DEVIATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICIES OF REVOLUTIONARY STATES: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF IRAN AND CHINA

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

A vast literature can be found on the relationship between revolution and war (Walt, DeFronzo, Conge, Maoz), yet works covering how, when and why changes in foreign policies of revolutionary states occur are few (see Sadri). Given that many revolutionary states have been key actors of the international system in the last hundred years, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind the changes in their foreign policy. This study examines the reasons of deviation from the original foreign policy principles of the revolutionary era and analyses the cases of China and Iran through the comparative case study method as well as process-tracing. This study argues that factionalization within revolutionary elites, economic and military insufficiencies, and national interests are among the internal reasons which cause revolutionary states to depart from their ideological foreign policy principles. Furthermore, it is also argued that as a strong external factor, geopolitical situation of a revolutionary state at a particular time has the ability to influence the magnitude of deviations, yet unable to constitute an independent variable on its own. Consequently, deviations increase the susceptibility of the revolution and its ideology to internal and external threats. The deviations result in the foreign policy tenets set by the revolutionary ideology to be increasingly untenable.

Keywords: Iran, China, revolution, foreign policy, deviation

ÖZET

Devrim ve savaş arasındaki bağıntı üzerine geniş bir literatüre rastlanmasına rağmen (Walt, DeFronzo, Conge, Maoz), devrim yapmış ülkelerin dış politikalarında meydana gelen değişikliklerin nasıl, ne zaman ve neden ortaya çıktıklarını inceleyen çalışmaların sayısı oldukça azdır (Sadri). Son yüzyıl içerisinde devrim yapmış ülkelerin bir çoğunun uluslararası sistemin önemli aktörleri arasında oldukları düşünüldüğünde, bu ülkelerin dış politikalarında meydana gelen değişimin nedenlerinin araştırılmasının önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışma devrim yapmış ülkelerin benimsedikleri dış politika prensiplerinden devrim sonrasında sapmalarının nedenlerini incelemekte ve bunu İran ve Çin vakaları üzerinde karşılaştırmalı vaka metodu ve süreç gözlemleme ile yapmaktadır. Bu çalışma devrimci elitler arasında ortaya çıkan hizipçilik, ekonomik ve askeri yetersizlikler, ve milli çıkarların devrim yapmış ülkelerin ideoloji bazlı dış politika prensiplerinden sapmalarına neden olduklarını tartışmaktadır. Ayrıca, önemli bir dış faktör olarak devrim yapmış bir ülkenin jeopolitik durumunun da meydana gelen sapmaların artırmasına neden olduğu bu çalışma kapsamında tartışılmaktadır, ancak bu faktör tek başına bağımsız bir değişken olarak ortaya çıkmamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, dış politikada oluşan sapmalar bir devrimi ve bu devrimle birlikte gelen ideolojiyi iç ve dış tehditlere karşı savunmasız hale getirmektedir. Bu sapmalar devrim ideolojisiyle belirlenen dış politika değerlerini de zamanla olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İran, Çin, devrim, dış politika, sapma

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GLOSSARY

Aleem	: a scholar of Islamic law.
Ayatollah	: a high ranking Shiite religious leader whose authority extends from religious law to politics.
Bazaari	: a merchant of a bazaar, the traditional marketplace in Iran.
Bonyad	: national charity organizations in Iran.
Faqih	: an expert of Islamic jurisprudence.
Fatwa	: a legal opinion or decree issued by an Islamic scholar.
Fuqaha	: plural of faqih.
Imam	: one who leads prayers in a mosque; in Shia Islam, an imam is an authority on Islamic law and is recognized as a guide.
Majlis	: parliament.
Mardom	: people.
Mojahedin-e Khalq	: people's crusaders; an Islamic socialist organization.
Mouhalif	: opponent.
Mujtahid	: a learnt Islamic lawyer who practices ijtihad (technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Quran and the Sunnah).
Mullah	: a low-ranking Muslim cleric.
Mustakbarin	: oppressed.
Mustazafin	: oppressor.
Novin	: modern.
Rahbar	: guide.
Rastakhiz	: resurgence.
Shah	: king.
Sharia	: the sacred law of Islam.
Shia	: follower; the second largest sect of Islam whose believers are the followers of Imam Ali.

Sunni	: the largest sect of Islam whose believers accept the first four caliphs as the successors of prophet Mohammad.
Tabaqa	: class.
Tudeh	: mass.
Ulama	: plural of aleem.
Umma	: Muslim community.
Velayet-e Faqih	: guardianship of the Islamic jurists.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Question

There is one common point to which both academics and statesmen pay attention when foreign policies of revolutionary states are considered. This common point is the tendency to evaluate foreign policy decisions of a revolutionary state with regard to an ideology according to which it undertakes to formulate its foreign policy. Here, the question is how much it is accurate to expect a revolutionary state to pursue a foreign policy consistent with ideological tenets. In other words, it is observed that after some time passes over a revolution, a gap begins to occur between ideology and foreign policy decisions of the revolutionary state. The revolutionary Chinese condemnation of the capitalist system in 1949 and the state's market regulations in the 1970s can be interpreted as China's compliance with the capitalist order and constitutes one component of the gap between its ideology and actual foreign policy implementation. Another example is the Islamic Iran's pledge to support (which they perceive as) the oppressed Muslims all around the world, yet opening its airspace to the American forces in 2002 during the invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign policy decision makers of revolutionary states fail to maintain a parallel line between their theoretical –isms and decisions which correspond to realities in domestic and external politics. Therefore, this thesis aims to find reasons why deviations occur in foreign policies of revolutionary states. More specifically, what internal and

external factors cause a revolutionary state to deviate from the basic rules and principles in its foreign policy which it acknowledges right after the revolution?

Studies on foreign policies of revolutionary states have so far focused on the relation between revolution and war, examining reasons for initiation or involvement of revolutionary states in conflicts. Other than this, studies on revolutionary foreign policies are done in a dispersed fashion in that revolutionary states' foreign policies are analyzed on a case-by-case basis, rather focusing only on the leadership factor by following certain time cycles while at the same time downgrading the importance of other internal and external factors. Moreover, mainly in developing countries, states lack a clear division between the legislative and the executive, and the power on foreign policy is rather vested in leaders. Therefore, study of foreign policy of such states deserves a significant amount of attention. However, currently existing theories of foreign policy (which are discussed in the following chapter) are rather applicable to the analytical studies of foreign policies of developed states. Contrary to this, most revolutionary states are developing countries, and foreign policy theories at hand, thus, fall short of either understanding foreign policy decision making processes in revolutionary states, or analyzing their foreign policy decisions.

Furthermore, considering the general pattern of closure of communication channels between a revolutionary state and its ideologically targeted enemies in a short time following a revolution, statesmen in the latter group become too much concerned with the ideological threat perceived from the former. This situation further deepens the rift between the two blocs and causes an exaggeration in the interpretation of the ideological threat, leaving the statesmen of the enemy side with a 'fixed revolutionary

image'. While there may be better policy options to benefit from, statesmen's evaluation of a revolutionary state within strictly ideological terms render such options almost impossible.

Organski (1968) argues in the theory of power transition that states experience power transition in three stages[1] (the stage of potential power, transitional growth, and maturity level). The number of states decreases as states go from one stage to another, approaching the power maturity level. Accordingly, as states become more powerful, they also become the states that make the rules of the international order. Therefore, Organski also argues that states can be considered along satisfied and dissatisfied lines. Contrary to what it can be considered as powerful and dominant states, those states that are yet to reach the second and third stages of power transition, unless effectively unified, have little power to influence or challenge the *status quo*. Many of such states are dissatisfied nations whereas the number of satisfied (*status quo*) states is less than that of the dissatisfied (revisionist) ones.

In this regard, states which underwent revolution can be considered as part of the dissatisfied camp because they perceive that the international order is not equitable in the distribution of resources. Considering that revolutionary states are either at stage one or two of their power transition, their dissatisfaction basically stems from economic discontent and financial restraints. Regardless of the source of such issues (internal or external), because a revolutionary state has claims that go beyond its territorial boundaries, it usually also creates and names "enemies" outside who are responsible for their problems.

[1] The theory of power transition and the stages are explained and discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.

Thus, this study is going to look for elements that suggest the acceptance of the international order. One such remarkable element is efforts to establish, or establishment of ties with the ideologically perceived enemies. While blaming one or more states of the satisfied camp for the ills that caused problems for a state that experienced revolution, a revolutionary state builds its strength and credibility at home as well as outside on the challenge it creates. Such revolutionary state, as a result, pledges to back its claims until its efforts to export the revolution prove to be successful, and the international order into which it is born is revised. However, when the same state with such claims starts to comply with the *status quo* states, this becomes an action worth noting while analyzing deviations in its foreign policy. Other similar elements are joining intergovernmental organizations that reflect values of the international order such as in economic terms (e.g., membership in World Trade Organization) or political alignments and cooperation with key powerful members of the satisfied camp. In this regard, a deviation in a revolutionary state can be considered as accepting crucial aspects of the international order of the era. The distinguishing feature of a deviation is the violation of basic ideological principles of a developing revolutionary state in its foreign policy. Despite the fact that non-revolutionary states also do acknowledge foreign policy tenets that are special to their states rather than vague and general principles as being "non-revisionism", their violation, it is argued in this work, may not pose a challenge to the survival of their regime. In other words, for a non-revolutionary state, it is easier to justify the reasons of an unexpectedly contradictory move in foreign policy, which, in the best case, results in the continuation of that policy, or in the worst case, causes a change in the ruling elite (i.e. early elections). Yet, for a revolutionary state, the *raison d'être* is basically its revolutionary ideology, and when deviations occur repeatedly, the revolutionary "soul" of that state dies. Thus, this

sort of a situation brings about questioning the revolutionary character of the state, if not an abrupt end to its existence. To sum up, deviations occur if and when a revolutionary state abandons its revolutionary foreign policy principles.

To conclude, the aim of this thesis is not only to contribute to the current literature of international relations by serving as a starting point topic, but also to initiate and/or deepen ignored approaches to evaluations of deviations in foreign policy outcomes of revolutionary states, which may serve as a basis for foreign policy making prescriptions.

1.2 Methodology of the Study

The complexity of the research question of this study definitely bears the hardship of the study, yet at the same time helps evade some of the critiques it is likely to face. As the research question more or less signifies, the thesis basically utilizes case study method. The most appropriate method that allows me to resolve the question of deviation and why it occurs, as well as to make a combination of induction and deduction is the case study method.

Working inductively in the case of Iran first as a separate chapter, each significant foreign policy decision is taken under consideration while examining them against the ideological principles of foreign policy. Utilizing induction helps to infer independent variables and develop hypotheses that explain why observed deviations occur in the foreign policy of a revolutionary state. This thesis then continues deductively, examining and testing the hypotheses in the case of China. Last but not least, both of these cases retain “intrinsic importance” for the consequences of their foreign policy deviations are

likely to have important consequences for their respective citizens, and in the broader sense, for the course of relations among states (van Evera, 1997: 86-87).

There are further reasons why Iran and China were chosen as the two revolutionary cases of this study. In order to make a categorization, two criteria are set on which to base the selection of case. First, for a revolutionary state to which the theory of this study can apply, it should be neither a superpower nor a small state which barely affects the region it exists. Based on the assumption that a small state's foreign policy may be constantly subject to influences coming from stronger actors, it will be very difficult for such a state to follow up its foreign policy principles independently. In such a case, the small state may demonstrate greater levels of foreign policy deviations whose reasons we seek to explain will substantially depend on internal reasons, thus leaving almost no room for us to study external reasons. Moreover, in contrast to a small state, a superpower is assumed to be capable of avoiding serious foreign policy deviations. This situation will reduce the number and/or frequent occurrence of deviations to be identified and explained. Therefore, it is significant that revolutionary states in scope are powerful and sovereign enough in their foreign policies to influence and to react to the regional and international events. This can be found not just in diplomatic, but also economic, political and military policies of regional powers. In this regard, both China and Iran were regional powers at the time of their revolutions. The Chinese revolution occurred only in the early years of the Cold War and was itself a sufficient incident to alarm the Western camp for its effects could bear the spread of communism into Asia. The Islamic revolution, on the other hand, dramatically affected the regional and international balances, such as the dissolution of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO – formed by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan

and Britain in 1955) with the withdrawal of Iran in 1979. Otherwise, for a revolutionary state that is constantly dominated and directed by greater power(s), external factors to be sought in this study would outweigh domestic ones, finally rendering the revolutionary character of the state under observation meaningless. Second criterion is that the revolutionary state to be studied must be a developing country which aims modernization in particularly industrial, technological and military realms. This is because a developed revolutionary state can usually find more room to maneuver in foreign policy than a developing one, it could easily refrain from deviation. In this sense, China and Iran fit the second benchmark of developing states. Given that there are few to no revolutions in developed countries, this is not a problematic criterion.

Both cases of this thesis are selected based on antecedent condition rather than on a dependent variable. Selecting on the dependent variable can become a serious problem because even though all the independent variables are present in a case study, the dependent variable may be absent. The antecedent of this study is that while the effects of certain factors on deviational foreign policy outcomes of states are observed, the states in scope are composed of ones that experienced revolutions. In other words, for the applicability of the theory this thesis is going to develop, states to be observed must be revolutionary states. In addition, it should also be noted that since international politics contain countless actors, agencies and internal and external, controllable and uncontrollable factors that are in constant interaction with each other, it is not feasible to get a fully valid result out of either large-n or case studies.

Moreover, both Mill's method of difference and process-tracing in this study are employed and whether the intervening variables which link the putative mechanisms and

observed effect move in the direction as predicted by the hypotheses offered are found out. Mill's method of difference suggests that "cases with similar general characteristics are chosen", but values on the study variable differ (van Evera, 1997: 57). Therefore, Mill's method of difference allows researcher "to establish the effects of the study variable" by asking "if its values correspond across cases with values on variables that define its possible effects" (van Evera, 1997: 57). However, the method of difference is weak method because similarity among cases undermines the likelihood of a strong explanation of the third variables (van Evera, 1997: 57). For this reason, process-tracing is conducted as it "attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes" with the aim of finding evidences "in the sequence and values of the intervening variables" (George & Bennett, 2005: 6). Making use of intervening variables not only assures the continuity and completeness of the study, but also helps us understand the interconnection between the hypotheses formed by different independent variables.

1.3 Outline of the Study

Of the remaining four chapters, the following one is the literature review on revolution and foreign policy analysis. In the part of revolution, the aim is to understand the process and outcome of a revolution by posing a few key questions. These questions will be utilized in the cases of Iran and China in order to figure out the principles of their foreign policies. Next in the same chapter comes foreign policy analysis literature. This part focuses on inadequacy of the existing literature while at the same time laying out a

theoretical framework to follow in addressing foreign policy deviations of revolutionary states.

In the third chapter, starting from the late Qajar era to the demise of Mohammad Reza Shah a brief historical background on Iran takes place and the aforementioned questions formed in the second chapter are consequently answered as the chapter moves on to its core part, namely the Islamic revolution and beyond. When the ideology of the new state and its foreign policy principles are identified, the chapter offers a comprehensive study of the Iranian foreign policy between 1979 and 2010, and therefore includes both deviational and non-deviational foreign policy decisions of Iran. Also, a number of hypotheses are stated at the end of the chapter.

The fourth chapter examines the Chinese foreign policy from 1949 until 1990s. Although this chapter is condensed in its historical background in comparison to the case of Iran, it is nevertheless concerned with understanding communist China's foreign policy tenets. Once these tenets are identified, different than Iranian case, the remaining parts of this chapter focus only on key foreign policy events most of which demonstrate deviations.

The last chapter of the thesis offers an overall analysis of hypotheses that explain the reasons of deviational foreign policy decisions found in the Iranian and the Chinese cases. Furthermore, after talking about weaknesses of the study, the chapter concludes by underlining the contribution it made to the study of revolutionary states' foreign policies, as well as offering policy recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONTENT

The literature review below contains two areas of research. While the first one is given under the rubric "revolution", the second one discusses a variety of works on foreign policy, ideology, revolutionary states' relative position in the international realm and stance towards the international order (*status quo* or not), and finally makes also inferences from the literature on revolution and war. Considering that there is no sufficient direct literature which is only on foreign policies of revolutionary states in terms of deviations, it is necessary to juxtapose these separate research areas.

2.1 Revolution

This section of literature review has two primary aims. One goal is to understand, but not discuss in detail what a revolution is and what it is not. The reason a comprehensive discussion of revolutions in this work is not undertaken is twofold. What matters for this thesis is not what a revolution is, but rather what outcome a particular revolution bears, since it is concerned with post-revolutionary foreign policy making. Second reason, however stems from the fact that even though a number of scholars (Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979, 1992; Keddie, 1981; Goldstone, 1991; Goodwin, 2001; Foran (ed), 1997; Foran et al., 2008) have so far studied revolutions, a consensus on the identification of revolutions is far from coming into being (Zahedi, 2001).

Another goal of the literature review on revolutions, which will guide us in the following chapters, is how to utilize the process of a revolution and its outcome for the study of foreign policy deviations. Therefore this section is divided by four main questions that are posed so as to obtain a better understanding of revolutionary states and the foreign policy principles they will adopt. With each question answered in the light of the works by scholars of revolution, it is aimed to create a framework within which foreign policy principles of revolutionary states can be found out and interpreted. All in all, the answers will also generate the definition of revolution. Based on the assumption that the incumbent rulers in an existing state are no longer capable of solving problems, the questions are stated below.

The first and foremost riddle to answer is on the composition of the contenders. Who are the actual contenders within a state to revolt against the state apparatus? According to Charles Tilly (1993: 8-9), the contenders appear at a mere in two separate blocs which might be "single actors" who usually are comprised of "coalition among rulers" or "members [of an incumbent polity] and / or challengers". Tilly (1993: 9) also underlines that when the revolutionary movement begins, the culmination of discontent also spreads even to non-contenders, because of the incompetence of state to preserve the interests of its citizens.

When the incumbent polity is no longer capable of performing its duties, not only the legitimacy of that polity starts to be questioned, but also the sovereignty of the state comes under serious question. The loss of sovereignty causes "multiple sovereignty" and this happens because the state, no longer behaving as a sovereign entity, loses control

over its institutions. According to Tilly (1993:10), multiple sovereignty occurs under three different circumstances:

> when (1) members of a previously subordinate polity (e.g. Lithuania within the Soviet Union of 1990) assert sovereignty, (2) when non-ruling contenders mobilize into a bloc successfully exerting control over some portion of the state, and (3) when an existing polity fragments into two or more blocs, each exercising control over some significant part of the state.

Therefore, in multiple sovereignty, two or more blocs that are consisted of the already ruling polity as well as one group of the contenders (the polity or mobilization group) make strong, "incompatible claims to control the state or to be the state" (Tilly, 1993: 10).

From a need to make a more precise assumption on the identification of the contenders, Theda Skocpol criticizes Tilly. For Skocpol, Tilly's "multiple sovereignty", together with the polity and mobilization models are too vague (Skocpol, 1994: 104 – 110). Contending that revolutions are not made by "some homogeneous type of individual behavior, [but] rather they are complex conjunctures of unfolding conflicts involving differently situated and motivated groups", Skocpol draws our attention to what those "differently situated and motivated groups" can be (1994: 104). In order to detect the contenders, Skocpol also criticizes Karl Marx's argument that "the most economically advanced social transformations of a given mode of production" are susceptible to revolutionary movements (Skocpol, 1994: 122). She justifies her critique by refreshing our memories of the French Revolution and revolutions that occurred onwards. Skocpol rightly underlines (1994:122) that those revolutions did not occur in the economically advanced countries as Marx claims, but occurred in "predominantly agrarian countries where capitalist relations of production were only barely or moderately developed". Moreover, revolutions were aimed "against dominant landed classes and/or colonial or

neo-colonial regimes, not against capitalists", with revolutionary leadership never coming from the group who controlled the means of production (Skocpol, 1994: 123 – 124). Hence, contenders should be sought within agrarian states. Skocpol argues (1994: 127) that a revolt against the landlords by the peasantry needs to take place for a revolution to be successful. Notwithstanding, she also underlines that the peasantry on its own is not capable of organizing "parties and armies, but rather incorporate into them. What makes difference is the outcome –whether the new state, or regime is more central, bureaucratic, and the degree of socio-economic stratification is high or not" (Skocpol, 1994: 127). In other words, Skocpol claims that peasantry makes up one component of the contenders, and unless the peasantry incorporates into organized contender groups, their cause cannot be voiced. In addition, Skocpol also argues (1994: 123 – 124) that it is not necessarily the class struggles or class forces which make the revolutions, but revolutions may also come from above, carried out by military political elites (i.e. the Meiji Restoration in Japan).

Another scholar to label revolutions as mass and elite revolutions is Walt (1997). Even though Walt's focus is not directly on how revolutions occur, he briefly mentions that in a mass revolution, there are "individuals or groups that were marginalized or excluded under the old order" while in an elite revolution, the contenders are composed of military or civil bureaucrats who were a part of the old regime (Walt, 1997: 12 – 13). Walt's work, therefore, does not help one specify who the contenders of a mass revolution actually are. What can be derived from his grouping of revolutions is that a mass movement is not necessarily the only determinant to call the outcome a revolution. As long as a current regime is replaced with another one, regardless of the statuses of the contenders, the result is a revolution.

Goldstone et al.'s work "Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century" brings a new synthesis to the literature on revolutions. Goldstone et al. discusses (1991: 30) that social revolutions both in early modern Europe and in the late twentieth century were made as a result of urban unrest, criticizing Skocpol (1994) for her emphasis on "peasant-driven social revolutions". Moreover, the book emphasizes that the role of ideology would diminish without especially mass support, be it mass- or urban-based, in which case the revolutionary movement is at risk.

To sum up, the above cited scholars have commonalities in defining contenders who take place in a revolutionary movement. The main common point is that these contenders are either a fraction of the existing ruling elite, or a group among ordinary citizenry who are excluded from the policy making mechanisms of their respective state. Thus, the answer to the first question, namely the identification of contenders, will automatically help one examine (a) by which group the revolutionary leadership is held, (b) with which other revolutionary movement supporters the revolutionaries are likely to side[2], and to a certain extent, (c) what ideology the new ruling elite is likely to adopt. An attention to these three elements will bring us one step closer to the analysis of certain foreign policy principles of the revolutionary state.

