

**THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON
JAPANESE CITIZENSHIP**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

Globalization is a new outreaching form of governance that affects all economical, political, social and cultural spheres of nation-states. It has become an important transformative force in re-shaping these spheres at the state level. There are different actions and reactions on globalization's transformative power in different national contexts. Each state has its own respond closely related to its social, economic, political and cultural positioning in the world. Thus there is no single way of dealing with globalization's transformation process but many. This research focuses on the impact of globalization on Japanese citizenship. The dilemma that this research addresses is the gap between Japanese states insistence on the ethnic homogeneity myth versus the demands for recognition and rights coming from minority groups within Japan.

Keywords:

Globalization, citizenship, Japanese citizenship, minorities in Japan.

ÖZET

Kuresellesme ulusdevletlerin ekonomik, siyasal, toplumsal ve kültürel olmak üzere tüm alanlarını etkileyen bir yönetim sistemidir. Kuresellesme devlet düzeyinde bu alanların yeniden şekillenmesinde önemli bir değiştirici güç haline gelmiştir. Değişik ulusal kontekstlerde kuresellesmenin değişimsel gücüne karşı farklı yaklaşımlar ve tepkiler bulunmaktadır. Her devlet, dünyadaki toplumsal, ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel durumuna göre kendi yaklaşımını geliştirmiştir. Dolayısıyla kuresellesmenin değişimci gücüyle baş etmenin bir değil, birçok farklı yolu vardır. Bu araştırma, kuresellesmenin Japon Vatandaşlığı üzerindeki etkisine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu araştırma Japon devletinin etnik homojenite mitindeki ısrarına karşı Japonya’da yaşayan azınlıkların hak ve özgürlük taleplerini ele almaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Kuresellesme, vatandaşlık, Japon vatandaşlığı, Japonya daki azınlıklar.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this research I had a whole different conception of governance, globalization and citizenship. As I advanced through the research and as I moved to Japan in April 2008, I have academically grown to understand that my mindset had so far been limited to a Western and especially a European point of view. Living so close to the European Union had a blinding effect on my political ideas and views during my studies in Turkey. Living in Asia and having the opportunity of meeting and chatting with ordinary Asian people has allowed me to broaden my academic view. The differentiation that I would like to make between my past mindset and the present will be especially evident in the next chapter with reference to notions of citizenship, nation, race and ethnicity.

Japanese citizenship has become a hot topic in East Asian studies mainly due to Japan's changing internal dynamics and international influences of globalization. The two main problems Japan is facing internally are the decreasing population problem and minority groups asking for more rights. On the one hand Japanese population is decreasing due to the dropping birthrate on the other hand the number of foreigners in Japan is increasing due to the facilitation of people's movement under globalization. Theoretically this should form an equation in balancing the population problem in Japan however minority groups and foreigners are having difficulties coping with the institutionalized social discrimination in

Japan. There are attempts to overcome discrimination tendencies with the support of channels created and organizations empowered by the process of globalization such as international organizations and local civil society organizations.

Japan is in need for a larger working population however due to the exclusive characteristics of Japanese citizenship based on bloodlines this need cannot be fulfilled by immigrants. Furthermore even if citizenship is granted in legal terms, this doesn't guarantee social acceptance or end of discrimination. There are many different minority groups in Japan with different characteristics, all these minority groups are facing diverse problems and are all struggling against one specific problem, social discrimination fuelled by the state's citizenship. This research aims to analyze the relationship between the Japanese state and these minority groups under the transformative power of globalization with reference to empowerment of people and universality of human rights.

1.1 Japan's Population Problem

The declining marriages and birth rate is becoming an immense problem for Japan with the social welfare system, and the labor market problem due to the aging population. On the one hand unemployment rates for the age group 15-24 were 10.4% for men and 8.7 for women year 2001. On the other hand Japan is a rapidly aging society and has the highest level of life expectancy in the world 78.4 for men and 85 for women (Takenaka & Rebick, 2006: 6). The declining birthrate has been reflected on the family and the average numbers of household members have decreased. Although the rate for the maintenance of population is 2.1 this rate was only 1.29 in Japan, in 2004 and it has been below the required levels since

1990. The declining birthrate is one of the direct outcomes of dropping levels of marriage as childrearing outside a marriage is quite uncommon (Takenaka & Rebick, 2006: 7).

In Japan there is pressure from both the society and the state to increase the rate of marriage and childbirth. The traditional duty for the continuation of the households and *ie* system which will be explained in chapter 1 is emphasized within society especially by the elderly. In Japan today, average age for marriage is 29,6 for men and 27,8 for women. And according to the 2005 census only 41% of women in the 25-29 age group were married compared to 76% in 1980¹. So there is a decline in marriage rate especially for Japanese women. The declining marriage rate is linked to modernity and women's' rising expectations based on their increased education level. However education presents a two way disadvantage for women in modern societies and in Japan, on the one hand finding a more educated husband becomes difficult, on the other hand education takes time which brings aging and narrows down choices of husband. Social reasons have also been effective in the lowering of birth-rates in Japan as the number of Japanese females getting married to foreigners or leaving the country has increased especially in the last decade. Marriage with a foreigner from a society where hierarchical relations are weaker than in Japan is becoming more appealing for Japanese women as well as opportunity for equal work and better pay opportunities overseas.

The declining marriage rates and birthrates in Japan can also be explained by difficulties for women to balance their life between work and family. In Japanese society, women have the disadvantage of being assumed to leave work as they would get marry or have children. Thus getting married limits Japanese

¹ <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/2005/poj/pdf/2005ch03.pdf>

women's career goals and presents a social security threat of being a housewife dependent on the husband. Lately the legal process of divorce has been facilitated in Japan, so women who quit their work in order to get married could be left without any social security in case of a future divorce (Takenaka and Rebick, 2006). Therefore, the possible economic opportunity cost for women to leave work has increased. As women's level of education as well as their rights has risen, their earnings at the workplace have also increased. Thus the opportunity cost of leaving work to establish a family has also risen (Takenaka and Rebick, 2006: 8).

Takenaka and Rebick (2006: 8) argue that there are also psychological factors that have caused the declining marriage rate for Japanese women, for example the perceived loss of freedom, as working single women have the liberty to spend all their earnings on themselves. This is an interesting argument, for example one of my Turkish friends living in Japan is married to a Japanese citizen and although my Turkish friend makes about 3 times the money that she makes, they share the rent half in half. Thus, living with the parents is more advantageous for Japanese women as they don't have to share living costs such as rent or bills and they are free to spend all their earnings on themselves. Marriage implies the burden of household management for Japanese women and as gender roles are clearly defined in Japanese society, the wife has to take care of the husband even if they have same long working hours. Furthermore having a child implies renouncing retirement plan for the future to take care of the child. Thus these are main reasons why marriage has become disadvantageous for Japanese women and has led to the drop of the birthrate in Japan.


Marriage also poses similar pressures on men: first of all, it's an enormous burden economically from the beginning. Edwards (1987) underlines that even

though the expensive wedding is assumed to be covered by the parents, marriage implies establishing a new home and having an economically dependent wife, which usually is the case in Japan. Even further, having children becomes an extra economic burden to work more and earn money for the sake of the family. In Japanese society this would mean longer working hours for the man to support a family that he would be seeing less. As in some cases he might even have to move to another city to keep his work but the family might not be able to follow him to the new city. This is a quite common practice in Japan for the father to live in another city and to see the family only about once a month (Takenaka and Rebeck, 2006: 51). Thus getting married in Japan has many disadvantages for both men and women. This sheds light on why the marriage rate and consequently the birth rate have dropped in Japan recently (Mathews and White, 2004: 67-81).

The changing family system in Japan is linked to modernity and globalization because it's the direct outcome of globalizations economic and social impacts on Japanese lifestyles. Companies can no longer remain local and isolated thus Japanese men have to re-allocate for the sake of keeping their work. On the other hand women are more aware of events around the world, have higher life standard expectations due to access to information and high levels of education (Gordon Mathews and Bruce White, 2004).

The table below demonstrates the equation of Japanese citizens leaving Japan and foreigners entering Japan. The increased gap between these two demonstrate to a great extent the need for Japan to adopt to changing conditions under globalizations impact.

Figure 1: Number of foreigners entering Japan in comparison with the number of Japanese citizens leaving Japan (1980 - 2004)



Source: The ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau²

The dropping rate of marriages and birthrate in Japan are linked to rights of immigrants and minorities in Japan because there is a need for population to work for the Japanese economy. The Japanese Development Bank and The Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) estimate a labor shortage of about 6 million people by 2025 despite the inflow of immigrants. (Reyes-ruiz, 2007). These numbers imply that Japan has to adopt to changing conditions under the impact of globalization and will have to revise its citizenship policies in order to keep its economy running and to meet its populatin needs.

1.2 Aging Population and Pensions

The situation of the declining birthrate has created a dilemma for the government, on the one hand they need workforce and could benefit from the women in the

² <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>

workforce but on the other hand they want to boost birthrates. The declining birthrate has reached such a level that the government is attempting to intervene in order to burst child rearing by plans such as the *kodomo, kosodate ooen* plan. Their main aim is to promote marriages and encourage childrearing (Takenaka and Rebick, 2006: 10). As women are moving to outside of home employment the government is adopting by encouraging childcare facilities at the work place and maternal leaves. Thus women's place is shifting from home to the workplace although only until recently women were to work home or at the family business only (Takenaka and Rebick, 2006: 10-2). Nowadays, childrearing in Japan is being encouraged to such an extent that we even observe the increasing of rights for nurturing fathers who are also allowed to have child leave. Thus, there is an attempt to boost birthrates by encouraging cooperation of couples in child rearing (Suzuki, 2006). The main problematic is that Japan is aware of its need for a larger population but still is insistent on bloodlines and off springs of wajin rather than minority groups. Restrictions of social and political rights to citizens persist although there is a large number of minorities demanding for more.

1.3 Globalization's Impact on Japan and its Minorities

The present dominant academic literature on Japanese citizenship and multiculturalism emphasizes the denial of the myth of ethnically homogeneous Japanese nation. This myth dates back from the creation of the central Japanese state during the Meiji Restoration. This framework reflects the political stand of the Japanese state which is denial of the multicultural nature of the population living in Japan with reference to immigrant groups, ethnic minorities and their struggle for

economic, social and political rights (Hendry, 1987: Miyajima, 1997: Nish, 2000: Reyes-ruiz, 2007: Ryang, 2005: Scully, 2002: Sellek, 1994: Siddle, 1997: Suzuki K., 2003: Suzuki T. , 2006: Tsuda, 2001: Weiner, 1997). However there is difference among the views expressed under this topic, while some academicians such as Wetherall (2008) argue that Japan's population is homogeneous compared to other countries, the dominant view is that the denial off all minority groups in Japan has gone too far and has become irrelevant in today's globalized world.

Globalization is a new outreaching form of governance that affects all economical, political, social and cultural spheres of nation-states. Unfortunately being a process without an architect, there are no control mechanisms to prevent the damage it causes in these spheres. Globalization is having a great impact on citizenship and nationality in both positive and negative terms depending on ones' positioning. In terms of negative impact arguments, the 1980's have been marked by the literature on the states possible loss of power, especially in the economic sphere. In terms of positive impacts arguments, the facilitation of communication and travel are emphasized.

The main crisis that was caused by globalization was the questioning of the nation states power and the newly arising limitations on the state. These reservations have led to further concerns on global governance and whether the state was going to be replaced. However, today the debate has reached a maturity level and there is quite wide consensus and emphasis on globalizations transformative power rather than a possibility of states' replacement. Within this transformation process, there are power shifts within certain spheres however the main challenge still relies in the transformation process itself.

There are different actions and reactions on globalizations' transformative power in different national contexts. Each state has its own respond closely related with its social, economic, political and cultural positioning in the world. Thus there is no single way of dealing with globalizations transformation process but many (Berger and Huntington, 2002). And this research mainly focuses on the case of Japan and how it has been dealing with the transformative force of globalization. Although this transformation force led to very fruitful and popular debates in the economic sphere, this research focuses on political and social aspects. The aim of this research is to outline globalizations' transformative influence on Japanese citizenship with reference to its impact on Japanese culture and state policies.

Globalizations most significant social impact has been the increase and facilitation of circulation of ideas, increased universality of human rights. This is especially observed through the increased interaction of states and empowerment of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) in regulating their intensified relations. The empowerment of NGO's through globalizations transformative force has led to the questioning of the state powers frontiers mainly due to the NGO's stress on rights and the rivalry of international conventions and agreements with national laws. There many diversified spheres of rights and different levels of organization and some bodies have become powerful in specific spheres, for example NGO's working on Human Rights are associated with the United Nations (UN) and UN Conventions, whereas right of laborers are associated with International Labor Organization (ILO).

These developments have led to a crucial question: how far can globalization reach? This research focuses on social and political rights under citizenship and presents analysis of the Japanese case and asks the following

question: How much longer can the Japanese State insist on the homogeneous ethnic nation myth? Is this myth condemned to dissolve in globalizations transformative process? Or will it prove to be the nation states last castle to survive? Furthermore, this case study leads us to the following dilemma: can international norms reach out right to the heart of nation states and intervene in national identity? Or on the other hand, is it ethical to allow the continuation of Japan's homogeneous ethnicity myth at the expense of all minority groups living in Japan?

1.4 Structure

This research aims at elaborating on above cited questions even if not answering them completely. The next section of this research, chapter 2 emphasizes on notions of globalization and citizenship and elaborates on the foundations of these terms in order to illustrate how they are related with references to the Japanese case. This section will also present a broader introduction to the impact of globalization on Japan in general on social and economic terms. Chapter 3 aims at tracing the roots of globalizations impact on Japan with reference to its three main modernization periods from Meiji restoration onwards. This chapter aims to present the essence of Japanese citizenship through its historical development for the foundation of a better understanding on “what?” globalization has transformed. The next chapter summarizes the multicultural nature of Japan with reference to ethnic minorities, outcasts and immigrants. This section aims to outline contemporary rights of these minority groups and their place in the Japanese population. Chapter 5 elaborates on the contemporary problems of minorities outlined in chapter 4 in

order to explain to a great extent why this research topic has become more important in contemporary Japan and provides information on the extent of globalizations impact on Japanese society. And lastly chapter 5 as the conclusion summarizes and elaborates upon the findings outlined in the previous chapters.

1.5 Methodology

The beginning of this research was unfortunately marked by the limitation of resources on Japan available in Turkey. However my short field research in Japan in March 2007 and my move to Japan after April 2008 have enriched it. I also had the opportunity to interact with academicians from all around the world at the Japanese Studies Association of Australia's Biennial Conference in Canberra in June 2007 and the American Sociological Association's Conference in New York in August 2007. My acquaintances during these conferences and the presentations I have listened to have also provided me with inspiration. I'm grateful to Koc University for providing me partial funds for my travels to these conferences.

The aim of this research was to blend qualitative and quantitative data with academic literature on the topic in order to provide a complete research. In terms of literature review although the resources on the topic are limited in Turkey, I had the opportunity to use Waseda University's library in Tokyo from April 2008 onwards as I was a research student with Japanese government scholarship in Japan. Waseda Library is one of the largest libraries in Japan and has been very useful in providing me with different resources and points of view while finalizing my dissertation.

In terms of field research, I have conducted a field research of three weeks in Japan in March 2007. During this period I have travelled around Japan as much

as I could in a very limited period of time, only twenty one days. I have been to; Sapporo, Iwate-ken, Tokyo, Kyoto, Nara, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima and Miyajima which sums up to about 1600km. I am grateful to Koc University for the partial fund which covered my Japanese Railways Pass that I used to travel within Japan by train and shinkansen (bullet train).

My field research in Japan in 2007 started in Sapporo which is in the northern part of Japan in the Hokkaido region. I chose Sapporo because it is the largest city at the homeland of the Ainu minority in Japan. In Sapporo, have been to the Ainu museum and most of the visuals in this research are from my visit to this museum. I have also arranged a meeting at the Ainu Association and conducted an interview with the secretary general of the association. The interview was one on one with open-ended questions. I also refer to this interview in the section on Ainu minority in Japan. This interview was fruitful in terms of understanding the functioning of civil society and perception of the Ainu minority in Japan.

After visiting Sapporo, I have travelled to Kyoto and Osaka which are located in the Kansai region bearing the highest number of foreign minorities in Japan with almost 17% foreign population. However it is important to note that this number also includes a large amount of Korean descendants who were born and raised in Japan but haven't acquired Japanese citizenship. I have tried to arrange an interview with the Korean Associations in the region prior to my travel, however my e-mails remained unanswered. I also went to their main offices while in Tokyo but was ignored once more. This was also an experience to incorporate in my research as it demonstrated the extent of the conservatism of the Korean society in Japan. They are not interested in informing other people about their conditions,

they are focused on gaining rights from the government and are closed to communication with other parties. This also became much clearer to me throughout my research. Quite interestingly, during my literature review I have noticed that most of the researchers working on the Korean minority in Japan are either from Korean descent or married to a Korean descendant.

One of the most productive parts of my research was my visit to the Osaka Human Rights Museum in the city of Osaka which is also in the Kansai region. My visit to this research allowed me to become aware of the differences in perception of minorities in different parts of Japan. The high number of foreign resident in Osaka had an impact on the perception of the term of minority within Osaka and the Kansai region.

Throughout my travel in Japan and since my move to Tokyo in April 2008 I have talked to many foreigners and Japanese about my research and received valuable feedback in return, I have also tried to incorporate these experiences in the research in order to provide a better understanding of my research.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN JAPAN

Nationalism and citizenship are crucial ingredients of nation state building, however their credibility and reliability seems to be gravely affected by the cosmopolitan ideas projected by globalization. These are concepts closely related to state and state power however, under the impact of globalization; borders between their spheres have become blurred to a larger extent and their definitions and conceptualization are being transformed.

2.1 Citizenship and Nationalism in Japan

Nationalism and citizenship are two different concepts that have very blurred limits and broad definitions and are often being misused interchangeably. In order to present a more comprehensive literature review, I will first refer to citizenship theories since its one of the main concepts under discussion and then refer to nationalism with reference to the nature of Japanese citizenship.

2.1.1 Theories of Citizenship

The notion of citizenship has its origins in ancient Greece and can be traced back to Greek Stoic philosophers however the meaning and definition of citizenship has come a long way since its evolution with Roman natural law and social contract theory since 17th century (Faulks, 2000: 15).

Citizenship by its origin in Ancient Greece was exclusionary as it involved people living in a city and then in a state through this city. A major turning point for citizenship was the creation of the Westphalia system in the 17th century through which the international system of nation-states was created. And according to Reinhard Bendix citizenship has become a means of nationalism after this process (Faulks, 2000).

The social contract theories are founding blocks for the notion of citizenship as they were formulated with reference to regulating relations between men and authority which has later become citizens and the state. There are three main figures in the development of the Social Contract theory in the western liberal thought; Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes has contributed to the literature with his formulation of the social contract in his book the Leviathan. According to which, men are in the state of nature where it's every man against every man, there is no authority and anarchy prevails. In such a chaotic situation the main aim of all men is "self-preservation". And this chaotic situation ends with the emergence of a leader and the formulation of a social contract. According to this social contract theory, men that form the society give in all their rights to the sovereign in return for the guarantee of security (Hobbes, 1981).

As another social contract theorist, Locke has developed the theory to include the right to own “property” which would be added in natural rights. Thus under this framework no one’s belongingness could be taken away arbitrarily and the authority that results from the social contract guarantees that. And lastly, Jean Jacques Rousseau has taken the social contract theory one step further with his emphasis on popular sovereignty and “general will” (Faulks, 2000). Here he refers to the relations among men. With the formation of the social contract men will make the rules all together and everyone will obey them. Thus they would have formed the general will.

