THE EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE

by

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ABSTRACT

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This study will underscore the role of Europeanization in Turkish-Greek dispute, the character of which has traditionally known as one of the problematic neighborhood relations. The bilateral relations reveal a détente pattern throughout the past. Many crisis and escalations among two states are followed by a détente process i.e. 1930s, 1950s, 1978 and 1987 incidents and afterwards the dialogue process. Turkish-Greek relations have entered a new phase namely a rapprochement process after 1999 which is different in character of usual détente pattern in relations. There have been various factors that had an influence on transformation of the relations. Two of most prominent factors are the EU and other European institutions. Thereby, this research seeks to understand the impacts of European institutions on the both sides of the Aegean. In this regard, I will elaborate the definition of Europeanization and its perception in Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, I will touch upon the discussion regarding the role of international institutions in world politics. In order to understand the current situation in Turkish-Greek relations a broad and detailed historical background about main conflicting areas and bilateral crises is provided to reader. Lastly, I gave a space to an analysis of interaction in different levels since 1999 which is based upon news from media, economic indicators and official documents from the EU, Turkey and Greece. This study argues that the new era in Turkish-Greek relations since 1999 have marked by the Europeanization which has major effects. I found the indications institutionalized cooperation and communication on both overcoming the core issues and also on seizing new opportunities in foreign affairs and economics. Overall, it seems that the Europeanization does have a considerable impact in Turkish-Greek rapprochement. However, if and to what extent this impact will continue has remained to be seen in near future.

Key Words: Turkish-Greek relations; Europeanization; European Union (EU); the Aegean disputes; Turkey; Greece.

ÖZET

TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİNİN AVRUPALILAŞMASI

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Bu çalışma, geleneksel olarak sorunlu komşuluk ilişkileriyle bilinen Türk-Yunan ilişkilerindeki Avrupalılaşmayı vurgulayacaktır. Söz konusu ilişkiler geçmişte bir yumuşama motifi ortaya koymaktadır. Pek çok kriz ve gerginliği yumuşama süreçleri takip etmiştir. Örneğin; 1930'lar, 1950'ler, 1978 ve 1987'de ortaya çıkan gerginlikleri müteakip gelişmeler. 1999 sonrasında Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin, genel motiften farklı karakterde bir yumuşama sürecine girdiği düşünülmektedir. İlişkilerin dönüşümünde muhtelif faktörlerin etkisi olmuştur. Bunlardan en belirginleri Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve diğer Avrupa kurumlarıdır. Dolayısıyla, araştırma Avrupa kurumlarının Ege'nin her iki yakasındaki etkilerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Avrupalılaşma tanımıyla beraber Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki Avrupalılaşma algısı da irdelenecektir. Yukarıdaki konularla beraber uluslararası kurumların dünya siyasetindeki rolüne dair bir teorik tartışmaya da değinilecektir. Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkilerindeki güncel durumu anlayabilmek için geçmişteki ana çatışma alanlarına ve ikili krizlere dair geniş ve detaylı bir tarihsel arka plan okuyucuya sunulacaktır. Çalışmada son olarak, 1999'dan beri farklı düzeylerdeki etkileşimin, medya, ekonomik göstergeler ve AB resmi dokümanları ışığında, analizi yapılacaktır. Bu tezde temel olarak, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde 1999'dan beri etkin olan ve Avrupalılaşmanın ağırlığını hissettirdiği yeni dönem tartışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde temel sorunların üstesinden gelmek amacıyla ve ilişkileri geliştirmek amacıyla dış politika ve ekonomi alanında yeni fırsatları değerlendirmek üzere kurumsallaşmış işbirliği ve iletişimin işaretleri bulunmuştur. Her ne kadar etkisinin sürekliliği gelecekte görülecek olsa da Avrupalılaşmanın, 1999 sonrası Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin genelinde kayda değer bir etkisinin olduğu ortaya konulmuştur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Türk-Yunan ilişkileri; Avrupalılaşma; Avrupa Birliği (AB); Ege sorunları; Türkiye; Yunanistan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABREVIATIONS

ABGS   : Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği

AEGEE   : *Association des Etats Generaux des Etudiants de l'Europe*

AKP   : Justice and Development Party

ATO   : Ankara Ticaret Odası

BSEC   : Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

CBMs   : Confidence Building Measures

CFSP   : Common Foreign and Security Policy

CoE   : Council of Europe

CSDP   : Civil Society Development Programme

CSOs   : Civil society organizations

CU   : Customs Union

DPT   : State Planning Organization

EC   : The European Community

ECCG   : European Centre of Common Ground

ECtHR   : The European Court of Human Rights

EIDHR   : European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights

ENP   : European Neighborhood Policy

EU   : European Union

FCPNM   : The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

FDI   : Foreign Direct Investment

FIR   : Flight Information Region

GATT   : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

HRW   : Human Rights Watch

ICAO   : International Civil Aviation Organization

ICJ   : International Court of Justice

IMF   : International Monetary Fund

KKE   : The Orthodox Communist party

MGK   : National Security Council

NATO   : The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD   : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIC   : Organisation of the Islamic Conference

PACE   : Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PASOK : Pan Hellenistic Socialist Movement

RTMFA : Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SBAs   : UK Sovereign Base Areas

TBMM   : Grand National Assembly of Turkey

TNCs   : Transnational companies

TPAO   : Turkish Petroleum Company

UK   : The United Kingdom

UNCLOS : The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

USA   : The United States of America

USSR   : The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WINPEACE : Women Initiative for Peace

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS AND MAIN CONFLICT POINTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The history of relations between the two nations and countries goes back centuries. It is a history full of wars, injustices, suspicion, and hatred based on differences in religion, ethnicity, culture, and politics. Memories of this tumultuous history have undoubtedly influenced contemporary Greeks and Turks. Although these memories are not among the root causes of the five Aegean disputes discussed in this thesis, they heavily contribute to the main obstacle impeding resolution, nationalism and distrust of the other country.

Treaty of Lausanne ended the Turkish-Greek fighting of the early 1920's that had erupted when World War I settlements took territory from Turkey and placed it under Allied control. In spite of its significant postwar territorial gains, Greece additionally invaded the Anatolian coast and tried to conquer İzmir, Turkey. Turkey fought against these attempts and at the same time fought for its independence from the occupying Allied powers. Signed in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne ensured independence of the Turkish territories; it also established the Aegean status quo and a delicate balance between Turkey and Greece by harmonizing the vital interests and legitimate rights of both countries including those in the Aegean Sea (Oran 1999)

Character of Turkish-Greek relations is mostly remembered as one of the problematic neighborhood relations (Aydın 2003). Historical overview of the relations reveals that there have been number of disagreements and crises over the Aegean and Cyprus. Reasons of the disaccord should be considered from variety of perspectives including historical, sociological and *realpolitik*. Many crises, such as Turkish intervention to Cyprus in 1974, continental shelf crises in 1976 and in 1987, Kardak/Imia crisis in 1996, and S-300 crisis in 1997 have taken place in the recent history which brought two states to the brink of war. These crises illustrate that the uneasy interaction between two countries perpetuated regardless of the international conjuncture. The crises were in the picture before and after the Cold War. Neither the threat of a common enemy namely, USSR nor the hegemony of the US was able to stop recurring crises. Different international institutions such as NATO, OECD or Organization of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) did not also achieve institutionalized cooperation or long lasting good relations between Turkey and Greece.

The Treaty of Lausanne, Treaty of Paris, and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III, which together established the existing status quo in the Aegean, were thus the major roots of the festering conflict between the countries throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The regimes that they established in the Aegean were sometimes subjected to the main arguments of national position regarding the core bilateral problems, namely the Aegean question. The dispute over these regimes is yet to be settled. The actual conflicts have two sides: the Greek and the Turkish. Many of the arguments that they put forward are understandably in line with their national interests.

Relations between Greece and Turkey have a rich history marked by interchanging periods of stability and tension. The first problems in the relations between the two neighbours can be traced back to the time of the Greek war of independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and even perhaps before that, to the Ottoman Turkish conquest of then Byzantine Greece. Relations between Greece and Turkey reached a low point in the early part of the 20th century which led to armed conflict. A short period of rapprochement in the 1930s gave way to the return of a troubled relationship in the 1960s. The 1974 debacle in Cyprus started a new period of fluctuation in bilateral relations. The two neighbours reached the brink of war twice, in 1987 and in 1996, putting bilateral arguments above their common NATO membership and bypassing the effects that it would have on Turkey's future in the European Union (EU).

The events which have marked the relations of the modern states of Greece and Turkey have had a profound effect in shaping of foreign policies of both states. Moreover, the problems which have thwarted Greek-Turkish relations in the past thirty years have become a leading factor in shaping the countries' positions against each other. This study will therefore attempt to portray the shift of Turkish-Greek relations after 1999; the year of official candidate status is given to Turkey. Additionally, the interchanging effect of the EU on Turkish-Greek relations and Europeanization in both parties along with their EU relations Turkish-Greek relations on EU decisions will be elaborated. Several events, occurrences, the EU Progress Reports furthermore some judicial decisions along with the changes in the governments in both countries that have played a role will be analyzed.

Since observing a pattern in social sciences is not as easy as material sciences; it is quite probable to assume that there is a détente pattern in Turkish

Greek relations which appears nearly after each serious crisis (Fırat 2002c). Two significant periods of cooperation, in 1920s and 1950s, were led by the common external threats and common incentives. The first one, a short period of rapprochement in the 1930s can be observed after Turkish war of independence. *Mare nostrum* policy of Italy, as a common external threat and encouragement of Britain, as a common incentive played enormous role in Turkish-Greek cooperation which was institutionalized with the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934 (Fırat 2002e). In 1950s, the Soviet threat became undeniable for both countries and furthermore the American support became significant which was embodied in Truman doctrine and paved the way to both Turkey and Greece's NATO memberships.

The positive mood of the relations was preserved until the clash of national interests in, which was seen as an integral part of survival of the state (Aydın 2004: 25-26, Fırat 2002d). After the serious crises in 1976 and in 1987, the leaders of the two countries (Karamanlis and Ecevit in 1978, and A. Papandreou and Özal in 1987) initiated dialogue, signed memorandum of understanding on bilateral disputes, and undertook some reciprocal concessions (Tsakaloyannis 1980, Pridham 1991). Since then, the only breakthrough in problematic nature of the relations has emerged with the beginning of a rapprochement in the year 1999.

The latest process is not only something rhetorical, but it is also supported by some solid progresses in three dimensions; in low politics (issues such as bi-communal relations and civil society relations), economic relations, and high politics (such as security issues, the Aegean issues, and Greece's veto towards Turkey's EU application). The details of the concrete evidence will be elaborated in the further parts of the study, such as the increasing bilateral visits, the development

of civil dialogue between civil societies, the trade volume among the countries, and several cooperation agreements.

An analysis of last eight years of the relations puts forward a different character than that of a problematic, a rapprochement. It is being observed since 1999 (Rumelili 2005a, Fırat 2002, Evin 2005, Öniş 2001). Even though rapprochements can be observed in the history of Turkish-Greek relations, none of them lasted so long and seemed so institutionalized. Increasing interactions among civil society of both countries (Rumelili 2005b), almost four times increased trade volume, bilateral agreements regarding several issues, institutionalized channels of communication with more than thirty rounds of explanatory talks among authorities of foreign ministries to settle the core problems in the Aegean, and the high level reciprocal visits some of which are happened for the first time in history can be elaborated as empirical evidences of such an institutionalized rapprochement.

The year 1999 marked the beginning of the rapprochement process. There were three different and very important occasions in 1999 which affected the nature of the relations very deeply. These are (respectively); (a) Öcalan crisis between Turkey and Greece; the capture of the leader of terrorist Kurdish separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) movement, Abdullah Öcalan, (b) Earthquakes in İzmit and Athens, (c) Recognition of official candidate status to the EU of Turkey. Greece removed its veto so that official EU candidate status is given to Turkey in Helsinki Summit. Most critiques, especially media, interpreted the rapprochement process as the outcome of very close personal relationship between two foreign ministers Papandreou and Cem and the effect of earthquakes. Before delving into the main objective, it is important to delve into these arguments.

The very early steps of softening of tension are conducted by bilateral correspondences between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which has named as a "civic diplomacy," "people's diplomacy" or "seismic diplomacy". The statements of the foreign ministers have interpreted as "people's diplomacy." (Gündoğdu 2001: 112). İsmail Cem, the Turkish foreign minister in 1999, has sent a letter to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou, inviting him to cooperate on terrorism. The date of Papandreou's response to his colleague İsmail Cem was before the twin earthquakes of İzmit and Athens and after the date of Öcalan was captured (Rumelili 2005a: 45). Thus it is hard to assume the earthquakes as the main reasons of the latest rapprochement. The initiated dialogue at the time ended with nine agreements on issues such as cooperation against terrorism, environmental policies and in tourism[1].

On the other hand, some others such as media perceived the earthquakes as the reason of détente. Earthquakes mainly served to differentiation in moral tendency of both nations towards one another indeed. Two consecutive disasters did not only destroy the cities but also destroyed prejudices of both nations in the eyes of the other. Millas (2004, 23) indicates the belief that when people see 'good' examples from other they thought that it is an exemption. Probably, it was the first time Greek people saw some Turkish people on TV and none of them were either officials or politicians. The question is whether such a shift in perceptions is enough to start and maintain a process or not. Changing perceptions has a positive effect in

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[1] These are specifically;.**Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism** (came into force on May 4, 2001); **Agreement on Economic Cooperation** (came into force on November 24, 2001); **Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology** (came into force on May 4, 2001); **Agreement on Maritime Transport** (came into force on August 19, 2001); **Agreement on Cultural Cooperation** (came into force on July 19, 2001); **Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations** (came into force on June 3, 2001); **Agreement on reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments** (came into force on November 24, 2001); **Agreement on Cooperation on Environmental Protection** (came into force on June 30, 2001); **Agreement on Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration** (came into force on July 17, 2001) (www.mfa.gr).

the bilateral relations; however, it does not seem reasonable to expect such a shift in foreign policies just because of the alternation of perceptions. This study admits that changing perceptions have a direct effect on rapprochement, but it would be inadequate to reduce the whole process to people's perception. Therefore the structure of the thesis is dedicated to understand the effect that EU had in the process given the importance of 1999 Helsinki decisions.

According to common sense, which is shared by most politicians and scholars, without the earthquakes and the public outcry that followed for the improvement of relations, Greece would not have taken the steps and decisions before and after the Helsinki European Council which followed in December 1999. Having the support of the public and the media in Greece, Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou worked to present the Greek position regarding Turkey's EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit. Yet arguing so called "seismic diplomacy as the only driving force of the developments in bilateral relations lack explanatory power for such a change in relations.

Greece lifted its veto oriented policy towards Turkey in 1999 after spending most of the 1990s vetoing Turkey's candidate status and blocking its road towards EU membership. Turkey with approval of all 15 EU members became an official candidate country for EU accession. It was truly historic moment as it was a sign of a major shift in Turco-Greek relations. The momentum that was gained in the summer of 1999 was now evident through the events of the Helsinki Summit. Furthermore, the decision to bring Turkey closer to the European "club" provided an optimistic outlook for relations between Turkey and Greece. Previously, Greek vetoes at European Union summits only worsened relations between the two neighbors. It was now therefore easy to conclude that the positive outcome of the

Helsinki Summit would only lead to further rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and enhanced bilateral contacts.

The effect of official candidate status of Turkey to the EU and the concept of Europeanization in the latest rapprochement constitutes the core focus of this study. In other words, this study is organized to inquire the trajectory of the relations in comparison to periods before and after the year 1999. In other words, to what extent the EU and Europeanization affected the rapprochement process as a result of Helsinki Summit Decisions 1999. The Europeanization concept is many times discussed within academia in national basis, yet the Europeanization of bilateral relations did not attract same degree of attention. In line with the research question mentioned above, I will discuss the Europeanization concept and its perception in Turkey and Greece in chapter two. Moreover, the influence of international organizations on foreign policy will be elaborated from a critical perspective based on the main assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism. I will try to evaluate the outcomes of the EU involvement with examples from Turkish-Greek relations since the thesis is aimed to understand the affects of Europeanization and the EU.

The latest rapprochement process started after 1999, however, the structural problems, namely; disagreements regarding continental shelf issue, territorial waters and airspace issue in the Aegean, minorities and Cyprus problem remained unresolved. Therefore, I will try to shed light on the points of conflict as well as both parties' views and theses on those matters. I also give a space to historical background in detail due to complexity of the issue in chapter three. Although Cyprus is one of the core problems, I will not examine the case in detail yet the aim of the study to understand the differentiation in path of the bilateral relations. I will

put forward the internationalized character of Cyprus Question and its relation in the focal concept of the study. As a consequence, I will put forward the main disputed areas in order to examine the past and the possible EU contribution to Turkish-Greek relations.

In the fourth chapter, I will try to dwell upon the Europeanized character of Turkish-Greek relations and thus I will assess the developments since 1999 in line with Smith's (2000) conceptual framework, which defines the indicators of Europeanization as; (a) constitutional changes, (b) elite and bureaucratic socialization and (c) public perception in both countries. I will benefit from the official documents of the EU such as the Regular Reports on Turkey's Progress towards Accession since 1999, Conclusions of The European Council on Turkey and Greece. Additionally, the decisions of The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and reports which are approved by Council of Europe in relation to my topic will be benefited as well. I will examine the institutional impacts of European institutions on bilateral relations with a special focus on pre and after period of 1999 in the light of all these documents and Smith's (2000) conceptualization.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND A SELECTIVE LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

Turkey's official candidate status to the EU is approved in Helsinki Summit, 1999. The Helsinki decisions did not only involve the proclamation of Turkey as an official candidate but also included the recommendation to candidate countries to solve border disputes and other problems with their neighbors. The recommendation also emphasized that countries should apply to the ICJ if they fail to solve their problems in reasonable time (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1999).

> "In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004." (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1999: 1/4).

The statements in paragraph 4 of the European Council Presidency Conclusions reached in Helsinki gave a clear signal that Turkey must improve its relations with Greece before it can become a member of the European Union. By

this way, Turkey made a commitment regarding to the solution of problems with its neighbors. On the other hand, signs of shift in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey can be observed. Greece did not veto that decision in contrary to its traditional foreign policy in 1990s (Öniş 2001: 37-38, Fırat 2002c). This drive in Greek foreign policy is generally evaluated as a natural outcome of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy (Tsardanidis and Stelios 2005: 226).

Before elaborating the main paradigms of international relations discipline in terms of their assessment regarding the interaction among international institutions and national states, I will elaborate on the Europeanization. To what extent the foreign policies of both countries are Europeanized and what the effects of the EU were over the relations are the questions to be responded. Such examination would provide a plausible ground to understand the role of Europeanization in Turkish-Greek rapprochement process.

