**Diasporic Identity Formation:**

**A Case Study of Albanian Immigrants in Istanbul**


**By**

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# STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any University or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due references is made in the text of the thesis.

<div align="right">Esra İşsever Ekinci</div>

# ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to investigate the process of diasporic identity formation with a case study on a particularly under-studied immigrant group in Turkey, the '*Albanians' from the former Yugoslavia.* Drawing on the theoretical literatures on diasporas, transnationalism and social movements in examining Albanian immigrant community, this thesis scrutinizes the way immigrant groups form and transform their identities and the role played by the political developments in homeland and host countries as well as immigrant associations in the diasporic identity formation. Through analyzing responses to 70 surveys and 10 in-depth interviews conducted with Albanian immigrants in Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul, this thesis advances three major arguments. The first argument is that diasporic identity is socially constructed in response to political developments in the home and host countries, it is not an essential social form emerged out of boundary-crossing. Secondly, contemporary diasporas constitute a form of transnational community with a simultaneous sense of belonging to both home and host countries. This simultaneity in loyalty does not invalidate their diasporic consciousness and orientation towards home country. Lastly, this thesis argues that a social movement approach to diaspora illuminates diasporic identity formation, through analyzing the role of both changing political structures and agency of immigrant groups in this process.

**Key Words:** diaspora, transnationalism, social movements, identity formation, Albanian diaspora, former Yugoslavia, immigrant associations.

# ÖZET

Bu çalışma, diyasporik kimlik oluşum sürecini Türkiye'de çok çalışılmamış bir göçmen grup olan Arnavut göçmenleri üzerinden irdelemektedir. Bu çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi, diyaspora, transnasyonalism ve sosyal hareketler literatürleri üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Türkiye'de bulunan Arnavut göçmenlerin kimlik süreçlerini inceleyerek, bu çalışma göçmen gruplarında kimlik oluşumunun ve değişiminin kavranmasına ve bunun yanı sıra bu değişimde anavatan ve göç ülkesindeki değişen siyasal durumlar ile göçmen derneklerinin rolüne ışık tutmaktadır. Bu tez, İstanbul'un Zeytinburnu ilçesinde anket, gözlem ve derinlemesine görüşme teknikleri kullanılarak yapılan saha çalışmasına dayanarak üç temel sav sunmaktadır. Birinci olarak, diyasporik kimlik, anavatan ve göç ülkesindeki siyasi gelişmelere cevap olarak inşa edilmiştir. Bu kimlik sadece sınır değiştirmeyle elde edilen sosyal bir form değildir. İkinci olarak, diyasporalar, anavatan ve göç ülkesine eş zamanlı aidiyetliğin geçerli olduğu ulus ötesi bir cemaat türü oluştururlar. Bu eş zamanlı bağlılık, diyasporik bilincin varlığını ve anavatana yönelimi geçersiz kılmaz. Son olarak, bu tez sosyal hareketler yaklaşımını kullanarak diyasporik kimlik oluşumunu, bu süreçteki değişen siyasi yapıları ve göçmen grupların eylemselliğini analiz ederek açıklamaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** diyaspora, transnasyonalism, sosyal hareketler, kimlik oluşumu,  Arnavut diyasporası, eski Yugoslavya, göçmen dernekleri.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION: FOCUS AND APPROACH

## 1.1. Aim of the Study

Over the past two decades, interest in diasporic communities and their role in world politics has grown to such an extent that both diasporas and their transnational activism have become a focal topic in recent studies within disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science and international relations. Along with the increasing general interest in diaspora, this literature has been enhanced with theoretical debates on how to define it and its relation with transnationalism and transnational communities, in addition to the empirical studies regarding the transnational mobilization of diaspora groups for home country development and home country politics.

The study of diasporas is significant because theoretically diasporas as a social form pose a challenge the very conventional institutions of state: citizenship and loyalty (Shain and Barth, 2003) through retaining simultaneous social relations that bring together societies of origin and settlement (Glick Schiller *et al.,* 1995). Besides that, contemporary diaspora communities have also become actors in the international politics utilizing the institutions of home and host countries plus international

institutions. These communities started to have implications on the international state system since their practical, economic and social roles have been enhanced with globalization (Cohen, 1997). Accordingly, diasporas emerge as the agents of, on the one hand conflict resolution or perpetuation and on the other, the economic and political development of home country most of the empirical research in the diaspora literature.[1] Therefore, they have a unique role in linking domestic and international politics together and should be accommodated in the international relations scholarship within 'a theoretical space shared by liberalism and constructivism' (Shain and Barth, 2003: 473). In their own words, Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth (2003) clarify the rationale for including diasporas in international relations as follows:

> Given that diasporas are mainly identity-motivated, that they exert influence on homelands mainly through domestic politics, that they are part of a larger international society, and that they are nonstate actors, this shared "theoretical space" is a sound basis for the incorporation of diasporas into IR theory (Shain and Barth, 2003: 457).

Despite the significance of studying their role as international non-state actors, it is equally essential to scrutinize theoretically and empirically how diasporas emerge in contemporary global world. As Reis (2004) points out, there is a need to differentiate contemporary diasporas from the classical ones since the emergence of the latter is strictly tied to the experience of exile. On the other hand, contemporary or global diasporas are more complex and reasons for their formation are manifold (Reis, 2004). Therefore, the process of diaspora formation and its relation to broader literature on transnationalism become key issues to unravel, rather than treating

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[1] See the studies by Djuric, 2003; Kleist, 2008; Lampert, 2009; McGregor, 2009; Mohan, 2006; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002.

diasporas as simply "causes", "independent variables" or "actors" as most conventional studies do (Adamson, 2008: 2-3).

This thesis aims to investigate the process of diaspora formation with a case study on a particularly under-studied immigrant group, the *Albanians from the former Yugoslavia in Turkey*. Drawing on the literatures on diaspora, transnationalism and social movements, this thesis argues that the relation that diasporas have with their countries of origin and destination is not a direct result of the migration itself (Sökefeld, 2006), nor does each immigrant community form a diasporic identity and engage in transnational activities (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003). Instead, immigrants *become* a diaspora through developing new imaginations of their community; and this research scrutinizes first what constitutes these imaginations and second how these new imaginations have emerged with tools of social movement theory such as *political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes.*

The study of diaspora formation with a social movement approach necessitates a multi-level analysis; therefore, this thesis will examine developments at the state level (macro-level), organizational level (meso-level) and individual-level (micro-level). At the state level, which will be discussed in third chapter, citizenship, migration and integration policies along with the relationship between governments of emigration and immigration countries will be laid out through the analysis of historical sources and policy documents. In addition, this chapter will explore both the migration process and the later developments in the countries of origin and destination respectively. Moreover, changes in the political structures, which are

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named as *political opportunities* in the social movement theory, are examined as they pave the way for the emergence of diasporic identity.

Besides the state level, the transnational networks and ties migrants have at the non-state level are also crucial inasmuch as they facilitate the formation of a collective identity (Faist, 2000). Hence at the meso-level, immigrant associations and kinship groups formed by the Albanian immigrant community will be analyzed through interviews with the directors and/or members of these associations and corresponding documents in the fourth chapter. The aim of this meso-level analysis is to figure out the role of the organizations on the formation of diasporic identity, in other words, their role as *mobilizing structures.*

Finally, individual immigrants and their political and social relations will be investigated at the micro-level through conducting in-depth interviews and surveys. The individual-level analysis, which is the main focus of this thesis, will trace how immigrants perceive their community and how they narrate their identity, in relation to the following: their migration experience, their orientation towards homeland, their relations within the group, and finally, in relation to preservation of their identity through endogamy or using native language.

### 1.2. The significance of the Migrants from the former Yugoslavia

The Balkan states inherited a multicultural and multinational population from the Ottoman Empire. Almost all Balkan states used similar measures for their multinational populations such as forced migration, population exchange or assimilation during the nation-state formation (Todorova, 2003). The Turkish state

was no exception to these policies. Turkey also utilized migration as a tool in constructing a Turkish national identity, especially during the early years of the Turkish Republic (see, İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004; İçduygu *et al.*, 2008; Kirişçi, 2000). For this, Turkey encouraged the migration of Muslim people from the conceded lands of the Ottoman Empire such as the Balkans, and Caucasus as an immigration policy (Bora, 1995; Çağaptay, 2002a and 2002b; Kirişçi, 1995 and 2000). The basic assumption behind this immigration policy was that those migrating from the former lands of the Ottoman Empire share common cultural heritage and can easily be assimilated to Turkish society. For this reason, the immigrants from the Balkans, whether from Bulgaria, Greece or the former Yugoslavia, were readily accepted as immigrants on the basis of their religion.

The migration from the former Yugoslavia is a part of this general trend of Balkan migration, especially in terms of Turkish policy towards the migrants. Turkey received approximately 305,000 migrants from the former Yugoslavia in sequential waves from 1923 to 2000 (Kirişçi, 1995). Aside from the population exchange with Greece, the migration from Yugoslavia is the second biggest migration after the Bulgarian one (Kirişçi, 1995). Moreover, the immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are also noteworthy in that they formed relations with other immigrants having established 24 associations in different periods which contain ties with their home countries (Toumarkine, 2000). Yet, what makes the migration flows from the former Yugoslavia interesting is that migrants were ethnically diverse and encompassed Albanians, Torbeshes, and Bosnians as well as Turks. Although there is not enough available data on the ethnic origins of immigrants due to state policies, it has been very much stressed in the literature that Albanians and Bosnian Muslims had to

declare themselves as Turks in order to be able to migrate to Turkey (Kirişçi, 1995: 71; see also Rapper, 2000; Malcolm, 1998; Poulton 1997).

Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a major controversy with respect to the number of Albanian versus Turkish immigrants in the literature of migration from the former Yugoslavia. While some scholars stress that Albanian migrants constituted only a minority in the migration waves (i.e. Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a; Oran, 1993; Duman, 2009), other sources emphasize that the majority of migrants were mostly of Albanian origin (Rapper, 2000; Malcolm, 1998; Poulton, 1997; Palmer and King, 1971). However, this demographic discussion is not so relevant to the aim of my thesis, since I concentrate more on how the immigrants themselves define their identity.

Notwithstanding the mass migration from the former Yugoslavia, its political and social implications on the society have not been thoroughly studied. Most migration studies concentrated on either broader level regional migration from the Balkans (Ağanoglu, 2001; Bulut, 2006; Kirişçi, 1995; Öksüz and Köksal, 2004; Yılmaz, 1994) or more specifically on the population exchange between Greece and Turkey (Arı, 2005; Belli, 2004; Yıldırım, 2006). Although scholarly work on waves of migration from the former Yugoslavia from the identity perspective is rare, there are two studies focusing on this gap in the literature. Beltan (2006) scrutinizes the relation between citizenship and identity through an analysis of post-80s Turkish immigrants from the Macedonia and she displays the paradoxical nature of the citizenship claims of these immigrants since their claims are based on similarity and difference from local Turks. Şen (2007), using the oral history method, focuses on

the narratives of daily experiences of immigrants from the post-1950 era, analyzing changes in their identity. While these studies are mostly on 'Turkish emigrants' from ex-Yugoslavia, Geniş and Maynard (2009) focus on the Albanian diaspora in Samsun and explain diaspora formation in direct relation to migration experience. Even though these studies touch upon the question of homeland and identity, they do not elaborate on the transnational dimension, the interplay between developments in the home country (the former Yugoslavia) and the political activities in the host country (Turkey). This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literature of Balkan migrations through analyzing the transnational dimension of the 'Albanian' community using both political science and international relations perspectives.

Despite the lack of studies that examine emigrants from former Yugoslavia in Turkey with regards to home country relations, the migration from the region to other countries became a major area of inquiry after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This body of research, utilizing the transnationalism and diaspora literatures, focus on different migrant communities from the former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnian refugee communities in the UK and the Netherlands (Al-Ali, 2002), the Slovenian diaspora in Canada (Skrbis, 1999), Croatian diasporas in North America (Djuric, 2003), and also in Sweeden (Frykman, 2002) and the Albanian diaspora in Italy (Derhemi, 2003).

The Albanian community is different from the above mentioned communities in that they are already scattered around Balkan region after the demise of Ottoman Empire. Hence, Albanians not only exists in the Albanian state but also in former Yugoslavia (mostly in Kosovo and Macedonia) and in certain parts of Greece. In other words,

out of 7,3 million of Albanians living in the Balkans, only 2,7 million of them live in Albania (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). In Kosovo, Albanians make up the majority of the population (more than 80 percent), whereas they are the largest minority group in Macedonia, constituting 20-40 percent of the population[2] (Gaber, 1997; Malcolm, 1998). This territorial differentiation constitutes a challenge in regards to analysis of relations with homeland, yet the fact that the majority of Albanian migrants in Turkey came from the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo and Macedonia) mitigates this challenge. According to the estimates of the Albanian government, Turkey only has a small population of Albanian migrants (5,000) from Albania as of 2005 (Vullnetari, 2007: 36), which are not included in this analysis.

The immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, came in three different waves, as will be discussed further in-depth in the third chapter. *The first* one took place immediately after the foundation of the Turkish Republic up until the Second World War, concentrated mainly between the years 1923 and 1939 (Kirişçi, 1995). The *second* wave of migration occurred when Turkey and Yugoslavia started to establish a relatively more harmonious relationship after the Second World War (Kirişçi, 1995). In particular the treaty signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1953 permitted large scale migration to Turkey (Malcolm, 1998: 332). Finally, the migration during the dissolution of Yugoslavia is categorized as the *third* wave of migration which consists of approximately 38,000 migrants from the region (Kirişçi, 2001). Among these, second wave of migration is very interesting for the purposes of this study in that the migrants had to declare that they were 'Turks' in order to

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[2] Since the Albanians protested the census in FYROM, there is no accurate data concerning their population. According to the official censuses of Macedonia, Albanians constitute 20 percent of the population, while Albanians claim that they constitute 40 percent of the population.

immigrate, which would inevitably affect how they define their identity in the host country as well.

In sum, this thesis is an attempt to move beyond the explanations of the macro-level structural analyses that focus on the process of migration. I aim to shift the focus of this literature from migration to the post-migration process and from structural analysis to individual-level analysis. In order to examine these post-migration processes, it is useful to accompany historical analyses with the study of the everyday practices of the migrants and networks formed by them. Hence this thesis tries to elucidate the interplay among developments in the homeland, political structure in the host country, and diasporic identity using a social movement approach to diaspora.

### 1.3. A Social Movements Approach to the Formation of Diaspora

Employing a constructivist approach to diaspora in this thesis, I define diaspora as *an imagined community with links spanning more than one country* which brings together objective and subjective characteristics, a transnationally dispersed group and the self-imagination as a community respectively. This definition enables me to refrain from essentialist notions of diaspora, which is also achieved by the transnational social space/field approach with its emphasis on the process whereby the migrant community engages in the "pentatonic" interactions. This "pentatonic relationship" includes the countries of origin and destination, civil society organizations in both receiving and sending countries and the diasporic group itself (Faist, 2000). Accordingly, the mobilization aspect becomes indispensable when

civil society is introduced into this relationship. This then ties the notion of diaspora to the social movement theory.

Social movements, defined as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities" (Tarrow, 1998:4), have been explained with different approaches and tools. McAdam *et al.* (1996) outline three main tools from these approaches: *political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes,* and argue that the analytical framework should combine insights from these three concepts and the relationship between them. These very tools used in social movement studies are also helpful in explaining the formation of diasporic identity. To begin with, the *political opportunities* perspective addresses changes in the structural conditions (Tarrow, 1998: 85-89). When translated into diaspora formation, it corresponds to the changes in the policies relating to citizenship and migration (Vertovec, 2003). As Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue it can also include the existence of groups with similar motives.

For the Albanian migrant community in Turkey, these *political opportunities* can be adoption of a more multiculturalist approach to different ethnic groups. Even though the Turkish migration regime largely favored Balkan and Caucasian people and allowed a smooth process of naturalization according to the settlements laws, there were also restrictions that did not allow the consolidation of a collective political identity. As an example, concentrating in the same districts was forbidden for non-Turk Muslim immigrants in the Settlement Law No. 2510. After the military coup of 1980, neither publication in languages other than the officially recognized language

(Law on the use of Languages other than Turkish No. 2932) was allowed nor was the establishment of an association claiming the existence/creation of a minority group (Law of Associations, Article 5). Similarly, establishing association branches abroad was not allowed, either (Hersant or Toumarkine, 2005). Nonetheless, the accession process to the European Union led to a more multicultural environment with changes in laws such as Law on Associations, Law No. 2392 etc. as will be explained further in the following chapters. In addition, preexisting groups with identity claims such as Cherkes diaspora and the Kurdish minority had both enabling and disabling effects on this migrant group. These changing circumstances open way for the formation of diasporic identity. Yet the critical event was the change in the home country: the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which was followed by the formation of a parallel state system in Kosovo in the 1990s; the Albanian referendum on autonomy in Macedonia in 1992; the Kosovo war of 1999; the insurgency in Macedonia in 2001 and the subsequent Ohrid Framework Agreement in the same year; and the independence of Kosovo in 2008. In this thesis all these changes are mapped out as *political opportunities*.

Another tool is *mobilizing structures*, which are defined as "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et *al,* 1996: 3). This concept examines the process of resource mobilization by tracing the links social movements have with other groups, and the need for external support (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1213). In the Albanian case, immigrant associations with their networks to home country both at the organizational level with associations or political parties in the home country and individual level based on familial ties constitute these *mobilizing structures*.

Yet another tool social movement theory provides are *framing processes*, which enable the social movement to have a common understanding and interpretation of events and conditions. Frames enable individuals to locate and identify events and they also represent shared meanings and definitions for collective action (Sökefeld, 2006). Framing is relevant to diaspora formation in that it can illuminate the agency in the process that leads individuals to transform their identity in relation to a critical event. Yet framing should not be assumed as a consensual process; instead there can be internal contestations or even competing frames in such a process. Thus, the internal process of contention should not be disregarded since it has effects on the extent and the form of the diasporic mobilization. In the Albanian case, there are contestations among immigrant associations and among the identity frames that they developed as well which, in turn, affects the form of Albanian diasporic activism. All in all, these three tools provided by social movement theory will help to analyze the emerging Albanian diaspora.

### 1.4. Methodology and Data Collection

As this thesis uses a multi-level of analysis, different methodologies are used for each level. First, in the analysis of the relationship between governments of emigration and immigration countries and admission and integration policies, the thesis draws on secondary sources which are analyzed historically. Hence, the analytical historical review section examines the migration process and the developments after migration in Turkey and in the former Yugoslavia. Second, in the analysis of transnational networks and ties, the activities of hometown associations and kinship groups of the migrant community are examined through their booklets

and websites as well as with interviews I conducted with the directors of these associations and founders of websites.

However, the primary methodological strength of this thesis lies in its individual-level analysis since the main aim is to examine the process of diasporic identity formation by the individual migrant. Therefore, I viewed it as necessary to conduct original empirical research aimed at scrutinizing how the Albanian migrant community describes themselves with regards to their collective identity and how they practice their identity. It is equally important to consider how they represent the self and Other and the ways in which using their own languages, watching satellite television channels, and visiting the homeland relates to their identity.

The individual-level of analysis also explores the process of collective identity formation. Collective identity, defined as "a social category that varies along two dimensions- content and contestation" (Abdelal *et al.*, 2006: 696), can be studied in relation to the meaning of the identity and/or to the degree of agreement group has on the content. The *content* of a collective identity is comprised of *constitutive norms* defining the membership, *social purposes* with goals shared by members and *relational comparisons* that establish a distinguishing feature of an in-group. On the other hand, *contestation* addresses the contextual nature of identities (Abdelal *et al.*, 2006). As the question at this level is how individual immigrants constitute their identity, the content of collective identity becomes the focus of this thesis, yet I will also examine the contestation aspect in order to understand the framing process.

This thesis will be based on the fieldwork I conducted in Zeytinburnu, a neighborhood of Istanbul, which is known for its large Albanian population (Rapper, 2000; Toumarkine, 2000). This fieldwork consists of both in-depth interviews and an exploratory survey in order to gain an understanding of the Albanian migrant identity with regards to homeland. With a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews, which is mostly interested in meaning and how people interpret their lives and experiences, I will be able to both elicit responses to the questions and observe and record the behavior in the natural setting (Creswell, 1994; Seidman, 1998). Therefore, in-depth interviews conducted with 10 migrants provide me with the thick descriptions and dense information regarding the identity formation of the migrant community. The qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews also complies with the aim of this thesis, which is to explain the process of diasporic identity formation. It should be noted here, however, that the literature on diaspora and transnationalism is often criticized for relying on a sample chosen on the dependent variable, in other words, a sample consisting only of those immigrants engaging in transnational activities (Guarnizo *et al.,* 2003). For this reason, I also employed surveys that I conducted with a larger sample of 70 respondents to have a relatively broader picture to capture the diversity among the members of the Albanian community (Weiss, 1995). I used this exploratory survey method as the basis of identifying the practices, attitudes and self-representation of individual immigrants and it served two purposes. First, it gave a relatively more diverse and general description of the community in regards to their attitudes and practices. Second, it constituted the basis of the in-depth interviews according to the demographic characteristics.

*1.5 Organization of the Thesis*

This study aims to analyze the formation of diasporic identity amongst Albanian immigrants from the former Yugoslavia in Turkey. The following four chapters will present this analysis. A brief synopsis of each of these chapters is as follows.

The second chapter presents a theoretical overview of literatures on diaspora, transnationalism and social movements. It presents a discussion of the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism without disregarding the critiques directed at both literatures. Moreover, I try to point out alternative ways of studying diaspora and transnational migration in addition to discussing how these alternatives intersect with each other. In addition, I introduce the tools that the social movement literature provides to study the process of diaspora formation. In this chapter, I will also explore different case studies on diasporic identity and transnationalism with the underlying question: can the concepts that social movement theory provides be used to explain the formation of a diasporic identity characterized by an intensified attachment to the home country while paradoxically retaining citizenship in the receiving country in different types of migration such as labor migrations or exile migration.

The third chapter will first concentrate on the general pattern of migration from the Balkan countries to Turkey, since this migration is significant in setting the general parameters of the Albanian migration to Turkey and the circumstances in which the 'Albanians' were accepted as immigrants and then as citizens. After explaining the pattern of migration from the Balkans in three different periods, I examine the citizenship and migration regimes in Turkey, in effect the political structures under

which immigrants define their identity. After that, I will delve into the historical context of the emigration from the former Yugoslavia, the citizenship and minority rights in the country as well as political and socio-economic changes that led to mass emigration of the Muslim population. This discussion will enable us to understand how Albanian immigrants perceive their migration as a form of exile and how it affects the transformation of their identity after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

In the fourth chapter, I will analyze the empirical data that I collected through in-depth interviews and surveys with the migrants. The analysis and discussion will focus on the formation of diasporic identity in the migrant community. First, I will concentrate on the way Albanian migrants perceive their community and practice their identity through focusing on the migration experience, self-awareness of the group as a community, home country orientation, and lastly boundary maintenance. Second, this chapter investigates the process of diasporic identity formation by examining roles played by *political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes*, and the relationship between them. After analyzing these tools regarding the emergence of diasporic identity formation, I will also observe the competing identity frames formed by immigrant associations and how this affects further processes of diaspora.

The final chapter summarizes the theoretical and analytical framework and the findings of this research, with an emphasis on the main arguments in the previous chapters and contributions to the various literatures. In addition, I will also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this study.

# CHAPTER II:

# TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA FORMATION

## *2.1. Introduction*

There is a growing interest in the literature on diasporas and their transnational activism which has extended the consciousness and political mobilization of people beyond the nation-state borders. Diaspora studies examine not only simultaneous social relations that bring together societies of origin and settlement (Glick Schiller *et al,* 1995) but also extension of migrant activities from the conventional practices of sending remittances to home country, to a myriad of political practices including electoral politics and diaspora nationalism (Tarrow, 2005). However, they are studied as not only the agents of conflict resolution or perpetuation but also as agents of economic and political development (i.e. Djuric, 2003; Kleist, 2008; Lampert, 2009; McGregor, 2009; Mohan, 2006; Ndofor-Tah, 2000). Yet in this thesis, diasporas will not be taken as actors or causes to explain the changes and developments in the home country. Instead, diaspora will be the dependent variable and the process of its formation will be explained through social movement theory.

Before elaborating on the process of diaspora formation, I need to emphasize the difference between classical and contemporary diaspora. In contrast to classical

diaspora whose existence depends on the traumatic event or exile, the contemporary diaspora is inseparable from the forces of globalization and transnationalism which create the opportunities for its emergence. Hence, the notion of diaspora will be explored in the context of the broader literature on transnationalism. Defined as "the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement", transnationalism theory provides researchers with the tools to study the process by which immigrants live across national borders and respond to the constraints and demands of the two (or more) states (Glick Schiller *et al.*, 1995: 48).

The strength of transnationalism is that with its multi-disciplinary approach it is wide enough to bring together different domains of transnational practices, such as the economic domain with a focus on the remittances and development, the political realm with an emphasis on the changing role of the state and boundaries of belonging, the social domain giving importance to the structures of family, class, gender and race, and finally the cultural and religious domains (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Although the study of transnationalism initially emerged within the economic domain and the phenomenon is explained as a response to the global restructuring of the capital, the other domains such as cultural and political ones, have gained equal importance over time. Moreover, the space and identity dimensions of migration experience have brought theories of diaspora and transnationalism even closer. Nevertheless, diaspora concept enables us to focus more on the identity component of transmigration rather than focusing all other domains of transnational ties. Thus, diaspora concept illustrates the ways in which the migrant communities relate to different states and how this affects their identities. It is also used as a tool to display

the way homeland identities are preserved, re-formed or transformed. For this reason, it is important to highlight the process of formation of and/or transformation into a diaspora as well as specific characteristics of it.

Consequently, in agreement with Sökefeld (2006:276), who defined diasporas as "imagined transnational communities", this thesis employs a process-oriented approach to diaspora formation and evaluates diaspora not as an automatic result of migration, but as developed in response to triggering events that occurred in the post-migration period. Also, unlike an essentialist approach which determines the criteria to be called 'diaspora' according to an archetype diaspora population, the process-oriented approach makes it possible to analyze the complex reasons and ways in which diasporic identity is imagined. This imagining of a transnational community brings the mobilization aspect into the picture and hence this process can be likened to the process of social mobilization. Therefore, social movement theory can provide necessary tools for explaining diaspora formation (Sökefeld, 2006). This research will primarily draw on the framework developed by Vertovec (2003), who offers a cross-disciplinary reading of transnationalism emphasizing the 'transnational social movements' literature and by Sökefeld (2006), who suggests integrating concepts such as political opportunities and mobilizing structures and framing processes into the analysis of diaspora formation. These approaches aid in explaining the process of Albanian diaspora formation in Turkey.

In this survey of the relevant literatures on transnationalism and formation of diaspora, I first briefly discuss the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism without disregarding the critiques directed to both literatures. In this theoretical part, I also

try to provide alternative ways of studying diaspora and transnational migration in addition to discussing how these alternatives intersect with each other. After presenting theoretical discussions on both literatures, in the fourth section, I explore the tools that social movement literature provides to study the process of diaspora formation. In the fifth section, I discuss different empirical cases with the following major question in the background: can the concepts that social movement theory provides be used as tools for explaining the formation of transnational ties and diasporic identity with intensified attachment to the home country while paradoxically retaining citizenship in the receiving country? For this, I will focus on the belonging dimension of migration in the transnationalism and diaspora literatures, and try to merge the theoretical discussion with case study examples. In this section, the main discussion will be concentrated on the concepts of 'home', 'identity' and 'belonging'. The final section will summarize the theoretical discussions and link three different, yet related, literatures together.

## 2.2. Diaspora Theory: Definitions and Approaches

The term "diaspora" literally means "dispersion", derived from Greek words *dia* (through) and *speiro* (to sow, to scatter) (Cohen, 1997). As a concept, it was first used in a religious sense for the dispersion of Jews from Palestine after the Babylon exile (Shuval, 2000), yet it was used also to describe ethnic populations who reside outside their historical homelands; including groups such as Greeks, Armenians and Africans scattered around the world (Cohen, 1997). As a form of a transnational community, diaspora concept has recently been used by a number of scholars. With the ongoing conceptualization and theorization of diaspora, the term is utilized to describe different types of migrations ranging from labor migration to refugee

migration. In other words, being "a traveling word" (Clifford, 1994: 302), the concept of diaspora has an enlarged semantic domain to include various forms of migration, though at the expense of making it difficult to define the concept in a way that can enable comparisons (Shuval, 2000). Nonetheless, diaspora theory has evolved by first de-limiting its boundaries and determining its relation to other paradigms.

Diaspora is at the crossroads of three different concepts, nation-state ethnicity and ethnic theory, and transnationalism. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay attention to how diaspora is linked to these theories in order to have a complete comprehension of the diaspora theory. Likewise, it is equally important to demonstrate how diaspora theory differentiates itself from these concepts. For example, diaspora theory is related to the discourse of nation-state authority and citizenship practices since the existence of diaspora challenges the notions of loyalty to one state and assimilation into one culture (Shuval, 2000). Ethnicity and diaspora are also linked to each other with their emphasis on the notion of homeland from which the identity is derived (Shuval, 2000). However, in the ethnicity paradigm the social positioning of the groups is not necessarily linked to migration. This differentiates diaspora from the ethnicity paradigm (Anthias, 1998). Moreover, the ethnicity paradigm is embedded within the nation-state whereas diaspora is not limited to homeland but conceptualized as a transnational community living in one place yearning for another simultaneously. This simultaneity aspect, on the other hand, links diaspora to the transnationalism theory in that both are concerned with immigrants whose social networks extend beyond national borders. Nonetheless, diaspora theory focuses more on the identity and the homeland relations aspects of transnationalism.

The term "diaspora" has been approached in various ways. On the one hand, some scholars have evaluated diaspora with essential objective criteria that are obtained from the Jewish example. One of the earliest and most-cited and used definitions of diaspora in this nature belongs to William Safran and consists of six characteristics of diaspora which can be listed as the following: being dispersed from the original center to at least two places, having a memory of lost homeland, believing that the host country will not embrace the migrating group, goal of returning to a homeland, being committed to contribute to their homeland, and finally having a group consciousness (Safran, 1991). Even though these criteria are obtained from Jewish diaspora existence, when contemporary Jewish diaspora is evaluated with these measures, some groups cannot meet the last three features (Clifford, 1994). This classical way of defining diaspora, which links the existence of diaspora directly to the experience of forced migration and which is strictly tied to its ethnic origin, does not take into account globalization and transnationalization that have affected diaspora tremendously (Reis, 2004).