The second question in analyzing a revolution, again common to these scholars, has been what revolutionary contenders are discontent with. Tilly's work (1993) falls

[2] If there is a coalition of revolutionary leaders from different societal realms, the proximity of their interests together with the dependency relationship between them in terms of access to and extraction of state resources, serve as another clue to predict whether or not their alliance will be maintained had the revolutionary movement been successful. With regard to their interests and resources they derive their power from, what type of regime and ideology the new revolutionary state is likely to be founded upon and correspondingly, the principles to serve as the basis of a new foreign policy can also be identified and understood better.

short of any comprehensive explanation in regard to this question. Tilly states (1993: 237) that:

> Revolutionary situations appeared most frequently in one or more of three circumstances: (1) when discrepancies increased sharply and visibly between what states demanded of their best-organized citizens and what they could induce those citizens to deliver; (2) when states made demands on their citizens that threatened strong collective identities or violated rights attached to those identities; and (3) when the power of rulers visibly diminished in the presence of strong competitors.

What are the exact kinds of discrepancies widely seen in revolutionary situations, and what sort of demands made by a state may resent its citizens are left unexplained by Tilly. This is important because root causes of a discontent which is, in a short time, embodied in the form of a revolutionary movement have substantial points to reveal us in order to fathom why, in a post-revolutionary state, particular foreign policy parameters are embraced, and hence, what type of foreign policy behavior we should expect from that state.

By arguing that revolutionary movements occur in agrarian states situated in disadvantaged positions within developing world capitalism, Skocpol's work signals (1994: 121 – 127) that political and economic matters are the bases of discrepancies between state and the contenders. While Walt is more concerned with the revolutionary outcome and does not specify conditions that lead to a revolution, Goldstone et al. (1991: 30 – 37) denotes the significance of constant economic distress which cannot be avoided by the ruling elite. The various sources of such discontent are also observed in Goldstone et al. (1991), and they range from the influence of superpowers to political and economic corruption. Similar to Goldstone et al., DeFronzo also states that disturbance of contenders stems from economic problems (1996: 11). These can be as such: "a rapid deterioration in material living conditions. . . a neocolonial type of political and cultural

dependency, and economic exploitation [by even a former colonizer]" (DeFronzo, 1996: 11 – 15). Furthermore, DeFronzo also argues (1996: 14) that the most popular unifying motivation that provided the base for extensive cross-class participation in a revolutionary movement has usually been "nationalism", or "the developments of widespread hatred toward a particular dictatorship". With these points in DeFronzo's arguments, dissatisfaction of the revolutionary masses stems either from loss of independence of the incumbent polity to a colonial power or from the rule of dictatorial governance. In conclusion, crucial levels of deterioration in politico-economic conditions, either due to foreign exploitation or internal corruption are the sum of reasons of mass discontent, whereas a state's inability to fulfill its obligations and thus, occurrence of "multiple sovereignty" are further and indirect reasons of that discontent. A careful examination of both who the contenders are and why they are discontent reveals additional information that can be used to assess the nature and foreign policy direction of the revolutionary state.

The third point to pay attention is who (externally) supports the revolutionaries and what the contenders promise those supporters (if any)? As stated above, revolutionary movements occur in societies whose problems can no longer be resolved by the incumbent ruling polity. However, any foreign support received by either the revolutionaries to advance their movement, or the existing state officials to suppress the revolutionary movement will be a factor influencing the new foreign policy once the movement is successful.

Although scholars of revolution do not pay particular attention to examining if any foreign support is received by the revolutionary contenders, pausing for a moment at this point and looking for an answer to this question is important for a smoother analysis of a

revolutionary state's ideologically formed foreign policy tenets. To be more precise, let us take a brief look at the two cases of this study in terms of foreign support received throughout the revolutionary movements that took place. In the case of Iran, the two major contenders in the revolution, namely the clergy and the merchants, neither were supported by another state –be it another Islamic state like Saudi Arabia, the anti-American Soviet Union, or any neutral member of the movement of the non-aligned states, nor were the Iranian revolutionaries challenged overtly and directly by any other country. However, albeit ideological interpretation differences between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviets had been supporting the Chinese communists since the 1920s all the way to 1949. As a result of this and compounded with the pre-revolutionary relations of these states with the others, new revolutionary foreign policy lines were formulated accordingly. While Tehran took a strong anti-American stance, Beijing chose to "lean to one side", which was the side of Moscow.

The fourth point to observe is the revolutionary outcome. It is the fourth question that can supplement the insights of a revolutionary foreign policy making, the ideology which forms it, and the instruments to be employed in its implementation. Summarizing Skocpol's findings on outcomes of revolutions, Goldstone et al. (1991: 28) states:

> social revolutions will result in a state where, one, internally the regimes are relatively autonomous, two, externally these regimes are stronger compared to their competitors, three, the revolutionary regimes have incorporated peasants and workers more than the old regimes, and four, the revolutionary regimes are more centralized and bureaucratic than the old regimes.

In comparison to the inability and weakness of the old state, the new, revolutionary state that secured mass support from the society naturally proves to be more autonomous domestically, and more successful in averting challenges against it. This autonomy along with the support and enthusiasm of revolutionary movement also indicates that the new

regime is perceived to be stronger by other states for the reasons stated in the next section. In addition, due to the necessity of controlling and oppressing the dissidents, the revolutionary state builds strong institutions.

Creating a state with stronger institutions nurtured with new notions, values, and ideology is also emphasized by Sadri (1997), Walt (1997), and Goldstone et al. (1991). By defining revolutions as "forceful attempts by the masses to bring about radical changes to the sociopolitical values, institutional system, and leadership in a short period of time", Sadri's emphasis on "radical changes" is remarkable in the sense that it also indicates the creation of a stronger and institutionally centralized state (Sadri, 1997: 10).

Walt argues (1997: 12) that revolution is not simply "the destruction of an existing state by members of its own society", but "the creation of a new political order". He also underlines that we need to bear in mind the fact that with a revolution, "a different set of values, myths, social classes, political institutions, and conceptions of the political community that leads the society to establishing a new polity" (state, regime) are also created (Walt, 1997: 12). This argument of Walt is compatible with that of Goldstone et al. (1991: 30) which emphasizes "the role of ideologies in revolutionary struggles and observes that the kind of ideology espoused by revolutionary leaders has a decisive impact on the kind of state reconstruction that is attempted after the failure of the old regime". In this regard, only the outcome of a revolutionary movement can show us what ideology exactly is in operation.

To sum up, it is concluded that a revolution is a purposive event in the sense that masses discontent with the incumbent regime aims to replace it with another. Although masses are not necessarily informed about the content of the revolutionary ideology in

detail, they gather around a unifying issue, value, or sentiment. Of the masses taking part in a revolutionary movement, one or more groups in fact compose the leading figures of the political game. Finally, a revolutionary movement brings about a new polity with the breakdown of administrative and coercive powers of the old state in the name of defending that society's interests *vis-à-vis* the sources of mass discontent.

2.2 Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy analysis digs into the question of why a particular decision is taken rather than what decision is taken. The ever grown field of foreign policy analysis contains both foreign policy decision making as a process itself and outcomes. While this thesis takes deviational foreign policy decisions as a starting point, it traces back to reasons explaining reasons of those decisions made. Most foreign policy literature, however, is written on developed countries. Of the models of foreign policy decision making (rational, bureaucratic, and pluralist), rational model offers a straightforward process in which state, as the unitary actor, identifies the problem, sets goals, evaluates policy options, and after analyzing costs and benefits, takes action. In bureaucratic model (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), actors with different interests "bargain" and a decision is made which is eventually in favor of the most powerful hand among bureaucratic players. In the pluralist model of foreign policy making, bargaining between interest groups, multinational corporations, public opinion and mass movements takes place.

These models are difficult to apply in analyzing foreign policy decisions of third world states because foreign policy in developing states are rather made by leaders than institutions. This is so because even in "democratic" third world countries, notions of democracy and freedom are weakly exercised. As a result of this reality, which is also

acknowledged and emphasized by a number of scholars (Ayoob, 1995; Sadri, 1997), actors in foreign policy making scene will be studied from a faction-based perspective especially while analyzing the foreign policy of Iran. The reason for doing so is because:

> Individual-level theories focus on decision makers in order to understand how an individual's belief system, the way an individual perceives, interprets, and processes information about an international situation, and idiosyncratic personal attributes explain foreign policy choices (Gerner, 1995: 24).

In other words, because this study is primarily concerned with why an ideology is abandoned over time in a revolutionary foreign policy, but not why and how an actor perceives his environment as it is regardless of, or without a significant focus on ideology, psychological / cognitive studies that focus on an individual leader's foreign policy choices are left out of the scope of this work. Rather, factions in a revolutionary state in terms of their approach towards foreign policy will be in focus because "a concentration of power … is rarely absolute [even in the hands of the most authoritarian leader]. While in stable authoritarian states leaders do not usually compete with autonomous centres of power … they are often constrained by the existence of political factionalism from within the ruling regime itself" (Webber and Smith, 2002: 72). Therefore, according to a faction based approach, the focus is on groups of individuals (statesmen, consultants, businessmen) who are likely to influence foreign policy decision making process and outcomes.

To briefly mention what is thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, two main factions are in scope. The reason for restricting factions to only two groups is because revolutionary principles are usually vaguely stated, and thus are open to different interpretations. It would be a futile attempt to search for more factions and understand if they offer ends compatible with ideology since justification of another interpretation of

revolutionary ideology is a matter of how words are stated, not what is done in foreign policy. Thus, all factions are going to look revolutionary if they wish to survive within the regime, but differ in their deviational or non-deviational decisions. These are the radicals (hardliners) and moderates in a revolutionary state. While both of these factions may be equally pragmatic, their views with regard to foreign policy largely differ. Radicals are the revolutionaries themselves and also usually the first generation revolutionaries. They create and follow ideological foreign policies even though deviations from the ideology may still be observed. Moderates, however, more often appear at the foreign policy realm in the second and further generations. That is not to say that there are no moderate politicians among the first generation revolutionary elites. They may be there, yet their active role in politics does not come out until the consolidation of revolutionary state is complete internally and externally. The moderate faction's foreign policy choices are not as much in line with ideology as those of radicals. They are more open to the outside world in that their stance towards other states is more accommodative, which this time is in a contradictory position in the face of the ideological principles. To sum up, considering the diverging approaches of factions toward foreign policy, it is more important to focus on them rather than single individuals.

Nevertheless, as far as this thesis is concerned, Organski's theory of power transition (1968) provides the study of revolutionary states' foreign policies with a framework. The main function of the framework is to determine relative position of revolutionary states in the international system and their stance towards the international order. According to the power transition theory, there are three stages of power transition that a preindustrial state will go through. In the first stage, that is the stage of potential power, a state is not industrial, technologically backward, with a rapidly growing

population governed by inefficient state institutions. One important factor that will influence stage two of transitional growth is the population size of that state. As the state begins to industrialize, for an increase in productivity and gross national product, a larger population appears as a key determinant. The relative growth of a small size population cannot be equal to that of a few times larger population. All in all, in the second stage, the state begins to experience a rapid increase in industrialization, urbanization, governmental efficiency level, and wealth. Additionally, in international politics, the state's ability to influence other states also increases. In the third and the last stage of power transition, the state reaches power maturity level, and continues increasing its wealth and population size, albeit rather quietly. Therefore, relative power of the state at the maturity level begins to decline because other states in the international system do not stand still and they also continue to develop.

Due to Organski's pyramid of states, there are five groups according to their relative power to each other. The pyramid is composed of a dominant nation, great powers, middle powers, small powers and dependencies. Furthermore, these states are categorized in four groups with a curve cutting off the pyramid, to show stance of each group of states towards the international order. The aim of the curve is to make the distinction between the powerful and satisfied, the powerful and dissatisfied, the weak and satisfied, and the weak and dissatisfied states. The powerful and satisfied nations include the dominant state and those great powers that are content with the already existing international order imposed by the dominant power. The powerful but dissatisfied states, however, are not yet powerful enough to influence the formation of the particular order they are unhappy with. The weak and satisfied states are composed of smaller states that still get their share from the international order, and agree with its rules, whereas in

the last place, the weak and dissatisfied, who are neither powerful enough to challenge the order, nor can receive their share from that order simply because they are the ones whose resources are being exploited by more powerful states (Organski, 1968: 368).

As far as revolutionary states in this study are concerned, first of all it is important to assess their position in the international system, and second, to try to understand their stance toward the international order whose rules are imposed upon them by taking into account the stage in which a state is. At first place, Organski's theory is helpful in that it helps us distinguish where the place of a revolutionary state is in the relative power pyramid of states. Furthermore, stages of power transition argument will guide this study in finding out whether revolutionary states are satisfied with the order or not because as the pyramid's pattern reveals, the number of dissatisfied states decreases at the higher levels of the pyramid. To put in more detail, revolutionary states are industrializing ones that have been either at the stage of potential power or transitional growth. Therefore, they are neither dominant nor great powers at the time of their revolutions, but rather they are either dependencies or middle and small powers.[3] Besides, contenders carry out revolutions usually because they are not only dissatisfied with the regime at home, but also are aiming to challenge the overall international order which they believe exploits their country and causes the decrease of state efficiency, wealth and speed of development. Indeed, Halliday's views (1999: 58, 62) support the latter argument that places revolutionary states among the dissatisfied states of the world order:

> When a revolutionary movement emerges, or comes to power, there certainly are often historical reasons for the internationalist character of revolutions: revolutionary movements, and their leaders, organisations and guiding principles, rarely have a purely national or country-specific origin … Paradoxically, we can

[3] As explained in the previous chapter, however, small states and dependencies will be left outside the scope of this study.

> say that the idea of revolution was international above all in that it proclaimed the abolition of the 'international', in the sense of differences between states or nations.

Therefore, internationalist claims of a revolution is one of the elements that makes it a revolution, and those claims are based upon the dissatisfaction of masses who were, prior to the revolution, ruled by a *status quo* regime which complied with the norms of the international setting. To take this argument one step further, Halliday's (1999: 204) points gathered in three ways in which repercussions of a revolution internationally take place and influence *status quo* states are important to study[4]:

> [a] Social and political movements respond to the fact, or perception, of revolution for domestic reasons. Such responses . . . affect the policies of other states . . . [b] the challenges posed by revolutions, and not least the costs and strains of counter-revolutionary policy, produce fissures within the status quo powers, at both popular and elite levels. [c] … revolutions destroy pre-existing alliances, and hence weaken the foreign policy of states.

Since one of the aims of a revolutionary state is to spread its word beyond its own borders, other states seek ways to avoid any opposition movement that is encouraged by the revolution. Moreover, policies in other states as to how to cope with the opposition movement and produce a counter-revolution becomes another problemmatique issue between the policy makers, and thus, precipitates diverging views. Finally, withdrawal of revolutionary states from large scale international organizations or even regional or bilateral commitments renders a margin in other states' foreign policies, which requires an assessment. To conclude, depending on if a revolutionary state deviated from its foreign policy principles, at which stage a revolutionary state is or if its rank in the overall

[4] However, the same argument on anti-status quo nature of revolutionary states cannot be made by bringing up the literature on revolution and war. Even though war or conflict may be seen as international consequences of revolutions, it is not always the revolutionary states who *initiate* the war or conflict (Maoz, 1989), and therefore, one cannot claim that post-revolutionary involvement in a conflict constitutes a proof of dissatisfaction with the international order.

pyramid has increased or decreased, the theory of power transition lets us assess whether the state should be expected to become satisfied at all or maintain revolutionary principles in its foreign policy. Although Organski's theory falls short of identifying the exact stance of a revolutionary state towards the international order because it offers a clear-cut model for the reasons explained below in light of Morgan and Palmer's theory, it helps us define deviations as well as make some analysis on possible behavior of revolutionary states. Moreover, considering that revolutionary states of this thesis are middle power states within the pyramid, these states are in stage two according to the power transition theory. Therefore, as Organski underlines (1968: 341-342), in stage two, industrial growth, efficient governments, productivity and gross national product increases take place, and the ability to influence other states' behavior increases. If revolutionary states in scope continue to demonstrate these better conditions, stage two of the power transition can be regarded as a phase in which revolutionary states become *status quo*, join more and more international organizations, and try to open channels of communication with major and especially dominant *status quo* states. Thus, Organski's theory is also useful in identifying deviations more easily by assessing changes that occur in a revolutionary state's stage of transitional growth in power.

Another work to give us insights on whether a state is content with the system and is going to pursue *status quo* policies or not is Morgan and Palmer's the two-good theory (2006). While underlining the impossibility of developing an overarching theory of foreign policy which encompasses every single foreign policy goal and decision, Morgan and Palmer take granted the two common foreign policy goals of states: they either want to maintain *status quo* or change it (Morgan and Palmer, 2006: 7). For the two-good theory, *status quo* is multidimensional and dynamic, and is explained as "a trend that is

generally (not necessarily universally) accepted to identify actors' anticipations on that [any particular] issue for the foreseeable future" (Morgan and Palmer, 2006: 24-25). Whereas in Organski's power transition theory, *status quo* is rather determined with a curve which places states either among the satisfied or dissatisfied, as a result of the multidimensional nature of *status quo* in Morgan and Palmer's theory, each state to a certain extent and relatively is satisfied and dissatisfied with the international order. What factors are likely to make states want to change or maintain *status quo* are "the environmental constraints" and "the preferences" of states (Morgan and Palmer, 2006: 28). Environmental constraints are out there in the form of resources for states, and when an increase occurs in resources, a state's ability to change the *status quo* increases (Morgan and Palmer, 2006: 28-30). However, resources a state can enjoy are not limitless and therefore, states are left with one of the two ways to follow: change or maintenance. What a state is likely to prefer, therefore, depends on "the distance between the *status quo* and the state's ideal point" and "the level of threat coming from other states" (Morgan and Palmer, 2006: 31). Taking into account the argument brought in by Halliday (1999) on the internationalist character or revolutions, it is concluded that still, revolutionary states must be regarded as anti-*status quo*, and as long as conditions (environmental constraints) allow them, they will try to remain loyal to their ideologies.

As discussed above, each revolution has an internationalist nature and aims at altering the *status quo* by exporting its values. While doing this, a revolutionary state announces its foreign policy from an ideological framework. According to Cassels (1996: 6):

> All ideological beliefs comprises a set of closely related ideas held by a group; we may speak of an individual's ideology but such a figure is either representative of, or claims to represent, communal interests. Ideological beliefs supply a broad

> interpretation of the human condition, 'a cognitive and moral map of the universe'.

Since an ideology is attributed to "a set of closely related ideas", and aims to make up a world that is in line with "a cognitive and moral map of the universe", the translation of an abstract, ideological foreign policy into the real world politics will not be without any modifications, or deviations. One reason that causes the difficulty for a revolutionary state in linking its ideology to the actual foreign policy decisions owes to the very intrinsic inadequacy of any ideology to have a flexible and crystal clear characteristic. Another reason is that an ideology does not address to the interests of a state. Inflexibility and vagueness (in terms of an ideology's being too broad) of an ideology makes it difficult for policy makers to follow, over time, consistent foreign policies that are also purely in line with the ideology while the exclusion of interests at times eradicates the possibility of making a foreign policy decision that can justify itself ideologically. As rightly underlined by Levi (1970: 6) who studies the link between ideology, interests and foreign policy:

> Ideologies are sets of values and beliefs. They are existing, ready, available in the minds of people. Values and many beliefs composing an ideology are generalized and evaluative. They are not merely quite distinct in nature from specific needs and wants [interests], they do not as a rule stimulate or originate wants and needs … They establish the quality of behavior that has been provoked by non-ideological reasons and aiming at non-ideological ends

Thus, an ideology becomes a paradoxical notion when it comes to the implementation of foreign policy and causes deviational moves for revolutionary states. Pardesi's study (1976: 30) on foreign policy of developing countries concludes that:

> For stable economic and social progress, they require a peaceful and cooperative world order which minimizes conditions of international conflict. On the other hand, in order to actualize political independence, it is necessary to restructure the international order … What really happens and will continue to happen is that the position of the developing countries will oscillate between cooperation and confrontation.

Thus, as developing countries, it is also expected from revolutionary states to follow either of these foreign policy lines. However, a broader analysis of why deviations occur, and why, even when ideology of a revolutionary state seems to be entirely abandoned, a sharp turn may be made to the revolutionary ideology will be made in the final chapter.

The restructuring of foreign policy for a revolutionary state particularly indicates that a disparate foreign policy from what it has been until the revolution will be followed. In other words, a revolution significantly alters the nature of the already established relations with the revolutionary state. What is for sure is that uncertainty prevails over the relations between the revolutionary state and others in the wake of a revolution (Conge, 1996: 23). The underlying reason of uncertainty specifically owes to the severance, or even the rapid breakup of diplomatic relations of the revolutionary state with the outside world. This situation produces misinformation since information is obtained through "testimony from self-interested exiles and revolutionary sympathizers" (Walt, 1997: 40). The misinformation, highly damaged channels of communication trigger "spirals of suspicion" not only for the others, but also for the revolutionary state (Walt, 1997: 33 – 37). The suspicion of the outside powers brings about a threat perception that may be based particularly on the ideology of the revolutionary state, as well as the mass support which backs the revolutionary leaders (Carter et al., 2009: 6). Finally, the suspicion of the revolutionary side about the others can be based on its own historical experience with specific states (Walt, 1997: 34), causing an increase in perceiving those as a threat to its revolution. To sum up, when a revolutionary movement is successful, the new state is born automatically into a crisis situation. When regarded unwelcome by the others, the same uncertainty and anxiety also encompasses the revolutionary state.

Works studying revolution and war (Walt, 1997; Maoz, 1989; Conge, 1996; Carter et al., 2009) far exceeds the number of studies on revolutionary states and foreign policy. Sadri's book "Revolutionary States, Leaders, and Foreign Relations" (1997) is one of the attempts to reduce this gap. Inserting a special emphasis on the leadership variable, Sadri (1997: 11) initially notes that "foreign policy in developed countries is often made by institutions whereas in developing countries made by the leaders." Moving on to the next stage, Sadri builds his explanations on two types of revolutionary leaders. These are the "idealists" who are divided into two other types as "revolutionary idealists" and "radical revolutionary idealists", and "revolutionary realists" (Sadri, 1997: 11 – 14). Of the two mainstream revolutionary typologies, Sadri defines the foreign policy making style of idealists in compatible terms with crisis-time style. Originally, his work is a comparative case study of China, Cuba, and Iran within the ideologically heterogeneous realm of non-aligned movement. Throughout his work, Sadri discusses that three stages in foreign policies of these revolutionary states have been observed: "a two-track policy", "a more conflictual policy"; and "a more conciliatory foreign policy". According to this classification, Sadri also introduces and emphasizes the international conjuncture as another variable which causes shifts in revolutionary foreign policy.