Helsinki Summit decision, 1999, is a mile-stone in so-called EU-Turkey-Greece triangle. Since then not only Turkish-Greek relations has entered a new era but also EU-Turkey relations are also transformed into a more institutionalized context. Furthermore, Helsinki Summit is also crucial in a way to see the effects and outcomes of Europeanization process for Greek foreign policy. Therefore it is necessary to clarify the concept of '*Europeanization*'.

2.2 Europeanization Literature

The concept of 'Europeanization' has accounted more frequently in the social science literature in the last three decades (Featherstone 2003: 5). This term is used to understand and explain various differentiations in the national and regional context. The meanings attributed to Europeanization are varied. Therefore, I will firstly touch upon the definitions of Europeanization; secondly, I will try to

emphasize existing views regarding the EU functionality in the framework of Europeanization; and lastly, I do want to pay attention to the meaning of Europeanization in a case specific context, in Turkey and Greece.

Europe witnessed major political changes in the continent in parallel to differentiation in global polity. The EU had an important role in that process both as a subject and object. The deepening and enlargement prospects of the Union affected not only member countries but also affiliated countries. In that sense, Europeanization became an influential and fashionable term in social terminology to indicate the changing policies in the continent. As Featherstone (2003: 5) indicates, the usage of the term has increased considerably in the last decades. There was only one academic article in 1990 referring 'Europeanization' but in 2001 the number reached 22.

2.2.1 The Concept of Europeanization

Europeanization is a crucial concept for a research agenda but it is not a single unified concept. Europeanization is marked by two main components: the determinant role of the EU, and its complications within the domestic structures of national states. Hence, most scholars agree that the EU is in the center of the definition, but still does not mean everything. There are various definitions in the field. Some scholars stress the role of the EU whereas many others insist that Europeanization concept should be discussed as a process in line with its transformative power in domestic politics.

A number of authors (Bache 2003; Buller and Gamble 2002; Goldsmith 2003; Guilani 2003; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Scharpf 1999; Winn and Harris 2003) consider Europeanization as a process of governance (Radaelli 2004: 6). Radaelli (2004: 23) emphasizes role of the EU in his definition of Europeanization:

"a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, (c) implementation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies".

Ladrech (1994: 69) also preferred to define Europeanization again in line with the role of the EU in the continent, "a process reorienting the direction and the shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making". On the other side, Europeanization is also acknowledged as an identity formation project. In that approach, Europeanization is mostly assessed in an exclusionary or essentialist sense. In this regard, Europeanization is defined not according to its intrinsic values but according how it differs from "the other" (Anastasakis 2005: 79). In sum, the EU is mostly accepted as an undeniable component of the Europeanization concept. In that sense, reviewing the Turkish-Greek relations after 1999 from Europeanization perspective is compatible with the notion of Europeanization since the EU is involved in this equation by Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999.

2.2.2 Characteristics of Europeanization

Due to the lack of a single common definition, I will prefer to explore Europeanization by underscoring its characteristics. First of all, the role of the EU is probably one of the most significant characteristics of Europeanization. The concept of Europeanization is mostly embodied in the decisions of the EU. The adaptation laws of nation states which aim to harmonize national level legislation to the Union level can be counted as a concrete example of Europeanization in this vein (Müftüler Baç 2005, Öniş 2004, Oran 2006). "Most definitions of Europeanization place the EU at the center of the debate, since the EU has given to it more

systematic, concrete, and structured meaning" (Anastasakis 2005: 78). Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that most of the time Europeanization is perceived as "EU-ization" (Diez *et al.* 2005: 2, Anastasakis 2005: 78). However, EU-ization should not be perceived as "a simple synonym for European regional integration or even convergence" (Featherstone 2003: 3).

Labeling Europeanization as EU-ization is also an issue of dissidence. Diez (2005: 2) mentions "Europeanization strictly speaking is EU-ization"; whereas Featherstone (2003: 3) defines this way in the minimalist sense of Europeanization. He indicates that the definition of Europeanization involves the policy and judiciary responses to the EU's political stance, which can be considered the minimalist sense of Europeanization. He defines the maximalist sense of Europeanization as a structural change that accommodates the fundamental characteristics which are involved in, or closely identified with, Europe. In this vein, Europeanization is also closely related to the values and norms of Europe.

Secondly, supranational characteristic of the EU enables Europeanization to be effective not only in the member states, but also in the candidate states via using its conditionality tool. Although, states try to influence the process, the Union has greater impetus over the members and candidates than states have. Therefore, the characteristic of Europeanization is also marked by the *one way* relation between the parties At first, scholars like Bulmer (1983) and Moravcsik (1993) paid attention more to the way in which domestic policies and policy preferences have influenced the EU level between mid-80s and mid-90s. Currently, analysts study on how both EU decisions and EU membership *per se,* capable of changing domestic politics, namely "Europeanizes" (Smith 2000: 613).

The superior role of the EU prevails itself both in the minimalist sense and the maximalist sense of Europeanization in reference to Featherstone's terminology (Featherstone 2003). The supranational character of the Union is more visible in the former one. In the latter one; norms, ideas and *acquis communautaire* can be accepted as signs of the advanced position of the EU vis-à-vis states (Radaelli 2004: 7-8, Diez et. al. 2005: 2-4). The asymmetrical power of Europeanization can be significantly observed in the example of Southern Europe. The Southern European countries almost had no power in that process. Due to need for financial assistance and desire for accession, the conditionality tool granted enormous momentum to the EU in the process of Europeanization (Anastasakis 2005: 80). The most concrete example of enforcement of norms towards affiliated countries can be seen in the Turkish-Greek dispute, which was the recommendation regarding implementation of the peaceful resolution principle for the ongoing border conflicts (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1999; 1/4). The applications of that principle through Turkish-Greek relations can be observed in summit decisions of Luxembourg (1997) and Helsinki (1999) (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2004).

2.2.3 Functionality of the EU in Europeanization

Due to absence of the clear-cut, unequivocal definition, many scholars deal with the term by dividing it into different realms. Diez et. al. (2005: 6) distinguishes four different meanings of the term; policy, political, discursive, and societal Europeanization; while Radaelli (2004: 6) takes into consideration Europeanization as governance, institutionalization, and discourse. Lastly, Featherstone (2003: 6-13) points out in his account that Europeanization can be applied within four broad categories, namely as an historical process, a matter of cultural diffusion; a process of institutional adaptation; and an adaptation of policy and policy processes.

Scholars preferred to indicate different characteristics of Europeanization to underscore its meaning.

It would be more useful to examine these classifications according to the effectiveness of the EU institutional role which is underscored in the latest period of Turkish-Greek relations in this study. Therefore, the author recognizes that it is better to make a distinction within various definitions of Europeanization. The areas of Europeanization which are not derived from the solely direct institutional impact of the EU will be called as (a) limited direct institutional impact; and the areas of Europeanization which are mostly influenced by the Union will be called as (b) the direct institutional impact in this research's own distinction.

The limited direct institutional impact of the EU is observed on a mostly societal, discursive, and cultural level in the existing Europeanization literature. In Featherstone's definition we can find the hints of the limited direct institutional impact of the EU as takes the issue into account (a) as a historical phenomenon, (b) as transnational cultural diffusion (Featherstone 2003). In the study of Diez et. al. (2005), we can find limited institutional direct impact in (a) discursive Europeanization, and (b) societal Europeanization (Diez et. al. 2005). Lastly, it can be seen in Radaelli's classification when he recognizes Europeanization as a discourse (Radaelli 2004). We can name other typologies of Europeanization as the areas in which direct institutional impact is observed (see table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Classification of Europeanization according to EU impact

	Limited direct impact of EU	Direct impact of the EU
Featherstone	**a.** *Historical Phenomenon* **b.** *Transnational Cultural Diffusion*	**c.** *Institutional Adaptation* **d.** *Adaptation of Policy & Policy Processes*
Diez et. al.	**a.** *Discursive Europeanization* **b.** *Societal Europeanization*	**c.** *Europeanization of Policies* **d.** *Europeanization of Political Processes*
Radaelli	**a.** *Europeanization as a Discourse*	**b.** *Governance* **c.** *Institutionalism*

It is necessary to determine what kind of Europeanization is directly related to this study in which focus is the transformation in Turkish and Greek attitude. Europeanization mostly occurs in different levels, namely societal and elite level or in official approaches, either simultaneously or respectively. Yet, the purpose is to understand the effectiveness of Europeanization in Turkish-Greek relations one can raise the question whether it is possible to find the reasons for the rapprochement solely in the foreign policy or not. It is obvious that there is no single reason for the détente; it contains a complex set of motives. If we want to understand how Europeanization is promising and sustainable in ameliorating bilateral relations, it is better to understand the effectiveness of Europeanization in bilateral relations.

Foreign policy was almost untouchable issue in both countries. Therefore, state preserves it efficiency in foreign policy without serious questioning. The overwhelming influence of the state can be observed throughout the political life in Turkey and Greece. One of the main aspects of Greek state at the time of accession was, "gigantic size of state apparatus", a highly centralized structure of state and the

political system in general (Iokamidis 2001: 76). Featherstone (1998: 28) shares the idea; "the state administration has grown obese, inefficient and at the time, corrupt. Its institutions are poorly coordinated – an archipelago of bodies often incorporating a Napoleonic hierarchy and suffocating legalism in their everyday operation".

Turkey, on the other hand, did not reveal different character than Greece in terms state functioning. Keyman and İçdugu (2003: 5) points that the strong-state tradition is highly effective since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey. Heper (1985), for example, argues that the Republic continued traditions of patrimonialism, meaning state elites typically distrusted civil society and perceived in 'Hegelian' terms, a sphere of universal ego that if left uncontrolled would produce social divisions. Both Greece and Turkey came from the strong state tradition. Therefore, state needs to be paid special attention while trying to understand the role of Europeanization. Hence "strong-state" preserves its greater importance as the political actor in social life.

Manners and Whitman (2000: 245) define Europeanization of foreign policy as:

> "a transformation in the new way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making".

Therefore, any possible differentiation towards Europeanization in foreign policy would not show itself suddenly. Europeanization of foreign policy reveals itself over a period of time rather than right after a certain decision taken in ongoing foreign policy. Any change in norms and values in the foreign policy domain may create concrete consequences in long term because it directly changes the frame of thinking and implementation both in the theory and practice of foreign policy. In

that sense, this transformation in national foreign policies that is driven by Europeanization; in other words the soft power of the EU. Since the soft power definition is highlighted by its capacity in changing "the values and the domestic practices, and perceived the legitimacy of its foreign policy" (Nye 2004: 5).

Efficiency of Europeanization generally depends on the power of transformation of values, norms and ways of doing things in domestic politics. What is meant by transformation is a convergence of domestic values towards European values. The EU gains leverage to penetrate societies of target countries by the transformation capacity of Europeanization. In other words, the more transformation capacity Europeanization has, the more operative the EU becomes vis-à-vis country.

Europeanization of bilateral relations will be elaborated in further chapters of the study as it is aimed. In that point, it is necessary to emphasize Smith's (2000) four major areas of policy adaptation in the Europeanization of foreign policy: namely, elite socialization; bureaucratic reorganization; constitutional change; and the increase in public support. He accepts these four areas as indicators of domestic policy adaptation to the EU foreign policy cooperation. He tries to measure the Europeanization of national foreign policies in EC/EU member states in a conceptual framework (Smith 2000: 617). Therefore Smith's conceptual framework will be benefited to measure the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek relations in the subsequent parts of the study.

2.2.4 The perception of Europeanization

In the previous parts we have discussed the definition, diversification, and the conceptual framework of Europeanization which all can be accepted as the explanation efforts for Europeanization. The author strongly believes that the

meaning which parties give to Europeanization also matters. The studies which try to conceptualize Europeanization did not cover that issue so much. Most of their concern was explaining either the Europeanization of single foreign policy or relations between foreign policies and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Europeanization in different states may be based on same exogenous principles and the use of the same instruments, but it is a distinctly national exercise of change and adaptability. It is a path of domestic change which occurs in each country in their own way (Anastasakis 2005: 86, Olsen and Johan 2002). Thus, the impact of Europeanization depends on the local will. "Because Europeanization is an all-encompassing and demanding project, it often generates and reinforces domestic cleavages based on competing notions of reform economic interest and identity" (Anastasakis 2005: 85). Illustration of the Europeanization understanding on both sides would give a chance to realize the role of it. I will try to pay attention to the meaning, perception and utilization of Europeanization. These concerns will be held briefly in regional level and then particularly in the cases of Greece and Turkey.

Not only the meaning and perception of Europeanization but also reactions to the Europeanization efforts are very similar in the both sides of the Aegean. As a result, it is possible to observe almost the same procedure during Europeanization. It should not be forgotten that the main and the greatest difference between Turkey and Greece is the EU membership. Whilst Greece achieved the biggest part of transformation, whether economic or political, after accession to EC/EU, Turkey started to experience those as a highly debated candidate.

2.2.4.1 What Europeanization Means in Regional Context

Anastasakis (2005: 78) points that the meaning of Europeanization differs for less developed European countries and the well developed ones. Europeanization means structural transformation and modernization in less developed European countries; whereas it means a smooth process of steady reforms and adjustment in developed ones. The Southern Europe example fits the former definition. In that kind of countries, Europeanization correlates with democratization and improvement of liberal Western values and practices which have been came up simultaneously with the EU prospect (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). Europeanization in Southern countries also related to the transformation and modernization of economies, politics, and societies (Anastasakis 2005: 79). As a result it would not be wrong to speak about an Europeanization stereotype for Southern European countries, a so called "Southern Style" (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001, Anastasakis 2005).

The one way character of Europeanization became significant in the Southern Style. The Commission has great impetus to force country reforms and economic convergence programmes. In 1996, the Commission threatened the weaker states that there would be no more Cohesion Fund for the new projects unless they abide by the targets set for their government deficits. Greece was one of the target countries in that call, involving Spain and Portugal. Greece, in addition, implemented a convergence programme which is under the scrutiny of its partners (Featherstone 1998: 30-32, Iokamidis 2001: 80-82). Another example of the one way characteristic came up for Turkey in 2001. When the destructive impact of the 2001 economic crisis was felt by almost every sections of society, the EU anchor has perceived as an additional safety net for a better off in Turkish economy by

local economic actors and international finance as well. As Öniş (2004: 11-12) points out, this crisis led Turkey to take further steps towards Europeanization. This tableau confirms that Europeanization mainly has gained acceleration due to the urgency of necessities which are mostly economic.

As a consequence, Featherstone (1998: 32) points out that regional aid indirectly led to administrative reforms, the significance of which was greater because of the long history of heavy-handed Napolenoic centralism in government in Greece. Ziya Öniş (2002: 2) also admits that the Union functions as a powerful engine for democratization and economic transformation in candidate countries with the prospect of membership. Thus it could be named as the "exporter of democratic governance" (Iokamidis 2001: 87)

2.2.4.2 The Meaning of Europeanization in Turkey and Greece

Europeanization mostly means 'modernization' in Greece (Iokamidis 2001: 76). Europeanization as modernization made the state capable of transforming the state, revising power relations, and changing the behaviors of the political actors towards the reform process. Actually, with the impact of Europeanization, the reform process became more attractive because Greek public opinion consents to Brussels more than Athens. Therefore the role of Europeanization turned into a plausible ground for justification and promotion through domestic reform (Featherstone 1998: 24-35, Iokamidis 2001: 87-90). Europeanization is felt strongly in the political and economical realm in Greece.

Many scholars agree with the fact that Europeanization and its influences in the Turkish case, is very significant and considerably increased after 1999 (Göksel and Güneş 2005, Baç 2005, Rumelili 2005b, Öniş 2004, Diez *et al.* 2005 and Tocci 2005). The EU and Europeanization generally came into the picture as a facilitator

in the democratic and economic transformation within the domestic policy realm. This is not to claim that the one and only reason behind this democratization process was the EU, but to allege that it had played a tremendous role in fostering internal change and Europeanization (Baç 2005: 29).

Some domestic actors perceived the EU as a symbol and a legitimating lever in Turkey. Tocci (2005) and Rumelili (2005b: 44) indicate that the EU served to bilateral relations as a symbol rather than as a direct impact. Thus, EU and Europeanization facilitated mobilization towards new reforms and legitimacy for new policies. Oran (2006) defines the facilitating capacity of the EU by making an analogy between the EU and the "starter motor". Once it [EU] promotes or stimulates the transformation, the rest of the process is mostly carried by the domestic dynamics.

The perception is also very similar on a societal level in Turkey and Greece. Featherstone raised the idea that who is leading who (elite or public) for more integration with Europe is unclear. Any government in Athens is likely to be encouraged towards more integration by public opinion. The willingness to accept the single currency, as a substitute of sacrificing the sovereignty, can be accepted as a proof of this attitude. "For the average Greek voter, the EU represents modernization, higher standards and better economic conditions; in short the 'future'" (Featherstone 1998: 37). Therefore, the transformative capacity of Europeanization is enormous in the Greek political domain. The will towards integration and the perception of the EU among Greek public, caused Europeanization to be so effective

Today, the situation regarding the perception of Europeanization in Turkish politics is very similar to Greek example. Europeanization is overwhelmingly being

used as synonymous to 'democratization', deepening the liberal democracy and activating the appropriate citizenship rights (Sofos 2001: 248). The study of Rumelili (2005b: 44) is very insightful to understand the mind-set of the people who are involved in directly to the efforts for Turkish-Greek cooperation.

> "…they perceive themselves and are also perceived by others not only working for Turkish-Greek cooperation, but also for [Turkey'membership in] the EU. Because of the meanings wrapped around the EU this means that they are also working for progress, modernity, and development.".

2.2.4.3 Europeanization Understanding of Ruling Elites in Turkey and Greece

The reflection of Europeanization at the elite level is worth mentioning. It has been highly acknowledged that ruling elites played a leading role in the transformation/westernization throughout the national histories of Turkey and Greece, which can be seen as an example of a top-down approach (Öniş 2004: 3-4). There was not widespread common support for EU accession during Greek candidacy among Greek political elites. Mainly the New Democracy party, additionally small centre groups and Eurocommunists were the driving actors of EC accession among Greek political actors. On the other hand, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and the Orthodox Communist party (KKE) constituted the opposition (Iokamidis 2001: 76). The prominent impact of Europeanization can be observed within PASOK, the socialist ruling party. For the modernizers, the domestic policy paradigm has been radically altered. New issues are increasingly examined through the lens of "Europe" (Featherstone 1998: 35). The political spectrum in Greece is consisted of keen supporters of Greece membership in the EU, except KKE. Moreover, these actors favored deeper integration along federal lines (Iokamidis 2001: 76).

