

**DISCRIMINATION AND SILENCE:
A CASE OF MINORITY FOUNDATIONS IN TURKEY (1974)**

PINAR DİNÇ KENANOĞLU

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Discrimination and Silence:

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Pınar Dinç Kenanoğlu

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Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

Pinar Dinc Kenanoglu

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
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examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Asst. Prof. Murat Ergin

Assoc. Prof. Dilek Barlas

Asst. Prof. Bogac Erozan

Date:

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ABSTRACT

In 1974, the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus had resulted in the Turkish military Intervention in the island. The same year, the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals issued a legal decision that rendered possible the confiscation of properties belonging to non-Muslim minority foundations in the years to come. Turkish citizens of Greek origin (*Rums*), Armenians, and Jews, who are regarded as unreliable citizens especially in times of foreign disagreements, all suffered from the conflict atmosphere. Although studies on minority foundations largely concentrate on the political and legal policies toward minority institutions, there is lack of research on how discriminatory policies were implemented in the societal and cultural levels. This thesis helps to understand the mechanisms through which discrimination is legalized, legitimized, and concealed in the cultural sphere. Relying on content analysis of three Turkish and one minority newspapers published in 1974, I first discuss the appearance of the negative attitudes toward Greeks, Cypriot Greeks, and *Rums* through news coverage of the major events such as mass demonstrations, state ceremonies, media organizations, and political debates. Second, I examine the concealment of the discrimination building upon the lack of news coverage of the Supreme Court decision allowing the confiscation minority foundations' properties. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to show that discriminatory policies toward minorities in the legal and political arenas are perpetuated in the social and cultural spheres through a campaign of silence on the matter.

Keywords: Minorities, discrimination, citizenship, nationalism, reciprocity, silence

ÖZET

Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında Kıbrıs konusunda yaşanan anlaşmazlıklar 1974 yılında Türkiye'nin adaya askeri müdahalesi ile sonuçlandı. Aynı sene Yargıtay'ın verdiği hukuki karar gelecek yıllardaki gayrimüslim azınlık vakıflarının taşınmaz mallarına el konulmasına dayanak oldu. Vatandaş oldukları halde yabancı ve hatta güvenilmez olarak bakılan Rum, Ermeni ve Yahudi vatandaşlar da bu anlaşmazlık atmosferinden zarar gördüler. Azınlık vakıfları üzerine yapılan çalışmalar genellikle azınlık vakıflarına yönelik politik ve hukuki yaptırımlara odaklanırken, ayrımcı politikaların sosyal ve kültürel alanlarda nasıl gerçekleştiği konusundaki araştırmalar yeterli sayıya ulaşmamıştır. Bu tez ayrımcı politikaların nasıl yasallaştırıldığı, meşrulaştırıldığı ve gizlendiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak, 1974 yılında yayınlanmakta olan üç Türk ve bir azınlık gazetesinin içerik taramasına dayanarak öncelikle Yunanlılara, Kıbrıslı Rumlara, ve genel olarak Türkiye'deki Rumlara karşı negatif tavrın gösteriler, devlet törenleri, medya organizasyonları, politik tartışmalar, ve günlük haberler ile meşrulaştırıldığına dikkat çekeceğim. İkinci olarak, Yargıtay kararını ve bunun sonucu olarak azınlık vakıf taşınmazlarına el konması hakkındaki haberlerin yokluğuna dayanarak ayrımcılığın gizlenmesini inceleyeceğim. Buna dayanarak, azınlık vakıflarına politik ve hukuki alanlarda uygulanan ayrımcı politikaların kültürel ve sosyal alanlarda sessizlik ile nasıl gizlenip devam ettirildiğini göstermektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Azınlıklar, ayrımcılık, vatandaşlık, milliyetçilik, mütakabiliyet, sessizlik

*To my mom and dad,
For giving me everything they have and beyond...*

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ABBREVIATIONS

CTS: Cyprus is Turkish Society (*Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*)

CUP: Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)

ECHR: The European Court of Human Rights (*Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi*)

EOKA: Greek for National Organization of Cypriot Fighters

(*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*)

GDF: General Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*)

GONGO: Government Operated Non-Governmental Organization

NTSU: National Turkish Students Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*)

SM: Subcommission of Minorities (*Azınlık Tali Komisyonu*)

TMT: Turkish Resistance Organization (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*)

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (*Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti*)

WTTSA: Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association (*Batı Trakya Türkleri*

Dayanışma Derneği)

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Cyprus dispute between neighbor countries Greece and Turkey resulted in a month-long military Intervention of the Turkish state in northern Cyprus between July and August 1974. Although it is described merely as years of political disagreement between the two nations, the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict extend beyond the place and time period in which physical violence actually took place. In this thesis, I examine the formal and informal policies toward non-Muslim minority citizens who were not directly involved in the Cyprus hostilities but were somehow pulled into the chaotic atmosphere of the conflict period. The non-Muslim minorities and particularly Greek minority-citizens (*Rums*¹) in Turkey have been the invisible victims of a quarrel that took place in neither Greece nor Turkey, but in Cyprus. This thesis deals with the causal relationship between the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece and the policies toward non-Muslim minorities in Turkey in legal, political, cultural, and societal spheres. The major focus of this thesis is on the cultural and societal fields.

In what ways did the conflict and war over Cyprus in 1974 affect the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey? How were notions of nationalism and citizenship in wartime significant in stereotyping Turkish Greek citizens in particular? What was the role of newspapers in the implementation of discriminatory attitude in daily life? How could we explain the silence following the Supreme Court decision that allowed

¹ Throughout this thesis, I will use the notion of *Rum* for the Turkish Greek minorities in Turkey. Meanwhile, the Turkish media uses the term *Rum* for both the Turkish Greek minorities in Turkey and the Cypriot Greeks. I will indicate each time if my references from newspapers refer to Turkish Greeks as *Rums*

property confiscation of non-Muslim foundations? Attempting to answer such broad yet crucial questions, this thesis draws upon the literatures of discrimination, silence, as well as nationalism, citizenship, multiculturalism, and reciprocity. Through a synthesis of these theories, I attempt to reveal how unequal policies toward non-Muslim minorities were legalized, legitimized, and concealed in formal and informal spheres.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was remarkable for constructing a Turkish nation-state, in which different ethnic and religious groups came together under the notion of Turkish citizenship. However, misconception of the notion of citizenship eventually caused a dilemma for the non-Muslim minorities. Treated as residuals, non-Muslim minorities in Turkey struggled to become ‘real citizens’. Particularly the *Rum* community suffers from the dilemma in the Turkish language, where the distinction between the meanings of the words *Yunan* and *Rum* (Greek and Romios) is blurred. The word ‘Greek’ is supposed to be used for the citizens of Greece, while the word ‘Romios’ means ‘having a Greek identity, or being Greek without Greek citizenship’ (Akgönül, 2008, p. 93). However, there is an ambiguity in the interpretations of the words Greek and Romios in Turkish society, mostly due to the intervention of the Turkish political context. The periods of conflict between Greece and Turkey have a determining influence on the interpretations and perceptions of who will be called Greeks and who will be accepted as Romios. For instance, the Cyprus conflict carried on between the two countries since the 1950s to the present had direct effects on the Turkish perception of who *Rums* are and how they are not different from Greeks. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots living in Cyprus were also called *Rum*, as in Southern Cyprus Romios Republic (*Güney Kıbrıs Rum Cumhuriyeti*). Although calling Greek Cypriots *Rum* is

fair since they are Greek Cypriots with non-Greek citizenry, the conceptualization caused a threat for the *Rum* population in Turkey since Cypriot *Rums* were supposedly the enemies of Turkish state, whereas *Rum* in the Turkish context were Turkish citizens.

The discriminatory attitude toward the so-called citizens of the Turkish nation is constructed and maintained on the political, legal, economic, cultural and social levels. With the implementation of the Wealth Tax policy in 1942, Turkish citizens and Jewish minorities in particular, were forced to pay taxes beyond their means. If they could not render payments, they were sentenced to work in the camps in Aşkale, a region near Erzurum in the eastern part of Turkey. On 6-7 September, 1955, a story was circulated that a bombing in Salonica (Thessaloniki) damaged the house in which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born. As a reaction, a Turkish mob in the hundreds rioted and looted the shops, houses, and sanctuaries of non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, using the slogan ‘Cyprus is Turkish!’ Nine years later, in 1964, the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus heated up again. The aggression toward the Greeks and *Rums* culminated in the confiscation of property, blocking of bank accounts, and deportation from Turkey. Furthermore, all non-Muslim communities whether *Rum*, Jewish, or Armenian, suffered the consequences of the formal and informal policies pointed out above in different ways.

With the rise of the conflict climate between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in 1974, discrimination toward the non-Muslims surfaced once again. In 1974, following the legal decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Turkish state began to confiscate the immovable property of its non-Muslim foundations²,

² In this thesis, I study the confiscation of property belonging to non-Muslim foundations. By non-Muslim foundations, I refer to the charitable minority corporations established by the *Rum*, Armenian, and Jewish communities. It should be noted that these four communities are official minorities declared in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

institutions that were established during the Ottoman period to provide funds for charitable purposes such as education or health. It is crucial to note that all discriminatory incidents this thesis cites above were carried out on both formal and informal levels. By the formal level, I mean the political and legal indicators of discrimination such as the legal decisions on the trials of non-Muslim foundations and the administrative role of the General Directorate of Foundations (*GDF- Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*). By the informal level, on the other hand, I refer to the cultural and societal aspects of discrimination on a daily basis, such as anti-Greek (and *Rum*) mass demonstrations, donation campaigns, and even song lyrics published in daily newspapers. This thesis project takes the legal documents into account, but mainly focuses on the discriminatory policies toward minority citizens and minority foundations through a content analysis of the news articles published in three Turkish and one *Rum* daily newspaper from the beginning to the end of 1974.

The legal (Kurban, 2004; Reyna and Zonana, 2003; İmamoğlu, 2006) and sociological (Oran, 2001; Oran, 2005, Mahcupyan, 2004; Akgönül, 2007) consequences of the policies toward non-Muslim foundations have previously been studied. Although some of these studies argue that the conflict atmosphere between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus was determinative in the implication of discrimination, their arguments are not supported by data. My purpose is to reveal the role of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in the legalization, legitimization, and concealment of discrimination in formal and more importantly informal levels by relying on newspaper articles published in 1974. I argue that the newspaper articles are indispensable for the implementation, normalization, legitimization, and concealment of discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities and their foundations in Turkey. Although the newspaper articles

commonly attacked the *Rum* community in Turkey, viewing them as the extension of Greeks in Greece and Cyprus, it should be noted that the Supreme Court decision on foundations affected all non-Muslim foundations. I claim that confiscation of non-Muslim foundation property in 1974, the year when Turkey and Greece had rising conflict over Cyprus, was not a coincidence.

This thesis argues that the increase of conflict between Greece and Turkey in the political arena, starting from the early 1974 allowed for the legalization and legitimization of discriminatory policy implementations against non-Muslim foundations following the Supreme Court decision of 8 May, 1974. The case selected in this thesis, immovable property confiscation of non-Muslim foundations starting from 1974, is significant in terms of focusing on not only legal or political reflections of discrimination, but also pointing out the cultural and societal factors that normalized and concealed discriminatory policies of the Turkish state. This thesis presents empirical data, the newspaper articles collected from different newspapers published in 1974, which not only indicate overt aggression toward Greeks and *Rums*, but also covert or silent discrimination through which the legal ruling and its ramifications on minority foundations are concealed. The main indicators that support the argument of this thesis are the theories of discrimination, silence, and literatures of nationalism, citizenship, multiculturalism, or reciprocity, (Chapter 2), the historical background of the non-Muslim community in Turkey, with a special emphasis on the role of the Cyprus conflict starting from the 1950s, (Chapter 3), the dilemma that equates the word *Rum* to Cypriot Greeks and Greeks in both linguistic and psychological levels, the role of political disputes, media campaigns and popular events in normalizing, legitimizing, and even demanding discrimination against Greeks and *Rums* (Chapter 4), and finally the role of the silence toward the legal

ruling and its consequences that veiled the negative policies targeting the non-Muslim foundations, and their property ownership rights (Chapter 5).

Chapter 2 presents a literature review, and the methodology of this thesis. The literature review focuses on the theories I rely on in this thesis, which are mainly theories of discrimination and silence, along with nationalism, citizenship, reciprocity and multiculturalism. Theories of discrimination constitutes a major theoretical framework of this thesis, since the 1974 Supreme Court decision and its aftermath are identified as discriminatory policies toward non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Theories of silence, on the other hand, addresses that discrimination was not only legalized, but also legitimized and concealed through silence in the cultural and social spheres, which is the main argument of this thesis. Meanwhile, nationalism, citizenship, minorities, reciprocity, and multiculturalism literatures are crucial in terms of laying out a broader understanding of the role of nation-states, and how minorities suffer of not being true citizens. The second part of the second chapter presents the methodology of this thesis.

Chapter 3 draws upon the historical background, beginning with an overview of the Ottoman *Millet* System. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, with the Sèvres Agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne that officially established the Turkish Republic is studied. This section also presents information on the 1923 Population Exchange, determined by the Treaty of Lausanne that is also a fundamental agreement that defines the minority groups and their rights in the Turkish Republic. Finally, the historical background addresses the Cyprus conflict that, in my interpretation, has a determining role in shaping the formal policies and informal attitudes toward non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The dispute over Cyprus and its effects on minorities in Turkey are analyzed in three time periods: 6-7 September,

1955, the 1960s, and the 1974 Cyprus Intervention chronologically. The background on the laws on foundations is also presented in the section discussing the 1974 Cyprus Intervention and its consequences on minority foundations.

Chapter 4 analyzes the overt threatening and prejudiced approach toward Greeks, non-Muslim minorities, and particularly *Rums* in the news articles published in Turkey throughout 1974. One of the main indicators of the discriminatory attitude toward particularly *Rums* is a linguistic delusion between the Greeks, Cypriot Greeks, and *Rums* in the Turkish language. Following the linguistic dilemma on the *Rum* notion, the chapter presents a detailed reading of the news articles that are published in 1974. The thesis analyzes the news articles in three topics: (1) The role of the political disputes between Greece and Turkey on the perception of Greece and Greeks, (2) the role of the press campaigns that are either anti-Greek press campaigns, financial campaigns for the Turkish military, the successive news articles and columns written against Greece regarding its political dispute with Turkey, or articles targeting the *Rums* in particular through gossip news questioning minorities and their institutions' loyalty to the, (3) the role of state ceremonies and public demonstrations, with a special emphasis on the role of the Government Operated Non Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) in organizing these ceremonies.

Chapter 5 focuses solely on the issue of silence, and its decisive role not only in the implementation, but also the maintenance of the discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities and foundations. The property confiscation decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals had direct consequences not only for the *Rum* foundations, but Armenian and Jewish foundations as well. First, I examine the legal ruling regarding the minority foundations in Turkey in 1974 and the following periods. In this respect, the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1974, the juridical

ramifications for the minority foundations in the following period, the reforms carried out by the Turkish government in 2000s, and finally the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR- *Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi*) legal ruling in 2007 are discussed in legal terms. Second, a quantitative analysis of the news articles in Turkish newspapers is presented, pointing out numerical data on the lack of news coverage of the legal ruling in newspapers. Third, a detailed reading of the few articles about foundations, but not minority foundations, are presented, including their appearance in the *Rum* minority newspaper *Apoyevmatini* itself. Fourth, relying on the in-depth interview I conducted with the recent chief-editor of *Apoyevmatini*, I examine the reasons of the silence in the minority community and media.

The conclusion section examines the changes and continuities in terms of the attitude toward the minorities and their foundations in the newspapers in today's Turkey, with an analysis of five Turkish newspapers in the ten days following the January 2007 ECHR ruling in the case of minority foundations. This section is fruitful in terms of giving a clue on the current stance toward the problems of minority foundations.

CHAPTER II

1. Literature Review

The rise of disagreements among Turkey and Greece regarding the Cyprus issue in 1974 has been a legitimizing tool for implementing formal and informal discrimination toward minorities in Turkey. The judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in May 1974 had a significant role in legally allowing the property confiscation of non-Muslim foundations in the following years. The legal ruling was consolidated by the informal discrimination appearing in the daily sphere, which triggered the prejudice against not only Greeks and Cypriot Greeks, but also *Rums*, and non-Muslim minorities in general, who are the internal enemies of the state in the Turkish mind-set.

This section focuses mainly on two literatures: Discrimination and silence. Studying theories of discrimination are necessary because this thesis claims that non-Muslim minorities were subject to discrimination in formal and informal spheres throughout 1974. This thesis also claims that discriminatory policies toward minorities were not only legalized and legitimized, but also concealed through a campaign of silence on the matter. Theories of silence present a theoretical framework for the silence argument in the thesis. Theories of nationalism,

citizenship, multiculturalism, and reciprocity are also fruitful literatures this thesis draws upon.

1.1. Theories of Discrimination

Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’. Discriminatory policies implemented against minorities include the depiction of these groups as being hostile, inner enemies of the state; forced migration or deportation; and economic suppression. The inner conflicts between the notion of citizenship and minorities result in new conceptions as in a ‘category of ‘artificial citizens’ or ‘partial citizens’ or in the Turkish sense ‘so-called citizens’ (Davis, 1997, p. 7 and 8, cited in Kadioğlu, 2008, p. 29; see also Yeğen, 2006). Nation-states, by nature, recognize and support certain ethnic and national identities, inevitably resulting in unequal stance toward other ethnic or national groups (Kymlicka and Shapiro, 1997). Cultural symbols lie in the main structure of nationalism, since ‘nationalism privileges one nationality among others and is tied to the fact that the state cannot seek to claim a monopoly of legitimacy in the abstract’ (Hoffman, 2004, p. 3). In daily life, through the mass media, minorities are repeatedly shown as the hostile groups and a danger toward the unity of the nations. Cultural symbols are often used by nation-states to legitimize their strength and position in times of conflict. Furthermore, it is argued that one’s ethnic identity could be more persuasive than citizenship (Tir and Jasinski,

2008; Horowitz, 1985; Morgan and Kenneth, 1992; Vanhanen 1991). The status of citizenship is mostly insufficient compared to ethnic identity, in terms of explaining the motives behind discrimination toward a certain group.

The main problem faced in the studies of discrimination today is in the measurement of covert forms of prejudice and discrimination. This dilemma can be explained through the historical transformations starting with the Civil Rights movement starting in the 1950s. 'Before the Civil Rights era, prejudice and discrimination were openly espoused and legally enforced' whereas in the post-Civil Rights period, discriminatory acts were prohibited. However, scholars agree that 'today it is harder to assess the degree to which everyday experiences and opportunities may be shaped by ongoing forms of discrimination' (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, p. 186). The shift from overt to subtle and covert discrimination resulted in the necessity of definition of discrimination and explanation of mechanisms for the contemporary forms of discrimination.

Pager and Shepherd (2008), claim that discriminatory acts can be explained through three main factors: (1) Intrapyschic Factors, (2) Organizational Factors, (3) Structural Factors. The 'Intrapyschic Factors' emphasizes the role of prejudice, the 'Organizational Factors' stresses the role of individual decision-makers in political, economic, legal and social environments, and the 'Structural Factors' highlights the role of a 'broader social context [where] minority froups may be systematically disadvantaged not only by willful acts of particular individuals, but [through] the range of policies and practices that contribute to the systematic disadvantage of members of certain groups' (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, p. 197).

According to the intrapyschic explanation of discriminatory acts, the main perpetrator of discrimination is prejudice, which can be defined as a biased and

negative evaluation of a group based on real or imagined characteristics of the group members' (Fiske, 1998; Nelson, 2002). Lott and Moluso note that interpersonal discrimination and institutional discrimination are 'inevitably interrelated' (1995, p. 3). The organizational explanation, on the other hand, points out that organizations are the 'key structural contexts shaping inequality' (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, p. 194). The organizational factors in the implementation of discrimination are largely referred to in the sociology of discrimination, through analyzing the role organizational functioning of religion, employment or politics.

There are several theories of prejudice, such as 'scapegoating', 'cultural theory' and 'conflict theory of prejudice'. The scapegoating theory is referred to as chronic social frustration toward other ethnic minorities (Kleg, 1993). By the mid World War II, the Jews in Turkey were scapegoated for the bad economy and accused of money speculation and black market activities. The Turks were seen as innocent citizens while Jewish minority citizens, and non-Muslims in general, had to pay off their sins by being forced to pay a wartime tax, also known as 'Wealth Tax'. The cultural theory of prejudice focuses on mechanisms such as education, through which people learn to be prejudiced toward certain groups. Scholars (Üstel, 2004; Çayır, 2003) study the education system in Turkey in the reproduction of the 'others' conceptualization, pointing the Greeks or Kurds as the enemies. The conflict theory of prejudice argues that prejudice is used deliberately to justify the oppression practiced by elites to reach certain goals. The GONGOs, such as student unions (National Turkish Student Association, *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) or politicized organizations (Cyprus is Turkish Society, *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*) were significant actors to impose prejudice against minorities in order to legitimize discriminatory policies toward non-Muslim minorities in Turkey during the Cyprus conflict since

the 1950s. In general, the ‘culturally embedded stereotypes about racial differences are reflected in both conscious and unconscious evaluations’ (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). These various examples show that discrimination is practiced in face-to-face interpersonal relations as well as institutional sphere through policy implications.

Finally, the structural factor underlines the role of ‘largely invisible contexts in which group-based inequalities may be structured and reproduced’ (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, p. 197). This explanation is important, since the historical events and policies targeting minorities are taken as historical evidence to support the main argument in this thesis. Structural form of discrimination focuses on the role of historical background and past discrimination, which ‘remains agnostic about the relevance of contemporary forms of discrimination’ (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, p. 197). Tilly’s study on durable inequality suggests that ‘the introduction of new organizational forms will have great impact’ on reducing inequality, rather than reduction of discrimination in the already existing organizational systems (1998, p. 15). Like Tilly’s suggestion of creating new organizations, some scholars argue that discrimination will remain even in the absence of present discrimination (Pager and Shepherd, 2008; see also Bowles et. al., 2007). Pager and Shepherd conceptualizes the role of historical inequalities as the ‘accumulation of disadvantage’ (2008, p. 199) and argue that sociological disadvantages of minorities such as housing and education can also be explained through the policies implemented in the past.

This thesis deals with both overt and covert forms of discrimination focusing particularly on 1974. This thesis regards the legal ruling, following which the Supreme Court allowed confiscation of properties belonging to minority foundations, as a form of institutional discrimination. Meanwhile, the thesis also examines the selected daily newspapers as indicators of intrapsychic factors of discrimination and

grounds of perpetuating interpersonal discrimination toward the non-Muslim citizens in the Turkish state. The study is a synthesis of overt and covert forms because while the ethnic discrimination toward particularly *Rum* community in Turkey openly rises during the Cyprus conflict between Greece and Turkey, the legal court decision and its ramifications for the non-Muslim foundations are kept discrete in the media.

1.1.1 Wartime Discrimination toward Minorities

Times of war are effective periods in the legitimization of systematic discriminatory policies. Panayi (1993, p. 7) argues that ‘the position of minorities change dramatically in wartime, usually for the worse, as dominant societies view national or racial groupings as hostile’. The main dilemma appears in viewing the minorities as citizens, which they actually are, or ‘inner enemies’ that ‘becomes the primary psychological touchstone for national cohesiveness’ (Nagler 1993, p. 191). In the book, *Minorities in Wartime* edited by Panikos Panayi, different authors exemplify various methods of discrimination toward minorities in different parts of the world such as France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (Panayi, 1993). As argued earlier, the social dimension of minority discrimination is observed in the loyalty and hostility arguments toward minority groups. Furthermore, ‘a widespread official reaction to minorities in wartime involves the implementation of forced location which can take the form of internment, deportation or resettlement’ (Panayi, 1993, p. 7). Although forced migration poses economic difficulties for minorities, there are other means of economic discrimination as well. Confiscation of property is a common policy toward minorities in times of war. Britain, Australia and the U.S. have applied policies of confiscation through

legislation during the First World War, since they thought of it as a necessity of battle against the enemy's economic power (Panayi, 1993).

Following Gurr's (1993) theory of causal relationship between ethnic discrimination, ethno-political rebellion, and interstate conflict, Caprioli and Trumbore hypothesize that 'high levels of discrimination against an ethnic group will lead to higher levels of conflict between the discriminatory state and a rival state controlled by the ethnic kin of the oppressed group' (2003, p. 7). Caprioli and Trumbore confirm their hypothesis with a study as well. However, in a critical reading, it can be argued that the interstate conflict and an ethno-political rebellion can lead to ethnic discrimination as well. In the Turkish case, the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus started in the 1950s, and the Cyprus Intervention lasted only a month between July and August 1974. Therefore in my case, studying the policies only during the exact war period would result in missing out on the major discriminatory policies. Furthermore, as my case study will show, minorities are not necessarily discriminated against at all times during the conflict periods in the pre-war process. Discrimination might occur in the societal sphere as an abrupt incident, or it might be systematically applied through state mechanisms. Likewise, there is not necessarily a continuation in the application of discriminatory policies. They might be implemented in a certain period, then abandoned, and reappear in a different form after a while. Discrimination can be concealed in the official and unofficial spheres, preventing formation of public opinion on the issue. Furthermore, I argue in this thesis that concealment of discrimination itself is a form of discrimination that perpetuates and legitimizes discrimination.

1.2. Theories of Silence

‘Secrecy and lies conceal, they camouflage, but they certainly don’t hide everything’ (White, 2000, p. 15). The main idea of this sentence, used by Luise White in her article about the significance of secrets and lies in terms of richness in content, is shared by a number of scholars who study ‘silence’ (Jensen, 1973, Jaworski, 1993; Zerubavel, 2006). The main purpose of this study is to show the significance of the absence of news on the property confiscation of minority foundations in Turkey beginning in 1974, and how the theory of the unsaid contributes to understanding the socio-political aspects of this attitude. Furthermore, this thesis emphasizes on the role of silence in legitimizing discrimination as a brute power. Put differently, silence on the confiscation of properties belonging to non-Muslim foundations is not a result of normalization; rather, it is a method of normalizing discrimination. In the following section, I will lay out theories of silence and analyze the case in Turkey in relation to these theoretical explanations.

Jensen (1973) lists five functions of silence in order to show that silence is not solely an absence of communication, but rather an important form of communication. These functions are listed as ‘(a) linkage, (b) affecting, (c) revelational, (d) judgmental, and (e) activating’ (Jensen, 1963, p. 249). The third function pointed out by Jensen, the revelational function, is crucial in terms of ‘revealing information’ and ‘making something known’ (Jaworski, 1993, p. 67) through irrelevance. Zerubavel defines the revelational function as ‘thick, deafening, heavy, or resounding silences’ that often ‘speak louder than words’ (Zerubavel, 2006, p. 8). In his detailed study on the *Rum* community, Akgönül (2007, p. 317) states that the time period between 1974 and 1988 was ‘the fifteen years when the *Rums* were forgotten’. By being forgotten, Akgönül implies that the *Rum* community who suffered from discrimination in societal, economic, and political levels was not

subject to any serious discriminatory policies in this period. Although Akgönül's (2007, p. 332) statement is partly true regarding the dramatic decrease in the number of *Rum* citizens in Turkey and the fact that 'obvious anti-*Rum* policies were not implemented in this period', I argue that neither *Rums* nor other non-Muslim citizens in Turkey were actually 'forgotten' but actively avoided. In other words, I argue that that the policies toward the foundations of non-Muslim communities were implemented while there was a deliberate silence about the matter.

The theory of Brummett (1980), 'political strategic silence' is crucial in terms of explaining the functions of avoidance problems faced by non-Muslim foundations in Turkey. Brummett (1980) explains 'political strategic silence' as 'a tool, not only an effect, of certain strategies employed to achieve political goals' (Jaworski, 1993, p. 105). Jaworski, himself, conceptualizes 'failing to mention something' as '*przemilczenie*' (Jaworski, 1993, p. 99). Parallel to Brummett's (1980, p. 290) definition of strategic silence as making 'mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment', Jaworski (1993, p. 108) argues that silence is a form of 'political manipulation of others, on a personal level, as well as on [the] societal level'. Jaworski also defines silence as 'a tool of sociopolitical oppression and/or control' (1993, p. 98).

Noelle-Neumann (1974, p. 44) defines her theory called 'spiral of silence' as a reflective concept, and states that 'public opinion is the opinion which can be voiced in public without fear of sanctions and upon which action in public can be based'. Therefore, Noelle-Neumann claims that silence takes place in the 'danger of isolation' (1974, p. 44). The spiral of silence theory attributes power to the mainstream media, claiming that it 'can overcome any differences in how their audiences process communication' (Gonzalez, 1988, p. 33). However, there are three

conditions for the mass media to be able to influence masses, which are listed as (1) Consonance, (2) Cumulation, and (3) Ubiquity (Gonzalez, 1988). Consonance is the concordance among different newspapers, a common language used in the media as a whole. Cumulation refers to reappearance of similar articles in different newspapers and different time slots. Ubiquity, finally, is the availability of the information for the public (Gonzalez, 1988). Persuasive role of the media transmits messages ‘primarily through language’ with an ‘attempt to influence’ and the ‘persuadee has a mental state that is susceptible to change’ (Perloff, 2003, p. 9-10). However, the notion of deception through silence should be distinguished from persuasion because the subject in deception is not given any messages, but kept isolated from any information, and therefore not capable of making free choices.

Lukes explains that power has three dimensions: the one that is concrete and observable, the one that prevents some issues to become observable and obvious, and finally, the one that:

‘is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (2005, p. 28)’.

In other words, Lukes points out that the third and most significant form of power is the one that prevents a view and even an imagination of alternatives. Lukes’s argument is significant in terms of encouraging researchers to analyze the “least accessible to observation” (Lorenzi, 2006, p. 88). The third dimension of power is also crucial for studying not only overt, but covert forms of conflict and discrimination. The case this thesis deals with, the legal act that allowed property confiscation that belonged to minority foundations, is significant in terms of being significant and yet off the agenda for a long period. Therefore, Lukes’s emphasis on

the third dimension of power is crucial in my attempt to discover and analyze the case even in the absence of agenda.

On the one hand, the Greek people, and the Turkish Greek citizens (*Rums*) are false-represented in the Turkish press, mainly by stereotyping them as betrayers, and enemies of the Turkish nation. On the other hand, the unequal policies of the Turkish state toward the minority foundations are not represented at all, that addresses the notion of ‘agenda denial’ (Cobb and Ross, 1997, p. 218). Acknowledging that the issue initiators are weaker in terms of resources than the opponents, the denial cannot only be explained by opponents’ ‘persuading governments to act when there is already a predisposition to do nothing’ (Cobb and Ross, 1997, p. 218). Furthermore, Cobb and Ross (1997, p. 218) explain the opponents’ power of influence in terms of their skills in symbolic politics, and success in ‘isolating initiators, in portraying their grievances in negative terms, and in casting doubts about the motives and abilities of the initiators themselves’. This point is experienced frequently in Turkey, as a consequence of the Sèvres Syndrome. The constant fear from the outer world and other nations due to the ‘geopolitical significance of the Turkish State’ can be given as an example to this skepticism.

1.2.1. Secrets and Rumors: Bypaths to Silence

White’s article, points out the notion of secrets, and argues that the significance of secrets come from the fact that they are ‘hidden’ (2000, p. 22). White’s explanation of secrets as ‘social’, ‘public’, and ‘concealment’ (White, 2000, p. 22) shows that secrets are more formulated and organized in terms of making ‘continual decisions about whom to tell, how much to tell, and whom not to tell’ (White, 2000, 11). Therefore, the process of keeping something secret ‘has to be

reconstituted and renegotiated through changing political and discursive practices’ (Minkley and Legassick, 2000, p. 8). The definition of secrets as social and public, and highly linked to politics, shows that the silence regarding the confiscation of non-Muslim foundations in Turkey is a form of negotiated and renegotiated secret in Turkish social, public, and political history. The Subcommittee of Minorities (SM - *Azınlık Tali Komisyonu*) in Turkey, which took an active role starting in the early 1960s until it was abolished by the AKP government in 2002, operated as a secret body of the government that aimed to ‘control minorities for the matter of national security’ (*azınlıkların yurt güvenliği bakımından kontrolü*) until the 2000s. However, even the presence of SM was denied by the state until 2004. It was in February 2004 when a mainstream Turkish newspaper published a document which proved that there was such a commission; and the Turkish Prime Ministry changed the name of this SM to The Commission for Evaluation of Minority Problems (*Azınlık Sorunlarını Değerlendirme Kurulu*) (See Appendix F)³. Even after its abolition, the existence of the commission was never fully recognized, and it is still officially concealed in the official level. Likewise, there are no archives available for researchers. White (2000, p. 11) describes this attitude as ‘the valorization of information’ that is linked to a ‘project of social history’. However, as she and other scholars studying silence argue, these concealments can never fully hide information. On the contrary, they provide significant information that reveals the motives behind the lying and keeping of secrets.

Another notion discussed by White in her article is the notion of ‘rumors’, which Chapter 4 deals with, through the news articles entitled *Kısa Kısa* in *Hürriyet*, and the articles of Rauf Tamer in *Tercüman*. These news articles, that mostly rely on

³ <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/02/24/417813.asp> *Hürriyet* 24.02.2004

anonymous sources, and if not anonymous relied on information picked up here and there with no testimony, represent a perfect example of White's explanation of rumor. White (2000, p. 13) states that 'rumor is a term that includes both true and the false [...] What is important about rumors is that they come and go with great intensity; and that people often act on the rumors even if they themselves don't fully believe in them'. While keeping silent on important matters regarding the *Rum* and other non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, such as the Subcommittee of Minorities; rumors whose truths are questioned frequently appear in the newspapers that I analyzed. However, as White points out, 'whether a rumor or gossip is true or false isn't what's important about it' (White, 2000, p. 13). Furthermore, I argue that the existence of rumor or gossip news is significant in terms of normalizing and popularizing the stereotypes of Turkey's non-Muslim citizens. Although newspapers cannot be said to always reflect the public attitude, they are highly influential in shaping it. This thesis reveals the silence in the newspapers, showing that although they presented different political perspectives, the mass media concealed the property confiscation of minority foundations.