However, what Sadri basically explains is the reasons of shifts in revolutionary foreign policies, rather than the magnitude of those shifts, and its interpretation for the assessment of susceptibility of the revolution and its ideology to internal and external threats. Nevertheless, the works of scholars cited above are invaluable in offering this study a good starting point.

In conclusion, with an aim to understand and interpret the ideological foreign policy of a revolutionary state, this chapter on literature review began with a discussion

on four questions pertaining to a revolutionary movement and its outcome. Following this, in the foreign policy analysis section, the reasons why current foreign policy literature cannot be applied to the study of foreign policies of revolutionary states are laid down while emphasizing the importance of a focus on factional politics. Furthermore, it continued with a discussion of the power transition and the two-good theories that help us see the relative position of a revolutionary state within the international order. Since a revolutionary state is a developing country and because a revolution itself has an internationalist character, revolutions aim at altering the *status quo* into which they are born. Whether or not a revolutionary state is actually dissatisfied with the overall international order may remain as a dilemma given the reality of (a) constraints on their relative power, (b) of the ultimate inapplicability of an ideology to the realm of foreign policy. An in-depth discussion and analysis of these points will be made, however, in the conclusion chapter once reasons of foreign policy deviations are driven from the case studies or Iran and China. The next chapter follows with the case of Iran, its brief pre-revolutionary history, the Islamic revolution and the translation of the revolution's ideology into the foreign policy principles, and the three decades of revolutionary foreign relations. Finally, the chapter will be concluded with a number of hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN

3.1 Introduction

Today there is little doubt that foreign policy of Iran has remarkably taken a different shape than what it was in 1979. The Islamic Revolution was not only directed against the Pahlavi family, but also against almost the entire outside world, especially the Americans and the British as former supporters of the Shah and as the masses in Iran regarded them, the exploiters of Iran's national resources. True, as in any other revolution, that the rebellious masses of Iran were not structured homogenously either in terms of their interests or an ideology. However, what made them act with solidarity was the goal of uncrowning the Shah. When the revolutionary movement ended successfully, the clergy, "As revolutionaries first at home and then as reformers of the international system … justified their deviant [external] behavior in ideological terms" (Levi, 1970: 11). In the course of 30 years of the Islamic revolution's foreign policy, the Islamic ideology has remained the same whereas its interpretation and application in the realm of foreign policy could not prove to be immutable. Each violation of the Islamic ideological principles in foreign policy has come to mean another deviation in foreign policy and departure from the revolutionary character. Throughout the part of this chapter that looks at foreign policy decisions and moves of Iran, certain elements are sought. According to the theory of power transition, Iran is a country that is at the transitional growth stage with revisionist stance. At this stage, as noted by Organski (1968), a state is in the process of

industrialization, urbanization, and has a more developed governmental efficiency and wealth. Therefore, with further industrialization, urbanization, and wealth, Iran needs to open to the outside world in order to sustain its development. This can happen only either at the expense of its ideological principles, or in favor of them. Looking at the composition of the international order and states that are satisfied with the order of the post-1979 revolution until today, it appears that Iran has had no powerful ally with which it has shared its ideological objectives. Thus, not only challenging the *status quo* per se proves to be more difficult to afford for Iran, but also taking steps to ensure the country's development simultaneously becomes arduous due to different external pressures. Iran's reactions that occur in its foreign policies eventually forms the ways as to how the state undertakes to deal with challenges on its way. In this study, those ways are the elements according to which Iran's foreign policy deviations are evaluated. Most anticipated moves in its foreign policy, therefore, are its relations with its ideological enemies (considering that according to Khomeini, these were the United States (the US) in particular, and the non-Muslim West), trade talks with the European Union (EU) or memberships in the Western-led international organizations.

In this chapter, the past century of political history of Iran is studied to understand the roots of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and how the foreign policy of the revolutionary state was formulated in line with the Islamic values that constituted the base of the ideology of the republic and has deviated from those principles over time. Therefore, the following sections first cover the years between late 1800s and 1979 in order to provide the reader with a brief summary of contemporary history of Iran. Examining the last minute efforts of the pre-revolution regime to ease the growing discontent among its society, as well as the failures of its diplomacy, politics, and

economics in the contemporary history will help us see more clearly where Iran today sits among nations, and why. Although this chapter does not aim to make a within-case comparison of Iranian foreign policy, crucial turning points that occurred until the 1979 Islamic Revolution will be touched upon. Tracing history is one of the most important ways that can provide us with appropriate lenses through which we will assess today's Iran. Furthermore, after studying Iranian foreign policy from 1979 Islamic Revolution to 2010, foreign policy deviations are found and analyzed in the last section of the chapter.

3.2 The Fall of the Qajars and the Pahlavi Rule

3.2.1 The Demise of the Peacock Throne

The Qajar dynasty, which had been ruling since 1795, welcomed the second half of the 19th century under the rule of Nasseraddin Shah. His years of rule witnessed the significant decrease of Iranian power in international arena and make a good point to start tracing history. Nasseraddin Shah ruled Iran from 1848 to 1896, and his basic foreign policy rule was to maintain the survival of Iran by playing the time's major powers against each other. The two major powers of the late 19th century were Russia and Great Britain. However, the growing scale of concessions granted to both major powers over time rendered the Qajar dynasty together with Iran's national industrial resources quite vulnerable in the face of a pernicious cooperation of Russia and Great Britain. It was Nasseraddin Shah who granted Baron Julius de Reuter an unprecedented concession "for free" in the area of industrial resources, and made Lord Curzon confess that it was "the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamt of, much less accomplished, in history" (Kinzer, 2003: 31). Moreover, by also selling the Iranian tobacco industry to the

British, Nasseraddin Shah paved the way for the Tobacco revolt in 1891. This event marked not only the beginning of explicit opposition against the Qajar dynasty in the country, but also intensified the demands for a constitutional rule. By the time Nasseraddin Shah was assassinated in 1896, it was obvious that a recovery of the Qajar rule from foreign exploitation was impossible. His successor, Muzaffaraddin Shah continued to grant further concessions to and receive loans from not only Great Britain, but also Russia.

It was almost when there was nothing else left to sell to foreign powers that the first constitution of Iran was signed and the *Majlis* opened in 1906, with an aim by the nationalists to stop foreign powers from further absorbing Iran's national resources. Although the draft of the constitution was signed by Muzaffaraddin Shah, hopes for a peaceful transition to constitutional rule were destroyed soon after by the order of Mohammad Ali Shah to the Russians to bombard the *Majlis* as he was against the rule of democracy. When he ascended to the Peacock Throne in 1907, Mohammad Ali Shah was just a few months from signing of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, and one year from the discovery of oil in Masjed-e Soleiman. Under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 Iran was divided into three zones, granting the southern Iran to the control of the British, the north to Russia while leaving the southwestern zone to Iranians (Kinzer, 2003, 38). The year 1909 brought more opportunities to the British: the throne passed to young Ahmed Shah who was then only 12 years old, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established.

As the World War I broke out, the Qajar dynasty was already waging three separate wars at home. While two of them were against the dominance of the British and the Russian, the third one was against the *Majlis* (Mafinezam and Mehrabi, 2008: 10-12).

The inept and weak Qajars, with the advice from the nationalist front of the *Majlis*, approached to the Germans who, as a late colonizer, had already begun spreading their influence towards the Middle East via the Ottoman Empire since the mid-nineteenth century (Ortayli, 2008: 21-24). This move was resented by Czarist Russia and Britain. Despite the fact that the forces of both powers cooperated to expel the Germans out of Iran, the Russians renounced all concessions, agreements, and loans granted to them following the Bolshevik Revolution (Avery et al., 1991: 208-209), leaving the entire stage to Great Britain in 1919, the year in which the Anglo – Iranian Treaty was signed. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 granted the British with "control over Iran's army, treasury, transport system, and communications network" as the southern provinces of Iran were captured by the British and the state was far too weakened to provide the necessary infrastructure for the conduct of above mentioned services (Kinzer, 2003: 39). This final treaty signed by the Qajar dynasty can be interpreted as equivalent to what the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 meant for the Ottoman Empire. Almost the entire loss of an empire's sovereignty to a single foreign power, however, could not be acquiesced in silence.

3.2.2 Reza Pahlavi in the Interwar Years

Despite the fact that the political elite in the Qajar dynasty tried hard to protect the country's independence from falling into foreign hands, it was already too late for them to do so especially right from the late 1800s (starting from the rule of Nasseraddin Shah). Facing growing demands for the constitutional rule on the one hand, while at the same time trying to preserve the Qajar dynasty's power on the other, the turmoil at home weakened the legitimacy of the unconstitutional monarchic rule, which was soon challenged by an officer named Reza Khan.

Reza Khan, commanding the Cossack Brigade, deposed Ahmad Shah and imposed Sayyed Ziya Tabatabai as the premier upon the request of the British. Yet, in the following months he did not hesitate to dismiss Premier Tabatabai, and later in 1926 crowned himself the Shah of Iran two years after his attempt to found a republic failed. Notwithstanding his antipathy towards the British, Reza Shah was well aware that he could not ignore this powerful state. Nonetheless he abrogated in 1928 a great part of capitulations granted to the British (Ramazani, 1966: 56-57).

At this point, it is worth mentioning how Reza Shah gave Iran back its sovereignty over its territory and a part of its economic independence, playing one power off against the other. One of Reza Shah's achievements was the signature of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with Russia. Due to this treaty, Iran secured its independence at most part as the Russians accepted to withdraw their troops from Iran. Two articles within the treaty, however, showed that Russia was still having control because both countries undertook not to permit any third party military force in their own territories. Furthermore, Article 6 granted the Russians the right to militarily intervene in Iran if Iran was intervened militarily, or a military base of a third party was established in Iranian territory with intentions against Russia (Ramazani, 1966: 188 – 189). Besides these two articles, Russia consoled itself with the Caspian Sea fishery rights (Ramazani, 1966: 55-57).

Along with these developments, Reza Shah worked to create a self-sustaining country. On the one hand, roads, railways, and port facilities were constructed, and a special emphasis was given to industrialization, while on the other hand, efforts to modernize Iran with European style legal and educational systems also took place (Avery et al., 1991: 229-232). In foreign policy, due to the traumatic concessions the Qajar dynasty granted foreign powers in the last fifty years, Reza Shah favored a xenophobic

approach to other powerful states in order to protect Iran from further foreign domination. However, he was aware of the importance of Iran's representation at the international realm. Iran took part in the formation of the Saadabad Pact of 1937 with the contiguous states. Together with registering Iran to the League of Nations, Reza Shah had sought ways to diversify "friends" of Iran by approaching the United States and Germany since the day he ascended to power. However, this effort of Reza Shah only brought Britain and Russia together again *vis-à-vis* Iran in 1941. The attitudes of Britain and Russia proved to be no different during World War II than what was displayed just prior to World War I when Iran was able to attract the German attention. Only this time, the invasion of Iran by these two major powers caused more destruction than before as the country had already achieved a significant degree of progress in reconstruction. To sum up, Reza Khan raised to power to save Iran from further foreign domination by pulling the country out of economic, military, and political troubles. Yet, it can be concluded that it was still too early for Iran to side with another rising power of the new century, Germany, before Iran could totally secure its independence and consolidate its power *vis-à-vis* the cooperation of the British and Russians. As a result, Iran was invaded by Russia and Great Britain while Reza Khan was sent to exile to South Africa, where he died three years later.

3.2.3 Great Expectations of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Operation Ajax

When his father, Reza Shah, was sent to exile in 1941, Mohammad Reza was only twenty one years old. As Fereydoun Hoveyda, a former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, underlines the young Shah was not coward, but rather weak and inexperienced when he took the throne (Hoveyda, 2003: 9-10). That is why, the little political freedom enjoyed in Iran from 1941 to the 1953 *coup d'état* that ousted Prime Minister Dr.

Mohammad Mosaddegh should not be interpreted as freedom emerging from the tolerance of the new Shah. Rather, it was Mohammad Reza's weakness, inexperience in politics, and the power vacuum that occurred in the wake of the sudden fall of Reza Shah which gave the domestic opposition the opportunity to actively participate in Iranian politics since the fall of the Qajars.

Similar to his father, Mohammad Reza wished to modernize Iran. He aimed at achieving industrialization, modernizing the army, and turning Iran into a regionally and internationally acknowledged power. And he did achieve these goals throughout his rule. However, his being weak early and becoming too powerful later by suppressing his opponents instead of consulting them, as well as receiving the foreign support against the will of his own people, eventually turned his rule into nothing more than a "paper tiger" over the years.

Again similar to his father, Mohammad Reza was also brought to power by tacit consent of foreign powers, especially Great Britain. The lasting influence of the British in the Iranian political life, an ongoing world war, and the ineptness of the Shah during his early years on the throne altogether impeded the maturation of politics in the country. Mainly as a result of these factors, it took the Shah over a decade to consolidate his power at home. Thus, by the time the Shah was powerful enough to realize his dreams for a more developed Iran, he had lost the trust of Iranians in himself due to the toppling of the Mosaddegh government in 1953.

Throughout the Shah's thirty seven years of rule, Iran was governed with thirty two prime ministers. This number demonstrates the extent of instability in Iranian politics. Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was elected prime minister to form a government in 1951, was a nationalist belonging to no political party, but created the National Front.

However, the National Front was more of a movement with high levels of volatility than a political party, and consisted of activists belonging to various circles (Avery et al., 1991: 256). However, Prime Minister Mosaddegh jeopardized his position step by step by causing the frustration of the US and Great Britain. At the top of his agenda was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mosaddegh also approached the leftist Tudeh Party, intensified the nationalist sentiments among Iranians to a degree he could not control, and condemned foreign elements which meddled in and harmed Iran's economy constantly. In spite of Mosaddegh's ability to convince the Shah –even at one time in 1952 by bluffing- to let him concentrate a significant portion of legislative and executive power in his hands, he could not gain the support of the US government *vis-à-vis* Great Britain.

Consequently, the government of Dr. Mosaddegh was overthrown in 1953 with a *coup* codenamed "Operation Ajax" backed by the American government. Informed of and given consent to the realization of the Operation, the Shah first went to Baghdad, then to Rome during the course of the *coup d'etat*. Returning to Iran immediately afterwards, the Shah now believed that the right thing to do to secure Iran's sovereignty against the British and the Russians by moving the country closer to the US. However, the fact that the *coup* was led by the latter can mean that it was nothing more than ruining the democratization efforts of Iranians and replacing the Shah as an unrivalled absolutist monarch back on the throne, rather than continuing to rule as just a figurehead.

3.2.4 The Odyssey towards the 1979 Islamic Revolution

As mentioned earlier in chapter 2, the revolutionary process and its outcome need a careful attention in order to be able to make good conclusions about the revolutionary

foreign policy. Therefore, in this very section it is aimed to find answers to two of the four questions listed previously. To recall, those questions are as follows: (a) Who are the actual contenders in Iran?; (b) What are the revolutionary contenders discontent with? Two further questions will be included in the following part: What, if any, were the foreign and/or domestic elements supporting the incumbent power or the revolutionaries? What is the revolutionary outcome? A more elaborated discussion of these questions will take place later. Now, the chapter continues with history-tracing, and answers to these questions.

In the years which followed Operation Ajax until the end of the Pahlavi rule in Iran, the White Revolution, the establishment of the Rastakhiz, and the 1975 anti-profiteering campaign are deemed as domestic reasons of the fall of the Pahlavis. Following the economic crisis of 1960, the Shah proposed "White Revolution" to the national plebiscite in early 1963, but no *Majlis* ratification was taken. As Skocpol decribes (Skocpol, 1994: 244):

> [The Shah] launched a "White Revolution" to buy out landlords, redistribute land to wealthier peasants, and extend bureaucratic state control into the villages. Poor planning left much of the agrarian economy impoverished, however, forcing millions of poorer peasants to migrate to the towns and cities. Urban Iran grew to become almost 50% of the population before the Revolution, and all urban strata relied heavily for privileges, employment, and services on burgeoning state expenditures.

This was an endeavor initiated by the Shah to further modernize his country by land reform, sale of government owned factories to supply funds for land reform, the nationalization of forests, rearranging the electoral law including woman suffrage, creating a national literacy corps for education in rural areas, and sharing industrial profits with workers (Keddie, 1981: 156). However, the reform attempts were unwelcomed

among many in the society, particularly the *Ulama* and *Bazaaris*[5]. These two groups within contemporary Iranian history proved to be effective forces when they combined their power against the rulers. Underestimating the possibility that *bazaaris* who have been politically more indifferent than the clergy, could join the *Ulama* in their cause to challenge the power of the Shah, was a very big mistake that the Shah made. At this point, a closer look at the *bazaari* – state relations is necessary.

In 1975, the Shah abdicated the two operating political parties (Mardom and Iran Novin parties) and established the Rastakhiz party, which would, as the Shah believed, contribute to the "legitimacy" of his rule (Mazaheri, 2006: 404). As per moving against the *bazaar*, several branches of Rastakhiz were opened in different cities, and the merchants were forced to donate to the party (Mazaheri, 2006: 405). Moreover, Rastakhiz was also used by the regime to liquidate the *bazaar*'s independent guilds that worked as a protection device against state intervention and generated political power for the *bazaaris* (Mazaheri, 2006: 405).

The resentment of the *bazaaris* was not limited to the opening of the Rastakhiz and its branches only. The anti-profiteering campaign imposed in the same year by the Shah was regarded as another tool that targeted the *bazaar* group. The Shah primarily denounced the extortionate pricing by the *bazaar*, began importing wheat, sugar, and meat to undercut *bazaar* suppliers (Mazaheri, 2006: 406-07). Indeed, it was the Shah himself

[5] As Keshavarzian (2007) notes the term "*bazaar"* is used in two meanings as "market" in English. One is the physical place where exchange takes place, while another is the abstract and metaphysical notion of the market. The Bazaar is also defined as a combination of "a nucleus and multiple potential peripheries which may be political, cultural or even professional" and that is difficult for the peripheries to reach the nucleus (Mozaffari, 1991: 378). In other words, by the nucleus, it is meant that the Bazaar has been fragmented over time into the commercial sector, trade networks and financial networks; a fact which underlines the heterogeneous nature the Bazaar has today, together with revealing why it could never become a forerunner in the Iranian political life. Therefore, fragmentation among the *bazaaris* weakened their voice in the Iranian political life.

who had admitted in his memoirs that he could not stop building supermarkets because he wanted to create a modern country; and that moving against the *bazaar*s was typical of the political risks he had to take in his drive for modernization (Pahlavi, 1980: 156). Compounded with the slowing down of the flow of petro-dollars into the country by 1975, the further efforts of the Shah to modernize and industrialize the Iranian economy and high inflation began upsetting the society. Although the Shah aimed by the anti-profiteering campaign to stigmatize the *bazaaris,* this effort proved futile and even, it can be claimed that it further strengthened the support for the *bazaar* group in the country. Moreover, the *bazaaris* were now viewed as "closer to the people than elites or foreign entrepreneurs, [and] the bazaar group could have easily portrayed themselves as the scapegoats for a regime incapable of formulating sound economic policy" (Mazaheri, 2006: 413). "All of this coincided with the Shah's steady efforts to exclude the Islamic clergy from educational, legal and welfare activities that historically had been theirs to perform" (Skocpol, 1994: 246). Thus, another consequence of the anti-profiteering campaign became the rapproachement of the *bazaaris* and the *Ulama*. "Purchasing" the clerics' support, the *bazaaris* further struggled against the interventionist state, and such a rapprochement also proved lucrative for the *Ulama,* or the *Ayatollah* Khomeini in particular, who was stretching arms to defeat the Pahlavis in order to establish a new regime based on the Islamic code.

To sum up, the Mullahs and the *bazaaris* were the main contenders of the Shah's absolutist rule.[6] It was a combination of various domestic factors which weakened the

[6] It can be said that the leftists also were among the contenders in Iran. However, their power to influence and mobilize the masses in the society diminished over time due to large fragmentation and oppression from the Shah. The fragmentation occurred as a part of leftists joined the national front movement of Dr.

state in Iran, endangering the Shah's rule day by day. Above, I have selected the most prominent of the reasons for the Islamic Revolution to occur in 1979. The Shah's rule without consulting any of the social classes in Iran, and expelling many of his successful men, and overall, the escalation of an unstoppable corruption weakened the "rentier state" of the Pahlavis. Finally in 1979 when faced with a large group of *mustazafin*, armed with great discontent, sufficient pecuniary resources, and most important of all with the ultimate aim from the contenders to topple the Shah, the Pahlavi family fled the country in January 1979.

3.3 The Revolution and the Decade Onwards

Discontent masses in Iran began their active riots in 1978 in major cities such as Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, and Mashad. The opposition movements gained a new momentum especially over the enunciation of human rights policy of the Carter administration in the US (Keddie, 1981, 231). President Carter's policy definitely encouraged the masses with the hope that the US pressure on the Shah would grant a degree of freedom to opponents of the Shah (Keddie, 1981, 231). However, the Shah was neither able to suppress the activists, nor willing to leave the country. He was also unable to silence the growing opposition because of the inconsistent actions he took. At first, he decided to use force against the masses. However, in the face of discrepant opinions on whether to interfere in Iran's domestic affairs and the escalating unrest, "bureaucratic and personal rivalries in the United States gave [him] different policy signals", the Shah changed his policy, and

Mosaddegh, and in the following years some others joined the *mullahs* with the aim to overthrow the Shah. Yet, to reiterate, they not only decreased in numbers over the years, but also lost their goal.

dismissed his premier and appointed a former politician, Sharif Emami who served in the 1960s to reconcile with the opposition (Goldstone et al., 1991:118; Keddie, 1981: 249). By appointing Sharif Emami as the new premier of Iran, the Shah aimed to reach a compromise with the opposition groups (of course without granting any political concessions to opposition) and decrease the level of violence used against them. However, the army and police of the Shah, under such indecisive moves of the Shah, were unable to "respond effectively to unrest" (Goldstone et al., 1991: 118).

