

**TRANSFORMATION AND PERSISTENCE OF LANGUAGE REGIMES:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE POLITICS IN FRANCE AND  
TURKEY**

**by**

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## **STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP**

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that , to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Şükriye Gökçe Silman

## ABSTRACT

This study explores the dynamics of the transformation and persistence of language regimes by analyzing the factors that create the demands for language policy change and necessary political conditions for policy outcome. Throughout the study, I argue that for a language regime change, there are necessary conditions that should be present within the political setting in a country and accordingly two sets of factors that are necessary for a language regime change are identified and analyzed. The first set is the minority-oriented factors that include the politicization of the linguistic demands of minority groups, securitization of minority activism, and the influence of transnational actors. The second set, the state-oriented factors, is adopted from Aktürk's (2011) study on ethnic regimes and adapted to the context of this study. These factors include the existence of a counterelite that represents the minority groups and/or their linguistic demands, a new discourse that reflects these demands of minority groups and finally political hegemonic power that is necessary for the policy outcome. Within this framework, this study is based on the comparative analysis of two cases, the case of France after 1970's, and the case of Turkey since 1980's. For each case, a brief history of language policy and general information about the linguistic minorities are presented, and then the factors of language regime change are analyzed within each case. After an extended comparative study in France and Turkey, I conclude that the factors presented above are all necessary for a language regime change to occur in a country. While the existence of these factors in Turkey has created the language regime change, the absence of the necessary conditions in France explains the persistence of the existing language regime.

**Keywords:** language regime, language policy, linguistic minorities, Turkey, France

## ÖZET

Bu çalışma dil politikasının deęişimi yönündeki talepleri ortaya çıkaran ve politika deęişimlerini sağlayacak gerekli siyasi koşulların analizi ışığında dil rejimlerinin deęişim ve devamlılık dinamiklerini araştırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada dil rejiminin deęişmesi için bir ülkenin siyasi ortamında gerekli olan koşulların sağlanması gerektiğini savunmaktayım. Buna baęlı olarak tezde bu koşullar iki farklı grup halinde çalışılmıştır. İlk grup, dilsel azınlıkları temel alır ve dilsel azınlıkların taleplerinin siyasallaştırılmasını, azınlık hareketlerinin güvenlik sorunu haline gelmesini ve uluslararası aktörlerin ülkedeki azınlık sorunları üzerinde etkisini içermektedir. İkinci grup faktörler, Aktürk'ün (2011) etnisite rejimleri üzerine yaptığı çalışmadan yola çıkılarak konuya adapte edilmiştir. Bu faktörler, dilsel azınlıkları ve/veya bu azınlıkların dilsel taleplerini temsil eden bir karşı elitin varlığını, bu azınlıkların dilsel taleplerini dile getiren yeni bir söylemi ve politika deęişimi için gerekli olan çoğunluęa sahip siyasi bir gücü içermektedir. Bu çerçevede, çalışma 1970 sonrası Fransa ve 1980 sonrası Türkiye'nin karşılaştırmalı analizine dayanmaktadır. Çalışmada, her ülkenin dil politikalarının kısa tarihine değinilmiş, dilsel azınlık grupları hakkında genel bilgiler verilmiş ve sonrasında yukarıda belirtilen faktörler ışığında iki ülkenin analizi yapılmıştır. Yapılan karşılaştırmalı çalışma sonucunda, belirtilen koşulların hepsinin varlığının dil rejimi deęişimi için gerekli olduęu saptanmıştır. Bu koşulların hepsinin Türkiye'de var olması dil rejiminde bir deęişiklik yaratırken, Fransa'da bu koşulların sağlanamaması deęişimi engellemiştir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** dil rejimi, dil politikası, dilsel azınlıklar, Türkiye, Fransa

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

*“Questions of Language are basically questions of power”*

*Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, 1979.*

The main questions that this thesis seeks to answer are based on the different language policy types present in different countries. The reasons why French and Turkish states have adopted different type of language policies especially during the last few decades require a deep analysis as both countries have a similar history of assimilation of cultural diversities and minority rights. While an historical analysis shows that there is a similar construction of the status of minority languages and the political framework for the state-minority group relations, there is a language policy change in Turkey but not in France. Therefore this thesis asks why such a policy change has not occurred in France so far and what are the reasons of language policy change in Turkey? With this question at the center of the arguments presented in this thesis, several factors that affect political agenda on minority rights and state policy making process will be explored and analyzed to reveal some patterns for policy change, which may have an explanatory power at a larger picture considering policy change in general. Moreover, different theoretical frameworks will also be used to present a better understanding of the status of language debates in both countries. Over the last decade Turkey experienced important developments in language policy area as the use of Kurdish language expanded significantly, especially in social sphere, and the demands for the use of Kurdish language in the official domain are on the agenda. On the other hand, France experiences a more repressive period in the language policy concerning

the linguistic rights of minority groups as the more the demands and the pressures concerning the use of minority languages in the social and official areas increases, the more the French state insists on applying the nationalist unified language policy framework. This makes these two cases important in explaining the causes of change or persistence in state policies as why change is present in Turkey but not in France point to some patterns for the conditions of change in language policy.

### **1.1. Statement of the Problem**

The nationalist and assimilationist outlook of Turkish state since the beginning of the Republican period is a well-accepted phenomenon as the Kemalist legacy within the constitution and the successive reforms made during the continuing modernization process in Turkey have all reflected this ideology. Kemalist ideology adopted a unitary identity formation among the members of the nation and did not recognize the existence of multiple identities within its territory. This ideology sought for minority assimilation and renunciation of distinct identities existing in the country. However, this did not change the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population over time. The left wing movement in Turkey which mostly included Alevi Kurds during 1960s and 1970s intensified the conflict between the state and the Kurds. Moreover, in 1979 when a cabinet minister Şerafettin Elçi declared himself as a Kurd, this created a big scandal and paved the way for the 1980 coup.<sup>1</sup> This reaction was mainly a result of the increasing assimilationist policies implemented by the military power as especially the use of Kurdish language was banned in any public place.<sup>2</sup> While successive coalition governments after the coup included Kurdish problem in their agenda with more liberal attitude towards minority rights, their relatively weak autonomy over the policy

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<sup>1</sup> Yavuz 2001, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Uçarlar 2009, 134.

mechanisms prevented policy change and increased the vulnerability of the state in domestic problems. However, starting in 2001, significant policy changes began to take place in Turkey during CHP-MHP-ANAP coalition.<sup>3</sup> In terms of language policy, there have been various policy changes in Turkey significantly since 2001. These policy changes which took place only during the last decade created a big change in existing policy structure toward minority groups in the country, and this has become a process continuing today with the expansion of the discussions towards further rights in linguistic domain. While reform process began after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power, the Islamist multiculturalist discourse of the party does not explain policy change by itself. Therefore, this thesis will ask “What are the reasons for such an important and a deep change in language policies in the Turkish case?” To answer this question, the political activism minority groups will also be analyzed as it contributes to the policy transformation process. The timing and the effect of language policy change in Turkey requires a deep analysis of the question why the demands of linguistic minorities were realized and the government took initiative to expand cultural rights in Turkey.

In 1994, the French government passed a law called Toubon law, which overall declared French language to be the only language used in all official domains.<sup>4</sup> When the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin signed the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1999, the Constitutional Council of France declared that the implementation of the Charter would be unconstitutional since the Constitution states that the language of the Republic is French, so it was not ratified

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<sup>3</sup> Hale 2003, 109.

<sup>4</sup> For the excerpts from the related parts of the law, see Appendix 1; Online version is available in English in French Ministry of Culture’s website: <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm>

by the parliament.<sup>5</sup> This decision was not very surprising for the French case as the state continuously limited or even banned the use of minority languages in any official domain and also for educational purposes. The Toubon Law relative to the use of the French language was completed by the addition of several regulations. The Decree of March 3, 1995 notably defined breaches of the law and the related penalties. The Law of August 4, 1994 relative to the use of the French language replaced the law of December 31, 1975, extending its scope and strengthening its provisions. This text is the tangible rendition of the constitutional principle recognized in 1992 according to which the language of the Republic is French. While a direct reference to the regional languages is not present in the text, it neither includes nor provides for a list of terms or expressions which may be prohibited or whose use may be made compulsory. The circular, dated March 3, 1995 supplements these regulations by defining the scope of the law. In particular it defines the use of the French language for the marketing of goods and services, during seminars and conventions, in companies and in education as well.<sup>6</sup> The overall context of the above mentioned laws emphasize the long tradition of monolingual structure of linguistic composition of the republic, but they alone do not explain why there has not been any extension of the linguistic policies and rights towards linguistic minority groups in the country. Considering the general positive trend within the European Union about the regional and minority languages and the status of the French state in the community, the attitude of French government requires a deeper analysis. While the emphasis on the cultural diversity within the European Union has been present for a long period, why French state has not act positively towards the linguistic minorities is questionable and make France an interesting case to trace the

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<sup>5</sup> Maatta 2005, 173.

<sup>6</sup> For the excerpts from the related parts of the Decree, see Appendix 2. Online version of the 1995 Decree is available at <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/decret-gb.htm>.

persistence on nationalist or unitary policies with the presence of a linguistic diversity at hand.

## 1.2. Defining Language Minorities in France and Turkey

As there is not an official definition of minority groups in France and Turkey due to the constitutional setup regarding this issue, the information about linguistic minority groups is acquired from different sources that publish information about minority groups in different countries. Although these secondary sources on demographic makeup can be inconsistent most of the time, I have used different sources to define the linguistic minorities that will be covered in this thesis and the language debated in both countries are centered around specific language groups which provide an information about the targeted communities by the government. In the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the definition for regional or minority languages are given in Article 1 of the Charter:<sup>7</sup>

### **Article 1 – Definitions**

For the purposes of this Charter:

a. "regional or minority languages" means languages that are:

i. traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and

ii. different from the official language(s) of that State;

it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants;

b. territory in which the regional or minority language is used" means the geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people justifying the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures provided for in this Charter;

c. non-territorial languages" means languages used by nationals of the State which differ from the language or languages used by the rest of the State's population but which, although traditionally used within the territory of the State, cannot be identified with a particular area thereof.

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<sup>7</sup> The full text of the ECRML is available online in the Council of Europe website: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/148.htm>.

However, as neither France nor Turkey has ratified the charter, it does not provide information about the linguistic minorities in these countries. Therefore as the definition of the Charter is useful for the defining purposes of this research, other numerical sources can be evaluated by this definition. In the following paragraphs linguistic composition of Turkey and France will be given in more detail by reference to different databases that give information of the population wise orientation of linguistic minorities.

Ethnologue (2009) gives the most detailed information about the linguistic composition in the French and Turkish territory. The general summary of languages in France and Turkey according to the Ethnologue is the following:

<b>France</b>	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Population</b>
<b>French</b>	53.200.000 (2005) <sup>8</sup>
<b>Basque</b>	76.200 (1991)
<b>Breton</b>	500.000 (1989)
<b>Calo</b>	15.000
<b>Catalan-Valencian-Balear</b>	100.000 (1996)
<b>Corsican</b>	341.000 (2001)
<b>Dutch</b>	80.000
<b>Franco-Provençal</b>	70.000 (1971)
<b>Swiss German</b>	1.500.000 (1987)
<b>Italian</b>	1.000.000 (1977)
<b>Luxembourgeois</b>	40.000 (2001)
<b>Occitan</b>	1.940.000
<b>Portugese</b>	750.000
<b>Balkan Romani</b>	10.500
<b>Sinte Romani</b>	28. 400 (2000)
<b>Vlax Romani</b>	10.000
<b>Vlaams</b>	10.000
<b>France Total</b>	<b>60.991.000</b>

<sup>8</sup> The numbers in parenthesis refer to the publishing year of the sources that Ethnologue uses.

<b>Turkey</b>	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Population</b>
Turkish	46.300.000 (1987)
Abaza	10.000 (1995)
Abkhaz	4.000 (1980)
Adyghe	278.000 (2000)
Tosk Albanian	15.000
N.M. Spoken Arabic	400.000 (1992)
Armenian	40.000 (1980)
South Azerbaijani	530.000
Balkan Gagauz Turk	327.000 (1993)
Bulgarian	300.000 (2001)
Crimean Tatar	2.000
Dimli	1.000.000 (1999)
Domari	28.500 (2000)
Georgian	40.000 (1980)
Greek	4.000 (1993)
Hertevin	1.000 (1999)
Kabardian	1.000.000 (2005)
Kazakh	600 (1982)
Kirmanjki	140.000
Northern Kurdish	3.950.000 (1980)
Kyrgyz	1.140 (1982)
Ladino	8.000 (1976)
Laz	30.000 (1980)
Pontic	4.540 (1965)
Balkan Romani	25.000
Serbian	20.000 (1980)
Turkmen	920 (1982)
Turoyo	3.000 (1994)
Uyghur	500 (1981)
Southern Uzbek	1980 (1982)
<b>Turkey Total</b>	<b>72.970.000</b>

The data show that there are many different languages spoken in France and Turkey, but especially in the Turkish case the number of Kurdish speakers make up the largest minority language in the country. In France, Occitan, Swiss German, Corsican,



Breton and Italian speakers have the largest numbers, but Italian is not mentioned in any debate and scholarly texts as a minority language but it is an immigrant language. Apart from the Ethnologue, CIA Factbook and Minorities at Risk project are evaluated for information about linguistic minority groups in Turkey and France. CIA Factbook does not give any detailed information about minority groups as it only lists Turkish, Kurdish and other minority languages for Turkey's languages section, and for the languages section of France it lists French, and other minority languages Provençal, Breton, Alsatian, Corsican, Catalan, Basque, Flemish with the explanation of rapidly declining regional dialects and languages without providing the numbers of speakers of each language.<sup>9</sup> Minorities at Risk project also does not categorize minority groups according to their linguistic orientation and it only includes Kurdish in Turkey, and Breton and Corsican for France by giving detailed timeline of the events regarding these groups without referring to the policy oriented events. One more source proper to use in this context is the UNESCO Atlas of World's Languages in Danger which includes minority languages in Turkey but in France, it does not include Occitan.<sup>10</sup>

One should note that neither all the listed languages in Ethnologue will not be relevant for a study of linguistic rights, nor the other studies mentioned above will be enough for a concrete definition of regional and minority languages in France and Turkey. Although the numbers are very important to see the variety of languages spoken in both countries, the policies toward linguistic minority groups does not simply stem from the numbers. As will be shown in detail in the following parts of the thesis, the language debates are concentrated on specific language groups, which is assumed to be the result of the demand part of the discussion, which emphasizes Kurds in Turkey,

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<sup>9</sup> The information above is provided from the website of CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php>

and Breton, Occitan, Corsican, and Basque speakers in France. Also immigrant linguistic groups will not be included in the comparative analysis because the magnitude of minority activism around the use of regional or minority languages are mostly present among the non-immigrant minorities in selected countries, which excludes Italian from the French case. While language debates and resulting policies in Turkey are again mainly a product of Kurdish speakers' demands from the state, which is the largest minority language spoken in the country, in France it is mostly the above mentioned minorities that voice the linguistic demands from the state.<sup>11</sup> However, the policies targeted toward linguistic minorities, summarized in the first part of the introduction, do not discriminate against different minority language groups most of the time as most of the provisions and limitations of the state has a general language with exceptions.

### **1.3. Research Design and Methodology**

There is a wide range of policy categories for states to deal with their minority groups, but all states pursue a specific set of policies that shape the relations within the society and between state and society. However, due to the dynamic structure of state society relations, in many cases states acknowledge the necessity to change the way state interfere in the lives of minority groups as a result of specific developments that concern both sides. Turkey and France are no exception for this issue. In fact, in both countries minority groups have been an issue of importance and French and Turkish governments seek to find the ideal environment to deal with their minority problems until today. Linguistic diversity in both countries came to be a crucial problem during the last few decades and still there has been an ongoing effort to deal with the demands of minority groups in different ways.

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<sup>11</sup> Trenz 2005, 9.

Minority rights, as an important part of the political science literature, have been explored in its various aspects. While linguistic rights is a part of the larger minority rights issue, linguistic demands of minority groups and the different responses that they get from their states create an interesting and contemporary area of study within a comparative perspective. Language is considered as one of the crucial aspects of national identity building process and it has been one of the primary driving forces for leaders to unify people in building their states and nations. While being a part of a greater knowledge accumulation in the field, minority linguistic rights opens a wider field of research and the political implications of minority language rights is the underlying subject of this thesis. While France and Turkey has a similar history of assimilationist policies regarding minority languages, the nature of relations between the state and the linguistic minorities presented significant developments. French state have insisted on and imposed further non-recognition (assimilationist) policies towards linguistic minority groups although in 1951 the French state provided some provisions to the minority groups in terms of educational law with the Deixonne Law. However, in the Turkish case, the state has adopted more inclusive policies towards regional minority languages since the early 2000's. Considering this fundamental change in the Turkish case and the persistence of assimilationist policies in France, why and in what conditions policy change occurs becomes an important question in this issue.

In terms of cases selected for this thesis, there are number of things to clarify. While this thesis argues that France and Turkey is in a different level considering the current language politics in both countries, this does not mean that France is in a much lower state in terms of language rights. The emphasis here is that France has not experienced a language regime shift although minority languages have been a part of the political agenda and there is a level of demand from linguistic minority groups.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to reveal the background information to explain why there has not been a policy shift in the French case.

### **1.3.1. Research Design**

Although the present picture in France and Turkey places these countries in different categories as the policy shift in Turkey changed the course of language policy evolution, this thesis does not assume that the situation will not change in both countries. As mentioned earlier state policies have a dynamic nature and they can be changed responding to the events and the conditions occurring at a specific time, especially in both countries linguistic minority issue is still an unresolved issue considering the last stage where in both countries linguistic minorities seek either for further recognition in the official domain (Kurds in Turkey) or for policies that would grant the fundamental rights keep their distinct cultural features alive (Corsicans, Bretons, and Occitan speakers in France). However, the main aim of this project is to reveal the conditions necessary for policy change by exploring the historical evolution of linguistic rights in both countries.

To achieve this aim, the factors that affect policy making in linguistic domain will be explored within different categories. While language regime is the dependent variable in this study, the dynamics of language politics are the independent variables as listed below. Formation and transformation of language politics is taken as a two-step process referring to the agenda creating role of the minority groups in the first phase, and the necessary political and ideational conditions that result in policy change as the second step.

**Figure 1: Basic Form of Investigation Adopted in this Study**



This type of investigation will lead the analysis beyond the state-oriented discussion and combine it with a different set of arguments that lead to policy change. Explaining why policy change becomes a political agenda requires an extended discussion on the demands of minority groups and how they communicate these demands with the state. As seen in the figure, the basic form of investigation adopted in this thesis is driven from argument that when minority-oriented factors create the necessary conditions, their demands transform into a political agenda. Then this process translates into policy change only if state-oriented factors of policy making create necessary conditions that enable governments to change their policy. The outcome of these two consecutive processes is the policy change that responds to the demands of minority groups. The literature on policy change mostly refers to either one of these two different sets of factors that influence policymaking process. However, I would claim that minority activism for example does not create policy change itself or states do not create new policies towards minority groups when there is not a demand from the groups or from the public in general. Indeed, minority-oriented factors are necessary to create state-oriented factors that produce language policy as an outcome. Therefore, both sides of the language politics have to create the necessary conditions to create a language regime change.

### **1.3.2. Methodology**

In this thesis, the research on language policy in Turkey and France will be conducted through a comparative historical analysis. The comparative basis of this

research uses Mill's method of difference which attempts to identify independent variables associated with different outcomes.<sup>12</sup> To translate this into the objectives of this thesis, this method will help identify the variables that led policy change in the Turkish case but not in France. In another definition, Most Similar Systems Design will be used to define different language policies present in Turkey and France as dependent variable, and different independent variables that explain this variance will be identified as discussed above briefly.<sup>13</sup>

Policy making about a crucial aspect of social and political life in a country like the linguistic diversity is a product of a long time evolving events, demands and a long period of public debates most of the time. Policy change itself is a very difficult process and when language policy is considered the picture becomes more complicated. As evolution of language policy in both countries requires a temporal outlook, the successive policies regarding the use of regional or minority languages in the official and non-official domain will shape the arguments presented in the following chapters. Language policies and constitutional amendments regarding the use of minority or regional languages in France and Turkey are analyzed to trace the policy evolution process to determine the trend within which difference in language policy in Turkey and France is created. Language laws are the primary documents that illustrate policy status and difference in both countries.

To explain the dynamics of policy change in terms of the minority centered factors and state centered ones, different surveys, news articles, declarations and other

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<sup>12</sup> George and Bennett 2005, 153.

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that France and Turkey might not present structural similarities in every aspect as both countries present different historical and structural conditions. However, the long history of assimilationist cultural policy in both countries makes these cases ideal for comparison in discussing language policy especially considering the recent policy changes in Turkey.

types of data will be utilized to explain the dynamics of language policy in France and Turkey.

#### **1.4. Structure of the Thesis**

There are four other chapters in this thesis. In the second chapter, I provide the theoretical framework of the thesis by giving information about the literature on language policy and planning, minority language rights. Moreover, I explain language regime concept as the main theoretical concept of the thesis. For the remaining part of the second chapter I introduce the factors that drive language policy change by providing basic arguments about these factors. I call this part as the dynamics of policy change as these factors provide the necessary condition for the cases to act about language policy in a certain way. I divided these factors into two main categories as state oriented and minority groups oriented. State driven factors of policy change has been well established in the literature, but minority group oriented factors have not been studied systematically as far as the author is aware. This second category will contribute to the understanding of policy-making dynamics from the perspective of the minority groups or more explicitly this category refer to the process before policy outcome occurs. By doing so, I explain language policy dynamics in two separate phases, which I will explain in the next chapter.

The third and the fourth chapter of this thesis are devoted to the empirical analysis of the cases in a systematic way. In the third chapter, I give the account of language policy and language minority groups in France. To achieve this, I provide the information about language policies in France since 1970's, and I give a general account of minority groups in France. In the last part of this chapter, I discuss the dynamics of policy making and state-minority relations in the country to explain why policy change

in language domain has not occurred in France so far based on the theoretical framework that I provide in the second chapter.

In the fourth part, I analyze the Turkish case in a similar way. The time period in the Turkish case is from 1980 to present. Within this period, I provide information about the official language policies to give information about the changing course of language policy in the country. On the other hand, I provide the linguistic map in Turkey to explain the linguistic diversity of the country. Then I give the account of Kurdish movement and linguistic demands of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. In the last part of this chapter, I discuss the dynamics of policy making in Turkey to explain how policy change was possible in this case unlike the French case.

In the conclusion part, I will discuss the different outcomes about the language policy in Turkey and France and compare how the dynamics of language policy have functioned in each country. Based on the analysis of both cases, I discuss the dynamics of policy making and language regime characteristics in Turkey and France to explain the divergence of language policy. By providing this comparison and the conclusive remarks on the cases, I expect that this thesis will contribute to the existing language policy discussions in each country with the explanatory power of the arguments.

After providing the essential components of the thesis in this part, the following chapter will establish the theoretical foundation of the study and discuss the dynamics of language policy.



## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW: LANGUAGE REGIME, MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE POLICY

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be introduced. There have been various studies on language policy with sociological and political perspectives. However, there is little written on the language regime changes. The main objective here is to define Language Regime as the core theoretical concept and to utilize it to explain variance of language policy in Turkey and France.<sup>14</sup> In other words, by discussing the main arguments about the language policy creation and transformation in the literature, this chapter will provide the necessary basis on the dynamics of language policy change. With the theoretical information given in this chapter, transformation of language regime in Turkey and persistence of monolingual language regime in France will be analyzed in the following chapters.

#### 2.1. Language Planning and Policy Literature: Theoretical Challenges

It is widely accepted that language, as a social phenomenon, is political. Its political nature derives from that it is a social and historical construct, which marks cultural borders among genders, statuses and communities, and that it is a means to control or maintain the access to knowledge, hence to power. Language is also always

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<sup>14</sup> Other relevant new concepts are **linguistic culture** see Schiffman 1998 and 2006, **linguistic landscape** see Landry & Bourhis 1997; Hicks 2002; Shohamy 2006; Gorter 2006; Backhaus 2007; **language/linguistic ecology** see Mühlhäusler 1996 and 2000; Maffi 2000 and 2001, and **language ideology** see Silverstein 1979; Joseph & Taylor 1990; Woolard 1992; Woolard & Schieffelin 1994; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity 1998; Blommaert J. 1999 and 2006; and Kroskrity 2000a.

politically contextualized because it has always been incorporated into the power play of politics.