On the other hand, there are also more pluralist definitions of diaspora in which other forms of migration are also included. Although Cohen (1997) employs a similar set of criteria for defining diaspora, consisting of "dispersal and scattering, collective trauma, cultural flowering, troubled relations with the majority, a sense of community transcending national frontiers and promoting a return movement" (Anthias, 1998: 562), he also develops a typology in which different types of diaspora are identified. In this typology; victim diaspora (Armenians and Africans), labor diaspora (Indians), trade diaspora (Chinese), imperial diaspora (British) and cultural diaspora are classified (Cohen, 1997). Even though these two approaches

differ from each other since the latter includes different typologies stemming from other forms of migration, both of them are still essentialist in that they conceptualize diaspora as consisting of "transnational ethnic groups" (Adamson, 2008: 6).

On the one side, these approaches enable us to avoid stretching the use of the term too much and reducing it into a meaningless tool by setting some objective criteria (Brubaker, 2005). Yet on the other side, they also introduce certain problems such as explaining diaspora as "rooted in the group itself" which can reify the diasporic identity (Butler, 2001: 193). In other words, the emphasis on the ethnic dimension and primordial bonding has the danger of making diaspora explanable by the attribution of origin, in which case the "the explanans becomes the explanandum" (Anthias, 1998: 565). Moreover, the centrality of homeland can also hamper realizing the differences among diaspora and lead to essentializing it as an ethnic label rather than a framework of analysis (Butler, 2001).

Some later definitions, however, underscore maintaining relationships with the homeland as the criterion for diaspora instead of emphasizing its stronger version, the desire to return to homeland (Brubaker, 2005; Butler, 2001; Wahlbeck, 2002). The theme of dispersal is also a very commonly used criterion in the literature, in order to indicate that diaspora has a transnational character and that it is not simply a transfer from a homeland to a single destination but being scattered into various countries. Moreover, other criteria such as multi-generational existence and boundary-maintenance are also included in the definitions of diaspora by different authors. Accordingly, the orientation towards homeland is not an unexpected outcome in first-generation migrants, but its existence through generations

differentiates diaspora from other groups (Butler, 2001: 192). Similarly, the boundary-maintenance which refers to the perpetuation of one's distinct identity vis-à-vis the host society is suggested as a way to facilitate preserving a distinct transnational community identity with strategies such as "resistance to assimilation," "endogamy", or "other ways of self-segregations" (Brubaker, 2005: 6).

However, emphasizing boundary-maintenance too much seems to contradict the definition of diaspora used in this research in that boundary-maintenance also has a tendency to reify notions of belonging and roots of immigrants. Moreover, the ways of maintaining boundaries such as self-segregation overlooks the practices of exhausting the political opportunities in the host country in the name of home country politics, which will be thoroughly discussed below. Nevertheless, since boundary-maintenance implies a strong attachment to origins, it can be a tool to discern a strong diaspora consciousness from a weaker one. Hence, it can be used not to determine whether the Albanian migrant community constitutes a diaspora but to understand whether this community uses the strategies of boundary-maintenance and the level of attachment to Albanian identity.

Another approach to define diaspora treats diasporas as "a framework for the study of specific process of community formation" (Butler, 2001: 195). This approach acknowledges that diasporization and globalization are coeval processes and mingles the contemporary diaspora with the issues of transnationalism and globalization (Reis, 2004). Hence, diasporas are not considered as emerging simply from border-crossing activity or exile but as discursively constructed. Starting with Clifford (1994), a more process-oriented approach to diaspora has been adopted, rather than a

descriptive scheme. This process-oriented approach takes into account the role of transportation and communication technologies that make contacting and having closer ties with home and host countries possible and evaluates them as opportunities made possible through globalization. Hence, it differentiates contemporary diasporas from classic diasporas whose existence depend on the exile condition.

Moreover, this more constructivist approach sees diaspora consciousness as a crucial aspect rather than the objective criteria cited above. In addition, diaspora consciousness as a process incorporates both negative and positive experiences; the experiences of exclusion and discrimination, as well as accommodation with host country norms (Clifford, 1994). Therefore, Clifford (1994) contends that diasporas can never be exclusively nationalist since they are deployed in transnational networks to form multiple attachments. Instead of overemphasizing the origin and return nexus which "overrides the specific local interactions …necessary for the maintenance of diasporic social forms", it highlights the process to untangle the paradox of dwelling here with a solidarity and connection there (Clifford, 1994: 322).

Nonetheless, the bonds that tie diaspora should not be assumed as homogenous and the intersectional divisions within diaspora should be reflected upon as well. As Anthias (1998) argues there is a failure to address issues such as class and gender differences in the works of both by Cohen and Clifford. However, more recent works using the transnationalist approach to diaspora tries to overcome the assumption of homogeneity within diaspora studies. In recent empirical studies, diversities within the diaspora are demonstrated so as not to essentialize the diaspora community even

though the central theme remains to be the study of homeland and belonging expressed in the forms of *construction of homeland*, *the effects of homeland political circumstances on the diasporic identity* or *utilizing host country institutions for the home country politics* (Al-Ali, 2002; Frykman, 2002; Koser, 2002; McAuliffe, 2007; Lampert 2009; Turner, 2008; Werbner, 2002).

All in all, diaspora is used in three ways in the literature according to Vertovec (1999:1); "diaspora as a social form, diaspora as a type of consciousness and diaspora as a cultural production". Diaspora as a social form is based on the diaspora's ties, (either imaginary or actual) with the homeland, and characterized by a triadic relationship between homeland, host country and diaspora group itself (Vertovec, 1999). Diaspora as a type of consciousness, on the other hand, describes its dual or paradoxical nature, and awareness of de-centered attachments in the global era. Finally, diaspora as cultural production refers to heterogeneity in the diasporic existence in the global era (Vertovec, 1999). However, these meanings, in particular diaspora as a social form and diaspora as a type of consciousness, are hard to distinguish from one another analytically. A transnationalist approach to diaspora can incorporate the first two meanings in the definition of diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006), which would also be able to overcome the tradeoff between stretching the term too much and essentializing the concept with strong emphasis on the objective criteria.

Therefore, defining diaspora as *an imagined community with links spanning more than one country* brings together objective and subjective characteristics of a transnationally dispersed group and the self-imagination as a community respectively. With this definition, it is possible to investigate whether certain traits

identified in the literature are the tools with which diasporas imagine their identity. This definition complies with Tölölyan's famous description of diaspora as "the exemplary communities of transnational moment" (1991: 5). Therefore, the literature on transnationalism with its emphasis on social networks and processes would open new ways to study diasporas. The scholars with a transnational approach place diaspora in its broad geographical and historical context without evaluating migration as a linear movement but a fragmentary process of relationship. The next section will examine transnationalism with reference to transnational social field / space approach which has some common points with the meanings of diaspora that Vertovec (1999) has outlined.

## 2.3. Transnationalism: An Overarching Framework for Diaspora

In many ways, studying diasporic communities under the umbrella of transnationalism seems intuitive, as the very nature of dispersal from a homeland implies a necessary link between host and home countries. The diaspora literature is very much tied with transnationalism since it also deals with the transnational connections of migrants and their descendants. However, transnationalism offers more diverse and varied political and social relations. Unlike diaspora studies which mostly focus on political transnationalism, studies of transnationalism examine cultural and social networks as well as political participation and identification. Therefore, diaspora with its specific focus on political identifications needs to be situated into the broader picture of transnationalism which would also help to mitigate the risk of reifying particular identities. Moreover, certain approaches in the transnationalism literature such as the transnational social field enable us to account for the process through which *the ways of being* are combined with *ways of*

*belonging*, which merges the practice and consciousness components of identity and makes it possible to study diaspora as a form of transnational community.

To begin with, transnationalism has introduced a new way to study migration, taking into account triadic relations between home country, host country and immigrant group itself. Earlier studies on migration have concentrated on three main forms of the incorporation of immigrants: assimilation, exclusion and integration. While assimilation denotes a one-way-process in which migrants adapt to the host society, in exclusion migrants are not accepted into every area of social life. Integration, on the other hand, regards this process as a two-way-relationship between immigrants and the host societies. A similar but separate form of incorporation can be named multiculturalism which is similar to integration in every aspect but for its emphasis on "the recognition of difference within plural societies" (Tambiah, 2000: 167). In sharp contrast to transnationalism, the major relationship of concern is between the immigrant and host society in all of these forms. However, immigrants also develop ties with their countries of origin which may consist of sending remittances to the home country, investing in properties and engaging in business activities in the home country, being involved in political developments, and sometimes even participating in the elections of the home country. Thus, migration studies need to move beyond analyzing this relationship and consider the relations of migrants with home country as well.

Furthermore, transnationalism from its very beginning poses an analytical challenge to nationalist assumptions of migration research and the unilinear assimilationist paradigm. For example, transnationalism studies include refugees as a form of

transnational immigrants, which challenges the assumptions of migration studies on the refugees in three ways. First, refugees are mostly assumed to return to their home countries in traditional migration studies. Second, if they remain in the host country they are expected to integrate and maintain few links with the home country. Finally if they remain in the host country, the assumption is that they will be disowned by the home country (Koser, 2002). However, studies on transnationalism highlight that refugees do maintain links to their home countries while integrating into the host society (Al-Ali, 2002; Koser, 2002; Frykman, 2002). In sum, migration studies embracing the transnational approach are better able to account for the novel aspect of migration: *increasing relations and links formed with the home country* while also having connections to the host country.

This novel aspect of contemporary migration, becoming increasingly transnational, is associated with three reasons in the literature. The first is the global restructuring of capital that alters the forms of capital relations and leads to worsening social and economic conditions in both sending and receiving countries. The second aspect is xenophobia in the developed world against immigrants which adds on to the insecurity that immigrants feel. The final aspect, the process of nation-building that can take place in both the home and host countries necessitates immigrants to build political loyalties in both countries (Glick Schiller *et al.,* 1995: 50). In the earlier literature, there is more emphasis on the global capital structures, the advancement in the communication and transportation technologies, and the increase in the average resources and human capital of the migrant to explain the emergence of this form of migration (Portes *et al.,* 1999: 223-4).

However, the factors leading to transnationalism/transnational migration include not only technological variables and the policies on minorities of the receiving country but also historically specific social, cultural and ideological factors (Al-Ali, 2002) and the political opportunity structure provided by both state(s) (Faist, 2000: 191). Hence, the role of the state has to be taken into consideration, given that "transnational social spaces"[3], to use Faist's words, are not only constituted out of forms of capital and resources but are also affected by regulations of the states offering opportunities and constraints (Faist, 2000). As recent studies demonstrate, not only labor immigrants but also refugees and exile communities engage in transnational activities, which makes nation-building in either or both countries also a suitable explanation for the emergence of transnational migration and which demonstrates that diaspora and transnationalism have another common point: *the effect of home country politics on the immigrant group* (Al-Ali, 2002; Frykman, 2002; Koser, 2002; Turner 2008; Ostergaad-Nielsen 2002 &2003).

Despite the novelty that it has brought to the migration studies, transnationalism is also criticized by a number of scholars. Vertovec (2001: 576) brings the criticisms together and argues that transnational migration studies need to establish the novelty of the phenomenon and relevancy of the new concept and that the transnationalism process involves significant proportions of migrants. Portes *et al.* (1999) concur with Vertovec that transnationalism developed as a new field of study lacking a full-fledged theoretical framework, but also try to provide alternative ways of conceptualizing transnationalism in order to overcome these shortcomings (Portes, 2001). Building on his research on Colombian, Dominican and Salvadorian

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[3] Faist (2000) uses the terms 'transnational social spaces' and 'transnationalism' interchangeably.

immigrants in the United States, Portes *et al.* (2001 in Portes, 2001: 183) contend that transnational activities of the immigrant groups correspond to no more than 18% of all their activities. Also, affected to some degree by the criticisms by Kivisto (2001) who argues that transnationalism has to be studied in relation to assimilation since it is a possible variant of assimilation where one is integrated into the receiving state, Portes (2001: 183) suggests that transnationalism should be conceptualized as one way of economic, political and cultural adaptation that exists along with the traditional forms.

However, this attempt at conceptualizing transnationalism as a subcategory overlooks the novel aspect of transnational migration that relates to home country relations. It also ignores the belonging and identity dimensions while concentrating merely on the activities of people. In addition, the existence of transnational activities among earlier immigrants such as Polish peasants and Chinese traders does not undermine the relevancy of the concept of transnationalism since transnationalism as a framework filters the common character and significance of the phenomenon and gives insights to both historical and contemporary international migration (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002).

Nonetheless, not all transnational groups constitute *transnational communities*; relational mechanisms differentiate different transnational groups. In other words, since there are other forms of 'transnational' with different relational mechanisms such as transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits as well as transnational communities, transnationalism cannot to be equated with the transnational community. For instance, transnational kinship groups are based on ties of

reciprocity and engage in sending remittances. Transnational circuits, on the other hand, are founded on mutual obligations with instrumental relations (Faist, 2000: 195-197). Transnational communities differ from these groups significantly, since their relations are based on solidarity, shared ideas and symbols expressed in collective identity. Thus, these communities are strongly embedded in both country of origin and immigration and they endure over time (Faist, 2000). The delineation of a transnational community as such complies with the definition of diaspora as an *imagined community with links spanning more than one country* with its emphasis on shared ideas in collective identity.

As stated before, transnationalism encompasses different domains, and transnational activities are comprised of different cultural, economic and political aspects with various factors affecting these activities (Faist, 2000: 199). For example, economic transnationalism develops among networks of business people who are provided with the necessary investment conditions, whereas political transnational communities can last beyond the generations because the main thread is the strong ties that immigrants have both for the country of origin and the country of immigration. As Al-Ali and Koser (2002) observe, despite the importance of the political economy dimension of transnationalism, it is only one dimension of the whole picture; but the strength of the transnationalism perspective is that it is also able to account for the political dimension, the development of new identities among immigrants, and the search for attaining certain rights in both countries. Thus, the political aspect includes a plethora of activities such as electoral participation in both homeland and receiving country, lobbying in the receiving country for homeland politics, membership in the political associations, which on the one hand emerge out of the sense of belonging

and longing, and on the other hand, reinforce the sense of belonging to both countries. In this research on the Albanian community, the main focus will be on the political aspect of transnationalism and how it interacts with and shapes identity and belonging.

The political aspect of transnationalism can also be studied with different approaches. One such approach is the "transnational social / political fields approach" by Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004). The aim of using this concept is to extend the analytical lenses to understand that immigrants are "embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields encompassing not only the immigrants but also those who stay behind" (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1003). Moreover, this approach distinguishes between "ways of being" and "ways of belonging". While ways of being refer to the actual social activities and practices in which the individuals participate, ways of belonging require the consciousness of being embedded in these activities; hence, it necessitates combining the awareness with the action (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004: 1010). In other words, the transnational social field approach entails the study of both the existence of transnational social networks and the consciousness of being in them. Applying Bourdieu's concept of 'social field' at the transnational level, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) are able to conceptualize and explain how individuals combine ways of being and belonging in different contexts. This framework for studying transnational migration will be helpful to capture the networks and relations between who moves and stays and more importantly, the simultaneous orientation towards both home and host countries. It makes it possible to evaluate the process of assimilation and establishing enduring transnational ties with homeland not as binaries but as *simultaneous processes*

(Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004:1006). Moreover, it is also important since the social field is conceptualized as networks that can allow seeing whether there is a connection among individual migrants and whether this connection is accompanied with shared identities (Glick Schiller, 2006). Last but not least, it helps to understand that transnationalism is not *an outcome but a process*.

Similarly, Faist (2000) introduces the concept of "transnational social space" which consists of "a pentatonic relationship" among the receiving country government, civil society organizations in the receiving country, sending country governments, civil society organizations in the sending country and the transnational group itself. This incorporation of civil society organizations in both countries into the discussion introduces a mobilization aspect of the political transnationalism. As Adamson (2002) argues, transnational communities can form advocacy groups which require mobilization for the home country politics. Unlike the approaches which see transnationalism as an outcome and try to trace the factors leading to this outcome, the above approaches concentrate on transnationalism as a process which enables tracing how transnational community emerges with *the ways of being* combined with *ways of belonging* to form *diasporic identity*.

In other words, formation of transnational communities or diasporas necessitates practicing and engaging in transnational activities be combined with acquiring consciousness of it. This aspect is important for it makes it possible to study diaspora as a form of transnational community which incorporates both claiming political rights and longing (Turner, 2008). Thus, Turner's conceptualization of diaspora politics, which is about both longing and claiming political rights, overlaps with

transnationalism as a social/political field (Turner, 2008: 747). Put differently, this transnational space is political as long as it is about two foundations of citizenship, belonging and rights. This relationship makes the transnational political field different since on the one side it challenges the nation-state but on the other it claims rights from the same state (Bauböck, 2003; Turner, 2008). This simultaneous involvement in home country politics and having the claim to or actual citizenship rights in the country of residence is addressed by the concept of 'diasporic' which means "to aspire to being a part of a community centered on a loss" (Turner, 2008: 746).

In sum, when diaspora is defined as *an imagined community with links spanning more than one country*, objective and subjective characteristics are brought together. Hence, diaspora needs to be a transnationally dispersed group with the self-imagination as a community (Sökefeld, 2006). This group not only practices transnational actions but also imagines itself as a part of a larger identity group. Then, it becomes important to ask the question of how this identity as community is deployed. This question brings in the issue of movement and mobilization and it can be analyzed with concepts of tools of social movement theory. It is noteworthy to mention that the use of concepts from social movement theory by no means equates diasporas and social movements; instead the aim is to take insights from this theory to explain the formation of diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006). From this point onwards social movement theory will be discussed with regards to its relevance for diaspora formation.

## 2.4. A Social Movement Approach to the Diaspora Formation

Social movement theory has been on the agenda of political science and sociology since the 1970s and its main concern is collective political activity outside the state. Defined as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities" (Tarrow, 1998: 4), social movements address too wide an array of theory to be surveyed in this research. Yet it should be noted that there are certain approaches that have been more prominent at times in social movement theory. A particularly pronounced divide exists with older theories and the new social movement theory which tries to explain the mobilization on behalf of post material politics and newly created identities (Choup, 2008: 193-4). Other important approaches can be given as political process, framing, and resource mobilization (Mees, 2004). Although these tools are used to explain the emergence of social movements separately, there is also a growing literature which tries to synthesize these different approaches to stop the split in the theory. For instance McAdam *et al.* (1996) brings together three factors for the emergence and character of social movements which are identified as *political opportunities, mobilizing structures,* and *framing processes.*

*Political opportunities* pertain to changes in the structural conditions that facilitate the emergence of a social movement (McAdam *et al.,* 1996). The shape and activities of social movements can be explained in accordance with the constraints and opportunities of a given national and local context (Vertovec, 2003). As Tarrow (1998: 81) argues, the movement formation is a result of "seizing and making opportunities". For analyzing the political structure five dimensions or variables are identified: the degree of access or openness, the stability of alignments, the existence

of support groups, the internal division of the elite and the state strength (Tarrow, 1998: 85-89). Gamson and Meyer (1996) introduce another dimension: the predecessor movements that create opportunities for the successors. However, the assessment of the political opportunities also needs to take into account the international level into the local and national variables (Meyer, 2003).

As for diaspora formations, the political opportunities can involve means of communication and transportation as well as institutional structural changes where the claims of the immigrants are re-articulated (Sökefeld, 2006). Opportunity structures include national asylum regimes, visa requirements, citizenship, residency or naturalization processes, access to legal representation, the availability of financial transfer, and most importantly, the organization of local ethnic or hometown associations for migrant assistance (Vertovec, 2003: 654). Thus, it is noteworthy that the changing context of sending and receiving countries can both facilitate and hinder the diaspora formation, creating *political opportunities*. The empirical studies (which will be discussed in the next section) demonstrate that the multicultural context of the host country helps the formation of diaspora through providing a platform where immigrants are able to discuss homeland issues which can not be articulated in the home country (i.e. Al-Ali, 2002; Koser, 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Skrbis, 1999; Sökefeld, 2006). One important caveat is that these political opportunities should not be taken as fixed and rigid; the structure can change with regards to certain conditions (Meyers, 2003).

While changes in the political structure in the host country facilitate formation of diaspora or diasporic identity, a more important factor is the changing political

atmosphere in the home country which mobilizes the immigrants scattered in different countries. Accordingly, changes in political structure of the homeland also construe *political opportunities* since these critical events/changes transform the way diasporas relate to their home countries. However, these need to be framed in a way to mobilize the immigrants to form collective action, which in turn, necessitates an organization as will be discussed below.

*Mobilizing structures* are defined as "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al.*,* 1996: 3). In other words, they are the links connecting the leaders with the organization of collective action that enables movement coordination and duration. Resource mobilization is a way to analyze structures and processes of movement formation (Vertovec, 2003). The resource mobilization approach examines the resources to be mobilized, the links social movements have with other groups, the need for external support, and argues that the presence or absence of resources affects the success of mobilizing strategies of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1213). However, mobilizing structures can be networks of people or formal organization that are ready to act for the same cause (Sökefeld, 2006). Klandermans and Oegema (1987: 519) identify four aspects of mobilization: 'mobilizing potentials', 'recruitment networks 'motivated to participate', and 'overcoming barriers for participation'. In this analytical device, mobilizing potential refers to the people who are willing to become engaged in a social movement and sets the limits for the mobilizing power of a social movement whereas recruitment networks means extending the reach of the organization by targeting people via means of mass media, ties with organizations, and friendship (Klandermans and

Oegema, 1987). The other aspects refer to arousing the motivation to participation and eliminating the barriers respectively. These two are the ways to secure the participation in the social movement (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987).

This framework requires a mechanism for network building that can be civil society organizations and associations. For the formation of diaspora, these organizations are also important since they disseminate the initiative for collective action as well as organizing the community meetings (Sökefeld, 2006). Hence, the existence of immigrant associations constitutes *a mobilizing structure* in the diaspora formation. Indeed, the role of networks and organizations in the diaspora formation is stressed by a number of empirical studies. For example, the Croatian Fraternal Union was very central to the diasporization of Croatian immigrants in North America (Djuric, 2003). Likewise, Nigerian or Zimbabwean organizations in the UK (Lampert, 2009; McGregor, 2009 respectively) or Somali associations in Denmark are engaged in transnational reconstruction of their home countries (Kleist, 2008). For the Albanian case, both the existing and newly formed immigrant associations are analyzed as *mobilizing structures.*

Finally, *framing processes* are defined as "the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediates between opportunity and action" (McAdam *et al.,* 1996: 2). Frames enable the social movement to have a common understanding and interpretation of the events and conditions along with representing shared meanings and definitions for collective action (Sökefeld, 2006). The effectiveness of the frame depends on its conformation to the targeted group (Resnick, 2009). For a better understanding of framing, it can be related to the

process of ethnic community formation where the groups contemplate their identities and demarcate their symbolic boundaries (Vertovec, 2003). Framing process is relevant to diaspora formation in it can illustrate the way immigrants imagine themselves as part of a transnational community. Yet the real strength of framing is that it identifies "the specific events"/"incidents" and shapes it in a way that enables the formation of diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006: 270-271). Framed in a way to mobilize people, critical events make the public respond to itself through various mechanisms. Yet, framing should not be assumed as a consensual process; instead, it is important to differentiate among the actors in the field while discussing framing. Moreover, internal processes of contention should not be disregarded since they have effects on the extent and the form of the diasporic mobilization. However, "the imaginations of transnational communities are not established once and for all but have to be reproduced time and again in order to continue" (Sökefeld, 2006: 276). Diaspora has to produce its *mobilizing practices* such as commemorating or celebrating certain events.

In his study on the formation of the Alevi diaspora in Germany, Sökefeld (2006) uses these three tools provided by social movement literature. According to this study, three developments have elicited the Alevi movement, the first of which is the emergence of a multicultural discourse in Germany which enabled the proliferation of Alevi diaspora organizations (Sökefeld, 2006), and which is related to the political opportunity structure of the host country. The other significant developments are the growth of political Islam and the emergence of the Kurdish movement, the latter providing a model for the Alevi diaspora organizations. Accordingly, there are also mobilizing practices turning a specific event that mobilized the community before

into something to commemorate or celebrate. In the case of Alevi diaspora, the event of the (Sunni) Islamist attack on the Alevi festival in Sivas in 1993 was declared as a memorial day and turned into a mobilizing practice. Hence, the existence of a critical event is not sufficient alone; there is a need for the agents such as the organizations, associations and parties, in this case the Federation of Alevi Communities in Europe, to frame these critical events in ways that motivate the individual Alevis to mobilize around a collective identity.

At this point, an empirical study on the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is also significant, for it also combines transnationalism and social movement literature in order to explain their involvement in homeland politics (Wayland, 2004), similar to what Vertovec (2003) and Sökefeld (2006) propose. Correspondingly, the Tamil diaspora who were forced to leave their home countries, utilized information exchange, lobbying and public demonstrations in the host country on behalf of home country politics, and financial support for the home country (Wayland, 2004). As a result, Tamils exhausted the three ways for becoming involved in home country politics (namely, constructing new political identities, building a transnational advocacy network, and mobilizing and transferring of material resources) that Adamson (2002) identified. In addition, the political opportunities of the host country- Canada- with an open structure of institutions has made it possible for the Tamil diaspora to organize itself (Wayland, 2004).

All in all, the interplay among the home country and host country politics and the diaspora necessitates a cross-disciplinary analysis of the formation of diasporic identity. As both Vertovec (2003) and Sökefeld (2006) point out, social movement

theory and the tools provided by this theory can systematize the obscure relationship among diaspora, home country and host country in the formation and transformation of diaspora. Although social movements and diasporas do not represent the same social form, there are many parallels in the formation of both which enable us to use the certain tools of social movement theory in explaining diaspora formation. From this point onwards, I will focus on empirical studies to show that findings can be better understood with tools of the social movement theory. Even though empirical studies on a variety of diaspora groups emphasize either or both the significant developments in the homeland or the opportunities provided in the host country in the emergence of diaspora, these studies do not make use of an explicit theory that combines all these variables.

## 2.5. *Becoming Diaspora: Findings from Empirical Studies*

As both diaspora and transnationalism literatures give importance to the relationship and networks between homeland, host country and the diaspora group itself, the empirical findings also concentrate on these networks. Although sometimes named differently such as vertical, lateral and transnational global networks (i.e. Tambiah, 2000) these correspond to relations with homeland, host country, and within diasporas themselves. To give an example, Sudanese refugees in Egypt have established nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have ties to both homeland and NGOs elsewhere. Two contradictory and parallel processes take place; while Sudan of the past was imagined as an ideal through "the reinvention of tradition", the negative characteristics of home (country) were simply attributed to the new Sudan (Fabos, 2002: 35).

However, in some case studies these networks can be encountered in the form of exhausting host country politics for changing the home country politics. For instance, the Nigerian diaspora in Britain constitutes an example for this relationship, since they form organizations for the Nigerian national development disregarding "a number of geo-ethnic and sub-national cleavages" (Lampert, 2009:165). The home country was able to connect to its citizens abroad and engage them in development practices for the homeland since it achieved the transfer of human capital and established the institutions that diaspora can invest in the country, whereas the host country provided the opportunities for diaspora to be mobilized for their home countries (Lampert, 2009: 166). Nevertheless, some diasporas are also successful in acting at the transnational/global level while they advocate for their rights in both countries. The Zimbabwean diaspora in Britain fits into this network by incorporating the international level through establishing networks with international agencies not only for directing international attention to the ongoing struggle in the homeland but also for national development purposes (McGregor, 2009). Being politicized on two fronts, the Zimbabwean diaspora struggles for their rights in Britain and for political transformation of their home, namely for their voting rights in Britain and for international intervention in Zimbabwe respectively (McGregor, 2009).

Just as important as these sites and networks are the nationalistic activities that diaspora engage in. Diasporas endorse different kinds of long-distance nationalism; "diaspora nationalism, transnational nationalism and transnationism" (Khandelwal, 1994 in Tambiah, 2000: 175). Diasporic nationalism denotes a situation in which immigrant communities are active in the host country but have weak connections to

home country. Transnationism, on the other side, is preoccupied with creating lateral networks between states to form a diaspora identity that transcends boundaries and encourages a global unity. Finally, transnational nationalism refers to the long-distance politics that diasporas are engaged in, and this kind of nationalism is studied more in the literature (Tambiah, 2000: 175- 177). The way Croatian diaspora became a *transnational national community* was explored in a study on the Croatian diaspora in North America and the study found that even though the Croatian Fraternal Union was very passive and neutral between 1980 and 1995, it became more active during the war in supporting political changes in the home society (Djuric, 2003). Hence, the war acted as a catalyst in a transformation that led to increased financial and material assistance to the Croatian army and the formation of a Croatian front so as to lobby and establish the Croatian Humanitarian Aid Fund during the war (Djuric, 2003). However, it should not be assumed that the long-distance politics that diasporas participate in is static in nature. Instead, it has ups and downs as exemplified in the study of the Brundi diasporic community in Belgium, Tanzania, and Kenya, where the conflict period extended the boundaries of politics beyond the nation-state while the post-conflict situation shrank the boundaries of politics as a response to critical events in the home country (Turner, 2008: 759-61).

Hence, transnationalism and diaspora formation require a process-based approach in empirical studies. Treating transnationalism and diaspora formation as a *process* indicates that the migration itself does not establish diaspora but migrants become a diaspora as a result of certain developments (Sökefeld, 2006). This finding is supported by empirical studies. For instance, in Al-Ali's (2002) comparative analysis of Bosnian refugees in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the constraints and

opportunities provided by the host countries on the emergence of transnational activities are carefully evaluated to conclude that the institutional framework in the Netherlands provides more incentives for the refugees to participate in transnational activities with giving refugee status rather than temporary protection (Al-Ali, 2002: 113). A process-oriented research was able to account for circumstances leading to diaspora formation. Therefore, the research on Bosnian refugees empirically displays that globalizing capital, time-space compression, and internationalization of labor fail to explain all kinds of transnational communities.

In a similar vein, there are also other studies focusing on the process of transnational community formation which include the examination of the roles of both home and host states. In a study of Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany, it is argued that the attempts of Eritrean government to institutionalize its diaspora have an important role in the transition of the Eritrean refugees into a transnational community, through deepening links that refugees have for with their communities and country of origin (Koser, 2002). Another important aspect of Koser's study, which is again in line with Levitt and Glick Schiller's (2004) approach, is that the transnational activities (voting in the referendum and elections, sending remittances, paying taxes) together with the involvement of the state in these change or "ebb and flow," in Levitt and Glick Schiller's terms, according to the events in the home country.