Sofos (2001: 256) points to a clash among Turkish elites during the transformation period after 1983. The struggle was marked by reformist elites who were "rallying around the banner of Europeanization" and the elites who were "supporters of a statist view of Turkey under the tutelage of suspicious and possessive military elite". It is observed that the positions of certain civil society organizations became convergent for further EU-induced democratic reforms but not all of them necessarily (Öniş 2002).

The political parties in power portrayed a pro-EU stance during their administrations. The coalition governments (56th and 57th Cabinet) attached to their commitment to undertaking the kinds of political and economic reforms which were necessary for full membership (Öniş 2002: 23). After the 2002 election, Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power as a single party government. Even though, they came from more religious and conservative origin, they performed enthusiastic actions to adopt European norms and rules namely towards Europeanization (Baç 2005: 29, Oran 2005: 148, Öniş 2006: 12).

2.3.1 Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalism, assumes that international institutions play an important role in coordinating international cooperation. Institutionalists begin with the same assumptions used by realists; namely; states are rational and self interested actors, system is formally anarchic. In this context the biggest diversification between realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches is the role they attributed to the international institutions. Neoliberal institutionalists agree that the anarchic character of the structure discourages the state to cooperate, but it is still possible. Cooperation of the states would base on more concrete and sustainable ground with the help of international institutions (Keohane and Martin 1995). However, Greico

(1995: 152) criticized neoliberal institutionalism as follows: "..misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of the state".

Disagreement between neoliberal institutionalism and realism is on the subject of the likelihood and affectivity of cooperation. The difference is derived from the different assumptions regarding the cheating, absolute and relative gains. Neoliberal institutionalists do not share the assumption of realism that states focus on relative gains and therefore they are reluctant to cooperate. In neoliberal institutionalist supposition, states concentrate on absolute gain which is not determined in comparison to others' gains. This makes cooperation available among states in an anarchic structure (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42-45). In this view, states are considered as *atomistic*, not *positional*. As a consequence of atomistic approach, neoliberal institutionalism foresees possibility of cooperation because of the potential absolute benefits of the states. Neoliberals argue that states are becoming less power and security oriented. Instead, states are more inclined to be welfare state which is acquainted with economic growth and social security oriented. In the light of these claims, neoliberal institutionalists say that states perceive each other not as enemies but rather partners to cooperate in various issues in order to secure their home publics (Greico 1995: 152-154).

Neoliberal institutionalists consider cheating as the greatest threat to cooperation. Because of the anarchy, this is defined as the absence of authority that enforces rules against cheating while cheating and deceptions are endemic in international relations (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226). Institutions are described by neoliberals as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Keohane

1988: 381-383). International institutions to some extent have ability to recover this "authority" lack in this definition. "Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, and establish focal points for cooperation" (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). It is available to see the confirmation of this proposal in the context of Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey and Greece did not achieve to set direct communication line between two countries, so-called red line despite the fact that they experienced serious crisis which brought them to the brink of war. Information flow is very valuable for decision makers not only in peace time but particularly in crises times. Policies can be decided more accurately in terms maximizing national interest via the true information flow (Keohane and Martin 1995: 44).

There is a disagreement between realists and institutionalists regarding to the role of the institutions. On the contrary of the realist argument, Keohane (1988: 379-93) states "International institutions have the potential to facilitate cooperation…. Without institutions there will be little cooperation". Institutionalists assert that international institutions are significant in international relations not only due to their capability of exercising power over the states but also they are useful for states. They depend on complementary and common interest and also they amplify them (Keohane and Hoffman 1993: 383). Realists argue, in response, international institutions only have marginal effect on cooperation of the state (Waltz 1979: 115-116, Morgenthau 1993: 512). Another critique is raised by Greico (1995: 155), and that is international institutions failure to reshape national interests during the North-South dispute and newly emerged supranational nature in Europe is only a replacement of old-fashioned international bargaining system. Liberal institutionalists also do not deny that how big powers can be determinant in

international institutions, "[France] sought to use European Community to balance growing German power" (Keohane and Hoffman 1993: 391).

Liberal institutionalists emphasize that the potential for conflict is overstated by realists and suggest that there are countervailing forces, i.e. repeated interactions that propel states toward cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995). Even though, big powers can be more powerful in international institutions, the main emphasis of liberal institutionalists is the capability of international institutions in improvement. International institutions and norms are also eligible to transform the game (Donnelly 2005: 150). In that context, liberal institutionalists suggest strategy of "lengthen the shadow of future" to overcome a *Prisoner's Dilemma* situation. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) point out that "Institutions form informal agreements through international organizations with extensive enforcement powers have considerable potential to lengthen the shadow of future". Keohane (1988: 83) notices that although the role of international institutions is important it does not mean that they are always successful.

It is better to evaluate in dichotomy in order to underscore the role of the institutions. In the absence of institutions we can talk about a world in which Europe and the United States are balancing each other respectively in security and economy. In reality we can see highly institutionalized relations on these issues and doing so they are capable of being influential over the others behaviors (Keohane and Hoffman 1993: 393). NATO could be an appropriate example *vis-à-vis* the realist critiques of institutions because NATO established as Waltzian balancing against common threat, but members of the alliances established institutionalized cooperation in various areas and maintain the cooperation even in the absence of common threat (Donnelly 2005: 150). Besides this role, we can examine that

NATO also created a ground for restoring the relations after serious crises. For example, the US has encouraged Turkey and Greece to meet bilaterally in NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 after 1996 Kardak/Imia Crises. In Madrid Declaration both sides agreed on these principles; Greek will avoid one sided actions (referring to increasing Greek territorial water from six NM to twelve NM). On the other hand, Turkey declared that it will renounce threat of use of force (referring to *casus belli* for one sided actions of Greece in the Aegean). And both sides also come to a decision to start "*wise men talks*" and to take confidence building measures among the countries (Fırat 2002c). In that sense, NATO created a common and reliable communication and consultation ground for the parties but still NATO lack to create an institutionalized cooperation mainly due to its absence of supranationality in its structure.

Lastly, the concept of "*power*" in neoliberal institutionalist realm will be mentioned. Robert Dahl (1961) defines power as "the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do". Population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability are generally accepted as traditional sources of power (Nye 2004: 53). As aforementioned, realist school of thought mostly emphasizes the military power among others. In the realist sphere, power is the most desired thing for the nation states in anarchic order and states are inclined to get more military power which is seen as legitimate measure to prevent undesirable consequences of future. In today's world using military power is not as easy and legitimate as it was in 19th century or the more population the state has, does not necessarily mean more powerful it is. However, it is appropriate to emphasize that these kinds of sources are still lies at the heart of power (Nye 1990: 155-58). The novel point is that the new types of power resources gains

significance. For example, transnational companies (TNCs) are one of the most important actors in world politics who lack military power. In that sense a transformation in the components of power can be observed which is through 'capital-rich' to the 'information-rich' (Nye 2004: 68-73).

Neoliberal institutional scholar Joseph Nye made distinction in the concept of power namely, soft power and hard power. In this respect, Nye (2004: 5) explains the concept of soft power as "the ability of a country to attract others arises from its culture, its values and the domestic practices, and perceived the legitimacy of its foreign policy". Nye paid attention to new sources of power whereas realists focused on balance of hard power. Soft power takes its ability from power elements like cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules or institutions of international regimes. He crowned his explanations with stressing the coherence between ideology and values of the American society and international institutions, i.e. International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Nye 1990: 168).

In the beginning of the 1990s, the soft power of the United States was significant in international ground especially in ending up the Cold War with a victory. But by the time in post-cold war, the American approach towards conflict areas includes more military measures. Especially, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in post 9/11 era made it clear that the US is not only capable of mobilization its military power but also willing to do so. On the other hand, 1990s are also witnessed the deepening and enlarging process of the EU. During this process the EU became effective over the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and even near abroad of the EU. This character of the EU generally caused to name the EU as a soft power, civilian power or normative power (Cameron 2003: 90). A

distinction is started to be made between the US and the EU as hard power versus soft power, after this period. Actually, the difference in foreign policy attitude had become significant in the cases of failed/rogue states. The US foreign policy is inclined to use military measures to provide global security whereas the EU pursues to achieve that goal by using trade agreements, economic assistance as it is seen in the case European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or Euro-Med (Wallace 2001: 20-22).

2.3.2 Complementary Theoretical Overview of Neoliberal Institutionalism

At first sight, institutionalist revival seems to draw an alternative explanation to realists; however, both of the theories are not completely complimentary to each other. Both liberalism and institutionalism focused on the issues of power, including state power. **"And also they, in formulation, are both actor oriented, individualistic theories whose practitioners follow neo-positivist standards of evidence"** (Keohane 2002: 6). Thus, they lack common point which is the underestimating the importance of domestic policies and the role of ideas.

As Eralp (2003) argues, missing explanations regarding the domestic structure produce an insufficient basis to understand transformation processes. Yet, we are facing a transformation in Turkish-Greek relations which can be explained by neither institutionalist analysis nor solely realist analysis. Consequently, I adopted eclectic approach to let us can comprehend the role of conditionality in Helsinki Summit (1999) and the EU support to civil society interactions between Turkish and Greek counterparts. As it is mentioned in the very beginning of this chapter, changing perceptions and increasing interactions between two nations played important role in rapprochement process. Addition of Putnam's *two level*

games analysis (Putnam 1988) in theoretical background would provide a better insight. Putnam points out that two levels are included in international negotiations; (a) domestic level, (b) international level. The decision maker(s) should pay attention to both levels because the domestic actors or interest groups tries to pursue their goal by pressure in the former one whereas in the latter one the national governments aim to maximize their policy out come in order to meet the domestic demands (Putnam 1988: 434).

As Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi (2004, 118) points out diplomatic negotiations between two countries are surrounded by complex set of games-each with its own dynamic and particular impact on the diplomatic negotiations at Level I in refer to Putnam. At the end of this interaction, decision makers generally decide the policy that they will adopt. In today's world, it is hard to implement any policy which got strong opposition from grass-root level. Therefore, public opinion has undeniable effect in foreign policy. In that sense there is a two way relation between public opinion and decision makers' choices. It is better to keep in mind the question of who has more influence over who can be varied in time and conditions. Whether the decision makers shape the public's view or the preferences of the public shape the politicians'. The question becomes further complicated by the fact that public opinion is rarely homogenous. It is composed of different "pockets," "sections" or "constituencies". Hence, all participants will have their own idiosyncratic reactions to each level of the game and their respective players. Consequently, it is also hard to find and clarify the roles of the domestic actors in the latest rapprochement process which is why this study mostly focuses on the state centric approach and at the meantime trying to include the influential domestic progress as much as it can.

2.4 Concluding Observations

Contestation between different approaches can play a positive role in social science scholarship, pushing advocates to sharpen their theories and test them in a more convincing ways. But if the contending approaches become conflicting schools of warring scholars with graduate students signed up as in one camp or another, they become what Albert Hirschman (1970) once called "paradigms as hindrances to understanding" (Keohane 2002: 7). Therefore, I do not investigate the role of the EU in Turkish-Greek relations from exclusively one perspective such as realist, neorealist or neoliberal institutionalist in order to avoid a biased approach. Yet, there are many driving forces of the causality in the effectiveness of the EU. The author tried to explore a theoretical room for further investigation of the role of the EU.

As it is shown in the previous parts of this chapter, nearly every theoretical approach has some weaknesses and strengths in explanation efforts. Realist, neorealist, and neoliberal institutionalist assumptions respectively have problems in explanations of the latest Greek foreign policy change which became significant after 1996, thus I will try to understand the effect of the EU from an eclectic approach which will be in accordance with Europeanization literature.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS

AND MAIN CONFLICT POINTS

3.1 Introduction

The history of Turkish-Greek relations reveals a tense character mainly full of political upheavals and crises. Furthermore, some of the crises brought two countries to the brink of war. Third party intervention, mainly by the USA, prevented a possible Turkish-Greek war in the region. Even though the times after crisis are followed by détente and dialogue initiatives, none of them achieved to conduct long lasting settlement in bilateral relations. This abnormality mainly derived from the historical memories in the societal level and the clash of interests which perceived as a matter of survival. The problem is crowned by distrust and prejudice (Aydın 2004: 22). Therefore, problematic character of the bilateral relations reproduced itself throughout the history. Neither Greece, nor Turkey succeeded winning the positive peace in the relations due to that vicious circle. However, there were two main exceptions in the problematic nature of the relations; namely, the cooperation in 1930s and that in 1950s. The latest rapprochement since 1999, therefore, needs to be addressed in a critical perspective. Historical background of the relations were intended to offer a detailed account because the

author thinks that it is crucial in order to elaborate on today's good mood in the relations.

3.2   Perception of Other

Turkish-Greek relations are almost internalized within the identity formation of the both nations. Both countries share the Ottoman history in the establishment process of national states from different perspectives. Greeks achieved to gain independency (1832) from four hundred years lasted Ottoman administration remembered as *Tourkokratia* which represents the repressive dominance (Clogg 1997). Nearly 400 years lasted Turkish domination had left a permanent mark on Greek idea about Turkish image that represent outrage, invasion and suppression. The legacy of the Ottoman domination is still remembered and coincides with the image of its larger and militarily stronger neighbor. The Greek doubts regarding the expansionist Turkish desires revived after 1974 Cyprus operation and provide the ground for Greek distrust and prejudices against Turkey (Evin 2005: 7).

On the other side, the Greek liberation is mostly named and perceived as rebellion which is supported by the Great Powers in line with their own aims of partitioning Ottoman territory. The expansion of Greek territories five times since its foundation against the Ottoman territory and the Greek occupation, which was in line with the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), after the Sevres Treaty in the early 1920s recalled elder partition phobia in Turkish minds (Fırat 2002e: 182). The cooperation between Greece and the Great Powers in Greece's liberation and Turkish independence war made Turkish consciousness skeptical in relations. The traces of this psychology can be followed nowadays which is mostly named as the "Sevres Syndrome".

Defining an "other" has some advantages in the nation-building process. Defining another nation as "the other" gives leverage on the way of unifying or creating the nation. The other generally represents the lower values, bad images and even uncivil specifications which are seen totally unrelated and stranger to host nation (Millas: 10). Both actors perceived each other as an "other" to identify its own identity in their nation building process subsequently after 1820s and 1920s, as both nation-states were established right after defeating the other one. Thus, it is easy to trace the roots of problems back to the nation-building processes and beyond. This situation created distrust and, furthermore, the legitimate ground for prejudices for the both sides. (Aydın 2004: 23). Millas (2004), points out that the discourse includes the construction of the other and absolutization of differences in his analysis on the images of other in Turkish and Greek novels.

Otherness plays a role as if it is the antithesis; therefore the prejudices became strong enough to hinder healthy bilateral relations. The existence of other justifies the prejudices which constitute hurdles on improving relations. By this way, a vicious circle has been established in relations. Greece and Turkey had managed to overcome the "no-win" situation by the presence of both a common threat and a very strong third party arbitrator as it was seen in 1930s and 1950s. However, *détente* periods in history could not overcome the prejudices and deep rooted hostility perceptions. Almost every crisis undermined the progress in regards to these perceptions. The 1974 Cyprus intervention of Turkey and the Öcalan crisis, for instance, revealed that how easy the softening thoughts can be sharpened by old narratives. Too much ethnic and national pride and too much history are involved in the Turkish-Greek relations. Therefore, the success of any arbitration attempt or détente process is directly related to its capability of penetrating the perceptions.

3.3 Main Conflicts among Turkey and Greece

Turkey and Greece disagreed on many issues three of which being outstanding as the source of Turkish-Greek question, namely the minorities issue, Cyprus question, and the Aegean dispute which is based on the disagreement about territorial waters, continental shelf and airspace related issues and disagreement on sovereignty rights for geographical formations in the Aegean. These headings are addressed in detail so as to diagnose. On the other hand, Bahcheli et. al. (1997: 3) also point out that the actions of Greece against Turkey within the EU as another contested area. However, it seems to have disappeared or changed its content after Greece lifted its veto against Turkish EU membership in 1999.

3.3.1 Minorities Issue

Minority problem is the first bilateral problem that two of nation states faced. Ankara and Athens signed the document about population exchange at Lausanne, in 1923. Population exchange aimed at the replacement of Turkish citizens of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek citizens of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. The Turks in Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul, Gökçeada *(Imvros) and* Bozcaada *(Tenedos)* were exempted from this transfer. The main challenges were the problems regarding the implementation of exchange and its sociological, economic and demographic consequences (Bilgiç 2006). Since then, the treatment to Greek Orthodox and Turkish Muslim minorities remained one of the disputed areas in bilateral relations.

The approach to minorities mainly kept suspicious because they were considered as the strangers inside. Especially the minorities which are located nearby the border lines are scared of being the "fifth column". There are two

striking examples of this suspicion and fear, respectively; Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATO) has been revealed a 25 pages brochure as the second volume of patriots' handbook which depicts the Patriarchate as the insider enemy and untrustworthy institution (ATO n.a), and the Greek government did not prevent the illegal occupation of houses and lands which belonged to the nearly 50,000 Muslim Turks in early 1920s, around the border lines, especially in Evros prefecture (Oran 1999: 73). Yet, the minorities are protected by the certain rules of the Lausanne; they were subjected to bad treatment[2] in the host states more than ever in the times of crisis. For example, the conditions of the minorities were in a good mood in the beginning of the 1950s with the impact of Turkey's and Greece's NATO membership and good neighborly relations but it sharply worsened in the aftermath of the Cyprus events in 1955.

The problems minorities faced were nearly stayed parallel to each other throughout the time. In this sense, the complaints are mostly about the institutions which are related to group identity of the minority such as religious representation (*muftis*, Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate), the difficulties of minority foundations (also known as *wakfs*), and minority schools. The questions of political representation and using their ethnic names in their own institutions are generally problems in Western Thrace. To better understand the nature and implications of this matter, it would be worthwhile to have a look at the specific conditions and problems encountered by the respective minorities in Greece and Turkey.

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[2] Events of September 6-7, 1955 (Istanbul pogrom) targeted the Greek Orthodox minority and the events on 19 January 1990 in Komotini can be counted as just two examples of bad treatment of many.