In January 1979, the Shah left Iran for a "vacation" and allegedly, medical treatment. Over this incident, *Ayatollah* Khomeini's return from exile was welcomed on February 1, 1979. He quickly appointed Mahdi Bazargan, another leading politico-religious figure throughout the revolutionary movement, as the prime minister on February 5, thus created a "dual power" situation (Keddie, 1981: 257). This move of the *Ayatollah* can be regarded wise in two senses. First, since the Shah's army was no longer willing to use force against its nationals, its seizure by the revolutionaries happened soon and less bloody than what it could have been otherwise. Second, the selection of Mahdi Bazargan for the prime ministerial post among the other prominent revolutionary figures was itself a very successful decision. Bazargan, as a moderate and liberal political actor who also served during the premiership of Mosaddegh, was both experienced in politics in contrast to the *Mullahs* and in a position to represent the main objective of the revolution. If an *Aleem* was chosen for the premiership, this could have endangered the success of the revolution by unraveling the differences existed among the leading revolutionary figures (Martin, 2000: 151). Finally, the total transfer of power was completed as early as February 11, 1979.

3.3.1 The Constitution and Institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Immediately in the following month of the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, *Ayatollah* Khomeini called for a referendum to determine the type of the new regime. He offered the Iranian society to choose between an Islamic Republic and a monarchy. Decades of dissatisfactory experience under the Pahlavi family inevitably influenced the final decision to be in favor of an Islamic Republic albeit its initially ambiguous nature. The Islamic republic, as envisioned by Khomeini, was to be guided by the *Fuqaha*. Therefore, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was also to be prepared by the *Majlis-e Khobregan* or the Assembly of Experts throughout 1979 and 1980.

The main institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran are as follows: The Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. The Assembly of Experts is composed of the high ranking Muslim clerics from all 30 provinces of the country and these experts are elected by the public. According to the Constitution, the Assembly of Experts is in charge of electing and disqualifying the Supreme Leader. However, the Assembly of Experts needs the approval of the Guardian Council, which is composed of twelve *ulama*. While six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council, whose chief duty is to check the compatibility of laws with the *Sharia* as stated in Article 96, are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader, the remaining six are appointed by the Supreme Judiciary Council. In this regard, it is worth underlining the fact that even though it looks as if the Assembly of Experts is elected democratically, this is not the case. As just stated, the remaining six members of the Guardian Council are appointed by the Supreme Judiciary Council, and this council is appointed by the *Mujtahid* who is directly chosen and appointed by the Supreme Leader.

At this point, it is useful to focus on the election of the president.[7] The president of the Islamic Republic, according to Article 114 of the Constitution, "is elected for a four year term by the direct vote of the people." Nevertheless in practice, the nomination of the presidential candidacy is subject to the approval of the Assembly of Experts although not indicated overtly in the Constitution. As a consequence, contrary to what the Iranian Constitution states, it can be claimed that neither of the institutions except for that of the *Faqih*, is truly independent, and that the ultimate power to rule the country is in the hands of the *Faqih*. Therefore, in a system where a candidate's candidacy is tied to the consent of the appointed, it is not possible to claim that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a democratic state.

3.3.2 The Ideology of Khomeini and Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Iran

As aptly underlined by Sadri (1997: 11), in developed countries foreign policy is made by institutions while it is the leaders who formulate and make foreign policy in developing countries. The Iranian case, in this debate, suggests nothing different. The constitution of the Islamic Republic, as discussed above, permits the accumulation of power under one single authority that is the Grand *Ayatollah*. Therefore, examining foreign policy decisions of Iran goes through comprehending the revolutionary victors' view of foreign elements.

[7] The Constitution of Iran was amended in 1989. According to this amendment, previously existing prime ministerial post was abolished, and all prime ministerial powers were transferred to the president. During the first 10 years, it was Ayatollah Khomeini who guided and checked the Iranian foreign policy. Mainly due to this reason, I chose to study the first decade of the Iranian foreign policy without making much mention of either the prime minister or the president.

Born in 1902 in Khomein, Iran, *Imam* Rouhullah Moussavi Khomeini acquired the significant part of his theological training in Qom. He became a *mujtahid* in 1936 and began publishing his critics of the Pahlavi rule in the 1940s. It was only during the 1963 White Revolution did Khomeini become a prominent *mouhalif* of the Shah, and subsequently was exiled in 1964. Although *Imam* Khomeini spent over a decade in exile until his return to Iran in 1979, events with harsh socio-political and economic impacts on the Iranian society which occurred throughout the Pahlavi family's rule gradually rendered him an ardent opponent of the existing regime. I say "gradually" because up to the time the White Revolution was declared and implemented, Khomeini rather remained "behind the scenes" and chose only to condemn the Westoxification (*Gharbzadegi*) of Iran. Yet, shortly after the negative effects of the 1963 revolution became tangible, the critical discourse of the *Ayatollah* came to target the entire "corrupt" regime of the Shah.

Khomeini continuously spread anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist as well as anti-monarchy sentiments from exile, and built his ideology according to these. For Khomeini, imperialism, Zionism, and monarchy are the ills that create the two *tabaqa* among the Iranians -and in general, the entire Muslim world (Keddie, 1981: 207-208). These two *tabaqa* are the *mustazafin* and the *mustakbarin*. By such a classification of the society, Khomeini also successfully incorporated leftist elements to his ideology. In the heart of Khomeinism lays the argument that God is the only bearer of legislation, and the *fuqaha* shall guide, monitor and govern on behalf of God (Keddie, 1981: 207). That is why exclusion of Islam from politics deprives the society of its rights such as a just, equal life, independence and sovereignty. Consequently, the path toward an uncorrupt government necessitates the recognition of the rule of God, and guidance of the *Velayat-e Faqih*.

The conjunction of Khomeinism on foreign policy can also be best read in Iran's constitution. The pertaining articles of the Constitution are cited below:

- Article 3 states that the duty of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to direct its resources to "…the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence", and "framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad'afiin of the world."
- Article 43, concerning economy and financial affairs, underlines that "prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's economy [together with an emphasis on making] the country self-sufficient and free from dependence."
- Articles 81 and 82 forbid "the granting of concessions to foreigners" and "the employment of foreign experts [except for situations when necessary and with the approval of the Majlis]."
- Articles 145 and 146 too forbid the acceptance of any foreigner "into the Army or security forces of the country" and "the establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes".

The common point of all these articles is the total elimination of all foreign elements from the country, regardless of their being Western or not. In addition to these articles, Chapter X of the Constitution directly deals with foreign policy, reiterating the elimination of foreign elements which have the potential to obstruct the independence of the country.

- Article 152 states that "The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, …the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers."

- Article 153 reads “any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden.”
- Article 154 emphasizes that “Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society” and “while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad’afiin against the mustakbirun in every corner of the globe.”

According to these articles of the Iranian constitution, one of the most distinct principles upon which the country’s foreign policy shall be based is undertaking the role of a “savior” for the entire Islamic world, regardless of any sectarian difference. By so asserting, it is in fact signaled that the Islamic Republic has to follow an active foreign policy starting in its immediate neighborhood. Another principle, with respect to the above-cited articles, is the pledge to support the causes of the *mustazafin*. Thus, the pursuit of an active foreign policy will possibly transgress the borders of Iran’s (Muslim) neighborhood, spreading the seeds of a conflictual foreign policy. Last but not least, the Constitution also explicitly declares non-alignment as Iran’s another basic foreign policy principle.

Although “all revolutionary developing countries have asserted that they pursue a foreign policy independently of the great powers”, a common definition to non-alignment is far from existence (Sadri, 1997: 9). Furthermore, neither Khomeini nor any of the Iranian revolutionary elite offered a definition as to what non-alignment means for Iran (Sadri, 1997: 88-89). For Sadri, by declaring non-alignment, Iran sought certain foreign policy objectives. These were (a) “autonomy in foreign policy making”; (b) “avoiding any involvement in the American – Russian rivalry”; (c) “ending dependence on any of the

blocs"; and (d) "improving ties with all nations [with the exception of Israel and former South African regime]" (Sadri, 1997:88). Thus, with a focus on these declared foreign policy objectives of Iran, Sadri offers us an analytical definition of Iranian non-alignment policy, and this study a starting point to analyze the reasons of foreign policy deviations of revolutionary states. For Sadri, Iranian non-alignment is best summarized in a famous phrase of *Ayatollah* Khomeini, that is "Neither East nor West, only an Islamic Republic" (Sadri, 1997: 89). This dictum of Khomeini, "*Na Sharq Na Gharb, Faqat Jumhuri-ye Islami*", constitutes the basis of Iran's foreign policy and means that Islam is a religion that does not belong either to West or the East. Accordingly, an Islamic Republic that embraces Muslims all around the world (regardless of their sects) must be the ultimate goal for the salvation of the followers of Islam. This phrase both "negates external elements", and champions "a universalization" that is based on an Islamic Republic (Sadri, 1997: 89).

To conclude, a negation of external elements packs the principles of being anti-imperialist (*vis-à-vis* both the West and the East) and savior of the entire Muslim world. These principles do not mean an isolationist foreign policy at all.[8] In contrast, a very active foreign policy is suggested with the aim of spreading Islamic values. However, it is also concluded that Iran could not pursue a coherent foreign policy in the first decade of

[8] Whether Iran was isolationist or not in its foreign policy depends on the perspective one employs to evaluate the first decade of the Islamic Republic. If we look at this issue from Iran's point of view, it is not possible to conclude that Iran had an isolationist foreign policy. Whereas from the point of view of the "enemies" (i.e. the US, some European states, and perhaps the Gulf States those years), Iran is regarded an isolationist state since it refused to reestablish ties with the above mentioned actors. But again, there cannot be a single judgment and conclusion on the issue of isolationism because of extraordinary circumstances such as almost a decade-long war with Iraq, and regarding the UN Security Council resolutions purely at the expense of its interests and on favor of Iraq. Finally, there is another point from which we can evaluate if Iran was isolationist any time during this period. That is a country-based argument from Iran's point of view. For instance, if we separately consider Iran – US, Iran – other "satans" relations, then we may claim if not prove, that hardliner revolutionaries in Iran used the post-revolutionary environment to pursue an isolationist foreign policy so as to consolidate power at home vis-à-vis any potential opposition against the young republic.

the revolution because of different interpretations of Iranian non-alignment policy which is going to be stated in the following pages (Sadri, 1997: 93). Finally, as Maloney (2002: 95-101) discusses, Iranian identity has a three dimensional nature and understanding these dimensions is a key to understanding Iranian foreign policy making. Two of these are already stated: Islam and anti-Westoxification. The third one, according to the authors, is the Persian nationalism which disguises itself under the anti-Western sentiment. Even though anti-Westoxification does not directly create a dilemma in foreign policy principles of Iran, when placed in the same equation, Islam and Persian nationalism definitely does create a dualism.

This dilemma was perhaps best explained in the briefest way by an (unnamed) Iranian Foreign Ministry official stating in 1996 that "The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has short-term, middle-term and long-term interests. The short- and middle-term interests are national interests, whereas the long-term interests are religious principles, such as helping the oppressed" (Marschall, 2003: 14). The existence of such a dualism is surely one reason of foreign policy deviations of Iran because it allows Iranian leaders to come up with varying and changing interpretations of foreign policy principles at different times, under different conjunctures as will be discussed in the following pages.

3.3.3 Foreign Relations under the Turban

Two factors are worth addressing before continuing with the most important external events occurred throughout the first decade of the Iranian revolution. One of them is that Iran cannot be regarded as an ordinary country in terms of its history. Despite the fact that Persia was ruled by different Turkic dynasties for many centuries starting from the Ghaznavids in circa 975 until the fall of the Qajar dynasty in 1925, the ancient Persian

mythology has been kept alive and used in politics by the rulers of Iran up to today (Ozturk and Sarikaya, 2006: 175; Hoveyda, 2003: 31-64). The most prominent way of reviving the Persian mythology has been on the emphasis of an independent Persian people. Therefore, either ethnic or religious identity building among Iranian society has been done by acknowledging (albeit subtly at times) and incorporating the independent character of the Persian civilization to political life. However, this element constitutes what Levine (1994: 34) calls the "informal ideology" of a state, and its inclusion in the study of revolutionary foreign policies will cast a shadow on correct examination of ideological principles (formal ideology), cause the study lose its main track, and most probably justify any deviation in foreign policy and put it in a consistent line with the overall ideological principles, be them formal or informal.[9]

Second factor has been the geopolitical importance of Iran. Especially in its contemporary history, Iran has been laying more or less on the same geography. Today, Iran shares borders with seven countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and Turkey) on land, and shares the Persian Gulf with Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Bahrain. This makes thirteen different countries with different national interests in sum. Additionally, Iran is the only Shiite country in the Middle East, and over half of its total neighbors are predominantly Arabs. Furthermore, the region has extensive natural gas and oil resources, a fact that has been attracting the attention of the great powers for over a century. Therefore, for a revolutionary Iran to pursue a foreign policy based on an Islamic ideology becomes a difficult task due to the factors mentioned above. The more the diversion in foreign policy

[9] The same problem also appeared in the Chinese case, and a further explanation of formal and informal ideologies, and why it is not proper to include the informal ideology in this study is explained in the following chapter.

objectives of these countries occurs, the more challenging the ideological foreign policy pursuit becomes for Iran. Compounded with the first factor, it becomes inevitable for Iran to make deviational moves. As also underlined by Takeyh (2009: 32), "Once in power, all revolutionary regimes deviate from their declared precepts, moderate their objectives, and even adjust to the prevailing order."

Iranian foreign policy underwent severe traumatic events in the first ten years following the Islamic revolution. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002) suggest the examination of the first decade of Iranian foreign policy in three phases. The first phase is "the consolidation stage" between 1979-1981 which is followed by a second stage called "the rejectionist stage" that lasted from 1981 to 1988, and the third phase is named as "the reorientation stage" of 1988 and 1990 (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002: 297-299). In more or less the same vein, Sadri offers a three-stage foreign policy for Iran. "A two-track policy" from right after the revolution in 1979 to 1982; "a more conflictual policy" which took place between 1982 and 1985; and "a more conciliatory policy" beginning from 1985, ending in 1989 (Sadri, 1997: 93-109).

What made these scholars to categorize the early years of the Iranian revolution in this way is the long war of attrition Iran and Iraq fought between 1980 -1988, and the date *Ayatollah* Khomeini passed away, 1989. The war with Iraq was accompanied by a series of events which isolated Iran in its immediate neighborhood. Before moving on to these events, a brief study of the Iran – Iraq war will be made for a better understanding of the categorization above.

Contrary to the widely accepted argument, the *casus belli* of the Iran – Iraq war was not the Sunni – Shiite clash between the two neighbors. There were more plausible objectives that pushed Iraq to attack Iran on September 22, 1980. Elimination of

revolutionary Iran's continuing support for the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq, the resolution of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway dispute over its control and use, the termination of threat perceived by the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein toward the Iraqi Shiite population (around 55% that time), and of course, the elimination of the threat posed by Khomeini to export the revolution were the basic objectives of Hussein (Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2006: 85-88). During the first two years of the war, Iran was on defense. Whereas in 1982, Iran began offensive attacks when the international community, headed by the US through the United Nations (UN), refused to comply with the Iranian demands for a large amount of reparation from Iraq and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the occupied Iranian territory. Thus, 1982 marked the end of "the two-track policy" of Iran during which Tehran moved away from Washington and closer to the Soviets (Sadri, 1997: 94). Since the consolidation of the clerical power *vis-à-vis* the Marxist Tudeh party was completed, the party was closed the same year. These are also the same reasons for moving from "the consolidation phase" to "the rejectionist phase" in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. Therefore, a new phase began in Iran's foreign policy following the elimination of dissident Tudeh members and the US assistance delivered to Iraq.

According to Sadri (1997: 97-99) the new, "more conflictual" phase continued until 1985, the time when the Iranian offense became weaker and heavy consequences of the war started to be felt in the country. However, this second phase in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami continues until 1988, that is the end of the war. Sadri's early closure of the second phase owes to two reasons. One reason is the rapproachement with the Soviets, then presided by Michael Gorbachev whereas the second reason is Iranian revolutionary realists' becoming active in politics due to the economic ills caused by the war. The war was eventually over in 1988 with Iran accepting the UN Security Council Resolution 598.

Apart from the war with Iraq, there was a series of other events Iran had to deal with. First, the crisis that erupted over the Iranian students' seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and taking the Embassy's staff hostage in November 1979 became an immediate reason of the US' distancing itself from Iran and not depriving Iraq of its support throughout the war. Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced revolutionary Iran to make a choice between either supporting the Muslims in Afghanistan or remaining neutral. Iran chose to support Afghanistan, albeit limitedly due to the war it was fighting the same years. Third, in order to export revolution, Iran backed the Islamic Jihad's bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983, supported the overthrow of the government in Bahrain in 1981, and perhaps most important and successful of all, created and supported Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 during the Lebanon War, as these moves were supported by Iran's constitution (Article 154) to defend the rights of the *mustazafin* (as Iranian revolutionary victors claim) (Palmer, 2007: 273-275). These events that the young revolutionary Republic could overcome, no doubt, completed the consolidation of the power of the Grand *Ayatollah* and his men. To sum up, Iran's relations with the Gulf monarchies and Egypt were far from being normal. The Gulf monarchies established the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 in order to shun the threat posed by the Iranian revolution, and gave assistance to Iraq during the war (Hooglund, 2002: 162). Therefore, Iran's problems with the Gulf states stemmed from the former's inclination to carry the revolution beyond its borders and frustration with the Gulf Cooperation Council whereas the roots of Iranian unfriendliness towards Egypt was engraved in Egypt's signing the Camp David Accords with Israel. Two events, however, mark the early deviations in Iran's foreign policy whose analysis will be made toward the end of this chapter. As early as 1981, Iran began purchasing arms from Israel due to the convergence of their interests

over Iraq as Israel felt threatened by the possibility of Iraqi development of atomic bomb and by its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (Takeyh, 2009: 66-67). This event was followed by the Iran-Contra affair, in which the US clandestinely sold weapons to Iran through Nicaragua and Israel in 1985. When the secret was unveiled, Tehran denied the incident at first, and recognized later. Both of these incidents reveal the existence of factions within the Iranian revolutionary elite since inconsistent conclusions are made regarding these events by the ruling clerical elite.

3.4 Irresistible Intra- and Extra-Territorial Calls for Deviations in Foreign Policy: President Rafsanjani at the Edge of Evitable Deviations?

When the first decade of the Iranian Revolution was left behind and the prolonged war with Iraq ended without a peace treaty, Iran found itself economically devastated and politically isolated. Although none of the articles of the Islamic Republic's constitution advised Iranian politicians to isolate the country from world affairs, and even in contrast to the policy of isolation, both the constitution and the Supreme Leader Khomeini's speeches suggested rather an active foreign policy, the fate of a revolutionary state is usually destined to isolation so long as the revolutionary fervor and ambiguities continue to be felt by the other states, and this was no different in Iran. Although one can never predict the direction the Iranian foreign policy would move towards had *Ayatollah* Khomeini been alive for the subsequent decade after the Iran-Iraq war, it is not difficult to estimate that Tehran's foreign policy would not be as moderate as of the Khamenei-Rafsanjani duo. This section of the chapter, as the title reveals, analyzes the internal and external events that followed the Iran-Iraq war and constituted reasons of deviations in

foreign policy of Iran during the two-term presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani. It first discusses the appearance of factions within the Iranian political elite to give a better sense of which faction ruled the country between 1989 and 1997 and what different attitudes towards foreign policy making were between these factions. Later, bearing in mind the factional politics, the section continues with the most remarkable events that topped the international politics agenda and the regional events that interested both Iran and those who were closely watching this country.

Before *Ayatollah* Khomeini died, he nominated *Ayatollah* Montazeri, who was known for his moderate stance, to become the next Supreme Leader. However, a few months before Khomeini's death, he was dismissed from candidacy and there was no other name to take over the position of the *Faqih*. As the health situation of the Grand *Ayatollah* deteriorated, his close aids suggested Hojatoleslam Sayyed Ali Khamenei, a cleric who at that time lacked the sufficient rank to become the *Rahbar*. Despite the fact that his ineligibility caused many debates among the mullahs, there existed no specific rank requirement underlined in the constitution to become the *Faqih*. Therefore, as soon as *Ayatollah* Khomeini's consent was taken on Khamenei's selection, he received the title of *Ayatollah* and became the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the death of Khomeini, Iranian political factionalism became more apparent. This happened in two ways. One way was the abrupt expression regarding new directions in the country's policies in the wake of Grand *Ayatollah*'s passing away. In other words, with the power vacuum that occurred in the absence of a new supreme leader as charismatic and hardliner as *Ayatollah* Khomeini had been, other factions were now on the scene to fight for power. Perhaps, this can be counted as an explanation to the

consensus given to the appointment of *Ayatollah* Khamenei as the *Faqih*. The new Leader was far less influential and experienced in Iranian political life than any other possible candidates for his position. Thus, with a less strict and powerful Supreme Leader, it would be easier for any faction to pursue their policies. Another way of the appearance of factionalism was that it continued to deepen over time, particularly during the first ten years of *Ayatollah* Khamenei's guidance. Except for the domestic and external realities which caused factionalism, its deepening owes to the more different attitude of *Ayatollah* Khamenei than that of Khomeini. As Banuazizi underlines in his article (1994: 4), "unlike Khomeini, who generally tried to maintain a balance between opposing factions, Khamenei has sided for the most part with one –the hardline faction." This attitude of Khamenei has caused the deepening of factionalism within Iranian political circles by favoring one faction at the expense of another.

As mentioned above, Iranian constitution leaves almost no room for the exercise of democratic politics. Except for a few preeminent institutions such as the Supreme Leadership, the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians, and the Judiciary, the Islamic Republic's *majlis* and presidency are in a constant, but desperate search for exerting their influence in policy making. That is why examining factions in Iranian politics is significant for understanding Iranian foreign policy decisions. Yet, an obstacle should be addressed before proceeding with the factions. In conclusion about different scholars' categorization of political factions that exist in Iran, it is important to draw attention to sometimes careless usage of adjectives such as "conservative", "hardliner (or radical)", "pragmatic", "moderate" and "reformist". Some scholars may use "conservative" with "hardliner" exchangeably while others confuse "moderate" with

"reformist" or "pragmatic". What is more, the faction names employed in this work are intentionally chosen with regard to different circles' approach toward foreign policy.