Modernity, by substantially transforming the ways in which the political sphere is organized and operated, has changed the political nature of language.<sup>15</sup> Modernity, especially with its urge for scientific understanding and control, turned languages into means of direct cultural and political change and discipline. Language has become one of the essential dimensions of modern forms of power.<sup>16</sup> The standardization and the spread of Western European vernaculars<sup>17</sup> were guided and accompanied by a series of parallel and consequential processes: the spread of printing and print capitalism,<sup>18</sup> the formation of the modern state institutions<sup>19</sup>, the undertaking of language as an object of science and a resource for intellectual and political discourses.<sup>20</sup> The highest level of authority and power in the modern era, the nation-state has taken the problem of language seriously from the very beginning and manipulated languages and language uses in the way to national identity construction.<sup>21</sup>

The western European nation-states transferred their experiences in language and culture administration to the colonies, as well, and created a colonial political culture in their imperial domains. As nationalism and modern-state formations are reproduced in non-European geographies, so were the corresponding politics of language. In 1960s and 1970s, the political interest in language policy and planning (LPP) was becoming globalized. In the center of the interest were the emerging nation-states, mostly established during the rapid decolonization process in Africa and Asia.

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<sup>15</sup> Neustupny 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Wright 2004 and 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Wright 2007, 165.

<sup>18</sup> Anderson 1991.

<sup>19</sup> Wright 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Crowley 1996; Neis 2006; and Patten 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Barbour & Carmichael 2000; and Joseph 2006.

There were two main sides of these planning attempts. On the one side were the political elites of these countries who inherited the European ideological legacies of state control of the linguistic domains. The other front of language planning process was formed by the language planners from the academic circles, who were, infused with the enthusiasm of modernization theories, believed that these new political settings promised a fertile domain in which linguistic and sociolinguistic theories would be assessed and put into practice.

Some issues were especially attractive. The choice of the official language was one of the main problems. Most decolonized polities were sociolinguistically complicated: there were the languages of the colonialists; the multilingual context of the society and a set of linguistic power relations pertaining to ethnic and class distinctions. Standardization and modernization of local languages were other hotspots, since a modern language was expected to satisfy the needs of a modern nation-state and country. The urge for language modernization was exhibited best in setting up educational language policies for the now-liberated members of these nations, in order to close the gap in the race for modernization.

However, theories emerging in the last quarter of the 20th century attacked fiercely on these types of Westernizationist and modernizationist attempts. The critique of the modernization theories in general were derived from dual sources of deconstructivism in the western political theory and the theories of post-colonialism. The tides of this critique also influenced classical LPP theory and practice. Sue Wright, in her review of language planning studies, similarly emphasizes that the concern for the

relationship between language and power relations was derived from the Critical Theory and postmodernism.<sup>22</sup>

The strong belief in the evolutionary progress of human societies that would bind them all, in the end, in the condition of modernity was among the pillars LPP research with modernizationist aspirations. Modernity was defined by the economic, political and cultural standards of the Western societies, of which national citizenship and modern bureaucratic formation of the state apparatus were held to be essential. Glyn Williams similarly argues that "... language planning emerged side by side with the theory of modernization which not only was closely integrated with a specific theoretical perspective (structural functionalism) but also involved a specific conception of the world. This world view involved dividing states into the modern and the traditional".<sup>23</sup>

Criticism of conceptual categorization of the modern and the traditional has also been coupled by the critique of modernity itself. Many scholars followed the Frankfurt School's disillusionment with modernity and the Enlightenment, especially that of Adorno and Horkheimer. Postmodern theories interrogated the institutions and technologies of modernity, and questioned to what extent modernity, as a discourse and practice, fulfilled its promise for the well-being and the development of humanity; and what it can further contribute.<sup>24</sup> Within the re-assessment of modernity, via its method and its content, none of the modern social and political formations were left out, including nationalism and language.

With respect to nationalism, a theoretical deconstruction of the modernist nationalist utopia was launched by those who successfully interpreted nationalism as an

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<sup>22</sup> Wright 2004, 165-172.

<sup>23</sup> Williams 1992, 124; cited in Blommaert J. 1996.

<sup>24</sup> Wright 2004.

invention of modernity, rather than a transcendental historical ideal.<sup>25</sup> However, for the issue of language, the deconstructivist attacks proved more subversive. The strongest criticism to the understanding of language as an object is studied, categorized and planned, appeared within anthropology, especially studies of linguistic anthropology. The nature of anthropological research and theory challenges established conceptions of social dynamics. Kroskrity identifies that there has been an increasing awareness in anthropological perspective to complement the microanalysis of language with —an understanding of how such patterns might be related to political-economic macro processes.<sup>26</sup> He describes how the 20th century linguistics mostly dealt with an amputated language, that is language removed from its social and political context and he marks the theoretical re-assessments to restore the relevance of contextual factors. Kroskrity refers, for example, to Irvine where she launches a socio-cultural emphasis as she concentrates on the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests.<sup>27</sup>

A series of reconsideration has also emerged about how language has become an instrument of politics and science. Among other philosophers, Foucault acknowledges the significance for modernity of the construction of language as a separate realm in the 17th century.<sup>28</sup> Bauman and Briggs similarly questioned the modern establishment of language as a discrete domain, and asked how language came into being.<sup>29</sup> Mühlhäusler joined this track with his claim that the notion of a language is a recent culture-specific

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<sup>25</sup> Gellner E. 1983; Hobsbawm E. J. 1993; Anderson 1991; Kroskrity V. 2000b.

<sup>26</sup> Kroskrity 2000a, 2

<sup>27</sup> Irvine 1989, 255.

<sup>28</sup> Foucault M. 2002; cited in Makoni & Pennycook, 2005, 145

<sup>29</sup> Baumann & Briggs 2003, 7

notion associated with the rise of European nation-states and the Enlightenment. The notion of a language makes little sense in most traditional societies.<sup>30</sup>

Similarly, Blommaert notes, language is a key ingredient of modernity and thus a rather recent construct.<sup>31</sup> He adds, "... but it has become the most widespread view of language both in popular and in scientific circles. Linguistics has contributed in no small degree to the cultural construction of language in general as a stable, individual mental object without context, and language and educational policies as well as larger nation-building programs have been deeply influenced by this ideology."<sup>32</sup>

Historians and sociologists approach to the linguistic dimensions of modernity, nationalism and the political. Anderson focused on this issue in relation with the emergence of nationalism and modern politics of language. He unearthed the association between nation building and language construction. Likewise, Blommaert confirmed that standardization of languages has been tied to the rise of nation-states and the concurrent project of modernity.<sup>33</sup> Glyn Williams described how, as a part of that project, language has been situated within an evolutionary view of progress, which is itself a central idea of the modernist thought.<sup>34</sup>

Among all, Bourdieu stands significantly distinctive in understanding and exposing the role of language in power relations.<sup>35</sup> Like Foucault, Bourdieu was also interested in how modern power relations are established, and through which dynamics they are maintained or subverted. In his analysis, the notion of symbolic power is

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<sup>30</sup> Mühlhäusler 2000, 358

<sup>31</sup> Blommaert 2006, 512

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Blommaert 1996.

<sup>34</sup> Williams 1992, 128.

<sup>35</sup> Wright 2004, 11

located at the center, defined as the power in constructing reality.<sup>36</sup> He further elaborates on reality, where he echoes Foucault's truth regimes: reality normalizes the social taxonomy of the social inequality (a process of legitimization of domination) naturalizes new configurations of power relations, and it subjugates the dominated. In this sense, symbolic power imposes systems of classifications, or hierarchies. His approach has challenged those of linguists with an understanding of language as a transcendental grammatical reality. Bourdieu criticized, for example, Chomsky's theory of universal language for ignoring the economic and social conditions of language and social laws of construction, and hence, for masking the social genesis of language.<sup>37</sup> A categorization of language, which had become of historical importance in the science of linguistics, Saussure's *langue* vs. *parole*, could not escape Bourdieu's critique, either.

Bourdieu emphasized the political unification of a language in the formation of modern official languages and during the incorporation of the vernaculars into the language of the political authority. Saussure's language as a category actually corresponds to official languages, according to Bourdieu. Subsequently, Bourdieu reversed one of the classical and popular assumptions about official languages and languages of the people. According to him, it is the politics of official language that has constructed the linguistic community as a group of people who use the same system of linguistic signs; and that such a construction has been a precondition for economic production and even for symbolic domination.<sup>38</sup>

Bourdieu's critical approach has inspired many scholars who reviewed, not only the actual relationships of politics and language, but also theoretical orientations that have had framed studies of those relationships.

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<sup>36</sup> Bourdieu 1991, 166

<sup>37</sup> Bourdieu 1991, 44.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

### 2.1.1. Minority Groups vs. Nation States

In traditional LPP literature, multilingual social settings, which were to be found in every nation-state, were found disruptive. They were the outward signs of multi-ethnic populations, therefore, in conflict with the project of modernization. Laitin summarizes the extent of the debate within the classical approach to LPP:

Ethnic heterogeneity is often portrayed as a powerful source of democratic instability, regional assertiveness, and civil war. In his classic essay on primordial conflict, Geertz (1973) sees it as a source of chronic tension in the postcolonial states after World War II. Dahl (1971) sees it as a serious constraint to the success of democracy. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model ethnic heterogeneity such that it leads in equilibrium to the breakdown of democratic regimes. Connor (1994) equates ethnic heterogeneity with higher probability for civil war. But not all studies link heterogeneity with unhappy outcomes. Lijphart (1977) for one showed the possibility for democracy (of the non-majoritarian sort) under conditions of cultural pluralism.<sup>39</sup>

The rise of the notion of minority rights has been another field that challenged the LPP researchers. While the focus in the traditional LPP studies was on the formation and the maintenance of the nation-state and its language policies, post-1980s were the times when the axes of the debates shifted. The emphases, since then, have been on the linguistic policies that would be produced to ensure the survival and the rights of the languages of minorities. Various new terminologies were developed, such as linguistic rights, linguistic human rights, linguistic discrimination, and linguistic genocide. Many scholars wrote extensively on how language politics of nation-states and colonial powers ended up with the destruction of languages of minorities, either in power or in number.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Laitin 2000, 142.

<sup>40</sup> See Atkins, 1978; Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994; Hamel, 1997; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000.



Contrary to the expectations towards the dissolution of nationalism in the post/late modern world, there is an apparent process of re-nationalization in the already established nation-states and a rise of ethnic nationalism by the sub-national minorities who seek autonomy or independence. Pleading for language rights or linguistic survival has been one of the pillars of these ethnic/national struggles. Besides the demands from existing minorities, new minorities are incessantly formed across world-geography due to the increased flow of individuals. The dislocation and relocation of masses due to civil wars, military occupations or oppression, poverty or streams of labor force doubles the linguistic challenges that countries and LPP researches face. As Heinrich concurs, “changing language regimes exert pressure on national languages. Their ideological assessment is affected because a growing number of new (foreign) speakers and their deviant language behavior serve as evidence as well as a source of change.”<sup>41</sup>

A remarkable point concerning the issues of minority language is that the very logic of the politics of language that nation-states have been employing now turned back onto themselves. That is, nation-states have built their own systems of language policies on the premise that every nation, as the political expression of a unique culture, represents itself exclusively with its unique language, its vital marker for identity. Hence, the nation-states have been assumed to uphold the right to pursue the development and practice of the language of the proclaimed nation.<sup>42</sup> However, the rising waves of nationalisms of ethnicities turned linguistic minorities of the nation-states into new nations, or they reclaimed their abused right to become one). The political actors of these nationalisms raised a similar demand, like that of the nation-state: the political independence or autonomy of the distinct linguistic/cultural community.

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<sup>41</sup> Heinrich 2005, 228.

<sup>42</sup> Barbour & Carmichael, 2000.

Coupled with the rise of equality and freedom of choice as basic values, at least in theory, the road to the recognition of the languages of autochthonous and immigrant minorities was drawn. Coulmas concludes that “thus, ironically, in combination with progressing democratization, monolingual language regimes have become instrumental in their own undoing. All Western countries are faced with increasing linguistic pluralism in urban centers and, calls for deregulation notwithstanding, feel compelled to introduce more language regulations targeted especially at immigrant communities”.<sup>43</sup> But how are these regulations institutionalized within the political system? To answer this question a clearer conceptualization of the language policy behavior of the state should be introduced. In this study Language Regime concept is used to investigate Turkish and French language policy in a more systematic way. In the next part Language Regime as the main theoretical concept will be defined and discussed with reference to the founders of the concept.

## **2.2. Language Regime**

In fact, the notion has already been used for some decades, however with a restricted scope. The political tensions concerning what language should be used in the services of schools, municipalities or governments of some states with multilingual populations were already on the rise in late 1960s and 1970s. Scholars, who were interested in language status problems in administration and education systems of multilingual social settings, used the notion of language regime to describe policies of official language. Main debates were about the ways to implement monolingual or bilingual language regimes in bureaucratic services and/or schools. Such studies focused on two major geographical areas where language regime debates were similarly

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<sup>43</sup> Coulmas, 2005, 12.

assessed: Canada with her francophone state, Quebec<sup>44</sup> and Belgium with her problems of regionalism between Flanders and Wallonia.<sup>45</sup>

These earliest uses of the notion of language regime should be evaluated within the theoretical framework of traditional LPP research and action. The concern in those studies was rather about maintaining the national unity than it was about cultural diversity. Both in Quebec and in the regions of conflict in Belgium, there were localities with populations in majority and who spoke languages other than the official language of the federal state. In the ideological climate of the world-wide decolonization process where political legitimacy of local majorities were celebrated, the main thrust of policies regarding language regimes was to preserve the status quo of the overarching political structure. In order to maintain the integrity of the polities, some of the linguistic minorities have been granted with rights to a certain extent. However, on the other hand, the policy makers were cautious about that any compromise in favor of linguistic rights would not trigger struggles of independence by the local majorities.

In the literature up to the 1990s, a clear definition of what a language regime is had not been offered. It was rather used in line with the concept of political regimes, in the ideological atmosphere of Cold War, where macro nation-state politics were classified as regimes: liberal/capitalist/democratic or totalitarian/socialist/communist. A regime was, then, taken to be the totality of basic premises according to which a government administered the political unit.

In 1991, Jonathan Pool offers the first clear definition for a language regime. Pool identifies a language policy as “the set of official languages and the tax schedule”,

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<sup>44</sup> See Pharand 1968, 269; Rowat 1968, 353; Smiley 1978, 204; and Esman 1982, 234.

<sup>45</sup> See Stephenson 1972, 513; Dunn 1974, 147; Geiger 1980, 260; and Halls 1983, 175.

and language regime as “a rule [that is] producing a language policy”<sup>46</sup>, or “as a set of official languages and a set of rules permitting complete mutual comprehension in a “deliberation” among representatives of language groups.”<sup>47</sup> Pool’s aim is to work out a proposal for a model to overcome the efficiency-fairness dilemma that arises in governance of multilingual societies. The peak point of that dilemma is about determining the official language(s) of a polity and Pool exclusively focuses on that problem. Pool, therefore, first defines what he called as the “official language problem”: a set of language policy choices that have particular consequences and that are subject to particular normative criteria.<sup>48</sup> In addition to fairness and efficiency, there are a large number of norms inhabited by various solutions to the official language problem. Pool gives an account of these norms:

... authenticity (favoring indigenous languages), uniformity (favoring only one language), diversity (favoring multiple languages), distinctiveness (favoring languages unique to the community), universality (favoring languages known by outsiders), stability (favoring existing language rights and statuses), radicality (using language policy to liberate oppressed groups), definitiveness (avoiding linguistic options), liberty (noncoercion), modernization (favoring languages with developed lexicons and literatures), populism (favoring mass over elite languages), prestige (recognizing already-high-status languages), antibossism (discouraging powerful linguistic intermediaries), and tolerability (avoiding policies that would induce emigration or secession)...<sup>49</sup>

Based on these normative premises, states and institutions determine their language regimes. He emphasizes the functions of a regime; of which inputs would be linguistic facts, such as the numbers and the size of language groups, and output to be a language policy that would ensure both justice and efficiency. He proposes ten possible models and compares them with respect to their power in efficiency and political

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<sup>46</sup> Pool 1991, 499.

<sup>47</sup> Pool 1996, 159.

<sup>48</sup> Pool 1991, 497.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

fairness. Pool later develops his definition, in another article in 1996. The writer, here too, is primarily interested in the politics of official languages, this time for the European Union. He identifies two possibilities of linguistic regimes for the Union:

“The prevailing conditions in the EU create a clear choice between two families of language regimes. One family satisfies the professed norm of equal language treatment by making either none or all of the groups' languages official. The other family, by making only the largest languages official, systematizes the common EU practice of sacrificing language equality for cost reduction”.<sup>50</sup>

Similar to his work in 1991, Pool compares alternative regimes. Here, he extends his discussion of language regimes and defines two dimensions of them: (a) a set of official languages and (b) a set of rules governing their use.<sup>51</sup> With such a description, he aims at disabling any reductionism regarding a language regime. He warns that:

“The official languages of an institution do not completely define its language regime. Two institutions with different official languages must have different language regimes, but two institutions with the same official languages need not have the same language regime. Nor do the rules governing the use of official languages completely define a language regime. For example, two institutions that both require all official communication to take place in a single official language still have different language regimes if their official languages differ. Likewise, if either the official languages or the rules change, the language regime changes.”<sup>52</sup>

Pool develops the span of a language regime, on the one hand, with the composition of official languages and their respective consequences on the linguistic communities, and, on the other hand, with the variety of rules with which the chosen languages are managed. The management is, basically, about the way the institutions

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<sup>50</sup> Pool, 1996, 159.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 164.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

the official languages employed are run, such as those of education, bureaucracy, or other offices of the state.

Pool's approach is institution-centered and clearly functionalist. He is more interested in the ways in which language regimes are utilized and how they function. A language regime, accordingly, is presented as a possible project of a government, or of a governing body such as the European Union, shaped by its political motives and morality. In this sense, Pool understands a language regime as a governmental practice, a matter of choice and political vision. Pool's early attempt of defining what language regime is, therefore, limited in its power of explanation with respect to the power relations that generate those language regimes and that the latter transform.

Pool emphasizes that it is a characteristic feature of the macro social and political establishments to develop some sort of a language regime. He notes that for a polity, indifference to religious or racial diversities, for example, is a possibility. However, it has to choose and use language(s), and the choice is inevitably political in its nature, regarding the institution's authority over related social networks of power.<sup>53</sup>

Florian Coulmas, a scholar who has utilized the concept of language regime with wider implications, joins Pool at this point: —Some states limit their attention to instrumental aspects, while others also take an interest in aesthetic and symbolic functions of language. However, all states have a language regime, which finds expression in the allocation of various statuses to the languages used within their territories.<sup>54</sup> Another functional definition, proposed by David D. Laitin, will be examined now, as it stands closer to that of Pool in terms of its empirical methodology and its focus on officialdom.

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<sup>53</sup> Pool 1991, 496.

<sup>54</sup> Coulmas 1998, 66.

Laitin (1992) offered a categorization of states based on the language repertoires that are necessary for citizens of any state to assure them a wide range of mobility opportunities within domestic political, economic, and social institutions. For him, “a categorization of “language regimes” can be derived based on the notion of necessary (and normatively valued) language repertoire.”<sup>55</sup> In his article dated 2000 where he utilizes the notion of language regime, Laitin discusses the ways in which language communities could be indexed. His distinction is based on the number of languages in a political territory, which are either officialized or crucial for social or economic mobility. In line with his aim, he distinguishes two forms of language regimes: (a) rationalized language regimes and (b) multilingual regimes.<sup>56</sup>

For the first type of language regimes, Laitin derives the notion of rationalization from Max Weber’s *Economy and Society* and redefines it for his purpose.<sup>57</sup> Rationalization, the authoritative imposition of a single language for educational and administrative communications, is a concept borrowed from Max Weber, who used the term to refer to modern state practices of standardization and bureaucratization. A common currency, a common legal system, and a unified tax code are all examples of rationalization, as would be a common administrative language.<sup>58</sup>

The second type of language regimes, multilingualism, is identified with respect to the states that are not able to pursue a single-language policy, for one reason or another. Laitin further categorizes each type of language regimes with reference to how they were achieved. He identifies three ways for realizing rationalized language regimes. Firstly, rationalization through the recognition of a lingua franca occurs when

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<sup>55</sup> Laitin 1992, quoted in Laitin 2000.

<sup>56</sup> Laitin 2000, 151.

<sup>57</sup> Weber 1968.

<sup>58</sup> Laitin, 2000, 151

there is a language spoken widely and understood practically universally within the boundaries of a state, but this language is not associated as the mother tongue of a significant language-group living within that state. His examples are Swahili in Tanzania, Bahasa in Indonesia, and English in the U.S.

Secondly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a majority group takes place when a dominant language group [has and practices] the power to impose its standard on a wider society as happened in France for French, in China for Han Chinese and in Japan for Kyotsugo Japanese. And thirdly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a minority group is the last type of outcome as in the rationalization of Spanish by Mestizos in South America, Halle Selassie's policy to impose Amharic on Ethiopia, and Afrikaner attempts to make Afrikaans the rationalized language of South Africa.<sup>59</sup>

Concerning multilingual regimes, Laitin defines two distinguished sets. Firstly, multilingual regimes with individual multilingual repertoires involve the development of different language repertoires that are required by distinct functional domains. These different domains might include “official regional affairs, economic exchange in large businesses, for official business with the central state, for local services such as hospitals and primary schools”.<sup>60</sup> Laitin’s frequently referred and quoted model of multilingual regime is derived from Indian case:

In India there is a well-established (but not formally recognized) 3 ± 1 language regime. Here, Indians with aspirations for a wide range of mobility opportunities must know Hindi (the language of much popular culture and some state documents), English (the language of the higher civil service and big business), and the state language (used for most state services and education). This is a three-language formula. For those who live in a state

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.



where Hindi or English is the state language, only two (3-1) languages are necessary for one's repertoire. For those who are minorities within states where Hindi and English are not state languages, and seek minority rights, their people need to know four (3+1) languages – English, Hindi, the state language, and their minority language.<sup>61</sup>

His second type of multilingualism is achieved through pillarization. In this regime, there is no necessity for individuals, even if they pursue social or mobility, to be multilingual. However, the political organization itself is multilingual: Each region under pillarization has equal rights to write laws, to impart education, and to administer society in its own language. There is no necessity for a citizen living in one pillar to learn the language spoken in regions of the other pillars, but there is a minimal level of bilingualism for those who develop a specialty in all-pillar governance. Laitin's examples for this category are Switzerland and Belgium.

Laitin's work is policy oriented and, as described above, it aims to create a model with empirical indices and well-defined categories. He is not interested in the political dimension, if not in consequences, of the establishment of rationalized or multilingual language regimes. Hence political processes involved in making a lingua franca or minority language the only official one, for example, or of what reconfiguration of power relations such rationalization or multilingualism results in have not been taken into consideration in his work. Like Jonathan Pool, Laitin gives clear definitions of language regimes and explains their various implementations. The works of both authors are confined mostly to polities and the way states organize the use of language(s) at the official level. Their common approach is institution-centered and they hardly attempt to discover relations of symbolic power that any language

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 151-152.

regime generates. Their theoretical preferences stems from their interest to build up practical solutions for linguistic conflicts at the official level.

The study of politics of language closely depends on how political is defined. In the classical sense, politics is relevant to sphere of action of governments, states and other actors associated with governance. This particular definition of politics narrows the conceptual universe of the notion with a bias towards institutional configurations. Within this conceptual framework, a study of language politics and language regimes would be focused, fundamentally, on the actions, practices or programs of the governmental bodies.

