

Correlates of Anti-Americanism:

A Multilevel Analysis of PEW 2002 Survey Results

Cem BIROL, MA in International Relations

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The topic of Anti-Americanism has attracted an important number of researchers for a long time. We can, in this regard, find a variety of suggestions so as to why and since when anti-Americanism occupies a considerable place in scholar debates. Kroes argues that as long as there is a history of Americanization, there will be as much stress on anti-Americanism in a great deal of places in earth which one way or another had exposure to US existence (Kroes, 2006). Judt and Lacorne go even further and assert that anti-Americanism is as old as America itself (Judt & Lacorne, 2005). On the other hand, some scholars point to a more recent date as the beginning of anti-Americanism. Baxter and Akbarzadeh argue that, historically the uni-polar political system creates worries about the potential power usage of the dominant country. In that regard, they argue that the US emergence as the sole power broker creates the rise of the anti-American sentiment (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008). Zakaria suggests that anti-Americanism serves as filling the ideological gap upon the bipolar world of the Cold War years (Zakaria, 2004).

It was however not until the unfortunate 9/11 terrorist events that the discussions of anti-Americanism reached a new momentum. Especially, upon the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings, the American scholars and relevant authorities became more concerned about the question “why do they hate us?” (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Gienow-Hecht, 2006; Snyder, 2003) Many argued that the American image would not be the same as before. This is clearly pointed out by Krastev, who argues that the 20th Century was "the American Century" with its emphasis on capitalism and democracy. Yet, this dream faded away after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and 21st Century started as the "anti-American" century with an increasing global wave of anti-Americanism (Krastev, 2004).

Scholars also report recent survey analyses that indicate dramatic increases of public distrust toward the United States, in the first half of the 21st Century. Pollack reports, according to a Zogby poll conducted in July 2003 that negative Saudi opinions toward the United States increased from 51 percent to 70 percent during the Iraq occupation (Pollack, 2003). Using the results of a 2003 Roper study, Joseph Nye shows that in 30 countries, for the first time since 1998, people signaled that they are less likely to purchase Nike products or to consume fast-food products of McDonalds. At the same time, European and Japanese companies had higher popularity rates than before. However, the anti-American reactions were not limited to boycotting or giving up using the US products (Nye, 2004). Giacomo

Chiozza indicates that between 2002 and 2004, there was a dramatic increase in the amount of people who argued for a power equal to the US which would make the world safer (Chiozza, 2009). Additionally, belief in the myths about the United States actions seem have obtained an unprecedented pace lately. Kohut and Stokes indicate that in a March 2004 PEW survey, the majority of the people in seven out the nine countries surveyed, believed that the United States exploited the terror threat in order to control Middle East oil. A close percentage of respondents also believed that the US wanted to dominate the world (Kohut and Stokes, 2006). Mark Tessler reports that in a survey conducted among 337 Sunni and Shia Muslims in Beirut, 30% of the respondents justified the 9/11 attacks (Tessler, 2003).

Considering dramatic changes in the relevant cross-national public opinion comes for a need for a comprehensive definition of anti-Americanism. This is mainly because the instances in the previous paragraph are not completely identical expressions of manifest or discontent. Some people express their displeasure in relation to what the US actually executes as foreign policy. On the other hand, notwithstanding the absent relevant empirical evidence, some other people increasingly adhere to specific events which they identify with the US. In other words, people believe in the existence of the non-existent vicious actions of the United States. Hence, what we mean by anti-American should cover almost all the possible dynamics leading to hold a negative opinion toward the US.

There is a wide range of definitions about anti-Americanism. Keohane and Katzenstein consider anti-Americanism as “*a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general*” (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007a). Rubinstein and Smith argue that anti-Americanism may refer to hostility in terms of action or expression toward American society, culture, values and foreign policy. However, the components of anti-Americanism vary cross-culturally (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988). Hollander contributes to the definition of anti-Americanism by bringing up the dimension irrationality. He suggests that “*the concept of anti-Americanism implies more than a critical disposition: it refers to critiques which are less than fully rational and not necessarily well founded. It usually alludes to a predisposition, a free-floating hostility or aversion that feeds on many sources besides the discernible shortcomings of the United States*” (Hollander, 1995). Not significantly deviating from Hollander, Brendon O’Connor prefers to define anti-Americanism as a *prejudice*. Accordingly, a prejudice refers to some *ex ante* beliefs that the target object solely bears negative intentions. An opinion which is enmeshed with prejudice can therefore extend to exaggerations and conspiracy theories (O’Connor, 2007). Rubin and Rubin argue, considerably in line with O’Connor that anti-Americanism is not only rooted in

hatred toward the nature of the US or its deeds. They assert that anti-Americanism is a fear driven by the false belief that the United States will dominate the world and destroy people's way of life economically and culturally (Rubin and Rubin, 2004).

Contrary to O'Connor and Rubin and Rubin, Friedman disagrees with the definition that anti-Americanism is a form of prejudice when there is a combined resentment toward American society and values. This prejudiced resentment provokes the rejection of any US policy simply because it is American. Friedman underlines that such attitudes are exceptions throughout the world, and attributable to extreme people like Usama Bin Laden (Friedman, 2008). Mary Buckley discusses the difficulty of coming up with a coherent definition of anti-Americanism because of the ambiguity that the prefix "anti" causes. The term "anti" refers to some sort of a phobia entailing the inability to tolerate, to understand or to accept. However, even during the Soviet era, the leaders which were supposed to stand firmly against the American bloc were eager to know about American culture. Buckley reports that they even tuned to Voice of America to be informed about what was going on (Buckley, 2007).

Considering Buckley's and Friedman's points, it is questionable and difficult to find instances where full antagonism toward the US occurs. Thus, concluding that anti-Americanism is a form of prejudice might fall short on empirical relevance. Accordingly, I prefer a definition of the term that has a grasp on a wider range of issues and that is not limited with specific attributes such as prejudice. In this line, as I am going to rely on the general evaluation of the United States and Americans in order to designate anti-Americanism. Indeed, we can observe such a simplistic definition attempt among several scholars (Kohut & Stokes, 2006; Buckley, 2007). Henceforth, in the following chapters, I will elaborate more on the reason why a definition of anti-Americanism should remain the most simple possible.

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As I argued, a very general and simple definition of anti-Americanism can be helpful in analyzing which factors bear some influence on its variance. Considering the literature on anti-Americanism, we come across with two different ways of analyzing its correlates around the globe. The first way focuses on the impacts of the US foreign policies which, one way or another, bear empirical basis and which can be associated with the grievance of the people who are affected by these policies. The second way analyzes correlates of anti-Americanism other than the US foreign policies. As I will elaborate more throughout the analysis, it is these

correlates that make anti-Americanism a particular issue vis-à-vis other anti-country cases. Basically, anti-Americanism can be a result of cues that do not adequate empirical basis. Hence, the second way analyzes both at societal and individual level, what factors influence people's adherence to the cues about the US which render them more anti-American, yet which are not always related to what is most likely going on in the empirical world. In other words, the second way analyzes the adherence to myths about the US because of the reasons alternative to the US foreign policies.

The first way of correlates of anti-Americanism points out that people are anti-American because they are negatively affected by observable/documented US policies. The relevant literature offers a number of scholars who focus on the impacts of US foreign policies on anti-Americanism either with cases studies or survey results. For example, based on a Gallup Poll outcome, Nye reports that a significant amount of people in several countries reported that US foreign policies had negative effects on their attitudes toward the US (Nye, 2004). Tessler finds that, in the Middle East and Arab countries, people are not strongly against American society or its culture but American foreign policies. He also indicates additional empirical evidence from a Gallup Poll 2002 survey which again indicates greater consensus among Arab people against US foreign policies compared to other aspects of the United States such as culture and society (Tessler, 2003; 179-180).

Recently, the US foreign policies after 9/11 –that are assumed to be harmful to people around the world- are more and more subject to the discussion of anti-Americanism of the 21st Century. Ikenberry suggests that since 9/11, the US, unlike before, started to prioritize unilateralism and now seeks to secure a uni-polar world where there is no alternative power (Ikenberry, 2002). Although it is not very clear why US would pursue the goal of creating a uni-polar world, Ikenberry's rightful suggestion that the understanding of US foreign policy changed since 9/11 requires great reflection. Somewhat in line with Ikenberry, McMahon and Edeman also assert that the Bush administration focused on the War on Terror strategy and tended to incline toward a more national security approach for the sake of which it would launch pre-emptive wars. Additionally, even when the reasons for war were unclear, according to McMahon and Edeman, the Bush administration would anyway seek to launch a preemptive war (McMahon and Edeman, 2006).

Many scholars accordingly point out that anti-Americanism became a more apparent, more vocal and took greater place in local politics by 9/11. Michael O'Keefe explains the impacts of the new US foreign policy as: “...*unbridled nature of post-September 11, US interventionism has encouraged the development of a virulent strain of anti-American*

sentiment.” (O’Keefe, 2007) Hubert Vedrine, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1997 and 2002 argues that anti-Americanism increases when “the United States shocks or unnerves the world”. Accordingly, he suggests that these shocks can be exemplified with events like the Vietnam War, US support for military regimes in Latin America, and the recent Bush administration’s militaristic policies (Vedrine, 2004). Fabbrini asserts that anti-Americanism served as a part of the European elite identity since the foundation of the United States as an independent country. However, the post-9/11 US Foreign policies amplified anti-American voices by including not only European elites but also European masses. Additionally, European political parties started to position themselves by their anti-American discourse and social cleavages started to take place by, again anti-American sentiments. For example the author indicates that, in the September 2002 German elections, the SPD-Green coalition became incumbent because they had promised that they would not let Germany join the war in Iraq (Fabbrini, 2004). Yet, the impact of the Iraq war concerns not only Europe, but also the rest of the world (Griffiths, 2007). In fact, the electoral positioning vis-à-vis the US is not unique to Germany, but also exists in countries like Pakistan, Brazil and Spain (Zakaria, 2004).

The scholars focusing on the impacts of post-9/11 US foreign policies allocate substantial attention to the recent US presence in the Middle East region. Citing an Australian observer's conclusion, Nye argues that President Bush's actions in the Iraqi war brought a greater momentum to the frequency of anti-American terrorist recruitments (Nye, 2004). In line with Nye, Kohut and Stokes assert that the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in the aftermath of the 2003 occupation of Iraq jeopardized the credibility of the United States, since the claim that these weapons existed was the primary justification for US military action. The authors also suggest that the war amplified the discrepancy of the policy preferences among the US and the Western Europe. The impact on the Muslim world was much graver as it led to increase the support for terrorism (Kohut and Stokes, 2006).

Even though scholars continue to offer evidence for the impact of US Foreign policies on anti-Americanism, it should be particularly clear which policies are observable and which other policies are just myths that are born out of alternative reasons. Therefore, a study of the impacts of US foreign policies on anti-Americanism require a considerable understanding of the pillars of the US policies before and after World War II. As I will indicate in the coming chapters, the some of the claims about the US foreign policies fail to convey empirical evidence. Hence, by nature, belief in the myths of US foreign policies drags the research of

anti-Americanism into an inquiry of the relevant structural or individual socio-economic correlates

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Graph 1.1 illustrates that since approximately 2001, there has been a great leap in the trends of income per capita all over the world including the Arab countries¹. Indeed, such an increase in income per capita should also drag the discussions of anti-Americanism into a more economic dimension. It may not easily be a coincidence that 21st Century also begins with an aggregate increase in the levels of national wealth in line with anti-Americanism. Even though the impact of economic changes do not swiftly affect the socio-political changes (Inglehart, 1997), since the year 2001, we can observe an increasing slope for each income per capita curve. In addition, compared to the rest of the World, the Arab World enjoys an observable increase in income per capita after almost two decades of no or trivial changes in national wealth indicators. However, the rest of the world appears to enjoy a considerable national income per capita growth in the decades where the Arab World is predominantly stable. In other words, it is possible that there is a marginal change in the wealth indicators of the Arab countries. Therefore the preliminary circumstance we observe in Graph 1.1 may cast doubt on the monopoly of US foreign policy in explaining the changes on anti-Americanism.

[GRAPH 1.1 ABOUT HERE]

In this regard, an alternative approach consists of inquiries directed to the structural features of the anti-American countries such as economic development, modernization and all relevant social factors. Nonetheless, these explanations are less popular among scholars of anti-Americanism which rather prefer to underline the impact or the perception of the US Foreign policies. Ashley Lavelle suggests that under the shadow of Bush administration's policies and US foreign policy bias toward Israel, the more structural issues like global poverty fall short on influencing anti-Americanism (Lavelle, 2007). It is very hard to judge which factors affect anti-Americanism more strongly than other alternative factors. However, a distinction between documentable and imagined US foreign policy attributions remains

¹ Data is taken from World Bank Open Data (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD>). GNI Per Capita figures are with current US Dollars. World Bank dataset offers GNI per capita for Arab World and the overall World separately.

salient, since the adherence to the latter leaves room for the inquiry of more structural correlates such as economic development.

The main assumption in the inquiry of economic development is that specific economic conditions lead people to adhere to specific political attitudes for a variety of underlying reasons. A number of scholars analyze the deterministic power of economic development on political attitudes. In this regard, Ronald Inglehart's findings about the association between national economic development and the emergence of individual survival values serve as an empirical motivation for further inquiries. The main reason is that survival values tend to emerge from personal economic insecurity and correlate with illiberal attitudes such as low social trust, support for authoritarianism and fear/suspicion of outsiders (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart's motivating, yet a posteriori associations do not provide us with a sound framework enabling us to understand why economic conditions create specific political values

The literature on economic development additionally offers two alternative theories that shed greater light on why illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism are linked to a certain phase of economic development. The first is the concept of the Double Movement brought by Polanyi's famous book *The Great Transformation*. Accordingly, some societies form a reaction to the marketization movement because the marketization process is unnatural and renders human nature vulnerable to economic shocks (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). Another theory which accounts for a similar transition pattern is Mousseau's Economic Norms Theory. Economic Norms Theory (ENT) which serves as a tool to detect which phase of economic development creates a structural reason for illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism. Based on ENT, Mousseau accords a bitter form of anti-Americanism to the clash of a market based economic system and with a pre-market clientelist system which are short of contractual relations. In this regard, the worse-off leaders of the old clientelist systems use the promotion of illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism as a tool to protect their old prestigious societal status. Since patron-client relations are undermined by market values and norms driven by the rule of law, the patrons and clients seek to demonize the most available agent of the rule of law: The US (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mosseau, 2011). My work in this regard hypothesizes that economic development leading to aggressive clustering within the society, as means to protection against market development can create a structural framework for the insurgence of anti-Americanism, or a Double Movement.

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There are diverse and grave implications of anti-Americanism. The main question stems from the widely accepted decline of American legitimacy around the world. If the United States –as the global hegemonic power- significantly loses its legitimacy in the eyes of global public opinion, the international system it represents might face serious problems. In other words, for the sake of American soft power, the scholars may be compelled to analyze the correlates of anti-Americanism, and offer policy implications. For example Katzenstein and Keohane report their concerned about the risk that anti-Americanism can decrease the legitimacy and the confidence in the American soft power (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007a). Nye defines soft power as the ability of a country to acquire what it wishes not through coercive policies of sticks and carrots but through softer attraction. Such attractiveness roots from a country's cultural, political ideals and policies. As long as others consider the policies of a country as legitimate, soft power becomes stronger. When a country can make use of its soft power, it no longer is in the need for resorting to sticks and carrots to orient another country for its own goals. As Nye asserts that the United States needs cooperation in the international arena. It cannot bomb al Qaeda headquarters or cells in different countries, unlike al Qaeda which apparently can. Nye argues that the US -in addition to the usage of hard power -should rely also on its soft power. It should make its policies appear attractive to other countries. Nye emphasizes the salience of anti-Americanism which, according to him, has a deep effect on the accommodation of American soft power (Nye, 2004).

However, these suggestions tend to disregard the impact of US soft power which actually can serve for local political entrepreneurs to create something to stand against. In other words, US soft power can be the root of some problems leading to anti-Americanism. In this regard, the preservation of the US legitimacy but the impact of US culture can be a bigger concern for policy-makers that are interested in anti-Americanism. After all, we can question the interplay between approving the American culture and the American foreign policies aiming at creating greater freedom and justice throughout the world. In other words, the discussion of US soft power in anti-Americanism, though not completely, is still open to debate. In this regard, I argue that the trends in global cooperation with the US matter more, and the cultural factors of the US might not on themselves be sufficient to secure it.

We are thus compelled to inquire how anti-Americanism and cooperation with the US are related to each other. Datta suggests that when the public opinion in a country is unpleasant toward the US, its policy-makers are motivated by the incentive of distancing their stance from the US in international political institutions. He gives the example of the United

Nations (UN). In this case the country with a negative public opinion toward the US, may vote against the national interests of the US. In February 2003, accordingly, the US encountered resistance from other countries in the UN before the Iraqi invasion. Datta adds that, if a country is democratic, its policy-makers will not disregard the opinion of the citizens (Datta, 2009). In addition, Miroslav Nincic and Monti Narayan Datta offer some interesting results from the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey conducted in twenty-three countries. Accordingly, people see Europe as having a greater positive international influence vis-à-vis the United States. The US influence is predominantly considered as negative. Considering these findings, Nincic and Datta argue that in case of international policy discrepancies between Western Europe and the US, the former gain more international backing. This discrepancy according to the authors might make it difficult for western civilizations to pursue their common priorities such as free international trade and war on terror (Nincic and Datta, 2007). Although Nincic and Datta's analysis about the American influence should be reconsidered by US foreign policy-makers, is hard to claim that Europe as a whole is an immediate substitute for the United States. Forsberg argues that during the war on Iraq, Germany was unwilling to participate in the coalition forces, but not because its people were predominantly anti-American. He suggests that it was because perceiving itself as a leading state in the European region, Germany got frustrated because the officials in the US did not consult German officials before the Iraqi War. Nevertheless, Germany's decision to not to join the war was facilitated by the prevailing anti-Americanism among its people (Forsberg, 2005). Forsberg's point should concern us, especially in democratic countries. An anti-American public opinion, as in the case of Germany might serve as a legitimizing factor of anti-American policies of the democratic countries.

However, there seems to be no impending threat that increasing trends in anti-Americanism will jeopardize the United States' relations with its allies. Jhee conducts a study in South Korea regarding the impact of anti-Americanism in electoral evaluations. He reports that the recent increase in anti-Americanism does not tend to replace strong pro-Americanism which prevailed during the Cold War times. The recent anti-Americanism in South Korea is not a public norm but rather a practical attitude and is related to economic, cultural and national security concerns. Jhee is not really concerned about any deterioration of South Korean - American relations because of anti-Americanism (Jhee, 2008). Meunier reports the incident of the French farmer José Bové. In 1999, Bové planned to destroy a McDonald's restaurant in France. Most of the press declared him as a national hero and man of the year. People expected this event would trigger increasing French boycotting of American products.

Yet, Meunier indicates that such expectations remained disproven. On the contrary, the sales figures of McDonald's products increased (Meunier, 2007). Thus It is too early to suggest that the rise in anti-Americanism will cost the United States the loss of its former political and economic allies such as France and South Korea. Yet, considering the recent Arab Spring and democratization trends in the developing world, prevailing and embedded anti-American attitudes of these countries because of more structural reasons could make it harder for the United States to get new democratic allies.

At the same time, the United States is not oblivious to the recent trends in its global image. Graber reports that, in fact, the US policy-makers sought to find remedies for the negative image of the US. For example, between 2001 and 2003, Middle East funding increased 58 percent. During the same period, Foreign Service officers increased 27 percent. Yet, increasing staff and monetary aid, according to Graber, did not significantly amend the image of the US. Additionally, the US State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs launched in 2002 a campaign in the Middle East called a "shared values campaign". This campaign consisted of showing Middle Eastern Muslims mini-documentaries pointing out the common values between Islam and the US, and assuring the audience that the US was not in a war with Islam. In these documentaries, American Muslims were the narrators. Some other programs sought to spotlight US aid to Middle Eastern countries. Yet, these aids, as Graber points out, remained only a fraction of the aid to Israel (Graber, 2009). Obviously, the problem in the Middle East is not exactly about cultural misunderstandings, or the Foreign Service's program to would have made at least some progress. Hence, for future alliance issues, even though it would be exaggerating to worry about old allies of the US, policy-makers might want to focus on regions like the Middle East where contrary to expectations, more political problems rather than cultural ones seem to produce anti-Americanism.

My thesis hence aims to clarify the extent to which US foreign policy affect anti-Americanism; and again the extent to which socio-economic factors, with a focus on economics and economic development contribute to people's adherence to anti-American attitudes. Consequently, my main aim is to demonstrate that anti-Americanism is not solely an outcome of unfavorable US foreign policies. We come across with factors such as economic modernization crisis that makes anti-Americanism a particular issue among other anti-country debates: Socio-economic features of a country can affect the degree to which its people are anti-American vis-à-vis another country. This is mainly a consequence of the hegemonic position of the US which makes it a readily available body that people and political authorities tend to use as cues while seeking explanations to their economic grievances.


This thesis is thus organized as follows: In Chapter II, I present a literature review aiming at understanding which factors can lead to changes in anti-American attitudes. In Chapter III, I first offer a separate literature review to present the most appropriate measurement of anti-Americanism. Second, I show my measurement process of the dependent variable which involves a factor analysis with notable implications such that people formulate their general opinions toward the United States and Americans based on foreign policy evaluations of the United States. Nevertheless, I indicate that a simplistic measure of anti-Americanism bears the greatest theoretical reach, instead of a measurement where one would control for various items related to the US, within the dependent variable itself. In Chapter IV, I first describe the research design. Second, I indicate the independent variable construction process. Finally, I discuss the statistical relations of the variables and the implications for further analyses. In Chapter V, I indicate the results of one-way ANOVA analysis justifying the necessity to make a multi-level inquiry for the dataset. Second, I present the $r_{wg}(J)$ analysis results (James, Demaree and Wolf, 1984) using countries as clusters. The findings show that middle-income countries or countries that experience the economic system transition have the most disagreement on anti-Americanism responses. Fourth, I offer the regression results of the hypotheses tested by hierarchical fixed-effects models, by several steps of inquiry. Finally, in Chapter VI, I offer an overview of my results and discuss its implications.

The results show there is partial evidence for the impacts of US foreign policies which are restricted to the US policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US bilateral aid for authoritarian regimes. In addition, bilateral trade volume with the United States is another correlate which is associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. On the other hand, there also appears to be a relation between economic development and anti-Americanism. Moreover, countries that experience the transition from a pre-market to market economic system appear to show greater trends of anti-Americanism. In other words, in terms of economic development, Mousseau's Economic Norms Theory (Mousseau, 2002/03, 2009) may bear an explanatory power on anti-Americanism. Finally, at individual level, I find that greater years education, greater personal income satisfaction and great income level vis-à-vis one's own country appear to be associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism.

In this regard, US policy-makers need not alter their policy choices marginally to reduce anti-Americanism outside the Middle East and should instead focus on economic opportunity in developing countries by promoting market systems where contract security is guaranteed by the state. However, they should be careful in the provision of economic aid to autocratic regimes, since there is potential that people in those regimes might become more

anti-American. Finally, greater trade volume with the United States appears to contribute in a better image of the United States in the rest of the world.

Graphs:



CHAPTER II – CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of anti-Americanism generally exceeds a mere quest for definition and also comprehends an analysis of why it is the case that a considerable number of people are anti-American. Consequently, we are compelled by the following questions: Is anti-Americanism solely an outcome of grievance affected by US foreign policies, or is it also a consequence of alternative factors leading to distorting interpretations of the United States in general? Following these questions, the relevant literature tends to offer us two main different approaches to analyze the changes in the degree of anti-Americanism. The first approach considers the negative impacts of specific US foreign policies, such that people are negatively affected by observable US behavior causing a social level grievance. The second approach analyzes alternative social and individual factors such as economic modernization or grievance, leading to belief in the empirically unjustifiable US foreign behavior, mainly because of the nature of the American Hegemony. In other words, in this chapter, I will discuss whether people are anti-American because of what the actions and the main features of the US, or because of whom anti-Americans inherently are.

1) OBSERVABLE US FOREIGN POLICIES

There is significant body of research analyzing the impacts of US foreign policies on anti-Americanism. Several scholars offer their empirical support that US foreign policies have an impact on the perception of America. Tessler and Robbins show that the participants from Algeria and Jordan both have greater likelihood of supporting terrorist activities toward the US when they have a negative view of the American foreign policy (Tessler and Robbins, 2007). Johnston and Stockman investigate Chinese attitudes toward the United States. Accordingly, the Chinese people who are unhappy with the US policies in general, consider the US foreign policies as strategies to prevent the rise of China as a global power. In addition, the perception of the American position in the Taiwan issue and the Iraqi occupation are other factors that seem to affect Chinese anti-Americanism (Johnston and Stockman, 2007). On the other hand, some scholars argue that undesirable American foreign policies bring forth bitter consequences such as anti-Americanism, regardless of the perception of the foreign policies by the holders of the opinion. Zaidi analyzes Pakistani anti-Americanism and argues that Pakistani anti-Americanism is contingent on the distrust of US war on terrorism,

on the perception of the American support for authoritarian leaders and on the US negligence of the political actors in Pakistan (Zaidi, 2009). Pollack argues that the Saudi anti-Americanism is strongly influenced by the US foreign policies in the Middle East region (Pollack, 2003). Criss offers a very detailed historical review of Turkish-American relations in her study of Turkish anti-Americanism. In light of Turkish-US relations since 1950, she argues that the main reason of anti-Americanism in Turkey generally stems because of the violation of the Turkish national sovereignty and because of what Criss argues as the “messianic” role that United States engages in (Criss, 2002). Overall, these analyzes imply that people have a tendency to generate anti-American feelings by making assessment of the US foreign policies.

We still remain unsure about whether the blame is on the US itself or on the way people perceive the relevant US foreign policies. In their American sample, Page et al. indicate that public opinion is considerably influenced by media interpretation or by popular authorities’ opinions (Page *et al.*, 1987). In this regard, opinions toward the United States may remain vulnerable to the interpretation of varying institutions or authorities. In the Arab World, Abdallah argues that people do not have much choice except hating the United States provided that the Arab mass media’s issue coverage pertains to a strong anti-American tone (Abdallah, 2003: 62). In their survey analysis covering the 21 Muslim countries, Blaydes and Linzer show that anti-Americanism serves as a tool exploited by the clashing secular and religious authorities who seek to attract followers (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012). Inescapably, one should be careful when assessing whether people are anti-American because of the policy choices of American authorities, or because of alternative factors leading to negative attitudes toward the United States. We are therefore faced with the necessity of clarifying the distinction between US foreign policies that we can observe and the ones that we fail to gather enough evidence so as to support their empirical validity. Below, I first analyze two different US foreign policy choices that we can observe and second, I offer a detailed analysis of which claims about the US foreign policies fall short on adequate empirical justification.

(i) US Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The US involvement in the Middle East region might require a separate analysis from the general debate of the interplay between anti-Americanism and the US foreign policies. The United States has a direct involvement in the Middle East region although it is

geographically far away unlike for example Latin America. There is almost a general consensus among scholars, such that the prevailing Middle East resentment toward the United States stems from public displeasure of the US policies in the region. As I will indicate below, scholars share evidence either via large-N analysis or via descriptive studies supporting the fact that there is an observable link between US foreign policies and anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

As I stated, several scholars show empirical evidence about particularity of the Middle East region in a large-N setting. In their survey analyses, Tessler and Robbins compare Algerian and Jordanian rates of approval of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In Algeria, they report that 77 percent of the respondents disapprove the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Of these 77 percent, 58 percent have strong disapproval against terrorist acts. On the other hand, in Jordan, 56 percent of the respondents favor armed Jihad against the US. In addition, 45 percent of the Jordanians consider Usama Bin Laden as trustworthy. One of the reasons about the great discrepancy of the support for terrorist attacks between Algeria and Jordan is according to the authors, the latter's closeness to the Palestinian Intifada. Algeria is a Muslim country as well. However, the support for terrorist activities of 9/11 is significantly lower than in Jordan which is not only a Muslim country, but is also situated close to the perimeters of Middle Eastern conflict². Additionally, not only does Islam have any effect; but also, religiosity in both Algeria and Jordan fails to be a predictor of support for anti-American terror (Tessler & Robbins, 2007). Peter A. Furia and Rusell E. Lucas, based on their empirical research show that in the Arab world, the Western countries' policies in Middle East –especially the Palestinian Issue- shape the Arab attitudes toward the Western countries. They find little evidence for impact of cultural factors such as Arab or Muslim identity (Furia & Lucas, 2008). These findings support the proposition that countries situated on the immediate perimeters of the Middle East conflict region house more anti-American public opinions. However, it remains a necessity to come up with a theoretical justification of why the perimeters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more prone to set a contextual correlate of anti-Americanism.

There are various suggestions on the reasons why Arab people, with an emphasis on Middle Eastern Arabs have deep anti-American sentiments. The literature predominantly focuses on the US support for Israel. Paul Hollander argues that, even if the United States is miles and miles away from the Middle East, the Arab resentment against it is imminent. He

² We can designate the Middle Eastern conflict as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided that this is the main conflict that strongly affects the perimeter countries in the Middle East region.

asserts that this resentment is rooted in the existence of Israel which is politically, militarily and economically supported by the United States (Hollander, 1995). Makdisi also argues that the current Arab opposition to the United States is neither a long-standing hatred for American values, nor a consequence of an Islamic philosophy. Makdisi is in favor of suggesting that the rupture between the US-Arab relations is primarily because of the US's unbalanced stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Arabs expect a more just mediation among belligerents (Makdisi, 2002).

We, indeed, need greater empirical evidence to conclude that Arabic people in the Middle East are more anti-American as a consequence of the US foreign policies in their region, especially regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The main caveat here is to be able to find observable patterns in the US foreign policies which negatively affect the lives of the Middle Eastern people because of the American stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is not much debate over the empirical validity of the US financial, military and political assistance to Israel which contributed to the political and economic development of the latter³. Thus, we could expect that US support for Israel creates a problematic for those who live in the periphery of Israel-Palestinian conflict.

(ii) American Bilateral aid to Authoritarian regimes

Another observable US foreign policy that might be associated with anti-Americanism can be the financial and military aid directed toward authoritarian regimes. Hollander argues that, contrary to the positive impacts of the Marshall aid to the Western European countries in the aftermath of the World War II, the US aid in the Third World contributed to anti-Americanism (Hollander, 1995). It is possible that foreign aid to specific countries does not bring a benevolent American image forth, but reinforces oppressive leaders to strengthen their grips thus increases oppression. For example, Abdallah argues that although the US tried to provide economic aid to an important number of Arab countries, the anti-Americanism of the Arabs prevailed (Abdallah, 2003). Similarly, Kizilbash posits that a considerable number of Pakistani people have negative attitudes toward the United States because they think the US supports military regimes (Kizilbash, 1988).

³ According to US Census Bureau's Bilateral Economic and Military Assistance data, Israel appears to be the biggest recipient of total US bilateral aid between years 1962 and 2006. Yet, since 2003, Israel appears not to be the biggest recipient of aid: Iraq and Afghanistan appear to receive greater amounts of aid. Nonetheless, Israel always comes the first after these countries hence always has a high rank. On the other hand, before 1962, the amount of aid Israel received appears to be trivial compared to the rest of the world and countries like Turkey, Taiwan and Greece.

In the literature of foreign aid and economic assistance, some scholars offer evidence against the suggestion that foreign aid increases the welfare and the democratization of the aid recipient. In an economic transactions framework, Griffin and Enos test whether foreign economic assistance contributes to long term economic growth. Their findings do not support the proposition that foreign economic assistance generates a stable economic growth. This is especially true when the flows of products occur from capital rich to capital poor countries. Accordingly, the authors believe that, the rich assistance provider might erroneously assume that the recipient has all the required capital and institutions that will generate a stable economic growth. However, the lack of capital in the assistance recipient becomes the impediment for this expected growth (Griffin & Enos, 1970). Another problem might be that the aid recipient country might continue to be dependent on the foreign aid if it does not meet certain economic criteria such as targeting specific saving rates, decreasing trade gaps and focusing on real economic activities (Chenery and Strout, 1966). In a more political framework, Stephen Knack tests whether foreign aid promotes democracy. The general assumptions in this regard that foreign aid will help the strengthening of the various democratic institutions, increase education and income per capita. However, Knack's empirical tests do not find the adequate evidence. On the contrary foreign aid can help the politics of corruption to survive and even to help coup d'états (Knack, 2004).

The democracy promotion via foreign aid, in Arab countries, creates several impasses that hinder democratization overall. Carapico (2002) indicates in his analysis that several Arab elites and administrative unites seek to channel the aid funds for their own activities, which as a result distorts the purposes of the aid. In fact, as the author reports, it is generally the non-governmental organizations and not the state agencies which receive the foreign aid in Arabic countries. Yet, it is also possible that Arab states stand against these foreign aids directed at NGO.s by showing worries about their sovereignty or integrity. Additionally, Carapico asserts that governments in the Arab countries might act in unconventional ways to seize the funds of the NGO.s within their territories. She, in this regard provides the example of Palestinian administration which gained access to 100 million dollars by discrediting and intervening in the activities of an NGO (Carapico, 2002). Carapacio's points might indicate that aid and assistance toward many Arab countries might not always serve its purpose and become funds for the most-likely authoritarian administrations.

Therefore foreign economic and military assistance could serve for authoritarian leaders to strengthen their grip and cause further grievances. Even if foreign aid secures a stable economic growth, it does not guarantee the fall of undemocratic regimes. After all,

there is also evidence economic growth does not necessarily satisfy democratization. On the contrary it might help the maintenance of the undemocratic regime as well (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Therefore, foreign aid might strengthen the grip of authoritarian administrators and expand public suppression. In terms of anti-Americanism, people might think that their oppressive leaders are financed by the United States. This might very well turn into a form of anti-Americanism. The assumption is that the US aid to authoritarian regimes has an immediate impact on the everyday lives of people. In his book “The Crisis of Islam”, Lewis asserts that US support for authoritarian and corrupt regimes is a more immediate way of grievance compared to the claims of imperialism (Lewis, 2004: 89). Apparently, the oppression of the corrupt or authoritarian regimes is always there for the citizens. The expectation is that they would generate disfavor toward the forces that they consider as sponsoring the regimes which oppress them.

2) AMERICAN HEGEMONY

The American support for Israel has an empirical basis. The same appears to be true for American bilateral aid toward authoritarian regimes. In other words, people who display higher levels of anti-American sentiments because of either Israeli-Palestinian conflict or authoritarian regimes reinforced by US aid appear to have observable reasons for grievance⁴. However, not all complaints about the US foreign policy and hegemony bear empirical validity. For reasons that not rooted in the policy preferences of the United States, some people become anti-American by believing in an empirically unjustifiable image of the US. There is no doubt that anti-Americanism exists not only because of US actions, but also because of the individual and social factors. After all, we encounter a variety of empirical studies of anti-Americanism that show evidence for correlates alternative to the US actions, such as outcome of elite manipulation in the Muslim world (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012), transnational TV exposure in the Arab World (Nisbet & Myers, 2011), and economic modernization crisis (Mousseau, 2002/03). In light of these findings or suggestions, we are compelled to shift the focus from the impacts of US foreign policy elements to other socio-economic factors as well.

⁴ We must be cautious in using the word “observable”. Although US provides significant amount of aid to either Israel or authoritarian regimes, this does not mean that it intends to cause grievance in local people. Anti-Americanism in these two cases more likely refers to the unforeseen consequences of observable US foreign policies.

It is crucial to make a solid distinction between observable and non-observable US behavior, since belief in the latter can be explained by social and individual factors alternative to the US foreign policy. Put simply, if it was because of the actions of the United States, economics and other alternative factors would be crowded out from the study of anti-Americanism, which apparently is not the case. Correlates related solely to US foreign policy cannot make anti-Americanism a distinct topic: For example, if almost most of the time, people in Mongolia generate anti-Chinese feelings because of the policy preferences of China that harm Mongolia, it becomes harder to distinguish anti-Americanism from anti-Chinese feelings, or anti- country X, where X could be any country in the world. In this regard, the particularity of anti-Americanism stems from the hegemonic position of the US, unlike other countries around the world, which brings forth a global pattern of beliefs in empirically unjustifiable actions attributed to the US.

Consequently, with regards to the next task, it becomes necessary to make a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy principles of the United States that will attest the norms of the American global hegemonic position. At the same time, it will highlight what claims about the US foreign policies fall short on evidence and thus adherence to which paves the way for the inquiry of several possible correlates. After all, as I stated earlier, if all the accusations about the US policies were true, anti-Americanism would not have a particular place in the literature knowing that any country can make mistakes and people can respond accordingly. Yet, the next section will seek to indicate that not all accusations bear empirical validity. Thus, it will prepare the legitimate ground for the remaining analyses of correlates of anti-Americanism.

Evaluation of the US Foreign Policy Principles

Thus far, I argued that anti-Americanism is not just related to responses to what US observably executes as foreign policies. This is mainly related to the hegemonic position of the United States which provokes the outbreak of empirically unjustifiable claims about US actions. Adherence to these claims may not necessarily occur due to what American policy-makers execute. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the norms and the reflections of these norms in terms of US foreign policies in order to come up with criteria to distinguish between which accusations tend to be true, which do not. In this regard, I first describe the foreign policy traditions that the US had already held when it became the sole hegemonic power in the

aftermath of World War II. Second, I review the application of these foreign policy principles by illustrative cases and large-N evidence.