1.2.2. Agenda Setting and the Mass Media

Agenda setting, although mostly under government control is an arena of struggle between two groups: The issue initiators who set the agenda, and their opponents who are against the agenda. Cobb and Ross (1997) names this competition 'agenda disputes [...] about both what government will and will not consider and how political problems are interpreted' (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 20). However, we cannot talk about a single form of agenda setting. Birkland (1997, p. 10) claims that there are three theories of agenda setting. The first theory 'examines the

characteristics of the actors and institutions making policy,' while the second 'focuses on the nature of the problems themselves, leading to a series of principles relating to whether the problem is more likely or less likely to expand to a broader audience' (Birkland, 1997, p. 10). The second strand which questions the expansion of the issue to an audience is linked to Cobb and Ross's argument, since the issue initiators usually have difficulties in imposing their issue to the agenda if they are not members of the political elite or bureaucracy.

The third strand in the theories of agenda setting is related to the silence that I attempt to explain in my thesis. This theory 'explores the use of language, stories, metaphors, and symbols to advance or retard the movement of issues on the agenda' (Birkland, 1997, p. 10). In other words, this theory is about the role of social constructions increasing 'group mobilization and issue expansion' (Birkland, 1997, p. 11). Although Birkland's major focus in his book is the agenda setting after natural or technological disasters, his theoretical use of agenda setting fits political or social 'disasters' as well. Birkland (1997, p. 11) gives examples like 'images of collapsed buildings or oiled birds' to which he argues 'mass publics respond more readily'. In other words, the reduction of disasters to 'simple, graphic, and familiar symbolic packages' (Birkland, 1997, p. 11) makes them easier to frame and increase public involvement.

This thesis questions the covert discrimination that took place in the media during and after 1974, and how the uneven policies toward non-Muslim minority foundations were concealed by 'powerful groups [that] retain power by working to keep the public and out-groups unaware of underlying problems, alternative constructions of problems, or alternatives to their resolution (Birkland, 1997, p. 17). On the contrary, events such as state ceremonies, public demonstrations and press

campaigns frequently stereotype the Greek and *Rum* communities as the internal and external enemies of the state. Birkland (1997, p. 11) claims that ‘As long as these images and symbols are maintained throughout the society, or remain largely invisible and unquestioned, agenda access for groups that do not share these images is likely to be difficult’. In other words, it is difficult for the suppressed or silenced groups to exert influence that would increase awareness to their problems.

Although there are controversial research on the mass media influence on the agenda setting and public opinion, Baker (1992) lists other ways to change the public attitude. One way is called the ‘utilitarian function’, where rewards are crucial in terms of shaping the public attitude. Another way is called the ‘knowledge function’, where knowing a majority or a minority culture is crucial for explaining the public’s attitude (Baker, 1992, p. 100-101). On the contrary, other scholars (Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Dearing and Rogers, 1996) argue that ‘the manner in which a news story is presented significantly affects its ability to set the public agenda. Stories with greater prominence – front page news, newspaper stories accompanied by photographs, lead stories in television newscasts, and the like- tend to be particularly influential (Brock & Green, 2005). The effect of greater prominence is also explained as ‘the priming effects of news’ where increasing salience results in greater reaction (Brock & Green, 2005, p. 232). More significantly, Brock and Green (2005, p. 233) state that ‘priming is significantly strengthened when news reports explicitly link politicians’ actions or statements with the state of national problems’. This point is significant for my study, since in 1974, there was an international political crisis between Turkey and its long-term ‘enemy’ Greece over Cyprus.

National leaders and governments are the most influential actors in terms of ‘their power to set the national agenda’ (Zerubavel, 2006, p. 36). Taking one step

further, Zerubavel defines the mass media as ‘stunningly successful in telling [us] what to think *about*’ (Zerubavel, 2006, p. 37, emphasis in original). Newspapers have the power to set the national agenda and shape public opinion through publishing news. Meanwhile, newspapers can also choose not to report certain on events. This choice is as significant as setting the public opinion, because by staying silent, the newspapers can hamper the formation of a public opinion.

The power of the media can also be linked to the studies on persuasion. In his study on persuasion, Perloff (2003) includes to different types of definitions of persuasion given by other scholars. ‘A communication process [...] seeks to elicit a desired response from his receiver’ (Anderson, 1971, p. 6), ‘a conscious attempt [...] to change the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of another [...] through the transmission of some message’ or ‘a symbolic activity whose purpose is to effect the internalization or voluntary acceptance’ (Smith, 1982, p. 7) are some of the definitions listed by Perloff. However, Perloff defines persuasion in his own words as ‘a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to change their attitudes or behavior regarding an issue through the transmission of a message, in an atmosphere of free choice’. In other words, persuasion is a symbolic process in which one tries to influence the other by a message that ‘may be verbal or nonverbal’ by his/her free will (Perloff, 2003, p. 11).

Meanwhile, the author points out that propaganda and persuasion have different characteristics and should be distinguished carefully. Propaganda is much related with ‘mass media influence’, group’s ‘total control over the transmission of information’, and ‘negative connotations’, while persuasion might ‘produce beneficial outcomes’ as well (Perloff, 2003, p. 17). In the Turkish case, frequent reference to only two Greek newspapers constitutes an exercise of power over the

information transfer. I argue that press campaigns in Turkey, frequently citing the anti-Turkish attitude of two Greek newspapers accepted as the Greek media, were decisive in the forming and perpetuating the prejudice against the Greeks, and Turkish Greek citizens (*Rums*) as well.

1.2.3. Censorship

Peleg defines censorship as ‘the systematic control of the content of communication by a government through various means’ (1993, p. 4). Censorship, therefore is a ‘systematic control to control ideas and their communication to others’, through governments that aim to control ‘specific content of ideas’ (Peleg, 1993, p. 4). Although application forms and amounts can change in different regimes, censorship is a commonly used ‘political tool’ (Peleg, 1993, p. 4). Peleg identifies macro and micro objectives of censorship, distinguishing them to target ‘ideological purity’ or protection of the institutions of the country (Peleg, 1993, p. 114). The third-world governments are referred in Peleg’s analysis as implementors of arrests and imprisonments of authors either with or ‘without a trial’ (1993, p. 121), due to offenses such as ‘expression of antigovernment opinions, criticism of the armed forces, support for minority ethnic group’ (1993, p. 122). It should be noted that Turkey was a democracy in 1974, however, the military government ruled the country for two years, until the general elections held on 14 October, 1973.

There are two events that can be argued as sustaining the uniformity of media on Cyprus in 1974. The first incident occurred in 1972, when five bombs exploded in the Ömeriye and Bayraktar Mosques in Lefkosia, Cyprus (Fırat, 1997, p. 118). At the time, Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* was critical of the Cypriot Turk administration in Cyprus. Two journalists of *Cumhuriyet*, Ayhan Mustafa Hikmet and Ahmet

Muzaffer Gürkan, who argued that the Turkish administration in Cyprus was responsible for the mosque bombings, were murdered in Cyprus during their investigation (Firat, 1997, p. 119) Discussions of this issue on the Turkish newspapers turned out to be suppressing. Firat argues that ‘with this incident, no matter what their ideological perspectives are, the Turkish press showed that they were going to operate as a single voice’ (Firat, 1997, p. 120). In this respect, this incident caused a sense of solidarity in the Turkish press.

The second issue on the persistence of the silence in media is related to the problems newspaper companies faced in the post-Cyprus Intervention period. On 24 October, 1974, *Cumhuriyet* reported that fourteen journalists would be judged in Turkey because they have reported ‘inconvenient news’ about the Cyprus Intervention (*Cumhuriyet*, 24-10-1974). The National Security Court judged twelve editors and a reporter on November 1, 1974 (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-11-1974). *Cumhuriyet*, once again, was the only newspaper to report news on this incident, and claim that ‘it is argued that this trial judges the journalists who did not approve the Cyprus policies of Turkey’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.11.1974). The prosecution of the journalists and newspaper companies is significant in terms of reflecting the official attitude toward opinions that contradict state policies. The statement of a defendant journalist, Ayhan Özer, is crucial since he claims that ‘they have not reported any news that would harm the state security, on the contrary, they have announced the strength of the Turkish army to the foreign world’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.11.1974). Ayhan Özer’s statement, I argue, draws the general attitude reflected in the newspapers in times of conflict.

2.3. Theories of Nationalism

The primordialist theory, which argues that nations are timeless and natural phenomena, is largely an unaccepted theory, with various theories opposing to the approach that take nations for granted. These theories can be generalized into three main groups: ethno-symbolism, modernism, and post-modernism. The ethno-symbolist approach explains nations relying on historical data. Smith (1986; 1991; 2006) refers to 'ethnies' which he explains as 'named and self-defined human populations sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and elements of culture and a measure of solidarity' (Smith, 2006, p. 172). For instance, Smith (2006, p. 26) defines groups 'like the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, who retained a symbolic link with their ancestral homelands' as 'ethnies'. The ethno-symbolist approach argues that 'nations have their origins in ethnic groups' and *ethnies* are 'named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity' (Smith, 1986, p. 32).

There are various views under the modernist theory that oppose to the idea that nations are timeless, arguing that rather, the nation is a modern phenomenon. Gellner (1983, 1997), Anderson (1983), Breuilly (1985), Hobsbawm (1990), and Billig (1995) can be listed as modernist nationalists, who all claim that nations and nationalism are invented in the industrialization and capitalization period. Gellner (1983, p. 57) argues that the high-cultures of nations are not natural, but they are 'impositions'. Nationalism, according to Gellner (1983, p. 48-49), 'takes pre-existing cultures, and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures'. Meanwhile, Anderson (1999, p. 6) claims that nations are outcomes of historical transformations, and they are imagined 'because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet

them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'. Anderson also points out the role of 'print capitalism' in terms of creating a ground for print language that was crucial in the imagination of a national community.

Breuilly (1985) explains nationalism as an outcome of the political movements led by modern state or its institutions that seek to justify their actions with nationalist arguments, although he also accepts that 'they require the symbols, images, and concepts of nationalism, the ideology and language' (Smith, 1998, p. 92). Like Gellner and Breuilly, Hobsbawm claims that nationalism is 'constructed from above' but he adds that it should also be studied from below, viewing the ordinary persons who are the objects of the action and propaganda coming from above. Hobsbawm (1992, p. 1) states that 'invented traditions' are crucial in the construction of nationalism, and defines invented traditions as 'both 'traditions' actually invented, constructed, and formally instituted and those emerging [...] within a brief and dateable period, [...] and establishing themselves with great rapidity'. Hobsbawm (1992, p. 2) argues that invented traditions are remarkable for establishing a connection between the 'constant change' in the modern world and the 'unchanging' structure in the social life. Finally, Billig (1995, p. 8) comes up with the notion of 'banal nationalism', through which 'the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations'. Billig uses the notion 'flagging' that unconsciously makes 'people believe that they have national identities, will such homelands, and the world of national homelands' (Billig, 1995, p. 9).

Post-modernism (culturalism) argues that 'the present creates the past in its own image' (Smith, 1994, p. 19). Put differently, post-modernist theorists claim that the information about the past that is argued in the primordialist, ethno-symbolist,

and even modernist explanations of the nations and nationalism are entirely constructed. The notions of discourse and discursive formations argued by Foucault are largely used in the post-modernist explanation of nationalism. Foucault (2007, p. 121) defines discourse as ‘the group of statements which belongs to a single system of formation’, and in this sense, the post-modernists focus on the nationalist discourse. Discursive formation, on the other hand, is ‘characterized not by principles of construction but by a dispersion of fact’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 131). Regarding Foucault’s conceptualizations, Calhoun (1993, p. 211) thinks of ethnicity as an instrument that is ‘invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles’, and therefore ‘a pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities’. Nationalism is explained as a pure construction by Atran (1990) as well, who argues that ‘culturalist approaches seek to specify the manner in which fears and threats are constructed through narratives, myths, rituals, commemorations, and other cultural representations’ (cited in Brubaker and Laitin, 1998, p. 442). Discursive logics, having obstacles in application due to its ‘supra-individual’ view, is an important area to explain the motives of ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The obstacles in studying discourse come from its ‘heterogeneity’ (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998, p. 441). As put by Brubaker and Laitin (1998, p. 441) the heterogeneity comes from explanation of ethnic conflict in several mechanisms such as ‘meaningful, culturally constructed, discursively mediated, symbolically saturated, and ritually regulated’.

This thesis examines the impact of the Cyprus dispute, and the construction of formal and informal discriminatory Turkish nationalism in 1974, that allowed the property confiscation of minority foundations in the years to come. The theories of nationalism that I examine above are crucial in terms of understanding how

nationalism is constructed and maintained in different levels. Primordialism, in this respect, is significant for studying the building blocks of the state nationalism, which accepts the Turkish nation as perennial and eternal. The primordialist approach is also significant for its 'apologetic discourse, to mitigate, and sometimes even to justify and legitimize discrimination and oppression' toward the 'others' (Özkırımlı, 2003, p. 352; see also Özkırımlı 2000, Özkırımlı 2005). The ethno-symbolist approach allows me to comprehend the links between a common reference to the Turkish ancestry such as the early-Turks and the Ottoman Empire, and a specific territory, namely Middle Asia and Anatolia. The effects of industrialization and capitalism, as argued by the modernists, can be traced in the Turkish nationalism as well. The construction or invention of certain symbols or rituals from above is viewed in the Turkish nationalism, such as invention of certain national days that are annually celebrated. Meanwhile, Turkish nation is referred to as a single entity, with its own national culture, rights, will, and even a code of honor (*milli kültür, milli haklar, milli irade, milli onur*) in the nationalist discourse. The media, which I relied on in my study, is also determining in flagging the invented traditions and reminding the people of a national unity and identity

The post-modernist (culturalist) approach is crucial in this thesis in terms of examining the construction of a nationalist discourse. Either 'invoked by elites' (Calhoun, 1993; Calhoun 1997) or constructed in cultural sphere (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998), the nationalist discourse is constantly reproduced in the discursive area, through different events such as myths, national symbols, or commemorations. This thesis argues that nationalism is also maintained through silence. On the one hand, the discursive level reproduces the nationalist ideas, by creating common threats and resisting these so-called threats through cultural symbols and myths. On

the other hand, I argue that the nationalist tendencies constructed in the discursive level are preserved by silence.

1.4. Minorities: The ‘Other’ Citizens in Nation-States

The construction of ‘the other’ is a crucial factor in social psychology for a group for self-identification through distinguishing itself (Horowitz, 1985, p. 175-184). ‘The other’ was also used by Hegel, where he explains the other as a constituent in self-consciousness through ‘a challenge to [...] individual’s claim about its selfhood (cited in Simpson, 1998, p. 70). It can be argued that through the description and explanation of ‘the other’, or them, people are able to define themselves, or us. The ‘us vs. them’ distinction is observed in the construction and reproduction of nation-states and nationalism as well. The others of a nation are mostly another nation, or a minority group that might be ethnic, religious, or linguistic.

The conceptualization of the ‘other’ in the nationalist discourse is a major area that helps the maintenance of discrimination toward outer groups. It is also argued that the distinctive discourse of nationalism is crucial for both internal and external ‘others’ of a political community (Calhoun, 1993; Seton-Watson, 1977; Breuilly, 1982; Mayall, 1990). The discursive strength of nationalism is crucial for people to internalize common cultural aspects and act as, or as if, a homogenous group (Hobsbawm, 1990). With a strong common culture and homogeneity, a nation can act as a strong entity towards the differences of the ‘other’ groups. Anderson (1990, p. 15) defines a nation as a bounded and an imagined political society. Millas accepts Anderson’s argument and adds ‘being bounded is explained through the existence of the other’ (Millas, 2002, p. 193; see also Millas 1994; Millas 1995). The

entire emphasis in nationalism, whether it ever existed or created as a source of manipulation to shape masses, is crucial for the ‘systematic differences’ between ‘us vs. them’. Yıldız (2001, p. 44), in his study about the reflections of excellence of Turkish identity, refers to ethnicity as an institutionalized presumption of a group of people who see themselves as different and elite in relation to other ethnicities’.

However, religious differences are also crucial in defining the others in the society. For example, the minorities in Turkey (as accepted with the Treaty of Lausanne 1923) are composed of non-Muslim minorities. The Kurdish population, as a major ethnic minority in Turkey, is not accepted as a minority group in neither the Treaty of Lausanne nor through any other way (Oran 2001, Minority Rights Group International Report, 2007).

Meanwhile, times of conflict and war are significant for the re-construction of the ‘others’ and solidifying of nation-states. Charles Tilly, (1975; 1992) and Bruce Porter (1994) have focused on the role of wars in state formation. As a way of understanding state formation, Tilly focuses on wars and coercion activities. Tilly’s purpose is to place ‘the organization of coercion and preparation of war squarely in the middle of the analysis, arguing ... war and preparation of war, strongly affected the entire process of state-formation’ (Tilly, 1992, p. 14). Putting forward a trio of activities for state-formation, Tilly lists ‘statemaking’, ‘warmaking’, and ‘protection’ and adds ‘extraction’ as an inevitable outcome of the previous three activities (Tilly, 1992, p. 96). I argue that his scheme can be applied to the Turkish state-formation. The foursome Tilly proposes fits the experiences of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with the Greek-Orthodox *Millet* (and thus the establishment of Greece and Turkey), because Turks and Greeks fought within their territories (statemaking), outside their claimed territories (warmaking), and against their allies’ rivals

(protection). At the end, both Turks and Greeks, parting themselves from the Ottoman Empire to form their respective nation-states, sought to ‘draw from their subject population the means of statemaking, warmaking, and protection’ which is conceptualized as ‘extraction’ by Tilly (1992, p. 96). Although Tilly acknowledges the role of wars and coercion in the establishments of states, his theory cannot constitute the major theoretical background of my thesis since his focus is on state-formation. The time period that I will analyze in my study is long-after the Turkish state was established. Still, Tilly’s methodology is observed in both Greek and Turkish states, and more interestingly, both nation-states continued fighting the enemies of their allies (protection), and extracted the means of protection from their population (extraction). The Turkish state did extract in order to protect, and I argue that they extracted wealth and property from a specific group of people, namely the non-Muslim minorities, in a discriminatory manner. Although Tilly’s methodology is illuminating for my thesis, it is not sufficient by itself to explain the experiences of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

The link between the ‘other’ and the legitimization of violence in nationalist discourse are explained by various scholars (Wade, 2002; Manzo 1996; Polanyi, 1985; Camaroff and Stern, 1994; Dandeker, 1998; Coronil and Skirski, 2006; Carment and James, 1997). Wade (2002) argues that the differences among people, traditions or cultures are essential for nations and nationalism because they increase the chances of conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Through the ‘integrality’ of diversity, states legitimize assimilation such as ‘violent acts of segregation, censorship, economic coercion’ (Wade, 2002, p. 853). Put differently, Wade claims that the ‘other’ is crucial for the self-identification of a state and a legitimate tool of state violence. Akgönül (forthcoming article) argues that both Greek and Turkish

nationalist discourse relies and thrives on the idea that there are others on the other side of the Aegean Sea and they are ‘furthermore used as a justification of the radical positions, and hence support the argument showing the need for a ‘national unity’ ‘. Akgönül (forthcoming) also points out that while Turks are not the only ‘others’ of the Greek nation, the Greeks cannot be argued to be the only ‘other’ of Turkey. The Armenians and Jews, along with Orthodox Greeks, mainly the non-Muslim minorities as accepted in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, are considered as a whole group of ‘others’ in Turkey; and they suffer from the consequences of being the ‘inner threat’. In a way, ‘the other’ and violence both maintain and reproduce one another in the state structure. Manzo (1996, p. 12) refers to Max Weber’s argument on the rise of national sentiments in ‘times of external danger (war); differences among anthropological types (race); tradition; aesthetic aversions that are social in nature; and a common language’. In other words, Weber acknowledges the tendency to adapt discriminatory attitudes in times of war, against certain groups that might be different in terms of race, culture, or language. The war-making and peace-making mechanisms are crucial for the maintenance of a system that ‘guarantees [the survival of] the strong and the weak’ for a better economy of the state (Polanyi, 1985, p. 7). Polanyi’s argument is important since he considers both war making and peace making as ‘mechanisms’ that ensure the continuation of a system that empowers ‘us’ against ‘them’ (‘the others’).

Another form of legitimization of ethnic discrimination appears in the legal sphere called ‘theory of justice’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Raikka, 1996; Nesiah, 1997; Oran, 2005; Vijapur, 2006; Spann, 1993; James, 1996). The theory of justice questions whether laws are means for preventing discrimination, or have ‘veiling’ discriminatory decisions under the name of equality (Spann, 1993, p. 4).

The notion of 'veiling' used by Spann is symbolic in the sense that the laws are criticized for concealing discriminatory activities in the name of justice and equality. In her study of racist and sexist tendencies of the U.S. legal system Joy James claims that national laws are not innocent. Quite the contrary, James states that national laws seek to protect the majority, while they avoid and even harm the rights of minority groups, and argues that national laws 'have the ability to produce their own forms of devastation' (James, 1996, p. 56). Similarly, Nesiah (1997) asks whether laws lower the chances of discrimination or implicitly allow for discriminatory policies toward certain groups. Whatever the answer to his question might be, Nesiah (1997, p. 277) argues that 'prejudice and psychological conditioning may continue to hinder progress for a long period'. Scholars who study the theory of justice point out that the laws are far from being guarantees of equality and fairness. On the contrary, they argue, laws have become means of protecting the rights of the powerful majority which are often aligned with the well-being of the nation-state. The theory of justice argues that legal decisions are more likely to protect the majority and avoid minority rights. Furthermore, laws make discriminatory decisions in a hidden manner and under a legitimate mechanism. This thesis also questions whether the 1974 Supreme Court decision fairly applied national laws. Positioning certain communities, whether ethnic, racial, or religious, as the 'others', or so-called citizens, is the main motive for legitimizing discrimination.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the notion of citizenship is mostly linked to nationalism, whereas minorities are regarded as the 'other' citizens. Bloemraad et. al. (2008, p. 155) argue that both citizenship and nationalism 'entail a tension between inclusion and exclusion', since they are, on the one hand, quite assimilationist, and on the other hand, intolerant to differences. However, exclusion

or inclusion does not rely on legal, political, social, or economic participation as it was once proposed by T. H. Marshall's (1950) classic book, *Citizenship and Social Class*. Marshall was mostly criticized for not considering 'individual subjectivities and cultural differences' (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 157; see also Mann, 2001; Yuval Davis, 1997). Put differently, the weakness of his work was due to his lack of consideration for the cultural rights of citizens. It is very common that nation-states seek for a homogeneous nation-state, composed of a single and united identity. However, in every nation-state, there are groups with diverse ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic characteristics that are often subjected to exclusionary policies toward those groups. The 'others' of a nation in the internal sphere are mostly constituted of minority citizens. In a nation-state system, the cultural values of the majority, are privileged and protected by the nature of the system. However, when the cultural identities of minorities are largely ignored by the majority, problems arise for both citizenship and minority rights.

Citizenship is no longer a privilege owned by a certain class, religion, or gender. In today's world, one can gain the legal right to citizenship, participate in the political sphere, and have equal rights as every other citizen (Bloemraad et al., 2008, see also Aybay, 1991). However, a final dimension of citizenship, which is 'belonging' (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 156) is not truly met for different cultural, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. As explained before, a certain practice of exclusion is seen as necessary 'in order for 'we' to exist' (Bosniak, 2001; see also Haste, 2004) [...] and often justified by the need for social cohesion (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Brubaker, 1992; Calhoun, 2007). Brubaker (1992) explains that the links between nationalism and citizenship are strengthened by attributing a stronger cultural insight to nationalism and a political insight to citizenship. In Brubaker's

words, ‘ ‘Citizenship’ has a participatory connotation that ‘nationality’ lacks and ‘nationality’ has a richer cultural resonance than ‘citizenship,’ but the words are used interchangeably to designate the legal quality of state membership’ (Brubaker, 1992, p. 64; see also Bendix, 1996).

Citizenship and nationalism are interrelated, and both are also closely linked to the notion of minorities. The accepted definition of minorities based on the definition of the International Court of Justice is ‘a community that lives in a country or a region, that has their own race, religion, language and traditions; and, through their racial, religious, traditional and linguistic identity, can protect their traditions, continue their beliefs, educate their children, relying on their racial characteristics and having the right to help and support each other’ (Akgönül, 2007). Furthermore, the General Comment 18 of the Human Rights Committee (1996) emphasizes the rights of minorities as follows:

Discrimination which affects minorities in a negative manner - politically, socially, culturally or economically - persists and is a major source of tension in many parts of the world. Discrimination has been interpreted to ‘imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, [. . .], language, religion, [. . .], national or social origin, [. . .], birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms’.

2.5. Multiculturalism

War periods, starting especially from World War I and World War II, have been quite destructive for the well-being of minority groups all around the world (Vijapur, 2006; Kymlicka and Shapiro, 1997; Panayi, 1993). As a result of the criticisms toward the social and legal spheres that perpetuate minority discrimination, theories of multiculturalism are proposed.

There is not a single perception of multiculturalism in academia, but scholars have different approaches such as the liberal, communitarian, and liberal culturalist multiculturalism. The liberal theory of multiculturalism, proposed by John Rawls (1971), puts the individual in the center and argues that priority should be given to the freedoms of individuals rather than communities. Rawls's argument is criticized by the communitarian approach put forward by scholars such as Sandel (1998), and Walzer (1983). The communitarians argue in favor of giving special emphasis to the community-operated minority groups rather than single individuals. Therefore, the communitarians, who support the priority of minority groups evolved around shared values and protection of their community, are distinguished from liberals who stress that the individual freedom and autonomy are crucial for minority protection. A third perspective raised by Kymlicka and Shapiro (1997) and Kymlicka (1995; 2001), which I will specifically adopt in my thesis, puts cultural values at the center of its argument and claims that culture is the source of individuals' self identification. In what follows, I will offer a more detailed explanation of liberal culturalist ideology and compare it to other forms of liberalism.

The nation-states in the nineteenth century commonly sought for a homogenous society, usually formulated around a common ethnic identity.

Therefore,

‘Governments [...] have pursued a variety of policies regarding cultural minorities. Some minorities were physically eliminated [...] other minorities were coercively assimilated [...] in yet other cases, minorities were treated as resident aliens, subjected to physical segregation and economic discrimination, and denied political rights’ (Kymlicka and Shapiro, 1997, p. 2).

Categorizing ‘indigenous people’ and ‘non-isolationist religious groups’, Kymlicka and Shapiro (1997, p. 20) argue that they have no purpose of establishing their own nation-state and they only seek ‘the ability to maintain certain traditional ways of life

and beliefs'. In my case study, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey characterize themselves as such, and stress their demands for equal citizenry and cultural freedom. Indigenous people and non-isolationist religious groups demand 'to exempt themselves from certain general rules that seem to discriminate against them' (Kymlicka, 1997, p. 23). Their demands, far from being divisionary, are directly seeking for 'rights to encourage social integrity' (2008, p. 212; 1995). However, Hoffman (2004) argues that nation-states seek for a so-called egalitarianism through the concept of equal citizenship, which results in absolute inequality. Therefore, liberal culturalist multiculturalism demands a model, called the 'membership sensitive model of justice', which should be applied in order to avoid minority discrimination (Raikka, 1996, p. 3).

The membership sensitive model of justice is distinguished from the 'membership blind model of justice' (Raikka, 1996, p. 3) also known as ethnocultural neutrality of a liberal state. Defenders of the membership sensitive multiculturalism argue that 'membership-blind model of justice has exemplified and would exemplify institutional discrimination in one form or another, either directly or indirectly' (Raikka, 1996, p. 3). The theory of justice, which questions the fairness of legal decisions of national courts, is an indirect form of institutional discrimination for the defenders of the membership-sensitive model. However, the arguments for sensitive model liberalism have been highly criticized by a counter-argument due to its unnecessary when all subjects are already equal with the citizenship status given to them. Difference blind liberalism puts liberalism and citizenship rights at the center of their argument and stress that these notions are sufficient to ascribe egalitarianism to all its subjects regardless of their status of being majority or minority. Put differently, multiculturalists argue in favor of special minority rights to avoid the

discrimination that occurs as a result of nation-state citizenship, while critics of special minority rights believe that ‘basic rights of citizenship cannot vary among citizens’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 31-33).

The debate between membership-sensitive and difference-blind models of multiculturalism is observed in the Turkish case as well. While the membership-sensitive model defenders argue for the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne, which gave specific cultural rights to non-Muslim minorities, the defenders of the difference-blind model choose to invoke the Constitutional rights given by the Turkish state to all its subjects. Since both laws are valid and applied in Turkey, the debate is far from over. However, as this thesis shows, the membership-blind model has its own problems in the application. For instance, the minority foundations in Turkey were subject to a different set of laws and regulations, especially in 1974 and afterwards, although all Turkish citizens are equal in the Turkish Constitution. Bora (2006, p. 70) states, the human rights movements ‘cause a nationalist reaction’ in the periphery, namely the eastern and southern regions in the globe. In fact, Bora claims that the implementation of multiculturalism policies is viewed as a form of political power of the prevailing core countries. The variation in the perception of human rights and multiculturalism movements between the core and the periphery triggers the suspicion toward the human rights notion (Bora, 2006, p. 70). Turkey is also quite doubtful about the protection of human rights, including its minorities, in the international arena. Suing Turkey in the ECHR is largely accepted as a betraying your country. Bora (2006, p. 67) argues that the nationalist campaigns pointing out ‘national threats’, ‘national enemies’ and ‘betrayers’ are frequently used as an excuse to avoid the implementation of human rights.

The international agreements in the post-war periods are also criticized by the minority rights defenders (Kymlicka, 1995). As argued in this thesis, war periods were significant in terms of discrimination against minorities, and therefore, most of the after-war treaties had articles concerning the status and protection of minorities. However, along with the notion of citizenship that is used to argue against the necessity of minority rights, there is the notion of reciprocity that is seen repeatedly in the political and legal spheres.

The post-war treaties and an international organization called the League of Nations (1919) aimed to protect minorities from the abuse of human and minority rights. A common characteristic of all post-war treaties was reciprocity, which means that the rights given to one minority would be given to the minorities of the other state. Put differently, the rights attributed to minorities were practiced in the minorities of both states that signed the treaty. However, ‘their application has been negative in all countries concerned (the same deprivations of rights and the same humiliations)’ (Millas, 1997, pp. 5-7, cited in Akgönül, 2008, p. 4). Although the main purpose of rule of reciprocity was to apply positive rights to all minorities, misapplication of the notion resulted in twofold discrimination. That is to say, even if a minority group of a nation was not subjected to discriminatory policies, violation of minority protection by the opponent nation would result in retaliation.

2.6. Reciprocity: A Rule Misused

The principle of reciprocity, also known as ‘tit-for-tat’ (Parisi and Ghei, 2003), has a legitimizing role for oppressive policies toward minorities, although the primary aim of the principle was to eradicate discrimination. The application of the reciprocity principle, however, ends up posing problems since its negative

application causes vicious cycles of disagreement and retaliation among nation states. Akgönül (2008, p. 41) argues that ‘any oppressive measure against the minorities is legitimized and ‘explained’ on the basis of probable and suspected future negative act by the ‘other’’. Accepting reciprocity as a threat, or ‘a form of blackmail’ (Akgönül, 2008, p. 44) to the minorities of a country allows us to connect the notion to the discriminatory aspect of nationalism and citizenship as well. The misuse of the rule of reciprocity in the legal sphere, give good reason for scholars who question the neutrality and egalitarianism of the justice system (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Raikka, 1996; Nesiha, 1997; Oran, 2005; Vijapur, 2006; Spann, 1993; James, 1996).

The abuse of reciprocity indicates the deficiency and vulnerability of the legal system in protecting minorities. Discriminatory tendencies and maintenance of prejudice, when supported by legal institutions, result in an increased desire in the majority to implement negative reciprocity toward minorities. Akgönül (2008) argues that the masses are likely to internalize the rule of tit-for-tat and argue that if their state discriminates against its minorities sufficiently, then the opponent state would not dare discriminate against its minorities. In other words, ‘blackmailing’ through discrimination of minorities is seen as a method for equalizing the degree of discrimination. Still, reciprocity is not only internalized in the social sphere, but it is also practiced on the financial level. The rights to property ownership of minorities and minority organizations are most likely to be exposed to the rule of reciprocity. Akgönül puts forward his argument on the property rights of minorities by stating that ‘the welfare of property plays a crucial role in the viability of the minority communities, at both the individual and collective levels’ (2008, p. 87). By the individual level, the author points out the individual rights of property ownership, as

in individual property that might be a business association or a real estate. As an example, in the collective level, we can point to the foundations, which are used by the minority communities for education, religious, cultural or social services purposes. The misuse of reciprocity economically and socially harmed the minorities in both states. Furthermore, the rule of reciprocity is also largely used in the cultural and societal arenas. The reference to bad conditions Turkish minorities suffer elsewhere always results in a demand for equal oppression of the minorities in Turkey.

