

**DISCOURSE AND POLICIES ON NON-MUSLIM CITIZENS: A
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF MAIN POLITICAL TRADITIONS IN TURKEY (1923-2012)**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Ayhan Özşeker

ABSTRACT

While the non-Muslims constituted 2.5% of Turkey's population in 1927, their percentage has now decreased to just 0.14%. They were a clear target for tacit exclusion and discrimination for the Turkish state. Has this government attitude ever changed? The study offers important insights into the definition of Turkish nationhood by mainstream political parties in Turkey in two major respects. First, it provides a rich original historical analysis of both the discourses and policies of Turkish governments and political parties with regard to non-Muslim citizens. Secondly, it looks into various Turkish nationalisms on a comparative basis, exploring the similarities and differences between all Turkish governments from 1923 to 2012. Based on an original empirical research on Prime Ministry archives, TBMM proceedings, and an extensive newspaper scanning, I find that conservative right-wing political parties in Turkey have generally demonstrated a more inclusive definition of Turkishness with regard to non-Muslims, than have the Kemalist nationalist-secular parties. Religious identity has consistently been a salient criterion for inclusion/exclusion. The thesis confirmed for the Turkish case, too, that nationalism as a contingent, multi-faceted, changing, and diverse phenomenon, just as elsewhere in the world, is a political struggle for hegemony, in which the contenders tend to utilize the hegemon's language and habits with limited challenges. Specifically, the thesis identifies the challenges about full inclusion during AKP under five groups: conditional and restrictive nature of reforms, persistence of reciprocity approach, communal representation, pragmatism about global prestige, intrinsic problems of neo-Ottomanism and Islamist nationalism as viable substitutes.

Keywords: nationalism, civic-ethnic nationalism, non-Muslims, inclusion, exclusion, comparative politics, discourse analysis, reciprocity, populism, Turkification, CHP, AKP.

ÖZET

1927’de Türkiye nüfusunun % 2.5’ünü oluşturan gayrimüslimler, azalarak bugünkü nüfus içinde % 0.14’e düşmüş durumdadır. Türkiye devleti tarafından açıkça dışlanan ve ayrımcılığa uğrayan bu kitleye yönelik hükümet politikaları zaman içinde değişikliğe uğramış mıdır? Bu çalışma, literatürde Türkiye’deki ana akım siyasi partilerin Türk ulusu tanımına iki yönden katkıda bulunmaktadır. Birincisi, Türkiye hükümet ve siyasi partilerinin gayrimüslimlere yönelik tutumlarını hem söylem hem de politika bazında inceleyen özgün bir tarihi analizdir. İkincisi, 1923’ten 2012’ye kadar olan bütün hükümetleri farklı Türk milliyetçilikleri bağlamında karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyen bir çalışma niteliği taşımaktadır. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri, TBMM tutanakları ve kapsamlı bir gazete taramasına dayanan bu özgün empirik çalışma sonucunda, genel olarak Türkiye’deki muhafazakar merkez-sağ partilerin milliyetçi-laik Kemalist partilere kıyasla gayrimüslimlere yönelik daha kapsayıcı bir Türklük anlayışı sergilediği görülmektedir. Bunun yanında, dini kimliklerin dahil edilme/dışlanma açısından devamlı olarak belirgin bir kıstas olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu tez, diğer ülkelerde olduğu gibi Türkiye örneğinde de milliyetçiliğin bağlamsal, çok yönlü, değişken ve çeşitlilik gösteren bir olgu olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Milliyetçiliğin bir politik hegemonya mücadelesi olduğu; aktörlerin genelde egemen zihniyetin dili ve alışkanlıklarını büyük ölçüde kullanarak yalnızca sınırlı bir karşı çıkış sergileyebildiği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışma, AKP hükümeti döneminde gayrimüslimlerin Türk ulusuna bütünüyle dahil edilme sürecinde beş önemli sorun saptamaktadır: reformların şartlı ve kısıtlı oluşu; müttekabiliyet yaklaşımının sürdürülmesi; cemaat bazlı temsil; global prestij kaygısı ve faydacılık; Kemalist milliyetçiliğe alternatif yeni Osmanlıcılık ve İslamcı milliyetçiliğin içkin sorunları.

Anahtar Sözcükler: milliyetçilik, vatandaşlık temeline dayalı milliyetçilik, etnik milliyetçilik, gayrimüslimler, dahil etme, dışlama, karşılaştırmalı siyaset, söylem analizi, müttekabiliyet, popülizm, Türkleştirme, CHP, AKP.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Statement of the Problem	2
1.2. Objectives of the Study, Research Questions, and Methodology	5
1.3. Organization of the Thesis	11
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY.....	14
2.1. General Discussion on Nationalism, and Nationalism-Religion Relationship.....	14
2.2. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism Dichotomy and Its Critiques	15
2.3. (Kemalist) Turkish Nationalism: Civic? Ethnic? Role of Religion?	18

2.4. Turkist Nationalism and Turkish-Islamic Movement	26
2.5. Conservative Nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, Islamic Multiculturalism and Medina Contract Discussions	28
CHAPTER 3. 1923-1946: CHP SINGLE PARTY REGIME	34
3.1 Introduction	34
3.2 1923 Population Exchange	41
3.3 Elza Niyego Affair (1927)	45
3.4 1934 Thrace Incidents (21 June - 4 July)	48
3.5 1941 Compulsory Military Recruitment of Non-Muslims (The Twenty Classes)	51
3.6 Wealth Tax (11 November 1942)	54
3.7 Other Events	57
3.7.1 Non-Turkish Millets and Non-Muslims in Census.....	58
3.7.2 Greek Orthodox or Orthodox?	59
3.8 On the Greek Patriarchate	60
3.8.1 Letter From Turkish Consulate in Komotini	60
3.8.2 Letter on “Fener Archbishop” and Insurgency in Cyprus	63
3.8.3 On Greek Archbishop’s Religious Conference	63
3.8.4 On Patriarchate’s Alleged Envoy in Athens	64
3.8.5 Mr. Fotios, Ecumenical Patriarch, or High Priest?.....	65
3.8.6 Scrutiny of Greek Press on Patriarchate	67

3.9 On İstamat Zihni Özdamar and Expectations about the Multiparty Regime	68
3.10 Racist Undertones of the Regime	72
3.11 Lawsuits against non-Muslims for Insulting Turkishness	74
3.12 The Issue of Non-Muslims' Membership to the CHP	74
3.13 Conclusion	76
CHAPTER 4. 1946-1959: DP IN POWER, CHP AS OPPOSITION	80
4.1 CHP's Change in Rhetoric and Policy	80
4.2 DP: A Light of Hope for Non-Muslims?	85
4.3 6-7 September 1955 Riots	94
4.4 The Aftermath of 6-7 September: Parliamentary Discussions	100
4.4.1 CHP on the 6-7 Events	101
4.4.2 CMP on the 6-7 Events	102
4.4.3 DP on the 6-7 Events	104
4.5 Conclusion	109
CHAPTER 5. 1960s: AP-CHP YEARS	115
5.1 Introduction	115
5.2 1964 Inonu Kararnamesi and the Expulsion of Greeks	117
5.3 Pressures on the Patriarchate, Greek Community and Minority Schools...	124

5.4 ‘Eritme’ Policies in Imbros and Tenedos	130
5.5 The Adalet Partisi (AP) Period	132
5.6 Conclusion: Convergence of the AP and CHP on Their Policies Towards Minorities	134
CHAPTER 6. 1970s-1980s-1990s	138
6.1 1970s: Coalition Years (CHP-MSP; AP-MHP-MSP-CGP) and Minority- Related Policies	138
6.2 1980s: Military Coup and ANAP Years: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Neo- Ottomanism	142
6.3 1990s: Uncircumcised PKK Terrorists and Their Presumed Armenian Origins	147
6.4 1990s: The Views of Political Parties on Non-Muslim Deputyship	150
6.5 Conclusion	153
CHAPTER 7. 2000s: AKP YEARS	156
7.1 Legal Reforms on Minority Foundations (Vakıf) and Institutions	157
7.2 CHP’s, MHP’s, DTP’s, and AKP’s Discourses in the Parliamentary Debate on the Law of Foundations	162
7.3 AKP’s General Discourse on Minorities	168
7.4 Pro-Kurdish Parties’ Discourse on Non-Muslims	177

7.5 Murders of and Attacks against Non-Muslim Individuals, Groups, Missionaries, and Places of Worship	179
7.6 What AKP Really Brought In: “Old Regime with Human Face”	182
7.7 Minority Representatives’ Demands from the New Constitution	200
7.8 Conclusion	207
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION	214
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	232
APPENDICES	273

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party]
AP	Adalet Partisi [Justice Party]
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BBP	Büyük Birlik Partisi [Great Union Party]
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [Peace and Democracy Party]
CGP	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi [Republican Reliance Party]
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People's Party]
CKMP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi [Republican Peasants' Nation Party]
CMP	Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi [Republican Nation Party]
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti [Democratic Left Party]
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi [Democratic Society Party]
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi [True Path Party]
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters]

EU	European Union
MC	Milliyetçi Cephe [National Front]
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu [National Security Council]
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Action Party]
MP	Millet Partisi [Nation Party]
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi [National Salvation Party]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan [Kurdistan Workers' Party]
PM	Prime Minister
RP	Refah Partisi [Welfare Party]
SHP	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti [Social Democratic People's Party]
SP	Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party]
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Turkish Grand National Assembly]
TDK	Türk Dil Kurumu [Turkish Language Association]
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish History Foundation]
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
VGM	Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü [General Directorate of Foundations]
YTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi [New Turkey Party]

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is true that, in a conference in Istanbul just before his departure for Ankara, Mr. Recep Peker declared and recorded that the CHP would not tolerate any opposition by the minorities with regard to the settlement of a sinful past; and it would not be tolerated to let the minorities, which have been exploiting the entire law under the auspices of the Republic, to take a superior and dominant position over the Turkish element, and insult the Turkish nation (Patris, a newspaper in Athens, 27/02/1932).¹

I had submitted that the Rum citizens in Istanbul showed considerable attention and sympathy toward our Party in the last by-elections. Now, I am presenting the summary of the research I have conducted about the measures that we need to take in order to have a wider segment of this people warm toward our Party. I believe an expeditious implementation of these measures would throw in a considerable new strength to our Party (Dr. Sadi Irmak, Istanbul Area Inspector (CHP), 27/12/1948).²

We will resolutely struggle with hate speech, hate crimes, discrimination based on religion and faith, all of which have been targeting our citizens of minority religions. We will prevent discrimination based on religious faiths and sects between our citizens. The Rum minority people who live in Turkey are equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey. We aim to establish a liberal democracy in which all of their civil, political, economic, social, cultural and minority rights would be fully guaranteed (CHP Election Bulletin, 2011).

¹ Its original in Turkish: “Recep Bey’in İstanbul’dan Ankara’ya hareketinden bir az evvel İstanbul’da verdiği konferansta Halk fırkasının esasatını ve akalliyetlerin kardeşçe yaşamaları esasatını izah ve teşrih etti. Halk fırkasını günahkar bir mazinin tasfiyesi hususunda hiç bir kimsenin evliyetle akalliyetlerin muhalefetine asla tahammil edemeyeceği ve cümhuriyetin himayesi altında hukuku tammeden istifade eden akalliyetlerin Türk unsuruna karşı mütefevvik ve hakim bir vaziyet almalarına ve Türk milletini istihkar etmelerine müsaade edilemeyeceği kayıt ve beyan edildiği doğrudur.” T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives), File No. 030-0-010-000-000-254-713-7.

² Its original in Turkish: “İstanbul’daki Rum vatandaşların son ara seçimlerde Partimize karşı dikkate şayan bir ilgi ve sempati gösterdiklerini arz etmiştim. Şimdi bu zevatı partimize daha geniş ölçüde ısındırmak için alınması lazım gelen tedbirler hakkında yaptığım araştırmaların özeti takdim ediyorum. Bunların kabil olduğu kadar süratle yerine getirilmesi Partimize küçümsenemeyecek yeni bir kuvvet eklemiş olacaktır.” T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives), File No. 030-10-00-00-109-733-2-10.

Above are the three historic excerpts exemplifying changing attitudes of CHP management toward Greek population in Turkey. The non-Muslim minorities of Turkey have been a clear target for assimilation or tacit expulsion for the Turkish state especially in the first four decades under CHP governments, following the founding of the new Republic. Their rights, which are protected by international treaties that Turkey is signatory to, have been heavily violated.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

The principal legal document that concerns non-Muslims in Turkey is the Treaty of Lausanne, which constitutes the founding treaty of the Republic of Turkey.³ The articles 37-44 of the Treaty of Lausanne grant rights to four different categories of people:

1. Non-Muslim Turkish citizens,
2. Non-Turkish speaking Turkish citizens (this would encompass the Kurds, Circassians, etc.),
3. All Turkish citizens,
4. Everyone residing in Turkey (Oran, 2006: 69-71).