However, there is another approach in political philosophy, which associates politics with broader relations of power. Accordingly, in this approach, politics as a noun turns into an adjective as the political, marking a state of affairs. Mouffe elaborates as “the political designates the potential antagonisms inherent in human relations and can manifest itself in many different social relations. Politics, for its part, indicates the ensemble of discourses, institutions and practices which aim at establishing an order; at organizing human coexistence, in a context that is always conflictual because of the presence of the political”.<sup>62</sup> Here, politics is considered intrinsic to human social relations, which involve intersecting arrays of discourses and practices of power. Such an expanded understanding of the political takes the concept beyond organized competition for access to institutions of power, as in party politics, or beyond the practices of domination exerted by macro bodies of governance.

Such an opening of the concept of the political also transforms the way language politics is understood. To consider the issue of language in society as an issue of

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<sup>62</sup> Mouffe 2005, 8.

dynamic power regimes rather than a problematic of institutional politics also empowers the attempt to understand and explain language in society.

### 2.3. Dynamics of Language Regime

In this part, the objective is the systematic presentation of Language Policy dynamics that the author will analyze for each selected case. In the first part minority group oriented factors are presented. These factors create the first pillar of the path towards policy change. Unlike what is presented in the literature mostly, this thesis claims that the involvement of minority groups and state actors are mutually necessary to create policy change. To prove this claim that this thesis puts forward, many alternative factors can be proposed to explore the different policy outcomes that both countries have experienced regarding their linguistic minority groups. Followings are the central arguments that will be explored with regard to the evolution of language polices in both countries. While different factors will be presented in the following lines, this does not mean that either one of them will be the only explanatory one among the others. The following arguments are presented to make preliminary assumptions about a possible pattern that include different factors, which influence policy evolution together.

**Figure 2: Dynamics of Language Policy**

<b>Minority-oriented Factors</b>	<b>State-oriented Factors</b>
<i>Political Participation</i>	<i>Political Hegemony</i>
<i>Securitization</i>	<i>Counterelite</i>
<i>Transnational Actors</i>	<i>New Discourse</i>

As seen in the table, dynamics of language policy is separated into two main categories to analyze these factors more systematically. In the first category presented in the following part, minority group centered dynamics of policy are presented. These factors mostly function as the means for politicization of the demands of minority groups because linguistic minorities have mobilized their demands in certain conditions and certain ways. In the following part, I discuss different arguments about the creation and success of minority mobilization that lead to political initiative by the state. Then in the second category, state oriented factors of policy change are discussed to explain the conditions through which minority demands are translated into policy initiative. The purpose of this two-pillared perspective is to propose a policy process that involves both state and the minority group. Minority activism is not enough to create policy change without political support from the ruling government, but also official state ideology does not create incentive for policy change without an explicit demand from the minority group. Under the lights of this argumentative framework, the dynamics of policy will be discussed in this part, but the detailed discussions about each argument with empirical evidence will be presented in the empirical chapters reserved to each case country.

### **2.3.1. Minority-oriented Dynamics of Language Regime**

It is widely accepted in the minority rights literature that certain conditions create and sustain contemporary ethnic demands, and minority activism politicizes the demands of these groups.<sup>63</sup> But in what conditions do these demands are translated into policy agenda is an important question to study. A preliminary look at the selected cases proposes that the existence of demands for language rights does not create policy change which can be seen in the French case. However, it also does not explain why the

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<sup>63</sup> Connor 1972; Young 1976; Esman 1977; Smith 1979; Enloe 1973, 1980.

demands of Kurdish minorities are reflected in the policy reforms. Therefore, there should be some factors that create the necessary conditions for policy initiative by the government. In this part, minority oriented factors are presented.

### **2.3.1.1. Minority Activism**

Active *participation* of linguistic minorities in politics is another factor that should be considered within this linguistic rights issue. Minority mobilization and political activism of minority groups directly affect the politicization of their demands and increase the possibility of political action.<sup>64</sup> In Turkey, there has been a continuous effort from the Kurdish minority to become an active part of politics. Party politics in Turkey has been very conflictual considering the history of minority parties that represent the Kurdish population in the country. Although participation and representation has become more available and significant in the Turkish case, the conflict among the political parties on policy making is not solved yet. However, increasing availability of participation of the Kurdish population in the political arena presents a direct link with the developments in language policies.<sup>65</sup> In France, the participation of the parties representing the minority groups remained marginal compared to the Turkish case. Parties representing linguistic minority groups like *Corsica Libera*, Party of the Corsican Nation, *Union Démocratique Bretonne* and *Abertzaleen Batasuna* have a very limited role in the political arena.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, the impact of political organizations and parties that represent minority groups is an important factor within this issue. In the empirical part of the thesis, this argument is analyzed by exploring the minority parties, minority groups involved in politics and minority movements will be explored. Within the case analysis the effects of the

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<sup>64</sup> Weller and Nobbs 2010.

<sup>65</sup> Watts 1999.

<sup>66</sup> Ager 1999.

minority parties, organizations and the minority movements led by the proponents of the minority languages are discussed with reference to the reactions from the French and Turkish governments.

### **2.3.1.2. Securitization**

*Securitization* is another important component in minority politics. Minority issues are considered as a security problem in many cases and the policies towards minority groups. Securitization of ethnic relations limits the possibility of granting rights and provisions towards minority groups because the presence of minority groups is considered as a matter of security rather than as an issue to be debated democratically.<sup>67</sup> Kymlicka also outlines the possible results of such perspective with the limited minority self-organization, limited freedoms to the political representations of minority groups and limited available means to raise the demands of minority groups publicly.<sup>68</sup> Rather than securing the rights of minority groups, states can decide to secure the unity in the country if a security threat from the minority groups is perceived. As the conflict between the state and linguistic minority groups can be traced in both France and Turkey, the magnitude of threat perceived from the minority groups can present a consistent argument against the freedoms granted to the minority groups. Whether there is a security threat, a separation movement or a terrorist group is present, this will increase the likelihood of securitization measures that states impose against minority groups. In the Turkish case Kurdish terrorist organization PKK can present an ideal example for this. Records of such activities in line with the timeline of the policy dynamics should be taken into account to present a consistent result of such an argument.

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<sup>67</sup> Waever 1995.

<sup>68</sup> Kymlicka 2002.

### 2.3.1.3. Role of Transnational Actors

Role of *transnational actors* and the available means for minority groups to raise their demands beyond the limits of state has become very important for both states as the pressures of European Union upon member and candidate countries to regulate their legal systems according to the international norms increased the anti-assimilationist demands among minority groups. While there has not been a systematic influence exerted by the EU institutions, the normative power and the conditionality factor create a framing affect about human rights and more specifically minority rights have been accepted by many scholars writing on this issue<sup>69</sup>. The EU funded organizations around linguistic minorities and the non-governmental actors beyond the state level can be counted as an external factor behind policy change. While an empirical study on the transnational and international actors does not go beyond the formal institutional level, the existence of these actors that recognize the existence of such minority groups challenge the legitimacy of state policies in anti-ethnic regimes. The international mobilization of the linguistic minorities (mostly because these minority groups are located in different countries rather than one) can be considered as an external factor, mainly because the availability of international channels that linguistic minorities can voice their demands outside of state borders becomes an effective tool for these groups to mobilize beyond the national territory and increase the legitimacy of international pressure upon states to change policy discourse.<sup>70</sup>

Transnational media networks, international research institutes and such can be included in these transnational opportunity channels<sup>71</sup>. While the impact of such organizations and mobilizations can be questioned, the diaspora activities initiated by

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<sup>69</sup> Kubicek 2005, Hughes and Sasse 2003, Uçarlar 2009.

<sup>70</sup> Sikkink 2002, 43

<sup>71</sup> Meyer and Marullo 1992, 110.

minority groups and their voice in the international legal context should not be underestimated. The existence of international courts and the responsibility of nation states against these institutions have had an important influence both on domestic and on foreign affairs of states as there have been many cases in which states have confronted with the members of minority groups who seek for their rights. Lastly, the international documents that promote recognition of linguistic rights will be evaluated within Turkish and French case because the existence of documents and agreements like Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), and Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights have been an important part of the linguistic minority activism where these documents are used as a means to achieve the recognition of minority languages in the official domain.<sup>72</sup>

In this part, minority oriented dynamics of language regime changes are discussed. These elements are necessary for creating a policy agenda on language policy that acknowledges minority language rights in a country. In the following part, state-oriented dynamics of language regime are explored before going into the empirical part of this study.

### **2.3.2. State Oriented Dynamics of Policy Change**

Aktürk's (2011) theory on regimes of ethnicity influenced my perspective about the effect of state actors on policy change. His theory on ethnicity regime changes explains the dynamics of ethnic regime transformations in Turkey, Germany and Soviet Union/Post-Soviet Russia.<sup>73</sup> The main argument presented in the paper is that "the persistence and change in ethnicity regimes is based on the interdependence of

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<sup>72</sup> Hughes and Sasse 2003, 23.

<sup>73</sup> Aktürk, 2011.



three elements, as follows: *counterelites*, once armed with a *new discourse* on ethnicity and nationality and assuming *hegemonic political power*, can bring about change in the ethnicity regimes.”<sup>74</sup> Ethnic regime change only occurs when these three factors emerge in favor of the demands for the change of the ethnic regime.<sup>75</sup> As Aktürk also recognizes, this regime changes are not entire change of an ethnic or a language regime as changing even one policy that points to a big impact on the political structure in a country is very hard to achieve<sup>76</sup> and requires a long term evolution. Starting from this perspective, a similar theory is applied to the language regime change in this thesis.

### **2.3.2.1. Counterelite**

Counterelite is defined as “is the political elite that is linked with, and representative of, constituents with ethnically specific grievances against the continuation of the ethnicity regime” by Aktürk.<sup>77</sup> In a similar fashion, *Counterelite* is considered as the political elite that proposes a discourse against the existing language regime. The existence of counterelite will be investigated through political parties that express grievances against the monolingual regime present in France and Turkey. Minority parties constitute the best examples of these kinds of organisms within the political system as their ideology and discourse explicitly defends linguistic rights. However, the existence of such a party is not enough most of the time as the possibility of minority parties to acquire necessary political support is very low most of the time. Still, such parties perform well in the politicization of the demands of minority groups, and frame the debated and political agenda. In this context, counterelite will be

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<sup>74</sup> Aktürk, 133.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Aktürk, 123.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

discussed by referring to the political discourse that political parties propose within the political spectrum present in each country.

### **2.3.2.2. Linguistic Hegemony and New Discourse on Language Ideology**

*Linguistic hegemony* established by the nation states is an important aspect of the issue as the underlying structure of the constitutional frame shaping the content of the use of language and the recognition of minority groups represent a strong relation with the policy history.<sup>78</sup> Nation-building process requires an official language as discussed above, and these official languages become a part of the national identity. France and Turkey had a similar experience in terms of the language as the core element of the nation building. Both in France and Turkey the unitary context of the policy mechanisms present a logical picture for the existing language policy content in France and it can be observed in the evolution of new language policy debates in the Turkish case. In both countries the hegemony of the official language has long been established and became one of the most important symbols of national identity. The impact of linguistic hegemony is an important factor for both cases that could hinder the positive opening of policy mechanisms, and this factor is expected to create a negative effect for policy reforms in linguistic rights.<sup>79</sup> To understand the impact of this ideological context, the alignment of ruling party on the language rights issue can be a useful tool to trace the context behind the language mechanisms.

This static form of monolingual structure of the language ideology can be broken at the state level with a *new discourse on language* ideology adopted by a counterelite, as Aktürk claims that a *new discourse* on ethnic regime that proposed by a *counterelite* is necessary for regime change. In this thesis, *new discourse* is interpreted

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<sup>78</sup> May 2001, 153.

<sup>79</sup> May 2001;Shohamy 2006; Kymlicka and Patten 2003.

as a new outlook, introduced by the counterelite, against the existing language regime and acknowledges the existence of the pluralistic language structure in the country and more importantly acts as the most important agent to transform the demands of minority groups into policy. The expectation would be that when nationalist tendencies rise, it increases the likelihood of negative or no policy change.<sup>80</sup> However, if a counterelite emerges and acquires the necessary political support, the linguistic demands of the minority groups can be a part of the political agenda. This argument includes different aspects of context of the language policies as both party programs and the election results will be analyzed to explore the arguments presented.

### **2.3.2.3. Political Hegemony**

*Hegemonic political power* is used as the same with Aktürk's account to explain the official political power that can produce policy change within the democratic system. Political power is necessary to establish a language regime and also it is crucial for a regime change as political hegemony grants democratic power to a party to exert a specific set of ideological input to the political system. Regime change, as Aktürk claims, "does not come about with razor-thin majorities".<sup>81</sup> Counterelite should acquire a political power that would constitute the majority in the political system to change policy against the opposition.

## **2.4. Conclusion**

Various discussion and theoretical debates presented in this chapter create the basis for the empirical research conducted for Turkey and France to explain policy change and structural variance in both cases. Language Policy and Planning literature has established different perspectives about the creation of language regimes mostly

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<sup>80</sup> Fishman 1972; Wright 2000, 2004; Barbour and Carmichael 2000.

<sup>81</sup> Aktürk, 134.

accompanied by the nation-state building. Language politics in Turkey and France have been studied in different ways, but there has not been a systematic study on policy change that includes different stages of policy agenda creation and policy change as the outcome. Therefore, with the theoretical foundation presented in this chapter, this thesis attempts to explore the reasons of policy change in Turkey and persistence of rationalized monolingual language policy in France.

In this chapter Language Regime is presented as the core concept to analyze the way states institutionalize their policy on linguistic diversity. The concept is very useful in order to understand the political system that produces language policies and laws that regulate linguistic relations among the population. Moreover, to explain the dynamics of Language Regimes, I presented a set of variables that directly impact policy making. These factors are grouped into two, which also present the functioning of the process of language policy change. In order to observe a change in official policy of the state, the theoretical framework proposes that minority group activism, desecuritization of the minority issue, and the involvement of transnational actors is necessary to create and politicize the demands of minority groups in the first place. When these factors are together present in a country, the demands of minority groups on linguistic rights translate into political agenda. However, this process should also be accompanied by the necessary political support that can produce policy outcome. This two-pillared analysis will reveal the reasons behind the variance between Turkey and France through a comparative historical analysis.

In the following two chapters, language laws and policies in France and Turkey are presented. For each case, the policies are analyzed, an historical and present status of minority groups is discussed and selected cases are analyzed according to the arguments and theoretical framework. These two chapters will present the reasons

behind the Language Regime transformation in Turkey and persistence of French dominant language regime in France.

## CHAPTER 3

### LANGUAGE POLICY AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN FRANCE

#### 3.1. Introduction

With one of the most multicultural populations in Europe, language policy in France presents a very complex picture in terms of laws and policies targeted to each language community. The history of regional minorities and their languages follows different pathways with regard to mobilization, political participation, and language maintenance efforts. This variety among the regional minority groups has been both a difficulty and advantage while studying the French case. Language regime in France has been monolingual since the creation of the nation and this persistence creates curiosity regarding the important variety of languages spoken in the country. Today there are over 24 languages spoken in France, but the constitution only recognizes French as the language of the nation.<sup>82</sup> Considering this setting, the persistence of monolingual language regime in France makes it an interesting case to study. Within the theoretical questions directed before, French case represent persistence in language regime as the presence of a large number of linguistic minorities in the country has not produced a change monolingual structure of language policy. However, the main objective of the following account of the language policy and linguistic minorities in France is to answer the question of why monolingual language regime in France has been persistent while the linguistic variety in the country points to a need for a change.

The aim of this chapter is to present the background of the language policy in France, along the lines of how linguistic minority activism among Bretons, Basques,

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<sup>82</sup> Lewis 2009.

Occitans and Corsicans has been evolving as an outcome of both the demands of language rights and the language policies imposed by the French state. Furthermore, the political context within which language policy in the country is discussed to present the language policy content and the historical evolution of language policy. By discussing both minority and the state side of the issue, this chapter will provide the empirical analysis of language regime argument provided earlier in this thesis. French case present the persistence of language regime with the monolingual language regime prevalent in the country from the foundation of the French state although there have been various challenges to this structure. Therefore French case provides a good point to exemplify when and in what conditions challenges to language regime fail to produce a change that recognize minority languages.

In this chapter, first a brief history of language policy in France is presented by relating the policies to the general situation about the linguistic minorities in the country. In the following parts, Breton, Basque, Occitan and Corsican minorities are discussed in line with the minority oriented factors within the framework of the larger theoretical context. In the last part, the political context in the country is evaluated to see how dynamics of language regime function in terms of state-oriented arguments on the dynamics of language regime and results in the persistence of the monolingual language regime in the French case.

### **3.2. Language Laws and Policies in France**

Before going into the contemporary language policy in France, it is useful to look at the historical structure of the language regime in the country. After France became unified under François I in the early 1500's, each region in the country used its own vernacular and Latin served as the official administrative language in many areas.

Timm says that “as early as the tenth century, only French was spoken in the chateaux, and French was, at that time, too, the official language of administrative and court matters.”<sup>83</sup> François, in an attempt to unify the territory under his control, issued the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 that installed French (as opposed to Latin) as the official language of government, as written and oral communications. Despite this imposition, the use of vernacular continued unabated throughout France through the 16th and 17th centuries. French remained the language of the elite and the language of government, but most citizens, especially those in rural areas, had no need to speak French, and that posed no problem to the government.

The discourse at the national level would change along with the revolution in 1789; the rise of a central state in Paris that had a stronger conception of national identity flourished with the emergence of Jacobinism. Ensuring that France had but one language for one nation became a top priority of the new government, and as such the government developed a policy that was extremely hostile towards the usage of regional languages. Stigmatization of regional languages thus occurred at the official level in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s. Many scholars have linked the French obsession with its central state and central identity to a fear of instability that recognition of internal diversity would bring.<sup>84</sup> Dealing with the *de facto* conditions of diversity within a given national space while dealing with *de jure* equality is a tension that the French state has fought for hundreds of years and continues to fight to this day, as McDonald observes:

“France has also tried to define its way over the same period through two monarchies, one consulate, two empires, five republics, one definitive revolution, the Paris Commune, the Vichy regime, and May 1968. Faced with this succession of external threat and internal upheaval, Paris has

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<sup>83</sup> Timm 1973.

<sup>84</sup> Ager 1999, Wright 2010, Hornsby 2010.



never been sufficiently sure of the integrity of France to wish into existence other identities within it.”<sup>85</sup>

It is logical, as Varaut argues that linguistic xenophobia would follow such concerns.<sup>86</sup> McDonald notes that “French has since [1789] been regularly invoked, internally and externally, as the face of France and of Frenchness itself.”<sup>87</sup> However, for the government, though, France was not sufficiently modernized for a governmental position to exclude the regional languages effectively at the time of the revolution. France did not have mandatory education until much later on, and as such could only truly force citizens to use French in rare, specific situations when they had to deal directly with the government. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence of governmental oppression of regional languages, for example, a representative of the Côtes-du-Nord wrote in a letter to the Minister of Public Education in 1846 that said “Il faut détruire le langage breton”.<sup>88</sup>

From the information presented above, it can be concluded that the nature of the language regime in France has had a monolingual structure with strict practical and ideological support from the establishment of French state. While maintaining such a structure was easier in the earlier periods, the rising awareness for the minority rights has changed the equilibrium, within which state established its relations with the minority groups. In the following section language laws and policies in France before 1990’s will be discussed. The reason for such a periodization is that the nature of language policies before 1990s presents a different picture from the last two decades in terms of how language politics are structured according to the ruling parties. While post-1990 governments have been dominated by the right parties and presidents, the

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<sup>85</sup> McDonald, 1989, 2.

<sup>86</sup> Varaut 2001.

<sup>87</sup> McDonald 1989, 5.

<sup>88</sup> “It is necessary to destroy the Breton language.” Jones 1999, 68.

electoral tendencies in earlier periods were more close to the Socialist Party and its candidates.

### **3.2.1 Language Laws and Policies in France Before 1990s**

Although the demands of linguistic minorities in France dates back to a much earlier time, the temporal scope of this thesis starts in 1975 when Bas-Lauriol law,<sup>89</sup> as an attempt to protect French language and culture against the domination of English, also indirectly prohibited the use of minority languages. This law was the first breaking point for the French case because the earlier periods presented a more permissive environment for the linguistic minorities as limited educational rights were given for optional training in minority languages but only as language courses. However, earlier language policy can be helpful to understand the change in the direction of the perspective on regional languages.

The most important law regarding the regional languages in France earlier than the 1970s was the 1951 Deixonne law,<sup>90</sup> which was a ground breaking achievement for minority groups in terms of the educational rights that it granted to linguistic minorities. It was the first time for French government to initiate the integration of local dialects into local school curricula. Although education was still in French, the government provided funding for language classes for these languages. After Deixonne Law was introduced in 1951, minority languages acquired some educational rights, but as the official status of these languages was not protected by the law, the future of these languages was not protected at all.<sup>91</sup> When in 1951 the Deixonne Law was passed, it applied to four languages: Breton, Basque, Catalan, and Occitan. It was extended to Corsican in 1974. The Deixonne Law was reaffirmed by legislation in 1975 that

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<sup>89</sup> Blackwood 2008, 57.

<sup>90</sup> Ager 1996, 68.

<sup>91</sup> Migge and Leglise 2010, 108.

declared that instruction in the regional languages and cultures may be offered at all levels of schooling. Since 1951 a variety of additional documents have extended and defined the scope of the Deixonne Law, which now applies to the teaching of regional cultures in all of France and not just in the areas that possess a different language.

Furthermore, it has been specified in the Law that wherever different dialects of a language exist, teaching of the language should be based on the local dialect and spelling, even though this may arguably lead to linguistic disunity.<sup>92</sup> In primary education, one hour a week can be devoted to the teaching of regional languages, within a pre-specified area of the syllabus, provided there is a demand expressed by the parents concerned and the class has been approved. Although the law is still in action, not much improvement about the sustainability of the regulations has been achieved. Therefore, the demands of linguistic minorities were met at the level of language maintenance (whether this statement is true which should be discussed in detail), which obviously required some educational arena for the new generations to learn these languages, but the maintenance efforts were not productive as the government could not create sustainable programs for these languages. Moreover, there has been no similar initiative from the French state after this law. While there is not an equivalent in the Turkish case, still this law did not signal a language regime change as the monolingual regime was not challenged even by this law.

The Toubon Law of 1994 was a revision to a similar 1975 law and was intended to be an improvement on it. Broadly speaking, the 1975 Bas-Lauriol Law required the use of French in the following domains:

-transactions and advertising relating to goods and services;

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<sup>92</sup> Mendel 2004, 71.

- job advertisements and contracts;
- signs in public places, public services, etc.;
- contracts with companies or public bodies;
- on radio and TV, unless the programs were intended for foreigners.<sup>93</sup>

The law was supported by the defenders of 'pure' French and its official title was 'Maintenance of the Purity of the French Language'. The law was not primarily targeted to regional languages, but it was mainly the result of the increasing use of English, which could cause erosions in French. While the 'purity' of French was at stake, the main aim of this attempt was not to cleanse the French language aesthetically, but to protect French consumers, workers and tax-payers from the hazards of foreign words which had expanded into the jargon of public services such as transport, employment contracts and commerce, as well as spoken and written advertising.<sup>94</sup> Here, it should be noted that the law itself did not refer to the regional languages or explicitly restrict the use of these languages, but the efforts that aimed at maintain the purity of French inevitably affected the use of regional languages, which did not have an official status already because regional languages were situated as foreign languages in the constitution.

While the course of language policies before 1990s presents a diverse picture in terms of the tendencies of the central government towards minority languages, none of the governments achieved to create a more inclusive structure for language politics during this period. The dominance of French in the legal and political texts shows that the language minorities within the French population did not have the opportunity to be a part of the legal and political system. While there were some provisions granted to the

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<sup>93</sup> Landick 2000, 132.

<sup>94</sup> Grigg 1997, 372.

regional languages, no substantive and effective language policy was created. Compared to the Turkish case, French language policies resembled to the traditional attitude of Turkish government towards linguistic minorities before the legal and cultural opening took place in the early 2000s.

