

**TO WHICH EURASIA DOES TURKEY BELONG? A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH EURASIANIST
GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This study argues that there are two prominent Eurasianist discourses in Turkey, the Kemalist and the Ottomanist, and that these traditions draw on three geopolitical traditions: the nationalist, the socialist, and the Islamist. The thesis then comparatively examines these three traditions and two discourses by employing insights from theories of collective memory and critical geopolitics. The contents of three representative journals (the nationalist *Türk Yurdu*, the socialist *Teori*, and the conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü*) are analyzed, investigating their issues published between 1990 and 2010, in order to seek answers to three main questions. First, what distinguishes these three types of geopolitical traditions? Second, did the nationalist and socialist views in recent years converge on each other, thereby forming the *Ulusalci* view, while the Islamists became the new opposing pole? Third, insofar as the answer to the second question is yes, why did this realignment take place?

In response to the first question, the thesis shows that the geopolitical visions of these three groups and the way they imagine the past help to explain their respective perspectives of Eurasia and how they place Turkey in these perspectives. In response to the second question, again the thesis shows that the nationalist and socialist visions of Eurasianism did indeed converge on each other. The thesis then maintains that this happened because the Islamist circles in the Post- Cold War allied with the liberal groups and developed a “counter-memory” of the past that became an alternative to the Kemalist historiography, while the nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions remained faithful to the Kemalist narrative of the past. In other words, while the political elites of these three ideological camps try to construct

these geopolitical discourses instrumentally with a view to serve their political aims, the ensuing disputes of historiography and competing collective memory constructions shape and constrain their political and ideological alliances and cleavages.

Keywords:

Turkish Eurasianism, critical geopolitics, collective memory, Post- Cold War Turkish politics, historiographical dispute, Turkish geopolitical tradition

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Türkiye’de milliyetçi, sosyalist ve İslamcı jeopolitik gelenek üzerinden şekillenen biri Kemalist diğeri ise Osmanlıcı olmak üzere iki tane öne çıkan Avrasyacı söylem olduğu iddiasındadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez bu üç jeopolitik gelenek ve iki jeopolitik söylemi kolektif hafıza ve eleştirel jeopolitik teorilerinin yardımı ile karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmek amacındadır. Bu üç geleneği temsil eden üç süreli yayının (milliyetçi Türk Yurdu, sosyalist Teori ve İslamcı Türkiye Günlüğü) 1990-2010 yılları arasında yayınlanmış sayılarına uygulanan içerik analizi aracılığı ile şu üç temel soruya cevap aranmıştır: birincisi, bu üç jeopolitik söylemi birbirinden ayıran faktörler nelerdir? İkincisi, yakın dönemde milliyetçi ve sosyalist grupların görüşlerinin birbirlerine yakınlaşıp ulusalcı adı verilen duruş altında birleşirken İslamcı grubun bu iki gruba karşı yeni bir fikir kutbu oluşturduğu iddia edilebilir mi? Üçüncü olarak, eğer bu yeni kutuplaşma meydana geldiyse altta yatan sebepler nelerdir?

Birinci soruya cevap olarak, bu çalışmada gösteriliyor ki bu üç grubun jeopolitik vizyonları ve geçmişi nasıl kurguladıkları onların bugünkü kendi Avrasyalarını nasıl oluşturduklarını ve Türkiye’yi bu kurgulanmış Avrasya’ya nasıl yerleştirdiklerini belirliyor. İkinci soruya cevap olarak, yine bu tez gösteriyor ki milliyetçi ve sosyalist jeopolitik gelenekler arasında Avrasyacılık noktasında bir kesişme yaşandığı tezi doğrudur. Bu çalışmanın bulgularının da desteği ile iddia ettiği üzere Soğuk Savaş sonrası Türkiye’de bu yeni ortaklık ve beraberinde gelen kutuplaşma yaşandı çünkü İslamcı çevreler liberallerle yeni bir ortaklık geliştirdiler ve beraber Kemalist tarih yazımını hedef alan alternatif bir tarih anlayışı içine girdiler. Bu arada sosyalist ve milliyetçi gruplar ise bu arayışa karşı çıkıp Kemalist tarihe sadık kalmayı tercih ettiler. Diğer bir deyişle bu üç jeopolitik grubun elitleri

pragmatik bir anlayıřla kendi siyasi amalarına uygun doęrultuda jeopolitik söylemlerini řekillendirirken ortaya ıkan kollektif hafıza odaklı tartıřmalar yeni kutuplařmanın aktörlerini belirledi.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Türkiye Avrasyacılıęı, eleřtirel jeopolitik, kollektif hafıza, Soęuk Savař sonrası Türk siyaseti, tarih yazımı tartıřmaları, Türk jeopolitik geleneęi

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Kotkin (2007:487) investigates the increasing use of the term Eurasia in American academia in the last two decades. He gives various examples of name changes in regional centers and political science sub-departments from “Post- Soviet Studies” to “Russian and Eurasian Studies.” He says: “Suddenly, ‘Eurasia’ is everywhere.”

By acknowledging this ongoing phenomenon in American academia, Kotkin is skeptical about how valid it is to define this region between Germany and Japan as “Eurasia.” To Kotkin, Eurasianism, except for some countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, Tataristan and Turkey, where different definitions are offered by some political elites as a project, does not really have many supporters: for example it has no reflections in East European countries, China or the Ukraine. For these countries, Eurasia is a decisive term for neither their identities nor political agendas. Even within countries with some kind of Eurasian perspective, there is no agreement on what Eurasia refers to. In Russia Eurasia generally means anti- Western, while in Kazakhstan and Tataristan it means Western- friendly. In Turkey, Eurasia can mean either anti- Western or Western-friendly (Kotkin, 2007:497-498).

1.1. Eurasia for Turkey

Turkey’s position in the concept of Eurasia has various reference points such as geography, “East,” alternative civilization, extension of the dream of Europe, a plan B for EU membership or a strategy to convince the EU about Turkey’s importance; a search for an alternative economic development other than Europe –

which is the most important one according to Ersanlı- and a cultural/ ethnic/ religious zone to integrate. In line with Kotkin's and Ersanlı's interest towards the sharp increase of Eurasia in world politics, and specifically in Turkey, various scholars conducted research on the potential reasons behind this development. However, despite the richness of resources, the available research seems to be still limited in terms of contextual depth and theoretical background. With the aim to direct this incomplete picture, I am conducting research on the formation of geopolitical discourses in Turkish politics on Eurasia from a comparative perspective.

My goal is twofold: first I want to describe the categories of Turkish Eurasianism by benefitting from the tools of the critical geopolitics theory. Secondly, by referring to the results of the descriptive part of my analysis, I will explain why the Turkish Eurasianists are categorized in this specific way: what are the reasons laying under their overlapping and clashing Eurasianist discourses in Turkey. In this second part of my study, I will make use of the social representation/ collective memory studies, because I claim that what defines these groups' borders are their clashing/ overlapping representations of history. Accordingly, I will be examining these groups' collective memory in relation to Turkish history, to scrutinize the causal mechanism of their discourses' differentiation/ overlap.

There is a wide range of national and international interest towards the topic of Turkish Eurasianism in academia; however, the products in relation to this topic are highly scattered. Even though most of the scholars refer to the relationship between geopolitics and Eurasianism, there is no study of Turkish Eurasianism with the tools of critical geopolitics. Turkey's geopolitical tradition has been studied by scholars like Pınar Bilgin, however Eurasianism with respect to Turkey has not been investigated. On the other hand, Turkey's interest towards Eurasia has been analyzed

by various scholars as a foreign policy issue. This kind of analysis is not serving my aims, where I ask questions about the very construction of Eurasia in elite discourse rather than interrogating which foreign policy objective is better than others and why. I expect to understand who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how they can be categorized, why there are more than one Eurasianism in Turkey by using the constructivist as well as rationalist tools of critical geopolitics for descriptive purposes. Afterwards, I will adapt collective memory studies to my current study for explanatory purposes in finding out the hidden causal mechanism behind the polarization as well as rapprochement among Eurasianist group discourses. Accordingly, at the end of my study, I will be contributing to the relevant literature via a well- designed research on who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how different they are from each other and why. This study's findings will also help to ask questions for future research on the potential influence of Turkish Eurasianists on domestic and foreign policies of the Turkish state.

1.2. New Turkish Politics with New Geopolitical Discourses: Post Cold War Period

In Post-Cold War Turkey, a new geopolitical discourse of Eurasia emerged as a political force in mainly two versions: Kemalist and Ottomanist, which originated from three geopolitical traditions,-nationalist, socialist and Islamist. The elites of these three geopolitical traditions have constructed their own Eurasian geopolitical maps for shaping the new Turkish politics. I discuss how these three Eurasian identities differed in the past and show that geopolitical visions of nationalists and socialists have grown closer to each other in recent years and formed *Ulusalcı*¹

¹For discussions on *Ulusalcı* movement in Turkey see Uslu, Emrullah. 2008. *Ulusalcılık: The Neo-*

geopolitical discourse, while Islamists allied with liberals and formulated the conservative democrat geopolitical discourse.

Why did this alignment take place? I argue that the political elites of these three geopolitical camps— and their respective political parties self-consciously construct these geopolitical discourses. These discourses help them to serve their political aims, but the ensuing historiographical disputes and competing collective memory constructions create clashes among them. Self consciousness refers here to the pragmatism and instrumental character of Turkish Eurasianism. In building my argument, I combine the constructivist and rationalist tools of critical geopolitics and instrumental collective memory theories. My research will be based on locally available primary and secondary sources.

1.3. A Short Introduction to the World of Geopolitics

Mamadouh (1998)'s broad review of the publications on “geopolitics” in the 90s, when geopolitics reappeared as a popular term in academia, is a highly practical tool for the purposes of this introduction chapter. The term geopolitics was first used by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899 (Mamadouh, 1998:237). It was one of the five neologisms he introduced, however the other four, namely demopolitik, ekonomipolitik, sociopolitik, kratopolitik, did not become as famous. With the term “geopolitik,” Kjellen was pointing at three geographical features of a state: topopolitik (the location of a state in relation to other states), morphopolitik (the form of the territory of a state) and physiopolitik (the surface and physical characteristics of this territory) (Holdar, 1992, 1994 in Mamadouh, 1998:237). Since its beginning to today, geopolitics has reflected some inherent confusion by referring

nationalist Resurgence in Turkey. *Turkish Studies* 9(1): 73-97 and Bora, Tanıl. 2003. Nationalist Discourses in Turkey. *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 (2/3): 433-451.

to both the characteristics of state and how to deal with the term “state” in reference to geopolitics.

The term geopolitics became highly influential among German geographers in the 1920s under the leadership of Karl Haushofer and his colleagues of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1924-1944). These geographers were mainly inspired by the work of German geographer Friedrich Ratzel. In addition, Haushofer was inspired by the Anglo- Saxon geostrategy, especially the work of the British geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, and the American admiral, Alfred T. Mahan. Both developed theories on the importance of having the control overseas and continents for the global balance of power (Mamadouh, 1998: 237). Both of these theorists’ works will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this thesis. Mainly because of the influence of *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and its writers on Nazi Germany’s foreign policy, after the Second World War the term geopolitics was mainly associated with Nazi propaganda. Because of this negativity associated with the term, it became unpopular in academia until the 1970- 1980s, when it reappeared, again in a highly influential way.

According to Mamadouh (1998: 238), the basic elements of classical geopolitics can be summarized in the following way: the state is conceived as a living organism, therefore borders are conceived as flexible: they change during the life of the state, in other words, a state enlarges its territory when its strengths grow at the expense of older states in decline. Secondly, following social Darwinism, the evolution of political organism is determined by its environment. What is typical for classical geopolitics therefore is geographical determinism, as opposed to the “possibilism,” advocated by the French school of geography (Mamadouh, 1998:238).

During the Cold War years, geopolitics was neglected. In addition to its negative connotation, Mamadouh (1998:238) supports the idea that it was also a result of the two new important conjunctural changes, which created the impression that geography did not matter as much anymore. The first of these changes is the material cause, which is the technological progress, mainly in transportation and telecommunication. The second change is political: the dominant view that world is divided into two camps only: communists and liberals. Geography ended up not being a decisive factor in shaping foreign policy choices of countries. However, in the seventies, the term geopolitics became famous again. (Hepple, 1986; O'Loughlin, 1994; Dijkink, 1996; O'Tuathail, 1996 and Parker, 1998 in Mamadouh 1998: 238).

At the end of the seventies, under the leadership of French geographer Yves Lacoste, a subversive type of geopolitics emerges. The distinction between classical geopolitics and subversive geopolitics lies in the content: while the first approach deals with states and their relations only, the latter, with a constructivist approach, pays more attention to alternative interpretations of state, national interest and world politics. According to subversive type of geopolitics, basically everything is geopolitical in essence (Mamadouh, 1998:241).

On the other hand, outside France, geographers were also rediscovering geopolitics. Mamadouh (1998:241) called the next geopolitics as “non-geopolitics”, because this school mainly tried to “neutralize” geopolitics. These geographers oppose the abuse of geographical knowledge and have worked for a scientific, neutral geography of international relations since the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties. O'Loughlin and Heske (1991: 37 in Mamadouh 1998: 242) state that: “It is time to reclaim the geopolitical theme from its hijackers in the

strategic community.” Differently than the understanding of Mackinder and the others following his path, non- geopolitics is for “understanding”, not “promoting” foreign policy (O’Loughlin and Heske, 1991: 54 in Mamadouh 1998: 242).

Mamadouh (1998:244) defines critical geopolitics as *a new flag and a self-designation*. Critical geopolitics was introduced in the United States in the eighties, and it pointed originally to studies of foreign policies by means of discourse analysis. This approach is embedded in the post- structuralism of French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault in which discourses are deconstructed, but not necessarily re-constructed as in the case of non-geopolitics. Critical geopolitical theorists deconstruct already existing geopolitical perceptions within state structures. This approach belongs to a broad school of post- modern social sciences involved in discourse analysis.

1.3.1. Geopolitics: a Pseudoscience

For centuries, “geopoliticians” from the Western world, claimed a “natural attitude” towards world politics. This natural attitude holds that the real is what is physically given. They have almost always discussed the so-called “material realities” of world politics. In accordance with these realities, geopoliticians referred to geographic location, natural resources, economic strength, and military power. The hierarchy among these natural “givens” has changed from one geopolitician to the other depending on the country they are from; however their claim of objectivity has never changed. Geopolitics has grown up as a pseudoscience, which claimed superiority over other sciences by its followers, who were mainly military experts, think tank members, people from mass media and sometimes academicians (Dalby, O’Tuathail, and Routledge, 2006).

Some of these geopoliticians became well- known by their “theories” about “unchanging geopolitical facts,” such as Halford J. Mackinder, Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Their work reflects a binary discourse, where they discuss geopolitical separation lines, borders, potential enemies, future directions, and important geographies in a prescriptive tone. All of these figures’ works reflect their short- cut understanding of world politics offering an omnipotent perspective.

In this study, because the individuals, groups and institutions, which construct the Turkish Eurasianism² refer to geopolitics as their source of assumptions and because the very fit of their work to the general picture of the subjects that critical geopolitics deal with, I am choosing to benefit from this approach in categorizing Turkish Eurasianism as a part of the Western geopolitical tradition as well as in determining the main divisions within the Eurasianists of Turkey. Accordingly, I am not the one choosing this theory: it is the actors I analyze, who chose the language of geopolitics as their guide. I am only following their path and choosing to investigate their geopolitical discourse from a critical perspective.

1.4. A Short Introduction to Collective Memory Studies

The one limitation of post-structuralist theories in general, and critical geopolitics in specific, is their stance against offering new definitions or explaining change and persistence in political phenomena. To direct this problem, in addition to benefiting from critical geopolitics’ constructivist tools, I will be supporting this approach by another group of theories, namely collective memory studies, by borrowing their rationalist as well as constructivist tools.

² In this thesis, the term “Turkish Eurasianism” will be used in reference to the Eurasianist tendencies in Turkey only. Therefore, expressions like “Turkish Eurasianism”, “Turkey’s Eurasianism” or “Eurasianism in Turkey” will be used as synonymous word groupings.

Olick and Joyce (1998:105) provide a review of social memory studies, which are “non-paradigmatic, transdisciplinary, and centerless.” The reason of this lack of focus is that scholars’ approach to it has been from the fields of sociology, psychology, history, literary criticism, anthropology and political science. They have studied it by referring to simple and complex societies, from above and below. The result is contemporary disorganization of the area, which Olick and Joyce (1998:106) aim to reconstruct out of the diversity of work. Accordingly, to supplement the critical geopolitics approach in explanatory ways, this article will provide the clues of some potential causal mechanisms in explaining the rapprochement of socialist and nationalist geopolitical traditions, which have stayed faithful to the state- lead collective memory while showing how and why the Islamists formulated a counter-narrative of history.

Hugo von Hoffmanstahl first used the term “collective memory” in 1902 (Schieder, 1978 in Olick and Joyce, 1998:106). Contemporary usages of it, though, date back to 1925, to the famous work of Halbwachs: *Social Frameworks of Memory*. Bartlett, on the other hand, is known as the first modern psychologist to discover the social dimensions of memory, by attributing special importance to group dynamics in remembering. Olick and Joyce (1998:107) claim that, since about 1980, social or collective memory theories have been experiencing their most popular period among the public and academia. The rise of interest, according to Kammen (1995 in Olick and Joyce, 1998:107), is mainly because of the rise of multiculturalism, the fall of Communism, and the increase in politics of victimization and regret.

Schwartz (1996,in Olick and Joyce, 1998:108), on the other hand, identifies three related aspects of the intellectual culture that gave rise to the interest in the

social construction of the past: first, multiculturalists identifying historiography as a source of cultural domination and challenge dominant historical narratives in the name of repressed groups; second, postmodernists attack the conceptual formulations of linear historicity, truth and identity, thereby raising interest in the relations linking history, memory and power. Finally the hegemony theorists provide a class- based account of the *politics of memory*, underlining memory as a contestation process, popular memory, and most importantly for the purposes of my thesis: they provide the instrumentalization of the past for practical purposes.

Historians like Aries (1974) and Agulhon (1981) studied the history of commemorative practices, which they saw as a power mechanism used by states. Their studies shifted historiographical interest from ideology to imaginary, from meaning to manipulation. Much-cited works by writers like Halbwachs,- especially his book *Invention of Tradition*- and Nora, with her work documenting all “realms of history” in France, anticipate today’s postmodernist discussions. Accordingly, Olick and Joyce (1998: 108) conclude that: “...the view that all frameworks have histories and that explicitly past- oriented frameworks are prominent modes of legitimation and explanation leads to increased interest in social memory because it raises questions about transmission, preservation, and alteration of these frameworks over time.”

The term collective or social memory means a remembering process, of not only what we have experienced during our life time, but what we have also thought via history teachings, as a part of our ancestral past. Therefore, studies of historiography overlap in many respects with the studies of collective memory in postmodernist thinking, which challenges the difference between “knowledge” and “interpretation.” For practical purposes, Halbwachs’ categorization of memory seems

to be efficient to work with. He distinguishes autobiographical memory, historical memory, history and collective memory from each other. Autobiographical memory is memory of those events that we ourselves experience; historical memory is the one that reaches us only through historical records. History is the remembered past to which we no longer have an “organic” relation, while collective memory is the active past that forms our identities. Historical memory can be organic or dead: we can celebrate things that we have not directly experienced (Olick and Joyce, 1998:111).

Olick and Joyce (1998:112) take social memory studies as an inquiry into the variety of forms through which we are shaped by past: *conscious or unconscious, public and private, material and communicative, consensual and challenged*. So do me. My expectation is that, making use of the tools of social or collective memory studies in investigating the dynamic relationship between socialist, nationalist and Islamist Eurasianists will be highly enlightening. I came to this conclusion while investigating the primary sources produced by the Turkish Eurasianists, where a specific kind of representation of national history in the shape of collectivized memory takes a central role. These groups define themselves, their goals and expectations exclusively by referring to their understanding of “Turkish history.” This is where Islamist circles distinguish from the socialists and nationalists, who more or less stay faithful to the state-led version of history, while conservatives embrace an alternative version of historical imagination.

Breisbach (1994 in Olick and Joyce, 1998:117) states: “Historians were called on to mediate between the demands for change and the equally strong desire to see the continuity of past, present and future preserved.” Scholars with similar presumptions have produced works to show how states have constructed useful traditions, myths and selectively shaped histories to provide unity, permanency and

authority (Olick and Joyce, 1998: 117-118). However, another shared idea is that the state has lost most of its monopoly over the collective memory of society once it started to share its power with the society. The states' power is in decline, while various sub-national groups fed by various alternative sources create their counter-memories.

1.5. Change and Persistence in Collective Memory

A definition of social memory, in terms of statics and dynamics, is an active process working differently at different points of time (Zelizer, 1995 in Olick and Joyce, 1998: 122). The main question is how the change and persistence in collective memory occurred. Sociologists have long asked this question and have come up with various conclusions: with the key terms of identity, contestation, malleability and persistence (Olick and Joyce, 1998: 122).

Huysen (1995:1 in Olick and Joyce, 1998: 122) argues "Identities,-personal or collective-, are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past." Accordingly, identity is seen as a project and practice, not necessarily a property. Hobsbawn (1978 in Olick and Joyce, 1998: 122), provides the most comprehensive approach to the issue of identity-memory relationship by stating that "to be a member of any human community is to situate oneself with regard to one's past, if only by rejecting it." In a similar vein, Zerubavel (1996 in Olick and Joyce, 1998: 123) refers to the "mnemonic communities", who remember what they have not directly experienced, but what they are told via generational storylines about a shared past. Zerubavel writes: "being social presupposes the ability to experience events that happened to groups or communities to which we belong before we joined them as if they were part of our

own past...” This “sociobiographical memory” is the mechanism through which we feel pride, pain, or shame with regard to events that happened to our groups before we joined them. Accordingly, I will examine the three geopolitical traditions' collective memories in terms of Turkish history, -Republican and Ottoman-.

Islamism in Turkey is identified as a political and social force of counter memory construction against the state historiography (Stone, 2009). Similarly, in my thesis, my position considers conservative identity as a counter one, which differs from the Kemalist stance of nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions. Accordingly, there are two Turkish Eurasianist geopolitical discourses: Kemalist Eurasianism and Ottomanist Eurasianism³. Their struggle over shaping the collective memory of the Turkish society is a good example of contestation. These groups do not necessarily define themselves as Kemalist and Ottomanist, at least as their prior identity, nevertheless I still categorize them in this way by referring to my criteria of overlapping and/ or clashing historical narratives of these groups. My hypothesis is that the nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions can be considered as Kemalist in the way that they are at peace with the Kemalist historical construction of Turkey. However, the conservative Eurasianists tend to challenge this state's discourse on Turkey's history, by hoping to redefine it in a way that glorifies Ottoman history as much as Republican history. Each group's definition of Eurasia is also shaped by their historical narrative, which makes it an explanatory variable for this thesis. Focusing on the Turkish political narratives illustrates Stone (2009:413)'s claim that

3 For a deeper discussion of Turkish Ottomanism see Yavuz, M. Hakan. (1998) *Turkic Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism*. *Critique* 12: 19-42, and for a critical discussion on Kemalism see: Bagdonas Demirtaş, Özlem. 2008. *The Clash of Kemalisms? Reflections on the Past and Present Politics of Kemalism in Turkish Political Discourse*. *Turkish Studies* 9(1): 99-114 and for a constructivist comparison article of Ottomanism and Kemalism, see Çolak, Yılmaz. 2006. *Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey*. *Middle Eastern Studies* 42(4): 587-602. Çolak's article is also explained in detail in the Chapter 2 of this thesis.

history is the key determinant of the national identity in the Turkish case. To him, “history is the present, imposing itself on the past” (Stone, 2009:420).

In the following parts of my thesis, I will first provide a detailed literature review of the two main relevant theories that form the framework for my study: critical geopolitics and collective memory studies. Then, in the third chapter, I will link these theories to an historical review on Turkish Eurasianism. Here I will discuss the Turkish Eurasianism as a geopolitical discourse constructed in the post- Cold War Turkey, which is embedded in the Euro-centric geopolitics tradition. The fourth chapter will be my data application chapter, where I will explore the sub-group dynamics within the Eurasianists in Turkey and try to provide original data from available primary and secondary sources.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Critical Geopolitics Theory

Agnew (1998:1) defines the aim of his book *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* as to show the incorporated character of American- European experience of geopolitics as the dominant geopolitical imagination spread to the world. To him, geopolitics became possible once people started to see the world as “a whole” and pursue political goals about the world. Despite the common idea that geopolitics started when Kjellen used the term geopolitics for the first time in 1899, Agnew claims that geopolitics actually began when the term “world politics” first used in Europe, long before Kjellen. It started with the ambitions of the Europeans about partitioning the territorial space (Agnew, 1998:3). Its very start was when some geographies of the world were seen as more important than the others.

Agnew claims that “power politics” has always been an integral part of the geopolitics experience. Hegemonies of each century claimed right to intervene far geographies’ politics with the claim of solving problems, but actually in the direction of their own interests. Accordingly, modern geopolitical imagination has provided meaning and rationalization for the European and American hegemonies in their actions (Agnew, 1998:4-5).

2.1.1. Modern Geopolitical Imagination

Modern geopolitical imagination is defined by Agnew (1998: 6) as *a set of understandings about the way the world works*, and it is Euro-centric because Europe and its offshoots such as Russia and the United States wanted to dominate the world.

The dominant representations and practices constituting modern geopolitical imagination have been overwhelmingly those of the political elites of Great Powers. Therefore, being hegemony gives one the power to shape modern geopolitical imagination: when there is no hegemony, there is no dominant geopolitical imagination. Three key assumptions of modern geopolitical imagination are the following: first state sovereignty and territorial space, second territorial state as a container of society and finally domestic- foreign polarity. Territorial states are the main actors in this imagination.

2.1.2. Renaissance's Effect on the Birth of Geopolitics

Visualization of the global space as a whole happened first when Europeans encountered the rest of the world in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (Agnew, 1993:11). This is the time when Europeans started to picture a world where there was an “us” and a separate “other.” From that time onwards, the observer could stand outside of the world and make comments about it. To Agnew, this observer perspective of human beings in relation to the world is a product of Renaissance. This representation of the world as a distinct existence also caused the hierarchy of places. The West started to define itself in accordance to the East, by referring to it as the totality of what West was not.

This visualization showed its effect on the drawings of world maps. First world maps were reflecting an ethnocentric, hierarchic representation of the world. In passing time, abstraction and subjectivity left their place to a relative objectivity, but the dominant countries' influence on maps have never changed. Another contribution of Renaissance was the idea of “perspective,” which allowed *a framing, or field projection of particulars as elements in an ordered whole* (Agnew, 1993: 17).

Perspective made the single eye the center of the world. To Agnew, this discovery was a revolutionary one because it changed the consciousness of people about the relationship between self and the world (or others) permanently. Accordingly, binary geographical imaginations of today's politics have their roots in the discovery of perspective.

2.1.3. Three Epochs of Geopolitics

Agnew (1993:86) defines three specific epochs of geopolitics from the early nineteenth century to the 1980s, characterized by changing material conditions and unchanging principles of modern geopolitical imagination. These three discourses or modes of geopolitics are: civilizational geopolitics, naturalized geopolitics and ideological geopolitics, respectively. The unchanging principles are: first spatial differences defined in a binary language like modern/ backwards distinction; second, visualization of the world as a whole; third the exclusively superior role of states in shaping the world politics' fate and finally existence of a hegemony (Great Power), which has the power of constructing each epoch's geopolitical grammar. What changed in time, on the other hand, are the idioms and contexts of usage.

Civilizational geopolitics started in the late eighteenth century as a reaction to the loss of Christianity as a unifying factor in the Western Europe as a result of the Wars of Religion. Civilization replaced religion as a unifying force. This period's main elements were: commitment to European uniqueness as a civilization, a belief that Europe's distinct character comes from its glorious past and finally identification of nation state as the most perfect invention of Europe. In this age, Europe turned into a cultural region from a religious and physical region.

Naturalized geopolitics showed itself with the tremendous effect of social Darwinism and its “survival of the fittest” idea, coupled with increasing racism in Europe. Nazi geopoliticians of 1930s came up with formalized schemes of racial representations of geography called pan-regions. They were depending on the firm idea that the world is separated into purely racial parts. This doctrine gained expression in three key points: the harmony of the state and nation, natural political boundaries and economic nationalism (Agnew, 1993:101).

Ideological geopolitics is the Cold War geopolitics. This mode of geopolitics is different than the other two in terms of its usage of myths, ideals, catchwords and fear as tools of polarization. The major characteristics of this geopolitical mode are: a central systemic ideological conflict over political- economic organization, a tripartite organization of the world as the First, Second and Third World and economic system rivalry as capitalism vs. communism. Reductionist approach to the world politics, which underestimates complexity is the most definitive character of this epoch.

2.1.4. Alternative Periodization of the History of Geopolitics

O’Tuathail and Dalby (2006) offer an alternative history for the historical progress of geopolitics (See Table 2.1.). Different than Agnew’s categorization, where the determinant factor is the hegemony; key intellectuals of each epoch are the most important factors in O’Tuathail and Dalby’s categorization of geopolitics’ history.

Table 2.1. Historical Progress of Geopolitics according to O’Tuathail and Dalby (2006:11)

Discourse	Key Intellectuals	Dominant lexicon
Imperialist Geopolitics	Alfred Mahan Friedrich Ratzel Halford Mackinder Karl Haushofer Nicholas Spykman	Sea power Lebensraum Land power/Heartland Land power/Heartland Rimlands
Cold War Geopolitics	George Kennan Soviet and Western political and military leaders	Containment First/second/third world countries as satellites and dominos Western vs. Eastern Bloc
New World Order Geopolitics	Mikhail Gorbachev Francis Fukuyama Edward Luttwak George Bush Leaders of G7, IMF, WTO Strategic planners in the Pentagon and NATO Samuel Huntington	New political thinking The end of history Statist geoeconomics US led New World Order Transnational liberalism/ Neoliberalism Rogue states/ nuclear outlaws and terrorists Clash of civilizations
Environmental Geopolitics	World Commission on Environment and Development Al Gore Robert Kaplan Thomas Homer- Dixon Michael Renner	Sustainable development Strategic environmental initiative Coming anarchy Environmental scarcity Environmental security

O’Tuathail and Dalby (2006) define the period between 1870 and 1945 as the Imperialist Era, when geopolitics as a power/ knowledge was born. There were competing empires, colonial expansionism and industrial developments were shaping the political map of the world. British Empire, Russia, US, Italy, Germany and later Japan: all had their own statecraft working to justify their imperialist aims. Among these, geopolitical competition between Germany and the British Empire was the most distinctive one, which caused two world wars. Especially the British geopolitician Mackinder and German geopolitician Karl Haushofer played important roles in this competition.