So, we see that it has not only granted rights to non-Muslims, but basically everyone living in Turkey. What makes non-Muslims a legal minority is their positive rights regarding their own foundations, languages, schools, culture, religious

³ During the negotiations, the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne pushed the Turkish government to give special legal protections to its non-Muslims whose numbers had significantly diminished after the 1915 massacres and the World War I. Consequently, the Turkish government had to acquiesce and reluctantly gave to its non-Muslim citizens minority status putting itself under legal and international obligations. The Lausanne Treaty, without mentioning the principle of *reciprocity*, has brought *parallel responsibilities* to the Turkish and Greek states with regard to their minorities, stipulating that the Turkish state would accord the same rights to its non-Muslims as its Muslim citizens, as well as would the Greek state confer the same rights to its non-Christian minorities as its Christian citizens.

places and practices; in addition to every other right that the rest of Turkish citizens lawfully enjoy.

Contrary to common knowledge among some academics and politicians, the Treaty does not explicitly refer to Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. The articles granting rights to non-Muslims do, therefore, apply to all non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey, including Assyrians, Catholics, Protestants, Nestorians, Chaldeans, Maronites, etc. The Turkish state, however, has preferred to interpret the Treaty as if it named only three non-Muslim minorities: Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. The rest of non-Muslims are deprived of these positive rights. One of the reasons for this exclusion can be the fact that these religious groups live predominantly in distant places from Istanbul, unlike the others (Akar, 1995: 404).

The Turkish state has even failed to provide the environment in which Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, the three de facto recognized minorities, would maintain their lives in dignity and flourish their culture. Soon after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the government curbed the rights and freedoms that were laid out in the Treaty with a number of laws, practices, and subjected them to various conditions and restrictions (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 7).⁴ Compliance with the Lausanne terms instead of their violations has become an exception. The result is clear. In 1927, non-Muslims constituted 2.5% (339.486) of Turkey's population (13.500.000); while their percentage has now decreased to just 0.14% (100.000) (Oran, 2011: 26).

⁴ The exemption of non-Muslim foundations from the new Civil Code that was adopted in 1926 is a case in point. The new Civil Code entitled the foundations to acquire new properties, however, the non-Muslim foundations were excluded from this new right.

With the gradual flight of non-Muslims (either to Greece, USA, Israel or elsewhere) and their numbers decreasing dramatically, Kurdish minority became the most imminent threat to the 'survival' of the state. So have the societal, military, economic and political struggles shifted to tackle the Kurdish question. Thus, we naturally have more such significant events related with non-Muslims in public memory in the years until 1960s, and very few until all the way to 2000s. Nonetheless, open and/or implicit legal, political, discursive, and social discrimination against non-Muslims; as well as problems concerning the implementation of minority rights, have not entirely disappeared as of 2012.

Some of the main significant cases (events, decisions, practices) related to the place of non-Muslims in definitions of Turkish nationhood are the following: 1923 Population Exchange; 1934 Thrace incidents; 1936 Beyannamesi/Declaration on the minority properties; 1942 Wealth Tax; 6-7 September Riots; 1964 İnönü Kararnamesi; 1971 Constitutional Court Decision on Private University Law and the Closure of Halki Seminary; ASALA attacks; Cyprus Conflict; Implementation of 1936 Beyannamesi; Supreme Court of Appeals Decision on Balıklı Greek Orthodox Hospital Endowment in 1975; Association of Armenian Citizens with ASALA and PKK terrorist organizations; Prohibition of Armenian as the language of instruction in Armenian schools and its reversal in 1993; Summoning of 6 bishops from the Ecumenical Patriarchate for allegations of Greeks buying property in Fener in 1993; New Law on Foundations and Amendments in 2000s; and finally the attacks and murders of Christian missionaries and priests.

On the other hand, some promising positive changes and improvements seem to be around the corner. The new constitution discussions have dominated the political agenda since before the latest general elections in Turkey in 2011. Although

the mainstream political parties have not proposed their tangible and detailed suggestions for the new constitution, it is fair to say that a redefinition of the Turkish citizenship is deemed necessary and as one of the most pronounced issues, including but not limited to who constitutes minority and whether they should be explicitly mentioned in the new constitution, and what sort of new rights they would constitutionally acquire.

Also, before the last general elections in 2011, most of the political parties' election bulletins gave large space to further pluralist and participatory democracy, extending liberties, and recognizing differences. AKP, CHP, Has Party and BDP mentioned explicitly about non-Muslim minorities, freedom of religion and conscience, and other differences in society. There were also, symbolic though, non-Muslim minority deputy candidates. Actually, one of them, Erol Dora, an Assyrian citizen, could get into the Parliament. All these developments can be interpreted as nascent developments giving more voice to the minorities, which could eventually end up with inclusion of the hitherto marginalized.

In particular, it is significant to examine the ruling AKP government's discourse and policies on non-Muslims, as it might offer a valuable insight, a litmus test to assess broadly its commitment to democratization, its chances of bringing about fundamental break with the Kemalist nationalism, and the sustainability of its Kurdish opening.

1.2. Objectives of the Study, Research Questions, and Methodology

In such a context, what is striking is that, at least, the political discourse about non-Muslim minorities and religious tolerance in society seems to be somewhat

changing. At the first glance, more emphasis seems to have been placed on equality, anti-discrimination, freedom and liberties, and especially of religion. Is the general atmosphere genuinely changing? If so, what could this mean? How can we explain the difference regarding policies about non-Muslim citizens over the years? Is there any political tradition which has been immune to change in their attitude toward non-Muslim minorities all these years?

How has the Turkish political elite so far defined, interpreted, and presented the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey over the years? What sort of a language has each one of them used? What are the possible differences between the norms, ideologies, or worldviews that the political parties in Turkey have utilized? How have they regarded the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey? How have they reacted to non-Muslim, mainly Christian, proselytization in Turkey?

The words, terms, idioms, analogies, comparisons that are used to define ‘who we are’, ‘who we are not’, ‘what keeps us together’, ‘what our common characteristics are/are not’, shortly, the discourse gives important clues about our social meanings and imagined constructions. It is through the language we use that these social imaginary items manifest themselves in concrete policies.

Benedict Anderson (1991) has discussed that nations are ‘imagined communities’. Since I examine how the non-Muslims have come to be imagined within a Turkish nationhood context throughout the years since the foundation of Turkey, critical discourse analysis provides the most suitable methodology. Critical discourse analysis is a method that hopes to link the discourse and the language to social power and processes (Fairclough, 1992; 1995; Wodak, 1996). It proposes to

uncover “non-obvious ways in which language is involved in social relations of power and domination and in ideology” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 229).

During the examination of the governmental discourse and practice, I attempted to detect variance through years in terms of political traditions. Broadly speaking, there are two main competing traditions in Turkish politics. I conceptualize one of them as ‘nationalist’, and the other one as ‘conservative’.

The *nationalist* tradition consists of nationalist-secular and ultra-nationalist elements. The first one involves the Republican Kemalist elite, i.e. CHP, who has founded the Republic and ruled the country as a single party regime until 1946. The CHP has traditionally been staunch adherents of Kemalism, and therefore, Western-oriented and secular. Since 1970s, Ecevit has pulled the party toward left, and later on, broke off and established his DSP. Therefore, DSP and SHP are also examined within this ‘nationalist’ category, despite having somewhat leftist credentials.

The other one is the MHP tradition, which is an offshoot from CHP. The more right-wing MHP could only get in power several times in coalition governments. So, even though MHP puts great emphasis on values, norms, and religion, because it is an offshoot from the Kemalist ideology and it has distanced itself from the Islamist tradition, I prefer to examine it within the nationalist category.

On the *conservative* axis, we see a great many of political parties vying to grab votes from the conservative urban and rural electorate. Since the first free and fair multiparty elections in 1946, DP has established a viable alternative to the Kemalist tradition. It has been followed by AP, DYP, ANAP, and finally, AKP. There have been also purely Islamist political parties such as MNP, MSP, RP, FP and

SP. The core of the AKP was formed by the reformist fraction of the FP. Since its founding in 2001, and its first electoral victory in 2002, it has played the leading dominant role in Turkish politics.

There is also a third separate tradition: pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey. The tradition which, in chronological order, was embodied in DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP, and now BDP, has had to exist in the face of successive legal closure cases and the notorious ten per-cent threshold. It has embraced ‘democratic socialism’ and aimed to represent Kurdish minority interests in Turkey. Although my main aim in this thesis is to compare and contrast ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalist’ traditions, I believed it would be enriching to see what the pro-Kurdish parties, as now having greater leverage in influencing political agenda, have had to say with regard to ‘other’ kind of minorities: non-Muslims.

My *dependent* variable is the place of non-Muslims in the definition of Turkish nationhood, where the *independent* variable constitutes political party traditions and their evolution in Turkey. My main hypothesis is the following:

Nationalist-secular line will, by virtue of its political principles (ideology), always hold an exclusionist and/or assimilationist discourse whereas the conservative line, by virtue of its political principles (ideology), will instead always utilize a more inclusionary, embracing and tolerant discourse with regard to the non-Muslim citizens. And, therefore, a shift in ideology, will necessarily alter their place at the inclusionary-exclusionary spectrum.

My main questions comprise:

1. Whether political traditions’ attitude toward non-Muslim citizens (with regard to seeing them as alien elements or as equal citizens of Turkey) has changed,

2. If changed, what caused this evolution?

Possible alternative independent variables were: international context (Second World War; Cyprus 1960s-1970s; EU Membership Process) internal context (i.e. significant events that affect society) and type of regime (e.g. democratization effect: multiparty, free elections).

Accordingly, my original alternative hypotheses were:

H1: “The negative external factors, such as a war-like international context (e.g. WW2), tension with neighbors, force governing political elite to adopt an exclusionist and illiberal attitude toward its non-Muslim citizens; whereas positive external factors (e.g. EU membership process) do the opposite effect.”

H2: “Democratization has a positive effect in adopting more minority-sensitive policies and defining the nation in a more inclusive and liberal way.”

During the course of my research, I discovered new independent variables, which I have incorporated into my explanations in the thesis. I mainly used primary sources for my thesis. These include, first, the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry State Archives between 1920 and 1973. We do not have legal access to the official documents processed after 1973 for national security reasons according to the law. These documents involve historical, legal, administrative, political, economic, scientific and cultural content relative to Turkish state and national life.

Another set of primary sources I utilized is the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM, its Turkish initials thereafter) official reports. These reports are publicly accessible since the founding of the TBMM in 1920. They are a compilation

of official reports codifying all of the parliamentary discussions except for secret sessions.

Both of these sets of databases are searchable online. Whereas the latter set is entirely accessible electronically, the former requires special permission and a registration as a researcher through the Prime Ministry state archives administration.

Lastly, I examined newspaper articles on and around certain significant dates that are important for minority-affecting legislations, riots, attacks, and such vital developments. At periods where I was unable to find enough data for minority-related issues either in newspapers, TBMM records or state archives, I made immense use of secondary sources, and mainly on political traditions and their evolutions in Turkey, as well as works of key ideologues of the political parties and movements.

The empirical core of my thesis constitutes the political elites' roles in, discourse on, and reactions to historical cases, events, decisions, and practices that have affected non-Muslim citizens of Turkey.

The study offers important insights into the definition of Turkish nationhood by mainstream political parties in Turkey in two major respects. First, it provides a rich original historical analysis of both the *discourses* and *policies* of Turkish governments and political parties with regard to non-Muslim citizens. Secondly, an important contribution of this study is that it looks into various Turkish nationalisms on a *comparative* basis, covering *all* Turkish governments since 1923 until 2012.

1.3. Organization of the Thesis

There are rich scholarly literatures on nationalism in the world, and also specifically on Turkish nationalism. Most of the latter literature deals with analyzing the nationalism understanding of the early Republican single-party period; and very limited scholarly works exist on the latter periods. The major purpose of the second chapter is to bring together these two literatures and give a conceptual background of Turkish nationalism. In the first part of chapter *two*, I discuss the civic-ethnic dichotomy, the criticisms it received, and alternative approaches to nationalism. In the second part, I focus on the scholarly views on the nature of Turkish nationalism. While the first perspective argues that the Turkish nationalism exemplified a civic-territorial nationalism, the others contend that it had an explicitly ethnic, or even, racist character. I also review the alternative descriptions, which have found the civic-ethnic dichotomy an insufficient conceptual tool to approach Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, apart from the studies on official Kemalist nationalism, I also look at the variants of Turkish nationalism; namely, Turkist nationalism, Turkish-Islamic nationalism, conservative nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, Islamic multiculturalism, and Medina Contract discussions.

The third chapter begins with a case-by-case analysis of the most prominent minority-related policies of the single-party CHP period. The main cases I chronologically examine are 1923 Population Exchange; Elza Niyego Affair (1927); 1934 Thrace Incidents; 1941 Compulsory Military Recruitment of Non-Muslims; and 1942 Wealth Tax. Additionally, in this chapter, I analyse the empirical data derived from an extensive examination of the Prime Ministry archives and TBMM official reports. The analysis of specific terminology used for and referred to the non-Muslim

minorities, and exploration of the hidden meanings behind each one of them constitute the bulk of this empirical section.