3.3.1.1 Problems of the Turkish Minority in Greece

The population of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace is around between 120.000- 150.000[3]. The Turkish minority of Greece was remained nearly at the same number of 1920s in last 80 years. The proportional figures of the minority declined to 35 % from 65% despite their high birth rate (RTMFA 2008a). According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of 1990, the minority population should have been around 500.000. Article 19 of the 1955 Citizenship Law of Greece was one of the primary reasons of current diminished minority population scene. The Article 19 says;

> "A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. This also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and domiciled abroad. His minor children living abroad may be declared as having lost Greek nationality if both their parents and the surviving parent have lost the same. The Minister of the Interior decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the National Council." (HRW 1990)

The indications in the Article 19 such as "*non-Greek Orthodox origin Greek citizens*" and *"intention of returning back"* are highly vague, and even racist, criteria for abandoning ones citizenship (Stephen 1999: 2-5). According to the HRW (1999) report in 1999, the article 19 has allowed the state to strip approximately 60,000 non-ethnic Greeks of their citizenship between 1955 and 1998. The freedom of expression is also a problem in Western Thrace. There are some court decisions banned the use of the word "Turkish". The logic behind the decision was to call the Greek Moslems as "Turks" endangering the public order (RTMFA 2008b)

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[3] According to Human Rights Watch, the Muslim minority numbers between 80,000 and 120,000 (1999), as the organization tends to attribute "Turkishness" to the entire minority and Foreign Ministry of Turkey suggests than the number is around 150.000.

The privileges Muslims have in Greece are more than those enjoyed by the Greek Orthodox in Turkey but the rights of Muslims in Greece are more restricted in comparison to Orthodox Christians. The institutions like Mufti (the religious leader of the Turkish-Muslim Minority) and the Muslim foundations are vital in the existence and continuity of the ethnic Turkish minority as a community. The biggest problem regarding Muftis is their way of coming to power. The Muslim community demands the right of election whereas the Greek government puts Muftis in power by appointment up to two presidential decrees dated December 25, 1990 and January 3, 1991, and the trustees of the wakfs as well. Another outstanding reality is that neither was a Mufti appointed nor selected in Dodecanese since 1982 (Oran 1999: 62). Moreover, Athens attempted to prosecute and imprisoned the elected muftis in the 1990s (RTMFA 2008c). The wakfs experiences some administrative and financial difficulties. The administrative problems of wakfs are rooted back to mid-1960s, namely the Junta time. The Junta replaced the existing administrations of that time with Board of Administrators composed of persons alien to the Turkish Minority. Almost all of the remnants are cleansed after re-establishment of democracy in Greece besides the Junta's arrangements about Moslem foundations (RTMFA 2008d, Oran 1999: 59).

Many small and medium sized businesses were seriously affected by the different taxation regime and high financial penalties which were justified by the Greek government via proclaiming Western Thrace as a pilot region of tax audit (Oran 1999: 45). Discriminatory law measures are also taken regarding the Muslim wakfs in 1980 in which are defined as *"minority private law legal person"*. 1980 regulations have not been implemented for ten years due to strong reactions from Turkey and the Muslim minority (Oran 1999: 63). Yet the Presidential Decree in

January 1991 made the working principles of wakfs even more complicated. Acquisition of immovable property and restoration of old properties are other important questions in administration whereas there are no restrictions about selling their own properties (RTMFA 2008b).

3.3.1.2 Problems of the Greek Minority in Turkey

The Greek minority in Turkey have been facing many discriminative approaches in various fields in daily life ranging from their military obligations i.e. recruitment of Greek Orthodox citizens without early notice in different uniforms than ordinary in 1941, to high tax rates which were imposed on them in 1942 which is known as wealth tax *(varlık vergisi)* (Ertan 2007, Oran 2002a: 392). Moreover, the Events of September 6-7 which ended up with a large scale assault on the Greek community in Istanbul with a damage of more than 300 million US dollars of wealth and deportation of Greek citizens in 1964 who came in Turkey as subject to conditions of the bilateral agreement between Turkey and Greece in 1930. This deportation has quickened the dissolution of Greek community in Turkey (Macar 2008). As a result, the number of 120.000 Greek Orthodox Community in 1920s diminished up to some thousands however the numbers from Greek sources indicate differently. It is estimated that the current number is less than 5.000[4] .

After the Greek community highly diminished in size, the problems were mainly kept related to religious affairs, freedom of expression and education, and the situation regarding their properties. Problem of immovable properties that belong to foundations goes back to the year 1972 when the General Directorate of Foundations demanded the charter from all of the wakfs. Non-Muslim wakfs did not have that list because most of them were founded in Ottoman times in accordance with

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[4] Ertan 2008, Bahcheli, Couloumbis and Carley 1997 and Oran 2004 all indicate different numbers and the author was not able to acquire any exact number from Turkish Statistical Institute, because citizens are not questioned about their ethnic origin.

the *firman* of sultan. The only list they gave to state was the 1936 property listing. The doubts over the validity of this listing enabled the state to consider the Greek foundations' properties illegal and confiscate them no matter how the foundation had obtained them, whether via purchasing, inheritance, or donation (Özlem 2007, Fırat 2002e: 229). The non-Muslim foundations have experienced many difficulties due to 1936 property listing which is currently not in force.

Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate is probably the most debated institution of Greeks in Turkey. After the Lausanne, Ankara consented for the Patriarchate to stay in Istanbul but since then the Patriarchate had appeared in the public debates with many reasons namely, the election of patriarch, the Halki (*Heybeliada*) Seminary, and the property predicaments of its related agencies. The title of "Ecumenical" is one of the most controversial issues regarding the Patriarchy. There are different allegations in that manner. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore the official position of Turkey, suggests that "the Patriarchate by no means get involved in political and administrative affairs and only serve for the spiritual needs of the Greek Orthodox Minority in Istanbul" and that is agreed in Peace conference in 1923 (RTMFA 2008e). On the other hand, some others propose views which are different than the official one. Oran (2002b: 340-341; 2004) indicates that there is not any single word mentioned in Lausanne and moreover the title of Ecumenical is a spiritual issue. Macar (2008), states that there is no argument stated about the geographical limits of Patriarchy's jurisdiction.

Orthodox Halki Seminary has been closed since 1971 when the private schools are gathered under the umbrella of state. This is an active threat to the continuity of the Patriarchate in the future since the clergymen are getting older (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008: 140). Despite the many calls from the Western world

leaders and presidents, including the USA presidents, on the subject of re-opening the Seminary, it is still kept closed (DPT 2003: 32, Oran 2002c). It needs to be also mentioned that re-opening of the Seminary was voiced time to time by Turkish politicians as well.

The existing double headed structure of the minority schools is another criticism. According to the dual presidency system in existence, the Muslim deputy head has more power than the minority head and is appointed by the Ministry of National Education. Ministry has been also delivering an approved curriculum and it is forbidden to import the books besides the list. The graduates of the theology schools are not permitted to teach in minority schools and it creates a difficulty in the religious education. Moreover, Greek minority teachers are not allowed to teach in more than one school whereas their Turkish colleagues are (DPT 2003: 31-35).

Greek community foundations still have not a legal personality and therefore, their properties are still in danger of confiscation at any time and they face serious obstacles in their attempt to register and to acquire legal status for their immovable properties. The Directorate General for Foundations have a superior authority over the Greek Orthodox foundations which enables that body to dissolve the foundations, seize their properties, dismiss their trustees without a judicial decision and intervene in the management of their assets and accountancy (DPT 2003: 31, Toktaş 2006: 504).

3.3.1.3 Concluding Remarks

Ankara and Athens hardly internalized the fact that the minorities are actually their citizens. Turkey followed the strong state tradition after 1923, and the state became an internal actor of politics rather than government (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223). Therefore, the survival of the states was the leading motive in

politics. In Turkish realm, the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) are perceived as a dangerous tumor which is capable of creating disturbance in the new "one nation-one state" understanding. On the other side, Turkish minority in Greece is seen as a potential separatist mainly because of their near-border location, the Western Thrace. However, Turkey and Greece have agreed on the preservation of the minorities and sustaining their economic and religious necessities in accordance with the Lausanne Peace Treaty Articles 37 to 45 (Toktaş 2006: 490). The principle of reciprocity has been clearly misunderstood or misinterpreted by Turkey and Greece. The past experiences in this field have pointed out that different measures and expectancies were adopted for their own minority and different ones for the other. Both parties did not hesitate to critic policies and implementations in daily life of the other side which were more or less the same in their own.

3.3.2 The Aegean Disputes

Three of four highlighted Turkish-Greek questions are about Aegean dispute which concern the extension of the territorial seas, the continental shelf and airspace over the Aegean Sea. Both sides are defending different theses regarding these issues. Interestingly both sides' claims about the Aegean are based on nearly the same documents. However, the theses of both sides are not the subject of this paper, it is necessary to understand the quasi deadlock situation and to evaluate prospects.

3.3.2.1 Possible 12 Miles Greek Territorial Water in the Aegean Sea

States exercise their sovereignty over their countries which are consisted of land territory, territorial waters and airspace (Pazarcı 2006). In that sense, territorial water exists as adjacent belt of sea in every coastal state. States do not need any

special announcement in order to get this right. It is embedded in the definition of every coastal state. "The concept of the territorial sea has throughout its development been associated with two fundamental problems. The first was the determination of the juridical rights over the territorial sea, those of both coastal states and others. The other problem was the determination of the limit up to which coastal States could exercise their territorial sea rights" (Acer 2003: 69). State sovereignty in territorial water is only limited regarding the rule of innocent passage. In this vein, states allow other states' vessels to pass through the territorial waters (Keskin 2002: 752, UNCLOS, 1982: Article 17).

The historical progress in the legal definition of the territorial water is beyond the scope of this study but it is necessary to mention that the definition in UNCLOS 1982 is accepted today. And it defines territorial waters in Article 2 as follows

> "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law."

The limitation question is also answered satisfactorily in UNCLOS 1982. It points out that "every state has right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles" (UNCLOS 1982: Article 3). However, it does not put forwards the 12 miles as one and only valid determination for territorial waters delimitation. The situation in state practice still varies from 3 miles to 12 miles. Today, at least 22 States apply wider or narrower than 12 miles i.e. Angola 20 mile, Nigeria 50 mile, the Philippines claimed more than 200 miles, Germany 3 mile in some parts of it coasts, Jordan 3 miles (Acer 2003: 74).

The delimitation of the territorial sea is determined as 3 miles for both Turkey and Greece in Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923). In 1936, Greece proclaimed 6 mile territorial water in the Aegean and Ankara did not object. 6 miles territorial water announcement of Turkey came in 15 May 1964, when the relations were strained due to Cyprus problem. Since then, both countries territorial waters fixed at 6 mile in the Aegean Sea. The essence of the problem derives from the possibility of 12 miles Greek territorial water. Turkey, many times indicated that she strictly objects to such an act and ready to take every measure including military action. The increasing Greek claims regarding the 12 miles territorial water is responded firmly by Turkey. Furthermore, she declared that 12 miles Greek territorial water proclamation will be treated as *casus belli*, or a cause of war (Fırat 2002b: 751-752). The issue of the breadth of territorial sea lies at the core of the delicate balance of the rights and interests of the two coastal states (Bölükbaşı 2004: 124).

3.3.2.1.1 Greek thesis/views

Greece alleges that 12 miles territorial water is a widely accepted rule in international law and also the acceptance of this rule can be seen in practice today. This rule can be accepted as a source of international law because it is indicated in the UNCLOS 1982 Article 3 and it also exposes a case law because of the practice in international community. Thus, Greece keeps the right of 12 territorial waters in the Aegean Sea (Fırat 2002f: 753).

Athens defends that having special characteristic is not unique to the Aegean in response to uniqueness claim of Ankara. Moreover, rule of law should create a viable solution to the problems without leaving a wide margin for deviation from international law (Acer 2003: 100). In line with this idea, Greece also favored a uniform conventional limit in UNCLOS. The main reason behind that claim is that

such unity in law will serve to protection of "indivisibility of sovereignty" and "equality of treatment" principles (Acer 2003: 100). Consequently, Greece asserts that this rule is also valid for the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea because they are the indispensable parts of the Greek country (Oran 1999: 82).

The authority of determining the breadth of the territorial water belongs to coastal state. Therefore, Greece is the one and only authority regarding the expansion of territorial waters in the Aegean since this right derives from international agreements and case law (Fırat 2002f: 753, Oran 1999: 82).

In Greek views, Article 3 of UNCLOS (1982) sets a common and standardized limit and moreover, the Conference "had found it judicially difficult to accept an exceptional legal regime for certain seas such as enclosed and semi-enclosed seas" (Acer 2003: 101). Greece thinks, therefore, the Aegean Sea does not constitute an exceptional case for the regulation of territorial waters.

Lastly, according to Greece, the Turkish claims that Turkey would be a land-locked country in case of 12 miles Greek territorial water in the Aegean is not sensible. Turkey will keep the right of innocent passage in any case (Oran 1999: 82).

3.3.2.1.2 Turkish thesis/views

Turkey always defended that there is no 'general and uniform limit of 12 miles' and by no means could there be. 12 miles rule is accepted as maximum limit for territorial waters in 1982 UNCLOS not as a binding uniform rule (Fırat 2002f: 753). Despite the fact that Turkey is not one of the parties to UNCLOS 1982, she remained stick to this argument during the UNCLOS 1982 meetings. Turkish delegation pointed out that "It was necessary...to avoid oversimplification under the pretext of seeking to work out rules of a general character which neglected the

different categories of geographical situations." (UNCLOS III) Ankara responds to the Athens claims in regards to standardized one limit view with the Greek stance during the UCLOS I and II meetings. In this vein, Greece stood up in favor of 3 miles and argued that 12 miles would have adverse consequences for international community (Bölükbaşı 2004: 128-129, Acer 2003: 99). The Greek delegate Krispis said: "If Greece extends its territorial sea to twelve miles, which according to Article 3 of Commission's draft, would not be to the international law, it would be closing the whole of the Aegean Sea to the international community." (Acer 2003: 99, Bölükbaşı 2004: 128).

Turkey refuses that 12 miles territorial water constitutes a customary law and that it is binding for Turkey, as Greece claims. First of all, Turkey has neither signed nor ratified the 1982 Convention. Secondly, Turkey's attitude is an example of "persistent objector" in the context of the Aegean territorial sea dispute. Turkey emphasizes that she persistently objected to any certain limitation without acknowledging special cases, especially for the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (Acer 2003: 109). According to Turkey, the customary rule regulating the breadth of the territorial sea, like the conventional rule, does not provide a single limit. The Aegean Sea with its unique character deserves a special regulation which would serve the interests of both of countries.

Turkey always emphasized the possible consequences of an increase in Greek territorial waters as justification tool both for her political and judicial arguments. The current statistics show that 43.5% of the whole Aegean Sea currently belongs to Greece while 7.5% of the whole Aegean Sea belongs to Turkey. The remaining 49% of the Aegean Sea is the high seas (Acer 2003: 108). If Greece and Turkey extends its territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles, Turkish

territorial water will be 8.76%, Greek territorial waters will be 71.53% and the high seas will be 19.71%. The differentiation would have more serious consequences for Turkey in terms of connection to high seas because in such a scenario all of the three straits leading to Mediterranean will be encircled by Greek territorial seas. As a consequence, it would, in a sense, become land-locked in the Aegean (Bölükbaşı 2004: 123). Furthermore such a case will irreversibly damage the delicate balance in the Aegean which was reached in Lausanne.

From the Turkish point of view, any possible 12 miles Greek territorial water should be addressed as an abuse of right in reference to the 1982 Convention. International law requires that all the rights and obligations be exercised so as not to constitute an "abuse of rights" (Acer 2003: 105, Fırat 2002a: 753). As a result of extension of Greek territorial sea, Greece would automatically acquire sovereignty in the airspace over the extended territorial sea as well as sea-bed. Such an unjust enrichment would deprive Turkey of its existing sovereignty rights in the Aegean (Bölükbaşı 2004: 123).

Last but not the least Turkey objects the Greek claims regarding the determination of territorial waters is an unalienable part of a coastal state jurisdiction. And moreover she proposes that it is only valid as long as other coastal states do not object. Turkey shows the decisions of International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1951 England-Norway and 1974 Iceland-England fishery case as a legal basis (Oran 1999: 83).

3.3.2.2 Continental Shelf Problem

Disagreement on the Aegean continental shelf caused serious escalation between Turkey and Greece. Delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 6 miles territorial seas of two littoral states is the subject matter of the disagreement. There

are outstanding differences between Turkey and Greece. It is the only dispute that actually Greece admits as a question that needs to be resolved. (Bölükbaşı 2004: 233, Fırat 2002a: 758) Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis stated that continental shelf issue is the only negotiable subject in the Aegean after the EU summit on 16-17 December 2004 (Sezer 2005: 55).

The continental shelf dispute is an arduous and a very complicated matter which has often impeded Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Before delving into the essence of the dispute, it is better to clarify the definition of the continental shelf. First of all, the geological and juridical definitions of continental shelf differ from each other.

> "With respect to geomorphologic (geologic and scientific) definition, continental shelf is the submerged prolongation of the coastal state into the sea. The whole area of submerged portion of the continental crust is called continental margin. The continental shelf constitutes one of the main parts of the continental margin, together with 'continental slope' and 'continental rise'. The continental shelf terminates at the point where the downward inclination of the sloping floor increases markedly as the continental slope occurs." (Bölükbaşı 2004: 234).

Figure 3.1: Continental Shelf

In juridical definition, every coastal state has right to have its own continental shelf but they do not have sovereignty rights on the continental shelf. The rights are limited in searching and exploitation rights over the living-nonliving natural sources. The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 limits the continental shelf either up to 200 meters deep beyond the finish of territorial waters or till the reasonable deep to exploit (Keskin 2002: 754, Bölükbaşı 2004: 236). But the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in1982 (UNCLOS) formulated the form of definition in Article 76 as follows:

> "The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance" (United Nations Convention on The Law Of The Sea, Article 76).

Greece claims that the jurisdiction of most of the Aegean Sea continental shelf is Greek because many of its islands are situated in the Aegean Sea. It therefore concludes that it retains jurisdiction as a matter of security for the Greek islands. On the other hand, Turkey objects, claiming that Greece is attempting to control all of the Aegean Sea and further Turkey believes that the continental shelf should be controlled more equally since the Aegean continental shelf is a natural extension of the western Turkish mainland (Anatolia) (Moustakis 2003: 38, Fırat 2002a: 754-758).

3.3.2.2.1   Greek Thesis and Views

Delimitation of continental shelf in the Aegean is a totally judicial problem. The international law and courts are applicable resources in order to find a settlement and 1958 and 1982 UNCLOS are the judicial sources as well (Fırat 2002: 758). In that sense, Greece referred to the 1958 Convention and argued that

"the Convention provided that if parties failed to agree on any other boundary, the delimitation line for the continental shelf should be the median line between opposite coasts, whether the territory concerned was continental or insular" (Greek Note Verbale on 7 February 1974). Furthermore, Greece claims that the rule about delimitation, which is indicated in 1958 Convention (specifically Article 1), is not only Conventional but also customary and therefore it is binding for Turkey even though she is not a party to 1958 Convention (Acer 2003: 150-151).