2.1.5. The Most Famous Geopolitician: Halford Mackinder

Mackinder was a geographer, who focused on the education of geography via which he wanted to raise British children with an imperialist view of the world. To O’Tuathail (2006:16), Mackinder’s role is important in the history of geopolitics.

This is because of his division of the world into hierarchical territories, and his firm idea about geography's influence on history and politics. Mackinder, for the first time, formulated "geographical causation in history," which made him a controversial figure, even for today's scholars.

Another influential and controversial figure from imperialist geopolitics is the American Admiral Mahan, who supported the idea of naval expansionism for the US to be a world power (O'Tuathail, 2006:18). American government of his times institutionally supported Mahan's ideas. Following Mahan's path, US President Theodore Roosevelt claimed that the US, as the most developed and superior state, has a right and duty to act as a global police, which was later termed as "the white man's burden" (O'Tuathail, 2006: 19). All in all, what common to imperialist geopoliticians is a contested geographical knowledge, embeddedness in politics, and a strong self-justification mechanism in glorifying imperialist agendas.

About the Cold War geopolitics, O'Tuathail (2006:47) claims that the geopolitical reasoning of the years of 1946 and 1947 in the United States and the reaction it provoked in Stalin's Soviet Union caused the antagonism between the two countries. The role of George F. Kennan, US' foreign affairs charge in the Soviet Union, is important in this situation, because he was the one first defining the Soviet Union as a historically imperialist power, with whom there cannot be made any deals (O'Tuathail, 2006:47).

The Truman Doctrine in 1947 is accepted as the first official declaration of the start of Cold War (O'Tuathail, 2006:48). Filled with abstract categories like the "free world" or the "enslaved world," Truman's doctrine does not draw a different picture than its forerunners in terms of the knowledge, which comes "out of nowhere." In his doctrine, the lines between "good" vs. "evil," "West" vs. "East," US

vs. Soviet Union are hypothetically drawn. Similar discourses are also found in the Soviet side's strategists and politicians' speeches.

The ending of the Cold War was not a positive development for the geopoliticians, because it changed their rigid maps. However, Geopolitics reappeared in the post- Cold War period. Fukuyama, who worked as the deputy director of policy planning in the Bush administration wrote "The End of History" via which he declared the victory of the US from the Cold War (O'Tuathail, 2006: 104). To him, the US and the Western Europe represented a homogenous unity, without consideration of numerous heterogeneities in this large geography (O'Tuathail, 2006: 106).

Samuel Huntington's thesis on clashing civilizations is another example for traditional geopolitical construction of borders. It was not a clash only between the West and the Rest, but also a clash between "us" and "them," as defined by Huntington (O'Tuathail, 2006:110). In his reasoning, cultural identity is an unchangeable given. His perspective is ahistorical and totalizing, similar to the Cold War reasoning (O'Tuathail, 2006:111).

Dodds (2000) claims that Fukuyama underestimates the differences among democratic liberal countries. Similarly, Huntington's world map (See Figure 2.1.) overly generalizes both civilizational homogeneity and the so called threats coming from the outside world. Both Fukuyama's and Huntington's political maps of the post- Cold War world are geopolitical in the sense that they share the concern of mapping the world politically (Dodds, 2000:15).


2.1.6. Geopolitics and International Relations Theory

Dodds' approach to geopolitics is from the International Relations perspective. Dodds (2000:34) provides a theoretical comparison of realism, liberalism and critical geopolitics (See Table 2.2.). He claims that the assumptions of the realist school of international relations overlap with the traditional geopolitics. Their only difference seems to be the explicit focus of traditional geopolitics on the geography as the sole explanatory variable.

Table 2.2. Theories of world politics: key terms (Dodds 2000:34)

Realism	Liberalism	Critical Geopolitics
-National Sovereignty -States -Military power -Anarchical world	-National sovereignty -States and non-state organizations -Limited International cooperation	-Interdependence -Globalization -Networks and nodal points -Representations of global space

"Emerging alignments" of civilizations, per Samuel Huntington's theory in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996).



Greater line thickness represents more conflict in the civilizational relationship.

Figure 2.1. The World According to Samuel Huntington

Dalby (2008) asserts that after the end of the Cold War, globalization puzzled the rigid dictionary of geopoliticians. However, after the September 11, critical

geopolitics became again visible with the remilitarization of foreign policy practices in the United States. This period, named as “Neo- Reaganite Era” by Dalby (2008: 413), proves the ongoing relevance of critical geopolitics.

2.1.7. Turkish Eurasianism as and Example of Classical Geopolitics

Classical geopolitics and the critical geopolitics theory which aims to deconstruct classical geopolitics, matter for my thesis because I claim that Turkish Eurasianists' geopolitical discourses match with the characteristics of classical geopolitical tradition. I agree with Agnew in the sense that no country in the world is immune from the effects of hegemonic geopolitical discourses. Information produced by the geopoliticians of the hegemonic powers in each geopolitical epoch shape how people think about world politics all around the world. Accordingly, I argue that researchers can find the traces of dominant geopolitical modes in the geopolitical imagination of Turkish Eurasianists. Accordingly, this research aims to define and describe Turkish Eurasianists via the descriptive tools of critical geopolitics theory .

2.1.8. On the Difference between Classical (Orthodox/ Traditional) and Critical Geopolitics

O'Tuathail (1999:107) describes classical (also named as traditional or orthodox) geopolitics as a problem- solving theory, used to provide recommendation to the statecraft. Characteristically, it takes existing power structures for granted and works with those to provide simple and instrumental concepts as well as practical advice for foreign policy makers. Accordingly, traditional geopolitical way of narration has two main characteristics: it is declarative (this is how the world “is”) and it is imperative (this is what “we” must do). The “is” shows commitment to

unchanging objectivity of truth, while the “we” shows the geographically bounded community and its cultural/political version of truth.

Opposite to classical geopolitics, critical geopolitics aims to question the existing power and knowledge structures. It sees the simple-mindedness of classical geopolitics as dangerous because of the power of classical geopolitics in shaping foreign policy choices of countries. Its power comes from its superficial knowledge, sacralization of a constructed reality via “experts” of “strategic security” institutionalized among parliaments, universities, military bureaucracies and think tanks (O’Tuathail, 1999:108). Critical geopolitics varies from political economy analysis to textual analysis of foreign policy rationale, largely inspired by Foucault’s discourse theory and Derriderian deconstruction theory (O’Tuathail, 1999:12, note 1).

According to critical geopolitics, geography is not a fixed objective reality but a historical and social form of knowledge about the earth. Therefore it is not freed from subjectivity of culture: it reflects its writer’s perspective. “Geopolitics is a writing of geographical meanings and politics of states,” states O’Tuathail (1999:109). Therefore, opposite to what the classical geopoliticians claim, critical geopolitics asks for transparency and freedom of discussion in a democratic environment as a normative goal.

Critical geopolitics argues that classical geopoliticians ignore the context and do not direct various inconsistencies in their work. To exemplify this point, O’Tuathail (1999:112) gives the example from the founding father of geopolitics, Mackinder, whose work is *historically simplistic, geographically deterministic, and technologically one-dimensional*. Similar characteristics can also be attributed to Turkish Eurasianists, as I will be analyzing in detail in the chapter four of this study.

2.1.9. Types of Classical Geopolitics

For methodological purposes, O'Tuathail categorizes geopolitics in four subdivisions: formal, practical, popular and structural (O'Tuathail, 1999:109, See Table 2.3.). Formal geopolitics is also named as “geopolitical tradition” or “geopolitical thought” in the critical studies. The actors investigated by formal geopolitics are intellectuals and institutions such as think tanks, universities and military- based strategy centers. Knowledge produced in these centers aim to shape the foreign policy of the state and affect masses. This is the type of geopolitics that I am dealing with in my study of Turkish Eurasians. This is because Turkish Eurasians are not in the practical realm of geopolitics but only produce elite- based instrumental information to shape Turkish foreign as well as domestic policies in indirect ways.

On the other hand, practical geopolitics is the one involved in the everyday practice of foreign policy production. Actors of practical geopolitics are government members, political parties, state institutions and active leaders of the political realm. Third category, which is the popular geopolitics, refers to the geopolitics created and spread by the media. It is embedded in the popular culture, as its name suggests. Finally, structural geopolitics studies the structural processes and tendencies within which all the countries conduct foreign policies. Debates on globalization, technological change and hegemony are under this category.

Table 2.3. Types of Classical Geopolitics: Turkish Eurasianism is a part of formal geopolitics (O’Tuathail 1999:111)

Type of Geopolitics	Object of Investigation	Problematic	Research Example
Formal Geopolitics	Geopolitical thought and the geopolitical tradition	Intellectuals, institutions and their political and cultural context	Halford Mackinder, his geopolitical theories and imperialist context
Practical Geopolitics	The everyday practice of statecraft	Practical geopolitical reasoning in foreign policy conceptualization	“Balkanism” and its influence over US foreign policy towards Bosnia
Popular Geopolitics	Popular culture, mass media, and geographical understandings	National identity and the construction of images of other peoples and places	The role of mass media in projecting images of Bosnia into Western living rooms
Structural Geopolitics	The contemporary geopolitical condition	Global processes, tendencies and contradictions	How globalization, informationalization and risk society condition/ transform geopolitical practices

2.1.10. On the Strength of Formal Geopolitics

O’Tuathail (1999:113) provides some general qualifications of formal geopolitical discourse, which unleash the truths behind its success in getting so much attention. O’Tuathail underlines its myth making, esoteric character and its promise of providing insight to a complex world as the two main features making it so attractive to people. As Campbell (1992) points out, sacralization and historical narrativization are the two tools used by geopoliticians in influencing their followers. In addition, geopolitics is a narrow instrumental form of reason: a form of faith and belief that there are permanent conflicts and national interests which shape the world politics. Among the key words of geopolitical discourses are, therefore, “insight” and “prophecy.”

Another characteristic of formal geopolitics is its binary discourse: it formulates identities in reference to the hostile “Others” like land power vs. sea power, oceanic vs. continental or as in the case of Turkish geopolitical tradition, East vs. West (O’Tuathail, 1999:113). Foreign policy complexity turns into a strategic

game. Geopolitics is a 20th century tradition of thinking about statecraft that begins with Friedrich Ratzel, Alfred Mahan, Rudolf Kjellen and Halford Mackinder, and then develops in the inter-war period with Karl Haushofer's *German Geopolitik* and Nicholas Spykman's *Rimland* theories. It develops in the writings of contemporary figures like Henry Kissinger, Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski (O'Tuathail,1999:110). This last group of writers affected Turkish geopoliticians a lot and have helped Turkish Eurasianists in justifying their arguments.

2.1.11. Concepts to Work with Critical Geopolitics

Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Study of Geopolitics by O' Tuathail (2003) is one of the most useful articles for the theoretical purposes of this study. In this study, O'Tuathail argues for a critical geopolitics conceptualization around two key lines: *geopolitical structures* and *geopolitical cultures*. The first one deals with the world politics in the macro level; while the second one concerns with the study of geopolitical cultures in the meso level. There are five related but distinct geopolitical structures defined by O'Tuathail (2003:3):

Geopolitical Order: It concerns with the organization of state power and violence around the world. It is primarily defined by the dynamics of war, peace and diplomacy.

Geopolitical Economy: It addresses the organization of trading structures, corporate networks, resource and financial flows in the current global economy.

Techno- Territorial Complexes: This category of structural geopolitics deals with the historical relationship of geography and technological advancement. It asks how

technological investment in transportation, communication and military technology shapes the new constructions of territoriality while making state borders obsolete.

Geopolitical Condition: The interaction of geopolitical order, economy, hegemony and techno- territorial advancement generate a prevailing cultural order of time-space communication within which geopolitics is experienced, processed and dealt with by individual actors. This is the geopolitical condition of the time.

The second key category is geopolitical cultures. This category matters more for this study because Turkish Eurasianism is a locally structured geopolitical discourse, which requires a case- specific, meso and micro level investigation. The most important term in this line is the “geopolitical discourse”. As O’Tuathail (2003:3) rightly points out, geopolitical discourse is the most associated concept to critical geopolitics, however with a generally unclear and inconsistent use. O’Tuathail offers six sub-categorizations under the category of geopolitical discourse:

Geopolitical Imagination: It is defined as the way in which influential groups in the cultural life of states define where the state belongs in the world map of geography, culture, tradition and/ or civilization.

Geopolitical imagination is important for this thesis because one of my primary goals is to find out how nationalist, socialist and conservative Eurasianist traditions define their “Eurasia,” in which they situate Turkey. Accordingly, where this thesis’ investigation starts is the comparison of the three geopolitical imaginations and declaration of how overlapping and/or clashing they are. My hypothesis, as mentioned before, is that the socialist and nationalist imaginations of Eurasia overlap in major terms while the conservatives’ Eurasia is an alternative to it.

Following questions are relevant to geopolitical imagination: how are the notions of self and other assembled, how does a social group situate its country within a world of collective identities, how are proximity and distance to the other countries or regions defined? As an example to this kind of study, there is David Newman's study on the geopolitical imagination of Israeli society in terms of how Israeli people define the geographical, cultural and civilizational place of Israel in the world (see Table 2.4).

Geopolitical Culture: This term refers to cultural and organizational processes by which foreign policies are designed by states (O'Tuathail, 2003:10). It is a product of geopolitical imagination, strategic culture and institutionalization of the state mechanism. "Naturalness of the borders;" identification of friends, enemies of the states, definition of model countries and civilizations, and definition of national missions are the processes in the realm of geopolitical culture. Despite its "unchanging truths," the geopolitical culture is not actually immune from change once the powerful actors in governing mechanism change hands. Basically, to O'Tuathail (2003:11), the design of foreign policy and institutional organization are the determinants of geopolitical culture in a country.

Table 2.4. Newman’s five Israeli Imaginations (O’Tuathail, 2003:8-9)

GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION	SUMMARY POSITION	SOCIAL SPONSORS	CULTURAL EXPRESSION
In the Middle East	Israel is and must become part of its geographical region, part of a ‘New Middle East’ (Peres)	<i>Mizrahim</i> of North African & Middle Eastern origin	Oriental music; lack of knowledge of English; Arabic
In Europe	Israel culturally part of Europe “somewhere between Paris and Prague.”	<i>Ashkenazi</i> founders and elite of modern Israel. Strengthened by Russian immigrants.	In European competitions; ties to Germany and Russia. Mediterranean identity
In the Jewish diaspora	A country without borders.	Diasporic groups across the world; Jewish National Fund and Jewish Agency	<i>Aliyah</i> , the ‘right of return.’
Fifty first state of the United States	Israel as America’s ally, ‘best friend’ and ‘only democracy in Middle East.’	American-Israeli lobby; Israeli American Jewish communities	Financial and military aid to Israel; Americanization of Israeli culture
Center of the World	The ‘holy land,’ birthplace of Judaism & Christianity, third most significant Islamic site. Metaphysical.	Religious communities; tourist industry and media coverage of ongoing conflict.	Battles over holy sites. Symbolic politics of religion. Global television spotlight.

Geopolitical Tradition: There are various alternative geopolitical traditions with different definitions of national interest, foreign policy, and state identity. All large states with long historical pasts have various geopolitical traditions, which challenge each other continuously (O’Tuathail, 2003: 13). In the Turkish case, there are three geopolitical traditions: nationalist, socialist and Islamic. Below, there is Walter Russel Mead ‘s (2002:6-7) table on competing geopolitical traditions in the United States with their competing definitions of national interest as well as their different social bases and competing definitions of cultural identity (see Table 2.5.).

Another study belongs to Graham Smith on the Russian geopolitical traditions (See Table 2.6.). His study connects the images of the state’s perceived place in the world to the concepts of national identity and normative geopolitical philosophy. Its method makes this study a highly important sample to adapt to the case for my analysis.

Geopolitical Vision: Geopolitical vision is a wishful statement about how the world politics should be organized. Kearns’ study, where he compares Halford Mackinder,

Woodrow Wilson and Lenin, is a good example of competing geopolitical visions with different geopolitical subjects and teleologies (See Table 2.7.).

Table 2.5. American Geopolitical Traditions (Mead, 2002 in O’Tuathail, 2003:14)

TRADITION	US NATIONAL INTEREST	SOCIAL BASIS	CULTURAL IDENTITY
Jeffersonian	Preserving American democracy at home. Limited foreign adventurism. Narrow interests abroad. Liberty before commerce.	Farmers. Independent small businessmen. Libertarians. Isolationists. American Civil Liberties Union.	Anti-elitist and populist. Some with exclusivist anti-immigrant tendencies.
Wilsonian	Spreading its values throughout the world. Democracy, human rights, freedom of religion.	Missionaries. International lawyers. Human rights community.	Multicultural.
Jacksonian	Keeping America militarily strong. Democratic populism. Fighting preemptive wars with all available force.	Military and popular culture of honor, individualism. KKK. National Rifle Association.	Folk nationalism. Exclusivist male-dominant Anglo-Saxon nation. Nativist.
Hamiltonian	Promoting American enterprise at home and abroad. Freedom of the seas. Protectionism then free trade. Open door for American exports.	Merchant and business class. Bankers.	Pluralist.

Table 2.6. Russian Geopolitical Traditions in 1990s (Smith, 1999 in O’Tuathail, 2003:14)

TRADITION	RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST	SOCIAL BASIS	CULTURAL IDENTITY
Liberal-Westernist	Good economic and trading relations with the West.	International business class.	Pluralist
Neo-Nationalist	Strong Russian state and Tsarist empire. Hostile to the West.	Russian Orthodox Church. Slavophiles. Romantic nationalism.	Russian
Neo-Soviet	Return to Communist values. Hostile to Western capitalist powers.	Communist Party members and supporters. Communist ideology	Pluralists but Russians as ‘first among equals.’
Democratic Statist	Neutral or implicitly hostile to West. Pragmatic pursuit of development and strength	Domestic business class and institutional power structures. Synthesis of nationalism and westernization.	Slavic-Turkic

Table 2.7. Contrasting Geopolitical Visions (Kearns, 2003 in O’Tuathail, 2003:17)

	Mackinder	Wilson	Lenin
Geopolitical subject	Nature: races	Meaning: ethnic nations	Social Relations: classes
Teleology	Consolidation of empires, emergence of single world empire	Break up of empires, emergence of mosaic of ethnic nation-states	Collapse of capitalism, diffusion of socialist revolution
Institutional support	British Empire	League of Nations	Third International
Conflation of state with geopolitical subject	Great Britain	United States	Soviet Union

Geopolitical Discourse and the Discursive Policy Process: Geopolitical discourse is defined by O’Tuathail (2003:17) as a storyline, whose grammar contains a what (situation description), where (location description), who (protagonist description), why (causality and blame definition), and so what (interest description). In this process, key metaphors, consistent storylines, mythical figures (heroes, leader figures etc.), future goal definitions, historical analogies and mission definitions play important roles. In addition, institutionalization of discourses via civil society organizations, think tanks, clubs, media channels, journals, and similar gatherings with mass audience should be important parts of investigation.

In the Turkish case, there are two prominent geopolitical discourses of Eurasianism: Kemalist vs. Ottomanist. Kemalist Eurasianism is represented by nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions, who take a defensive role in supporting Kemalist foundation of Turkey. On the other hand, Ottomanist group is made of the Islamist geopolitical tradition, which tries to challenge the Kemalist foundation of the state. These two geopolitical discourses are investigated in the light of what, where, who, why and so what questions in the fourth chapter of this study.

Geostrategic Discourse: Geostrategic discourse is a sub-category of geopolitical discourse. It focuses on making strategic claims about national security interests of

the state in a world characterized by dangers, threats, competition and resource scarcity. It is a self-referential, performative discourse, institutionalized in state bureaucracies, military and civil society (O'Tuathail, 2003: 19). Because of the power of military as an institution in Turkish politics, scholars have preferred focusing on geostrategic geopolitics from a critical perspective, as in the case of studies of Bilgin (2007a, 2007b, 2008) and Tank (2005). In line with Bilgin's description, O' Tuathail (2003:20) also mentions the term "securitization" as an alternative to the term "geostrategic discourse."

2.1.12. Flow Chart of Critical Geopolitics Terminology

Following figure (2.2.) summarizes the relationship between these key terms in a flow of reasoning. Accordingly, at the macro level there is the Euro-centric modern geopolitical imagination, which produces geopolitical imaginations on global terms. The productions of this process as key code words, phrases, ideas and problems reflect in similar ways in each country's geopolitical culture. Geopolitical cultures contain clashing/ overlapping geopolitical traditions in a dynamic relationship with each other. These traditions produce geopolitical visions, which are constructed and justified via instrumental historical myths, storylines and scripts.

In the Figure 2.2., I provided an application of this flow chart to the case of Turkish Eurasianism. As mentioned before, socialist, nationalist and Islamist geopolitical traditions are in a dynamic relationship. My hypothesis is that, in the post-Cold War Turkey, nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions have been in a process of rapprochement, which created the so called "Ulusalçı" vision. Ulusalçı vision ended up with the overlapping Kemalist Eurasianist discourses of the two groups. On the other hand, the Islamic tradition has cooperated with the liberal

tradition in Turkish politics, which caused the construction of the alternative geopolitical discourse of Eurasianism: Ottomanist discourse. Kemalism and Ottomanism are the geopolitical imaginations in a rivalry, whose roots, I claim, can be found in the two groups' clashing collective memory construction. This hypothesis is the explanatory one and will be investigated with the tools of collective memory studies.




Figure 2.2. Cultural Geopolitics: Key concepts and their relationship in work (O’Tuathail, 2003:23)




Figure 2.3. Turkish Eurasianism application of the key concepts

2.1.13. Critical Geopolitics and Narrativization

Dalby and O’Tuathail (1998:3) focus on the importance of the narrativization processes within geopolitical cultures in understanding competing geopolitical imaginations. They define the founding storylines of national states as geopolitical acts. Construction of national heroes, enemies, national mission and goals are parts of this action. There are competing traditions trying to shape national geopolitical imagination and borders of belonging:

Counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries- both actual and conceptual- disturb those ideological maneuvers through which “imagined communities” are given essentialist identities. For the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its irredeemably plural modern space-representing the nation’s modern territoriality is turned into the archaic, atavistic temporality of traditionalism. The difference of space returns as the sameness of time, turning territory into tradition, turning

the people into one. (Babha, 1994: 149 in Dalby and O’ Tuathail, 1998: 3).

Accordingly, foreign policy is defined as a “specific sort of boundary producing political performance” (Ashley, 1987: 51 in Dalby and O’Tuathail, 1998:4). Sites of production of geopolitics are diverse: they are both high (a national security memorandum), and low (a headline of newspaper), visual and discursive, traditional (religious motives) and postmodern (internet) (See Figure 2.4.). It asks questions like: “What is the path for national greatness for a state? (Mahan), “How can a state grow? (Ratzel), “How can a state be reformed in a way that it does not lose its greatness?” (Mackinder). These questions are always in a close relationship to politics and their answers lack “possibilism.”




Figure 2.4. A critical theory of geopolitics as a set of representational practices (O’Tuathail, 1998:5)

2.1.14. Critical Approaches Turkish Geopolitics

Bilgin’s article “*Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography*”: *The uses of geopolitical truths in Turkey* published in 2007. It provides a theoretically and empirically rich critical analysis on the history of geopolitics in

Turkey. Starting with the World War II, when the term “geopolitics” first introduced to the Turkish political tradition by the military, Bilgin traces the development of this tradition promoted as a “new, Western science.” Bilgin’s article (2007) is one of the deepest works done on the geopolitical tradition in Turkey, which has been constructed and promoted by the military in an instrumentalist way. Bilgin’s study adds a historical dimension to the issue via some valuable qualitative data. The retired General, also the first teacher of geopolitics courses in the Turkish military academies and writer of twenty books on the geopolitics of Turkey, Suat İlhan states: “It was never easy being a Turk: nor is it today, nor will be tomorrow. This is what history and geographical variables point to” (İlhan, 1999 in Bilgin, 2007:741).

2.1.14.1. Geopolitics Appearing in Turkish Politics: World War Two Years

The term “geopolitics” is introduced to Turkey as a body of knowledge during the World War II in a series of articles published in newspapers (Eren, 1964, Sezgin and Yılmaz, 1965 in Bilgin, 2007:742). To Bilgin, geopolitics was introduced to Turkey with instrumental reasons: as a new and potentially useful tool to provide an influential position for Turkey in its foreign relations. One of the first writers of on geopolitics in Turkey, Prof. Fındıklıoğlu refers to geopolitics as a “necessary evil,” whose benefits Turkey should not miss out (Bilgin, 2007:743). This reference proves that Fındıklıoğlu was aware of the lack of objectivity in this term but still wanted to make use of its instrumental power.

When the World War II ended, geopolitics had a highly negative connotation in the world because of its usage by strategic thinkers of the Nazi Germany. However, isolation of geopolitics in the Western world did not reflect to Turkey.

Turkish civil and military actors kept referring to geopolitics as a new science studied in high level of education of Western institutions (Osmanağaoğlu, 1968 and Tufan, 1965 in Bilgin, 2007:743). To Bilgin, Turks embraced geopolitics because it had positive connotations like “rational” and “Western,” which gave Turkey the chance of cutting ties with the “irrational,” “Eastern,” and “old” Ottoman Empire and its legacy (Göle, 1986 in Bilgin, 2007:743).

2.1.14.2. The Geopolitics of Military

After the World War II, the Military Academy introduced to its curriculum a series of lectures on geopolitics, which were delivered from professors of leading universities. Despite criticism, these lecturers underlined the determinative character of geography over the (mainly) domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. After the course “Classical Geopolitics” taught by İlhan, a new literature on geopolitics has started to appear via publications of military outlets (Bilge, 1969; Eren, 1964; Turfan, 1965; Öngör, 1963 in Bilgin, 2007:743). Since then, the majority of the geopolitics studies in Turkey came from military circles (Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, 1963; İlhan, 1971, 1986, 1989, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005; Tezkan and Taşar, 2002; Tursan, 1971; Uzun, 1981 in Bilgin, 2007:743).

The compulsory high school course named “National Security” has been in the curriculum since 1926; however in 1973, shortly after the 1971 military intervention, geopolitics component was added to this course, where it was defined as “the definition and administration of government politics in accordance with the necessities and inclinations of geography” (Altınay, 2005: 133 in Bilgin, 2007:745). Since then, after each intervention of the army to politics in 1980 and 1998, the content of geopolitics got strengthened. The 1998 textbook opens as follows: “The

Turkish Republic, because of its geopolitical position, has had to face political schemes devised by external powers. The Turkish youth needs to be prepared to deal with such schemes” (Lise Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi, 1998:7 in Bilgin, 2004: 746).

According to Bilgin (2007: 744), among the military’s instrumental motivations was to gain a superior power on the –mainly- domestic politics, but also foreign policy decisions of Turkey. Geopolitics became important after the World War II because military started to lose power among society during the 1944-1960 periods. Civilian actors started to gain power vis-à-vis the military. The deterministic character of classical geopolitics provided the military to justify its interference to domestic politics. As İlhan (1971 in Bilgin, 2007:745) pointed out: “Politicians no longer have a monopoly on foreign policy issues...geostrategic issues are of interest not only to the military but also scientists.” The National Security course has become a tool to reach all high school students in Turkey and construct a strong military figure in their minds as the “only institution which can make the best decisions about the difficulties caused by the unique geopolitical position of Turkey.”

2.1.14.3. The Civilian Geopolitics

The civilians in Turkey have not questioned the monopoly of military over the usage of the term geopolitics. Oppositely, they embraced geopolitics as it is promoted by the military, again for instrumental purposes. Bilgin (2007:747) especially refers to the early 60s as the time when civilians started to use geopolitics discourse as a justification of some foreign policy choices. As an example of geopolitical representations in Turkish foreign policy, Bilgin mentions the “central state” metaphor, which was first used by the office of Commander of the Military Academy in 1963. Since then, various civilian actors have used this term (see for

example Davutoğlu, 2004a, 2004b; Doğanay, 989; Hacısalihoglu, 2003; Okman, 2002; Özdağ, 2003, *Stratejik Öngörü*, 2005; Tursan, 1971; Uzun, 1981 in Bilgin, 2007:749).

The “central state” term originally comes from the British geopolitician Mackinder. Turkish geopoliticians interpreted selectively the importance that Mackinder gives to Eurasia in his writings as an evidence of Turkey’s geopolitical importance. Today, the AKP government and its leader Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan also embraced this term. Bilgin(2007:749) finds it ironic that both the military and the conservative government, which has tense relations with the military, use the same geopolitical reasoning as well as terminology. This also shows how flexible geopolitical discourse is.

2.1.14.4. The Centrality of History in Turkish Geopolitics

Traditional discourse on security in Turkey has three major components: fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory, and geographical determinism (Crisis and Karaosmanoğlu, n.d.in Bilgin, 2005:183). Both of the fears have their origins in the Ottoman history. The following excerpt is from former General Nahit Şenoğlu’s (then the Commander of the Military Academy) addressing to students at the beginning of the academic year:

You will see that Turkey has the most internal and external enemies of any country in the world. You will learn about the dirty aspirations of those who hide behind values such as democracy and human rights and who want to take revenge on the republic of Ataturk (Jenkins, 2001:90 in Bilgin, 2005:184).

Here is another excerpt from the former Secretary General of the National Security Council between the years 1992-1995, Doğan Bayazıt:

For centuries, external forces which find a self-sufficient and powerful Turkey, in this region with enormous geopolitical advantages, as threatening to their interests have adopted the covert policy of the creation of a Turkish state within Turkey. Indications are such that this policy is currently being forced upon the future of the country. Whenever this country has an opportunity to prosper, and ethnic or religious problem makes its appearance (Bayazıt, 1998:82-83 in Bilgin, 2005: 185).

By geopoliticians, Turkey is defined as a country in the middle of wealth but endless conflict. Accordingly, geography is defined as the most critical factor in Turkey's national and international politics. As former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit once said: "Turkey's special geographical conditions require a special type of democracy." (Aydınlı and Waxman, 2001:385 in Bilgin, 2005:186). Similarly, a member of the military bureaucracy states that Turkey's geopolitics does not allow for more democracy (Belge, 2003:82 in Bilgin, 2005:186). Bilgin argues that such statements exemplify the ways in which certain representations of Turkey's geopolitical location have been used to legitimize the adoption of a particular conception of national security that does not prioritize further democratization.