To begin with, in Iran there are three elite circles that are the "inner circle elite" which has the power to execute domestic and foreign policy decisions, "the administrative elite" who still has influence on decision-making, but less in comparison to the inner circle elite, and "the discourse elite" which can (usually) indirectly influence policy making via setting the political discourse (Rakel, 2009: 106). According to Rakel (2009: 113-114), while the inner circle elite of Iran comprises of those whose legitimacy is embedded in the Islamic Law, the administrative elite includes the elected institutions of Iran, and the discourse elite is composed of the *bonyads* who have the ability, as a result of their economic power, to influence the inner circle elites. Therefore, closely observing all these three elites in Iran is key to understanding Iranian domestic and foreign policy. The primary focus of the thesis will be on the inner circle and administrative elites because they are directly included in policy making processes and also because the support of the *bonyads* can be purchased by different factions, at different times.

Since the focus of this work is on foreign policy, two mainstream factions are observed, that are the hardliners (radicals) and moderates. The hardliners, or radicals, favor a foreign policy that bears hostility towards the US, aims to export the Islamic revolution, utilizes "*na sharq na gharb*" principle, regards Iran as the true interpreter and representative of Islam, and that Iran is the protector of the *umma*. Furthermore, according to the radicals, maintenance of economic self-sufficiency is of vital importance to the country. Supreme Leader *Ayatollah* Khamenei, Chairman of the Council of Guardians *Ayatollah* Ahmad Jennati, former Assembly of Experts member and the mentor of the

current Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, *Ayatollah* Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, the Chairman of the Judicial branch as well as the member of the Assembly of Experts *Ayatollah* Mahmoud Shahroodi can be counted among the most prominent hardliners of the post-Khomeini era (Kazemzadeh, 2008: 193-194). As can be derived from their titles, all of these members belonging to radical elite circle in Iran are from the clergy and operate within the inner circle. Yet, there are also those who are a part of the radical faction and are non-clerics, such as President Ahmadinejad, Keyhan newspaper's chief editor Shariatmadari, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, and General Mohsen Rezai are to name but a few within the radical "young conservatives" faction (Kazemzadeh, 2008: 193-194).

While Rakel names the group that is called "radicals" in this work as "conservatives", it is argued that at the end of the day, the moderates can be as much conservative as radicals with regard to the representation of Islam in foreign affairs of Iran. Furthermore, both factions in Iran complied with the fact that mending relations with the US did not require urgency and that starting with Khomeini, all politicians emphasized Iranian nationalism (Halliday, 2001: 44-45). However, these similarities do not necessarily mean that moderates and radicals are identical in their approaches to foreign policy. For moderates, radical idealist policies cause the isolation of the country from world affairs. That is why they acknowledge the reality of interdependence among states and the importance of setting and maintaining diplomatic, political, and economic relations with other countries, especially when Iran sits on vast oil and natural gas resources and has a remarkable geopolitical importance. To put it differently, moderates simply ignore the motto "neither East nor West" because by blocking interaction channels

with the others, there remains no way to protect and expand either the Islamic values beyond Iran's territory or the interests of the country. The president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani was the leading moderate figure in foreign policy of Iran and former minister of Intelligence Hojatoleslam Ali Fallahian was also another cleric who supported moderate foreign policy making in the Islamic Republic. Bearing these two mainstream factions of Iranian politics in mind, it is now time to examine the foreign policy of Iran in the years between 1989 and 1997.

When Ali Khamenei was appointed the new Supreme Leader of war torn Iran in 1989, the country's economy was devastated. However, the new *Faqih* was supportive of a hardline foreign policy. His approach towards the US and Israel was no different than that of his predecessor whereas he was soon to come to similar terms with President Rafsanjani, who, in contrast, was an advocate of a more internationalist and export oriented foreign policy (Moslem, 2002: 148-149). When the two leaders are compared, it is obvious that President Rafsanjani had more experience in politics than *Ayatollah* Khamenei, and that the president was a more charismatic leader with further influence within the inner circle of Iranian politics. As a result, Rafsanjani was the man who was to shape and direct Iran's foreign policy until 1997, albeit the existence of serious restrictions upon his moves from the radical faction.

One major international event that soon after the both leaders took their offices was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the invasion, Iran found itself among constraints and opportunities. On the one hand, a Muslim country's invasion of another Muslim country should not have been acceptable to the "true defender" of Islam, and thus, there was the question whether or not to interfere in this event. On the other

hand, the invasion deemed to be a great opportunity for Iran to reverse its belligerent and dangerous image in the eyes of many states. As a result, Iran chose to remain neutral during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and joined calls of the UN Security Council for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Indeed, Iran's neutral stance was appreciated by the European countries as well as the Gulf states. Although Tehran's foreign relations with these states did not suddenly increase to a great level, it was enough for Iran to see that one of its main competitors in the Middle East was denounced and almost eliminated. Last but not least, except for "correcting" its image, Iran's biggest gain from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was that "Saddam capitulated to all of Iran's war aims" accepting the UN Resolution 598[10] and recognizing the 1975 Algiers Accord[11] on the Shatt al-Arab waterway (Takeyh, 2009: 135).

The same period also witnessed the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union. Albeit Moscow's satisfaction with the revolution in Iran, relations between the Soviets and Iran did not improve for a variety of reasons most of which stemmed from foreign policy principles of Iran. As concisely stated by Rubinstein (1981: 603), these reasons were:

> ingrained anticommunism; hostility to Soviet atheism; traditional Iranian fear of the covetous imperialist neighbour to the north; the communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978; and Moscow's insistence on reaffirming the operativeness of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty

While the embedded anticommunist sentiments have their roots in history when Iran was invaded by the Anglo-Soviet alliance in 1941 and the Soviet support for the separatist

[10] UN Security Council Resolution 598 calls upon the belligerent parties to withdraw their forces to the international recognized boundaries, thus ending in no territory gain by either side.

[11] According to the 1975 Algiers Accord, Iran and Iraq are bound to recognize the thalweg (mid-river) principle while sharing the Shatt al-Arab waterway. However, Iraq violated this treaty as Saddam Hussein yearned to gain the full control of the waterway because it is Iraq's only outlet to the Persian Gulf.

Azeris located in Tabriz, the rest of the reasons find their justifications in the Iranian constitution and the speeches of Khomeini. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Iran was wary of the newly independent post-Soviet countries not to frustrate Russia. This was the main reason why Iran remained neutral during the conflicts emerged in Chechnya and Azerbaijan and did not interfere in any means to save the Muslims there. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, Russian arms sales to Iran continued and Iran became the largest trading partner of Russia in the region (Mafinezam and Mehrabi, 2008: 72). Last but not least, the Rafsanjani government tried to reset its ties with the Kraftwerk Union to complete the Bushehr nuclear site project, however under the pressures from the US, the German government did not permit this. The other attempts, made by both Iran and some European states to finish the Bushehr project were also hampered by the US. This time Iran made significant cooperation with the Russian Federation by signing a bilateral cooperation agreement on technological, commercial, economic and scientific areas in 1993. Thus, Russia helped complete the reconstruction of the Bushehr nuclear site.

The need to diversify Iran's economy after the first decade of the revolution and to reduce the country's dependence on oil helped moderate the radical faction. Now that the geostrategic importance of the country became obvious once again with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the dissolution of the Soviets, restraints on the moderates decreased to a level that let them establish and enrich relations with the Europeans, China, and the Gulf states. Notwithstanding, relations with the "Great Satan" did not improve much except for a few trade agreements during the second decade of the revolution due to a variety of reasons to be explained below.

Relations between Iran and the EU were established under the 1992 Critical Dialogue initiative. This initiative constituted the first official EU approach towards Iran, the primary topics of which being soft security issues such as human rights, terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. On human rights, the EU asked Iran to halt the use of torture against the dissidents, uphold the rights of women and minorities, and recognize the freedom of press. As per terrorism, Iranian support for some extremist groups such as the Palestinian Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese Hezbollah were brought to the agenda of the Critical Dialogue by the EU. Moreover, the EU was disturbed by the drug trafficking through Iran coming from Afghanistan. The main reasons behind the EU's eagerness to establish a dialogue with Iran originated from the belief that Iran could contribute to the regional stability and the Middle East policies of the EU further. The EU also expected to enhance economic activities with Iran. The Critical Dialogue of 1992 was interrupted in 1997 with the Mykonos Verdict ordered by *Ayatollah* Khamenei and president Rafsanjani. The Mykonos Verdict, in which "a German court implicated the Iranian leadership of directly involved in the assassination of three Iranian Kurdish leaders in [September 1992] in Berlin", caused the withdrawal of European ambassadors from Tehran in April 1997 (Tarock, 1999: 53; Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2008: 62-63). Later in 1998, the Critical Dialogue was renewed under the name "Comprehensive Dialogue" which I shall discuss in the next section.

Apart from the Critical Dialogue with the EU, Iran maintained bilateral relations with Great Britain, France and Germany. To be sure, Iran's relations with the "Little Satan", Great Britain, did not remedy much although the latter "maintained a diplomatic mission of some sort in Iran throughout the tumultuous revolutionary decade", and the

relations came to an end with the Rushdie affair in 1989 (Takeyh, 2009: 140). Furthermore, relations with France were hampered as a result of close ties between France and Iraq, and the fact that France let the Iranian dissidents to take shelter and continue their activities in this country (Takeyh, 2009: 140-141). Germany, becoming the largest trading partner of Iran after the Islamic revolution, preferred to pursue commercial relations with this country and not interfere in its internal affairs directly (Takeyh, 2009: 142).What is more, German colonial activities were far from resenting Iranians in comparison to presence of the British in Iran and all the traumatic consequences it brought.

Iran's relations with China continued following the Islamic Revolution and Beijing acted quickly to recognize the new government in Tehran. The fact that both countries acknowledged the strategy of non-alignment in their respective foreign policies made them natural allies. Especially during the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, while Iran was en route to isolation, Chinese and Iranian approaches to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were convergent. Both of the non-aligned states condemned these invasions. While China expressed its denouncement of the US shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988, Iran remained silent in Chinese infighting *vis-à-vis* Uighur Muslims. The trade, military and political relations of two countries further improved upon the then Iranian president Ali Khamenei's visit to Beijing in 1989. Last but not least, the Chinese technical support was taken throughout the 1990s upon the Iranian government's decision to resume its nuclear program.

Perhaps the Gulf region constituted the first and foremost test area of the Islamic republic's success in terms of expanding the revolution beyond its borders. In this regard, the Gulf also became the ground in which Iran's foreign policy was moderated after 1989. Relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies did not improve in the first decade of the revolution as a consequence of the ideological threat perceived by the Gulf states and resulted in support for Iraq during its war against Iran. Yet, after 1989, Iran's approach towards its Gulf members began to change. Indeed, Iran was now aware of the need not only to set up amicable relations, but also to guarantee tangible results out of them. As the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place and Iran was seeking ways to improve relations with the Gulf monarchies, the Damascus Declaration in March 1991 with six Gulf states plus Egypt and Syria was signed. This declaration aimed to form a security alliance to counter the threat posed by Iraq. However, Egypt insisted that Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt should become the leading actors in providing the security of the region – a demand which aimed at the exclusion of Iran (Marschall, 2003: 117). Another incident that hampered the improvement of relations between Iran and the UAE was the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands crisis. The dispute originates from the strategic importance of these islands as they overlook the Strait of Hormuz. When Iran took decision to expel foreign workers from the islands in order the change population balance against the UAE and establish its control over them, the crisis began. As Marschall (2003: 121) put it:

> It [the crisis] strengthened the Gulf states' reliance on security arrangements with outside powers, particularly the US, as they feared Iranian expansionism to a greater or lesser degree. But notwithstanding the conflict, the relations improved further in the economic and political fields. Both sides clearly tried to avoid tension in the region and seemed to wish the islands dispute had never flared up.

Despite the crisis, leaders of the Gulf monarchies and Iran exchanged visits throughout the 1990s and improved their relations. The major obstacle with the power to influence the smaller Gulf states' stance towards Iran was Saudi Arabia. "The fact that both countries predicated their legitimacy on the transnational mission of safeguarding Islam made them natural competitors" as Iran's revolutionary hardliner *mullahs* posed a threat – if not overt- against the Saudi kingdom which closely allied itself with the US (Takeyh, 2009: 132). One concrete example of this competition is illustrated by Mafinezam and Mehrabi (2008: 70):

> the religious competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia lingered throughout the 1990s. Nowhere was this more evident than in the financial backing provided by Saudi Arabia to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in the latter half of that decade. The Taliban's religious extremism was especially directed against Iranian's Shia Muslim faith, which the Taliban leaders considered heretical. The confrontation between Iran and the Taliban reached a peak in the summer of 1998 when the Taliban attacked the Iranian consulate in the predominantly Shia town of Mazar-e Sahrif and murdered eleven diplomats stationed there, along with thousands of residents.

3.5 Disguising Foreign Policy Deviations: Iranian, Islamic, Republic?

3.5.1 President Khatami: More Deviation

When Sayyed Mohammed Khatami was elected the president of Iran in the summer of 1997, Iran's relations with key international actors were already on the mend. Despite being a cleric himself, and one of the leading figures of the Islamic revolution, President Khatami's interpretation of foreign policy interests of Iran was far from being radical. Indeed, President Khatami took foreign affairs of Iran from the point where previous president Rafsanjani left and further strengthened Iran's position in regional and international politics. This is, of course, not to suggest that his moderate approach

especially towards the US was not hindered at home by the Spiritual Leader *Ayatollah* Khamenei. Moreover, as underlined by Gheissari and Nasr (2004: 100), Khatami was challenged by *Ayatollah* Khatami on such platforms within the state apparatus as "the Judiciary, the Council of Guardians, and his allies in the media, the Parliament and various government agencies to limit reform". A short, but clear evidence to this is the fact that "111 of Khatami's 297 bills were vetoed by the Council of Guardians" between 1997 and 2004 (Gheissari and Nasr, 2004: 100). Notwithstanding, today it can still be concluded that at the end of two successive terms in office, Khatami's conduct of foreign policy could enhance Iran's place in the international arena. Shortly after assuming the office, President Khatami agreed to be interviewed in January 1998 by the CNN correspondent Christiane Amanpour. At the opening remarks of this interview, Khatami said:

> Ultimately, the Islamic Revolution had-and should have-two directions: First, an interpretation of religion which couples religiosity with liberty. Of course, now that four centuries have passed since the beginning of the American civilization, human experience has taught us that prosperous life should hinge on three pillars: religiosity, liberty, and justice. These are the assets and aspirations of the Islamic Revolution as it enters the 21st century… Second, there is the issue of the independence… Finally, I should refer to the struggles of the Iranian people over the last two centuries which culminated in the quest for independence during the Islamic Revolution launched by *Imam* Khomeini. When *Imam* Khomeini launched the revolution, Iran was in a terrible condition. In other words, the Iranian nation had been humiliated and its fate was decided by others. You know that a remarkable feature of *Imam* Khomeinis struggle was his fight against capitulation which the Shah was forced to ratify making the American advisors immune from prosecution in Iran. This was the worst humiliation for our people. They rose up, fought for independence, and emerged victorious. Of course, the war of the revolution was one of words not weapons. We, therefore, endeavored to obtain a novel experience of religion and to gain independence. Both these features are salient in the American civilization and we feel close to them.

These statements of the President clearly underlined two points. First, he was not a president to abandon the Islamic ideology and thus the essence of the revolution. Despite

his moderate views on foreign policy, he marked that he would be an advocate of the regime's ideological principles. Second, by stressing that Iran regained its independence and halted capitulations given to Americans through Khomeini and his movement in 1979, Khatami not only reiterated his adherence to the Islamic Republic, but he also made a subtle remark of Iranian nationalism. In the same interview, he also drew attention to the point that it was time for the US to stop "cold war mentality and [trying] to create a perceived enemy." This statement constructs a direct, open call to the US government to start dialogue with Iran. As an initial means of the opening of a dialogue, Khatami recommended "the exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and tourists."

To sum up, Khatami sought "dignity, wisdom and prudence", "détente in foreign relations", and "dialogue among civilizations" (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2008: 61). In more concrete terms, President Khatami aspired to open at least a channel of dialogue with the US, tackle the Iraqi threat which Iran continued to perceive even after the invasion of Kuwait, and at the same time gain the support -albeit limitedly- of the Arab world and develop relations with them while putting the old rhetoric of exportation of the Islamic revolution aside. In addition to the Arab countries, as an extension of Khatami's emphasis on "multipolarization", regionalism played a crucial role in Iran's foreign relations and included its Central Asian neighbors in the president's list of Iran's would-be friends (Afrasiabi, 2008: 77-78; Mafinezam and Mehrabi, 2008: 80). Finally, Khatami also wished to resume relations with the EU, with the goal of improving areas of cooperation on which both sides' interests overlapped (Roshandel, 2000: 111).

With these aims on mind, the very urgent two issues to be dealt with were the Rushdie Affair and the Mykonos Verdict. The Rushdie affair had erupted over the publishing of *The Satanic Verses* in 1988 by the Indian-British author Salman Rushdie. *Ayatollah* Khomeini perceived the book as a blasphemy against Islam and issued a *fatwa* (a binding religious opinion in Shia Islam) in 1989 ordering the assassination of the author. In October 1998, President Khatami told the Time magazine reporters in New York that the Rushdie affair was over. However, a reporter from BBC News, Sadeq Saba put it in 1999, "Salman Rushdie has [then] become a kind of political football for the opposing factions in the Iranian leadership". Following the resolution of the Mykonos issue and Khatami's declaration on the Rushdie affair, Europe and Iran reestablished their relations on the ambassadorial levels.

Now that these problems were over, the suspended Critical Dialogue between the EU and Iran, after being reformed in 1998, resumed under the title of Comprehensive (or Constructive) Dialogue. The Dialogue put an emphasis on the issues of human rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, the Middle East Peace Process, trade and investment, and energy (Moshaver, 2003: 296). On the diplomatic front, Khatami paid visits to Italy and the Vatican in March 1999, and France in October 1999. France and Germany provided Iran with the credits and loans (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2008: 64). However, it was not until 2002 that the EU and Iran signed agreements entitled Trade and Cooperation, and Political Dialogue. These agreements were important because they embody clearly the main areas of cooperation between the two sides, and from Iran's point of view, they have the potential to help the country remedy its economy. According to the EU trade documents published online in September 2009, Iranian

imports from the EU was 13,1 billions of euro, and exports to the EU was 7,5 billions of euro by the year 2004. In other words, EU's share of Iran's total imports was around 42% of Iran's total imports of 30,6 billions of euro from the world. Moreover, the EU's total share in Iranian total exports was about 24% out of 31,4 billions of euro exports to the world, again according to the abovementioned EU document. The exports of Iran to the EU have mainly been in the fields of energy and machinery, while Iran imported from the EU machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, and chemicals and related products.

Even though the trade relations between the two sides boosted during the presidency of Khatami, the nuclear program of Iran, on which the EU has shown sensitivity, was and today continues to be a source of tension. When the existence of an undeclared nuclear facility at Natanz, Iran was revealed by the leftist Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq in 2002, Iranian – EU relations became taut, with the US pressuring Iran to sign the Additionl Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT in 2003, it did not ratify it in the *Majlis*, causing the suspension of the Comprehensive Dialogue by the EU. Relations continued only after the signing of the Paris Agreement in November 2004, according to which Iran complied with the reassertions not to acquire nuclear weapons, and fully cooperating with the IAEA on its nuclear program. Iran also accepted the full suspension of all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, and negotiation with the EU on long-term arrangements regarding its nuclear program. However, when in April 2005 the EU asked Iran to permanently cease its nuclear program because Iran was violating the terms of the additional protocol by not being transparent and opening its

nuclear facilities to the IAEA inspectors, the relations between the two sides halted once again.

Iran's relations with two other major powers, namely Russia and China continued in a profitable manner. On the Russian – Iranian front, further improvement of relations was achieved as Putin was elected president of Russia in 2000. In this regard, two points are remarkable. First, President Putin immediately after assuming office, cancelled Gore – Chernomyrdin agreement with which Russia agreed to stop arms exports to Iran by the year 2000 (Mafinezam and Mehrabi, 2008: 73). Second, Putin offered an international gas consortium to Iran in 2002 (Mafinezam and Mehrabi, 2008: 75). Iran's relations with China were strengthened by the official visits paid by President Khatami and President Zemin. While China's need was growing for oil and gas, Iran's primary concern was to diversify its trading partners. In 2000, when Khatami visited China, the China – Iran Joint Communique proclaimed that "The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in energy, transportation, telecommunications, science, technology, industry, banking, tourism, agriculture, mining, environmental protection and other fields" (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, 2002). Furthermore, according to Reuters news agency report on 9 December 2007, Chinese SINOPEC Group signed an agreement with Iran in 2004 agreeing to develop Yadavaran oil field and "to buy 10 million tones of liquefied natural gas a year for 25 years" (Reuters). Last but not least, trade between the two partners increasingly continued and China's rank in the major trading partners list of Iran increased from the sixth in 2003, to second in 2008 (Ghafouri, 2009: 84; The EU Trade Document, September 2009).

The relations between the US and Iran entered into a turbulent period when the Islamic revolution was successfully carried out, and continued until the presidency of Khatami. As indicated in the beginning of this section, President Khatami sought a rapproachement with the US. "Not only did he try to rip down the "wall" of distrust with the United States, he also deplored the occupation of the American Embassy on November 4, 1979 which still symbolizes the essence of Khomeinism" (Mozaffari, 1999: 20). However, this should not be taken as though Khatami deliberated a comprehensive improvement of relations with this major power neither over a short term, nor in the long run.

Only a few months after the Islamic Revolution, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and its staff was taken hostage by the leftist Iranian students, ostracizing the relations between the two. Unable to ensure the release of the hostages, Washington froze the Iranian assets in the United States. In addition, the US also sanctioned "the importation into the United States of Iranian crude oil and refined finished products of such crude oil, and its possession by the United States, or within free trade zones of the United States" (Alikhani, 2001: 66). Further US efforts to undermine Iran's economy by persuading the European states as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council and Japan to impose sanctions on Iran continued. However, when the attempts of the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proved futile, this time the US referred Iran to the UN Security Council with the request that all UN members apply sanctions against Iran "for all items except for food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes", but this request was turned down with the veto from the Soviet Union who

regarded the issue to be a bilateral one between Washington and Tehran (Alikhani, 2001: 75 – 76).