The Greek islands are indispensable parts of Greek country and the proposed median line solution confirms the fact that there is a political and geographical unity between the Greek mainland and its islands (Oran 1999: 84, Acer 2003: 151). The main purpose behind this Greek argument is to sanctify her as an archipelago state and by this means Greece would be able to proclaim the maritime territory between outer borders of its islands in Eastern Aegean and the Greek mainland as its inner water. According to international law, the territorial water between the mainland and outer line, which is an outcome of the merging the outer points of the islands, is treated as inner water in the archipelago states. The status of the inner water is almost the same as the soil of the country in terms of international law (Fırat 2002: 758, Oran 1999: 84).

The Eastern Aegean islands are also subject to dissidence whether they have their own continental shelves or not. UNCLOS 1982 regulated the status of the islands in Article 121:

> "The territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." (UNCLOS 1982).

Greece alleges that Greek islands have their own continental shelf as in line with UNCLOS 1982; "The Greek islands, even those that are in the vicinity of the Turkish mainland, should be entitled to their own continental shelf in the very same way as the Turkish mainland" (The Greek Note Verbale on 14 June 1974).

3.3.2.2.2 Turkish Thesis and Views

Turkey has no objections to the rule that assures continental shelf right to islands (Fırat 2002: 758). The diversification in view starts at the subject of delimitation. Turkey claims that the median line between coasts of the states is not a mandatory method for delimitation. Turkey accepts the concept of natural prolongation as the dominant concept and justifies her claim by the International Court of Justice decision in the case 1969 Northern Sea Continental Shelf decision (Oran 1999: 86) In that sense, delimitation should be based on not the equidistant line between Greek islands and the Turkish mainland as Greece claims but to midways between mainland of the countries (Acer 2003: 152-153).

Turkey does not interpret the Article 6 of 1858 Convention as it is indicating the equidistance as the mandatory method. She, in fact, accepts this method as one of the possible methods that could be used to reach an equitable solution in the light of the special circumstances of the case (Turkish Note Verbale on 27 February 1974). Turkey justifies her views above, by arguing the peculiarity of the Aegean. In this regard, she stresses that the Aegean Sea is a semi-enclosed sea with many Greek islands located very close to Turkish mainland and granting continental shelf right to these islands would create an inequitable result in the Aegean. Therefore, if there will be any settlement on this issue it should favor the principle of equity (Fırat 2002a: 758, Oran 1999: 86, Acer 2003: 154)

Moreover, Turkey puts forward that the balance of interests is established in the Aegean by Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 which includes the issues of demilitarization of the islands, and territorial waters. The balance of interests should not be disturbed by granting continental shelf to the so-called Greek islands (Fırat 2002a: 758, Oran 1999: 84, Acer 2003: 153-154) Turkey announces that delimitation of continental shelf in the Aegean is not a totally judicial problem but a political one as well. She offers that any viable solution could be reached after political and judiciary consultations (Fırat 2002a: 758).

Lastly, in response to Greek efforts in order to get legal status of archipelago state, Turkey recalls that the same Greek efforts during the 1958 Convention failed and this status is neither applicable nor acceptable (Oran 1999: 85).

3.3.3 Airspace Related Disagreements

3.3.3.1 Ten Nautical Miles Greek Airspace

The legal definition of the airspace is used to emphasize the airspace which is superjacent to land territory, internal waters and territorial waters. In that sense, every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Fırat 2002a: 759). The main problem derives from the disagreement between Turkey and Greece regarding 10 miles Greek airspace. Greece declared 10 mile airspace by *Presidential Decree of 6/18 September 1931* "to define the extent of the territorial waters for the purposes of the aviation and the control thereof." (Bölükbaşı 2004: 575). However, Greece promulgated this decision to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1974. It is worth stating that at the time when Greece extended its territorial waters for the purposes of 'the aviation and the control thereof', its territorial water in practice was 3 miles from the baseline. Greek territorial waters expanded to 6 miles five years later in 1936. (Bölükbaşı 2004:

577). At the time of announcement of 10 mile Greek airspace, it did not take any objection from Turkey probably due to good relations at the time which also coincidences right before the Prime Minister İnönü's Athens visit (Oran 1999: 87). The military flights of Turkey in the zone of 4 mile airspace, which starts after the Greek territorial water and under of it is high sea, frequently generates serious situations and high tensions, including crashes of aircrafts.

3.3.3.1.1 Greek Thesis and Views

Greece justifies the 10 mile airspace by announcing it as a necessity to meet the needs for national security of Greece due to speed of aircrafts and ability of early warning systems (Oran 1999: 89). Athens highlights the similar examples of airspace expansion to secure the mainland. The United States of America (USA) and Canada established Air Defence Information Zone (ADIZ) in the 1950s. American ADIZ extends over 300 nautical miles in some areas whereas Canadian ADIZ goes along roughly 100 nautical miles from the mainland. Thus, Greece does not constitute one and only example of this application (Bölükbaşı 2004: 582-583, Fırat 2002a: 759). Greece emphasizes that the absence of international objection to 10 mile Greek airspace means recognition by international community and it is an outcome of local customs (Bölükbaşı 2004: 601).

3.3.3.1.2 Turkish Thesis and Views

Turkey asserts that the 10 mile Greek airspace is not valid under the international jurisdiction. "Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which Turkey and Greece both are parties, in no uncertain terms lay down that the airspace over which a State can claim complete and exclusive sovereignty is limited to that portion of the airspace which lies above its territory

and the territorial waters adjacent to it, over which it enjoys full sovereign rights"
(Turkish Note No. 147 of 12.1.1989).

Greek claim for the concept of "contiguous air zone" cannot be justified by establishing analogy to maritime contiguous zone. First of all, "contiguous air zone" has not been recognized by and codified in international law. Secondly, maritime contiguous zone expose a limited jurisdiction and control for a limited purpose over a maritime belt in the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea to coastal state. On the contrary of premises of maritime contiguous zone Greek claim is based on national sovereignty (RTMFA 2006a).

The ADIZ cases in North America cannot be accepted as example cases for Greek claims. Since the coastal states in that example force partial jurisdiction for the issued purpose and additionally ADIZ practices do not require identification for the transit passing aircrafts. Greece does not seek any difference between the aircrafts that are intended to penetrate the Greek airspace and those are willing to transit flight. Greece claims that the 4 nautical airspace belt is under its complete and exclusive sovereignty. (Bölükbaşı 2004: 588).

Lastly, Turkey responds the Greek claims regarding the tacit recognition, by stating that Turkey did object the 10 nautical mile Greek airspace announcement when the decision is posted to ICAO in 1974, which is a prerequisite in order to get in force. Therefore, Turkey keeps the status of "persistent objector" in that issue.

3.3.3.2 Flight Information Region (FIR) Conflict

Finally, another airspace-related problem is about the Flight Information Region (FIR) in the Aegean. FIR is an aviation term used to describe airspace with specific dimensions, in which a Flight Information Service and an alerting service are provided. Boundaries of the FIRs should be approved by ICAO. FIR line in the

Aegean was regulated in the ICAO Istanbul meeting in 23 May 1952. Both of the countries agreed on the Athens' control over the Aegean airspace. In the days of good relations with Greece, Turkey did not make any objection to decision. Another reason was the unwillingness of Turkey to cover the expenses of high technology for air traffic control (Fırat 2002a: 760, Bölükbaşı 2004: 605).

Under the Athens FIR, Greece controls most of the air traffic over the Aegean Sea region. As a result, Greece has demands that she should be notified of any military exercises and flights by Turkish aircrafts within the Athens FIR even if they are in the international airspace. Greece naming the flight by Turkish air force which plans do not informed to Greece authority as a "violation of the Greek FIR".

Turkey objects to Greek demands regarding the submission of the military flight plans because she mainly perceive such a claim as the persistent abuse of its Flight Information Region (FIR) responsibility. Thereby, Greece is limiting the freedom of Turkish military flights in the international space over the Aegean. Turkey claims that Greece's continued insistence on the submission of flight plans by military aircraft contravenes to the 1944 Chicago Convention. FIRs were devised by International Civil Aviation Organization in 1950's to provide facilities and services to the civilian aircraft in the international airspace. FIR arrangements solely entail technical responsibility. It does not change the free status of the airspace over the high seas under international law. The Article 3/A of the ICAO Convention says "This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be applicable to state aircraft" (Bahcheli, Couloumbis and Carley 1997: 3, Fırat 2002a: 758-760, RTMFA 2006a).

3.3.4 Sovereignty Rights Question in the Aegean

3.3.4.1 Greek Thesis and Views

Greece claims that Lausanne Peace Treaty and 1947 Paris Peace Treatment clearly draws up the sovereignty issues in the northeast and southeast Aegean. Thus, there is not any island under undetermined sovereignty (Başeren and Kurumahmut 2003: 101). According to Greece, the Greek sovereignty over the islands, islets and the rocks, those have been subject to disagreement between two countries, based on 3 international agreements which are Lausanne Peace Treaty, 28 December 1932 Treaty and Paris Italian Peace Agreement respectively.

Lausanne Peace Treaty 1923

Departing from the Article 16/1,

> Turkey "renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned"

Greece concludes that Turkey concretely sacrifice her sovereignty claims beside the islands that have been indicated. In other words, Article 16/1 constitutes a decision of a massive renounce status for Turkey except the islands counted as Imros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, which are evidently granted to Turkey in Lausanne Peace Treaty (Bölükbaşı 2004: 918).

28 December 1932 Treaty

The Treaty dated 28 December 1932 between Turkey and Italy is a valid international agreement because it is supplementary agreement of January 4, 1932 Agreement between Italy and Turkey, which set down the maritime frontier

between the island of Castellorizzo and the Turkish coast. Therefore, it does not necessarily to be registered in the Secretariat of the League of Nations and precisely delimits the rest of the maritime frontier between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast. In accordance with the norms regarding successor principle in international law, as Greece is the successor of Italy according to the 1947 Peace Treaty of Paris, the Imia rocks were ceded to her, with the rest of the Dodecanese islands, and they constitute an integral part of the Greek territory (Bölükbaşı 2004: 918-919). Furthermore, Turkey revealed that she undoubtedly accepted the arrangements of 28 December 1932 Treaty by her approach and behavior since then (Başeren and Kurumahmut 2003: 101-102).

1947 Paris Treaty of Peace

Paris Peace Treaty, which is signed between the Allied forces and Italy, envisages the transfer of sovereignty rights of Italy in the Dodecanese to Greece consistency with the Vienna Convention rule regarding perpetual succession (Başeren and Kurumahmut 2003: 102).

3.3.4.2 Turkish Thesis and Views

Turkey, states that she renounced the sovereignty rights over totally nine islands in the northeast Aegean and thirteen islands, which are counted by names in the agreement, in favor of Greece and the islets and rocks in connection with those and Meis island in favor of Italy. Greece took these islands that are counted by their names from Italy in Paris Peace Treaty. The all islands, islets and rocks which were under the Ottoman sovereignty before Lausanne and did not subject to sovereignty reassignment in Lausanne Peace Treaty are descended from their original owner Ottoman Empire to its successor Republic of Turkey (Başeren and Kurumahmut 2003: 103).

The sovereignty of the namely counted all islands, islets and rocks depended on or adjacent to named islands in Menteşe region were allocated to Greece but the rest of properties has been transferred to Turkey because of its the successor state of the Ottomans. Albeit, the Article 16 in Lausanne Peace Treaty exposes a total renouncement status for Turkey, it only issued the islands. Therefore, Article 16 does not cover the islets and rocks (Başeren and Kurumahmut 2003: 104). Furthermore, Article 12 does not cover the issue of islets and rocks depended on or adjacent to named islands (Bölükbaşı 2004: 928).

28 December 1932 Treaty

The historical document dated as of 28 December 1932 regulations concerning the sovereignty rights of islands, islets and rocks in Menteşe Region lacks signature, ratification process by parties and registration by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. In addition, "28 December 1932 Prochés-Verbal was a record of technical nature and, as such, did not constitute a valid treaty in international law capable of giving rise to rights and obligations for the parties" (Bölükbaşı 2004: 934). In sum, this document is neither legal in international law nor binding for its parties. Doubts about the legality of this document are also raised by Soviet representative (Fırat 2002c: 467).

1947 Paris Treaty of Peace

In response to Greek claims based on 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Turkey argues that first of all, Italy did not have sovereignty over the disputed geographical formations at the present; secondly, the sovereignty of the islets and rocks in dispute now was not subjected to Italian sovereignty either by the Article 15 of Lausanne or by any later valid and legally binding transaction, lastly, Greek claims

cannot be treated as valid since Turkey was not a party of 1947 Paris Peace Treaty (Bölükbaşı 2004: 935).

3.4.   Cyprus Problem and its International Character

The lack of agreement on the Cyprus problem constitutes one of the core problems among Greece and Turkey. They have always disagreed about the events of 1974. Turkey generally insists that her action was on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriots to protect them from Greek-Cypriots attacks and coup d'etate and it was done as a result of her guarantor state role assigned by London and Zurich Agreements. On the other side, Greece maintains that 1974 intervention was a Turkish invasion on the island of Cyprus. Ever since 1974, de facto division is continued among Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus and all subsequent governments of Greece and Turkey have failed to reach a viable solution (along with the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots) on reuniting the island.

The historical background, thesis of parties and even ongoing developments in Cyprus are out of the scope of the study since the main purpose is to understand the effectiveness of the EU in improvement of Turkish-Greek bilateral relations. The history of Cyprus question is very complicated and multidimensional as well. Many parties are involved in Cyprus question other than Turkey and Greece. Cyprus has become an internationalized issue since 1964 with the UN involvement in terms of diplomacy and peacekeeping activities (Stearns 2001: 243). Turkey, Greece, Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the United Kingdom (UK), the EU and the UN are officially indispensable elements of any possible settlement formula. The role of GB becomes significant as another "inhabitant" state of Cyprus fue to its bases in the island, Akrotiri and Dhekelia which cover 3% of the land area of Cyprus (Sovereign Base Areas Cyprus 2008). Even though, there is no official US

deployment in Cyprus; the USA has always played a significant role in solution initiatives mainly the leading role. Moreover, the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) members can be included in this formula as it was seen in the Russian veto in the UNSC regarding the Annan Plan in 2004 (Zaman Daily: 24 March 2004, Birgün Daily: 12 June 2005). Therefore, conceptualizing the Cyprus problem as a bilateral problem between Turkey and Greece would be oversimplification.

The past peace plans did always consider mainly the demands that came from 4 parties Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. Despite the fact that Turkish and Greek identity formations are at the heart of the problem, that peaceful settlement does not necessarily based on the agreement between Turkey and Greece only. The harmony and concordance among communities play key role in Cyprus solution. As Larrabee (2001: 234) points out, several factors may have positive effects for Cyprus but Turkish-Greek resolution for ongoing dispute in the Aegean might have the most fruitful consequences in Cyprus. Cyprus question is included in the list of Turkish-Greek dissidences but solution is not depended on solely both parties. Long-lasting and just settlement seems possible as long as all parties to Cyprus question agreed.

3.5. Main Crises in Recent History of Relations

There are many serious crises in Turkish-Greek relations which are mostly derived of the main contested issues i.e. on continental shelf, in 1976 and in 1987 and on the subject of sovereignty disagreement over the disputed geographical formations, Kardak/Imia crisis in 1996 which brought the two countries to the brink of war. Last but not the least one is the Öcalan crisis in 1999. Even though, to get a pattern in social science is very difficult, it would not be a big mistake to assume

the rapprochement processes as a pattern in Turkish-Greek relations, because almost every significant crisis in bilateral relations are followed by an initiative of cooperation between two countries. The leaders of the two countries (Karamanlis and Ecevit in 1978, and Papandreuo and Özal in 1987) initiated dialogue, signed memoranda of understanding on bilateral disputes, and undertook some reciprocal concessions after the serious tensions (Oran 2002). There were three driving force in 1999 of the latest rapprochement and more or less every one of them has impact, namely (a) Capture of Öcalan in Kenya after he left the Greek Consulate in Nairobi, (b) the disastrous earthquakes in İzmit and Athens, (c) Turkey's announcement as an official EU candidate status without any Greek objection. Therefore, assessment of Öcalan crisis as a main reason of latest détente would be biased. The recent crises in bilateral relations may help to understand the characteristics of the relations and may enlighten how fragile the Turkish-Greek relations are, particularly in the field of contested areas.

3.5.1 Continental Shelf Crises in 1976 and in 1987

The 1987 Aegean Crisis was rooted in the problems dated at the end of 1970s. The 1976 crisis were the first bilateral crises derived from the disagreement on the Aegean shelf. Both of the countries claimed that they have rights of searching and exploitation for oil in the almost same geographical location. The crisis was prevented by the US peaceful intervention. Foreign Ministers Çağlayangil and Bitsios decided to start meetings. It was the first concrete step taken towards the regulation continental shelf question. According to Bern Declaration (1976), both sides committed (a) to keep secret (completely) all meetings because both government can easily be target of though critics in domestic politics, (b) to avoid any action which humiliate the other side or to avoid

any action which can block the meetings. Thereafter, summits were held between two countries. They failed to achieve to agreed on a settlement but to freeze the problems regarding the continental shelf till 1987 (Fırat 2002a, 2002b).

Greece declared that she would not recognize *Bern Declaration* anymore on 27 February 1987. Moreover, she also announced that they could make efforts for prospect for oil. Turkey sent a note to Greece. Athens is warned that if Greece starts any attempt regarding seeking oil as the violation of Bern Declaration, Turkey would take retaliatory measures on 1 March 1987. Turkish Security Council decided to advise the sail of *Seismic I* to the Aegean in the purpose of seeking oil. Government gave the permission to Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) on 25 March 1987. It is perceived as a threat by PASOK government and Greece reacted by sending navy to the area. The day after Turkish Armed Forces are alarmed in the Aegean as well (Cowell 1987). Fortunately, with the intervention of NATO's Secretary General, Lord Carrington, a war was avoided and the southern flank of NATO's military alliance was kept intact**.**

After the high tension ended up, Papendreu brought the issue of going to ICJ to solve the continental shelf issue. Turkish response came and confirmed that there is no difference in Turkish attitude. Turkey defended a political solution to continental shelf issue rather than applying international justice organs. The main disagreement regarding the solution of continental shelf dispute is also stayed unresolved. The pattern of rapprochement did work again and both sides open the way of Davos which neither achieved to find enduring solutions to disagreements over the Aegean (Fırat 2002b)

3.5.2   Kardak (Imia) Crises (1996)

The story of Kardak crisis began on 25 December 1995; probably nobody predicted that a rescue operation would trigger such crisis which brought both countries brink of war. The Turkish ship-named "*Figen Akad*"-run ashore of the Kardak (Imia) Islets on 25 December 1995 and rescued by Greece. Four days later Ankara send a protest to Athens with the reason of violation of Turkish territorial water by Greek forces during the rescue work of *Figen Akad.* Athens responded this protest by voicing that the right of rescue in that region belongs to Greece because the issued area was under the Greek sovereignty. Dispute and correspondence between ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) of two countries about the sovereignty of islets started with this accident.