In chapter *four*, I critically assess and compare the discourses and policies of CHP and DP governments, respectively. Again, based on a combination of review of literature and an analysis of first-hand empirical data, I first discuss the governing CHP's change in discourse and policy with the introduction of multi-party elections. Then I analyze the DP government's minority-related liberal discourse, and inclusive policies. As the most salient incident in 1950s, I discuss the September 6-7, 1955 attacks, and critically engage with the Parliamentary proceedings regarding the incident. In this regard, I separately analyze each political party's particular discourse on the attacks. In the conclusion section, I compare and contrast the similarities and differences between the two major parties of the era.

Chapter *five* delves into the AP-CHP years in 1960. The most significant anti-minority policy in this period is the *1964 Kararname*. In this chapter, I first elaborate on the background, development, and the aftermath of the expulsion decision. Then I examine the CHP government's pressures on the Greek Patriarchate, minority schools, Greek population living in the Aegean islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada, after which I analyze the AP government's minority discourse and policy. In the conclusion, I compare these two countries' similarities and differences, as well situating this analysis in the conceptual framework of Turkish nationalism.

In chapter *six*, I comparatively discuss and evaluate the discourses and policies of Turkish governments during three decades, based on an extensive study of newspaper editorials and articles published in mainstream newspapers on and around significant dates. Chiefly, the Armenian citizens' association with the ASALA

terrorism, as well as with PKK terrorism, are critically examined. Lastly, I discuss the views of political parties on non-Muslim deputyship; neo-Ottomanism; and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

Chapter *seven* focuses on the ten years of AKP government. I start with the legal reforms on minority foundations and institutions. Then I comparatively analyze the discourses of four parties in the Parliament, (AKP, CHP, MHP, and DTP) in the parliamentary debate on the Law on Foundations. Then, I turn to AKP government's and policymakers' general discourse on non-Muslim minorities. Furthermore, I discuss the AKP government's positive steps and shortcomings in a detailed analysis. I also present the minority representatives' demands from the new constitution, as well as discuss the murders of and attacks against non-Muslim individuals during the AKP period.

In the conclusion, chapter *eight*, I summarize the study and comparatively discuss the findings of my research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. General Discussion on Nationalism, and Nationalism-Religion Relationship

There is no single definition for nationalism in social sciences. Many scholars came up with their own definition, and focused on different aspects of nations and nationalisms. For instance, Benedict Anderson (1991) notes that nationalism has a peculiar interpretation of time, which differentiates its power from other ideologies and religion. It is a linear understanding of time, placing the nation in a spectrum all the way from a certain past to the future. This alleged continuity justifies its existence. This ‘past’ does not have to be real; it could as well be fictional. More important is the “forgetting” mission of nationalism. It is the exclusion of the historical developments or incidents that might be detrimental to the “national unity” from the national/official history (Renan, 1990). The nationalist, thus, constantly aims to forge history and control the collective memory.

A prominent student of nationalism, Ernest Gellner (1983) draws attention to the nationalist ideology’s mission of providing cultural homogeneity. He argues that industrial economies impose a standardization among people in terms of training, which in turn necessitates and produces a diffusion of “high culture”, once a privilege of only higher classes. Nationalism appears exactly here in this process of diffusion of the “high culture” through formal compulsory education. The state is the

protector of this national education so as to provide a cultural homogeneity. The demand for such a state is nothing but nationalism. In reality though, this homogeneity is never fulfilled completely. Almost every nation contains some sort of ‘minorities’. These minorities are the *others* of the nation, *us*. Nevertheless, nationalism never ceases to make peace with its *others*, and constantly tries to maximize this homogeneity in society, using various oppressive means ranging from assimilation to population exchange, ethnic cleansing or even genocide.

Özkırımlı (2008: 15-17) suggests that “nationalism is a horizon that limits politics.” By naturalizing itself and presenting national values as if they are natural laws, it leaves no room for alternative interpretations or values. In other words, the nationalist master narrative seeks hegemony over alternative interpretations and ways of thinking by presenting whatever at stake – the real or perceived threat – in absolute terms and in a single reality. So, the nationalist ideology asserts itself most in face of a real or a perceived threat, and claims to have the unique solution for it. The danger or threat, is most of the time, another nationalism, or a factor that shakes the hegemonic power of nationalism. This re-assertion of nationalism – to reinstate its hegemony – is actually what is commonly called “rise of nationalism.” It often comes so natural that this hegemonic process is rarely realized.

2.2. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism Dichotomy and Its Critiques

In the nationalism literature, we observe a common categorization of various experiences of nationalism in different social contexts. It is a dichotomy of *civic* (territorial, individual) and *ethnic* (cultural, genealogical, collectivist, organic)

nationalisms. This bipartite categorization started in the scholarly literature with Hans Kohn. He observes a sharp qualitative difference between nationalisms in the Western Europe (France, UK, Switzerland, etc.) and the U.S. and the ones in the Central and Eastern Europe. In the former group, *nations* precede the rise of the nationalist ideology, having completed their sociopolitical developments; whereas in the latter group, nationalisms took the form of a political and cultural challenge to the existing state mechanisms. As in the countries in the East nationalism started *before* their due political development, it displayed itself more vehemently in the cultural domain (Kohn, 1958 [1944]).

This classification was later used beyond its geographical specificities and used for categorizing a wider range of countries' nationalisms under 'civic' and 'ethnic' titles (Brown, 2000). According to Ignatieff, ethnic nationalism is exclusionary; and based on kindredship, *cultural* affinity, and certain common qualities such as language, religion, or customs. Civic nationalism, however, defines the nation in terms of common *political* ideals, and the membership on a voluntary basis regardless of race, color, religion, or language (1993). In other words, in the cases where ethnic path (the German model) is followed, the basic characteristic has been excluding differences and minorities, and establishing a 'nation' on cultural and ethnic grounds. Whereas in the civic (or the French) model, a homogenizing attitude towards the end of integrating all differences into the nationalist project, based on legal and rights bases (Brubaker, 1996; Hobsbawm, 1992; Smith 1986; Anderson 1991).

This dichotomous categorization lately received much criticism from various scholars on mainly two grounds: ethical and analytical. From the moral point of view, the Western-type 'civic' nationalism is presented as 'good' whereas the

Eastern-type 'ethnic' nationalism is attributed 'bad' qualities. Kohn's classification along the fault lines of the East-West dichotomy is, therefore, morally laden. It extols the Western nationalism, making it superior to the 'conflict-ridden' Eastern nationalism. The critics argue, in fact, that in the history of French nationalism, a 'civic' one, thousands of Protestants were slaughtered in the Saint-Barthélemy massacre. Likewise, one should not forget the ethnic cleansing of the American Indians in the U.S. history (Hall, 2003).

For Brubaker (2006), only a few nationalisms define their nations in terms of common ancestors and blood tie; thus if we reduce the term 'ethnicity' to biological characteristics, we end up with a minuscule number of ethnic nationalisms today. Conversely, if we define ethnicity in terms of culture, then almost all nationalisms would be categorized as 'ethnic nationalism'. In other words, all nationalisms make references to culture. Virtually no nationalism predicates its membership criteria solely on the adoption of, or loyalty to, certain common political goals. Therefore, it is analytically problematic. From the ethnonationalist school, Anthony D. Smith agrees that all existing nationalisms include both 'ethnic' and 'civic' ingredients; however, offers that we should keep and utilize this civic-ethnic dichotomy as Weberian ideal types in order to analyze and locate nationalisms (2001).

There is also a theoretical binary opposition between policies of assimilation versus discrimination/exclusion. Assimilation policy aims to supersede ethnic or cultural differences, melting them into the majority culture and national identity. Exclusion, on the other hand, is defined as outright segregation of minority people with different ethnic, religious, or cultural backgrounds (Somersan, 2004: 204-206). Bauman criticizes this mutually-exclusive categorization, and argues that in practice,

the definitive line between assimilation and discrimination may be much thinner than what is thought:

Assimilation and racism seem to be radically opposed. And yet they stem from the same source – the boundary-building concerns inherent in the nationalist tendency. Each one emphasizes one of the poles of the inner contradiction. Depending on circumstances, one or other side can be deployed as weapons in the pursuit of nationalist objectives. Yet both are constantly potentially present in any nationalist campaign – waiting for their chance. Rather than excluding, they may mutually boost and reinforce each other (Bauman, 2001: 176).

2.3. (Kemalist) Turkish Nationalism: Civic? Ethnic? Role of Religion?

Within the Turkish context, this civic-ethnic dichotomy has also been discussed in order to locate where the Turkish nationalism best fits into. Some scholars argued that the Turkish nationalism exemplified a civic-territorial nationalism. Their definitions of Turkish ‘nation’ and ‘citizenship’ are mainly based on a formal analysis of constitutional texts. Kirişçi asserts that the official definition of Turkish citizenship “emphasizes territoriality rather than ethnicity” (2000: 1). Similarly, Tanör contends that “Turkishness was defined in terms of geographical and political parameters rather than racial parameters” (1988: 309). This approach argues that Turkish citizenship has been inclusive and open to every Turkish citizen irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. Likewise, Feroz Ahmad maintains that Turkish nationalism was an inclusive ‘patriotism’, as opposed to an ethnically based regime. He cites Atatürk’s aphorism “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk’ to support his argument (Ahmad, 2003: 89). Bernard Lewis also studies the definition of Turkish nationhood based on official and formal texts; and arrives at the conclusion that the new Turkish Republic pursued a civic-territorial form of nationalism (2001).

Here, it should be noted that most of these scholars from this contention acknowledge that there have been instances of aberrance from the civic-territorial spirit of Turkish citizenship. However, they regard these instances as *accidental*, arising from somewhat rare discrepancies between the legal-political definition of Turkish citizenship and policies in practice. Yeğen (2004) and Maksudyan (2005: 293) object to the argument that the ethnic manifestations of Turkish citizenship were seen only in practice. On the contrary, they emanated from an “oscillation between political and ethnic definition of citizenship” already existent in the *texts* (Yeğen, 2004: 55). Yeğen (2004) cites the *Memurin* law¹ of 1926 and many other similar policies that were directly relevant with the official and formal instances of ethnic undertones of Turkish citizenship. The Kemalist élites had appealed to ethnicity as the ultimate denominator of Turkishness (Aktar, 2000: 103-108; Parla, 1995: 178-120; Bora, 1995b: 37-38).

Similarly, based on an examination of the scholarly *Turkish Review of Anthropology* from 1925 to 1939, Maksudyan (2005) believes that anthropological discourse of the early Republican period revealed intentional discriminatory presumptions, which consistently stressed the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, on part of the Turkish nationalist élites. Eissenstat also argues (2007: 52) that Turkish History Thesis and government-promoted anthropomorphological studies served to *unite* and *assimilate* different ethnic groups within the *Turkishness* melting pot. In other words, the doors were wide open for assimilation for the non-Turkish Muslim minorities. As far as the non-Muslims are concerned, though, the Turkish political élite showed ultimate attention to keep them as distant and separate from the “real Turks” as possible (Eissenstat, 2007: 52). Çağaptay, however, claims

¹ For more information about these policies, see: Chapter 3 - Single Party Period (1923-1946).

that instead of alienating non-Muslims, the regime actually wished to incorporate them into the Turkish nation via linguistic assimilation campaigns such as “Citizen Speak Turkish” (2004: 87). Therefore, he rejects the view that it was racism that targeted *others* of the regime; but it was assimilation. The regime was not interested in segregating its citizens on genetic factors; all it cared about was linguistic homogenization (Çağaptay, 2004: 97).

Nevertheless, some other scholars, still, argued that early Turkish nationalism was in fact an explicitly ethnic, or even, a racist one, i.e. exclusionary. Baer’s seminal work on the relationship between *dönme* (*Sabetaycı*, Sabbateans – religious converts from Judaism) and Turkish nationalism, showed that the ambiguity of the *dönme* identity compelled the opponents of the Republican regime – whose élites included many *dönme* in high ranks – to embrace a racist and anti-Semitist discourse (2004: 688-692) For instance, Dr. Rıza Nur, a nationalist in the Republican ruling clique, expressed in his memoirs (1968) his fear about the *dönme* referring to them as Jews in disguise with the following statement: “This foreign community, these parasites, are hiding in our blood” (Eissenstat, 2007: 47).² The case of *dönme* presents another example of the prevalence of ethnic lineage, and perhaps more importantly *religious* descent, as a key feature of Turkish citizenship. Despite this group’s efforts to integrate within the Turkish nation, the doors were closed for them – unlike the Muslim minorities – and their eventual exclusion reveals, for some scholars, the *racial* nature of Turkish national identity (Baer, 2004: 684; Eissenstat, 2007; Yıldız, 2001: 15-20).

So, apart from their minor disagreements, these academics identified ethnic or racist elements in the Kemalist discourse in the early Republican period, *besides* its

² In Turkish: “Bu ecnebi unsur, bu parazit kanımızda saklanıyorlar.” Cited in Eissenstat, 2007, p. 47.

universal and inclusive face based on citizenship (Parla and Davison, 2004: 72-80, in Maksudyan, 2005: 292). To put differently, Turkish citizenship was not a sufficient qualifier for Turkishness for the Turkish state. Many of them also believe that in addition to Turkish ethnicity – or a willingness for assimilation – being Muslim was *also* sought for full inclusion in the nation. Yeğen cites the Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey for the perfect manifestation of this criterion. To recap, the Turkish state has even *officially* failed to provide full equal citizenship rights towards its citizens.