Therefore, it is the degree of home state involvement, the degree of acceptance by the host state and the duration of the stay in the host country that help to explain the transition to a transnational community (Al-Ali *et al.*, 2001). However, the transformations in the country of origin can have different implications for identity

formation of the members of the same ethnic community depending on whether they are diasporas or refugees (Frykman, 2002). This study of Croatian diaspora in Sweden found that while the idea of homeland and the sacrifice for the homeland is very strong among earlier Croatian diaspora including the material, territorial as well as cultural layers, the emphasis changes in the refugee groups from the Croatian nation towards the family as a result of war experience (Frykman, 2002).

Similarly, in a comparative study on the second generation Croatian and Slovenian diaspora in Australia, Skrbis (1999) explores the ways diaspora formation is tied to external events. This study revealed the difference in the ethno-national identity perceptions of two diasporic groups despite the similar history these groups share. In contrast to the Slovenian diaspora, the Croatian one is more engaged in ethno-national myths, plus the members of the Croatian diaspora imagine their homeland as Croatia and yearn to go back. This difference is explained with reference to the existence of an independent Croatian state between the years 1941 and 1945, and to the relatively larger number of Croatian post-second world war displaced people in Australia (Skrbis, 1999: 37). Also according to this study, an important dimension in the construction of ethno-national myths is the political opportunities acting as a catalyst of the host country. In this case that would be multiculturalism in Australia, which allows for a celebration of cultures (Skrbis, 1999: 84).

Needless to say, the relationship between home country and diasporas is not a one-way relationship; diasporas also organize themselves to affect the country of origin through engaging in the forms of long-distance nationalism discussed above (Tambiah, 2000). The first way to do this is by constructing new political identities

and discourses. The second is to build a transnational advocacy network through using multiple "channels of local, regional and global levels for political changes" (Adamson, 2002: 165). The final way is the mobilization and transfer of material resources for the home country politics, which is referred to as "long distance nationalism" by Benedict Anderson in the literature (Adamson, 2002). This three-step organization can be observed in the Kurdish diaspora in Germany who uses four such strategies: illegal and underground such as supporting the PKK[4], legal and confrontational strategies such as demonstrations and hunger strikes, institutional participation such as seminars and panel discussion where the independence of Kurds in Turkey is emphasized, and finally, working with German institutions such as labor unions and political parties for their demands (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002). In addition, it is not only the host country institutions but also other international or supranational institutions and human rights norms that are used by the diasporas for publicizing their demands (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

## 2.6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have tried to incorporate three different yet related literatures in order to explain the transformation in the collective identities of Albanian community in Turkey. Using the diaspora concept enabled me to focus more on the political dimension of transnational networks as well as the relations with the homeland established by migrants. While diaspora is very helpful in understanding the political and identity aspect of transnational relations, there is the risk of essentializing and reifying the concept with too much emphasis on the objective criteria on the attribution of origin in particular. For this reason, the diaspora concept

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[4] PKK is abbreviation for Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan which has led an armed struggle against the Turkish state since the beginning of the 1980s.

is situated into the broader framework of transnationalism which also enabled me to see the difference between contemporary and classical diaspora. In the transnationalism literature, diasporas are defined through how "their daily life activities and social, economic and political relations create social fields that cross national boundaries" (Basch, et al., 1994, p. 27). Moreover, they are also analyzed in relation to the complex web of reasons that are lined with globalization. Hence, the transnationalism approach views diasporas as deployed in transnational networks to form multiple attachments to homeland and host country, making it possible to account for the paradox of dwelling here with a solidarity and connection there instead of overemphasizing the origin and return.

Moreover, the transnational social space/field approach suggests "a pentatonic relationship" including the countries of origin and destination, civil society organizations in both receiving and sending countries and the transnational group itself (Faist, 2000). Accordingly, the mobilization aspect becomes indispensable with the civil society introduced into this relationship. As this thesis emphasizes that diaspora is not a direct result of migration but as emerging through a process whereby mobilization around a collective identity occurs, the tools used in social movement theory can facilitate explaining the process of diaspora formation as well. As a result, I analyze Albanian migrants from ex-Yugoslavia in Turkey with these three different but related theories. While the concept of transnationalism as a broader framework helps to capture the simultaneous social relations that this group has both to their society of origin and society of destination, the diaspora concept enables us to give specific attention to the politics of the home country after the dissolution of the Yugoslavian state and its effects on the collective identity of the

group. More importantly, this thesis analyzes the process of diaspora formation following Martin Sökefeld (2006) who states that migrants do not form a diaspora automatically but *become* a diaspora by developing new imaginations of community. Therefore, I employ concepts from the literature on social movements such as the political opportunities, mobilizing structures and the framing processes in the analysis of the Albanian community in Turkey.

# CHAPTER III

# HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF EMIGRATION FROM

# THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

### 3.1. Immigration to Turkey: A Legacy from the Ottoman Empire

After the demise of Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic inherited a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, similar to other nation-states established in the former lands of the Empire. Almost all of these newly founded nation-states, particularly those in the Balkans, perceived minorities as an important source of trouble for their security, especially during the nation-state formation periods in the region. In order to deal with the minority populations, two methods were mostly used in the region: assimilation and (forced) migration, which resulted in continuous migration waves among the newly established states in the Balkans. Having been perceived as a successor to the Ottomans, Turkey received mass migrations of former Ottoman Muslim subjects outside the borders of the newly established Republic.

The migrations from the Balkans, which were mostly evaluated as *kinship-based migrations* in Turkey despite the fact that not all migrants from Balkan countries were ethnically Turk, constitute an important source of the population flows to

Turkey. While examining the emigration from the Balkan countries to Turkey after the foundation of Republic, the following periodization helps to evaluate the effect of differing historical developments on the migrations. The first period, which is between the years 1923-50, corresponds to the nation-building process while the second one is between the years 1950-80 at the peak of Cold War era. Finally, the third era encompasses the time period of the 1980s and onwards coinciding with the weakening of the Cold War period and dismemberment of Yugoslavia. It is necessary to note that former migrations affected the later ones by providing important networks. For example, first wave migrants from ex-Yugoslavia provided certificates for the second wave migrants which enabled the latter's migration. Similarly, migrants of first and second waves provided their relatives homes during the migrations after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Although the reasons that trigger the migration in these periods differ from one other, the response of Turkish governments nearly remained the same throughout by accepting the migrants from the Balkans. The migrations from the former Yugoslavia did not diverge from this general pattern, either. Turkish governments welcomed the Muslim migrants such as Bosnians, Albanians as well as Turks, regardless of ethnic background (Kirişçi, 2000). However, these non-Turkish Muslim immigrants were expected to fully integrate into Turkish society. The second wave of migration presents an interesting case since the migration agreement stipulated that immigrants had to relinquish their Yugoslavian citizenship and declare that they were Turks or belonged to Turkish culture. Hence, immigrants of this wave are a very challenging yet illuminating case for the diaspora literature and constitute the majority of the sample interviewed in this thesis.

In this survey of literature on Albanian emigration from the ex-Yugoslavia, I aim to set the historical background of the migration flows by explaining not only the circumstances in the home country leading to migration but also interstate relations and migration policies of the host country during the different periods of migration. As this thesis is an attempt to explain the dynamics in the formation and transformation in immigrant identities, the analysis should include the circumstances in which migrants leave their country and the way they are treated in the host country. Yet, the emigration from the former Yugoslavia needs to be situated in the general framework of Balkan migrations since the Turkish state followed similar policies regarding migration from Balkan countries. However, the emigration from ex-Yugoslavia differs from the general Balkan migrants in two ways: first, their migration to Turkey was viewed as voluntary migration and second, the different ethnic composition of immigrant groups. Also in tandem with second aspect, another important point to highlight is that Albanian migrants were not as welcomed as either Turks or Bosnians from the Balkans, which may stem from the fact that they had a strong national identity, as Çağaptay (2002a) and Erol (2007) argues.

In the literature on the emigration from the Balkan countries, whether the studies present a general picture of Balkan migration (e.g. Duman, 2009; Kirişçi, 1995; Öksüz and Köksal, 2004; Toumarkine, 2000) or concentrate on the migration from the former Yugoslavia (e.g. Çavuşoğlu, 2007; Hikmet and Köksal, 2004; Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2001 and 2003a), the focus is on the process of migration. Hence, these studies do not explore the post-migration processes rather they take the integration or assimilation of these migrants into Turkish culture for granted. In fact, there is a shortage of research that focuses on how the formation and transformation of

identities of immigrants takes place in the post-migration period. Likewise, this literature has not greatly explored the relations immigrants have with the homeland and/or the effects of the changes in the homeland on the immigrants using transnationalism or diaspora theories. In this thesis, I aim to investigate the relations between homeland and immigrants in the post-migration period. For this reason, the significant events that took place in the home country in the postmigration period will be explained in this chapter. Similarly, this literature has also not gone beyond the macro-level, structural analysis in explaining the migration from the former Yugoslavia, mostly focusing on the interstate level relations without considering their implications on the immigrants themselves. This thesis, however, follows the view that even though discussing the factors affecting the migration are important in the analyses of emigration, in this particular case of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, it constitutes only a limited picture of the migration phenomenon. In order to examine what occurs postmigration, historical analyses should be accompanied with the study of everyday practices of the migrants and networks formed by them as well as the activities of organizations formed to represent their interests.

In the first section of this chapter, I will concentrate on the general pattern of migration from the Balkan countries to Turkey. This brief introduction to migration from the Balkans is significant in setting the general parameters of the migration to Turkey and the circumstances in which the Albanians were accepted as immigrants. After explaining the pattern of migrations from the Balkans in three different periods, in the second section I will scrutinize the citizenship and migration regime in Turkey to better understand the political structure within which immigrants define and re-

define their identity. In the third section, I will delve into the historical context of the emigration from the former Yugoslavia, the citizenship and minority rights in the country, as well as political and socio-economic changes that led to the mass emigration of Muslim population. In the final section, I will discuss the significance of this historical analysis.

## 3.2. An Overview of Immigration to Turkey from the Balkans

The mass migration to Turkey in the early years of Republic was a continuation of large population flows taking place after the decline of the Ottoman Empire as Muslim subjects of the lost territories were targeted and forced to migrate by the newly founded nation-states. For those who forced to emigrate from their homelands (mostly from the Caucasus and the Balkans), the Ottoman lands became the only possible option to settle. Hence, the Ottoman Empire attracted large migration waves from both the Northern Caucasus and the Balkans starting in the late 18th century, with the first one coming from outside the Empire after the Crimean War of 1788-92 (Doğanay, 1996). This was followed by the mass migrations from the Balkans after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 *(93 Harbi)* and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 (Beydilli, 1999; Blumi, 2003; Bozbora, 1999).

The independence of nation-states from the Ottoman Empire such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania after the Berlin Congress of 1878 shifted the equation against the Muslim population who were privileged during the Ottoman times. The new rulers evaluated them with suspicion, which affected their decision to emigrate. Another key event in the period was the Balkan Wars, which marked the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and triggered large flows of migration from the region

(Poulton, 1997). The literature indicates that the Ottomans received 4 million Muslim migrants (including Crimean, Caucasian, Cherkes and Balkan migrants) and 1.5 million of them came from the Balkans during this period of contraction (Karpat, 1985: 259; Tekeli, 2008 and Babuş, 2006). According to Tekeli (2008), the process by which the Ottoman Empire received large migration flows from the Balkans just as it was being disintegrated into nation-states caused a demographic change which can be called the 'Balkanization Migrations'. Indeed, the outcome of those migrations was the Islamization and Turkification of Anatolian lands of the Ottoman Empire (Karpat, 2003: 99), especially given the fact that migrations of non-Muslims were restricted from 1878 onwards (Tekeli, 2008).

However, the large scale migration was not dealt with by centralized institutions in the Ottoman Empire until the 1860s when The Commission of General Administration of Immigrations *(İdare-I Umumiye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu)* was established in Trabzon (Babuş, 2006). Yet, as the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 instigated the mass migration from the Balkans these commissions were instituted in every province *(vilayet)* and also centralized under the Directorate of General Settlement in Istanbul *(Istanbul İskanı Umumiye Müdürlüğü)* (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Before the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877, the migrants were usually settled in the rural areas where they had positive effects in improving the agriculture and the economy in the Anatolian cities. Nevertheless, the increasing number of migrants after 1878 led the Directorate of General Settlement to allow migrants to establish migrant districts *(göçmen mahalleleri)* around the cities as well (Tekeli, 2008).

After the second greatest migration wave in the Ottoman era which took place during the Balkan Wars, the Charter of Migration Settlement was proclaimed in 1913 to manage the settlement of migrants (Ağanoğlu, 2001). This date is also significant since the first population exchange, which was a voluntary one, took place between Bulgaria and the Ottomans with the Istanbul Agreement of 1913 (Babuş, 2006; Tekeli, 2008). According to the Charter of Migration Settlement, all migrants received during the Balkan Wars including the exchanged population were settled in the empty lands of Thrace. However, the Ottomans tried to ensure that the number of migrants did not exceed that of the locals in the settled areas while settling the migrants (Tekeli, 2008). As a consequence of all these migrations during the demise of Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic inherited a more or less religiously homogenous population yet it was a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic population with more than 14 percent of which spoke a language other than Turkish (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Nonetheless, this policy of accepting migrants from the Balkans continued during the republican era as well. The following words of Vehbi Bey (the MP from Karasi[5]) in the parliamentary debates about the settlement of the exchanged population and migrants from Rumelia on the 5th of November, 1924 highlights this, "Every person immigrating is a fortune for us, every person emigrating is a blessing for us"[6], referring to Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim emigrants respectively (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1975: 25 cited in Aktar, 2000: 43). Thus, migration became a major tool with which national identity was defined in the

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[5] The Turkish province (*sanjak*, later *vilayet*) of Balıkesir was called the sub-province of Karesi until the early years of the Republic of Turkey, after which it was re-named after its central town Balıkesir.

[6] " Gelen her fert bizim için servettir, giden her ferdin gitmesi de bizim için nimettir" (translated by the author).

early years of the Republic; the settlement of immigrants was also arranged in a way to strengthen the national identity.

Therefore, the migration from the Balkans was encouraged even after the foundation of the Republic, though not to the same extent as it was during the first migration period between the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russia War and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 (Karpat, 1985; Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). The main reasons for the continuation of the migrations were the willingness of the Balkan states to displace their Muslim minorities as well as the eagerness of the Turkish state to compensate for the population loss due to the War of Independence. These complementary aims of the Balkan states and Turkish governments translated itself into including a clause about migration in the friendship agreements among these states such as in the Friendship Agreement with Bulgaria in 1925, Greece in 1930, Romania in 1936, and Yugoslavia in 1952 (Hecker, 2006).

Nonetheless, the migration flows from the Balkans did not take place at one stage; rather they occurred in certain periods due to the changing circumstances in both sending and receiving country. For this reason, the migrations from the Balkans are examined in three major periods after the foundation of modern Turkish state; the first period occurring from 1923-50 in the form of nation-building process, the second one in the 1950-80 period, and the last one occurring from the 1980s onwards (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1999; Kirişçi, 1995 and 2000). In each of these periods, different historical events triggered the mass migration, yet the basic motive in all these migrations was the problem of dealing with the minorities (Todorova, 2003). In the following sections, I will examine these three periods in detail, in order to give an

overview of the migration from the Balkans since it is necessary to grasp the broader framework of Balkan migration to understand emigration from ex-Yugoslavia.

### 3.2.1. The First Period of Balkan Migrations

During the first wave of migration from the Balkans, Turkey received migrants from Balkan states including Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. It is important to note that migrations in this period were regulated according to the treaties between governments. The most infamous agreement among these treaties was the "1923 Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece", according to which approximately 390,000 people with Turkish origin emigrated from Greece to Turkey (Doğanay, 1996) in exchange of a total of almost 1.2 million Greeks including the people who migrated immediately after the Independence War (Yıldırım, 2006a and 2006b; Kirişçi, 1996). During this era, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement (*Mübadele İmar ve Iskan Vekaleti)* was established in 1923 in order to tackle the settlement of those immigrant groups (Ülker, 2007).

Another example to the migrations by a treaty is the emigrations from Bulgaria which were legalized by the "1925 Turkish- Bulgarian Settlement Convention". This agreement resulted in the migration of approximately 219,000 people from Bulgaria consisting of 76,000 settled immigrants (who were provided accommodation by the Turkish state) and 143,000 independent immigrants (Doğanay, 1996; Kolukırık, 2006). According to Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2003b), there were approximately 198,000 Turkish and Pomak (Bulgarian Muslims) emigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey as well as 50,000 Thracian Bulgarians who settled beside the border between these countries

because of the increasing nationalist attitudes towards Muslims and the change in agrarian policies which targeted the Muslim population in Bulgaria. In the same period, there were also a significant number of emigrants from Romania to Turkey. A total of 79,000 immigrants, consisting mostly of settled immigrants left the Turkish populated lands of Romania such as Dobruca, to come to Turkey between 1923 and 1949 (Doğanay, 1996). The reason for these migrations was the Romanization policy of the Romanian governments and the disputes between Macedonian Wallachs (who were settled into the Turkish populated lands) and the Turkish minority (Kirişçi, 1995).

The migration from Yugoslavia during this first period, on the other hand, reached a total number of 117,112 migrants consisting of 5,894 settled immigrants and 111, 318 independent immigrants (Doğanay, 1996). In this period, there was a "1938 Migration Convention" signed between the Yugoslav Monarchy and the Turkish Republic, which foresaw the migration of 200,000 people including mostly Turks and Muslim Albanians. According to Albanians, this Convention displays the attempts by the Yugoslav government to displace Albanian population from Kosovo and Macedonia.[7] However, the treaty was not practiced by the parties since it coincided with the World War II, though migrations on relatively smaller scales took place (Malcolm, 1998 and Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Hence, the major reason triggering the migration of these people was the Agrarian Reform of 1931 which affected Muslim population of the Serbo-Croatian Kingdom.  It is important to note that this reform was practiced in the areas such as Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia

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[7] This interpretation is very common in the Albanian websites such as the one below http://www.arnavutum.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=173 (Last Access: 17.05.2010)

which were mostly populated by Muslims including Turks (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). For this reason, the migration from Yugoslavia in this period has mostly been evaluated as stemming from the socio-economic reforms and hence as voluntary migration (Doğanay, 1996).

**3.2.2. Second Period of Balkan Migrations**

The second period of emigration from the Balkans to Turkey started in the aftermath of World War II, mostly as a result of regime changes in the Balkan countries. In this period, immigrants were settled according to the Law of Settlement No. 2510 which separated migrants into independent immigrants and settled immigrants. The independent immigrants could settle in places they prefer but would not receive any financial aid from Turkish government whereas settled immigrants would receive financial aid yet had to stay in districts that government had designated for them beforehand. Although the major immigration flows originated from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in this period, there were migrations from Greece and Romania as well.

To begin with, Romania left Turkish-populated areas such as Dobruca to Bulgaria and Besarabya to the Soviet Union during World War II. This resulted in migration of 8,000 Turks from these areas to Turkey, who were settled in Thrace and Western Anatolia (Bozkurt, 2008). In the same period, there were approximately 25,000 migrants who came to Turkey from Greece due to the civil war in Greece (Doğanay, 1996). When the internal situation in Greece was normalized after 1951, Turkey terminated its liberal policy of admitting Turks from Greece and hence the migration flows ended as well (Kirişçi, 1996). However, the most significant wave of migration came from Bulgaria which stemmed from the attitudes and policies of the Bulgarian

government in the 1950s. As a result, 154,000 people migrated to Turkey as settled immigrants in this period (Doğanay, 1996). In addition, another 116,000 people immigrated to Turkey as independent immigrants on account of the "Turkish-Bulgarian Close Family Immigration Convention" in 1968 (Kolukırık, 2006). The migration in this period resulted from persecution on the grounds of nationality, race, or religion, since it occurred due to the oppressive minority policy of Bulgaria. The fact that Bulgaria and Turkey were in different camps during the Cold War period also affected the perception of the Bulgarian state towards the large Turkish minority group as a source of insecurity for the regime in Bulgaria. Accordingly, the Bulgarian government closed mosques and schools and banned the use of Turkish in schools (Kirişçi, 1996).

Similarly, minority groups in Yugoslavia (Turks, Albanians, and Bosnians) also suffered under the pressures of the communist regime established after World War II (Kirişçi, 1995 and 1996). While migration was not allowed until 1950s, the break up in the communist camp between the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation enabled the Yugoslavian leader Tito to have better relations with the Western camp countries. This rapprochement led to the cooperation between Turkey and Yugoslavia, and they signed "Turkish-Yugoslav 'Gentlemen's' Agreement" in 1953 which included agreements in trade, air traffic, migration and other matters and which facilitated an extensive migration from Yugoslavia in the form of *voluntary migration* (Doğanay, 1996). The bulk of the migration in this period occurred between the years 1954 and 1960, amounting to 152,000 migrants composed of Turks, Albanians, Pomaks and Bosnians (Doğanay, 1996; Kirişçi, 1995 and 1996; Öksüz and Köksal, 2004).

All in all, a total of 330,000 immigrants and refugees were accepted to Turkey in this second period of migration from the Balkans. According to Kirişçi (1996: 387), these post-1945 migrants who are called "immigrants" according to the Law on Settlement No. 2510 of 1934 can be evaluated as "national refugees." Although he acknowledges that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to categorize these migrants as refugees according to Geneva Convention, he argues that Elizabeth Ferris's definition of refugee as "persons who are persecuted for their political or religious beliefs, ethnic or racial backgrounds, irrespective of whether or not they are individually singled out for persecution" (Kirişçi, 1996:387) would qualify immigrants from the Balkans as refugees since they were either expelled or felt coerced to move to Turkey to flee from political, religious and ethnic suppression and repression (Kirişçi, 1996). Even though I will not use the term "national refugees" for the immigrants from the Balkans, this delineation is noteworthy in terms of reminding us the economic, social, religious and ethnic pressures that generated the migration in large numbers from the Balkans. Especially in the case of the migration from the former Yugoslaviathe migration agreement states the voluntary nature of the migration (Doğanay, 1996). However, ethnic and religious pressures on the Muslim minorities in the republics of Serbia and Macedonia during this period show the involuntary, if not coerced, character of the migration according to the interviews and surveys I conducted. These different perspectives between state and migrants in terms of identifying the reasons of migration are very significant as will be explained in the next chapter.

### 3.2.3. Third Period of Balkan Migrations

The most significant migration wave after 1980 came from Bulgaria as a result of the *Bulgarization* policy of the communist regime. Turkish people living in Bulgaria were perceived as a threat to the security of country during the Cold War years. Consequently, the Turkish language was forbidden in the Turkish schools and mosques were closed down (Kirişçi, 1994). The assimilation or *Bulgarization* policy against Turks went as far as to force individuals to change their Turkish names to the Bulgarian ones and led to the arrest of Turks who resisted these policies (Kolukırık, 2006). When the Bulgarian President Thodor Zhivkov asked Turkey to open the borders for Turks in Bulgaria, a total of 227,000 immigrants entered Turkey in 1989 (Doğanay, 1996: 197). In the 1990s, the number of immigrants from Bulgaria was approximately 74,000; thus a total of 300,000 people migrated to Turkey in this period.

Another important development was the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation and the migration of Bosnian and Kosovar people because of the ethnic wars in their countries. Even though the total number of refugees is not known for certain, it is thought that approximately 20,000 Bosnians migrated to Turkey (Kirişçi 1995). Most of these people moved in to their relatives' houses in Istanbul and roughly 6,000 refugees settled in the refugee camps in Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, Ankara and Üsküdar, Istanbul (Kirişçi 1996). The majority of the refugees returned back to Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Treaty in 1995. Another similar situation took place with the Kosovo War of 1999 which caused 18,000 Kosovar Albanians to come to Turkey (Kirişçi, 2003 and 2008). While the majority of them lived with their relatives, a considerable number of people (8,700) lived in the refugee camps where Bosnian

refugees had stayed before. The refugees in the camps returned to their homeland, yet those staying with their relatives continue to move back and forth between Kosovo and Turkey.

In sum, the immigration to Turkey from the Balkan countries was realized by 1.4 million immigrants settling in Turkey in three different time periods (see Table 3.1 below). As stated earlier, there was an implicit consensus about the migration in the region, while the Balkan countries tried to remove the Muslim minority population whom they viewed as representing the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state embraced

**Table 3.1 The Number of Emigrants from the Balkan countries to Turkey**

| Countries | 1878-1923* | 1923-45** | 1945-80** | 1980-onwards | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yugoslavia | | 117,112 | 151,889 | 38,000*** | 307,001 |
| Bulgaria | 1,500,000 | 219,990 | 154,393 | 226,863** | 601,246 |
| Greece | | 390,000 | 24,625 | - | 414,625 |
| Romania | | 79,287 | 8,000 | - | 87,287 |
| Total | | 806,389 | 338,907 | 264,863 | 1,410, 159 |

Sources: * Karpat, 1985: 259; Tekeli, 2008 and Babuş, 2006
** Doğanay, 1996; ***Kirişçi, 1995 and 2003

the Muslim population from the Balkans. This historical background of the Balkan migrations is important for understanding both the emigration from ex-Yugoslavia and the Turkish policy towards the Balkan migrants. Indeed, the most important characteristic of the migration to Turkey was the religion of the migrants; almost all migrants coming to Turkey were Muslims, although different ethnic communities existed (Doğanay, 1996). In addition, the settlement of these migrants was

coordinated according to the Law of Settlement No. 2510 which was put into force in 1934. The settlement of migrants from the Balkans ties us to the very delicate question of migration policies and citizenship practices of Turkey, which will be discussed in the following section.

### 3.3. Citizenship and Migration Policies in Turkey

The migration and citizenship policies in Turkey serve a critical function in both the migration of Albanian people from the former Yugoslavia and in the formation of their diasporic identities. As Kirişçi (1995) argues, the migration policy is closely related to the notions of citizenship and national identity, as it determines who can enter into the 'national territories'. Furthermore, migration policy also has constitutive effects on the identities of migrants; it sets the social structure within which migrants define their identities, though not being entirely determinative. As the transnationalism literature informs us the changing circumstances in the home country in the post-migration period are as important a dimension as the migration and citizenship policies for the collective identities of migrants. Therefore, I will explore the citizenship and migration policies in Turkey, in particular paying attention to the way Turkey accepts immigrants, which constitutes migrants from Yugoslavia as Turks or Turcophil as will be explained in this section. However, I will try to account for the changes in these policies so as not to draw a static picture of the citizenship and migration policies.

Despite the official discourse that Turkish national identity is civic-territorial, the actual state practices reveal a national identity based in national and ethnic concerns, whereby non-Muslim minorities were excluded and non-Turkish Muslim minorities

were assimilated (Aktar, 2004; Yeğen, 2002). In this respect, citizenship was evaluated as a tool to unite the population under a national identity. Since "the emergence of Turkish citizenship preceded the emergence of bourgeoisie and the process of urbanization", Turkish citizenship was conferred on people by the ruling elite to create an intact national community (Kadıoğlu, 2007: 285). The fact that this process was elite-driven also affected the very nature of Turkish citizenship in which membership duties override rights, leading to a passive form of citizenship. According to Yeğen (2004: 54), there is a consensus in the literature on Turkish citizenship that it "reflects a passive rather than active citizenship, a republican citizenship rather than a liberal one and a citizenship colonizing the private sphere instead of one limited to public".

In regards to ethnic content of citizenship, however, it is possible to see references to both political-territorial and an ethnicity-based definition of Turkish citizenship in major laws such as the Constitution and Citizenship Law (Nomer, 2007). The basic understanding of citizenship which is based on *jus sanguine*/descent has not changed from the very first Citizenship Law of 1928 (No: 1312) onwards. The succeeding Citizenship Laws of 1964 (No: 403) and 2009 (5901) continued to define Turkish citizenship on the basis of descent ((Nomer, 2009). As far as the definition of Turkishness is concerned, there are different viewpoints about whether it indicates a political definition of Turkishness or an ethnic one in the Constitution and other major texts (see, Yeğen, 2004). When it comes to evaluating practices of citizenship, there is again a consensus that these practices of citizenship unravel the ethnic underpinnings of Turkishness. The studies on Turkish citizenship that concentrate on the state policies revealed that Turkish citizenship has religious (Sunni sect of Islam),

linguistic (Turkish) and cultural dimensions (i.e. Kirişçi, 2000; Yeğen, 2004). Moreover, the notion of "one common culture" that is paramount in the migration practices and settlement policies of Turkish state also characterizes the ethnic content of citizenship practices (Hecker, 2006; Kirişçi, 2000).

In this respect, the settlement policies deserve a special analysis since they form the basis on which immigrants are accepted and settled and on which the existing communities are re-settled. It is imperative to note that both the Settlement Law of 1926 No: 885 and the Law on Settlement of 1934 No: 2510 emphasize the 'Turkish descent and culture' as a precondition for migration to Turkey (Çağaptay, 2002: 226). The existence of the same parameters in both of these laws show that the goal of creating/having 'a homogenous culture' was sought from the early years of the Turkish state onwards (Babuş, 2006). Thus, the aim in the Settlement Laws was not only to compensate the loss of population after the devastating war, but also to increase what was viewed as the quality of the population with immigrants of Turkish descent and culture. Nonetheless, 'who belongs to Turkish descent and culture' was not lucid in both of these laws since there were no explicit criteria. However, a brief look at the history of migration in Turkey illuminates who are accepted or not: Turkish-speaking communities from the Caucasus, Asia and the Balkans were all welcomed. In addition, the Albanian, Bosnian, Circassian, Georgian, Pomak and Tatar migrants were also accepted with a flexible reading of the Laws on Settlement, since those people were thought to be more likely to melt into 'the one culture'. This flexible reading of Settlement Laws was made possible with "Memorandum of Settlement of 1926" in which the last paragraph reads as Pomaks, Bosnians, and Tatars are accepted as bounded to Turkish culture and the

families of Albanians who came to Turkey before are granted admission (Ülker, 2007). In Tanıl Bora's words "the Balkan Muslims of non-Turkic origin were considered as Turcophone or Turcophil elements" (1995: 111).

