Structural Factors Affecting Approval of Islamist Terror in Predominantly Muslim Countries

by

Nail Tanrıöven

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This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

Nail Tanrıöven

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,

and that any and all revisions required by the final

examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Michael Mousseau (Advisor)

Assist. Prof. Resat Bayer

Assist. Prof. Jeffrey C. Dixon

Prof. Dr. Ziya Onis

Institute of Social Sciences, Director

Date:

Statement of Authorship

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Nail Tanrioven

Abstract

This thesis focuses on public approval of Islamist terror- driven by Wahhabis ideology- in predominantly Muslim countries. Taking Islamist terror as a concern in security discussion, the thesis argues that fighting terrorism is different from fighting terrorists and in order to overcome the threat the structural dynamics should be aimed at by counterterrorism policies. Counterterrorism policies should identify the structural factors leading to the creation of the milieu morally not opposing but approving Islamist terror.

In the thesis the factors that are more likely to increase the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries are identified from two literatures: Political Islam and Terrorism. 12 Structural factors that have been considered to be more likely to explain Islamist terror and its approval in predominantly Muslim countries are discussed and analyzed in 9 predominantly Muslim countries: Turkey, Uzbekistan, Mali, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Senegal, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

The information on the 9 cases indicates that none of the structural factors account for the variance in approval of Islamist terror across 9 cases. Instead, some factors show consistency with the change in the level of approval of Islamist terror in some certain country groups in the sample of 9 Muslim countries with majority Muslim population.

Key Words: Approval, Islamist Terror, Structural Factor, Muslim, Case Study.

ÖZET

Bu tezde, vahabi ideolojiden etkilenen islamcı terörün müslüman nüfusu yoğun olan ülkelerdeki halkın tasvip etmesi üzerine yoğunlaşılmaktadır. İslamcı terörü güvenlik tartışmalarında bir konu olarak ele alarak, bu tez, terörizmle mücadeleyi teröristlerle mücadeleden farklı olarak ele alır. Buna göre, tehdit unsurlarını yok etmeye yönelik antiterör politikalarında, yapısal dinamiklere ağırlık verilmelidir. Anti-terör politikaları, ahlaki olarak yaratılan karşıtlık ortamından çok, İslamcı terörün tasvip edilişinin etik olarak yaratılmasına öncü olan yapısal faktörleri belirlemelidir.

Tezde, müslüman nüfusu yoğun olan ülkelerdeki İslamcı terörün tasvip edilme derecesini arttıran unsurlar iki farklı literatürün/yazının taranmasıyla bulunmuştur: Siyasi İslam ve Terörizm. İslamcı terörün ve çoğunluğu Müslüman olan ülkelerdeki halkın tasvibi üzerinde etkili ve bu iki olguyu açıklayabilecegi düşünülen 12 yapısal faktör üzerine tartışılmış ve bunlar 9 tane Müslüman nüfusu yoğun ülkede (Türkiye, Özbekistan, Mali, Lübnan, Ürdün, Pakistan, Senegal, Bangladeş ve Endonezya) araştırılmıştır.

9 ülkeden toplanan bilgi ver veriler şunu göstermektedir ki: Ele alınan yapısal faktörlerden hiçbiri ülkelerdeki tasvip oranındaki değişimi açıklamamaktadır. Fakat bazı faktörler 9 ülke içerisinde oluşturulan bazı ülke grupları için tutarlı grafikler göstermekte ve ülkeler arası tasvip oranındaki değişimi açıklamaya yardımcı olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tasvip, İslamcı Terör, Yapısal Faktör, Müslüman, Vaka Analizi.

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1. Chapter I: Islamist Terror and its Approval, and Security

1.1. Introduction

Islamist terrorists blowing up buildings and killing many civilians in different parts of the world take attention of many researches from several disciplines. This work is one of the several studies that focus on a narrow topic in Islamist terror. Approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries is the main concern of the thesis. The merit of this work- starting from the notice of the fact that there is a need to grasp the structural factors the terrorist organizations survive easily under- is to understand the structural factors effecting the public approval of Islamist terror and do research for evaluating the explaining factors.

In this chapter how new or non-conventional security issues have appeared in the international system will be discussed with a focus on Islamist terror. A general picture of contemporary Islamist terror will be drawn and that will be followed by clarification of terms such as terrorism and concepts used within Political Islam. Finally, why approval of Islamist terror is the focal point of this work will be explained.

1.2. New Phase of (In)Security

That the world has been experiencing a phenomenon named in relation to Islam is in media, politics, academia, and even in daily lives of many living in places like Israel and Afghanistan. Some call it radical Islam, some prefer the term fundamental Islam while some call it Islamist or Islamic terror. There has been an ongoing debate on the definition or the terms to be used to refer to the phenomenon. In spite of the blurred terminology, it is palpable that there is an event having relation to Islam or Islamic ideas. Terrorist attacks in USA on September 11, 2001 (9/11 attacks) have been a turning point in minds of many in understanding and perceiving Islam and terror, especially in Europe and North America. The attacks given inspiration by Islamic thought brought enormous focus on Islamist groups. The attacks in the name of Islam in places like the Netherlands, which is proud of its pillar of pluralism, and tolerance for cultural diversity created controversial discussions followed by cautious policies against the Muslims. For instance the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh¹ was a striking event in the Dutch Society. Aarts and Hirzalla (2005: 18) write:

The second of November 2004 delivered a rude shock to Dutch society—long viewed by itself and by others as the most liberal and tolerant in Europe. Early in the morning on that day, a radical Islamist named Mohammed Bouyeri awaited the filmmaker and provocateur Theo van Gogh near his residence in Amsterdam. When he spotted Van Gogh on his bike heading to work, Bouyeri shot and stabbed him multiple times before pinning a five-page letter to his chest with a knife.

This murder created a sudden anti-Muslim reaction in the Dutch society. An increase in the racist acts against the Muslims followed the sudden reaction of the very few numbered Dutch individuals. The media reported that some Dutch people tried to desecrate Muslim sanctuaries² and as a counter act, attacks against Christian symbols followed. Following the murder of Theo van Gogh, the "Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia" (DUMC) recorded a significant number of racist incidents, the majority of which were against Muslims and countered by incidents against 'Dutch' targets (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006: 80-81).

¹ Director of the film 'Submission' telling the story of a Muslim woman forced into an arranged marriage who is abused by her husband and raped by her uncle. It triggered an outcry from Dutch Muslims. Retrieved from <u>http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3974179.stm</u> on April 17, 2009

² Stories were reported about the events of the aftermath of the killing of Theo van Gogh. For instance, <u>http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/000232.php</u>

In a very tensional atmosphere after numerous attacks, on the one hand, there have been efforts to understand the Muslim minorities living in places threatened by Islamist terror. Their integration to non-Muslim cultures or their perception of non-Muslims; that is to what extent they feel to belong to the society they live in, and how they perceive the cultural values of the majority have emerged as concerns. On the other hand, the terrorist organizations aiming at attacking those who are not with them or who are not Muslims are analyzed by different parties for security concerns. The terrorist organizations and some members of Muslim minorities have been security concerns of governments trying to take precautions and fight to eliminate the threat of terror.

1.3. Islamist Terror and International Relations

The threat caused by Islamist groups might be considered out of the realm of the International Relations due to the long-lasting dominance of realist paradigm. The denial of the non-state actors as main players in the international game by the dominant realist ideas and their emphasis on the state centric approaches to security issues can put Islamist terror out of attention in International Relations. This can be the case for those who are studying security relations or security policies of states in relation to other states. Yet, still the threats to the states have changed. For instance, in recent news, it has been reported that Osama Bin Laden has called for the overthrow of Somalia's moderate Islamist president in an audio recording published on the internet³. Non-state actors can pose danger to the state authority. Hence, International Relations should incorporate new sources of threat or security issues with the existing studies.

³ Retrieved from <u>http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7952310.stm</u> on March 23, 2009

The world experiences the existence of 'non-conventional' threat sources. Poverty, international trade, and financial crises can be seen as threat sources from different perspectives. They might be causes of tension in the interstate relations or have implications for human life.

International terrorism that has recently been dominated by the Islamist wave as pointed out by Rapaport's (2004: 46-73) 'four wave' theory can be an exemplary of nonconventional threat for the international system. Rapaport (2004) identifies four main waves of terrorism that threatened and has been threatening the world: In the 1880s, "Anarchist Wave", the "Anti-Colonial Wave" in the 1920s, in 1960s the "New Left Wave," and starting in 1979 the fourth or "Religious Wave".

Non-state threats and actors have become key factors in contemporary security and statistics show that today more people are killed by ethnic conflicts, HIV/AIDS, or the proliferation of small arms than by interstate wars (Krahman, 2005: 3). People, especially those living in certain parts of the world, are aware of the fact that they are threatened more by non-conventional menace. If societies are threatened by a source of jeopardy then states or governments, by nature, should take precautions for providing protection. Yet, either as a result of division between high and low politics or limited budget of governments, sometimes authorities have less willingness in fighting against certain types of threats such as HIV/AIDS or poverty. Terrorism is in between low and high politics being closer to higher level of consideration and already taking more shares in the security policies of states.

A definition of the term "security" can clarify why terrorism is easily perceived as a concern. A general reading of the term suggests that a security threat can be defined as an event with potentially negative consequences for the survival or welfare of a state, a society, or an individual (Krahman, 2005: 4). This general statement suggests that the ultimate goal in a security precaution is the protection and the welfare of a state, a society or individuals. Terrorism in that sense can easily be integrated in the security understanding since it has direct and enormous effects on a state's survival and welfare. Its effects can be easy to observe and faster compared to other issues generally stuck in the realm of low politics. In fact, terrorism, among the new security threats identified by governments, is the most limited in terms of intensity; that is, the number of people directly affected by death or injury (Krahman, 2005: 5). However, it is not surprising that governments bring terrorism as a priority to their agendas since terrorism is not limited to killings it causes or the material loss. The political motives and ultimate aims also threaten the survival and welfare of states. Especially, as given in the following parts terrorist organizations such as Islamist terrorists aiming at altering the international system poses a threat for states at the global level. Islamist terror, for instance, challenges and undermines the secular order of the body politics and aim to replace it by a divine order (Tibi, 1998: xi). The threat might be far from reaching its ultimate goal in the near future. It is argued that Islamists will not be able to impose their alternative to the system, but they can create disorder, on a vast scale (Tibi, 1998: xi). It seems that as far as the organizations are equipped with necessary abilities and find conditions they can make their moves, they will keep on challenging the system and certain leading states in the international level. Therefore, scholars of International Relations should integrate

terrorism in International Relations theory and analyze the existing threat within the border of security studies.

1. 4. Terrorism, Islamist Terror and Political Islam

1.4.1. Islamist Terror: General Picture

For many, Islamist terror is fairly a new event that emerged in recent decades. However, looking into the history of Islamic societies one can realize that this is not true. In fact, the history of Islamist terror can be traced back to the twelfth century. As Combs (2003: 20) maintains "group terrorism became more common as early as the Middle Ages and the word assassin comes from an Arabic term "hassashin", which literally means 'hashish-eater' or 'one addicted to hashish'⁴". In fact group terrorism might not directly means that it was Islamist terror. Yet, the term hashashin- referring to the terrorist groupwas used to describe a sectarian group of Muslims who were employed by their spiritual leader to spread terror in the form of murder and destruction among religious enemies, including civilians (Combs, 2003: 20). The Assassins were active in what is today Syria and assassinated many of their prominent opponents, and the authority that they hoped and failed to set up by terrorist means was that of their form of Islam which in practice meant their own political authority (Sedwick, 2004: 798). They used assassinations and attacks against civilians for establishing their own political authority shaped by religious principles. Therefore, it can be concluded that attempts for political achievement in the name of Islam with terrorist means is not new but emerged centuries ago in the Middle East.

⁴ Funk and Wagnall's Standard Dictionary: Comprehensive International Edition, Vol. 1, 86, col.3

Islamist terror traced back to twelfth century is now present in the name of several organizations. One of the most prominent organizations is al-Qaeda. There have been international scale terrorist acts such as 9/11 attacks in USA and Madrid bombings in the name of al-Qaeda. In response to these attacks, especially to 9/11 attacks, several wars have been fought. The striking terrorist attacks and the counter movements by states are related to the name al-Qaeda. That is why it might not be surprising that al-Qaeda is the most important or popular terrorist organization within the borders of Islamist movements.

The nature of al-Qaeda has been discussed in several works in several literatures such as sociology, political science, and religion. One can discuss about in which part of those several literatures the study of al-Qaeda fits. It can be argued that some of those literature such as the one on religion are not related to the study of al-Qaeda or do not have theories explaining the phenomenon at stake. The main premise of such an argument can be that al-Qaeda is not a religious movement but a political one therefore there is no need to go into details concerning the religious side of the organization. Such a point is open for debate and a basic frame for discussion can be the aims of al-Qaeda, and separation between its ultimate and immediate goals as Sedgwick (2004: 795-814) argues. Alternatively, it can be argued that al-Qaeda can feed from religious doctrine and has aims for the sake of religion. As far as the leading figures or the masterminds of the organization maintain references to a religious cause there is always a possibility that the group has real religious goals. Therefore, it is important to analyze al-Qaeda as a religious organization, as well. Otherwise, if effective in the life circle of al-Qaeda and underestimated in an analysis, the religious factors can lead a researcher to wrong conclusions. Not to result in such a mistake, the religious and terrorist identity of the organization should be analyzed together.

Islamist terror as a point of study deserves a main point to be stressed at the very beginning. The point is about where the Islamist terror locates in the international system. In my opinion the understanding of the phenomenon can be taken into account in two different levels. It is not to say that the following levels are necessarily exclusive but they might need different approaches. The Islamist terror can be understood as an internal problem of the 'West' due to the Muslim migrants in the 'western sphere' of the world on the one hand, and radicalism in relation to the Muslims in the predominantly Muslim countries or the 'Muslim sphere of the world' on the other. The former understanding can cover the integration of migrants, minority problems, and cultural clashes. While the latter point requires the understanding of structures of states having predominantly Muslim population such as economies of those states, political organizations, and ideological and theoretical movements within those states. It is also necessary to understand Political Islam of which many terrorist organizations and their relations with Muslim societies are part of.

For Islamist terror or its dominant symbol al-Qaeda, literature on Political Islam and terrorism literature can serve such an aim. In other words, the analysis of these two different and in some terms overlapping literatures can help a researcher analyze two characteristics of Islamist terror together. Yet, before grasping the literature it is important to understand terrorism, Islamist terrorism and Political Islam, while also the terms used within the discussion on these points should be clarified.

1.4.1.1. Terrorism

How can we define terrorism? In fact, seemingly there are limitless ways to define it. In academia it is widely accepted that a comprehensive definition of terrorism is difficult to achieve. For instance, a study on terrorism in 1988 counted 109 definition of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 5-6). Generally, definitions are criticized for being ambiguous and overlapping with other definitions of several concepts. Yet, still out of academics there have been some attempts to find out an unambiguous definition of terrorism by United Nations or governments.

Common in various definitions are the understanding that terrorism includes violence, and especially violence on civilians while terrorist organization have some political motives as ingredients of their movements. Therefore, it is enough to conclude for the scope of this work that terrorism is an act for political purposes and against targets including civilians using indiscriminate violence targeting a population determined according to the preferences of each terrorist organization⁵.

1.4.1.2. Islamist Terror

What is Islamist terror? As the name and the multifarious definition(s) of terrorism suggest, Islamist terror must be about some political ends, and violence against civilians. Simply, Islamist terrorism occurs when the use of terrorism is systematized by an ideological and fanatical interpretation of the religious text of Islam (Venkatraman, 2007: 231). In other words Islamist terror is a political act using means such as attacking civilians, and forms its rhetoric with the help of religious doctrine.

⁵ For many, terrorism is not an act peculiar to non-state organization trying to achieve some political goals. States can also be actors resorting to terror and this type of terrorism is called as State-terror

1.4.1.3. Political Islam

What is Political Islam? In general, Political Islam can be considered as an approach to statehood which suggests the rule of a state and a government in accordance with the Islamic principles. The legislation and the rule of a society should be set according to Islam and the secular institutions are accused of the worse-off situation of certain groups, namely the Muslim societies. That is, Islam must be the basis of all institutions related to the Muslim people. This point of view is in contradiction with the Western style of state since that political approach rejects the Westphalian system. In the Westphalian system states should not impose their norms or values to the other states. However, Political Islam suggests that all Muslims all around the world should be ruled according to a single set of principles dictated by the Islamic thought.

This is one of the simplest explanations of Political Islam. This simple explanation can shed light for understanding what Political Islam is. However, in order to analyze the issue better, it is important to understand how Islam and politics are connected to each other. What the borders of these two elements- Islam and politics- are is important to. Simply, does Islam have something in its origins related to politics? There are two main arguments.

Firstly, it is discussed that Political Islam does not originate from the religion itself. A political sphere is added to Islam as a social process in the societies in which Islam poses the role of dominant religion. In Islam there is no direct reference to run of the state. As Ayubi (1993: 1) writes "[t]he original Islamic sources (the Quran and Hadith) have very little to say on matters of government and the state". Shortly, Islam as a set principle is only related to lives of individuals and does not provide rules or prescriptions for establishing or conducting the rule of a political entity or a state.

Secondly, it is argued that Islam in addition to being a religion or a doctrine of faith has important indications for politics. This point of view mostly adopted by the adherents of Political Islam. As Fuller (2003, xi) discusses, most of the adherents of Political Islam advocate that Islam has something important to say about how politics and the Muslim societies should be ordered. The adherents of Political Islam advocating Islam has principles for the rule of the society and the manner in which the politics should be conducted mainly rely on original sources of Islam. However, they interpret the general points for special cases or make their implementation in a certain way. Hence, what is thought to be references to politics and the rule of society can be seen as not god-sent but man-made.

If the picture is that there are no or very few references to politics in Islam and the relation of Islam with politics is mainly created by the adherents of Political Islam, then researchers should be cautious. Those interpreters are members of a religion and live under some social realities of their places. Then, the religion and the social realities can be both the cause and the aim of the movements. Political Islam should be analyzed with the idea in mind that the adherents can either be religiously or politically motivated, or both. This makes the analysis of the literature related to these two points necessary.

Political Islam as a movement or as a historical process has many variants within its borders. It includes those having radical approaches and adopting terrorism or armed

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fight to achieve determined goals, or those having a more pacifist approach in their methods.

As a result of its long lasting history there have been several blurry concepts gathered in Political Islam literature. There are multifaceted terms having been used to mean different things and refer to various actors, organizations, and movements. Therefore, a brief clarification is needed before giving a review of the literature.

1.4.1.4. Terms in Political Islam

Those who study Political Islam or Islamist movements face several difficulties. The literature contains several controversial terms, references and discussion on what to use to for allude to elements within the phenomenon in relation to Islam.

One of the difficulties is about identifying the movements within Political Islam and deciding whether they are 'Muslim' or 'Islamic'. Roy points out that 'Muslim' refers to a fact, cultural reality, while Islamic means to convey political intent (1994: viii). Therefore, if the issue at stake is about politics then we need to use Islamic while we also have to use Muslim to refer to the groups taking part in the movement. It is Islamic since the terrorist acts aim at some political ends while those groups identify themselves with a fact and cultural reality; that is being Muslims. However, many Muslims feel offended due to the fact that for them Islam is not a violent religion but condemns attacks against civilian, and the use of the term Islamic with terrorism is insulting since it directly relates Islam and terrorism. Considering such anxieties the term Islamist is used instead of Islamic. Islamist as in many "ism"s stands for a sort of political ideology. Then, terrorism studied in this work is Islamist being favored by a segment of Muslim world as a just cause. 'A segment of Muslim world' is not a clear reference to the groups leading the Islamist terrorism. Are those people fundamentalists or can we use another word to name them?

As Denoeux (2002: 57) puts, the word fundamentalism used with Islamic or Islamist refers to the adherence to the texts and original sources of Islam. One can understand the importance of primary sources in Islam by reading the basics of Islamic doctrine. Many Muslims would agree that the main way to practice Islam and be a Muslim is to adhere to the fundamentals of the religion. Therefore, as Denoeux (2002: 58) also argues all Muslims are fundamentals. Therefore, there is a need for another term for reference to those attaching to Islamist terrorism. At this point the term 'Wahhabism' or its widely used sister 'Salafism' comes for help.

"Within the Islamic context, the tradition that comes closest to the western concept of fundamentalism is what is known as Salafism, a current thought emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century" (Denoeux, 2002: 59). Contemporarily, those who attach themselves to the Salafi ideas such as al-Qaeda mostly fight global 'Jihad' against the enemies of the Muslim world or an imagined global community of Muslims- 'Umma'. All Salafis share a puritanical approach to the religion to eschew religious innovation by strictly replicating the model of Prophet Mohammed (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 207; Wiktorowicz, 2005: 75-97). Their strict adherence to the concept of 'tawhid' (the oneness of God) and passionate rejection of the concepts such as human reason and other elements of social life being considered to be peculiar to the western societies is the main point of Salafi movement. However, there are differences among various groups of Salafi movements in terms of their methods for achieving the desired prophetic model of society. As designated by Wiktorowicz (2002: 207-239) there are three main Salafi movements: Purist, Politicos and Jihadist.

Purists are those who do not advocate political and militant activities for the desired end, while Politicos prefer political participation in the existing system for the change they aim at, and Jihadist prefer armed struggle including attacking civilians of the rival groups with the help of their doctrinal justifications (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 207-239). Therefore, a result can be simplified that Islamist terrorism is fought by Jihadist Salafis or Wahhabis which is much clearer when one looks at the ideology of al-Qaeda in details (Hellmich, 2008: 111-124; Sedgwick, 2004: 195-814). Another conclusion can be that the phenomenon named as Islamist terror in some parts of the globe can be called as Jihad in the other parts of the world. Therefore, Jihad should also be understood.

'Jihad' is a holy war against infidels undertaken by Muslims⁶. This definition is certainly how non-Muslims perceive Jihad. Their perception is not necessarily a wrong one. Yet, Muslims recognize Jihad in a different sense. Jihad appears in several verses of Quran. Fighting the aggressors against the Muslims or aiming at increasing the number of Muslims is among several meanings related with Jihad. However, there is a commonality among several parts of Quran including any link with Jihad. It is frequently appear in Quran that Jihad is a fight or strive within the borders of the belief system of Islam or in the way of Allah. The fight can be against anything that can disturb a life in the true path of Islam. For instance, individuals can fight a Jihad against their appetite for things

⁶ Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus. 2004. Pymple, NSW: HarperCollins Publishers

forbidden by Islam. However, such usages are not of interest of this work. Therefore, this work sticks to the usage of Jihad in a sense that it is a struggle or striving the way of Allah, especially against the 'non-believers' or 'infidels'. Throughout history, Jihad has been fought in order to spread Islam and conquer new lands to be ruled under the influence of Muslims. The contemporary, globally fought Jihad by certain groups against a set of enemies is the focal point. The usage of 'set of enemies' is appropriate since Jihadists maintain debates about whom the Jihad should be fought against.

In Political Islam or Islamist movement there has been a difference between 'far enemy' and 'near enemy. The near enemy stands for the local governments and local entities that are perceived to be in collaboration with the West- the U.S. and its close allies, while the far enemy is a term used for the U.S. itself and its allies. Extremists target some Muslim groups in addition to foreign states and local governments. The extremist groups publish their own manifestos, in which the struggle against the "deviant" fellow Muslims take up as much space as attacks on the "ungodly" (Kepel, 2000: 208).

There had been some events having impact on the choices, strength and situation of Jihadists during the process that the Jihadists experienced. The Gulf War and War in Afghanistan against Soviet Russia had enormous effects on the nature of Jihad being fought (Kepel, 2000: 205-252). It is argued that the Islamist movements or the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan by participation of militants from different countries was financed by the Saudi Kingdom. The war of Jihadists in Afghanistan started the global Jihad to some extent. Kepel (2000: 217-219) writes that "having been armed and funded by the Kingdom, the militants⁷ of the Saudi Islamist movement turned against Saudi Arabia and its allies and the international brigade of Jihad veterans, being outside the control of any state, was suddenly available to serve the radical Islamist causes anywhere in the world".

Having been funded and provided by willing militants to fight Jihad anywhere in the world and taught about the enemies of the Muslim world by Salafi Islamist ideologues, radicals had resources for fighting a larger extent of Jihad. The social process or the history the Jihadist or Political Islam experienced bred a new hybrid Islamist ideology whose first doctrinal principle was to rationalize the existence and behavior of militants, and this was Jihadist-Salafism⁸ (Kepel, 2000: 219). Salafis have been seen as the radicals fighting the war in the global scale and their point of view is seen as unique. Yet, some authors even use the term Salafism as maintenance of Wahhabism. In academic parlance, the term Salafism denotes a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas and it advocated a return to the traditions of the devout ancestors (Kepel, 2000: 219). In line with this meaning, Wahhabism denotes the similar thought as Gerges uses (2005).

1.5. Salafism as a Brand

Salafism can be considered as a franchising. Franchise as a term is also used by Ayoob (2007: 633) to explain al-Qaeda. It is a worldwide cause or a supranational formation. Although it is a supranational or transnational idea, the Islamist movements

⁷ The most prominent among them was the billionaire Osama bin Laden, whose family held a position of hegemony over the public works and construction in the peninsula, thanks to is close connections with the royal family

⁸ This term used by the Imam Abu Hamza, one of the representatives of this movement, in the course of an interview (London, April 1998), reappears in his pamphlets and audio-visual releases

must adapt to the local contexts in which they recruit, and then use their ideas to shape the identities of activists and followers (Collins, 2007: 74). Salafism or the idea of returning back to original sources of Islam and living the life-style of the devout ancestors (mostly Arabic ancestors) is the general brand. Local fighters or terrorist organizations are as the branches of this world wide brand. It might be rough or vague to name Islamist terror as a franchising. However, we might think it as one of the global brands or companies such as Mc Donald's. Mc Donald's has many local branches all around the world. It has internationally constant properties and appeal to the tastes of the local consumers. Salafi Jihadists are like those companies that have internationally constant regulations or rules. Salafist want to spread the way of living of devout ancestors and for this purpose they use terrorist attacks against their rivals, be it near enemy or far enemy. However, international constants might not be enough to get supporters all around the world since internal dynamics of societies might vary across countries while there might be some commonalities as well. As Collins (2007: 67) argues rather than tie themselves to a global agenda, organizations must develop a local Islamist ideology that suits the local base and al-Qaeda being an organization lacking a homeland but preferring a global cause also needs support or source of appeal to the locals since it needs militants or a milieu for its activities. At this point it is important how locally Jihadist or Salafi movements appeal to the locals. In order to market their cause and get support for their attacks they need to localize their cause and advertise their products or terrorist acts.

In order to understand the spread of Salafi movements or the Salafi Jihadist cause we need to understand how they appeal to the locals in predominantly Muslim countries since their market is the Muslim world. In order to understand how Jihadist or Islamist terrorists working under the flag of Salafism appeal to locals and why locals approve their acts we need to investigate the internal dynamics of predominantly Muslim countries. We need to find out common dynamics that lead to approval of the terrorist acts and differences among the predominantly Muslim countries.

1.6. Why Approval of Islamist Terror

The pool in which terrorist organizations survive is one of the topics taking very little attention of the researchers. As Waldmann (2008: 25) notes the 'radical milieu' referring to the segment of a population which sympathizes with terrorists and supports them morally and logistically is one of the most under-investigated topics in terrorism studies. Yet, the milieu or the public approving is crucial in the study of Islamist terror. As Mao offered, the people "may be likened to water" and the guerrillas "to the fish who inhabit it" (Tse-Tung, 2000: 92-93). Like guerillas, militants who employ terrorist tactics too can survive in the "water" of people (Mousseau, 2009: 1). As far as the pool is existent and in well conditions there is always a possibility that new population of the fish emerge and maintain life in it.

To understand the support for terrorist organizations and approval of terror is crucial for overcoming the threat posed by the Islamist organizations since it is one of the vital components for the sustainability of the pool where Islamist terror occur and survive while it is one of the understudied topics in terror research (Fair & Shepherd, 2006: 51). There can be several reasons of the importance of public support for Islamist terror.

The first reason is that many followers of Islam claim that it, as a religion, is against violence. Among Muslims, in general, it is a common saying that Islam is a religion of allowance and is against the murder of innocent people. After the attacks in USA some governments of Muslim countries condemned terrorism. However, in the aftermath of 9/11 there have been scenes on the televisions showing some Muslim folks celebrating the attacks and turning 'West's tragedy into a festival on the other side of the world. Then, we need to be skeptical: are those people celebrating the 9/11 not Muslims or are there different Muslims that practice different kinds of Islam; at least two- one praising terror the other condemning?

Living in a predominantly Sunni-Muslim country, what I have learned as a common sense that there is only one single Islam and it has never been diverged from the original sources. However, one reading into literature on Islam or Political Islam can recognize that there have been differences in understanding the original sources and various interpretations on certain issues. Therefore, societies providing support for Islamist terror somehow legitimize the terrorist acts and base it on a certain type of interpretation. There can be some factors playing role in the dominance of some certain interpretations of the religion and make terrorist acts appeal to the public sense in some Muslim societies. If same religion results in different conclusions then the factors effective in this result should be identified in order to understand the Islamist terror better.

The second reason is that terrorist organizations are more likely to encounter difficulties in places where general public thought does not support their acts or ideas. It might not be possible to come up with a fixed number of approving people necessary for success of an organization. Looking at the issue in a more qualitative perspective, the lack of a large scale opposition to an organization can be a sort of measure for the level of approval of Islamist terror. Radical acts such as suicide bombings require active participants in the terrorist organizations. Without human capital terrorist organizations cannot continue their attacks and potential recruits are more likely from a group that does not oppose terrorists' acts but approve them. Suicide bombing is an extreme instance for terrorist activities and there might be other tactics requiring less capital. Yet, still those tactics require an environment with an absence of popular opposition to the terrorist acts at least from a potential segment of the society. Therefore, one of the most important conditions for a terrorist movement for survival is a society approving terrorist organizations that provides a potential sample of individuals that might be more likely to participate in terrorist organizations.

The third point is about fighting terrorism and fighting terrorists. Fighting terrorists is different from fighting terrorism. Terrorists can be constrained by security precautions but terrorism can be fought against with the help of structural policies aiming at the roots and causes of terrorism and the way the terrorist organizations recruit new members. In addition to these, how and under what conditions terrorist organizations get approval of the public is important as a component of the structure the terrorists act in and recruit from. Approval of terrorist acts by the public is a structural factor and should be incorporated with counter-terrorism. If terrorism is to be stopped, then a fight against the structure favoring the terrorist formations should be conducted and the conditions suitable for terrorist organization have to be either altered or tried to be turned against the terrorist organizations.

Islamist terror is a security threat for the international community having caused tension in the system and probably will bear new problems. A government can fight terrorists by security precautions in the airports or military interventions in different regions. Yet, a fight by a government or an international community against terrorism requires better-grounded strategies. These strategies have to aim at some structural factors favoring the interests of terrorists. This structure can be formed by several components such as economy and education. One of the most important layers of that structure is approval of terrorism by the public since it is one of the crucial elements providing terrorists with a safe haven in societies and enables them for more efficient movements.

1.7. Conclusion

It is widely accepted that Islamist terror threatens the welfare of certain societies and governments have integrated counter-terrorism policies with their security precautions. Islamist terror is one of the components of Political Islam and there are moderate parties under the umbrella of Political Islam and having the same aims with Salafism or Wahhabism that shape the ideology and acts of contemporary Islamist terror. The franchising of Salafism or Islamist terror appealing to the locals with some international standards can be overcome by fighting the structure that favor the terrorist organization of which one layer is public approval. Approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries is important for several reasons and should be studied. For studying approval of Islamist terror, one should, first of all, need to understand Political Islam and terrorism. The next chapter serves this aim.

2. Chapter II: Political Islam and Terrorism

2.1. Introduction

In the first chapter how new or non-conventional security issues have appeared in the international system has been discussed with a focus on Islamist terror. Secondly, a general picture of Islamist terror has been drawn. Thirdly, clarification of the terms such as terrorism and the concepts used within Political Islam has followed. Finally why approval of Islamist terror is the focal point of this work has been explained.

The concluding remarks of the previous chapter has emphasized that reviews of two broad literatures are needed for having insight to approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. These two literatures are on Political Islam and terrorism or Islamist terror. In the following parts several approaches from the two literatures will be summarized and how they are related to approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries will be pointed out. The next parts are organized firstly under the main headings of Political Islam and Terrorism that are separated into sub-parts in accordance with the approaches developed within the borders of the general literatures. Firstly, Political Islam as one of the main components of this work will be analyzed with discussion on the approaches and secondly the same will be conducted for terrorism literature. Then, summaries and concluding remarks for literature reviews will follow. Finally, what these two literatures introduce to this work as factors to be analyzed in predominantly Muslim countries will be discussed and they will be summarized. Yet before getting into details of the two literatures and the factors they introduce, it is helpful to make an important note.

The note is that this study considers the presence of two different literatures necessary to be analyzed. Although the literatures converge at some points the divergences are grand to take them separately.

The convergences mainly stem from the similarities or the commonalities of the factors the two literatures consider as important in explaining the Islamist terror. Generally, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the scholars of the two texts focus on similar factors. The two literatures compose of works stemming from similar disciplines. Yet, the differences are more dominant.

One of the differences is that Political Islam literature includes discussion on several movements having been related to Islamist ideologies while terrorism studies mainly focuses on the types of movements resorting to violence as means of fight. For instance, while one can get information from the former on movements preferring political means such as participation in elections in order for their Islamist aims, it is very difficult to do so from terrorism texts.

Another difference is that Political Islam can be considered as the special research area or specific field of study that mainly focuses on Islamist movements, while for terrorism studies Islamist terror is one but not the single point of interest. Political Islam studies take several aspects of the Islamist movements into consideration. Terrorism studies focus on Islamist movements from a less broad perspective. There can be several other differences included in this work. Yet, in the following chapters several characteristics of the literatures are given before summarizing the approaches and they highlight differences and similarities, as well.

2.2. Political Islam

2.2.1. Introduction

There are four points to be stressed about Political Islam texts before reviewing them. These four points are not peculiar to Political Islam but their remark would ease our understanding in terms of avoiding further confusion.

First as Ayoob (2008: ix) argues there is adequate high-quality specialist literature on various aspects of the interaction of religion and politics in Islam, yet much of it is very condensed, highly specialized, country specific, and not easily ingested by those without satisfactory background in the study of Islam and/ or of the Muslim world. Some topics are studied only in country-specific cases (e.g. Haddad & Khashan, 2002). It is inevitable that as social scientist we need to be as specific as we can. However, on the other hand, to explain cases we need road maps and general understandings for evaluating the data we have.

Second in Political Islam literature there is significant number of groups, ideological parties working in the name of religion. This creates the necessity to analyze a great number of actors as contributors to Political Islam and this, on its own, requires a separate study. There is no single text that analyzes comparatively the various forms of political activity undertaken in the name of Islam and presents them in a way that would make the multifaceted phenomenon intelligible to students and general readers (Ayoob, 2008: ix). In fact, recently, attempts for overcoming such problems in the literature have been developed and Ayoob's (2008) work on the several faces of Political Islam is one of them.

Third, there is a wide variety of theories at the origin of Political Islam. The historical process of organizations brings change to the structure of Political Islam or to the way it is shaped. There is still an ongoing evolution of Islamist movements and the theories or explanations try to go parallel to those developments. The continuing change both in the structure of the Islamist movements and the approaches makes the summary of Political Islam a complex task.

Finally, in relation to the third point above, it is difficult to find a theory explaining the issue at stake in a whole scale and even in a large extent. As Mandaville (2007: 1) argues, due to the inherent pluralism and diversity of Muslim politics, it is impossible for a single theory to account for Political Islam, however there are better and worse explanations as to why Islamist social and political movements appear and assume the form that they do under certain circumstances. In fact this is the case for majority of the topics in social sciences, yet it is noteworthy in Political Islam. In addition to this it is very difficult to gather different theories or approaches under a single framework or in a few numbers of frameworks.

There are at least 5 approaches explaining several aspects of Islamist movements; 1- Islam as a civilization, 2- the West triggering Islamist movements, 3- discourse within the Muslim World, 4- Political Islam and Revolution against illegitimate rules, and finally 5- economic structures and Political Islam.

2.2.2. Islam as a Civilization

The first approach to Islamist phenomenon or Political Islam is predicated on an essentialist interpretation of Islam as "civilization" (in the singular) rather than as religion and code of ethics that affects and is, in turn, affected by multiple cultural and geographic milieus (Ayoob, 2008: 23). This monolithic perception of Islam often appears in articles, commentaries, and editorials that put forward a clash between "Islam" and the "West" (Ayoob, 2008: 23). Among the prominent figures of this thought or approach having a perception of Islam as monolithic are Lewis and Huntington. Lewis (1990) argues that Islam as a religion give the feeling of both peace, and comfort and hatred, and violence for Muslims in different periods of history and the current time is one of those periods during which Islam provides the Muslims with the mood of hatred and violence. In the same vein, Huntington's (1996) argument is that the civilization of Islam and the West are in a sort of inevitable clash. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and the later attacks in Madrid and London have given the thesis much greater credibility among the Western public than had been the case earlier (Ayoob, 2008: 23). If the West and the Muslim world are in a conflict merely due to the fact that they are separate and different civilizations, what can this imply for approval of Islamist terror? It can be asserted that Muslims approve Islamist terror because they are Muslims and their priority is to exist for their identity. Ones' being Muslim or non-Muslim determines whether s/he approves Islamist terror or individuals' religious thoughts determine their attitude towards Islamist terror. In line with the approach emphasizing Islam or being Muslim as the main factor affecting Islamist terror, we can conclude that those who affiliates with Islamic doctrine more are highly likely to approve Islamist terror more.

This approach emphasizing Islam as the main factor in explaining Islamist terror has some weak points. There have been some rejections developed against this point of view.

One of the rejections is about the across time-explanatory power of the cultural or religious customs. Mousseau (2003: 8) argues that it is a weakness of the cultural theories that cultural mores are constant across time and the cultural explanations cannot sufficiently account for variation levels of social support for terror across time and place. If the clash is out of a natural hostility between the Muslims and the West, then it is logical to assume that the West or a distinctive party rather than Islam should be in a constant clash with the part of the world adhering to Islamic principles. The inherent hostility in the relationship of the Islamic world and the other(s) should start after the settlement of the Islamic civilization. Yet, it is mostly accepted by many that various Islamic states have histories of connivance. Even the existence of instances of indulgence to the others especially to the other religions indicates that Islam is also a peaceful religion and Islam cannot explain the rise of terror against the West on its own. As Mousseau (2003: 8) indicates "Islamic values and beliefs cannot explain why the Muslim world did not produce suicidal mass murderers in, for instance, the 1950s, or why millions of Muslims around the world joined others in expressing shock and horror at the events of September 11". Moreover, Mousseau (2009), by analyzing survey results conducted in predominantly Muslim countries, has shown that Islamic faith or Islam is not correlated with approval of Islamist terror.

However, it might be argued that Islam- although like any religion it composes of dogmas that are not to be changed by time as far as written original sources are presentis not constant due to the fact that most of its principles are open to individual interpretations. 'Ijtihad', the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, namely the Quran and Sunnah, can be considered to be resulting in variations in understanding and practicing Islamic principles. There are some points in Islam that need clarification or interpretation in order to answer the demands of contemporary life-styles. In addition to this, the complex linguistic characteristics of Arabic results in ambiguous meanings of some verses. In such cases it has been both legitimate and traditional to appeal to Ijtihad. Since there is no single body of Ijtihad, in some cases state-sponsored or independent religious scholars and clergy come up with their own interpretation. These interpretations might serve some interests or ideologies and this might finally result in 'several Islam(s)'. Different interpretations of Islam might mean that it is not be Islam that leads to terror or its approval, but sects of Islam such as Sunni or Shia should be the factors that have to be analyzed.

A study has scrutinized the possible effects of being Sunni or Shia, among various other factors, on the approval of Islamist terror. A survey analysis of a stratified random sample consisting of 337 Sunni and Shia male and female respondents in Beirut-Lebanon in 2001 affirmed that either Sunni or Shia respondents exceed the other in terms of approving Islamist terror (Haddad & Khassan, 2002). This finding of the survey-although the study is limited in scope- implies that being Shia or Sunni does not affect the level of approval of Islamist terror in a predominantly Muslim country.

The inability of Islam as a factor in explaining the variances at the level of Islamist terror across time is prominent. In addition to this the sub-sects of Islam are not determinants of approval of Islamist terror, at least in Lebanon.

2.2.3. The West Triggering Islamist Movements

Another approach focusing on the rise and development of Political Islam and Islamist terror is concerned about the policies of the West, especially towards the Muslim world. According to this group of scholars, the impulse against foreign domination has contributed strongly to the rise of Islamist movements (Hunter, 1995: 320). Real or imagined dominance of the West in the Muslim world triggers the Islamist movements and its branches of Islamist terrorism. Burgat (1986: 25) believes that "... we are witnessing the third phase of the process of decolonization. The first phase was political, the second was economic, and the last phase is cultural". It is implied that cultural resurgence against the West exists due to perceived Western dominance in the Muslim world and Muslims' state of being nervous as a result of their colonial history. The focal point of this approach is on the real or imagined (by the Muslims) Western colonial policies in the Muslim world.