Turkish and Greek media played major role in escalation of crisis; actually media moved current situation from routine disagreement to crisis. Priest hoist up a Greek flag on the islets on 25 January 1996. The Kardak issue turned out one of the biggest crises five days after the first media coverage (Hadjidimos 1998/1999: 8). Journalists from *Hürriyet* (Turkish newspaper) flied to islets aftermath of this event and changed the flags. Photographs of islet with Turkish flag were published in *Hürriyet* (Fırat 2002a, Hadjidimos 1998/1999). The Greek Special Forces landed to one of the islets and raised Greek flag again on 29 January 1996. Turkey blockaded the islets the day after, 30 January 1996. Turkish SAS commandos deployed on the other islet. Armed and well equipped soldiers from both parties are 325 meters away from each other in such a situation. Therefore, these were the closest moments for a Turkish-Greek armed conflict.

Military escalation was ended by the initiative of Clinton administration. US envoy Richard Holbrooke and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana had played

considerable role in intermediation of crisis between two NATO-allies (Economides 2005: 482-483, Uzgel 2002b: 292). The navy patrols of both countries withdrew from around the region. However, the issue has remained an unresolved diplomatic conflict since that time. Greek Prime Minister Simitis had accepted Clinton's offer about the starting the talks. Simitis had also start a diplomatic initiative through the EU and looked for support to Greek claims. Actually, the EU foreign policy during the crisis created disappointment in Greece. Kardak crisis showed that the EU was not capable of protecting Greek interests, however Turkey was called to consider international law and EU has ended up with the Greece's internationally recognized borders by the EU Parliament on 15 February 1996 and by Council of Ministers on 15 July 1996 (Stavridis and Tsardanidis 2005. 230, Aksu 2004: 35).

US, intermediating force of crisis, has encouraged both sides to meet bilaterally in NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 which is concluded with Madrid Declaration. Greece and Turkey declared "simultaneously" that they will avoid one sided actions (referring to increasing Greek territorial waters). On the other, Turkey declared that she will renounce threat of use of force as long as Greece stays away from prolongation (referring to *casus belli* for one sided actions of Greece in Aegean). Both sides also decided to start "wise men talks*"* and to take confidence building measures among the countries (Aksu 2004:35, Uzgel 2002: 293).

Kardak (Imia) Crisis showed some important points. First of all, how fragile is the Turco-Greek relations are understood by domestic publics and international community. Second of all, it is realized that the US is more effective than the EU in conflict resolution, Last but not the least, another disagreement subject has been

emerged; namely *grey area thesis* which points that sovereignty of islets in the Aegean is not as clear as black or white (Fırat 2002c: 466).

3.5.3. Öcalan Crisis

Ironically, the origins of the rapprochement process lies down the changing politics and politicians aftermath of the Öcalan crisis. Earlier, Öcalan was evicted from his shelter in Syria as a result of Turkish pressure on President Haifiz al-Asad, 12 October 1998. He had caught in Rome airport but Rome did not agree upon Öcalan's extradition (Aksu 2004: 56-57). Italian decision took many protests both in administrative and societal level including boycotting Italian products and exclusion of Italian firms from state projects. Italy decided to send Öcalan due to the worsening mood in relations. The leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Liberation Army) had stayed in Minsk for nearly ten days and then he landed Greece on 29 January 1999. The head of Greek secret service, Dimitris Stavrakkasi, decided to send Öcalan to third country after his meeting with Öcalan in Greece. Öcalan came back to Greece on 1 February because Netherlands and Belarus did not give permission for the passage of their airspace. Greek authorities considered the best option they had is to transfer Öcalan to an African country and then to ask for asylum. But Öcalan was apprehended in Kenya where he had been hiding in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi (Hürriyet Daily: 20 February 1999).Turkey succeeded in keeping track of Öcalan with American and Israeli assistance (Evin 2005: 396).

The clear-cut facts of Greek assistance for Öcalan, who was known as the most wanted fugitive in Turkey, have been publicized after the capture in Kenya i.e. Greece was the host to Öcalan and a false [Greek] Cypriot passaport was found on Öcalan. Aftermath, a new crisis has begun in Turkish-Greek relations (Hadjidimos 1998/1999: 4, 20 February 1999, *Hürriyet*). The reactions from various levels were

very though in Turkey however these reactions never effected the economic relations between Turkey and Greece as it happened it the case Turkish-Italian relations (Aksu 2004: 56-57) President Demirel defined Greece as a "rogue state" and pointed out that Turkey would have to her own legal defense right (Balbay 1999, Fırat 2002d: 66). On the other side, the societal relations among Turkey and Greece almost came to point of stop, for example Rahmi Koç, the biggest industrialist in Turkey, resigned from the presidency of Turkish-Greek Business Council (Hadjidimos 1998/1999: 13, Aksu 2004: 55), Erkut Yüceoğlu the Chairman of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) raised the concerns regarding the lack of positive response from Greek businessmen (Aksu 2004: 56), the meetings of Platform of Journalists of the Aegean and Thrace, a forum for around 200 journalists from both sides, eventually stopped (Hadjidimos 1998/1999: 9).

Öcalan crisis was turn into an embarrassment to the Greek political leadership. Prime Minister Simitis ordered for an investigation. The direct ties of Foreign Minister Pangalos, Internal Minister Papadapulos and the Public Progress Minister Petsalnikos were revealed and Simitis had to oust them from the government (Aksu 2004: 81, Evin 2005: 396). Simitis assigned George Papandreou as the new Foreign Minister. The Greek foreign policy priorities were considerably changed towards Turkey from those of his predecessor in a positive manner (Grigoriadis 2003: 3). George Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, İsmail Cem achieved to take further steps in order to improve the poor mood of Turkish-Greek relations. As a consequence of the letter exchange among Cem and Papandreou successively on 24 May 1999 and on 25 June 1999, parties agreed on cooperation in

various areas such as international terrorism, trade, tourism, culture, science and technology, the environment and the economy (Evin 2005: 397).

CHAPTER 4

EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE

4.1   The Indicators of the Europeanized Character of Turkish-Greek Relations

4.1.1   Introduction

The overall process of Turkey and Greece's relations with the EU is out of the scope of this thesis. It is the part of the story which starts in Helsinki, 1999, when Turkish-Greek dispute becomes strongly marked by Europeanization what is scrutinized here, indeed. Since from this point onwards bilateral relations, the so-called rapprochement process, between those tow countries reveal a distinct character in comparison to other détente instances in common history. Increasing trade volume, interaction at the societal and political level and lack of serious crisis situations since 1999 can be shown as the arguments of particular positive atmosphere in the relations.

Turkey and Greece are countries, which are not considered as a pair of equal specifications. In particular there is an asymmetry in respect to their power capacities. In other words, power asymmetry is one of the dimensions of the relations. On the one side, Turkey is considered as a more powerful country with its population, size, strategic depth, quantity and quality of its armed forces (Ayman

2007: 17). Among these factors, the Turkish Armed Forces (*TSK*) and its positioning in Turkish daily life attracts more attention in Greece than in any other neighbor of Turkey. From Greek perspective, the power of *TSK* is perceived as a reflection of Turkey's expansionist desires, which should be balanced by the enhancement of Greek military power (Grigoriadis 2003: 6).

Greece, on the other hand, holds some comparative advantages vis-à-vis Turkey in social solidarity, economic stability, and in its coalition building capacity. Membership of the EU is the driving force of Grecee's high grounds on these points. The EU leverage of the Greece cannot be thought apart from its bilateral relations and it is a key dimension on the way of Europeanization of the Turkish-Greek dispute. The rule of unanimity in the EU decision making process is the basic source of Greek leverage. Hence, the Greek foreign policy through Helsinki decision is also worth to mention.

Greek foreign policy has tried to benefit from its advantageous EU leverage against Turkey, however, policy instruments of this approach have been various within time. Greek decision makers chose this policy option in order to exploit Turkish desires of the EU membership, which is considered as a legacy of more than two hundred years long modernization project. Greece used its veto power to make Turkey adopt more moderate and flexible perspectives on disputed issues. In that way Greece can better pursue its national interest via attaching the Turkish-Greek questions in to European realm (Grigoriadis 2003: 6). Turkey-EU relations suffered an impasse because of the Greek veto for any decision that can stimulate Turkey's EU orientation. Greece vetoed the financial aid provided by the Fourth Financial Protocol of 1981 in line with the same mentality. Furthermore, Turkey's disputes with Greece and Cyprus are cited as well as the lack of democratic and

economic development, respect for minorities and human rights in rejection of Turkey's application in December 1989 (Hale 2000: 178-179). Greece successfully achieved to attach Turkish-Greek questions in the EU context; however she did not get fruitful consequences of that policy option.

The year 1995 was a breakthrough in Greece's veto oriented policy when Greece lifted its veto against the Turkey-EU, Customs Union (CU) agreement and the release of EU funds for Turkey provided for by the Fourth Additional Protocol (Kirişçi and Çarkoğlu 2003: 118, Fırat 2002c). Grigoriadis (2003: 3) emphasize this event as "a milestone as regards Greek views of Turkey-EU relations" but from the author's point of view, it is an over-rated assessment. What Greece did was a diplomatic "give-take" maneuver in response to Cyprus' EU membership. Letting Turkey into CU did not facilitate any positive mood in the relations, on the contrary bilateral relations were hit by two major crises namely, Kardak in 1996 and S-300 in 1997. Membership to the CU was not perceived as a strong EU anchor in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. Moreover, being a part of the CU without EU membership is still subject to hot debates in Turkish internal politics.

A major policy shift in Greek foreign policy happened in 1999 with the recognition of Turkey's official candidate status to the EU. In fact, Greece had been giving the hints of policy change with Simitis government. There are some reasons of foreign policy shift in Greece that is crowned in 1999. First of all, Greek economic objectives in line with the European Monetary Union (EMU) obligations made Greece to decrease public spending, and military spending, which was is one the most crucial expenses in order to achieve the objectives. A relief in Turkish-Greek policy would pave the way of realization of downsizing budgets (Fırat 2002d). Secondly, Greece did not achieve to align Turkey with its veto oriented

policy in the EU. In other words, they could not bring Turkey either to the negotiation table neither to judicial bodies (Grigoriadis 2003: 3). Thirdly, Greek gained a negative image among her EU partners by its persistent objecting position with regard to the Turkey-EU relations. Moreover, at the time Greek foreign policy departed from the general EU stance on Macedonia and Kosovo cases. In sum, the dissatisfactions of EU partners became unbearable for Greece. Overall, this policy backfired against EU general interests and the national interests of the remaining EU member states (Grigoriadis 2003: 3, Stavridis and Tsardanidis 2005: 229). Last but not the least; Greece had to face considerable accusations of Turkey at the highest level after Öcalan was taken into custody in 1999. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel branded Greece as an "outlawed state". Moreover he suggested to add Greece in the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, listed by the US Department of State for countries that repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism (Ayman 2006: 20). Therefore, Turkey's EU aspect exerted an incentive for Greece to prevent these accusations widespread by Turkey at that time. One can easily see that a Turkish accusation, which alleges Greece as supportive to terror, was never voiced so passionately after 1999.

The new approach of Greek foreign policy became more solid under George Papandreou's ministry. Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem initiated a dialogue on low politics, i.e. trade, tourism and environmental protection. And eventually positive mood arose after the devastating earthquakes that hit İzmit, Turkey and Athens, Greece in August and September respectively. This process was then crowned with the official proclamation of Turkey's candidate status in Helsinki Summit, 1999. Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999

Presidency Conclusions (1/4) referred the bilateral border disputes for candidate countries as such;

> "…the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues"

The recommendation is followed by an indication that Turkey should settle its disputes with Greece (Evin 2005: 397, Fırat 2002c: 479, Rumelili 2005b: 45). Retrospectively one can say that Helsinki Summit decisions triggered Europeanization of the bilateral relations *per se*. The clause in1/4 of Helsinki European Council 1999 Presidency Conclusions created an incentive for Turkish side. In point 4.2 of the Accession Partnership document, under medium-term goals, EU once again spelled out the importance of resolving border disputes with member states of the Union before the commencement of accession negotiations (European Council, 2001). After those decisions from the EU, Greece acted in favor of Turkish membership to the EU in the Unions meetings.

At the Laeken European Council Summit on December 14-15, 2001 in Belgium, Greek government politically backed up Turkey's EU prospect. At that time, France and Germany among some other countries voiced their doubts regarding the daily implementation of the reforms in Turkey. To convince the doubters, the Greek delegation alleged the example of improvement in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey as a sign of Turkish political reform. Furthermore, Greece reminded that it was beneficial for the Balkan region to have Turkey in European Union as a stability factor. Moreover, Turkey's EU membership is presented to diminish Turkeys' possible acts of aggression in the future (European Council, 2001).

The Europeanization discussion is held on the previous chapter in a broad extent with touching upon the concepts, the characteristics, and the perception of Europeanization in a regional context and in Turkey and Greece in particular. For that reason, reiterating such a debate is not necessary. The Europeanization of Turkish-Greek relations are needed to be tested for the sake of thesis aims. The ways in which Smith (2000) puts forward to measure the Europeanization seem compatible with the notion of Europeanization. Therefore, the four indicators namely, constitutional change, elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and the increase in public support will be instrumental to understand whether it is possible to talk about a Europeanization of Turkish-Greek relations or not.

Despite the fact that the subject of Europeanization is increasingly studied, the subject Europeanization of bilateral relations did not get attention so far in the literature. The Europeanization of bilateral relations did not attract same degree of attention as harmonization of national policies to European level for instance. There are various academic studies (Economides 2005, Panagiotis. 1999, Stavridis and Tsardanidis 2005, Featherstone 1998) that discuss the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy and the major shift in Greek foreign policy since Greece EU membership, 1981. On the other hand Turkey is still a candidate country which started EU negotiations in 2005 and is still in progress. Therefore, it is early to confer the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, it is a fact that Turkish foreign policy has to deal with more tangible areas in comparison to Greek foreign policy i.e. the serious situations in her near abroad explicitly, Iraq, Iran and Georgia. Therefore, it is hard for Turkey to alter its traditional foreign policy concerns and behavior in a short term.

4.1.2 Constitutional Changes

4.1.2.1 Greece

The constitutional changes are the foremost signs of domestic policy alignment with the European norms and values. The scrutinized constitutional changes and legal arrangements here are the ones which effect Turkish-Greek relations; since the aim of this section is to understand the Europeanization character of bilateral relations. Yet, another reason for this method of scrutiny lies beneath the fact that foreign policies are not strictly defined by constitutions.

The regulations and constitutional changes regarding the minority regime of the countries have a direct effect in bilateral relations. Therefore the policy adaptations on minority issues in Turkey and Greece provide an important relief to minorities in these countries. In that sense, Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code stipulated that individuals who were not ethnically Greek left the country without the intention of returning, could be deprived of their citizenship (Oran 1999: 30, Anagnostou 2005: 337). The existence of Article 19 was the major target of criticism towards Greece in regards to respect for human rights and minority rights. Greece Report of the USA, 1990, assessed the punishment of exile is not constitutional in Greece. By this way, the provision of Article 19 is named as an exile by the United States (Oran 1999: 31).

In the European context, a multicultural understanding for minority protection was built in 1995 by the adoption of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities[5] (FCPNM) which foresees a monitoring mechanism for its signatories. The increasing critics from Council of Europe (CoE) focused on the Article 19 (Heraclides 2002a: 306). Greek Ministry of Foreign

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[5] Greece signed FCPNM in 1998 but did not ratified yet. Turkey has never signed FCPNM.

Affairs initiated an attempt in order abolish the controversial article in deliberations with the Greek Ministry of Inferior Affairs. The possibility of opening a monitoring process to investigate the treatment to Muslim minority in Western Thrace came to agenda after the report had submitted to the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) in 1997 and that was the most undesirable scenario for Simits' Greece. In early November 1997, the Monitoring Committee of the CoE decided to finalize its decision on whether a possible monitoring process for the allegations is necessary or not (Anagnostou 2005: 348-351). Article 19 was abolished on 23 January 1998 by the unanimous decision of the cabinet (Oran 1999: 32, Anagnostou 2005: 350). The abrogation of Article 19 ended the powerful critics of CoE and strengthened the hands of Greece. However some Greek MPs alleged that the lack of retroactive leg of the amendment reveals that this change is not done in accordance to European norms and values but just to block to critics (Anagnostou 2005: 351).

"Restricted Area" is also another freedom limiting enforcement of Greece which is not in force today. This zone is located in east-west direction and occupies nearly one eight of Western Thrace (Heraclides 2002a: 302). While the entrance to this zone was only available with special pass documents and it was totally outlawed between 24:00-08:00 even for Greek citizens. Neither the barriers nor the special pass documents are active in that region since the year 1995. However the legal basis of the zone was not abolished (Oran 1999: 34).

4.1.2.2 Turkey

Since 2001, Turkey has been trying to reform her legal system in accordance to the EU norms and standards. The successive governments since then have pursued an ongoing process of transformation by so-called harmonization packages.

Nine of them have passed through assembly as of the year 2008. The spokesman of cabinet and the Deputy Prime Minister, Cemil Çiçek, indicated that the harmonization process should not be directly correlated to the harmonization packages because other changes in legal system is also held in line with EU objective (ABGS 2008). The first two packages concentrated on the freedoms of expression and association and the last one was mainly includes the new arrangements in penal code and reorganization of autonomous institutions like, Turkish Council of Higher Education (*YÖK*) and Radio and Television Supreme Council (*RTÜK*). The transformation process covers a great deal of legal arrangements therefore the changes regarding foreign policy related subjects such as the minorities and National Security Council (MGK) will be elaborated.

The freedom of the press and association are expanded, the Law on Political Parties is renewed, penalties for torture crimes are increased, and retrials of cases contrary to The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), judgments are became feasible by the fourth and fifth packages passed in July 2003. Moreover, these packages changed the member distribution of MGK (Tocci 2005. 73-74). A civilian was appointed Secretary General of the National Security Council for the first time, in 2004 (European Commission 2004: 53). The Deputies of prime minister and Minister of Justice are included into the structure of the Council and the frequency of meetings decreased from every month to once in every two months. In other words, the civil structure of MGK is strengthened (ABGS 2008b). This is an important change when the aforementioned powerful negative Greek perception of Turkish military is considered.