Faulks (2000: 26-8) argues that most significant factors that have affected the development of citizenship are as follows: social movements, ideologies, economic factors and the changing nature of the liberal state itself. An important remark that Faulks makes is that the French revolution in 1789 was a turning point because it fused state and nation together. He refers to the work of Habermas in terms of how the French Revolution is more radical in terms of its conception of citizenship and argues that the nature of the French Revolution is one of the reasons why the conservative political scientist Burke has given his consent to the American Revolution but not to the French revolution.

There are two basic systems of citizenship: these are *jus soli* and *jus sanguine* which are also referred to as civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Gellner, 1983). Basically, the first means citizenship based on land as “soli” means soil in Latin whereas the latter refers to citizenship based on blood ties as “sanguine” means blood in Latin. Today with increased and facilitated movement of people through globalization, we mostly observe a mixture of these two in states. But in classical terms *Jus sanguine* which is also referred to as ethnic citizenship is

usually defined through the examples of Germany, Italy and Japan (Miyajima, 1997: 126) and is more common in Europe (Icduygu, 1996: 157). Whereas *jus soli* is usually defined through the example of France or states with high levels of immigrants such as the United States, Canada and Australia. And it refers to the development of a sense of obligation amongst the members of the polity, doesn't rely on cultural unity. *Jus soli* is defined as "constitutional patriotism" by Habermas which is a post national model of citizenship for which the sole criteria for membership is residence thus it can also be explained this post national model of citizenship.

This differentiation becomes especially significant with reference to the situation of immigrants within the legal arena. In the civic nationalism systems like the US, Canada or Australia immigrants can be granted citizenship more easily whereas in ethnic citizenship countries they could be referred to as guest-workers all their lives as the case of Turkish workers in Germany Denial of citizenship provides the state with the freedom for space to maneuver in order to deport these immigrants in case they are no longer necessary for the workforce and if they are demanding more rights (Icduygu, 1996: 153; Kadioglu, 1992: 199-202).

Tilly's differentiation between thin and thick citizenship with reference to thin citizenship entailing less rights and obligations when compared to thick citizenship (Tilly, 1996). Or, Giddens' 'duality of structure' theory which refers to the mutual dependency of individual agency and social practices. The states surveillance over its citizens has grown and widened with public education, court system and parliament. However greater state power also means the creation of new channels that can be used to for social movements. Shift from the state reliance on force to consensual means thus Giddens proposes a third-way to govern

in order to avoid the state-ism of socialism and market fundamentalism of neo-liberalism.

Kymlicka (1995) emphasizes on the importance of culture in a person's identity and how minority rights should be protected from the majority, he also further argues that state and ethnicity should be separated as the state and church had been separated. As appealing as that might sound, as Faulks (2000) points out this is a very difficult task to accomplish. Further more Faulks argues that Kymlicka uses the term culture interchangeably with 'nation and people' and that this is problematic.

Oommen (1997: 34-5) differentiates between three entities of individuals under a state: full-fledged citizens, nominal citizens and non-citizens. And defines nationality and ethnicity as group identities whereas citizenship as an individual identity. However this differentiation seems problematic as citizenship is more about the state rather than the individual, the individual is given the citizenship by the state and doesn't always have the right to choose citizenship, might not be granted the citizenship s/he desires. However identities, ethnicity and nationalism are concepts that that must be taken into account when citizenship is under debate.

There are many different classifications and debates on ethnicity and nationalism within the academia. For example Anthony Smith outlines six characteristics of an ethnie: collective name, common myth of descent, shared history, distinctive shared culture, association with specific territory and a sense of solidarity. However, Oommen criticizes the definition provided by Smith based on the argument that the distinction between nation and ethnie, thus nationality and ethnicity, are too vague. On the other hand in terms of differentiating between nation and ethnie, Eriksen introduces the differentiation as insiders and outsiders and

argues that ethnies can only survive if they succeed in establishing their own states. Whereas Horowitz adopts an other approach through which ethnicity incorporates groups differentiated by colour, language and religion (Faulks, 2000). Different from these points, according to Komai (2006) who is Japanese academician; people, volk, signifies a group sharing common language, culture and history whereas nation simply refers to the sum of people who make up a nation state, this is a much more incorporating definition.

Oommen's (1997) work presents a different view from western conceptualism of nationalism and adopts an effective critical viewpoint towards the western conceptualization of the terms nation, nationality, ethnicity and citizenship. Oommen emphasizes on the importance to balance the relation between citizenship and national identity; citizenship as the membership and participation in a polity and national identity as affiliation and internality to a society. This is an important distinction to make especially with reference to immigrants and foreigners who acquire citizenship, this is also closely linked to the Japanese case and underlines one of the main problematics in Japanese citizenship. According to Oommen imbalance between these two notions lead collective identity to become a source of deprivation. Oommen also remarks that this is often reflected through the mistaken use of the terms nation and state with reference to citizenship; for example citizens being referred to as "nationals" as well as states being referred to as "nations"³. This usage is often found in mass media, interstate organizations as well as academic writings. Oommen finds this usage problematic and refers to Karl Deutsch's definition of nation which according to Oommen omits many existing

³ He refers to news items such as "Indian national honored in Germany" as a reference to the usage instead of citizen and the news article "51 nation meet on European security" with reference to the use in the meaning of state (Oommen, 1997: 14)

nations from this category. Oommen has a quite distinctive mindset on the notions of nation and nationality, he criticizes Gellner's theory with the argument that not all nations seek to create their own state and refers to states in the Indian Union. Minorities in Japan can also be discussed under this framework, as there are no independence movements, most of the discontent is based on demand for cultural recognition and equal human rights.

This leads us to the next differentiation put forward by Rejai and Enloe who argue that differentiation between ethnic nationalism and state nationalism is important due to the multi-layered nature of identity and low tolerance of multiculturalism in some countries. Their theory is explanatory in understanding the low tolerance for multiculturalism in Japan due to the states nationalist policy. The state policy in Japan is close to the definition provided by Walker Connor who emphasizes homogeneity and assimilation carried on by the state, in a nut shell defined as; citizens should be nationals and they should assimilate or otherwise leave the territory.

Oommen defines Connor's conceptualization as "a fetish for purity" which in fact suits the Japanese case perfectly. Anthropologist Laura Miller (2006) underlines that purity and clean-ness are often over-emphasized in Japanese culture and this is also carried on to the state level in terms of defining citizenship based on pure blood lines and a myth of ethnic homogeneity. The belief in the cleanness and homogeneity of the Japanese citizenship often became a contradictory issue during my field research in Japan in 2007. During my research in Japan, I was insistently corrected many times by Japanese acquaintances that I was not working on minority groups of Japan but foreigners living in Japan, since there are no minority groups. I was also corrected by the secretary general of the Ainu Association that

the Ainu were not a minority but indigenous people he argued that they cannot be considered as a minority because they are now dispersed around Japan. At this point I think it is important to note that this insistence on the denial of the term minority shocked me so I asked him whether he had Ainu ancestry and the answer was no. Then I asked him how he became the secretary general of the association and he replied that he applied for the positions through a newspaper add 15 years ago. Thus, he had no ancestry or emotional attachment to the Ainu minority and advocated the main state view as a waijin, a member of the homogeneously ethnic nation.

The rise of nationalism in Japan is difficult to trace back since it has long been an isolated island with its own religion and language. Japan was defined as a closed country, *sakoku* from 1630 to 1853 and it was difficult to travel overseas from Japan even until 1970's. Until recently Japan was strict on passport acquisitions and there was a high level of control over its citizens travelling overseas. Even in the 1970's the easiest way for a Japanese national to travel overseas was to get a scholarship abroad (Nish, 2000). The facilitation of travel was gradual in Japan and mostly for educational purposes. It started in 1853 with the arrival of Black Ships of Commodore Perry of the United States with which Japanese citizens started travelling abroad for educational purposes to broaden their knowledge and improve their society. This practice aimed at the advancement of Japan and continued throughout the Meiji restoration. Nish (2000) argues that Japanese encounter with European nations and rising nationalism was appealing and influential for them. He especially refers to Germany's unification under Bismarck and the aggressive expansionist German nationalism. Japanese constitution, parliament, education and military system were based on the German

system (Nish, 2000: 83). Nish also refers to “Iwakura mission” which was an assembly of five statesmen from the Japanese government visiting US and Europe to learn from their systems and to incorporate good governance practices into to their own system. This Japanese assembly also visited the Vienna Grand Exposition in 1873 with the aim of developing trade relations. Until 1880, Japan completed a high level of progress in implementation of nationalist policies and was admired by the west in its development of patriotism and nationalism. The next section attempts to classify this patriotism and nationalism in Japan with reference to related theories in the academic literature.

2.1.2 Understanding Japanese Citizenship through Theories of Nationalism

Nationalism has become rather difficult and problematic concept to define with increased theories, classification, exceptions and criticisms in the academic literature. This is closely related to the fact that there is no single nationalism theory to explain the diversification of nationalism. Habermas traces back the origin of the word “nation” to Roman times during which the word was used to refer to a group of people who are not yet under a political association (Faulks, 2000). This is surely quite different from the usage of the term today. Under today’s terms, Smith (2000: 1) defines nationalism as:

“An ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’”

However in terms of creation and source, according to Anthony Smith nation is the dominant political form because it’s rooted long before modernity. Thus Smith

argues that citizenship derives its power from the nation-state and that differentiation between ethnic identity and civic citizenship is important. He further argues that these cannot exist independent of each other. Thus according to Smith, the nation is rooted in the pre-modern identities to a certain extent. However in these terms the Japanese case seems to be closer to Gellner's conceptualization. Gellner argues that nationalism has become a social necessity with modernity. Under this framework modernity is defined as a distinctive form of social organization and culture, and nationalism is the product of modernity not the producer. This is consistent with the creation of the myth of ethnically homogeneous Japanese nation during the Meiji modernization period which will be elaborated upon to a larger extent in the next chapter. Under this framework, Gellner further argues that nationalism and nations are not natural, that they have come into being with industrialism. Thus he bases his argument on industrialization of agricultural societies which is also one of the characteristics of the Meiji period in Japanese history. Thus foundations of Japanese citizenship laws and nationalist ideology can be traced back to the Meiji period and this will be further elaborated upon in the next chapter however at this point it is important to note that these have been under constant change with the rise of post-modernity and increased globalization. The next section will elaborate on the evolution of Japanese citizenship through the process of and under the impact of globalization.

Faulks (200) underlines that citizenship implies both inclusion to and exclusion from the polity at the same time. And then refers to how globalization has blurred the boundaries between states. Thus he argues that threats to citizenship benefits should be handled with a global approach to governance. In terms of how the condition has changed, Faulks refers to the Turkish community living in

Germany who were not granted citizenship and classified under the category of guest worker although they lived there for decades and paid taxes. He also refers to the headscarf issue, muslim girls going to school wearing the headscarf and being sent home with accusation of expression particularistic identity which conflicted with the nature of the French state⁴. Both these examples are of course related to immigration and globalizations impact on economic movement and movement of people for economic aims which have had impact on other realms. An expanding trend of revision on citizenship laws can be observed: either in the German case of recognition of minorities or the French case with the recognition of refugees. However it is also important to note that although there are improvement in some cases, this is not universal, there still are many states which are resisting this trend and have limitation on issues such as naturalization of refugees, freedom of speech and bodily control right. It is also important to note that citizenship rights and their extension is a quite recent phenomenon, dating back from the 20th century onwards only.

Faulks (2000: 4) argues that citizenship in the modern terms that we observe today is egalitarian and that it satisfies the basic what Hegel defines as basic need: recognition which promises inclusion to a wider society however the Japanese case proves the opposite as the legal right of membership to that society doesn't guarantee acceptance. However he also admits that he aims at a perfectionist theory and that it could only be realized under a liberal framework.

Soysal touches upon limits of citizenship in the global arena with an argument that citizenship is being replaced by human rights as people are going to

⁴ At this point Faulks argues for a discrimination against the Muslim population and argues that the Christians are free to express their religion however this is no longer correct, due to the secular nature of the French state, it is not allowed to wear religious symbols to schools in France.

supranational bodies for their rights especially the UN. In some countries guest workers have acquired almost same rights as citizens through application to NGO's and civil society. However Faulks disagrees as citizenship also implies participation in governance (Faulks, 2000: 133). At this point it is important to differentiate between different spheres of rights. There are basic human rights, economic rights, social rights and political rights. Faulks emphasizes on political rights and argues that Soysal has left this element out. It seems like Soysal has an over-optimistic view on globalizations' impact on citizenship because her work is limited to a specific region, Europe, where a special supranation body exists. However the immigrants position at the rest of the world have been worsening especially since 9/11. This is also supported by Huntington's (1993) argument that since the world is formed by civilizations that are all suspicious of eachother, there cannot be a single human rights to be used all around the world and that there should be a 'global multiculturality'. Komai (2006), also argues that multiculturalism is the only mechanism that could prevent social tension when there is a minority and majority however this seems too simplified and too idealistic.

2.2 Globalizations Transformative Power on Japan

Globalization is blurring the boundaries which have made citizenship significant in modernity. Held (2002) argues that states are not capable of coping with the new global problems that are rising on their own. Globalization is a transformative process that leads to the reorganization and ordering of modern frameworks. Although notions of citizenship and globalization are usually studied jointly under

the framework of cosmopolitanism or global governance this research rather aims to explain globalizations tangle with Japanese citizenship in particular.

There is no argument of global governance in Japan, the particular rather than the general is being questioned. Japan is an island country with its symbolic emperor and democratic government still trying to resist change brought on to it by globalization. Japan's method of coping with globalization is also closely related to its geographic allocation and the Asian culture it belongs to. Compared to Europe, Asia has gone through a different history and relations among Asian countries are quite different from the European example. Although there are cultural similarities within Asia as there are within Europe, their nature is different. This can be linked to the geographically dispersed nature of Asia however elaboration on this topic would require more anthropological research. There is no strong economic cooperation as in the case of Europe under the European Union framework and political cooperation has long been out of question due to aggressive external policies of potential leader countries Japan and China.

Globalizations impacts in Japan could also be observed in all economic, social and political realms. However the difference and particularity of the Japanese case lies within the persistent strength of protectionism and insistence on self-sufficiency. In the Japanese case, social norms are very important besides formal rules such as laws and regulations thus these will be emphasized (Milhaupt and West, 2004: 4). Japan has long been a very conservative and inward oriented state, although academicians trace it back to different periods in its history there is a wide spread agreement on Japan's long lasted protectionism policy (Benedict, 1946; McVeigh, 2002; Miyajima, 1997; Nish, 2000; Sellek, 1994; Weiner, 1997).

At the end of the 19th century, Japan has managed to take great advantage of globalization in economic terms, while remaining conservative in social and political terms. Japan has profited from globalization and new market opportunities to such an extent that its economic rise in the 1980's has led to speculations and abundant literature on the possibilities of Japan becoming a superpower. However during this period Japan focused on exports while having both economic and cultural protectionism on imports. Thus until the last decade Japan's economic openness was concentrated on Japanese exports rather than imports. Although Japan had high level of exports, its imports remained limited both in terms of region and quantity. Japan's integration in the world economy, and simultaneous preservation of its social inwardness, presents an interesting dilemma for globalization. Cultural protectionism has played an important role in Japan's low level of imports as culturally Japanese people prefer to consume locally produced products rather than foreign imports. This consumption habit is closely related to the perception of the Japanese products being better in quality when compared to other counterparts; this will be explained to a larger extent in chapter 3.

Migration allows increased cultural interaction which in return affects nationalism and self identification. One of the dominant arguments in the literature is that Japan has had difficulty in coping and dealing with immigrants due to its history of low level of immigrants. For example Reyes-ruiz (2007) argue that this is one of the main reasons why the governmental institutions are insufficient in facing problems and non-governmental organizations are weak due to lack of resources.

The multi-ethnicity of Japan dates back from its colonial history, thirteen million Koreans and three million Taiwanese were incorporated in 1910. From this

date there are also academic works referring to the complexity of the Japanese race, for example according to Hoshino Wataru, the Koreans and Japanese have the same roots and by annexing Korea, Japan has nothing but to re-unite. On the other hand, Tsuboi Shoogoroo, an anthropologist from Tokyo Imperial University also advocated that there were linguistic similarities between Korea and Japan. Japan attempted to use this discourse of unity with Asia during its expansionist policies for the sake of dominating Asia. However with the end of World War II this discourse has changed (Suzuki, 2003: 8-10).

Japan it is important to note that although there is no level to measure this impact, academicians such as Miller (2006) have proven that all social developments cannot be directly linked to American culture and Americanization. She has proven through her research that Japanese have their own Japanese idols and role models and remain culturally Japan oriented. This is spread to many different aspects of their lives and their consumption habits from electronics to cosmetics and popular culture. It is interesting to note that the average Turkish youngster is more interested and well informed on American pop culture rather than an average Japanese youngster, the example becoming very clear with them not knowing Metallica.

Culturally, Japanese society has long been labeled as one of the most conservative or even isolated societies in the world despite its multi-ethnic nature (Shigematsu: 1993). And still today, when compared to its counterparts in Europe Cultural protectionism and emphasis is so high that there is denial of multiculturalism. Japan has used nationalism for homogenization in Taylor's (1999) terms.

Globalization is a process that is re-structuring the world through increased interaction in all social, political and economic spheres and this restructuring has become more intensive especially in the last two decades with the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War system was based on basic and simple differentiations such as black and white, good and bad; capitalist and communist. States were the main actors in the international system and world events were evaluated within the sphere of influence of two superpowers; the United States and the Soviet Union. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States became the sole superpower in the world system. Writings in the international relations academia during this period were marked by attempts to theorize on the possible rise of a new superpower that could fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period Japanese economy was having a boom which rendered it a strong candidate with its rising economic miracle in 1980's (Forsberg, 2000). The Japanese economic miracle was basically characterized by Japan's investments in technical development instead of security expenses during the cold-war. Japan's economic miracle was the outcome of two condition; firstly not being allowed to have a large standing army due to its aggressive expansionist policies in World War two and secondly due to the United States' use of Japanese territory as the base in Asia in terms of allocation of army troops. Being under the sphere of influence of the United States and being guarded directly provided Japan with the advantage of focusing on economic development⁵. However the Japanese

⁵ At this point I think it is also interesting to note that most young Japanese people that I have met in Japan since I have moved here six months ago have a quite poor knowledge on world history. Most of the young people I have met know about World War II in general and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki however most of them don't know about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This

economic miracle ended with the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis which started with the devaluation of the bath and had a devastating effect on Asian economies (Bowles. 2002).

Globalization in some cases functions as a pushing force to increase regional integration and the Asian financial crises was a partially caused by this interaction. Trade relations among Asian countries have intensified especially in the last two decades and foreign direct investments have also increased (Ota, 2004). This can also be explained under the framework of globalization as an outcome of an attempt of regionalism in Asia. This was also regarded as an attempt to cope with the economic competition from European regionalism rising as the European Union. In this case also we observe the dilemma presented by globalization on Japan, on the one hand increasing interaction in the region and economic boost through increased foreign direct investments from 1960 onwards. Although there were some crises from time to time, foreign direct investments increased to a large extent with the Plaza Accord in 1985 but at the end this increased interaction worked to the disadvantage of Asian countries as proved through the 1997 East Asian economic crisis. After this period, arguments for the rise of Japan as a new superpower were also put on hold and its candidacy to become as superpower lagged behind China and India (Ota, 2004).