3. Methodology

This thesis deals with the formal and informal discriminatory policies implemented toward the non-Muslim minorities and minority foundations in Turkey during the rise of the conflict atmosphere between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 1974. Newspapers published at the time period are useful sources to explain the mutual relationship between official and unofficial discrimination. Newspapers, reporting the daily political, social, and economic news, are also fruitful as they include the personal comments of the columnists. Analyzing newspapers in this research is key for ‘trying to learn something about people by examining what they write’ (Berger, 1998, p. 23). I analyze newspapers (1) to explore the events that intimidate Greece and its supporters, (2) to point out the prejudice against minorities, particularly *Rums*, who are regarded as the internal enemies of the Turkish state, (3) to compare the apparent and concealed forms of discrimination against minorities in times of political conflict. The weakness of an analysis conducted solely of newspaper articles are overcome by two additional methods: (1) the analysis of the laws on foundations and the legal documents regarding the court cases of minority

foundations, and (2) an in-depth interview conducted with the current chief-editor of the minority newspaper.

Selecting the 1974 period is suitable for purposive sampling where I select cases with a specific question and 'a specific purpose in mind' (Neuman, 2003, p. 213). This thesis specifically aims to find the directional relationship between the Cyprus conflict and the discriminatory policies against the minority foundations in Turkey. The period in which the Cyprus Intervention took place is only a month, between 20 July and 16 August. However, the effects of the Cyprus dispute in 1974 went beyond that single month during which the Turkish Military Intervention took place. To include the period before and after the military Intervention, this thesis studies selected newspapers in the entire 1974 through which one may observe the ramifications of the pre and post Cyprus Intervention periods in terms of the formal and informal policies toward minorities in Turkey. A detailed analysis of the whole year reflects the transformation of Turkish-Greek relations from peaceful to hostile, not only toward each other, but also toward the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, and minorities within their respective countries. Complications between Greece and Turkey on issues such as continental shelf or oil research on the Aegean Sea are frequently observed in the pre-Cyprus Intervention process. Furthermore, this thesis particularly points out the aggressive attitude toward the Greeks in general due to the vague and brittle distinction between *Rums* and Greeks.

In the process of sampling, in order to increase the internal validity, a researcher should enlarge the study area as much as possible to various resources (Neuman, 2003, p. 187). However, there are some

limitations in the selection of newspapers as well. For instance, there are many other minority newspapers that this thesis has not taken into account such as Jewish *Salom*, or Armenian *Marmara* newspapers. The reason why *Apoyevmatini* is selected is that the conflict was between Turkey and Greece in 1974 over Cyprus that involves *Rum* community particularly. Put differently, the Turkish Greek minorities (*Rums*) were particularly subject to prejudice and *Apoyevmatini* was more likely to criticize the attitude against its own community.

Other sources of news are the weekly newspapers or journals that are highly political. This thesis does not analyze the weekly newspapers or the local newspapers since my major aim is to study the daily languages used in the influential daily newspapers. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover any Greek newspapers that were published in Greece during the period of dispute. However, I recognize that a comparison between the attitudes and language of Greek and Turkish newspapers during 1974 would be an important research I could conduct in the future.

The newspapers this thesis analyzes are *Hürriyet*, *Tercüman*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Apoyevmatini*. *Hürriyet* is a mainstream Turkish newspaper; *Tercüman* and *Cumhuriyet* reveal rightist and leftist views, respectively, and *Apoyevmatini* is the only *Rum* newspaper being published during 1974. Going through the news, comics, and articles published in newspapers in 1974, I aim to ‘examine what they read [...] and then go backward, assuming that what people read [...] are good reflections of their attitudes, values, and so on’ (Berger, 1998, p. 24). Additionally, this thesis points out that what people do not/ cannot read are as significant as what they do/can read. Revealing the concealment of the legal actions taken against minority

foundations, this thesis analyzes the laws on foundations and the minority cases taken to the international courts in the following periods. To better emphasize the attitude of the minority press, this thesis also draws upon an in-depth interview I conducted with Mr. Mihail Vasiliadis, a minority member, journalist and the recent chief-editor of *Apoyevmatini*. Studying different newspapers of different political persuasions, laws, legal documents, and the Vasiliadis interview, I analyze the threats and prejudice toward minorities, the legal acts taken against them, the concealment of discrimination, and the attitude of minorities and minority media in this process.

Hürriyet (Liberty) was established in May 1948 by Sedat Simavi. However, after Sedat Simavi's death in 1953, his son Erol Simavi continued as the editor-in-chief. *Hürriyet* was printed in color in 1974, and sold for 100 pennies (*kuruş*). The title was printed on a pinkish red banner, while *Cumhuriyet* and *Tercüman* were printed on a sanguineous color. On the left side of the title, there appeared a Turkish flag in the same color as the banner, a pinkish red. The most significant part that appeared in *Hürriyet* is its motto, 'Turkey belongs to the Turks' (*Türkiye Türklerindir*). *Hürriyet* is the mainstream newspaper in this research, because it is widely circulated, popular, and also close to the mainstream movements in Turkey.

Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman (The Interpreter to the Public and Events) was established in October 1960 by Kemal Ilıcak. The newspaper was priced the same as *Hürriyet*, 100 pennies (*kuruş*), and its name, *Tercüman*, was printed in bold red. Although we do not know the exact circulation rate of the newspaper in 1974, the newspaper reported printing around 437,000 copies a day, with average sales of around 90,000. It should also be noted that there is a communal sharing of newspapers in the Turkish context in which a newspaper is read by more than one person. The motto of *Tercüman* was 'Each morning the world is set up again, each

morning is a fresh start' (*Her sabah dünya yeniden kurulur, her sabah yeni bir başlangıçtır*). *Tercüman* was a right-wing newspaper, and this could also be observed in its news articles and the events and campaigns it supported. The newspaper mainly defended the former rightist political party, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*), and its leader Süleyman Demirel through its news articles. Meanwhile, there are article series on various topics connected to Turkish nationalist discourse, such as on the Turkish race, Turkish nationalism, or the excellence of the Turkish nation.

The third Turkish newspaper analyzed in this thesis is *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic), the oldest newspaper among the ones analyzed. Established less than a year after the Turkish Republic was founded, in May 1924, the newspaper was named by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself. The founder of *Cumhuriyet* was Yunus Nadi, whose son Nadir Nadi continued as the editor-in-chief after his father's death. There was no motto of the newspaper shown in the banner unlike in *Hürriyet* or *Tercüman*. Koptener (2005, p. 159) states that the circulation rate of *Cumhuriyet* was around 76,000 in the 1980s; however, it is not clear what the circulation rate of the newspaper in 1974. The political stance of the newspaper was leftist, and quite sympathetic to the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and his government at the time.

Apoyevmatini (Afternoon), the only minority newspaper analyzed in this thesis, is a *Rum* newspaper published in Greek. The name of the newspaper comes from the fact that it is printed in the afternoons. *Apoyevmatini*, compared to the Turkish newspapers examined, was a short newspaper with only four pages. The idea of establishing a newspaper named *Apoyevmatini* belongs to Andonis Vasiliadis while the newspaper was first published by his brother, Konstandinos Vasiliadis. *Apoyevmatini* was the only *Rum* newspaper published during 1974. *Apoyevmatini* is

the oldest newspaper published uninterrupted along with *Cumhuriyet*, since 1925. Furthermore, *Apoyevmatini*'s circulation rates were higher than *Cumhuriyet* in the early period of the Turkish Republic since the old Turkish alphabet could not be read until the Latin alphabet reform was made later, in 1 November 1928. 'With regard to the population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923, the Muslim Greeks coming from Greece could only read from *Apoyevmatini* since it was published in Greek'. Mr. Mihail Vasiliadis, the recent chief-editor of the newspaper, claims that the circulation rate of *Apoyevmatini* was 12,000 in the 1960s, while this number has dropped to 2000 in the 1970s. Today, around 500 copies of *Apoyevmatini* are printed, although circulation could be higher due to the PDF (Portable Document Format) files sent to the Greek citizens in Greece via the Internet.

Apoyevmatini, a daily newspaper of four-pages, published news from all around the world in the first pages in 1974. The news varied from political news such elections in Israel, American-Western Europe relations or oil price rises in Jordan or Algeria, to science news such as the French nuclear tests, and social news like holidays or robberies. In the second page *Apoyevmatini* published daily news on cultural matters such as radio programs or local news such as car accidents, and serialized novels. Furthermore, *Apoyevmatini* announced congratulations and condolences in the second page. In the third page of the newspaper, there was a section called '*Apoyevmatini* 40 years ago' that reprinted articles from *Apoyevmatini* in 1934. Also, there were announcements about houses for rent or sale, along with 'good deeds' on donations and donators to philanthropic institutions. On the last page of *Apoyevmatini*, there was 'News from Greece' on issues like economics, sports, or even weather reports. Reporting news from Greece was important for the *Rum* community since there was a bond between the *Rum* minorities in Turkey and their

family and friends living in Greece. The second and third pages of *Apoyevmatini* showed that the audience of the newspaper is the *Rum* community in Turkey, although the first page news regarding political events did not go beyond translating news articles from Turkish newspapers.

I collected the newspapers in Istanbul, Turkey, from three libraries: Beyazıt State Library (*Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi*), Taksim Atatürk Library (*Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı*), and the Press Museum Library (*Basın Müzesi Kütüphanesi*). I analyzed the newspapers published in Turkish, while getting translation help from a research assistant for the *Apoyevmatini* articles, which are published in Greek. The research assistant was asked to search and translate into English articles regarding discrimination against the non-Muslim or particularly the *Rum* community in Turkey and any news on the decision and instances of property confiscation of minority foundations. The laws and legal documents are supplied by books written on the minority foundations (İmamoğlu, 2006; Reyna and Zonana, 2003).

Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of the newspaper articles published in 1974. The newspapers are the main sources of information in the research, and the events are the units of analysis. Following Swell's (1996) 'critical junctures' this thesis regards (historical events) as determinative in understanding the transformation of structures. The events examined in this thesis are listed as state ceremonies, demonstrations organized by GONGOs and the public, the media campaigns in support of the Turkish military forces, the affairs among Turkey and Greece regarding the Cyprus issue, the oil crisis or continental shelf disagreements, and finally, the daily incidents such as crimes, sports, and even gossip news. The news articles reporting the state ceremonies and demonstrations reflect the

threatening manner, usually with reference to the historic incidents such as previous successes of the Turkish nation like the conquest of Istanbul or the liberation of Izmir. Meanwhile, the reproduction of history is also noteworthy, such as the opening of Hasan Tahsin Monument to symbolize the first bullet targeting occupying Greek soldiers, or the Fallen Soldier Monument built for the casualties during the Cyprus Intervention. However, the threatening attitude toward the Greeks was also visible in the mass demonstrations against Greece and its policies in Cyprus. The common characteristic of the state ceremonies and demonstrations was that they all pointed out the *Rum* citizens in Turkey, reminding them of the glorious Turkish history, how their ‘ancestors’ were defeated, and how they had better remain loyal to Turkey.

Newspapers take an active role in drawing the public attention to certain issues. The media campaigns largely took place in the newspapers, mainly organized to collect money for the Turkish Army forces such as the naval or air forces. The donations were also collected by drawing public attention through sports events such as football matches between two popular sports teams, or simply by announcing the names of celebrities who donated money in these campaigns. The Turkish newspapers also track discriminatory news articles published in Greek newspapers, and react to these news in their reports such as accusing the Greek military junta of not sufficiently controlling its media, or highlighting the timeless antagonism of the Greeks against Turkey. Furthermore, the Greeks are threatened by the Turkish media in the news articles and the columns of journalists, usually with reference to the Greek defeat in 1922 and hinting at a likely future fiasco. Therefore, the media campaigns and journalists are significant actors for intimidating Greece, *Rums*, and the *Rum* institutions that arose the suspicion of the media.

The news articles are also significant for pointing out that the *Rums* are unreliable subjects in the Turkish state. Therefore, the news articles regarding the political affairs between Greece and Turkey or reporting daily incidents tend to distinguish the Turkish nation from Greeks and *Rums*. Whether in the pre- or post-Cyprus Intervention periods, these news articles focus on the achievements and the righteousness of the Turkish politics and the Turkish army in the Cyprus issue. The news articles accused Greeks of various issues such as passing the Turkish continental shelf in the Aegean, or barbarously attacking the Cypriot Turks and being violent even against Cypriot Greeks in Cyprus. The Turkish Army is frequently exalted in the reports, pointing out the fairness of the Turkish forces on the island. Meanwhile, the news articles reporting the daily incidents use language with negative connotations toward the *Rum* community and its institutions in Turkey. For instance, the tax evasion of a *Rum* citizen is reported in a newspaper article, pointing out the disloyalty of the *Rums*. Certain columns, where news articles are based on anonymous reports or pure gossip, take up large portions of the newspapers. These columns and news articles frequently claim that the *Rums* are not loyal citizens and that they tend to betray Turkey. Furthermore, some news reports specifically accuse *Rum* institutions, namely the Fener Rum Patriarchate, of functioning as a secret spy for Greece.

The news under the category of these celebrations, remembrance, or opening dates set examples of the reflections of the nationalist ideology in cultural life. Meanwhile, nationalism is perpetuated as a natural and inevitable value through the news articles reporting liberation days, monument openings, or speeches of the politicians who highlight the internal enemies of the Turkish state. My attempt in analyzing the news articles that report the state ceremonies and mass demonstrations

is to criticize the primordial perspective on nationalism. I aim to point out that nationalism is not a natural or an inevitable fact. On the contrary, my interpretation is that these events such as the celebration of historic conquests, liberation days, and also the establishment of new remembrance days and monuments are tools to maintain the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state.

Another issue to be pointed out in the analysis of the ceremonies in 1974 is the reference to the internal and external ‘others’ of a political community. The common stereotypes used to define ‘the others’, mainly the non-Muslim community, are spies, inner enemies, or hostiles. Throughout the newspaper articles analyzed, the emphasis on the *Rum* community as ‘spies’, the skeptical view toward the Patriarchate, or the ‘Greek’ generalization as a whole is frequently observed. Such discursive mechanisms are important for people to internalize themselves as a homogenous group, and externalize ‘the others’ (Hobsbawm, 1990). The theories of discrimination and citizenship are also crucial in terms of explaining the attitude toward the others of a nation, namely the Turkish society. The finger pointing of the others, who are in my case the Greeks and *Rums*, also results in the internalization of the tit-for-tat rule, also known as the rule of reciprocity. Furthermore, through false perceptions of reciprocity, societies believe that the problems of their citizens in a ‘hostile’ country could be solved by discrimination toward the members of the other state’s ethnic group living in their country (Akgönül, 2008). An example of this attitude is observed in the articles of the memorandum of the NTSU in the mass rally against Greece, where they complained that the Turkish minorities are suffering in Western Thrace, whereas the *Rum* spies in Turkey are enjoying their liberty. In addition, the NTSU memo stated that reciprocal acts should be taken against Greece, even if they lead to a war between Turks and Greeks.

The news articles are better analyzed by dividing the year 1974 into four time periods. The first period spans from January to March 1974, pre-Cyprus Intervention I. Pre-Cyprus Intervention II is the period that starts from April and continues until the beginning of the Cyprus Intervention in July. The third period is the Cyprus Intervention period, July-August. The last period is the post-Cyprus Intervention period, from September to December. The period before the Intervention started is divided into two periods because of the rise in discriminatory discourse in the media. Most of the state ceremonies and public demonstrations took place from April to June, which is the period when the Greek-Turkish dispute heated up both politically and socially. Furthermore, this period was when the Supreme Court of Justice allowed for the confiscation of non-Muslim foundation properties that were gained after 1936. Although this thesis examines the selected newspapers throughout 1974, it only analyzes news articles with overt or covert discriminatory contents. The newspaper articles published during the Cyprus Intervention period is fewer in number because the news pieces in this period specifically focused on militarily issues in a neutral tone and manner than any other period throughout 1974.

In the various newspapers analyzed, I observed three types of articles. First, there were the news articles; second, there were political cartoons sarcastically describing the events of the time; and last, there were announcements that might be death notices or announcements for social campaigns. The tone and intensity variables used in the analysis are crucial in terms of reflecting the general attitude of the article as negative, neutral, positive or sarcastic. Furthermore, the intensity of the tone may vary from low to high. It can be argued that both negative and sarcastic tones reflect a negative attitude, but when the tone is sarcastic there is a particular way of making fun of the subject within the news

article. The cartoons I picked in my analysis all have sarcastic tone and high intensity.

Chapter 5 studies laws on foundations and official court documents to better emphasize the legal acts toward the minority foundations. These documents are listed as follows: Articles 38 through 45 on minority rights in the Treaty of Lausanne, 2762 Law on Foundations, the interpretation of the 2762 Law on Foundations by the May 8, 1974 judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Justice that acts as a precedent, and the following court trial regarding the Fener Rum Foundation in the European Court of Human Rights. The laws on foundations mainly constitute a historical and legal background for this study, since they indicate the continuities and discontinuities of the state attitude toward foundations. Historically, I focused on the period starting from the late Ottoman period to the end of 1974. Through this period, this thesis points out the significance of conflict periods on both the changes in laws and the changes in their applications. In order to understand the applications of the laws, it is important to study the regulations of minority foundations in Turkey.

Chapter 5 also examines the lack of news coverage on the judicial decision and its aftermath: the property confiscation of the non-Muslim foundations. Studying the absence of news articles reporting the problems of minority foundations, this chapter presents a content analysis of the selected Turkish newspapers. In the content analysis, each news article is given an identification number. The Turkish newspapers, *Hürriyet*, *Tercüman*, and *Cumhuriyet*, are given numbers from one to three, respectively. Furthermore, the significance of silence

in covert discrimination is studied through a detailed reading the four newspapers analyzed. Finally, to have a better perspective on the *Rum* media, especially *Apoyevmatini* during 1974, I conducted an in-depth interview with Mr. Vasiliadis in February 2009. Mr. Vasiliadis is the chief-editor of *Apoyevmatini* since 2003. Except the period when he left Turkey and moved to Greece between 1975 and 2003, he has been active in the minority media. Being the manager of another *Rum* newspaper called *Embros* in the late 1960s; he is capable of noticing the problems faced by the non-Muslim minorities and their institutions. This thesis focuses on the reflections of the events I analyzed in *Apoyevmatini*, and also refer to the statements of Mr. Vasiliadis to reveal the reasons behind the neutral attitude of the *Rum*, and minority media in 1974.

Categorization of different newspapers is crucial to compare and contrast the attitudes of each. The date variable refers to the month when the article is published in 1974. The articles are also distinguished in terms of their appearance in the newspaper -the front page, inside pages, and the back page- with numbers from one to three respectively. The pages these news articles were placed on were categorized into three groups, listed as first page, inside pages, and last page. Coding this variable allows me to analyze whether discriminatory language was used more on the first pages or on the other pages. It should be noted that the appearance of news on front or inside pages are important in terms of showing how much attention is given to these news articles, at least in the media.

Themes are categorized the last in the content analysis of the Turkish newspapers. There are eight themes, listed as (1) nationalism, (2) the threat of war, (3) self-victimization, (4) prejudice and

discrimination, (5) demand for retaliation, (6) foundations, (7) peaceful claims of both Turkey and Greece, and finally (8) press campaigns in the Turkish newspapers. The news articles categorized under the nationalism theme are the articles pointing out the Turkish superiority, loyalty, and the characteristics that distinguish Turks from the others, namely the Greeks. The second theme is related to the nationalism, however, in the threat of war, there is more emphasis on the Turkish triumphs over Greece and how Greeks have lost and will lose any wars they enter against Turkey. The self-victimization theme is used for articles where it is implied that Turkish minorities elsewhere, especially in Greece, suffer from discriminatory policies. This theme is significant for legitimizing future discriminatory policies implemented against the minorities in Turkey. The inhumane treatment of the Turks elsewhere usually increases the demands for reciprocal policies toward the minorities in Turkey. The prejudice theme applies to the articles discrediting *Rums* and minority institutions such as the Fener Rum Patriarchate, and blaming them for not being true allies of the Turkish nation. Questioning the loyalty of minorities, and pointing out the discriminatory policies toward the Turkish minorities elsewhere, the fifth theme is devoted to demanding retaliatory acts against the minorities in Turkey. Although there is an open request for equal discrimination against minorities in Turkey, the policies toward foundations are almost never presented in the Turkish media. The news articles about the foundations are categorized in the foundations theme. Meanwhile, there are also some news articles in which a peaceful attitude among Turkey and Greece are reflected, and these articles are categorized in the seventh theme.

Finally, the press campaigns are quite influential in shaping public attitude and drawing public attention to issues like military power or the value of Cyprus for the Turkish nation.

Chapter 6 both presents a conclusion and points out the shifts and continuances in terms of discriminatory attitude against the non-Muslim foundations are analyzed through a historical analysis of the judicial cases of minority foundations following 1974. The judicial decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 9 January, 2007, on the property rights of the Fener Rum Foundation is examined to both formally through legal documents and informally through an analysis of the news articles published in Turkish newspapers such as *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Zaman*, *Milliyet* and *Radikal* in the ten days following the decision. These newspapers are also selected to represent different political perspectives. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* are categorized as the mainstream newspapers in Turkey. Meanwhile *Cumhuriyet* is a laicist Kemalist newspaper and *Zaman* is a right-wing Islamist newspaper. *Radikal*, on the other hand, is a newspaper that aims to unite different perspectives together with a liberal perspective.

CHAPTER III

1. Historical Background

1.1. The Ottoman *Millet* System

The Ottoman *Millet* system is one of the building blocks for not only understanding the relationship between the state and its subjects in the Ottoman Empire, but also for shading light on the status of citizenship and minorities in the Turkish Republic. The constitutionally recognized minorities in the Turkish Republic are the *Rums*, Armenians, and Jews, three of the four millets in the Ottoman Empire. The fourth millet is the Muslim millet, and as the ‘sovereign *millet*’, it is distinguished from the ‘subject’ non-Muslim millets in terms of its higher position in the system’s hierarchy. The rise of nationalism especially in the Balkans in the late-Ottoman period, the late 18th century, were determining for the attitude toward the minorities in Turkey, who are regarded as possible threats to the sovereignty of after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This attitude is also significant to explain the discriminatory policies toward minorities. In order to better understand the status of the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman period and what follows as the Turkish Republic, the administrative system called the *Millet* System is studied in this section.

James Scott (1998) defines the *millet* system as the administration of ‘ethnoreligious distinctions of the conquered peoples’ (Barkey, 2008, p. 12). Having different religious communities within its borders, the Ottoman Empire categorizes its subjects in terms of their religious identity (Ortaylı, 2008). There were four millets under the Ottoman Empire, listed as Muslim, Orthodox-Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Barkey (2008, p. 131) claims that ‘the orthodox *millet* was recognized in 1454, the Armenian in 1461, and the Jewish *millet* [...] was unofficially recognized around the same time as the other two’. On the contrary, Quataert (2005, p. 176) argues that the conceptualization of non-Muslims as a *millet* is not very old and states that ‘*millet* in fact meant Muslims within the Empire and Christians outside it’ until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Whatever the recognition date might be, the *millet* system is significant to explain the lives of the different communities in both the official and unofficial spheres.

Meanwhile, there are opposing arguments in terms of the peacefulness of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire. A group of scholars argue that it was a peaceful administrative system, while the others claim that it was problematic in terms of equal treatment of the Muslim and non-Muslim millets. Many scholars (i.e. Kymlicka, 1992; Barkey, 2008; Quataert, 2005; Sezgin and Biçer, 2006; Ortaylı, 2008) agree that the millet system was a peaceful form of ruling different communities in the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, others argue that the Ottoman Empire was still ‘not a liberal society’ because it did not tolerate individual oppositions within these *millets* (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 143).

Barkey (2008, p. 146) refers to the relatively calm period that was free of ethnic or religious strife as ‘the centuries of Pax Ottomanica’. However, as a consequence of the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the Greek and Serbian nation-

states were established in 1829 and 1878, respectively. Although the role of nationalism in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is another area of study, it is still crucial to understand the future treatment of the non-Muslim communities living in the Turkish Republic. State and public internalization of paranoia against the non-Muslim communities who were regarded as internal threats within society and the attitude toward minorities during the Turkish Republic could not be described as neutral or peaceful. The Sèvres Agreement that ended the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Lausanne that established the Turkish Republic in the international spheres are studied next. These international agreements are significant to highlight the constitutional status of minorities and the role of the historicity in terms of the attitude toward minorities.

1.2. From Sèvres to Lausanne

The Ottoman Empire struggled with independence movements of different ethnic groups such as the Serbs, Greeks, Romanians, Bulgarians and Albanians starting from the early nineteenth century. The Serbian revolts and the Greek war of independence were significant in causing a psychological insecurity of the Ottomans. Being the first independent nation-state coming out of the Ottoman Empire, Greek uprising and its consequences are significant in the later conception of Greeks, and the remaining Rums as an unreliable community. Jung and Piccoli (2001, p. 39) claim that ‘in their struggle with the Ottoman state, internal and external forces were joining sides and Ottoman elite in Istanbul saw itself in an atmosphere of outside conspiracy and inside betrayal’. These uprisings against the Ottoman rule were ‘supported by foreign powers also eager to interfere in Ottoman affairs’ (Barkey, 2008, p. 267). However, the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkan region, and

the struggle of Greeks for independence caused misconceptions especially toward the Greek Ottomans (*Rums*) who worked and lived in the Ottoman territories, mainly in Istanbul. Quataert (2005) argues that the Greek independence movement resulted in dissent between the *Rum* officials and Ottoman rulers. Quataert (2005, p. 81) states ‘With the Greek war of independence, the loyalty of Ottoman Greeks generally became suspect’. For instance, the *Rum* community and the *Rum* translators called the *dragomans* who were skillful in foreign languages were no longer given posts in the state bureaucracy, and a separate Translation Office was established to provide new translators selected from trained Turkish officers.

One of the most traumatic experiences for the Ottoman Empire was the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 through which the Ottoman rule lost its power and sovereignty. At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire lost its territorial unity and was partitioned into different regions, each under the control of different victorious Allies. Hale (2002, p. 45) states that ‘under this stillborn treaty, Ottoman rule in Istanbul would be maintained, but control over the straits placed under an international commission, on which the Ottoman government would have only minor representation’. It can be argued that the Sèvres Treaty had long lasting consequences on the suspicious Turkish attitude both toward the West and the non-Turkish elements within its territories.

The ‘inner threats’ notion can be explained in a historical perspective. Hanioglu (2006, p. 3), while refuting the theory that ground the emergence of the Turkish nationalism to the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, claims that this theory was accepted in the early Republican history. Although the relations between the emergence of Turkish nationalism and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP-*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) can be questioned, the Turkish historians ‘drew a straight

line back from the new ideology formulated by the founding fathers of the Turkish republic to its alleged origins under the rule of Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress' (Hanioglu (2006, p. 3). Meanwhile, Dündar (2006) argues that the ideology of the CUP was largely influenced by the loss of Balkans. The trauma in the Balkans resulted in the Turkification policy accepted by the CUP, meaning Islamization and Turkification in state mechanisms, the demography of the Anatolia, and the economy (Dündar, 2006, p. 37). The notion of inner threat can be traced back to the late-Ottoman period, when the 'fear of vanishing as a result of both the world, and the ones closest to us (the insiders)' (Belge, 2002, p. 186), namely the 'Christian people under its rule, and other imperial states' (Akçam, 2002, p. 60).

The outcomes of the Sèvres Treaty had been conceptualized as the Sèvres Syndrome, which refers to seeing the imperial powers as potential threats to the unity of the Turkish state in both state and societal levels. The Sèvres Syndrome is significant for the justification of the formal and informal skepticism against the West and the non-Muslim minorities who are regarded as the extension of the West. The footprints of the Sèvres Syndrome are echoed in the responses of Turkish politicians to criticisms of Turkish democratization throughout the Republican history. As long as the politics of Turkey continue to be criticized by western powers, whether on the Kurdish problem or the European Union candidacy, the Turkish arguments rely on the so-called 'Sèvres Syndrome' and how Western powers secretly pursue the fall of the Turkish Republic for their own purposes. One example of this attitude is shown in Hale's book (2002) with a statement of the former Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel, pointing out that 'Turkey could never win the support of the West, however hard it tried to democratize its internal political system' (Hale, 2002, p. 225). The psychological repercussions of the Sèvres Treaty

have persisted, most scholars argue, although the clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres were never practiced, as the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923 four years after the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) superseded it.

Symbolizing a break from the damaged pride caused by the previous experiences of the collapsing Ottoman Empire, such as the Balkan Wars or the Sèvres Treaty (1920), the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) is considered to be the building block of the Turkish Republic. The success of the Turkish National Struggle (*Milli Mücadele*) resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne that settles variety of issues such as the determination of Turkey's borders, abandoning capitulations, or payments of the debt of the Ottoman Empire. 'The protection of the minorities' was a section of the 'political decisions' of the Treaty of Lausanne, which has been violated for a long period of time in the Republican history. In what follows, I will focus on the treaty's articles on minorities (Articles 38-45) and their complications regarding the minorities of Turkey.

Signing the Treaty of Lausanne, which is also accepted as an early version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Turkish government has agreed 'to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion' (Treaty of Lausanne, Section III Article 38). As an attempt to establish Turkey's obligations and responsibilities toward its minority citizens in particular, the Treaty of Lausanne specified who the minorities *are*. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the minorities are the 'non-Muslims' living in Turkey. However, in a critical reading of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty Section III, there appears a dilemma on the conceptualization of the minorities (Oran, 2005). The contradiction is that although the non-Muslim citizens are stated as minorities in the Lausanne Treaty, the groups regarded as

minorities are limited to three communities: Greek Orthodox, Jews and Armenians. The *Süryanis* (Syrian Orthodox), although being a non-Muslim community in Turkey, were not counted as minorities.

1.2.1. The 1923 Population Exchange

Apart from determining who minorities were in the newly established Turkish Republic, the Treaty of Lausanne had a significant role in the homogenization of both Turkey and Greece. Although the *Rums* in Istanbul, along with Muslim Turks in the Western Thrace were not parts of this compulsory exchange, around 900.000 Greeks in the Anatolia were exchanged with around 400.000 Muslim Turks in Greece (Hale, 2002, p. 55). Akgönül claims that ‘when the population exchange was accomplished, Greek speaking population was only 1% of the overall Turkish population’ (2007, p. 64). Furthermore, Hale states that ‘the population of Anatolia, of which about 20 per cent had been non-Muslim before the war [the Turkish Independence War/ The Great War] was now about 98 per cent Muslim’ (2002, p. 56). The population exchange brought problems for both Rum and Turkish communities that were to migrate, and for newly established nation-states Turkey and Greece. Being compulsory resulted in ‘psychological, sociological, and even economic burdens’ for the exchanged communities (Ari, 1995, p. 21). Furthermore, for both Turkey and Greece, ‘the gain was bought at appalling human cost, and ended of generally peaceful co-existence between the two communities’ (Hale, 2002, p. 56). Although the ramifications of the population exchange are beyond the focus of this thesis, the population exchange in 1923 is still important for setting an example of Rum and Turkish Muslim minorities were accepted in the Turkish and Greek nation-states respectively.

1.3. The Cyprus Conflict

The Cyprus Island, before being conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, had been under Venetian control since 1489. When Ottoman rule in Cyprus began, the *millet* system was implemented on the island as well. Although Calotychos (1998, p. 5) states that under the Ottoman rule, Orthodox Christians were particularly ‘discriminated [against] in matters of taxation and, at times, by repressive measures’, he also recognized that Greeks ‘were given [the] right to regulate their affairs’. In accordance with the millet system ‘the Greek Orthodox Church was established as an administrative authority that dealt with the Greek population’ (Calotychos, 1998, p. 5) under Ottoman rule.

At the end of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire territories began to shrink with the rise of nationalist uprisings, Cyprus was occupied by the British under the Cyprus Convention in 1878. Calotychos (1998, p. 5) estimates that the percentage of Orthodox Greek and Muslim Turks were 73.9% and 24.4%, respectively, at this time. There were both mixed and separate villages where Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks lived under the British occupation, but ‘whether this era was characterized as a time of conflict or a time of harmony is greatly debated’ (Killoran, 1998, p. 160).

The Treaty of Lausanne, furthermore, decided the way Cyprus was to be ruled in the early Republican period. Although Cyprus was annexed by Britain in 1914, it was after the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that Greece and Turkey officially accepted British rule over the island. In the post World War I period, Turkey and Greece took action to further their self-interest. The newly established countries suffering the damages caused by WWI therefore accepted the British annexation without opposition. After the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), ‘Cyprus was declared a

Crown Colony in 1925' (Calotychos, 1998, p. 5). Calotychos (1998, p. 5) describes the Crown Colony of Cyprus as a rather peaceful semi-autonomous government between 1925 and 1955. However, from the 1950s onward, the politics in Cyprus shifted dramatically.

The dispute over Cyprus was carried to the international arena through the United Nations in the 1954. However, the Greek argument in the UN, requesting 'self-determination rights to the population in the Cyprus Island, under the protection of the United Nations' (Oran, 2005, p. 598) was rejected by the UN. The failure of Greece resulted in the establishment of an 'underground Greek terrorist organization' called the *EOKA* (Hale, 2002, p. 130). The main goal of the *EOKA* was the unification with Greece. As a result of the rise of conflict over Cyprus, the British government called Turkish and Greek governments for a meeting in the United Kingdom, known as the London Conference. The London Conference failed to find a solution to the controversy over how to rule Cyprus. The attacks toward the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey halted the conference before any consensus on Cyprus could be reached.