1) Before World War II

The main reason of reviewing the US foreign policy norms before World War II remains substantial in understanding the motivations of the US hegemonic behavior during and after the Cold War. Before beginning any in-depth review, one should bear in mind that the US was a colony and suffered of colonial imperialism. It is thus a natural phenomenon for a former colony to possess grievances because of its prior colonial history. Accordingly, the most important two items that we need to consider in terms of US foreign policy before World War II are the US demand for Normal Trade Relations (NTR) and the Monroe doctrine which mainly stands against imperialistic expansion. These two points have been the pillars of US Foreign Policy before the World War II and afterwards when the US achieved a position of the global hegemonic power. Therefore the belief in a bullying, imperial image of the United States tends to deviate from the actual norms of the US Foreign policies. I do not argue that US fully adhered to NTR and anti-colonialism principles before World War II. Nonetheless, these principles were present in the mindset of the US policy-makers right when they had to undertake the duties of global hegemony.

Normal trade relations dictate that no country should impose restrictions satisfying its trade interests while harming another country. In other words, no country should impose tariffs and quotas to its trade partner while it enjoys unrestricted access to its partner's resources. It was historical reasons which pushed US to adhere to normal trade relations. Since its foundation, the United States has stood against the colonial mindset of unfair taxing and duty imposition. A good case to illustrate this is Benjamin Franklin's demands on the British Empire. As one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, Franklin showed an eagerness to refrain from military action under the condition that British Empire would revise oppressive trade duties and taxations in addition to restoring civil liberties and to withdrawing the additional British troops. Yet, the British were reluctant to abide by these terms (Srodes, 2002: 253-254). Apparently, support for anti-colonial normal trade relations was among the founding principles of the United States.

Another important pillar of the traditional US foreign policy understanding is the Monroe doctrine. James Monroe was a president of the United States from 1817 to 1825, during a time when European superpowers sought to assist Spain in its maintenance of the

colonies in Latin America. Being also an Independence War veteran, Monroe stood against the presence of the any colonial power on the American continent. Accordingly, the colonial presence meant the violation of the freedom and the sovereignty of the Latin American states (Cunningham, 1996). Charles E. Hughes, the Secretary of State of the United States rephrased this principle in 1923 as follows: “*The postulates of our foreign policy were determined by the ideals of liberty. The dominant motive was the security of the Republic; it was a policy of ‘let and let live’ with no imperialistic designs or thought of aggression*” (Hughes, 1923). In other words, the Monroe doctrine referred to the respect of the sovereignty of a state and a stance against those who violate the sovereignty by colonial means. Overall, the US had NTR and the Monroe doctrine of anti-imperialistic actions as reference points in the foreign policy behavior by the end of the Second World War.

ii) After World War II

Until the end of World War II, the United States mostly pursued an isolationist policy. Most of the time, it was reluctant to join international organizations such as the League of Nations of post-World War I. Although there had been some attempts by politicians like President Wilson, the Congress failed to pass laws with regards to internationalist policies. It was when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that a spark of pro-internationalism started to emerge among the American intellectuals and the public in general. By the end of World War II, the number of pro internationalist coalitions significantly increased (Schild, 1995). At the same time, the United States did not forfeit its prewar principles of anti-Colonialism and Normal Trade Relations. The Atlantic Charter discussions between F. D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill seem to clearly illustrate the American determination to execute its foreign policy ideals upon the Second World War. The American president F. D. Roosevelt strongly held his anti-Imperialist principles and sought to convince Churchill and Britain to relinquish their colonial holdings. He supported freedom of the people and right to have an independent state no matter the size is. Additionally, Roosevelt and thus the United States were willing to extend financial and military assistance to the Great Britain under the condition that the latter would treat its colonies not much different from the free states of the rest of the world (Dulles and Ridinger, 1955). Overall, when Churchill sought to revive the status quo of the pre-war system where Britain had its colonies and the European powers had the greatest influence on the system, Roosevelt significantly deviated from this mindset. Roosevelt considered the participation of the all possible countries to a peaceful international system (Sainsbury, 1994).

Similar to what we observe in Atlantic Charter discussions, the American post-war economic plans also appear more likely to be benevolent rather than selfish and imperialistic. During the late 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, world trade enjoyed prosperity because of low tariffs despite bilateral commitments and the lack of considerable multilateral regulations. However, along with World War I and the Great Depression, many economies crumbled and adhered to discriminatory trade to protect themselves from the harmful flows of goods (Irwin, 1995). As a consequence of the non-liberal policies during the Great Depression, the interwar period had bitter economic outcomes. Under these circumstances, the post-war economic reconstruction aimed at creating a free trade system based on specialization and normal trade relations regulated by General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade, namely the GATT (Arndt, 1982). In the mean time, in the global scene the US had a far superior position in economic and military means compared to the rest of the world. These circumstances led the United States to be the key country in determining the post-war international economic policies (Milward, 1979; Cox, 1990; Killick, 1997).

The supremacy of the United States in the aftermath of the World War II in macro-economic terms was evident. In more tangible terms, the US possessed almost more than half of the global Gross National Income, most of the food surpluses and approximately all financial resources (Cox, 1990). In order prevent a revival of the interwar economic catastrophe; the US adhered to the trade liberalization by a strong commitment to GATT agreements. Consequently, US overall decreased its tariff rates by 35 percent on average (Eichengreen & Irwin, 1995). At the same time, the US allowed other countries to discriminate against its exports, in other words other countries had the chance to apply trade barriers on US exports. What is more striking is that during the Bretton Woods agreements, the Morgenthau Plan which sought to deprive Germany from financial aids because of the worries that the Nazi regime would re-emerge, never became real and faced rejections (Schild, 1995). Additionally, the fact that US always held a trade deficit might well indicate it did not pursue an agenda of weakening the rest of the world for the sake of acquiring relative economic benefits. In short, based on macro-economic indicators, the immediate post-war era offered an inescapable opportunity of world domination and exploitation to the United States. However, to this day, we fail to find enough amount of evidence to suggest these claims.

The particularity of the United States compared to preceding hegemonic powers such as Great Britain was that although it became the ultimate world power, it did not choose to act as a stereotypical world power that sought ultimate global domination. It indeed constrained its powers by the very international institutions it promoted such as the United Nations, and

the World Bank (McMahon and Wedeman, 2006; Ruggie, 2006). Additionally, this commitment did not exist in the case of the Soviet Union which predominantly relied on coercive power (McMahon & Wedeman, 2006). More surprisingly, not only the United States committed its resources to the prosperity of the rest of the world, but also it allowed its relative national and material capabilities to decline vis-à-vis other countries. For example, currently, the United States no more has the productivity and the technological supremacy that it cherished during the immediate aftermath of the postwar era (Nelson & Wright, 1992). The next step is coming up with the empirical justification of the non-imperialist ambitions of the United States. Such an inquiry remains at the core of the social-psychological correlates of anti-Americanism provided that the interest lies in what the real actions are and what the myths are that people relate to the United States.

Evidence for Lack of Imperialist Policies in US Foreign Behavior:

The United States, for the most part of its history set an image as global promoter of human rights, freedom and democracy. As Forsythe points out, most international actions of the US involved the ideals of democracy, human rights and freedom (Forsythe, 2006). As I will elaborate, among these principles and their reflection to the empirical reality, colonial expansion and economic exploitation by enforcing unjust trade duties to the target countries cannot find adequate evidence among US foreign policy principles in the aftermath of the World War II. Therefore I argue that the claims about the US as an imperialistic power tend to deviate from what we most commonly observe. It is however a great necessity to prove this argument by empirical evidence and by simultaneously analyzing counter-claims from a variety of scholars.

The current section is allocated to the display of empirical evidence indicating that since the end of World War II, the United States did not deviate from Monroe Doctrine and Normal Trade Relations principle, and it promoted other countries' prosperity rather than keeping them under-developed and weak. The empirical demonstration is as follows: First, I show that the US did not engage in imperialistic territorial expansion by using Correlates of War project's dyadic Military Interstate Dispute dataset. Second, I show using the National and Material Capabilities Dataset that American relative capability declined vis-à-vis the rest of the world and its closest rivals by comparing the 1945 and the most recent 2007 indicators. I also repeat this comparison by using energy consumption data again for the same years.

Finally, I review several illustrative historical cases to reinforce my claim that the United States' foreign policies since the Second World War fall short of imperialistic ambitions and actions.

It is necessary to recapitulate what is an imperialistic action and what is not. There are two main pillars of imperialism: Enforcement of unequal terms of trade, and pursuit of territorial expansion by possible aggressive policies... Zevin defines imperialism as "... *the activity on the part of any state which establishes or subsequently exercises and maintains qualified or unqualified rights of sovereignty beyond the previous boundaries within which such rights were exercised*". Zevin's definition clearly focuses on the second point of our criteria for imperialism which is the disrespect for the sovereignty of other countries (Zevin, 1972: 319). On the other hand, Gallagher and Robinson put forward, in addition to creating its own institutions, that the imperialist country should impose economic sanctions to the colonized territory in order to boost its trade advantages (Gallagher & Robinson, 1953). According to Galtung, in an imperialistic scenario, there are two types of countries such as center and periphery. The imperialistic exchange happens on behalf of the former and creates a disharmony of interest between the former and the latter based on the disadvantage of the periphery countries. In other words, in the imperialistic dyads, the core –the imperialistic country- chooses to execute policies that are not on behalf of the periphery countries (Galtung, 1971). Alternatively, Landes uses the word "exploitation" in the imperialistic context and goes beyond conventional usage of exploitation by suggesting a concrete defining mechanism: The imperialistic country exploits another country by enforcing suboptimal wages on the workers of the exploited country (Landes, 1961). Hence, economically speaking, we expect the imperialistic power to be better off, whereas the colony or the target of the imperialist country to be sub-optimally worse off.

In the case of the United States, judging whether it is an imperialistic country or not leads us to be clear about following two points: First, we should prove that the US does not engage in economic exploitation similar prior imperialistic forces with a pursuit of relative economic gains compared to the rest of the world. Second, we should indicate that US has never engaged in territorial demands and aggression since the aftermath of the Second World War when it became the global hegemonic power. Henceforth, I will show based on several inquiries, that there is no satisfactory evidence leading to the claim that the US bullies other countries for relative economic gains and engages into aggression for territorial seizure, thus it is neither imperialistic or an empire.

In order to be clearer about whether the US is an imperialistic power or not, I will first indicate that the United States did not engage in any territorial aggression which might constitute a vital feature of an imperialistic power. In this regard, I checked the Correlates of War's Dyadic Military Interstate Dispute dataset. Correlates of War project is an empirical project that collects data about inter-state and intra-state conflicts and wars (Singer and Small, 1972; Small and Singer, 1982). In this project, the Dyadic Military Interstate Dispute offers a dataset that records bilateral conflict processes (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004). If we find necessary amount of evidence that US makes territorial demands in the relevant disputes, we might argue for a imperialist US. This inquiry necessitates looking at the demands that the United States made throughout the military interstate disputes. Table 2.2 summarizes the demands that United States made in the military interstate disputes it took part as a revisionary state.

[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]

Accordingly, I looked at the military interstate disputes in which the US has been involved since the time it had to undertake a hegemonic role. The COW MID dataset offers a variable named "revtype1" referring to the demand made by the revisionist state in the conflict. The question is coded as "1" when the country makes a territorial demand within a dispute, as "2" when the country makes a demand in the policy change of another country, as "3" when the revisionist state asks regime change of the other and as "4" for other revisionist demands. There are 61 overall disputes where the United States was a revisionist state, in other words it stated its demands to the other state of the conflict dyad. Out of these 61 observations, 46 (75%) were related to the demands in policy changes (revtype1 coded as 2), 11 (18%) were related to demands in about the regime type of government changes (revtype1 coded as 3), 1 (2%) related to other changes (revtype1 coded as 4), and finally there were 3 disputes (5%) which were coded such that the US makes territorial demands (revtype1 coded as 1)⁵. These disputes refer to US-China disputes over the security of Taiwan throughout the 1950's, but which did not involve any US seizure and exploitation of territory. Hence, we failed to find evidence based on a large-N inquiry that the US makes territorial demands and engages in conflict to fulfill such revisionist policies.

⁵ See APPENDIX 2.1 for a long list of all the MIDS between 1945 and 2007 where US was the revisionist state.

On the other hand, some scholars disregard the analysis of territorial aggression in the inquiry of whether the United States is imperialistic or not. Saull argues that, the US does not fit in the category of empires in a historical sense. Instead, it promotes the autonomy of the states. Yet, this does not mean according to Saull that the United States is not imperial or imperialist. Even though US does not wage war in order to threaten the autonomy of other states, it uses aggression in order for other states to comply to the very international system it promotes (Saull, 2008). Steinmetz uses the World Systems Theory (WST) approach to offer his argument about whether US is imperialistic or not. He disregards the claims that US is a colonial or neo-colonial power. Nonetheless, by relying on how WST defines a hegemonic power in the world system, he argues that US is imperialistic. Accordingly a hegemonic power dominates the world system. This dominance not only takes place by military means but also by an urge to protect global free trade. More clearly, the hegemonic power seeks to maintain the openness of the periphery countries in order to make use of the cheap labor and raw materials. In this regard, the hegemon seeks to maintain its strong core system and to maintain the free-trade system by the means of force in case it needs to (Steinmetz, 2003: 331-332).

Yet, these scholars tend to dismiss the fact that maintaining a world order is not without its costs. There is no doubt that the US is a hegemonic power and it promotes the current system. But, does this promotion take place with use of force? Does the United States use force in order that countries open up for free trade so that the US can benefit from the proceeds of this process? In many scholars who adhere to this claim cannot be successful in providing adequate empirical support. In other words, is there any case where the US forced any country either by military threat or similar means to open up for free trade? As a response some scholars might very well point out the conditionality behind providing loans by the international institutions such as IMF and World Bank. Yet, we cannot find clear evidence that US forces countries to take loan from IMF or similar institutions. Nonetheless, we cannot observe all the cases one by one and we might also misinterpret several details if we dwell solely on descriptive inquiry. Thus as the next step, I show an indirect evidence for the fact that US is not an imperialistic country which consists of the time-series pattern of American relative national and material power vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Several scholars believe in Washington's pursuit of maintaining a relatively superior global power. For example, Gabriel Kolko argues that the United States seeks superiority no matter the costs. Hence, the main drive behind US foreign policies such as enforcing free market and keeping national security is to be able to sustain some amount of military

spending that will maintain the superior status of the US (Kolko, 2002). I, hence, examine the empirical evidence in the changes of the US national and material power compared to the rest of the world. Accordingly, if US sought to pursue imperialistic aims and material superiority, its relative national and material capabilities to the rest of the world would increase constantly since it would acquire the proceedings from compelling the rest of world to a free trade system. In this regard, I look at national material capabilities data (v4.0) of the Correlates of War Project. The data contains yearly-based measurements of a country's total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure. The dataset offers a Composite Index of National Capability (*cinc*) measure which aggregates all these six variables⁶ (Singer, Bremer and Stuckley, 1972; Singer, 1987). Accordingly, I checked the *cinc* measure of the United States in 1945 and 2007. In 1945, the US is the strongest country with its supreme position in the aftermath of the World War II. However, we can see for example, that in year 2007, China's capability index supersedes the one of the United States. However, in 1945, it was not the case at all. TABLE 2.1 shows the national material capabilities index for the years 2007 and 1945.

[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]

In 1945, there was no single doubt that the US had a supreme position in terms of capability. If China, Russia, Germany and United Kingdom allied, they would roughly be equal to the United States in terms of capabilities. Yet, in 2007, China on its own had a greater capability score than the US. In a realist mindset, the US would not allow these countries to surpass its own national and material capabilities. Yet, the very international system that the US promoted in the aftermath of World War II just allowed any country to prosper. The American allowance for such prosperity cannot easily fit into a realist framework. After all, the United States did not prevent other countries to match its national and material capabilities when it had the chance. I admit that the comparison of national and material capabilities is an imperfect justification of the US benevolence and the lack of economic exploitation. Nevertheless, there is –to my knowledge– no more coherent measurement of national power other than the National & Material Capabilities dataset of the COW project. Yet, the assumption exists that the colonized or non-imperial countries cannot

⁶ Further information can be obtained at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

easily prosper vis-à-vis imperialistic countries since the latter will pursue superiority in their relative power to the rest of the world.

Alternatively, can be compared additional wealth indicators of the United States in 1945 with the recent years. One of these measurements is the US energy consumption rate over world energy consumption rate. I use the energy consumption variable from the Correlates of War Project's National and Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer and Stuckley, 1972; Singer, 1987). Accordingly, I summed the energy consumption indicators separately in years 1945 and 2000. For each year, I divided the US energy consumption score with the global energy consumption and obtained the following results: In 1945, the United States appears to have had 58 percent of the global energy production. This is an overwhelming indicator that shows strong support for the fact that the US had all the means to create an empire to dominate the world in the aftermath of World War II. However, an investigation of the same measurement in the year 2000 shows that this percentage drops to 22 percent. Even if this is a significant percentage for a country compared to the rest of the world, it reveals an obvious decline in the US share of the world energy consumption. Therefore, asking why the United States which had a supreme position in the immediate aftermath of the World War II allowed other countries to prosper seems a viable one. An imperialist power, would not allow such relative loss of power that the US experienced throughout its hegemony.

It might still be unsatisfactory to solely rely on the Correlates of War indicators such as Military Interstate Dispute trends and trends in National & Material Capabilities, provided that many historians and political scientists can point to cases where US casted question marks about the benevolence of its hegemonic power. Hence next, I discuss a number of cases where scholars accuse the US of illegitimate actions. What I accordingly seek to propose is that many accusations toward the US such that it is an imperialistic, selfish bullying force either fall short on coherent argumentation or on adequate empirical evidence. It is also necessary to question why an ordinary person cannot adhere to empirically flawed judgments about the US, even when the relevant scholar literature is far from reaching a consensus. However, this lack of scientific consensus might also provoke further speculations on US actions. There is, after all, no single authority capable of judging whether attributions for the US are true or false. Under these circumstances, the world of empirics gains greater salience and examination of a number of cases of US foreign actions play a key role accordingly.

One of the most popular accusations about the US is the so-called CIA or covert involvements in internal affairs of another country. Consequently, a number of scholars

consider the United States as imperialistic because of the CIA interventions in organizing coup d'états for the sake of selfishly preserving American hegemony. First of all, it is difficult to argue for the legality of any CIA interventions during the Cold War. However, referring to my definition of imperialism, obviously not all illegal actions entail imperialism. We can classify CIA involvements in foreign territories as illegal and even unpleasant for some people. Yet, there is no evidence that CIA imposed unfair economic conditions by threat or use of force. Additionally, US's greatest rival of the Cold War, the Soviet Russia also used its intelligence organizations in the same manner. CIA's actions were most likely counter measures to similar Soviet attempts. This situation becomes more robust in the absence of CIA interventions by the end of the Cold War. Thus, the CIA involvements, if considered to be true, still fail to be part of the definition of imperialism.

On the other hand, some scholars disregard the particularity of the US foreign policies in the Cold War era, and suggest US foreign policies throughout the American history had a common motivation of securing economic gains. Hartman seeks to prove this suggestion by a review of the US interference in Afghanistan upon the Soviet occupation. He argues that, the real intention of the US foreign policy in the Cold War era was to secure American business interests and the stable flow of raw materials to US economy. Therefore, US –via CIA- sought to prevent Soviet occupation by supplying radical Islamists in Afghanistan. The author argues that Washington covered its pursuit of business interests by the story of preventing Soviet expansion (Hartman, 2002). There are similar critics of US interferences which –in line with Hartman- consider US policy-makers to be actually guided by an economic agenda.

Yet, several cases show that US can value other nations' sovereignty more than reaping economic benefits. Between October 1973 and September 1974, Saudi Arabia regime put an embargo on the sale of oil. This action took place predominantly as a response to American provision of aid to Israel and Israeli victories over Arab countries during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The consequences of this embargo were severe: Oil production decreased by 25 percent and oil prices sky-rocketed in those years' terms (Golub, 1985). Despite such great harms to the world economy, the United States did not bully or invade Saudi Arabia. After all, Arab countries showed solidarity in using the oil as an economic weapon as a response to the Western and the US support for Israel (Paust & Blaustein, 1974: 410). The US indeed had the power and capability to do so; yet the evidence lacks regarding any US aggression toward the Saudis to prevent the usage of oil as an economic weapon. Indeed, to my knowledge, no members of the OPEC faced any coercion or threat of invasion by the

United States because of their decision about oil embargo or price adjustments which had observable and severe consequences to global economy.

Another case where a number of scholars argue that US interferes for the sake of oil gains is the US involvement in the Iranian Coup of 1953. This involvement, for many constitutes a classical case of American imperialism and exploitation. Conventional wisdom might suggest that the US and the Great Britain desired to get rid of Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh who nationalized the Iranian oil reserves and harmed British interests. Indeed after the nationalization of Iranian oil and thus a great part of the Anglo-Iranian oil company's operations, Great Britain was frustrated. Lacking its imperial might of a century ago, the British sought the help of the US in restoring the oil status quo before Mosaddegh.. US President Truman was reluctant to interfere with domestic affairs of Iran. When Eisenhower came to power, the British attempts to convince the US to support a coup in Iran carried on. (Yergin, 1991: 450-479)

A cautionary approach should be used with the US involvement in the coup against Mosaddegh. After all, Eisenhower did not interfere until Mosaddegh chose to align with the Iranian communist party which had strong connections to Soviet Russia in those days. As previously discussed, the Cold War US foreign policy involved containment of the Soviet expansion of influence even if it necessitated supporting coups against pro-Soviet coalitions. Hence, there is no decent evidence that US supported the coup against Mosaddegh for the sake of oil gains. Another question remains as to what happened to Iranian oil after the coup. As Yergin indicates, the Iranian oil always remained national and was never privatized. Indeed, the oil contract rates remained intact: Fifty percent of the revenue went to Iranian state and the other fifty percent to the extracting company. These rates were unfavorable compared to the other oil contract rates of the 50's. The United States did not want Iranian economy to collapse and Iran to orient toward the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, it sought to promote Iranian economy. This would be through keeping the Iranian oil market alive despite the unfavorable rates. Indeed, the United States forced several of its companies to buy Iranian oil with the unfavorable rates (Yergin, 1991: 450-479). Overall, the United States did not exploit Iranian oil, but on the contrary sought to promote Iranian economy by forcing American firms to buy Iranian oil with actually unprofitable rates.

There are additional cases that contradict the claims that the US acts in an anti-Imperialist manner. An examination of the case of Suez Crisis may allow a greater grasp on the traditional US opposition to anti-imperialistic actions. The particularity of the Suez Crisis is that, the US did not help its traditional allies England, France and the new ally Israel, but

sought to help Egypt which was under the threat of being bullied. Some scholars might argue that US favored Gamal Abdel Nasser who was president of Egypt during the Suez Crisis. However, Kingseed shows evidence from Eisenhower's diaries and speeches that there was distrust to Nasser's policies and his close relations with Soviet Union. At the same time, Nasser's anti-Western speeches did not come to a halt. Indeed, for a veteran of World War II like Eisenhower, there might be strong reasons on behalf of the US joining the Franco-British and Israeli alliance against Egypt. Yet, clearly it did not happen. When Nasser seized the Suez Canal, the French and British responses were tough and immediate. Kingseed indicates that French foreign minister Christian Pineau did not prefer to wait for a UN resolution to solve the crisis because it would take too much time. A similar mindset existed for the English foreign minister Anthony Eden who preferred a quick action against Egypt by claiming that Nasser's actions negatively affected the global interests in the Middle East region. However, President Eisenhower's response to the crisis sharply contrasted the ones of Eden and Pineau (Kingseed, 1995).

The USFP during the Suez crisis of 1956 raised questions on the fundamental beliefs about US's international stance. Basically, Eisenhower's policies cast doubt on US relations with its old allies France and the UK as well as on the special alliance relations with Israel. After all, the US did not act on behalf of its traditional allies but adhered to its foreign policy principles of anti-colonialism and sought to prevent aggression toward Egypt by economic and diplomatic means. It applied diplomatic sanctions to France, England and Israel in order that these countries abide by the UN resolutions of non-aggression. In other words, the Eisenhower administration showed traditional American foreign policy features of anti-colonialism, self-determination and resistance against totalitarianism (Kingseed, 1995).

A simplification of the discussions in this section shows that there is an inadequacy of evidence supporting the claims that US foreign policies entailed Imperialist set of actions⁷. Even though more sophisticated statistical proof is necessary to argue that the US is or is not an imperialistic country, simple large-N inquiries and illustrative cases imply that those who argue for an evil-doer imperialistic global hegemonic power tend to deviate from the world of empirics. In the current study, the actual interest lies in seeking the social factors that lead to empirically flawed attributions to the US foreign behavior and policies.

⁷ There are obviously more cases to be reviewed in order to justify the non-imperialist image of the United States. The cases I provided are illustrations of the US foreign policy principles. Nonetheless, to my knowledge the reality falls short of any US actions justifying the claims that the US is an imperialistic power.

Yet, it still is necessary to inquire whether there is a general worry of the US power because of its supreme and hegemonic status around the world. Therefore, testing the following two hypotheses can offer substantial evidence about worries on the American foreign policies: First, people might be anti-American because their country is not closely allied with the United States. This weaker alliance status can lead to the expectations of possible American aggression. Second, people living in the relatively weaker countries compared to the United States may worry about the US power and suspect of American aggression directed to their countries. In other words, the public perception of a nation's insecurity next to the US power can lead to worries translating into anti-Americanism. These hypotheses cause the assumption that people clinging to an imperialistic and bullying image of the United States, might think that this country would harass weaker countries relative to its capabilities and show aggression toward its foes.

Trade Dependency on the United States:

Worries of US aggression because of weak alliance ties and low relative national power can be immediate, yet crude manifestations reflecting the interplay between anti-Americanism and the American Hegemony. Recall that, several scholars point out the US aggression to maintain a free trade system in order that periphery countries open up their economies for US to make use of their raw materials and cheap labor (Steinmetz, 2003; Saull, 2008). Thus, these claims motivate the inquiry of the impact of trade relations with the United States. Accordingly, trade relations with the United States constitute a dynamic and dyadic process which might impact the public opinion of the partner country and of the United States. I present two competing theories about the impact of trade dependency on the United States which might play a predicting role in assessing how economic relations with the United States impact anti-Americanism. Accordingly, I will review the main tenets of the Liberal International Relations (Liberal IR) scholars and that of the World Systems Theory which are likely to predict opposite impacts of the dependency on trade relations with the United States.

In a rough sense, we can argue that the World Systems Theory concentrates on the negative impacts of the trade relations with the United States. Wallerstein (1974), one of the founding fathers of the World Systems Theory, accordingly, does not dwell on the existence of the nation states. The World systems theory adheres to an aggregate world system where

there are economically advanced core countries and periphery countries with much less sophisticated production output. In this concept, if the periphery countries continue to be a part of the international trade, core countries will likely exploit them economically and prevent any further development and economic sophistication in the periphery countries. Considering the global economy as a world system, the World Systems Theory would consider the United States as a core country in a core-periphery division. Based on the World Systems Theory understanding, one would expect that trade dependency of the periphery to the core -the US-, would cause some kind of an exploitation of the periphery, causing a failure to catch up with the core economies. This exploitation would cause public grievance and spur anti-American feelings. Thus, in World Systems Theory understanding, trade dependency on the United States should incur greater anti-Americanism.

The alternative approach to the World Systems Theory can be considered as the liberal International Relations Theory that underlines the importance of trade relations. Among the prominent scholars of Liberal IR, Oneal and Russett argue that in dyadic interstate relations, trade constitutes a mutually beneficial interaction. Both parties are economically better off and choose to relinquish aggressive policy options. For both importers and exporters, the cost of finding alternative trade partners because of interrupting violent conflict is costly. This situation could even harm the interests of countries. Oneal and Russett emphasize that trade and foreign investment provides a wider range of means of communications among states. Hence, economic interactions create a security community where use of violent force loses its status as a viable solution. The authors find statistical support for their argument that dependence on trade increases the odds of resorting to peaceful interstate relations. In addition, as the economic importance of trade decreases, the likelihood of conflict gravely increases. In addition, asymmetric trade relations do not change the odds for militarized dispute (Oneal and Russett, 1997). Oneal et al, find again support for the effect of trade dependency in decreasing the odds for militarized trade disputes (Oneal et al, 2003).

Although, much evidence in the literature suggests that increasing trade relations and dependency decreases the odds for interstate conflict, care should be taken before extending these findings to the public opinions of the countries engaging in trade. Goldsmith et al. inquire about the correlates of support of US war in Afghanistan by using the survey results of the Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001 which surveyed more than 60,000 participants in sixty-three countries. The researchers find in their analysis that trade relations which represent the shared economic interests with the United States do not influence general trust in the US. However, higher levels of trade positively influence trust in US foreign policy

(Goldsmith et al., 2005). Nevertheless, there are several problems with the designation of general trust in the US and the trust toward the US policy. Goldsmith et al. measures the former with the questions asking people's worry about bombing of the Afghan civilians and about the expansion of the war in Afghanistan toward a general war in Islam. On the other hand, the specific trust in the US foreign policy entails the general inquiry of whether people agree with the US operation in Afghanistan and again whether people agree on the involvement of their countries in Afghanistan mission along with the US (Goldsmith et al., 2005: 412-413). Unfortunately, the authors do not provide us with a strong theoretical support of their designation of trust to US foreign policies or to general trust in the US. This problematic, although not empirically, but theoretically creates a question mark on their results. However, their evidence still motivates an inquiry of the impact of trade volume with the US on anti-Americanism. Since increasing trade relations open up more connection channels of communication between states, I argue that this is the case for anti-Americanism. In other words, increasing trade relations with the US decreases anti-Americanism since more economic relations with the United States open up more channels of communication with the country and prevents further bias distorting the image of the US.

Economic Development and Anti-Americanism

As I suggested earlier, the most apparent problem with the attempts to explain the changes in anti-Americanism is some kind of a zealous focus on the US itself as the source of all problems. Such an approach tends to disregard the opposite side of the story; namely, the country which in possession the predominantly anti-American population. In other words, it can be an oversimplification to allocate the greatest amount of focus on the role of the US in generating anti-American attitudes. In accordance with this suggestion, the difference of anti-Americanism from any other anti-country cases requires greater scrutiny: It would be more surprising to expect a citizen of –say- Zimbabwe to be anti-Russian than to be anti-American. After all, both Russia and the United States can make mistakes in foreign policy issues. However, anti-Americanism can be an outcome of the imagined behavior of the US, and there closeness to US borders appears not to be an issue. For example, a Georgian can imagine US as an evil-doer as much as he or she imagines Russia or any neighbor similarly despite the fact that the former is miles and miles away from Georgia.

What makes the US accordingly distinctive is that it serves as a cue in many societies to represent any political aspect, as it is the most readily available foreign unit due to its

hegemonic status. Therefore, the US can be designated as evil, or as a supplier of an opposing faction within a country although it is not the reality. In this section, I argue that these tendencies of attribution can be related to the economic conditions of the societies in question. Ultimately, this relation brings the discussion of Polanyi's *Great Transformation* and Mousseau's *Economic Norms Theory* which seem to offer a comprehensive framework to understand the interplay between a society's economic conditions and anti-Americanism.

It is therefore necessary to have a sense of the process through which the US comes to be imagined in other countries. Accordingly, a discussion of media coverage of the United States requires some attention. A number of recent papers inquired the impacts of media and political identification in anti-Americanism with a focus on the Arab world. Nisbet and Myers (2011), in their survey analysis of 5 different Arab nations, find that exposure to transnational media channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia have an impact on people's perception of the United States. After all, as they point out, based on prior research, the US is physically and socially distant to Arab people. Therefore Arab public opinion needs cues about the US before forming judgments. Yet, the authors also show evidence that people's predispositions – here, the Arab people's political identities- cause variance on the evaluation of the information acquired from the transnational TV channels. In other words, Arab people are not directly anti-American, because they frequently watch Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabia. Different political identifications mediate the impact of exposure to these TV channels. The various Arab political identities that Nisbet and Myers underline are pro-Arab, pro-Muslim and pro-Statist ones. Their impact change from year to year and the strength of each identity changes the impact of exposure to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia in terms of anti-Americanism.

Somehow building on Nisbet and Myers' framework, Blaydes and Linzer (2012) contribute to the research field with an alternative framework. In this regard, the more countries have clash between secular and Islamist authorities, the more there is room for anti-Americanism. The reason is that both secular and Islamist opinion leaders use anti-Americanism as an instrument to compete each other. Especially in countries where neither Islamists, nor seculars have an absolute domination (e.g when both sides have a similar weights in the population), there is significant upward trends in anti-Americanism.

The main problem with both research projects is the omission of scrutiny of the structural circumstances that lead to diverging socio-political authorities and identities to clash in societies. In other words, Nispet & Myers (2011)'s and Blaydes & Lizer (2012)'s research offer a very detailed and valuable framework of clashing identities that lead to anti-Americanism in the Arab world. Yet, both for theoretical and policy implication purposes,

one might wonder when these clash of identities prevail, and what causes these identities. In this regard, I argue that economic development can play the role of filling the omitted points of the both research projects, in terms of generating a favorable environment for the clashing factions and political authorities within a society.

The first question we should ask throughout the analysis of the interplay between economic development and anti-Americanism is whether empirical evidence exists that support the link between economics and illiberal political attitudes. Indeed, recent research on modernization shows some empirical evidence on the correlation of economic development and political values related to economic insecurity (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; Abramson & Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The central claim of the modernization theory is that economic development has some impact on cultural, social and political life. Economic development drags the societies and their adherence to specific political and cultural values to a predictable direction.

Scholars attempt to establish a link between economic development and political attitudes in an empirical context. For example, Inglehart and Baker suggest that industrialization causes specialization in occupation, greater income and educational attainment levels. Coupled with these demographic shifts, some other changes follow such as gender roles, sexual norms, public- authority relations, greater political participation and less easily manipulated publics. Even though the leaders or the elites of the societies stand against changes for considerable time, in the long run they lose their capabilities for manipulating the public and change becomes imminent (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). However, the problem is the lack of a strong theoretical drive and a link between findings and the hypothesis of Inglehart and Baker. In other words, the inherent reasons why economic situation cause changes in people's political attitudes are not evident. At least, broadly speaking, these findings reinforce the expectancy that economic development will affect the social and political environment in a society.

An analysis of the impact of economic development on political values brings forth the necessity to scrutinize the modernization theory which might serve as a framework to understand how economics change personal values. The modernization theory was popular between the 1950's and 1960's. As Inglehart indicates, this theory assumed that economic development is linked with industrialization, urbanization, increasing mass education, occupational specialization, bureaucratization, development in communications. These patterns also are linked to further socio-cultural changes. The particularity of the modernization theory was that it possessed a power to predict socio-cultural changes by

analyzing economic changes. Yet, the theory was challenged by other theories such as dependency theory. Nevertheless, Inglehart (1997), with the support of a cross-national empirical analysis, contributed to the modernization theory. He argued that economic development still has a predictive power on socio-cultural changes within a society, yet there are several conditions which are not in line with what early modernization theorists would suggest:

(1) The impact of economic development is not a curvilinear one. Inglehart rather finds a diminishing impact of economic development on political values as income per capita increases. Upon the achievement of a certain level of economic development, there is less interplay between political values and economic development.

(2) Economic development does not per se cause modernization; rather there is reciprocity between the former and the latter. In other words, Inglehart does not offer a theoretical causation between the economic development and political values. He observes a correlation between two concepts.

(3) Modernization does not mean that countries are becoming more Western. Even though early modernization took place predominantly in the West, we observe more modernization trends in the East, namely Asia. Throughout this Modernization process, cultural factors still played a role and impeded a global convergence in similar political values. In other words, Inglehart finds in his analysis that cultural differences survive material changes within countries.

(4) Economic modernization does not generate more democratic regimes.

While analyzing the impact of economic modernization on political values, Inglehart adheres to some set of assumptions that he designates as the *theory of intergenerational change* which sheds light on the pace of societal value changes. He underscores two important hypotheses endorsing the theory of intergenerational change. The first is *Scarcity Hypothesis*, where the priorities of an individual reflect that individual's socio-economic status. Accordingly, an individual accords more importance to the needs which are relatively short in supply. By pointing out "needs" Inglehart refers to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The second hypothesis is *the Socialization Hypothesis* which argues that there needs to be a time-lag between the change in socio-economic conditions and value priorities, since people predominantly acquire values during their pre-adult years. Put simply, values are sticky. According to the scarcity hypothesis, the societies which have no large segments of population living below the poverty line and no majority of its people with economic insecurity tend to embrace more post-materialist values. In such circumstances, the societal

value emphasis shifts to esteem, intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. On the other hand, economic decline reverses such post-materialist processes. Yet, Inglehart argues that it is not perfectly so, provided that one should consider the cultural settings and institutions where at the same time economic changes take place. This institutional effect is mainly supported by the socialization hypothesis. In brief, societal changes do not happen overnight, but gradually, under the influence of cultural patterns (Inglehart, 1997).