Furthermore, during the first term of the Clinton administration, two more steps were taken by the US regarding Iran's economic and political position. These were done due to three issue areas on which the American and Iranian views are strikingly different. These were the WMD acquisition of Iran, its support for terrorist groups, and vehement opposition to the Middle East Peace Process –albeit Khatami's moderate views on the Middle East peace process (Moshaver, 2003: 290). One of the steps taken by the US was the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1995 which was enacted as a response to Iran's nuclear program and support for terrorist organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Jihad). According to ILSA, American companies were banned from investing in Iran's energy sector, as well as trade. The US President Clinton also enacted a "Dual Containment" policy with the goal of isolating Iran and Iraq economically, whereas it was far from producing the desired shift in the attitudes of these two states' behavior (Monshipouri, 2004: 575; Gause III, 1994). The Dual Containment remained from 1993 until 1997 in effect. When Khatami was elected president in 1997, the Clinton administration "removed Iran from the list of states involved in narcotics trafficking and placed the Mujahedin-e Khalq…on the initial listing of foreign terrorist organizations" in 1998 (Byman, 2008: 177).

The turning point of the US-Iranian relations came only with the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US. This event was of a type that brought about opportunities and challenges to the relations between the two. Although Iran was among the first states to send condolences to the US, and opened its airspace and port facilities to the US military

personnel during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, relations were hampered shortly after. First, President Bush included Iran in the axis of evil list upon the Israeli discovery of tons of weapons aboard the Karine-A en route to Palestinians (Clawson, 2005: 153). Second, the invasion of Iraq disturbed the already fragile balance the US and Iran was trying to maintain, because it was now not a weakened Saddam who neighbored Iran, but the US military. At the outset of the US invasion, Iran declared "active neutrality", however worked to empower the Iraqi Shiites so that they could assume political power within the US-formulated Iraqi politics (Taremi, 2005: 39). Despite the Iranian help in reconstruction of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration continued to accuse Iran particularly "of meddling in Iraqi affairs and attempting to destabilize Iraq" (Taremi, 2005: 40). To conclude, at the end of the two presidential terms of Mohammad Khatami, the goodwill towards the US was demonstrated, however the long-standing distrust, divergent interests, and of course, ideology between the two states prevented them from enhancing cooperation in political and economic areas.

3.5.2 President Ahmadinejad: More Disguise

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected to his first presidential term in 2005. Unlike previous presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, during his presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad did not mention his foreign policy visions particularly because he found it more lucrative to refer to economic problems that the nation was facing at home. Although not a cleric himself, Ahmadinejad's views on foreign policy are conservative, but at the same time pragmatic. He belongs to the young conservatives who fought both in the revolution

against the Shah, and in the Iran-Iraq war. The main foreign policy issues that topped the Ahmadinejad's term in office were the nuclear program of Iran and the invasion of Iraq. While he was particularly interested in Asia and the immediate neighborhood, Ahmadinejad did not necessarily overlook Iran's relations with the EU.

President Ahmedinejad's foreign policy sits on two pillars. One of them is "accommodating policy" while the other is named "alliance policy" by Barzegar (2010: 173). With the "accommodating policy", Ahmadinejad aimed at "expanding cooperation after Saddam's fall with the main Arab world actor … and seeking direct talks with the US" (Barzegar, 2010: 173). Indeed, President Ahmadinejad's emphasis on regional relations aimed at turning the Middle East as well as Central Asia and Caucasus to regions which are self-reliant and free of extra-regional powers (meaning the US) (Maleki and Afrasiabi, 2008: 78-79). On the other hand, with the "alliance policy" did Ahmadinejad seek ways to avert a possible US attack against Iran by allying it with regional and extra-regional states, and also aimed to "regionalize" the nuclear issue so that Iran's nuclear program would be justified *vis-à-vis* Israel's nuclear capabilities and the conflict with Palestinians (Barzegar, 2010: 173). In addition to these pragmatic means of policy, President Ahmadinejad's chanting "wipe Israel off the map" was very radical, yet still far from "the frenzied early days of the revolution, as even the New Right recognized that a less belligerent approach was the best means of ensuring Iran's ascendance in the Middle East" (Takeyh, 2009: 237).

With regard to the nuclear issue, Iran resumed its nuclear program which was voluntarily suspended with the Paris Agreement of 2004 Iran and the EU signed. As a result of this resumption, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, as well as the Political

Dialogue Agreement were suspended by the EU in 2005. In 2006, the UK, France, China, Russia, and the US offered "June 2006 Proposal" to Iran, stating that in return for cooperation in the area of nuclear activities with full transparency, the suspension of discussion of Iranian nuclear program at the UN Security Council was assured. As Iran did not comply with this proposal, the UN Security Council resolution 1747 "calling upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes" was accepted.

With regard to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has supported the territorial integrity of this country since then. Although Iranian and American interests over Iraq converged on overthrowing Saddam Hussein and preventing Iraq from becoming a military power again, Iran was not utterly comfortable with the US as its new neighbor. This was so because especially "for Ahmadinejad and his allies, America is both a source of cultural contamination of the sacred Islamic lands and a rapacious capitalist power exploiting indigenous resources" (Takeyh, 2009: 240). Relations between Iran and Iraq entered into a new era when Saadun al-Dulaimi, then defense minister of Iraq, visited Iran where he apologized from Iranians for all Saddam Hussein had done to Iran, and thus Iraq's apology opened the way for a number of trade and cooperation agreements (Takeyh, 2008: 22).

Apart from these two major issues that dominated Iranian foreign policy during Ahmadinejad's first presidential term, Iran's relations with the EU, Russia and China continued on trade and energy areas as before. Against all odds that have emerged over the nuclear program of Iran, it is observed that Iran-EU trade relations continued to

increase. From 2004 to the beginning of the year 2009, the sum of exports and imports of Iran with the EU increased by 5 billions of euro placing the EU27 first with 21% of total share in Iran's trade with the world, and it was followed by China with 17%. Besides these, it is worth mentioning Iran – Turkey relations in the final years of Khatami's and throughout Ahmadinejad's presidencies. Although with the Islamic revolution in 1979, the relations between the two countries were hampered and since then, a major portion of the Iranian political elite viewed Turkey as the stalking horse of the US, with the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey in 2002, relations with Iran gained importance –due to the pro-Islamic stance of the JDP. However, this stance of the JDP should not be perceived as though the new government in Turkey severed ties with the US. Quite contrary to this, relations between the US and Turkey continue in an amicable manner. For Iranian pragmatists (Khatami and Ahmadinejad), improving ties with Turkey on economic matters not only means improving Iranian economy, but also decreasing its dependence on the West.

3.6 Analysis and Hypotheses

3.6.1 Foreign Policy Tenets of Revolutionary Iran

Before making an analysis of foreign policy deviations of revolutionary Iran, it is useful to recall foreign policy tenets of Iran which are mentioned earlier in this chapter. These principles are divided into two main pillars, and each pillar is discussed with three different principles in both groups. The reason for creating pillars is to better understand the dynamics behind the Iranian Islamic Revolution which are used as basis to understand

Iranian foreign policy and deviations that occurred. These categories are created by answering four main questions posed earlier. Studying these questions shows us that the Iranian revolution and the motive behind its foreign policy stand on the economic and religious pillars. It is observed in the case of Iran that when an Iranian foreign policy tenet that is under the economic pillar is violated, the state behaves more *status quo*, whereas when a principle that belongs to the religious pillar, the state becomes more nationalist than following its universalist claims. "Who are the actual contenders in the Shah's Iran?" was the first question. As already studied previously, those who took part in the 1979 revolution were made up of a large portion of the Iranian society, ranging from the ordinary citizens to the clergy, the *bazaaris*, the nationalists, and to the leftists. Yet, two groups were the forerunners of the revolution, namely the *mullahs* and the *bazaaris*. The second question was "what are they discontent with?" The main reasons of these two groups' discontent were the loss of Iranian independence to major foreign powers and the interests they pursued and to a large extent, realized in Iran. Therefore, the clergy and the merchants were also automatically discontent with the policies of the Shah, his inability to rule justly, and distribute the wealth of the nation gained from especially its oil revenues equally. And the third question was if the revolution was violent or not, and if any foreign support was received. In the case of Iran, the revolutionary movement had no foreign support, and moreover, it had opposition from the West. This answer also helps to see one component of the first pillar on which the Iranian foreign policy was formed.

These answers form the basis of one pillar of revolutionary Iran's foreign policy, which contains three components. These are anti-imperialism, self-sufficiency, and independence. What is derived from anti-imperialism is that Khomeini's revolution aimed

at forming a non-aligned foreign policy which left no room for foreign interference and dominance over the state and its governance. The same non-aligned orientation of foreign policy also aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in particularly economic, industrial and technology areas without the help, or with minimum possible help from any foreign entities. This is also due to the fact that the Islamic revolution made in Iran was not supported by any foreign element, nor was it an extension of any revolution which previously took place elsewhere in the world.

The second pillar of Iranian foreign policy finds its basis in the answer to the fourth question: "What is the revolutionary outcome?" The answer is an Islamic republic, which is also Iranian. If we interpret the outcome only as an Islamic republic –considering the speeches of *Ayatollah* Khomeini, we can do so- then it is possible to conclude that another characteristic of Iranian foreign policy is its quite anti-nationalist feature. Because, as Mirbaghari (2004: 559) discusses it clearly, the source of foreign policy "is usually thought to be the will of people" in the West, while in "Shiite Islam . . . the source of political behavior is God." Mirbaghari (2004: 559) also draws our attention to lexical difference between the origins of the words "politics" and "*siasat*", interpreting the former as "preoccupation with keeping people happy", and the latter as "[advancing] people, even if it means incurring their displeasure." The interpretation of "*siasat*" in the case of Shiite Iran is embodied in two further foreign policy principles that are anti-Zionism and supporting the *mustazafin* in any corner of the world. However, as it will be discussed below that foreign policy making in Iran was almost at no times free of the restriction of Iranian national interests over the revolution's Islamic character, one may argue that the employment of the pro-*umma* characteristic of Iranian foreign policy

become difficult in this work. At this point, I base my argument of anti-nationalist and pro-*umma* character of foreign policy of Iran on the speeches and deeds of *Ayatollah* Khomeini, who was the main figure establishing the foundations of the Islamic republic's foreign policy and located at the top of the state with the title of the *faqih*. To sum up, we can talk about six foreign policy principles of revolutionary Iran. These are anti-imperialism, self-sufficiency, independence, anti-nationalism, support for the *mustazafin*, and anti-Zionism.

3.6.2 Deviations in Iranian Foreign Policy and Conclusion

Bearing in mind the principles of Iran's revolutionary foreign policy, the deviations found out from the facts stated throughout this chapter will be presented. In the following pages, four hypotheses are proposed providing with brief reminder statements of the facts instead of re-writing them at length here, and also the principles that are violated with those specific events which caused deviations are stated.

- Hypothesis 1:

  Deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when the state is not self-sufficient in military and economic terms during war time.

- Hypothesis 2:

  Deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when the state is not sufficient in economic terms.

- Hypothesis 3:

Deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when national interests prevail over its revolutionary ideology.

- Hypothesis 4:

  Deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when factionalization appears.

Iran's purchasing arms from Israel in 1981 during the war with Iraq was due to the convergence of Iranian and Israeli interests with regard to Iraq. Iran violated its principle of anti-Zionism with this move because by arms purchase, the revolutionary Iran de facto recognized Israel and directly contributed to the economy of this country. The reason for this deviation is of an internal one, stemming from self-insufficiency in military terms. The second deviation which occurred in 1985 was Iran's purchasing arms from the US through Nicaragua and Israel to maintain its war against Iraq, and was again against the principle of self-sufficiency. The same reason as in the case of arms purchase from Israel can be discussed here, namely self-insufficiency.

Furthermore, Iran's remaining silent in three conflicts erupted in the 1990s in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and China (the Uighurs) concerning Muslim populations in these places was caused by national interests as Tehran did not activate its principles of supporting the *mustazafin*, and acting in a pro-*umma* way. Had Iran defended and supported the causes of these peoples, it would hamper its relations with Russia and China.

Another deviation in Iran's foreign policy happened as then President Khatami made an open call for direct talks with the US. Khatami's moderate and pragmatist

foreign policy, at this point, ignored the principles of anti-imperialism and self-sufficiency since he aimed ultimately at lifting the US sanctions against Iran and paving the way for future economic relations with this country. The reasons caused this particular deviation are twofold: economic insufficiency of the state and factionalism within the Iranian political elite.

Economic insufficiency of Iran caused it once again to make deviational moves in its foreign policy especially during the second term of President Khatami when he expanded trade links with the EU, and let the Union reach the first place among Iran's other trading partners. This situation changed the balance of relations between the two at the expense of Iran, making it dependent economically on trade with EU. However, as seen on previous pages, it can be claimed that the pressure put on Iran by the EU with regard to the nuclear program of the former owes to this imbalance, thus also hurting the principle of independence.

Moreover, President Khatami's moderate stance towards the Middle Eastern Peace process violates the principle of anti-Zionism of revolutionary Iran. The drive behind this moderate view is both domestic and external. Domestically, the reason is factional politics in Iran, whereas externally it is geopolitics and the advantage that Iran can take from contributing to peace, a move which can make it again an influential power on the regional scale.

Perhaps, the most important deviation, in terms of its magnitude, in Iranian foreign policy can be counted as its attitude towards the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. While in the invasion of Afghanistan, Iran opened its airspace to US forces, it maintained

active neutrality during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Thus, Iran quite openly proved to be supportive of "the oppressor" instead of "the oppressed" as it referred to in its constitution (and as they perceive Muslims to be oppressed by particularly the US), as both of these countries were invaded by the US, to whom the revolutionaries and Khomeini himself referred as the oppressors. Moreover, considering Tehran's uneasy relations with the Taliban government of the time in Afghanistan and Hussein's regime in Iraq, Iranian policy makers did not adhere to the principle of pro-*umma* characteristic either. While there were no overt external reasons which caused these deviations, Iranian factionalism as well as national interests can best explain why Iran subtly supported the invasions of both of these countries.

Last but not least, as stated earlier, President Ahmadinejad also tried to find ways for establishing direct talks with the US. In spite of his being a hardliner president, pragmatism has prevailed over his anti-American discourse, because he was internally pressured by the public critiques against his repetitive rhetoric on the Iranian nuclear program which became hollow over time, and caused nothing but harming Iranian pride and economic development. Also, his presidential term saw almost no improvement in daily lives of Iranians in economic terms, and he consistently increased Iran's dependence on trade with the EU, which finally used its stick to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for its nuclear program.

Overall, Iranian foreign policy has undergone fluctuations over the course of more than 30 years. The line which had been designed by Ayatollah Khomeini right after the revolution has largely shifted especially after the death of the Leader. What was formerly an almost pure anti-*status quo*, dissatisfied line of Khomeini's foreign policy has become

rather an amalgam of *status quo* and revisionist one. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in line with the theory of power transition, a revolutionary state is assumed to be discontent with the international order and Iran is no exception to this. What is more, as a revolutionary state that has been at the transitional growth stage, Iran's revolutionary foreign policy options have naturally been restricted by the number of *status quo* states whose power was equal to or surpassing Iran's power. As a result, former (and current) Iranian presidents sought ways to open talks with the US, and expanded trade ties with the EU. Therefore, these examples reveal that Iran has rather become a *status quo* state that partially accepted the international order it used to stand against some three decades ago.

Of the above stated deviations in Iranian foreign policy and their reasons, three of the reasons are observed to have the potential to cause deviations by themselves. These are insufficiency in economic or military matters, nationalism, and factional politics. Whereas four other factors which play role in occurrence of deviations in revolutionary Iran have not taken place without one or the other main factors that caused deviations. These four factors are a change in the international system, pragmatism, public pressure and geopolitics. It is argued that while the above mentioned three factors per se can cause deviations, the latter four factors rather exist as antecedent conditions in a way that can affect the magnitude of deviations. These hypotheses are next going to be tested in the following chapter where the revolution and foreign policy of China are studied.

CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN POLICY OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to focus on the hypotheses written in the previous chapter, and study Chinese foreign policy mainly in guidance of those hypotheses. The first section is composed of a brief historical background to understand the factors that contributed to the Chinese communist revolution in 1949. While doing this, answers to the four questions posed earlier in the second chapter will help fathom the revolutionary foreign policy are also sought. To recall, these questions ask (a) who the contenders are in a revolutionary movement; (b) what they are discontent with; (c) if any foreign support was received; (d) what the revolutionary outcome is. Once these questions are answered, Chinese foreign policy principles are laid down in the next section. Then, the chapter continues with the most important events occurred in Chinese foreign policy and world politics. As a revolutionary state, China is under focus within the framework of the theory of power transition in this chapter (Organski, 1968). As a state whose economy has steadily developed especially after the 1970s, revolutionary Chinese foreign policy had been one of an opponent to the international order that was being shaped in the post-World War II. Like Iran, China is also considered to be at the second stage in 1949 that is the transitional growth stage on its way to power maturity. What this had meant for China is that the state's economy had been developing with industrialization and its population growing, eventually carrying the state to a point where the state began to face and comply with the

realities of the international order rather than pursuing its revolutionary path in foreign policy. The fact that China alone did not challenge the international order was primarily because even though at the transitional growth stage a state's ability to influence international politics increases, it is yet to become a great power. Therefore, the state needs equal or above-level (in power) allies to move on with its revisionist cause. This had been what the Chinese state was missing considering its stormy relations with the Soviets. Although China has become much more powerful today, its dissatisfaction with the international order can be deemed as already faded due to occurrence of several elements of acceptance of the order. The most prominent of these is the opening of communication channels in 1972 with the US. Taking under consideration that the Chinese socialist revolution's first and foremost goal had been to challenge and defy capitalism and liberal economy, the Sino-American rapproachement, despite several political crises erupted over the issue of Taiwan, is a clear indicator that revolutionary China has no longer existed among the states dissatisfied with the international order. Following this, China's ever growing economic and trade relations with the US and European states is another such element showing the state's acceptance of the international order. To conclude, the Chinese state is not a state with revisionist characteristics today, and the main goal in this chapter is to find out the root causes of such elements that emerged as foreign policy deviations. The period under focus is from 1949 to 1990s. This is because of a considerable shift in Chinese policy by the 1990s. As will be discussed below, all the foreign policy principles of revolutionary China were violated by the second half of the 1990s. To give an example, Chinese trade relations with the US began in early 1970s. A further study on ever growing Chinese-US trade relations will bring the analysis only to the violation of the same principles, if not the reasons.

Therefore, once it is confirmed that all revolutionary foreign policy principles are violated, there is simply no need to go forward in time as there are no remaining principles which can be violated. Following this section on the Chinese foreign policy, the chapter continues with the analysis of it, and concludes with an overall analysis of the hypotheses proposed.

4.2 The Demise of the Imperial China and the Communist Revolution

Foreign penetration into the imperial Chinese economy began in the 19th century when China, with its growing population, premature industry as well as weak economy was vulnerable and unable to compete with the colonial powers of the time (Skocpol, 1979: 42-43). The Opium War broke out as British opium imports to China were banned by the Chinese government in 1839, not because opium was a threat to health of the society, but because its importation from the British constituted a threat to national economic security (Lin, 2004). At the end of the three-year long war with the British, China was defeated and signed the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, which had severe articles for China (Fairbank, 1940: 28-29). These included China ceding Hong Kong to Great Britain and the treaty granting Great Britain "most favored nation" status, according to which the British would enjoy the same rights (or concessions) on trade given to any other great powers. From the second half of the 19th century until 1911, not only further concessions were granted to especially Great Britain and France, but also China lost a large part of its influence over the neighboring territories such as Burma, Annam, Korea and Chinese Turkestan. The British, French, and Russians began to establish protectorates over the above mentioned

territories, while Japan finally defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and China ceded Taiwan.

In 1912, Sun Yat-Sen, a nationalist, was elected provisional president to the Republic of China when the Qing dynasty collapsed. Goals of the Nationalists, as formulated by Sun Yat-Sen, were to unite people and state, gain independence from foreign powers, and realize social reforms (Fitzgerald, 1990: 326). However, while Sun Yat-Sen aimed at building the young republic over these three principles that would boost nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood, he was missing the military power needed to consolidate his government. Therefore, the missing military power resulted in the subtle and quick defeat of Sun Yat-Sen. Sun Yat-Sen agreed to leave the provisional presidential seat to Yuan Shikai in 1912, who was in fact sent to suppress the rebellions by the imperial government just before its collapse. Even though Sun Yat-Sen and other prominent Kuomintang (KMT - Nationalist Party) members rebelled against Yuan's rule that was being turned into a dictatorship and monarchical rule, soon after they were suppressed by Yuan's forces and left to Japan in 1913. When Yuan died three years later in 1916, domestic struggle to seize power in Beijing restarted, and actually, the internal unrest caused by the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, established in 1921) continued consistently until the communist revolution in 1949. The Nationalist rule, as Fairbank (1949: 280) states, "[had] its roots in none of the principal classes of society, it was utterly devoid of a social outlook and took foreign imperialism for its friend."

The Communist activities, on the other hand, began with the May Fourth (1919) movement in China following the heavy losses of the country in the First World War. Masses dominated mostly by students protested against the Nationalist rule and the Treaty

of Versailles, according to whose articles 156, 157 and 158 Germany renounced all its "rights, title and privileges" it had over China in favor of Japan (Yale Law School, 2008). Taking its official form in 1921 as the Communist Party of China, the CCP's goal was to mobilize the society by preparing them slowly for the revolution while coexisting with the KMT until the revolution succeeded, as dictated by the Soviets. While both the CCP and the KMT were financially supported by the Soviets at the same time, the KMT fragmented in the mid-1920s into right and left wings. The Nationalist party's power began to decrease as it was now operating only with the right wing and facing a power vacuum with the death of Sun Yat-Sen in 1925. Mao Zedong, who believed in a peasantry revolution more than in urban-based worker rebellions, became a popular figure among the Chinese society over the years, and especially his leadership was ensured with the 1934 Long March during which Mao and his supporters visited many provinces in China, mobilizing the masses based in rural areas. Along with foreign penetration and ineffective rule of the Nationalists, Chinese revolution also owes to:

> (a) the Chinese state's military weakness in peripheral areas that gave the Communists their initial room to maneuver, (b) an agrarian regime that allowed the [Communist] party to gain a measure of popular acquiescence and support on the basis of class (antilandlord) and tax-resistance (anti-state) appeals, (c) rising nationalist sentiment (especially in urban areas) to which the Communists successfully appealed in United Front declarations and which the Nationalists antagonized by pursuing the civil war, and (d) a world economic crisis that both weakened the Chinese state and economy and helped impel Japanese imperialism in Northeast and Northern China (Esherick, 1995: 56).

