THE IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP BENEFITS ON THE NATIONAL IDENTITY PERCEPTION OF THE DISPLACED COMMUNITIES: THE PALESTINIANS AND COMPARISONS WITH THE ARMENIANS IN LEBANON

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between citizenship benefits and national identity acquisition through a within-case comparative examination of Lebanon. Through structured interviews with four groups it shows that more citizenship benefits tend to increase the identification of displaced individuals with their host country. In particular, the research draws on field work in Beirut, which involved interviews conducted with four groups: naturalized Armenians with full citizenship benefits; naturalized Palestinians with less citizenship benefits than naturalized Armenians; Identified (ID) Palestinians by the UN but live in Beirut and who have even less citizenship benefits; and Identified (ID) Palestinians by the UN and who live in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp and who have the lowest amount of citizenship benefits. The thesis argues that citizenship benefits tend to increase national identity acquisition among displaced individuals because, as the interviews suggest, displaced individuals with less (more) citizenship benefits have less (more) ontological security. Two consequences follow from this. First, people with less citizenship benefits and thus more ontological *in*security are psychologically less resourceful to embrace multiple identities. Thus, they tend to view the national identity of the host country as rival to their original national identity. Second, as the interviews show, although the displaced individuals view the citizenship of the host country as instrumental, nevertheless they display more identification with the host country as they gain more citizenship benefits. It is argued that this is because more citizenship benefits make them psychologically more resourceful to embrace multiple identities, whether this happens consciously or

subconsciously. Consequently, they begin to see the national identity of the host country as compatible to their original national identity, which makes it easier for them to embrace the host country identity.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma vatandaşlık faydalarıyla ulusal kimlik edinme ilişkisinin daha iyi bir şekilde kavranmasına Lübnan'da örnekler arası karşılaştırma yaparak katkı sağlıyor. Dört farklı grupla yapılan planlanmış röportajlar sayesinde bu çalışma vatandaşlık faydalarının ev sahibi ülkeyle özdeşleşmelerini arttırmaya eğilimli olduğunu gösteriyor. Araştırma Beyrut'ta dört farklı grupla gerçekleştirilen saha çalışmasına dayanıyor. Bu gruplar: Tüm vatandaşlık haklarından yararlanan vatandaşlığa kabul edilmiş Ermeniler; Ermeni'lerden daha az vatandaşlık faydalarına sahip olan vatandaşlığa kabul edilmiş Filistinliler; Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) tarafından tanımlanmış (ID) Beyrut şehrinde yaşayan ve daha da az vatandaşlık faydalarına sahip Filistinliler; ve en az vatandaşlık hakkına sahip olan BM tarafından tanımlanmış (ID) Bourj Al Barajneh Mülteci Kampı'nda yaşayan Filistinliler. Yapılan röportajlara göre daha az (çok) vatandaşlık faydalarına sahip yerinden edilmiş bireyler daha az (çok) ontolojik güvenliğe sahip olduklarından dolayı, bu tez, vatandaşlık faydaları arttıkça bu bireylerin ulusal kimlik edinmelerini arttırmaya eğilimli olduğunu savunuyor. Bu ilişki iki sonuç doğuruyor. Birincisi, daha az vatandaşlık faydasına sahip olan ve dolayısıyla ontolojik olarak daha güvensiz olan insanlar birden çok kimlik benimsemek için gerekli olan psikolojik kaynaklara daha az sahip oluyorlar. Bu nedenle, ev sahibi ülkenin ulusal kimliğini orijinal ulusal kimliklerine rakip olarak görüyorlar. İkincisi, görüşmelere göre, yerinden edilmiş bireyler ev sahibi ülkenin vatandaşlığını bir takım haklara sahip olmak için bir araç olarak görseler de, daha fazla vatandaşlık faydasına sahip oldukça ev sahibi ülkelerle daha fazla özdeşleşme gerçekleşiyor. Bunun nedeni vatandaşlık faydalarının onları

psikolojik olarak daha çok kaynak sahibi yaparak, bilinçlice veya bilinçsizce, birden çok kimlik benimsemelerini sağlaması. Sonuç olarak, bu bireyler ev sahibi ülkenin ulusal kimliğini orijinal ulusal kimliklerine uyumlu olarak görmeye başlıyor ve bu da yerinden edilmiş bireylerin ev sahibi ülkenin ulusal kimliğini benimsemesini kolaylaştırıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal Kimlik, Vatandaşlık Faydaları, Yerinden Edilmiş Topluluklar, Ontolojik Güvence, Rakip/Uyumlu Kimlikler

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The relationship between displaced communities and their host states has been a popular topic in social sciences. Studies have usually focused on how to adopt immigrants, refugees and people in exile to their host countries and what kind of citizenship would be necessary to sustain the well-being of displaced communities in the countries they reside in. This study explores how individual members of Lebanon's Palestinian community respond to the citizenship benefits they receive. The Palestinian community in Lebanon is a promising case to study the impact of citizenship benefits on national identity perception because it exhibits variation of citizenship benefits displaced communities receive.

My research aims to make an original contribution to address this question by providing empirical evidence regarding individual responses to citizenship benefits based in a one month-long field research in Lebanon. I examined citizenship benefits as an everyday practice: a set of economic, symbolic and political practices and as a bundle of civil, political and social rights and duties that define an individual's membership to a polity (Işın and Wood, 1999), which thereby create equality among the beneficiaries (Marshall, 1963; Turner, 2009) but also foster exclusion and animosity between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (Işın and Wood, 1999). The specific question addressed is that changes in these citizenship benefits affect displaced community members' sense of belonging. This helps to illuminate the relationship between citizenship benefits and national identity – some sort of political community which suggests a social space that the members of the society feel they

belong to and that implies common institutions and a single code of rights, duties for the members of the society (Smith, 1991: 9).

The comparison of Armenians and the naturalized Palestinians in Lebanon is an understudied research area. I included the Armenians in order to find a pattern that is not specific to one displaced community alone, in order to see if the same patterns we find among the Palestinians also exist among other displaced communities such as the Armenians. The data collected from my field research can make an original contribution to research on refugee and diaspora communities and citizenship studies.

1. 1. Aim of the Thesis

The major aim of this thesis will be to explore how individual members of the Palestinian community in Lebanon respond to their differences in terms of citizenship benefits, which were originally conceptualized by Marshall (1992: 8), as follows: civil, political and social rights that provide freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, to participation in the exercise of political power as either a member of a body or as an elector of the members of such a body, right to economic welfare, security and to live the life of a civilized being. In order to see the variations in individual responses to citizenship benefits, I investigated four different groups:

i)   Armenian respondents, who enjoy full Lebanese citizenship benefits

ii) Naturalized Palestinian respondents, who enjoy less citizenship benefits than the Armenians

iii) Identified Palestinian (ID) respondents living in Beirut, who are provided with less citizenship benefits than the naturalized Palestinians

iv) ID Palestinian respondents living in Bourj Al-Barajneh Camp, who are provided with very few citizenship benefits.

To the extent it is possible, variations within each one of these four groups will also be examined.

1. 2. Argument of the Thesis

In order to fulfill these objectives, the main research question that I will try to answer in this thesis will be why citizenship benefits should increase the feeling of identification that diasporic communities develop to the host country from the point of view of individual beneficiaries. The minor questions will be as follows: What kind of an atmosphere do the displaced individuals experience after they are displaced? How do they respond to the change after the displacement by their identities? To what extent are they in need of citizenship benefits in an atmosphere of displacement? How do the displaced individuals view citizenship? How do they develop identification with the host country when they are provided with citizenship benefits? How do they view the relationship between the national identity of the host country and their original countries?

My general hypothesis is that the sense of belonging the Palestinians feel to Lebanon would increase as they are provided with more citizenship benefits. I argue that the Palestinians in Lebanon who are deprived of citizenship benefits have a high level of ontological security, which is, according to Giddens (1991), 'a person's fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other people' and that it is a crucial feature of the theory of human existence since everyday practices provide social stability and answers to existential questions. Hence, lack of ontological security implies that first they are in need of normalization of their lives, in other words, they seek citizenship benefits. Second, in an atmosphere of

ontological insecurity they are psychologically less resourceful to embrace multiple identities and hence they hold on to their refugee/victim identities (Eastmond, 1996). They see the national identity of the host country as "rival" to their original national identities (Somer, 2004). I also argue that the individual beneficiaries of the Lebanese citizenship develop a sense of identification with Lebanon, despite the fact that they see these benefits as instrumental (Agliera, 1999; Mavroudi, 2008). They become psychologically more resourceful to embrace multiple identities and they adopt multiple identities (the national identity of the host country and their original national identities), not as a result of choice but as a result of experiences. They perceive the national identity of the host country as a "compatible identity" to their original national identities (Somer, 2004).

1. 3. Organization of the Study

1. 3. 1. Historical Framework

The first chapter on the historical framework portrays two crucial points. One of them is the turning points that led to the displacement of the Armenians and Palestinians from their original homelands and the formation of their collective memories. The other point is the political developments that changed the citizenship laws of the countries which affected the relationship of the displaced communities with the host countries they reside.

1. 3. 2. Theoretical Framework

The second chapter relies on the theoretical framework that discusses how the citizenship benefits have an impact on the development of identification of the displaced individuals with the host country. First, it focuses on the atmosphere that the displaced individuals experience after displacement and its impact on their perception of citizenship and perception of national identity. Second, it discusses

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how citizenship benefits influence the identity perception of the displaced individuals by increasing the ontological security they lack.

1. 3. 3. Analysis of Data

The third chapter shows the findings of the interviews which rely on a field work conducted in Beirut. The analysis of these findings is conducted with reference to the theoretical framework that the previous chapter discussed. It is an original contribution which demonstrates how the subjects respond to the citizenship benefits of Lebanon in terms of their national identity perceptions.

1. 3. 4. Conclusion

The last chapter summarizes the major findings and reemphasizes the main argument with reference to the theoretical and historical framework of the thesis.

1.4. Methodology

This study is based on a one month-long field work carried out in Beirut in October 2009. In order to remain focused on the individual responses to citizenship benefits, I conducted semi-structured in depth interviews with 35 individual respondents and one group and one family whom I reached through snowball sampling method. The respondents include the Armenians living in Beirut, the naturalized Palestinians living in Beirut, the ID Palestinians living in Beirut and the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Refugee Camp which is in the outskirts of Beirut. I selected the respondents from Beirut in order to keep the city they come from same. Also, it is easier to reach student clubs, NGOs in which there are Palestinians who vary in terms of citizenship benefits and Armenians. I selected the ID Palestinians living in a camp only from Bourj Al Barajneh Refugee Camp, in order to keep their backgrounds same. The reason why I only focus on this refugee

camp is that it is also in Beirut and so it is easier to reach respondents as a result of snowball sampling.

I would like to point out that the findings in this thesis are only suggestive and they can be generalized only to a limited extent. I reach conclusions in terms of sense of belonging of the Palestinian respondents in the refugee camps which are in the surroundings of Beirut. These do not necessarily apply to the Palestinians who live under very different conditions than those respondents I interviewed with. The validity of the findings in settings outside Beirut should be verified through further studies.

I would also like to note that my hypothesis cannot be falsified based on my limited sample. If the findings are consistent with my hypothesis then they would support it but not prove it. If they are inconsistent with the hypothesis, then I would not have found support for the hypothesis, but not have falsified it.

I tried to build the sample of this thesis so as to control for variables other than citizenship benefits as much as it is possible in a small sample. I can not argue that my sample is unbiased. I tried to reduce my bias by selecting from different groups such as gender, age and income level. It is possible to find more detailed information about the variables in Appendix A. In addition, the respondents are chosen according to whether they are affiliated with NGOs associated with the Palestinian and Armenian movements. Yet, the majority of the NGOs in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are concerned with the Palestinian movement. For this reason, the respondents who live in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are selected from the religious and non-religious NGOs. Since the selection of the respondents was according to such sensitive variables and since I had limited time period to conduct the field work the number of respondents was limited to 40.

Also, I took into consideration the fact that the snowball sampling would be biased if I reached respondents from only one source. For this reason, I tried to choose the respondents from a variety of sources. I reached the respondents through different sources in order for my sample to be as representative as possible, given the living conditions among refugee communities in Beirut. I tried to pay attention to selecting respondents from non-political organizations. For instance, I got in contact with professors; university students from student clubs; NGOs which vary according to their ideological backgrounds. All of these resources, as a result, led me to a variety of respondents.

Regarding the backgrounds of the respondents, it is worth noted that the majority of the respondents were Muslims. There were 2 Christian naturalized Palestinians and 1 Christian ID Palestinian living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. Yet, there was no major difference in terms of the national identity perception between the Muslim and Christian respondents. Moreover, in order for the sample of my thesis case to be less biased, I selected young, senior, female and male respondents as it is shown in Table 1. In order to keep the gender and age variables controlled, I selected:

- **Young female** active respondents and **young male** active respondents from the Palestinian and Armenian student clubs at AUB and at LAU
- **Senior female** active respondents and **senior male** active respondents from NGOs affiliated with the Palestinian and Armenian issues.

In order to keep the civic participation variable controlled, I selected:

- Young and senior female **active** respondents
- Young and senior female **non-active** respondents
- Young and senior male **active** respondents

- Young and senior male **non-active** respondents

Table 1

Target groups	Young – Active	Senior –Active
1.Naturalized Palestinians vs. **Armenians**	Student Clubs at AUB or LAU: Palestinian Club and Lebanese Armenian Heritage Club	NGOs affiliated with the Palestinian issue and Armenian issue
2.Naturalized **Palestinians vs. ID Palestinians in Beirut**	Student Clubs at AUB or LAU: Palestinian Club	NGOs affiliated with the Palestinian issue
3.ID **Palestinians in Beirut vs. ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp**	Religious NGOs and non-Religious NGOs	Religious NGOs and non-Religious NGOs

The interviews with these respondents enabled me to understand two important points. One of them is the difference between the Armenians and the naturalized Palestinians, ID Palestinians in Beirut and in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp in terms of the citizenship benefits they are provided. The other one is their perception of citizenship and the role of citizenship in making the respondents' national identity perception. The significance of these two dimensions is that they were helpful in understanding the differences between the lives of the respondents who vary in the citizenship benefits they are provided.

After the respondents are asked about their background information such as education, age, religion and profession they are asked two sets of questions. The first set is regarding their perception of citizenship and the second set query their level of identification with Lebanon. In order to understand the difference in terms of the citizenship benefits the respondents are provided with and to what extent they are in need for citizenship benefits, the first set of questions addressed what rights and privileges the respondents are missing; whether they would like to be granted

Lebanese citizenship or any other citizenship; and whether they would like to be granted civic rights only or citizenship.

The second set of questions is designed to assess the respondents' identification level with Lebanon, with Palestine and for the Armenian respondents with Armenia. This is separated into three criteria. The respondents were asked questions that were scored out of 13 then the result was calculated with 7.6 in order to make the measurement out of 100.

In order to find out whether the respondents would prefer to refer to Lebanon or Palestine as their national identity; I asked simple questions that would indicate their feeling of membership to a nation. I referred to national identity as 'a political community which suggests a social space that the members of the society feel they belong to and that implies common institutions and a single code of rights, duties for the members of the society' (Smith, 1991: 9). For this reason, I asked questions, first, regarding their feeling of membership to a nation. They were asked whether they feel Palestinian only, Palestinian-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian or Lebanese only. While measuring the respondents' identification level with Lebanon, the respondents who said that they feel Palestinian only would get a 0; Palestinian-Lebanese would get a 1; Lebanese-Palestinian would get a 2 and those who only feel Lebanese would get a 3. While measuring the respondents' identification level with Palestine, the respondents who said that they feel Lebanese only would get a 0; Lebanese-Palestinian would get a 1; Palestinian-Lebanese would get a 2 and those who only feel Palestinian would get a 3.

Regarding the identification of the Armenians with Lebanon, if they say that they feel Armenian only they would get a 0; Armenian-Lebanese would get a 1; Lebanese-Armenian would get a 2; and those who only feel Lebanese would get a 3.

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While measuring the identification of the Armenian respondents with Armenia, if they say that they feel Lebanese only they would get a 0; Lebanese-Armenian would get a 1; Armenian-Lebanese would get a 2 and those who only feel Armenian would get a 3. In addition, they were also asked to score the attachment they feel to Palestine and Lebanon by giving a number from 0 to 5.

Second, I asked two questions about their sense of belonging to a social space. I asked questions such as where do you consider your homeland and your country to be. In order to determine the identification level of the Armenians and Palestinians is the answer given when they are asked where they are from. While measuring the identification level with Lebanon, if the Palestinian respondents say Palestine for where they come from then they would get a 0; if they say Lebanon but originally Palestine then they would get a 1; and if they only say Lebanon then they would get a 2. While measuring the identification level with Palestine, if the Palestinian respondents sat Lebanon for where they come from then they would get a 0; if they say Lebanon but originally Palestine then they would get a 1; and if they say Palestine they would get a 2. While assessing the identification of the Armenian respondents with Lebanon, if they say that they are from Armenia, then they would get a 0; if they say Lebanon but originally Armenia they would get a 1 and if they say Lebanon they would get a 2. While assessing the identification of the Armenian respondents with Armenia, if they say that they come from Lebanon then they would get a 0; if they say Lebanon but originally Armenian they would get a 1 and if they say that they come only from Armenia they would get a 2.

The last criteria to measure the identification level of the respondents, they were asked where they perceive as their homeland and country. In order to measure the identification level of the Palestinian respondents with Palestine, when they said

Palestine for their perception of homeland then they would get a 2; when they said Palestine and Lebanon then they would get a 1; and when they said Lebanon for their homeland they would get a 0. In order to measure the identification level of the Palestinian respondents with Lebanon, when they said Lebanon for their perception of homeland then they would get a 2; when they said Palestine and Lebanon then they would get a 1; and when they said Palestine for their homeland they would get a 0.

Also, in order to measure the identification level of the Armenian respondents with Armenia, when the Armenian respondents said Lebanon for their homeland, they would get a 2; when they said Armenia and Lebanon for their homeland they would get a 1; and when they said Lebanon for their homeland they would get a 0. In order to measure the identification level of the Armenian respondents with Lebanon, when they said Lebanon for their perception of homeland then they would get a 2; when they said Armenia and Lebanon then they would get a 1; and when they said Armenia for their homeland they would get a 0.

While assessing the identification of the Palestinian respondents with Lebanon if the respondents said that they consider Palestine as their country they would get a 0; if they said Lebanon they would get a 1. Regarding the identification of the Palestinian respondents with Palestine, if they said Lebanon for their country then they would get a 0; and if they said Palestine they would get a 1.

In order to assess the identification level of the Armenians with Lebanon when the Armenian respondents are asked where they consider their country if the Armenians say that they consider Armenia as their country then they would get a 0 and if they said Lebanon then they would get a 1. Regarding the identification with

Armenian, if they say that they consider their country as Lebanon they would get a 0 and if they consider Armenia as their country then they would get a 1.

The respondents were also asked about their will to leave Lebanon and start living in the Occupied and Liberated Palestine for the Palestinians to see the attachment the respondents feel to Lebanon and Palestine. The Armenians were asked whether they would like to live in Armenia. They were also asked questions about the narratives regarding Palestine, Armenia and Lebanon. The Palestinian and Armenian respondents were asked what Palestine and Armenia connotates respectively. All respondents were also asked what Lebanon connotates.

In addition, there was an unstructured part of the interviews which included open-ended questions. This part was significant for me to learn more about the respondents' personal experiences which would be helpful in formulating new research questions. There were questions such as:

- When and how did your grandparents come from Palestine? How many times were they displaced? Where did they settle?

- How did you were you granted Lebanese citizenship?

- How were the civil war years? Have you lost your close relatives in any of the wars or conflicts? 1947-8, 1967, 1973 or during the civil war?

- Do you have a Palestinian or a Lebanese dialect?

- Do you feel having the citizenship is important for you?

- What do you think about the peace process?

- Would you feel comfortable if your son / daughter want to get married with a Lebanese?

- Do you follow Lebanese news? Which media resources do you follow?

- Do you have political affiliations in Lebanon?

- Would you identify yourself as returnees or Palestinian refugees? Why so?

- What benefits have you seen of living in Lebanon?

- What do you think about the peace process and the right to return?

- Do you feel outcasted in the Lebanese society?

- Have you come across with any stereotypes, what did you do when you heard them?

There were also questions special for the Armenian respondents in order to understand their national identity perception such as:

- How did they come from Anatolia? What were they told?

- How were the conditions?

- Do you speak Armenian?

- Do you have mostly Armenian or Lebanese friends?

- Is Armenian food cooked mostly at home?

- If there was a football game between Armenia and Lebanon? Which one would you support?

- Do you follow Armenian and Lebanese news?

- Do you read Armenian newspapers?

Regarding the anonymity of the respondents, I would like to note that many of them told me that they don't mind having their names in the thesis. However, for the sake of uniformity I changed their names and I gave artificial names for the respondents.

1.4 Limitations

The field work of this thesis has five limitations. One of them is the comparison of the Armenians with the naturalized Palestinians most of whom are Muslims. It was hard to reach especially the senior Christian naturalized Palestinians since I had only one month in Beirut to conduct all the interviews.

Second limitation is affiliated with my Turkish identity as an interviewer. The Armenian and Turkish political dispute may have created a need for the Armenian respondents to overemphasize the Armenian national identity during the interviews. It is possible to assume that if the interviewer was not Turkish, the Armenian respondents' identification with Armenia might have been lower. For this reason, I asked questions to the Armenians regarding their perception of the 'Turkish' and 'Turkey'. The questions and the answers can be found in Appendix B. The findings indicated that the respondents held a considerably negative image of Turks. It is possible that this image might have biased some of their responses.

The third limitation is about the fact that they may reply to the questions during the interviews as if the Palestinians represent all of the Palestinian people and as if the Armenians represent all of the Armenian people. Since this research relies on the interviews conducted and since it focuses on only the individual responses, this limitation may cause the research to lose its focus which is the individual responses.

The fourth limitation was that there were three respondents that I missed asking questions about their perception of homeland and country. So, the assessment of their identification with Lebanon was carried out without taking into consideration their perceptions of homeland and country.

The last limitation is regarding one of the questions I asked to the Armenians which was about their perception about Turkey. I asked whether they were raised with hatred to Turkey and to Turkish people. Yet, after I went over my thesis with my advisor, I realized that there was a wording bias since I used the word 'hatred'. This might have influenced their answers. I believe that I couldn't plan the format of the interview questions to the Armenian respondents in the right way.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Framework

This chapter reviews the turning points that prepared the background for the displacement of the Armenians and Palestinians from their original homelands to Lebanon and their relations with the Lebanese state. The displacement of the Armenians and Palestinians and their relations with the Lebanese state are significant since it affected their legal status (Knudsen, 2009) and the formation of their collective memories. The first section focuses on the period of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire which had two salient consequences that are in the interest of this thesis. One of them is the displacement of the Armenians from their original homelands (Migliorino, 2008). The salience of this displacement is its effect on the increase in the number of Armenians in Lebanon (Cleveland, 2008; Migliorino, 2008) and on their collective memory. The other consequence is the French and British rules in Lebanon and Palestine respectively. The significance of this is the impact of the French and British rules on the legal systems of Lebanon and Palestine, respectively which would influence the relations between the state and the Armenians and Palestinians (Cleveland, 2008; Smith, 1996; Migliorino, 2008; Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000).

