges and public prosecutors from these courts in order the bring Turkish judiciary system in line with the EU standards, Article 143 of the Constitution was amended on June 18, 1999. With the entry into the force of this amendment on 22 June 1999, the military judges were removed from the National Security Courts (European Commission, 1999: 9). Moreover, another fundamental legislative amendment with regard to State Security Courts came to the sphere with the adaptation of second constitutional reform package on 7 May 2004. This constitutional package eventually abolished the State Security Courts .and replaced them with the Heavy Penal Courts (European Commission, 2004: 23). Thanks to the removal of the State Security Courts from the Turkish judiciary system, Turkey undertook progressive steps to ensure the rule of law in parallel to EU standards and procedures

4.1.3.2 The Constitutional Amendment Related to Right a Fair Trial

With the constitutional amendment of 2001, the legislative amendment was made on Article 38, two principles directly interrelated to the rule of law were included into Article 38. The first principle added in to the Article 38 is that unlawfully obtained findings shall not be accepted as evidence. The second principle specifies that no one should be deprived of liberty merely on the grounds of an inability to fulfill a contractual obligation (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 33). Thus, the incorporations of these two principles into the Article 38 are the certain legislative steps strengthening the rule of law in Turkey as increasing the legal guarantees providing the fair trial.

4.1.3.3 The Lifting of State of Emergency

In order to decrease the military involvement in the civilian life and to ensure the rule of law in a full sense; emergency rule, which were in force for 15 years, was completely removed in 2002 from the provinces in which previously emergency rule was applied because of the existing social disorder due to terrorism. Moreover, provisions that were used to restrict pre-trial detention rights under emergency rule were amended (European Commission, 2004: 53). As a result of the lifting of state of emergency, the military intervention into the civilian life has considerably decreased in the Southeast provinces and tolerance towards cultural events has increased significantly (European Commission, 2004: 13). Moreover, thanks to the end of emergency rule, the people living in the Southeast provinces has began to enjoy the same rights and freedoms that has been used by the people living in different regions of Turkey. Therefore, the removal of state of emergency enhances the scope of rule of law in Turkey.

4.1.4 State Bureaucracy and Government

Democratic consolidation is not only undermined by the inefficiency of the state, but also by the over-institutionalized state apparatus and public bureaucracy coupled with the strong state tradition that impedes to consolidation of democracy as hindering the development of the democratic values among political actors (Özbudun, 2000: 7). In this context, the foremost academicians of Turkish politics, Ergun Özbudun argue that the output structures of modern Turkey particularly the armed forces, the police and the civil service have been so highly institutionalized that the overdevelopment of the state machinery have negatively influenced the

emergence of private spheres of action and expression, and a more balanced relationship between state-society/individual (Özbudun, 1996: 7). Moreover, as claimed by Metin Heper, Turkey is a *par excellance* example of a "strong state" in which extreme importance is attributed to the survival and well-being of the state and also the extreme sensitivity exists on the notion of state sovereignty (Heper, 1992: 170). In this vein, before the beginning of the EU-related reform process in Turkey, due to the over-institutionalization of state apparatus and public bureaucracy, and particularly because of their excessive power over the rights and freedoms of society/individuals; human rights violations were very persistent and also the major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities existed in Turkey. On the other hand, thanks to the EU-inspired reform process, Turkey took certain progressive steps in terms of eliminating human rights violations and increasing the scope of the fundamental rights and freedoms and even extending cultural rights of minorities. Hence, in the section, the positive developments, which came to the fore in Turkey thanks to the adaptation of the EU-demanded reforms decreasing of the power state bureaucracy, is analyzed.

4.1.4.1 Human Rights Developments in Turkey Thanks to Decreasing Power of the State Bureaucracy

First of all, it should be pointed out that in the period before the start of the EU-inspired democratic reform process, torture and ill-treatment were very common in Turkey because of the over-institutionalization of the state security forces and their uncontrolled power over the rights and liberties of both society and individuals. Also, one should kept in his mind that before the certain amendments made on the Constitution of 1982, it already have certain provision prohibiting all kind of human

rights abuses such as mistreatment, and inhumane treatment and punishment. However; despite the existing legal guarantees prohibiting the all sort of human rights violations, human rights abuses were very widespread in Turkey in the period before adaptation of democratic rights in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, with the beginning of the political Europeanization process; under the EU anchor and the incentive of EU membership prospect, Turkey put certain legislative efforts to eliminate the major shortcomings in its political and legal system which constituted to obstacle to the inclusion of Turkey into the EU. In this vein, with the adaptation of the right-based EU-demanded reforms, the uncontrolled power of the state security forces was curbed which positively affected the situation of human rights in Turkey. Hence, Turkey reached certain progress in the realm of fight against torture and ill-treatment through the adaptation of the EU-induced reforms and their full enforcement. In this context, in addition to adaptation of certain legislative changes concerning the situation of the human rights, the AKP government's strong commitment to consistently pursue strategy of "the zero tolerance" towards torture and ill-treatment, which was initially adopted in December 2002, has been the significant administrational change and the noticeably important step toward implementation of the EU norms and standards. Thanks to the adaptation of the zero tolerance against torture and ill-treatment, Turkey achieved certain progress in the realm of human rights (Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 23; Müftüler-Baç, 2005, 26).