As a result of this immigration policy, Turkey encouraged Muslim people from lost lands of the Ottoman Empire such as the Balkans and the Caucasia (Çağaptay, 2002a and 2002b; Kirişçi, 1995 and 2000). Kirişçi (2000) explains this prioritization of immigrants from the Balkans, especially from Macedonia with the strong attachment of ruling elite to Rumelia inherited from the Ottoman past and with the existence of people with Balkan background in the high ranks of the bureaucracy, legislation and military in the early years of Republic. Hence, the idea that Turkish state would trust more easily to the migrants from Rumelia than its religious minorities was very prevalent among the ruling elites. The fact that Turkish citizenship is defined by first a religious dimension (Sunni sect of Islam) and then a linguistic (Turkish) dimension is also evident in the 1923 Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece. The decision about migrants was based on the ethno-religious aspect; Christian Greeks emigrated from Turkey to Greece in an exchange with Muslim Turks. Moreover, in this exchange of populations, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Karamanlides communities from Cappadocia were exchanged to Greece as well, regardless of their linguistic unity with nation, which shows that the religious aspect was even more prominent (Kirişçi, 2000; Yıldırım, 2006a and 2006b).

Consequently, it can be argued that the Turkish state had a hierarchy in its migration policy, consisting of ethnic Muslim Turks at the top while Tatars and Muslim migrants from the Balkans were in second tiers. It should be noted that not all Balkan

migrants shared the same priority. Bosnians and Pomaks were readily accepted as migrants whereas Albanians were not as welcomed as the former ones. Finally, there were the Caucasians such as Lezgis and Georgians in the outermost cycle (Çağaptay, 2002a and 2002b and Kirişçi, 2000). In this immigration scheme, non-Muslims were not included. Thus, religion played the most important role in this hierarchic migration policy; furthermore, a certain sect of religion (Sunni-Hanefi sect) was even further prioritized in designating the category of immigrants (Kirişçi, 2000). For this reason, *non-Turkish speaking* ethnic groups such as Albanians, Bosnian, Tatars and Pomaks were incorporated into the migration practice whereas *Turkish-speaking* Christian Gagauz Turks and Shiite Azeris were excluded.

However, I want to highlight an important point in the migration policy; even though these *non-Turkish speaking* groups were accepted as immigrants, they were subjected to the assimilation and homogenization efforts of Turkish state as well. In other words, these immigrants moved from the stage of Turcophil elements to Turkified citizens. According to Erol Ülker (2007: 2nd par.), the migration and settlement policies of interwar period aimed at assimilating Muslim immigrants "on the basis of Turkish culture and language." For instance, the Law on Settlement No: 2510 did not permit these groups to settle into a region as a community (Article, 9) since the aim was to scatter them so that they could better integrate into the Turkish community. As a result, Albanian migrants were scattered too. They mostly preferred to settle in the Marmara region (48 percent), while the Aegean region had 18 percent, the Black Sea region 8 percent, and southern Anatolia with 7.5 percent (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). The interviews conducted with the immigrants show that they have connections with the immigrants in other cities and in fact sometimes are

relatives. More importantly, they pride themselves on the existence of Albanians in almost every region of Turkey.

Beginning with the late 1920s and early 30s, the criterion for membership to national community became "belonging to a Turkish ethnic group". In tandem with this criterion, the language gained importance in the settlement policies and the parliamentary debates centered on this issue (Aktar, 2004). In particular, the settlement policies in strategic areas such as İzmir and Thrace were very much criticized (Ülker, 2007). The major criticism was that Rumalia Muslims were settled in strategic regions regardless of their cultural characteristics. In Ali Şuuri Bey's (MP from Balıkesir) words,

> Among the people in the coastal regions polka outweighs the national dance, mandolin and piper predominate over the national musical instruments and Albanian and Bosnian prevails over the national language[8]. (TBMM- Zabıt Cedidesi, 1975: 28 in Aktar, 2004: 44 also see in Ülker, 2007)

Furthermore, the parliamentary debates during the Law on Settlement in 1926 also illustrates that non-Turkish speaking Muslims were targets of assimilation policies and the aim was the Turkifying them. In Besim Atalay's (MP from Kütahya) words,

> At what time will we make Turkish the language of the people we call Turk? I wonder, why we do not compel, why we do not oppress. Why do the Albanians who have come here speak Albanian? Why does Bosniak speak Bosniak and Circassian speak Circassian? (Ülker, 2007: par. 42).

Linguistic prejudice became so prevalent in the late 1920s that there emerged campaigns that "aimed to eradicate the public visibility and audibility of non-Turkish languages" (Aslan, 2007: 246). With the aim of spreading Turkish language, the Law Faculty Student's Association initiated *Citizen, Speak Turkish* campaign in

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[8] Sahildeki kısımların ahalisinde milli raks yerine polka, milli çalgı yerine mandolin, gayda milli lisan yerine Arnavutça ve Boşnakça hakimdir. Translated by the author.

1928. Even though the main target of this campaign was the non-Muslim minorities, *non-Turkish speaking Muslim* immigrants were also affected. Hence, this campaign was a move towards the Turkification of Albanian and Bosnian immigrants who spoke their own languages in their daily lives (Kadıoğlu, 2007). In addition, the major bond that Turkish speaking and non-Turkish speaking Muslim population had, which was the Ottoman history, was also weakened by the emphasis given to the Theory of the Great Migration from Central Asia, the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis. Therefore, the only possible option for non-Turkish Muslims was to be assimilated into the Turkish culture (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a).

The classification of the immigrants in the Law on Settlement No: 2510 is also another important dimension regarding the status of the Albanian immigrants as they migrated to Turkey. There are three terms concerning the migrants from a foreign country; exchanged immigrants *(mübadil),* immigrants *(muhacir)* and refugees *(mülteci).* To start with, exchanged immigrants *(mübadil)* mean that migrants were accepted to Turkey in accordance with the agreement with another country. The refugees, on the other hand, are defined as "those asylum seekers who want to reside temporarily because of an exigency and without the intention to settle in Turkey"[9] (Law on Settlement No: 2510, Article: 3). However, the most of the refugees were given the right to residence and treated as immigrants (muhacir) after a certain period of time (Babuş, 2006). The term 'muhacir' is used to differentiate immigrants from the exchanged populations, it is defined as "people who migrate to Turkey with the aim of settling in Turkey, and who come from Turkish descent or those residents

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[9] Türkiye'de yerleşmek maksadile olmayıp, bir zaruret ilcasile muvakkat oturmak üzere sığınanlara (mülteci) denir." (126)

attached to Turkish culture"[10] (Law on Settlement No: 2510, Article: 3). These immigrants could choose to come either as a 'settled immigrant' or as an 'independent immigrant'; while in the former case, the state provided the accommodation and financial aid for settlement on the condition that their place of settlement should be decided by the state, in the latter case the state did not provide any funds for settlement but did not interfere with the place of settlement, unless the population of non-Turkish speaking people exceeded the number of Turkish-speaking population in a district.

The migrants from the former Yugoslavia in the first and second waves of migration from the Balkans were given the status of *immigrants* regardless of their ethnic background. Most of these immigrants were 'independent immigrants' except for about 6,000 people (out of approximately 305,000 migrants) migrated. Despite the fact that non-Turkish populations were also accepted as migrants, these people had to declare their identity as Turks to become accepted (Malcolm, 1998). Therefore, it is important to underscore that the immigration and settlement policies of Turkey first demarcate who can be a citizen or not with a common denominator of religion. After that, the assimilationist policies aiming at melting the *non-Turkish speaking people* into the Turkish identity are used.

Moreover, the Turkish state applied the 1951 Geneva Convention relating the Status of Refugees with a geographical limitation, which *de facto* meant that Turkey gave the refugee status only those fleeing from communist persecution in Eastern Europe

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[10] "Türkiye'de yerleşmek maksadıyla dışarıdan münferiden veya müçtemian gelmek isteyen Türk soyundan meskûn veya göçebe fertler ve aşiretler ve Türk kültürüne bağlı olan meskûn kimseler" (125).

and Soviet Union (Kirişçi, 2001 and 2003). This geographical limitation coincided with the earlier immigration policies which encouraged migration from the Balkans and Turkic Republics of Soviet Union. However, this policy has changed in the recent years, particularly with regards to Bosnian and Kosovar refugees. Turkish officials neither applied the provisions of 1951 Convention for these refugees nor settled Bosnian and Kosovar refugees in accordance with the Law on Settlement No 2510 (Kirişçi, 2001 and 2003). In line with the practice in other European countries, Turkish state granted only temporary asylum to those refugees (Kirişçi, 1996: 389).

In conclusion, Turkish migration policy welcomed immigrants from the Balkans, including those from the former Yugoslavia. Although there is not systematic data on the ethnic composition of these immigrants, in general it can be argued that the overwhelming majority of these immigrants from the Balkans are Turks. Yet, especially the immigrants from Yugoslavia were ethnically diverse containing Albanians, Bosnians and Torbesh groups. However, the major discourse during the Balkan migrations especially before 1980s was that these were *return migrations* to the homeland, Turkey.[11] As the migration from former Yugoslavia is also a part of this broader migration, this discourse reflected itself even in the Albanian immigrants trying to trace their identities back to Anatolia, especially in Konya. Among the interviews I conducted, some interviewees commented on this discourse and one of the interviewee directs his criticism as:

> Those who try to trace their identity in Konya are trying not to be evaluated as second class citizens, I think. There is a special attempt to introduce migration of 1950s as a return to homeland. When educated in Turkey, this story that we immigrated to Macedonia from Konya during the Ottoman times and then we came back to Turkey can be persuasive. Well, in these kinds of situations I think of my relatives back in Macedonia and what would they think of this

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[11] It was also true for the migration from Bulgaria in the post 80s, too.

story, and what would it mean to be Turk for them? But my relatives there do not sense any belonging to Turkish identity. If you start school day swearing that "I am Turk, I am right and I am hardworking" then you become assimilated into Turkish identity. But, I should say that if my relatives there spoke Turkish, then I would consider myself a Turk, too. I am not talking about these people; but about Albanians who see themselves as Turks. (Serkan, 30, from Macedonia, second generation migrant, second wave of migration)

This dominance of Turkish people in the immigrations from the Balkans, the shared history of Ottoman Empire and the policies that restrict concentration of non-Turkish immigrants in one region affected the way the 'Albanian' immigrants constituted their identities in Turkey. According to the surveys and interviews I conducted, I can say that Turkish identity does not constitute "the other" of the Albanian one but they exist simultaneously, which is very much related to the reasons discussed above. Having examined the migration regime and citizenship policies in Turkey, I will explore the conditions under which migration from Yugoslavia took place with an emphasis on the minority regime and reasons triggering migration from the former Yugoslavia in different migration waves in the next section.

### 3.4. Emigration from Yugoslavia

As it was also the case with the migration from other Balkan countries, the migration from Yugoslavia was closely tied to the attitudes of governments towards the minorities. After the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population was left to the successor states in the territories of Yugoslavia. In each successor states (namely, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the repressive attitudes of governments especially towards the Muslim minorities resulted in the large scale emigration of these minority groups. According to Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2003: 394), one important consequence of these migrations caused by

persecutions especially during the interwar period was the scattering of the Albanian population to countries such as Australia, the USA, and Canada as well as European countries, and this led to the creation of an Albanian diaspora and transnationalization of Albanian issue of Yugoslavia.

Before discussing the emigration waves from Yugoslavia, it is important to underline the fact that the religious composition of Yugoslavia had been already altered during the Balkan Wars. McCarthy (2001:143-45) draws attention to the increase of the Muslim population in Kosovo and Bitola (in Macedonia) after the 1877-78 War of Russia and the Ottoman Empire (see Table 3.2 below).

**Table 3. 2 Muslim Populations in the Balkans**

| Muslim Population | 1876 | 1882 | 1911 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Serbia | 131.000 | 12.000 | NA |
| Bulgaria | 1.501.000 | 715.000 | NA |
| Greece | 40.000 | 5.000 | NA |
| **Kosovo** | **360.000** | **637.000** | **959.000** |
| **Manastır/ Bitola** | **143.000** | **302.000** | **456.000** |
| Edirne | 434.000 | 539.000 | 605.000 |
| **Total** | **2.609.000** | **2.210.000** | **2.020.000** |

Source: McCarthy, 2001

While Muslim residents in the Yugoslavian territories (including Bosnia) equaled to 1.4 million, it decreased to 566,000 after the Balkan Wars concentrating mainly in Kosovo and Macedonia (McCarthy, 2001). The policies of successor states also led to further emigration of Muslim population from Yugoslavia. From this point onwards, this chapter will examine the minority policies of successor states in Yugoslavia in conjunction with emigration patterns from the region. In addition, the

bilateral relationship between Turkey and Yugoslavia in regards to migration politics will also be scrutinized.

### 3.4.1. Emigration in the Interwar Era

In the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Muslim population lost their privileged position in the earlier Ottoman *millet* system. Neither did the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which reigned during the years between 1919 and 1929, nor Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was a dictatorship established by King Alexander in 1929, recognized Albanians and Bosnians as nationalities (Babuna, 2004). In contrast, they discriminated Muslim populations in the major reforms during the interwar period as well as prohibiting Albanian language and closing down the Albanian schools along with other non-Slavic languages and schools. Albanians were only allowed to have religious education in the so called "Turkish schools, mektebs and medresses employing Arabic and Turkish as a medium of education" (Babuna, 2000: 69).

In the interwar period, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes collected guns from the Albanian and Turkish people, applied agricultural and settlement reforms in a way to alter the distribution of lands and population against the Albanians and Turks in Kosovo and Macedonia (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Especially the policies of colonization[12] and forced migration during this era were evaluated as *white terror* by the Yugoslav Communist Party. The colonization policy, which continued during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was accompanied with partitioning of Kosovo into four districts; three belonging to Serbia and one to Montenegro. Alarmed because of these

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[12] Colonization is a migratory process in which nationalities other than Albanian were brought to Kosovo and settled in the evicted lands and houses of Albanians.

changes in the local governments and the violent measures by the governments, Albanians and Turks from Yugoslavia saw emigration as the only alternative (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). In addition to these policies, Cubrilovic issued a memorandum on the solution of Albanian problem which basically foresaw colonization as an impractical method and offered the forced migration of Albanians to Turkey (not to Albania since it was a border country) as a solution.

Moreover, Cubrilovic's proposal was realized in the negotiations between Yugoslavia and Turkey on the migration agreement. *The Convention Regulating the Emigration of the Turkish Population from the Region of Southern Serbia in Yugoslavia* was signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1938. According to this Convention, Yugoslav Muslim subjects of Turkish origin, culture and language would migrate to Turkey (Article 1) after renouncing their Yugoslav citizenship (Article 12) and Turkish government agreed for 40,000 families to be deported to Turkey (Elsie, 1997). Due to the outbreak of WWII, the migration agreement was not activated, though there were migrations in those years. According to the Yugoslav records, the number of Muslim people having migrated to Turkey during the interwar period was 255,000, in which Albanian migrants were counted as 215,000 (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 215), whereas in the Turkish records the number of people migrating from Yugoslavia in the same period was given as 110,000 without any specific information about the ethnic background of the migrants (Geray, 1962; see also Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a).

In sum, the oppressive regime towards the Muslims in the interwar period led to the large scale of migration. Even though the Migration Convention was not

implemented due to the World War II, there were migrations during and after the agreement yet not in the same amount as was targeted in the Convention. However, the developments during the war paved the way for another migration wave in the postwar period. To briefly outline these developments, a large part of Kosovo and Western Macedonia was united with the Kingdom of Albania under the Italian rule (Babuna, 2000). During the war, some Albanians sided with Italians and Germans as well as involving in the killing and removal of Serbs, which created a further resentment among the Serbs (Malcolm, 1998). Nonetheless, there were also Albanians who fought with the partisans during the war and in return who were promised to govern themselves after the war. While making this promise, partisans aimed at creating a big federation for the Balkans which would include Albania and Bulgaria yet this aim was not realized (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 246). Indeed, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established after the war with six states in the republic status, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. Kosovo remained within the Serbian Republic without a republic status, but with the title of Autonomous Administrative region in 1946 (Ivanov, 1996).

### 3.4.2. Emigrations in the Postwar Era

The emigration from the socialist Yugoslav state to Turkey was made possible with "Turkish-Yugoslav 'Gentlemen's' Agreement" in 1953. According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a total of 150,000 migrants consisting of Albanians, Turks and Bosnians arrived Turkey between 1952 and 1960 (Öksüz and Köksal, 2004). However, there is a controversy in regards to the number of Albanian versus Turkish migrants in the literature of migration from the former Yugoslavia. Even

though I find this discussion not so relevant to the aim of my thesis, I will try to present it since it shows the ambivalence and gray areas in regards to the identities of migrants and the fact that demographic analyses, in this respect, inevitably fails to capture these gray areas and ambivalences.

In the literature that concentrates on the migration from Yugoslavia, the major controversy has been whether those migrants were Turks or Albanians. While some scholars stress that Albanian migrants constituted only a minority in the migration waves (i.e. Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a; Oran, 1993; Duman, 2009), other sources emphasizes that migrants were mostly Albanian origin (Rapper, 2000; Malcolm, 1998; Poulton, 1997; Palmer and King,1971). This controversy stems from not only government policies during the migrations but also the shared experience of Ottoman rule during which Albanians were belonging the dominant Muslim group. For instance, Çavuşoğlu (2007: 138) points out that the Ottoman history and religious similarity caused Albanians to equate *Islam, Ottomans and Turkish identity* which eventually led them to identify themselves as *Turks*. In order to prove his point, he gives the examples of sayings such as "I swear in my Turkish religion[13]" where Turkishness is equated to religion (Çavuşoğlu, 2009:171).

**Table 3.3 Turkish population in official documents of Yugoslavia**

| Areas | 1948 | 1953 | 1961 | 1971 | 1981 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kosovo** | 1,315 | 34,583 | 25,764 | 12,244 | 12,513 |
| **Macedonia** | 95,940 | 203,908 | 131,481 | 108,552 | 86,691 |
| **Yugoslavia** | 97,255 | 229,672 | 157,245 | 120,796 | 101,291 |

Source: Geray (1962: 10-14)

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[13] Türklük dinimin hakkı için (translated by the author)

As an example to such government policies, the agreement between these states can be given. The agreement indicated that only those coming from Turkish descent and culture would be accepted as migrants, which led people to change their previously declared ethnic identities even though they did not speak Turkish (Rapper, 2000). This obliged identity declaration as Turks also facilitated the integration of Albanians into Turkish society. As Palmer and King (1971) display, the number of Turkish ethnic group in Macedonia oscillated in the years between 1948 and 1960. While the number of Turkish people was about 96,000 in 1948, it increased to around 204,000 in 1953 right after the migration agreement was announced. After that, it declined to 131,000 in 1961 (Palmer and King, 1971; see also Table 3.3 above). Despite the significance of demographic information, I argue that the structural forces that led the Albanian migrants to declare themselves as Turks played an important role in the collective identity formation for this immigrant group.

Another example of government policies which impede to account for the number of people of Albanian origin is that Turkish state does not ask the ethnicity questions in the censuses. In the population census, the relevant question was being asked through respondent's mother tongue as well as the next best spoken language. However, language data stopped being published since 1965, though the mother-tongue question was being used up until 1970. After that, they quitted asking language questions in the censuses (İçduygu *et al.,* 1999). Nevertheless, there is linguistic data until 1965 and the Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 give the number of Albanian speakers among the Yugoslavian immigrants in Turkey which can provide us estimation for the number of Albanian migrants from the former Yugoslavia.

**Table 3.4 Yugoslavian Migrants in Turkey according to Linguistic Criteria (1927-50)**

| Languages | 1927 Native Lang. | 1927 2nd Lang | 1935 Native Lang. | 1935 2nd Lang. | 1945 Native Lang. | 1945 2nd Lang. | 1950 Native Lang. | 1950 2nd Lang |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Albanian** | 21,774 | | 22,754 | 26,161 | 14,165 | 17,701 | 16,079 | - |
| **Total** | 21,774 | | 48,915 | | 31,886 | | 16,709 | |
| Bosnian | 7,450 | - | 24,613 | 13,526 | 13,280 | 9,599 | 24,013 | - |
| Total | 7,450 | | 38,141 | | 22,879 | | 24,013 | |
| Serbian | - | - | 4,369 | - | 4,100 | - | 1,605 | - |
| Total | - | | 4,369 | | 4,100 | | 1,605 | |
| Languages | 29,224 | - | 51,736 | 39,687 | 31,545 | 27,300 | 41,697 | - |
| **Total** | 29,224 | | 91,425 | | 58,845 | | 41,697 | |

Source: Dündar (1999)

*Second language was not asked to Balkan immigrants in 1950

Yet, it should be kept in mind that immigrants would be unwilling to disclose their identities in the censuses if we consider the fact that these people declared themselves 'Turk' to be able to come to Turkey especially those immigrants who came in accordance with the 1953 Agreement on migration.

**Table 3.5 Yugoslavian Migrants in Turkey according to Linguistic Criteria (1955-65)**

| Languages | 1955 Native Language | 1955 Second Language | 1960 Native Language | 1960 Second Language | 1965 Native Language | 1965 Second Language |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Albanian** | 10,893 | 25,898 | 12,025 | 37,144 | 12,832 | 40,688 |
| **Total** | 36,791 | | 49,144 | | 53,520 | |
| Bosnian | 11,844 | 13,908 | 14,750 | 37,526 | 17,627 | 37,237 |
| Total | 25,752 | | 52,096 | | 54,864 | |
| Serbian | 4,654 | 28,961 | 7,386 | 55,473 | 6,599 | 59,578 |
| Total | 33,615 | | 62,859 | | 66,177 | |
| Languages Total | 27,391 | 68,767 | 33,981 | 130,143 | 37,058 | 137,503 |
| **Yugoslavia Total** | 96,158 | | 164,124 | | 174,561 | |

Source: Dündar (1999)

Before discussing this agreement and migration took place after this agreement thoroughly, it is important to introduce the general situation of Albanians within the Federal Yugoslav state and the factors that led Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo to emigrate. These reasons for emigration constitute a key to the discussion of diaspora formation since these reasons are perceived differently by the migrants and Turkish state. While the voluntary character was emphasized in the migration agreement, the immigrants and their families with whom I conducted surveys and in-depth interviews make references to violent treatment by the existing regime. Hence, these factors will be discussed in the following section.

*3.4.2.1 The factors leading to Emigration from Yugoslavia*

The national categorization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an important element to understand the situation of minorities within the republics. In this multi-ethnic federative state, there were three categories of national communities; constitutive nations, nationalities and ethnic communities. The status of constitutive Yugoslav nation, which had the right to self-determination, was given to Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Later, Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were also given this right in 1960s. Other larger national groups such as Albanians, Hungarians and Italians were recognized as nationalities. The term 'minorities' was not used because first it was considered derogatory and second it would be confusing considering the fact that nationalities such as Albanians and Hungarians were majority in the regions they lived (Adamson and Jovic, 2004). Finally smaller national groups such as Roma people, Slovaks and Turks were called ethnic communities (Adamson and Jovic, 2004).

The Albanians, like Hungarians and Italians, were not among the constitutive nations since they were not Slavic and these nations had other nation-states unlike constitutive nations of Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1998). For this reason, Kosovo was not given the republic status regardless of the fact that Albanians were a larger group than some constitutive nations such as Montenegrins (Adamson and Jovic, 2004). Nonetheless, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the Albanians were recognized as a distinct ethnicity for the first time (Babuna, 2000). Yet Albanians, who fought with the partisans during the war, were disappointed for they were not given the right to self-determination (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). On top of this, the Tito-Stalin break-up in 1948 and deteriorating relations between Yugoslavia and Albania (which sided with Stalin) had negative effects on Albanians in Yugoslavia. Moreover, Yugoslav state tried to turn ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia into a separate nation "by referring them as Shqiptar and their co-nationals in Albania were named as Albanci" (Babuna, 2000: 70).

In addition, the major reforms in the agriculture in the postwar era put Muslims into a disadvantaged position. With the introduction of *Oktup system* in 1946, the Yugoslav government started to buy food and agricultural products at a cheap price which affected Albanians and Turks who were agricultural producers. This new system was evaluated as a deliberate repression of Muslims through economic means (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). This policy was replaced by incremental collectivization policy in 1953. However, both of these resulted in not only the underdevelopment in Kosovo where agriculture remained only economic option but also in the perception that agricultural reforms aimed to repress the Muslim population (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 255-60).

Moreover, religious reforms were not welcomed by the Muslim population in the region, either. The Yugoslav federal state put some restrictions on the Catholic and Muslim communities whereas Orthodox community was not controlled at all (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). For instance, the budgets of Catholic churches and Muslim mosques were cut down and there were restrictions on the activities of Muslim communities such as banning of *dervish* organizations and *tekkes* in 1952 and prohibiting *ferace* (headscarf) for Muslim women in 1951(Malcolm, 1998; see also Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Furthermore, Yugoslav state considered the Bosnian Islamic Community as representing the whole Muslim community in the country which caused tension within the Turkish and Albanian population (Babuna, 2004). All in all, these prohibitions were taken as hostility against Muslims and triggered the emigration of Muslims from the region. It should be noted that the religious repressions affected the choice of the destination country in the Albanian migration; they chose Turkey instead of Albania where an atheist state was proclaimed by Enver Hoxha in late 1940s (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). This argument is also in line with my findings from the interviews and surveys conducted with the Albanian community in Istanbul.

According to Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2001 and 2003a), another reason that affected the migration flows in this period was the confiscation of arms by Yugoslav state which created an atmosphere of fear and the feeling of insecurity among the Albanians. Moreover, Albanian language schools were closed down; teachers of history and language were pressured. It was banned to show any Albanian national symbols, flags, and to commemorate the national holidays (Babuna, 2000). Along with these general reasons of migration, there are some significant political events both in

Kosovo and Macedonia that need to be considered separately as they emerge in states with different ethnic combination and accordingly with different political atmospheres.

The first one is the Prizren Trial of 1956 in Kosovo in which nine Kosovar Albanians were accused of infiltrating into the Yugoslav Communist League as spies of Albania. Among these Albanians, there were the local administrators of Suha Reka as well as journalists from Rilindja newspaper. They were found guilty of treason and spying for Albania and sentenced to prison for 12 years (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). After the Prizren Trial, the Albanian migration from Yugoslavia escalated and turned into a mass migration since it aroused frustration among the Albanian population. Also, political repression by Alexandar Rankovic who was known with his harsh anti-Albanian policies such as unjustified arrests and detentions shaped people's decision to emigrate. However, most emigrants from Kosovo who chose Turkey as a destination country had to migrate to Macedonia first and then move to Turkey (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 278). This information also coincides with the accounts of first generation interviewees who experienced the whole process of migration.

However, it needs to be emphasized that after Rankovic was removed from his duty, a process of political liberalization started in 1966 whereby the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia improved drastically. Moreover, Second Prizren Trial took place in which the Yugoslav state paid compensation to the incarcerated people since the accusations in the first trial were fake and bogus (Bozbora, 2002; Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). Also, there were some other improvements such as Albanians were permitted

to establish Prishtina University, given the right to fly their black-eagled flag after 1968 (Babuna, 2000: 71; Ivanov, 1996).

In contrast to the Serbian republic, the Macedonian Republic provided a relatively more conflict-free environment for Albanians (Ortakovski, 2001). There were less public protest about the status of Albanians in Macedonia in comparison to Kosovo and Serbia. This relatively low level of protests in Macedonia can also be tied to the Yücel incident of 1948. Yücel was name of the Turkish group which was a part of the Albanian-Turk organization called *Yardım*. When *Yardım* was separated into two; National Albanian Organization and Nationalist Turkish Organization (*Yücel*) in 1941, Yücel organization committed itself to benefiting Turkey (Ağanoğlu, 2006). This organization was not well received by Yugoslav authorities and the administrators of Yücel organizations were arrested and sentenced to death after a brief period of trial in 1948 (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a). This incident was carried out blatantly creating a psychological pressure on the Turkish and Albanian minorities in Macedonia. Nevertheless, the liberalization of minority policies especially with regards to Turkish minority started in 1949 after Tito-Stalin break-up and the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Turkey. A number of civil society organizations, such as True Path [*Doğru Yol*], Victory [*Zafer*], *Unity* [Birlik] and New Life [*Yeni Hayat*] were established in this era. Notwithstanding these liberalization policies towards minorities, this period witnessed a large scale migration beginning with 1953.

*3.4.2.2 Migration Agreement*

The migration agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1953 became the framework of the large scale emigration from Yugoslavia. According to the agreement, a Commission on Migration was established in Macedonia which was determined as a center of migration and visa proceedings took place in the Turkish Consulate in Macedonia. The condition to be eligible for migration was at least 3 years of residence in Macedonia (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 239). Accordingly, those emigrants who wanted to get migrant visa should fulfill the following requirements: to get a certificate from the local authorities *stating that they are Turkish,* to prove to Turkish embassy that they belong to Turkish culture, to give information about Turkish relatives residing in Turkey (Çavuşoğlu, 2007).

It should also be noted here that the Yugoslav state wanted the Muslim emigrants to relinquish their Yugoslav citizenship which was not a condition in the emigrations of other nationalities from Yugoslavia (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 438). This requirement makes it explicit that Albanians and Turks were not welcomed in the region and all measures were taken to prevent their return to Yugoslavia. According to Çavuşoğlu (2007: 140), those Albanians leaving for Turkey was a blessing for Macedonian and Serbian authorities which enabled them to get rid of a population who had ambitions to establish a bigger Albania which included certain parts of Macedonia and Kosovo.

In sum, the bulk of migration from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey took place during the years 1954-60. The political and agricultural reforms and repressive measures taken against Islam urged the Muslim minorities to emigrate and almost

155,000 people immigrated to Turkey (Kirişçi, 1995). These migrants during this era were not recorded as refugees according to Geneva Convention of 1951 but as free immigrants entering Turkey in accordance with the voluntary migration agreement between Turkey and Yugoslavia (Kirişçi, 1996). The fact that Albanian migrants were obliged to declare themselves as Turks to come to Turkey makes this wave of migration interesting topic to study particularly regarding their relations with the home country.

In the later period, however, the migration to Turkey declined significantly. While the main destination of migration from the former Yugoslavia in the postwar era was Turkey, it has changed in the period after 1980s. The refugees of Bosnian and Kosovo Wars were scattered around the European countries along with Turkey. In the next section, emigration process after 1980s will be explained in detail.