The second section overviews the effect of the establishment of new nation-states in the Middle East such as Lebanon and Israel on the Palestinian refugees and Armenians living in Lebanon. After the establishment of Israel a high number of Palestinians moved, who are predominantly Muslim, to Lebanon (Pard, 1998) where the confessional system privileging Christians was consolidated with the Lebanese independence in 1943 (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000). Besides,

concurrent with the establishment of Israel, the Middle East has witnessed confrontations between the Arab states and Israel which would encourage political polarizations in Lebanon (Picard, 1996) and affect the relations between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese state.

The third section examines the post-war period of Lebanon by underlining the role of peace agreements on the legal status and on the living conditions of Palestinian refugees with reference to Knudsen (2007, 2009); Smith (1996); Brynen (1997); Chiha (2006). Overall, these three points will provide a better understanding for the identity responses of Armenians and Palestinians to Lebanese citizenship policies which will be addressed in the next chapter.

2. 1. Collapse of the Ottoman Empire

2. 1. 1. Armenian Deportation

Armenian deportation is one of the turning points that prepared the background for the presence of the Armenians in today's Lebanon. In addition, it is possible to suggest that it affected their collective memory and collective identity due to the displacement they were subject to. Also, I would like to underline that the displacement of Armenians to Lebanon occurred not only with the Armenian deportation of 1915 but in different stages in 1920s and 1930s (Migliorino, 2008: 31). Moreover, there is a linkage between most of the Armenian political parties that operate in Lebanon and those that were established during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Migliorino, 2008: 27).

In this period the first important nationalist Armenian political parties, some of which still operates in today's Lebanon, were established. This is significant since these political parties would be playing a role in the domestic politics of Lebanon. The nationalist discourse of some Armenian political parties would affect the identity

perception of the Armenians living in Lebanon. The first one, Armenekan Party engaged in arms smuggling, and revolutionary propaganda and attacks against Ottoman police and Kurdish local chieftains. The second one Hunchakian Revolutionary Party (simply Hunchak), was influenced by Marxism and Russian revolutionary movements. It also associated the Armenian national issue with obtaining social justice through the engagement of peasants and social workers for the independence of Armenian independence (Migliorino, 2008: 27). The third party was the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (simply the Dashnak) which shared the commitment of having revolutionary tools as Hunchak party had but in the first phase it supported the autonomy of Armenian *vilayets* rather than independence from the Empire (Migliorino, 2008: 28).

The turning point that resulted in the presence of Armenians in Lebanon was the deportation of 1915. As a result of the First World War conditions, the Armenian community of the East and Southeastern Anatolia was deported (Cleveland, 2008: 170) to Aleppo and Deir Ez-Zor which were far away from the war zones in the Syrian *vilayets* of the Empire (Migliorino, 2008: 29)

Yet, I would like to note that the displacement of the Armenians was not limited only to the First World War period. After the British and the French secured Cilicia in 1918, refugees around 120,000 (Kerr, 1973 in Migliorino, 2008: 31) and 150,000 (Sanjian, 2001 in Migliorino, 2008: 31) traveled back to their homes in Marash, Antep and Hadjin (Topouzian, 1986 in Migliorino, 2008: 31). However, after France renounced control of Cilicia by signing the Ankara Accord in 1921, the control of the region was transferred to Turkey. Around 80,000 Armenians left the region to Lebanon and Syria. Following that, another movement occurred in 1929 and 1930; and in 1939-40 the cessation of Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey resulted

in a number of Armenians to leave (Migliorino, 2008: 31). The impact of the French presence in the region was not only limited to the Armenian community, but also affected the future of Lebanon as well.

2. 1. 2. Lebanon under the French Mandate

The French partly filled the power vacuum in the region which was created by the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It is possible to consider this as a turning point in Lebanon's policy towards the citizenship law and the political system of the country. It had three salient impacts that concern this thesis. First, the special relations of France with the Maronites affected the political system of the country - confessionalism - which shaped the relations of various sects in Lebanon in a way that privileged the Christians like the Palestinian Christians and the Armenians (Abdallah, 1986 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2007: 161).

Second, the citizenship law of Lebanon which was changed from the Ottoman to the French law - the abolishment of state religion and protection of all faiths recognized by the millet system - would provide more privileges to Armenians and Christian Palestinians who were deported to Lebanon (Suny, 1993: 219).

Third, the French presence and its rivalry with the British in the region would also have an impact on the formation of new nation states in the region and hence the displacement of people such as Palestinians and Armenians. Overall, concurrent with the settlement of Armenians and Palestinians in Lebanon while some Christian Palestinians and Armenians would benefit from the citizenship law and the confessional system that granted them more rights than the millet system (Migliorino, 2008: 53); some Muslim Palestinians would not.

The sectarian differences started to become more apparent, especially, during the period of *mutasarrifiya* - autonomous Lebanese government between 1860 and

1920 - and these differences were based on the special economic relations between the French and the Christian dominated area of the Mount Lebanon (Harris, 1997: 109). France also consolidated its political and military relations after it seized the country during the First World War. Syria was separated into two entities according to the Sykes Picot Agreement in 1916 (Saadeh, 1994: 67). Following that, Greater Lebanon - including the coastal cities, some interior regions and the Mount Lebanon - was established in 1920 by General Henri Gouraud, as the highest Commissioner of the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon (Saadeh, 1994: 68).

The social stratification of Lebanon was institutionalized not only concurrent with the establishment of Greater Lebanon (Saadeh, 1994: 68), but also with the 1921 census which was conducted as a result of the Resolution 763 issued by the French Mandate. The purpose of the census was to count the residents of Lebanon (Abdallah, 1986 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2007: 161). Following the census, the French high commissioner issued Regulation 1307 on the 10th of March, 1922 which declared that:

> "Until a regulation concerning Lebanese citizenship was to be issued, all subjects registered in the 1921 census, which was demanded by the French Mandate for the purpose of counting the residents in Lebanon, would be recognized as Lebanese" (Abdallah, 1986 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2007: 161).

Hence, in order to have Lebanese citizenship one should prove that she or he was residing on Lebanese territories on 30 August 1924. I would like to emphasize that although the 1921 census was conducted for administrative purposes, it played a major role in the 1932 census and also the citizenship regulations of 1924 (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 162).

Besides the 1921 census, the Lausanne Treaty - which is the final peace agreement, signed in 1923 between Turkey and the winners of the First World War -

determined the question of nationality of the people who used to have Ottoman citizenship. According to the Article 30 of the Treaty,

> "Any Turkish subject habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become *ipso facto*, in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State which such territory is transferred."[1]

It is possible to argue that this Article envisaged a territorial citizenship and shaped the citizenship laws of the new nation-states. However Article 32 stated that:

> "Persons over eighteen years of age, habitually resident in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty, and differing in race from the majority of the population of such territory shall, within two years from the coming in to force of the present Treaty, be entitled to opt for the nationality of one of the State in which the majority of the population is of the same race as the person exercising the right to opt, subject to the consent of the State"[2] (Migliorino, 2008: 54).

This meant that in addition to the territoriality, another condition was added to the citizenship law of the newly established nation-states. The race of the residents became an indicator of their eligibility for the citizenship of the state of which they shared the same race with the majority.

Given the change in the legal system of the Mandate and particularly in the light of the two articles, the case of the Armenian community was left unclear. The Treaty of Lausanne underlined that any plan regarding the creation of an Armenian state in historical Armenia was shelved (Migliorino, 2008: 54). According to Migliorino (2008) the Treaty called for the resettlement of the refugees to the Soviet Republic of Armenia which would be technically complex. So, since there was no Armenian state where the majority of the population is Armenian, the French Mandate offered citizenship to 'all Armenians willing to accept it' (Suleiman, 1967

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[1] League of Nations Treaty Series, vol.28, nos 1-4 [1924], 29 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2007: 62.
[2] Treaty of peace signed in Lausanne in July 24, 1923, Part I, Section II, Article 30, as published in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1924. The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Migliorino 2008: 81.
 Ibid. Article 32. (Migliorino, 2008: 81)

in Migliorino, 2008: 54). Later on in 1925, Lebanese citizenship was established officially for all Lebanese including the Armenians (Migliorino, 2008: 55).

Consequently, I would like to emphasize that as a result of the inclusion of Armenians to Lebanese citizenship, the number of the Christians in Lebanon increased. This can be regarded as an advantage for them since they live in a country where political power is based on the demographics. Besides, Maronites added political privileges to their economic privileges and held the highest positions in the political system (Saadeh, 1994: 68). It is also evident in the Lebanese Constitution which was approved in 1926 and which declared that the French Commissioner was the supreme power; the President had to be a Maronite; the Prime Minister a Sunni; and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite (Harris, 1997: 118).

Furthermore, the mandate of the French had also an impact on the Ottoman legal system. According to the 1926 Constitution of the Mandate, Islam was no longer the religion of the state and the state had no religion. Article 9 of the Constitution was stating that 'the state would protect all faiths with the limit that they should not prejudice public order'. Yet, the protection was 'limited to the faiths recognized in the Empire, in the framework of the Islamic formula of the millet system' based on the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (Migliorino, 2008: 47). For instance, the Armenian community benefited from the combination of the old and new legal systems and enjoyed the vast autonomies that had been established by the millet system especially in the religious affairs and personal status law (Migliorino, 2008: 48). Moreover, in 1924 the French granted Lebanese citizenship to most of the Armenian refugees and also recognized "the Supreme Patriarch of the Cilician See as the spiritual leader of the local Armenian community" (Suny, 1993: 219). The

French also recognized the Armenian community as one of Lebanon's confessional groups in 1928 (Suny, 1993: 219).

Lebanon, with an environment that had favorable conditions for Armenians, witnessed a wave of immigration from Syria. The use of Armenian fighters in the repression of the revolts against the Mandate, the conflict between the anti-French leadership in Aleppo and the pro-French Armenian voters and similar incidents resulted in the migration of Armenians from Syria to Lebanon (Migliorino, 2008: 57). Also, the 1926 Druze rebels in Syria caused destructions in the Armenian refugee camps which occasioned the fleeing of the Armenians to Lebanon. This was a favorable development for the Maronites in Lebanon who was concerned about the rise in the number of Muslims. Hence, the Armenian Catholics who came from Syria were accepted for the entry to the local representative council (Suny, 1993: 219).

Another favorable environment was created by the 1936 law of Lebanon during the French mandate. The law was quite significant for the Armenian community since it included the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic Church in the list of historic communities in the country. According to Migliorino (2008) this was the recognition of a community which was new to the area. Also, Patriarch Sahak was invited from Jerusalem in order to head the Apostolics as Catholicos. As a result of all these developments, the center of the Armenian Christianity in the Middle East became Lebanon (Suny, 1993: 219).

So, the fact that the Armenian community had good relations with the French also provided a favorable environment for them to be granted citizenship. While, the French wanted to build religious representative systems in the polities that they were establishing, they also wanted to gain local support. In return, the French enrolled the Armenians in order to assist controlling the region by recruiting them in public

services and in the army with the purpose of creating a separation between these bodies and Arab national politics (Migliorino, 2008: 53).

Other than the impact of the French presence on the confessional system and the citizenship law of Lebanon, it also affected the formation of new borders in the Middle East. On account of three negotiations, the borders of the Ottoman Empire changed. These negotiations also affected the Lebanese and Israeli borders and paved the way for the displacement of particularly Palestinians. One of the negotiations that had an impact on the formation of new borders in the region was the McMahon Correspondence in 1915 which was between the Sharif of Mecca Hussein bin Ali and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon. The Correspondence included exchange of letters between Hussein who demanded the "independence of the Arab countries" whose boundaries encompassed all of Great Syria (Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and the Arab Peninsula). In addition, the British would declare an Arab caliphate. On the other hand, the British acquired rights in Aden and Hussein would give preference to the British in all economic enterprises in Arab countries (Smith, 1996: 44).

Another negotiation was the Sykes Picot Agreement. According to Picard (1996) the Agreement was signed by the French and the British in 1916 in order to divide the Arab Near East and to create distinct nations. France got the right to spread its influence in Syria, including the provinces of Mosul and Cilicia (Picard, 1996: 29); and Britain got the right to control Iraq from Baghdad south to the Gulf, from the Egyptian border through eastern Palestine (Smith, 1996: 47). Picard (1996) also argues that there were two elements that influenced this decision. One of them is that although the French had its army in the home soil, the British had been the major military victor in the Ottoman land (Cleveland, 2008: 271). The other element is that

there were pressures on the British from the Zionists who were promised by the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour in 1917 for the creation of a national homeland on the Palestinian soil (Picard, 1996: 30). The Balfour Declaration (1917) stated that:

> "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" (Smith, 1996: 54).

2. 1. 3. Palestine under British Rule

One of the crucial effects on the British to make the Balfour Declaration was the efforts of one of the prominent Zionist activists, Chaim Weizmann. He played a salient role in the British foreign policy regarding the Middle East (Cleveland, 2008: 270). Zionism is an ideology which was first born in Russia where the Jews were subject to anti-Semitism. There were prominent activists of Zionism like Leo Pinsker who argued that the Jews should not wait for the Europeans to change their anti-Semitic attitude but to establish a Jewish state to have their own autonomy. Another prominent activist who moved Zionism to the international arena was Theodor Herzl (1960-1904). Herzl supported that although the Jews constituted a nation, they were deprived of a state where they could practice their own national culture (Cleveland, 2008: 268).

These ideas, that Zionism was based on, challenged the millet system, which the Palestinians were used to during the Ottoman rule. At this point, the British played a role in terms of giving support to the Zionist Commission which arrived to Palestine in 1918 in order to act as the representative of the Zionist Movement. The Zionist Commission had many requests from the British rule and they were accepted. For instance, they requested Hebrew to have an equal status with Arabic in official

proclamations; to appoint Jews as government officials, to appoint a Jew as the mayor of Jerusalem, and to ensure that half of the members of the municipal council of Jerusalem to be Jewish. Moreover, the Zionist Commission also demanded Jewish government employees to have higher salaries than Arabs. Another important request that challenged the millet system was that the British accepted the demand of the Zionists to fly their own flag while the Arabs' were not allowed (Smith, 1996: 68).

So, although the Arab population was the majority in Palestine, the percentage of their representation in government did not reflect their size. On the other hand, the Jews did not experience any economic or psychological disadvantages as the Arabs did. Besides their higher salaries, they could also rely on an official who was sympathetic to Zionism in major decisions (Smith, 1996: 81).

Furthermore, in order for the British to support the Jewish settlements in Palestine, British presence in the region was needed and also the French should be kept distant to the neighboring countries of the Suez Canal (Cleveland, 2008: 271). Through the San Remo Conference in Italy in 1920 the British presence in Palestine was not only limited to military but was extended to civil rule as well (Cleveland, 2008: 273). The British Mandate was approved by the League of Nations in 1922 which escalated the feelings of Jews to have the right to pursue their objectives (Smith, 1996: 73).

Moreover, after Sir Herbert Samuel - an ardent Jewish and Zionist activist - was appointed as the High Commissioner to Palestine, he perceived his duty in Palestine to make it easier for a Jewish national state to be established. However, there was a confluence in the meaning of Jewish national state; because the Zionists were interpreting "national state" as a Jewish state and expecting the British to support them. According to the Balfour Declaration, the British did not grant a

promise for establishing a Jewish state in Palestine and in fact guaranteed the protection of rights of the non-Jewish population living in Palestine who were the Arabs constituting the 85 percent of the population (Cleveland: 2008: 273).

Although there was a confluence in the interpretation of "national home", Zionism developed further with the immigration of Jewish people, *Aliyah*, to Palestine from various countries. This was an important factor that caused Palestinians to leave their original homelands. The Zionists believed that in order to claim that they needed a national state they had to increase the number of Jewish people in Palestine. In addition, they needed lands for the immigrating people to settle (Cleveland, 2008: 281). The first two *Aliyah* waves were before the First World War; the third one was between 1919 and 1923 that came predominantly from Eastern Europe; the fourth was especially from Poland in 1924-1926. The fifth one was by the end of 1930s which were the refugees fleeing from Europe due to Gestapo. Concurrent with the outbreak of the Second World War in September in 1939 the transfer of refugees intensified (Smith, 1996: 114). The fifth one was important since most of them were highly educated German businessmen who brought capital with them (Cleveland, 2008: 282).

The third *Aliyah*, which consisted of young Jewish population took place between 1919 and 1923 (Smith, 1996: 72), draws special attention. As the migration increased, the Arab-Jewish rivalries among factions also increased and it turned out to be a series of attacks between the Jewish and Arab populations targeting each other. In order to mollify Arab aggression, the British issued a White Paper in 1922 declaring that Britain did "not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine" (Smith, 1996: 73). In addition, in order to fix the misunderstanding of the

Balfour Declaration, it was declared that establishing a Jewish national state does not mean granting each of the Palestinians Jewish nationality. It also stated that the Jewish population has the right to be present in Palestine (Cleveland, 2008: 274).

However, the conflict continued as the Arabs and the Jews were trying to consolidate their power in Palestine. Besides the tension between the two communities, the Holocaust in Europe convinced Western countries to give support to the Jews to have a national state (Cleveland, 2008: 289). In addition to that, the sabotage campaign organized against the British rule by the Yishuv (the name given to the Jewish community in Palestine before 1948) also paved the way for the state of Israel to be established (Cleveland, 2008: 291). As a result of all this chaos, the High Commissioner of the British General Alan Cunningham left Alima, a coastal city in Israel, on the 14th of May, 1948. However, the leadership was not passed over to any local government, because there was no Palestinian government. A few hours after the departure of the High Commissioner, Ben Gurion declared the state of Israel (Cleveland, 2008: 295). Overall, the rivalry between the French and the British and the effect of Maronites and Zionists on them respectively would contribute to the formation of new nation states in the region like Lebanon and Israel. It would also cause the displacement of Palestinians from Israel.

2. 2. Establishment of New Nation-states

2. 2. 1. Lebanon

As the British aimed to establish a stronghold in the region before the establishment of Israel, the French also had the same interest (Saadeh, 1994: 68). Hence, concurrent with the adoption of the unwritten National Pact, *mithaq watani*, in 1943, Lebanon gained its independence from France and it consolidated the confessional system. It also designed its citizenship law which was privileging the

Christian Maronites in Lebanon (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 164). This development was going to be quite important for the relations between the Palestinians and the Lebanese state which will be elaborated below.

The importance of the establishment of Lebanon for the citizenship law and the confessional system was the 1932 census which showed that the Christians were the majority. This would have an effect on the displaced Muslim Palestinians to benefit from the citizenship law. Maronites constituted the plurality in Lebanon with a number of 227,800 (28.7 percent) which were followed by the Sunnis 178,100 (22.5 percent) and then the Shi'ites 155,035 (19.6 percent) of the population. Other communities constituted: Greek Orthodox 77, 312; Druzes 53, 334; Greek Catholics 46,709; Protestants 6,869; Armenian Orthodox 6,102; Armenian Catholic 5,890; Jews 3,588; Syriac Catholic 2,803; Syriac Orthodox 2,723; Chaldean Catholic 548; Chaldean Orthodox 190; Miscellaneous 6,396 of the total 793,396 Lebanese population (Butenschon, Davis, Hassassian, 2000: 150). The Lebanese Constitution that was approved in 1926 continued to determine the confessional structure of the country (Hamzeh, 1993: 44). Yet, the 1932 census was taken as a basis for the demographic framework of the country and that any demographic change would result in a change in the sectarian structure of the country.

Relying on such a political background, the National Pact envisaged that while the Maronites could speak for the Christians in the country, the Sunni Muslims could speak for the Muslims (Saadeh, 1994: 69). Overall, the Pact had two implications one of which is the commitment to safeguard a distinct Lebanese Arab identity within the larger frame of the Arab states and also a renewed consociational agreement to manage access to public positions in a way that the proportions

between the different confessional groups in the country would be respected and preserved (Rabbath, 1973 in Migliorino, 2008: 93).

As Lijphart (1969) also argues, the Lebanese political system was based on the consociational democracy whereby the "[…] government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1969: 216). The political system should be based on equal representation (*paridad*) on all levels of government (Lijphart, 1969: 213). Hence, as emphasized above, the National Pact granted representation rights to all the confessional groups of the country according to their proportions.

The explanations why the Maronites were given the supremacy within the political structure illuminates the reasons why the Armenians and the Christian Palestinians were granted citizenship and the Muslim Palestinians were not. One of the explanations relies on the Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution:

> 'Temporarily, and for the purpose of equity and friendly understanding, the Communities shall be represented in an equitable manner in public offices and in the formation of the Cabinet, provided that this will not cause prejudice to the interests of the State' (Saadeh, 1994: 71).

Regarding the first explanation, the "fair" representation meant that the highest number of sectarian group was going to head the country. Indeed, according to the 1932 census the Maronites were numerically superior to the other sectarian groups no census was conducted after 1932 (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 149). So, here the issue is not the equitable but equal and fixed representation of each community.

The second explanation was expressed by Riad al-Solh (1894 - 1951), who was the leading representative of the Sunni Muslim communities (Migliorino, 2008: 93):

> "The Christians are worried about Lebanon's destiny. They fear that in the future Muslims might become numerically superior and manage constitutionally, through

a majority vote in the Parliament, to unite Syria and Lebanon, for uniting the two countries have always been their obsession" (Saadeh, 1994: 71).

So, this Article also shows the significance of demographics within the Lebanese political system. Moreover, I would also like to argue that although the Lebanese political system was based on the demographics of each confessional group, the concern of confessional groups, especially the Christians, is to maintain a power balance.

During the French Mandate of Lebanon, the citizenship law made it easier for Christian refugees to be Lebanese citizens than the Muslims ones. The fact that the Lebanese state did not change the articles on the citizenship law that was enacted during the Mandate shows the importance given to granting citizenship to the Christians of the country. I would like to note that Resolution 2825 which was issued on 30 August 1924 promulgated the Lausanne Treaty in Lebanon. And until the Resolution 2825 was issued everyone without differentiating between Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians, residing in the Ottoman territory were considered as Ottoman citizens (Maktabi, 1999: 225).

However, according to the Article 13 of the Resolution 2825, "refugees from Turkish territories such as Armenians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and Greeks of Turkish origin, shall be counted as Lebanese provided they were found on Lebanese territories on August 30, 1924" (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 163). According to Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian (2000), common to these groups is their Christian background, whereas Muslim refugee groups such as Kurds and nomad bedouin groups who lived close to the borders of Syria were not counted as Lebanese. So, at this point, I would like to emphasize that the confessional system in Lebanon separated those refugees from Turkish territories according to their religion

and privileged only the Christian ones. It is possible to put forward that the issue was only to keep a power balance of confessional communities.