With respect to legislative changes regarding human rights, the second reform package is one of the important reform packages that changed the Civil Servants Law with the aim of preventing the torture and mistreatment. In the changed Civil Servants Law, it is stipulate that damages compensated by the Turkish state as a

result of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in torture and mistreatment cases should be claimed from the perpetrators. Moreover, the fourth reform package of Turkey adopted by the AKP government in a swift manner in December 2002 brought about the legislative improvements in Turkey with respect to its human rights regimes. The main objective of the fourth reform package was to cease the human rights violations in Turkey and bring the human right situation in Turkey in line with the EU standards. Hence, the fourth reform packages of Turkey revised the Law on the Trial of Civil Servants and it eliminated the requirement for the superior's permission to try civil servants and also it removed all legal impediments for the persecution of the public officials conducted human rights violations such exercising torture and ill-treatment Also, the fourth adaptation package brought the revision of the Penal Code for torture cases and adopted a measure that would prevent sentences because of torture being converted into monetary fines (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 26).

4.1.4.2 The Progressive Developments in the Realm of Minority Rights

Because the developments enhancing the cultural rights came the scene in Turkish politics as a consequence of the decreasing influence of the strong state tradition in Turkey and the reducing influence of the reform-resistant state bureaucracy thanks to easing security concerns in the period following the capture of the head of terrorist organization of the PKK; in the section below, the progress in the realm of the minority rights is analyzed in order to display that the probability of creation of the optimum state bureaucracy and governance in Turkey has been increasing.

4.1.4.2.1 Cultural and Language Rights of Minorities

Before embarking on the detail of cultural and language rights of minorities and their linkage with consolidation of democracy, it should be pointed out that the arrest of the head of the terrorist organization of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya was one of the significant events manifesting the defeat of the PKK. In the period following the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK took the decision of continuing their struggle on the legal grounds through pursuing a policy of legalization of the Kurdish problem. As a result, the PKK eventually took the decision of the ceasefire unilaterally and then changed its name and adopted the KADEK in order to gain legality and credibility in the eyes of people (Yavuz, 2000). As a result, as the security situation improved; security concerns of the state bureaucracy considerably decreased which led to creation of an appropriate ground for Turkey to carry out the democratic reforms in the area of the cultural rights of minorities such introduction of teaching and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. In this context, the constitutional changes of 2001 eliminated legal barrier on use of languages and dialects different than Turkish in publications and expression as changing the third paragraph of Article 26 and the second paragraph of Article 28 (European Commission, 2001: 28). Moreover, the third reform package made the amendment on the High Audio Visual Board Law as of permitting broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish (European Commission, 2002: 34). Also, the third reform package brought legal changes on the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching. Thanks to this legal amendment, It become possible to learn and teach in languages different than Turkish (European Commission, 2002: 41). Thanks to the adoption of this amendment, the number of

cases, against the university students demanded from the university administration to open elective Kurdish language courses at university level, was dropped ((European Commission, 2002: 41). Moreover, in July 2003, the amendment made on the Civil Registry Law in a way that the parents obtain the right to name their children as they desire. On the other hand, still there exist restrictions on the use of names including the letters q, w and x which were commonly used by Kurds (European Commission, 2003: 37). With respect to cultural and language rights of minorities, the ban on the use of language other than Turkish in political life has been the remaining restriction. In this context, by the year of 2007, the number of investigations and court case has been open against the official representatives of the DTP. Moreover, some members and executives of the HAK-PAR were sentenced on the ground that their speeches at the party's congress in Kurdish violated the Law on Political Parties imposing ban on the use of languages other than Turkish in the political life (European Commission, 2007: 22).

