CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT AND TURKEY

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Koc University

June 2009

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis compares the evolution of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey from a historical perspective. The cases involve several common features but remain a study of contrast. Particularly, this study is prompted by military interventions of 1952 in Egypt and 1960 in Turkey where political roles of the militaries seemed the most similar. However, parallel patterns of civil military relations produced different results. Egyptian military remained in control of political life whereas in Turkey the military returned political power to elected civilians and increased its control over politics at the same time. This thesis studies the reasons for the establishment of ruler regime in Egypt and guardianship regime in Turkey in the interventions of 1952 and 1960 respectively.

While political role of Egyptian military has become less apparent in the following decades, three more interventions took place in Turkey. Such uneven pattern of civil military relations in both countries defies simplistic explanations. In order to understand the complex and multidimensional nature of military involvement in politics, modernization and professionalization of national armies, historical legacies, political regimes and international conditions with regard to Egyptian and Turkish civil military relations will be examined. While incorporation of various approaches to civil military relations enables different interpretations, the comparative approach facilitates testing some propositions in the literature.

Keywords:

Civil military relations, military intervention, civilian control, Egypt, Turkey.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada Türkiye ve Mısır'da sivil asker ilişkilerinin gelişimi tarihi bir bakış açısı ile karşılaştırılmaktadır. Bir çok ortak noktanın varlığına rağmen, Türkiye ve Mısır'da sivil asker ilişkilerinin gelişiminde zıtlıklar ağır basmaktadır. Bu çalışmada özellikle Mısır'da 1952 yılında Türkiye'de ise 1960 yılında gerçekleşen askeri müdahelelerin benzerliklerinden esinlenilmiştir. Benzer nitelikler taşıyan bu darbeler her iki ülkede farklı sonuçlar doğurmuştur: Mısır'da asker siyasi hayatı yönetmeye devam ederken, Türkiye'de asker siyasi gücü sivillere geri vermiş ancak siyaset üzerindeki kontrolünü de artırmıştır. Bu tezde Mısır'da askeri iktidarın, Türkiye'de ise vesayet rejiminin oluşmasının sebepleri incelenmektedir.

Bundan sonraki dönemlerde Mısır'da askerin siyasi hayattaki görünürlüğü azalırken, Türkiye üç askeri müdaheleye daha sahne olmuştur. Sivil asker ilişkilerindeki değişimin gösterdiği bu farklı tablolar basit açıklamalara izin vermemektedir. Askerin siyasi hayattaki rolünün karmaşık ve çok yönlü yapısını anlamak için Mısır ve Türkiye'de milli orduların modernleşmesi ve profesyonelleşmesi, tarihi rolleri, her iki ülkenin siyasi rejimleri ve uluslararası şartlar incelenmektedir. Sivil asker ilişkilerini açıklayan çeşitli yaklaşımların kullanılması Mısır ve Türkiye'de sivil asker ilişkilerinin farklı yorumlarına imkan verirken, karşılaştırmalı yöntem de literatürdeki bazı önermelerin test edilmesini sağlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler:

Sivil asker ilişkileri, askeri müdahele, ordunun sivil kontrolü, Mısır, Türkiye.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis compares the evolution of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey from a historical perspective. The cases involve a broad range of common features but remain a study of contrast. Particularly, this study is prompted by military interventions of 1952 in Egypt and 1960 in Turkey where political roles of the militaries seemed the most similar. In both countries, military officers were dissatisfied with the policies of civilian rulers ranging from military issues to social and economic conditions. While high commands remained loyal to the civilian regime, middle ranking officers staged the coups. After the interventions, internal struggles between officers favoring different policies emerged. However, parallel patterns of military involvement in politics produced different results. In Egypt, the military established its control over politics under the leadership of Nasser. In Turkey, the military returned political power to elected civilians while increasing their control over politics. This thesis studies the reasons for the establishment of ruler regime in Egypt and guardianship regime in Turkey in the interventions of 1952 and 1960 respectively.

After military interventions of 1952 and 1960, civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey followed different directions with consequences on the political regimes of the countries. In Turkey where the military handed power to elected civilians after the coup of 1960, three more interventions took place in the following decades with destabilizing effects on democracy. In Egypt where military remained in control of political life after 1952, the situation changed by military withdrawal from overt political activity, whereas it has become an integral component for the stability of the

authoritarian regime. Studying these developments of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey after the interventions of 1952 and 1960, this thesis will compare the course from ruler regime towards civilian rule with military partnership in Egypt and from guardianship regime to civilian rule with military influence in Turkey.

In comparing the cases of Egypt and Turkey, first, a comprehensive picture of civil military relations will be presented through examination of the historical legacies regarding the role of the military in politics. In this respect, modernization and professionalization of the militaries, their roles in the modernization of the countries and nation building, the influence of colonialism and military ideologies will be examined.

Sharing a common history within the Ottoman Empire, the modernization of the militaries and their influence for the overall modernization of the countries followed similar paths. Establishment of a modern military in Egypt took place in the nineteenth century under Muhammad Ali. The strength of the military was crucial to the security of his rule. To have a powerful military, Muhammad Ali promoted European techniques in training of officers and conduct of warfare. He initiated a series of reforms in educational, technological, administrative and economic life of Egypt in order to promote the strength of the army. The situation was similar in the Ottoman Empire. The sultans inspired by the success of Muhammad Ali's policies, undertook similar reforms. In both countries, the militaries became spearheads of the development and modernization. As military officers gained more professional characteristics, their political activities became more salient.

While prominent role of the military in the politics of the Ottoman Empire continued into the 20th century, the power of the Egyptian army was curtailed by

British intervention. The change in the course of history was visible in military coups within the Ottoman Empire, leading role of the military in the War of Independence and in the establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Atatürk. While Turkish military became the leader of nationalism, under colonial rule, nationalism in the Egyptian army developed later. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk established democracy and Westernization as objectives, cultivated an attitude of non-interventionism in the military while appointing the military as the vanguard of Republic. In Egypt, there was not such a legacy of non-interventionism. Historical analysis will provide information on the course of events in both countries and their repercussions in the attitudes of officer corps towards politics.

Following the overview of historical background, there will be a closer examination of the features of pre-coup periods, the period of military rule when decisions to withdraw or remain in power were taken, and further developments in civil military relations. In doing so, internal and international context of Egypt and Turkey will be examined according to their influence on civil military relations. With respect to internal context of countries, political regimes of the countries and features of their military establishments will be studied. For political regimes of countries, patrimonialism in Egypt and multiparty democracy in Turkey, internal order and perceived legitimacy of the political system or of prominent actors, and prevalent social and economic conditions will be studied in terms of their influence on civil military relations. As features of militaries of Egypt and Turkey, professionalization and institutionalization of militaries, their corporate interests such as concerns for budgetary allocations or institutional autonomy, and military ideologies will be

analyzed. For international context, the influence of colonialism and imperialism, interwar era, Cold War, Palestine War, 1967 and 1973 will be examined with respect to their influence on the development of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey. The comparison of cases will enable a better understanding of the relative weight of those different factors in the evolution of civil military relations in both countries and also prevent simplistic explanations that would obscure complex nature of the topic.

The analysis of each case will be based on secondary sources regarding the development of civil military relations from the nineteenth century to the contemporary period. Various approaches from the literature of civil military relations will be incorporated into the evaluation of historical developments in Egypt and Turkey, according to their relevance to the experiences of each country and to the comparison. These concepts from theories of civil military relations would enable a better understanding of the complex and multidimensional nature of the cases on the one hand, and the variety of cases would serve as a test for some propositions of those theories, on the other.

Derived from the literature on civil military relations, the basic approach that will be used in this thesis is addressing civil military relations in terms of a continuum between military intervention in domestic politics and civilian control over military (Welch, 1976a). Seeing it as a continuum will help to grasp dynamic nature of civil military relations since it is subject to many influences including historical, internal and international factors and has undergone many changes in terms of civil military balance both in Egypt and Turkey. Military intervention in domestic politics is defined as "the armed forces' substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities" (Finer, 1988: 23). Civilian control

emerges as the opposite of military intervention and can only be understood with reference to the reasons and the means of military intervention. It should also be noted that, like wide range of issues from military funding to the definition of national security, civil military relations also cover different levels of interactions between civilians and the military. These levels of interactions can be thought as the relations between the military and society, between military high command and social elites, and between military high command and political leaders (Huntington, 1972: 487). Approaching civil military relations as a continuum also helps to overcome these complexities, because as the basis of analysis, the definition of military intervention requires the focus to be on the relations between military and civilian leaders. Other levels of interaction will be incorporated into the discussions in cases where they influence the position of civil military relations on the scale of military intervention and civilian control.

The remainder of the thesis will provide information about the literature, historical developments of civil military relations in the countries and comparison of the cases. Chapter 2 introduces theories of civil military relations according to their relevance to the Egyptian and Turkish cases. Different approaches on the reasons of military interventions, varying degrees and features of military rule, the process of military withdrawal and conditions for civilian control will be covered. Concepts like military professionalism, corporate interests, politicization, and political situations influencing prospects of military intervention will be underlined.

Chapter 3 focuses on the evolution of civil military relations in Egypt. It examines the establishment of modern Egyptian military by Muhammad Ali, professionalization of Egyptian officer corps under his successors and beginnings of

political activism, the period of non-interference under British rule, and reinstatement of Egyptian officers into political prominence. It analyzes 1952 Revolution and the establishment of military ruler regime in Egypt by Nasser. The chapter continues with the process of military disengagement after the defeat of 1967, which was undertaken by Nasser and maintained by Sadat, turning the system into a civilian rule with military partnership rather than a military rule with civilian assistance. It examines how these rulers managed to distance military from politics and the attitude of the military officers in the process. It ends with an evaluation of civil military relations under Mubarak, illustrating the consolidation of civilian rule and military partnership.

Chapter 4 examines the development of civil military relations in Turkey. It begins with the role of the military in the Ottoman history, reforms for its modernization and professionalization of officers, as well as the effects of those reforms in increasing political activism of officers, which culminated in interventions of 1876 and 1908. The role of the military in the War of Independence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic and its distance from politics under Atatürk will be studied as important factors determining officer corps' political attitudes. The chapter will continue with the conditions that brought first coup of the Republic in 1960 and the establishment of a guardian regime where the military took over political control and then relinquished it to civilians. Then, motivations of military officers for another intervention after return to civilian politics will be examined. 1971 memorandum will be studied with reference to features of a moderator regime which is defined as military intervention through veto powers or threats of coups without taking over political control. The chapter will go on to examine 1980 coup as

another guardian regime and study the establishment of military prerogatives in order to control politics of the country, followed by the process of military disengagement.

Chapter 5 presents a summary of substantive and theoretical conclusions of the previous chapters with a comparative approach. It will be stated that the differences in historical legacies of militaries influenced their stances towards politics. Historical legacy has provided Turkish military with more motivation to intervene into politics and to withdraw rapidly afterwards, contributing to instable civil military relations. The differences in the results of 1952 and 1960 military interventions in Egypt and Turkey are also explained by differences in public and military support for civilian politicians, and threat of war with Israel in Egyptian international environment. It compares consequences of politicization of the military, which destabilized the civilian regime in Turkey and caused military defeat in Egypt. This defeat provided opportunity for distancing military from politics in Egypt. The process of military disengagement continued under the rule of Sadat. Afterwards, overwhelming pattern in Egyptian military showed that the military opposition emerged in cases of infringements of its corporate interests. In Turkey, on the other hand, military concerns exceed the problems of budgetary allocations or autonomy of the military. While the Egyptian military remained supportive of rulers despite the problems of legitimacy or public unrest, in Turkey the military deposed civilian governments two more times on the basis of such considerations. The difference is attributed to different historical legacies and the authoritarian regime in Egypt and democracy in Turkey. It is concluded that cooptation of Egyptian military officers through economic benefits and appointment on the basis of loyalties as well as the identification of the stability of the regime with the power of the authoritarian ruler

guarantees the continuation of the relationship between civilian leaders and military in the form of civilian rule with military partnership. In Turkey, military loyalties are to the integrity, and secular, and democratic tenets of the state rather than particular leaders of parties. While pattern of civil military relations itself had adverse effects on democracy, military distrust to politicians prevents establishment of consensus on the proper form of civil military relations. Covering conditions which brought 1997 intervention when government was disposed by threats of coup as in the case of 1971 and more recent developments, post-script suggests that European Union's requirement of standard principles for Turkish membership can serve to stabilize civil military relations in Turkey.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Concentrating on the questions of civilian control in North America and Western Europe in the beginning, the literature on civil military relations expanded its scope and shifted its focus in response to the developments in the world. While initial questions were about the development of military profession and the management of the relations between those professionals and politicians in the context of Cold War, the wave of military interventions in the Third World became the focus of attention in the 1960s. Various theoretical positions were developed on the causes of intervention covering whole range of issues from professionalism of officer corps to the features of supplanted regimes and their societies. Functions of military interventions, whether they would promote or inhibit political and economic development became an issue of discussion. As civilian rule began to replace military regimes in many countries, scholars have produced literature on the causes and processes of military disengagement from politics. Then, a revival of interest in the issues of civilian supremacy and democratic control of the armed forces arose with the end of the Soviet Union, emergence of post- Cold War democracies and spread of democratic norms. As a result, a rich literature covering various aspects of civil military relations emerged. This chapter will provide an overview of main studies in the area. Early scholarly works will be the subject of more comprehensive analysis due to their contributions on the analytical framework of the field, introducing terms and ideas that largely drew the boundaries of future debates.

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, first published in 1957, has been accepted as one of the seminal works on civil military relations. He defines the

area of military responsibility as the external defense of the state, and notes that there is a tension between military security and civilian control of the military. Finding an equilibrium where both military security and civilian control are maximized depends on the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.

Huntington (1985: 2) states that the tension between military security and civilian control comes from the interaction of two imperatives. *Functional imperative* arises from threats to the security of the society. *Societal imperative* stems from social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant in the society. According to Huntington, as components of social imperative, American constitutional system and liberal anti-military ideology conflict with the functional imperative of security against external threats. Thus, there is a necessity to achieve a balance between the two imperatives, leading Huntington (1985: 3) to focus on the relation of officer corps as "the active directing force of the military" to the state as "the active directing element of the society".

Central to the relation between officer corps and the state is the rise of military professionalism. Beginning from early 1800s, with new technologies and larger armies, it became impossible to be an expert in external military defense, and qualified in politics or maintenance of internal order at the same time. This led to the differentiation of the functions of officer corps from that of the politician and policeman. Meanwhile, military also gained an increasingly autonomous status within the state bureaucracy. As a result, officer corps grew into a professional body qualified by three main attributes. First one is *expertise* on the management of violence. This requires considerable training and experience. Second attribute of the officer corps is *responsibility* to utilize its expertise for the benefit of society. Third

one is *esprit de corps,* or corporateness, referring to the officer corps' feeling of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group different from society. This resulted from complex vocational institutions molding the officer corps into an autonomous unit as well as military societies, associations, schools, journals, customs and traditions. Physically and socially an officer corps probably has fewer non-professional contacts than most other professional men (Huntington, 1985: 7-20).

Related to military professionalism, Huntington (1985: 59-62) elaborates on the notion of military ethic. He states that military ethic is shaped by functional imperatives rather than societal ones. Thus, Huntington (1985: 62) claims, it can serve as a standard to judge professionalism of any officer corps anywhere. Among the many, political neutrality seems to be the most relevant feature of military ethic to the relations of professional officer corps and the state. Political neutrality stems from functional imperatives since participation in politics weakens the professionalism of military officers, decreases their competence in military field, and creates divisions in the military. Moreover, politics exceeds the capacity of officers due to the limits of their expertise and legitimacy in the political sphere. Thus, it is not the military but the statesmen who make final decisions. The role of the military is the representation of the claims of military security, advise on the implications of alternative courses of action from the military view, and execution of state decision even if it is opposite of the military judgment (Huntington, 1985:70-72).

However, for the military to remain professional and politically neutral, the autonomy of the military in its sphere of action should be recognized. Huntington (1985: 80) introduces two forms of civilian control, which differ according to this criterion. *Subjective civilian control* denies an independent military sphere. It operates

by maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. Since there would be many civilian groups with different characters and conflicting interests, it also involves maximization of the power of particular civilian groups. Historically, these groups were particular governmental institutions, social classes and constitutional forms (Huntington, 1985: 80-83).

Objective civilian control rests on the recognition of autonomous military professionalism. Civilian control is achieved through endeavors to professionalize the military, which politically neutralize armed forces. Interference in military affairs decreases the professionalism, so it also undermines objective civilian control. Objective civilian control weakens the military only politically, it does not decrease its professional capacities. Huntington (1985: 84) states that "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state". Thus, objective civilian control also maximizes the possibility of achieving military security. However, the tendency of many civilian groups to see civilian control in subjective terms and to insist on the subordination of officer corps to their interests hinders the achievement of objective civilian control. Thus, high level of objective civilian control was not widespread even among the modern western societies (Huntington, 1985: 83-85).

Huntington's argument is strong in explaining reasons for military non-intervention. Because political activities decrease military effectiveness, it is only natural that as militaries professionalize they will be less politically involved. However, there can also be reasons for military intervention which need to be addressed. It is at this point that Huntington's argument loses some of its persuasiveness. What Huntington says regarding civilian tendency to draw military

into politics is quite important, but military reasons to be drawn into politics are overlooked in this argument.

S.E. Finer provided an alternative view of civil military relations in his book, *The Man on the Horseback*, first published in 1962. Different from Huntington who establishes his arguments on the patterns of civil military relations in the West, Finer's main focus is those countries where governments have been subjected to the interference of their militaries. He begins with the assertion that "instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight, the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming." (1988: 4). Then, he explains those political advantages of the military: a marked superiority in organization with its cohesive and hierarchical structure, a highly emotionalized symbolic status and prestige in society, and a monopoly of arms (Finer, 1988: 5).

On the other hand, the military also has two main political weaknesses which prevent officers from ruling without civilian collaboration, and openly in their own name unless there are exceptional cases or short time periods. First one is the lack of technical ability on the part of armed forces to administer the society. This is the reason why even in those states described as military dictatorships, the ruling body does not consist exclusively of military men. Moreover, as societies get more complicated, technical skills of the military officers lag further behind (Finer, 1988: 12-14).

Second weakness is the lack of legitimacy in the armed forces to rule. Rule by force or threat of force alone is not enough. The government also has to have

authority and wide recognition that it is lawful and rightful. This is more than a moral standing since any claim to rule arising from superior force invites challengers. Any contender assuming enough strength can challenge the rule. This is why a military coup is generally followed by a succession of further coups. Thus, governments coming to power by force have to take measures against further coups or establish their claim to power by something other than their successful seizure of power in the first place. They need to legitimize themselves in order to "slam the door of morality in its challengers' faces." (Finer, 1988: 16). Until this is done, they are outlaw, and after this is done, they are entitled to hunt down other challengers as rebels or mutineers. Another reason for the need of legitimacy is the lack of efficiency in achieving obedience by mere use or threat of force. Thus, when military breaks the order, it has to claim moral authority. Whether or to what extent people recognize or resist such claims determines the form of military intervention (Finer, 1988: 14-19).

After stating advantages and disadvantages of the military in the political realm, Finer goes on to examine motives hindering or bringing military intervention in politics defined as "the armed forces' substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities." (1988: 23). He begins with examining the role of professionalism. Finer (1988: 21) criticizes Huntington for employing a strict definition of professionalism which rejects political involvement of the officer corps. He refutes Huntington's argument by stating that there have been cases of military intervention by highly professionalized officers. Finer (1988: 22) defines the whole weakness of Huntington's thesis as being essentialist, built upon such strict definition of professionalism and denying professionalism of those officers who act inconsistently with the concept.

Finer (1988: 22-24) argues that in reality the very nature of professionalism often pushes the military into collision with the civilian rulers. Three reasons were given for the argument. First, military consciousness as a profession may cause officers to see themselves as the servants of the state, a permanent entity, rather than that of the government, which is in power only temporarily. This distinction leads them to invent their own notion of the national interest. The substitution of this military definition of national interest is what Finer defines as military intervention. Second, as specialists in their field, military officers may feel that they are the only ones with competence to judge on the size, organization, equipment and recruitment of the military. Moreover, they can begin to consider economic and social aspects of politics as their civilian base, where they draw their strength as materials and manpower. The development of such views as a result of purely professional considerations leads the military to establish itself as an autonomous body. Third, because professional army sees itself as the nation's guardians against foreign enemies, it may be reluctant to act against fellow nationals so as to coerce government's domestic opponents. These professional motivations would lead the military officers to intervene in the political sphere.

Hence, while professionalism may inhibit military desire to intervene, it sometimes drives military into intervention. Some other considerations may also discourage military intervention. These can be summarized as fear for the fighting capacity of the armed forces, of a civil war which would cause fighting within the armed forces, and of their future as any kind of force. However, the most important factor is the armed forces' belief in the principle of civilian supremacy (Finer, 1988: 22-28).

After outlining main restraints on military intervention, Finer (1988: 28-53) examines motives for the military to intervene. The mission of the soldiers as savers of their countries constitutes a significant motive. While every section in political life puts emphasis on national interest, it is easier and more plausible for military because it has a deliberate purpose of defending the state and prestige as a symbol of independence and sovereignty. By the nature of the task, military officers are indoctrinated with nationalism. Combination of this with its power provides the basis for the belief of the military in its duty to save the nation. All armed forces are politicized more or less because of their unique identification with national interest. Neither the form nor the substance of their custodianship role is uniform. However, the pretext of national interest is often hypocritical. There are complex motivations behind each particular case of military intervention in politics. The most general motives are referred as class interest, regional interest, the corporate self interest of the armed forces mainly resulting from professionalism, and the motive of individual self interest.

Furthermore, Finer (1988: 54-64) examines self esteem of the army, the sense of grievances, frustration and humiliation as important elements of military tendency to intervene. Conditions which increase dependency of the civilians on the military or enhance popularity of the military create opportunities for military intervention.

On the other hand, as stated before, when military breaks the order, it has to claim moral authority. Finer (1988: 78) argues that to what extent people recognize or resist such claims depends on the degree of public attachment to the civilian institutions. He equates political culture to the level of this attachment. The level of political culture is determined in turn by the strength of civilian associations and

parties, the public approval of the procedures for the transfer of power, and the recognition of the sovereign authority. Finer (1988: 79-80) argues that, when the political culture of a society is high, military intervention in politics will be weak and vice versa.

Accordingly, Finer (1988: 77-78) defines four levels of military intervention in politics. First, the *influence* of the military is achieved by appealing to the reasons and emotions of the civilian authorities. In this type, military authorities act like other elements in the bureaucracy. This is legal type of intervention and consistent with the supremacy of civilian power. Second, in the level of *pressures or 'blackmail',* the military tries to convince civilian power through threat of sanction. In these two levels, the power of the military is exercised behind the scenes, through the civil authorities. Third level is *displacement* where one cabinet is removed and replaced by another. Fourth is the level of *supplantment*, where the military removes the civilian regime, and establishes itself as the ruling body. This is the most complete level of intervention. Finer (1988: 151) classifies the resultant types of regimes as *indirect-limited, indirect-complete, dual, direct, and direct-quasi civilianized military* rule.

Finer questions Huntington's argument on military professionalism and political involvement, and rightly states that there are cases where professional officers carry out interventions. The influence of professionalization in Egyptian and Turkish militaries on political activities will be examined in next chapters. In general, Finer explains what Huntington does not mention, military reasons for intervention as well its restraints in doing so. Especially, identification of military with the nation and its need for legitimacy are quite important points. However, Finer's statement that the most important factor that would prevent military from political activity is the belief

for civilian supremacy needs further explanation because he does not give reasons why military officers should have such a belief in the first place.