Moreover, while the Christian refugees did not have to prove their residency on 30 August 1924, the Muslim refugees were obliged to do so (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 163). Therefore, I would like to underline that the Lebanese system politicized confessions from early on. Finally, the Resolution 2825 stipulated that "persons who resided on Lebanese territories on 30 August 1924 are confirmed as Lebanese citizens (Karam, 1993 and Abdallah, 1986 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 168). Also, Decree 398 which was issued in 26 November 1949 draws special attention. It stated that:

> "[…] a person seeking to obtain Lebanese citizenship had to present 'all documents that prove his Lebanese origin such as registration in old personal records of him or one of his ancestors, official documents issued by the administration or the district, notifying him or his family in kinship books and family history, or the like" (Maktabi, 1999: 228).

According to Maktabi (1999) it underlined the significance of the historical character of the residents who were seeking to be Lebanese citizens. Hence, the citizenship laws in Lebanon that requested the historical character of the residents and that privileged the Christians benefited the refugee groups, such as the Armenians. Yet, it wouldn't be beneficial for the Muslim refugees. It was this period when there was an ongoing process for the establishment of Israel which resulted with another displacement of people, the Palestinians, to Arab countries one of which is Lebanon.

2. 2. 2. Israel

The establishment of Israel was a turning point for the Palestinians and the Lebanese state since the citizenship law of Lebanon and the establishment of international regulations and bodies such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) would affect the lives of the Palestinians (Knudsen, 2009: 53). While some would become Lebanese citizens, some would remain as refugees (Pard,

1998: 12). Besides the deportation of Palestinians, another reason why the establishment of Israel is important for this thesis is that after the establishment of Israel the region has seen a series of Arab-Israeli wars which affected the demography and the internal politics of the countries in the region.

The establishment of Israel and following that the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 started Palestinians to be scattered and dispersed in various countries. When David Ben Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel to exist on 14 May 1948, the Arab forces (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan with a sign contingent from Saudi Arabia) invaded the Arab Palestine and the new Israeli state. Although the UN ended the first war with a truce, the failure of the Arabs caused internal unrest especially in Syria and Egypt. Consequently, another war broke out which ended with Israeli defeats in all fronts and also with the Israeli expansion of its territories (Smith, 1996: 146).

Although an armistice negotiation was held between January-July 1949 between Israel and various Arab states and although the hostilities were stopped, there was still a state of war according to Smith (1996). The Israelis were ousting the Palestinians from the territories that they took over across the lines into Arab-held territory (Smith, 1996: 147). According to Pard (1998) the villages that the Palestinians used to live were occupied by Jewish settlers and agricultural lands, homes and often the entire village was abandoned either out of fear, proximity to fighting or direct intimidation.

It is possible to consider the experience of trauma during the displacement and during the war after the establishment of Israel as turning points that had an impact on the collective memory of the Palestinians. Palestinians who used to be full citizens of Palestine under the British Mandate and Ottoman citizens before that, found themselves stateless without passports, subject to the political and economic

vagaries of the countries that hosted them (Pard, 1998: 8). While only 150,000 Palestinian Arabs stayed in the territory which became the state of Israel, 700,000 of them fled to other countries. Some were also expelled or fled to the parts of Palestine such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which did not fall to the Jewish forces (Pard, 1998: 6).

One development regarding the displaced Palestinians was that Israel offered repatriation of 100,000 Palestinians during the Lausanne negotiations in 1949 in exchange of peace (Morris, 2004: 573). However, the proposal was conditional on "retaining all present territory" and also on "the freedom to resettle the returnees where it saw fit" (Morris, 2004: 577). According to Avraham (1998) these demands were very significant for the existence of Israel. However the Arab rulers did not accept such a proposal: first, because of their fragile domestic positions and second because of 'the Arab public consensus that any political agreement with Israel was illegitimate' (Avraham, 1998: 51). The fact that 700,000 Palestinians became a diasporic refugee community after 1948-1949 War attracted international action which designed regulations to provide shelter to refugees.

2. 2. 3. Establishment of International Bodies

As the situation was leading to a regional refugee crisis, the UN established the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) on 8 December 1949. According to the Resolution 302 (IV), the UNRWA aimed to provide relief and assistance to the Palestinian refugees (Knudsen, 2009: 53). Specifically, it aimed to provide development and maintenance of basic infrastructure to schools, clinics and property (UNRWA, 2007: 9).

However, there were problems with the way the UNRWA functioned which made it less efficient in terms of giving assistance to the Palestinian refugees.

According to Bowker (2003) the UNRWA was remarkable for its lack of precision about its objectives. For instance, in order for UNRWA regulations to function, the Palestinian refugee should be resident in one of the countries where the agency is operating (Knudsen, 2009: 53). Moreover, there was no provision for who qualified as a Palestinian refugee and so needed assistance (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen, 2009: 53). After a few years the UNRWA revised its provision and defined refugees eligible for assistance as "Palestine refugees are persons whose normal place of residence was in Palestine during the period of 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict" (UNRWA, 1993 in Schulz and Hammer, 2003 in Knudsen 2009: 70). Yet, there has never been a formal definition of the Palestinian refugees by the United Nation. There was no specification of whether the refugee status applied to the descendants of Palestinians or not. Still, the UNRWA gave refugee status to the male descendants of Palestinians (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen, 2009: 53).

One of the major problems concerning the Palestinian issue is the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their original lands that they were displaced from when the state of Israel was established. According to the "General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and UNRWA's mandate in General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949" the Palestinians have the right to return (Amnesty International, 2007: 8). Moreover, according to the report of Amnesty International, both of the Resolutions preceded the negotiations on the "Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute" that exempted the people who are provided by protection or assistance from other UN agencies (Amnesty International, 2007: 8).

So, according to the international law the Palestinians who fled or were forcibly moved out of their homes and lands in the Mandate of Palestine have the right to return[3]. Moreover, the right also includes their descendants who maintained what the Human Rights Committee calls "close and enduring connections" with the area (Amnesty International, 2007: 11).

There were also international conventions which were designed to protect refugees. However there were problems with the way they functioned. One of them is the first international refugee convention "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951" which was signed in Geneva. Different than UNRWA, it prohibited the forcible return of refugees (refoulment) and adopted a universal definition of refugee emphasizing the people who became refugees before 1 January 1951, excluding the Palestinians fleeing Palestine in 1948 (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen, 2009: 53). According to Knudsen (2009) the reason for this is that several Arab states feared that submerging Palestinian refugees within the 1951 Convention would weaken the special case of the Palestinian refugees (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen, 2009: 53). The Palestinian refugees who are receiving assistance from the UNRWA "became the only refugee population in the world excluded from the international protection accorded by the UNHCR Statute and the Refugee Convention" (Amnesty International, 2007: 9). Moreover, if the Palestinian refugees are treated under the 1951 Convention, then the Arab states would be responsible for their preservation. For this reason, they presented an amendment to the draft 1951 Convention which excluded refugees who were under support from UNRWA.

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[3] Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12(4) of the ICCPR Article, Human Rights Committee General Comment 27 on Article 12, paras 20, 19, Article 5(d)(ii) of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Israel) 14 June 2007 UN Doc: CERD.C/ISR/CO/13, at para 18, and various UNHCR Executive Committee conclusions, including conclusion no.101 (2004) in Amnesty International, 2007: Footnote 22)

Although the amendment was approved and was included as a separate exclusion clause (Article 1D), it was never ratified by the Arab states (Knudsen, 2009: 53).

The 1951 Convention was not the only international instrument that could protect the Palestinian refugees. There were also other international covenants such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention Regarding Stateless Persons (1954), the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights (1996) (Footnote 4 in Knudsen, 2009: 70). According to Knudsen (2009), Arab countries which are hosting refugees failed to adopt these international covenants. Hence, Knudsen (2009) emphasizes that no international body secures legal protection of the Palestinian refugees. So, the problems associated with the UNRWA would make the living conditions of the Palestinians living in Arab countries more difficult, especially in a country which is politically fragile like Lebanon.

2. 3. Displacement of Palestinians to Lebanon

2. 3. 1. Palestinian Movement to Lebanon and Lebanese Politics

In 1948-49 100,000 of the 700,000 Palestinians who were fleeing Palestine crossed into Lebanon. Lacking political and labor rights, most of the Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon formed a skilled labor force by which they were offered seasonal jobs in hotels and air transport (Picard, 1996: 79). However, the refusal of the Israeli authority to allow them back in the country made the Palestinian refugees *de facto* residents of Lebanon (Picard, 1996: 79) for a long time, which would cause tense relations between the Lebanese state and the Palestinian refugees. While very few Muslim Palestinians became Lebanese citizens by showing family ties or purchasing the citizenship (Pard, 1998: 12), the majority of the Christian Palestinians were granted citizenship by the Lebanese government in order to

compensate the numerical deficit of Christians in the Lebanese population which was critical for the confessional system (Picard, 1996: 79).

The tense relations existed mostly with the refugees having no citizenship. They were settled to the 12 official refugee camps (*mukhayyem*) which were consisting of tents and later on replaced by small blocks operated by UNRWA. Although, they had no citizenship, they were provided with a limited number of benefits. The operation of UNRWA in Lebanon includes providing education, health and social services both to the registered and non-registered Palestinian refugees. There are 80 elementary and preparatory schools and six secondary schools in Lebanon operated by UNRWA. I would also like to underline that it operates secondary schools only in Lebanon since the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon "have limited access to public secondary education, and most cannot afford the high cost of private secondary schooling."[4] Besides, the Siblin Training Centre of UNRWA, it operates 850 vocational training and a teacher training scheme. Those who complete these training programs are usually employed in UNRWA schools (Amnesty International, 2007: 26).

Besides the limited benefits of the UNRWA for the Palestinian refugees, their rights within the camps were restricted as well. For instance, the camps were set up far from urban areas (Pard, 1998: 12) which meant having less access to the citizenship benefits provided in the urban areas. Moreover Lebanon put strong limitations on the refugee Palestinians in the camps. For example, political activism of the Palestinians was restricted and the camps were controlled by the Lebanese army's security agency (*Deuxieme Bureau*) along with paramilitary security forces (Brynen, 1990: 28 in Knudsen, 2009: 54). This also meant that there was limited

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[4] Online: http://www.un.org/unrwa/programmes/education/basic.html, visited on June 20, 2010.

movement inside Lebanon (Knudsen, 2009: 54). According to Knudsen (2009) these tense relations were one reason why Lebanon did not ratify the 1951 Convention. I would like to note that the Palestinian nationalism was linked with the pan-Arab sentiments that escalated with the rise of Nasser in Egypt (Knudsen, 2009: 54). Moreover, an atmosphere like this was influential in a country where there was a vulnerable political system (Attie, 2003 in Knudsen, 2009: 54) based on demographics and sectarian identities.

In addition to the tense relations with the Palestinian refugees, Lebanese politics was becoming more polarized and fragile as the influence of Arab nationalists and the Cold War was increasing and penetrating into the Lebanese society. The polarized atmosphere was preparing the base for a civil war in the country which would inevitably affect the relations with the Palestinian refugees. This polarization was initiated by the defeat of the Arab countries in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War which led to a series of military coups. Starting with Syria in 1949 it continued with the free officers seize of power, which was led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, in Egypt in 1952. The Middle East was divided in such a way that on the one hand there were countries supporting Western liberalism in the Middle East; and on the other hand there was Arab progressivism which was led by Gamal Abdel Nasser (Picard, 1996: 73).

In addition to all these, Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal to assert Egyptian independence and following that the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt and their failure signaled the end of British tenure in the Middle East (Picard, 1996: 73). Britain's decline in the region opened the way for spread of more Nasserist propaganda and weakened its allies like Iraq and Jordan (Smith, 1996: 174). As to strengthen the Arab regimes against Nasser's influence, Eisenhower developed a

strategy called Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 which assured the provision of economic assistance to be granted to 'any nation or group of nations which desires such aid' and also military assistance 'to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.' In other words, Eisenhower aimed the gap in the Middle East to be filled by the US rather than the Soviet Union (Smith, 1996: 175).

In such a political atmosphere, the leadership of the Lebanese government had to make a choice between Western liberalism and Arab progressive. After the Suez crisis, Lebanon did not break ties with France and Germany. Moreover, the president of Lebanon - Chamoun -supported the Eisenhower Doctrine (Khalaf, 2002: 108). On the other hand, according to Picard (1996) the policies of Nasser which galvanized the Sunni populations of Lebanon against Chamoun and the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) by the unification of Syria and Egypt revived pan-Arab enthusiasms of 1930s of Lebanon.

In addition to the impact of the change in the political regimes of the Arab countries; rise of Arab nationalism and Western liberalism; the institutional structure which resulted from the National Pact of Lebanon was another factor that escalated the 1958 crisis (Picard, 1996: 75). While some argued that Chamoun betrayed the Pact by forging Lebanon in the Western camp, the opposition supported Nasser in the competition for power. Furthermore, the Pact enlarged the division between the Christians and Muslims as a paradigm for mobilization in the Lebanese political life (Picard, 1996: 75).

In 1958 Lebanon has witnessed the peak of the political polarization such that while the majority of Muslims opposed the government's foreign policy alignment,

the Christians - especially Paul Meouchi, the Maronite patriarch - supported the government (Picard, 1996: 74). The conflict also penetrated into the societal life which prepared the ground for deep confrontations for instance: a strike by the Sunnis of large cities, division of Beirut to Christian East and Muslim West, official accusations of interference of Syria, a presidential appeal to US military intervention, the unorganized Palestinians remained on the sidelines the mustering of peripheral Lebanon (Tripoli, Hermil, Bikaa, Akkar) against the central Lebanon (the Mountain, Kisrawan Matn and Shuf), patrolling of the American Sixth Fleet (Picard, 1996: 74). Picard (1996) emphasizes that during the 1958 crisis, the only indictment needed against an opponent was that of being a member of a different religious, clan or regional group. Overall, I would like to argue that the issue with the confessional system of Lebanon was to keep the power balance of each confessional community rather than the equitable representation of each community. All these developments showed the fragile political structure of the country and prepared the ground to spark another conflict in Lebanon.

The 1958 crisis also accelerated the tensions among the Armenian political parties and hence the polarization of the Armenian population in Lebanon. The Armenian community was divided between the Dashnaks who were pro-Western and allied with Chamoun and Kataib. On the other hand, there were Armenians who were anti-Dashnak and who supported the leaders of the national opposition like Abdullah Yafi and Saeb Salam (Migliorino, 2008: 102). The Armenian quarters of Beirut had become the places for open arm confrontations mainly between Hunchaks and the Dashnaks. The schools, churches, clubs and other public center of one faction were closed to members of the opposite camps (Schahgaldian, 1979 in Migliorino, 2008:

102). The two opposing parties reached an agreement by the end of 1958 through the mediation of the Interior Minister Raymond Edde (Migliorino, 2008: 102).

In addition to the fragile political environment, there were legal amendments which excluded Palestinian refugees particularly from the economic system and furthered the polarized environment of Lebanon. Starting with the 1962 Decree, the Palestinians in Lebanon were considered as 'a special category of foreigners who held no documents from their original countries and are currently residing in Lebanon' (Takkenberg, 1998: 163; UNHCR, 2006 in Knudsen 2009: 55). According to the Decree 319, Palestinians were considered as one of five categories of foreigner (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen 2009: 55) being deprived of the citizenship benefits and civil rights like social and political except those which were envisaged by the UNRWA. Hence, they did not have the right to work, health care, higher education, and the right to vote (Knudsen, 2009: 55).

Continuing with the Law 17561 in 1964, Palestinian refugees were deprived of the right to join professional syndicates which was a precondition for employment in high status professions such as medicine, law, engineering (Knudsen, 2009: 55). Following this Law, in 1965 the Arab League established a regional rights regime applicable to Palestinians in the Arab states which grants them the rights of work, travel and residency. The rights regime called on member states to grant Palestinian refugees the right to employment like ordinary citizens (Takkenberg, 1998 in Knudsen 2009: 55). Seven member states of the Arab League - Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Lebanon - signed the protocol. However, Lebanon made the right to work dependent upon the country's economic situation and restricted entry into and exit from Lebanon (Knudsen, 2009: 55).

2. 3. 2. More Palestinian Refugees

Even though the legal environment in Lebanon was not favoring the Palestinian refugees, Lebanon saw an increase in the population of the Palestinian refugees coming from Jordan, Syria, West Bank and Gaza in 1960s (Chiha, 2007: 1). This would make Lebanon the capital of the Palestinian struggle and Lebanon would fail to provide legal protection to the newly arrived refugees.

One of the key events that attracted more Palestinians to Lebanon was the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Especially the number of Palestinian *fedayeen* increased from hundreds to thousands in the following three years. The patronage of the Arab League and leadership of Nasser to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - that was founded in 1964 - was passed to Yasir Arafat and joined with Al-Fatah[5] in 1968 (Smith, 1996: 188). So, concurrent with the change of the leadership the tactics of conventional warfare was also changed to guerilla operations and the bordering countries of Israel, like Lebanon, were used for the attacks (Smith, 1996: 81). This increased the number of Palestinians in Lebanon.

In addition to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the change in the PLO leadership and in the warfare tactics; another development that attracted more Palestinian *fedayeen* to Lebanon was the 1969 Cairo Agreement. For the first time the Palestinian attacks to Israel from the Lebanese soil were authorized by the Cairo Agreement. This paved the way for a more fragile political environment in Lebanon. The Agreement provided administrative authority to the PLO in the refugee camps

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[5] Fatah was formed in either 1959 or 1962 by young Palestinians who fled to Gaza after the establishment of Israel (Smith, 1996: 188). Most of the members of the movement supported the idea of Arab unity and believed that the liberation of Palestine can only occur after Arab unity is reached. They also believed that the liberation of Palestine should precede Arab unity which also meant that military action is the prelude to politics (Smith, 1996: 189).

and lifted the ban on employment (Knudsen, 2009: 55). The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were joined by 100,000 more coming from Jordan. Besides the refugees, militias and ammunitions flow from Jordan to Lebanon as well (Smith, 1996: 81).

Following the Agreement, the Black September that occurred in Jordan - the conflict between the PLO in Jordan and the Hashemite Kingdom in 1971 – escalated the displacement of Palestinian *fedayeen* from Jordan to Lebanon (Smith, 1996: 82). When the PLO rejected the UN Resolution of 242 in 1967 which did not recognize the right of the Palestinians for nationhood and considered themselves as refugees, it criticized both Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan for accepting it. Following this, PLO came into conflict with the Hashemite Kingdom that resulted in a clash between the extremist fractions of the PLO and the Jordanian army. Hence, Jordan prohibited the operations of Palestinian organizations inside the borders. In addition to the impact of Black September on Palestinians, the Assad regime in Syria was subjecting to PLO in the following years. Moreover, the Sadat regime in Egypt was about to make peace with Israel (Khalaf, 2002: 221). All these developments led to the change of headquarter of the Palestinian resistance.

So, the most convenient country with a certain extent of freedom and autonomy for PLO to operate became Lebanon. The significance of the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan which is in the interest of this thesis is that it had a crucial effect on the legal situation of the Palestinian refugees coming to Lebanon. As a country where the Palestinian refugees were protected by the Cairo Accord, Lebanon hosted a higher number of Palestinian refugees than before (Khalaf, 2002: 221). In addition to those coming from Jordan with the PLO, there were also refugees who were working or studying abroad and returned to Lebanon to fight when the Arab-Israeli conflict escalated. It should be underlined that when they wanted to return to

their homelands, they were denied to do so due to border changes. Moreover, there were also Palestinian refugees who were registered in UNRWA in its other fields of operation such as Gaza, West Bank, Jordan or Syria but were exiled in 1967 or after the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Hence, their UNRWA files have not functioned in the countries they left to (Chiha, 2007: 2). Furthermore, they were protected by the PLO and their legal situation was not an issue before the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1982 (Chiha, 2007: 2). These Palestinians are called the non-ID Palestinians in Lebanon since their UNRWA papers do not function in Lebanon (Amnesty International, 2007: 9). So, they became individuals with no identification.

Some of the Palestinians who came fled from Jordan after the Black September and from Syria are recorded as non-registered Palestinians according to the UN. UNRWA only recognized the transfer of Palestinians with "the approval of the Governmental authority in the Field of Area to which the families wish to be transferred" (Frontiers Association, 2005: 39). They also face some obstacles in their lives such as they have limited access to education, subsistence and health services that only the UNRWA provides on an ad hoc or de facto basis (Frontiers Association, 2005: 23)

Besides, the non-ID Palestinians cannot benefit from UNRWA facilities like the ID Palestinian refugees can. In addition, they are also deprived of certain rights. They are considered as illegal migrants in Lebanon since their presence is not recognized by any authority literally. So, if they move outside the camps they are subject to be arrested (Frontiers, 2007: 65). There are some refugees who haven't left the camp for years in fear of being arrested. Consequently, they cannot also visit their families abroad since they have no documents or because their documents have expired. They also cannot officially register marriages, births and deaths. They can

get married at the confessional court but cannot register to Lebanese authorities. A new born child can get a birth certificate signed by the local mayor (Chiha, 2007: 2).

Another limitation is access to education. Although the non-ID Palestinians can access UNRWA schools there are some exceptions[6]. They usually cannot continue their secondary education in a Lebanese school because of their lacking identification documents and because they cannot sit the official brevet exam to the age of 15 (Amnesty International, 2007: 26).

Regarding employment, for a non-ID legal employment outside the camp is impossible while the ID Palestinian refugees have access to legal employment. As the other Palestinian refugees, they also cannot own immovable goods or anything that requires registration. Although UNRWA revised its guidelines and allowed refugees registered in another field of operation and women married to non-registered refugees; non-ID refugees registered in another field of UNRWA can access health care but access to hospitalization is more difficult (Chiha, 2007: 2). If they are included in UNRWA special hardship cases program, then they can access to UNRWA shelter rehabilitation. However, this is the case for only about 7 percent of all cases (Chiha, Danish Refugee Council, 2007: 2).

In the light of these key points, the UN categorizes Palestinian refugees in Lebanon under three titles: refugees registered with UNRWA and Lebanese authorities who number 400,000 (ID or registered); refugees registered only with Lebanese authorities who number about 15,000 to 35,000 (Non-registered); and refugees not registered with Lebanese authorities or UNRWA who number 1,000 to 3,000 (Non-ID). The exact number of the Palestinians are unknown since there has been no census conducted after 1932 (Amnesty International, 2007: 9). Lebanon, as a

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[6] "Reportedly, some non-ID refugee children are able to sit exams due to an informal arrangement between the Lebanese Ministry of Education and UNRWA" (Amnesty International, 2007: 26).

country hosting a high number of Palestinian refugees, is also criticized as the country where Palestinian refugees are the most disadvantaged. The UNRWA emphasized the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as such:

> "Palestine refugees in Lebanon are among the most disadvantaged. They have only limited access to government services and have to depend almost entirely on the Agency for basic education, health and relief and social services. Lebanese authorities continued to restrict construction in certain refugee camps, and entry of construction materials continued to be subject to military approval, which was not always granted. Palestine refugees in Lebanon suffer from poor living and housing conditions and high rates of unemployment. New legislation aims at preventing refugees from buying immovable property and depriving them of their inheritance rights. There are similar attempts to retroactively annul the Lebanese nationality obtained by certain refugees in 1994" (Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 1 July 2002-30 June 2003, United Nations General Assembly, fifty-eighth session, Supplement no.13, UN Doc. A/58/13,para. 38 in Amnesty International, 2003: 5).