In the Japanese economic sphere, it is also important to note that through modernization and the increasing impact of globalization, economic power has become to be utilized as a means of national self-defense for the Japanese political elite. McVeigh (1998) traces this back to the Meiji restoration period in Japanese

could be explained either by their parochial political participatory culture and their lack of interest in politics in general or their national education system.

history and underlines the particularity of the Japanese case in terms of State - business relations today. In business theory, businesses or companies are established with the aim of making money and their main goal is to maximize profits (Boone and Kurtz, 1993). Although they are related to the state and its economic policies to a large extent since the legal framework they function in is provided by the state, the relation between private businesses and the state in Japan is different from the western example. In the Japanese case, both businesses and the state have the same economic aim, to boost national economy. McVeigh (1998) defines this relation as a kind of economic nationalism and demonstrates that this is very explanatory for understanding the economic policy behind the Japanese economic miracle until the end of 1990's. During this period Japanese economy mostly relied on exports and protectionism against imports. Today these legal trade barriers of protectionism against imports are abolished to a large extent however consumption is to a large extent under the influence of cultural protectionism.

In Japan, there is a cultural protectionism in some sector whereas some are marked by brand addictions. Fashion is praised in Japan and there is a clear brand addiction in terms of clothes and accessories most popular ones being the GAP, Louis Vuitton, Tiffanies...etc. The brand addiction in Japan can be explained to a large extent by globalization of brands, there is a McDonald's at almost every corner throughout Tokyo and at least one Starbucks in every neighborhood. However globalization of brands and having that brand doesn't always have a positive connotation. For example although there is a McDonald's at every corner, the frequent customers are high school students and low level employees. It is quite interesting to see the differences in perceptions of brands. For example one of my Japanese friends loves eating hamburgers from Freshness Burger but never steps

foot in a McDonald's simply because in her perception McDonald's is "yada" unclean, cheap and low quality whereas Freshness is much better although there is no visible difference. Thus there are different mindsets and perceptions that must be taken into account. However consumption habits and perceptions due change from sector to sector, for example in terms of beauty products and electronics Japanese products are praised and emphasized. In beauty products Tsukiba and Shiseido are considered best quality brands whereas in electronics Panasonic is considered as the best. The beauty sector has a very big market share in Japanese economy and mostly Japanese products are emphasized and used.


Thus there is a blend of the use of both the global and the local, Friedman (2000) explains this combination in very basic terms in his book "The Lexus and the olive tree" where Lexus the car model represents the global, and the olive tree represents the local. In the Japanese case this could be adopted as Louis Vuitton and Panasonic. Friedman argues that globalization often causes the disadvantaged groups to concentrate at the local level as a protest to the globalized. However the Japanese case presents an exception as Japan is not one of the poor disadvantaged states in the globalized world. However the basis of his argument can be used in better understanding Japanese consumption habits because Friedman argues that globalization brings about fast and volatile changes and this causes for people to emphasize their localities. And we observe the rise of Glocalization as an attempt to resist the negative impacts of globalization through the empowerment of the local. Friedman explains this as a reaction for not being able to cope up with globalizations transformative power although this argument is not explanatory for the Japanese case. Friedman's next argument refers to conservative or more inward oriented societies which are disadvantaged in the globalized world because they

insist on self-sufficiency rather than multi-lateral interdependency. Thus, this lead to a vicious circle: inability to cope with globalizations transformative circumstances leading to isolation and isolation leading to further disadvantage in the world system. However Japan presents an exception because has managed to do both at the same time. On the one hand American and French brands are praised but on the other hand they are quite ignorant in terms of popular culture from Europe and the United States. One of the most striking examples while I was living in Japan was that most Japanese people haven't ever heard of the World wide famous Metal band Metallica. The detachment of the Japanese from globalized popular culture is explained by Laura Miller (2006) in her book "Beauty Up: exploring contemporary Japanese body aesthetics" to a large extent, she emphasizes that the Japanese are conservative in terms of popular culture and attached to their own values and idols. Thus it seems that the Japanese on the one hand have the nationalist consumption habit outlined by McVeigh (1998) and but also an addiction for the popular global brands explained above by Friedman.

Consumption habits in Japan are also linked to social status and each brand has a different connotation. Brand of clothes and accessories are important determinants in social status. However at this point it is important to note that kimono has the highest social status. This is also partly related to the fact that kimono's are very expensive and ordinary Japanese people cannot afford to owe a real one made of silk thus they are usually rented for about \$100 on special occasions. Thus in the Japanese case the locally produced mostly does have an upper standing. This can also be linked to negative associations that globalization has in peoples minds due to discontents and negativisms.

The rise of conflicts and discontent from globalization is closely related to the lack of any damage control mechanisms to protect states or individuals from the negative impacts of globalization. What each individual or state gains from or loses to globalization differs according to their positioning, links and interconnectedness in the international system. This is the direct outcome of the increased interconnectedness created by globalization at all economic, political and social levels. Within this framework, at the state level the possible erosion of the notion of “strong state” has been under debate. In today’s globalized world, neither large armies nor economic strength are enough to guarantee power or safety for any state (Strange, 1994a). The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States have proven that even the world’s sole superpower has a weakness, an Achilles’ heel. Thus, today we observe a global transformation through which events or developments previously labeled as irrelevant are now having major impacts in other spheres. This is also linked to the changing world order that we have observed throughout the 19th century. Although wars were fought mostly among armies of states until the second half of the 19th century, today civilians have become main targets and terrorism has been defined as the new threat in the world system. This argument is especially emphasized by the international theory developed after the end of the world war which underlines terrorism as the new danger to be contained after the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism (Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995). This topic and framework is also relevant to this research because the definition of terrorism as the new threat in the world system has also influenced minorities and immigrant groups in Japan to a large extent. Japan was still a country with low numbers of immigrants until only two decades ago (Yamamoto, 2007).

Figure 2:



Source: (Yamamoto, 2007)

After 9/11, Japan has also taken higher security measures and some of the changes carried on under the title of homeland security have put immigrants and minority groups in a disadvantaged position. One of these developments is the change of the law on entering Japan. Since 1952 foreigners entering Japan were required to give their fingerprints upon entering to the country. However this was considered humiliating and was protested against especially by civil society organizations. This included tourists, student, foreigners married to Japanese citizens and Korean residents. This issue was carried on to the international level through channels created by globalization and this law was amended in 1992 (Aldwinckle, 1998). I gathered information about this practice during my visit to the Osaka Human Rights Museum in March 2007 during my field research. The abolishment of this requirement was considered as an important development in human rights in Japan, especially by the Korean residents who had lobbied to a

great extent for this aim. However, as I came back to Japan in April 2008, only one year after my field research, as a foreigner entering Japan I was required to give my fingerprints in order to enter the country. Thus the requirement to submit fingerprints upon arrival to Japan was re-established and many civil society organizations have protested against it at the international level condemning it as a step backwards in terms of human rights. However, the Japanese state has put forward the reasoning based on increase in crime rate committed by foreigners in Japan (Yamamoto, 2007).

The submission of fingerprints by foreigners upon entering Japan presents at a smaller scale the basis for the dilemma created by the impact of globalization on Japan. On the one hand the fingerprint submission law was amended through the use of global networks and the utilization of international norms and human rights however on the other hand it was re-established based on the argument of global terrorism and homeland security which are also outcomes of globalization.

Definition of terrorism as the new global threat has also limited the movement of people to Japan. It has placed some immigrants living in Japan under unfavorable conditions and is used as one of the main arguments in not giving rights to immigrants living in Japan. Compared to Japanese citizens, foreigners and immigrants living in Japan have limited social rights and most importantly no political rights. The next section is a literature review on nationalism and citizenship which aims to elaborate on these notions with reference to Japanese citizenship and the arguments that have been put forwards until now.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW: EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE CITIZENSHIP

The notion of citizenship undergoes constant transformation in different cultures under different contexts through modernity and modernization. The importance of Japan's modernization period can be traced to its impacts on citizenship at different instances in its history.

With reference to nationalism and modernity, definitions provided by Emerson, Connor and Powell emphasize on the possible intolerance for co-nationals based on race, religion, tribe and language. This provides a quite explanatory framework for understanding Japanese nationalism and citizenship and the resulting problematics of multiculturalism in Japan (Oommen, 1997: 24). And as pointed out by McVeigh (2002), the main problem in Japanese nationalism is that although nationalism and racism do exist in Japan they are being minimized and de-emphasized through the use of terms such as 'tradition', 'culture' or 'custom'. According to Gellner, high culture defines the society and needs to be sustained by that polity, in the case of Japan this is done through the continuation of the myth of ethnically homogeneous nation (Taylor, 1999).

3.1.1.1 The Meiji Restoration

The fundamental modernization period that lay the seeds of Japanese citizenship can be traced back to the Meiji restoration in 1868 which started with the Meiji Emperors reign (Livingston, 1976). The Meiji restoration has set the basis for the political and economic structures of the modern Japanese state and a great amount of institutionalization has been achieved during this period. It is considered as a turning point in Japanese history and modernization and can be briefly defined as the rapid creation of a centralized, absolute state. The modern Japanese economy, political life and foreign policy are rooted in this period. The Meiji restoration is classified as a top-down elite revolution and often compared with other modernizing top-down revolutions such as the Turkish and Egyptian modernization processes. This classification is especially due to the role of military bureaucrats in these revolutions (Trimberger: 1978). Also in terms of religion, Shinto was made into state religion in 1886 during the Meiji Restoration.

The Meiji reforms were very quick and quite successful, the new state was set up around 1890 with a cabinet, parliament, constitution and modernized education system. The focus of the new state was becoming *kokutai*, the Emperor and the aim was to transform the people into subjects of the Emperor, thus *kazoku kokka* (Suzuki, 2003: 7). During this period, Japan had an aggressive and successful foreign policy, wars with; China in 1894-1895 and in 1900; Russia in 1904-5 which also bought in Japan's fame in western eyes and the First World War.

After the reign of Meiji Emperor, Emperor Taisho (1912 – 1926) came to power. Emperor Taisho's term of rule was characterized more within a context of nationalism of social democracy. In 1919 they had their first prime minister; they

passed on to universal adult suffrage in 1924 and signed disarmament proposals. The *kokutai* ideology was weakened especially because of the Emperor's illness for the last six years of his reign during which he didn't have much say in political matters.

In Japan symptoms of the great depression started in 1927. During this period the army sided along with the discontent peasantry against politicians who were blamed for the worsening of economic conditions. Throughout this process the army became powerful by playing on the peoples fears of Russia and China with emphasize on threat of communism. They argued that there was a rising threat due to the passivism of Emperor Taisho and the signing of disarmament proposals. During this period there were rival groups of nationalists, for example there was a rivalry between the army and the navy, split between armed services and political allies, the emperor and the court. On February 26th 1936 there was an attempted *coup d'etat* by Junior army officers who advocated that the emperor was misled by his entourage, the coup was repressed.

Japanese nationalism of this period could be defined as the opposite of internationalism, with growth in power and self-confidence. This self-confidence had led Japan to leave the League of Nations in 1933 although it was one of the pillars back in 1923. Japan had an independency policy up until its alignment with Germany in 1936 and had many successes in last six decades. Consequently, the belief of Japan's leadership of Asia was growing in Japan. Other countries also did consider Japanese leadership after its victory over Russia in 1905, but they were displeased when it came (Nish, 2000: 82-5).

The post-war period was defined as a rapid fall after a rapid rise and the 'old nationalism' was to blame. Until the end of the Second World War the

Japanese state system was quite different from that of a nation, rather than a contract between the state and its people, there was a big family where people were subjects rather than citizens (Miyajima, 1997). In the post war period the United States attempted to use democratization as the anti-thesis of nationalism. In this process the aims of allies were to destroy trappings of nationalism such as education, military and the Emperor. On January 1st 1946, the Emperor Hirohito was forced to issue an imperial edict denying his divinity. Thus the emperor had become the authority without power (Nish, 2000: 85-6).

After the occupation ended in 1952, for two decades nationalism was questioned to a great extent but prevailed only little by little. There were debates on minor issues between the right wing and the left wing however the common view was the revival of nationalism would be beneficial and “wholesome” for Japanese society. The Liberal Democratic Party was in power from 1955 to 1993, and in the meantime Japan started playing a little role in international affairs from 1972 onwards (Nish, 2000: 86-7). Although there are all these arguments on the non-nationalist nature of Japanese society today, according to Nish (2000: 87-8) even today nationalism in Japan is questionable. There are arguments for the rise of Japanese nationalism based on the events that followed the death of the Emperor Hirohito in 1989. After the emperor’s death, many Japanese citizens went to the Imperial Palace in order to pay their respects. This event led to the questioning of Japanese nationalism and the value of the emperor mainly because citizens went there to wait outside for hours although they are not allowed to enter. This led to arguments on whether Japanese were becoming more nationalistic. Nish argues that this event is linked to the survival of the imperial tradition rather than rising nationalism. However this event of paying respect to the Emperor can be

considered as the direct continuation of the *kokka kazoku* tradition which was the base for Japanese citizenship and nationalism.

In the education system, all Japanese textbooks are controlled by the government and negative aspects of Japanese history are omitted from these textbooks. This has attracted reactions from neighboring countries on the basis of national education and denial of historical facts. However, on the other hand Japan has shown prove of good will as in 1995, at the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, the Prime Minister Murayama apologized for Japans actions during the war. Quite interestingly, after this apology, some governments insisted for another apology that should come from the Emperor rather than political leaders, this is still an issue for some foreign governments in the international arena (Nish, 2000: 88-9).

3.1.2 Racialization of Japan

The modality of nationalism in each nation is to a large extend dependent on its construction and reproduction, the link that is created and emphasized between the nation and its citizens is key. In the Japanese case, from the Meiji Restoration onwards, cultural and racial homogeneity of the nation were promoted as the building blocks of the Japanese nation. McVeigh (1998: 115) argues that the Emperor is the representative of two values, first of all he represents the Japanese state and on the other hand he also represents the homogeneous-ness of the Japanese people. The representation of the state through the Emperor is clear as the Emperor by definition is the head of the state. In terms of the representation of homogeneousness, it relies on the belief system that all Japanese subjects are from the same blood line and thus when together form an immense family. Everyone

under Japanese nationality is assumed to be from the Emperor's blood line and this is also the reason behind the term *kazoku kokka* as *kazoku* within that term means family.

Weiner (1997) argues that the imperial rule has persuaded a heterogeneous nation that they were in fact homogeneous. Weiner further elaborates that this is an un-easy task achieved to a large extent through intensive assimilation policies and suppression. These assimilation policies aimed at securing the continuation of the family state *kazoku kokka* and creation of a national consciousness based on unity and uniformity. This new structure was re-enforced by symbols of power conveying the idea of continuity from the glorious imperial past to new reforms and in this structure the nation was projected as a large family in which the emperor was the semi-divine father and thus citizens were the children of the nation, carrying the same blood. Weiner (1997) also underlines that this claim is contradicting as there were social inequalities and classification of individuals in Japanese society based on work sectors and descent. However this state ideology of homogeneous nation propaganda was so strong that the homogeneous nation discourse was carried on despite social inequalities and rankings.

Weiner (1997) also emphasizes the role of Japan's historical economic and political developments impact on race and racialization. He refers to writers, thinkers, political scientists and elaborates on how the discourse on nationalism changed and emphasized on the Japanese race and its superiority. Most of these were indeed intellectuals with organic ties to the state, attempting to reproduce state ideology at all social levels mainly through the writings of western thinkers such as Haeckel, Lamarck and Spencer. This ideology was also supported by Japanese language, for example the popularity of the term *minzoku* which refers to

unique characteristics of the Japanese nation was first popularized by Shiga Shigetaka in 1880's, he was the editor of the magazine *nihonjin* which means Japanese and he objected extreme westernization. Weiner gives reference to books published throughout the 19th century which aimed at applying Darwinism and proving the superiority of the Japanese race: Ueda Kazutoshi's *Kokugo to Kokka to* which was published in 1894 arguing for the superiority of the Japanese race being evident in the qualities of the Japanese language; the publication of *Shinkagaku yori kansatsu shitaru nichiro no unmei* in 1905 by Kato Hiroyuki which was the application of Darwinist notion of survival of the fittest to the context of Japan's struggle with Russia at that time; Takahashi Yoshio's *Nihon Jinshu Kairyoon*⁶ which was on interbreeding with Europeans and the impact this might have on the Japanese race (Weiner, 1997: 5-7). Racism has a different meaning in Japan it's rather a tool for discrimination, it's used as a more general term in the sense that it is not always against one race or one group but there are diverse versions. For example Weiner gives reference to Mayama Seika's *Minami Koizumi-mura* which was published after the Russo-Japanese war and emphasized on the inferiority of peasants.

Besides the discrimination policies within its territory, Japan also had a discriminative discourse of superiority amongst Asian cultures in the international arena. This discourse of superiority was to a large extent boosted by Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. Before Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, there was a common belief of superiority of western states under the leadership of the great five; Britain, France, Germany, Austria- Hungary and Russia. However in 1905 Japan defeated Russia and for the first time in that period a great power was

⁶ Improvement of the Japanese Race

defeated by an Eastern power thus on the one hand Russia lost prestige in the West on the other hand Japan gained prestige in East Asia. During this period it was even debated whether Japan can become one of the great powers. However during this period due to Japan's aggressive policy in East Asia, Asian states were disturbed by this shift of power (Joll, 1990). Thus, in terms of Japanese superiority, besides the national civilizing process of the Ainu in Hokkaido and Ryukyuan in Okinawa, there also was a civilizing mission on Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese and Malays at the international level (Weiner, 1997: 9-11). This civilizing Asia mission formed the basis for Japanese colonialism in Asia especially during the first half of the 19th century and the Japanese family system formed the basis for the discourse of superiority of the nation based on blood ties and descent.

3.1.3 Race in Japan: Blood Ties and the Family

During the Meiji restoration, the family system referred to as the *ie*⁷ system institutionalized and became the new civil code in Japan (Hendry, 1987: 21-2). The term *ie* basically means home but it also denotes a system of continuity based on the family name. It was established as a *koseki*, a registration system to ensure that all members of the family shared the same last name and it later become a social system that aims the continuation of the family name. During the Edo period the Japanese had to register at a Buddhist Temple under Tokugawa Shonugate and this was replaced by the national family registration system in 1871 (Kawano, 2005; Krogness, 2008).

⁷ Meaning "house" in Japanese

The *ie* is also a belief system that incorporates all the ancestors and the unborn of the family, thus it represents more than the sum of all its members because it's a continuous system (Hendry, 1987: 23). It's characterized by vertical relations rather than horizontal ones and is structured by a hierarchy based on; age, sex and expectance of permanency within the family. It is based on Confucian principles of loyalty and benevolence, thus relations within the *ie* are about duty and filial piety rather than love and affection. And most importantly, the *ie* system is a nation wide social network under which every house is seen as a branch of the imperial family line (Hendry, 1987: 26) thus the whole nation is considered to be interconnected through this system.

In this system the family living in the main family house is the essential small unit and the continuation of the family in the main house with the family name is vital. This duty is the burden of the eldest son who is responsible of bringing in an appropriate bride to the *ie*, taking care of his parents, producing offspring and guaranteeing the continuation of the *ie* (Hendry, 1987: 21-5). The importance of marriage is vital at this point, it is an important duty to ensure the continuation of the family thus the *ie*. However it is important to note that young members of the *ie*, except for the elder son, belong to this home only until they get married, they are expected to marry out because there cannot be more than one couple in one generation under the same roof. There are only two permanent positions in the family, one male and one female, *atatori* and *yome*, thus the bride and the groom, however traditionally grandparents from the previous generations also live in the *ie*⁸.

