

**RECONCILIATION AS PART OF POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING AND
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS:
COMPARING POSTWAR GREECE AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that , to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

In this study I examine the relationship between two processes that are of utmost importance in post-conflict contexts: the process of democratization which refers to the establishment of democratic institutions and processes after internal conflict, and the process of reconciliation which refers to the establishment of peaceful relationship between previously opposing fractions. I argue that in order to investigate the question of under what circumstances postwar democratization may lead to reconciliation we should examine three issues that are accepted to be central in post-conflict contexts: the issue of international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economic development. This study is based on a comparative analysis of two cases, the case of Greece after the divisive civil war of 1946-1949, and the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the civil war of 1992-1995. Although these two cases do not seem comparable at a first glance, a closer investigation indicates that the processes of postwar democratization and reconciliation proceeded similarly in both countries. After the comparative analysis of the cases I find that the level and essence of international engagement in a postwar country has major impact on how the processes of democratization and reconciliation proceed. The fact that reconciliation in Greece was achieved as a result of the democratization process as an internal dynamic of the Greek society provides a clue for how the democratization process that is ongoing in Bosnia may pave the way for reconciliation among the ethno-nationalist groups of the country.

Keywords: postwar democratization, reconciliation, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovin

ÖZET

Bu çalışma iç savaş sonrası toplumlarda büyük önem taşıyan iki sürece odaklanmakta: ilki, savaş sonrası demokratik kurumların ve süreçlerin oluşturulması olan demokratikleşme, ikincisi ise, savaş döneminde karşıt olan grupların barışçıl ilişkiler geliştirmesi olarak tanımlanan toplumsal uzlaşma. Savaş sonrası demokratikleşmenin hangi koşullar altında toplumsal uzlaşmaya yol açtığını anlayabilmemiz için üç temel unsura bakmamız gerektiğini savunuyorum: uluslar arası toplumun savaş sonrası topluma müdahale düzeyi, savaş sonrası iç meşruiyet düzeyi ve savaş sonrası ekonomik gelişme düzeyi. Bu çalışma iki örneğin karşılaştırmalı analizine dayanmaktadır: 1946-1949 iç savaşı sonrası Yunanistan örneği ve 1992-1995 iç savaşı sonrası Bosna-Hersek örneği. Bu örneklerin ilk bakışta karşılaştırılabilir olmadığı düşünülse de aslında bu iki örnekte savaş sonrası demokratikleşme ve toplumsal/siyasal uzlaşma süreçleri benzer bir yol izlemiştir. Bu iki örneğin karşılaştırmalı analizi sonucu uluslar arası toplumun iç savaş sonrası topluma müdahale seviyesi ve bu müdahalenin ne şekilde gerçekleştiğinin savaş sonrası demokratikleşme ve uzlaşmanın nasıl bir yol izlediği üzerinde merkezi bir rol oynadığı görüldü. Yunanistan'da savaş sonrası toplumsal/siyasal uzlaşmanın demokratikleşmenin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkması, Yunanistan'ın bu süreçleri kendi iç dinamiği sonucu gerçekleştirmesi ile açıklanıyor. Bu durum, şu an Bosna-Hersek'te halen devam eden bu süreçlerin nasıl süregelmesi gerektiği ile ilgili bize önemli bir ipucu sağlıyor.

Anahtar kelimeler: savaş sonrası demokratikleşme, uzlaşma, Yunanistan, Bosna-Hersek

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ABBREVIATIONS

EAM	National Liberation Front (<i>Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο- Εθνικο Απελευθερωτικό Μετωπο</i>)
EDA	United Democratic Left (<i>Ενωμένη Δημοκρατική Αριστερά -Ενομένη Δημοκρατική Αριστερά</i>)
EC	European Community
EK	Center Union (<i>Ενωση Κέντρου -Ενωση Κέντρου</i>)
ELAS	National Popular Liberation Army (<i>Εθνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός -Εθνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός</i>)
ERE	National Radical Union (<i>Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ενωση- Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ενωση</i>)
ERP	European Recovery Program
EU	European Union
HDZ	Croat Democratic Community
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund

KKE	Greek Communist Party (<i>Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος- Kommunistiko Komma Ellados</i>)
KYP	Central Intelligence Agency (<i>Κεντρική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών- Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	New Democracy (<i>Νέα Δημοκρατία- Nea Dimokratia</i>)
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (<i>Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα- Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima</i>)
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
SDA	Bosnian Party of Democratic Action
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WCC	War Crimes Chamber

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1.RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question that I seek to answer in this study is based on the puzzle that exists between the process of democratization in societies emerging out of violent conflict and the process of reconciliation that is expected to flourish among the previously opposing groups on the road to the establishment of sustainable peace. This puzzle is observed from the diverse opinions that exist on the post-conflict democratization-reconciliation relationship and the previous empirical examples of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in societies emerging out of violent conflict. While the literature on democratization and reconciliation has pointed to differing views on whether democratization leads to reconciliation or whether reconciliation is the wider process that encompasses democratization (IDEA 2003; Sarkin and Dali 2004), previous examples of post-conflict democratization have also indicated that reconciliation is not always achieved as the result of the democratization process. Based on this observation, in this study I am mainly concerned with linking the democratization discussions to reconciliation and I basically investigate the question of “Why in some countries democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not”. In later parts of this study I comparatively analyze two cases that have provided diverse insights on the issue: the case of postwar Greece where reconciliation was achieved as


the result of the post-1974 democratization process, and the case of postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina where despite the enormous efforts of the international community in terms of democracy-building and institutional and electoral engineering, democratization has still not led to reconciliation among previously fighting fractions.

This study is based on the analysis of postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded on the way to the establishment of sustainable peace. Although the two cases present strong differences in terms of the character of the civil war (ethnic versus non-ethnic) and the post-conflict reconstruction process which in Bosnia was mainly externally-driven, these two cases provide valuable insights for the question of how democratization and reconciliation may root for each other and contribute to sustainable peace. In this study I place Greece in the Balkan context as a country which went through the process which is today in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the divisive civil war of the 1940s. Greece went through a civil conflict which was characterized by severe atrocities and high level of casualties, as was the case in the Bosnian internal conflict of 1992-1995. Both the Greek and the Bosnian civil war occurred in the aftermath of wider interstate conflicts: the Greek civil war took place immediately after the end of the Second World War, and the Bosnian civil war occurred as part of the wider Yugoslav Wars that took place among previous Yugoslav republics. The civil wars in both countries were marked by a nationalist rhetoric exceeding the mere ideological (Left vs. Right in Greece) and ethnic (Serbs vs. Croats vs. Bosniacs in Bosnia) divisions. This nationalist dimension continued its relevance in the post-conflict democratization and reconciliation processes. In postwar Greece, the Rightist nationalist discourse dominated the political arena especially until the coup d'état of 1967.

Similarly, in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina the political arena is still dominated by the ethno-nationalist parties and political competition is based on ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Finally, the process of democratization in both countries proceeded within the process of integration to wider European structures (EC/EU).

Based on these two cases and the democratization-reconciliation puzzle that I proposed earlier, this study investigates the circumstances that determine the pacifying effect of democratization based on three issues: the issue of international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of post-war economy. The figure below indicates the basic form of investigation that I adopt in the following parts of this study:

Figure 1: Basic Form of Investigation Adopted in this Study



As this figure shows, the analysis that I adopt in the following chapters of this study is based on a theoretical framework that encompasses three major aspects that are generally accepted to have major importance within the post-conflict reconstruction process (Whitehead 1996; Lipset 1969; Burnell 2006; Brinkerhoff 2005; Diamond 1992). While these three factors are often mentioned in the literature as being crucial, what is missing in the study of these factors in the literature is their role in post-conflict democratization and reconciliation processes. This study tries to address this by establishing a model that encompasses all three aspects at once for analyzing the question of why democratization in Greece led to reconciliation while in Bosnia this is not the case until today. Therefore, in this study I use the issue of international engagement/external influence; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy in order to analyze the research question at hand.

1.2 WHY STUDY POST-CONFLICT RECONCILIATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION?

Previous studies on post-conflict democratization (Diamond 2006; Manning 2007; Høglund et al. 2009; Horowitz 2008) and reconciliation (IDEA 2003; Bloomfield 2006; Pankhurst 1999; Brouneous 2008; Assefa 1999) have tended to analyze these two processes in relative isolation from each other and research that investigates the link between democratization and reconciliation has been limited. This study is an attempt to provide a perspective which connects democratization to reconciliation. This analysis basically aims at investigating the question of why in some cases democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not.

Based on the cases of Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina, this study will add to the research on democratization by comparing two countries that have not been subjected to extensive comparative research previously. The comparison between the Greek postwar processes from 1950s through 1980s provides valuable insights for the ongoing reconstruction process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a process which began in 1995. Considering the great number of post conflict reconstruction processes that have been initiated in different parts of the world since the last decades, including the post-Yugoslav states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia; African states such as Liberia, Mozambique; Asian states such as Cambodia; and Middle Eastern examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the importance of analyzing democratization and reconciliation from a different perspective becomes apparent.

Additionally, the significance of this topic in general and of this study in particular is related to the fact that the issues of democratization and reconciliation are not only relevant for countries that emerge out of internal conflicts, but for divided societies in general. The theoretical and empirical investigation of the connection between reconciliation and democracy will give insights for divided societies where ethnic and socio-political cleavages threaten societal and political stability. Therefore, research on the pacifying effect of democracy and the investigation of the conditions that lead to reconciliation through democracy will provide valuable insights for the amelioration of intergroup relations in societies that are characterized by divisions including social, political, ethnic, and religious differences.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

In order to investigate the research question at hand this study applies qualitative research methods and more specifically the comparative case study method. The case study method presents several strengths compared to large-N studies which include its potential to achieve high conceptual validity; its strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; its value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and its capacity for addressing causal complexity (George and Benett 2005, 19)¹. The research that I conduct in order to understand how postwar democratization and reconciliation are related to each other and how these two processes proceeded in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on a comparative analysis of these processes in these two cases. By comparing postwar reconciliation and democratization in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina my aim is to provide a first attempt to investigate the question of how democracy and reconciliation are related in post-conflict contexts.

The comparative analysis of this research is based on Mill's method of difference which attempts to identify independent variables associated with different outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 153)². In the method of difference the investigator chooses cases with

¹ It should be noted that as every social science method, case studies also present a number of limitations. Benett and George provide a non-exhaustive list of such limitations: case selection bias; identifying scope conditions and "necessity"; lack of representativeness; potential lack of independence of cases (2005, 22).

² George and Benett note that "it is generally extremely difficult to find two cases that resemble each other in every respect but one, as controlled comparison requires" (2005, 152) and that "in exercises that use the method of agreement and difference, the investigator cannot be sure that all of the possibly relevant independent variables have been identified" (2005, 156). Here I acknowledge that Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina present strong differences in many aspects and by no means is the comparative analysis of this study exception to the structural weaknesses that surround controlled comparisons. In terms of methodology, the study at hand can also be classified as "disciplined-configurative" in Eckstein's typology of case studies (1975) or "interpretative" according to Lijphart's typology (1971). Both of these typologies signify that a case is selected and analyzed with interest in the case rather an interest in the formulation of a general theory (Lijphart 1971, 692). However, since both Eckstein's and Lijphart's typology refer to single case studies, I caution to use them in the study at

similar general characteristics and different values on the study variable (Van Evera 1997, 57). Despite the limitations that I provide below, postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina provide a fertile ground for comparison in order to investigate why the outcome in terms of the postwar democratization and reconciliation was achieved. With the aim to investigate the different outcomes in terms of democratization-reconciliation processes I use a theoretical framework composed of three explanatory variables which are: the level of international influence/external engagement; the level of internal legitimacy; and postwar economic development.

Besides the method of difference, I also apply the method of process-tracing which allows for investigation of the causal relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The method of process-tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal processes- the causal chain and causal mechanism- between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Benett 2005, 206). In this study I apply the method of process-tracing in order to capture the possible causal pathways that led to reconciliation as the result of the democratization process in Greece contrary to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1.3.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

hand. In order to avoid criticisms regarding case selection (associated with the general weaknesses of the controlled comparison method), below I list the main aspects that differentiate the two cases as limitations of the study. I also take into consideration the differences between the two cases before reaching a tentative conclusion at the end of this study and in Chapter 5 I list several alternative explanations to the question of why postwar democratization in post-1974 Greece opened the room for reconciliation while in Bosnia it has not.

Before proceeding to the theoretical framework and the analysis of the cases it is essential to provide a list of the limitations of this study. Here I refer mainly to the aspects of this study that may be seen as weak points of the research that has been done and the results that were achieved. The limitations of this study are related firstly to case selection and secondly to the conceptualization of the main concepts, i.e. democratization and reconciliation.

One area of limitations is concerned with the issue of case selection. It should be noted from the beginning that Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina are two cases that do not seem comparable at a first glance. This is related both to strong differences in terms of historical background and to differences in terms of the essence of divisions that characterize each society. Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina differ in terms of previous experience with democracy (prewar democracy in Greece versus communist/authoritarian rule in Bosnia); in terms of the character of the civil war (ethnic in Bosnia versus non-ethnic/ideological in Greece); and in terms of the postwar reconstruction process which in Bosnia was essentially externally-driven (as opposed to low levels of external engagement in postwar Greece).

While Greece and Bosnia differ in terms of their previous experience with democracy, a close investigation of the historical background of the cases indicates that this difference does not pose a serious drawback for their comparison. Procedural democracy in Greece dates back to the establishment of the Greek Republic in the 1830s with the establishment of the First Crowned Democracy in mid 19th century (Legg and Roberts 1997). Crowned democracy in Greece continued throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and multi-party elections persisted

until shortly before the breakup of the civil war in 1946³. Contrary to Greece's experience with democracy, as part of the Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been under communist authoritarian rule during the whole 20th century. As a republic of Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia had not experienced multi-party elections since the end of the Second World War until the 1990s. The move to procedural democracy was realized with the electoral race of 1990 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, a close investigation of the Greek case indicates that the experience of Greece with multiparty politics had gone hand in hand with authoritarian practices. Parallel to its experience with multiparty politics, Modern Greek political history is marked by continuous coup attempts and instability, while two dictatorship periods marked 20th century Greece (Metaxas Dictatorship, 1936-1941 and the Colonels' Dictatorship, 1967-1974)⁴. Therefore, an authoritarian past is present in both countries. Additionally, despite the difference in previous experience with democracy, Greece and Bosnia were at the same levels of democracy when the civil wars ended in 1949 and 1995 respectively⁵. The fact that Greece and Bosnia present such a parallelism in terms of postwar level of democracy indicates that the two cases provide a fertile ground for a comparative analysis in terms of postwar democratization and reconciliation.

As a second aspect of case selection, Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina are differentiated in terms of the essence of inter-communal divisions. The Greek civil war was based on the ideological division of Left versus Right while in Bosnia intergroup divisions are

³ Procedural democracy had been restored in Greece in the interwar years and an electoral race has taken place in 1946, amid the increasing tension between the opposing Leftists and Rightists and just before the breakup of the civil war on March 1946.

⁴ Verney and Coulombis (1991) note that approximately 22 coup attempts were made in the short period from 1915 to 1936 in Greece.

⁵ Based on Polity IV Country Reports 2010, both Greece and Bosnia had a democracy score of 4 in the immediate aftermath of their civil wars. This score was preserved in Greece until the coup d'état of 1967 while Bosnia is still at the same level of democracy score since 1995.

based on ethnicity, with the Serbs, the Croats, and Bosniacs being the three main ethno-nationalist groups in the country. Despite the difference in the essence of divisions, a preliminary analysis of the two cases indicates that war-time and postwar divisions in Greece were as deep as the divisions in the Bosnian case. I contend that the depth of the divisions in both countries opens the room for their comparative analysis. Additionally, besides the essence of divisions, a nationalist rhetoric has been at the heart of both civil wars. In Greece the schism between the Left and the Right was characterized by a nationalist rhetoric adopted by the Greek Right. Similarly in Bosnia the civil war was in essence an ethno-nationalist war, where all ethnic groups based their claims on nationalist terms. The centrality of a nationalist rhetoric in both countries indicates that the difference in the essence of the divisions does not pose a serious drawback for the comparison of the two cases. Furthermore, by comparing two countries that are differentiated in terms of the character of the civil war and the essence of societal divisions, this research will investigate the importance of the essence of the divisions for postwar reconciliation.

As a third issue in terms of case selection, the issue of the level of international engagement in Greece and Bosnia deserves special attention. The level of external engagement to the postwar phases of the two countries is a major differentiating aspect of the two cases. While in Greece direct engagement to the reconstruction of the country after the 1946-1949 civil war was not the case, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the reconstruction process was mainly conducted through external actors, primarily through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and then through the European Union (EU). I contend that the different levels of post-conflict external engagement can be accepted as a limitation to the ensuing

comparative analysis which is methodologically based on the comparative analysis of two cases based on the method of difference. However, in the theoretical framework that I introduce later in this study I incorporate the level of foreign engagement to postwar processes in the two countries as one major issue that defined the way democratization and reconciliation proceeded. Therefore, in this study I use the diversification in terms of foreign engagement as an explanatory factor in my investigation of why reconciliation was achieved as a result of postwar democratization in Greece contrary to Bosnia.

A second set of limitations is concerned with the concepts that form the basis of this study. In this study I use the concept of post-conflict democratization in its broader sense, referring to the establishment of democratic institutions in the aftermath of conflict. The concept of democratization in this study encompasses both the establishment of democratic rules and procedures in the aftermath of conflict and the restoration of democracy in the aftermath of authoritarian rule in the Greek case. Considering that reconciliation in Greece was achieved after the restoration of democracy in the post-1974 period, the comparison between the Bosnian post-1995 democratization process and the Greek post-1974 democratization process poses a limitation to this study which aims to investigate how democratization and reconciliation are related in post-civil war contexts. However, considering that the post-1974 democratization in Greece presents continuity with the pre-1967 process, I contend that this does not limit the explanatory power of the comparative analysis that I conduct in later chapters of this study.

As a second concept, the concept of reconciliation that I adopt in this study is differentiated from the general conceptualization of reconciliation as a process which is

essentially individual and covers issues such as forgiveness and healing. Indeed, as the analysis in the theoretical framework indicates, there is a lack of clear-cut definition of reconciliation in previous scholarly research. In this study I use the concept of reconciliation with reference to the inter-communal level, i.e. reconciliation between previously opposing groups. Furthermore, the concept of reconciliation in this study refers primarily to reconciliation in the political domain. The fact that reconciliation lacks a clear conceptualization on the one hand and that previous use of this concept with reference to the political and inter-communal level has been limited on the other may be accepted as a limitation for this study. However, I contend that besides being a limitation, this is also an asset for this study. It is a limitation because the conceptualization of reconciliation in this study builds on the previous blurred usage of the concept. However, this is also an asset because the conceptualization that I provide here may be seen as a basis for development and clarification of the concept in future studies. In later parts of the study I further elaborate on the main concepts of democratization and reconciliation and I analyze both their conceptualization in previous research and their conceptualization in the study at hand.

Despite these limitations, I contend that this study is a successful initial attempt to understand how democratization and reconciliation are related in postwar contexts. By comparing two cases that have not been subjected to extensive comparative study previously, in this study I aim to unravel the circumstances that led to the establishment of reconciliation in Greece contrary to Bosnia. Furthermore, by comparing two cases that differ in terms of the essence of intergroup divisions- ethnic in Bosnia-Herzegovina versus ideological in Greece-

this study will also provide insights about how determining is the issue of ethnicity may be in postwar reconciliation.

1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

There are five remaining chapters of this study. In the second chapter I provide the core concepts that I use throughout the study, namely the concept of reconciliation and democratization, and then I provide the theoretical framework that I adopt in the analysis of the case studies in the following chapters. In this part I provide the literature review on the main concepts and issues and I present how I approach these concepts and issues throughout the remaining parts of the study. Then I introduce the three main issues that I use in order to investigate the research question at hand, namely the issue of international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy. These three issues are accepted to be central in post-conflict contexts. In this study, I use these three issues in order to investigate why in Greece democratization led to reconciliation while in Bosnia-Herzegovina this is still not the case.

The third and fourth chapters are devoted to the case studies that I use in this study. In the third chapter I analyze the case of Greece after the Greek civil war of 1946-1949. In this chapter, after providing a brief overview of the Greek civil war and its background, I analyze how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in Greece in the post-war period. Then, based on the theoretical framework that I proposed in the second chapter, I extensively

analyze the post-civil war processes in Greece in terms of the issue of international influence, the issue of internal legitimacy, and the issue of post-war economy.

In the fourth part I provide a similar analysis for the Bosnian case for the period after the civil war of 1992-1995. After providing a brief overview of the Bosnian civil war and its background, I proceed on the analysis of the Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction process in terms of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in the country. I then analyze the Bosnian post-war processes based on the three issues that compose the theoretical framework of this study.

The fifth chapter builds on the previous two chapters and is a comparative analysis of the Greek and the Bosnian case. In this part I focus on how the specific issues that I examine explain the diverse outcomes in the two cases. Here my main aim is to unravel which of the three explanatory issues is responsible for the diverse outcomes. I expect that the comparative analysis will provide deep insight on the processes that are under investigation and will form a fertile ground for further analysis of the democratization-reconciliation puzzle using different comparative cases.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous scholarly research on post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building has devoted major attention to reconciliation and democratization as two central processes for the establishment of sustainable peace in societies emerging out of violent conflict (see for example Sarkin 2008; Baskar 2009; Bloomfield 2006; Hippler 2008; Ottaway 2003). Both reconciliation and democratization have emerged as key concepts within the complex environment of post-conflict reconstruction which encompasses societal, economic, and political aspects all at once. However, while acknowledged as being central aspects of peace-building, reconciliation and democratization have been studied in relative isolation from each other and studies focusing on the relationship of these two processes have been missing. Furthermore, previous case studies on post-conflict reconstruction have revealed diverse insights in terms of the link between reconciliation and democratization and the views on whether reconciliation is the wider process that encompasses democratization or democratization leads to societal reconciliation and sustainable peace have been diverse. Based on this observation, in this study I primarily focus on the link between the

reconciliation and democratization processes and specifically I seek to answer the question of why in some countries democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not.

In the first part of this chapter I focus on reconciliation and democratization as the main concepts of this study. While holding a central place in analyses of post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation as a concept is far from having a cross-cutting definition and studies focusing on reconciliation have provided differing views on what the concept signifies in post-conflict contexts. In previous analyses reconciliation appears as a twofold process which is backward-looking and forward-looking at the same time (IDEA 2003; Sarkin and Dali 2003). As a backward-looking process reconciliation requires transitional mechanisms such as justice and truth-seeking which are the means for dealing with violent acts committed in the past. The forward-looking aspect of reconciliation, democratization, is analyzed as a second central theme in this part. Democratization after conflict and democracy promotion through external actors has been one of the central themes within scholarly debates on post-conflict peace-building (see for example Tansey 2007; Grimm and Merkel 2008). At this point I especially focus on the role that democracy is called to play within the reconstruction process.

The second part of this chapter is devoted to the link between reconciliation and democracy. Here I provide the theoretical framework that I use throughout the study. The theoretical framework of this study is based on the link between the reconciliation process, as a process aiming at the establishment of sustainable peace, and democratization, which especially has become a priority of post-conflict reconstruction processes in the recent decades. Within this theoretical framework I examine the factors that contribute to the

emergence of post-conflict reconciliation as the result of the democratization process. Here I examine the issue of international influence/external engagement⁶; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of post-war economy. In the following chapters of this study, I analyze the relationship between reconciliation and democratization processes based on these three issues in the cases of post-war Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2.2 CENTRAL THEMES OF THE STUDY

Post-conflict reconciliation and democratization form the main concepts of this study. In this part I introduce the conceptual framework of these themes and review the literature on the two concepts.

2.2.1 RECONCILIATION: CONCEPT AND DEFINITION

Conceptual discussions regarding reconciliation have not established a cross-cutting theory and conceptualization of reconciliation within the post-conflict context. In previous scholarly research, the concept of reconciliation has been presented as encompassing various aspects of post-conflict peace-building, including psychological aspects, societal/intercommunal aspects, and political aspects and there appears to be a general

⁶ I use the terms “international influence” and “external engagement” interchangeably in this study with reference to the impact of external actors on the democratization and reconciliation processes. The reason why I include both the terms of “influence” and “engagement” is related to the complex nature of international engagement in post-conflict contexts. As the analyses in later chapters indicate, in Greece and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the impact of international actors on these processes has been both direct and indirect. Therefore, I use the terms of “international influence/external engagement” together in order to capture all the dimensions of international engagement in post-conflict reconstruction processes.

confusion about its exact definition. One common denominator of previous scholarly research has been the agreement on the absence of a clear conceptualization of reconciliation. The absence of a clear-cut perception of what reconciliation entails in post-conflict contexts and the existence of a general terminological confusion has been an introductory argument of previous studies and reports on reconciliation (IDEA 2003; Bloomfield 2006; Pankhurst 1999; Brouneous 2008; Assefa 1999). This terminological confusion has been linked to the fact that reconciliation as a concept is perceived both as a goal and a process (IDEA 2003, 12; Nordquist 2007) that includes political, social, and legal components once at the same time. Reconciliation is also perceived as an umbrella concept that encompasses various concepts such as justice, truth-seeking, forgiveness, and healing (Bloomfield 2006; Pankhurst 1999). Furthermore, reconciliation is perceived as an evolving process rather than a static point (Sarkin 2008); a proactive and dynamic process that requires the highest degree of mutual participation (Assefa 1999; Hoogenboom and Vieille 2008).

Numerous discussions on definitional issues of reconciliation have acknowledged the importance of reconciliation as a relationship-building process (Bloomfield 2006; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004; Chicuecue 1997; Brouneous 2008; Lederach 1997). Studies that conceptualize reconciliation as a relationship-building process underline the importance of reconciliation as a process that requires the restoration of the relationship between former adversaries, which will pave the way for long-term peaceful coexistence. The praxis of reconciliation as a relationship-building process encapsulates concepts such as peace, truth, justice, and mercy, which refers to the act of healing (Lederach 1997). Additionally, as a relationship-building process, reconciliation requires the building of decent relationships; the establishment of

restorative justice; the acknowledgement of truth; and the emergence of forgiveness (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2008). According to Hoogenboom and Vieille this is called the ‘thick perception of reconciliation’ as opposed to thin conceptions that refer to aspects such as ending physical violence, democratization, and retributive justice (2008, 6). Seen from this point of view, reconciliation forms a key concept for the move from a history of violence and conflict to a shared future that is characterized by sustainable peace. This view is also central in studies adopting a solid psychological perspective on the issue of post-conflict reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2000; Kaufman 2006).