The approach focusing on colonialism as an explanatory factor for Islamist terror or its popularity in the Muslim world suffers from some weaknesses. Although it can be argued that a real or imagined set of policies of the West to exploit the Muslim world can be a good explanatory factor for the choice of the Muslims to fight against the far enemy, this explanation is weak. It might be true that people may have negative feelings against the West if their countries experienced colonial rule and their wealth were exploited but this approach has some weaknesses.

First, recent Islamist terror is mainly against the U.S. and its allies. It is true that most of allies of the U.S. had involved in colonialism and imposed their rule to today's underdeveloped countries. Most of the Muslim world was dominated by the Britain while the U.S. idealism fought against the colonial economies. Hence, if colonial past is the main origin of terrorism or reason for support for terrorism, the anger resulting from colonial past should be directed to other states in the world rather than the U.S. It might be argued that the U.S. interventionist policies are perceived as a new type of colonialism. If the point that the U.S. is a new type of colonial power in the world politics is assumed to be true, then there must be differences between the U.S. and the other colonial powers since the former is threatened more seriously by terrorism compared to others. Then, colonialism is a weak explanatory factor that fails to clarify why there are variances in the reaction against the colonial powers.

Second, the Muslim world is not the single part of the world that had been colonized. Several countries in Asia such as India have been the most prominent subjects of colonialism. However, the Muslim world is the most prominent actor of contemporary international terrorism against the U.S. and its allies. If history of colonialism was the factor that explains the origins and support of terrorism, then it would be expected that the most prominent subjects of colonialism were the main actors of international terror today. Yet, this is not the case.

2.2.4. Discourse within the Muslim World

The third approach is about the dominant discourse in the Muslim world. This approach mainly takes rhetoric as a main determinant of the form or situation of Political Islam. One of the components of this perspective is a sort of evolutionary one. It is argued that, historically, those who write on politics in the Muslim world gave way to the contemporary Political Islam. Discussing about the forms and process Political Science and politics experienced in the Muslim world, Butterworth (1992: 28) points out to the failure in Western analysis of Political Islam to pay sufficient attention to the rhetorical transformations that arguments for something like an Islamic regime have undergone in the course of history as the character of the audience addressed has changed over time and as the goal pursued by the various speakers has been altered. Similar to this perspective Venkatraman (2007: 229-248) argues that the intensity of extremist interpretations of Quran and religious doctrine and their relative power compared to the moderate and non-violent interpretations have an influence on the level of radical, violent movements. Indeed, the focus of the author is mainly about the religious basis for Islamist terrorism, yet it is implicitly argued that the role of the radical rhetoric shaped from the Islamic doctrine affects the level of militant movements. This indicates that the historical evolution that Political Islam has undergone has been the cause of the contemporary Political Islam. Therefore, approval of Islamist terror by the public in predominantly Muslim countries can also be affected by these factors.

The factor of relative strength of radical and moderate movements in a society can be applicable in approval of Islamist terror. Yet, there are some weaknesses of the approach.

The first weakness of the approach taking the dominance of a certain type of rhetoric in a society as the main factor is about being falsifiable. For a theory to be falsifiable the data that would evaluate it should be defined and theories that make predictions that are fulfilled by all observed events are non-falsifiable (Van Evera, 1997: 20). Although, the approach makes emphasis on the relative strength of the radical and moderate interpretations of Islam, it does not indicate how they are defined or on what basis their strength should be measured. One way for measuring their strength can be to compare the written sources of two types of interpretations and to what extent they are taken granted by the public. The increased usages of electronic communication channels by terrorist organizations ease access to the documents of propaganda for the researchers. Lack of access to most of the written documents is partly overcome. Yet, it is obvious that terrorist does not merely prefer on-line letters written to the public attention, but many preachers or charismatic leaders- who mostly seen as religious leader as well- make references to their type of Islam and seek for support during public or private meetings. This kind of information is very limited and to my knowledge there is no study which channel of communications is mostly used by terrorist organization which might help to collect reliable data for comparing the power of different rhetoric. It is unlikely that a reliable data or study would appear unless all ways to spread a cause in the public are identified, ranked according to the intensity of their usage and their effects are measured. The strength of types of interpretations of Islam in relative terms is not a factor that can be comprehensively analyzed in order to find whether it is influential.

Another weakness is about the dominance of radical Islam or hostile interpretation factor is the fact that it is blurry that what does the dominance of radical Islam exactly means. If it means that their ideology is the one mostly taken into consideration by the public and people adhere to the radical point of view advocating terrorism, then there is a serious problem for the factor to be used in approval of Islamist terror. The factor trying to explain approval of Islamist terror is measured or defined by the approval of Islamist terror itself. People who advocate or adhere to the principles favoring Islamist terror should be those that approve principles resorting to terrorism. Dominance of radical Islam advocating terrorism as a just means and meaning existence of approval of Islamist terror, and dominance of moderate Islam giving no place for terrorism already mean either lack of approval of Islamist terror by the public or its presence.

2.2.5. Political Islam and Revolution against Illegitimate Rules

The fourth framework explains Political Islam by drawing on analysis of revolutionary movements. Contemporary Islamist movements and their political structure are taken into account as revolutionary attempts and the relationship between Islam and politics are tried to be explained accordingly. Their main argument is that Islam is used as an instrument but not seen as an end by the movements. The aim is to create a bounding and collective movement which appeals to a large number of people by the power of a religion. For instance, Butko (2004) argues that Islamist movements utilizing the ideology of Political Islam are not primarily religious groups concerned with the issues of doctrine and faith, but political organizations utilizing Islam as a 'revolutionary' ideology to attack, criticize, and de-legitimize the ruling elites and the power structure on which their authority and legitimacy is based. Using Gramscian approach, it is stated that the ultimate aim of the Islamist movements is to construct an active counter-hegemonic force

with the sole and final objective of overthrowing the current elites and the present political, economic, and social structure (Butko, 2004: 41). Berman (2003) argues that many theories on revolutions would predict the necessary precondition for Islamists' rise has been the declining efficiency and legitimacy of the state. Finally, having analyzed traditional Brotherhoods in the Muslim World, Voll (1992) argues that the long-term effect of the conservative brotherhoods in the Muslim world has been to provide a foundation for popular support for political movements. From this perspective Political Islam is the means of some trying to bring a change against the existing ruling elite. The main concern of such movements is merely political and their usage of Islam and taking part in the Political Islam wave is mostly practical. Their appeal to Islam and doctrines coming out of the Political Islam trend is for the sake of legitimacy; Islamic doctrine is instrumental.

Revolutionary movements by definition are against a rule perceived as illegitimate or fail to provide what is promised to the society. This requires the integration of another approach with the approach taking revolutionary movements as the focus.

The perspective, to be cited with the revolutionary movement approach, takes the tension as a part of the North-South division. In this perspective the overall popular discussion about the better-off North and the suffering South paved way to new ideologies trying to alter the international system especially after the demise of Cold War. Political Islam is one of those ideologies aiming at change for the international system and its power comes from the alternative it aims at bringing (Ayoob, 2007). In this respect Political Islam is an ideology working for the relative deprivation of the South.

Related to this point it is argued that Political Islam is seen as a sort of substitute that can full the ideological gap emerged after the Cold War (Juergensmeyer, 2008: 2). The role of Political Islam is, then, a creation of alternative to the post Cold War ideologies in the Muslim world.

The discussion above indicate that approval of Islamist terror is higher or possible in the existence of a revolutionary movement against an illegitimate rule and when the public have experienced failure of other alternative ideologies rather than radical wings of Political Islam.

This point of view may explain why people prefer an ideology against the West or the development of the perception of a far enemy. If the illegitimate rule is enforced or perceived to be done so by the West or any state being a member of the Western bloc, people can blame the enforcing power for the unrest in their country. Yet, why people prefer Islamic ideologies as an alternative in their fight against the illegitimate rules is not clear. The combination of the two above can answer this, as well. It is very difficult for other ideologies to gain power in the Islamic societies today. "In the Islamic world today Marxism is unlikely to be popular because of its atheism. Nationalist fascism, mostly represented by the Baathist parties in the Arab countries, wore itself out in many countries a generation ago by gaining power and failing to solve problems" (Mousseau, 2009: 13). Then, it is understandable how failed ideologies, being not the single factor, pawed way to the development of Islamist ideologies. However, this point is not a strong candidate to be analyzed in the study on approval of Islamist terror for several reasons. The first problem is that a revolutionary movement against an illegitimate rule is a sort of precondition for approval of Islamist terror in this approach. Emergence of an Islamist terror should be present at the same time period, simultaneously. However, emergence of revolutionary movements is widely thought to be an outcome of various factors, and ideology construction is a process that is under influence of several factors. The approaches above do not make reference to the effects of the other factors which might be influential on the revolutionary movement and why an ideology emerges. Moreover, there can be interaction between the movement and the ideology. It is not clear whether ideology shapes the movement or vice versa. It might be implied that they are independent in the approach, but again it is not clear how they are not interconnected.

This approach seemingly assumes that people somehow accepts an Islamist ideology in the presence of a revolutionary movement, failure of former ideologies, and illegitimate rule especially backed by the West. But it is not clear how an ideology favoring the murder of civilians of the West can find support or approval of the public, and this makes it weak. The approach or the integration of the ones above lacks explanatory power in general and especially cannot answer why people support the killing of civilians.

The second weakness is about the failed ideologies and Political Islam. If people consciously evaluate whether an ideology provide what it promises or analytically analyze the discourse of an ideology and make conclusions on the success it, then Political Islam or radical Islam is less likely to be favored. The reason is that Islamists do not come up with a future plan. They do not have a concrete alternative to replace the

existing order. The aim is only to replace the dominance of the others' with the Muslim one. 'The golden age of the Muslim world' is aimed at, but there is no reference how it would fit the contemporary world or how it will bring emancipation to the people. Therefore, although accepting that revolutionary movement, failed ideologies and illegitimate rules can be factors in the approval of Islamist terror, it would be argued that they can only create conditions for other more serious factors having more effect on the approval of Islamist terror. They cannot explain the major problems in understanding Islamist terror. They cannot give answers to why people support murder of civilians, and why people risk their lives for the community they value more than their existence.

2.2.6. Economic Structures

Finally, Heston (2003) argues that the tension between the West and the Islamic world is not a fact of doctrine but long-run economic structures and relations between different parts of the world have been the cause of the tension between parties. Political Islam in this respect has been an alternative for the underdevelopment and disadvantageous position of the Islamic world. This approach is summarized shorter compared to other approaches but similar arguments are analyzed in more details in the following parts on the review of the terrorism literature.

The last factor analyzed in Political Islam literature is the differences between economic structure of the Islamic world and the West. The main tension is believed to be out of not doctrinal differences but long-run economic structure and relations between different parts of the world (Heston, 2003). The main weakness is that, as argued in the previous part, Political Islam does not come up with a concrete solution as an alternative to the existing world order, but just aim at replacing it with the dominance of the Muslim world or bring emancipation of Muslims. Therefore, it is not clear how Political Islam is an alternative. This decreases the explanatory power of the approach that is not capable of answering the four important questions that a theory on Islamist terror should address, either.

However, the economic structure can be important. The differences or the incompatibility of the economic relations can create a tension between two parties resulting in an opposition in terms of spreading the economic types of their own. This point will be elaborated more in the coming parts, but one remark is worth noting at this point. If economic structures are important and their differences creates a tension between the parties, how it leads to a movement resorting to terrorism and why people provide support to Islamist terror should be elaborated more. This approach within Political Islam is far from explaining this important element of the inquiry in approval of Islamist terror. It needs more detailed analysis of the structures and how individuals affected by the tension resort or provide support to terrorism.

2.2.7. Conclusion: Political Islam

In general, Political Islam literature is relatively weak in terms of providing clearly defined factors that might affect the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Generally, the approaches lack strong explanatory power or are not falsifiable. However, the approaches can be useful in picturing the conditions under which Muslims live disparity. Political Islam literature can provide factors to be analyzed if the terms are to be defined clearly and the direction of causations are determined well with evaluations by either existing data or proposed measurements.

What can be an overall brief description of what these tell the reader is that people approve of Islamist terror for two different reasons: for the sake of either Islam or their well being. The first group considers Islam as an end itself while the second group sees it inferior to other ends. Then, we can conclude that:

- a- Those who approve Islamist terror live in societies where there is strong dominance of radical wing of Islamist groups resorting to terrorism and somehow legitimizes it, where being pious is granted as a strong value, where it is believed that blasphemy against Islam exists and taken by other as a system of belief that should be eliminated. Or,
- b- Those who approve Islamist terror live in societies where there is strong dominance of radical wing of Islamist groups resorting to terrorism and somehow legitimizes it, where people are aware of the fact that their social and economic conditions should be altered, where they are not happy with the Western policies for political or economic anxieties, where they seek for revolution against the rulers and former ideologies failed to provide this, and finally where Islam or being pious is not a strong element of identity and they are at least considered to be secondary.

The Political Islam literature is one of the ingredients of the study. However, it is not enough on its own. The literature on terrorism and specifically Islamist terror will be analyzed, too. The following part summarizes the works on terrorism and Islamist terror according to a framework.

2.3. Terrorism and Islamist Terror

2.3.1. Introduction

Voluminous literature on terrorism has been developed with the help of several studies from various disciplines ranging from anthropology to economics. Perhaps due to the involvement of different disciplines and the complex nature of the issue, there have been competing and/or completing positions trying to explain the origins of Islamist terror. Yet, the causal models trying to explain different aspects of life-cycle of terrorism are still immature. It might not be unexpected that a phenomenon even lacking a comprehensive or a general definition being largely accepted has not been explained to a large extent. Yet, what might be surprising is that terrorism as a research interest has been studied for long, and most of the theories are either very limited in scope or need to be modified within very short time periods. The reason can be that terrorism have been evolving and getting more complicated as technological innovations, and several social and political events emerge constantly.

The variety of actors or factors considered to have impact on terrorism requires the necessity to classify them for an easier understanding of the issue. There are at least three alternatives in order for classifying the causal mechanisms or the factors used in explaining terrorism.

The first one is to classify the factors in relation to the broader topics they are related to such as anthropology, sociology or political science (e.g. Richardson, 2006).

Within what general framework or discipline a factor fits is one of the themes to use for classification.

The second framework for classifying the elements of terrorism studies is to organize by level of influence (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981). That is, to classify the factors on the basis whether they work at micro or macro level⁹ is another framework.

Finally, we can classify studies by locating them under the heading of cultural or rational approaches (e.g. Mousseau: 2003; 2009). Culture and factors related to cultural structures or individuals' choices of rational action can be the basis of classifying factors explaining the origins of Islamist terror.

In this work I classify the factors in relation to the disciplines they are related to. The reason is that by contacting the factors to the disciplines we can draw the general picture that an origin of Islamist terror is a part of. A general picture can also bring potential elements into the understanding. On the other hand, organization by the level of work can bring the risk that a researcher misses the influence of a certain factor at different levels rather than the one it is classified under. It is not to say that the classification based on the general picture or the discipline-factor relation excludes analysis according to the level understanding, but it is a framework that does not dominate the understanding from a perspective granting the level point of view. There will inevitably be references to at which level a factor is analyzed due to the nature of the

⁹ For more information read Della Porta, Donetella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

disciplines bringing the factor into our consideration such as psychology making references to the factors that are likely to work at individual level.

Considering the framework according to the disciplines, this work focuses on the approaches trying to explain the root causes of terrorism. Why terrorism emerges in a society and why it becomes a durable event for a period of time in a given context is the main concern of this review. In the following parts different approaches; 1-*Psychological roots of terrorism*, 2- *Political roots of terrorism*, 3- *Economic roots of terrorism*, and 4- *Sociological roots of Terrorism*.

2.3.2. Psychological Roots of Terrorism

The first framework for the root causes of terrorism is the one analyzing individual and psychological roots. In general, this approach tries to explain the causes of terrorism with the help of the mental situations of individuals. It seeks to interpret general patterns for personal traits that are most likely to engender tendencies towards terrorist actions. There are various studies focusing on several psychological factors, such as parent-child relations.

Involvement of innumerable individuals in terrorist activities within countless organizations is one of the challenges that psychological approaches have to overcome. This problem is not a challenge only to the individual level analysis. Yet, personality analysis of individuals active in terrorist movement is one of the main sources of generalization in psychological approach. Moreover, to build and strengthen the explanations psychological analysis needs general statement derived from studies of the individuals. Therefore, the statements has to account for innumerable individuals taking part in countless organizations and this makes the number of individuals active in terrorism a serious challenge for psychological studies. Terrorism is a complex problem: Its origins are diverse; and those who engage in it, even more so (Reich, 1990: 1). Hence, psychological approaches deal with one of the most difficult elements of terrorism; the participants. As any attempt to understand the motivations and actions of terrorist individuals and groups must obviously take into account the enormous diversity, it is hardly possible that a single psychological theory can fulfill this duty (Reich, 1990: 1).

There are mainly two approaches within psychological studies of terrorism. They are approach focusing on mental disorder and collective identity as the explanatory factors of terrorism.

2.3.2.1. Mental Disorder

As Victoroff (2005: 12) concisely summarizes that one point in psychological studies of terrorism is that terrorists must be insane or psychopathic (Hacker, 1976; Cooper, 1977; Pearce, 1977; Taylor, 1988). Conventional understanding of many would suggest that terrorists are crazy or mentally deranged. It is not surprising that people think in this way because it is eccentric to see planes crashing into skyscrapers as terrorist acts or it is not easy to understand people blowing up themselves in order to cause damage to another party. Then, one of the possible explanations of roots of terrorism might be the mental derangement of individuals. This might be related to approval of Islamist terror. If it is true that terrorist are not mentally normal, people approving their acts are more likely to be similar to them or mentally deranged. The reason is that what terrorist conduct should be somehow meaningful to those approving them.

Although the common sense might make us believe that this approach might explain the Islamist terror, the reality is different. There is a plausible weakness with this approach. The empirical evidence proves the contrary of what this approach emphasis. Post (1984) argues that "the psychology of terrorist does not reveal major psychopathology". In substantial agreement with the finding of Crenshaw (1981), Post (1990: 26) indicates that the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality. The research suggests that terrorists, mostly, are not mentally sick personalities but have normal and non-psychopathic behaviors. For instance, Ruby (2002), departing from the need to study the terrorists conducting the attacks of 9/11 and being considered to be mentally deranged individuals that are portrayed as evil in the media and public eye, argues that terrorists are not dysfunctional or pathological; rather, he suggests that terrorism is basically another form of politically motivated violence that is perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives. In line with this point Hassan (2006: 39) in the concluding remarks of the interviews with failed suicide bombers or succeeded ones' families indicates that almost none of the suicide bombers were described as having psychological problems. What can be concluded is that there is no strong evidence suggesting that terrorists have abnormal characteristics that drive them into the path of terrorism, but there is evidence indicating that terrorist are normal individuals. Available evidence negates the main argument of this approach. Psychological problems thought to be characteristics of terrorist are not strong factors to explain the level of approval of Islamist terror.

2.3.2.2. Collective Identity

A second understanding in psychological studies develops with adding the effect of the society on the individuals. Rather than simply focusing on the individuals this approach also considers the effects of the society and departs from psychology to social psychology.

Having being skeptical about the notion that there is a particular terrorist personality and that the terrorists are crazed fanatics (Richardson, 2006: 3), psychologists turned to new topics and more general factors that are more likely to explain the issue. Post (2006: 18) asserts that there is clear consensus that group, organizational, and social psychology- and not individual psychology- provide the greatest analytic power in understanding the complex phenomenon of terrorism where collective identity is paramount. Collective identity or its strength in a given in-group is one of the important factors that can shed light on the understanding of terrorism. Terrorists subordinate their individual identity to the collective identity so that what serves the group, organization, or network is of primary importance (Post, 2006: 18). Therefore, rather than analyzing every single person-peculiar characteristics of terrorists it is easier to understand the general properties of a group, organization or a society that terrorists shape, practice and finalize their acts according to. This point of view augments that a terrorist organization or a group is more important than any individual because collective identity dominates individual identity (Crehshaw, 2000: 414; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003: 176). Having more insightful analysis of the collective identity Post comes up with the conclusion concerning the collective behaviors of individuals. He (1990: 30; 2006: 19) argues that the youth with rebellious parents being disloyal to the rule or with non-rebellious parents

having been made worse-off by the rule become or are more likely to be disloyal the governments. Finally, Gupta (2005: 18) models individual terrorist behaviors and concludes that a rational individual can join a collective action even if his or her own net personal welfare is negative, as long as the perceived benefit to the group is large enough to compensate for these losses. In other words, individuals can prioritize the group benefit at the expense of their personal seeks.

If we cannot come up with very acute and general personal information about the terrorists and better explanations are derived from the studies of group or organizational psychology, approval of Islamist terror studies should consider the factors such as collective identity.

Collective identity can be considered to be plausible in explaining why people join or support terrorists claiming to work for the sake of a society. Yet this approach suffers from major weaknesses.

The first major weakness is that collective identity approach does not explain how or why people support the group sake at the expense of lives of many civilians of the others. Why an individual would support the murder of an innocent people or how a civilian of the other group can be perceived as a threat to the interests of one's own group cannot be adequately explained by collective identity approach. The approach can explain why people might support movements that aim at bringing gain to the in-group they belong if they favor collective identity or are members of society dominated making the individual gains inferior to the sake of the group. The second major mistake is that why the far enemy being threatened by the Islamist terror is defined as 'the other' or the out-group standing against the Muslim ingroup. People can form a tightly-bounded in-group composing of the Muslim individuals and they can consider the group gain as the ultimate goal that is to be supported in the expense of other. Yet, how is their collective identity is formed in terms of seeing the others? Why do they perceive some other groups as threatening while they have no serious problems with the remaining out-groups? For instance, why the Islamist terrorists prefer the U.S. and its close allies such as Britain as their main targets but do not conduct terrorist attacks against other states considered to be Western.

Collective identity can account for an important role in understanding approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Yet, the weaknesses of the approach require the necessity of introducing other factors to explain the aspects of the issue that collective identity fails to give details of.

2.3.3. Political Roots of Terrorism

The second framework is the one trying to explain the political roots of terrorism. Where psychologists seek explanation at the individual and group level, political scientists bring their own tools and try to establish lines first of correlation and then causation between the outbreak of terrorism and the nature of the political environment in which the terrorism takes place (Richardson, 2006: 4). One of the leading works seeking to explain the political roots of terrorism is Crenshaw's (1981: 381) work differentiating between preconditions and precipitants, and permissive factors and situations directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns within political environments. For her there are several permissive factors such as modernization, urbanization, governments' inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism (381-383). As direct causes for terrorism she counts concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, lack of opportunity of political participation, elite dissatisfaction, mass passivity and a precipitating event that immediately precedes the outbreaks of terrorism (383-384). Reading the roots counted by Crenshaw can be confusing since many factors are gathered in her work. Detailed analysis of each factor can be another alternative for better understanding.

2.3.3.1. Political Instability

Firstly, political instability is among the mostly commonly identified political roots of terrorism (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2006; Piazza, 2007; Przeworski, 2000: 127). It is affirmed that the formation of terrorist organizations is a transformation that occurs within the societies but that some political conditions filter and select which of these mutations survive and reproduce, thus creating a serious challenge to the political system (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2006: 71). Yet, a certain reason why terrorism occurs is not clearly defined. From Sanchez-Cuenca's (2006) point of view it can be implied that past political instability can promote Islamist terrorism that emerge as a result of mutation and past political instability can engender conditions necessary for the durability of the movements. However, as the author himself accepts, his point is limited to the study of organizations working within the borders of a state (2006).

One point that should be stressed about past political instabilities and Islamist terror conducted against the West can be that political unrest in a state can be somehow related to the relations between a state and the Western powers. It can be concluded that if past political instabilities are to be considered as a factor in the approval of Islamist terror, then the political instability should also be evaluated in relation to the West.

The approach focusing on political instability has several weak points. It has to overcome some problems in order to provide a good explanation for approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

Firstly, if political instability will be argued as a factor affecting emergence or development of a terrorist movement within a country and aiming at an external power that in turn results in international scale acts, then the relationship between political instability and the link between the external powers has to be shown. In the case of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries and the fight against the far enemy, the link between political instability and the far enemy should be pictured. Otherwise, why a movement turns to international action cannot be explained.

Secondly what is meant by political instability is not clear. Generally, it is defined in terms of the comparison of the strength of the power. In other words, permanent changes in the rule and lack of control in a state or simply political turmoil are referred as political instability. The blurry meanings for the main terms and a poor framing of the approach decrease its power in explaining the issue.

Finally the approach is not clear in terms of the direction of the causality. What emerges in a political turmoil is point of concern. Is it anarchy that appears during a political instability or is it terrorism? Or does not terrorism add to political turmoil? In short the discussion on political instability is blurry and direction of causality is not clear.

2.3.3.2. Regime Type

The second political root of terrorism is regime type. Regime types and their abilities in handling the threat of appearance of terrorism have been studied as a research topic in terrorism studies (Weinberg, 2006; Lutz & Lutz, 2005). Three main arguments have been developed on the relationship between democracy and terrorism that dominates the regime type approach.

The first theoretical argument is that features of democracy reduce terrorism. In democratic societies, free and fair elections can change rulers and social changes can be brought by voters (Schmid, 1992). Different social groups can participate in the political process to obtain their interests through peaceful means rather than violent movements (Eubank & Weinberg 1994, 2001). Since democracy is able to lower the cost of achieving political aims via legal means, groups might find illegal terrorist activities less attractive and costly (Ross 1993; Eyerman, 1998). Democracy providing other means rather than violent or terrorist movements and giving peaceful opportunities for social change to the parties is likely to reduce the occurrence of terrorism aiming at change within a country. How such a reductionist effect can be possible in international terrorism originating from a country should also be discussed. As Li (2005: 281) summarizes:

Within the context of transnational terrorism, wide democratic participation helps to reduce incentives of domestic groups to engage in terrorist activities against foreign targets in a country. When citizens have grievances against foreign targets, greater political participation under a democratic system allows them to exert more influence on their own government so that they can seek favorable policy changes or compensation more successfully. Joining a terrorist group and attacking the foreign target become less appealing options

Then, as the arguments in the literature suggest democracy can be effective in reducing the terrorism with the means it provides to the groups seeking social change.

The second argument in democracy-terrorism discussion is that democratic system increases terrorism instead of reducing it. This argument stems from the civil liberties democracies provide to the citizens. By promising civil liberties, democratic rules allow terrorists to organize and maneuver easily (Ross, 1993; Eyerman, 1998). Liberal and protected civil liberties make it harder for the democracies to convict terrorists or retaliate against terrorism (Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; 2001). Democracies both providing liberties to the individuals that become more able in getting organized or maneuver and limiting the rulers in dealing with terrorism might be likely to increase terrorism.

Totalitarian regimes and firmly entrenched authoritarian rules have the advantage of having an almost absence of domestic terrorism and ease of dealing with terrorists by means that most democracies would not prefer to use such as methods of torture (Lutz& Lutz, 2005: 15; Gurr, 2003: 202; Laqueur, 2001: 11; Wilkinson, 1986; Ross, 1993: 321). In other words, regimes that can control the society even with harsh methods such as torture or taking hostage of members of illegal organizations are less likely to experience the appearance of terrorism and more likely to control the terrorist movements. In contrast to repressive authoritarian regimes, weaker authoritarian systems and democracies are more vulnerable to the acts of terrorist groups and more suitable for the emergence of terrorists (Crenshaw, 2003: 94). The main point of these arguments is that the more control can a regime have over its people especially by means of repression, the less opportunities the terrorist organizations have. Then, what we can conclude is that people living in less authoritarian regimes or democracies are equipped with more freedoms that might lead to choices of participation in terrorist organization or entrench movements aiming at conducting terrorist acts. Moreover, those who somehow participate in terrorist organization are discouraged less in non-authoritative regimes or democracies since their regimes counter them with less harsh security methods especially due to the constraints created by the guarantee of civil liberties.

The third argument on the relationship between regime type and terrorism is that terrorism is able to work better or can only work in democracies. This argument originates mainly from the freedom of press in democracies. Press freedom, as part of civil liberties, may bring possible terrorist incident reporting bias and create an additional incentive for terrorism (Li, 2005: 281). As Li (2005: 281) notes "a terrorist group succeeds because of its ability to terrorize". To terrorize a broad sector of the public, terrorists chase recognition and attention by seeking to expand publicity and media coverage of their activities (Crenshaw, 1981; Atkinson, Sandler, & Tschirhart, 1987). Press freedom, which is a characteristic of democracies, increases the opportunities for terrorists to be heard and watched by a large audience and hence their ability to create widespread fear (Li, 2005: 282).

Then regime type can have the effects of either increasing or decreasing terrorism. The guarantee of civil liberties and press freedom in democracies can increase terrorism while peaceful means for participation provided by democratic regimes can decrease terrorist movements. In the same vein, totalitarian regimes can deter terrorist movements with the help of repression that can also result in an increase in the sense that it blocks the peaceful means for social change that a group seeks.

People in democracies can resort to terrorism or give support to terrorist organizations less since they might prefer some other methods such as political participation or public demonstrations to show their dissatisfaction or any kind of unrest with the government. While authoritative regimes can ban such moderate or 'more peaceful' methods open to the public. The regime type having the possibility of a dual effect on approval of Islamist terror suffers from the lack of clear direction of causality in approval of Islamist terror.

2.3.3.3. International System

The third factor within the political roots of terrorism is the present international system. It is argued that the structure of the present international system is influential on today's terrorist organizations attacking the United States and its allies, specifically the U.S.-led international system is one of the targets to be eliminated by today's Islamist terrorist organizations (Weinberg, 2006: 51-56; Crenshaw, 2004; Cronin, 2003: 34). The overwhelming U.S. hegemony or the relations in the international system favoring the U.S. policies- the presence of many allies of the U.S. - limits peoples' opposition to the inequality. It is common to see protests in summits such as G-20 meetings and people accuse the international system leaded by USA and the countries having U.S.-like policies of several problems ranging from HIV to global warming. Inequalities or problems such as worse-off situations of several countries are perceived to be condoned by the balance in the international system that limits the incentives of individual

governments due to the dominance of USA and its allies This concise argument takes present international system as the main cause of the terrorism against USA and its allies.

This approach and the coming approach focusing on globalization is better understood when they are taken into account together. The reason is that the present international system is mainly discussed with relation to globalization which is the next element of this review within the economic roots of terrorism.

2.3.4. Economic Roots of Terrorism

The third framework is economic roots of terrorism. Scholars analyzing the economic roots of terrorism review the economic factors that trigger and maintain terrorism. Generally, those resorting to terrorism picture themselves as disadvantaged groups and bring economic demands to the scene. Therefore, the study of economic factors as possible origins of terrorism takes attention in researches on terrorism.

2.3.4.1. Globalization

One of the factors discussed in line with economic roots of terrorism is globalization. Gotchev (2006), an economist, explores the downside effects of globalization as a cause of terrorism and shows how unfair allocation of the positive effects of globalization across countries provides both incentives and opportunities to organize, finance and carry out terrorist organization. The author (2006) does not argue that globalization causes terrorism but rather that it can too can create a permissive environment for its occurrence by increasing inequalities and social polarization both within and between. For instance, he discusses that globalization fostering political and cultural resistance and bringing the development of global markets for goods, services and capital compels societies to alter their cultural practices (2006: 106). And for him the spread of western culture and the need to adapt to take advantage of the benefits of globalization provoke political and cultural resistance and an emphasis on differences (2006: 106). Gotchev (2006: 107-109) argues that globalization also fosters the development of new minorities by facilitating the movement of labor and this in turn may provide logistical and financial support as well as human capital for the terrorist groups.

The major weakness with this approach is that not every single country that is worse-off in the system and negatively impacted by globalization experience high level of terrorism with a supporting public. Weinberg (2006: 51-56) believes that broad-based explanations such as the structure of the international system or globalization are not consistent with the evidence. By using empirical analysis he challenges the explanatory power of globalization concluding that an examination of terrorist incidents suggests that most terrorist attacks are committed by citizens of countries at the bottom of the globalization index against citizens of countries also at the bottom of the index (Weinberg, 2006: 51-56). Moreover, when citizens of highly globalized countries are victims their attackers tend to come from other highly globalized societies.

2.3.4.2. Market Civilization vs. Non-Market Civilization

The next analysis that can be considered among the studies taking a variable from an economic perspective is the idea that support for terrorism stems from the tension between the 'market civilization' and non-market or transition economies, (Mousseau, 2003; Mousseau 2009). One of the main points of the author is the difference between economic practices between the market-oriented societies favoring contracts and basing economic facilities on formal agreements, and clientalist societies that base economic facilities on informal entities (Mousseau, 2003: 10). This difference implying dissimilar practices in cooperating with strangers, and different perception for in and out groups is sort of the main tension feeding today's terrorist movements between the West and the Islamic societies. The people in market-oriented societies are more likely to cooperate with strangers, yet, from the clientalist perspective those with market values that do not cooperate on the basis of friendship or cooperating with the exchange of goods are from out-groups and thus are untrustworthy (Mousseau, 2003: 15). From the clientalist perspective, in contrast to market-oriented societies, no one is innocent: Individuals share responsibility for the actions of others within the in-group and all-out group members are enemies or at least outsiders unworthy of empathy (Mousseau, 2003: 20).

On the stage there is one society granting market values such as contracts et cetera and another one maintaining economy on different entities such as kinship. The spread of the former's values or principles to clientalist societies threatens the sake of ones who make advantage of non-market oriented economies. Those belonging to worse-off strata of clientalist societies are the mostly affected by the negative consequences associated with globalization- such as spread of Western style markets or Western affiliated values-, however those with the most to lose are patrons that are privileged in the old clientalist hierarchies (Mousseau, 2003: 19). Then, cultural narrow-mindedness with a particular grievances and favoring the group even in the expense of individual sakes added with absence of science may increase the approval of suicide as a sign of loyalty to the ingroup (Mousseau, 2003: 21). This approach clearly explains how individuals in clientalist societies- most of predominantly Muslim countries- feed anger against the capitalist societies- the West. It also account for how they limit their perception of a possible cooperation with the others, they do not differentiate between those responsible for their status of being worse-off and those not, and they support terrorism and participate in terrorist organizations.

However, one of the weak points in this argument is about how individuals or under what conditions they meet the political entrepreneurs. How individuals become aware of the others' being responsible for the disparity of their society and why do they become members or provide support for Islamist terror against the West or the capitalist societies is not clear. In other words, what make individuals meet the mechanism of Islamist terrorists and drive them into the channels of either participation or support is not clear. Yet, this drawback is solved in a further work by Mousseau (2009) that is discussed in more details below.

2.3.4.3. Urban Poverty

The last economic factor in the study of approval of Islamist terror is urban poverty. This point is interconnected with clientalism and with the problems that I see in the approach focusing on clientalism that how individuals become accustomed to ingroup ideology and collective identity that lead them to group interest seeking in the expense of the others and individual interest. Mousseau (2009) in his recent work brings clarity to this point. He argues that those who survive with the help of traditional ties such as kinship support and friend based trade face harsh conditions and feel the lack of security when they move to urban areas that undergo either transition to contract-based economies or dominated by capitalist economic structures, and find the security they need within the Islamist communities responding to their needs or security and sort of survival. The poor in the rural area survive with the help of the traditional relations, but when they face the urban life and maintain to be poor they need those groups who provide them with the security they are accustomed to during their rural life. Yet, there is a problem with this point and the current researches or the data is unlikely to solve this problem. Individuals can be pro-Islamist movements before they migrate to the urban life and one of the reasons of the migration might be aim of cooperation with the groups working within the city life. However, it is difficult to find out whether individuals aimed at attending the Islamist movements during their rural life. Although, I believe that this point is one of the weaknesses in urban poverty understanding, still urban poverty is one of the plausible factors to be analyzed in a study on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

2.3.5. Sociological Roots of Terrorism

The fourth framework comes from studies within Sociology. Those researchers who pledge a sociological approach view terrorism as a reflection of various social elements

2.3.5.1. Relative Deprivation

Poverty or social grievances resulting in inequalities or relative deprivation is considered to be one of the reasons of people's unrest with their state of being and tendency of using tactics such as terrorism or any type of collective violence against the means that maintain their relative deprivation (Gurr, 2006: 86-87; Crenshaw, 1981: 383; Atron, 2004: 77-78; Wolfensohn, 2002). Arguing that terrorism is a choice made by 58 groups waging conflict rather than an automatic response to deprivation, (Gurr, 2006) points out that the perpetrators of the 9/11 atrocity in the United States were middle class and well educated and products of societies undergoing profound socioeconomic changes in which opportunities for political expressions were sharply curtailed. It is argued that inequalities or relative deprivation are more important than poverty as source of terrorism, and rather than poverty, structured inequalities within countries facilitate the emergence of terrorism and that rapid socioeconomic change feeds this process (Gurr, 2006). Finally he augments that when these factors interact with the restrictions on political rights, disadvantaged groups are what he calls "ripe for recruitment" (Gurr, 2006).

This explanation seems plausible for many. However, there is a very clear fact that not every individual or society experiencing relative deprivation resort to violence or feed hatred against the West. For instance, many suffering from poverty, lacking political rights, struggling against fatal diseases and even lacking the basics for survival in many African societies does not resort to violence against the West. It has been also indicated that very poor people in the Muslim world are less likely to approve Islamist terror (Fair & Shepher: 2006). In addition to this if people are driven to terrorism simply because of relative deprivation then, there must be tension among the political entrepreneurs of many Islamist movements and their foot soldier since the former are relatively better-off then the later.

2.3.5.2. Education

Education, popularly, discussed in the literature in terms of whether it increases or reduces terrorism and the common sense is that people lacking education are more likely to be members of terrorist organization or support terrorism. Mousseau (2009: 8) argues that few studies actually explained how education should reduce approval of terror with reference to previous works (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). He adds- with reference to Perlez (2003) - that people can learn to approve Islamist terror. Individual can be educated according to certain doctrines by the terrorist-minded people. They might be socialized in way that they approve Islamist terror. Mousseau (2009) adds two other problems for the reductionist role of education. First he argues that the relationship between education and approval of Islamist terror is not examined; there are works indicating that those who became terrorists have relatively better education levels (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Krueger, 2007). Secondly it is argued that education level is higher than they were generations ago (Mousseau, 2009: 8). In his work Mousseau (2009: 19) finds out that correlation between education and approval of Islamist terror is not significant meaning that those who have poor education are not more likely to approve Islamist terror.

2.3.5.3. Young Male Status

Young male status is another factor that is discussed in the literature in relation to participation in and support for Islamist terror. Those who act in terrorist activities or provide support for terrorist organizations can come from the young generations. However, it does not necessarily mean that the young approve Islamist terror only as a result of their being young. One of the general characteristics of the most Muslim countries is that they have younger populations compared to other parts of the world or to the developed countries. Mousseau (2009: 8), referring to Urdal (2003), argues that societies with lower incomes tend to have younger generations, and works have related young generations with violence. However, it must be logical to expect that if a society is composed of mainly young individuals, it is ordinary to see the young generations in any movements and be it terrorism or democratic protests. In other words, if we think the possible recruits or supporting group of terrorism as a sample space, it composes of dominantly young individuals. This does not necessarily mean that the young status is a cause of support for terrorism. Moreover, Mousseau (2009: 20) finds out that the interaction between young male status is significant but in contrary to the general point of view favoring the idea that the youth male is more supportive than others. He indicates that there is no support for the idea that young males are more supportive of Islamist terror. In opposition to Mousseau's (2009) point, in one study it is argued that closeness to militant Islam and young age are positively correlated with approval of Islamist terror (Haddad & Khashan: 2002). However, this study is limited in scope that it focuses on merely Lebanese Muslims.

2.3.6. Conclusion: Terrorism and Islamist Terror

Terrorism literature is one of the elements contributing to the study aiming at analyzing the structural factors that might explain approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. The review in this work is a merit for classifying the variables derived from several disciplines. It is important to acknowledge that the variables do not strictly belong to a certain discipline. Since the main aim is to find out potential factors having influence on approval of Islamist terror, this review of the literature is adequate for the scope of this work.

Generally, the works within terrorism literature- unless they negated by existing data and evidence- has merit in explaining several aspects of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. None of them can account for an explanation leaving no questions in mind, or without needing the help of the other factors used by other approaches. Several factors explain different aspects of the issue at stake and some of them are better in explaining the phenomena.

2.4. Concluding Remarks: Literature Reviews

In this part an analysis of approaches in two literatures related to Islamist terror is given. Political Islam and terrorism literatures giving insight in understanding the issue have been summarized in the preceding parts and a collection of candidate variables have been summarized.

Due to the complex structure of the issue at stake various approaches have been considered to be influential both on the emergence of terrorist organizations and the support provided by the public. However, as argued above several approaches suffer from major weaknesses. Generally, most of the approaches do not introduce strong explanations for the issue.

In the first chapter in the part 'Salafism as a Brand', the ideology- Salafismleading most of the movements fighting Islamist terror, has been discussed. It has been argued that Salafism can be considered as a franchising. It is a worldwide cause or a supranational formation. Although, it is a supranational or transnational idea, Islamist movements must adapt to the local contexts in which they recruit. It has internationally constant properties and also appeal to tastes that the local Muslims approve. Salafi Jihadists are like those companies that have internationally constant regulations or rules. That is, Salafis want to spread the way of living of devout ancestors and for this purpose they use terrorist attacks against their rivals, be it near enemy or far enemy. However, international constants might not be enough to get supporters all around the world since internal dynamics of the societies might vary across countries while there might be some commonalities as well. In order to market their cause and get support for their attacks Islamist terrorists need to localize their cause and advertise their products or terrorist acts in accordance with the taste of the locals.