The third transformation package has introduced a modification to the Law on Foundations. The non-Muslim foundations had a right to acquire and to hold

their problematic properties in relation to 1936 declaration (İçduygu and Soner 2006: 463). The government has also accepted the return of the real estates which are transferred to the Treasury. However, the amendment did not provide a satisfactory solution to already the ones transferred to third parties other than Treasury (Macar 2007: 85).

Turkey has been monitored like other EU candidates. The compliance of the transformation process with EU criteria is audited by the annual Commission Progress Reports. The commission closely observes the developments in Turkey, i.e. the abolition of the "Secondary Committee for Minorities" in January 2004 was welcomed. However, discretionary power of Directorate General of Foundations over non-Muslim foundations is criticized (İçduygu and Soner 2006: 463, Toktaş 2006: 502-503). Such a close auditing process created a correlation between political reforms and the relations with the EU. Therefore, the ongoing changes in legal system since 2001 have interlinked to the EU aspect of Turkey (Tocci 2005: 75).

4.1.3 Elite and Bureaucratic Socialization

The sphere of elites and bureaucrats are highly influential in decision making process. Believes, values, judgments and even prejudices of elites and bureaucrats are critical on the verge of sensitive choices since they are capable of manipulating the politicians at the first hand. That is fact that the bureaucracy is the policy implementing body of the governments. Despite the fact that they are under the authority of politicians they have capacity to resist tacitly or directly behind doors. Smith (2000) points elite socialization and bureaucratic adaptation as the indicators of Europeanization. The concept of Europeanization Smith is interested in refers to the coherence between the national foreign policies to European level.

Smith (2000) counts the ability, structure, and social capital of bureaucracy in order to achieve coherence. These factors are not directly included since the thesis main argument is the Europeanization of the bilateral relations, *per se*. Smith (2000: 623) highlights the limited sources of Greek diplomacy during their first term EU Presidency in the second half of 1983. But today, the bureaucracy of Turkey and Greece, foreign ministries in particular, demonstrated their sufficiency in international arena, i.e. the Greek EU Presidency terms, and leading roles of Turkey in international organizations and operations such as NATO and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization.

Regular communication and consultation on foreign policy issues are the most fundamental European norms. European countries gave importance to consultation mechanisms in foreign policy before finalizing their national stance to prevent any surprises (Smith 2000: 615-616). The relevant point to the case is their abilities of cooperation, communication and problem solving capacity inter-parties. In this manner, I will argue the bureaucracy not in terms of structural efficiency but capacity of adaptation of European norms and values.

Smith (2000: 617) puts forward the definition of elite socialization as such;

> "This domain is subject to the same dynamics of 'multi-level governance' and overlapping policy networks… Thus, a vital distinction must be made between temporary governments (and their personal representatives) who take decisions at the highest levels and the entrenched lower level officials who prepare the decisions and communicate with their EU partners on a regular basis in numerous institutionalized settings."

The distinction between thesis testing points and Smith's focal point is Europeanization of bilateral relations. Smith mainly discusses the adaptation of European norms and values in foreign policy. The vital question is whether the

ongoing relations created "an increasingly dense, institutionalized, transgovernmental communications network" (Smith 2000: 618).

Turkey and Greece have agreed on a new dialogue in 1999, with the prospect of starting co-operation process on non-contentious areas for instance international terrorism, trade, tourism, culture, science and technology, the environment and the economy (Evin 2005: 397, European Commission 1999: 41). Since then, the interaction among parties gradually increased. By the end of year 2001 the new policy attempt gave fruitful results including informing each other on military exercises in the Aegean, an accord on cleaning the common border of land mines and on co-operation in relation to natural disasters since the rapprochement process started in aftermath of disastrous twin earthquakes. Moreover, a direct telephone line between the foreign ministries was set up, as well as naval and air transportation committees. Communication has started in a Greek-Turkish EU Committee and parties exchanged their views in areas such as customs, finance, jurisdiction and agriculture. There were also other initiatives on the grass-root level such as the Third Turkish-Greek Tourism Forum in Marmaris in May 2001 (European Commission 2001: 89).

In 2002, ten bilateral co-operation agreements have entered into force in the areas of environment and economic development. Furthermore, five co-operation agreements regarding culture and emergency relief were signed (European Commission 2002: 44). Two governments agreed on building a natural gas pipeline will provide for the supply of natural gas from the Caspian Sea area to Greece via Turkey and it became operational in 2007 (European Commission 2002: 44, Sabah Daily, 19.11.2007). Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece paid a joint visit to the Middle East in April 2002 (European Commission 2002: 127,). The policy ventures

of Foreign Ministries furthered from deeply rivalry position to common ground that enabled them to initiate joint action on regional issues.

The communication among diplomats is institutionalized with the exploratory contacts in themes related to the Aegean. In the framework of the peaceful settlement of border disputes, exploratory contacts between officials at the level of experts including the Political Directors of the foreign ministries (European Commission 2002: 44). The EU-OIC (European Union-Organisation of the Islamic Conference) forum on the harmony of civilizations in Istanbul hosted the very first round of talks (European Commission 2002: 127). Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that 37th exploratory talks were held as of January 2008 in joint press conference with Prime Minister Karamanlis in Ankara, (ABGS, 23.01.2008).

Another co-operation has started between the intelligence agencies of Turkey and Greece. Although it did not get attention of media, it was an outstanding development in bilateral relations. The importance of this cooperation can be understood better when the Öcalan crisis is recalled (European Commission 2002: 127). Bureaucratic co-operation was deepened with the supply of technical expertise to Turkish diplomats on acquis-related issues by Greek counterparts (European Commission 2003: 42). Furthermore, the good relations on bureaucratic level are expanded in 2005 when a Protocol of Judicial Co-operation was signed by the Justice Ministers of both countries during a visit by the Turkish Minister of Justice and government spokesman to Athens in June 2005 (European Commission 2005: 40).

Business groups, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, journalists and, last but not least, the personality of the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and his counterpart Ismail Cem contributed to climate improvement in

Greek-Turkish relations. It was hardly possible to flame dialogue process without those factors where traditional public opinion deemed hostility (Grigoriadis 2003: 7). Commercial and economic links continue to deepen. An agreement was signed in December 2002 that the two countries should undertake studies to boost commercial relations. A bilateral agreement on double taxation was signed (European Commission 2003: 41). Increasing cooperation in economy triggered gradually expanded trade volume and reciprocal capital flow. The trade volume has folded more than four times since 1999, the trend gradually increased except the year 2001.

Figure 4.1: Turkey's Trade with Greece in US Dollars

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute's web site www.tuik.gov.tr.

Table 4.1: Turkey's Trade with Greece in US Dollars

Years	Export of Turkey	Import of Turkey	Trade Volume
1999	406794	287555	694349
2000	437725	430813	868538
2001	476095	266254	742349
2002	590382	312462	902844
2003	920401	427743	1348144
2004	1171203	594351	1765554
2005	1126678	727830	1854508
2006	1602590	1045328	2647918
2007	2262655	727830	2990485

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute's web site www.tuik.gov.tr.

The meetings of politicians and high level officials opened a floor for mutual understanding and reciprocal gestures. During their meeting in Crete on 26 May, foreign ministers Abdullah Gül and George Papandreou decided to call a number of confidence building measures (CBMs) including exchanges between military academies and military hospitals and some other additional CBMs have been agreed on July 2003 (Radikal Daily, 27. 05 2008, European Commission 2003: 41). The Turkish Prime Minister paid an official visit to Athens in May 2004 which is the first prime ministerial visit after 16 years. For the first time in fifty-two years a Turkish Prime Minister paid a private visit to Western Thrace and Tayyip Erdoğan called on the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority to contribute to Greece's prosperity (Berbarkis 2004 Sabah Daily 07.05.2004, European Commission 2004: 52). As a result of the implementation of a series of confidence-building measures

both governments are taking steps in view of a gradual and balanced reduction of military expenses (European Commission 2004, 52).

There have been several high-level visits including the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey in April 2005. New mechanisms have been established to defuse tension between the two countries, including the establishment of a direct phone line between the Combined Air Operation Centers in the Turkish city of Eskişehir and the corresponding authorities in the Greek city of Larissa (European Commission 2005: 40). The Chief Admiral of the Greek Naval Forces paid a 5-day visit to Turkey in January and in June 2005; the Turkish Land Forces Commander paid a visit to his Greek counterpart for the first time in the history (European Commission 2005: 40, Hürriyet Daily, 24.06.2005).

The president of TBMM of that time, surprisingly implied Turkey could drop the *casus belli* in the Aegean in his statement in April 2005 (European Commission 2005: 40). It was an important remark because the EU reiterated that Turkey should "unequivocally commit to good neighborly relations and refrain from any action which could negatively affect the peaceful process of peaceful settlement of border disputes" as a critic to *casus belli* decision of TBMM in 1995 (European Commission 2007: 27).

A new package of CBMs were agreed during the visit of Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis to Turkey in June 2006, including a new bridge over the border river Evros/Meriç, and a joint civilian task force on natural disaster prevention. The second hotline between Chiefs of General Staff is decided additional to existing hotline between Combined Air Operation Centers in Eskişehir, Turkey and in Larissa, Greece (European Commission 2006: 26). The Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan paid an official visit to Greece on 3-5

December 2007 and he also visited Komotini (*Gümülcine*) where Turkish Muslim Minority lives.

In July, the Greek Chief of Staff visited his counterpart in Turkey (Akşam Daily, 27.07.2006). In response, Turkish Chief of Staff paid an official visit in November 2007. Further confidence-building measures in the military field were discussed such as a Joint Operations Unit to ensure participation in peace support operations under NATO, establishment of a joint land force unit to participate in NATO Response Force operations and establishment of a Joint Turkish-Hellenic Civilian Standby Disaster Response Unit and development of technical measures to ensure flight and traffic safety establishment, in this sense Greece decided to fly her aircrafts unarmed in the Aegean flights as Turkey does since 1996 (Milliyet Daily, 11.05.2006, European Commission 2007: 25). In the second meeting of Chiefs of General Staff in Thessaloniki, Greece officially complained about continued Turkish airspace violations (European Commission 2007: 26). Last but not the least; Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis paid an official visit to Ankara in January 2008 after forty nine years (NTVMSNBC, 26.01.2008)

All these high level meetings and cooperation on bureaucratic level i.e. joint ventures of armed forces and foreign ministries constitute an extraordinary of co-working. Official meetings or joint working groups on different areas are important in terms of informing other side regarding their national position. Even though core issues are at stake, contemporarily, parties are able to voice their concerns and priorities to their counterparts via communication channels. Otherwise, politicians can make ardent speeches on so called high-political problems of bilateral relations, as it happened in the past, and their repercussions on bilateral relations could be negative. Such a facility decreases the vulnerability of the relations from the

murmurings on sensitive issues in domestic politics by means of to some extent institutionalized contact points.

4.1.4 Changes in Public Perception

Smith (2000: 625) indicates the public opinion as the last indicator of Europeanization. Yet, he still acknowledges constitutional changes, elite and bureaucratic socialization as the most direct indicators. Due to objectives of thesis, I will try to elaborate the change in public perception of the other side if there is any. When the bilateral relations are observed in retrospect, the year 1999 comes into picture as the milestone in the relations. Therefore, the public survey held before and after 1999 is included yet the aim is to understand how much the rapprochement process penetrated into societal level.

The recent survey in 2007, which is held in both Turkey and Greece, shows that both publics share the idea of loneliness in foreign policy. According the data of this survey, 71,3 percent of Turks agreed the idea that "there are no friends of Turks other than Turks" and 54,5 percent of Greeks agreed the idea that "Greeks are a brotherless nation" (Kırbaki 2007). The findings of Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004 (1999: 125) in Turkey were in line with the data above; the question of which country is the best friend in international arena responded as "no one" by 33, 3 percent of participants. The position of two nations exposes that they distrust the external world. Here after I will argue the distrust among Turks and Greeks along with the results of surveys which are held before and after 1999.

The views of both nations are important in order to evaluate the on-going process and the future of bilateral relations. Dimitras (1985: 137) points that more than 90 percent of Greeks believe that Turkey threatens Greece and this was the only broad consensus in his study. The enemy or threat perception of Greeks does

not seem changed much in time despite the rapprochement process and the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy. In 2007, Turkey still occupies the first place among the threats to Greece with 77, 7 percent (Kırbaki 2007).

The opinion surveys regarding the Greek image among Turks, on the other hand refers a considerable change. The findings of Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi 2004 (1999: 126) show that Greece is the first-coming country in the list of "the worst enemy" of Turkey with 36, 1 percent. Greece was also just before last country in the list of "best friends" of Turkey, with 1,1 percent. Furthermore, 51 percent is worried that Turkey might be attacked and the 29 percent of these responders said it would come from Greece. In sum, this survey indicates that 15 percent of entire sample think that Turkey might be attacked by Greece (Kirişçi and Çarkoğlu 2003: 128-130). In 2007, Greece occupied the third place of the biggest threat list to Turkey, with 9, 5 percent after the USA (35,6 percent), a possible Kurdish state in Northern Iraq (25,8 percent) (Kırbaki 2007). Along with the data of these surveys from different times, we can see that the positive effect on Turkish side is bigger than that is on Greeks.

4.2 The European Impact on Bilateral Relations

4.2.1 The Impact on Perception

The media, civil society organizations including prominent business and labor associations, and the public figures with their remarks on relations are influential factors in formation of public view. Since the public view is softened to some extent since 1999, it is not possible to assume the hostile feelings are totally diluted. The EU functionality on these factors comes into picture in the assessment of civil dimension of the relations.

The direct impact of the EU can be observed particularly in the Turkish-Greek dialogue. The amount of the funds was really significant when it is thought in terms of the financial capabilities of the CSOs in both countries. Civil Society Development Programme (CSDP), which aimed at strengthening the development of NGOs in Turkey with a budget of 8 million Euros for two years, has been initiated only for NGOs. CSDP began in 2001 and consisted of five different frameworks including "Promoting Greek–Turkish Civic Dialogue" (Güder 2004: 153).

The CSDP supported three macro projects of the NGOs, which are already active in the Turkish-Greek issues, and granted three macro-grants to the European Centre of Common Ground (ECCG), WINPEACE (Women Initiative for Peace), and the AEGEE (*Association des Etats Generaux des Etudiants de l'Europe*). The funds were used in these organizations respectively in the following ways; (a) media professionals and students from Turkey and Greece have been brought together and the joint production radio and TV documentaries were coordinated by ECCG; (b) youth camps, the agro tourism and peace education activities by WINPEACE and lastly (c) two student conferences and a friendship festival in Kayaköy, Turkey was held by AEGEE-Ankara (Rumelili 2005b: 47-48).

Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue Micro Project is also included in the framework of CSDP. The first phase was launched in May 2003. Eight joint projects[6] where selected to be funded with target areas ranging from cultural

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[6] Some of the projects and NGOs listed below:
Minority Group Research Centre-KEMO and Lausanne Treaty Emigrants Foundation. The goal is to improve the dialogue with a scientific meeting by the participations of Lausanne representatives from both sides. Venue: Komotini and İstanbul.
Observing and Protecting the Mediterranean Seal Association (MOM) and Turkish Undersea Research Association SAD-AFAG. Venue: Aegean costs of both countries. The goal is to share experiences and data for protection of Mediterranean Seal.
Middle East Search and Rescue Club-ORDOS and Research Center of Emergency Statement. Venue: Ankara, İzmir, İstanbul and Athens

heritage, conflict resolution, arts, rural development, tourism and gender. Totally 200.000 Euros granted to the projects that continue 12 months. In the second phase of the Turkish-Greek civic dialogue micro-project scheme has primarily concentrated on the areas of (a) community-to-community initiatives in the areas of rural and local development, environment, culture, cultural heritage and disaster preparedness, (b) women and gender issues, (c) youth, and (d) media cooperation. And the total allocation for the second phase was 400.000 Euros (European Union Representation of The European Commission to Turkey Press Release 2004a)

In addition, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has focused on Turkey and supported NGOs through micro and macro-projects (Commission of the European Communities 2005, 6). The European Commission adopted a cross-border co-operation programme between Turkey and Greece which will be financed by the Community Initiative INTERREG III[7] and pre-accession funding for Turkey. The EU has granted €35 million for the Greek side and €15 million for the Turkish side. In addition to these funds, the amount of €16 million is granted by national co-financing of Greece (€11, 6 million) and Turkey (€4, 4 million) (EU Representation of The European Commission to Turkey 2004). In sum, € 66 million had become operational for cross-border co-operation between Greece and Turkey for 2004-2006.

Medecins du Monde Greece and International Blue Crescent Humanatarian Aid and Development Foundation of the Boshporus University. The goal of the project is to increase the sensitivity on women trade to struggle against women trade. Program will be implemented İstanbul and Trabzon firstly.

European Perspective and Economic and Social History Foundation. Venue: Gümülcine/Greece and İstanbul/Turkey.

[7] The Community initiative INTERREG III assists "trans-European cooperation intended to encourage harmonious and balanced development of the European territory". Strand A of the initiative concerns "cross-border co-operation and the promotion of an integrated regional development between bordering regions" (EU Representation of The European Commission to Turkey 2004).

4.2.2 The Impact on Minority Issues

The minorities in both countries are faced difficulties on regular basis but their situation is getting worse when the bilateral relations are strained. The equal treatment to minorities among the other citizens is under the constitutional guarantee. However, there are various court decisions ended with prosecution of minority members or their institutions in reference to their "unoriginal origin". The abolished Article 19 in Greece and the decision of the General Assembly Supreme Court in 1974[8] in Turkey are just two examples of this logic. When the minorities appealed a negative decision, especially contradicts to their constitutional rights, Court decisions admits that they are right but yet again stays in line with the previous decision. A very recent example is the shutdown of The "Rhodopian Turkish Women's Culture Foundation" on account of the word "Turkish" found in its title by the Greek federal Court of Appeals (Hürriyet Daily, 05.10.2005). The perception of insider stranger comes out with these decisions.

The European umbrella provides these groups equal treatment as it is indicated in national constitutions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in this manner, creats a safety net for minorities. The ECtHR prosecuted Greece in the cases of Emin and Others v. Greece (application no. 34144/05) and Xanthi Turkish Union (*Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis*) and Others v. Greece (no. 26698/05) in March 2008. The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and in the case of Xanthi Turkish Union and Others the Court also held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6, 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) of the Convention (ECtHR 2008a). In July 2008, the ECtHR ruled in favor of the applicant, the

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[8] The General Assembly Supreme Court indicated the acquisition of real estate by legal entities formed by non-Turks prohibited, 1974/505 numbered decision on 08.05.1974 (Macar 2007: 85) .