The conceptualization of reconciliation as a process fostering the move from a divisive past to a shared future indicates that reconciliation is both a backward-looking and a forward-looking process (Sarkin and Dali 2003; IDEA 2003). As a backward-looking process, reconciliation requires acknowledging and dealing with the past (Baskar 2009), facing the past while overcoming hostility between divided peoples (Haider 2009, 2), and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a common vision and understanding of the past (IDEA 2003, 19). As a forward-looking process reconciliation requires building positive relationships, developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society (Baskar 2009; Hamber and Kelly 2004), and the establishment of “a civilized political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power” (IDEA 2003, 19). The transitional justice mechanisms and the truth-seeking mechanisms that are established in the aftermath of violent conflict are part of this backward-looking process of “dealing with the past” (Mobekk 2005; Sarkin and Dali 2003). The backward-looking aspect of reconciliation, including the mechanisms of justice and truth, is interlinked with its forward-looking counterpart, which encompasses a wide

range of reconstruction processes for a peaceful future. In post-conflict contexts, democratization is the most important of these processes.

Building on previous scholarly research, and in line with the study of Brouneous (2008) and the IDEA handbook (2003), in this study I conceptualize reconciliation as the long-term and broad societal and political process that involves the change of destructive attitudes into constructive relationships towards sustainable peace. This definition encompasses aspects of both the thin- ending of violence, democratization- and the thick- deeper transformation of inter-communal relationships- conceptions of reconciliation. This definition is also in accordance with the conceptualization of reconciliation as both a backward-looking and a forward-looking process. In this study I am concerned with the inter-communal level of reconciliation, i.e. with the change in intergroup relations, as opposed to the individual level which mostly refers to the process of healing and forgiveness. Here I am mainly concerned with political reconciliation, i.e. the move towards political moderation both with the establishment of moderate political forces and the change in the voting pattern towards political parties that foster moderation. Political moderation in this study refers to the emergence of cross-group voting and vote-seeking in postwar reconstruction processes. In Greece political moderation was achieved with the establishment of the center-Left and center-Right parties of PASOK and New Democracy after the mid-1970s. In Bosnia on the other hand political moderation has not been achieved, as ethno-nationalist parties that represent exclusively the ethnic group that they belong to still dominate the Bosnian politics since 1995. In later chapters of this study I seek to analyze how the process of reconciliation proceeded in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina with regards to the democratization process that

was initiated in Greece with the elections of 1950 after the end of the civil conflict in 1949, and in Bosnia with the first post-conflict elections in 1996 after the end of the civil war in 1995.

2.2.2 POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRATIZATION ON THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Studies on democratization have focused on the difficulties of transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones in countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and South Korea (Diamond 1992; Geddes 1999; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). Within the studies of democratic transitions democratization refers to the processes whereby the rules and processes of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights (e.g. ethnic minorities), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies) (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 8).

The list below indicates the countries that transitioned to democracy in the period 1974-1990, including the Greek democratization in 1974 and the Yugoslavian (Bosnian) transition to democracy in 1990.

Table 1: The Establishment of New Democratic Governments, 1974-1990

Year	Countries
1974	Portugal, Greece
1976	Spain
1979	Ecuador
1980	Peru
1982	Honduras, Bolivia
1983	Argentina, Turkey, Grenada
1984	El Salvador, Uruguay, Nicaragua
1985	Brazil, Guatemala
1986	Philippines
1987	South Korea
1988	Pakistan
1989	Paraguay, Taiwan, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Panama, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania
1990	Yugoslavia, Russia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti

Source: Drake (1994)

Since the 1990s there has been a shift in scholarly research on democratization, conditioned by the developments in the international arena. With the end of the Cold War democracy has been increasingly perceived as a prerequisite both for political and societal reconstruction after conflict while at the same time the promotion of democratic institutions and the holding of free and fair elections have been accepted as the main engine for sustainable peace (Ottaway 2008). Especially the establishment of peace operations in different parts of the world and the increasing involvement of the international community in peace-building and state-building operations has dramatically increased the attention devoted to the issue of democratization through external actors for the promotion of sustainable peace. At the same time, the wave of externally-led transitions to democracy in the post-1990s

period and the active role that the international community assumed especially in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and in more recent examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq has led to a new flow of discussions on the relationship between external democratization and peace. Within this context, issues such as the role of post-conflict elections, the establishment of democratic institutions, constitution-making, and party-building processes have attracted the attention of both the international community and scholarly studies (see for example Hippler 2008; Diamond 2006; Manning 2007; Hoglund et al. 2009; Santiso 2001; Horowitz 2008).

In this research democratization refers to the establishment of democratic institutions (e.g. political parties) and processes (e.g. elections) in countries emerging out of violent conflict. This study covers the democratization process in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the end of the civil wars, i.e. after 1949 and 1995 respectively. This study covers also the democratization process in Greece in the post-dictatorship period, which is basically the restoration of democracy in the aftermath of authoritarian rule. I accept that the post-conflict democratization process began in the two countries with the first post-conflict elections which took place in Greece in 1950 and in Bosnia in 1996.

In this study I conceptualize democracy based on the definition provided by Schmitter and Karl who define democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by their citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and the cooperation of their elected representatives” (1991, 76). Based on this broad conceptualization, in this study I use the term post-conflict democratization as the process through which democratic institutions and processes are established in countries

emerging out of violent internal conflict. While the concept of post-conflict democratization is now being associated with international efforts to promote democracy in war-torn societies and especially the UN missions deployed to these societies since the 1990s, the issue of post-conflict peace-building and democratization encompasses post-civil war reconstruction processes since the end of the Second World War (see for example Doyle and Sambanis 2000). In later chapters of this study, I engage in the comparative analyses of two post-conflict democratization cases, the Greek case after the civil war of 1946-1949, and the Bosnian case after the civil war from 1992 to 1995.

Accepting that post-war democratization refers to the establishment of democratic processes and institutions in the wider sense, the concept of postwar democratization that I adopt here also encompasses the democratic consolidation process which is accepted that is achieved at the end of the transition process to democracy after conflict or after authoritarian rule. In this study I adopt the term ‘democratic consolidation’ as a process that diminishes the probability of reversal of democratization (Pridham 1995, 168). In my analysis I use the concept of democratic consolidation based on two different but interrelated definitions, the first offered by Pridham (1995) and the second by Karakatsanis (1997). Pridham defines democratic consolidation as a situation where “basic political structures and procedures established during transition become institutionalized, “internalized”, and eventually legitimated”⁷ (1995, 168). Pridham differentiates between two types of democratic

⁷ Throughout this study I use the issue of internal legitimacy as a force explaining the question of why in some countries democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not. Therefore internal legitimacy is one of the independent variables of this study. The concept of legitimacy within the definition of democratic consolidation refers to the legitimacy of the democratic regime. On the other hand, internal legitimacy as an explanatory force behind the research question at hand refers to the legitimacy of the democratic institutions and the state apparatus in general.

consolidation: “negative consolidation” which broadly refers to the containment or reduction of any serious challenges to consolidation, and “positive consolidation” which refers to the remaking of the political culture both in the mass and the elite level. According to Karakatsanis on the other hand, “the institutions, norms, and ‘rules of the game’ of the established democratic regime must not only be *adhered* to by all significant political groups in order for the regime to be seen as consolidated, but they must also be *regarded* as acceptable and legitimate by these groups” (Karakatsanis 1997, 290).⁸

In this study I focus on democracy in the aftermath of violent conflict and I explore the role of reconciliation and democracy in the establishment of sustainable peace. Within post-conflict contexts, democratic governance provides the means for the peaceful negotiation of contested issues and electoral processes function as the main means for political participation. Democracy is generally accepted as reinforcing domestic peace, as it stabilizes post-conflict societies by resorting previously fighting groups into an institutionalized political order (Joshi 2009, 827). Elections, political competition and participation are perceived as central to democracy (Dahl 1971), while it is generally acknowledged that political participation to democratic governance through non-violent methods paves the way for the establishment of norms that emphasize negotiation and conciliation (Yalcin-Mousseau 2001), which are essential for the establishment of sustainable peace after conflict.

⁸ Greece after 1974 and more specifically in the 1980s fits well these two definitions of democratic consolidation. Greece gradually moved from negative consolidation to positive consolidation with the 1981 elections being a critical turning point. These elections resulted with the advent for the first time of a center-Left party, PASOK, as politically victorious. More specifically, what happened in post-dictatorial Greece was the rise to the surface of a common desire for the establishment of democratic politics and this was the basis upon which a consensus towards consolidating democracy was built.

The essence of democracy as a means for peaceful contestation of issues and its close relation to peace and order brings the process of democratization close to that of reconciliation. Especially in this study where I accept that political reconciliation is achieved when a move towards moderation in terms of political party competition is achieved, the concept of reconciliation comes close to that of democratic consolidation which in general terms signifies the establishment of moderate political forces in the political arena (see for example Gunther et al., 1995). However, one essential difference between the process of reconciliation as I adopt it in this study and the concept of postwar democratic consolidation is that reconciliation refers essentially to the change of mutual destructive attitudes towards constructive relationships while democratic consolidation refers to attitudinal change towards political institutions. Gunther et al. note that the attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation means that existing political institutions are regarded as acceptable and without legitimate alternatives while at the same time are respected and adhered to by all politically significant groups (1995, 7). Within post-conflict contexts both reconciliation and democratization in its broader sense (including consolidation) form central issues that are in accordance with the essence of post-conflict reconstruction process which aims at the establishment of a peaceful society. In the next part of this chapter I investigate the understudied link between reconciliation and democracy. Here I also provide the theoretical framework that I adopt to investigate this relationship.

2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LINKING RECONCILIATION TO DEMOCRACY

The theoretical framework that I adopt in this study is based on the link between reconciliation and democracy within post-conflict social and political reconstruction processes. Throughout my analysis I consider reconciliation and democratization as interrelated processes and I seek to analyze the dynamics of their relationship. The main question that I seek to answer based on the theoretical framework is the question of under what circumstances democratization is likely to lead to post-conflict reconciliation in societies emerging out of violent conflict.

While acknowledged in general terms, the relationship between reconciliation and democracy in post-conflict peace-building has been understudied. Reconciliation and democracy form the basis upon which sustainable peace is sought to be built and both democratization and reconciliation are seen as the main engine that will transform past controversies to a peaceful coexistence in the future. However, the connection between the two concepts remains vague and there is a blurred picture of whether democratization requires reconciliation in order to succeed or whether reconciliation is the broader process that both enhances democratization and is the result of it. While the IDEA handbook (2003) underlines the importance of democracy as a prerequisite for post-conflict reconciliation and the restoration of peace, other studies have pointed to the opposite relationship between democracy and reconciliation, declaring the need for reconciliation as a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic governance (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009). Additionally, the view that democracy is related to reconciliation in terms of its forward-looking dimension

urge us to think of a more dynamic interaction between the two concepts (Sarkin and Daly 2003). Accepting that democracy is part of the forward-looking aspect of reconciliation leaves unanswered the question of whether reconciliation is a prerequisite for democracy or whether it is the broader process that encompasses democracy as part of the reconstruction process.

In this section I introduce the theoretical framework that I use in the preceding analyses of reconciliation and democratization processes in postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The theoretical framework is composed of the three factors that are accepted to be central to understand the link between reconciliation and democratization processes in post-conflict societies.

2.4 EXAMINING THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE RECONCILIATION-DEMOCRATIZATION PUZZLE

In the theoretical framework of this study I establish a model that incorporates three factors that I contend that primarily affect the post-conflict reconstruction process. This model can be accepted as a beginning exercise for investigating the research question at hand. The factors that compose the model are the issue international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy. Previous studies on post-conflict democratization have acknowledged the importance of each of these issues for the transition to democracy both in the aftermath of conflict and in the aftermath of authoritarian rule (see for example Whitehead 1996; Lipset 1969; Burnell 2006; Brinkerhoff 2005; Roberts 2008; Diamond 1992). In this study I use these factors in order to analyze the question of *why*

in some countries democratization leads to reconciliation while in others does not. Thus, in the ensuing analysis of the case studies I examine the role of these issues in the democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here I introduce and analyze each factor separately.

2.4.1 EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Previous scholarly research on international influence and democratization has focused on the importance of the international context for democratization and on the influence of international actors like the EU on democratizing countries transitioning to democracy (see for example Yilmaz 2002; Whitehead 1996; Burnell 2006). Research on international engagement has also included the role of unilateral and multilateral actors in cases where the transition to democracy after intervention was externally driven (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, see for example Diamond 2005; Suhrke 2008; Bojkov 2003). Within the studies that focus on internal-external linkages and democratization there have been established various perspectives on the issue. An overview of the studies on international context and democratization reveals three central approaches on the international dimension of democratization: the concept of “democratization through convergence” (Whitehead 1996); the concept of “democratization through system penetration” (Pridham 1991); and the notion of “internationalized domestic politics” (Chalmers 1993). These three concepts explain the issue of external influence within the democratization process based on three perspectives. According to Whitehead’s conceptualization, a state may become democratic with its entrance

to a democratic community of states, as was the case with Spain, Greece, and Portugal after their membership to the EU. Pridham's concept is closely associated with Whitehead's as it refers to democratization through long term penetration of domestic politics. Lastly, Chalmer's conceptualization refers to the long-term engagement of international actors in domestic politics of transitional countries and the effect of this engagement on the democratization process.

The role of the international community in post-conflict reconstruction is mostly studied within the framework of external democratization (see for example Hippler 2008; Ottaway 2003; Santiso 2001; Grimm and Merkel 2008). This is related to the fact that the peace-building operations of the last decades have generally included provisions for fostering democratic governance in the aftermath of conflict. In this direction the international community has assumed the task of organizing and implementing the first post-conflict elections that are seen as the main engine for the establishment of democratic governance (Reilly 2002; Lyons 2004; Hoglund et al. 2009). External actors have assumed various democracy-building tasks including the organization, conduction, and implementation of democratic elections; constitution-building and designing postwar power sharing arrangements; establishing transitional governing bodies; and establishing transitional justice mechanisms. International actors such as the UN, the OECD and unilateral states have assumed these and a variety of other tasks with the primary aim of fostering democratization and sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. In this study the role of international actors is especially important for the case studies that are analyzed in the ensuing chapters. External interference is one central factor differentiating the Bosnian case from the Greek one, as in

Bosnia the international community assumed a central role in the reconstruction of the country after the war of 1992-1995.

2.4.3 INTERNAL LEGITIMACY

While previous studies on post-conflict reconstruction acknowledge the importance of internal legitimacy both for the transition period (especially in relation to justice, see for example IDEA 2003; IDEA 2005; Leebaw 2005) and the post-transition period (see for example Diamond 2006; Lyons 2002), extended analysis on what legitimacy means in the post-conflict contexts and how it affects peace processes is missing. In this study I focus on the issue of legitimacy within the post-conflict context as one of the central factors affecting the relationship between the reconciliation and democratization processes. Post-conflict legitimacy can be seen as a campaign to convince the population that the state- as a holder of power and set of institutions- is sufficiently appropriate for the context, hence, meriting freedom from excessive opposition or violent contestation (Lipset 1963 cited in Barakat et al. 2010). Based on this conceptualization, in this study I use the term *internal legitimacy* as a concept that indicates whether a state is accepted as rightfully holding and exercising political power (Gilley 2006)⁹. In this study my focus is on internal/local/domestic legitimacy, i.e. on state legitimacy as it is perceived by its own citizens rather than external legitimacy, i.e. the recognition of the state by the international community (Roberts 2008). The concept of

⁹ Gilley (2006 and 2012) provides a quantitative measurement of state legitimacy with data based on 72 and 52 countries respectively. In order to measure state legitimacy the author focuses on three defining aspects of the concept which are *legality*, *justification*, and *consent*. The author measures legality and justification based on World Values Surveys. Consent is measured based on several indicators such as taxes on income, profits and property as a percentage of central government revenues less social contributions, and voting turnout as the proportion of the voting age population.

internal legitimacy that I adopt encompasses also the legitimacy of the institutions created by the international community in cases where international actors assumed extended role in the post-conflict reconstruction process, as it is the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The issue of internal legitimacy is closely linked to the reconciliation and democratization processes after conflict. As the above conceptualization of internal legitimacy reveals, the very essence of the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens has the potential to affect the peace process as a whole. If a state is not accepted as rightfully holding and exercising political power then the prospects for opposition and subsequent violence rise. Especially in cases where ethnic divisions are deep, power sharing mechanisms should be designed accurately so that any group does not feel marginalized in the political arena and contest the legitimacy of state institutions. In cases where state legitimacy is intertwined with the question of power-sharing and with the issue of the relationship between the state and the groups (whether they are ethnic or non-ethnic/ideological), the reconciliation process runs the risk of getting interrupted. Questioning state legitimacy will inevitably impede the reconciliation process, as, in cases where the legitimacy is contested, the risk for conflict recurrence will increase.

Democratization and legitimacy are interlinked with respect to the formation of the post-conflict governing body. This is related to the fact that the way the democratization process proceeds will affect the legitimacy devoted to the subsequent government. This is a central issue especially in studies focusing on post-conflict electoral processes. The main argument is that the mechanics post-conflict elections, including their timing, the electoral system design, and their administration, impact the legitimacy of the government that is

formed as a result of them (Lyons 2004; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Reilly 2002). The timing of post-conflict elections affects both their administration and the essence of the electoral context. Elections that are held in a short period after conflict run the risk of being administered improperly because the unavailability of time will lead to the incomplete organization of the elections. Additionally, elections that are conducted in the immediate aftermath of conflict will be shaped by wartime divisions and run the risk of being a mere power-sharing contest of the previously fighting groups. As a second aspect, the electoral system design is important from the viewpoint that it affects the formation of the political party system. The electoral system defines the way votes will be casted into seats in the parliament and the way they will be distributed among different political parties. This, from its part affects the basis upon which the political parties will seek their votes. In cases where political party competition is again conditioned to wartime divisions, the electoral results and the subsequent government risks of not being accepted as legitimate. Lastly, the electoral administration also affects the issue of legitimacy from the viewpoint that deficits in the administration of the election will again lead to skepticism regarding the results.

In the ensuing parts of this study I analyze internal legitimacy as an issue that affects the democratization process in post-conflict contexts. In the following chapters my focus will be on the issue of how the question of internal legitimacy affected the post-conflict reconstruction phase of Greece and of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I expect to find that the issue of internal legitimacy was a more central theme in Bosnia rather than Greece due to the essence of the war and the post-war reconstruction process that Bosnia has been exposed to. I contend

that the ethnic character of the war in Bosnia and the externally driven post-conflict process should have impacted to the question of legitimacy in a negative manner.

2.4.4 POSTWAR ECONOMY

Previous scholarly research on the link between the economy and democratization has acknowledged both the importance of economic development for democratization and oppositely the effect of democratization on economic development (Lipset 1969; Muller 1988; Diamond 1992; Kurzman et al. 2002). Most explanations on the relationship between economic development and democratic governance have rested on cultural, instrumental-rational, or structural-functionalist foundations (Mousseau 2000, 479). Mousseau briefly notes that structural-functionalist models assert that democracy is simply more functional development (Fukuyama 1992; Parsons 1964 cited in Mousseau 2000, 479); instrumental-rationalist approaches tend to point to the changing class-structures with development (Huntington 1968; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, cited in Mousseau 2000, 479); and cultural models tend to reject a role of economic prosperity as a source of democratic values (Diamond 1997, cited in Mousseau 2000, 479). This brief overview indicates that the democracy-economy link has not been well understood yet and there is a lack of well established theoretical account of how democracy and economy are related to each other. Still, besides the lack of a well-established theoretical link between democracy and economy, the observation of wealth and democracy opens the room for accepting that democracy and economic well-being are connected to each other (Barnes 2001, 87).

Besides the observation between economic wealth and democracy, the economy-democracy link has been established through the economic norms theory (Mousseau 2000; 2009; 2012). This theory mainly argues that a specific type of economic development, the capitalist economic development, creates citizen-wide preferences for universal freedom, peace, and democratic rule of law (Mousseau 2012, 1). While initially analyzing the relation between economy-values-peace among nations, economic norms theory has also been applied to intrastate conflict including civil wars (Mousseau 2012). For the economy-democracy link both among and within nations, the economic norms theory rests on the argument that in contract-intensive economies, individuals behave in accordance with the proper functioning of a market economy, which requires that all individuals have freedom of choice and are protected by the state. In this study I adopt economic norms theory as part of my analysis of the issue of postwar economy which is part of the model that I establish. In later parts of the study I use the economic norms theory in order to investigate the question of why democratization in some countries leads to reconciliation while in others it does not.

The concept of reconciliation is closely linked to economic aspects. The IDEA Handbook notes that the improvement of socio-economic conditions in a post-conflict society is a key step on the road to reconciliation (2003, 27) while it is generally acknowledged that economic disparities form a barrier for reconciliation (Sarkin 2008; Pankhurst 1999). Economic considerations are the main engine for the willingness of opposing parties or individuals to reconcile with other members of the society. In societies where there is a sense of economic inequality in the aftermath of conflict, it is expected that reconciliation initiatives will be ineffective. This situation is especially important for societies where intergroup

divisions are deep. Especially in societies where ethnic divisions coincide with wartime warring lines, the feeling of economic injustice at the expense of a specific group will affect intergroup relations and the reconciliation process in general.

Economic aspects affect the democratization process from different perspectives. As I noted above, democracy is generally associated with economic well-being while at the same time, it is accepted that in post-conflict transitions successful economic growth raise the chances for democracy (see for example Barnes 2001, Przeworski et al. 1996). Additionally, economic norms theory also links contact intensive economy with democratic norms and values. The analysis of the Greek and the Bosnian postwar economic developments and the general characteristics of their postwar economies will reveal valuable insights for explaining how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in these two countries. Preliminary analysis of the cases indicates that both the overall economic flourishing in Greece during the 1950s and 1960s, and the high levels of market institutionalization in Greece both in the pre and post-dictatorship periods had an increased impact on the democratization and reconciliation processes in the country. Contrary to Greece, the macroeconomic performance of the Bosnian economy has remained behind its prewar levels while the level of market institutionalization is still very low. In later parts of this study I provide a more extensive analysis of the postwar economies in Greece and Bosnia in order to analyze why in Greece reconciliation was achieved as a result of the democratization process while in Bosnia this is not the case.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Post-conflict reconciliation and democratization form two central processes in societies emerging out of internal conflict. Here I firstly clarified how reconciliation and democratization are conceptualized within post-conflict contexts and then I introduced the theoretical framework based on which I analyze the conditions that reconciliation may be achieved as the result of the post-conflict democratization process. In order to investigate the relationship between postwar democratization and reconciliation, I adopted a theoretical framework composed of three issues that are accepted to be central in post-conflict processes: the issue of international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy. In the following chapters I proceed on the analysis of postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the theoretical framework that I proposed above.

In this chapter I conceptualized reconciliation as the broad societal and political process that fosters the move from a history of conflict to a commonly shared future which is characterized by peace. Based on this conceptualization, this study is mainly concerned with the inter-communal level of reconciliation as opposed to the individual level, and more specifically with political reconciliation, i.e. the establishment of political rhetoric and competition that exceeds the divisions that formed the basis of the conflict. As a second concept, in this study I use the concept of democratization as the process of the establishment of democratic institutions and processes in the aftermath of conflict. In this study democratization encompasses also the establishment of democracy in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, as in the Greek case after 1974.

To analyze the relationship between post-conflict reconciliation and democratization processes in postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina I use a theoretical framework that encompasses three central themes that affect the reconstruction process after war. These are the issue of international influence/external interference; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy. External influence may range from external interventionism in internal politics, as was the case with American interventionism to Greece within the Cold War context, to the active role of the international actors in the post-conflict process, as is the case with the international community in Bosnia after 1995. International interference means that major issues such as constitution-making, the implementation of post-conflict elections, and party-building are subjected to the engagement of international actors at various levels, which has a primary impact on how societal relations are constituted and how democratization proceeds in the post-conflict context. Similarly, the issue of internal legitimacy is important both with respect to reconciliation and to democratization due to the potential for conflict in cases where there is a sense of the absence of legitimacy. In cases where internal legitimacy is contested, the prospects that democracy will lead to intergroup dialogue and compromise are very low. Lastly, economic considerations are interlinked with the reconstruction process as a whole and define both the intergroup relations and the success of the process as a whole. Postwar economic development and associated socioeconomic development may impact positively on democratization through political mobilization and the eradication of economic injustices will have a positive effect on postwar intergroup relations. I argue that these three themes are intertwined in the process for the establishment of sustainable peace and form central aspects regarding the question of how democratization may lead to reconciliation in societies emerging out of violent conflict.

CHAPTER 3

THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR GREECE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Greek civil war of the 1940s marked the history of modern Greece as the bitterest civil strife with the highest level of casualties involving Greeks during the 20th century (Close 1995). The civil war in Greece was mainly based on the Right versus Left cleavage but exceeded this cleavage in many aspects. Besides the main division between Left and Right, the conflict was interlinked with the issue of monarchy versus republicanism which itself has been a source of deep divisions in the prewar period of the 1930s. The civil war was also complicated by the fact that it involved a Rightist nationalistic discourse which deepened the divisions between the two fractions. The bitterness of the civil strife had a catalytic impact on how the postwar reconstruction process in Greece proceeded as it was the essence of war-time divisions that shaped the postwar democratization and reconciliation efforts. The postwar reconstruction process in Greece was marked by the Colonels' dictatorship that began with the coup d'état of 1967 and persisted until 1974, when it was eventually self-destroyed, paving the way for the democratic consolidation process of the country and opening the horizons for reconciliation between the opposing fractions of the civil war.

In this chapter I analyze the post-civil war reconstruction process in Greece from the viewpoint of how reconciliation and democratization processes proceeded in the country after the divisive war of 1946-1949. Based on the theoretical framework that I proposed in the previous part of this study, in this chapter I analyze the case of the Greek democratization and reconciliation process based on three main issues: the issue of international engagement to the process; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of the postwar economy. This study covers the post-conflict reconstruction process in Greece beginning with the early 1950s and continuing through the 1980s. In the following analysis of postwar Greece I distinguish between the pre- and post-dictatorial period, i.e. between 1949-1967 and 1974 and onwards. This analytical distinction is necessary because the two periods are highly diversified from each other in terms of both the democratization and the reconciliation processes.