In order to understand the spread of Salafi movements or the Salafi Jihadist cause we need to understand how they appeal to the locals in predominantly Muslim countries since their market is the Muslim world. We need to find out common dynamics that lead to approval of the terrorist acts and differences among the predominantly Muslim countries in order to understand the adaptation of Salafi movement to different countries. For this purpose, we need to make case analysis in the light of general terrorism theories of Political Islam and terrorism literatures. Therefore, as also discussed in the chapter on methodology the factors will be analyzed in the case studies.

(1) Adherence to Islam, (2) Hostile and Peaceful Islam and their Relative Power,
(3) History of Colonialism and Anti-Westernism, (4) Revolutionary Movements,
Illegitimate Rule and Failed Ideologies, (5) Differences between Economic Structures,
(6) Mental Disorder, (7) Collective Identity, (8) Political Instability, (9) Regime Type,

(10) Current International System, and Globalization, (11) Clientalism, (12) Relative Deprivation, (13) Education, (14) Young Male Status, (15) Urban Poverty are the general factors derived from the two literatures.

In this work the main interest is in the structural factors. Therefore, the factors that have relation to or implications for structures of the country will be the main ones for analysis of predominantly Muslim country cases. In the next chapter the factors that are considered to be important for the analysis in this work are discussed.

3. Chapter III: Factors

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapters the introduction of this thesis and review of two literatures have been provided. In the literature part identification of several approaches has been conducted. These approaches will be the main guides in identifying several factors about which the information in predominantly Muslim countries is inquired. In the introduction chapter, it has been argued that this thesis aims at focusing on structural factors that might influence the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Therefore, the main focus is on the approaches that provide factors in relation to the structures of the countries.

In this work I identify 14 factors that have structural implications. The factors around which detailed discussion will be given in the coming parts are: 1- Adherence to Islam, 2- Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power, 3- History of Colonialism and Anti-Westernism, 4- Revolutionary Movements, Illegitimate Rule and Failed Ideologies, 5- Differences Between Economic Structure, 6- Collective Identity, 7- Political Instability, 8- Regime Type, 9- Current International System, Globalization, 10- Clientalism, 11- Urban Poverty, 12- Relative Deprivation, 13- Education, 14- Young Male Status. These are the 14 main factors that have structural implications within a country. For instance, mental disorder is another factor that can be used for a study on approval of Islamist terror. Yet, since it is not related to structural analysis, but is more influential in individual level, it is not included in this study. Moreover, due to the similarities or commonalities of point of inquiry in some of these 14 main approaches or

factors, some of them will be combined in the coming sections. In addition to this, the approaches point out to some certain properties of countries to be considered for an analysis about Islamist terror.

Collective Identity, Urban Poverty and Clientalism are the first set of factors that are considered to be integrated in this work. The combination is due to the similarities in the approaches and their commonalities in explaining approval of Islamist terror. Economic incompatibility approach is the viewpoint that suggests the analysis of economic condition of the country in relation to the global economic system or inquiry of the comparison of economic profiles of countries with the rest of the world. International System, Globalization and History of Colonialism approaches making references to the relations of countries with the West or the U.S. led international system require the analysis of the foreign policies of the countries . Briefly, some properties of countries are implied to be analyzed in relation to approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries by some approaches and some standpoints need to be integrated as a result their similarities in explaining approval of Islamist terror.

In the coming parts, the factors will be discussed in details and the main reason why each factor has been chosen or why some factors have been combined will be given. The organization of the coming parts has been designed according to the sub-headings of factors or set of factors that are combined. There are 12 factors that this works focus on. They are: the level of adherence to Islam within states, type of Islam dominant among people, colonial history, urban poverty, relative deprivation of states compared to other states, demography, economic situations of states, regime type, political instability, education structure, foreign policies of countries, and international status of states.

3.2. Structural Factors

3.2.1. Adherence to Islam

This factor is derived from the approach taking Islam as a civilization against the West. According to this approach the more people affiliates with Islam or attach to Islamic principles and make being Muslim as one of the dominant identities in their lives, the more likely they are to be pro-Islamist terror or in conflict with the West.

This approach has been discussed to be weak in the literature review part. In this work, still adherence to Islam is going to be analyzed in predominantly Muslim countries. By adherence to Islam people's perception of Islam as a main component of the society, and how strict it is practiced in one country are meant. Islam can be very important in one country and overall cultural practices can be set according to its principles. For instance, weekends can be set according to the holy day of Islam or special days of Islam can be given more importance over others, or for instance consumption of pork or alcohol can be strictly forbidden in the country since Islamic principles forbid their consumption. In addition to such practices in a country, the life styles of individuals can also vary in terms of being parallel to Islamic principles. Individuals can personally give importance Islam or being Muslim to a very large extent. The importance given to Islam can be at various levels in several countries.

People giving high levels of importance to Islam and societies structuring their practices according to Islamic principles can be more likely to be willing to protect the existence of Islam or keep it away from threats. People affiliating with Islamic principles more can be more sensitive about the future of Islam in the world and the threats or imagined-threats can be more meaningful to them compared to individuals having less affiliation with Islamic principles. Any movement or organization claiming that Islam is under threat of the West and they fight for the sake of Islam can be perceived as more righteous in societies where Islam is given more importance. Islam as a core fabric of a society might have higher social desirability, hence threats against Islam can be considered as highly. As a result, movements fighting for the sake of Islam can be granted more. That is why, adherence to Islam or the level of importance given to Islamic principles in a country will be analyzed in this work.

3.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

Hostile and Peaceful Islam and their Relative Power or the existence of radical or moderate movements within a country, and to what extent which type of organizations is more prominent in the country is another factor that is thought be effective in the level of approval of Islamist terror. This factor is derived from Political Islam literature and has been analyzed in term of its weaknesses. Although the approach inherits some limitations, it can still be important in the analysis of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

In several countries the number of peaceful Islamist movements and movements resorting to violence can vary. In a country, resort to violence for the sake of Islam can be the main preference of movements while in other countries peaceful ways are preferred over terror. In countries fitting to the latter category people are served with the availability of peaceful means. People are invited to be organized under peaceful movements and their approval is mostly sought for peaceful solutions. If we consider peaceful solutions and terror as two companies trying to get as high share as possible in the market of approval and if peaceful movements are higher in number and popular among the public they are more likely to get higher shares. This is also same for radical or terrorist movements. The more popular they are or the more they dominate the market, the higher the share they can get in the market. That is why; the analysis of the situation of two types of Islamist movements will be conducted in this work.

3.2.3. History of Colonialism

This approach is one of the approaches that have been discussed with major weaknesses and counter evidence against it. However this factor can be influential in explaining the general atmosphere in the Muslim world and inspire further research on Islamist terror.

The history of colonialism can be effective in the sense that the transformation of countries can be different. Violence against the colonial powers and the role of Islam during the changing process can vary across countries.

Some countries might have had violent struggle against the colonial powers and they might have made use of cultural revolutions such as revivalism or re-introduction of Islam in the cultural sphere of the country. Moreover, the process of introduction of Islam in the country can be different. It might have been used as a policy and from the very beginning of the independence processes Islam can be introduced or accepted as a fact of the countries and given important roles in the construction of the post-colonial states. Countries can show variances in terms of revivalism, maintenance or re-introduction of Islam during and after colonial rule.

3.2.4. International Status

The approaches focusing on International System and Globalization introduce the necessity of the analysis of the international status of a country. Therefore, that is one of concerns of inquiry about approval of Islamist terror.

The approach mainly focusing on the position of a country in the globalization ranking has been discussed to be weak in the sense that it is countered by empirical evidence. However, low globalization can bring or be a reason of other properties of a country that might increase the likeness of the emergence of Islamist terror and its approval. The low level of globalization can drive countries to various alignments with certain countries or search for new integration processes to overcome the negative effects of being at the low levels of globalization. For instance, a country can be lowlyglobalized and this might be due to the fact that it prefers local integrations within its region for several reasons such as economic gains or political aims. Unlike such countries, there might be countries that have low performance in terms of globalization but aim at having higher scores in globalization and adapt policies or processes for a better score of globalization. The low score of a country might not necessarily mean its preference of keeping its integration far from global system or the West led global structure.

The globalization levels of countries can be accompanied by supporting or contradicting policies or preferences of countries in terms of their eagerness to be integrated to or detached from global structure led by the West. Therefore, the search of the processes the countries undergo in terms of globalization and their international status might shed light on their perception of the rest of the world and can bring information about the Islamist terror and its approval for the countries that are concern of this work.

3.2.5. Urban Poverty, Collective Identity and Clientalism

In this work I consider Urban Poverty, Clientalism and Collective Identity as the factors that are supposed to be integrated together. The reason is that the latter two factors can show their effects in predominantly Muslim countries especially in the urban life that is dominated by poverty.

Clientalism explains the attitude towards the strangers or members of out-groups and collective identity makes clear why people highly attach to their in-groups even at the expense of their interests. These two factors become operational or meaningful in urban life where difficult conditions- compared to the smoother ones of rural areas- direct people to seek for networks or social entities enabling them to handle the difficulties of life. In other words, the way the two factors affect approval of Islamist terror is possible in the existence of urban poverty. Therefore, these two factors will be analyzed with the information on urban poverty. In this, sense urban poverty making these factors operational and helps explaining their effects is taken as the main structural factor.

3.2.6. Relative Deprivation

This factor emerges from the approach taking inequalities, social grievances and lack of certain social, political, and cultural rights within a society as the main reasons of resorting to terror or support for it. However, it has been argued that if inequalities are the main reason then the leading figures of Islamist terror and their recruits should be in a clash, too. The reason is that the two types of participants of Islamist terror are in general from different segments of society and there are unequal distributions between them. However, this factor can be still important in explaining approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

The relative deprivation of the societies in the Muslim world or predominantly Muslim countries in comparison with other societies, especially societies in the Western part of the world can be important. The level of income compared to the rest of the world, availabilities of social conditions for human emancipation can generate a level of disparity in societies in predominantly Muslim countries and a comparison of their situation with other societies. This, in turn, can generate grievance among the Muslim against the better-off societies. Therefore, this factor will be analyzed at the societal level in this work.

3.2.7. Political Instability

Political Instability has been argued as one of the factors that might explain Islamist terror and its approval. Political instability is a sort of precondition of the conditions for the emergence or approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries, yet what are those conditions are is not clear in the approach.

Although, the some weaknesses are apparent in the approach, political instability is one of the factors that might take attention. Political instability, in fact, can generate some conditions which are not definitely defined but can vary across country cases. Each country can be an environment for the emergence of some unique conditions that might affect Islamist terror and its approval. Analysis of country cases can shed light on those conditions. Therefore, this factor will be analyzed in the case studies.

3.2.8. Regime Type

In the review of the approach on regime type, different arguments have been summarized. The arguments are related to the characteristics of democracies and other regimes that might affect the emergence of terror and how it is handled. I have argued that the arguments gathered in the approach about regime suggest contradictory directions of causation and none of them have been supported by strong evidence in the literature. However, the role of democracy and how democracy is practiced in a country can be important in the analysis of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

Democracy or democratization process in the Muslim countries can be important. Some countries can aim at incorporating religious parties in the democratic system or have already legalized the religious parties. Other countries can be strict and ban the participation of religious parties in the democratic system due to concern about secularism or laicism of the state. Various policies concerning Islamist groups can develop in different countries and each country that is either a democracy or a democratizing state can show peculiar properties that might have implication over the fate of Islamist movements or terror. Case study of countries can bring inspiring information about the role of regime in the approval of Islamist terror. That is why, in this work, regime type will be analyzed as one of the factors that might affect approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim counties.

3.2.9. Education

High level of education has been widely discussed to decrease the level of terror in a country. The existing empirical studies have provided counter evidence for this argument. It has also been discussed that people receiving education do not necessarily learn to be against terror but they can be educated as pro-terror individuals or they can learn to support or approve terror. However, in this work education will still be analyzed in the case studies.

Education system of countries can be different from each other and the importance given to education by the governments can vary. The state can be the controller or the regulator of education and strictly controls non-governmental education channels. For instance, religious education can be under the state control in some countries while in some other non-governmental organization can be given the authority of religious teaching with none or very few regulations. Such properties of a county can give insight about approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries and, as a result, education or in general education systems of countries will be analyzed in this thesis.

3.2.10. Young Male Status

Young male status has been reviewed as one of the factors that are more likely to increase the level of approval of, support for or participation in terror. However, evidence suggesting that young male status does not have the expected effect on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. In this work young male status is taken into account as a factor giving inspiration about analyzing the demography of the countries. Demography or the population properties of countries can bring extra information that either introduce new approaches or evaluates the existing ones. The comparison of demography of several predominantly Muslim countries can be helpful in developing better understanding about approval of Islamist terror.

3.2.11. Economic Conditions

Economic incompatibly is related to other approaches that have references to the economic conditions in the Muslim countries. This makes this approach and the economic conditions in the Muslim as one of the important candidates in the case studies.

Economic conditions of a Muslim world can give clues about its relation with other countries. It can also give information to what extent a country is to the West with the help of analysis of elements of economic conditions such as trade partners, foreign direct investment trends and et cetera. Therefore, economic conditions will be analyzed in the case studies of this thesis.

3.2.12. Foreign Policy

International System, Globalization and History of Colonialism approaches making references to the relations of countries with the West or the U.S. led international system require the analysis of the foreign policies of the countries especially in relation to the West or the U.S.

The foreign policies of countries can be important in the sense that there are issues that are sensitive in the Muslim world. For instance, relationship with Israel and standings of countries in terms of Palestinian issue can be vital. Some countries can be intensely pro-Palestinians groups and make it as one of the cores of their foreign policies. As a result of this several other policies can develop such as aid campaigns for Palestinians or boycotts of Israeli relations. This might make the public to lead to certain directions. Foreign policies of governments might have implications for the perception of the public about certain issues and Islamist terror can be one of them. Therefore, foreign policies of countries having majority Muslim population will be analyzed.

3.3. Conclusion

The literature review of Political Islam and Terrorism suggest several approaches. The approaches have been discussed in terms of their weaknesses and the factors they introduce for study of approval of Islamist terror. There are 15 factors emerging from the reviews but 14 of them have structural implications. Since this work focuses on structural factors affecting the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries, the 14 factors given above are the core factors that lead the inquiry of information in case studies. The discussion on these factors and the important notices of approach suggest main focus on 12 main factors as a result of convergences and implications of some approaches. The main factors that guide the case studies in this work are as follow: 1- Adherence to Islam, 2- Hostile and Peaceful Islam and their Relative Power, 3- History of Colonialism, 4- International Status, 5- Urban Poverty, 6- Relative Deprivation, 7- Political Instability, 8- Regime Type, 9- Education, 10- Demography, 11- Economic Conditions, and 12- Foreign Policy.

4. Chapter IV: Methodology

4.1. Introduction

In the introduction chapter why this work aims at studying approval of Islamist terror has been discussed. In the second chapter two relevant literatures have been reviewed and in the next chapter structural factors that might be capable of explaining the issue have been selected.

In this work the main interest is to search for conditions under which approval of Islamist terror occurs in predominantly Muslim countries and try to explain the differences between the levels of approval across countries. The evaluation of factors that are thought be more likely to explain the approval of Islamist terror in the previous chapter will be the chief endeavor.

In this chapter, first I explain the method, which is case study of a large sample of Muslim countries, of this work aiming at analyzing the factor that are more likely to have effect on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Second, since the method requires, I define how I choose the country cases that are analyzed for answers for the strength of the approaches in explaining the issue. Thirdly, I will focus on the factors as points of research in cases studies. Finally, summary of the chapter with concluding remarks follows.

4.2. Method: Case study

This work focusing on approval of Islamist terror aims at going beyond the quantitative analysis by discussing several cases with rich data analysis which can be considered as a large-n case study.

The case studies conducted in predominantly Muslim countries is the main method to understand the effects of the factors thought to be effective on the level of approval of Islamist terror. The research conducted in this thesis aims at contributing to the former research on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries by using the advantages of case study analyzing more than one country. The case study in the next chapter excels at bringing those, who are interested in Islamist terror and especially its approval, to an understanding of the complex issue by detailed analysis of the countries.

I use case study as the method of my research on approval of Islamist terror for several reasons. Although, case studies have been considered to be weak in testing theories when compared to experimental and large-n quantitative studies (Yin, 1994: 9-11), there are several advantages leading this thesis to the analysis of case studies as the main method. Van Evera (1997: 51) notes that the criticism of case studies advanced by Lijphart (1971), who argues that studies of one or a few cases are worst, since the data is unrandomized and partial correlations are infeasible, because data points are too few, are unfair at least for two reasons.

First, tests of predictions of within-case variance gain strong controls from the uniform character of the background conditions of the cases since most cases offer a backdrop of fairly uniform case conditions, and many cases allow a number of observations of values on the variables (Van Evera, 1997: 52). In this work, considering the findings of the previous work on approval of Islamist terror, I will drive on the method of case study with the advantages it provides in term of within-case studies. Since

approval of Islamist terror is one of the complex issues, case study of more than one country can inspire further research of within-case analyses, although the merit here is not to do so due to the limited scope of this work.

Second, Van Evera (1997: 52) argues that we can control the effects of omitted variables by selecting for study cases with extreme (high or low) values on the study variable, which lowers the number of third factors with the strength to produce the result that the test theory predicts, and this in turn lowers the possibility of omitted variables account for passed tests. Although, in this work the selection of cases is not according to this advantage of case study research method, a study on the cases can shed light for further research.

These two points are among the reasons why I choose case study research as the main method of this work as a contribution to the quantitative analysis of the issue. The other advantages of case study compared to quantitative studies I consider in addition to the two points are as follow.

First, case studies can supply quite decisive evidence for or against political theories and often this evidence is more decisive than large-n evidence (Van Evera, 1997: 54). Case studies, unlike, large-n quantitative analyses, are more likely to bring more information about the predictions of an approach and provide better understanding of the several dynamics of a case that in turn explain more about the issue at stake. An issue being related to several factors within a case can be explained in detail in relation to each factor and this increase the reliability of the founding of case studies.

Second, inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable are often easier with case-study than large-n methods (Van Evera, 1997: 54). This advantage of case study can ease our understanding of antecedent variables. In addition to this, one conducting case study and gathering detailed information on the study variable and the influential factors can become aware of several other factors that might be effective on the study variable. This, while increasing the reliability of test, raises new questions about the approaches being tested and leads to the initial steps of theory building. That is, a researcher becoming aware of the new factors that might be influential on the process leading the case outcome can develop new approaches or modify the existing point of views.

Third, I choose case study of large number of countries over large-n quantitative method because of the measurement of the variables. Large-n studies can be argued to base their result on more crude measurements compared to cases studies. Case studies can make use of both quantitative and qualitative measurement of variables by which they can provide more detailed information about the factors analyzed.

The fourth point why I conduct cases study of more than one country is about to what extent a research is replicable. Cases studies are more difficult to replicate in other researches or in other case studies since every country or unit of analysis has its unique characters. Since the quantitative analysis of large-n samples can be easily adopted to several countries or in several studies, large-n quantitative analysis are more replicable compared to cases studies. However, if large numbers of cases are analyzed in the same work with the same measurement criteria and with the same motives of searching of information, the same research can be directly replaced in several cases. Hence, the weak replicable characteristic of case study method can be partly overcome.

The final point why I choose cases study of large-n sample of countries is about the generalization. The cases are weak in terms of providing generalization compared to large-n studies. This point is related to what extent a research or study replicable or not, as well. However, as discussed above in detail analysis of several countries in accordance with the same criterion increases the possibility of the rightness of the generalization derived from cases studies.

In conclusion, first of all with the aim of gathering more information on the countries in terms of approval of Islamist terror, this work adopts case study of a large-n sample as the main method. Secondly, by conducting case study this thesis aims at providing more reliable test of approaches concerning the issue and provides more reliable generalization about the approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Finally, considering how the issue is under-studied, by choosing case study of large-n sample of countries, this work aims at providing background for further research. The selection of several countries out of various Muslim countries is set according to criterion and the next section summarizes how countries are selected for this work on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

4.3. Case Selection

The main topic of this work is approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Hence, the sample of the countries from which the cases of the thesis are to be chosen consists of the all states that can be defined as predominantly Muslim. I describe a predominantly Muslim country as where majority of the population is defined as Muslim- more than 50 % of the population is Muslim. There are around 50 predominantly Muslim countries meeting this standard¹⁰. The cases for this work will be chosen among the population predominantly Muslim countries

One of the alternative ways to pursue in selecting the cases is to design the cases in accordance with the principles of mostly chosen methods of case study, Mill's (1843-1973) 'method of difference' or 'method of agreement'. Either method of agreement or difference, or in different names, most similar or most different cases can be selected for studying approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. In the method of difference the investigator chooses cases with similar general characteristics and values on the study variable and in the method of agreement the investigator chooses cases with different general characteristics and similar values on the study variable (Van Evera, 1997: 57). However, these methods are almost impossible to use in this study, unless the number of the cases is limited to two countries. The properties of the members of the population of predominantly Muslim countries are diverse in some aspects that most similar case is difficult to conduct while they are so alike that most different method is not applicable.

Another alternative is to select the cases according to available data. Since the main aim of this work is to analyze the approval of Islamist terror, the first concern should be whether any data or information is available on approval of Islamist terror for members of the sample of predominantly Muslim country population. Therefore, instead

¹⁰ The CIA World Factbook which is available at <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html</u> is used for information on the country profiles

of adopting the first alternative in choosing the cases, I select my cases according to the available data and from the 48 predominantly Muslim countries.

Van Evera (1997: 46) points out an argument that those interested in comparative politics or case studies have been widely warned that they should not select cases according to the dependent variable. Researchers should not select cases of what they seek to explain also without choosing cases of the contrary (Geddes, 1990; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). However, this is the best and the only available option due to the limited information on the sampled countries. In addition to this, since this work is also designed as an introduction or roadmap for the further research that can strengthen understanding by within-case analyses this option or method is an advantage rather than a setback. As Van Evera (1997: 46-48) argues we can select on the dependent variable if selected cases can be compared to a known average situation, within-case variance in the study variable can be analyzed, and finally if cases allow the researcher to do process-tracing. Since these analyses can be considered as further research plans as given in the conclusion chapter to select on the dependent variable or approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries is appropriate.

PEW global survey for 2002 is used as the source of data for approval of Islamist terror. Pew data for 2002 is chosen, so attitudes are less affected by the Gulf War that began in 2003 (Mousseau, 200: 17). In analyzing survey results for the cases I follow Mousseau (2009: 16).

"Of the fifteen nations in the Pew Survey identified as predominantly-Muslim, in one (Egypt) the survey did not ask the key question of approval of terror. In some other countries response rates on this sensitive question were low enough to raise concerns about sample representativeness. Following the recommendation of Babbie (1992: 267), I considered response rates of less than 50% inadequate. Five countries were removed

from the analysis on this basis: Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. Two additional countries, Jordan and Lebanon, were omitted because interviewers did not answer the key question of urban status. Seven countries remain in the sample: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey and Uzbekistan".

Mousseau (2009) excludes two countries- Jordan and Lebanon- since the respondents did not answer the urban poverty question. However, I am not testing urban poverty with a quantitative method; therefore there is no reason for me to exclude these two countries. The sample I will conduct rich data analysis for the factors discussed in relation to approval of Islamist terror, then, consists of 9 countries: Uzbekistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Senegal, Mali, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Lebanon. As far as the data and/or information are available for these countries, the several approaches derived from literature reviews will be analyzed within these 9 cases.

4.4. Approval of Islamist Terror and Influential Factors

4.4.1. Approval of Islamist Terror

The phenomenon on which the effect of the structural in factors will be analyzed is the approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. In the first chapter the choice of predominantly Muslim countries have been discussed yet what is meant by predominantly Muslim country and what approval of Islamist terror is are still blurry.

I define approval of Islamist terror as the consent of the public for the terror of which the aim is fighting against the enemies of Islam for securing Muslim World from threats. Simply, consent for terror that is thought to be fighting for the sake of Islam.

Therefore, approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries means the consent of the public- in the countries having at least 50% Muslim population in their borders- to the movements fighting for the sake of Islam. One of the ways to find out the level of approval of Islamist terror in a country is conducting surveys. It is difficult to conduct surveys in the Muslim world as argued above and conducting a new survey for this work is not possible due to several limits. Yet, there are several surveys conducted in the Muslim worlds that can serve the aim of this work. One of the most complete cross-national surveys that have examined attitudes in developing world is offered by the Pew Global Attitudes surveys and this is also the only large-cross national survey that asks about approval of Islamist terror in multiple predominantly Muslim countries (Mousseau, 2009: 17).

The Pew Global Attitudes survey for 2002 asked a question about the attitude toward the Islamist terror in several countries. The question is as follow:

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

This question has been asked in some countries but not in all. The survey with the question above has included fifteen predominantly Muslim countries but the key question has not been directed to respondents in Egypt. This question has been asked to Muslim respondents and the number of respondents shows variances across countries which will be given in detailed for each country in the case studies. The answer to this question indicating the level of approval of Islamist terror in the countries the question has been asked in will be main measurement of the level of approval of Islamist terror.

Mousseau¹¹ considers the same question for measuring approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. Approval of Islamist terror is calculated ranging from 1 to 4, 1 is never, 2 is rarely, 3 is sometimes, and 4 is often. The scores of the countries ranging from 1 to 4 will be one of the measurements to have an idea of the situation of approval of Islamist terror in the case studies. In addition to this, the frequencies of the responses given to level from sometimes to never are also considered to be useful in understanding approval of Islamist terror better. The frequencies as will be discussed in the cases studies show more considerable variance and therefore give more reliable comparison of the level of approval across countries. For this purpose the frequencies of the level never will be made use of in this work since it is standard giving more apparent variance across countries that is consistent with the state scores of approval of Islamist Terror.

4.4.2. Factors

There are 12 factors of which effect on approval of Islamist terror will be analyzed and about which information will be provided in the cases. The factors are Adherence to Islam, Hostile and Peaceful Islam and their Relative Power, History of Colonialism, International Status, Urban Poverty, Relative Deprivation, Political Instability, Regime Type, Education, Demography, Economic Condition, and Foreign Policy.

¹¹ The calculation of levels of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries has been calculated by Mousseau, Michael separate from his work (2009)

4.4.2.1. Adherence to Islam

It is difficult to find out whether individuals are religious or how strong they adhere to the principles of religions. One can observe an individual or ask them about the role of religion in their lives but still such information cannot bring a certain measurement of the role of religion in individual lives or societies. Individuals' religious beliefs can never be measured with certainty yet all we can do is ask individuals the intensity of their beliefs and religious practices (Mousseau, 2009: 19). In this sense information about the individual perception of religion in the cases will be searched for.

In addition to search of the importance given to religion by individuals in the countries, information on how Islam is important in the societies will also be analyzed. Regulations within the society such as arrangement of weekends according to the holy day of Islam- Friday, importance given to religious days, and institutional arrangements concerning religion such as declaration of Islam as the official state religion will be discussed in country cases to find out how important Islam is in the societies and how public and state adhere to Islam.

4.4.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and their Relative Power

By hostile and peaceful Islam, in the preceding chapters, moderate and radical wings of Islamist movements have been referred to. The dominance of the discourse of these two types of Islamist movement and their relative power should be analyzed in order to understand their power over the approval of Islamist terror. However, the approach emphasizing different types of Islamist movements does not suggest any means in order to find out the relative power of the two types and does not draw the borders for a good definition of them.

Considering radical Islamist movements as the ones advocating violent means unlike the moderate Islamist movements making reference to more peaceful solutions, one of the ways to find out their relative strength can be the analysis of their historical process, and how large the population they reach at. However, such a work far exceeds the merits of this work due to the limitations of time and fund. For instance, to understand the rhetoric of different groups in several countries requires at least a group of people having enough language skills and being able to reach the necessary texts, visuals and et cetera, and this is not possible within the limits of this study.

An alternative of understanding the relative power of two types of interpretation of Islam in the case studies can be to scrutinize the histories of the movements within the overall history of the countries. The popular responses to the two types of Islamist movements within the countries in the shape of public demonstrations can be analyzed to find out how influential the movements are. Moreover, state response in the shape of repression, compromise or any other legal change in the principles of the counties can be discussed and the power of movements can be investigated for every case. In short, the near history of the cases can be used in order to understand the role of the Islamist movements in the countries.

4.4.2.3. History of Colonialism

For history of colonialism, general histories of countries might be summarized with emphasis on the periods and effects of colonialism if the case has history of colonialism. How severely the struggle for independence or nationalization of the country took place is an example point for what can be the focus of the history analysis will be.

The role of religion during, after and against the colonial rule can be one of the elements that might shed light for this study. What kind of references have been made to religious institutions or identity in the country, whether Islam has been used as an element in the independence process, and how religion has tried to institutionalized in the country can be important elements playing role on the approval of Islamist terror. Therefore, the history of colonialism in terms of the issues related to Islam and colonial rule will be discussed in this work.

4.4.2.4. International Status

For getting information about the international status of countries, firstly the globalization levels of them should be considered. For analyzing the globalization level of countries KOF Index of Globalization¹² (Drehel, 2006) is one of the alternatives. The data is available for years from 2002 to 2009 and the index can be summarized as:

The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (Dreher, 2006) and is updated and described in detail in Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008). The overall index covers the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. Following Clark (2000), Norris (2000) and Keohane and Nye (2000), it defines globalization to be the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. More specifically, the three dimensions of the KOF index are defined as: *economic globalization*, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; *political globalization*, characterized by a diffusion of government policies;

¹²Available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/

and *social globalization*, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images and people¹³.

Another option is A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index.

The index is available for the period of 2003-2007.

The A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index is an annual study that assesses the extent to which the world's most populous nations are becoming more or less globally connected¹⁴. The A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index tracks and assesses changes in four key components of global integration, incorporating measures such as trade and investment flows, movement of people across borders, volume of international telephone calls, Internet usage, and participation in international organizations¹⁵.

The next alternative for analyzing globalization level of countries is The Centre

for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization- Warwick University (Lockwood &

Redoano, 2005)¹⁶, which is available for the period between 1982 and 2004.

(...) The Index measures the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization for many countries, and combines these into an overall globalization index, or score, for each of these countries during this time period.

(...) The index (...) is constructed so as to be consistent both over time and across countries. The same variables are used to calculate the index in every year and for every country, and the variables are normalized so as to be comparable across time and countries. So, our index enables us to address questions such as: is a particular country more globalized than in was twenty or thirty years ago? Which were the most and lest globalized countries of the last decade? And the decade before that/ and before that?¹⁷

The final alternative of globalization indexes is the one prepared by the University

of Bamberg and TransEurope Research Network, GlobalIndex (Raab, Ruland, Schönberger, Blossfeld, Hofäcker, Buchholz & Schmelzer)¹⁸, which is available for the

period between 1970 and 2002.

¹³ Retrieved from <u>http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2009.pdf</u>

¹⁴ Retrieved from http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/globalization-index.html

¹⁵ Retrieved from <u>http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/globalization-index-data-2007.html</u>

¹⁶ Available at <u>http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/</u>

¹⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/intro</u>

¹⁸ Available at <u>http://www.transeurope-project.org/globalindex</u>

The GlobalIndex constitutes a key result of collaborative TransEurope research in Programme. It is a new and innovative aggregated index measure designed to capture the phenomenon of globalization on four separate dimensions: *Economic Globalization*, *Socio-Technical Globalization*, *Cultural globalization*, and *Political Globalization*.

The last option, the GlobalIndex is the best alternative. Besides the clarity of the definitions they provide and the detailed explanation of the method (Raab, Ruland, Schönberger, Blossfeld & Hofäcker, 2007), the index has advantages over the other three indexes available. First of all, the GlobalIndex has the most detailed or diverse components of globalization in the index construction. This increases the reliability of the data since globalization of a country can range from culture to politics. Second, like the index prepared by The Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization-Warwick University, the GlobalIndex provides the researcher with the ability of comparing cases across different time periods.

With the help of the information taken from this index for globalization the overall policies and standings of the countries in terms of the international system will be analyzed in this work. What kind of aims or trends the countries in respect to the rest of the world will be searched for to get information about the international statuses of the cases.

4.4.2.5. Urban Poverty

Poverty taking attention of many researchers as the main source of several social phenomenons has been widely discussed and analyzed. Although, poverty is long studied, scholars have not reached a certain definition of poverty, yet most definitions associate poverty with a "lack" or "deficiency" of the necessities required for human survival and welfare (Wratten, 1995: 12). Therefore, urban poverty simply means lack or deficiency of necessities required for human survival and welfare experienced in urban life. However, such a simple identification of the term might not be adequate for collecting data about or measuring urban poverty in Muslim countries that are selected as cases of this work. Baharoglu and Kessides (2004: 124) asserts in their work on urban poverty:

In the urban context, poverty (...) can be related to three distinctive characteristics of urban life: commoditization (reliance on the cash economy), environmental hazard (stemming from the density and hazardous location of settlements and from exposure to multiple pollutants), and social fragmentation (lack of community and of interhousehold mechanisms for social security, compared to those in rural areas).

In line with authors' point what I argue is that characteristics of a country's decreasing individuals' purchasing power or income level and employment opportunities, diminishing the healthy conditions by increasing environmental problems, and increasing the insecure atmosphere like lack of social security, equality or non-discrimination policies as signs for urban poverty.

For analyzing urban poverty I will use the data and reports released by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Human Development Report¹⁹. The information provided by UNDP ranges from illiteracy rates to biomass waste²⁰ and this let the researchers make use of a wide variety of indicators of developments and poverty problems within a country. Yet, there is risk of getting confused among many indicators that, in some cases, overlap with another. Therefore, in this work I will make use of the tool letting the analysis of the data according to countries. That is, I will conduct my research by using the data by country²¹.

In addition to the data provided by UNDP, I will conduct research for former case studies of the countries that I analyze in this work to gather information about

¹⁹ Available at <u>http://hdr.undp.org/en/</u>

²⁰ For more information check <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/</u>

²¹ Available at <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/</u>

urbanization level, urban dynamics of the country and overall development of the country especially in urban areas.

Especially for comparison of nine cases in terms of their urban poverty problem I will use the percentage of the population living for under 2\$ per day and the share of urban population in the countries. The higher the shares of these two segment of population are, the more serious the urban poverty problem in a country. In order to compare the situation of these two segments of societies I will multiple the percentages of these two indicators.

It has been argued that clientalism and collective identity are the factors related to urban poverty. Therefore, within this point of research information on these two factors will also be provided.

Clientalism refers to a form of social organization common in many developing regions characterized by patron-client relationships. In such places, relatively powerful and rich patrons promise to provide relatively powerless and poor clients with jobs, protection, and other benefits in exchange for loyalty (Kernath, 2005).

In this work clues for clientalism will be searched by analyzing cases qualitatively. Economic structures and economic exchanges in the societies will be investigated. The main question of the investigation will be whether economic facilities are conducted in accordance with patron-client relations, gift exchange, and ties such as kinship rather than contract based agreements. The cases will be analyzed for information about the conduct of economic facilities in the light of the main point given above. Next, collective identity refers to individuals' sense of belonging to a group. From the perspective of the individual, the collective identity forms a part of his or her personal identity. Sometimes, the sense of belonging to a particular group will be so strong that it will sound over other aspects of the person's individual identity. For example, the person may be willing to assume great risks for the group, even in the expense of his life.

Collective identity briefly means the perception that gives more importance to one's community, family or members of his or her kin compared to his own. The sake of the in-group is granted more than individual interests.

In order to find out whether collective identity is prominent in a case, I will analyze the level of importance given to family and friends or the whole society. Loyalty to parents in different situations and expectations from children can shed light on the level of collective identity in a society. Moreover, cultural traits favoring obedience to the society or smaller communities such as family, unselfishness and feeling responsibility to a certain in-group will be used as indicators of a closely-tight in-group structure that is available with the existence of a strong collective identity. Finally, family structure and social relations will be analyzed in order to get clues about collective identity.

4.4.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation as its names suggests is the state of being worse-off compared to others. In this work since the societies analyzed are of predominantly Muslim countries, the general economic situation and welfare of individuals living within those societies will be compared to the other nations.

The relative deprivation of the societies in the Muslim world or predominantly Muslim countries in comparison with other societies, especially societies in the Western part of the world will be conducted. Information about the stage of welfare compared to the rest of the world, obtainable public environment for individual emancipation and similar indicators that can give clues about the general atmosphere of countries for comparison will be searched for. Any sign of grievance against the rest of the world, especially against the West will be tried to be explained for each cases.

For this analysis, the information provided by University of California Atlas of Global Inequality²² will be used. The information about the countries classified as poverty and inequality situations and overview of the countries will be used for comparing the countries.

4.4.2.7. Political Instability

Political instability in general meaning the lack of durability in the political system of a country that is resulted by political turmoil, anarchy or changes in the political system of the country will be analyzed for each case and the countries will be compared with each other.

For analysis of political instability the data provided by the POLITY IV Project²³ can be used. Several factors have been considered in the works of POLITY IV project such as state failure, coup d'état, and high causality terrorist bombings.

 ²² Available at <u>http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/</u>
²³ Available at <u>http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm</u>

Consolidated country cases²⁴ giving information on the regime crises and armed conflict within the borders of the state provide insight for the stability in the countries can also be useful.

4.4.2.8. Regime Type

For regime type POLITY IV dataset on regime type can be used. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions between 1800 and 2007 annual, cross-national, timeseries and polity-case formats have been coded indicating the democratic and autocratic patterns of authority and regime changes. The countries are referred with characteristic such as democracy and semi-democracy. The properties given to the countries might be discussed. In addition to this, countries are assigned scores standing for the democracy level. The lowest score is -10 indicating the most autocratic regime and the highest score is 10 for the most democratic country. Depending on the availability of the data, the regime scores of countries for years starting from 1990 to 2002 can be used since.

4.4.2.9. Education

The education level and the education policies of the countries can be searched for. In addition to this, information on what kinds of education are provided in the countries might be gathered. Education available for the citizens can be secular or religious. There can be variances on the main theme being emphasized in the education system of a country. Moreover, information on to what extent private education or nonofficial education is limited or freed can be important in a country. Organizations being not restricted by law in terms of providing education to the pupils with a very limited control over the topics by the state can work in different directions from teaching radical

²⁴ Available at <u>http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFConsolidatedCaseList2007.pdf</u>

Islam to non-Islamic values. The findings or the rich data analysis of the education systems and the different types of education provided in the countries can shed light for further research and theory development of improvement.

4.4.2.10. Demography

Demography of the countries has been considered as one of the structural factors. Young male status is the main factor that gave path to the analysis of demography of a state.

The overall picture of population of each country will be drawn. What the percents of gender across countries, the age composition and the role of genders or certain age groups will be discussed for cases as far the available information allow.

4.4.2.11. Economic Conditions

For this factor the overall economic conditions or facilities of countries will be discussed in order to find out where their economies stand in relation to the rest of the world and how they are connected with the global economic system. One of the components of this point of research is to look at the foreign direct investment the countries receive. Those countries attracting foreign direct investment would be the ones turning their faces to the global economic system and try to integrate their economies with the global scale economic facilities.

The level of inward foreign direct investment of countries will be analyzed in order to find out their relationship with the other economies. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment will be used to find out how compatible the structure of a country with the contract based economic principles. The inward foreign direct investment index for 2001- 2003^{25} will be used.

The method of the conference in calculating inward FDI is given as:

The Inward FDI Performance Index ranks countries by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It is the ratio of a country's share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. A value greater than one indicates that the country receives more FDI than its relative economic size, a value below one that it receives less (a negative value means that foreign investors disinvest in that period). The index thus captures the influence on FDI of factors other than market size, assuming that, other things being equal, size is the "base line" for attracting investment. These other factors can be diverse, ranging from the business climate, economic and political stability, the presence of natural resources, infrastructure, skills and technologies, to opportunities for participating in privatization or the effectiveness of FDI promotion²⁶.

The UNCTAD index is based on the comparison of the country's share of global FDI inflow and its global GDP disregarding the general properties of the economy of the host country. However, from the UNCTAD index giving information about to what extent a country attracts foreign investment, we can derive how the economy of host FDI country is compatible with the contract based economic principles. However, this might not be adequate to understand the dynamics of the economies of the countries. For this reason I will collect information about the regulations, policies, law enforcements within the economies of the countries and general economic indicators such as trade capacity or partners in order to find out a general picture of economies of the cases as far as the knowledge is available for cases.

²⁵ The index is available at <u>http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/Performance_Index_2001-2003_en.pdf</u> and for several other periods data is available at <u>http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2471&lang=1</u>

²⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2469&lang=1</u> on April 28, 2009

4.4.2.12. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy or the general picture of countries relations with the other states will be analyzed in order to get clues about especially the standing of countries against the Western countries.

How certain policies are shaped about several topics such as Palestinian issue will be among the guides in collecting information about the foreign policies of countries. Foreign policies of regimes can have effect on awareness of the public about some issues and Islamist terror. Therefore, foreign policies of countries having majority Muslim population will be analyzed.

4.5. Conclusion

In this work several structural factors that are thought to be influential on the approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries are analyzed by rich data search within 9 cases of predominantly Muslim country.

Considering the limitations in collecting data about Muslim countries most of which are developing countries, this work is mostly likely to have incomplete analysis of several elements within the cases. However, the limits will shed light to the need of various further research and theory development.

In the coming chapter the cases are analyzed for information concerning the factors. The analysis of nine predominantly Muslim countries in search for support or counter-evidence for the approaches to approval of Islamist terror will be the main point of the next chapter.