In the period between 1955 and 1974, Cyprus experienced a clash of two different ideologies: *Enosis* and *Taksim*. Hale (2002, p. 130) states that 'concern for the future of Cyprus only began after the pro-*enosis* movement began to gain momentum among the Greeks, both in Greece and in Cyprus, in the mid 1950s'. *Enosis*, which means to unite, seeks the union of Cyprus with mainland Greece. *Taksim*, on the contrary, is a thesis defended by Turkey that seeks for the partition of the island into two distinct territories: Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus.

There were armed groups that fought for the *enosis* and *taksim* ideologies. While the *EOKA* (*Etniki Organosi Kipriaku Agenos*) fought for *enosis*, the *VOLKAN*

(Volcano) and *TMT* (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*) fought for *taksim*. The *EOKA* was established by Colonel Grivas and started to operate in April 1, 1955 (Oran, 2005, p. 600). The *TMT* was financed and supported secretly by the Turkish government (Oran, 2005, p. 606). Meanwhile, the status of these organizations is not clear. Calotychos (1998, p. 6) notes that Greeks and Cypriot Greeks define *EOKA* as ‘a struggle for liberation’, while the British, Turks, and Cypriot Turks classify *EOKA* as a ‘guerilla group’. The same applies for the Turkish armed groups, *VOLKAN* and *TMT*, which are characterized as resistance groups by the Turks and Cypriot Turks while the Greeks and Cypriot Greeks name them as guerillas.

In 1960, under the London-Zürich Accords of Treaty and Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus was formed with the agreement of three guarantor states: Britain, Greece and Turkey. However, the disagreements on the governance of the new Republic continued to rise, and ‘violence between two communities from 1964 to 1974 led to 350 Turkish Cypriot and 200 Greek Cypriot deaths by early 1964’ (Calotychos, 1998, p. 7). The rise of conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can be observed through the number of mixed villages in Cyprus, which went down from 346 in 1964, to 48 in 1981 (Calotychos, 1998, p. 5 and 7).

In 1974, the Turkish army ‘invaded [Northern Cyprus] in the name of [the] security of its ethnical and religious minority’ (Calotychos, 1998, p. 7). This act by Turkey was given different names in the international arena. Killoran (1998, p. 160) states that the act of Turkey in 1974 can be named ‘intervention, invasion, or liberation’⁴ and the selection of the term is ‘dependent upon one’s political position on the issue’. A year after the Cyprus Intervention, the Federated State of Northern Cyprus was established by the Cypriot Turks in 1975. On 15 November, 1983, ‘the

⁴ I choose to use the term ‘Intervention’ in this thesis since ‘liberation’ has a strong Turkish tone, while ‘invasion’ has a Greek tone. I believe that the notion of ‘Intervention’ is more neutral.

northern part of the island declared its statehood and called itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)' (Calotychos, 1998, p. 9). The TRNC is considered a 'pseudo-state' by the Greeks and Cypriot Greeks and is not recognized in the international arena. Turkey is the only country that has recognized the existence of TRNC so far. Meanwhile, the dispute over Cyprus has not been resolved up to our day, and the UN is still working on a solution. Appendix A shows a chronology of the main political events that took place in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus until the end of 1974.

The stance of Turkey and Greece on the conflict over Cyprus has been criticized by both Turkish and Greek scholars. These nations are accused of acting irresponsibly and causing tragedy for both Cypriots and their own minority citizens. Oran (2005, p. 593) states that 'Both Turkish and Greek governments did not hesitate to use their minorities in the conflicts the chronic disagreements, and clashes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, starting from the 1955, and disputes over Aegean Sea.' Meanwhile, Calotychos (1998, p. 9) argues that neither Greece nor Turkey did anything to promote policies that would foster greater unity or cooperation between the two communities. These arguments highlight the fact that the Cyprus conflict had direct consequences, not only for the Cypriot people or for the foreign policies of Greece and Turkey, but also for domestic minority politics of both countries. The disagreements over Cyprus allowed the Turkish state to implement and legitimize discriminatory policies toward its non-Muslim minorities. The next section presents a historical background of the 6-7 September, 1955 events, and the mass deportation of Greeks in 1964. Finally, the 1974 legal ruling, and the historicity of foundations is discussed.

1.3.1. The Cyprus Conflict and Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is decisive in the attitude and policies toward the minorities in Turkey. More importantly, the effects of the Cyprus conflict on the minorities in Turkey address not only the Turkish Greek (*Rum*) community in Turkey, but non-Muslim minorities in general, including the Jews and Armenians. The dispute over Cyprus and its implications for the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey are analyzed in three sections. First, the 6-7 September 1955 incidents are correlated with the rise of the conflict atmosphere between Greece and Turkey. Second, the increasing tension over Cyprus in the international arena is discussed and linked to the Greek and *Rum* deportation in 1964. Last but not least, I focus on the 1974 disagreement among Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, which resulted in the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus, and argue that the judicial decision that allowed the property confiscation of minority foundations in May 1974 is a continuation of a policy of discrimination that has long been legitimized through the Cyprus dispute. The main reason for discussing these acts is to show that they are echoes of one another with an aim to exclude the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey from social, cultural, political, and economic arenas.

1.3.2. The Cyprus Conflict and the 6-7 September, 1955 events

On 6 September, 1955, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's house in Salonica was bombed. The news was circulated almost instantly through Turkish newspapers, especially with the second edition of the newspaper *Istanbul Express* entitled as 'Our Atatürk's House Damaged by a Bomb' (*Atamızın Evi Bomba ile Hasara Uğradı*) (*Istanbul Express*, 06-09-1955). Meanwhile, the

Cyprus dispute was discussed among Greek, Turkish, and British officials in a conference held in London. Cyprus, becoming a national issue, was linked to Greeks, Greek Cypriots, *Rums*, and the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey as a whole. In these days, the store owners, including the *Rums*, put up signs on their shop windows that read 'Cyprus is Turkish'. The 'Cyprus is Turkish' slogan became a tool for minorities to claim their Turkishness, and their loyalty to the Turkish state. Although the aggression was toward the *Rum* community in particular, the ramifications of the aggression were generalized to all non-Muslims, including Armenians, Jews, and Greek Orthodox. In response to the news, masses in Turkey, and mainly in Istanbul, became activated and started attacking and plundering houses, shops, and religious sites of the non-Muslim community. The two days of looting targeting the non-Muslim property resulted in a low number of deaths as well as material damage of approximately 300 million dollars. Furthermore, Turkey's image in the international arena was damaged once again as the 'Barbarian Turk' (Oran, 2005, p. 601).

Meanwhile, looting the non-Muslim property for two days was not an instant reaction, but a consciously organized and triggered effort against the *Rums* living in Turkey (Dosdoğru, 1993, Vryonis Jr., 2005). Although those responsible for both the material and intangible losses of the non-Muslim community were not fully identified, the inquisitorial in Greece shows that the percussion bomb put in front of Atatürk's house in Salonica was given to a state officer in the Turkish Consulate by a Western Thrace Turk who was also an employee in MIT of Turkey, (National Intelligence Organization, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*). Furthermore, the GONGOs, such as the National Turkish Students Union (NTSU - *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) and the Cyprus is Turkish Society (CTS - *Kıbrıs Türktür Derneği*), were influential in the creation of the anti-Greek, and thus anti-minority, atmosphere.

The 6-7 September 1955 incidents are significant for their psychological effects on the minority groups, and also to show that out the uncalculated consequences of ‘official provocations went too far’ (Bora, 2006, p. 196). Meanwhile, it is the first time when the dispute over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey has resulted in an act that can be defined as ‘the national reflex’, in other words: ‘a lynch orgy’ (Bora, 2006, p. 191). Bora defines the notion of the ‘national reflex’ as a ‘campaign’ not only joined by the citizens, but also carried out under the ‘leadership of the media’ (Bora, 2006, p. 193). The 6-7 September incidents should be regarded as a synthesis of the official provocations, their reflections in the media, and the society’s response to them. Moreover, there are several other periods in Turkish history, when the minorities were discriminated against through formal and informal policies. The 1964 Greek Deportation is the second policy I focus on to point out the role of the Cyprus dispute on the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

1.3.3. The Cyprus Conflict and the 1964 Greek Deportation

The conflict over Cyprus in the international arena did not end in the 1960s, even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. There were problems in the governance of the Republic of Cyprus in matters such as tax collection, public utilities, or the establishment of a Cypriot military. Meanwhile, disagreements between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots turned into violent actions on the island.

In 1963, pictures of the Cypriot Turks who were killed were conveyed to the media. On 21 December, 1963, the Turkish Army was commanded to ‘fly over the island as a warning, and if the skirmish did not end, ‘bombard’ the island’ (Firat, 1997, p. 125-126, emphasis original; see also Oran, 2005, p. 724). Although the

Turkish state did not put this decision into practice in 1963, the dispute over Cyprus was taken to the international arena in 1964 with a letter U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on 5 June, 1964. Johnson's letter explained that the United States was against a Turkish Intervention in Cyprus. The response letter sent by İnönü on 13 June, 1964, was quite significant in terms of 'blackmailing' the United States and the Western Alliance as a whole. In his response letter, İnönü warned that 'if our allies do not change their attitude, the Western Alliance will break up [...] A new kind of world will then come into being on a new pattern, and in this new world, Turkey will find herself a place' (Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 516). However, Johnson's response to İnönü was written in a 'patronizing style' that implied that if Turkey took unilateral action, a possible war between Greece, Turkey, and the Soviet Union could begin (Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 517). Meanwhile, Johnson also invited İnönü for a meeting in Washington for a peaceful negotiation on the subject. The Johnson-İnönü meeting took place on 22 and 23 June, 1964. During the meetings in Washington, D.C., between Johnson, İnönü, and the Greek Prime Minister Yeorgios Papandreaou, the leaders decided that the dispute over Cyprus would be solved by negotiations among governments rather than an intervention (Oran, 2005, p. 869).

With the rise of conflict in Turkish-Greek relations, the *Rum* population was used as a threat factor and a potential target of reprisal in response to Cypriot acts toward Cypriot Turks (Akgönül, 2007). Oran (2005, p. 732) points out that 'with the rise of conflict in Cyprus, the Turkish public started to pay close attention to the Patriarchate, *Rum* minority, and the Greek citizens residing in Turkey'. The Turkish government unilaterally annulled the 1930 Turkish-Greek Residence, Trade, and Maritime Agreement (*Oturma, Ticaret, ve Denizcilik Sözleşmesi*) on 16 September,

1964. The repercussions of the annulment were almost instant. First, a total of 8,600 Greek citizens were forced to leave Turkey, along with their *Rum* family members. According to Ker-Lindsay (2007, p. 17), this number is even higher, up to ‘an estimated 40,000 people had been deported, or had otherwise chosen to leave voluntarily who had been forced out’. Second, a ‘secret governmental decree’ (Oran, 2005, p. 773) revoked the ownership and revenue rights of the Greek citizens who were previously allowed to reside and conduct business in Turkey.

Although it is not going to be studied in this thesis, the Muslim minority in Greece has suffered from the international conflict as well. Akgönül (2007) argues that the conflict over Cyprus negatively affected both *Rum* minorities in Turkey and Turkish minorities in Greece. The Turkish policies toward the Greek and *Rum* citizens in Turkey resulted in Greek repression of the Turkish minorities on the Dodecanese Islands (*Oniki Adalar*), Rhodes Island (*Rodos Adası*), and Western Thrace. In fact, after the 1967 Greek military coup, the lands owned by the Turkish minority were expropriated, and Turkish villages were kept under military blockade (Oran, 2005, p. 733). The reciprocal policies of Greece toward its Turkish and Muslim minorities will be frequently referred to in the newspaper articles that are analyzed to discuss the property confiscation of minority foundations beginning with the juridical decision of 1974.

Having reviewed the 1955 incidents and the 1964 policies, two periods when the dispute over Cyprus had direct consequences on the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, I next focus on the main case selected for this thesis: The Cyprus dispute, and the complications it caused the non-Muslim foundations.

1.3.4. The Cyprus Conflict and the 1974 Supreme Court Decision on Property Confiscation of the Non-Muslim Foundations

The tension between Greece and Turkey on the Aegean continental shelf arose as a result of an oil search in the Aegean Sea at the beginning of the 1970s. Ker-Lindsay (2007, p. 19) claims that in the early 1970s, ‘the Greek Government issued a number of licenses to petroleum companies to start exploring for oil reserves in the Aegean’. The search for oil in the Aegean caused disagreements on the continental shelves of Turkey and Greece. However, ‘the events in Cyprus took centre stage’ on July, 1974. On 13 July, 1974, the Greek military junta that came to power with a coup organized a military coup against Makarios, the president of Cyprus at the time. Overthrowing Makarios, the military junta installed Nikos Sampson as the president of Cyprus, who is argued to be ‘a virulently anti-Turkish supporter of *enosis*, and declared that Cyprus had united with Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2007, p. 18). A week later, Bülent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister at the period, started a military operation on the island, taking control of the northern part of Cyprus. The Turkish military Intervention took place between 20 July and 16 August, 1974, in two parts. The unpreparedness of the Greek military for a combat caused the collapse of the military government in Greece, and a civilian government was established by Constantine Karamanlis on 24 July, 1974 (Ker-Lindsay, 2007; Coufoudakis, 1985).

Unlike the 1955 incidents and the 1964 Greek deportation that took place after the Cyprus dispute had reached its highest level, the policies toward the non-Muslim foundations were put into practice months before the Turkish state intervened in the island. On 8 May, 1974, the Supreme Court of Appeals issued a legal decision, holding that the declaration of property (*beyanname*) demanded from

all foundations in 1936, were deeds of trust for foundation property (*vakfiye*), and therefore had no indication that non-Muslim foundations could own new property after 1936. As a consequence of the decision, all property owned after 1936 by the non-Muslim charity foundations were going to be either returned to the proprietors or their heirs. However, since the minority foundations were not established by individuals but through collective community donations, the owners were named after saints like St. Miriam or St. Jesus (Ballar, 2001, p. 9). Starting from 1974, the GDF took action and filed lawsuits against the non-Muslim foundations. Since the heirs did not appear in courtrooms, the properties of the non-Muslim foundations were confiscated by the Treasury. Although the implementation of this policy in the informal level is studied in the following chapters of this thesis, it is necessary to focus on the historicity of the foundations and the laws on foundations starting from the establishment of these community foundations in the Ottoman period.

4.4.1. The Historicity of *Vakıfs*

It was in 1912 when the Ottoman Sultan of the period, Sultan Mehmed Reşat (Mehmet V), allowed both Muslim and non-Muslim *millets* to register the property of the charitable foundations they founded. For almost three years, foundations of Muslim and non-Muslim property were registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds (*Defter-i Hakani*) under the 1912 law. However, there is a distinction between the Muslim and non-Muslim foundations in terms of the ways they are established.

The Turkish word for foundation, *vakıf* (charitable fund), comes from the Arabic language and means to stop one's self in order to devote his/her property (Ballar, 2001). In other words, the foundations are established by a person, or a community, which refrains from using the property owned, but uses it for the benefit

of a charitable foundation. The Muslim foundations in the Ottoman period were established by a material donation and ratification of the Sharia Law. The non-Muslim community foundations, on the other hand, were founded by the Sultan's decree; and the properties of the foundations were not bequeathed by a person in particular. On the contrary, the financial resources of the minority foundations were accumulated by the non-Muslim community over time through donations made in churches or synagogues. Non-Muslim communities built places of worship, schools, and village clinics of through the collection of donations. Therefore, the founders of non-Muslim foundations are anonymous (Ballar, 2001, p. 8). The regulation of both Muslim and non-Muslim foundations had changed after the establishment of Turkish Republic, and the ratification of its legal basis, the Treaty of Lausanne.

The most crucial part of the Treaty of Lausanne, in terms of the regulation of the cultural and social life of the *Rum*, Armenian and Jewish minorities, appears in the articles concerning minorities in Turkey. Article 40 states that 'Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein' (The Treaty of Lausanne, Article 40). Put differently, this article stipulates that the Turkish Republic will set non-Muslim institutions free in their affairs, whether they are charitable, religious or social organizations.

Article 88 of the first constitution of the Turkish Republic in 1924, states that 'the People of Turkey, regardless of religion or race, are Turks as regard to Turkish citizenship' (the 1924 Turkish Constitution, Article 88). This article shows that the

citizens of Turkey were regarded as equal by the Turkish Republic, and their rights were protected by law. However, the foundations that were established during the Ottoman Empire were to be controlled and administered under the Turkish law of 1935. Oran (2005, p. 100) argues that the 1936 Law mainly aimed to ‘limit the financial sources of the Islamists’ who were seen as a major threat to the secular Turkish State, back then. Nevertheless, Oran states, the precautions toward the Islamists soon lost ground after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and over time, the GDF started to keep non-Muslim minority foundations under pressure.

The Law 2762 on Foundations dated on 5 June, 1935 was enacted and put into practice in 1936. The 1936 Foundation Law is important since it is the first law that puts all foundations under the control of state bureaucracy under the auspices of the General Directorate of Foundations (GDF). The primary motive behind the establishment of the GDF was to keep track of all the foundations and their property. Therefore, the very first article of the 1936 Law, defines the non-Muslim community foundations as *mülhak* (added) foundations (İmamoğlu, 2006; Reyna and Zonana, 2003). As a result to their categorization as added foundations, it was the GDF that was responsible for any restoration and updating the existing foundations needed. GDF abused this responsibility from the 1970s and onwards, with excuses such as the lack of a non-Muslim community in the region the foundation is located, or the problems in establishing a management for the foundation. The second category of foundations is called *mazbut* (appropriated) foundations. These foundations are the ones that no longer meet the needs of society and therefore need to be restructured. For instance, a fountain that was built and donated for the use of the public two hundred years ago would be closed and instead a current need of the community would be met. The regulation organization for the appropriated foundations is the

GDF. However, the GDF did not restore these foundations, especially after 1974, with excuses like the absence of a management of a given foundation and the ambiguities on the legal status of these foundations.

The Law on Foundations and the establishment of the GDF did not seem to pose any problems for either Muslim or non-Muslim foundations until the late 1960s. In 1966-67, when the conflict over Cyprus began to heat up, the attitude of the GDF dramatically shifted against non-Muslim foundations. I argue that the judicial decision of 8 May, 1974 aimed to legalize and legitimize the use of discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities and their foundations, which were regarded as actors of the ‘historical infidelity’ against Turkey (Bora, 2006, p. 84).

CHAPTER IV

The discrimination toward the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey does not operate in a linear fashion. There are rises and falls, the targets can vary from individuals to institutions, and the agents implementing discrimination can be politicians, judges, government operated organizations, the media, or simply individuals. This chapter addresses the analysis of the events as were reported in the newspaper articles I collected from *Hürriyet*, *Tercüman*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Apoyevmatini*. First, the vagueness of the *Rum* and Thrace notions in the Turkish language is put forward. Second, the quantitative content analysis of the newspaper articles are presented to point out the frequencies and chronology of themes listed as nationalism, war, self-victimization, prejudice, reciprocity, peace, foundations, and press campaigns. After drawing a general scheme of the content of the Turkish newspapers I studied, I begin to examine the news articles, including *Apoyevmatini*, in more detail. Third, the political dispute between Greece and Turkey and its reflections in the media are discussed. Fourth, the role of the media in implantation of discriminatory attitude toward Greeks and *Rums* is analyzed through the press campaigns organized by newspapers. Fifth, the state ceremonies and public demonstrations are examined to explain how Turkish nationalism is maintained, not only by the state, but also by the GONGOs, student unions, and thus the public itself.

Finally, I highlight the news articles that directly target the Greek and *Rum* individuals, and institutions.

1. Cypriot Greeks turned into *Rums*: A Linguistic Delusion

In the twentieth century, two reputable linguists developed theories to explain the meanings lying behind the signs people use to communicate. Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that the ‘sign’ consisted of three parts, called signifier, signified, and referent (Saussure, 1983, p. 67, cited in Chandler 2005). The ‘signifier’ refers to the sequence of letters, and the shape of the word. When a certain word creates an image in people’s minds, that concept is called the signified. Meanwhile, referent is the actual object that is seen. For instance, when people read the word ‘t-a-b-l-e’, it is the signifier, while the appearance of an object with a smooth flat top and vertical legs in human mind is called the ‘signified’. Meanwhile, a table as an actual object in the world is the referent. Saussure’s theory is significant in terms of explaining the meanings and mechanisms of signs. Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-58) proposed another formulation to explain the mechanisms through which people attribute names and meanings to the objects around them. Although his explanation was similar to Saussure’s, Peirce distinguished himself with the special emphasis he attributed to the ‘interpretant’. Peirce’s model is composed of three parts listed as ‘representamen’, ‘interpretant’, and ‘object’ (Peirce, 1931-58). ‘Representamen’ refers to the represented word, as in Saussure’s ‘signifier’. ‘Object’ refers to the subject matter that is being represented by the ‘representamen’, as in Saussure’s notion of the ‘signified’ (Silverman, 1983, p. 15, cited in Chandler, 2005). However, Peirce’s model is distinguished with its emphasis on the concept of ‘interpretant’, also known as ‘semiosis’ (Mertz, 2007, p. 338). Symbolizing the role of signs on

humans, the interpretant ‘integrates issues of social context more systematically into the analysis of meaning’ (Mertz, 2007, p. 338). It is this concept, the ‘interpretant’, through which people might attribute deeper meanings to society and distinguish themselves from the others (Belge, 2002).

The notion of ‘dominant discourse’ put forward by Michel Foucault (2007) is one step further from Saussure and Peirce. While Saussure argues that language is a regulation of a community, Peirce focuses on the effects of the social context in the human mind’s reading and comprehending a word. Foucault, on the other hand, claims that there is a link between linguistic signs and cultures, and language is a tool that allows us to know and construct the world (Foucault, 2007). I argue that Foucault’s ‘dominant discourse’ notion is observed in the Turkish-Greek relations, where the production of the language mechanisms define, reproduce and influence the meanings applied to the *Rum* community in daily life.

Nişanyan (2002) puts the etymological meaning of the word *Rum* as *Yun* (Romios). Another interpretation of the *Rum* notion comes from the notion ‘*Diyar-ı Rum*’ (Roman Land), a term used for Anatolia when it belonged mainly to Christians, namely to Byzantiums. Koca (***, p.2) **claims that Anatolia was named Turkey rather than *Diyar-ı Rum* after the Manzikert (*Malazgirt*, 1071) and Myriocephalonia (*Miryakefalon*, 1176) wars that Turkified and Islamicized the region.** In either explanation, the *Rum* notion symbolizes a historical fact, and it involves no hostile interpretations by nature. With the rise of nationalist tendencies in Cyprus beginning from the 1950s, the *Rum* notion was started to be used for the Cypriot Greeks as well. Furthermore, with the rise of dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the *Rum* notion started to be used for all non-Muslim minorities as well as Cypriot Greeks (Bora, 2002, p. 913). It should be noted that the vagueness

of the *Rum* notion, being applied to the *Rum* minorities as well as Cypriot Greeks results in ambiguities in the meaning of the word and avoids *Rums* from being real-citizens of Turkey. Furthermore, the informal interpretation of the *Rum* notion as all non-Muslim elements in Turkey resulted in a negative attitude toward non-Muslim minorities including Armenians and Jews as well. Meanwhile, *Rums*, Cypriot Greeks, and non-Muslim minorities are generalized as *Rums*, and *Rums* are regarded as Greeks. Put differently, the political disputes with Greece eventually effected the perception toward Cypriot Greeks and *Rums*, who are generalized as Greeks, in official and unofficial levels.

Likewise the word *Romios*, the Thrace region, as an intersection point between Greek and Turkish territories, has a variety of meanings and interpretations relying in the social and political contexts of Turkey and Greece. On the one hand, Turks refer to Thrace as ‘Western Thrace’ that ‘expresses the Thrace region left in Greeks’ hands’, on the other hand Greeks refer to Thrace as ‘Eastern Thrace because there is only a single Thrace for them, and that is the Thrace that belongs to them (Yerasimos, 1994, p. 86). Put differently, there are a number of concepts that have distinguished meanings attributed by different cultures in the language mechanisms. In this regard, I argue that Saussure, Peirce and Foucault have rightly argued that signs, people, and cultures are both the creators and the creations of the social interpretations.

Although the aggressive and discriminatory approach toward the Greeks as a whole mostly involved the *Rum* community in Turkey, who are the eternal enemies given the Turkish mind-set (Kirişçi, 2002; Belge, 2002), it is crucial to distinguish the direct discrimination toward the *Rums* in particular. The discriminatory news against the *Rum* minorities is distinguished from the word *Rum* used for the Cypriot

Greeks, since the Cypriot Greeks are also named *Rum* in the Turkish language. The oppressive or unequal treatment the Turkish minorities faced elsewhere, such as the Dodecanese Islands or the Rhodes Island, are categorized as the victimization of the Turkish minorities, and compared to the conditions of the non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey. The unjustness and misery that is described as being experienced by the Turkish minorities in different places like the Western Thrace or Greek Islands underlines several further points. First of all, the common reference to the Turkish minorities living elsewhere results in the negative perspective on the social, political, legal, economic, and cultural rights that is told to be shared by the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Furthermore, I argue that the comparison of the Turkish minorities elsewhere to the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey eventually normalizes and legitimizes the implementation of discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

2. The Role of Political Disputes between Greece and Turkey: Reactions against Greece and Greeks

Domestic politics in 1974 for both Greece and Turkey involved high tension and instability. While Greece was dealing with a military junta leadership and a lack of democracy, Turkey was struggling, with its own democracy thanks to short-lived coalitions that failed to effectively govern the country. Furthermore, two countries came face to face with the dispute over Cyprus that resulted in the Turkish military Intervention on the island on 20 July, 1974. The instability between Greek-Turkish relations had been reflected in a biased manner in Turkish newspapers. In other words, the dispute with Greece was used as a pretext in the Turkish media to justify discrimination against Greeks and Cypriot Greeks as well as the exclusion of the

Rums. The depiction of the dispute and its implications on the Greek nation as a whole had been influential in terms of setting the external enemy, Greece, which eventually affected the internal enemies of the state, the *Rums*.

On 13 February, 1974, *Tercüman* published a news article titled as ‘*Rums Keep Changing the Meriç Riverbed*’ (*Rumlar Meriç Yatağını Durmadan Değiştiriyorlar*) (*Tercüman*, 13-02-1974). The Meriç riverbed is the natural border between Turkey and Greece, and therefore, any changes in the riverbed would directly concern Turkish national borders. This news article appeared on the front page of the newspaper and claimed that the *megalo idea*, which means the great ideal of Greeks to revive the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople (Istanbul) as its capital, was in fact *Kleptoida* meaning thievery. Aside from calling the Greeks thieves, this article is significant in terms of using the word *Rum* to describe Greeks. This attitude, I argue, shows that the distinction between the words Greek and *Rum* are vague in the public mind.

Starting from April 1974, the three attitudes listed as peaceful, sarcastic, and ‘so-called friend’ appear together with high intensity until the Cyprus Intervention begins in 20 July, 1974. In his column entitled ‘Did the Greeks Go Crazy?’ (*Yunanlılar Çıldır mı?*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 02-04-1974), Ümit Gürtuna argued that the main reason of the aggressive attitude the Greek junta has is to conceal its political weakness and the high inflation rates in Greece. The author pointed out that it is a common ‘tendency of governments to create foreign disagreement in order to detract attention’ (*hükümetlerin dış anlaşmazlık yaratarak gözlerin başka tarafa çevrilmesi eğilimi*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 02-04-1974; *Cumhuriyet*, 07-04-1974). *Apoyevmatini* refers to Gürtuna’s column on 2 April, 1974, without any further comments and states:

‘Mr. Gürtuna says ‘The Turkish government gave little publicity to the incident in order to avoid worsening the situation, to avoid getting into a

heated conflict with Greece or provoking hostile feelings amongst the Turkish population against Greece. In reality, all these efforts performed by the Greek government are directed to turn the attention of the Greek people towards external topics so that they would not pay attention to the internal situation and the danger of inflation that is threatening Greece' (*Apoyevmatini*, 02-04-1974).

The approach toward Gürtuna's article was rather passive, although the headlines of Gürtuna's article implicitly asked 'Did the Greeks Go Crazy?'

Meanwhile, *Tercüman* journalist Ergun Göze argued that 'it is enough with the so-called Turkish-Greek friendship after fifty years' and claims that Turkish foreign policy could 'turn Greece into a tamed monkey' (*Yunanlıları terbiyeli maymuna döndürebilir*) (*Tercüman*, 03-04-1974). The attitude of the statesmen was rather peaceful in this period, as seen in the Minister of National Defense's call for finding solutions to end the conflict between Turkey and Greece (*Tercüman*, 05-04-1974). Similarly, the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stressed the importance of a 'friendly and just solution' (*dostane ve adil çözüm*) in the Turkish Greek crisis (*Cumhuriyet*, 08-04-1974). The peaceful attitude of the Greek statesmen, such as the Greek ambassador in Turkey, Juannis Tzounis, were represented in a sarcastic way entitled 'According to the Greek Ambassador, Turkey and Greece are brothers' (*Yunan elçisine göre Türkiye ve Yunanistan kardeşmiş*) (*Hürriyet*, 16-04-1974). The same day, *Hürriyet* also reported that there were demonstrations against Greece in the southern Turkey, Reyhanlı, where banners read 'Last warning to Greece, we will call Greeks to account for each Turk oppressed abroad' (*Yunanistan'a son ihtar, dışarda ezilen her Türk'ün hesabını soracağız*) (*Hürriyet*, 16-04-1974). The warnings toward Greece continued in the newspaper articles written by journalists such as Oktay Akbal, Altan Öymen or Kamuran İnan in *Cumhuriyet*, all stressing the victorious characteristic of the Turkish military in times of national struggle, and advising Greeks that wars bring damages rather than gains. Oktay Akbal also

criticized the Greek junta as being against its own people, violating their own rights and ‘knowing that their survival depends upon a constant disquiet, fear, and pre-war atmosphere’ (*ayakta kalabilmelerinin ancak sürekli bir huzursuzluk, bir korku, bir savaş öncesi havasına bağlı olduğunu bildiklerinden*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 11-04-1974).

This attitude also shows that the peaceful attitude and sarcasm are merged in the articles by both warning the Greek junta and pointing out that the Greek citizens are not well-represented by the junta.

However, perhaps the most aggressive attitude in the newspapers that I analyzed was on 6 April, 1974, in *Hürriyet*, which perpetuated an obvious opposition toward Greece and Greeks in general. The headline of the newspaper was ‘Down with Such Friendship’ (*Olmaz Olsun Böyle Dostluk*) (*Hürriyet*, 06-04-1974). Not wanting the so-called friendship of Greece any more; *Hürriyet* asks ‘what kind of a friend is Greece?’ (*Yunanistan bizim ne biçim dostumuzdur?*) (*Hürriyet*, 06-04-1974). The headlines and the news articles above were significant in terms of supplying a general idea of the attitude and perception toward Greeks and Greece in the period. Greece is aggressively criticized for its policies against the Western Thrace Turkish minorities, its representation of Turks in Greece as brutal, its consistent manner of calling Istanbul ‘Constantinople’ after so many years of Turkish rule in the city, and the installation of the monument of Parish Hristosmos across from Turkish city: Izmir.

The neutral stance of *Apoyevmatini* was also seen on 6 April, 1974, toward *Hürriyet*’s scathing headline: ‘Down with this Friendship’ (*Olmaz Olsun Böyle Dostluk*) (*Hürriyet*, 06-04-1974). This was one of the most aggressive and unfriendly first page news throughout 1974, which involved persistent news toward Greece and how Turkish minorities in Greece are mistreated. Furthermore, the *Hürriyet* article

focused on how Greeks insist on calling Istanbul Constantinople and also accused Greeks of stealing the cultural treasures of the Turkish nation such as the shish kebab, Turkish delight, or the Turkish shadow play called *Karagöz*. *Apoyevmatini*, on the same day, refers to many Turkish newspapers such as *Milliyet*, *Günaydın*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Hürriyet*. Summarizing the news articles published in these newspapers, *Apoyevmatini* made no further comments or counter-arguments about the articles in Turkish newspapers. For instance, the articles in *Hürriyet* are almost translated word for word, reporting that the newspapers:

Emphasize the Western Thrace Turkish minorities, the representation of Turks in Greece as brutal, calling Istanbul Constantinople after so many years of Turkish rule in the city, or the monument of Parish Hristosmos facing Izmir, the Turkish city in view of Greece, claim even our *Karagöz* by using foul tricks they try to make the Turkish-Cypriots live the life of work-slaves (*Apoyevmatini*, 06-04-1974).

As can be implied from the direct translation of news from the Turkish newspapers, *Apoyevmatini* did not have its own voice regarding the politics between Greece and Turkey.

The emphasis on the cultural and societal enmity of Greeks against Turks is significant as seen in the reference to how Greeks try to present the Turkish shadow play named *Karagöz* as Greek, or how they advertise the Turkish delight as Greek delight, or *döner kebab* as Greek *kebab*. On 7 April, 1974, *Tercüman* published a political cartoon entitled 'Rest in Peace' (*Toprağı bol olsun*) (*Tercüman*, 07.04.1974) (see Figure 1) showing a tombstone inscription that read 'Turkish-Greek Friendship'. These examples of the conflict between Greeks and Turks on the cultural level, I argue, are crucial in terms of showing the repercussions of political crises such as the oil crises or continental shelf disputes' ramifications on the societal level. It should be noted that the main problem from which this reaction resulted was the oil crises regarding the continental shelf dispute on the Aegean Sea. However, the political

dispute easily shifted to the cultural level to include a list of unfriendly actions of the Greek nation as a whole.