A preliminary analysis of the postwar reconstruction process in Greece reveals the importance of the Colonels' dictatorship of 1967-1974. Indeed, the analyses on postwar Greece generally encapsulate two distinct periods, the first from 1949 to 1967 and the second from 1974 and onwards, with the Junta period as the divisive factor between the two periods. This is closely related to the fact that the pre- and post-dictatorship periods are highly diversified from each other both in terms of how democratization proceeded and in terms of how intergroup relations were shaped. In terms of democratization, the pre-junta period is marked by an unstable period of party politics with nine electoral races taken place from 1950 through 1964. In terms of reconciliation, the analysis of the pre-Junta period indicates the persistence of wartime divisions. The importance of the Junta is related to the fact that, unintentionally though, the dictatorship functioned as a catalytic force for the democratic

consolidation of the country and for the reconciliation of the divisions between the previously fighting fractions in its aftermath. With the end of the Colonels' dictatorship all political and social forces in Greece were like-minded on the issue of the restoration of democracy and transition to democratic politics paved the way for reconciling past divisions.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the first part I give a brief background of the war in order to provide a picture of how war-time divisions were shaped and how they did affect the post-conflict process. Then I analyze the two main processes that this study is primarily interested in, firstly the democratization process and secondly the reconciliation process as they proceeded in postwar Greece. In both analyses I distinguish between the pre- and post-dictatorial periods. Preliminary analysis of the Greek case indicates that reconciliation in postwar Greece was achieved only after the restoration of democracy after the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974. Therefore, in the Greek case reconciliation was the result of the intense democratization phase in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the last part of this chapter I investigate the effect of three factors on the democratization and reconciliation processes of the country: first, the issue of external interference; second, the issue of internal legitimacy; and last, the issue of postwar economy.

3.2 THE 1946-1949 CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

A brief examination of the main characteristics of the Greek civil war is essential for a valuable evaluation of the postwar reconstruction process in Greece which began in the early 1950s. The Greek civil war, while conventionally is projected as a Right versus Left

ideological war, has been a more complex and multidimensional conflict exceeding the mere division of Right versus Left. Indeed, the conflict has its roots in the monarchism versus republicanism issue that marked the interwar period in Greece until the mid-1940s and that has been an issue of outmost concern until the complete eradication of the monarchical rule in 1973. In the civil war of 1946-1949 the issue of monarchy gained special importance as the warring parts of the Right and Left were divided on the issue, with the Right being pro-monarchist and the Left pro-republican. The division between monarchist/Rightists and republicans/Leftists was further deepened with the adoption of a nationalist discourse by the former. During the civil war the Right has projected the conflict between Right and Left as a conflict between the 'nationally minded' (*ethnikofrones*) versus the Slavo-communists (Clogg 2010). The civil war has been also complicated with the engagement of foreign actors such as the Great Britain and then the U.S. in the conflict (Clogg 2000; Close 1995)¹⁰. Furthermore, the war-time period is important in the analysis of postwar reconciliation because it encompasses several unsuccessful reconciliation initiatives which took place in the first half of the 1940s.

The Greek civil war is analyzed as a three-round conflict that began with the Axis occupation in 1941 and took the shape of a civil war in the years 1946-1949. In the conflict over the issue of monarchy, the position of the leftist ideology in favor of republicanism and the position of the rightist groups in favor of the monarchical rule led to a conflict of Left

¹⁰ A major strand of previous scholarly research on post-civil war Greece argues that the United States was an important actor for postwar Greece (Tsoukalas 1969; Clogg 1992; Kofas 1989; Botsiou 2009; Kassimeris 2009; Close 2002; Verney and Coulombis 1990). Historical archives including FRUS documents (Foreign Relations of the United States) and CIA documents (Central Intelligence Agency) also indicate that the U.S. was concerned with the civil war-time and post-civil war developments in Greece mainly due to the Cold War context. Based on these primary and secondary sources that I use throughout this study, I accept that the U.S. was at least an important actor for post-World War II Greece and its interest towards the developments in Greece was associated with the Cold War context and the containment of communism.

versus Right with the Right mainly backed up by the British (Close 1995, 163). During the civil war, the Left has engaged in the conflict through EAM (National Liberation Front- *Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo*) and its military wing ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army- *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*). The first round of the conflict, which covers the years 1941-1943, has been marked by the emergence of nationalism as an ideological back-up of the monarchist Right. The conflict has been projected as one of the people against the monarchy and as one of the nationalists or the “nationally minded” (*ethnikofrones*) Right versus the Left (Giannakos 2000, 93).

The conflict between the monarchist Right and the republican Left proceeded firstly with a reconciliation initiative through the Lebanon Conference in 1944, which under circumstances of mutual distrust led to the resurrection of the conflict. The second round of the conflict, which began in 1944 resulted with the victory of the British-backed Right which produced the Varkiza agreement of 1945. While the Varkiza agreement offered hope for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through the disarming of EAM/ELAS and the restoration of civil authority and foresaw the permission for the Greek Left to participate to the political life in Greece, it was never implemented. Additionally, the post-Varkiza governments made little effort to protect the Left from harassment and undermined the process of reconciliation that was supposed to begin between the two opposing groups (Vlavianos 1991, 83)¹¹. The most important consequence of this agreement was the discrediting of EAM/ELAS and the blaming of the Leftists for the violence that led to the establishment of Varkiza (Iatrides 1995a,

¹¹ The post-Varkiza governments are as follows: the government of Plastira (January 1945- April 1945), Voulgaris (April 1945-October 1945), Kanellopoulos (November 1945), and Sofoulis (November 1945-March 1945).

10).The control of the national institutions by the Rightists as the result of this agreement led to the renewal of the conflict with the third round beginning in 1946¹².

On the other hand, one important aspect of the civil war years in Greece is the increased involvement of external actors including the Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, Former Yugoslavia and Balkan countries such as Bulgaria. External engagement to the Greek civil war throughout the years 1941-1946 has been subject to change both in terms of the actors themselves and in terms of the level of their engagement. While an extensive analysis of the dynamics of such engagement is beyond the scope of this study, an overview of external engagement is useful in order to capture the post-civil war dynamics of external engagement in Greece. For the period from the early 1940s to 1945, British interests in Greece were the subject of an agreement between Churchill and Stalin which was concluded in 1944 in Moscow and according to which the Great Britain was to have a 90 percent sphere of influence in Greece (Nachmani 1990, 496; see also Glogg 2000)¹³. British interests over Greece declined throughout 1946 due to economic considerations and Britain gradually diminished its economic assistance towards Greece in the same year (Iatrides 1993b)¹⁴. Parallel to Britain, the USSR policy towards Greece has not remained constant throughout the civil war years. Stavrakis notes that beginning with the World War II years until 1949 Soviet policy is shown to have been divided into several distinct phases: (1)

¹² The most important clash between the monarchist Right and the republican Left which initiated the civil war took place on December 1945 and is commonly known as *Dekemvriana* (the December events).

¹³ According to the “the spheres of influence in the Balkans” agreement Russia was to have 90 per cent dominance in Rumania, and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; Britain was to have 90 per cent in Greece, in Yugoslavia, and in Hungary, and the influence of the two powers would be balanced, each with 50 per cent. Based on this agreement, the British defeat of the Greek communists in 1944 did not lead to Russian aggression (Nachmani 1990, 496).

¹⁴ Close notes that from 1945 the British government begun to warn the Greek government of an imminent termination of financial support and on June 3 1946 the British Cabinet set the terminal date for 31 March 1947 (Close 1995 , 203).

wartime collaboration with the West, with the primary objective being the defeat of Nazi Germany; (2) KKE political gradualism immediately following the war, which was designed to create a weak Greek government and a strong Communist political presence; (3) a “dual” strategy of political activity and simultaneous gradual preparations for war in response to the inexorable movement toward civil war; and (5) a partial and brief effort to return to the pre-civil war strategy of gradualism (Stavrakis 1995, 229).

Other actors that were involved in the internal war in Greece are Yugoslavia and Balkan states such as Bulgaria. Yugoslavia’s interest towards Greece increased with the deterioration of the relations between Yugoslavia and Russia in 1948 which came to be known as the Tito-Stalin split. Banac notes that beginning with 1946, the KKE third phase of the conflict received a major boost from Yugoslavia¹⁵ (Banac 1995, 264). The author notes for example that the indoctrination camp in Vojvodina was the school for the KKE cadres and the transmissions of the Radio Free Greece originated in Yugoslavia, as did most of the Democratic Army of Greece’s food and supply. Similarly, Bulgaria and other Balkan states such as Macedonia supported military tactics of the fighting guerillas by allowing their access to their territories in the Northern frontier of Greece (Nachmani 1990, 510). Direct UN observations of certain routes leading to Greece and UN reports on the issue reveal that the supplies of the guerillas during the civil war came from bordering Balkan countries such as Bulgaria (UNSCOB Report 16/800, cited in Nachmani 511).

Beginning with the shrinking of the British interests towards Greece in 1946, the United States expanded its interests towards the country. One major policy included the Truman Doctrine which foresaw economic assistance to Greece and Turkey as a way of “saving” the two countries from communism (Nachmani 1990, 499). The 1946-1949 phase of the civil war is characterized by the engagement of the U.S. in the conflict with the aim of containing communism as the primary objective within the Cold War (Close 1995, 204).

This brief analysis of how the civil war in Greece proceeded unravels several important facts for the postwar reconstruction process. The first is that the identification of the Right with monarchism and the Left with republicanism and the adoption of a nationalistic discourse by the Right indicate the complex nature of the conflict and the depth of the division between the two groups. The civil war created a deep and long-lasting cleavage within the Greek society, what came to be known as the “national schism” between the “nationally-minded” (*ethnikofrones*) and the Left (Seferiades, 74). The self-identification of the Right as the protectors of the nation provided a powerful backup for the discriminatory practices against the sympathizers of the Left. I contend that the essence of war-time divisions in the Greek case reveals that these divisions were as deep as it is expected to be in ethnic wars. What I mean at this point is that the war in Greece was based on such deep divisions that mutual animosity and distrust between the two camps was at the highest levels. Mutual atrocities were also analogous to those committed in ethnic civil wars where intergroup divisions are deep.

The second fact that the above analysis reveals is that foreign engagement in Greece has its roots in wartime policies of Britain and the U.S. and that various external actors were

interested in internal developments in Greece from early to late 1940s when the civil war took place. This is especially important for this study because the theoretical framework that I adopt here accepts the international dimension as one main issue determining how the democratization and reconciliation processes proceed.

The third point that is of primary importance for this study is that two reconciliation initiatives through the Lebanon conference in 1944 and the Varkiza Agreement in 1945 worsened the divisions between the two fractions as they led to renewed conflict. Especially the Lebanon Conference stands as an important initiative which in fact deepened the already existing divisions between the Right and the Left and led to the third phase of the conflict which is accepted to be the most severe one. In terms of post-conflict reconciliation I contend that the failure of this reconciliation initiative should be accepted as being catalytic for intergroup relations. The failure of such reconciliation initiatives was the result of the deep divisions between the two groups. This also explains why reconciliation was not achieved in Greece in the immediate postwar years and did take place only after the dissolution of the military dictatorship in 1974. Indeed, reconciliation in Greece was the result of the democratization process which accelerated after the mid-1970s.

3.3 DEMOCRATIZATION AS A MAIN POSTWAR THEME

The democratization process in Greece is analyzed in two phases, the first beginning in the immediate aftermath of the civil war and ending with the coup d'état of 1967, and the second beginning after the end of the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974. In this chapter I focus on

the two phases of post-conflict democratization in Greece in terms of the party politics that emerged in the country in the aftermath of the civil war. The political party system and its evolution have attracted the attention of a considerable part of the studies focusing on postwar Greece (see for example Pappas 2003; Seferiades 1986; Mavrogordatos 1984). Indeed, the analyses on the political party competition in the postwar period have been multidimensional and previous studies on political parties in Greece after the 1940s and especially after the late 1970s have produced valuable information on how democratization has proceeded. At this point my main focus is on the context within which the Greek transition to democratic politics took place and on how the consolidation of democracy was achieved, an issue that especially covers the years from the early 1980s and on.

The Greek post-conflict democratization process has peculiar characteristics because it covers a period of monarchical rule until 1974 and a dictatorial phase that took place in the period 1967-74. The monarchical rule in Greece persisted until 1973 and finally ended after the self-dissolution of the dictatorship and the return to party politics in 1974. The Colonels' dictatorship on the other hand established an authoritarian no-party system which resisted the change towards multiparty system until the mid-1970s (Xydis 1974). In terms of the democratization and reconciliation processes that are the central concepts of this study, the Colonels' dictatorship had a catalytic impact on these two processes. The Colonels' dictatorship put an end to the multiparty politics that had begun with the post conflict elections of the 1950s and paved the way for a period during which reconciliation initiatives in terms of intergroup communication between the Right and the Left were expectedly unable to flourish.

On the other hand, while the Colonels' dictatorship impeded the democratization and the reconciliation processes, it also impacted in an adverse manner in the post-authoritarian period. Indeed, the end of dictatorship and the transition to party politics jumpstarted a more dynamic democratization process that was far ahead of the process that took place in the postwar period until the coup. This impact can be largely summarized as a result of the bid for return to normal life both in political and social terms and to overcome previous divisions on this path. Indeed, the discontent with the Colonels' rule and the common anti-Junta stance led to a common desire for the return to party politics. This was accompanied by the desire for the removal of the already unpopular monarchy and the transition from crowned democracy to a fully functioning liberal democracy based on Western values. Therefore the self-dissolution of the Junta in 1974 after the crisis with Turkey over Cyprus offered a historical opportunity for a quick transition and then consolidation of democracy in the country.

3.3.1 THE POST-CIVIL WAR PHASE: 1949-1967

With the end of the civil war in 1949 Greece entered a period of political turmoil marked by a series of electoral races that took place almost each year from 1950 to 1963. While monarchy was still at place after the end of the bitter conflict of the 1940s, Greece entered a period of political party competition that broadly projected the war-time divisions of the previous decade. The most important characteristic of political party competition of this period has been the reference to civil war-time divisions as the main means for identification with the three main political fractions of the Left, the Right and the Center (Nicolacopoulos 2010, 29). The immediate post-war years until the disruption of party politics in 1967 have

been marked by an unstable party competition that presents both continuity with and departure from the past. This instability can be observed from the frequency of electoral races; nine electoral races took place until the 1967 coup d'état by the Colonels while the number of political parties competing in the electoral races has varied considerably, from 44 parties in the elections of 1950 to three in the elections of 1964¹⁶. Another important aspect of this period has been the banning of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE- *Komounistiko Komma Ellados*) from Greek political life. The banning of the KKE was a legacy of the civil war years which persisted until the dissolution of the military rule in 1974. The re-legalization of the communist Left was part of the broader process of democratic consolidation which took place in the country in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the period 1950-1967 the Greek political party competition has been structured around the three broad political camps of Right, Center, and Left, a division which has been consolidated and continued in the post-dictatorship period (Papadopoulos 1989, 59). Within this tripolar structure, the Left has not been perceived as a serious contender of power because political party competition in terms of votes has been mainly shared between the Right and the Center fractions¹⁷. The weak position of the Left has been also closely related to the fact the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was banned from politics since 1947. On the eve of the dictatorship, in 1967, each of these three historical political families had been assembled

¹⁶ These parties were the Center Union (*Enosis Kentrou*), the electoral alliance of National Radical Union (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*), the Progressive Party (*Komma Proodeftikon*), and the United Democratic Left (*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*) (for more information on the electoral races and parties from 1950 to 1967, see Clogg 1987 p. 17-54).

¹⁷ The Greek Communist Party was proclaimed illegal with the 'Emergency Law' 509 of 27 December 1947 and regained legality after the fall of the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974

under the roof of a single party: the Center Union (EK), the National Radical Union (ERE), and the United Democratic Left (EDA) (Mavrogordatos 1984, 156).

The political system in Greece in this period has been characterized as “guided democracy” or “restricted parliamentarism” (Lyritzis 1984, 103). This term refers to several characteristics of the Greek political system in this period such as systematic efforts to isolate the Greek Left and to exclude it from the political arena and attempts to control from above any social and political development that would lead to mobilization and the subsequent social or political change. Similarly, the Greek political system of this period has also been called as the “predominant-party system” (Pappas 2003) because of the dominance of the postwar Right in Greek politics until at least 1963. This dominance refers to the unified Right bloc of the Greek Rally and its successor ERE (National Radical Union- *Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*). This period of “predominant-party system” with the dominance of the Right persisted until 1963 and came to an end in the 1963 elections which resulted with the victory of Center Union (EK-*Enosis Kentrou*) over ERE. According to Pappas (2003) the electoral defeat of the Right signaled the transition to “polarized pluralism” that persisted until 1981, when the eventual establishment of a two party system with the well-known dominant parties of PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement-*Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*) and ND (New Democracy- *Nea Dimokratia*) took place.

The Greek political parties used the Left-Right divide as a means to create and promote a political identity, and the content of this divide was manipulated according to the exigencies of the political structure (Lyritzis 2005, 244). Another view is that while the Right-Left divide marked the civil war and its aftermath until the coup d'état, indeed the political

fractions in Greece lacked of a strong ideological background (Kassimeris 2009). According to Kassimeris, with the exception of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and United Democratic Left (EDA-*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*), the remaining parties were entirely dependent on their charismatic leaders as a means for seeking electoral support. These parties adopted a nationalistic discourse because of their lack of a strong ideological background through which they could establish a strong basis for electoral support. It is accepted that during the pre-1967 period, outside the far Left, political parties had remained unstructured, with only a notional ideological or organizational base (Clogg 1987, 215). The lack of a strong organizational and ideological base and the absence of a strong sense of democratic norms can be seen as a main explanation for the virtually non-existence of an opposition to the coup d'état of 1967. A major factor in explaining the Colonels' success was the absence of autonomous structures such as genuinely independent trade unions or properly structured political parties, which might have afforded some obstacle to a seemingly effortless assumption of power (Clogg 1987, 211).

With the coup d'état of 1967 the Greek political life entered to a no-party authoritarian system which was governed by a group of non-hierarchical Colonels. The coup d'état suspended the multiparty system that prevailed in Greece after the end of the civil war (Xydis 1974, 508) and started a period of suppression in Greek politics. During the reign of the Colonels Greek politics were virtually frozen and serious contestation of the military power did not take place because of the unorganized structure of the existing political parties and the fractionalization of the society after the civil war. Similarly, extrication of the military regime had little to do with an intrinsic concern or respect for democracy, democratic institutions, or

democratic pluralism, per se (Karakatsanis 1997, 291). Instead, the dissolution of the dictatorship took place as soon as the military realized that its capabilities had been destroyed at the end of its seven-year rule. However, the fact that there was at least a long-standing parliamentary-as opposed to truly democratic- culture among the Greek political elite does much to explain why the junta's demolition of parliamentary institutions was never legitimated (Bermeo 1995, 451). Immediately after the dissolution of the Junta Greek politics returned to multiparty politics and the democratic consolidation process begun.

3.3.2 THE POST-DICTATORIAL PHASE: 1974 AND ONWARDS

The majority of the studies on Greek democratization and democratic consolidation approach the issue in terms of the political developments in the aftermath of the Colonels' dictatorship, i.e. after 1974 (see for example Doukas 1993; Diamandouros 1984; Pridham and Verney 1991; Mavrogordatos 1984; Kioukias 1993). This is related to the fact that the post-civil war attempt to democracy until 1967 was marked by a period of political instability and did not produce promising results for immediate transition to a fully functioning democracy. Additionally, considering that the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was banned from the "multiparty" politics of 1950s and 1960s, political party competition in the pre-dictatorial phase proceeded under the anti-communist fears that had their roots in the civil war period. Under the new environment of post-1974, these fears had been much more reduced with the establishment of the new center-Left and center-Right parties of PASOK and ND.

The way through which the transition of power from the Colonels to the democratic regime took place has been catalytic for the democratization process of the country. The transition from authoritarian rule took the shape of self-dissolution after the inability of the Colonels to manage the crisis between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue. The inability of the junta to manage the Cyprus issue and its collapse from power so discredited the military organization that the ability of officers to influence the transition process was virtually eliminated (Karakatsanis 1997, 293). Indeed, Greek politics present a unique example of bloodless transitions both from multiparty politics to dictatorship and from dictatorship to parliamentary politics¹⁸. The 1967 coup d'état was carried under the leadership of army colonel George Papadopoulos without much resistance from civilian authorities and with no resistance by King Constantine (Clogg 1987, 55). Similarly, the way through which the military was extricated from politics- by collapse following its failed coup attempt in Cyprus and its inability to carry out a general mobilization and defend Greece against war with Turkey- left the military with no preferable alternative but to submit to civilian control (Karakatsanis 1997, 297). Combined with the smooth eradication of the monarchy through the plebiscite of 1973, the peaceful transition to civilian control and the return of the Greek military to its barracks have opened broad prospects for democratic consolidation in Greece since 1974. In Greece the level of cohesion among all social and political groups for the establishment of parliamentary democracy appear as an interesting aspect, considering the inherent fragility which marked Greek politics in the pre-Junta period (Clogg 1987, 211). This politico-ideological fragility was a legacy of the civil war divisions and was the most

¹⁸ Here I refer specifically to the transition “moments” from party politics to dictatorship and then from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy without considering important anti-junta events, the most significant of which has been the student uprising in Polytechnic School of Athens in 1973.

significant characteristic of the pre-dictatorship period in Greece. It is ironic that the Junta, which entered to Greek politics with no resistance from the fragile *politikos kosmos* of the 1950s and 1960s, became the remedy of this fractionalization and created a coherent anti-Junta stream. During the Colonels' reign the Greek society coalesced around the common desire for the dissolution of the Junta. While this common anti-Junta stance did not make itself explicit during the dictatorship years and took the shape of passive resistance, in the immediate post-Junta years this implicit anti-authoritarian sentiment resurfaced and enabled the quick transition to democracy (Voulgaris 2001, 27). It is even more interesting that the common anti-Junta sentiment helped to mitigate the Left versus Right division which stood as a bitter legacy of the civil war period (Clogg 1987, 212). Undoubtedly this mitigation paved the way for the reconciliation process among the Right and Left, a process which did not flourish in the 1950s and 1960s.

While multiparty politics and regularly held free and fair elections are the central indicatives of democratic politics, the issue of democratic consolidation appears more controversial. This controversy is related to the fact that the process of democratic consolidation is first and foremost a qualitative process with no clear-cut start and end points. In the Greek case one certain point to be made is that the consolidation of democracy was not achieved in the pre-dictatorship era, and even in the first two terms that ND was in power, i.e. until 1981. The 1981 elections are seen as a turning point because they resulted with the alteration of the Right as the sole holder of political power in Greece since even before the civil war of 1946-1949. With the advent to power of PASOK Greek politics entered a new era

in democratic politics where a center-Left party contested political power with an unprecedented victory.

The most important aspect of the post-dictatorial phase in Greece is that with the breakdown of the Junta two main components of postwar Greece became politically neutral or extinct: the army and the monarchy (Pappas 1999, 28). The army lost most of its credentials as a result of the Cyprus failure which functioned as a catalytic event in the passing of the Colonels regime. After 1974 the role of the army in Greek politics was eradicated. The abolition of the monarchy in 1974 has been another catalytic factor for Greek democratization. With the eradication of monarchy a main source of division was totally out of date: that of the schism between the proponents of monarchy and the republicans. This meant that the main contenders of state power left the political arena to civilian authorities and a political party competition with political parties stronger than ever.

After the Colonels' dictatorship, with the reestablishment of constitutional rule and the return to democratic politics, the Greek political system was formed as a three party system, presenting continuity with the pre-1967 period (Mavrogordatos 1984, 156). In the post-1974 period the political fractions of Left, Center, and Right entered the political arena presenting both continuity and diversification with the pre-1967 period. For the Left, the most important development was the legalization of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) which was banned from multiparty politics since 1946. In the Right the most significant development was the establishment of a new party under the leadership of Karamanlis, the New Democracy (ND- *Nea Dimokratia*). The ND proceeded with the liquidation of the past through a substantive purge of the dictatorship's collaborators, the legalization of the KKE,

and the abolition of the monarchy through the plebiscite of 1974 (Seferiades 1984, 82). In the Center, the establishment of the PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement- *Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*) under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou is seen as a central development in the political life in Greece. PASOK came to power after the 1981 elections and achieved a strong party base under its charismatic leader and the slogan for “change”.

Another element of continuity between the pre- and post-dictatorship periods has been that every electoral law passed from 1952 to 1985 sought to rule out the possibility of coalition government to avoid the Communist Party as a coalition partner (Pridham and Verney 1991, 46). Indeed, the single most significant characteristic of the Greek political system has been its pronounced majoritarianism (Bruneau et al. 2001, 56). The electoral system of “reinforced” proportional representation has been designed to discourage multipartyism and foster the emergence of large parties with a single party enjoying majority support in parliament. The adoption of virtually the same electoral system with minor changes in pre- and post-dictatorship period in Greece resulted with the domination of two large parties in the political arena. Therefore, the pre-1967 domination of ERE (National Radical Union- *Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*) and EK (Center Union- *Enosis Kentrou*) present parallels with the domination of the ND and PASOK in the post-1974 period¹⁹.

¹⁹ Besides such a parallelism, one major differentiating aspect of the pre and post-dictatorship periods is that in the pre-dictatorship period, the Rightist parties (including the Greek Rally and the National Radical union) dominated Greek politics with little chance for a Leftist party to become the dominant party in the elections. In the post-dictatorship period on the other hand, PASOK as a socialist party increased its votes almost doubled its votes in the second post-authoritarian elections of 1977 and became victorious with an unprecedented majority (48 per cent) in the 1981 elections which are accepted to be a turning point in the postwar period. What this analysis indicates is that despite the seemingly common pattern of political party competition between the pre and post-dictatorship periods in terms of the existence of a two-party pattern, these two periods are essentially different.

A closer look at the two central parties of this period give a clear picture of how party politics proceeded in the post-1974 and how did they affect the democratization process of the country. The importance of Konstantin Karamanlis as the leader of ND lies in the fact that he was the central actor in the immediate post-dictatorship era when the radical move towards democracy and party politics took place in Greece. In 1974 Karamanlis took on the role of managing the institutional set-up of the democratic regime and adopted a political program which prioritized the establishment and consolidation of democratic politics. In other words Karamanlis returned to Greece from his self-imposed exile in order to take on the role “transition manager” and oversee the whole process of democratic restoration (Diamandouros 1984, 55). The political program of Karamanlis had three main aims that were reflected in the new constitution of 1975: the strengthening of the executive; the advancement of a system favoring leadership while excluding the masses, i.e. while promoting depoliticization; and lastly, the promotion of political moderation through the mitigation of ideological divisions (Pappas 1999, 39). With the charismatic leadership of Karamanlis, the newly founded New Democracy became victorious in the general elections of 1974, the first elections that were held in Greece after a ten-year break to party politics. With this electoral victory, Karamanlis was able to continue his project of transition to democracy that he initiated in 1974. The victory of ND was continued in the next elections of 1977 but with a radical drop in the electoral share. This backlash was the result of the emergence of the new party of Andreas Papandreou PASOK.