⁸ However due to changing living conditions, the continuation of the family under the same roof is becoming more difficult and thus flexible. On the one hand these homes are usually in the country side but young generations work in the cities and the brides might not want to live with in-laws. But there are also adoptive

The survival of the *ie* and the continuation of the family name are so essential that the system has adapted to different conditions. For example, in cases where the elder son is not capable of providing continuity of the *ie*, this duty passes on to preferably other sons. However if there are no other sons, or if they're unwilling to get married or incapable for any other reason, the duty passes on to daughters. In this case the daughter would have to bring in a groom to the family who will take her family name and assure the continuation of the *ie*. And although previously an outsider from another *ie*⁹, from that point onwards this male represents the family in society.

In this system the continuation of the *ie* is so important that there is even a last resort of *yooshi* which implies adopting a son for the sake of the continuation of the *ie*. The interesting aspect of this adoption is that the adoptee is chosen among grown man for the sake of avoiding any unpleasant surprises that may arise while a child heir grows into an adult. At this point it is also important to note that this grown man should be willing to ensure the continuation of the *ie* through marriage with an appropriate bride (Takenaka and Rebick, 2006). As the continuation of the *ie* was essential, the elderly arranged marriages and the young members' duties towards the family were emphasized, rather than love marriages, so that the couple could focus on more important things in their marriage. At this point more important things than love is the duty for the continuation of the *ie* and having offspring to carry on the family name (Hendry, 1987, p. 34).

Today the *ie* system has been weakened with the transformation to nuclear family system. In the nuclear family system the family lives as mother, father and

measures for example Hendry (1987, p. 31) refers to the adoption of not living under the same roof but close enough to give them a cup of warm soup when they need it.

⁹ The Eldest son of another *ie* is not to be taken this would probably be one of the younger brothers who would have to marry out anyway.

children in big cities for the sake of being close to work and good schooling opportunities. Grandparents don't live with the younger generation anymore and have to remain in the country side at the family house until the next generation retires and moves to the country to take over the family house and to carry on the tradition.

3.2.1 Democratization of the Japanese State after World War II

The World War II was one of the major turning points in Japanese history. Japanese culture and citizenship have been both positively and negatively affected by this period. Trimberger (1978) defines this period as a top-down revolution imposed by an external power; the United States. In this sense the Japanese modernization differs from the European examples. Unlike the French revolution or the Turkish revolution, demand for a revolution did not come from the Japanese people or the Japanese elites but an external force, The United States. This period is marked by the limitation of Japan's military power and its democratization with an imported constitution. Unfortunately legal arrangements after the war led to the beginning of Japan's problems with its minorities from its colonies as they lost their citizenship rights. During this period Japanese authorities had difficulties dealing with minorities due to United States' influence and tense political relations during the Cold-War era. Especially the Korean minority was hard to deal with after Korea's division into two countries (Chung, 2003).

At the end of World War II, Japan had long been labeled as an aggressive state due to its foreign policy in the Far East. However this aggression was noticed late by western powers because Japanese victory over a western power, Russia in

1905 was considered as an opportunity window for Japan to become a member of the western world in terms of alliances. However during World War II, west witnessed the extent of Japanese aggression with its attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This attack drew the United States into World War II and changed the balance of power and thus world history. After Pearl Harbor, the United States took action and with the rise of two super powers, the world witnessed the formation of the Cold-war order (Joll, 1990). The United States intervened in Japan with the argument of keeping an eye on this aggressive state and preventing its possible further attacks in Asia. This resulted in a several decades of occupation in the province of Okinawa, which was in reality used by the United States as a naval base to contain the Soviet Union. This has caused power shifts on the island vis-à-vis the local population of Okinawa Islands, namely Ryukyuan minority and the central Japanese state. The relation between Ryukyuan and Americans who have settled in Okinawa will be further elaborated upon in chapter 4 under the topic of Ryukyuan as a minority in Japan.

3.2.2 Japanese Culture and Citizenship from an Anthropological Perspective

The first western researcher to conduct a large scale research on Japanese culture was anthropologist Ruth Benedict, her book “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword” was published in 1946. Benedict’s anthropological research is important in Japanese studies literature as it reflects how a top-down revolution has affected the Japanese nation. Studies on Japan and Japanese culture remained quite limited until the twentieth century nevertheless after the World War II, interest in Japan and Japanese culture increased.

Ruth Benedict (1946: 4) went to Japan as a Cultural anthropologist in June 1944. Her main aim was to study the cultural pattern of Japan in order to contribute to end the war. At that date Americans were facing problems on how to take action against the Japanese in order to end the war. Thus the cultural pattern was studied in order to determine the military strategy to be pursued against Japan. The main problem that Ruth Benedict underlines in her book is the political conditions at the time of her research. Being a foreigner, Benedict had difficulties on gathering information on insights of Japanese culture. At the time being Japan was allied with Germany and was fighting against the United States which rendered it rather difficult for her to integrate into society to study Japanese social groups. However Benedict also had access to resources written by Japanese people which were written sincerely and open heartily as journals. Furthermore, she indicates that even Japanese aims to control the World were written sincerely in these documents.

3.2.3 Social Hierarchy: Citizens as Subjects of the Emperor

Benedict (1946) underlines that for that time being most valuable notions in the Japanese cultural pattern were *Emperor* and *honor*. This has been a problematic topic for Japanese modernization as Americans and the Japanese could not reach an agreement on the issue. Japanese scholars were insistent on the Emperor's importance and power for them whereas American scholars insisted that the Emperor was only a symbol for the Japanese society and a source of power rather than the power itself. Japanese citizens were subjects under the rule of the Emperor

on the land of the sun¹⁰. Thus in these terms the obedient nature of citizenship was emphasized under the rule of the Emperor. This caused a cultural clash between American scholars working on Japanese modernization whom advocated and pursued harsh policies over the weakening of the Emperors powers.

Photo 1: Douglas MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito, at their first meeting, at the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 27 September, 1945



Source: Photo by unidentified U.S. Army photographer.

In terms of citizenship, prior to the democratization process that followed World War II, Japanese citizenship relied on absolute obedience of the Emperor's orders thus a form of altruistic citizenship. The Japanese citizens' belief and trust in the Emperor included arguments for the Emperor being liberal and fighting for peace. According to Ruth Benedict's study (1946) Japan wouldn't be Japan without the Emperor. Besides being the highest level in the Japanese cultural pattern, the Emperor was also the highest religious authority and the obedient citizen model in Japan is analyzed to a large extent in Benedict's work.

¹⁰ In Japanese, the name of the country Japan is "Nihon" and it refers to where the sun is born.

The importance of the Emperor in Japan at that time can also be inked to the importance of social hierarchy in Japanese society. This is the trace of the Japanese social structure dating from feudal times and this could not be changed by a top-down revolution. Still today Japanese cherish hierarchy in all social, economic and political spheres. This hierarchy is especially evident in Japanese language as there are different levels of speech, different sets of words to be used when communicating with people according to this social hierarchy, the terminology is to be chosen based on where the speaker stands in these vertical relation structure¹¹. This hierarchal social structure has formed the basis for Japanese citizenship and this tradition has also affected the situation of immigrants in Japanese society. This is an important factor for explaining why even today we observe discrepancy between written laws and their implementation in everyday life. Such social structures cannot be reformed easily they require three things, willingness to reform, acceptance of change and settlement of change.

Japanese nationalism places Japanese citizens at the top of the anthropological hierarchal system in the World. Terms such as race and homogeneity are constantly emphasized and they symbolize purity. One of the strong arguments for Japan's aim to take part in World War II in alliance with Germany and Italy was to expand their civilization to other people. This is also one of the main reasons which led to Japan's classification as an aggressive state in the worlds system. And Japanese states' policy to promote the superiority of its race is

¹¹ This is especially evident in the use of verbs as the "-mas" form which is referred to as the "polite form" is to be used with ne acquaintances and with people from higher social status. Whereas dictionary form is used while speaking with family or friends. However as it is inappropriate to use dictionary form with new acquaintances or people from higher states, it is also inappropriate to use the polite form with friends as it implies distancing one-self through politeness. There is also an other form referred to as honorific language which is extremely polite and is used rarely today, this third form is like a different language, very difficult to master as it adoptable to specific conditions. Today even not all the Japanese people can master this form.

reflected in its attempts to re-create and preserve its homogeneous nation myth through its citizenship policies. As outlined in the previous section, the homogeneous nation myth that has its foundations in the Meiji Restoration, and had emerged as a means for the creation of a centralized state system.

3.3.1 Contemporary Japanese Society

Japan's myth of ethnic homogeneity has solid bases in her history, it has long been an inward oriented country this characteristic is the outcome of its geographic location and its cultural heritage of conservatism (Benedict, 1946). Japan's self-isolating tendency was reflected since its relations with European powers in the nineteenth century. At this time, Japanese authorities expelled European missionaries on the basis that these were trying to overturn feudal order. Japan, in its internal dynamics, has been a state attached to its traditions that does not accept reforms or changes easily (Livingston: 1976). However at the end of the nineteenth century and especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan was the most eager Asian country to follow the western example in colonization and this period has played a very important role in the formation of Japan's multi-ethnic composition (Joll, 1990). Armstrong argues that Japan's isolation from the 17th century to the 19th century has led to the racialization of the imagined community and the membership criteria has become both cultural and biological (Miyajima, 1997).

The Japanese state denies multi-ethnicity arguments. Officially, only the Ainu are recognized in legal terms as indigenous people. The Ainu Association in Sapporo constantly underlines and emphasizes the term "indigenous". Of course

this may also be related to the fact that most people working at the association do not all have Ainu origins for example the secretary general is Japanese. This can also be linked to how civil society operates in Japan. Civil society in Japan is mostly financed by the government and is strictly controlled. The functioning of the Ainu Association will be elaborated upon to a larger extent in chapter 4 under the topic of Ainu minority in Japan.

At the official state discourse level the term minority is avoided and “socially vulnerable populations” is employed¹². This can also be perceived as an attempt on the part of the state to deny minorities because Japanese state and citizenship is characterized by the exclusion of identities with non-Japanese components. Thus Japanese-ness is emphasized and often supported and reinforced by symbols of power and unity. In terms of these political visions archeology has been used as a powerful tool through sites and artifacts to contribute to the building of this sense of identity. Some historical sites like Morishoji site in Osaka or reconstruction of lifestyle during Yayoi period¹³ were for example attempts of strengthening identity ties with the ancestors and their glorious past (Fawcett, 1996: 74).

There is currently a lively debate in Japanese Studies on discriminatory tendencies at the states discourse level traced from legal documents and everyday life. However this issue is also contradictory basically due to the complexities of Japanese language. For example the term *kokuseki* conveys the meaning of

¹² http://www.minorityrights.org/Dev/mrg_dev_title2/mrg_dev_title2_s_6.html

¹³ “The site of village of the Yayoi period, an archaeological term designating the period in Japanese history from about 200 B.C to 200A.D, was discovered around here in the 6th year of Showa. Among excavated were such as Corbicula sandais, Yayoi potteries. According to the latest investigation, it has turned out to be a complex historic remain from the Nara era to the medieval period. The site was located below 3meters of a land height and was noticed as the lowest level ground historic remain in Osaka.” http://www.road.osaka-city.or.jp/orc/rekishi/nakaturu/p62_e.htm

nationality and is translated in relation to the notion of race rather than citizenship. This term is used by the government under the form of *kokumin* which denotes national. While Chung (2003) argues that this is a discriminatory discourse at the state level, Wetherall (2007) on the other hand argues that it does not have a racial implication and that it refers to nationality in general terms without racial connotations and that in Japanese law, it is used as a civil term rather than racial or ethnic. In terms of acquisition of citizenship, the term *kika* is used in Japanese for naturalization. And although Chung (2003) argues that this is discrimination due to its meaning of assimilation, there is no contradiction between naturalization and assimilation in the Japanese case because the process of naturalization does require assimilation.

A process of revising the discriminatory discourse has started and, Korean and Japanese activists are working on the wording of the naturalization process. They are encouraging the use of the term *shiminken o shutoku suru* for this process which denotes an acquisition of rights rather than surrender to assimilation (Schaeffer, 2006). Also citizens are being referred to as *Shimin*, which reflects recognition of multi-ethnic society based on community rather than state membership (Chung, 2003).

According to Fawcett (1996: 75), some scholars such as Mouer and Yoshio argue that the use of *nihonjinron* and this over-emphasized uniqueness and homogeneity serves the elites rather than common people. And that they base their claim on the assumption that this perception encourages the people to cooperate with authority for their own good, Japan's good and national good.

In legal terms, Japan doesn't allow dual citizenship and requires naturalization for acquisition of Japanese citizenship (Kashiwazaki: 1998).

However cases of dual citizenship do exist due to citizenship policies of other states such as Switzerland, when the other state automatically gives citizenship by birth. Children with one Japanese parent living abroad are granted dual citizenship until the age of twenty two but are obliged to make a choice afterwards. However this law is also flexible although these citizens are required to apply to government authorities when they reach the age of 22, in some cases they don't apply and keep their dual citizenship. Liberal Democratic Party member Taro Kono has submitted a bill for the allowance of dual citizenship however there has been no progress on the issue yet.

3.4 Japanese Citizenship and Japanese-ness

Japanese citizenship is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, based on blood ties and Japan is very strict on nationality issues. For example they refuse dual citizenship at demand for Japanese citizenship, the process requires naturalization (Kashiwazaki: 1998). Although there are also citizenship regulations based on *jus sanguinis* in Europe, there is no other country where this principle applies to beyond second generation where as in the Japanese case it applies even as far as three or four generations in the case of minority groups formed in Japan due to colonialism (Chung, 2003).

Japanese nationalism is clearly felt at the state level discourse, especially at bureaucratic bodies. For example, bodies that deal with non-Japanese subjects include the term “international” and this is the main differentiation between Japanese and non-Japanese at the state discourse level. There are separate international branches under each relevant ministry to deal with the non-Japanese

(McVeigh, 1998: 109). It is also important to note that even Japanese citizens educated abroad fall under this international branch as they are assumed to be alienated when they are away from the country, even if for a short period of time. This also affects their careers in Japan and limits their chances of getting higher positions in some cases (Goodman, 1993). McVeigh (1998) stresses how Japanese nationalism has resembled a religion through time; it has become a complete belief system. He gives the example of his Japanese students who would insist on the ethnically homogeneous nature of Japan with reference to history and geography, the isolationist political history, the island culture and Japanese distinctiveness.

Language is also an important component of Japanese identity and citizenship, one of the requirements for citizenship is language proficiency. Language is emphasized in both the education system and employment to a large extent. The right forms of referral are emphasized as they also project inequalities and ranking. It is also important to note that there is a belief of equality at the social level, 90% of the population classify themselves as middle-class whereas they have different levels of income. McVeigh (1998) links this to the strong state tradition and education, how the state is emphasized and even the possibility of a civic solidarity is denied. Thus there is no national solidarity independent from the state.

Japan has long been pride of its myth of homogeneous nation and there is a strong argument that it has contributed to the low crime rate and the image of egalitarian society at least in peoples mind. According to a survey when their economic status was asked, a large quantity of Japanese replied as being middle class. This is also observed from primary education onwards, standardization and most importantly equality is emphasized throughout the Japanese education system. A clear example is shown in a research done at three primary schools; three field

researches were conducted in Japan, China and United States. At the school in Japan there was a child who always disturbed other kids who would be labeled as hyperactive in the west. So the researchers asked the Japanese teacher and principle whether his actions could be due to his boredom in class, as if he could be special in a way in need for special attention. The response of the school teacher and principle was the same, denial of any such possibility of the child being “special”. They underlined that he was normal like all other kids and that all children at school were equal and the same. As the researchers thought they didn’t make themselves clear it was made clear to them by the school administration that there was no such thing as special child, some children are slower, some children are faster in understanding things but at the end none of them is “special” and all children are equal. Thus, the construction of Japanese identity’s emphasis on equality starts from early education (Tobin, 1989). However this emphasis on equality within the homogeneous nation is ignored for the case of minority groups and their “unequal” treatment. Minority groups, their origins and their positions in Japanese society will be elaborated upon to a large extend in chapter 4.

3.5 Legal Barriers in Entering the Country: Immigration Problems

Globalization has facilitated movement of people across borders and this in return has led to the increase in cultural interactions. Sellek (1994: 179-182) presents a positive view on the movement of people; on the one hand migration giver

countries have the advantage of reducing pressure and decreasing unemployment, and on the other hand migration taker countries benefits from gaining workforce for the sector in which their own citizens are not willing to work for. Japan has other important factors as well since the aging population and dropping birthrate problem are giving rise to the need for new workforce, thus immigrants.

In terms of legal rights, immigrants living in Japan might seem to be better off when compared to other countries as in Europe however one should bare in mind that this is also one of the basic outcomes of Japan's high selectivity on immigrants; until very recently, only highly qualified individuals were accepted to the Japanese workforce. This again is linked to Japanese tradition of preserving high standards. Japan is accepting qualified workforce unlike the case of Europe where most immigrants are working in unwanted sectors. In Japan there are also immigrants working in unwanted sectors however these are more difficult to reach due to their Asian looks, and language barriers.

Japan's selectivity on accepting immigrants dates back to the 1951 "Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act". Through this act, Japan has limited the acceptance of immigrants to highly skilled ones who either have a special skill or who can work in a field where no Japanese citizen would like to (Sellek, 1994: 70). The basic aim of this law was to keep Japanese employment rates high by keeping immigrant workforce out. However immigrants have long abused the easy entrance to Japan. For most countries around the world, Japan provides a tourist visa of three months upon arrival to Japan at the airport. However this has caused the increase of Asian illegal immigrant workers who have entered the country and overstayed their tourist visa of three months. Therefore Japan has revised this visa application for some countries, especially in the Asia region.

Besides the tourist visa, student visas have also been subject to abuse. Foreigners with student visas have the right to work for ten hours a week however as their working hours are limited, overtime should be reported to concerning authorities. Asian students abuse this situation as they cannot be easily distinguished from Japanese. Japan has introduced penalties on employers to prevent the overtime working of foreign students, so the employers prefer to employ Asian students rather than non-Asian students as they are more discrete and difficult to distinguish in their appearance.

In order to cope with the difficulties in controlling the entrance of unskilled worker immigrants, the ministry of labor proposed the introduction of “The New Two-year trainee plan” in 1992. This plan aimed at regulating the entrance of immigrants, who would be admitted as trainees. This proposal is considered as the first signal of letting unskilled workers enter Japan. Immigrants in the illegal work force of Japan face many dilemmas, they are mostly mal treated by their employers but cannot report the employer to authorities in fear of deportation. The state has also positioned itself against them as the law on visa has also been amended to end the health insurance of tourists, so they have to pay for their medical expenses while in Japan¹⁴ (Sellek, 1994: 192).

The most important barrier immigrants’ face in Japan is at the social level. They cannot become a part of society although it is important to function as a part of society in Japan. Japanese society doesn’t allow integration easily as it’s characterized by homogeneity as outlined in previous chapters and multi-layered identification is incomprehensible for the Japanese. Thus, it takes long time for

¹⁴ Japan has a very good National Health insurance plan for registered aliens. For example the annual payment for a foreign student is about 11.000yen, which sums up to about 110dollars and although Japanese Medical expenses are very high, this Health Insurance allows a 70% discount.

foreigners to really connect with Japanese people even on one-on-one basis. Perception of immigrants also plays an important role in this process and the perception of the foreigner as being discriminated against may cause irritation at the individual level. Thus the main dilemma foreigners and immigrant face in Japan is their exclusion from the homogeneous society and the emphasis of their differences (Katada *et al.* 2004).