### 3.4.3. Emigrations in the post 1980s

The major emigration waves from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey took place during the Bosnian and Kosovo wars in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Before these wars, the total number of migrants from Yugoslavia was slightly higher than 3,000 people (Doğanay, 1996). Yet, the Bosnian War resulted in 20,000 asylum seekers applying for Turkey. Similarly, Kosovo War of 1998-99 generated another 18,000 asylum seekers (Kirişçi, 1996 and 2001). There were also another group of Albanian refugees from Macedonia who were brought as a part of Humanitarian Evacuation program in 1999 (Kirişçi, 2003). All in all, these de facto refugees who were settled in refugee camps in Kırklareli, were not given the right to settle in Turkey but rather were granted a temporary asylum (Kirişçi, 2003). As

expected, majority of these refugees returned back to their countries. However, the process in which the conflicts and war took place and these refugees came to Turkey inevitably affected their conationals in Turkey. Hence, I will briefly outline the process in which the war in Kosovo and insurgence in Macedonia took place.

In explaining the Albanian migrations of this period, it is important to consider the political turmoil that led to escalating ethnic tension and subsequent war. After Tito's death in 1980, a social unrest among the Albanians in Kosovo, who were not satisfied with *de facto* republic status but wanted to have a *de jure* constitutional status, started to take place (Lendvai and Parcell 1991). However, these protests for more autonomy and freedom were responded by more repressive measures; restricting the autonomy of the province in 1988 and abolishing it altogether in 1990 (Ivanov, 1996). In response, Albanians declared their independence with a referendum in 1991 and Ibrahim Rugova was declared as the president of Kosovo (Poulton, 1997). Yet, Kosovo was not recognized internationally and the Albanian government in Kosovo remained as an underground government (or parallel government). This passive resistance to Serbian rule turned into an active insurgence with Kosovo Liberation Army taking over a more powerful role. After Raćak Massacre where 50 Albanians were killed in 1999, NATO became involved in the war introducing its peacekeeping forces. The Kosovo War created large numbers of refugees, only a small portion of refugees were accommodated in Turkey. After a nine-year period of administration by the United Nations, Kosovo declared its independence on 17th February 2008 and Turkey became one of the first countries recognizing its independence.

In Macedonia, on the other hand, Albanians mobilized when the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia following the Slovenian and Croatian examples in 1991 (Ivanov, 1996). Albanians in Macedonia demanded more rights, equal status with the Macedonian majority, and official language status for Albanian (Ivanov, 1996). There were constant tensions between Macedonians and Albanians, these tensions were culminated into an insurgency in 2001 (Reka, 2008). Before these tensions turned into a civil war, the Ohrid Agreement was signed in 2001 and Ohrid process resulted in empowerment of not only Albanians but also other minorities such as Turks and Roma in Macedonia (Reka, 2008).

### 3.5. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have tried to situate the 'Albanian' immigration to Turkey into historical context in conjunction with the Balkan immigration. By juxtaposing the migration from the former Yugoslavia and Balkans together, I have tried to outline the general pattern of emigration from the region and its relation to the Ottoman legacy, which singled out Turkey as successor state in the eyes of the migrants. In exploring the background of these migration flows, I have also investigated the citizenship and settlement policies of Turkish state. This historical account is important since they illuminate the circumstances in taking the decision to migrate, in other words, 'push and pull factors'; factors that lead the migrants to leave their home country and factors that attract migrants to the host country, respectively.

In the first period of migration which coincided with the nation-building process and single party period in Turkey, the migration from the Balkan countries was very much encouraged. In this period, the colonization policies in agriculture and

pressures against Muslim population in Macedonia and Kosovo generated large flows of emigration. Besides, the agreement between Turkey and Yugoslav Kingdom in 1938, though not activated, also engendered migration. Thus, the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia reached 110,000 in this period (Doğanay, 1996). In this period, the migration and settlement policies of Turkey replicated the aim to form a homogenous society; hence coming from 'Turkish descent and culture' was prioritized. Nonetheless, as far as the migration from the Balkans is concerned, this precondition of migration was flexibly implemented which made it possible for Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks and Torbeshs to immigrate to Turkey. In this flexible implementation, it was expected that these immigrant would melt into the Turkish culture. As the parliament debates discussed above display, the attempts by these population to preserve their culture and language were not well-received by the members of the parliament.

The regime changes in the postwar era initiated another migration wave from the Balkans. In tandem with other Balkan countries, the minority groups in Yugoslavia (Turks, Albanians and Bosnians) were also suffering from the pressures of the communist regime (Kirişçi, 1995 and 1996). The change in agricultural system, repressive attitude towards Islam and confiscation of guns by the government generated the feeling of insecurity. Moreover, Yugoslav state tried to differentiate the Albanians in Yugoslavia from their conationals in Albania by inventing different names for Albanians in Albania; Albanci after the Tito-Stalin break up and Enver Hoxha siding with Stalin (Babuna, 2000: 70). On the other hand, this break-up between Tito and Stalin facilitated cooperation between Turkey and Yugoslavia which translated itself into "Turkish-Yugoslav 'Gentlemen's' Agreement" in 1953 in

which migration was also included (Kirişçi, 1995). In sum, a large wave of migrants composed of Turks, Albanians, Pomaks and Bosnians, relinquishing their Yugoslav citizenship, migrated to Turkey as *independent immigrants* according to the Settlement Law of 1934 (Doğanay, 1996; Kirişçi, 1995 and 1996; Öksüz and Köksal, 2004). Turkish migration policy which welcomed immigrants from the Balkans, including those with different ethnic backgrounds from the former Yugoslavia, aimed at melting the non-Turkish Muslim communities into Turkish society as they were assumed to have similar culture. This dominance of Turkish people in the immigrations from the Balkans, the shared history of Ottoman Empire, the Migration Agreement which made it obligatory to declare Turkish descent to come to Turkey and the policies that restrict concentration of non-Turkish immigrants in one region affected the way the 'Albanian' immigrants constituted their identities in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkish identity is not "the Other" of the Albanian immigrants.

Beginning with the 1980s, not only the number of migrants from the former Yugoslavia declined significantly, but also the Turkish policy towards immigrants changed. The major migrations occurred during the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars. The most refugees that came to Turkey during the wars preferred to stay with their relative's houses, while the rest of them were accommodated in the refugee camp in Kırklareli (Kirişçi, 1996 and 2003). It is important to note that these asylum seekers were not settled according to the Law on Settlement, rather granted a temporary asylum ((Kirişçi, 1996). Lastly, the majority of the Albanian refugees from Kosovo as well as Bosnian ones returned to their countries after the war (Kirişçi, 2003).

In this chapter, I have given the historical background of the migration from the former Yugoslavia trying to account for the political atmosphere in both Turkey and Yugoslavia in the respective migration waves. This macro-level analysis of immigration constitutes only one dimension of analysis. However, state-level analysis should be accompanied with investigating the everyday practices of migrants after migration took place as well as the networks and associations that these migrants established in order to analyze the process of diaspora formation. In the next chapter, I will explore the post-migration period at the individual level, as well as analyzing the networks that immigrants have formed.

# CHAPTER IV

# AN IMAGINED TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITY:

# A CASE STUDY OF ALBANIAN MIGRANTS

## *4.1. Introduction*

The fundamental aim of this thesis is to understand and explain the process of diasporic identity formation by drawing upon the literatures on transnationalism, diaspora and social movements. Equally important is to inquire this process in the example of 'Albanian' immigrant community whose identity constitute an interesting case as it is contested due to a common discourse that these immigrants have integrated into the Turkish society without retaining their distinct identities and relations with the homeland. Given the recent changes political circumstances in the home countries of 'Albanian' immigrants, this migrant community needs to be examined in regards to their relations with the home and host countries with an approach moving beyond the assimilation-integration debate in the migration studies.

This thesis employs literatures on transnationalism and diaspora which necessitates the use of a constructivist approach to diaspora. In explaining the Albanian case, I try to avoid the understanding that diasporic identity results from the act of migration. Instead, the imagination of the group as a community, in Vertovec's words "diaspora as consciousness" as well as practicing transnational identities are the basic

components of becoming diaspora. Therefore, I emphasize the sense of identity, state of mind and awareness of de-centered attachment in the diasporic identity. As Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) argue, "ways of being", practicing transnational actions, needs to be accompanied with "ways of belonging", consciousness of a particular group, to form a diasporic identity. This process oriented approach also enables us to overcome static and homogenous understandings of diaspora and to account for the 'ebbs and flows' in the diasporic activities. Combining the literatures on diaspora and transnationalism has allowed me to make comparison among certain sections of the group such as gender and generation of the migrants. The tools of social movement theory, on the other hand, have enabled me to explain the formation of diasporic identity as will be discussed in later sections.

The case study presented in this chapter aims to fill the gap in the academic literature in two ways. First, even though there are some studies on the immigrants from the Balkans and from the former Yugoslavia in particular, these studies rarely discuss the process of identity formation but concentrate on the questions who, when and why migrated. Drawing on the recent researches in the literature on diaspora, this chapter sheds a light to the identity perceptions among the 'Albanian' migrant population. In order to accomplish this, this thesis utilizes the fieldwork conducted with individual members and associations unlike the existing literature which focuses only on the structural factors. Second, the findings of thesis support the constructivist approach to diaspora which emphasizes a move beyond binary oppositions and sees diasporic existence as simultaneous. As the survey responses and interviews suggest Albanians identify themselves both as Albanians and Turks and make attempts to reconcile their Albanian and Turkish identities through the Ottoman heritage in the Rumelia.

In sum this chapter advances three arguments through the case of Albanian residents in Zeytinburnu. First, contemporary diasporas are not an essential social form emerged out of boundary-crossing but is a social construction resulting from certain developments in the home and host countries and these developments are known by diaspora thanks to contemporary communication and transportation technologies. Second, diasporas constitute a form of transnational community and the emerging contemporary characteristics of diaspora consciousness is the simultaneous sense of belonging to both home and host countries. This simultaneity in their loyalty does not invalidate their diasporic consciousness and their orientation towards home country. Last, a social movement approach to diaspora shed light on the critical role played by changing political structures and agency of immigrant groups in the process of diasporic identity formation.

The remainder of this chapter continues as follows, the next section discusses the methodology of the thesis, introducing the methods used in the case study, the data collection, sampling methods and location of fieldwork. Third section presents the demographic features of the sample group such as gender, marital status, income and education levels as well as place of origin and migration wave. In the fourth section, I explore the way Albanian migrants perceive their community through focusing on the migration experience, self-awareness of the group as a community, home country orientation and lastly boundary maintenance. In examining these characteristics of Albanian immigrant group, I argue that Albanian community is an imagined community that has links spanning more than one country, and its formation as such is a result of transnational mobilization as a response to critical events in the home country which enabled the new imaginations of community. The fifth section

investigates the process of diasporic identity formation through examining role played first by *political opportunities* such as changing minority policies and preceding groups with identity claims in the host country and changing political structure in the home country namely disintegration of Yugoslavia, second by *mobilizing structures* such as existence of immigrant associations. After analyzing these regarding the emergence of diasporic identity formation, the competing identity frames of immigrant associations are also observed. In the final section the arguments of the chapter are summarized.

## *4.2. Methodology of the Case Study*

The findings presented in this chapter are based on the data I have gathered throughout my fieldwork conducted in Zeytinburnu, Istanbul between January 2010 and May 2010. Before starting to collect my data, I have been able to participate as an observer in the activities of Albanian community in Istanbul through visiting their associations in certain occasions. In this single-site case study, I have carried out my research in Zeytinburnu, a district attracting both internal and international migrants but in particular migrants from the former Yugoslavia. In order to explain the case of Albanian community in Turkey with regards to their process of diasporic identity formation, I have chosen a single-site so that I would be able to detail the lived experiences of persons in that setting.

Locating my case study in Zeytinburnu has enabled me to benefit from the strengths of different methodologies; hence I was able to conduct exploratory surveys with the members of migrant community as well as carrying out in-depth interviews and making observations in the activities of associations such as A Luggage, A Coffer

*[Bir Kofer Bir Sandık]* which was organized as a commemoration of the migration experience and an organization for Yıldız Spor Club, a football team of immigrants from former Yugoslavia in Zeytinburnu. As a result, I have gathered both quantitative and qualitative data for my research. The use of different methodologies has enabled me to benefit from the advantages of these methodologies. The use of the closed-ended survey questions has allowed me to see if identity variables are related to the variables on transnational activities and attitudes. The advantage of interviews, on the other hand, is that it enables "an access to thought process" of the respondents and allows respondents to explain their identities and process of transformation of identities which would not be possible with survey questions (Sylvan and Metskas, 2009: 83-84).

Even though in-depth interviews are difficult to conduct and systematically analyze with relatively large numbers of questions and large numbers of sample (Sylvan and Metskas, 2009: 84-85), they provided the opportunity to understand the *cognitive aspect* of identity that structures the story of the group, their evaluation of themselves as a group and of their relation with other groups through interpretive techniques (Adams, 2009). There are multiple levels of subjectivity in using interpretive methods and techniques since often interviews have revealed not only information on the interviewees but also on the third parties: their children and relatives. Thus, using multiple methods (sometimes refereed as triangulation) is also important for subjectivity problems (Jick, 1979 and Adams, 2009). With the data gathered from the exploratory survey, I was able to gather more general descriptive information as well as some tendencies, whereas qualitative data from interviews and observations

enabled me to have a more complete and holistic interpretation of Albanian community and the factors affecting their identity (Jick, 1979).

Conducting an exploratory survey was also necessary when the criticisms directed to the diaspora literature are considered. The literature is often criticized for relying on a sample chosen invariably on the dependent variable, in other words, a sample consisting only of those immigrants engaging in transnational activities (Guarnizo *et al.,* 2003). For this reason, I also employed surveys to have a relatively broader picture to capture the diversity among the members of the Albanian community. I have applied in-person surveys in which I visited the houses of respondents and asked the questions in the questionnaire, instead of using mail or telephone surveys. The questionnaire consists of multiple choice questions, ranking items, rating scales as well as an open-ended question (see Appendix A) and it was revised after a pilot study in which 5 questionnaires were completed with the immigrants. To determine the respondents for the survey, I have used the dataset provided by Zeytinburnu Municipality Local Governance and EU Coordination Center *[Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Yerel Kalkınma ve AB İlişkileri Koordinasyon Merkezi, ZEYKOM]*. This dataset consists of 179,525 municipality residents. According to this dataset, 12,636 people originate from the Balkan countries (7 percent of all population). In particular, the migrant community from the former Yugoslavia corresponds to 8,795 people, making up almost 5 percent of whole population. Nonetheless, the data set has also a weakness; it only takes into account the previous location of residents before Zeytinburnu. In other words, if a family migrates from Macedonia to Samsun and then moves to Zeytinburnu, they are coded as coming from Samsun disregarding the earlier migration from another country. Therefore, I have not been able to reach

the migrants from the former Yugoslavia who came to Zeytinburnu from other cities in Turkey.

 All in all, I have conducted surveys with 70 respondents from 8,704 migrants from Macedonia and Kosovo. In selecting respondents, I have made two lists: the main list consisting of 70 people and a backup list consisting of 100 people, considering the possibility of non-responses. After visiting 163 households[14], I was able to conduct 70 survey questionnaires; the majority of them were completed in the houses of respondents which provided me the opportunity to observe their everyday lives and take some notes about the similarities among the houses and daily lives of Albanian migrant community. I acknowledge that the sample size of this survey is relatively small; therefore drawing statistical inferences may be problematic. However, a sample size of 70 for an in-person conducted survey should not be underestimated; especially considering that the goal of the survey is to identify the general tendencies within this immigrant group. Thus, this study constitutes a preliminary step for more comprehensive surveys on this topic.

The qualitative component of this study consists of semi-structured interviews (for interview questions see Appendix B) conducted with 10 Albanian migrants from the former Yugoslavia. The interviews were held either in the houses of respondents or at their workplace or out in the cafes and restaurants and took one hour on average but in some cases they exceeded one and a half hour. In the thesis, the names of interviewees appear as pseudonyms. The interviews were conducted in Turkish but

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[14] Among 163 people I visited, 25 of them declined to answer the questionnaire, 4 of them were too old to complete it, 13 of them moved to other places, and 2 of them died. The remaining 49 people were not at home.

older interviewees spoke also Albanian at times when they could not express their feelings in Turkish. As the respondents expressed their discomfort with the recorder, I took notes during the interviews. As I was collecting data through surveys, I asked people if they would like to have an in-depth interview and took the phone numbers of those who were willing. In selecting the interviewees from those willing people, I have tried to take into account gender, age, income and education and contacted interviewees accordingly (see Appendix C).

In addition, I have also visited the immigrant associations in and near Zeytinburnu to which the respondents of the survey attend. Hence I conducted in-depth interviews with the people working in the Culture and Solidarity Association of Rumelian Turks *[Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği],* the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood *[Arnavut-Kardeşliği Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği],* the Culture and Solidarity Association of All Turks of Rumelia *[Tüm Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği],* the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Prishtina *[Priştineliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği]* and finally the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Köprü *[Köprülüler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği].* Moreover, I had the opportunity to conduct an interview with the founders of the website *arnavutgenclik.com* as a group. In addition to the interviews and off-the-record conversations in the associations, I have also gathered insights through non-participant observations, observing the way they organize their cultural activities and events.

It is important to point out that even though I used a non-participant technique throughout my fieldwork, I have formed friendships with the local people in

Zeytinburnu during my regular visits, which helped me to have an easy access to some households for conducting surveys. As I was conducting surveys, I paid attention not to reveal that my family was also a migrant from the former Yugoslavia so as not to affect the responses of the informants. I only revealed that information during our conversations after completing the interviews. As I am aware of the disadvantages of being too much involved with people in the fieldwork, I have tried to avoid giving the impression of myself as 'a fellow citizen' (*hemşeri*).

### 4.2.1. Zeytinburnu: A Home for migrants from the former Yugoslavia

Some districts in Istanbul such as Zeytinburnu, Bayrampaşa, Alibeyköy and Sefaköy are known for their highly concentrated population of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (Rapper, 2000). Among them, Zeytinburnu is best-known to be constructed by the migrant communities, as the study carried out by Charles W.M. Hart in 1962 displays the foreign country born population in Zeytinburnu equaled of 51,8 percent of the total population in those years.[15] The migrants from Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia are the ones with highest proportion among the whole migrants. Today, the population of Zeytinburnu approaches to nearly 250,000 people of which 15,000 are born in a foreign country, mostly in a Balkan country. As Murat Aydın, the mayor of Zeytinburnu municipality, states "it would not be wrong to call Zeytinburnu as 'the Little Balkans'[16]." It should also be emphasized that even though these immigrants were scattered around different neighborhoods in Zeytinburnu, there were four major neighborhoods where the immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are clustered so much so that these neighborhoods were called 'Albanian

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[15] http://www.zeytinburnu-bld.gov.tr/bel_zeytinburnu/zeytinburnu/ilce_haritasi.cfm, Last Access: 13.05.2010.

[16] http://www.zeytinburnuhaber.org/news_detail.php3?id=33, Last Access: 13.05.2010.

neighborhoods' such as certain streets in Çırpıcı, Veliefendi, Merkezefendi and Beştelsiz.

In addition to the high proportion of migrants from the former Yugoslavia, another reason to focus on Zeytinburnu district for this study is the fact that there are continuous efforts by the municipality in regards to creating a friendly environment for migrants and in particular for the immigrants from the Balkan countries. First of all, Zeytinburnu municipality organized "International Migration Symposium" in 2005 and 2008 in both of which the main focus was the immigration from the Balkan countries and Caucasus to Turkey. Moreover, it also established Zeytinburnu Municipality Local Governance and EU Coordination Center and became a leading party to the EU-funded project called *Municipal Dialogue for Integration of Migrants* in 2008. Apart from these general efforts regarding migration, Zeytinburnu municipality has also built strong connection with Macedonian municipalities of Plasnica and Jupa in an attempt to foster economic and cultural cooperation, which was very appealing to its immigrant population from Macedonia. Last but not the least, the existence of the Skopje Square in Zeytinburnu as well as the replica of Skopje Tower ended up creating both the sense of nostalgia for home country and the feeling of being at home for the immigrant community there. These activities by the municipality are significant in that they shape the ways in which immigrants evaluate their identities vis-à-vis the home and host countries.

After this brief presentation of Zeytinburnu as a center for immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, I can claim that Zeytinburnu is an important site for conducting the fieldwork not only because of its neighborhoods with highly concentrated

migrant community but also because of its projection of itself as a home for the migrants from the Balkan countries. Moreover, most of the migrant associations are established in and around Zeytinburnu, which also affects the daily lives and experiences of 'Albanian' immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the socio-economic and cultural structure of Zeytinburnu affecting the experiences immigrants may be very different in comparison to other districts in Istanbul as well as other cities in Turkey. Emphasizing the socio-cultural dynamics in Zeytinburnu, this study also aims to create the bases for further comparative researches on this under-researched topic of transformation in identities of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia.

### 4.3. Demographics of the Albanian migrants from the Former Yugoslavia

The previous section has briefly discussed the methodology of the study and the significance of Zeytinburnu as a site of research. The major aim in this section is to present the demographic characteristics of the aforementioned migrant community through an analysis of data gathered from survey. In addition to the mostly referred demographic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education level and income level which constitute the basis of the selection of respondents for the in-depth interviews, other characteristics of the sample such as place of origin and the wave of migration in which they come to Turkey and their citizenship status will be laid out in this section.

In terms of gender, the sample consists of 37 male and 33 female respondents making up 53 percent and 47 percent respectively and it will enable me to make comparison on the basis of gender in the following sections. Parenthetically, I want

to mention that the survey is conducted especially on the weekends in order to achieve an equal distribution of gender considering that male respondents would more likely to be working on the week days. However, this did not have the same impact in terms of age distribution. As the Figure 4.1 displays, majority of the respondents (27 percent) are clustered in the age interval between 30 and 39. While the number of respondents below the age of 30 is corresponds to 21 percent of the sample, the people above the age of 39 constitute 51 percent.

**Figure 4.1. Distribution of Respondents into Age Clusters**



In terms of the education level of the respondents, Figure 4.2 demonstrates that it is highly concentrated on the primary education up to 8 years with 70 percent. While 16 percent of the respondents finished high school, only 10 percent of the respondents are graduated from universities. Another important point is that the majority of the respondents with primary education (65 percent) belong to an age group above 40.

**4.2. Distribution of Respondents according to Education**



In terms of marital status, 64 percent of the respondents are married, while 27 percent are single and 9 percent are divorced or widowed.

**4.3. Distribution of Respondents according to Marital Status**



When it comes to income levels of the respondents, as the Figure 4.4 below shows, 44 percent of respondents declared their household income levels as below 1,000 TL, while 43 percent of them stated as between 1000 and 2000 TL. It has to be emphasized that this income levels might not be reflecting the real household incomes. As I had the opportunity to enter into the houses of people, I had the

impression that their income levels can be higher than what they reported to be with some respondents. In addition, some respondents were complaining that as some Albanians make money, they immediately move to a 'wealthier' district, leaving Zeytinburnu vulnerable to influx of other migrants, meaning internal migrants.

**Figure 4.4 Income Distribution of Respondents (household)**



Before discussing the birthplace of the respondents, it is important to emphasize that the age distribution discussed above provided the possibility to make a comparison between first generation and second generation migrants. It would be problematic if the majority of the sample was born in Kosovo and/or Macedonia, or if the overwhelming majority was born in Turkey which would make it very difficult to make this comparison. However, as the Figure 4.5 below shows, it is possible to compare first and second generation of migrants. While there are 29 people as first generation migrants (born in Kosovo and Macedonia), 41 of the respondents are second generation migrants. More specifically, among the first generation migrants respondents born in Macedonia amount to 23 percent while those born in Kosovo amount to only 6 percent of the total respondents.

**Figure 4.5 Distribution of Respondents according to Birth Place**



This predomination of Macedonia born people in the first generation migrants can also be observed when second generation migrants are also taken into account. Those whose family originates from Macedonia correspond to 88 percent while those from Kosovo are 12 percent. In general, we can conclude that the overwhelming majority of respondents in the overall sample (84 percent) originate from Macedonia whereas those originating from Kosovo do not exceed 16 percent. This distribution is in line with the historical fact that the main center of migration from the former Yugoslavia was Turkish consulate in Skopje, Macedonia.

In terms of waves of migration that respondents belong to, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (and/or their families) belong to the second wave of migration which starts in the postwar period and continues until 1980. As shown in the Figure 4.6, 88 percent of the respondents (and/or their families) migrated in the postwar period. The migrants, who came in the period between the foundation of Turkish Republic and Second World War hence belonging to first wave of migration,

constitute only 6 percent of the sample. Similarly, those migrants who came in the third wave of migration after 1980s make up only 6 percent of the sample (see Figure 4.6 below).

**Figure 4.6. Distribution of Respondents according to the Wave of Migration**



This mostly stems from two reasons; first one is the fact that those migrants from the former Yugoslavia mostly came to Turkey in the second wave of migration, constituting 49 percent of all migrations from former Yugoslavia after the foundation of Turkish Republic. Second reason is that Zeytinburnu was on the process of becoming a shanty town with rural migration in the late 1940s (Murat and Ersöz, 2005: 162). When the migrants of second wave come to Istanbul, Zeytinburnu offered the possibility of cheap housing through these shanty houses, which attracted migrants from the Balkans. For this reason, the migrants of second wave migration overweigh the number of migrants from other waves in the sample.

Lastly, I want to highlight that all of the respondents in the sample are Turkish citizens. Even though I was expecting a high percentage of the respondents to be Turkish citizens since the migrants who came to Turkey in the first and second migration waves were given Turkish citizenship, I did not anticipate the whole

sample to be as such. The major reason for this is that though there were non-Turkish citizens in my original list and I visited their homes to include them in my sample, they did not accept to participate in this study. In my short conversation with these people, I was able to learn that they came to Turkey in 1990s and 2000s and were not accepted as Turkish citizens and not all of these people were given the residency permit. Hence, they were reluctant to complete survey or have interviews due to their legal status in Turkey. Having introduced the basic characteristics of the sample, I will be discussing the diasporic identity formation in the following sections, and other characteristics of the community such as native language, their membership to migrant associations and languages spoken at home will be discussed with regards to diaspora formation in the next section.

## 4.4. Becoming a Diaspora: Simultaneity in the Diasporic Consciousness

Transnational community and diaspora, though very much related with one another in terms of referring to mobility of people and production of space and networks, are conceptually differentiated in the literature. Diasporas are viewed as having strong territorial attachment and territorial identity, whereas transnational community refers to communities using networks to create solidarity beyond national borders as well as utilizing "new social space" based on transnational networks connecting the country of origin and residence (Blunt, 2007). Moreover, diasporas have certain characteristics that differentiate them from other transnational communities which are usually formed by labor migrants. For instance, forced migration and dispersal are specific to diasporas, while transnational communities are formed mostly on voluntary base and participate in the life of the two national spaces. Cheran (2003: 4) makes this distinction as follows; transnational communities denote "a condition of

living" whereas diaspora is about "a condition of leaving", but this distinction is more appropriate for classical diaspora, since this is not necessarily a feature of all contemporary diaspora groups (Reis, 2004).

Moreover, this distinction between diaspora and transnational community becomes blurred when a more constructivist approach to diaspora is used. With this approach, diaspora is not seen as solely resulting from "migration, exile or dispersal" but rather is viewed as "socially constructed" through discourse or transnational mobilization (Adamson, 2008). Thus, the diaspora is becoming disentangled from the notion of being a pre-political and natural entity and in return it is becoming deterritorialized or transnational (Adamson, 2008; see also Anthias, 1998). Similar to the literature on transnational communities and/or transnationalism which focuses on the process of becoming transnational, constructivist works of the literature on diaspora also concentrate on the process of forming transnational ties by migrants without essentializing the concept of diaspora. Moreover, the transnationalist approach with its emphasis on the *process of diaspora formation* is able to account for the differences and intersectional divisions within diaspora, reducing the tendency to view the community as homogenous.

Following the constructivist approach to diaspora, I define diaspora as *an imagined community with links spanning more than one country.* With this definition, I attempt to combine both *objective criteria* that are ascribed by the observer and *subjective criteria*, self-imaginations as community so as not to essentialize the concept of diaspora. Thus, the migration itself does not produce diaspora; rather it needs to be accompanied with an imagination as a community by the immigrant

group. As the process of *becoming diaspora* is strictly tied to developing new imaginations of immigrant groups, the important question is "how they become diaspora" (Sökefeld, 2006). Before discussing how Albanian migrant community is being transformed into a diaspora, it would be illuminating to evaluate how the 'Albanian' community perceives and practices their identity in the first place. The fieldwork conducted with 'Albanian' migrants and their families yields certain features which differentiate them from other international migrants. These features include the understanding of their migration as a dispersal and displacement, awareness of their identity as a group, maintaining relations with homeland and using strategies of self-segregation. All of these features are used in the literature as defining characteristics of diaspora (see; Brubaker, 2005; Butler, 2001; Cohen, 1997). However, these features are not "substances from which diasporas … are made" but codes with which Albanians imagine their diasporic identity (Sökefeld, 2006: 272).

### 4.4.1 Migration Experience

The dispersal from the homeland to at least more than one country and traumatic experience of migration usually in the form of involuntary migration constitute the criteria in many definitions of the diaspora. In the Albanian case, studies show that they are spread over territories such as Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, Turkey as well as western countries of Germany, Switzerland, Italy and the USA[17] (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2003a: 80). Moreover according to Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2003), most of Albanian diaspora (which equals to 5 million people) perceive Kosovo and Macedonia (including Camuria, in the North of Greece) as their motherland. In

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[17] For the Albanian diaspora in Italy and the USA, see also Derhemi, 2003 and Schwandner-Sievers, 2005 respectively.

addition to these studies, I encountered this image of being scattered all around the world in my field work, most of the survey respondents and interviewees mentioned their relatives in the European countries, in the US as well as in far "away places" like New Zealand and Australia as evidences of being scattered.

When the reasons of Albanian migration from the former Yugoslavia are evaluated, we see that the migration experiences reflect a traumatic element. The status of Albanian minorities in the former Yugoslavia is a key to understand the nature of these migrations. As explained before, the Second World War, collectivization policies of 1950s, religious reforms and restrictions of religious activities of Muslims in 1950s, disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990s were the major reasons of emigration in different time periods, according to the literature on these migrations. Despite the fact that the above reasons indicate the involuntary character of migration, the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia were given the status of *muhacir* (immigrant) according to the Law on Settlement No. 2510 and were treated as voluntary migrants as declared in the migration agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey.

However, there is a striking contrast in terms of the state perception and the self-perception of the Albanian community. Even though state perception (both Yugoslav and Turkish) evaluates it as voluntary migration, the Albanians view the above mentioned reasons as well as the migration agreement of 1953 making their migration as a form of exodus. In particular, the fact that migrants had to renounce their Yugoslav citizenship and the return of migrants was forbidden led to a perception that Albanian migration was in the form of exile resulting from an intolerable relationship between those migrated and the homeland (Butler, 2001),

though implemented voluntarily. This controversy shows that it is hard to establish 'the condition of leaving" on an objective basis, hence, it is more appropriate to learn how the migrants and their families themselves narrate their migration.