4.1.4.2.2 Minority Property Rights

Before embarking on the legal improvements with respect to the property rights of minorities, it should be pointed out that in the period before the start of the democratic reform process, Turkey applied certain legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the non-Muslim communities   because of the prevailing fear of the possibility of territorial disintegration and partition of Turkish territory along the line of ethnic detergency, called as Sevres Syndrome (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 80). Despite the ongoing impact of the Sevres Syndrome embedded in the cognitive map of the members of the public bureaucracy; under the EU anchor, within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey took certain progressive steps to bring

about legal improvements with respect to property rights of minorities. In this vein, the third reform laws package adopted by the fragile tri-party government in August 2002 and went into force on August 9, 2002 within the scope of enhancing the rights of minorities. The third reform packages brought about legal changes on the Law on Foundations in a way that granted the right to community foundations to acquire and to dispose of immovable properties without facing any bureaucratic restrictions. Furthermore, third reform package gave the community foundations the right to register their properties as and if they are able to prove that these proporites belong to them (European Commission, 2002: 38). Another legal improvement with regard to property rights of minorities came to the sphere with the adotation of the sixth reform package by the AKP government. The sixth reform package went into force on July 19, 2003 and recognized the right of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship, subject to approval by competent administrative authorities (European Commission, 2003: 34). On the other hand, despite the certain legal progress in the field of the property rights of minorities, there exist remaining problems that the non-Muslim communities continue to face such as lack of legal personality and restricted property rights (European Commission, 2007: 17). In this context, Alevi communities suffer from the lack of official recognition as a different religious community; hence, they encounter with difficulties with opening their places of worship which are not officially recognized as places of worship and also they could not get any funding from the authorities to facilitate their religious activities (European Commission, 2007: 17).

To sum up, in the period before the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey suffered from the serious shortcomings in the realm of human rights and minority rights because of the over-institutionalization and excessive power of the state apparatus which were fueled by the worse security conditions and the Sevres

syndrome embedded in the cognitive map of the state bureaucracy. Particularly, state security forces holding the uncontrolled power were the major reason behind the poor human rights record of Turkey in the period before the start of the EU-demanded reform process. In the absence of the EU anchor, state security forced conducted the widespread human rights abuses within the scope of fight against terrorism. At that point, it should be pointed out that the improvements in the security situation with the arrest of the head of the terrorist organization brought about peaceful atmosphere in Turkey which helped the governments to carry out the EU-inspired reforms in the realm of human rights and minority rights.

The legal improvements with respect to human rights and minority rights brought certain progress for minorities in Turkey; hence, they began to live in the better and more democratic conditions as enjoying enhanced cultural and languages rights. This situation is a clear manifestation that under the highly efficient EU anchor, the state bureaucracy has lost its power in Turkey; because in the presence of strong power of the state apparatus to carry out the EU-demanded reforms enhancing the scope of human rights and minority rights is impossible. Therefore, Turkey's success in adaptation of EU-related reforms with respect to human rights and minority rights has clearly demonstrated that Turkey has been moving towards achieving the optimum state bureaucracy which is sine qua non condition for consolidation of democracy. Moreover, it should be pointed that as a part of the recent democratic reform process with the aim of fulfilling the requirement for EU membership, a reform package adopted in June and July 2004 made certain progress on the public administration as changing Framework Law on Public Sector Reform, a Law on Special Provincial Administration, as well as a Law on Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities. The reform on these four laws is instrumental to

convert Turkey's centralized, hierarchical administrative system into a decentralized, participatory, transparent one (European Commission, 2004: 21). Therefore, from the point of consolidation of democracy, this reform package on public administration is a quite important step as leading to build the "usable bureaucracy", a sine qua non requirement for consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, because the EU-demanded reform process in Turkey is neither completed nor implemented in a full sense, there are remaining problems from the point of the existence of usable bureaucracy. In this context, the bureaucratic problems, which the minority communities face in building their worship and training their clergies, and also the problems in the implementation of the legal amendment introducing the broadcasting and teaching in languages other than Turkish might be proposed as remaining problems originated from the highly centralized and over-institutionalized state machinery. These remaining problems clearly showed that Turkey needs to take certain progressive steps in order to build the usable bureaucracy and ensure the minority rights in the standards of the EU.

4.1.5 Economic Society

Linz and Stepan argue that in order to consolidate a given democracy, there must be an institutional economic society in which there exist a set of socio-political accepted norms, institutions, and regulations appropriately regulating state-market relations (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 11-12). From this point of this view, Turkey's EU transformation process is a golden chance to build an institutional economic society; because within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey is required to take certain progressive steps to eliminate the shortcomings embedded in Turkish economy which are obstacles to a well-functioning market economy in Turkey.

Moreover, within the context of EU accession process, Turkey is supposed to adopt some significant economic measures to increase the capacity of its economy to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. In this realm, since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, on the road of EU membership target, Turkey has accelerated its legal efforts to ensure the fully functioning market economy through adopting series of constitutional and legal amendments which eliminate the shortcomings in Turkish economy. The elimination of the legal barriers to the well-functioning economy has made contribution to the creation of an institutional economic society. In section below, the detail analysis of the constitutional and legislative amendments, made in Turkey with the intention of realizing long-standing aspiration for EU membership, is provided in order to assess the impact of Turkey's EU transformation process over the creation of an institutional economic society and even the prospect for consolidation of Turkish economy.