### **3.2.2. Linguistic Laws and Policies in France Since 1990s**

The first language policy in this period was the 1992 amendment to the Constitution, which represented the change in the language perception of the French state and reinforced protective attitude towards French as the national language. This 1992 amendment to the French Constitution added the line “the language of the Republic is French” to the article describing the symbols of the nation.<sup>95</sup> Maatta argues that during the debates about the amendment, in spite of the reactions from the supporters of minority languages (which mostly belonged to the leftist parties as there were no minority representatives), the Senate pronounced that mentioning regional languages was unnecessary because it was well known that France was committed to respect regional languages and cultures.<sup>96</sup> In addition, another interesting remark was the claim that the defense of the right to use regional languages was contrary to human rights, thus only centralized language policy would guarantee democracy and equal rights for each citizen.<sup>97</sup> Such ideologies were built in the language laws of the revolutionary period, in which regional languages were linked with counterrevolution, religious fervor, and backwardness. While no apparent minority groups were a part of counterrevolutionaries, the discourse on unity around one single language framed these groups into such role. And while the Revolution did not kill regional languages, the

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<sup>95</sup> Loi constitutionnelle no. 92554, 1992: Article 2. For the English translation of the French Constitution, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp>

<sup>96</sup> Maatta 2005, 172.

<sup>97</sup> Marek 1996, 343.

reiteration of monolingual ideologies in later laws and practices reinforced them and was a major factor leading to the decline of regional languages.<sup>98</sup> As a result, these policies further diminished the number of monolingual speakers of regional languages left in France as will be mentioned in the following parts.

The 1992 amendment of the Constitution was followed by the Toubon Law<sup>99</sup> required the compulsory use of French in most official domains and replaced the previous legislation, which became unnecessary due to the constitutional amendment and the development of organizations that promote French language in the areas that the Bas-Lauriol law mentioned. On the one hand, the Toubon Law reiterated most of the provisions of previous language laws by stating that only French should be used in most official contexts, on the other it qualified the French language as “a key element in the personality and the heritage of France”.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the law reiterated and specified the position granted to French in the amended Constitution.

While the use of French language and the battle against the dominance of English in France was secured by these laws and amendments, the demands for the use of regional languages even in the regions where these languages are dominantly spoken<sup>101</sup> was not a matter to discuss. The Toubon Law was followed by a reaction both in France and abroad; French media labeled it as an ineffective tool for fighting against English.<sup>102</sup> However, another aspect of the law attracted the attention in most of the debates in the Parliament and it was the regional languages, and the concerns were about the lack of freedom and rights accorded to the regional languages. For some people no law of such legal force has ever taken regional languages into account to the

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<sup>98</sup> Judge 2000, 36.

<sup>99</sup> Loi no. 94-665, 1994.

<sup>100</sup> For the English text of the Toubon law, see <http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> For the territorial location of minority language regions see Map.1

<sup>102</sup> Truchot 2001, 323.

same extent as the Toubon Law did.<sup>103</sup> Indeed, although the law states that French is the language of education, it specifies that “the necessity to teach regional or foreign languages can constitute an exception to this rule”<sup>104</sup>. However, even though the Toubon Law mentioned regional languages, the exception was not specified by the law and in many cases the use of regional languages were denied justified with Toubon Law combined with the Constitutional Amendment. Toubon law did not change anything when still the rights given to the speakers of these languages were stayed at the level of the Deixonne law, which did not even include these languages in the education system.<sup>105</sup> When the Toubon Law was introduced, the means for teaching these languages still were not supported by the state, and the private funding was too limited to sustain the programs aimed at the maintenance and teaching of these languages.

On the other hand, under the high opposition for the use of regional languages, two *circulaires* were brought forward during the 1990s and are used today as the foundations for local language policy for regional language education. The first *circulaire* relative to the regional languages was not designed with these languages in mind. Instead, *circulaire* sought to allow for the establishment of ‘European departments’ in secondary schools, with the aim of enhancing language teaching in France.<sup>106</sup> While this first *circulaire* targeted the modern foreign languages, it was used by the regional minorities to a limited extent as it did not explicitly exclude the country’s regional languages. The second, *circulaire* 95-086 included a number of provisions for the teaching of the regional languages, both as disciplines to be taught and as the language of instruction.<sup>107</sup> Although these *circularies* brought new

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<sup>103</sup> Maatta 2005, 175.

<sup>104</sup> Loi no. 94–665: Article 1, 11.I.

<sup>105</sup> Ager 1999, 20.

<sup>106</sup> Blackwood 2007, 28.

<sup>107</sup> Blackwood, 29.

opportunities for regional languages within education system, the benefits remained very little as a result of the inconsistent structure of the language policy imposed by the central state and the cosmetic regulations that could not guarantee any improvements to the situation of the regional languages. In the next part of this section, I discuss the role of international agreements and the EU on the linguistic rights issue in France by referring to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) as a primary document at the center of the EU-French relations in this issue.

### **3.2.3. The International Context: European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages and Other Documents**

Although France is one of the key founders of the European Union, as a part of its social and economic structure, the legacy of revolutionary ideas have remained strong enough for France to keep a distance during the integration process within the Union. Therefore, most of the cultural changes towards creating a multicultural but one Europe have been resisted by the French state. The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages was not an exception to this. It was the main document that intensified the discussions about the problem of regional languages when it was signed. The Charter was signed in 1999; it coincided with the political problems of the ‘cohabitation’ period in France. While president Chirac was a right wing politician, he could not take the risk of directly rejecting the Charter by ignoring the powerful Jospin cabinet, as Jospin being the prime minister from *Parti Socialiste*, which has been a hope for the regionalists and openly in favor of the diversity in France.<sup>108</sup> Therefore, Chirac asked for the review of the Charter by the Constitutional Council. The Council declared the Charter as contradictory to the French Constitution. Constitutional Council is the highest constitutional authority in France like the Constitutional Court in Turkey. The

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<sup>108</sup> Wright 2000, 415.



decision of the Council was based on Article 1 of the French Constitution, which states that France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic in which all citizens are guaranteed equality without distinction of origin, race, or religion, and Article 2, which states that French is the language of the Republic.<sup>109</sup>

Another important international document on human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), annex to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), was not ratified by France until 1980. When eventually ratifying in 1980, France made a reservation that, since its constitution recognized no minorities, article 27 of the Covenant concerning the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities was not applicable as far as the Republic was concerned. It was declared that "in the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic,... article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned." This reservation was used in the cases against French state in the Human Rights Committee.<sup>110</sup> According to that constitutional provision, France is a "republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs."<sup>111</sup> A similar reservation was made by the Turkish government also. To justify further its reservation in diplomatic circles, it was argued that "with regard to religion and regional languages these are matters of choice for each individual, pertaining not to public law, but to the exercise of public liberties by citizens".<sup>112</sup> The same principles of indivisibility and equality are also asserted when faced with pressures from within France itself, such as

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<sup>109</sup> Maatta, 178.

<sup>110</sup> See, e.g., *Guesdon v. France*, 2 Report of the Human Rights Committee, 1990, U.N. Doc.A (45/40), Annex IX.G, at 91 5.6. Available online at: [www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol3en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol3en.pdf)

<sup>111</sup> Rodley 1995, 50

<sup>112</sup> Rodley, 51.

in 1992, when the Constitutional Council rejected the government's proposal to recognize the "Corsican people, as a component of the French people".<sup>113</sup>

In this part, I discussed language policies and laws in France that determined the course of state-minority relations in the long term. As can be seen from the policies, monolingual language regime in France remained intact although various challenges have been present in the country. In the following part of this thesis, these challenges will be analyzed with regard to each minority group in France.

### **3.3. Dynamics of Language Regime in France: The Case of Persistence**

The history of language policy in France shows the way in which the French state has established and reinforced the unitary ideology within a monolingual language regime structure. However, language policy itself cannot explain the dynamics of why and in which settings a specific type of language regime is established rather than the other. The aim of this part is to explore the dynamics of language politics and answer both state-centered and minority-centered questions of language politics.

#### **3.3.1. Minority-Oriented Factors of Language Regime Change and the French case**

##### **3.3.1.1 Linguistic Minorities in France, Minority Activism and Securitization of the Minority Issue<sup>114</sup>**

The demographic and socio-political structure of language communities in France poses a challenging picture in terms of the different levels of involvement of each group with diverse background condition. Unlike the Turkish case the number of linguistic minorities is higher in a group-wise categorization. In this thesis, I analyzed

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<sup>113</sup> Oakes 2011, 63.

<sup>114</sup> The map of territorial composition of regional and minority languages in France see Map 1. in Appendix 3.

four different language community in France, namely Bretons, Basques, Occitans, and Corsicans. There are multiple reasons of why I include only these groups. First of all these groups possess different characteristics almost unique to each group which enable a profound amount of information to analyze the structure and the nature of language regime in France. Second, they all present different levels of activism in French politics today and this prevent further elimination.

On the other hand, the number of the speakers of minority languages in France poses a different picture compared to Turkey. While even only the number of Kurdish speakers exceeds two million in Turkey, the total number of the speakers of all minority languages comes close to this number as shown in the figures in the earlier parts of this thesis. With this numerical fallback in mind, it is important to see how these groups have been successful in framing language politics in the country or fail to achieve recognition from the state.

In this part of the thesis, the minority-oriented dynamics of language regime is discussed with reference to each linguistic minority group in France as named above. While doing so, I discuss minority activism emerged within each linguistic community, political parties established by these groups and the security side of the issue. Moreover, the role of transnational actors in triggering mobilization among linguistic minorities in France is presented within the scope of the arguments.

#### **3.3.1.1.1. Breton**

Breton, or *Brezhoneg*, is an indigenous Celtic language spoken mainly in western Brittany, but also spoken in the main cities in east called *Breizh-Uhel* ‘Upper Brittany’. Traditionally it is the language of a large part of Brittany, but over the centuries the linguistic border gradually moved westwards. Linguistically, Breton forms

part of the Brittonic branch of the Celtic languages, to which Welsh and Cornish also belong. Today, speakers of Breton mostly concentrate along Brittany, which is located at the Northwestern part of metropolitan France.

At the beginning of World War I, the Breton-speaking parts of Brittany had approximately 900,000 monoglot Breton speakers, with some additional 400,000 bilinguals. Today, of a total population of 3,175,064<sup>115</sup> within Brittany, it is estimated that about 400,000 can speak Breton to some extent as well as French, corresponding to 12.6 per cent of Brittany's population.<sup>116</sup> Only half of them speak Breton on an everyday basis and the vast majority of these are over the age of sixty.<sup>117</sup> These numbers are only estimates as the French state does not record language profile of the population in censuses. However, in an interview that Yann Rivalrain, a Breton journalist, told CNN that there are only 200,000 Breton speakers, corresponding to less than 10 per cent of Brittany's population, and this number is expected to fall to 70,000 in 10 years if French state does not take any action.<sup>118</sup>

### **3.3.1.1.1. French Domestic Imperialism as the Ethnic Doctrine**

Brittany, though initially regarded by the center (Paris) as part of the rural far west of France, showed signs of unrest and political mobilization that resulted, in 1972, in two serious, anti-state, anti-capitalist strikes both by factory workers, and by farmers. At least a portion of the Breton population was becoming more radicalized, and anti-French feeling was running higher than it had in years.<sup>119</sup> Berger states in her 1972 article that there were three types of imperialisms expressed within the ethnic doctrine

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<sup>115</sup> INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 2009 population figures for regions in metropolitan France.

<sup>116</sup> Mendel 2004, 65.

<sup>117</sup> Mercator-Education Regional Dossier, Breton. Page? Publisher?

<sup>118</sup> <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/12/11/brittany.language/index.html>

<sup>119</sup> Timm 2003, 39.

of the Breton movement during that period. There was cultural imperialism because French state continuously refuses to allow Bretons to speak their language or to teach their language and their culture to their children. There was economic imperialism because their rural production was underdeveloped within prospering national economy and could not become a part of industrial production. And there was political imperialism because the regions are governed by the bureaucrats from Paris who did not understand the regional interests.<sup>120</sup> This imperialism argument legitimized the movement's violent and peaceful actions in the eyes of the Breton population. Of course the motivation behind pursuing such a sudden and ferocious activism was the increasing gap between the center and periphery where most regional minorities lived.<sup>121</sup> The fundamental grievances were explicit: the right to speak and learn the Breton language, the preservation of Breton culture, and economic planning for the region that remained sensitive to the Breton way of life.<sup>122</sup> The demands for redress of these grievances increased dramatically after mid-1960s, as did the tactics of the groups involved.

Breton militant groups escalated their attacks on government buildings and installations by the end of the 1960s and they regarded French state as an 'occupying power' that was diminishing the social and economic strength of Brittany.<sup>123</sup> Among the militant groups during this period, still existing ones are the *Front de libération de la Bretagne* (FLB, 'the Front for the Liberation of Brittany') and the *Armée Révolutionnaire Bretonne* (ARB, 'the Revolutionary Breton Army'), the former name modeled on the famous Algerian FLN, the latter on the well-known Irish IRA.<sup>124</sup> There were many other groups that participated in the movement actively. These groups and

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<sup>120</sup> Berger 1972, 173.

<sup>121</sup> Hornsby 2010, Timm 2003, Boomgard, 2008.

<sup>122</sup> Boomgard 2008, 281.

<sup>123</sup> Berger 1972.

<sup>124</sup> Boomgard 2008.

their actions inevitably shaped public opinion in Brittany and shaped the discourse of the movement during the following decades. Some of these organizations demanded autonomy from France and some others only demanded official status within the legal system. Post-1968 period is called by the Breton militant groups as third *emsav* (which means uprising, movement, revolt in Breton), as mentioned by Mendel.<sup>125</sup> The role of these groups and their activities will be discussed separately later in this study.

### **3.3.1.1.1.2. The ‘néo-bretonnant’ Movement: An Effort for Language Revival**

For over a century, but in earnest only since the rise of regionalism in France since the late 1960s, attempts have been made to restore the Breton language’s usage and status, often through political efforts to gain more Breton instruction in schools. The most important characteristic of the Breton activism has been the emphasis on improving the educational system and integrating Breton language to the national education. The rise of *néo-bretonnant* movement was mostly characterized by a shift in speaker demographic as within each generation of Breton speakers the number of rural agricultural workers was declining, while an urban middle class was rising.<sup>126</sup> The role of economic development in this region was an important aspect of the rise of new discourse in Breton movement.

Soon after the creation of the *Union Démocratique Bretonne* (UDB, Breton Democratic Union) as an autonomist regionalist party.... An important development in the Breton case for their cultural demands was the Cultural Charter that was signed in 1978. When President Giscard d’Estaing from Republican Party (later joined Union for a Popular Movement, UMP), on a tour of Brittany during the campaign for the 1978 legislative elections, made the initial move towards the creation of a Breton Cultural

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<sup>125</sup> Mendel, 70.

<sup>126</sup> Ference 2007, 47.

Charter, the expectations were high.<sup>127</sup> Although did not met the initial extended cultural rights proposed by the regional institutions, the Charter was aimed at increasing the broadcasting time in Breton, which was not available until that time and more importantly to open new separate Breton language courses to create more opportunities for children to learn Breton.<sup>128</sup> This contradiction within the French system was an interesting point that made this attempt impossible to succeed in although it was aimed to increase both the demands and the presence of such an important regional culture. However, as the available number of qualified Breton language teachers was already scarce, schools could not offer these courses most of the time.

The most well-known aspect of the *néo-bretonnant* movement is the *Diwan* school network that immerses students in Breton, and then introduces French later on.<sup>129</sup> In a 2004 record, there were 33 primary schools, 3 *colleges*, 2 *colleges-annexes* and 1 *lycée* in the *Diwan* network, and 2761 students were enrolled in 2003.<sup>130</sup> At the present time, the *Diwan* network functions with semi-private status, not integrated to the French public school system but having its teachers certified by the national education board and, for a certain percentage of posts, paid for through the government. The battle that was fought to gain such a status for *Diwan* is the most important case study in French regionalism and center-periphery relations according to Timm.<sup>131</sup> In one of his articles, he traces Breton language militancy back to 1870, with the first movement to give the Breton language some presence in the French-dominated school system, noting that “by the early 20th century, however, it is easy to sense the urgency and sometimes militancy on the part of Breton advocates that show a deep concern over the future of the

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<sup>127</sup> Rogers 1996, 555.

<sup>128</sup> Mendel, 71.

<sup>129</sup> For the map of *Diwan* schools in France, see Appendix 4.

<sup>130</sup> Ference, 48.

<sup>131</sup> Timm, 40.

language.”<sup>132</sup> The Diwan movement’s struggle begins in 1977 with the establishment of the first private preschool. An early attempt to incorporate the school into the French public education system was made as part of the writing of a Breton Cultural Charter in 1978, but the failure of that document, as it was modified both by Paris and by lower-level bureaucrats that were initially supposed to be supporters of the Breton cause, would set the tone for the next twenty years. Diwan, which was going ahead with plans for expansion, had high hopes for the Socialist government under Mitterrand that replaced the Giscard d’Estaing administration in 1981. Minister of Culture Jack Lang, a Socialist often lauded for his commitment to cultural pluralism, wrote a report, which “emphasized that it was the responsibility of the government to engage in the active promotion of cultural pluralism”.<sup>133</sup> The first official document to come out of the new administration, however, did not fulfill expectations: the *Savary Circular*, which united all existing education statutes in one document, did not include treatment for Breton and failed to provide productive solution for the Breton problems.<sup>134</sup>

As the 1990s arrived, the Breton regional assemblies began to demonstrate more and more aggravation over Paris’ inaction on the Breton issue, though Paris claimed that it was staying hands-off because the enormous debt Diwan had accumulated. Though *Diwan* has grown rapidly, their aim to improve the education within *Diwan* schools did not turn out perfectly. Although *Diwan* schools were given semi-private status, they would have preferred public school status because the private status deprives the schools the right to use public facilities like food facilities. Although the debts of *Diwan* schools were tolerated by the government once, new debts needed the

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<sup>132</sup> Timm 1982, 1.

<sup>133</sup> Rogers 1996, 558.

<sup>134</sup> Timm, 2.



public funding.<sup>135</sup> Additionally, the government managed to control the number of bilingual classes in the mainstream public system by limiting the number of CAPES (certificate for teaching in secondary schools) certifications it awarded in regional languages each year. Without such certification, a teacher cannot teach that given subject. For instance, only four such posts were created between 1992 and 1995 while 20 posts per year were required,<sup>136</sup> and the numbers are still the same today.

Today Diwan school network is actively in operation within the boundaries that national education system created over the years. The semi-public status of Diwan schools and availability of Breton teachers are still a problem for Breton population. Still that fact that Diwan schools expanded within the borders of Brittany can be considered as a positive development as the interest in learning regional languages is a sign of possible future developments. Breton population is still the most active linguistic group in France as their close participation in the non-governmental organizations such as EBLUL-France and others have created good opportunities to keep their cause alive in the eyes of public opinion.

### **3.3.1.1.2 Basque<sup>137</sup>**

Located at the Southwest France along Spanish border, French Basque region has a population of around 262,000<sup>138</sup> with the number of reported 76,000 people speaking Basque language, corresponding to 29% of the population of the French Basque region.<sup>139</sup> The area where Breton speakers dominated the population is part of *Aquitaine* region in France and called as *Ipparalde* (refers to “northern side” of the

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<sup>135</sup> Rogers, 571.

<sup>136</sup> Rogers, 577.

<sup>137</sup> For the general map of great Basque country and its French and Spanish divisions, see Map 3 in Appendix 5.

<sup>138</sup> INSEE 2009. See also the figures provided at the end of the section.

<sup>139</sup> Ethnologue 2009.

greater Basque Country or Northern/French Basque Country) in Basque records. The connection between Spanish Basque Country and French Basque population has been one of the most important factors for developments in French Basque region history. Today, Basque population in France identify themselves mostly with France, but many of them identify themselves with the Greater Basque Country or even with Spain.<sup>140</sup>

Basque minority in France can be counted as one of the most advantageous linguistic groups in the country as the institutional and political mobilization in the region has created many legal opportunities and Basque activist used them very effectively. This organizational success of Basque minority resulted in more autonomous cultural politics much different than the other regional language speakers.

#### **3.3.1.1.2.1. Decentralization and Basque Civil Society**

Because of the lack of a real regional language policy until the 1990s, the promotion of Basque language in France was initiated mostly by civil society organizations through different techniques.<sup>141</sup> In the field of education, one of the first initiatives was led by the Catholic Church and after WWII, the Deixonne Act enabled the organization of Basque courses three hours per week as a second (or third) language in public schools. Despite the overall limitations within the French legal system on regional languages, the decentralization reforms of 1982 and 1995 undertaken by the Socialist governments enabled the teaching of Basque language through “Regional Culture and Language” courses in public schools.<sup>142</sup> These decentralization laws were offered by socialist Gaston Defferre (Minister of Interior and Decentralization at that time) but the offer to create a single Basque department was refused based on the fear that it would encourage separatism, given the violent situation on the Spanish side of the

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<sup>140</sup> Mansvelt Beck 1999.

<sup>141</sup> Jacob 1994, 349.

<sup>142</sup> Harguindéguy and Itçaina 2011, 3.

border and the presence of large numbers of ETA refugees on the French side.<sup>143</sup> In 1982, the *Savary* decree that reregulated the higher education included Basque language unlike Breton and allowed private teaching of the language.

Within the frame of the decentralization process, privatized teaching opportunities were carried mostly by the Church.<sup>144</sup> On the other hand, the main association for adult language training in Basque region in France is AEK (*Alfabetatze Euskalduntze Koordinakundea* - Coordination for Alphabetization in Euskera). Established in 1965 the organization organizes courses, linguistic exchanges and immersion training camps for French students in its Euskadi and Navarrese branches in Spain for more than 50.000 people still today.<sup>145</sup> However, the presence of regional languages outside of the classroom has been greatly reduced. For example, Basque is practically absent from private business in France due to the obligations stated by the Toubon Law. Regarding the mass media, again the opportunities are very limited as the radio broadcasts are still very rare and irregular and Basque has a very limited space in national TV broadcasting. Nevertheless, the Spanish Basque channels *Euskal Telebista* 1 and 2 also broadcast to French Basque region and funds some correspondents in Bayonne (a Basque populated city in south-western France).<sup>146</sup> Finally, newspapers distributed in this region are written in French with only a few exceptions as on rare occasions, *Sud-Ouest* or *La Semaine du Pays-Basque* publish short articles in Basque language.<sup>147</sup> Even French Basque nationalist newspapers such as *Enbata* are written in French.

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<sup>143</sup> Laughlin 1985, 103-104.

<sup>144</sup> Jacob, 64.

<sup>145</sup> Jacob, 357.

<sup>146</sup> Arana et. al., 2003.

<sup>147</sup> Harguindéguy and Itçaina, 7.

The institutionalization of a cultural and linguistic policy in the Basque Country benefited largely from the process of decentralization. In 1981, socialist President Mitterrand from with the Socialist Party, launched an agenda of territorial empowerment marking the most radical reforms that the leftist president brought about.<sup>148</sup> This project consisted of transferring more competencies and resources to the 36,680 city councils (*mairies*), the 100 departmental councils (*conseils généraux*) and the newly created 25 regional councils (*conseils régionaux*).<sup>149</sup> Since then, the French Basque region has experienced an unusual pattern of territorial governance since the end of the 1980s that constituted much more than what scholars of Basque nationalism have called ‘cosmetic decentralisation’.<sup>150</sup> Along with this decentralization process Basque region was reorganized as ‘pays’ in 1997 under the Law on Territorial Planning.<sup>151</sup> Since then the Basque experience has been seen as a good example of local development, and it has inspired the national policy of the pays led by the central state. Over the past 10 years, the new French Basque territorial institutions created as a result of decentralization policies have had tangible effects on territorial governance, especially in linguistic and cultural matters. The efforts of the Basque Country Development Council (*Conseil de développement du Pays Basque*), a new public body created by local notables, state representatives and civil society actors to elaborate a strategic plan for the Basque part of the département, to negotiate consensual territorial contracts involving the state, the Regional Council of Aquitaine, the General Council of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques and local authorities constitute evidence of its willingness to include and recognize all of the actors of Iparralde.<sup>152</sup> Overall, the institutional developments for the French Basque Country originated more in the changing territorial

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<sup>148</sup> Safran 1985, 42.