In his book, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Janowitz (1964:1) questions "What characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?" By the concept of new nations he refers to those nations which achieved their independence or entered to the process of modernization recently. In search of an answer, Janowitz concentrates on the internal organization of the military which conditions it political capacities.

Janowitz's analysis of political capacity of militaries has some resemblance with that of Finer. He states that capacity of the military establishment to intervene in domestic politics of new nations comes from its control over instruments of violence, ethics of public service, national identification and degree of internal coherence. Its skill structure which combines experiences in managerial tasks and a heroic posture explains the greater initial political capacity of the military relative to other civilian groups. On the other hand, authoritarian structure of the military limits the leadership skills of the officer corps in bargaining and public communication. Social recruitment is also significant in Janowitz's argument. In the new nations, the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower classes. Their history is marked with an absence of domination by feudal aristocratic and upper class personnel which used to be a significant feature of Western European armies. As a result, they do not have a strong allegiance to an integrated upper class as the political leader. In addition, military elite groups tend to bring with them strong nationalist and sometimes puritanical attitudes. They accept extensive government control of economic and social change, and have a deep distrust of, even hostility towards,

organized politics and political leaders. The actual intervention of the military into politics generally follows the collapse of efforts to create democratic institutions (Janowitz, 1964: 27-29).

Janowitz (1964) questions political neutrality of the military in the context of democracy. Due to its distrust of politics, the military in new nations can hardly be neutral. Frequently, its political neutrality disguises opposition to democratic principles. Hence, as opposed to Huntington, Janowitz argues that indoctrinating the military with the ideal of political neutrality is dangerous. Instead, the military needs to be committed to the principles of democracy even though it remains neutral in its approach to political parties. "It must have a political orientation and, in fact, a political education similar to that of the citizenry at large- one that enables it to act within the broad consensus of the polity." (Janowitz, 1964: 102).

While Janowitz's (1964) explanation of military intervention largely depends on factors internal to military establishment, he also acknowledges external causes. He pays special attention to the influence of colonial period which most of those new nations had experienced. He differentiates two types of military establishment. *Designed militarism* refers to the military intentions to intervene in domestic politics, and to follow expansionist foreign policies. In the *reactive militarism,* the political behavior of the military is shaped by the weakness of civilian institutions as well as pressures of civilian groups to win the support of the military, and enlarge its role. Colonial powers in general avoided the establishment of militaries with characteristics of designed militarism. Hence, the prevalence of political involvement of the militaries in most of the new nation's results from the weakness of civilian institutions

and the activities of civilian groups to establish what Huntington refers as subjective civilian control.

Janowitz statements about political involvement of the military and democracy are quite significant. It is true that many times, military interventions follow the collapse of democratic attempts. His argument regarding puritanical values of military personnel and distrust for politicians and subsequent need for military officers to be committed democratic principles and to receive political education like any other citizen are the most important aspects of his work. In this way, what Finer states as the most important factor to prevent military from political activity, i.e. belief in civilian supremacy, can be achieved.

Huntington (1968) in *Political Order and Changing Societies* disagrees with explanations of military intervention in politics by reference to internal structure of the military or social backgrounds of the officers. He (1968: 194) argues that military interventions results from "the general politicization of social forces and institutions". He compares *civic societies*, those with a high level of institutionalization and a low level of participation, with *praetorian societies*, which have a low level of institutionalization and high level of political participation. In civic societies there is an orderly political system and stable civil military relations are part of it. On the other hand, in praetorian societies, absence of accepted procedures result in a situation where "wealthy bribe, student riot, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup" (Huntington, 1968: 196). However, if internal structure of the military does not have a role in military intervention, then neither does its professionalism. While it seems true that military interventions take place in situations described above rather than societies where everything is in order, calling high institutionalization and low

participation as civic societies with stable civil military relations cause to overlook potential differences between such cases. The case of authoritarian regimes with some strong institutions and low participation, and democratic Western regimes are quite different in terms of existing civil military balance in those stable civil military relations.

Perlmutter (1969: 383) defines praetorian state as a state "in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system." Praetorianism has endured in all historical periods, although in different forms. Perlmutter (1977: 90-94), distinguishes modern praetorianism from historical praetorianism. In historical praetorianism, military intervention in politics did not challenge the legitimacy of the authority. Military represented and defended the legitimacy of the authority in the state. The authority relationship between military establishment and political order had a traditional orientation. In modern praetorianism, military challenges legitimacy and offers a new kind of authority. For Perlmutter (1969), there are two main reasons for the development of modern praetorianism: civil institutions' lack of legitimacy and their permissive position for military domination. There are several conditions which contribute to praetorianism, such as low degree of social cohesion, fratricidal classes, social polarity, lack of support for political structures, weak political parties and frequent civilian intervention in the military.

Perlmutter's differentiation of modern and historical praetorianism will be relevant in examination of modernization of Egyptian and Turkish militaries. Like Huntington, Perlmutter also explains military intervention mainly through social conditions, an approach which overlooks to the conditions internal to the military.

Nordlinger (1977: 22) states that main motivation behind most military interventions is the preservation of military corporate interests. These interests include adequate budgetary support, autonomy in the internal affairs, absence of functional rivals and survival of the military. Nordlinger also incorporates the influence of politicization of lower classes, performance failures and loss of legitimacy of governments in his explanation of military intervention. He defines intervention at three levels as undertaken by *moderators, guardians, and rulers.*

Moderators do not take governmental control, yet exercise number of veto powers in a range of political issues and governmental decisions. They are highly politicized and put pressure on governments sometimes with explicit threats of coup. Their objectives are limited, i.e. preserving the status quo, ensuring political order and stability, preventing changes in distribution of resources. They may stage displacement coups and replace the existing government with another more acceptable to the military.

The objectives of *guardians* are similar to that of moderators, mainly keeping the status quo. They differ in the method, controlling the government themselves for a period of two to four years. This happens only after military officers conclude that there is no alternative way. All military regimes are authoritarian in their restriction of political rights, liberties and competition.

Rulers on the other hand have far reaching intentions in changing economic, political and social life. The scope of aims necessitates the dominance of army in the regime for an indefinite period of time. Making these classifications, Nordlinger (1977: 28) accepts that this is an oversimplification, and in reality, civilian and military regimes include various combinations of civilian and military control.

Nordlinger is right in accepting the case of oversimplification, but his classifications are also useful in comparing different levels of military interventions. Thus, while Welch's approach that will be mentioned in the next paragraphs offers more comprehensive understanding of civil military relations, Nordlinger's terminology has been widely used and still useful in the study of civil military relations.

Claude Welch (1976a: 1) states that civilian control is a *set of relationships* which is difficult to define, and which changes over time. He argues that armed forces cannot be excluded from politics given its organization, identity, autonomy and specialization. Thus, political role of the military is "a question not of *whether,* but of *how much* and *what kind."*(Welch, 1976a: 2). Consequently, civilian control is also a matter of degree and the relationship between civilians and the military is a continuum which is schematized (Welch, 1976a: 3) as:

Military Influence (civilian control)	—	Military Participation	——	Military Control (with partners)	—	Military Control (without partners)

Military influence in politics is considered to be the normal form of civilian control. Members of the military are not excluded from politics, but their involvement is limited to those holding upper ranking positions. The boundaries between the civilian and the military are clear and not subject to challenges by the officers. Political influence is carried out through regular and accepted means. The interaction between the civilian and the military takes place at the top ranks of military hierarchy. Military provides advice, the influence of which depends on its specialized knowledge and responsibilities rather than coercive force.

Military participation is different from military influence in degree. Political decisions are made by civilians and military together. Armed forces may have an extensive area of policy autonomy secured by legislative enactments. The lobbying activities of the military may include light tones of pressures or "blackmail" as Finer (1988) suggested. Military participation can happen in two ways. In the first one, greater military involvement in politics is demanded by politicians who want to increase their share of power. Leaders of the military may be co-opted to provide stability and support for a weak regime. In the second one, the decisions of the civilian leaders may be liable to military veto. Civilian perception of potential veto or even displacement from office determines the difference between military participation and influence.

In *military control* of politics, government can no longer oversee the military. It is the military who decide basic issues. In the cases where the military do not have a consensus on subordination to government or its legitimacy, infringements on what they consider as their prerogatives would easily bring intervention. The "displacement" or "supplantment" in Finer's (1988) terms is what differentiates military control from military participation. Military control can be carried out in two ways. When military governs through partnership with civilians, they remain largely behind the scenes or it can rule directly by drawing the leaders from within the ranks of the military. In the latter, civilians are utilized in minor and subordinate positions.

Welch (1976b: 313-314) proposes two strategies of civilian control. First is through mutual restraint of officers and politicians. It concentrates on the military and keeps it within relatively narrow set of responsibilities. To do this, the boundaries between civilian and military should be established and, as Huntington (1985) argues,

the military should be provided with institutional autonomy. The focus of the military should be directed internationally in order to remove its involvement in internal problems. Civilian leaders should emphasize disengagement from active political roles of the military figures. Service to the government should be stressed rather than service to the nation. Second is through enhancing governmental legitimacy and effectiveness.

Conditions of military disengagement depend on the reasons of the military intervention at first place. In other words, "the factors and trends in any particular society that led to military intervention have to be eliminated and reversed if that society ever hopes to achieve military withdrawal from politics" (Maniruzzaman, 1987: 29). As military intervention is explained either by internal features of the military such as professionalism and corporate interests; by conditions external to it such as political culture of the society; or by a combination of both, scholars of military disengagement develop their analysis on some internal and external causes. The causes of disengagement internal to the military are generally explained by the decrease in military prestige and internal cohesion. Political involvement generally creates cleavages in the military organization, sometimes leading counter coups. This situation makes those regimes unstable and decreases military capacities in fulfilling their real responsibility which is the defense of the country. Externally, when political elites resolve their conflicts and present an alternative to military rule, which most often fails to address complex problems of their societies, and when popular demand for return of civilian rule prevails, armed forces withdraw from politics (Danopoulos, 1992).

However, whether military disengagement leads to civilian supremacy or conditions for civilian supremacy is another question. In his study on Brazil, Alfred Stepan (1988) points out how armed forces through various forms of *reserved domains* maintain their influence on the politics of their countries after their withdrawal. Different civil military relations emerge according to combination of varying level of military prerogatives. Stepan explains military prerogatives as

> areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society (1988: 93).

The concepts of disengagement and reserved domains are useful in terms of understanding the process after military interventions take place, and will be used in the analysis of Egyptian and Turkish civil military relations.

While the theories of military intervention and disengagement enlightened various aspects of civil military relations, the scope of theories on civilian control of the military remained relatively narrow. This is due to the situation that, in general, successful civilian control over the military was confined to Western world where separation of political and military spheres and the principle of civilian supremacy seem to be established. End of the Cold War changed that situation. The establishment of civilian control, or democratic control over the militaries in emerging democracies became the focus of attention. Some of the studies also addressed questions regarding the influence of changing threat environment and alterations in the structure of military on the civil military relations.

Rebecca Schiff (1995) introduces a theory of concordance that calls for a cooperative and integrated relationship between the military, political elites, and citizenry. Schiff criticizes dominant approaches to civilian control because of their emphasis on the separation of political and military institutions, arguing that this reflects the experience of the United States and may be inapplicable to other nations due to historical and cultural differences. Moreover, institutional emphasis on those theories tend to ignore the role of culture, which includes the values, attitudes, and symbols informing the nation's view of the role of the military as well as the view of the military itself.

Concordance theory underlines dialogue, accommodation and shared values and objectives; and encourages cooperation among the military, political elites and society. If they can agree on four indicators, then the likelihood of domestic military intervention is low. These indicators are the composition of the officer corps, political decision making process, recruitment method, and military style.

Schiff's theory of concordance seems more predictive than explanatory, since it suggests four topics to be agreed upon by the military, political elites and society as indicators of military intervention but does not mention why such agreement would take place. Moreover, there is no reason for intervention as long as civil and military authorities agree on most important topics, but more essential question is what happens when they disagree, how those disagreements are solved, through military intervention or military subordination to civilian authority. That is why Schiff's theory of concordance, although predictive, is not as useful as other theories in explaining civil military relations.

Douglas Bland (1999) proposes the theory of shared responsibility or regime theory of civil military relations. Bland asserts that, in every state, civilian leaders and military officers share responsibility of civilian control of the military through sharing the responsibility of control. Civilian leaders are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military officers for others. This relation is based on "a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge" (Bland, 1999: 10). Differences between civil military relations stems from the differences in regime types.

Similar to Schiff, Bland also proposes an overarching theory meant to be instrumental in understanding of civil military relations in any country. However, like Schiff's theory of concordance, Bland explanation of different regimes where actors' expectations converge does not explain situations when actors' expectations do not converge. Different regime types emerge when actors' expectations converge on different principles, norms and decision making procedures, but when they do not converge, it can be said that unstable civil military relations emerge.

Desch (1999) focuses on the influence of international environment on civilian control of the military. He challenges Harold Lasswell's (1941) argument that the military is harder to control in a challenging international threat environment, but easier to control in a relatively benign international environment. Desch (1999) proposes that international factors (external threats) shape the agenda of the military so that their focus shifts to the external conditions. This in turn, promotes civilian control. On the other hand, absence of external threats diverts countries focus of attention to internal politics, making civilian control difficult. These two stances

regarding the influence of international threat environments will be tested by examination of the development of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey.

Besides the literate on civil military relations in general, many scholars have also studied civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey. In Egypt, establishment of modern military and its influence on Egypt has been studied by a number of scholars. While Afaf Lutfi Sayyid el Marsot (1984) takes the position that formation of modern military in Egypt helped establishment of Egyptian national identity, Khalid Fahmy (1997, 1998a,1998b) questions this argument. Analyzing the development of modern military in Egypt, and attitudes of Egyptians toward military duty at the time of Muhammad Ali, Fahmy argues that modernization of military in Egypt did not bring national identities at the beginning. Vatikiotis (1961) studies 1952 Revolution extensively with regard to military history in Egypt and internal conditions of the country that brought 1952 Revolution. Amos Perlmutter (1974) focuses on praetorian nature of Nasser's Egypt and role of military officers as middle class. Raymond Hinnebusch (1988) studies economic, social and international developments under Sadat rule and argues that during the period military became an instrument of established interests. Nazih Ayubi (1991) also underlines increasing economic presence of Egyptian military while Anthony McDermott (1988) stresses that military is an integral part of political regime in Egypt since no civilian government without military support can assume power.

Literature of civil military relations in Turkey also starts from studies on the Ottoman Empire. Halil İnalcık (1980), Stanford Shaw (1965-1966) and Avigdor Levy (1971) wrote about the changes in the military and the Ottoman state. William Hale (1988) and George Harris (1988) also emphasized historical developments in their

analysis of civil military relations in Turkey. Harris (1988) argued that the period of Young Turks was a mixed experience for military officers, a situation where middle officers came to power disrupting the hierarchy, but also their act against constitutional authority was for the welfare of the people. Hale (1988) stated that the legacy of Atatürk was also an ambiguous one for military officers since it gave the military the guardianship of the Republic against external and internal threats but also distanced it from political activities. Hale (1988) considered the international conditions, Turkish membership in the NATO and relations with the European Community, as an unacknowledged factor in the choice of military to return power to the civilians. He also emphasized the learning process of military underlining how in each intervention the mistakes of the previous were tried to be avoided. Dankwart A. Rustow (1980) also analyzed the role of Turkish military in politics historically. He underlined the role of military in political modernization of Turkey. According to Rustow, the differences between tradition and modernity led to the upheavals of 1950s, which led the military to assume the obligation of dealing with problems of the cultural change.

Kemal Karpat (1988) explained military interventions in Turkey in terms of changes in the ruling coalition in the country. He stated that professional concerns of the military were not strong enough to engender a coup in 1960, but it was a result of party politics. Ahmet Evin (1988) stated that military interventions in Turkey occurred as a response to intra-elite conflict. According to Evin, the aim of the interventions was not to establish order in the country but to reduce the vulnerability of the state due to fragmentation in the political elite.

Heper (1992) also stressed the role of the state in his studies. He explained that strong state tradition in Turkey prevented the authoritarian path taken by some other countries after crisis. In Turkey, strong state preserved the legitimacy of the regime which prevented complete breakdown of the system in cases of crisis. Moreover, democracy was regarded as an end in itself by state elites, including military, who blame politicians and the leaders of associational interest groups for crises (Heper, 1992: 158). Hence, strong state tradition prevented complete breakdown of democracy in Turkey, but the nature of the state prevented Turkish democracy finding political balance, since state elites entered into the scene when they considered that political parties endangered democracy and the state. Heper (2005) stated that over the years military become less enthusiastic in intervening into politics and its distance from politics is increased in the prospect of EU membership.

Özbudun mainly focused on the institutional aspects of civil military relations in Turkey. He explained how military ensured its continued role in politics through establishment of certain reserved domains after the coup of 1980 (Özbudun, 2000). In another work, Özbudun and Yazıcı (2004) stated that through series of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, significant improvements were achieved in civil military relations.

Demirel (2004) who considers civil military relations as power relations which would involve confrontation and tension on contentious issues was less optimistic. According to him, because of the Turkish army's self perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of state, it cannot accept civilian supremacy. On the other hand, feeling a sense of powerlessness vis-a-vis the military, civilians proved to be hesitant to question the prevailing power configuration. The solution is increased legitimacy of the civilians. He states that, without a supportive constituency at the societal level, the

decreases in the military weight in the political life would not be long lasting (2004:144). Even if civilians achieve higher degrees of legitimacy, smooth relations cannot be guaranteed due to the nature of the civil military relations as power relations.

Cizre (1997) underlines issues of military autonomy and the definition of national security in the civil military relations of Turkey. She states that in addition to institutional autonomy, Turkish military has high degree of political autonomy, i.e. military defiance of civilian control (Cizre, 1997: 152). She states that although in different degrees, political power in Turkey "has always resided in the barrel of a gun" (Cizre, 1999: 156) One of the main issues regarding the political role of the military is its definition of national security. Due to military concept of national security which includes both internal and external threats and since what qualifies as an internal threat is also defined by military, military was able to insert national security concerns into public policy (Cizre and Çınar, 2003). Cizre (2004) states that change in civil military relations in Turkey cannot be achieved only through institutional reforms that EU membership process requires, but it also necessitates civilian empowerment.

The following chapters discuss historical developments of the Egyptian and Turkish military in light of the theoretical issues, various explanations mentioned in this section. Chapter two examines the development of the Egyptian army from late Ottoman period to the contemporary era and defines transformations in the form of civil military relations as a result of the combination of features of the military establishment, political regime, societal factors and international conditions.

CHAPTER 3. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT

This chapter is designed to provide an understanding of the conditions which brought the Egyptian military into political prominence, the Revolution of 1952, and the evolution of its political role leading to the current civil military relations in Egypt. In doing so, first, it will present historical background on the rise of modern Egyptian military beginning from the reign of Muhammad Ali, professionalization of Egyptian officer corps under his successors and first instances of Egyptian military officers' political interventions. Second, the period of non-intervention under British colonialism will be covered. The path towards the 1952 Revolution will be examined with reference to internal context, covering factors internal to the military and domestic conditions as well as international environment. Third, the features of military ruler regime under Nasser's leadership will be analyzed. Then, the chapter will proceed with the decrease in the role of the military after 1967 war. The defeat led Nasser to eliminate his rivals in the military and distance military and politics. Then, the examination of Sadat's presidency will show the continuation of the same practice while many of the political, social and economic policies of Nasser were reversed. Civil military relations in this era turned into civilian rule with military partnership. Lastly, there will be an analysis of main developments in Egyptian civil military relations under Mubarak who consolidated the pattern of civilian rule and military partnership.

3.1. Historical Background

The reign of Muhammad Ali is important to understand the position of the military in Egypt. It was this period when the foundation of a modern army was established, and with this army as his starting point, Muhammad Ali constructed a state.

Before Muhammad Ali, there had been no Egyptian army. From Pharaonic times, Egypt experienced a series of military conquests, ending in foreign political domination and colonization. The armies consisted of foreign regulars and mercenary troops, but did not include any considerable number of Egyptians. This was the case during the rule of Alexander the Great, the Ptolemies and the Romans and continued after the Arabization and Islamization of the Nile Valley. None of the various caliphates, petty dynasties or the Mamluks encouraged or required the conscription of native Egyptians. There were mercenary troops of Mamluks forming a military caste, receiving land in return for their military service rather than a national army of Egyptians. As a result, Egyptians had never developed a tradition of military service or officer training (Vatikiotis, 1961: 4).

Muhammad Ali was an Albanian army officer raised in the service of the Ottoman Sultan. He was sent to Egypt as a second in command of an Albanian contingent. This was part of an Ottoman expedition sent to evacuate the French. With French departure, a power vacuum arose in Egypt. Taking advantage of this situation, Muhammad Ali established his own control by using the small Albaninan contingent. He gained the support of the local population as new *wali,* governor, of Egypt (Marsot, 1984: 36-59).

Yet, Muhammad Ali was aware of the fact that his appointment to the governorship of Egypt was made against the will of the Sultan and afraid of an attack from İstanbul. Moreover, Mamluks who had ruled Egypt before Muhammad Ali were also a source of threat. Another concern for Muhammad Ali was the coalition which brought him to power. If it had not been defused quickly, it could have been dangerous for him. Hence, Muhammad Ali first broke the coalition of ulamas, artisans and notables through a series of maneuvers. Then, he eliminated Mamluks through a carefully planned massacre in 1811. Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali was trying to appease the Sultan, showing him his loyalty (Fahmy, 1998a: 140-150).

Lack of reliable troops was a crucial problem for Muhammad Ali. He first tried to discipline Albanian troops which were known for their unreliable and rebellious behavior. However, not only the attempt failed, but also Albanian soldiers conspired to kill him. Dealing with Albanians was more difficult for Muhammad Ali because he was an Albanian, too. Having failed to discipline them, Muhammad Ali decided to get rid of them. He has done so not by massacring them as in the case of Mamluks, but by using the opportunity of Ottoman Sultan's order to fight Wahhabis in the desert. During the seven years of conflict, Muhammad Ali effectively got rid of Albanians in the military (Fahmy, 1997: 85-86).

Muhammad Ali needed a strong army, but he was uncomfortable with the idea of conscripting native Egyptians. He feared that confronting the Egyptian population with conscription could lead disaffection, and a possible rebellion. It would also decrease agricultural labour leading to a reduction in agricultural productivity. In order to find new recruits to form a modern army, Muhammad Ali tried to bring slaves from Sudan. To do so, he sent his son İsmail there. Yet, the expedition was a

complete failure. Many of the Sudanese brought to Egypt in order to be trained for the new army died (Fahmy, 1997: 88). The only alternative was recruiting native Egyptians. In 1823, Muhammad Ali took this unprecedented step of recruiting native Egyptian *fellahin*, peasants. He first ordered to conscript 4000 of them. This was the nucleus of his army which would reach to the figure of more than 130,000 troops in ten years (Fahmy, 1998a: 150-154).

Meanwhile, an officer corps composed of Muhammad Ali's slaves was educated by French officers in Aswan, where Muhammad Ali had opened the first military Officers' School in 1820. The place is important in the sense that it was away from the intrigues of Cairo (Vatikiotis, 1961: 5). When the native Egyptians began to be recruited, they were commanded by this first group of officers educated in Aswan. In 1825, French influence on the new army further increased with the arrival of new French military mission to restructure the officer corps (Fahmy, 1998a: 154).