Similar characteristics can be attributed to Turkish Eurasianists from all the three geopolitical traditions: nationalist, socialist and Islamist. They are fed by the geopolitical culture of Turkey, whose origins are explained by Bilgin's studies. I claim that their perception of Turkey's geographical importance and its effects on Turkish politics makes them suitable to be studied by the tools of critical geopolitics. I also share the normative goal of this theory that traditional geopolitics is dangerous because of its power over shaping politics in a non-democratic way.

2.1.14.5. Turkey vs. the West: a Key to Turkish Geopolitical Construction of Identity

Tank (2006) investigates Turkey's Western identity from a critical geopolitics perspective. According to her, since the foundation in 1923, the rulers of the Turkish Republic wanted to take part in the Western civilization. Therefore, she claims, they deliberately repressed the Muslim character of the Turkish society and emphasized the synthesizing geopolitical position of Turkey between East and West. However, after 9/11, with the AKP government, Turkey's religious/ democratic identity became more marketable (Tank, 2006:463).

Tank asserts that the "main polarities of Turkish politics" are the Islamic identity and the military- led Western/ secular identity. By referring to the constructivist premises of critical geopolitics, she deconstructs the military led security discourse, which, she claims, undermines the democratic alternative identity for Turkey, which became specifically powerful with the AKP government. To her, from the foundation of the Republic till the end of Cold War, military has been the sole institution shaping the Turkish foreign policy, via which the Western image of Turkey has been constructed. Today the AKP government, now being powerful enough, uses its own foreign policy to promote an alternative identity of Turkey as a democratic, moderate Muslim country.

2.2. The Collective Memory and Narrative Theory

This thesis hypothesizes that for a better understanding of the causal mechanism under the polarization of Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasians, the researcher should investigate the very basis of these social groups' collective memory of the past. Seeing these two clashing groups' memories as parties of a "mnemonic battle," I will benefit in my analysis from the following scholars' theories on how to study clashing collective memory dynamics.

The article *A Narrative theory of history and identity: Social identity, social representations, society and individuals* by Laszio and Liu (2007) provides important clues about how to theorize narratives of history and how to relate them to identity construction. Identity, from the social identity theory perspective (Tajfel and Turner, 1979 in Laszio and Lui, 2007: 1) is not something which belongs to the individual, but something which comes out of the relationship of the person and the situation. Individuals' self concept of identity is centrally shaped by other people and institutions, which direct the person about how to think, feel and behave. Self-categorizations are only meaningful, when the "in-group" and "out-group" are clearly defined (Laszio and Liu, 2007: 2).

Narrative theory mainly focuses on possibilism. Laszio and Lui (2007:3) underline this idea by pointing out that the same political situation can create different responses from different groups of people depending on their representations of history. History provides legitimizing myths for today's actions (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999 in Laszio and Liu 2007: 4) depending on how people "ought to be," based on different forms of collective remembering (Halbwachs, 1980, Pennebaker, Paez and Rime, 1997 in Laszio and Liu 2007: 4). It is commonly accepted that history as social representation is a selective interpretation. Accordingly, historical narratives are defined as "stories that communicate symbolic and practical meaning over and above the bare facts of history" (Laszio and Liu 2007: 4). The validity of a historical narrative depends on its credibility, authenticity, relevance and coherence.

According to Bruner (1986: 43 in Laszio and Liu 2007: 5), narrative is a medium for constructing psychological and cultural reality so that history can be brought to today. Assmann (1992 in Laszio and Liu 2007: 6), on the other hand,

recommends a two- partite definition of memory as communicative and cultural. Communicative memory is used for the happenings one remembers from his/her life and shares with contemporaries. Generational memory is an example of this type. Cultural memory is, on the other hand, the memory which goes back to the assumed origins of the group that the individual belongs to. In the case of Turkish Eurasianism, cultural memory is more important than the communicative memory. This is because the polemical memory is Ottoman and Republican memories, both of which are not experienced by the members of both Eurasianisms. Their clash is over a past, to which they are bound via generational storylines.

2.2.1. How do the Narrative Templates Emerge?

As an answer to the question of how these schematic narrative templates emerge, Wertsch (2002 in Laszio and Liu 2007: 12) states the importance of the repeated use of these standard narrative forms constructed by history books, popular media, and so forth. They are powerful because a) they are unnoticed in our daily lives; b) they are fundamental part of identity claims of groups. Places of memory such as museums, statues and institutions of commemorations contribute to this process (Laszio and Liu 2007: 15). Two features of historical narratives: perspective and the ability to generate empathy are vital in forming bridge between the past and today (Laszio and Liu, 2007: 17-18).

2.2.2. Why Narrative Analysis?

Gotham and Staples (1996) examine the interconnectedness of human agency, social structure and the temporality of historical events. They claim that, scholars are increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional historiography and

conventional sociological practices. That is why they increasingly prefer to engage into narrative work (Maines, 1993: 17, 32 in Gotham and Staples, 1996:482).

To answer why it is impossible to define an objective history, Gotham and Staples put forward two reasons: first the supply of information about the past is unmanageable. It exceeds the human capacity to collect, absorb, synthesize all the data available. So, the historians have to be selective in writing history. Second, the questions that the historian asks depend on his subjective assumptions, which unavoidably shape the written history in a selective way. According to Abbott (1991: 207 in Gotham and Staples, 1996:483), historical reality is conceptualized not as time-bounded snapshots within which causes affect one another, but as stories, cascades of events in which complex actors encounter complex structures.” This definition supports the writers’ position that narratives should replace causes and results.

Narrative is defined as “the organization of contemporaneous actions and happenings in a chronological order that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them” (Griffin, 1993: 1097 in Gotham and Staples, 1996:483). For a narrative theory to be successful, historical events should be arranged and identified in a story, where context is clarified. In addition, the temporal order of events should be given to explain why and how things have happened. Counterfactuals are also important tools in the analysis of sequences of events (Gotham and Staples, 1996:484). This is because social reality is context-dependent, historically contingent and socially constructed. Narrative theories do not aim to develop grand theories: they do not believe them (Gotham and Staples, 1996:493).

2.2.3. Memory and Geography

Hoelscher and Alderman (2004:348) see memory and geography as complementary in producing “much of the context for modern identities- and the often contestation of those identities.” They focus on the importance of Halbwachs and Hobsbawn as the two main thinkers, who made collective memory available to be studied as a social activity, an expression and binding force of collective identities. Halbwachs and Hobsbawn’s writings, provided the interchangeable use of the terms like “collective memory,” “social memory,” “public memory,” “historical memory,” “cultural memory,” and “social representation.” Hobsbawn and Ranger’s *Invention of Tradition* (1983) started an Era, where instrumental theories started to guide historical research and where history is assumed to be a tool serving to state interests such as providing national unity or justifying wars (Hoelscher and Alderman, 2004:349). On the other hand, recent research suggests that sub- national groups, such as ethnic or religious ones, also use memory in defending their own perceived interests to challenge subordination by the state. In the Turkish case, Islamists are the example of this kind of action.

2.2.4. Memory and Nation

Memory and the Nation- Continuities, Conflicts and Transformations is, on the other hand, on the relationship of nation and memory, where forgetting plays as much important role as remembering (Olick, 1998:377). According to Olick, memory and nation have a “peculiar synergy” (Olick, 1998:378). It is so that, even competing identities of nation formulate their position by referring to the nation. On the other hand, Olick acknowledges that national history is losing its monopoly over public memory: sub- national memories develop to challenge national memory as a

new phenomenon. Political developments like countries facing their failures in the past, politics of victimization and regret, breakdown of authoritarian regimes with difficult legacies have been some of the results of this development (Olick, 1998:380).

Olick refers to some interesting studies about the theorization of memories in terms of their persistence. These studies, which combine instrumentalist and essentialist theories, show that memories, which are more flexible in facing oppositional views persist more than the conservative ones. In case of conservatism, oppositional memories win over the national memories (Olick, 1998:384). Also these studies prove how difficult it is to define exact sources of memory clashes over the representation of the past. States are not monolithic entities, that's why it is hard to point out overlapping, competing and changing memories of various social groups.

2.2.5. How Past Weighs on Present

How the past weighs on the present: social representations of history and their role in identity politics by Hilton and Liu (2005) is another key article for this thesis because it is devoted to investigate how “collectively significant events become selectively incorporated in social representations of ethnic, national and supranational identities” (Hilton and Liu, 2005: 1). Socially shared representations of history are keys in creating, maintaining and changing people's identity, while having an explanatory power in interethnic and international relations. This is because history provides narratives telling who we are, where we come from and where we should go.

History provides “narratives of origins” (Hilton and Liu, 2005:3), which work as *quasi-legal charters* establishing rules, norms, moral codes, do's and don'ts.

However, representations of history are contested when it comes to apply them into current events. Accordingly, social representations of history may be hegemonic (consensual through society), emancipated (different versions in different parts of society) and polemical (conflicting across different groups) (Hilton and Liu, 2005:6). In the Turkish Eurasianism case, I claim that social representation of Republican and Ottoman history is polemical, because they are remembered differently by different groups. I will conduct a content analysis on primary data to test this hypothesis in the fourth chapter.

Historical symbols attain acceptance to the extent that they are in line with objective records obtained from physical resources, and they are valid if they suit to the political agenda. On the other hand, they lose credibility if the competing representations undermine their claims or when things they symbolize become irrelevant. Historical representations should contain narratives that allow conflict resolution and subgroup reconciliation to be dynamic. If not, subgroup representations might become polemical, like in the case of Islamic counter memory force in Turkish politics. (Hilton and Liu, 2005:10).

2.2.6. How Does the Social Representation of the Past Change?

The malleability and persistence of collective memories can be defined by “presentism.” Presentism refers to works which document the ways in which images of the past change over time, how groups use the past for present purposes and holds that the past is generally a useful resource for expressing and justifying current interests. Within presentism, it is possible to emphasize the instrumental or meaning dimensions of memory: for the former, memory entrepreneurship is a manipulation of the past for particular purposes, while for the latter, selective memory is an

inevitable consequence of how we interpret the world. Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) give pragmatic examples of instrumental presentism, while Mead (1959) and Mannheim (1956) represent the latter approach: Halbwachs (1992) combines both approaches. In my study, I will draw conclusions from Halbwachs' work to combine the two presentist approaches in formulating my causal mechanism.

Olick and Robbins (1998: 129) summarize the discussion of the malleability and persistence of collective memories in six ideal types:

1. Instrumental persistence- actors intentionally seek to maintain a particular version of the past, as in orthodoxy or movements to maintain or recover the past;
2. Cultural persistence: a particular past perpetuates because it remains relevant for later cultural formations (more general images are more likely to adapt to new contexts than more specific ones);
3. Inertial persistence: a particular past occurs when we produce a version of the past by sheer force of habit;
4. Instrumental change: we intentionally change an image of the past for particular reasons in the present (though we cannot always predict the results of our efforts);
5. Cultural change: a particular past no longer fits with present understandings or otherwise loses relevance for the present, and;
6. Inertial change: the carriers of particular images die, our mnemonic capabilities decay, or we simply forget (See Table 2.8.).

**Table 2. 8. Dynamics of Persistence and Change in the Image of the Past
(Olick And Robbins 1998:129)**

	Instrumental	Cultural	Inertial
Persistence	Self- conscious orthodoxy, conservatism, heritage movements	Continued relevance, canon	Habit, routine, repetition, custom
Change	Revisionism, memory entrepreneurship, redress movements, legitimation, invented tradition	Irrelevance, paradigm change, discovery of new facts	Decay, atrophy, saturation, accidental loss, death

In addition to these process definitions, Olick and Levy (1997) claim that whether a particular past persists or not partly depends on how it is constituted: mythic logics produce taboos and duties, while rational logics produce prohibitions and requirements. While the mythic foundations require bold acts of transgression to change, rational foundations can be changed through argument or refutation.

2.2.6.1. Causal Mechanism

My expectation regarding these change- persistence mechanisms in collective memories is that the cultural change happened for the socialist and nationalist groups in Turkey. The ending of the Cold War made these old ideologies irrelevant in various terms. Also Turkey's newly founded relations with the Central Asian countries after they became independent brought some disillusionment about these countries. For the two old ideologies, Eurasianism worked as a roof under which they meet through cultural and instrumental change in their geopolitical vision. However,

on the other hand, cultural and instrumental persistence worked for the conservative groups, whose sub-national identity became even more relevant in the post-modern context of localization.

I will conduct quantitative and qualitative research, whose results I will share in the fourth chapter of data analysis. Via a content analysis I will conduct on representative journals of nationalist, socialist and Islamist geopolitical traditions, I will try to find supportive data on the occurrence of these cultural and instrumental causal processes.

2.2.7. How Do Polemical Memories Emerge?

I expect that the Ottomanist Eurasianists in Turkey have a polemical memory, which challenges the hegemonic Kemalist version of the past. This is the key reason lying on the grounds of the ongoing clash between the Ottomanist and Kemalist Eurasianists. According to Conway (2003:310) past is not a given; it is continuously reevaluated, reinterpreted and remembered, mainly in the light of the present changes (Andrews, 1991 and Zerubavel, 1996 in Conway, 2003: 312). However, not everyone is powerful enough to reinterpret the collective memory. Official memory generally reflects the inclinations of dominant groups in the society by repressing alternative interpretations. Conway defines the reasonable chain of identity-remembering relationship in the following way:

Memory is a central component of identity and biography; identity and memory are socially constructed; identity arises from self- other interaction; the self emerges over time and place; narratives or stories carry memories forward from one historical period to another, thus reproducing society's ties to the past; stories define our present identities; identity in turn defines what is remembered and what is forgotten about the past (Connerton, 1989, Epstein, 2001, Gillis, 1994, Lipsitz, 1990, Weigert, 1999 in Conway, 312).

Representations of the past are not always shared. When there is a clash over remembering an event in the most “appropriate” way, there are “mnemonic battles” (Koonz, 1994, Zerubavel, 1996 in Conway, 2003: 313). As mentioned before, I expect to define a similar mnemonic battle over the memory of the past between the Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasianists.

2.2.8. Revisionists vs. Conservatives of Collective Memory

Levy (1999:51) uses an alternative concept, “revisionism,” in defining the polemical memories. He explores the relationship between revisionism and collective memory by referring to the examples of Germany and Israel. In both countries, historians with clashing ideas about their nations’ past are in a commemorative battle, where the role of state as a hegemonic power is not as strong as it used to be. In line with the argument that “whoever controls images of the past can also control the present,” of Foucault, battles over reformation of national identity keep going and historiography, as an important site for the organization of collective memory, is not immune from these developments. In both Germany and Israel, different groups with different political interests, self- consciously try to reshape the representation of past. They have competing claims about the foundation of nationhood (Levy, 1999:64).

Historical revisionism, Levy claims, can become successful and have the power of influencing large masses. Interestingly, in Germany and Israel revisionism come from opposite directions: in Germany it is the conservative right pushing for re-nationalization of identity, while in Israel, the left and the new generation scholars push for a change in the Zionist historiography. In both countries opposing parties discuss on which past to reject and which past to accept (Levy, 1999:65). In Turkey, even more interestingly, left and right have come together to protect the foundational

historiography, while the “conservative” religious circles ask for revisionism for more space for the Ottoman history in the Turkish collective memory.

2.2.9. On the Collective Memory in Turkey

Çetin (2004), in his work *Tales of Past, Present and Future: Mythmaking and Nationalist Discourse in Turkish Politics* adapts the theoretical framework of collective memory studies to the Turkish nationalism case, which he sees as a “modernizing and secularizing project.” Following Edward Said's idea that “neither past nor present make a complete meaning alone,” Çetin deconstructs Turkish collective memory with its competing representations. Sharing Hobsbown and Ranger's position that past has an instrumental usage in the hands of the hegemonic groups, Çetin tries to prove his claim about how the founders of the Turkish Republic tried to use a new history to cut the new Republic's ties with the Ottoman Empire and make the country a part of the Western civilization. This is a typical position among academia and also conservative democrats and important to understand the dynamism of polarization of clashing collective memories in Turkey.

Çetin refers to “mythicization, mystification and ritualization” as symbolic processes of legitimization of the nation state in the Turkish case. Referring to Gramsci's definition of hegemony, Çetin (2004 :349) investigates the Turkish elite's efforts to recreate a nation with a new history, new ideals and belonging. In his approach, Kemalist nationalism is understood as an ideology, which used state mechanism against clashing narratives and memories of masses.

Traditional elite of the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the modern elite. Ottoman Empire and its main cultural component religion is eliminated from the state mechanism and discouraged from being an integral part of culture. Religion

related institutions got banned, religious law is replaced by the European modern law, and the Ottoman script has been replaced by the Latin one. All these reforms, Çetin claims, aimed to delete the collective memory of Ottoman Empire from the minds of the masses. The new history was glorifying pre- Ottoman times like Hittites and Sumerians as well as the Central Asian origins of the Turks. The Republican history got mystified. The very name of Atatürk was disposed as a national symbol, myth, and hero.

On the other hand, Çetin (2004:358) refers to the “polemical memories” among the masses, which resisted forgetting. He claims that mnemonic resistance did not happen in an organized way, but only in the daily lives of people. This happened because the society was tired after all those years with war and conflict: they did not have enough power to resist the founding elite.

Various commentators' ideas on the foundation of the Turkish Republic in institutional, cultural and ethnic terms overlap with Çetin's claim that Turkish Republic aimed to delete the empire history from the collective memory of the public (see Cağaptay, 2002, 2004, 2006, Nesim, 2005, Zürcher, 2005, Akça and Hülür, 2007). On the other hand, Nergis Canefe provides an alternative explanation why the Ottoman heritage was denounced by the founders of the Republic (2002). She claims that after the fall of Istanbul by Mehmet the Conqueror, Arabic and Persian influence undermined the Turkism, which used to be prevailing since the foundation of the Empire. After the conquering of Istanbul, rulers of the Empire neglected Turkish people. Until the Young Turks Era being Turk stayed equal to being a soldier or a peasant. Because of this neglected position of the Turks, to Canefe (2002), Turks became the poorest and the most illiterate fraction of the Ottoman society. All the drawbacks of this situation wanted to be deleted and replaced by welfare and wide-

spread wisdom by the Kemalists. This made them to deny the Ottoman heritage and claim a totally new existence of a nation. Therefore, Ottomanism became the anti-thesis of Turkishness (Canefe, 2002: 138).

2.2.9.1. The Assassination of Collective Memory?

Yavuz (1999) agrees with Çetin. Islam, he claims, is more than a religion in Turkey: it is a way to communicate with large masses (Yavuz, 1999:193). Kemalism, on the other hand, is almost another religion in Turkey, especially the laicism principle, states Yavuz (1999: 194). State ideology clashes with the Islam that masses follow. Yavuz continues, as a result of this activity of the Republican founders, religious movements in Anatolia like the *Nurcu* movement, which is led by Said-i Nursi appeared to rescue people's collective memory from being lost, while creating a duality in the society in terms of what to remember and what to forget (Yavuz, 1999:195).

To Yavuz, Nursi's discourse was different than the modernist Kemalist discourse, since it was more constructive and it embraced all different parts of society in reference to Islam. To Yavuz, Nursi is "the founder of modern religious discourse in Turkey" (Yavuz, 1999:195). Said-i Nursi's writings aimed to maintain collective memory of Muslims in order to save coming generations from being left without customs, traditions and a whole history. *Dershanes* were the Nurcu institutions working for the same aim (Yavuz, 1999:196). The liberal economy that started with Özal in the early 1980s provided *dershanes* the chance to get more financial means and increase their visibility in Anatolia. This movement constructed the counter elite in Turkey (Yavuz, 1999: 197).

I share Yavuz's ideas because of two reasons: first he refers to collective memory as an important component to understand the Islamic discomfort with the Republican historiography and second, his arguments reflect some of the main claims of the Islamist geopolitical tradition. Accordingly, they provide some background information and alternative explanations about where the Kemalist vs. Islamist discourse clash arise from. Similarly, Mellon (2006: 68) states that Islamists and Kemalists have different narratives: Kemalists seek a link to pre- Ottoman and pre-Islamic past while Islamists prefer to embrace a past which involves the empire. This is in an effort to link Turkish history to the Islamic world's common Ottoman memory. According to this view, the birth of Islamism should be interpreted as religion striking back as a reaction to the strict control of the state (Mellon, 2006: 75). Mellon's views are again representing common conservative democrat opinions.

Kadioğlu (1998) approaches this issue from a different perspective by referring to the clashing epistemologies of Republican and Islamic discourses in Turkey and comes to similar conclusions with Yavuz and Mellon. Epistemology is the theory investigating the origin, nature, methods and limits of knowledge (Kadioğlu, 1998: 1). To her, Turkish Republican epistemology has two distinguishing features: first it is based on a rigid distinction of the East and the West. Second, its elite describe themselves as societal engineers, who have a duty of constructing a modern national identity at the expense of the religious, local, traditional identities existing in the society (Kadioğlu, 1998: 2).

Kadioğlu refers to Hobsbawn's idea that in the process of invention of tradition, there is a break: a discontinuity with the past (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983: 1 in Kadioğlu, 1998: 3). To Kadioğlu, this break in the Turkish context happened after the 1920s with the empire history. This is caused by the adaptation of Western

institutions before the society asked for them, which Kadıođlu clarifies with the analogy of “placing the cart before the horse” (Kadıođlu, 1998:6). To Kadıođlu (1998:13) Kemalist control over religion paved the way to its politicization.

2.2.9.2. Turkish Enlightenment: A Top Down Project?

The Islamic discourse is embedded in modernism just like the Republican one, says Morrison (2006). The Muslim intellectual figures like İsmet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, Hüseyin Hatemi and Abdulrahman Dilipak are people who got a secular education. They know Western languages and refer to Western historiography in their writings. They criticize modernity by benefiting from the tools of it. They consider Muslimness as an important part of their identity and they want religion to play a more important role in their social life. They might or might not call themselves Islamist but they call for a greater role of religion in daily life of masses. They represent educated conservatives of Turkey (Morrison, 2006:508).

These intellectuals believe in the possible coexistence of religious authenticity and modern life (Kadıođlu, 1998:17, Morrison, 2006, 514). These confirm my hypothesis that both Islamist and Kemalist geopolitics is embedded in the modern geopolitical imagination. Kadıođlu, Yavuz and Morrison, on the other hand, interpret the Islamist religious order of Fethullah Gülen as a moderate and pragmatic movement. This approach also fits to my expectation that rationality explains dynamism within these groups: they choose how to behave by considering the limitations as well as benefits of their situation.

2.2.9.3. Short History of Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism

It is necessary at this point to refer to the history of the geopolitical traditions, from which the geopolitical discourses of Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasianisms derive. By the end of the seventeenth century, Europeans started to challenge Ottomans' superiority in economic and military terms. One Ottoman response to wars was “cultural despair,” another pragmatic response was to rearrange the military with reforms (Nora, 2009: 231). Despite these efforts, European pressure via capitulations as well as the Christian mobilization along national lines continued. During the nineteenth century, Ottomans responded in three different lines of thought to rescue the country from disappearing: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.

This process started with the so called Tanzimat Reforms (1832- 1871), which aimed to create a national, centralized, safe state for all equal members from various ethnicities and religions. The Edict of *Gülhane* (1839) guaranteed all subjects life, property and religious freedoms. The Imperial Reform Edict, on the other hand, guaranteed full equality for all members of the society. Starting with the 1860s, the Ottoman identity was used as a citizenship based solution for the disintegration. It proved to be unsuccessful with the continuing separations of the non- Muslim groups from the empire. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1907), as a result, came up with the idea of making use of his religious caliph status as a way to keep at least the Muslim members of the country together. This strategy seemed to have worked for another generation for the Arab, Kurd and Albanian groups.

On the other hand, there was a new generation coming up, educated in European style with a negative approach to religion, which they saw as an irrational doctrine. These people were highly affected by the Hungarian and French Orientalists' work on Turan -the mythical Central Asian homeland for Ural Altaic people. Effects of these works got more intensified once over millions of displaced

Muslims arrived to Turkey from the Balkans and Caucasus regions. After losing the First World War, the non-implemented Sevres Treaty, which divides the Ottoman land between Greece, Britain, France and Italy and constructs independent Kurdistan and Armenia, was written. A nationalist resurgence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk blocked the implementation of this treaty and had it replaced by the Lausanne Treaty, which internationally recognized the 1923 foundation of the new Turkish Republic.

Nevertheless, the effects of the Sevres Treaty on the Turkish society and intelligentsia have never lost intensity. This never implemented treaty has kept its central place in the collective memory of Turks. This obsession, named as Sevres Syndrome, has shaped political discourses of almost all kinds in Turkey. In my study, Sevres Syndrome plays an important role in the rapprochement of nationalist and socialist groups. Being afraid of another potential Sevres, the young Republic of Turkey abandoned all kinds of -isms of the Ottoman Empire and ironically saw the solution in attending the Western civilization as an equal member. This is the time when the new nation's builders started to eliminate Ottoman- Islamic institutions such as sultanate, caliphate, clergy, seminaries and heterodox Sufi brotherhoods from the state and social mechanisms. They replaced these with a directorate of religious affairs. This was a "state- sanctioned form of enlightened Islam," which was in peace with the nationalist and secularist ideas (Onar, 2009:232). Arabic calendar and script got replaced with the Gregorian and Latin ones cutting links with Quran and Ottoman literature. Even the Ottoman style appearance changed: the fez got banned, the veil discouraged and religious clerical garb got banned for the off duty personnel (Onar, 2009: 232).

Onar suggests that the first challenges to the Kemalist narrative start in the 1950s with the political liberalization followed by the economic liberalization of the 1980s. The socially conservative, politically and economically liberal politician Turgut Özal was the main figure of the new Neo- Ottomanist⁴ paradigm. This paradigm has a domestic and international dimension. Domestically it refers to Ottoman cosmopolitanism to trigger a more tolerant environment for various local differences on ethnic and religious terms. Ottoman Islam, in this context, represents a source of tolerance and flexibility. Internationally, with the pan- Turkist and pan- Islamic sub-tones, Neo- Ottomanism became a tool to play a more active role in the newly independent Turkic states, the Caucasian region, the Middle East and Balkans. “A deliberate attempt to reconstruct the present, Neo- Ottomanism engendered a range of responses as competing elite groups struggle over the country’s collective memory” (Onar, 2009:233). (Neo)Ottomanism is an important term for this study. The journal *Türkiye Günlüğü* , which has been a supporter of this movement as an alternative to Kemalism, is going to be analyzed in the data analysis part of this study.

⁴ Murinson (2006)'s article aims to investigate institutional and intellectual sources of the new Neo- Ottomanist foreign policy vision in Turkey: the strategic depth doctrine of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the post- Cold War period, a transition in foreign policy traditions of Turkey has been happening named Neo- Ottomanism. Even though the founder of this approach is the first President of the post- Cold War Turkey, the idea has become mature under the AKP government. Murinson (2006:246) interprets this change of foreign policy from Kemalism to Neo- Ottomanism as a strategic and a pragmatic one. The name of this policy is first used by the writer Cengiz Candar to define a more active, region- oriented and diversified foreign policy perspective. Neo- Ottomanists envisioned Turkey as the leader of the Muslim and Turkic world: Eurasia (Murinson, 2006: 247). In 2003, Ali Bayramoğlu from *Yeni Şafak* wrote: “...the partisans of Neo- Ottomanism are increasing every day.” The strategic depth that Davutoğlu depicts includes historical depth and geographical depth (Murrison, 2006: 947). The Ottoman history as well as geography becomes specifically important in his imagination. Murrison (2006:948) defines Davutoğlu as a “truly original Neo- Ottoman thinker.” Neo- Ottomanists see Ottoman history as a legitimate source of soft power for Turkey's potential relations with the ex- Ottoman geography's new countries. They see the increasing interdependency between countries in a global world as a chance for Turkey to develop its relations with the long time neglected regional countries. Davutoğlu's doctrine asks for a reconfiguration of Turkey's identity as a global political actor via specific emphasis on the Middle Eastern countries: especially Iran, Syria and the Gulf States.

2.2.9.4. On the Kemalist Version of the Turkish Past

“For Kemalists, the past seems to be like a foreign country,” states Onar. She claims that, if pushed, Kemalists remember the very last years of the Empire, the lost Balkan Wars, Gallipoli of the First World War, Sevres and the Independence War. In this imagination, that’s why, Ottoman sultans are corrupted traitors and the Kemalist revolution symbolizes transition from dark times to enlightenment. They blamed Ottoman Islam and cosmopolitanism for the failure of the empire. The 1930s became golden age for Kemalists as the times of further civilization.

In the new conjuncture of the post Cold War politics, Kemalists’ approach towards the neighboring countries of Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia changed, states Onar (2009:234); Kemalists changed their direction from Western oriented politics to their own region. Socialists and nationalists, I claim, would partly agree with this statement. This is because they claim that Kemalism has always been interested in the East: it has actually been anti- Western since the beginning. Islamists, though, would agree with Nora that Kemalism started out as a Westernization process.

Islamists, on the other hand, opposite to the Kemalist view of the past, depict Ottoman Empire as a paradise lost, says Onar. Their golden age starts with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, through the times of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66), to the Tulip Period (1718- 30). AKP’s Istanbul municipality is known of giving special importance to these eras and turning them into annual festivals like the annual Tulip Festival (Onar, 2009:235). For Islamists, remembering these times is taking the stolen past back and becoming complete again. Islamists refer to the multi- ethnic, multi- religious and multi- cultural character of the empire, which they assume got destroyed by the Republic and they hope to reconstruct it in today’s postmodern

environment. Ali Bulaç's Medina Contract idea represents this view by offering a framework for coexistence via a new social contract based on the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire. All these information are highly valid for my study. This is because they offer a historical background of how the conservative democratic counter memory has been founded and institutionalized. As mentioned before, with my existing data I will have a chance to see whether Islamists necessarily glorify the empire history as a reaction to the Republican historiography or not.

2.2.9.5. The Liberals

There is another group which cooperates with the Islamists: the liberal group, which is made up of few people that are well represented in intelligentsia, business and NGO communities. They pursue further democratization (Onar, 2009: 237). A slight difference in the representation of the past of liberals than Islamists is that the glorified past for liberals was not the imperial one but the post- Tanzimat years, when a synthesis of the West and Ottoman was initiated. Many representatives of this group write at *Türkiye Günlüğü* occasionally such as Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet Altan and Ümit Boyner.

2.2.9.6. The Nationalists vs. the Conservatives

Onar claims that there are right and left wings of ultranationalists in Turkey (Onar, 2009:238). The left wing ultranationalism is the *Ulusalci* socialist movement. By categorizing socialists in the same group with nationalists, Onar confirms my argument that these two groups should be investigated under the same category today. Following information she provides about the right wing ultranationalists will

be important in analyzing the difference of today's nationalists from conservative democrats.