<sup>149</sup> Mansvelt-Beck 2008, 381.

<sup>150</sup> Mansvelt Beck 2005, 2008. Jeffrey 2006.

<sup>151</sup> Loi du 4 février 1995 d’orientation pour l’aménagement et le développement du territoire.

<sup>152</sup> Mansvelt Beck 2008, 382.

policy paradigm than in a significant shift in the state's linguistic policy while also these developments created improvements in language education.

The improvements in the relation between the French Basque Country and the central government were not directly driven by Basque nationalists. It was dominantly the result of compromise between the various political leaders dominating the Basque territory in France (the French center-right in the hinterland and the coastal area; the Socialist Party on the periphery of the largest cities, and some isolated Green leaders and Basque moderate nationalists)<sup>153</sup> and the business groups although the Basque nationalists and militants also influenced the population along the cultural rights.

Of course eliminating Basque nationalism and militancy was among the objectives of central government with these initiatives. First of all, state promoted deliberation on local issues aimed at putting an end to a period signaled by a relatively high level of tension in the French Basque Country.<sup>154</sup> The French Basque armed movement *Iparretarrak* (those of the north) was particularly active in the 1980s, as were the anti-terrorist squads of the GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* – Counter-terrorist Liberation Squads) organized by the Spanish secret service to attack alleged members of ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*) living in the French Basque Country. These militant and nationalist organizations were highly influenced by the Spanish Basque organizations and they were actively supported by them. In addition to this objective, the French central state needed to respond to demands for the creation of a specific Basque region by offering alternative institutional formulas than separation. As more separatist demands for Basque region were voiced than the other regional

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<sup>153</sup> Jacob 1994, 47.

<sup>154</sup> Harguindéguy and Itçaina, 7.

minorities, French state felt the necessity to give other concessions to decrease the violent voices within the Basque community.

**Table 1. Basque Population aged sixteen or over by age group and district. Northern Basque Country, France, 2006<sup>155</sup>**

Ages groups	Population aged 16 or over			
	Northern Basque Count.	BAB	Lapurdi hinterland	Lower Navarre and Zuberoa
≥ 65	59,600	27,800	21,800	10,000
50-64	51,500	21,600	22,900	7,000
35-49	59,000	25,100	26,100	7,800
25-34	31,000	14,700	12,100	4,200
16-24	29,100	11,700	13,600	3,800
<b>Total</b>	<b>230,200</b>	<b>100,900</b>	<b>96,500</b>	<b>32,800</b>

Source: Fourth Sociolinguistic Survey. Vice-Ministry for Language Policy. Basque Government, 2006.

**Table 2. Changes in language competence. Northern Basque Country, 1996-2006 (%)**

Language competence	Population aged 16 or over		
	1996	2001	2006
Full bilinguals	26.4	24.8	22.5
Passive bilinguals	9.3	11.7	8.6
Non-Basque speakers	64.2	63.5	68.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>212,400</b>	<b>221,600</b>	<b>230,200</b>

Source: Fourth Sociolinguistic Survey. Vice-Ministry for Language Policy. Basque Government, 2006.

### 3.3.1.1.3. Occitan

Occitan language presents a different picture than the regional languages in France that are mentioned previously. While *Ethnologue* records show that there are

<sup>155</sup> BAB refers to the largest three-town urban area of Bayonne (Baiona in Basque), Anglet (Basque: Angelu) and Biarritz (Basque: Miarritze), on the coast of the Basque province of Lapurdi in France.

about 2 million people speaking Occitan language<sup>156</sup>, which is concentrated in the southern part of the country, the internal dialects and divisions of the language has created a complex assessment of the policies targeted towards this language. Moreover, the literature on Occitan language or minority activism among Occitan speakers is very limited unlike Breton or Basque as a result of this diversity within the language domain. The people of southern France make up the largest of the French minority groups, and, although far from homogeneous, they largely share the consciousness of belonging to a distinct ethnic domain, whether as individuals they speak the ‘Occitan language or not, while this consciousness has not produced a consistent mobilization for language maintenance.<sup>157</sup> In the south, the varieties of Occitan language occupy the entire French continental territory with the exception of the Basque and Catalan areas. Today, the domain of the *langue d'oc*, which refers to the Occitan language and its dialects, covers about one-third of the continental territory of France, an area that contains 23 percent of the French population.<sup>158</sup>

Reliable data for Occitan use in these areas do not exist, but estimates of the number of speakers vary from 2 to 3 million. It appears clear, however, that Occitan usage is found in rural and economically poor communities, and that the number of speakers is declining.<sup>159</sup>

### **3.3.1.1.3.1 *Felibridge* Movement and Rise of Occitanism**

In the nineteenth century, inspired by Romantic nationalism in many European countries, ethnic identity in southern France found expression in the ‘*Felibrige* movement’ created by the poet Frederic Mistral in the 1860s in an effort to preserve

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<sup>156</sup> Ethnologue 2009.

<sup>157</sup> Jeanjean 2006, 89.

<sup>158</sup> Mercator Regional Dossier: Occitan 1998.

<sup>159</sup> Euromosaic Report, 2006 update

Provençal, southeastern variant of the *langue d'oc*, which refers to the Occitan language and dialects of it.<sup>160</sup> The *Felibrige* was a group of idealistic writers attempted to reverse the increasing irrelevance and marginalization of the south as seen from the center by turning to the past and to a local language and culture that proclaimed their distinctive history and identity. To win any recognition beyond the region, Mistral had to translate his work into French, and he did, in the end, win a Nobel Prize for literature.<sup>161</sup>

In the twentieth century support for regionalist movements crystallized after 1968, a consequence of decentralization, and was expressed in an ideology of Occitanism, held primarily by some members of the urban middle class, which sees unity rather than fragmented diversity of language and culture throughout the south. Thus southern France is conceived of as one geographic entity, referred to as *Occitanie*. Occitanism is as well a political force, appearing both independently of and within the Communist and Socialist parties.<sup>162</sup> Yet elements of southern regionalism have also been associated with the right, as in the years just after World War II, when support for regional cultures was viewed positively as perpetuating conservative religious and political values.<sup>163</sup>

In the wake of the *Félibrige* movement, societies concerned with the promotion of Occitan language, literature and education sprang up, *Escola Occitana* (1919), the *Societat d'Estudios Occitans* (1931) and the *Institut d'Etudes Occitanes* (1946), which has been the most active militant organization, were some of them. These organizations attracted most of the intellectuals within Occitan population and created an important representation opportunity for Occitan movement. Apart from the language maintenance

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<sup>160</sup> Priest 2008, Jones 1997.

<sup>161</sup> Jones 1997, 433.

<sup>162</sup> Mark 1987, 64.

<sup>163</sup> See Kuter 1985 for discussion of a similar phenomenon in Brittany.



efforts by these organizations, the political initiatives by the regional parties representing the Occitan minority have been a part of the political spectrum. The 1960s-onwards, different political parties such as the *Parti Nationaliste Occitan*, the *Parti Socialiste Occitan*, the *Mouvimento Autonomista Occitanico*, the *Fédération Anarchiste Communiste d'Occitanie* and *Jeune Languedoc* have been established, gained power and waned from political arena.<sup>164</sup> These parties presented a wide political spectrum from autonomy and separatist claims to integration by demanding only cultural rights. This revivalist movement failed to produce a solid and sustainable mobilization and also could not attract political support. The most important reason for this failure was the widespread illiteracy among the speakers of Occitan language in French or in general that were mostly concentrated in rural areas.<sup>165</sup>

#### **3.3.1.1.3.2. French-Occitan Diglossia**

When the time came to found a new language movement in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Occitan movement had to choose between adopting the standard language and framework of the Provençal revival, which created another diversity within Occitan activism, they choose instead to establish a movement as a reaction against previous movements that were created before.<sup>166</sup> The Occitanist movement was also shaped by the diversity within the Occitan region, and as such it made finding a single best-fit solution even tougher. The movement also felt the necessity to urgently form a comprehensive image as the other regional languages have been more organized and active in supporting their own languages. The Occitanist movement also arose

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<sup>164</sup> Priest 2008, 143.

<sup>165</sup> Blanchett and Schiffman 2004 provides a detailed account of the failure of Occitan movement.

<sup>166</sup> Manzano 2004, 70.

specifically to combat the French language with a new identity which would be an ideal example for other regional groups too.<sup>167</sup>

After 1968, Occitan movement became more prominently aligned with Socialism and local moves for autonomy. Neither coopted exclusively by the right nor the left, 'Occitanism' continues to bear differing political values at the same time. In terms of language maintenance and/or revival they adopted the Catalanist definition of *diglossia*.<sup>168</sup> *Diglossia* is considered to be a symptom of a historical conflict between two national communities which will be solved only by the victory of one language and one community against the other one. If it is the dominated one that wins, a process of normalization makes the use of the language normal in every social situation and rejects the former dominating one; if it is the dominant one that wins, a final language shift will eliminate the use of the dominated one.<sup>169</sup> The situation is the same in the French and Occitan case. The Occitan speech community is such that French monolinguals are common, Occitan monolinguals are statistically insignificant in number, and, for the bilingual segment of the community, French and Occitan are in a diglossic relationship; that is, they are functionally differentiated and serve to express two different sets of attitudes. This type of relationship was an important characteristic of the Occitan movement during the last decades.

As a result of this diglossic situation as defined above, attempts at linguistic normalization, which is considered to be necessary for such a diversified linguistic community, resulted in certain groups objecting strongly to what was seen as the imposition of the linguistic forms of one area on speakers from other areas who did not wish to alter the way they speak and write. 1980s was seen for Occitan movement as an

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<sup>167</sup> Manzano, 74.

<sup>168</sup> Priest, 142.

<sup>169</sup> Blanchett and Schiffman, 7; Field 1980; Schlieben-Lange 1993.

“illustration of the adage ‘united we stand, divided we fall’”.<sup>170</sup> This fragmentation still works against any sense of Occitan identity through language and the tendency among Occitan speakers is to highlight diversity rather than unity as no consensus on a unified Occitan language and Occitan community is achieved. Thus users identify both their spoken and written language with a specific geographical area within the *langue do’c* area (Southern France) in a way which sub-divides the language and tends to facilitate many Occitan identities rather than one.<sup>171</sup> This fracture within the movement is reflected in the results that Occitan movement has produced so far.

The contemporary Occitan speech community remains socio-linguistically enigmatic in many ways, both to outsiders and to the Occitan speakers themselves. As discussed above, two reasons for this would be, on the one hand, the clearly fragile nature of Occitan language revitalization or mobilization as a result of failures in normalization attempts and, on the other, related to the first one lack of organizational mobility and a unified political agenda by the political parties. These shortcomings of Occitan movement are the main reasons that have made it different from the other linguistic groups in France. Moreover, the lack of political attention from the central state and specific policies for Occitan language is a result of situation. Still, today Occitan speakers feel themselves a part of the regional activism in France and participate in the demonstrations for linguistic rights in France.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Blanchett 2003, 8.

<sup>171</sup> Occitan speakers refer to the dialects such as Gascon, Auvergnal, Provençal etc. while declaring their languages.

<sup>172</sup> Occitans was the largest group with 30,000 people during the March 31, 2005 demonstrations in France for language rights. Source: <http://midi-pyrenees.france3.fr/info/des-milliers-de-voix-pour-l-occitan-73219754.html?onglet=videos>.

#### 3.3.1.1.4. Corsica

Corsica was purchased by France just before the Revolution and experienced intensive ‘gallicisation’ of ‘Francization’ from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, meaning intense imposition of French culture and language.<sup>173</sup> In Corsica, with a population of 278,650, Blackwood calculates that currently there are approximately 156,000 Corsican speakers on the island, corresponding to 56 percent of the island’s population.<sup>174</sup> Especially during the last decades, Corsica witnessed the evolution of French language policy towards Corsican in such a positive way that the language policy in the island today gives Corsica a different position with regards to the other regional languages in France because of the different attitude of the state towards the language politics in the island.

With regionalist movements emerging across France, support was voiced for minority languages and conditions across the country appeared to favor the existence of such movements. Not for the first time, however, the situation on Corsica was different to that on the mainland. Whilst not suggesting that there was no emerging regionalism on Corsica after the Liberation from the German invasion in 1943, the island did experience what Carrington describes as ‘a period of stagnation’.<sup>175</sup> The effects of this stagnation can be seen in the first major piece of legislation regarding language policy since the Second World War. Corsican involvement with the preparation of the Deixonne Law of 1951 was minimal.<sup>176</sup> This lack of participation in linguistic legislation certainly gave the impression that Corsicans were reluctant to support Corsican, leading to beliefs that the islanders were turning their backs on their mother

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<sup>173</sup> Blackwood 2004b, 135.

<sup>174</sup> Blackwood 2008, 28.

<sup>175</sup> Carrington 1984, ix.

<sup>176</sup> Berger 1977, 176.

tongue. While Breton or Catalan politicians were clearly involved in the movement which led to the drafting of this law, there was almost no involvement by the Corsican activists or politicians.<sup>177</sup> From the perspective of the Corsican language, excluded from the law, this piece of legislation at the time was of no practical benefit to Corsican even though the exclusion of Alsatian, Corsican and Flemish was rectified some 20 years after the passing of the Deixonne Law.

Post-war movement for language policy change in Corsica, known as *merendelle*, was festive rallies and a blend of political activism and language activism. Support, even if not widespread, was and is crucial for Corsican. As speaker numbers declined and more parents elected to raise their children as francophones first and foremost, it became increasingly important for proponents of the minority language to speak up for Corsican. Mainly as a result of this activism, a change on the part of the French state came in 1957 when it founded the Centre for Corsican Studies, the first academic body to work, teach and research matters pertaining to the island's language. However, the irony is that this institute was established at the University of Aix, on the mainland, as Corsica's university had been closed down by the French authorities shortly after the purchase of the island.<sup>178</sup> The 1960s were marked by the issues of decolonization and one local perspective was to perceive Corsica as a colony of France.<sup>179</sup> The independence of Algeria provided an obvious encouragement to the regionalists on Corsica. However, the French government, having lost Northern Africa, was keener to retain other non-continental territories like Corsica.

Despite the foreignness of Corsican to many young people, there was political and linguistic activism on several levels during the 1970s. Linguistically, this decade

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<sup>177</sup> Blackwood 2008, 20.

<sup>178</sup> Blackwood 2004b, 137.

<sup>179</sup> Kofman 1982, 303.

saw the founding of the association known as *Scola Corsa* (Corsican School) to support the island's language, building on the enthusiasm generated by the *merendelle* festivals. The significance of such an association, working to support the Corsican language, is considerable. Jaffe highlights the campaign they launched, including 'Corsican Days': 'political, cultural and linguistic rallies that drew thousands of militant students and nationalist sympathizers'.<sup>180</sup> *Scola Corsa* aimed to raise the profile of Corsican in the face of the accepted threat posed by French. The association lobbied for the reopening of the island's university and for the extension of the Deixonne Law to include Corsican. This was the first time that an organised body had come together to work for the Corsican language and thereby countered some of the accusations that Corsicans were generally apathetic towards their language.<sup>181</sup> *L'Association pour la de'fense de l'e'tude de la langue corse de l'est et du centre* (l'ADECEC) was also established in the 1970s. Such efforts on behalf of Corsican are, in many respects, invaluable. However, unless Corsicans are actively engaged with speaking and teaching Corsican, the work of l'ADECEC and others cannot be benefited to its full potential as scholars also argue. In higher education, the island's university was reopened in 1981 in Corte, and was named after *Pasquale Paoli*, hero of Corsica. University authorities have been successful in introducing mandatory Corsican language classes for all.

In 1988, the *loi Joxe* focused upon Corsican and sought to adopt a strategy for the teaching of both Corsican and Mediterranean cultures. These laws greatly strengthened the teaching of Corsican, as well as the history, culture and geography of the island, despite the stated intentions of these laws, the teaching of Corsican like the other regional languages suffered from chronic underfunding during this decade and 1990s. the Assembly in Ajaccio, established after the limited decentralization process in

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<sup>180</sup> Jaffe 1999, 126.

<sup>181</sup> Blackwood 2004a; Jaffe 1999.

France, was charged with proposing policy for Corsican language education, and founded dependent and consultative agencies, such as *le Conseil de la Culture, del'Education et du Cadre de Vie*. Nevertheless, despite these potentially positive advances for the language, the state still resisted the use of Corsican and tolerated its practice only in a few, clearly specified domains.

Having been overlooked during the passing of the Deixonne Law, Corsican, at the end of the 20th century, was emerging as the most defended and privileged regional language within France. By the end of the 20th century, Corsican language classes were all but obligatory for school children starting at secondary school, despite a further appeal to the Constitutional Council in 2000 by over 250 members of parliament and senators, protesting against the wording of the *Corsica Act*.<sup>182</sup> Their submission highlighted that the wording of the Act, 'The Corsican language shall be one of the subjects taught within normal school hours in nursery and primary classes on Corsica', was unconstitutional on the grounds that it ran contrary to the principle of equality.<sup>183</sup> Between 2001 and 2003, three *circulaires* on bilingual education were drafted, which now provide the framework used by the *Acadé'mie de Corse* for the extension of instruction Corsican. Still, like the other regional languages in France, Corsican language rights have been limited to the education system, which is strictly controlled by the central state. Still this different course of language policy in Corsica has been mainly the result of the territorial and historical relations with the region.

### **3.3.1.3. Role of Transnational Actors**

The involvement of transnational actors have been limited within the policy making process in France. In the case of the EU, the French state has prevented policy

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<sup>182</sup> Blackwood 2007, 30.

<sup>183</sup> Jaffe 2006, 575.

change pressured by the EU institutions that has been contradicting to its statist constitutional makeup. Therefore, the EU pressures about extending minority rights have not been very effective in the French case. The strong state power exerted through the dominant role of France in every aspect of the EU mechanism granted the state to act upon its will unlike the weaker EU states, namely the CEES, which mostly have implemented the EU policies.<sup>184</sup> The inefficiency of the EU as an external power is complemented by the internal silencing of the minority demands in country. While certain provisions have been given to the minorities, as of 2008 France still was one of the weakest states in Europe in terms of minority rights, as Minority Rights Group International has reported. This included the ethnic, religious and linguistic rights all together. While French constitution recognized the freedom of religion, the treatments and the legal prohibitions against Muslim minority are still debated in the country. The French state has not signed the ECRML as a member of the Council of Europe or the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which is accepted as an important part of the membership conditions by the EU. The main argument behind this has been the incompatibility of such agreements with the French constitution, which does not recognize minority identities.<sup>185</sup>

While such a persistent attitude towards minority groups has been the case in France, the demands from the state from the minority groups and NGO's representing these groups has not declined much. Still many reports are being published by these organizations; some of them are supported by the UN, the EU while the others are independent from institutions. For example, in 2007, The French Committee of the European Bureau for Lesser-used Languages (EBLUL) published a report on the status of the minority rights in France in which all the demands of minority groups are

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<sup>184</sup> Hughes and Sasse 2001, 13

<sup>185</sup> Frickey et. al. 2005, 72



presented and many problems about the state policies are addressed in this policy. However, still in 2011 there has not been any significant policy implementation about minority rights in France. On the contrary, broadcasting in minority languages is more restricted, religious freedoms have been imposed to negative implementations, and schooling opportunities for minority groups in their mother language remains marginal.

Therefore, while the similar external and domestic forces that have been resisting to the state authority to expand the minority rights in France as even the EU pressure is much higher in the French case. However, still the French state has not transformed its policies towards minority groups, while also the Sarkozy government insists on more restrictive regulations on immigration and the expulsion of the alienated minority groups (as seen in the Roma example). The reason behind this persistent nature of French politics is mainly a result of the strong central state authority that has a long history of assimilationist policies towards minority groups. While the similar attitude can be perceived in the Turkish case, the external and the domestic pressures resulted in transformation of Kurdish problem into a Kurdish opening. This can be explained by the opportunity structures that were available for the Kurdish minority in Turkey, but the same opportunities have not been available for the minority groups in France. The policy change in France has been depended on the will of the state and the involvement of the minority groups in these changes remains marginal.

### **3.3.2. State Oriented Factors of Language Regime Change and the French Case**

The presence of counterelite in France has a long history. Exclusionist policies towards minority languages dated back to the unification of French after the French revolution, and since then linguistic minorities have experienced the results of the assimilationist discourse of French nation building process. The legal restrictions and

the persistent hegemony of Jacobins over the French political history limited the demands of linguistic minorities from the beginning as the road for recognition of the minority languages have been a part of the status quo. Positive changes in language policies occurred only when Socialist Party came to power, but the initiatives have been both limited and ineffective in creating sustainable changes that provide positive rights to linguistic minorities.

Therefore, the presence of the linguistic rights supporters as counterelite, did not produce effective results in language policy change. In addition to this, there has never been a new discourse that would enable the change even the involvement of the EU could not liberalize the state-minority relations. On the contrary, the last decades of French language policy evolution showed nationalistic patterns as the importance of French language and universal use of it have been strengthened in many language policies. With the absence of a political hegemony and a new discourse, unlike the Turkish case, the linguistic minorities as counterelites could not create the policy change in France.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

As presented in each regional minority in France, the language policy and its outcomes show a great deal of variance between regional language speakers. Far from providing a unified and solid language policy, the French state has increased the complexity of the case by creating inconsistent and non-sustainable policy mechanisms towards regional minorities. The demands of minority groups have been framed by the educational provisions made by the government while the demands for official status for regional languages have been ignored. However, the interest of the non-governmental organizations, mostly affiliated with the European Union, and the

pressures from the EU itself have been a great importance in keeping minority language discourse alive in France. The importance of political interests over the issue has proved the sensitivity of the language policy in the country. While minority activism in each regional group has its ups and downs, the policy outcome of the demands has been limited to the political interests of the central government most of the time. The most important proof of this fact has been visible in the 2012 presidential election campaigns and the debates among the candidates whether to accept ECRML and give regional languages an official status or not.

However, the reasons behind the failure of the language regime change attempts cannot be attributed only to the French state. Minority groups could not create a unified and effective movement against the central government and the fractionalization of the minority activism have pushed the state to compromise only on paper and limited this to specific groups as shown in the individual cases on each minority groups. With all the empirical evidence on each factors identified as important for language regime change, language politics have not produced change in the French case. In the next chapter, language politics in Turkey, where language politics have followed a different course is discussed within the same argumentative framework.

## CHAPTER 4

### LANGUAGE POLICY AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN TURKEY

#### 4.1. Introduction

Ömer Türkeş, a journalist in *Radikal* newspaper, wrote in his column that Kurdish language has been exposed to a politicization process in which the main problems that Kurdish language faces in contemporary Turkey has not been addressed and the government only responds to a marginal use of Kurdish language, which is neither enough nor reliable.<sup>186</sup> Especially for the last two decades the monolingual language regime of Turkey has faced a serious challenge with the politicization of Kurdish language as a result of the politicization of Kurdish question overall. So far there have been serious developments in the use of Kurdish and other languages, but these seemingly positive changes stuck within the limits of legal and political inconsistencies.<sup>187</sup> Still the policy changes and the structure of legal reforms points to a language regime change in the Turkish context. Compared with the French case discussed before, linguistic demands and language policy in Turkey creates a different picture in terms of the direction of the linguistic rights as language policy in Turkey has been the crucial aspect of the “opening process” that targets the minority languages and other cultural rights. Therefore, Turkish case also requires a close examination to see how monolingual regime has become a part of the official discourse and how language policy has been reformed through time.

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<sup>186</sup> “Kürtçenin Kaynakları”, *Radikal*, June 1 (2012).

<sup>187</sup> Coşkun, Uçarlar, Derince, 2010, 35.

In this context, two questions should be directed. The first one is why and how did the Kurdish language evolve into a politicized subject and a crucial part of the ethnicity regime change in Turkey? And the second one is that how such changes became possible considering the monolingual and anti-ethnic regime composition has been prevalent in the Turkish case. In the French case such tremendous changes have not occurred and even when there are attempts to provide marginal rights to specific linguistic minority groups, the legal protection of the monolingual and anti-ethnic regime is not susceptible to changes. In this respect, Turkish case can be an important source to understand the dynamics of language policy change.