Within the context of Turkey's efforts to align the norms, institutions, and regulations of Turkish economy with the EU standards, the first constitutional amendment package adopted on 3 October 2001 included progressive changes on articles in the Turkish Constitutions of 1982 regulating norms and institutions of Turkish economy. In this vein, with the Constitutional amendment of 2001, the phrase in Article 46 "compensation" is replaced with the word "true compensation" with the intention of strengthening the property rights in Turkish legal system. Özbudun and Yazıcı argue that the added of "true compensation" has to be interpreted in a sense of the actual market value of the expropriated property (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004: 24). Thus, it is fair to argue that because this amendment is instrumental to strengthen the property rights in Turkey; with this amendment, Turkey's capacity to attract much more foreign direct investment has

considerably increased due to inclination of foreign investors to make investment in a given country in which the property rights are under the strong guarantee of the legal system. Moreover, the constitutional amendment enacted in August 13, 1999 brought about changes on Article 47 of the Constitution of 1982 in a way that a clear reference to privatization is made. Hence, thanks to this constitutional amendment; the legal obstacles to privatization of the state economic enterprise was ultimately removed (Özbudun, 2007: 188). As a result, in the period afterwards this constitutional amendment entry into the force, privatization has considerably increased in Turkey which made serious contribution to Turkey's target of achieving the macro-economic balances. Furthermore, the constitutional amendment package of 2001 brought about the legal change on Article 49 of the Constitution of 1982. As a result, with this amendment, the unemployed people began to be protected by the state (Özbudun, 2007: 188). Hence, this constitutional amendment is an important step to strengthen social equality and social justice in Turkey. Therefore, this legislative change would potentially affect the social order and social stability of Turkey in a positive way which would also make contribution to Turkey's process of consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, the constitutional amendment package of 2001 brought about legal amendments on Article 55 regulating the right to a fair wage in Turkey which added the phrase "the living conditions of the workers" as another criterion in determining the minimum wage in Turkey (Özbudun, 2007: 188). Hence, with this constitutional amendment, the economic rights of the lower income groups were enhanced which have potential of positively affecting the social justice in Turkey. In a nutshell, under the incentive of EU membership prospect, Turkey has accelerated its reform efforts in order to achieve the alignment of Turkish economy with the EU standards and norms. The constant reform efforts of Turkey to adopt the

EU-inspired reforms have the potential of contributing to build an institutional economic society which is a sine qua non criterion for consolidation of Turkish democracy. On the other hand, despite legal improvement strengthening the social state nature of the Republic; regional discrepancies, uneven economic distribution and widespread unemployment are the remaining economic problems which constitute impediments preventing the developments encouraging the economic society in Turkey. Moreover, high amount of current account deficit is also another remaining problem challenging the macro-economic stability in Turkey which might negatively affect the prospect of an institutional economic society in Turkey.

4.6 Conclusion: Democracy is not the only game in Turkey

To sum up, the analysis of the EU-inspired legislative and constitutional amendments of Turkey in the theoretical framework on the basis of the theory of consolidation of democracy clearly demonstrates that consolidation of democracy is not assured yet in Turkey despite of taken important steps through the adaptation of EU-related reforms which enhance "free and lively society", "relatively autonomous and valued political society", "the rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms", "the usable state bureaucracy", and "the institutional economic society". The remaining legal shortcomings and the problems with the implementation of the enacted reforms have clearly demonstrated that Turkey has to take further progressive steps in order to eliminate shortcomings embedded in its legal and political system which would ensure the consolidation of Turkish democracy. Moreover, the internalization and socialization of the enacted reforms by both the Turkish public and elites are the urgent necessities from the point consolidation of Turkish democracy because most of the problems of consolidation of democracy in Turkey stems from the

undemocratic attitudes and behaviors of the Turkish public and Turkish elites, rather than legal barriers on the way to consolidation of democracy. In this context, the interventionist stance of the Turkish armed forces into the political issues such as Presidential election crisis, the institutional resistance of the Kemalist judiciary to apply the EU-related reforms over the cases related to freedom of expression, and the rising PKK terrorism since the mid-2005 have been the par excellence examples displaying that the democratic norms, values and practices have been not internalized by the major segment of the Turkish society; so it is fair to argue that Turkish democracy has not been consolidated yet.