Lebanon, hosting three categories of Palestinian refugees some of which having limited rights and some of which having no rights at all, was also the country in which the management of Palestinian organizations was conducted. All the orphanages, hospitals, research and press centers, political and military organizations of the Palestinian society particularly the PLO were administered in Beirut. The combatants in the resistance in Lebanon were so high in number such that they even exceeded the number of soldiers in the Lebanese army. Gradually the civilian population of Beirut became familiar to more troops, ammunition transports, armed men wearing combat uniforms and to the scenes of military training (Picard, 1996: 82). It was in only a few years that Lebanon would be in the brick of a devastating civil war.

2. 4. The Civil War

The key factors such as the political institutional system based on consociationalism that politicized divisions and which is easily affected by the regional movements and wars, the 1958 crisis, the Cairo Agreement which

authorized an authority to operate in Lebanon and the presence of more Palestinian refugees as a result of Arab and Israeli wars made a basis for further polarizations and confrontations within the Lebanese society. Polarization in terms of politicized confessional identities started to be clearer by the beginning of the 1970s. The 1973 Arab - Israeli War affected the PLO to stop its operations except the attacks in the occupied territories. Yet, these operations resulted in Israeli reprisals. It also escalated the tension in the southern border of Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002: 225). Following this, the Kataib and Chamoun's National Liberation Party called for a referendum regarding the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon. The referendum resulted in the denouncement of the government by the Muslims and the leftist coalitions (Khalaf, 2002: 226). While on the one hand Kataib and his followers were alarmed by the increased militarization of the Palestinians and demanded imposing restrictions on the Palestinian commandos; the majority of the Sunni Muslims along with Kamal Jumblat and the left-wing coalitions were against such restrictions. The Muslims also considered themselves weakened by the National Pact's reservations of privileges for the Christians, particularly the Maronites (Khalaf, 2002: 108).

The polarized political atmosphere of Lebanon affected the Armenian parties as well, especially as the Maronite leadership pressured Armenian parties to support them. Some of the marginal sectors of the Armenian political spectrum joined the leadership. But the Dashnak, Hunchak, Ramkavar and of the Armenian communists adopted positive neutrality strategy and took no political sides until the end of 1990. However, positive neutrality caused a basis for a clash between the Armenians and the Maronite militias, particularly the Kataib who perceived Armenian position in the civil war as a limited devotion to Lebanon (Migliorino, 2008: 153). The stance of mainly the Dashnak Party requires special attention. Although Dashnak party

cooperated with Chamoun in 1958, this time it dropped its anti-Soviet stance and put the anti-Turkish sentiment at the centre of its political discourse and adopted a more Third World-leaning position. It called for the 'reinforcement of the struggle for the liberation of the Armenian lands of Turkey, by of all necessary means' (Minassian, 2002 in Migliorino, 2008: 150).

Similarly, the Palestinians as a nation engaging in a guerilla war to have their homeland back was on the same track with the political discourse of the Dashnak Party. Also, the Maronite press used the term '*ghuraba'*, foreigners, for the Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon. However, the Armenians of Lebanon found it difficult to consider them as such within the context of these developments. The reason was that, according to Kassir (1994), the Palestinians who were fighting a war for the liberation of their homelands was an example for the nationalist Armenian youth of 1970s (Kassir, 1994 in Migliorino, 2008: 151). Overall, there were two outcomes of the evolution of the Armenian parties. The first one was that the Dashnak Party distanced itself from the Kata'ib (Migliorino, 2008: 151) who asked for a referendum with Chamoun's National Liberation Party on the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002: 226). The second one was that the Dashnak Party got closer to Hunchak and Ramkavar Parties (Migliorino, 2008: 151).

The polarized and violent atmosphere of Lebanon contributed to the establishment of Armenian terrorist organizations such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The nucleus of the organization was formed by the Hunchak and Tashnak activists in 1971 which set the political agenda of the terrorist organization as to plan and carry out attacks against the Turkish government and also against any institution abroad that are against the Armenian cause. As internal rifts emerged within ASALA and since it was perceived as a 'gun for hire' at

the service of Syria, it started to decline. Another terrorist organization the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) was established in 1975 and assassinated 20 Turkish diplomats and their families (Migliorino, 2008: 155). All of these organizations can be considered as a sign of the polarized and violent political context of Lebanon.

The civil war caused violence and trauma among the communities living in Lebanon. Yet, the role of the Palestinians in the eruption of the civil war deserves special emphasis in terms of the violence and trauma that the Palestinians passed through. The confrontations continued as the Palestinian refugee camps had become the places for fully-fledged military bases in the beginning of 1970s (Khalaf, 2002: 223). The Maronites, like the Palestinians, established their own paramilitary organizations since the state could not secure its own citizens (Khalaf, 2002: 219) which would make the magnitude of violence in the civil war higher. As a response to the heightened militarization of Palestinians, Kataib even increased the confrontation with the Palestinian commandos by getting the support of the Lebanese Security Forces and the *Deuxieme Bureau* (Khalaf, 2002: 223). These polarizations paved the way for the eruption of a civil war in Lebanon. The civil war started in May 1975 when Phalangist gunmen strafed a bus which was carrying Palestinians (Smith, 1996: 250).

The confrontations between the two sides, the Palestinians and the Lebanese Security Forces, escalated as the Christian Palestinian camp of Dbaye was seized and the shantytown of Qarantina was massacred in 1976. Moreover, the Palestinian militias with the leftist Joint Forces besieged the Christian villages of Damur, Jiyeh and forced many residents to flee from the sea (Picard, 1996: 110). Also, the Palestinian refugee camp of Tel-Al-Zater was blockaded by the Maronites in 1976

and resulted with many atrocities (Smith, 1996: 250). Following that the Arab Summit in Riyadh, in October 1976, called for the relocation of the PLO from central Lebanon in order not to contact with the Maronite militias. PLO was settled to the south of Lebanon. Nevertheless, the change in the location of the PLO affected the tensions with Israel (Smith, 1996: 251). For instance, in March 1978 eight Palestinian commandos of Fatah landed on an Israeli beach and commandeered a passenger bus and headed to Tel Aviv (Smith, 1996: 252).

Another salient factor that escalated the tensions between the Palestinians and Israel was the invasion of south Lebanon in March 1978 until June by Israel (Smith, 1996: 252) which was followed by the Palestinian raid of the Israeli bus. After the Israeli withdrawal in July 1978, the tension between the Palestinian *fedayeen* and the Israeli army was still high. For instance, the Palestinian *fedayeen* reached the interior of Israel by sea in 1981 and in return, Israel applied lethal bombing to Beirut's popular district called *Fakhani*. The PLO, on the other hand, rained down shelling to tens of thousands of Israeli civilians (Picard, 1996: 123).

Following these events, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. While it took six days to reach Beirut, the Israelis stayed in Lebanon for three months. The war was one of the costliest wars for Israel since the 1948-49 War. After invading half of Lebanon, the Israelis could not obtain any political capital after their military victory (Picard, 1996: 124). Likewise, the PLO suffered much causality as well and it had to leave the southern border of Lebanon. After the 1982 invasion, a huge number of Palestinians fled to Lebanon in order to fight as *fedayeen* against the Israelis. Eventually the PLO agreed that the 15,000 *fedayeen* would be scattered to several Arab countries by the end of 1982 (Picard, 1996: 124). After the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon, the Christian Phalangist militias seized Sabra and Shatila camps,

with the Israeli aid, in order to wipe out two thousand PLO fighters (Smith, 1996: 272).

After the end of the 1982 War a Multinational Force consisting of the Americans, French and the Italians were deployed to the southern border of Lebanon to manage the evacuation of the Palestinian *fedayeen*. However, the presence of the Multinational Force did not last long. It clashed against the Druze and Syrian forces and pulled out of Lebanon in 1984 (Picard, 1996: 126). According to Picard (1996), the disastrous effect of the war was the outburst of a new civil war between and within communities of Lebanon. Especially, the Palestinians were deprived of organization and protection and they were pulled back to the refugee camps.

At this point, I would like to point out that when the Lebanese Army collapsed in 1984, 90 percent of the attacks were carried out until the withdrawal of Israel, only by Hezbollah (The Party of God) which was trained by the combatants of Iran (Picard, 1996: 136) and which boosted its image as the most successful resistance group in fighting with Israel (Hamzeh, 1993: 322). One of the confrontations was called the 'War of the Camps' when the Shia militia group - Amal movement - seized the refugee camps in Beirut and Tyre from 1985 till 1988 which resulted in 2,000 deaths. The siege of the camps was conducted in order to secure the surrender of the PLO combatants since they were considered as a threat to its hegemony in West Beirut and in the south (Picard, 1996: 132). In response, all the Palestinian allies and Arafat's supporters defended the refugees in the camps, while at the same time, the Israeli planes were bombing the bases of the Palestinians. Following this, the Lebanese government abrogated the 1960 Cairo Accord and ended the liberties of the PLO in 1987 (Picard, 1996: 133). After the Ta'if Accord

signed in 1989 the civil war ended and a new era began in Lebanon which would affect especially the Palestinian refugees.

Another development regarding the rights of the Palestinians was the Intifada in 1987 that occurred in Gaza. It was a result of a spontaneous eruption of hatred and anger stemming from issues about politics and economics like daily harassments. Although the anger was towards Israel, the Palestinian leadership was also targeted as well (Smith, 1996: 293). Even though the Intifada did not occur in Lebanon, it would have a major effect on the Palestinian political leadership in Lebanon, because, after it ended, a new Palestinian movement was established: the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS (Hroub, 2000; Mishal and Sela, 2000 in Knudsen, 2005: 226). The main goal of Hamas was "ending Israeli occupation by the use of force (in the form of a jihad) to establish a Palestinian state in all of Mandatory Palestine" (Knudsen, 2005: 226). This major divide in the leadership of the Palestinians would affect the Palestinians living in Lebanon as well.

2. 5. Palestinians in Post War Lebanon

Post war Lebanon has witnessed many agreements and legal amendments which would affect the legal status and living conditions of the Palestinian refugees. One of the major changes that occurred was the citizenship law by which many Palestinian refugees became Lebanese citizens (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 170). It is possible to argue that the background for such an amendment in the law was a result of the change in the political culture of Lebanon with the Ta'if Agreement (Knudsen, 2009: 58). Another change was the overall consequence that the Casablanca (1990), Madrid (1991-1993) and Oslo (1993) Accords made by making the camps hideout places for militia leaders (Knudsen, 2009: 61). As camps

were seen as unsecured areas by the Lebanese, more limitations were put by the government by legal amendments that would deteriorate the living conditions of the refugees further (Knudsen, 2009: 60).

2. 5. 1. Ta'if Accord

The Ta'if Accord which was signed after the civil war was a restructuring of the National Pact of 1943. The Ta'if Accord was the major factor that changed the political system of Lebanon from favoring the Maronite supremacy, as it was envisaged in the National Pact of 1943, to political system which rejected any communal group's preeminence (Picard, 1996: 158). It responded to the Muslim demands of participation in the political system (Picard, 1996: 156). For instance, it is stipulated in Article 95 of the constitution that "the communities shall be equitable represented in the ministries"[7] (Picard, 1996: 157). The political communitarianism was also changed from 54:45 balance of seats in the parliamentary to 50:50 between the Christians and Muslims, and extended to high-ranking posts in the government (Picard, 1996: 157). Yet, given the demographics, this means overrepresentation of Christians. Another change within the political system was the replacement of the presidential supremacy with the triumvirate regime where power is shared by the president, a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni; the president of the Parliament, a Shi'i (Picard, 1996: 158).

Regarding the significance of the Ta'if Agreement for the Armenian community in Lebanon, I would like to emphasize that it was regarded as a positive development for the community. The Armenians of Lebanon were represented in Ta'if with a delegation of three and they backed it politically. The Agreement meant that the Armenian community was one of the permanent members of the Lebanese

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[7] Al-Jumhuriyya al-lubnaniyya, Majlis al-nuwwab, Al-Dastur al-lubnani (Beirut, 1990), p.78 in Picard, 1996: 157.

family and indicated that it constituted the seventh main community of the country (Migliorino, 2008: 182). Although in the newly designed parliamentary representation, the representation of the Armenians in the parliament decreased from 5 percent to 4.6. Yet, the Armenian community preserved the number of deputies that it had in 1972 (Migliorino, 2008: 182). According to Migliorino (2008), after the Ta'if Accord the Armenian representation had never been larger than before.

Hence, it is possible to put forward that the Ta'if Agreement encouraged Lebanon to change the citizenship law and grant Lebanese citizenship to more Palestinians. The Interior Minister of Lebanon issued a new citizenship Decree no 5247 in 1994 (Knudsen, 2009: 58) which allowed around 120,000 people, most of who were stateless or long-term residents in the country, to become Lebanese citizens (*Al-Hayat*, 22 July 1994 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 147). According to Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian (2000), the Decree was a step forward for national unification, whereas some considered it as the inclusion of foreigners to the Lebanese citizenry (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 147). According to Peteet (1996) of the approximately 120,000 people, 60,000 were Palestinians. In the first round in 1994, most of the Palestinians who were granted citizenship were from the bordering seven Shi'i villages that had Palestinian refugee status. In the second round in 1995, the rest of those who were naturalized were Sunni, for reasons not made public (Peteet, 1996: 29).

One noteworthy point is that the seven villages which were detached from Lebanon and annexed to Northern Palestine on 3 February 1922 with the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement which was not promulgated until the Jerusalem Agreement in 1926 (Alawiyya, 1984 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 170), claimed Lebanese citizenship in 1926 since they were registered as Lebanese in the 1921

census (Abdallah, 1986 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 170).[8] However concurrent with the establishment of Israel, these residents came to Lebanon as refugees and later in 1994 obtained Lebanese citizenship by indicating their Lebanese roots, specifically their Shi'i background (Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 170).

Moreover, according to Peteet (1996) following the Sunni naturalization, the few remaining Christian Palestinians were then naturalized as a result of the demands from the Maronite Church (Knudsen, 2009: 58). The names of the naturalized people were published in the Official Gazette in 1,270 pages but interestingly they were categorized according to neither their sect nor alphabetically (Knudsen, 2009: 58). According to Knudsen (2009) this made the total exact number of people who were naturalized difficult to confirm. At this point, it is possible to put argue that naturalization is a key factor in the power balance of the Lebanese confessional system. Moreover, the major confession groups in Lebanon, like the Sunnis and the Christians, were trying to keep the number of people registered to their confessions high by naturalizing people regardless of what nationality they had.

2. 5. 2. Casablanca, Madrid and Oslo Accords

Besides the Ta'if Accord and the naturalization law, another change was the overall consequence that the review of the Casablanca Protocol in 1990, the Madrid Conference between 1991 and 1993 and the Oslo Accord in 1993 forged. The three of them made the camps hideout places for militia leaders and made the camps places for fights between Palestinian organizations (Knudsen, 2009: 61). It is possible to argue that the chaotic and traumatic atmosphere that the Palestinians

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[8] With the Rhodes Armistice Accord of 1949 which is a document that Lebanese authorities believe consititutes the basis of Lebanese sovereignty over the villages (Sayigh, 1994: 18 in Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian, 2000: 170).

living in the camps continued to exist since the civil war years. According to Knudsen (2009), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as members of the League Council, proposed an amendment which paved the way for member states to subject refugee rights to national priorities which, according to Knudsen (2009), was a result of PLO's support to Saddam Hussein's regime during the First Gulf War.

The Casablanca Protocol was approved and it made 'the status of refugees a national responsibility based on the laws of each member state.' The change in the Protocol became the basis for legal discrimination against the Palestinians. For example, the Lebanese Parliament passed the General Amnesty Law in 1991, 'which ensured immunity against war crimes for militia-leaders-turned-politicians'. The law excluded non-citizens such as the Palestinian refugees but granted amnesty for all the militias that were active and committed crime before 28 March 1991. Those who were singled out were sentenced to death but the rest had to hide (Knudsen, 2009: 57).

In addition, the Madrid Conference which was held between October 1991 and the summer 1993 affected the popularity of the PLO in a negative way (Smith, 1996: 314). After the Madrid Talks the prestige of PLO's opponents risen since for the Palestinians they were confronting Israel on the ground, whereas PLO agreed "to nonparticipation in talks on their lands that had no defined goals beyond the concept of interim stages" (Smith, 1996: 317). Following the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accord was signed in 1993. The most important term of the Oslo Accord was that the PLO recognized the "right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security and called for her overthrown by armed struggle were now inoperative and no longer valid" (Smith, 1996: 318). In return, the government of Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Smith, 1996: 319).

Having this in mind, the Accord is salient for the Palestinians in Lebanon for two reasons. First, the PLO started to lose its influence and left its place to the opposition (Brynen, 1997 in Knudsen, 2009: 58). For instance, a breakdown of order in Gaza occurred as Hamas, as opposed to Fatah, increased its power in the Gaza Strip (Smith, 1996: 326). After the Oslo Accord the Palestinian resistance was split between the PLO and Hamas and leftwing groups which opposed to the accords (Knudsen, 2007: 7).

Second, concurrent with the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) it made the right to return, as enshrined in UN Resolution 194, less likely to happen (Brynen, 1997 in Knudsen, 2009: 58). Therefore, the Lebanese authorities feared that it could legitimize the permanent settlement of the refugees in Lebanon. In fact, the Foreign Minister Fariz Buwayz proposed in 1994 to expel the refugees with a regional settlement plan (Buwayz quoted in Schulz and Hammer, 2003 in Knudsen, 2009: 58).

Besides the impact of these Accords, Lebanese government made legal amendments which put more limitations to the Palestinian refugees due to the negative perception of the refugee camps. In the post-war decade, the refugee camps in Lebanon were self-governed and there were still political factions which were armed under Syrian control, although the Cairo Agreement of 1969 was abrogated in 1987. In order to prevent more armament, the Lebanese ministerial committee and the PLO representatives engaged in a high level dialogue which aimed to grant civil and social rights to the refugees and in return the arms in the camps would be handed. However when the dialogue fell, a fight between the PLO and the Lebanese army broke out causing the camps to attain heavy weaponry and the control of the Army of the southern camps in the beginning of 1990s (Knudsen, 2009: 60). Besides

the heavy weaponry, since the camps were semi-autonomous, they became the center for drug dealing, gun running and hideouts for militants (Knudsen 2009: 61). So, according to Knudsen (2009) the popular perception of camps became a place for security threat. The camps were also named as security islands since there is no law applied in the camps (Ar. *Juzur amniyya*, islands of self-policed security) (Suleiman, 1999 in Knudsen, 2009: 61).

The living conditions in the camps were hardened and became more unsecured with the limitations that the Lebanese government put during the post-war period. Besides the polluted drinking water, faulty electrical wiring and open sewers, one of the limitations was that the southern camps close to the border were cordoned with barbed wire, army check-points and security controls became daily routine (Peteet, 1998 in Knudsen 2009, 61). Another restriction is that the boundaries of camps cannot be changed and construction inside the camps is restricted. Moreover, if refugees residing in a camp which is in the north of Litani River want to leave the camp and travel to the south, they have to get a written permission. Regarding the education services, after 2002 the university education is less attainable for Palestinian refugees since they are recently classified as 'foreign students' which means a higher tuition fee (Knudsen, 2009: 62). In addition to all these, the Ministry of Labor issued a new Decree 621/1 on 15 December 1995 which added 46 salaried jobs and independent professions to the already banned 70 high status jobs (Knudsen, 2009: 59).

In the light of the legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in post war Lebanon, it is possible to say that the relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees were deteriorating. For instance, although the post-war Lebanese economy was building as a result of borrow-to-build policy (Najem, 1998 in Knudsen, 2009:

59), the Palestinian refugees could not benefit from it since the majority of them still could not work in the formal sector. Also, the camps were not rebuilt and rebuilding or enlarging existing houses were also banned. In fact, Prime Minister Hariri emphasized on TV that the situation of Palestinian refugees is really bad but improving their living conditions would further their integration to the Lebanese society. So, according to Knudsen (2009), the rejection of improving their living conditions was justified as it served for Palestinian nationalism and the right to return of the Palestinian refugees. For instance, the name of the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DAPR), an office under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established in 1959, was changed with a ministerial decree (no. 4082), to 'Direction of Political and Refugee Affairs'. It is interpreted as a manner to end Lebanon's official host position for Palestinian refugees (FIDH, 2003 in Knudsen, 2009: 60).

The recent legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was also shaped after the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and after a coalition government was set with the Prime Minister Fouad Seniora. After taking part in the opposition for years Hezbollah obtained two ministerial posts in the new cabinet and its Labour and Agriculture Minister - Trad Hamade - initiated a memorandum to lift the laws that barred the Palestinians from more than 70 jobs since 1983 (Daily Star, 2005b in Knudsen, 2009: 66). However, the Memorandum only lifted the ban on manual and clerical jobs (Daily Star, 2005a in Knudsen, 2009: 66) but not the high-status professions which require syndicates such as medicine, engineering, pharmacy and which are only for Lebanese citizens since 1964 law (Knudsen, 2009: 66). Hence, the Memorandum excluded the Palestinian refugees from professions which are more

influential in decision making processes and kept the Palestinian refugees restricted in the low-income sectors of the economy.

In addition, with the new Memorandum, the refugees need to obtain a work permit which costs around US$ 133–1,200 (UNHCR, 2006 in Knudsen, 2009: 66) which made it more difficult for refugees to apply. Another problem with the labor law is that the Palestinian employers cannot benefit from social security taxes because there are no reciprocity requirements. First reason for that is that they are not considered as citizens of an 'officially recognized state' so they are not eligible for reciprocity arrangements. Second reason is that Lebanon has not ratified the UN Convention of the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) which grants stateless people reciprocity rights (FIDH, 2003 in Knudsen, 2009: 66).

Besides the discriminatory laws, during the post-war period the political situation in the camps became more fragile and made the living conditions in the camps harder. Following the Oslo Accord, PLO's political support to refugees dwindled and the funding that the UNRWA got decreased as it consequently gave less and less support to the refugees. As a result, the camps became a basis for factional conflict and fighting (Knudsen, 2009: 62). One of the major fighting was between a new militia group, Fatah El-Islam, and the Lebanese Army in Nahr El-Bared camp near Tripoli in 2007. The importance of the Nahr El-Bared fighting is firstly it dissatisfied the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue and the LPDC was targeted for being dysfunctional by political events (Mehri, 2007 in Knudsen, 2009: 67). Hence, according to Knudsen (2009) the fighting escalated the tension between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees, since many died during the battle. Second, after the civil war it was the highest death toll and more than 30,000 families had to

move out and live in neighboring camps since they became homeless (Knudsen, 2009: 67).