There are also scholars who have sought alternative categories or definitions for Turkish nationalism, transcending civic versus ethnic dichotomy. Ayhan Akman introduces the term “modernist nationalism” for the non-European nationalisms which have emerged in countries with no colonial past, such as Turkey (2004). Some scholars have drawn attention to the fundamental dilemma for the nationalist élites of ‘Third World’ societies: cultural authenticity or modernization (Nairn, 1977; Gellner, 1997: 235). Akman’s “modernist nationalism” postulates that in non-European countries with no colonial past, this dilemma has been overcome. It garners solidarity through a cultural project of “modernization” or “Westernization” of citizens. Baer qualifies this desirable citizen definition with religion, and instead offers that “secular Muslim” citizen was desirable for the regime (2007: 687-688).

The “modernist nationalism” differs from civic nationalism in terms of its abhorrence of popular participation, and from ethnic nationalism as it does not set any ethnic or racial criterion for membership (Akman, 2004: 25). The combination of statism and a defensive modernization goal defined the Turkish national identity as a Kemalist modernizing project of top-down “cultural transformation”, instead of promoting a “unique identity based on ethnic difference and cultural authenticity”

(2004: 32-42). This explanation has merit in underlining the cultural transformation aspect of the Turkish nation-building process; yet, again, turns a blind eye to the ethno-racial and linguistic references in defining Turkish nationhood in the nation-building process of the single party period.³

Aktürk distinguishes three categories for describing the ethnic regime of a country: monoethnic, antiethnic, and multiethnic. He assesses countries on the axes of *membership* and *expression*. His criterion for membership is limited to the regime's immigration and naturalization policy. He analyzes the regimes' permission of legal and institutional expression of ethnic diversity, in the expression axis. What is salient for the purposes of my thesis is his conclusion that Turkish nationalism exemplified an antiethnic regime until 2004, when a state TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish (TRT 6) was opened by the AKP (Aktürk, 2011). That is, the regime accepted people as citizens from different ethnic origins, but prohibited the official public expression of any sort of ethnic diversity (Aktürk, 2011: 119). So, he argues that the regime welcomed groups with diverse ethnic origins as citizens and forced them to assimilate by disallowing any public expression of such diversities. This argument has merit in stressing the salient role of assimilationist logic found in the Turkish state, as opposed to one based on segregation, as defined by Aktürk. However, by reducing the conceptual difference between segregation and assimilation to mere immigration and citizenship policies; it masks the fact that many ethnic groups in Turkey, and mostly the Kurds, have never been regarded by the state fully as equal citizens, even the assimilated ones. Also, although opening the TRT 6 seems like a major break with the assimilationist past, many scholars emphasize that

³ For more detailed information on ethno-racial references, please see: Chapter 3 - Single Party Period (1923-1946).

public use of Kurdish and other minority languages is still largely restricted (Yeğen, 2011: 77).

I agree with Aktürk's (2009) contention, though, that the definition of Turkish nationhood is *mono-religious* in continuity with the Ottoman *millet* system. After examining many instances – e.g. immigration practices of Turkey, public employment policies, as well as the policies that directly affected the lives of non-Muslims – of the single-party era as well as the DP period, he argues that the religious identity trumps the ethnic categories in the formulation of Turkish national identity (Aktürk, 2009: 896-902).

In addition to, and building upon the aforementioned scholarly views in the literature, the starting point of this thesis is the contention that there are diverse groups in every society that possess diverse interpretations, projects, and views of a nation. The answers to questions of who constitutes a nation, who is included in it and who is excluded from the nation are not fixed in stone. In other words, I consider nations and nationalisms contingent, changing, and diverse entities rather than given, static, monolithic, teleological, and natural phenomena. To capture this change I examined in this study *all* political periods in the Republic of Turkey from 1923 up until 2012.

Nation-building consists of different projects about the nation entering into dialogue, negotiating, and conflicting (Verdery, 1993). It is a political struggle for hegemony. Some actors prevail over others due to contingency, socio-historical conditions, ideologies, or strategies. Nation-building is, thus, designed, altered, and constructed as a result of a hegemonic struggle between different nationalist projects.

The hegemonic nation-building project may create its adversaries (i.e. Basque, Kurdish, Quebec nationalisms), or produce alternative projects from within the hegemonic elite (i.e. CHP nationalism, and AKP nationalism). My study focuses on the latter form of struggle. Therefore, I argue that the Turkish nation of the 1930s – or how it was envisaged by the political actors then – does not have to and cannot be the same, in, say, 1960s or in 2000s. It means that there is more than one version of Turkish nationalism (Kentel et al., 2007: 16-20), each interpreted variously by different political groups and actors in different periods of time.

Tanıl Bora (2003) puts the various forms of Turkish nationalism into five main categories: Official (Atatürk) nationalism, Kemalist nationalism (*ulusçuluk*), Turkist (racist-ethnicist) radical nationalism, liberal neo-nationalism, and Islamist nationalism (nationalism in Islamism). He contends that the early Republican nationalism was an eclectic one, a combination of ethno-racial and civic features (Bora, 1995b: 34). He also claims that the Muslim identity was used not per se but as one of the biggest concomitant parts of Turkish national identity. For the Kemalist élite, Islamism might have failed but Muslim identity could still be exploited for adapting non-Turkish ethnic groups into the new national identity (Bora, 1995b: 37).

In the Republican period, Kemalist nationalism⁴ did not officially define *Turkishness* in racial or ethnic terms. Anyone who feels like Turkish, or who adopts the Turkish culture was accepted as a Turkish citizen, at least on paper.⁵ However, as we will see in the upcoming chapters, the individuals and groups who do not speak Turkish, or not identify themselves with the Turkish culture were not accepted as

⁴ In Turkish: “Atatürk milliyetçiliği”

⁵ According to the successive Turkish constitutions (1921, 1924, 1961, 1982), everyone bound to the Turkish state (1961 and 1982 constitutions) or to Turkey (1921 and 1924 constitutions) through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.

belonging to the nation. The Muslim minorities, i.e. non-Turkish Muslims, were systematically exposed to assimilationist policy and practises. The non-Muslims, on the other hand, were not targeted for assimilation, but were excluded from the Turkish nation by various means and policies, such as deportations, population exchanges, intimidations, state-promoted attacks, discriminatory taxes, deprivation of employment in some public sector positions, and in some cases, even de-nationalization decisions. So, the Kemalist nationalist elite pursued different strategies for Muslim and non-Muslim *others*: assimilation and exclusion, respectively. For instance, the Turkish state has never bothered to embark on a campaign in order to verify the innate Turkishness of non-Muslim groups, as it did for the Kurds and other Muslim minorities.⁶

Some authors have argued that the boundaries of the ‘Turkish nation’ has been wide open to all Muslim peoples in Anatolia whereas the doors have been strictly closed to the non-Muslims such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews. (Yeğen, 2006:10-69; Özdoğan, 2001). The secular nation-building process, for some others, have systematically discriminated against the system’s ‘Others’, be it the Kurds, non-Muslims, or the Islamists (Bora, 2002; Bilici, 2009; Oran, 2004).

As I have stated, we observe various versions of Turkish nationalism up until today. Each one version, despite their significant differences which I have illustrated in the upcoming chapters, has proved to devise strategies *within* the parameters laid out by the founding (root) version of nationalism, i.e. the Kemalist nationalism. Remarkably, Roseberry applies Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to nationalism. He

⁶ The famous Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) of the 1930s basically claimed that those people in Turkey who feel attached to another culture or ethnicity than Turkishness were in fact Turkish in the past. This campaign was particularly utilized for the Kurdish minority, in order to refute its claim to difference and to break its resistance to assimilation. For more information and debates on Turkish History Thesis, see: Çağaptay, 2006; Ersanlı, 2003.

contends that hegemonic nationalist project, i.e. the state nationalism, determines the parameters and the language in which other actors are socialized to act and compete (1996). In other words, the competitors utilize the hegemon's language, too. Rarely though, even these parameters themselves are called into question. In such a case, the challengers are labeled as traitors who aim to destroy the state. However, most of the time, they go unchallenged and are usually taken for granted. Very similarly, Bora claims that Turkish nationalism is not a homogenous discourse; and the official Kemalist nationalism is the "root-language of all Turkish nationalisms" (2003: 436). All his four other categories of Turkish nationalism are derivations ("dialects" in his words) of this root-language. The army, as well as the bureaucratic state élite serve as the protectors of this root-language, utilizing the power of the state mechanism, its symbols and rituals, to perpetually regenerate it (Bora, 2003: 436-437). Now, I turn to other "dialects" of Turkish nationalism in the following sub-chapters.

2.4. Turkist Nationalism and Turkish-Islamic Movement

For the Turkist movement, the term *Türk* refers to an extremely limited category: "people of Turkish blood" (Atsız, 1953 cited in Bora, 1995b: 40). Any sort of assimilation, or cross-breeding with other cultures is regarded to have a contaminating effect on the Turkish culture, language, and identity. Therefore, the Turkist movement, in principle, opposes the assimilation of Kurds and other non-Turkish ethnic groups, who they see as "Turk-ish aliens" (Bora, 1995b: 40-41).

Similarly, the non-Muslim minorities should be segregated. However, even more dangerous than either non-Muslims or the non-Turks are the *dönme*

(particularly the Thessalonikian dönme) and *devşirme* people, for the Turkists, because they “infiltrated” into the nation, and it is hard to detect them openly (Bora, 1995b: 40). Today’s MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) is largely inspired by this Turkist school (Bora, 1995b: 42).

The Turkist movement is heavily anti-Semitic; and this anti-Semitism paved the way for Turkish-Islamic (nationalist-conservative) school’s anti-Semitism, too. So, anti-Semitism is a common denominator of Turkism, Turkish-Islamism, and Islamism. For the anti-plutocratic Turkists, the *Jew* is the embodiment of cruel finance capital, cultural and moral degeneration, and all kinds of cosmopolitanism (Bora, 1995b: 42-45). Communism and later on, capitalism, were constructed as ‘Jewish inventions’ to rule the world. Notwithstanding the anxiety it inflicted on the Jewish society, anti-Semitism was used by the Turkish-Islamism more as a populist metaphor than a full-fledged campaign against Jews (Bora, 1995b: 43).

In the 1960s, both Turkism and Turkish-Islamism used anti-Semitic themes. The Islamic daily of the ‘60s, *Bugün*, was particularly loaded with anti-Semitic articles. The conservative school used anti-Semitism for its anti-communism; whereas the Islamic school did it for its fight against Israel and Zionism (Bora, 1995b: 45). Turkish-Islamic movement targeted the Greeks in particular because of the tensions in Cyprus. There was a call from the influential Turkish-Islamic youth organization MTTB (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) to close

non-Muslim places of worship, as well as convert Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque (Bora, 1995b: 45).⁷

In the 1970s, the popular *ülkücü* (Turkist, ultranationalist) writers targeted minority schools and religious institutions. The minority schools were described as agents' schools that "they opened in order to protect their cultures, and raise militants to be used in the rebellions when the conditions are ripe" (Sevinç, 1975, cited in Bora, 1995b: 45). Grey Wolves (*Ülkücüler*) as well as MTTB vilified minorities in 1960s and 1970s, and often associated them with the communists.⁸ In the period between 1975-1980, the strengthening of the leftist movement helped marginalize and decrease the salience of the anti-minority and anti-Semitic discourse in the Turkist and conservative schools (Bora, 1995b: 46).

2.5. Conservative Nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, Islamic Multiculturalism and Medina Contract Discussions

The Islamic movement gained momentum and developed particularly after the 1980s. It also slowly moved away from its vulgar anti-Semitism in the 1950s-60s. Islamist intellectuals started to conceive Islam as a civil society project, making references to the Ottoman *millet* system (Bora, 1995b: 49). In the beginning of the 1990s there has been a lively discussion around Medina Contract (*Medine Vesikası*) between Turkish intellectuals. Medina Contract, signed between the Jews, Muslims,

⁷ A similar call has also been currently made from nationalist-Islamist groups in Turkey (2012). From the political front, this cause has been embraced by BBP (Great Unity Party), but also, ironically by the CHP. See: "Sinan Aygün Ayasofya İçin Harekete Geçti!" [Sinan Aygün Made A Move For HagiaSophia!], Samanyolu Haber, May 9, 2012. Consulted 2 June 2012<<http://www.samanyoluhaber.com/politika/Sinan-Aygun-Ayasofya-icin-harekete-gecti/760988/>>

⁸ Bora (1995b: 45) cites an *Ülkücü* newspaper editorial, in 1969, in which an Armenian murderer was argued to be in collaboration with the communists.

and Polytheist Arabs in 622, underlayed the basis of a social coexistence and political unity in the city of Medina (Bulaç, 1992b). However, this ‘multiculturalist’ project, also reflected in the RP (Welfare Party) élite, ascribed the non-Muslims a *protectee* status, making them “subject to Islamic hegemony and protection” just like in the Ottoman *millet* system (Bora, 1995b: 49).