On the other hand, unlike the French army, Muhammad Ali's army was ethnically divided. While soldiers were mainly composed of Egyptian peasants gathered by force from their villages, the officer corps was largely from groups originated in Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus. There were strict orders to prevent Arab speaking peasants from rising above the rank of captain. Through this division, which was also reflected in the bureaucracy, Muhammad Ali managed to attract men from the Ottoman world, especially relatives from Kavalla, and enhance his household. At the same time, he aimed to prevent challenge from the natives to his rule (Fahmy, 1998a: 154-156).

The army was the key institution around which all the reforms of Muhammad Ali were centered. His army proved efficient in various occasions, but also showed

some deficiencies. In order to strengthen the army, Muhammad Ali undertook various reforms in many spheres of his administration. In the Greek expedition for instance, the soldiers were well trained and reliable while the officers were not so. Thus, Muhammad Ali decided to open a staff college in Cairo. He set out arsenal works in Alexandria, a new medical school at Abu Za'bal near Cairo, and numerous factories mainly for war products like footwear, uniforms, guns and cannon. When many of those institutions proved ineffective, Muhammad Ali decided that the main reason for this was the expensive European managers. Then, he initiated educational missions to Europe through which he sent hundreds of young Arabs and Turks to run the new institutions. In order to implement such costly projects, Muhammad Ali established tighter control over the economy, over the lives of people through expanding the bureaucracy and centralizing the government (Fahmy, 1998a: 157-162).

However, the position of the Egyptian army was dramatically changed in 1841, when the British intervened in the confrontation of Muhammad Ali and the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali was required to withdraw his troops which came close to the Ottoman capital and in return, Ottoman Sultan recognized him as governor of Egypt for life and granted his descendants the right to office. Moreover, Muhammad Ali had to reduce the size of the army to 18,000 troops (Fahmy, 1998a: 175).

Under the reign of Muhammad Ali's successors, political history of Egypt was marked by the establishment of the dynastic state and by European economic and political influence leading to foreign control (Hunter, 1998:180). Under the rule of Abbas, thousands of Albanians held influential positions in the army. This led to the deterioration of relations between this group and Egyptian population. Successor of

Abbas, Said Pasha admitted native Egyptians to high ranks in the military in order to decrease the influence of Albanians. Previously, men from the poorer classes had been admitted to the army. Said, on the other hand, made military service compulsory for all, and limited the term of service to one year. He also encouraged Egyptians to join the army with prospects of promotion to higher ranks. In this period, the first nucleus of Egyptian officers was created (Vatikiotis, 1961: 8). This was also the period when Urabi, who led the military officers' revolt in 1881, was conscripted.

During the reign of Khedive İsmail, the size of the Egyptian army was further increased. Ismail was anxious to Europeanize Egypt quickly, so he spent much effort on the development of education and training of the army. He sent various military training missions abroad, founded most of the military schools including infantry, cavalry, artillery and a staff college near Cairo. A Chief of Staff's department was established for the first time. Ismail also paid special attention to the institution of an army publicity department. Two publications of Egyptian army officers appeared in 1873, named the Egyptian Army Staff Newspaper and Egyptian Military Journal. His efforts had certain effect on the Egyptian army officers. For the first time, the Egyptian army officers began to acquire professional identity and pride. The experiences in the African campaigns in Sudan and Ethiopia also contributed to those developments (Vatikiotis, 1961: 8, 9).

Khediv İsmail also invested in developmental and infrastructural projects. He completed Suez Canal in 1869, making Egypt an important transportation center. However, to fund such projects, he also borrowed from the West, especially from the British and the French. Increasing debt of Egypt resulted in restriction of the Egyptian rulers' freedom of action and more European penetration into the country. There were

consuls with formal powers to advocate rights of foreigners. These consuls were exempt from Egyptian jurisdiction and enriched by capitulations. Increasing influence of foreign capital turned into direct European control with the creation of new institutions to administer debt payments (Hunter, 1998: 187-194). The burden of foreign debt and the duality in the justice system working at the expense of the native Egyptians increased the discontent in the population.

Indigenous army officers also had many grievances. İsmail's army shrank under bankruptcy. In 1879, when 2500 officers were called back to Cairo as a prelude to retirement, they demonstrated before the ministry of finance. These officers were young Egyptians and from lower ranks of the army. They were discriminated by Turkish and Circassian officers. This was the first incidence that they attempt to influence policy and exert authority (Vatikiotis, 1961: 12-13).

Urabi Revolt in 1881 was another and much bigger movement in Egypt led by army officers. Urabi was a son of a village shaykh, educated in Al Azhar. He entered into army during the period of Muhammad Said. In the Abbyssian campaign, seeing Circassian commanders led the army to a disaster, he became interested in politics. During the reign of Khedive Tawfiq, he was promoted as colonel. When the Khedive decreed a new law for military service in 1880, he led the Egyptian officers who opposed the law on the grounds that it decreases the chances of Egyptian recruits for promotion. They drafted a series of demands to increase the strength of the army up to 18,000 permissible levels. They also wanted reinstatement of the assembly of representatives established under Khedive İsmail and suspended by Tawfiq. These demands were rejected, and they were also brought to martial court. However, their troops demanded the release of their commanders. The minister of war was changed.

Officers listed their demands for increase in salaries, legislation to regulate promotions on a sound basis, uniform rules for pension, retirement and compensation. Khediv accepted the demands, but was not comfortable with the increase of Egyptian officers' political influence. When he changed the popular minister of war, Urabi's forces protested the decision. A new government was formed in which Urabi became the Minister of War (Vatikiotis, 1961:15-18).

On the other hand, Britain and France were not satisfied with the result. They doubted whether the new cabinet would fulfill their financial obligations. They also feared that the new government would not allow them to use Suez Canal. When anti-foreign riots erupted in Alexandria in June 1882, the British government authorized bombardment of the city. The Urabi movement came to an end with British occupation of Egypt which was said to end as soon as possible, but lasted until 1952.

This period beginning from the establishment of the Egyptian army by Muhammad Ali was characterized by patrimonialism. The military served to the personal authority of Muhammad Ali and the ruling elite composed of his relatives. While the military was the spearhead of development and source of reforms in many areas from industrial initiatives to educational activities, this did not provide Egyptians in the military with nationalistic ideas at that time. Before, Egyptians had been exempt from military duties. Under Muhammad Ali, they were forced to fight, just like they were forced to work for him. Serving in the military was a burden rather than prestige. It was not a means for upwards mobility for young Egyptians. They were confined to rank and file, remained under the command of Turks, Circassians, and Albanians. Thus, Muhammad Ali's initiatives for modernization and

professionalization of the army did not create professional considerations in Egyptians within the military (Fahmy, 1998b: 436).

Then, Egyptians started to be admitted in the officer corps under the reign of Khedive Said, and acquired professional skills with the efforts of Khedive İsmail. The professionalization of Egyptians as officer corps with positions of more responsibility, increasing military expertise, and solidarity among themselves was accompanied by their political activism. As examined before, the theories of civil military relations differ in the relationship between military professionalism and military intervention in politics. While Huntington (1985) argues that professionalism keeps military out of politics since it would establish a division of labour separating military duties and political activities, scholars like Finer (1988) propose it would lead to political activity. Finer underlines that professionalism can lead to the identification of national interest with the interests of the military that is responsible for state's defense or to the development of the sense of superiority in judgments regarding the size of the military, its budget etc. Similarly, Nordlinger (1977) emphasizes the preservation of corporate interests of the military such as adequate budgetary support or autonomy in the internal affairs of the military. The activities of Egyptian officers in 1879 and 1881 when they demanded higher payments, better regulations for promotions and expansion in the size of the military supports those arguments that professionalism can increase political involvement of military as opposed to Huntington. While Urabi movement has been referred as the first nationalist attempt by the Egyptian army against British interests, its point of departure was more the protection of corporate interests of Egyptian officers. The position against Britain and France developed so long as their control over the finances of Egypt prevented the payments of the officers

and decreased the strength of the army. The immediate aims of Urabi were more focused on promotions and higher salaries for military officers (Vatikiotis, 1961: 20). Nevertheless, Egyptian officers' experience with politics was short-lived. Under the British ruler, the Egyptian army entered into an era of noninterventionism.

3.2 Anglo-Egyptian Question, and Prelude to Revolution

The defeat of the Egyptian army by the British, and the exile of the leaders of the movement brought frustration to the society. The British dissolved the Egyptian army because of the fear that a large Egyptian army would be a revolutionary threat. The army was purged of all officers suspected of nationalism. The pashas who formerly supported constitutionalist movement tried to show their loyalty to the Khedive and to the British. Remaining troops were dispatched to Sudan against Mahdi revolt and were annihilated by the Mahdist forces. The British authorities reorganized the Egyptian army, and established General Commanding Officer, *Sırdar,* to keep the army under direct British control. The army was kept small and used mainly to the frontier controls. The practice that allowed payment instead of serving in the military guaranteed that a minimum number of Egyptians received military training, a situation which eased the control of the British over the army in which the poor illiterate fellahin constituted the majority. Military as a profession under British mandate was neither prestigious nor a means of social advancement. Only some upper class Egyptians took part in a number of cavalry units patterned after British high status regiments. Under such circumstances, Egyptian army played little role in the struggle against British occupation at that time. Instead, civilian elements composed

of landowners and rising professional groups such as lawyers, doctors, civil servants, teachers, and students assumed political leadership (Vatikiotis, 1961: 21, 44).

With the death of Khedive Tawfiq in 1882, Egyptian opposition to British occupation intensified. The new Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, became a focal point for Egyptian opposition. His attempt to build up a following in the Egyptian army was futile. However, he was supported by people of Egypt and some notable leaders. As the British rule prioritized servicing the Egyptian debt, it neglected the social aspects of administration like education and health services. The increasing discontent with the British occupation reached its climax with the Dinshawai incident. A minor fracas between Egyptian villagers and British officers in the Dinshawai village led to mass reaction of the Egyptians surprising even the British (Daly, 1998: 241-243).

With the outbreak of World War I, domestic politics in Egypt came to a standstill. Fearing that Muslim population would support the Ottoman Sultan's call to jihad, the British declared Egypt as a protectorate as a step toward self government, and promised to take responsibility for the defense of Egypt. Martial law was imposed. British priority was the defense of the Suez Canal. As a result, two incompatible expectations had emerged with the end of the war. On the one hand, Egyptian nationalists wanted independence both because of their contribution during the war and because of British promises. On the other hand, the British became more aware of the importance of Egypt for imperial interests, and presumed to get acquiescence of the Egyptians through minor reforms (Daly, 1998: 246-247).

To express their will for complete independence, Egyptian people from landed gentry and legal profession formed a delegation called *Wafd*. When this was refused, they rallied for popular support. Under the leadership of Zaghlul, constant revolting

by the Egyptian people throughout the country led to the British Declaration of February 1922, making Egypt an independent kingdom. However, the declaration contained four reserved points according to which the British government would remain responsible for the security of imperial communications in Egypt, the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression, the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt and the administration of Sudan and its future status (Botman, 1991: 25-30). Thus, the independence granted to Egypt was far from meeting the demands of Egyptians. Moreover, it ensured the British military presence in Egypt.

In the minds of the Wafdist politicians, the idea of independence and the establishment of a constitutional government were closely linked. In 1923, a constitution was proclaimed. However, it was violated by the King in the first year, 1924, again in 1928, and suspended in 1930. Martial law during the eleven years out of fifteen between 1937 and 1952, made the constitution void. The Wafd led the struggle against the suspension of constitution (Vatikiotis, 1961: 23-24). The politics turned into a struggle among the King, the British and the Wafd, at the expense of basic problems of policy.

The main issue was the negotiation of 1922 treaty with Britain so as to achieve full independence of Egypt. On the other hand, the British continuously refused any amendment until 1936 when Italian expansionism in Ethiopia became alarming for the imperial interests. This period influenced all segments of society with nationalist discourse. Attending secondary school during this period of agitation, future Egyptian military officers were not immune to those political discussions (Vatikiotis, 1961: 46).

In 1936, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed. The Egyptian leadership was satisfied because the treaty recognized Egypt as an independent and sovereign state.

The British favored the treaty because Britain would aid Egypt in case of emergency. In addition to this, Egypt was required to supply military facilities necessary for imperial communication. The pact restricted Britain's troops to Suez Canal in peacetime. The British were to allow Egyptian membership in the League of Nations (Botman, 1991: 38-39).

With this treaty, Egyptian military achieved some autonomy although arms and military infrastructure were to be provided by the British. Egyptian government enlarged the size of the army as a symbol of the newly achieved sovereignty. The Military Academy opened its doors to native Egyptian youth regardless of family background, social or economic class. Eight of the eleven men who formed the founding committee of the Free Officers group in 1949 entered the military academy in 1936. The most famous of them was Gamal Abdel Nasser (Vatikiotis, 1961: 45).

After the negotiation of the treaty, there was no excuse to delay the solution of internal problems. However, government became entrapped with party infighting. There was also a continuing conflict between the Wafd and the King. The parliament was unable to check executives and the power of the King who was acting under the umbrella of martial law. King was prone to use his right to dissolve the parliament, to appoint and dismiss ministers. Basic constitutional rights were suspended by decree (Vatikiotis, 1961:25).

Meanwhile, new social and political groups and ideas were emerging in Egypt. Yet, these could not find a place in the existing structure. The Wafd was the representative of nationalism, but at the same time a hierarchical organization whose access was based on wealth in land. Other parties also had similar compositions and they were discredited as a result of their cooperation with the King. Under these

conditions, communist and socialist groups gained some popular base but Muslim Brotherhood benefited from the situation most. During this period, re-entry of Islam to politics was through modern techniques of organization and propaganda. Islamic groups operated schools, cooperatives, factories and hospitals. They also began to spread into high school and university students, business associations and young officer corps (Vatikiotis, 1961: 28-29).

With the outbreak of World War II, Britain began to pay more attention to the internal affairs of Egypt because of its strategic importance. In line with treaty obligations, Egypt was put under martial law in 1939. About half million Allied troops were placed in Egypt. Dissent with British occupation led to a pro-Axis current. Some of the Egyptian officers thought that German victory would be a means to drive out the British. Even the King seemed to share that feeling, and Chief of Staff Aziz Ali al-Misri made efforts to join German war campaign. Fearing that their war efforts were being undermined, the British first forced the dismissal of Aziz Al-Misri and Prime Minister Ali Mahir. Then, the British gave an ultimatum to the King for the establishment of a Wafdist government in order to change pro-German atmosphere. The Wafd had been the nationalist opposition to British occupation. Thus, its collaboration with the British in coming to power was controversial and disappointed the population (Botman, 1991: 42-46).

After the war, King Farouq tightened his control over the Egyptian politics. At the same time, conflict with the British continued over the issues of the evacuation of British troops and also the status of Sudan with which the Egyptians demanded unification. However, these disputes were replaced by the increasing concern for the developments in Palestine. When Britain ended mandate in Palestine, all Arab

countries declared war on the new state of Israel. Egypt was one of those countries although it was known that the Egyptian military was totally unprepared for the war. It had no weapons except for the antiquated ones supplied by the British, and no airplanes. Although this situation was reported to the King, he decided to enter the war. He sent some of his officials to Belgium for arms deals. When the Egyptian army was defeated, it revealed that there had been corruption in the arms deal since arms sold to Egypt had been the defected arms surpluses of World War II (Vatikiotis, 1961: 32-33, 59).

There was loss of leadership in the parties, increasing criticism of the lifestyle of the King, and of corruption. After 1945, violence became the standard resort of opposition. Attacks on British personnel and property were widespread. The Muslim Brotherhood was at the centre of these disturbances and the government tried to crush the organization. In 1948 a martial law was declared and the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved. While the Brotherhood was held responsible with the assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi, Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the movement, was killed in 1949, assumed on government orders (Yapp, 1996: 65-66).

The King and the political parties failed to find an adequate response to chaos in the country. With considerations of national security, martial law was extended. In 1950, the Wafd won the elections once more. The Wafd gave priority to settling down the disputes with Britain, but this turned into armed conflict in the Canal Zone between British troops and Egyptian police. Then, unprecedented riots were erupted in January 1952, leading to the burning of downtown Cairo (Yapp, 1996: 66).

In 1952, the Egyptian military was called upon to take the place of the police and end the violence in the streets. The officer corps was expected to help the

government but they had lost their confidence in the government and the system. During World War II, they had been frustrated by British treatment and disregard of Egypt's independence (Yapp, 1996:67). Moreover, although the army had always supported the monarchy, the war in Palestine changed the situation. The class of younger officers that had come into existence after 1936 changed their perception of duty after the Palestinian war. The experience convinced Gamal Abdel Nasser and his associates that the King and the government were not interested in the welfare of the nation or the army. Under their control, the country was regarded as doomed to frustration, and foreign control. Thus, they began to equate national liberation with the destruction of the regime. The Free Officers group held their first meeting informally at the end of 1949. They tried to spread their criticisms against the government and the King, to recruit more members and to establish links with the press. The Free Officers were under surveillance but neither government nor the King took drastic action against them. The confidence of the King in the support of the army as he controlled the top personnel might have caused this (Vatikiotis, 1961: 60-61).

However, the King thought that so long as he controlled the army, he can control everything, and he was in control of the army to a great extent. He appointed senior officers and a minister of war, and he insisted on approving every applicant to the military academy. Moreover, it was thought that, as long as the British supplied arms to the Egyptian military, the position of the King was safe (Vatikiotis, 1961: 41-42).

On the other hand, the increasing chasm between the army and the King became apparent during the elections for the Presidency of Officers Club, traditionally

governed by senior officers loyal to the palace when General Naquib was elected instead of the man of the King. In an attempt to increase its control over the senior appointments, and punish those who had supported rival candidates, the King appointed a new Minister of War with no known qualification for the position except his relation to the monarchy. The military officers thought that existing hierarchy was just a tool in the hands of the King to control the army. Eventually, the Free Officers took action in July 1952 (Vatikiotis, 1961: 64-66).

The overview of the situation before the revolution presents many elements for intervention underlined by scholars of civil military relations. Under colonial control, Egyptian military remained outside of nationalist movement for a long time. After Egyptians were accepted in the officer corps, the army began to be involved in politics. Rather than being a fountainhead of nationalism, the military reflected nationalist sentiment which had been stirred by civilian political and intellectual groups. In addition to this, the ideas of communist groups and Muslim Brotherhood began to be adopted by different groups in the army. At the time of the revolution, the Free Officers was not the only group, but they proved to be the most influential one. So, it can be said that the military was drawn into politics by the civilians.

In addition, there were many reasons for the military to be self-motivated, a mix of professional considerations and social conditions. During World War II, Egyptian officers remained under British command. The war in Palestine was also humiliating for the army. The blame was put on the King and the politicians. When the corruption in arms deals revealed, the military perception was that they were "stabbed in the back". At the same time, there was a power vacuum in the country. Despite formal independence, British presence continued and clashes between

Egyptians and British forces began. The King lost legitimacy, political parties were unable to produce solutions to the problems, and violence erupted. It was thought that "only the army" could correct the misdoings and play the "role of vanguard" for the revolution (Nasser, 1959: 32-33, 42-45).

3.3. 1952 Revolution and Nasser

General Naguib emerged as the figurehead of the coup. He was appropriate for this role as a renowned general in society for his success at the Palestinian war with the support of the army. On the other hand, Nasser had more influence over the Free Officers. Initially, the Free Officers did not conspire to establish a complete military regime. They did not have time to reflect on the political implications of their action. They decided to turn power to a civilian prime minister but there was no candidate in their minds. Their aim was to displace the existing government, to make necessary reforms and return order to the politicians. However, during the first six months, officers began to consider themselves as not only vanguards of national independence but also the rightful rulers of the country (Gordon, 1992: 56-59).

The Free Officers dissolved the cabinet, and called Ali Maher to form a government. This increased the hopes for civilian rule. However, Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which was mainly composed of the original Free Offices assumed increasing control over the country.

After the deposition of the King, it became apparent that there were disagreements among those who supported the coup. It included a vast coalition of political organizations which wanted to overthrow the King and to establish a new political setting. On the other hand, they did not have much in common, and in many

cases their interests were in conflict, such as those of the Muslim Brotherhood and Marxist leftists. Moreover, Maher cabinet did not support radical decisions that RCC took such as the agrarian reform. Soon, the officers became dissatisfied with the performance of politicians (Beattie, 1994: 72-77).

General Naguib, the Chairman of the Free Officers' Committee became the new prime minister of a cabinet composed of civilians in September 1952. At the same time, officers were appointed in ministries to ensure coordination of civilian and military policies. Seeing that the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood were becoming successful in their struggle to exert influence, RCC dissolved all political parties, and abrogated the constitution of 1923. Military tribunals were established to purge defective officers. Press was suppressed. Naguib was declared as the Chief of the Revolution. He assumed full sovereignty, combining the position of presidency and premiership. Three-year transition period to return to constitutional government were announced. To obtain an organized civilian base of support, officers started building a mass organization called Liberation Rally. It was an attempt to legitimize army rule and its nationalist ideology as well as to eliminate all civilian opposition to the army (Vatikiotis, 1961: 78-86).

During this transition period, disagreements within the military emerged on the question of direct rule or disengagement. Nasser who advocated continuation of military rule gained the upper hand. After two years struggle for power, in 1954 he took the political power from Naguib who supported a return to the civilian rule. Nasser became prime minister, and all ministries were filled with members of RCC. Cabinet ministers who held positions between 1952 and 1954 were deprived of all political rights. Officers that supported Naguib were purged. After an attempted

assassination of Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood and Communist Party were crushed as the main opponents of the regime with strong followings (Beattie, 1994: 89-100).

The consolidation of this rule was eased by external events. In October, an agreement was signed with Britain for the complete evacuation of Suez Canal, increasing the popularity of the regime among Egyptians. The Israeli attack on Gaza, and arms deal with the Soviet bloc also strengthened the regime. The threat for security in the Middle East served as further justification for the military rule (Vatikiotis, 1961: 97-98).

As promised, a constitution was prepared by 1956. It stated the objectives of the Revolution as abolition of imperialism, feudalism, monopolies, and capitalist influence over the government, establishment of a strong army, and a sound democratic society. Yet, constitution gave the president all powers of the deposed monarch. Political parties remained suspended. National Union was to be established to nominate candidates for the assembly. This process was carried out under the control of Nasser and the RCC. When the constitution and the presidency were put to the plebiscite, they were adopted by more than 98% of the vote. The following day, the RCC was dissolved (Beattie, 1994: 119-24).

The same year, Suez Crisis erupted. As a retaliation of Egyptian arms purchase from Czechoslovakia, the USA withdrew its financial support from the construction of Aswan high dam. To finance the project, Nasser declared the nationalization of Suez Canal. It was a blow against post-colonial interests as well as a confirmation of Egyptian nationalism. Egyptian military proved weak against what is called tripartite aggression, joint forces of Britain, France and Israel. They were withdrawn from the Canal only with the pressure of the USA and the USSR. Yet, this defeat was a

political victory for Nasser, increasing popular support behind him in Egypt and in the Arab world. Thus, despite losing the battle, Egypt won the war (Beattie, 1994: 114-116).