In May, June, and July 1974, Turkish newspapers started to talk about a possible war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The same attitudes, peaceful, sarcasm, and so-called friendship continued to exist in the contents of articles. The friendship of Greece continued to be questioned in the articles of journalists such as Ergun Göze in *Tercüman*, asking whether it was ‘Friendship or Heedlessness?’ (*Dostluk mu? Gaflet mi?*) (*Tercüman*, 26-06-1974). The unease in politics between Greece and Turkey started to be referred to as ‘traditional’ (*Hürriyet*, 01-06-1974), and the hostile attitude of Greece was referred to as ‘insanity’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-06-1974). Over time, the stress on a battle in Cyprus became more frequent and Greece began to be identified as ‘the enemy’ of the Turkish nation (*Hürriyet*, 03-06-1974).

Meanwhile, references to the founding of the Turkish Republic following the defeat of the Greek army fifty years earlier were repeated in the newspaper articles. Oktay Akbal’s article, ‘The Junta Wants War!’ (*Cunta Savaş İstiyor!*), developed this type of reference to the Greco-Turkish War in 1923, and claimed that the international forces such as Britain and the United States were significant in terms of determining the status of the Aegean Islands, Salonica, and Western Thrace Turks (*Tercüman*, 01-06-1974). This idea was observed in the following period, when anti-Americanism rose as the U.S. was seen as providing only limited help on Cyprus. Anti-Americanism related to the Cyprus dispute is shown in the political cartoons in newspapers such as the ‘Arms Producer’, where a U.S. armament plant sits in the middle of Greek and Turkish cargo ships, and the American gun producers say ‘We will win regardless of whether there’s a war’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-06-1974). In another cartoon, there is a soldier holding a U.S. flag to which a smaller Greek flag is

attached (*Cumhuriyet*, 05-06-1974). This attitude toward Greece and the foreign forces acting against Turkey is symbolic in terms of the arguments of the loneliness of Turkey in the international arena (see Figures 2, 3 and 4).

The approach of *Hürriyet* and *Tercüman* was quite nationalistic in the pre-Cyprus Intervention period. The columns and news articles implemented an ‘us vs. them’ distinction between Greece and Turkey with significant emphasis on the heroic Turkish military and nation, although there was not specific discriminatory news on the *Rum* community. Three days prior to the Turkish military Intervention in Cyprus, *Hürriyet* published another article entitled ‘They should ask this of their fathers’ (*Babalarına Sorsunlar*) (*Hürriyet*, 17-07-1974). This article was a synthesis of irony and threat toward the Greek army, stressing that ‘The minute there is a threat toward our national rights and national existence, each individual of the Turkish nation would become Turkish soldiers as *Mehmetçiks* are’ (*Milli haklarımıza ve milli varlığımıza bir tehlike yöneldiği dakikada Türk Milletinin her ferdi, hududlarda bekleyen Mehmet’ler kadar Mehmet olur*) (*Hürriyet*, 17-07-1974) The *Mehmetçik* notion is quite significant in the Turkish language, since it is used to describe the Turkish soldiers with a compassionate attitude. *Mehmet*, a common Turkish male name, is added a *-cik* suffix, giving an infancy status and a compassion feeling to the word. Stressing that each and every person in Turkey would become ‘as *Mehmet* as *Mehmetçik*’ means that there is a military soul in each of them, and the Turkish nation would fight for its rights and independence as a whole in times of threat to its well-being. The article supports its claims by calling on the Greeks to ask about the truth of the Generals, and their fathers (*Hürriyet*, 17-07-1974). Here, the emphasis on the 1922 Greco-Turkish War can be seen again, which was played up during the

whole year dispute over Cyprus and given the possibility of another war between Greece and Turkey.

In the post Cyprus Intervention period, the most significant sarcastic article toward the Greek *enosis* ideology appeared in *Hürriyet*, on 5 September, 1974. The article's headline itself was heavily sarcastic: 'Hotdog *Enosis*' (*Sosisli Enosis*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-09-1974) (see Figure 5). The article was a critical allusion to the Cyprus Intervention, written by a popular pop band in the period called the *Ateş Böcekleri*. At the beginning of the article, it is claimed that the parts published in the column would summarize the burlesque. The song, namely a record called The Cyprus Movie: Hotdog *Enosis* From Ardahan to Edirne, From Trabzon to Girne (*Kıbrıs Filmi: Sosisli Enosis Ardahan'dan Edirne'ye Trabzon'dan Girne'ye*). Although there are several songs and lyrics related to the Cyprus dispute from 1974 such as 'My Turkey' (*Türkiyem*), 'Traacherous Greek' (*Kalleş Yunan*), or 'The Voice of the Turk' (*Türk'ün Sesi*), I have not observed any articles other than the Hotdog *Enosis* lyrics published in *Hürriyet*. The lyrics of the song are significant in several ways. The notions used for the actors against Turkey in the international arena, such as Kissinger or Ioannides include 'lecherous' and 'rattlebrained' (*çapkın* and *beyinsiz*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-09-1974). The incidents going on in Cyprus are depicted as a movie in the lyrics, and it is claimed that 'lecherous Kissinger, rattlebrained Yuhanidis' and others such as Dzikis or Sampson are directed by Karaoğlan, the nickname used for the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in his politic career. *Karaoğlan* was a name given to him by an old peasant woman right before the 1973 general elections in Turkey and accepted by Ecevit and his party due to its affinity to the public. (<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/ecevit/karaoglan.asp>).

Turkish speaking *Rums* use are parodied by the exclamations or phrases such as ‘vre’, ‘endaksi’ or the pronunciation of a Turkish letter ‘ş’(she) as ‘s’(ce) in the lyrics. The international characters are voiced in the lyrics, but their language was neither in Greek nor in English as it actually should be, but it is Turkish with a *Rum* accent. I argue that this voice, given to the political enemies of Turkey, was targeting the *Rum* minorities in Turkey rather than any other group. The so-called movie, directed by Bülent Ecevit, continues by the defeat of the ‘fictitious heroes’ by the heroic ‘*Mehmetçik*’, the Turkish Army. The triumph of the Turkish military forces is highlighted with a reference to the Turkish-Greek war in 1923, where the Greek Army was defeated and ‘poured to the seas’ (*denize dökülmek*). However, the reference was ironic, since it was ‘the scared-to-death’ politicians, who ‘bedwetting’ (*donuna işetmek*) demanded that the Turks ‘should be poured to the sea’ when they heard that the Turkish army intervened in Cyprus. The response was ‘they are pouring us, vre!’ (*Onlar bizi döküyor vre!*). Finally, the reference to the success of the Turkish Army, and how that should be preserved in diplomacy as well are stated in the lyrics. Ecevit claims that ‘the victory gained by *Mehmetçik*’s bayonet would not be lost in the diplomatic arena!’ (*Mehmetçiğin sürgüsüyle alınan kalemler verilemez masada!*).

In the post-war period, the main attitude reflected in the articles was about the brutality of Greeks in Cyprus that appeared in forms of mass graves and inhumane living conditions of Cypriot Turks. Meanwhile, the Turkish military was praised due to its peacefulness and righteousness. In this regard, the Greek activities in Cyprus were compared to Nazi Germany, and considered more brutal and violent. In the aftermath of the Cyprus Intervention, as the Turkish soldiers dogged out mass graves in the Cypriot Turk villages, the attitude against the Greeks, in general, became more

aggressive. The word *kahpe* was used in particular against the Greeks, which can be interpreted both literally and figuratively. Literally, the word *kahpe* means a prostitute, whereas symbolically it is used to explain backstabbing or disloyalty. Furthermore, there is a famous saying in the Turkish language, *Kahpe Byzantine (Kahpe Bizans)*, related to the historic roots of the Greeks. The word *kahpe* literally means a harlot, while the term is often used to refer to Greeks and their historic roots as treacherous. There is even a popular movie called '*Kahpe Bizans*' (1999), a parody movie. The presentation of a 'disloyal' and also somehow 'dissolute' Greek identity became visible in the Turkish daily newspapers (*Böyle Kahpelik Olmaz (Hürriyet, 02-09-1974)*). The next day, on 3 September, *Hürriyet* journalist Celalettin Çetin claimed that the Cypriot Greeks are 'coward, and obscure as they are coward as they have been not only recently, but for immemorial past' (*Yeni değil yıllardan, yıllardan beri Kıbrıs Rum'u böyle çıkmıştır ortaya korkak, korkak olduğu kadar kapkara bir yürekle çıkmıştır (Hürriyet, 03-09-1974)*). Furthermore, Çetin gave a list of words that characterized the Cypriot Greeks of being 'powerless', 'heartless', 'not trustworthy', 'betrayers', 'immoral', and 'so-called civilized people' (*Güçsüz, yüreksiz, kaypak, kalleş, arkadan vurur, uygar geçinir, namussuz (Hürriyet, 03-09-1974)*). While the generalization of Cypriot Greeks as inhuman was more commonly seen in the post Cyprus Intervention period, the glorious and humanly Turkish character was also pointed out in the articles more frequently. On 25 September, *Hürriyet* journalist Ziya Akçapar reported that 'a Turkish army officer was looking after a baby left on the street by his/her mother and father' (*Ana babasının sokağa attığı Rum bebeğe Türk subay bakıyor (Hürriyet, 25-09-1974)*). On the one hand, the article shows the compassionate character of the Turks and Turkish military officers; while on the other hand, Cypriot Greeks were murdering babies in Turkish villages.

The previous day, *Hürriyet* also referred to Greeks and Cypriot Greeks as infidel, a common word used to describe the non-Muslims within or outside Turkish borders. The news was titled as ‘God protect all from being left to the hands of infidels’ (*Allah kimseyi gavurun eline düşürmesin*), and it was reported that the Cypriot Greek hostages in the Turkish zone did not want to go back to Greek camps where they were mistreated. This news claims that the Turkish military is more righteous and fair to the Greeks than the Greek military is to their people.

Another incident was reported in the Turkish newspapers in the post Cyprus Intervention period about a Cypriot Greek driver who murdered five Cypriot Turks in Cyprus in November. While *Hürriyet* reported this murder as ‘Turks paid the price of thinking that a *Rum* is an actual human being’ (*Rum ’u insan sanmanın cezasını çektiler*) and ‘five Turks whose chests were cut will be avenged’ (*Göğüsleri kesilen beş Türk’in hesabı sorulacak*) (*Hürriyet*, 22-11-1974), *Cumhuriyet* referred to the ‘brutal driver’ in a rather objective manner, claiming that ‘The *Rum* press [...] argues that his action should not be generalized to the *Rums* in general’ ([...] *bunun bütün Rumlara mal edilmemesi gerektiğini öne sürmektedir*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 22-11-1974). The approach toward the Greeks and Cypriot Greeks who were referred to as *Rums* in the post Cyprus Intervention era was rather aggressive. Furthermore, the glorification of the Turkish military and the innocence of the Cypriot Turks were pointed out frequently.

The second attitude in the post-war period is related to the isolation of the Turkish state in the international arena. The idea of ‘losing in the diplomatic arena’ (*masa başında kaybetmek*) was frequently observed after the Cyprus Intervention ended and states started to negotiate on the future of the island. In an article published on October 5, 1974, it is reported that the UN delegate Osman Olcay had

‘told the truth about the Turkish-Greek conflict to the secret agencies like the CIA and FBI’ (*Hürriyet*, 05-10-1974). However, the title of the news, ‘Did they get it?’ (*Anladılar mı acaba?*) is more charged with deeper meaning, implying that the international agents do not get the Turkish perspective, and also are misinformed on the dispute between Greece and Turkey (*Hürriyet*, 05.10.1974). The notion ‘they’ should be noted since there is a reference to a distinction between us, the Turks, and the others, the Greeks, Americans, or the international arena as a whole. United States, in particular, was frequently criticized as taking the Greek side, pointing out that Turkey has lost the case in the diplomatic arena. On 23 October, a *Hürriyet* article asked ‘What is up with Little Kennedy?’ (*Küçük Kennedy’e ne oluyor?*) and continued: ‘We cherish, while the other betrays us to get a few votes from the Americans with *Rum* origins’ (*Yani biz bağrımıza basarız, karşımızdaki ise Rum asıllı Amerikalılardan almayı tasarladığı üç-beş oy için bizi oracıkta satıverir*) (*Hürriyet*, 23-10-1974).

3. The Role of the Press Campaigns

Throughout 1974, there were several press campaigns in the Turkish newspapers. These campaigns were significant, particularly for the agenda setting in the Turkish public sphere. In what follows, I will first point out the frequent reference to the anti-Turkish attitude of two Greek newspapers represented as the Greek media. The so-called anti-Turkish press campaign in the Greek newspapers are reported in news articles and criticized by the columnists. Second, I analyze the newspaper articles about the financial campaigns such as announcements or sports events organized by newspapers to collect donations for the military foundations.

3.1. Anti-Turkish Press Campaigns in Greece

I argue that the news reports pointing out the anti-Turkish press campaign of two newspapers, namely *Ellenikos Vorras* and *Eleftheros Kosmos*, were crucial in terms of setting a reciprocal language between Greek and Turkish newspapers. The approach of the Turkish newspapers, I argue, was to stress the victimization of Turkey through assaults. The articles appearing in the Greek newspapers are studied only through the references made in the Turkish newspapers, and therefore have low reliability. It is beyond the scope of this study to survey actual Greek newspapers. Therefore, I will focus on the Greek newspapers as they are represented and referred to in Turkish newspapers. I argue that the anti-Turkish press attitude in Greece has been determining in creating a distinction between Greece and Turkey, and accusing Greeks of not being friendly.

The discriminatory and aggressive tone that stands out in one of the Greek newspapers, *Ellenikos Vorras*, was first reported on 1 March, 1974, by *Cumhuriyet* is foreign news service. The article referred to *Ellenikos Vorras*, which ‘described the dispute over continental shelf in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey to be even more dangerous than the dispute over Cyprus’ (*Ege’deki petrol anlaşmazlığı, Kıbrıs’tan da tehlikeli olarak nitelendi*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-03-1974). The Greek newspaper continued in an insulting manner and claimed that ‘the ignorant professors of Turkey should know this well that the Aegean Sea is an inland sea. It is a Greek lake. This is the fact since the 1821 Greek Independence War [...] Putting in a claim for the Aegean Sea by the Turks is as ridiculous as demanding rights on the Mexican gulf’ (*Türkiye’nin cahil profesörleri şunu iyi bilmelidirler ki, Ege Denizi kapalı bir denizdir. Bir Yunan gölüdür. Bu, 1821 Yunan Bağımsızlık Savaşından beri böyle devam edegelmiştir. [...] Türklerin Ege Denizi’nde hak iddia etmesi, Meksika*

körfezinde hak iddia etmesi kadar gülünçtür) (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-03-1974). This article reflects a hostile attitude of the Greek press, which will also be exemplified in the Turkish press itself in the following period. What is crucial in this statement of the Greek press is the reference to the Greek Independence War in 1821, which is symbolic in terms of reviving the nationalist Greek public opinion.

Starting from April 1974, Turkish newspapers frequently referred to Greek newspapers, their anti-Turkish attitude, and their reflections in Turkey. On 4 April, 1974, *Hürriyet* reported that a member of the Turkish National Assembly, Mehmet Bıyık, questioned ‘whether Turkey was considering a counter publication in the world radio and television networks or not’ (*Mehmet Bıyık, bu arada Türkiye’nin dünya radyo ve televizyonlarında bir karşı yayın yapmayı düşünüp düşünmediğini de sormuştur*) (*Hürriyet*, 04-04-1974). The day after Bıyık’s statement in the Turkish National Assembly, the Minister of National Defense, Hasan Esat Işık, claimed that ‘We will show Athens that we are worthy of our ancestry’ (*Atina’ya ecdadımıza layık olduğumuzu gösteririz*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-04-1974). It should be noted that the reference to the ancestry and the national struggles of independence take place in both the Greek and Turkish discourse. However, the critique and response of the anti-Turkish press campaign do not only appear in the statements of politicians, but also in newspapers themselves. Some news in the Turkish press in 1974 did not have bylines; therefore the opinion stated is regarded as the language of the newspaper management itself.

On 8 April, *Hürriyet* published a story with the headline ‘The Greek Press Bullies Us’ (*Yunan Basını Bize Çatıyor*) (*Hürriyet*, 08-04-1974). The ‘us’ here refers to *Hürriyet* itself, and ‘the Greek Press’ refers to the Greek TV networks, particularly *Ellenikos Vorras*. It is stated in the article that ‘The Greek televisions [...] attack

Hürriyet that has disclosed their new articles and secret campaign against Turkey' (*Yunan TV'si [...] Yunan basını Türkiye aleyhine yazıları yanısıra giriştiği gizli kampanyayı açığa çıkararak Hürriyet'e de saldırıyor*) (*Hürriyet*, 08-04-1974). At this point, the anti-Turkish sentiment in the Greek press takes a new dimension and pervades among the newspapers and their editors. This can be shown in the reference to the statement of İlia Kirci, the editor-in-chief in *Ellinikos Vorras*, where he declares that 'we do not need Turkey's friendship. Turkey needs our friendship as a needy and incapable state' (*Türkiye'nin dostluğuna ihtiyacımız yok. Fakir ve kudretsiz bir devlet olarak onun bizim dostluğumuza ihtiyacı var*) (*Hürriyet*, 08-04-1974). The newspapers articles in Turkey also speak to the military junta in Greece and accuse them of not being able to make themselves listened to by the newspaper speaking against Turkey. In an article on 5 April, 1974, *Hürriyet* claimed that *Ellinikos Vorras* was a mainstream newspaper that was administered by 'Cypriots and fanatic Greeks' (*Kıbrıslı ve fanatik Yunanlılar*), and continued to publish anti-Turkish articles that refers to Turks as 'Barbarian, brutal, dumb, and needy' (*Barbar, zalim, aptal ve sefil*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-04-1974).

Hürriyet reported the dispute between Greece and Turkey on 19 April, 1974, with the headline 'So-Called Friend Greeks' Brand New Trick' (*Dostumuz (!) Yunanlıların Yepyeni Bir Marifeti Daha*) (*Hürriyet*, 19-04-1974). The article reported that Celalettin Çetin, a Turkish reporter, was deported from Greece because he was 'insane' (*Hürriyet*, 19-04-1974). It is stated in the article that 'In the days when Celalettin Çetin was on exile, Greek journalist Politi wandered around freely in Anatolis and *Eleftheros Kosmos* newspaper published one of Politi's interviews, entitled 'Turkey's Hashish Poisons America'' (*Eleftheros Kosmos gazetesi [...] Celalettin Çetin'in sürgünde olduğu günlerde ellerini kollarını sallayarak*

Anadolu'yu baştan başa dolaşan Yunanlı gazeteci Politi'nin 'Türkiye'nin haşhaşı Amerika'ya zehirliyor' başlığı altında bir röportajını yayınlamıştır) (*Hürriyet*, 22-04-1974). What this article implies is that Greek journalists have the freedom to do anything in Turkey and even insult it, while Turkish journalists in Greece are mistreated. Meanwhile, Turkish media continued to criticize the anti-Turkish press campaign in Greece. On 20 April, 1974, both *Cumhuriyet* and *Tercüman* reported *Eleftheros Kosmos*, another anti-Turkish newspaper, was shut down for ten days. The reason for the suspension was reported as the anti-Turkish campaign carried out by the newspaper (*Tercüman*, 20-04-1974). However, two days later, *Hürriyet* published news titled as 'Eleftheros Kosmos newspaper continues the campaign opposing us' (*Eleftheros Kosmos gazetesi aleyhimize kampanyayı sürdürüyor*) (*Hürriyet*, 22-04-1974). The use of the word 'us' is significant in terms of implying the 'us and them' distinction between Greece and Turkey.

It should be noted that the anti-Turkish press campaigns in Greece were frequently referred to in the Turkish newspapers during April, 1974. However, there were not as many news articles in the post-Cyprus Intervention period. The only news on the anti-Turkish attitude of the Greek press was reported on 18 September, when *Ellinikos Vorras* was identified as 'shameless' (*edepsiz*) (*Hürriyet*, 18-09-1974). This time, the news is about the *Rum* community in Turkey, and the way Turkey treats them. In the article, it is argued that the Greek newspaper aims to distract and provoke the Greek community, since they have been acting violently in Cyprus. The post-Cyprus Intervention period is important in terms of the application of reciprocal oppression between Turkey and Greece.

As for the coverage of *Apoyevmatini*, especially the news on the last page of the newspaper called 'News from Greece', the news were selected from the Greek

radio broadcasts and newspapers, and selected carefully not to offend Turkey or Turks. The constant reference to two Greek newspapers, *Eleftheros Kosmos* and *Ellinikos Vorras*, were a source of aggression toward the Greek state and society. Meanwhile, Mr. Vasiliadis, who lived in Greece in the 1970s defines these newspapers as ‘fascist’. He distinguished fascism and socialist internationalism by stating ‘there is no such thing as fascist internationalism, but it exists in reality. If there was no fascism in Greece, the fascism in Turkey could not have survived, and vice versa. Meanwhile, socialism is a so-called internationalism, although no socialist actually helps another elsewhere.’ His point shows how upset he is with the discriminatory politics that are perpetuated by mutual relations between the Turkish and Greek states. Mr. Vasiliadis’s statements can be explained through the rule of reciprocity that results in the implementation of discrimination and legitimizing discriminatory policies through the ‘fascist’ acts of the other. He also shares that these newspapers, *Eleftheros Kosmos* and *Ellinikos Vorras*, appealed to only 1 or 2% of the Greek population, although this couldn’t be shown by the circulation rates because of the junta regime. Mr. Vasiliadis explains that the citizens of Greece were pushed to buy *Eleftheros Kosmos* that turned into the voice of the military junta in Greece in the 1967-1974 periods. People used to hide the newspapers they actually wanted to read under *Eleftheros Kosmos* to avoid being arrested.

3.2. Financial Campaigns for the Turkish Military

The press campaigns carried on in Turkey have mostly been related to the Turkish military such as the Turkish Naval Force Foundation (*Türk Donanma Vakfı*) or the Turkish Air Forces Fortification Foundation (*Türk Hava Kuvvetleri Vakfı*). Furthermore, there have been organizations such as a competition for the best epic

story about Cyprus, a football tournament organization for the military foundations, and a sports organization where marathon swimmer Ersin Aydın swam from southern Turkey to northern Cyprus. These organizations emerged in the pre-Cyprus Intervention period and continued during and after the Intervention.

The first invitation to support the Turkish military appeared on 16 July, 1974, on *Cumhuriyet*'s inside pages. This was a small announcement directed toward Turkish society by calling them as 'the Faithful Turkish Nation' (*Vefakar Türk Milleti*) (see Figure 6). The aim of this announcement was to encourage the Turkish nation to unite, support the Air Force Foundation, be confident in and praise themselves (*Cumhuriyet*, 16-06-1974). On 19 June, 1974, *Cumhuriyet* published another announcement, which appeared in a sidebar on an inside page and stated that 'all kinds of donations to the Turkish Navy Forces Foundation would strengthen our glorious Navy' (*Türk Donanma Vakfına yapacağımız her türlü bağış şanlı donanmamızı güçlendirecektir*) (*Cumhuriyet*, 19-06-1974) (see Figure 7). This announcement was short but rich in meaning, and the reference to the naval forces were honorific. The two announcements published three days apart called on the Turkish nation to support the Turkish military and its foundations through their donations. These ads were published only a month before the Cyprus Intervention and when the dispute over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey was intensifying day by day. Meanwhile, as soon as the Cyprus Intervention started, and in its aftermath, *Hürriyet* and *Tercüman* newspapers took active roles in organizing campaigns and social events to attract the public's attention and collect money for the military foundations.

When the Turkish Army intervened in Cyprus on 20 July, 1974, *Hürriyet* started a campaign called 'We Want a New Yavuz' (*Yeni bir Yavuz İstiyoruz*)

Kampanyası) (see Figure 8). Throughout the campaign, the Turkish society engaged in raising money for a new Yavuz, a new battleship for the Navy. The participants included a variety of individuals and institutions, ranging from ordinary citizens to celebrities, state officers, and private enterprises. The celebrity factor was crucial throughout the campaign, in which some of the biggest stars of the period such as Emel Sayın, Zeki Müren, Ayhan Işık or Müjdat Gezen participated, donating and helping to raise money. On 16 December, 1974, *Hürriyet* declared in a headline that the result was huge and that they had collected 81 million Turkish Liras (around 6 million US Dollars based on the 1974 exchange rate). On top of the headline, the newspaper announced ‘From *Hürriyet* Readers to the Army, with Love’ (*Hürriyet Okurlarından Ordu’ya Sevgilerle*) was written (*Hürriyet*, 16-12-1974). The article pointed out that the money collected would be used not only by the Turkish Navy, but also the Turkish Air Force. To the right of the article, there was a sidebar, related to the campaign, recounting anecdotes of how the money was collected. An elderly woman, blue collar workers, shoeshine boys, imams, teachers and their students, nurses and their patients were listed in these brief paragraphs. The amounts of their donations were not specified, but the range shifted from a few pennies to millions, and even included the wedding rings of a couple. This campaign is significant in terms of calling the whole Turkish nation to unite for a single cause, to support its military that bravely fought in Cyprus and to carry on until the end of the year (*Hürriyet*, 16-12-1974). *Hürriyet* organized another campaign in August, called the ‘Cyprus Epic Competition.’ In the announcement of this competition, published on 8 August, 1974, Greece was openly identified as ‘the historical enemy’ (*tarihi düşman*) who was being fought again after 52 years (*Hürriyet*, 08-08-1974). The focus of this

competition was the glories and success of the Turkish military Intervention on Cyprus.

Meanwhile, *Tercüman* organized two major sports events to raise money for the Turkish Army forces. One was a football tournament and the other was Ersin Aydın's swimming marathon to Cyprus. The amount of money collected in the football tournament was not as high as the *Hürriyet* campaign, but the ticket sales of the final game between Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray was donated to the Turkish Navy Force Foundation. Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, and Beşiktaş, popular football teams in Turkey, participated in this tournament organized by *Tercüman* newspaper. The news articles reported that the chairmen of three clubs exclaimed 'With our blessing, to our army!' (*Ordumuza helal olsun!*) (*Tercüman*, 30-07-1974).

Tercüman's second sports event organization was Aydın's swim from southern Turkey to Northern Cyprus. News coverage of this event started to be published on 10 November, 1974, and follow up stories lasted a week. References to the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and his famous command during the Turkish Independence War, 'Armies, your first goal is the Mediterranean, forward!' (*Ordular, ilk hedefiniz Akdeniz'dir. İleri!*) appeared in several articles (*Tercüman*, 10-11-1974). This highly popularized event was not organized to raise money for the Army, but to honor and cherish the Turkish Army and Turkish citizens by a Turkish national swimmer by symbolically 'conquering' Cyprus. In this regard, a news article in *Tercüman* compared Aydın to *Mehmetçik*, Turkish soldiers, and reported that a military general had cried after witnessing Aydın's success and honored the national swimmer. (*Tercüman*, 16-11-1974) (see Figure 9). Aydın's 'success' was also celebrated by a stadium full of people right before a national football game, in which Aydın toured the field with a Turkish flag on his shoulders.

4. The Role of Government Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations in 1974

The state ceremonies and public demonstrations organized by GONGOs were frequently reported in newspaper articles in 1974. I argue that these events are significant for three reasons. The first function of the state ceremonies and public demonstrations is to remind Turkish society of the struggle Turkish nation went through to establish its independent nation. The opening of the monument for Hasan Tahsin, who is believed to have started the resistance against the Greek Army in 1922; the celebration of national days such as the conquest of Istanbul, the liberation of Izmir, and the entrance of the Ottomans to Rumelia are significant for being reminiscent of the triumphs in the Turkish historicity. The second function is to establish new days or monuments to turn the Cyprus dispute into a national issue, and to maintain its significance in the Turkish state and society. The Cypriot Casualty Day and the opening of the Fallen Soldier Monument in the post Cyprus Intervention period are symbolic of the persistence of the Cyprus issue for the Turkish nation. Third, and finally, the demonstrations organized particularly by GONGOs such as the Cyprus is Turkish Society or the National Turkish Student Union are determining in shaping the public attitude in line with state ideology. It should also be noted that these ceremonies mostly took place with the joint participation of politicians, various citizen groups, students, and the GONGOs. The Denouncing Greece Mass Meetings in April are significant in reflecting the state attitude toward Greece, and *Rums* in Turkey as well.

4.1. Denouncing Greece Mass Rally

The role played by official state ceremonies, public demonstrations, and especially the GONGOs are crucial in terms of setting the agenda, invoking

nationalist history, pointing fingers at ‘the others’ in society, and calling for reciprocal action against the so-called enemy of the state. There were no state ceremonies in the first months in 1974. Rather, this period was when the interstate policies between Greece and Turkey worked to end the rising tension between the two countries. However, there were a number of events such as popular assemblies, monument openings, or celebration of remarkably odd remembrance days in the second part of the pre-Cyprus Intervention period, mainly from April until mid-July.

On 10 April, 1974, *Hürriyet* announced that there was an upcoming mass demonstration called Cursing Greece (*Yunanistan’ı Tel’in Mitingi*). *Hürriyet* reported that the National Turkish Students Union (NTSU) was organizing the event, and it would take place in Beyazıt Square in Istanbul on Saturday. The next day, on 11 April, *Hürriyet* and *Tercüman* published news about a black wreath placed in front of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul. While *Hürriyet* wrote that the action was performed by ‘the youth’, *Tercüman* claimed that it was the ‘NTSU’. The protest in front of the Greek Consulate is significant in terms of informing the public on the forthcoming mass meeting. Meanwhile, the title ‘Did you forget about September 9?’ (*9 Eylül’ü unuttunuz mu?*) appeared on a black wreath, referring to the defeat of the Greek army on September 9, 1922. This attitude is noteworthy and commonly used for referring to the past in a sarcastic way to remind the enemy of the triumph of the Turkish struggle. During the demonstrations, the GONGOs also opened up a Turkish flag and sang the Turkish national anthem.

The day before the mass demonstration against Greece, the NTSU administration made statements about various issues such as the conditions of the Turkish minorities in Western Thrace, Greece, the role of the *Rum* community members as ‘spies’ in Turkey, or the willingness of the Turkish youth to listen to and

obey the commands of the Turkish military. *Hürriyet* discusses the speech of the NTSU chief, Raşit Ürper, in which he claimed ‘the heedlessness shouldn’t continue any more’ (*Bu gaflet artık bitmelidir*) (*Hürriyet*, 12-04-1974). Moreover, it is stated that the Greeks ‘tear down our mosques in Western Thrace with the excuse of building a road [...] while we apply the largest freedom to their spies in Turkey’ (*Yunanlılar Batı Trakya’da yol yapma bahanesiyle camilerimizi yıkar [...] biz onların Türkiye’deki ajanlarına en geniş serbestiyi tanımaktayız*) (*Hürriyet*, 12-04-1974). In the same article, *Hürriyet* reported that a representative of Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association (WTSA- *Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği*) pointed out that the citizenship rights of the Turkish minorities in Western Thrace are violated by the Greek state which banned their rights to own property, start a business, or elect the administrators of their foundations (*Hürriyet*, 12-04-1974). The reference to *Rums* as the ‘spies within’ is an attitude not only toward the *Rum* citizens, but also *Rum* institutions such as the Patriarchate. It is also significant that the leaders of GONGOs like NTSU or CT request reciprocal policies against the *Rum* minorities in Turkey. It should be noted here that the minority foundations in Turkey and their rights to own property was about to be banned.

On 13 April, 1974, the mass demonstration that was given various different names such as ‘Cursing Greece Demonstration’ (*Yunanistan’ı Tel’in Mitingi*), ‘Warning to Greek Demonstration’ (*Yunan’a İhtar Mitingi*), or ‘Warning to Greek Rowdy/ Palikar’ (*Palikarya’ya İhtar Mitingi*) took place in the Beyazıt Square in Istanbul. Selection of the word ‘Palikar’ is significant in terms of the multiple meanings contributed in Turkish, Greek, and English. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘Palikar’ as ‘an armed follower of a Greek or Albanian military chief, esp. during the Greek war of independence (1821-32)’. Meanwhile, the term Palikar was

commonly used for the *Rum* gangs fighting against Turks during the war of independence period. In the Greek language, Palikar means a young man, an adolescent. However, the meanings attributed to the word Palikar in these demonstrations are negative. In the Turkish language, Palikar is a pejorative word and refers to young *Rum* men as vagrants rather than youngsters. Headlines from 13 April, 1974, stated that this meeting was the first in three years, but the tenth meeting against the Greeks in total. There were almost twenty-four attendee organizations such as student unions, craft unions, and workers unions representing over one hundred thousand members according to the report (*Hürriyet*, 13-04-1974).