5. Chapter V: Case Studies

5.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters firstly non-conventional security concerns of states with an emphasis on Islamist terror has been discussed. Then, Political Islam and clarification of several terms have been given in the first chapter. In the next chapters, Political Islam and terrorism literatures have been reviewed with identification of factors and approaches to be used in the analysis part of this work. In the following chapter, the method of this work has been discussed.

In this chapter the cases are investigated in accordance with the research map given in the previous chapter. The next parts of the chapter are organized firstly, by countries in alphabetical order and for each case sub-organization by factors that might influence the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries.

5.2. Bangladesh

Bangladesh, formerly East Bengal or East Pakistan separated from India in 1947 together with West Pakistan. Later, it seceded from its union and became independent in 1971with an estimated population of 157,000,000 for 2009. The share of Muslim in the Bangladeshi population is 83% and of Hindus is 16%²⁷.

Bangladesh is a country in South Asia. It is bordered by India on all sides except for a small border with Burma to the far southeast and by the Bay of Bengal to the south. Together with the Indian state of the West Bengal, it makes up the ethno-linguistic region of Bengal. The borders of present-day Bangladesh were established with the partition of

²⁷ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on July 17, 2009

Bengal and India in 1947 when the region became the eastern wing of the newly formed Pakistan. However, it was separated from the western wing across India. Political and linguistic discrimination as well as economic neglect led to the war for independence in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh. After independence the new state endured famines, natural disasters and widespread poverty, as well as political turmoil²⁸.

5.2.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Islam is one of the core dynamics of the Bangladeshi politics and culture. Besides being the state religion, Islam is also one of the driving principles of several radical and political movements or networks within the country. There have been attempts such as the nationwide strike in 1994 which was called by Islamist fundamentalist that tried to mobilize the public under the umbrella of Islamist principles²⁹.

In recent years as elsewhere in the Muslim world, the impact of the Islamist movements is clearly visible in contemporary Bangladesh. The number of Islamist parties and networks has increased. The more prominent among the existing ones are the Muslim League, Islamic Democratic League, Jamaat-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Islam Party, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Islamic Republican Party, Bangladesh Justice Party, and the Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon and some of these parties are led by modern educated leaders, but the leaders of most of them are traditionally fundamentalists or radicals (Ahamed & Nazneen, 1990: 801).

²⁸ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on July 17, 2009

²⁹ For more information check <u>http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-09/2006-09-21-voa22.cfm?moddate=2006-09-21</u>

One of the groups dominating Bangladeshi politics is Jamaat-i-Islam organized by Ghulan Azam (Hossain & Siddiquee, 2004: 384). The group is the most popular and the most active Islamist organization in Bangladesh. With a considerable number of followers among the students, intelligentsia, civil servants, military and other strata of the society, Jamaat-i-Islam has already emerged as a force to be reckoned in politics in Bangladesh (Hossain & Siddiquee, 2004: 384). There have been several radical acts in Bangladesh creating tension within the country. For instance, on 30 June 1994 a nationwide strike was called in Bangladesh by radical Islamist political parties, following the death sentence fatwa against the author Taleema Nasrin who, in her novel had criticized persecution of Hindus and women in the country (Kabir, 1996: 104).

In Bangladesh, 574 Muslim individuals have been asked the question about approval of Islamist terror. The public response to Islamist terror is that individuals approve the idea that Muslims should protect themselves by violent means more than rarely. The score for Bangladesh has been calculated as 2.47 which is in between the scores of rarely and sometimes. The frequency of the responses indicating that they never approve Islamist terror or violence for the sake of Islam is 24% of the overall responses.

5.2.2. Factors

5.2.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Islam has been one of the main fabrics of the society in Bangladesh. Having been in relation to Islam for centuries, Bangladesh has mostly Sunni Muslim population. The country with a very high Muslim population was formed as a secular state. Although, initially secularism was declared as a core principle of the state, later amendments have turned Islam to the state religion (Ahamed & Nazneen, 1990: 795). Islam is the official state religion of Bangladesh and the constitution guarantees peaceful practice of other religions, as well. "When in June 1988 an Islamic way of life was proclaimed for Bangladesh by constitutional amendment, very little attention was paid outside the intellectual class to the meaning and impact of such an important national commitment and most observers believed that the declaration of Islam as the state religion might have a significant impact on national life, however³⁰. Aside from arousing the suspicion of the non-Islamic minorities, it could accelerate the proliferation of religious parties at both the national and the local levels, thereby exacerbating tension and conflict between secular and religious politicians. Unrest of this nature was reported on some college campuses soon after the amendment was promulgated³⁷¹.

There is not any formal group of ulema or clergy directing the religion in Bangladesh, yet, instead, traditional group of religious people make interpretations that inform the individuals about the practice or nature of Islam³². The Ministry of Religious Affairs provided support, financial assistance, and endowments to religious institutions, including mosques and community prayer grounds³³.

The attachment to Islam at the individual level shows variance in several aspects in Bangladesh. According to the results of the World Values Survey for 2002³⁴ almost 90% of the respondents (1500 individuals) say that they are very religious people. Around 60% of the population either agree or strongly agree that politicians that do not

³⁰ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/39.htm</u> on June 14, 2009

³¹ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/39.htm on June 16, 2009

³² Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/39.htm</u> on June 12, 2009

³³ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/39.htm on June 16, 2009

³⁴ Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

believe in God are unfit for public office. Yet, almost half of the people believe that religious leaders should not influence how people vote and they should not affect government, either.

Islam, generally, is practiced as part of culture and people adopt Islamic practices or ceremonies such as visiting the tombs of past religious leaders. Moreover, they consider faith in god as one of the important morals as the survey results above indicate. However, people do not want Islam interfere in aspects of their lives such as their voting preferences or they do not want religious leaders to have influence over the government. Since people give importance to Islam as one of the core morals but do not prefer it to have influence over several aspects of their lives, it can be argued that adherence to Islam can be ranked as middle, although Bangladesh is officially an Islamic state,

5.2.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

In Bangladesh the main tradition of Islam pursued by most of the Muslim individuals is Sufism³⁵. Sufism is famous for its peaceful approach to political or cultural issues and nonviolent standings against the problems of the Muslims. For instance, it aims at spreading the idea of 'love for God' rather than 'fear of god'. The ceremonies and teachings regarding Islam in Bangladesh are mainly shaped around the tradition of Sufism.

In addition to the peaceful teachings in the society, the political sphere also experiences the existence and participation of political groups. As indicated above, there is already a political party in Bangladesh having a popular support base emerging from

³⁵ For more information check <u>http://sufismjournal.org/community/community.html</u>

several strata in the society. There are incidents in Bangladesh conducted by Islamist groups that prefer violent means but in general Jamaat-i-Islam is the main organization directing Political Islam and Sufism is the main anchor of Islamic teaching. The main political party and the tradition in Bangladesh are basically peaceful or prefer political pressure in the country. Therefore, hostile Islam in Bangladesh is relatively weak compared to peaceful Islam.

5.2.2.3. History of Colonialism

Bangladesh as a part of India experienced the colonial rule of British Empire. The country separated from India with Pakistan and later it gained its national independence from its union with Pakistan.

The main driving force triggering Bangladesh independence was not the hatred or policies of the colonial British Empire. Rather, the policies or the attitudes against the region of Bangladesh during the years of unified entity with Pakistan were the main reason among the Bangladeshi people. Political and linguistic discrimination as well as economic neglect led to the war for independence in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh³⁶.

In the early years and during the independence war Islam was not a major element of the process. The first aim was to create the national identity in the region. Islam was not referred as a binding factor or not introduced as a political force. The state building was aimed to be secular. The Bangladeshi leaders declared the state as secular and Islam was not introduced as the official state religion. The introduction of official religion as

³⁶ See <u>http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/history.shtm</u>

Islam and revivalism of Islam as an important element in politics was later than the independence years³⁷.

In general, history of colonialism or the policies of the colonial rules was not the main driving force of the independence war of Bangladesh. In addition to this, Islam did not appear as a political factor or being Muslim was not used as an element of national identity construction.

5.2.2.4. International Status

Bangladesh, which is a very poor country, has been trying to integrate with the global community and system in order to enhance its standing and achieve a better development level. However, its process of globalization or integration with the rest of the world has been a very weak performance.

The GlobalIndex scores for Bangladesh are very low. The highest score of globalization in this dataset is 6 or 6.5. The average of scores assigned to Bangladesh between 1970 and 2002 is 1.39. The highest score assigned to it is for 2002 and it is approximately 2. There is a trend of increase in the globalization level of the country indicating that the country aims at integrating more with the global system and become a member of the international system in several aspects.

Bangladesh respects United Nations and several other international organizations. It mainly trusts China as a strategic partner. Mostly due to its geography China has been one of the major countries that Bangladesh has been in close relation with. India has always been pursued as a neighbor in terms of problems and difficulties. There is a still

³⁷ See <u>http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/history.shtm</u>

border dispute between these two countries. Finally, especially after the declaration of Islam as the state religion, Bangladesh trusts the Muslim world or the countries with majority Muslim populations for support and alliance³⁸.

In general, Bangladesh has a tendency of becoming highly integrated with the global system. It respects international organizations such as UN. It always seeks for solutions to its political problems by diplomatic ties at the international organizations.

5.2.2.5. Urban Poverty

The Bangladeshi economy is still immature and following a path of development. Between 1990 and 2004 the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line in Bangladesh is 49.8 % (UNDP) and 84% population lives for under 2\$ per day.³⁹ The country has 3.5 % annual rate of change in urbanization between 2005 and 2010 (CIA)⁴⁰. In Bangladesh, the poverty in urban areas has been reported as more than half of the population for each year between 1981 and 2000 (Abu Elias Sarker & Mohammad Habibur Rahma, 2007: 99). Bangladesh having 2.9 % annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 has 9.9 % urban population in 1975 while this ratio increased to 25.1 % in 2005⁴¹. The country experiencing a growth in its transition economy still undergoes the process of urbanization. While urban population of the country increases and the economy is in a development process, a high level of poverty persists to exist in the country.

³⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/105.htm</u> on June 14, 2009

³⁹ Retrieved from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BGD.html on June 14, 2009

⁴⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on June 12, 2009

⁴¹ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BGD.html</u> on June 12, 2009

In Bangladesh urban poverty is one of the problems the nation encounters. In addition to this, the state is not well-equipped to overcome the problem or alleviate it; hence the urban poor have to live under constraining conditions. One of main difficulties of urban life in Bangladesh is unemployment and migration. Due to the growing labor force in urban areas, a large majority of migrant and urban workers are found in the informal sector since jobs in the public sector are becoming increasingly scarce while, at the same time, the private formal sector is unable to absorb the growing labor force (Chowdhury, 2004: 49). Increasing number of those in need of job and the scarcity direct people to seek for ways of earning money in the informal sector. For instance, it was found out that of all employment in Dhaka metropolitan area, over 60 percent was in the informal sector, for some sectors this proportion of the population reaches above 90 percent and according to the World Bank, employment in both formal and informal sectors may be expected to rise significantly in Bangladesh over next 25 years (Chowdhury, 2004: 50-51). In Dhaka, the urban poor are those residents who are mainly rural migrants living in the slum and squatter settlements, it has been estimated that nearly 50 percent of the city's poor population live in slum and squatter areas (Rashid, 2000: 242). Limited employment opportunities result in greater competition for jobs and lower wages. Further, compared to their rural counterparts, who have better safety nets of more relations to fall back on, the urban poor are far more dependent on access to jobs and they have fewer shared assets that can help during crisis situations such as in cases of illness, sudden unemployment or during a disaster (Rashid, 2000: 243).

In general, the urban life in Bangladesh is characterized by scarcity of jobs, migration and a trend of occupations in informal sector. Informal sector lacks the properties for providing security to people and this insecure job environment is multiplied by scarcity basics such as housing opportunities. Therefore, urban poverty is one of the major problems in Bangladesh.

In relation to urban poverty, clientalism and collective identity are existent in Bangladesh. Clientalism is a persistent character of the Bangladeshi economy and culture. The patron-client relationship is existent in both economic and political spheres. Clientalism has been a sort of strategy both for privileged and the poor strata in the society.

Early development analyses in Bangladesh highlighted a key link between what was perceived as traditional patterns of relationships, based essentially on deference and subordination, and the reproduction of poverty and these relationships took the form of patron-client networks in which for the poor, both survival and upward mobility depend on the ability to secure the sympathy of a reliable patron (Devine, Camfield & Gough, 2008: 126-127). The patron-client relationship as the running principle of survival of many has been apparent in several economic facilities in the country. For instance, a research (Devine, Camfield & Gough, 2008: 128) reports that

(...) Our evidence from Bangladesh relates to the experience of a particular development organization called Shammo which one of us has observed over a number of years. Members of the organization are poor landless farmers who for many years have lived and worked under the authority of local elite landlords in a patron-client relationship. As poorer clients, they were expected to offer loyalty to their respective patrons in the hope of receiving benefits or favors that would help them achieve a more secure livelihood.

In addition to this, the Awami League that took power in 1972 was composed of middle class, rural-based elite and steeped in the culture of patron-client politics (Kochanek, 2000: 532).

In sum, there are evidences that politics and economy of Bangladesh have been ruled by principles of clientalism. It is a strategy of both survival and maintaining power for people depending on their economic and political situation.

As it is the situation in many developing Asian countries, collective identity is also effective in Bangladesh. Especially among those who rely on others or any in-group member for survival against poverty and scarcity, collective identity is a preferred or adopted property. However, Bangladeshi society also favors personal autonomy and appreciates the development of autonomy that lessens dependence on others.


The role or position of personal autonomy in Bangladeshi society has been studied. Arguing that autonomy is a universal psychological need but its expression is always contextual, it has been reported that although respondents in Bangladeshi society never explicitly used the word autonomy they expressed an appreciation of the idea of autonomy in other terms (Devine, Camfield & Gough, 2008: 105-116). People might not seek autonomy openly or due to their cultural norm they do not directly refer to individual autonomy, but they have a tendency towards it.

The urban life, where poverty is a main problem to be handled by personal efforts, directs people to reliance to their in-groups or social surroundings. In urban slums there tends to be an extensive network throughout each area. Most households within the neighborhood are generally linked through genuine or fictive kinship ties, members tend to rely on each other for social support (Rashid, 2000: 249). Collective identity is again a strategy for survival.

5.2.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Bangladesh is one of the very poor countries in the world. After becoming a separate national state, it had to deal with national disasters that seriously damaged the country and its economy. The country, for instance, had to deal with a very devastating famine and floods after it gained its independence. As a result, the society in Bangladesh is very poor and has a very low level of welfare compared to other nations.


According to the calculations of University of California Atlas of Global Inequality (UCAGI), as summarized in Graph 1, life expectancy in Bangladesh is very low. It is the 142nd country among 196 where 196th country has the lowest level of life expectancy. Illiteracy rate is very high and it is the 9th highest rate among 133rd country. Finally, infant mortality is above the middle level and it is the 50th country among 191 states of which the first has the highest infant mortality rate.



Graph 1	
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Bangladesh is at a very low level in the comparison of 175 countries according to the GDP. The GDP of the country is extremely low compared to other states. It is the 148th country among 175th states. 175th country has the lowest GDP compared to the sample of

states about which information is available. The level of poverty of Bangladesh compared to other states is illustrated in Graph 2 below.



Graph 2

The situation of Bangladesh in terms of level of life expectancy, illiteracy rate and infant mortality is very low compared to other states. The level of GDP per capita of the country is extremely low and it is one of the bottom countries. These comparisons indicate that Bangladesh is a relatively deprived country compared to other states about which information available to UCAGI.

5.2.2.7. Political Instability

Bangladesh has suffered from political turmoil since its independence. The country has experienced several coup d'états and attempts of replacing the regime with more autocratic rules. In addition to this political and civil unrest has been dominant in the country that also suffers from high level of poverty.

From the very early years of its independence there has been political tension in the country. For instance, according to the reports of POLITY IV project in 1974 floods, famine and the breakdown of law undermined parliamentary democracy and brief experiment with strong presidential rule ended as anti-regime officers staged a coup. Following this event, from 1975 to 1996 the country experienced 7 other coups or coup attempts emerging out of the political unrest in the country. The country also suffered from the damages of a separatist war between 1976 and 1991 that ended with an autonomy agreement for a certain region.

Today political unrest and instability is persistent in Bangladesh. By 2007 increasing tensions between the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the main opposition Awami League (AL) over the conduct of new parliamentary elections lead to a caretaker government and imposition of a military-backed State of Emergency on January 11, 2007. New elections were delayed while military government conducts "anti-corruption" campaign to diminish patronage structures built by ruling party leaders.

In general Bangladesh is far from having a stable political atmosphere. It can be argued that ongoing active military participation in governing the country, poverty, civil and political unrest creates a very high level of political instability.

5.2.2.8. Regime Type

Political unrest or instability is one of the reasons of Bangladesh's lack of building a successful democracy and welfare for the society. The early years of the country has witnessed the existence of a more democratic rule but later the dynamics of the country undermined its development or durability until very recently. POLITY IV project has scores for Bangladesh varying from 8 for 1972 to -8 for 2007. Between these years the score changes indicating that there is an ongoing transform in the democracy level of the country. For instance in 1991 the country is assigned 6 showing that a certain level of democracy has been achieved. However, only for two years the country has score above 0 which means that only for two periods Bangladesh has principles of democracy adapted to its regime. For the rest of the years, it has been always autocracy. Therefore, it can be argued that the main or dominant characteristics of the regime of Bangladesh are being an autocracy.

5.2.2.9. Education

The education in Bangladesh is highly subsidized by the state. The education was in the past was provided in the language of the colonial rule, English. There are several private education institutions and the state also provides support for them since education is perceived as one of the remedies for poverty.

The religious education is also supported by the government⁴². The national government supports Islamic education at different levels. In the late 1980s, efforts were being made to modernize the madrasa system and to introduce secular subjects in the madrasa curriculum under the Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board. In 1986 there were 4,118 madrasas and 638,926 students under the aegis of the government-supervised system. By 1985 forty madrasas had been established for female students. There were primary, secondary, and postsecondary madrasas, which were attached to mosques and

⁴² See <u>http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/es_bd.htm</u>

dependent on public charity and endowments. Most of these institutions had poor physical facilities and equipment⁴³.

The religious education, although supported by the government, is mainly run by the public charities and in the control of mosques. The state has projects such as introducing secular subjects to madrasa system but in general the education in madrasas is private, not directed by the state.

In Bangladesh the school life expectancy for both male and female individuals is 8 years. The country spends 2.7% of GDP for education. It is ranked as the 151st country out of 182 states⁴⁴.

5.2.2.10. Demography

The population of Bangladesh is 156,050,883. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 34.6% aged between 0 and 14 years, 27,065,625 individuals of this group are male and 26,913,961 are female; individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 61.4% of the population (male 45,222,182 and female 50,537,052); and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 4% of the country. (male 3,057,255 and female 3,254,808)⁴⁵.

The median age of the population is 23.3. The average age of the male population is 22.9 and for female population it is 23.5. The country has a very young population.

⁴³ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/45.htm</u> on July 11, 2009

⁴⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁴⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on July 17, 2009

More than 90% of the population is aged between 0 and 65^{46} . There is not an unequal distribution between genders in the sense that one gender group outnumbers the other.

5.2.2.11. Economic Conditions

The inward FDI performance of Bangladesh is given as 0.083 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment for 2001-2003. The score is less than 1 and very close to 0. The score indicates that Bangladesh receives extremely low level of FDI. Bangladesh aiming at achieving a sustainable development and a better economy, and create a more prosperous conditions for its people, receives almost no FDI to its borders. This fact is mostly to be out of the fact that foreign investors have concerns about the Bangladeshi economy which is not in good conditions.

Mostly, dominant clientalist principles running the economic facilities and trend towards informal sector in the country are setbacks for Bangladeshi economy. Although, the country adopted policies in cooperation with international institutions, the FDI score for the country is a sign for low level of development and integration of the Bangladeshi economy.

5.2.2.12. Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Bangladesh is tied closely to the realities of its economic condition. Since independence the country has required a great deal of foreign assistance in the effort to keep its people fed and to build a modern society⁴⁷. Under these

⁴⁶ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/BG.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁴⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/105.htm</u> on July 17, 2009

circumstances, it has been important for successive regimes to seek good relations with all nations and to attract economic aid from every possible source. Bangladesh has therefore cultivated good relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies, but it has remained unaligned with either superpower. In an attempt to stimulate regional development plans, Bangladesh has been instrumental in organizing regional economic cooperation in South Asia. It has also been active in international organizations, especially in those dedicated to solving the economic problems of the poorer countries of the world.

Despite its poverty and small military capability, Bangladesh has not hesitated to defend its sovereignty and to take strong stands on many international issues. Any hint that India might try to intimidate Bangladesh or encroach on its territorial rights has quickly elicited a powerful, nationalistic response from all levels of society⁴⁸. Furthermore, Bangladesh has annoyed both superpowers by standing against them on various major issues, and relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union have gone through difficult periods. A major component of Bangladesh's self-assertiveness has been evident in its efforts to focus on its Islamic heritage and its quest for fraternity with the worldwide Muslim congregation. The friendly relations it has enjoyed with Islamic nations have led to the receipt of economic aid from wealthy Arab countries⁴⁹.

What can be concluded is that Bangladesh does not have permanent problems with any of the bloc or the countries in its foreign policy except India. It is very close to the Arab world as a result of common Islamic identity.

⁴⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/105.htm</u> on July 17, 2009

⁴⁹ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/105.htm on July 17, 2009

5.2.3. Conclusion

Bangladesh having more than 83% percent of Muslim population approves Islamist terror more than rarely with a score of 2.47 on the four point scale measurement where 1 means never. 24% of the respondents indicated that they would never approve violence for the sake of Islam. The overall information about the country is summarized in Table 1.

Bangladesh	Approval of Islamist	Score: 2.47, 24% Never
	Terror	
	Adherence to Islam	Medium, State Religion
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
	Colonialism	Yes
	International Status	Globalization: 1.39, Not Isolated
	Urban Poverty	84% under 2\$, 9.9% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Low, GDP ranking: 148
	Political Instability	Instable
	Regime Type	Autocracy, Democratizing
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 8 Years
	Demography	>90% Young, Mean Age: 23.3
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.083
	Foreign Policy	Pro-West, Minor Problems

Table 1: Bangladesh Summary

Hostile Islam is not more powerful than peaceful interpretations of Islam in Bangladesh. The country did not introduce Islam or Political Islam as an element in the years of independence. The independence war was not fought against the former colonial rule or Islam was not made use of as an identity against the British Empire.

Bangladesh a relatively poor and young country has high level of adherence to Islam at the state level but at the public level there are concerns about the introduction of Islam as one of the core principles of the country. Religious or Islamic education is supported by the state but mostly run by publicly financed private organizations or madrasas. It has a trend of integration with the international system and does not have a certain foreign policy trend towards the West but has been in an effort building good relations with the rest of the world for the sake of any possible aid. It largely trusts China and the Muslim world.

The regime of the country can be argued to be autocracy but it is in a struggle of democratization .The country suffers from political instability to a very large extent. Civil and political unrest have been dominantly existent in the country since the early days of the country.

The country has the problem of urban poverty which is worsen by low economic development and increase in urbanization. The economic conditions of the country are not good as country's very low FDI score also indicates. Clientalism is a sort of strategy for survival and maintenance of power for different strata of the society. It is partnered by collective identity especially in urban areas where people rely on their social environment for dealing with the difficulties. However, people also show tendency toward personal autonomy and this makes Bangladeshi society a transition nation in terms of perception of collective identity.

5.3. Indonesia

Indonesia, formally the Republic of Indonesia, is located in South-Asia. Having had a long history of colonialism mainly under Dutch and later Japanese rule, the country declared its independence in 1945. Its population is approximately 241,000,000 of which 86.1 % is Muslim⁵⁰.

Indonesia comprises of more than 17,000 islands. The transcontinental country shares land borders with Papua New Guinea, East Timor and Malaysia. Other neighboring countries include Singapore, Philippines, Australia, and the Indian territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands⁵¹.

Across its many islands, Indonesia consists of distinct ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. The Javanese are the largest and most politically dominant ethnic group. Indonesia has developed a shared identity defined by a national language, ethnic diversity, and religious pluralism within a majority Muslim population⁵².

5.3.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world. Having a very huge population of Muslims, the country has witnessed the prevailing existence of Political Islam and cultural dominance of Islamic values in its history (Wanandi, 2002; Baswedan, 2004). It is neither a Muslim nor a secular country since there are five officially sanctioned religions (Wanandi, 2002: 104). Although, five religions are officially sanctioned, Islam is the main religion having influential impact on the political sphere of the country.

⁵⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁵¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁵² Retrieved from <u>http://www.kjri-johor.org/about_indonesia.html#</u> on July 17, 2009

In Indonesia, since 2002, a number of western targets have been attacked. Victims have included both foreign—mainly Western tourists—as well as Indonesian civilians. Terrorism in Indonesia intensified in 2000 with the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing, followed by four more large attacks. The deadliest killed 202 people (including 164 international tourists) in the Bali resort town of Kuta in 2002. The attacks, and subsequent travel warnings issued by other countries, severely damaged Indonesia's tourism industry and foreign investment prospects⁵³.

In general, although they are considered to have a very minor share in overall Political Islam in Indonesia, there are radical groups resorting to violence. Two of the radical groups taking more attention globally are 'the Jihad Brigade' and 'Islamic Defense Front' (Wanandi, 2002: 105).

Indonesia, having been engaged in crisis with Islamist terror, is considered as one of the key countries for the security in South-East Asia (Dibb, 2001). The Indonesian state accepts the existence of Islamic parties in the political arena and it is one of the cases for analyzing in terms of approval of Islamist terror and the relevant factors.

The level of approval of Islamist terror according to the data retrieved from PEW global survey 2002 is 1.77. The sample of the survey for the key question on approval of Islamist terror in Indonesia consists of 935 Muslim individuals. The public approval of Islamist terror is less than rarely but more than never. The frequency of responses indicated as never approval of Islamist terror for the defense of Islam is 55%. More than half of the sample representing the Indonesian public or Muslim population always

⁵³ Retrieved from <u>http://www.smamuhiyogya.org/projects/D2D09/group10/Terrorist%20in%20Ind.html</u> on July 17, 2009

disagrees with the idea that violence against the civilians is justifiable when it is used for the sake of Islam.

5.3.2. Factors

5.3.2.1. Adherence to Islam

During the early years of introduction of Islam in Indonesia, the practice of the religion was quite different. People kept their old beliefs while they adopted Islamic principles, as well. There was a sort of mixture of several belief principles at the first years. However, with the technological advances, people achieved more information about the other Muslim communities and started to direct themselves to a type of practice that is more immune to the effects of the other belief systems⁵⁴.

The state, while accepting the majority Muslim population within its border, does not declare Islam as the official religion. Rather five religions are sanctioned as official and religious freedom is guaranteed. Yet, there is an incredible concern within the country about the role of Islamist groups trying to bring Sharia law as the main running force in several parts of the country⁵⁵.

According to World Values Survey for 2001 almost 80% percent of Indonesian people (the sample is 1004) declare themselves as religious people. 60% of respondents believe that politicians that do not have faith in God are unfit for public service. 85 % of the respondent agrees that religious leaders should not influence the way people vote and almost 90% believe that they should not affect the government.

⁵⁴ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/37.htm</u> on July 20, 2009

⁵⁵ See <u>http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/2187933/Indonesia-backs-sharia-law-poll-shows.html</u>

As majority of people indicate themselves as religious and see belief in God as a sign of morality or trustworthiness, Islam can be argued to be a strong cultural element in Indonesia. However, majority of the people oppose the influence of religious leaders on the voting behaviors and government. This indicates that they do not prefer religion's interference in politics or the way the state is run. Therefore, adherence to Islam in cultural terms can be argued to be high while in political sphere it can be indicated as low.

5.3.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

The introduction of Islam in Indonesia has resulted in a sort of hybrid practice of Islam which was influenced the earlier religious thoughts of the region such as Buddhism. The Sufis- arguing the peaceful practice of Islam- was the main component of this mixture. As a result, Indonesia has witnessed the peaceful interpretation of Islam historically. However, later, organization resorting to violence appeared in the country. They are marginalized due to the participation of political parties in Indonesia.

Indonesian political sphere is generally hosts moderate Islam in the shape of political parties and civil society organizations such as 'the Muslim Scholar organizations', and 'Syarikat Islam Party' (Wanandi, 2002: 105). The Muslim groups or organization have already been given the right to raise their voices or concerns in the political sphere through non-violent means. However, political parties are not widely supported in Indonesia. "Since the 1998 fall of the autocratic Suharto and the beginning

of a transition to democracy, support for Islamist parties has not risen above sixteen percent, while their secular and pluralist rivals earn large majorities"⁵⁶.

It is clear that the interpretation of Islam is generally peaceful in Indonesia. Political participation is provided for several Islamist groups; even support for political parties is quite low. However, what can be argued is that peaceful Islam is relatively stronger than hostile Islam mainly as a result of the introduction and the process Islam has undergone in the country.

5.3.2.3. History of Colonialism

For most of the colonial period, Dutch control over these territories was dominant. The Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation during World War II ended Dutch rule, and encouraged the previously suppressed Indonesian independence movement. Two days after the surrender of Japan in August 1945, Sukarno, an influential nationalist leader, declared independence and was appointed president. The Netherlands tried to reestablish their rule, and an armed and diplomatic struggle ended in December 1949, when in the face of international pressure, the Dutch formally recognized Indonesian independence⁵⁷.

During the struggle years against the colonial or foreign powers there was no sign of making use of Islam in the identity construction or in political sphere. Islamist groups were not reported to be active in the fight against colonial rulers.

 ⁵⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2886</u> on July 17, 2009
⁵⁷ See <u>http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/indonesia/pro-history.htm</u>

5.3.2.4. International Status

Globalization scores of Indonesia are in between the highest and the lowest scores assigned to countries in GlobalIndex project. The average score of the country between 1970 and 2002 is 2.33.

The country has been highly willing to cooperate and integrate with global market. Since the very early years of its independence it aimed at cooperation with foreign investors and foreign markets.

The country has tried to preserve an independent standing in the international system. It is one of the founding states of Non-Aligned Movement- international organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. The country gives importance to regional cooperation and aims at keeping close ties with the Muslim world by joining Organization of the Islamic Conference⁵⁸.

5.3.2.5. Urban Poverty

In Indonesia 27.1 % of the population lived below the national poverty line and 52.4% lived for under 2\$ per day between the years of 1990 and 2004. Urban population for year 1975 and 2005 respectively are 19.3 and 48.1⁵⁹. There has been an increase in the urban population of the country in 30 years as it is the expected trend in many developing countries. GDP per capita annual growth rate between 1990 and 2005 is 2.1

⁵⁸ See <u>http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/foreign/foreignpolicy.htm</u>

⁵⁹ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_IDN.html</u> on July 17, 2009

 $\%^{60}$ and estimated rate of urbanization is $3.3\%^{61}$. There is a considerable level of poverty in Indonesia that has both economic development and urbanization process.

Indonesia is one of the countries taking attention of researchers focusing on urbanization and poverty in the South-East Asia (Ford, 1993: 374). Urbanization in Indonesia has been characterized by a heavy concentration of urban population in a few large cities (Firman, Kombaitan & Pradono, 2007: 433). Economic development especially with the help of foreign aid or foreign capital flow in the urban areas of developing countries makes the city life more attractive and preferable to rural life. However, urban economic growth in Indonesia is greatly driven by exports and consumption instead of by investment and the recent economic crises had negative impacts on urbanization and urban development in Indonesia, most notably in the rapid increase in the number of the poor and unemployed in the urban areas (Firman, Kombaitan & Pradono, 2007: 436-450). Poverty increased in both urban and rural areas in Indonesia; however this increase was more marked in urban areas, where poverty incidence doubled from 16% to 33%, while rural poverty incidence rose from 38% to 55% between February 1997 and February 1999 (Dhanani & Islam, 2002: 1220). An urbanization process depending on exports and consumption rather than investment in Indonesia had damaging effects on the prosperity of urban population in terms of employment and welfare as a result of recent economic crisis.

⁶⁰ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_IDN.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁶¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html</u> on July 17, 2009

It is safe to say that as a result of the Asian crisis, at least 20 million people in Indonesia were expected to become jobless in a real sense, and there will be crowding in employment in the informal sector, including the agricultural sector (Asra, 2000: 105). In early 1998 the government of Indonesia established several social safety net programs to help the poor and the newly poor to cope with the impact of impending economic crisis, covering food security, employment creation, education, health, and community empowerment (Sumarto, Suryahadi & Widyanti, 2005: 155). However, studies conducted by researching the effects of those policies on the household have shown that although the impact of the programs have been found to be generally positive, only the policies concerning the rural poverty appeared to have significantly reduced the risk of poverty (Sumarto, Suryahadi & Widyanti, 2005). Hence, a rapid and unsafe urbanization turned into a risk factor for the country with the consequences of economic crisis is not countered by the Indonesian rule especially in terms of social security.

The risks brought by the rapid urbanization in Indonesia are not balanced with precautions of the rule. Poverty and insecurity felt by the individuals are among the major problems in the urban life. Although urban poverty or unsafe urbanization creates or results in insecurity and individuals seeking for survival in the existence of unemployment, urbanization is not channeled to a direction for controlled programs that aimed at increasing social security and employment in the urban areas of Indonesia.

Investment possibilities taking attention of large global companies bring Indonesia among the countries under the focus of investors and economists trying to understand the dynamics of the country. One of the major discussion concerning Indonesia focuses on the entrepreneurial behavior of the indigenous population (Rutten, 2003:3).

Rutten (2002) argues that Indonesian businessmen highly trust on state intervention in the market and their conduct of business or run of their family companies basically maintained on the basis of kinship, relations within their religious communities. They do not prefer to do business with those who do not belong to their religious or ethnic groups or conduct business.

Although it is argued that many Indonesians believe that private sector and market place should be the defining factors (Wanandi, 2002: 104), it is widely common in Indonesia, as studies (Heuer, Cummings & Hutabarat, 1999) show, that there is still the dominance of clientalism as one of the norms directing the economic facilities in the country.

Indonesia has been in a nation or society building process since the early years of its independence from the colonial rule. The Indonesian state-builders have turned their face to the West for development and aimed at adopting western style economy and political structure. In addition to this general aim, founders of Indonesia have also planned on keeping the traditional social structure of the Indonesian people. Indonesian leaders sought simultaneously to advance toward modernization and industrialization and to preserve older, village-level norms and values which they projected onto the national legal and political screen (Rahardjo, 1994: 493). The distinct character of social life in Indonesia was thought to reside in the sense of a shared communal life, a sense of oneness, togetherness, and harmony (Rahardjo, 1994: 495). A closely-tight society or community is one of the cores of the Indonesian state or the perception of the state builders. Some basic characteristics of the founders of Indonesia are that individualism is frowned on and all works should be accomplished in a spirit of togetherness, and the state exists to protect and serve the interests not of an individual or group but of society as a whole (Rahardjo, 1994: 495). Collectivism is prioritized over individualism. There has been an effort in Indonesia to keep the traditional norms that values the community or the society more than the individual interests; yet, the development of new cities and economic development highly concentrated in the urban areas brought communities that are the backbones of the traditional norms to the status of neglected social structures being exploited by the highly increasing urban population (Rahardjo, 1994).

The transformation Indonesia undergoes has also loosened the understanding of taking community more valuable over individuals. The transformation has created problems as the old, idealized community life has experienced critical changes (Rahardjo, 1994: 499). However, there is still a certain level of perception leaving individualism aside for the sake of community or collective sake. In Indonesia, still, to impose one's individuality is considered by some to be an offense against harmonious communal life (Rahardjo, 1994: 500). Protest against the current course of economic development, which Indonesians believe has moved the society away from an ideal cooperative and familial economy occurred (Rahardjo, 1994: 500). Studies indicate that those who affiliate with national identity also grant collective identity (Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe, 2002). Moreover, although the transition diminishes the collectivism, the state also resists against this process.


At the time of economic crisis, the state and the international organization tried to overcome the problems especially in urban areas with the help of community based development programs due to the high importance given to the community values in Indonesia (Dasputa & Beard, 2007). Community leaders included in the decision making process and the rather than top-down economic programs, community-driven program have been pursued.

In summary, collectivism is a very strong identity in Indonesia. The state and the individuals grant it as a property to be maintained and protected; even the Indonesian transformation creates obstacles for the maintenance of collectivism such as the complex competitive nature of urban life and economic development.


5.3.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Indonesia trying to increase its development level especially with the help of high volume of trade relations is still among the countries that can be considered to be underdeveloped or developing. The general indicators of the country sign a low rank in comparison to other countries.

According to the calculation of UCAGI, as summarized in Graph 3, life expectancy in Indonesia is low and close to middle ranking. It is the 129th country among 196 where 196th country has the lowest level of life expectancy. Illiteracy rate is slightly above the medium level and it is the 76th highest rate among 133rd country. Finally, infant mortality is above the middle level and it is the 66th country among 191 states of which the first has the highest infant mortality rate.



The comparison of the GDP per capita of Indonesia compared to other countries is again low and is not close to medium level. It is the 108th country out of 175 countries. The GDP per capita comparison of Indonesia is illustrated in Graph 4.



Graph 4

Indonesia can be considered to be a country that is relatively deprived compared to the rest of the world. There are countries that have higher life expectancy or more GDP per capita income compared to Indonesia. It is at low rankings or medium rankings in comparison with the other countries.

5.3.2.7. Political Instability

Throughout its national history starting after World War II, Indonesia has had to deal with different sources of political turmoil. The country has suffered from political power competition and, as a result, political instability. The country is indicated as one of the countries having political instability by POLITY IV project that briefly explains the history of political turmoil in Indonesia.

In the early decades of the country, on March 14, 1957, President Sukarno declared martial law and ends Indonesia's liberal parliamentary system. On July 5, 1959, Sukarno issued a decree reinstating the 1945 Constitution with its strong presidential system and established "Guided Democracy". A new parliament was set up with a majority of seats reserved for political appointments and representatives of the military. Oppositional parties were declared illegal.

Islamic rebels in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi challenged the secular state of President Sukarno in an attempt to set up an Islamic regime, Darul Islam.

Following the repressive characteristics of the early decades of the country coup d'états emerged in the country in 1965 and 1966.

Opponents to Sukarno's regime attempted to set up an alternative government, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), in February 1958. The PRRI, or "Permesta," rebellion was defeated by loyalist forces and an amnesty is declared in August 1961. Indonesian authorities used indiscriminate force to subdue the Free Papua Movement (OPM) prior to the 1969 popular referendum on incorporation of the former Dutch territory in Indonesia. OPM resistance was driven into the interior of the island.

Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) rebels fought to regain autonomy lost when Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in November 1975. The Fretilin leader is captured and the movement is brutally repressed by 1991.

After attempted Communist coup, Muslim vigilantes massacred Party members and ethnic Chinese. After government formally banned Party; military eliminated suspected Communists and sympathizers.

Indonesian backed coup plunges East Timor into civil war followed by Indonesian invasion. Resisting Timorese were killed in massacres and famine.

Finally, economic decline lead to mass demonstrations, widespread protest, and rioting in Jakarta. Suharto resigns; Habibie takes over in interim, but riots and mass protests continue.

5.3.2.8. Regime Type

Regime type of the country that was led by "Guided Democracy" in the early decades of its independences has a trend of fluctuations but for the last couple decades, trend of democratization is existent in the country according to POLITY IV project.

For 1945 the country is given -5 as a score of regime type. This indicates the country as an autocracy. However, for the following years it is given 2 and 3 as an

indicator of increasing level of democracy. The country in these years started to be on the democracy side of the scale but was not a strong democracy since its scores are low. For the later years, it is always assigned scores for autocracy until 1999. Starting from 1999, again the country has scores on the democracy scale of the calculation. For 1999 the score is 6 and for 2004 it is 8. In the last couple of decades Indonesia has become highly democratized. However, the past records of the country are signs of any possible fluctuations in the democracy level of the country.

It might be argued that the country in the last years became highly democratized. As a result of this, its regime for the last decades can be indicated as democratic. However, due to the past fluctuations and political instability in the country, in this work Indonesia is regarded as a democratizing country.

5.3.2.9. Education

Education in Indonesia is the responsibility of the Ministry of National Education of Indonesia. Education in Indonesia was previously the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Culture of Indonesia. In Indonesia, every citizen has to have nine years of education, six years at elementary level and three in middle school⁶².

The expected school life for the population of Indonesia is 11 years. For the male situation it is 12 years old while it is 11 years old for the female students. The country spends 3.6% of GDP for education and it is ranked as 127th country which is a low rank⁶³.

⁶² See

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESIAE XTN/0,,contentMDK:21521167~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:226309,00.html ⁶³ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html</u> on July 17,

^{os} Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html</u> on July 17, 2009

5.3.2.10. Demography

The population of Indonesia is approximately 240,000,000. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 28.1% aged between 0 and 14 years (male 34,337,341 and female 33,162,207); individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 66.6% of the population (male 79,549,569 and female 78,918,321), and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 6% of the country (male 6,335,208 and female 7,968,876⁶⁴.

The median age of the population is 27.6. The average age of the male population is 27.1 and for female population it is 28.1. The country has a very young population. Around 95% of the population is aged between 0 and 65^{65} . There is not an unequal distribution between genders in the sense that one gender group outnumbers the other.

5.3.2.11. Economic Conditions

As several times emphasized in the preceding section, Indonesia undergoes economic and social transition or development. This transition process suffers from poverty, economic crisis, and political tension. The development is still immature.