CONCLUSION

Although Turkey completed its first transition to democracy process in the year of 1950; more than fifty years, Turkish democracy has been not consolidated yet in an actual sense and it has been stagnated into the grey zone of the process of democratic consolidation between transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy due several endemic democratic deficits. In this vein, the omnipresent role of the Turkish military stemming from the mission of the vanguard guardian of the Kemalist regime; the interventionist stance of the Turkish armed forces regarding various issues which they considered fall into the scope of national security and also the chronic military takeovers when it deemed it is necessary to preserve the national security and social cohesion have been the major endemic democratic deficits of Turkish democracy hindering the developments to ensure consolidation of democracy (Özbudun, 2000; Müftüler, 1998; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007). Moreover; lively and vigorous, self supporting and autonomous civil society which is required for monitoring and limiting the state power, encouraging the political participation and even consolidation of democracy, has been inherently weak, passive and inefficient in Turkey (Diamond et. al., 1995; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007). Also, the election system in Turkey has been far from functioning to produce meaningful and extensive competition as restricting to full sense of effective political participation and representation (Özbudun, 2000; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). Furthermore, the absence of democratic culture among the state and political elites producing uncompromising political attitude is another major democratic deficit of Turkey

hindering the developments on the way to consolidation of democracy as causing to high level of political polarization which also adversely affect the political stability and consolidation of Turkish democracy (Özbudun, 2000). In this regard, this thesis argue that Turkey's peculiar internal factors and the legacy of history which are strong state tradition, center periphery cleavages, the deinstitutionalization of the party system, strict secularism understanding, and the high degree of autonomy of the military and its strong influence over politics were the major reasons behind the persistent democratic deficits of Turkish democracy. Hence these internal factors and unique historical legacy of Turkish democracy have been major reasons lying behind the persistent democratic deficits of Turkey; thus they are responsible for the stagnation of the Turkish democracy in the grey zone of the process of consolidation of democracy and also eventual regime breakdowns carried out the Turkish military. In this vein, Turkey's process of political Europeanization, in which Turkey endeavored to align its political and legal system with the EU standards, norms and procedures through adopting a set of constitutional and legal amendments in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, has been a golden chance to eliminate the major deficiencies of Turkish democracy. In this vein, in the fourth chapter, in order to assess the impact of political Europeanization of Turkey over consolidation of Turkish democracy, this thesis analyzed the constitutional and legislative amendments enacted in Turkey with the purpose of fulfilling the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria; while employing Linz and Stepan's definition of consolidation of democracy including "the free and lively society", "the political society", "the rule of law to ensure the citizens' freedom", " the usable state bureaucracy" and "the economic society" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 6-7). In the section below, the findings are provided:

From the point of "free and lively society", the weakness and inefficiency of Turkish civil society due to the Ottoman legacy of the strong state tradition and the Kemalist legacy of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state administration and also legal barriers embedded in Turkish legal system, have been the major obstacles preventing the developments ensuring the lively and robust civil society (Özbudun, 2000; Heper, 1992; Kubicek, 2005). On the other hand, the traditional weakness and inefficiency of civil society which were often attributed to the strong-state tradition in Turkey and the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of the early republican period, have began to disappear with the political Europeanization of Turkey in which Turkey attempted to reach the alignment of its political and legal system with the EU standards through adopting a number constitutional and legal amendments. In this context, constitutional amendments in the area of freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom assembly, and freedom of press, and also a new Law on Associations adopted in November 2004 and a new Penal Code in 2005 have created much more appropriate legal infrastructure for Turkish civil society to play further active roles in creating more inclusive and pluralist political system in Turkey as beginning to channelize more efficiently the interests of the Turkish public into the decision making mechanism. In this vein, as getting benefitted from the legal progress with respect to civil society and associational life, Turkish civil society organizations have become more vocal and better organized with increasing number and variety (European Commission, 2007). On the other hand, as in line with the argument of Kubicek, this thesis argues that time is needed for internalization and socialization of the legal improvements extending the freedoms to accorded to civil society organizations. Over time, the developments in the realm of free and lively society will make significant contribution to the prospect of consolidation of

democracy in Turkey as and if Turkish civil society organizations begin to internalize the legislative improvements and actively use the advantage of the adaptation of new laws regulating the activities of civil society organizations in a much more positive fashion such as giving permission to use financial funds provided by the organizations from abroad (Kubicek, 2005). Hence, thanks to Turkey's political Europeanization process, Turkish civil society has reached the potential to play the more active role in influencing decision making mechanism and shaping policies which has made significant contribution to both Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy and Turkey's quest for EU membership (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007; Öniş, 2006).