The Contract was meant to provide a pluralist social organization with each and every religious group having religious, cultural, educational, commercial, and legal autonomy. It is seen by many scholars as a sort of Islamic constitution based on social reconciliation, participation, and negotiations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike. One of the most important features of the Medina Contract is its special emphasis on the acknowledgement of, and respect towards, heterogeneity, i.e. it was not ‘imposed’ on anyone (Bulaç, 1992b). The Islamist intellectuals who criticize the modernist Hegelian philosophy ardently seek alternative solutions to contemporary problems particularly in heterogenous societies, in a pluralist, participatory social agreement inspired by the Medina Contract (Bulaç, 1992b: 111).

Ahmet İnel finds the internal inconsistencies within Ali Bulaç’s articulation of a pluralist society based on the Medina Contract. He rightly asks why one should seek the Divine Revelation in Islam particularly (1992: 30). Islamic principle of *Tawhid* (oneness) obliterates all other religions’ claims to validity in their particularity. The **homogenizing** tendency of *Tawhid* also makes it impossible to realize the pluralist, decentralized state and society that Bulaç envisages. On one hand, Bulaç argues that Quran, and legal and moral practices deriving from *Sunnah* are binding only for Muslims (1991; 1992a); and the social contract should be based on voluntariness (1991). On the other, Islam obliges all Muslims to convey God’s message onto the non-believers and invite them to Islam, the *unique* source of Divine

Revelation (Bulaç, 1990 in İnel, 1992: 31). This is where the inconsistency emerges: “How possible is it to talk about a pluralist state consisting of equals with differences when it is guided by a social contract laid out according to the Islamic sharia?” (İnel, 1992: 31).⁹

Indeed, there are some Islamist intellectuals who concede that Islamic multiculturalism deriving from Medina Contract is an illusion, which results from its overstretched misreading. These authors believe that Islam is superior to other religions; consequently, so are Muslims to non-Muslims. An interesting theme in this ultraconservative version of Islamic thinking is the Muslims’ duty to protect non-Muslims as long as the latter professed subservience to the former (Durdu, 2012). Here, in this constructed relationship of master (protector) - slave (protectee), there is a striking similarity with how the secular Kemalist nationalists viewed the non-Muslims:

Those who are not pure Turkish have only one right in the Turkish country; and that is, to be a servant, to be a slave. (Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Minister of Justice, CHP ideologue, Ödemiş Speech, 19 September 1930).

Having mentioned this important common feature between ultraislamist thinking and the secular Kemalist thought, let us continue with other presumptions of the ultraislamists. They reject ideological differentiations within Islamist thinking, such as “modern Muslim”, “pious Muslim”, “liberal Muslim”, “democrat Muslim”, etc. For them, there are only three valid categories: Muslim, non-Muslim, and infidels. They are disdainful of the discourses of human rights, coexistence, multiculturalism, and dialogue. They construct the Muslim ethic and

⁹ Its original in Turkish: “...İslami Şeriat’ın gölgesinde oluşacak ümmet sözleşmesinin tesis ettiği, farklılıkları içinde eşitler devletinden söz etmek ne derece mümkündür?”

non-Muslim (non)ethic as mutually exclusive categories. The non-Muslims, as the “friends of the Devil”, are associated with adultery, alcoholism, brothels, and homosexuality (Durdu, 2012). Durdu’s remarks and thoughts about the status and characteristics of non-Muslims support Insel’s (1992) presumptions about totalitarianism and intolerance the *Tawhid* principle may potentially engender.

Bora traces the emergence of such a reactionary right-wing nationalism¹⁰ to the DP’s populism (1995b). For him, the DP has laid the ground for a more radical right-wing nationalism, diverting the conservative opposition against Kemalist elitism into a xenophobic, anti-cosmopolitan, anti-minority discourse, which inculcates the non-Muslim minorities as the sole responsible of modernist degeneracy. The non-Muslims were constructed as *enemy* forces, along with communists, bureaucrats, intellectuals, just as Durdu (2012) did after almost 60 years. This right-wing populist nationalism, consisted of Turkism and Turkish-Islamic populism, got further ingrained in the AP in 1960s (Bora, 1995b: 39). Turkish-Islamic synthesis, or populism as Bora puts it, culminated in the ideological texture of the 1980 coup. This radical thought which re-emphasized the significance of Islam in the Turkish national identity was loaded with symbolism touching upon the religious sensitivities of the rural Anatolian periphery. Non-Muslim minorities were thus constructed, again, as the symbols of Westernization (Bora, 1995b: 39).

¹⁰ Bora uses the terms “nationalist-conservative”, “Turkish-Islamist”, and “radical right-wing nationalism” more or less interchangeably. “Right-wing populist nationalism” is construed as a generic name of Turkism and Turkish-Islamism. For Bora, the famous writer of 1960s, Nihad Sami Banarlı is an ideal representative of the conservative (*Gelenekçi/muhafazakar*) approach. Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, who is positioned between MSP and MHP in the 1968-70, is a representative of Islamist-Turkish (*İslamcı-Türkçü*) school. Lastly, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek belongs to the Turkish-Islamist (*Türk-İslamcı*) school.

With regard to Islamist nationalism, it should be lastly noted that although anti-Semitism and anti-minority view marginalized in the Islamist wing, it never completely faded away. The infamous ‘Bosnia demonstration’ in Istanbul, as well as the discourse and acts of ultra-Islamist groups such as IBDA-C attest to the persistence of anti-minority stance in the Islamist movement (Bora, 1995b: 49).

Neo-Ottomanism is a term more commonly utilized in academic debates explaining the foreign policy of post-1980 era (Barchard, 1985: 91; Fuller, 1992). Neo-Ottomanism basically refers to Turkish policymakers’ rediscovery of the Ottoman legacy, which the Kemalist nation-building process intentionally chose to forget and cut off its links with due to its Westernization and secularization ideal. Ersanlı contends that the Kemalist nationalist élite deliberately removed the Ottoman and Islamic past from Turkey’s historiography (2002). So, it was suggested that “multicultural” re-constructions of the Turkish nation’s past, i.e. of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the aspiration to “remember” that forgotten past constitutes a challenge to, and a revision of, the official Kemalist nationalism (Çolak, 2006: 599).

In the foreign policy domain, it was invoked to assert Turkey’s role as a regional power justified by its Ottoman experience and familiarity with the neighboring countries in the Middle East and Balkans. More importantly for my study is the increasingly entrenched role and visibility of *Islamic* identity within the Turkish national identity, as a common ‘overarching’ identity designed to quench Kurdish separatist claims (Çolak, 2006: 598). Since the number of non-Muslims decreased to insignificant numbers, the *Islamic* component was now more comfortably emphasized.

As I dealt with it in the following chapters, particularly after 1980s, Turkish policymakers and governments from almost all political lines (e.g. Özal; Çiller; Ecevit; Cem; Erdoğan and Davutoğlu) made many references a romanticized version of multicultural and multireligious past of Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism, thus, have constituted a significant dimension of the nationalist discourse in the last decades.

CHAPTER III

1923-1946: CHP SINGLE PARTY REGIME

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the historical cases, significant events and decisions regarding non-Muslim minorities since the foundation of the Republic, 1923. The analysis chapter consists of seven main sub-chapters, each dealing with certain periods in its chronological order. It starts with the CHP single party regime, which lasted from 1923 to 1946, the year in which the first free and fair multiparty elections were held. As it was a single party regime, it is not possible to speak of a political competition in these years; hence a comparison between political parties is not assertible.

The reason it is included in this work is to display the features of the Kemalist tradition, the founding ideology of the Republic. Considering that the CHP is the only party that politically survived and kept its place as one of the biggest political parties, even in Turkey of 2000s, I believe that it is important to examine and interpret whether it has evolved, and if so, in which way. This time span also coincides with the period in which numerically and consequentially most of the events, decisions, and cases took place.

Following the CHP single party regime, I examine the years between 1946 and 1959, in which DP was in power and CHP in opposition. The following chapters

each examine one decade in Turkish politics until today (2012). Let me start with several important quotations, that I believe, reflect the era:

If the Christian and Jewish citizens who live among us today will bind their fate and destiny to the Turkish nation because their conscience tells them to do so, then how can the civilized and nobly moral Turkish people consider them as strangers? (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1931, in İnan, 1998: 23-24, cited in Bali, 2006).¹

...Nation is the one and only element that binds us. The other elements have no influence vis-a-vis the Turkish majority. Our duty is to Turkify everyone in the Turkish homeland, at all costs. We will destroy those who come against the Turks and Turkishness. The criteria we will seek in those people who will serve the country is, above everything, that they are Turkish and Turkist (Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's speech at Türk Ocakları Kongresi (The Congress of Foyers Turcs, in Vakit, 27 April, 1925, cited in Yılmaz, 2008: 23).²

Those who are not pure Turkish have only one right in the Turkish country; and that is, to be a servant, to be a slave (Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Minister of Justice, CHP ideologue, Ödemiş Speech, in Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, 19 September 1930, cited in Tuncay, 1981: 301).³

The CHP single party regime generally viewed the non-Muslims as *foreign* elements; and have always perceived them with suspicion. This view and perception were embodied in multiple discriminatory measures affecting the lives of thousands of citizens, all of which constitute the backbone of this chapter. The non-Muslim citizens of the Republic were seen as “limited, conditional, and ‘they-are-not-from-us-after-all’ type of citizens, found in odd corners of nationalism” (Parla, 1995: 209).

¹ Its original in Turkish: “Bugün içimizde bulunan Hıristiyan, Musevi vatandaşlar, mukadderat ve talilerini Türk Milletine vicdani aruzlarıyla raptettikten sonra kendilerine yan gözle yabancı nazarile bakılmak medeni Türk Milletinin asil ahlakından beklenebilir mi?”

² Its original in Turkish: “Milliyet yegâne vasıta-i iltisakımızdır (milliyet tek birleştiricimizdir). Diğer anâsır (unsurlar) Türk ekseriyeti (çoğunluğu) karşısında hâiz-i tesir (etkileme gücüne sahip) değildir. Vazifemiz, Türk vatani içinde bulunanları behemahal Türk yapmaktır. Türklere ve Türkçülüğe muhalefet edecek anâsırı kesip atacağız. Vatana hizmet edeceklerde arayacağımız evsaf (nitelikler) herşeyden evvel o adamın Türk ve Türkçü olmasıdır.”

³ Its original in Turkish: “Öz Türk olmayanların Türk vatanında bir hakkı vardır, o da hizmetçi olmaktır, köle olmaktır.”

Although the Party often abstained from embracing an overtly discriminatory stance toward its non-Muslim citizens at least in principle, and portrayed itself as a ‘caring father’, the non-Muslims were never accepted as genuine citizens and were exposed to various discriminatory measures. In other words, the governments never adopted racism, or fascist ideologies such as anti-Semitism, as state policy; however, the non-Muslims were always remembered that they were only ‘guests’ and ‘foreign’ elements within the Turkish nation. Indeed, a drop in the number of non-Muslims from several hundred thousand to almost five thousand cannot be explained as a normal demographic course; but as a result of these attitudes and policies.

To start with, Article 5 of the CHP’s 1927 Party Statute stated that:

The Party is convinced that the strongest ties between the citizens are unity of language, unity of feeling, and unity of opinions, as well as certifying as its fundamental principle to develop and circulate the Turkish language and culture properly (Parla, 1995: 27).⁴

So, a certain format for the Turkish citizen was already laid out in the party statute. The criteria were mainly the same language and culture, i.e. Turkish. At times, some Party officials were a bit more honest about their Party’s true colors regarding their image of the ‘ideal citizen’. In the third quotation above, the Party ideologue, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, clearly expressed that what the State perceived as the *genuine Turkish citizen* was the (Muslim) Turk, and the people who fell outside this category could only be regarded at best as *aliens, strangers*, or as he put it “servants” and “slaves.” This quotation summarizes the official view of non-Muslims, and non-Turkish people par excellence during the single party era.

⁴ Its original in Turkish: “Fırka, vatandaşlar arasında en kavi rabitanın dil birliği, his birliği, fikir birliği olduğuna kani olarak Türk dilini ve Türk kültürünü bihakkın tamim ve inkişaf ettirmeği ... umde-i esasiye olarak takrir eder.”

The manifestations of this view were crystal clear in a CHP group debate too, on 21 August, 1940. Upon a discussion of the possible situation in which İstanbul would find itself during the Second World War, the following conversation took place between the General Kazım Karabekir and other CHP deputies:

- Dear colleagues, wherever you see a non-Turkish area, you must know that it is a shelter for spies (traitors)! Even those associations that our respectful fellow-colleagues participate are no exception. For example, go to Büyükkada; the Anatolian Club, there, is swamped with Jews.

Rasih Kaplan (Deputy of Antalya):

- They should prevent it from being a Jewish club.