This exile situation emerges in the in-depth interviews, especially in the narratives of first generation migrants. Most often, they talk about migration decision through disowning it, as explicit in the phrase "we were left with no other choice". Also apparent in Ramadan's narration of their decision to migrate:

> My grandfather was killed by Serbians in his own garden. They used to beat my father every night like they do to the other men in the village. They used to shout and want the guns. There were no guns but they would not listen. I remember the times when my father would come home all wet, because after beating him to death, they would throw him to the creek. Finally my family realized that they could not put up with those pressures and oppressions anymore. We had no options but to leave Kosovo (Ramadan, 54, from Kosovo, second wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by author).

The migration decision was up to the families so it was not a *forced migration* per se, however the oppressions and continuous pressures by the governments account for intolerable relationship of migrants and their home countries, which makes this migration perceived as a form of exile. Thus, the continuous references to the oppressions in the homeland were ingrained in the minds of later generations apparent in Irem's words:

> Our family had suffered a lot of pain, especially after the war, I think it was Tito's time. My grandmother told me that they had oppressed Muslims also they had even wanted to recruit females into the army. So they had to leave. The whole family migrated to Turkey (İrem, 17, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by author).

The reference to oppressions against Muslims is the most recurring theme in the surveys, as well. As shown in the Figure 4.7 below, 67 percent of the respondents reported the reason of their (or their family's) migration as oppression against

Muslims, while 14 percent of the respondents cited oppression and the existence of family networks together. When we differentiate these responses according to gender and generation, there are no major differences in the responses (see Appendix D and E).

**Figure 4.7 Reasons to Leave**



Unlike the state discourse, the Albanian community perceives their migration as a form of exile resulting from the oppressive regime in the home country, which is apparent not only in their responses to the survey questions but also in their narratives of migration experience in the interviews. This example underlines the role of self-perceptions in the constitution of diasporic identity.

### 4.4.2. Homeland Orientation

Earlier approaches to diaspora evaluates the orientation to homeland at several levels, such as maintaining a collective memory of homeland, regarding homeland as a place to return, orientation towards prosperity and well-being of homeland and defining solidarity towards homeland (i.e. Safran, 1991). While the focus on the

homeland as the defining criterion for diaspora is not much questioned, more constructivist and process-oriented theorizers find these approaches as 'centered models' and try not to reify the homeland and aspiration for return to homeland. Instead, the simultaneity of diasporic existence, meaning " dwelling here" with "a connection there", and lateral connections are more emphasized (Clifford, 1994: 322). Therefore, I will not take homeland orientation as a rigid or centered category with strict conditions but leave open to include emotional attachments and simultaneity of diasporic existence.

In the case of the 'Albanian' community in Turkey, nostalgia for homeland is a common theme in the in-depth interviews not only with the first generation migrants but also with the second generation. The 'homeland' is either Kosovo or Macedonia for these people, and for some it is both. When asked where the homeland is, Iskender replies:

> When people ask me where my homeland is, the only thing comes to my mind is Macedonia. For us, it is our motherland. Actually, Kosovo is also an important place for Albanians, a kind of homeland for all Albanians because it is where our descent comes from. However, to me Macedonia is the real homeland. Whenever I go there; I feel relieved and sense a feeling of being at home (Iskender, 45, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by author)

However, the nostalgia for homeland is even more explicit in the first generation migrants as Ramadan describes Kosovo and his visits to Kosovo:

> Oh qika jem, (my daughter) we are departed from the motherland but it is still *a door to heaven for me*. My childhood in Kosovo was the meaning of happiness. When we came here, everything changed…. it is like *a miracle* to go there. Especially now, everyone speaks Shqiptar (Albanian); *my people* are not forced to speak Serbian any more (Ramadan, 54, from Kosovo, second wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by author).

Nonetheless, there also generational differences among the 'Albanian' community members in that some members would identify Turkey as their motherland and see Macedonia and/or Kosovo as a place where their roots belong to. As Irem describes "My country and my motherland is Turkey but Macedonia is the place where me and my family originate from" (İrem, 17, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by author). At this point, survey data will enable us to see a relatively more general view of identification with the homeland as well as the relations with homeland.

First of all, it is important to understand the level of identification with the homeland. Hence, I have asked the members of 'Albanian' community to score six locations (consisting of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, Turkey, Kosovo and Macedonia, Balkans and finally Europe) in line with how close they feel. Accordingly, two locations with which the respondents identify themselves most are the home and host countries (see in the Table 4.1). The identification with the home country is 4.89 out of 6 on the average while it is 4.61 for the host country. However, it is important to emphasize that there is a greater variation in rankings of Turkey in comparison to Kosovo and Macedonia. Contrary to all the other categories, none of the respondents has assigned numbers that would identify their homeland as *very distant* and *the most distant* in this question. Hence, the minimum level of identification with the homeland starts 3-point-grade which signifies a distant relation, and which demonstrates that people have high levels of identification with home country.

| Table 4.1 How much do you identify yourself with … | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Zeytinburnu | Istanbul | Turkey | Kosovo and Macedonia | Balkans | Europe |
| Mean | 3,39 | 3,93 | **4,61** | **4,89** | 2,57 | 1,57 |
| Std. Deviation | 1,671 | 1,220 | 1,386 | 0,971 | 1,162 | 1,149 |
| Minimum | 1 | 1 | 1 | **3** | 1 | 1 |

Second, it is equally noteworthy to discover what kinds of relations this community has with the country of origin. In case of the Albanian community, it is difficult to capture the range of relations established with the homeland through survey questionnaire, since most of these relations are carried out through migrant associations and foundations, including sending aids to the homeland, helping students from homeland to get their education in Turkey and establishing relations with associations in the homeland which will be discussed thoroughly in the later sections. Nevertheless, some questions are asked to assess the individual level ties with the homeland which are most commonly established through their relatives in the homeland. As shown in the Table 4.2, 37 percent of the respondents have their cousins and other distant family members in the homeland; the majority of the respondents (with 59 percent) have both their second degree families such as aunt, uncle and third degree family members in the homeland.

| Table 4.2 Relatives in the Homeland | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent |
| **None** | 1 | 1,4 |
| **3rd degree** | 26 | 37,1 |
| **2nd-3rd degrees** | 41 | 58,6 |
| **1st-2nd-3rd degrees** | 2 | 2,9 |
| **Total** | 70 | 100,0 |

In line with Reis (2004) who directs attention to the advanced and cheaper telecommunication services as providing an opportunity for contemporary diasporas to emerge since these services enable them to have ties with their home countries, the most common interaction of the respondents with their homeland and relatives there is through internet and phone; 53 percent of respondents reported that they have conversations with their relatives in the homeland nearly always, while only 7 percent of them include people with rare contact and no contact with homeland. As displayed in the Table 4.3, the remaining 40 percent of people contact either often (24 percent) or sometimes (16 percent).

| Table 4.3 Contacts with relatives via phone & internet | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent |
| **Never** | 1 | 1,4 |
| **Rarely** | 4 | 5,7 |
| **Sometimes** | 11 | 15,7 |
| **Often** | 17 | 24,3 |
| **Nearly Always** | 37 | 52,9 |
| **Total** | 70 | 100,0 |

In the analysis of the connections to homeland, visiting homeland is among the most important elements. In the case of 'Albanian' community, 59 percent of the respondents visited their homeland at least once (see Table 4.4). When evaluated according the generational differences, it becomes obvious that the majority of the respondents who never went to homeland are among the second generation migrants (see Appendix F). Yet, gender does not make a significant difference in the responses.

| Table 4.4 Visits to Homeland | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent |
| **Never** | 29 | 41,4 |
| **At Least Once** | 13 | 18,6 |
| **Up to Three times** | 14 | 20,0 |
| **Every 5 years** | 11 | 15,7 |
| **Every two Years** | 3 | 4,3 |
| **Total** | 70 | 100,0 |

Despite high identification with homeland, lateral connections at the individual level are not very high among members of 'Albanian' community, mostly resulting from interactions with relatives. Apart from communication with relatives and travel to homeland discussed above, the respondents connect to their homeland also through sending monetary assistance to their relatives (37 percent), through sending aid during the War in Kosovo (84 percent), through watching Albanian satellite TV channels (47 percent). (see Appendix G).

Nonetheless, through these ties, immigrants and their families formed multiple identities and loyalties grounded in both their society of origin and destination in the case of Albanian community. This existence of multiple identities is demonstrated with the high level of identification with Turkey as well as Kosovo and Macedonia in the surveys. Instead of dedication to home country as a place to return as earlier approaches prioritize, Albanian case displays a simultaneous identification with home and host countries which lends support to the transnationalist approach to diaspora as the diasporic existence does not necessarily result in alienation from host country. Moreover, in-depth interviews also reveal that strong identification with the homeland does not necessarily weaken ties with host country Turkey. All of the

interviewees were paying special attention not to frame their longing for homeland in direct opposition to the host country, for which they were trying to conciliate their Turkish and Albanian identities through the Ottoman heritage in the Rumeli and Balkans.

### 4.4.3. Relations within the Group: Self-Awareness

As discussed above, the homeland orientation and links to more than on country are an indispensable part of the diasporic identity. However, the imagination as a community requires a group consciousness to bind the members to each other (Butler, 2001). The self-perception of group members as a community is very much tied with relations within the group such as the existence of migrant associations and the opportunities that these associations create (Sökefeld, 2006). Thus, I have tried to evaluate the group identification through some survey questions. In addition, my observations from the field and some issues coming up in the interviews also helped me to understand the relations within the community and relations vis-à-vis other communities.

First of all, I have asked the respondents to score nine communities in line with how close they feel, in order to understand the level of identification with migrants among themselves, with their co-ethnics in the home country and with majority in the host country (see Appendix H). In this question, I have differentiated the home countries and ethnic communities in the home countries, thus introduced categories such as Albanians in Macedonia, Albanians in Kosovo and Albanians in Albania. Accordingly, the respondents mostly identified themselves with Albanian migrants in Turkey with the score 8,04 out of 9 on the average ( Appendix H). After the

Albanian migrants, the identification with Turks in Turkey and Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovar Albanians are aligned with the means 6,96; 6,61 and 5,94 respectively. It should be noted that there is no major difference in the responses in terms of gender. Hence it can be argued that Albanian immigrants in Turkey have community identification; they perceive their community as the closest group.

Moreover, 70 percent of the respondents in the survey reported that they are a member of at least one migrant association such as the Culture and Solidarity Association of Rumelian Turks, the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood, the Culture and Solidarity Association of All Turks of Rumelia, the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Prishtina, the Culture and Solidarity Association of Kosovars, the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Köprü, Köprülü Yabul Çişta Association[18]and finally Yıldız Spor. Yet, only 22 percent of the respondents reported themselves as active participants taking responsibilities in the organizations (see the figures in the Appendix I).

In addition, there is a question in the survey which asks the respondents to evaluate their perceived level of unity among the Albanian community. The question asks the respondent the degree of agreement with the statement "The migrants from former Yugoslavia have a unified voice to speak as a group". As shown in the Table 4.5, the majority of the respondents, 53 percent, agreed with this statement whereas 19 percent disagreed and the remaining 28 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. The responses to this question display that majority of the people in the 'Albanian'

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[18] *Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, Arnavut-Kardeşliği Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, Tüm Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, Priştineliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, Kosovalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, Köprülüler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği,Köprülü Yabul Çişta Derneği*

community perceived themselves as having a unified voice. Therefore, we can say that self-awareness of the group identity exists among the Albanian community in Turkey in accordance with the responses to these questions. Interestingly enough, second generation migrants have more tendency to agree with this statement while women prefer to choose neither agree nor disagree option in this question (See Appendix J).

| Table 4.5 The level of perceived solidarity | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent |
| **Disagree** | 13 | 18,6 |
| **Neither agree nor disagree** | 20 | 28,6 |
| **Agree** | 37 | 52,8 |
| **Total** | 70 | 100,0 |

Moreover, the need to preserve the culture and identity and foster solidarity among the members was also emphasized in the interviews conducted with the migrant associations, in tandem with the responses above. The associations pride themselves upon creating the solidarity among the migrants yet this is not always in the form of 'Albanian solidarity', more often terms such Rumelili are used in the associations. In the interviews with both individuals and associations, I encountered with an attempt to differentiate themselves from the Albanians in Albania (see also Appendix H) with the exception of the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood which was more inclusive towards them. Hence, references to the solidarity of Rumelia people were not only a way to combine Turkish and Albanian identities but also to differentiate themselves from the Albanians in Albania.

During my fieldwork in Zeytinburnu, I had the chance to observe that Albanian migrants usually concentrated in the same neighborhoods, in Çırpıcı and

Merkezefendi there were two-three streets dwelled by only Albanians and hence called 'Albanian neighborhood' by the local people there. This experience of dwelling in the same neighborhood as a group also helps promote self-awareness of the collective identity in that people are already in relation to one another. For instance, it was quite common that my respondents looked at my sample list and describe the houses of the people I was going to conduct surveys with as well as giving some personal information about them.

### 4.4.4. Boundary-Maintenance

Boundary maintenance refers to the strong attachment and preservation of identity vis-à-vis host society (Brubaker, 2005). In the diaspora literature, there is a tension in regards to the boundary-maintenance; while the earlier approaches see the deliberate resistance to assimilation through different ways as an indispensable characteristic of diaspora; more constructivist approaches fused with transnationalism literature evaluate it as essentializing the ethno-national character of diaspora. Hence, too much emphasis on boundary-maintenance has the risk of overlooking the simultaneity in the diasporic existence and exhausting the political opportunities in the host country in the name of home country politics. For this reason, I do not use boundary-maintenance as a criterion for diaspora. Instead, I try to map out the imagination of Albanian community in regards to their attachment to Albanian identity through some survey questions.

For this, a few questions are asked in the survey regarding the use of native language, the existence and willingness of endogamy. To begin with, the Albanian language is the mother tongue of 36 percent of the respondents. However, 85 percent of

respondents state that both Albanian and Turkish are spoken in their houses, which is very important in terms of preserving one's identity (see Appendix K). This language preservation appeared as an important concern for the interviewees,

> I think municipalities where the (Albanian) migrants are concentrated should open a language center like Bayrampaşa municipality does. Eventually we would like to preserve our language. Even though it does not have an international function, like English has, our children should learn Albanian. I taught my children how to speak Albanian. Both I and my husband talked in Albanian with our children at home (Mimoza, 36, from Macedonia, third wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by author).

In regards to the other important strategy for boundary-maintenance, two questions are asked in the survey. The first question asks them to score the categories from 5 to 1 with which they would prefer their children to get married, if they had the chance to choose. In this question, respondents displayed their preference in favor of Albanian migrants with 4.43 out of 5 on average, which was followed by the preference for other migrants from the former Yugoslavia such as Bosnians, Torbesh and Turks with 3,73 average score out of 5.

| Table 4.6.  Endogamy for their children | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Albanian migrants** | **Other Migrants from F. Yugoslavia** | Balkan Migrants | Thrace | **Turk** |
| Mean | **4,43** | **3,73** | 2,61 | 1,90 | **2,33** |
| Std. Deviation | ,926 | ,833 | ,889 | ,903 | 1,595 |

In the second question about endogamy, the level of agreement with the statement "I would like my spouse or his/her family be an immigrant from Macedonia or Kosovo". Accordingly, the average of the respondents in terms of the scores is 4,23 and as the Table 4.7 below displays those who would choose their spouse according to their homeland constitute 80 percent of the respondents. In these two questions,

majority of the respondents stressed that their preference reflect a sense of cultural proximity rather than a racist or nationalist tone.

| Table 4.7. Endogamy for the respondent | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent |
| Agree | 56 | 80,0 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 6 | 8,6 |
| Disagree | 8 | 11,4 |
| Total | 70 | 100,0 |

However it is important to mention a caveat with these figures, the questions ask for their preferences but does not report realities. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that there is a tendency to preserve their identity through retaining native language and prioritizing endogamy. Perhaps, a quotation from the interviews will show an extreme form of endogamy

> It is very common in Albanian families in Zeytinburnu to speak Albanian at home and to make a preference about to whom your child is getting married, preferring Albanians, of course. Sometimes, it comes at a certain point that … well our neighbor Cavit, for instance, married to a woman from Kosovo, likewise his brother. She did not know a word in Turkish, now she is trying to learn (Serkan, 30, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by author)

In sum, I have argued that diaspora is an imagined community and explored the way in which Albanian community is imagined. The above characteristics display that 'Albanian community' imagines themselves as a community with simultaneous attachment to both home and host countries, which lends support to transnationalist approach. Having discussed how Albanian immigrants imagine their community and how they retain relationship with their home countries, I will try to explain the process of diaspora formation through using the tools of social movement theory and illuminate the process of mobilization in the following sections.

### 4.5. Social Movement Approach to Diasporic Identity Formation

As diaspora is defined as "*an imagined community with links spanning more than one country*" the migration itself cannot result in the diaspora formation, instead immigrant group can *become* a diaspora through developing a new imaginations of their community. Hence, the ways through which this imagination is constructed becomes an important question to explore. The previous section has analyzed how the Albanian immigrants imagine their collective identity. An equally important task is to explain the process through which this imagined community emerged, which brings about the issue of movement and mobilization. Although social movements and diasporas do not represent the same social form, there are many parallels in the formation of diasporas and social movements, since both are related to the collective identity and action.

Employing a social movement approach to diaspora formation does not contradict with transnational social space approach, which suggests a pentatonic relationship between the countries of origin and destination, civil society organizations in both receiving and sending countries and the diaspora itself (Faist, 2000) since the existence of civil society organizations in this relationship brings the issue of mobilization. Moreover, the tools of social movement theory enable us to explain the process of diaspora formation in a way to eliminate the risk of essentializing the concept of diaspora. In addition, it highlights the political agency, since it tries to understand how the diaspora consciousness emerged. Furthermore, tools of social movement theory also enables us to investigate how this imagination of identity is disputed and negotiated, which is very important so as not to evaluate the Albanian community as a homogenous one. Therefore, I will use the tools such as *political*

*opportunities, frames and mobilizing structures* in order to explain the mobilization aspect.

As explained in the theoretical chapter of thesis, all of these tools of social movement theory refer to a certain aspect of diaspora formation. To begin with, political opportunities refer to structural conditions that pave the way for diasporic identity formation; it implies a more macro-level analysis including *changes* citizenship policies of host country (Sökefeld, 2006) and existence of preceding movements (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).  As diaspora formation necessitates also considering the changing structure in the home country, political opportunities need to be extended to the former Yugoslavia to include its disintegration as well. *Mobilizing structures* denote collective vehicles through which people mobilize, and emphasize meso-level actors, such as organizations and informal networks. Finally, *framing process* is defined as "the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediates between opportunity and action" (McAdam *et al.,* 1996: 2). According to McAdam *et al.* (1996), framing processes supply shared meanings and definitions to the social movement; the central component of collective action frames is framing political opportunity, in which a critical event is emphasized (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). It should also be noted that a consensual and unified *framing* is rare and there are multiple actors in the field that discuss framing.

Before explaining the formation of Albanian diasporic identity with these tools, I want to underscore that the insights gained from these three tools will be used together. There are many relationships between these factors, *political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes* for example framing of political

opportunities can be more pertinent in elucidating the formation of one diaspora group while existence of mobilizing structures would be more significant for another. Yet another important thing to emphasize is that these tools are relevant for both the emergence of diasporic identity and its extent and form over time. As stated before, transnational activities may ebb and flow in certain periods though diasporic consciousness does not fade away, these fluctuations can be understood with analyzing the competing frames through the tools described above. The next section scrutinizes the political opportunities.

### 4.5.1. Political Opportunities in the Host Country

*Political opportunities* refer to the broader political system structuring opportunities for collective action. In explaining the emergence of social movement, political opportunities mean the changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations in the political system. Applied to diaspora formation, there can be different conditions facilitating the emergence of a community in the form of diaspora such as change in the asylum and citizenship regimes, existence of groups with similar motives or demands (Vertovec, 2003). These political opportunities should not be assumed as static and fixed, instead the changes in the institutional structure, citizenship regime, or proliferating different identity claims can be the source for the transformation in the identities of migrants. In this section, I will concentrate on the changes in the citizenship policies, existence of groups with similar identity claims that enabled 'Albanian' community to form a diasporic identity through analyzing the in-depth interviews.

*4.5.1.1 The Changes in the Policies*

As explained before, Turkish migration policy towards 'Albanian' migrants was inclusive and followed by a smooth process of naturalization especially during the first and second waves of migration. However, these immigrants were scattered around Anatolia especially during the first wave of migration so that they could better integrate into Turkish society. In tandem with this, immigrants were required to declare themselves 'Turks' in order to migrate to Turkey, which also affected the political identities of these migrants. When these conditions are evaluated with the restrictive nature of the political life in Turkey such as the ban of publications in languages other than Turkish, the ban on establishing association with a claim to minority and restriction on the language schools in ethnic languages, the inward orientation of the community is not unexpected.

Nonetheless, the accession process to the European Union changed the political discourse in Turkey, more liberal policy changes started to take place, which also affected the process for the community formation among Albanian immigrants. In the in-depth interviews, the comparison of earlier times with the current situation is a recurrent theme, especially in regards to language. Many respondents directed attention to the fact that speaking the Albanian language freely is a very current phenomenon, in Iskender's words:

> We passed through a very difficult process. Although we have been here from 1959 onwards, there are things we did not get used to. For example, we could only talk our native language at home; we could not talk Albanian in the coffeehouses. If people had heard that we spoke in Albanian, they would immediately object to it and pressure us to speak in Turkish. Now, we can talk in Albanian freely in comparison to the earlier times (Iskender, 45, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by the author).

Another interviewee, Ramadan, also makes this comparison of past and present in terms of the use of Albanian language during the in-depth interview in his workplace. Upon the beginning of an Albanian song on TV, Ramadan asked permission to volume up and stated that

> Look at now, an Albanian song is playing on TV and I raised the volume up this much. I could not do that before. Everyone would start complaining. Also, I would be afraid of losing customers. Now, I can raise the volume without any worries. Nobody says anything and can say anything now (Ramadan, 54, from Kosovo, second wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by the author).

However, these changing policies are not only tied to the pressure by the European Union to comply with Copenhagen criteria, but also to the existence of Kurdish movement which demanded for language and education rights for their group. This point is also raised in the interviews and they tied the changing circumstances as in the example of the language to the existence of a group with identity claims which will be explained in the next section.

*4.5.1.2. The Preceding Groups with Similar Identity Claims*

As a structural condition enabling or disabling the formation of 'Albanian' diaspora, two examples of existing groups with identity claims can be given in the Turkish context, first one is the North Caucasian diaspora and second one is the Kurdish movement. To begin with, the North Caucasian diaspora has become an active lobby group in Turkey after the collapse of Soviet Union especially in the Abkhazian issue in early 1990s and Chechnya War of 1994 (Chochiev, 2007 and Çelikpala, 2006). Surprisingly enough, the similarities with (or differences from) the North Caucasian diaspora were not touched upon either in the interviews with individuals or with associations.

Instead, the Kurdish movement was very much discussed in the interviews. Basically Kurdish movement fulfilled two functions for the Albanian community; first its success in language and broadcasting rights had an enabling function, second it functioned as the *other* of the 'Albanian' community, from which the members tried to set apart their claims and reason d'être. The enabling function of the Kurdish movement was mostly associated with political and cultural rights. As Turkish government evaluated Kurdish demands for broadcasting in Kurdish and Kurdish language education as individual rights rather than group rights, this enabled other communities in Turkey to benefit from the demands of Kurdish movement. This enabling factor was also emphasized in the interviews,

> Now that Kurds has won the language rights, we obtained the same right with them, whether we wanted it or not. It became very helpful, actually. We remembered our identity through these opportunities (Iskender, 45, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by the author).

However, along with the recognition of the enabling effect of Kurdish movement, both the respondents of the survey and interviewees distance themselves and their demands from them. One of the questions in the survey asks whether the respondents agree with the statement "Ethnic groups should be able to preserve their identities". The general reaction to this question was to ask what I mean by 'preserving identities' and whether it involves the strategies used by Kurdish movement. This reaction was an attempt to differentiate their demands from the Kurdish people.

Moreover, while stating their claims to identity rights, there is always sentences beginning with "we do not have any problems with the unity of state; we fulfill every duty that our status as citizens requires us to do". In addition to this subtle way of

dissociation, there are also more explicit ways of differentiating the goals of two communities from each other:

> What we want is to preserve our identity and culture through the use of our native language. Also we want to build relations with our home countries in an easier way which requires a deeper cooperation of Turkish state with Macedonia and Kosovo. Our demands are not in the same line as that of Kurds, because we migrated to Turkey and became Turkish citizens. So we try to convey our message clearly not to give the image that we betray Turkish society (Mimoza, 36, from Macedonia, third wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by the author).

Therefore, the prior existence of Kurdish group with identity claims had both enabling and disabling effects as a political opportunity. While they enabled the Albanian community to use their languages more freely, their antagonistic relation with Turkish state led the Albanian community to apply a control mechanism to curtail any demand that would produce any parallel to the Kurdish movement. These significant changes in the host country political system are an important part of the political opportunities yet any study of diaspora should also analyze the changes in political system of the home country, too. The next section will be preoccupied with the changes in the home country and its effects on the collective immigrant identity.

### 4.5.2. Framing Political Opportunities of the Home Country

Transnational activities of a diaspora are very much shaped by the political circumstances in the home country (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). The political events in the home country can lead to the increased consciousness of identity, the ways of belonging which is necessary for the emergence of transnational community. Sökefeld (2006: 272) calls these political developments "triggering events" in diasporic imagination. Hence, the *transformation of homeland* can lead to significant changes in the relationship between homeland and immigrant community, leading to re-focus their attention on the homeland. These events are necessary conditions for

the formation of diaspora but unless framed by a diasporic leadership they do not result in diasporic consciousness.

In the case of Albanian community in Turkey, this political event that increased the level of transnational activity and political activism is the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The breakdown of Yugoslavia was followed by a series of events that are very significant for the Albanians there and elsewhere; the formation of a parallel state system in Kosovo in the 1990s, Albanian referendum on autonomy in Macedonia in 1992, the Kosovo war of 1999, the insurgency in Macedonia in 2001 and the consequent Ohrid Framework Agreement in the same year, and finally the independence of Kosovo in 2008. These subsequent events have extended the boundaries of identity for the Albanian migrants and led to redefinition of their relations with home country.

When the place of origin 'Yugoslavia' was disintegrated into different states, it produced new candidates of home country for the migrant community. The differentiation between Albanians from Macedonia and Kosovo in terms of home country orientation started to take place. In the in-depth interviews, two conflicting yet relevant interpretation of this emergence of homeland become visible. While the most of the interviewees are content with the emergence of new homelands, Macedonia and Kosovo, some of them see the emergence of two states as the home country as weakening the Albanian solidarity.

Nevertheless, the parallel developments in both Macedonia and Kosovo (by then within Serbia) named above facilitated the creation of Albanian solidarity in Turkey,

responses by the majority population show this sense of unity of Albanians in the immigrant communities. As İskender responds to the question of how he acted during the process of Ohrid Framework and Kosovo War:

> I did not go there during the war; I contacted my relatives through phone during that period. They really needed money and other kinds of aid. We did what we could in terms of aid, both individually and through associations. Some of our relatives sought asylum in the western countries such as Belgium and Austria. I really wanted to have an impact on these developments. Actually, all migrants shared the same feeling. Indeed, this has revealed our identity, actually not ours but our children's identity. Eventually, we come from Illyrian descent (showing the two-headed eagle flag-symbol of Albanian flag- on the wall of his office) and accepted Islam as a religion during the Ottoman times. We are not Torbesh or Pomak (Iskender, 45, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by the author).

Another interviewee recounts these processes through their aid to Albanians in the homeland as:

> My youngest son, now lives in İzmit, sold all the gold jewelry that was given as marriage present and sent them to Kosovo and Macedonia. If *our people* there suffer, how can we live in luxury here? Nowadays, we do sacrificing in Kosovo to benefit *our people*. It is good to know that your child cares about your home country and this war affected his motivation for home country (Kadriye, 57, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, first generation migrant, translated by the author).

For younger generation such as Irem, just the existence of war in the home country and oppressive regime against both Albanians and Turks there marks a turning point in the discovery of their identity; for example she started attending to immigrant organizations thereafter.

Although the existence of such traumatic events and experience of human sufferings after the disintegration of Yugoslavia initiated a revitalization of homeland in the minds and hearts of the immigrant population, the effects of such events would fade away if not framed by an existing or newly formed agent. Since framing denotes a process of interpreting events and conditions in order to fashion a shared

understanding, the disintegration of Yugoslavia provided an important opportunity to frame an identity oriented towards homeland. Hence, the disintegration of Yugoslavia throughout 1990s resulted in mushrooming of associations founded by the immigrant communities in Turkey[19] as well as establishment of TV Channels such as Rumeli TV in 2006, Tek Rumeli TV in 2009. Moreover, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the armed conflict between national liberation army and Macedonian security forces in 2001 were two events that propelled the migrant associations towards a more home country oriented discourse. The associations formed "Kosovo Solidarity Committee" which was a centre for distributing aid to both homeland and the refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania and Turkey[20] during the Kosovo War. It should be emphasized that this activism was also translated to the individual immigrants as the survey results show over 80 percent of the respondents sent aid to Kosovo during the Kosovo War (see Appendix G).

This orientation towards homeland was also translated into a lobby activity in an attempt to influence Turkish foreign policy towards Yugoslavia such as their visits to Mesut Yılmaz, Çetin Doğan and Mustafa Kalemli[21] in 1997 concerning the increasing violence in Kosovo as well as their visit to Bülent Ecevit, prime minister in 2001 concerning the continuous suppression against Albanians and Turks in Macedonia as the members of the associations interviewed recount. During this activism towards homeland, the immigrants in Turkey were projected as a

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[19] Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Kırcova in 1991; Köprülü Yabul Çişta Association in 1994; Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Kosovo Gilan in 1997; Rumeli Education Foundation in 1993; Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Üsküp Köprülü in 1998; Rumeli Managers and Businessmen Association in 1991; Rumeli and Balkan Federation in 2006.
[20] ttp://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=333&P5=B&page1=25&page2=25
[21] Mesut Yılmaz was the President of Motherland Party in the period, Çetin Doğan was the Chief of General Staff of the period and Mustafa Kalemli was the President of Parliamentt.

community with same level of commitment to the homeland discursively, whereas there were various levels of participation and commitment to the homeland and to 'Albanian' identity in reality. At one extreme, there are activists who act for the community as 'diasporic leadership elite' (Sökefeld, 2006: 275), whereas there are also people who identify themselves Albanian but do not participate in the activities, or participate but do not identify themselves as Albanian. Nonetheless, this change in the political system created a political opportunity to be framed by the migrant associations successfully and this process led to an *emerging diaspora*. The extend and form of this emerging diaspora is related to the existence of consensual frames and forming mobilizing structures which will be explained in the following sections, yet before moving into that topic, it would be better to learn the agents of diaspora formations, in other words, mobilizing structures.