On the other hand, since the mid-the 2005, the endemic deficiencies of Turkish democracy in the realm of freedom of thought and expression have recently revitalized due to increasing institutional resistance to the implementation of democratic reforms despite the previous adopted legal reforms enhancing the quality of Turkish democracy. In this context, the prosecutors have begun to use the remaining illiberal legal codes of Turkish legal system in order to impose the restrictions on the freedom of expression, thought and press. For example, Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code has been actively used by the prosecutors to limit the freedom of thought and freedom of expression. In this context, Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink and Elif Şafak are the most famous examples who were prosecuted on ground of Article 301 of Turkish Penal. Those intellectuals faced with the charge of that they were insulting Turkishness and Turkish state and nation through their speeches and press (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007: 236). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the major part of the Turkish judiciary has preferred to apply the legal changes to the cases with a more restrictive interpretation that caused to the emergence of the

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barrier on the full implementation of the EU-inspired reforms. Therefore, the democratic reforms have remained on the book without efficient enforcement in the country which adversely affected Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy because in a great extent the consolidation of Turkish democracy depends on the full sense of implementation of the EU-inspired reforms that would help Turkey to create more inclusive, pluralist and efficient democratic regime in Turkey (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 78-80).

From the point of "relatively autonomous and valued political society", Turkey has had the certain advantage of experiencing representative democracy more than a half century since completing its first transition to democracy process in the year of 1950. Therefore, thanks to the fairly long history of experiencing the representative democracy, Turkey has been relatively more conducive to reach a consolidated democracy (Özbudun, 2000: 5). On the other hand, the omnipresent role and the interventionist stance of the Turkish military force stemming from the mission of vanguard guardian of the Kemalist regime; also the chronic military takeovers have been the major impediments hindering the developments strengthening the relatively autonomous and valued political society in Turkey. On the one hand, the EU-inspired reforms carried out in Turkey in the realm of civil-military relations affording to subordinate the military power to the civilian authority such as changing the duties and composition of the National Security Council in favor of civilians, eliminating influence of the military over the judiciary system through the removal of State Security Courts, the creation the budgetary transparency over the military expenditures as imposing the full parliamentary oversight upon the military spending, and the removal of all military representatives from the civilian boards, made certain contribution to the creation of the autonomous political society

while considerably curbing the power and influence of the military over the political sphere, education, art and broadcasting. On the other hand, as argued by Meltem Müftüler Bac, in Turkey the military's traditional omnipresent role and interventionist stance do not stem only from its power and influence on the institutions (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 27). Because of this reason, to make changes on institutional power of the military is not strongly enough to ensure democratic framework of civil-military relations in Turkey as proposed by the theory of consolidation of democracy. Thus, it is fair to argue that despite the progress in the field of the civil-military relations thanks to the adaptation of the EU-related reforms, the military in Turkey is not fully subordinated to the control of the civilians as seen in the presidential election process of 2007.

With respect to "relatively autonomous and valued political society", one of the progressive steps was taken through the adaptation of a constitutional package in October 2007 by the referendum. This constitutional amendment packages was prepared by the AKP government in May 2007 as a response to Presidential election crisis in April 2007 which introduces the election of the President by popular vote for a renewable term of five years, reduces the government's term staying in office from five to four years, lowers minimum age for a person to be elected to parliament from 30 to 25 years (European Commission, 2007: 6). These are all positive legal developments that are more likely to trigger the development of political society and eventually contributed to consolidation of democracy while increasing political accountability thanks to shortening the term of government and rising participation of people with lowering the minimum age to be eligible to be elected as a parliamentarian. On the other hand, it should be point out that from the perspective of the prospective developments enhancing the political society in Turkey, the ten

percent threshold in the general elections, required for political parties to enter into the Turkish Grand National Assembly, is the remaining legal barriers on the full sense of political participation and representation and it reasonable to demand to decrease the threshold in order to ensure optimal representation and to motivate political participation (European Commission, 2007: 6-7).

From the point of "The Rule of Law Ensuring Legal Guarantees for Fundamental Rights and Liberties", Turkey have had an advantage of having a fairly long history of constitutionalism and the rule of law, their historical roots went back to the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 in the Ottoman Empire era. Thus, the situation of the rule of law in Turkey has been fairly more conducive to make contribution to the consolidation of democracy (Özbudun, 1996: 6-7). Also, within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey enacted serious reforms on the institutions which previously created the barrier to enforcement of the universal principles and norms of the rule of law. In this vein, the State Security Courts and the State of Emergency were eventually removed in Turkey with the intention of enhancing the quality of "the rule of law" in accordance with the EU standards.