Kazım Karabekir (cont.):

- What would two Party-member deputy who go there talk about? They would naturally talk about politics and the current situation. The others would overhear, or listen with their instruments; and perform espionage (Karabekir, 1994: 224-225, cited in Bali, 1998: 171-172).⁵

As Ridvan Akar (2000) publicized, CHP had an infamous 9th Bureau dealing with the minorities. They prepared a Minority Report coinciding with the Wealth Tax legislations. The Report defined the Turkish nation consisting of “Turkish-speaking and Turkish-feeling individuals”, while it described the minorities as “those showing disloyalty and refusing to intermingle with the *constitutive element* that constitutes the nation” (Akar, 2000: 185-187).⁶ Here, there is a clear distinction between “constitutive element” – which is said to constitute the nation itself – and the secondary ones – that are actually outside the definition of the Turkish nation. The

⁵ Its original in Turkish: “-Arkadaşlar, nerede gayri Türk bir yer varsa, muhakkak biliniz ki casus yuvasıdır! Münevver arkadaşlarımızın dahi gittikleri kulüpler böyledir. Mesela Büyükkada’ya gidiniz. Oradaki Anadolu Kulübü Yahudilerle doludur. Rasih Kaplan (Antalya Milletvekili): Orayı Yahudi kulübü olmaktan kurtarsınlar. Kazım Karabekir (devamla): Oraya giden, Partiye mensup iki münevver mebus ne konuşur? Tabiatıyla siyasetten, vaziyet-i hazıradan bahsedeceklerdir. Kulaklarıyla veya tertibatıyla dinlerler ve istediği casusluk teşkilatını yaparlar.”

⁶ Emphasis added. Originals of the terms in Turkish: “Türkçe konuşanlar ve kendini Türk hissedenler,” and “memleketin asli unsurunu teşkil eden milletle kaynaşmayan ve sadakat göstermeyenler.”

former – “constitutive element” – obviously refers to the aforementioned “Turkish-speaking and Turkish-feeling” individuals. The report continues with its racist tone:

Moving with slow, sinuous movements in Anatolia, they [Armenians] are becoming small congregations. They are working to increase their populations with a political influence. The Armenians should be principally cleared of from Anatolia, and then be transported collectively to İstanbul, where it could be easier for us to control their population growth... Their proliferation would thus be thwarted; and **when this problem is being resolved** in the future, it would be easier to **sort them out en masse** (Akar, 2000: 185-187).⁷

The above quote, especially the part in bold, implies a possible second possible deportation of the Armenians from Anatolia. In the report, the Greek citizens of Turkey were similarly excluded from the ‘nation’ and were sought ways to be gotten rid of:

There is hardly any Greek in Anatolia today. Those few left are not in a position that could pose threat in the future. Nevertheless, where we must take essential measures about Greeks is Istanbul. The only thing that can be said about this matter is: **to have not one single Greek left in Istanbul until the 500th anniversary of the Conquest of Istanbul** (Bulut, 1998: 178, cited in Akar, 2003: 86).⁸

The intended year was 1953. CHP was no longer in power; but after 2 years, under the DP government, the *6-7 September Attacks* took place. After all these incidents, the Greek population did not perish entirely, but declined by 30%.⁹

⁷ Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: “Anadolu’da yavaş yavaş çöreklenecek küçük cemaatler haline gelmektedir. Politik herhangi bir tesirle nüfuslarını arttırmaya çalışıyorlar. Ermeniler öncelikle Anadolu’dan temizlenerek İstanbul’a nakledilmelidir. Böylece nüfus artışları kontrol altına alınabilir. (...) Bu suretle hem çoğalmalarının önüne geçilmiş, hem de yarın bu mesele halledilirken, topluca hal imkanı hazırlanmış olur.”

⁸ Its original in Turkish: “Anadolu’da bugüm Rum yok denecek kadar azdır. Hiçbir yerde ileride bir tehlike teşkil edecek durumda değildir. Binaenaleyh Rumlar için esaslı tedbir alınması gereken yerimiz İstanbul’dur. Bu hususta söylenecek tek söz, İstanbul’un fethinin 500.yılı dönümüne kadar İstanbul’u tek Rumsuz hale getirmektir.”

⁹ See: Appendix 1.

The regime viewed the *Sabetaycı* (or *dönme*) – converts from Judaism – more skeptically. Their confession of Islamic faith was distrusted and seen even *more dangerous*:

...What is calamitous is the fact that they seem Turkish. Greeks and Armenians are much better than them, because at the end of the day we know that they are Greeks or Armenians. This foreign element, these parasites are hiding in our blood (Dr. Rıza Nur, 1968; in Eissenstat, 2007: 47).¹⁰

So, clearly, the ‘ambiguous’ identities were seen *more* of a source of danger. The reasoning is as such: the Greeks and Armenians are ‘bad’ too, but at least they are not hiding their true colors like the *dönme*. The CHP officials were certainly not always as blunt and honest in their remarks as Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Dr. Rıza Nur, and some other deputies/officials I quoted above. In most of the official speeches and addresses, the government officials, ministers, and other administrators emphasized that the non-Muslims were as equal as the rest of the population; however, most of the time with various stipulations and conditions. CHP General Secretary Recep Peker addressed the non-Muslim citizens in a conference he delivered at Istanbul University in 1931 as: “...It is necessary to express our opinions with the same clarity for our Christian and Jewish citizens, as well. Our Party considers these citizens, too, as entirely Turkish, provided their participation in the aforementioned unity of language and ideals/goals” (Parla, 1995: 8).¹¹

When it comes to the powerhouses of this period, we see two powerful men ruling the Party, Parliament, and the State at the same time: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

¹⁰ Its original in Turkish: “İşin felaketi bunkar Türk görünüyorlar. Rumlar, Ermeniler, bunlardan çok iyi. Çünkü hiç olmazsa onları Rumdur, Ermenidir biliriz. Bu ecnebi unsur, bu parazit kanımızda saklanıyorlar.”

¹¹ Its original in Turkish: “...Hıristiyan ve Musevi vatandaşlar için de aynı açıklıkla fikirlerimizi söylemek lazımdır. Fırkamız bu vatandaşları da biraz evvel izah ettiğimiz dil ve emel birliğinde iştirak kaydı altında tamamen Türk olarak kabul eder.”

and İsmet İnönü. It is fair to say that until especially mid-1930s, before İnönü declared his “national chiefdom” – reminiscent of the dominant fashion in European politics during the interwar years – the minority policy of the government was comparatively a bit more liberal and less discriminatory. Assimilation of different ethnic and religious backgrounds into the ‘Turkish nation’ was almost consistently aimed, and with the exception of 1923 Population Exchange, expulsion of the minorities (both physically and figuratively from the definition of the ‘nation’) and intimidation were not targeted goals. They were, though, in İnönü’s single party years. It is evident from the multiplicity of traumatic incidents, levies and decisions affecting minorities’ lives and status particularly during the *İnönü* years, in which Atatürk was initially too ill to manage the country and then no longer in life.

Although İnönü could only reach the top of the state mechanism following the death of Atatürk, as the second president of the Republic, he has been, in fact, one of the main actors of Ottoman/Turkish politics since all the way from 1908, when he first appeared in the Ottoman politics as an aide to Mustafa Kemal in their attempt to ensure the army’s political neutrality after the coup of the Union and Progress, to 1973, his death. He has been the longest-serving Prime Minister under Atatürk’s regime in 1920s and 1930s, and the architect, or at least one of the two main architects, of many watershed decisions, legislations and decisions affecting the lives of non-Muslims living in Turkey.¹²

There is no single way to intimidate or to destroy a minority. There are many. It varies from open and explicit state policy (a) to covert state policy aiming legal (de

¹² He can even be regarded complicit in the 1915 Armenian Deportation/Genocide. He frankly called for a deportation, and replacing the “insurgent and problematic” non-Muslims with Muslims in the Eastern Anatolian lands. See: David Gaunt, *Katliamlar, Direnişler, Koruyucular*, (translation: Ali Çakıroğlu), İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2007, pp. 109-110.

jure) and practical (de facto) intimidation (b), to generating a xenophobic and anti-non-Muslim atmosphere in society (c). In this period, all of these policy tools were utilized by the State.

- a. With a treaty, a massive number of Greek-Orthodox Christians were exchanged with Muslims. It goes without saying that the infamous Wealth Tax targeted the non-Muslim prosperity and businesses. A lot more cases will be examined in this chapter.
- b. Numerous lawsuits were filed against non-Muslims for insulting Turkishness.
- c. Jewish houses and shops were vandalized in Thrace. Some perpetrators are found to be from among the local branch of CHP (Toprak, 1996: 19-25). Non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities were harassed with campaigns such as “Citizen, speak Turkish!”¹³

I will try to analyze the most prominent ones of these decisions, legislations, and incidents, as well as the Party’s official discourse and how it relates to its practices, in the rest of this chapter.

3.2. 1923 Population Exchange

A great mass of Armenians had been deported from Anatolia with 1915 events. The population exchange between Greece and Turkey constituted the second massive-scale evacuation campaign serving the Turkification purpose of the nation-building process of the new Turkish Republic. The Turkish political elite and the political atmosphere then was both averse and lacked a democratic tradition to accommodate

¹³ In Turkish: Vatandaş, Türkçe konuş!

starkly different ethnic and religious citizen profiles. A peaceful coexistence required equal and sincere treatment of all people who now suddenly became ‘citizens’ in a republican sense; and should this path be chosen, a strong willingness was necessary.

It was lacking due to several reasons of which the major one was **the tragic memories and feelings of betrayal by particularly non-Muslims during the War of Independence** (Aktürk, 2009: 901). Hence, the most rational option for the Republican elite was to send as many as possible away before it was too late, especially when remembering the horrid interethnic conflicts between Armenians on one hand and Turks and Kurds on the other in 1915. Approximately one million Greek Orthodox – from Marmara region, East Thrace, Black Sea (Pontus), and Western Anatolia – had already left Turkey anyway (Arı, 1995: 7-8). The task to be done was just to drive out the remaining population within a policy of forced resettlement to Greece.

With this intention in mind, the Turkish delegation in the Lausanne negotiations pressed for exchanging Greek Orthodox people in Turkey with Muslims in Greece. The Greek side was more than willing to exchange their Muslims with Greeks from Anatolia; so, in principle, a consensus was there.¹⁴ Initially, the Turkish delegation, headed by İsmet İnönü, lobbied for removal of the Ecumenical Greek Orthodox Patriarchate from İstanbul, as well; however in the end, it had to acquiesce and the institution was remained intact. The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed on 30 January, 1923, which started as:

¹⁴ The Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos had offered to expel Muslims from Greece in a population exchange as early as 1917.

As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively (Soysal, 1983: 177, cited in Okutan, 2004: 228).

So, the criteria for exchange was certainly **not ethnicity**, but **religion**. As a corollary, certain ethnic groups such as Karamanlides (Karaman Orthodox, Karamanlı), a Turkish-speaking Orthodox community who only wrote in Greek letters, were subject to the Exchange due to their religion. Very similarly, most of the Muslim Turks coming to Turkey knew little Turkish or not at all. They wrote Greek in old Turkish (Arabic script). Their religion being Islam was sufficient for the policymakers to leave their homeland and start a new life with some people whose even language was alien to them. The only exception, curiously, was the Muslim inhabitants of the Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox community residing in İstanbul and the two Aegean islands (Imbros and Tenedos, Gökçeada and Bozcaada (Lausanne Treaty, Art. 14)).¹⁵

There were also certain individuals who were given exemption from the Exchange on grounds of providing intelligence to the Turkish government during the War, and thus, collaborating with the Turkish troops (Okutan, 2004: 230). This special treatment can be interpreted, first, as a reward to those ‘loyal’ individuals who distanced themselves from the ‘black sheep’. Secondly, it might be aimed to show sticks and carrots to other ethnic and religious groups still remaining within the Turkish borders: If you become good citizens, you are welcome to stay; otherwise

¹⁵ Article 2 of the Convention. The Convention did not actually mention the Greeks living in those two Aegean islands which were ceded to Turkey with the Lausanne Treaty. It was instead mentioned in the proper text of the Treaty, see Art. 14: <http://www.ttk.org.tr/templates/resimler/File/Antlasmalar/lozan/lozan20-29.pdf>.

you will share the destiny of your friends who were made to leave. Finally, for our purposes, it doubtless displays the post-traumatic mentality in which the Turkish political elite found itself after the War, in terms of treating ‘different peoples’. In other words, due to tragic memories of ‘betrayal’ and a perception of collaboration with the enemy, the people of Greek Orthodox origin had to be expelled; and there would be only be no harm when a symbolic number of them – and that had to be chosen from among the ‘good apples’ (the individuals who aided the Turkish authorities during the War) as well as the most ‘productive’ ones for the economy (Istanbul Greeks) – would be allowed to stay.

No matter if the majority had already left beforehand, still, the rest had to go, because this would have at least a symbolic demonstration of ‘making them pay for their wrongdoing’ besides the functional aim of clearing the country of future betrayals; and that is what happened. During the Population Exchange that lasted until the end of 1924 (Aydın, 1995: 500), between some 139,000¹⁶ (Mihailidis, 2007) and 384,000 (Öksüz, 2000: 758) Greek Orthodox people living in Anatolia were exchanged with around 500,000 Muslims coming from various parts of Greece (Pope, 2005: 97-98).¹⁷ With the exodus of 1 million Greeks during the War added to this figure, we can say that a great majority – over 90%¹⁸ in total - of all the Greek

¹⁶ According to Dr. Christos Thifis, professor at the University of Melbourne, the Greeks that were exchanged in 1923 (after the agreement was signed) were only 189.916. see: Χρήστος Φίφης, “Πρόσφυγες – Ανταλλαγή πληθυσμών και Μετανάστευση”, *Neos Kosmos*, 14 September, 2009, <http://neoskosmos.com/news/el/node/3348>.