Inglehart's further research shows that the non-curvilinear impact of economic modernization on political values repeats itself for the life satisfaction values which are designated, again by Inglehart as post-modern values. Accordingly, it appears that economic well-being does not show a constantly increasing impact on post-materialist value of life satisfaction. His evidence shows that there are diminishing-returns to life satisfaction by economic well being. To put it more specifically, Inglehart finds in his analysis that when income per capita reaches the threshold of 10,000 Dollars, the impact of economic well-being on life satisfaction is trivial. For example people living in Ireland seem to be happier than Germans who have much greater income per capita. In this fashion, Inglehart shows a logarithmic trend where, at the initial half, the returns to life satisfaction by economic well-being are significantly higher than the other half of the curve which entails richer countries. He argues that, at the initial half, the survival strategies for life consist of economic gains and security. As income per capita increases, people tend to give more priority to life-style (Inglehart, 2000).

Along with to the impacts of economic modernization, came some specific socio-political values to reinforce illiberal attitudes. For the sake of anti-Americanism, it might well be the survival political values that Inglehart analyzes (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Henceforth, it is necessary to analyze which patterns and concepts lead people to adhere to survival values that promote fear and suspicion against outside forces. A great part of the literature offers significant empirical findings with regards to survival values. Inglehart and Baker indicate that in countries where people cannot feel some sort of economic and physical security, there is an overwhelming adherence to survival political values. Survival values entail low tolerance and trust to others. Economic and physical well-being remain the priority, and overshadow self-realization values which prevail in post-materialist societies. People who cling to survival values feel threatened by foreigners, out-groups and societal change in general (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Nonetheless, these striking empirical findings cannot directly offer a framework or an a priori causal mechanism that clarifies the interplay between survival values, low tolerance and trust.

We have to rely on empirical evidence; yet, a more rigorous inquiry would need a stronger theory.

Another empirical finding is related to survival values is the personal support for authoritarian leaders. Materialist, rather than post-materialist countries, may demonstrate an overarching support for authoritarianism as a consequence of economic insecurity. Inglehart shows, politically speaking, that individual perception of insecurity promotes xenophobic attitudes and demands for strong and swift leaders. He provides the example of the countries that experienced huge movements of xenophobia during the Great Depression. Accordingly, societies suffering of economic insecurity paved the way for authoritarian and xenophobic leaders (Inglehart, 2000). Feldman, in his empirical analysis, shows that people who adhere to social conformity values may be more prone to worry about threats. They tend, for example to see social or political diversity within the society as a threat. Social conformists see deviating groups from the mainstream as potential sources of hostility. In general, what social conformists consider as threat are the issues in contradiction with their perception of social conventions. Hence, social conformists see traditional values as helping tools to regulate social behavior. In Feldman's analysis, the opposite of those social conformists are pro-individual autonomy people. Hence when they value autonomy, they stand against constraints to civil liberties. However, Feldman's analysis is restricted to a small American sample (Feldman, 2003). There is still room for a global inquiry about support for authoritarian leaders.

Another correlate of the survival values that needs greater emphasis is general distrust to other people. Inglehart (1997) shows his empirical evidence from an analysis of the World Values Survey that societal trust creates democratic norms and institutions. In democratic regimes, according to Inglehart, people trust that the incumbent political authorities will hand their power to the opposition if they fail in any democratic contest. At the same time, the author's findings support the fact that societal trust is strongly correlated with economic development (Inglehart, 1997). Nevertheless, we need a stronger theoretical background in order to understand the issue of trust. Literature on trust offers further evidence about the relation between national level economic conditions and the patterns of trust among citizens. The research provided by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) seems to highlight greater details and empirical evidence about the issue of trust that can contribute to a theoretical setting for further inquiry

The main caveat in the study of trust is that it is not related to a monolithic concept and bears different versions. Accordingly, based on the literature on trust, there are three types

of trust that might have an explanatory power of political survival values. These are trust among people, among groups within societies and among people of different nations. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) define what is called social trust as “*a measure of how people evaluate the moral fabric in their society.*” (p.43). In other words, social trust entails the evaluation of and feeling of trust to all segments of people within a defined society. Rothstein and Uslaner, accordingly, analyze the interplay between corruption, economic inequality and social trust. They show in a global sample that increasing economic inequality and political corruptions lead to less social trust. The impact of corruption is rather indirect such that it increases inequality and in the next step inequality again decreases social trust. The authors suggest that corrupt governments cannot execute a progressive and equitable taxation, because they find it more viable to distribute the benefits to solely loyal people, hence to a specific segment of the society. This targeted spending of corrupt governments enhances economic inequality because of the asymmetric distribution. The economic inequality causes according to Rothstein and Uslaner, what is called as “particularized trust” In other words particularized trust refers to a form of in-group trust. People only trust the others included in their social groups, and distrust those who are outside these groups. Any intention of the out-group people is trivial when particularized trust prevails. Therefore, particularized trust represents social strains among groups, and generates a context where members of different groups do not trust each other. This is contradictory to generalized trust, where there is a belief in the common fate of all people and all groups within a society. (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005)

There are further points to be noted in the nature of particularized trust. Rothstein and Uslaner consider in an a posteriori manner that, states with relatively early experience economic equality such as Scandinavian ones, tend to generate more generalized trust scores. Based on this finding, they claim that societies with considerable experience in economic inequality generate greater particularized trust and not general trust. Their assumption is that, the people who become disadvantaged during the unequal distribution of wealth tend to ask more radical re-distribution from their disadvantaged group. Additionally, such redistribution should be in a way to exclude others, especially the prior advantaged groups. In this manner, a form of distrust to other groups emerges. The authors find supporting evidence for these hypotheses in a cross-national dataset (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). The problem with Rothstein and Uslaner’s research stems from their assumption that when societies face unequal economic distribution, they also experience inner strains. Even though the authors support this finding with considerable empirical evidence, there is a missing point in the

theoretical background: The relative deprivation of the disadvantaged segments of the society is taken for granted and not adequately explored. In addition, the authors do not present an interest in the reciprocity of the issue. Thus it is unknown whether in societies whether there is inherent distrust or different groups seek political office in order to facilitate unequal distribution that will crowd out the groups which they distrust. Nonetheless, the authors' evidence on the relation between income inequality and social distrust is a valuable finding that sheds greater light on political survival values where there is evidence on which the issue of trust is embedded.

Reviewing the literature on particularized and generalized trust brings an inquiry of the international trust where people evaluate other countries. The understanding of international trust remains crucial provided that anti-Americanism is a consequence of the people's evaluation of a foreign country, namely the United States. Accordingly, Brewer et al. offer their analysis on how international trust in their American sample affects the evaluation of the US foreign policy and of some other nations. They argue that the concept of international trust stems from the phenomenon of low-knowledge rationality: People may act rationally in their political reasoning, yet they need not fully develop a coherent body of information shedding light on their actions. Instead they can use shortcuts to process information. In this regard, people develop heuristics with low-knowledge, or a bounded rationality method to assess their opinions. International trust is, as Brewer et al. suggest, a heuristic tool which helps to develop people's judgments about world affairs and other nations. There are two components of international trust: Social and political trust. The former basically refers to interpersonal trust that I just reviewed in the Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) analysis. The other form of trust is the political trust which simply consists of the trust in someone's own government. This trust predominantly involves evaluating the economic performance of a government. Brewer et al argue that the concept of international trust unites the social and political trust. In other words, they expect that people from some amount of international trust by using generalized trust or political trust as heuristics. The international trust therefore becomes a form of generalized belief with normative expectations about the conduct of other nations. The authors expect that low international trust should cause lower demand for international cooperation and higher isolationism. On the other hand, higher international trust causes greater demand for international cooperation and a better evaluation of the other nations. In their statistical analysis, the authors show evidence for the fact that first, social and political trust merge to form international trust. Second, international trust increases the odds for international cooperation against isolationism. Third and finally,

increasing international trust helps the respondents' evaluation of the foreign nations. However, these results only belong to a fully American sample as the authors explain (Brewer et al, 2004). The problem with Brewer et al.'s work is that they assume generalized and political trust to merge and form some sort of an international trust. Such assumption would need greater inquiry in theoretical aspects, nevertheless, as it is the case for the previous reviews, Brewer et al.'s findings serve as cues for the construction of a theoretical framework designating political survival values. Their empirical evidence shows us that generalizes trust within a society can play a role in that society's degree international trust toward other nations.

Overall, in materialist societies, economic insecurity might provoke illiberal attitudes. Considering the relevant literature, economic insecurity motivating fear of outsiders (i) correlates with middle level economic development; (ii) reinforces survival-oriented values; (iii) influences support for more authoritarian measures; (v) increases societal, political and international distrust. However, as I discussed in previous sections, none of the evidence shown in the literature provides information about exactly why economic insecurity generating illiberal attitudes happens. Such a theoretical necessity leads further scholarly work which I will present below that may account for a theoretically reinforced prediction of causation between anti-American attitudes and economic development.

The Great Transformation and Economic Norms Theory

Scholars show further supporting evidence in the literature that economic conditions in developing countries play a causal role in the support for terrorist or anti-American activities. Bloom offers an analysis of Palestinian support for terrorist activities. Accordingly, in the year 2000, the increase of corruption and unemployment within the Palestinian authority altered people's support for Hamas. The author thus proposes that these events signaling economic downturn tend to the increase the support for this organization's martyrdom activities. He also reports that such support rose to approximately 70% before the downturn era (Bloom, 2004). However, Bloom's findings do not show that Hamas is a less corrupt organization. His findings indicate that there is some empirical evidence showing that economic situation can facilitate support for terrorist activities. Goldsmith et al. test whether higher levels of economic development, for which they use GDP per capita as a proxy, influence a tendency to show less support for the US-led war in Afghanistan. Goldsmith et al. base their reasoning on Inglehart's theory of post-materialism which indicates that greater

economic welfare brings post-modern values such as less adherence to military security. They find that post materialist values, operationalized by GDP per capita, do not affect agreement or disagreement with the US war in Afghanistan. However countries with greater levels of GDP per capita appear to have greater trust in the US-led war on terror (Goldsmith et al., 2005).

However, the problem with these findings is that none of them predict the shape of the relationship between economic structure and anti-Americanism in a theoretically-driven manner. Therefore, in this section I will review the works of Polanyi and Mousseau consecutively who also contributed to the scholarly inquiry on the interplay between economic context and political attitudes. First, in order to have a fundamental grasp of the society-economic system relations, it is necessary to re-visit Polanyi (2001 [1944])'s approach on formation of markets and their political implications. His book *The Great Transformation* serves as the framework which is also helpful in understanding better how and why the economic norms theory takes place. Second, I review Mousseau's *Economic Norms Theory* which also accounts for a theoretical explanation for the interplay between economic circumstances and the political values which are products of these circumstances. Considering the Great Transformation and the *Economic Norms Theory*, theoretically speaking, the middle level of economic development bears a possibility to serve as the most adequate contextual framework for a considerable amount of anti-Americanism.

The Great Transformation

Karl Polanyi's famous masterpiece "The Great Transformation" provides a historical overview of the shifts in the economic systems of societies. Accordingly, it offers an anthropological and historical analysis which involves a comparison of the pre-market societies and the market societies. Indeed, the transition to market economies might be considered as the Great Transformation itself. The core tenet of Polanyi's work is that every society in fact has had some sort of an inherent economic mechanism. The mechanisms were not always guided by markets. Markets were more or less the production of the 19th Century. Additionally, market system is destined to destroy itself provided that it is a system far from what is natural, according to Polanyi (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]).

Polanyi shows some evidence from anthropological research that someone's economy takes its shape by that one's social relations. The possession of material goods tends to secure social status as opposed to safeguarding the economic status as it is prevalent in market economies. In pre-market societies, the production and distribution is facilitated via

reciprocity and redistribution. This redistribution system relocates the economic system within the social relationships. Therefore until the end of Western Feudalism, Polanyi points out that reciprocity, redistribution or house-holding defined the economic systems. These systems experienced some kind of centrality where the products were sent before the leader, the patron or the monarch of the society for the sake of redistribution. An important factor here is that the redistribution process had its customs, rules of behaviors specific to varying cultures. Nonetheless, according to Polanyi, the pursuit of economic gains never had its place among the codes and motivations of redistribution in the pre-market culture. Additionally, this pattern of production and distribution does not only hold for primitive societies, but feudal ones such as in Western Europe before Industrial Revolution as well (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]).

On the other hand, Polanyi asserts that the market has a different motive. Accordingly, the market system is a consequence of societal organization. Nonetheless, the society remains as an auxiliary body next to the market, and not intertwined with it like in the pre-market society-economy relations. Hence, the economic relations are not embedded in social relations; on the contrary social relations are shaped by the very economic system itself. What thus drives the market system is a society which takes its shape in a manner to allow for the market institutions to function purely. Under this logic, Polanyi indicates that a market economy can only exist under a market society, a society shaped by market institutions. The particularity of the market economy is that prices conduct the overall market mechanism, which is quite outside of what Polanyi considers as the natural state of humanity. Barter, exchange and truck are the principle economic behaviors which are best mediated within a market framework. Without a market, exchanges are suboptimal and price formation is impossible. The profit motivation and the self pursuit of happiness are products of the market societies. However development of markets is recent and did not take place before events like industrialization. Polanyi indicates that even in the most primitive societies, man did not hunt for himself or his household (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). Additionally, another important outcome of the emergence of the market system is the birth of the urban culture, in Polanyi's opinion. Urban centers arose from the markets, served as backgrounds for the markets and at the same time protected the markets from expanding to non-urban areas (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 65). Thus based on Polanyi's point, the marketization process also created an urban-rural dichotomy which defined the reach of the market zone.

Therefore overall, as Polanyi asserts, in the market culture, man's role came into a different shape. His or her labor is no more part of the regular activities of life unlike before. Labor became a commodity and market rules determined the transactions involving the

relevant supply and demand for it. This pattern, according to Karl Polanyi, annihilates the organic form of life and brings about a more individualistic culture. This annihilation process is organized by the principle of freedom of contract. The freedom of contract stood as a safeguard against non-contractual kinship, guild or neighborhood organizations (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]).

However, the development of the market-oriented economic systems did not proceed without any reaction. While the markets developed tremendously in the 19th Century, at the same time, a counter societal movement evolved which Polanyi designates as the “Double Movement”. This movement was against the commodification of the society. The main reason for the existence of counter-market movement within the double movement is that the market system commodified man and soil, thus rendering them vulnerable to any economic shocks just like a corporation which incurs profits and losses depending on the business cycles. In other words, the double movement was a reaction to become inhumane, unnatural based on Polanyi’s designation (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]).

Many cases in the recent history of marketization relate to the Double Movement dynamics. Polanyi provides the rise of fascism after the World War I as an example to the counter-market movement. It was a reaction to the depression caused by the liberal market system. The fascist movements sought to denaturalize the individualistic understanding of its constituents and to convert them into members of a political body. All these actions aimed, according to Polanyi, at getting rid of the perils of the marketization movement. The reason for the rise of fascism thus was not due to political, cultural or religious reasons. Polanyi contends that the market movement will destroy society. This is why Polanyi adheres to the concept of Double Movement as a societal response to the inhumane nature of the markets.

The problem behind the word “destroying” leads to questioning some of the assumptions of Polanyi. After all, was the bartering or pre-market economic system natural? According to Polanyi the answer tends to be affirmative (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). This is probably why he prefers to use “destroying” to designate that the market system annihilates what is natural. The likely concern here might be that Polanyi supports this assumption of pre-market bartering system as being natural with few cases. In other words, there is no rigorous evidence to prove it. However, Mousseau neither considers pre-market culture, nor the market culture as natural. His ENT mainly assumes that economic norms are social productions within the relevant economic framework that shapes the society. In other words pre-market systems such as bartering do not represent the natural condition of humanity. Economic

conditions lead to such economic systems which in turn create economic norms. The same is true for market societies as well (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau 2009).

Economic Norms Theory

It therefore becomes vital to inquire into the role of anti-Americanism in the Great Transformation framework. The concept of the Double Movement bears a potential to shed light on the clash between marketization and societal reactions to it. In economic norms theory, the main divergence from Polanyi's work is that Mousseau holds less assumptions than Polanyi in terms of what economic system is natural for human society: Neither the autarkic pre-market system nor the market-system are embedded in human nature. Both systems are social constructions based on material, in other words economic needs. Therefore both systems also help the creation of political norms as well which, during a certain stage of economic development provoke some sort of a clash of socio-economic civilizations with illiberal consequences (Mousseau, 2002/03).

Although there are a great number of works on the correlation between economic development and its socio-political impacts, the literature offers little emphasis on the impact of economic development on the illiberal political attitudes toward the United States. In economic norms theory, Mousseau makes a distinction between two types of economies; namely the clientelist and the market economies. The former can be observed predominantly in developing countries, while the latter in more developed and integrated market economies. It would not be a mistake to assume that almost all countries have a mixture of clientelist and market economy systems. However, especially in developing countries the clientelist system has greater influence on the overall system. ENT focuses on the clash in a society, throughout the economic transition period from a more clientelist system to a more market-oriented one (Mousseau, 2002/03).

In that regard, a solid understanding the features and the patterns of the clientelist systems are crucial in order to understand the negative impacts of the absence of economic norms. Keefer shows that in countries where the clientelist system prevails, political candidates fail to make credible public service promises to all segments of the public. It is much cheaper and preferable to engage in spending to a focused group and please the members of the group (Keefer, 2007). However, we still need a framework to understand how and why political patronage and clientelism takes place. Sabri Sayari offers us a useful

framework that sheds light on the understanding of patron-client relations. According to him, patronage is a type of social mechanism that regulates societal relations between people with unequal access to economic and political resources. In a society where vertical networks of society prevail, clientelism increases. In other words, Sayari assumes that those who have greater resources find themselves on the upper side of the vertical networks of society. The needs and the subsistence of the people with lower access to resources depend on those who are at the upper side of the vertical network. On the other hand, in the Western World, vertical hierarchies were replaced by horizontal ties during the industrialization process, thus Sayari assumes that there is less patronage. In developing countries, there is no similar modernization pattern and thus the *vertical networks* prevail. The vertical networks are built upon patron-client dyads. These dyads consist of face-to-face interactions of patrons and clients. According to Sabri Sayari, traditional clientelist relationships occur in the social settings where social integration is low, the state autonomy is weak and there are inequalities of land tenure (Sayari, 1977). The impact of patron-client relations might be severe as well. Keefer argues that, in the absence of the credibility of political actors, patron-client relations emerged. This pattern creates high targeted spending, high rent seeking and low levels of general public good provision without specific target (Keefer, 2007). As a consequence, in clientelist systems, cooperation takes place mostly within in-groups. The government cannot adequately supply all the groups by its provisions; thus, in-group solidarity remains the core for survival (Mousseau, 2002/03).

However, along with economic development and greater opportunity for market economies, adherents of the old clientelist system become unhappy with the marketization trend. When more market values entailing contractual and impersonal relations between the state and individual emerge, those who cling to clientelist values feel the threat to their previous prestigious status. In such situations, disrespect for the common rule of law and adherence to illiberal actions are likely to take place (Mousseau, 2002/03). In economically developing clientelist systems, in other words, there is a clash of market values with the old clientelist values because of economic development. In such a transition environment, demand for security might increase, and political entrepreneurs can shape such demands by promoting fear of outsiders (Mousseau, 2009).

It is however essential to come up with an answer to the question what can stand as the indicator of a market dominated system. Mousseau claims that the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes the more clientelistic from more market oriented economies is the presence of impersonal contractual relations in the latter, measured with contracts per capita. Indeed,

contracts per capita possess a strong explanatory power in a variety of topics in international relations. For example, countries with poor market economies, with less reliance on contractual relations tend to engage more frequently in military inter-state conflicts (Mousseau, 2009). In addition, countries with weak guarantees for contracts have less support for universal values such as human rights (Mousseau & Mousseau, 2008). Not surprisingly, contract rich countries also agree more on peace-related global issues (Mousseau, 2003). Here, the relationship the nature and the significance of contractual relations among individuals are significant.

Contract intensive development, according to Mousseau, is an alternative explanation for economic development. In contract intensive economies (CIE), individuals trust strangers, no matter their backgrounds are, in making contracts and satisfying contractual relations. Hence, people of the CIE support the preservation of the Westphalian interstate system where the rule of law overweighs power politics. In contractual relations, the preferences of both parties are explicit. Hence, people respect each other's rights. The bigger role the markets have, the more room for contractual relations occur. Mousseau also shows correlation between high income countries and contracting relations. In addition, higher interpersonal trust figures are correlated with contract-intensiveness. In fact the contract intensity creates a bounded rationality among people. In other words, people obtain cognitive habits about bartering, trading in sustained contract intensive economies. Mousseau uses life insurance agreements and economic securities as a proxy for the degree of contract-intensity since these factors hedge people from patrons and clientelist networks under the guarantee of the central state (Mousseau, 2009).

Further it is possible that the shortage of contractual relations in an economically developing country can result in a social level modernization crisis. This is hence the societal modernization crisis which creates societies justifying anti-Americanism or anti-American terrorism. For example, Crenshaw points out that modernization has created an environment which facilitates the occurrence of terrorism. As all levels of society get more complex and the structure of economics become more vulnerable and offer opportunities, technological improvements allow more sophisticated communication and logistic systems. Hence there is ample room for terrorist organizations to maneuver (Crenshaw, 1981). In addition to extremist public manifestation, Mousseau discusses the possible emergence of a bitter form of anti-Americanism during the transition from clientelist to market-based economies. As people can observe news and events related to United States via an ever expanding media network, the United States becomes the most available scapegoat of the modernization grievances

(Mousseau, 2002/03). Therefore the economic modernization crisis which is rooted in economic norms theory of Mousseau prepares the societal framework for the clashes that lead to anti-Americanism which Nisbet & Myers (2011) and Blaydes & Linzer (2012) inquire in the Arab world. What I additionally argue is that economic modernization crisis can occur not only in Arab world but also in the rest of the globe.

For example Russia has been undergoing the process of transition from clientelistic Soviet System to market system. Mendelson and Gerber offer an analysis of the Russian youth which have been affected by Vladimir Putin. President Putin provides his supporters with a quite anti-American discourse. Accordingly he blames the foreign governments for financing the Russian non-governmental organizations in order to manipulate Russia's internal affairs. In this regard, Putin strongly criticizes the United States as trying to impose its culture, ideas, policies and interests on the rest of the world. Additionally, Putin goes as far as comparing the US to Nazi Germany. Such discourses might have an impact on Russian youth. The authors provide survey results indicating that 80 percent of the Russians believe that the US trying to impose its interests and culture on Russia (Mendelson & Gerber, 2008). It is no doubt that Russia suffers of the grievances of economic transition and the changes in the economic culture. Under this framework, President Putin seeks to motivate its supporters by fueling some sort of an anti-American sentiment. In addition, as the authors show, Putin's attempts seem to pay off, based on polling results.

Overall, illiberal outcomes are expected from the clash of market and pre-market clientelistic cultures. Countries in the midst of the economic development may experience Double Movements of marketization and anti-marketization problem or the economic development crisis, generating a structural cause for the rise of anti-Americanism. Analytically-speaking, I expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between economic development and anti-Americanism; where the top of the curve represents middle level economic development which is a simple indicator of dynamic economic development where market culture is unstable and generates social reactions. Additionally, economic development coupled with the contractual deficit can constitute the economic modernization crisis stage which also can be associated with higher anti-Americanism.

3) INDIVIDUAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CORRELATES of ANTI-AMERICANISM

In addition to social level correlates of anti-Americanism, there are also individual factors reflecting someone's education, economic situation and his or her personal grievances

from these situations. For example, Kim conducts a multilevel analysis on the correlates of the evaluation of US soft power in seven Asian countries: China, India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. His results show that positive sociotropic and egotropic economic evaluations and the overall trust in multinational companies increase Asian trust toward the US soft power (Kim, 2009). Obviously, Kim's findings suggest that the interpretation of some specific features of the US policies tend to vary based on the individual economic motivations of the respondents. Therefore, in a study of anti-Americanism, it is necessary to inquire individual level socio-economic motivations of the individuals which might possess some potential in their evaluation of anti-Americanism. In this section, I present an inquiry into the impact of levels of education, poverty, urban poverty and income dissatisfaction on anti-Americanism.

Education:

There are distinct findings in terms of the effects of greater levels of education of political perceptions. In their paper written in 1964, Ewing and Harrell show against the conventional wisdom that, the caricaturization and negative attributions to American businesses do not stem from poor and uneducated people. Based on contemporary events in Japan, Venezuela, Peru and similar countries, they indicate that young students and educated men and women tended to condemn more American businesses as imperialistic and viciously capitalistic (Ewing and Harrell, 1964). Bobo and Licari find in their analysis that greater levels of education, in fact, increase tolerance for modestly disliked groups. However, in cases when people have an extreme resentment toward the target group, greater levels of education do not significantly generate tolerance (Bobo and Licari, 1989). Shabad and Slomczynski conduct an experimental analysis in Poland among students to understand whether liberal values like support for democracy and market economy can be learned from a state sponsored civic education system. Compared to the students who did not undergo a civic education, those who underwent a civic education tended to avoid clinging to extreme attitudes such as being anti-democratic, anti-market or pro-democratic and pro-market (Shabad and Slomczynski, 1998).

On the other hand, some scholars point out the contextual factors that can mediate the years of education. Weil argues that the "the institutionalized regime or societal values" have more predictive power over whether higher levels of education provide more liberal values. He claims that education more likely provides liberal norms long-term liberal democracies (Weil, 1985). Similar to Weil, Gentzkov and Shapiro indicate that higher levels of education

generate different outcomes across countries. According to their research, the respondents with higher education in Kuwait and Pakistan have greater tendency to consider the events of 9/11 as unjustifiable. In Turkey, Iran and Indonesia the effect of higher education tends to be similar yet not significant. On the other hand, in Lebanon, the researchers found insignificant evidence for higher education to increase justification of 9/11 activities. Finally, in Morocco, highly educated people tend to justify the 9/11 attacks more. Hence, the authors consider it is necessary to analyze the content of the knowledge acquired by education (Gentzkov and Shapiro, 2003).

Overall, the literature related to the interplay between education and liberal or illiberal political attitudes does not have a consensus about the direction of the impact of education. Moreover, as I pointed out above, some illiberal actions can also be related to greater levels of education. Yet, the impact of the education might also change based on the content of the evaluated information. In terms of information about the US and Americans, as I reviewed in the previous sections, there is information with empirical validity and misinformation at the same time. Indeed, greater years of education might well eradicate some of the misinformation about the United States by allowing greater access to empirical reality. In other words, greater levels of education might undermine the prejudices about the US. After all, anti-Americanism does not fully entail extremely illiberal attitudes such as justification of terrorist acts. Hence, greater years of education per se might decrease anti-American attitudes by eradicating claims that are short of empirical validity.

Additionally, contextual factors might alter the impact of education. There are two points that are crucial in this regard: First, higher levels of education may serve as a way of justifying anti-American attitudes in some of the countries, since we can assume that countries have different political and educational institutions affecting public opinion. Therefore, there may be higher level contextual impacts on the interplay between the level of education and anti-Americanism. Second, the educational institutions in developing countries might induce greater justification for anti-Americanism to remedy the burdens of economic modernization. In line with this argument, the increasing effects of higher levels of education in middle income countries which are in the midst of their modernization process. This is mainly possible because, in societies where there is a modernization crisis due to the bitter process of economic transformation, some leaders can promote education that demonizes outside forces such as the United States to protect their status and to guarantee their legitimacy via educational means.

Income Dissatisfaction:

Inglehart, in several of his studies, finds evidence for the fact that economic distress and income dissatisfaction are involved in the determining factors of survival values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). In addition, Amato and Zuo, in their American sample, show evidence that poverty brings low level of social support, family life dissatisfaction, lack of extending social networks under the constraint of very few economic resources. Based on these circumstances, the authors also argue that poverty generates low psychological well-being (Amato and Zuo, 1992). However, Mousseau brings a different explanation for the impact of poverty on illiberal attitudes. He argues that support for Islamic terror cannot be related to poverty or economic deprivation as rationalist choice theorists would claim. His reasoning is straight such that if poverty increased support for terror 50 years ago, a great number of people around the world would support Islamist terror since there was greater amount of poverty and worse living conditions (Mousseau, 2002/03: 7; Mousseau, 2011: 39). Alternatively, Burgoon (2006) analyzes the impact of social spending on transnational terrorist activities. He argues that lack of social spending spurs income inequality, which in return brings economic insecurity and social discontent. His cross-sectional and pooled time-series analysis offer some evidence for the decreasing impact of social spending on transnational terrorist activities (Burgoon, 2006).

On the other hand, poverty might very well constitute a problem if it transforms into income dissatisfaction. Mousseau tests the fact whether income dissatisfaction influences the terror in defense of Islam among Muslim nations. He argues that income dissatisfaction might be justification of poverty because of the concept of relative deprivation. The term relative deprivation refers to a personal dissatisfaction due to the discrepancy between an expected and actual outcome (Mousseau, 2011). Hence, income evaluation might serve as a better indication of poverty, because we do not know whether people are aware of their conditions. Accordingly, income evaluation might account for the impact on a direct poverty measurement is supposed to generate which is an individual manifestation of economic grievance.

Urban Poverty

Michael Mousseau tests support for Islamic terror in terms of justification of suicide bombing actions. His findings show that among Muslim people education, poverty, religiosity, urbanity and income dissatisfaction have no effects on their justification of terror in the defense of Islam. Indeed, the interaction of poverty and urbanization has a significantly

increasing effect on the justification of Islamic terror. Accordingly, in countries experiencing modernization crisis, people who suffer poverty in urban places are more likely to find support for Islamic terror justifiable. This causal mechanism finds its roots in the patronage system, created by different groups in the urban zones of countries where the state administration fails to provide services to all of its citizens. People, short of public good provision in urban places, look for salvation within the patronage networks. In Muslim countries, such networks might be controlled by extreme religious groups who are looking and competing for their potential clients –which predominantly are the urban dwellers suffering poverty. In brief, urban poverty which is considered by Mousseau, as a sign of modernization crisis has an increasing effect over the tendency to justify Islamic terror (Mousseau, 2010). However, we should note that Mousseau’s analysis is limited to the Muslim countries which are either in their midst of development process or in the very early stages of development. Yet, since the interaction of urbanity with poverty might well designate an individual level of manifestation of modernization crisis, it is necessary to inquire into its impact on anti-Americanism.

* * *

To sum up, throughout the review of literature, I encountered a great diversity of claims with regards to what causes anti-Americanism. In this chapter, I reviewed scholarly claims about the impacts of actual US foreign policies, of the perception of US foreign policies, of the middle level economic development and some other individual level socio-economic items that might have an impact on anti-Americanism. I provide, below this paragraph, the summary of the hypotheses that I aim to test based on the discussion I offered in this chapter. However, in addition to the inquiry of the correlates of anti-Americanism, a clear definition and operationalization of anti-Americanism is necessary before engaging in empirical operations. Therefore in the next chapter, I offer an in depth review of literature aiming to answer what is anti-Americanism and which items constitute such a concept.

Overview of the hypotheses discussed in Chapter II:

H₁: Living in the perimeters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict creates a social correlate that increases anti-Americanism

H₂: American bilateral economic and military aid to authoritarian regimes increases anti-Americanism

H₃: As a country's relative capability to the US declines, its citizens become more anti-American

H₄: As a country's alliance status with the United States declines, its citizens become more anti-American

H₅: Greater trade dependency to the US increases (World Systems Theory) / decreases (Liberal IR Theory) anti-Americanism

H₆: Middle level economic development or contract poverty during economic transition stage toward a more market-oriented system increases anti-Americanism.

H₇: Greater levels of education decreases anti-Americanism, but in middle level economic development countries, greater levels of education's impact is reversed

H₈: Urban poverty increases anti-Americanism

H₉: Economic satisfaction and greater personal income possession decrease anti-Americanism.

TABLES:**TABLE 2.1: COW Capability index in 2007 and 1945**

<i>Country</i>	2007	1945
1-China	0.20	0.09
2-USA	0.14	0.38
3-India	0.07	n/a
4-Japan	0.04	0.05
5-Russia	0.04	0.12
6-Brazil	0.02	0.01
7-Germany	0.02	0.08
8-South Korea	0.02	n/a
9-United Kingdom	0.02	0.09
10-France	0.02	0.02

Notes: (i) “Cinc” is sorted by 2007 indicators.

(ii) For 1945, S. Korea and India data are missing.

TABLE 2.2: Summary of Military Interstate Dispute demands made by the United States

Type of Revisionary Demand	Frequency	Percentage
Policy Change	46	0.75
Regime/Government Change	11	0.18
Other Demands	1	0.02
Territorial Demand	3	0.05
Total	61	1.00

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX 2.1 - MIDs between 1945 and 2007, where US was a revisionary state

<i>Dispute Number</i>	<i>Start Year</i>	<i>End Year</i>	<i>Demanded Issue</i>
125	1958	1958	2
1217	1967	1967	2
1801	1961	1961	2
1806	1968	1969	2
2227	1980	1980	2
2578	1986	1986	2
2740	1987	1988	2
2741	1987	1988	2
2775	1988	1989	2
2845	1957	1957	2
2929	1965	1967	2
2931	1967	1967	2
2934	1967	1967	2
2936	1969	1969	2
2941	1969	1969	2
2943	1971	1971	2
2946	1971	1971	2
2947	1971	1971	2
2948	1972	1972	2
2949	1972	1972	2
2952	1974	1974	2
2953	1975	1975	2
2954	1975	1975	2
2958	1976	1976	2
2960	1976	1976	2
2971	1981	1981	2
2972	1981	1981	2
2978	1982	1982	2
2979	1982	1982	2
2981	1983	1983	2

Notes: (i) Demanded Issue=1 Territorial demands, =2 Policy change demands, =3 regime/government change demands, =4 other demands

(ii) In all the disputes, the US is the revisionary state, and makes demands

APPENIX 2.1 (continued) - MIDs between 1945 and 2007, where US was a revisionary state (continued)

<i>Dispute Number</i>	<i>Start Year</i>	<i>End Year</i>	<i>Demanded Issue</i>
3021	1979	1979	2
3065	1983	1983	2
3071	1983	1983	2
3099	1981	1981	2
3551	1992	1996	2
3636	1986	1986	2
3903	1989	1989	2
3950	1990	1990	2
3972	1991	1991	2
4125	1999	1999	2
4137	1998	1999	2
4174	1997	1998	2
4195	1996	1996	2
4213	2000	2000	2
4217	1998	1998	2
4227	1998	1998	2
61	1962	1962	3
246	1960	1961	3
1193	1954	1954	3
1742	1959	1959	3
2217	1961	1961	3
2742	1987	1987	3
2977	1982	1982	3
3058	1983	1983	3
3901	1989	1989	3
4016	1993	1994	3
4283	2001	2001	3
4261	2000	2000	4
633	1950	1950	1
2052	1951	1952	1
50	1953	1956	1

Notes: (i) Demanded Issue=1 Territorial demands, =2 Policy change demands, =3 regime/government change demands, =4 other demands

(ii) In all the disputes, the US is the revisionary state, and makes demands

CHAPTER III – DESIGNING ANTI-AMERICANISM

Reconsidering what I briefly argued in the introductory chapter, it is challenging to come up with a universal and coherent definition of anti-Americanism, since people do not disfavor the United States because of similar concerns regardless of their background. After all, as Kohut and Stokes rightly assert: “*With the advent of globalization, the focus on America now encompasses not only U.S. military and foreign policy actions abroad, but also global discontent with those American values that affect the daily lives of people around the world*” (Kohut and Stokes, 2006). In other words, along with the increasing pace of globalization, more features of the United States are exposed to the rest of the world. Hence people overall have many more items to consider before generating negative views or attitudes toward the United States. It is nonetheless a sound and a practical concern for especially American policy-makers to understand anti-Americanism and revise their country’s image if necessary. Therefore, despite all the different versions, the necessity to hold a general definition providing a sense of what anti-Americanism is remains salient. It is the extent of this definition which should supersede the concerns for how people understand anti-Americanism in their own fashion.

In this chapter, I first offer a literature review concerning how the concept of anti-Americanism should be approached for the sake of coming up with a coherent measurement. Second, I indicate my implications and the empirical results of the measurement stages which led me to come up with the measurement of anti-Americanism that I am going to use in the coming chapters. Based on the empirical evidence and theoretical guidance, I will argue for a simplistic measurement of anti-Americanism involving a general evaluation the US and Americans. My main reason is that a more detailed score controlled by different features of the United States will only narrow the theoretical reach of the measurement. Additionally, separate measurements of the different versions of anti-Americanism do not make great sense, provided that these scores are highly correlated to allow for separate analyzes. This solution becomes viable especially for the attempts to evaluate a cross-culturally acceptable measurement of anti-Americanism. Not only does a common consensus in the literature, but also empirical evidence from my dataset show that what people understand of anti-Americanism varies by country.