The advent of PASOK to Greek politics signaled the transition from the long tradition of the domination of the Right to a two-party system where a center-Left party is the

dominant opposition party. The importance of PASOK's victory in the elections of 1981 is related to the fact that the 1981 elections were the first instance of democratic alternation of power since 1974 (Kalyvas 1997, 83). At the same time the rise of PASOK as a dominant party resulted with the establishment of "polarized bipartism" where the political arena became a mere duopoly between the ND and the PASOK (Papadopoulos 1989, 62). At least in the early phases of its formation PASOK succeeded in consolidating an image of a new party with no connections to the past (Nicolacopoulos 2005, 261). The orderly handing over of power in 1981 by a Right which had dominated the political scene for virtually the whole of the postwar period to a party which, in rhetoric at least, was of the Left signaled a new maturity in the political system (Clogg 1987, 216).

The democratization process in Greece was highly affected by the international context. In postwar Greece the main actors that affected, in different manners though, the democratization process have been the US and the European Community. In terms of the foreign relations of Greece with the US, there is a very significant difference between the pre- and post-dictatorial period. What is important for the analysis at this point is the way that the relations between Greece and the US were shaped after 1974. In Greece historical experience of foreign intervention appeared as a main reason for rejecting the past and embracing a new democratic future (Pridham 1995, 175). According to various studies on Greek politics the post-1974 was marked by a substantive anti-American stance (Clogg 1987 and 2010; Close 2002, Stefanidis 2007)²⁰. The withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO in 1974

²⁰ Stefanidis (2007) extensively analyzes the dynamics of Greek-American relations throughout the civil-war and post-civil war years and provides a detailed account of anti-Americanism for the period after the civil war. One significant aspect of the anti-American stance is the importance of the developments regarding the Cyprus issue for the establishment of the anti-American stance. While an anti-American stance was present in the immediate

and internal developments such as the legalization of the KKE and the participation of the previously excluded Left to Greek party politics were among the most significant actions towards weakening the relationship of subordination to the US.

On the other hand the effect of the European Community on Greek democratization is a more straightforward issue. In Greece, as in many other countries, the EC's identification with liberal democracy in the eyes of political elites and the coincidence of the negotiations for membership with the democratization process impacted positively on the consolidation process in the country (Pridham 1995, 175)²¹. It is not coincidence that the year 1981, which is the date of accession of Greece to the European Community, is accepted as a turning point in Greek politics in terms of the electoral race when PASOK, a center-Left party became victorious for the first time.

The above analysis indicates that the transition of Greece to a consolidated democracy was a product of the post-Junta period and was shaped both by domestic and international aspects. In terms of international aspects, the effect of democratic conditionality of the EC within the process of membership has been catalytic for the democratization process in the country. On the other hand, the emergence of PASOK as a serious contender of political power indicated a significant broadening of the Greek political spectrum and a major democratization of the political system itself (Diamandouros 1991, 25). In the next part of this

postwar years especially during the early parts of the 1950s, the Cyprus issue and the post-1974 developments like the emergence of the EEC as a central aspect of the Greek political agenda, moved anti-Americanism from being an almost exclusively Leftist-communist issue to wider parts of the Greek society.

²¹The argument that membership to the EC enabled the democratic consolidation in Greece is common in previous research on the Greek democratization in the post-1974 period (see for example Verney and Coulombis 1991; Verney 1991). As an opposite view, Tsingos (1996) notes that the EC's role in Greek democratization should be perceived as a process of "underwriting" democracy and its consolidation rather than "causing" it. The author argues that the process of democratic consolidation in Greece was largely completed by 1981 when the membership to the EC was realized.

chapter I analyze the issue of reconciliation between the previously fighting fractions, i.e. the Right and the Left. As the ensuing analysis indicates, the reconciliation process in Greece was the result of the efforts to promote liberal democracy in the post-1974 period.

3.4 RECONCILING PAST DIVISIONS

The analytical and temporal distinction between pre- and post-Junta period in the analysis of Greek democratization suits also well the analysis of the postwar reconciliation process in the country. Like democratization, reconciliation between Right and Left progressed very differently in the period before 1967 on the one hand and the post-1974 period on the other, with the Colonels' dictatorship being the turning point²². This is closely related to the fact that reconciliation and democratization were closely interlinked processes in the Greek case. As I show in the next part, reconciliation was achieved in Greece only after the dissolution of the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974 and the transition of Greece to a consolidated democracy. Indeed, reconciliation in Greece was both the result of the domestic and the international context of the 1980s and of its extensive usage as a political tool in the party politics as they emerged in late 1970s and 1980s.

3.4.1 THE PERSISTENCE OF DIVISIONS: 1950-1967

²² In this study I am concerned with reconciliation between the Greek Right and Left as the main fractions of the civil war. While an ethnic aspect to the Greek civil war in terms of the role of the Greek Macedonians and Jews exists, this ethnic dimension is not central to this study because these ethnic groups participated to the war on the basis of their ideological affiliations. Since ethnicity is not a dividing aspect of the civil war it is excluded from the analysis of reconciliation that this study is concerned with.

One main aspect of the Greek postwar reconstruction process is the persistence of war-time cleavages and their further deepening, both as a result of the international context and as the result of domestic politics. The Greek postwar reconstruction process of the 1950s and the 1960s proceeded within the Cold War context and domestic politics were shaped by Cold War divisions²³. Under the circumstances of the Cold War and the persistence of war-time divisions, the primary objective of postwar governments was the containment of communism, on the domestic and the international planes, rather than any serious effort to reform or restructure the society (Clogg 1992, 146). Under these circumstances during the 1950s Greece remained faithful to a cold war division of the war, unwilling either to praise resistance or to condemn collaborators. Even Konstantin Karamanlis who was in power from 1955 to 1963 and saw himself as a modernizer, remained unwilling to push against the anticommunist norms of the civil war years (Mazower 1995, 283).

During the 1950s and 1960s discriminatory practices of the politically dominant Right over the Left led to the persistence of the Right-Left cleavage in Greece. Although the post-civil war constitution afforded guarantees of basic political liberties, these liberties were negated in practice as a result of emergency legislation introduced in the civil war period (Clogg 1992, 147). The emergency legislation continued to be exercised mainly through laws 512 and 516 that were issued in 1948 and that provided severe penalties for those advocating the overthrow of the existing social order (Samatas 1993). The enactment of the new constitution in 1952 did not end the emergency legislation emanating from the civil war years.

²³ Here I refer broadly to the Cold War context as being an important aspect of the persistence of war-time divisions in Greece. One strand of previous studies on postwar Greece accepts that the U.S. was closely interested with internal developments in Greece during the immediate postwar years, i.e. during the 1950s and 1960s. See for example Tsoukalas 1969; Clogg 1992; Kofas 1989; Botsiou 2009; Kassimeris 2009; Close 2002; Verney and Couloumbis 1990.

Samatas notes that after the enactment of the 1952 constitution the Constitutional Parliament passed a constitutional resolution making it legally possible for civil war emergency anti-communist measures to remain in force, even if they contradicted the Constitution (1986, 41)²⁴. Furthermore, the legal banning of the KKE under law 504 issued in 1948 based on which party members were prosecuted, jailed or exiled can be also accepted as an important aspect of the persistence of the divisive legal nexus in the postwar years. The law on the banning of the KKE was eventually released in 1974 after the dissolution of the Junta and the subsequent restoration of democracy.

Similarly, the security police maintained a close watch on those suspected of left-wing sympathies (Clogg 1992, 148). Various forms of discrimination continued to be practiced against known or purported Leftists, including the insistence on a ‘certificate of social reliability’ as a precondition of government employment and even of obtaining a passport or a driving license (Clogg 1987, 48). The “certificate of social reliability” was part of the wider process of citizen classification which came to be known as “fakeloma” which literally means “filing” and which refers to the classification of the citizens based on their ideological affiliation (Samatas 1986 and 2003)²⁵. By this legislation of ‘social reliability’ the country

²⁴ Samatas cites a pronouncement made by the Supreme Court (Άρειος Πάγος- Areios Pagos) in 1961 which declared that “this court is unable to record the end of the (civil war) rebellion and draw the necessary conclusions because the end of the rebellion must be declared by law. Until the enactment of such law we will continue to declare that the rebellion is still continuing” (1986, 42). The existence of such a “constitutional dualism” that enabled the coexistence of the 1952 Constitution with the emergency legislation of the civil war years is a common point of the studies that analyze the societal divisions of the immediate postwar years (see for example Samatas 1986; 1993; 2005; Kalyvas and Marantzidis 2003; Kalyvas 1997).

²⁵ *Fakeloma* was initially introduced in Greece during the First World War with the aim of watching the leftists and during the civil war years it was expanded through the “civic mindedness certificates” (Samatas 1986, 50). Examples of the cards of “social reliability” and other related documents were published in the post-dictatorship period in various Greek newspapers including *To Vima* (13 Jan. 1980), *Ta Nea* (29 Sept. 1982 and 7 May 1984) and *Rizospastis* (17 Apr. 1983) (translated version of these documents can be found in Samatas 1986). These documents reveal that until 1974 all Greek citizens were categorized either as *ethnikofrones* (i.e. nationally-minded) of the first grade (E1), the second grade (E2), “Alpha” Leftists (A), “Beta” crypto-communists (B),

was divided between the nationally-minded (*ethnikofrones*) and those deemed harmful to the society (*miasmata*) (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 564). The surveillance of the society was stepped up with the establishment of the Central Service of Information (KYP- *Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion*) which by 1962 was estimated to have 60,000 paid informers, keeping files on much of the population. Clearly, these practices undermined any prospects for reconciliation between Right and Left while at the same time deepened the Right-Left cleavage, posing the sympathizers of the Left ideology to a subordinate position to the politically dominant Right.

The dominance of the Right in postwar Greek politics until 1963 and the systematic exclusion of the major Left party KKE from the political arena maintained the Right-Left divide throughout the postwar years. As the victorious part of the 1946-1949 civil war and beginning with the 1950 elections, Rightist parties were victorious in all elections until 1963:

“Gamma” dangerous communists (Γ), and “Chi” unknown (Χ). Under the Junta reign, *fakeloma* gained special significance as it was used as a means to determine and suppress the part of the society that was deemed as harmful to the Junta regime. A speech in 1984 made by PASOK’s Minister for Public Order revealed that by the mid 1970s, the total amount of such files was about 40 millions, while the total Greek population in this period remained below 10 millions (the detailed documentation of this speech can be found on the Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation archive, volume 12). A significant portion of these files were finally incinerated in 1989 under PASOK rule for the sake of reconciliation (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 571).

Table 2: Elections Results in Greece, 1952-1981

	% of Votes	Seats (out of 300)	Prime minister
1952			
Greek Rally (right)	49	247	Marshall
Union of the Parties (center coalition)	34	51	Aleksandros Papagos
United Democratic Left (far left)	10	0	
1956			
National Radical Union (right)	47	165	Konstantinos Karamanlis
Democratic Union (center/far left coalition)	48	132	
1958			
National Radical Union (right)	41	171	Konstantinos Karamanlis
United Democratic Left (far left)	24	79	
Liberal Party (center)	21	36	
1961			
National Radical Union (right)	51	176	Konstantinos Karamanlis
Center Union (center)	34	100	
United Democratic Left (far left)	15	24	
1963			
Center Union (center)	42	138	Georgios Papandreou
National Radical Union (right)	39	132	
United Democratic Left (far left)	14	28	
1964			
Center Union (center)	53	171	Georgios Papandreou
National Radical Union (right)	35	107	
United Democratic Left (far left)	12	22	
1967-1974 Military Dictatorship			
1974			
New Democracy (right)	54	220	Konstantinos Karamanlis
Center Union (center)	20	60	
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (center/left)	14	12	
United Left (far left)	10	8	

1977			
New Democracy (right)	42	171	Konstantinos
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (center/left)	25	93	Karamanlis
Union of the Democratic Center (center)	12	16	
Communist Party of Greece	9	11	
National Camp (far right)	7	5	
Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces (far left)	3	2	
1981			
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (center/left)	48	172	Andreas
New Democracy (right)	36	115	Papandreou
Communist Party of Greece	11	13	

Source: Clogg (2010).

The situation changed with the 1964 elections when the Center Union party of Georgios Papandreou came to power. Papandreou's stay in office for eighteen months paved the way for a series of reformist policies which were directed to change some of the divisive aspects of Greek politics. During Papandreou's premiership some of those who were still in prison for activities during the civil war were released and the freeze in the relations with the eastern bloc countries was partially thawed (Clogg 1992, 160). However, Papandreou did not continue this stance of leniency towards the Left as he refused the legalization of the KKE and criticized the commemoration of the resistance by the main leftwing party of the period, the United Democratic Left (Close 2004, 258).

Another significant indicator of the Right-Left gap during the postwar years is the name that was used to characterize the civil war. While today the war of 1946-1949 in Greece is regarded as a civil war, this term was adopted only after 1989. Until the late 1980s, the term used for the war was *summoritopolemos* (bandit war), a term used by the victors of the war

(Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 562). During the 1950s and 1960s the leftwing participants of the civil war were dismissed as ‘bandits’ (Close 2004, 258) and this characterization was both adopted as an official attitude and embraced by the Greek society. It was only after the 1980s that the war of 1946-1949 in Greece was called a ‘civil war’ between royalist Rightists and republican Leftists²⁶. The terminology used for the civil war obviously has implications for the reconciliation process of this period as it shows that reconciliation was not an issue between two groups which even were not regarded as having been equal parts in the bitter strife of 1946-1949.

The Right versus Left division of the postwar years entered a new period under the Colonels’ dictatorship. The bitter experience of the military dictatorship which was viewed as anachronistic and embodying the worst characteristics of the postwar period led to the establishment of an anti-Junta stance which cross-cut the divisions of Right versus Left. Instead of Right and Left the main division under the Junta was between the supporters and the opponents of the Junta (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 565). During the reign of the Colonels, Left and mainstream Right were slowly pushed together and the wartime resistance against the Germans became an inescapable analogue to the campaign against the Junta (Mazower 1995, 287). Resistance and the desire of the dissolution of the Junta became primary concerns of the majority of the Greek society which was united under this purpose. Furthermore, as part of the anti-Junta stance, the Colonels’ policy of political apartheid towards the Left increasingly lost credit and the need for change became a common desire.

²⁶ Kalyvas (2003) also points to the changing climate towards the Greek civil war after the 1980s declaring that there has been a qualitative change in the way scholarly research approaches the war-time divisions and the acts of violence that were committed in the civil-war period. The author underlines that since the last decades there has been a shift towards the ending of the “myths” regarding the civil war and the move to the individual-level of inquiry that requires deeper analysis of the war-time events.

Briefly, the dictatorship in Greece radically changed intergroup relations and unintentionally bridged the divide between the un-reconciled fractions of the Right and the Left, a process that accelerated after 1974 with the return to multiparty politics and the consolidation of democracy.

3.4.2 RECONCILIATION IN THE POST-DICTATORIAL PHASE: 1974 AND ONWARDS

After the collapse of the Junta many people, and especially the young, felt sympathy for the defeated leftwing movement of the 1940s, which represented policies that were antithetical to those of the whole post-civil war regime (Close 2004, 259). This paved the way for the reshaping of the Right-Left relations in the period after 1974. Especially important for the post-1974 move towards reconciling past divisions was the Greek party politics as it emerged in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. Here I analyze mainly the move towards reconciliation on the basis of how party politics changed in Greece with the emergence of ND and PASOK and their leaders as the main contenders of political power.

According to Diamandouros (1984), national reconciliation was one of the five distinct strategies that Karamanlis adopted in his return to Greece as the manager of the transition to democracy after the fall of the Junta. The strategies that Karamanlis adopted included (a) national reconciliation and the end of wartime divisions that perpetuated in the postwar exclusivist state; (b) radical redistribution of power among the major political actors that dominated postwar Greek politics; (c) democratization of the Greek Right; (d) creation of the conditions that will allow the Left to participate fully in the political system; (e) the

establishment of new institutions that would ensure the inclusiveness of the political system²⁷. The national reconciliation strategy of Karamanlis first and foremost required the dismantling of the postwar institutional and legal nexus. In this direction, through legislative acts of his government Karamanlis officially put an end to restrictive legislation originating in the civil war years, restituted the civil liberties to those that had been denied them, and legalized the KKE, integrating the mainstream Left again to the political arena (Diamantouros 1984, 60). These were important steps that jumpstarted the process of reconciliation which it is accepted that was fully achieved in the late 1980s. Greece had to wait for the electoral races of 1981 and 1985 when a radical change took place in Greek party politics with the emergence of PASOK²⁸ as a contender of political power, to accept that reconciliation has been fully achieved in Greece in terms of bridging the gap between the Right and the Left.

Reconciliation in 1974 was not primarily about healing the wounds of the conflict but was a specific political project designed to bridge the divides in Greek society so as to forge a national consensus (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566). Siani-Davies and Katsikas declare that reconciliation in Greece was closely linked to the need to meet the political exigencies of the time and consolidate democratic norms and practices. This was the result of both the domestic political processes and of the international context. In the domestic arena reconciliation was used as a political tool through which the main contenders of political power sought to gain support. For the sake of gaining broad-based support both ND and

²⁷ Diamantouros (1984) states that concrete evidence that explains the motivations behind the strategy of Karamanlis is absent. The author provides his own explanation that Karamanlis chose such a strategy because he realized that unless political structures in Greece were radically modernized to become congruent with social and economic changes that had taken place in the preceding thirty years the chances for political stability would be highly diminished.

²⁸ *Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima* is the main social-democratic party in Greece since its foundation in 1974.

PASOK chose moderation in their ideological background and moved to the center. On the other hand, the crisis with Turkey over the issue of Cyprus was an international factor that added to the national reconciliation process. After the humiliating loss in the Cyprus issue, which itself terminated the military dictatorship, Greece had to be united to overcome the crisis. The broad-based anti-Junta stance of the Greek society remained intact for the sake of national unity on the issue of foreign policy. This unity was further enhanced with the prospect for entering the EC in the 1980s.

With the establishment of New Democracy led by Karamanlis and the establishment of the PASOK led by Papandreou in 1974 Greek politics entered a new era which was of utmost importance for the process of reconciliation. In the immediate post-dictatorship years Right and Left ideologies continued to be relevant in Greek politics. However, this relevance was essentially different from the way the two ideologies dominated the 1950s and 1960s politics. The 1970s saw the modernization of the Greek Right, by abandoning its traditional anti-communism and its past tendency to tolerate military interventionism in Greek politics and the establishment of a new and more moderate profile (Bellou 2003, 160). The Rightist ND of the 1970s, while retaining several old aspects of the Right, adopted a more moderate stance with a new identity which belonged to the center-of-Right spectrum of Greek politics (Diamantouros 1984, 61)²⁹. Similarly, the establishment of

²⁹ The move from the anti-communist stance of the pre-dictatorship years to a more moderate profile after 1974 is a common argument of scholarly research on Greek political life (see for example Clogg 2010; Couloumbis et al. 2003; Pappas 2003). Diamantouros notes that throughout the late 1970s Karamanlis strove to attain the goal of modernization by pursuing a three-tier strategy. The central part of this strategy was that on the ideological level “Karamanlis sought to forge a new identity which foreswore the sterile anti-communism that had marked the Right for nearly forty years, since the commencement of its virtually uninterrupted of Greek politics in 1935, and which had been the foremost characteristic of the National Radical Union during the 1950s and the 1960s” (1984, 61). The argument regarding the change in terms of political party ideology can be observed also from the archival record of Karamanlis and his party’s political record since 1945 which is available online at

PASOK as a center-of-Left party signaled the inclusion of the Left to party politics at a more moderate stance. While the KKE was formally legalized in 1974, the advent of PASOK and its electoral success throughout the 1970s and eventual victory in 1981 indicated the desire of the Left electorate to break away from the extreme Leftist ideology. Throughout the 1980s PASOK has managed to occupy a very broad space in the spectrum of political competition extending from the Left to the center-Right (Pappas 2003, 98).

With the advent to power in 1981 of an openly socialist party Greek reconciliation process entered a new era. The consolidation of democracy in this period and the peaceful contestation of political power between Rightist and Leftist groups indicated that a peaceful relationship between Right and Left was already established by the beginning of 1980s. Moreover, the elimination of the legal nexus emanating from the civil war years and the shrinking importance of individual files and other means of citizen classification (including the “certificates of social reliability”) and their final incineration in late 1980s indicated that the means of division of the Greek society were gradually abandoned. This situation was combined with the prospects for the entry to the EC. The transition from a divisive past to a common future gained special importance with the desire for being member of the European Community in the late 1970s. Considering that reconciliation is about moving together towards a common shared future, in Greece this eventually occurred when the nation coalesced around the desirability of embracing the political norms associated with EEC/EU membership (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 562).

<http://www.karamanlis-foundation.gr/> (in Greek). In the party program 1977-1980 that is available within the archive, the new aspects of the party ideology are listed under the title “Renewed Directions”: “the completion of the restoration of the democracy that was initiated in 1974; progress in the domain of the economy; restoration of the relations with the other members of NATO; rapid solution to issues of foreign policy (with regards to Cyprus); and the acceleration of the membership process to the EC” (1977-1980, 53).

At this point it should be noted that reconciliation in Greece did not mean the complete eradication of the Right-Left division. Here I accept that the Greek Right and Left reconciled after the mid-1970s from the viewpoint that the deep divisions that led to the civil war did not continue to be relevant any more. In this sense, the concept of nationalism lost its relevance as a dividing factor between Right and Left. The extreme Left was fully integrated to the political system and this in fact was initiated by a Rightist leader, Karamanlis. While party politics continued on a bipolar structure still defined as Right and Left, the essence of the division had essentially changed. Right and Left remained ideological cleavages but they did not constitute a non-reconcilable division with no prospects for conflict between the two fractions.

In this sense, in the 1980s the move from a divisive past to a commonly shared future had been achieved. However, counterviews have also provided a skeptical view of the reconciliation process as it took place in Greece. According to Close the public attitude towards the civil war by the end of the 1980s might be more accurately described as one of growing calm and detachment than reconciliation (Close 2004, 276). In the author's view this is related to the fact that the feelings of bitterness left in most older people by the civil war must have run too deep to be eradicated by the reconciling efforts made by politicians. Furthermore, other skeptical views have been expressed regarding the divisive effect of 'reconciliation as national unity' that took place after the 1970s. According to Mazower (1995) while reconciliation smoothed away the memories of the war-time social division opened the room for new divisions at loss of ethnic groups. The point here is that the reconciliation of the 1980s paved the way for a national unification process which either tried

to assimilate ethnic groups such as the Greek Macedonians or Jews or excluded them from the Greek society. This seems to be a reasonable viewpoint considering that policies such as the return of political exiles that had moved to various Balkan communist states included only those that were ethnically Greeks. However, both counterinterviews do not eradicate the fact that a level of reconciliation had been achieved since the 1980s between Right and Left which was essentially the result of the democratization process and the political developments in the country during the post-1974 third Greek republic.

3.5 ANALYZING THE DEMOCRATIZATION-RECONCILIATION PROCESSES

The analysis above indicates that in Greece reconciliation was achieved as a result of the democratization process that took place in the country since 1974. This indicates that in Greece democratization functioned as a prerequisite for reconciling past divisions originating in the civil war years³⁰. In post-1974 the extreme Left party KKE was integrated to the political system while Right and Left under ND and PASOK moderated their stances for the sake of gaining broad electoral support. Besides, Right and Left were united in their anti-Junta stance during the Colonels' dictatorship, and they became equal parts of the national unity on the road to overcome the crisis with Turkey over Cyprus. This national unity was further

³⁰ Here I refer to the restoration of democracy after 1974. As I discussed above, the post-1974 democratization process was far ahead the democratization process that took place in the immediate years after the end of the civil war, i.e. from 1950 to 1967. According to Linz et al. the Greek transition to democracy from authoritarian rule was one of the most rapid compared to other southern European transitions, such as Spain and Portugal, as the authors argue that the transition in Greece was completed within less than a year after the self dissolution of the dictatorship in 1974 (1995, 110). The usage of the term *metapolitefsi* in Greek, which means restoration instead of *metavasi*, i.e. transition signifies the rapid character of the transition to democracy that took place. Linz et al. further argue that while it is more difficult to specify when the Greek democracy became consolidated, the electoral victory and the assumption of power by the Socialist opposition in 1981 indicated that Greek democracy was consolidated at that time (1995, 112).

enhanced on the road to get accession to the European Community where Greece was eventually accepted in 1981. When it came to the end of 1980s, divisions emanating from the civil war period had totally lost relevance and there was a move towards a commonly shared future. In this part I investigate the role of three factors that I contend that have major explanatory power on way the reconciliation process proceeded in Greece.

3.5.1 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE GREEK POSTWAR PROCESS

The international aspects of the Greek postwar process are mainly related to the international context within which Greece entered the phase of postwar democratization after the end of the civil war in late 1940s and to the emergence of the European Economic Community/ European Union as a main actor especially after the end of the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974. As the analysis below indicates, during the 1950s and 1960s the international aspects of the post-civil war democratization process in Greece were related to the Cold War context, and more specifically to the convergence of the internal divisions (Greek Right versus communist Left) with the divisions on the international arena. In the pre-dictatorship period, internal practices rather than external influence/engagement had a decisive impact on intergroup divisions and the democratization process in general. On the other hand, in the post-dictatorship period, the membership process to the EC and eventual membership in 1981 can be seen a major external force that impacted positively on the restoration of the democracy in mid-1970s and its consolidation in the 1980s.

The immediate post-civil war years in Greece were marked by the persistence of the divisions emanating from the civil war years. As was analyzed in previous parts of this chapter, these decades were marked by internal discriminatory practices towards the part of

the society that was inclined to the leftist ideology. The act of *fakeloma* (filing) that emanated from the previous decades was mainly maintained in order to categorize the citizens based on their ideological affiliations and was eventually abolished only after the dissolution of the Junta and the restoration of democracy after 1974. Moreover, the persistence of the emergency laws of the civil war years enhanced the practice of discrimination towards those that were deemed as leftists or more broadly as harmful to the existing political order. The fact that the Right became victorious at the end of the civil war and that Greece entered the Western sphere of influence in the international arena (mainly through membership to NATO in 1952 and through the strengthening of its ties with the U.S. through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid³¹) can be accepted also as main aspects of the suppressive stance that was adopted towards the part of the society that was inclined to communism or the far left. All these factors, combined with the legal banning of the main far left party KKE until the end of the Junta period led to the strengthening of the divisions emanating from the civil war years in Greece.