From the point of "the usable state bureaucracy"; first of all, it should be pointed out that democratic consolidation is not only undermined by the inefficiency of the state, but also by the over-institutionalized state apparatus and public bureaucracy coupled with the strong state tradition that impedes to consolidation of democracy as hindering the development of the democratic values among political actors (Özbudun, 2000: 7). Because Turkey is a par excellence example of a "strong state" in which extreme importance is attributed to the survival and wellbeing of the state and also the extreme sensitivity exists regarding the notion of state sovereignty; Turkey has been experiencing serious difficulties in consolidating its democracy. In

this context, as directly related to the over-institutionalized state apparatus and public bureaucracy as a consequence of the strong state tradition in Turkey; in the period before the start of the political Europeanization, human rights violations and shortcomings in treatment of minorities are very common in Turkey. In this context, it should be pointed out that the major reasons behind the widespread human rights violations and shortcomings in treatment of minorities were the worse security conditions of Turkey due to terrorist activities of the PKK on the basis of the militant Kurdish nationalism and the Sevres syndrome embedded in the cognitive map of the state bureaucracy fuelling the fear of dissolution of the territorial integrity of Turkey. On the other hand, thanks to the EU anchor and also the improvements in security conditions with the arrest of the head of the terrorist organization, Turkey took certain progressive steps in terms of eliminating human rights violations, enlarging the scope of the fundamental rights and freedoms and also extending cultural rights of minorities. This situation has manifested that state apparatus and public bureaucracy have been losing power; therefore, Turkey has moving toward achieving more usable state bureaucracy which is sine qua non condition for consolidation of democracy.

Moreover, with respect to "usable state bureaucracy", within the context of the political Europeanization, Turkey took certain steps to increase the efficiency of the public administration through adopting legislative amendments. In this vein, as a part of the recent democratic reform process with the aim of fulfilling the requirement for EU membership, a reform package were adopted in June and July 2004 which brought about certain legislative progresses on the public administration as changing Framework Law on Public Sector Reform, a Law on Special Provincial Administration, as well as a Law on Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities.

As stated by the European Commission, the reform on these four laws is instrumental to convert Turkey's centralized, hierarchical administrative system into a decentralized, participatory, transparent one (European Commission, 2004: 21). Therefore, from the point of the consolidation of democracy, this reform package concerning the public administration in Turkey is a quite important step leading to build the "usable bureaucracy", a sine qua non requirement for consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, because the EU-demanded reform process in Turkey is neither completed nor implemented in a full sense, there are remaining problems from the point of the existence of usable bureaucracy. In this context, the bureaucratic problems, which the minority communities face in building their worship and training their clergies, and also the problems in the implementation of the legal amendment introducing the broadcasting and teaching in languages other than Turkish, might be proposed as the remaining problems originated from the highly centralized and over-institutionalized state machinery which is fuelled by the Sevres Syndrome embedded in the cognitive map of the state bureaucracy and the worsening security condition since the mid-2005 with the resurgence of the PKK terrorism. These remaining problems clearly showed that Turkey needs to take certain progressive steps in order to build the more usable bureaucracy that ensures the minority rights in Turkey in accordance with the standards of the EU.

From the point of "the institutional economic society", Turkey's EU transformation process is a golden chance to build an institutional economic society; because within the context of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey is required to take certain progressive steps to eliminate the shortcomings embedded in Turkish economy which are obstacles to a well-functioning market economy in Turkey. Moreover, within the scope of EU accession process, Turkey is supposed to adopt

some significant economic measures to increase the capacity of its economy in order to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union. In this realm, since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, on the road of EU membership target, Turkey has accelerated its legal efforts to ensure the fully functioning market economy through adopting series of constitutional and legal amendments which eliminated the shortcomings in Turkish economy. The elimination of the legal barriers to the well-functioning economy has made contribution to the creation of an institutional economic society. In this vein, the legislative and constitutional amendments brought legal changes on legal codes related to expropriation, privatization, the right to work, and the right to a fair wage which strengthened the property rights, well functioning of market, the attraction of Turkey from the standpoint of the foreign investors and also the social state nature of the Republic. Hence, it fair to argue that the constant reform efforts of Turkey to align its economy with the EU standards have the potential of contributing to build an institutional economic society which is a sine qua non criterion for consolidation of Turkish democracy.

On the other hand; despite legal improvement strengthening the social state nature of the Republic, regional discrepancies, uneven economic distribution and widespread unemployment are the remaining economic problems which constitute impediments preventing the developments contributing the development of the institutional economic society in Turkey. Moreover, the high amount of current account deficit is also another remaining problem challenging the macro-economic stability in Turkey which might negatively affect the prospect of an institutional economic society in Turkey. Hence, the EU anchor alone is not sufficiently strong to solve the structural problems of Turkish economy; so Turkey needs to take further

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steps to solve the problems of social inequality, regional discrepancies which are required for both political and social stability of Turkey and even for increasing the prospect for consolidation of Turkish democracy.