3.6 Cultural and Social Barriers

In theory, according to the Japanese constitutions Article 14, all people are equal before the law;

“All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. 2) Peers and peerage shall not be recognized. 3) No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.”¹⁵

However in practice non-Japanese residents in Japan face many social barriers as well as legal barriers due to language problems. In some cases, even if the legal right to citizenship is granted through naturalization, this does not guarantee the granting of cultural acceptance into the society. The most striking example of social exclusion is the minority of Burakumin who are discriminated against socially. Members of this social group are descendents of an economic class of Japanese citizens who are often discriminated against despite their national and

¹⁵ The constitution could be reached on-line from:
<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>

ethnic heritage. The case of Burakumin demonstrates that social inclusion in Japan is not solely based on ethnic origin. The case of Burakumin social group will be further elaborated upon in chapter 4 under the topic of minorities in Japan.

The study of Japanese citizenship necessitates to put an emphasis on cultural and social barriers and how each minority or group is ranked in society according to their origins. Under this context, the sense of solidarity and national consciousness are important. However debates arise on the length of and extend to which people are treated from this perspective (Icduygu, 1996: 153; Miller, M.J., 1989: 947-9). In terms of ethnic minorities and immigrants, willingness to integrate is also important besides capability to integrate. This becomes a problematic issue as citizenship or human rights demands are mostly based on demand for equal access to opportunities rather than ratification of identity or feeling of belongingness to the nation. According to Icduygu (1996: 157), surveys in Sweden and Germany have demonstrated that practical reasons such as facilitation of transport become more important in citizenship demands than the feeling of solidarity. This list can of course be extended to other spheres for political rights or economic rights such as equal pay.

When we look at contemporary Japanese society, although tourists are much welcome to visit Japan, being a foreigner living in Japan comes with a luggage of being labeled as an outsider no matter their length of stay. Although globalization has facilitated the movement of people, in the Japanese case there still is discrimination against foreigners based on arguments of tradition and customs. Living in Japan as a foreigner requires the will to assimilate and to adapt to Japanese non-written rules and customs, and to carry the ineffaceable label as a

*gaijin*¹⁶. The term *gaijin* means foreigner and it has both advantages and disadvantages in Japan. On the one hand the *gaijin* has the advantage of being accepted as ignorant of Japanese customs and traditions, thus has a larger maneuver space and liberty of actions without being judged for inability to adopt. However on the other hand this tolerance for the *gaijin* is also based on the assumption of difference. The *gaijin* is the “other” who will never be able to adopt and to assimilate enough to become a part of the homogenous whole. It is possible for a foreigner to acquire Japanese citizenship however there is a long discouraging bureaucratic process often defined as annoying or frustrating. The problematic nature of this process can be explained by two reasons, first of all bureaucracy and doing everything slowly by many re-checking processes is the basic rule in Japan. For example, when I decided to get my drivers license validated to drive in Japan I did some research and theoretically it seemed like an easy process of answering 10 general questions in English and then entering a driving test. However another foreigner friend of mine explained that they always let the foreigners fail at least 3 times before granting the drivers license, I did some research on-line and came across the same comment at forums on websites for foreigners living in Japan. This foreigner friend of mine who wanted a motorbike license failed the driving test seven times and had to take the test over and over every Wednesday for seven weeks and had to pay the driving test fee seven times. At this time he had been driving for few years already so the chances of him becoming a better driver in only seven weeks is quite low, however he had to show his commitment for the cause and show up for the driving test every week¹⁷ and this basically is the

¹⁶ “foreigner” which literarily means “outsider” in Japanese.

¹⁷ This is also related to traffic rules in Japan. The norm is to let the foreigner fail 3 times for car drivers however rules for motorbike drivers are different. For the sake of security reasons, Japanese

Japanese way of doing things about foreigners, showing commitment is very important.

In social terms, fast and spontaneity actions are avoided in Japan and are much disliked in society. Action is always followed by the expression that the action is going to be performed whether in a restaurant, store or information office. Thus, this abundant bureaucracy for citizenship could be linked to social norms that are already well established in society. This is observed in all spheres of social life in Japan, from shopping at the supermarket where the cashier tells the customer the price of everything that s/he passes them by the counter, to daily conversations. Secondly, in terms of acquisition of citizenship, as the national discourse is established upon the homogeneous nature of the nation, its preservation is essential. Thus one willing to become a part of this homogenous whole should demonstrate will and devotion to this cause.

It is possible for a foreigner to acquire Japanese citizenship if one is willing to go through the trouble and accept the Japanese way of doing everything in order, step by step, by re-checking many times. Foreigners living in Japan have different views and attitudes towards Japanese citizenship according to their nationalities, occupations and personalities in terms of how they approach problems. For example, I have met a former British citizen who lives in Tokyo with his Australian wife who acquired citizenship and his argument for acquiring citizenship was that he feels that he belongs here and wanted to gain more rights since he decided to stay for a long time. He is aware that he will never be considered as a part of the whole Japanese family nation but was very happy and proud to show his Japanese

are not allowed to buy and ride any bike they like as it's the case in Turkey. There are different levels for driver licenses and drivers willing to buy more powerful motorbikes with higher cc value need to update their license. The reason why my friend was failed seven times was because he bought a bike of 750cc and needed a high level license.

passport that he carries around. On the other hand I have also talked to some of my Turkish friends, most of them except for a girl married to a Japanese citizen said they wouldn't consider changing their citizenship since they would like to go back to Turkey some day. One of the main problems foreigners have, which keeps them from considering applying for Japanese citizenship is the language barrier. One of the requirements for Japanese citizenship is a high level language proficiency which is quite difficult for foreigners or even Japanese to get. During my stay here I have met many foreigners who have been living in Japan for many years without learning Japanese. This is on the one hand due to the fact that Japanese people prefer to practice their foreign language with foreigners rather than teaching them Japanese. Also, it's difficult for a foreigner to make Japanese friends since they are quite conservative and it takes them very long time to trust foreigners.

Foreigners do have a negative image in Japan, partly due to the perception of foreigner as the ignorant outsider who does things wrong and partly because of problems that foreigners actually cause. On the one hand foreigners cannot always have access to information due to language barrier but on the other hand there are also foreigners that are abusing the Japanese system by playing the role of ignorant foreigner. For example I received an e-mail from my University expressing their disappointment in some of foreign students studying at Waseda University. Lately, some foreign students staying at Waseda University dorms were arrested for growing marihuana in their rooms and the event was on Japanese national news for days. Japan is very strict on the use of drugs and there is no differentiation between light or hard drugs as in the case of Europe. Thus all foreigners studying at Waseda University were sent an e-mail reminding that drugs are illegal in Japan and that their use will end in deportation. The e-mail also included a connotation that the

image of the school was damaged because of these foreign students. On the one hand it is true that this is very bad for the image of the school and although foreign students kept making jokes about this event in class, at the administrative level this is a very serious problem and will probably have consequences in the future as lessening the number of rooms provided to foreign students at the dorm.

Besides the example of western foreigners living in Japan, there are also high numbers of Asian foreigners and they also have a negative image. Asian foreigners are usually associated with illegal immigration and high levels of crime. The Japanese perception of the illegal immigrant worker is also important, as they come from poorer countries, they are often perceived as a danger because of their potential to engage in criminal act if they are unemployed, dissatisfied or hungry. In terms of health, there is a high number of Asian female workers in the sex-entertainment industry in Japan especially from Thailand and Philippines and they are often accused of causing the rise of AIDS in Japan (Sellek, 1994).

Housing also has an important social barrier for foreigners. Landlords are not willing to loan their homes to foreigners as they are perceived as “trouble makers” (Sellek, 1994). The lending system has become more problematic for foreigners within the last year. In Japan, when moving into an apartment, traditionally the tenant was required to pay the landlord both a deposit and a key money. The deposit was to be returned when the tenant moves out however the key money was a one month worth rent paid to the landlord in terms of showing gratitude to have been able to rent the apartment. However this custom was recently abolished by law and now Japanese citizens or foreigners living with Japanese citizens don’t have to pay this key money. However foreigners who would like to have an apartment on their own still have to pay it. For example, I

had to pay a key money of one month rent to move into my dormitory which is a dormitory for foreign students. On the other hand I have two Turkish friends who both rented their apartments last year without giving any key money because they moved in with their Japanese girlfriends and the contracts were done with the Japanese girlfriends. On the other hand I also have many foreigner friends who are moving out from the dorm and they are all paying key money to move in their apartments. Foreigners are in a quite disadvantaged position on this subject because most Japanese landlords don't want to rent their apartments to foreigners. Thus when the foreigner finds an apartment that s/he can actually move into, they don't want to lose it over an argument for one month rent. This is quite an economic burden on foreigners as this money is not to be returned to the tenant and the tenant has to pay this money again every two years in order to keep the apartment in the long-run. This practice is also for Asian foreigners in Japan, for example one of my Japanese teachers has Korean origin. Being a teacher of Japanese language, her Japanese is perfect and she is Asian so she can't be distinguished physically from the Japanese. When she wanted to rent an apartment, she found a place she liked, they agreed on terms with the landlord however when she went to sign the contract they noticed that her name was written in Katakana characters which is used to write foreigner names only, Japanese names are written in Kanji. Thus the landlord then understood that she was not Japanese and changed his mind, did not rent her the apartment although they had agreed on the terms before that. Through the process the only thing that changed was the landlord noticing that she wasn't Japanese. She wasn't trying to pass for a Japanese however since the landlord had assumed that she was Japanese from her appearance and her language skills, it

wasn't an issue during the bargain. Thus there are many social and cultural barriers that foreigners face even if they manage to get into the country.

CHAPTER 4

MINORITIES IN JAPAN

Debates on citizenship rights have recently become a hot topic in Japanese Studies especially with the internationalization of the focus on rights and liberties of Koreans living in Japan and problems caused to Japanese economy by the growing number of unregistered Asian workers. Globalization has empowered some of these minority groups through facilitation of movement of people and improvement of communication channels. Through these means, it has become easier for these groups to voice their demands at the international level. Prove for this statement is this research itself, conducted by a Turkish student working on minority groups in Japan.

The multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of the population living in Japan has been acknowledged by the sociology and political science academia to a large extent however even this acknowledgement is problematic in terms classification of minority groups in Japan. The number of minority groups and foreigners in Japan has increased to a large extent in the last two decades as shown in figure one at chapter one of this research. On the one hand the number of foreigners living in Japan has increased through the facilitation of movement of people under the impact of globalization and on the other hand minority groups in Japan have been empowered by international organizations such as the United Nations and the

International Labor Organization through the creation of communication channels within the process of globalization.

Although there are many discriminative policies towards diverse ethnic and social minorities in Japan the state is still insistent on the equality of citizens and ethnic homogeneity of the nation. Social barriers that these groups face in contemporary Japan are closely related to the state policy. On the one hand the state doesn't protect these groups legally and on the other hand the education system emphasizes the homogeneous nation discourse. Another important factor that allows the state insistence on this ethnic homogeneity myth is the large population size of Japanese which is displayed in Table 1 on the next page.

Table 1:

Population Estimates by Age (5-Year Group) and Sex

Age groups	February 1, 2008 (Final estimates)						July 1, 2008 (Provisional estimates)		
	Total population			Japanese population			Total population		
	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female
	Population (Thousand persons)						Population (Ten thousand persons)		
Total	127,716	62,272	65,444	126,031	61,472	64,559	12772	6225	6546
0 - 4 years old	5,424	2,779	2,645	5,369	2,751	2,618	542	278	264
5 - 9	5,856	3,003	2,853	5,804	2,976	2,828	582	299	284
10 - 14	5,980	3,063	2,917	5,931	3,038	2,893	598	306	292
15 - 19	6,244	3,199	3,045	6,166	3,163	3,003	620	318	303
20 - 24	7,198	3,696	3,502	6,983	3,592	3,391	715	367	348
25 - 29	7,740	3,942	3,798	7,499	3,823	3,676	767	391	376
30 - 34	9,241	4,687	4,554	9,037	4,590	4,447	909	461	448
35 - 39	9,486	4,795	4,691	9,299	4,713	4,586	956	483	473
40 - 44	8,266	4,164	4,103	8,113	4,096	4,016	834	420	414
45 - 49	7,746	3,887	3,860	7,631	3,835	3,796	777	390	387
50 - 54	7,947	3,966	3,981	7,858	3,924	3,934	786	392	394
55 - 59	10,217	5,054	5,164	10,144	5,017	5,127	997	493	504
60 - 64	8,658	4,223	4,435	8,603	4,195	4,408	887	433	454
65 - 69	7,835	3,745	4,090	7,794	3,725	4,069	792	379	413
70 - 74	6,963	3,213	3,750	6,933	3,198	3,735	697	322	375
75 - 79	5,649	2,445	3,204	5,629	2,436	3,193	569	247	323
80 - 84	3,927	1,499	2,428	3,912	1,492	2,420	401	154	246
85 and over	3,338	912	2,425	3,326	908	2,418	342	94	249
Regrouped									
0 - 14 years old	17,260	8,845	8,415	17,104	8,765	8,339	1722	883	840
15 - 64	82,744	41,612	41,132	81,332	40,947	40,385	8248	4148	4100
65 and over	27,712	11,815	15,897	27,594	11,759	15,835	2801	1195	1606
75 and over	12,914	4,857	8,057	12,867	4,836	8,031	1312	494	818
	Percentage distribution (%)								
0 - 14 years old	13.5	14.2	12.9	13.6	14.3	12.9	13.5	14.2	12.8
15 - 64	64.8	66.8	62.9	64.5	66.6	62.6	64.6	66.6	62.6
65 and over	21.7	19.0	24.3	21.9	19.1	24.5	21.9	19.2	24.5
75 and over	10.1	7.8	12.3	10.2	7.9	12.4	10.3	7.9	12.5

Notes) * Figures may not add up to the totals because of rounding.

* Based on the Census population of 2005.

* Final estimates for this month's population will be computed 5 months later using updated sources.

Source: Population Estimates by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (July 2008)

Although minorities account for less than 2% of Japan's population, it is important to note that with its population of approximately 128 million people, Japan has world's 9th largest population. Thus the argument that minorities constitute only a small percentage is overruled by the size of Japanese population in sum as shown in the table 5. In September 1986, the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in his speech said that the Japanese were a homogeneous nation and were therefore more intelligent than other nations. This has led to many

debates and reactions from minority groups however quite interestingly a survey conducted soon after by *Asahi Shinbun* revealed that about 40% of Japanese agreed with the prime ministers view that they were in fact a homogeneous nation (Miyajima, 1997: 128).

Japan has been getting more immigrants since 1980's onwards, and from a wider geographic region. Oommen (1997: 40-1) categorizes Japan's inhabitants in three groups: the first groups includes nationals who are full-fledged citizens, the second groups is ethnies who are nominal citizens and the third group is illegal migrants who are ethnies and non-citizens. However in relation to this use of terminology, Faulks (2000: 30) criticizes Oommen at two points; firstly for his failure to detach citizenship from the state and secondly for his attempt to separate state and nation, and draws attention to the historical development of the state and nation in parallel.

Previously, most immigrants coming to Japan were from Asian countries and former colonies such as China and Korea however in the past decade, the number of immigrants from southeast asia as well as central and south America has increased. This migration pattern was motivated by the need to cover the labor shortage in Japan however many workers were entering the country on tourist visas and overstaying while working illegally. And when discovered, they were being sent back to their home countries.

4. 1 Japan's Minorities

Compared to other countries with large number of ethnic minorities such as Turkey or Belgium, an interesting characteristic of Japan is that on the one hand there are

not many extremist minority groups or terrorist acts to voice their demands for rights and there are no specific xenophobic violent act against these immigrant groups. Discrimination and racism in Japan is mostly expressed through social discrimination (Miyajima, 1997: 129-32) as shown in chapter 3. Howell (1996) underlines that although there is no racial hatred or violence in Japan against minorities, social discrimination is institutionalized and ethnic rights are often bargained between government agencies and ethnic representatives.

There are different views on the foundations of multiculturalism in Japan however the impact of Japanese colonialism is acknowledged to a large extent. Galownin (1824) traces the origins of minority groups in society back to feudal times, before the Meiji Restoration. He argues that Japanese society was strictly hierarchical even before the arrival of foreigners or immigrants and thus the definition of minorities should not be limited by ethnicity in the Japanese case.

Galownin (1824) refers to eight social classes that existed within the Japanese society in the feudal system. The first class he refers to is *Damjo* or reigning princes: this class enjoyed many privileges but their rights differed within the group itself. The dignity of all the reigning princes was hereditary, and properly always belonged to the eldest son thus it passed on to only one male of the family. The second class was *Chadamodo* or nobility: this class also enjoyed many privileges. For example, in case of war, commanding generals were chosen amongst them. This class was similar to *Damjo* in the sense that nobility was also hereditary but there was also an important difference, the father had the option to choose to whom to leave his title and authority. And furthermore, in rare cases the father could leave his title to the son of another family. The third class was referred to as *Bonzes* or priests: this class was composed of ecclesiastics and they were

quite numerous in Japan. This class had the advantage of enjoying luxury, at the expense of others. The fourth class was *Soldiers*, however it is important to note that these differed from higher military class. Members of this class were chosen from the nobility or other classes. The system required for everybody in the service of the Emperor to learn the art of war to fight in a possible outbreak of war and this was considered as an honorable profession in Japan. The fifth class was composed of *Merchants* and members of this class were mostly rich. However they were unable to hold a good place in society despite their wealth because of the general belief that one could only gain so much wealth through dishonorable means. However, although people from this social class were deprived from social respect, they had the purchasing power for anything else they desired. For example, they were able to buy high ranks or job opportunities for their sons. The sixth class was composed of *Mechanics*, this class also included artists as well as mechanics and their rights and privileges were similar to the merchant's class. The seventh class was composed of *Peasants and laborers*, and this class constituted the lowest class of Japan's free inhabitants. This class included all the people who worked at the service of others to earn their living. And lastly, there was a social class of *Slaves*, this class included descendents of war prisoners taken from China and Korea. Quite interestingly, this class also comprised children who were sold by their parents as slaves. Members of this class were entirely in the power of their masters. With reference to this classification put forward by Galownin in 1824, it is important to note that before the arrival of immigrants, the classification and ranking was based on economic class and activities rather than ethnicity or race. On the other hand, as Japan was a conservative, inward oriented and protectionist state there was no

migration from other countries until World War I, until that date most of the foreigners living in Japan were war prisoners, thus slaves.

A contemporary classification of minorities has been done by Howell (1996) who has simplified the minority groups for practical reasons. He identifies five groups and classifies them in three categories; the first category includes three native minorities: Ainu, Ryukyuan and Burakumin; the second category is composed of Korean immigrants who were brought in as slaves during the World War II period and their descendents. And lastly, the third category consists of recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America. Howell elaborates on these groups with reference to their incorporation to, or exclusion from, Japanese identity in both social and legal terms. However this classification also presents a problem in terms of categories, for example in the first category he places Ainu and Ryukyuan which are ethnic minorities with the social minority Burakumin. On the other hand through his emphasis on the Korean minorities, he de-emphasizes other large Asian minority groups such as the Chinese who have also been brought to Japan as slaves during colonization.

All the figures above emphasizes minority groups that have arrived to Japan from the end of 19th century onwards however minorities living I Japan are not limited to these. Thus, the next section will first put emphasis on minority groups that already existed in Japan prior to the end of 19th century and then minorities formed by foreign nationals under the impact of globalization and facilitation of movement of people.