The legal banning of the KKE can be accepted as a main factor that undermined the process of democratization during the immediate post-civil war years. The KKE was banned through Law 504 issued in 1948 and remained banned from the political arena until 1974. The exclusion of the main far leftist party from the “multiparty” politics of the 1950s and 1960s was both the result of KKE’s (through its military wings EDA and EAM) violent acts during the civil war and of the general effort of suppressing the leftist ideology during the post-civil war years (Sfikas 2001). In the post-civil war years until the Colonels’ coup d’état the far left was represented in the political arena through the United Democratic Left party. However, as

³¹ For a detailed account see Botsiou (2009), Kofas (1989), and Kassimeris (2009).

table 2 above also indicates, the pre-dictatorship years in Greece were exclusively dominated by the Rightist parties which became victorious in each electoral race until 1963. The domination of the Right came to an end with the electoral race of 1964 when a centrist party became dominant. This electoral race also signaled the strengthening of the leftist part of the political spectrum, which is accepted as one major force behind the coup d'état of 1967 which was established by a traditionally anti-communist military (Danopoulos and Patel 2007, see also Judt 2005).

While the immediate postwar years were marked by internal practices that maintained the societal divide, in the post-dictatorship period the European Community proliferated as a main external actor that impacted the democratization process in Greece. Greece had already established relations with the EC in the pre-dictatorship period through the EC-Greek Association Agreement signed in 1961. While this agreement explicitly referred to the eventual accession by Greece to full Community membership, the membership process was interrupted with the coup d'état of 1967 which froze the EC-Greek relations (Tsingos 1996, 317). After the military coup in 1967, associate membership to the EC acquired a value that had not been presumably foreseen by Greek politicians, which was to expose Greece to pressure for return to democracy (Close 2002, 136). During the Junta reign, the EC precluded further negotiation for the Greek membership to the Community until democracy was restored. The freezing of the Greek Association was made in response to the authoritarian developments in Greece and amounted to the attempt by the EC to influence the domestic political structure of one of its associates (Coufoudakis 1977, 114). In general terms the policy of the EC towards the Junta period in Greece took the shape of various anti-Junta

statements at the bureaucratic and executive authorities' level such as the Commission and the Council of Ministers and the shrinking of the economic activities between Greece and other EC members (Coufoudakis 1977, 120). With the dissolution of the Junta and the restoration of democracy, the EC is accepted to be the central external actor to have contributed to the consolidation of democracy (Ioakimidis 1994, 35)³².

On the other hand, the accession process to the EC had highly significant implications for the establishment of a Greek national identity (Verney and Couloumbis 1991). The desire to break from the authoritarian past and to become part of the politically and economically developed Europe created a new identity where divisions emanating from the civil war years lost credence. In terms of reconciliation, the fact that the Greek community coalesced around the desire to become a member of the EC impacted positively on the intergroup relations and paved the way for reconciliation.

This analysis shows that the Greek postwar democratization process was affected both by external and internal factors both in the pre- and the post-dictatorship period. While in the pre-dictatorship period ,internal developments such as suppression mechanisms through *fakeloma* and the political suppression and banning of the KKE had a negative impact on the democratization process, in the post-dictatorship period the EC as an external actor had a positive impact on the consolidation of democracy and the cementing of the divisions between the two camps. However, at this point it should be noted that the impact of the EC was not in the form of direct interference in Greek politics; the impact was the result of Greece to become a member rather than the desire to the EC to democratize the country.

³² Ioakimidis notes that even before entering the EC in 1981, the anticipated adherence provided a strong stimulus to democratic stabilization in Greece (1994, 38).

3.5.2 THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL LEGITIMACY

Defining state legitimacy as a concept that indicates whether a state is accepted as rightfully holding and exercising political power (Gilley 2006), in this part I analyze the issue of state legitimacy in postwar Greece as a factor affecting the democratization and reconciliation processes of the country. Through a temporal distinction between the pre- and post-dictatorship phases, the analysis of state legitimacy indicates that the Greek state acquired high levels of legitimacy after the dissolution of dictatorship, the abolition of monarchy, the transition to multiparty (in fact bipolar) party politics, and the emergence of the center-Left as a serious contender of political power in the post-1974 period.

During the period of crowned democracy, i.e. until 1967, state legitimacy in Greece was highly contested. This is related to both the unpopularity of the King as part of the state apparatus and the contested legitimacy of the multiparty system which excluded systematically part of the society which was inclined to Leftist ideology. Especially, the legal banning of the KKE inescapably delegitimized any efforts for multiparty politics and government formation.

With the establishment of the Junta the issue of legitimacy gained special significance. Considering that the Junta was commonly viewed as anachronistic and that a common anti-Junta stance existed, the Junta was never viewed as legitimately possessing its power. The weakness of the regime's initial claim to legitimacy and its inability to institutionalize itself,

the ultimate crisis of failure and the state-led character of the transition (Fishman 1990, 436) may account for why the transitional caretaker government of Karamanlis in 1974 was perceived as possessing high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the Greek society. In direct contrast to the Colonels' reign, the post-1974 phase of democratization led to the establishment of a republic which possessed high levels of legitimacy.

With the transition to fully functioning liberal democracy and its consolidation in the 1980s, the perception of state legitimacy also changed. The first development changing the attitudes was the transition from monarchy to republic and the ending of the crowned democracy regime. The eradication of the royalists as a main source of division after 1974 made the New Greek Republic by far the most legitimate in the history of Greece (Papadopoulos 1989). On the other hand, after the long-lasting political reign of the Right, the emergence of the socialist PASOK victorious in the 1981 elections impacted positively on how the leftist fraction of the Greek society perceived the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. With the 1981 elections the previously excluded center-Left gained an unprecedented electoral success which paved the way for a more inclusive political life. This was intertwined with the legalization of the far Left KKE and its re-entrance to political life after a long period of banning. In this way we can say that party politics gained a real multiparty character. At the same time, the bid for becoming a member of the EC and eventual membership has also impacted positively on the legitimacy of the Greek state. The adoption of Western liberal democratic values associated with accession strengthened the legitimacy possessed by the state apparatus.

This analysis indicates that the issue of state legitimacy was closely linked to the process of democratization. The persistence of the monarchy and the not very successful experience with party politics in the pre-Junta period resulted with the contestation of state legitimacy by the Greek society. The Junta period was also not accepted as legitimate. The importance of the Junta lies in its impact on the post-1974 period. The establishment of democracy and the move towards democratic consolidation in the aftermath of the dictatorship increased the legitimacy of the state apparatus in the new republic. This close link to democratization indicates that the issue of state legitimacy was a product of the democratization process rather than an autonomous issue affecting this process. Considering that I investigate the issue of internal legitimacy as a force that explains why democratization may lead to reconciliation, the above analysis indicates that for the Greek case internal legitimacy falls short of explaining why democracy led to reconciliation in postwar Greece.

3.5.3 THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR ECONOMY

The issue of economic recovery and performance after violent conflict is of utmost importance for both social and political reconstruction of a country emerging out of civil war. In Greece the temporal distinction between pre- and post-dictatorial periods is again useful in the analysis of the issue of postwar economy. In terms of economic performance and its effect on democratization and reconciliation processes the Greek case is interesting as in Greece, in the pre-dictatorship period when the prospects for democratization and reconciliation were very thin economic performance was at very high levels. Contrary, in the post-dictatorship period when the consolidation of democracy and reconciliation between the Right and Left


took place, Greek economic performance was very low. Indeed, in the post-1974 period Greece entered a period of serious economic problems which persisted in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Being part of the European Recovery Program (ERP), postwar Greek economic recovery was first and foremost influenced by the Marshall Plan and the foreign policy of the U.S. towards Greece. Through the recovery program Greece received large amounts of economic aid from the U.S. with the aim of its postwar reconstruction and entrance to the Western Alliance.

In the immediate postwar years until 1974 the economic performance of Greece was one of the most impressive in postwar Europe (Alogoskoufis 1995, 149). In the 1950s and 1960s Greece became part of the Southern Europe countries that experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth that was mainly externally introduced and heavily dependent on the Western European prosperity (Vergopoulos 1987, 107). The figures below indicate the economic growth that Greece went through the immediate postwar years which was interrupted by the coup d'état of 1967 and was followed by slow economic development and problems in the post-dictatorship period³³. The political mobilization of the mid-1960s in Greece which resulted with the alteration of political power by centrist parties was closely associated to the developments in the economic sphere.


³³ The figures for the Greek economic indicators cover the years 1960-2011. These figures do not cover the first decade after the end of the civil war, i.e. the 1950s due to the unavailability of World Bank data for that period. The IMF Country Report No 06/5 (2006) on Greece reveal that the economic development in Greece through the 1950s presents a very similar pattern with the 1960s in terms of GDP growth rate. More specifically, the report reveals that the average growth rate of the 1950-1959 period has been 7 per cent annually, which is the same average annual growth with the period 1960-1969. The report defines broadly the period 1950-1974 as the "catch-up growth" period and the post 1975 years until the early 1990s as the stagflation years for the Greek postwar economy.

Figure 2: Annual GDP per Capita Growth Greece, 1960-2011



Source: World Bank

Figure 3: Annual GDP per Capita (Constant 2000 US Dollars). Greece, 1960-2011




Source: World Bank

The importance of the economic development of the immediate postwar years in Greece lies in the impact of this rapid economic flourishing on the post-dictatorship period in terms of democratization. After the economic flourishing of the pre-dictatorship period, Greece achieved high levels of GDP which opened the room for the rapid restoration of democracy and its consolidation in the post-1974 period. My argument at this point is that based on the link between income and democracy (see for example Przeworski 1995), the high levels of income and the general economic flourishing of the 1950s and 1960s in Greece had a positive impact on the democratization process. Despite the economic drawbacks of the post-1974 period, the increased economic development of the 1950s and 1960s may be accepted as a significant force behind the post-1974 democratization process.

Parallel to the general economic flourishing, Greece reached also high levels of market institutionalization in the postwar period. The figure below gives a picture of the trend of market institutionalization in Greece in the period 1960-2000:

Figure 4: Market institutionalization in Greece, 1960-2000



Source: Economic Norms Data (provided by Michael Mousseau)

This figure indicates that market institutionalization in Greece followed an ascendant trend throughout the years 1960-1972. In the post-dictatorship period the level of contract intensive economy in Greece remained above the pre-dictatorship period and increased through the 1980s and 1990s. The importance of the level of market institutionalization in Greece for the study at hand is that the economic norms theory predicts that market institutionalization is a main force behind the establishment of democratic norms in a society. Therefore my argument for Greece at this point is that the increasing market institutionalization in the postwar period in Greece opened the room for the flourishing of universal norms such as freedom, peace, and democratic rule of law which had a positive impact on the democratization process in the country. Since the economic norms theory links market institutionalization with intrastate peace (Mousseau 2012), one argument to be made for postwar Greece is that the move to contract intensive economy in Greece had also a positive impact on intergroup relations that were affected by the normative change associated with increasing market institutionalization.

Previous scholarly research on postwar Greece and more specifically on the post-1974 reconciliation process has not established a clear connection between postwar economic developments and inter-group relations. On the other hand, while for the period of 1950s and 1960s any analysis on intergroup relations and economic development is missing, for the post-1974 period one common point is that the economic problems that resurfaced in this period triggered the bid for becoming a member of the EC (Ioakimidis 1994; Tsingos 1996). Considering that membership to the EC was embraced as a common ground by the Greek

society as whole, it can be argued that the economic drawbacks of this period functioned as a force for uniting the opposing fractions of the Greek society.

Overall, both the increased economic development during the 1950s and 1960s, and the increasing levels of market institutionalization in the postwar period opened the room for the democratization process in post-civil war Greece. On the other hand, Greece entered a period of serious economic drawbacks in the post-dictatorship period which functioned as a force that triggered the desire to become a member of the EEC.

3.6 CONCLUSION

In postwar Greece the democratization and reconciliation processes have been highly affected by the dictatorship years which begun with the coup d'état in 1967 and ended with the self-dissolution of the dictatorship in 1974. In terms of democratization, the pre-Junta years have been marked by unstable multiparty politics with frequent electoral races and unsuccessful attempts to establish governments. In this period the banning of the communist party KKE and the various suppression mechanisms towards the part of the society that was inclined to the leftist ideology has maintained the Right-Left divide and has undermined the democratization process. In terms of reconciliation, the suppressive attitude towards the Greek Left in the form of legal discrimination emanating from the civil war years has deepened the divisions between the two fractions limiting the chances for cementing past

divisions. However, the coup d'état of 1967 has been a turning point both for Greek politics and for the society in general. The general discontent with the Colonels' regime had a catalytic impact on how democratic norms were perceived and how intergroup relations between Right and Left were shaped. With the dissolution of the Junta the Greek society coalesced around the desire to return to democratic politics. Furthermore, the establishment of two moderate parties of ND and PASOK paved the way for a stable bipolar political party competition through democratic means. In this period, national reconciliation was achieved as a result of the democratization process.

Based on the theoretical framework that I proposed in the previous chapter, I investigated the role of three main issues in the democratization and reconciliation processes as they proceeded in Greece: the issue of international influence/ external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy. In terms of international influence, the pre-dictatorship years have been marked by internal divisions that were closely associated with internal discriminatory practices towards the part of the society that was inclined to the leftist ideology. On the other hand, in the post-dictatorship period the EC has emerged as a central actor that affected the democratization and reconciliation processes in the country. The desire for being member to the EC led Greece to strengthen its democratic institutions as part of membership conditionality while the bid to become a member and later entrance to the EC has strengthened national unity. In terms of state legitimacy, the low level of the legitimacy of the 1950-1963 governments has impacted negatively on the two processes. The situation changed with the dissolution of the Junta and the establishment of a legitimate liberal democratic government. In terms of postwar economic developments, I

argued that the unprecedented economic development in the 1950s and 1960s functioned as an enabling factor behind the rapid restoration of democracy and the democratic consolidation process after the 1980s. On the other hand, the economic drawbacks that resurfaced in the 1970s increased the bid for becoming an EC member in order to overcome these drawbacks. This had a positive impact on intergroup divisions.

While all three factors have affected significantly how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in Greece, the issue of international influence appears as the major issue that had a catalytic impact on the establishment of national reconciliation in Greece as a result of the post-1974 restoration of democracy. The low levels of direct international engagement to post-1974 Greece and the positive impact of the EC on the dissolution of the Junta and the restoration of democracy led to an internally-driven democratization process characterized by high levels of internal legitimacy. The reason why *metapolitefsi* was seen as such a legitimate period in Greece is closely related to the fact that it was the result of the internal dynamic of the Greek society and politicians. This internal dynamic from its part opened the room for the national unity project of Karamanlis that led to eventual reconciliation between the Greek Left and Right. The importance of the issue of international influence/external engagement remains intact when we consider the other aspects that compose the theoretical framework, namely the issue of internal legitimacy and the issue of postwar economy. While internal legitimacy was the result of the restoration of democracy as an internal dynamic, the impact of the postwar economy on the process of reconciliation went hand in hand with the international influence of the EC over the country. Considering that membership to the EC was primarily related to economic considerations and that postwar

economic drawbacks inflamed the desire to become a developed European country, the issue of postwar economy was also closely linked to the international aspects. Overall, the above analysis indicates that the level and essence of international influence in post-1974 period has been the central factor behind the establishment of national reconciliation in Greece.

CHAPTER 4

DEMOCRATIZATION AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s paved the way for a period of ethno-nationalist conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina which lasted from 1992 through 1995 and was

followed by a highly internationally driven post-conflict reconstruction process. The civil war in Bosnia occurred among the three ethnic groups of the country, the Serbs, the Bosniacs, and the Croats and was marked by severe atrocities committed against humanity, including a series of massacres against civilians³⁴. Due to the seriousness of the crimes, the civil war in Bosnia attracted the attention of the international community which ended the conflict through a UN peace operation and initiated the signing of the Dayton peace accords which was finally signed in Paris in 1995. With the signing of Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina entered a highly internationalized post-conflict reconstruction period which still continues. Bosnia today is a country composed of two entities divided on ethno-territorial basis- the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska- with a highly complex political structure.

In this study I analyze the Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction process in terms of the democratization and reconciliation processes that prevailed in the country with the end of the civil war in 1995. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of a highly internationalized post-conflict peace-building process where unilateral and multilateral actors assumed various tasks including democratization and the promotion of transitional justice with the aim of fostering inter-ethnic reconciliation and sustainable peace. Democracy promotion through the establishment of a consociational democratic governance structure has been at the center of the institution-building efforts of the international actors in Bosnia. Inter-ethnic reconciliation on the other hand seems to have emerged as a more implicit issue within the general aim of

³⁴ At least 35 massacres took place in Bosnia in the period 1992-19 95, with the most known being the one occurred in Srebrenica in 1995.

building sustainable peace³⁵. In this study I am mainly concerned with the question of how democratization and reconciliation processes proceeded in the Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction process.

The next parts of this chapter are organized as follows: In the first part I introduce a brief background of the 1992-1995 civil war. Then I analyze the democratization process that the international community initiated in the country since 1995. At this point I analyze the Dayton peace accords which functioned as a blueprint for the post-conflict reconstruction of the country and then I focus on the institutional structure that was established. In the third part I analyze the reconciliation process on two grounds: firstly the institutional and electoral engineering that the international actors assumed with the aim of establishing inter-ethnic dialogue and political moderation, and secondly the transitional justice mechanisms that were introduced in the country with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber (WCC). In the last part I provide an analysis of how democratization and reconciliation processes affected each other in the Bosnian case considering the role of international actors; the issue of state legitimacy; and postwar economic aspects.

4.2 THE 1992-1995 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Bosnian civil war has its roots in the polarization of ethnic politics beginning with the weakening of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The gradual dissolution of

³⁵ Here my point is that reconciliation did not prevail as a central issue in the Dayton Peace Agreement which was signed in 1995 and ended the ongoing conflict, but rather that it was embedded in the general aim of building peace and reconstructing postwar Bosnia.

Yugoslavia and the nationalist and separatist tendencies of the former Yugoslav republics such as Serbia and Croatia inflicted intergroup tensions based on ethnicity³⁶. The war in Bosnia broke out after a series of conflicts in Croatia and Serbia which brought the issue of sovereignty of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs in the forefront of the political arena. By mid-1992, almost three-quarters of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was claimed either by Serb or by Croat nationalists while mutual suspicions flourished among the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats (Burg and Shoup 1999, 74). In the post-Yugoslav context, the conflict in Bosnia evolved into a conflict of antagonistic national identities and an underlying dispute over the legitimate unit of sovereignty (Bose 2002, 249).

The short period between the formal dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of an independent Bosnian state in 1992 proved crucial for the strengthening of nationalist identities which formed the basis of the ensuing violence. From the end of 1988 and especially in the months preceding the elections of 1990, the polarization of the Bosnian society along ethnic lines had gained momentum (Burg and Shoup 1999, 46). The deepening of societal divisions based on ethnicity was reflected to the political arena with the establishment of three ethno-nationalist parties representing each group. By 1990 the three ethno-nationalist parties that dominate the Bosnian political arena today, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Bosniac Social Democratic Party (SDP), were established. With the establishment of these parties and the following electoral race, Bosnian politics became deeply divided along ethno-nationalist lines with the political parties seeking to preserve each their own power. With the referendum of February

³⁶ For an extensive analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia before the explosion of the war in Bosnia, see for example Malcolm (1994) and Burg & Shoup (1999).

1992 which declared Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, Serbian military forces initiated the onset of conflict for the establishment of a Bosnian Serb territory. The ensuing war was a war of mass atrocities and genocide where each ethnic group viewed the other as enemy. The civil war process in Bosnia has been marked by a continuous interplay of Bosniac, Serb, and Croat nation-building efforts, “each striving to define the character of the groups inhabiting Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to claim and arrange the state according to that understanding” (Kostic 2008, 386).

The nationalist fractions that fought the civil war were initially introduced in the political arena as political parties in the first elections held in Bosnia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. Among the five parties that participated in the electoral race of 1991, the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) represented the Bosniacs, the Serbs and the Croats respectively³⁷. In the 1991 elections the candidates from nationalist parties gained more votes than their share of the population which indicates that cross-ethnic support prevailed in these elections in order to secure victory over the remaining two parties, the League of Communists and the Reformists (Bieber 2006, 23). The three parties formed a coalition for the government of post-Yugoslav Bosnia however; their opposing visions regarding the future of the country obstructed any possibilities for cooperation. The coalition between the nationalist parties broke down in late 1991, with the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats supporting the independence of the country while the Serbs avoiding any move that would detach them from neighboring Serbia.

³⁷ These parties maintain their leading position in Bosnian politics today.

The outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia in March 1992 was followed by a series of attempts by the international community which was in search for a political solution to the crisis that began with the electoral race of 1991. The first series of talks began with the EC Peace Conference in February 1992 and were named the “Cutileiro Negotiations” after the EC mediator Jose Cutilero (Burg and Shoup 1999, 108). While an agreement that envisioned power-sharing among the ethno-nationalist groups was signed within the same year, this agreement failed to generate the expected results because Alija Izetbegovic as the representative of the Serbs withdrew from the agreement immediately after its signing. A second set of talks took place in 1993 and led to what came to be known as the “Vance-Owen Plan” which envisioned the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina to ten divisions on ethno-territorial basis (Burg and Shoup 1999, 189). Burg and Shoup note that the plan, while was the most fully articulated peace plan within the Bosnian war, could not overcome the fundamental lack of credibility of the commitments both from the part of the warring parties and from the part of the international community (1999, 257). Both the Cutileiro Negotiations and the Vance-Owen Plan were unable to prevent the descent to civil war from 1992-1995.

The civil war in Bosnia came to an end with a series of NATO bombings and the weakening of the Serb forces which paved the way for ceasefire and was followed by a series of peace negotiations that led to a final peace agreement. The General Framework Agreement for peace known as the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 and was negotiated by the representatives of each national group³⁸. The Dayton Peace Accords gave unprecedented authority to the international community for the post-conflict

³⁸ These representatives were Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia; Franco Tudjman, the president of Croatia; and Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the presidency of Bosnia (Bieber 2006, 27).

reconstruction and government of the country. The Dayton Accords established the Office of High Representative, an international body with extended powers, which assumed the civilian implementation of the agreement. In Dayton Bosnia was designed as a democratic state encompassing the mechanisms for the protection of human rights and economic development. In the next part of this chapter I focus on the democratization process that the international community initiated in Bosnia in the immediate aftermath of the civil war.

4.3 DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA

The Bosnian democratization process has peculiar characteristics as it is a process which was initiated by international actors within the phase of transition from an ethnic warfare to a multiethnic state and from the socialist rule to democracy (Bojkov 2003, 42). Within this context, democratization in Bosnia has been a process driven by external actors who assumed the task of institutional and electoral engineering in order to foster democratic institutions and secure representative government. However, the effort for democracy promotion has been undermined by the highly undemocratic character of the Office of High Representative (OHR), charged with the civilian implementation of Dayton. The OHR has been criticized for its lack of accountability and representativeness of the Bosnian people, possessing low levels of internal legitimacy (Richmond and Franks 2009; Steward 2006; McCann 2007).

On the other hand, the goal of democratization in Bosnia is not only a goal in itself but it was seen from the very beginning as a tool for the transformation of the political system of

the country in general. International actors in Bosnia have designed the new Bosnian state with a consociational structure which secures equal participation of all ethno-nationalist groups in the political arena. In general terms, democratization in Bosnia has meant that international authorities charged with overseeing postwar Bosnia have tried to use the design, monitoring, and revision of successive electoral processes to change the basic shape of interest aggregation (Manning 2005, 47). Besides electoral engineering, democratization in Bosnia has required the establishment of an institutional structure based on strict power-sharing among the three ethno-national groups. Both institutional and electoral engineering in Bosnia have been used for securing the representation of all ethnic groups in the political arena while the establishment of a multi-national Bosnian state has been seen as a key for preserving peace.

4.3.1 THE DAYTON PEACE AND THE OHR

The Dayton peace agreement, officially known as the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP), was signed in 1995 and ended the violent conflict that had begun three years before among the three ethno-nationalist communities of the country, the Bosniacs, the Croats, and the Serbs. The Dayton agreement declared the establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would be composed of two distinct entities, the Bosnian Federation and the Republica Srpska, and the subdivision of the federation to ten cantons. The division of the country has been realized based on ethno-territorial principles and the country was in essence

divided based on the territorial division of its three ethnic entities (Stefansson 2010, 63). The Dayton agreement ended the war, froze the formerly warring parties in their territories, and foresaw a democratic governance system that would be developed by the warring parties themselves (Perry 2009, 42). The Dayton agreement also envisioned the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that would be responsible for directing the implementation of the peace agreement. Dayton further envisioned the establishment of the Office of High Representative (OHR) that assumed the task of the civilian implementation of the agreement.

The content of the peace agreement indicates that it far exceeds its purpose as a sole agreement ending an ongoing conflict, as Dayton touched upon the most important issues of reconstruction and foresaw high levels of international engagement in postwar Bosnia. Dayton was designed as an agreement that served both as a legal accord and as a blueprint for building a stable and peaceful state (Perry 2009, 36). On the other hand, Dayton has been criticized from the point that it actually froze the conflict and rewarded ethnic cleansing as it benefited those who conducted the civil war, promoting the territorial subdivision of the country based on the ethno-territorial order that was established as a result of ethnic cleansing and forced migration (Chandler 2005, 336). The Dayton agreement was not negotiated directly with parties within Bosnia but rather, it was signed by nationalist war leaders such as Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 25). These war-time leaders did represent their ethnic groups and sought to maintain their influence through the peace agreement. On the other hand, the parties that accepted and signed Dayton did not have any opportunity to transform the content of the agreement and

were in a way ‘forced’ to sign it (Chandler 2005: 337). Therefore, Dayton is accepted as an externally imposed peace agreement that paved the way for an externally driven post-conflict process.

In terms of consequences, the Dayton peace agreement created a highly problematic structure in post-1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina. First of all, the Dayton agreement created a complex structure that aimed at reconciling the previously warring parties, through the establishment of a state that would be unitary and partitioned at the same time (Ducasse-Rogier 2004). The composition of the country of two separate entities and the creation of a complex federal structure both at the state level and the entity level resulted with institutional chaos that rendered problematic the introduction of reforms during the reconstruction process. This complex institutional structure maintained and further enhanced ethnic divisions in the country. It is generally accepted that although the Dayton agreement supports the establishment of a unitary Bosnian state with a democratic political structure, it favors ethnic partition (Weller and Wolff 2006; Caplan 2000).