Some scholars begin by introducing their analysis of anti-Americanism with a straight and simple definition. For example, Andrei Markovits and Lars Rensmann define anti-Americanism as a generalized hostility toward the United States and the Citizens of the

United States (Markovits & Rensmann, 2007). Katzenstein and Keohane, as I also indicated in the first chapter, define anti-Americanism as a psychological tendency to possess negative attitudes toward the US and Americans (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007a). Paul Hollander defines anti-Americanism as an unfocused and irrational distaste based on intuitions. This antipathy is directed toward the United States, its government, its institutions, its foreign policies, its values, its people and its culture. It feeds itself by a motive of scapegoating. Hollander contends that anti-Americanism in this respect is similar to chauvinistic nationalism which seeks to denigrate other nations to bolster inner self-esteem (Hollander, 1995). Nonetheless, it is the underlying cognitive process that leads to a coherent understanding of anti-Americanism.

A great variety of scholars consider anti-Americanism as an irrational or prejudiced set of attitudes. Therefore, I present three different but not completely discrepant designation of anti-Americanism: Paul Hollander posits that anti-Americanism would not be an interesting scholarly topic if it was a rational response. After all, nobody tried to elaborate more on anti-Nazism sentiments, provided that it was a national response to evil policies of Nazi Germany (Hollander, 1995). Markovits and Rensmann suggest that anti-Americanism, similar to other prejudices, consists of beliefs which demonize and devalue some a priori set of stereotypes; so as to say, constructed others. The others are the United States and Americans. However, the authors suggest that anti-Americanism deviates from other sorts of prejudices, particularly because the former includes discrimination against the different features of a superpower (Markovits & Rensmann, 2007).

Another approach to define anti-Americanism stems from the assumption that it signifies anti-modernity. Haig Patapan argues that anti-Americanism is neither a literary, nor a geographical concept. It refers to a more political concept. Accordingly, the author suggests that the foundation process of the United States of America was an experiment of modernity. This experimental process created its “pro”s and “anti”s. Under this dichotomy, Patapan considers that anti-Americanism is in a way related to what is anti-modern and thus anti-Americanism is a critic of modernity. After all, with all of its achievements and deficiencies, the United States surpasses the stage of being only a state like others. As a case of modernity by its foundation, it has some political and theoretical claims. These claims are confronted by the rest of the world and sometimes also allow for what we call anti-Americanism (Patapan, 2007). Even though these definitions account for their logical pattern, they fail to grasp a greater reach in the definition of anti-Americanism. In other words, defining anti-Americanism as “reaction against modernity” or as a “kind of prejudice” exceeds the

boundaries of the definition. I argue that these suggestions should be in the definition of anti-Americanism, but should constitute the independent correlates which shape a more general definition of anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism as a heuristic

Another concern in the discussion of anti-Americanism is its constructed-ness and subjectivity. Unlike the anti-Americanism, we do not encounter much talk about anti-Italianism, anti-Brazilianism and so on. The main reason is that the USA is not just a place like any other country; but it is also a *place of imagination* (Friedman, 2008). Most people do not see the United States with their own eyes, but via national media coverage or other sorts of mediums where the varying portrayals of the US take place. In his analysis of European anti-Americanism during the Cold War, Pierangelo Iserna discusses the salience of the physical existence of the Americans in Europe shaping opinion toward the US and Americans. Europeans actually had significant physical contact with Americans at the immediate post World War process. However, as the US troops started to leave the old continent along with the start of Marshall Aid, Europeans had nothing but national media coverage which described them the United States and Americans (Iserna, 2007).

In addition, the particularity of anti-Americanism is that US can reach every place in different ways. It would be a futile effort to look for, say, interesting amount of anti-Brazilianism in Japan or in Mongolia. Even though globalization is considered to erode the distances among countries, a Mongolian would not find much reason for justifying some sort of anti-Brazilianism or anti-Nicaraguanism. However, a Mongolian would probably find significantly much more reasons to be anti-American. This is because there is definitely more than what the United States actually is in anti-Americanism. A Mongolian can definitely hate the United States as much as he or she hates China. Brendon O'Connor suggests that the United States has been a reference point as a friend, as an enemy, as a threat, as a source of anxiety (O'Connor, 2007). In other words, anti-Americanism bears a tendency to serve as a heuristic for expressing displeasure with some political or social facts phenomena. Indeed, Katzenstein and Keohane's reference to a form of schema which guides relevant attitudes is another way of designating anti-Americanism as a heuristic. However, the schema can be empirically based or bear some gaps to be filled with *a priori* thoughts (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007a). In addition to the adherence of the constructed-ness of anti-Americanism, some scholars cast complete doubt on the existence of an ideal form of anti-Americanism.

Richard Crockatt is one of the scholars who question the existence of anti-Americanism. Indeed, he admits that there is rejection of and opposition against the US foreign policies worldwide. However, he asks whether these oppositions aggregate in a form of anti-Americanism. In other words, Crockatt is suspicious about the fact that there is a form of anti-Americanism that shows an aggregate pattern of dislike toward the US, Americans, American culture and so on (Crockatt, 2007).

Katzenstein and Keohane offer a more detailed analysis in their understanding of the heuristic dimension of anti-Americanism by emphasizing the usefulness of *schemas*, *identities* and *norms* in their discussion. The authors indicate that a *schema* has a function very similar to a heuristic. In other words, a schema constitutes some sort of a cognitive mechanism which makes use of narratives, analogies, symbols and metaphors in order for the attitudes to become meaningful. Schemas can be quite empirically constructed or contain significant bias because of the empirical gaps within. *Identities* serve as behavior regulating mechanisms by creating social norms leading to creation and separation of groups. Katzenstein and Keohane point out that anti-Americanism's functions resemble those of nationalism in terms of identity-making. In his regard, anti-Americanism can contribute to the formation of identity. Finally, anti-Americanism can bear a normative status with do's and don'ts. *Norms* are not neutral but biased and determine what is appropriate or not. The authors provide an example of how anti-American norms can work: During protests against the United States' occupation of Iraq, it was socially inappropriate to salute the American flag, but appropriate to shout against George Bush or burn the American flag. Hence overall, anti-Americanism can take the form of individual attitudes or of a reflection of collective thinking. The authors conclude that anti-Americanism is enmeshed in cognitive schemas, emotions and norms (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007a).

An alternative explanation for the cognitive mechanism of anti-Americanism is brought upon by Pierangelo Isernia. He provides a detailed framework for the formation mechanism of the mass beliefs about the United States. Yet, his analysis only covers some West European countries, thus there are problems of universality of his framework. Accordingly, in order for a belief system to emerge, there should first be an object, which is here the United States. Second there should be some attributes related to this object such as democracy, capitalism or foreign policy. Third, people should possess positive or negative attributions to these items. Fourth, these attributions should contribute to the formation of a more general belief about the United States. However, these steps are not to be simplified into a mere ensemble of negative evaluations of the attributes of the United States. It is necessary

that these negative evaluations form a more coherent body of anti-American feelings that distort the evaluations of all the alternative items (Isernia, 2007).

Anti-Americanism or anti-Americanisms

Another approach to anti-Americanism is to divide it into different concepts and offer an analysis for each of these distinct concepts. Brendon O'Connor argues that if anti-Americanism designates negative attitudes toward the US and then asks people if their favorability of the US can work. However, he is wary about such a singular measurement (O'Connor, 2007). O'Connor is not the only scholar with such a concern. The literature on anti-Americanism presents a variety of combinations regarding the attempts of classifying anti-Americanism.

In their paper published in 1973, Tai, Peterson and Gurr come up with two dimensions of Anti-Americanism, which are labeled "resistance" and "scapegoat". Resistance considers Anti-Americanism as a justifiable act against the American penetration in economies and cultures of societies as well as American military intervention. On the other hand, scapegoat perception is an ideological hostility toward the United States (Tai, Peterson and Gurr, 1973). Rubinstein and Smith show two different kinds of anti-Americanism in their analysis of US-Third World relations. The first is issue oriented anti-Americanism where a country's government and the US cannot come to the terms in a policy debate and clash. The second is ideological anti-Americanism where the US is perceived as the root of all evil. Marxism, Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism generate this ideological anti-Americanism (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988). An example of "scapegoat" anti-Americanism is in Kim, Parker and Choi's analysis of South Korean attitudes toward the US. Even though they do not use the term scapegoat, they propose "ideological Anti-Americanism" which refers to holding the United States accountable for the ever continuing problems of Korea. (Kim, Parker, Choi, 2006). Additionally, Krastev proposes two current kinds of anti-Americanism: "murderous anti-Americanism" and "anti-Americanism lite". The former refers to the more terrorism related anti-Americanism; whereas the latter entails a lighter, less fanatical version of anti-Americanism. In murderous anti-Americanism, terrorists are willing to sacrifice themselves to harm the US. However, anti-Americanism lite refers to people on the streets who protest the US and to media campaigns against the US (Krastev, 2004)

Naim offers five different categories of anti-Americanism: (1) Politico-economic anti-Americanism, which refers to the active opposition toward US foreign policies. (2) Historical anti-Americanism which stems from the past deeds of the United States. (3) Religious anti-

Americanism which refers to the reactions of the religious fundamentalists. However, this dimension does not only refer to Islamic fundamentalism, but to any other religion's fundamentalist parts. (4) Cultural anti-Americanism which is a manifestation of the worries that the American culture threatens local cultures. (5) Psychological anti-Americanism, which emerges because of the resentment brought forth by the jealousy of US values such as freedom, capitalism and democracy (Naim, 2002).

Katzenstein and Keohane offer a more detailed and coherent classification of anti-Americanism. They divide the concept of Anti Americanism under liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical categories where from liberal to radical Anti-Americanism, the intensity of the negative feeling increases. In liberal anti-Americanism, people generally agree on the ideal features of the United States. However, they criticize the United States for not acting based on its ideals. They find the US hypocritical since in practice it fails to fulfill its stated ideals. Especially in Great Britain, and in countries under the influence of Great Britain, liberal anti-Americanism seems to be prevalent. However, liberal anti-Americans would never plant bombs in US-related buildings or engage in anti-American terrorist activities. Social anti-Americanism is more related to the disagreement with the free-market principles of the US. Such manifestations of anti-Americanism get rooted predominantly in social democratic countries such as Scandinavian countries or Germany. There is a general stress that American policies favor the rich over the poor. However, social anti-Americanism is not a radical form of anti-Americanism and agrees with the democratic principles of the United States. Sovereign-national anti-Americanism can occur in three ways: the first is through strong nationalist sentiments. The second is through stress on sovereignty. In places like Middle East or Asia, an important number of countries obtained their sovereignties the hard way, namely by violent conflicts. Hence, the sacredness of these wars of liberation boosts anti-American sentiment. The last form of sovereign-national anti-American sentiment occurs through state leaders' quest to recover their previous international prestige. There is the perception that the old might was un-rightfully replaced by the current might of the US. Radical anti-Americanism bears a total stance against American institutions, actions, cultural traits and economics. Marxist-Leninist movements are good examples of radical anti-Americanism. There is no strict requirement for violent reactions to the US, but radical anti-Americanism does not dismiss destruction of American values (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007a).

Empirical debates on anti-Americanism

The debate on how to come up with a measurement of anti-Americanism is widespread and far from reaching a consensus among scholars. The overall problem is similar to theoretical debates of anti-Americanism which somehow limit the concept by adding features. Giacomo Chiozza is concerned about contending only with an assessment of the question of general favorability about the US. He argues that people might be more enthusiastic about answering a general favorability question. However, when people encounter deeper and more specific features of the US, they might fail to reflect their initial enthusiasm of the US. Chiozza's solution is to run separate regressions for each question related to the United States. For example, a regression has a general evaluation of the United States as the dependent variable, while the other has the evaluation of US technology and scientific achievements (Chiozza, 2007). Not far from Chiozza, Brendon O'Connor criticizes the PEW question asking respondents their rate of favorability about the US in general⁸. Accordingly, although the PEW surveys bring influential data on US favorability trends, this general question pushes respondents to consider the US as a monolithic bloc. O'Connor argues that the question should be more complex and more precise (O'Connor, 2007a). Marc Lynch offers the different aspects of Jordanian public opinion toward the United States, based on the Zogby Poll conducted in 2004. While 83 percent of Jordanians are reported to admire American technology, 57 percent favored American freedom, 56 percent favored American television; yet only 2 percent approved the US policies toward Iraq and 8 percent favored US policies toward Arabs (Lynch, 2007). To conclude that the Jordanians are anti-American, based solely on the low figures of 2 percent or eight percent in Zogby Poll ignores the Jordanian enthusiasm for other features of the US such as science or entertainment.

A number of scholars suggest controlling the general evaluation of the United States with several other concepts to obtain a more sound measurement of anti-Americanism. Giacomo Chiozza, in his extensive analysis of PEW 2002 dataset, expresses the salience of the term "politeness norm" in determining whether people are anti-American or not. A respondent might have a negative view toward the US (having unfavorable or somewhat favorable view of the United States). Nonetheless, the respondent might have declared itself as having negative views on the US, because she or he also has negative views on other countries. Hence, in order to create a consistency within, which Chiozza names "politeness

⁸ In PEW 2002 with 44 country dataset, the question is "What is your opinion of the United States?"

norm”, the person might stick to anti-Americanism. The same pattern is true when the vice versa happens. In other words, people might express favorable views toward the United States because they also have favorable views of other countries and that they desire to keep an internal consistency about favoring countries in general. Based on the interaction between favorability of other countries and of the US, Chiozza offers four categories. The first is called “contrarians” where people have negative feelings both against the US and the other countries. The second is “politically correct people” who have positive feelings toward the US and toward other countries. The third category is “anti-Americans” where people tend to dislike US, yet favor other countries. The final category is “pro-Americans” where people disfavor other countries when they have positive attitudes toward the US (Chiozza, 2007).

There are nonetheless two problems with Chiozza’s “politeness norm”. The first is that it narrows down the concept of anti-Americanism and dismisses the nationalist component of the topic itself because the unfavorable views of other countries might well be inherent in anti-Americanism. In other words, although Chiozza’s suggestion makes intuitively great sense, it risks a model misspecification about anti-Americanism. The second problem is a more technical one about how Chiozza operationalized the politeness norm in the PEW dataset. He only uses the question “What is your opinion about the dominant country in the region?” (Chiozza, 2007) For each country PEW provides a different dominant country of the region of interest (For further detail, see PEW GAP 2002 Dataset codebook). However, there is no coherent explanation about why a country was chosen as a dominant country in the region over another. For example PEW 2002 indicates Mexico as a regional dominant country over Canada. Nevertheless, for further research in the future about anti-Americanism, Chiozza’s theory needs greater scrutiny because it could contribute to the debate of whether anti-Americanism is a biased form of opinion or not.

An alternative way of measuring anti-Americanism is to put different questions related to the United States into a factor analysis rather than using a single question. Cullen et al. find three different factors out of different specific questions related to the evaluation of the United States among Canadian participants. The first factor consists of questions related to critics of the United States, pointing out what is wrong with the United States. The second factor score consists of items related to measuring the suggestion that Canada should take measures to hedge itself from the United States. The authors argue that the first factor score is more like an emotional manifestation of anti-Americanism, whereas the second is a more rational one. The third factor score again contains critics of the United States which are this time more related to its status (Cullen et al., 1978a).

Dallas Cullen and his colleagues offer one of the earlier struggles to come up with a coherent quantitative measurement of anti-Americanism. Their a priori concern is that anti-Americanism does not include a distaste of all the different features related to the US and the Americans. Their analysis involves only Canadian public opinion. Accordingly, a Canadian might not complain about Americans as individuals, but might stand against the societal features of the United States. Likewise, a distaste of American foreign policy might not bring forth disfavor of American people. In this regard, before analyzing their data, they consider five different categories of an evaluation of the American people. The first is American people which assumes the individual psychological traits of American people. The second is American society which consists of the evaluation of the American society as an aggregate body. The third is related to American governmental policies. The fourth is related to the impact of the American businesses in Canada, and the fifth is an evaluation of the Canadian policies related to the United States (Cullen et al, 1978b).

To sum up the debate so far, anti-Americanism can be irrational or biased. In addition, it could signify an overall reaction to what is modern. I do not dismiss any of these suggestions, yet as I will point out in my measurements, I will define and measure anti-Americanism in the most simplistic way. The reasons are, first, it is not a monolithic concept but can spark different meanings for different people. Therefore a detailed, narrowed definition of anti-Americanism simply bears a great risk of weaker explanatory power. Put simply: if anti-Americanism is a prejudice, does that disregard any rational response to US foreign policies? Recall that, in the previous chapter, the literature review accounted for both rational responses toward US foreign policies and the social psychological factors that lead to misinterpret US foreign policies. Putting the adjective “irrational” or “prejudice” just underscores the impacts of US foreign policy on anti-Americanism. In addition, considering anti-Americanism as a response to modernity, to the modern foundation of the United States only accounts for correlates of anti-Americanism such as modernization crisis and economic development. Yet, it dismisses many other correlates that still might explain anti-Americanism. Finally, empirically speaking, the more I control for additional items and concepts such as politeness norm, the more I limit the explanatory power of the dependent variable. It is definitely necessary to consider these concepts, but not in the left hand-side of the equation, but on the right hand-side where the independent variables stand if the hypothesis tests involve these variables.

Research Design and Measurement

Knowing that the design of anti-Americanism for current analysis is closely linked with theoretical issues underlined in this chapter, I keep the description of the operational procedures right after the discussion of what anti-Americanism is, rather than underlining it in the next chapter. Therefore it is important to consider both how the items related to anti-Americanism make meaningful factors and how the theory leads us. However, the usage of the relevant items should be a matter of theoretical guidance. In other words, as I will elaborate below, a theoretical guidance precedes deciding on which items serve as the best measurement of anti-Americanism. Accordingly, below I discuss whether a score of multiple different concepts or of a single concept should prevail. Based on theory which is supported by empirical findings on the PEW dataset, I find more reason to carry on with the former provided that it is not constrained by specific features of the US.

The construction of my dependent variables followed two major steps: The first step consists of a factor analysis where I present the different possible scores related to anti-Americanism out of 12 questions on the PEW dataset. The second step shows the theoretical deduction within the constraint of empirical findings. Overall, I contend with a simplistic measurement of anti-Americanism where I only use the general evaluation of the United States and the Americans which, in a general sense, is more likely to correlate with questions related to the evaluation of US foreign policies.

As I indicated, there are 12 questions in the PEW 2002 dataset that cover personal evaluations with regards to different concepts about the United States, its people, its ideas and its cultural features⁹. None of the questions were asked in China or in the United States, hence there is a significant drop in the observations. Table 3.1 indicates all the questions with their full wordings.

[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

⁹ There is another question (q66), where ranking the answers in an increasing fashion would be too much subjective. Accordingly, question q66 asks “How much does US solve the world problems?” The answers are “too much, right amount, too little and does nothing”. It would be subjective to convert q66 into a variable showing increasing distaste toward the US. It is not clear whether the answer “too little” shows a greater displeasure with the US compared to the answer “too much”. Some people might expect greater aid from the US and if their expectancy is not met, they might feel anger toward the US. On the other hand, people might think the US is interfering with the affairs of other states too much in attempt to solve the world problems. There is not empirical and theoretical reason to argue that one of the cases dominates the other. Therefore, I did not use the question q66 because it does not represent a gradual increase of distaste toward the US.

The following presents the answer trends in the two main questions that I am going to use in my dependent variable¹⁰. Question q61b asks respondents: “*What is your opinion of the United States?*” Overall, there are 33,762 observations for this variable. The respondents chose among four answer categories in this question such as: very favorable (19.37%), somewhat favorable (39.49%), somewhat unfavorable (16.78%), and very unfavorable (15.45%). Additionally some people reported that they don’t know the answer (7.93%) or refused to answer (0.99%). Similarly, question q61d asks: “*What is your opinion of Americans?*” Again, there are 33,762 observations for this variable. The answer categories are: very favorable (19.17%), somewhat favorable (42.71%), somewhat unfavorable (15.57%), and very unfavorable (12.37%). Some people reported that they don’t know the answer (9.11%), or refused to answer (1.07%). At an initial look, for both questions, the majority of the respondents appear to choose “somewhat favorable” category, the answer “very unfavorable” appears to slightly be the least preferred answer.

Looking at the general tabulation, the answer trends of q61b and q61d turn out to be consistent and indeed the inquiry of consistency among different questions is a salient matter in public opinion research. The reason is that people might provide inconsistent answers that relate to the same topic. Some scholars chose to experiment with wording of the questions or separating the sample into two groups and asking one group additional questions about a topic that are not asked to the same group in order to see the changes in the consistency (Druckman & Lupia, 2012). PEW 2002 dataset does not allow for such experimentation. It is notwithstanding possible to check correlation between the relevant answers and the cross tabulation. Including the “don’t know” and “refused” categories shows that q61b and q61d strongly correlate (Pearson’s $r=0.79$). Additionally, checking the general cross tabulation, a consistency can be observed among the answer trends between q61b and q61d. Roughly speaking, 76% of the respondents who answered that they have a very favorable opinion of the United States also reported that they have a very favorable opinion of the Americans. A total of 77% of those who had very favorable opinions of the Americans had also very favorable opinions of the United States. A somewhat similar consistency appears in “very unfavorable” answers. A total of 66% of those who reported very unfavorable opinions of the United States also have very unfavorable opinions of the Americans. On the other hand, 83% of those who have very unfavorable opinions of the Americans have also unfavorable

¹⁰ For similar details for the other 10 questions, see Appendix 3.1. Since I am not going to use these questions at the ultimate analysis, I chose to keep the focus on the main items.

opinions of the United States¹¹. These figures might demonstrate that the general evaluation of the United States and Americans are not two distinct features. Nonetheless, these outcomes are based on a general tabulation that disregards country-specific variations on the answers.

The country specific variations show that the picture is not discrepant at a worrisome degree from the straight cross-tabulation between of the general evaluation of the US and of the Americans. Despite few countries where people have greater dislike toward the US than toward Americans and vice versa, there is still a consistent pattern between opinion toward the US and toward Americans. Graph 3.1 displays the mean scores of general opinion toward the US and toward Americans¹².

[GRAPH 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

As Graph 3.1 shows, overall there are 25 countries out of 42 where a general evaluation of the US is more negative than that of the Americans. Especially, the mean score of general dislike toward the US is much greater than that of Americans in India and Jordan compared to the same comparison in other countries¹³. However, there is –so far- no theoretical reason leading an assessment of why these countries evaluate the opinion toward the US considerably more negative than that of Americans. On the other hand, there are 15 countries where general evaluation of Americans is slightly more negative than that of the US. Yet, there are no particular cases where people significantly much higher dislike toward Americans than toward the United States. These results reinforce the fact that opinions toward the US and the Americans are generally consistent with trends across countries. Yet, there are deviating cases such as India and Jordan which I will analyze more deeply in the upcoming sections.

* * *

After an initial inquiry of cross-tabulation, the next step is to put the items related to anti-Americanism into a factor analysis. Accordingly, I re-coded all the twelve questions in a way that an increase shows more displeasure with the relevant feature of the United States.

¹¹ See Appendix 3.2 for all the cross-tabulation details between q61b and q61d.
¹² I recoded “don’t know” and “refused” categories as missing values. The scores represent the mean response rate for q61b and q61d which consecutively ask general evaluations of the US and the Americans. The questions range between 1 and 4, where the score 4 represents the greatest dislike toward either US or Americans.
¹³ The average difference between general evaluation of the US and Americans is 0.16. The countries India, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan and Germany are the countries above this mean difference.

Since the twelve questions are not equally scaled, I standardized each question to z-distribution with their sample mean set to zero and their standard deviation set to 1, in order to obtain a universal scale for each variable to render them eligible for factor analysis. I did not execute the factor analysis operation by considering country-specific changes. Indeed, when I sought to obtain country-specific scores, I realized that different countries have different numbers of factors with an Eigen-value greater than 1. In addition, the ordering of the item loadings of these factors is significantly different across countries¹⁴. To put it more concretely, I could not obtain a factor score that has the same important items with the same ranking of the loadings of these items across all countries. In other words, what anti-Americanism means in different countries changes significantly, which offers some difficulty to come up with a factor score that fully accounts for country-specific differences. Henceforth, below, I present general factor scores without reference to country-specific differences to remedy for the possible bias that might disregard the varying understandings of anti-Americanism across countries.

First, I checked if these questions together constituted a reliable concept by looking at the Alpha scores. Using all the questions already have a significant Alpha of 0.74, which is enough to run a factor analysis based on all 12 questions. I kept all the factors with Eigen-value greater than 0.80 unlike the conventional wisdom about holding factors with Eigen-value greater than 1. Some researchers according to Reise et al, prefer to hold some percentage of the total variance, ranging from 50 to 80 percent. Another criterion to hold factor scores based on Eigen-values greater than 1. However, as the authors point out that Eigen-value does not directly indicates the significance of a factor score. In fact, as the number of the items in the factor score increases Eigen-value increases. Hence the authors do not advise the "Eigen-value greater than 1.0 criteria" while keeping the factor scores. (Reise et al, 2000)

I obtained three different scores with an Eigen-value greater than one. However, when we examination of the proportion of the variance in the 12 questions reveals that these three scores account for only 48 percent of the variance. Hence, using the cutoff of 0.80 as Eigenvalue helped me to explain more variance among the related questions. This way, I obtained six different factor scores with Eigenvalue greater than 0.8 which overall can explain roughly 0.70 percent of the variance that the 12 questions generate. In order to obtain the factor scores, I used principal components factor analysis and report the loadings after

¹⁴ For the sake of saving space, I do not report the country based factor scores.

varimax rotation. Table II summarizes the six factor scores, the loadings of the items and the proportion of the variance each factor score accounts for.

[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

As can be seen in Table 3.2, the first factor (Factor 1), can explain 30 percent of the variance within my factor analysis. It is by far the greatest percentage of variance explained vis-à-vis other factor scores. Again in Table 3.2, the highlighted four questions constitute the questions with the greatest loadings. The questions related to the “general opinion toward the United States”, and “general opinion toward the Americans” are the strongest items, which are followed by two questions related to foreign policy aspects of the United States. The first asks people their opinions about whether the United States cares about their country in making international policy decisions. The second asks respondents whether they support the US fight against terror. This finding already provides a clue about how people evaluate their general opinion toward the United States: They make use of their beliefs and judgments about what they think of a variety of US foreign policy items.

A quick look at the other five factors indicates that none has a general evaluation of the US and/or the Americans as strongly loaded vis-à-vis other items. Considering these scores as dependent variables might offer interesting results. However, without accounting for how people perceive Americans and/or United States, theoretical problems may arise; for example the second factor score in Table 3.2, the items US7, US10, US11 and US12 have relatively the strongest loadings. At the same time, the general evaluation of the United States and Americans remain somehow weak identifiers of this factor score. It is possible to come up with a conclusion that cultural aspects of the United States such as its music, TV shows, customs, business culture and democracy do not make a meaningful set with general evaluations. These findings are consistent with the story-line that Shifter shares in his work: *“In April 2003, crowds gathered in the main plaza of Miraflores, a middle class district in Lima, to protest the U.S. military action in Iraq. The mood was angry and the speeches were fiercely critical of the Bush administration. Yet, as the protest ended and Peruvians dispersed and went their separate ways, many were drawn to a nearby cinema to see either “Chicago” or “Gangs of New York.” After the movies, they went out to grab a bite to eat at an adjacent Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald's”* (Shifter, 2004: 107) People might be against the United States and its foreign policies but might still favor its cultural items.

In Table II, the same pattern of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th factor scores with the 2nd one occurs. As I pointed out earlier, a variety of scholars stress that the United States is not a monolithic body and that its evaluation should be multi-dimensional is frequent. However, measurements of multiple factor scores will not satisfy this concern. After all, it is likely that what people think of anti-Americanism will vary across countries and cultures. Additionally, the empirical evidence I came up with shows that when I run country-specific factor scores, there are not any single factors showing a universal pattern. Therefore, using cultural specific factor scores not only narrows the analysis down, but also may lead to theoretical misspecification. In other words, if cultural factors of the United States do not influence the general evaluations of the US and the Americans, their relevance to the discussion anti-Americanism is questionable at least in my current analysis.

There is therefore only the first factor score that offers a deeper inquiry because of theoretical and empirical reasons to have a measurement having the least possible amount of correlation with the other factors, the most viable method would be to use only the significantly loaded items. Items US1, US2, US3 and US9 are consecutively about a general evaluation of the US, of Americans, of the concern whether the US cares about respondent's country in making international policy decisions, and finally of US fight against terrorism. Consequently, it is necessary to refer back to the prior analysis of cross-tabulation among the significant items of the first factor score, and to assess how much consistency the respondents show in their answers.

There are two main reasons why I analyze cross-tabulation of US1 and US2 with US3 and US9: First, this analysis might help to assess whether the responses of US1 (evaluation of the US, q61b) or US2 (evaluation of Americans, q61d) are more consistent with the questions related to the US foreign policy. Second, the cross tabulation of US3 (q62) and US9 (q72) could shed light on the consistency of the responses in two different US foreign policy evaluation items. Indeed, cross-tabulation remains a straight and simple evaluation of consistency among questions compared to alternative approaches, yet provided that this analysis is not the main focus of the current inquiry, I keep it simple and straightforward¹⁵. When I mean consistency, I expect people to rate a question negatively to the same degree with another question related to the same topic¹⁶.

¹⁵ Appendices 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 provide greater details and numerical explanations for the simple assessments that I make about the cross-tabulation operations with further explanations based on the data.

¹⁶ For example if someone reports very unfavorable opinion of the United States and if he or she at the same time offers negative opinion of Americans at the same time, we could argue that this person was consistent in his or her answers for US1 and US2.

Overall, the cross-tabulations between US1 and US3, US2 and US3, US1 and US9, US2 and US9; and finally between US3 and US9 do not allow a strong consistency in the answers as between US1 and US2. In other words, generally speaking people appear to be most consistent in their general evaluation of the United States and of the Americans. In the evaluation of the US-led fight against terrorism (US9 or q72), the general evaluation of the United States appears to yield slightly more consistent answers vis-à-vis the general evaluation of Americans. In the case of question US3 (q62) asking respondents whether the US regards their country when making international decisions, there is slightly greater consistency in the negative responses of US3 with US1 (general evaluation of the United States), compared with US2 (general evaluation of Americans). Finally, the cross-tabulation of US3 and US9 shows that although majority of the responses are consistent in their answers, this consistency is not as strong as the one between US1 and US2.

These results lead the question of whether general evaluation of the United States is more related to the assessment of the US foreign policies. It is indeed difficult to make an assessment provided that the cross-tabulations do not offer considerably obvious differences between two items. Additionally, the correlation coefficient between US1 and US3 ($r=0.16$), is slightly lower than that between US2 and US3 ($r=0.17$). Nevertheless, the correlation between US1 and US9 (0.37) is greater than the correlation between US2 and US9 ($r=0.33$). Indeed, these findings do not significantly shed light on the interesting pattern in Graph 3.1: In countries like India, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt general evaluation of the US is more negative compared to the general evaluation of Americans. Nonetheless, general evaluation of the US (US1) correlates more with evaluation of the US-led fight on terrorism (US9), which might occur due to the relatively greater salience of the US-led fight on terror in India, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. However, it would be too hasty to jump to a conclusion based on the current observations. I will elaborate more on this issue when I will discuss the regression results.

* * *

My next step is to analyze whether the items US1, US2, US3 and US9 constitute a reliable set by looking at their Cronbach Alpha coefficient which serves to fulfill this inquiry of inter-item reliability (Cronbach, 1951). Among all the four items that appear strong in the first factor score, a reliable Cronbach score of 0.74 is obtained. Nevertheless, I obtain the greatest reliability (Cronbach Alpha score), which is equal to 0.87, when I only use general

evaluations of the US and Americans and drop other two items. Indeed, using only two items might be a concern for scholars who prefer using numerous numbers of items in their factor score. Nevertheless, because of the theoretical concerns, using only two items which relate to a general evaluation of the US and the Americans can be optimal to capture approximately all theoretical possibilities that are inherent in what anti-Americanism means. Adding any foreign policy items such as US3 or US9 limits the measurement to those who are anti-American because of US foreign policies. After all, someone might be perfectly be against the United States foreign policies but not against the US overall and Americans. Considering these people as anti-American will obviously distort my measure of the independent variable. Henceforth, I take the arithmetic average of standardized versions of US1 and US2, provided that their loadings are almost similar. Graph 2.2 indicates my dependent variable scores across the countries from the greatest to the smallest score in PEW 2002 countries.

[GRAPH 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

I treat the dependent variable as continuous where an increase signals greater anti-Americanism. There is one caveat here that might necessitate technical inquiry. The dependent variable consists of 16 different responses/categories. We can treat it as a categorical variable as well and execute ordinal logit regression analysis in the measurement part. Despite its ordered nature, it would be too complex to model a dependent variable of 16 categories, mainly because of the enormous number of parameters such as 15 threshold values to estimate. Nonetheless, I provide the percentage distribution of the categories of the dependent variable in Graph 3.3. As we can observe, majority of people have -0.28 points. This is probably the rank where respondents have somewhat favorable opinion toward the United States and the Americans. Hence, for PEW 2002 dataset, we might argue that people in general tend to have somewhat favorable opinion toward the US and the Americans.

[GRAPH 3.3 ABOUT HERE]

* * *

Overall, this chapter inquired a viable solution for a good measurement of anti-Americanism. The literature in general adheres to specific features which might play a crucial role in the definition of anti-Americanism. However, my suggestion is not to use mottos starting like “Anti-Americanism is ...”; and add some adjectives. Either in theoretical or

empirical disputes such designations only limit the scope of anti-Americanism. However, anti-Americanism can be rational, prejudiced, anti-modern, or biased. A researcher should try to treat these features as independent variables and account for the widest measurement of anti-Americanism at the dependent variable side. In addition, I also tried a factor analysis method that several scholars pursued in order to obtain different forms of anti-Americanism. In these measurements, only one factor score had general evaluations of the United States and the Americans as greatly loaded. The interesting finding in this factor showed that people relied on US foreign policy evaluations to come up with a general opinion of Americans and the United States. Additionally, knowing that these foreign policy items inquired into people's support for US fight on terror and US concern for their countries, one might suspect and analyze in depth the aspects of anti-terrorist policies of Bush administration. However, under the assumption that people might disfavor US policies and still like the United States and its peoples, I dropped the foreign policy items from the measurement of my dependent variable. In line with this theoretical reasoning, and the empirical findings I showed, I overall define anti-Americanism as a negative evaluation of the United States and Americans.

TABLES:

TABLE 3.1: The Questions Involved in the Factor Analysis

Item	PEW question	Wording of the Question
US1	<i>q61b</i>	What is your opinion of the United States?
US2	<i>q61d</i>	What is your opinion of Americans?
US3	<i>q62</i>	In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?
US4	<i>q63</i>	Do you think the world would be a safer place or a more dangerous place if there was another country that was equal in military power to the United States?
US5	<i>q64 & q64nig</i>	When there are differences between our country and the United States, do you think these differences occur because we have different values than the United States or because we have different policies than the United States? (coded 1 if respondent reports "culture"; 0 otherwise)
US6	<i>q65</i>	In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?
US7	<i>q70</i>	Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.
US8	<i>q71</i>	Which is closer to describing your view? I admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances
US9	<i>q72</i>	Which is closer to describing your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism.
US10	<i>q69</i>	Which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business.
US11	<i>q68</i>	And which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.
US12	<i>q67</i>	Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.

Note: The bold codes at the first column refer to the item codes that are used in the factor analysis table. The italic codes at the second column refer to relevant question number in the original PEW 2002 dataset


TABLE 3.2: Factor Analysis Results

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
US1	0.86	0.19	0.10	0.10	0.00	-0.01
US2	0.85	0.17	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.01
US3	0.54	-0.03	0.12	0.42	0.06	-0.08
US4	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.99	-0.01
US5	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.99
US6	0.08	0.06	0.00	0.92	-0.01	0.04
US7	0.17	0.79	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02
US8	0.11	0.04	0.90	-0.03	0.03	-0.01
US9	0.55	0.16	0.22	0.09	-0.08	0.08
US10	0.18	0.46	0.53	0.22	0.03	0.04
US11	0.27	0.55	0.39	0.16	0.04	-0.03
US12	0.28	0.64	0.07	0.24	0.11	-0.02
Eigenvalue	3.59	1.12	1.02	0.99	0.89	0.83
Proportion in Variance	0.30	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.07


Notes: (i) Shaded factor loadings (greater than 0.40) are the strongest items in the relevant factor.