One of the main aims of the Indonesian political or economic entrepreneurs is to adopt or build an economic system integrated with the West. However, the picture indicates that Indonesia has not succeeded in doing so.

For the period between 2001 and 2003 the inward FDI performance of Indonesia is given as -0.324 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

⁶⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁶⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html</u> on July 17, 2009

(UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment. The score of Indonesia is below 0. A negative value indicates that it receives less than its capacity in terms of FDI. Although Indonesia has the capacity to host more FDI with the help of its economic power, foreign investors does not prefer to channel their capital to Indonesia. In the preceding parts it has been argued that Indonesian businessmen mostly trust on their social networks and generally limit their partners with those of same religious or ethnic backgrounds.

The FDI inflow rate of the country and overall economic characteristics of the society indicates that Indonesian economy is not developed to higher levels. It might be in a transition or try to achieve progress towards integration and development but it is clear that it is at the very beginnings of its process.

5.3.2.12. Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Indonesia is active to the extent that Indonesia does not maintain a passive or reactive stand on international issues but seeks active participation in their settlement. In other words, Indonesia's independent and active policy is not a neutral policy, but it is one that does not align Indonesia with the super powers nor does it bind the country to any military pact⁶⁶.

Essentially, Indonesian foreign policy is designed to serve the national interest while simultaneously allowing Indonesia to cooperate with other nations to abolish colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations for the sake of world

⁶⁶ See <u>http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/foreign/foreignpolicy.htm</u>

peace and social justice. This explains why Indonesia was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement⁶⁷.

5.3.3. Conclusion

Indonesia, country of the largest Muslim population, has 1.77 level of approval of Islamist terror meaning that the public approves Islamist terror less than rarely. More than half of the respondents indicate that they would never approve Islamist terror. The county has experienced the existence of Islam both in cultural and political spheres since the early days of its independence.

Adherence to Islam is dominant in cultural terms. Islamic principles are also considered as moral rules within the country. However, in political terms adherence to Islam low in the country where peaceful Islam is more dominant.

The country suffering from political instability is democratizing and globalizing. It has an international standing and foreign policy without attachment to any bloc of countries after long years of colonialism.

The country having a young population experiences relative deprivation compared to other countries. It is still an underdeveloped or a developing country.

Urban poverty is one of the major problems of the country. Rapid urbanization triggered by economic development resulted in a complex urban structure with the dilemmas of modernization and traditional values of the Indonesian society. The state is well aware of the problem of urban poverty and works to overcome it. Yet, the policies

⁶⁷ See <u>http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/foreign/foreignpolicy.htm</u>

pursued are not well-designed to decrease the problems such as social insecurity in the urban areas. Collectivism and clientalism are the dominant characteristics of the country that undergoes development especially in the shape of intense urbanization. While protecting collectivism is one of the aims of the political leaders of the country, it is not compatible with the aim to overcome clientalism in order to achieve a compatible economy with the Western one.

The information on the factors and approval of Islamist terror for Indonesia is summarized in the Table 2.

Indonesia	Approval of Islamist	Score: 1.77, 55% Never
	Terror	
	Adherence to Islam	Cultural: High, Political: Low
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
	Colonialism	Colonial Past
	International Status	Globalization: 2.33
	Urban Poverty	52.4% under 2\$, 48.1% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Medium, GDP Ranking: 108
	Political Instability	Instable
	Regime Type	Democratizing
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 11 Years
	Demography	95% Young, Mean Age: 27.6
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: -0.324
	Foreign Policy	Non-Aligned, No Problem with the West

Table 2: Indonesia Summary

5.4. Jordan

Following World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire Britain separated out a semi-autonomous region of Transjordan from Palestine in the early 1920s, and the area gained its independence in 1946. It adopted the name of Jordan, officially the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in 1950. It is an Arab country in Southwest Asia spanning the southern part of the Syrian Desert down to the Gulf of Aqaba⁶⁸.

It shares borders with Syria to the north, Iraq to the north-east, the West Bank and Israel to the west, and Saudi Arabia to the east and south. It shares control of the Dead Sea with Israel, and the coastline of the Gulf of Aqaba with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

The population of Jordan is approximately 6,500,000 and 92% of the population is Sunni Muslim while 6 % is Christians and 2% is Shia Muslims⁶⁹.

5.4.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Islam is the religion of majority in Jordan and the number of Islamist movements in addition to Islamist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing aid to the society increase in Jordan. Salafism is one of the approaches of several Islamist networks. The Salafi movement in Jordan began during the 1970s as the result of individuals being exposed to Salafi thought while studying abroad in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 222). Although non-violent reformists still dominate the Salafi movement, Jihadi thought is becoming increasing popular and this change is reflected in the growing number of Jihadi publications that began to appear in Jordan during the 1990s (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 225). In 1994, a Salafi group known as the "the Afghans" was convicted of bombing cinemas and liquor stores, in addition to the bombings, the

⁶⁸Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/JO.html</u> on July 17, 2009

⁶⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/JO.html</u> on July 17, 2009

group had plotted to assassinate leading Jordanian officials and peace negotiators and to bomb symbols of Western culture, such as night- clubs and video-rental stores (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 222-223).

In addition to the Salafi movements resorting to violence NGOs also became the interest of several networks in order to spread their Islamist principles in Jordan. Although legal conditions and government oversight prohibit direct political activities through Islamic NGOs, Islamists utilize these institutions to combat the intrusion of Western values and cultural codes (Wiktorowicz & Farouki, 2000: 685).

Islamist movements plan on stopping the impact of Western culture and spread the life-style they consider as the proper one and governed by the Islamic principles are gaining power in Jordan. Those who resort to violence for Islamist aims are approved by the Jordanian public more than rarely with a score of 2.33 according to the data provided by PEW global survey 2002. 26% of the respondents indicate that they would never approve Islamist terror.

5.4.2. Factors

5.4.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Islam is the official state religion in Jordan. The other minority religions are not legally sanctioned. The constitution of the country declares that the king and his successors must be Muslims and sons of Muslim parents⁷⁰.

Despite a strong identification with and loyalty to Islam, religious practices varied among segment Jordan's population. This unevenness in practice did not necessarily correlate with rural-urban division or differing levels of educations. The religious

⁷⁰ See <u>http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html</u>

observance of some Jordanians was marked by beliefs and practices that were sometimes antithetical to the teachings of Islam. This is attributed at least some of the elements of pre-Islamic beliefs customs common to the area 71 .

The 1980s witnessed a stronger and more visible adherence to Islamic customs and beliefs among significant segments of the population. The increased interest in incorporating Islam more fully into daily life was expressed in a variety of ways. Women wearing conservative Islamic dress and the head scarf were seen with greater frequency in the streets of urban as well as rural areas; men with beards also were more often seen. Attendance at Friday prayers rose, as did the number of people observing Ramadan⁷².

According to the results of the World Values Survey for 2001 85% of the respondents (1223 individuals) say that they are very religious people. Around 80% of the population either agree or strongly agree that politicians that do not believe in God are unfit for public office. Finally, 70% of the population believes that religious leaders should not influence how people vote.

Adherence to Islam at the state level or in the government is very high in Jordan. Especially after 1980s there is a tendency of practicing more orthodox way of Islam and attachment to it in the daily lives of Jordanians. Moreover, it is highly supported that to believe in God is a very important sign of trust. However, more than half of the population believes that religious leaders should not intervene in the voting preferences of the individuals.

 ⁷¹ Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/jordan/40.htm</u> on July 18, 2009
⁷² Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/jordan/40.htm</u> on July 18, 2009

5.4.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

The rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement as a social and political force has been one of the most important developments in the modern Arab world. Beginning in the late 1970s, radical Islam directly affected Jordan, its neighbors and co-signatories of peace treaties with Israel. The radical Islamic movement in Jordan assumed two forms: non-violent, represented mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood, and violent, represented by various terrorist groups. Both groups shared the objective of replacing the existing regimes with Islamic theocracies⁷³.

Jordan responded firmly to the growth of radical Islam, quashing terrorist activity. In Jordan, where the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed legal status, the regime kept a strict hold on the movement so that its influence would not exceed government-imposed limits⁷⁴.

By the end of the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist groups no longer posed an existential threat to the Jordanian regime, since there was little chance of their seizing the government in the foreseeable future. Although they might succeed in toppling a head of state, it is unlikely that they would be able to establish an Islamic regime. At the same time, the regime acknowledged that it was beyond their power to eradicate Islamic radicalism, and recognized that they would have to face its challenge for many years to come⁷⁵.

 ⁷³ Retrieved from <u>http://www.sussex-academic.co.uk/sa/titles/middle_east_studies/Tal.htm</u> on July 18, 2009

⁷⁴ Retrieved from <u>http://www.sussex-academic.co.uk/sa/titles/middle_east_studies/Tal.htm</u> on July 18, 2009

⁷⁵ Retrieved from <u>http://www.sussex-academic.co.uk/sa/titles/middle_east_studies/Tal.htm</u> on July 18, 2009

There is not clear data indicating to what extent the public in Jordan support Muslim Brotherhood, but it is clear that the movement in one of most dominant and popular opposition in Jordan. Therefore, although it is not obvious, hostile Islam is less powerful compared to peaceful Islam in Jordan.

5.4.2.3. History of Colonialism

With the break-up of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the League of Nations and the occupying powers were required to redraw the borders of the Middle East. The ensuing decisions, most notably the Sykes–Picot Agreement gave birth to the French Mandate of Syria and British Mandate of Palestine. More than 70% of the British Mandate of Palestine was east of the Jordan River and was known as "Transjordan". Until 1921, the land was intended to be part of the Jewish National Homeland, the land designated by the League of Nations to be the future Jewish State of Israel. In 1921, the British gave semi-autonomous control of Transjordan to the future King Abdullah I of Jordan, of the Hashemite family, after his failed attempt to take control of Syria when his brother King Faisal I became king of Iraq. This partition was in breach of the British Empire's undertaking to make Palestine a Jewish state as was required under the terms of the mandate, and as such outraged the Jewish population, but pressure from the Arabs caused the British to acquiesce to the Hashemites' demands⁷⁶.

The mandate over Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946; on May 25, the country became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. Transjordan was one of the Arab states opposed to the second partition of Palestine and creation of Israel in May

⁷⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/history.html</u> on July 14, 2009.

1948. It participated in the war between the Arab states and the newly founded State of Israel. The Armistice Agreements of April 3, 1949 left Jordan in control of the West Bank and provided that the armistice demarcation lines were without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines⁷⁷.

5.4.2.4. International Status

Globalization score of Jordan is higher than the medium level of globalization. Until very recently the scores assigned to Jordan has been around 3 and for 2002 it has been assigned score that is very close to 4. The scores indicate that it has a very high level of globalization. The average score of the country between 1970 and 2002 is 3.05.

In general Jordan has had consistent pro-Western standing in international relations and traditionally has had close relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. These relations were damaged by support in Jordan for Iraq during the Gulf war. In public, Jordan continued to call for the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq⁷⁸.

Since the end of the war, Jordan has largely restored its relations with Western countries through its participation in the Middle East peace process and enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq⁷⁹.

5.4.2.5. Urban Poverty

The works on Jordan are very limited in number compared to other countries, and urban poverty is one of the topics taking very less attention as a research topic. The information about the urban life and urban poverty in Jordan is very inadequate.

⁷⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/history.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁷⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/nea/jordan9510.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁷⁹ Retrieved from http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/nea/jordan9510.html on July 14, 2009

Between 1990 and 2004 the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line in Jordan is 14.2% and 7% live for under \$2 per day (UNDP)⁸⁰. Annual rate of change in urbanization between 2005 and 2010 (CIA) in Jordan is 3.1⁸¹. Jordan having 1.6% annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 has 57.7% urban population in 1975 while this ratio increased to 82.3% in 2005⁸².

One of the sources of information about this point is a report prepared by a project named Making Cities Work⁸³. In this report approximately 12% of the urban population is indicated as poor. However, general standards of living in the urban areas are reported to be relatively higher compared to the other parts of the country. Migration that is one of the dynamics worsening the urban poverty and declining the quality of life in the urban areas is not reported to be a major problem in Jordan in this report. It is stated that many labor migrants who turn their face to the cities for better education or health conditions in addition the job opportunities return to their villages on the weekends. Therefore, it might be argued that most of the migrants are temporary residents of cities in Jordan. This is an advantage for the country in the sense that families are not brought to the cities does not create extra burden for the city life and poverty is kept in the rural areas.

In general, although there is not enough information on the urban life and poverty in Jordan, the available limited data indicates that Jordan does not suffer from high rates of urban poverty. In addition to this, migration trends in country are far from worsening the situation.

 ⁸⁰ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_JOR.html</u> on July 14, 2009
⁸¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/JO.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁸² Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_JOR.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁸³ Retrieved from www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/neareast-n-africa/Jordan.pdf on July 14, 2009

Clientalism, although does not dominate the social structure of the country, is existent in relations, especially of the poor in Jordan. Patron-client relations that able the poor achieve security and survival through several means is also present in Jordan. Islamic organizations aiming at providing aid to the poor does not help the society change the clientalist social structures.

In Jordan Islamic private voluntary organizations, or Islamic social institutions, have been particularly successful, providing services to thousands of people each year (Clark, 2004: 942). However, they are not the only organizations providing help to the poor. The state runs its own Islamic institutions, one of the most important of which is the Sunduq al-Zakat in the Ministry of Awqaf and poor families receive less from the non-state actors than they do from the state-run charity (Clark, 2004: 958-965). However, the combinations of these two aid channels are not adequate to respond the needs of the poor. The financial and material aid, are too little to prevent the poor from seeking additional aid elsewhere and to engender clientalist loyalties (Clark, 2004: 956). Still, the poor make of clientalist structure for survival. In addition to this it is argued that the elite or several movements also get advantage of patron-client ties for mobilization in Jordan (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 221).

The history of Jordan has been dominated by tribes as the main actors that played important roles in the nation building process (Nevo, 2003). Individuals have identified themselves as members of certain tribes and social relations have been conducted accordingly.

This domination of tribe understanding and attachment of individuals to certain tribes or families have structured the society of Jordan that based its nation building 146 process on this fact (Nevo, 2003). In Jordan at the tribe level it is highly valued that it is a tribe's responsibility to protect its members' interests (Antoun, 2000: 443). Family and/or tribe are social structures that an individual must respect and prioritize over other social networks (Nevo, 2003). However, recently these perceptions are under social construction. In Jordanian society individuals become more skeptical about the importance or the role of tribes in their social setting and relations with others. In the country where even conflict among individuals are solved or discussed in relation to the tribes they belong to or punishments given to individuals are also directed to their tribes, people are ambivalent about tribalism or their collective identity attaching themselves to their in-group tribes (Antoun, 2000: 455). People change their perception about how much importance should be given to their tribes and to what extent an individual should be considered as a member of a certain tribe.


Collective identity is one of the strongest elements of the Jordanian society. The country making use of tribes in the nation building process and having a social code of treating individuals as the members of certain families or kin networks undergoes a process of de-valuing highly granted collective identity.

5.4.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Jordan is, as the calculations of UCAGI suggest, has been one of the medium countries in comparison of the several indicators of life standards of its people.


The life expectancy is slightly below the middle score. It is still not high but it is not close to the bottom line either. As the Graph 5 also illustrates, Jordan is 84th country in the ranking of life expectancy. Illiteracy rate is below medium but not very high. It is

ranked as 81st country out of 133. Finally, infant mortality is around the medium score. It is ranked as 93rd country.



Graph	ı 5
Orapi	1 5

The comparison of the Jordan in terms of its GDP per capita indicates that Jordan is near medium line. It is neither at high or low country status but it is ranked as 88th country out of 175. The Graph 6 illustrates the comparison of GDP per capita of Jordan in relation to other 175 countries.



Graph 6

5.4.2.7. Political Instability

Jordan having monarchy as the rule of the state does not have problem of political instability. It has been politically stable and has not suffered from political turmoil or political unrest to a very large extent.

The main problems resulting in political unrest for temporary periods in Jordan have been Kind Hussein's demand of resignation of his prime minister on suspicion of maneuvering to abolish democracy and the ban of all political parties. In addition to this, government attacked on Palestinian guerrilla groups in February 1970 triggers intense fighting that finally ended with Jordanian military victory in July 1971.

5.4.2.8. Regime Type

The regime type of Jordan has always been an autocratic rule of the royal family or the monarchy. The government type is constitutional monarchy. In 1946 the country is given the score of -10 which means the highest level of autocracy. Last couple of decades the country is assigned scores of -2 and -3. This means that the level of autocracy is decreasing. This is most probably due to the increasing respect to or influence of constitution in the country.

5.4.2.9. Education

In Jordan, development in education is given priority. The regime highly stipulates the reforms and development in the education system of the county. Higher levels of education are regarded as sources of emancipation of the country in general⁸⁴.

The school life expectancy in Jordan is 13 years for male and female individuals. The country spends 4.9% of its GDP for education expenses. The country is ranked 77th among 182 countries⁸⁵.

⁸⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁸⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html</u> on July 14, 2009

5.4.2.10. Demography

The population of Indonesia is approximately 6,500,000. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 31% aged between 0 and 14 years (male 1,014,183 and female 973,538); individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 65% of the population (male 2,183,638 and female 1,904,420), and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 4% of the country (male 128,759/female 138,410)⁸⁶.

The median age of the population is 24.3. The average age of the male population is 25 and for female population it is 23.6. The country has a very young population. More than 96% of the population is aged between 0 and 65. Male population, especially for the age group of 15-64, is more than female⁸⁷.

5.4.2.11. Economic Conditions

The inward FDI performance of Jordan is given as 0.941 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment for 2001-2003. The score is almost 1. The score indicates that Jordan receives high level of FDI or it receives a level of FDI that is equal to the level its economy can host.

Although, the economy of Jordan is not very developed and suffers from crisis and several other problems such as unemployment, the reforms pursued by the Jordanian rule such as following IMF guidelines, practicing careful monetary policy, making

⁸⁶ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁸⁷ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html</u> on July 14, 2009

substantial headway with privatization, and opening the trade regime⁸⁸ have played important roles in the process of integration of Jordanian economy with the global economic system.

5.4.2.12. Foreign Policy

The foreign relations of Jordan have consistently followed a pro-Western foreign policy and traditionally Jordan has had close relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. These relations were damaged by support in Jordan for Iraq during the Gulf war. In public, Jordan continued to call for the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq within the context of implementing UNIC resolutions⁸⁹.

Since the end of the war, Jordan has largely restored its relations with Western countries through its participation in the Middle East peace process and enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq⁹⁰. Jordan signed a non-belligerency agreement with Israel in 1994. Jordan and Israel signed a historic peace treaty in 1994, witnessed by President Clinton⁹¹.

In 1996, the United States added Jordan to their major non-NATO ally agreement. Jordan also participates in the multilateral peace talks, and recently Jordan has signed a free trade agreement with the United States. Jordan is an active member of the UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and World Health

⁸⁸ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html</u> on July 14, 2009

⁸⁹ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/jordan/63.htm on July 14, 2009

⁹⁰ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/jordan/63.htm on July 14, 2009

⁹¹ Retrieved from http://countrystudies.us/jordan/63.htm on July 14, 2009

Organization (WHO). Jordan is a member of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Non-Aligned Movement, and Arab League⁹².

5.4.3. Conclusion

The key information useful for the coming sections on comparison of the cases and discussion is summarized at the Table 3 below.

Jordan	Approval of Islamist Terror	Score: 2.33, 26% Never
	Adherence to Islam	High
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
	Colonialism	Colonial Past
	International Status	Globalization: 3.05
	Urban Poverty	7% under 2\$, 82.3% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Medium, GDP Ranking: 88
	Political Instability	Stable
	Regime Type	Autocracy
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 13 Years
	Demography	96% Young, Mean Age: 24.3
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.941
	Foreign Policy	Pro-West

Table 3: Jordan Summary

5.5. Lebanon

Following the capture of Syria from the Ottoman Empire by Anglo-French forces in 1918, France received a mandate over the territory of Lebanon and separated out the region of Lebanon in 1920. France granted this area independence in 1943. A lengthy civil war (1975-1990) devastated the country, but Lebanon has since made progress toward rebuilding its political institutions⁹³.

⁹² Retrieved from <u>http://countrystudies.us/jordan/63.htm</u> on July 14, 2009

⁹³ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/LE.html</u> on July 14, 2009

Approximately 4,000,000 people live in Lebanon. 59.7 % of the population is Muslim composing of Shia, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite or Nusayri, and 39% is Christian⁹⁴. More than half of the population is Muslim and the Muslim groups are very diverse in terms of practicing Islam.

5.5.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

The share of Islam in the population is not as much as in many other predominantly Muslim countries, but Islamist movements or parties are very dominant and influential in the country. The country has a very plural social structure and the historical process the county experienced has made it very difficult for a single grouppolitical or religious- to dominate and impose its rule in the society. However, Islamist movements appeared in the country and searched for ways to implement their perception of the governance of the state.

In the early years of the country violent acts were conducted by Islamist movements in the country. However, before 1985, little was known about the shadowy Islamist movement that was apparently behind the kidnapping and death of Westerners in Lebanon, but in an open letter to a daily newspaper in that year, Hizballah formally introduced itself as a Muslim community rather than a Lebanese party or political cadre (Harik, 1996: 44). The internal dynamics of the country banning several movements working by the means of violence in the name Islam have played significant role in the evolution of the Islamist movements. Today, more than 20 Islamist groups exist in Lebanon and the Islamist movements' participation in the municipal election was limited

⁹⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/LE.html</u> on July 14, 2009

to two organizations: Hizballah (The Party of God), and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Association) (Hamzeh, 2000: 739).

In Lebanon's 1992 parliamentary elections, Hizballah party members took 8 parliamentary seats, giving them the largest party bloc in the 128-seat chamber (Harik, 1996: 42). The standing of Hizballah for today and how it achieved to this point can be briefly summarized as follow:

In Lebanon, Hizballah has adapted to a process of national integration after 15 years of civil war, and appears as much more positive towards pluralism now than in 1985, when it made itself known officially. However, the Palestinian resistance struggle constitutes an ever more important part of the party's political and religious identity, and in this area the party relies on a vocabulary of absolute and religiously motivated conflict. Hizballah has made the Palestine Question into a religious absolute at the same time as it connects this question to the issue of national unity in Lebanon, questioning the patriotic credibility of every Lebanese who disagrees with it on this issue. Consequently, a conflict-oriented vocabulary 'colonizes' Hizballah's more tolerant and pluralist vocabulary within Lebanon, thus hindering a further development of pluralist attitudes (Høigilt, 2007: 123).

Hizballah constraining the pluralistic structure of Lebanon is considered as one of the security problems in the country, and has been declared as a terrorist organization by several Western countries.

The level of approval of Islamist terror in Lebanon is very high. The public approves violent means in the protection of the Muslim world amore than sometimes. The score for Lebanon is calculated as 3.17. 12% of 588 respondents indicated that they would never approve Islamist terror. This share of population is very low. As the issues of the country have implication both for regional and international relations, Lebanon is one of the important countries to be analyzed in terms Islamist terror.

5.5.2. Factors

5.5.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Islam is one of the 18 religions that are officially accepted in Lebanon. Islam in Lebanon is divided between four Muslim sects; Shiites, Sunnis, Alawites, and Ismailis including the Druze. All but Ismailis enjoy proportional representation in parliament⁹⁵.

Muslims (including Druze) account for 59.7% of the total population of Lebanon, where 39% are Christians. About 25% of the Lebanese population is Sunni, concentrated largely in coastal cities. Shi'is - about 35% of the total population of Lebanon - lives mostly in the northern area of the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon⁹⁶.

Islam is one but not the single religion in Lebanon having implications for culture and politics. However, Islamist terror and militant groups are fighting in the country and aim at spreading the impact of Islam in the country.

Generally, in the country adherence to Islam among the Muslim population can be argued to be high since clash and tension among several segments of society in Lebanon are shaped or directed under the identity of the religion individuals belong to⁹⁷. Therefore, it is very likely that Muslims that perceive their religious group in conflict with other religions adhere to Islam more. However, unity among the Muslim sects in Lebanon is absent. There have been also clashes among different sects of Islam in Lebanon. Therefore, when Muslims of different sects of Islam are considered together,

⁹⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html#People</u> on July 14, 2009

⁹⁶ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html#People</u> on July 14, 2009

⁹⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/neareast-n-africa/Lebanon.pdf</u> on July 14, 2009

the adherence to each other can be weak but still their perception of Islam or being Muslim as the main identity in their relations with other is highly likely.

5.5.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon gave Shi'a and Sunni Islamists unmitigated freedom to participate in public life for the first time in decades--at a time when public disillusionment with the political establishment was at an all-time high and parliamentary elections were just weeks away. Both took the opportunity to renegotiate their relationships with other political forces from a position of strength 98 .

The Islamist movements in Lebanon have very war prone discourse. The Islamist movements are various and can be classified under three main heading: Shia Islamism, Sunni Islamism and Salafist⁹⁹. The general characteristic of these three branches of Islamist movements is that especially due to the Palestinian issue and civil war they resort to armed struggle and aim at dominance over others in the political sphere of the country.

The political and social structure of the country has mainly resulted in hostile Islam and even those having right of political participation approach to the issues in an aggressively and struggle for dominance over other groups in the country.

5.5.2.3. History of Colonialism

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that make up present-day Lebanon to the direct

 ⁹⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://www.mafhoum.com/press10/312P1.htm</u> on July 18, 2009
⁹⁹ Retrieved from <u>http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue4/jv11no4a3.asp</u> on July 18, 2009

control of France. Although often conquered, the Lebanese take pride in their rebellions against despotic and repressive rulers¹⁰⁰.

Lebanon gained independence in 1943, while France was occupied by Germany. General Henri Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, played a major role in the independence of both nations¹⁰¹. The Vichy authorities in 1941 allowed Germany to move aircraft and supplies through Syria to Iraq where they were used against British forces. Britain, fearing that Nazi Germany would gain full control of Lebanon and Syria by pressure on the weak Vichy government, sent its army into Syria and Lebanon¹⁰².

After the fighting ended in Lebanon, General Charles de Gaulle visited the area. Under various political pressures from both inside and outside Lebanon, de Gaulle decided to recognize the independence of Lebanon. In 1941, General Georges Catroux announced that Lebanon would become independent under the authority of the Free French government. Elections were held in 1943 and in 1943 the new Lebanese government unilaterally abolished the mandate. The French reacted by throwing the new government into prison. In the face of international pressure, the French released the government officials on and accepted the independence of Lebanon. The allies kept the region under control until the end of World War Two. The last French troops withdrew in 1946¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ See <u>http://www.lgic.org/en/history.php</u>

¹⁰¹ See http://www.lgic.org/en/history.php

¹⁰² See http://www.lgic.org/en/history.php

¹⁰³ See http://www.lgic.org/en/history.php

Lebanon's history from independence has been marked by alternating periods of political stability and turmoil interspersed with prosperity built on Beirut's position as a freely trading regional center for finance and trade. Lebanon was also a major center for the production of opium in the Mideast. Beirut became a Mecca for institutions of international commerce and finance, as well as wealthy tourists, and enjoyed a reputation as the "Paris of the Middle East" until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War¹⁰⁴.

5.5.2.4. International Status

The GlobalIndex does not provide information and data about Lebanon. Therefore, the country cannot be compared to other states in terms its globalization level.

The country suffers from regional conflict. It has been a camp of refugee for many Palestinians, therefore takes attention of the international community. It has been place for several groups fighting against Israel; hence it is one of the actors in the controversial issue of Palestine-Israel conflict. As a result, the country is a in the concern of international community in terms of humanitarian aids and its role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

5.5.2.5. Urban Poverty

The research available for getting information on urban poverty in Lebanon has not developed. It might be due to the fact that researcher are mainly interested in the political problems and the state is very weak in terms of publishing data on the poverty level in the country or researchers are not able to get information due to internal problems of the country.

¹⁰⁴ See http://www.lgic.org/en/history.php

Between 1990 and 2004 the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line in Lebanon is not reported by UNDP. Annual rate of change in urbanization between 2005 and 2010 (CIA) in Jordan is 1.2^{105} . Jordan having 3.2 % annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 has 67.0 % urban population in 1975 while this ratio increased to 86.6 % in 2005¹⁰⁶.

The urban life in Lebanon has been characterized mainly by the waves of internal migration from rural areas to the cities especially Beirut. A report prepared by Making Cities Work project ¹⁰⁷ indicates that through the 1980s, the primary impetus of rural-urban migration was violence in the rural areas and employment opportunities in Beirut. However, as the general trend in many developing countries suggests the city opportunities are not adequate to meet the needs of the increasing number of newcomers. In addition to the scarce sources and the problems they result in the city life, the report states that migration into Beirut has causes significant conflict between neighborhoods and religious ethnic groups. Moreover, the existence of refugees largely trusting on the Lebanon economy worsens the situation in the country.

It is obvious that the urban life is home for difficulties for individuals in Lebanon. High rate of violence partly increased by migrants from rural areas, overall underdeveloped economy of the country, ongoing political unrest, and limited opportunities to overcome the personal insecurity result in tough conditions for individuals living in the urban areas.

¹⁰⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/LE.html</u> on July 18, 2009

¹⁰⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_LBN.html</u> on July 18, 2009.

¹⁰⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/neareast-n-africa/Lebanon.pdf</u> on July 18, 2009

Clientalism in Lebanon maintains existence. The processes the country undergoes, rather than diminishing the role of patron-client relations- have made clientalist evolve and even survive in institutional level.

Despite the establishment of modern Lebanon, clientalism has evolved and persisted along with other modern forms of participation. Its various forms have had a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and discouraged the development of citizen participation and support as contingent to general policy implementation (Hamzeh, 2001: 168). Clientalism is present in the political participation of individuals in the country.

The production especially in the rural areas is also under the dominance of clientalism. The production facilities or the rural life is clearly a form of patrimonial clientalism, involving the exchange of support for protection: Peasants or villagers needed protection from the excessive demands of the central administration particularly with regard to taxation, army recruitment and arbitrary conscript (Hamzeh, 2001: 169).

The individuals seeking for protection and loyalty, and conducting their relations in the individual basis has changed their perception of clientalist ties in Lebanon as a result of conflict in the country. The break of sectarian hostilities in 1841 and 1860 brought about a more significant shift that not only changes clientalist relationships from personal to sectarian or confessional allegiance but highly influence the birth of Lebanon's modern political system where individuals perceived themselves as being bound by his sect, not necessarily by personal allegiance to his feudal (Hamzeh, 2001: 170). Clientalism is a very strong element of Lebanon. It has evolved over time and institutionalized working at both individual and sectarian level.

As the parts above indicate individuals in Lebanon feel attached to their religious or ethnic groups. The society is plural and conflict among various parties continues. In such a situation the in-groups are mainly identified around the identity of religion, ethnicity or sects.

A research conducted among Lebanese people in comparison with a sample from Germany finds out that Lebanese individuals grant collective identity as one of the important element of their personalities (Bierbrauer, 1994). The Lebanese showed a general willingness to abide by the norms of tradition and religion and a lesser willingness to let state law intervene in in-group matters since they see such laws as less legitimate for disputes involving primary social relationships (Bierbrauer, 1994: 259). The individuals respect the in-group or community norms more compared to legal ones since their collective groups are the main social entity in their lives.


Lebanese people prefer their in-groups in conflict resolution since they highly grant collective identity. They identify their personalities as members of certain groups.

5.5.2.6. Relative Deprivation

The status of Lebanon in comparison with other countries varies according to the different indicators of the welfare of the Lebanese people.


As the Graph 7 illustrates, according to calculations of UCAGI, life expectancy in Lebanon is medium compared to other countries. The ranking of the country is 92nd.

Illiteracy rate is medium in Lebanon and it is 75th out of 133 countries. Finally Infant mortality is again medium with its ranking as 92nd country out of 191 states.



Graph 7

The GDP per capita comparison of Lebanon indicates that the country has medium level of GDP per capita. As Graph 8 show it is 67th country among 175 states.



Graph 8

The indicators of the country imply that Lebanon has medium ranking in some aspects of comparison and low status in other aspect. Therefore, the country can be regarded as to stand between the low and medium status in terms of relative deprivation compared to other countries.

5.5.2.7. Political Instability

Lebanon has witnessed problems resulting in political turmoil, civil unrest and conflict within the country. POLITY IV project provides extensive information about the political situation in the Lebanon. In general, the country can be argued to have suffered from political instability. As a result of its plural structure and groups' tendency of trying to dominate the rule of the country, there has been an ongoing struggle within the country among several parties.

Christian-dominated political system collapsed as civil war divided the country into parts. New power-sharing constitution eventually was established as elections are held under Syrian supervision.

Later, Christian-dominated government collapsed in civil war among Druze, Shi'i, Maronite, and Sunni forces. After this, Muslim opposition groups rebelled against the Christian dominated government.

The country has been a stage of political and power struggle of several religious and ethnic groups which undermined the stability within Lebanon. The country still suffers from ongoing conflict and tension within the country and with the neighboring states.

5.5.2.8. Regime Type

The country suffering from political turmoil and civil war for long periods of time has scores of democracy according to POLITY IV project. Except, the years during which the country has political uncertainty the country is assigned scores ranging from 2 to 7.

For 1943 the country is given score of 2. The country is regarded as a democracy but not very stable or high level of democracy. For 1970 it is given 5 as the score. Finally for 2005 the country is given the score of 7 as its regime is considered to be democratic.

5.5.2.9. Education

In Lebanon the state controls the public education, but it has been reported that most of the individuals prefer private education institutions¹⁰⁸.

The school life expectancy in Lebanon is 13 years for the population. For female and male individuals, this period is same. The country spends 2.7% of its GDP for education. The ranking of the country in comparison of the percentage spent for education is 153rd among 182 countries¹⁰⁹.

5.5.2.10. Demography

The population of the country is more than 4,000,000. The percentage of individuals aged between 0-14 years is 25.8% (male 528,047 and female 506,838). 67.1

¹⁰⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Lebanon-EDUCATION.html</u> on July 18, 2009

¹⁰⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html#People</u> on July 18, 2009

% is aged between 15-64 years (male 1,294,485 and female 1,399,047). The percentage of individuals aged 65 years and over is 7.2 % (male 130,148 and female 158,530)¹¹⁰.

The median age of total population is 29.3. The average age of male individuals is 28. Finally, the female age average is 30.5¹¹¹.

5.5.2.11. Economic Conditions

Lebanese economy being burdened by long-lasting conflicts, refugee problems has been one of the weak economies in the Middle East. The Lebanese economy suffered from crisis and has not directed well as a result of ill-designed monetary, fiscal policies in the last couple decades (Dibeh, 2005). The economy of the country is very weak and far from recovery.

For the period between 2001 and 2003 the inward FDI performance of Lebanon is given as 0.823 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment. The value assigned to Lebanon is very close to 1. This indicates that the country receives a very high level of FDI and this level is very close to the capacity the economy can host. Although, the economy is not good conditions, foreign investors are not discouraged from investing in the country to a very large extent.

5.5.2.12. Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Lebanon reflects its geographic location, the composition of its population, and its reliance on commerce and trade. Until 2005, Lebanon's foreign

¹¹⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html#People</u> on July 18, 2009

¹¹¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html#People</u> on July 18, 2009

policy had been heavily influenced by Syria. The framework for relations was first codified in May 1991, when Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of mutual cooperation. This treaty came out of the Taif Agreement, which stipulated that "Lebanon is linked to Syria by distinctive ties deriving strength from kinship, history, and common interests." The Lebanese-Syria treaty calls for "coordination and cooperation between the two countries" that would serve the "interests of the two countries within the framework of sovereignty and independence of each." Numerous agreements on political, economic, security and judicial affairs have followed over the years¹¹².

After Syria's military withdrawal in 2005, Lebanon's foreign policy charted a more independent course. Although its current government's policy can be considered Western-leaning if not pro-Western, the political opposition led by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement advocate a foreign policy more in line with that of Iran and Syria¹¹³.

5.5.3. Conclusion

Lebanon is a country with a very high level of approval of Islamist terror. Moreover, the country is home for several social and political dynamics. The information gathered for this country is summarized in the Table 4.

 ¹¹² See <u>http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/100.htm</u>
¹¹³ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/100.htm</u>

Lebanon	Approval of Islamist	Score: 3.17, 12% Never
	Terror	
	Adherence to Islam	High
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Hostile Islam
	Colonialism	Colonial Past
	International Status	Globalization: Not Available
	Urban Poverty	Not Available under 2\$, 86.6% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Medium, GDP Ranking: 67
	Political Instability	Instable
	Regime Type	Democratizing
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 13 Years
	Demography	92% Young, Mean Age: 29.3
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.823
	Foreign Policy	Western-Leaning
Table 4		

5.6. Mali

Mali, officially the Republic of Mali, is a landlocked nation in Western Africa. Mali is the seventh largest country in Africa, bordering Algeria on the north, Niger on the east, Burkina Faso and the Côte d'Ivoire on the south, Guinea on the south-west, and Senegal and Mauritania on the west¹¹⁴.

The Sudanese Republic and Senegal became independent from France in 1960 as the Mali Federation. When Senegal withdrew after only a few months, what formerly made up the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. Consisting of eight regions, Mali's borders on the north reach deep into the middle of the Sahara, while the country's southern region, where the majority of inhabitants live, features the Niger and Senegal rivers. The country's economic structure centers on agriculture and fishing. Some of Mali's natural resources include gold, uranium, and salt. Mali is considered to be one of

¹¹⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html</u> on July 16, 2009

the poorest nations in the world. The population of Mali is approximately 12,700,000 of which 90% is Muslim¹¹⁵.

5.6.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Islam as the religion of the majority has played a role in the country both in cultural and political terms since the early years of the society. Pragmatism and cooperation have characterized relations between religious and secular leaders in the regions of modern Senegal and Mali from early colonial times to the present (Clark, 1999: 149). There has been always a search for balance between the colonial rule and the local religious parties. From the early colonial period, the French realized that the Muslim orders or brotherhoods were entrenched in the region and that the colonial regime could benefit by seeking the public support of religious figures, and the brotherhood leadership likewise accepted the inevitability of secular rule and sought political support for their activities (Clark, 1999: 150). Muslim leaders and movements have responded to the secular state with various forms of accommodation, conciliation, and collaboration in order to further their own interests among the local populations (Clark, 1999: 152).

In the process, a moderate organization in cooperation with the state emerged. In the regions of French Soudan, later Mali, the Umarian Jihad left a legacy to Tijaniyya Islam; however, the Wahhabis reflected discontent with the dominant organization and indirectly with the colonial rule and adherents of both groups felt that the Tijaniyya had abandoned its initial mission of confrontation and resistance for a policy of cooperation

¹¹⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ML.html</u> on July 16, 2009

with and submission to the French (Clark, 1999: 157-158). However, this change in the country has not brought the dominance of the discontented groups. Political and economic expediency have taken precedence over ideology, most notably in the 1980s and early 1990s, pragmatism clearly dictated the interaction between the government and the dominant religious brotherhoods, resulting in a balance between the secular political systems and a non-militant Islamic society predominantly Muslim society (Clark, 1999: 152).

In Mali Islamists or local religious parties and the secular state have always been in interaction and searched for a balance that brought cooperation between these two parties. In the atmosphere of struggle for balance violent wings of the Islamist movements tried take share in the country. However, economic concerns have dominated the politics of the country that resulted in less active Islamist groups in Mali. The approval of Islamist terror in Mali is 2.10 which mean people approve the violent acts rarely. The share respondents indicating that they would never approve Islamist terror is 35% of 682 individuals.

5.6.2. Factors

5.6.2.1. Adherence to Islam

The constitution establishes a secular state and provides freedom of religion, and the government largely respects this right. Islam as practiced in the country is reported to be relatively tolerant and adapted to local conditions¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁶ Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71312.htm on July 16, 2009

The Government requires that all public associations, including religious associations, register with the Government. However, registration confers no tax preference and no other legal benefits, and failure to register is not penalized in practice. Traditional indigenous religions are not required to register¹¹⁷.

A number of foreign missionary groups operate in the country without government interference. Both Muslims and non-Muslims are allowed to convert people freely¹¹⁸.

The family law, including laws pertaining to divorce, marriage, and inheritance, are based on a mixture of local tradition and Islamic law and practice¹¹⁹.

During presidential elections held in April and May 2002, the Government and political parties emphasized the secularity of the state. A few days prior to the elections, a radical Islamic leader called on Muslims to vote for a certain candidate. The High Council of Islam, the most senior Islamic body in the country, severely criticized the statement and reminded all citizens to vote for the candidate of their choice.

In January 2002, the High Council was created to coordinate religious affairs for the entire Muslim community and standardize the quality of preaching in mosques. All Muslim groups in the country currently recognize its authority¹²⁰.

The state isolates religious and politics in Mali. The state provides religious freedom for any belief set and in order not to let the country fall into the hands of Islamist radicals the state regulates the practice or institutionalization of Islam in the country. In

¹¹⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71312.htm</u>on July 16, 2009

¹¹⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71312.htm</u>on July 16, 2009

¹¹⁹ Retrieved from <u>http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71312.htm</u>on July 16, 2009

¹²⁰ Retrieved from <u>http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,ANNUALREPORT,,MLI,3da3f07830,0.html</u> on July 16, 2009

Mali, Islam does not extremely dominate the lives of people who incorporate their native or local values with Islam. Therefore, adherence to Islam at both state and societal level can be argued to be low.