However, the recent developments regarding the Palestinian refugees, particularly the non-ID Palestinians is worth noted. After remaining closed for years, the PLO was opened in 2006 (Chiha, 2006: 5). One major impact of an active PLO is that as a result of a joint initiative of the Lebanese Government and PLO more than 765 special ID cards for non-ID Palestinian refugees were issued which allowed their legal residency for one year, on a renewable basis with no cost. Besides, UNRWA revised its regulations and allowed some services such as health care to some of the non-ID refugees. 192 non-ID cases were submitted to the UNRWA who were registered in other fields of UNRWA operation and facilitated almost half of their access to its services as well (Danish Refugee Council, 2009: 7). On the other hand, another impact of an active PLO is that, according to Knudsen (2009), it made the political situation, especially in the camps, more sensitive since Hamas won the 2006 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council and since PLO was assigned as the official Palestinian representation in Lebanon (Knudsen, 2009: 67).

Taking all these into consideration, it can be emphasized that the living conditions of the Palestinians and Armenians in Lebanon is rooted in the historical developments that occurred in the region. The historical turning points such as the French and the British rules in Lebanon and Palestine respectively, the confessional system in Lebanon, the rise of Zionism in British Palestine affected the citizenship status of the refugees such as the Palestinians and Armenians. Besides, the displacement and the psychological burden along with it that occurred as a result of the First World War, Arab-Israeli Wars, the Lebanese civil war should not be disregarded since it was influential in the formation of Palestinian and Armenian

collective memories. Due to these developments, the rights that the displaced communities have and their living conditions differ with respect to their citizenship status.

Regarding the Armenians who came to Lebanon at different stages between 1915 and 1940 (Migliorino, 2008: 31) it is possible to say that all of the Armenians are naturalized and they enjoy all the rights a Lebanese can enjoy. However different than the naturalized Palestinians, they have a representative in the Parliament. Moreover, they constitute the seventh community of the Lebanese family (Butenschon, Davis, Hassassian, 2000: 150). On the other hand the naturalized Palestinians and ID Palestinians came to Lebanon in 1948-1949 (Picard, 1996: 79) during the Arab-Israeli War. Unlike the Armenians, they don't have a representative in the parliament (Butenschon, Davis, Hassassian, 2000: 150).

The ID Palestinians, on the other hand, can benefit from UNRWA schools, health centers and social services it provides. They can attend Lebanese universities as well however they are required to pay higher tuition fees (Knudsen, 2009: 62). They have access to legal employment (Chiha, 2007: 2) but they are excluded from 72 professions (Knudsen, 2009: 59). In addition they don't have the right to own immovable goods (Chiha, 2007: 2).

Having in mind that there is no Lebanese state at all especially after the civil war period in the Palestinian refugee camps (Knudsen, 2009: 60), the citizenship benefits of Palestinian refugees change depending also on whether they live in a camp or outside a camp. The focus of this thesis is on the ID Palestinian respondents who live in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp which is in the outskirts of Beirut. There are no facilities provided for the Palestinian refugees living in the Bourj Al Barajneh Camp, except the UNRWA operations. Different than Beirut, there are less citizenship

benefits. There is polluted drinking water, faulty electrical wiring and open sewers (Peteet, 1998 in Knudsen 2009, 61). In addition, construction within the camp is not allowed and the boundaries of the camp cannot be changed (Knudsen, 2009: 62) which means that the camps are very crowded and old.

Overall, the difference between the citizenship rights of the Armenians, naturalized Palestinians, ID Palestinians in Beirut and ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are overviewed in this chapter along with the historical turning points that affected them. After having a comparison of the citizenship benefits they have, their individual responses to the Lebanese citizenship will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

This chapter examines why citizenship benefits should increase the feeling of identification that displaced individuals develop to the host country from the point of view of individual beneficiaries. The chapter is separated into three sections. The first section presents a review of the major contributors to the citizenship literature in general. The section defines citizenship by reviewing the discussion on citizenship in general. The review of general citizenship literature is helpful in understanding the elements of citizenship which shows what citizenship can provide for the individual beneficiaries. The section extends the discussion on how the individual beneficiaries can develop identification to the host country that provides citizenship benefits.

After defining citizenship, the second section, reviews how citizenship benefits have an impact on the identification of the displaced individuals with the host country. First, I examine the lack of ontological security of the individuals after displacement with reference to Giddens (1991), İçduygu (2005), Kinvall (2004) and Young (1993). This will be helpful in pointing two needs of the displaced individuals. One is their need to normalize their lives (Eastmond, 1998), which I suggest that citizenship benefits could normalize their lives. The other one is their reliance on their refugee or victim identity (Eastmond, 1996). Regarding their identity perception it is suggested that if the Palestinians in Lebanon have no citizenship benefits they see the national identity of the host country as rival (Somer, 2004), because lack of citizenship benefits may make them feel psychologically less resourceful to embrace multiple identities.

In the second section, I will argue that the displaced individuals may view the citizenship of the host country as instrumental with reference to (Agliera, 1999; Mavroudi, 2008). This means two crucial things. One is that they say that they view citizenship only as a way to reach the benefits that they lack due to their displacement. The other is that after they are provided with citizenship benefits, they may develop an attachment which relies on a beneficial relationship to the host country (İçduygu, 2005) but at the same time which has emotional belonging to their refugee/victim identities.

The third section explains how citizenship benefits provide ontological security to the displaced communities and how this has an impact on the national identity perception of the displaced communities with reference to Somer (2004) and İçduygu (2005). Although they view the citizenship of the host country as instrumental and have an attachment that is based on benefits rather than emotions, they adopt multiple identities not necessarily purposefully but as a result of their experiences and they view the Lebanese identity as compatible (Somer, 2004) to their original identities.

3.1. Citizenship Literature

An overview of citizenship as rights, duties and identity implies that citizenship can create exclusions, foster tensions and increase the ambiguities in the daily lives of individuals who do not benefit from citizenship. First, it creates equality for the beneficiaries of citizenship (Marshall, 1963; Turner, 2009) which may exclude those who do not benefit from citizenship. Second, the unequal situation between the citizenship beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries may increase tension between them. Third, those who do not benefit from citizenship may feel ambiguities in their everyday life more than those who benefit from it since

former would not benefit from citizenship which would provide rights may feel a lack of security and certainty in their lives.

Citizenship can create exclusions for those who are unable to benefit from citizenship. It grants equality to the individual beneficiaries of citizenship (Marshall, 1963; Turner, 2009). However, for those who cannot benefit from citizenship, it may create an unequal relationship between the individual beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. As Işın and Wood (1999) argue:

> "Citizenship marks out the members of a polity from another, as well as members of a polity from non-members. Identity marks out groups from each other as well as allowing for the constitution of groups as targets of assistance, hatred, animosity, sympathy or allegiance" (Işın and Wood, 1999: 20).

Turner (2009) argues that citizenship institutionalizes the conditions for equality and the rights to enjoy. He emphasizes that citizenship enables access to resources, such as welfare benefits, and also social entitlements (Turner, 2008: 46). Citizenship as participation in work, war and reproduction, on which citizenship has developed, grants citizens an effective influence over resources (Turner, 2009: 6). Marshall (1963) also argues that the most important aspect of citizenship is equality and that all who possess the citizenship as status are equal in terms of rights and duties that the status grants.

Hence, relying on such a framework, Turner (2009) argues that citizenship should be actively practiced and three conditions are necessary for such practice. First, he views employment as essential for individuals to reach entitlements such as unemployment benefits, insurance, retirement benefits and health care "for the provision of adequate pensions and superannuation in later life" (Turner, 2009: 6). Second, service to the state has also generated entitlements for the citizens, securing benefits for them. So, besides work, individuals were able to acquire social security

entitlements like pension rights, health provisions, housing and education in return of the warfare service they have made (Turner, 2008: 48).

Third, individuals reached entitlements like "family security systems, various forms of support for mothers, health and educational provision for children" through the establishment of household and family which were important for the reproduction of society and hence maintenance of nation and socialization of offspring (Turner, 2008: 46). In this way, active participation, which is related to associations like trade unions, guilds, working men's clubs, was fostered. This contributed to the development of civil society (Turner, 2008: 48), the creation of social solidarity and communal cohesiveness, and the formation of civil society (Turner, 2009: 7). This may foster tensions between those who benefit from citizenship and those who do not. Because citizenship is the key to have access to resources and when one side is deprived of having access, this may increase the tension between them.

Işın and Wood (1999) identify citizenship as a set of economic, symbolic and cultural practices and as a bundle of civil, political and social rights and duties which define an individual's membership to a polity. They also point to the equality that citizenship provides:

> "While being a citizen cannot be conceived as a fixed right and privilege, but is an ongoing negotiation of identity and difference, the resources available to enter such negotiations are not equally distributed. The constitutive element of being a citizen may well be the restoration of *agon* in political life, but inequalities in redistribution of resources as well as in recognition of differences force us to reassert citizenship as an institution for reducing and eliminating such inequalities" (Işın and Wood, 1999: 22).

In addition, citizenship provides more certainties and securities to those who benefit from it than those who do not. According to the liberal individualist concept of citizenship, the notion of 'rights' is inherent in individuals, because they are prior to the state which is responsible to protect them and sustain their security. This perspective views rights as needs since rights strengthen and empower individuals in

order to grant human dignity to them (Oldfield, 1990: 179). Status protects from the clientelism and favoritism of individuals and the arbitrariness of the state.

Moreover, citizenship provides civil, political and social rights to the beneficiaries who can utilize these for freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, to participate in the exercise of political power as either a member of a body or as an elector of the members of such a body, right to economic welfare, security and to live the life of a civilized being (Marshall, 1992: 8).

Although citizenship provides rights to the citizens, it cannot be considered without the entitlement of duties. As Marshall (1977) argues citizenship is a balance of rights and duties. In order for rights to be granted duties should be fulfilled as well (Marshall, 1992; Oldfield, 1990; Turner, 2008). Individuals practice their citizenship by acting: by public service which Oldfield defines as duties and as "necessary for citizens to do in order to define, establish, and sustain a political community of fellow-citizens" (Oldfield, 1990: 181). Yet these duties are related to their identification of themselves as citizens (Oldfield, 1990: 181).

In order to perform these duties citizens need to be empowered, which is the key argument of civic-republican concept of citizenship. Citizens require certain conditions such as civic, political and legal freedoms and entitlements to health, education and income. Unlike the liberal individualist citizenship, these freedoms and entitlements are not regarded as rights but rather as conditions necessary to practice citizenship duties. So, another important point about this perspective of citizenship is the emphasis on practice (Oldfield, 1990: 183). The appropriate conditions for citizens to perform their duties can be created by the customs, habits and traditions of the community, in other words the *moeurs,* the civil and moral

codes, of the community. Accordingly, this can create a secure medium for the practice of citizenship (Oldfield, 1990: 184).

In addition to the rights, duties and identity aspects of citizenship Kymlicka and Norman (2000) argue that there is an aspect of citizenship other than rights, duties and identity: social cohesion, which operates at the community level different from the three dimensions. Social cohesion includes worries about "social stability, political unity and civil peace." Thus, citizenship status, citizenship identity, citizenship activity and citizenship cohesion are all connected to each other in a way that they can be traced to concerns regarding the fragmentation of citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman: 2000: 31).

3. 2. Displaced Individuals without Citizenship Benefits

3. 2. 1. Lack of Ontological Security

The unique atmosphere of the displaced individuals who are deprived of citizenship benefits deserves an emphasis. It is significant to show the impact of the atmosphere that they experience on their national identity perception and their perception of citizenship.

The major characteristic of the atmosphere of the displaced individuals without citizenship benefits is the ontological security they lack. According to Giddens (1991) there are two salient features of the theory of human existence, one of which is the ontological security and the other is existential anxiety. The former means a "person's fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other people" (Giddens, 1991 in Kinnvall: 2004: 746). The latter means "a protection against future threat and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront" (Giddens, 1991: 39). Giddens (1991) also adds that in order for the

individual to keep a sense of psychological well-being, avoid existential anxiety and carry the individual through crises and circumstances of high risk, the individual should obtain this.

Furthermore, Giddens (1991) emphasizes that in a state of chaos, the individual loses a sense of the very reality of things and of other people. In other words, chaos threatens the ordinariness of everyday conventions and creates anxieties. Yet, practical consciousness, which is the emotive anchor of the ontological security (Giddens, 1991: 36), help bracket those anxieties with the help of everyday practices not only because of the social stability that they imply but also because they provide answers to existential questions (Giddens, 1991: 37).

İçduygu (2005) points the insecure and uncertain future of immigrants with reference to Giddens' term of ontological insecurity or uncertainty (İçduygu, 2005: 197). He argues that individuals who are challenged by international migration start losing their "comfortable certainties concerning the nation-state" (Young, 1993: 3). Therefore, İçduygu (2005) argues that international migration causes a certain level of uncertainty and insecurity for citizens who move from one country to another (İçduygu, 2005: 203).

Similar to immigrants, Diasporas are in a state of uncertainty and insecurity. They live outside their home but with a romantic look towards a 'bounded home' (Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 11) which provide "security, identity, a place where one is comfortable, need no roles, where stability, warmth, comfort, relaxation and meaning prevail" (Sarup, 1994; Sagar, 1997; Rapport and Dawson, 1998 in Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 19). Yet, homes on the move may increase the feeling of uncertainty and a longing for a secure place, a home which is stable (Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 19). For these reasons, there is a difference between "the lived,

transnational, unbounded and out of space experience of diaspora and the memory of a nationalized, rooted, placed and essentialist past and identity" (Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 11).

Besides diasporas, refugees also draw special attention in the discussion of displacement and identity, because they are usually described as "uprooted" which implies that "the natural state of affairs is to stay put, to continue belonging to a certain place" (Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 16). However, being "rooted" means being secure, stable and healthy (Sarup, 1994 in Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 16). Thus, in a case of exile while home - the secure place - is far away and unreachable; the self is situated where insecurity and chaos exist (Nederveen and Pieterse, 1997 in Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 20).

Eastmond (1998) also argues that refugees and displaced individuals are in an anomaly situation and that they are in need of normalization and control. So, they are worried with the active reconstitution of normal life by attaining control over their lives (Eastmond, 1998: 177). Hence, the insecurity and uncertainty of the displaced individuals (İçduygu, 2005; Kinvall, 2004) may increase the need for normalization of their lives by having control over their lives (Eastmond, 1998: 177). Besides, Kinvall (2004) asserts that in case of migration a sense of powerlessness and dependence occurs as insecurity increases among the migrants. In addition to this, a feeling of anxiety and homelessness occurs because of the new conditions that they live in (Kinnvall, 2004: 747). Thus, all these arguments on insecurity and uncertainty that the displaced individuals feel show their need for citizenship benefits.

In addition, it is helpful to explain the way the refugees and those in exile tend to identify themselves. As Eastmond (1996) emphasizes "a generalized victim identity both as refugee and traumatized victim, while it provides individuals with an

explanation for their failing to live 'normal lives', may become part of self-identity, reinforcing dependence and disability rather than empowerment". Furthermore, the collective self in exile may be formed with reference to the notion of homeland as the best place to be and with reference to the discourses of victimization (Eastmond, 1998: 179).

3. 2. 2. National Identity Perception

I would like to add to the discussion above that lack of ontological security puts the displaced individuals in a situation where they become psychologically less resourceful to adopt multiple national identity of the host country and their original national identity. The fact that the displaced individuals are not provided with Lebanese citizenship benefits, first they may feel excluded from the Lebanese society. Second, they may feel hostility towards the beneficiaries of Lebanese citizenship. Third, they may feel more ambiguities in their lives than those who benefit from it. I argue that all of these would increase the feeling of ontological insecurity of the displaced individuals and as a result they may feel psychologically less resourceful. In addition, as they cannot benefit from the Lebanese citizenship, they may blame the Lebanese for not granting citizenship and they may view the drawbacks of having the Lebanese national identity and define it as rival to their original national identity. All of these may lead the displaced individuals to have the will to hold on to their original identities.

Before discussing the possible reasons for the definition of Lebanese identity as rival by the Palestinians in Lebanon, it would be helpful to have an overview of what rival identity stands for.

Somer (2004) argues that there are oppositional identities which are defined according to rival definitions. He argues that: "The *rival definition* refers to the

beliefs of actors who consider two or more identity categories as rival substitutes and evaluate the associated group interests in zero-sum terms" (Somer, 2004: 244). On the other hand, the compatible definitions of identity raise a sense of belonging for people to multiple identity categories which evaluate the associated group in positive-sum terms (Somer, 2004: 244). Rival identities substitute one another and there is a binary choice between rival identities and there is low attachment to comprehensive categories that are jointly belonged to (Somer, 2004: 245). Rival definitions of identity also increase the polarization between two rival defined identity groups (Somer, 2004: 246).

3. 2. 3. Lebanese Identity as Rival

The Palestinians who vary in terms of citizenship may have different conceptions of the Lebanese identity for reasons discussed above. The ID Palestinians who live in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp may define Lebanese identity in a more rival way than the ID Palestinians who live in Beirut and who are provided with more citizenship benefits. Likewise, the naturalized Palestinians in Beirut may perceive Lebanese identity in a less rival way than the ID Palestinians in Beirut who are provided with less citizenship benefits.

The Palestinians may view the Lebanese identity as rival because they may see the negative aspects of it. One of the reasons for this is that as pointed in the history chapter the Lebanese militia groups attacked and sieged the refugee camps for several times during the civil war (Smith, 1996; Picard, 1996). It would be helpful to underline that the Palestinian refugees living in the refugee camps had less resources to have control over their lives since they were deprived of more rights than the ID and naturalized Palestinians living in Beirut. I would like to argue that even the naturalized Palestinians who live outside the refugee camps may be affected

psychologically since their co-nationals were targeted in the refugee camps. This may have raised the hostility between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, especially those who live in the camps.

The Palestinians in Lebanon may see the Lebanese identity as rival because they may feel excluded from the Lebanese society as a result of basic rights that they are deprived of. The exclusion they feel may also increase the ambiguities that they feel in their everyday lives. In addition, I would like to argue that the ID Palestinians may feel excluded from the Lebanese society more than the naturalized Palestinians since they are deprived of more rights than the naturalized ones as the historical chapter pointed out (Knudsen, 2009: 59). I would like to suggest that they may come across with stereotypes among the Lebanese society since they are excluded from the Lebanese society as a result of lack of basic political, social and economic rights. The feeling of exclusion and coming across with stereotypes by the Lebanese society may increase the tensions between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, especially those who have less citizenship benefits.

Also, the right to return is a significant issue for the Palestinians to see the Lebanese identity as rival. I would like to suggest that the Palestinians who do not have citizenship may be living with the hope of going back to Palestine and not becoming part of the host country they are living currently. For this reason, they may see the Lebanese identity as rival since if they are granted citizenship it would be harder for them to go back to Palestine.

One reason why the Palestinians, regardless of their citizenship benefits, may see the Lebanese identity as rival is because of the role of the Palestinians in the eruption of the civil war. As history chapter points, the civil war in Lebanon started with a clash between the Phalangists and the Palestinians (Knudsen, 2009: 59). The

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role of the Palestinians in the civil war may have increased the hostility between the Palestinians and the Lebanese. This may also had an impact on stereotyping and outcasting of the Palestinians, in general, by the Lebanese. On the other hand, the neutral stance of the Armenians in the civil war (Migliorino, 2008: 153) may have kept their acceptance among the Lebanese society as a displaced community.

3. 2. 4. Perception of Citizenship

National identity may have a relationship with their perception of citizenship. The displaced individuals who would like to hold on to their victim identities (Eastmond, 1996) may say that they view the citizenship of the host country as an instrumental (Agliera, 1999; Mavroudi, 2008) to fulfill their need of citizenship benefits. At this point, I would like to suggest that the displaced individuals may say that they perceive citizenship as instrumental but they might actually have emotions to the host country that they may not admit to themselves and may not reveal, to others.

Agliera introduces the concept of instrumental citizenship which illuminates the strategic relationship between immigrant citizen and the host state. Agliera (1999) argues that if the immigrant citizen has strong emotional attachment to their nation of origin, s/he may not prefer to acquire the citizenship of the host country, even if they were eligible. However, the immigrant citizen may also think strategically and instrumentalize citizenship for practical purposes such as facilitating international travel and to access entitlements in the host country (Agliera, 1999: 326). Also, since passports have a central place for pragmatic citizenship, Mavroudi (2008) emphasizes that the reason for acquisition of citizenship is related to security, social and economic reasons instead of strong emotional feelings of belonging to the host state.

The instrumental perception of citizenship by the displaced individuals can have an impact on their identification with the host country. Citizens, who view the citizenship of the host state instrumental, may say that they still have cultural attachments to their original nation (Agliera, 1999: 326). Like the ID Palestinians naturalized in 1994, the naturalized Palestinian respondents also draw attention to the benefits that citizenship provides. Therefore, I would like to argue that even the naturalized Palestinians, besides those naturalized in 1994, view Lebanese citizenship as instrumental and have cultural attachments to Palestine. When a naturalized Palestinian is asked whether he is regretful to have the Lebanese citizenship, he says:

> "No. I was born as Lebanese. I am benefiting from the citizenship, then I would not be able to work at a bank, not have social security, I cannot own a land, building… Palestinians also cannot enter Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, only can go to United Arab Emirates. So the Lebanese citizenship is beneficial. Palestinians who are not naturalized are not more Palestinian or more patriotic than me. Maybe I know information about the history of Palestine more than them. Some friends say you are Lebanese and you don't care about the cause, you are integrated in the Lebanese society. But I don't feel like that. I still remember Palestine. I got angry during the war in Gaza. I feel sad also for the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict. They have to have unity." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

> "I don't know. I see what my friends face. The problems they have…Lives are hard. It's not easy. My life is much easier with the Lebanese citizenship. Personally I'd prefer to have stayed as an ID Palestinian." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

The instrumentality of citizenship is also shown when they are asked whether they feel having the citizenship is important for them or not, they say:

> "Citizenship is important as a temporary measurement until I return back to Palestine. Right to live in dignity we need human rights, until the right to return." Abal, Naturalized Palestinian

"You can own stuff, you have insurance, can work… and more advantages. If it was up to me, I wouldn't choose the Lebanese identity". Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

In addition, the answer given to whether the naturalized Palestinians agree with 'I'd have the Lebanese citizenship if I don't have to give up my Palestinian identity' reveals the perception of citizenship as providing only benefits.