One of the main aspects of the Dayton agreement was the establishment of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for the civilian implementation of the agreement³⁹. The OHR was created to carry out the will of the international community in Bosnia over and above that of local political institutions where they did not conform to the parameters of the Dayton agreement (Richmond and Franks 2009, 22). In post-Dayton Bosnia the OHR became the actual executive and legislative body while it gradually extended its mandate, gaining

³⁹ For a critical overview of the OHR and its position in the post-Dayton political structure of Bosnia see International Crisis Group Balkans Report no 121 titled “Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery” (November 2001).

previously unforeseen powers. The powers of the OHR were extended gradually after the 1997 Bonn Summit where the OHR was granted the power to remove officials from office and to impose laws. In today's Bosnia central institutions of State Presidency, Council of Ministers, and Parliamentary Assembly have little opportunity to develop policy proposals independently of the OHR (Chandler 2000, 70). Within this structure, the government of Bosnia has the power to govern in principle, but its ability to govern is constrained by the continued intervention of the OHR, the fragmentation of public authority in the entities and regions, as well as the extensive veto rights at state and entity level (Bieber 2007, 47)⁴⁰.

The above analysis indicates that while the Dayton agreement was signed with the purpose of reconstructing postwar Bosnia as a peaceful and democratic state, it established a problematic structure which encourages partition. In the new Bosnian state ethno-nationalist cleavages remain deep while the government of the country is mainly conducted through external actors which lack internal legitimacy. Ethnic divisions are further enhanced through the consociational and federal structure of the state which grants strong powers to the entities while creates a weak central government. In the next part I analyze this institutional structure and discuss its impact of interethnic relations.

4.3.2 THE NEW BOSNIAN STATE AND ITS POLITICAL STRUCTURE

⁴⁰ While a general overview of the literature on Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction adopts a critical stance towards the expanding roles that the OHR assumed since the last decades, the positive impact of the international body's work on postwar Bosnia has also been acknowledged. It is acknowledged that the country's institutions have evolved significantly as a result of both the process of implementing Dayton and of moving beyond it in some key aspects through the work of the OHR (Weller and Wolff 2006).

The main characteristic of the postwar Bosnian state is its complex institutional structure which is basically a consociational model⁴¹ which encompasses the characteristics of a confederal structure. With the signing of the Dayton Accords Bosnia basically adopted a consociational structure which aims at ensuring equal political representation for each national group. This structure aimed at protecting each group's right to self government and to promote inter-ethnic compromise and accommodation (Belloni 2004, 336). Within this framework Bosnia was designed as a country composed of two distinct entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, with the Federation sub-divided to ten cantons⁴². Today Bosnia-Herzegovina still consists of three de facto monoethnic entities, each having a separate army, police force, and education system (Lyon 2006, 50) and a national government which remains weak in regards to the entities.

The international community established a consociational structure with the aim of reconstructing Bosnia as a multiethnic state based on power-sharing among the ethno-national groups. The aim of reconstructing a multi-ethnic Bosnia and the provision of security to all ethnic groups were perceived as the key to preserving peace in the region (Chandler 2000, 66). The constitution of the country established in article 3 of Dayton foresaw an institutional structure where the power of majorities at higher levels would be closely regulated while at the same time power was to be shared through being devolved downwards, allowing greater self-government at the entity level (Chandler 2000, 67). Within this structure, the Bosnian

⁴¹ Consociationalism is a group-based approach that is proposed for divided societies to serve the aim of promoting reconciliation among ethnic groups through their recognition and their participation to the political system. This theory was firstly proposed by Arendt Lijphart in his 1969 article "Consociational Democracy".

⁴² The International Crisis Group's Balkan Report No 128 notes that the structure of the new Bosnian state has meant that the rights and freedoms of the citizens depend overwhelmingly on the goodwill of the regional (usually mononational) power structures, emphasizing that this structure reflects the ethnic bias that is inherent in the Dayton Constitution itself (2002, 1).

democratization process has been based on the institutionalization of ethnic division both through the subdivision of the country to entities and cantons and through the allocation of political power on the basis of ethnicity. Chandler notes that in the new Bosnian state “while the ethnicisation of politics has been welcomed, and multi-ethnic administrations formed at all levels, the politicization of ethnicity, the success of political parties that appeal to one ethnic group, has been roundly condemned as a central barrier to democratization” (2000, 111).

One of the most prominent aspects of the consociational reconstruction of Bosnia has been the establishment of the federal structure of the country. The 1995 Dayton peace agreement constructed Bosnia “as a loose, almost confederal union between a radically autonomous Republika Srpska and a Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the equality and the power-sharing between the Croat and the Bosniac peoples” (Bose, 2002, 241). The federal structure of post-Dayton Bosnia functioned as a middle solution between the partition of the country among ethnic lines and the creation of a unitary state encompassing the three ethnic groups within the same territory. Bose argues that Bosnia is a confederal union between its two political entities in which most competences are devolved to the ten cantons and is a prominent example of consociational confederalism where the federal autonomy is defined in ethno-territorial terms (2005, 326). Mc Mahon also notes that “decentralization and power-sharing were the twin principles underpinning the creation of a consociational style democracy” and for this purpose, the two entities composing the federal structure of Bosnia were given high levels of power and responsibilities (2004, 574). However, it should be noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a confederation but is a

federal state where the requirements of the federal system are fulfilled: it is compounded of constituent units (the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia) and a general government; the people elect representatives in both levels of government; none of these levels can unilaterally alter the allocation of responsibilities; and lastly, the constituent units participate in the decision-making at the federal level (Gromes 2010, 356).

Ethno-territorialism is embedded in the Bosnian federalism. The two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia, are defined in ethnic terms and the majority of the ten cantons composing the Federation of Bosnia are ethno-territorial, i.e. an ethnic majority is present at them. Despite the weak position of the federal Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to the strong position of the two entities, the consociational character is highly preserved. The representation of all three constituent people is guaranteed in the constitution of the country. Accordingly, the Bosnia and Herzegovina level House of Peoples is composed of fifteen representatives, five of each ethnic group and the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is three-chaired with a representative for each ethnic group.

The consociational and ethno-territorial character of the new Bosnian state has established a political structure where the divisive lines among the three ethnic groups remain deep. In terms of interethnic reconciliation that this study is concerned with, this structure has widened the gap among the three ethnic groups and therefore has impacted negatively on interethnic dialogue. This is because through this structure the divisive lines among the three groups have been established in such a way that there is no need for cooperation as each constituent entity is relatively autonomous. In the next part I analyze the process of interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia in terms of the electoral and institutional engineering of

the international community and in terms of the transitional justice mechanisms that have been established with the aim of promoting peace through justice.

4.4 INTERETHNIC RECONCILIATION

Two central aspects of the reconciliation process in Bosnia have been the transitional justice mechanisms that have been established in the country after the war of 1992-1995 on the one hand and the management of institutional and electoral engineering as a tool for reshaping intergroup relations on the other. As I discussed in the theoretical framework previously, transitional justice mechanisms in the form of criminal tribunals and truth-seeking mechanisms are intertwined with the aim of reconciliation first and foremost because these mechanisms serve the purpose of “dealing with the past”. Through transitional justice it is expected that a sense of relief and a process of healing will pave the way for the recovery of intergroup relations. On the other hand, institutional and electoral engineering in the form of reshaping the rules for political party formation and electoral competition in a way that intergroup dialogue and political moderation takes place has been seen as another source for reconciling previously fighting factions. Through electoral engineering the international community has sought to constrain the power of nationalist factions and open room for more moderate views to flourish. In the next part I analyze these two mechanisms and I discuss their role within the reconciliation process.

4.4.1 INSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL ENGINEERING AS RECONCILIATION TOOLS

The importance of electoral engineering in Bosnia is related to the fact that the goal of democratization in Bosnia is not only a goal in itself but it was seen from the very beginning as a tool for the transformation of the political system of the country in general. Democratization in Bosnia meant that international authorities charged with overseeing post-war Bosnia have tried to use the design, monitoring, and revision of successive electoral processes to change the basic shape of interest aggregation (Manning 2003, 47). Therefore, besides a tool for democratic transition, elections in Bosnia were seen as the engine for political change. Political change in the Bosnian case refers to the transformation of the basis of political party competition, which reflects the ethnic composition of the country, and the change in the voting pattern, which is still defined in ethnic terms.

The OHR and OSCE have actively and explicitly sought to use repeated elections at various levels to diminish the power of particular political parties that were seen as bearing a large part of the responsibility of the war (Manning 2004, 62). Indeed, the political engineering that these and other institutions have pursued in Bosnia has rested on specific assumptions regarding the introduction of rules and procedures and the implementation of reforms. Several such assumptions are: that voter preferences towards moderate parties will prevail once free and fair elections take place; that institutional engineering can change the balance of power within the party system; and that nationalist parties can be ‘made’ more moderate through direct intervention of international authorities (Manning 2004, 63). Each of these assumptions concentrate on different agents as the engine for political change, the first

focusing on voters, the second on the parties, and the third on the international actors themselves.

Based on these assumptions, electoral and institutional engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina has focused on introducing and implementing reforms to achieve political reconciliation and moderation. After the 1996 elections, which are generally considered as a failure both in terms of organizational deficits and in terms of their results that led to power-sharing strictly among the previously warring factions, the international community used subsequent elections in order to achieve political change and compliance with the provisions of the Dayton peace agreement (Manning 2004, 69). The Provisional Election Commission of Bosnia initiated a series of reforms, including power-sharing requirements at the level of cantons and municipalities, preferential voting system, the establishment of local constituencies for the Republica Srpska National Assembly, and change in the casting of votes for the Federation's House of Peoples. In general terms these reforms were in accordance with the aim of diminishing the competitive advantages of wartime parties, focusing on transformations of the electoral and institutional system (Manning 2004, 69).

On the other hand, the electoral system of Bosnia, which was adopted in accordance with the consociational system that was built with Dayton, is accused of increasing the salience of ethnicity in the country, paving the way for electoral competition and voting behavior defined in ethnic terms (Hulseley, 2010). The proportional representation, in conjunction with the general consociational structure that recognizes group rights and supports the differences between the groups rather than eliminating them, has consolidated stable party competition based on ethnicity. Belloni argues that the consociational structure

that was established in the post-Dayton period served the maintenance of the war-time nationalist parties, who took advantage of this structure and systematically used the electoral processes to pursue their own agendas (2004, 335). Political party competition under this structure has taken a stable form, consolidating the existing pattern of competition in ethnic terms. This stability has persisted despite the efforts of the international community to promote political moderation.

Indeed, efforts to promote political moderation in Bosnia have succeeded only in periods when these efforts have taken the form of intense international pressure, mainly through the Office of High Representative (OHR). The 2000 elections in Bosnia resulted with the electoral success of the Social Democrat Party (SDP) which has a non-nationalist agenda and is one of the strongest moderate parties that were established in post-war Bosnia. However, this success has been short lived and was reversed with the next elections held in 2002. This indicates that in the political arena ethnicity remains as the main cleavage dividing the Bosnian society. Under these circumstances it is difficult to expect that at the societal level interethnic divisions have been bridged which indicates that interethnic reconciliation has not been achieved.

4.4.2 RECONCILIATION THROUGH JUSTICE: THE ICTY AND THE WCC

The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 827 and 857 (May and August 1993 respectively) based on the provisions of the international humanitarian

law⁴³. The tribunal aimed mainly at the prosecution of those responsible for atrocities during the post-Yugoslav wars and at promoting retributive justice in postwar Bosnia. The ICTY was created based on the belief that by prosecuting individuals responsible for genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass cleansing, the court would contribute to the restoration and sustenance of peace in Bosnia (Basic 2006, 358). Therefore, the work of the ICTY served the purpose of promoting peace through retributive justice. The ICTY was regarded as an essential aspect of the reconciliation process which aimed at the establishment of a peaceful relationship between formerly fighting groups through the acknowledgement of previous criminal acts and the prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities committed during the civil war.

One major issue regarding the ICTY is that it is not merely a judicial body established for prosecution but rather a judicial body which was established with political concerns. The fact that the ICTY was established with the aim of fostering peace through justice indicates that the tribunal exceeds its mission as a sole judicial body. The role that the ICTY played in the initial parts of the Dayton peace accords⁴⁴ and its subsequent function of prosecuting political criminals in the post-Dayton period indicates that the tribunal should be considered as having been created for a political purpose (see for example Gow 2006; Armakolas and Vossou 2008). Indeed, each trial that the ICTY initiates exceeds its function as a judicial process and impacts either negatively or positively on the post-conflict peace process. The

⁴³ The ICTY was established in 1993 before the major atrocities took place in Bosnia during 1993-1995, such as the Srebrenica massacre (July 1995) which is accepted to be one major example of the horrors committed against humanity. The fact that the Srebrenica incident took place after the establishment of the ICTY is regarded as a main indicator of the failure of the court to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.

⁴⁴ James Gow (2006) notes that the first example of the instrumental role of the ICTY occurred in getting the warring parties to Dayton for peace talks in 1995. Within the Dayton talks the US authorities hosting the talks insisted that no persons that were indicted by the ICTY could attend the talks, and this meant that two major actors, the Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic and his military counterpart, General Ratko Mladic were excluded from being parts of the agreement.

direction of this impact (negative or positive) depends on how each trial is perceived by the Bosnian community. Considering that each national group adopts its own view of the past and has a different perception of victimization, it can be argued that the work of the ICTY is perceived in different ways depending on each group.

The contradiction that exists between the international character of the international criminal tribunals and the internal character of justice and reconciliation after civil conflict has been a central issue regarding the ICTY (Kamatali, 2003; Clark, 2008). One issue closely related to this contradiction is the fact that international tribunals including ICTY are generally responsive to international actors (like the UN) and not to the states for which they have been established. International criminal tribunals that are located outside the territory of conflict such as the ICTY⁴⁵ have been criticized as not being fully internalized as justice mechanisms by the societies that they have been established for. The effect of this territorial segregation is that in the case of the former Yugoslavia, justice in The Hague is perceived as highly contested by various groups in the ex-Yugoslav countries (Clark, 2008).

The fact that the tribunal was established by the Western powers that initiated the peace operation and the post-conflict reconstruction process in the country and the territorial segregation of the tribunal from Bosnia have been major factors in determining how local perceptions were formed against the court. Several surveys on local perceptions of the ICTY revealed that local views regarding the tribunal and its work vary extremely between the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ The ICTY is located in The Hague, the Netherlands.

⁴⁶ Several such surveys are: the survey that has been conducted by IDEA in 2002 and covers a number of topics ranging from the economy and future prospects to domestic and international institutions. According to the

According to such surveys the ICTY is highly contested by Bosnian Serbs while Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs adopt a more moderate view. The way that the court is perceived is closely related to how the three ethnic groups perceive the past and on how they think that the court decisions affect their ethnic identity.

The variation in the attitudes towards the ICTY is based on several points. Firstly, each national group that fought the war continues to see itself as the victim of the war rather than the perpetrator (Saxon 2005, 562). This means that in the post-conflict process in Bosnia the question of who is to be blamed for the atrocities is still used in a manipulative way and has no clear answer. Secondly, the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked a tradition of an independent judiciary has been a source of the critical view towards the court's function. The court has been viewed as an instrument of the West and as a means for the Western powers to assert their control over Bosnia (Saxon 2005, 562). Thirdly, the fact that the trials that the ICTY has conducted so far have been long-lasting and complex has paved the way for the political manipulation of the court's work. Nationalist parties have used the trials to present their own perception of the past. All these have impacted negatively on how the ICTY is perceived by the people for whom it was established, but most importantly this negative perception has undermined the prospects for reconciliation among the opposing groups.

The continuing salience of ethnicity in the postwar decades has affected significantly the ICTY's functioning and performance. In general terms the ICTY has been an important motor for public discussions regarding wartime atrocities, but on the other hand it has also

survey, trust to the Hague Tribunal as an international institution is 51% in the Bosnian-Croat Federation and only 4% in Republika Srpska. Similarly, the UNDP opinion poll on public perceptions of justice in BiH conducted in 2005 reveals the same results regarding the great difference between the perceptions of the ICTY in the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska.

fuelled nationalist discourses about the war (Fischer 2006, 23). Different perceptions of past episodes and different visions on criminality and victimhood have interacted negatively with the prosecutions that the ICTY conducted, affecting the intergroup relations in a negative manner. From this viewpoint the ICTY has been unable to radically change the social and political climate of mutual mistrust among the different ethnic groups.

The international character of the transitional justice mechanisms in post-Dayton Bosnia has changed significantly with the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber in March 2005. The WCC was established with the purpose of the gradual transference of the postwar judicial system from the ICTY to a national body. The WCC represents the most significant effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina to investigate and prosecute those allegedly involved in serious violations of international humanitarian law at the national level (Ivanisevic 2008, 5). The WCC was established as a national institution with a hybrid nature, staffed by both national and international judges (Sriram et al 2011, 345). In Bosnia, politicians have attacked the WCC for the sake of their own nationalist agenda (Ivanisevic 2008, 34). Bosnian Serb associations have led protests against the WCC and judicial prosecutions and are constantly undermining the Court as bias against the Bosnian Serbs (Sriram et al 2011, 349). This indicates that like its international counterpart, the WCC is a judicial and a political institution at the same time.

The impact of the retributive justice mechanisms on the reconciliation process has been negative for Bosnia thus far. The above analysis indicates that as main transitional judicial bodies, the ICTY since 1993 and of WCC since 2005 have both achieved up to a point the aim of individualizing guilt and of prosecuting those responsible for atrocities.

However, considering that civil wars generally take the form of mass atrocities, criminal courts tend to be always contested as to what degree they can achieve the punishment of all those who committed crimes. Indeed, this is a central criticism towards the retributive justice mechanisms in general. On the other hand, the ICTY has also been perceived as ethnically biased towards the Serbs⁴⁷, while its international dimension has undermined its reliability in the eyes of the Bosnian people.

4.5 ANALYZING THE DEMOCRATIZATION-RECONCILIATION PROCESSES

As the above analysis indicates, reconciliation and democratization in Bosnia have been two interlinked processes as part of the broader process of postwar reconstruction. While democratization has been a primary objective of the international community in the post-conflict reconstruction process, international actors have managed institutional and electoral engineering also as a tool for promoting political moderation and reconciliation among the different ethnic groups and the parties representing them. On the other hand, transitional justice mechanisms such as the ICTY and later the WCC have been promoted as a means for “dealing with the past” and seeking the truth in order to establish a common view of the past. These mechanisms are regarded as the main tools for the establishment of a common view of the past, which will serve as the basis to reshape intergroup relations and foster a sense of a commonly shared peaceful future.

⁴⁷ Ivanisevic notes that the perceived or real flaws in the work of the WCC may not necessarily reflect ethnic bias, because considering that the majority of the victims of the Bosnian civil war were Bosniacs, it is logical that the majority of the trials should be the one dealing with crimes against Bosniacs (2008, 34).

However, despite the carefully planned institutional and electoral engineering and despite the success of transitional justice mechanisms in prosecuting a number of wartime perpetrators, political and social reconciliation have not been achieved in today's Bosnia. The persistence of ethno-nationalist parties and their success in the political arena indicate that ethnicity persists as the main cleavage in the Bosnian society. On the other hand, the negative perception of the ICTY and its work, especially by the Bosnian Serbs, indicates that retributive justice falls short of fostering a sense of healing and erasing the mutual mistrust among the different ethno-national groups. Based on this observation, in the next part of this chapter I analyze the effect of three aspects- the international community's role, the role of state legitimacy, and the role of economic factors- on this outcome.

4.5.1 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN BOSNIA

The international community in Bosnia assumed tasks that covered both the military and the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. A multi-national force led by NATO supervised the compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supervised the conduct of the elections. Together with the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN High Commission for Human Rights took on the task of supervising the implementation of human rights provisions, an area which needed special sensitivity considering the gross human rights violations that occurred in the country during the civil war. In terms of economic reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) led the reconstruction process. The ICTY was established as the main judicial body charged with the task of fostering

transitional justice. Finally, the OHR assumed the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement.

The plethora of actors and the wide range of tasks that they assumed in post-conflict Bosnia indicate that the process of reconstruction was mainly externally driven. Additionally, the international dimension of the post-conflict reconstruction process in Bosnia was further widened as international bodies such as the OHR widened their mandate throughout the 2000s. The OHR gradually expanded its time-limits: while it was initially established as a provisional body with its mandate ending after the first post-conflict elections in 1996, its mandate was prolonged firstly for two additional years and after 1997 it was extended indefinitely (Chandler 2005, 339). While widening its period of existence, the OHR also widened the areas of its mandate. Throughout the 2000s, the OHR expanded its power, gaining both executive and legislative control over the Bosnian state and assuming the power to dismiss officials in case of non-compliance to Dayton.

The expansion of the powers of the international community entered a new period with the inauguration of EU accession negotiations in early 2000s. From 2000 and onwards Dayton gradually became subordinate to the requirement for EU membership (Chandler 2005, 341). Since 2002, the Directorate for European Integrations, which was established with the aim of preparing a strategy for EU integration for Bosnia-Herzegovina, has become a key executive body for Bosnia. This has paved the way for more direct EU involvement in the government of Bosnia. Additionally, since 2002 the High Representative in Bosnia jointly holds the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EU has also impacted the reconstruction process through its policy of conditionality and it is accepted that the

importance of the EU in terms of the post-conflict democratization process in Bosnia lies in this policy of conditionality (Weller and Wolff 2006, 9; see also Aybet and Bieber 2011). EU's conditionality policy is successful especially in cases where political elites and the general public are willing to make concessions in order to get EU accession⁴⁸ and this was the case for post-conflict Bosnia which is still in a reconstruction process. However, EU integration should become a real option and "the criteria for access should be concrete, credible and achievable if a positive effect of such integration is to become reality" (Fischer 2006, 32).

In terms of interethnic democratization and reconciliation, the impact of the international administration has been multidimensional. The democratization process that was initiated in Bosnia since 1996 has proceeded with various levels of international engagement. Since the 2000s, the increasing engagement by the side of the EU has led to a form of "controlled democracy" where national actors are controlled by international ones with the aim of preserving stability and peace (Bojkov 2003). This control over the political system of Bosnia has ranged from elections control to the High Representative's removal of elected politicians from office and to constitutional reform in 2000 which was in accordance with the OHR decisions. The continuous control over Bosnian politics has obscured the establishment of political dialogue that cross-cuts intergroup divisions. Additionally, considering that the international community in Bosnia has assumed the task of promoting democracy and sustainable peace in the country, international actors have sought in various ways to adopt policies that would contribute to erasing mutual hostilities among the ethno-national groups.

⁴⁸ Bosnia-Herzegovina became potential candidate to the EU following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003. Since 2000 Bosnia-Herzegovina has benefited from EU autonomous trade measures.

Within this framework, the international community has engaged in institutional and electoral engineering that would secure equal participation to the political arena; the establishment of a consociational structure granting equal rights to the different entities; the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms that would serve as a means of peace through justice.

The main impact of the international community in postwar Bosnian reconciliation process has been through the institutional structure that international actors established for the democratic Bosnian state. The bid of the international actors to preserve diversity within unity in Bosnia has led to the establishment of a state where ethnic diversity is strictly preserved and power-sharing mechanisms are based on ethnicity as the divisive factor. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the democratic system that was established in postwar Bosnia has also been called as “controlled democracy” from the viewpoint that Bosnian politics is controlled by outside actors (OHR) with the aim to preserve stability (Bojkov 2003). This form of controlled democracy, together with the institutional engineering aiming at preserving diversity within unity, and the extensive roles that the EU acquired especially since the 2000s has inhibited the move towards a Bosnian ownership of the postwar reconstruction and democratization process (Chandler 2005). Accordingly, this has inhibited to the strengthening of dialogue and compromise among the various ethnic groups and the reconciliation process in general.

4.5.2 THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL LEGITIMACY

It is generally accepted that Dayton established a post-conflict political structure that failed to generate legitimacy among the Bosnian people (Richmond and Franks 2009; Mc Cann 2007; Bieber 2007; Steward 2006; Hansen 1997). The issue of legitimacy in post-conflict Bosnia covers the issue of legitimacy both towards the structure of the state and towards the international administration. The establishment of a Bosnian state composed of two distinct entities has been contested in terms of legitimacy mainly by the Serb and the Croat communities in Bosnia. On the other hand, the OHR in Bosnia effectively represents the international community rather than the Bosnian people, and so lacks democratic legitimacy, but possesses international legitimacy based on the consent of the warring parties and the UN delegation (Mc Cann 2007, 1). As opposed to internal legitimacy, the international legitimacy of the OHR is related to the fact that it was established with the aim of promoting peace and security, protecting human rights, and of governing a post-conflict country which lacked institutional infrastructure and was devastated by the war.

The legitimacy of the Bosnian state is contested from the different ethno-national groups. The main source of division between the ethnic groups is the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state composed of two distinct entities, the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. Within this structure most Bosnians reject the status of Republika Srpska considering it as a state established through war crimes (Bieber 2007, 49). This is because the Serb entity is the result of the ethno-territorial division that was shaped through forced migration and genocide during the Bosnian war and which was consolidated through the Dayton accords in 1995. On the other hand, the Serb population resists any move towards strengthening the Bosnian state and favor separation from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

establishment of an independent Serb state or merger with neighboring Serbia (Bieber 2007, 49).

The issue of legitimacy of international administrations is closely linked to the issue of accountability of these administrations. While the power and authority of the international administrations possess may be quite considerable, those administrations are not accountable to the population whose territory they administer (Caplan 2005, 463). The fact that international administrations are not elected by the local community but are established by outside institutions and therefore they have a distinct spatial identity separate from the communities they govern indicates that these administrations lack democratic accountability (Zaum 2006, 469). The OHR in Bosnia is an example of such an international institution that presents accountability deficits. The paradox regarding the international administration in Bosnia is that while it is tasked with the promotion of democratic governance, it lacks accountability, which is the basis of democracy, because of its unchecked executive authority over Bosnia (Mc Cann 2007). The international authority in Bosnia has “the unlimited authority to overrule the democratic institutions of the Bosnian state” (Knaus and Martin 2003, 60)⁴⁹. The decisions of the OHR are not accountable to independent bodies, the Bosnian public or the Bosnian government (Steward 2006, 758) and while being an institution established with the aim of fostering democracy, the OHR is actually stifling democratization because it is both unrepresentative and unaccountable to the people (Richmond and Franks 2009, 28).

⁴⁹ The international authority in Bosnia has the power to dismiss elected officials. Knaus and Martin note that the OHR can dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, and mayors without having to submit its decisions for review to any independent body (2003, 61). From this viewpoint the international administration contradicts its own purpose of existence, which is to promote democratic governance.

The importance of legitimacy lies in the fact that political legitimacy and confidence-building are accepted to be crucial factors for the success of the peace process while lack of confidence towards the political structure that is constructed in the aftermath of peace agreements may threaten the process of constructing sustainable peace. (Hansen 1997). In terms of democratization, the lack of accountability may undermine the transition to democracy because it will set a bad example for local politicians (Zaum 2009, 469). Considering that the efforts to build democracy require the transmission of democratic norms and procedures to the local community, the democratic deficits of the international bodies that have been established for this purpose will expectedly render difficult the establishment of a self-sustaining democracy.