5.6.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

Islam as practiced in the country is reported to be relatively tolerant and adapted to local conditions. Women participate in economic and political activity, engage in social interaction, and generally do not wear veils. Islam in Mali has absorbed mystical elements, ancestor veneration and the traditional beliefs¹²¹.

Many aspects of Malian traditional society encourage norms consistent with democratic citizenship, including tolerance, trust, pluralism, the separation of powers, and the accountability of the leader to the governed.

The effect of Sufism in the country is persistent and the institutionalization of religious practice is channeled to peaceful direction by the government.

Hostile Islam is not powerful in Mali. Peaceful Islam dominant and branches resorting to violence are not powerful in the country.

5.6.2.3. History of Colonialism

Mali fell under French colonial rule in 1892. In 1893, the French appointed a civilian governor of the territory, but active resistance to French rule continued. By 1905, most of the area was under firm French control. French Sudan was administered as part of the Federation of French West Africa and supplied labor to France's colonies on the coast of West Africa. In 1958 the renamed Sudanese Republic obtained complete internal

¹²¹Retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/107/74066b.pdf on July 16, 2009

autonomy and joined the French Community. In early 1959, the Sudanese Republic and Senegal formed the Federation of Mali, which gained full independence from France as part of the French Community in 1960. Following the withdrawal of Senegal from the federation in August 1960, the Sudanese Republic became the independent nation of Mali in 1960¹²².

In 1959, French Sudan was joined with Senegal to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent within the French Community in 1960. The federation collapsed again in 1960, when Senegal seceded. On September 22, Sudan proclaimed itself the Republic of Mali and withdrew from the French Community¹²³.

5.6.2.4. International Status

According to the GlobalIndex dataset the average of globalization score of Mali between 1970 and 2002 is 1.10. The average score for this country indicates that globalization of Mali is very low. The country is recently aims at high level of cooperation with the West contrary to its initial standing during the early years of independence.

Following independence in 1960, Mali initially followed a socialist path and was aligned ideologically with the communist bloc. But Mali's orientation became increasingly pragmatic and pro-Western over time. Since the institution of a democratic form of government in 2002, Mali's relations with the West in general and the United States in particular have improved significantly. U.S.-Malian relations are described by the U.S. Department of State as excellent and expanding, especially given Mali's recent

 ¹²² See <u>http://www.vmfa.state.va.us/mali_geo_hist.html</u>
¹²³ See <u>http://www.vmfa.state.va.us/mali_geo_hist.html</u>

record of democratic stability in the volatile area of West Africa and its support of the war on terrorism. Mali is reported to be one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in Africa¹²⁴.

5.6.2.5. Urban Poverty

During the last ten to fifteen years Africa's urban population has had to deal with diminishing incomes and the increasing cost of living. Even the real wages of urban workers in the formal sector fell, sometimes so dramatically that a growing proportion of wage-earning households were pushed below the poverty line (Harts-Broekhuis, 1997: 106). In Mali between 1990 and 2004 the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line is reported as 63.8 % (UNDP) and 72.1% for under 2\$¹²⁵. The country has 4.8 % annual rate of change in urbanization between 2005 and 2010 (CIA)¹²⁶. Mali having 2.2 % annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 has 16.2 % urban population in 1975 while this ratio increased to 30.5 % in 2005¹²⁷. The country is in an urbanization process with a very high level of poverty. The country suffers from problems in the urban life.

In Mali rural-urban migration has continued, leading to steady growth in the number of people dependent on informal- sector activities for their subsistence (Harts-Broekhuis, 1997: 106). Increasing population in the urban areas in the presence of scarcity in the job opportunities has resulted in insecure environment for those that have to maintain their lives in the city areas. Urban households, in Mali, can be expected to take steps to safeguard or better their position and spread risks in order to survive should

¹²⁴ See <u>http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Mali.pdf</u>

¹²⁵ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MLI.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹²⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MLI.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹²⁷ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MLI.html</u> on July 16, 2009

their sources of income run dry (Harts-Broekhuis, 1997: 106). However, this is not easy for majority of the urban-dwellers in Malis. The reason is that urban tribalism and the monopolization of certain jobs by particular ethnic groups is one of the core characteristics of urban life (Harts-Broekhuis, 1997: 107).

The situation in the urban areas for especially newcomers to the city life is very difficult to handle.

Few townspeople had access to the services on offer and for many households the big question every day was how to make ends meet. The urban economy offered more diverse opportunities than the rural economy. However, to exploit those opportunities it was essential to have access to capital or personal contacts. A considerable proportion of the urban population especially the newcomers lacked both. Households and their individual members had to rely on their own resources more than might be expected (Harts-Broekhuis, 1997: 126).

The city life in Mali is not developed in the sense that individuals can overcome their insecurity concerns with the help of the services and opportunities open to them. They mostly rely on their own resources and capabilities for survival.

Clientalist ties have been developed and maintained in Mali as a way of conducting politics and trade. In Mali, reciprocity is the main the principle in trade (Lemarchand, 1972: 74). It is widely common in Mali to conduct relations in accordance with the patron-client networks and the norms that are set under the influence of those networks. Clientalism has been both a sort of cultural norm of the country and a strategy of the political entrepreneurs for controlling the country or maintaining power over the society.

Hetland writes that in Mali, as a strategy to maintain hegemonic control over the post-colonial state, the political leaders of Mali sought to assimilate competing political networks through a clientelistic redistribution of resources (Hetland, 2008: 26). The Malian elite considered clientalism as a method to create loyal clients that are depended

on the center distributing the resources in a clientalist approach. For instance, the leader of the Kel-Antessar faction was actively recruiting new members prior to the 1999 elections through entering into new patron-client relations with families (by paying their taxes) in order to increase the demographic importance of the faction as a means to recruit votes (Hetland, 2008: 28).

The eagerness of the political leaders of the country in maintaining clientalism in Mali would have turned patron-client relation as one of the strong ingredients of the Malian society. The society suffering from high level of poverty and meeting willing patrons and state for helping in return for loyalty that is served in the shape of votes or political support during elections has provided sufficient conditions for clientalism become a social institution (Lemarchand, 1972: 74; Hetland, 2008: 32). Therefore, clientalism can be considered to be a very strong element in Mali.


In Mali collective identity is existent in line with the ties that provide support and resources of survival for the individuals. This is common especially in the areas where people have to deal with scarcity of resources and search for ties that gives them access to the security structures. For people in urban environments, practices and beliefs allowing creation of supportive social relationships are important for dealing with economic and other insecurities (Jones: 2007).

Although, there is not a certain trend of collective identity in Mali, it is permanent in the society. For instance, there is no trend of submission of individual interests to families or religious sects. In Mali collective identity is reported to be one of the strategies for survival. Toulmin (1992) believes the boom of the 1950s and 1960s in Mali led to more individualistic labor activities, whereas the periods before and after were characterized by pooling of labor and collective activity within households.

There is no a certain way the collective identity is dominant in Mali. It has diverse trends that are shaped according to the needs of the people. Individuals attach to different groups that have the potential to provide the varying wants.


5.6.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Mali is one of the countries that are highly relatively deprived compared to other countries according to the information provided by UCAGI. As Graph 9 illustrates life expectancy in Mali is extremely low and it is 188th country. Illiteracy rate and infant mortality are very high. For former it is 10th country and for the latter it is 7th country.





The comparison of GDP per capita of Mali is extremely low compared to other nations according to UCAGI. The situation of Mali is illustrated in Graph 10.





The situation of Mali clearly indicates that the country is highly relatively deprived. It is at the very low status in each indicators of welfare about which information is retrieved from the project of UCAGI.

5.6.2.7. Political Instability

The political environment in Mali can be considered to be highly instable. The country has witnessed several coup d'états. In addition to interference of several actors in the government, the country has also experienced civil war as POLITY IV project reports.

There have been successful and failed coup d'état attempts in the country. In 1978, 1980, 1991, 1993 and 1996 coup d'état was a reality of the country and resulted in political turmoil.

After 1991 the Mali rule had to deal with rebellion of nomadic Tuaregs seeking for regional autonomy. It was an ethnic war and resulted in violence and political uncertainty in the country.

5.6.2.8. Regime Type

Mali has had regime type trend that can be divided into two main sections according to POLITY IV project. Each section or period of different types of regime is consistent within their own borders.

Between 1960 and 1979 the country is assigned a high level of autocracy. For this period the country has been given -7 as the regime score. For the civil war years, the country is not assigned a democracy or an autocracy score. For 1992 and 1997 the country is assigned 7 and 6 as regime scores respectively. The country has two main periods of different regime types; first high autocracy and later higher level of democracy. Yet, the political turmoil and uncertainty in the country make it reasonable to categorize Mali as a transition democracy or democratizing state.

5.6.2.9. Education

Mali is a very poor country. It is at the very low levels in comparison with the other countries in several aspects of life conditions of people. The education is also in bad conditions in the country.

School life expectancy is very low in the country. The average school life expectancy is 7 years. This period increase to 8 years for male individuals. However, it is 5 years for female citizens in the country¹²⁸.

The country is ranked as the 87th nation among 182 states in terms of its expenditure on education. 4.5% of Malian GDP is used for education in the country¹²⁹.

¹²⁸ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html</u> on July 16, 2009

5.6.2.10. Demography

The population of Mali is approximately 13,000,000. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 48.3% aged between 0 and 14 years (male 3,089,406 and female 3,023,341); individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 48.7% of the population (male 3,065,167 and female 3,101,914) and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 3% of the country (male 151,718 and female 235,441)¹³⁰.

The median age of the population is 15.8. The average age of the male population is 15.5 and for female population it is 16.2. The country has a very young population. Around 97% of the population is aged between 0 and 65^{131} . There is not an unequal distribution between genders in the sense that one gender group outnumbers the other.

5.6.2.11. Economic Conditions

The Malian economy has been in a dynamic development. Macro-economic balances have been established, debt controlled, the economy liberalized, and the framework of business restructured (Traore, 2003: 1). The constraints to economic development in Mali are numerous that include the high cost of capital, the weakness of the basic infrastructure, the high cost of public services, poor productivity of labor, the landlocked nature of the country and the weakness of the local saving rate, and the need for funding is large and the potential sources are few (Traore, 2003: 2).

¹²⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹³⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹³¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html</u> on July 16, 2009

The inward FDI performance of Mali is given as 1.568 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment for 2001-2003. The country receives more FDI than its economy can host. It has been reported that FDI is foreign investment in Mali is primarily through foreign loans (Traore, 2003: 2). However, the FDI level of the country indicates that the economic development has been successful at least in the sense that foreign investors channel their capital to Mali with less concerns and this is possibly due to the guarantee that is provided to the foreign investors.

5.6.2.12. Foreign Policy

Since independence in 1960, Malian governments have shifted from an ideological commitment to socialism and a policy alignment with communist states to pragmatism that judges issues and their merits, welcomes assistance from all sources, and encourages private investment. The present government, which assumed office in 2002, is committed to democracy, economic reform, free market policies, regional integration, and international cooperation on peacekeeping and counter-terrorism activities¹³².

Mali is a member of the UN and many of its specialized agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; the International Labor Organization (ILO); the International Telecommunications Union (ITU); and the Universal Postal Union (UPU). It also belongs to the African Union (AU); the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and

¹³² See www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm

the African Development Bank (ADB). Mali also is an associate member of the European Union $(EU)^{133}$.

Mali is active in regional organizations. It participates in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic Monetary Union (UEMOA) for regional economic integration; Liptako-Gourma Authority, which seeks to develop the contiguous areas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso; the Niger River Commission; the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS); and the Senegal River Valley Development Organization (OMVS)¹³⁴.

5.6.3. Conclusion

Mali has 2.10 level of approval of Islamist terror. 90% of its population is Muslim that has been mainly directed by the struggle between the religious organizations and the state in order to achieve a balance. The share respondents indicating that they would never approve Islamist terror is 35% of 682 individuals.

Approval of Islamist	Score: 2.10, 35% Never
Adherence to Islam	Low
Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
Colonialism	Colonial Past
International Status	Globalization: 1.10
Urban Poverty	72.1% under 2\$, 30.5% Urban Population
Relative Deprivation	Extremely Low, GDP Ranking: 160
Political Instability	Instable
Regime Type	Democratizing
Education	School Life Expectancy: 7 Years
Demography	97% Young, Mean Age: 15.8
Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 1.568
Foreign Policy	Pro-West
	TerrorAdherence to IslamHostile & Peaceful IslamColonialismInternational StatusUrban PovertyRelative DeprivationPolitical InstabilityRegime TypeEducationDemographyEconomic Conditions

Table 5

 ¹³³ See www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm
¹³⁴ See www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm

5.7. Pakistan

Pakistan, officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is a country located in South Asia. It is located along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman in the south, and is bordered by Afghanistan and Iran in the west, the Republic of India in the east and the People's Republic of China in the far northeast. In recent times, Pakistan has been called part of the New Middle East¹³⁵.

The history of Pakistan as a state started with independence from British India in 1947 and the state took its today shape after the separation of Bangladesh in 1971¹³⁶. It came into existence through the efforts of Muslims to protect their dispersed religious community in South Asia from the antagonism of the much larger Hindu community in India (Shuja, 2007: 26). It is an Islamic state. 95% of the population that is more than 170,000,000 is composed of Muslim individuals of whom 75 % is Sunni and 20% is Shia¹³⁷.

5.7.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

In Pakistan Islam has always had an important role in political and cultural spheres. During the construction of the state and struggle for independence, religion and nationalism combined to create the separate state of Pakistan (Shuja, 2007: 25). As a result of this combination the country has a tribal and feudal social structure, and Islamic ideology and a legal and political system that is British in origin which resulted in Islamic and secular law battling each other (Shuja, 2007: 26).

¹³⁵ Retriebed from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹³⁶ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/PK.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹³⁷ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/PK.html</u> on July 16, 2009

Islamist cultural nationalism eventually surrendered to a trans-national 'Shariatization' of Pakistani nationalism under pressure from Pakistan's involvement in geopolitical processes beyond its control (Shaikh, 2008: 593). The practice of supporting militant groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan contributed to intense political violence in the region and the proliferation of terrorist networks in Pakistan itself (Shuja, 2007: 26).

The state announced a ban on several organizations: Lashkar-I Taiba (The Army of Pure), Sipahi-I Sahaba (Pakistan Army of the Prophet's Companions), Tehrik-I Jaferia Pakistan (Pakistan's Shia Movement), Tanzim Nifaz-i Shariat-i Mohammadi (Organization for the Establishment of the Law of Mohammed), and Jaish-i Mohammad (Force of Mohammed) (Talbot, 2002: 199). Yet, still there were a number of terrorist outrages during 2002 that were directed against both Western interests and the regime (Talbot, 2002: 201).

The approval of Islamist terror in Pakistan is 2.20. The public give consent to violent acts of Islamist movements slightly more than rarely. 38% of the respondents (1982 Muslim individual) answer the question on approval of Islamist terror as they would never approve violence for the sake of Islam.

Islamist movements pose a serious threat for Pakistan and the region. Besides being threatened by the Islamist movements, the country is often accused of supporting several terrorist groups in other countries such as India. Islam and Islamist movements seem to be very important actors in Pakistan and the country has not made progress in terms of solving the problems in relation to the religion and religious groups.

5.7.2. Factors

5.7.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Islam is the official religion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. There have been regulations in accordance with the religious principles in the country. In 1977, the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto outlawed alcohol and changed the weekend from Sunday to Friday, but no substantive Islamic reform program was implemented prior to General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization program. Starting in February 1979, new penal measures based on Islamic principles of justice went into effect. These carried considerably greater implications for women than for men. A welfare and taxation system based on Zakat and a profit-and-loss banking system were also established in accordance with Islamic prohibitions against usury but were inadequate¹³⁸.

In addition to the Islamic characteristics of the country, the society is also inclined to Islamic way of life. For instance, there is no law in Pakistan enforcing a certain type dress code for women, although there is strong social pressure for women to dress according to a certain interpretation of Islam in some regions. The practice of wearing according to a certain way believed to be imposed by religion among younger women is growing due to media influence from the Middle East and travels to Persian Gulf $countries^{139}$.

The more educated people have started learning about religion, as a result of which following one school of thought is gradually replacing practices and beliefs based

 ¹³⁸ Retrieved from <u>www.countrystudies.us/pakistan/40.htm</u> on July 16, 2009
¹³⁹ Retrieved from <u>www.countrystudies.us/pakistan/40.htm</u> on July 16, 2009

on alleged evidence from Ouran and Sunnah. There are also incidents of violent reactions to perceived anti-Muslim events in the world¹⁴⁰.

The episodes of sectarian violence have significantly decreased in frequency over the years due to the conflictual engagement of the Islamic militant organizations with the state's armed forces and intelligence agencies¹⁴¹.

In such an atmosphere in Pakistan a very high percentage of population define themselves as religious and replace religion or faith in God as one of the core values in the society. According to the results of World Values Survey conducted in 2001 in Pakistan, 85.8% of 1715 respondents define themselves as religious and 95% believe that politicians that do not believe in God are unfit for public service. On the other hand 70% of the population believes that religious leader should not intervene in how people vote.

Adherence to Islam can be considered to be high at both state and societal levels in Pakistan. Islam is very important in the daily lives of many and people mostly define themselves as religious while they highly oppose to the effect of religious people on the voting preferences of individuals.

5.7.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

Sufism has a strong tradition in Pakistan. The Muslim Sufi missionaries played a pivotal role in converting the millions of native people to Islam. As in other areas where Sufis introduced it, Islam to some extent incorporated with pre-Islamic influences, resulting in a religion with some traditions distinct from those of the Arab world.

 ¹⁴⁰ Retrieved from <u>www.countrystudies.us/pakistan/40.htm</u> on July 16, 2009
¹⁴¹ Retrieved from <u>www.countrystudies.us/pakistan/40.htm</u> on July 16, 2009

Salafi Islam was introduced to Pakistan from the early conquerors of Islam. A historically strong presence of the movement in Pakistan can be found in the cities Faisalabad, Gujranwala and the region Azad Kashmir, where most of the populations follow the movement, but also in Karachi, Sialkot, Islamabad and Jhelum. Today, more and more people are affiliated to the movement, due to a growing number of mosques and many madrasas which teach the Salafi views of Islam. The largest Islamist party, the Jamiat Islami, is strongly influenced by the movement. Today, approximately 20% of the Pakistani population feel themselves appropriate to the movement. This makes Pakistan the country with the highest number of Salafi Muslims with more than 30 million followers, even more than Saudi-Arabia. Therefore, hostile Islam is very powerful in Pakistan with the presence of peaceful Islam in the country¹⁴².

5.7.2.3. History of Colonialism

In 1947, British India gave way to two new independent states, the Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India, both dominions which joined the British Commonwealth. However, the ill conceived and controversial decision to divide Punjab and Bengal, two of the biggest provinces, between India and Pakistan had disastrous consequences. This division created inter-religious violence that exchange of population along religious lines became a necessity in these provinces. More than two million people migrated across the new borders and more than one hundred thousand died as a result of communal violence that spread even beyond these provinces. The independence also resulted in tensions over Kashmir leading to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. The postindependence political history of Pakistan has been characterized by several periods of

¹⁴² See http://www.islamawareness.net/Asia/Pakistan/

authoritarian military rule and continuing territorial disputes with India over the status of Kashmir, and with Afghanistan over the Pashtunistan issue¹⁴³.

In 1948, Jinnah declared in Dhaka that Urdu would be the only state language of Pakistan. This sparked protests in East Bengal, where Bengali was spoken by most of the population. The Bengali Language Movement reached its peak in 1952. Later, the Government agreed to provide equal status to Bengali as a state language of Pakistan, a right later codified in the 1956 constitution¹⁴⁴.

5.7.2.4 International Status

According to the GlobalIndex dataset the level of globalization of Pakistan is very low. The country is not assigned any score more than 2 for any year between 1970 and 2002. The average score of the country for the given period is 1.28, which indicates a very low level of globalization.

Pakistan has a status of declared nuclear power, and it is the only Islamic nation to have that status. This plays a very important part in its international role. Pakistan is also an important member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)¹⁴⁵.

Pakistan is an active member of the United Nations. As a result of Soviet expansion, Pakistan had strong relations with both the United States of America and the People's Republic of China during much of the Cold War¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴³ See <u>http://www.heritage.gov.pk/html Pages/history of pakistan.htm</u>

¹⁴⁴ See <u>http://www.heritage.gov.pk/html_Pages/history_of_pakistan.htm</u>

¹⁴⁵ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm</u>

¹⁴⁶ See http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm

Its alliance with the United States developed especially after the Soviets invaded the neighboring country of Afghanistan. In 1964, Pakistan signed the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) Pact with Turkey and Iran, when all three countries were closely allied with the U.S.¹⁴⁷.

5.7.2.5. Urban Poverty

Pakistan has 27.5% of the population living below the national poverty line between 1990 and 2004 (UNDP) and 73.6% of population live for under 2\$ per day¹⁴⁸. Annual rate of change in urbanization is reported as 3%¹⁴⁹. According to the UNDP statistics, urban population in 1975 is 26.3% of total population and this ratio increased to 34.9 % in 2005¹⁵⁰. Pakistan has GDP per capita annual growth rate of 2.5% between 1975 and 2005¹⁵¹. The urban population in Pakistan is an increase while the country experiences a very considerable extent of poverty. Pakistan's populations is unevenly distributed over its four provinces and, as in most developing countries, is showing in rural flight and simultaneous urbanization (Rogers, 1990: 448).

The high urbanization is not supported by the development of the conditions in the urban areas of the country. Pakistan has exhibited many of the typical problems of growth and urbanization in developing countries: shortages in housing and schools, traffic congestions, more slums and shanty towns, environmental ruin, and inadequate sanitation and attendant health problems (Rogers, 1990: 449). In addition to the low

¹⁴⁷ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm</u>

¹⁴⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_PAK.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁴⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/PK.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁵⁰ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_PAK.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁵¹ Retrieved from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_PAK.html on July 16, 2009

quality of surroundings and services in the urban areas, unemployment has also increased the difficulties that individuals have to deal with.

Many refugees who came from rural India settled in urban Pakistan, thus accelerating the urbanization of the country (Rogers, 1990: 458). The newcomers started to increase the demand for jobs, although the employment facilities were limited. Moreover, workers returning to Pakistan from the Middle East have tended to settle in urban areas and reclaim work they left behind, contributing to pressure and competition for scarce jobs (Rogers, 1990: 459).

The refugee problem and the returners from the Middle East added to the scarce sources in the metropolitan areas of the country turned urban poverty into a very serious problem. In general, unemployment and limited power of the state in providing services in the urban areas is the main problem of the Pakistani urbanization.

As in many developing countries, clientalism in Pakistan has been one of the principles of conducting trade and politics. Colonial history of Pakistan that resulted in a middle class competing for political power in the existence of scarce economic sources resulted in a clientalist system that incorporated negotiation over political and economic power at the same time and made these two tradeoffs of each other (Khan, 1998: 116). The middle class searching for political power started to buy the support or the authority they need from the market of clients in Pakistan. Moreover, clientalism is used for maintaining power by those who already entered the ruling class in the country. Clientalism is mainly conducted in the way that political leaders use the resources for

negotiating the power balance in the country and those who are seem to be effective in the political sphere are considered to be more valuable clients (Khan, 1998: 28).

In general, in the country patron-client relations run the inter-class relations. Political power is either maintained or achieved with the help of clients that provide what is needed by the patrons holding economic or political power or the both.


Pakistani society and culture is reported to be highly collectivist (Huber and Darwish, 2003; Wiqar and Afghan, 2007). Networks are the main elements of the social structure in the country. Collectivism applies in Pakistan because the primary social organization in the country is a web of kinship networks which extends beyond the immediate family of an individual to include one's own cousins and those of the parents as well (Wiqar and Afghan, 2007). Kinship or the network created according to the blood tie is very important in the Pakistani society that this kind of network is prioritized over any other tie.

For family or kinship ties sometimes Pakistanis break the rules guiding their relations with their patrons (Islam, 2004: 323). Clientalism is a very strong element of the country but family or kinship networks are more important in the Pakistani society that sometimes individuals prefer not to obey the rules of patron-client relations for the sake of the former.

5.7.2.6. Relative Deprivation


Pakistan is one of the relatively deprived countries in the world. As the information gathered from UCAGI suggest, Pakistan has low status in comparison to other states in terms some main indicators of life standards of the society. The level of 190

illiteracy rate, infant mortality and life expectancy of Pakistan is illustrated in Graph 11 which shows country's low level of living standards.



Graph 11

The GDP per capita of Pakistan is slightly below the very low level. The country is ranked as the 133rd country in the sample of 175 nations in which 175th country is the poorest country in terms of GDP per capita. GRAPH 12 illustrates the status of Pakistan in the comparison of GDP per capita.



Graph 12

5.7.2.7. Political Instability

As most of the developing and young states, Pakistan has not had a stable political structure according to POLITY IV project. The country has suffered from several sources of political turmoil. The political power struggle within the country has resulted in uncertainty and lack of durability in Pakistan. POLITY IV provides information about the events in the country that have added to political turmoil.

In 1958 a decade-long experiment with parliamentary and presidential system ended when democratic constitution was abrogated, political parties dissolved and the government was handed over to a coalition of military and bureaucrats.

In 1970, the first general election conducted in Pakistan on the basis of one person, one vote. The results highlighted a deepening divide between East and West. Mujib of the East bloc was slated to become Prime Minister but Bhutto of the West declared that his party would not attend the inaugural session of the assembly, thereby making the establishment of civilian government impossible. In 1971, Yahya Khan, leader of the military, dissolved the cabinet and declared an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly. In the East, the reaction was immediate: strikes, demonstrations, and civil disobedience increased to open revolt. The independence of Bangladesh was declared, leading to open warfare; India intervened and the Pakistan army's attempt to crush the revolt was defeated.

In 1977, democratic government overthrown in military coup as political violence escalated in the wake of surprise parliamentary elections. General Zia dissolved the legislature, arrested politicians and declared martial law.

1999, General Musharraf led military coup; arrested democratically-elected Prime Minister Sharif, suspended constitution, dissolved parliament, and imposed rule by National Security Council.

These events clearly indicate that Pakistan has a very high level of political instability. The military is an active political player in the country where civil and political unrest are already present.

5.7.2.8. Regime Type

Pakistan suffering from several military interventions has been in its path towards democracy. However, the country has a very poor record of democratic development.

POLITY IV provides information about the type of the regime in Pakistan. The regime scores are assigned to Pakistan for the period of time between 1972 and 2007. For 1973, 1988, 1997 and 2007 Pakistan is assigned the scores of 8, 8, 7 and 2 respectively. For the remaining years, the country is assigned scores on the scale of autocracy.

The score record of the county suggests that Pakistan does not have continuity in its regime type. However, the most recent score is on the democratic scale. Although, the democracy level is very low, Pakistan can be considered as a democratizing country.

5.7.2.9. Education

Islamic education to the masses is propagated mainly by Islamic schools. Madrasas are for the most devoted Muslims, mostly comprising youth and those learning to be Islamic clerics. More casual and even research oriented material is available in the form of books. The most prominent of these schools are being monitored, while several other are not controlled¹⁵².

School life expectancy is very low in Pakistan. For total of the population it is 7 year. For male individuals the school expectancy is 7 while it is 6 for female individuals. 2.6% of Pakistani GDP is spent for education. It is a very low share; hence it is ranked as 155th country out of 182 nations¹⁵³.

5.7.2.10. Demography

The population of Pakistan is 176,242,949. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 37.2% aged between 0 and 14 years, male 33,739,547 individuals of this group are male and 31,868,065are female; individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 58.6% of the population (male 52,849,607 and female 50,378,198); and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 4.2% of the country (male 3,475,927 and female 3,931,605)¹⁵⁴.

The median age of the population is 20.8. The average age of the male population is 20.6 and for female population it is 21. The country has a very young population. More than 95% of the population is aged between 0 and 65^{155} . There is not an unequal distribution between genders in the sense that one gender group outnumbers the other.

¹⁵² See

http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalism/Pag

¹³³ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁵⁴ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁵⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html</u> on July 16, 2009

5.7.2.11. Economic Conditions

The Pakistani economy has suffered from serious problems such as growing poverty, high budget deficit, and slow growth and crisis in the last couple of decades (Hussain, 2004). It has been argued that the regime changes and the political turmoil in the country restricted the abilities of the country to develop a better economy (Hussain, 2004).

For the period between 2001 and 2003 the inward FDI performance of Pakistan is given as 0.668 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment. The score indicates that the economic structure of Pakistan is still immature.

5.7.2.12. Foreign Policy

Historically, Pakistani foreign policy has encompassed difficult relations with the Republic of India; especially on the core-issue of Kashmir, over which it has fought two wars. It has also had difficult relations with Afghanistan and Iran; however it has had long-standing close relations with China, extensive security and economic interests in the Persian Gulf and wide-ranging bilateral relations with the United States and other Western countries¹⁵⁶.

Pakistan's foreign policy has been marked by a complex balancing process--the result of its history, religious heritage, and geographic position. The primary objective of that policy has been to preserve Pakistan's territorial integrity and security, which have been in jeopardy since the state's inception.

¹⁵⁶ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm</u>

India and Pakistan became adversaries at independence and have so remained. The two countries fought each other shortly after partition, in 1965, and in 1971, causing the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of still another new sovereign entity--Bangladesh. India-Pakistan rivalry intensified rather than diminished after the Cold War, and the Kashmir territorial dispute remains dangerous and recurrent¹⁵⁷.

Pakistan sought security through outside alliances. The new nation painstakingly worked on building a relationship with the United States, in which the obligations of both sides were clearly defined. The Western-oriented, anticommunist treaties and alliances Pakistan joined became an important part of its foreign policy. Pakistan also saw itself as a vanguard of independent Muslim states¹⁵⁸.

5.7.3. Conclusion

Pakistan is one of the prominent figures of Islamist terror discussion due in the sense that it both suffers from and accused of terrorism. It is predominantly Muslim and Islamic country with 95% Muslim population and 2.20 level of approval Islamist terror. 38% of the respondents (1982 Muslim individual) answer the question on approval of Islamist terror as they would never approve violence for the sake of Islam.

The information about Pakistan is briefly summarized in the Table below:

 ¹⁵⁷ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm</u>
¹⁵⁸ See <u>http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/82.htm</u>

Pakistan	Approval of Islamist	Score: 2.20, 38% Never
	Terror	
	Adherence to Islam	High
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Hostile Islam
	Colonialism	Colonial Past
	International Status	Globalization: 1.28
	Urban Poverty	73.6% under 2\$, 34.9% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Low, GDP Ranking: 133
	Political Instability	Instable
	Regime Type	Democratizing
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 7 Years
	Demography	95% Young, Mean Age: 20.8
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.668
	Foreign Policy	Pro-West

Table 6: Pakistan Summary

5.8. Senegal

Senegal, officially the Republic of Senegal, is a country south of the Sénégal River in western Africa. Senegal is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the south. The Gambia lies almost entirely within Senegal, surrounded by it on the north, east and south; from its western coast, Gambia's territory follows the Gambia River¹⁵⁹.

Senegal, one of the former French colonies in Africa, had a history of search for independence and political stability for years. The country had attempts of unification with other colonized countries of the continent and aimed at forming a stable rule for its people. Approximately 13,800,000 people live in Senegal of which 94% is Muslim and 5% is Christian¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁶⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

5.8.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Islam is the main religion in Senegal. Within the Muslim Africa, Senegal has long been characterized by the striking dominance of Sufi forms of Islamic practice and social organization, with important consequences for Senegalese politics (Villalón, 2004: 61). Senegal's highly organized religious society is structured hierarchically around several religious lineages, affiliated with two major-and several smaller-Sufi orders (Villalón, 2004: 63). Unlike in several pre-dominant Muslim countries, the religiousness or Muslim identity of people are organized in accordance with a social structure. The distinctive Senegalese institutionalization of religious traditions is an artifact of the colonial period; the system is built on the organization of disciples into associations tied to religious centers led by the family dynasties that developed after the deaths of a generation of founding fathers (Villalón, 2004: 63). The rulers or the elites of Senegal have been in cooperation with this existing religious structure or they paid attention to the demand or the expectations. However, political unrest in Senegal and general pattern in dissatisfaction with the religious groups' participation in representing the Muslim population, new Muslim organization such as the Jamatou Ibadou Rahmane and the Hizbut Tarqiyyah appeared in Senegal (Villalón, 2004)

There exist a great many Muslim organizations in Senegal and their number has steadily increased since the late 1970s and some of those organizations are mainly concerned with Qur'anic study; others organize conferences on current affairs or devote themselves to political activism (Renders, 2002: 63). There is a trend of Islamist movements trying to influence the political environment of the country and have a role in law making process. The public approves the violent branches of Islamist movements almost rarely. The score of Senegal is 1.90 according to the calculations from PEW global survey 2002. 50% of 656 respondents indicate that they never approve Islamist terror or violence for the defense of religion or Muslims. Yet, the influence of Islamist movements should not be neglected. Moreover, the importance and influence of the traditional brotherhoods and their contemporary counterparts on Senegalese politics cannot be overlooked in a country where Muslims represent the highest percentage of the populations since their impact can be decisive (Fatton, 1986: 65).

5.8.2. Factors

5.8.2.1. Adherence to Islam

The way Islam is practiced in Senegal is significantly different from most other Islamic countries. Islam in Senegal is partially derived from mystical Sufi traditions. In Senegal, Islamic practice takes the form of membership of religious brotherhoods that are dedicated to their founder figures. Individuals are organized according to the religious group they belong to. The main in-groups or social belongings and attachment are shaped with religious identity. In this sense Islam or being Muslim is important in the social level, while at the state level the regime attaches to the secular principles.

The Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal have not been historically destabilizing to the secular government of Senegal. Some fear that this trend is changing since Islam has become more politicized in recent time. Indicators, including as small Wahhabis population, suggest it may become the first Black African Islamic state attaching to Wahhabis tradition but stresses that it does not imply an extremist one¹⁶¹.

¹⁶¹ See <u>http://www.northwestern.edu/african-studies/Docs/ISITA-Conference_Rpt_6.08.pdf</u>

5.8.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

As indicated below the general trend of the practice of Islam in Senegal is in accordance with the Sufi thought or peaceful interpretation of Islam. The Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal have not opposed the regime through violent means, although they participated in politics and incorporated with the political system of the country¹⁶².

There are worries in the country about the direction of Islam or Islamist movements. It is believed that the trend of Islam is leading to more politicized and radical shape. The existence of small Wahhabis groups implies that hostile Islam is getting more powerful in the country. However, this is not the case for the time being; hence peaceful Islam can be argued to be more powerful in Senegal.

5.8.2.3. History of Colonialism

Various European powers - Portugal, the Netherlands, and England - competed for trade in the area from the 15th century onward, until in 1677, France ended up in possession of the region. In 1758 the French settlement was captured by a British expedition as part of the Seven Years' War, but was later returned to France. It was only in the 1850s that the French began to expand their foothold onto the Senegalese mainland, at the expense of the native kingdoms¹⁶³.

In 1959, Senegal and the French Sudan merged to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent in 1960, as a result of the independence and the transfer of power agreement signed with in 1960. Due to internal political difficulties, the

¹⁶² See <u>http://www.northwestern.edu/african-studies/Docs/ISITA-Conference_Rpt_6.08.pdf</u>

¹⁶³See <u>http://africanhistory.about.com/od/senegal/Senegal.htm</u>

Federation broke up in 1960. Senegal and Soudan proclaimed independence. Léopold Senghor was elected Senegal's first president in August 1960¹⁶⁴.

5.8.2.4. International Status

The globalization level of Senegal is very low. Between 1970 and late 1990s the country has scores of globalization around 1.5. In the late 1990s and early 200s the country has scores close to 2 and slightly above 2. The average score for Senegal between 1970 and 2002 in the GlobalIndex dataset is 1.53.

Senegal has never turned its back to the West or the international system. President Léopold Senghor advocated close relations with France and negotiation and compromise as the best means of resolving international differences. To a large extent, the two succeeding Presidents have carried on Senghor's policies and philosophies. Senegal has long supported functional integration among French-speaking West African states through the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Senegal has a high profile in many international organizations and was a member of the UN Security Council in 1988-89. It was elected to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997. Friendly to the West, especially to France and to the United States, Senegal also is a vigorous proponent of more assistance from developed countries to the Third World¹⁶⁵.

5.8.2.5. Urban Poverty

Similar to vast majority of African countries Senegal goes through a reformation or the process of developing or re-constructing its economy. 33.4 % of the population is reported to have lived below the national poverty line between 1990 and 2004 and 56.2%

 ¹⁶⁴ See <u>http://africanhistory.about.com/od/senegal/Senegal.htm</u>
¹⁶⁵ See <u>http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/senegal9802.html</u>

live for under 2\$ per day¹⁶⁶. Senegal has 3.1% annual rate of urbanization¹⁶⁷ and 1.2 % annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 with 33.7 % and 41.6% urban populations for year 1975 and 2005 respectively¹⁶⁸.

Urbanization driving several aspects of society and economy in Senegal is maintained due to the preferences of the ruling elite of the country. However, the country suffers from a certain level of undeniable urban poverty. For instance, In Dakar, depending on the definitions and calculation methods used 20% to 25% of households live below the poverty line (Soumare, 2002: 262). Moreover, in Dakar, as in other African cities, rural migrants new to the cities produced underprivileged social strata with little place in the city's economic and social life (Soumare, 2002: 262). The economic development perceived to be modern by the ruling elite of the country necessitates the urbanization of the country triggering consumption and industrialization or service sector. The modern pillars of the national economies- public administration and the private manufacturing sector- are being restructured and can no longer generate enough jobs (Soumare, 2002: 261). There is scarcity of job opportunities and the economy cannot meet the job demand of the increasing urban population. The frustrating wait for jobcreating outside investment continues, and employment opportunities remain limited: While 42 percent of Senegal's population lives in cities, urban employment is scarce and dwindling, and many of the urban poor return to the countryside for the farming season (Galvan, 2001: 59).

¹⁶⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_SEN.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁶⁷ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁶⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_SEN.html</u> on July 16, 2009

The ruling elite are not blind to the problematic situation of the country. The urbanization is recognized as major problem of Senegal. However, despite projects aiming at overcoming urbanization problem, most town dwellers still live in dirty, under equipped districts and face the main problem of unemployment and underemployment (Soumare, 2002: 261). As Soumare (2002: 261) puts urban unemployment and poverty are spreading, particularly among the younger generations, who nowadays are left feeling utterly helpless.

It is obvious that Senegal, already a relatively poor economy and undeveloped country, suffers for the problem of urban poverty. There are attempts to overcome the situation in the country. However, they are not well-designed programs like the one carried out between 1970 and 1990 that pushed the poorest families away from the city centre towards overspill areas lacking basic amenities (Soumare, 2002: 262).

Senegalese society has been organized in way favoring the development of clientalism in the country as one of core values running the social, economic and political life. The pre-colonial African culture of the Muslim brotherhoods and the rather liberal electoral patterns established by French colonialism in the eighteenth century conveyed to patron-client relationships which (Fatton, 1986: 61). Moreover, the social norm of patron-client relationship shaped around the constructed religion and kinship based groups.

The modernizing bureaucrats sought to take over and manipulate to their own advantage the existing political and social system, rather than create autonomous bases of power for radical social change (Fatton, 1986: 63). Clientalism persists not so much because of the so-called traditionalism of the Senegalese masses but rather because its continued presence reinforces the power of the ruling groups (Fatton, 1986: 68). In other words, the ruling elite are prefer clientalism to continue and the society is not equipped with means to alter the existing situation. Moreover, the relatively peaceful extraction of the economic surplus from the Senegalese masses for the benefits of a privileged and small state bureaucracy rests on the maintenance of the personalistic and individualized bonds of dependence that clientalism entails and nurtures (Fatton, 1986: 68). Therefore, Senegalese society is a clientalist society as a result of the constructed social and political structures which are preferred by the Senegalese elite.

The society in Senegal inherits both individualistic and collectivist identity as running norms at different levels. The urbanization or the development of the country and democratization process has brought itself with implication over the perception of the community and individual. Senegal's democratic structure rests on two distinct foundations: an urban tradition of individualism and civic pluralism and a rural tradition of politics mediated by family and community loyalties (Galvan, 2001: 56). This indicates that the parts of partly enjoying the development of the country and modernization also adopts or favors individualism while the underdeveloped rural areas or more traditional segments of the society grant collectivism. Moreover, the colonial past of the country had affected the differences between different social layers of the country in terms of having either collectivist or individualistic values.

Colonialism divided most African societies, including Senegalese people, into a minority, Western-educated, individualistic, urban elite and a rural majority focused on


substance production and solidarity along kinship, religious, or communities lines (Galvan, 2001: 56). In this view, elites trust, associate, and cooperate with others based on common interests rather than familial, ethnic, regional, or religious ties (Galvan, 2001: 58). However, it has been argued that political rule or the elite in Senegal highly consider the preferences of the social groups mainly centered on religion and kinship. Therefore, it is very unlikely that individualistic urban population or the elite ignores the collectivist behavior of the rural regions or population.

Being divided between an individualistic minority and traditional collectivist rural population, it can be argued that the larger the elite population in Senegal, the less the country becomes collectivist. However, since the country is going through development process it can be argued that this requires several years to happen. Therefore, the general Senegalese society can be considered as collectivist in the presence of an individualistic elite minority.

5.8.2.6. Relative Deprivation


Senegal is a very poor country. In relation to other states Senegal is at the very low levels of some main indicators of welfare within the country.

As the Graph 13 illustrates life expectancy, according to calculations of UCAGI, is low. It is the 159th country among 196th nations. Illiteracy rate is extremely high which is accompanied by a very high level of infant mortality rate. In former ranking, Senegal is 4th country and in the latter the latter 51st country.