¹⁷ There are different estimations about the numbers of immigrants in various sources. Some references estimate, for instance, the number of Muslim immigrants who arrived from Greece as 350,000 while others mention 500,000. It appears that 350,000 is based on some sort of official information, while 500,000 is closer to the real number. See: Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç*, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1995; Ertuğrul Aladağ, *Andonia: Küçük Asya’dan Göç*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1995; Nedim İpek, *Mübadele ve Samsun*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000.

¹⁸ According to Justin McCarthy, there were 1,254, 333 Greeks living in Turkey in 1911-12, i.e. before the War and the Exchange. See: Justin, McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 1998, p. 91, in Okutan, 2004, p. 237. If we take İçduygu et. al’s figures (see: Appendix 1),

Orthodox people living in Turkey left Anatolia. In the end, another massive step – in the process that well started before the creation of the Republic – was taken in nationalizing, or Turkifying, Anatolia in terms of ethnic homogeneity. The population exchange, thus, exhibited that non-Muslim minorities were not accepted as ‘Turks’, i.e. full citizens, despite holding Turkish citizenship (Hirschon, 2004). The trade and industry, as well as abundant lands, were handed down to Turks/Muslims, and thus, it helped nationalize the economy, too (İpek, 2000: 169).

3.3 Elza Niyego Affair (1927)

As I suggested before, one of the biggest purposes of the new Republic was to prosper economically and industrially, as well as to Turkify the capital; and that meant, naturally, purging the ‘minority’ component. After the deportation/genocide of the Armenians in 1915 and the exchange of the majority of the Greeks with the Lausanne, the Jews became the most visible ‘alien’ group in the economy in the eyes of the policymakers, as well as the public. The Anti-semitism had penetrated into Turkey from Europe after the World War I; and there were already a big volume of caricatures, news articles, and public jokes satirizing, and even demonizing ‘the Jew’ in Turkey (Bali, 2003: 403). Also, according to Okutan, the conservative opposition, and particularly the extreme right, sought to use anti-Semitism as an outlet of expressing anger and discontent in the lack of democratic means to contest Kemalism (2004: 241). So, the anti-Semitist propaganda was well under way.

there were 110,000 Greeks left in 1927. The difference is 1,144,333 people, and that is 91% of the Greek population previously residing in Anatolia. This figure (around 1 million people in total) is also somewhat closer to the figures of Suavi Aydın (910.000). See: Aydın, Suavi, *Türkiye’de Etnik Yapı*, in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 12, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1995, p. 500.

The Jews became the principal target of the infamous “Citizen, speak Turkish!”¹⁹ campaigns, as the Turkish authorities and the elites did not consider Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) as the Jews’ ‘national language’ but ‘Hebrew’ which they did not excel in, they were exposed to way more pressure to learn and use Turkish in public than were either Greeks or Armenians, who were thought by state authorities as speaking their ‘national’ languages at least unlike Jews (Bali, 2004a: 118). This emphasis on ‘national language’ or ‘mother tongue’ can be explained by the linguistic rights the Treaty of Lausanne had conferred on non-Muslim minorities. Ladino, a language that the Sephardi Jews spoke and which emanated from old Spanish but distinct from the contemporary one, was thought by the state as an alien country’s language and not a ‘national tongue’; and the Jews were blamed as speaking an alien country’s – and that country was Spain, from which they had been expelled – language and resisting to learn the official language of the country they lived in. The fact that many Jewish parents preferred to send their children to Alliance Israelite Universelle Schools, whose language of instruction was *French*, exacerbated the situation – i.e. learning another *foreign* language but refusing to speak Turkish (Bali, 2011; Bali, 2004a). So, the notorious and disturbing image of the economic power of the Jew was combined with their perceived resistance to learn the language of the country they claim loyalty to; and these two themes constituted the backbone of the Turkish anti-Semitism in the first fifteen years of the Republic.

Against this background, the first outright confrontation of the Turkish state with its Jewry – the second would be the 1934 Thrace events – took place in August 1927. A man called Osman Ratıp (44) stabbed a Jewish girl called Elza Niyego (22) to death, for rejecting his marriage proposal. The years-long pressure of “Citizen,

¹⁹ “Vatandaş, Türkçe konuş!” in Turkish.

speak Turkish!” campaigns and widespread anti-Semitism in the media and public discourse, the murder set the thames on fire and the funeral turned into a mass protest among the Jews (Bali, 2004a: 118-119).

The Turkish media (Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Son Saat, and Vakit) was quick to chastise the Jewish community for derailment, misbehaving, disturbing the public order, and, of course, insulting Turkishness and the Turkish Republic. 11 Jewish citizens were consequently arrested for breaching the infamous 159th article of the Turkish Penal Code, “insulting Turkishness” (Okutan, 2004: 239). Although after a long period of trials, the suspects were acquitted as no criminal offense was found during the funeral, this was symbolically meaningful for the Turkish authorities to intimidate the Jews for not repeating such a widespread protest ever again.

The trials were unfortunately not the only measure the Turkish officials took. On 29 August 1927, the free movement of the Jews within Turkey was prohibited by a decree. The Jews who had travelled outside İstanbul were not allowed to get in to the city, either (Okutan, 2004: 240). This was a clear breach of the Lausanne terms (Article 38 which regulates and guarantees the free movement of all Turkish nationals within the Turkish territories). It is speculated that the ban was principally aimed at preventing the Jews from capitalizing on the evacuated Greek and Armenian lands, properties and industries, and thus allowing the Muslim Turkish citizens to benefit from the opportunity, thus help promoting the nationalization of the economy (Okutan, 2004: 241). The ban was revoked after a Jewish delegate paid a visit to Ankara; however, a serious damage was inflicted upon the Jewish people’s common psyche, a damage that would only be surpassed later by the 1934 Thrace incidents.

3.4. 1934 Thrace Incidents (21 June - 4 July)

Another infamous page in Republican history is doubtless the process which started as attacks on Jews and their properties in Thrace and resulted in large numbers of Jewish Turkish citizens fleeing the country. Of 13,000 Jews living in Thrace, some 3,000 had to flee to İstanbul. Some others escaped abroad. At the end of the year 1934, 521 Jews, and in 1935, 764 Jews left Turkey for Palestine (Bali, 2000: 262). Many lost their properties, wealth and jobs. As a result, an immense capital transfer (from Jews to local Muslims) and a demographical change in Muslim/non-Muslim ratio in Thrace took place. The total number of Jews in some Thracian cities has dropped significantly.²⁰

Before coming to the actual event itself, it is insightful to keep in mind the international political atmosphere: the interwar years. Democracy was in a severe crisis in the world. Fascist regimes were being established one after another in continental Europe. Following the Grand Congress of CHP in 1931, with the initiatives and leadership of the General Secretary, Recep Peker, Turkey took its share from this fascistic political atmosphere as well, perhaps in a way just short of a full-fledged fascist regime setup. Convening of Turkish Linguistic Council (*Türk Dil Kurumu*, TDK), production of pseudo-scientific theses such as *Turkish Language Theory* and *Turkish History Thesis* were several manifestations of this fascistic transformation.²¹

²⁰ In 1927 there were 6.098 Jews in Edirne. Only 2000 Jews were left in 1943. See: Appendix 2.

²¹ Turkish Language Theory (also Sun Language Theory, Türk Dil Teorisi, Güneş Dil Teorisi) is a pseudoscientific linguistic theory which asserts that all human languages have derived from the Turkic languages. Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) is another pseudoscientific theory that purports to connect the Turkic people with the 'Aryan race' and even goes so far as to say that the Turks are the descendants of the Hittites.

Mussolini's remilitarization of the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean daunted Balkan countries, as well as Turkey. A particular general inspectorate was installed in Thrace; and the government took various military and legal measures to fortify its western tip from a possible aggression. Inspired by the Nazis' anti-Semitism, the Turkish bureaucrats and politicians started to become suspicious of the loyalty of large number of Jews scattered around Thrace, and regarded them as potential allies of the aggressors. They had to find a solution to covertly expel them from those strategic lands. A capital transfer from the Jews to Muslims was also sought.

The image of the Jews in the eyes of the local Muslim people made their job easier. They were a clear target of jealousy for their successful businesses in creamery and usury. Soon the Jewish notables started to receive poison-pen letters. The notables from the Jewish congregation expressed their concern to the government and asked for protection, yet to no avail (Bali, 1998: 205-227).

The first assaults began on June 21, 1934 in Çanakkale, where around 1,500 Jews lived. The militants were physically obstructing the operation of Jewish businesses, threatening them for death to force them to leave the city. As soon as June 24, the Jews started to escape the city, leaving behind their wealth, businesses and properties, which were later all undersold. Similar events occurred in Edirne, Keşan, Uzunköprü, Babaeski, Lüleburgaz and Kırklareli since June 28. The notorious accusations such as the Blood Libel started to be spread among the local Muslims after certain institutions distributed defamatory leaflets, which aggravated the situation for the Jews immensely (Bali, 1999a: 47-55; Bali, 1999b: 42-48).

On July 2, a mass of rioters started to raid the Jewish district in Edirne, looting shops, houses and synagogues. Many Jews were beaten up and forced to

leave. In Kırklareli, a rabbi's house was raided, his beard was cut, and his personal belongings stolen. Several Jewish girls were raped and physically tortured. After all this horror resembling the Kristalnacht, some of them rushed to Istanbul, others to Bulgaria and Greece. Instead of stopping this pogrom, the administrative authorities ordered the rest who could stay to leave within 48 hours (Bali, 2000: 250-251).

Reportedly, a Jew in Persia caught Atatürk's attention and informed him about the attacks in Thrace, and was replied: "If this nation wants, they can even expel me" (Borakas, 1987: 46, cited in Hür, 2010). Nonetheless, after a secret meeting between Atatürk and two Jewish notables, the Prime Minister İnönü had to make a public speech from the TBMM, commanding the cessation of the assaults, after which the pogrom finally came to halt.

The government was ostensibly uninformed about the entire event. However, a piece from a letter sent by the CHP General Secretary Recep Peker to local CHP organizations in Thracian cities is quite remarkable: "...Why has the duty of informing the Party's General Secretary of the indoctrination, preparation, and practice stages of the issue not been performed?" (Toprak, 1996: 19-25).²² So, it is clear that Mr. Peker was perturbed not because why the events were not forestalled, but instead why he was left uninformed. It is obvious that local CHP organizations were somewhat complicit, if not the CHP General Secretary (Bali, 2000: 250).

According to Rifat Bali, the hidden actor behind the Thrace incidents is the fascist author, Nihal Atsız, who had a column in the Nazi-sympathiser daily *Orhun*. The daily was distributed and sold more in Edirne than in İstanbul. Bali contends that Atsız had inspired the perpetrators (Bali, 2009). However, still, the role of local CHP

²² Its original in Turkish: "...Meselenin telkin, hazırlık ve tatbik devirlerinde Fırka kâtibi umumiliğine haber vermek vazifesi ne için yapılmadı?"

members in the atrocities and the hostile atmosphere seems very likely. Corroborating this possibility even more is an official government declaration, 15 July 1934, not many days after the Thrace incidents, which goes: “There are surmises that the Jews insist on maintaining a foreign language and culture, and that among them there are certain mischievous people and spies, in demilitarized zones²³, who are detrimental to the security of the country” (Oran, 2011: 21).²⁴ This declaration gives the impression that the government was somehow trying to justify whatever its degree of complicity was. Also, the references made by officials to ‘demilitarized zones’ as well as the fact that only the Jewish community in Thrace (and not in, for instance İstanbul or İzmir) were targeted, reveal the security-driven nature of the campaign.

3.5. 1941 Compulsory Military Recruitment of Non-Muslims (The Twenty Classes)²⁵

...How would the Armenians, Greeks, Jews act there? [upon a possible invasion of İstanbul during the War]. For this reason, we must place the Turkish element in a dominant position in İstanbul... Imagine that the threat [danger] arrives in İstanbul and that the Jews rush to the coasts of Marmara! Then would arrive the Armenians; they might today possess organizations capable of collaborating with the enemy... We must transfer the dangerous elements to Anatolia. We must give the homes that these elements/components would evacuate, especially the ones in Beyoğlu [Pera] to the Turks... Especially when these components, who suck the blood of Turks, reside in the most beautiful houses...²⁶ (Deputy of

²³ Demilitarized zones are the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles), as well as the borders of Turkey between Greece and Bulgaria, which is practically the Thracian peninsula.

²⁴ Its original in Turkish: “Yahudilerin yabancı dil ve harsta kalmakta ısrar ettikleri ve içlerinde demilitarize mntikalarda memleketin emniyeti için zararlı ve casus adamlar bulunduğu hakkındaki zanlar mevcuttur.”

²⁵ In Turkish: Yirmi Kur’a Nafia Askerleri.