(ii) Proportion in variance refer to the proportion of the variance of the relevant factor score in the overall variance created by 12 items


GRAPH 3.1: Country mean scores of q61b (Opinion of the US) and q61d (Opinion of Americans)



Graph 3.2: Standardized Anti-Americanism Mean Scores by Country



Graph 3.3: Percentage Distribution of the Dependent Variable Categories



APPENDICES:

APPENDIX 3.1 - Tabulation of the 10 questions related to the US that are not involved in the dependent variable

Question	Topic	Tabulation
q62	Does US about other countries in International Policy-Making Decisions?	<i>Great deal</i> (13.89%); <i>fair amount</i> (28.20%); <i>not too much</i> (28.11%); <i>not at all</i> (19.41%); <i>don't know</i> (9.91%); <i>refused</i> (0.47%)
q63	Will the world be safer if another country balances the US?	<i>Safer</i> (31.32%); <i>more dangerous</i> (56.13%); <i>don't know</i> (11.70%); <i>refused</i> (0.85%)
q64	Differences between respondent's country and the United States	<i>Values</i> (36.26%); <i>policies</i> (51.27%); <i>don't know</i> (11.69%); <i>refused</i> (0.78%)
q64nig	Differences between respondent's country and the United States(Nigeria)	<i>Values</i> (29%); <i>policies</i> (47.30%); <i>both</i> (20.90%) <i>don't know</i> (2.30%); <i>refused</i> (0.50%)
q65	Do US policies increase the gap between the rich and the poor?	<i>Increase</i> (51.98%); <i>lessen</i> (20.15%); <i>no effect</i> (14.39%); <i>don't know</i> (12.86%); <i>refused</i> (0.62%)
q67	Spreading of American customs	<i>Good</i> (29.97%); <i>bad</i> (60.62%); <i>don't know</i> (8.52%); <i>refused</i> (0.89%)
q68	American ideas about democracy	<i>Like</i> (49.10%); <i>dislike</i> (36.65%); <i>don't know</i> (13.46%); <i>refused</i> (0.79%)
q69	American ways of doing business	<i>Like</i> (47.80%); <i>dislike</i> (34.20%); <i>don't know</i> (17.25%); <i>refused</i> (0.75%)
q70	American music, movies and television	<i>Like</i> (53.14%); <i>dislike</i> (39.22%); <i>don't know</i> (6.91%); <i>refused</i> (0.73%)
q71	American tech & scientific advances	<i>Admire</i> (75.83%); <i>don't admire</i> (16.42%); <i>don't know</i> (7.18%); <i>refused</i> (0.57%)
q72	US-led efforts to fight terrorism	<i>Favor</i> (57.61%); <i>oppose</i> (33.37%); <i>don't know</i> (7.99%); <i>refused</i> (1.02%)

Notes: (i) Topic column does not offer the direct wording of the questions. Nonetheless, direct wording of the questions can be found in TABLE 3.1

(ii) q64nig is the Nigerian version of q64, in other words the same question was asked in Nigeria with one more category offered, namely: both (policies/values)

APPENDIX 3.2 - Cross-tabulation of Questions q61b and q61d

		<i>q61d: Opinion of Americans</i>						
		VF	SF	SU	VU	DK	Ref.	Total
<i>q61b: Opinion of the United States</i>	VF	5,025	1,183	134	97	79	22	6,540
	SF	1,024	10,900	891	237	254	26	13,332
	SU	231	1,443	3,436	339	190	25	5,664
	VU	131	735	735	3,465	141	9	5,216
	DK	37	144	54	33	2,395	13	2,676
	Ref.	25	14	7	4	18	266	334
	Total	6,473	14,419	5,257	4,175	3,077	361	33,762

Note: *VF*: Very favorable, *SF*: Somewhat favorable, *SU*: Somewhat Unfavorable, *VU*: Very unfavorable, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

APPENDIX 3.3- Cross-tabulation of Questions q61b and q72

		<i>q72: Opinion of the US efforts to fight terrorism</i>					
		Favor	Oppose	DK	Ref	Total	
<i>q61b: Opinion of the United States</i>	VF	5,214	1,063	247	16	6,540	
	SF	9,011	3,476	761	84	13,332	
	SU	2,438	2,802	363	61	5,664	
	VU	1,177	3,493	463	83	5,216	
	DK	976	729	911	60	2,676	
	Ref	146	98	40	50	334	
	Total	18,962	11,661	2,785	354	33,762	

Notes: (i) For q61b *VF*: Very favorable, *SF*: Somewhat favorable, *SU*: Somewhat Unfavorable, *VU*: Very unfavorable, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

(ii) For q72, *Favor*: Respondent favors US fight against terrorism, *Oppose*: Respondent opposes US fight against terrorism, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

The cross tabulations indicate that 80% of those who have a very favorable opinion of the United States favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism. A total of 25% of those who favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism have very favorable opinions toward the US. The majority of those who favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism have somewhat favorable opinion of the US by 48%. Nonetheless, since the categories of the questions are not equal, q61b can be collapsed into two categories and observe that 75% of those who favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism have either very or somewhat favorable opinion toward the US. On the other hand, 54% of those who oppose US-led fight on terrorism have either somewhat or very unfavorable opinion of the United States. Finally, 67% of those who have very unfavorable opinion of the US oppose the US-led fight on terrorism.

APPENDIX 3.4 - Cross-tabulation of Questions q61d and q72

		<i>q72: Opinion of the US efforts to fight terrorism</i>				
		Favor	Oppose	DK	Ref	Total
<i>q61d: Opinion of the Americans</i>	VF	4,999	1,177	266	31	6,473
	SF	9,333	4,200	796	90	14,419
	SU	2,221	2,651	327	58	5,257
	VU	1,066	2,641	403	65	4,175
	DK	1,180	879	955	63	3,077
	Ref	163	113	38	47	361
	Total	18,962	11,661	2,785	354	33,762

Notes: (i) For q61d *VF*: Very favorable, *SF*: Somewhat favorable, *SU*: Somewhat Unfavorable, *VU*: Very unfavorable, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

(ii) For q72, *Favor*: Respondent favors US fight against terrorism, *Oppose*: Respondent opposes US fight against terrorism, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

The cross tabulation between q72 and q61d indicates that 77% of those who have a very favorable opinion of Americans favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism. 76% of those who favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism have either a very or somewhat favorable opinion of Americans. In addition, those 45% of those who oppose US-led fight on terrorism have either somewhat or very unfavorable opinion of Americans. Finally, 63% of those who have very unfavorable opinion of Americans oppose the US-led fight on terrorism.

APPENDIX 3.5 - Cross-tabulation of Questions q61b and q62

q62: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?

		GD	FA	NTM	NAA	DK	Ref	Total
<i>q61b: Opinion of the United States</i>	VF	1,772	2,443	1,394	557	358	16	6,540
	SF	1,604	4,645	4,556	1,602	901	24	13,332
	SU	517	1,083	2,076	1,601	366	21	5,664
	VU	357	642	1,118	2,476	584	39	5,216
	DK	164	396	439	483	1,163	31	2,676
	Ref	30	50	73	84	64	33	334
	Total	4,444	9,259	9,656	6,803	3,436	164	33,762

Notes: (i) For q61b, *VF*: Very favorable, *SF*: Somewhat favorable, *SU*: Somewhat Unfavorable, *VU*: Very unfavorable, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

(ii) For q62, *GD*: Great deal, *FA*: Fair amount, *NTM*: Not too much, *NAA*: Not at all, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

The cross-tabulation of questions q61b and q62 show that 27% of those who have very favorable opinion of the US think that the US thinks a great deal of their country when it makes international policy decisions. A total of 40% of those who report that the US considers a great deal of their country when it makes international policy decisions have also very favorable opinion of the United States. On the other hand, 48% of those who have very unfavorable view of the United States argue that US does not think at all of their country when it makes international policy decision. Approximately 36% of those who report that US does not think at all of their country when it makes international policy decision, have very unfavorable opinions of the US.

APPENDIX 3.6 - Cross-tabulation of Questions q61d and q62

q62: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?

		GD	FA	NTM	NAA	DK	Ref	Total
<i>q61d: Opinion of the Americans</i>	VF	1,749	2,409	1,336	607	362	10	6,473
	SF	1,643	4,704	5,028	2,095	918	31	14,419
	SU	487	1,054	1,817	1,541	342	16	5,257
	VU	345	549	848	1,858	537	38	4,175
	DK	189	478	544	616	1,214	36	3,077
	Ref	31	65	83	86	63	33	361
	Total	4,444	9,259	9,656	6,803	3,436	164	33,762

Notes: (i) For q61d, *VF*: Very favorable, *SF*: Somewhat favorable, *SU*: Somewhat Unfavorable, *VU*: Very unfavorable, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

(ii) For q62, *GD*: Great deal, *FA*: Fair amount, *NTM*: Not too much, *NAA*: Not at all, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

The cross-tabulation of questions q61d and q62 show that 27% of those who have very favorable opinion of Americans think that the US thinks a great deal of their country when it makes international policy decisions. Approximately 39% of those who report that US thinks a great deal of their country when it makes international policy decisions, have very favorable opinion of Americans. However, 40% of those who have a very unfavorable view of Americans argue that the US does not think at all of their countries when it makes international policy decision. 35% of those who report that US does not think at all of their country when it makes international policy decisions, have a very unfavorable opinion of Americans.

APPENDIX 3.7 - Cross-tabulation of Questions q62 and q72

		<i>q72: Opinion of the US efforts to fight terrorism</i>				
		Favor	Oppose	DK	Ref	Total
<i>q62: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?</i>	GD	3,587	1,119	175	17	4,898
	FA	7,109	2,352	419	65	9,945
	NTM	5,764	3,599	474	76	9,913
	NAA	2,512	3,836	422	75	6,845
	DK	1,303	827	1,310	56	3,496
	Ref	40	35	19	72	166
Total		20,315	11,768	2,819	361	35,263

Note: (i) For q72, *Favor*: Respondent favors US fight against terrorism, *Oppose*: Respondent opposes US fight against terrorism, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

(ii) For q62, *GD*: Great deal, *FA*: Fair amount, *NTM*: Not too much, *NAA*: Not at all, *DK*: Don't know, *Ref*: Refused

The cross tabulation of the questions q72 and q62 show that 73% of those who think the US thinks a great deal of their countries when making international decisions also favor the US-led fight against terrorism. Approximately, 53% of those who argue that either the US thinks a great deal or a fair amount of their countries when making international decisions also favor the US-led fight against terrorism. On the other hand 56% of those who argue that US does not take at all their country into account when making international policy decisions also oppose the US-led fight on terrorism. Additionally, 63% of those who think either the US does not much or not at all takes their countries into account when making international policy decisions also oppose the US-led fight on terrorism.

CHAPTER VI: RESEARCH DESIGN and MEASUREMENT

So far, I discussed issues related to what anti-Americanism is and what factors might affect it on both individual and social levels. Testing whether these factors bear significant impact on the changes of anti-American attitudes requires rigorous public opinion research. Hence, I used PEW Global Attitudes Project's 2002 cross-national survey dataset which involves 44 countries including the United States. The main reason I used the year 2002 is to measure anti-Americanism by excluding the marginal impact of 2003 occupation of Iraq by the United States (Mousseau, 2011). In fact, there are researches on anti-Americanism conducted in more recent years such as in the analysis of Blaydes and Linzer (2012) where they used a PEW 2007 dataset. However, even though the usage of PEW 2007 would also provide important outcomes, provided that several hypotheses and variable designs are based on Mousseau (2011)'s research, for comparative means I chose PEW 2002 dataset. The PEW survey is conducted between July 2 and October 31, 2002¹⁷. In its raw form, the dataset contains overall 38,263 respondents. However, provided some of the vital questions are not asked in China and the United States, the individual observations as well as the national level observations drop¹⁸.

This chapter is allocated to describe the nature of the dataset I use, the relevant analyses that I conduct in order to test the hypotheses and the variable I constructed. I first describe the reasons and the essential features of the hierarchical regression that will serve as testing the hypotheses. Second, I describe how I constructed all the independent variables that I use in the analyses. Provided that I suspect the multilevel nature of the variance in anti-Americanism, I present two levels of variables: National and individual levels. Finally, I show the main statistical features of the variables along with their intra-level correlations which tend to bear implications and caveats for the further analyses.

Multilevel Fixed Effects Analysis

Even though PEW 2002 dataset offers an individual-level dataset, my hypotheses also invokes national level effects. It is thus necessary for the analysis to include a multilevel approach. J. J. Hox points out that individuals and social groups are predominantly organized

¹⁷ The raw version of the dataset can be found at <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>

¹⁸ By considering all the missing values and some of the responses I coded as missing values, at individual level, I obtain 30,006 observations and at national level 42 clusters/countries.

in a hierarchy. Within this system individuals and their social groups constitute different levels of analysis; hence I can include variables at different levels of analysis. Multilevel analysis examines the interaction of these social group and individual level variables (Hox, 1995). Multi-level modeling therefore, offers quite a considerable number of theoretical uses. Klein et al point out several positive contributions of the multilevel modeling. Even though their work covers the organizational behavior studies, they posit that the benefits of multilevel modeling expand to political science research. Their main argument is that multilevel modeling connects what is micro and what is macro. As a result, a richer organizational –or political in my case- life can be obtained accounting for structure and the individual at the same time (Klein et al, 1999). If one simply used OLS regressions, the standard errors of the estimates would probably be biased provided that there is strong evidence for cross level effects. In other words, the nature of the distribution of the individual variables would be clustered or nested within higher level units. Multilevel analysis enables an understanding of whether there are cross-level correlations (Paterson & Goldstein, 1991; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). The clustered standard errors violate the homogeneity assumption of the Gauss-Markow Theorem, and thus multilevel modeling helps remedy the clustered – hence biased- standard errors problem.

It is crucial to make sense of the technical setting of multilevel modeling. Kreft and De Leeuw indicate that multilevel models are helpful in integrating the different models at different levels of interest. Accordingly, the simplest integration occurs in the form of a random coefficients model where we consider the individual (or first level) variables as random variables at the second level, with a distribution of means and variances. Adding the second level models to the random coefficient model generates multilevel models. Adding second level models according to Kreft and De Leeuw is useful (Kreft and De Leeuw, 2004). However, none of my hypotheses predict a change in the slope of the predicted values curve within clusters. In other words, I will not randomize and model the individual level coefficients, which actually refer to the random coefficients model (Luke, 2004). Therefore, because of theoretical reasons, I only randomize the intercept of the first level, thus obtain a random intercept model (Hox, 1995; Luke, 2004). In other words, I re-model the first level – the individual level- intercept with an equation of second level regressors.

Design Procedures of the Independent Variables

In this section I describe the operationalization procedure of the variables that I tested in the analysis. There are two overall sets of variables: The first set entails the national level variables. In this set I review how I designed the concepts of “social grievance of war with Israel”, “US bilateral aid toward autocratic regimes”, “alliance situation with the US”, “relative national capability with regards the US”, “bilateral trade dependency to the US”, “economic development” and “contracts per capita”. The first two variables are included in the hypotheses related to the observable impacts of US foreign policies. The rest of the national-level variables inquire the alternative social correlates that might lead people to adhere to myths about the US foreign policy.

The second set of variables inquires into possible individual level changes in the responses of anti-Americanism. I explain how I constructed levels of education, household income category within a nation, poverty, urbanity and household income dissatisfaction. At the end, I describe the operationalization procedure of the demographic control variables; namely gender, age and population which I included in all of the models in my analyses.

NATIONAL LEVEL VARIABLES

Middle Eastern Conflict / War with Israel: This variable represents a dummy constituting the countries right in the perimeter of the Middle Eastern conflict. Based on the literature review, I suspected that there is a societal-level grievance factor which is rooted in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This societal grievance might lead to anti-Americanism, provided that the United States appears to side more with Israel. Thus, those who feel they are negatively affected by the Israeli foreign policies might put the blame on the United States by arguing that the US does little to prevent their grievances in the Middle Eastern conflict.

In the PEW 2002 dataset, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt are directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or have close boundaries; thus are strongly affected. Additionally, Jordan and Lebanon have a great number of Palestinian refugees which abandoned their homeland during Israeli-Palestine conflicts. Hence a considerable number of people which had direct experience with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are expected to reside in Jordan or Lebanon. Since, the PEW 2002 dataset does not offer any individual level question involving people’s opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this national level binary variable

remains relatively a raw measurement that assumes that people leaving either in Jordan, Lebanon or Egypt will have some sort of a grievance because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

US Bilateral Military and Economic Aid to Autocratic Regimes: This variable inquires the impact of US bilateral aid when it is directed to autocratic regimes. I use the interaction of a continuous bilateral aid measure with a binary variable designating whether a country is autocratic or not. I suspect that the US bilateral aid directed to autocratic regimes again creates a societal level grievance that increases anti-Americanism. Unlike non-autocratic countries, there is a possibility that US aid might become the autocratic administrations' means for financing greater tyranny and suppression. Since, the American bilateral aid plays substantial role in this scenario, people might put the blame on the US arguing that it contributed to their grievance by supplying their oppressor. Below, I first discuss how I obtained a bilateral aid measure, second I indicate my measurement of autocracy.

I use the US Census Bureau's US Foreign Economic and Military Aid by Major Recipient Country dataset¹⁹. I use the 2001 year indicators. The main reason to lag US aid data for one year is in line with the theoretical expectations allowing one year for the autocratic leaders to exploit the US aid for further oppression. If I used 2002 data, I would probably not allow for the US aid to be efficiently allocated to the autocratic leader's institutions of oppression. I divided the figure by the Gross Domestic Product of the relevant country to indicate the intensity of the aid rather than using a direct measurement²⁰. At the same time, the Census Bureau dataset did not offer figures for Canada and Italy. I coded these countries as zero provided that the US does not provide that military and economic assistance to these countries. In addition, there may be an expectation that the US aid increased for Muslim and Middle Eastern recipient countries after 9/11 events. As Graph 4.1 shows, the US aid amount for Egypt is relatively higher than other countries in the PEW 2002 dataset. Hence, I took the natural logarithm of the US military and economic aid variable to normalize the skewed nature of the dataset toward countries like Egypt²¹.

[GRAPH 4.1 ABOUT HERE]

¹⁹ The Dataset can be found at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/foreign_commerce_aid/foreign_aid.html

²⁰ I obtained GDP data from World Bank. I use the year 2001 indicators.

²¹ The operation is $\ln(\text{US aid} + 1)$ provided that some of the countries do not receive aid and thus are coded as 0. Thus I avoid missing values at country-level.

To generate an indication of the autocracy degree, I constructed a continuous autocracy variable. I used POLITY IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) and the autocracy variable of POLITY IV dataset which ranges between 0 and 10 and measures a country's degree of autocracy. In fact, a great number of scholars using POLITY dataset offer different measures such as considering a country democratic when autocracy-democracy is greater or equal to six (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995; Farber & Gova, 1995; Maoz, 1997). However, I do not try to capture a country's degree of democracy or anocracy. The autocracy variable use in this analysis seeks to show how much a country is autocratic regardless of the democratic tendencies. After all, most of the democratic countries of the PEW dataset have autocracy score equal to zero.

An additional problem is about Lebanon which is indicated in the POLITY dataset as occupied by foreign forces²². Based on the information of the POLITY dataset, the central government of Lebanon cannot exercise power because of the occupation of foreign forces. In this case, American bilateral aid cannot be expect to reinforce the Lebanese government's grip since its power already appears to be disabled during the interregnum period. Alas, it is not easy to decide about the degree of autocracy of Lebanon in this case. At the same time, in order not to lose country level observations, instead coding Lebanon as missing, I coded this country with the mean value of autocracy scores.

Dependency on Trade with the US: As I explained in the second chapter, the variable designating trade dependency on the United States aim to test two rival hypotheses: the first is rooted in the logic of the liberal IR tradition which would suggest that increasing trade relations with the United States might improve the image of Americans and their country by opening more channels of communication. The second theory, which is closer to World Systems Theory scholars, would suggest that increasing trade relations with the United States will have grave societal implications because increasing American trade interference will create social grievance by economic exploitation. Based on these theories, it is necessary to use a measurement showing how much place the bilateral trade with the United States occupies in the relevant country's total economic activities.

In order to measure the dependency on the trade with the US, I use the World Bank GDP data and US Census Bureau's foreign trade figures for the year 2001. I obtain the ratio

²² The coding is -77 which refers to an interregnum process where central government is assumed to fail to exercise power.

of bilateral trade with the US to the GDP of my country of interest. In algebraic terms, the expression is $(\text{EXPORT}_{ij} + \text{IMPORT}_{ij}) / \text{GDP}_i$, where (i) represents the country; and (j) the United States. This measure is generally used by scholars of economic interdependence and conflict (See Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal et al 2003; Oneal, 2003). Graph 4.2 indicates the trade dependency to US figures by countries in PEW 2002 dataset.

[GRAPH 4.2 - ABOUT HERE]

Alliance with the United States: This variable aims at measuring the degree of alliance with the United States and the relevant country. Accordingly, I suspect that the less a country is allied with the US, the more there is social room for anti-Americanism because people worry that the United States rewards only its allies and bullies its foes. At the same time, real life illustrations such as the Suez Crisis may imply that US cares more about the integrity of nation-states rather than allies. Thus I suspect that alliance degree with the United States is not a correlate of anti-Americanism.

In order to come up with an alliance degree measurement, I derived from the EUGene Software, the S Score with System Leader indicator for the year 2000 (Bennett and Scott, 2000). I use the un-weighted S scores. This indicator overall shows the alliance situation of the country of interest with the system leader, the United States. The alliance figures come from the Correlates of War Project's Dyadic Formal Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004). An increase in this alliance variable indicates that the country of interest is allied with the United States in a stronger manner. According to the theoretical claim that I presented, lower alliance similarity with the United States is expected to increase anti-Americanism. Graph 4.3 indicates the S-Scores with System Leader of the PEW 2002 countries.

[GRAPH 4.3 - ABOUT HERE]

There are several issues to note in the alliance status indicator. Alliance with the United States appears to follow a pattern of clustering region by region. In North America, Canada seems to be closest ally of the United States with a distinctively high score. Next, the Latin American countries with similar alliance scores can be observed. After Latin American countries, we generally observe Western European countries. Yet a similar sharp clustering in alliance in African and Asian countries cannot be observed. Therefore, throughout further

operations, the fact that countries geographically closer to the United States appear to be greater allies of the United States should be considered.

Capability relative to the United States: Relative capability aims at measuring a country's national and material capabilities compared to the US. Based on the discussion in Chapter II, one might suspect that when a country's national and material capabilities compared to the US is lower this might create a social level concern about possible US attack that might lead to anti-Americanism. In other words, people living in countries considerably less powerful than the US might think that US will attack their lands since they lack the necessary national and material capabilities. Hence, to come up with a social level manifestation of the worry about US power, I use the relative capability.

For this measurement, I used Correlates of War Project's National Material Capabilities Data. As also indicated in the second chapter, this dataset offers a capability measure that aggregates total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure of a state to come up with a capability measure, which is indicated in the dataset as "cinc" (Singer, Bremer and Stuckley, 1972; Singer, 1987). I use the capability index for each country in the year 2002. I divided the relevant country's capability figure with that of the US: $Relative\ Capability_i = Cinc_i / Cinc_{US}$, where i represents the country of interest. As relative capability increases, the country's national material capability is closer to that of the US. Graph 4.4 summarizes PEW countries' relative capability indicators vis-à-vis the United States

[GRAPH 4.4 - ABOUT HERE]

Economic, Contractual and Market Development: In previous chapters, I offered several prior academic outcomes that led to the quest for exploring the impact of economic development on anti-Americanism. As Polanyi (2001 [1944]) and Mousseu (2002/03; 2009; 2011) argued, there is a possibility that the bitter process of transition from pre-market to market economies might bring forth anti-market movements in the form of anti-Americanism. The trick here is to algebraically capture which phase of economic development can serve as proxy to indicate the clash of market cultures. It is necessary to come up with a continuous indicator of economic development and consider the middle range observations as the economic transition phase which spurs a structural correlate of anti-Americanism.

Two different measurements designate the development of market-economy. The first is a raw measure economic development, namely Gross National Income per capita which comparatively designates the national economic development. For this, I use the World Bank's GNI per capita indicators for the year 2001. I take the natural logarithm and the squared form of the natural logarithm of GNI per capita for the sake of capturing middle level economic development in the models of interest.

Second, I use Mousseau's Contract Per Capita Index for the year 2000 which imputes the strength of the contractual relations by using life insurance contracts data²³. The reason is, as Mousseau argues, life insurance offers a means of protection by the hand of the state alternative to the patronage protection. Thus the greater the contract enforcement, the greater salience a state occupies instead of patrons (Mousseau, 2009). I created a dummy variable showing that a country is contract poor. In other words, the dummy is equal to 1 if a country's contracts per capita score is below the median value which shows that there is weak contract enforcement by the country in question.

In the PEW dataset, approximately 84 percent of the respondents live in a contract poor country and the rest live in a contract rich one. Apparently, the contract poor countries are in an absolute majority. The dummy on its own does not contain enough variance to be tested in regression analyses. Additionally, considering the economic modernization crisis, countries at the very early stages of development may not always generate economic grievances leading to anti-Americanism. What is more interesting is to capture the process of the clash of market and the pre-market cultures. Hence, I created an interaction variable of contract poor dummy with logged GNI per capita of the year 2001. This new variable catches the state of contracts poverty during economic development. Provided that GNI per capita is logged, it will not be skewed to the late stages of economic development. Thus the interaction designates economic modernization crisis because of deficit of contractual relations during economic development.

There would be alternatives to measure contract poverty. After all, Mousseau's contract intensity variable is a continuous one. Yet, based on the overall distribution of the variable, countries are either clustered as contract poor or contract rich. Thus not only using a dummy variable for contract poverty provides easier means of interpretation, but also, by nature countries are either contract rich or contract poor, which is an indication of the binary

²³ The year 2000 is the latest available year for the Contracts per capita variable

nature of the contract intensity variable. Graph 4.5 shows Gross National Income Per Capita indicators by country. Graph 4.6 displays Contract Intensiveness figures by country

[GRAPH 4.5 ABOUT HERE]

[GRAPH 4.6 ABOUT HERE]

The red bars in Contract Intensiveness indicate the contract rich countries (in our case, this refers to the value “0” of the contract poor indicator). In other words, among 42 PEW 2002 countries, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, South Korea, Canada and South Africa appear to be contract rich. Those countries consist of governments that can establish contractual relations.

Individual Level Variables

Levels of Education: The main argument that I discussed for the levels of education was that it universally decreases anti-Americanism since it might eradicate the false conclusions about the US images. On the other hand, I also suspected that institutional settings of different countries might mediate the impact of education. Under this assumption, it is possible that in countries with middle level economic development, the institutional settings might lead greater levels of education to justify more illiberal attitudes. Especially, the leaders that promote anti-market feelings might amplify their strategies via affecting the educational system. In other words, education in middle income countries can increase anti-Americanism.

Question q84 asks the participants: “What is the highest level of education that you have completed?” However, in several countries, the number of scales representing the educational system is not the same. For example while participants in Germany are offered an education question (q84ger) with 6 scales, participants in India are faced with a question of 8 scales (q84ida). When the question is asked to Indonesians (q84ind), they are offered 9 scales among which they have to choose one education level. In Nigeria, people are offered 13 different choices (q84nig). Hence there is no commonly scaled education question which can be used in the analysis. Accordingly, I standardized each version of q84²⁴. In other words, each variable of interest had a mean of 0, and a standard deviation of 1. This way, the

²⁴ In Stata, the standardization can be done such as: `egen X=std(q84i)`. X is the new variable’s name, and i represents any country in the dataset. The standardization subtracts the grand sample mean of the variable and then divides the outcome by the grand sample standard deviation in order to obtain a z distribution.

country-specific versions of years of education have the same range of distribution and can be aggregated in a single variable. I coded the answers “Don’t know” and “Refused” as missing values.

The more challenging part remains in creating a national level variable indicating middle level economic development which also designates potential economic grievance and insecurity within a country. I created four national income per capita categories based on Inglehart and Baker (2000)’s findings. The first category involves countries with GNI per capita less than \$2,000. The second covers countries with GNI per capita between \$2,000 and \$5,000. The third covers countries with GNI per capita between \$5,000 and \$15,000. Finally, the fourth dummy category covers countries with GNI per capita greater than \$15,000²⁵. In Inglehart and Baker’s research, the countries in their World Values Survey dataset cluster in a two-dimensional political value spectrum, under the criteria of the aforementioned income per capita categories. The two dimensional political value spectrum contains in one dimension, traditional versus secular values; and on the other survival versus self-expression values²⁶. I created a binary variable indicating that the country belongs to the national income per capita range between \$2,000 and \$15,000. This range covers two income per capita levels, namely the upper and lower middle income countries in PEW dataset.

Nonetheless, according to Inglehart and Baker (2000)’s findings, the first two income per capita ranges that are overall between \$0 and \$5,000 have the strongest economic insecurity values. Some of the upper middle income countries between \$5,000 and \$15,000 appear to have less concern for economic insecurity than lower income per capita countries. Hence, I also created a dummy that includes the income per capita range from \$0 to \$5,000 that might alternatively constitute a social proxy for economic grievance. Finally, I expect that, the cross-level interaction of middle level economic development with education increases anti-Americanism²⁷.

²⁵ In the PEW 2002 dataset, the countries which fall in the first category are: Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Jordan. The countries which are in the second category are: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Venezuela and Lebanon. The countries in the third category are: Czech Republic, South Korea, Mexico and Slovak Republic. Finally, in the fourth category, the countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Great Britain

²⁶ For a more detailed explanation of survival values which turns out to be the opposite of self-expression values, refer back to Chapter II.

²⁷ By cross-level, I refer to the interaction of an individual level variable (here education) and national level variable (here economic development).

Poverty and Urban Poverty: In the previous chapters, based on prior research, I argued that poverty has no direct link with anti-Americanism. The main reason for this direct insignificant relationship would be that the issue of poverty predates recent anti-Americanism, and people were even poorer when anti-Americanism was not a serious issue. Nonetheless, as Mousseau (2011) argued, when poverty takes place in urban settings it might signal economic modernization crisis and become a correlate of illiberal attitudes. Hence for the current topic, it may not be that poverty, but urban poverty increases anti-Americanism since it could be an indicator of an economic modernization crisis.

In order to generate an indicator of poverty, I replicated the operations of Mousseau (2011). Questions q87a, q87b and q87c asked “Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food, medical and health care, and clothing that your family needed?” respectively. In his article, Mousseau (2011) sums the affirmative answers (coded as 1) of these questions along with three other asked only in Least Developed Countries to obtain a poverty score. However, it is possible that these 3 types of poverties might have different loadings in different countries. If inability to buy food and medication are treated equally, in some countries, this might have blurring implications. Hence I ran a factor analysis of poverty by including q87a, q87b and q87c. When I compared a general factor analysis with an alternative country-based factor analysis, I realized that the loadings of q87a, q87b and q87c varied across countries. However, no different coefficient or significance occurred, between general, country-based poverty factor scores and Mousseau’s summation. Thus for the sake of a clear comparison, I kept Mousseau’s (2011) measurement of poverty.

In the PEW 2002 dataset, questions q87a, q87b and q87c were not asked in Egypt. Under the concern of low second (national level) observations, it is best not to lose any country observations. Therefore, to remedy for the missing observations in Egypt, I followed two steps. In the first step, I used the income per capita range that Inglehart & Baker (2000) created. Egypt falls in the first income per capita category between \$0 and \$5,000. In addition, this country is situated –based on Inglehart and Baker (2000)’s findings- among countries with high survival and religious values. At the second step, I took the mean poverty score of the income per capita category that Egypt is also involved in. For all the observations in Egypt, I replaced the missing values with that mean poverty score. The main reason I conducted such an analysis is based on the assumption that, countries that have similar political values motivated by the national income per capita might have similar degrees of grievances due to the problems of poverty. It is not a perfect measurement. Nevertheless, it

helps remedy the missing value problem of Egypt at the second level in the models where I measure the impact of poverty.

There are still several differences with Mousseau (2011)'s poverty measurement and my current measurement. He also includes two additional questions in his poverty variable: In PEW 2002 Dataset, question q89c asks people whether they have running water in their houses and question q89d asks whether respondents have a flush toilet. Mousseau's measurement involves these questions. However, Mousseau's analysis covers only Muslim countries (Mousseau, 2011). If I used these variables here, I would obtain too many missing values provided that q89c and q89d are only asked in Least Developed countries. In addition, I cannot use the computation that I used for Egypt because the poverty variable which involves all the questions that Mousseau (2011) used is missing in the highest income per capita category of Inglehart and Baker (2000). Therefore, I cannot obtain a mean poverty score to use for the most economically developed countries. Hence, even though I sought to keep a similar measurement of poverty with that of Mousseau (2011), because of the concern for missing values I cannot use all the variables that he used. This way, any findings in this thesis related with poverty that contradicts Mousseau (2011)'s outcomes may be due to difference of measurement.

Just like the poverty variable, I came up with a close measurement of urbanity with Mousseau (2011)'s related variable. In this regard, question q97 asks "*About how many people live in the place the interview was conducted?*" I coded more than 500,000 and above answers as living in an urban setting, and generated an aggregate dummy covering all the different versions of q97. In fact, this coding is purely a replication of Mousseau (2011)'s urbanity measurement. When the binary variable is 1, it means the respondent living area comprehends a population more than 500,000. However, q97 is not asked in the United Kingdom, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, South Korea and Uganda. For these missing cases, I rely on question q98 which directly codes urban, sub-urban or rural for each respondent instead of assessing whether there are more than 500,000 people living in

their town²⁸. I coded 1 when people are marked by the interviewers to be living in urban places²⁹.

Nevertheless, q98 was not asked in Lebanon. For that reason, I relied on q94leb which offers information about which region of Lebanon the respondent is from. This indicator offers six regions: West Beirut (27.5% of all Lebanese respondents), East Beirut (27.5%), North (14%), South (13%), Bekaa (10%) and Mount Lebanon (8%). Even though World Bank Urban Population as a Percentage of Total Population dataset³⁰ indicates that in 2002, the urban population of the total population of Lebanon is 86 percent. However, under the logic that we are mostly interested in places where there are more than 500,000 people, only the Beirut area but no other city in Lebanon possesses more than 500,000 habitants. Therefore, I code the East and West Beirut categories of q94leb as urban and non-urban otherwise. Finally, I constructed an interaction variable of urban poverty by multiplying the urban dummy with the poverty variable in line with Mousseau (2011).

Income Satisfaction: I considered, in line with Mousseau (2011)'s findings that the income dissatisfaction can be a more explicit signal of economic grievance with regards to a direct measurement of poverty. Thus, income dissatisfaction might be an increasing factor of anti-Americanism. Question q6a in the PEW dataset asks: *“Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this aspect of your life: your household income?”* Respondents had to choose one among four categories of household economic evaluation. I coded the variable of household income dissatisfaction in a gradually increasing manner that showed increasing satisfaction. Nonetheless, I did not recode the “don’t know” answers as missing values. After all, if people do not know what they feel about their household income, it is likely that they are neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied; but rather they are indifferent. Thus I recoded the variable as -2 for the very dissatisfied answers (18.41%), -1 for the somewhat dissatisfied (28.99%), 0 for the “don’t know” answers

²⁸ Question q98 has different versions for each country in the dataset. In my analysis: For United Kingdom there is q98usr; for Egypt, q98ur; for Guatemala q98gua; for Honduras q98hon; for Jordan q98usr; for South Korea q98kor; and for Uganda q98ur. In the case of South Korea, q98kor has codes as metropolitan and small/medium city. I coded the former as equal to 1 for the general urbanity dummy. On the other hand, I coded the latter – small/medium- city as 0. In all versions, I coded the “don’t know” answers as missing values.

²⁹ The reason why I predominantly relied on q97 instead of q98 is again because I am concerned about coming up with a similar measurement of urbanity of Mousseau (2011), provided that I pursue re-testing his urban poverty findings in the case of anti-Americanism.

³⁰ The dataset is available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?page=1>

(0.51%), 1 for the somewhat satisfied answers (440.41%) and 2 for very satisfied answers (11.69%).

Personal Income: Unlike poverty, personal income is an indication of where the monthly or yearly household income household is situated in national a categorization. Thus it might be hard to makes sense of the personal income as an indication of economic grievance.

Additionally, neither could I find a theoretically coherent reason for why a simple indication of personal income could affect anti-Americanism. However, as I indicated in Chapter II, a group-mean centered poverty might show a household's economic situation vis-à-vis the rest of its country hence be a material proxy for relative economic deprivation. Thus, economic deprivation might increase anti-Americanism. In other words, the greater the distance from the mean level of income in a country, the more I would expect someone to find material reasons to be more anti-American.

Accordingly, question q88 asks people to situate themselves in a given scale in terms of their monthly or annually household incomes. The number of categories offered changes for each country. I first recoded all the categories in an increasing manner, showing an increase of income. Second, I recoded "don't know" and "refused" answers as missing values. Third, I standardized all the country specific versions of q88 to obtain identical scales for each country. Then, I aggregated all the standardized versions in a single variable indicating personal income. Throughout the regression analyses, I used a group mean-centering method for this variable to obtain someone's economic position vis-à-vis the mean income category in his or her country.

There are indeed two problems in the measurement of personal income. First, people are asked to situate themselves based on their monthly or annual household income. In some countries q88 ask monthly, and in some other annual incomes. Annual income reports are relatively rare and are asked in Great Britain, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Tanzania. PEW 2002 dataset's codebook does not provide additional information that clarifies this difference in the reporting of annual versus monthly income. Nevertheless, provided that I measure a household's economic situation vis-à-vis the mean observation of its country, this monthly/annual difference observed across-nations remains less of a concern. Second, for the missing values and Egyptian respondents who are not asked q88, I make an imputation with poverty and income dissatisfaction variables which might give a clue about someone's economic situation. The observations that I imputed totaled 5,335 which makes 13.94 percent of the dataset.