The comparison of GDP per capita of Senegal indicates that it is a relatively deprived country in comparison with other countries. The GDP per capita is very low in the country and its 128th country in a ranking of total 175 countries, as Graph 14 illustrates.





5.8.2.7. Political Instability

Senegal is one of the countries where political instability is persistent. The country has suffered several incidences resulting in political turmoil and uncertainty in the country. According to POLITY IV project consolidated country reports in Senegal there are several events taken into account as sources of political instability.

In 1962, the increasing tensions between President Senghor and his prime minister resulted in a failed coup attempt by Prime Minister Dia. President Senghor arrested Dia, strengthened the constitutional powers of the presidency, and established one-party rule.

In 1992, a split in the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MDFC) over the issue of independence led to an outbreak of armed attacks in September 1992. Violence continued until a newly elected government initiated a new peace agreement in December 1999.

5.8.2.8. Regime Type

The regime type of Senegal is scored on the autocracy scale according to POLITY IV project. Between 1960 and 1981, the highest score for autocracy is given for the 1963. The score of 1963 is -7. However, contrary to its long lasting history of autocracy or lack of democracy the country achieved the score of 8 at the beginning of 21st century.

For 2000 the country is assigned the score f 8. This score is an indicator of a very high level of democracy in Senegal. Yet, this is the only democracy score given to Senegal. Therefore, in this work Senegal is considered as a democratizing country.

5.8.2.9. Education

In Senegal, education is compulsory and free up to the age of 16. However, due to limited resources and low demand for secular education in areas where Islamic education is more prevalent, the law is not fully enforced. In 2002, the gross primary enrollment rate was 80 percent and the net primary enrollment rate was 69 percent. Gross and net enrolments ratios are based on the number of students formally registered in primary

school and therefore do not necessarily reflect actual school attendance. In 2000, 41.2 percent of children ages 5 to 14 years were attending school. Primary school attendance statistics are not available for Senegal. As of 2001, 80 percent of children who started primary school were likely to reach grade¹⁶⁹.

The country spends 5% of its GDP for education expenses. As its 74th ranking among 182 countries suggests it is already poor country and spends relatively low share of income for education¹⁷⁰.

5.8.2.10. Demography

The population of Senegal is approximately 13,500,000. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 42.2% aged between 0 and 14 years (male 2,911,324 and female 2,877,804); individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 54.8% of the population (male 3,728,664 and female 3,786,000), and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 3% of the country (male 190,343/female 217,462)¹⁷¹.

The median age of the population is 18.6. The average age of the male population is 18.4 and for female population it is 28.8. The country has a very young population. 97% of the population is aged between 0 and 65^{172} .

¹⁶⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁷⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁷¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁷² Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html</u> on July 16, 2009

5.8.2.11. Economic Conditions

The inward FDI performance of Senegal is reported as 0.525 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment for 2001-2003. The score reports that the country receives less FDI than it economy can host. Senegalese economy is driven by the relations between the indigenous people, the foreign capital or the colonial powers, and the state or the ruling elite (Thioub, Diop and Boone, 1998: 63) and is not capable of meeting the requirements of the FDI sources.

The developing economy of the country is dominated by the clientalist norms that serve the interest of the elite seemingly persists to be weak. The reason is for this conclusion rests under the preferences of the local businessmen, too. It has been reported that indigenous investors still prefer the intervention of the state in the market and they advocate the state-run economy (Thioub, Diop and Boone, 1998). In other words, the Senegalese society prefers the choices of the elite favoring and aiming at maintaining clientalist economic structure. Therefore, as far as the internal social and political dynamics in Senegal are maintained, its economy will be one of the instances of weak economies.

5.8.2.12. Foreign Policy

Senegal is a member of the UN, the African Union (AU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The country accepts the necessity of cooperation and integration with the international community. As several other poor countries, Senegal relying on foreign aid and donors, it does not take risk in its relations with especially developed countries¹⁷³.

Since the very first years of its independence, the country has relied on the help of France and other countries for resolution of international problems and disputes concerning national interests of Senegal. The country does not have an anti-west or global system standing, but highly value the importance of international community and cooperation 174.

5.8.3. Conclusion

Senegal having a colonial past is one of the predominantly Muslim countries having 1.90 level of approval of Islamist terror.

Senegal	Approval of Islamist Terror	Score: 1.90, 50% Never
	Adherence to Islam	Medium
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
	Colonialism	Colonial Past
	International Status	Globalization: 1.5
	Urban Poverty	56.2% under 2\$, 41.6% Urban Population
	Relative Deprivation	Low, GDP Ranking: 128
	Political Instability	Instable
	Regime Type	Democratizing
	Education	School Life Expectancy: Not Available
	Demography	97% Young, Mean Age: 18.6
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.525
	Foreign Policy	Pro-West
		Table 7

The main findings for this country are summarized below, Table 7:

 ¹⁷³ See <u>http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/senegal9802.html</u>
¹⁷⁴ See <u>http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/senegal9802.html</u>

5.9. Turkey

Turkey, known officially as the Republic of Turkey, is a Eurasian country that stretches across the Anatolian peninsula in western Asia and Thrace in the Balkan region of southeastern Europe. Turkey is bordered by eight countries: Bulgaria to the northwest; Greece to the west; Georgia to the northeast; Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran to the east; and Iraq and Syria to the southeast. The Mediterranean Sea and Cyprus are to the south; the Aegean Sea and Archipelago are to the west; and the Black Sea is to the north.

Turkey is the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, a major historical power which lasted for more than six centuries on three continents, controlling most of Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. As a result, Turkey's culture has a unique blend of Eastern and Western tradition.

Turkey one of the nation-states founded after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire gained its self-rule in 1923 after its war of independence. The population of Turkey is approximately 77,000,000 and 99.8 % of the population is Sunni Muslim while 0.2 % is mostly Christians and Jews¹⁷⁵.

5.9.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

The major religion that has considerable implications in Turkey is Islam. Islam is one of the topics that has been discussed in relation to politics and culture of Turkey. The society in Turkey, as the country emerged out of the ashes of an empire having Islamic identity as one of the main characteristics, has almost no period during which Islam has

¹⁷⁵ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html</u> on July 16, 2009

lost its place in discussion on culture or politics. Islam has had its place before, during and after the emergence of Turkey.

Islam was one of the components of politics and in several cases rebellions in the pre-Turkey period of the society of which today's people is considered as the continuation (Ahmad, 1991). Turkey as a relatively young secular or secularizing state has experienced the challenge or the existence of Islam in politics as an identity of several groups creating domestic tension in the country. For instance in the early years of the secular state a rebellion in the country took place and although the nature of revolt is still controversial, it has been widely accepted that it has contained attachment to Islam in political terms (Ahmad, 1991: 6-7).

Turkey has experienced the existence of religiously inspired political groups throughout its history. Yet, Islamist terrorist activity in Turkey began in the 1960s by Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) (Karmon, 1997). Karmon (1997) indicates that a report by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Security General Directorate of the Police in October 1991 indicated several Islamist organizations active in Turkey: Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), Turkish Islamic Liberation Front (TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO), Universal Brotherhood Front-Sharia Revenge Squad (EKC-SIM), Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic War of Liberation (EIK-TM), Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO) and Turkish Sharia Revenge Commandos (TSIK). The approval of Islamist terror conducted by several of those organizations in Turkey is 1.44 which means that the public approves the violent Islamist movements at a level between never and rarely. The number of respondents in Turkey is 990 and 65% of this sample indicated that they would never approve Islamist terror conducted for the sake of Islam.

As one of the predominantly Muslim countries having history of movements inspired by Islamist values and creating tension and insecurity within the country, Turkey is one of the cases that are concern of this work. It will be analyzed according to the factors

5.9.2. Factors

5.9.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Although Turkey was secularized at the official level, religion remained a strong force at the popular level. After 1950 some political leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment to religion by espousing support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined. Such efforts were opposed by most of the political elite, who believed that secularism was an essential principle of Kemalist Ideology. This disinclination to appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually led to a polarization of society. The polarization became especially evident in the 1980s as a new generation of educated but religiously motivated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the secularized political elite. These new leaders have been assertively proud of Turkey's Islamic heritage and generally have been successful at adapting familiar religious idioms to describe dissatisfaction with various government policies. By their own example of piety, prayer, and political activism, they have helped to spark a revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. By 1994 slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, the country's two largest cities.

The state or regime has had persistent policy of keeping Islam or religion out of the political realm. The secularity of the state is one of the characteristics that are even not open for discussion in the country. As a result of this, political parties perceived to be Islamist in nature are closed by the regime in Turkey.

In the social level individuals, mostly practice Sunni Islam. Shia and Alewi Muslims also live and practice their interpretation of Islam. However, they are minorities in the country. Sunni Islam is the type of Islam or interpretation of religion preferred by the state, since it is the most moderate and peaceful way of Islam. Adherence to Islam shows variances in the country and Islam is one of the set of principles forming the ethics in the country in addition to several traditions and practices.

According to the World Values Survey 2001, in Turkey 78% of 4607 respondents in Turkey indicate that they religious people. 57% of the sample argued that they do not find politicians without belief in God as proper for public service. Finally, 73% of the populations believe that religious leaders should not influence the way people vote. More than half of the population in Turkey composes of religious people. For almost half of the population religion is one of the main determinants of trustworthiness in the country, especially in politics. However, a very considerable share of the population prefers religious leaders not intervene in the voting behaviors of the citizens.

5.9.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

Islam is the religion of majority and one of the most important components of culture. Islam has also been an element of politics in the country. Turkey has experienced the existence of religiously inspired political groups throughout its history. There have been several Islamist groups some of which has resorted to violence. Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party), Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), Turkish Islamic Liberation Front (TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), and World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO) are some of the Islamist groups that appeared in Turkey.

These groups have enjoyed support to some extent. They have been active in Turkey and imposed effect in the country. However, they have been largely marginalized groups that find support from the radical sphere of the society.

What can be argued about Turkey about the position of Islamist groups in Turkey is that moderate Islam or peaceful Islam is very popular in the society. Yet, radical of hostile groups are also present in Turkey.

5.9.2.3. History of Colonialism

Turkey does not have history of colonialism in the sense that it was ruled by foreign governments for long periods of time. However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the region what is called Turkey today has been occupied by several foreign countries such as Britain, France and Greece.

The independence war of the country was fought against the foreign occupiers that were perceived as colonial powers trying to exploit the resources of the country. As a result of this anti-colonial perception or a sort of siege mentality in the society formed against the colonial or foreign rule has found its place in Turkey. However, this has not resulted in the opposition or alignment against the West. Instead, the country has been working to become a member of the international community and be a part of the developed Western part of the world.

5.9.2.4. International Status

According to the GlobalIndex the scores for Turkey between 1970 and 2002 are above 2 for each year. Fort the last couple years the country is assigned scores above 3. The average score for Turkey between the years above is 2.41. This indicates that Turkey has a globalization level that can be considered to be medium level.

Since the early years of independence Turkey has turned its face to the West and reforms followed to change the country and the society in the direction of the West. Accordingly, international status of the country has been among the Western powers. Turkey has become member of NATO during the early years of the organization. In addition to this, Turkey declares its support for international norms and peaceful solutions of disputes. There have been problems of the country such as Cyprus issue that created tension between Turkey and the international community. Yet, Turkey declared its attachment to the norms and international community as a main principle of its international status. Moreover, Turkey, for long, has been working to become a full member of European Union and this has dominates its foreign relations and domestic reforms for several decades.

5.9.2.5. Urban Poverty

Between 1990 and 2004 the percentage of the population living under the national poverty line in Turkey is 27 % (UNDP) and 18.7% lives for under 2\$ per day¹⁷⁶. The country has 1.9 % annual rate of change in urbanization between 2005 and 2010 (CIA)¹⁷⁷. Turkey having 1.7 % annual growth rate in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 has 41.6 % urban population in 1975 while this ratio increased to 67.3 % in 2005¹⁷⁸. The country experiencing a growth in its transition economy still undergoes the process of urbanization with a considerable level of poverty.

In Turkey poverty started to develop an intense pattern after the 1980s (Sonmez, 2007: 324). The country undergoing urbanization and having a concentrated poverty trend could not be successful in alleviating the impact of poverty in dominating the urban character of the country. One of the dynamics of concentrated poverty in the metropolitan cities of Turkey is related to the over-growth of some city economies with migration from economically less developed regions (Sonmez, 2007: 324). Those who are fascinated by the pictures of city life with promising- in several cases not reachable- "supply of housing, urban infrastructure, and job opportunities in these cities" (Sonmez, 2007: 235) and a better life style prefer to live in cities mostly without cultural, social or economic tools necessary for a city life. Existence of informal economy attracting more migrants in the city life and limited capacity of the state in meeting the needs of the increasing-especially with new migrants without the tools necessary for city life- population, has resulted in urban poverty in Turkey.

 ¹⁷⁶ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_TUR.html</u> on July 16, 2009
¹⁷⁷ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁷⁸ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_TUR.html</u> on July 16, 2009

Turkey maintained its process of economic development and integration with the global economy. However, this has been far from being a cure for urban poverty but changed the type or the structure of the urban poverty in its especially large cities. Sonmez (2007: 326) writes:

After the 1980s, Turkey integrated to broader economic restructuring processes, which resulted in social polarization in many cities (...). Meanwhile, to overcome the negative impacts of the economic crisis of the 1970s, Turkey adopted structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. The implementation of such programs created many negative impacts on the middle and low-income population. "Since export oriented development model that depended on liberalization was adopted, the exploitative support of the export became the source of inflation; external debt rates and price controls were liberated, subvansions at some areas were cut off" (Aren, 1986, p. 31). [...] Ultimately, Turkey had an economic crisis in the late 1990s. The capacity of production decreased with the development of the money market. The urban places and the capital market became the new tools of economic investments. The growth rates in the sector of production, service and commercial declined in the late 1990s. Besides, under the influences of inflation, real wages declined. This also caused loses at the local markets, since the levels of importing increased as well (Kazgan, 1999). Consequently, the structure of poverty in urban areas started to change after the 1980s. Changes in the socio-economic policies created some new opportunities for some urban poor but also formed new socially excluded and disadvantaged groups in poverty. By the late 1980s, a pattern of the concentrated urban poverty evolved in inner areas because certain jobs in the informal economy are located in the inner areas of metropolitan cities.

The informal economy cities and general economic performance of development has not diminished but instead maintained and evolved urban poverty.

Turkey, which can be named as a transition developing economy, suffers from poverty. It has an uncertain and insecure economic structure for its populations concentrated in urban areas. The economy is very risk and state has been considered to be one of the main problems of the national economy in Turkey (Oh & Varcin, 2002: 718-719). Therefore, even state that is supposed to be providing at least basic protection to the individuals is perceived to be a constraint for the economic welfare.


In the 1960s, the Turkish government's policies based on the planned economy had accelerated industrialization, which is followed by the emergence of the organized labor force, and in 1963, the workers had gained legal rights to form labor unions, hence from the aspect of low income groups it could be said as considerable social security (Sonmez, 2007: 329). However, the industrialization in urban areas, which was capital intensive and foreign capital oriented, was inadequate to supply enough job opportunities for new migrants (Sonmez, 2007: 329). This resulted in the emergence of an informal sector that held no rights and therefore no social security or a union (Demir, 1993). Various studies on Turkey point out the presence of different types of relations that primarily depend on fellowship and kinship and also these roles in the survival strategies of the urban poor (Erder, 1996; Ersoy & Sengul, 2000, 2002; Kalaycioglu & Rittersberg 2002; Isik & Pinarcioglu 2001). The general picture of Turkey, then, is that there is a culture of conducting business or achieving security especially in city life. Generally, those excluded from the developments in social security and rights such as labor unions are the individuals turning to traditional kinship ties or families for seeking security in the risky conditions of Turkish economy, which makes Turkey a clientalist society in a transition.

Turkish society is taken into account as one of the instances of communities in which individualism is not existent but group interest or identity dominates the individual choices or preferences. Turkish culture has long been described as being high on collective identity (Hofstede, 1980). Several studies have also shown that Turkish samples tend to exhibit collectivistic tendencies (Goregenli, 1997; Imamoglu, Kuller, Imamoglu, & Kuller, 1993). However, this property of the Turkish society has been in change due to the general transition the country undergoes for several decades.

Turkish society having turned its face to the West since its foundation with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's reforms and been in a process of adopting the Western values gradually, has lost or evolved its several values. Collective identity is one of those that have been evolving over years. With embracing the market-based economic structure and following a path towards a Western style of living, social groups especially the new generations seeing no other alternative way due to the lack of experiences like of their elder family members, diverge from the traditional picture of the Turkish society. Recent research indicates that especially young generation s in Turkey have more individualistic characters and they perceive the society as more individual based rather than collectivist o community granting (Cukur & Rosaria T. De Guzman Gustavo Carlo, 2004; Aycan & Fikret-Pasa, 2003). Collective identity can be considered to be a strong element of Turkish society, yet it has been evolving and the new generations become more individualistic in their perception of the society.


5.9.2.6. Relative Deprivation

Turkey, according to the information gathered from UCAGI and the illustration of Graph 15, can be considered as medium rank country in comparison to standards of living. Life expectancy in the country is at the medium level and the country is ranked as 102^{nd} country among 196 nations. Illiteracy rate and infant mortality are at the medium level and the country is ranked as 71^{st} for these indicators.





The GDP per capita of Turkey is slightly above the medium level. Among 175th country Turkey is ranked as the 66th nation. The status of the country in comparison to other nations is indicated to be medium as the Graph below illustrates.



Graph 16

5.9.2.7. Political Instability

Turkey is one of the countries that have suffered from high level of political instability. According to POLITY IV, there have been permanent political and civil unrest in the country in addition to the regime changes and intervenes of the military in the government.

The military has been declared as the guarantor of democracy and secularism of the country, as well as development and welfare of the society. For this reason, the military intervened in politics several times and changed the rule for three times. In 1960, 1971 and 1980 the military took the power from the governments of the time and established militarily controlled regimes in the country. The role of the military in politics has triggered tension and political uncertainty for several times in the country.

In addition to the role of military resulting in political instability in Turkey, the problem of Kurdish minorities also has increased the level of uncertainty and unrest in the country. In 1984, Kurds of militant groups engaged in protracted conflict with Turkish authorities in quest for independence. Capture of main figures of militants by Turkish authorities lead to PKK rejection of armed struggle in 2000. However, Turkey continues repression of Kurds and periodically attacks are conducted by Kurdish militants who sought refuge in neighboring Iraq.

5.9.2.8. Regime Type

Turkey is one of the countries on the path of democratization. From the very beginning the nation has been trying to achieve a certain level of democracy. However, the country has its own national principles indicating that the participants of the democracy in the country have to be in line Kemalist ideology and any threat against the principles of the founder of the country are banned and excluded from the democratic system of the country.

The POLITY IV project provides extensive information about the region of the country. The data starts form 1800 since Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. In this work the scores after 1923 are considered.

The country has fluctuating scores of regime type. The scores vary across very democratic and very autocratic type of regime. It is interesting that the pre-coup d'état years in the country coincide with very high levels of democracy scores. However, during military rules the country experiences high level of autocracy.

For last three decades the country is assigned higher levels of democracy. The score of Turkey, for instance, is 9 for 1989 and for 1997 it is 7. The variance of the regime scores of the country and its trend towards democracy suggest regarding Turkey as one of the democratizing countries.

5.9.2.9. Education

Education in Turkey is controlled by the state. The secular principle of the country is also dominant. The religious education is controlled by the state and rather than state-controlled organizations any institutions is abstained from teaching religious principles or religion.

The expected school life in Turkey is 11 years. This mean is 12 years for male individuals in the country. The female school life expectancy is 11 years. Turkey spends 4% of its GDP for education. With this share of GDP spent for educational expenses Turkey is the 102nd country among 182 nations¹⁷⁹.

5.9.2.10. Demography

The population of Turkey is approximately 80,000,000. The distribution of the population among age groups is as follow: 27.2% aged between 0 and 14 years (male

¹⁷⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html</u> on July 16, 2009

10,701,631 and female 10,223,260); individuals aged between 15 and 64 years forms the 66.7% of the population (male 25,896,326 and female 25,327,403), and the segment of the society aged 65 years and over forms the 6.1% of the country (male 2,130,360 and female 2,526,544)¹⁸⁰.

The median age of the population is 27.7. The average age of the male population is 27.4 and for female population it is 28.1^{181} . The country has a very young population. More than 90% of the population is aged between 0 and 65.

5.9.2.11. Economic Conditions

Turkish economy planning on attracting investment from the global market has been tried to be developed or reformed in cooperation with global agencies like International Monetary Fund. The inward FDI performance of Turkey is given as 0.418 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index for inward foreign direct investment for 2001-2003. The score is less than 1. It is not a negative value therefore it does not mean that Turkey received less than its capacity in terms of FDI in these years. Yet, the score indicated that Turkey receives very low level of FDI contrary to its economic potential. This fact is mostly to be out of the fact that foreign investors are watchful concerning Turkish economy. Even, local or domestic investors have been cautious

A study conducted on the dynamics of the Turkish economy in comparison with another national economy has interesting results about the perception of the domestic

¹⁸⁰ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html</u> on July 16, 2009

¹⁸¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html</u> on July 16, 2009

businessmen of Turkey (Oh & Varcin, 2002). The authors by trusting on the interviews conducted with local business runners argues that the economic structure of Turkey is not trustworthy and political reforms are not enough to overcome the anxieties of the investors. Moreover, state or the political structure of the country is even thought to be a disadvantage of the Turkish economy. These indicate that Turkey have been on its way of economic development.

5.9.2.12. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy of Turkey is, historically, based on the Western-inspired reforms founder of the state. Such policies have placed heavy emphasis on Turkey's relationship with the Western world, especially in relation to the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. The post-Cold War period has seen a diversification of relations, with Turkey seeking to strengthen its regional presence in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as its historical goal of E.U. membership.

Turkey's internal problems such as terrorism have driven the country in the path of cooperation in the international system. The Kurdish problem within the country has played role in its relation with the neighboring countries. There have been disputes with Greece over the boundaries in the Aegean Sea, but tension has not escalated to armed conflict. Turkey has been in cooperation with several countries including Israel.

In general, foreign policy of Turkey is pro-western. However, Turkey in several cases tries to be independent and neutral. For domestic and historical reasons, it tries to picture a foreign policy independent of any influence and pursued for the sake of national

interests. Yet, it is obvious that Turkey has a pro-western and western-oriented foreign policy.

5.9.3. Conclusion: Turkey

Turkey having more than 99% percent of Muslim population experiences the existence of 1.44 level of approval of Islamist terror. The number of respondents in Turkey is 990 and 65% of this sample indicated that they would never approve Islamist terror conducted for the sake of Islam. The information on possible structural factors and approval of Islamist terror in Turkey is summarized below:

Approval of Islamist	Score: 1.44, 65% Never
Terror	
Adherence to Islam	Low-Medium
Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam
Colonialism	No Colonial Past
International Status	Globalization: 2.41
Urban Poverty	18.7% under 2\$, 67.3% Urban Population
Relative Deprivation	Medium, GDP Ranking: 66
Political Instability	Instable
Regime Type	Democratizing
Education	School Life Expectancy: 11
Demography	90% Young, Mean Age: 27.7
Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.418
Foreign Policy	Pro-West
	TerrorAdherence to IslamHostile & Peaceful IslamColonialismInternational StatusUrban PovertyRelative DeprivationPolitical InstabilityRegime TypeEducationDemographyEconomic Conditions

Table 8

5.10. Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, officially the Republic of Uzbekistan, is one of the countries having a predominantly Muslim population in Central Asia. The population of the country is approximately 28,000,000¹⁸². 88% of the population consists of Muslims, mostly Sunni, while Eastern orthodox form the 9% of the population and the ethnic diversity is as

¹⁸² Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html</u> on May 21, 2009

follow: Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%, Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Tatar 1.5%, other 2.5%¹⁸³.

Russia conquered Uzbekistan in the late 19th century. Resistance to the Red Army after World War I was eventually suppressed and a socialist republic set up in 1924. The country maintained its existence as Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist republic until 1991. The country gained its independence in 1991. It shares borders with Kazakhstan to the west and to the north, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the east, and Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to the south.

During the Soviet era, intensive production of cotton and grain led to overuse of agrochemicals and the depletion of water supplies, which have left the land poisoned and the Aral Sea and certain rivers half dry. Independent since 1991, the country seeks to gradually lessen its dependence on agriculture while developing its mineral and petroleum reserves. Uzbekistan is a dry, landlocked country of which 11% consists of intensely cultivated, irrigated river valleys. More than 60% of its population lives in densely populated rural communities. Recently Uzbekistan's economy has relied mainly on commodity production, including cotton, gold, uranium, and natural gas. Uzbekistan is now the world's second-largest cotton exporter and fifth largest producer; it relies heavily on cotton production as the major source of export earnings and has come under increasing international criticism for the use of child labor in its annual cotton harvest. Other major export earners include gold, natural gas, and oil

¹⁸³ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html</u> on May 21, 2009

In Uzbekistan current concerns include terrorism by Islamist militants, economic stagnation, and the restriction of human rights and democratization. The country still undergoes several processes concerning politics, social structure and economics.

5.10.1. Islamist Terror and Approval

Uzbekistan is one of the countries having trouble with terrorism. The country has been working to counter the Islamist movements that threaten the state. Uzbekistan has been considered as one of the countries facing Political Islam and Wahhabis movements as one of the security issues having broad implications for regional welfare (Zelkina, 1999: 358-362).

Conflicts in the neighboring countries had a negative influence on some categories of the population of Uzbekistan. The spread of slogans about returning to Islamic values and about establishing Islamic statehood in the region created preconditions for the appearance of persons like G. Namangani and T. Yuldashev who with the support of foreign Islamists organized the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and became its leaders (Sayfulin, 169). The United States believe bin Laden supplied most of the funding for setting up the IMU, with some Uzbek and Tajik officials saying the al Qaeda leader encouraged Yuldeshev and Namangani to organize such a group in the first place, which declared a Jihad against the Uzbek government and sought to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan¹⁸⁴. The early years of the independent country has witnessed the existence of Islamist groups resorting to violence and aiming to establish an Islamist state within its borders.

¹⁸⁴ Retrieved from <u>http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm</u> on July7, 2009

It took some years and several large-scale terrorist actions organized by the IMU for the world community to recognize it as an international terrorist organization (Sayfulin, 170). The attacks conducted by this organization brought IMU as one of the concerns of the states. The fears of the Uzbek leadership were not without cause since the young republic became the target of terrorist actions with destroying consequences and human victims several times (explosions in Tashkent in February 1999, attacks on Uzbekistan's border provinces by terrorist bands in 2000-2001, terrorist actions in Tashkent in March and July 2004) (Sayfulin, 170).

The young republic of Uzbekistan has been experiencing the existence of Islamist terror within its borders. The general aim of the main Islamist group is to establish an Islamic rule within the borders of Uzbekistan and this organization is reported to be related to al-Qaeda that is considered to be fund the establishment of the organization. Therefore, there exists the threat of Islamist terror having Salafi orientations.

The Islamist movements claiming that they fight for the sake of Islam or in defense of Islam are not approved at higher levels in Uzbekistan. The level of approval of Islamist terror in Uzbekistan is 1.23. It is very close to never. According the Survey results of PEW the public approval of violence for the sake of Islam is very low. 618 respondents answered the question on the approval of Islamist terror in Uzbekistan. 78% of the respondents indicated that they never approve the act of terror for the sake of Islam. Uzbekistan with this situation of approval of Islamist terror is the country where the highest percent of respondents indicate their preference as never approval.

5.10.2. Factors

5.10.2.1. Adherence to Islam

Islam, as the religion of majority in Uzbekistan, can be analyzed for three different intervals: Pre-Soviet rule, Soviet rule and After Soviet Rule periods. For this work, the last years of the Soviet rule and its aftermath is useful for understanding the role of Islam in Uzbekistan.

Revivalism of Islam in both cultural and political spheres became a dominant characteristic of the country especially after the adoption of *perestroika* or *glasnosts* in the USSR (Hanks, 2007; Ruzaliev, 2005; Zelkina, 1999; Khalid, 1993). Islam and Political Islam have been among the controversial issues of the state especially after the independence of the country from the Soviet rule. "After the declaration of national independence, the leadership of Uzbekistan made clear its strategic orientation towards the creation of secular democratic statehood and in a state with an absolute majority of the Muslim population, all political organizations with religious extremist maintenance were banned at the legal level. In consequence, the political leadership and power structure of the Republic became the main targets of the Islamic extremists' terrorist threats" (Sayfulin, 170). There have been several movements fighting for several reasons but with relation to Islam within the country (Hanks, 2007: 211). However, in general, it has been indicated that that Islamist rhetoric exists in Uzbekistan in an inhospitable cultural milieu (Khalid, 1993:590). Khalid (2003: 576-583) summarizes the historical process Islam has undergone in Uzbekistan as follow:

Throughout the Soviet Union, the regime launched campaigns for literacy, health care, women's rights, and enlightenment. Two aspects of the program pursued during the Soviet era were of particular importance to our concerns (...): a radical transformation of

society, with attacks on the property and status of old elites (many of whom had already suffered huge blows from the economic crisis of the civil war) and the emergence of new elites; and a vision of a rational society in which religion had no place. [...]Today's Islamic revival originated in the context of the open assertion of national identity that took place throughout the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s as glasnost broke old taboos. [...] The most ubiquitous sign of the re-Islamization of society has been the availability of what one might call "religious commodities" in Uzbekistan. These range from plaques and stickers bearing prayers in Arabic and calendars with dates of Islamic holidays to posters bearing the photographs of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina and new editions of "classical" Muslim authors of Central Asia. Yet the life of these religious commodities is different from elsewhere in the Muslim world. In the cities of Uzbekistan, they can share shelf space with foreign liquor and tobacco, the most palpable symbols of the "opening" of the country to the outside world.

The Islamic revivalism apparent especially by the availability of the Islamic commodities in the market indicates that the Uzbek society has not strictly attached to the principles of Islam. They do not fight against the existence or consumption of alcohol or other products forbidden by Islamic principles. Individuals or the government does not prefer the restriction of symbols or products that are against Islamic way of life. Therefore, attachment to Islamic principles in the sense of preferring to go in line with the fundamentals of Islam is not high in Uzbekistan.

At the governmental level, there is a very high tendency of controlling the direction of Islam in Uzbekistan. The state aims at controlling any fundamental formation trying to spread the violent interpretation of or strict adherence to Islam. As a result of this, the Uzbek government has established its own institution for directing Islam within the country which might be considered alike to the policies of the Soviet rule that tried to bring religion or direction of religion under the state rule. The regime in Uzbekistan celebrates the Islamic cultural heritage of the region and invokes the moral and ethical values stemming from it while the regime is committed to remaining in firm control of Islamic expression (Khalid, 2003: 587). To this end, it has refashioned the Soviet-era bureaucracy. The institution controlling religion in the Soviet era has been replaced by 231

the Muslim Directorate of Uzbekistan (O'zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi), which functions as an organ of the state, firmly under the control of the regime (Khalid, 2003: 587). The Muslim Directorate has a monopoly over religious instruction, the organization of contacts with the rest of the Muslim world, and mosques and their personnel in the country (Khalid, 2003: 587). For instance, an official text issued as part of an educational effort to combat "religious extremism" renders it synonymous with "fundamentalism" and "Wahhabism" (Khalid, 2003: 588). In addition to this, especially the urban intelligentsia is deeply suspicious of any uses of Islam that are not entirely subordinated to the celebration of national heritage (Khalid, 2003: 590).

Islamic identity as argued above is in a revivalism period in Uzbekistan especially after the independence of the country from Soviet rule. The 're-Islamization' of society in Uzbekistan has been a complex process and generated conflict in political, cultural and social spheres (Hanks, 2007: 209). With the loosing of control over religion during the final years of the Soviet rule brought enormous interest to the religion as the society observed the construction of thousands mosques (Hanks, 2007: 215). Although, Islam is revisited in the country by many, state tried to keep its structure as secular and has adopted an official standing towards Islam with its own definition of what true Islam is (Khalid,2003 :580). Uzbek government has a policy of keeping religion out of the political sphere, and as a result it restricts role of Islam in the identity of the country.

5.10.2.2. Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power

"Despite employing a policy that has nationalized one version of Islam, thus marginalizing all other interpretations since 1999 the Uzbek state has experienced more religious violence directed against it by "extremists" than any other former Soviet republic in Central Asia. The list of violent acts attributed to Islamic militants from 1999 to 2004 is considerable, beginning with a series of car bombs detonated simultaneously in Tashkent in February of 1999; three consecutive summers of incursions by armed militants into the Fergana Valley and southern Uzbekistan between 1999 and 2001; and two episodes of suicide bombings and shootings in March and July of 2004" (Hanks, 2007: 211).

From the early years of the country Islamist movements appeared in the political life of Uzbekistan. Hanks (2007: 211-212) briefly summarizes the history of the Islamist movements:

Four organizations represent the majority of "unofficial" Islamist sentiment in Uzbekistan: the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Jamoat. Of these only three, and possibly only two, appear to be antithetical to American or Western interests and are currently active in Uzbekistan and greater Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Jamoat. Other politicized Islamic groups, most prominently the Islamic Renaissance Party, indicate little animosity towards the West either in their literature or by their actions.

HUT and the IMU are the organization having anti-American or Western interests and those are the movements resorting to violence in order to achieve the true way of life or Islamic rule of the country. It has been reported that the IMU in 1999 may have had 2000-3000 followers and most of them have operated from training camps in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (Hanks, 2007: 212). However, after 9/11 attacks in the U.S. series of campaigns against the violent movements in the region and many followers and key figures of the movements have been either arrested or killed. Therefore, a reasonable estimate of IMU membership today would be 1000 followers in all of Central Asia, and with the loss of funding, bases and training provided by the Taliban (and possibly Osama bin Laden), the IMU stands little chance of re-emerging as a political or military player in

the region, and in fact never approached the level of a mass movement (Hanks, 2007: 213). The suicide bombings and related violence in March and July of 2004 conducted by Jamaat may have been the work of IMU remnants, although the Uzbek government has accused HUT, unspecified "Wahhabis," and others of the attacks. In addition to this the number of members of HUT is reported to be very small- below 0.5 % of the overall population- and the overall support or attachment to the organization is very low in Central Asia (Hanks, 2007: 213-214)

The acts of violent Islamist movements in Uzbekistan are continuously tried to be limited and banished by the state. Although, certain attacks has been conducted especially against Islam Karimov (Khalid, 2003:588), the movements are extensively fought and restricted by the repressive regime leaving them narrow places for maneuver. Moreover, one of the most peaceful practices if Islam, Sufism, is widely accepted and promoted in the country where violent types of Islamist approaches are not granted. Therefore, hostile Islam can is weak in Uzbekistan as a result of the nature of Uzbek regime and the society.

5.10.2.3. History of Colonialism

Uzbekistan had a long history of control Russian rule in different regimes in several periods and achieved its independence in 1991. The nearest memory of foreign rule of Uzbek society is the Soviet Russian rule that has influenced the Uzbek society largely. Islam was tried to be alleviated in terms of its effect on the society during the soviet rule and it started its revivalism. The revivalism has been especially in the cultural sphere and political sphere has been closed to the effects of Islamist movements. In addition to the restriction on Islam, the Russian effect on the Uzbek society is also tried to be lessened. The government has been trying to decrease the Russian effect on the society by decreasing the cultural ties with Russia by such ways as limiting broadcasting of Russian television channels (Dadabaev, 2007: 409). However, the findings of Dadabaev (2007: 416-417) indicates that especially the generations experiencing Soviet rule have some sense of nostalgia to the past rule as a result of high societal interactions and mutual reliance. Therefore, it is not true to argue that Soviet rule has left an anger in the lives of those Uzbeks having seen their countries being governed by Russian power, it can be implied that as a result of the contemporary difficulties certain generation

5.10.2.4. International Status

As a region Uzbekistan has been one of the places that the rest of the world was unaware of for a long period of time due to the Soviet rule. The country has become a member of the global society of independent states in early 20th century. It has been a state that started to have its international status on its own since 1991.

The globalization level of the country is not ranked by the GlobalIndex. In addition to this, there is not available index giving idea about the level of globalization of Uzbekistan and its comparison with other countries. Therefore, as a score no information can be given about the international status of the country in terms of globalization.

There are some clues about the international status of the country. The main clue is about the role of Uzbekistan in fight against the terror led by the U.S. after 9/11. Uzbekistan officially calls for and agrees with the idea of global fight or war led by an international community against terrorism. It has been in close alliance and cooperation with USA in fighting terrorism. The second clue is about its declaration of respecting to or obeying the international norms. The Uzbek state tries to be integrated with the international community. Several setbacks for its high integration with the global community can be argued such as its geographic situation and long-lasting dominance of Russian state. The country has been largely in close relation with its neighbors rather than turning its face to the overseas countries. The reason can be that its closed geography and Russian dominance on the country. The country has been in a process of membership to World Trade Organization and it has achieved observer status. The country is also in cooperation with regional organization such as Asian Development Bank and The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The country is committed to non-nuclear projects and highly supportive in international security concerns.

In general, Uzbekistan tries to be parallel with international norms. It is supportive of cooperation among states at the global level. It does not have major international problems and it is in cooperation with other states in the issues such as nuclear threats or international terror.

5.10.2.5. Urban Poverty

Uzbekistan having 32.6 % of the population living below the national poverty line between 1990 and 2004 (UNDP)¹⁸⁵, has 1.6 % annual rate of change in urbanization¹⁸⁶. UNDP reports shows that almost 80% of the Uzbek population live for under 2\$ per day. This is a very high share of population compared to other nations such as Malaysia having approximately 8 % of population living on 2\$ per day, Tajikistan with 50% population or Ukraine with less than 2%. According to the UNDP statistics, urban

¹⁸⁵ Retrieved from <u>http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_UZB.html</u> on May 21, 2009

¹⁸⁶ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html</u> on May 21, 2009

population in 1975 is 39.1 % of total population and this ratio declined to 36.7 % in 2005. Uzbekistan. As UNDP reports, Uzbekistan has GDP per capita annual growth rate of - 0.4 % between 1975 and 2005. The country experiences poverty to a considerable extent, which is accompanied by a stationary trend of human development. However, urbanization is in increase.

"Uzbekistan in Figures"¹⁸⁷- a result of joint efforts of UNDP Country Office and Center for Economic Research in Tashkent, Uzbekistan- a specialized project on providing statistics about Uzbekistan gives detailed information especially for the Uzbek urban population by which analysis of this country can be deepened. The data provided indicate that the total number unemployed individuals were 35400 people in 2002 and 25500 in 2006. In these years, the number of unemployed people in urban areas is 14000 and 7100 respectively. The number of both total unemployed people and urban unemployed has decreased in Uzbekistan. Moreover, the poverty, as the numbers indicate, in urban areas is less than the half of the total number. This indicates that rural poverty is more serious compared to urban poverty. However, as argued by Wratten (1995: 22) in rural areas dealing with poverty is easier compared to urban areas. Therefore, although statistically rural unemployment outnumbers its counterpart in urban areas, the unemployment in urban life might have more serious implication for the society.

Ethnicity and identification of individuals according to their ethnic backgrounds in Uzbekistan is one of the important layers of the social structure in the urban areas

¹⁸⁷ Retrived from http://www.statistics.uz/ on May 21, 2009

(Dadabaev, 2007: 412). However, there is no report, data or information indicating that trade, business or social relations are conducted with people of a certain or similar ethnic backgrounds.

The available data overall implies that although rural poverty is statistically higher than urban poverty, and urban poverty is lessening in Uzbekistan. The overall economy of the country does not have a progressive trend that will meet the needs of urbanizing population but the population in the urban areas and unemployment is in a decrease.

Uzbek society is clientalist in the sense that they lack trust towards foreigners but rather develop their relations according to kinship and closeness of the others. A recent research using data from the Asia Barometer survey indicates that two traceable trends in respondents' answers are a certain distrust of each other and a desire to protect themselves through close kinship or residential ties (Dadabaev, 2007: 407). Dadabaev (2007: 419) writes that

(...) in many cases, people are left with no other choice but to resolve their problems through private means such as family ties, networking or private connections. This sends a message throughout the society that one has to rely on one's own 'community', while those who are not part of it are considered to be competitors for scarce resources and opportunities. These tendencies are evident in incidents of bribery or networking for entry or graduation from university, when people seek employment or business opportunities or when certain regional officials misuse and personalize the power entrusted to them.

Therefore we can conclude that clientalism is one of the dominant characteristics of the Uzbek society. The survey results are for 2007 and approval of Islamist terror in Uzbekistan is measured for 2002. However, characteristics of societies such as

clientalism or individualism resist change and they are durable for long periods of time. Therefore, it is appropriate to have such a conclusion from a survey conducted in 2007.

Collective identity in Uzbekistan after the Soviet rule has diminished and individuals feel responsible less to the society (Dadabaev, 2007). Uzbek individuals being used to working and acting for the sake of the society as a whole, started to loosen their understanding of responsibility towards their larger community composing with no respect to gender, religion or ethnicity and which was highly granted during the Soviet rule. The post-independence years brought the transition of the society towards a structure advancing loyalty or responsibility to smaller groups rather than the whole society. As Dadabaev (2007) argues in line with his survey analysis, the Uzbek society started to grant and attach to family that is prioritized over religious communities or ethnic groups.