The history of language policy in Turkey has been very complex and reflective of the ideology of consecutive governments.<sup>188</sup> As will be discussed below, the language of the constitution and the linguistic laws has been much politicized and also sometimes vague. The 1982 constitution is the most debated constitution in Turkish history regarding this issue and the echoes of the problems emerged from the laws in this constitution make it the good reference to discuss the earlier phase of the linguistic context of Kurdish question and state-minority relations in Turkey within the post-1980 period. Although none of the policies discussed below directly address Kurdish language, these laws mostly targeted to the Kurdish language perceived as a threat by the post-1980 governments (mostly as a legacy of the military governments ideology), considering the historical context in which 1982 constitution was written. The discussion in this chapter will first include the analysis of the post-1980 linguistic laws and policies in Turkey in a two separate period, and the implications of these laws and policies for the solution or intensification of Kurdish question in its political and social

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<sup>188</sup> Sadoğlu, 2010.

context.<sup>189</sup> In the second part the linguistic map of Turkey and the development of the Kurdish movement in a linguistic context will be discussed to reveal the historical dynamics of the recent language policy changes. Although the historical account of the language policy in modern Turkish history dates back to the early years of the republican period, post-1980 period will be included to illustrate the magnitude of changes in the language regime of Turkey in 2000s.

## **4.2. Language Laws and Policies in Turkey**

### **4.2.1 Language Laws and Policies in Turkey Before 2000**

The effects of 1980 coup dominated the way the language regime in post-1980 period was redefined. The state policies of this period were also crucial in politicizing the use of the Kurdish language and bringing the language issue to the core of cultural contestation that would last for the years to come.<sup>190</sup> Both the existence of Kurdish elements, which might become a political threat in the eyes of the military government unless precautions were taken, and the necessity felt by the military leaders to redefine the new unified Turkish identity without any reservation to ethnic and/or linguistic diversity led to the creation of a Turkish identity with strict borderlines with the 1982 constitution.<sup>191</sup> In this section laws of 1982 constitution concerning minority languages will be discussed and the revisions made until 2000s will be reviewed to see how linguistic policies has evolved during this period. From the legal texts referred below, the legal reflections of the monolingual language regime in Turkey and since 2000's, transformation of language regime in Turkey within the legal context will be presented.

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<sup>189</sup> All the information about the laws and revisions of the Turkish Constitution is accessed from <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/> by the author and analyzed according to the context of the thesis. The translations are made by the author with the exceptions of the cited ones.

<sup>190</sup> Arslan, 2009, 5.

<sup>191</sup> Tanör, 2002.

The 1982 Constitution was less focused on rights but more on duties, limitations and prohibitions, compared to the 1960 Constitution.<sup>192</sup> It is still in effect, with considerable amendments made especially after 2001 that shaped and also has been a part of debates around linguistic rights in Turkey. A much debated pattern, introduced to the Turkish justice system by the 1982 Constitution, is the phrase of “*kanunla yasaklanmış diller*” (languages forbidden by law). The languages that are forbidden by law were made clearer in 1983 with the Law no. 2932. The Constitution, however, before defining which ones are the forbidden languages, brought limitations to the freedoms of expression and publication. It outlawed the expression and spread of ideas (the Article 26/3) and any publication (Article 28/2) in forbidden languages. Both clauses were annulled in October 2001 in line with the EU reform packages.

The Constitution also limited the education of languages of the Turkish citizens and with the Article 42, it is prohibited to teach and study any language, other than Turkish, as a mother tongue. The Article implies that the education in and of other languages are ordered by law, however, none of them could be taught as the mother language of the students, except that the rights granted by international treaties, such as the Lausanne Treaty, are recognized.<sup>193</sup>

One of the legal regulations associated with the problem of mother languages was *Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi Kanunu* (the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching), dated September 14, 1983 and numbered 2923. The law formulated in an interesting way the outlawing of teaching mother languages other than Turkish. Article 2/a stated that the mother languages of the Turkish citizens cannot be taught in any language other than Turkish. Only five day later, on October 19, 1983, after long

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<sup>192</sup> For a comparative analysis of 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, see Tanör 2002.

<sup>193</sup> Oran, 2004.

debates on its formulation, *Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish, no. 2932), was accepted.<sup>194</sup> The Law stated, in its Article 1, that it was a regulation of the languages that were prohibited in order to protect the indivisible unity of the State with its country and nation, the national sovereignty, the Republic, the national security, and the public order. The Law's rationale was that any expression and publication of ideas in the forbidden languages might pose a threat to these precious elements of the republican political order. The second article defined those languages that were forbidden as such: "It is prohibited to express, publicize and broadcast ideas in languages other than the first official languages of the states that are recognized by the Turkish State". This was a carefully drafted definition as the recognition clause was referring to the complicated Iraqi situation at that time.

To provide a general picture, the 1982 Constitution asserts, no language other than Turkish may be studied and taught to the Turkish citizens as their mother languages. The Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching (no. 2923) states, the mother languages of the Turkish citizens may not be taught in a language other than Turkish. The Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish (no. 2932) states, the mother language of Turkish citizens is Turkish. It is forbidden to engage in any activity to use or disseminate languages other than Turkish as the mother language. This body of legal texts on mother languages has been quite confusing. The confusion is, in the first place, caused by the contradictory ideas on whether there are mother languages in Turkey other than Turkish or not. It is hard to resolve it from the phrasing in the Constitution; the Law no. 2923 is affirmative but limits its teaching with

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<sup>194</sup>For the excerpts from the related part of the law, see Appendix 6.



the obligation of using Turkish; and the Law no. 2932 is negative since it states that Turkish is the mother language of all citizens in Turkey.

To continue with this military legislation; *Siyasi Partiler Kanunu* (the Law on Political Parties no. 2820, dated April 22, 1983) have further restriction on the use of languages in political activities. The Law prohibits the use any language other than Turkish by the political parties, with the Article 81, under the section heading “Prevention of Creation of Minorities”, Article 81: Political parties; a) cannot put forward that minorities based on national, religious, confessional, racial, or language differences exist in the Republic of Turkey. b) cannot advocate the goal of destroying national unity or be engaged in activities to this end; by means of protecting, developing, or disseminating language or cultures other than the Turkish language and culture and thus create minorities in the Republic of Turkey. c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and printing party statutes or programs, at congresses, indoors or outside; at demonstrations, and in propaganda; cannot use or distribute placards, pictures, phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements written in a language other than Turkish; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and acts committed by others. However, it is possible to translate party statutes and programs into foreign languages other than those forbidden by law.

The Law on Associations, no. 2908 was accepted on October 10, 1983. The linguistic regime also acted on the languages that are used in the activities of associations or societies, and the Article 6 forbid the use of languages forbidden by the law in their documents, transactions, correspondences, congresses, publications and public banners, and in their formal or private meetings. Similarly, the Law further aimed at the prevention of any political activity that would be operated under associations, which has not been a rarity in Turkish political history.

During the 1990's the course of Kurdish language rights experienced a change with the DYP-SHP coalition. While the previous Özal government imposed policies that emphasize the dominance of Turkish in the political and public realm, a clause to the 1991 Law on Struggle against Terrorism (no. 3713) was added which annulled the Law 2932 that prohibited the use of forbidden languages with a rationale of sustaining the unity of the state. However, still the understanding of Kurdish language as a possible threat was not totally eliminated from the political realm.

The expansion of the audio-visual universe with the emergence of private radio and television broadcasts kept alive the debates on the rights of Kurdish. The broadcastings that began illegally were put into order with *Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radios and Televisions, no. 3984) was prepared and accepted on April 13, 1994. Despite all the confrontations at the political level on the possibility of withdrawing the restrictions of the use of Kurdish on broadcasts, the law strictly limited the language of programs with Turkish because the definition of the language to be used in broadcasting had to be a moderate Turkish that will support the development of the language that is one of the primary elements of national unity. Afterwards, the continuing regulations on language use was a part of a different process. Since 1999 with the status of candidate was given to Turkey as a result of Helsinki European Council, the course of cultural policymaking was accompanied by the European reform packages. In the next section, the laws and regulations that created the biggest change in the monolingual language regime in Turkey will be discussed with their positive and negative implications.

#### **4.2.2. Linguistic Laws and Policies in Turkey Since 2000**

During the last decade the language regime in Turkey experienced unprecedented changes in terms of the visibility of the Kurdish and other minority languages in the public realm. Although the initiatives have not been adequate for the solution of the language problems in the country, the new steps taken by the AKP government has changed the way the Turkish state deal with the Kurdish problem. Both with the involvement of the EU reform packages and the introduction of a new discourse about minority issues, Kurdish problem, once seen only as a militaristic issue, evolved into a the cultural and political movement.

In 2001, on March 19, the National Program of Turkey for the Harmonization of the European Union *Acquis Communautaire* was adopted by the Council of Ministers. In the Program, the issue of language was stated, as well, with some reservations. It was stated that the official language and the formal education language of the Republic of Turkey are Turkish. This, however, does not prohibit the free usage of different languages, dialects and tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purposes of separatism and division. It was the declaration of what was obvious, as the penal code already criminalized separatism. However, it was a clear statement, which accepted that there were languages other than Turkish in Turkey.

On the other hand, the way the State conceptualized these languages was remarkably interesting. There was no reference to mother languages, but to languages, tongues and dialects that were spoken by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This pattern would become a popular one to be repeated in a number of new legal texts. The State was cautious about the language issue, as the European Union was becoming increasingly sensitive on language rights in its member countries, and for the candidates, as well. The acceptance of that there are different mother languages would

bring forward a conflict with the EU standards and the traditional politics of language against the minority languages. Turkey, until now, has noted reservations in the application of the agreements of the United Nations and the EU on cultural and linguistic rights, or has not ever signed them. Baskın Oran marks that a common reservation of the Turkish State in her participation in international agreements usually brings forward the Lausanne Treaty. Oran reports that a typical reservation looked as the following:

“The Republic of Turkey reserves her right to apply the Article xxx, according to the provisions and the verdicts of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and their appendixes.”<sup>195</sup>

This kind of a reservation basically aims at the refusal of recognizing any minority other than those of the Lausanne Treaty.

One critical moment towards the change of the language regime was the enactment of The Law Amending Several Articles of the Constitution (No. 4709) on October 3, 2001. It covered 35 articles, two of which aimed at removing restrictions on the use of different languages and dialects. According to Article 9 of the Law, the clause, which read, no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought is deleted from Article 26 of the Constitution. In the same vein, the Article 10 of the Law deleted the second paragraph of Article 28 of the Constitution, which read, “Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law”. However, Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads, “no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training and at education” remains intact today. However, with the opening of the private Kurdish courses, a negative interpretation of the law was not publicized during the reform process.

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<sup>195</sup> Oran 2004, 49

In March 2002, another regulation in line with efforts of harmonization with the EU was decreed. The Law no. 4748, titled *Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun* (the Law Amending Various Laws) followed the Law no. 4709 and deleted the clause from the Article 16/5 of the Basın Kanunu (the Law on Press, no. 5680), which banned the use of languages forbidden by law. The government used the harmonization process very successfully as during this period many such changes occurred within the Turkish Civil Law. With such changes Kurdish language in mainstream newspapers has been used and even in *Radikal* a handbook for Kurdish language was published.<sup>196</sup>

A package of major amendments in the existing laws was issued in the summer of 2002. On August 3, the Law Amending Various Laws, no. 4771, was accepted, which contained two articles enabling broadcasting in non-official languages and allowing private courses to be opened for the teaching of non-official languages, which are referred in the law as “the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives”.<sup>197</sup> This change led to the opening of the private Kurdish courses after 2004 in various cities both in the eastern part of the Turkey and in the big cities like İstanbul.

In July 2003, the title of the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching (dated 1983) was changed as *Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi ile Türk Vatandaşlarının Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerinin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching, and on Learning Different Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives), which is still in effect. Its second article was amended as follows:

“No language other than Turkish can be taught in educational institutions and in schools to the Turkish citizens as their mother language. However, private

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<sup>196</sup> “Yeni Başlayanlar İçin Kürtçe Rehberi”, *Radikal*, June 17, 2012.

<sup>197</sup> Eraydın-Virtanen 2003, 35.

courses can be opened for learning different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.”

The Regulation regulates the establishment, operation and supervision of the private language courses. In 2004, after a number of failed attempts, eight Kurdish private language courses were finally opened in Kurdish-populated cities of the southeast Turkey. In Şanlıurfa, the opening of the first Kurdish course was celebrated by thousands of people.<sup>198</sup> Most of these courses were closed as the number of people attending these courses did not meet the financial costs.<sup>199</sup> As understood from the language of the regulation, these courses are not offered or funded by the state. Although these attempts broke the barriers of the language regime that has been persistent in the Turkish system, the sustainability of these provisions is not protected by the state. These educational attempts and their results resemble very much to the French case where the educational opportunities provided by the legal system have not been realized or systematized within the educational system.

The most important challenge to the monolingual structure in Turkey has been the inclusion of minority languages in the broadcasting system so far. In 2004, the Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives (*Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik*) was accepted. The Regulation was composed of procedures related to broadcasts carried out by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*, TRT) in different languages and dialects. Strikingly, the TRT appealed to the Council of State to annul the Regulation on the grounds that an autonomous state institution could not be obliged to

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<sup>198</sup> “Kürtçe Kursuna miting gibi açılış”, *Radikal*, March 13, 2004.

<sup>199</sup> “Bir efsanenin sonu”, *Radikal*, July 19, 2005.

broadcast in minority languages.<sup>200</sup> As a result of this regulation, Turkish state television, TRT, began broadcasting in Kurdish and other minority languages, namely Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian and Zazaki in TRT 3 in 2004.

Moreover, in 2009, TRT 6 a new channel which is entirely broadcasting in Kurdish was established. While this was considered a great step towards recognizing minority languages, mostly Kurdish language as it experienced the harshest challenge from the state, it also marked the most visible symptom of the language regime change in Turkey. In France no such expanded coverage for the minority languages has been granted to linguistic minority groups. However, the most problematic side of this initiative was that TRT as a state institution controls all the input that the channel is broadcasting. At the beginning, most of the criticisms came from the inexperienced officials that create the programs and prepare the content for the broadcast.<sup>201</sup> However, later many Kurdish intellectuals and scholars that work on the Kurdish language supported the channel to provide a better content for the public. Today, the channel provides a wide range of programs on politics, culture, and news in Kurdish. The opening of this channel is still considered as the most important step that AKP government has taken regarding linguistic rights. This state-owned initiative is the most publicized initiative and has been considered as a symptom of further changes.

The reactions and the problematic sides of this initiative will be discussed in the next part, but considering the whole picture in Turkey in general, this new development could not satisfy the demands of every language community in Turkey, primarily because it excluded some of the minority languages such as Laz. After the establishment of TRT 6, Laz community prepared a report on their demands to protect their language

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<sup>200</sup> Uçarlar 2009, 148.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, 150.

to the parliamentary constitutional committee (*Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu??*).<sup>202</sup> On the other hand, this development opened the way for new opportunities for Kurdish minority. During the same year Mardin Artuklu University opened the Department of Kurdish Language and Literature. With the recent debates on the optional Kurdish language course in public schools, this department will provide Kurdish language teachers for such programs,<sup>203</sup> because as seen in the earlier experiences of private Kurdish courses, private initiatives were not successful to generate public interest towards this language. Unlike the Breton *Diwan* schools in France, this department is directly a state university program and this is directly a state initiative and the expansion of such departments is expected. From the beginning, the definitions provided by the legal texts have served as a barrier for the minorities to express their demands on cultural rights. The official discourse before 2000s ignored the existence of the minority languages in the country and even included them among the prohibited languages, but after the AKP government came to power many changes were made within the legal system and the recognition of minority languages came to an unprecedented level. This course of change is continuing with new opportunities and initiatives although there is still an ongoing debate on whether these changes points to a better level of state-minority relations. In any case, these changes in the Turkish case created a language regime transformation within the legal system and the official discourse.

In this part, the legal and political changes about the use of Kurdish and other minority languages in Turkey have been presented chronologically. These changes are the outcomes of the government's initiatives about the linguistic communities within the country. However, to understand the magnitude of these changes, the linguistic map of Turkey and the historical background of minority activism in the country should be

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<sup>202</sup> “Lazlar Meclis’te”, *Hürriyet*, March 17, 2012.

<sup>203</sup> “100 Kürtçe Eğitimimiz var”, *Radikal*, June 14, 2012.



presented. Although there is not concrete information about the number of speakers of minority languages in Turkey, in the next part, the linguistic map of Turkey will be presented with reference to the early censuses and academic works on this issue.

### **4.3. Dynamics of Language Regime in Turkey: The Case for Transformation of Language Regime**

#### **4.3.1. Minority-Oriented Factors of Language Regime Change and the Turkish Case**

##### **4.3.1.1. Linguistic Minorities in Turkey, Kurdish Question and PKK Terrorism**

In the previous parts of this chapter, a short sketch from a long legal history of the Turkish language has been presented. The laws and regulations certainly point out how the language ideology of the official institutions and the authorities in charge were reified in order to establish a corresponding language regime. However, the history of official arrangement alone does not define the ways in which language regimes are practiced, why and how questions should not be addressed without considering the context behind these changes. It is necessary to look at the composition of the minority languages spoken in the country and the historical evolution of the minority activism that pushed the official ideology to question its assimilationist and monolingual perspective.

On the other hand, the sources of data for such information are rather poor for the country. The State was uncompromisingly headed for a linguistic homogenization, with all the laws decreed and campaigns organized, which in turn is an evidence of a multi-linguistic situation in Turkey. The citizens who were born into a non-Turkish linguistic environment in the families and household have been considerable in number.

It was therefore the State aimed at the leveling of the linguistic diversity in favor of Turkish. However, it was not an easy task to work on the statistical information on these numbers. How many people in fact were speaking Turkish as a mother language? How was the homogenization process working? And, how was the linguistic shift effective between generations of non-Turkish speakers? These questions address to the formation of the current linguistic map of Turkey

#### **4.3.1.1.1. Linguistic Map of Turkey**

As far as known, the only way the State devised on collecting information about the linguistic composition of the country was the censuses, of which history has been given below. For a very long, in fact until the 1990s the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the population was a taboo subject to be studied in the academia. Auto censoring has been quite powerful in the Turkish universities in order to avoid dealing with sensitive issues such as cultural diversity of the society, which was outlawed by the Constitution. Rare exhibitions of bravery were immediately punished by the political regime, as it was the case for İsmail Beşikçi, who served many years in prison for the reason that his studies on the Kurdish population encouraged separatism.

Following is the compilation of the information from the two extended studies or collection of data about the linguistic composition of the Turkish population. Although these numbers are inconsistent and belong to different times, a general picture of the linguistic diversity in Turkey can be obtained from these numbers. One of the most cited study on Turkish demographic is Fuat Dündar's book. Dündar compiled the relevant numbers of the censuses between 1927 and 1965, and explained them with respect to the way the questions were formulated. He included in the work his analyses of the repercussions of counting the minorities of Turkey and he presented the speeches

and declarations by the authorities on the significance and political implications of the censuses. Dündar explains the ways in which the questions on language were formulated. In the censuses of 1927 and 1935, the mother language was defined as the language spoken among family members. In 1940, it was the language spoken in the household. In 1955, the mother language was described as the tongue conventionally spoken in the household, within the family. In the following censuses, it was defined as the language of the household and within the family.<sup>204</sup>

The second language, on the other, was another information that was researched. The question on the second language was first asked to the respondent in 1935. In 1935 and 1945, the second language was formulated as —the language the respondent knows to speak other than her mother language. In the next three subsequent censuses, the question was asked as the language best spoken other than the mother language.<sup>205</sup> While Dündar uses censuses as primary data for the numbers obtained in the book, these numbers are quite problematic for various reasons. As Mete Tunçay states that there are inconsistencies in numbers of ethnic communities with respect to respective languages and religions:

“In the last census of 1965, in which questions related to language and religion were asked, there were around ten thousand people who answered that they spoke Hebrew, but the number of the Jews was around 40.000. 8.000 Greek speakers but 80.000 Greek-Orthodox, and 33.000 speakers of Armenian but around 70.000 people associated with the Gregorian Church.”<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Dündar F., 1999, p. 67.

<sup>205</sup> Dündar F., 1999, p. 68.

<sup>206</sup> Tunçay, 1983, p. 1563

Therefore the numbers from this book should be compared with other sources although most of the available data about the population of ethnic groups in Turkey does not rely on the official sources as none is available.<sup>207</sup>

The main source used in this thesis for the linguistic map of Turkey and France is the *Ethnologue*, a worldwide reference book on languages spoken in every country and the only source that include information on the languages spoken in Turkey and France. The numbers in this book are collected from a wide range of sources on each country and it is the most updated source for this topic. As mentioned before, both in Turkey and France, official data on the minority languages do not exist as a result of the assimilationist political structure in both countries. While these numbers are mostly estimates, they are a product of extended studies on each language community.

Kurdish population makes up the largest language minority with the number around 8 million, including all the dialects used by the Kurdish population. Such a diversity of varieties of Kurdish and the disagreement on their classification, without any doubt, is a consequence of a lack of a central political power that would utilize Kurdish as the language of a polity. The political pressures on Kurds, and therefore their language, inevitably ended in the absence of reliable linguistic studies on Kurdish. The categorizations of the Kurdish varieties are rarely more than derivations from ethnographic guesses and personal experiences and observations about a population that is highly mobile, both socially and geographically. Concerning the official reaction to Kurdish and its variants in Turkey, there are chiefly two distinct attitudes. One of them, as noted above, is denial: Kurdish has never been an authentic language. It is either a distorted form of Turkish or Persian, or just a tribal tongue that does not deserve to be

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<sup>207</sup> For the compiled information about minority languages in censuses of Turkey from Eraydın-Virtanen 2003, Tunçay 1983, and Dündar 1999, see Appendix 7.

classified as a proper language.<sup>208</sup> It is worth to note that the emphasis on the distortedness which can be considered as a result of the republican understanding holds that Kurds are inferior to Turks.

The second attitude towards Kurdish has been the overemphasis on the dialectical diversity of the language. This approach is, certainly in close relationship with the first one above. This was best exemplified in the choice of languages for broadcasting in 2004. When the State began to start broadcasting in minority languages in 2004, five languages that are spoken by Turkish citizens in their daily lives were designated: Arabic, Bosnian and Circassian, Kurmanji and Zazaki. At the time, TRT asked statistical information about the linguistic minorities from *Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü* (State Institute of Statistics, DİE), and the data that was sent to TRT as a response was the results of the census of 1965. TRT declared that the design of language allocation was based on scientific evidence.<sup>209</sup>

However, among these languages a very few of them are recognized by the state during the reforms made on the language policy since the last decade. Moreover, many of these languages will eventually become extinct as the speakers are declining.<sup>210</sup> While the AKP government achieved to break the assimilationist and monolingual official state ideology, still more attention should be given to the languages existing in the country. As will be presented later in this chapter, only some linguistic groups such as Kurdish could create a movement to preserve the language and expand the use of it, which have resulted in the changing language reforms. Transformation of language regime in Turkey occurred with the expansion of language rights in some areas. The magnitude and the political implications of the Kurdish movement politicized the

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<sup>208</sup> “30 bin kelimelik bir Kürtçe roman yaz bastırması benden”, *Zaman*, May 18, 2003.

<sup>209</sup> “Lehçelerde nüfus savaşı”, *Yeni Şafak*, October 25, 2004.

<sup>210</sup> Haig 2003, 130.

cultural rights of this community more than the other. Compared to other language communities in Turkey, Kurdish population has been the most active group in Turkish politics, which in the long run publicize their demands more and create a political agenda. However, there is still a need for further effort towards preserving these languages.

An outline of the Kurdish movement with its changing course within the Turkish politics to gain political and cultural rights is required to understand the emerging transformation of the language regime in Turkey. In the following parts, the content of the Kurdish political movement and its discourse on cultural rights as well as the reactions from the consecutive governments will be discussed.