The army was the guarantor of the regime not only against foreign aggression. It was also a major source of active support for the revolution. Nasser advocated Arab socialism as a combination of nationalism and socialism, anti-imperialism and unification with other Arab countries. He needed the support of military in order to implement his radical program of reform. While using the army in crushing the Marxist workers and various political organizations, in controlling the landed interests and capitalist class hurt by nationalization and land reform, Nasser also incorporated the army into a new political class along with technocrats to sustain and perpetuate the new regime. When nationalization of foreign investments began and when socialist measures of 1961 were taken, officers found themselves in key positions. Their role was extended to the public sector, the governmental bureaucracy and diplomatic corps (Beattie, 1994: 124-127). Key ministries were taken over by the officers, and civilians were used only in secondary positions. When civilians were at the top, there were always advisors from the military cadres. Until 1967 War, military officers oversaw virtually every aspect of Egypt's political and economic development. As Raymond Baker (1978: 81) states "Real power in Egypt did not flow through the officially prescribed constitutional channels. Crucial to the actual system of rule was the relationship established by Nasser between his regime and the military establishment."

As the security of the regime depended on the support of the army, Nasser needed to sustain it. This policy of distribution of political positions was one way for

Nasser to keep the officers loyal to him. Clientalism and distribution of economic benefits were also used. For similar considerations, Nasser appointed his close friend, Abdal Hakim Amir as the head of the army in order to keep the opposition under control.

However, in time problems between Nasser and Amir emerged. Amir rose from major to the chief of staff just in two years. He was in control of the army from 1953 until 1967. Under his control, the military developed some level of autonomy from Nasser, resulting in two power and decision centers. This power duality, politicization of the military and factionalism in the armed forces were seen as the basis of some poor decisions in Suez Crisis when Amir was the commander in chief. When Syrian officers ended three year union with Egypt, Amir was the governor of Syria and blamed for his policies there. After a disagreement with Nasser on the issue, Amir began to encourage cliques that directly depended on him. In this period, loyalty to Amir became more important than professional expertise in promotions. He appointed Colonel Badran as the Minister of War to increase his influence (Gawrych, 1987: 542-543). While Nasser tried to retire Amir several times, it was the June War in 1967 which ended Amir's career (Harb, 2003: 280).

Meanwhile, the threat of Muslim Brotherhood's infiltration into the armed forces caused an overreaction in the regime. Any individual who was suspected of being a Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer and those officers who received Soviet training were purged. While weakening the armed forces from within, the military implications of those purges were not considered seriously (Gawrych, 1987: 543-544).

The war was disastrous and humiliating for Egypt. On June 5, 1967, Israeli jets destroyed Egypt's air forces and defenses. Egyptian infantry was also defeated by the Israeli forces. As a result of the war, the Israelis occupied Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula while thousands of soldiers lost their lives.

The war became a turning point in the history of civil-military relations. In the aftermath of the war, leadership of Egypt confronted a legitimacy crisis. Strengthening the military and national integrity was among the core objectives of the Revolution. The public had believed that Egypt had managed to develop the strongest military in the Middle East. With the defeat, people felt that they were deceived. Public dissent increased. Yet, as soon as Nasser declared his resignation, people called for his reinstatement in mass demonstrations (Brook, 2006).

Coming to the presidency again, Nasser moved to establish his control over the armed forces, and to professionalize the officer corps. Incompetent officers were removed. Losing his position, Amir eventually committed suicide. Other top commanders were also dismissed including the minister of war. Public trails decreased the prestige of armed forces which had been beyond reproach for the last fifteen years. After removing many of the top commanders, Nasser began to reshape the armed forces. He promulgated a new law requiring presidential approval for promotions above colonel. Although loyalty to the regime remained an important factor, the influence of merit in promotions increased. High command was reorganized so that the posts of the minister of war and commander in chief were combined (Gawrchy, 1987: 546-548). Thus, after 1967 defeat, army officers ceased to be an effective political power (Waterbury, 1978: 267).

These events created public resentment at the privileges of the officer corps. In February 1968, workers and students demonstrated against the light sentences given to officers which were regarded as responsible for the defeat. Nasser responded these challenges with "March 30 Program" for reform. The Structure of Arab Socialist Union, as successor of National Union, was completed to undertake elections for National Congress. This was the first time civilian means of gaining support became more important over the clientelist networks in the army, leading to the civilianization of the regime which continued under Sadat. While the military represented the 66% of the cabinet in 1967, it declined to 41% in 1968 and to 22% in 1972 (Karawan, 1996: 113).

On the other hand, the debacle of 1967 made it imperative to improve the image of the army in society, and increase the international bargaining position of Egypt through a military showdown with Israel for the regime's survival. Thus, during the last three years of Nasser and the first three years of Sadat, the main task of the military leaders was to prepare the army for the war in the Sinai front. In consequence, despite the reduction in the autonomy and political influence of the military, it remained as the most privileged state organization. Its place in budgetary allocations was greater than before. The military expenditures amounting to 7.4% of the GNP during the first half of the 1960s increased to 13% in 1969-70 and to over 21% by the mid 70s (Karawan, 1996: 113-114).

From July 1952 until Nasser's death, Egypt experienced different levels of military intervention. While, initially, the military neither expected nor intended to govern the country, the regime increasingly turned to a military rule. At first, the military replaced the government with a new civilian one. They established the RCC,

but at the beginning its influence was limited. When the wills of the RCC were met with resistance from the old politicians, the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood, the RCC intensified its influence. Naguib became the prime minister of a civilian government, but by that time, all civilian institutions had to include military staff. Then, with continuing opposition, all parties were outlawed. When Nasser gained the upper hand against Naguib, complete military rule was established in the country.

There can be different reasons why Nasser was able to eliminate Naguib. First, Naguib did not have a base of his own as much as Nasser. He was chosen as the leader of the coup, but Nasser was more influential in the Free Officers' committee. The army and the society had been radicalized enough to accept complete military rule. Continuing threat of war with Israel has also strengthened military position in society as stated by Lasswell's (1941) argument.

Until 1956, the regime was mainly composed of military elites. After that, civil servants, non-political technicians were included in the administration, since it was impossible to govern the country only with military cadres. This was the final stage of military rule according to Finer (1988). The military continued to rule with a civilian façade. Yet, people in the parliament, bureaucracy and the military were selected among relatives and loyalists of Nasser. It was similar to the period of Muhammad Ali in that sense. Nasser established a patrimonial system in which the military was the most important pillar.

Nevertheless, military's involvement in politics was accompanied by political factionalism in the military. As a result, its capacity to provide defense decreased. Interestingly, 1948 defeat created humiliation and increased political activity of the military as they put the blame on civilians. In 1967, it was the military that was held

responsible for the defeat and paid for it. Probably the reason for the difference was the support for Nasser among the people, while the King had not had such an advantage. Although the military underwent purges and changes for the re-establishment of Nasser's control, it remained as the most important element of the regime as long as Israeli threat continued. Israeli threat, on the other hand, continued as long as the military was defeated.

3.4. Civil Military Relations in Sadat Era

Anwar Sadat ascended to the presidency after Nasser's death in 1970. He was an ex-officer who had participated in the Revolution along with the fellow Free Officers. After holding many positions, he had been chosen to be the vice-president by Nasser. Yet, he was not a very significant figure. Most observers thought his ascendancy as a compromise or a transitional solution in the face of a deeper power struggle. Without a political base of his own, Sadat's initial task was to strengthen his position by eliminating his rivals, mainly those close to Nasser, in the military and in the civilian Arab Socialist Union. In May 1971, Sadat conducted what is called "Corrective Revolution", i.e. his own purge of Egyptian administration. The Minister of War, Minister of Interior, Minister of Presidential Affairs and the leader of Arab Social Union (ASU) were dismissed, tried and imprisoned. In ousting Nasserists, Sadat used military officers loyal to him (Harb, 2003: 282).

For both Nasser and Sadat, the military was a source of legitimacy and power. However, while Nasser was concerned with the power of Amir, Sadat tried to manipulate entire officer corps. He played individual officers against each other. When the top echelons disagreed with him, Sadat dismissed them. These dismissals

and sidelining made Egyptian army subordinate to his authority (Harb, 2003: 282). While political arena was dominated by the military during the Nasser era, under Sadat's presidency their political role significantly decreased. Under Nasser, more than one third of all cabinet ministers had been from military. In Sadat's presidency less than 13 % of ministers came from military backgrounds. Moreover, two thirds of these ministers with military background had also received further technical training. Those with military training were only in the areas of defense and foreign affairs. Sadat carried out similar demilitarization in governorships and in the bureaucracy (Springborg, 1987: 5).

With the efforts of Nasser and Sadat, by 1973, the army leadership had become quite professionalized and ready to abide by the constitutional powers of the political leadership (Brook, 2006). In the October 1973 War, Sadat ordered a surprise attack against Israel in coordination with Syria. Egyptian success in the war reinstated the prestige of the armed forces. It also made Sadat a leader in his own right. He became the "Hero of the Crossing". Sadat used this political opportunity to transform Egypt's foreign and economic policy (Hinnebusch, 1988: 54).

Sadat was able to negotiate from a position of relative strength for a settlement with Israel. He made sure that the military was involved in all stages of the peace process carried out among Egypt, Israel and United States. As a result of Sinai I and Sinai II agreements, the Suez Canal and Sinai oil fields were taken back, Israeli threat to Egyptian heartland was ended, and significant amount of Western aid to Egyptian economy was guaranteed (Hinnebusch, 1988: 54-57). The process continued with Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977. It led to Camp David Accords in 1978 and Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, as well as Egypt's alienation from Arab world.

Meanwhile, the economy of Egypt was also under transformation. Sadat initiated *infitah*, i.e. opening of the economy. Although he argued that it was not a retreat from Nasser's socialism, *infitah* was a major reversal. It brought unrestricted opening of the economy to foreign investment and imports while decreasing public intervention in economy. With *infitah*, Egyptian economy was gradually integrated to global capitalism. It also led to the development of an economic bourgeoisie that began to develop under Sadat's protection (Hinnebusch, 1988: 54-65).

Openings in the economic sphere found their reflection in politics, too. Sadat encouraged the establishment of *manaber*, platforms within ASU. Among the forty propositions, three platforms were allowed: "liberal", "left" and "central", i.e. pro-government, factions. When pro-government faction won the elections, Sadat felt secure enough to allow the transformation of platforms into political parties. However, this transformation reflected neither a departure from single party system, nor an introduction of multiparty system as in democracies. There were numerous measures to ensure its limitation such as constitutional supremacy of the President over all parties (Fahmy, 2002: 62-63).

Sadat's policies in the economic and political spheres created tensions. Liberalization harmed the lower classes in society, while peace with Israel and pro-Western policies alienated Islamist and conservative classes. Since Sadat had already eliminated Nasserists, he faced the difficulty of obtaining enough support for his policies. There was mounting unrest in society escalating into large demonstrations. The largest of them erupted when the government announced that it would cut subsidies on basic commodities, acting on recommendations of the IMF. Known as "Bread Riots", the demonstrations swept Egypt's major cities in January 1977. Police

forces proved ineffective to quell the riots. The events were a test for professionalism and obedience of the armed forces. Although not eager to assume such a role, the military intervened and restored order throughout the country. (Hinnebusch, 1988: 69-72, 129).

One of the reasons for military obedience to Sadat's policies was international environment. Because of international threat environment despite Camp David Accords, the military was impatient toward any internal threat to stability (Hinnebusch, 1988: 126).

However, Sadat's relationship with the military was not without problems despite the obedience of military in quelling the riots and returning to their barracks. The domestic political and economic policies of Sadat caused a change in the position of military. The liberalization of economy increased the inflation by making the economy of Egypt more exposed to international influences. Purchasing power of the low and mid-level military officers was decreased along with other segments of society. This created resentment on the part of the military with some reports of resignations from military posts on economic grounds (Karawan, 1996: 115). In response to the economic hardships, the military developed a new role in the economy of Egypt. It engaged in industrialization projects, arms production, and cooperatives including housing, transportation, and agriculture. Consequently, the economic role of the military and its ties with businessmen increased significantly (Ayubi, 1991: 255-260). With these developments, the army leadership underwent an embourgeoisement, turning from a populist 'tribune of the people' into an advocate of established interests (Hinnebusch, 1988: 125).

With the reduction in the size and expenditure of the military after Camp David Accords, the criticism against Sadat increased in the army in late 70s. Moreover, there was significant measure of disaffection because of Camp David Accords. New groups began to emerge in the army. Sadat tried to eliminate opposition by several purges and reshuffling in the high command. There were reports of a new free officers group who was arrested for plotting against Sadat after Camp David. In September 1979, some 11 air force officers were arrested for anti-regime activity. Islamic opposition also began to infiltrate into the army. These trends reached its peak with the assassination of Sadat by an Islamist officer (Aulas, 1982: 16).

The military remained as a critical force in the Egyptian political system under Sadat. Without its support, his rule would have been vulnerable to challenge. Sadat controlled successful transformation of its role in the state. The military was turned from a dominant political actor to a professional force subject to legal authority. Even in defense matters, its role in policy making was radically decreased (Hinnebusch, 1988: 125).

At the beginning of Sadat's rule military was a privileged ruling group dominating the top elite posts. By the end, it had been reduced to a much smaller weaker competent of the elite. Its role decreased to professional advice. Moreover, institutionalization of politics under Sadat era gradually narrowed the scope of overt military intervention in politics (Hinnebusch, 1988: 131).

Sadat's period can be seen as civil military partnership rather than military rule with civilian assistance. He tried to professionalize the military. However, this professionalism was linked with personalism and loyalty of the officers. Thus, during

Sadat's era military high command was highly professionalized, but its relationship with the president remained patrimonial.

3.5. Civil Military Relations in Mubarak Era

After Sadat, Mubarak became the president of Egypt. Before entering into politics, he was a pilot and then the commander of the Egyptian Air Force. His distance from politics was the reason why he was chosen by Sadat as the vice president in 1975. Sadat wanted to reassure the military that he would not ignore their interests. On the other hand, he did not want to choose a prominent figure or one from ground forces where political rivalry would cause resentment (Waterbury, 1983: XV).

Mubarak inherited a complex legacy from the periods of Nasser and Sadat. The policies and institutions of the state was a mix of socialist transformation of Nasser era and open door policy of Sadat (Tripp and Owen, 1989: 10). Different from his predecessors, Mubarak did not develop a particular vision of his own. He chose to continue with economic and foreign policies of Sadat while trying to control social reaction against those policies. He did not change liberalisation of the economy but emphasized social justice. He maintained close relations with the US, but called Egypt's stance as "positive neutrality". After the initial wave of arrests and repression of opposition groups following the assassination of Sadat, he tried to neutralize the opposition, except the radicals, not with repression but through the party system (McDermott, 1988: 75-77). On the other hand, when social justice did not realize and opposition to the regime strengthened, Mubarak took a more authoritarian path.

Mubarak was more decisive about his policy towards the military from the beginning. He knew that the military became a source of opposition against Sadat

who followed a policy of restricting military role in public life and cutting its budget. In order to gain the support of the military, Mubarak reversed the process. He reassured that there would be no cutbacks any more. He built up the size of the army again, brought new weapons from the US to replace old Soviet equipment, and provided the officers with extra privileges (Owen, 2000: 203).

Mubarak needed the army against protests and religious radicalism which became more dangerous for the regime during 1980s and 1990s. In 1986, Central Security Forces rioted over their low pay in Cairo. However, it was their task to quell riots. Then, Mubarak used the military to suppress the 17,000 conscripts of Central Security Forces and to restore the order (McDermott, 1988:177). The events demonstrated that mission of the military was not confined to external defense, as Field Marshal Ghazala stated: "The role of the police and the army are complementary and cannot be separated. To both of them falls a unique task: to guarantee the security of Egypt both internally and externally."[1]

Although it was proven that the military was ready to protect the regime when it was called, Mubarak avoided using the military against increasing terrorist activities in Egypt. He did not want to raise fears among the people that the problem of terrorism became so significant to necessitate military help (Kechichian and Nazimek, 1997: 129). Only in Luxor attack in 1997, military moved in to help police forces. On the other hand, since 1992, those civilians accused of terrorist activities have been put on military trials whose decisions cannot be appealed. The practice developed when the members of Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamic groups were not convicted by

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[1] As quoted in Owen (2000: 203)

civilian courts. Thus, military courts are also a demonstration of the military's domestic presence (Owen, 2000: 203).

Under Mubarak regime, the economic activities of the military have been expanded further. The military has become a strong actor not only in arms industry, but also in numerous other sectors of the economy, mainly related with land reclamation and food production (Ayubi, 1991: 255-260). Its role was so prevalent that military became object of criticism by 1986. Accusations were made on the grounds that economic activities were reducing military effectiveness, its factories were not efficient, they were exempt from taxation, and that the links between officers and businessmen created corruption (Owen, 2000: 204). Despite Mubarak's concerns for protecting the interests of the military, these discussions were also helpful for him in his establishment of control over the military. Like Amir during Nasser's presidency, Field Marshall Ghazala became a powerful figure in the 1980s. He was popular in the military and took credit for his role in keeping military budget at high levels, and other economic investments. He was also perceived to be a man of high political ambition. There were rumours that Ghazala would succeed Mubarak in presidency. However, these expectations ended when Mubarak dismissed Ghazala in 1989. He replaced Ghazala with Hussein Tantawi, a relatively undistinguished general, not to allow another ambitious military officer to rise as a challenger (Kechichian and Nazimek, 1997: 134).

By removing Ghazala, Mubarak reasserted greater control over the military. However, Mubarak's control does not mean that Egyptian military lacks autonomy. Instead, there is a reciprocal relationship between the military and the president, serving interests of both. While Mubarak maintains support of the military as the

defender of the regime at last resort, the military is guaranteed generous budgetary allocations and autonomy on military issues (Owen, 2000: 204,205). Mubarak's control of the government and the assembly gives him sole responsibility for military budget and purchase of military equipment. In addition to military budget, the army also receives $1.3 billion military aid from the US annually. The military decides on how to use these funds without state scrutiny.

Classification of civil military relations during Mubarak's presidency is difficult. The level of professionalism has developed. The military seems to accept civilian supremacy. However, since Mubarak remains sensitive to the concerns of the military, there is no need for the military to assert themselves openly as long as they can exert influence through the presidency. Moreover, it is still hard to imagine a civilian government coming to power and stay there without intimate connections with the military. Therefore, it can be said that despite changing internal or external conditions, Egyptian political development is still linked to the attitudes of the military. On the other hand, because military does not assert or contradict with the government, civil military relationship in Egypt under Mubarak regime can be called as civilian rule and military partnership.

CHAPTER 4. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

This chapter will analyze the role of military in Turkish politics. The structure of the Ottoman military will be defined first, and then reform movements in the nineteenth century and the developments until the establishment of the Turkish Republic will be examined. Next, the role of the military under Atatürk will be studied. These two periods are important, especially the latter, in establishing military's stance towards politics. The chapter will continue with the conditions that brought first coup of the Republic in 1960. The main features of the military regime will be compared with Egyptian Revolution. The chapter will continue with the examination of developments in civil military relations including the 1971 memorandum, 1980 coup, and the process of disengagement.

Turkish history of civil military relations was marked with cycles of military interventions and withdrawals. In the coups of 1960 and 1980, the praetorian stance of the military took the form of Norldinger's guardian regime where the military took over political control and then relinquished it to civilians. In other times it acted as a moderator using number of veto powers and threats of coups to influence politics. This moderator practices culminated in the deposition of government in 1971 and 1997 without resorting to force. In examination of the development of civil military relations in Turkey, military concerns and ideology, domestic conditions of the country and international environment will be taken into consideration.

4.1. Ottoman Legacy

4.1.1. Historical Background

Ottaman society was divided into two main classes. Sultan delegated religious or executive power to the *askeri*, literally the military class comprising officers of the court and the army, civil servants and *ulama*, i.e. religious functionaries. The remaining masses constituted the *reaya*, all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan. The logic of statecraft was to keep each individual in its appropriate social position, excluding the subjects of the empire from the privileges of the "military". However, as the external and internal conditions of the Empire changed, it became difficult to maintain this rigid social organization (İnalcık, 1964: 44-45). Thus, in the early recommendations for the recovery of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim *reaya*'s invasion of the Sultan's military institution had been defined as the main reason for decline (İnalcık, 1980: 283).

The most important part of Ottoman forces was the Janissaries. They were the infantry forces of the Empire recruited through the *devşirme* system, i.e. periodic levy of the male children of the Christian subjects. They were slaves, *kuls,* of the Sultan. Being introduced to a new religion, new language and new way of life, they owed everything to the state. Their education was to provide them with the highest degree of expertise and commitment. The Janissaries constituted the original foundation of the centralist government, and they were the main supporter of the Sultan's absolute power. They formed a permanent army at the Porte and also were stationed in the main strongholds in the provinces (Hale, 1994: 3-4).

The majority of trained cavalry for the Ottoman army were recruited through the *tımar system.* Members of the cavalry, *tımarlı sipahis*, were given usufruct of state

lands in exchange for their military service in the wartime. They also performed administrative duties such as collecting land and other taxes and helped to maintain law and order in the provinces.

However, in late sixteenth century, important changes took place as a result of economic and military changes in Western Europe. As *tımarlı sipahis* proved ineffective against foreign musketeers, the Ottoman government discarded them and increased the number of Janissaries. Next, they recruited peasants equipped with firearms as mercenaries (İnalcık, 1980: 288-289).

The involvement of the Janissaries in the politics of the Empire had begun long before such developments. They took the actual control of the government in distant provinces when the central authority grew weaker. As early as 1446, Murad II came to the throne after gaining the consent of the Janissaries in a public meeting (İnalcık, 1964: 46). In 1451 at the beginning of his second reign, Mehmet II had suppressed a Janissary revolt. There was further unrest in 1514 and 1525. Although Mehmet II issued a decree entitling the prince in the throne to execute his brothers, this did not prevent succession struggles, and support or opposition of the Janissaries were influential in those struggles. As they had integrated to Turkish Muslim society, the Janissaries lost loyalty to the Sultan. When Selim II allowed them to enroll their sons in the corps in 1568, they began to lose their status as slaves. Their attachment to the Ahi brotherhood and later Bektashi order of dervishes also helped them to gain an increasingly independent corporate status. Many of them turned to civilian occupations although this was forbidden (Hale, 1994: 8-9).

With the increase in their number, the Janissary corps began to dominate the Ottoman capital and central government (İnalcık, 1980: 289). In 1628, a former

commander of the Janissary corps became Grand Vizier for the first time. The vizier, courtiers and heirs to the throne all sought the aid of the Janissaries to obtain power. Between 1618 and 1730, no less than six Sultans were deposed by their own soldiers. The Janissaries began to control all sectors of the empire (İnalcık, 1964: 46).

Organization of firearmed peasants known as *levends* into special companies as *sekban bölükleri* had significant effects in the Empire. Increasing number of young peasants joined the *levends*, creating a big reservoir both for military service and banditry. They served as an alternative for Janissary recruitment since the *devşirme* system had been abandoned by 1700 (Aksan, 1999: 27). *Tımarlı sipahis* on whom the responsibility of keeping security and order in the provinces rested were ineffective against the muskets of the *sekbans*. Thus, the *sekbans* became the most important source of power of the provincial governors against the central state. When they were self-employed, they roamed in Anatolia and acted as robber bands. Those brigand-soldiers known as *celalis* brought devastation to Anatolia and destroyed the power of Sultan there (İnalcık, 1980: 292-297).

There were rivalries between the Janissaries and the *sekbans*. Although during campaigns, the *sekbans* performed similar functions with the Janissaries, they did not have the privileges of the Janissaries. Thus, they tried to infiltrate in the Janissary corps. That the Janissaries and the *sekbans* were used to counterbalance or suppress each other contributed to the situation (İnalcık, 1980: 297-304).