### 4.5.3 Mobilizing Structures: The Existence of Immigrant Associations

*Mobilizing structures* refer to the collective vehicles through which people mobilize for collective action. Together with political opportunities, they constitute structural forces in the emergence of diaspora yet mobilizing structures emphasize meso-level actors, such as organizations and informal networks. In the Albanian case, the mobilizing structures are nothing but the existing immigrants associations formed as early as 1950s onwards. The migrant associations which position themselves as "bridges between Turkey and home countries" are necessary conditions for diasporic community formation (Toumarkine, 2000: 420). These associations are very active on the regional level, paying regular visits to home countries, participating in the international events, hosting academic seminars and exhibitions across borders contacting political parties, civil society organizations as their partners in the

homeland as well as sustaining solidarity in the host country (interviews conducted with associations, see also in Bulut, 2006). During the activity of A Luggage, A Coffer *[Bir Kofer Bir Sandık]*, it was possible to observe the participation of political party members as well as deputies from Kosovo and Macedonia. All in all, there are more than 20 immigrant associations, which are founded by immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia and which organize these events regularly.

One important characteristic of these associations is that their names carry "geographical connotations" such as Rumeli, Kosovo or names of local districts instead of "ethnic or communal qualifiers" such as Albanian, Bosniak, Pomak which are difficult to use in the Turkish context[22]. The only ethnic qualifier used in the names of associations is Turks though the association may be representing also non-Turks (Toumarkine, 2000: 412). Nevertheless, it was suggested during the interviewes with the association members that these associations functioned for maintaining cultural identity in the public space, though were not politically active at all times. The role of associations in sustaining cultural identity was also emphasized by the individual interviewees. For Meryem (24, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant), they are places to socialize with co-ethnic people and to build up solidarity among members.

However, some interviewees have a more critical tone towards the immigrant associations as Aydin points out:

> The associations are helpful to protect cultural identities but one should not disregard the vested interests in the associations. I would participate in anything

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[22] The only association whose name carries the ethnic qualifier 'Albanian' is the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood. Its name was the Association of Turk-Albanian Brotherhood yet changed recently.

they (referring to associations) would do to protect my *hemşeri*. But they are not well-coordinated, moreover leadership is lacking in these institutions (Aydın, 37, from Kosovo, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by the author).

Another critique to the association is that they do follow official discourse too closely. Serkan states his distrust in the following words:

I do not trust the associations in preserving an Albanian identity. There are some directors in the associations who cannot protect even his own Albanian identity. How can I trust this guy to protect mine? Would MHP[23] make people who declare their Albanian identity a candidate for elections? I do not believe so (Serkan, 30, from Macedonia, second wave of migration, second generation migrant, translated by the author).

Nonetheless, when the survey responses are evaluated it is apparent that members of immigrant associations tend to identify themselves more with their homeland, with Albanian migrants in Turkey and identifying as Albanian respectively (see Appendix L). Even though it cannot be discerned whether those with strong Albanian identity become members to immigrant association or whether the associations reinforce the Albanian identity, this data show that increase in the identifying with homeland and with Albanians is closely related to membership to immigrant association. Despite the different identity frames that these associations have and promote as will be discussed in the next section, the overall relationship is not weakened.

All in all, it should be noted that these associations do not diverge from the official discourse of Turkish state, yet they have become the centers for pressuring the state in certain critical and key issues (Rapper, 2001). While the existence of immigrant associations constitutes a *mobilizing structure,* they have become agents in framing processes as well, as explained during the discussion of how the disintegration of Yugoslavia is framed to establish closer links and connections with homeland and to

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[23] Nationalist Action Party, known for its extreme Turkish nationalist stance.

pressure the Turkish government and political parties to the situation there. In the next section, the focus will be on the internal contention and different frames existing in the corresponding immigrant associations and its relation to the form of diaspora.

### 4.5.4. Internal Contentions within Diaspora

As stressed in the literature, the consensual and unified identity frames are rare; hence there exists internal process of contention within a collective identity (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). This contention is also related to the different frames among the immigrant associations which also translate into the imaginations of migrants from the former Yugoslavia and their families. The social and political dynamics intrude at various levels and affect the vision and identifications of the community (Sökefeld, 2006). These dynamics depend on social relations and processes preceding the formation of diaspora and these "cannot be completely overturned by the emerging diasporic formation" (Sökefeld, 2006: 278). Hence, social and political dynamics affect the form of diaspora and its capacity to produce mobilizing structures to ensure reproduction of the initial urge.

In the Albanian diaspora, three competing identity frames can be identified. These identity frames are very much embedded in the names of the associations; while Turks of Rumeli signify a more strong attachment to the Turkish identity, using just Rumeli as identification connotes the Ottoman legacy and using ethnic identity refers to a more overt orientation toward homeland (Bulut, 2006). These three different identity frames also have its corresponding support among the respondents of survey. Before discussing these three discourses in detail, an important issue about Turkish political scene should be raised. After the coup d'êta of 1980, it was forbidden to

create associations with a political character and any associations to support identities different from prevailing identity would result in stigmatization (Hersat and Toumarkine, 2005). In relation, varying degrees of Turkish identity and sometimes even Turkism is embedded in the Rumeli associations which will be discussed below (Toumarkine, 2000).

The first frame is more oriented towards Albanian identity, and it was very active in the early stages of diasporic identity formation. The agents of this identity are the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood, and some internet websites such as *arnavutum.com, arnavutgenclik.com.* Also, the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Köprü and the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Prishtina can be grouped in this first category, since they also identify themselves as Albanians. The common point in these agents is that they are not reluctant to identify themselves as 'Albanians' in the first place and do not feel the urge to trace their ancestry in the Anatolia. Also, they acknowledge that the immigrants from the former Yugoslavia included people from other ethnic origins such as Bosnians, Torbesh and Albanians as well as Turks and define these other ethnic groups as related (*akraba*) ethnic groups due to the shared Ottoman history. Yet, it does not mean that these associations do not embrace Turkish identity. Instead, their Turkish identity stems from the fact that they live in Turkey.

However, their level of activism differs; for instance the Culture and Solidarity Association of Albanian Brotherhood are more active in terms of creating a diasporic identity, also it has a more inclusive approach towards Albania. First, they are more active in terms of relations with the political parties and leaders Kosovo, Macedonia

and Albania. Second, they attempt to create mobilizing practices for Albanians in Turkey; for example they commemorate Chameria incident of June 27, 1944 by leaving a black wreath to Greek Consulate in Istanbul. More importantly, they are also keen on celebrating the anniversary of Kosovo's independence. At this point, it should be noted that the Association of people from Prishtina is also very active in celebration of Kosovo's independence. Third, the Association of Albanian Brotherhood has newly started an Albanian language course in their Küçük Çekmece branch. On the other hand, the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Köprü and the Culture and Solidarity Association of People of Prishtina are more oriented towards creating solidarity among their members in Turkey. Their interaction with the homeland is more at the familial networks and also through students coming from homeland to Turkey for education as the interviewees from these associations state.

Along with the associations, aforementioned websites and their founders emphasize their Albanian identity. While *arnavutum.com* is keen on tracing the history of Albanians and emphasizing the Albanian language and culture, *arnavutgenclik.com* is more active in terms of building relations with the homeland through regular visits to Kosovar Ambassador to Turkey and the Albanian Consulate as well as participating in the seminars and conferences. Through these activities, they want to make Albanian identity "public" and more visible, no more hidden in private sphere, as the members emphasize.

As stated earlier, the identity frames provided by the associations infiltrate into the members. The members of both the Association of Albanian Brotherhood and the Association of people from Köprü in the sample a define themselves as Albanians

and Turk (see Appendix M). Similarly, the members of the Association of people from Prishtina in the sample either define their identity as Albanian or as Albanian and Turk (see Appendix M). As to the relationship between the aforementioned websites and identification, the members of *arnavutum.comı* and *arnavutgenclik.com* tend to identify themselves as either as Albanian and Turk or Albanian, as well (see Appendix M). Moreover, the identity frames are also related with the practices of the immigrants, as the agents of these frames try to create mobilizing structures such as celebrating the independence of Kosovo. The findings of the survey suggest that members of immigrant associations tend to participate in the celebration of Kosovo's Independence. In addition, there is also significant relationship between participation in this event and membership to *arnavutum.com* and *arnavutgenclik.com* (See Appendix N).

Second frame prioritizes Turkish identity of the immigrant community; however does not project this identity as if immigrants have always been Turk but as Turkish identity is attained by the immigrants as they migrated to Turkey. This discourse is framed usually by associations whose members come from different ethnic backgrounds such as the Association of All Turks of Rumelia whose members are predominantly from Macedonia (1,350 out of 1,400 members) with Albanians, Torbesh and Turkish ethnic identity but also include immigrants from Bulgaria. The ambivalence in terms of defining their identity was the most striking point during my interviews with the women branch's director as well as the regular members of the Association of All Turks of Rumelia. For example, women branch's director  states that

> We are Turks of course, we come here accepting to be Turk, you know this right? When our families immigrated to Turkey, they had to accept and declare

> to be Turk. We are here, as Rumeli people, thanks to the Ottoman history. To be Albanian is our sub-identity. But we are not Albanian nationalist; those Albanian nationalists should go and live in Kosovo. We are here as Turks and Albanian.

While disdaining Albanian nationalist in the one of the interviews as cited above, she would call her father as 'real Albanian' (has Arnavut) in another. Similarly, my interview with another member in the same association yields a very similar picture, when asked how he defines his identity he, trying to rationalize his Albanian identity with Turkish one, replies as:

> I am originally Albanian, our roots go back to Illyrians but we are Turks in Turkey. In any way Turks were nomads, you know, they had settled in the Balkans centuries or millenniums ago. Hence in any society in the Balkans you can find traces of Turkish race. Then, we became Illyrians. Let me say this, no matter how Albanian we are, we have Turkishness inside[24].

Nonetheless, both the members and directors are sensitive about and closely following the home country politics and their activities mostly concentrate on creating quasi homeland in Zeytinburnu, with its small shops called Skopje, with its Skopje Tower which was built by the pressures of the association. Moreover, this association was also active during the Kosovo War and violent events of 2001 in Macedonia, providing aid to the people there. As the director recounts, 15 people came from Macedonia during the events of 2001 and stayed in his houses for more than two months. Furthermore, the association also provides aid for those immigrants of third wave who were residents but not able to get Turkish citizenship yet.

Even though this association has been active transnationally, it neither promotes an Albanian identity nor tries to generate *mobilizing practices* for creating an identity more oriented towards homeland. Moreover, the ambiguity in the discourse of the

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[24] Translated by author

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association also penetrates into the members identifications. While majority of the respondents who declared themselves as members of this association identified themselves as Albanian and Turk (23), some of them identified themselves as immigrants from former Yugoslavia, while others as Albanian and as Turk (see Appendix O). However, in accordance with the discourse of the associations which emphasize creating solidarity among the Albanian migrants, survey results reveal that members of the Association of All Rumeli tend to identify themselves more with Albanian migrants (See Appendix O).

The third frame is Turkism, projected by the Association of Rumelian Turks which is oriented towards continuous relations with the Turkish minority in Macedonia and Kosovo. This association prides itself with being one of the few examples of the associations that are not closed after 1980 coup d'état; yet as Toumarkine (2000) also states only associations linked to 'national cause' were not closed in this period. The Association of Rumelian Turks builds transnational networks with institutions, political parties and associations; however, their interaction is mostly limited to Turkish minority associations and political parties such as Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party, Macedonian Turkish National Unity Movement, Macedonian Turk Democracy Party and Macedonian Turkish Women Association. The explicit emphasis on Turkish identity by this association, which Toumarkine (2000) calls as 'Turkism' is not welcomed by the other Macedonian immigrants and they see this as "as an attempt by the immigrants from Skopje to establish their supremacy within the movement" (Toumarkine, 2000: 413)

Similar to the other examples above, there is also a relationship between the frame of the association and the responses of the members in the survey. To begin with, the members to the Association of Rumeli Turks tend to identify with Turks in Macedonia as well as Turks in Kosovo. It is important to note that members of the association those who identify themselves as Albanian and Turk and Albanian have also memberships to other associations such as the Association of All Rumeli and the Association of Köprülü Yabul Çişta respectively (see in Appendix O).

Yet, it should be noted that is not possible to establish a conclusive relationship between association membership and identity frames promoted by associations, so it is not apparent whether people have chosen the type of associations according to their own identity perceptions or their identities have been molded within the association as such. Yet, it should be highlighted that no alternative ways of identity has materialized either in the interviews or in the survey responses.

In sum, in the case of Albanian migrant community it is hard to generalize that a unified identity frame of Albanian diaspora exists due to the different identity frames affecting the migrant community, even though there is a definite orientation towards homeland, and consciousness of their identity as the responses to survey questions and interviews display. This also affects the formation of mobilizing practices which would ignite the shared identity when "the initial urge for the community, springing from specific critical events is gone" (Sökefeld, 2006: 276). The lack of dominant identity frame in the diaspora leads to the emergence of pluralistic identities, such as identifying themselves as both Albanians and Turks, or Turkish citizens or immigrants from Yugoslavia. Moreover, it also constrains establishing institutional

relations with Albanian diasporas in other countries, though these relations are formed with the homeland. The only option to have relations with Albanian diaspora groups elsewhere becomes the familial ties.

### *4.6. Concluding Remarks*

This thesis applies recent theoretical developments in the diaspora literature to the case of Albanian migrants from the former Yugoslavia. Instead of making only a macro-level analysis concentrating on the state level, I combine the structural analyses of state and organizational/network level with the individual level through conducting surveys and in-depth interviews with the Albanian immigrants in Zeytinburnu. Incorporating individual level has enabled me to understand the everyday practices of immigrants and how they constitute their identities on the daily lives.

In examining the process of Albanian diasporic identity formation in this chapter, I make following arguments. First, I argue that Albanian diasporic identity is not projected in opposition to Turkish identity unlike the earlier approaches which see diaspora as rooted in the homeland and having troubled relations with host country. Instead of constituting Turkish and Albanian identities as binary oppositions, Albanian community retains a simultaneous sense of belonging to both home and host countries, as the fieldwork findings display above. Hence, the findings of this thesis validate the transnationalist approach to diaspora which captures this simultaneity in the diasporic consciousness.

The second argument is that diaspora is not a result of migration but requires an imagination of a community. When defined as an imagined community with links spanning more than one country, becoming diaspora involves new imaginations of immigrant groups. The fieldwork conducted with Albanian migrants reveals that certain features of how Albanians imagine their identity. First, they view their migration as an exodus resulting from repressive rule of Yugoslav government against them. Second, they view their community as having a single voice to speak as a group. Third, they view endogamy and preservation of their language as ways to protect their culture and identity. Hence, in this chapter, I identified the codes with which Albanians imagine their diasporic identity.

Finally, this chapter argues that a social movement approach to diasporic identity formation demonstrates how the imagination of the Albanian migrants as a community is made possible. For this, certain tools of social movement theory are used. Accordingly, the changes in the political structure construing *political opportunities* are the preconditions for the emergence of a diasporic identity. The fieldwork findings reveal that these opportunities are the changes in the state policies such as the one in language use, opportunities created by preceding movements in the Albanian case. Even though these changes in the host country have impacted the emergence of diasporic identity, the most important aspect in the diaspora consciousness has come from the changes in the political structure of home country, namely the disintegration of Yugoslavia and subsequent conflicts which constitute critical/triggering events in the diasporic identity formation.

However, these structural changes need to be conveyed to the members of the community, for this, *mobilizing structures* that structure collective imagination are necessary. The existing immigrant associations and the proliferating media instruments such as websites and TV channels concerning with the Albanian identity have undertaken this role in the Albanian case and they became the agents in framing, as well. Hence, these agents framed a disporic identity which translated itself into a myriad of activities in the emergence of diaspora responding to the political developments in the home country. Nevertheless, the existence of competing identity frames in the Albanian diaspora has hampered the formation of all encompassing mobilizing practices such as commemorating or celebrating certain events. Also it has constrained establishing institutional relations with Albanian diasporas in other countries. Although these different identity frames produce a decline in diasporic mobilization at the local level, it does not weaken the diasporic identity as the fieldwork findings regarding identifying themselves as Albanian and practicing transnational activities presented above demonstrate.

# CHAPTER V

# CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Drawing on the multi-level analysis, this study has explored first what constitutes a diaspora and how it is related to the broader framework of transnationalism second, the process of diasporic identity formation in relation to critical events in the home country and the existing immigrant association in the host country. In this thesis, I have examined how Albanian migrants imagine their identity and how this imagination emerged through analyzing individual responses to surveys and in-dept interviews. In addition to individual level, I have analyzed the organizational level through findings from the interviews with the immigrant associations and founders of certain websites in order to understand this process of diasporic identity formation.

This study contributes to existing theoretical and empirical literatures. Its theoretical implications are centered on four crucial elements. *First one* is concerning the implicit divide between diaspora as an essentially ethnicity-based concept and diaspora as a more transnational identity concept. The case study of Albanian immigrants reveals that diasporas are not exclusively nationalist since they are deployed in transnational networks to form multiple attachments. Hence this case demonstrate that the paradoxical nature of "dwelling here" with "a connection there"

and simultaneity in the belonging rather than reifying the national identity represent a diasporic identity more accurately. Both the survey responses and in-depth interview narratives are in line with transnationalist approach to diaspora since simultaneous attachment to both countries emerged in the various questions asking the level of identification (see Table 4.1). Moreover, interview findings suggest that Albanians identify themselves both as Albanians and Turks and make attempts to reconcile their simultaneous Albanian and Turkish identities through the Ottoman heritage in the Rumelia.

The *second* contribution to the theoretical literature is that this case study displays that transnational activities cannot solely be explained in reference to technological variables such as increasing availability of transportation and communication technologies. Instead, certain specific social, cultural or political events in the homeland, in this particular case disintegration of Yugoslavia, together with the political opportunities provided by host country can also lead to increasing transnational activities and attachment to homeland by the diaspora group. The case study of this thesis shows that the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the problems occurred in the Albanian populated areas such as Kosovo and Macedonia mobilized the immigrants in Turkey. It had also affected the second generation migrants, as the interviewees narrate, in a way to lead them to search for their homeland. Nonetheless, as this case study show cheaper availability of communication and transportation tools and media makes it possible for diaspora to establish more links with home country and to find about circumstances in their homeland.

*Third,* this thesis contributes to the debate concerning the definition of diaspora and lends support to the idea that essentialist criteria for defining a diasporic identity fail to capture the dynamic nature of diasporic existence. For this reason, the way the members of community imagine their identity is emphasized in this thesis. According to the survey results, the Albanian community perceives their migration as a form of exile and they see their homeland as either Kosovo or Macedonia, sometimes even both of them. However, they distance themselves from Albania where there is a religious diversity among the Albanians. Moreover, they also (want to) utilize endogamy to be able to preserve their identity and culture. They have a diasporic consciousness, as diasporic identity formation requires not only "ways of being", which means performing activities in regards to homeland, such as visiting homeland, watching homeland television channels, to "ways of belonging", which requires awareness of this identity (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004). Accordingly, this thesis claims that Albanian community expresses this consciousness through first viewing Albanian migrants as the closest group to them second considering their community as having a single voice and acting together.

*Lastly* and most importantly, this thesis contributes to the theoretical literature on diaspora through displaying that the tools of social movement approach shed light on the process of diaspora formation through displaying the critical role played by changing political structures and agency of immigrant groups in the process of diasporic identity formation. In the emergence of Albanian diasporic identity, firstly there are political opportunities that pave the way for the new imaginations of collective identity. For example, more liberal minority policies started to be implemented due to the accession process to the European Union. These changes

have reflected itself in the in-depth interviews in the form of the comparing earlier times with the current situation, especially in regards to language. Moreover, the prior existence of Kurdish group with identity claims had both enabling and disabling effects as a political opportunity. While they enabled the Albanian community to use their languages more freely (as the interviewees denote), their antagonistic relation with Turkish state lead the Albanian community to apply a control mechanism to curtail their demands that would produce any parallel to the Kurdish movement.

Apart from these host country based changes in the structural environment, the major changes in the home country have been found as constituting political opportunity framed to mobilize Albanian community. The breakdown of Yugoslavia was followed by a series of events that are very significant for the Albanians has led to mushrooming of associations founded by the immigrant communities in Turkey as well as establishment of TV Channels such as Rumeli TV, Tek Rumeli TV, to lobbying activities during 1999 Kosovo War and 2001 conflict in Macedonia, and to the formation of "Kosovo Solidarity Committee" which was a centre for distributing aid to the refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania and Turkey during the Kosovo War. In the process of these developments, Albanian immigrants also engaged in political activities such as sending aids, hosting their relatives in their homes, pressuring Turkish state to help the "Muslims" there; hence diasporic identity arises through the political mobilization for the home country around mobilizing structures. In the Albanian case, the migrant associations which position themselves as "bridges between Turkey and home countries" are necessary conditions for diasporic community formation (Toumarkine, 2000: 420) and constitute the *mobilizing*

*structures* for the Albanian diasporic identity, since they take the initiative in creating solidarity among immigrants in Turkey and directing this solidarity towards the home country. This thesis also contributes to the diaspora literature, through eliciting different identity frames in the period after the emergence of diaspora, which affects the strength of diaspora as a social form. In the Albanian case, the existence of three different identity frames and none of them dominating over others constrained establishing institutional relations with Albanian diasporas in other countries and led to formation of more pluralist identities.

Alongside these theoretical implications, this thesis also has a comprehensive and innovative research design. *First*, the use of multi-level analysis including the individual level enabled this thesis to account for the interaction between the macro, meso and micro levels, namely state, organizational and individual levels, unlike the majority of the literature on the migrations from the Balkans which concentrates mostly on the state level structural analysis of migration. *Second,* this study focused on an understudied group of Albanian migrants and provided thick descriptions in regards to their identity formation process. In this literature, most of the studies concentrate on the broader framework of Balkan migration, and neglect the diversities within this broader framework. While the majority of the migrants from Balkans are comprised of Turks, the migration from former Yugoslavia is significant for it introduced ethnically diverse group of migrants, Albanians being one of them. Hence, this study focused on the Albanian migrants, who were not studied thoroughly in the literature.

*Third one* is the choice of methodology in this thesis displays conformity with the main purposes of this study. The use of in-depth interviews together with survey method enabled me to capture the diversities within the diaspora group. With a qualitative analysis, which is mostly interested in meaning and how people interpret their lives and experiences, I was to both elicit responses to the questions and observe and record the behavior in the natural setting. Yet, this literature on diaspora and transnationalism is being criticized for relying on a sample chosen invariably on the dependent variable, in other words a sample only consisting of those engaging in transnational activities (Garnizo *et al,* 2003). For this reason, surveys conducted with a sample of 70 migrants have been employed to have a relatively broader picture. Therefore, the survey method has been helpful in two ways; first it has represented attitudes and practices of a relatively broader community. Second, it has constituted the basis of the in-depth interviews according to the demographic characteristics.

More importantly, I have tried to avoid homogenizing the Albanian community throughout the case study, accounting for the diversities in the sample. With the survey responses, I have made cross-generational comparisons as well as comparisons based on gender. In addition, I have tried to choose the sample of the in-depth interviews in a way to provide variation among the interviewees. Moreover, I have also differentiated different political actors in the process of building identity frames, again, in order not to homogenize the group studied.

Apart from these strengths of my thesis, there are certain shortcomings, as well. To begin with methodological ones, the *first* shortcoming is related to location of the research. This research is conducted with Albanian migrants in Zeytinburnu district

of Istanbul. This restriction in terms of location prevents me to make generalizations about the whole Albanian immigrant community in Turkey. A more comprehensive fieldwork including immigrants in other cities as well would enable to make more generalizations. Moreover, the sample of exploratory survey and interviews consists of a very limited number of people due to the practical reasons. A sample consisting of larger number of suvey respondents would enable to establish more conclusive relations between variables. Nonetheless, the fieldwork results of this thesis give descriptive information as well as tendencies regarding the Albanian community.

The *second* weakness of this thesis is that it concentrates on only one group of immigrant community, without comparing Albanian community to other immigrant communities in Turkey. This kind of a comparison would enable to see the effects of political opportunities and mobilizing structures on the diasporic identity more clearly and eliminate other possible explanations more confidently. The *third* weakness of this study is related to second one. Despite being a transnational study, it does not include Albanian diaspora in other countries to evaluate the similarities and /or differences between these groups. Also this thesis does not take into account those stayed behind in the home country but only focuses on those who left the home country.

The theoretical framework used in this thesis to understand the Albanian diasporic identity formation in Turkey challenges the basic assumptions in regards to immigrants from the Balkans. Taking into consideration the historical legacy of Ottoman Empire and systematic Islamization and Turkification took place in the Balkan region, the use of diaspora concept requires taking into account the interplay

between state policies, shared history and immigration processes. Theoretically, the ambivalence in the identities of Balkan immigrants brings forth the question: when and where the immigrants from Balkans constitute a diaspora given that migration from the Balkans is viewed as *kinship based migration.* For this reason, the immigration from Yugoslavia, in which different ethnic groups also took place, is a challenging yet enlightening case to study the diasporic identity. Instead of analyzing a general group of "the Rumeli immigrants" or "Balkan immigrants", I chose to study a specific immigrant group, Albanian immigrants. However, instead of focusing on rigid categorizations based on ethnicity, I tried to use the subjective criteria that Albanian immigrants define themselves with taking into account the duality of diasporic identity and also tried to focus on the diasporic processes rather than categorizing immigrants groups as diaspora or not.

An ambitious topic for further research would be based on the comparison of process diasporic identity formation in the Albanian case with another group. There are other immigrant communities such as Cherkes community in Turkey, which followed a similar experience of migration at least through the effect of migration and citizenship regime in Turkey. A comparative framework where these groups are analyzed in terms of the process of diasporic identity formation would enable us to identify the differences in terms of the strength and form of diaspora as a social form and the possible reasons contributing to this difference.

Also, a comparison on the same diaspora group, Albanian diaspora, in another country would allow identifying the role of the political opportunities of the host countries on the formation of diaspora. This way, it would be possible to elicit to role

played by the different political structures in the host countries on the diasporic identity formation since the triggering event in the home country; namely disintegration of Yugoslavia, does not change.

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**SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE**

## KOSOVA VE MAKEDONYA GÖÇMENLERİNE
## YÖNELİK ANKET FORMU
## KOÇ ÜNİVESİTESİ, İSTANBUL

Bu araştırma Koç Üniversitesi Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü, yüksek lisans öğrencisi ve araştırma asistanı **Esra İşsever** tarafından yürütülmektedir.

Araştırmada Makedonya ve Kosova göçmenlerinin kimlik ve aidiyetleri incelenmektedir. Lütfen aşağıdaki ankette yer alan her soruya sizin durumunuzu **EN İYİ** ifade eden cevabı vermeye çalışınız. Burada verilen cevapların doğru ya da yanlış olarak değerlendirilmesi söz konusu değildir. Bütün soruları eksiksiz cevaplamanız ve cevaplarınızın içtenliği araştırmanın bilimselliğinin tek garantisidir. Sonuçlar araştırma amacıyla kullanılacak ve kesinlikle gizli tutulacaktır.

Yardımlarınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz. Araştırma sonuçlarının Ağustos 2010 tarihinde tamamlanması planlanmaktadır. Araştırmanın sonuçları hakkında soru sormak veya bilgi almak için aşağıdaki iletişim bilgilerini kullanabilirsiniz.