Control Variables:

In each model, I also control for the age and gender of the respondents at the individual level. The main reason is that these variables are independent of the theoretical guidance and all other independent variables; and are demographic features linked to people or to their countries by nature. The first control variable is the age of the respondent. Theoretically speaking, I expect that age has an increasing effect on anti-Americanism which decreases as a person grows older. In other words, I expect a logarithmic relation between age and anti-Americanism. I take the natural logarithm of respondents' age in question q74. The sample in the PEW 2002 dataset is an adult sample where all the respondents are either 18 years old or above, so there is no idea of anti-Americanism trends of people below 18 years old.

The second control variable is the gender of the respondents. Just under the same logic with age, gender develops independently of the other variables in the dataset. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the coefficient and the significance of the gender variable are not affected throughout the models. However, females are expected to be less anti-American compared to males. Hence, I constructed a binary variable indicating whether the participant is female or not. In PEW dataset, question q73 codes the gender of the respondents. Based on this question, I coded a binary variable coded equal to 1 when the respondent is female, and to zero otherwise. Overall, I use logged age and the gender as control variables at each regression model that I run.

* * *

Another concern for the variables is the problem of correlation among variables that might affect the multivariate regression results. Hence, the findings at the correlation tables require attention before moving on to further analyses, since putting any two significantly correlated variables at the same multivariate regression can spur biased results; in other words one should beware of the correlation issues in to mitigate the problems of endogeneity. Accordingly, I explore the correlation issue in two tables, namely among the individual and national level variables.

[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4.1, the most expected correlations occur between variables that show material economic conditions and expression of economic satisfaction. There is correlation between household income and poverty (Pearson's $r=-0.30$), poverty and income dissatisfaction (Pearson's $r=-0.32$), and slightly between income dissatisfaction and household income (Pearson's $r=0.26$). On the other hand, the more striking correlation cases happen between levels of education and economic variables. This relation is especially observable between education and household income where there is a positive correlation (Pearson's $r=0.38$), and the correlation coefficient is the strongest among the other results³¹. Accordingly, people with greater years of education are situated in higher income categories. Indeed, I will address this problem more in detail in the regression results chapter.

[TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4.2 shows the correlation figures of the national level variables. It is highly useful to go over which variables correlate among themselves for what theoretical reasons, and what should be considered when analyses are run containing these variables. Henceforth, I review all the correlation status of the national level variables. The war with Israel dummy considerably correlates with US aid/ GDP (Pearson's $r=0.51$) and with alliance status with the US (Pearson's $r=-0.39$). The former correlation is expected since the United States provides the Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt, with a great amount of aid and assistance. The latter correlation is not surprising such that the degree of alliance of the countries that are negatively affected by the Israeli conflict is expected to be lower with the US than other countries.

The US bilateral aid variable strongly correlates with autocracy (Pearson's $r=0.52$); alliance degree with the US (Pearson's $r=-0.34$); relative capability (Pearson's $r=-0.35$); contracts per capita (Pearson's $r=-0.42$); GNI per capita (Pearson's $r=-0.38$); and primary energy consumption per capita (Pearson's $r=-0.41$). These correlations in the PEW dataset show that, first US provides greater aid to autocracies. This situation requires further inquiry since my aim was to test the interaction of bilateral US aid and autocracies. The correlation between US aid and alliance with the US might lead to an assessment that the less US is allied

³¹ I do not count the correlation between urban*poverty and poverty; where the Pearson's r of 0.57 is certainly expected because poverty is involved in the interaction. This correlation leads us to be careful in the models where we test urban poverty. Nonetheless, provided the standardization of the poverty variable involves the subtraction of the mean; in other words centering, the results may be interpreted more reliably.


with a country the more it sends aid to that country. Nonetheless, this relation is limited to the PEW 2002 countries; hence there is no reason to make a universal claim. The same is true for relative capability. It appears by the correlation figures that the weaker a country's national and material capabilities vis-à-vis the United States, the greater amount of aid per GDP that country receives. Additionally, in line with the relative capability finding, it is not surprising that economically less developed countries receive greater US aid. This relation is seen by the negative correlation coefficients between US aid/GDP with separately contracts per capita, GNI per capita and primary energy consumption per capita.

The correlation of the autocracy with other variables is also in theoretically expected directions. The autocracies appear to be less allied with the United States (Pearson's $r=-0.34$); weaker compared to the United States in terms of relative capability (Pearson's $r=-0.35$), and economically less developed (Correlation coefficients for GNI per capita is -0.42 as measured by Pearson's r).


As for the rest of the table, the correlations do not show surprising patterns. For example, the correlation between bilateral trade dependency to the US, and alliance with the US is not an unexpected indication, since it seems plausible that the US engages in greater volumes of trade with its allies (Pearson's $r=0.41$). Additionally, there is a correlation between logged GNI per capita and alliance degree with the United States (Pearson's $r=0.52$). This is too not unexpected. After all, there is evidence in the literature that economic or market development is closely associated with UN voting alignment (Mousseau, 2003). This relation could well be extended to the alliance degree with the United States.

As I briefly reviewed the correlation issues, it is a necessity to re-consider which variables correlate with one another. After all, there is the possibility of endogeneity, provided that one variable considerably correlated with another at the same model can lead to biased results. In the next chapter, I will offer the results of my analyses and discuss in more detail the correlation issues in the necessary cases.


Graph 4.1: US Bilateral aid/GDP for PEW 2002 countries




Graph 4.2 - Trade Dependency to the United States, by Country




Graph 4.3 - Alliance Status with the United States, by Country



Graph 4.4 - Relative Capability by Country



Graph 4.5 - Gross National Income Per Capita, by Country



Graph 4.6 - Contract Intensiveness by Country
 (Red bars indicate contract intensive countries)




TABLE 4.1: Correlation Matrix of Individual Level Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education	(1) 1.00							
Poverty	(2) -0.21	1.00						
Urban _{dummy}	(3) 0.13	-0.08	1.00					
Urban*Poverty	(4) -0.12	0.57	-0.10	1.00				
Income Satisfaction	(5) 0.14	-0.32	0.07	-0.19	1.00			
Household Income	(6) 0.38	-0.30	0.14	-0.19	0.26	1.00		
Age _{logged}	(7) -0.17	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.07	-0.06	1.00	
Female	(8) -0.08	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.02	1.00

Notes: (i) Individual-level N is 29,294; while national-N is 42

(ii) All the variables except binary ones are standardized to z-distribution

TABLE 4.2: Correlation Matrix of National Level Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
War with Israel _{dummy}	(1) 1.00										
(US Aid/GDP) _{logged}	(2) 0.51	1.00									
Autocracy	(3) 0.29	0.52	1.00								
(US Aid/GDP) _{logged} * Autocracy	(4) 0.56	0.81	0.79	1.00							
Trade Dependency to US	(5) -0.11	-0.09	-0.17	-0.12	1.00						
Tau or S with System Leader	(6) -0.39	-0.34	-0.37	-0.38	0.41	1.00					
Relative Capability	(7) -0.18	-0.35	-0.26	-0.22	-0.17	-0.01	1.00				
Contracts poor _{dummy}	(8) 0.14	0.30	0.27	0.21	-0.05	-0.23	-0.23	1.00			
GNI per capita _{logged}	(9) 0.09	-0.38	-0.40	-0.25	0.10	0.52	0.15	-0.72	1.00		
GNI per capita _{logged} ²	(10) 0.06	-0.38	-0.39	-0.26	0.10	0.50	0.16	-0.75	1.00	1.00	
GNI pc _{logged} *Contracts poor _{dummy}	(11) 0.25	-0.29	-0.35	-0.18	0.10	0.51	-0.04	-0.17	0.78	0.73	1.00

Notes: (i) All the variables except the war with Israel dummy are standardized to z-distribution

(ii) For all variables, the second level observation number is 42 and individual level observations total 30,006

(iii) Tau or S with System Leader measures alliance with the US

APPENDICES

APPEDIX 4.1 - Summary Statistics of Individual-Level Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Education	29,935	0.00	1.00	-3.26	3.61
Poverty	29,754	0.00	1.00	-0.95	1.36
Urban _{dummy}	29,903	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Urban*Poverty	29,654	-0.04	0.57	-0.95	1.36
Income Dissatisfaction	29,878	0.00	1.00	-1.44	1.47
Household Income	29,999	0.00	1.00	-3.95	2.59
Age _{logged}	29,824	0.00	1.00	-1.70	2.59
Female _{dummy}	30,006	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00

Note: All the variables are standardized to z-distribution except binary variables

APPEDIX 4.2 - Summary Statistics of National-Level Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
War with Israel _{dummy}	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
(US Aid/GDP) _{logged}	0.00	1.00	-0.69	3.54
Autocracy	0.00	1.00	-0.61	3.17
(US Aid/GDP) _{logged} * Autocracy	0.00	1.00	-0.49	3.16
Trade Dependency to US	0.00	1.00	-0.64	5.00
Tau or S with System Leader	0.00	1.00	-1.25	2.55
Relative Capability	0.00	1.00	-0.75	2.92
Contracts poor _{dummy}	0.84	0.37	0.00	1.00
GNI per capita _{logged}	0.00	1.00	-1.38	2.16
GNI per capita _{logged} ²	0.00	1.00	-1.22	2.38
GNI pc _{logged} *Contracts poor _{dummy}	-0.26	0.67	-1.38	1.04

Notes: (i) All variables are standardized to z-distribution except the binary variables

(ii) All variables involve 42 countries with 30,006 individual observations

CHAPTER V – REGRESSION RESULTS

So far, I first discussed what anti-Americanism is at a quick glance and what the consequences of anti-Americanism are which turn the topic into a concern for relevant policy-makers. Second, I reviewed several hypotheses that might bear a potential effect on the changes in anti-American attitudes both at the national and individual levels. Third, I dug deeper in the discussion of what anti-Americanism is to the extent of leading me to construct a comprehensive dependent variable measurement. Fourth, I showed the operationalization process of the independent variables and indicated several statistical concerns that might create potential endogeneity problems throughout the regression analyses. In this chapter, I will discuss the regression results of the hypotheses that I presented in preceding chapters.

Accordingly, there are five steps in the presentation of the results: First, I show the between group variance of the dataset based on variance components model. Second, I show my findings about the inter-rater Agreement index and several models taking the inter-rater agreement as the dependent variable. In the third step, I report the bivariate results of my variables at national and individual levels separately by controlling for demographic variables. In the fourth step, I discuss the multivariate results. In the fifth step I present and compare the percentage of total variance that the variables of this analysis explain.

There are several issues to note about the models that I am going to elaborate on in this chapter: First, in each regression, I used an individual level weight by multiplying the *weight* variable in the PEW dataset with the probability that each observation is included³² (Mousseau, 2011). The weight variable corrects for the representation of gender, age and type of settlement distribution of the individuals. On the other hand, since the PEW 2002 dataset's codebook does not indicate how and why the countries were chosen, I do not use a second level weighting. Second, I use a separate significance criteria for national and individual level variables. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1, provided that there is low number of second level observations. For individual level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.05 as there is adequate number of individual observations. Finally, I use one-tailed significance test for each variable of interest provided that my hypotheses suspect of precise directional relations with anti-Americanism.

³² In HLM, the procedure of weighting is as follows: Other Settings → Estimation Settings → Weighting → Level 1 weight

Variance Components Model

In the first step of my analysis, based on the variance components, or the null model, I obtain the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable explained by national differences in the dataset (Luke, 2004). In the coming models, what I expect is that the additional variables will reduce the variance explained because of the higher level discrepancies (Peterson & Goldstein, 1991). The variance components model is basically a null regression which does not include any regressors, but the degree of freedom is $N-1$ where N is the number of second level observations, because there is still a predictor in the variance components model which is the error term of the random intercept model. I obtained 24 percent of total variance. This figure is also called as the inter-class correlation, namely the ICC(1) which indicates the percentage of the within-group (national level) variation in the total variation³³. This percentage can also be considered as the between group effects (Luke, 2004). This is a strong reasonable figure to carry the multilevel analysis on despite the relatively low number or second (national) level of observations, equal to 42. Thus this strong figure can be considered as a remedy for the low number or second level observations. In addition, provided that in each nation, there is more than enough of observations³⁴, the reliability estimate is 0.995; namely the ICC(2)³⁵. These results thus justify the aggregation on the dataset on behalf of my dependent variable

Inter-rater Agreement or $r_{wg}(J)$

Another concern that arises when researchers study multilevel analysis is to question whether first level individuals signal an agreement on their responses within the groups they are nested. Here, $r_{wg}(J)$, in other words, the Inter-rater reliability index serves such a purpose. The inter-rater reliability index was introduced by James, Demarree and Wolf (1984) within the field of organizational psychology. To my knowledge, $r_{wg}(j)$ index is not used very often in political science and public opinion studies. James, Demarree and Wolf offer a measurement of agreement for a single question or a set of questions among respondents

³³ In the variance components (ANOVA) model, the variance of the individual level error term, r_{ij} is 0.65 and the variance of the second level error term u_0 is 0.21. These error terms are the random effects of the model. Additionally, the chi-square statistics of this variance components estimation equals 12082.6 with 41 degrees of freedom of the national level. I obtain ICC(1) by dividing the variance of the error term of the national level to the total variance of the national and individual level error terms.

³⁴ Mean size for a cluster, namely a nation, is 581.3 respondents

³⁵ ICC(2) has its own separate formula, yet HLM 7 directly provides this figure on the output.

(judges) within the second level break variables where they cluster. The equation 1.1 shows the $r_{wg}(J)$ measurement which aggregates the answers of different questions provided by the respondents at the same second level unit. In other words (5.1) shows the *multiple item estimator* of inter-rater agreement measurement (James, Demarree and Wolf, 1984).

$$r_{WG(J)} = \frac{J[1 - (\bar{s}^2 / \sigma^2)]}{J[1 - (\bar{s}^2 / \sigma^2)] + \bar{s}^2 / \sigma^2} \quad (5.1)$$

In this formula, J is the number of items in the score of interest. Since the dependent variable has two different items, J equals to 2 in this case. Additionally, \bar{s}^2 is the average variance of the items in question within a single second level case. σ^2 refers to the variance of some null distribution with regards to non-agreement. Equation 5.2 shows how I obtained σ^2 :

$$\sigma^2 = (A^2 - 1) / 12 \quad (5.2)$$

In this formula, A is the number of scales in the questions I am interested in analyzing for the $r_{wg}(j)$ analysis. The term σ^2 measures “the expected error variance based on a uniform distribution (James, Demarree and Wolf, 1984). Since all the items I used in my scores designating anti-Americanism were standardized, provided that the null requires items to be equally scaled in an integer form, I collapsed all the items into two scales where from 0 to 1 anti-Americanism increases. In this regard, A is equal to 4, where σ^2 makes $(4^2 - 1) / 12 = 1.25$ for each item. Putting 1.25 as σ^2 to the Equation 5.1, I obtain interesting patterns of inter-rater agreement scores of anti-Americanism for each country. For the calculation of $r_{wg}(j)$ in each score, I used the relevant items which made up the score. Graph 5.1 shows the inter-rater reliability figures for each score of anti-Americanism in each country I used in the analysis.

[GRAPH 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

There is a general consensus among many scholars using the $r_{wg}(J)$ measurement in taking 0.70 as a cutoff value (Lüdtke, et al 2006; Flood et al., 2000). Hence, I consider the countries which have $r_{wg}(J)$ scores above 0.70 as showing significant amount of agreement

among its respondents. I indicate a horizontal line in Graph 5.1 indicating the 0.70 threshold for agreement index. The countries having inter-rater agreements above 0.70 are situated above this horizontal line and tend to consist of people who show some sort of convergence in their answers to the dependent variable.

There are interesting conclusions that can be drawn from Graph 5.1, which led me to inquire into the correlates of inter-rater agreement before engaging in the actual regression analysis. As seen in the graph, the countries which are considered as situated in the middle income per capita range such as Turkey, Jordan, South Africa, Egypt or Argentina show some of the lowest agreement scores. This situation can offer some preliminary support for the Economic Norms Theory. Accordingly, more societal disagreement in anti-Americanism can be explained by middle-level economic development, which merely supports the clash of market and clientelistic cultures within a society leading to a lack of consensus of public opinion (Mousseau, 2002/03).

In order to retest this raw finding, I ran simple OLS regressions considering the aggregated $r_{wg}(4)$ scores as the dependent variable. There are overall three models which inquire into the changes in the inter-rater agreement scores. Accordingly, in line with the suggestion of the Economic Norms Theory, I first tested whether middle level economic development leads to increasing disagreement of public opinion among in societies. For this operation, I used logged and the squared logged forms of the GNI per capita the year 2001 that I took from World Bank. Second, I tested the interaction of logged GNI per capita with contracts poor dummy which, as I designated earlier, is an alternative measurement of economic modernization crisis. Finally, I tested whether countries with greater anti-Americanism have also greater agreement in anti-American responses. At each model, I controlled for the natural logarithm of the countries' population for the year 2001³⁶. The main reason to control for population is because of the possibility that countries with lower populations might have more agreement and represent a more integrated society. At each model, I controlled for the clustering of the standard errors by countries³⁷. Table 5.1 shows the OLS results analyses.

[TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

³⁶ The population data is taken from World Bank. The reason I logged the population is to control for the skewed-ness of the data because of the excessively populated countries like India and Russia.

³⁷ In Stata, this means adding the `vce(cluster country)` option to the regular OLS regression where "country" represents the national level identity variable.

Model 1 of Table 5.1, which controls for the natural logarithm of the population, we realize shows that there is a U-shaped relation between economic development and inter-rater agreement of anti-Americanism. In other words, the logged GNI per capita has a negative coefficient and the squared form of the logged GNI has a positive one. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 0.1 level with one-tailed significance tests. Additionally, the negative and significant coefficient of the logged population not only in the first, but in the overall models is consistent with the expectations: More populated countries have less agreement in the anti-Americanism responses. To illustrate the nature of the U-Shape, Graph 5.2 displays the actual and the fitted values of Model 1 in a scatter-plot. Accordingly, I took the predicted values of the Model 1 and in a scatter-plot of inter-rater agreement and logged GNI per capita. The predicted values curve indicates a slightly U-shaped relation in line with the directions coefficients. Nonetheless, the shape is not a perfect U shape. I also tested whether the sum of logged GNI per capita and squared logged GNI per capita equals to 0³⁸. Yet the test did not yield significance (Prob>F = 0.10). Indeed, apparently because of the extreme disagreement of anti-Americanism score, the countries like Jordan, South Africa, Lebanon and Turkey lead the predicted y-hat graph to become slightly concave. Nevertheless, the minimum value of the predicted y-hat graph appears to be due to India which is surprising since the model already controls for the population of the countries. Indeed, India also offered the greatest inconsistency between the means responses for the general evaluation of the United States and of the Americans³⁹. Thus, India might appear to be a particular case for anti-Americanism.

[GRAPH 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

In Model 2, it appears that the alternative measurement of economic modernization crisis yield a more significant coefficient (beta: -0.41, p-value <0.001) with the expected direction. Indeed, the interaction of logged GNI per capita and contract poverty dummy might be a better indicator of economic modernization crisis. This is mainly because the interaction of GNI per capita_{logged}*Contracts Poor_{dummy} captures the problem of contract poverty in economic development. The contract poverty dummy may not after all entail to the economic modernization crisis on its own because many countries might be contract poor and also

³⁸ In a perfect U-shaped relation, the absolute value of the coefficients of GNI_{logged} and GNI_{logged}^2 would be equal; in other words $|GNI_{logged}| = |GNI_{logged}^2|$ which also makes betas of $GNI_{logged} + GNI_{logged}^2 = 0$

³⁹ The detailed information can be found in Chapter III.

situated in the early phase of economic development. After all, in PEW dataset, the contract-rich countries are (Contract poor dummy=0), Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, South Africa and Great Britain. The contract poor category includes countries like Mali, Nigeria, Angola and Ghana which are at the early phase of economic development. Hence interacting the dummy with economic development –here GNI per capita- might indicate the impact of contract poverty when there is increasing economic development; that is to say, what happens when economy develops in a contract poor system. Additionally, the direction and the significance of the constituents outside the interaction term make theoretical sense as well: Contract-poverty without economic development increases agreement or economic development without contract poverty again increases agreement.

In Model 3, I offer another interesting finding showing that anti-Americanism is inversely related to inter-rater agreement. The independent in this model is my regular dependent variable showing the amount of anti-Americanism. Accordingly, in countries where there is more anti-Americanism, there is also more variance in the responses of anti-Americanism. After all, if the assumption that more anti-Americanism is attributed to middle-level economic development or to a bitter consequence of the economic modernization, this finding is related to the *Economic Norms Theory*. However, we should realize that a comprehensive model might have served as a better measurement that shows the Model 3's relevance to the economic norms theory⁴⁰. Provided that, Table 5.1 offers only variables aggregated at the national level, 42 different observations are offered for each model. More complicated regressions might become harder and less reliable to interpret.

The findings at the Model 3 of Table 5.1 can induce policy-makers to ask what if people who are anti-American had also higher inter-rater agreement. Indeed, such a finding would have brought some great concern for policy-makers who deal with anti-Americanism, provided that they would face anti-American publics which also converge in their anti-American attitudes. Therefore, in the future, the inter-rater agreement aspect of anti-Americanism should become a concern for policy-makers.

Hierarchical Regression Results:

In this section I present the regression results at three different sets models. First, I show the results where I only tested each individual and national level hypothesis separately

⁴⁰ For example, a more comprehensive model could be recursive analysis inquiring the interplay between anti-Americanism, economic development and agreement in anti-American responses.

by controlling for demographic variables of age and gender. Second, I tested all the statistically significant variables of the first step at a multivariate setting in order to see how they influence each other. Finally, because of low degrees of freedom, I re-run the models with all the statistically significant individual-level variables with one national-level variable (hypothesis) each time. There are two major points to note before moving on to the display and the discussion of the results. The first is, in all models, I use restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation and not full maximum likelihood estimation. It is apparent that for the second level model, the dataset only offers 42 country observations. Hence, as several scholars argue, with low number of observations, restricted maximum likelihood model might provide more reliable estimates (Kenward & Roger, 1997). Additionally, since I do not test or estimate any random slopes for a particular individual level variable, I preferred using REML again in order to obtain more accurate estimates.

Second, except for the dummy variables, I standardized all the variables at both levels. There are two ways of standardizing. The first can be applied after the output related to the regression models is obtained. The second is the a priori standardization, where all the variables are standardized before using them in the relevant models. However, provided that computation softwares do not standardize the coefficients in the output, a posteriori standardization does not allow the interpretation of the variance components, since the variance components represent the figures of unstandardized coefficients. In other words, if the variables are standardized after the output is already obtained, variance components of the output cannot be interpreted (Hox, 1995). Hence, I chose to standardize before I put the variables in multilevel regression analysis. Henceforth, the results with standardized coefficients that I am going to present and discuss will have several advantages. First, they are interpretable for the later meta-analyses on anti-Americanism; in other words, they possess the feature of external comparability (Hunter & Hamilton, 2002). Second, standardized coefficients can allow for the comparison of the impact of different variables (Hox, 1995; Hunter & Hamilton, 2002). Indeed, as the results make evident, the standardization of the coefficients will help to understand which approach on the correlates of anti-Americanism has a greater impact than others.

There are two important points in terms of the standardization of the variables: First, prior to standardizing all the variables I dropped the missing values in the dependent variable. Standardization without dropping the missing values of the dependent variable excessively

includes the dropped observations of China⁴¹. Throughout the analysis, this problem causes slight changes in the statistical distributions of the variables such that their mean is not perfectly set to zero and standard deviation to one. Hence, I drop the missing values of the dependent variable *before* standardization, to obtain a clear z-distribution table for all the continuous variables during the analyses. Second, I do not standardize the binary variables provided that their standardized version does not offer me a 1 versus 0 conditions which blurs its interpretation. Nonetheless, provided that the dummy variables remain un-standardized, the magnitudes of the standardized coefficients with dummies (and interactions that involve the dummies) cannot be compared.

Step 1: Simple test of the hypotheses

My purpose in testing the hypotheses separately was to obtain a preliminary idea of how these different variables affect the anti-Americanism *ceteris paribus*. At each model I controlled for gender and the natural logarithm of age at the individual level. These demographic control variables do not correlate well with the rest of the variables, and their impact is not contingent on the rest of the variables⁴². As I underlined earlier, for all the regressions, I use the restricted maximum likelihood method provided that I have a low number of second level observations, and that I am only interested in the fixed effects of the second level variables.

Table 5.2 indicates the hierarchical regression results of the simple national level hypotheses. At each model, number of observations for the individual level is 29,824 and for the national level, it is 42. Each time I control for the gender and logged age. Nonetheless I only offer the robust standard errors of the variables of my theoretical interest to save space and to bring the focus on the variables which I actually test. For the rest including the intercept and the control variables, I show only their coefficients and significance level. In addition, I report the ICC(1) figures indicating the variance explained because of the national level differences. I expect each newly added variable to account for a significant amount of variance explained at the national differences. Thus as ICC(1) shrinks, a conclusion may be that the newly added variable accounts for greater variance between nations.

[TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

⁴¹ Note that China has 3,000 observations.

⁴² For further information on correlation patterns, see Chapter IV.

Model 1 tests the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or simply the Middle Eastern conflict. Theoretically speaking, the assumption is that countries that are directly affected by Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have greater levels of anti-Americanism. The war with Israel dummy consists of Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt which either received a considerable number of Palestinian war refugees or which experienced strained relations with Israel because of the conflict in question. When the dummy is equal to 1, the participant either lives in Egypt, Lebanon or Jordan.

Accordingly, controlling for the relevant demographic variables, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. Indeed, as I pointed out earlier, the measurement of the Middle Eastern conflict is a very simplistic one that indicates whether the participant lives either in Jordan, Lebanon or Egypt. Provided that the respondents are not asked any question about their grievance of the Israeli conflict in PEW 2002 dataset, this crude binary measurement is used. However, the significance and the direction of the coefficient is in line with the hypothesis that the US presence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict increases anti-American attitudes of the respondents who live in the surrounding countries of this conflict, which therefore directly or indirectly affected by the conflict⁴³. Additionally, the ICC(1) of the model one is much smaller than the semi-null model's ICC(1) which is roughly equal to 24 percent. The semi-null model estimates only demographic variables⁴⁴. For the sake of saving space and indicating only theoretically-driven measures, I do not report the semi-null model.

At Model 2, I test the impact of bilateral US aid to autocratic regimes. The theories that I reviewed previously lead the suspicion that US aid to autocratic regimes create a national level impact on greater anti-Americanism. In simpler words, the expectancy is that

⁴³ Indeed, some scholars argue that US presence in other regions such as Latin America is a source of anti-Americanism. In order to strengthen the particularity of the findings about the Middle East region, I re-tested the first model, with other regional dummies of Latin America (Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Mexico) Asia (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, India Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Ukraine) Africa (Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, Uganda, Mali, Angola, Ivory Coast and Senegal) and Europe (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic) separately. None of these dummies are significantly associated with higher anti-Americanism. Additionally, the dummy designating the African region is significantly associated with lower anti-Americanism. These findings reinforce the particularity of the regional war with Israel dummy in significantly increasing anti-Americanism. For the sake of saving space and maintaining the logical flow of the analysis, I do not report the results.

⁴⁴ The equation of this semi-null model is: $\text{Anti-Americanism}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} * \text{female}_{ij} + \gamma_{20} * \log(\text{age})_{ij} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$ where i represents the individuals, and j the nations. The error term r_{ij} represents the individual level error term, in other words it is the residual of the individual i , in the nation j . On the other hand, u_{0j} represents the error term of the national level, belonging to the nation j . We assume that these different errors are independent of each other. I name the model semi-null because it is not a completely null model like the variance components model.

the interaction of US Aid*Autocracy significantly increases anti-Americanism. Accordingly, Model II involves the logged US Aid/GDP, the continuous autocracy measurement from Polity IV and their interaction, in other words US Aid*Autocracy. The results show that US aid*autocracy can be associated with greater levels of anti-Americanism (standardized beta=0.40, p-value<0.01 with one-tailed significance test). The moderator and focal variables, namely the US aid and the Autocracy outside the interaction appear to have statistically insignificant coefficients⁴⁵. The ICC(1) of the Model 2 is 0.20 which is again smaller than the semi-null model's ICC(1).

In Model 3, I test whether a country's national material capabilities relative to the United States is associated with anti-Americanism. Theoretical discussion guides the suspicion that when a country's relative capability to the US is weaker, people in that country will worry about the US might and thus about a possibility that the US will attack their country. Hence, they will manifest their worries with greater levels of anti-Americanism. Recall that the design of relative capability consists of dividing a country's national and material capabilities by the ones of the United States. As the relative capability variable increases, it designates relatively stronger countries. Hence, theory leads the suspicion that relative capability's coefficient is negative.

Table 5.2 shows that relative capability's standardized beta coefficient is significant at 0.1 level with one-tailed significance test (beta: 0.06). Nevertheless, considering the inter-cluster correlation, namely the ICC(1), the introduction of the relative capability to the semi-null model appears not to decrease the variance explained at the national level. The ICC(1) in Model 3 is equal to 0.24 similar to the semi null model where only logged age and gender are tested. Hence, the impact of relative capability appears not to be considerably strong despite its statistical significance. Nonetheless, it can be argued that when a country's relative capability to the US increases; it is linked with greater levels of anti-Americanism of its public at the national level. This preliminary finding might mean that people living countries with material capabilities, that are closer to the US, consider themselves in greater competition with the US and adhere to anti-Americanism as a result of frustration. Yet,

⁴⁵ When I repeat this model by dropping the interaction of logged US aid with autocracy, the logged aid variable appears to be slightly significant at 0.1 level with 1-tailed test (standardized beta: 0.10; 1-tailed p-value: 0.08). However, the autocracy variable is not statistically significant at any levels. When I test autocracy and US bilateral aid separately, I obtained similar results. These preliminary findings have controversial implications about the impact of American bilateral aid since it appears to slightly increase anti-Americanism. Yet, before rushing in conclusions, I will re-test these results at the relevant multivariate models. For the sake of saving space, I do not report the results.

apparently, such an argument needs much further tests to be confirmed which would deprive the current analysis from its logical flow.

Model 4 inquires whether the alliance status with the United States bears an impact on anti-Americanism. It is possible that within the weaker allies of the United States, there will be greater levels of anti-Americanism. People living in countries that do not have considerable alliance relationship with the US might worry about possible US antagonism. This hypothesis entails to the public assumption that the US only cares about its closer allies and will protect the interests of its allies even if it takes to bully the foes or weaker allies. Nonetheless, as the illustrative case of Suez Crisis suggests, the actions of the United States are not motivated by the degree of alliance. As the simple test of this hypothesis indicates, the degree of alliance with the United States is not associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism since there is no statistically insignificant standardized beta coefficient.

In Model 5, I test whether greater bilateral trade volume with the US has an impact on anti-Americanism. Recall that I test two competing suggestions from two distinct set of theories. The first is in line with the liberal international relations (liberal IR) scholars claims, by suggesting that increasing trade relations with the United States might have a decreasing impact on anti-Americanism, provided that increasing trade relations open also more channels of communications among people. Such opportunities might also gradually eradicate myths about the US and Americans leading to anti-Americanism. The second hypothesis is in line with the World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1976). Accordingly, this theory may lead to the expectation that increasing trade relations with the US can lead to greater levels of economic exploitation in the other country of the trade dyad. Hence, this might create greater levels of anti-Americanism. In other words, if increasing trade relations with the US decrease anti-Americanism, this finding would be on behalf of the liberal IR scholars; whereas if the opposite is true the World Systems Theory would be the winner (US trade relations would increase anti-Americanism.).

Hence, Model 5 shows that the preliminary result is in favor of the liberal IR scholars' theories on behalf of the international trade (Oneal & Russett, 1997; Oneal et al, 2003). On the other hand is the opposite of what World Systems Theory scholars would expect (Wallerstein, 1976). After all, a country's trade dependency on the United States does not create a social level grievance as a result of exploitation that transforms into anti-Americanism. There are several points to consider while interpreting the results. First, the coefficient's magnitude is small compared to the tested variables at the previous models. Second, the decline in ICC(1) is small compared to the semi-null model. However, the

direction and the significance of the coefficient is theory-driven, thus there is no satisfactory reason to dismiss the current outcome.

Models 6 and 7 separately test impacts of alternative measurements of economic modernization on anti-Americanism. Based on the Double Movement (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]) and the Economic Norms Theory (ENT) (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau, 2009 economic modernization may be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. This theoretical link is rooted in the economic development period where people experience the transition from pre-market (generally clientelistic) culture to market culture. During this period, the leaders and authorities that enjoyed the pre-market culture's status start to demonize the US and cause higher anti-Americanism. This period refers to the economic modernization crisis period.

As described in the previous chapter, there are two different measurements that might entail to a social manifestation of economic modernization crisis: The first is the logged and the squared logged form of GNI per capita which aims to capture an inverted-U relation between economic development and anti-Americanism. In other words, countries in the midst of their economic development will be expected to generate greater levels of anti-Americanism. The middle level economic development entails a clash of market and clientelistic cultures that produce the anti-market movement. The second measure is the interaction of logged GNI per capita with the contract poverty dummy. The latter measurement is more specific and related to ENT provided that it captures the grievance of economic development within a contract poor concept. Hence, the interaction GNI per capita $\text{logged}^* \text{Contracts Poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ may be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

At a first look, both measurements of economic modernization crisis are associated with the significant and expected directions of impact on anti-Americanism. At Model 6, the logged GNI per capita is significant and positive (standardized beta: 1.37, p-value<0.05 at one-tailed test); and its squared logged form is significant and negative (standardized beta: -1.30, p-value<0.05 at one-tailed test). At the bivariate setting, these findings show an inverted-U shaped relation between economic development and anti-Americanism suggesting that middle level economic development is linked with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

At Model 7, the interaction GNI per capita $\text{logged}^* \text{Contracts Poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ has a significant and positive coefficient (standardized beta: 0.26; p-value<0.05)⁴⁶. Accordingly, contract

⁴⁶ When I dropped the interaction variable of GNI per capita $\text{logged}^* \text{Contracts Poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ from the model, both constituents, namely the GNI per capita logged and $\text{Contracts Poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ were statistically significant at one-tailed tests (the standardized beta for logged GNI per capita is 0.16 with p-value 0.03 at one-tailed test. The beta for the

poverty moderates the economic development process and transforms it into a contextual factor leading to greater levels of anti-Americanism. As I also discussed in the previous section with the regression models of inter-rater agreement, theoretically speaking the interaction $\text{GNI per capita}_{\text{logged}} * \text{Contracts Poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ is a theoretically more precise measurement of ENT. This is because there is no theoretical and empirical link between a curvilinear relation between economic development and anti-Americanism. Yet, when the contract poverty situation starts to play a role within the process of economic development, a discussion may arise of the economic modernization crisis or the Double Movement context (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]) leading to greater levels of anti-Americanism.

Due to greater theoretical soundness, the interaction of economic development and contract poverty could be a better measurement compared to the logged GNI per capita and its squared form. However, when comparing the standardized coefficients, the constituents of inverted-U relation at Model 6 appear to have bigger coefficients vis-à-vis the interaction term of logged GNI per capita with contract poverty. On the other hand, the ICC(1) of Model 6 and Model 7 are equal as seen at Table 5.2. Thus, there appears no significant discrepancy of explanatory power between the two measurements of economic modernization crisis. This pattern is also evident with the close Chi-Square measures at both models. Nevertheless, provided that Model 7 is a sounder measurement of ENT based on what it theoretically captures, I will carry on with the interaction of logged GNI per capita with contract poverty dummy. After all, there is no theoretical reason so as to why the standardized beta coefficients of $\text{GNI per capita}_{\text{logged}}$ and $\text{GNI per capita}_{\text{logged}}^2$ are greater than the coefficients of the Model 7.

Finally, in all models of Table 5.2, the demographic indicators of age and gender appear to keep their betas and significance levels the same. Even though at the bivariate setting, it may be that females are associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism (beta: -0.02, p-value <0.05 at one tailed significance test). On the other hand, the logged age is associated with greater levels of anti-Americanism (standardized beta: 0.03, p-value <0.01 at one tailed significance test). In other words, as one gets older, he or she becomes more anti-American. Yet, the impact of increasing age is trivial at later ages since there is significance

contract poor dummy is 0.19 with p-value 0.03 at one-tailed significance test). However, none of the variables are statistically significant when I ran separate tests. In terms of contract poor dummy, the outcome is not surprising since most of the countries of the PEW dataset are contract poor. On the other hand, the results related to the logged GNI per capita make theoretical sense: Economic development on its own cannot be associated with anti-Americanism unless it captures the transition period from contract poor to contract rich state. This is why I adhere to the interaction of economic development with contract poverty to designate a dynamic measurement of economic modernization crisis stage.

with the natural logarithm of the age indicator. Additionally, the consistency of the betas of the demographic variables regardless of the different models reinforces the reason why I use these as control variables. However, the independence of the demographic variables can be proven as we make changes at the individual level variables, since individual attributions might be more closely related to individual socio-economic variables that I will elaborate on next.

* * *

In the step, I analyzed the models testing the potential individual level correlates of anti-Americanism. Table 5.3 indicates the relevant results. Just like the national level bivariate models, here too I control for gender and logged age at the individual level. At each model, the number of second level observations is 42. However, the number of individual level variables changes at almost each model; hence I additionally report these at Table 5.3. For every model, I only report the robust standard errors of the tested variables.

[TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE]

Models 1, 2 and 3 test the impact of levels of education on anti-Americanism. Theory guides the suspicion that greater levels of education may be associated with lower level of anti-Americanism. After all, greater levels of education can ease the eradication of prejudiced information about the US. Yet, in middle income countries, leaders favoring the pre-market system might intervene in the education system by creating an anti-market curriculum. Thus these leaders' followers will be educated in an anti-market tradition; hence greater exposure to education in middle income countries might bring forth greater levels of anti-Americanism. The results at Model 1 show that increasing years of education overall decreases anti-Americanism (standardized beta: -0.03, p-value <0.01). Hence, based on preliminary outcomes, there is support for the first hypothesis about the years of education.

As I presented in Chapter II, there is the possibility that the impact of education on anti-Americanism can change based on institutional differences. Model 2 and 3 inquires whether the impact of years of education changes at different national settings. Guided by the relevant hypotheses that I presented in Chapter II, I test whether the cross-level interaction of middle level national-level economic development moderates the impact of individual level years of education. Accordingly, I test two different GNI per capita ranges that might

designate middle level economic development. At Model 2, the national economic development dummy captures GNI per capita range between \$0 and \$5,000. This range represents Inglehart and Baker (2000)'s low income and lower middle income per capita range where economic insecurity values are salient⁴⁷. As can be observed in Table 5.3, the interaction of Education**Middle Income I* dummy appear to be statistically significant (beta: -0.04; p-value<0.01). Additionally, as the model indicates, education outside the interaction term is statistically insignificant (beta: 0.00; p-value>0.05 at one-tailed test). Therefore, at the bivariate setting, the impact of years of education in shrinking anti-American attitudes is limited to low and lower middle income countries where economic insecurity values are assumed to be salient. This limitation, as I explored, is due to the insignificance of education variable outside the interaction.

In Model 3, I test an alternative indicator of middle level economic development's moderation on the impact of education. This dummy covers the two middle income per capita categories ranging between \$5,000 to 15,000. This range entails lower and upper middle income per capita ranges of Inglehart and Baker (2000). Nonetheless, even though a more accurate middle level economic development measure is available, Inglehart and Baker's third income category (upper middle) covers several countries where economic insecurity values are not dominant. As the results on Model 3 shows, a fully middle level economic development does not alter the impact of years of education. The education variable keeps its own negative significance. An interesting fact is that the Middle Income II dummy that I used in Model 3 appears to be statistically significant (beta: 0.24; p-value <0.05 at one-tailed significance test). In fact, this finding is in line with the ENT, yet provided that it is a highly simplistic measurement of middle level economic development, I will test more coherent variables that bear greater potential to represent economic modernization crisis⁴⁸.

Overall, I fail to find support for the hypothesis that the negative impacts of more years of education to anti-Americanism is reversed in countries with middle level economic development. However, in lower middle and low income countries, not only education decreases anti-Americanism, but has been observed no shrinking effect of education on anti-Americanism outside these countries. On the other hand, the years of education in middle

⁴⁷ The relevant national income per capita dummy is represented in the model 2 as Middle Income I dummy

⁴⁸ In the multivariate models, I do not use the Middle Income I and II dummies that I used for the Models 2 and 3 of Table III. First of all, provided that I already have economic development measures at national level, these dummies might create collinearity issues as they also measure middle level economic development. Second, as the second level observations are low, I sought to keep multivariate national models with minimum possible number of variables that are theoretically guided. Recall that the findings at Models 2 and 3 of Table III are contrary to the expectations. Nevertheless, Appendix I displays the multivariate models with the significant variables of Models 2 and 3 of the Table III.

level income countries does not show a significantly deviating pattern considering lower and upper middle income countries. Yet, middle level economic development based on the income per capita ranges I developed by using Inglehar & Baker (2000)'s criteria appear to increase anti-Americanism.

At Model 4, I test the urban poverty interaction. Similar to Mousseau (2011)'s findings about the correlates of supporting terror in defense of Islam, I expect that Urban Poverty increases anti-Americanism. As Mousseau indicates, poverty in urban setting can be an individual designation of individual-level grievance of economic modernization crisis. Hence, it may be that those who suffer of poverty in urban setting are likely to express anti-Americanism. Recall that the poverty variable measures whether the respondents can afford required nutrition, medical products or clothing that will maintain their way of subsistence. Urbanity indicates, as a binary variable, whether a respondent lives in a place with population greater than 500,000. I designate the interaction of these two variables as urban poverty.

Model 4 shows that not only the beta coefficient is insignificant, but its sign does not offer the expected direction. Nevertheless, this finding does not particularly offer counter-evidence for Mousseau's results. First of all, unlike in Mousseau(2011)'s work, the dataset I use is not limited to the Islamic countries. In addition, even though I sought to replicate the same measurements, in order not to lose significant amount of individual and national level of observations I could not for example use the same poverty measurement with Mousseau's version. Indeed, he considers the lack of affordability of more items that can lead to poverty as I pointed out in the research design section. Hence Mousseau's measurement refers to a more intense measurement of poverty (Mousseau, 2011). This measurement discrepancy might also account for the different outcomes in my Model 3 and his insignificant coefficient for poverty

Another suggestion might be that the Economic Norms are a social phenomenon rather than an individual manifestation of anti-Americanism. It most likely entails a societal level cultural phenomenon since it underlines the salience of the economic cultures and the contractual development. Urban poverty is rather an individual level measurement of modernization grievance, yet it does not tell about a state's economic culture and contractual development (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau, 2009). This is why one could argue, that the insignificance of urban poverty in the topic of anti-Americanism does not accurately challenge Economic Norms Theory.

Model 5 inquires the impact of egotropic evaluation of household income. In Chapter II, I indicated that income evaluation can be a better measurement of individual economic

grievance than a material poverty indicator (Mousseau, 2011). This may indicate that greater income dissatisfaction is associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. Model 5 shows that this expectation holds at the current setting (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value <0.001 at one tailed significance test). Recall from the previous chapter that this variable measures income satisfaction where “don’t know” answers represent indifference and are not coded as missing values and as the variable increases, it implies greater income satisfaction. Hence the negative coefficient tells us that the more economic satisfaction increases, the less anti-Americanism is evident.

At Model 6, I tested group mean-centered actual household income. Based on the theoretical discussion I expect that someone’s economic position vis-à-vis its country can serve as a measure of economic deprivation and also replace the measurement of income dissatisfaction in this regard. Therefore, as one’s economic position is much better than the rest of the country, we expect him or her to be economically more satisfied. This will also lead to less anti-Americanism. Thus, I use the group-centering method in order to designate someone’s economic position vis-à-vis the rest of the country. In group mean centering, country means household income are subtracted from the variable. This allows for an easier interpretation of how much someone is below or above the mean economic position⁴⁹. As can be observed in the model, the coefficient is negative and significant at p-value < 0.001 with one-tailed significance tests.

Step 2: Multivariate Models

The next step in the analysis is to re-test the variables significant variables of bivariate models in a multivariate setting. The basic rule I followed in the multivariate models is that I took all the statistically significant variables of the bivariate models and aimed to observe their impacts when they serve as regressors at the same model. Nonetheless, there are exceptions: If the preliminary test of interaction of two variables did not yield statistical significance, I not only eliminated the interaction term, but also the relevant constituents. For example, recall that urban *dummy**poverty interaction did not yield a statistically significant coefficient. Hence in addition to this interaction variable, I eliminate urban dummy and poverty from the multivariate inquiry even though poverty is statistically significant. The

⁴⁹ The software HLM 7 offers a possibility of group-mean centering for individual level variables. A possible concern here could be the problem of mean centering of a standardized variable. Nevertheless, recall that in standardization, we subtract the sample mean; whereas in standardization we subtract the country means.

main reason is that there is not theoretical reason in my analysis to inquire urbanity or poverty separately. On the other hand since the coefficients of $(US\ aid/GDP)_{logged} * Autocracy$ and $GNI\ pc_{logged} * Contracts\ poor\ dummy$ were statistically significant, I kept these variables with their constituents at the multivariate models. Table 5.4 shows the multivariate results

[TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 5.4, Model 1 displays the multivariate model where I tested all the significant models from Tables 5.2 and 5.3. At a national level, the variables measuring *trade dependency to the United States* (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test); *relative capability to the US* (standardized beta: 0.14; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test), and *logged GNI per capita*contract poverty* (beta: 0.36; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test) survive as statistically significant at the national level. At individual level, *education* (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test), *group (national)-mean centered household income* (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test), *household income satisfaction* (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test) survive as significant variables⁵⁰.

On the other hand, as seen in Model 1, US bilateral aid for autocratic regimes at the national level is not statistically significant. Recall from the previous chapter that autocracy considerably correlates with logged GNI per capita (Pearson's $r = -0.40$) and War with Israel dummy correlates with US aid/GDP (Pearson's $r = 0.56$). Hence, because of collinearity problems with war with Israel dummy and logged GNI per capita, the coefficient of $(US\ Aid/GDP)_{logged} * Autocracy$ could be biased, which is also called as endogeneity problem. At separate models, I first dropped the war with Israel dummy to check whether the insignificance of US bilateral aid to autocracies is caused because of this variable. Second, I dropped GNI per capita $_{logged}$, Contracts poor dummy and $GNI\ pc_{logged} * contracts\ poor\ dummy$

⁵⁰ I re-run the model by dropping the interactions of $(US\ Aid/GDP)_{logged} * Autocracy$ and $GNI\ per\ capita_{logged} * contract\ poor\ dummy$ in order to see the changes in the relevant constituents. The model becomes: $Anti\ Americanism_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * War\ with\ Israel_{dummy\ j} + \gamma_{02} * Autocracy_j + \gamma_{03} * US\ Aid_i + \gamma_{04} * Trade\ Dependency_j + \gamma_{05} * Relative\ Capability_j + \gamma_{06} * Contract\ Poor_{dummy\ j} + \gamma_{07} * GNI\ per\ capita_{logged\ j} + \gamma_{10} * Age_{logged\ ij} + \gamma_{20} * Education_{ij} + \gamma_{30} * Household\ Income_{group\ centered\ ij} + \gamma_{40} * Income\ Satisfaction_{ij} + \gamma_{50} * Female_{dummy\ ij} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$ where γ_{00} represents the second level intercept, u_{0j} the second level error term and the r_{ij} first (individual) level error term. The degree of freedom is 34 for the national-level. The estimates Autocracy (beta: 0.08, one-tailed p-value 0.122), US aid (beta: 0.07, one-tailed p-value 0.196) and Contract poor dummy (beta: 0.28, one-tailed p-value: 0.104) are statistically insignificant. Only the logged GNI per capita preserves statistical significance (beta: 0.18, one-tailed p-value 0.04).

instead of war with Israel dummy. Third, I dropped all the variables that I dropped at the first two steps. It is only in the third step that US bilateral aid to autocracies is significant again⁵¹. Nonetheless, provided that the interaction is insignificant at Model 1, I drop it along with its constituents in order to observe what happens to the remaining significant variables at the same model, namely the Model 2 of Table 5.4.

At the second model of Table 5.4, I drop (US aid/GDP)_{logged}, Autocracy and (US aid/GDP)_{logged}*Autocracy variables. This is mainly because I obtained no significant results about these variables. In addition, provided that degrees of freedom at the Model 1 were low, dropping any variable that fails to meet statistical significance becomes evident⁵². In Model 2, *war with Israel* dummy (beta: 0.91; p-value<0.001 at one-tailed test), *trade dependency to the US* (standardized beta: -0.07; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed test), *relative capability to the United States* (standardized beta: 0.10; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed test) and *logged GNI per capita*Contract poor* dummy (standardized beta: 0.23; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed test) keep their significance at the national level. Since I dropped (US aid/GDP)_{logged}*Autocracy, war with Israel's significance level and beta increased. This might probably occur because (US aid/GDP)_{logged}*Autocracy suppresses war with Israel dummy's impact due to correlation. The significance levels, directions and the magnitude of the beta coefficients of the individual level variables (*education, group centered income, income satisfaction and female dummy*) remain unaltered at Model 2.

At the final model of Table 5.4, I inquired whether war with Israel suppresses the significance level of logged GNI per capita* contracts poor dummy. After all, none of the countries, namely Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the war with Israel dummy are contract rich. Nonetheless, as Model 3 indicates, neither the significance level, nor the magnitude of the GNI pc_{logged}*Contracts poor_{dummy} changes considerably. On the other hand, the relative capability loses its significance when the war with Israel dummy is dropped. Especially Jordan and Lebanon are considerably weak countries compared to the United States⁵³. Yet apparently, the problem of anti-Americanism is not because of relatively weaker states of Lebanon and Jordan. When I add war with Israel dummy, the relative capability is significant again; hence it is possible that relative weakness of Jordan and Lebanon to the United States in terms of national and material capabilities does not have any effect on the anti-American

⁵¹ See Appendix 5.2 for the endogeneity inquiries of the (US Aid/GDP) logged* Autocracy

⁵² As seen on Table IV, the first model has degrees of freedom equal to 32. This is because at national level, the model predicts 9 variables plus the intercept. Hence the overall national degree of freedom diminishes by 10. This is a huge loss for such a low number of national observations

⁵³ If we rank countries based on their relative capabilities from stronger to weaker vis-à-vis the US, Egypt is the 16th, Jordan is the 34th and Lebanon is the 40th country out of 42 PEW countries.

attitudes in these countries. However, this suggestion remains under question since, the relative capability variable was significant⁵⁴.

Model 3 illustrates that the significance level, the magnitude of betas and the direction of individual level variables remains the same compared to the first two models. Nonetheless, there is one case that should be controlled for whether coefficients are biased because of endogeneity: There is a considerable correlation between education and household income (Pearson's $r=0.38$). After all, those who have higher levels of education overall can attain greater income levels. Therefore, I first dropped education from Model 3 of Table 5.4; and second, at another model, this time I dropped household income. In these models, neither the education nor the household's impacts and directions change⁵⁵. Hence, the correlation between education and income appears not to cause an endogeneity problem that would alter the results.

As I pointed out earlier, the purpose of Table 5.4 is to observe the behavior of the variables when tested in the same model. Nonetheless, these results are far from making necessary inductions and conclusions. First of all, recall that I offered no hypothesis suggesting that the impact of one variable is cancelled out because of another variable; or a variable becomes significant only when it is controlled by another variable. In other words, the results of the Table 5.4 are not under theoretical guidance. Second, all the models of Table 5.4 apparently have low degrees of freedom. Third, the robust standard errors of the national level variables already are considerably different from the non-robust standard errors. These issues might be problematic if we ultimately rely on the results so far to draw conclusions. Hence, a better approach to shrink potential problems of reliability of the results would be to maximize the degrees of freedom at the national level the most possible. The next table I am going to present will discuss this issue.

[TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE]

The particularity of Table 5.5 is that I retest all the significant variables of the Tables 5.2 and 5.3 with smaller loss of degree of freedom compared to Table 5.4: At each model, I add all the significant individual level variables (education, income satisfaction, household

⁵⁴ In fact, when I dropped trade dependency to the United States variable from Model 3 of Table IV, relative capability was significant again. Nonetheless since there is no immediate theoretical reason why this is the case, I do not report the results. After all, there is no considerable correlation between relative capability and trade dependency to the United States (Pearson's $r=-0.17$)

⁵⁵ Provided that there is no deviating pattern in the endogeneity inquiries between education and income, I do not report the results.

income, logged age and female dummy); and I only test one national level variable in a model. Therefore, at the national level, each model only predicts the intercept and the tested variable. The degrees of freedom in these models are equal to those of the bivariate national level models. While describing the patterns in the Table 5.5, I first overview the changes in the national level variables. Second, I briefly describe important points to note about individual level variables. Finally, provided that Table 5.5 indicates the ultimate outcomes to make inferences, I will also provide the explanatory power of each model. As inter-cluster correlation coefficient, namely the ICC(1) demonstrates, the first model has the greatest explanatory power even in the overall variance explained by individual and national models. In other words, the state of war with Israel appears to bear the greatest explanatory power among other theories.

In Model 1, the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict turns out to be statistically significant ($p\text{-value} < 0.001$), which indicates greater levels of anti-Americanism when the countries are affected by the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Provided that Lebanon and Jordan receive a considerable number of Palestinian refugees and that Egypt has always taken active part the in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is possible to observe relatively greater levels of anti-Americanism in these countries. Additionally, the results support the findings of Tessler and Robins (2007) who compare the public support for terrorist activities in Jordan and Algeria; and who observe greater support for terrorism in Jordan because it is in the Middle East region⁵⁶.

Next, Model 2 shows that, US economic and military aid for authoritarian regimes turns out to be significant (standardized beta=0.40; $p\text{-value} < 0.01$ at one-tailed significance test). In other words, the US's bilateral aid toward authoritarian regimes causes more anti-Americanism. This finding is in line with the expectations that I elaborated on in Chapter II: Authoritarian leaders channel the US aid to reinforce their suppression mechanisms and institutions. This fact creates grievance among citizens leading to a perception that the US reinforces their suppression. Nonetheless, there is a caveat in interpreting the US aid $\text{logged}^* \text{Autocracy}_{\text{dummy}}$ interaction. In order to prevent collinearity problems and to acquire interpretable coefficients, several scholars suggest centering the continuous variable within the interaction term and rendering its mean as "zero" (Franzese & Kam, 2007). Provided that I standardized all the continuous variables prior to the analysis, the continuous variable in the interaction (logged US aid) already has its mean set to zero and its standard deviation to one⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ For a detailed description of Tessler & Robins (2007)'s analysis, see Chapter II.

⁵⁷ A quick look at Table II confirms the statistical features of the logged US aid variable.

Hence, I find no significant obstacle for adherence of the significance and the meaning of the interaction of $(\text{US aid/GDP})_{\text{logged}} * \text{Autocracy}$.

Recall that, in the prior models, the trade dependency on the United States remained statistically significant and negative throughout all the relevant models. This suggests that increasing bilateral trade relations with the US can be associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. Not discrepant from the earlier findings, at Model 3 of Table 5.5, looking at the trade dependency to US, in addition to bivariate and the multivariate models; the variable is still significant and has a decreasing impact on anti-Americanism (standardized beta: -0.10; p-value < 0.01 at one-tailed significance test). The decreasing impact offers evidence in favor of liberal international relations (Liberal IR) scholars (Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal et al, 2003), and counter-evidence against the World Systems Theory (WST) claims (Wallerstein, 1976). It appears that the greater bilateral trade volume a country has with the United States, the lower levels of anti-Americanism can be observed

Next, I test Relative Capability's impact on anti-Americanism. In the previous models, Relative capability was slightly significant (p-value < 0.1 at one-tailed test) at bivariate setting. However, at Table 5.4, in the final model it turned out to be insignificant because of reasons that were not strongly driven by theory⁵⁸. At model 4, the relative capability to the United States slightly increases anti-Americanism (standardized beta: 0.06; p-value < 0.1 at one-tailed significance test). This result is similar to what is observed in the initial preliminary model of table 5.2. Accordingly, as a country becomes stronger vis-à-vis the US in terms of national and material capabilities, greater levels of anti-Americanism are observed. This finding appears to contradict the expectations. Recall from Chapter II that theory leads the suspicion of a negative association between relative capability and anti-Americanism: As a country grows weaker compared to the US, there might be a societal level worry that the United States will attack that country. Nonetheless, as the results show, greater national and material capabilities relative to the US appear to be associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism.

The final model of Table 5.5 tests the impact of social level economic modernization crisis on anti-Americanism. In bivariate and multivariate settings, the interaction of logged GNI per capita and contract poor dummy was significant and associated with higher anti-Americanism in line with what *Economic Norms Theory* would indicate. In other words,

⁵⁸ The other tested variables of this model was $\text{GNI pc}_{\text{logged}} * \text{Contracts poor}_{\text{dummy}}$ with its constituents and trade dependency to the US at the national level; education, household income and income satisfaction at the individual level with the regular control variables that I add at each model. Recall that as I dropped trade dependency to the US from Model 3 of Table IV, relative capability was significant again. There are no immediate theoretical reasons for such change.

contracts poverty might cause an illiberal process throughout the economic development process. Assuming that logged GNI per capita serves as a proxy for economic development, its interaction with the state of being contract poor is theoretically relevant to what Mousseau considers as an economic modernization crisis (Mousseau 2002/03). I, in this regard, replicated the significance of logged GNI per capita*contracts poverty at Model 5 of Table 5.5 (beta: 0.24; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance tests).

There are additional findings related to the interaction of GNI per capita_{logged}* contracts poverty_{dummy}. Thanks to logging of the GNI per capita, I could focus on earlier stages of economic development more than the higher stages as the logarithmic function allows. After all, higher stages of economic development can overlap with contract richness and thus be unrelated to anti-Americanism. Additionally, as Model 5 shows the constituents of the interaction, namely GNI per capita_{logged} and contracts poor_{dummy} are statistically insignificant outside the interaction term. This is also theoretically relevant: some countries are contract poor and at a very beginning stage of economic development. This setting does not include a serious clash of market norms with pre-market norms. The interaction of economic development and contract poverty designates the stage of economic development where the clash of market and pre-market cultures might take place. Therefore, its association with the anti-Americanism is relevant to the Economic Norms Theory.

As a next step, I offer the implications from the results of individual level variables. First, as can be observed at Table 5.5, there is no change in the direction, magnitude and significance level of individual level variables in the models: More years of education is associated with lower anti-Americanism (standardized beta: -0.02; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test). More personal income vis-à-vis the rest of a country in question is related to lower anti-Americanism (standardized beta: -0.02; p-value<0.05 at one-tailed significance test)⁵⁹. More income satisfaction can be associated with again lower levels of anti-Americanism (standardized beta: -0.06; p-value<0.001 at one-tailed significance test). All of these results are consistent and almost identical with the findings of the bivariate and multivariate inquiries. Additionally, logged age appears to be insignificant in all models whereas being female can be related to lower levels of anti-Americanism.

⁵⁹ Group-mean centering of a variable in the multilevel modeling has technical problems that one might want to consider. The most apparent one is how to treat the subtracted group (national here) means of the individual level variable. Several scholars suggest that in order to prevent model misspecification, subtracted group means should be re-added back at the higher level model. In this regard, I re-added the national means of household income category at each models of Table IV and Table V to the national level. However, the introduction of group means of household income crowds out the significance of relative capability. Appendix 5.3 and 5.4 display these results.

* * *

The results showed that there are partial evidence on behalf of all the three approaches that I discussed and reviewed in Chapter II. An inquiry into the impacts of US foreign policies showed first that people are more anti-American if they live in a country where the grievances from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are observable. Second, there is evidence for the fact that increasing bilateral aid toward authoritarian regimes increase anti-Americanism. Next increasing trade dependency to US decreases anti-Americanism. However, alliance with US is not associated with anti-Americanism. Contrary to the theoretical expectations increasing relative capability of a country to the US is associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. Finally, there is evidence on behalf of the economic norms theory such that throughout the middle level economic development greater levels of anti-Americanism can be observed. Additionally, contract poverty throughout economic development process appears to be – again- associated with higher anti-Americanism which is in line with the *economic norms theory*.

In terms of individual socio-economic variables the results showed that increasing years of education is associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism. In case when I took the interaction a national economic development dummy that covers low and lower middle income per capita country with education, the impact the latter outside the interaction of is statistically insignificant. We also inquired whether income satisfaction and real income relative to someone's country is associated with anti-Americanism. Accordingly, I found that as economic satisfaction and economic position increases, there is lower anti-Americanism.

The final stage of this chapter is to inquire into the explanatory power of each variable on anti-Americanism. In other words, I will show the results of how much variance each variable explain in the overall variance of the dependent variable. Recall that at each model, I provided the ICC(1) measure which referred to the between group variance remained upon the estimations in the relevant model. Yet, these indicators do not show how much of the overall variance does the model explain. In order to obtain the relevant information, I rely on the Bryk and Raudenbush (1987) measurement of percentage of variance that a model explains⁶⁰.

⁶⁰ In order to calculate the variance, what we need is the variance components of the one-way ANOVA model that I used to estimate how much of the variance of the dependent variable occurs at the national level. This is mainly because the calculation of variance explained requires the estimated variance of the errors of the intercept of the higher level model (u_j) and that of the individual level model (r_{ij}). Say, the variance of the error terms of the ANOVA model are Au_j and Ar_{ij} and those of the model of interest are Bu_j and Br_{ij} . The calculation of the

Table 5.6a displays the variance explained by each variable that was significant at the bivariate model along with the variance explained at national level and within national levels. Table 5.6b repeats this operation for the models of Tables 5.4 and 5.5.

[TABLE 5.6a ABOUT HERE]

Table 5.6a indicates that among all the national and individual level variables, war with Israel accounts for the greatest amount of total variance explained which is 7%. In none of the models of Table 5.6a, I did not include the demographic control variables of logged age and female dummy since I am interested on the real impact of the variables per se. War with Israel dummy is followed in terms of percentage of total variance explained by the measure of US bilateral aid to authoritarian regimes (5%). Trade dependency to the United States and economic modernization crisis (GNI per capita_{logged}*Contracts poor_{dummy}) separately account for 2 percent of total variance explained. In case of the individual level variables, the percentage of total variance explained is negligible except the household income. However, as I included the national means of household income to the model, this might be the cause of the 3% of variance explained by the group centered household income variable.

Additionally, I provide additional between-group and within-group variance percentages of variance explained at each model compared to the ANOVA model. War with Israel (29%) and US bilateral aid to authoritarian regimes (21%) account for the greatest percentages of additional between-group variances compared to the ANOVA model. Economic modernization crisis occupies 8 percent, whereas trade dependency occupies 7 percent of between group variance explained. Relative capability occupies only 1 percent of between group variance explained. None of the national level variables account for within group variance was explained since this measurement accounts for the individual level variance within nations. For individual level variables I was interested in within group variance percentages. In this regard, only income satisfaction accounts for 1 percent of within group variance explained. Nonetheless, as the analyses accounts for individual level observations around 30,000 such low figures are not surprising.

[TABLE 5.6b ABOUT HERE]

overall variance explained of a hierarchical model is: $(Ar_{ij} + Au_j - Br_{ij} - Bu_j) / (Ar_{ij} + Au_j)$. Additionally, to estimate the variance explained at national and individual level separately, the national level estimation is: $(Au_j - Bu_j) / Au_j$ which explains the between-group (nation) variance. For within group (individual level) variance percentage, we calculate: $(Ar_{ij} - Br_{ij}) / Ar_{ij}$


At Table 5.6b, I show the variance percentage that each model of Tables 5.4 and 5.5. For each model, I also included its alternative by adding the household income national means. Accordingly, Model 1 of Table 5.4 has the greatest percentage of variance explained without (11%) and with (13%) adding the national means of household income. When I drop (US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy and its constituents, the significance explained drops by 1% when I do not control for national means of household income. Recall from the TABLE 5.6a that, the actual total variance explained of (US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy is 5 percent even though the decrease of the variance explained from Model 1 to Model 2 of Table 5.4 is smaller. It is quite possible that the actual variance that other variables some part of the actual variance that (US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy accounts for. As I discussed in the relevant section, there are variables that correlate with US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy or its constituents such as GNI per capita _{logged}, contracts poverty _{dummy} and war with Israel _{dummy}. Next, Model 3 of Table 5.4 shows that dropping war with Israel causes 7 percent less total variance explained. This reduction is equal to the variance explained by the war with Israel _{dummy} in a strictly bivariate setting that I presented at Table 5.6a.

Finally, in the trends of percentage of variance explained for the models of Table 5.5; the ranking of the variance explained of each model is identical to that of Table 5.6a. This is primarily because, in all the models of Table 5.5, I kept the individual level variables the same. Therefore, again war with Israel _{dummy} has the greatest percentage explained which is followed by (US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy. Trade dependency to the United States has the almost same percentage of variance explained with economic modernization crisis measure (GNI per capita _{logged} * Contracts poor _{dummy}). The least variance explained appears to belong to relative capability variable. In all models, again adding the national means of household income per capita visibly increases the variance explained of each model.

* * *

As the next task of the inquiry of the Correlates of anti-Americanism, there are few items remained to consider: The first is to answer what are the implications of the current findings of this thesis. The second is to provide instances that might help to illustrate the results. The third is to discuss what are the consequences of anti-Americanism which would lead the policy makers take relevant measures. The next chapter which concludes the current discussion of anti-Americanism covers all these matters.

Graph 5.1: Inter-rater agreement scores by country



Notes: (i) Vertical axis displays the $r_{wg}(4)$, namely the inter-rater agreement scores. The horizontal axis shows the countries of the PEW 2002 dataset
(ii) The cutoff value for $rwg(4)$ is 0.70, and countries that have scores above 0.70 appear to have agreement in their responses to the two questions that I use within the dependent variable of this overall analysis. (The two items are general evaluation of the United States and the general evaluation of the Americans).

TABLE 5.1: OLS Results for Inter-rater Agreement Scores


Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>
GNI Per Capita _{logged}	-0.45 ^t	(0.32)	0.39***	(0.07)	-	-
GNI Per Capita _{logged} ²	0.48 ^t	(0.31)	-	-	-	-
Contracts Poor _{dummy}	-	-	0.57***	(0.15)	-	-
GNI per capita _{logged} *Contracts Poor _{dummy}	-	-	-0.41***	(0.08)	-	-
Anti-Americanism	-	-	-	-	-0.04**	(0.01)
Population _{logged}	-0.04**	(0.01)	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.04**	(0.02)
Intercept	0.60***	(0.03)	0.01	(0.15)	0.60***	(0.03)
N	30,006		30,006		30,006	
R-squared	0.12		0.29		0.09	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for 42 country clusters

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests.

(iii) GNI Per capita_{logged}, GNI per capita_{logged}² and population_{logged} are standardized to z-distribution

GRAPH II: Scatter-Plot of Rwg(4) scores and Logged GNI per capita



Notes: (i) The fitted values are derived from the Model 1 of TABLE I: $R_{wg}(4)_j = a_1 + b_1 * GNI_{pc_j \text{ logged}} + b_2 * \ln(GNI_{pc}_j)^2 + b_3 * \ln(Population)_j$, where j=country

(ii) The dots in the graph indicate the actual observations. The abbreviations represent the countries such as: ANG= Angola, ARG=Argentina, BAN=Bangladesh, BOL=Bolivia, BRA=Brazil, BUL=Bulgaria, CAN=Canada IVO=Côte d'Ivoire, CZE=Czech Republic, EGY=Egypt, FRA=France, GER=Germany, GHA=Ghana, GUA=Guatemala, HON=Honduras, IDA=India, IND=Indonesia, ITA=Italy, JAP=Japan, KEN=Kenya, SKOR=South Korea, MAL=Mali, MEX=Mexico, NIG=Nigeria, PAK=Pakistan, PER=Peru, PHI=Philippines, POL=Poland, RUS=Russia, SEN=Senegal, SLOV=Slovakia, SAFR=South Africa, TAN=Tanzania, TUR=Turkey, UGA=Uganda, UK= United Kingdom, UKR= Ukraine, UZB=Uzbekistan, VEN=Venezuela, VIET= Vietnam LEB=Lebanon, JOR=Jordan

TABLE 5.2: HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REDUCED NATIONAL-LEVEL MODELS

Models:	Test Variables		Female dummy	Age logged	Intercept2	ICC(1)	d.f	Chi-Square
	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Beta	Beta			
1- War with Israel dummy	0.97***	(0.21)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.13	0.18	40	9148.1
2- (US Aid/GDP) logged*Autocracy	0.40**	(0.16)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.04	0.20	38	8898.9
(US Aid/GDP) logged	-0.10	(0.11)						
Autocracy	-0.13	(0.11)						
3- Relative Capability	0.06 ^t	(0.05)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.05	0.24	40	11948.6
4- Tau or S with System Leader	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.06	0.24	40	11805.2
5- Trade Dependency to US	-0.10**	(0.03)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.05	0.23	40	11191.7
6- GNI per capita logged	1.37*	(0.63)	-0.02*	0.03**	-0.07	0.23	39	11160.3
GNI per capita logged ²	-1.30*	(0.62)						
7- GNI per capita logged* Contracts Poor dummy	0.26*	(0.12)	-0.02*	0.03**	0.01	0.23	38	11351.0
GNI per capita logged	-0.07	(0.08)						
Contracts Poor dummy	-0.02	(0.17)						

Notes: (i) Robust restricted maximum likelihood standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are provided for only test variables in the analysis. For demographic variables, only beta coefficients are provided

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and ^t<0.1 after one-tailed significance tests.

(iii) All the variables but the dummies are standardized to z-distribution

(v) Tau or S with System Leader is a measure of alliance status with the United States

(vi) For variance estimates, inter-cluster correlation –ICC(1)-, degrees of freedom for the national level variables and Chi-Square statistics are provided

TABLE III - HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REDUCED INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MODELS

Models:	Test Variables		Female dummy	Age logged	Intercept2	Level-1 N	ICC(1)	Chi-Square
	Beta	Std. Err.						
1- Education	-0.03**	(0.01)	-0.02*	0.02*	-0.06	29,760	0.24	11962.4
2- Education* <i>Middle Income I</i> dummy	-0.04**	(0.02)	-0.03*	0.02*	-0.01	29,760	0.24	12027.6
Education	0.00	(0.01)						
<i>Middle Income I</i> dummy	-0.07	(0.11)						
3- Education* <i>Middle Income II</i> dummy	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.02*	0.02**	-0.13	29,760	0.23	11702.9
Education	-0.03*	(0.01)						
<i>Middle Income II</i> dummy	0.24*	(0.14)						
4- Urban dummy*Poverty	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.02*	0.02**	-0.05	29,478	0.25	12091.1
Urban dummy	-0.03	(0.03)						
Poverty	0.05***	(0.01)						
5- Income Satisfaction	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.02	0.02*	-0.07	29,699	0.25	12178.6
6- Household Income group centered	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.02*	0.02*	-0.06	29,817	0.24	11968.6

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are provided for only test variables in the analysis. For demographic variables, only beta coefficients are provided

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests.

(iii) Standardized restricted maximum likelihood coefficients are provided. Dummy variables are kept unstandardized

(iv) All models but 2 and 3 have national level degree of freedom (d.f) equal to 41. For Models 2 and 3, d.f is 40

(v) Middle Income I and II dummies (in italics) are national-level variables. Middle Income I covers countries with GNI per capita between \$0 and \$5,000. Middle Income II covers countries with GNI per capita between \$5,000 and \$15,000.

(vi) For variance estimates, inter-cluster correlation –ICC(1)-, and Chi-Square statistics are provided

TABLE 5.4: MULTIVARIATE HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	Std err	Beta	Std err	Beta	Std Err
National Level:						
Intercept ₂	0.20	(0.20)	0.05	(0.17)	0.01	(0.17)
War with Israel _{dummy}	0.59*	(0.31)	0.91***	(0.23)	-	-
(US aid/GDP) _{logged}	0.09	(0.10)	-	-	-	-
Autocracy	0.09	(0.10)	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) _{logged} *Autocracy	0.01	(0.15)	-	-	-	-
Trade Dependency to US	-0.06*	(0.03)	-0.07*	(0.03)	-0.09**	(0.03)
Relative Capability	0.14*	(0.06)	0.10*	(0.05)	0.06	(0.05)
GNI per capita _{logged}	-0.13	(0.11)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.11)
Contracts poor _{dummy}	-0.22	(0.19)	-0.13	(0.18)	-0.00	(0.19)
GNI pc _{logged} *Contracts poor _{dummy}	0.36*	(0.17)	0.23*	(0.13)	0.27*	(0.13)
Individual-level variables:						
<i>Education</i>	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Household Income</i> _{group centered}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income Satisfaction</i>	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> _{logged}	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> _{dummy}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29,630		29,630		29,630	
ICC(1)	0.15		0.17		0.22	
d.f	32		35		36	
Chi-Square	7,174.1		8,495.8		10,666.6	

Notes: (i) Robust restricted maximum likelihood standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies

(iv) For variance estimation, Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom and ICC(1) are provided. ICC(1) shows the remaining variance explained by the national level variables in the total variance explained of the model.

TABLE 5.5 - MULTIVARIATE HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS (2)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.
National-level variables:										
Intercept2	-0.14	(0.06)	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.14)
War with Israel dummy	0.97***	(0.22)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) logged	-	-	-0.10	(0.11)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Autocracy	-	-	-0.13	(0.11)	-	-	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) logged*Autocracy	-	-	0.40**	(0.16)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trade Dependency to US	-	-	-	-	-0.10**	(0.03)	-	-	-	-
Relative Capability	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.06 ^t	(0.05)	-	-
GNI per capita logged	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.04	(0.08)
Contracts poor dummy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	(0.17)
GNI pc logged*Contracts poor dummy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.24*	(0.12)
Individual-level Variables:										
<i>Education</i>	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Household Income</i> group centered	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income Satisfaction</i>	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> logged	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> dummy	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29.630		29.630		29.630		29.630		29.630	
ICC(1)	0.19		0.21		0.23		0.24		0.23	
d.f	40		38		40		40		38	
Chi-Square	9,261.7		9,052.5		11,432.3		12,108.0		11,523.5	

Notes: (i) Robust restricted maximum likelihood standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies

(iv) For variance estimation. Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom and ICC(1) are provided.