Another recourse to suppress the *sekbans* was to issue *nefr-i am*, calling the *reaya* population to arms in order to assist the forces of the Sultan. However, since *nefr-i am* soldiers frequently resorted to brigandage, they were also tried to be dispersed immediately after the order was established. In later stages of this trend,

central governments continued to encourage the provincial governors to employ young peasants that had not been influenced by *sekban* organization. The idea was that such unspoiled ingenious people could be better disciplined than organized *sekbans*. In the nineteenth century, the organized armies of Selim III and Mahmud II were drawn from this source of large reservoir of peasantry (İnalcık, 1980: 305-310).

4.1.2. Reform and Revolution

Selim III has been regarded as the father of Westernization in the Ottoman Empire. Like his predecessors, Selim III was concerned to restore the military power of the Empire. However, to achieve this end he created a new army outside of and independent from the older corps, called *Nizam-i Cedid*, meaning New Order directly modeled on the armies of the West. While all reform attempts had been characterized by efforts to restore the purity of old institutions and practices until the rule of Selim III, with *Nizam-i Cedid* a new concept of reform, the creation of new institutions and practices based on the developments in the West began (Shaw, 1965-1966: 63).

The first recruits of the new army were renegades of Austrian and Russian campaigns and unemployed young men from the streets of Istanbul. Later, recruits came from Anatolia. Starting in 1802, Selim III developed a system of military conscription according to which each provincial and district official and notable was required to send certain number of men for the *Nizam-i Cedid*. They were armed with modern weapons, trained by European officers and had European uniforms. Although they proved their superiority over the Janissaries and other elements of the old army on the occasions that they were employed, the new army suffered from lack of

discipline as a result of rapid increase in the number of recruits (Shaw, 1965-1966: 178-181).

The efforts of Selim III to create a new army under his direct command threatened the dominant position of the Janissaries and provincial governors. Military reform necessitated a need for political reform bringing changes in administrative and financial system of the Empire. His reforms in order to raise funds for the new army also created tensions. In 1807 the opposition of the Janissaries, the *ulema* and others with vested interests in the preservation of the old institutions led to an open revolt which ended with the dissolution of the *Nizam-i Cedid* army and disposition of Selim III (Hale 1994:16).

The events in 1807 and 1808 proved that as long as the Janissaries stayed in the same form and with the same power, they would prevent modernization of the military which was essential to prevent the collapse of the Empire. The revolt in Greece could only be suppressed with the help of Muhammed Ali Pasha whose French trained army served as a source of envy and an inspiration for military reform (Zurcher, 1998: 437). When Mahmud II felt secure enough to resume the military reforms, he first tried to incorporate some part of the Janissaries to the nucleus of a new army. He aimed to achieve gradual change in the attitudes and powers of the Janissaries (Aksan, 1999: 32). He started drill based on the model of Muhammed Ali. The mutinous response of the Janissaries was ended with the dissolution of these five-centuries-old corps in 1826.

Mahmud II formed a new army called *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye*, Triumphant Soldiers of Muhammad. Removal of the Janissaries meant the elimination of the main obstacle to reform but there were other difficulties. The main problem for

the new army was the recruitment of the cadres needed for training and leading this new army. Muhammed Ali of Egypt had solved the problem methodologically. First, he had established a school in Aswan where selected youths received training from French colonel Seve. After the graduation of one thousand officers from this school, Muhammed Ali begun to recruit Egyptian regiments. By this way, Muhammed Ali managed to have an organized, effective army. However, Mahmud II had no time since the removal of the Janissaries left the Empire defenseless. The problem in Greece and European pressure on the issue contributed to the sense of urgency to establish a new army. Moreover, because the Janissaries had fulfilled police duties, considerations of public security added to the motives for the organization of the new army immediately. Thus, Mahmud II had to proceed to recruit the regiments of the new army without well-trained officers who would lead the new army (Levy, 1971: 21-24).

Moreover, since the traditional military caste was foreign and superimposed in Egypt, it was relatively easy for Muhammed Ali to control them after the elimination of the *Mamluks*. Because there was no distinction between civilian and military government in the Ottoman Empire, even after the destruction of the Janissaries, large segments of the old military order remained in power. Thus, the commanding caste of the new army was to be staffed as before with the Ottoman ruling elite. This complicated the task of Mahmud II in reforming the military since he had to transform the old military leadership while Muhammed Ali had relatively easier task of creating a new leadership. Furthermore, because of the Greek problem, European military assistance was ruled out. Thus, the Ottoman Empire also lacked the military assistance of European powers while Muhammed Ali benefited from foreign officers

to a large extent. Because of the severe fiscal conditions of the Empire, those European advisers employed on private basis were no match for the foreign advisors under the service of Muhammed Ali. They were in far inferior condition to those in the Egyptian service. Thus, *Mansure* army was short of military officers that were crucial for the success of its operations as it was to be observed in the superiority of the Egyptian army over the *Mansure* in their later encounters (Levy, 1971: 21-24).

The new army was modeled on the earlier *Nizam-i Cedid* corps and organized along European lines as regiments. The *Mansure* regiments were composed of volunteers and peasants recruited by Sultan's officials in the provinces. There was no system of recruitment, but the army would be manned according to need. Parallel to *Mansure* army, Imperial Guard called *Hassa* replacing the old *Bostanciyan* was formed. Later a reserve army known as *redif* was established on the Prussian model (Zurcher, 1998: 438).

Although efforts were made to professionalize the army stressing the ability and merit in promotions, favoritism continued to be dominant. Since the high echelons of the army were occupied by the courtiers and protégés of the ruling elite, officer corps became an arena for politics and intrigues. This factionalism immobilized the army in the disastrous war with Russia (1828-1829) and in the later conflict with Muhammed Ali. They all demonstrated the inadequacies of the officer corps (Levy, 1971).

The Ottoman Empire had some technical and professional schools established as the naval school (1773), artillery school (1793), military medical school (1826) which had been fulfilling some requirements of the Ottoman army. In 1834, School for Military Sciences known as *Harbiye* was established to train the army officers.

However, the school suffered from problems such as lack of teaching materials, qualified instructors or political influence on the selection of officer corps at the beginning. The new army gained little benefit from the military school during the reign of Mahmud II as seen in the 1839 defeat against Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali, in Syria as a result of inadequacies in the Ottoman military leadership (Levy 1971, 35-36).

On the other hand, in the long run, *Harbiye* College managed to train a new class of professional officers with important political and military consequences. The officer corps trained in the college became the state's most favorite class attracting people from all circles of the older ruling elite. As a result, the new military leadership produced in this school was integrated with the older ruling class, preventing the upheavals against the reforms. Although transformation of the old leadership was a slower process than creating a new one, in the long run, it became an advantage for the Ottoman Empire to have an indigenous westernized Ottoman military leadership rooted in the culture of society, because in the following decades, the officer corps became the most significant modernizing force in Ottoman society (Levy, 1971: 37-39).

After the death of Mahmud II, military reforms and their reflections in the political sphere continued. Two major reform decrees of the *Tanzimat* period, the *Hatti Serif-i of Gülhane* (1839) and the *Hatt-i Humayun* (1856) provided theoretical base for universal conscription by their emphasis on civic equality among all subjects of the Empire, regardless of religion. Meanwhile, new army regulations fixed the terms of services and defined the details of drawing lots as the means of recruitment. As participation of non-Muslims in the military was not sought after either by

themselves or the Muslims, conscription laws were supplemented with a decree enabling non-Muslims to pay a commutation fee called *bedel-i askeri*. Inhabitants of the holy places, Mecca and Medina, religious functionaries, students of religious schools and members of professional groups were exempted from military service. As recruitment of nomads was difficult, the Ottoman army was an army of settled Muslim men most of whom were peasants (Zurcher, 1998: 438-444).

Improvements in military education continued. Since military education became available before the special secular schools to train civil servants, they became important as a means for upward mobilization of provincial boys with inferior backgrounds. The graduates of modern military schools regarded themselves as pioneers of enlightenment. The military education system provided officers with a separate world of their own beginning from their youth to the rest of their career. This structure provided officers with a corporate social homogeneity (Hale, 1994: 24).

Meanwhile, the rising Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia was critical of the highly personal and authoritarian system of government. Known as Young Ottomans, they embraced romantic nationalism which was widespread in Europe and advocated constitutionalism. They wanted to introduce elements of Western civilization and at the same time to keep the traditional Islamic-Turkish culture. This group of people was the pioneers of Ottoman nationalism and democracy (İnalcık, 1964: 62).

Collaborating with civil servants and military officials, Young Ottomans prepared coup d'etat of 1876. They also formed the constitution of that year. However, after the coup in 1878, Abdulhamid II suspended the parliament.

Abdulhamid II continued many of the reforms of his predecessors while ruling as an absolutist monarch. He promoted technical and educational developments in the

Empire. In the army, conscription system was extended, artillery was modernized with the help of Germany, and military education was expanded. *Das Volk in Waff en,* The Nation in Arms, the classic book of the German General von der Goltz who was appointed to restructure and revitalize the Ottoman officer corps in the nineteenth century was translated into Turkish and recommended for all Ottoman military cadets. The book advocated an active role for the military in reshaping society and regarded the armed forces as representative of the essence of the nation (Jenkins, 2007: 340). Moreover, young officers assigned to fight dissidents in the Balkans or Arabian Peninsula observed the weakness of the Empire and the political benefits of national spirit and organization (Rustow, 1964: 360).

Such developments contributed to the politicization of the officers along with the problems in the army. Abdulhamid II prevented military maneuvers for fears of conspiracy. The graduates of *Harbiye* constituted still a small percent of the army officers. Court favoritism continued to be the normal means of advancement. The economic and physical conditions of soldiers were also bad. The demoralization in the army and the professional concerns of the military was important in the open revolt of the army in 1908 as well as the constitutionalist sentiments (Hale, 1994: 30).

The opposition to Abdulhamid II emerged among the students and young graduates of military schools and especially in the medical cadets. The first secret political society against Abdulhamid was formed by some students of military medical school in 1889. The name of the society was Progress and Union. They wanted to restore constitutionalism and replace Abdulhamid with one of his brothers. After the revelation of their conspiracy against the Sultan, many of them were executed or exiled. Thus, the leadership of the organization was taken by figures

living abroad while some clashes began to emerge between advocates of strong central government and liberals with repercussions after the revolution (Hale, 1994: 30-31).

The revolution of 1908 was largely inspired by those radical exiles. However, it was carried out by rebellious officers in several Macedonian garrisons. In 1906 a group of officials and civilians had formed the Ottoman society of Liberty, and another group of officers, including Mustafa Kemal formed the Fartherland and Liberty society in Damascus. Next year they merged and declared their affiliation with the exiles. The name of the opposition became known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The movement became so strong that Abdulhamid had to proclaim the constitution in 1908 after a few acts of defiance by the dissidents (Rustow, 1964: 360-361).

After the revolution, the divisions between unionist emphasizing nationalism and liberals stressing the concept of Ottoman patriotism became more profound. These divisions were reflected in the army. The different perspectives of the military were divided into four categories as conservative, unionist, liberal and neutral. There were many soldiers and lower-ranking officers who were unwilling to shift away from Islamic tradition. They were loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. The ordinary soldiers were generally supported by *alayli* who had risen from their ranks and resented the rapid promotions of *mekteplis* who had been educated in the new military schools. That almost all of the revolutionary officers were *mekteplis* shows the ideological difference between the *alayli* and *mektepli* groups (Hale, 1994: 37).

Officers who supported the revolution constituted majority of the upper ranks of the army, but they were divided as unionists favoring nationalism as the source of

loyalty, and liberals demanding a free democratic regime which would reconcile diverse peoples in the Empire under the concept of Ottoman nationhood. On the other hand, a number of officials were neutral or non partisan. They wanted to keep the army out of politics. They were worried that if the army got into politics, it could not perform the task of protecting the empire. A civil war could emerge and foreign powers could exploit the conflict in the army (Hale, 1994: 36-38).

A year after the revolution in 12 April 1909 (31 Mart), the reaction against the regime exploded by rebel soldiers from the First Army along with religious students and serving and dismissed *alayli* officers. The mutiny was suppressed by the march of Macedonian Army under the command of Mahmud Shevket Pasha on Istanbul. In the incident, the rivalry between *alaylis* and *mekteplis* was exploited and it caused the revolt by lower ranks to the higher rank (Hale, 1994: 39).

The events of 1909 are considered to have brought the dictatorship of CUP and the army. Yet, the period between 1909 and 1914 was marked by the shifting struggles between military high command, the liberals and the unionists. Mahmud Shevket tried to keep army out of the politics. The CUP remained as an underground society and did not turn into a political party. The cabinet was directed by the members of old military and civilian elite, and the CUP had a few members in it. While the power of the CUP increasingly concentrated in the triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Cemal, they were able to establish their centralist dictatorship after setting another coup, eliminating liberals, and their success in recapturing Edirne after the defeat in Balkan Wars (Hale, 1994: 41-45).

Becoming the minister of War and deputy commander in Chief, Enver became the most prominent figure in the Empire. He made a secret agreement with Germany

in August 1914, informing only a few members of the cabinet. The war brought the final calamity for the Empire.

During the period of 1908 and 1918, the army along with the CUP had become the dominant element in the politics of the Empire. It constituted precedents for the military activism which influenced the politics of the Republic to follow. The 1908 Revolution was an example of the military reaction against absolutism in favor of representative governance. The 31 March Incident illustrated lower ranks revolting against the upper echelons of the army and its unsuccessful end. The period also showed that ambitious middle ranking officers like Enver could gain high political power with military backing. Shared political involvement of military officers with civilian leaders through their close relationship with the CUP consolidated officers' sense of responsibility for the future of the state (Harris, 1988: 180-181).

The military involvement in politics in the Ottoman Empire can be seen in two different phases of praetorianism, as suggested by Perlmutter (1977). In historical praetorianism, military represented and defended the legitimacy of the authority in the state. The authority relationship between military establishment and political order has a traditional orientation. In modern praetorianism, military challenges legitimacy and offers a new kind of authority (Perlmutter, 1977: 93). This differentiation might be useful in explaining the difference between actions of the Janissaries and the politicized soldiers of 1876 and 1908.

The Janissaries present a complex picture of political involvement of the military. They had been professional soldiers trained to have military expertise. They had been banned from other occupations. They had corporate unity, lived in barracks, wore uniforms etc. As argued by many scholars, these professional features gave them

the power to exert political influence when the power of the Sultan, central authority, decreased. This seems to be against Huntington's argument on professionalism which requires political neutrality. On the other hand, in accordance with the same argument, the Janissaries' involvement in the political affairs of the Empire increased as they started to lose some of their professional features. They began to have other occupations, and their expertise on military affairs declined. Although their fighting capacities decreased relative to the European armies, the Janissaries remained as the most powerful section of the military within the Ottoman Empire. They remained strong enough to influence the succession of the Sultans or prevent attempts for military reform.

Thus, the main distinction between the political involvement of the Janissaries and the military establishment of the Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries can better be understood not in terms of the results of military professionalism, but with the traditional orientation of the relationship between the Janissaries and the political order. Even in times that the preference of the Janissaries determined who was to ascend to the throne, they did not question the basis of the legitimacy of Sultans. The Janissaries tried to preserve their own interests, but did not offer a new type of authority. This made them an example of historical praetorianism, suggested by Perlmutter (1977: 90-93).

On the other hand, those officers who took part in the coups of 1876 and 1908 challenged the authority of the Sultan by advocating constitutionalism and a parliamentary system. In that sense, they can be seen as modern praetorians. Their relationship with the political order differed from traditional orientation of the relationship between the Janissaries and the Sultan. Those officers had been educated

along Western lines in modern military schools. Their sense of corporateness had developed together with nationalistic ideas and reformist attitudes. Yet, this definition does not reflect the stance of whole officer corps of the time. There were divisions between *mektpeli* and *alaylı* officers, unionists and liberals. Hence, there was a complex picture of military officers with different political and professional concerns. As a result, this period was marked with high military activism. The factionalism in the military decreased its fighting capacity and brought some defeats as in the case of Balkan War. As a result, despite the efforts to protect status quo, the developments in the 19th and early 20th centuries left a military legacy of modernization and Westernization and a tradition of military activism in the Ottoman history. It also provided the learning process from experience regarding the drawbacks of the politicization of the military in decreasing its fighting capacity as a result of increasing factionalism.

4.2. The Turkish Republic and Army in Interwar Era, 1918-1945

After the war, Istanbul government faced with the dismemberment of the Empire and the tutelary regime under Allies. On the other hand, the generals and field commanders tried to delay the de-mobilization of troops and not to surrender their arms. There were stirrings of national resistance, but it was scattered and unorganized while all political forces were disqualified from taking any effective initiative to fill the gap of leadership and organization except the army (Rustow, 1959: 520).

Mustafa Kemal used his position as the inspector of the Ninth Army to coordinate the efforts of resistance and organize the independence movement. Although he was forced to resign from his military post when the Sultan ordered his

discharge, he managed to prepare the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas for this purpose. When Allied armies completed their occupation of capital, the nationalists formed Grand National Assembly in Ankara under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal.

There was no serious division of civil and military affairs in the initial stages. Under Mustafa Kemal`s leadership, military officers fulfilled critical positions and organizational functions in the war of Independence and the foundation of the Republic. The critical conditions of the country and the small base of the leadership made military officers essential in the conduct of government. They participated in the Cabinet, Assembly and bureaucracy and returned to their military duties when needed (Harris, 1965a: 55). Since circumstances were critical, Mustafa Kemal tried to prevent disruption of national unity by focusing on the independence and disguising the differences of his political ideas with the Sultan. The avoidance of the army in partisan acts during the war facilitated its withdrawal from politics later (Rustow, 1964: 371).

Once the victory was won, it became possible to clarify the internal structure of the state. The sultanate was abolished (1922), the republic was proclaimed (1923), the caliphate was abolished (1924), and a representative constitution was prepared (1924). Later, the principles behind those developments such as secularism, territorial integrity and national unity, and westernization turned into an ideology known as Kemalism. In these scheme of reforms, Atatürk's envision of the military was beyond the defender of external frontiers. It was vital for the spread of reforms, base of power for the regime, "the guardian of its ideals" (Harris, 1965a: 55). Atatürk declared that

> …the Turkish nation has…always looked to the military… as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals… When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country… The Turkish nation… considers its army the guardian of its ideals.[2]

On the other hand, Atatürk also supported the separation of military from ordinary conduct of politics. Presumably influenced by the experiences of the Young Turk period and Enver's wartime regime, Atatürk made the following statement on the separation of civil and military affairs:

> Commanders, while thinking of and carrying out the duties and the requirements of the army, must beware of letting their minds be influenced by political considerations. They must not forget that there are other officials whose duty it is to think of the requirements of the political side. ….With talk and politicking a soldier's duty cannot be done…[3]

The aims were to prevent military from having direct political influence and also to insulate military from political influences (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 20). The presence of some dissident military figures in the Parliament and the confused loyalties of the transition period from Sultanate to the Republic constituted a significant incentive for the efforts of dividing civil and military affairs.

While being sensitive in conciliating the military at first, Atatürk made moves to isolate military from the influences of political opposition and to achieve its complete loyalty to him and to the reforms after the proclamation of the Republic (Harris, 1965a: 56-57). Although filled by former military leaders, the Republican People's Party (RPP) was established as a civilian instrument for the formulation of national policy. In 1923, officers on active duty were required to resign their commissions before standing for elections. The officers were even deprived of right to vote and the influence as well as the numbers of the retired officers in the parliament

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[2] As quoted in G. S. Harris, 1965a: 56.
[3] As quoted in Rustow. 1964: 382

declined in the lifetime of Atatürk (Harris, 1988:181). In 1924, the Chief of the General Staff was removed from the Cabinet, and thus from ministerial control and attached to the Presidency. This made the military independent of political interference while subordinate to the President.

On the other hand, civil and military affairs were not separated completely. The main factor in the stable relationship between civil and military spheres was the military figures in the highest positions. The military prestige of Atatürk and İnönü were important in the military's acceptance of standing aloof from politics (Rustow, 1959: 549). The loyalty of Fevzi Çakmak as the Chief of the General Staff to Atatürk guaranteed that the armed forces would not use their independence against him (Harris, 1965a: 58).

Autonomous in handling military issues, the Chief of the General Staff had access to all governmental and parliamentary leaders. His position preceded that of Cabinet Ministers in the government. In the Supreme Military Council, the Chief of the General Staff was present to consider problems concerning the armed forces. Military considerations influenced developments in various fields such as road and railroad building and industrialization of the country. Although their proportion decreased gradually, ex-officers continued to occupy posts in the Parliament, the cabinet, and other high civilian institutions. Regionally, military posts and the governorship of some frontier provinces were combined. Likewise, in the provinces declared under martial law such as the ones after the Kurdish uprisings or Istanbul in World War II, army commanders were responsible for the civil administration (Rustow, 1959: 549-550).

From the early 1930s on, the education system inculcated the concept of military nation. The introduction of compulsory military service in 1927 strengthened the identification of the military and the nation. Besides the activities of the officers and ex-officers, universal conscription had a pervasive modernizing influence. Besides military training, military service had an educational role imbued the youngsters with the values of the republic. Military service constituted a common experience shaping the attitudes of the male population in Turkey (Jenkins, 2007: 340-341).

While popular respect and prestige of the officers continued, there was also a vast social change in Turkey which prepared for the eventual disruption of the civil military equilibrium. The emergence of a middle class of businessmen and professionals and the spread of education which broadened the base of elites began to produce alternatives for the prominence of military officers in the power structure of the state. The decrease of the retired officers in the Assembly proved the situation (Harris, 1965a: 61). While those with military career constituted 16% of the Assembly in 1931, this figure decreased to 11 % in 1946 and 5% in 1950 (Yeşilada, 1984: 23).

Yet, military profession remained as a channel for upward mobility for provincial youth who otherwise did not have much chance to improve their status. Limited opportunities in primary education put limits on such advancement. The boys from villages or small towns who could attend the military schools achieved the means of entering the upper class while those who could not remained in their conditions (Rustow, 1964: 386-387). For those who overcame this initial barrier, the advancement in military profession was based on merit. While the period of peace after the continuous situation of war since the beginning of the 20th century facilitated

the withdrawal of military from politics, it also slowed the advancement in military positions since the vacancies occurred only through retirement or death in the upper ranks (Harris, 1965a: 61).

The freezing of the top ranks in the army stimulated frustrations among the junior officers, contributing to their involvement in ideological currents. The concept of revolutionary change as the doctrine of the RPP enshrined in the 1937 constitution was a prominent one. The compulsory courses on the Turkish Revolution increasingly indoctrinated military cadets for radical social reform, reinforcing the identification of the officer corps with the mainstream of Turkish intelligentsia (Harris, 1965a: 61-62).

Although Turkey did not enter World War II, the mobilization revealed the weaknesses of the Turkish military, creating a general agreement in the top levels of the government on the inefficiency of the independence of the military from parliamentary control. Thus, after the retirement of Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff was attached to the Prime Minister to deal directly with other ministries on common issues (Harris, 1965a: 63).

The overview of this period illustrates the formation of Turkish armed forces' attitude towards politics. The War for Independence reinstated the prestige of the military after the defeat of World War I and provided legitimacy for the military in the eyes of the Turkish people. Its role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic gave the military the main reference for the guardianship of the features and integrity of the Republic. This was not a self-appointed mission. The legacy of the founder of the Republic, Atatürk, was twofold in this respect. He assigned the military as the guardian of national ideals, i.e. secular democratic order and the integrity of the state. At the same time, Atatürk stated the necessity for the separation of the military and

politics, and subordination of the former to the latter. Thus, civilianization of the regime was accompanied by legitimization of the military as its protector. In Egypt Nasser, on the other hand, gave a civilian role to the bureaucracies and political organizations created by the army. This maximized military domination and discouraged return to civilian rule.