4.1.1 The Ainu

The Ainu are the indigenous people who are accepted as the original inhabitants of the northern part of Japan in Hokkaido. When their lands were incorporated to Japanese territory, the Ainu suffered economic and social colonization under the Japanese government (Kingsbury: 1998). The Ainu were formally incorporated to the Japanese Feudal system at the beginning of 17th century, however through history because of political struggles and economic interests they have been denied Japanese identity or citizenship rights while at the same time being assimilated into Japanese culture.

The island of Hokkaido was called *Ezo* before the Meiji restoration and this is where the assimilation of the Ainu people started with the Meiji restoration. Their lands were exploited for economic reasons and these local people, *dojin*, were despised for their inferiorities and savageness (Weiner, 1997: 11). Thus assimilation was a part of the development discourse projected as one the steps of modernization and development. However in economic terms there was also a close link between the natural resources of the geography on which these people lived. Japan, with its large population has limited land to cultivate thus land is a very valuable asset. The Japanese state projected the idea that Ainu people were incapable of managing the resources that were available to them in Hokkaido and that this was their inferiority.

Photo 2: Map of Hokkaido



Source: www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/¹⁸

The Japanese State's argument in taking the land from the Ainu was based on the large masses of uncultivated land available in the Hokkaido. The Ainu were not an agricultural society, they believed in picking up what the motherland offered them naturally and their main economic activity was fishing. Thus, the Japanese state seized their land, re-allocated the Ainu, dispersed them throughout Japan in different regions and encouraged the movement of agrarians to the Hokkaido region. This state policy was so successful that by the end of the century the Ainu accounted for only 2% of Hokkaido's population. One of the turning points and the institutionalization of the assimilation of the Ainu was the enactment of the Protection Act in 1899 which projected the Ainu as a dying race. This act aimed at assimilating the Ainu population by turning them into farmers and education them

¹⁸ http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/NR/rdonlyres/97176ED3-1F7B-4BB1-8754-1BB7656B9CF4/0/map_shicho.gif

under the national education system (Kibe, 2006; Weiner, 1997: 22-24). In terms of social resistance movements, Siddle (1997) argues that there was the rise of an Ainu movement to improve their conditions in 1920's and 1930's. During these two decades, the first organization to the Hokkaido Ainu was formed: the *Ainu Kyookai* however this movement was weakened after Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945.

The political environment in 1970's enabled the re-emergence of *Ainu Kyokai*. At this period, the social movement had been radicalized and Ainu politics were influenced by both domestic and international movements. We observe globalizations impact of the Ainu minority especially from this period onwards as most developments where in areas of civil rights and human rights. This process can be defined as the ethnic mobilization of the Ainu as they were being re-defined as a nation through the creation of a flag, a history and a homeland (Weiner, 1997: pp.24-25). The Ainu flag first appeared at the May Day parade held in Sapporo in 1973.

Photo 3: The Ainu Flag at the Ainu Museum in Sapporo



Source: Ainu Association in Sapporo, Hokkaido (March, 2007)

The flag was designed by an Aini sculptor, Sunazawa Biki and symbolized “Utari pride, struggle and passion”. On the flag the sea, sky and the earth were represented by light blue and green colors whereas there was also a red-white arrow head which symbolized snow and the Ainu God of fire (Weiner, 1997: p.37)

According to Siddle (1997), the revival of Ainu nationalism was the reconstruction of an ethnic identity as a response to deprivations and structural inequalities (Weiner, 1997). There was a period of rising violence in 1970’s however the main problem was that it wasn’t sure who was carrying out these actions as the police had no suspects but the media was depicting it as the acts of Ainu radicals which harmed the Ainu image even to a further extend. There were also legal attempts, struggles against the media and the negative Ainu image they reflected through TV series, cartoons. On the other hand there were also trials concerning discrimination cases. Siddle argues that the Ainu movement rose precisely because of the government’s denial policy. One of the turning points for the rise of Ainu nationalism was the Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s speech in 1986 where he declared there were no minorities in Japan. Wetherell (2008) also touches upon this discrimination with reference to the case of a survey conducted on the Ainu population in 1993 for which there is an assumption that people living in Japan are either Waijin or Ainu, however this is incurrent as there are many minorities in Japan who would not be classified as Waijin.

At the second half of the 20th century, many Ainu descendents preferred to deny their past because they were being discriminated against in society, thus the will to be recognized as a minority group was replaced by the will of being integrated rather than being pinpointed as “different”. Even among scholars, the willingness to integrate and to preserve the Ainu culture in museums seemed to be

the dominant point of view. This alienation can also be linked to the strong ties established between the government and the *Ainu Kyokai*. The *Ainu Kyokai* was later renamed as *Utari Kyokai* because they were not willing to use the name *Ainu* anymore. The term *inu* meaning “dog” in Japanese cause instances of been mocked for the Ainu minority as the pronunciation of *A-inu* meant; “oh - a dog” in Japanese (Weiner, 1997: 25-28).

Japanese state’s assimilation and discrimination policies continued until the acceptance of the Ainu Culture Promotion Law in 1997. This law is considered as “a mark of progress and success” to correct the image of Japan as embodying ethno-cultural uniformity and to effect change in public policies based upon this ideology (Maher, 2002: 175). An important barrier for the Ainu in gaining rights was their geographic dispersal and even when politicized, there were many different groups within the Ainu that adopted different ideologies. Thus even when they were politicized, there was no unity within the Ainu minority. The *Utari Kyokai* remained as the most powerful group however ironically it was in close relation with the state, it managed to balance its demands with the government’s interests and as a result, on 27th of May 1984, the General Assembly of the association adopted a proposal which clearly marked the rise of Ainu ethno-politics. This was a turning point for the Ainu as well as their transformation from a “dying race” into “indigenous people” in the eyes of *Waijin*. In 1980’s, the Ainu were also becoming more and more active at the international level; they had been widely recognized as indigenous people and were being invited to forums and United Nations activities. In 1980 the Japanese government declared that there were no ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in Japan, this was a denial of the Article 27 of the United Nations Covenant dating from December 16th, 1966.

However this approach was softened in 1988 with a delicate formulation as; “people of the Ainu” have the right to maintain their own culture and religion (Kingsbury, 1998: pp.414-457).

Weiner emphasizes that although the Japanese state is changing its discourse on denial of minority groups, the tradition of presenting these as primitive cultures frozen in time continues (Weiner, 1997). Still, at the Ainu museum in Hokkaido, the Ainu culture is presented as it was frozen in time just as Weiner expresses.

Photo 4: Tools used by the Ainu



Source: Ainu Museum in Sapporo (March, 2007)

The secretary of the Ainu Association in Sapporo defined Ainu culture as:

“Originally the Ainu identify themselves as a separate nation with a different language, religion and culture. They have their own language which is today unfortunately spoken by only few. They have a religious system based on the worship of mother earth. According to their religion, mother earth provides all the things they need, thus they believe in the mother earth and her divine power to nourish them. Their religious belief is also reflected upon their economic activities, they were not farmers but gatherers of food, they took only what the nature had to offer them and they were grateful for it afterwards through religious rites. Fishing was one of their main economic activities which was partially due to their belief system and partially due to their geographic allocation. The Hokkaido Island is a quite rich area in fish, especially Salmon. And they had a custom of storytelling with wise lessons to grasp about the mother earth, these stories are traditionally told from generation to generation and aim at transferring the essence of their culture and beliefs to new generations”.

The emphasis is on their past as tribal clothes and traditional customs but there were no connotation on today’s Ainu population except for the emphasis that their number is unknown and that they are geographically dispersed.

Photo 5: Display of Ainu Artifacts at the Ainu Museum in Sapporo



Source: Ainu Association in Sapporo (March 2007).

The items on display conveyed the message of Ainu minority being a population in the past is emphasized.

4.1.2 Okinawans - Ryukyans

Ryukyuan people are the indigenous people of Ryukyu Islands which are between islands of Kyushu and Taiwan. The Ryukyuan people are composed of three subgroups: Okinawans, Miyako and Yaeyama. They speak Okinawan language which is different from Japanese language even though it's officially treated as a dialect by the Japanese state. The Ryukyuan culture is close to Japanese culture however it has also been affected by the Chinese culture to a large extent.

The Japanese conquered this area in the 17th century however kept the kingdom intact at first in order to benefit from their trade with China. Japan later expanded its sovereignty over the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879 and Japanization of the islands became more intense especially after the Japanese victory in Sino-Japanese war in 1894-5. Although the Cairo Accords of 1943 gave sovereignty to Ryukyuan people, Japanese state tried to get back the Ryukyu Islands (Weiner, 1997). The reason why the islands were so important for Japan is their strategic geographic allocation in the Pacific; these islands are close to Hong Kong, Manila, Taipei, Shanghai and Seoul.

After the World War II, the island was occupied by the US military force and this occupation continued until 1972. The US took over the island in 1952 with the San Francisco Treaty and returned it to Japan in 1972. Approximately 75% of US military force in Japan is stationed in Okinawa and it accounts for 30% of the island's total area. Discontent movements in the region due to the American

existence have increased among the local people especially since 1995. This movement was especially fueled by increasing rape cases committed in the area by American soldiers. An action plan was formulated in 1996 according to which Okinawa will be free of United States military bases by the year 2015¹⁹. Nevertheless, the identity triangle that was created in the region in the 20th century with the Ryukyuan cultural heritage, Japanese domination and United State's occupation has played an important role for the Ryukyuan minority in Japan. Brettell (2006) defines Ryukyuan people as: "ambiguous national subjects under the Imperial Japan and nation-less subjects under US military occupation".

I have arranged a field research to the main island in the Okinawa region and stayed in Okinawa City close to Naha for a week in September 2008. My first impression upon arrival to the island was having left Japan for another country. That is one of the main reasons I refer to them as Ryukyuan rather than Okinawans because it's very different, another reason is because Okinawa is the name given to the islands by the Japanese government. Ryukyuan are aware of their difference from the rest of Japan, to which they refer to as the "mainland" and the impact of the American base is quite evident throughout the main island, in some ways the main island is like little America. For example, although mainland Japan is characterized by railroads and expensive but good public transportation, transportation facilities in Okinawa is not limited to roads and most of the population living on the island owns a car, which is a very uncommon practice in mainland Japan although its very common in the United States. In mainland Japan the main public transportation means are trains and subways, there are both national and private railroad companies and a well developed railroad. Also, in the

¹⁹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm>

mainland, the maintenance of a car and parking spaces are expensive and traffic is tiring so many people either don't have a car or go to work by train even if they have a car to get out of the city on week-ends.

In terms of social environment, fluency in English is also more common than mainland Japan, as I went shopping I was surprised by the store clerk talking to me in English and kept answering him in Japanese. Islanders in Okinawa are less afraid of foreigners compared to mainland Japanese, probably because they are used to interacting with United States citizens living in the area and maybe due to having less stress in their lives compared to crowded and busy Tokyo. Islanders are not afraid to approach foreigners and are talkative. To give an example, in Tokyo, if I am sitting in a train, the seat next to me is usually the last one to be filled in the train wagon. However in contradiction with that, when we went to Okinawa to visit the Shurijo Castle, the guard at the door asked us questions about our nationalities, made comments, talked about other visitors and insisted on taking a picture of me with my friend for us. Such warm social interaction is very uncommon in Tokyo.

Photo 6: Shisa Guardian Lions



Source: Ryukyu Mura – Ryukyu Village in Okinawa City

Culturally the trademark of Okinawa is these two lions called Shisa lions. One of the lions has an open mouth to catch good fortune and the other has a closed mouth to keep the good fortune in. This is very traditional in Okinawa and found at each and every doorstep. Culturally it's as common as the evil eye is in Turkey. Below is a picture of these lions, picture taken from Ryukyu Mura, Ryukyuan village.

In terms of culture, Okinawa is also different from the rest of Japan in terms of clothing, food, music and dances. In terms of clothing, they have lighter clothes compared to the mainland Kimono or yukata culture and women are allowed to wear shorts, this is probably closely related to the tropical climate in the region. In terms of food culture, although seafood is also very common as on the mainland their traditional dishes are very different including the head of the pork, pork ears, taco rice and Okinawan soba (noodles). They also have a famous regional alcoholic drink; aomori which resembles the traditional Japanese sake and they have their own local beer, Orion which is only found on the island but is famous throughout Japan.

In terms of music and dances, Okinawan music and dances are also very famous and popular throughout Japan, they have their own particular songs played with their traditional music instruments such as shown in the picture 7. The instrument on the left is their most famous traditional music instrument, it resembles a guitar and the surface is made from snake skin.

Photo 7: Traditional Okinawan music instruments



Source: Display of Okinawan music instruments from Osaka Museum of Human rights (March,2007).

In Okinawa, there is a touristic re-creational village called *Ryukyu Mura* in Okinawa City. This village is a small re-creation of the traditional life style of the island and Ryukyuan kingdom. The village includes a show with the traditional lions that are symbols of Okinawa as well as traditional Okinawan music and dances. The picture on the next page was taken in Ryukyu Mura after their show with the symbolic king and queen of Ryukyu Islands in their traditional clothes. Also, on the sides are the traditional Okinawan drummers in their traditional costumes which are also very famous.

Photo 8: Symbolic King and Queen and Drummers in Ryukyu Mura



Source: Ryukyu Mura – The Ryukyuan Village in Okinawa City (September 2008)

My impression from Okinawa today was that it's neither Ryukyuan nor Japanese nor American but has become a mixture of all three cultures. An important factor for me to realize this was my stay over at my American friend's home in Okinawa City. My friend has American parents but a Japanese name; Midori. She was born and raised in Okinawa but is an American citizen. She had left Okinawa few years ago to get her collage education in the United States however being born and raised in Okinawa, she felt alienated while in the United States and came back to the island to finish her education in Okinawa and to live there as long as she could. Her best friend Judy, also an American citizen, was also in a similar position. The most striking fact for me was their identification with the island and their attachment to Ryukyuan culture rather than Japan in general. Also, they have been integrated to the Island society to a great extent compared to foreigners living on the mainland. However at this point it is also important to note that it is easier for Americans to get social acceptance in Japan compared to other minority groups due to the American influence on Japan since World War II.

4.1.3. Burakumin

The case of the Burakumin minority in Japan is quite different from other minority groups. The Burakumin have Japanese citizenship and legal rights and although not an ethnic minority, are being discriminated against on the basis of their occupation or rather their ancestor's occupation and lifestyles. They have been excluded from society mainly because they are working on dead animals for leather and their work is considered to be impure and dirty.

The formation of the Burakumin minority has been through the bloodline. Thus, they form a group of Japanese citizens from the mainland Japanese race who are subject to status discrimination in society at large (Wetherall, 2008). The identification of a Burakumin requires research on family background as there are no visible differences and the discrimination is based on bloodties and ancestor occupation rather than ethnicity. The Burakumin minority have no particular cultural, linguistic or religious difference from the Japanese population at large. The Japanese state denies their minority status however they continue to suffer from discrimination mostly in terms of employment, schooling of children and marriage (Miyajima, 1997: 122-3).

In terms of schooling, members of the Burakumin minority have difficulty in getting good education since they cannot enter prestigious schools due to their bloodline and social status. In economic terms, they are not able to get good jobs due to their poor schooling and even if they do go through schooling, they are often discriminated against in the job market as their bloodline is revealed in the back research. Also, in social terms it is difficult for them to find brides since that means marrying into a minority and to be discriminated against in the future.

Photo 9: A Burakumin work stand from Osaka Human Rights Museum



Source: Osaka Human Rights Museum (March 2007).

The discrimination discourse against Burakumin minority group has been transformed through modernization and this minority has been deprived from economic benefits of capitalism and processes of modernization and industrialization. The discrimination discourse that was based on impurity and unhygienic work was transformed into a discrimination discourse based on poverty, low level of education and ignorance, thus failure to fulfill basic Japanese citizenship duties (Weiner, 1997: 50-56).

Arguments on whether the Burakumin are ethnically different do exist within the academia. There are arguments about their descendant from slaves or Koreans minority or even lost tribes of Israel that somehow ended up in Japan. However these are considered as attempts to exclude and differentiate the minority from the population at large.

The discrimination against the Burakumin minority is referred to as the *Dowa* issue and the Japanese state denies existence of such discrimination policies on the basis that *Dowa* people belong to the Japanese race and are Japanese nationals. That is why in Japanese they are referred to as *Dowa* rather than Burakumin because *Dowa* means equality and harmony. The previous policy on the Burakumin was *duwa* which referred to integration and harmony (Wetherall, 2008).

4.2 Foreigners (?) in Japan

Classification of Japanese minority groups is a rather difficult task since they have so many different characteristics as seen in the previous three groups. The starting point for the classification of foreign minorities in Japan for this research was to evaluate the official data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications on the website of Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute²⁰:

²⁰ <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/02.htm>

Table 2: Registered Aliens by Status of Residence (Permanent Residents, Non-permanent Residents, 2003)

Status of residence	Total
Permanent Residents (PR) ²¹	742,963
Non-Permanent Residents (NPR)	1,172,067
Total	1,915,030

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications on the website of Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute

According to the table above, the total number of non- citizens who were living in Japan in 2003 and who completed their alien registration at the immigration office was 1,915,030. The table below displays citizenships of these foreigners:

Table 3: Registered Aliens by Region of nationality and Status of Residence (Permanent Residents, Non-permanent Residents, 2003)

	<u>Asia</u>	<u>America, North</u>	<u>America, South</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Oceania</u>	<u>No - nationality</u>
PR	661,019	10,160	61,936	6,861	1,489	1,031	467
NPR	761,960	53,111	281,699	50,302	8,571	15,045	1,379
Total	1,422,979	63,271	343,635	57,163	10,060	16,076	1,846

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications on the website of Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute

As shown at the table 3 above, 1,422,979 of registered aliens were from Asian countries. At this point it is important to note that this number also includes Korean Residents, Zainichi who have been living in Japan for generations but who refuse to apply for Japanese citizenship as they don't want to renounce their Korean identities for the sake of obtaining Japanese citizenship. Numbers of Asians in terms of distribution by nationality is presented at Table 4 below:

²¹ From this point onwards acronyms PR and NPR will be used in tables.

Table 4: Registered Aliens from Asia by Status of Residence (Permanent Residents, Non-permanent Residents, 2003)

	<u>Korea</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Philippines</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Indonesia</u>	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Other</u>
Total	613,791	462,396	185,237	34,825	22,862	23,853	14,234	65,781
PR	511,563	86,727	39,759	5,448	1,084	6,276	1,528	8,634
NPR	102,228	375,669	145,478	29,377	21,778	17,577	12,706	57,147

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications on the website of Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute

Another striking figure is the number of registered aliens from South American with 343,635. The composition of the category by nationality is as follows:

Table 5: Registered Aliens from South America by Status of Residence (Permanent Residents, Non-permanent Residents) (2003)

	<u>America, South</u>	<u>Brazil</u>	<u>Peru</u>
PR	61,936	41,788	17,218
NPR	281,699	232,912	36,431
Total	343,635	274,700	53,649


Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications on the website of Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute

This number includes 274,700 Brazilian citizens of which 41,788 are permanent residents and 232,912 are non-permanent residents. There are also 53,649 Peruvians of which 17,218 are permanent residents and 36,431 are non-permanent residents. And lastly, there are 15,286 citizens from other countries in South America.²² This population will be explained to a larger extend under the topic of Nikkeijin within this chapter.