"If I didn't have the Lebanese citizenship, I'd prefer to have only the civic rights, not the citizenship. It would be clear for me about who I am." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

"No one will leave his identity. It's in the roots, you can't leave it, deny it. I was born as Lebanese. I was not asked at that time. I'd prefer to be Palestinian if it was asked, and would prefer to have the civic rights to feel more attached to Palestine." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

They may see their nationality in primordial sense (Agliera, 1999: 326). Furthermore, if the immigrant citizens face with racist attitude in the host country, they may attempt to remain as 'outsiders' to the host nation which may valorize their attachment to their original nation (Agliera, 1999: 327). Those in exile are also in a similar situation. For instance, although exile does not mean a total separation from the original place but it is: "a condition where one never abandons the old nor completely accepts the new. It is not a state in which one can become complacent, comfortable and secure. Rather, it is a state that hones your skill for survival" (Aschroft and Ahluwalia, 1999 in Schulz and Hammar, 2003: 13).

3. 3. Displaced Individuals with Citizenship Benefits

3. 3. 1. Attachment to the Host Country

The displaced individuals who are provided with citizenship benefits may tend to develop an attachment - that is based on interest rather than emotions - to the

host country that provides these benefits[9]. There is an instrumental and interest-based perception of citizenship when the migrants acquire the citizenship of the host country which provides them the securities and certainties that they are lacking in the international migration atmosphere. However, I would like to suggest that the displaced individuals who are provided with citizenship benefits may develop identification to the host country that is based on emotions.

İçduygu (2005) argues that given the fact that immigrants have an insecure and uncertain future, when they are granted citizenship they develop a sense of attachment to the host country as a result of the securities and certainties that citizenship provides for especially the displaced people. He asserts that "citizenship provides us, citizens, with an environment of certainties and securities – a world of predictable relationships. This context is our attachment to our state". The asymmetrical relationship between the state and the citizen means that the state has more power over its citizens. İçduygu (2005) emphasizes that:

> "So, at this stage we should look at how states sustain or undermine the sense of certainty or security that we, citizens, struggle to attain competition for autonomy and control, displaces the burdens of uncertainty with the heaviest falling on the weakest (citizens) with the fewest social and economic resources. One should think about the possibilities of control of uncertainty which could encourage a politics of reciprocity. It is within this context that I wish to propose that an adequate model of citizenship must be based on the attachment-type of reciprocal relationship between citizen and state" (İçduygu, 2005: 202).

This attachment type relationship between the state and the citizen is perceived by the citizen as "a relationship to the state figure which takes care of us and with which we seek a secure bond of attachment" (İçduygu, 2005: 202). In other words, this unique bond between the two grows out of an interaction which creates or frustrates a sense of security and certainty in the citizen (İçduygu, 2005: 202).

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3 Further information obtained from an interview with Ahmet İçduygu about his argument on attachment-based citizenship, 14 April 2010.

Another dimension that supports the argument that would affect the individual response to citizenship benefits is that when the displaced individuals are empowered and provided with the right to form home-town associations, their attachment to the host country may diminish or increase (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008: 303). These home-town associations may help the domestic development of the home country. In addition they may also engage in humanitarian projects such as rotating credit; building schools, sending funds to the families in the home country and so on. Consequently, their objective may be the well-being of their home countries. Hence, İçduygu and Şenay (2008) argue that engaging in this kind of activities increase the attachment of the migrants to the original community and make their integration to the host country harder.

On the other hand, the sense of belonging of the individuals who participate in community organizations may be affected as well (Smith, 1995; Berry *et al.,* 1993; Chavis and Wandersman, 1990; Davidson and Cotter, 1989; Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988 in Higgins, 1999: 289). It is argued that citizens who engage in community organizations usually feel that they are more empowered (Schulz *etal,* 1995; Smith, 1995) than those who are unable to participate (Higgins, 1999: 288). The citizens who participate may feel that they have greater control over their lives and a high level of capability (Arai and Pedlar, 1997; Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988; Kieffer, 1984). Whereas an individual who cannot participate and cannot have an influence over decision making that affects his or her life may lack self-esteem and the feeling of full membership to the socio-political system (Younis, 1995 in Higgins, 1999: 289). Consequently, the identification of the displaced individuals with the host country may increase as well, when one takes into consideration that

the right to empower a migrant may provide a sense of membership and identity in the receiving society (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008: 306).

At this point, I would like to suggest that as the host country provides citizenship benefits that increase the securities and certainties that the displaced individuals lack, their ontological security increases as well and hence they would psychologically feel more resourceful to embrace multiple identities. They might see the positive side of the national identity of the host country and view it as compatible to their original national identity since the host country increases the ontological security of the individual beneficiaries.

According to Somer (2004) compatible definitions of identity raises a sense of belonging for people to multiple identity categories which evaluate the associated group in positive-sum terms. Moreover, regarding the compatible identities there are simultaneous holding of identities. There is also high attachment to comprehensive categories that are jointly belonged to (Somer, 2004: 245).

3. 3. 2. National Identity Perception
3. 3. 2. 1. Lebanese Identity as Compatible

One reason for the Palestinians in Lebanon to see the Lebanese identity as compatible may be the Arab identity of the Lebanese society and the Lebanese state. The Lebanese nationality is defined in the National Pact with reference to the Arab identity of the Lebanese (Rabbath, 1973 in Migliorino, 2008: 93). The Palestinians who identify themselves as Arabs may find it more compatible to identify with the Lebanese. Besides, the Palestinians may also see Lebanese identity as compatible because Lebanon as a country has suffered from the Israeli attacks. The Palestinians and the Lebanese may perceive Israel as the common enemy.

In addition, the Armenians may see the Lebanese identity as more compatible because they are provided with more citizenship benefits than the naturalized Palestinians. As discussed in the historical chapter, they have a representative in the Parliament and they are approved as the seventh community that constitutes the Lebanese nation (Migliorino, 2008: 182) which grants them certain rights and privileges.

Overall, this chapter discussed how citizenship benefits may increase the identification of the displaced individuals with the host country. It is argued that as citizenship benefits increase the ontological security of the individual beneficiaries may increase. In this way they may feel psychologically more secure and embrace multiple identities. On the other hand, the displaced individuals who have less citizenship benefits have less ontological security. This paves the way for them to feel psychologically less resourceful to embrace multiple identities.

CHAPTER 4

This chapter shows that although the displaced individuals emphasize that they view Lebanese citizenship as instrumental and they have an attachment type relationship to Lebanon which is not based on emotions but based on interests; my findings suggest that they cannot accept the fact that they develop identification to Lebanon and that their national identities change subconsciously, meaning that, they change not as a result of their choice but as a result of their experiences.

The major argument that supports this pattern is that the displaced individuals who are provided with less citizenship benefits are psychologically less resourceful to embrace multiple identities. They tend to hold on to their original national identity and view the national identity of the host country as rival. On the other hand, the displaced individuals who are provided with citizenship benefits are psychologically more resourceful and they tend to adopt multiple identities of the national identity of the host country which provides ontological security as a result of citizenship benefits. At this point, they may think that the original national identity and the national identity of the host country are compatible identities.

4. 1. Impact of Citizenship Benefits on the Displaced Individuals

As Table 5 shows, there is an obvious pattern in terms of the relationship between the identification level of the Palestinian respondents with Lebanon and their citizenship benefits. The naturalized Palestinian respondents in Beirut have higher identification level than the ID Palestinian respondents who also live in Beirut. Here, I would like to underline that it is not the citizenship but the citizenship

benefits that have an impact on the identification of the displaced individuals. Table 5 shows that the ID Palestinians who live in Beirut and who do not have citizenship but have more citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have higher identification level with Lebanon than the latter.

As Table 5 portrays, while on the one hand the naturalized Palestinians score 33 out of 100 in the identification with Lebanon and 78 in the identification with Palestine; the ID Palestinians in Beirut score 26 in the level of identification with Lebanon and 89 in the identification with Palestine. Thus, the naturalized Palestinians in Beirut who are provided with more citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians in Beirut have more identification level with Lebanon than the latter. The ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh, on the other hand, score 8 in the identification with Lebanon and 92 in the identification with Palestine. So, the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut who are provided with more citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have higher identification level with Lebanon than the latter. It is possible to find further assessment of the identification in Appendix C.

Table 5

Citizenship Status	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Lebanese Citizens		
Abal (S, A)[10]	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53
Majid (Y, NA-A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha (Y, NA)	23	91

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[10] S: Senior, Y: Young, A: Active in the movement for their original national movements; NA: Non-Active in their original national identity movements

	33	78
ID Palestinians in Beirut		
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Ayten (Y, A)	23	91
Ghalib (S, NA)	8	91
Qasim (S, NA)	53	84
Amin (Y, NA)	61	61
Zahra (Y, NA)	15	100
Ikram (Y, NA)	68	61
	26	89
ID in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp		
Ramadan (S, A)	0	100
Hashim (S, A)	0	100
Maysam (Y, A)	20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)	10	100
Nour (Y, A)	0	100
Ismail (Y, A)	0	100
Maha (S, NA)	30	76
Raima (S, NA)	46	91
Shaila (S, NA)	0	100
Nasib (S, NA)	0	100
Jabbar (S, NA)	0	100
Marwa (Y, NA)	0	80
Dima (Y, NA)	0	80
	8	92

Three criteria determined the respondents' identification levels with Lebanon and with Palestine. The first criterion to determine the level of identification was the way the respondents perceive their national identity. They were asked whether they feel Palestinian only, Palestinian-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian or Lebanese only. Additionally, they were asked to score the attachment they feel to Palestine and Lebanon by giving a number from 0 to 5.

As Table 6 shows, the Armenians' identification level with Lebanon and with Armenia is 65. Hence, I would like to argue that as citizenship benefits increase the

respondents would view the host national identity and their original identities as compatible and adopt multiple identities. This will be elaborated in the following pages further. Also, the difference between the identification score of the naturalized Palestinians with Lebanon which is 33 and Palestine which is 78 is higher than the difference between the identification score of the naturalized Armenians with Lebanon which is 65 and Armenian which is 65.

Table 6

Citizens of Lebanon	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Naturalized Armenians		
Razmig (S, A)	68	46
Dikran (S, NA)	76	61
Aida (Y, A)	68	68
Aline (S, NA)	46	76
Ara (Y, NA)	76	61
Christine (Y, NA)	61	53
Harout (Y, A)	46	84
Nareg (Y, NA)	76	68
	65	**65**
Naturalized Palestinians		
Abal (S, A)	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53
Majid (Y, NA-A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha(Y, NA)	23	91
	33	**78**

As Table 7 displays, the way the displaced individuals who are naturalized identify themselves is almost similar. Both naturalized Armenians and naturalized

Palestinians have multiple identities. The Armenians identify themselves as either Lebanese-Armenian or Armenian-Lebanese. Likewise, the majority of the naturalized Palestinians also identify themselves as either Palestinian-Lebanese or Lebanese-Palestinian.

Table 7

Citizens of Lebanon	National Identity Perception
Naturalized Armenians	
Razmig (S, A)	Lebanese Armenian
Dikran (S, NA)	Lebanese Armenian
Aida (Y, A)	Armenian Lebanese
Aline (S, NA)	Armenian Lebanese
Ara (Y, NA)	Lebanese Armenian or Armenian Lebanese
Christine (Y, NA)	Lebanese Armenian
Harout (Y, A)	Armenian Lebanese
Nareg (Y, NA)	Armenian with Lebanese nationality
Naturalized Palestinians	
Abal (S, A)	Palestinian
Bashir (S, A)	Palestinian Lebanese
Roy (Y, A)	Palestinian
Zeina (Y, A)	Palestinian Lebanese
Yasir (S, NA)	Palestinian Lebanese
Sami (S, NA)	Lebanese Palestinian
Majid (Y, NA-A)	Palestinian Lebanese
Kamil (Y, NA)	Palestinian Lebanese
Reina (Y, NA)	Palestinian Lebanese
Rasha(Y, NA)	Lebanese Palestinian

There were less ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut who identified themselves as Palestinian-Lebanese. Indeed the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut mostly emphasize the fact that they don't know much about Palestine but know more about Lebanon. I would like to argue that although they know that they are Palestinians, the

fact that they lived all their lives in Lebanon and benefited from a limited number of citizenship rights may have an impact on them to adopt multiple identities and identify themselves as Palestinian-Lebanese.

> "Lebanese-Palestinian, because I'm attached to Lebanon. You feel attached to places, friends in Lebanon. All my life is here. I know everything about Lebanon." Amin, ID in Beirut

> "I feel Palestinian-Lebanese."
> Researcher: "Which nationality do you think you have?"
> "Palestinian. After that I say that I was born and raised in Lebanon. I think I'm both. My parents are from Palestine. If I'm supposed to put one before another it would be mainly Palestinian. Why Lebanese is second, nothing connects me to this country. My parents are not from here, nothing legal that binds me to here. I don't vote. I'm Palestinian, Palestinian in Lebanon, woman and Arab." Ayten, ID in Beirut

There were a few ID Palestinian respondents living in Beirut who said that they perceive themselves as only Palestinian.

> "Palestinian only. I'd thank Lebanon because I got my education, work here, home. Just thank you. Even if I was raised here, my emotions, mentality fighting life it's Palestinian. I don't give up, never, in my rights." Zahra, ID in Beirut

On the other hand, all the ID Palestinian respondents living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp identified themselves as only Palestinian. Overall I would like to argue that the majority of the naturalized Palestinian, Armenian and ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut have a more tendency to have multiple identities instead of single identities than the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp.

When they are asked whether they feel Palestinian, Palestinian-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian or only Lebanese and when they are asked to score their attachment to Lebanon and Palestine, they said:

> "Only Palestinian. I'd give 5 for the attachment to Palestine and 0 for Lebanon." Nasib, ID in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp
> After showing me his key chain which is the map of Palestine, Nasib said:

"I live in Lebanon but I'm forced to live. There is nothing in my house about Lebanon. I can't live as I would like to."

"Palestinian only. I'd give 5 for the attachment to Palestine and 1 for Lebanon for thanking them, welcoming us here." Maysam, ID in Bourj Al Barajneh

Besides from the way the respondents identified themselves, second criterion that determined the identification level of the Armenians and Palestinians was the answer given when they were asked where they are from. There are more respondents among the naturalized Palestinians and Armenians who say that they come from Lebanon when they are asked where they are from. On the other hand all the ID Palestinians in Beirut and in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp say that they come from Palestine. Accordingly, I would like to argue that as citizenship benefits increase the Palestinians develop a sense of belonging more to Lebanon than Palestine. When the respondents are asked where they are from, they say:

"Outside Lebanon, I say Lebanon. If we go into details, I say I'm Armenian. I'm Lebanese and I'm Armenian." Ara, Naturalized Armenian

"I'm from Lebanon, because I don't know Palestine."
Researcher: "Originally?"
"Palestine and I'm proud." Sami Abu Ghali, Naturalized Palestinian

"Lebanon, because I'm living in Lebanon. I hold the citizenship. I'm being represented by this document."
Researcher: "Where r u from originally?"
"From Palestine, Alima. Sometimes I don't say where I'm from originally when I'm in Lebanon. They make stereotyping like they are throwing bombs…They don't differentiate between one another." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

On the other hand, the majority of the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut, except one, say that they come from Palestine when they are asked where they come from. Regarding the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp, all of them say that they come from Palestine.

"I'm Palestinian, originally from Palestine. Now I'm a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon. Even if I say I'm from Lebanon, I say I'm a

Palestinian refugee living in Lebanon. I love Lebanon. I was born here, I lived here, but I never want to be Lebanese." Alima, ID in Beirut

The last criterion that measures the identification level of the respondents was their perception of their homeland and country. As Table 4 shows, the majority of all the Palestinian respondents consider their homeland as Palestine. Regarding the Armenians the majority of them identify their homeland as Armenia. Similarly, the majority of the naturalized Palestinians identify their homeland as Palestine. However there are more respondents among the naturalized Palestinians who perceive Lebanon as their homeland than the ID Palestinians in Beirut. Also, there are more respondents among the ID Palestinians in Beirut who perceive their homeland as Lebanon than the ID Palestinian respondents in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp all of whom perceive Palestine as their homeland. This pattern also demonstrates the relationship between the identification pattern of the respondents and the citizenship benefits they are provided with.

The respondents are also asked about where they perceive it as their country. As Table 8 displays, the majority of the Armenians identify their country as Lebanon however the majority of the naturalized Palestinians identify their country as Palestine. There were more respondents among the ID Palestinians in Beirut who identified their country as Lebanon than the naturalized Palestinians. On the other hand, all of the ID Palestinian respondents in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp perceive their country as only Palestine.

Table 8

Citizenship Status	Perception of Homeland	Perception of Country
Armenians		
Razmig (S, A)	**Lebanon**	Lebanon

Dikran (S, NA)	Armenia	Lebanon
Aida (Y, A)	Armenia	Lebanon
Aline (S, NA)	Armenia	Lebanon
Ara (Y, NA)	**Lebanon**	Lebanon
Christine (Y, NA)	No homeland	Lebanon
Harout (Y, A)	Armenia	**Armenia** and Lebanon
Nareg (Y, NA)	Armenia	Lebanon
Naturalized Palestinians		
Abal (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Bashir (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Roy (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Zeina (Y, A)	**Lebanon**	Palestine
Yasir (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Sami (S, NA)	**Lebanon**	**Lebanon**
Majid (Y, NA-A)	Palestine and **Lebanon**	Palestine
Kamil (Y, NA)	Palestine	**Lebanon**
Reina (Y, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Rasha(Y, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
ID Palestinians in Beirut		
Sharif (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Rashid (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Huma (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Alima (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Sulaiman (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Ayten (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Ghalib (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Qasim (S, NA)	Palestine	**Lebanon**
Amin (Y, NA)	Palestine	**Lebanon**
Zahra (Y, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Ikram (Y, NA)	**Lebanon**	**Lebanon**
ID in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp		
Ramadan (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Hashim (S, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Maysam (Y, A)	**Lebanon**	Palestine
Fawzi (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Nour (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Ismail (Y, A)	Palestine	Palestine
Maha (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Raima (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Shaila (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Nasib (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Jabbar (S, NA)	Palestine	Palestine
Marwa (Y, NA)	Palestine	Palestine

| Dima (Y, NA) | Palestine | Palestine |

Overall, according to the interviews and the theoretical framework I would like to show that as citizenship benefits increase the identification level of the Armenians and Palestinians with Lebanon increase as well. Yet, there is one salient point about this argument which deserves mentioning and further research. There is a tendency among the active naturalized Palestinians, who work in NGOs affiliated with the Palestinian cause, to identify less with Lebanon and more with Palestine than the non-active naturalized Palestinians.

As Table 9 demonstrates, the identification level of the active naturalized Palestinians with Lebanon is 17 and the level of identification with Palestine is 88. Whereas the score of the level of identification with Lebanon of the non-active naturalized Palestinians is 44 and the level of identification with Palestine is 63. Similarly the level of identification with Lebanon of the active ID Palestinians in Beirut is 14 and the level of identification with Palestine is 96. However, the level of identification with Lebanon of the non-active ID Palestinians in Beirut is 41 and the level of identification with Palestine is 79. In addition, the level of identification with Lebanon of the active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp is 5 and the level of their identification with Palestine is 97. The level of identification with Lebanon of the non-active Palestinians is 11 and identification level with Lebanon is 90. The active naturalized Palestinians' identification level with Lebanon is higher than the active ID Palestinian respondents living in Beirut who have less identification level with Lebanon than the non-active ID Palestinian respondents living in Beirut. On the other hand, there is a slight difference between the active ID Palestinians and the non-active ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp.

Table 9

Citizenship Status	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Lebanese Citizens Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Abal (S, A)	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
	17	88
Lebanese Citizens Non-Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53
Majid (Y, NA-A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha(Y, NA)	23	91
	44	63
ID Palestinians in Beirut Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Ayten (Y, A)	23	91
	14	96
ID Palestinians in Beirut Non-Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Ghalib (S, NA)	8	91
Qasim (S, NA)	53	84
Amin (Y, NA)	61	61
Zahra (Y, NA)	15	100
Ikram (Y, NA)	68	61
	41	79
ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp Active in the Palestinian		

Movement		
Ramadan (S, A)	0	100
Hashim (S, A)	0	100
Maysam (Y, A)	20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)	10	100
Nour (Y, A)	0	100
Ismail (Y, A)	0	100
	5	97
ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp Non-Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Maha (S, NA)	30	76
Raima (S, NA)	46	91
Shaila (S, NA)	0	100
Nasib (S, NA)	0	100
Jabbar (S, NA)	0	100
Marwa (Y, NA)	0	80
Dima (Y, NA)	0	80
	11	90

The active naturalized and active ID Palestinians living in Beirut and active ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have less identification level with Lebanon. This pattern can be explained with reference to the arguments of İçduygu and Şenay (2008) who argue that the attachment individuals, who are provided with citizenship benefits, to the host country may be affected since they are empowered and provided the right to establish their home-town associations. Their attachment to the host country may increase as it empowered them to contribute to the development of their original countries. Yet, it may also decrease as they engage in activities for the well-being of their original countries (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008: 303). Hence, this kind of activities may increase their attachment to their original countries and make their integration to the host country harder (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008: 304).

On the other hand, they may feel part of the society of the host country since they feel more empowered as a result of citizenship benefits. So, they may feel that they have more control over their lives (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008: 306). As the data

above presents, I would like to argue that active naturalized Palestinian respondents have less identification level with Lebanon than the non-active naturalized Palestinian respondents since they feel more attachment to their original home countries as they engage in activities concerning the development of their original countries.

The comparison between the active Palestinians in terms of their identification with Lebanon and Palestine still shows the impact of citizenship benefits - which includes "participation in the exercise of political power as either a member of a body or as an elector of the members of such a body" (Marshall, 1992: 8) - on their national identity perception. As deliberated above, although active Palestinians have more identification with Palestine and less identification with Lebanon than those that are non-active, the active Palestinians' identification levels vary among each other according to their citizenship benefits. Consequently, I would like to argue that the citizenship benefit of engaging in political activities for the home-town associations may increase the sense of belonging to the original homeland and may decrease the sense of belonging to the host country.

Table 10

Citizenship Status	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Active Lebanese Citizens		
Abal (S, A)	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
	17	88
Active ID Palestinians in Beirut		
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Ayten (Y, A)	23	91

95

		14	96
Active ID in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp			
Ramadan (S, A)		0	100
Hashim (S, A)		0	100
Maysam (Y, A)		20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)		10	100
Nour (Y, A)		0	100
Ismail (Y, A)		0	100
		5	97

As the Table above indicates, the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have lower identification with Lebanon than the ID Palestinians living in Beirut. Similarly, the ID Palestinians living in Beirut have a lower identification with Lebanon than the naturalized Palestinians living in Beirut. Likewise, the Armenians who have more citizenship benefits than the naturalized Palestinians have a higher identification with Lebanon than the latter. As a result, the pattern of the relationship between citizenship benefits and national identity perception can be inferred from the findings.

As citizenship benefits of the displaced individuals increase, their identification with the host country increases as well, because they tend to feel more ontological security as they are provided with more citizenship benefits. As the level of ontological security increases they psychologically feel more resourceful to embrace multiple identities and view the national identity of the host country as compatible. However, the displaced individuals who lack ontological security - because they are not provided with citizenship benefits - are psychologically less resourceful to embrace the national identity of the host country. They view it as rival to their original national identity.