Atatürk started civilianization of the regime after the War for Independence was won, and external threat was defeated. This situation was in line with Lasswell's argument that challenging international environment makes civilian control over the military difficult. If evaluated in terms of Welch's civil-military continuum, the change can be seen as a move from military control and civilian partnership to military influence and civilian control. While military officers had been the leading figures in politics, later they had to abandon their military positions to continue their political life. As a result, influence of the military in political affairs decreased. In accordance with Huntington's argument, the decrease in the political role of the military was accompanied by an increase in its autonomy. While these two trends seem mutually reinforcing, the importance of Atatürk's leadership cannot be overlooked. Atatürk civilianized the regime, and distanced the military and politics, but the military's acceptance of this position was eased and secured by its support for and loyalty to Atatürk. This was true for İnönü, too. Thus, although civilian control over the military was established under the rule of Atatürk and İnönü, whether or not the belief in the principle of civilian supremacy, which Finer (1988) suggests as the main factor in preventing military intervention existed was to be tested when the leadership of the country changed.

4.3. Multiparty Regime and Prelude to the Coup, 1945-1960

With the end of World War II, Turkey entered into a new era. With the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) by the former members of the RPP, single party period came to an end. The transition period brought forward the questions regarding the relations between the politicians and armed forces. Before multiparty period, military figures saw no problem in attending party meetings, since there was virtually no difference between the activities of the RPP and the government. Now, on the other hand, the DP called for no display of partisanship by the military in order to ensure its neutrality. While some commanders had difficulty in tolerating the opposition, some officer corps in the army was supporting the opposition despite the absence of military connections of its founders. They shared the intellectual discontent of the civilian opposition with the single party regime. After the 1946 elections, some secret groups in support of the DP began to emerge within the military in order to exchange ideas about preventing dishonest elections, and infiltrating officers thinking like themselves into key command positions (Harris, 1965a: 63-64).

Both the DP and the RPP tried to get military figures to bolster their position before the 1950 elections, which constituted further motivations of political consciousness for the officer corps. Despite this attempt, both parties also took measures to downgrade the importance of the military. In 1949, the RPP made the the Chief of the General Staff subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense and established a National Defense Council to ensure more civilian control (Harris, 1965a: 65).

The elections ended the era in which the military had been the most important figure in the power structure. The Democrats' victory in the elections surprised many

in the government and the military. Some senior generals asked İnönü for a military move, but their proposal was not accepted. The subordination of the military to the civilian rule became clear, while it kept its former attitudes, regarding itself as the vanguard of intelligentsia and the defender of the reforms (Harris, 1965a: 65-66).

Apprehensive of the relationship between the military and the RPP, Menderes government carried out a purge in the military High Command. The Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy and air force along with some other generals were removed from their positions (Ahmad, 1977:150). Although an immediate threat from the military was averted, discomfort of the Democrats with the army continued. They decided to reform the army and to put it under civilian control. By 1952, Turkey was a member of the NATO, which also wanted to see reform in Turkish Army. However, unwilling to challenge the generals directly and repeat the public embarrassment of the previous purge of the generals, Menderes decided to give up the reform programme. By this way, he appeased the generals but also lost the chance of establishing firm control over the military (Ahmad, 1977: 151-153). This decision caused the resignation of the Minister of National Defense, Seyfi Kurtbek, who was the main advocator of reform. After that, there was no representative in the Cabinet to voice the ideas of the military (Harris, 1965b: 169).

Confident about the generals, the Democrats neglected the officers in the lower ranks. However, there was discontent spreading in the junior ranks. With NATO membership, the character of the Turkish armed forces began to change in 1950s. Thousands of young officers were sent abroad, Turkish forces fought in Korea, they were assigned to NATO commands and involved in multinational maneuvers. These experiences convinced them that Turkey's economic and social backwardness

could only be overcome by radical social reform. Moreover, those who learned about modern techniques of warfare began to lose respect for their traditional minded superiors (Harris, 1965b: 170).

Emerging middle classes with their increasing wealth and status in the society were causes of disturbance both in the military and civilian intelligentsia. The inflationary trend decreased the well being of officers so much that by 1956, one third of commissioned officers had left the military due to economic reasons (Harris, 1965b: 170). In fact, military was lowered down in the list of priorities, but not neglected in terms of military budget which kept increasing. Yet, the situation was not enough to satisfy the demands (Ahmad, 1977: 154).

In this atmosphere, new military cliques began to emerge, especially in the Staff College in Istanbul. Although the main aim was to achieve military reform at the initial stages, later some officers decided that this would not be enough to solve the problems of the country (Harris, 1965b: 171-172). The context of inter-party struggle between the DP and the RPP provided a political direction to the discontent in the army. The officers began to see the problems of Turkey as they were articulated by the RPP and the press. The solutions were those advocated by the intelligentsia supportive of the opposition. On the other hand, a few officers with radical tendencies were probably influenced by the developments in countries like Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan (Ahmad, 1993: 125-126).

Even if the DP did not know what was going on in the army, it was alarmed with the arrest of nine officers accused of conspiracy against the government by the end of 1957. However, Menderes decided to bury the matter instead of carrying out a thorough investigation in order not to expose that they did not have complete control

over the army. Thus, the incident was no serious setback for conspirators, who continued their plotting (Ahmad, 1977: 156-157).

Conspirators wanted a high ranking general to lead the movement so that the military unity and command structure would be preserved. However, finding a general was not easy. The unwillingness of the generals to lead the coup was a proof of the Democrats' success in gaining the loyalty of the high command. On the other hand, those generals who rejected to involve in the coup did not expose the conspirators either, which indicates their greater loyalty to the army than to the government (Ahmad, 1977: 158). The Commander of the Land Forces, Cemal Gürsel accepted the leadership. With his help, the conspirators began to occupy key positions like the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, and the command of the Presidential Guard. They controlled the assignments in the army.

Meanwhile, during the events in Kayseri trip of İnönü and the declaration of martial law in Ankara and Istanbul to control student demonstrations, the military was further drawn into politics. The demonstration by the students of the military academy created a sense of urgency for the conspirators who were afraid of countermeasures by the government, while the government continued to underestimate the possibility of a military action (Harris, 1965b: 174-175; Ahmad, 1977, 159-160).

With the transition to multiparty system, military's position in politics began to change. Initial developments were towards greater civilian control, in theory. Civilian government had constitutional controls. The chief of staff was made responsible to the Ministry of Defence rather than to the Prime Ministry in 1949. However, in practice, the period has seen politicization of the military, a setback for civilian control. The rivalry between two parties reflected in different groups of

officer corps in the army. During Menderes government, critics of the DP gained prominence. The autonomy of the military discouraged or prevented Menderes from establishing full control over the army. Instead, Menderes tried to guarantee the loyalty of the high command by some purges, and new appointments at the high echelons. While he succeeded in creating a loyal high command more or less, the discontent among the lower ranks became the source of real problem for the Menderes government.

How much of this process leading to the coup of 1960 resulted from factors internal to the military establishment or other domestic conditions is difficult to determine. In evaluating factors internal to military, it seems that despite the increase in the professionalization of the military within NATO membership, political activism in the army grew. From this perspective it can be concluded that primary motivation for military intervention was not the corporate interests of the military as argued by Nordlinger (1977). He lists corporate interests of the military as adequate budgetary support, autonomy in their internal affairs, absence of functional rivals and survival of the military. That the military budget increased, the educational and technical facilities of the military improved, and the military remained largely autonomous from governmental control weakens the motivation for the preservation of corporate interests. However, despite the increase in military budget, decrease in the well being of officer corps as a result of inflationary trend and loss of prestige in society were sources of grievances for the officer corps. Moreover, as emphasized by scholars like Finer (1988) and Janowitz (1964), the role of the military as the savior of the nation, leading drive for modernization and the guarantor of the regime was a more significant factor. As the legacies from both Ottoman history and Atatürk, this role

shaped the officer corps' understanding of political and social conditions in the country and served as the main reference from which they derived the task of intervention and a means for legitimacy.

Other factors related to domestic conditions and political regime are emphasized by many scholars, such as Finer, Nordlinger, Huntington and Perlmutter. The economic crisis and the severe political strife between two parties led to the erosion of governmental authority. The government responded increasing criticism with authoritarian measures. The military which already had stronger political sympathies with the opposition was drawn into the confrontation between the parties as seen in İnönü's Kayseri trip. The crisis spread to the streets and universities with violent demonstrations against which martial law declared in Istanbul and Ankara. This also forced the officers to make a decision whether or not to act in support of the government. The current of military coups in other developing countries like Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq constituted another influence on the attitude of military officers towards military intervention.

4.4. Military Rule and Path from Disengagement to Memorandum, 1960-1971

In the early hours of 27 May 1960, the coup was carried out with minimum bloodshed. The opposing forces were too weak and disorganized for resistance. High ranking officers whose opposition to the coup was known were arrested while those undecided joined the coup after they saw that it was successful. The coup broadcasted on radio in the morning with statements that ending the irreconcilable situation of the political parties, setting up an above party administration, holding free elections and

handing back political power to the winning party were the purposes of the action (Harris, 1965b: 176; Ahmad, 1977: 160-161).

The junta which had seized the power called itself as the National Unity Committee (NUC). It was not a coherent body but rather mix of factions participated in the coup and wanted representation afterwards. Thus, the NUC composed of 38 members with Cemal Gürsel as the Chairman of the NUC, Head of State and Prime Minister. His powers on paper even exceeded that of Atatürk had ever held, yet he remained as a figurehead rather than the leader (Ahmad, 1977: 162).

With no preconceived plan for the post coup period, the NUC was unable to propose its own policy. Thus, the NUC invited a group of professors to prepare a new constitution. Yet, there were divergent views in the NUC on which way to follow. While moderates, i.e. Gürsel and generals, wanted to restore power to the civilians and supported the preparation of the new constitution, the radicals consisted of mainly junior officers with Colonel Türkeş as the most prominent figure advocated that armed forces would retain power to implement structural reforms more thoroughgoing than the constitutional committee had envisaged (Ahmad, 1993: 127-128). The report of professors called for the recreation of state and social institutions along with political authority and legal government. All members of the Assembly in the DP were arrested in accordance with the proposals. Then, the provisional constitution prepared by the constitutional commission outlined the powers of the NUC. According to the provisional constitution, the NUC would exercise sovereignty on behalf of the Turkish nation until Grand National Assembly returned to power. The Committee would exercise legislative power directly and executive power through the

cabinet. Only the judicial function was left independent from the NUC (Ahmad, 1977: 164).

When junior officers rejected Gürsel's initial proposition for the return of those officers participated in the coup to their barracks, radicals gained the strength in the Committee. As advocates of prolonged military rule, they disagreed when the NUC began to discuss the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to take over the legislative functions of the NUC. The retirement of 5000 officers and 235 generals, the threats against the press, and expulsion of 147 professors from the universities had already made the radicals unpopular among those many which had supported the coup. The deadlock in the Committee and the fear of both groups of a coup by the other led the generals to act before. In November 1960, fourteen members of the NUC were expelled (Ahmad, 1977: 165-168).

The purge of fourteen prevented further radicalization in the military rule and also eliminated officers opposed to the RPP (Karpat, 1988: 142). The way towards Constituent Assembly and elections was opened. On the other hand, armed forces and especially junior ranks sharing the same distrust in politicians and the institutions of the state were frustrated because the fourteen provided a voice in policy making for them. Their dismissal caused the reestablishment of new conspirational groups in the military (Ahmad, 1977: 168).

The power of the NUC within the army was moved to the Armed Forces Union (AFU), formed out of a combination of conflicting motives in the military. Some senior officers wanted to control all dissident elements in the army, and some others sought to prevent the NUC from intervening day to day activities of the military, while those middle ranking officers who had been involved in the coup

preparations but could not participate in the NUC used the AFU as a place to exert influence (Hale, 1990: 61-63).

The restoration of multiparty politics was on the way with high tension. The new constitution received a lukewarm acceptance in the referendum. Propaganda against the military regime and the constitution was carried out by the successor parties of the DP, especially by the Justice Party (JP), followed by threats from the military. Yassıada trials added to the tension. Fifteen former members of the Democrat Party were sentenced to death, and Adnan Menderes and his two cabinet ministers were executed with the confirmation of the NUC. The executions were designed to appease the extremist wing of the army as well as to demonstrate the necessity and legality of the intervention. In the wake of these events, elections were resulted in small lead of the RPP over the JP, which was a continuation of the DP, followed by two other parties close to the position of the DP (Ahmad, 1977: 172).

After the results, hardline officers in the AFU decided that intervention was necessary. Their attempt was prevented by the assurance of the High Command that they would act if the political conditions necessitate. The crisis was solved with the presidency of Gürsel and the formation of coalition government by the RPP and the JP, and İnönü became the prime minister. The event showed that opposition to civilian rule had still substantial support in the middle ranks of the military (Hale, 1990: 65). However, this unstable coalition did not eliminate the danger of intervention. Constant debates about amnesty for former Democrats unsettled the coalition government and the interventionist section in the army regarded it as a provocation. In February 1962, the Commander of War School, Talat Aydemir, attempted to take over the government. While Aydemir expected no opposition,

attachment to the chain of command prevented the success of this attempt. Aydemir's second try came one year later. Without substantial support in the army, this attempt also failed, and Aydemir and his main collaborators were executed. The result of the coup attempt conveyed the message that unless supported by commanders, colonels' coups destined to fail. This ended the overt political activity by the junior officers, while those of the generals continued (Harris, 1988: 185).

As a central element of the system, 1961 Constitution established the National Security Council (NSC) as a legal mechanism for military voice. It was composed of the chief of the general staff, commanders of land, sea and air forces, prime minister, ministers of defence, the interior, and foreign affairs under the chairmanship of the president. Its function was to assist the cabinet "in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination." Its broad mandate guaranteed political involvement of the top ranks of the military (Harris, 1988: 182-183). Moreover, just after the first coup attempt of Aydemir, a new bill increased the powers of the Council, through regular consultations and participation in regulatory discussions in the assembly (Ahmad, 1977: 181). The chief of the general staff was made responsible to the prime minister rather than to the defence minister. The Constitution also secured the future status of military rulers with seats assigned to the members of the NUC as life senators.

1961 Constitution was designed to prevent re-emergence of authoritarianism of parliamentary majorities by diluting the government power. It established a second parliamentary chamber, a proportional system of representation, broad autonomy for the universities, and a constitutional court able to invalidate governmental decrees and legislation. It also included explicit guarantees of freedom of thought, expression,

association and publication along with other democratic liberties, social and economic rights. The system of checks and balances in the new regime was so effective that at times it became impossible for the government to deal with crises, a situation which tried to be balanced in later interventions (Harris, 1988: 184).

The withdrawal of military from politics was slow and partial. High Command remained watchful but left the politicians alone as long as they behaved themselves. With the election of Süleyman Demirel who suggested a conciliatory policy towards the 27 May as the new leader of the JP, High Command came to acquiesce in the party. When the party gained majority in the 1965 elections, there was no meeting of the AFU followed by a protocol as was the case after 1961 elections. When the JP government passed the bill for amnesty for former Democrats, there was no warning from the High Command while the denouncements of the National Unity Group in the Senate was no longer intimidating for the JP. With the election of General Sunay as the new President, government's standing with the High Command increased further (Ahmad, 1977: 191-193).

Military became an integral part of not only political but also socio-economic life of the country. With higher salaries and pensions, economic status of the military personnel improved along with their social status. The creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) which became one of the largest conglomerates in the country brought the military into business and industry (Ahmad, 1993: 130-131).

The military was concerned with the defense of the regime it helped to create rather than with a particular party. The main concern was the stability which the government failed to provide. The period after the adoption of 1961 Constitution saw an increase in the political ideas, especially in the left. First time in history, an openly

socialist party, Turkish Labour Party (TLP) was established in Turkey. University students become politically active and polarization began. Cyprus issue and revelation of Johnson letter increased the criticisms against the NATO and the US. The upsurge of leftist currents was not in militant character at the beginning, but later the left turned militant. The TLP was divided into number of radical organizations. Extreme right, ethnic nationalists and Islamists, set up their own armed groups. Clashes between these groups turned into murderous and increased in frequency (Ahmad, 1977: 194-201).

The government was unable to take effective measures against the increasing violence in the country. Both the JP and the RPP were preoccupied with internal dissent. After the experience of 1960, Demirel resisted to declare martial law even if normal security forces could not provide security and order. There were increasing clashes between rightist and leftist students, the militant activities by the workers and the kidnappings of American military officers in Turkey. The military issued warnings against the situation with an anti-left position. The unrest in the armed forces brought some arrests and retirements in the military due to political involvement. This attitude of the High Command in support of the government increased the confidence of Demirel that there was no threat of military intervention. Meanwhile, it was not so easy for commanders to have such a consensus in the face of declining law and order. Muhsin Batur, commander of the air force issued two memorandums, calling for reforms on which member of the NSC could not agree. However, there was one thing the generals agreed upon that the Demirel government was not able to control the violence upsetting the constitutional order (Ahmad, 1977).

The period from 1960 to 1971 covers the military rule after the coup, its disengagement and conditions which brought it back to the politics. After the coup, military officers assumed power through the NUC. In Nordlinger's (1977) terms, there was a conflict between those who advocated a guardian type of rule which aimed at a return to civilian rule, and those who advocated a ruler type of regime with far reaching intentions in changing the economic, social and political life of the country and military domination for an indefinite period of time. The situation was quite similar to the Egyptian case between 1952 and 1954. However, the result was different. In Turkey guardians gained the upper hand by purging the radical figures from the NUC, while a ruler regime was established in Egypt. This result can be traced back to different reasons.

First, the difference in military regimes of Turkey and Egypt can be explained with the influence of different historical experiences of the militaries. Although as the guardian of the Republic, Turkish military assumes right to intervene in politics when it deems necessary for its security, there was also a legacy of keeping the military out of politics. This was prescribed and practiced under the rule of Atatürk. The drawbacks of political involvement in the profession of military and weakening of fighting capacities had also experienced during Ottoman rule. Moreover, democracy is one of the constitutional features of the Turkish Republic as established by Atatürk. Thus, upholding the principles of Atatürk and securing the regime requires a return to civilian rule elected by people. Turkish military regards its intervention in politics not a deviation from this principle, but as a result of the deviations in the trend of civilian politics. This was the case in 1960 coup and other military interventions in Turkey. In contrast to Turkish case, Egyptian military neither had a history long enough to have

an experience which led them to avoid political involvement, nor had a legacy of a leader which would limit their scope of political involvement.

Second, the internal dynamics of the militaries of Egypt and Turkey was also important. In Egypt, Naguib was included in the coup as a figurehead, but Nasser was the leader of the Free Officers. Thus, lack of support for Naguib contributed his elimination and the establishment of a ruler regime by Nasser. Turkish case was similar as the coup was organized by middle ranking officers, and Gürsel participated at later stages. However, in Turkey initially there were more divisions within the ruling junta than in the case of Egypt. In Egypt, the Free Officers planned and carried out the coup. In Turkey, those officers who participated in the coup merely knew each other. Although those advocating strong military rule acted together and influenced the policies of the NUC to some extent, General Gürsel had enough support from generals and other officers to purge the radicals and send them overseas.

Next, political and social conditions in Turkey and Egypt were also different. In Egypt, all political parties were discredited in the eyes of many officer corps as a result of their performance during the colonial rule and afterwards until military intervention. They also lacked popular support. In Turkey, on the other hand, many officers had sympathy with the RPP and thought that the party had enough popular support to win the elections. While in Egypt, the military gained mass support as it secured independence of the state against British colonialism, the support for political actions of the military in Turkey increasingly decreased with its repressive policies.

Lastly, international environment was also conducive to military rule in Egypt with continuing possibility of war with Israel. This strengthened the prominence of the army. In the context of Cold War, Turkish environment could not be seen secure,

but NATO membership provided a guarantee which against immediate threat of war as in the case of Egypt.

The return to civilian rule was realized slowly and partially. As stated by Stepan (1988), Turkish military left some reserved domains, or prerogatives, to maintain its control over politics after returning to civilian politics. The presidency of Gürsel, seats for military rulers in the senate, establishment of the National Security Council and the sentences for the members of the DP constituted some of these military prerogatives. Since there was not a consensus on subordination to government among the military, infringements of military prerogatives would easily bring intervention. Thus, despite the presence of elected government, the period until 1965 can be seen as military participation. After the elections of 1965 when the JP gained the majority, the military decreased its pressure on civilian politics. However, this period did not last long. With the eruption of violence in the country and declining law and order, the government rendered ineffective. The conditions were similar to the situation before 1960.

4.5. Memorandum, Political Collapse and Path to Coup, 1971-1980

On March 10, there was an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme Military Council including Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç, force commanders, some generals and admirals. Just two days later, on March 12, 1971, the Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç, commanders of the land, sea and air forces signed a memorandum, forcing the resignation of the government (Ahmad, 1977: 194-201, Harris, 1988: 186-187).

The reason for the memorandum was stated as the anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest in the country. The government and the assembly were held responsible for the situation, and unless a strong, credible government capable of implementing the reforms stated in the constitution was formed, there would be a military take over. However, since the reasons in the memorandum had been present in the country in for more than a year, the timing of the memorandum suggests that the memorandum was to forestall action from below, which was the policy of high command since the establishment of the AFU. If they failed to take the initiative, then there would be a revolt by the subordinates or divisions in the high command. This motive for the intervention was supported by the dismissal of three generals and eight colonels due to their engagement in political activities just after the declaration of the memorandum (Ahmad, 1977: 205, Hale, 1990: 70).

The 1971 memorandum was not a full scale military intervention into politics. The absence of unity in the political views was effective in the reluctance of the army to take over power outright. The assembly was retained, and an above-party cabinet headed by a neutral figure would govern the country. Nihat Erim, a liberal minded RPP leader, formed the new government with support of most of the JP and the RPP deputies. Martial law was imposed; constitutional amendments to limit the independence of the universities, press, and civil liberties were passed. Strikes were outlawed, hundreds of leftist activists were arrested, Turkish Labour Party and National Order Party were dissolved (Hale, 1990: 71- 73, Narlı, 2000:113).

On the other hand, the reformist part of the 12 March programme did not produce lasting results. The assembly was not dissolved and the government needed the parliamentary support of the JP which opposed the memorandum itself, and the

reforms it envisaged. The army had to choose between a total takeover and leaving the reformist part of the agenda. When the government fell as a result of the resignation of eleven reformist ministers, thirty generals met to make a decision. Although some generals favoured to launch an outright takeover, Erim was asked to form a new government and the army abandoned the reform programme (Hale, 1990: 73).

A second clash between the civilians and the army arose on the election of the president. When Sunay's term of office came to an end in March 1973, Faruk Gürler, the Chief of the General Staff, emerged as a powerful candidate. However, there was parliamentary opposition. Demirel did not want to make succession of the chief of the general staff into presidency a tradition. Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit who opposed the 12 March memorandum was the new chairman of the RPP. Moreover, there was no consensus in the army on the presidency of Gürler, and the army was not prepared to threaten to intervene if he was not elected. As a result, politicians refused to elect Gürler. Instead, ex-admiral Fahri Korutürk became the new president (Hale, 1990: 74-75).