TABLE 5.6a: Percentages of variance explained for Significant Variables of Bivariate Analysis

Tested variable	var(r_{ij})	var(u_j)	Between-group variance explained	Within-group variance explained	Total variance explained
National Level Variables					
War with Israel <small>dummy</small>	0.65	0.15	29%	0%	7%
(US aid/GDP) <small>logged</small> *Autocracy	0.65	0.16	21%	0%	5%
Trade Dependency to US	0.65	0.19	7%	0%	2%
GNI per capita <small>logged</small> *Contracts poor <small>dummy</small>	0.65	0.19	8%	0%	2%
Relative Capability	0.65	0.20	1%	0%	0%
Individual Level Variables					
Education	0.65	0.21	0%	0%	0%
Education*Middle Income I <small>dummy</small>	0.65	0.20	1%	0%	0%
Income Satisfaction	0.65	0.21	-2%	1%	0%
Household Income <small>group centered</small>	0.65	0.18	13%	0%	3%

Notes: (i) All the variables are standardized to z-distribution except the dummy variables

(ii) At each model, only the variable of interest (with the relevant focal and moderator variables in case of interaction) is tested. Logged age and female dummy is dropped from the models

(iii) r_{ij} refers to the error term of the individual observations and u_j refers to the error term of the national level observations where i represent the individuals, j the countries. For the ANOVA (null) model, $\text{var}(r_{ij})= 0.65$ and $\text{var}(u_j)= 0.21$; where $\text{var}()$ refers to the variance function.

(iv)The model testing Household Income group centered incorporates the national means of Household Income at the model

TABLE 5.6b: Percentages of variance explained of the models of Tables 5.4 and 5.5

Tested Models	var(r_{ij})	var(u_j)	Between-group variance explained	Within-group variance explained	Total variance explained
Table IV models:					
Model 1 (All significant national variables)	0.64	0.12	44%	1%	11%
Model 1 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.10	50%	1%	13%
Model 2 (Model 1 - US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy)	0.64	0.13	38%	1%	10%
Model 2 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.12	44%	1%	11%
Model 3 (Model 2 - War with Israel _{dummy})	0.64	0.18	14%	1%	4%
Model 3 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.16	23%	1%	6%
Table V models:					
Model 1 (War with Israel _{dummy})	0.64	0.15	29%	1%	8%
Model 1 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.13	37%	1%	10%
Model 2 (US aid/GNI pc _{logged})* Autocracy	0.64	0.17	19%	1%	5%
Model 2 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.14	34%	1%	9%
Model 3 (Trade dependency to the US)	0.64	0.20	5%	1%	2%
Model 3 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.17	20%	1%	5%
Model 4 (Relative Capability)	0.64	0.21	0%	1%	1%
Model 4 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.18	12%	1%	4%
Model 5 (GNI per capita _{logged} * Contracts poor _{dummy})	0.64	0.19	7%	1%	2%
Model 5 + National means of Household Income	0.64	0.17	16%	1%	4%

Notes: (i) All the variables are standardized to z-distribution except the dummy variables and the national means of Household Income

(ii) r_{ij} refers to the error term of the individual observations and u_j refers to the error term of the national level observations where i represent the individuals, j the countries. For the ANOVA (null) model, $\text{var}(r_{ij})= 0.65$ and $\text{var}(u_j)= 0.21$

APPENDIX – 5.1: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression Results

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Beta	Std Err	Beta	Std Err
National Level				
Intercept2	0.05	(0.10)	-0.16*	(0.07)
War with Israel _{dummy}	0.83**	(0.29)	0.68*	(0.31)
(US aid/GDP) _{logged}	0.00	(0.10)	0.06	(0.10)
Autocracy	0.02	(0.07)	0.03	(0.07)
(US aid/GDP) _{logged} *Autocracy	0.08	(0.15)	0.08	(0.14)
Trade Dependency to US	-0.07**	(0.02)	-0.05*	(0.03)
Relative capability	0.08*	(0.04)	0.15**	(0.06)
Middle Income I _{dummy}	-0.20*	(0.11)	-	-
Middle Income II _{dummy}	-	-	0.33*	(0.14)
Individual Level				
<i>Education</i>	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Middle Income I _{dummy} * <i>Education</i>	-0.04*	(0.02)	-	-
<i>Household income</i> _{group centered}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income satisfaction</i>	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> _{logged}	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> _{dummy}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29,630		29,630	
ICC(1)	0.16		0.15	
d.f	34		34	
Chi-Square	7,745.6		7,172.1	
Total variance explained	0.10		0.11	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies

(iv) For variance estimation, Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom, ICC(1) and the percentage of the total variance that the relevant model explains are provided. ICC(1) measures intra-cluster correlation

(v) Middle Income I and II dummies are national-level variables. Middle Income I covers countries with GNI per capita between \$0 and \$5,000, Middle Income II covers countries with GNI per capita between \$5,000 and \$15,000

APPENDIX – 5.2: MULTIVARIATE HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION RESULTS⁶¹

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	Std Err	Beta	Std Err	Beta	Std Err
National Level Variables						
Intercept ₂	0.25	(0.20)	-0.09	(0.08)	-0.03	(0.07)
War with Israel _{dummy}	-	-	0.80**	(0.08)	-	-
(US aid/GDP) _{logged}	0.13	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.11)
Autocracy	0.07	(0.12)	-0.03	(0.07)	-0.13	(0.11)
(US aid/GDP) _{logged} *Autocracy	0.11	(0.15)	0.15	(0.15)	0.37*	(0.16)
Trade Dependency to US	-0.07**	(0.03)	-0.07*	(0.03)	-0.08**	(0.03)
Relative capability	0.13*	(0.06)	0.09 ^t	(0.05)	0.06	(0.06)
GNI per capita _{logged}	-0.13	(0.11)	-	-	-	-
Contracts poor _{dummy}	-0.20	(0.20)	-	-	-	-
GNI pc _{logged} *Contracts poor _{dummy}	0.43**	(0.17)	-	-	-	-
Individual Level Variables						
<i>Education</i>	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Household income</i> _{group centered}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income satisfaction</i>	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> _{logged}	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> _{dummy}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29630		29630		29630	
ICC(1)	0.17		0.17		0.19	
d.f	33		35		36	
Chi-Square	7221.4		7956.0		8526.8	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies

(iv) For variance estimation, Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom and ICC(1) are provided. ICC(1) shows the remaining variance explained by the national level variables in the total variance explained of the model.

⁶¹ As seen throughout the models, the interaction of logged US aid with autocracy gets statistical significance when we drop war with Israel _{dummy}. Dropping the economic norms theory variables (logged GNI per capita, Contract poor dummy and their interaction) does not alter the results.

APPENDIX 5.3: Controlling For Country Means Of Household Income For Table VI⁶²

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	Std. Err	Beta	Std. Err	Beta	Std. Err
National-level variables:						
Intercept2	0.38 ^t	(0.24)	0.20	(0.21)	0.24	(0.24)
War with Israel _{dummy}	0.46 ^t	(0.31)	0.83 ^{***}	(0.20)	-	-
(US aid/GDP) _{logged}	0.10	(0.09)	-	-	-	-
Autocracy	0.05	(0.10)	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) _{logged} *Autocracy	0.06	(0.14)	-	-	-	-
Trade dependency to US	-0.08*	(0.04)	-0.09*	(0.05)	-0.11*	(0.05)
Relative capability	0.06	(0.06)	-	-	-	-
GNI per capita _{logged}	-0.22*	(0.13)	-0.17 ^t	(0.12)	-0.19 ^t	(0.14)
Contracts poor _{dummy}	-0.41*	(0.22)	-0.30 ^t	(0.21)	-0.25	(0.24)
GNI pc _{logged} *Contracts poor _{dummy}	0.37*	(0.17)	0.22 ^t	(0.13)	0.29*	(0.13)
Household income country means	3.84*	(1.90)	3.78*	(1.92)	4.37*	(2.47)
Individual-level Variables:						
<i>Education</i>	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Household income</i> _{group centered}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income satisfaction</i>	-0.06 ^{***}	(0.01)	-0.06 ^{***}	(0.01)	-0.06 ^{***}	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> _{logged}	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> _{dummy}	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29,630		29,630		29,630	
ICC(1)	0.14		0.15		0.20	
d.f	31		35		36	
Chi-Square	6,107.1		7,419.5		9,310.1	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies

(iv) For variance estimation, Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom and ICC(1) are provided. ICC(1) shows the remaining variance explained by the national level variables in the total variance explained of the model.

⁶² As we can see in this table,

APPENDIX 5.4 – Controlling For Country Means Of Household Income For Table V

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.	Beta	Std. Err.
National-level variables										
Intercept2	-0.12*	(0.06)	-0.02	(0.06)	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.05	(0.06)	0.23	(0.23)
War with Israel dummy	0.89***	(0.19)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) logged	-	-	-0.01	(0.09)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Autocracy	-	-	-0.08	(0.10)	-	-	-	-	-	-
(US aid/GDP) logged*Autocracy	-	-	0.30**	(0.11)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trade Dependency to US	-	-	-	-	-0.11*	(0.05)	-	-	-	-
Relative Capability	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.02*	(0.07)	-	-
GNI per capita logged	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.20 ^t	(0.12)
Contracts poor dummy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.25	(0.22)
GNI pc logged*Contracts poor dummy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.30**	(0.12)
Household income country means	3.59*	(1.56)	5.03**	(1.73)	4.78*	(2.07)	4.64*	(2.36)	4.11 ^t	(2.52)
Individual-level Variables										
<i>Education</i>										
	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Household Income</i> group centered										
	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Income Satisfaction</i>										
	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> logged										
	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
<i>Female</i> dummy										
	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)	-0.02*	(0.01)
Level-1 N	29630		29630		29630		29630		29630	
ICC(1)	0.17		0.17		0.21		0.22		0.21	
d.f	39		37		39		39		37	
Chi-Square	7938.3		7019.4		9641.4		10276.0		10060.4	

Notes: (i) Robust restricted maximum likelihood standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

(ii) P-values are ***<0.001; **<0.01; *<0.05 and t <0.1 after one-tailed significance tests. For national level variables, the cutoff p-value of significance is 0.1; whereas for individual level variables it is 0.05

(iii) The restricted maximum likelihood method is used. Betas are standardized for all variables but the dummies and Household income country means

(iv) For variance estimation, Chi-Square statistics, degree of freedom and ICC(1) are provided.

CHAPTER VI – IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon; but scholars pay greater attention since the 9/11 terrorist events. Throughout my thesis, I tested several potential correlates related to US foreign policies and economic development. The results indicated that anti-Americanism is not immune to some US foreign policies especially in the Middle East and the autocratic regimes⁶³. On the other hand many academic and non-academic people decisively relate several other forms of US foreign policies as substantial correlates of anti-Americanism. These US foreign policies seem to belong to a great power that seeks global domination while leaving other potential rivals relatively weak and economically exploited. As I indicated, there is no satisfactory empirical support for myths about a bullying global power. Recall that since 1945 when the US become the global hegemonic power, its national and material capabilities relative to the rest of the world decreased; it never engaged in imperialistic territorial acquisition; and it never obstructed other countries' economic development⁶⁴. Hence, the claims about the US foreign policies that cannot find adequate empirical ground constitute another dimension of inquiry of the correlates of anti-Americanism. Indeed, I showed some evidence suggesting that national factors like economic development and individual factors such as education level and income evaluation might lead people to be more anti-American.

It is, thus, vital to grasp the extent of anti-Americanism throughout the world by scrutinizing the process through which correlates operate. Accordingly, my analysis proceed as follows: In Chapter II, I showed a diversity of claims about the causes of anti-Americanism in the literature. Along with careful consideration of this diversity of suggestions, it is possible to offer two different theoretical approaches serving to measure the correlates of anti-Americanism. The first approach considers the impacts of observable US foreign policies. In my analysis, I came up with two different issues under this category: The American bilateral economic and military aid for the autocratic regimes; and the American stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The particularity of these foreign policy issues is their distinctiveness based on their empirically validity. In other words, US economic and military aid toward the authoritarian regimes and the US stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be documented. These facts hence might turn into sources of grievance for those who are affected from either

⁶³ The significances of the variables War with Israel_{dummy} and US Aid_{logged} * Autocracy_{dummy}

⁶⁴ Recall that, in Chapter II, I support these claims by an illustrative case such as the Suez Crisis and with evidence from Correlates of War Project MID and National Material Capabilities datasets.

Israeli-Palestinian war, or for those who are suppressed by the tyrant regimes which tend to use the US aid to strengthen their grip.

On the other hand, the second approach argues that the hegemonic position of the United States creates perceptions and interpretations of the US foreign policy that deviate from the reality. I showed possible false claims about the US foreign behavior such as the US is an imperial power; the US pursues realist foreign policies and a US that seeks to obtain relative economic gains by weakening the rest of the world. I showed empirical evidence using several datasets under the Correlates of War Project. Accordingly, the findings indicate that since World War II –roughly, the start of the US hegemony- there is no satisfactory evidence that is in line with the claims that US is an imperial power that bullies and exploits other countries. On the contrary, since the World War II, US appears to have executed been anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist foreign policies which sought to maintain the integrity of the Westphalian interstate system.

The question of hegemonic status of the United States led me to inquire into the following three scenarios: First, I tested whether a country's relatively low national and material capabilities to the US translates into anti-Americanism because its public feels insecure about any US aggression. Second, I tested whether people who live in countries that are not close allies of the US worry about US aggression. Finally, I inquired into the impact of trade relations with the United States and accordingly tested whether greater so-called US interference with trade relations cause public grievance leading to anti-Americanism.

Next, I argued that empirically inadequate foreign policy attributions to the US might be rooted in alternative contextual factors of a country. Accordingly, I focused on the impact of economic development. Even though several papers attempt to show that economic development, predominantly measured as income per capita, has some impact on illiberal attitudes (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), these suggestions generally offered *a posteriori* arguments that justified their findings. Therefore, I showed two complementary approach, which not only offered theoretical support, but also undermined several taken-for-granted claims about economics and society relations. First, I reviewed the *Great Transformation* of Polanyi, where he argued for the unnatural and state sponsored features of the market systems which alienates the society and creates an alternative anti-market movement. Hence, along with marketization, the anti-market movement constitutes a “double movement” process (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). Second, I reviewed Mousseau's *Economic Norms Theory* which inherits the non-naturality of the market system; yet which also points out that what is considered as pre-market is also non-natural. He claims that economic conditions in a

society created economic norms that shaped behaviors and attitudes in a society. In this regard, when pre-market norms and market norms clashed during the middle phase of economic development, Mousseau argued that illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism can be observable (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau, 2009).

There are also individual factors which might have a significant role in explaining the changes in anti-Americanism. Hence, I discussed the potential impacts of levels of education, and argued that greater levels of education can increase anti-Americanism if one controls for the institutional impacts. Under this logic, the middle level income development can serve to the policy-makers to put the blame on the United States via the education system in order to remedy for the perils of the economic modernization. Next, I reviewed claims about individual economic dissatisfaction. In line with Mousseau's findings, I argued that personal income and its manifestations cannot be a correlate of anti-Americanism. Finally, I showed how urban poverty might affect anti-Americanism provided that it could be an individual manifestation of modernization crisis (Mousseau, 2011).

In Chapter III, I indicated different scholar suggestions aiming to define anti-Americanism. Some scholars, who mainly disregard the possibility that any type of anti-Americanism can precede some sort of a rational calculation, underline the "irrationality" of anti-Americanism. There is also a variety of theoretical researches pointing out that anti-Americanism is a kind of prejudice, which means that anti-Americanism tends to occur as a consequence of deviation from the reality, from the empirically observable facts because of different reasons. However, based on not only theoretical concerns, but also on the findings in the dataset of my analysis, I argued that anti-Americanism should entail a very simplistic and broad definition which only includes general evaluations of the United States and Americans. My main reasoning was that any specific dimension attributed to anti-Americanism such as prejudice or irrationality tends to constrain the scope of anti-Americanism as a dependent variable and escapes cross-cultural differences. Thus, one should examine factors like irrationality or prejudice by using them as independent variables.

Upon describing the design of my dependent variable, anti-Americanism, I offered an inter-rater agreement analysis seeking to understand which factors contribute to the convergence or the divergence of anti-American opinions in a cross-country context. Accordingly my findings were such that countries, where we can observe greater anti-Americanism, tend to have less convergence in anti-American responses. In addition, as a preliminary support for the economic norms theory, I found that middle level economic development and contract poverty in economic development are associated with less

agreement in anti-American responses. Even though this finding was not a direct prediction by economic norms theory, it indicates an *a posteriori* manifestation of disagreement, or roughly the polarization of the public opinion where clash of pre-market and market norms occur.

In Chapter V, I tested all the suggestions related to anti-Americanism that I reviewed in the literature review chapter. There is some evidence for the two different approaches in terms of having a significant explanatory power on anti-Americanism. At the very final model that I presented, there are statistically significant results on behalf of war with Israel, national and material capability relative to the United States, trade dependency to the United States, US bilateral aid to autocratic regimes and economic norms theory at the national level⁶⁵. Nevertheless, a country's degree of alliance with the US failed to constitute substantial impact on anti-Americanism. On the other hand, at the individual level, I presented some evidence that greater years of education, household income level vis-à-vis the rest of the country, household income satisfaction are associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism.

* * *

This study bears a variety of implications. At a first look, it is plausible to assess that anti-Americanism could be attributed to both US actions and to structural factors of the country. However, not all US observable or non-observable actions about US behavior can be significantly associated with anti-Americanism. As the results imply, the US stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes an association between US foreign policy and anti-Americanism. However, the logical mechanism behind this relation is complex and the current types of measurement may not fully help us to grasp the mechanism.

As I showed in Chapter II, the US provides substantial amounts of aid to Israel. Therefore, those who are negatively affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might attribute the source of their grievance to the US backing of Israel, and thus simultaneously generate dissent toward the US. A similar logic is true for the US bilateral aid to authoritarian regimes, where people might think that US reinforce their oppressors by aiding. Yet, the measurements to test these hypotheses leave several questions to be discussed in depth: First, does the US aid Israel or the authoritarian regimes to create grievance for some people? Second, to what

⁶⁵ Recall that, relative capability did not survive in several models including the ones where I controlled for national means of household income level. Hence, we might argue that the results about relative capability are not robust enough.

extend are people aware of the fact that US provides Israel or authoritarian regimes with substantial aid? The statistically significant results of the current analysis may leave room for discussion of these questions.

Making an assessment about anti-Americanism based on US foreign policies might require people to possess some amount of information on US actions. Unfortunately, PEW dataset does not provide individual level indicators such as a measurement of people's awareness of the US aid directed to their country and of the US aid toward Israel. In addition, it is highly possible that several authorities and opinion leaders manipulate the information with regards to US actions. After all, anti-Americanism can serve as a policy instrument that opinion leaders or different authorities use to attract followers (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012). However, the evidence on behalf of direct national level indicators leads us to assume the existence of such grievances because of US aid.

The next question to be discussed is whether US aims to make people grieve around the world. In this regard, there is no direct evidence that the United States provides aid to Israel or to authoritarian regimes because it wishes to take part in the oppression and the grievance of some people. After all, as I reviewed in Chapter II, we cannot find satisfactory evidence but rather counter evidence about claims that the US is an evil-doer, a bullying global hegemonic power. Nonetheless, what distinguishes the US presence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US aid to authoritarian regimes from other foreign policy claims is that the formers bear greater empirical validity in the discussion of anti-Americanism: We can observe substantial American aid to Israel and to autocratic regimes.

On the other hand, when we look at relative capability and the alliance status, the opposite is the case: There is no evidence that US bullies or threatens weaker allies or materially weaker countries. Yet, as I reviewed in Chapter II, some scholars argue that the US seeks to establish its hegemonic power by dictating the principles of its hegemony and by threatening with sometimes the use of force if a country does not comply. If these claims had considerable degree of empirical validity, it would be expected that people living in states weakly allied to the US or materially weaker countries to US, would be more anti-American because of the worries of US aggression. The current analysis cannot find evidence that relatively weaker countries or weaker allies to the US have significantly more degree of anti-Americanism.

Another claim about the nature of the US hegemony is related to the international trade system. If the US dictated –as some scholars point out- trade openness by force and against the wishes of the state in question, the expectation would be such that greater anti-

Americanism can be observed states that substantially trade with the US. Especially, scholars adhering to World System Theory underline the harm of the involvement of international trade system and the grievance in the periphery countries, which is a consequence of this process. Yet, the current analysis shows that increasing trade relations with the United States actually improves the image of the United States and is associated with lower levels of anti-Americanism, which would be in line with what Liberal International Relations theorists would project.

Next, I showed how economic development can be associated with negative attitudes toward the US. As the current analysis indicates, anti-Americanism is not solely about US foreign policies. If it was all because of policy preferences of US, there would be no room for additional inquiry about the structural features of the countries other than the US in terms of anti-Americanism. The review of the hegemonic features of the US showed that not all claims about the “evil” US can find adequate justification. This fact naturally leads us to inquire what the structural circumstances are that might lead to significantly more observation of anti-Americanism. Accordingly, I analyzed the interplay between economic development and anti-Americanism. Among the theories or suggestions that I reviewed, Mousseau and Polanyi appear to offer a clear mechanism designating which stage of economic development can be associated with anti-Americanism for which reasons. In line with Mousseau’s economic norms theory which builds on Polanyi’s Great Transformation framework, the current results imply that economic development in a country where we observe deficit of impersonal contractual relations, anti-Americanism significantly prevails.

There are two main reasons why the study of *economic norms theory* is particularly crucial. First, the current findings with regards to anti-Americanism appear to contribute to an ongoing research agenda⁶⁶. So far, building upon Polanyi’s Great Transformation theory, Mousseau finds, in subsequent research projects, that economic norms and contractual development affect military interstate disputes (Mousseau, 2009), voting alignment in UN roll call votes (Mousseau, 2003), support for human rights (Mousseau & Mousseau, 2008), support for terrorism in defense of Islam (Mousseau, 2011), and intrastate conflicts (Mousseau, 2012 *forthcoming*). Therefore, the current findings contribute to the body of research by extending the explanatory reach of the economic norms theory into anti-Americanism.

⁶⁶ One might suspect that the findings related to the trade dependency to the US contribute to the research agenda of the liberal IR scholars. However, provided that this research paradigm focuses predominantly in interstate wars, the current findings do not expand the current academic interest in the relevant field.

Second, compared to the other findings of this analysis, economic norms theory offers us a theoretically clearer mechanism that explains anti-Americanism, even though it does not bear the greatest explanatory power⁶⁷. In other words, the findings about the economic norms theory appear to be the most theory-driven ones compared to the other hypotheses I tested throughout the analysis. Unlike many other comprehensive projects, economic norms theory might offer some clarification about when a particular type of anti-Americanism, which is the instrumental anti-Americanism, is more likely to take place. Blaydes and Linzer inquire under which conditions anti-Americanism can be used as a policy instrument in Muslim countries. Accordingly, in countries where we observe the greater amount of clash between secular-modernist and conservative-Islamist authorities, there is greater anti-Americanism (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012). Even though their research has a sound quantitative background and is based on a more recent dataset (PEW 2007), Blaydes and Lizer do not offer a clear-cut explanation so as to why and under which conditions Islamist-secular antagonism significantly escalades. Indeed, as economic norms theory suggests, such clashes are more likely to occur during economic development which introduces market norms in a country and which also undermines the prestige of the authorities that benefited from the pre-market norms (Mousseau, 2002/03). Therefore, we can assume that promotion of illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism are associated with economic development crisis.

It is nonetheless necessary to illustrate how to promotion of anti-American or illiberal attitudes take place. Anwar analyzes the radical Islamist trends in Indonesia. She argues that the radical Islamists in Indonesia tend to interpret the “War on Terror” discourse of the Bush Administration as a war on Islam. The author reports that the US administration, under the War on Terror program, named some Indonesian religious schools, mass organizations and controversial people such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as potential terrorist threats. In return, several Islamist groups in Indonesia considered and interpreted these actions as interference with the domestic affairs of Indonesia. Hence these organizations including Hizbut Tahrir, Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly, and Front of Defenders of Islam organized mass protestations of the United States in the major cities of Indonesia (Anwar, 2009). Within the framework of economic norms theory, the patrons –in this case, the leaders of the Islamist groups- who are interested in the survival of their clientelist basis are contingent on promoting hatred, fear and distrust of the outsiders (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau, 2003; Mousseau

⁶⁷The relation is an inverted-U between contracts per capita and anti-Americanism. Recall that war with Israel and US aid to authoritarian regimes bear greater explanatory power than the measurements of economic norms theory.

2009; Mousseau, 2011). In addition, Mousseau argues that anti-Semitism just prior to World War II was also a similar bitter consequence of economic development crisis which ravaged Europe and especially Germany (Mousseau, 2002/03).

It is highly apparent that anti-Americanism is not only a consequence of social or country level factors. Even though I showed that a great deal of variance anti-Americanism occurs because of national-level factors (24%), still a majority of variance remains at the individual level. Accordingly, I inquired into the impact of education and individual level economic situation via various models. In terms of education, the current evidence shows that more educated people appear to be less anti-American. Indeed, little number of a priori research projects supports this finding. As I reviewed in Chapter II, most findings about the impact of education is that there is country-level or institutional differences that prevents us to come up with a universal claim about how education impacts illiberal attitudes. Yet, it seems that, because people are not well informed about the US because of lower levels of education, they are more prone to believe in empirically flawed facts with regards to American foreign policies or any item that lead them to be more anti-American. This finding again supports the fact that anti-Americanism is not just a consequence of US foreign policies. It can be associated with lower levels of education and maybe proneness to believe in myths about US foreign policy. I also hypothesized that in countries with middle level economic development; the impact of education can be reverse and be associated with greater anti-Americanism. However, my estimates cannot adequately support this hypothesis.

In addition to the levels of education, I inquired how individual economic situation interacts with anti-Americanism. The main aim was to capture whether personal economic grievance has an impact on anti-Americanism. A previous striking finding from prior research is Mousseau (2011)'s individual-level economic modernization crisis measure. As I previously indicated, economic grievance measured as material poverty in urban setting is associated with higher support for terror in defense of Islam⁶⁸. The current analysis could not find a similar association of urban poverty with anti-Americanism. However, because Mousseau only uses a Muslim sample and the normality distribution of the dependent variables are discrepant, the current statistical insignificance is subject to further analyses. Alternatively, economic modernization crisis might be a social phenomena rather than an individual manifestation such as urban poverty, when it comes to the discussion of anti-Americanism.

⁶⁸ This measure is also called as urban poverty

On the other hand I showed that personal economic satisfaction is associated with higher levels of anti-Americanism. The current analysis also showed that the better someone's own economic situation in his or her society, the less anti-American she or he appears to be. In fact, when we look at the final models, personal income satisfaction and economic situation keep their statistical significance at the same models. In addition, the current results lead us to question whether people, overall, attribute their economic problems to the US. It would be hasty to come up with such a conclusion based on the current results, provided that there are no further questions in the PEW 2002 dataset to fulfill such an inquiry. Nonetheless, it is safe to argue that there is a possibility of attributing personal economic hardship to the US and that more research is needed for better assessments.

* * *

To sum up with the current findings, it is plausible to argue that anti-Americanism is not just a mere consequence of the US foreign policies, even though several US foreign policies such as support of Israel or bilateral aid to authoritarian regimes appears to be a significant correlates. Indeed, as I stated earlier, the particularity of anti-Americanism from other anti-country cases is that the former appears to be increasing or decreasing by significant amount of empirically unjustifiable facts that I reviewed in previous chapters. After all, because of its hegemonic position, the United States represents more than a political entity that upsets people with specific policy choices. Some people tend to attribute US with features that cannot be adequately documented. The fact that national economic development, individual level education and income evaluation play a crucial role in explaining the changes on anti-Americanism is a proof that there are not only the wrong-doings of the US. Throughout the analysis, I sought to show this claim by testing a variety of hypotheses at both national and individual level.

It is nevertheless clear that my analyses bear several limitations. Technically speaking, the major problem turns out to be limited number of country-level observations. This is especially problematic in the interpretation of the multivariate models since the degrees of freedom at these models visibly drop. This is why the final multilevel regression table of this analysis tests only one national level hypothesis at each model. Indeed, it would be more robust to test the hypotheses with greater number of countries. In this regard PEW Global Attitudes Project's 2007 dataset is the only one that has greater number of countries compared to 2002 survey. However, as I stated earlier, since in several hypotheses I follow on Mousseau

(2011)'s analyses and that there are contract intensity measures as late as 2000, I kept on running the analyses in PEW Global Attitudes Project's 2002 dataset. Nonetheless, a re-testing of the some hypotheses in PEW 2007 dataset would be one of the most valuable inquiries building upon the current one.

Additionally, I stated earlier, some of the country level measurements about the impacts of US foreign policy remain simplistic. A better way to test these hypotheses would be to come up with cross level interactions where we would add individual level assessments of US foreign policies. PEW 2002 dataset does not provide, for example, an indicator of personal grievance from Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or from autocratic leaders. A similar problem is true for the tests of alliance similarity with the US and the relative capability. However, the shortage of these variables does not dismiss the current findings: The war with Israel dummy captures the countries where there is the greatest likelihood of being negatively affected by Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The bilateral aid to autocratic regimes captures the autocratic countries where there is substantial American bilateral aid, although it does not differentiate between the supporting elites of the autocrats and those who are oppressed by the autocrats.

The final problem is about the low percentages of total variance explained at the models. The greatest percentage explained turns out to be 13 percent in the full multivariate model where I control for the national means of personal income (Appendix 5.3 – Model 1). This suggests that there is still room for alternative inquiries of anti-Americanism. Nonetheless, in a dataset with at least 30,000 individual level observations, it may be difficult to obtain considerably higher percentages of total variance explained. Additionally, none of the hypotheses I tested involved claims about the magnitude or explanatory strength. Hence, the problem of low variance explained does not necessitate an immediate remedy to the current models.

What is next?

Researchers interested in anti-Americanism discussions might wonder about the future of anti-Americanism. A possible solution can be to retest the current models with other years of the PEW Global Attitudes Projects' dataset. However, there is a variety of substantial differences among these datasets from questions asked to countries involved in the project. This situation makes the replication almost impossible or requires extremely sophisticated techniques for which it is questionable whether the investment is worth the effort. As I indicated before, only PEW 2007 dataset offers a similarly comprehensive dataset with that of

the 2002. However, provided that the current aim is to capture a possible trend of anti-Americanism along with its correlates, only two years may not be adequate.

An alternative task could be to assume that the current results in terms of economic development hold for all the other years, and to make predictions in this regard. Thus I offer simple analysis of the trend in the frequency of the middle level income countries compared to the rest of the world. Such an inquiry might help us to make some predictions for the future of anti-Americanism. Based on the empirical findings I presented in the previous chapter, it could be expected that an increasing trend in middle income countries accompanied with a decreasing trend in low income countries can signal warning that there are more people to suffer of modernization crisis. Graph 6.1 shows the percentage trends for different income per capita ranges. I used the World Bank's criteria which displays four different ranges of income per capita: Lower income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income countries⁶⁹. In this regard, I divided the number of countries within each four categories of income per capita on the total number of countries that appear in the World Bank in the relevant year. Accordingly, there are four different lines that show the trends in the frequencies of the income categories between 1989 and 2010⁷⁰.

[GRAPH 6.1 ABOUT HERE]

As seen in Graph 6.1, approximately since the year 2004, there is a decline in the percentage of the lower and lower middle income categories. Indeed, the decline in the frequency of the lower income countries turns out to be a constant one since early 21st century. On the other hand, the frequencies of the upper middle and high income categories appear to be almost constantly increasing together since the year 2002. What is mainly striking here is that fewer countries seem to be within the least income categories whereas more in the upper middle and high income categories. Income per capita placements are changing. There is an apparent and sharp decline in the number of lower income countries. Assuming that they experience a transition toward the classification of middle income categories, there is a possibility that economic modernization crisis is to take place. Yet, at the same time, provided that there is also an increase in the number of high income countries, it becomes difficult to predict whether the world will experience much greater anti-

⁶⁹ More information about the income per capita classification criteria throughout the years can be found at <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419~isCURL:Y,00.html>

⁷⁰ World Bank offers this categorization as early as the year 1989

Americanism. Overall, the most important point to note is the societal experiences of the countries that leave the lowest income category. According to Graph 6.1, the world has fewer low income countries. In addition, the decline of the percentage of the lower income countries (0.16) appears to be greater than the one of high income countries (0.05) between the years 2001 and 2010. This difference leads the suspicion with regards to greater number of cases related to the economic modernization crisis in the world, in case such trends persist over the coming years. Overall, the implications from Graph 6.1 signal greater levels of anti-Americanism in the future.

The possibility of a global increase of anti-Americanism offers greater salience to the question what are the possible threats that it might engender. The main concern about anti-Americanism is that it might certainly decrease the US soft power around the globe (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007a; Nye, 2004). Declining American soft power might bear diverging outcomes: In Chapter I, based on what several researchers put forth, I briefly pointed four different issues where anti-Americanism can play a concerning role. First, anti-Americanism can harm voting alignments with US in the UN or other international institutions (Datta, 2009). Second, in case there are issue discrepancies between the US and its European counterparts, anti-Americanism can drag the rest of the world to favor the latter and to stand more against the US (Nincic & Datta, 2007). Third, in several countries regardless of the level of democracy⁷¹, political parties can start to embrace discourses against the US in order to designate their political stance to attract voters. Finally, and perhaps most importantly anti-Americanism can increase transnational terrorist recruitments (Nye, 2004; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007b). However, there is also the possibility that the US soft power can be a problem itself. After all, people might be against the American cultural items. Nonetheless, this concern remains somewhat trivial since there is no evidence that US imposes its culture on other countries. On the other hand, local authorities might provoke hazardous interpretations of the American culture leading to anti-Americanism.

Provided that anti-Americanism should be a concern for Americans; there is the fundamental question of what policy makers should do in order to remedy the negative image of the US. Although not all, several findings in this research bear also implications for the policy-makers: First, provided that greater trade dependency to the United States decreases anti-Americanism, the US might focus more on engaging in greater volumes of trade with the problematic nations. This might increase channels of communication with the US and the

⁷¹ See Forsberg, 2005 for the case of German elections

country of interest; and ameliorate people's perceptions of the US. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the US should provide greater amounts of aid. After all, as the current results imply, bilateral aid might be a problematic in the case of autocratic regimes. Second, as Mousseau also underlines, policy makers should promote the maintenance and the sustainability of the market economies in the developing world (Mousseau, 2002/03; Mousseau, 2011). After all, I showed some statistical evidence that marketization process might spur bitter societal impacts such as anti-Americanism. In that respect, capital rich countries might hence promote the stability and the embedded-ness of the market system in poor countries.

In terms of US foreign policy choices, making suggestions become more complex. For example, in delicate situations such as the US stance in the Israeli-Palestinian war, it would be challenging to suggest that US should stop support for Israel. Yet, policy-makers should be encouraged to analyze further the impacts of US stance in Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to understand anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In addition, provided that my measurement of war with Israel remains a direct and a rough one, we need more complex and coherent statistical operations to come across with a situation where we can make more reliable suggestions for policy-makers.


Finally, it remains us to identify what the researchers interested on anti-Americanism should focus on the field. Obviously, the field of anti-Americanism lacks a strong theoretical research agenda unlike studies like democratic peace or liberal international relations theories. As I predominantly indicated in Chapter II, most of the anti-Americanism studies are limited to descriptive case studies and statistical analyses focusing on few countries. In this regard, except several inquiries (Chiozza, 2007; Chiozza, 2009; Blaydes & Linzer, 2012), the study of anti-Americanism lacks recent statistical analyses that might show what is going on around the globe. Therefore, not only the replication of the few statistical analyses is necessary but also, new global statistical analyses conducted from scratch should be promoted in the scholar field. It is highly possible that greater amounts of rigorous analyses will necessitate stronger theoretical backing which will in return help the discussion of anti-Americanism to reach higher sophistication levels.

The study of anti-Americanism lacks also time series inquiries. As I underlined in previous chapters, more sound of assessments regarding the impact of US foreign policies, time varying observations are needed where the before and after the introduction of a specific US foreign policy action can be reliably analyzed. In the absence of such analyses, a great number of claims about how US foreign policies increase or decrease anti-Americanism remain speculative or inadequate. Accordingly the most valuable relevant method might be a

three level hierarchical analysis where countries are nested in years and individuals are nested in countries. Yet, as I put forth, there is no research project or dataset that currently enables us to pursue a three-level statistical inquiry. Therefore, there is a need for wider global projects that cover more sophisticated data collection which are consistent throughout the years.

To sum up, there are political and economical reasons of anti-Americanism independent of each other both at national level and individual level. These findings suggest that the interplay between economic development and illiberal attitudes such as anti-Americanism should attract considerable attention by students of statistical inquiry. The statistical global analysis of anti-Americanism is at an infant stage because of the issues I discussed at previous paragraphs. Yet, it is without question that the relevant policy-makers in the United States should keep an eye on the global trends of anti-Americanism especially in places where economic conditions might foster terrorist recruitments.

Graph 6.1: Changes in the Frequencies of Per Capita Income Categories



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