While family became the most important social entity over society and other social communities in Uzbekistan (Dadabaev, 2007: 420), societal level trust has declined (Dadabaev, 2007: 416). People became more skeptical of others and expect less contribution from them in terms of their welfare. The transition of the economy, government and social structure of the Uzbek society has reflected changes in individuals' perception of the society or the communities larger than relative, kinship or family relations. Family and kinship became the main theme of the collective behavior or collective identity.

5.10.2.6. Relative Deprivation

For almost two decades the government of Uzbekistan has tried to increase the living standards of its citizens. The country being challenged by Islamist militants, economic problems and necessity of development of human rights has been in a process of development and emancipation of individual living standards since its independence. The country after long years of socialist rule tries to adopt free market economy and develop its society accordingly.


The statistics about Uzbekistan indicate that country has achieved development in some aspects of individual life while some data sign low level of success in several issues.

The overview of the Uzbek society, according to University of California Atlas of Global Inequality (UCAGI), for 2000 is as follow. Life expectancy is around the middle level and the country is ranked as the 100th country among 196. Illiteracy rate is extremely low and Uzbekistan is the 125th country. The higher the ranking the worse the situation is for this standard of life. Finally, infant mortality is, again, around the middle level and the country is 100th among 191 countries. This information is summarized at Graph 17 below.





Uzbekistan is at low level in the comparison of poverty among the countries. According to the calculations of UCAGI Uzbekistan is the 138th country among 175 countries about which information is available. The ranking of the country is illustrated in Graph 18.





5.10.2.7. Political Instability

The main source of this work for political instability, POLITY IV project, does not provide information about Uzbekistan. The young republic is not included in the project. However, several organizations or works focusing on political instability have drawn the general picture of the country and give information about the political situation.

One of the organizations focusing on political instability and political crisis in national states, 'International Crisis Group' reports that Uzbekistan suffers from political crisis and political situation is very vulnerable and highly likely to be instable. The group writes, for the beginning of 21st century, the following:

Evidence continues to mount that Uzbekistan's "unique state-construction model" is falling apart. The last two years have witnessed bombings in the capital, Tashkent (February 1999) and armed incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (summer 1999 and 2000). However, the growing potential for civil unrest is driven by the twin prongs of severe political repression and economic despair, as protests this year in Tashkent, Andijan and Jizzakh over crop seizures and the detention of political prisoners make clear.

During the early stages of independence, many observers attributed Uzbekistan's relative socio-economic and political stability to President Islam Karimov's authoritarian policies. Despite the country's often abysmal human rights record, and over the protests of human rights organizations and increasingly repressed opposition groups, most international financial assistance (including security aid) has continued to flow. Ironically, in looking past the Uzbekistan government's frequent abuses out of concerns regarding Islamist radicalism in the region, the international community has inadvertently helped create exactly the conditions that it has always feared the most. Growing political repression and poverty now provide a fertile breeding ground for violence, instability and increasingly active Islamist extremist groups. The authoritarian approach has at best postponed, but not defused. а looming economic and political crisis.

[...]The establishment of near absolute power by the executive branch has only been achieved though a brutal crackdown on moderate voices and through power-sharing arrangements with leftover Soviet-era bureaucrats in the "power" ministries. Tashkent's authoritarian domestic approach has sparked a political crisis marked by mismanagement, the emergence of a strong Islamist opposition, broad economic dislocation, endemic corruption, growing dissatisfaction with the government, poor relations with neighbors and continuing regional turmoil.

The country as a result of several factors suffers from political problems. It cannot

achieve a stable or durable political environment for the development of a better civil

^[...] As it (Uzbekistan) approaches the tenth anniversary of its independence (...), internal and external pressures threaten to crack the nation's thin veneer of stability. (...) It is clear that the most important factor driving the mounting instability is Uzbekistan's failure reforms.

society or democratic nation where individual freedoms are guaranteed or political power is distributed among several political actors.

5.10.2.8. Regime Type

Since the independence the official name of the country is "the Republic of Uzbekistan". However, unlike its name suggests the country is far from being ruled according to the will or under the influence of the people. The country is ruled by authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch¹⁸⁸.

The score is assigned to Uzbekistan by POLITY IV project is -9 for 1991. The country has record only for one year. The most authoritarian countries are assigned the score of -10 in this project. The score of Uzbekistan is very close to the highest score for authoritarianism. Therefore, Uzbekistan can be considered as a country that has a highly authoritarian regime.

5.10.2.9. Education

After the independence the state secularized the education in Uzbekistan. The religious education has been monopolized by the state and madrasas providing religious education out of the control of the state has been delegitimized by a Law in 1998 on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which prohibits private teaching of religious principles (Khalid, 2003: 588). The school system remains resolutely secular, with no religious instruction (Khalid, 2003: 585).

¹⁸⁸ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/UZ.html</u> on June 12, 2009

The school life expectancy of an individual in Uzbekistan is 11 years and the country spends 9.4% of its GDP for educational expenses in 1991¹⁸⁹. Uzbekistan is ranked as the 7th country spending the highest share of its GDP for education.

5.10.2.10. Demography

The population of Uzbekistan is approximately 28,000,000. The percentage of individuals aged between 0-14 years is 28.1% and 3,970,386 of this population is male while 3,787,371 are female. 67% is aged between 15-64 years (male 9,191,439 male and 9,309,791famele). The percentage of individuals aged 65 years and over is 4.9% (male 576,191 male and 770,829 female)¹⁹⁰.

The median age of total population is 24.7. The average age of male individuals is 24.2. Finally, the female age average is 25.2^{191} . The population of the country is very young and in the young age population there is not considerable differences between the male and female groups. Moreover, the number of the female individuals is more than the male in the age group between 15 and 64.

5.10.2.11. Economic Conditions

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Uzbekistan turned its face to the marketoriented economies and started its transition to contract intensive economy (Blackmon: 2007). Uzbekistan is considered to be one of the Central Asian developing economies and its performance in terms of reforms and success in its path oriented to contract intensive

¹⁸⁹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html</u> on June 12, 2009

¹⁹⁰ Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.htmlon June 12, 2009

¹⁹¹ Retrieved from <u>https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html</u> on June 12, 2009

is argued to be weak and far from reaching its destination. Blackmon (2007: 355) conducting interviews with several firm representatives that had invested or conducted business in Uzbekistan has found out that Uzbekistan lacks progress in reforms in areas such as foreign investment legislation, tax legislation, banking system reform, and higher levels of investment and business.

Therefore, there is information and data indicating that Uzbekistan's economy underdeveloped. It can be inferred that the economy is in a transition better shape.

For the period between 2001 and 2003 the inward FDI performance of Uzbekistan is given as 0.360 by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index. The value assigned to Uzbekistan is less than 1 and very close to 0. It is not a negative value therefore it does not indicate that it receives less than its capacity in terms of FDI but very close to 0 indicating that it receives a very low level of FDI.

5.10.2.12. Foreign Policy

Uzbekistan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, whose participating countries are former Soviet Union States, in December 1991. However, it opposed to reintegration and withdrew from the CIS collective security arrangement in1999.

Especially after the 9/11 attacks Uzbekistan declared its affiliation with the idea of fighting against the international and Islamist terror at the global level by an international community. The Uzbek government has cooperated with the U.S. by opening its borders to the international and U.S. forces in the fight against the terrorist groups in the neighboring countries. Uzbekistan was an active supporter of the U.S efforts against the worldwide terror and joined the coalitions that have dealt with both Afghanistan and Iraq. The relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States began to deteriorate after the so-called "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine. When the U.S. joined in a call for an independent international investigation of the events an Andijon, the President Islam Karimov changed the political alignment of the country to bring it closer to Russia and China, countries which chose not to criticize Uzbekistan's leader for their alleged human rights violations. In the late July 2005, the government of Uzbekistan ordered the U.S. vacates an air base in its borders¹⁹².

Until the year of the survey used to understand the level of approval of Islamist terror, Uzbekistan had close relations with the U.S. Rather than aligning with other countries such as China or Russia, the Uzbek government turned its face to the U.S. However, recent events has deteriorated the relations between Uzbekistan and the West led by USA and now Uzbekistan is gets closer to the countries that do not put pressure on it due to issues such as human right issues.

5.10.3. Conclusion

Uzbekistan being analyzed in terms of approval of Islamist terror is discussed for information about the structural factors that might affect the level of approval of Islamist terror. The overall information about Uzbekistan is summarized in the Table 9.

¹⁹² See <u>http://mfa.uz/eng/inter_cooper/</u>

	Approval of Islamist	Score: 1.13, 78% Never		
	Terror			
	Adherence to Islam	Low		
	Hostile & Peaceful Islam	Peaceful Islam		
T	Colonialism	No Colonial Past		
tar	International Status	Globalization: Not Available		
ais	Urban Poverty	80% under 2\$, 36.7% Urban Population		
ləc	Relative Deprivation	Low-Medium, GDP Ranking: 138		
Uzbekistan	Political Instability	Instable		
	Regime Type	Autocratic		
	Education	School Life Expectancy: 11		
	Demography	95% Young, Mean Age: 24.7		
	Economic Conditions	FDI Score: 0.360		
	Foreign Policy	Pro-West		
	Foreign Policy			

Table 9: Uzbekistan Summary

It is argued that Islamist rhetoric is less likely to be welcomed by the Uzbek society and the survey results indicate that Islamist terror is approved very close to never. The level of approval of Islamist terror in Uzbekistan is 1.23 and 78% of the respondents indicated that they never approve the act of terror for the sake of Islam.

Adherence to Islam is very low in Uzbekistan in the sense that there is not a tendency to go back to the fundamentals of Islam or pursue the way of living of the ancestors of Islam. Contemporary habits such as drinking alcohol or eating pork exist with the practice of Islam.

Hostile and peaceful Islam exists in Uzbekistan. Peaceful Islam is more powerful in the country. The reason is the habits or preferences of general public of not practicing Islam strictly and the repressive regime banishing any interpretation of Islam rather than officially sanctioned one.

The country had been under the rule of Russian control for long time periods. The independence movement against the Russian did not introduce Islam as a political factor but from the very beginning the Uzbek independence seekers planned for secular

structure. The Uzbek government, in addition to alleviation of the influence of Islam in political sphere, tries to restrict the effect of Russian culture on the society.

The country has turned its face to the West and declares its respect to the international norms. It is in cooperation with the international community especially in the area of security. Yet, there have been changes in its foreign policy after recent events in Georgia and Ukraine.

Urban poverty in Uzbekistan is low in scale compared to rural poverty. The structure in the country leaving individuals with scarce sources has resulted in an understanding of relying on own communities. Reliance on small scales in-groups such as family and kinship has found itself as a norm of conducting business, trade and other economic facilities especially related to the meeting the basic requirements in city life.

The welfare of the country is low or middle compared to other states. Almost 80% of the population live for under 2\$ per day and GDP per capita of the country is very low compared to other countries. It is ranked 138th among 175 countries.

The regime of the country is autocratic. The score assigned to it is -9 which is very close to the highest score of autocracy, -10. The regime suffers from political instability in the sense that civil and political unrest occurs from time to time in the country.

The population of the country can be considered to be extremely young. Almost 90% of the population is aged below 65. The male and female distribution does show high variances between genders, their share can be considered to be equal. The education provided to the population is secular and religious education is monopolized by the state. The school life expectancy is 11 years.

The economy of Uzbekistan has been going through a transition since the independence of the country. There have been reforms aiming at integrating the national economy with the global economic system. However, the Uzbek economy is still immature as FDI inflow rate of the country, which is 0360, indicates. Moreover, investors' choice and their explanation for not or less investing in Uzbekistan imply the Uzbek economy as a risky one for those having adopted the principles of contract intensive economic structure.

6. Chapter VI: Analysis and Discussion

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, information about the countries in terms of approval of Islamist terror and the structural factors that are considered to explain and influence level approval of Islamist terror in predominant Muslim countries have been given. In this section the information is analyzed in relation to the level of approval of Islamist terror in the cases.

The approval of Islamist terror shows variances across the 9 cases of this work. The mean of the values calculated for the level of approval of Islamist terror in these 9 predominantly Muslim countries is 2.1. The lowest level of approval of Islamist terror is in Uzbekistan with score of 1.23 and frequency of never as 78% and with 3.15 the highest is in Lebanon with the frequency of never as 12%. The other countries between these two extreme points are ranked in ascending order as follow: Turkey (1.44), Indonesia (1.77), Senegal (1.90), Mali (2.10), Pakistan (2.20), Jordan (2.33), and Bangladesh (2.47).

The information gathered for the countries and their situation in terms of approval of Islamist terror is summarized in Table 10. The table draws the general picture of the cases clearly and provides a frame for comparison easily.

	Uzbekistan	Turkey	Indonesia	Senegal	Mali	Pakistan	Jordan	Bangladesh	Lebanon
Approval of Islamist Terror	1.13, 78% Never	1.44, 65% Never	1.77, 55% Never	1.90, 50% Never	2.10, 35% Never	2.20, 38% Never	2.33, 26% Never	2.47, 24% Never	3.17, 12% Never
Adherence to Islam	Low	Low- Medium	Low-High	Medium	Low	High	High	Medium- High	High
Type of Islam	Peaceful	Peaceful	Peaceful	Peaceful	Peaceful	Hostile	Peaceful	Peaceful	Hostile
Colonial Past	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
International Status/Glob.	NA	2.41	2.33	1.5	1.10	1.28	3.05	1.39	NA
Urban Poverty	80% under 2\$, 36.7% Urban Pop.	18.7% under 2\$, 67.3% Urban Pop.	52.4% under 2\$, 48.1% Urban Pop.	56.2% under 2\$, 41.6% Urban Pop.	72.1% under 2\$, 30.5% Urban Pop.	73.6% under 2\$, 34.9% Urban Pop.	7% under 2\$, 82.3% Urban Pop.	84% under 2\$, 9.9% Urban Pop.	NA under 2\$, 86.6% Urban Pop.
Relative Deprivation	Low- Medium, GDP Ranking: 138	Medium, GDP Ranking: 66	Medium, GDP Ranking: 108	Low, GDP Ranking: 128	Extremely Low, GDP Ranking: 160	Low, GDP Ranking: 133	Medium, GDP Ranking: 88	Low, GDP ranking: 148	Medium, GDP Ranking: 67
Political Instability	Instable	Instable	Instable	Instable	Instable	Instable	Stable	Instable	Instable
Regime Type	Autocratic	Transition to Democracy (TD)	TD	TD	TD	TD	Autocracy	Autocracy, TD	TD
Education/ School Life Expectancy	11 years	11 years	11 Years	NA	7 Years	7 Years	13 Years	8 Years	13 Years
Demography	95% Young, Mean Age: 24.7	90% Young, Mean Age: 27.7	95% Young, Mean Age: 27.6	97% Young, Mean Age: 18.6	97% Young, Mean Age: 15.8	95% Young, Mean Age: 20.8	96% Young, Mean Age: 24.3	>90% Young, Mean Age: 23.3	92% Young, Mean Age: 29.3
Economic Conditions (FDI Score)	0.360	0.418	-0.324	0.525	1.568	0.668	0.941	0.083	0.823
Foreign Policy	Pro-West	Pro-West	Non-Aligned	Pro-West	Pro-West	Pro-West	Pro-West	Pro-West, Minor Problems	Western- Leaning

Table 10: Cases Summary
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Uzbekistan and Lebanon are the countries with the extreme values of approval of Islamist terror in this work. Turkey and Bangladesh are the countries with the second extremist scores. Indonesia and Senegal are those with values below the average. Mali has the mean value while Pakistan and Jordan have values above the mean. This classification is the main framework for analyzing the information gathered in the previous chapter. Firs, two extreme values countries will be compared as separate comparison groups. Then, the general trend of all countries will be analyzed by looking at each factor.

6.2. Analysis

6.2.1. Uzbekistan and Lebanon

Highest level of support is in Lebanon and the lowest is in Uzbekistan. These two countries deserve special attention since logically they should also be the cases with extreme instances of the factors thought to be effective on the level of approval of Islamist terror. In Uzbekistan, for instance, relative deprivation and urban poverty should be extremely low compared to the other country cases and it should be vice versa for Lebanon.

In Uzbekistan the level of approval of Islamist terror is 1.33 and 78% of the respondents never approve violence for the defense of Islam. On the other hand, in Lebanon 3.17 is the level of approval of Islamist terror while only 12% of the respondents indicate that they would never give their consent to the usage of violence for the sake of Islam. The variance between the levels and the frequencies of the answers as never is considerable in this pair of extreme value countries. Therefore, the variance in the level or situation of the structural factors should also be significant in the comparison of these two countries.

Uzbekistan and Lebanon are important cases in the analysis of Islamist terror not only because they have extreme values of the level of approval but they have other properties. First of all, Uzbekistan is post-Soviet country which makes the role of Islam in the country historically weak. The society in Uzbekistan has been alienated from religion for long time periods. This might be influential on the situation of Islamist terror in this country. In addition to this, Uzbekistan is geographically far from the Middle East and does not have physical proxy to most of the controversial issues such as Israel-Palestine conflict. While, on the other hand, Lebanon shares both physical and psychological proxy with highly controversial and sensitive issue of Palestine as a result of the refugees from Palestine and the conflict with the Israel. However, the scope of the comparison conducted here is limited to the scope determined by the structural factors of this work.

Levels of adherence to Islam in these two countries are in line with the expectation of the approach on this factor. Uzbekistan has a very low level of adherence while it is high in Lebanon. The attachment to Islamic principles and orthodox practices of religious principles vary in accordance with the level of approval of Islamist terror.


The dominant types of Islamist movements or the ways Islam is politicized in these countries are also parallel to the levels of approval of Islamist terror. In Uzbekistan, peaceful Islam is more powerful compared to hostile Islam. However, Lebanon is a stage for more aggressive and war prone ideologues and movements resorting to violence and armed struggle.

Colonial past is different in these two countries. Uzbekistan does not have a colonial past but it was ruled by Russian during several periods of time. However, in the last periods of foreign rule over Uzbekistan, the region was regarded as a separate integrity like other states of Soviet rule, while Lebanon as a colonized region was inferior

to the main land of the colonial power. In this sense, these two countries can provide support for the approach on colonial past.

The percentages of the population living for under 2\$ per day in these countries are very close to each other. The data does not let the comparison of the urban population share in these countries. However, it has been indicated that the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan is decreasing parallel to the decline in the urban population percentage. This indicates that urban poverty is getting less serious in Uzbekistan or at least not getting worse while the situation of urban poverty is very serious in Lebanon due to the problems such as refugee waves. Therefore, these two countries where clientalism and collective identity are present support the approach on urban poverty.

Lebanon has a better situation in the comparison of GDP per capita than Uzbekistan. Moreover, life expectancy is slightly higher in Lebanon. However, illiteracy rate and infant mortality is worse in Lebanon. These points are clearly illustrated in Graph 19. Lebanon can be a medium level country in relative deprivation in comparison to other states while Uzbekistan is a low level country, as summarized in the Table 10. Uzbekistan is the 138th country while Lebanon is 67th nation in the comparison of GDP per capita. Therefore, relative deprivation does not explain the variance in the levels of approval of Islamist terror in these two countries.





Both of the countries have young populations. The average age is slightly younger in Uzbekistan. Comparing the young generation situation in the countries and the variance between the levels of approval of Islamist terror, it is clear that young generation or demographic structure is not able to explain the change in the situation of consent for violence for the sake of Islam. The education levels in the countries are not consistent with the level of approval of Islamist terror, either.

Both of the countries suffer from economic difficulties. FDI score of the countries do not provide support for the approach on economic situation of countries. Both of the countries having difficulties in their economies also suffer from political instability. However, Lebanon is a transition democracy with a better score compared to Uzbekistan, which has dominantly autocracy scores as indicators of its regime type. This is consistent with one of the arguments from regime type approach that autocratic regimes are more likely to repress terror with the means that is not available in democracies. Uzbekistan has pro-western foreign policy while Lebanon has troubles with Israel and indirectly with the West. The foreign policy of Lebanon is shaped in a western-leaning direction but still not as pro-Western as Uzbek foreign policy. Therefore, this fact supports the idea about foreign policy and consent for approval of Islamist terror relation.

6.2.2. Turkey and Bangladesh

Second highest level support is in Bangladesh and the second lowest is in Turkey. These two countries form the second group of comparison. Neither of the countries has a history similar to Uzbekistan. The societies in these two countries were not alienated from religious principles as a part of state policy. Moreover, neither of the countries is close to Palestine in the sense of physical proxy or neither of them has permanent tension with Israel. In other words, they do not play important roles in sensitive issue of the Muslim world.


In Turkey the level of approval of Islamist terror is 1.4 and 65% of the respondents never approve Islamist terror. However, in Bangladesh the score is 2.47 and while only 24% of the respondents indicate that they would never approve violence for the sake of Islam. The difference between the stage of consent for terror and the regularities of never approval are substantial. Parallel to this situation the condition of structural factors analyzed above should show variance across these two cases, if the predictions of the approaches are valid.

Levels of adherence to Islam in these two countries are medium. In Turkey it can be considered to be in between low and middle but close to middle while in Bangladesh it is between medium and high close to high. The social fabrics in these two countries are similar in the sense that mainstream practices of Islam peaceful. Therefore, adherence to Islam can explain the approval of Islamist terror while type of dominant Islam does not support the prediction of the approach.

Turkey does not have history of colonialism, yet gained its independence against foreign rule. Bangladesh has colonial history as a part of India. In this pair, the country having colonial past has higher level of approval of Islamist terror. Hence, this pair of comparison provides support for the prediction of the approach on colonialism. Similar to colonialism globalization or international status is also finds support for this pair. The higher the globalization of a country, the lower the level of approval of Islamist terror is.

In Bangladesh the poverty calculated by the share of the population living for under 2\$ per day is far higher than Turkey. The urban population of the country is very minor. The high level of poverty is also experienced in the urban areas of the country as the information suggests in the previous parts. In these countries, clientalism and collective identity are common. The urban poverty is less serious in Turkey compared to Bangladesh. These support the predictions of urban poverty factor.

The relative deprivation level of these two countries support the expectation that the more relatively deprived a country, the higher the approval of Islamist terror. As the Graph 20 illustrates and GDP per capita comparison of countries in the Table 10 shows, Turkey is better in terms of life conditions compared to Bangladesh.



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Both of the countries experience political instability and they are both democratizing countries. However, Bangladesh has more scores of autocracy compared to Turkey. In this sense, this pair of countries does not support political instability and regime type approach.


Education approach, economic conditions and demography factors are supported by these two countries. Expected school life in Turkey is higher and approval of Islamist terror is lower. The mean age in Turkey is higher than Bangladesh and this is consistent with the idea that the younger the population the higher the approval of Islamist terror. Finally, the FDI score of Turkey is higher than the one of Bangladesh.

Foreign policies of these two countries do not vary parallel to the level of approval of Islamist terror. Both of the countries have pro-Western policies, yet the levels of consent for the usage of violence for the sake of Islam are not consistent with this since they are not similar or very close to each other.

6.2.3. Nine Muslim Countries and Trends of Factors

In this part rather than looking at pairs or groups of states, analysis of each factor according the information on 9 cases will be the main basis. The trend of each factor in relation to the level of approval of Islamist terror across 9 predominantly Muslim countries will be analyzed. The variance of factors will be assigned basic scores for each level and quantitative analysis will be formed.


Adherence to Islam in countries is described as low, medium and high. Some countries are given the status of low-medium and low-high. The low level is codified as 1, medium as 2, high as 3, low-medium as 1.5, and low-high as 2.5.



Graph 21

As Graph 21 illustrates, for 9 cases the approval of Islamist terror and Adherence to Islam do not show consistency. For Uzbekistan, Turkey and Indonesia the direction of levels of two variables are consistent that as the adherence to Islam increase the level of approval of Islamist terror rises. For specific pair of states adherence to Islam correlates with approval of Islamist terror, but this is not enough for generalization.


Type of Islam is codified as 0 and 1. 0 assigned to country if peaceful Islam is dominant in the country and 1 is used for the dominance of hostile Islam. The scores assigned for this factor is not proper for analysis of the direction or trend in relation to approval of Islamist terror which has values from 1 to 4. However, the frequency of hostile Islam should be expected to be intense, at least, for the group of states that have approval scores above the mean which is 2.10.






The Graph 22 illustrating the level of approval of Islamist terror and type of Islam demonstrates that Pakistan and Lebanon are the only countries having hostile Islam as the dominant type or interpretation of religion. However, at least, on the graph countries located on the right of Mali should have hostile Islam as dominant interpretation of religion.

Colonial past is the factor that is supposed to show the same trend as of type of Islam. However, except Turkey and Uzbekistan, all of the countries having mean or above mean scores should have history of colonialism. History of colonialism is assigned the value of 1 and lack of history of colonialism is given 0.




Graph 23

The international status of countries is illustrated with the help of globalization scores of countries derived from GlobalIndex dataset. The scores range from 1 to 6.5 in the GlobalIndex dataset. The higher the globalization score of a country, the less the approval of Islamist terror should be. As the illustration below shows, for the countries below the mean score of approval and for the mean country the level of globalization is consistent with the prediction of the approach. However, for the countries above the mean, this consistency is not existent.






For urban poverty the percentage of population living for under 2\$ per day and the share of urban population in the countries are used for each country. The reason is that there is a general trend in every case of this work that they suffer from some basic problems generating urban poverty, but their positions in terms of the share of the population living for under 2\$ per day and percentage of urban population are different. For each country these two indicators are multiplied and compared in the Graph 25. The results for the multiplication of these values are as follow: Uzbekistan- 0.2936, Turkey-0.125851, Indonesia- 0.252044, Senegal- 0.233792, Mali-0.219905, Pakistan-0.256864, Jordan-0.05761, Bangladesh-0.08316, and Lebanon- Not Available. This variance can account for the change at the level of urban poverty experienced in a country. In the graph Uzbekistan and Lebanon are included but their case of urban poverty is different from other. For Lebanon information is missing for the percentage of the population living for under 2\$. In addition to this, Uzbekistan is the only country where share of urban population and rate of unemployment decreases. Ignoring these two state, urban poverty trend is not consistent with approval of Islamist terror. The quantitative analysis of the level of urban poverty in nine countries indicates that Indonesia, Senegal, Mali and Pakistan have close level of urban poverty and their levels of approval of Islamist terror are similar, too. However, since several urban poverty includes several other problems rather than the population living for under 2\$ per day and the level of urban population the discussion in the comparison of two extreme value country groups give more information about this variable.





Relative deprivation is not supported as a factor explaining approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. The GDP per capita of countries and their comparison shows that not every country with a status of very low GDP per capita has high level of public consent for Islamist terror. Political instability factor is clearly not supported across the variance of 9 countries. Except Jordan, all country cases suffer from political instability. It cannot explain the variance in the level of approval of Islamist terror.

The regime type of the countries are scored as 1, 2, 3 and 1 is for democracy, 2 for transition or democratizing regimes, 3 for autocracies, and 4 for regimes that is directed to democracy especially from high levels of autocracy. As Graph 25 illustrates Uzbekistan and Jordan are autocracies and Bangladesh is directed to democracy from a high level of autocracy. The remaining 6 countries are transition democracies. The regime type does not have a consistency across countries or a certain trend parallel to approval of Islamist terror. However, the internal dynamics of each regime can shed light about the trends of Islamist terror. Yet, the comparison of general characteristics of countries does not explain the variance of approval of Islamist terror.



Graph 26

Education levels of countries that are scored according to the school life expectancy periods in countries do not show variance in line with the level of approval of Islamist terror. The country with the highest level of approval of Islamist terror is the country with the longest period of expected school life for individuals.

Demography of the countries are not as the approach on young male status assumes. The mean countries have the youngest generations while Lebanon is supposed to have the youngest generation.

Finally the FDI scores giving clues about the economic structure of the countries and foreign policies- which is constant for 9 cases since any state in the sample has pro-Western leanings- do not explain the variance in the level of approval of Islamist terror.

In conclusion, the analysis of the trends of 12 factors in relation to approval of Islamist terror across 9 cases indicates the weakness of factors in explaining the level of approval. None of the factors show consistency with the variance of consent of the public in different countries.

6.3. Discussion

The findings of the analysis of 9 cases concerning 12 factors and approval of Islamist terror indicate that there is no support for any factor to whole extent. The trends of factors for 9 cases are not consistent but some factors show consistency for some states as the analysis above indicate.

Adherence to Islam is partly supported. The comparison two groups of countries with extreme values provide support for adherence to Islam. At the individual level importance given to Islam or the level of attachment or practice of religion might not be effective or can be considered to be weak in explaining or predicting the level of Islamist terror and its approval. However, the role of Islam in a country in the sense that its historical construction or institutionalization, the role of religion in culture and the importance of religion in the country can be effective in the perception of Islamist terror that is advertized as a fight or struggle for the sake of Islam. For instance, in Uzbekistan the role of Islam as a fabric within the country might not be as important as it is in Lebanon. For the latter country, Islam can be one of the main components of identity and/or culture and as a result

Type of Islam or relative power of hostile and peaceful Islam is not backed by the information and comparison of the 9 cases of this work. The comparison of countries with second most extreme values does not provide support, either. However, group of Lebanon and Uzbekistan provide support. In Lebanon mainly the hostility of Islamist groups is shaped against Israel. The case of Israel is highly sensitive in the Muslim world and Lebanon is a party in the issue of Israel-Palestine conflict as a result of its geography and the refugee concern within its borders. Therefore, hostile Islam should be analyzed on its own. How and under what conditions and against which party it is shaped can be effective in explaining the emergence and maintenance of approval of Islamist terror.

Colonial past is one of the weak explanatory factors. It is common except for two cases in the sample composing of nine predominantly Muslim countries. However, the analysis of colonial history of countries and especially the process of independence can shed light in understanding Islamist terror. How independence achieved, how Islam incorporated in national identity construction and what roles religious parties played during the indolence process can be helpful in explaining the role of Islam in the countries, hence the emergence and approval of Islamist terror.

Urban poverty is one of the factors that find higher support. Two extreme value country groups provide support, while a certain groups of countries in the comparison of 9 countries given above partly supports urban poverty approach. The internal dynamics unique for each case can make the effect of urban poverty vary across countries. Therefore, this factor should be analyzed for each case and in relation to several internal dynamics of nations such as collective identity and clientalism. For instance, clientalism is a sort of strategy of the middle class and the elite in several countries. The elite might choose to make use of clientalist networks for control over the society and the middle class prefer clientalism to gain more power in the country. Therefore, the relation of the middle class and the elite with the Islamist ideas also might be influential in the predominantly Muslim countries If individuals are affected by the clientalist ties and behave in the way the patrons prefer then two what extent the elite or the middle class affiliate with or lead Islamist movements should be concern of those analyzing approval of Islamist movements since the scope of this work is far from identifying such a relation.

Relative deprivation does not have a trend that explains the variance of level of approval of Islamist terror across countries. It is a very weak factor in explaining the variance of approval of Islamist terror. Only in the comparison of the countries with second most extreme values, it finds supporting evidence.

Regime type and political instability are among the weak explanatory factors for approval of Islamist terror. However, these two factors are very broad that although the cases of this work are indicated as roughly transition democracies or regimes, each regime or transition can include several and distinctive conditions. The deeper analysis can bring more meaningful information or explanation, yet in broad terms these two factors have similar values in every country of this work. For instance, the democratization process after a civil war like in Lebanon can be different from Uzbek experience. The power distribution or power struggle can show variance across countries and this might be effective in the perception or local status of Islamist terror. Moreover, another point deserving more detailed analysis can be the factors adding to the political instability in a country. For instance, in Turkey the existence of terrorist groups rather than Islamist ones are elements increasing political instability. This might be effective in the sense that people accuse terrorist organization of unrest in the country and do not differentiate among the causes of the groups but focus on their tactics. In such a case approval of Islamist terror can be low.

Education, demography, economic conditions and foreign policies in the 9 cases of this work do not show considerable variances. They are very less likely to explain the approval of Islamist terror as inconsistent trends of these factors in the analysis of the nine cases indicate. However, education can shed light in the understanding of approval of Islamist terror in the sense that the religious education can vary across countries and its institutionalization can be different. In general, the factors analyzed in this work cannot be generalized with the findings in this work. Some factors can explain the variances across certain countries or country groups with the help of other explanatory factors. This implies that several factors can be in interaction with each other and influence the level of approval of Islamist terror in different ways depending on the internal dynamics of countries and the general atmosphere of states.

7. Chapter VII: Conclusion

Chapter VII summarizes the main motivation of this work and the aim of the research. Then, it briefly reminds the steps that have been pursued for the aim of the thesis and the problems that have been encountered during the research. Then, the findings of the research are summarized. Later, weaknesses and further research suggestions will are discussed.

7.1. The Motivation and the Aim

What has motivated this research is the fact that in international relations there has been an increase in the number of non-conventional threat sources. International Relations as a discipline has to incorporate studies focusing on the new type of threat with the existing approaches. As a result of the dominance of the realist paradigm in security studies threat causes created by the Islamist terror can be perceived to be out of the realm of security studies within International Relations. However, Islamist movements aiming at changing the rule of the states are likely to threaten the welfare of the people and implement changes in the international structure. They might not achieve their goals easily or in the near future. Yet, still their acts and influence within states and intra-state level results in tension in the system and jeopardy for people. If people are in danger as a result of any movement, states, by nature, should protect its citizens.

In recent year, in the international system Islamist terror mainly works under the umbrella of Salafi or Wahhabis ideology that targets the international system and aims at the establishment of an Islamic system under which Muslims achieve the true path and welfare. Salafism can be considered as a franchising that brings several local Islamist movements and citizens, and creates common grounds for already diversified Muslim 270 societies. At this point how Salafi movement finds support among the locals or how its points appeal to the various Muslim people becomes important.

Considering Islamist movements as threat sources in the international system and arguing them as branches of a general brand called Salafism, this work aimed at focusing on approval of Islamist terror. It started research with the question under what conditions approval of Islamist terror occurs in predominantly Muslim countries. The main concern has been on the structural factor that might affect the level of approval of Islamist terror.

Approval of Islamist terror has taken as the main point of this work, as a result of the idea that fighting terrorism is different from fighting terrorists. The surrounding in which terrorist survive and strengthen their movements should be understood carefully and the conditions emancipating the terrorist organization should be either altered or eliminated, or should be grasped well for better policy implications. Otherwise, terrorists will not find difficulty in surviving or re-emerging even if the states arrest their leaders or huge numbers of their members. As a result of this point view, the merit of this workstarting from the notice of the fact that there is a need to grasp the structural factors the terrorist organizations make use of- has been to understand the factors effecting the public approval of Islamist terror and search for evaluating of the explaining the factors.

7.2. Research

The aim of this work has been to analyze the condition under which approval of Islamist terror occurs in predominantly Muslim countries. For this purpose two broad literature, Political Islam and terrorism, have searched for approaches. The arguments of several works have been reviewed and assessed. In the evaluation process a certain criteria has been followed in this work and some of the factors have been considered to be weak in explaining the issue at stake or unable to give insight to it.

In this work I identified 14 main approaches that have structural implications. The factors around which detailed discussion will be given in the coming parts are: 1-Adherence to Islam, 2- Hostile and Peaceful Islam and Their Relative Power, 3- History of Colonialism and Anti-Westernism, 4- Revolutionary Movements, Illegitimate Rule and Failed Ideologies, 5- Differences Between Economic Structure, 6- Collective Identity, 7- Political Instability, 8- Regime Type, 9- Current International System, Globalization, 10- Clientalism, 11- Urban Poverty, 12- Relative Deprivation, 13- Education, 14- Young Male Status. Due to the similarities or commonalities of point of inquiry for some these approaches, some of them have been. In addition to this, the approaches points out to some certain properties of countries to be considered for an analysis about Islamist terror.

After discussing on the approaches, mainly the level of adherence to Islam within states, type of Islam dominant among people, colonial history, urban poverty, relative deprivation of states compared to other states, demography, economic situations of states, regime type, political instability, education structure, foreign policies of countries, and international status of states have been analyzed as structural factors.

In order to understand the effects of the 12 variables that have been considered to be influential in explaining the issue or likely to give insight for the level of approval of Islamist terror, case study has been chosen as the main method of this thesis. The cases for this work have been chosen among the 48 predominantly Muslim countries. The cases have been selected according to available data. The sample I have conducted rich data analysis for the factors discussed in relation to approval of Islamist terror consisted of 9 countries: Uzbekistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Senegal, Mali, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Lebanon.

7.3. Findings

Information has been gathered about the 12 factors that have been thought to be effective in approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries. They are analyzed in accordance with the level of approval in the 9 country cases.

The findings of the analysis of 9 cases concerning 12 factors and approval of Islamist terror indicate that there is no support for any factor to whole extent. The trends of factors for 9 cases are not consistent but some factors show consistency for some states.

Adherence to Islam is supported to a degree. The evaluation of two groups of countries with extreme values supply support for adherence to Islam. Meaning given to Islam individuals might not be helpful in explaining the level of Islamist terror and its approval. However, the role of Islam in a country in the sense that its historical construction or institutionalization can be effective in the awareness of Islamist terror.

Type of Islam is not backed by the information and comparison of 9 cases. However, the group of Lebanon and Uzbekistan provides support while the comparison of the countries with second most extreme values does not provide support. In Lebanon mainly the antagonism against Israel is apparent as a result of its geography and the

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refugee concern within its borders. Therefore, hostile Islam should be analyzed on its own.

Colonial past is one of the weak explanatory factors. It is common except for two cases in the sample of case studies. However, the investigation of the history of countries and particularly the development of independence movements can shed light in understanding Islamist terror. How self-government achieved, how Islam included in state characteristics building and what roles religious parties played during the independence process can be helpful in explaining the role of Islam in the countries, hence the emergence and approval of Islamist terror.

Urban poverty is one of the factors that find higher support. Two extreme value country groups provide support and comparison of 9 countries partly supports urban poverty approach. The interior elements exclusive to each case might create variances of the effect of urban poverty across countries.

Relative deprivation does not have a consistent trend across countries. It is a very weak factor in explaining the variance of approval of Islamist terror. Only in the comparison of countries with second most extreme values, it finds supporting evidence.

Regime type and political instability are among the weak explanatory factors of approval of Islamist terror. However, these two factors are very broad that although the cases of this work are indicated as transition democracies or regimes, each regime or transition can include several and distinctive conditions. The deeper analysis can bring more meaningful information or explanation, yet in broad terms these two factors have similar values in every country of this work.

Education, demography, economic conditions and foreign policies in the 9 cases of this work do not show considerable variances. They are very less likely to explain the approval of Islamist terror as inconsistent trends of these factors in the analysis of the nine cases indicate. However, education can shed light in the understanding of approval of Islamist terror in the sense that the religious education can vary across countries and its institutionalization can be different.

In general, the factors analyzed in this work cannot be generalized with the findings in this work. Some factors can explain the variances across certain countries or country groups with the help of other explanatory factors. This implies that several factors can be in interaction with each other and influence the level of approval of Islamist terror in different ways depending on the internal dynamics of countries and the general atmosphere of states.

7.4. Weaknesses and Further Research

This work having the merit of identifying several structural factors effective on the level of approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries aimed at providing information about and analysis of 12 main factors. These factors have been identified by the review of two broad literatures and the findings about these factors have been summarized below. However, this work suffers from some weaknesses and therefore has implications for further research. One of the weaknesses is that in the case studies the information gathered is not highly standardized for each case for a better comparison. The cases for this work have been selected according to the available data of the dependent variable, approval of Islamist terror. Therefore, the cases have not been set in way that they have similar backgrounds or common points. Therefore, there is not a scale for the variables. That is it is not possible to claim that collective identity is more dominant in one case than it is in the others. However, the available data enable the researcher make a rough analysis of the cases and a comparison of them.

Another weakness is that cases have been selected according to the available data and this situation made it inevitable that some important country cases have not been analyzed. There are more countries where Islam is more dominant and which might have more important roles in the process of Islamists and their effect in the international scale. However, as a result of the limited data available for approval of Islamist terror the research had to be restricted to a number of states.

As a result of these weaknesses further research should be conducted in order to enhance the findings and strengthen the results of this thesis. A further research can be the comparison of the cases with better standardized information about the variables. If the data is more quantitative that provides better standardization and the same cases are compared and analyzed for the same variables the results of the thesis can be tested.

Another further research can be to develop a standard measurement of approval of Islamist terror rather than the available one derived from survey results. Instead of relying on the survey results and providing a new framework for analyzing approval of Islamist terror would bring the advantage of choosing more cases from the sample of predominantly Muslim countries. Important country cases can be analyzed. Cases can be selected to make more controlled comparison and cases with most similar or most different backgrounds can be analyzed in order to observe the effects of other factors rather than the four used in this work. Finally, cross time analysis of single cases can be done.

The final further research can be about the comparison of the data used for approval of Islamist terror. In this work considering possible effects of Iraqi war led by the U.S. or an international community, the PEW data for 2002 has been used. However, discussion on the effects of Iraqi war can be built and possible effects can be analyzed which might lead to the comparison of the results of datasets for two different periods and the findings of this work can be evaluated.

The limitations about the available data and the complex nature of the issue at stake inevitably have resulted in the existence of several weaknesses in this work. The case selection and the analysis of the factors have been tried to be kept as broad as possible to alleviate the effects of those weaknesses. These weaknesses can easily be overcome with further researches which can easily replicate this work or modify several parts of it. Since this work has analyzed several factors and discussed them in a broad number of cases it provides insight for the effects of the factors and enables readers compare several country cases. Moreover, it provided ideas and inspiration for further research on approval of Islamist terror in predominantly Muslim countries which is a very important topic in Islamist terror studies that should be given more importance in security studies in International Relations.

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