The successful challenge of the politicians marked the end of the 12 March memorandum, clearing the way for the restitution of civilian competitive politics with the election of October 1973. At the same time, it decreased the ability of the military to threaten with words. As stated by Harris (1988: 191), "The retreat of the generals in the presidential election created a fatal disjunction between the real power of the military establishment and the illusion that it could be confronted with impunity by civilian politicians."

In the period of 1973-1980, there were many sources of instability in Turkey. The elections did not produce stable governments. The RPP adopting a democratic socialist stance under the leadership of Ecevit was the first party. However, it did not achieve majority in the parliament, and the JP under Demirel did not take part in the government. As a result, internally divided coalition governments were formed including ultranationalist National Action Party (NAP) led by Alpaslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan's Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), continuation of the National Order Party (NOP) which had been dissolved because of using Islam for political ends. Maintaining parliamentary majorities outweighed the concerns of effective administration. Those in power tried to infiltrate in state agencies. Polarization spread into different segments of society including labour, teachers, bureaucracy, and the police. Under these conditions, decisive governmental authority was virtually impossible. Tensions reached its peak in the inability of the parliament in electing a successor to President Korutürk over a six month period until the military intervention in 1980 (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 24-26, Harris, 1988: 191-192).

The governments could not prevent the escalating waves of violence and terrorism in the country. As a result, more than five thousand people died and fifteen thousand were wounded between 1975 and 1980, a figure equivalent of Turkish losses in the War of Independence. There were many radical leftist groups involved in left wing terrorism while right wing terrorism centred on the ultranationalists. The violence reached its peak in the May Day meeting where 34 people died in 1977. Violence continued to intensify; assassinations of the members of the parliament, former prime minister, journalists and professors took place. There were also inter-ethnic, i.e. Turkish-Kurdish and inter-sectarian, i.e. Shii-Sunni, conflicts. Partisan

politics delayed the imposition of martial law. After the massacre of Kahramanmaraş, the government declared martial law. However, the infiltration of the police by the right and left wing extremes and lack of state authority prevented its effectiveness. The daily figure of death was about 20 people per day by 1980 (Özbudun, 2000:35-36, Ahmad, 1993: 170-173).

Economic troubles were also pressing. The oil crisis, loss of US support after the Cyprus crisis, the decreasing demand for Turkish workers and exports in Europe, combined with the weak governments created high rates of inflation and shortages of consumer and import goods. The military became highly critical of the successive governments in their poor performance of dealing with political and economic instability (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 25).

The influential position of the NSP in the coalitions with policies and activities regarded as the compromises of secularism and the reforms of Atatürk was a further source of disruption for the military (Harris, 1988: 192). Moreover, the RPP's espousal of minority and ethnic causes in its way towards becoming a democratic socialist party was considered to be deviation from principles of Kemalism, leading to the alienation of the party from the military (Karpat, 1988: 147-149).

The military intervention of 1971 can be seen as a moderator regime in Nordlinger's (1977) terms. The military put pressure on the government with the threat of a coup. The objectives of the military were limited to keep status quo and restore order. The civilian government was replaced by another one. It also fits Welch's (1976a) classification of military control with civilian influence. The military expanded its influence with changes in the status of the NSC and some constitutional amendments. While joint opposition of the political parties decreased military

influence on the election of president, and on political life, developments between 1973 and 1980 destabilized the politics and brought military into political prominence again.

4.6. The 12 September Regime and Return to Civilian Rule, 1980-1983

Seeing the lack of effective government as the main cause of the breakdown in the country, the military made demands for a coalition of the RPP and the JP, but this could not take place. Also, a letter signed by Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren and four force commanders was sent to the President stating that it was the duty of the government to end anarchy, terrorism and secessionism. However, there were some accounts that the military had already took the decision to intervene, and the letter served as an evidence that military intervention was the only option left to save the country. There were also arguments that the military delayed the action since aggravation of the situation would increase the support for military action (Özbudun, 2000:41-43, Birand, 1984: 206).

On September 12 1980, the military staged the coup on the grounds that political and economic situation, anarchy and secessionism reached "proportions threatening the very existence of the State and the nation." as stated by Kenan Evren (General Secretariat of the NSC, 1982: 225). He continues that:

> The Armed forces has been compelled to take over administration for the welfare and happiness deserved by the great Turkish nation, for strengthening and rendering effective the principles of Atatürk for reinstating on sound foundations the democracy which has been unable to control itself and for restoring the impaired authority of the State (1982: 232).

In addition to those motives, there were also military reasons for intervention. Negative effects of the deteriorating economic and social environment on the military

concerns such as recruitment, arms production, and the activities of OYAK constituted some of them. The fear that political conflict could spread on to the army was another reason. The imposition of martial law brought the possibility of politicization of the armed forces, and there were increased demand within the military ranks to take action (Owen, 2000: 212, Birand, 1984: 106). In his speech to cadets of War College soon after the coup took place, Evren stated this aspect of the coup:

> Whenever the army entered into politics, it began to lose its discipline and, gradually it was led to corruption…. Therefore, I demand you from once again not to take our present operation as an example to yourselves and never get involved in politics. We had to implement this operation within a chain of commands and orders to save the Army from politics and to clean it from the political dirt. Had we not carried out this operation, the Army would have gotten involved in politics as in the previous examples… (General Secretariat of the NSC, 1982: 302).

International environment was also important for 1980 coup. Revolution in Iran harmed the position of USA and West in the Middle Eastern region. In the context of Cold War, loss of Iran as a Western ally further increased the strategic importance of Turkey. Thus, domestic instability or rise of leftist currents was regarded unacceptable not only for military officers but also for Western allies of Turkey. Thus, military coup did not cause difficulties in international sphere much. Military rulers did not change direction of foreign policy. In fact they were more cooperative with international allies of Turkey than civilians in the return of Greece to the NATO. During September 12 regime, Turkish veto against Greece return to the NATO was rescinded without any reciprocity from Atina (Birand, 1984).

The first significant feature of the 1980 coup was that it had been well planned. Achieving the consent and cooperation of the leading commanders had been

given importance. While planning, the general staff gave importance to achieving consent and cooperation of the leading field commanders. The tasks of individual officers during and after the intervention had been determined in advance. The members of the NSC, namely Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, four field commanders and the Secretary General concentrated power in their own hands. In order to prevent possible clashes between the military rulers and the commanders on active duty as happened in 1961, all the members of the NSC carried on their commands until 1983 (Karpat, 1988: 149-150, Hale, 1994: 249). Although there might be disagreements in the armed forces, they were never brought to the surface. There was no purge within the army after the takeover and no disagreement among the members of the NSC.

The policies to be followed after the coup were also determined in advance. Similar to the previous interventions, the aim of the takeover was not to establish a permanent military regime. The NSC clearly stated that there would be a return to civilian power but not to the status quo. The generals were convinced that the regime was in need of more comprehensive adjustments than in the case of 1971. Thus major restructuring of Turkish democracy was intended in order to prevent the revival of political polarization, violence and deadlock. Basic constitutional principles and institutional changes were decided before the coup. (Özbudun, 2000: 57, Karpat, 1988: 149)

Tired of the breakdown of law and order, public welcomed the coup in general. With the intervention, the NSC suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament. They assumed the executive and legislative duties. An amendment in the martial law gave the commanders extensive powers. Virtually all professional

associations and trade unions were suspended. Strikes were banned. The military established its control on the country completely (Ahmad, 1993: 182).

Political parties were not dissolved immediately, but restrictions were put on the political activities of their leaders. The initial idea was the formation of an entirely civilian government. However, when the continuing influence of the party leaders became clear, a government led by Bülent Ulusu, a former admiral, composed of bureaucrats, professors and retired officers was formed. Turgut Özal who launched the economic stabilisation programme in Demirel's government was made responsible for the economy. In fact, the realm of economy was one of the two areas untouched during the intervention (Karpat, 1988:152).

The second area is the foreign policy. The NSC declared its allegiance to the international commitments of Turkey. In the context of the Cold War, Turkish alliance with the West was not to be changed (Ahmad, 1993: 183).

The intervention did not have organized support of a political party or a social group. Fragmentation of civil bureaucracy and the division of intelligentsia along ideological lines prevented military from a coalition with other elite groups. The military was the last homogenous group as an institution, thus acting as the sole representative of the state. With no natural allies in any significant cadres, the military paid attention to maintain the supportive attitude of the public for the intervention. Evren played an important role in doing so through the image of a neutral above party arbiter working for the interest of the entire nation. Popular respect for the military increased with its insulation from the civilian influence (Evin, 1988: 211, Karpat, 1988: 150-151).

It was natural for the military rulers to promote the goal of a return to Ataturkism, which had been always the salient ideology in the military. An ideology was needed in order to battle all ideologies causing fragmentation and polarization of the polity. It had to be broadly acceptable to the citizens and have a mediating role. Ataturkism with national integration taking priority over ideological issues had those features. Although various reinterpretations were made, with its basic tenets of the nation state, republicanism and secularism, Ataturkism has been employed as the guiding ideology of the state (Evin, 1988: 211-212, Karpat, 1988: 153).

When the order was restored and economy began to improve, the military reached the peak of its popularity. However, there were also violations of human rights and great discontent with the regime. The situation was reflected in Western media and pressures began to be exerted on military regime. In 1981 Evren announced a calendar for restoring political life. In this settlement, the concerns of European Community and the Council of Europe on issues like timetable for return to civilian rule, human rights, detention period were also influential (Karpat, 1988: 133, Dağı, 1996: 124).

In order to return to the civilian rule, a new constitution was to be prepared. The Constituent Assembly was created by the NSC. Different from the Constituent Assembly of 1961 which included representatives of two opposition parties in its civilian part; in 1981 all of the members were appointed by the NSC. The NSC had the absolute power to reject or amend the constitutional draft (Özbudun, 2000: 58). Just before the formation of the Constituent Assembly, all political parties had been outlawed in order to prevent their influence on the formation of a new constitution. However, the discussions on the constitution opened door for politics. Then, the

political leaders engaging in debate were banned from doing so (Hale, 1994: 260-261, Ahmad, 1993: 186).

The new constitution reflected the aim of the military in restructuring the politics. It was designed to prevent parliamentary deadlock or to end it through elections. Provisions weakening trade unions, restricting the freedom of association and outlawing all cooperation between political parties and other civil society organizations were included in order to demobilize workers and depoliticize the society at large. A more hierarchical educational structure under a centralized board of directors was established. With less trust in civilian bureaucracy as well as political parties and politicians, the military rulers enhanced the role of the presidency with substantive powers in appointing high court judges and university administrators, two areas that the military considered as sensitive. The system of electing the president was altered in order to prevent the stalemate happened before the coup (Özbudun, 2000: 27, 58-59; Hale, 1994: 257-258).

Presidency was also crucial in establishing the continued influence of the military over the civilian governments to be elected. With the proclamation of the constitution, the leader of the 1980-83 regime, Kenan Evren, would automatically become the President of the Republic for a period of seven years. Thus, with the extensive powers of appointment and observation, the presidency guaranteed the continued presence of the military at the highest level of the decision making. The president was to represent the office of the commander in chief, and he was given right to decide on the use of Turkish Armed Forces, to appoint the chief of the general staff, to convene the NSC and to declare martial law. Moreover, the constitution provided him with additional authority for the first seven years. He was given the

right to veto constitutional amendments. This veto could be overturned by the parliament with three quarters of the vote, while after the presidency of Evren, this ratio would become a simple majority (Evin, 1994: 25, Karpat, 1988: 195).

Four commanders in the NSC during the military rule were declared as the Presidential Council in order to assist and provide advice in the functions of the President until the end of Evren's term. The constitution provided immunity to members of the NSC for their decisions or measures during the period covering September 12 1980 until the formation of the Grand National Assembly. Through the Constitutional Court, challenges against the laws passed by the NSC were denounced as unconstitutional (Özbudun, 2000: 114-115).

The 1982 Constitution enhanced the constitutional status of the NSC. It added precision to the composition of the council by enumerating its civilian members rather than leaving their determination to the law. According to the new constitution, the council was composed of the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, the ministers of national defense, interior and foreign affairs, the commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie under the chairmanship of the president. In this way, numerical equality of the civilian and military members of the council was assured. When the president came from military background, it meant the majority representation of the military in the NSC, as in the case of the presidency of Evren (Özbudun, 2000: 108).

The constitution increased the powers of the NSC by stating that the decisions of the NSC are to be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers on the issues of the formulation, determination and implementation of the national security. The concept of national security was broad including the preservation of the existence

and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and peace and security of the society. The law on the National Security Council further extended the notion of national security as the protection of the constitutional order of the state, national existence and integrity, all state interests in the international arena including social, political, cultural and economic interests and the interests acquired through international treaties (Özbudun, 2000: 108-109).

The autonomy of the military was also increased by the constitution. Armed forces were exempted from the oversight by the State Supervisory Council. No judicial appeals were allowed against the decision of the Supreme Military Council which was responsible for the retirement and promotion of the top military personnel. The decisions of the martial law commanders were exempted from administrative and civil law courts. The domain of the martial law courts were enhanced, including crimes outside the martial law regions and with increased number of criminal offences (Özbudun, 2000: 112).

Apart from the presidency of Evren, the military rulers paid attention to the electoral process in order to have a larger share of power in the coming democratic regime. In accordance with the generals' attitude towards the politicians, the constitution disqualified all members of the 1980 parliament from political activity for five years and the leaders of the parties for ten years. To prevent the domination of the similar parties in the politics of the country, the constitution prohibited the formation of new parties from the bulk of the older ones (Özbudun, 2000: 112-113, Ahmad, 1993: 187).

Approval of the constitution became the overriding concern for the generals. However, criticisms emerged especially against the provisions which combined the

ratification of the constitution and Evren's presidency and which banned the ex-politicians. Then, all criticism on the constitution was banned. Campaigning for the constitution, Evren travelled the country and delivered speeches. His lectures were broadcasted on radio and television almost daily. The referendum was held after this one sided campaign, but it cannot be known what would differ in the result of the referendum if there had been an opposition. However, one thing is clear, i.e. people knew that if the constitution was rejected, then the return for civilian rule would be delayed. As a result of the referendum, the constitution was accepted by %91.37, a figure exceeding even the expectations of the generals (Ahmad, 1993: 187).

The acceptance of the constitution increased the confidence of the generals in the creation of new political forces replacing the old ones. The date for elections was declared, and attention was turned into the control of the process. The laws on political parties and elections were changed. Generals wanted only three or four parties in the elections in order to prevent coalition politics after the elections and also prevent the emergence of a party which would restore the political rights of the politicians. Thus, they kept their authority to limit the individuals and organizations to run in the first elections. Using their veto rights, they limited the number of parties to contest in the elections to three, two of which were essentially creations of the military (Harris, 1988:196-197, Özbudun, 2000: 113-114).

Among the three parties entering elections, the Motherland Party (MP) established by Turgut Özal, minister for economic affairs between 1980 and 1982 was the only party without immediate connection with the military. It won a wide popular support rapidly. The military adopted a neutral stance at first. However, when the polls showed that Özal was ahead of his rivals, Evren launched an attack on Özal and

asserted his support for the Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP) led by a retired general, Turgut Sunalp. Nevertheless, the MP won the election and gained the majority in the parliament, and the NDP became the third party, undermining Evren's prestige (Hale, 1994: 267-269).

The military regime after the coup fits Nordlinger's guardian category as it aims to restore order and return to civilian rule. However, it also includes the features of ruler type regime in the sense that the military did not confine itself to restoration of the order, but also undertook the task of creating a new political system in order not to allow a return to the previous situations. In terms of Welch's categorization it was military control without civilian partnership since military leaders took control of the politics directly.

4.7. Military Disengagement, 1983-1993

After the elections, a period of decreasing military authority began, but there was no comprehensive transfer of power to a civilian regime. The military maintained considerable influence over governmental decision-making through the NSC and the presidency. Martial law continued in many provinces also made the military highly visible, and it maintained executive powers. The military also exercised some judicial functions through military courts (Evin, 1994: 25-26).

While there was not any military objection against the formation of a civilian government by the Motherland Party, the heterogeneity of the party with deputies of divergent backgrounds including former supporters of the NAP and the NSP concerned the military (Evin, 1994: 26). On the other hand, Özal came to power with a comfortable majority in the parliament without being indebted to the military for his

election or worried about the opposition from generals. He also knew that the Europeans would not like continuation of military rule under a civilian guise. Thus, he was decisive in ending military influence (Harris, 1988: 197). Under those conditions, establishment of civilian superiority took place slowly but firmly through informal practices and adaptation rather than constitutional change (Özbudun, 2000: 118).

Initially, a division of labour emerged between the presidency and the government. President Evren retained his influence over all matters concerning internal and external security, foreign affairs and higher education, areas that military commanders deemed sensitive. The government sought and received the approval of the president for almost all of its decisions on these matters. In turn, Prime Minister Özal was in control of economic matters. He gradually enhanced the influence of the government to civil bureaucracy and increased his control over economy without challenging the division of labour with the military until 1987 (Evin, 1994: 26-28).

Meanwhile, the army began to return to the barracks according to its own timetable. Despite the gradual lifting of the martial law, military presence in public life remained strong. The prosecution of those indicted under martial law continued to be held in military courts. The press reports of those cases increased the public awareness of the military authority. The evolution of events in southeastern region created doubts whether the military would completely give up its policing duties (Evin, 1994: 27).

There were number of events leading Özal to take steps to challenge the role of the military. Opposition politicians raised objections to military involvement in decision-making and criticized the constitution for institutionalizing that. With the increasing political maturity in the country, the intelligentsia no longer regarded the

military rule as an insurance against the corruption and incapacity of the civilians. Rather, there was a strong antimilitarization attitude of the press and intellectuals constituting a source of pressure. Meanwhile, major representatives of the military developed a conciliatory policy toward Özal (Karabelias, 2000: 136-137, Ahmad, 1993: 214).

Özal tried to limit military influence on public policy. The demands for constitutional amendments to lift the ban on former politicians constituted a real challenge to the order established by the military. Despite the ban, Ecevit and Demirel involved in politics and began to act like political leaders. President Evren first agreed to remove the ban on public speaking. However, there was public demand for restoring all political rights of the former politicians. Evren signalled that he would not oppose a constitutional amendment on the issue. Then, Özal took the issue to a referendum as a result of which, former leaders regained their rights to establish, join and to have relations with political parties. The referandum removed restrictions on the former leaders to form new political parties and the limitations on the movement of parliamentary deputies from one party to another. Public meetings, demonstrations and right to form associations, to collect petitions were allowed. Detention period of suspects decreased to 15 days from 90 days. All trade unions except one were allowed to operate (Karabelias, 2000: 137).

At the same time, Özal tried to interfere and establish political authority on the matters concerning military autonomy. In 1987, he intervened in the succession of the chief of the general staff, overruling the recommendation of the senior military command. He appointed his own candidate General Necip Torumtay to the post. Although civilian governments had promoted their own candidates in the top

command previously, the decision of Özal was unprecedented. In previous cases, the civilians had to spend efforts to manipulate promotions and assignments in order to pave the way for their preferred nominees, but this time the decision was taken suddenly. It was to demonstrate the power of the government over the military. Procedures for the appointment were completed. President Evren approved the decision (Evin, 1994: 33-34).

Özal decided to bring taboo subjects into public discussion. As a result of a tacit agreement on the non-interference of the political authority on issues of the internal organization of the military and its funding requirements, none of these had been debated in the parliament. In the summer of 1987, the administration took the initiative to review the defense budget, and to dicsuss resource requirements of professionalizing army publicly. Özal ordered to stop air force training exercises over the Agean Sea as a result of an agreement he reached with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou without consulting or informing military chiefs (Karabelias, 2000: 137, Evin, 1994: 33).

Although Özal could not keep the promise of making the chief of the general staff report to the defense minister rather than the prime minister after failing to receive enough votes in the elections, the government and the prime ministry assumed greater authority over the defense requirements, and the military budget was discussed openly. The government continued to extend its authority into security issues. With the termination of martial law in remaining provinces, the government announced the creation of a regional governorship with extraordinary powers to coordinate and implement against counterinsurgency measures in southeastern region (Evin, 1994: 34-36).

In extending the influence of politics over the matters of the state, the politicians did not met with much resistance. Evren had a vital role in the process as the main element of continuity between the military regime and its civilian successor. He did not take an interventionist stand which would make the transition process much more difficult. Özal's presidency after his retirement as the first civilian president since Celal Bayar, demonstrated further reduction in the influence of the military over politics (Hale, 1994: 296, Evin, 1994: 37).

As the President of the country and as an influential figure in the ruling party, Özal became the undisputed political leader in the country. The developments in the Persian Gulf and Özal's determinacy in formulating an active foreign policy created disagreements with at least some sections of the military, leading the Chief of the General Staff, General Torumtay to resign. This was an extraordinary situation since generally it was the civilian rather than the military figure who leaves his post (Karabelias, 2000: 138).

The period from 1983 to 1993 was a period of military disengagement. However, withdrawal of the military from politics was not easy. There were many reserved domains that the military was keen on protecting. However, in time Özal achieved to decrease military control over politics to a large extent despite little formal changes in the institutions (Özbudun, 2000: 119). Under the conditions of strong civilian leadership, military withdrew from political arena largely, yet the establishment of the civilian control over the military was not over. Thus, the situation fits in between the categories of civilian control with military partnership where military uses veto powers and blackmail to pressure civilian governments and civilian

control with military influence where civilians are more in control of political decisions.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND INSIGHTS

This thesis attempted to analyze the evolution of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey. The preceding chapters included theoretical approaches to the concept, an examination of the conditions which brought militaries of both countries into political prominence, the reasons of military intervention, the periods of military rule, and the process of disengagement. This chapter offers some substantive and theoretical conclusions about the similarities and differences of civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey.

Historical legacies on the role of the military in politics influenced developments in civil military relations of Egypt and Turkey significantly. There had been no Egyptian army until the rule of Muhammad Ali. During his reign, Egyptians in the military did not assume political roles as they remained mostly in the rank and file under the command of foreigners, who had patrimonial links with the ruler. Under Muhammad Ali's successors, professionalization of Egyptians as officer corps took place with positions of more responsibility, increasing military expertise, and solidarity among themselves. This process was accompanied by their political activism which culminated in the events of 1879 and 1881. These included nationalist tones against France and Britain that controlled the Egyptian finances at the time, but activism was mostly motivated by corporate interests of the Egyptian officers with demands on higher payments, better regulations for promotions and expansion in the size of the military. Thus, the period supports the scholars like Finer and Nordlinger who argue that professionalism can increase political involvement of military rather than Huntington who proposes that professionalism keeps military out of politics.

Political activism of Egyptian military rendered abortive with British occupation in 1882. The military entered into a period of non-intervention under the control of British officers. During the period, the struggle for independence was carried out by civilians. Egyptian military gained prominence only after 1936 when Egypt gained formal sovereignty through Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Egyptians began to be admitted to the military schools to receive professional education. The period until 1952 provided Egyptian officers graduated from those schools with professional grievance and distrust of politicians in their capacity or will to solve the problems of the military and the country. Political considerations of the military officers were shaped by their humiliation under the command of the British during World War II, and in the defeat of 1948 by the Israelis; the failure of the King and the politicians to produce solutions for the problems and gain support of the public. Thus, Egypt before 1952 was rich in supplying evidence for different theories of civil military relations which emphasized internal conditions of the military, political regime and societal situation of the country or international environment of threat in promoting military intervention. It can be concluded that the situation in all aspects was conducive to military intervention, enabling the military to change Egypt radically after 1952.