Ecumenical Patriarchate (Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Turkey no. 14340/05) concerning the expropriated properties of the Büyükada Greek Orphanage for Boys. "The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on Human Rights" (ECtHR 2008b).

The effectiveness of the European institutions peaks regarding the minorities in bilateral relations. Both Turkey and Greece are inclined to criticize other side's treatment to minorities without critical thinking about her own. Unfortunately they adopted reciprocity principal in maltreatment to minorities. It is a policy that already locked itself into a vicious circle. European Council and its organ namely, ECtHR, European Parliament and EU Commission played, and still play, a cycle breaker role with their reports and court decisions. The decisions of the ECtHR are supranational character therefore countries have no choice but to respect and obey the decisions. Greece and Turkey are convicted by unanimous decisions of the court including Turkish judge, Rıza Türmen in the case against Turkey and Cypriot judge, George Nicolaou and ad hoc Greek judge Petros Pararas in the case against Greece. Therefore, objectivity of the court leaves no room for hesitation.

European Parliament generally attempts to influence the foreign policy domain by its sensitiveness on human rights. And lastly EU Commission Reports assures that the respect for minority rights remained on the top place of national agendas. The problems of Greek minority in Turkey persistently reiterated in Commissions' Turkey Progress reports, i.e. the freedom of association since 1998, Halki Seminary since 2000, opening new places of worship since 2001, Ecumenical Patriarch since 2003, minority schools since 2002 (Toktaş 2006: 507). Last but not the least the attempts of Swiss member of PACE, Andreas Gross, are important. He

has already prepared a report regarding the situation of the Greek minority in Gökçeada Island (*Imvros*) and Bozcaada Island (*Tenedos*) and he also stated that he would report the life conditions of Turkish minority in Rhodes and Kos (*İstanköy*) and present to the agenda of PACE (Zaman Daily, 08.08.2008)

One may question the efficacy of these reports if the problems are in the agenda for almost a decade. It should be noticed that there are progress in minority rights in both costs of the Aegean but the lack of common definition of minority rights and a concrete mechanism to protect minorities in European context prevents to take more coercive measures. Moreover, there is a considerable inconsistency among the minority policies of the EU members and that hinders the credibility of the Union particularly on the eyes of Turkish decision makers. The most significant example is the suggestions to Turkey to adopt the Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages while EU members "France and Greece do not recognize the existence of minorities within its borders" (Tocci 2005: 79). Therefore Turkey seems to meet the Copenhagen Criteria by widening the human rights instead of altering the minority regime (Toktaş 2006: 513). Oran (1999) also admits that the reasons of remarkable improvement in minority rights in Greece are mainly due to the EU pressure. The reports and EU conditionality still an important and the most effective way because it is capable of dealing with the subject objectively whereas Turkey and Greece are tended to see in nationalistic perspective.

4.2.3 The Impact on The Aegean Disputes

The Helsinki decisions set a timetable for both countries to solve their bilateral problem by the end of year 2004 and otherwise to transfer the disputes to the ICJ. Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency

Conclusions (1/4) indicated the calendar on the subject of agreement on the bilateral border disputes as such;

> "The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004."

Turkey did not include these points in its National Programme submitted to the EU, and it remained a question how Turkey would strive to solve these two problems by 2004 (Gündoğdu 2001: 113). The Greek government believed that by further advocating Turkey's case in the EU and by continuing its policy of friendly rapprochement to its neighbour would eventually provide fruitful results. As a result, Turkey would in the long run adjust its harsh position on the Aegean issues and become more cooperative on the Cyprus problem. It was no less than the inherent belief of the Greek officials at the time.

At Laeken European Council Summit on December 14 and 15, 2001 in Belgium, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Cem agreed to restart rapprochement efforts in 2002 after a period of relative inactivity in 2001 (Berberakis 2001). Bilateral meetings started in a more intense agenda in 2002. Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou met several times and discussed to start the dialogue in regards to outstanding mutual problems. After meeting in New York, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou visited Istanbul for the European Union-Islamic Conference Organization forum in February 2002. At the sidelines of the forum, Papandreou and Cem had the chance to hold some talks regarding the advancement of the bilateral dialogue (Athens News Agency). Greece agreed to open the dialogue process. Greek diplomats wanted to limit the dialogue the issue

of the continental shelf. However, in practice other issues such as airspace disagreement and the Ecumenical Patriarch could also be addressed (Larrabee 2002: 77).

Two countries started the explanatory talks in 2002 in order to get settlement via negotiations and 38 rounds have been passed so far. It was the first time that Greece agreed to hold a dialogue on a "high politics" issue such as the continental shelf argument in the Aegean Sea. Due to nature of talks, there are no hints or information leak about the national positions. Therefore, the EU contribution to settlement efforts in the Aegean can be named as a starting engine or a facilitator. It would be hard to think the beginning of such a negotiation process without the EU.

Despite the ongoing rounds of explanatory talks and CBMs in the Aegean, the ICJ solutions remained as a solid question mark since 2004. When the year 2004 arrived, Karamanlis government did not make the ICJ option operational and continued the explanatory talks and its efforts to maintain further co-operation among parties (Tsakonas 2007: 31). In other words, Karamanlis government chose to de-link the Turkish-Greek bilateral questions from Turkish accession to the EU. There are no solid reasons are stated why Greece adopted this policy option. Even though the exploratory talks are classified, it is possible to assume that there are promising progresses in negotiations. Yet, these assumptions go no beyond logical speculations.

Tsakonas (2007: 31) calls the attitude of Karamanlis government as the "stability-plus strategy". In his further explanations about stability-plus strategy, Tsakonas, clarifies the stability as the goal of keeping tension at lowest level in the

Aegean and the term "plus" refers to the positive of outcomes of Turkey's Europeanization process.

The Aegean disputes are analyzed in detail with their historical background, and legal allegations of parties. It is obvious that the most important dimension of this problem is its direct link to matters of sovereignty and deep-seated historical background collated with national identities. These two factors leave little maneuver room for the politicians because any negative development in bilateral relations has serious repercussions in domestic politics. In other words, engaged parties are aware of even little gestures could be used against them. By the time being, Turkey and Greece refrained from any transfer of their own authority or jurisdiction to third parties including the EU and the ICJ on the matters of bilateral relations. Since conflicting issues are generally on the matter of sovereignty. The EU conditionality presented a common incentive on the Aegean dispute but by the year 2004 conditionality tool de-functionalized by both parties.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Europeanization of Greece is admitted by many studies and the ongoing Europeanization process of Turkey is acknowledged by both academics and the Progress Reports prepared by the EU Commission. Turkish-Greek relations including the latest rapprochement era that has been taking place since 1999 are studied in academia. How promising the future of the relations is the common question in these studies. Although the developments in bilateral relations are welcomed, the prospect for good neighborly relations remained questionable due to lack of agreement in core bilateral disputes, particularly the ones about sovereignty issues in the Aegean. Unresolved issues in the Aegean hinder the hopes for better relations in the future because the past experiences proved that the tension between Turkey and Greece can easily turn into a crisis in a very short time. Once the tension escalates, third party intervention is needed to end it, as it was seen in 1976, 1987 and 1996. Ensuring the balance and stability around the Aegean has become a key concern for the US and the EU foreign policy elites. The USA has generally played a powerful arbitrator role; however, the EU involvement took the relations to a different status.

It does not seem very much possible to evaluate the bilateral relations independent of the national policy preferences. In that sense, the transformations experienced in both countries, namely Europeanization, have considerable effects

on bilateral relations. The pace of bilateral relations has changed solidly since 1999, the beginning date of rapprochement. The relations after 1999 indicate a new structure with improved relations at societal and governmental levels. In other words, following the classical high-low politics distinction we can suggest that successful development has achieved at both levels. Even though high-low politics distinction has become fuzzy after the Cold War, it would be useful to understand the path of bilateral relations. Thus, Turkish-Greek relations evolved in three dimensions namely, low politics, high politics (together with CBMs, explanatory talks) and at the economic level. The pace of change and the effect that outsiders have varied from dimension to dimension.

There were many civil society organizations focusing on Turkish-Greek relations before the rapprochement process. It is noteworthy that most of the civil society activities have become project based, issue-oriented, and professional after 1999. This was mainly due to EU's financial support which made it mandatory for CSOs to be project oriented and well organized in order to get access to European funds. The interaction among civil societies is held at both elite and societal levels i.e. among journalists, academics, artists, businessmen, university students and people from coastline towns.

The interaction at both elite and societal levels is important in terms of penetrating good neighborly relations mentality into people. Elites, as respected public figures, are important in changing the views of the grassroots. In addition, increased interaction at the societal level is important overcoming prejudices.

Planned reciprocal visits between military academies were also crucial steps because it was determined to change next generation's mind set away from a traditionally hostile one. However, a torn apart Turkish flag and an insulting note

were found in one of Turkish military academy students' room during their visit on April 12, 2005 (Radikal Daily, 14.04.2005). This incident shows that the traditional national pride and hatred may be powerful than what today's leaders think. There are some other signs of hostile perception such as; (a) the refusal of Turkish red Crescent's aid convoy on Turkish-Greek land border during the disastrous forest fire in 2007 by Greek authorities while they were accepting aid from their European partners (Milliyet Daily, 30.08.2007), (b) high rates of enemy perception towards Turkey in Greece. This survey is held in both sides and its findings confirm that threat feeling is more powerful on Greek side (Kırbaki 2007). The normalization of relations at grassroots level will be harder for Greek side and there is still a long way to go to achieve it.

The Turkish perception with regards to Greeks is not as negative as Greeks' perception as it is shown in the findings of the research mentioned in previous chapters. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that antagonism against each other exists in both sides. The refusal of Greek blood donations by the Minister of Health, Dr. Osman Durmuş (*Hurriyet Daily*, 22 Agust 1999; *Radikal Daily*, 14 July 2000) should be remembered to understand how much the image and perception of Greece were tough on Turkish side. This example may be not reflecting the whole Turkish people because many reactions were raised in that day against this behavior of the Minister of Health. Yet it still can be an important example regarding the nationalist mind-set. Moreover, The Öcalan crisis in 1999, and the Greece's role in his fugitive period in particular, triggered the negative image in Turkish public and it can be seen in the public survey conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi (1999).

The CSOs are capable of intervening to foreign policies such as in TOBB's attempt to gather Turkish, Greek and Turkish and Greek Cypriot's chambers

together. Furthermore, CSOs has started to act proactively on the high politic matters such as on foreign policy and security related topics. Foreign Policy Forum of TUSIAD, Economics and Foreign Politics Forum of Arı Movement from Turkey and ELIAMEP, the Kokkalis Foundation from Greece are just some examples of many (Belge 2004).

The most solid impact that the EU has was materialized in societal interactions among parties. The most efficient impact was a result of financial capacity of the EU. These funds affected Turkish-Greek civil dialogue prominently. The importance of the funds can be understood better if the financial sources of the NGOs are observed as it is shown previously in this research. The role of EU was three fold in low politics; (a) the role as a "legitimizer" because EU involvement is utilized by participants to trigger more participation; (b) the role as a "funder"; (c) the role as a "catalyst".

It is a fact that these funds will not be available forever. Therefore, the direct EU impact is limited both in terms of time and the financial means. The only way to understand whether direct EU financial aids work or not, or whether it had been able to establish reciprocal trust between two parts are remained to be seen in the future.

From the theoretical perspective; realism and neo-realism do not constitute fully sufficient background in explaining the developments on the low policy realm. Their unit of analyses focused on either the system, the international structure or the agent, state. Therefore, the efforts on low politics cannot be covered by these theories. The assertions of institutionalism, on the other hand coincidence with the progress in low politics. As Keohane and Martin (1995: 42) indicate, international organizations reduce transaction costs, and they create focal points for cooperation.

The latest developments in Turkish-Greek social dialogue correspond to the theoretical background of neo-liberal institutionalism.

In economic sphere; the trade capacity has been nearly four times increased since 1999 and reached the amount of $3 billion in 2007 whereas it was around $700 million in 1999. More importantly these numbers are not an outcome of a boom in one economy or another special condition as it is shown in Figure 5.1. The foreign trade between parties consistently increased since 1999 except in 2001 when Turkey is hit by the biggest economic crisis in her history. In the year 2007 the foreign trade among parties has ended with $1,3 billion surplus in advantage of Turkey. On the other side, Greek foreign direct investments in Turkey reached the largest level in the history, nearly about €4,3 billion at the end of 2007 (RTMFA 2008f). Greece is the biggest EU investor in Turkey with the share of 22 percent between 2004 and 2006 (Demianova 2008: 3). The contemporary economic statistics reveals that interdependency marked the economic relations.

Figure 5.1: Bilateral Trade Data Between Turkey and Greece (Value 000$)

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute's web site www.tuik.gov.tr

Keridis (2003: 50) pointed out the weak economic links between two countries made deterioration in bilateral relations cost-free for the Greek business interests. The situation was no different for Turkish business sphere either as of 2003. The current economic relations exterminated cost-free status of any crisis both for Turkish and Greek business world. Both countries have comparative advantages in economic interaction in trade surplus and FDI flows.

The arbitration role is generally played by third parties in turbulent times, i.e. the USA. Latest trend in economy may lead internal actors to play an arbitrative role in relations. So-called internal mediation role of business world can always be on the agenda while third party involvement appears only in times of crisis. In other words, business world would also initiate efforts to prevent crisis. The figures in economic realm, I believe, created the internal dynamics of ensuring prosperity and stability in bilateral relations.

Turkish Foreign Ministry indicates that Turkey and Greece signed 33 agreements (including protocols and memorandums of understanding) so far and the legal framework for bilateral relations is accomplished. Within the framework of the CBMs Process, which is instrumental in reinforcing the mutual trust required to settle security related issues between the two countries, 24 CBMs have been adopted (RTMFA 2008g). The communication between two countries is institutionalized through the hot lines, ongoing rounds of explanatory talks, and increasing density of reciprocal high level visits. With all these developments, the current condition of the relations fits well with the arguments of neo-liberal institutionalism. All of these achievements took place after 1999. I mentioned two more crucial events of the year 1999 in the introduction; seismic diplomacy and Öcalan crisis. Here it needs to be clarified the causal relationship between these

three occasions and the rapprochement process. The détente can be seen as a routine part of bilateral relations since it was observed many times in history. The last one reveals different character than those took place in the past with its components in economy, civil society dialogue and security realm. Accepting so-called the seismic diplomacy as the main reason is another misinterpretation because it was associated with the personal relations of foreign ministers Cem and Papandreou and the positive image in both that arose after the catastrophic earthquakes. The pace of relations did not derail after foreign ministers Cem and Papandreou left their offices. The Helsinki decisions were an incentive for both parties to improve the bilateral relations. The EU bid of Turkey and EU membership of Greece allowed the EU to be effective in this formula even though the starting point was independent from the EU or other European bodies such as Council of Europe. In other words, the European bodies played a starting engine role, in Öniş's (2002) terminology, in high politics as it did in the Europeanization.

If we assess the relations in terms of the theories discussed in the literature review, we can see theory-practice match varied in time. Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey since mid-90s adopted a relative gain perspective. In this respect, Greece aimed to empower its own foreign policy against Turkey by its veto oriented policy. Greece policy makers thought that Greece would be more advantageous by this way. The policy alignment after mid-90s gives also a sign of transformation in theoretical background. The year 1999, Greece did not blockade official candidacy of Turkey, was a milestone in Greek Foreign Policy. First of all, from neorealist perspective one may claim that Greece decided to support active involvement of the EU because of its security concern, which is called by Waltz as the ultimate concern of the states. In fact, the Kardak Crisis may have increased the security concerns of

Greece. Yet, it is still in question whether the EU was the right choice for security considerations when its inefficiency in Kardak Crisis is considered. Secondly, from institutionalist perspective one may claim that the matter was not the security but welfare and that is the reason beneath the Greek support to Turkey's EU aspect in consecutive Summits throughout the beginnings of 2000s. The absolute gain of Greece via supporting Turkey's EU prospect was recognized as bigger than that of blocking it. Greece may have thought that the inclusion of the EU may reduce the cheating possibilities due to its close auditing mechanism.

In retrospect the expanded economic relations confirm welfare argument. Thus, the theoretical explanation of the rapprochement varies mainly according to theoretical stance of the observer. From my point of view, neo-liberal institutionalist background seems more plausible for an explanation of the period up till 2004. Therefore, the premises of Keohane and Martin (1995: 42) namely, "institutions can (a) provide information, (b) reduce transaction costs, (c) make commitments more credible, and (d) establish focal points for cooperation. (e) Institutions can allow cooperation to emerge" are confirmed in practice.

The ICJ suggestion of Helsinki decisions constituted an incentive for both countries but in 2004 parties did not take the conflicting issues to the Court. Turkey and Greece continued their settlement efforts through political negotiations. Structural realism emphasizes the interstate bargaining process regarding the distribution and redistribution of scarce resources. "Interstate bargaining outcomes reflect the relative cost of threats and inducements, which is directly proportional to the distribution of material resources" (Grigoriadis 2003: 10-11). The Greek opt out for ICJ based solution can be assessed in this manner, and we can assume that Greece did not foresee a better settlement option in the ICJ solution in comparison

to ongoing negotiations with Turkey. Yet giving up the ICJ is also a sign of a broader sense of Europeanization that prevailed in bilateral relations. In other words, Turkish-Greek relations are evolved into the maximalist sense of Europeanization since the fundamental characteristics of the bilateral relations has changed.

The ongoing complaints from both sides regarding airspace and territorial water violations and in 2006, warplane crush in the Aegean were testing points for both countries and they proved that they adapted the principal of peaceful resolutions to ongoing disagreements, and the channels of communication at various levels are capable of lowering the tension. Turkish Chief of General Staff spoke right after the warplane crush in the Aegean and then both Foreign Ministers. Both Chiefs of General Staff and Foreign Minister's attitude were moderate towards the tragic accident (Hürriyet Daily, 02.06.2006). Furthermore, the absence of not only military escalation but also political upheavals regarding the bilateral issues and all these events can be seen as other examples of the internalization of maximalist sense of Europeanization in bilateral relations.

Turkish-Greek relations achieved a great deal of success so far in its multidimensional trajectory. Developments at the political, economic and societal levels are interlinked for the success of peaceful and crisis-free bilateral relations. I sincerely believe that the role of the EU and Europeanization is undeniable in this process because they directly affected the mindset and the behavior on both sides of the Aegean. However, the bilateral disputes remained unsolved. When Turkey becomes a member, the EU framework would be more fruitful. Even though the EU's positive impact remained limited in the Aegean disputes, the EU projects like Single European Sky, which aims to unify the airspace management in one hand,

may address the core bilateral problems like airspace related issues. The efficiency

of the EU involvement needs to be improved yet it is remained to be seen in future.

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