One reason why the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp to see the Lebanese identity as rival is that the Lebanese militia attacked them more than the ID Palestinians and naturalized Palestinians in Beirut during the civil war (Smith,

1996; Picard, 1996). This may have increased the hostility between the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp and the Lebanese. In addition, another reason for their subjection to the attacks during the civil war was the fact that they were deprived of citizenship benefits and hence lived in a less secure environment and had fewer resources to protect themselves. Thus, I would like to argue that the lack of citizenship benefits as an everyday practice may have increased the ambiguities in their lives and the hostility between them and the Lebanese which as a result may lead to the perception of the Lebanese identity as rival.

> "Even Lebanese army was against us other than the Israeli army. Lebanese army sieged the camp (Bourj Al Barajneh) for 6 months. Just sympathized with the Lebanese but not felt more Lebanese. We are living in Lebanon." Maysam, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "We stayed in Bai Camp for 5 years then the civil war started. Christian forces entered the camp. Our neighbors helped us to escape. My grandfather was killed." Raima, ID Palestinian in Sabra

> "It was the 6th of June exactly in 1982. When a commando, we saw the tanks on the main street, then they started to shoot the camp and attack it. (the camp in the south)(Bourj al Shamali). Militant people wanted to defend the camp as well. After two hours of fighting, Palestinian militants succeeded to attack them. Israeli tank was exploded. It was the first time I saw when 3 Israeli soldiers were injured. To take care of them, people were asking for doctors, nurses. But the second day, they used airplanes and destroyed half of the camp, bombed it. More than 100 people were killed in 2 hours. My brother was killed there as well. Then 2 days after, Israel occupied the camp. They used to call us by microphones to gather everyone and tanks were surrounding us. They used to call the women and children. The tanks were killing other men. Then they used to ask who the members of political fractions are. There were a few men among the women and children as well who were called by the Israelis. Israel threatened them to tell them among the others men who did not surround to see who is a militia, fedai…" Alima, ID Palestinian in Beirut

The quotations above show that the respondents who have less citizenship benefits have less ontological security. Yet, there were very few exceptions who

emphasized that they feel ontological security to Lebanon although they are deprived of many citizenship benefits. For instance, when it is asked what Lebanon connotates, one of the ID Palestinians said:

> "It is my second homeland. They helped us, protected us, they made us guests here." Jabbar, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

Another ID Palestinian in Beirut emphasized the ontological security Lebanon gives to him. He said:

> "The country where I was born, he respects it and loves it. He wishes it is his homeland." Qasim, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

When asked whether she feels excluded from the Lebanese society, another ID Palestinian in Mar Elias Camp said:

> "No exclusion. We have intermarriage with the Lebanese. I'm part of the Lebanese society." Maha, ID Palestinian in Mar Elias Camp

The ID Palestinians and naturalized Palestinians living in Beirut have more citizenship benefits, some of them also had the resources to leave Lebanon and move to another country for a temporary period to escape from the civil war. I would like to argue that those who had the citizenship benefits had more control over their lives so that they could feel more ontological security than those who are deprived of citizenship benefits.

> "My father's relative was killed by the Phalangists. No one was attached with political parties or military. We lived in Saudi Arabia until 1987." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian in Beirut

The ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp were not the only Palestinians who were affected from the civil war. The naturalized and ID Palestinians living in Beirut were also affected from the role of the Palestinians in the civil war. The fact that the civil war was erupted by a clash between the Phalangists

and the Palestinians and that the clashes continued throughout the civil war might have led the Lebanese to blame the Palestinians for the chaos that was generated in Lebanon. Blaming of the Palestinians in general may have led to the exclusion and stereotyping of the Palestinians. When the role of Palestinians in the civil war is compared with the neutral stance of the Armenians in the civil war, I would like to emphasize that the Palestinians may feel less welcomed in the Lebanese society and hence they may view the Lebanese identity as rival. The interviews also support this:

> "After the civil war, I heard blaming Palestinians within the Lebanese society. Palestinians were saying 'We didn't do this' but I recognized what the Palestinians did. The civil war has a lot to do with the Lebanese perception of Palestine. That's my perception. Their perception also affected my belonging or not belonging." Ayten, ID Palestinian in Beirut

> "When the civil war started, we were obliged not to say we are Palestinians. Otherwise, we would be killed by the militia (Phalangists, Lebanese forces) that ruled the region. So we had to learn the Lebanese dialect. When there were no strangers at home we used to speak Palestinian. In the family, we were Palestinian, in front of different people we were Lebanese. Despite of that, my father was threatened to be killed. There was no proof. So he wasn't killed. First, they stole his shop. Once they also came into the house, they couldn't find anything. He had a paper from a friend who was a member of the Phalangists. That friend told his friends not to kill him. The bullet just passed from his ear, he still can not hear well." Roy, Naturalized Palestinian

> "During the civil war, my uncle got assassinated in 1985. He was a famous doctor, especially famous in refugee camps in Lebanon. After work, he used to go to the camps to help the Palestinians out. In the clinic in Beirut, three men came to his clinic. They started talking to them. They had arms. He went inside and told the patients to lie down on the floor. And while he was looking from the door he got shot from his stomach. He was 33 years old." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

This has raised hostility between the Palestinians, especially those who live in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp and the Lebanese society. When the respondents are asked what Lebanon connotates, it is referred as the country they were forced to come and where they were discriminated.

"No rights. No humanity. Lebanese government sees Palestinians as animals, garbage." Dima, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

"The place where he was born, raised, suffered, destroyed his future, discrimination, racism. At the end it's a nice (geographically) country." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

"Racism, not the people but the government. When I live in a country, they should defend my rights, not permit my rights to enjoy owning property for the Palestinians no. They don't have the right to own." Rashid, ID Palestinian in Beirut

For this reason, I would like to argue that the naturalized Palestinians may face with more stereotypes among the Lebanese society than the Armenians who were neutral during the civil war. The significance of this is that coming across with stereotypes may impede their sense of belonging to Lebanon. So, if the Palestinians come across with stereotypes among the Lebanese society more than the Armenians do, then it is possible to argue that the Armenians' feeling part of the polity and community is more than the Palestinians' feeling. The very majority of the Palestinians said that they come across with stereotypes among the Lebanese society. Nevertheless, there is no sufficient data in order to assess the difference in terms of to what extent the naturalized Palestinians, ID Palestinians in Beirut and ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are coming across with stereotypes.

Although the naturalized Palestinians have more citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians and although they interact with the Lebanese more than especially the ID Palestinians living in camps, they say that they still face misperceptions by the Lebanese about Palestinians in general. This may also increase the Palestinians' perception of Lebanese identity as rival. When the Palestinian respondents are asked what stereotypes they face with, they emphasize that the Lebanese say that: "You are the cause of civil war, misery" "It's a shame to be Palestinian" "You don't look Palestinian" "You're Palestinian, but you are good" "Palestinians being aggressive,

having guns" "You were too scared / weak to stay in your country" "You left your country, so you have to pay for that." When the naturalized Palestinian respondents are asked whether they face stereotypes, they say:

> "Yes, not so much like the people in the camps. I'm perceived as a foreigner." Abal, Naturalized Palestinian

> "Yes, of course. Even I'm naturalized. They say the new nationalized people." Bashir, Naturalized Palestinian

> "Sometimes I don't say where I'm from originally, when I'm in Lebanon. They make stereotyping like 'the Palestinians are throwing bombs…' They don't differentiate between one another." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

> "They start talking about Palestinians in a bad way in the society. But I haven't come across with stereotypes directly to me. Sometimes I say that I'm Palestinian after they say those stereotypes. It depends on the situation and my mood." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

> "They say in the Lebanese society that Palestinians were raised with military guns, they are aggressive. They can't believe that Sulaiman didn't have any guns." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

Another naturalized Palestinian emphasizes the impact of outcasting on her feeling of belonging as a naturalized Palestinian.

> "Yes. Usually people at work have stereotypes toward me as a Palestinian. My family brought me as an Arab, a Palestinian, not a Christian. There are Christians on the mountain. They never interact with Muslims since the civil war. Some Christians moved to the mountain during the civil war. Especially, after the assassination of Hariri in 2003, we were not differentiated in schools. This can be regarded as a turning point. After then, they started categorizing as this is Shiite, this is Sunni, Christian…Then I felt the tension especially between the Sunni and Shiite. At that point I felt divided. I didn't feel where I belonged." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

> "Not directly to myself since I have the Lebanese ID. Just to get the job I say I'm Lebanese. My CV would say I'm Lebanese. It's just papers. I leave my identity to myself when it comes to official matters. In the university, at work first you say that you are a Lebanese especially not in a friendly environment. Later on I told some of them that I'm Palestinian. I'm sure they'd beat me up, the teacher would be more severe, I would be looked up in a negative way, treated in a way that is not just." Roy, Naturalized Palestinian

The ID Palestinians in Beirut may feel more excluded than the naturalized Palestinians living in Beirut. Although both live in the same city the ID Palestinians are deprived of more rights than the naturalized Palestinians.

> "You cannot become a lawyer, doctor, engineer, you can't own property, become a taxi driver, no insurance from the government, you can't work with any government company, you can't settle down your bill you have to give extra cash as an insurance (in order to pay your phone bill you need to leave insurance to the bank), no retirement money, every employee has a 15 day annual vacation. My sister is working for 6 years and never got an annual vacation! I felt like I want to achieve something in my life. It is impossible to prove anything. I want to be successful in my life and become a sample for the next generation and never give up, even if you're faced with the toughest circumstances. I feel myself lucky and successful." Amin, ID Palestinian in Beirut

> "When I gave my CV to the employer for a job application, when they understood that I'm a Palestinian, they threw it on my face. So it's very difficult to live outside your country. You feel that you're not welcomed. Eventually there are no rights at all. No rights. Like you are nothing here." Zahra, ID Palestinian in Beirut

On the other hand the naturalized Palestinians and the Armenians living in Beirut - as having more citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians in Beirut - tend to have more stability and certainty in their lives. Indeed, when they are asked whether they miss any privileges or rights as Lebanese citizens, the majority of them said that they don't miss any rights or privileges. This would support the argument that they have more ontological security compared to the ID Palestinians in Beirut and in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. However, when their situation is compared with the Armenians, the naturalized Palestinians may feel more excluded than the Armenians because the former is provided with less citizenship benefits than the latter. For this reason, the naturalized Palestinians may see the Lebanese national identity as a less compatible identity than the Armenians see.

One of the reasons for the Armenians to have a perception of the Lebanese identity as compatible is that they have a representative in the Parliament and they are approved as the seventh community of Lebanon which grants them more privileges (Migliorino, 2008: 182). Furthermore, having in mind that Lebanon was founded as a country to harbor the Christians of the region (Maktabi, 1999: 232) the fact that Armenians are also Christians, they may feel part of the community more than the Muslims. In addition, the Armenians are hosted by Lebanon more than the Palestinians are. In addition to all these, the Armenians may view the Lebanese identity as compatible since they may perceive Lebanese identity as a non-Arab one. For all these reasons, the Armenian respondents may view the Lebanese identity compatible to their original national identity. Consequently, I would like to argue that their identification level to the Lebanese state is higher than the naturalized Palestinians, so that their sense of belonging to the polity may be higher than the naturalized Palestinians.

Another reason why the naturalized Palestinians may view the Lebanese identity less compatible than the Armenians is that the co-nationals of the naturalized Palestinians have been suffering because they are deprived of citizenship benefits. The facts that the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut and in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are deprived of certain rights and live in harsh conditions may have an influence on the naturalized Palestinian respondents. This may increase the feeling of psychological pain and responsibility on the naturalized Palestinians. Hence, I would like to argue that the Palestinians who are provided with citizenship benefits are also affected from the ontological security their co-nationals have due to the displacement they experienced but less than the Palestinians who are deprived of citizenship benefits.

"I just feel bad and helpless for them." Rasha, Naturalized Palestinian

"Palestinians in camps live in very bad situation. If they go to Palestine, it wouldn't be worse than this. It's better to live in their homeland an honorable life. They have to increase the population of Palestinians in Israel…Civic rights to Palestinians should be given. Since you can see how they live in the camps. They are poor, no water, bad situation, hospitals.. They have to get their civic rights. If you give them the rights, you wouldn't find them making chaos, divert their interest to be productive more." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

The ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp may feel more excluded from the Lebanese society than the ID Palestinians living in Beirut since living conditions in the refugee camps is much worse than living in an urban area. There are ambiguities in their everyday lives as they have no certainty and control over their lives. For instance, when they are asked about the disadvantages of living in the camp, the majority of them point the fact that anything can take place unexpectedly in the camp which shows the instability and the uncertainty of living there.

"No infrastructure, no water everyday, no electricity. There are cables of water and electricity in the same place. Not a good place for living. My mom teaches at UNRWA so she has insurance; so that I have. Normally they are not given insurance. She worked in other schools but she wasn't given insurance. For health needs, she goes to Red Crescent as other Palestinians do. In Palestinian hospitals you pay less." Maysam, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

"Miserable environment, crowded, infrastructure (I talk in general), no entertainment. It's difficult for me to spend all my time in the camp." Alima, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

"Social situation inside the camp, social economic situation prevents people working for their cause, does not empower them. Bad infrastructure, popular committee (government of the camp, combination of different political fractions) there is a conflict between them, there are explosions… There is also psychological pressure, no sunlight, it is impossible for 2-3 people to walk together." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "Every person has a gun in his hand, there are fights, deaths." Jabbar,
> ID Palestinian in Beirut

> "Of course, there are 65 jobs we are excluded from. They see us as
> foreign people." Maysam, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

Furthermore, I argue that especially the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp may lack the ability to prevent the chaos which increases the insecurities and uncertainties that they are living with. The interviews also support this argument. When they are asked whether they would like to leave the camp, they say:

> "Yes, it's a new feeling. Everyday I see a kid dying because of lack
> of water. I feel insecure. There is also a conflict among the
> Palestinian community. They are not united. Before, there was unity.
> The camps were socially collective. My son is young. He is
> demoralized. I want to leave the camp. At night there are explosions,
> I get up at nights." Fadi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> Researcher: Do you feel attached to the camp?
> "Pain, oppression, the big erosion, close minded people, short views.
> Going back to home is a dream that will never come true." Nadine,
> ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

The exclusion that the Palestinians feel and the ambiguities in their everyday lives, especially those who are deprived of more citizenship benefits, may lead to hostility between the Palestinians and the Lebanese. As a result, this hostility may lead the Palestinians to see the Lebanese identity as rival and hold on to their original national identities. For instance, when it is taken into consideration that the environment the ID Palestinians living in the camp is like a small Palestine, where the majority of the residents of the camp is Palestinian, the names of the streets are the names of the neighborhood in Palestine and where Palestinian dialect is spoken constantly; this argument may be applicable. When they are asked whether they would like to continue living in the camp, they say:

> "For one hundred percent I want to live in the camp, because all are
> Palestinian. I am not lonely. I'm sharing for happy and sad." Nour,
> ID Palestinian in Beirut

"My parents, family are all there. I have friends. Secondly the camp is one of the symbols for us as refugees, it is a temporary place. We should move from this camp to Palestine. They shouldn't be cancelled. I don't support integration. Palestinian identity will be maintained. We name the parts of the camps in the original name of the villages in Palestine."

Researcher: "Advantage of camps?"

"Family, symbol, design of the camp, maintaining identity." Alima, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh

"You live among your people. There is bad hostility between Lebanese and Palestinian. But this doesn't exist anymore. Living inside is easier than outside."

Researcher: "Do you feel attached to the camp?"

"I feel so. I am attached although Palestinians and Lebanese got better relationship. Living in the camp makes me closer to my cause."

Researcher: "Advantages of living in the camp?"

"When I analyze, living in the camp doesn't make you closer to the camp. Belonging and identity has nothing to do where you live."

Researcher: "What forms your national identity then?"

"Identity you are born with, then you develop it. The environment you live in, either encourages or deters you. The environment I lived in made me attached to the Palestinian cause. I loved the camp after getting in Fatah."

Researcher: "What are the advantages?"

"Living in the camp, you live among your people. They make you feel secure; they make you understand you more." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

The connotations of the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp about Palestine also reveal that they view Palestine as their imaginary homelands and as the place that they would like to escape from the hostility in Lebanon. This pattern also demonstrates their perception of the Lebanese as rival.

"My homeland. A lot of meanings that you can't express. It's the place that I'm dreaming to go and to live there." Maysam, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

"My homeland, my everything. What connotates Turkey for you, for us it's the same for Palestine. If you see your homeland more valuable than yourself, for us it's also like that." Shaila, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "She feels like crying, if they were living in Palestine, she wouldn't be living like this." Raima, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "A dream that has to be fulfilled. No choice of moving back or giving up." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

On the other hand, the naturalized Palestinians and the ID Palestinians in Beirut may see the Lebanese identity compatible to their Palestinian identity. They may view it as the country which has suffered from Israeli occupations and feel that Israel has been the common enemy of the Palestinians and the Lebanese. For this reason, they may have a perception of the Lebanese identity as compatible to their original national identities.

> "Lebanese has been supportive to the Palestinian cause. Even now. Not make peace agreement with Israel. For Lebanon Israel is an enemy. Lebanon resisted as well against Israel in 1982." Bader, Naturalized Palestinian

> "The peace process scares me. Lebanon can't sign it. Lebanon may not want to find a way and sign the peace treaty with Israel. Then they'd have the stability, security. Then I would leave the country. I'd feel completely betrayed." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

> "The problem was a larger scale. Israel was planted in the mid of the Arab world. Not a problem of only Palestinians. It also affects the Arab world. The solution is only the unity of Arab countries. Her father saw the issue. Direct effect on Palestinians, but indirectly the whole region was affected." Reina, Naturalized Palestinian

> "The meaning of Beirut, it's a city of resistance. Beirut was invaded by Israel in 1982. Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus I love. Lebanon had the same suffering. I love the people here!" Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

> "I support a strong Lebanon. It is important for the region. I would want it to be competing with Israel in terms of human development, tourism. It should be the main player in the Palestinian cause, because Lebanon still has a mix of conservative and open-minded people. Israel is always depicted as the only democratic country in the region, but I believe mixture of culture, people is leading to a better place." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

Another reason for the naturalized and ID Palestinians in Beirut to see the Lebanese identity as compatible is that they may think that the Lebanese and the Palestinians are culturally similar to each other. They may view the Lebanese identity as having an Arab aspect and hence see it as compatible to their Palestinian Arab identity.

> "I feel myself as a Palestinian, Lebanese, then Arab." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

> "My family brought me as an Arab, Palestinian." Reina, Naturalized Palestinians

> "Very close to Palestine. A lot of cultural interaction between Palestine and Lebanon, many common things. Food, songs, poetry, literature, interaction is a lot. Same climate, similar geographical area." Abal, Naturalized Palestinian

4. 1. 1. Instrumental Citizenship?

The displaced individuals emphasize that they view the citizenship of the host country as instrumental. This shows that they are in need of citizenship benefits so that they would view the citizenship of the host country as an instrument to reach those rights. In addition, it shows that they would develop an attachment based relationship that is based on interest rather than emotions.

In order to reveal the respondents' perception of the citizenship of the host country they were asked two questions. For the first question - when the ID Palestinian respondents are asked whether they would want to have Lebanese citizenship or not - the majority of the ID Palestinian respondents emphasized that they would prefer it just to have basic rights. While some of the ID Palestinian respondents in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp gave a similar answer; some of them said that they would not prefer especially the Lebanese citizenship, because then they would lose the right to return to Palestine. The answers of the respondents to the

second question - whether they would prefer citizenship or civic rights only - reveal their need for civil rights only but not citizenship. It is also possible to argue that almost all of the Palestinian respondents, who are naturalized, view Lebanese citizenship as instrumental since they say that Lebanese citizenship provided them with certain rights and benefits.

Regarding the ID Palestinian respondents living in the camps who have less citizenship benefits than the ID Palestinians living in Beirut, there is a tendency to make reference to the right to return when they are asked whether they would like to be granted Lebanese citizenship. This also demonstrates their strong emotional attachment to their original homeland and their perception of Lebanese citizenship as an instrumental temporary status. Although they may be in need of citizenship benefits according to the answers of the respondents, returning to their homeland and remaining Palestinian is still more important than having citizenship benefits. For instance, when the ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp are asked whether they would like to have Lebanese citizenship they say:

> "If they say that you will have Lebanese citizenship but not return to Palestine then I wouldn't want it. If they grant me both, then I would like to have Lebanese citizenship." Jabbar, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "No. My wife's brother has two disabled children. If it was in Syria, it would be different. Why would we get the Lebanese citizenship? They would look down on us. We better go back to our country." Nasib, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "No. We don't want it. We want to return to Palestine. We have the right to live in Palestine and also their children have the right." Raima, ID Palestinian in Gaza Buildings

> "I don't want it. It doesn't mean anything to me. These rights should come to me naturally, without the citizenship. He doesn't want his son to be saying I'm Lebanese. This conflict has to continue." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

Yet, when they are asked whether they would want another citizenship, they still show their ambition to go back to Palestine.

> "European. So, I can go to Palestine. European social situation, financial situation will make me better, which would help me to work for my cause better." Fawzi, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

> "If they give us better life conditions, we would accept, except the Lebanese." Nasib, ID Palestinian in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp

Similarly, some of the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut said that they would prefer to have citizenship other than the Lebanese since they may need to leave their Palestinian identity if they are granted Lebanese citizenship. Though, the majority of the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut emphasized that in order just to have rights they would want to be granted citizenship. For instance, when she is asked whether she would want Lebanese citizenship, Ikram, an ID Palestinian said:

> "No, because I will have to leave my Palestinian ID card. It's like Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, America are Palestinians. Also if Israel kills the Palestinians in Israel, there wouldn't be any more Palestinians. You don't want to have it."
> Researcher: "Would you want another citizenship?"
> Ikram: "If I'll keep my Palestinian ID card. Yes.

> Researcher: "Why?"

> Ikram: "I can't study, work here. It's not like I'm nagging everyday to have it."

Ayten also draws attention to the rights that the Palestinians were deprived of, especially when they were displaced at the beginning. She talks about her grandparents and says:

> "They didn't apply for the Lebanese citizenship. Why should they need one? They didn't have the idea of getting a citizenship. Even for one second they didn't think about being Lebanese. They were villagers. Grandfather had no income and he had 8 children. So he took a stick and put an iron piece on top of it and went to the UNRWA in the camp. He went to the manager of the UNRWA and he said: 'I have 8 children

and no income. Either you give me a job or I'll kill you!' Then he started working as a worker in the UNRWA."

"If it doesn't mean losing Palestinian documents. If I get Lebanese citizenship you cancel your Palestinian identity, Palestinian documents. Culturally I would never lose it. I would want citizenship rights without citizenship." Ayten, ID Palestinian in Beirut

Researcher: "Why?"