In Turkey, the military has always had a prominent role in politics and society. The power of the Ottoman Empire based on the success of the military. Before the nineteenth century, the Janissaries had been the most important part of the army. After their dissolution, Ottoman Sultans tried to establish a modern army which would enable the Empire to reinstate its strength. Military schools along Western lines were opened to train professional officers. A series of reforms in the administrative and financial system of the Empire was undertaken to support a strong military. In such an

atmosphere, military officers emerged as leading figures of the Empire, and seeing themselves as the spearhead of development. Thus, increasing professionalization was accompanied by political activism of the officer corps, similar to Egypt. However, in the Ottoman case, military officers exerted more influence through the coups of 1876 and 1908. The politicization of the military was accompanied by a decrease in its effectiveness in wars. This period under the Ottoman Empire left two legacies for Turkish military, i.e. a tradition of political involvement, and a learning process based on experience of drawbacks of this political involvement on military performance.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the military gained the War of Independence and played a crucial role in the establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Atatürk. These earned military high prestige in society. After the foundation of the new state, Atatürk established the RPP as a civilian instrument to carry out political activities, and distanced military from politics. Atatürk's policy towards the military was in two ways. On the one hand, he established the military as the guardian of the new regime against internal and external enemies, and on the other hand, he emphasized that the military should stay away from politics in order to fulfill its duties. While military officers were prevented from taking political positions, the prestigious position of the military in society was consolidated through national education policy. Development of war-torn country was given priority over the modernization of the military while the military was given high autonomy. This balanced policy was supported by the loyalty of the military to the personality of Atatürk and also İnönü, keeping the military under the control of civilian rule. The legacy of Atatürk became the main reference for political stance of

the military, on the one hand, assuming a guardianship position exceeding the considerations of external defence and on the other hand remaining out of politics.

When multiparty politics began in Turkey, political activism of the military reinvigorated. Technological and educational modernization of the military started and intensified with the membership to the NATO. However, the policies of the DP government in increasing military budget, acquiring modern weapons, or guaranteeing the loyalty of the high command did not prove enough to prevent dissent in the military. There were other developments like deteriorating living standards of the officer corps against inflation, decrease in military prestige in the face of emerging classes and loss of adherence to the military hierarchy by younger generation of officers who received better training than their traditional minded superiors. Popular support for the DP in the elections was not enough for some middle ranking officers as a source of legitimacy in the face of severe political strife between two parties and antidemocratic measures of the government against opposition.

Similar to situation in Egypt before 1952, there were number of reasons for military officers to intervene in politics. Thus, a comparison between the two cases can provide insights about the relative weight of different factors in the development of civil military relations in each country after military interventions. Since both cases ended up with military intervention, it would not be much useful to discuss Huntington's argument on professionalism in preventing its happening. Military officers of both countries were graduates of military schools with expertise in military affairs, a feeling of responsibility for the security of the state, and a sense of corporate unity differentiating them from other occupations. Thus, it is clear that professionalism of the armies could not prevent military intervention. Instead in both

countries, as Finer underlines, professional considerations promoted political grievances. In Egypt, the situation under British command, the defeat of 1948, the scandal on defected weapons, extensive interference of the King in military affairs created dissent in the army. In Turkey, officers could be seen in better conditions, but they were also dissatisfied with the status of the military in the priorities of the government, decreasing prestige in society, and use of military against political opposition. Yet, these grievances were not shared by all officer corps or produced consensus on what to do. Securing loyalty of the military was important for the rulers of both countries, and they appointed high commands accordingly. Both in Egypt and Turkey, middle ranking officers were more active. Like civilians in the administration, the hierarchical structure of the military lost credit in their eyes. Thus, internal conditions of the military among dissidents were quite similar, except for historical legacies of the militaries.

Historical legacies of the militaries of Egypt and Turkey were different. In Egypt, colonial rule created resentment in the officers. Those military officers initiating the coup interpreted social situation that there was no alternative to military intervention to change the course of events. In Turkey, military officers staging coup shared the same view about the necessity of intervention, and this was supported by the role of military as the guardian of the Republic. However, they were to guard democracy at the same time, and abstain from politics to fulfill their military duties. This limitation in the actions of Turkish military seems to lose its significance since there were officers supporting return to a civilian rule in Egypt and continuation of military rule in Turkey. However, historical legacy can also be counted as a reason why those supporting the return to civilian rule overwhelmed in Turkey. This

becomes more meaningful in the context of other military interventions and continuation of civilian rule.

The difference between social and political conditions of the countries can be seen more influential in the course of events. In Egypt, the King lost legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and political parties lost public support largely. There were only Marxists and members of Muslim Brotherhood with some support as an alternative to the prevailing structure. They had links with different groups within the army. Thus, military intervention in Egypt took place against rulers who did not have social support. In addition to this, uncertainty about the path that the military would take after the intervention prevented opposition and increased support for officers. Meanwhile, the military officers willing to establish a ruler type of regime had time to eliminate rival centers of power, and consolidate their control over the country. In Turkey, on the other hand, political parties had substantial support. Military intervention did not face public reaction, but its base of support was less than in the case of Egypt. Moreover, the actions of the military after the takeover such as restrictions of freedoms, dismissals of professors from universities further eroded this base. Thus, Finer's emphasis on the importance of public attachment to civilian institutions including the role of political parties seems to have a strong explanatory power in those cases. Moreover, although some officers remained critical of all politicians and thought all of them were responsible for the problems of the country, majority of military officers had sympathy with the opposition and focused on the misdoings of the government. Thus, they advocated a return to civilian rule after eliminating those they deemed responsible from misconduct.

International conditions were also different. In Egypt, there was a threat of war with Israel. This strengthened the prominence of the army. In the context of Cold War, Turkish environment could not be seen secure, but NATO membership provided a guarantee. There was no equivalent of immediate threat of war as in the case of Egypt. What happened can be seen in line with Lasswells' argument that challenging international threat environment strengthens the role of military. Moreover, it seems that as long as military officers find domestic conditions inappropriate to provide means for external defense, Desch's argument that international threats shift focus of the military to external conditions rather than domestic politics does not hold true.

With the influence of those factors, in Egypt military officers who advocated continued military rule gained the upper hand in the struggle against those offered a return to civilian rule. In Turkey, the opposite happened. In Egypt, military control over the politics continued practically, but was not incorporated into the new constitution in detail. As argued by Finer that those staging military coups need to legitimize their rule through gaining the support of the public, Nasser tried to give the regime a civilian façade without allowing political activities. The assembly served for this purpose. The power was concentrated in the hands of Nasser who ruled the country with military staff and a combination of civil servants and political technicians. In Turkey, the influence of the military continued less prominently but established more formally through the establishment of the NSC and NUC members' appointment as senators for life. Power was handed to civilians after popular elections, but the military remained influential in determining policies of the government through threats of coup for some time. This created fluctuations in civil military relations of Turkey while relations in Egypt were more stable although in

favor of military. The reason was the presence of civilian opposition to military control over the politics in Turkey. Despite the prestige of the military in society, Turkish society preferred civilian governments. That the JP which was a continuation of the ousted DP won the elections as opposed to military preferences, is one signal of this. Since political parties had their own electoral support and did not owe their position to military, they could try to limit military's control over political life. In Egypt, members of the Assembly seemed to be elected by popular vote, but their candidacy was determined by Nasser with no alternatives. Thus, patrimonial system in Egypt where positions were distributed by the ruler rather than obtained through public support or personal merit limited the possibilities of alternatives for the military regime, which was already the aim of such a system.

Another reason for more changes in civil military relations in Turkey emerges in the prevalence of disagreements on political role of the military within the military. Theories of civil military relations frequently emphasize that military intervention in politics brings further politicization and factionalism to military. This is seen as one of the main reasons why militaries avoid political involvement. Yet, the possibility of such a result did not prove deterrent enough at the beginning for military officers who staged interventions in Egypt and Turkey despite the richness of Turkish history in that aspect and the warnings of Atatürk. However, this problem caused trouble for the rulers and militaries of both countries afterwards, albeit with some differences. In Turkey, differences in political ambitions of military officers continued to be influential after the elimination of radicals within the NUC. Members of the NUC lost control of the military officers in active command. Those in active command on the other hand, did not develop a single stance towards politics. Thus, the military

institution was overwhelmed with struggles of power, and establishing hierarchical discipline took time. This weakness of hierarchy with the politicization of the military and factionalism provided more opportunity for military officers to involve in political matters. Similar to Turkey, in Egypt, Nasser lost his control over the military affairs to Amir whom Nasser appointed to control the military. It seems that once politicization began, it proved difficult to reestablish an obedient military. Although power struggle within the military was not in favor of Nasser, this did not influence political arena much. The reason was that the focus of the struggle remained on the establishment of dominance over the military rather than on the administration of the country.

The rivalries and factionalism within the military brought dramatic results for Egypt. Egyptian military was defeated by Israel once again in 1967 war. This humiliating defeat constituted a turning point for the role of Egyptian military in politics. While 1948 defeat created bitterness within the ranks of military towards the rulers of the country, this time it strengthened Nasser's hand in eliminating rivals to his power within the armed forces. This was enabled by continuing popular support for Nasser. The blame was put on the internal structure of the military. In preparation for a new war with Israel to regain lost territory and prestige, Nasser purged his rivals in the military and appointed loyal officers. The decay in the professional qualities of the military was fixed through the growth of a younger generation as officer corps with extensive training. The hierarchy was reestablished. Seeing that it was popular support which kept him in power, Nasser tried to decrease his dependence on military and promoted civilian means of gaining support. Reflecting this tendency, military figures in the assembly and cabinet decreased significantly. Thus, it was a period of

limiting political role of the military and eliminating Nasser's rivals, but by no means a decrease in military power or concessions from corporate interests of the military. In the opposite, these efforts provided the military with better budgetary allocations, higher payments and more advanced weapons.

In contrast, in Turkey, civil military relations continued to be shaped by the changes in the civilian side and its reflections on the military. The corporate interests of the military in terms of salaries or budget seemed no longer a source of motivation for military involvement in politics since military rule improved the situation. Moreover, the military began to involve in economic activities, established OYAK, for the well being of its personnel. Thus, social and political conditions become more prominent in the development of civil military relations. The increasing unrest in the country, politicization of society in the late 1960s and the JP government's inability to establish order was conducive to military intervention. This situation was combined with continuing lack of hierarchy within the military, leading senior officers to issue a memorandum in 1971 to preempt another coup by the middle ranks. It can be seen as a moderator regime in Nordlinger's terms where military caused the change of the civilian government with the threat of a coup. After this intervention, the formal role of the military in politics further increased with some constitutional amendments. In accordance with Maniruzzaman's emphasis on the reversal of conditions which brought military intervention for its withdrawal from politics, the interruption of political disagreements and alliance of parties overwhelmed military preferences in the elections of the president, and decreased the influence of the military in politics until when political, economic and social situation of the country began to deteriorated again towards the end of 1970s.

In Egypt on the other hand, decline in the political role of the military continued although not without problems. After Nasser's death, Sadat, a former military officer, came to power. He continued to civilianize the regime. While 1967 defeat was used to decrease political influence of the military, the victory of 1973 served the same purpose, too. The elimination of external threat did not lead the military to turn their attention into internal politics as Desch argues. In contrast, declining international threat was accompanied by a military that was easier to control. The military gained prestige, but so did Sadat. With this public support, Sadat was able to distance military from political life. At the same time, he tried to secure the loyalty of the military through purges of Nasserists and appointing his preferences to positions of importance. As a result, Sadat managed to reverse political, economic and international policies of Nasser without military interference. On the other hand, decreasing public support for Sadat as a result of economic deterioration, public disorder and peace with Israel, did not reinstate military into political control. During the Bread Riots in 1976, Egyptian military confined to the wills of Sadat, and did not assume further political roles. The problems between the military and Sadat did not emerge from his reversal of policies of the Revolution, but from declining position of the army in terms of budgetary allocations and the well-being of officers. This was combined with efforts of opposition to infiltrate into the military, which brought the end of Sadat era.

The period under Sadat set the main difference between civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey. In Egypt, opposition of military officers to Sadat stemmed from their dissatisfaction of their corporate interests rather than problems of political legitimacy or disorder. This trend continued under Mubarak, too. However, as he paid

more attention to the needs of the military, Mubarak did not face with military opposition. In Turkey, on the other hand, concerns of officers exceeded economic conditions of the military or concerns of autonomy. Its guardianship role continued with another intervention.

In 1980, Turkish military staged a coup in the face of political crisis in the Assembly, political polarization and violence across the country. This time military hierarchy was kept and political control was limited to the high command. The military aimed at returning barracks after correcting what they saw as the deficiencies of the system. However, to establish continuation of military control over the political life of the country, the military established formal structures before leaving the scene to elected civilians. After three years of military rule, Turkey returned to civilian politics with a new constitution and under scrutiny of the officers. Since then, the military did not take over political power directly, but act as moderator in Nordlinger's terms, exercising number of veto powers in a range of political issues and governmental decisions. The intensity of military involvement in politics showed changes. While after 1983, military influence on politics decreased to some extent under the conditions of political stability, the trend reversed with a combination of weak civilian governments, and the army's growing involvement in fighting terrorist activities for Kurdish separatism.

The developments in civil military relations of Egypt and Turkey show that the relations have been influenced by a number of factors. These have been corporate interests of the militaries such as adequate budgetary support or military autonomy, internal conditions of the countries like variances in the political stability, legitimacy, internal order and economic development, and international environment. It has also

been influenced by the differentiation of political regimes, Turkey remaining as a democracy despite ups and downs, and Egypt's becoming an authoritarian state. The evolution of civil military relations under the influence of those factors can better be understood in terms of Welch's continuum.

Since 1950s, civil military relations in Egypt evolved from military ruler regime into civilian control with military partnership in Egypt. After 1967 debacle, political roles of military officers decreased. Presidents of Egypt have tried to guarantee elimination of rivals to their authority within the military through intervening in appointments. Except this intervention, the military has been provided with extensive policy autonomy, high budgetary allocations without screening its activities, advanced weapons, modern training, and incentives in economic activities of the military. Through these strategies, the loyalty of the military to the system has been achieved. However, the system was an authoritarian one where the legitimacy of the elections has been questioned, political opposition has been suppressed, and personal rights have been limited. As supportive of this system, conditions underlined as motivations for officers to interfere in politics such as lack of support for political structures, weak political parties, or increasing conflicts have not brought military intervention in politics. Instead, military emerged more sensitive to its corporate interests that were infringed during Sadat era, a policy which Mubarak has avoided. Moreover, although the military assumes responsibility for both internal and external defense of the country, it has not been used against internal security except for a few occasions when its support for the regime whenever necessary for the continuation of the system was proven. The international conditions do not motivate a more active political role for the military since Camp David Accords. Although Palestinian issue has not been

solved, Egypt is no longer involved as a military party to the conflict. There is no such international threat to make Egyptian military act as vanguard of nation as it happened under colonial rule. Moreover, Egyptian relations with the USA contribute to support the privileged situation of the military.

Schiff's theory of concordance is also useful in understanding the absence of military intervention in Egypt. She proposes that military intervention does not occur when cooperative relationship and consensus exist among military, political elites and society on issues like decision making processes, recruitment method, and composition of officer corps. In Egypt, such cooperation exists between the military and political elites, and criticisms against it are not influential enough to cause any change under authoritarian measures. Application of Bland's theory of shared responsibility would bring a similar result. In Egypt, actors' expectations converge on current situation of civil military relations.

Since 1960s, Turkey has experienced more fluctuations in civil military relations, taking many forms in the scale from civilian to military control. Like Egyptian military, Turkish military also tries to secure the regime. The regime under the guardianship of Turkish military is a democracy to be consolidated. While stability of the regime in Egypt necessitates officers' support for the ruler which is identified with the system, in Turkey the military's loyalty is to the integrity of secular and democratic structure of the state rather than governments of particular parties. The military officers tend to regard politicians as sources of instability and manipulators of democracy, a stance supported by the performance of politicians. Naturally, this is not an approach that would be shared by politicians. The attitude of Turkish society, on the other hand, has supported the positions of both the military

and politicians by regarding the military as the most trustworthy institution of the country while ignoring its political preferences in the elections. Thus, despite the consensus in Egypt on the roles of military and civilian rulers, Turkish political history is marked with the absence of such a situation and with a cycle of military intervention in politics and withdrawal. In Bland's terms, it can be said that actors' expectations does not converge on the principles or rules that would guide civil military relations.

Civil military relations seem quite stable in Egypt. Probably, a change in the current situation would not happen in the near future. There is no reason for Mubarak to give up promoting military interests and military to intervene in politics at the expense of him. Moreover, there is no need for military to assert its political position openly, except for the support, so long as Mubarak remains the source of power in the country, and military has access to him. A change in the current situation of civil military relations could emerge in the future with the problem of Mubarak's succession as a possible source of conflict between civilians and military officers.

In Turkey, whether civil military relations will continue to have an unstable pattern or develop in which direction is more difficult to predict. Prospect of European Union membership would be influential in the future civil military relations in Turkey. While civilians and the military could not reach an agreement on the principles that would guide civil military relations, the European Union requires and provides certain standards in civil military relations. Thus, as long as the aim of European membership is shared by politicians, military and society, the developments towards democratic control of the military which involves decreasing role of the

military in domestic politics, and increasing legislative and executive oversight on the military, seem possible.

CHAPTER 6. POST-SCRIPT

In this section developments in civil military relations after the presidency of Özal will be covered. Besides the shift in the process of military disengagement since 1983, military intervention for government change in 1997 and decreased role of the military in politics in the context of European Union candidacy will be examined briefly.

After Özal, civilians keep their hold of the presidency with Demirel as the new president. However, this was not enough to keep the process of military disengagement. The balance between civilian and military authorities shifted again due to combination of weak civilian governments and the growing role of army in putting down Kurdish separatism in the East (Owen, 2000: 213). As stated before, military definition of national security included internal threats as well as the external ones. With the decision of the NSC in 1992, Kurdish terrorist acts were singled out as the main security threat to the state. In 1997, this was replaced with another decision the NSC stating that priority would be given to fighting internal threats. This time, primary internal threat was defined as Islamist activism while Kurdish separatism was given the secondary place (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 330).

The increased military concern on Islamist activism as an internal threat had much to do with the coalition government led by the Welfare Party (WP). During this period, the military first adopted a wait and see approach. But many of the senior generals considered the period as a prelude to a full scale assault on secular institutions by Islamisation of the society and the foreign policy. A series of confrontations in which the generals used their presence in the NSC to pressure the

government took place. Ratification of a defense and intelligence treaty with Israel which the Prime Minister Erbakan had previously opposed was such a confrontation as well as the eighteen recommendations designed to decrease the power of reactionary Islam. The tension culminated in the 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC at which commanders criticized the government for permitting reactionary activities. The result was referred as a "post-modernist coup" which led the resignation of the government and created a system in which the military used formal and informal mechanisms to influence the government and ensured that its operations were confined to the parameters defined by the military's perceptions of security (Owen, 2000: 213-214, Jenkins, 2001: 40).

The events following the 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC illustrated the limits of the military acceptance or tolerance of civilian leadership. Although not willing to become involved in daily politics and direct intervention, high sensitivity over the integrity of the Turkish state and its secular character led military to intervention. Another important factor was the military distrust of civilian politicians. Since the military blamed inefficient, irresponsible or weak political agents for the "creeping Islamization of Turkey", the solution was devised as enhancing discipline of public sphere (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 319). Since the concept of threat was defined broadly, which includes all parts and sectors of the society, the solutions of the military meant that many aspects of the public policy were reorganized according to military considerations. As criticism of military presence in politics increased, military paid attention to construct its own support base by establishing new relationships with targeted groups in society (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 321-322). Thus, during the period, the military also acted like a pressure group joined with civil

society institutions such as trade unions and business people's associations (Özbudun, 2000: 121).

Military pressure on the politicians continued under the new coalition government, hardening the positions of both sides. Prime Minister Yılmaz and his deputy Ecevit asserted that the government had the responsibility to fight against the political Islam. On the other hand, General Çevik Bir, a deputy to the commander in chief, responded with a series of strong statements about the determination of the military on the issue (Owen, 2000: 214). Meanwhile, the government began to reduce institutional influence of the military. Military judges were removed from state security courts in June 1999. In October, constitution was amended to increase the civilian membership of the NSC by adding the justice minister and any deputy prime ministers. The requirement that the Council of Minister's give priority consideration to the recommendations of the NSC was replaced by an obligation of the Council to be notified of the recommendations (Jenkins, 2007: 346).

Changes in regulations on civil military relations continued under the government of the Justice and Development Party (JDP). The JDP won the elections of 2002, and formed a single party government. Established by former members of the WP which had been deposed from the government in February 28 and then closed for infringement on secularism, the party was approached by suspicion both by the military and the opposition. While military remained alert over the activities of the JDP government, and stated his opposition on some policies that the JDP would pursue otherwise, it also accepted the decrease in its formal powers over politics in the context of Turkey's EU candidacy. The JDP managed to curtail authority of the

NSC and also brought greater scrutiny of the military budget by the parliament (Owen, 2004: 196).

According to Özbudun and Yazıcı (2004: 41), the constitutional and legal reforms during this period civilianized Turkish politics to a large extent by eliminating certain military prerogatives and curtailing some of its privileges. Military preference of not to intervene in politics with regard to Iraq question and Cyprus issue is provided as evidence of the military's relinquish of their tendency to control politics. However, Demirel (2004: 144) considers that military disengagement during Özal period is an example which proves that any "rolling back" of the military without presence of a societal support for civilians is not likely to be long lasting.

Cizre is also sceptic about the decrease in the military weight, unless some substantial changes take place, too. Cizre (1997) emphasizes antipolitical stance of the military as an important aspect of its relation to civilians. She states that the tendency of the military to interpret mediation of interests and conflicts through party politics or other interest groups as disruptive is not compatible with democracy. She also emphasizes like many other scholars, the guardianship role of the military. Thus, purely institutional changes, as prescribed by the EU will not bring civilian control of the military unless ideological and historical underpinnings of the power relationship, the systems that sustain the legitimacy of military intervention undergo a substantial change (Cizre, 2004: 117-119). Building on the Bland's regime theory of civil military relations, she draws attention to the deficiency of the EU approaches which do not take into account the historical realities constituting the foundation of civil-military configuration (Cizre, 2004: 117).

Turkish history of civil military relations shows that despite many reasons for military intervention, the sustenance of unstable relationships and praetorian status results from lack of consensus between civilians and military on their respective roles in the politics of the state. As stated by Cizre (2004: 117), institutional changes would not bring a transformation of civil military relations unless accompanied by more substantial changes, mainly civilian empowerment, which itself requires military cooperation. Thus, it would not be realistic to expect the process of the EU membership to solve all the problems of civil military relations in Turkey.

However, under some conditions, the EU criteria also have potential to improve civil military relations toward a more democratic status by providing certain standards of civil military relations for politicians and the military to agree on. Since Turkish military already presented its cooperative stance in the reform packages considerably decreasing their prerogatives at least in the institutional sphere, one expect that as long as the aim of European membership is shared by politicians, military and society, the developments towards democratic control of the military which involves decreasing role of the military in domestic politics, and increasing legislative and executive oversight on the military can improve. However, decline in prospects of membership would decrease such a motivation. Furthermore, increases in domestic threats against secularism and integrity of the state would also negatively affect the process if politicians fail to prove their capability and sincerity for the security of the regime. Similarly, increasing instability in the international environment of Turkey would prevent the adoption or application of the EU standards unless civilians assure the military that their concerns are taken into consideration in the formulation of policies.

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