Right wing nationalists embrace Islam, especially since 1960s with the slogan "the aim is *Turan*, the guide is Islam." They are the founders of the Turkish- Islam synthesis. Their reading of Ottomans, on the other hand, resembles the Kemalist reading. They blame the westernization efforts of the empire after the Tanzimat period as the reason lying on the ground of today's problems. Their other reference point goes all the way back to the 1071 Manzikert War and underlines 700 years of Ottoman rule after the Turkification of Anatolia instead of the 500 year later Conquer of Istanbul different than the conservative democrats (Onar, 2009: 239). Ultranationalists blame Ottomans for polluting Turkishness and therefore causing the empire to decline.

At this point it is also necessary to quickly refer to the main political representative of Turkish nationalists: Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP. *Dokuz Işık* (Nine Lights), a populist version of Kemalism, are the guiding principles of the party. The difference between another nationalist party named the Grand Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*, BBP) and MHP gives some clues about the difference of the nationalists and conservative democrats. According to Yazıcıoğlu, the founder of BBP, MHP did not embrace Islam in a coherent way. The 32 commandments of Islam do not take part in the Nine Lights of MHP and that is why, to BBP, MHP does not qualify to be a real Turkish- Islamic party. In a way, MHP happens to be too Kemalist to be a proper example of Turkish- Islamic synthesis.

After the 1980 military intervention, among some of the members of MHP there was an increased Islamisation. Some members saw religion as a more reliable

ideal for devotion than the state as a result of the negative treatment by the military regime. Islamisation among the group created the main source of tension in the movement's reconstruction process after the military intervention. Radical Islamists got forced to resign from the party (Arıkan and Çınar, 2002: 29).

MHP prioritizes the state over the religion in terms of their social and political role. Serving for the state is a synonym of serving for the nation (Arıkan and Çınar, 2002:3). To MHP, state means order. Islam has a unifying role in the society but this role is not more than a moral, spiritual one. That is why the Ottoman Empire was not a theocracy: traditions and customs defined the state regime: not the Qur'an or the Sunnah. This should also be the case for the Turkish Republic. To them, Turks before Islam used to have beliefs in similar characteristics to Islam. They were monotheist and their moral values were compatible with Islam. After accepting Islam, Turks became complete and contributed to the Islamic tradition and history in the most positive way. One contribution was secularism, rescuing Islam from the manipulation of politics and freeing it to be alive only in the hearts and minds of people (Tepe, 2000:65). Another synthesis of religion and statism in MHP thinking is about nationalism, which they define as a morally and religiously accepted concept.

To this thesis, the Qur'an accepts nations as culturally distinct groups of people and that's why nation states are religiously legitimate institutions. It is because these kinds of institutionalizations are suitable to human nature and facilitate progress. This view contradicts the Islamist idea, which sees nations and nationalism as obstacles in reaching Islamic unity in the world. MHP ideology, just like Kemalism, sees religion as a matter of personal conscience which should not be made a public issue. The role of Islam in the society cannot be determined without state intervention (Tepe, 2000: 66).

2.2.9.7. Reconstructing Republican Historiography

In the 1990s, during the 75th year celebrations of the Republic, a certain type of remembering of the Republican past occurred: remembering the “human” side of history to make it more interesting (Yazıcı, 2001: 4). Yazıcı (2001:5) sees this process of remembrance as a part of reconstruction of Kemalism in 1990's Turkey. This process occurred as a reaction to the perceived threat of increasing Islamism by the secularists. The past is a contested area. Two groups imagine two alternative histories with selective references. As Yazıcı puts it rightly: “the past becomes a mean to legitimize current struggle.” Secularists depict their struggle as a duty inherited from their ancestors: a continuation of the past, a legitimate war against reactionary forces. Talking in the name of the dead, claims Yazıcı (2001:12), is a common way of defense by nationalists. Today's actions got justified by formulating them as “debt to the past generations.” I agree with Yazıcı in his claim: this type of communitarian approach to the state is observable in nationalist and socialist discourses.

2.2.9.8. Attila İlhan: The Key Name in the Background of *Ulusalci Rapprochement*

As an alternative collective memory construction process in Turkey, it is necessary to refer to Attila İlhan's line of historiography, which is defined by Şener (2004: 209) as a “forth pole of the Turkish intellectual landscape.” Şener Aktürk (2004: 208) defines Turkish Eurasianism as a newly emerging intellectual phenomenon in Turkey, which, for the first time, imagines a common future for Russia and Turkey. This movement, via a reinterpretation of Russian and Turkish

histories, formulates a common history where Russia and Turkey have always been “brother nations” being fooled by the Western powers to fight against each other for over five centuries (Aktürk, 2004: 209). Turkish Eurasianism becomes an alternative master narrative. It aims to make the two countries realize their common fate and unite against their real enemy: the West. Aktürk names Attila İlhan as the father of Turkish Eurasianism.

İlhan's construction of Turkish history has four main periods (See Table 2.9.). He reimagines an alternative history for Turkey, which perfectly matches with the Russian one, to provide Turkish Eurasianists a formula for an inseparable place for Turkey in Eurasia as an historical as well as economic, cultural, social and civilizational partner of Russia. Rehabilitation and raising of some figures from history, such as Sultan Galiyev, a Tatar Muslim nationalist communist from Lenin's Soviet Union, as founder of Turkish Eurasianism is another important dimension in İlhan's imagination of history. He said: “During the years of 1920 to 1940, when the two big revolutions (1917 Soviet and 1919 Anatolia) were in a close cooperation, imperialism was out of Asia: in the Caucasus region, Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Asia there was a total peace and improvement process going on. Why not now?” (İlhan, 2004)

Table 2.9. Attila İlhan's Eurasianist Construction of Turkish History

İLHAN'S VALUE JUDGMENT	PERIOD I: 1800s (1838)-1919, "PROLOGUE"
WORST	Tanzimat Reforms/ Informal Colonization of the Ottoman Empire. Diagnosis of "capitalist underdevelopment" most clearly observed. Russia and Ottoman Turkey "bleed to death" in perpetual warfare.
BEST	<p>PERIOD II: 1919-1938, "FOUNDATIONAL MOMENT / DOUBLE REVOLUTION AND THE 'GOLDEN AGE'"</p> <p>Bolshevik Revolution & Turkish Independence War / Kemalist Revolution. Kemalist Turkey & Bolshevik Soviet Russia: strongest alliance. Western imperialism defeated. Third World revolution initiated.</p>
BAD	<p>PERIOD III: 1938-1990s, "INTERREGNUM: COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALIST COOPTATION"</p> <p>Counter-revolution at home & co-optation abroad in both countries. Turkey joins NATO. Liberalization and "dependent development". Pro-Western Turkey used as a peon of imperialism against USSR.</p>
OPTIMISTIC	<p>PERIOD IV: 1990s-PRESENT, "REVIVAL: PREPARING FOR THE 'SECOND COMING' OF EURASIANISM"</p> <p>History repeats itself: conditions of the 1920s reemerge. West breaks down USSR. Attempts to "divide and control" Turkey. Kemalist revival in Turkey. Putin revives Eurasianism in Russia. Increasingly anti-Western Turkey rapidly moves closer to Russia.</p>

According to İlhan, Eurasia was a "common hope for Turkey and Russia" (İlhan, 2004). İlhan's ideas matter for this study because, even after his death in 2005, his ideas are still alive and makes him the most influential figure in bringing nationalist and socialist forces under the common being hopeful for an ongoing appearance of a "new type of intellectual, whose point of departure is the same with Atatürk: *vatan* (motherland)" (İlhan, 2005). He was considering Turkey's situation as an ongoing war between the Kemalist forces who want a united, sovereign and

independent state and liberals as well as Islamists who cooperate with the West and want to separate the country into ethnic and religious pieces. He was working to construct a new patriotic movement like the one in 1919 to protect the country. Current situation was an emergency, which should have united people from different poles of ideologies to fight against the West and its supporters (İlhan, 2005).

2.3. Conclusion

Turkish Eurasianists, from all the three geopolitical traditions of nationalism, socialism and Islamism, are embedded in the civil society realm, which make them eligible to categorize as formal geopolitics, in O'Tuathail's terms. Even though they have some existence in the popular geopolitics' realm also like in the case of the Kemalist ART (Eurasia Radio and Television), this channel's influence over masses is limited. On the other hand, the socialist Eurasianists are partly in practical realm of geopolitics because they represent an oppositional party: the Workers Party. Nevertheless, this party has never gained more than 2% of the popular votes and has always stayed in the opposition, working like a civil society organization more than a political party. Because of these reasons it is safe to stay within the borders of formal geopolitics when conceptualizing Eurasianisms of Turkey.

Critical geopolitics literature is central in this analysis, because its periodizations, premises, assumptions and rationale can be adapted to the Turkish Eurasianism of all types. I claim that the development of Turkish Eurasianism in Turkey is a product of Turkish geopolitical culture, which cannot be investigated separately from the globally spread Euro-centric geopolitical tradition (Agnew, 1998). Just like in the definition of O'Tuathail (2006:1), all Eurasianist geopoliticians

search for the “big picture,” where the local and regional meets the global. Second, they claim objectivity, strengthened by their “scientific” position. Third, their grammar is filled with terms like “strategy,” “power race,” “chessboard politics,” and “national interest.” Turkish Eurasianists are Turkey's geopoliticians, who fit to the following description of O’Tuathail (2006: 10) where he defines geopoliticians as

...strong national chauvinists, entrenched conservatives having operated within, and given voice to multiple Western ethnocentric discourses of power, articulating national and personal variations of racial, cultural and sexual supremacy in the name of “common sense, reason and objective perspective.

This is why I am going to use critical geopolitics’ methodological tools in trying to prove that the geopolitical imaginations of nationalist and socialist circles overlap, while the conservative group has an alternative discourse. Similar to Smith's study on Russian geopolitical thought (1999), I will draw the lines of these two competing geopolitical imaginations and their geopolitical visions. I will ask questions like the following in determining the borders of their Eurasia:

1. Where is (your) Eurasia? Which countries are parts of this region?
2. What is the place of Turkey in Eurasia?
3. Are Turkish citizens also Eurasian? (Cultural and political identity of Turks)
4. What is the criterion to be Eurasian? (geographical, cultural, historical, traditional, civilizational etc.)
5. Who are not Eurasian? Who are the enemies/ opposites/ Others of Eurasia?
6. What is the importance of Eurasia for world politics? What is the importance of Turkey for world politics?
7. What should be Turkey's approach to Eurasia? (foreign policy recommendations)

For these questions to be more meaningful, I will also search for answers to questions like the following:

1. What is Turkey's national interest?
2. What kind of a future are you working for?
3. What should change/ stay the same for a better future of Turkey?

I will also try to understand these groups' approach to each other. I will try to point out the ongoing institutionalized cooperation between nationalist and socialist groups, which is the main reason why I expect these two groups to work in the same direction. The thickness of the institutional ties will be important evidence in line with my descriptive level hypotheses about these groups.

According to the answers I get for these questions, I will first provide a descriptive picture about the Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasianists. As the second level of investigation, I will try to find out the causal mechanism differentiating these two social groups from each other. In this level, I will deconstruct their collective memories, which I expect to be in a battle over the social representation of the past of Turkey. Ottomanists have a polemical memory, which wants to challenge the hegemonic memory supported by the Kemalist groups. Another important dynamic about memories to investigate is the Cold War's socialist and nationalist groups' changing memories, which brought them together under the roof of the Kemalist collective memory. As mentioned before, I will investigate the persistence and change mechanisms in collective memories, which created today's two camps of Turkish Eurasianism.

CHAPTER 3. ON THE HISTORY OF EURASIA IN TURKISH POLITICS

3.1. Introduction

A quick look to the ongoing discussions about the place of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy orientation, political tradition, identity formulation and future projections, confirm the complexity of the issue. Scholars' ideas vary in a wide range of ways about the viability of using the term "Turkish Eurasianism." However, the fact that, even the most pessimists about this terminology like Torbakov (2007) and Imanov (2007), feel the necessity to devote at least some part of their study to this issue confirms my claim that well-established or poorly designed, emotionally or pragmatically motivated, temporary or sustainable, there is a reality of Eurasia in Turkish intellectual thought. Its popularity from right to the left makes it worth to be investigated more deeply.

Scholars like Özsağlam (2006) and Imanov (2007) prefer to define Turkish Eurasianism as a poorly copied version of the Russian Eurasianism. That's why they prefer to compare Turkish Eurasianism with the "original" classical Russian Eurasianism, and judge the Turkish version accordingly. This view is against calling ideas on Eurasia in Turkey as "Eurasianism" because of the lack of depth. Another group, including Aktürk (2007), Laruelle (2008) and Torbakov (2007), approaches to the issue by referring to the increasingly close relationship between Russia and Turkey in the last decade. Accordingly, they conduct a foreign policy analysis to understand Turkish Eurasianism. While others, like Ersanlı (2002, 2003, 2004), Kaleci (2006) and Akgül (2009) prefer to see Turkish Eurasianism as a separate movement in the Turkish intelligentsia: not necessarily as a reflection of Russian

Eurasianism, even though it is in a limited relationship with the Russian one. They also claimed that the limits of Turkish Eurasianism are defined by pragmatism.

In my thesis, I have a similar position to Ersanlı, Kaleci and Akgül regarding the relationship between Russian and Turkish Eurasianisms. It is right that the intellectuals in Turkey have not investigated the Russian Eurasianist school's teachings in detail. Their knowledge about Russian Eurasianism is mainly limited to the speeches and writings of Alexander Dugin. However, this does not change the fact the Turkish Eurasianists see an interest in situating Turkey within this region in economic, social and cultural terms. Their Eurasianism does not have to be fed by the Russian one to become an imagined alternative for Turkey. It is a newer phenomenon for Turkish intellectual thinking than the Russian, but it will become more established once more and more researchers develop interest towards it. That is why I prefer to define Turkish Eurasianism as an intellectual movement embedded in Turkish domestic politics in the micro and meso level with some important similarities as well as some limited ties to the Neo- Eurasianist movement in Russia.

In addition, since Turkish Eurasianism is mainly an elite-led project grown up within civil society and academia, it is not possible to test its reflections on the foreign policy choices of Turkey. Because of this limitation, the primary data sources of this thesis are not going to be from governmental institutions but from non-governmental ones, to reflect the formal character of Turkish Eurasianism as a geopolitical discourse.

3.2. Eurasia: Geography, Strategy or Ideology?

The concept Eurasia is both a geographical/cultural and a strategic concept. Geographically it does not have clear- cut boundaries, but in the general sense it is a north- south combination of the Ottoman and Russian Empires; strategically powerful states of our century had

different views about Eurasia, they saw the region as the place of rich energy resources, as the focal point where old and modern power states met. Turkic languages are predominant, culturally Orthodox and Muslim people are articulated to this former feature enriched by Persian, Arabic and Byzantine civilizations. It is the old world with a relatively young dynamic population. It is the zone where alliances as well as animosity and friendship have been tested over and over again and where new style partnerships are initiated officially. It is a zone of pragmatic appeal for big powers and a deep emotional inclination towards the east for two ex-empires. It is the latest and most trendy see-saw region hinting at a near future balance of powers. (Ersanlı, 2001: 111)

This is how Ersanlı (2001) defines Eurasia. Her research on the meaning of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy is important for this thesis. That is why, I will go through relevant points from her article, and then summarize her main arguments.

According to Ersanlı, there are three important characteristics of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy: first, Eurasianism has never been an intellectual school of thought in Turkey. Therefore, it cannot be seen as an identity issue in Turkish political tradition. Second, the use of Eurasia as a goal in foreign policy orientation is a recent phenomenon for Turkey. And third, within Turkish intelligentsia, Eurasia is shaped by the following alternate allegations:

1. new- Ottomanism or nostalgia for the Ottoman cultural power,
2. a project for consolidating relations with the new Turkish states and people,
3. an outlet for creating a regional sphere of influence, and finally,
4. an opportunity for an enlarged European Union (Ersanlı, 2001:114).

Accordingly, Ersanlı sees Eurasia in Turkish politics not as an identity issue, but as an opportunistic search for alternative regional cooperation. She defines this newly constructed orientation as “new neighborhood consciousness,” similar with the EU’s new neighborhood policy. To Ersanlı, this similarity is not a coincidence, because Eurasianism in Turkey is a neo- Westernization project, formulated with the hope to enter to the EU by strengthening hand in the Eurasian region via active

policy engagement. Accordingly, Europe is still at the center of Turkish foreign policy: as a civilization project, as an economic partnership, and as a technological development ideal, if not as culture.

To Ersanlı, Turkey has realized that EU is not without alternative. Another disillusionment is about the Central Asian region, which has appeared to be more complicated than being ethnically Turk: those countries have their own distinct understanding of history, culture and even language, coupled with their own political privileges and expectations. With the understanding that the “Turkish model project”⁵ for Central Asia is not going to work as expected, Turkey started to see Eurasia as an extension of the West with full of advantages to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis the EU.

“Within the Turkish foreign policy, Eurasia is an expression useful to further understand the changes that are taking place in the new international order,” says Ersanlı (2001:122). To her, different understandings of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy from phase to phase are reflections of international order on Turkey’s choices. Between early 1990s and mid-1990s Turkey’s interest was limited to the Turkic peoples of the region; while after 1995, its interest span got enlarged by including Asia, Middle East, the Caucasus, China, Russia and even Japan. Realism and pragmatism are the two main determinative forces shaping these choices, states Ersanlı.

Ersanlı (2002:143), in her another interesting study on the political culture of Turkey and its effects on the term of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy, defines seven

⁵For detailed information about the Turkish model transference project of Turkey and the US to the Central Asian newly independent countries in the 1990s, see Bal, İdris. (2000). *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

definitive characteristics of Turkish political culture, which are specifically helpful in understanding Turkey's foreign policy choices in Eurasia:

1. Within and without the country, rejecting to acknowledge differences, but trying to melt them within similarities. According to Ersanlı (2002:144), this situation is caused by the efforts to create a national unity out of the multi-national ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
2. Considering relativity and blood ties as necessary biological criteria of being a nation, instead of seeing them as some natural commonalities.
3. Seeking for unchanging truths in understanding, explaining and shaping politics; instead of referring to changeability depending on various factors.
4. Enemy-focused politics. Ersanlı (2004:145) gives the examples of the perception as enemies of Russia during the Cold War and "Islamic fundamentalism" after the Cold War as they defined by the Western world and accepted by Turkey without being questioned.
5. Three principles shaping education: threat, danger and terror, defined not as temporary but permanent facts.
6. Terms like love, fraternity and human rights not taking sufficient part in the education.
7. Finally, the practice of reciprocity in international relations is not embraced fully by Turkey: inter-state relations are understood almost always in hierarchical ways. This tendency reflects to the projects in Eurasia, where, geopoliticians tend to imagine a Turkey- centered alliance. Relations are seen from a perspective of dependence instead of interdependence. To Ersanlı, the roots of this tradition can be found in the post-imperial trauma.

3.3. Eurasia: A Regional Identity or a Pragmatic Option

Ersanlı (2002:155) asks some important questions and provides answers to them, which sum her arguments. First: is Eurasia a region or an identity for Turkey? Her answer is that it is not an identity but a pragmatic region for Turkey. Related to this issue, Paasi's (2002) theory on the construction of regional identities confirms her position. Paasi provides three elements to define an identity as regional, which are cognitive, affective and instrumental criteria. In cognitive terms, people must be aware of a region and its limits in order to distinguish it from other regions. In affective terms, it matters how people feel about the region, because these feelings provide a common identity to replace other identities like class, ethnicity, religion and/or nation. Finally, in instrumental terms, whether the region is a basis for mobilization and collective action in pursuit of social, economic and political goal, matters. As Ersanlı and other writers working on Turkish Eurasianism explained, this is an elite- led discourse, which does not have wide popularity among the society. Therefore, it would not be realistic to expect any cognitive and affective reality of Eurasia in Turkish public. Only in instrumental terms Eurasia has a value.

Second question of Ersanlı is whether Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy is an extension of Turkism or not. Ersanlı states that in commerce, economy, and struggle to enter to the EU, Eurasia opening is not an extension of Turkism; however, Turkism has been one inspiration in integrating Eurasia into the Turkish foreign policy discourse. Turkism is only one of the various ideological sources from which Turkish Eurasianism got fed: the other two ideologies are Islamism and socialism.

3.4. Eurasia for Russia and Turkey in Comparison

American scholars and strategists have defined Eurasia as the most critical region in the near future for the dynamics of globalization, because of its economic power (Europe) and resource potential (Asia) (see Linn, J. F. and Timken, D., 2007). However, the term Eurasia has different connotations for Russia and Turkey than these instrumental connotations of it for the West (Ersanlı and Okman, 2000:29). For Turkey and Russia, Eurasia is an opportunity area with some emotional connotation, if not an idealism. Both Russia and Turkey's imperial history reflects their current interest in the region. For these countries, Eurasia is a geopolitical and geohistorical entity with meaningful commonalities and flexible meanings. It refers to an arena for imperial wishes, regional cooperation and global activism.

3.5 Russian Eurasianism: A Search for an Alternative to Western Civilization

Even though I am for the idea that Turkish Eurasianism is separate development from Russian Eurasianist tradition in major amounts, I still need to summarize Russian Eurasianism's history and main premises to shed light on the classical and Neo- Eurasianism movements as an alternative civilization idea. I will refer to Özsağlam's article, along with the articles of Korkmaz (2004-5) and Ersanlı (2005) to explain the main premises of Russian Eurasianism, which do not necessarily lie on the grounds of Turkish Eurasianism, but has some obvious influence on it –especially on the socialist segments of Turkish Eurasianism- and therefore deserves some detailed investigation.

Russian Eurasianism is a way of thinking, which has an interdisciplinary character. It starts in the early 20th century and reflects discussions on the identity of the Russian Empire. It aims to find out whether Russia is Eastern or Western

(Özsağlam, 2006:114). The ideologue groups of the classical Eurasianism⁶ had to live exile because their ideas were not appreciated by the Soviet Union leaders. In their writings, classical Eurasianists underlined the difference of Eurasia as geography and as a cultural and historical entity vis-à-vis the West. They emphasized their differences from the West in terms of cultural structure, understanding of nationalism and state mechanism (Özsağlam, 2006:114).

Classical Eurasianist thinkers claimed that the relationship between nation and state is different in Eurasia than the West (Özsağlam, 2006: 114-5). In Eurasia, the state (or the empire) leads the nation in a top-down manner, while in Europe, like in the French national movements, there is an activity coming from bottom to top (see the following schema, modified from Özsağlam, 2006:15)

Eurasia: State → Nation (not depending on ethnic differences, but different ethnicities coming together and form a cultural organism called empire culture)

Europe: Nation → State

Russian Eurasianists assumed that a culture of tolerance is embedded in Eurasian history, which prevents any imperial domination of one ethnic culture over the others. They claim that in Eurasia different cultures come together in a harmonic way, where all different sub- cultures of ethnicities are recognized and supported to be impressed. In summarizing important points of Russian Eurasianist thought, Özsağlam (2006: 116-8) refers to Savitsky's ideas, who contributed to the formulation of Eurasia as an organic economic, cultural and geographic entity.

6 Founders of classical Eurasianism were linguist Nikolai Sergeevic Trubetzkoy (1890-1938), geographer Petr Nikolaevich Satitsky (1895-1968), teolog Georgii Vasilevich Florovsky, historian Petr Petrovich Suvchinsky (1892- 1985), jurist Nikolai Nikolayavich Alekseev and teolog Lev Platonovich Karsavin (1882-1952). Their original ideas were supported by the works of linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896-1982) and historian Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadskii (1887-1973), teolog A.V. Kartasev, philosopher Vsevlod Nikaranoviç Ivanov, jurist Vyaçeslavovich Şahmatov, Ya. D. Sadovsky and V. N. Ilin. Their ideas were published in a number of collected works such as *Iskhod k Vostoku* (Exodus to East, 1921), *Na Putyakh* (On the Roads, 1922); *Rossiyai Latinstvo* (Russia and Latin World, 1923).

According to Savitsky, special economic and geographic conditions of Eurasia force the countries of the region to cooperate. Specifically, he refers to the fact that Europe is situated in an open position to the oceans, which make inter-continental relations possible, while in Eurasia, countries cannot form such inter-continental relations easily: they have to form close relations with each other. To him, inter-continental relations create less dependence between the parties than the within- continent relationships. Because of this feature of its geography, Eurasia should become a unity so that it can decrease its economic costs to the minimum level.

In transition from classical Eurasianism to Neo- Eurasianism, Özsağlam (2006: 116) refers to the historian Lev Gumilev as the most important thinker making classical Eurasianist thought available to the generations of the post- Soviet Russia. Neo- Eurasianists define themselves as a social, philosophical, scientific, geopolitical and cultural movement, which came about at the end of the 80s. They claim that today they are working actively within the state system of Russia: among political parties and the military. Just like the classical one, Neo- Eurasianism highly depends on an anti- Western philosophy and offers an alternative globalization by focusing on economic and social regionalization in Eurasia.

Economically, Neo- Eurasianism recommends a complex system, which is a combination of state intervention and liberal enterprise. In terms of the state system, it recommends a supra-national political unity for Eurasia, where not individualist but collectivist ideals will define the rights of people. This is one of the main areas of differentiation from the Western thought: Russian Eurasianism glorifies collectivity instead of individualism. It purports that individualism does not serve for the needs of people, at least not the Eurasian people. In Eurasia, historically, people have lived

collectively and what matters is the collective rights: such as the right to speak ones mother tongue. Accordingly, Eurasian culture is defined as a dialogue of Orthodox and Islamic traditions living in harmony.

To Özsağlam, except some overlapping ideas, Turkish Eurasianism does not reflect the essence of Russian Eurasianism, because Russian Eurasianism rejects the nation state and aims a supranational federation-empire as an ultimate goal. However, from left or right, Turkish Eurasianists from all circles have the nation state as their center of view. Özsağlam claims that Turkish Eurasianism mainly reflects the Eurasianist groups' old ideologies and is only constructed by some temporarily defined terms and discourses. To deepen their position, Turkish Eurasianists should learn more about the teachings of their Russian counterparts, argues Özsağlam.

Korkmaz (2004: 109) defines Eurasianism as a philosophy, a teaching, and a perspective in Russian intellectual tradition, being fed by different scientific disciplines such as philosophy, theology, history, and strategy. According to her, Russian Eurasianism has persisted for so long by relying on sustainable characteristics in every period of its history. These characteristics are its binary character, its perception of the West as the "Other" and its collectivism ideal.

Eurasianists see the Western political, social and economic institutions as dangerous for humanity because they depend on the primitively developed distinction of the superior vs. the lower and this characteristic might kill institutions which depend on the ideal of collective utility, happiness and security. More importantly, they are dangerous because they challenge the moral roots of institutions. This philosophical position of Eurasianism, to Korkmaz, is the reason why today Eurasianism has become popular again.

Classical Eurasianists were confident about their idea that Eurasia is “another world,” separate than its counterpart, the West, and that is why it is bound to draw its future on its own way (Korkmaz, 2004:113). Eurasia is considered as a geographic structure, an economic regionalism and a historical unity (Korkmaz, 2004:114). It depends on the interdependent reciprocity of the sub-nations within it. Serving faithfully to the political structure, harmony and unity are the ideals making the Eurasian entity stay alive. It aims “unity in diversity,” which is only possible in a collectivist tradition, where the individual perceives him/herself only meaningful within a collectivity. Both the Turkic and Slavic cultural traditions are suitable for this kind of ideal to be realized. Therefore Eurasia composed of these two cultures’ combination can reach these goals.

3.5.1. Only Meaningful vis-à-vis the West

As Korkmaz (2004:117) rightly explains, Eurasianism has always been fed by opposition to the West, but it is more than a superficial anti- Westernism. The process of defining the West has intensified the simultaneous process of defining the East and Eurasia. Anti- Westernism is interpreted by Eurasianists as a defense mechanism of local cultures as well as collective Eurasian culture against the Western imperialism. This is the place where patriotism (just like *ulusalcılık* in the Turkish case) and universalism come together in the Eurasianist thought. The clash between the East and the West is not coincidental, to Eurasianists, it is the reflection of natural difference of these two civilizational entities.

Neo- Eurasianists ask for a multipolar world structure, where supra- national governing structures become the major actors of world politics. To Neo-Eurasianists, multi- polarism is not only a strategic but also a political and moral choice. This is

because, as explained before, a multi- polar world system is the only one under which all localities can be protected against imperialism (Korkmaz, 2004:127). Justice, according to this ideal, can only be reached in the societal level, not on individual bases (Korkmaz, 131). To Korkmaz (2004:132), because of these qualifications of the movement, Russian Eurasianism as well as the Turkish version can be rightly considered as alternative globalization movements, just like Aktürk (2007) and Akçalı and Perinçek (2009) pointed out.

3.5.2. Russian Eurasianism, a Model for Turkish Eurasianists?

Ersanlı and Korkmaz (2004:99), in their article *Russian Eurasianism: Model for Iran and Turkey?* argue that some principles and values of classical Eurasianism create a solid ground for cooperation for the three countries: Russia, Turkey and Iran. Two concepts, deriving from the teachings of classical Eurasianism are specifically important: social justice and economic dynamism, which Ersanlı and Korkmaz (2004:100) see as the main ingredients of this political thought.

In terms of social justice, Eurasianists has challenged the rule of the Western thought from David Hume to post- modernism namely utilitarianism and contractualism (Ersanlı and Korkmaz, 2004: 101). Eurasianists alternatively introduced a multilateral, collectivist *bildung* of the self interacting with all dimensions of human participation. Eurasianists imagine a kind of justice, where individual can reach self consciousness only by knowing collectivity. Accordingly, in the minds of Eurasianists, collectivity replaces authority in the Western sense. The outcome of this kind of an understanding of social justice is the social revolution, like the Bolshevik Revolution, aiming “justice through negation: meaning sufferings,

hunger, poverty and the tragedy that is experienced by the individual” (Ersanlı and Korkmaz, 2004: 103).

In terms of economic dynamism, according to Eurasianists, the only viable way for Eurasia to cope with its economic problems is economic regionalization (Ersanlı and Korkmaz, 2004: 120). The welcomed regional alliances after the demise of the Soviet Union by Iran, Turkey and Russia can be seen as suitable attempts serving this goal. Some examples are: Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC, 1992), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO, 1993), GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia. 1997), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 1991) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (1996). Because of power rivalries among the members and financial constraints, most of these organizations did not become successful enough; however they definitely created some kind of dynamism and sustainability in developing relations in Eurasia.