"Because I don't want to be Lebanese. I want to work. I want all regular civil rights. Lebanese look to Palestinians as they want to interfere the country but we don't. We only want civil rights. I want to work, travel, own property, equal opportunity in terms of education, health, governance of associations, social security." Ayten, ID Palestinian in Beirut

When a respondent is asked whether Lebanese citizenship is important, he underlines the benefits of it in terms of making life easier in general.

"I can't be a member of syndicates, can't have jobs, can't own property, I can't govern myself. I can vote neither in Palestinian Authority nor in Lebanese elections. I would want to vote in Lebanon. I have no decision on the people governing me, on the people who are deciding my destiny. Then how can they be accountable for you? Anything that happens in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria (countries bordering Israel) will affect Palestine. So I would want to vote in Lebanon." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

"It's not important, although it will make my life better. I would want to have European citizenship, not any Arab country's citizenship." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

Researcher: "Why?"

"It is to visit Palestine! I want to go to my grandfather's (father's grandfather) grave in Akka. Visa issue is a problem. If I had the European citizenship, then I would visit Iraq, Afghanistan which are suffering. I would like to see those places." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian in Beirut

The interviews also demonstrate that the respondents have the will to remain as Palestinians. It is possible to argue that there is a zero-sum relationship of being Palestinian and having the Lebanese citizenship for the ID Palestinian respondents. At this point, I would like to argue that they perceive Palestinian and Lebanese national

identities as rival to each other. They emphasize that they would not want to lose the right to return if they obtain the Lebanese citizenship. In addition, they would prefer to remain as Palestinian refugees deprived of rights instead of being Lebanese citizens.

In order to show the benefits Lebanese citizenship provides and the respondents' instrumental perception of it, the major difference between being an ID Palestinian and a Lebanese citizen is asked to the ID Palestinians who were naturalized in 1994. So, the value of citizenship in the Palestinians' lives is revealed when the ID Palestinians naturalized in 1994 are asked the difference between being an ID Palestinian and a naturalized Palestinian. They emphasize that citizenship benefits provide them with a particular sense of security and certainty such as basic rights that make their lives easier and more manageable.

> "There is a big difference. ID Palestinians cannot get any employee in the government; cannot buy a house…" Yasir Musa, Naturalized Palestinian in 1994

> "With the Palestinian identity, you can't have anything, no work…" Zeina, Naturalized Palestinian in 1994

> Researcher: "You think Lebanese citizenship is important?"
> "Yes, because I feel as a member of this society." Yasir, Naturalized Palestinian in 1994

> "My brother has two kids. One is anemia. UNRWA cannot cover this. When we got the Lebanese citizenship, Lebanese public hospitals covered everything. Also, because I have Lebanese citizenship, I can work. I would also want another citizenship like the Canadian to benefit from citizenship rights." Majid, Naturalized Palestinian in 1994
> "Mainly for my children, for more opportunities, work, rather than the issue of identity." Bashir, Naturalized Palestinian in 1994

The interviews show that the displaced individuals emphasize that they view citizenship as instrumental and they have the will to remain only as Palestinian. However, they adopt multiple identities subconsciously as they are provided with

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citizenship benefits and start identifying themselves with their original national identities and the national identity of the host country.

The displaced individuals who are provided with more citizenship benefits are psychologically more resourceful to embrace multiple identities. According to the interviews, the respondents who are provided with more citizenship benefits had more multiple identities than the respondents who are provided with less citizenship benefits.

CHAPTER 5

5. Concluding Remarks

This thesis on the Palestinians and Armenians in Lebanon examined the individual responses of the displaced individuals to citizenship benefits. It provides answers to the question how citizenship benefits increase the identification level of the displaced individuals. It focused on, specifically, the Palestinian community that varies in terms of citizenship benefits – the naturalized Palestinians, ID Palestinians in Beirut and the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp and the Armenians. It shows the relationship between the differences in terms of their identification level with Lebanon and the citizenship benefits they are provided with.

The interviews demonstrate that the displaced individuals who lack citizenship benefits also lack ontological security. The ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp, as provided with very few citizenship benefits, lack more ontological security than the ID Palestinians in Beirut who have more citizenship benefits. There is a similar pattern regarding the ID Palestinians in Beirut and the naturalized Palestinians in Beirut: while the former has less citizenship benefits than the naturalized Palestinians, they also lack more ontological security than the naturalized Palestinians. In addition, the naturalized Palestinians who have less citizenship benefits than the Armenians also lack more ontological security than the latter one.

Interviews also show that the identification pattern of the respondents has a relationship with the citizenship benefits they are provided with. Having in mind that I tried to reduce bias by selecting from different groups on the basis of age, gender,

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civic participation and income level, the respondents who are provided with more citizenship benefits identify more with Lebanon which grants these citizenship benefits. As citizenship benefits decrease, the level of identification of the respondents also decreases.

The identification pattern of the respondents shows three inferences. First is that the majority of the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp perceive their homeland and country as Palestine. There were fewer respondents among the ID Palestinians in Beirut who consider their homeland and country as Palestine. Similarly, there were much fewer respondents among the naturalized Palestinians in Beirut than the ID Palestinians in Beirut who perceive Palestine as their homeland and country. There were less Armenians than the naturalized Palestinians who perceive their original homeland as their homeland and country.

Second inference is that almost all of the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp emphasize that they come from Palestine when it is asked where they are from. However, there were a few respondents among the ID Palestinians in Beirut who say that they come from Lebanon instead of Palestine. There were more naturalized Palestinians than the ID Palestinians in Beirut who say that they come from Lebanon instead of Palestine. On the other hand, there were more Armenians compared to the naturalized Palestinians who say that they come from Lebanon.

The third inference is regarding the national identity perception of the respondents. The respondents who are provided with more citizenship benefits tend to adopt multiple identities of the national identity of the host country and their original countries. All the Armenians have multiple identities; likewise the majority of the naturalized Palestinians also have multiple identities. Yet, there are fewer respondents among the ID Palestinians in Beirut than the naturalized Palestinians

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who have multiple identities. Similarly, there are fewer respondents among the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp who have multiple identities than the ID Palestinians in Beirut.

This study supports the argument that the respondents who have more citizenship benefits tend to have more ontological security which enable them to be psychologically more resourceful to embrace multiple identities. I would like to note that there is diversity of experiences on commonalities among different age groups, civic participation or income level. I can not rule out the possibility that this relationship is caused by different levels of age, civic participation or income level; yet my findings are consistent with my hypothesis that citizenship benefits increase the identification level with the host country. The respondents who are provided with less citizenship benefits see the negative sides of the national identity of the host country and view it as rival to their original national identities. The reasons why they are excluded from the Lebanese society; the reason why there is hostility between them and the Lebanese; and the reasons of the ambiguities in their everyday lives defines the Lebanese identity as rival.

However, the respondents who have more citizenship benefits see the positive sides of the national identity of the host country because citizenship benefits increase the ontological security of the individual beneficiaries. They define the Lebanese identity compatible to their original national identity.

All of these findings can be considered as an original contribution to the literature since there has not been a comparative research of the naturalized Palestinians, ID Palestinians in Beirut and the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp in terms of their national identity perception. Moreover, conducting interviews

contributed to this study by focusing only on the individual perceptions of the displaced individuals.

In addition, the comparison of the Armenians with the naturalized Palestinians - as the two major displaced communities in Lebanon - is an understudied area. The pattern with regards to the national identity perception of the Armenians shows that the Armenians and the naturalized Palestinians have multiple identities. At this point, I would like to stress that the relationship between the citizenship benefits and having multiple identities is not only specific to the naturalized Palestinians but it is possible to generalize it to another displaced community: the Armenians who benefit from Lebanese citizenship. As this thesis conducted a comparative study of the two, it can be regarded as an original contribution to the literature.

This study demonstrates that the displaced communities who have less citizenship benefits and are in need of them tend to identify with the host country that grants them these citizenship benefits. For this reason, it can be suggested that the communities which are in need of citizenship benefits can be provided with more citizenship benefits, if the host state has a policy to increase their identification with the host country.

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APPENDICES

a. Appendix A

The Variables

The interviews are conducted by selecting from different groups such as gender, age and income level. As Table 1 shows, there is not a major difference in terms of the identification with Lebanon between female and male respondents. While the female respondents scored 25 for the identification with Lebanon, the male respondents scored 21. And while the female respondents scored 86, the male respondents scored 89 for the identification with Palestine. Yet, still the respondents are selected on an equal basis according to their gender.

Table 1

	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Female Respondents	25	86
Male Respondents	21	89

On the other hand, Table 2 shows that there is a generational difference. While the senior respondents scored 19 for the identification with Lebanon, the young respondents scored 27. The senior respondents scored 90 for the identification with Palestine; the young respondents scored 81. In order for my sample to be representative as much as it is possible for a small sample, I selected senior and young respondents equally. Still, the identification level of the respondents varied according to their citizenship benefits.

Table 2

	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Senior Respondents		
Abal (S, A)[11]	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Ghalib (S, NA)	8	91
Qasim (S, NA)	53	84
Ramadan (S, A)	0	100
Hashim (S, A)	0	100
Maha (S, NA)	30	76
Raima (S, NA)	46	91
Shaila (S, NA)	0	100
Nasib (S, NA)	0	100
Jabbar (S, NA)	0	100
	19	**90**
Young Respondents		
Majid (Y, A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha(Y, NA)	23	91
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Hana (Y, A)	23	91
Amin	61	61
Zahra (Y, NA)	15	100
Ikram (Y, NA)	68	61
Maysam (Y, A)	20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)	10	100
Nour (Y, A)	0	100
Ismail (Y, A)	0	100
Marwa (Y, NA)	0	80
Dima (Y, NA)	0	80
	27	**81**

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[11] S: Senior, Y: Young A: Active in the movement for their original national movements; NA: Non-Active in the movement of their original national movements

Regarding the income level variable, as Table 3 shows, the respondents who have higher middle income scored 33; middle income scored 21 and lower income scored 8 in terms of identification with Lebanon. The higher middle income respondents scored 81; middle income respondents scored 88; and lower income scored 92 in terms of the identification with Palestine. It should be pointed out that the majority of the higher income respondents were naturalized Palestinians. Regarding the middle income respondents, the majority of them were ID Palestinians in Beirut except a few naturalized Palestinians. The lower income, on the other hand, were all ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp.

Table 3

	Identification with Lebanon	**Identification with Palestine**
Higher Middle Income		
Citizen	0	100
Citizen	84	53
Citizen	45	53
Citizen	23	91
Citizen	53	68
Citizen	0	100
Citizen	0	100
Citizen	30	83
	33	**81**
Middle Income		
Citizen	38	76
Citizen	0	91
Citizen	53	76
ID Palestinian in Beirut	60	90
ID Palestinian in Beirut	0	100
ID Palestinian in Beirut	23	91
ID Palestinian in Beirut	0	100
ID Palestinian in Beirut	15	100
ID Palestinian in Beirut	68	61
ID Palestinian in Beirut	53	84
ID Palestinian in Beirut	61	61
ID Palestinian in Beirut	8	91
	21	**88**
Lower Income		
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100

ID Palestinian in Camp	20	80
ID Palestinian in Camp	10	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	30	76
ID Palestinian in Camp	46	91
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	100
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	80
ID Palestinian in Camp	0	80
	8	**92**

It is possible to argue that citizenship benefits and income level has a relationship. As citizenship benefits increase, the income level of the respondents increases as well. When it is asked to the ID Palestinian respondents who live in Beirut and in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp what rights and privileges they miss they tend to point the citizenship benefits they are deprived of. While the naturalized Palestinians are provided with all the citizenship benefits a Lebanese citizen can enjoy, all the ID Palestinians are deprived of the right to work in 72 professions. For this reason, it is probable that the naturalized Palestinians will have higher income levels than the ID Palestinians.

On the other hand, the reason why respondents who have middle or higher middle income have more citizenship benefits may be because they used their resources to benefit from citizenship benefits.

> "There were massacres going on in Palestine. They left to Lebanon, my grandfather was well off, so he didn't stay in the camp. So he afforded renting a flat. He used to export oranges to Liverpool. He got supported from UNRWA. One of the reasons why Palestinians not applied for citizenship was because they were going to be cut off from UNRWA support." Abal, Naturalized Palestinian

The Palestinians who got the Lebanese citizenship after they were displaced from their original homeland, those who could afford it, purchased citizenship (Pard, 1998: 12); or hired a lawyer to be granted Lebanese citizenship.

> "In 1956, they were granted citizenship through a lawyer. There was Estaiteh family in Lebanon. He came to the court and said they are living in Palestine but they are our relatives. This is a special case to Kamil's family." Kamil, Naturalized Palestinian

ID Palestinians who live in Beirut also used their resources to live in the city instead of camps. Consequently, those who were better off preferred to live in the city and so they benefited from citizenship benefits more than the Palestinians who stayed in the camps. Hence, I can argue that the ID Palestinian respondents in Beirut can live in the city of Beirut because of their well economic situation. And they can benefit from the citizenship benefits in Beirut since they can live in Beirut.

> "Until the situation got better they were going to stay in Lebanon. But they were not allowed back. They settled outside the camps. Because uncle of his grandmother was rich so they could live outside the camps." Sulaiman, ID Palestinian

> "He came to Lebanon in 1948. No money, nothing. He started to work hard. He owned a wood shop. We have buildings." Zahra , ID Palestinian in Beirut
> Researcher: "How can you own property?"
> "Everything is under the name of my aunt." Zahra, ID Palestinian in Beirut

> Researcher: "What was the reason for coming to lebanon?"
> "Each group preferred whats best for each one. To run away. For our grandfather it was to go to Syria then to Lebanon. He came to beirut, not to the camp." Qasim, ID Palestinian in Beirut
> Researcher: "Why?"
> "He had a lot of money when he came to lebanon. They used to come on vacations. Then they wanted to stay here in 1949." Qasim, ID Palestinian in Beirut

b. Appendix B

Armenian Respondents' Perception of Turks

Researcher: "Were you raised with hatred to Turkey at the Armenian schools?"

"In general, they teach about the deportations and the 'Genocide' and the number of Armenians massacred. Then about the reactions, such as which countries have recognized it etc... Some teachers in some schools go as far as claiming that half of present-day Turkey is Armenian, which in my view is not an accurate portrayal. Many Armenians had property back then. Many lands were owned by Ottoman Armenian citizens. Whether this gives full legitimacy to reclaim national land is an open question. But in my view, this gives full legitimacy to some form of compensation." Ara

"Negative. As Turkey is the enemy. They made this, they did this, not only to Armenians but also to the region. They forced them to leave, on foot… They used to show us some pictures, presentations. It was very scary. We have the ceremony of the "genocide" on the 24th of April. We used to go to the church, pray for their souls. Now I think it's not nice to teach the hatred to children. We learn Armenian history from the fourth grade till we graduate." Christine

Researcher: "Is there a difference in the hatred they feel to Turkey between the ones who attended Armenian schools and who did not?"

"Yes there is." Christine

Researcher: "How is Turkey portrayed by your grandparents?"

"Negatively. But about the Turkish people I don't know, as I'm sure they would have different opinions about different people." Ara

Researcher: "Did your attitude towards Armenia/Turkey relations changed throughout your life?"

"Yes. It changed as I met with Turkish people. As I grew up… It was different in the Armenian schools. I think Turkey should open up to its history, open archives, it has big potential... Anyone who claims that 'it was a genocide' is in jail. This should change. And I also strongly oppose European countries sending citizens to jails for denying it. This mentality will get us nowhere. There's a considerable portion of Turkish middle class educated society that would like to know more and be given the chance to engage in academic dialogue, a discussion about historical issues. Whoever acknowledges the misdeeds but actively denies them for personal/national interests cannot be tolerated as a deserving counterpart for discussion." Ara

Researcher: "Was Turkey portrayed as the enemy?"

"Yes. They used to say, 'Don't eat Ülker, Eti. Don't watch Turkish TV channels'. They used to stick posters on the windows such as a picture of Turkish TV on which NO is written" Aida

Researcher: "Do you watch Turkish TV series?"

"Sometimes I watch. My father doesn't know. Me and my mom watch them." Aida

Researcher: "Do you consume Turkish produts such as Ülker or Eti?"

"No." Harout

Researcher: "Why?"

"That's the least that I can do. If one apology you are not giving me, I ask for my rights. You don't even respect me." Harout

"Yes. I wear made in turkey, I eat Turkish brands. My father does business with Turkey." Christine

Researcher: "What connotates when I say Turkey?"
"Currently, it's just a country. When I go back to history it means something. About the peace protocol, I was happy about it. We can not live in hatred. It will be more helpful to both countries." Christine

"Me as Vahan, my perspective to the world has changed. I was raised to hate Turkey to fight, we have our land, need to get it back. Whenever Turkey is the subject, I change it. After this peace protocol, I was shocked. Now, I want them to apologize and give our land back." Harout
Researcher: "What changed your perspective?"
"It begins with the religion. I met with good Muslim. We have this pride to be Armenian. I'm reading books. I believe in our cause. The whole ambiance, you feel guilty to speaking to Turkish. But I need to find stuff. I must talk to Şenay." Harout

c. Appendix C
Assessment of the Identification Pattern

It is possible to assess the identification pattern of the respondents by the number of zero and one hundred scores given to the identification with Palestine and

Lebanon as well. As Table 4 shows, regarding the identification level with Palestine, while there is only one respondent who scored one hundred among the ten naturalized Palestinians; there are five one hundreds among the eleven ID Palestinians in Beirut; there are eight one hundreds among the twelve ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. So, it is possible to argue that the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have higher identification with Palestine than the ID Palestinians in Beirut. Similarly, the ID Palestinians in Beirut have higher identification with Palestine than the naturalized Palestinians since the former have more hundreds in terms of identification with Palestine than the latter.

The number of zeros in terms of identification with Lebanon shows the low identification of the respondents with Lebanon. While there are only two zeros for the identification level with Lebanon among the ten naturalized Palestinians; there are four zeros among the eleven ID Palestinians in Beirut and nine zeros among the twelve ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. Hence, it is possible to put forward that the ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have lower identification with Lebanon than the ID Palestinians in Beirut. Likewise, the ID Palestinians in Beirut have lower identification with Lebanon than the naturalized Palestinians since the former have more zeros in terms of identification with Lebanon than the latter.

Table 4

Citizenship Status	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Lebanese Citizens		
Abal (S, A)	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53

Majid (Y, NA-A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha(Y, NA)	23	91
	33	78
ID Palestinians in Beirut		
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Ayten (Y, A)	23	91
Ghalib (S, NA)	8	91
Qasim (S, NA)	53	84
Amin (Y, NA)	61	61
Zahra (Y, NA)	15	100
Ikram (Y, NA)	68	61
	26	89
ID in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp		
Ramadan (S, A)	0	100
Hashim (S, A)	0	100
Maysam (Y, A)	20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)	10	100
Nour (Y, A)	0	100
Ismail (Y, A)	0	100
Maha (S, NA)	30	76
Raima (S, NA)	46	91
Shaila (S, NA)	0	100
Nasib (S, NA)	0	100
Jabbar (S, NA)	0	100
Marwa (Y, NA)	0	80
Dima (Y, NA)	0	80
	8	92

Furthermore, Table 5 shows, while there are two respondents among the four active naturalized Palestinians in terms of the identification pattern with Lebanon, there are no zeros at all among the six non-active naturalized Palestinians. In terms of the identification with Palestine there is one respondent who scored one hundred among the four active naturalized Palestinians and there are no one hundreds at all among the six non-active naturalized Palestinians. Therefore, it is possible to argue

that the active naturalized Palestinians have lower identification with Lebanon and higher identification with Palestine than the non-active naturalized Palestinians.

Regarding the ID Palestinians in Beirut, there are four zeros among the six active ID Palestinians and there are no zeros at all among the five non-active ID Palestinians in Beirut in terms of the identification with Lebanon. In terms of identification with Palestine there are four one hundreds among the six active ID Palestinians and one respondent who scored one hundred among the five non-active ID Palestinian. Similarly, I can argue that the active ID Palestinians have lower identification level with Lebanon and higher identification with Palestine than the non-active ID Palestinians.

On the other hand there are four zeros among the six active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp and five zeros among the seven non-active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. And while there are five one hundred among the six active ones, there are three one hundreds among the seven non-active ones. Hence, I would like to emphasize that the fact that there are more one hundreds among the active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp in terms of the identification level with Palestine shows their higher level of identification with Palestine and lower level of identification with Lebanon than the non-active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh.

Table 5

Citizenship Status	Identification with Lebanon	Identification with Palestine
Lebanese Citizens Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Abal (S, A)	0	100
Bashir (S, A)	30	83
Roy (Y, A)	0	91
Zeina (Y, A)	38	76

	17	88
Lebanese Citizens Non-Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Yasir (S, NA)	8	91
Sami (S, NA)	84	53
Majid (Y, NA-A)	53	76
Kamil (Y, NA)	53	68
Reina (Y, NA)	45	53
Rasha(Y, NA)	23	91
	44	63
ID Palestinians in Beirut Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Sharif (S, A)	60	90
Rashid (S, A)	0	100
Huma (S, A)	0	100
Alima (S, A)	0	100
Sulaiman (Y, A)	0	100
Ayten (Y, A)	23	91
	14	96
ID Palestinians in Beirut Non-Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Ghalib (S, NA)	8	91
Qasim (S, NA)	53	84
Amin (Y, NA)	61	61
Zahra (Y, NA)	15	100
Ikram (Y, NA)	68	61
	41	79
ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp Active in the Palestinian Movement		
Ramadan (S, A)	0	100
Hashim (S, A)	0	100
Maysam (Y, A)	20	80
Fawzi (Y, A)	10	100
Nour (Y, A)	0	100
Ismail (Y, A)	0	100
	5	97
ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp Non-Active in the Palestinian		

Movement		
Maha (S, NA)	30	76
Raima (S, NA)	46	91
Shaila (S, NA)	0	100
Nasib (S, NA)	0	100
Jabbar (S, NA)	0	100
Marwa (Y, NA)	0	80
Dima (Y, NA)	0	80
	11	90

As Table 5 indicates, while there are two zeros out of four among the active naturalized Palestinians in terms of the identification with Lebanon; there are four zeros out of six among the active ID Palestinians in Beirut; and there are four zeros out of six among the active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp as well. Hence, it is possible to argue that the active naturalized Palestinians have higher identification with Lebanon than the active ID Palestinians in Beirut. And the active ID Palestinians in Beirut have higher identification with Lebanon than the active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp.

Regarding the identification with Palestine, there is one respondent who scored one hundred among the four active naturalized Palestinians; four one hundreds among the six active ID Palestinians in Beirut; and five one hundreds among the six active ID Palestinians living in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp. Therefore, I can put forward that the active ID Palestinians in Bourj Al Barajneh Camp have higher identification with Palestine than the active ID Palestinian in Beirut. And the active ID Palestinians in Beirut have higher identification with Palestine than the active naturalized Palestinians.