#### **4.3.1.1.2. Kurdish Question and Kurdish Movement Since 1980's**

The nationalist and assimilationist outlook of the Turkish state since the beginning of the Republican period is a well-accepted phenomenon as the Kemalist legacy within the constitution and the successive reforms made during the continuing modernization process in Turkey have all reflected this ideology. Kemalist ideology adopted a unitary identity formation among the members of the nation and did not recognize the existence of multiple identities within its territory. This ideology sought for minority assimilation and renunciation of distinct identities existing in the country. This long legacy is challenged in many times by the members of Kurdish minority groups that demand the recognition of their separate identity as Kurdish. However, the voice of these people was silenced as they were considered as separatists and terrorists.

The left wing movement mostly included Alevi Kurds during 1960s and 1970s and as a part of it. Minority parties, mostly parties representing Kurdish minority, in Turkey have a long history of trials, court hearings and democratic challenges. Before

1970's, Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey was established, but could not achieve a popular support from the Kurdish population.<sup>211</sup> The beginning of political and more significantly leftist attempts by the Kurdish population, as explained by Romano, is a result of different factors. According to him, the socio-political environment of the 1960's onward enabled Kurdish elite to form a more publicized, left oriented movement from the rural and tribal form of the old Kurdish movement. The availability of the worker movements in the western part of the Turkey created a new discourse among the new elites of Kurdish community.<sup>212</sup> However, with the available popularity of the leftist movements and mass support for it pushed Kurdish activists into an alliance with the labor movement during the 1970's. During this period, the Labor Party was the main arena for Kurdish movement to raise its voice in politics. There were other parties that Kurds could participate like the New Turkey Party, or the Unity Party, but the Labor Party had more impact in the Turkish politics.<sup>213</sup> However, with the expansion of the Kurdish nationalist views in the party, it was closed down in 1970 because of its pro-Kurdish statements. Moreover, in 1979 when a cabinet minister Şerafettin Elçi declared himself as a Kurd created a big scandal and marked a significant point for the 1980 coup.<sup>214</sup>

While statements about the existence of Kurdish minority were illegal and considered as separatist by the state, the conflict between the state and the Kurdish minority intensified significantly over the period of time. This was mainly a result of the increasing assimilationist policies implemented by the military power as especially the use of Kurdish language was banned in any public place.<sup>215</sup> However, the most

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<sup>211</sup> Barkey, 1998, 134.

<sup>212</sup> Romano 2006, 62.

<sup>213</sup> Barkey, 130.

<sup>214</sup> Yavuz 2001, 10.

<sup>215</sup> Uçarlar, 2009, 134.

important era began with the 1980 military coup in Turkey as the activism among Kurdish people became more violent after this time. The emergence of PKK during the early 1980s with its terrorist activities added another dimension to the Kurdish problem after this period. The increasing conflict between the military and the PKK resulted in a large number of casualties were perceived by the public as a failure to an extent that the state could not legitimized its capacity for delivering welfare to its citizens.

PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) was established in 1984 as a terrorist organization, and has been fighting with the Turkish state for political, territorial and cultural rights since then. Interestingly, prior to Öcalan's capture in 1999, the PKK itself did not attach much importance to increased rights for cultural expression, preferring to pursue political and territorial goals. Indeed, Öcalan considered traditional Kurdish culture to be backward and the language, in its present state, inadequate.<sup>216</sup> He has persistently used Turkish as a vehicle for spreading his own beliefs, a fact that is regularly repeated in official Turkish sources as evidence of the inferiority of Kurdish. While language did not have a primary role in Kurdish politics and mostly focused on the violent actions in 1980's and 90's, since 1999, cultural rights has been a part of the Kurdish movement and had an extended role within the political side of the Kurdish movement. After this time, language has been a part of the political debates as the Kurdish political parties adopted such a discourse. This change in the orientation of the Kurdish movement paved the way for the continuous political developments in the 2000's.

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<sup>216</sup> Haig, 127.



#### 4.3.2.1.2.1. Kurdish Political Parties Since 1990's

The political system in Turkey enabled the minor parties to be active in politics and become a part of the political discourse to express the demands of minority groups in the political sphere. Minority parties, which belong to the Kurdish minority totally or support the extended linguistic rights for minority groups, have been present in the Turkish political arena. The history of Kurdish minority parties goes back to the early years of republican period such as Kurdish National Party (*Kürd Milli Fırkası*), which emerged in 1919 and represented the separatist ideology for Kurdish population. Other parties like the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Turkey have been present in the successive decades and faced severe confrontations with the state because of the separatist claims and the strict regulations on non-recognition that dominated the state ideology. However, 1990s experienced the more active participation of Kurdish minority with the establishment of People's Labour Party (HEP) and its successors like the Democracy Party (DEP), Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP). While none of these parties gained an actual participation in the parliament because of their marginalized public support. HADEP achieved a big success during the local elections of 1999 by winning 39 municipalities.<sup>217</sup> Like the other successive parties like Democratic People Party (DEHAP) and Democratic Society Party (DTP), all were closed as they were claimed to be a part of PKK terrorist organizations. The last party that represents the Kurdish minority is the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which supports 64 independent parliamentary candidates in 41 cities.<sup>218</sup>

The legal activism by the Kurds in Turkey came from these political parties, which have a long debated and challenging history. These political parties became the

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<sup>217</sup> Uçarlar 2009, 136.

<sup>218</sup> "İşte BDP'nin adayları" Beyazgazete, April 11, 2011.

only legitimate way by which Kurdish demands have been politicized and publicized to a greater extent. Although the route of Kurdish activism was defined with the violent actions of PKK during 80's, 1990's marked a different type of Kurdish involvement in Turkish politics with the establishment of consecutive pro-Kurdish political parties. The first of these political parties was *Halkin Emek Partisi* (HEP, or People's Labor Party). HEP was founded June 1990 by a group of people including eleven members of the Turkish Parliament, but in a short period of time, public meetings and outspoken promotion of Kurdish political and cultural rights by the party created concern among many bureaucratic and elected officials. While the party faced constant pressure from police, public prosecutors, and many members of Parliament, it managed to play a prominent part in Turkish politics for several years. The representative power of the party that was unprecedented compared to other parties that promoted Kurdish rights made it unique in the republican history. The creation of the HEP marked the onset of a new phase in Turkish-Kurdish relations that had begun in the late 1980s but had not really captured public or political attention as such. Domestically, reconciling an espousal of democratic principles with the suppression of Kurdish political and social expression also became increasingly difficult. Parliament also added to the new voices: early parliamentary elections held on 29 November 1987 brought a handful of outspoken pro-Kurdish deputies to Ankara.<sup>219</sup> By the late 1980s, state agencies no longer had the cultural power to enforce an ideology at odds not only with demographic realities, but also with their own long-time emphasis on the principle of democratic government. Political parties, in turn, increasingly began to reflect the diversity of political voices that existed within the different religious and ethnic groups that constituted Turkish society. The HEP was founded in 1990 by eleven members of

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<sup>219</sup> Watts, 636.

Parliament who had been expelled from or had left the SHP (more on this later). Their goal was nothing short of radical, for they sought to alter the premises of a form of Turkish nationalism that had been promoted for many decades. Nevertheless, they sought to accomplish this politically, and, when possible, by using democratic discourse also supported by Turkish officials. In the first year or so of its existence, the HEP deputies avoided Kurdish nationalist views and called the HEP a party for all.<sup>220</sup>

On the one hand, the existence of the HEP, along with President Turgut Ozal's meetings with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the repeal of the prohibition of Kurdish in public places, seemed to signify a willingness to try a new approach to Kurdish issues in Turkey. On the other hand, the obstacles and threats that HEP members faced—particularly in the larger context of the military's strong arm tactics in the mostly Kurdish southeastern part of the country, along with various court decisions limiting the publication of pro-Kurdish material—suggested continued state resistance to any overt demonstrations of Kurdish political identity. Although the deputies of HEP were punished, Kurdish was already becoming increasingly visible. In spite of various ways of legal and illegal prosecutions and oppression, publications and music records in Kurdish were becoming a part of Kurds' daily lives. In 1991, when Süleyman Demirel's DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party) made a coalition with SHP to establish the government, declared that they recognized the Kurdish reality.<sup>221</sup> Until then, it was a problem of terrorism, anarchy, underdevelopment, unemployment, *eşkiyalık* (banditry) etc., but never a problem concerned with Kurdishness. Turgut Özal, the president then, was frequently referring to the Kurdish problem, as well. After a very long time, Kurdishness was voiced aloud, as a political issue. The difficulty was that there were no solid steps taken to solve it.

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<sup>220</sup> *Halkın Emek Partisi Program* 1992, 18-19.

<sup>221</sup> Düzgören, 1994, p. 124

The HEP was later closed down by the Constitutional Court in July 1993, but the party's supporters founded the *Demokrasi Partisi* (DEP) to take its place. However, the DEP also was closed in 1994 and party members lost their seats in Parliament. After that the party was re-established as the *Halkin Demokrasi Partisi* (People's Democracy Party, or HADEP). HADEP's participation in the December 1995 national election and insistent presence of pro-Kurdish parties in politics through the local and national elections of 1999 suggested that a Kurdish political "house" had been built in the Turkish political system.<sup>222</sup> However, HADEP also banned in 2003 on the grounds that it supported PKK while the decision was found by European Court of Human Rights to be contrary to Article 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention on Human Rights.<sup>223</sup> In 2004, *Demokratik Toplum Partisi* (Democratic Society Party, DTP) was founded in the midst of reform process in Turkish politics, which flourished after AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power. Although, DTP succeeded another Kurdish nationalist party HADEP, *Demokratik Halk Partisi* (DEHAP) also merged with it.

MPs for DTP declared that TRT 6 is a great success in the struggle led by the Kurdish people. Indeed, TRT 6 signifies a change in the mainstream Turkish policy that sees the freedom for the Kurdish language as a threat to national unity.<sup>224</sup> In the general elections of July 2007, twenty independent deputies were able to win seats and re-establish a group under the DTP banner in the Parliament. Following the General Assembly in August 2007, the DTP criticized its own failures, citing a lack of

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<sup>222</sup> Watts 1999, 632.

<sup>223</sup> The whole decision document can be found at  
<<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102256>>.

<sup>224</sup> Uçarlar, 151.

democracy within the party and an incapability to represent all the oppressed groups, working classes and the democrats in Turkey.<sup>225</sup>

#### **4.3.1.3. Role of Transnational Actors**

The involvement of the EU in terms of minority rights in Turkey did not gain an explicit voice during the earlier phases of negotiation process, but the increasing attention to the minority rights by the domestic political circles as well as continuing pressures from Kurdish elite to the EU made it possible for the EU to adopt a more specific language.<sup>226</sup> This was mainly the result of the ongoing non-recognition policies within the Turkish political agenda. However, as the Copenhagen criteria was considered as the key element for Turkey for full membership, the emphasis on minority rights needed more open discussions in the political sphere. While, the 2004 and later policies were implemented in an environment where skepticism towards EU accession increased, the Kurdish elite remained loyal to the EU support because of the impact on EU pressures in democratization towards minority rights was high. Actually, the public support for the EU increased rights after the first steps of Kurdish opening were implemented. The empirical evidence showed that the EU support increased after the reforms were implemented. Also Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy confirmed in their article that, by 1999, when the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU had increased, the Turkish governments carried out several important reforms in order to give more domestic rights to the Kurdish minority and as a result public and political support

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<sup>225</sup> See the full text on the official website of Baskın Oran, who ran as one of the independent candidates (Istanbul) in the elections 2007, though he did not win a seat. During the same year, the DTP proposed a democratic solution, which was mainly based on democratic self-administration of all 'diversities' to be represented by their symbols see "DTP: Ezilenlerin Sesi Olmayı Başaramadık", August 10, 2007, *Bianet.org*. Furthermore, it was declared at the Democratic Society Congress in 2007 that the operational language of DTP would be Kurdish. For the full text of the declaration see "DTP Kongresi Sonuç Bildirgesinin Tam Metni", October 31 2007, *Bianet.org*.

<sup>226</sup> Moustakis and Chauduri 2005, 87

(excluding MHP party) increased significantly.<sup>227</sup> The EU conditionality for the advancement of the accession process and led to a certain improvement in human rights policies in Turkey and this created an opportunity for NGOs to put pressure on Turkey through EU channels, while also lobbying for the upholding of the accession prospect for Turkey into the EU.<sup>228</sup> Therefore, while non-governmental organizations emphasized the solution for Kurdish problem both domestically and via the EU channels, the government's concerns about the minority rights increased significantly. Moreover, Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) stated in their 2004 report that minority rights should be the most important issue areas where Turkey needs to implement the EU policy requirements and addressed to the negative treatments targeted towards Kurdish minority about linguistic rights.

Apart from the direct influence of the EU on the political reforms about minority rights in Turkey, other external factors were effective in creating a network where Kurdish people and the members of other minority groups could express their demands from the Turkish state. Various NGO's (most of them were in cooperation with the EU) were active in the reform process. One of the most significant examples among them was the Document for Mutual Understanding was published a civic initiative supported by NGO's from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States facilitated participation by Turks, Kurds, and members of other minority groups in Turkey. While this initiation was an initiation from a marginal community, the organization named Center for the Research of Societal Problems (TOSAV), published this document with the support of a US rooted NGO, National Endowment for Democracy, and this effort was a part of the civil society involvement in the minority problems beyond the borders of Turkey. Doğu Ergil, as an initiator of this project, outlines the targets and the scope

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<sup>227</sup> Müftüleri-Baç and Gürsoy 2010, 416.

<sup>228</sup> Çelik 2006, 145.

of this document in promoting the recognition of minority rights in Turkey in his article. As he also acknowledges, the support for such activism remains marginal to the members of the minority groups in Turkey and fails to expand a larger audience.<sup>229</sup> However, the active support from the other countries, where Kurdish people could create a transnational network clearly shows the transnational side of the Kurdish problem apart from the EU related arguments.

Moreover, as the reforms in the Turkish case was mainly limited to the linguistic rights, many international and transnational organizations started to include Kurdish language as a language category. Kurdish Institutes have been active in many cities like Stockholm, Brussels, Paris and Washington, and have been a part of knowledge accumulation about the history of Kurdish language reaching to a global audience. Most of the Kurdish elites living in Turkey have been a part of such activism. The EU based research center on minority languages MERCATOR, adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) as the primary document for linguistic rights across the Europe and included Kurdish as a minority language spoken in a large landscape. ECRML was adopted in 1992, signed and ratified by most of the EU member states as well as non-member states for protection of minority languages. Kurdish language is a part of the Charter as a protected minority language, but Turkey is not included as the Charter has not been signed by the Turkish government yet. However, the inclusion of the language to the Charter is a legitimizing tool by the Kurdish elite to put pressure on the Turkish government.

The last argument about the Kurdish activism and the policy reforms was about the Kurdish Diaspora, which added a transnational character to the Kurdish minority demands in Turkey. Uçarlar in her extended project on Kurdish minority, argues that

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<sup>229</sup> Ergil 2000, 135.

media channel MED-TV was a transnational channel that expanded Kurdish community to a transnational space where it has a motto like the national TRT channel in Turkey.<sup>230</sup> Through this channel, the Kurdish diaspora gained a voice, where they express themselves in a free zone. Moreover, the fact that Kurdish minorities has confronted European states about their immigrant or minority rights, their possibility to organize around their cause had a spillover effect within the Kurdish population in Turkey, who tried to identify themselves with these movements and tried to get their support and advocacy.<sup>231</sup> This media network that Kurdish diaspora have developed is considered as a way to sustain the existence of such community and provide a counter movement against suppression with the use of a boundless space with freedom of expression. The fact that MED-TV or ROJ-TV has experienced problems in many countries increases the potential of the network to be a part of a resistance movement.<sup>232</sup>

Unfortunately, when the overall relations of NGO's and other transnational networks and actors involved within the policy reforms in the Turkish case are analyzed, the marginal success of these networks is observable and limited to the EU funded projects and networks. Of course the transnational aspect of the Kurdish issue has remained important as the organizations mentioned above continue to be a part of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. If we turn back to the state power and capacity arguments, it was clear that the initiation of Kurdish opening coincided with the declining public support for the pre-AKP governments' policies to solve the problem to a significant extent. The shifting political discourse away from the centralized, unitary Kemalist arguments with the ideological hegemony was contested by the AKP government, the possibility for such democratization process increased. The

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<sup>230</sup> Uçarlar 2009, 240-41.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid, 246.

<sup>232</sup> Karim 1998, 10.



politicization of Kurdish problem with the increasing public appearance of minority parties in the political arena gives more strength to the Kurdish population. However, these processes were accompanied by the intensified negotiations with the EU from the initial periods and the civil society was able to reach a great number of information provided by the media about the democratic policy initiations required by the EU. Therefore, the Turkish state experienced a double pressure both from the civil society where Kurdish elite gained more political and public means to publicize their demands, and from the increasing pressures from the EU as the AKP government intentionally adopted a pro-EU stance. The European countries where Kurdish minorities have been able to organize more freely have been the homeland for numerous NGO's directed by the Kurdish diaspora.

#### **4.3.2. State-Oriented Factors of Language Regime Change and the Turkish Case**

Language policy and linguistic rights in Turkey presents a complex picture as the context of the minority activism primarily by the Kurdish population has its unique characteristics that have made the solution of the Kurdish problem both harder and easier. The violent aspect of the Kurdish movement enabled governments to act autonomously from the demands of the Kurdish minority as Kurdish movement and their demands were considered solely as terrorist actions. However, during the last decade AKP acted in a different way and treated PKK terrorism and language rights in different policy mechanisms.

While successive coalition governments included Kurdish problem in their agenda with more liberal attitude towards minority rights, their relatively weak autonomy over the policy mechanisms prevented policy change and increased the vulnerability of the state in domestic problems. While the challenge to the long

established Kemalist tradition intensified with the Welfare Party, the marginal power of the party over policy mechanisms lacked the available resources for policy change. However, starting 2001, significant policy changes began to take place in Turkey during CHP-MHP-ANAP coalition<sup>233</sup>. The role of intensified relations with the EU during and after this period has been among the major forces that motivated the policy change in Turkey during the coalition period. The real significant shift came with the AKP government, which acted more autonomously from the external influences with its political power, and the period since 2002 signified a bigger change in Turkish political history. From the first year, that the party came into power, the liberal anti-assimilationist agenda was present in AKP policy agenda. The pro-EU attitude of the party and the intense Turkey-EU relations during that period also increased the speed of policy reforms occurred in Turkey during successive AKP governments.<sup>234</sup> In terms of language policy, there have been various policy changes in Turkey significantly since 2002. All of the reforms that have been made are about the linguistic rights that enabled the public use of minority languages in media and educational purposes and the main reason behind this was the importance of the demands for the use Kurdish language by the ethnolinguistic Kurdish minority.

While the existence of counterelite in Turkey can be traced back in 1950s with the DP party government that presented a different policy agenda than the CHP's Kemalist agenda, existence of minority groups in the country was not a crucial part of the policy agenda. The most significant counterelite came about with the rising power of the pro-Islamist parties in Turkish politics and among them, only the AKP had the resources to introduce the policy change with enough political autonomy, capacity to mobilize public opinion towards its new discourse. The rise of Kurdish problem as a

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<sup>233</sup> Hale 2003, 109.

<sup>234</sup> Efeğil 2011, 28.

part of the political agenda provided necessary basis for the AKP government to introduce what is called now as 'Kurdish opening'. Kurdish opening and the resulting policy changes have been more crucial for explaining the change in language policy in Turkey since 2002. The presence of the counterelite is not a new phenomenon in Kurdish problem, but the other internal dynamics created the opportunity mechanisms for policy change. The political hegemony and the available means of institutionalizing the new discourse acquired by the AKP government were unprecedented as any other parties that expressed pro-liberal reforms concerning linguistic rights. The challenges that AKP brought against the Kemalist ideology that adopted a universalistic stance towards different identities showed the clear break up with the existing relations between the state and the ethnolinguistic Kurdish minority. This new discourse led to more politicization of linguistic rights in the public and the political realm, which as a result achieved more support for the policy change from the members of Kurdish population and also by the non-Kurdish supporters of the party. Moreover, maybe the most important factor, political hegemony that the party gained as the majority party with a large proportion of representatives (two-thirds majority) in the parliament provided the necessary political capacity for policy change to the party.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

Language regime in Turkey has been challenged by the Kurdish minority especially since 1980's with the emergence of PKK as a terrorist group which brought Kurdish issue to a very different level from what it had been before that period. Not only it helped the politicization of Kurdish demands but also increased the security concerns of the Turkish state. While it is definitely not my purpose to justify terrorist actions of PKK, it is evident from the narrative of Turkish language politics that securitization of Kurdish question led Turkish state to recognize the Kurdish problem

and started the efforts for desecuritizing the problem by eliminating the militant part of the movement and communicate with the minority group by officially recognizing the cultural aspect of the movement. Today it is fair to say the Kurdish problem has come to an unprecedented stage considering the history of the attitude of the state towards minority groups.

Apart from the political aspect of the availability of the reform in the Turkish politics, the demands and the level of activism by the Kurdish population acted as a driving point for the politicization of the minority problems, following reforms, and possible future initiatives about the language rights in the country. Persistent involvement of the Kurdish parties in Turkish politics since 1980's enabled politicization of the Kurdish problems rather than staying just as a military issue. Unlike the French case where minority groups have been more marginalized in the political arena, in Turkey political involvement of the largest minority group helped formulation of alternative solutions. In France, there has not been such a level of political participation by the minority groups, and also minority parties cannot gain even a marginal role in French politics. Comparing both cases, political involvement and politicization of demands for cultural rights in an effective way marked one of the basis reasons why transformation occurred in the Turkish case, but not in the French case. There are still lacking points in the Turkish legal system and there still a lack of concern towards many of the minority languages, but legal and political reforms made since 2002 resulted in a language regime transformation in Turkey, a process which still continues and hotly debated in the country.

In the following chapter, I conclude this thesis with an outline of the dynamics of language regime change in a comparative manner. As the Turkish and French cases are discussed separately in the empirical chapters, in the conclusion part, I attempt to

reevaluate the findings of the thesis by going referring each factor that drives language regime change.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The main objective of this thesis is to explore the dynamics of language regime change in a comparative historical analysis of the language politics in France and Turkey. The main argument in this thesis is that language regime in Turkey has experienced a change from a monolingual structure to a more multicultural one as a result of the combination of different factors that determines the course of language politics in the country. On the other hand, the absence of the necessary conditions in the French case prevented a change in the monolingual language regime in the country although several attempts have been present. This variance between these cases have been the main motivation for the case selection as the persistence of monolingual language regime in France is an interesting case ideal for an analysis of the language politics within a multicultural setting.

The research includes the analysis of language policy in both countries within a specific temporal scope; post-1980 period in Turkish case and post-1970 period in the French case. The reason for the selection of these periods in both countries is based on the intensification of language politics in both countries. Similarly, for each case, timeline of the language policy is divided into two periods marking the breaking points in the course of language regime in these countries. For the language policies, I used primary legal documents of the laws and when necessary public comments on the laws to present the reactions towards them. Along with this policy analysis, minority and state-oriented dynamics of language regime is studied in each country. For the minority-oriented dynamics of language regime change; I analyzed the political and social

activism emerged among the minority groups defending linguistic rights, political parties representing the minority groups in each setting and when existent militant groups emerged from the minority movements. On the other hand, for the state-oriented dynamics of language regime; I analyzed the governing parties and their policy tendencies and initiatives responding to the important positive and negative developments regarding linguistic rights and language policy making.

The main conclusion driven from this extensive study is that the reason for the failure of the language regime change in France is a result of the absence of certain necessary conditions; namely the lack of a unified substantive minority activism that could frame language politics in favor of their linguistic demands, the absence of securitization and desecuritization process that would drive the state to make concessions on the demands of minority groups, and the failure of the transnational actors to impose a pressure upon the French state towards positive transformation even though the international setting is ideal for such initiatives considering the position of EU in French politics. On the state side the evidences of the failure is more apparent as no governing party has been successful in creating the ideal environment for a policy change. Even when Socialist Party, which is the most powerful party that defends minority rights in France, came to power, no successful policy initiative towards linguistic rights has been present. In other words, assimilationist policies have been successful to marginalize the demands of linguistic minorities.