Turkish and *Rum* newspapers reported the seven articles declared in the memorandum during demonstrations. The content of the memorandum is noteworthy in terms of reflecting the aggression and discriminatory attitude toward both Greeks and *Rums*, who were citizens of the Turkish Republic. Furthermore, the news reports in *Apoyevmatini* also show the passive attitude internalized by the minority press at the time. The non-Muslim foundation properties in Turkey started to be confiscated shortly after this memorandum, which I argue indicates the normalization and legitimization in the societal level. The articles in the memorandum target not only Greeks, but also *Rum* citizens and institutions such as the Patriarchate as well. The violation of the rights of Turkish minorities in Western Thrace was stressed, and asked to be remedied by going on a war if necessary. Furthermore, the *Rum* population in Turkey was referred to as ‘the spies amongst us,’ pointing out the Patriarchate in particular. The conditions and rights given to the *Rum* citizens were also questioned and criticized as being unnecessarily positive, and it is requested that the official announcements given to the *Rum* newspapers to be cut. In a more hostile manner, the memo proposed that the response to the unfairness of Western Thrace

Turks requires reciprocity (*Hürriyet*, 13-04-1974). The demonstration was described as a ‘Great Warning,’ and it was reported that tens of thousands of people shouted ‘To Athens!’ (*Atina’ya!*) (*Hürriyet*, 14-04-1974). The target in crying out ‘to Athens!’ needs to be questioned, although no further implications are made in the newspaper article. I argue that the intention was particularly to warn the *Rums* who are claimed to be ‘spies within us’, and send them to where they belong in the Turkish mind-set: Greece. Furthermore, the news report stated that ‘the police was precautious for any provocation of the Greek tourists and local *Rums* that would result in ebullition of the participants’ (*Polis ekipleri olay yerinde turist olarak bulunan Yunanlılarla yerli Rumların herhangi bir tahrikine karşı halkın galeyânını önlemek için geniş çapta güvenlik önlemleri almıştır*) (*Hürriyet*, 14-04-1974).

The news on the demonstrations in *Apoyevmatini* was directly translated from *Hürriyet*, on 13 April, 1974. *Apoyevmatini* stated that ‘*Hürriyet* reminds that this is the 10th demonstration since 1958 as a warning towards the palikaria’, and follows ‘there were mottos of today’s demonstrations such as the protection of the human and political rights of the Turks in Western Thrace and in Cyprus, revision of the position of the *Rums* in Turkey, and boycott of *Rums* in business, expulsion of the Patriarchate for being a center for Greek espionage, no more state advertisements in *Rum* newspapers, revision of the situation in the Dodecanese, and reaction to Greek offences’ (*Apoyevmatini*, 13-04-1974). At the end of the news, *Apoyevmatini* referred to some Greek newspapers which *Hürriyet* reported to have ‘offensive publications’ (*Apoyevmatini*, 13-04-1974).

It should be noted that the ‘spies within’ stereotype of the *Rums* is not just a phrase used in a nationalist atmosphere of the demonstration. The newspaper article, reporting that the police was taking measures to avoid any ‘provocation of the Greek

tourists and local *Rums*' is significant in terms of showing the perspective of the majority toward the Greeks and *Rums* in Turkey. While the mass demonstration particularly targeted the Greeks and even *Rum* citizens of Turkey, the news article phrased the atmosphere by accusing the Greeks and *Rums* as the possible spies who are likely to cause trouble. Meanwhile, the word provocation is also significant since it might be, in some context, a condition that reduces the level of guilt. It should be noted that provocation can also be a tool used justify crimes. In my context, referring to a possible provocation of the *Rum* community implies that *Rums* are likely to cause trouble, and therefore, any response to the provocation of the *Rums* would be a natural reaction to their provocation.

Two additional remarks can be made on the mass demonstration in April: The Turkish press campaigns and the anti-Turkish press campaigns carried out in Greece. It is asserted in Turkish newspapers that 'the Salonica press continues to swear: 'Turks are 'Asian bandits'' (*Selanik basını küfre devam ediyor: Türkler Asya eşkiyasıdır*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-04-1974). Meanwhile, news on the donations to Turkish military, namely Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (*Hava Kuvvetlerini Kuvvetlendirme Vakfı*) appears in the newspapers (*Hürriyet*, 12-04-1974).

4.2. The First Bullet Monument – Hasan Tahsin

One month after the mass demonstrations led by the NTSU in Beyazıt, there was a new event in which the state was more involved this time: The commemoration of a monument in remembrance of Hasan Tahsin, the Turkish journalist, popularly believed to have started the resistance against the Greek invasion in Izmir in 1922. The Turkish president Fahri Korutürk participated in the opening ceremony of the monument, along with other politicians and military

officers. *Hürriyet* and *Tercüman*'s coverage of the event were similar. They both pointed out that the 'national feelings were raised to a higher pitch' with the monument that 'symbolizes with all its ridiculousness the Greek troops that occupied Izmir under Priest Hristostomas's leadership, and their panic after a single bullet and their escaped into the sea' (*Ve, Papaz Hristostomas'ın önderliğinde İzmir'i işgal eden Yunan birliklerinin tek kurşunla paniğe kapılışları, denize kaçışları tüm gülünçlüğüyle sembolize ediliyor*) (*Hürriyet*, 14-05-1974). It is noteworthy that the newspaper articles explained the monument and its symbolic meaning mocking Greek history, including its military failure. The statement of President Korutürk appeared in *Hürriyet* on 15 May, 1974, where he pointed out that the Turkish nation 'must be unified not only against the foreign threats, but also the inner threats' (*dış tehlikeler olduğu gibi iç tehlikelere karşı da birlik içinde olmamız şart*) (*Hürriyet*, 15-05-1974). When the conflict between Greece and Turkey was rising, the notion of inner threats by the President of the Turkish Republic is significant in terms of maintaining the prejudices toward the minorities in Turkey, such as *Rums*, who are regarded as the secret spies within the Turkish state. Although the President did not specifically refer to the minorities or minority institutions such as the *Rums*, or the Patriarchate as they were referred to in the memorandum of the Denouncing Greece mass meeting, Korutürk's statement is significant for its concealed support of the threatening approach toward the 'inner threats'.

4.3. The commemorations of Istanbul's Conquest, Entering Rumelia, and Coast Navigation Days

Up until the beginning of the Cyprus Intervention by the Turkish state on 16 July, 1974, there were three different celebration days: the 521st anniversary of the

conquest of Istanbul, the 618th anniversary of the Turkish entrance to Rumelia, and the Coast Navigation Day celebrations on the continental shelf. These celebrations play an important role in agenda setting and recalling the triumphs not only in the Turkish history, but also from the Ottoman ancestry. It should be noted that these commemorations are crucial for the invention and reproduction of Turkish nationalism.

On 29 May, 1974, it was the 521st anniversary of Istanbul's conquest, and the NTSU arranged celebrations for the event. *Tercüman* covered the news with the headline 'The 521st Year of Pride, the Greatest Conquest, and the Greatest Conqueror' (*521. inci gurur yılımız. En büyük Fetih, En büyük Fatih*) (*Tercüman*, 29-05-1974). The news is symbolic in terms of illustrating the bright history of the Turkish nation.

A week later, on 4 June, 1974, there was another remembrance day organized with the participation of 'thousands of people' (*Hürriyet*, 04-06-1974). The commemoration was of the Ottoman Turks setting foot on Rumelia (the Trace Peninsula) 618 years earlier, in 1357. I argue that the celebration was symbolic in terms of highlighting the Turkish existence and power in Thrace that is now shared among Greece and Turkey. The Turkish minority in Western Thrace was frequently covered by the media, while this celebration intimidated that Thrace belongs to Turks. The implication of Islamic values with Turkish nationalism can also be observed in the event, since the news report that 'in a representative [...] ceremony, forty young men rafted and landed on Namazgah Hill [...] and recited the call to prayer' (*Temsili [...] törende kırk genç bir sala binerek Namazgah Tepesi'ne çıkmışlardır [...] ezan okumuşlardır*) (*Hürriyet*, 04-06-1974).

Thrace was not the only issue of debate between Greece and Turkey at the time, there was also heated debate on the continental shelf issue. On Coast Navigation Day on 2 July, 1974, it is reported that the ceremony took place ‘on our continental shelf’ (*kıta sahanlığımızda*) with the participation of the Minister of Transportation (*Hürriyet*, 02-07-1974). I argue that the celebration of this day is also significant in terms of implying the Turkish military strength. This argument also relies on in the speech of the minister on the celebration day, as he claimed that ‘[...] as individuals serving the government and as a nation, and given our peace of mind for being worthy of Atatürk and for pleasing his soul, we have earned the right to celebrate this day with pride and confidence in our seas, air, land, and continental shelf’ ([...] *hükümette görev alan fertleri olarak ve vatan olarak Atatürk’e layık olmanın ve onun ruhunu şademenin huzuru içinde, denizlerimizde, havalarımızda, karalarımızda ve kıta sahanlığımızda bu bayramı, bu yıl da övünçle ve güvenle kutlamaya hak kazanmış bulunuyoruz*) (*Hürriyet*, 02-07-1974). The reference to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is significant in terms of reflecting the loyalty to mainstream Kemalism, and reminding the value of an independent Turkish state.

4.4. Liberation of Izmir, Cypriot Casualty Day, and the Fallen Soldier

Monument

The physical intervention of the Turkish military in Cyprus ended on 16 August, 1974, and shortly thereafter, the 52nd anniversary of Izmir’s liberation was celebrated. On 9 September, 1974, *Hürriyet* focused on the ‘bravery’ and ‘indefatigability of the Turks’ (*Türk’ün kahramanlığı, Türk’ün yenilmezliği*) (*Hürriyet*, 09-09-1974). With a special emphasis on Turkishness, the article reports that ‘the liberation of Izmir gained a disparate meaning and significance after 52

years' (*52 yıl sonra bambaşka bir anlam ve önem kazanan 9 Eylül Kurtuluş Bayramı*) (*Hürriyet*, 09-09-1974) (see Figure 10). I argue that this statement is crucial in terms of implying the repeated defeat of Greeks after fifty-two years. The significance of the celebrations of September 9 in Izmir, I argue, comes from the triumph and pride the Turkish nation feels after the Cyprus Intervention. In the news articles, a picture of Atatürk and his fellow soldiers with a Turkish flag in hand and rising clouds of dust which shows the accomplishment of the Turks in 1922. However, the main emphasis is on the notion of sending the Greek fleets back to Greece, a common reference used to describe the Turkish glory against Greece.

'We poured the Greeks into the sea first in Izmir' (*Yunan'ı ilk defa Izmir'de denize dökmüştük*) (*Hürriyet*, 09-09-1974). 'Pouring the Greeks into the sea' is a phrase frequently used against the Greeks, emphasizing the Turkish glory during the Greco-Turkish War in 1922. In the Turkish national discourse, figurative expression of defeat of the Greek army is visualized by Greek soldiers fleeing in confusion to the shores of Western Anatolia, the region they had previously occupied. Although this process was not literally a tag between the Greek and Turkish soldiers, this metaphor has been commonly observed in the Turkish discourse. This image is referred to as a way of showing the success of the Turkish independence struggle and also to imply the weakness and helplessness of the Greeks against Turkey. Therefore, I argue that news coverage about the salvation day of Izmir is not only meant to inform the public, but also to remind the strength of the Turks against the Greeks.

Throughout the news articles in 1974, not only certain figures from the history or symbolic dates were pointed out, but also new dates were determined to remember the incidents related to Cyprus through construction of monuments and establishment of new commemoration days. First, on 5 October, 1974, the news

reported that the last Friday of Ramadan would be remembered as the Cypriot Casualty Day (*Kıbrıs Şehitler Günü*). The selection of that date is remarkable in terms of merging the Islamic date with a national event. Since the last week of Ramadan changes due to the lunar calendar used to determine the Islamic days, the date changes every year in the Gregorian calendar Turkey uses. The day was declared a national day of commemoration by the Turkish parliament, and Prime Minister Ecevit made a speech that was also ‘appreciated’, as he claimed that ‘We should show that we are worthy of our glorious army, this is our duty’ (*Şanlı ordumuza her zaman layık bir millet olduğumuzu göstermeliyiz, bu görevimizdir*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-10-1974). The second date of new commemoration involved a monument opening on 28 December, 1974. However, unlike the monument for Hasan Tahsin, who was already a known character, this monument was called the ‘Fallen Soldier Monument’ (*Meçhul Asker Anıtı*). Journalist Ziya Akçapa who reported the news states that the monument ‘symbolized that the Turks, coming from the depths of history, will live freely for eternity’ (*Türk’ün tarihin derinliklerinden gelerek ebediyen özgür yaşayacağını simgeleyen anıt [...]*) (*Hürriyet*, 28-12-1974). The emphasis of the ‘Turks, coming from the depths of history’ is a theme frequently used in newspaper articles that shows the connections between the primordialist nationalist view and the political and public opinion.

5. Reflections of Politics in Implementing Discrimination in the Daily Sphere

The news articles I analyzed so far reflect that the *Rum* community in Turkey was affected by the conflict climate between Turkey and Greece. The events that I studied through newspaper articles such as the press campaigns, the state ceremonies, and public demonstrations organized by GONGOs and student unions mainly

targeted Greece and its policies in Cyprus. Although these events usually implemented a negative attitude toward the *Rums* as well, there were no direct assaults to the *Rum* minorities in Turkey. However, the news articles I will examine in the following section particularly address the *Rums* in Turkey, and how *Rums*, *Rum* institutions, and the Greek people are untrustworthy for the Turkish state and society.

5.1. *Rums* are Not Loyal Citizens: How Turkey and Turks are ‘Betrayed’

The discriminatory articles toward the *Rum* citizens in Turkey played out in several ways. The instances of tax evasion and currency smuggling were actions that resulted in the questioning of the loyalty of *Rum* citizens in Turkey as a whole. On the front page of *Tercüman*, on 30 July, 1974, an article entitled ‘A *Rum* who was evading tax and smuggling currency was captured’ (*Döviz ve Vergi kaçırın bir Rum tutuldu*) (*Tercüman*, 30-06-1974). *Cumhuriyet* reported the same news on the same date, but this time the citizen’s *Rum* identity was not referred to either in the headline or the article itself. While *Tercüman* focused on the citizen’s *Rum* ethnicity, *Cumhuriyet* only identified him by name, Dimitri Karayini, and his profession, the Turkish distributor of automobile company BMW. The difference in the attitude of two newspapers was symbolic in terms of explaining different perspectives on the *Rum* community. However, in the post Cyprus Intervention period, *Hürriyet* published news with a similar fraud story about eight hundred *Rums*, who ran away with millions of liras (*Hürriyet*, 04-11-1974). This news article was significant in terms of pointing out the suspects’ *Rum* identity, and how the fact that *Rum* citizens are not real Turks was proved by their act. Uğur Cebeci, the author of the article stated that ‘All of them were going around saying ‘We are Turks’’ (*Hepsi de biz*

Türküz diye geçiniyordu) (*Hürriyet*, 04-11-1974). Furthermore, even the doormen of one of the *Rums* are interviewed, and exclaimed ‘Shame on them! They have lived in comfort in this country for all these years’ (*Yazıklar olsun. Bunca zaman bu vatanda rahat yaşadılar*). His remarks echoed the general perspective toward *Rums*, and minorities in general, who are characterized as betrayers and the inner enemies of the state. The doormen’s response to the journalist also reflects the public attitude toward the *Rum* minorities.

5.2. Gossip News

A similar voice from society was heard in a section of *Hürriyet* called ‘*Kısa Kısa*’ which consisted of news briefs that were partly gossip news. On 3 September, 1974, *Hürriyet* published a piece headlined ‘Don’t Let Them Ruin Our Vacation’ (*Tatilimizi berbat etmesinler*) relying on a letter sent to their column. In this letter, the Italian vacationers in Kemer, Turkey, asked the newspaper to publish their letter so that the holiday village would not let the *Rums* in. It was reported that Italian tourists who sent the letter claimed that ‘We want a secure vacation with the Turks, but we know that we won’t be peaceful when the *Rums* come’ (*Biz Türklerle güven içinde tatilimizi geçirmek istiyoruz ama Rumlar gelince huzurumuz kaçacak, biliyoruz*) (*Hürriyet*, 03.09.1974). This story is significant in terms of reflecting a comparison between *Rums* and Turks by the Italians who also stated that ‘the real barbarians are *Rums*’ (*Gerçek barbar Rumlardır*) (*Hürriyet*, 03-09-1974). Once again, the *Rum* notion appears in a news article where the reader cannot fully understand whether the Cypriot Greeks or Turkish Greeks are being referred to.

The newspaper columns like *Kısa Kısa* column in *Hürriyet* also appeared in *Tercüman* in 1974, although, in *Tercüman*, the author of the column was known:

Rauf Tamer. Tamer's columns frequently discussed cultural issues, such as actresses, songs, or food culture. Although his focus was not only *Rums* in Turkey, but Greeks in general, his attitude is significant in terms of criticizing their cultural weaknesses, or warning the Turks to protect their cultural superiority. The language Tamer uses in his column is ironic and sometimes includes insulting words such as 'thief' which he uses to refer to Greeks for claiming that shish kebab is their national food, or 'fool' for not eating beans due to superstitious beliefs.

On 3 November, 1974, the same columnist writes about the placards in Athens that read '*Hülya*'. According to the author, the word '*Hülya*', written on the placards refers to 'our *Hülya*', namely Hülya Koçyiğit, a famous Turkish actress. (*Bu Hülya bizim Hülya'mız*) (*Tercüman*, 03-11-1974). The author argued that there were two implications of Greek placards. First, the Greeks were harassing a Turkish actress, in Tamer's words, 'our' actress. Second, the definition of *Hülya* in Turkish is 'a daydream', and the author claims that it symbolizes Greek dream of 'attacking Edirne', a Turkish city in Eastern Thrace, that would allow them to conquer Istanbul following the Greek *Megali Idea*.

Tamer, once again, synthesized politics and culture in his article on 11 November, 1974, in which he claimed that he criticized the Greek song played with Turkish lyrics in the ceremonies for the Republic Day in Turkey. Although the author points out that 'one should not be concerned about nationalism when it comes to the arts', he was still uncomfortable. (*Tercüman*, 11-11-1974). This article is important in terms of reflecting the sensitivities that go beyond the political arena, to include the cultural arena. Tamer's column is significant in terms of merging the cultural and political issues in a questionable manner, resulting in the categorization

of his news as gossip news. The significance of gossip in terms of discrimination will be discussed in chapter four.

5.3. Personal and Institutional Discrimination against Non-Muslims

The attitude toward minorities of non-Muslim identity was observed in newspaper articles on Leter Küçükandonyanis, a Turkish national football player of *Rum* background after he was beaten in a police station on 21 September (*Hürriyet*, 21-09-1974). The reflections of the news in the Turkish newspapers were critical of the police act. *Tercüman* and *Hürriyet* journalists Necmi Tanyola, Erdoğan Şenay, and Tahsin Öztin wrote similar articles, condemning this act as ‘afflictive’ (*Tercüman*, 22-09-1974). However, it should be noted that the disapproval of the police act against Leter was based on his Turkishness, his military service in the Turkish Army, and even his Turkish son-in-laws. On 5 October, *Hürriyet* published an interview conducted with Küçükandonyanis under the following headline: ‘Leter Gave His Two Daughters to Turks’ (*Leter iki kızını Türk’e verdi*) (*Hürriyet*, 05.10.1974). The interview ended with a remarkable question: ‘Is there anything left that Leter has that he has not devoted to this country?’ (*Leter’in sahip olup da, bu vatana vermediği bir şey kaldı mı artık?*) (*Hürriyet*, 05-10-1974). I argue that Küçükandonyanis’s daughters are introduced as commodities that were ‘presented’ to Turks, and therefore to the Turkish nation.

Meanwhile, neither the news articles nor columns referred to the main aspect of the event: A person getting beat up due to his ethnic or religious identity no matter what he does, or how he lives his life. It is also significant that in the interview he conducted with *Hürriyet*, Küçükandonyanis identified himself as a Turkish citizen of Albanian origin. Focusing on the selection of an ethnic identity with its expressive

and instrumental functions, Song (2003, p. 2) claims that ‘The ability to exercise, or even enjoy, an ethnic identity of one’s choosing is not simply a personal matter – it is a highly politicized issue which cannot be taken for granted’. His idea can be linked to Küçükandonyanis’s position in terms of reflecting the difficulty of a well-known *Rum* citizen and a national football player, Lefter Küçükandonyanis, who chooses to identify himself Albanian attempting to conceal his *Rum* identity.

The position taken toward the *Rums* or *Rum* institutions such as the Fener Rum Patriarchate in Turkey was depended on the conditions of the Turkish minorities in Greece. Ergun Göze, a *Tercüman* journalist whose attitude was blatantly against *Rum* rights in Turkey, wrote two articles on a row about the state of the Fener Patriarchate. The author demanded the *fener*, which means a lighthouse in Turkish, to be put out, to be blown out. With reference to the Treaty of Lausanne and the rule of reciprocity among the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and Turkish minorities in Greece, Göze claimed that Turks were not given rights and freedom in Greece. On the contrary, he argued, ‘Turkey keeps feeding the admiration toward Greece thinking that we are westernizing, [...] while they discretely keep gnawing the Turkish emotional existence’ (*Biz boyuna Batılılaşıyoruz diye, Yunan haranlığını köpürtür, [...] onlar sinsi sinsi Türkün manevi varlığını kemirmiş durmuşlardır*) (*Tercüman*, date missing). The distinction between the Turkish and Greek identities and culture is followed by the religious identity of the two nations. The Fener Patriarchate is compared to the mosques in places where Turkish minorities live, such as the Rhodes Islands, Western Thrace, and Cyprus. Göze and Ahmet Kabaklı, two columnists in *Tercüman*, refer to the inhuman conditions the Turkish minority in Greece faced throughout 1974, mocking the eternity of the supposed friendship of Greece (*Tercüman*, 23-11-1974, 03-04-1974). Göze’s article on 4 April also focused

on the Fener Patriarchate, referring to it as 'Fener', and stated that ' 'Fener' is the poor looking but not to be extinguished source of the 'Rum fire'' ('*Fener' bu 'ateş-i Rum'un', belki gösterişsiz fakat bitmek bilmeyen kaynağıdır*) (*Tercüman*, 04-04-1974). *Hürriyet* also focused on the Turkish minorities elsewhere, claiming that they were suffering from closing down of mosques, compulsory military service, moral pressure, insult on women, and slaughters (*Hürriyet*, 06-09-1974).

It was not only the columnists or newspaper articles that focused on the inhumane conditions suffered by Turkish minorities elsewhere, but GONGOs such as the Western Thrace Solidarity Union took an active role decrying the oppressive attitude of Greece. On 8 April, 1974, *Hürriyet* reported that the Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Union (WTTSU) 'proved with historical evidence that Greece would not make a friend' (*Yunanistandan dost olmayacağı tarihi vesikalar ile ispatlandı*) (*Hürriyet*, 08-04-1974). Although such a claim would hardly be proven, the speakers in the conference organized by the WTTSU argued that 'the Turks in Western Thrace are living in no better conditions than prison camps, while it is the opposite for *Rums* in Turkey, and this brotherhood cannot be unilateral' (*Hürriyet*, 08-04-1974). The focus on the Turkish minorities elsewhere was supported with more concrete news articles such as the Turks fleeing the 'atrocities' in Rhodes Islands and Crete, and taking refuge in Turkey (*Hürriyet*, 05-09-1974; *Tercüman*, 06-11-1974).

The attitude toward the *Rum* people and the Fener Patriarchate is crucial in terms of offering a glimpse of the implementation of reciprocity in the public domain. The constant reference to the Turkish minorities elsewhere is destructive rather than constructive, since they argue for limiting the liberties of *Rums* rather than solving the problems of the Turks through diplomatic means. It should be noted

that the comfortable life that is told to be enjoyed by *Rums* in Turkey is not a source of self-esteem but a shame for the Turks. The rule of reciprocity, which is meant to ensure the application of human rights for both sides of an assent, has been negatively applied in all countries involved (Akgönül, 2008, p. 4). In this perspective, the application of negative policies in one side results in a call for retaliation, as frequently seen in the statements of organizations, columnists, and newspaper articles in general.

CHAPTER V

*'But I tried to remember!'
'Don't try. It'll come when we need it. All of us
have photographic memories, but spend a
lifetime learning how to block off the things that
are really in there.'* (Fahrenheit 451, 1953, p. 151)

The novel written by Ray Bradbury, *Fahrenheit 451* (1953), is described as 'the classic bestseller about censorship,' (Bradbury, 1979). Although Bradbury does not agree with the interpretation, the book is regarded as a critique against state-led censorship. The theme of the novel is significant for my thesis, in which I argue that certain events and policies were not given space in the media through an tacit assent between the state and the media. This thesis studies the confiscation of non-Muslim foundation properties following Supreme Court decision of May 1974, and the lack of news coverage on the issue. I attempt to reveal how the policies implemented against non-Muslim foundations were ignored by the daily newspapers, and how the lack of information in daily life can be interpreted by using a socio-psychological analysis of denial and avoidance.

This chapter specifically focuses on the property confiscation of minority foundations, pointing out (1) the legal ruling on minority foundations in 1974 and the reforms made in the 2000s, (2) the news articles about the foundations (3) silence and its connotations in the literature, and finally (4) the more recent developments in

the international arena with judicial decisions on minority foundations, and its reflections in the Turkish media.

1. The 1974 Legal Ruling and Thereafter

Minority foundations faced no problems in terms of property registration until the 1974 Supreme Court of Appeals decision. However, the decision (no 1974/505) stated that the declaration of properties handed over in response to the Law 2762 on Foundations were regarded as deeds of trusts. İmamoğlu (2006) analyzes the Supreme Court decision in three parts. The first part of the 1974/505 (See Appendix A) decision explains that the properties can be registered to foundations within six months of the decision was issued. The second part of the decision, however, points out that non-Turkish corporations/foundations (*Türk olmayan*) are precluded from owning property due to the fact that they have more power than real persons and can pose a threat to the state. This part of the decision is crucial since it distinguishes the Turks from non-Turks, and minority foundations are categorized as non-Turk corporations. The lawyers of minority foundations objected to this categorization, and asked for amendment. On 11 December, 1975 (See Appendix B), the Supreme Court decided that the phrase that addressed minority foundations as ‘non-Turkish’ was ‘a mistake’ and that it should be taken out of the decision, however, the request of amendment was still declined by the Supreme Court. The third part of the Supreme Court decision concludes that the deeds of trust of the minority foundations must indicate that they cannot acquire new property. Therefore, ruling allows the confiscation of any property added to the immovables of minority foundations after 1936.

The most critical part of the Supreme Court ruling is the third part in which it states that the deeds of properties in 1936 did not specifically declare that minority foundations could gain new property. However, there is a dilemma in the conceptualization of the documents minority foundations submitted to the General Directorate of Foundations in 1936. The law on foundations in 1936 demanded declarations of property (*beyannames*) for all foundations in the Turkish Republic. However, with the Supreme Court of Appeals decision, these declarations were regarded as deeds of trust for foundation property (*vakfiye*). Although declarations of property and deeds of trust are different, they were treated the same as if they were equivalent documents following the 1974 period with the judicial decision of the Supreme Court. This shift in the interpretation of the declaration of properties and deeds of trusts were explained as an ‘obligation’, since the minority foundations did not have deeds of property in the first place. However, since the 1936 declaration of properties consisted of a list of properties owned by minority foundations up until 1936, any new properties acquired by the foundation did not appear in the declaration. Following the 1974 decision, there were series of lawsuits filed against minority foundations by the State Treasury and the General Directorate of Foundations, aiming to confiscate the properties gained in the post 1936 period.

The minority foundations, established and maintained by the non-Muslim community, acquire immovable properties mainly through bequest. Members of the minority community choose to bestow their houses, shops, or building grounds to the foundations. Most of the lawsuits involved such donations by minority members to their community foundations after 1936. For instance, on 21 January, 1960, Öjeni Azak Vartanyan, a minority citizen in Turkey, bequeathed two houses she owned in Şişli, Istanbul to the Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation with an

official written will (İmamoğlu, 2006). After Vartanyan's death in 1962, the Armenian Foundation implemented her written will, and the houses were registered to minority foundations. However, on 24 June, 1975, the court issued a ruling in favor of the Treasury, and canceled Vartanyan's written will. Furthermore, the Treasury filed another court trial against the Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation, claiming to be the 'final inheritor' (*nihai mirasçı*) of the property, and asked for the registration of the two houses with the Treasury. There are several other cases in which the inheritors were registered as St. Jesus or St. Maria. In this case, the court called in St. Jesus or St. Maria to the court rooms, and in their natural absence, the state confiscated the property as the 'final heritor'.

Meanwhile, the state cannot define itself as the 'final heritor' when the donors or their inheritors are alive and present in the court room. For example, a building site Mıgırdiç Sayian donated to the Surp Vartanants Church Foundation was filed for cancellation by the General Directorate of Foundations on 14 March, 1984. Quite normally, the properties donated on 12 September, 1969, were not stated in the 1936 declarations. With a Supreme Court decision on 14 May, 1985, the properties, which were previously donated to the Surp Vartanants Church Foundation by Mıgırdiç Sayian, were returned to him on 15 April, 1984.

The lawsuits I examine show that the State Treasury started to file lawsuits against minority foundations in the early 1970s. However, the 1974 decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals was decisive for the outcome of these lawsuits in favor for the State Treasury in the post-1974 period. These trials continued in the 1980s and 1990s, but given the Supreme Court decision, they were all decided in favor of the state. Whether the properties were confiscated by the state or returned to their previous owners or inheritors, the minority foundations suffered financial problems.

Starting from 2002, the Justice and Development Party (*AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) government implemented reforms of harmonization in the European Union integration process. The first law, numbered 4771 was enacted on 04 October, 2002, allowing minority foundations to own property and use their property with the permission of the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, an article of the statute states that Turkey reserves its rights given by the 45th article of the Treaty of Lausanne, which focuses on the reciprocity of the policies between Greece and Turkey. It should be reiterated that the rule of reciprocity is misused in the international arena, through which countries implement and legitimize discriminatory policies with reference to the discriminatory policies in the other country. Therefore, the reference to the 45th article in the 4771 Law on Foundations has caused concern among non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

On 11 January, 2003, a new act was passed, Law 4778 on Foundations, which states that minority foundations are allowed to own and use their property with the permission of the General Directorate of Foundations. Following this new law, the Balat Or-Ahayim Jewish Hospital was extended to include a geriatric section (Reyna and Zonana, 2003, p. 135). Meanwhile, minority foundations were given extra time to declare and register their properties donated to them before 2002.

Although the reforms in the 2000s aimed to relieve the minority foundations by implementing new laws to prevent future problems, these laws failed to resolve most of the problems faced by non-Muslim foundations. According to the data and tables presented by the GDF (see Tables 4 and 5), out of over one thousand five hundred applications of minority foundations, no immovable properties were registered in the first request. In the second applications, composed of foundations that 'lacked documentation' in the first applications, two hundred and forty-two

immovable properties were registered, that constitutes fifteen percent of the total requests (see Table 4). According to the data of May 2004, once again, in the first applications none of the foundations could register property. In their second request in 2004, eighteen percent of the applicants could register property, and a total of two hundred and eighty-six immovables were registered (see Table 5). However, the reforms in the Foundation Laws are not sufficient since they do not specifically focus on the foundation properties that have previously been confiscated, and the properties that now belong to the new owners (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009, p. 9).

The democratization movement and reforms in the laws in Turkey were obviously not sufficient enough to solve the problems minority foundations faced for many years. Therefore, the application of the Fener Rum Boys School Foundation to the ECHR was not withdrawn, and the ECHR declared that the case was admissible on 8 July, 2008 (Press release issued by the ECHR Registrar, 20-09-2005). The complaints of the Fener Rum Boy' School Foundation and the Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation are stated as follows:

The applicants complain of the orders setting aside their title to the properties. They argue that the Turkish legislation as interpreted by the domestic courts deprives foundations established by religious minorities within the meaning of the Lausanne Treaty of all capacity to acquire immovable property. In their submission, that incapacity amounts to discrimination when their position is compared to that of other foundations. The applicants rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. *Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi* further complains under Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) that it did not receive a fair hearing in the Turkish courts (Press release issued by the ECHR Registrar, 20-09-2005).

The ECHR handed down its final decision on the Fener Rum Foundation case on 9 January, 2007, and ordered the Turkish Republic either to pay compensation or to return the property to its legitimate owners (See Appendix D). The judgment of the

ECHR is available only in French, but the Human Rights Information Centre reports the legal decision as follows:

The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court held that Turkey was to re-enter the property in question in the land register under the applicant foundation's name within three months of the date on which the Court's judgment becomes final. Failing such re-registration, the State was to pay the applicant foundation 890,000 Euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant EUR 20,000 for costs and expenses.
(http://insanhaklarimerkezi.bilgi.edu.tr/pages/news_full.asp?lid=en&id=134)

Having a general background on the legal policies and acts toward minority foundations in 1974 and the following period, I will next focus on the discussions of the legal issues in the informal, daily sphere through newspaper articles.

2. A Quantitative Analysis of the Turkish Newspapers in 1974

In the content analysis of Turkish newspapers, I categorized the news articles in terms of themes, months, and pages they appeared on. The themes are listed as nationalism, war-threat-revenge, discrimination-prejudice, self-victimization, peace, and press campaigns. The foundations are also listed in the themes as a separate category. The pages are listed as front, inside, and back. In general, similar numbers of articles were counted in the themes I analyzed, although the newspapers were selected from different political perspectives. This shows that overall, Turkish newspapers had a collective attitude toward the Cyprus conflict. Furthermore, the Cyprus dispute resulted in the implementation of a negative attitude toward Greeks, Cypriot Greeks, and also toward the *Rum* community in the news articles.