Unless the issue of internal legitimacy is solved, the Bosnian people will continue to be discontented both with the international presence in the country and with the territorial subdivision of the country which was carefully planned in order to secure equality and interethnic dialogue. Under the circumstances of mutual discontent of each other's status, it will be unrealistic to expect that interethnic relations will be reshaped and reconciliation will take place.

4.5.3 THE ISSUE OF POST-WAR ECONOMY

The Bosnian economic reconstruction process has meant both the transition from the previous socialist structure of Yugoslavia to a market economy and the transition from a war economy to a postwar economy marked by rapid market liberalization and high levels of

international assistance. Like the general reconstruction process, the economic reconstruction process in Bosnia has been marked by extensive international assistance. The postwar economy of Bosnia has been analyzed both in terms of the overall economic performance in the aftermath of the civil war (see for example Pugh 2002; Friedman 2004; Bieber 2007) and in terms of the establishment of clandestine economy within the reconstruction process (see for example Donais 2003; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). In this part I am mainly concerned with how the economy of post-war Bosnia affects the democratization and reconciliation processes in the country.

The fact that the Bosnian war was fought in ethnic lines has impacted on how economic power has been structured in postwar Bosnia. In today's Bosnia the desire to accumulate power both in political and economic terms is the main factor that unites the country's nationalist fractions that are represented by the three main nationalist political parties of SDS, SDA and HDZ (Donais 2003, 366). Like the political arena, the economic space has also been dominated by ethnic interests and conflicting views about how the state and the economy should be organized (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006, 72). Additionally, in postwar Bosnia wartime criminal networks have continued their existence due to the weakness and fragmentation of the state institutions (Bieber 2006, 34). Festic and Rausche note that in the post-Dayton institution-building process the international community failed to ban the appointment of wartime political figures to key posts such as banking and customs and gave them the institutional structure needed for the clandestine political economies (2004, 33). Bosnia today maintains the characteristic of a criminal economy and corruption that have

their roots in the Yugoslav era⁵⁰. In general terms, the connection between organized crime and corruption and nationalist political forces is the most important obstacle for the development of a market economy and the integration of Bosnia into the EU's economic space (Donais 2003, 361). At the same time, corruption and extensive party control over the economy continue to be two main aspects that have been inherited from the communist era. Dayton established a fragmented economic system where the entities and the cantons set their own budgets and have a degree of autonomy in development policies (Divjak and Pugh 2008, 375). Within these autonomous structures ethnic lines are closely interlinked to economic power while at the same time social clientelism continues to be the main determinant of social provision (Pugh 2002).

Economic assistance from international actors has been conditioned to the achievement of political goals. Especially since the 2000s economic assistance has been closely tied to the conditionality policy of the EU. Since the late 1990s and in accordance with the policy of conditionality, only those parties who agreed to cooperate with the international community in the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement were permitted to receive economic aid (Friedman 2004, 105). Especially for aid received from the EU, economic aid is conditional upon fulfilling the democratization criteria, such as multiparty elections and liberal market reforms. Within this context, the levels of


⁵⁰ For an extended analysis of criminal structures in post-conflict Bosnia see Donais (2003) and Pugh (2002).

economic aid thus far presented variation between the two entities based on the extent that they complied with the DPA provisions⁵¹.

In terms of overall economic performance, postwar Bosnia presents a weak economic performance with high levels of unemployment and low levels of income, and the general performance of the economy is behind its prewar levels (Friedman 2004, 94). Poverty varies regionally and coincides with ethnicity, with poverty being most widespread in Serb-dominated regions and less in Croat dominated regions (Bieber 2007, 51). Building upon the democracy-economic well-being link, one argument to be made regarding the postwar democratization process in Bosnia is that the democratization process should be accompanied by the improvement of the overall economic performance so that the Bosnian democracy be stabilized and reach the point of consolidation in the future. While the economic growth of the country in terms of the GDP per capita has been considerable in the postwar period, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still far behind the prewar levels of economic functioning.


Figure 5: Annual GDP per Capita Growth: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-2011

⁵¹ Friedman notes that the Republika Srpska received only 2 percent of the total international assistance during the first postwar years, because its leadership refused to actively implement the provisions of the peace agreement (2004, 106).



Source: World Bank


Figure 6: Annual GDP per Capita (Constant 2000 US Dollars): Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-2011



Source: World Bank

In terms of economic norms theory and market institutionalization in postwar Bosnia, the economic data indicate that market institutionalization has remained in low levels. While the data for market institutionalization in Bosnia covers only the initial five years in the post-civil war period, it provides the information that the level of postwar market institutionalization remains below the median level.

Figure 7: Market Institutionalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-2000



Source: Economic Norms Data (provided by Michael Mousseau)

The importance of the level of market institutionalization in postwar Bosnia lies in the connection that the economic norms theory builds between contract intensive economies and democratic values. The fact that the level of market institutionalization in Bosnia remains

very low indicates that the flourishing of universal norms such as freedom, peace, and democratic governance has remained low in the country, at least for the initial postwar years until 2000.

The above analysis indicates that postwar Bosnia presents a weak picture of economic performance with low levels of market institutionalization and high levels of ethnic favoritism and corruption. In terms of economic reconstruction, international actors have provided assistance to the postwar economy of Bosnia for the transition to a market economy. Especially since 2000s, EU's economic aid to Bosnia has been based on the policy of conditionality and has been linked to the fulfillment of the democratization criteria. In terms of the postwar democratization process, the weak economic performance in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be accepted as having negative impact on the democratization process. In terms of reconciliation, postwar economic aspects in Bosnia affect negatively intergroup relations. In postwar Bosnia ethnicity persists as a main determinant of economic power while clientelism and corruption basically rest on ethnic ties. Similarly, the dominance of wartime political figures in key areas of the economy has perpetuated wartime divisions. Especially the local elites are striving for perpetuating the "mafia-type war economy" through semi-legal and illegal business, preserving in this war-time structures (Fischer 2006, 450). Within this structure, economic structures function as another source strengthening ethnic divisions and therefore impacting negatively on the reconciliation process of the country.

4.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I sought to analyze the Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction process in terms of the democratization and reconciliation processes that took place after the divisive war of 1992-1995. The above analysis of the democratization process indicates that the process of democracy promotion in the country established a complex consociational political structure which strengthened interethnic divisions. The political and institutional structure that was established with Dayton was basically based on preserving each ethnic group's participation to politics through free and fair elections, and granting high levels of political power to the entity level at loss of the central level government. In terms of interethnic reconciliation, in this chapter I analyzed both institutional and electoral engineering, and the role of transitional mechanisms in the reconciliation process. The analysis indicated that despite the effort of the international community to promote political moderation and approximation through institutional and electoral engineering, ethnic ties have been preserved and interethnic dialogue has not flourished in postwar Bosnia. The transitional justice mechanisms such as the ICTY and the WCC on the other hand have not generated the results that they were expected to, i.e. promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation through justice.

Based on the theoretical framework that I proposed in the second chapter, in this chapter I analyzed the reconciliation process in Bosnia with regard to the role of international actors, the issue of state legitimacy, and the issue of postwar economy. The above analysis indicates that all three issues have an explanatory power on why reconciliation has not been achieved in Bosnia yet. The contested legitimacy of the Bosnian state on the one hand and of the international administration on the other has undermined the process of interethnic

reconciliation. The structure of the Bosnian state as composed of two entities is perceived as illegitimate especially by the non-Serbs who regard the Serb entity as a territory established through war crimes and mass atrocities. Similarly, the lack of accountability of the international administration undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of the Bosnian people. In terms of economy, the postwar economy in Bosnia has been restructured in a way which strengthens ethnic divisions, as the distribution of economic power has been realized in a way which undermines the other ethnic groups. Additionally, the preservation of wartime criminal ties and clandestine economy indicates that underlying wartime structures have been preserved in the economic domain. Lastly, the impact of the international community on the reconciliation process in Bosnia has been catalytic. Through the reconstruction of postwar Bosnia the international community designed Bosnia as a unitary but also partitioned state based on ethnicity. The preservation of ethnic lines and the institutionalization of the ethnic diversity have led to a structure where interethnic reconciliation is neither a political nor a social priority in Bosnia.

Overall, I contend that the role of the international community has been catalytic on preserving ethnicity and establishing divisive lines within the Bosnian community which is the main obstacle behind the establishment of a Bosnian community with a common view of the past and the future. The extensive control over the political system by international actors has impeded the Bosnian ownership of the process and the establishment of a national unity where ethnic divisions would not be so deep. By dividing the society institutionally the international actors have established a structure where there is no need for interethnic dialogue at least in the political arena. Considering that the two entities in Bosnia are highly

independent from each other, reconciliation between the Serbs on the one hand and the Bosniacs and the Croats on the other, is expectedly not the priority neither for Bosnian politicians nor for the two communities. Within this context, while international actors have used democracy as a means for promoting interethnic compromise and condemning ethnicity-based politics, ethnicity continues to be the single divisive line in Bosnian politics. All in all, democratization in Bosnia has not paved the way for reconciliation among the three ethno-nationalist communities that compose the Bosnian state because ethnicity persists as the main characteristic of the Bosnian society today.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES: COMPARING POSTWAR DEMOCRATIZATION AND RECONCILIATION PROCESSES IN GREECE AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The research question that guided this study thus far is based on the democratization-reconciliation puzzle that I introduced in the early parts of the study. This puzzle is based both on the theoretical confusion that exists regarding postwar reconciliation and democratization and on previous examples of postwar reconstruction processes that have produced diverse insights on the issue. As I discussed in the second chapter, previous scholarly studies have produced diverse insights, as some studies have accepted democracy as a prerequisite to reconciliation while others have pointed to reconciliation as the wider process that encompasses democratization. Based on these, the main research question that guides this study is the question of “*Why in some countries democracy leads to reconciliation while in others it does not?*”. With this question in mind, in the third and fourth chapters I basically focused on the question of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina and I sought to analyze these processes in each case based on the theoretical framework that I provided in the second chapter. In the chapter at hand, I proceed to a comparative analysis of the postwar Greek and Bosnian processes based on the

issue of external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy.

Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina entered postwar reconstruction process after civil wars that lasted for three years in both countries (1946-1949 in Greece and 1992-1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina). In both countries several peace initiatives were launched before and during the civil wars, including the Lebanon Conference (1944) and the Varkiza Agreement (1945) in Greece, and the EC-sponsored Cutileiro Talks (1991) and the Vance-Owen Plan (1993) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One common aspect between the two cases has been the fact that these efforts to prevent the commencing and/or to end the ongoing civil war have been the result of both national and international actors⁵². On the other hand, the two cases have been differentiated in terms of how the respective civil wars ended. While the Greek civil war ended with the domination of the Greek Right over the Left, the Bosnian civil war ended through international intervention with no winning or losing side. Despite this differentiation, in both countries the post-civil war years were marked by widening divisions among the previously opposing fractions. In Greece the postwar domination of the Greek Right and the discriminatory policies towards the Left widened the Left-Right divide until the coup d'état of 1967. In Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand, the divisions among the three ethno-nationalist fractions has been preserved throughout the postwar years since 1995.

The analyses of the Greek and the Bosnian postwar processes in the previous chapters revealed diverse insights on how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in these two

⁵² In the Greek case, the Lebanon conference was stage-managed by the British and the Varkiza Agreement was signed with the active involvement of the British (Close 1995). In the Bosnian case the series of peace talks including the Cutileiro Talks and the Vance-Owen Plan were initiatives by the international community to prevent the civil war (Bourg and Shoup 1999).

countries in the aftermath of the civil wars. In Greece reconciliation was achieved as a result of the intense democratization process that took place in the aftermath of the Colonels' dictatorship. Therefore, the post-1974 restoration of democracy in Greece enabled the establishment of intergroup reconciliation in terms of political moderation and dialogue. In Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand, the democratization process that was inaugurated with the Dayton Peace Accords and the following reconstruction process has not led to interethnic reconciliation in terms of intergroup political dialogue and compromise. Bosnian politics and society today remain politically and socially divided based on ethnicity while the composition of the country on ethno-territorial basis both enhances and perpetuates intergroup divisions.

In this chapter I proceed to a comparative analysis of the two cases on the basis of the theoretical framework that I provided earlier. Here my aim is to comparatively analyze the postwar democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia on the basis of the issue of international engagement, the issue of internal legitimacy, and the issue of postwar economy. The comparative analysis of these issues will lead to deeper understanding of the reconciliation-democratization puzzle that exists between Greece and Bosnia. This analysis will also provide the basis for further comparative research which will broaden our perspectives on the issue of how democracy and reconciliation are related in postwar contexts.

The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows: In the first part I provide a general comparative overview of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in the two countries. After this general overview, in the second part I analyze separately each of the issues that I introduced in the theoretical framework, namely the issue of international influence, the issue of internal legitimacy and the issue of postwar economy. At this point, I

proceed to a comparative analysis of each issue based on the analysis that I provided in the previous chapters for each case. After the comparative analysis of each issue, I conclude reassessing my findings.

5.2 EXPLAINING THE DEMOCRATIZATION-RECONCILIATION PUZZLE IN GREECE AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ON WHAT GROUNDS DO THE TWO CASES DIFFER?


Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina were analyzed in this study as two cases that are differentiated in terms of how reconciliation and democratization proceeded in the post-civil war period. In Greece, reconciliation between Left and Right was achieved as a result of the postwar democratization process that was re-established after the dissolution of the authoritarian rule in 1974. In Bosnia on the other hand, the democratization process that was initiated by the international community since 1995 has not led to political reconciliation among the three ethno-nationalist groups. The Bosnian political arena is dominated by ethno-nationalist parties that represent each ethnic group, while both vote-seeking and voting is based on ethnic terms. Based on the analysis of each case in previous chapters, here I provide a comparative overview firstly of the democratization and secondly of the reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia.

5.2.1 POSTWAR DEMOCRATIZATION IN GREECE AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In the analysis of the Greek post-civil war democratization process in the third chapter I distinguished between the pre- and post-dictatorship periods, i.e. between pre- and post-1974. As I noted earlier, this temporal distinction was necessary because the post-1974 democratization process, commonly known as *metapolitefsi*, was far ahead the process that took place in the 1950s and 1960s and despite the virtual continuities⁵³, in essence post-1974 Greek politics presented a radical break from the divisions that marked the initial postwar years. This distinction is also necessary for the comparative analysis that I conduct here because my aim at this point is to capture the specific circumstances that led to reconciliation in Greece after 1974 in contrast to the pre-1967 period and to assess the relevance of this analysis for the Bosnian case. A preliminary overview of the two cases reveals the similarity that exists between the postwar Bosnian democratization process since 1995 and the democratization process in pre-dictatorship Greece, i.e. until 1967. The figures below also indicate the parallelism that exists between democracy levels in the immediate postwar years in Greece (1950-1967) and the postwar years in Bosnia until today (1996-2012).

⁵³ A major continuity that I noted earlier in Chapter 3 based on Papadopoulos (1989) was the continuity of the “political families” of the Right, Center, and Left in pre and post-1974 Greece. However as the analysis on the Greece case indicated, the division of post-1974 Greek politics in these lines was essentially different from the pre-dictatorship period.

Figure 8: Regime Trends in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1945-2010



Source: Polity IV Country Reports 2010: Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina

As the figures above indicate, the Polity score⁵⁴ of Greece during the 1950s and the 1960s, i.e. until the 1967 coup d’état has been at the same levels with the Polity score of Bosnia-Herzegovina since its establishment in 1992.

The similar levels of the “democracy scores” of Greece and Bosnia in the immediate postwar years reveal several clues for the comparative analysis on these cases. First of all, a close examination of these initial postwar years indicates that intergroup political and social

⁵⁴ The “Polity Score” captures a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed “anocracies”) to fully institutionalized democracies. The score ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) on a 21-scale spectrum.

relations have been structured in similar ways in Greece and Bosnia. During the 1950s and 1960s Greek politics went through an unstable period of democratization with frequent electoral races and unsuccessful attempts of government formation. One major characteristic of the Greek democracy in these years has been the persistence of divisions between the Greek Right and Left. These divisions have been enhanced by the discriminatory practices against the part of the society that was inclined to the Leftist ideology and the legal banning of the Leftist party KKE from the political arena. Additionally, the design of the political system in a way that aimed to eliminate any chance of the Left or Left-of-the-Center parties to have electoral success has been both a main source and indicator of the Right-Left gap. Similar to Greece, postwar democratization in Bosnia has been marked by the persistence of war-time divisions and political competition in Bosnia today is still based on ethno-nationalist ties. While in Bosnia the exclusion of any ethno-nationalist group from the political arena is not the case⁵⁵, the functioning of the Bosnian democracy is widely conditioned to external engagement. Democracy in Bosnia today continues to be controlled by external actors that initiated its establishment.

The level of external engagement in the Bosnian democracy is one major factor that differentiates the Greek democratization from the Bosnian with reference to the initial postwar years. The importance of external engagement in Bosnia lies in the form that democracy has taken in Bosnia today. Due to extended international control the Bosnian democracy today has been named as “controlled democracy” where national actors are

⁵⁵ Indeed the political system of postwar Bosnia was formulated in such a way that any ethnic group does not feel marginalized. The consociational structure that was established after 1995 was based on the principle of equal representation of each ethno-nationalist group. For more information see Bose (2002).

systematically controlled by international ones (primarily the EU and the OHR) (Bojkov 2003).

On the other hand, as Figure 1 shows, with the dissolution of the dictatorship and the restoration of democracy Greece entered the process of democratic consolidation. The consolidation of democracy in Greece is accepted to have been fully achieved with the electoral race of 1981 and the advent of PASOK as the victorious party. The end of the postwar domination of the Greek Right and the electoral success of a center-of-the Left party indicated that democracy was fully established. Considering that the Bosnian democratization process is still ongoing and that Greece achieved the consolidation of its democracy within thirty years since the end of its civil war in 1949, it is apparent that more time is needed in order to have a complete overview of postwar democratization in Bosnia. However, the comparison between the Greek and Bosnian postwar democratization and reconciliation processes will not be a fruitless effort. I contend that such an investigation will provide deep insights for the future of the reconciliation process in Bosnia.

5.2.2 POSTWAR RECONCILIATION

Parallel to the comparative analysis of postwar democratization in Greece and Bosnia, for the analysis of the reconciliation process in the two countries I also distinguish between the pre- and post-dictatorship periods in the Greek case. This is because reconciliation in Greece was only achieved after the end of the authoritarian rule in 1974. The common

patterns in the postwar democratization processes of the two countries are observed also with regards to the process of reconciliation.

The initial postwar years in Greece after the end of the civil war in 1949 were marked by the persistence of wartime divisions. As was extensively analyzed in the third chapter, the main characteristics of postwar Greek politics until 1967 were the domination of the victorious Right in the Greek political arena and the systematic exclusion of the far Left from politics. Similar to Greece, in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina the political arena is dominated by the ethnic divisions that formed the basis of the 1992-1995 conflict. Contrary to Greece, in postwar Bosnia none of the ethno-nationalist groups is excluded from politics; indeed the postwar political system has been designed so that each ethnic group has equal power in the political arena. However, political reconciliation in terms of cross-ethnic dialogue and in terms of cross-ethnic voting and vote-seeking has not been realized.

Greece achieved national reconciliation in the post-1974 period. The restoration of democracy as an internal dynamic of the Greek society paved the way for the inclusion of the previously excluded Left and the move towards a moderate political competition with the establishment of two major parties, the PASOK and the ND. The restoration of democracy allowed for high levels of internal legitimacy as democracy was seen as the single most legitimate type of government after the seven-year authoritarian rule. Additionally, the restoration of democracy opened the room for national unity and reconciliation between the previously opposing fractions of the Greek Right and Left. National unity was further enhanced with the bid to become a member of the EU with the aim to overcome the economic drawbacks of the post-dictatorship period and to become a developed European country.

This brief summary of the postwar democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia reveals important clues about the democratization-reconciliation puzzle. Considering that reconciliation in Greece was only achieved after the restoration of democracy after 1974, the analysis of the Greek democratization process after 1974 is essential in order to capture how democracy may root for reconciliation. As it was the case with Greece in 1950s and 1960s, Bosnian political life today reflects the war-time divisions based on ethnicity. On the other hand, contrary to post-1974 Greece, Bosnia today lacks a sense of national unity despite being in the process of membership to the EU. In order to unravel the specific dynamics that enabled national unity and reconciliation in Greece after the 1970s contrary to Bosnia today, in the next part I proceed to the analysis of each issue that I proposed in the theoretical framework. Through this analysis my aim is to unravel the factors that have led to the establishment of national unity and reconciliation in Greece through democracy and to investigate the prospects that democratization in Bosnia will pave the way for intergroup reconciliation in the future.

5.3 ANALYZING THE ISSUES

The comparative analysis that I provide in this chapter is based on the three issues that compose the theoretical framework of this study, namely the issue of international engagement, the issue of internal legitimacy, and the issue of postwar economy. In the previous chapters I analyzed extensively each case based on each of these three issues in order to understand the paths that Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed (or, continue to follow in the case of Bosnia) in terms of postwar democratization and reconciliation. The analyses on

each case indicated that each of these issues had a multidimensional impact on how democratization and reconciliation proceeded. Here my aim is to unravel the impact of these issues on the reconciliation-democratization puzzle in Greece and Bosnia. Through a comparative analysis of each issue, I seek to understand why democratization in Greece paved the way for political reconciliation, while in Bosnia this is still not the case.

5.3.1 THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The Greek and the Bosnian postwar processes differ mainly in terms of the level of foreign engagement to these processes. While in Greece international engagement took the form of a more indirect engagement through the policies of the United States on the one hand and the EC membership process on the other, the engagement of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina took the shape of direct engagement in the post-conflict reconstruction process. International involvement in Bosnia was realized through the establishment of an international governing body (OHR) and the gradual expansion of EU governing powers since the 2000s. Contrary to the internally-driven character of democratization and reconciliation in Greece, the Bosnian postwar democratization process as part of the broader reconstruction of the country has been essentially externally-driven.

The analysis made in previous chapters on the issue of international engagement in the two cases indicated that international engagement had a multidimensional impact on the post-war reconciliation and democratization processes in the two countries. More specifically, in the pre-dictatorship period international engagement to the Greek postwar processes has

remained low. While it can be accepted that the Cold War context and the divisions in the international arena should have impacted on intergroup relations in Greece, intergroup divisions were mainly enhanced through internal mechanisms of suppression of the Greek Left (*fakeloma* and the legal banning of the KKE). For the post-1974 period, international influence in Greece on the postwar and post-dictatorship period has been linked to the EC through the membership process. In this period, the bid to enter the EC and to become a developed European country enabled the national unity project that Karamanlis introduced after the dissolution of the Junta.

In Bosnia on the other hand, the major role that the international community assumed after the end of the civil war has been catalytic for the establishment of what is called “controlled democracy” (Bojkov 2003) where external actors possess increased control powers over how democratic governance proceeds. The increased level of international influence and control in Bosnia has hindered the Bosnian ownership of the postwar reconstruction process. It is generally accepted that while procedural democracy has been established in Bosnia through the international efforts to institutionalize democracy, this has been limited to a controlled form of democracy where national actors are controlled by international ones within the democratic governance structure (Bojkov 2003).

The impact of the EC/EU as a major common actor in both countries deserves special attention. In Greece, the membership process to the EC affected positively the national unity project that Karamanlis put forward during his premiership after the Colonels’ dictatorship. On the contrary, the increasing influence of the EU in Bosnia through both the membership process and the extensive powers that the EU acquired since the 2000s has obstructed the

establishment of a sense of national unity as was the case with Greece. Furthermore, the EU ownership of the state-building process since the last two decades and more generally, the fact that the powers and the authority of the post-Dayton Bosnian state have been assumed by external actors, have undermined the prospects for unity and legitimacy of the Bosnian state in the eyes of all three ethnic communities (Chandler 2005).

Table 1: International Influence in Postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Terms of Democratization and Reconciliation

	Greece	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Overview	Limited international influence in the immediate postwar years. After the dictatorship, external influence by the EC through the membership process	International design of the post-Dayton Bosnian state. Highly externally-driven post-conflict reconstruction process
Democratization	Positive impact of EU membership. However, democratization was an internal dynamic of the Greek society, transition to <i>metapolitefsi</i> was an internally-driven process	“Democratization from above” and “Controlled democracy”. International presence enabled the establishment of democratic institutions and processes (e.g. elections)
Reconciliation	National unity and reconciliation partly the result of the bid to enter the EU	The move “From Dayton to Europe” (Chandler 2005) inhibited the establishment of a sense of national unity and reconciliation

The table above shows in summary the diversification between the level and essence of international engagement in Greece and Bosnia comparatively. This diversification reveals the contradiction between the internally-driven democratization and reconciliation in Greece as opposed to the externally-driven transition to democracy in Bosnia.

Overall, the above analysis revealed the importance of the level and quality of international influence/engagement on the democratization-reconciliation puzzle that surrounds the two cases. The fact that the restoration of democracy was an internal dynamic of the Greek society opened the room for the establishment of a sense of national unity and the reconciliation process that took place in late 1970s and early 1980s. On the contrary, the externally-driven character of democratization in Bosnia and the extensive control role that international actors assumed within this process prohibited the emergence of a sense of national unity that would cross-cut ethnic divisions.

The internal divisions in Bosnia over ethnic lines have been further enhanced as a result of the contested legitimacy of the international presence in the country. In the next part I comparatively analyze the issue of internal legitimacy in postwar Greece and Bosnia in terms of how it affected the democratization and reconciliation processes in the two countries.

5.3.2 THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL LEGITIMACY

The issue of internal legitimacy encompasses various aspects of the postwar phase in both countries. In Greece, internal legitimacy was not achieved until the post-dictatorship period and the transition to a fully functioning democratic regime. The 1950s and 1960s have

been marked by problems of legitimacy which were the result of the systematic exclusion of part of the society which was inclined to the Leftist ideology. This situation changed with the restoration of democracy after the dissolution of the authoritarian regime. The post-1974 period in Greece has been accepted as the most legitimate period of Greek politics due to the commonly agreed-upon restoration of democracy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand legitimacy has been closely linked to the international design of the country in the post-1995 period. Bosnia today is characterized by low levels of internal legitimacy due to the international design of the country and the international governing body that has been established since 1995.