To sum up, with the analysis of the EU-inspired legislative and constitutional amendments of Turkey in the theoretical framework on the basis of the theory of consolidation of democracy, this thesis reached the conclusion of that consolidation of democracy is not yet assured in Turkey despite of taken important steps through adaptation of EU-related reforms which enhance "free and lively society", "relatively autonomous and valued political society"; "the rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms", "the usable state bureaucracy"; and "the institutional economic society". The remaining legal shortcomings and the problems with the implementation of the enacted reforms have clearly demonstrated that Turkey has to take further progressive steps in order to eliminate shortcomings embedded in its legal and political system which would ensure the consolidation of Turkish democracy. Moreover, the internalization and socialization of the enacted reforms by both the Turkish public and elites are the urgent necessities from the point consolidation of Turkish democracy because most of the problems of consolidation of democracy in Turkey stems from the undemocratic attitude and behavior of the Turkish public and Turkish elites, rather than legal barriers on the way to consolidation of democracy. In this context, the interventionist stance of the Turkish armed forces into the political issues like in the case of the Presidential election crisis, the institutional resistance of the Kemalist judiciary to apply the EU-related reforms over the cases related to freedom of expression and freedom of thought, and the rising PKK terrorism have been the par excellence examples displaying that the democratic norms, values and practices have not been internalized by the major

segment of the Turkish society. Moreover, it should be pointed out that these problems in Turkish democracy came to the sphere since the EU anchor has lost its credibility in Turkish context because of the more emphasized open-ended ended nature of accession talks, the ambivalent signals sent by the EU member states with respect to Turkey's possible EU membership on the ground non-Copenhagen criteria, non-reciprocal demands of the EU regarding the Cyprus issue; the criminalization of denial of so-called Armenian genocide by the French Parliament and the decision of the French parliament to hold a referendum for Turkey's entry into the EU (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007).

Although the process of consolidation of democracy under the EU membership incentive is far from being completed, due to remaining legal shortcomings and the problems with the implementation of the enacted reforms; no one can deny the importance of the EU-related reform process from the point of consolidation of Turkish democracy. Thanks to the EU anchor and the concrete EU membership prospect for Turkey, the democratic reforms were adopted in Turkey with respect to some sensitive areas that would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor (Kubicek, 2005; Öniş, 2004). For instance, to make reform on the civil-military relations and minority rights was seen as taboo in the period before the start of the political Europeanization process of Turkey because of the prevailing fear of the possibility of territorial disintegration and partition of Turkish territory along the line of ethnic divergence, called as Sevres Syndrome (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 80). Hence, the EU anchor is one of the major explanatory variables catalyzing domestic transformation in Turkey in accordance with the EU standards, norms and procedures (Narbonne and Tocci, 2007). Also, it should be pointed out that the success of the EU anchor triggering the

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democratic reform process of Turkey is directly contingent on the EU's positive stance towards Turkey's bid for EU membership. The slowdown in the adaptation of the further EU-related reforms and the institutional resistance towards the implementation of EU-inspired reforms have clearly showed that as the credibility of the EU's system transforming impact on the basis of the EU membership conditionality has decreased due to uncertainty surrounding the end result of accession talks between Turkey and the EU, Turkey's both social and political reformist zeal has been considerably tarnished.

However, this is the fact that Turkey needs to implement the EU-inspired reforms in a more effective and efficient way in order to eliminate its deficiency in the field of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minority rights which would ensure the internalization of the democratic norms, values and practices by the major segment of the Turkish society (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007). In this context, to maintain the support of the Turkish society for Turkey's aspiration for EU membership is necessary for further EU-demanded reforms and the full sense of the implementation of the enacted reforms within the context of fulfilling requirements of the Copenhagen political criteria. Moreover, the socialization of the democratic norms and procedures depends a great extent on both the implementation of the reforms effectively and also the will of the public to internalize these reforms; otherwise the enacted reforms remained on the book without contributing to Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007: 83). Furthermore, to maintain the supports of the EU member states for Turkey's eventual EU membership are also crucial for the continuity of Turkey's political Europeanization because Turkey's further reform performance is largely contingent on the credibility of EU's system transforming impact stemming

from EU membership conditionality (Balcer, 2007). It is certain that there exist remaining doubts and fears in Turkish politics about the prospect of Turkey's accession to the EU because of more emphasized open-ended nature of the accession process and also the existence of absorption capacity of the EU as a criterion determining the eventual accession of Turkey to the EU. The ongoing uncertainty surrounding the end result of accession negotiations is the major reason lying behind the recent slowdown in the reform energy of Turkey as fueling the persistent fear in Turkey that the EU would turn its cold face to Turkey despite of the Turkey's impressive performance in carrying out the EU-induced reforms and in enforcing these reforms in a full sense. Moreover, the reluctance of the EU member states to put strong determination in favor of Turkey's membership in the EU caused to anti-EU nationalist backlash which has adversely affected Turkey's process of consolidating its democracy (Patton, 2007). In this vein, this is the responsibility of the EU to explicitly display its will to employ objective criteria in evaluating Turkey's EU membership prospect for the sake of the democratic consolidation of Turkish democracy through the adaptation of the EU-related reforms (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit, 2007: 84).

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