²² More precise data on classification by nationality can be reached through the Ministry's website: <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/02.htm>

According to the data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2003, the highest number of foreign nationalities in Japan is ordered as; 613,791 Koreans; 462,396 Chinese, 274,700 Brazilians and 185, 237 Filipinos. In addition to this data, The Immigration Bureau under the Ministry of Justice have also provides data on foreign nationals in Japan, in terms of percentages. This data dates from December 2004 and the distribution is portrayed at figure 1 seen below:

Figure 3: The Ministry of Justice, Number of Registered Foreign Nationals in Japan:



Source: The website of Immigration Bureau under the Ministry of Justice²³

Although their number is remarkably high at almost 2 million, registered foreign nationals in Japan are excluded from the political sphere on the basis that ‘sovereignty rests with the Japanese nation’ as indicated in Article one of the constitutional law (Miyajima, 1997: 127).

²³ <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>

Japan's foreign population has been increasing especially since 1985 due to economic conditions in Asia and geographically, this increase is reflected through regional concentration of foreigners in Japan (Chung, 2003). For example, there is regional concentration of Koreans in certain neighborhoods and cities which is also the outcome of the colonization period between 1910 and 1945. This regional distribution is also affected by the availability of job opportunities in certain regions and sectors. For example, the number of Koreans residing in rural areas being limited is explained in economic terms as most Koreans run businesses such as game shops and barbecue restaurants in urban areas (Tsuneo, 2006: 143-5).

4.2.1 Koreans

Rights of Koreans residents in Japan has become a hot topic especially in East Asian studies and human rights. The Korean minority composed of second – third generation Koreans who were born and raised in Japan are currently struggling for equal treatment as they are being discriminated against on the basis of their Korean identity (Okano, 1997).

A large number of Koreans migrated to Japan from 1910 onwards after Japan's colonization of Korea, the biggest wave of migration from Korea to Japan was in 1930's and 1940's. Koreans were bought in mostly under the form of forced labor to work in mines and factories (Morris-Suzuki, 2005; Miyajima, 1997). However during this period, immigrants from colonies were granted Japanese citizenship upon their arrival and were in return required to take Japanese names and speak Japanese fluently. According to Miyajima (1997) the main aim was to

keep the homogeneous appearance of Japan and to guarantee cultural assimilation which was inseparable from legal citizenship (Miyajima, 1997).

The classification of Koreans as aliens living in Japan dates from 1952 the San Francisco Peace Treaty after the end of Japan's occupation of Korea. After the official ending of the occupation with this peace treaty, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular on the 19th of April according to which Korea's independence was recognized and thus all Koreans²⁴ living in Japan lost their Japanese citizenship. This legal change cost Koreans living in Japan their social rights and limited social welfare services for them (Miyajima, 1997: 125). Thus during this period Koreans living in Japan were presented with two choices, either to choose Korean citizenship or to naturalize to become Japanese citizens. However the latter involved assimilation and renouncement of Korean identity. At this point it is also important to note that differentiation between North Koreans "special permanent residents" and South Koreans "Korean permanent residents" did not yet exist at Japanese state's level (Tsuneo, 2006: 141). In 1965, with the "Japan – Republic of Korea Normalization Treaty", Koreans were granted 'permanent resident' permits and they were also allowed to naturalize into Japanese citizenship. Nevertheless the *jus sanguinis* principle of nationality by origin was been a major barrier for the Koreans acquisition of Japanese citizenship even until second and third generation Korean residents (Miyajima, 1997: 126). By the year 1990, 323,000 South Koreans were granted permanent residence permit and 268,000 were granted permanent residence on an exceptional basis.

²⁴ This was not issued against Koreans only, Taiwanese also lost their nationality rights on the same date with Koreans with the same treaty.

There are different estimations on the Korean population living in Japan although the difference in estimation is about 15,000 this does not affect much the overall proportion of Korean minority within Japanese population. According to Kibe (2006: 416) their number is around 950,000 of which 640,000 are registered foreigners and the rest have either naturalized to become Japanese citizens or are children of a Korean - Japanese intermarriage. On the other hand according to Chang (2003), Koreans without Japanese citizenship constitute approximately 625,000 whereas according to Miyajima and Suzuki they constitute 700,000 of Japan's population (Miyajima, 1997: 123; Suzuki, 2003). In both cases, Koreans equal approximately 0.005% of the total population in Japan. This is a quite low percentage when we consider other immigrant ethnic minorities demanding citizenship rights in other countries. However at this point it is important to remember that as indicated in chapter 3; Japan is the 7th most densely populated country in the World. Also, Korean minority's demands arise not only from the number of Koreans within the population at large but the length of time for which they have been living in Japan. For example more than 90% of this Korean minority was born and raised in Japan and Miyajima (1997: 123) underlines that in 1984 only 0.8% or 5107 of Korean minority naturalized to become Japanese citizens.

In terms of citizenship, even Korean minority families who have been living in Japan for two or three generation are not granted citizenship unless naturalized. So this leads to the following question: why to naturalize or not to naturalize? From the Korean minority perspective, as they have been living in Japan for generations, they want to enjoy the benefits of citizenship as other Japanese residents. At this point it is also important to note that most of these Koreans haven't been to Korea,

cannot speak Korean and use Japanese names. However they are not willing to sacrifice their Korean identity or to denounce the idea of Korea as homeland. The dilemma lies here: Koreans are not demanding citizenship because they “feel” Japanese but because they want to enjoy citizenship rights as they were also born and raised in Japan like Japanese citizens although they have Korean ancestors (Chung, 2000).

The peculiarity of the Korean minority is that they have been assimilated to a large extent. For example, according to a survey conducted in 1986, 75% of Koreans living in Japan have adopted Japanese names however the naturalization rate still remains low because naturalization is perceived as a failure to preserve identity or defeat in terms of assimilation. The use of Japanese names by the Korean minority is quite common and is mostly to prevent social discrimination; some Koreans prefer to use their Japanese names in public in order to avoid social discrimination. Historically, this can also be linked to assimilation policies of the colonial era as in 1940 with *Sooshi kaimei* colonial subjects were obliged to change their names in order to assimilate. They were given six months to do so and if not comply, they were to be discriminated against. This has also led to the introduction of the family name system in Korea. Suzuki (2006) defines the insistence on Japanese name as a loyalty test on the part of Korean minority.

4.2.1.1 Alternative Citizenship Claims: Koreans in Japan

Research in Japanese citizenship focuses mainly on the legal aspects of citizenship rather than cultural acceptance in society (Tsuneo, 2006: 142). However there are attempts in the academia to re-define Japanese citizenship for the sake of the

Korean minority. Kibe (2006) emphasizes the different distribution of rights and duties, and public policies related to the Korean minority and proposes the use of the term “differentiated citizenship”. Kibe argues that there is need for different classification of the Korean minority because its more suitable for the stable and pluralistic society. Differentiated citizenship presents three advantages,

“(1) disconnects citizenship from nationality, (2) aims at cultural plurality instead of uniformity, and (3) affirms positively some in-between status between national and non-national categories.” (Kibe, 2006).

Another citizenship formulation for the Korean minority is put forward by Kashiwazaki (2000: 455–60) who introduces the notion of “denizenship” and argues that it suits the Korean case due to their demands as rejection of naturalization, preservation of ethnic identity and profit from citizenship rights. These two alternative proposals are radical in the sense that they propose the stressing of Korean identity within Japanese citizenship. Wetherall (2008) defines these as utilitarian approaches for the Korean minority to benefit from citizenship rights while emphasizing their difference from Japanese citizens. However this presents a contradiction with Japanese state policy and renders these ideas radical.

4.2.2 Nikkeijin

The Nikkeijin minority is formed of descendents of Japanese citizens who migrated to Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Peru at the beginning of 20th century and who have recently been returning to Japan. The first generation of this minority group doesn’t encounters any legal problems when they return to Japan if they still hold their Japanese citizenship, second or third generation

members on the other hand are given status of “spouse or child of Japanese citizen” or “permanent resident”. This minority group has the advantage of working for higher wages when compared to illegal workers from the same countries (Sellek, 1997: 189). However they work in three “K” jobs that mainland Japanese citizens don’t want to work in: *kitanai* (dirty), *kiken* (dangerous), *kitsui* (demanding).

At the beginning of 20th century Japan had a surplus population at the rural area and Brazil needed labor workforce so Brazil started recruiting Japanese laborers from 1908 onwards and this was supported by both governments. The Brazilian government traditionally preferred European immigrants in order to ‘whiten’ its population however since the immigrants from Europe couldn’t meet the demand for workers in numbers the Brazilian government decided to take in immigrants from Asia. At that period in history, Japan was gaining prestige at the international arena after its victory over Russia in 1905. That was one of main reasons why Brazil started taking in Japanese immigrants. As governments cooperated in this process, Brazilian government paid for their trip costs and Japanese government provided its citizens with guidance before they left for Brazil. The Japanese government aimed to facilitate the permanent settlement of the Japanese agrarians in Brazil and the number of Japanese agrarian immigrants increased year by year. The number of immigrants was about 8,800 per year in first few years and peaked at 23,000 in 1933. The Brazilian government then introduced a quota to limit the number of incomers to only 2% of the previously admitted in last fifty years (Brody, 2000: 68-72). Japan’s foreign policy was also influential on Japanese citizens living abroad. The Japanese living in Brazil became less and less popular due to Japan’s aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, Japanese citizens living in Brazil became more nationalist as they faced problems.

Tsuda (2001: 413-4) argues that today they are once more emphasizing their Japanese identity as the Japanese state has become prestigious once again.

The number of Japanese ancestry living in Brazil reached 1,280,000 by 1994. Today their profile has changed, they are a respected and well educated minority group and they sum up to 10% of university enrollment in Brazil. At some cases they are being recruited by Japanese companies while living in Brazil and some are returning to Japan in order to work for jobs that require lower skills, with higher wages and more secure environment.

In case of Japanese citizenship, the Nikkeijin are allowed to work without immigration restrictions. Although second and third generations not holding Japanese citizenship had difficulties returning to Japan until 1990, a special status has been granted to them from 1990's onwards. 80% of the Nikkeijin population in Japan works in low skill industries and they encounter social discrimination. Even if they consider themselves Japanese, in some situations they are not perceived so by the society at large, hence they are often discriminated against and mocked about their language barriers, accents or Latino heritage (Miyajima, 1997: 134).

Reyes-ruiz, (2007:152) underlines that according to 2002 Japanese Immigration Office records, there were 70,000 Latin Americans in Japan and of these, 80% were Nikkeijin who have a claim of Japanese ancestry. However besides the Nikkeijin, there is also an estimation of 50,000 illegal Latinos about 6,000 of them being women working in the sex industry mostly from Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. Most of the Latino minority in Japan works in jobs that require low or no skill at all. The research conducted by Reyes-Ruiz (2007: 153) has revealed that these Latinos are often subject to discrimination and harassment from Japanese supervisors at the

workplace. The discrimination the Nikkeijin minority faces has tied them together, Reyes-Ruiz gives the example of a Latino community in Yokohama region where small business owned by Latinos which are not listed in telephone directories and are only publicized through social networks within the community. Under this framework Reyes Ruiz refers to Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" and argues that the Latinos have imagined an audience to become a 'community' (Reyes-ruiz, 2007: 154).

In the case of the Nikkeijin, through the increase of immigrants in number, their rights have also increased to a certain extend through diplomatic networks. For example the Nikkeijin of second or third generation are allowed to vote for their national elections at designated sites in Japan and they have favorable tax laws in purchasing business and property. In cultural terms, events are organized as a part of diplomatic mission. However Reyes-ruiz (2007) argues that Latin America still lacks behind in its diplomatic mission due to its lack of resources. On the other hand Japanese politicians are using them for political purposes and attributing them crimes committed by immigrants in order to get more votes. Although diplomatically these problems are acknowledged, they lack the power or resources to prevent trafficking or harsh working conditions of Latinos. In the Nikkeijin case, when diplomatic networks fail, there are also religious networks that are being effective in terms of support. For example Christian guidance in Spanish is provided and the church helps the women working in sex industry to get out of the sector and to go back to their home country if they wish so (Reyes-ruiz, 2007: 157-8).

At the community level, education has also become an important problem for the Nikkeijin children, especially when parents have uncertainties about their future.

For instance sometimes the parents are not sure whether they would stay in Japan for a long time or go back to Latin America or even to another country, like the United States. So they usually prefer bilingual schools but don't have much choice (Reyes-ruiz, 2007; Brody, 2000).

Brody (2000: 37-8) argues that Nikkeijin do have an advantage compared to other minority groups, and an important one, they have the advantage of blood, ethnicity. In Japan there usually is a problem of accepting migrants in cultural terms however since the Japanese emphasis on race Nikkeijin have a comparative advantage. However at this point it is important to note that, as noted within this chapter, ethnicity doesn't guarantee social acceptance in Japan and Nikkeijin are also subject to discrimination.

One of the main problems the Japanese state is having with this minority groups is the creation of false Nikkeijin which are referred to *chicas*. Basically, these are illegal immigrants who want to profit from Nikkeijin rights although they don't belong to this minority. The harm is two ways in this case as the Nikkeijin have also lost credibility due to *chicas* (Reyes-ruiz, 2007).

4.2.3 Chinese

Chinese started moving to Japan from as early as mid 1600's and the number increased during Japan's colonization as they were being imported as worker slaves (Brody, 2000: 43). Taiwan was also colonized after in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese war and thus most of the Chinese foreigners came in who waves; after

1899 and after 1920's, but a large population left around 1931 following the Manchuria Incident²⁵.

Within the Chinese minority in Japan, Komai (2006) touches upon the category of War orphans referring to Japanese women and orphans who were separated from their family and who had remained in China after World War II. The orphans were mostly adopted and women had to get married in order to survive. Most of these were from the provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin. As Japan's relations with China were normalized in 1972, Japanese government took action in promoting the return of these Japanese nationals left behind in time of war and the expenses were to be paid by the Japanese state. Nonetheless it was difficult for these people to locate their families in Japan, thus number of returnees remained low. Only 12 people returned in 1993 although the Japanese government was encouraging the return of these women and their settlement in Japan with state support. In 1994, "Law to Promote the Smooth Reentry of Japanese Nationals Left Behind in China etc. and to Support Their Independence Following reentry" was enforced. In consequence, from 1973 until 1998, 5326 Chinese return to Japan at state expense. However most of these people were over 50 years old, and upon their return to Japan, they were given Japanese language and customs classes. The state aimed at settling them at the countryside however many resisted and moved to metropolitan cities like Tokyo. They faced many problems most importantly adaptation difficulties and language barriers. Only 60% of these returnees were working and when the rest were asked why they were not working, 68% answered because of old age and illness.

²⁵ The South Manchuria Railway, near Mukden was dynamited and Japan accused Chinese for this event and used it as an excuse to invade Manchuria.

The Japanese state also facilitated for the offspring of Chinese minority to come to Japan. And according to statistics, there were about 50,000 to 60,000 Chinese citizen registered as aliens under this category. This means that every returning orphan had brought back on average 10 family members (Komai, 2006: 60-4).

4.2.4 Filipinos

In recent years, the number Filipinas immigrating to Japan have increased and this increased is often explained by the marriage patterns in modern Japanese society. In 1992, 95% of marriages with female foreigners were with Filipinas. From the Japanese point, this is mainly due to the fact that Japanese Farmers are having difficulties finding brides partly due to decreasing population in rural areas and partly due to their non-prestigious jobs as farmers. On the other hand, from the Filipina point of view, these women were obtaining visas to live in a more secured environment without fear from deportation (Sellek, 1994: 193).

In contemporary Japanese society, as the level of education for Japanese women increased, it became more difficult for Japanese farmers to find Japanese brides. On the one hand because farmers are being despised for their highly physical work and on the other hand the Japanese women are unwilling to live in the country in the *ie* system, as explained in chapter 2. Consequently, this has led to the importation of Brides from the Philippines since 1980's. In 1989 alone, 3210 visas were issued for Filipina brides. While Japanese women don't want to be out in the land married to men working in hard labor, for Filipinas this is an opportunity to marry up to social and economic security. Although this is launched

as a dream come true for most Filipinas, some who have high expectations are disappointed upon their arrival in Japan when they see the social status of farmers in Japan. An important characteristic of this migration pattern is the government support behind it. This project is supported by diplomatic and economic agreements between Japan and Philippines (Scully, 2002: 397-401).

There are also Filipinas who enter Japan as illegal workers rather than brides. This has become a social and economic problem in Japan since the number of foreign Asian women working in the sex industry is increasing. This trend can be traced back to the end of 1970's when the number of Filipinas, Thai, Korean and Taiwanese women coming to Japan to work in the "entertainer" sector started increasing.

4.3 Legal Reforms on Japanese Citizenship under the Impact of Globalization

4.3.1 Empowerment of Civil Society

Civil society organizations have long played an important role in minority group's acquisition of rights everywhere in the world as well as in Japan. Globalization and communication network created through the process of globalization has played an important role in the empowerment of civil society organizations.

The development of civil society in Japan and its role has been different from the west. Japanese civil society has traditionally been in close ties with the political authorities which rendered it non-civil in nature according to some academics. In these terms Japanese third sector resembles Turkish third sector. Under this framework, also similar to the Turkish case, local municipalities in

Japan sometimes work as civil society organizations based on the needs and conditions of those geographic regions in particular. This has mostly been the outcome of increased migration and empowerment of minority groups within regions. In 1980s there were attempts to empower local bodies for the sake of *minsai gaiko*, people's international diplomacy. Thus civil society organizations in Japan function differently in different regions in accordance with the population living in that region (Komai, 2006: 120-2). It is important to note that with the impact of globalization and the empowerment of civil society under international support, civil society organizations in Japan especially the ones working for minority rights have started to take a stand against the Japanese state with reference to international agreements and conventions. For example, The Japan Civil Liberties Union has been putting pressure on the Japanese government using the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination"²⁶ to change the wording in laws with reference to the discriminative discourse. However this process also has critics, Wetherall (2008) argues that this would cause the racial classification of people living in Japan and would eventually lead to a worse racial discrimination discourse in consequence.

In terms of civil society organizations working for minority rights, Korean civil society activism and achievements have become inspiring for other minority groups in Japan although. Korean minority's civil society activism dates back from

²⁶ "This Convention requires countries to condemn all forms of racial discrimination, whether based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and to pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination. Countries must guarantee everyone's right to equality before the law, and to various political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. The ICERD recognizes that affirmative action measures may be necessary to achieve these ends. Unfortunately, the Convention does not make any specific reference to discrimination against women in the context of race discrimination. The Convention establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which is empowered to consider complaints from other countries about violations of the ICERD and, in certain circumstances, individual or group complaints. Its role is also to monitor progress towards full implementation of the Convention in the countries that have ratified the Convention". <http://www.iwtc.org/ICERD.html>

1950's, when Korea was divided into two countries, half under Soviet control and half under US control. In 1945 the League of Koreans was established in order to facilitate the life of Korean minority in Japan through cultural and language education. However this organization later became politicized and announced its support for North Korea's regime under the Soviet Union. This was a problem since the general belief of Korean minority in Japan was that the partition would soon end. In 1948 schools they had opened were closed down and violent activism began which led to the abolishment of the league. Some former members joined the Japanese Communist Party and believed that communism would spread on to China and then to Japan. However during the Korean war in 1952 when the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced it was ready to enter diplomatic relations with Japan, consequently tables turned and Chongryun was formed in May 1955 (Ryang, 2005).

Chongryun, General Association of Korean Residents in Japan is an organization and a community at the same time. This is a civil society organization for North Koreans. However due to diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, some North Koreans had to take South Korean nationality when they were given the choice of either South Korean nationality or a "no nationality" paper from the Japanese government. Chongryun announced that they were not political and through their work Korean minority in Japan became North Korea's overseas citizens. They also preserved and presented the belief that Korea will be united in the future.