Table 1
Themes recorded in Turkish Newspapers

	Newspaper			Total(%)
	<i>Hürriyet</i> (%)	<i>Tercüman</i> (%)	<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (%)	
Nationalism	12 (26.7%)	21 (46.7%)	12 (26.7%)	45 (100.0%)
War-Threat	13 (33.3%)	7 (17.9%)	19 (48.7%)	39 (100.0%)
Self-Victimization	20 (37.0%)	18 (33.3%)	16 (29.6%)	54 (100.0%)
Prejudice	10 (30.3%)	19 (57.6%)	4 (12.2%)	33 (100.0%)
Self-Critique	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	3 (100.0%)	3 (100.0%)
Foundations	2 (40.0%)	3 (60.0%)	0 (.0%)	5 (100.0%)
Peaceful	3 (21.4%)	5 (35.7%)	6 (42.9%)	14 (100.0%)
Press Campaigns	17 (35.4%)	23 (47.9%)	8 (16.7%)	48 (100.0%)
Total	77 (32.0%)	96 (39.8%)	68 (28.2%)	241 (100.0%)

The nationalism theme emphasizes the Turkish identity and the highness of Turkishness, and there were forty-five news articles with nationalism theme in the Turkish newspapers (see Table 1). The nationalist news appeared mostly on the front page of newspapers, indicating the importance attributed to Turkish nationalism. Among the newspapers, *Hürriyet* reported nationalist news articles mostly in the front page, whereas in *Tercüman* the inside pages had a higher number of nationalist news. It should also be noted that among the three newspapers, *Tercüman* had the highest number of news articles with nationalism themes: Twenty-one in total. There were twelve news articles with nationalist themes in both *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet* (see Table 1). There was an increase in the nationalist news in August and September, the months following the Cyprus Intervention (see Table 3), which can

be related to the post-Cyprus Intervention nationalist atmosphere that exalted and felicitated the Turkish Army for their fairness and success in Cyprus.

Table 2
Themes recorded in Front, Middle, and Last pages of Turkish Newspapers

	Page			Total(%)
	Front Pg.(%)	Middle Pg.(%)	Last Pg.(%)	
Nationalism	26 (57.8%)	18 (40.0%)	1 (2.2%)	45 (100.0%)
War-Threat	13 (33.3%)	20 (51.3%)	6 (15.4%)	39 (100.0%)
Self-Victimization	30 (54.5%)	23 (41.8%)	2 (3.6%)	55 (100.0%)
Prejudice	13 (39.4%)	17 (51.5%)	3 (9.1%)	33 (100.0%)
Self-Critique	3 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	3 (100.0%)
Foundations	0 (.0%)	5 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	5 (100.0%)
Peaceful Attitude	5 (35.7%)	8 (57.1%)	1 (7.1%)	14 (100.0%)
Press Campaigns	13 (27.1%)	16 (33.3%)	19 (39.6%)	48 (100.0%)
Total	103 (42.6%)	107 (44.2%)	32 (13.2%)	242 (100.0%)

The war-threat-revenge theme represents the attitude in the news articles that have a belligerent content. These articles usually refer to the Turkish war of independence against the imperial powers, and Greece in particular, and point out that Greeks would be defeated once again. Furthermore, the news articles have a threat tone that ‘warns’ the Greeks of possible future Turkish response to Greece, implying that the Turks would take revenge for any aggression toward its people. Table 1 shows that there were thirty-nine news articles with the war-threat-revenge themes, and *Cumhuriyet* had the highest number of articles with this theme, a total of

nineteen news articles (see Table 1). Out of the thirty-nine news articles with war theme, twenty news articles appeared on inside pages (see Table 2) and fourteen were reported in April (see Table 3). While news articles with the war theme mostly appeared in the pre-Cyprus Intervention period, particularly in April, the nationalism theme rose in the post-Cyprus Intervention period. The war theme focuses on a threatening attitude toward Greeks before the Cyprus Intervention; the nationalist news articles address the triumph of the Turkish Army in Cyprus.

Table 3
Themes Recorded throughout 1974 in Turkish Newspapers

	Month												Total
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
Nationalism	0	0	1	2	7	3	5	10	8	2	4	2	44
War-Threat	1	2	1	14	3	3	4	1	4	3	2	1	39
Self-Victimization	1	4	3	13	4	6	4	4	5	4	7	0	55
Prejudice	0	0	1	6	1	7	1	3	6	0	7	0	32
Self-Critique	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Foundations	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5
Peaceful	0	0	1	5	0	2	1	0	3	1	0	1	14
Press Campaigns	0	0	0	15	4	2	8	0	1	0	18	0	48
Total	2	9	7	57	19	24	23	18	28	10	39	4	240

In the news articles, there was a common emphasis on the Turkish minorities living elsewhere, and the pains they suffer abroad. This attitude in the Turkish newspapers falls under the self-victimization theme. There were fifty-four news articles with self-victimization theme, which was the highest number among the

eight themes analyzed in the content analysis of newspapers (see Table 1). *Hürriyet* had the highest number of articles with self-victimization theme at twenty. However, *Tercüman* and *Cumhuriyet* followed *Hürriyet* closely with eighteen and sixteen news stories, respectively. Table 2 shows that news articles focusing on the Turkish minorities elsewhere appeared on both front and inside pages, although they were fewer on the back page. However, the significance of this theme is that self-victimization usually normalizes and even legitimizes any discriminatory policies of the Turkish state against its minorities. Put differently, the comfortable conditions that minorities in Turkey enjoy were criticized; especially with reference to the oppression Turkish minorities suffered elsewhere. Therefore, the self-victimization theme is significant in terms of reflecting the reciprocity theme, which is reduced to the implementation of equally oppressive policies towards one another.

It should be noted that self-victimization and war-threat themes appeared the most in April, the month when the anti-Greek attitude rose the most. The rise of war-threat theme in April was due to a series of mass demonstrations and rallies against Greece that GONGOs organized in this time period. I argue that the pre-Cyprus Intervention period, and especially April, is symbolic in terms of an increase in the aggression toward the Greeks, and therefore *Rum* minorities in Turkey. Considering that the Supreme Court made its legal decision in May 1974 allowing the confiscation of property belonging to minority foundations, I argue that the news articles with nationalism, war and self-victimization themes are crucial for normalizing and legitimizing discriminatory policies toward minorities in Turkey.

Meanwhile, press campaigns organized by newspapers are also significant in forming and influencing the public attitude on the one hand, and collecting donations for the Turkish military on the other hand. Table 3 demonstrates that the number of

media campaigns increased in April and November. It should be noted that in April, the press campaigns and war-threat themes rose in parallel. This shows that the threatening attitude toward Greeks was supported by press campaigns, especially in raising money for the Turkish Army. In July, during the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus, there were eight articles for press campaigns. There were fifteen news articles involving the press campaigns in 1974, and this number increased to eighteen in the post Cyprus Intervention period, particularly in November. *Tercüman* had the highest number of articles or announcements regarding the press campaigns, twenty-three, whereas *Hürriyet* had seventeen, and *Cumhuriyet* had eight (Table 1). Table 2 shows that there were a total of forty-eight news articles about press campaigns, and the appearance of these articles in pages were quite balanced. The reason of high numbers of articles with the press campaign theme in *Tercüman* is that the newspaper organized a campaign in which a national swimmer, Ersin Aydın, swam to Cyprus. Due to the press campaigns organized with sports events, the last pages of newspapers had nineteen news articles. This shows that sports events were equally crucial in popularizing press campaigns.

The prejudice-discrimination and peaceful themes in Turkish newspapers shows the frequencies of two opposing attitudes. The number of stories with the discrimination theme was thirty-three, whereas the number of peaceful news articles was fourteen (Table 1). The discrimination theme was commonly observed in opinion columns, whereas the peaceful attitude was in the articles reporting Turkish or Greek politicians' speeches. *Tercüman* had the highest number of discriminatory language, nineteen in total of which fifteen appeared in the inside pages, which shows the role of opinion columnists in the implementation of a discriminatory attitude. *Cumhuriyet* had the lowest number of news articles where Greeks, Cypriot

Greeks, or non-Muslim minorities in Turkey were stereotyped. *Cumhuriyet* had the highest number of peaceful articles that mostly referred to the speeches of politicians, or stressed that Greeks should not be accused of the Greek state politics.

One of the main arguments in this thesis is that there was an overt discriminatory attitude toward the *Rums* and non-Muslim minorities in the societal and cultural spheres, while the discrimination in the state level against the non-Muslim foundations was concealed. The number of news articles concerning foundations was five, and none of these articles referred to the ongoing lawsuit in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court decision on 8 May, 1974, or its unborn effects on minority foundations. Table 3 demonstrates that there were two news articles published in February, two in April, and one in September. Two of these articles appeared in *Hürriyet*, while the other three were published in *Tercüman* (Table 1). *Cumhuriyet* did not publish any news about foundations. The articles I categorized in the foundations theme are about Turkish minority foundations abroad and therefore linked to the self-victimization theme as well. The common argument in these articles is that Turkish foundations elsewhere are treated unequally. However, none of these articles point out the resulting problems for minority foundations in Turkey. Table 2 shows that the news articles about foundations only appeared in the inside pages, because the issue was only raised by opinion columnists and their columns appeared in the inside pages. This also shows that either political or legal actors did not debate the foundations issue, or their discussions did not appear in the agenda, since there were no news reports in the newspaper articles.

3. News Articles Regarding Foundations in 1974

Among the news articles of four daily newspapers published in Turkey in 1974, I could find only five articles regarding minority foundations. However, these news articles were not about the legal decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals that allowed confiscation of properties belonging to minority foundations. On the contrary, out of the five news articles or columns written on foundations, four were about the disadvantageous conditions of the Turkish foundations in Greece, Rhodes Island, or Cyprus. Only the last article reported a draft resolution introduced by Nihat İlğün, a parliamentarian from the opposition Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*), who questioned the relationship between the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*) leader and Vice-president Necmettin Erbakan and the director of the General Directorate of Foundations. In what follows, I focus on the contents of these news articles and their role in terms of avoiding the problems awaiting the minority foundations.

With the 1974 Supreme Court decision, the non-Muslim foundations in Turkey experienced a turning point in terms of their rights of property ownership. However, newspapers stayed silent about the court decision and its repercussions. On the contrary, the disadvantages and injustice applied to the Turkish foundations elsewhere such as Cyprus, Greece, or Rhodes were rather aggressively voiced and justice was demanded. The first example of this attitude was seen in *Tercüman* on 22 February, 1974, by columnist Ahmet Kabaklı, and followed by a second article on 28 February, 1974, by the same writer (*Tercüman*, 22-02-1974; *Tercüman*, 28-02-1974). The main argument of these two articles is that the Turkish charity foundations in Cyprus were either impoverished or disempowered by British colonial rule.

In the article published on 22 February, headlined ‘The Foundations Catastrophe in Cyprus...’ (*Kıbrıs’ta Vakıflar Faciası...*) (*Tercüman*, 22-02-1974), Kabaklı lays a broad historical background on the Turkish and *Rum* foundations during Ottoman rule and British occupation in Cyprus, and explains how their economic and administrative conditions worsened over time. The first sentence in the article is a strong statement, which argues that the foundations were invented by the Turks and reflects the primordialist nationalism ideology. ‘We know that the FOUNDATIONS, as the biggest social creation of our ancestors to astonish the world have been going through a desolation even in Turkey and only recently have been recovering’ (*Atalarımızın dünyaya parmak ısırtacak yücelikte en büyük sosyal eseri olan VAKIFLAR’ın Türkiye’de dahi nasıl bir perişanlık geçirdiğini [...] nihayet son yıllarda az çok toparlanmaya başladığını biliyoruz*) (*Tercüman*, 28-02-1974). The reference to the establishment of the foundations first by ‘our [Turkish] ancestors’ is significant in terms of its links with the primordial nationalism arguments.

Although the argument on the antiquity of foundations does not continue in the column, there is a large emphasis on the double standards applied between *Rum* and Turkish foundations during British colonial rule in Cyprus. Kabaklı states that the Turkish foundations were weakened by unequal treatment and claims that ‘[...] this treatment was never applied to the *Rums*, on the contrary, their foundations [...] were promoted and organized to reinvigorate for the Greek soul’ (*[...] bu muamele Rumlara asla yapılmamış; bilakis onların [...] vakıfları teşvik ve organize edilerek Yunan ruhuna canlılık sağlanmıştır*) (*Tercüman*, 22-02-1974). This statement shows that the author was aware of the significance of charity foundations in terms of creating solidarity among a certain group whether they are Turks or Greeks, and also

reflects the attitude toward the supposedly double-standards under British rule in Cyprus between 1878 and 1960.

Kabaklı's 22 February 1974 column is also significant in terms of pointing out that the Cyprus dispute was lost by Turkey due to the different policy applications toward Turkish Cypriots ('Turks') and Greek Cypriots ('Rums') foundations. The strengthening of *Rum* foundations, while at the same time weakening the Turkish ones, Kabaklı describes, 'is the story of how we have lost Cyprus to a great extent' (*Kıbrıs'ı büyük ölçüde kaybedişimizin hikayesidir*) (*Tercüman*, 22-02-1974). Through this perspective, it is argued that the weakening of the Turkish community's foundations in Cyprus has taken a major role in the political and societal defeat as well.

While comparing the *Rum* and Turkish foundations in Cyprus, there are certain issues that Kabaklı points out as a threat to the *Rum* community in Turkey as well. Kabaklı, in his article published on 28 February, 1974, claims that 'the British, in the Treaty of Lausanne, was determined to give Cyprus to Greece (saving a few bases for themselves)' and continues 'even the Patriarchate in Istanbul was the 'mind' of this chauvinism' (*Istanbul Patrikhanesi dahi bu şovenliğin 'beyni' durumunda idi*) (*Tercüman*, 28-02-1974). The imperial powers such as Great Britain or the Istanbul Patriarchate are all subject to the skepticism of the author. It should be noted that the author's stance reflects the general position observed in Turkey when it comes to minority issues, and even the founder treaty of the Turkish Republic, Treaty of Lausanne, is subject to this skepticism. The mistrust toward the *Rum* minorities and its institutions in Turkey is easily influenced by international disputes between Greece and Turkey, just like the dispute between these countries over Cyprus.

Kabaklı's 28 February 1974 article also discusses the role of foundations in terms of creating a 'national consciousness' (*milli şuur*), and argues that they have great importance for the formation of Turkish identity and Turkish culture in Cyprus. Regarding this opinion, Kabaklı focuses on different issues such as religious, educational, and economic contributions of foundations to a community. More strikingly, the author points out that 'on the grounds of some of the Turkish cemeteries, *Rum* schools, cinemas, bars, and unfortunately even Turkish schools were constructed; and these are hearth-breaking catastrophes' (*Bazı Türk mezarlıkları üzerinde Rum okulları, sinemalar, barlar, hatta maalesef Türk okulları yapılmış olması, yürek parçalayan ayrı facialardır*) (*Tercüman*, 28-02-1974). Although the conditions of the Turkish community in Cyprus should not be disregarded, it is significant that the following discriminatory policies toward the *Rum* community and its foundations in Turkey were not referred to by Ahmet Kabaklı in his later columns. Put differently, the troubles of Turkish foundations elsewhere were criticized while equally oppressive policies toward *Rum* foundations in Turkey were ignored.

On 14 April, 1974, *Tercüman* columnist Ergun Göze's article entitled 'Foundation School' (*Evkaf Mektebi*) proposes that foundation schools should be opened for giving education in a variety of branches, such as radiotelegraphy, history, or law. Göze states: 'If you are capable of protecting foundations, you can protect the country' (*Eğer vakıfları muhafazaya muktedir olabilirsiniz, vatani da muhafaza etmiş olursunuz*) (*Tercüman*, 14-05-1974). Meanwhile, Göze claims that foundations are 'so engraved in the Turkish soul that the civil code we imported from Switzerland had to be changed because they did not fit the soul of Turkish foundations and charity' (*Vakıf o kadar Türk ruhuna nakşolmuştur ki, İsviçre'den*

[...] ithal ettiğimiz Medeni Kanunun vakıflarla ilgili maddeleri, Türk vakıf ve hasenat ruhuna uymadığı için değiştirilmek zorunda kalmıştır) (Tercüman, 14-05-1974). While Göze aggrandizes the foundations, which he argues to be ‘a souvenir of the ancestry’ (*ecdad yadigarı*), he also states that the Cypriot Turks failed to protect their foundations (Tercüman, 14-05-1974).

The attention on the problems of Turkish communities in places like Cyprus, Western Thrace, or Rhodes Island was focused on the unrighteousness of the Greek policies toward Turks. On 2 September, 1974, *Hürriyet* published news that was related to different issues such as the anti-Turkish attitude of the press in Greece, Turkish minorities living elsewhere, and Turkish minority foundations. In *Kısa Kısa* section appeared in *Hürriyet*, without a byline and with short gossip articles, the title of the article was called ‘Oh, Don’t Misunderstand’ (*Aman Yanlış Anlaşılmasın*) (*Hürriyet*, 02-09-1974). The article is about the conflict between a Greek newspaper, *Eleftheros Kosmos* that denies that a Turkish mosque in Rhodes was invaded by Greeks, while *Hürriyet* argued that the Turks in Rhodes were ‘being tortured’ (*Hürriyet*, 02-09-1974). The article refers to *Eleftheros Kosmos* that argued the Turkish mosque was ‘consigned to a foundation and assured that it was protected well’ (*Hürriyet*, 02-09-1974). However, *Hürriyet* ends the article saying that ‘They simply want to say that ‘we respect religious places’, that’s all!’ (*‘Dini yerlere saygımız çok’ demek istiyorlar, o kadar!*) (*Hürriyet*, 02-09-1974). The exclamation mark at the end of the sentence shows that the Greeks are not trusted, and the tone is quite ironic. It should be noted that it is almost four months later that the Supreme Court of Appeals decided under a seriously questioned, and refuted, reasoning that the property of non-Muslim minority foundations should be confiscated.

The only event reported in a Turkish newspaper that was directly related to the General Directorate of Foundations in Turkey failed to grab the attention of the media, and therefore the public. A news article in *Hürriyet*, on April 3, 1974, reported that a parliament member of the opposing party asked the relationship status between Vice-president Necmettin Erbakan and the head of the General Directorate for Foundations. The article appears on the eleventh page of the newspaper, which shows that it was not a lead story to appear on the front page. However, the content of the question asked in the parliament was significant for the Turkish government and the administration of foundations in Turkey through GDF since the parliament member asks: ‘The esteemed Prime Minister, in his various statements, claimed that state officials who cannot cooperate with them would leave and would be replaced by ones who can. Has the head of the General Directorate for Foundations been assigned in this perspective?’ (*Sayın Başbakan, çeşitli beyanlarında bize ayak uydurmayan devlet memuru gidecek, yerine bize ayak uyduran gelecektir demiştir. VGM müdürü bu anlayışla mı tayin olmuştur?*) (*Hürriyet*, 03-04-1974). However, in the following days, there were no comments or reactions to the draft resolution of the parliament member.

4. Explaining the Silence in *Apoyevmatini*

In my interview with Mihail Vasiliadis, my major focus was to understand the reasons behind the newspaper’s neutral attitude that I defined as the silence of the victim. The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus had direct negative ramifications especially on the *Rum* community in Turkey. Although the 1974 Supreme Court decision addressed non-Muslim foundations as a whole, the daily reflections of discrimination and stereotyping were observed against the *Rum*

community in Turkey. Functioning as the newspaper of the *Rum* community in Turkey, *Apoyevmatini*'s silence vis-à-vis the discriminatory attitude toward its community was crucial to explain in my thesis. Mr. Vasiliadis explained that in the 1970s and the following years, self-censorship was used by the minorities to protect themselves from 'physical things'.

Mr. Vasiliadis, a witness of the 6-7 September, 1955, lootings of non-Muslim properties, claims that the targeting of the *Rum* community in Turkey has started with the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey, that goes back to the 1950s. As an attempt to create a negative atmosphere against the *Rums*, there were constant draft resolutions that questioned the role of the Patriarchate in sending money to Cyprus and *EOKA*, the Cypriot national struggle organization that is accepted as a terrorist organization in Turkey. Even the questioning itself was enough to judge and punish *Rums* in Turkey. Considering the draft resolution in the Turkish Parliament and its effects on the *Rum* minorities in the 1950s, a news article from *Hürriyet* (03-04-1974) stands out. The article reported that a parliamentarian implied that the new head of the General Directorate for Foundations was assigned to his position due to his closeness to the recent government. However, the news article appeared on the eleventh page of the newspaper, which showed its lack of importance for the agenda. While the issues regarding foundations did not appear in the newspapers, the anti-Turkish attitudes of two Greek newspapers were frequently referred to. I argue that this partly supports Mr. Vasiliadis's point on the misuse of cases to evoke negative feelings toward the Greeks, and *Rums* who are regarded as Greeks in Turkey.

There is a popular saying in Turkish society 'against a perceived threat from a world in which 'Turks have no friends other than Turks'' (Kirişçi, 2002). In a similar fashion, the *Rum* community in Turkey, along with the Jewish and Armenian

communities, is regarded as an imminent threat against the unity of the Turkish state. This attitude of the Turkish state and society results in the so-called necessity to keep an eye on everyone except ‘Turks’. Vasiliadis demonstrated documentary evidence to exemplify this attitude of the official state (See Appendix E). The document was one of many sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the 1940s, reporting the contents of articles published in minority newspapers. The document I present in this thesis is concerned with the articles in two different *Rum* newspapers, *Metapolitefsis* and *Apoyevmatini*, published in March and April 1946. It is written in the document that these articles ‘were deemed important’ and the Turkish translations could be viewed in the attachments.

Analyzing the translation of a news article entitled ‘Fortunate Commencing’ (*Hayırlı Başlangıç*) shows that the article focuses on the new regulations regarding the income taxes of foundations, and ‘render thanks to the Republican government’. Meanwhile, the article ended some of the problems of foundations, such as the ‘occupation of churches in *Galata*’ or ‘intervention of the Foundations Administration in their community affairs’. The last paragraph of the article is crucial in terms of reflecting the general attitude of the minority media: taking care to point out problems in a soft and unthreatening way. ‘We are sure of the fairness of our government. We trust that this problem, too, will be resolved in the future, as long as our righteousness is realized’ (*Hükümetimizin adaletinden eminiz. Bu meselemizin de günün birinde halledileceğine imanımız vardır. Yeter ki haklı olduğumuz anlaşılsın*). Reading this sentence, Mr. Vasiliadis stated that this is the ultimate strategy used in minority newspapers, pointing out their problems and expectations while assuring the governments that they are loyal citizens with full confidence in their state.

‘When there is self censorship, you avoid the physical thing’ (*Oto sansür olunca fiziksel şeyden kurtulmuş oluyorsun*) says Mr. Vasiliadis. By the ‘physical things’ he means any physical attacks toward his community in the absence of self censorship. Furthermore, he shared a personal experience from the early 1970s when he was the chief editor in the *Rum* newspaper *Embros*, and taken by the police to be interrogated. In the police station, the policemen asked Mr. Vasiliadis to sign a blank piece of paper and he was actually beaten until he agreed to sign the blank page. ‘They had taken almost every piece of clothing I had, involving my shoelaces. Then, one of the policemen came and told the other officers to take me home. But my clothes were missing. They told me that they would take me to my house anyways, and took me to the police car. However, they left me in Hacıhüsrev [an infamously dangerous district in Beyoğlu/Istanbul] half naked. I walked home from there in the middle of the night’. When asked whether he signed the paper or not, there was a short pause, and he responded ‘Of course I signed’. It eventually turned out that the reason of his arrest was because he wrote ‘Galata’ instead of ‘Karaköy’, and ‘Pera’ instead of ‘Beyoğlu’. ‘Pera’, a Greek word meaning ‘the other side’ and ‘Galata’, a Genoese name, were given Turkish names: Beyoğlu and Karaköy. Although both words are used interchangeably for both places today, the policies toward Mr. Vasiliadis at the time were explained by the selection of the wrong words in the newspaper that he represented. Other than state control, self censorship, and the problems caused by the state officers as the police, the effects of the societal mass demonstrations against Greece should be noted as a form of suppression against the minority newspapers. There is a symbolic meaning attributed to words such as Galata and Pera in Turkey, especially in the Turkish nationalism debates. Bora (2006) points out the Turkification policies in the early republican years when the minorities were

attempted to be assimilated into Turkish culture. Bora (2006, p. 88) quotes a study of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1967, p. 215-16, 353-4), a main figure in Turkish nationalism, where he stated that ‘they are going to give up Galata, and being natives of Galata!’ (*Galata’dan ve Galatalılıktan vazgeçecekler!*).

A similar Turkification policy was experienced during the 1970s, when the official government notices published in *Apoyevmatini* and other minority papers were abruptly discontinued, causing financial problems that resulted in the decline of *Apoyevmatini* that continues even today. The set of regulations for the state to publish official announcements and advertisements to newspapers were changed and formed in a way to exclude *Apoyevmatini*. The number of pages or the size of the newspapers that are eligible for placing ads no longer contained *Apoyevmatini* or other minority newspapers. When asked why they have not re-organized their newspaper to meet the regulations Vasiliadis responded in a sarcastic way, saying: ‘Ok, do so. Then, they would say that you have eyebrows above your eyes’ (*Peki deđiştir. O zaman da gözünün üstünde kaşın var derler*). Put differently, the Turkish officials already made their decision to cut the financial aid to the newspaper under any pretext, and nothing would stop them from it. Furthermore, the proverb Mr. Vasiliadis uses shows that the Turkish state always legitimizes its acts against minorities even if its rationales are far from being logical.

In the three-hour long interview I conducted with Mr. Vasiliadis, I realized that he had to keep silent as the others did although he heavily opposes being silent about minorities’ problems, unconsciously over the years. Overall, he has tried to break the silence the best that he could. However, his opposition to the silence due to the sorrows of the community in the past never crossed the invisible line between the minorities and the state.

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

The rise of conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus starting from the 1950s had a decisive role to play in policies toward non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, who are frequently subjected to “foreigner” conceptualization in formal and informal spheres. In my interpretation, the Supreme Court legal ruling in 8 May 1974 was a discriminatory act in the formal sphere, and it was legitimized and concealed in the informal sphere. Put differently, I argue that discriminatory policies toward minority foundations in 1974 were implemented through legalization through laws, legitimization through the Cyprus dispute, and concealment in the social and cultural spheres.

The main goal of this thesis was to correlate the conflict atmosphere between Greece and Turkey that resulted in Turkey’s Intervention in Cyprus with the legitimization of official and unofficial discrimination against non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. My hypothesis was that the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus was decisive in the implementation of discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim citizens and their institutions, namely the non-Muslim foundations. This thesis argues that the 8 May, 1974 decision Supreme Court of Appeals issued regarding the confiscation of non-Muslim foundation properties acquired after 1936 was not a

coincidence. Rather, discrimination toward minorities take place in different forms, either openly or veiled, and implemented in different ways, either formally or informally, intentionally or unconsciously. This thesis attempted to show all forms together, through different methods and literatures.

This thesis mainly presented and relied on four indicators to support its argument: (1) Historical background on the Cyprus dispute and its ramifications particularly on non-Muslim minorities, (2) Linguistic dilemma of the *Rum* notion, (3) Media coverage throughout 1974, (4) Silence in the media regarding the legal ruling and its consequences for the minority foundations. I used three different methodologies to measure/analyze discrimination toward non-Muslim minorities in the formal and informal spheres: (1) Document analysis of laws on foundations and legal decisions, (2) Content analysis and a detailed reading of selected newspapers, (3) In-depth interview with Mihail Vasiliadis. Discrimination and silence literatures constituted the main theoretical framework of this study, along with others like nationalism, citizenship, multiculturalism, and reciprocity.

In Chapter 2, I focused on the theoretical framework and the methodology of the thesis. The previous events and policies toward non-Muslim minorities in periods when the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, such as the 6-7 September 1955 events or 1964 Greek deportation, were offered as historical indicators, and an introduction to a deeper analysis of 1974 is in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 first focused on the linguistic dilemma of the *Rum* notion, and then presents a detailed reading of the news articles published in newspapers that can be collected under different subtitles such as political disputes, media campaigns, commemoration days, and daily sphere. The analysis of news articles are significant in terms of pointing out an overt discrimination toward minorities in Turkey. Chapter

5, on the other hand, focuses on the covert discrimination against minorities, focusing on the silence and concealment of the Supreme Court decision and its ramifications for minority foundations in 1974. In order to gain further insight into the silence of the *Rum* minority newspaper, *Apoyevmatini*, I have conducted an in-depth interview with the recent editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Mr. Vasiliadis. As he is a member of the *Rum* community in Turkey and taking an active role in the *Rum* media before and after the 1974 period, Vasiliadis's input was fruitful for my research. I have relied on his experiences about the discriminatory attitude against the *Rum* and non-Muslim community, the silence of *Apoyevmatini*, and the non-Muslim community, in this process. Mr. Vasiliadis contributed to my thesis with his personal view, experience, and archive.

At the beginning of this research, I assumed that there would be a huge gap between the Turkish newspapers (*Hürriyet*, *Tercüman*, and *Cumhuriyet*) and the *Rum* newspaper (*Apoyevmatini*) in terms of the content of the news articles. I expected that the Turkish newspapers would publish articles claiming the justifiability of the official Turkish policy toward the non-Muslim foundations, while the *Rum* newspaper would be highly critical of it. However, my expectations were far from facts. I could only find five news articles in which there was a reference to foundations in the Turkish and *Rum* newspapers combined. Furthermore, these articles were not referring to the property confiscation of the non-Muslim foundations, but they were critical of the conditions of the Turkish foundations elsewhere. The lack of coverage of the ongoing policies toward the non-Muslim foundations in Turkey was as important as any information I could find in my research. The silence on the discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim

foundations was significant in terms of showing how discrimination was concealed, and it was as crucial to this thesis as overt discrimination was.

I argue that this thesis is significant in terms of showing the outcome of international conflict periods in terms of legitimizing discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, who are often considered as inner enemies of the Turkish state. Several studies correlated the property confiscation of the non-Muslim minority foundations in 1974 and thereafter (Oran, 2001; Oran, 2005, Mahçupyan, 2004; Akgönül, 2007; Kurban, 2004; Reyna and Zonana, 2003; İmamoğlu, 2006). However, my argument is that these studies lacked an analysis of the informal mechanisms of discrimination in the cultural and societal level as reflected in newspapers. This research is important in terms of studying the daily sphere through newspapers, along with the official documents such as laws or court documents. In general, this thesis shows that the discriminatory attitude mainly targeted the *Rum* community in Turkey. However, the most important point is that while normalizing and legitimizing discrimination toward the *Rum* community, the implementation of discriminatory policies toward the non-Muslim minorities in general were concealed in the daily sphere. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the minority press was also silent and did not have an individual stance toward the daily incidents.

Debates on minority politics in Turkey have gone on for years. The official description of minorities, the application of the minority rights granted by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Capital Levy (1942) policies toward especially Jewish citizens, the 6-7 September, 1955 incidents constitute only a few of the topics in the long list of minority issues in Turkey. The clash between the Armenians and Turks on the definition of the incidents that took place in 1915 is subject to disagreement in the

international arena. However, the need for self-censorship that has insidiously replaced liberty is the biggest obstacle against the improvement of not only minority rights, but human rights in Turkey. I argue, like most other scholars, that the main focus should be on the restoration of minority rights and human rights that would ensure the equality of people of all ethnic or religious backgrounds. The only way to address problems is to acknowledge the mistakes once made rather than legitimizing or concealing them. I hope that this thesis contributes to the discussion of the troubles that would eventually lead to a Turkey at peace with its multicultural character.

THE WAY AHEAD

1. What Happens When Minorities Break Their Silence? News Articles on January 2007: The ECHR Decision and Its Reflections in the Media

The non-Muslim foundation properties were confiscated starting in 1974. However, the issue was not covered in the mainstream media for a very long time, until the case was taken to the European Court of Justice by the non-Muslim foundations themselves. So far, the ECHR has issued two decisions on such cases. The Fener Rum Foundation and the Surp Kevork Armenian Church and Cemetery Foundation both won their cases in the ECHR in January 2007 and December 2008, respectively. Although the issue is much openly discussed and criticized nowadays especially in the academia and among the minority media (e.g. *Agos*), this section will specifically focus on the persistence silence and indifference toward the minority foundations issue in the Turkish mainstream media. In what follows, I will discuss the coverage of the ECHR decision in the selected Turkish newspapers: *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Zaman*, *Milliyet*, and *Radikal*.

1.1. First Reflections

On 10 January, columnist Taha Akyol states that the decision of the ECHR is significant in terms of strengthening the legitimacy of the Treaty of Lausanne and the

Turkish legislation in terms of minority rights but that the ECHR condemned Turkey for violating property rights (*Milliyet*, 10-01-2007).

The next day, columnist Oktay Ekşi argued that ‘the rule of law is a need for everyone’ (*Hukuk herkese lazım*), and that if a country does not follow laws, they are more likely to pay the price in the future (*Hürriyet*, 11-01-2007). Although the points made by Ekşi show that he is critical of the Turkish policies toward minority foundations, he is also critical of the Turkish indifference to the conditions of the Turkish foundations in Greece. This attitude is highly linked to the literature of reciprocity and the self-victimization theme that I pointed out in the content analysis of the 1974 articles. However, the author also points out that this is not a criticism of to the non-Muslim foundations in Turkey; that their attitude should rather guide the Turkish foundations in Greece. Another *Hürriyet* columnist, Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, states that ‘an error has been corrected’ (*Bir hata düzeltilmiş oldu*) and refers to the reader comments on the internet regarding this issue. Yılmaz focuses on ‘the huff caused by racism and ignorance’ (*Irkçılık ve cehaletten doğan dayılanma havası*) he sees in these comments, and raises three points (*Hürriyet*, 11-01-2007). First, he claims that these people who applied to the ECHR are as equal citizens as everyone else. Second, he says that the ECHR decision corrected the mistakes made in the past. Finally, he adds that the Treaty of Lausanne is protected with the ECHR decision.