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**Görüşmenin yapıldığı**
**Tarih:**
**İlçe:**
**Mahalle:**

**Öncelikle, sizinle ilgili bazı kişisel bilgilere ihtiyacımız var.**

**1. Cinsiyetiniz**                                      **2. Doğum tarihiniz**
    a. Kadın                                        ………………………
    b. Erkek

**3. Doğum yeriniz**
- a. Türkiye
- b. Kosova
- c. Makedonya
- d. Diğer …………………..

**4. Medeni durumunuz**
- a. Evli
- b. Bekar
- c. boşanmış
- d. dul
- e. diğer ………….

**5. Eşinizin doğum yeri (Evliyse)**
- a. Türkiye
- b. Kosova
- c. Makedonya
- d. Bosna
- e. Diğer………………

**6. Türkiye'ye (aileniz) kaç yılında göç etti?**
………………...

**7. Aileniz nereden göç etmiştir?**
………………...

**8. Eğitim düzeyiniz**
- a. Okur-yazar
- b. İlköğretim
- c. Lise
- d. Lisans
- e. Yüksek lisans

**9. Çalışma durumunuz**
- a. Kendi işimde çalışıyorum
- b. Aylıkla çalışıyorum
- c. Emekliyim
- d. İş arıyorum
- e. Çalışmıyorum
- f. Öğrenciyim
- g. Diğer…………………

**10. Mesleğiniz nedir?**
………………………….

**11. Aylık geliriniz**
- a. 0-1000 TL
- b. 1000-2000 TL
- c. 2000-3000 TL
- d. 3000 TL'den fazla

**12. Anadiliniz nedir?**
- a. Türkçe
- b. Arnavutça
- c. Makedonca
- d. Boşnakça
- e. Diğer…………………

**UYARI: Şimdi soracağım sorular için birden fazla şıkkı seçebilirsiniz.**

**13. Evde en çok hangi dili (dilleri) konuşuyorsunuz?**
- a. Türkçe
- b. Arnavutça
- c. Makedonca
- d. Boşnakça
- e. Diğer ---------------

**14. Türkiye vatandaşı mısınız?**
- a. Evet
- b. Hayır

**15. Başka bir ülkede vatandaşlığınız da varsa, hangi ülke ?**
   a.  Makedonya
   b.  Kosova
   c.  Sırbistan
   d.  Bosna-Hersek
   e.  Diğer ---------------

**16. Aşağıda saydığım yakınlarınızdan hangisi halen memleketinizde (doğduğunuz yerde) yaşamaktadır?**
   a.  1. Derece: Anne-Baba- Kardeş
   b.  2. Derece: Teyze-Dayı-Amca-Hala
   c.  3. Derece: Kuzenler
   d.  Doğduğum yerde yaşayan yakınım yoktur

**17. Göçmen derneklerinden hangisine üyesiniz?** (gerekli olduğu takdirde dernek isimlerini sayıp, üye olduğu derneği işaretle)
   1.  Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı
   2.  Köprülü Yabul Çişta Derneği
   3.  Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
   4.  Pirlepeliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
   5.  Kırçovalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
   6.  Gostivarlılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
   7.  Kalkandelenliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
   8.  Tüm Rumeli Türkleri Kültür Ve Dayanışma Derneği
   9.  Priştineliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   10. Kosovalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   11. Kumanovalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   12. Tüm Balkanlılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   13. Prizrenliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   14. İpekliler Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   15. Kosova Gilanlılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Dernegi
   16. Manastır Folklor Araştırma
   17. Kosova Güç Spor Klubü
   18. Rumeli İşadamları Dernegi
   19. Göçmenlere Yardım Dernegi
   20. Türk-Arnavut Kardeşliği
   21. Diğer……………………...
   22. Derneklere üye değilim

**18. Sizin ya da ailenizin Türkiye'ye göç etmesinin temel nedeni nedir?**
**……………………….**

**Aşağıdaki sorularda size verdiğim şıkları puanlamanızı istiyorum.**

**19.  Kendinizi nereli hissediyorsunuz?** Saydığım kategoriler için, kendinize en yakın hissettiğinize 6, en uzak hissettiğinize 1 puan vermelisiniz.

| Zeytinburnu | İstanbul | Türkiye | Makedonya/Kosova | Balkanlar | Avrupa |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**20. Türk olmanın kriterleri nelerdir?** Saydığım kriterleri önem sırasına göre, en önemli olanı 6 puan olmak üzere puan vermelisiniz.

| Türk hissetmek | Türkiye'de yaşamak | Türk vatandaşı olmak | Müslüman olmak | Türkiye'de doğmuş olmak | Türkçe konuşmak |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |

**21. Seçme şansınız olsaydı, çocuğunuzun nereli biriyle evlenmesini isterdiniz.** Saydığım kategorilerden daha çok tercih ettiğinize 5 puan vermelisiniz.

| Arnavut | Yugoslavya göçmeni | Balkan göçmeni | Trakyalı | Türk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | |

**22. Kendinizi aşağıda saydığım gruplara ne kadar yakın hissediyorsunuz?** En yakın hissettiğiniz gruba 9 puan, en uzak hissettiğiniz gruba 1 puan veriniz.

| | |
|---|---|
| Arnavut göçmenlere | |
| Diğer Balkan göçmenlerine | |
| Kosova'daki Arnavutlara | |
| Arnavutluk'taki Arnavutlara | |
| Makedonya'daki Arnavutlara | |
| Türklere | |
| Makedonya'daki Türklere | |
| Kosova'daki Türklere | |
| Avrupalılara | |

**23. Kendinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? (Birden fazla şıkkı seçebilirsiniz.)**
   a. Arnavut
   b. Yugoslavya göçmeni
   c. Balkan göçmeni
   d. Türk vatandaşı
   e. Türk
   f. Diğer…………………….

**24. Şimdi size bir takım fikirler sayıp bunlara katılıp katılmadığınızı soracağım. Bu ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı bildiriniz.**

| | Kesinlikle katılmıyorum | Katılmıyorum | Ne katılıyorum Ne katılmıyorum | Katılıyorum | Kesinlikle Katılıyorum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Etnik gruplar kimliklerini korumalıdır | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Etnik gruplar adetlerini devam ettirebilmelidir | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova / Makedonya göçmenlerinin grup olarak ortak bir sesi vardır | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Eşimin Kosova/ Makedonya göçmeni olmasını tercih ederim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Birlikte çalıştığım insanların Kosova/ Makedonya göçmeni olmasını isterim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Komşularımın Kosova/ Makedonya göçmeni olmasını isterim | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**25. Memleketinizle ilgili haberleri hangi iletişim yolları ile takip ediyorsunuz? Bu soruda birden çok şık seçebilirsiniz.**

a. Türkiye'deki gazeteleri
b. Türkiye'deki televizyonları
c. Makedonya/Kosova gazeteleri
d. Makedonya/Kosova televizyonları (uydu)
e. Derneklerin yayınladığı dergiler
f. Derneklerin internet sitesi

**26. Hangi uydu kanallarını izlersiniz? Bu soruda birden çok şık seçebilirsiniz.**

a. RTK Live
b. Alsat
c. TvŞh
d. Vizyon Plus
e. Balkanika
f. Tek Rumeli
g. Diğer ………………….

**27. Aşağıda saydığım internet sitelerinden birine üye misiniz? Bu soruda birden çok şık seçebilirsiniz.**

a. Arnavutum.com
b. Arnavutgenclik.com
c. Arnavutuz.net
d.  Balkanlar.net
e. balturk.org.tr
f. rumeliturk.net
g. Diğer………….
h. Bu gibi internet sitelerine üye değilim.

**28.  Aşağıda bazı cümleler sayacağım. Bunlardan sizin durumunuza uyanlar için EVET, uymayanlar için HAYIR olarak cevap verin.**

|  | Evet | Hayır | Uygun Değil |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seçimlerde oy kullanırım | 1 | 0 | |
| Siyasi partiye üyeyim | 1 | 0 | |
| Dernekte aktif üyeyim | 1 | 0 | |
| Derneklerin yardım faaliyetlerine katılırım | 1 | 0 | |
| Kosova için yardım etkinliklerine katıldım | 1 | 0 | |
| Bosna-Hersek için yardım etkinliklerine katıldım | 1 | 0 | |
| Kosova'nın bağımsızlık kutlamalarına katıldım | 1 | 0 | |
| Çalıştığım yer Kosova/Makedonya ile ticaret yapıyor | 1 | 0 | |
| Çalıştığım yerde başka Kosova/ Makedonya göçmenleri de çalışıyor | 1 | 0 | |
| Arkadaşlarım genelde benim gibi Kosova ve Makedonya göçmenidir | 1 | 0 | |
| Yakın dönemde Kosova/Makedonya'dan başka ülkelere göç eden akrabalarım var | 1 | 0 | |
| Bu akrabalarımla sürekli iletişim kurarım. | 1 | 0 | |
| Memleketimdeki akrabalarımıza maddi destekte bulunurum | 1 | 0 | |
| Memleketimdeki akrabalarımız bize maddi destekte bulunur | 1 | 0 | |

**29. Şimdi size bazı aktiviteler sayacağım. Bu aktiviteleri ne sıklıkla yaptığınızı soruyorum.**

| | Hiçbir zaman | Nadiren | Bazen | Sıklıkla | Sürekli |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arkadaşlarla Makedonya/ Kosova'daki siyasi durumunu konuşmak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/ Makedonya'dan gelen misafir ağırlamak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/ Makedonya'daki tanıdıklarla telefon/ internetten görüşmek | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Derneklerin eğlence gezilerine ve/veya gecelerine katılmak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Televizyon izlemek | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/Makedonya televizyon kanalları izlemek | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Gazete okumak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/Makedonya gazeteleri okumak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Müzik dinlemek | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/Makedonya müzikleri dinlemek | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Internet forumlarına katılmak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Kosova/Makedonya ile ilgili internet forumlarına katılmak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**30. Memleketi ne sıklıkla ziyaret edersiniz?**
   a. Her iki yılda bir
   b. Her beş yılda bir
   c. 3 defaya kadar gittim
   d. Bir kez gittim
   e. Hiç gitmedim


Zaman ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim.

# INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

**(Part A, Part B and Part C: for first generation immigrants)**
**Part A- Personal History**
1. Ne zaman ve nerede doğdunuz?
2. Ebeveynlerinizin doğum yeri neresidir? Eşinizin doğum yeri?
3. Ne zaman (kaç yaşında) Türkiye'ye göç ettiniz?
4. Göç etmeden önce yaşadığınız yerlerden ve burada aldığınız eğitimden bahseder misiniz?

**Part B- Migration Process**
5. Makedonya/ Kosova'daki hayatınıza dair neler hatırlıyorsunuz?
6. Neden göç ettiniz? (Ailenizin göç etme sebepleri nelerdir?) Göç kararını nasıl verdiniz?
7. Neden Türkiye'yi seçtiniz? Burada akrabalarınız var mıydı? (Varsa nerelerde yaşıyorlardı?) Göç etmeden önce Türkiye'ye hiç gelmiş miydiniz? (Geldiyse, kaç defa gelmiştiniz, nerede kalmıştınız?)
8. Göç etme sürecini anlatır mısınız? Göçmen vizesini nasıl aldınız? Türkiye'de ilk nereye geldiniz? İstanbul'a nasıl geldiniz?

**PartC-After Migration**
9. Göçten sonra, vatandaşlık süreci nasıl gelişti? Herhangi bir bürokratik engel ile karşılaştınız mı? (İsim ya da soyadı değişikliği, din, dil, eğitim ile ilgili bir problem vb.)
10. Göç ettikten sonra Türkiye'ye adaptasyon konusunda bir zorluk yaşadınız mı?
11. Türkiye'de dil ile ilgili bir problem yaşadınız mı?
12. Yerleştiğiniz yerde göçmen olmanızla ilgili herhangi bir problem yaşadınız mı?

**Part D- Belonging**
13. Kendinizi nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? (Türk, Yugoslavyalı, Arnavut, Rumelili, Balkan vb.)
14. Sizce Rumeli, Balkan göçmenlerini ayıran nedir? Size göre kimler Balkan göçmeni, kimler Rumeli göçmenidir?
15. Memleket deyince aklınıza ne gelir? 'Anavatanınız/memleketiniz' olarak gördüğünüz yer neresidir?
16. Türkiye'de farklı olduğunuzu hissettiniz mi/ hissediyor musunuz? (yabancı vs. yerli, daha Avrupalı vb.) Buradaki insanlarla aranızdaki herhangi etnik, dini, siyasi, sosyal bir ayrılık olduğunu dusunuyor musunuz? Neden?
17. Sizce Türkiye'deki Arnavut göçmenler dillerini, kültürlerini yaşatabiliyorlar mı? Göçmen dernekleri ya da onların düzenlediği etkinliklerin bunda etkisi oluyor mu? Mesela merasimlerde kültürel geleneklerinizi sürdürmeye devam ediyor musunuz?
18. Bazı belediyelerde ve derneklerde Arnavutça kursları var. Hiç çocuklarınızın bu kurslara gitmesini ister miydiniz? Sizce bu kurslar kimliğin korunması için önemli mi?
19. Sizce önemli Arnavut kahraman kimdir? Örneğin Adem Yaşari, İbrahim Rugova sizin için ne ifade eder?

**Part E- Relations with the home country**

20. Göç ettikten sonra doğduğunuz yere hiç gittiniz mi? Göçten sonra memleketinizi ziyaret ettiğinizde neler hissettiniz?

21. Makedonya/ Kosova'da akrabalarınız var mı? Onlarla ilişkileriniz nasıl? Yugoslavya'daki savaş sırasında oradaki tanıdıklarınıza ilişkileriniz nasıldı? Akrabalarınızın Türkiye'ye gelmesi için yardımda bulundunuz mu? Akrabalarınızdan sığınma talep edip başka ülkelere gidenler oldu mu?

22. Çifte vatandaşlık başvurusunda bulundunuz mu? Neden?

23. Makedonya/Kosova'ya geri dönmeyi hiç düşündünüz mü? Neden dönmediniz?

24. (Paralel Kosova devleti kurulduğu)1990'lı yıllarda akrabalarınızla iletişiminiz nasıldı? Onlardan yaşadıkları zorluklar ve problemler hakkında ne gibi bilgi alıyordunuz?

25. Savaş sırasında neler hissettiniz? Sizin memleketinize daha çok bağlanmanıza sebep oldu mu?

26. Makedonya'daki Arnavut azınlıklar hakkında neler düşünüyorsunuz?

27. Makedonya'da 2001 yılında yaşanan etnik çatışmalar sırasında neler hissettiniz?

28. Yugoslavya'nın dağılması ile birlikte Makedonya'nın yeni bir devlet olması sizin için ne ifade etti? Örneğin, oraya dönmeyi hiç düşündünüz mü? Artık memleketinizi daha raht ziyaret edeceğinizi düşündünüz mü? Ya da size veya orda yaşayan akrabalarınıza veya diğer Arnavutlara bir etkisi oldu mu?

29. Peki, Kosova'nın bağımsız devlet olması hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz, neler hissettiniz? Dağılan Yugoslavya'dan çoğunluğu Müslüman ve Arnavut olan bir devlet kurulması sizde nasıl bir duygu uyandırdı?

30. Sizce Yugoslavya'nın dağılması sırasında Türkiye'nin izlediği dış politika nasıldı? Yeterince oradaki Müslümanları koruyabildi mi?

31. Savaştan sonra Kosova'nın yeniden yapılandırılması sürecinde hiçbir aktivitede bulundunuz mu? Örneğin, (işadamıysa) Kosova / Makedonya ile ticaret yaptınız mı ya da yapmayı düşünüyor musunuz? (yaptıysa, ne zaman? herhangi bir zorluk yaşadınız mı? )

## THE PROFILES OF INTERVIEWEES

| Pseudonym | Country Origin | Age | Migration Wave | Genera-tion | Income | Marital Status | Education |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Serkan | Macedonia | 30 | Second wave | Second | Between 2.000-3.000 | Single | University level |
| Mimoza | Macedonia | 36 | Third wave | First | Below 1.000 | Married | Primary level |
| İskender | Macedonia | 45 | Second wave | Second | Between 2.000-3.000 | Married | Primary level |
| Ramadan | Kosovo | 54 | Second wave | First | More Than 3.000 | Married | Primary level |
| Meryem | Macedonia | 24 | Second wave | Second | Below 1.000 | Widowed | Primary level |
| İrem | Macedonia | 17 | Second wave | Second | Between 1.000-2.000 | Single | High School |
| Cevriye | Kosovo | 70 | Second wave | First | Below 1.000 | Widowed | High School |
| Kadriye | Macedonia | 59 | Second Wave | First | Between 1.000-2.000 | Married | Primary Level |
| Aydın | Kosovo | 37 | Second wave | Second | Between 2.000-3.000 | Married | High School |
| Mustafa | Macedonia | 68 | Second Wave | First | Below 1.000 | Married | Primary Level |

# APPENDIX D

## COMPARING REASONS TO LEAVE
## ACCORDING TO GENDER

<table>
<tr><td colspan="9" align="center"><strong>Gender * Reason to Leave Cross tabulation</strong></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3" rowspan="3"></td><td colspan="5" align="center">Reason to Leave</td><td rowspan="3">Total</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">War</td><td rowspan="2">Oppression</td><td>Migration</td><td rowspan="2">Networks</td><td>Networks and</td></tr>
<tr><td>Agreement</td><td>Oppression</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="9">Gender</td><td rowspan="3">Male</td><td>Count</td><td>2</td><td>25</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>7</td><td>37</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Gender</td><td>5,4%</td><td>67,6%</td><td>2,7%</td><td>5,4%</td><td>18,9%</td><td>100,0%</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Reason to Leave</td><td>33,3%</td><td>53,2%</td><td>50,0%</td><td>40,0%</td><td>70,0%</td><td>52,9%</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Female</td><td>Count</td><td>4</td><td>22</td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>33</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Gender</td><td>12,1%</td><td>66,7%</td><td>3,0%</td><td>9,1%</td><td>9,1%</td><td>100,0%</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Reason to Leave</td><td>66,7%</td><td>46,8%</td><td>50,0%</td><td>60,0%</td><td>30,0%</td><td>47,1 %</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="3">Total</td><td>Count</td><td>6</td><td>47</td><td>2</td><td>5</td><td>10</td><td>70</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Gender</td><td>8,6%</td><td>67,1%</td><td>2,9%</td><td>7,1%</td><td>14,3%</td><td>100,0%</td></tr>
<tr><td>% within Reason to Leave</td><td>100,0%</td><td>100,0%</td><td>100,0%</td><td>100,0%</td><td>100,0%</td><td>100,0%</td></tr>
</table>

# APPENDIX E

# GENERATIONAL COMPARISON OF REASONS TO LEAVE

| Reason to Leave * Generation Cross tabulation | | | Generation | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1st generation | 2nd generation | Total |
| Reason to Leave | War | Count | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 16,7% | 83,3% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 3,4% | 12,2% | 8,6% |
| | Oppression | Count | 19 | 28 | 47 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 40,4% | 59,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 65,5% | 68,3% | 67,1% |
| | Migration Agreement | Count | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 50,0% | 50,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 3,4% | 2,4% | 2,9% |
| | Networks | Count | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 60,0% | 40,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 10,3% | 4,9% | 7,1% |
| | Networks and Oppression | Count | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 50,0% | 50,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 17,2% | 12,2% | 14,3% |
| Total | | Count | 29 | 41 | 70 |
| | | % within Reason to Leave | 41,4% | 58,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

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# APPENDIX F

## GENERATIONAL COMPARISON OF HOMELAND VISITS

| | | | Generation | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Visit to Homeland \* Generation Cross tabulation** | | | 1st generation | 2nd generation | |
| Visit to Homeland | Never | Count | 2 | 27 | 29 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 6,9% | 93,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 6,9% | 65,9% | 41,4% |
| | Once | Count | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 53,8% | 46,2% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 24,1% | 14,6% | 18,6% |
| | Up to Three times | Count | 8 | 6 | 14 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 57,1% | 42,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 27,6% | 14,6% | 20,0% |
| | Every 5 years | Count | 10 | 1 | 11 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 90,9% | 9,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 34,5% | 2,4% | 15,7% |
| | Every two Years | Count | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 66,7% | 33,3% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 6,9% | 2,4% | 4,3% |
| Total | | Count | 29 | 41 | 70 |
| | | % within visits to homeland | 41,4% | 58,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

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## TABLES FOR
## LATERAL CONNECTIONS WITH HOMELAND

| Table 1. Sending Aid to Kosovo | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 11 | 15,7 | 15,7 | 15,7 |
| | Yes | 59 | 84,3 | 84,3 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 2. Sending Money to Homeland | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 44 | 62,9 | 62,9 | 62,9 |
| | Yes | 26 | 37,1 | 37,1 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 3. Watching Satellite TV (in general) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 1 | 1,4 | 1,4 | 1,4 |
| | Yes | 69 | 98,6 | 98,6 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 4. Watching Satellite TV in Turkish | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 19 | 27,1 | 27,1 | 27,1 |
| | Yes | 51 | 72,9 | 72,9 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 5. Watching Satellite TV in Albanian | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 37 | 52,9 | 52,9 | 52,9 |
| | Yes | 33 | 47,1 | 47,1 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

# APPENDIX H

## THE LEVEL OF IDENTIFICATION
## WITH LISTED COMMUNITIES

| How much do you identify yourself with… | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Valid Number: 70** | **Mean** | **Median** | **Std. Deviation** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** |
| **Albanian Migrants in Turkey** | **8,04** | **9,00** | **1,377** | **3** | **9** |
| **Kosovar Albanians** | **5,94** | **6,00** | **1,587** | **3** | **9** |
| **Albanians from Albania** | 2,90 | 2,00 | 2,058 | 1 | 8 |
| **Macedonia Albanians** | **6,61** | **7,00** | **1,636** | **2** | **9** |
| **Balkan Migrants** | 4,97 | 5,00 | 2,140 | 1 | 9 |
| **Turks in Turkey** | **6,96** | **7,00** | **1,628** | **3** | **9** |
| **Turks in Macedonia** | 4,56 | 4,00 | 1,823 | 2 | 9 |
| **Turks in Kosovo** | 3,14 | 3,00 | 1,277 | 1 | 9 |
| **Europeans** | 1,77 | 1,00 | 1,342 | 1 | 7 |

# APPENDIX I

# TABLES FOR MEMBERSHIP TO
# IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS

| Table 1. Membership to Immigrant Associations | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 21 | 30,0 | 30,0 | 30,0 |
| | Yes | 49 | 70,0 | 70,0 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 2. Membership to Immigrant Associations * Gender Cross tabulation | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Gender | | |
| | | | Male | Female | Total |
| Membership to Immigrant Associations | No | Count | 8 | 13 | 21 |
| | | % within membership to Associations | 38,1% | 61,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Gender | 21,6% | 39,4% | 30,0% |
| | Yes | Count | 29 | 20 | 49 |
| | | % within membership to Associations | 59,2% | 40,8% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Gender | 78,4% | 60,6% | 70,0% |
| Total | | Count | 37 | 33 | 70 |
| | | % within membership to Associations | 52,9% | 47,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Gender | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

| Table 3. Active Membership to Immigrant Associations | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | No | 54 | 77,1 | 77,1 | 77,1 |
| | Yes | 16 | 22,9 | 22,9 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

## TABLE FOR GENERATIONAL COMPARISON
## OF PERCEIVED SOLIDARITY

| Perceived Solidarity * Generation Cross tabulation | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Generation | | |
| | | | 1st generation | 2nd generation | Total |
| Perceived Solidarity | Strongly Disagree | Count | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 42,9% | 57,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 10,3% | 9,8% | 10,0% |
| | | % of Total | 4,3% | 5,7% | 10,0% |
| | Disagree | Count | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 50,0% | 50,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 10,3% | 7,3% | 8,6% |
| | | % of Total | 4,3% | 4,3% | 8,6% |
| | neither agree nor disagree | Count | 11 | 9 | 20 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 55,0% | 45,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 37,9% | 22,0% | 28,6% |
| | | % of Total | 15,7% | 12,9% | 28,6% |
| | Agree | Count | 4 | 15 | 19 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 21,1% | 78,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 13,8% | 36,6% | 27,1% |
| | | % of Total | 5,7% | 21,4% | 27,1% |
| | Strongly Agree | Count | 8 | 10 | 18 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 44,4% | 55,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 27,6% | 24,4% | 25,7% |
| | | % of Total | 11,4% | 14,3% | 25,7% |
| Total | | Count | 29 | 41 | 70 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 41,4% | 58,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

| Perceived Solidarity * Generation Cross tabulation | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Generation | | |
| | | | 1st generation | 2nd generation | Total |
| Perceived Solidarity | Strongly Disagree | Count | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 42,9% | 57,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 10,3% | 9,8% | 10,0% |
| | | % of Total | 4,3% | 5,7% | 10,0% |
| | Disagree | Count | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 50,0% | 50,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 10,3% | 7,3% | 8,6% |
| | | % of Total | 4,3% | 4,3% | 8,6% |
| | neither agree nor disagree | Count | 11 | 9 | 20 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 55,0% | 45,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 37,9% | 22,0% | 28,6% |
| | | % of Total | 15,7% | 12,9% | 28,6% |
| | Agree | Count | 4 | 15 | 19 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 21,1% | 78,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 13,8% | 36,6% | 27,1% |
| | | % of Total | 5,7% | 21,4% | 27,1% |
| | Strongly Agree | Count | 8 | 10 | 18 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 44,4% | 55,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 27,6% | 24,4% | 25,7% |
| | | % of Total | 11,4% | 14,3% | 25,7% |
| Total | | Count | 29 | 41 | 70 |
| | | % within Perceived Solidarity | 41,4% | 58,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within Generation | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % of Total | 41,4% | 58,6% | 100,0% |

# APPENDIX K

# TABLES FOR
# LANGUAGE PRESERVATION

| Table 1. Mother Tongue | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Turkish | 45 | 64,3 | 64,3 | 64,3 |
| | Albanian | 25 | 35,7 | 35,7 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

| Table 2. Language at Home | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Turkish | 7 | 10,0 | 10,0 | 10,0 |
| | Albanian | 3 | 4,3 | 4,3 | 14,3 |
| | Both | 60 | 85,7 | 85,7 | 100,0 |
| | Total | 70 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

## MEMBERSHIP TO ASSOCIATONS AND IDENTIFIYING WITH HOMELAND

| Correlations | | Association Membership | Association Membership (controlled) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 Y/N | Pearson Correlation | 1 | 1,000 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | |
| | N | 70 | 0 |
| Identifying with homeland | Pearson Correlation | ,375[**] | ,365 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | ,001 | ,002 |
| | N | 70 | 66 |
| Identifying with Albanian Migrants in TR | Pearson Correlation | ,317[**] | ,306 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | ,008 | ,011 |
| | N | 70 | 66 |
| Identification as Albanian | Pearson Correlation | ,248[*] | ,234 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | ,038 | ,055 |
| | N | 70 | 66 |

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

# APPENDIX M

# TABLES FOR IDENTIFICATION AND ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

**Table 1. Identification * Membership to Albanian Brotherhood Cross tabulation**

| | | Albanian Brotherhood | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 10 | **0** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 32 | **4** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 17 | **0** | 17 |
| Total | | 66 | **4** | 70 |

**Table 2. Identification * Membership to People from Köprü Cross tabulation**

| | | People from Köprü | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 10 | **0** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 33 | **3** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 17 | **0** | 17 |
| Total | | 67 | **3** | 70 |

**Table 3. Identification*Membership to People from Prishtina Cross tabulation**

| | | Members of Prishtina Assoc. | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 10 | **0** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 35 | **1** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 16 | **1** | 17 |
| Total | | 68 | **2** | 70 |

| Table 4. Identification *Membership to Arnavutum.com Cross tabulation | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | arnavutum.com | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 4 | **6** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 24 | **12** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 14 | **3** | 17 |
| Total | | 49 | **21** | 70 |

| Table 5. Identification*Membership to arnavutgenclik.com Cross tabulation | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Arnavutgenclik.com | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 9 | **1** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 31 | **5** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 12 | **5** | 17 |
| Total | | 59 | **11** | 70 |

| Table 6. Correlation between websites and identification towards homeland | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 27 A | 27 AG |
| Identification with Kosovo and Macedonia | Pearson Correlation | ,239[*] | ,255[*] |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | ,046 | ,033 |
| | N | 70 | 70 |

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

# APPENDIX N
# TABLE FOR
# MOBILZING PRACTICES

| | Participating in the celebrations of Kosovo's Independence | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Pearson Correlation | Sig. (2-tailed) | N |
| Participating in the celebrations of Kosovo's Independence | 1 | | 70 |
| Membership to associations | ,275[*] | ,021 | 70 |
| Watching satellite TV | ,131 | ,279 | 70 |
| Watching satellite TV in Albanian | ,407[**] | ,000 | 70 |
| Membership to Arnavutum.com | ,476[**] | ,000 | 70 |
| Membership to Arnavutgenclik.com | ,239[*] | ,047 | 70 |
| Membership to websites related to homeland overall | ,482[**] | ,000 | 70 |

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## APPENDIX O
## TABLES FOR IDENTIFICATION AND
## ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

<table>
<tr><td colspan="8"><b>Table 1 Correlation between membership to All Rumeli Association and Identification with ….</b></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>All Rumeli</td><td>Albanian Migrants</td><td>Balkan Migrants</td><td>Kosovo Albanians</td><td>Albanians in Albania</td><td>Macedonia Albanians</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Association of All Rumeli</td><td>Pearson Correlation</td><td>1</td><td>,322**</td><td>,110</td><td>-,051</td><td>-,184</td><td>-,052</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td><td></td><td>,006</td><td>,365</td><td>,677</td><td>,127</td><td>,667</td></tr>
<tr><td>N</td><td>70</td><td>70</td><td>70</td><td>70</td><td>70</td><td>70</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5"><b>Table 2. Identification * Membership to All Rumeli Association Cross tabulation</b></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Count</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">Membership to All Rumeli Association</td><td rowspan="2">Total</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>No</td><td><b>Yes</b></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Identification</td><td>Turk</td><td>4</td><td><b>1</b></td><td>5</td></tr>
<tr><td>Turkish Citizen</td><td>2</td><td><b>0</b></td><td>2</td></tr>
<tr><td>Immigrant from FY</td><td>4</td><td><b>6</b></td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>Albanian and Turk</td><td>13</td><td><b>23</b></td><td>36</td></tr>
<tr><td>Albanian</td><td>8</td><td><b>9</b></td><td>17</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Total</td><td>31</td><td><b>39</b></td><td>70</td></tr>
</table>

| Table 3. Identification * Membership to Rumeli Turks Association Cross Tabulation | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Count | | | | |
| | | Rumeli Turks Association | | |
| | | No | Yes | Total |
| Identification | Turk | 5 | **0** | 5 |
| | Turkish Citizen | 2 | **0** | 2 |
| | Immigrant from FY | 7 | **3** | 10 |
| | Albanian and Turk | 34 | **2** | 36 |
| | Albanian | 16 | **1** | 17 |
| Total | | 64 | **6** | 70 |

| Table 4. Controlling for membership to Yabul Çişta Association | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Count | | | | | |
| | | | Mem. To Rumeli Turks Association | | |
| Identification | | | No | Yes | Total |
| Turk | Mem. Yabul Çişta Assoc. | No | 5 | | 5 |
| | Total | | 5 | | 5 |
| Turkish Citizen | Mem. Yabul Çişta Assoc. | No | 2 | | 2 |
| | Total | | 2 | | 2 |
| Immigrant from FY | Mem. Yabul Çişta Assoc. | No | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| | Total | | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| Albanian and Turk | Mem. Yabul Çişta Assoc. | No | 30 | 2 | 32 |
| | | Yes | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| | Total | | 34 | 2 | 36 |
| Albanian | **Mem. Yabul Çişta Assoc.** | No | 15 | 0 | 15 |
| | | **Yes** | **1** | **1** | 2 |
| | Total | | 16 | 1 | 17 |

| Table 5. Controlling for Membership to All Rumeli Association | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Count | | | | | |
| | | | Mem. To Rumeli Turks Association | | |
| Identification | | | No | Yes | Total |
| Turk | Mem. To All Rumeli Assoc. | No | 4 | | 4 |
| | | Yes | 1 | | 1 |
| | Total | | 5 | | 5 |
| Turkish Citizen | Mem. To All Rumeli Assoc. | No | 2 | | 2 |
| | Total | | 2 | | 2 |
| Immigrant from FY | Mem. To All Rumeli Assoc. | No | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| | | Yes | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| | Total | | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| Albanian and Turk | Mem. To All Rumeli Assoc. | No | 13 | 0 | 13 |
| | | Yes | 21 | 2 | 23 |
| | Total | | 34 | 2 | 36 |
| **Albanian** | **Mem. To All Rumeli Assoc.** | No | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| | | **Yes** | **8** | **1** | 9 |
| | Total | | 16 | 1 | 17 |