3.5.3. On the Role of the State in Eurasianist Thought

In Turkish political culture, the writings of Ziya Gökalp give the clues of inherent collectivism in terms of rights and duties. He underlines the need to fulfill duties more than defining and safeguarding rights of individuals. He shares similar views with Eurasianists on the idea of natural membership to collectivity. The state is taken as a natural organism, which has the right to survive on equal terms with other states and the very existence of an independent state is the main right of its members.

Accordingly, Ersanlı and Korkmaz (2004:115) state that, Eurasianism in Turkey can only be studied with the idea of state. This is because, since the Liberation War, the East- West dichotomy has always been understood within a state – based discourse in Turkey. Deriving from Gökalp, the separation of civilization

and culture (*medeniyet* and *hars*) gave legitimization to Turkish intellectuals to both westernize (taking part in universal civilization) on institutional basis and ask for equal participation in world politics with the Western countries. To Ersanlı and Korkmaz, Turkish Eurasianist discourse is a continuation of this narrative.

3.5.4. On the Role of Russian Eurasianism in the Turkish Eurasianist Thought

Ersanlı and Korkmaz underline the fact that classical Eurasianist thought is not investigated and embraced by the Turkish Eurasianist groups. Turkish Eurasianists have pragmatic motivations instead with little intellectual background. The important point is that, within the limits of its current usage, Eurasianism does not imply collectivity and sociality of justice. In Turkey, Eurasianism neither describes a certain social reality nor explains a specific feature of state. In other words, Eurasianism has not become a part of political culture in Turkey yet. Rather, political elite since the early 1990s showed some intellectual interest to the issue as a realist, pragmatic maneuver towards “a complementary identity for neo-westernization in Turkey” (Ersanlı, 2002: 113).

To sum up, Turkish Eurasianism is a state- oriented idea of justice. It is a right of the state to have more say over the world politics. The “great state” expectations motivate further regional economic dynamism to secure national unity against the imperialist West. The existence of Eurasianist groups portrays a debate arena and inner competition on the concept of Eurasia in Turkey. They have a weak impact on the popular discourse and society. In terms of relations with the Eurasian countries, Ersanlı and Korkmaz (2004:133) claim that Iran, Turkey and Russia, have

many values “to dwell upon a new cognitive search for cooperation, which can be inspired by the classical ideas and principles of Eurasianism.”

3.6. Russia and Turkey: New Eurasianist Partners or Old Rivals in a Temporary Pause?

In his critical study, Torbakov (2007) investigates the increasingly promising relationship between Russia and Turkey in the post- Cold War period. He, different than various scholars writing on this issue (see Mitchell and Warhola, 2006; Hill and Taşpınar, 2006 and 2006a; Aktürk, 2006 and 2007; and Laruelle 2008) takes a relatively more skeptical stance about the sustainability of these positive relations, mainly in the three areas of cooperation: economic cooperation, Eurasian international identity, and historically defined the “Other” position vis-à-vis the West (Torbakov, 2007:6).

Hill, Taşpınar, Aktürk, and Laruelle also underline some other overlapping political characteristics for the two countries such as the post- imperial trauma, having difficulties in forming close alliances within the close neighborhood, ongoing identity search, and authoritarian tendencies of the leaders, who consider national unity and sovereignty as the priorities of politics (Torbakov, 2007:3). However, to Torbakov, it is too quick to conclude that these similarities promise a sustainable future for the two countries’ relationship. To him, Eurasianism is neither Turkey’s nor Russia’s current foreign policy priority. Ongoing cooperation of the two countries in various dimensions is actually coupled with ongoing competition in other dimensions, he purports. On the other hand, Torbakov acknowledges the fact that there is a considerable amount of positive increase in the two countries’

cooperation, mainly because of their changing threat perceptions, which do not refer to each other as threats any more.

In terms of energy politics, the interests of Russia and Turkey clash, despite the fact that Russia is the major supplier of gas to Turkey. Russia's ultimate goal is to monopolize European market and Caspian exports (Torbakov, 2007:7), while Turkey hopes to become an energy hub, via which Europe can diversify its energy sources to balance Russia. As these energy goals of the two countries clash with each other, so do the pipeline projects that Turkey and Russia are parts of. That is why, even if some commentators refer to the energy issue as a hopeful cooperation field for the two countries, Torbakov rather sees it as a field of competition.

In terms of their relations vis-à-vis the West, Torbakov (2007:9-11) sees the current overlapping anti- Westernism in both countries as coincidental and temporary. To Torbakov, the origins of anti- Westernism in two countries are different. For the Turkish side, the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq after the US invasion has become a nightmare. As for the EU, Turkey thinks that the union behaves unjustly to itself. However, for the Russian part, there is a deeper, a more long-lasting competition with the West. With the favoring conjuncture of today, Russia feels strong enough to challenge the Western unilateral dominance in the world politics. On the other hand, even if the interests of Russia and Turkey vis-à-vis the West overlaps on the surface, it is too bold to claim that Russia and Turkey have become new strategic partners. Their perceptions in the foreign policy areas of the Azerbaijan- Armenia conflict and the Cyprus issue are different.

In terms of Eurasianism, Turbakov (2004:11-13) is critical of the idea about a Russo- Turkish rapprochement through Eurasianism. To him, Eurasianism is far

from being a direct foreign policy tool in both countries because the Eurasianist groups are not in influential positions of the decision making process. In Russia, Neo- Eurasianists use their discourse for four main reasons (Turbakov, 2007:12) :

1. to underscore Russia's physical identity as the country has the borders and interests in both Europe and Asia;
2. to justify the necessity of conducting a balanced foreign policy that does not privilege the relationship with the West at the expense of the Eastern dimension;
3. to interpret the multicultural and multiethnic nature of Russia's Eurasian identity to justify the country's membership in various international organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference.
4. and, most importantly, to rationalize Russia's right to be a great power with the corresponding geopolitical role in global and regional affairs.

Turkish Eurasianist choice, on the other hand, is a less deep, less established but more practically motivated one. However, in terms of state policy, Torbakov claims that Turkey can only be considered as Neo- Ottoman rather than Eurasian.

To sum up, Torbakov (2004:14) claims that, even if there is a rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, it happened in the 90s when both countries were weak. Today, when both countries start to become stronger regional powers, their interests will start to clash more. His ideas matter for my thesis because, as he also points out, many writers on Turkish Eurasianism choose the way of integrating their study with the current Turkey- Russia relations (see Aktürk, 2007 and Laurelle 2008). However, I agree with Torbakov that these seemingly positive relations cannot be directly related to the ongoing popularity of Eurasianism in both countries.

3.7. The Short History of Turkish Eurasianism

Imanov's study is devoted to a detailed analysis of Russian classical Eurasianism. Probably because of this reason, Imanov has a negative approach to the Turkish version of this movement. He acknowledges the fact that Eurasia has become a highly attractive term in Turkey. However, to Imanov (2007:292), it is not fair to call these political tendencies of Turkish groups as Eurasianism because of their relative superficiality compared to their Russian counterpart. To Imanov (2007:293), what is happening in Turkey is a reconstruction of already existing ideologies of Neo- Ottomanist, Pan- Turkist and Socialists without a radical change in the priorities of these ideological groups. Eurasia does not add anything new to these groups' narratives: Eurasianism in Turkey has only a role of justifying post-Cold War versions of already existing ideologies, purports Imanov.

According to Imanov, the reason why these groups got interested in Eurasia for the last decade is that first because of the emergence of this large, newly independent area with rich resources, where Turkey has close historical, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious ties with. This new situation created a lot of unavoidable attraction in all circles of Turkey towards Eurasia. Second, for the leftist groups, there appeared a lack of foreign policy objective after the demise of the Soviet Union, which they filled with Eurasianism.

Imanov's views are highly important for my thesis because Imanov is the only scholar among the others, who rejects the possibility of talking about a "Turkish Eurasianism," maybe only reflections of Eurasia. This is mainly because there is no history of Eurasia as a geography, civilization or regionalism. However, I do not agree with his argument: I claim that just because one world view has a history in one country relatively more deeply than others, it does not necessarily give the right

to that country to monopolize that world view. So does Professor Ersanlı, who was one of the advisors of Imanov's thesis study,⁷ thinks.

In his analysis of "Eurasian reflections in Turkey," Imanov investigated the following journals: *Ulusal*, *Teori*, *Yeni Avrasya*, *Asya- Avrupa*, *Diyalog Avrasya* and some other internet- based ones. These sources show that the leftist groups' interest towards the region started between the years 1995-1997, while the nationalist groups became interested in the region starting in 2000-2002. Imanov (2007:299) scrutinizes Eurasia's place in Turkish intellectual tradition under five categories and one thinker. The five categories are, in chronological order, *Ulusal's* leftist Eurasia published in the years of 1996-1997; Perinçek's *Teori* and *Aydınlık*; nationalist *Yeni Avrasya* and *Asya- Avrupa*, Dialog Eurasia Platform and their journal; and finally Neo-Ottomanist *Yarın*. The first two are from the left wing, the third one is from right wing and the last two are from the religious wing. The thinker Imanov specifically wants to refer is, expectedly, Attila İlhan, "the father of Turkish Eurasianism" (Aktürk, 2007).

3.7.1. The *Ulusal* Eurasianists

The *Ulusal* group prefers to see Eurasia as a unity of exploited countries (Imanov, 2007:301). They imagine an Eurasianist movement, which has an international character. This group is openly against any supranational attempt which tries to replace nation state as the core actor. To them, any movement in Eurasia should be motivated and directed by the socialist ideology. In any potential future Eurasian unity, Kemalist Turkey should be given the leadership role. Atatürk and

⁷ Personal interview with Professor Ersanlı, on October the 23th, 2009.

Sultan Galiyev are presented as the main thinkers of Eurasia, whose ideas should guide regionalism attempts.

3.7.2. *Perinçek* and the Nationalists

Imanov defines Perinçek's Eurasianism as a civilization project and a strategy (Imanov, 20007:314), but not an ideology. Nationalists' Eurasia, on the other hand, focuses on the Central Asia's Turkic countries. Namık Kemal Zeybek is the main figure of this group. Its ultimate aim is to form a union of the Turkic world under one umbrella (Turbakov, 2007:317), while some non-Turkish Eurasian countries can also join the union in later steps. Nationalists perceive Russia's position in Eurasia in a cooperative way, which is highly different than the Cold War perception of Russia by the nationalists. These two groups are important for this study's analytical purposes also. I will investigate these two groups as two of the three main geopolitical traditions, which overlap to construct Kemalist Eurasianism.

3.7.3. The Dialog Eurasia and *Yarin* Groups

The Dialog Eurasia Group takes an apolitical position and tries to be independent from any kind of ideological position. However, *Yarin* does not hide its Neo- Ottomanist position. To Imanov (2007:335), differently than all other groups, the *Yarin* group has the most overlapping ideas with the Russian Eurasianism: it is anti-liberal, anti- capitalist, conservative, anti- Westernist and localist (or Easternist). Accordingly, their Eurasia is defined by the Ottoman Empire's borders.

Imanov tries to compare views about Eurasia in the Turkish intelligentsia with its Russian counterpart. Although this thesis does not agree with his position deriving from Russian classical Eurasianism as a reference point, I accept the benefit of this

comparison in categorizing Eurasianisms of Turkey. These comparisons indicate two main categories of Turkish Eurasianism: first the national, state- oriented, Kemalist, nationalist, socialist (*Ulusalci*), Turkist, anti- Western one, which I will be calling Kemalist Eurasianism; and second is the civilizational, empire- oriented, conservative, Islamist, anti- Western version, which will be named as Ottomanist Eurasianism in the following chapter of this thesis. The first version contains socialism and nationalism, two conflicting old ideologies, and brings them together under the one roof. How this convergence happened is one of the main research questions of this thesis.

3.7.4. Anti-Westernism of Eurasianists in Turkey

Pinar Akçali (2008:9), in her critical article on Eurasia's place in Turkish foreign policy choices, prefers to see Eurasian tendencies of the Kemalist/ leftist groups as an expected extension of the conjunctural changes of the Post Cold War world. As Akçali (2008:12) rightly points it out, Turkish Eurasianists see both the US and the EU as threats against the territorial unity and sovereignty of Turkey. They assume that Western imperialist powers want to, with the most optimistic scenario, isolate, ignore and cheat Turkey and with the worse scenario, they hope to disintegrate, exploit and separate the country into many pieces. This highly skeptical view of the West is coupled with a positive view of Eurasianism as the remedy for these threats. Accordingly, Eurasianism becomes the honorable, realistic and obligatory alternative for Turkish foreign policy. Under today's conditions, Eurasia is not an option only, but a must to survive.

To Akçali (2008:15), Eurasianism in Turkey has evolved around anti-Westernism. Its core goal is to provide a more pursuable foreign policy orientation

for Turkey via which it can protect its sovereignty and independence. The Eurasian option, in the minds of Turkish Eurasianists, is constructed as a defensive regionalism against the US-led unspooled world with the attendance of the Eurasian countries of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, China, and even India. The prominent motto is “preserving Eurasia for Eurasians only.”

3.7.5. Is Turkey European?

According to Akçali (2008: 18), there are three main limitations of Eurasianism to be a foreign policy alternative for Turkey: first is the differences within Turkey in terms of foreign policy orientation , second is the differences about Eurasianism within Turkey and finally problems in relations among Turkey and the Central Asian countries. Akçali argues that, Eurasia cannot be seen as an alternative to Turkey’s Western orientation. The Western choice is a permanent one, which was made by the founders of the country. The whole institutionalization of the country and imagination of the ideal society has been constructed in this direction. Therefore, all the Eurasianist discourses and activities should be investigated in relation to the Western orientation of Turkey.

On the other hand, Aktürk (2007) does not agree with this rigid definition of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation as mainly and only Europe- oriented. He, in a highly speculative way, goes beyond the mainstream and claims that, Turkey has never been in the claim of being “European.” It has tried to become a member of the EU and became a member of NATO, because Turkey calculated these as the most pragmatic options of the time. However, in the societal level, Turkey has always stayed under the influence of Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism, not really Europeanism or Westernism. Because of this non- internalization of the European

identity, Turkey can easily change its foreign policy orientation and engage into an alternative cooperation in Eurasia.

Akçali (2008:21) claims that there is no consensus on the definitions of the terms Eurasia and Eurasianism in Turkey. This is another limitation because for the formulation of a foreign policy alternative, there must be an agreed definition of the region to integrate. According to her, diversity of ideological backgrounds among the supporters of Eurasianism in Turkey also confirms her skepticism about the terminological confusion.

3.7.6. Turkish Eurasianism as a Master Narrative

Aktürk (2004: 208), in his article *Counter Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: the Case of Turkish Eurasianism*, defines Turkish Eurasianism as a newly emerging intellectual phenomenon in Turkey, which, for the first time, imagines a common future for Russia and Turkey. This movement, via the reinterpretation of Russian and Turkish histories formulates a common history where Russia and Turkey has always been “brother nations” being fooled by the Western powers to fight against each other for over five centuries (Aktürk, 2004: 209). Turkish Eurasianism, as an alternative master narrative, serves to make the two countries realize their common fate and unite against their real enemy: the West.

Because of the centrality of geopolitics in Turkish intellectual and political culture, the question of where to situate the country turns out to be the question of who the Turks are. Accordingly, Aktürk asserts that the idea of Turkey as a part of Eurasia does not only reflect a foreign policy preference for the country, but also a cultural/ civilizational position for the society. Accordingly, Turkish Eurasianism offers both a reconciliation project between Russia and Turkey and a reconciliation

project for the nationalist and leftist groups, which used to be the main poles of the Cold War Turkish politics. This is an important idea for this study. I agree with this claim of Aktürk and focus on the domestic politics dynamics of Turkey in investigating who the Eurasianists are, how different their Eurasia from each other is and why.

In Aktürk's (2004: 209) study, Turkish Eurasianism is introduced as the fourth pole of the Turkish intellectual landscape, three of which are Pan- Turkism, Pan- Islamism and Westernism, retrieved from the prominent Turkish nationalist ideologue, Yusuf Akçura's *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Types of Politics). To Aktürk, the distinguishing feature of Turkish Eurasianism is its anti- imperialist character, which does not necessarily give Turkey the leadership role in a Eurasian regional camp but rather supports cooperation on the basis of common civilization, common interests and against the common enemy: Western imperialism.

3.7.6.1. Attila İlhan: The Father of Turkish Eurasianism

Aktürk names Attila İlhan, one of the most famous poets of the 20th century Turkish literature as well as a prominent thinker and writer on politics, as the father of Turkish Eurasianism. This is why, Aktürk refers to the writings of İlhan in deconstructing the Turkish Eurasianism. This deconstruction provides the reader a detailed frame of this movement, which is not only descriptive but also a prescriptive. İlhan reconstructs Turkish and Russian histories with his own unique dictionary. He reimagines an alternative history for Turkey, which has an almost perfect match with the Russian one. This attempt provides the Eurasianists to formulate an inseparable place for Turkey in Eurasia as an historical as well as economic, cultural, social and civilizational partner of Russia.

According to Aktürk (2004: 234), what makes Ilhan's views strong in Turkey is his position against the EU integration policy of Turkey. As a natural consequence of his overwhelming anti-Westernist position, he rejects the EU project and recommends an alternative regionalism for the Eurasian countries to balance the Western power. This distinguishing position of Ilhan made him the meeting point for various clashing groups such as nationalist and socialist Kemalist groups.

As mentioned before, Turkish Eurasianism in general and Ilhan's ideas in particular, are fed by the decisive characteristics of classical geopolitical thought. Ilhan openly claims that Russia and Turkey are bound to behave in cooperation against the West because of their shared geography, overlapping historical experiences vis-à-vis their Western counterparts as well as overlapping civilizational qualifications such as having no history of racism (Aktürk, 2004: 235). Ilhan's belief in historical materialism and determinism also feeds his trust in geopolitical reasoning.

One interesting idea of Aktürk is a necessary reconsideration of the world-wide academic definitions of positioning Turkey as a part of Middle Eastern Studies and Russia as a part of the post-Communist Studies. Aktürk claims that Russia and Turkey are more alike than Turkey and Saudi Arabia or Russia and Bulgaria are; so they should be considered under the same category with Russia. Interestingly, a similar idea is expressed by another scholar, Ayla Göl (2007), in her article *Turkey's Search for Identity: A Eurasian and Islamic Country*. Göl's article aims to challenge overwhelming theses about the geographical identity of Turkey: "Turkey is neither a torn country nor a bridge between Europe and Middle East, but a Eurasian country that historically combines the fundamental characteristics of both the East and the West." Accordingly, Göl draws an alternative identity line for Turkey as a synthesis

of Islamic and Western civilizations: a Eurasian country with its own endogenous Eurasianism. This choice of identity, to Göl, is also the most practical way of managing the relationship with the EU: Turkey as an energy corridor and a safe way to reach the large Central Asian market. This practical approach of Göl to the issue of regional identity overlaps with the Turkish Eurasianists' instrumental positions.

3.7.7. Aça's Six Eurasianisms

Aça's article (2002) on the Turkish Eurasianism is one of the first works aiming to systemize Turkish Eurasianism. This is the reason why this article is important for this thesis despite its highly informal style and ideologically shaped arguments. Like various other writers on Turkish foreign policy, Aça also refers to the ending of the Cold War as the starting point for all different types of Turkish Eurasianisms to appear. He defines six different, - sometimes overlapping, sometimes clashing- Eurasianisms in Turkey, constructed and led by various groups with different ideological and institutional backgrounds:

1. Attila İlhan's Sultan Galiyev centered Eurasianism

Just like Aktürk (2007) Aça also states the fact that İlhan is the oldest supporter of Eurasianism in Turkey. He tries to construct an alternative line of history for Turkey, which overlaps with the Russian history. İlhan mainly refers to the relationship of Atatürk and Lenin, the essential figures of ideological construction in both countries. The other most important point in İlhan's history construction is the Eurasian hero, Sultan Galiyev, and his Turk- Slav union ideal for Eurasia. İlhan defines this as a similarity between Atatürk and Galiyev; because, according to İlhan, Atatürk wanted to form a regional cooperation in Eurasia against

the West. For foreign policy, İlhan recommends cooperation between China, Russia and Turkey; and for the local politics he supports a cooperation between nationalists and socialists. Regional cooperation attempts in Eurasia, especially the Schanghai Economic Cooperation, are considered by İlhan as positive developments for the future of the region.

2. Ulusal Journal Eurasianism

Under the umbrella of *Ulusal*, Aça (2004:165) refers to the owner of the journal, Hakan Reyhan, as the leader of the group. He also mentions some other contributors from different ideological and institutional backgrounds such as the former Prime Minister and Socialist Party leader Bülent Ecevit, A. Ahad Andican, Anıl Çeçen, Doğu Perinçek, Attila İlhan and Arslan Bulut. This journal's Eurasianism favors cooperation among exploited classes of Eurasia. Accordingly, their Eurasia does not include Russia and China because of their repression on, in the same order, Chechen and Turkic minorities. However, *Ulusalcı* Eurasianists think that they can include Cuba to this proposed cooperation because of its "exploited country" character (Aça, 2004: 165). Despite its regionally defined name, Eurasianism depends on a Marxist discourse, which has a universal class- based character.

The main threat to the Eurasian world, according to this group, comes from *localization*. It means strengthening of sub-national identities in a way that challenges nation states. They localization attempts as planned processes by the imperialist West. They recommend strengthening the Kemalist nation state for Turkey and transmission of Kemalist model to other exploited countries of Eurasia, starting with the Central Asian Turkic countries.

3. Doğu Perinçek's Workers Party Eurasianism

Aça (2004:167) has a critical approach to this group, despite this group's overlapping character with the previous one. Aça openly favors the *Ulusalcı* group and, probably because of some ideological considerations, he is skeptical of the Worker's Party Eurasianism. He states that their perspective is not favorable because of their underconsideration of the problems that Chechen minorities in Russia and Turkic minorities in China have.

4. Yeni Avrasya (New Eurasia) Journal's Nationalist Eurasianism

The most important character of this group is Namık Kemal Zeybek (Aça, 168). Also the Hoca Ahmed Yesevi International Kazakh- Turk University is directly related to this group.

5. Diyalog Avrasya (Dialog Eurasia) Journal Eurasianism

This group is defined by Aça (2004:169) as religiously motivated, which has a close relationship with the Fethullah Gülen movement. This group, which claims to be non-ideological, aims to strengthen cultural relationship among the Eurasian countries. Imperialism, globalization, "New World Order," and similar common narratives to Eurasianists do not exist within the discourse of this group.

6. ASAM (Eurasian Strategic Research Center) Eurasianism

ASAM is the first and most established think tank in Turkey. According to Aça (2004:162) it is the only one, among the other five Eurasianist groups, which

does not have an ideological position towards Eurasia. Members of this think tank study the region in scientific terms and try to shape Turkish foreign policy indirectly.

As mentioned before, Aça's article is a non-scientific one with ideologically shaped comments. However, it is still important as a guide to see how Eurasianists are actually perceived in Turkey. One of its conclusions about Turkish Eurasianism is also in line with the hypothesis of this thesis that Cold War's poles of socialists and nationalists have become closer under the umbrella of Kemalist Eurasianism by meeting at the minimum commonalities (*asgari müşterekler*), which, though, does not reflect the position of the conservative Eurasianist group of the Dialog Eurasia Journal. Accordingly, I prefer to categorize Eurasianists under two groups only: Kemalist Eurasianists and Ottomanist Eurasianists.

3.7.8. On the Kemalist Eurasianism

For the sake of understanding the origins of Turkish Eurasianism as an emerging geopolitical discourse in Turkey, Akçalı and Perinçek's (2009) article *Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey* is one of the most current and comprehensive sources. They see Turkish Eurasianism as a meeting arena for the Kemalist cycles of Turkish academic, civil society and military institutions over the past decade. According to Akçalı and Perinçek (2009), Turkish Eurasianism is an alternative foreign policy objective constructed in the post-Cold War Turkey to replace the pro- Western engagement of Turkish foreign policy, which has been active since the 50ies. What is offered as an alternative to the Western orientation is a "Eurasian" alliance of the countries like Turkey, Russia, Iran, as well as Central Asian countries, even China, Pakistan and India.

Akçalı and Perinçek's claim is that Kemalism as an ideology is the most determinative factor in combining groups with different ideological backgrounds under the roof of Eurasianism. Especially the anti-imperialist character of the Independence War is underlined as a proof in claiming that Kemalism has never been a "Westernization" project, but only a "modernization" one. It seeks for a place for the country in the universal civilization of development: not necessarily the Western civilization. This argument about situating Kemalism within an anti- Western discourse, instead of a pro- Western one, is highly speculative considering the mainstream idea that Kemalism has been a Westernization project⁸.

In defense of their argument that Kemalism has never been synonymous to Westernization, Akçalı and Perinçek (2009: 554) refer to some quotes from Atatürk such as: "Turkey is not a monkey and is not aping a nation. It will neither Americanize nor Westernize. It will only become pure." (Mango, 1999: xi in Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009: 556) To strengthen their argument, they also refer to the historical discourse of Kemalist modernization, which glorifies the non- Western non- written laws (*töre*) coming from the Central Asian roots of Turkish culture as well as the Anatolian civilization of the Hittites. Akçalı and Perinçek indicate that the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic investigated the roots of gender equality, security, and parliamentary democracy not in the Western philosophy and history but in the ancient lands of Turks (Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009: 557).

⁸ For the examples of the assumption that Turkish modernization is a Westernization project see Ç. Keyder , (1993) The Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Magrin of Europe, *Review* 16(1), 19-33; Ç. Keyder (1997) Whither the Project of Modernity- Turkey in the 1990s in S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. London: University of Washington Press, 37-51; S. Mardin (1991). *Türk Modernleşmesi* (Turkish Modernization). Istanbul: İletişim; J. Henri. (2000). The Struggles of a Strong State. *Journal of International Affairs* 54(19), 87-105 retrieved from Akçalı, E. and Perincek, M. (2009). Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey. *Geopolitics* 14(3), 550-569

At the very origins of the Turkish Eurasianist movement, Akçalı and Perinçek (2009:562) see the “specific context of political and economic transformation that Turkey has gone through during the post- Cold War period.” They think that this unique conjuncture reinforces unity for some segments of socialists and nationalist groups to. Akçalı and Perinçek also underline the organic ties of Russian Neo-Eurasianism to some politically and intellectually influential groups in Turkey such as the Workers Party, Attila İlhan and the *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) newspaper.

3.7.8.1. The Others of the Kemalist Eurasianists

Coming back to the 1990s, there are two main issues that writers underline as important threat perceptions of the Eurasianist groups, which brought them together: the asymmetrical economic and political developments between Turkey and its Western partners and the continuation of PKK terrorism. In both of these issues, Eurasianist circles blame the previous and current governments in binding themselves one-sidedly to the West.

About the EU integration process, Eurasianists are specifically against the Customs Union Agreement signed with the EU in 1995. Turkey was the first country signing this agreement without having a member status. This means that Turkey does not have a say in the decision making process but has to follow the rules set by the EU countries. Turkish Eurasianists, like their Russian counterparts, believe that the West has never been sincere in its relationship with the East. In regard of the PKK issue, Eurasianists again have the firm idea that both the US and the EU secretly support the PKK movement, which is evident in the open support of the EU countries in the Kurdish rights issue under the name of human rights. However, EU’s main aim is to weaken Turkey and threaten its national unity by emphasizing ethnic differences

within the country. Also the fact that the EU recognized PKK as a terrorist organization only in 2003 is used as evidence by Kemalist Eurasianists in strengthening their enemy image of the West.

One of the mostly emphasized narratives in the discourses of these groups is the so called “Great Middle East Project” of the US, aiming to reshape the Middle Eastern region countries’ boundaries by force. They refer to the article of Condoleezza Rice *Transforming the Middle East* published at the Washington Post in August 2003, as an official declaration revealing the real interests of the US in the region, including Turkey.

Akçalı and Perinçek (2009: 555) refer to the cultural representation of Europe as “an enemy or a sinister force threatening to break up Turkish national unity” as one of the reasons why anti- Western sentiments easily find supporters in Turkey. This representation of Europe has its roots in the so-called “Sevres syndrome” of Turks coming from the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the Independence War years. The treaty of Sevres, although canceled after three years of the start of the War of Liberation, has remained as one of the most disturbing reference points in the collective memory of the Turks. Coupled with the ongoing problems with EU and tension against the US, Turkish anti- Westernism evolved into a search for an alternative foreign policy, where the overlap with Dugin’s anti- Western Eurasianist movement happened. Akçalı and Perinçek (2009:566) refer to some defining meetings happened in Turkey with the attendance of influential figures of Turkish politics as well as representatives of the Eurasian countries such as Russia, China, Iran, Serbia, Bulgaria, Palestine and Korea.

3.7.8.2. Eurasianism in Practice

The First International Eurasian Conference held in Istanbul on 19-20 November 2006. Participants defined ethnic separatism and religious fundamentalism as the common threats to fight against in cooperation. Western powers and international organizations such as IMF and the World Bank were considered as the main destabilizing factors for the Eurasian countries' security and sovereignty. A second meeting was held in Istanbul again, in April 2000, with participants from the same countries, who came to similar conclusions at the end of the meeting. Then, in November 2003, a delegation from Turkish Workers Party participated in the International Eurasian Conference in Moscow, where participants of 22 countries elected Alexander Dugin formally as the leader of the International Eurasian movement. In his speech of leadership, Dugin was straightforwardly giving some clues about the rationale behind the Turkish Eurasianist movement:

The modernists who have not fallen in the postmodern side have similar concerns. That's why today the socialists and nationalists can find themselves in the same front. However, Eurasian patriotism does not mean chauvinism and micro-nationalism. We oppose these two. Postmodernism in return opposes socialism, the real industry, and the nation-state (Perinçek, 2006: 83 in Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009: 567).

Turkish Eurasianism kept strengthening its ties via meetings with Dugin: in December 2003 Dugin visited Turkey for the first time and gave a seminar about Eurasianism at Istanbul University (Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009: 567). Attila İlhan was one of the attendee in this conference, which made the meeting an important issue for the media. A year later, on 3 September 2004, The Strategic Research Center of Istanbul University organized another symposium on Eurasianism entitled "Turkish, Russian, Chinese and Iranian Relations on the Eurasian Axis." Prof. Nur Serter, who is currently a member of the Republican People's Party (CHP) chaired the conference, while the keynote speakers were the following: the Iranian

Ambassador Firouz Devletadabi, the Russian Ambassador Albert Chershinev, the vice- president of CHP Onur Öymen, the ex-Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, retired General Tuncer Kılınç and the head of the Workers Party Dogu Perinçek.