The fact that the Chinese state was not militarily strong enough in peripheral areas resulted in the Communists' mingling in the lives of peasants and getting to know their unrest closely. Hence, contrary to the diminishing popularity of the Nationalists, the Communists were more welcomed and had also opportunity to spread their revolutionary

cause over time. Furthermore, the urban-based part of the society also began to sympathize with the Communists when the Nationalists failed to act in accordance with the United Front movement (according to which, the two blocs, namely the nationalists and communists, were to unite against the foreign ills and work for the benefit of an entire people of China). Last but not least, as also indicated above, anti-imperialist sentiments with regard to Japan and its gains after the World War I, as well as the atrocities and invasion of eastern China by Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937 – 1945) were also among the factors that rendered the revolutionary movement successful. On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the People's Republic of China, and shortly after the establishment of the republic, the Nationalists fled to Taiwan.

In conclusion, it is necessary to answer the above mentioned questions to have a better understanding of the principles of Chinese foreign policy. The contenders who carried out the Chinese revolution were the peasants and not the workers. The resentment of the contenders in Chinese revolution was rooted in foreign imperialist exploitation of China which lasted over a century and the ineffective and unequal governance of both the Qing dynasty and later, the Nationalists. Furthermore, different than that of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the Chinese Communist revolution received foreign support from the Soviets, a fact which had an initial effect on formulation and conduct of early years of Chinese foreign policy. And finally, the outcome was a people's communist republic. In the next section, foreign policy principles of the Communist China are studied before examining the state's foreign relations from 1949 to the mid-1990s.

4.3 Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy

The main source of Chinese foreign policy is the form of Marxist – Leninist ideology shaped by Mao Zedong to meet the needs of the Chinese. According to Levine (1994), Chinese foreign policy is composed of "formal" and "informal" ideologies. On the one hand, as Levine (1994: 33) put it:

> A formal ideology consists of a fairly small number of interrelated central propositions that constitute an orthodoxy that is defined as much, or even more, by defence of the central doctrines against the heresy of large or small deviations as it is by confrontation with major competing ideologies.

This formal ideology of China is, therefore, constituted by the Marxist – Leninist – Mao Zedong thought *vis-à-vis* capitalism.As Zhao (2004: 8) summarizes:

> Communist ideology is "a formal system of ideas which provided a perceptual prism" through which the Communist leaders view the world and which, they believe, explain the reality. Perceiving international relations through the ideological concepts, Chinese Communist leaders believed in the inevitable victory of anti-imperialism, socialist revolution, and national liberation struggles. Acting upon the belief that "East wind was prevailing over the West wind," Mao Zedong adopted aggressive foreign policies against the capitalist world in the 1950s and tried to export the Chinese model of socialism in the 1960s.

Henceforth, the Chinese foreign policy after the revolution of 1949 "was based on unity with the socialist camp, solidarity with the third world, and opposition to the capitalist world" within the framework of the official, or "formal" ideology (Womack, 2008: 4; Levine, 1994: 33). Albeit vaguely and broadly defined, these foreign policy principles suggest a sharp division between the two blocs of the Cold War. This division translates into a rejection of any form of submission to or cooperation with the capitalist states or their supporters in political, economic, technological, and cultural areas. According to the formal communist ideology, the world is divided into two camps, namely the capitalist and the socialist camps. That is why, the struggle between the two camps will continue

until the time the socialists reign over the imperialist states. Therefore, China undertook to support the liberation movements of the colonial states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Embracing the socialist notions, the Chinese favored a world order in which all nations were to be treated equally while China promised to support developing countries.

The "informal ideology", on the other hand, means "cultural values, preferences, prejudices, predispositions, habits, and unstated but widely shared propositions about reality that condition the way in which political actors behave" (Levine, 1994: 34). However, the "informal" ideology of China will be left out of the study of revolutionary Chinese foreign policy. Following also this track together with the formal ideology will obscure the understanding of the ideological aspect of Chinese foreign policy particularly which is dealt in the thesis. To give one example in terms of informal ideological values, Chinese regard themselves and would like to be treated as a "great power", which means China is superior to other states. In order to obtain the great power status, China may very well violate its (formal) communist ideological principles in pursuit of informal ideology and therefore, it becomes almost impossible in this study to catch any deviations from revolutionary principles.

4.4 Foreign Relations of China during the Cold War

The first important foreign policy test for China came when the Korean War started in June 1950, just about a year after Chinese communist revolution. In a divided Korea at the end of the World War II, hostilities reached its peak when the US troops withdrew in 1949. Guaranteeing support from the Soviet Union and China, the North Koreans attacked

the Republic of South Korea. In return, the US forces intervened in order to help the South Koreans. However, as Scobell (2004: 114) underlines in his work, Chinese reluctance to take a decision to intervene in the Korean War came only after a thorough calculation between national interests of China and the responsibility that Communist ideology put on the shoulders of revolutionary leaders.

A second test for China was its policy toward Hong Kong. Hong Kong was ceded by the imperial China to the British rule with the Nanjing Treaty on 1842. Following the Communist revolution of 1949, China, instead of attempting to take Hong Kong back mainly because "the seizure would ipso facto mean probably war, and certainly the final cutting off of China from the rest of the world," let Britain continue ruling the island (Kirby, 1951: 198). After the expiration of the 99-year lease in 1997[12] and Hong Kong's attainment of the status of special administrative region, China agreed the maintenance of the capitalist system of the Island as well as the local government's administration for the next half century (Chang, 1992: 129). Siu-Kai and Hsin-chi (1986: 223) conclude that the Chinese compliance with the economic and political autonomy of Hong Kong "is basically a practical decision, and is contingent upon a critical condition: that Hong Kong should be economically viable and useful to China's economic modernization."

At the early stages of the Communist revolution, Chinese foreign relations were determined by a number of pragmatic leaders whose primary aim became to align China with the Soviet Union. Given the situation that the Soviet Union was the only communist superpower in the early days of the Cold War, China's alignment, if not true alliance, with the Soviets proved to be the sole option for Chinese officials. According to the Sino –

[12] 89% of the Hong Kong's land area was leased to Britain under the 1898 convention of Beijing (Chang, 1992: 128).

Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed on 14 February 1950, both parties to the treaty undertook to provide the other with the military assistance in case of an invasion. Despite the fact that differences did exist between Moscow and Beijing with regard to the ideology, the alignment of China with the Soviets did not compose any contradiction to its principles.

The most prominent advantages of the Sino – Soviet alliance for China were that first, China thus had the opportunity to be protected against a possible US, or US-backed attack, second, by averting threats from outsiders to some degree, China gained time to consolidate its power domestically, and third, by "leaning to one side", in addition to the drive for protection of the regime from outside threats, China also sought ways to carry the communist revolution beyond its borders (Yahuda, 1968: 95; Sadri, 1996: 45). Indeed, the driving reasons why Mao signed this treaty can be laid as (a) the need to renew the existing 1945 treaty of friendship and alliance between the Soviets and the Nationalist China because China lost its sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and recognize its independence; (b) regulating the sources of Sino-Soviet tension; (c) the need for China to receive economic and technical support from "a steady and reliable source"; and (d) the need to preserve and strengthen the young communist government with the support of a "military-cum-political ally" (Kuisong, 2005: 2; Gittings, 1969: 45; Whiting, 1959, 102).

Apart from Beijing's relations with the Soviet Union, the same decade witnessed almost no significant activity in China's relations with either the US or the West European states. The means of communication between China and the US remained vague and taut due to the overt US support to the government in Taiwan as well as the existence of the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. Although Germany established trade

relations with China in 1955, it soon suspended it due to the US-led boycott until the Chinese – American relations began to normalize in 1972. China's relations with some of the East European countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were established and maintained in economic and industrial areas (Shambaugh, 1992: 102 – 103; Pringsheim, 1960).

The guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy are mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. While from 1954 to 1982, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence determined the basis of relations between China and the third world states, the same principles were also included in the preamble of the 1982 Constitution of China. The main difference between the 1954 and 1982 Connstitutions of the People's Republic of China is that in the latter Constitutiton's preamble, China uses a softer language by removing the statement that says "resistance to United States aggression", and not making mention of "an indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics".

The same five principles were also cited in the 1954 agreement China and India signed. However, it is hard to claim that this treaty healed specific problems between India and China. In 1959, Premier Zhou Enlai refused to recognize borders that Indian leader Nehru insisted on. Furthermore, China accused India of being expansionist and eventually attacked it in 1962. Albeit resolving that particular conflict in a short time with a unilateral cease-fire declaration by China the same year, "New Delhi's reaction to its 1962 defeat and ensuing changes in the Sino-Indian power relationship was manifold and included dramatically heightened suspicion of Chinese intentions" (Elkin and Fredericks,

1983: 1129). Therefore, relations remained taut due to power competition over the region until late 1980s. China supported Pakistan in its war against India in 1965, and border conflicts continued also in the second half of the 1960s between China and India (Garver, 1996).

In April 1955, the Bandung Conference was held with China playing a prominent role in it. The conference was held with the participation of a number of post-colonial African and Asian states whose primary aim was to enhance political, economic and cultural relations with each other while at the same time unifying around the goal of establishment of an independent and fair, as they perceive it, line in international relations. Moreover, the conference is also considered as the initial step towards the non-aligned movement established in 1961. One importance of the Bandung Conference comes from the fact that China explicitly signaled that it was willing to play a more active role towards the Third World in promotion of economic and cultural cooperation as well as opposing colonialism. Furthermore, the Bandung Conference also "marked the beginning of Chinese appreciation of the role of the Third World in combating adversaries and winning international recognition and support" (Yu, 1988: 850). The conference helped China overcome its isolation to some degree in addition to causing discomfort of the Soviets due to China's subtle aspiration to play a leading role in the Third World. Especially with the Bandung Conference, China gave priority to actively supporting "national liberation movements in some Asian, African and Latin American countries by providing weapons and introducing Mao's guerilla strategy" well into the end of 1960s (Jian, 1996: 46).

A number of events influenced the making of the Chinese foreign policy in the 1960s. These were the Sino – Soviet split of the early 1960s, 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, 1963 boundary disputes between China and the Soviets, the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the US and the Soviets, the competition over the Third World throughout the entire decade, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and finally a brief but direct conflict in 1969 about the Damansky (Zhenbao) Island over the Ussuri river. It would not be wrong to claim that all these developments occurred during this decade had profound effects on foreign relations of China also in the 1970s. China's relations with the Soviets were severed as the Soviets signed the aforementioned nuclear test ban treaty with the US. Because from a Chinese perspective, the treaty was seen to have imperialist tendencies and taken as a means of curbing China's nuclear program along with isolating it. Additionally, a final rift hit the relations with the 1968 invasion, leading China to label the Soviets as a "social-imperialist" union. The rift between the once two allies not only brought about the threat factor into Chinese perceptions of the Soviets, but also seriously damaged "the universalist claims of Marxism-Leninism" (Levine, 1994: 40-41). Moreover, as a result of the Sino – Soviet conflict, economic and technical support of the Soviets was withdrawn in 1960, thus causing disrupt in relations with the East European countries at the same time. Furthermore, even though China's relations with France were normalized as De Gaulle recognized the government in Beijing in 1964, this recognition did not further enhance the relations in any areas between the two states due to the US-led boycotts.

Last but not the least, Chairman Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 which aimed at eliminating the opposition elements who were believed to have moderate,

or “liberal bourgeois” views, and to endanger the future of the communist republic. The Cultural Revolution officially lasted until 1976, yet its most hectic and violent days ended in 1969 as the need to shift attention from domestic friction to outside issues (i.e. the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the conflict over the Damansky Island) emerged. All in all, when the Chinese Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966, China’s relations came to a break with the West European states and diplomatic relations between China and Great Britain and France suffered setbacks, which were established in 1950 and 1964, respectively.

Under these circumstances what China needed was to “abandon its self-righteous ideological approach to foreign affairs which left Beijing diplomatically isolated and weak in the face of the Soviet pressure” (Jian, 1996: 62). Therefore, in the 1970s, Chinese foreign policy began to depart from its revolutionary characteristics and strategy. Other than these external elements which pushed China into the direction of moderation in foreign policy, the weakening of the Cultural Revolution and the death of the radical vice premier Lin Biao in a plane crash in 1971 helped strengthen hands of the moderates. Premier Zhou Enlai and vice premier Deng Xiaoping together initiated in 1975 the “four modernizations” in agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology. The aim of these modernizations was to build a self-reliant economy and make China economically a major power (Dernberger, 1980: 331). Therefore, repercussions of the domestic developments revealed themselves in a conciliatory and moderate form in China’s foreign policy. As a result of national modernization aim, although the Deng era foreign policy “still inherited the antihegemony tradition of the Maoist era…it had lost the distinct ideological connotation in opposing hegemonism” (Zhao, 2004: 183).

International events which occurred in the 1960s, especially the Soviet Union's bellicose behaviors, rendered Chinese political elite to reassess their alliance with the Soviets. Now that in the early 1970s perceiving the Soviet Union as an enemy with imperialist aspirations, the new aspect of Chinese foreign policy became one that was called the Three Worlds theory (also called the united front strategy). According to the three worlds theory, which was originally developed by Chairman Mao in his late years as a "non-Marxist international strategy based on a perceived hierarchical structure of three worlds", it was aimed to reinvigorate Mao's revolutionary ideology by uniting the developing (third world) and the Western developed states and Japan (second world) against the superpowers (first world), and following an independent line of foreign policy (Zhao, 2004: 4 – 5). This new independent line in foreign policy meant a retreat from "leaning to one side" and a quest for setting an environment in which China could "shape a strategic triangle" in which it could play a role between the Soviets and the US (Zhao, 2004: 5).

Indeed, for the US President Richard Nixon, there could have been no better timing than this for approaching China. Taking advantage of strained atmosphere between China and the Soviets, meticulously recognizing the common interest of containing the latter, and the belief that China had to be involved in, not isolated from world affairs for the sake of long term interests of the US, President Nixon made his historical visit to China in 1972 (Macmillan, 2007: 6). At the end of Nixon's visit, China and the US signed the Shanghai Communiqué whereas the establishment of full diplomatic relations had to wait until January 1979. According to this document, the US and China undertook to normalize their relations, reduce the possibility of military conflict, enhance bilateral

trade, and not to have aspirations to establish hegemony over the Asia Pacific region. Besides these common undertakings, the US assured China that it would reduce arms sales to Taiwan, ultimately withdraw forces from the island, and it de facto recognized "one China" while the Chinese part promised a peaceful resolution to Taiwan issue. Beijing's rapproachement with Washington began to give concrete results only in the 1980s. For the whole decade, China and the US established liaison offices in 1973, exchanged official visits, and the US recognized the People's Republic of China, withdrawing its recognition from the Republic of China in Taipei.

Particularly after the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976, the moderate faction under Deng Xiaoping bolstered the four modernizations of Zhou Enlai, as well as supported an economic opening to the West. Furthermore, while the US military and economic aid to Taiwan did not substantially decrease during the 1970s, the Chinese cut off their support for Vietnam and ended this support totally in 1978 when Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets. Vietnam went so far as to invade Cambodia upon signing assistance treaties in 1975 and 1978. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between Vietnam and the Soviets especially disturbed the balance in the region since the treaty gave Moscow the right to extend its military presence to Vietnam. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China intervened militarily in Vietnam in 1979, yet was unable to make Vietnam withdraw its forces from occupied Cambodia. Furthermore, the border conflicts went on during the 1980s between Vietnam and China, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 constituted another rift in the former's relations with China.

Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s underwent significant changes. Three factors estimated by Chang (1984: 156) with the potential to affect the course of Chinese foreign relations for the second half of the 1980s were "the containment of Soviet expansionism, acquisition of foreign capital and technology, and the acceleration of China's modernization program". In addition to these, and perhaps a more influential factor was not only the continuation of an independent line in foreign policy (that was adopted with the theory of Three Worlds of the 1970s), but also its furtherance as a result of the constraining aspects of Sino-American relations (i.e. trade restrictions put by the US against China, or the US arms sales to Taiwan). However, this new strategy did not mean a departure from normalizing relations between the US and China. The strategy rather helped China to involve more actively in international politics, international organizations and to consider taking steps towards cordial relations with the Soviet Union.

Overall, Sino-American relations in the 1980s fostered as a result of exchanges by the high-level statesmen of both countries. Of these visits, a few remarkable ones are worth mentioning. In January 1979 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Washington, and later the same year, his visit was reciprocated by his American counterpart Vice President Mondale. Other important visits were made in 1983 between ministries of defense and military delegations, in 1984 between the US president Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang, and Li Xiannian became the first Chinese president to visit the US in 1985. Military, cultural and educational exchanges, establishment of joint commissions, technology transfer and trade relations took place between the two countries following the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1979 and the aforementioned visits paid to each other (Worden et al., 1987).

Despite the blossoming of mutual understanding, two factors stood as obstacles yet to be overcome in relations of China and the US at that time. These were the continuing US arms sales to Taiwan in early 1980s, and the American limitations on Chinese imports. As per arms sales, the US and China signed the Joint Communique in August 1982. In essence, this document is only different from the 1972 Shanghai and 1979 Joint Communiqués in that this time, the US pledges not to increase the level of arms sales to Taiwan, and began to reduce it gradually in time upon the Chinese underlining that it is a must thing to be done if a peaceful resolution is to be achieved with regard to the issue. The second obstacle to Sino-American relations was the limitations put by the US against the importation of the Chinese goods. This challenge was not removed in the 1980s and became one reason for the PRC to expand its relations with West Europe, Japan, as well as the Soviet Union. In spite of the US' becoming third largest trading partner of China in this decade, relations with West Europe[13] and Japan were mostly based on trade links in line with China's independent foreign policy strategy.

Even though trade between China and the Soviets expanded with the efforts of both parties on normalizing their relations, and the former continued to enjoy benefits out of technical exchanges, three obstacles stood on the way until the second half of the 1980s. These were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the support Vietnam received from the Soviets for its invasion of Cambodia, and the accumulation of the Soviet military forces on the Sino-Soviet border. Tension on these particular subjects were reduced when the Soviet president Gorbachev delivered his speech in 1986 summer, in which he

[13] Except for the Netherlands who, between 1981-1984 sold submarines to Taiwan.

underlined that the Soviets would begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and his eagerness on resolving the Sino-Soviet border problems.

Last but not the least, a new dimension was emphasized as a part of the post-Mao era active foreign policy during the 1980s. As China sought to diversify its relations for the sake of an independent foreign policy, to break its isolation and play a more active role with the driving force of fostering economic relations with other countries, it began to be involved in many international organizations. In order to achieve the Four Modernizations of 1975:

> Deng took China in the opposite direction [than what Mao did]. To facilitate economic modernization at home, he promoted engagement with the international community. China expanded its international profile by significantly increasing its participation in intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, especially financial ones, and China gradually began to emerge from its Mao-era isolation (Mederios and Fravel, 2003: 24).

Chinese leaders not only acknowledged the necessity for more capital flow to China, but also that they were lacking adequate technical knowledge on how to realize economic development plans. This change first arrived in 1978 as a necessity to achieve Deng's reforms for modernization. China began receiving the UN Development Program (UNDP) aids in 1978. However, the aid arriving from UNDP was limited because it was provided by voluntary donors, Chinese leaders gave priority to the IMF and the World Bank. IMF and the World Bank became the two institutions to provide Chinese economy with both lending money and technical assistance. China gained access to these institutions in 1980 and because of the country's successful record of paying its debts back, Beijing was able to avoid the IMF conditionalities to continue borrowing money (Kornberg and Faust, 2005: 227 – 228). Moreover, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has played an

important role in privatization of the Chinese economy since 1986. The majority of the private sector investments in China has been made by multinational corporations whose headquarters are in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe (Kornberg and Faust, 2005: 230).Chinese membership in particular in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank indicated that China accepted the Western economic world order, one that was far from carrying any socialist credentials. In addition to this, China also renewed its GATT membership application in 1986.

4.5 Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cold War

As the twentieth century drew closer to an end, two events influenced the course of Chinese foreign policy. One of these events unfolded on June 4, 1989 at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The protestors, majority of whom were students, chanting for more freedom and reforms were suppressed violently. Immediately after this incident, China was denounced vehemently by a number of states, level of diplomatic exchanges were reduced and in addition to these, the US put embargoes against Chinese goods as well as arms sales to China. International criticisms and moves to isolate China, contrary to radicalizing the country at the dawn of the collapse of communism in the Soviets, resulted in the moderation of its foreign policy.

The second event that paved the way for changes in Chinese foreign policy was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thus end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War marked both constraints and opportunities for Chinese national interests at most part in

economic matters. While on the one hand room for China to maneuver between the two superpowers in times of need for political, economic and technological assistance closed, on the other hand the withering bipolarity of the international system granted China an immense flexibility and opportunity to break its post-Tiananmen isolation. Chen (1993: 242-243) states that major changes the Chinese foreign policy underwent were the adoption of the good-neighbor policy especially with Vietnam, Pakistan, India and South Korea with an aim to reduce the tensions with these states; the improvement of relations with all developed and developing countries while at the same time redefining hegemonism; and the commitment to a more active role for China in international organizations, particularly in the United Nations.

The same period also coincided with the introduction of Chinese nationalism to its domestic and external politics. As Sutter (1996: 5) points out:

> Recognizing the inability of communist ideology to support their continued monopoly of power, leaders in Beijing played up more traditional themes of Chinese nationalism to support their rule. Thus, US and other criticisms of the communist system in China were portrayed not as attacks against unjust arbitrary rule but as assaults on the national integrity of China. They were equated with earlier "imperialist" pressures on China in the 19th and 20th centuries.

In line with the nationalist tone in its domestic and foreign policy, the Chinese government resumed the 1975 reforms in planning its economy with market regulations in the post-Cold War era (Huo, 1992: 268). Furthermore, Beijing also stopped supporting separatist movements in Kashmir and Nepal in early 1990s (Hunter and Sexton, 1999: 195).