Chongryun re-organized ethnic education for the Korean minority in Japan in order to teach about Korean heritage however in order to be independent from the Japanese government control over their education system they had to finance

themselves. During this period in history, South Korea was perceived as a military dictatorship under American influence thus North Korea was emphasized to a larger extent in their ethnic education. In 1965 the Japanese government recognized South Korea as a nation state thus Korean minority in Japan gained “permanent resident” status. They were presented with the choice of *kankoku* which refers to South Korea and *Choosen* which refers to Korea in general with no reference to North Korea. But even today they identify themselves closer to North Korea. They have revised their teaching curriculum and have included more information about Japan but their affiliation to North Korea remains.

One of the most effective activities of Chongryun was the *Zainichi Chôsenjin Sôrengôkai* project which aimed to promote repatriation. This project was also supported by the Japanese government and the Red Cross. However the support of the Japanese government led to suspicions within the Korean minority. There were social arguments behind this suspicion. Firstly, there was the argument that Japanese government wanted to send back Korean immigrants and their descendents because of the perception of high crime rate committed by Korean minority. Secondly, there was the perception that government wanted to shrink the size of Korean community in Japan. Besides these social arguments, there were also economic arguments; before 1952 members of Korean minority in Japan were entitled to receive state aid as citizens from colonies. Although their citizenship rights were taken away in 1952, the Japanese government couldn't abolish the state aid in fear of social disruption. However over the years these aids had become an economic burden on the Japanese government as well as increasing demands for political rights, thus it was in the advantage of the Japanese state also for them to return to Korea.

Today, Korean civil society organizations are especially concentrated with the issue of local voting rights and have in return received many counter attacks from Japan's conservative circles. The major weakness of Korean civil society organizations in Japan is the lack of unity within the Korean minority and their heterogeneous nature due to the division in Korean politics. This is mainly caused by the division between North Korea and South Korea which is also reflected on the associations representing them in Japan as well as in the international arena (Chung, 2000).

Other minority groups in Japan also have their civil society organizations working to defend their rights. For example the most influential Nikkeijin organizations are; Nikkeijin Advisory Center of Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai, Toyota International Organization and Homigaoka International Center, Nagoya International Center, the Aichi International Association and the Catholic Church affiliated Mikokoro Center. In terms of activities; The Advisory Center of Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai provides the Nikkeijin minority with support in terms of consultation services. The Toyota International Association was established especially for the interest of Nikkeijin working at Toyota Town and it focuses on the education of adult Nikkeijin. Homigaoka International Center emphasizes education and is mostly run by volunteer teachers with limited resources.

The Filipinos don't have as many civil society organizations however like in the case of the Latino community the church also plays an important role in terms of their socialization. Although there are debates in the academia on whether religious groups could be considered as civil society organizations or not, their functioning does render differentiation rather difficult in the case of minorities in Japan. For example on the third Sunday of every month about 1000 Filipinos are

meeting at the Akabane Church and this is more of a social gathering rather than religious one (Komai, 2006).

The Zenkoku Suihei-Sha was founded in 1922 and was later transformed into Burakumin Liberation League and the “International Movement against Discrimination Based on Race” was established by the Burakimin Liberation League in 1988. This civil society organization focuses on Burakumin people but also helps other migrant workers with their problems. This civil society organization has been quite effective to a large extent due to its deliberative status under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Komai, 2006: 134-6).

Some other civil society organizations that function for the benefit of minority groups in Japan which have headquarters in Tokyo are, HELP – Asian Women’s Shelter, *Kalabaw no Kai*; Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS). These civil society organizations have had some success in gaining rights through their mediation with central government organs such as Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare, and Justice on issues concerning settlement and visas for foreigners. In terms of education of minority groups in Japan, there are 336 private institutions with 6511 volunteer workers as teachers and total of 83086 foreigners studying. Unfortunately most of these remain insufficient due to inadequacy of financial resources (Komai, 2006: 135-7).

4.3.2 Education of Minorities in Japan

In Japan only 5000 Japanese public schools have special Japanese language classes to serve 17,300 foreign students. However prior to outlining education of minorities, it is important to lay out the basics of Japanese education system.

Education in Japan is mostly based on equality and uniformity. The teachers are there to facilitate the development of group consciousness rather than to regulate relations between children. The emphasis is on children's relations with each other rather than the teacher's relations with the children. Thus from childhood onwards children learn to function as a part of the homogeneous society that they grow into (Tobin, 1989).

From 1950's till early 1980's Japanese laws on foreigners living in Japan were mainly formulated to regulate relations with the Korean minority (Tsuneo, 2006: 145). In terms financing schooling of minority groups, the Japanese government provides only limited funds. However education is very important for the Korean minority in terms of passing their cultural heritage to next generations so they underline ethnic education, *minzoku kyoiku*. The aim is to cultivate ethno-cultural identity among Korean minority children through the teaching of language, history, culture and society. The Korean minority had established many schools in Japan during the colonial era however most of these were closed down by the Japanese ministry of education in 1949, and the ministry approved only three schools to continue teaching. Although Korean schools were re-established after 1955, today approximately 90% of Korean children are attending Japanese schools (Tsuneo, 2006: 144). However Korean parents who affiliate themselves with North Korea prefer for their children to attend Chongryun schools because they believe that their children are being bullied and discriminated against in Japanese public schools. Korean children in Japan have especially had more problems from September 2002 onwards, since the North Korean government admitted to have kidnapped Japanese citizens. Thus political relations are also having a great impact on the schooling of minorities. In this case members of Korean minority faced the

accusation of being attached to a terrorist state (Ryang, 2005: 235-6). Ethnic education remains problematic especially in terms of higher education because graduates from Korean schools are not eligible to apply to national universities in Japan (Furukawa and Menju, 2003: 8).

The central Japanese state and most of the municipalities are not doing much for the special needs of these minority groups' children. However there are exceptions, for example in Osaka where foreigners constitute 10 to 20 % of the population, there are ethnic classes where foreign teachers are employed to teach minority groups' children. However the central government is not pleased with the expenses at the local level. This is an example of providing local solutions to local needs which has slowly started becoming popular in Japan in terms of granting rights to minority groups. This can also be explained by globalization's empowerment of local bodies. There is also a similar case in the Kanagawa prefecture of Tokyo where special bi-lingual teaching classes have been established for Nikkeijin children (Miyajima, 1997: 138).

The Nikkeijin minority in Japan is mostly focused on earning money and this leads the parents to neglect their children's education. This carelessness of the parents endangers these children's future in terms of higher education and employment opportunities. These children need special attention and facilities in order to adapt to the Japanese education system and culture. However most often, if the child attends a Japanese public school with no tutoring, s/he has a very little chance of entering university in the future due to the language barrier (Brody, 2000: 120-30). Japanese language difficulties are causing for more immigrants' children to drop out of school especially in the case of Nikkeijin. Their language

barrier is also having a negative impact on their social life as it's also difficult for them to socialize make friends.

Each minority group in Japan has different problems and concerns on education according to the need of their community. For example on the one hand Korean minority emphasizes ethnic education for their young generations whereas the Nikkeijin focuses on social adaptation and language issues.

4.3.3 Inter-State Relations and International Agreements

International relations and diplomacy have played an important role in the Japanese states positioning on minority groups and immigrants. There are both positive and negative examples. On the one hand we see the importation of brides from Philippines through the cooperation of two states or the organization of cultural events for Latinos in cooperation with Latino countries. But on the other hand there are also negative examples like the hostile relations between Japan and North Korea causing additional obstacles for the Korean minority in Japan.

Japan recognized South Korea diplomatically in 1965 and afterwards Koreans willing to take South Korean citizenship have been treated as permanent residents if born in Japan or have been living there since 1945. On the other hand as North Korea was not diplomatically recognized, North Koreans were treated as resident aliens, not North Koreans. However there has been a gradual liberalization in the granting of permanent residence to North Koreans on an exceptional basis. The recognition of the South Korean government in 1965 has burdened the Japanese government with the responsibility to take into consideration their opinion in matters that affect the Korean minority in Japan. The democratization of

South Korea has also led to Japanese worries of public image in South Korea (Tsuneo, 2006: 150).

Nationality Act and Family Registration Act were revised in 1984 and foreigners willing to take Japanese citizenship were required to change their names to Japanese sounding names that could be written in Japanese characters. Miyajima (1997) links this to Marshall's division of citizenship into three elements: civil, political and social and this situation fits the social element which was defined as:

“whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share fully in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Miyajima, 1997)

Japan ratified the convention on the status of refugees and protocol in 1981 through which Japanese government was obliged to establish a new legal system for the equal treatment of foreign nationals especially in terms of social security and social welfare. Thus prerequisites for the health insurance and worker pensions were abolished in 1982 and 1986 respectively. However still as there is no transnational pension system, in order to join this system one must continue living in Japan after retirement, thus this narrows down the number of people who could join in as some still would like to return to their homeland after retirement (Miyajima, 1997: 127).

In 1991, a memorandum aimed at reforming Japanese Alien Registration Law and the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was signed by the foreign ministers of Japan and Korea. The aim was to change discriminatory practices against Korean minority in Japan and it covered practical issues such as alien registration, immigration control, appointment of permanent resident to public offices as well as education and appointment of teachers in public schools. In 1992 all Korean permanent residents were made “special permanent residents” thus the

impact of the memorandum was extended to all Korean residents. Furthermore, registration of foreigners with fingerprinting was abolished and multiple re-entry permits valid five years were introduced for special permanent residents.

There are many international agreements and norms that have been effective from the second half of the twentieth century onwards. For example the ratification of the “International Covenant on Human Rights” in 1979 improved the situation of minorities and especially resident-alien Koreans to great extent. On the other hand although Japan hasn’t ratified it yet, the “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” indicates that cultural autonomy was to be preserved as human rights (Komai, 2006: 93-6). “International Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child” have often been emphasized under the framework of demand for ethnic education based on both equal human rights and the recognition of that particular ethnic groups’ history (Kibe, 417). International Labor Organizations’ conventions have also been adopted for example No.97 for equal treatment to nationals in terms of working conditions and wages was adopted in 1949 whereas No.142 concerning labor rights to all migrant workers including irregular workers was adopted in 1982, No.118 for equal treatment for nationals and foreigners was adopted in 1962 and lastly No.157 concerning pensions was adopted in 1982. Although Japan has adopted these, they haven’t been yet ratified (Komai, 2006: 94-5). The impact of international conventions and norms concerning rights of immigrant workers in Japan is still a process in the making.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION:

One of the main reasons why globalizations transformative power on Japanese citizenship has become a hot topic in East Asian studies is the population problem Japan is facing. Japan's population problem can be summarized as the drop in the marriage rate and the number of children per household decreasing below population sustainability levels. Although there has been a slight increase in the past few years it still is a very serious population problem for Japan. The marriage rate in Japan is decreasing and as it's socially unacceptable to bear children outside marriage birthrate is decreasing as a direct consequence. Post-industrial countries, especially in Europe are also facing similar problems, the Japanese case is often compared with the Italian case in terms of similarities (Takenaka & Rebick, 2006).

The dropping birthrate caused by reasons outlined in chapter 1 leaves Japan face to face with an elderly population and pensions problem with no young workforce to pay for the pensions. The Japanese government has been implementing family plans to boost birthrates and to convince the elderly to take good care of themselves in order to cut back on pensions and medical expenses. The Japanese government needs to reverse this situation which will otherwise have a major negative impact on Japanese economy in the future.

As shown in figure 1 in chapter 1 the number of foreigners entering Japan is increasing as well as the number of Japanese citizens leaving Japan, this might not cause a disproportion due to the large population size. However this trend will have consequences in the long-run in terms of granting more rights to foreigners and minority groups. The problematic is Japanese insistence on the importance of bloodlines and exclusive nature of citizenship. On the one hand there is need for young population but on the other hand Japan is insistent on discrimination policies against foreigners and minorities. However it seems Japan will have to adapt to changing conditions although these policy changes are being delayed.

As explained in chapter 1, within the *ie* system, the continuation of the family was guaranteed by adaption to new conditions when necessary. Japan's population problem will also necessitate a similar adaption in the long-run. At this point in the future one of the key determinants will be action taken by minority groups. This process could be smoothened and improved if civil society organizations working for minority right in Japan could form a unity until that time. As mentioned in chapter 4, there are different kinds of civil society organizations established by minority groups and their main weakness is the lack of communication amongst them. This is mainly due to their differences in terms of historical development and their social, political and economic stands in Japan. For example the Ainu and Ryukyuan minorities want more cultural recognition while Burakumin are demanding social equality rights. Koreans emphasize their demands on equal civil rights whereas Nikkeijin are asking for better employment opportunities.

Globalization has empowered the third sector to a larger extent, civil society as well as international and Non-governmental organizations have better conditions of

expressing their cases in today's globalized world. These bodies present the advantage of empowering people or minority groups against governing bodies that formerly had absolute power over their citizens. This has led to the increased universality of human rights which in return fuelled the conflict of interests between minority groups and the Japanese government in terms of bargain for rights and citizenship. Although traditionally citizenship has been a means for political identification and belongingness, in today's world it has become more of a legal issue.

As outlined in chapter 2, the definition and implication of citizenship has evolved and was transformed throughout world history in parallel with political developments. Furthermore, today under the impact of globalization, the basic definition of citizenship as classification of people according to geographic borders has been transformed. This process has especially been affected by increased immigration, emigration, wars and creation of successor states, formation of supranational bodies, codification and internationalization of human rights and norms. Through this process, debates on citizenship have been carried on to a transnational level. The main dilemma lies here; citizenship was a national issue however is now being debated at the international arena with more parties involved. It is also important to note that citizenship is no longer limited to being a legal status its definition has been extended to include social recognition and becoming a part of the economic re-distribution (Isin and Turner, 2002).

The Japanese state's formulation of citizenship emphasizes the aim of preserving the homogeneity of the nation while incorporating "others" only when they are assimilated enough not to disturb the homogeneity of the nation as a whole. In political terms, Japanese citizenship is based on *jus sanguine* with a focus

on assimilation and homogeneity. There is no discrimination in the sense of limitations on which nationals can or cannot naturalize to become Japanese citizens, the emphasis is on the necessity of assimilation only. Thus the Japanese states' policy can be summarized as a type of "equal discrimination" for all foreigners. The use of the term "discrimination" emphasizes the problematic and the term "equal" defines the nature. This policy has become an important problem due to the internationalization of human rights and norms under the impact of globalization. Thus there is a struggle between the Japanese states insistence on preserving the homogeneity of its citizens through assimilation policies and globalizations transformative power on universality of human rights.

Japanese citizenship requires naturalization which can be summarized as the denunciation of former citizenship. The process of naturalization by itself entails identity problems. Even though the world has been globalized to a large extent in social and cultural terms, the idea of denouncing the former national identity that was formulated throughout one's life, to denounce all the legends or heroic stories that one grows-up with is easier said than done. An even further difficult task is to learn new heroic stories and adapt a new national identity while being aware that these efforts will not be enough to bring along social acceptance.

In terms of social acceptance and extreme racialization arguments on Japan, Wetherall (2008) argues that Japan doesn't present an extreme case when compared to other countries in the World and focuses on the distinction between racialisation and discrimination. This differentiation of concepts render it easier to understand the situation in Japan; there is 'equal discrimination' against all minorities. Wetherall traces this discrimination to the historical development of citizenship in Japan as outlined in chapter 3 with focus on race and blood ties

during the modernization period under Meiji restoration. He also underlines the increased role of the media in contemporary Japan and how these events have become more visible although racist movements haven't increased in the last three decades.

With reference to equal discrimination for minority groups, Japanese state has a strict policy on keeping foreigners out of the political realm with focus on assimilation for the naturalization process. Political rights are denied to non-Japanese citizen minorities regardless of their length of stay in Japan. The Korean minority's civil society organizations have been working in order to obtain at least limited rights at regional levels without any success. Legally only full fledged Japanese citizens have political rights, although demands from the Korean minority are on the rise these have been rejected and stopped by the Liberal Democratic Party (Komai, 2006: 116-7). However, Japanese state's argument is clear, social integrity of the nation is important and only full fledge citizens can decide on who will be their political leader.

As outlined throughout chapters 2, 3 and 4, the main problem faced by minority groups in Japan is social integration. Although obtaining Japanese citizenship legally provides political rights, there is no guarantee of equality within or acceptance to the society at large. Furthermore, as presented in chapter 4, acquisition of citizenship doesn't guarantee full use of all citizenship rights especially in terms of equality. Thus the problem is also being able to use citizenship rights in daily life without having to carry events to the legal sphere. While even minority groups that hold citizenship cannot enjoy all their rights, immigrants and minority groups not holding citizenship are disadvantaged to a larger extent.

Historically, Japan's foreign policy and attitude towards immigrants has affected its migration patterns, as explained in chapter 4, most of Japan's ethnic minorities were brought to Japan during the colonial period. Japan has long had difficulties in handling minority groups and foreigners both socially and economically in terms of labor. In economic terms, Japan is still attempting to resist globalizations transformative power on universality of laborer rights. Japan's incapability in dealing with the migrant work force is the reasons why "United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families" could not be ratified. Opposed to this, the immigration reform that emerged in 1989 which later became the "Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 1990" aimed at preventing illegal workers and their employment, with sanctions. Thus Japan's tendency is to keep foreign labor out rather than incorporating it or providing rights. This is a direct outcome of Japan's emphasis on the differentiation between skilled and unskilled labor. Japan has long been trying to keep unskilled labor out. A turning point for this policy is the return of Nikkeijin to Japan which led the way for taking in low skilled labor (Brody: 2000: 60-4). This could be considered as the first step forward in opening to foreign labor and immigrants.

Brody (2000) argues that minorities groups not belonging to the wajjin race will not be integrated into Japanese society regardless of their length of stay. However as I have outlined throughout this research, Japan is under globalization's transformative power and will have to adapt to changing conditions in order to survive. Change might take long time however a time will come when Japan will have no more means to resist to globalizations transformative power and will have to adapt eventually.

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GLOSSARY

Choosen	: Korea as a whole without reference to South / North division.
Dowa	: Equality and harmony
Duwa	: Integration and harmony
Gaijin	: Foreigner, outsider
Jinshu	: Race
Kankoku	: North Korea
Kasoo shakai	: Lower class society
Kazoku koka	: Family state
Kika	: Naturalization / assimilation
Kokka ishiki	: National consciousness
Kokumin	: National
Kokuseki	: Means nationality however translated in the meaning of race rather than citizenship
Kokutai	: Emphasis on the emperor and the Meiji reforms – ‘national polity’ according to Weiner. Symbol of ethnic homogeneity according to Suzuki (2003)
Koseki	: Registration system
Minsai gaiko	: Peoples international diplomacy
Minzoku Kyoiku	: Ethnic education
Minzoku	: Volk – referring to the superiority of the Japanese race, first popularized by Shiga Shigetaka in 1880’s according to Weiner (1997). Equivalent of ethnicity, ethnos, ethnic group according to Suzuki (2003)
Nihon Jinshu Kairyoon	: Improvement of the Japanese race book published By Takahashi Yoshio
Nikkeijin	: Descendants of Japanese migrants who have returned (mainly from Peru and Brazil)

Sakoku	: Living in a closed country
Shimin	: New term to be used for citizenship
Shiminken o shutoku suru	: Acquisition of rights
Sooshi kaimei	: Name-changing program begin in Korea on February 11, 1940 in order for them to become true Japanese according to Suzuki (2003).
Tennoono sekishi	: Children of the emperor
Yooshi	: Adaptation of an elder son