A few months later, another symposium named as the Eurasian Symposium (Avrasya Sempozyumu) took place at Gazi University in 4-5 December 2004. The list of attendee was interesting again: Alexander Dugin, The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, *Ulusal* Channel (a TV channel which has close ties with the Workers Party) and The Association of Kemalist Opinion (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği). On individual terms, the symposium gathered a wide array of sympathizers of the Kemalist Eurasianism: the former President Süleyman Demirel, the former President of the *de facto* Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktaş, Doğu Perinçek, the President of the Parliamentary Group of CHP Ali Topuz, ambassadors of Russia, China, Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, retired military officers Tuncer Kılınç and Şener Eruygur, a former minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Sina Gürel and a considerable number of scholars and professors (Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009: 569).

3.7.8.3. Unpopularity of Turkish Eurasianism in Public

Despite these efforts and some successful results, Akçalı and Perinçek (2009:570) admit the fact that Turkish Eurasianism still stays as a highly superficial idea without sufficient depth in terms of philosophy, goals and future expectations. This situation is expectable though, considering the very short-term history of this movement in the post- Cold War Turkey. One reason of its unpopularity in public, according to the writers, is its close relationship with the military, which has lost its credibility in the post- Cold War Turkey. Mainly because of this reason, most of the

liberal thinkers in Turkey are very skeptical about any potential success of positioning Turkey somewhere outside of the Western world. As in the case of Pınar Bilgin (2007), most of the liberals are not only skeptical about, but also against this idea because they consider it as another geopolitical discourse creation of the military to undermine the ongoing democratization of Turkey via the EU accession process.

To sum up, Akçalı and Perinçek's (2009:574) Kemalist Eurasianism is a "statist geopolitical discourse embedded into the Realpolitik tradition." As Dugin describes, this is not a micro-nationalist movement. It has an anti-globalization character, which seeks an alternative foreign policy orientation to filter the negative effects of globalization. Regionalism, via which the Eurasian countries will cooperate to face the "Western challenge," is presented as the main solution for the Eurasian countries.

For my thesis, situating Turkish Eurasianism within the geopolitics tradition like Akçalı and Perinçek do, is specifically important. This study sees Turkish Eurasianism as a genuine continuation of a Western originated way of thinking, dating back to the beginning of the 20th century. The very characteristics of classical geopolitical thinking can be traced in the Turkish Eurasianism, which is constructed via a binary categorization of the world politics, search for unchangeable, objective truths and institutionalization around the military and military-backed think tanks founded by retired generals.

3.7.9. Dugin's Turkish Eurasianism

Laruelle's(2008) article *Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin's Networks in Turkey* is one of the mostly cited studies

among the writers on Turkish Eurasianism. She formulates her discussion on Turkish Eurasianism by focusing on the Russian Neo- Eurasianist Alexander Dugin's networks in Turkish intellectual circles. Laruelle (2008: 4) claims that because of the geopolitical shifts in the Post- Cold War Turkish politics, Dugin decided to change his negative position towards Turkey and declared Turkey within the International Eurasian Movement. Accordingly, the end of Pan- Turkism was actually the beginning of today's Russia- Turkey relations. Laura asserts that the Turkish *Avrasya* is a more practical, less ideological and that's why calmer (Laruelle, 2008:7) term compared to its Russian counterpart.

Coming to the networks of Dugin in Turkey, Laurelle, like Akçalı and Perinçek, also refers to the Eurasian Movement conferences organized in Turkey under the leadership of Dogu Perinçek's Workers Party. Perinçek's groups including the Workers Party, *Ulusal* TV channel and *Teori* Journal seem to be the main allies of Dugin's Eurasianism in Turkey. However, this group is the only one considering Turkish Eurasianism as a continuation of Russian Eurasianism.

According to Laruelle, there are five different uses of the term Eurasia in Turkey: a purely commercial one among companies working with the post- Soviet states; a pragmatic one at state institutions such as TIKA; ones that refer to Turkic brotherhood such as extreme rightist pan-Turkist movements and advocates of a Turko- Islamic Union and finally an alter-globalist left in search of new allies. Also, business men seeking to improve conditions for trade between the former USSR and Turkey, army officers disillusioned by Turkey's loss of clout in NATO and shocked by the Iraq War, politicians and intellectuals looking for a notion of Turkishness that would facilitate Ankara's rapprochement with the new Central Asian countries and give cause to the humiliation being dealt out by Brussels, and, on the other side of

the political spectrum, left- wingers intending to convert communism into alter-globalism, all make up Eurasianism in Turkey (Laurelle, 2008:10).

3.7.10. Turkish Eurasianism Reflections on Domestic Politics

Akgül (2009:162) describes Eurasianism in Turkey as a meeting area for the nationalist and socialist groups in Turkey with the idea of protecting the national state against globalization. *Kızılelma Koalisyonu*, (Red Apple Coalition) is the name given to this movement, in an analogy with the Russia's Red- Braun Coalition. Akgül mentions two important events as evidences of this new and unexpected coalition: first was on 30 August 2003, a demonstration in Istanbul , organized by the attendance of Workers Party and Nationalist Action Party's semi-formal Youth Organization *Ülkü Ocakları*. Second event was organized on 6th of September, 2003 in Ankara, and it was a conference called *Kuva-i Milliye Cephesi*, gathering influential people from both ideological groups such as the Nationalist Party ex-members, retired General Hasan Kundakçı, Big Union Party Vice President Enis Öksüz, a right wing newspaper *Yeniçağ*'s writers, socialist academician Anıl Çeçen, *Ülkü Ocakları*, Turkish World Research Center, Kemalist Thinking Associations (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*).

The two groups' main difference is their priority at the center of their approach to Eurasia: while nationalists prioritize the ethnicity in defining the goals of their Eurasian foreign policy, socialists find ways to justify closer cooperation with former communist countries Russia and China. The idea of Eurasia seem to be their new meeting point, where both sides are willing to compromise their priorities, at least in the first step, as a practical way to reach their ultimate goals. Kemalism, on the one hand, Attila İlhan's all-embracing socialist Turkism on the other hand

prepared the very bases of cooperation for these old enemies, new partners. I agree with these arguments of Akgül and added them to my presumptions about the nature of Turkish Eurasianism. In the fourth chapter I will search for evidence to prove these assumptions.

Akgül (2005: 166) also refers to the retired general Suat İlhan's study on categorizing Turkish Eurasians. İlhan, in line with Akgül, does not refer to Islamists as Eurasianists. In his dictionary, there are two groups of Eurasianism: the Turkic world- oriented nationalist Eurasianists and Dugin- led International Eurasianism Movement supporters. To him, the first one is more practical and realistic for a well designed "geopolitics" for Turkey. In addition, to İlhan, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's Eurasianist plans should also be investigated deeply. Relations with Russia should be developed as the second step, after reaching a unity among the Muslim- Turkic majority of Eurasia.

Finally, Kaleci (2004:235), like Akgül (2009), mentions the Red Apple Coalition between the nationalists and socialists as an important happening for the first time in the two groups' history. What brought them together, according to Kaleci (2004:243) is their common threat perception. Kaleci's article mainly focuses on the Pan-Turkist movement, its emergence under the Ottoman Empire and its convergence with Eurasianism since the early 2000s. To him, Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism meets Pan-Turkism on the idea of patriotism (Kaleci, 2004:242). In addition, Kaleci emphasizes the similarity in the motivations of two countries Eurasianisms: they both reflect the countries' search for a remedy of thought to justify taking science and technology from the West while denying its claim to be the source of universal civilization.

3.7.11. Pan- Turkist Eurasianism: How Nationalist, How Eurasianist?

Kaleci (2004: 243) asks the following questions in search of integrating Pan-Turkism to Eurasianism: What does the Pan- Turkist movement expect to get out of this alliance? What does the Russian Eurasianism mean to the Pan-Turkists? Does the Turkish Eurasianism have a different meaning for the Pan- Turkist than their own ideology? His research has some interesting outcomes about the potential reasons of nationalists' attraction to Eurasianism. First comes the hierarchy of the perceived threat sources by the nationalists. By not trusting Russia on the one hand, they also acknowledge the fact that nation states cannot fight dangers alone in a globalized world: so they have to cooperate in regional terms. Here comes Russia into picture as the most important, biggest and most influential country in the region. Nationalists seem to approach this cooperation as an unavoidable must-option for a stronger Turkey (Kaleci, 2004: 248). For the local coalition with the socialists, again a pragmatic, instrumental approach seems to be overwhelming.

3.7.12. Conclusion

These discussions shaped the following assumptions of this thesis about Turkish Eurasianism:

1. It is a new phenomenon for Turkey, started mainly in late 90s and early 2000s.
2. It reflects post- Cold War international system, which is multi-polar, globalized and regionalized simultaneously, and its old modern institutions are being challenged by postmodernist discussions.
3. Turkish Eurasianism is an elite- level project: it is not popular among the society.

4. Its supporters are mainly from non-governmental institutions and in opposition parties.
5. It has various supporters from right, left and conservative wings. In the last decade, the right and left wing has gotten closer under the names like Red Apple Coalition, *Kuva-i Milliye* Front or *Ulusalçılık* (Patriotism), while the conservative one stays out.
6. This is not an identity- related movement but a highly pragmatic and instrumental one.
7. Attila İlhan's works on creating an alternative Eurasianist history for Turkey has been effective in bringing nationalists and socialists together; also contributed in the increasing the popularity of Eurasianism in Turkey.
8. Turkish Eurasianism is embedded in the geopolitics tradition: one of the two words of the constructors of this discourse is "geopolitics" and this choice of language is no coincidence.

These assumptions also shaped my choice of theories to work with. For the descriptive purposes, I will be using the critical geopolitics theory, and for the explanatory purposes, I will make use of the collective memory literature. The following chapter is the data analysis chapter where I will combine these theories with my findings deriving from the content analysis of the primary sources investigated.

CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

A basic Google search with the key words of Eurasia and Eurasianism (*Avrasya- Avrasyacılık*) in Turkish provides a wide range of results about how these terms are perceived in academia and media. One writer from an Ankara- based think tank describes Eurasianism as a dream, which is far from realization. Nevertheless, he still realizes Eurasianism's role in Turkish politics as an important bridge between the extremist left and the extremist right. He defines Eurasianism as "both socialism and nationalism; both rejection of the Western hegemony and centralizing Eurasia's place in world politics." According to this view, Eurasianism appeared to be the antidotal of the West. Berkan (2009) from the newspaper *Radikal*, asserts that *Ulusalçılık* means Eurasianism, which has also appeared under other names like *Kızıl Elma* (Red Apple) Coalition. Socialist İlhan (2004) sees it as a common hope for Russia and Turkey while liberal Berkan criticizes Eurasianist groups, because they use geopolitics as a so called scientific approach in justifying their anti-democratic claims. While some see *Ulusalçılık* and Eurasianism as almost the same thing (Üşümezsoy, Doğan, 2008), others add the so called "Ergenekon terrorist organization" to these two and blame Eurasianists by being outmoded and anti-democratic groups embedded in the deep state tradition of Turkish politics. (Korkmaz, 2010; Çandar, 2008 Birkan, 2009).

Another commentator, Çomak, from the nationalist wing, defined Eurasianism as the meeting point of anti- EU groups, who would never come together under normal conditions. Çomak questions, accordingly, whether a term which is defined differently by different people can play a unifying role or not.

Another nationalist figure, the head of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Homes) Kavuncu (2009) shows hesitation in approaching to Eurasianism, which he sees as a wrong route for Turkists to follow, who should rather work for unification of Turkey with Turkistan. However, he still underlines a potential pragmatism in cooperating with Russia in Eurasia if the two countries' interests overlap. On the other hand, as this research plan to confirm, some nationalists have already embraced Eurasianism as a potential foreign policy option for Turkey (Bulut, 2010; Eslen, 2008; Külebi, 2006; Özbek, 2010; Özdağ, 2004, Taşçı, 2010 and Yeniçeri; 2004, 2010). Some of these nationalists describe Eurasianism as an insufficiently considered option for Turkish foreign policy (Külebi, 2006), while others see it as a historical fact (Yeniçeri, 2010), a geopolitical necessity (Bulut, 2010; Eslen, 2008) and an emergency for Turks. Some, on the other hand, see Eurasianism more important of a goal for Turkey than democracy (Eslen, 2010). Finally, there are comments about Eurasia from liberal business organizations like the *Marmara Grubu Vakfı* (Marmara Group Foundation), which organizes business meetings with Eurasian countries and has the slogan of “Future is Eurasia!”

These dense discussions prove one thing if nothing, Eurasianism has triggered a lot of interest in Turkish politics. People from a wide range of political spectrum wrote about it, even though some of them do not have faith in it. In this chapter of my thesis, I will refer to data collected from three journals, which represent three geopolitical traditions that these discussions mainly trigger from: socialism, nationalism and Islamism. Before sharing my content analysis results with the reader, I will start with a short introduction to the content analysis as a quantitative research tool and refer back to the two main theories from which I derive

my terminology. While I sharing my content analysis results, I will be reemphasizing my hypotheses as well as relevant research questions.

4.2. Introduction to Content Analysis

Content analysis is “the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics.” (Neuendorf, 2002:1) Krippendorff (1980:21) describes content analysis as a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from text. It is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method including attention to objectivity- intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing, and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created and presented (Neuendorf, 2002: 10). The simple content analysis by itself has limited utility. It becomes more useful once integrated with other qualitative and quantitative data analyses (Neuendorf, 2002:3). In my case, I combine content analysis with qualitative data collected from the main three journals I worked on: nationalist (*Ulusalci* today) *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), socialist (*Ulusalci* today) *Teori* (Theory) and Islamist- liberal (conservative democrat today) *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Diary of Turkey).

Content analysis is different from discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis and conversation analysis because in these three methods the readings of the researcher are considered unique and many different readings are possible. These analyses aim to read the “deep, indirect” messages hidden beneath sentences. These types of analyses have their own utility, but they do not aim objectivity as content analysis does (Neuendorf, 2002: 6-8). Accordingly, there are two types of studies: idiographic vs. nomothetic. Idiographic studies’ conclusions are unique,

nongeneralizable, subjective, well-grounded and rich; while nomothetic studies conclusions are broadly-based, generalizable, objective, summarizing and inflexible (Neuendorf, 2002: 11). Even though ideally I prefer to use nomothetic studies, my analysis includes some level of subjectivity because I was the only person who read the material, prepared the coding form and filed it through interpretation. This data helped me to test my hypotheses. An alternative to hypothesis testing is posing research questions about potential relations between variables. In my case, I try test my two hypotheses (one descriptive and one explanatory). Via my explanatory hypothesis, I search for a potential causal mechanism.

There are three criteria for causality: a) a relationship between independent and dependent variables, b) time ordering (X precedes Y in time) and c) the elimination of alternative explanations (Neuendorf, 2002: 47). The second criterion requires either two or more measurements over time or an experiment. The third criterion is generally impossible to reach because of the numerous variables which are difficult to control all at once. Historical process tracing is generally a good method to eliminate some of the alternative explanations. I also make use of process tracing as well as comparatively designed content analysis to deal with some potential alternative explanations.

I refer to Neuendorf's definition (2002:95) in understanding variable: it is a definable and measurable concept that varies, that is, it holds different values for different individual cases or units. Variables to be included in a content analysis must reside in the messages rather than the source or receiver. There are four recommended techniques for selecting variables for a content analysis:

1. Consideration of universal variables
2. Using theory and past research for variable collection

3. A grounded or “emergent” process of variable identification and,
4. Attempting to find medium- specific critical variables

4.3. My Content Analysis: Theories and Terminology


In my case, I refer to theories as well as past research in selecting my variables. Three ways in which theory and past research can be applied to the analysis:

1. By providing predictions about the effects of messages, by providing the rationale of the study and hypotheses which cannot be purely tested by a single content analysis only, but with the help of it.
2. By providing predictions about the origins of the messages
3. By providing predictions about the relationship between variables (Neuendorf, 2002:99).

The aim is to test hypotheses and find statistics confirming that the variables we defined are statistically important (Neuendorf, 2002: 168). If they are proven to be insignificant, it shows that we failed to find support for our hypothetical relationship between variables. In my case, I look for a relationship between the representation of history and geopolitical discourse for three geopolitical traditions in Turkey. In interpreting the results, the receiver’s point of view rather than the author’s point of view matters (Somer, 2010, 562). Subjects discussed, code words and ideas are the main messages to be collected and systemized via content analysis (Somer, 2010, 562). In my case, I collected; key ideas, key reference points (thinkers, events and journals), key subjects discussed and some clues about the ways these subjects are discussed from these three journals.

During the interpretation process, changing of frequencies of findings in time combined with historical event analysis, and the books and articles written by three groups' geopoliticians will guide me as the researcher (Somer, 2010, 564). A typical process of content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002: 50) follows the way schematized below by the Table 4.1. I follow this route in defining my content analysis' background, purpose, units and coding schemes.

Table 4.1. How to construct a typical content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002: 50)



4.4. My Theory and Rationale

My goal with this study is twofold: first I want to describe different categories of Turkish Eurasianism, benefiting from the tools of critical geopolitics theory. Secondly, I will try to deconstruct the reasons which lay behind the overlapping and clashing discourses among the three geopolitical traditions that the Turkish Eurasianists come from. In the descriptive part of my analysis I am using the critical geopolitical theory's analytical tools. In this second part of my study, I make use of the social representation/ collective memory studies, because I claim that what defines these groups' borders are their clashing/ overlapping representations of the past. Accordingly, I will be examining these groups' collective memories in relation to Turkish history to scrutinize the causal mechanism behind their geopolitical discourse dynamics.

Various scholars analyzed Turkey's interest towards Eurasia as a foreign policy issue. This kind of analysis is not serving my aims, because I ask questions about the very construction of Eurasia in elite geopolitical discourse rather than interrogating which foreign policy objective is better than others and why. By using the constructivist as well as rationalist tools of critical geopolitics for descriptive purposes, I expect to understand who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how they can be categorized, and why there is more than one Turkish Eurasianism. As a second step, I adapt collective memory studies for explanatory purposes in finding out the hidden causal mechanism behind polarization and rapprochement dynamics among Eurasianist groups' geopolitical discourses. I explore how Eurasianists perceive each other and themselves. Accordingly, at the end of my study, I will be contributing to

the relevant literature via a content analysis supported by qualitative data on who the Turkish Eurasianists are, how different they are from each other and why.

4.5. Conceptualization, Measures, Coding and Sampling Information

4.5.1. Concepts from Critical Geopolitics Theory

Stone (2004: 9) underlines the idea that traditional geopolitical discourse has almost a monopoly in Turkish politics: both in academia and practice. Constructivist models are rarely adapted to political studies. Vague terms like “Turkish national interest” are highly common without concrete definitions in shifting contexts (Stone, 2004:10). About Eurasianist discourses in Turkey, Stone says: “Eurasia is a porous conception, then and remains ensnared within shifting geographist or ideological positions.” I agree with this idea and that is why I refer to critical geopolitics, which provides the opportunity for me as the researcher to conduct a constructivist analysis on traditional geopolitical discourses as in the case of the Turkish intellectual tradition.

Critical geopolitics sees classical geopolitics as a pseudoscience and it provides the tools to critically analyze traditional geopolitical discourses and the geopoliticians, who form and develop these discourses. Turkish Eurasianists are geopoliticians in this sense and I want to investigate them critically. I am going to take this claim as a priori fact by depending on mainly Bilgin’s and various others’ work explained in detail in the second chapter (Bilgin, 2005,2007, 2007b, 2008). That is why, the key concepts that critical geopolitics scholars provide will be my key concepts in categorizing Turkish Eurasianists and supporting my descriptive hypothesis: that there are two key Eurasianist groups in the contemporary Turkish intellectual arena: the Kemalist Eurasianists coming from nationalist and socialist -or

the *Ulusalçıs* geopolitical traditions and the Ottomanist Eurasianists coming from Islamist geopolitical tradition or -in today's terms the conservative democrats-.

4.5.1.1. Turkish Eurasianism as a Part of Modern Geopolitical Imagination

Traditional discourses of the three groups that I investigate are embedded in the modern geopolitical imagination as defined by Agnew (1998). On the other hand, referring to the historical progress of geopolitics categorization of O'Tuathail, Turkish geopolitical traditions can be investigated as a part of the new world order geopolitics discourse, which is constructed by key intellectuals like Fukuyama, Huntington and key institutions like IMF, WTO and G7. The dominant lexicon of this discourse include key terms like “end of history,” “clash of civilizations,” “US led new world order” which are also common to the Turkish Eurasianists of each type.

“The current picture after the demise of the Soviet Union is a gift of geopolitics to Turkey” was saying Çandar (1992: 31) from conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü*. Similarly, Hepkon (1997:20) from socialist *Teori* was referring to Huntington by saying “Huntington's thesis is a bad written Eurocentric nonsense.” On the other hand, nationalist *Türk Yurdu* writers were the ones embracing geopolitics and history as the two main determinants of a country's fate: “Turkish history and its geopolitics and the Turkish civilization founded on this geopolitics shows that all kinds of pessimism is irrelevant for our country...Eurasia should be our geopolitical center of attention.” (Özdağ, 2006:16).

4.5.1.2. Traditional Geopolitical Way of Narration: The Case of Turkish Eurasianism

As mentioned before, this type of narration has two main characteristics: it is declarative (this is how the world “is”) and it is imperative (this is what “we” must do). The “is” shows commitment to unchanging objectivity of truth, while the “we” shows the geographically bounded community and its cultural/political version of truth. Sacralization and historical narrativization are the two tools used by traditional geopoliticians in influencing their followers. These criteria reflected to my research and I prepared a coding table which contains these points. While reading all articles, I checked whether they fit these criteria or not and if they do how intense do they show adaptation to traditional geopolitics (See Table 4.2. below).

My primary goal with this study is to find supportive data to prove my two main arguments: one descriptive and one explanatory. Accordingly, as my primary resources, I scanned three journals representing three main background geopolitical traditions in Turkey: *Türkiye Günlüğü*, which represents the Islamists (today's conservative democrats), *Teori*, which is the official journal of today's *ulusalci* socialist Worker's Party and finally *Türk Yurdu*, which is a nationalist right wing journal. Because of the fact that Turkish Eurasianism is a post- Cold War phenomenon, I scanned these post- Cold War volumes of these journals published between the years of 1990 to 2010. I did not read all these publications but rather I eliminated some of them by looking at the index parts of all volumes. I scanned them in a way that I could read only relevant articles to my hypotheses and research questions. Accordingly I chose articles written on the following topics to read:

1. Ideologies in Turkey
2. Turkish history (Ottoman and Republican)

3. Geopolitics
4. Eurasia/ Eurasianism
5. Ottomanism
6. Turkism
7. Turkish foreign policy
8. Turkish domestic policy
9. The West

After the eliminations according to these criteria, there were 113 articles left from *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 109 from *Türk Yurdu* and 81 from *Teori* of different lengths: from one page to 15 pages. On average the articles were between 5 to 10 pages each. I read all of them and filled the coding form I prepared with the help of the theories as well as primary and secondary resource readings.

I claimed in the previous chapters that Turkish geopolitical discourses, which originate from three main sources of geopolitics tradition in Turkey, -socialist, nationalist and Islamist-, are embedded in the modern geopolitical imagination. Accordingly, I expect all the journals to fit the criteria defined below (See Table 4.2.), which show whether a discourse is geopolitical or not. When I was reading all these articles from three journals, I filled a content analysis coding form to see whether they fit to these criteria or not. Secondly, I claimed that there are two distinctive geopolitical discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Kemalist and Ottomanist. In addition, I am for the idea that Kemalist Eurasianists come from two separate geopolitical traditions: socialist and nationalist. This might sound like a bold claim, because these two traditions used to be clashing parties of a virtual civil war in the Cold War Turkey. Accordingly, I will try to deconstruct change and persistence dynamics in the construction of today's new polarization.

To find confirming data of my descriptive claims, I defined some critical questions and searched for answers from the three journals (See Table 4.3.). In formulating these questions, I benefitted from previous critical geopolitics studies, as mentioned before in the second chapter (See Table 2.3. for Newman's study on five Israeli imaginations, 2005, which inspired me in defining my questions on how to define Eurasia and see Table 2.5. Smith's study on Russian geopolitical traditions, 1999, which inspired me in defining my questions on how to define national interest).

I was expecting the nationalist and socialist journals' answers to overlap in major amounts: especially on the issues of how (Republican and Ottoman) history is imagined, how Kemalism is defined and accordingly how ideal domestic and foreign policies are constructed in these discourses. I was expecting the nationalists and socialists are faithful to Kemalist historiography, and to describe Kemalism in anti-imperialist and anti- Western terms. Oppositely, I was expecting the Islamist group to use the terms of Kemalism and Westernism interchangeably, while opposing Kemalist historiography, which they claim, tried to delete Ottoman and Muslim history of Turks from the collective memory of the society. As a result of these clashing imaginations of history, I was expecting Kemalist Eurasianists to have different political and social expectations from Ottomanist Eurasianists in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

In addition, another data set that I created to test dynamism in three geopolitical traditions represented in three journals: I prepared a table of referenced intellectuals, events and journals. I was expecting the common reference points of nationalist and socialist geopoliticians to be more than their common reference points with the Islamist group (See Table 4.6.). The idea that these reference points matter

come from the constructivist theory of collective memory studies. The theory claims that in social and political life what matters is interpretation. There is no reality waiting out there to be discovered: interpretations make up our realities. That is why, on the ground of different groups' clashing "realities" lie their clashing interpretations: in my case clashing imaginations of the past. One way to find out where these clashing interpretations originate from is to look at these groups' main reference points.

As already mentioned, my explanatory hypothesis was that the reason laying behind the rapprochement of nationalist and socialist groups is their shared vision of Turkish history. Accordingly, I will be referring to some key ideas I collected from each of the three journals to see how they interpret Republican history, Kemalism, Ottoman history and each other. In terms of Republican history, I expect the nationalists and socialists to have similar perspectives, which is majorly positive even if sometimes critical. On the other hand, for Islamists I expect tension regarding the Republican historiography, which will reflect their negative perception of Kemalism. In terms of Ottoman historiography, I again expect the nationalists and socialists to have similar negative views, in contrast to the glorification of the empire by the Islamists. Finally about the data showing the three groups' perspective about each other, I expect increasing approach from nationalist and socialist geopolitical traditions towards each other in the Post- Cold period. As the presentist theory suggests, I claim that socialists and nationalists changed their perceptions in an evolving manner, in a way that their interpretations of reality got closer. On the other hand, I expect nationalist and socialist groups to have negative perception of the conservative democrats and vice versa.

4.6. Concepts from the Collective Memory/ Social Representation Theories

I want to reemphasize some specific terms from the collective memory and social representation theories before sharing the content analysis results so that the reader can see the theory- practice connection more clearly.

Epistemic realism is a concept to explain how the rationale of threat construction via specific foreign policy discourses and practices work in international relations (Campbell, 1992: 1). Epistemic realism sanctions in two analytical forms: narrativation of historiography in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves and logic of explanation, whose purpose is to identify these self-evident facts and material causes to them. In my analysis, all three geopolitical traditions carry these two criteria, which are why they can be seen as good examples of epistemic realism.

Collective or social memory means a remembering process, of not only what we have experienced during our life time, but what we have also thought via history teachings, as a part of our ancestral past (Laszio and Liu, 2007). On the other hand, autobiographical memory is memory of those events that we ourselves experience; and historical memory is the one that reaches us only through historical records. History is the remembered past to which we no longer have an “organic” relation, while collective memory is the active past that forms our identities. Historical memory can be organic or dead: we can celebrate things that we have not directly experienced, as in the case of all the three geopolitical traditions.

Another helpful definition is the “mnemonic communities,” which are groups, who remember what they have not directly experienced, but what they are told via generational story lines about a shared past. In the Turkish Eurasianist case, I expect the socialist and nationalist groups to be mnemonic communities, which share

the Kemalist historiography as their primary source of information about the past. On the other hand, I expect the conservative democrats to play the role of a counter memory, which is not satisfied with the Kemalist understanding of Turkish history and works to reimagine it as a social and political counter-force. Kemalist groups seem to be defensive, while the Islamist group seems to be offensive in this fight over collective memory of the Turkish society.

Construction of collective identities via national heroes, golden ages, myths or suffering, point out one fact about the characteristic of social identity: it is a field of ongoing debate, just like in the case of Kemalist historiography vs. Islamist historiography. Narrative, on the other hand, is the organization of contemporaneous actions and happenings in a chronological order that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them. For a narrative theory to be successful, historical events should be arranged and identified in a story, where context is clarified. In addition, the temporal order of events should be given to explain why and how things have happened. Counterfactuals are also important tools in the analysis of sequences of events.

History provides “narratives of origins” (Hilton and Liu, 2005:3), which work as *quasi-legal charters* establishing rules, norms, moral codes, do’s and don’ts. Accordingly, I have focused on the perceptions of history of the three groups, to understand the mechanisms of change and persistence among and within them. This is because, representations of history are contested when it comes to apply them into current events. Social representations of history may be hegemonic (consensual through society), emancipated (different versions in different parts of society) and polemical (conflicting across different groups) (Hilton and Liu, 2005:6). In the case of Turkish Eurasianists, I expect to see polemical representations of history in the

clash between Islamists and Kemalists while hegemonic representation seems to be shared by the nationalist and socialist groups.

In preparing my coding form, in line with this theory, I investigated all the three journal writers' imaginations of Turkish history and the way they narrativize it. How hegemonic, emancipated and polemical different groups' storylines are and how this reflects to their categorization as clashing and overlapping geopolitical groups constitutes an important part of this analysis. This is because this kind of data gives important clues about the causal mechanism lying on the grounds of group dynamics among Turkish Eurasianists.

4.6.1. How the Representation of Past Can Change and Persist

As mentioned before, to define malleability and persistence of collective memories, presentism is a helpful theory which puts forward alternative ways in which images of the past change over time. It is also an instrumentalist theory aiming to deconstruct how groups use the past for present purposes and holds that the past is generally a useful resource for expressing and justifying current interests (Olick And Robbins,1998). Within presentism, it is possible to emphasize the instrumental or meaning dimensions of memory: for the instrumental dimension, memory entrepreneurship is a manipulation of the past for particular purposes, while for the meaning dimension; selective memory is an inevitable consequence of how we interpret the world.

Instrumental persistence happens when actors intentionally seek to maintain a particular version of the past; while cultural persistence refers to a particular past which perpetuates because it remains relevant for later cultural formations. More general images are more likely to adapt to new contexts than more specific ones.

For instrumental change to occur, actors intentionally change an image of the past for particular reasons in the present, though we cannot always predict the results of our efforts; and finally cultural change happens when a particular past no longer fits with present understandings or otherwise loses relevance for the present.