In the Turkish case, both Kurdish minority and the AKP government have been successful in creating the language regime change in Turkey. Unlike the French case, all the dynamics of language politics have functioned in favor of linguistic regime change. mobilization of Kurdish minority, the existence of PKK as a driving force for the desecuritization of Kurdish question and the influence Kurdish diaspora (although

marginal compared to the other factors) have been the underlying reason for the non-military steps taken towards linguistic rights in Turkey. Moreover, the political hegemony of the AKP since the early 2000s accompanied by the new multiculturalist discourse has created the biggest challenge to the assimilationist minority politics in the country.

In the following part I present a brief overview of the arguments presented throughout the thesis and the evidences presented in each case in the previous chapter in order to conclude with the comparative perspective of this study. In the last section, I mention some alternative studies on language regime changes as well as the implications of the arguments I present in this study.

### **5.1. Dynamics of Language Regime: Comparing Turkey and France**

In this part I discuss Turkish and French cases in terms of the minority and state-oriented dynamics of language regime change that I identified earlier in this thesis. This brief reminder of the arguments of the thesis in a comparative way is useful for seeing the complete picture of the dynamics of language politics in both countries. Minority activism, securitization of minority movements and the role of transnational actors are defined as the minority-oriented dynamics of language regime. On the other side, the presence of a counterelite, a new discourse on minority issues and political hegemony are defined as the state-oriented dynamics of language regime. According to the main argument of this thesis, for a language regime change to happen, all these conditions should be present together in a country in a specific setting.

In terms of analysis of the minority-oriented dynamics of language regime, minority activism in France and Turkey has been the most challenging side of the language politics analyzed in this study. While there has been a certain level of minority



activism in both countries, the nature of the political and social movements that emerged from minority groups differ in both countries. In France, minority groups are highly fragmented and have failed to produce an organized and unified movement that would frame language politics in the country. Breton, Basque, Occitan and Corsican minorities have been involved in language politics to a certain extent but compared to the Turkish case the activism in France remained marginal. The insistent political presence of Kurdish minority with the existence of pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkish politics for a long period of time translated into a political power that resulted in the election of Kurdish representatives into the parliament. In France no such occasion occurred until the last elections in France in 2012, where Paul Molac, a Breton autonomist is elected from UDB (Breton Democratic Union) with the support of Socialist Party. However, the contribution of this development to the language politics in France is questionable and prone to future observation.

Militant tendencies among minority groups have also been present in France and Turkey. However, the level of militanism in France cannot be compared to the Turkish case, where the casualties from the conflicts between Military Forces and PKK exceed one thousand in the last 10 years while the total numbers exceed ten thousand.<sup>235</sup> In France, militant groups such as *Front de libération de la Bretagne* (FLB, the Front for the Liberation of Brittany) and the *Armée Revolutionnaire Bretonne* (ARB, the Revolutionary Breton Army), GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* – Counterterrorist Liberation Squads), *Institut d'Etudes Occitanes* could not create the same effect as the influence and power of these groups have been marginal.

Looking at the role of the transnational actors, the role of the EU in language politics in Turkey is surprisingly more traceable unlike the French case. In Turkey, the

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<sup>235</sup>“1984'ten 2010'a kaç şehit verdik”, *En Son Haber*, August 17, 2011.

policy change process since 2000s is accompanied by the intense relations with the EU with the introduction of reform packages. However, this relation lost its intensity in a couple of years as later AKP government, after securing its hegemonic power, began to present Kurdish question as a domestic issue to be solved in a peaceful way. The motto behind the openings has been expressed in this manner. However, the importance of the Kurdish diaspora and the involvement of transnational organizations have been effective in Kurdish activism. In France, the influence of the EU in the domestic politics of the country has remained marginal as the centralist stance of the French state prevented external involvement of the EU norms and reforms. While international organizations defending linguistic rights have been involved with the minority activism in the country, they have not produced an effective result in framing the language politics in the country so far. Therefore, in this aspect of the issue French minorities have failed to challenge the monolingual regime in the country.

In terms of the state-oriented dynamics of language regime in Turkey and France, the variance of language politics is also explicit. As discussed before, French politics have not produced a counterelite with a new discourse and a necessary political hegemony. As minority parties could not act as a counterelite in the French case as a result of the marginal presence of these parties in French politics, the only powerful supporter of the linguistic rights has been the Socialist party. However, even within the limited periods when Socialist Party came to power, it could not create an alternative language policy that would challenge the existing monolingual centralist structure of language politics. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, the influence of AKP in language politics cannot be contested. Although counter arguments on the effectiveness of the language policies produced by the consecutive AKP governments can be presented, the magnitude of the impact of language policies since 2000s on language

regime in Turkey justifies the role of AKP as a counterelite with a new discourse on linguistic rights with the multiculturalist ideology that the party has been presenting.

The combination of the necessary factors of language regime change in Turkey enabled the transformation of language regime towards a multiculturalist position. In the French case the situation has been in a reverse direction so far. With the comparisons presented above, I conclude this chapter with the following section where I propose some concluding remarks about the state of this study in the literature.

## **5.2. Concluding Remarks**

The main motivation behind this extensive study on language politics in France and Turkey is two-folded. First the variance between France and Turkey present an interesting case to analyze how language politics are functioning or in other words, why and how language regimes change as presented the theoretical framework of this thesis. While the systematic approach I introduced in this study produced important and reliable results in terms of the dynamics of language regime change, there may be alternative explanations of the same political phenomenon in different perspectives. The factors that I identified in this study should be applied to other cases systematically to see the implications of the conclusions driven from the comparison of France and Turkey. As I have not identified a similar approach to language politics in other scholarly works, the applicability of this theoretical framework should be tested in other cases as well.

Politics, especially language politics as the focus of this thesis has a very dynamic nature. Changing a state policy has a very complex process behind it and most of the time it is very hard. However, this does not mean that policy structures presented in this study will remain static in the future. There is always the possibility of change

either in a positive or negative way. The aim of this research has been to provide a systematic view on the dynamics of language politics and France and Turkey are compared. As minority rights has become a very sensitive issue in many countries today, this topic requires further investigation in order to reveal the dynamics of the lively process of minority politics. I hope this study will contribute to the existing state of knowledge on this topic with the conclusions driven from each case throughout this thesis.

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## APPENDICES

### **Appendix 1. Related Excerpts From Toubon Law of 1994.**

#### **LAW No. 94-665 of 4 August 1994**

#### **Relative to the use of the French language**

Be it enacted, by the President of the Republic of France, by and with the advice and consent of the Constitutional Council through its decision No. 94-345 DC dated 29 July 1994, and the authority of the National Assembly and the Senate as follows :

**This version incorporates the changes made in compliance with the decision of the Constitutional Council dated 29 July 1994 as well as the change made to the second paragraph of Article 5 by Law No. 96-597 of 2 July 1996 on the modernization of financial activities.**

#### **Article 1. -**

Established by the Constitution as the language of the French Republic, the French language is a key element in the personality and the heritage of France.

French shall be the language of instruction, work, trade and exchanges and of the public services.

It shall be the chosen bond between the States comprising the community of French-speaking countries.

#### **Article 2. -**

The use of French shall be mandatory for the designation, offer, presentation, instructions for use, and description of the scope and conditions of a warranty of goods, products and services, as well as bills and receipts.

The same provisions apply to any written, spoken, radio and television advertisement.

The provisions of the present article shall not apply to the names of typical products and specialities of foreign origin known by the general public.

Legislation relative to brands shall not prevent the application of the first and second paragraphs of the present Article to the remarks and messages recorded with the brand.

#### **Article 3. -**

Any inscription or announcement posted or made on a public highway, in a place open to the public or in a public transport system and designed to inform the public must be expressed in French.

If the inscription drafted in breach of the foregoing provisions is posted by a third user on a good belonging to a public corporate body, the latter must serve a formal notice on the user demanding him to cease the observed irregularity at his own expense and within the deadline set by the public corporate body. If the formal notice is not complied with, depending on the seriousness of the breach, the use of the good may be

withdrawn from the offending party, irrespective of the stipulations of the contract or the terms of authorisation granted the said offending party.

**Article 6. -**

Any participant in an event, seminar or convention organised in France by natural persons or corporate bodies of French nationality has the right to express himself in French. Documents distributed to participants before and during the meeting for the presentation of the programme must be drafted in French and may include translations in one or more foreign languages.

Where an event, seminar or convention involves the distribution of preparatory documents or work documents to participants, or the publication of proceedings or minutes of work sessions, the texts or papers presented in the foreign language must be accompanied by at least a summary in French.

These provisions apply neither to events, seminars and conventions exclusively organised for foreigners, nor to events designed to promote France's foreign trade.

Provision must be made for translation services when the events herein referred to are organised at the initiative of a public corporate body or private corporate body carrying out a public service assignment.

**Article 7. -**

Publications, reviews and papers distributed in France and drafted in a foreign language, shall include at least a summary in French when the said publications, reviews and papers are issued by a public corporate body, a private person on a public service assignment or a private person subsidised by public funds.

**Article 8. -**

The last three paragraphs of Article L. 121-1 of the labour code are replaced by four paragraphs drafted as follows:

"The employment agreement expressed in writing must be drafted in French.

"Where the position covered by the agreement can only be designated by a foreign term without an equivalent in French, the employment agreement must include an explanation in French of the foreign term.

"Where the employee is a foreigner and the agreement is put in writing, the said contract must be translated, at the employee's request, into his native tongue. Both documents shall be considered as authentic and receivable in court. Should any inconsistency be observed between the two texts, only the agreement drafted in the native tongue of the foreign employee may be used against the latter.

"The employer cannot invoke the provisions of an employment agreement concluded in breach of the present article against an employee prejudiced thereby."

**Article 9. -**

**I. -**

Article L. 122-35 of the labour code is completed by the paragraph below:

"The company rules shall be drafted in French. Translations in one or more foreign languages may be attached to them."

**II. -**

Article L. 122-39-1 herebelow is inserted after Article L. 122-39 of the labour code:

"Article L. 122-39-1. - Any document containing obligations for the employee or provisions which the employee needs to know for the proper execution of his work shall be drafted in French. Translations in one or more foreign languages may be attached to it.

"These provisions do not apply to documents received from abroad or written for foreigners."

**III. -**

In the first and third paragraphs of Article L. 122-37 of the labour code, the words: "articles L. 122-34 and L. 122-35" are replaced by the words: "articles L. 122-34. L. 122-35 and L. 122-39-1".

**IV. -**

Article L. 132-2-1 herebelow is inserted after Article L. 132-2 of the labour code:

"Article L. 132-2-1. - Labour agreements, union contracts and corporate or institution agreements must be drafted in French. Any provision drafted in a foreign language shall be non-invocable against the employee at which the grievance is directed"

**Article 10. -**

The third paragraph of Article L. 311-4 of the labour code is as follows:

"3° A text written in a foreign language.

"Where the employment or position offered can only be designated by a foreign term without an equivalent in French, the French text must include a sufficiently detailed description to avoid any misleading interpretation as defined by paragraph 2 above.

"The provisions of the two preceding paragraphs apply to services to be carried out on French territory, whatever the nationality of the author of the offer or employer, and to services to be performed on non-French territory when the author of the offer or employer is French even though perfect knowledge of a foreign language may be one of the conditions required for acquiring the position offered. Nonetheless, in France, directors of publications written entirely or partly in a foreign language may accept job offers drafted in this language."

**Article 11. -**

**I. -**

The language of instruction, examinations and competitive examinations, as well as theses and dissertations in State and private educational institutions shall be French, except for cases justified by the need to teach foreign and regional languages and cultures or where the teachers are associate teachers or guest teachers.

Foreign schools or schools specially set up to teach Foreign nationals as well as institutions providing instruction of an international nature are not bound by this obligation.

**II. -**

The following paragraph has been inserted after the second paragraph of Article 1 of the education framework law No. 89-486 of July 10 1989:

"The command of the French language and the knowledge of two other languages are part of the fundamental goals of education."

**Article 12. -**

Article 20-1 herebelow has been inserted before Chapter 1 of Section II of law No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 relative to the freedom of communication:

"Article 20-1. - The use of French is compulsory in all the programmes and advertising messages of radio and television broadcasting organisations and services, whatever their mode of dissemination or distribution, with the exception of motion picture and radio and television productions in their original language version.

"Subject to the provisions of point 2b of Article 28 of the present law, the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to musical works which contain text written wholly or partly in a foreign language.

"The obligation laid down in the first paragraph applies neither to programmes, parts of programmes or advertisements included in the latter which are designed to be fully broadcast in a foreign language or which aim at the teaching of a language, nor to broadcasts of religious ceremonies.

"Where the broadcasts or advertising messages referred to in the first paragraph of the present Article are accompanied by translations in a foreign language, the presentation in French must be as legible, audible and intelligible as the presentation in the foreign language."

**Article 13. -**

Law No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 referred to above is amended as follows:

**I. -**

The following paragraph has been inserted after the sixth paragraph of Section II of Article 24:

"- respect of the French language and influence of the French-speaking community."

**II. -**

Point 4b has been inserted after point 4 in Article 28 as follows:

"4b. Provisions capable of ensuring the respect of the French language and the influence of the French-speaking community;"

**III. -**

Point 2b has been inserted after point 2 in Article 33 as follows:

"2b. Provisions capable of ensuring the respect of the French language and the influence of the French-speaking community;"

**Article 14. -**

**I. -**

It is strictly forbidden for public corporate bodies to use a trademark, trade name or service brand made up of a foreign expression or term when an equivalent French term or expression with the same meaning exists and is approved under the conditions

defined by the provisions of the rules relative to the enhancement of the French language.

This proscription also applies to private corporate bodies on a public service assignment during the performance of this assignment.

**Article 19. -**

Article 2-14 drafted as follows has been inserted after Article 2-13 of the rules of criminal procedure:

"Article 2-14. - Any association constituted in compliance with relevant laws and declaring in its articles the defence of the French language and approved under the conditions defined by decree of the Council of State may exercise the rights of a plaintiff in matters concerning breaches of the provisions of the texts drafted for the application of articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10 of law No. 94-665 of 4 August 1994 relative to the use of the French language."

**Article 22. -**

Each year, the Government shall communicate to the assemblies before 15 September, a report on the application of the present law and provisions of international agreements and treaties relative to the status of the French language in international institutions.

**Article 24. -**

Law No. 75-1349 of 31 December 1975 relative to the use of the French language is repealed, with the exception of articles 1 to 3 thereof, which will be repealed when Article 2 of the present law comes into force, and Article 6 thereof which will be repealed on the date Article 3 of the present law comes into force.

The present law shall be enforced as a State law.

Drafted in Paris, on this day of 4 August 1994

## **Appendix 2. Related Excerpts From Decree of 1995.**

### **Circular for the relative use of French language**

**Decree No. 95-240 of 3 March 1995**

**set down for the application of law of 4 August 1994 relative to the use of the French language**

**Journal Officiel dated 5/3/1995**

#### **SECTION 1**

#### **PENALTIES**

##### **Article 1.-**

I - Any failure to use the French language under the conditions laid down by the law of 4 August 1994 referred to above relative to the use of the French language:

1. In the designation, offer, presentation, instructions for use, and description of the scope and conditions of a warranty of goods, products and services as well as bills and receipts;

2. In all written, spoken, and radio and television advertisements, shall be punishable by a fine as defined for class 4 offences.

II. - Any failure to use the French language for any inscription or announcement designed for the general public, posted or made on a public highway, in a place open to the public or in a public transport system shall be subject to the same penalty.

III. - Any presentation of the French version in a manner that is not as legible, audible or intelligible as the foreign language version of remarks, advertisements, inscriptions and announcements referred to in I and II of the present article shall be subject to the same penalty.

IV. - In the event of a conviction for one of the breaches referred to in the present article, the court may apply articles 132-66 to 132-70 of the criminal code.

##### **Article 2 -**

The following acts committed by any person of French nationality organising an event, seminar or convention shall be punishable by the fine laid down for class 4 breaches, subject to the exceptions listed in Article 6 of the aforementioned law of 4 August 1994:

1. Forbidding participants from expressing themselves in French;

2. Distributing to participants before and during the meeting documents presenting the programme without including a French version of the said documents;

3. Failure to prepare at least a summary in French of the preparatory documents or work documents distributed to participants and failure to include in the published proceedings or minutes at least a summary in French of the texts or papers presented in a foreign language;

4. Failure to make provision for translation services in the case described in the fourth paragraph of Article 6 of the aforementioned law.



**Article 3. -**

Failure to provide an employee with a French language version of an employment agreement including obligations concerning the said employee or provisions which the employee needs to know for the proper performance of his work shall be punishable by the fine laid down for class 4 offences.

**SECTION III**

**AUTHORISATION FOR ASSOCIATIONS**

**Article 9. -**

Any association constituted in compliance with relevant laws and declaring in its articles the defence of the French language is entitled to ask for the authorisation set forth in Article 2-14 of the rules of criminal procedure when it complies with the following conditions:

1. Two years of existence starting from its declaration.
2. Sufficient number of members paying dues either individually or through the intermediary of federated associations.
3. An activity that actively defends the French language while respecting other languages and cultures. This activity is mainly attested to by the nature and size of events and publications.
4. The non-profit nature of activities.

**Article 13. -**

The authorisation may be suspended or withdrawn by joint decree by the Minister of Justice and the Minister in charge of the French-speaking communities in the event where the association no longer fulfils one of the conditions which justified the authorisation. The association must first of all be summoned to present an explanation.

**Article 14. -**

Each year, authorised associations are required to send two copies of their corporate report and financial report to the Délégation générale à la langue française.

### Appendix 3.


Map 1. Languages of France



Source: [http://portal-lem.com/map-carte\\_des\\_langues\\_de\\_france.html](http://portal-lem.com/map-carte_des_langues_de_france.html)

## Appendix 4.

### Map 2. Diwan Schools in France



Source: Diwan Breizh

<http://www.diwanbreizh.org/sections.php4?op=viewarticle&artid=5>

## Appendix 5.

Map 3. Greater Basque Country; the blue area is the Basque Region in France.



Source: <http://www.shunpiking.com/shun0844/44MapBasquecol.jpg>

**Appendix 6. Excerpts from the related parts of the law on publicizing ideas in languages other than Turkish.**

**Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun**

Kanun Numarası: 2932

Kabul Tarihi: 19/10/1983

Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete: Tarih: 22/10/1983 Sayı: 18199 Sayfa: 27

Yayımlandığı Düstur: Tertip: 5 Cilt: 22 Sayfa: 810

Durumu: Külliyyatın yayımlanmasından sonra 12/4/1991 tarih ve 3713 sayılı

Kanununun 23 üncü maddesi ile yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır.

**Amaç ve Kapsam:**

**Madde 1:**

Bu kanun; Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünün, milli egemenliğinin, Cumhuriyetin, milli güvenliğinin, kamu düzeninin korunması amacıyla düşüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında yasaklanan dillere ilişkin esas ve usulleri düzenler.

**Düşüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında kullanılmayacak diller**

**Madde 2:**

Türk Devleti tarafından tanınmış bulunan devletlerin birinci resmi dilleri dışında herhangi bir dille düşüncelerin açıklanması, yayılması ve yayınlanması yasaktır. Türkiye Devletinin taraf olduğu milletlerarası andlaşma hükümleriyle eğitim, öğretim, bilimsel araştırma ve kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının yayınlarına ilişkin mevzuat hükümleri saklıdır.

**Türk vatandaşlarının anadili**

**Madde 3:**

Türk Vatandaşlarının anadili Türkçedir.

a) Türkçeden başka dillerin anadili olarak kullanılmasına ve yayılmasına yönelik her türlü faaliyette bulunulması,

b) Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşlerinde, mahallin en büyük mülki amirinden izin alınmadıkça bu Kanunla yasaklanmamış olsa bile Türkçeden başka bir dille

yazılmış.afiş, pankart, döviz, levha ve benzerlerinin taşınması, plak, ses ve görüntü bantları ve diğer anlatım araç ve gereçleriyle yayım yapılması, Yasaktır.

### **Ceza hükümleri**

#### **Madde 4:**

a) 2nci madde ile 3üncü maddenin (b) bendinde belirtilen yasaklara aykırı harekette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri başka bir suç oluştursa bile ayrıca altı aydan iki yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolunur.

b) 3üncü maddenin (a) bendi ile yasaklanan hususlarda her ne surette olursa olsun faaliyette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri başka bir suç oluştursa bile ayrıca bir yıldan üç yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolunur. Mahkemece yapılacak kovuşturma sonunda, mahkumiyet hükmüyle beraber her nevi elle yapılmış veya yazılmış veya basılmış kağıt ve eserler, plaklar, ses ve görüntü bantları, afiş ve pankartlar ile diğer anlatım araç ve gereçlerinin müsaderesine de hükmolunur.

Bu Kanun kapsamına giren yayın araç ve gereçlerinin kaçırılmasını, değiştirilmesini, ziyana uğramasını ve tahribini önlemek için tahkikatın her aşamasında gerekli görülen tedbirler alınır.



## Appendix 7. Minority Languages in Censuses of Turkey

The figures in the following table are compiled from Eraydın-Virtanen (2003b), Tunçay (1983), and Dündar (1999).

		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
Abaza	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		10,099	8,602	17,200	13,655	4,689	4,563
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		2,108	1,265	-	1,489	8,018	7,836
	per 1000		0.75	0.53	0.82	0.63	0.46	0.40
Albanian	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	21,774	14,496	14,165	16,079	10,893	12,000	12,832
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		26,161	17,701	-	25,898	37,144	40,688
	per 1000	1.69	2.52	1.69	0.77	1.52	1.78	1.70
Arabic	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	134,273	153,687	247,294	269,038	300,583	347,690	365,340
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		34,028	60,061		95,612	134,962	169,724
	per 1000	9.85	11.62	16.35	12.84	15.34	17.39	16.99
Armenian	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	67,745	57,599	47,728	52,776	56,235	52,756	33,094
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		9,782	12,354	9,322	6,084	19,444	22,260
	per 1000	4.97	4.17	3.18	2.96	2.59	2.60	1.76
Bosnian	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		24,615	10,900	24,013	11,844	14,570	17,627
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		13,526	9,599		12,669	37,526	39,589
	per 1000		2.36	1.09	1.14	1.01	1.87	1.82

		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
Circassian	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	95,901	91,972	66,691	75,837	77,611	63,137	58,339
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		14,703	9,779		22,861	65,061	48,621
	per 1000	7.04	6.60	4.07	3.62	4.17	4.62	3.40
Georgian	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		57,325	40,076	72,604	51,983	32,944	34,330
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		16,255	9,337		24,720	54,941	44,934
	per 1000		4.56	2.63	3.47	3.19	3.16	2.52
Greek	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	119,822	108,725	88,680	89,472	79,691	65,139	48,096
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		67,547	64,736	55,280	58,990	82,830	78,941
	per 1000	8.80	10.90	8.16	6.91	6.91	5.32	4.05
Hebrew	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	68,900	42,607	51,019	35,786	33,010	19,399	9,981
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		3,578	2,800	3,770	4,107	4,375	3,510
	per 1000	5.06	2.86	2.86	1.89	1.54	0.86	0.43
Kurdish*	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	1,184,446	1,480,246	1,476,562	1,854,569	1,679,265	1,847,674	2,370,233
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		114,456	117,130	215,352	263,020	469,458	447,080
	per 1000	86.90	98.69	84.82	98.82	80.71	83.49	89.75

\* Kurdish was evaluated in 3 groups in the 1950 census and 4 in 1960.

		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
<b>Laz</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		63,523	39,323	70,423	30,566	21,703	26,007
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		5,061	4,956		19,144	38,275	55,158
	per 1000		4.23	2.36	3.36	2.07	2.16	2.59
<b>Pomak</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		32,661	10,287	36,612	16,163	24,098	23,138
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		8,380	5,594		22,816	28,602	34,234
	per 1000		2.48	0.85	1.74	1.62	1.90	1.83
<b>Romani (Gypsy)</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		7,855	4,463				
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		-	193				
	per 1000		0.58	0.28				
<b>Tatar</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	11,465	15,615	10,047				
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		4,106	2,255				
	per 1000	0.84	1.22	0.65				
<b>Non-Turkish Speakers</b>	per 1000 percentage	125,15 %12.5	153,54 %15.3	129,52 %12.9	138,34 %13.8	121,3 %12.1	125,61 %12.5	127,24 %12.7