As per Sino-American relations, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 and the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 were the two major events that

caused tensions. The first crisis occurred when China conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, a short time prior to the Taiwanese presidential elections. This move was countered by the US, sending its naval forces to the region. As the crisis ended with no open conflict, the US and China continued working on their relations. Visits were paid by then presidents of both states, and cooperation on a wide array of issues from trade to non-proliferation started to increase. The second crisis between China and the US erupted when the NATO forces bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. However the tension was eased soon enough not to pose any significant threat to the flow of Sino-American relations. With the turn of the century, interdependence became one of the main reasons that nurtured converging interests, and therefore, cooperation between China and the US. The US has become China's top trade partner in 2009 (The US-China Business Council). Moreover, the two country's common stances with regard to international issues such as terrorism, and regional ones as the nuclear program of North Korea make it inevitable for Beijing and Washington to cooperate as far as their respective national interests are considered.

In sum, swift boosting of Chinese economy throughout especially the last decade, the country's growing demand for energy urges it to actively get involved in a variety of issues in international politics, and to have a sense of responsibility to tackle issues fundamental to its national interests. According to the World Bank, Chinese economy has achieved 9.7% growth per annum since the late 1970s. China ranked third as the world's largest trading economy after the US and Germany in 2004. In general, "China's abundance of cheap labor has made it internationally competitive in many low cost labor-intensive manufactures" (Morrison, 2006: 9). Morrison (2006: 9) concludes that China's

main export items[14] constitute automatic data processing machines and units, garments and clothing accessories, textile products, and radio telephone handsets, whereas the country's imports include electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies, crude oil, liquid crystal display panels, steel products and plastics. In China's trade relations with the EU, agriulctural products, fuels and mining products, iron and steel, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and garments have the biggest share (The EU Official Document, 2009). While the EU is China's largest trading partner, the US ranks second place in the list. Furthermore, "the United States ranked third accounting for 8.2% ($51.1 billion) of total foreign direct investment" (Morrison, 2006: 5).

Apart from the EU and the US, China also has extensive trade relations with Japan, South Korea, India, and Russia. According to the US-China Business Council, all these countries rank among the top ten trade partners of China as of 2010. Energy resources of Russia are especially vital for China, and China sells Russia "footwear, garments, foodstuffs, electronics, and machinery" (Kornberg and Faust, 2005: 113 – 114).In addition to China's expanded trade relations these partners, China has been particularly paying attention to multipolarity in its relations that its involvement in a large number of international organizations has taken place, some of which are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and the IMF. Overall, Chinese involvement in international organizations continued increasingly after the Cold War. This shows that China has come to recognize norms of international institutions (especially in trade and rules of market economy) over its revolutionary ideology.

[14] According to Global Europe June 2010 report, "more than half of China's export goods are produced by foreign invested exterprises."

4.6 Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy

To recall, foreign policy principles acknowledged by Mao Zedong were:

- Unity with the socialist camp,
- Solidarity with the third world,
- Opposition to the capitalist world,
- Supporting the liberation movements around the globe.

As Gittings underlines (1969: 43) and was previously discussed in chapter 2, revolutionary middle powers like China, are more susceptible to being under pressure from stronger states and this continues as long as revolutionary states lag behind industrialization, and do not become a great power Therefore, such states maintain a tendency to follow "short-term national interests". Deviations found in the study of early revolutionary Chinese foreign policy stem mainly from either national interests or economic anxieties.

The first deviation in Chinese foreign policy occurred with the Korean War. As explained, it took Mao and other revolutionary leaders for some four months before the Chinese troops intervened in the war. It is arguable to whether or not to regard the late Chinese decision to intervene, which was made because of perception of military threat from the advancement of the US forces, a deviation. On the one hand, what was an internal crisis prior to the US intervention took an international form, and China did not interfere immediately despite its ongoing support for the communist North Koreans. On the other hand, when China did intervene, (a) it was a late move, and (b) obviously it was not a move that primarily aimed at supporting the North Koreans' ideological war, but at

thwarting the possibility of an attack on the mainland China. Thus, China actually violated the principle of "unity with the socialist camp", that required it to extend its military support to its ideological brothers, and the reason for this postponed decision was national security concerns.

The second deviation came with the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972. With this move, China violated the principle of "unity with the socialist camp" at first place because the Shanghai Communique was particularly directed against the Soviets. Furthermore, China was in a position to stop challenging the capitalist world as it aimed at enhancing bilateral trade with the US. The reasons for this deviation were rooted in consideration of national interests and economic insufficiency. Of course, this does not mean that China abandoned the ideological principles in making and implementing its foreign policy. However, it is still true to claim that "China has abandoned the flamboyant ideological fanaticism of earlier years" in contradiction with the foreign policy principle of opposition to the capitalist world (Kane, 2001: 45).

During the early years of the post-Mao period, we witness not only the existence of Chinese national interests serving as a reason for further deviation in foreign policy of China, but also factionalization. With the aim of modernization in mind, Deng Xiaoping pursued policies of economic reform and opening to the outside world on the basis of the united front strategy (or the theory of Three Worlds). The united front strategy per se can be counted a deviation since it aimed to curb the Soviet moves while allying with the developed world, including the US. Overall, China's economic openings in the post-Mao period are a direct violation of the principle of opposition to the capitalist world.

A third deviation in Chinese foreign policy is its memberships in the World Bank and the IMF (and later on particularly the WTO). Approximately 30 years after the revolution, "Chinese position shifted to reformation rather than transformation of the global economic system" (Kornberg and Faust, 2005: 226). As Zhao (2004: 8) underlines that "before the CCP's shift of its emphasis from worldwide Communist revolution to national economic modernization in the late 1970, China's foreign policy was largely driven by Communist ideology". The country's memberships in these platforms were aimed at protecting the Chinese national interests while violating the principle of opposition to the capitalist world.

The fourth and the last deviation in Chinese foreign policy was violations of the principles of supporting the liberation movements worldwide, uniting with the socialist camp, and solidarity with the third world, when it first cut down, and then completely stopped assisting the socialist movements taking place in different countries. While the earlier reduction in the Chinese support of these movements was caused by the economic insufficiency China had, the total halting of its support can be best explained by China's consideration of its own national interests because an anti-*status quo* stance would jeopardize China's enhancing, economically fruitful relations with the US.

As observed throughout this chapter, Chinese stance towards the international order has largely shifted over the course of 60 years as a revolutionary state in principle. In 1949, Mao's foreign policy had stood upon a worldview which saw the "salvation" of the world in socialism. Bluntly declaring the US and its allies (in 1952 Constitution) China's enemies, the Chinese revolutionary statesmen took their position by the side of the dissatisfied camp of international politics. Unlike the Islamic Republic of Iran, which

has been swinging between *status quo* and revisionist lines, the Chinese stance has clearly been transferred to the *status quo* line. China's membership in several international organizations which form the basis of the day's order, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and its politico-economic relations with the US and the EU are identified as main indicators of China's satisfied approach to the international order once it criticized and aimed to revolutionize.

4.7 Conclusion

The communist Chinese foreign policy has so far had three phases in terms of Beijing's perception of the international system. The first phase began with the revolution and continued until the death of Mao Zedong. This phase is best described by Mao's power-centered perception of foreign relations. Such a view of world politics caused deviations in Chinese foreign policy as it emphasized national security and interests of China. Throughout the second phase, began in 1976 and continued until the end of the Cold War, the Chinese perception of the international system was interpreted and explained by Deng Xiaoping's three worlds theory, according to which China sought to play a leading role among the third world states while getting close with the second world and gaining their support in standing against the so-called imperialists of the first world. In the third phase that began with the collapse of the Soviets, Beijing defended that the new world order be shaped within multipolarity, rather than a unipolar international system. As a result of such a Chinese perception of the post-Cold War international system, Chinese leaders had no option but to conform with the consequences of interdependence as it perhaps is the

most salient side-effect of a multipolar system. Consequently, different Chinese perceptions of the international system brought up different interpretations of the communist ideology and its varying applications to the realm of foreign policy. This happened, as discussed above, due to factionalism. Along with factionalism, national interests and economic insufficiency are also among the reasons of Chinese foreign policy deviations. In the next chapter, an analysis based on the two case studies is made, and the concluding remarks on theoretical and policy implications of this study are given.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 An Overall Analysis of Deviations in Foreign Policies of Revolutionary States

Each revolutionary state adopts different principles for its foreign policy. It is of course no surprise to coincide with this dissimilarity when studying two revolutions that are born into different ideologies. Nevertheless, reasons that cause deviational moves in their foreign policies, as this work has shown, may very well be identical. Three of the four hypotheses produced at the end of the study of Iran are confirmed with the study of the Chinese foreign policy between the years 1949 and early 1990s whereas the remaining one hypothesis is not.

The first hypothesis, which is observed in both Iranian and Chinese foreign policies, is that deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when the state is not sufficient in economic terms. That is, considering revolutionary states that fall within the framework of this thesis as developing countries that are middle size powers at the time the revolution is made, these states are still in the process of economic development. As a result, it becomes challenging for revolutionary states to constantly confront the international order because of their economic insufficiency. As Pardesi (1976: 30) underlines:

> In order to grow economically and socially and to achieve fuller political independence, the developing countries have two alternatives. For stable economic and social progress they require a peaceful and cooperative world order which minimizes conditions of international conflict. On the other hand, in order to actualize political independence, it is necessary to restructure the international

> order. This implies gradual (if not radical) destabilization of the established economic order and the life styles of people in the capitalist countries leading, predictably, to conditions of confrontation. What really happens and will continue to happen is that the position of the developing countries will oscillate between cooperation and confrontation.

Compounded with the discussion in the two-good theory (Morgan and Palmer, 2006) which points out that a state can neither be fully happy or unhappy with the international order, revolutionary states, whether or not they like it, do comply with the realities of the international political and economic order. Eventually, in order to help to enhance their economic status, revolutionary states make deviational moves either via borrowing from international organizations which are a part of the order these states try to challenge, or choose to cooperate, purchase goods, arms, or make trade with other entities (states or international organizations). While in the Iranian case, this happened at the same time with factionalization of Iranian politics, in the case of China, the founder of the revolution, namely Mao Zedong, was still alive and the factional politics was yet to override the ideology. Therefore, it can be concluded that deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs regardless of factionalization, if the state is economically insufficient.

The second hypothesis supported by both cases is that deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when national interests prevail over its revolutionary ideology. As Halliday (1999: 147) underlines, revolutionary foreign policies "pursue national interests, as much by betraying those they claim to support as by using their international support for the tactical, 'cynical', ends." Indeed, revolutionary states pledge to support revolutionary movements elsewhere as both Iran (for the *mustazafin*) and China (for communist movements) did promise whereas withdrew their support over time

not to hamper their relations with Russia and the US, respectively. Furthermore, in both of the case studies, it is also revealed that these states sought "cynical ends" because their ideology was subordinated by national interests. Iran's support for the Middle Eastern peace process, as discussed in chapter 3, aims to provide Iran with the regional leadership role, whereas Chinese late entrance to the Korean War, which ostensibly was made to support the communist Koreans, was actually nothing but a move that regarded Chinese national interests most important.

In addition to these hypotheses, a third one is also supported by the Iranian and Chinese cases. Deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when political factionalization appears. Political factionalization means the birth of a party within a party. In other words, a single party is composed of members whose interests, aims may differ. Especially in the early years of a revolutionary state, in order to suppress the opposition and consolidate the revolutionary ruling elite's power, only one party operates in the political life. True that different movements occur over time that represent the interests of different groups of people in a country. However, these movements are usually not allowed to turn into political parties. Therefore, it is no surprise that factionalization is inevitable in a single political party formed and operated by the revolutionaries. Although it is not suggested that factionalization will always automatically cause foreign policy deviations, this thesis reveals that deviations occur where factional politics exist, especially in an increasing manner. Before causing any deviations due to factionalization, the faction in scope must retain the power to influence the foreign policy decision making process. Last but not least, the observed pattern in the Iranian and Chinese case studies suggests that deviations as a result of existence of

factions occur when the founding fathers of a revolution is no more on the political scene. To be more precise, it was only after the death of Khomeini did factions in Iranian political life emerged, and political figures from the moderate bloc caused deviations. In the case of China, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms after Mao's death caused deviation in foreign policy and one of its reasons was different interpretation of Chinese communist ideology as voiced by this moderate faction.

One hypothesis was not confirmed in the Chinese case, but it was not refuted either. This hypothesis is "deviation in foreign policy of a revolutionary state occurs when the state is not self-sufficient in both military and economic terms during war time". This hypothesis was written after observing that Iran, in its war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988, was one and half year-old revolutionary, militarily and economically weak republic, and resorted to arms purchase from Israel and the US. When Chinese involvement in the Korean War of 1950 is studied, however, it is not found that China sought ways to purchase military equipment or receive support in general, from any country that created contradiction to its ideological principles. This was so not because Chinese revolutionary statesmen adhered to their principle, but because there was the Soviet Union who supported the Chinese. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was not supported by any ideological ally simply because there was none.

Last but not least, two additional factors are worth mentioning before concluding the analysis section. These are informal ideology of a revolutionary state and geopolitics of a revolutionary country. In cases of Iran and China, as formerly discussed, an informal ideology constituted shared values, cultural traits and habits unwritten but commonly agreed upon, thus, it was not included in the overall revolutionary ideological principles

of their foreign policies. When it comes to analysis, however, for revolutionary countries whose historical existence in the world constitutes a civilization, the pride those nations have today are hardly avoided from being included in their foreign policy making mentalities. Although an informal ideology does not *per se* cause a foreign policy deviation, it affects the national interests of revolutionary states, and serves as an auxiliary factor in deviations. No need to say, a revolutionary state which lacks such a strong place in world history will not be affected from this factor and make deviational foreign policy moves as a result of it. The second factor that is observed to have influenced the occurring of deviations is geopolitics. In politically an unstable geography, or a neighborhood in which there are stronger, challenging powers, it may get difficult for a revolutionary state to remain loyal to its ideology basically because constraints and opportunities may come spontaneously. Yet, at the same time, having these kinds of a geopolitical location does not immediately cause deviations. As observed in both case studies, there were times the geopolitics of Iran and China influenced the outcome in that manner, whereas there were also situations where geopolitics stood still, and the outcome was not a deviation.

5.2 Conclusion

This thesis is written as an attempt to explore the driving reasons behind non-revolutionary foreign policy behaviors of revolutionary states. This goal emerged as a result of the inadequacy of overall foreign policy literature in shedding light on revolutionary states. A state that has left the early hectic years of its revolution behind is no longer observed to act in the international system in line with its own rules set out by

the revolutionary ideology. To recall, an ideology is a set of values and beliefs and by its general nature, it is open to different interpretations. An ideology sets out how things should be, but not how things in fact are. As far as revolutionary states are concerned in this study, it is important to analyze two questions: why is a revolution made? And what is the function of an ideology for a revolutionary state? To answer the first question, there are two elements to take under consideration. These are the discontent of masses, and replacing the incumbent regime with a new, ideologically backed one. Which one of these elements matter in a revolutionary movement? As discussed in chapter 2, except for certain revolutionaries who support an ideology, rest of the masses support a revolutionary movement purely because they are not content with the conditions (mainly economic) they live in. Since this is the picture derived from a number of studies on revolution, one cannot expect ordinary citizens (which constitute a large portion of masses) to chant an ideology during a revolutionary movement. Thus, it is not imprudent to conclude that a mass-based revolution does not aim to bring a new ideology in, but simply ousting the existing leader / ruling elite that is no longer governing effectively and addressing the needs of people.

Hence, the answer to the second question is that ideology matters only when the revolutionary movement is successful. After this, the main function of an ideology becomes to unify a people around to justify and consolidate the new ruling elite's power at home. As Morgenthau (1993: 102) rightly underlines a critical point:

> To rally a people behind the government's foreign policy and to marshall all the national energies and resources to its support, the spokesman of the nation must appeal to biological necessities, such as national existence, and to moral principles, such as justice, rather than power. This is the only way a nation can

> attain the enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice without which no foreign policy can pass the ultimate test of strength.

Therefore, an ideology also serves as a means of consolidation of power through its justification and acceptance by the masses. As a result of these, what is continuing to exist domestically (ideology) demises beyond the borders of a revolutionary state because once successful, revolutionary ruling elite begins to manage a state, no longer a revolutionary movement (Armstrong, 1993: 303). Different than a revolutionary movement, managing a state requires policy makers to take under consideration "worldly" needs instead of pure ideological appeals. Hence, although an ideology begins its journey with a claim to challenge whatever is not in line with its aspirations domestically and internationally, it eventually fails to do so, to a large extent, in foreign policy decisions and implications.

This thesis studied the reasons of deviations that occurred in foreign policies of revolutionary states. To summarize, in the case of Iran, most foreign policy deviations due to factional politics occurred following the death of the father of the Islamic Revolution, namely *Ayatollah* Khomeini. In the Chinese case, a similar pattern can also be observed starting from the death of Mao Zedong. Moreover, further deviations in both case studies revealed that national interests, economic and military insufficiencies are the other reasons of deviations. Both Iran and China had been middle powers at the time of their revolutions according to their relative power capacities and abilities to influence regional and to a lesser extent, world politics, a fact which suggests that they were both at the second stage of their power transition. Today, the question is if they still remain as middle power revolutionary states.

By studying Organski's power transition theory, it can be suggested that as a state grows stronger and gets closer to the power maturity level, it should become satisfied, or status-quo, rather than remaining revisionist since it is the very system that helps this state enhance its economic (and probably political and military) level. Organski discusses that ". . . the powerful and dissatisfied nations are usually those that have grown to full power after the existing international order was fully established and the benefits already allocated" (1968: 336). This statement by Organski suggests that a powerful and dissatisfied state benefits from the already existing system as it is in its transition from the stage of transitional growth to the power maturity stage, and most probably does not challenge it until it is certain of its power. Therefore, according to this statement, the fact that a state does not challenge the *status quo* does not make it a status-quo state automatically. As a result of this, it can be said that a state that is both satisfied and dissatisfied with the existing international order it is living in may very well exist and does not absolutely fall on either side of the curve that cuts the pyramid in Organski's theory. The cases studied in this thesis are no exception to this. Iran, although a middle power at the second stage of power transition, its ability to influence other states have increased over 30 years of its life, and different foreign policy decisions of Iran have been studied throughout this thesis which showed us that Iran has so far behaved both like a *status quo* and as a revisionist state at different times. At this point, it is argued that Iran "appears to have been satisfied" because first of all, it lacks the support for its ideology from other Islamic states. Therefore, Iran cannot create an international platform which could make it possible for Iran to defy the international order in a way, if not entirely, and has to be satisfied with the order. In addition to this, Iran's continuing support for Hamas and Hezbollah, together with its nuclear program which it did not halt despite external

pressures and further sanctions can be interpreted as Tehran is still trying to preserve a level of its independent and non-complying nature on issues that today's dominant power the US as well as the majority of great powers agree upon and set the rules.

China can be said to have approached the power maturity stage in its long revolutionary life, and does not yet pose a threat to the international order. Abandoning its revolutionary principles for its national interests and economic development, China is regarded among the great powers of world politics, with its economy ranking second in world, equaling to half of that of the US. Furthermore, as Beijing is able to derive its share from the international order as far as the annual growth percentages are concerned, it can be concluded that, in contrast to Iran, for a communist state China is quite satisfied with the already existing capitalist order.

The weakness of this thesis has been that it includes two cases only. Had more cases been studied, would it be possible to see the applicability of hypotheses proposed in chapter 3, and perhaps, to encounter with more factors causing deviations. Revolutions in Cuba (1959) and Yemen (1962), in this regard, are worth studying because both of these revolutions were born into a bipolar international order and have survived ever since. While ideologically Cuban revolution claims to defend socialism and despite its distance from the Soviets, the 50 years of its revolutionary path would be very much interesting to observe. Yemen, on the other hand, is considered to be a small power between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with considerable oil and gas reserves. Its dependency on Arab countries for a long time, but political proximity to the communist states are the two main factors that makes this country an interesting case to focus on in terms of foreign policy deviations. Furthermore, the Russian Revolution would perhaps tell us more than any of

these other revolutions as it ideologically "lost the game". In addition to the inclusion of more than two cases, quantitative methods could have revealed the existence of unexpected deviations with different reasons which is hard to find out when conducting a qualitative study.

Despite this weakness, however, considering the inadequacy of the ever growing field of foreign policy analysis in addressing not only the foreign policies of third world states, but also of revolutionary states, this thesis serves as a starting point in analyzing foreign policies of revolutionary states. Once more, the main emphasis should be made to the fact that rational, bureaucratic and pluralist models of foreign policy decision making are not possible to apply to such a study of revolutionary states for the reasons discussed in chapter 2. Moreover, taking an individual-based perspective would also create obstacles because in a study where many foreign policy decisions are analyzed, actors per se are not the sole decision makers and their accumulation into a pool of factions offers a more consistent evaluation of foreign policy decisions. In this regard, factional politics deserves a special attention in the context of revolutionary states and their foreign policy. Factionalization is perhaps the most critical turning point in revolutionary foreign policies. Its emergence is almost impossible to avoid, and when once occurs, it is difficult to maintain the ideological forces in foreign policy decision making. As a separate topic of study, students of foreign policy may find it interesting to further study various notions that are brought into both the political and foreign policy decision making scenes, or those that already are at work but whose strength are increased in times of fragmentation as a result of factionalization within revolutionary foreign policy decision making circle.

Another suggestion for further studies is actually the reversed form of what this thesis asks. That is, what does not cause a deviaton? Except for domestic dynamics that trigger the revolutionary / ideological discourse (and actions) of foreign policy decision makers, what happens on the international level and those in charge of foreign policy making in revolutionary states resort to enhancing revolutionary feelings? This is important to study systematically because those revolutionary feelings resuscitated may bring about destructive consequences such as increase in international terrorism (i.e. Iranian support for the Middle Eastern terrorist groups), triggering movements in other countries that may even lead to civil wars, and if none of these, at lease causing instability in those states that are weaker and vulnerable. This is neither to claim that every time this may result in negative ways nor that the existing international order is always the best one and remaining loyal / submissive to the *status quo* is the best thing to do. Yet, it is likely to happen when a revolutionary state is dissatisfied but powerful enough to cause these events, and in an international system that is working efficiently for most nation states, maintaining the stability (when it is the natural choice of *status quo* states) would be an important way of preserving peace.

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