My expectation is that cultural change happened for the socialist and nationalist groups in Turkey. The ending of the Cold War made these old ideologies irrelevant in various terms. For socialists, communism lost its power as an alternative way of life and political ideal after the demise of the Soviet Union. However, the Workers Party is still a political party, which wants to get votes from people. That is why they had to change their discourse that it fits to the current conjuncture. Similar situation is applicable to the nationalist geopoliticians of Eurasianism. They lost their anti- communist position after the disappearance of Soviet Union as an enemy. To not to get irrelevant, cultural change also occurred for nationalists. Cultural change for both of these groups is also accompanied by an instrumental change. Both groups have direct or indirect political aims to shape the policy decisions about Turkey's future.

In the macro level, with the ending of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy perspective changed dramatically. It realized that it is not necessarily an inseparable part of the West: the idea that Turkey's national interests might not always fit with the interests of the EU and the West got confirmed with various incidents. On the other hand, Turkey's newly founded relations with the Central Asian countries brought some disillusionment about these countries specifically and about the East in general. As a result, nationalist and socialist groups decided to rely on anti-Westernism, while looking for some ways to integrate Turkey into alternative

alliances. For these two groups, Eurasianism worked as a roof under which they meet via cultural and instrumental changes.

On the other hand, cultural and instrumental persistence occurred for the conservative group, whose sub-national identity became even more relevant in the post-modern context of localization. Conservatives became more relevant in the post Cold War's postmodernist world, where hegemonic state discourse got challenged by sub-national forces everywhere in the world. As a counter memory, Islamists met on the ground of change and democracy with the liberals of Turkey and constructed the Ottomanist Eurasianism alternative. In instrumental terms, they also got powerful with the success of AKP government, which confirmed the wisdom of persistence in terms of social representation of history.

In the following part of my thesis, via benefiting from the two main theories' presumptions and terminology reemphasized here, I will interpret my content analysis' results to test my hypotheses and to come up with some potential answers to my research questions.

4.7. Content Analysis Results: Two Main Hypotheses and Supporting Data

4.7.1. Descriptive Hypothesis

My first hypothesis is a descriptive one: Turkish Eurasianism is embedded in the traditional European centered geopolitics tradition. Eurasianists in Turkey refer to geopolitics as a science to understand the global and domestic politics and that is why their imaginations can be identified via the tools of the critical geopolitics. In my analysis, while preparing my coding form, I benefited from the definition of traditional geopolitical way of narration. Accordingly, to test how the three journals' geopolitical discourses fit to this definition, I defined the following criteria in the

Table 4.2. While reading articles from each journal, I took notes about how well they three journals fit to these criteria: (1) binary concepts, (2) personalized language : "we" vs. "they," (3) claim of objectivity/scientific observation, (3) usage of geopolitics as a scientific approach (4) declarative (this is how the world "is") discourse, (5) imperative (this is what "we" must do) discourse, (6) sacralization, (7) historical narration, (8) permanent conflicts and national interests. My analysis showed that all of the three journals carry these characteristics with insignificant exceptions and some of these journals have some of these characteristics in a more frequent way than the others.

Table 4.2. Traditional Geopolitical Way of Narration

JOURNALS	Binary Concepts	Personalized Language: "We" vs "They"	Claim of Objectivity/Scientific Observation	Usage of Geopolitics as a Scientific Approach	Declarative (this is how the world "is") Discourse	Imperative (this is what "we" must do) Discourse	Sacralization	Historical Narration	Permanent Conflicts and National Interests	Exceptions
Türkiye Günüğü	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	XX	O	4 out of 113 (%4)
Teori	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	XX	XX	2 out of 81 (%2)
Türk Yurdu	X	X	XX	XX	X	X	XX	XX	XX	3 out of 109 (%3)

At the Table 4.2., the "X"s symbolize the matching criteria for the group, the double "X" is put to emphasize the existence of the relevant criteria in a more extreme way and the "0" shows the non- existence of the criteria. For the conservative democrats 96%, for nationalists 97% and for socialists 98% of all articles carry these criteria. This data qualifies them as examples of traditional geopolitics. In addition, since this data is countable, it support this study as a factor

of falsifiability. This data us that, as I expected, Turkish geopolitical traditions can be investigated as a part of the new world order geopolitical discourse.

4.7.1.1. Questions of Categorization

Sites of production of geopolitics are diverse: they are both high (a national security memorandum), and low (a headline of newspaper), visual and discursive, traditional (religious motives) and postmodern (internet). It asks questions like: “What is the path for national greatness for a state? (Mahan), “How can a state grow? (Ratzel), “How can a state be reformed in a way that it does not lose its greatness?” (Mackinder). Accordingly, in my descriptive analysis, I searched for answers of the following questions from all the three journals to categorize them accordingly:

1. What is Turkey's national interest? What kind of a future are you working for?
2. What should change/ stay the same for a better future of Turkey?
3. Where is your Eurasia? What countries are parts of it? Who are not Eurasian? Who are the enemies/ opposites/ Others of Eurasia?
4. What is the criterion to be Eurasian? (geographical, cultural, historical, traditional, civilizational etc.) What should Turkey's approach be to Eurasia? (foreign policy recommendations)
5. What is the place of Turkey in Eurasia?
6. Are Turkish citizens also Eurasian? What is the cultural and political identity of Turks?
7. What is the importance of Eurasia for world politics? What is the importance of Turkey for world politics?

In answering these questions I referred to key ideas that I noted down from each article I read. For the *Türkiye Günlüğü* journal I noted down 371, from *Teori* 276 and from *Türk Yurdu* 445 key ideas (See Table 4.3.). I prepared the Table 4.3. by referring to these key ideas. The answers given to the nine questions by the journal writers vary, but some key tendencies of each journal towards addressing these questions can be caught. My aim is to find out whether the socialist and nationalist journals show any common approach to these questions, while the conservatives' perspective creates an alternative to them. I will go through all questions one by one and refer to the most relevant data accordingly.

Conservative democrats see Turkey's national interest in change towards a more democratic, multicultural, and liberal state. The Özal type conservative liberalism and Ottoman type multinational, multicultural unity seem to be reference points of this group in domestic politics as remedy. They also see Neo- Ottomanism as a way to democratize and form more effective relations in the international arena. They want to reorganize the state structure accordingly.

On the other hand, socialists talk about a "proletarian Republic" which values equality, democracy, independence, freedom, secularism and enlightenment. However, democracy does not seem to be a priority for this group as a national interest of Turkey. Socialists value patriotism. They think secularism brings freedom of speech and that's why it should be protected. Even though they are internationalist, they seem to have become more statist in time. One of their key terms is anti- imperialism because they firmly believe that on the ground of both domestic and international problems of Turkey lay the interests of the Western imperialists.

Similarly the nationalist group is under the effect of Sevres syndrome in interpreting both the domestic and international problems of Turkey. Nationalists think that Turkey is at the center of world politics and they are the only ones who realize this fact. That's why, they think,, both the West and its "supporters" inside are against the nationalists. These supporters of the West are the liberals and the Islamists. Nationalists, like socialists, value patriotism as well as the state. They have no problem with secularism and in general with the Kemalist doctrine, even though they do not praise it as much as the socialists do.

JOURNALS / QUESTIONS	What is Turkey's national interest?	What should change/stay the same for a better Turkey?	What is (your) Eurasia? Who are the enemies/ opposites/ Others of Eurasia?	What is the criteria to be Eurasian? (geographical, cultural, historical, traditional, civilizational etc.)	What is the place of Turkey in Eurasia? What should be Turkey's approach to Eurasia? (foreign policy recommendations)	Are Turkish citizens also Eurasian? (Cultural and political identity of Turks)	What is the importance of Eurasia for world politics? What is the importance of Turkey for world politics?
Türkiye Günlüğü	More democracy, less bureaucracy more civil society, less military intervention, Neo-Ottomanism for domestic and international politics, limitless freedom of speech, synthesis of Islam and modernity, liberal economy, multiculturalism (mosaic idea)	Change in the system to adapt the requirements of the new age, remembering glorious Ottoman empire, its multicultural system, its universal justice, synthesis of Turk and Kurd, periphery and center, Islam and modernity, conspiracy theories should end, thinking and producing more, turning to ourselves	Turkey's hinterland: ex Ottoman geography, where Turkey has a say, role and responsibilities. The Islam geography. The undemocratic status quo seekers, racists, militarists are the others of us (domestically)	Eurasia as an alternative civilization for the ones who do not fit to one civilization only, an alternative culture, an opportunity for an alternative system to the Western, a communitarian civilization, a geographic, strategic, geopolitical alignment	Ex- Ottoman geography, where Turkey has historical ties with the region's countries bring a right as well as responsibility for Turkey to take part in its politics; not to take over but to help. Two reasons: central and vital geography and securing territory by having sanctionary power, Neo- Ottomanism, guiding role, bussiness allies, better relations, long term goals	We Turk and Kurds are Ottoman just like the others with whom we share a common history, Islam matters as an additional value to bring ex- Ottomans closer	Turkey should be the leader in the region, Turkey has a place in every new system founded in Eurasia, more initiative to unite Eurasia, EU Economic Union is not just to Turkey, better relations with all neighbors: Russia, Middle East, Caucasasia, Africa, Balkans
Teori	Proletarian Republic which values equality, democracy, independence, freedom, secularism and enlightenment. Patriotism (=nationalism), anti-imperialist Kemalism, Eurasian regionalism, sovereignty, anti-Westernism, Republicanism	Liberalization of the peasant from its exploiters. 19 May 1919 is the history which will enlighten and create Turkey's future. Fraternity of Kurds and Turks as a model for the exploited nations. Uniting domestically and internationally against the imperialist West	Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an anti-imperialist Eurasian movement. From Balkans to the Pacific Ocean is Chaos Geography. Latin America and Africa are the wings of Eurasia. This geography used to be stable during the Cold War. The imperialist West and its NGOs are the Others of Eurasia.	Russia and Turkey share common history of anti-imperialist revolutionary wars. Eurasianism is not only a geography but a historically shaped structure. Eurasia is not only a foreign policy choice it is the only choice for revolution of the workers.	Alternative regionalism ideas for Turkey: Mustafa Özlurk's Southwest Asia (Turkey, Syria, Iran), Anıl Cecen's Central States Union (Turkey, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan) Dogu Perincek's Big Asia Union(Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Azerbailjan), Hakan Albayrak's Turkey- Syria Union are some concrete overlapping plans for Turkey's future foreign policy direction.	Lenin's Soviet Union and Atatürk's Turkey has been in close cooperation. West sees the East as despotic, authoritarian, totalitarian, they do not understand our difference. Turkey, Iran and Russia have a common civilization. We are Eurasian, we are Asian, Eastern, exploited; different than the West.	Eurasias geostrategic situation, rich energy resources. Turkey's glorious history enough to take the leadership role for exploited world. Turkey should regionalize to fight against unfair international trade, be free from foreign investment, nationalize its industries, anti- EU.
Türk Yurdu	State is sacred, it provides independence and sovereignty. Democracy is secondarily important. United Turkistan is a historical and sociological urgency. it would affect our domestic politics also positively. Both secularism and Islam are important, more flexible secularism	The awakening of Turks for the Turkish world, Islamic world and the humanity Turkey should be a strong state, leader in Eurasia to balance the EU, Turkish nationalists should change their direction to the East and should cooperate with Russia and Turkish Republics in Eurasia.	From Yugoslavia to the Chinese wall. Turks' historical geopolitics: Onturks, Summerians, Kimmerians, Anav, Keltiminar cultures, Iskitis were born in Eurasia. Eurasia today: Central Asia, Russia, China's north, Mongolia, Iran, Eastern Turkistan, Anatolia and Mesopotamia. anti- West and Israel	The word Turkic is a propaganda tool of the Soviets and it is still used in Turkey. Those ones named as Turkic are Turks like us, not anything less. Ethnicity and culture based definition of Turks, pragmatic approach to Eurasia.	The new world order of Turkism or "the sun country" ideals. Eurasia owns the main energy resources of the future. It has young, energetic population and the necessary history, culture and civilization to change the direction of world politics. Television, sports, art should be means of integration	"Turks' heart" should beat with Lefkosa, Baku, Almaata, Tasikent, Bishkek. Akcaabad as much as it beats with Ankara." Ethnicity and culture based definition of Turkey. 3000, 4000 years old historical wealth.	Geopolitically Turkey is at the center of humanity. After the demise of the Soviet Union, all world powers' main focus point became Eurasia and its center: Turkistan. Russia as a potential ally, corporation on common interests in Eurasia

Table 4.3. Turkish Eurasianism from Three Geopolitical Traditions: conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü*, socialist *Teori* and nationalist *Türk Yurdu*

When it comes to the idea of change, conservative democrats are strong supporters of it (See Table 4.3.). They think that Turkish historiography should get revised in a way that it is more in peace with the Ottoman history. They do not like the Kemalist doctrine, which they do not find democratic enough. Accordingly, they are also against the Republican elite, who they think have a gap between themselves and the society. Conservative democrats ask for a synthesis of the periphery and the center via further democratization: "Turkey is looking for a synthesis to combine Turk and Kurt, periphery and center, Islam and modernity via liberalism rather than authoritarianism: Turkey looks for Özal" (Göle, 1993: 24). They think nationalists and socialists are into conspiracy theories, which make Turkey waste time: "It is pathetic to search for the West behind all of our problems" (Göle, 1993: 26).

On the other hand, socialists define democratization as freeing proletariat from its ties of its exploiters (Perinçek, 1994: 8). They think the Republican reforms did not get completed they rather got manipulated, that's why Turkey struggles with many problems today. To overcome this, Turkey should be guided in light of the Republican revolution again. Turks and Kurds should also form fraternity, which will lead to fraternity of Turkey with the Eurasian countries: "Our fraternity can be a model for the world and we solve the problems in the Chaos Geography" (Perinçek, 1994:5). Nationalists' approach to the Kurdish issue is different: they think Kurds are tricked by the West, so this is a fake problem created by imperialists: "State accepted Kurds as Turks and never discriminated them (Türkdoğan, 1991:2), "There is a possibility that Kurds came from the Turkish origin" (Köseoğlu, 1995:5), "Imperialists want to do today what they did with the Montrose Treaty yesterday by using Kurds" (Onat, 2006: 60). One other important national interest for nationalists is Turkey to realize its strength and cooperate with Russia and China to be a Eurasian

power. Socialists and nationalists' ideas overlap here too about regionalization in Eurasia as a necessary step for the future of Turkey.

Following table (See Table 4.4.) summarizes the results of the descriptive questionnaire about the political expectations of the three geopolitical traditions. In line with the discussion, this summary also confirms that in terms of domestic politics expectations the Islamist tradition draws a highly alternative line to the nationalist and socialist groups, which overlap in major amounts, with some less important priority issues.

Table 4. 4. Clashing/Overlapping Political Expectations of the Three Geopolitical Traditions

ISLAMISTS:
Change towards a more democratic, multicultural, liberal state
Özalian type of Neo- Ottomanism
Kemalist historiography should be revised
Distaste with conspiracy theories
SOCIALISTS:
Democracy is not the priority (Negative connotation)
Kemalist historiography should remain
Patriotism, statistism, anti- imperialism, anti- Westernism
Sevres syndrome
NATIONALISTS:
Democracy is not the priority (Negative connotation)
Turkey as the center of world politics
Inner and outer enemies, anti- Westernism, anti- liberalism, patriotism, statism, secularism, (peace with) Kemalist doctrine
Sevres syndrome

Eurasia for conservative democrats is the ex- Ottoman geography. For socialists, on the other hand, it is a big area which includes Russia, China, India, Central Asia, Iran, Middle East and even Latin America and Africa. Basically, socialists see all the countries except the Western ones as potential allies for Turkey in Eurasia. They refer to various alternative regionalism ideas for Turkey like

Mustafa Öztürk's Southwest Asia (Turkey, Syria, and Iran), Anıl Çeçen's Central States Union (Turkey, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan) Doğu Perinçek's Big Asia Union (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan), Hakan Albayrak's Turkey- Syria Union as some concrete overlapping plans for Turkey's future foreign policy direction.

For nationalists, primarily the so called "Turkistan," then the areas where Turks live and finally Russia become parts of a vague definition of Eurasia. "The new world order of Turkism" and "the sun country" are some alternative names nationalists offer for a new Turkish future ideal. Ambiguity in defining where Eurasia is seems to be common to all three groups. For the socialists and nationalists, though, there is an overlapping mistrust towards the West, which they think, has only bad intentions about Turkey specifically and the whole Eurasia in general. On the other hand, this ambiguity can be interpreted as a natural result of instrumental reasoning: a non-well defined Eurasia is more practical than a well defined one.

When it comes to Turkey's role and importance in the region, all the three groups seem to have similar perspective in terms of referring to history. However the histories they refer to are not the same. Conservative democrats see Turkey's role as a historical one, coming from the empire, and they think having an active role in the region is both a right and a duty for Turkey. Socialists also refer to history but to the Republican revolutionary history instead of the Ottoman one. They focus on the anti-imperialist unity of the Eurasian countries against the West, of which Turkey has to take part because of its revolutionary history. Nationalists also refer to history, but they go beyond the Ottoman history and refer to the previous existence of Turks in the region. In addition to the other two groups, nationalists also underline the ethnic, linguistic and cultural commonness of Turkey and Eurasian countries, which makes regionalization in Eurasia a sociological, historical and political necessity.

Among the three, only socialists openly claim that Turks are Eurasians. To conservative democrats, Turks are Ottomans and for nationalists Turks are primarily Turks. Conservatives state that Eurasia can work as an alternative civilization for the countries which do not belong to one civilization only, like Turkey. To them, Eurasianism can be perceived as an opportunity, an alternative to the existing system. They show their difference from socialists by asserting that countries like Iran, Russia, Turkey and China cannot be considered exploited or underdeveloped: their history of self modernization makes them special. They also say that Eurasia today is more than a geographical term: it also has strategic, political and cultural references.

For socialists, definitions in Eurasia should be formed in two levels: security and necessities. Turkish Eurasianism is not only a geographically but also historically shaped structure. Socialists see regionalization in Eurasia as the unique pragmatic option for Turkey and the entire exploited world. This group embraces Eurasianism both as an identity for Turks and as a pragmatic option. Nationalists' view of Eurasianism is only a mean to reach their ultimate goal of uniting with the Central Asian Turkic countries. They even claim that calling these societies as "Turkic" is discriminatory because they are as Turkish as Turkey's Turks.

For conservative democrats, Eurasia is the ex- Ottoman geography, where Turkey needs to regain its historical honorable role in it. However, for nationalists and socialists, Eurasia means even more: it is the global key point where all the big states have interests on. They refer to its rich energy resources as well as its glorious history and developed culture as the reason why it is the center of the world. Turkey, as a part of it, becomes also the center of attention. Socialists define this area as the "Chaos Geography." To them Turkey and Russia, which have cooperated before during the Bolshevik and Republican Revolutions, should come together again for

the sake of guiding a long term wide range regionalization in Eurasia. On the other hand, nationalists state their plans of using television, sports and art as potential means of integration among Turkic countries. Turkey, to them, needs to be the most critical power behind this integration. Similarly, socialists recommend Eurasian countries to construct common Eurasian media sources. They need to learn each other's language and build Eurasian universities. This is the only way to fight against the American propaganda putting Eurasians aside one another. Following table summarizes the overlapping/ clashing geopolitical visions of the three traditions, which again confirm my expectations about the overlapping visions of nationalists and socialists, which are countered by the alternative vision of the Islamists.

Table 4.5. Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong To: Three Geopolitical Traditions, Three Eurasias

ISLAMISTS:
Eurasia: ex- Ottoman Geography
Turkey's role: historical responsibility (from Ottoman history)
Cultural identity: Ottomanism
SOCIALISTS:
Eurasia: non- Western exploited world
Turkey's role: Historical shared leadership with Russia
Cultural identity: socialist Eurasianism
NATIONALISTS:
Eurasia: Central Asia (and Russia, if necessary)
Turkey's role: Historical and cultural leadership
Cultural identity: Turkism

4.7.1.2. Breakdown of the Topics Covered

In addition to these statistics, another source of quantitative and descriptive data is from the indexes of all the volumes, from which I chose the relevant articles to read. In this set of data, I scanned through all indexes and created a data set in

terms of topics covered by each journal. The breakdown of the sections in the dataset is: (1) Journal Name, (2)Publication Details, (3) Total Number of Articles, (7)Articles on Eurasia, (8) Articles on Turkish Islamism/ Ottomanism and Islam, (9)Articles on Turkish Right/Nationalism/ Turkism, (9) Articles on Turkish Socialism/ Left, (10) Articles on Turkish History- Politics Relationship, (11) Articles on the clash of the East and West, (12) Articles on the West (EU & US) and (12)Notes. Below, the three charts (See Chart 4.1., 4.2. and 4.3.) show the breakdown of the topics for each newspaper.




Chart 4.1. Breakdown of Topics Covered by Türkiye Günlüğü in Percentage, 1990-2010




Chart 4.2. Breakdown of Topics Covered by Teori in Percentage, 1990-2010




Chart 4.3. Breakdown of Topics Covered by Türk Yurdu in Percentage, 1990-2010

One interesting result from these three pie charts is that the topic of the history- politics relationship, which takes high percentages for all the three journals (27% for conservative democrats, 12% for socialists and %14 for nationalists). These articles are the ones, where writers refer to history in justifying their arguments or disclaiming others' claims about today's politics. Meaning, these are the articles where a specific kind of past becomes an instrumental tool to justify, interpret or argue against a current political or social issue and/ or idea. At these articles past overweighs today. The topic of history-politics relationship, as the data shows, is one of the main three topics covered by all of the journals. This is an important proof to support my hypothesis that imaginations of the past for all the three groups is a critical factor in understanding their position today -vis-à-vis Eurasia and vis-à-vis each other. Accordingly, this data also adds this thesis a value of falsifiability. Especially for the conservative group, past overweighs today even more. Considering the fact that this group is the one trying to formulate a counter-hegemonic collective memory, I think it is understandable why this is the case.

Qualitative data also shows that, the conservative democrat writers share a questioning of the Republican foundation years, its historiography, modernization project, as well as today's Kemalists who stay faithful to the principles of the foundation. They claim that the foundation was a top-down, despotic process, which the society did not approve but could not openly disagree with. That's why the society secretly lived in the traditional way. These masses started to have a say in politics after the multiparty system started in 1950s.

Conservatives claim that the Turkish collective memory related to Islam and Ottoman Empire got deliberately deleted by the authoritarian Kemalist Republic, which is at the center of today's problems: "Kemalism is for forgetting rather than remembering: there is not much to remember in Kemalist historiography (Baydur, 1997: 68)." Conservative groups' obsession with the Republican history and its anti-state position makes it different than the two other groups. Because of this difference, other groups call these group members traitors.

According to the socialist group, second Republicans (*İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler*), liberals, Neo-Marxists, Neo Ottomanists are the same and they are at the same side with Islamists. They all cooperate with the West. They are the others of the patriotic groups. Nationalists completely agree with these ideas of socialists. In terms of interpreting the Republican historiography, some nationalist writers agree with the conservative democrats and claim that the Republic deliberately ignored the Ottoman Empire history. However most of the nationalist writers seem to approach this issue with tolerance by considering the specific conditions of the time. Accordingly, I conclude that, even though imagination of the Turkish history is the most critical dynamic in defining the relations of the three groups, perception of the West and it's so called supporters inside the country seems to be another very

important factor, which brings socialists and nationalists together in their opposition to conservative democrats. I was not expecting this factor to be this much important but my research showed me that I was not right in disregarding this variable's importance. Another two important variables that I did not emphasize sufficiently are perception of change and, related to this, perception of democracy. Again, research showed me that, in addition to the history, these two areas are also potential explanatory variables in this research.

4.7.1.3. References of the Three Journals

Another data set to uncover commonalities as well as differences of the three geopolitical traditions' main reference points, I prepared the following table. The reference points are (1) Referenced Thinkers/ Groups, (2) Referenced Events and (3) Referenced Journals:

Table 4.6. Main Reference Points of the Three Geopolitical Traditions

JOURNALS	Referenced Thinkers/ Groups	Referenced Events	Referenced Journals
Türkiye Gunlugu	Sultan Galiyev, Kemal Tahir, Ziya Gökalp, Atatürk, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Köprülü, Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin, Said-i Nursi, Cemil Meriç*, Gazali, İbn-i Rüşd, İbn-i Sina, Mehmet Akif Ersoy (Safahat), Yahya Kemal and Necip Fazıl, Tarık Buğra, Peyami Safa, Hekimoğlu İsmail (Minyeli Abdullah), Zekai Karakoç (The "Diriliş" idea), Nurettin Topçu, Fetih Cemiyeti, Aydınlar Ocağı, Türkiye Milli Kültür Vakfı (Turk- Islam Synthesis), Osman Turan (Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi), Erol Güngör, Mustafa Yıldırım, Ziya Nur, Dündar Taşer, İsmet Özel (Uç Mesele), Taha Akyol, Sabri Ülgener, Attila İlhan, Nurettin Topçu, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Fazlurrahman, Prens Sabahattin	Single Party years, Foundation years, Istanbul Fetih Derneği 500th Annual Celebrations of the Conquer Activities in 1953	Büyük Doğu (Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's), Hareket (Nurettin Topçu's)
Teori	Lenin, Marx, Atatürk, İsmail Gaspirali, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, Hobbesbawm in the context of state's construction of nations, Yusuf Akcura, Brezenski, Huntington, Fukuyama, Ziya Gökalp, Mustafa Suphi, Şefik Hüsnü, Banu Avar, Nazım Hikmet, Arslan Bulut, Akçura, Gökalp, Ağaoğlu, H. Suphi Tanrıöver, Attila İlhan, Oktay Sinanoğlu, Hulki Cevizoğlu, Sultan Galiyev,	Lenin- Atatürk friendship (paranthesis years in both countries' history), Sevres Treaty, Independence War, Bolshevik Revolution	
Türk Yurdu	Atatürk, Mim Kemal Öke, Erol Güngör, Nihal Atsız, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Sadri Maksudi, Ayaz İshaki, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, Zeki Velidi, Hamdullah Suphi, Ömer Seyfettin, Huntington, Fukuyama, Mackinder and Spykman (geopoliticans' theories by Suat İlhan), Mümtaz Turhan, Oktay Sinanoğlu, Erol Güngör, Gun Sazak, Dursun Onkuzu, Suleyman Ozmen, Necip Altınok, Yavuz Ozkaya, Yusuf Imamoglu, Osman Turan, Ibrahim Kafesoglu, Attila İlhan, Sultan Galiyev, Namık Kemal, İsmail Gaspirali, Alparslan Türkeş, Mustafa Yıldırım Şifre çözücü: Project Democracy, Brezenski, Graham Fuller, Yusuf Akcura, Hulki Cevizoğlu, Banu Avar,	Ergenekon Legend, Nevruz, Sevres Treaty, disintegration of Yugoslavia, Independence War	Birikim, as a jornal where leftist- liberal- Islamist ally became real, Ahmet Yesevi Vakfı, Türk Metal Sendikası, TİKA, Turkish army, Turkish World Foundation, TURKSOY, Süleyman Demirel

This is an interesting way of deconstructing competing and/ or overlapping geopolitical discourses of Turkish Eurasianists coming from the three different geopolitical traditions of socialism, nationalism and Islamism. The highlighted references show common referenced thinkers and events for all the three Turkish traditions of geopolitics. For socialist and nationalist group, the first groups of common references are some famous *ulusalcı* figures like Banu Avar, Oktay Sinanoğlu, Hulki Cevizoğlu, Mustafa Yıldırım and Attila İlhan. This is not surprising because these figures are known as interceders between the nationalist and socialist groups via their articles at newspapers, TV programs, conferences and books. Even though their number is not many, their influence is considerable over both groups.

Another group of common reference point is worldwide famous geopoliticians such as Huntington, Brzezinski and Fukuyama. This result fits to my first hypothesis that Turkish Eurasianists are embedded in the modern geopolitical imagination, which is Western oriented. Finally, there are some other reference points from history like Sultan Galiyev, Ziya Gökalp, İsmail Gaspıralı and Yusuf Akçura. Among these, Sultan Galiyev has a special place for this study. This is because he is a heroic character that Attila İlhan had always emphasized as an historical symbolic figure for “revolutionary Turkists.” İlhan used this figure very successfully in his writings and speeches as a common reference point from the so called “common history” of Russian and Turks, as well as Turkists and revolutionists.

When it comes to the referenced events, it was again expected to see the Sevres Treaty and the Turkish Independence War as common points in the memory of the socialist and nationalist groups. These results confirm my claim that socialist

and nationalists are mnemonic communities, who share common historical representations of the same events.

4.7.2. Hypothesis Two and Data on Causal Mechanism

As my second hypothesis, I discuss how three Eurasian geopolitical traditions differed in the past and show that geopolitical perspectives of nationalists and socialists (*Ulusalcis* of today) have grown closer to each other in recent years, while Islamists (conservative democrats today) have become the new opposing pole. Why did this alignment take place? I argue that the political elites of these three ideological camps self-consciously construct these geopolitical discourses. These discourses help them to serve their political aims, but the ensuing historiographical disputes and competing collective memory constructions create clashes among them. In the last two decades, the right and left wing has gotten closer under the names like *Kızılelma Koalisyonu* (Red Apple Coalition), *Kuva-i Milliye Birliđi* or *Ulusalcılık* (Patriotism), while the conservative democratic circles stay out of these rapprochements. Attila İlhan's works on constructing an alternative history line of Eurasianism as well as the Workers Party led international conferences and publications have been effective in bringing nationalists and socialists together; also contributed to the increasing popularity of Eurasianism in Turkey.

An example of this cooperation is the series of books published under the leadership of Attila İlhan named "A Nation Awakening" (*Bir Millet Uyanıyor*). In this series, famous thinkers from socialist cycle such as Ataol Behramođlu, Mehmet Perinçek, Erol Manisalı, Vural Savaş and Sina Akşin and writers from nationalist wing such as Sadi Somuncuođlu, Arslan Bulut, Suat İlhan and Ümit Özdađ came together and contributed to it. These *ulusalci* people came together with the aim of

protecting and supporting the Turkish Republic in cultural terms (Bilgi Publishing House, 2005: 6). They state that, -from whatever circle they are-, they should come together to wake the society up, to let it know about the dangers against its sovereignty and independence.

These writers perceive themselves and the nation in a war with the West, that some of the people are still not aware of: “the US and Europe are in an economic recession period. In such periods world wars are started by the West. They want to prevent the Shanghai Union to get stronger and that is why they want to create hostilities in Eurasia. This is going to be a new global crusade. We should prevent this” (Bulut, 2005:6). Four of the twenty books in this series are devoted specifically to the issue of Turkish Eurasianism⁹.