Internal legitimacy in Greece has been restored with the transition to a fully functioning democracy after the dissolution of the Colonels' dictatorship in 1974. The high level of internal legitimacy of the restoration of democracy in post-1974 Greece was the result of the general bid to become a democratic country after the seven-year authoritarian rule. Therefore in Greece, the achievement of postwar internal legitimacy was the result of the democratization process and more specifically it was the restoration of democracy as the commonly agreed-upon legitimate regime that led to internal cohesion in terms of legitimacy. In Bosnia on the other hand, the democratization process of the post-1995 period has not led to internal legitimacy of the Bosnian state. Legitimacy in Bosnia has been undermined both by the ethno-territorial design of the postwar Bosnian state and by the unaccountable and unrepresentative character of the international presence in the country through the OHR. Recent opinion surveys on the issue of legitimacy in Bosnia indicate that the international

administration lacks internal legitimacy in the eyes of the Bosnian society⁵⁶. Similarly, the composition of the country of two separate entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, reflects the war-time ethnic cleansing against the non-Serb part of the population. The design of the country reflecting the ethnic cleansing of the civil war years form the second major source of contested legitimacy from the viewpoint of a specific part of the population, the non-Serbs.

Internal legitimacy has had a catalytic impact on the postwar reconciliation process in the two cases. The uncontested legitimacy of the democratic regime after 1974 and the inclusion of the far Left to the democratization process enabled the process of reconciliation that was initiated as part of the national unity project after 1974. With the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the restoration of democracy, the Greek society coalesced around the bid for national unity in order to overcome the divisions emanating from the civil war years and in order to become a developed country with prospects for integration with European structures such as the EC. In Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand, the contested legitimacy of the state as composed of two entities on ethno-territorial basis and the contested legitimacy of the international presence of the country which assumed extensive governing tasks has undermined the process of interethnic political dialogue and compromise. The table below provides a summary of how internal legitimacy proceeded in postwar Greece and Bosnia with relation to democratization and reconciliation.

⁵⁶ These surveys are the IDEA (2002) and the UNDP survey (2005) that I referred to in Chapter 4.

Table 2: Internal Legitimacy in Postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Terms of Democratization and Reconciliation

	Greece	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Overview	Pre-1967 problems of legitimacy <i>Metapolitefsi</i> by far the most legitimate period in Greek politics	Contested legitimacy of the international presence, problems of accountability and representativeness
Democratization	Post-1974 legitimacy was the result of the restoration of democracy and enabled democratic consolidation, democracy was accepted as the single most legitimate type of government	The unrepresentative and unaccountable character of the OHR damaged the democratization process
Reconciliation	The commonly agreed-upon transition to <i>metapolitefsi</i> and the democratization process with the inclusion the far Left to politics paved the way for reconciliation	Problems of legitimacy inhibited interethnic reconciliation, unwillingness of the opposing parties to promote dialogue

Overall, the issue of internal legitimacy in postwar Greece and Bosnia had a catalytic impact on how democratization and reconciliation proceeded. In Greece the high levels of internal legitimacy in the post-1974 period was the result of the restoration of democracy and paved the way for the reconciliation process. The fact that internal legitimacy in Greece was achieved as a result of the restoration of democracy after the end of the dictatorship indicates that the issue of legitimacy in the Greek case does not explain why the democratization process in Greece paved the way for reconciliation in Greece as opposed to Bosnia-

Herzegovina⁵⁷. The only argument to be made regarding internal legitimacy in post-1974 Greece is that the high levels of legitimacy is closely associated with the internal character of the democratization process in this period. On the other hand, in Bosnia the unaccountable and unrepresentative character of the OHR undermined both the legitimacy of the international body and the democratization process in general. Accordingly, the contested internal legitimacy of the Bosnian state and the international presence in the country has suspended the move towards national unity and reconciliation.

The above analysis revealed that the issue of internal legitimacy in both cases has been closely linked to the issue of international engagement in the postwar processes. In Greece, the fact that the restoration of democracy was an internally-driven process has impacted positively on how the Greek society perceived the new regime. In Bosnia on the other hand, the externally-driven character of the postwar process was essential in determining the low levels of internal legitimacy. As discussed above, the unrepresentative and unaccountable character of the OHR has undermined both the reconciliation and the democratization processes in Bosnia.


5.3.3 THE ISSUE OF POSTWAR ECONOMY

Postwar economy in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed different patterns. In Greece, the postwar economic performance has been highly diversified in the pre- and post-

⁵⁷ Throughout the analysis on the Greek case I accepted that postwar internal legitimacy was achieved in the post-1974 period based on the previous scholarly research that commonly argue that internal legitimacy was low in the pre-dictatorship period and was restored in the post-1974 period (Papadopoulos 1989; Danopoulos 1983; Clogg 1987; Kioukias 1993; Nicolacopoulos 2010). Concrete data on internal legitimacy in Greece (such as opinion poll surveys) is missing for both periods.

dictatorship period. The pre-dictatorship period has been marked by unprecedented levels of economic performance and growth, while the post-dictatorship years have seen serious economic drawbacks emanating from the externally-supported growth of the previous decades. Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand has been marked by continuous economic drawbacks while its economic performance today is still behind its prewar levels. One main characteristic of postwar economy in Bosnia since the 2000s has been its link to the membership process to the EU. The figure below gives a comparative overview of the postwar economic development in Greece and Bosnia in terms of GDP per capita changes during the years 1960-2011. The figure reveals the different paths that the two countries followed in terms of economic development after the end of the respective civil wars.

Figure 9: GDP per Capita (Constant 2000 US Dollars), Greece and Bosnia Herzegovina, 1960-2011



Source: World Bank


The impact of the postwar economy on the democratization process has been multidimensional in the two countries. In Greece, the economic prosperity of the 1950s and the 1960s prepared the ground for the political mobilization of the post-1974 period (Nicolacopoulos 2000). The post-1974 economic drawbacks on the other hand increased the bid to become a member of the EEC in order to overcome the malfunctioning in the economic domain (Pappas 1999). In the Bosnian case, postwar economic performance and the democratization process especially since the 2000s has been linked to each other through the conditionality policy of the EU. More specifically, the conditionality policy of the EU in the

political domain has been linked to the economic domain as foreign aid has been conditioned to the fulfillment of the democratization criteria such as multiparty elections and liberal market reforms (Friedman 2004).

In terms of reconciliation, the poor economic performance in post-dictatorship Greece functioned as a tool for cementing the divisions between the Right and Left through the membership to the EC. The Greek society coalesced around the bid to enter the EC in order to overcome the economic problems of the 1970s and to become a developed European state (Lavdas 1997). On the other hand in Bosnia, the persistence of war-time economic structures such as clandestine economy and criminal networks in post-civil war period has underlined the importance of ethnicity as a means of economic power. This has undermined the reconciliation process as ethnic divisions have become more concrete.

With regards to market institutionalization, the two countries present highly different levels of market institutionalization in the postwar periods. While data for post-2000 is missing and the data covers only the initial five years after the end of the civil war in Bosnia, the figure below indicates the wide difference in terms of market institutionalization in the two countries. The figure shows that even in the 1960s Greece had a far greater level of market institutionalization than Bosnia in the late 1990s. One argument to be made based on these data and the economic norms theory is that the increased levels of market institutionalization in Greece opened the room for the flourishing of universal norms such as freedom and democratic governance. Therefore in Greece, the high levels of market institutionalization and the expansion of contract-intensive economy opened the room for the democratization and the democratic consolidation process in the postwar years.

Figure 10: Market Institutionalization in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1960-2000



Source: Economic Norms Data (provided by Michael Mousseau)

Table 3: Postwar Economy in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Terms of Democratization and Reconciliation

	Greece	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Overview	1950s and 1960s extensive economic assistance and economic growth. Post-1974 economic drawbacks	Postwar economic performance still behind prewar levels. Persistence of wartime clandestine economy and criminal networks
Democratization	The economic prosperity of the 1960s opened the room for the democratic consolidation process in the post-1974 period. The economic drawbacks of post-1974 increased the bid for EU entrance and democratization	Poor postwar economic performance impacts negatively on the democratization process, better performance of the economy is needed in order to move on to the consolidation of the Bosnian democracy in the future
Reconciliation	Economic drawbacks of the post-1974 period functioned as political tools cementing the divisions between Left and Right. The opposing fractions coalesced around the bid to overcome economic malfunctioning through EU membership	The persistence of wartime economic structures which were based on ethno-nationalist networks underlined the importance of ethnicity as a means of economic power. This had a negative impact on reconciliation

As a general picture of postwar economic aspects of Greece and Bosnia, the above analysis indicates that postwar economic aspects have functioned differently in the two countries. In Greece the economic drawbacks of the 1970s and 1980s were combined with the bid of the political leadership to re-establish democratic structures and enter the EC. Within this period of economic stagnation the political leadership of Karamanlis has sought to preserve national unity through restoring economic prosperity, re-starting the process of

democratization, and reconciling the previously divided fractions of far Right and Left. Therefore, reconciliation in post-dictatorship Greece has been achieved within the context of economic drawbacks and these drawbacks have functioned as a force for stirring the desire to become a EEC member. On the other hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, economic aid and performance have been linked to the process of democratization through the membership process to the European Union. More specifically, economic reconstruction especially since the 2000s has been conditioned to the democratization process on the road to become an EU member. On the other hand, building on the economic well-being- democracy link, one argument to be made for Bosnia is that the low economic performance since the end of the civil war impacts negatively on the democratization process in the country. While this is only a tentative argument, it is based on the observation that well-functioning and developed economies are all democracies while poor countries are mostly observed to be governed by principles other than democracy (see for example (Przeworski et al. 1996 and Przeworski 2004). Additionally, postwar economic performance has remained behind its prewar levels while in many aspects economic structures have been combined with ethno-nationalist patterns. This has undermined especially the reconciliation process, as it has perpetuated wartime economic structures which were based on ethnicity.

5.4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

While the comparative analysis of this chapter revealed the importance of the issue of international engagement for the democratization-reconciliation puzzle, I contend that several alternative explanations need to be considered before reaching a tentative conclusion on the

democratization-reconciliation puzzle that characterizes the two cases. These alternative explanations include the issue of ethnicity; the issue of prior experience with democracy; the issue of postwar time; the issue of external conflict (with reference to the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus in the Greek case); the issue of postwar territorial arrangements; and finally, the issue of clear victory after civil war. The table below gives in summary the alternative explanations:

Table 4: Alternative Explanations

	Greece	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Prior experience with democracy	Parliamentary democracy in Greece dates back to the first half of the 19 th century	As a former Yugoslav Republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina was under authoritarian communist during the whole 20 th century until its establishment in early 1990s.
The essence of inter-group divisions/ Ethnicity	Inter-group divisions based on ideology-the main division was between Rightists and Leftists/communists as opposing ideological camps	Intergroup divisions based on ethnicity- the Croats, the Bosniacs, and the Serbs as the three ethno-nationalist fractions of the country
Postwar time	Reconciliation achieved in early 1980s, i.e. 30 years after the end of the civil war in 1949	The civil war ended in 1995- more time needed so as to reach a tentative conclusion about reconciliation
External conflict	The conflict over Cyprus with Turkey in 1974-	Absence of external conflict in post-civil war period
Postwar territorial arrangements	Absence of territorial arrangements in the post-conflict period	Post-civil war territorial arrangements based on ethnicity- the Bosnian state composed of two distinct

		entities based on ethnicity
Civil war outcome	Clear victory in the end of the civil conflict- victorious Right dominated immediate postwar years	No clear victory- the war ended with international intervention and postwar arrangements were based on power-sharing and consociationalism

In the introductory part of this study I introduced previous experience with democracy and the ethnic vs. ideological character of the civil wars as two major differentiating aspects of the Greek and the Bosnian cases. These two aspects are useful as alternative explanations for the question of why reconciliation was achieved in Greece as a result of the intense post-1974 democratization process while in Bosnia it has not been achieved yet. First of all, the fact that Greece had prior experience with parliamentary democracy (since the foundation of the country in 1830s) may be seen as an explanation for why democracy in Greece opened the room for intergroup reconciliation. The existence of a tradition of parliamentary democracy enabled the democratization process both in the immediate aftermath of the civil war and its restoration after the authoritarian rule. Both in the aftermath of the civil conflict and in post-dictatorship period, democratization was launched as an internal process with no direct external involvement. Contrary to Greece, Bosnia lacked previous experience with democracy⁵⁸ and the postwar democratization process was initiated by the international actors that assumed the task of establishing democratic institutions and processes in the country. The

⁵⁸ The first experience with multiparty elections in Bosnia and the other Yugoslav Republics took place with the electoral races in early 1990s. In Bosnia, the ethno-nationalist parties that were established in the short period between the Yugoslav dissolution and the first democratic elections were those fractions that initiated the civil conflict in 1992.

absence of a previous democratic tradition can be accepted as a factor that determined the “controlled” form of democracy that was established in the country in the post-1995 period.

Another aspect of differentiation that was not explicitly mentioned in the previous parts of this study is the issue of postwar time. Considering that in Greece reconciliation was achieved almost thirty years after the end of the civil war and that for Bosnia it has only been merely 17 years since the war ended in 1995, more time is needed in order to have a complete picture of postwar democratization and reconciliation in Bosnia and provide a more correct comparative analysis of the two cases. The issue of postwar time may serve as an alternative explanation since it can be argued that in Greece, reconciliation was achieved because three decades after the end of the civil war, in the 1980s, war-time divisions had lost their relevance for the Greek society. On the other hand, war-time divisions in Bosnia are still relevant and the memories of war-time violence and atrocities are still alive.

A further issue that differentiates postwar Greece from Bosnia is the existence of an external conflict within the Greek postwar period. As I noted previously, the dissolution of the Greek Junta was closely related to the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict with the Turkish invasion to the island in 1974. I also noted previously that this created national unity within the Greek society that coalesced around the desire for the dissolution of the Junta that was seen as responsible for the Cyprus defeat. Therefore, it can be accepted that for the Greek case, the existence of an external dispute functioned as a force behind the post-1974 reconciliation process between the Rightist and the Leftist fractions.

Postwar territorial arrangements may be accepted as another issue that explains the lack of reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The composition of Bosnia of two distinct

entities (the Federation of Bosnia and the Republika Srpska) and the subdivision of the federation to ten cantons on ethno-territorial basis underlined ethnicity as the divisive factor among the ethno-nationalist groups of the country. I contend that ethno-territorial arrangements consolidated intergroup divisions and therefore impacted negatively on the reconciliation process which by definition requires the transformation of intergroup relationships through dialogue and compromise. Contrary to Bosnia, in Greece any territorial arrangement was not the case after the civil war. Greece remained a unitary state with no claims on territorial division of the country based on ideological divisions.

Lastly, the outcome of the civil wars in the two countries can be accepted as an alternative explanation. In Greece the civil war ended with the clear victory of the Greek Right over the Left. However, in Bosnia the civil war ended through international engagement and with no clear victor. The absence of a clear victor and the fact that the war in Bosnia ended with international involvement and subsequent power-sharing arrangements can be accepted as a factor that preserved the divisive lines among the three ethno-nationalist groups of the country.

While all the above factors can be considered as having defined the question of why in Greece reconciliation was achieved as a result of the postwar democratization process while in Bosnia this has not been the case, I contend that the most important aspect of the analysis made in this study is the issue of postwar time. Since the Bosnian reconstruction process including democratization is still ongoing, I contend that more time is needed so as to reach a comprehensive conclusion about the comparative analysis made in this study. However, the model established in this study and the analysis made based on this model which encompasses

three major aspects of postwar reconstruction processes, namely the issue of external engagement, the issue of internal legitimacy, and the issue of postwar economy, provide valuable insights for the question of why in some countries democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis made in this chapter aimed at providing a deep investigation of the democratization-reconciliation puzzle in post-conflict Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on the theoretical framework and the extensive analyses of each case in previous chapters, this chapter firstly overviewed the democratization and reconciliation processes in the two cases. Then it focused on the issue of international influence, the issue of internal legitimacy, and the issue postwar economy in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina from a comparative perspective. This comparative analysis provided deep insights for the research question that guided this study thus far.

The above analysis revealed the importance of the issue of international engagement/influence for the democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Being one of the major factors differentiating the two cases, the level and essence of the engagement of international actors to the postwar processes in the two countries has been catalytic in terms of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded. The low levels of direct international engagement in the Greek postwar and post-dictatorship period opened the room for a democratization process which was essentially internally-driven.

Both the restoration of democracy and the subsequent project of national unity were the result of the internal dynamic of the Greek society. On the contrary, the Bosnian transition to democracy was driven by external actors that assumed extensive role and power in the government of the country. The increased level of external engagement prohibited the establishment of a sense of national unity which would lead to political moderation through cross-ethnic vote-seeking and voting.

More specifically, in Greece, the restoration of democracy after 1974 has been mainly an internally-driven process and the impact of external actors and mainly the EC has been indirect. The fact that the process of democratization has been an internal dynamic of the Greek society enabled the establishment of the national unity project that formed the basis of political reconciliation between the Greek Left and Right. The low levels of international engagement have also been interlinked with the issue of internal legitimacy and the issue of postwar economy. Internal legitimacy in Greece in the post-1974 period has been the result of the restoration of democracy as an internal dynamic of Greek politics. The fact that democracy was viewed as the single most legitimate type of government after the dissolution of the authoritarian rule has been another factor that contributed to the attainment of Left-Right reconciliation. Postwar economic stagnation on the other hand has been closely associated with the bid to become member of the EC. With the advent of post-1974 economic problems, the Greek Right and Left coalesced around the bid to become a developed European country.

The issue of international engagement in Bosnia on the other hand has been a more straightforward issue that affected the democratization and reconciliation processes. The

international community in Bosnia has assumed extensive reconstruction tasks and governing powers. Within this context democracy in Bosnia has taken the form of “controlled democracy” (Bojkov 2003) which inhibits the Bosnian ownership of the democratization process, as it means continuous control over the functioning of democracy by outside actors. The establishment of a “controlled democracy” undermined the reconciliation process as there has been little incentive for politicians to promote interethnic dialogue and compromise. Additionally, the gradual transmission of the Dayton powers to the EU has inhibited the Bosnian ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process in broader terms (Chandler 2005). Furthermore, the international character of the Bosnian reconstruction process has also been closely associated with the issue of internal legitimacy and postwar economy. The unaccountable and unrepresentative character of the international governing body in the country and the design of the state as composed of ethno-territorial entities have led to low levels of internal legitimacy in today’s Bosnia. In the economic domain, economic aid has been gradually conditioned to the fulfillment of the membership criteria to the EU. Within this context, the economic domain has become closely associated with conformity to international structures.

All in all, the comparison between Greek and Bosnian postwar reconciliation processes revealed the importance of international engagement in these processes. However, this comparison forms a preliminary attempt to unravel the relationship between democratization and reconciliation and it is only a limited effort to understand how these processes proceed in postwar contexts. Future research on different cases with focus on

different aspects of these processes is essential so that a more complete picture of post-conflict democratization and reconciliation can be obtained.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study has been an initial attempt to investigate the link between postwar democratization and reconciliation as two central processes on the road to the establishment of sustainable peace in societies emerging out of violent conflict. The main point of departure of this study has been the puzzle that exists between postwar democratization and reconciliation processes: while previous scholarly research has pointed to diverse opinions on whether democratization leads to reconciliation or whether reconciliation is the wider process that encapsulates democratization, previous empirical examples have also revealed diverse insights on the democratization-reconciliation relationship in post-conflict contexts. Based on this observation and with the aim to provide a perspective that connects post-conflict democratization and reconciliation processes to each other, this study has been mainly interested in answering the question of why in some countries postwar democratization leads to reconciliation while in others it does not..

With the aim of answering the research question at hand, in this study I conceptualized democratization as the process through which democratic institutions (such as political parties and party-competition) and processes (such as elections) are established in the aftermath of conflict. The concept of democratization in this study encapsulated also the establishment of democratic procedures in the aftermath of authoritarian rule. As a second main concept of this

study, reconciliation was conceptualized as the broad societal and political process that involves the change of destructive attitudes into constructive relationships. Throughout the study I used the concept of post-conflict reconciliation with reference to the inter-communal level (as opposed to the individual level) and more specifically to political reconciliation, i.e. the establishment of intergroup dialogue and the moderation of attitudes in political terms. Based on this conceptualization of the two central concepts and with the aim of investigating their relationship, I adopted a theoretical framework that is composed of three main issues that are accepted to be of utmost importance in post-conflict contexts: the issue of international influence/external engagement; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economic development and reconstruction.

In this study I attempted to investigate the research question at hand based on two cases: the case of postwar Greece after the divisive civil war of 1946-1949 and the case of postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina after the ethno-nationalist civil war of 1992-1995. These two cases revealed diverse insights regarding their postwar democratization and reconciliation processes: while in Greece reconciliation was achieved as a result of the post-1974 democratization process, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the democratization process that has been initiated by the international community since 1995 has not paved the way for intergroup reconciliation in social and political terms. These two cases were analyzed firstly separately and then comparatively in order to provide an answer to the question of how and under what circumstances is democratization likely to lead to reconciliation in post-civil war contexts. One initial concern of this study was to clarify the strengths and limitations of engaging in a comparative study of these two cases that do not seem to be comparable at a first glance. In

order to avoid any criticisms on case selection, this study clarified the diverging aspects of the two cases which were related to previous experience with democracy; to the character of the civil war and the essence of intergroup divisions; and to the level of international engagement in postwar processes. After providing these limitations, the common grounds were introduced. These common grounds were related to the persistence of wartime divisions in the postwar period; the existence of a nationalist rhetoric as a defining aspect of intergroup divisions; and the integration process with European structures that marked the postwar periods in both countries.

The extensive analysis on the historical background of each case and the analysis of each case's postwar democratization and reconciliation processes based on the theoretical framework introduced previously provided fertile ground for the comparative analysis that I conducted in the last part of this study. The analysis made for both cases revealed that each of the three issues that compose the theoretical framework had a multidimensional impact on how the democratization and reconciliation processes proceeded. However, while both the issues of internal legitimacy and the issue of postwar economic development and reconstruction were important in order to capture how the postwar phases in each country proceeded, the comparative analysis of the cases revealed the centrality of the issue of international influence/external engagement in terms of explaining why reconciliation was achieved in Greece in the post-1974 period (as opposed to the pre-1967 period) while in Bosnia this is still not the case.

More specifically, the reconciliation of the Greek Left and Right as a result of the post-1974 democratization process was closely associated with the level and essence of

international engagement in Greece. In the analysis of the Greek case I distinguished between the pre- and post-dictatorship periods, i.e. pre-1967 and post-1974. This distinction was necessary because the two periods in Greece are highly diversified from each other both in terms of democratization and reconciliation. Democratization in the pre-dictatorial period was marked by frequent electoral races and unsuccessful attempts to government formation, intergroup divisions remained deep as a result of the exclusion of the far Left from the political arena and the broader discriminatory practices towards the part of the society that was inclined to the Leftist ideology. This period was characterized by low levels of internal legitimacy due to the discriminatory practices against the Leftist ideology. Additionally, this period was characterized by high levels of economic development which was conditioned on external aid and was highly dependent on Western prosperity.

With the end of the Colonels' dictatorship and the restoration of democracy, Greece entered a period of reconstruction which was far ahead the immediate post-civil war years during the 1950s and the 1960s. In the post-dictatorship period the level and the essence of international engagement in Greece changed. The restoration of democracy in 1974 was an internal dynamic of the Greek society and it was basically an internally-driven process. National reconciliation in Greece was achieved as a result of the national unity project that the Greek politician and transition manager Konstantin Karamanlis introduced in order to overcome the divisions emanating from the civil war years. Reconciliation in Greece is accepted that was fully achieved with the establishment of two moderate parties of the ND and PASOK that achieved unprecedented levels of electoral success. With the peaceful alteration of power by a socialist party (PASOK) in the 1981 elections, the wartime divisions

in Greece had totally lost credit. On the other hand, the general bid to become a member of the EC in order to overcome the economic problems that resurfaced with the dissolution of the dictatorship functioned as another factor that eliminated the divisions between the Left and the Right. The Greek society coalesced around the bid to become a developed European country both economically and politically. This was closely associated with the economic drawbacks that resurfaced after the dictatorship period. On the other hand, the commonly agreed-upon transition to democracy led to the establishment of a democratic regime that possessed unprecedented levels of internal legitimacy.

The analysis of post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed strong commonalities between the Greek case until the coup d'état of 1967 and the Bosnian case from 1995 until today. Similar to the immediate postwar years in Greece, postwar Bosnia is also marked by political competition that is based on the divisions that emanate from the civil war. In terms of democratization, postwar Bosnia is characterized by a controlled form of democracy where international actors control the national ones for the sake of stability and peace based on the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995. In terms of reconciliation, Bosnian politics today is structured around ethno-nationalist ties while political party competition both in terms of vote-seeking and voting remains conditioned to ethnic differences. This is closely related both to the international design of the country as composed of two entities and ten cantons on ethno-territorial basis and the control by the international community (through the EU especially since the 2000s) over democratic practices and the government of the country in general. The analysis of the Bosnian case indicated that the essence and level of engagement of the international community in postwar Bosnia has been catalytic for all

aspects of the Bosnian reconstruction process, including democratization and reconciliation, and both the issue of internal legitimacy and the issue of postwar economy have been closely related to the international aspects.

The conclusions to be drawn from the comparative analysis provided in this study are closely related to the level and essence of international engagement in post-conflict contexts. From the analysis of Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I reached the point that the establishment of political reconciliation as a result of the democratization process requires that an internal dynamic towards this direction is established. The fact that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the role of the international actors such as the EU since the 2000s has been expanding rather than shrinking, has obstructed the move towards the establishment of a sense of national unity as was the case with Greece in late 1970s. With the increasing role of the international community in terms of controlling the political practices in the country, there has not been a move towards the Bosnian ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process.

Future research with focus on different aspects of democratization and reconciliation will give a more complete picture of how democracy and reconciliation are interrelated in post-conflict contexts. One such aspect is the transitional justice mechanisms that are increasingly applied in post-conflict contexts since the last decades. A major differentiation between Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina is that contrary to Bosnia, within the Greek reconciliation process of the 1970s and 1980s transitional justice had not been a central issue. The fact that transitional justice in Bosnia both in retributive and restorative terms is a central aspect within the reconstruction process indicates that in Bosnia the forward-looking aspect of reconciliation is closely linked to its backward-looking counterpart. While the transitional

justice mechanisms have not been a focus point of this study, future research focusing on this aspect will provide further insights on the issue. Furthermore, future research on reconciliation that will focus on individual level will also reveal deeper insights on the side of reconciliation. The research on individual level would require a more anthropological approach which will investigate aspects of reconciliation such as forgiveness and healing. These aspects are closely linked to restorative justice mechanisms that have gained importance especially in African cases such as Rwanda and South Africa.

Overall, I believe that this study is a good starting point for further research on democratization and reconciliation in the future. While limited to a comparative case study of two cases, this study has attempted to provide a basis for further comparative research that will include other cases of post-conflict democratization and reconciliation. Further research on these processes will provide new perspectives on how a move from a divisive past to a commonly shared future may be achieved through democratic processes and institutions on the road to sustainable peace.

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