Unlike the other authors, columnist Yalçın Doğan (*Hürriyet*, 11-01-2007) focused on the policies implemented by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to handle lawsuits filed by Cypriot Greek foundations. Doğan explains that The Commission of Immovable Goods (*Taşınmaz Mal Komitesi*) was established in TRNC to solve the immovable goods disputes between Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot

Turks, and their decisions were recognized by the ECHR. I argue that his article can be interpreted in two opposite perspectives. On the one hand, the author ignores the minority foundations' ECHR victory in Turkey and ignores the Turkish policies toward the non-Muslim foundations. On the other hand, the author focuses on the policies implemented by the TRNC government to solve the immovable problems by the Commission of Immovable and indirectly proposes a similar solution. In *Radikal* newspaper, the editor in chief İsmet Berkan states that 'Non-modern nationalism got stonewalled' (*Çağdışı milliyetçilik duvara tosladı*), and gives a general background on the problems of the minority foundations (*Radikal*, 11-01-2007). The most significant point in his article is the criticism of the Turkish Constitution that claims to be respectful of human rights, and asks for a true respect for human rights.

Taha Akyol, who had written a column on this issue the day after the ECHR issued its decision and explained court's reasoning in ruling against Turkey, wrote a second column on 11 January (*Milliyet*, 11-01-2007). This time, like many of the other authors discussed, there is a self-victimization theme in the article, claiming that the ECHR decision should lead many communities like Muslim Turks, Albanians, and Bosnians in the Balkan region to defend the property rights of their foundations. Akyol also points out that the deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin told him that the government is planning on establishing a General Directorate for Foreign Relations (*Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü*) to support the Turkish foundations and any lawsuits they file abroad.

Zaman newspaper, among the other ones, has a different attitude on the ECHR decision. On 10 January, *Zaman* claimed that the new regulations of the Foundations Codes were vetoed by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (*Zaman*, 10-01-2007). Although the news article only points out the reasons raised by Sezer to

veto the codes, it has a strong connotation that supports the government and criticizes the President for obstructing government reforms. The day the ECHR issued its decision, *Zaman* published another article pointing out the difficulties caused by the Greek government to Turks in Western Thrace who wanted to go on pilgrimage to Mecca.

References to the Turkish minority foundations in the Balkans were continued in the following days. On 12 January, it was claimed that the head of the General Directorate for Foundations, Yusuf Beyazıt had said ‘We will apply to ECHR as well’ (*AIHM’ye biz de gideriz*) (*Milliyet*, 12-01-2007). Beyazıt focused on former Ottoman foundation property in the Balkans, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Bosnia and stated that ‘we will seek our rights’ (*Haklarımızı arayacağız*) (*Milliyet*, 12-01-2007). Another reference to the Turkish minorities in the Balkans was made in the article of Özdemir İnce (*Hürriyet*, 17-01-2007) in which he pointed out the inequalities against the Turks in the economic, educational, and political spheres.

1.2. The Worker’s Party Building in Beyoğlu

The case of the Fener Rum Foundation in the ECHR involved the immovable in Beyoğlu that was being used by the Worker’s Party (WP - *İşçi Partisi*). Following the ECHR decision, the newspapers reported the statements of both the Fener Rum Foundation attorney, Gülten Altan, and the leader of the WP, Doğu Perinçek. While Altan claimed that the property of the Fener Rum Foundation was ‘being taken over’ (*işgal altında*) by the WP (*Radikal*, 11-01-2007; *Zaman*, 11-01-2007), the WP leader Perinçek asks ‘Are we fools to pay?’ (*Enayi miyiz ödeyelim*) (*Hürriyet*, 12-01-2007). Furthermore, Perinçek claims that the previous payments made by their party were

‘totally out of conscience,’ (*tamamen vicdanen verdik*) because the foundation administrator told him that ‘they were the victims of the Supreme Court decision and that their students were left in hard conditions’ (*Onlar Yargıtay kararından mağdur olduklarını, öğrencilerinin güç durumda kaldığını söylediler*) (*Hürriyet*, 12-02-2007).

Perinçek’s statement, ‘Are we fools to pay?’ shows that the people or institutions who use the minority foundation properties after the state confiscation do not take responsibility for the economic damage they cause. The tone of Perinçek’s statement is also symbolic in terms of considering the indemnity payments, either by the state itself or its political party, as ‘foolness’. Perinçek also points out that the Worker’s Party indeed helped minority foundations who claimed that they were in bad conditions as a result of confiscation of their property. Meanwhile, there were no further news articles or reports about the debate between the Worker’s Party and the Fener Rum Foundation in the following days.

1.3. Citizen Dimitri

Following the ECHR decision on 9 January, 2007, different comments appeared place in the newspapers. In general, the columnists recognized that the previous policies toward the minority foundations were unfair and must be corrected. Meanwhile, they also stated that this decision should be a leading case for the Turkish minority foundations elsewhere, especially in the Balkans. In a general outlook, the themes in the news articles about the ECHR decision were a synthesis of the self-critique and self-victimization themes. However, on 13 January, *Hürriyet* published an article under the category of a ‘news of the day’ (*günün haberi*) called ‘Citizen Dimitri’ (*Vatandaş Dimitri*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007).

The news article seems like an ordinary interview conducted with the administrator of Balıklı Rum Armenian Foundation, Dimitri Karayani, who claims that his foundation is not going to take its case to the European Court of Human Rights. The time period when this interview is conducted with Karayani should be noted, since less than a week ago, the ECHR had condemned Turkey in the case of another minority foundation regarding property rights. The main focus in this article is to lay out a distinction between the citizens who take their cases to an international court and the other citizens who consider this as ‘Treason’ (*vatana ihanet*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). Put differently, Karayani is placed as a true Turkish citizen, while the Fener Rum Foundation and its administrators are implicitly accused of being residual citizens, namely ‘betrayers’. More significantly, this argument is reflected from a minority member himself.

The news article continues on page twenty, only this time the title is reads ‘The Dimitri Stance’ (*Dimitri Duruşu*) (*Hürriyet*, 19-01-2007). The aspect of Dimitri being covertly praised is his objection to suing the Turkish state in an international arena. Furthermore, Karayani openly claims that ‘I cannot interfere with what the Fener Rum Foundation does. But I view the application to ECHR as treason. This is a Turkish foundation. I cannot complain about my country to foreigners’ (*Fener Rum Vakfı’nın ne yapacağına ben karışmam. Ama AİHM’e başvuruyu vatana ihanet olarak görüyorum. Burası bir Türk vakfıdır. Ben devletimi yabancılara şikayet edemem*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). This statement reflects the emphasis on the Turkishness of the minority foundation he is the head of, and the foreignness of the ECHR. Following this sentence, Karayani claims ‘I trust the state courts, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the government in this country. [...] If I need any help, I would apply to my government and ask for financial aid from the budget’

(*Devletin mahkemesine, Yargıtay'a ve hükümete itimadım var. [...] İhtiyacım olursa hükümetime başvurur, bütçeden para isterim*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). Furthermore, Karayani views the people who do apply to the ECHR as 'beggars' stating that 'I won't be a beggar as a citizen of the Turkish Republic' (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olarak kimsenin kapısında dilencilik yapmam*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). Listing the rules of being a true citizen as trusting one's own state, not reporting it to 'foreigners', and never betraying it in order to 'beg' for money, Karayani focuses on his roots in the Black Sea region (*Karadeniz*). The people in Karadeniz are argued to be brave and trustworthy people, and Karayani focuses on his Karadeniz identity to claim that people of Karadeniz do not like betrayal or beggary.

Another significant statement made by Karayani is that the *Balıkli Rum* is a hospital while the other [Fener Rum Lycee for Boys] is a 'just a school' (*sadece okul*), and 'there are not even ten *Rum* patients among our patients' (*Hastalarımız arasında on tane bile Rum yok*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). This argument is noteworthy since there is a distinction on the functions of the school and hospital for the Turks and non-Muslim Turkish citizens such as *Rums*. His statement can be interpreted as a comparison between a *Rum* Lycee that is generally used by *Rum* students and a *Rum* hospital that is used by mostly Turks, '70 million people' (*Burası ise 70 milyona hizmet veren bir hastanedir*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). This statement can be read as an internalization of the secondary status of minorities in Turkey because Karayani emphasizes that there are fewer *Rum* patients in the hospital. Furthermore, Karayani seems to ignore the fact that *Rums* are Turkish citizens as well, and the ethnic or religious identity of the Turkish citizens does not legitimize any kind of unequal treatment.

Meanwhile, the same day, right next to the ‘Citizen Dimitri’ headline there is another news article entitled: ‘This is a Soldier of Armenian Background’ (*Bu da Ermeni asıllı asker*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). The position of this article is quite significant as it is right next to the ‘Citizen Dimitri’ story. The Armenian soldier, Aleks Mesropyan, holds a small-sized carpet with a Mustafa Kemal Atatürk portrait and his famous saying, ‘Happy is the one who calls himself a Turk’ (*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). The rest of the story on page twenty reports that Mesropyan ‘stated that as a Turkish citizen, he is proud to perform his military duty’ (*Bir Türk vatandaşı olarak vatani görevini yapmaktan gurur duyduğunu belirten [...]*) (*Hürriyet*, 13-01-2007). The emphasis on the Armenian identity of the soldier, and his commitment to his country and the founder of the Republic is described as ‘emotional’ in the news article.

On 14 January, 2007, the lawyer of the Fener Rum Foundation, Gülten Alkan, reacted to the treason allegation by Karamani, and stated that laws by the European Court of Human Rights is accepted by the Turkish Republic as an equal text to the Turkish constitution. Alkan also said that ‘accusing someone or an institution of treason is a crime’, and Karamani will be sued if he either explains or disclaims his previous statement. (*Bir kişiyi veya kurumu ‘vatana ihanet’le suçlamak başlı başına suçtur*) (*Hürriyet*, 14-01-2007). Another reaction to Karamani’s statements came from Istanbul Bilgi University Law School Professor Turgut Tarhanlı, in *Radikal*, where he questioned ‘whether the citizenship of a non-Muslim minority member is a status to be achieved after fulfilling certain preconditions?’ (*Bir gayrimüslim azınlık mensubunun vatandaşlığı, bazı önkoşulları sınıdıktan sonra varılacak bir statü müdür?*) (*Radikal*, 16-01-2007). Furthermore, Tarhanlı criticizes the attitude of *Hürriyet* management, for ‘choosing an ironic and sarcastic manner in covering the

minority issue' (*Yoksa gazete yöneticileri [...] azınlık konusuyla ilgili ironik ya da büyük altından gülmeye çalışan bir üslubu mu tercih etti?*) (*Radikal*, 16-01-2007).

In general, the two articles regarding the 'ideal' *Rum* and Armenian citizens appearing the same day and only a few days after the ECHR decision on the Fener Rum Foundation is crucial in terms of focusing on the notion of citizenship in Turkey, and making a distinction between real citizens and residual citizens who tend to easily betray their country. Although the previous articles regarding the ECHR decision on the Fener Rum Foundation consisted of either objective news stories reporting the legal decision or the responses of the columnist that can be categorized as both self-criticism and victimization of the Turkish minorities elsewhere, 'Citizen Dimitri' and 'This is a soldier of Armenian Background' articles were connotative.

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APPENDICES

1821: Greek Independence War begins

1914: Cyprus annexed by Britain, after more than 300 years of Ottoman Rule

1919: Turkish Independence War begins

1920-22: Turkish-Greek War

1923: Treaty of Lausanne, Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey

1924: Greece becomes Republic

1925: Cyprus becomes a crown colony

1930: Turkish-Greek Friendship, Residence, Trade and Maritime Agreement

1934: Anti-Jewish incidents in Western Thrace

1935: The Law 2762 on Foundations

1935: Greece Monarchy restored

1942-43: Wealth Tax policies in Turkey

1952: New constitution declares Greece a parliamentary democracy with a monarch as head of state. Greece joins Nato

1952: Turkey joins NATO

1953: Greek Cypriots begin guerrilla war against British rule. The guerrilla movement, the National Organisation of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA), wants enosis (unification) with Greece. British authorities arm a paramilitary police force made up of Turkish Cypriots.

1953: EOKA established in Cyprus by Grivas

1955: London Conference

Appendix A: Chronology of Major Developments in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus until the end of 1974 (BBC News, Country Profiles)

September 1955: The 6-7 September lootings in Turkey

October 1955: Karamanlis became the Prime Minister of Greece

1959: Makarios elected President in Cyprus

1960: Republic of Cyprus is established, by the Treaty of Guarantee

May 1960: Military Coup in Turkey against the Democrat Party Government

1963: Conflict in Cyprus between Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks

1963: Political instability in Greece

November 1963: Karamanlis defeated in the general elections, and left Greece.

Papandreou is elected the Prime Minister

1964: Turkey unilaterally annuls the 1930 agreement between Greece and Turkey

April 1967: Military Coup in Greece by George Papadopoulos, Papadopoulos

becomes the Prime Minister

1971: Military Memorandum in Turkey to force Demirel's resignation

1973: Greece is declared Republic, Monarchy is abolished. Papadopolos assumes the Presidency

25 November 1973: Counter-Coup in Greece by Ioannidis, Papadopoulos overthrown

May 1974: Supreme Court decision

15 July 1974: Military Coup in Cyprus backed-by Ioannidis. Makarios III overthrown. Clerides becomes the temporary president

20 July 1974: Military intervention by Turkey, one third of the island is occupied

November 1974: General Elections in Greece, Karamanlis comes to power

December 1974: Makarios returns to Cyprus

Appendix A: Cont'd



**T.C.
YARGITAY
Hukuk Genel Kurulu**

Esas No : 1971/2-820
Karar No : **1974/505**
Tarih : 8.5.1974

KARAR :

16 Şubat 1328 (1912) tarihli «Eşhasi Hükmiyenin Emvali Gayri Menkuleye Tasarrufu» hakkındaki kanuna göre, önce Hükümet ve Belediye Daireleri, sonra özel kanunları gereğince dernekler ve daha sonra Hükümetçe sözleşme veya şartname ya da tüzükleri uyarınca, Türk Ticaret ve Sanat ve inşaat Şirketleri taşınmaz mal edinebilirler. Aynı Kanunun geçici fıkrasında ise, Türk Hayır Kurumları tarafından şimdiye kadar «Namı müstear» ile köy ve ilçelerde tasarruf olunagelen taşınmazların bu Kanunun yayımından başlayarak 6 ay içinde başvurmaları halinde, kurumlar adına kaydın düzeltilmesi, böylece tapuya başvurmayan veya davayı gerektiren bir hal var olmasına rağmen davaya konu yapılmayan yerlerin bundan sonra kurumlara ait olduğu yolundaki iddiaların dinlenemeyeceği ön görülmüştür.

Görülüyor ki, Türk olmayanların meydana getirdikleri tüzel kişiliklerin taşınmaz mal edinmeleri yasaklanmıştır. Çünkü; Tüzel kişiler gerçek kişilere oranla daha güçlü oldukları için, bunların taşınmaz mal edinmelerinin kısıtlanmamış olması halinde, Devletin çeşitli tehlikelerle karşılaşacağı ve türlü sakıncalar doğabileceği açıktır, işte bu görüşten hareket edilerek 2644 sayılı Tapu Kanununun 35 maddesi ile Kanuni hükümler yerinde kalmak ve karşılıklı olmak şartıyla yabancı gerçek kişilerin Türkiye'de satın alma veya miras yolu ile taşınmaz mal edinmeleri mümkün kılınmış, olduğu halde, tüzel kişiler bundan yoksun bırakılmışlardır. Esasen 1. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu devrinde de 7 Sefer 1284 tarihli kanunla yabancı gerçek kişilere Türkiye'de taşınmaz mal edinme hakkı verilmişken, 1328 tarihli kanunla yabancı tüzel kişiler bundan ayrı tutulmuşlardır. Lozan Antlaşmasına bağlı «ikamet ve salahiyeti» adliye sözleşmesinin birinci maddesiyle Türkiye'deki yabancı tüzel kişilere tam bir muameleyi müteakibe uygulanması şartı öngörülmüş ve bu sebeple de 2644 sayılı Tapu Kanununun 5. maddesiyle (mevcudiyetleri

Appendix B: The Supreme Court of Appeals judicial decision on 8 May, 1974.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetince tanınmış olan yabancılara ait dini ilmi ve hayri müesseselerin fermanlara ve Hükümet kararlarına müsteniden sahiplendikleri gayrimenkullerin, bu belgelerin dışına çıkmamak ve hükümetin izni alınmak şartıyla müesseselerin hükmi şahısları namına tescil) olunacağı hükmü konulmak suretiyle kazanılmış haklar korunmuştur, 5404 sayılı Kanunla değiştirilen Vakıflar Kanununun 1. maddesinin son fıkrasında, cemaatlerin ve esnafa ait vakıfların kendileri tarafından seçilen kişi veya kurullarca yönetileceği öngörülmüş, böylece bunlar, tüzel kişiliklerine dokunulmamak üzere bir statüye bağlanmıştır. Vakıflar Kanununun 44. maddesinde, (16 Şubat 1328 tarihli Kanunun yayınlanmasından sonra tapuya verilmiş defterleri ve buna benzer belgelerle anlaşılacak olan yerlerin o yolda vakıflar kütüğüne (geçeceği hükmü yer almıştır. Bu suretle, vakıf niteliği kazanan cemaatlara ait hayri, ilmi, bedii amaçlar güden kuruluşların düzenlenmiş vakıfnameleri bulunmadığı için az önce belirtilen 44. madde gereğince bunların süresinde verdikleri beyannamelerinin (vakıfname) olarak kabulü zorunluğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Nasıl ki, vakıfname de mal edinme için açıklık olmayan hallerde vakıf tüzel kişiliği mal edinemezse; beyannamelerinde bağış kabul edecekleri yolunda açıklık olmayan hayır kurumları da gerek doğrudan doğruya, gerekse vasiyet yolu ile taşınmaz iktisap edemezler. Çünkü, vasiyeti kabul yararına vasiyet yapılan ait bir haktır. Vakıf (vakfeden) vakıfnamesinde izin vermedikçe onun iradesi dışına çıkılıp mal kabul olunamaz. Öyle ise Balıklı Rum Hastanesinin vasiyet yolu ile taşınmaz mal edinmeyeceği gözetilip Hukuk Genel Kurulunca da benimsenen özel daire bozma kararına uyularak Hazinesinin itirazlarının kabulü gerekirken önceki kararda direnilmesi usul ve yasaya aykırıdır. Direnme kararı bozulmalıdır.

SONUÇ :

Temyiz itirazlarının kabulü ile derinme kararının yukarıda ve özel daire bozma kararında açıklanan nedenlerle H.U.M. K.nun 429. maddesi gereğince BOZULMASINA 8.5.1974 gününde oybirliğiyle karar verildi.

Appendix B: Cont'd

‘... davalı mülhak vakfın Türk vatandaşları tarafından kurulmuş olmasına karşı[n] onama kararında ‘yabancıların Türkiye’de taşınmaz mal edinmelerini yasaklayan yasalardan söz edilmesi’ bir yanılğı sonucudur. Bu nedenle (...) [bu tümcenin] düzeltme yolu ile onama ilamından çıkarılmasına, bunun dışında (...) düzeltme isteğinin reddine (...) oybirliğiyle karar verilmiştir’. (Yuda Reyna ve Yusuf Şen, **Cemaat Vakıfları ve Sorunları**, İstanbul, Gözlem, 1994, s.90-93)

‘Despite the fact that the foundation was established by Turkish citizens, mentioning the laws prohibiting foreigners acquiring real estates in the previous decision was by mistake, anyway the objection of the hospital was denied’ (Macar, 2007: 85).

Appendix C: The Supreme Court of Appeals decision in 1975 about the ‘non-Turk’ phrase in the 8 May, 1974 judicial decision.

Press release issued by the Registrar

**CHAMBER JUDGMENT
FENER RUM ERKEK LİSESİ VAKFI v. TURKEY**

The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment¹ in the case of *Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey* (application no. **34478/97**).

The Court held unanimously that there had been **a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1** (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court held that Turkey was to re-enter the property in question in the land register under the applicant foundation's name within three months of the date on which the Court's judgment becomes final. Failing such re-registration, the State was to pay the applicant foundation 890,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant EUR 20,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)

<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=34478/97&sessionid=25904528&skin=hudoc-pr-en>

Appendix D: The ECHR decision regarding the confiscation of property belonging to the Fener Rum Foundation.

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

T. C.

Başbakanlık
BASIN VE YAYIN UMUM MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

Ankara: 26 4.1946

Sayı: 2928 / 354

Özet: 4 yazının gön-
derildiği H:

Ek
4
yazı

İç.Y.D.

Başbakanlık Özel Kalem
Müdürlüğüne

İstanbul'da yayınlanmakta olan Meta-
politensis gazetesinin 31.3.1946 ve 7.4.46
Apoyevmatini gazetesinin 4.4.946 ve 8.4.946
tarihli sayılarında çıkan yazılar önemli
görüldüklerinden, Türkçelerinin ilişik ola-
rak sunulduğunu arzeder, saygılarımı suna-
rım.

Umum Müdür Y.

(Hasan Refik Ertuğ)

N.T.
M.B.

-6-

030	01			101	623	9
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Appendix E: The report sent to the Ministry of the Interior regarding the summary of
a publication in *Apoyevmatini*.

Yerli Rumca gazetelerden:

Apoyevmatini 4.IV.1946

"Hayırlı başlangıç" başlığı altında yazdığı kısa bir fıkrasında, ezcümle şöyle diyor:

▪ Büyük Millet Meclisi, kazanç vergisinin üçüncü maddesinin 14. fıkrasını tadil etmiştir. Bu sayede okullarımızın vergi meselesi halledilmiş oluyor. Okullarımız hiçbir vakit kazanç peğinde koşmamışlardır. Bunlar talebelerinden birçoklarını parasız okutmakta ve masraflarını müsamereler vermek suretile kapatmaktadırlar.

Anılan kanunun tadili lâzımgeldiğine kani olan hükümet, bunu Meclise yollamış ve tadil ettirmiştir. Maliye tahsil şubelerine icabeden emirlerin verileceğinden eminiz.

Bu yeni kanunu cemaat işlerimizin hallinde bir başlangıç addederiz. Cumhuriyet hükümetine teşekkürlerimizi sunarız ve diğer cemaat işlerimizin de hal ve fasledileceklerini ümideyleriz.

Eftim'in işgali altında bulunan Galata'daki kiliselerimizin iadesi de bu meselelerden birisidir.

Balıkli hastanesinden ücretli tek mütevellinin uzaklaştırılmasını, cemaatlerimizin seçim yapmalarına müsaade edilmesini ve Vakıflar İdaresinin cemaat işlerimize karışmasına son verilmesini de bekliyoruz.

Hükümetimizin adaletinden eminiz. Bu meselemizin de günün birinde halledileceğine imanımız vardır. Yeter ki haklı olduğumuz anlaşılsın."

030	01			101	623	9
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5

T.C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
Güvenlik İşleri Başkanlığı

SAYI :B.02.0.GİB/465 01/03530
KONU :Azınlık Sorunları
Değerlendirme Kurulu

05/01/2004

- İlgi: a) Başbakanlık Özlük ve Yazı İşleri'nin 07.11.1902 tarih ve 28-4869 sayılı talimatı.
b) İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın 10.12.2003 tarih ve B.05 1.EGM.0.12.05.05/10762-214302 sayılı yazısı.
c) Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği'nin 19.12.2003 tarihli yazısı.

Ülkemizdeki azınlıkların yurt güvenliği bakımından kontrolü amacıyla ilgi (a) talimatla kurulan "Azınlık Talı Komisyonu"nun, Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği'nin ilgi (c) yazısında belirtilen Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatı uyum çalışmalarına ilişkin görüşleri doğrultusunda, İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın koordinatörlüğünde, Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü'nün başta bulunduğu Devlet Bakanlığı, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı temsilcilerinden oluşması, adının "Azınlık Sorunlarını Değerlendirme Kurulu" olarak değiştirilmesi, kurulda görüşülecek sorun ve taleplere bağlı olarak ilgili kurum ve kuruluşların temsilcilerinin toplantılara davet edilmesi uygun görülmüştür.

Bilgilerini ve genişini rica ederim.


Omer DİNÇER
Başbakan a.
Müsteşar

Appendix F: The document reporting the abolition of the Secret Committee of

Minorities.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 4

Data given by the GDF on applications of minority foundations for registration of immovables (November 2003)

First Applications

Number of Applicant Foundations	116
Number of Immovables Applied for	2234
Rejected for repeated application	268
Rejected for being already registered	434
Number of Immovables Applied for (total)	1532
Rejection by the owner	622
Rejection due to missing data/documents	910
Registered	0

Second Applications of Foundations that had missing documents in the first application

Number of Foundations re-applied	86
Number of Immovables re-applied for	no information
Number of Immovable rejected due to missing info/documents from the proprietor	477
Numer of Immovables accepted for registration	242
Number of Foundations still under consideration	6
Number of Immovables still under consideration	unknown

Contemporary Results according to Data

Number of Immovables Applied for Registration	1532
Number of registered immovables	242
Registration ratio	15.79%

Table 5

Data given by the GDF on applications of minority foundations for registration of immovables (May 2004)

<i>First Applications</i>	
Number of Applicant Foundations	116
Number of Immovables Applied for	2234
Rejected for repeated application	268
Rejected for being already registered	434
Number of Immovables Applied for (total)	1532
Rejection by the owner	622
Rejection due to missing data/documents	910
Registered	0
<i>Second Applications of Foundations that had missing documents in the first application</i>	
Number of Foundations re-applied	87
Number of Immovables re-applied for	no information
Number of Immovable rejected due to missing info/documents from the proprietor	526
Rejected for already being registered	13
Numer of Immovables accepted for registration	286
Number of Foundations still under consideration	no information
Number of Immovables still under consideration	85
<i>Contemporary Results</i>	
Number of Immovables Applied for Registration	1532
Number of registered immovable	286
Registration ratio	18.66%




Figure 1: A tombstone inscription that read 'Turkish-Greek Friendship' (*Tercüman*, 07-04-1974).



Figure 2: The dove of peace behind the grates illustrated as the Greek flag (*Cumhuriyet*, 30.06.1974).



Figure 3: A Greek soldier, waiting for Aegean to be his, like the other Aegean islands that belong to Greece such as Lesbos or Dodecanese Islands (*Cumhuriyet*, 18-06-1974).



Figure 4: The arms producers in the United States, illustrated as the arms producer that sells arms both to Greece and Turkey, and how both the USA and arms producers are profitable in all terms (*Cumhuriyet*, 01-06-1974).

Sosisli Enosis

ÜZERİNE hiç bir şey eklemeyen, size Ateş Böceklerinin "Kıbrıs hareketini" özetleyen taşlamalarını veriyoruz. Adı "Sosisli ENOSIS" bu taşlamamızın.

"Son asrın toplu tüfekli, indirilmiş mıldırtılmış Karbonatsız sindirilmiş, aynalı fıyakalı Birleşmiş Milletlerden karmalı, Atina'dan aktarmalı Bilhassa dört dörtlük çıkartmalı Jet ve havan sesleriyle müzikli, neft yağı sürülmüş filmi: Sosisli ENOSIS!..

Sosisli Enosis'te gelmiş geçmiş en büyük avantajçılar rol almış, Senaryosunu tanınmış üç kâğıtçılar yazmış Fakat sonunda hepsi yaya kalmıştır.

Başrollerde: Beyinsiz beyin Yuhanidis ve Sampson Filizsiz! Altına yağ kaçırın conta ve haybeci Dıgızıpıs Figürasyonunda conta ya Paravanlis, zampara Keskinger ve İngiltere'den Kalhagan

Yönetmen: Karaoğlan, Karaoğlan, Karaoğlan! Aç gözlülerin boğazını yırtan kılıç Ve sonuna imzayı atan bizim aslan Mehmetçik!

Dünyayı yayık gibi çalkalayan bu filmde İki maceraperestim içine limon sıkılan şaşkın macerası

"He, he! Kırye Dıgızıpıs Alalım Kıbrıs'ı. Yunan halkını biraz daha uyutalım Tamam! Haklısın kırye Yuhanidis. Bir darbe yapalım Kıbrıs'ta, Enosis'e kapı açalım.

Endaks! Dusururuz papazı, baskan yaparız çiğerdelen Sampson'u Memnun ederiz mister Nikson'u..."

Hayalleri boşa çıkaran, kuyrukları fena sıkışan üç uydurma kahramanı Buram buram terleten, donlarına işeten müthiş bir son:

-"Alo! Alo! Baskan Dıgızıpıs... Alo! Yuh-anidis... Ben Sampson anason... İmdat! İmdat vre! Türkler çıkmış adada..."

-"Hi! Türkler mi çıkmış adada? Ne duru-yorsunuz orada?"

-"Denize dökünüz..."

-"Onlar bizi döküyor vre Yuhanidis

-"Sizler de birşeyler çıkartın.

-"Biz şimdi yalnız İstavroz çıkartıyoruz!

-"Hepsini öldürünüz!

-"Sivil halk değil ki öldürelim. Gelen Meh-metçik vre kırye Yuhanidis..."

-"Bana bak, biraz dayanınız. Güvenin Atina'ya.

-"Çabuk olun, vre çabuk olun.

Yoksa dokuz doğurtacaklar, Eleni'ye, Ka-tina'ya..."

Dünyanın gerisinde kukla oynatan, tebes-ümeleri kalpleri hoplatan

Gittikleri yerde göbek atan, faizle yardım edip madenleri toplatan

Tuzu kuru iki devlet adamının tutuşan etekleri:

-"hello mister Kalhagan. Nicin Türklerin çıkartmasına engel olamadınız?"

-"İm soru, Beni ve Sisko'yu dinlemediler mister zampara Keskinger.

-"Yardım vadetmediniz mi?"

-"Milletimiz veriyor, dediler.

-"Altıncı filodan bahsetseydiniz.

-"Ettik! Yanından geçeriz, dediler.

-"Hi! Başka neler dediler?"

-"Yırtıldı Kıbrıs'ta conta, Paravanlis'i ge-tirdi conta.

Şimdi sıra Nikson'da dediler..."

Bize tepeden bakan, bilmeden atığa kalkan Burnu kayaya çarpan, iki tarafa göz kurpan Bir politikacının ağlatan serencâmı Sosisli Enosis'te

-"Ol-rayt mister Bülent Ecevit, dediğiniz yaptınız.

Adaya çıktınız. Eh şimdi çekilin.

Bir anlaşma yapalım, dursun bizim kaan-da..."

-"Sayın söz Kalhagan! Mehmetçik'in süngüsü ile alınan

Kalemle verilmez masada!

-"Oooool... Anlaşamazsanız hemen ko-nuşmayı keserim.

-"Ultimatom'a alışık değilim, hemen güle güle derim.

-"Sevgili dostum! Fazla dağılmayın ada-nın her yanına..."

-"Öyleyse söyleyin onlara:

Son versinler sivillerin katliamına.

Yoksa gene iş düşecek, Sakarya kahraman-larına..."

Figure 5: Song lyrics of Hotdog Enosis (Hürriyet, 05-09-1974).

VEFAKÂR TÜRK MİLLETİ

Senin kendi uçağın, senin öz malın kendi şerefindir.
Türk Hava Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Kampanyasına katıl.

- Milletçe el ele verelim.
- Güçlendirme vaktini destekleyelim.
- Milli Havacılık sanayimizi kuralım.
- Güvenelim.
- Östnelim.

Figure 6: The announcement directed to the 'Faithful Turkish Nation' to attend to the organization to support Turkish Air Forces (*Cumhuriyet*, 16-06-1974).

T.C. Bakanlık: 5263)

TÜRKİYE VAKIFLAR BANKASI
Umum Müdürlüğünden

Bir vakıf kuruluşu olan
TÜRKİYE VAKIFLAR BANKASI'nın
bütün şubeleri,

TÜRK KARA HAVA KUVVETLERİNİ
GÜÇLENDİRME VAKIFLARI'na
ve TÜRK DONANMA VAKFINA

yapılacak bağışlar için
sayın halkımızın hizmetindedir.
Kıvançla duyururuz!



Tera: 23

Figure 7: Turkish Foundations Bank, announcing that they are in service for the donations that will be made for the Turkish Navy Forces (*Cumhuriyet*, 31-08-1974).



Atilla Uras «YAVUZ» için 500 bin lira verdi

Yurt içinde ve dışındaki
işçilerimiz bağış için yarışıyor

(Yazısı 6. sayfada)

BAĞIŞ LİSTESİ

Dünkü Toplam	16.154.825
Atilla Uras	500.000,00
Ret. Tic. San. End. A.Ş.	100.000,00
Osman Kabil	100.000,00
Atlas Cosco Makine İmalat A.Ş.	100.000,00

(Devamı Sa. 6, Sü. 4'de)

En büyük bağış yapan beş müessesese

HÜRRIYET Gazetesi	4.000.000
İnşaatçılar Derneği Şişli Komitesi Mensupları ..	946.536
OLKER Gıda Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş.	
İstanbul ve Ankara Fabrikaları	700.000
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş.	500.000
İstanbul Kumcular Derneği Mensupları	369.077

En büyük bağış yapan beş kişi

Mühendis Fettah Aytac	1.000.000
Atilla Uras	500.000
Fazıl Soysal	250.000
Şahap Halat	155.000
Cahit Uzunhasan	150.000

N. Karaböcek,
Ayhan Işık,
Müjdat Gezen
ve
Galatasaraylı
Muzaffer
bugün
YAVUZ'a bağış
toplayacak

(Yazısı 6. sayfada)

Figure 8: An announcement on a press campaign to buy a new battleship for the Turkish army, giving a list of the amounts of donations and the names of donators including famous artists in Turkey (*Hürriyet*, 1974).



Figure.10: Liberation of Izmir news article headline (*Hürriyet*, 09-09-1974).