4.7.2.1. Key Ideas on Republican Historiography and Kemalism

Following area and pie charts show the three groups’ key ideas on the Republican history. How these ideas evolved in time in the post- Cold War period can be read in the area charts, while the pie charts show these three journal writers’ approach to the Republican history in terms of number of the articles written on that issue and the percentage of positive, negative and neutral perspective related to that issue. Positive key ideas on the Republican history can also be read as a positive approach to the Kemalist foundational principles of Turkey, Republican historiography, Turkish independence War, treaties signed after it, reforms made between the years of 1923- 1938, and all other relevant political developments during the Republican foundation.

⁹Bulut, Arslan. (2005). Küresel Haçlı Seferi (Global Crusade). Bilgi Yayınevi: İstanbul. Perinçek, Mehmet, (2006). Türkiye’deki Teori ve Pratiği (Eurasianism: Its Practice and Theory in Turkey). Bilgi Yayınevi: İstanbul. İlhan, Suat.(2005). Türklerin Jeopolitiği ve Avrasya (Geopolitics of Turkey and Eurasianism). Bilgi Yayınevi: İstanbul. Sertel, Yıldız. (2006). Şu Değişen Dünyada Türkiye ve Avrasya (Turkey and Eurasia in a Changing World). Bilgi Yayınevi: İstanbul.




Chart 4.4.




Chart 4.5.




Chart 4.6.




Chart 4.7.




Chart 4.8




Chart 4.9

The first two charts numbered 4.3. and 4.4. belong to the conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü* journal. In both charts the red color, which represents

negative ideas, outweigh. The area chart shows that from 1990s to 2000, there are only a couple of positive views about Republican history, while after 2000 there are no positive views at all¹⁰. In *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 75% of ideas on the Republican history are negative, while only 9% is positive. For the nationalist *Türk Yurdu* and socialist *Teori*, on the other hand, there is a different perspective towards the Republican history, Republican elite and their reforms (See Charts 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9).

In *Teori*, the outweighing color is blue, which represents positive views about the Republican history. Even though there are some negative and neutral views in the early 90s, we see them almost totally disappear with passing time. However, as I said before, what mainly matters for the thesis are the pie chart results. This is also because what I need to compare in terms of time is the Cold War period with the post- Cold one. Even though I do not have the pre- 1990 data, how the situation was during the Cold War years among these three groups is well known today: the conservative and nationalists were in the right wing and they were in an intense clash with the socialists, which used to include today's liberals also. However, in the post- Cold War period, these categorizations changed dramatically. These data I share are devoted to pinpoint this change.

In *Teori* 77% and in *Türk Yurdu* 58% of views about the Republican history are positive: for *Teori* only 8% and for *Türk Yurdu* only 14% of the views are

¹⁰ The fact that there is no data between the years of 2000- 2003 and after 2005 does not say much to us, because it is probably because of the editors and journal owners' choice on which topic to write for each volume. The non- existence of data as well as the increases and decreases are probably related to this very fact about journal writing. Journals do not necessarily follow the daily politics of the country but rather writers share ideas on topics chosen by editors and journal owners. This situation can be seen as a limitation of journal based archive scanning. Another limitation in my data selection was that I did not read all articles published between these years, which would be the ideal case. However, in my case, I only read the relevant articles, which I chose by going through indexes and reading article names. I hope that with the data set I have, I got a representative sample. This is why the pie chart results are more vital than the area charts for the purposes of my thesis, even though some area chart results contribute a lot to the falsification process (See the Chapter 5 "Limitations of My Research" part for a more information.)

negative. Compared to the *Türkiye Günlüğü*, there is an obvious similarity among socialist and nationalist groups in terms of having a positive approach to the Republican historiography. Looking at the area chart of *Türk Yurdu*, I claim that the nationalist writers' ideas on the Republican history have become more positive in time and the negativity in their perceptions decreased.

4.7.2.2. Key Ideas on Ottoman History

To have a more complete picture about this issue, these three groups' approach towards the Ottoman history should also be investigated. My expectation related to this issue was that, while the nationalist and socialist groups get closer in terms of their positive approach to the Republican history, they also share a negative approach towards the Ottoman history. On the other hand, I was expecting conservative democrats to remember Ottoman history in mostly positive terms, again different than the two *Ulusalci* groups. Here is the relevant data and my interpretations of it:




Chart 4.10.




Chart 4.11.




Chart 4.12




Chart 4.13




Chart 4.14.




Chart 4.15.

Partly different than I was expecting, the conservative democratic group seems to be approaching Ottoman history in a more neutral way (50%) than a positive way (35%) (See Chart 4.11.). Their disagreement with the Republican historiography, which they claim ignored and deleted Ottoman past from the social memory of the society, does not necessarily reflect to data as an over-exaggerated glorification of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the socialist *Teori* group seems to have some problems with the Ottoman history, to the extent that 90% percent of the 20 key ideas about Ottoman Empire are negative (See Chart 4.13.).

There is another surprising result on the side of *Türk Yurdu*. Their approach to Ottoman Empire seems to be even more positive than the conservative *Türkiye*

Günlüğü: 62% of key ideas are positive (See Chart 4.15). However, nationalists are also more critical of the Ottoman history with 24% negative views compared to the 15% of the conservatives. Important additional information to keep in mind though is the fact that *Türkiye Günlüğü* talks more about the empire history (40 key ideas) than the other two: *Teori* (20) and *Türk Yurdu* (21). Accordingly, data about the three journals' approach to the Ottoman Empire does not necessarily confirm my prior expectations about a visible overlap between the nationalist and socialist groups.

4.7.2.3. Key Ideas of the Three Journals about Each Other

However, another type of data shared below, which shows each group's perspectives about the other two groups, shows some overlap among the two *ulusalci* groups in terms of their negative perception of the conservative democrats.




Chart 4.16




Chart 4.17





Chart 4.18




Chart 4.19




Chart 4.20




Chart 4.21




Chart 4.22




Chart 4.23




Chart 4.24

Chart 4.25




Chart 4.26

Chart 4.27

As expected, both *Teori* with 93% and *Türk Yurdu* with 75% have overwhelmingly negative views on the conservative democrats (See Charts 4.20 and 4.26). For *Teori*, this negative perception has been stable in twenty years, as the Chart 4.17 shows, but for *Türk Yurdu* the negativity seems to have increased in time. While in the 90s there were still some positive thoughts about them, in the 2000s these positive perceptions seem to have disappeared (See Chart 4.26). This is important information because it shows a change among the nationalists' view about the conservatives in time.

Qualitative data suggest that this growing negativity is caused by the idea that conservatives cooperate with the West, if not cheated by it, and they started to support the Western as well as liberal views, who are also not domestically originated. Unfortunately I do not have the quantitative data to support this claim but qualitative data shows this direction. Accordingly, see the following quotations from some of the writers of the nationalist *Türk Yurdu* to clarify my claim: “Marxists, Neo- Marxists and political Islamists converge on the idea of being bothered by Turks to exist in this geography and wanting to replace Turkish Republic's main principles with their own intentions for ten years. They see Turkish nationalism as

their enemy. They come together via newspapers and TV and share their ideas through the means of media.” (Türk Yurdu, 2007). “These groups, who are bothered by our existence in this geography have a long history” (Ercilasun, 2007). “There are mainly three categories of the supporters of the West within: 1) the ones who do not feel Turk, 2)the ones with weak personality and 3)the ones who fall into internationalist ideologies in young ages.” “Westernism of the Ottoman years evolved to Marxism of the Cold War, which then evolved to liberalism after the end of the Cold War. They became supporters of Kurdism, Armenians, the EU and Alevis.” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:76) “After 28 February, the anti- EU Islamists became pro-EU to fight against the state (Bayram,2007: 77) “These groups did not intentionally come together but they are brought together by the global market, which has vital interests on Turkey” (Yeniçeri,2007: 79) “The main aim since Sevres is the same: to separate Turkey into religious and ethnic parts. Yesterday's *İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti* (Supporters of Britain) is today' liberal groups...*İslam Teali Cemiyeti* was using Islam to demand protection from England. Today's usage of Islam is the same and has nothing to do with the real Islam...These groups are brought together by the plans of super powers.” “Second Republicans and Islamists want to create a memoryless, historyless society. Nationalist are the main powers against them. That is why they hate nationalists...These groups misunderstood both liberalism and Islam ...They are slaves of the West and we have to cooperate against these Neo-Ottomanist traitors” (Kodaman,2007: 83). “Islamists paradoxically cooperate with the liberals because of the common foreign resources they have. They are traitors because they work against their own state (Atasoy, 2007:88).

When it comes to how the nationalists and socialists see each other, *Teori* has 50% positive and 33% negative views on nationalists (See Chart 4.23). Looking

solely at this data might make one think that it is not positive enough to conclude that there is a rapprochement from socialists to nationalists. At this point the Chart 4.22. helps us to see the increasing positive perception of socialists about nationalists starting around the year 1993 and continuing through 2000s, while the negative views disappear in time.

In addition, qualitative data gives us some satisfactory clues about the instrumental and pragmatic change mechanism among the socialist group, which discusses among its members to embrace nationalist symbols and philosophy to gain the support and trust of the society. These instrumentally motivated discussions among the socialist group confirm my expectation driven from the presentist theory. Revisionism in this group's geopolitical discourse happens in a way that they legitimize change via memory entrepreneurship to adapt to the changing conjuncture:

“Workers Party has to be supporter of national symbols against imperialism; we cannot leave this duty to the reactionary forces...These symbols and feelings must be taken away from the reactionaries and should be given to the society as weapons...One cannot have a future without having a past...We have to refer to our history positively so that we can give the courage to the society for another revolution to happen. They would not trust people who are against everything they respect and who are critical all the past achievements that they are proud of...Nations with a glorious history are more likely to accomplish a lot in the future. Islamists and fascists are using history as their main weapon. We should embrace these values and not let them use them against the people...Our internationalist red flag is of course always will be prior to us but we should also consider people with attachment to national symbols... I do not tell you to sing the Ottoman army anthem but the national anthem because Ottoman one does not have any progressive side but the role of the national anthem in the Liberation War is obvious (Güntekin, 1994: 15- 19 and 31).

Investigating the nationalist group's ideas about leftists, I found some supporting data for my hypothesis (See Charts 4.24 and 4.25). Even though the 64% negative views of nationalists about leftists might not see promising in the first sense, the increase in their positive views from 1993 to 2005 can be interpreted as critical

also. Here again, qualitative data says more than the quantitative ones. Qualitative data suggest that the rapprochement from nationalists to leftists is mainly constructed and developed by some specific figures among the nationalists such as Arslan Bulut and Özcan Yeniçeri from *Yeniçağ*, the famous nationalist Ümit Özdağ, who opened many think tanks in Turkey and Ali Külebi, another think tank founder. There is an important fact about Ali Külebi. He worked as the director of the think tank TUSAM (Turkey National Security Strategic Analysis Center), which was preparing the journal *Strateji* on foreign policy analyses for Turkey. This journal was distributed weekly by the socialist newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. TUSAM is a good example of the practical institutionalization of the socialist- nationalist alliance¹¹.

Even though the number of these leader figures from the nationalist circle is not much, their effectiveness is enough to shape perceptions of the whole group. They are active figures, who produce a lot and reach masses through TV programs, newspapers and books. Especially the TV channel called Eurasia TV (*Avrasya TV*) has been the meeting point for famous figures from right and left wing *ulusalcıs*, who share their ideas with each other and with masses via various political discussion programs. *Ulusalci* cooperation got triggered even more by figures like Attila İlhan and Doğu Perinçek. The book *Türkçü- Devrimci Diyalogu* “Turkist- Revolutionist Dialogue Talks with Attila İlhan and Doğu Perinçek” (*Türkçü- Devrimci Diyalogu Doğu Perinçek ve Attila İlhan ile Söyleşi*) written by the nationalist Arslan Bulut is a good example of the *Ulusalci* ally, where nationalists and socialists seem to have come together with the help of a common enemy perception. Even though there are still some issues where they have non-matching ideas, like the Kurdish issue and the situation of Turkic people in China, they seem to focus on cooperation more than

¹¹ The writer of this thesis has worked at TUSAM as an intern for one month from June to July 2008.

competition. This book is a good example of these attempts: “We have to reconsider our terminology and redefine our values and goals in light of the changing conjuncture and guidance of our leader: Atatürk’s ideals. Our common reference points are the sacred existence of Turks and Turkey, its independence and sovereignty...We should work together for the leadership of Turkey in this region: for ourselves, for the region and for the humanity’s sake” (Bulut, 1998:9).

4.8. Conclusion

According to Çolak (2006: 587) recently the perception about Ottomans in Turkey has dramatically changed and a new focus on the tolerant (instead of reactionary) and refined (instead of cruel) sides of the empire have been emphasized. This new perception has reflected to Turkish architecture, media, art, fashion, popular culture and most important of all the daily politics. This new phenomenon started with Turgut Özal's initiative. He and his supporters tried to invoke a collective cultural memory via constructing a nostalgic narrative of Turkey's Ottoman past. Çolak defines this attempt as a deliberate one to recreate the present in an intense competition with Kemalist elite groups.

Neo Ottomanism as an idea first came about in the 1950s with the Democrat Party, which shared more space for the religious- Ottoman past of the Turks both in public life and education. Özal was the one who institutionalized these ideas politically as a new form of collective memory, foreign policy and social contract (Çolak, 2006:591-592). Özal, in formulating his doctrine, was in close cooperation with the journal *Türkiye Günlüğü*, which became the voice of Neo- Ottomanist ideas. The Ottomanist doctrine got institutionalized via the writings of people like Cengiz

Çandar and Mehmet Altan (Çolak, 2006: 593). This is why I chose *Türkiye Günlüğü* as the representative of the Ottomanist Eurasianist group in my content analysis.

After the Özal period, the Welfare Party continued using Neo- Ottomanism as their official ideology. Especially some mayors from this political party worked on reviving Ottoman arts, calligraphy, food and architectural forms and they sought ways of integrating Ottoman past into daily life of the Turkish society. Alternative commemorations appeared with reference to the Ottoman and Islamic culture and history. By 1994, Istanbul's mayor of the Welfare Party began to organize a set of commemorations of this type. (Çolak, 2006: 596).

These attempts of the Neo- Ottomanists made Kemalists feel threatened. Accordingly, in the second half of the 1990s Kemalists also started to reemphasize Kemalist memory and the Republican past. This is the time when competing pasts and memories of the two groups became an intense topic in Turkish daily politics. One Kemalist writer from *Hürriyet* newspaper wrote about Ottoman pluralism, where he blamed it to be not suitable for today's politics because it is a primitive doctrine which cannot adapt to the developments of modern times (İnce, 2002 in Çolak, 2006: 598). The Kemalist remembrance process heightened in 1990s via the efforts by groups like the Society for Atatürkist Thought and the Society to Support Contemporary Life. They organized rallies, conferences, concerts and balls to remember the Republican past and to forge stronger ties between Kemalists to compete against the Neo- Ottomanists in a stronger way.

This is the time when the term “*ulusalci*” suddenly became a widely accepted social term. As an answer to the question “why has *Ulusalcılık*” blossomed into such a potent political force today?,” Uslu (2008: 81) claims the fundamental causes are: the overwhelming and ongoing success of the AKP and the fast reform process that

AKP has started with the cooperation of the EU. *Ulusalcis* never trusted Erdoğan, they have always thought that he has never changed and holds a secret Islamist agenda.

To Uslu (2008: 87), even though *Ulusalcis* are not represented by a single political party, there are some groups and organizations, which can be considered as *ulusalci*: *Kuva-i Milliye Hareketi* (Nationalist Forces Movement), *Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi* (Patriotic Forces United Movement), *Büyük Hukuçular Birliği* (Great Movement of Jurists), *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (Atatürkist Thought Foundation), *Yeniçağ* (New Age) Newspaper, *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left), *İleri* (Forward), Turkish Workers Party and its journals, Eurasia Television Channel, *Cumhuriyet* (Republic)

Similar to Çolak and Uslu, in my thesis I followed a constructivist route in examining the dynamics of Turkish ideological groups, which, in my thesis, turned into geopolitical traditions. My hypothesis was that the nationalist and socialist Eurasianists can be considered Kemalist in that they are in peace with the Kemalist historical construction of Turkey. However, the conservative Eurasianists have a counter memory, which tends to challenge this state-led Turkish historiography, by hoping to redefine it in a way that it glorifies Ottoman history as much as the Republican history. Their definition of Eurasia's borders is also shaped by their historical narratives, which makes perception of history the main explanatory variable for this thesis.

My content analysis provided some support for these expectations I had before starting the analysis, while sometimes not reflecting what I was hoping to find out, as I explained before. I made use of the tools of collective memory studies in investigating the dynamic relationship between socialist, nationalist and Islamist

geopolitical traditions which make up the Kemalist and Ottomanist Eurasianist geopolitical discourses. Before I started the content analysis, I was expecting that there are two different representations of national history and these clashing representations shape their collective memory. Accordingly, representation of history takes a central role in how these groups define themselves, their goals and expectations. This is where conservative circles distinguish from the socialists and nationalists, who more or less stay faithful to the state-led version of history, while conservatives embrace an alternative version of historical imagination.

In addition, qualitative data showed that the representation of the West in the positioning of nationalist and socialist geopolitical discourses also played an important role in uniting them against the conservative democratic coalition of liberals and Islamists. *Ulusalcis* see this coalition as a natural continuation of the Western imperialism inside of Turkey. This common enemy perception seems to be playing an influential role in integrating the key ideas of nationalists and socialists with each other.

In this chapter, I referred to various quantitative data coming from primary resources and strengthened by qualitative data, when necessary. I claim that this method added to this study's falsifiable character. My hypotheses related to the traditional geopolitical character of Eurasianism in Turkey, importance of history in change and persistence mechanisms of the geopolitical discourses and rapprochement between nationalists and socialists are all tested by these mostly countable data. Researchers can refer back to these available data to challenge it, if necessary.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

5.1. Summary of the Four Chapters

The introduction chapter provides the reader a glimpse of the main issues discussed in the thesis, as well as the hypotheses and theories used in the following chapters. Accordingly, the first chapter introduced the reader to the idea of Eurasia and Eurasianism in Turkish politics in the Post- Cold War period. This part was followed by a short introduction to the traditional and critical geopolitics theories as well as the social/ collective memory studies.

The second chapter is devoted to the literature review of the two theories, which define the assumptions, methodology and terminology of this thesis. It starts with the critical geopolitics theory and discusses its history from different thinkers and theoreticians' perspectives. The chapter continues with collective memory, social representation theories and narrative studies. Additionally, a large scale literature review of the studies published on Turkish politics, which are conducted via the tools of these two main theories are included.

The third chapter is on the history of Eurasia in Turkish politics. This chapter discusses Eurasia as a term and Eurasianism as a movement in the post- Cold War Turkey. Different categories of Eurasianism in Turkey are discussed and outweighing ideas among academia about how to categorize Turkish Eurasianists are also included in this chapter. In addition, this chapter describes Russian Eurasianism and its relation to Turkish Eurasianism in light of late developments in the two countries' relations. This chapter helped me define my main assumptions about Turkish Eurasianism, its content, its categorizations and how to study it.

Finally, the last chapter is the data analysis chapter. It begins with the results of a Google search on Eurasia and Eurasianism in Turkey as an introduction to different perspectives about this movement in Turkish media. The chapter continues with the method information of the content analysis: how to define content analysis and how this study adapted it to the Turkish Eurasianism case. This part is followed by my content analysis, where I adapted Neuendorf's research to my study. Afterwards, the most necessary terms of two theories are reemphasized and the most important results of the content analysis are shared with the reader.

5.2. Summary of the Data Analysis

My first hypothesis was a descriptive one: Turkish Eurasianism is embedded in the European centered geopolitics tradition. Eurasianists in Turkey refer to geopolitics as a science, which helps to understand global and domestic politics. This is why their imaginations can be identified by the tools provided by critical geopolitics. To test this hypothesis, I referred to critical geopolitics theories, which provided me key criteria to discern whether a discourse is geopolitical or not: (1) binary concepts, (2) personalized language : "we" vs. "they," (3) claim of objectivity/scientific observation, (4) usage of geopolitics as a scientific approach (5) declarative (this is how the world "is") discourse, (6) imperative (this is what "we" must do) discourse, (7) sacralization, (8) historical narration, (9) permanent conflicts and (10) national interests. As expected, with insignificant percentages of exceptional articles, almost all articles I read from all the three journals showed suitability to these criteria.

Again, for descriptive purposes, I developed research questions for the three journals I investigated eg. What is Turkey's national interest? What kind of a future

are you working for? What should change/ stay the same for a better future of Turkey? Where is your Eurasia? What countries are parts of it? Who are not Eurasian? Who are the enemies/ opposites/ Others of Eurasia? What are the criteria to be Eurasian? What should Turkey's approach be to Eurasia? What is the place of Turkey in Eurasia? Are Turkish citizens also Eurasian? What is the importance of Eurasia for world politics? What is the importance of Turkey for world politics? Accordingly, I compared the three geopolitical traditions' answers to these questions. Results showed that the nationalists and socialists show similarity in having a different approach to democracy and change than the conservative democrats, who want systemic changes for more democracy. Even though nationalists and socialists also ask for change, their wishes are in the opposite direction. They show a statist and communitarian character in defining their priorities compared to the individualist/ liberal expectations of conservative democrats. As expected, the nationalists and socialists seem to stick to Kemalist Foundation principles, which, they think, are indispensable for Turkey to protect its independence and sovereignty against potential Western imperialist intervention. Nationalists and socialists also show similarity in their approach to the idea of Eurasia in terms of instrumental usage of the term and the nation-state based understanding of regionalism.

Another data set created for descriptive purposes was the main reference points table (Table 4.6.), which, again, provided supporting data confirming my expectations about the rapprochement of nationalists and socialists. This data showed that these two groups have more common reference points in terms of the intellectuals and events they refer to in justifying their arguments compared to the conservative democrats.

The charts, which consist of a breakdown of the topics covered by the three journals (Chart 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) confirmed my argument that the perception of history is one of the key factors in the three journals' writers' interpretation of current politics. Accordingly, as my explanatory hypothesis, I discussed how the two -socialist and nationalist- Eurasian geopolitical traditions have grown closer to each other in recent years, while Islamists have become the opposing pole. As a potential answer, I argued that the political elites of these three ideological camps self-consciously construct these geopolitical discourses. These discourses help them to serve their political aims, but the ensuing historiographical disputes and competing collective memory constructions create clashes among them. To test this hypothesis, I referred to qualitative as well as quantitative data, in addition to a detailed historical process tracing. In this part, data partly confirmed my expectations, while, also providing some potential alternative explanations.

In the fourth chapter, data showing the three journal writers' imagination of Republican history, Ottoman history and each other provided the main data set. These results proved my explanatory expectations in major terms. Expectedly, conservative democrats' approach to Republican history is mostly negative (75%) and rarely positive (9%), while for nationalists and socialists positivity outweighs towards the Republican history. On the other hand, unexpectedly, results about imagination of Ottoman Empire did not reflect my assumptions. For example, while I was expecting conservatives to glorify the empire history, results show more neutrality (50%) than positivity (35%) towards this issue. On the other hand, as another surprising result, nationalists also glorify Ottoman history (62%) even more than the conservatives do. Here nationalists and socialists do not overlap. Socialists' negativity in imagining the Ottoman history is highly obvious (90%).

On the other hand, there is an important note I need to underline about another overlapping imagination of the nationalist and Islamist geopolitical traditions. Even though they are proven to be in polarized positions in the post- Cold War political spectrum, both groups can still be considered Turkist. Meaning, they both are highly interested in the faith and future of Muslim Turks outside of Turkey's borders. They both are willing and eager to take action to intervene to other countries' domestic politics to protect the rights of these outside Turks. Their difference is about their priority in understanding who these Turks are and what unites them. For Islamist, it is mainly religion, while for the nationalists it is primarily ethnicity. Following quotes from conservative democrat *Türkiye Günlüğü* provide evidence about the Turkist character of this group: "Turks' Turkism is not racist: neither was Atatürk's, as he defines Turks by referring to common history, willingness to live together and willingness to create the future together" (Türköne, 1994:95). Also see: "Turkism never became an ethnic project for us, its borders have always been flexible and defined by culture (Alkan, 1994:20). In my study they are in clashing categories also because my criterion of categorization is the imagination of the past, which is an area of contestation for the two groups, as explained before.

Data on how the three journals perceive each other provided some highly interesting results. For example, the overlapping negativity of socialists (93%) and nationalists (75%) about conservative democrats confirm that their enemy perception has something to do in bringing these old enemies together under the umbrella of *ulusalci* Eurasianism. Combined with area charts showing year- based changes in perspectives about each other: we see an increasing negativity in nationalists' perspective about conservative democrats and increasing positivity in socialist' perceptions about nationalists. Both changes can be explained by referring to


presentist theory. Qualitative data, combined with these quantitative results, indicate some alternative explanations. In the background of the reaction of nationalist and socialists against conservative democrats seem to lay the first two groups' negative perception of the West and how they relate conservative democrats to this negative perception. The two *ulusalci* groups basically see conservative democrats as continuation of the West within Turkey. They claim that all the ideas and actions of conservative democrats reflect the West's interests.

5.3. Limitations

As a prior weakness of this study, I was the only person, who conducted the content analysis by creating the coding form as well as reading all articles and filling the coding form accordingly. Afterwards, I created relevant charts and interpreted them via the theoretical tools. Even though before conducting this analysis I referred to the Neuendorf's guide book on the method of content analysis, the fact that I was the only one preparing the whole data set makes this analysis' objectivity weaker. Ideally, there should be more people involved in this research, which should be conducted in a longer investigation.

Another weakness of my analysis is that I did not read every article of the three journals published between 1990 and 2010. Even though I chose the articles I read by referring to the relevant topics, it is still highly possible that I missed some key ideas from those articles I missed reading. This weakness is closely related to the first weakness I just mentioned. As said before, more people and more time working on this project would make it possible to read all articles and come up with a much more detailed data set. Limited space, time and resources caused this limitation.

Finally, the very fact about journal writing that topics of each volume are decided by either the editor or the writers committee, reflect to the charts in a negative way. It is so that, writers of these journals do not write according to daily political developments like the newspaper writers do, they nor write on the topics they are specifically interested in. Rather, they write on what they are told to write. That is why in some years there are no articles about specific issues, while in other years there is much more data available on that specific issue. Keeping this fact in mind, instead of looking at the changes in the data through passing years, it is healthier to follow changes within the years, when data is available. For example, in the chart below, the fact there is no available data between some specific years like 1991-1992, 1996- 1998 and 2000-2002 does not necessarily mean that there is less interest to these topics by the writers of *Teori* between these years. It makes more sense to consider available data in comparison.



5.4. Future Research Recommendations

There are some macro level alternative explanations, which weren't mentioned in this thesis but should be investigated to complete the research. Some

macro level questions which could fill the gaps in this study and the corresponding theoretical perspectives are the following: How does the global political structure affect Turkish Eurasianists' dynamism of change (Neo- Realist perspective), what is the role of leader figures in the changing dynamics among and within the three geopolitical traditions (Liberalist perspective), and how do the institutionalization mechanisms affect these dynamics, in the state as well as civil society level (Historical Institutionalism). The level of this study was micro and meso because of limitations in terms of space, time and available resource.

Another recommendation for future research is that I think the movement of considering Eurasia as an alternative political direction for Turkey is an interesting issue to study academically. Even though there are some studies conducted on this topic, more can be written on this issue from different perspectives and in different contexts. For example, Turkish Eurasianism can be studied in relation to political parties. In my study, I focused on Eurasianists in civil society, which was the formal geopolitics. Studying political parties would be in the sphere of practical geopolitics, which would change the direction of the study dramatically. Representative political parties to be investigated could be MHP for nationalists, CHP for socialists and AKP for conservative democrats. As a more specific research idea, developing post- cold war relations of Putin's Russia and Erdoğan's Turkey could be interesting to investigate in relation to Turkish and Russian Eurasianisms.

Another future research can be on the relationship of the *Ergenekon*¹² trials in Turkey and Turkish Eurasianists. There are already various news and articles reflecting some parallels between this organization and Eurasianism movement in Turkey. Even so that, Russian Eurasianist Alexander Dugin had to declare that he supports Eurasianism, not the Ergenekon. Some leading figures of Turkish Eurasianism, who are also quoted in this study, got arrested during these trials: for ex. Workers Party Leader Doğu Perinçek, Turkish Metal Workers Union Leader Mustafa Özbek and *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper writer Mustafa Balbay.

Critical geopolitics provides helpful tools to investigate the geopolitics tradition in Turkey. Even though there are already some studies on Turkish politics from critical geopolitics perspective, research like Newman's five Israeli imaginations, or Smith's geopolitical categorization of Russia would be interesting to adapt to the Turkish case (See Chapter 2, Tables 2.3. and 2.5.). For this kind of analysis, discourse analysis as well as quantitative data should be collected in a long term, broad investigation process.

Finally, collective memory studies and social representation theories can be applied to the Turkish case via broader studies too. For example, a similar study to Pierre Nora's investigation of “sites of memory” in France could be adapted to the Turkish case to enlighten the relationship between history- memory- social representation and nation building. *Lieux de mémoire* is the magisterial seven-

12 This is a massive, long lasting investigation in Turkey, which aims to look into “deep state” terrorist organization, which wants to create chaos in Turkey so that the military can intervene to politics with a coup d'état. Via this investigation numerous writers, journalists, high end military members and political party members got arrested. Trails as well as arrests continue simultaneously today. For detailed information see Steinworth, Daniel. (2009). Massive Trial in Turkey Provides Look into Deep State. *Spiegel Online International*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,603581,00.html> , Euronews (2008). Ergenekon Trial Begins in Turkey. <http://www.euronews.net/2008/10/20/ergenekon-trial-begins-in-turkey/> , also see Jenkins, Gareth H. (2009). Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation. Silk Road Paper August 2009: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0908Ergenekon.pdf>

volume collaborative project led by Pierre Nora. The publication of a three-volume English-language edition under the title *Realms of Memory* made this highly interesting study accessible to readers of the world 46 of the 132 articles that were published in *Lieux de mémoire* between 1981 and 1992¹³. In his studies, Nora tried to provide almost a dictionary of memory in France. For this aim, he focuses on all symbols of historical representation in the country. A similar research on Turkish collective history would help to understand Turkey's current political spectrum in both descriptive and explanatory ways. Such kind of a data set would also provide more concrete answers for this study's questions.

13 These include the introduction, "Between Memory and History," and the afterword, "The Era of Commemoration," both by Pierre Nora. (1996- 1998) *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (3 Vol.s) See <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/106.3/ah000906.html>

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