²⁶ Comments in brackets added. Its original in Turkish: “Oradaki Ermeni, Rum ve Yahudiler ne yapacaklardır? Binaenaleyh İstanbul’da Türk unsurunu hakim vaziyette koymalıdır... Tehlikenin İstanbul’a geldiğini düşünün! Ondan sonra Ermeniler gelir; bunların bugün, ihtimal ki, mihver elinde

İstanbul, Kazım Karabekir's speech at CHP Group Meeting, November 1940, cited in Oran, 2010: 6; Karabekir, 1994: 248-249).

In May 1941, the Turkish government decided to conscript its male non-Muslim citizens between the ages of 18 and 45, including those who had already fulfilled their military service obligations. The particular target population was the non-Muslims living in İstanbul and the rest of Thrace. It was reported that the police stopped people in the street and checked their ID cards, and recruited the non-Muslim ones right away, without even allowing them to let their families know (Bali, 1996: 6).²⁷

They were not allowed to carry weapons and they did not wear military uniforms. It was a massively humiliating treatment, particularly in a social, cultural and historical context in which militarism was revered greatly. Besides clearly breaching the 'equality of all citizens before the law' clause of the 1924 Constitution, this treatment ran counter to the Turkification ideal of the CHP which aimed at assimilation of the non-Muslims.²⁸ They were forced to work in labor battalions as construction workers under very harsh conditions. There were even several fatalities. In these labor battalions, no Muslim Turkish citizens were enlisted. This fact has brought to mind that the government wished to gather all non-Muslim male citizens who are deemed to be 'dangerous' in case Turkey joins the ensuing Second World War. The hastiness of the recruitment, as well as the fact that only the non-Muslims were called up, spread rumors among minority communities that the gathered people

çok fenalık yapmak istidadında olan teşkîlatları olabilir...Tehlikeli unsurları Anadolu'ya transfer etmeliyiz. Bu unsurların terk ettiği evleri, özellikle Beyoğlu'ndakileri, Türklere vermeliyiz... Türklerin kanını emen bu unsurlar en güzel evlerde otururken..."

²⁷ The claim belongs to an Armenian recruitee, Yervant Gobelyan, in Rifat, N. Bali, "20 Sınıf İhtiyat Olayı", *Cumhuriyet Dergi*, vol. 717, 1999, p. 6.

²⁸ On Turkification policies, see Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan Türkleştirme Politikaları", *Tarih ve Toplum*, vol. 156, December 1996, pp. 4-18.

would soon be exterminated when a suitable moment arrives, in a similar way as the Nazi concentration camps (Bali, 1998c: 331-337).

When the Chief of General Staff, Marshall Fevzi Çakmak learned about this issue, he ordered that the non-Muslim recruits – who were under the service of the Ministry of Public Works – be transferred to the service of the Ministry of National Defense. The non-Muslim minorities were grateful to Marshall Çakmak and the Army, as they saved them from poor working conditions and assuaged their fear of extermination. This anecdote even inspired a Jewish stage play, which portrayed Marshall Çakmak as the person saving non-Muslims by not obeying the extermination directive of the German Ambassador Franz von Papen (Bali, 1998c: 8-9).

So, the fear did not come true. However, first, this compulsory military recruitment exhausted and traumatized the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Secondly, it gave the Turkish government a perfect opportunity – if not this was the principal aim – to seize the minority assets, most of which went bankrupt as they could not manage them and had to sell for almost free. Also, this incident kept the non-Muslims out of business for a while, and thus creating an opportunity for the Muslim bourgeoisie to flourish. After the 1915 Armenian Deportation, 1920 Turkish-Greek population exchange and most recently 1934 Thrace incidents, this conscription led to the fourth biggest capital shift from non-Muslims to Muslims. It will be followed by Wealth Tax and 6-7 September incidents.

Actually who in the government was behind the decision of this exceptional recruitment of non-Muslims, and by what sort of reasons and motivations, are not known, as the archive documents cannot be accessed. However, according to Bali,

there are three mutually-non-exclusive possible explanations. First is what I mentioned in the previous paragraph: the capital transfer. The second is the mistrust for non-Muslims on part of the Turkish government, as they figured that the non-Muslims would cooperate *again* with the enemies if Turkey finds itself in the War. The quote in the preamble of this sub-chapter attests to this claim. The third one, which I think is the least compelling however still can be true, is the Nazi pressure to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intern the non-Muslims in concentration camps (Bali, 1998c: 9).²⁹

To conclude, the Twenty Classes incident marked one of the most traumatic memories in the minds of non-Muslims in general, and Jews in particular. Dr. Eli Shaul, a Turkish Jew, described the Thrace incidents, Twenty Classes, and the Wealth Tax (which will be examined in the following sub-chapter) as “three rueful dates in the lives of Turkish Jews” (Shaul, 1994: 10, cited in Bali, 1998c: 334). Similarly, an Armenian journalist, Raffi A. Hermonn described the Twenty Classes (*Kisan Tasagark*, in Armenian) as a “torture”, and reacts: “Do we question now the misery that made us, non-Muslims, break tons of rocks under the sun for months, which would not contribute to the national economy, development or defense at all but was just a mere torture?” (Hermonn, 1997, cited in Bali, 1998c: 335).

3.6. Wealth Tax (11 November 1942)

Wealth Tax, which was levied by a decision made on November 11, 1942 was another, perhaps the biggest, catastrophe for the non-Muslim minority in Turkey.

²⁹ The fear of cooperating with the enemy ‘again’ emanates from the historical memory that some non-Muslim individuals did actually cooperate with the Allies in World War I.

According to many historians, it was not an ordinary tax but a significant step in line with the Turkification policies that had started long ago with the *İttihat ve Terakki* government, since 1912.

When the war broke out in 1939, Turkish government had recruited almost a million people in the army. Recruitment of the peasants meant a decline in the supply of agricultural products in particular, and a significant recession in the economy. The import rates had also started to decrease. The “national leader” İnönü decided to cover increasing public expenditure by printing money, and creating an enormous inflation. In this wartime, inflationary economic environment, a rational merchant would sell his products, which he knows he could not refill his stocks, at as high prices as he can. Instead of taking it as a rational choice of merchants, the Istanbul press started to accuse the big tradesmen, particularly the non-Muslim ones, of black-marketeering and jobbery. There were numerous newspaper articles speculating about the bigger role of non-Muslims in profiteering.

Faik Ökte was appointed as the head of the Financial Department on September 12, 1942; and he received a confidential official letter from Ankara. The letter said :

As of now, our laws cannot tax the gigantic revenues due to the war and profiteering. And for this reason, particularly the minorities have acquired profound wealth. As soon as possible detailed investigations must be conducted in the market to find out who and which persons have acquired great wealth; and the minorities' part should be indicated separately (Ökte, 1951: 154).³⁰

³⁰ The original quote in Turkish: “Harp ve İhtikar dolayısıyla kazanılan fevkalade kazançları kanunlarımız vergilendirememekte; bu sebeple bilhassa ekalliyetler büyük servetler iktisap etmişlerdir. Piyasada acele tetkikat yaptırılarak kimlerin bu şekilde fevkalade kazanç temin ettiğinin tesbiti, ekalliyetlerin ayrı bir cetvelde gösterilmesi gerekmektedir.”

From this then-confidential letter, it is clear that the government shared the opinion of the Istanbul press that the non-Muslim merchants are the principal responsible for profiteering. In this speculative atmosphere, the Prime Minister Saraçoğlu announced the Wealth Tax in TBMM on 11 November morning:

The aim we pursued with this tax is to decrease the money in circulation and to cover our country's needs. Besides this purpose, this tax might as well help increase the value of Turkish money, assuage the hatred of people toward profiteers, soften the prices of commodities which will be necessarily put on the market in order to pay this tax (Aktar, 2001: 147-148).³¹

However, the Prime Minister had presented this tax in a quite different fashion at a closed CHP group meeting:

This tax is at the same time a revolutionary tax. We are provided with an opportunity which would gain us our economic independence. By eradicating the **foreigners** who are dominating our economy, we will give the **Turkish** market to the **Turks' hands** (Barutçu, 1977: 263, cited in Aktar, 2004: 83).³²

In the above quote, the terms used such as “economic independence”, “foreigners dominating our economy” and “Turkish market to the Turks” reveal the true intention of the government. What is meant by the “foreigners” is most likely the non-Muslims, as the Turkish economy then was not quite open to foreign investors.

So the tax was approved at the TBMM with a feeble discussion. According to the law, so-called independent commissions would decide who would pay how much tax; and the decisions of these commissions cannot be contested. From Ökte's

³¹ Its original in Turkish: “Bu kanun ile takip ettiğimiz hedef tedavüldeki paraları azaltmak ve memleket ihtiyaçlarımıza karşılık hazırlamaktır. Bu böyle olmakla beraber bu kanunun tatbikinden, Türk parasının kıymetlenmesi, muhtekirler üzerinde toplanan halk buğzunun silinmesi, vergileri ödemek için bizzarure satışa çıkarılacak malların fiyatlarında bir itidal husule getirmesi gibi tali faydaların tahassül etmesi de imkan haricinde addedilemez.”

³² Emphasis added. The original text in Turkish: “Bu kanun aynı zamanda bir devrim kanunudur. Bize ekonomik bağımsızlığımızı kazandıracak bir fırsat karşısındayız. Piyasamıza egemen olan yabancıları böylece ortadan kaldırarak, Türk piyasasını Türklerin eline vereceğiz.”

memoirs, we see that İstanbul commerce bourgeoisie was treated differently, and 70% of the total tax revenues was collected only from İstanbul. The non-Muslim Wealth-Tax-payers comprised the 87% of the entire Wealth-Tax-payers. Here, it should also be noted that this tax was not only collected from the rich strata of merchants. There were non-Muslim driver, grocer, secretary and worker taxpayers as well.

The taxpayers had to submit their share in fifteen days. After fifteen days, the property of those who could not afford to pay the tax would be distrained. And those taxpayers who still could not afford to pay the tax were sent to labor camps (Ökte, 1951: 158).³³

In sum, the non-Muslims were especially targeted in Wealth Tax and suffered the most out of it. They had to sell their homes, shops, and property to pay the devastating tax. The minority presence was deleted from the economy to a great extent, opening a door to Turkish-Muslim entrepreneurs. The non-Muslim minorities' integration with the regime was severely shattered. Many of them emigrated from Turkey in the ensuing years. As a direct result of such Turkification policies (Wealth Tax, 6-7 September attacks, 1964 expulsion), the non-Muslim population dropped from 2,78% in 1927 to 1,5% in 1945.

3. 7. Other Events

In the sub-sections so far, the main and the most publicly known anti-minority policies and decisions were examined. In this chapter, I will present my much more

³³ A total of 2058 people were sent to Aşkale and Sivrihisar to work in labor camps, according to Ökte's figures, p. 158.

detailed findings based on the examination of the Prime Ministry archives and TBMM official reports. The principal aim is to emphasize the specific terminology used for and referred to the non-Muslim minorities, and uncover the hidden meanings behind each one of them.

3.7.1 Non-Turkish Millets and Non-Muslims in Census

In a letter³⁴ addressed to the Prime Ministry by General Manager³⁵ on March 18, 1933, there was a discussion on the number of “the non-Turkish millets and non-Muslims” in the census. Millet is a categorical and administrative term used by the Ottomans to refer to main religious groups in the Empire. However, it also means ‘nation’ in the Turkish language. What leaves no space for the confusion is the term “non-Turkish” in this context. The author could have only used “non-Muslim”, but instead preferred the “non-Turkish”, which gives it an ethnic connotation. Moreover, in the same letter, it was spelled out that “in the census, the racial millets were assigned/categorized according to the spoken language”. So, the scope of who is not from “us” or “Turkish” is clearly and intentionally broadened as an ethnic element was also officially added to identity categorization.

³⁴ T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives), İvedik Caddesi No: 59 06180 Yenimahalle/Ankara, File no. 030-0-010-000-000-24-136-3.

³⁵ In Turkish: Umum Müdür Vekili.

3.7.2. Greek Orthodox or Orthodox?

In a letter³⁶ from the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry on 10 September, 1930, the term “Greek” in “Greek-Orthodox” was found inconvenient as it denotes a separate nation, i.e. the Greek nation:

Although the recording of the établis Greeks in their identity cards as ‘Greek Orthodox’ to signify that their nationality is Turkish and their religion is Greek-Orthodox, instead of just ‘Rum’, is deemed necessary by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Ministry regards it as inconvenient. In consideration that the word ‘Grek’ [Greek] is not only a foreign word but also denotes a nationality. For this reason, we believe that in the official documents they should be recorded as belonging to the Turkish nationality and Orthodox religion.³⁷

When this quote and the previous one (i) are put together, it makes it clear that the Turkish government aimed at two different goals at the same time: to distance the Turkish citizens of Greek origin from the Turkishness, and simultaneously not allowing them to be identified with the mainland Greeks as this might create an organic bond between them which in turn might solidify Greece’s potential claims of irredentism. So, the Greeks in Turkey particularly, and the non-Muslims in general, must have been intentionally kept distant to ‘us’, i.e. Turkishness, but not too distant to ‘us’, at the same time, so as not to be affiliated with another nation. Also, wiping out the term ‘Greek’ would serve another goal, and that is, to discard the distinction between the genuine Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the set-up institution of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, led by Papa Eftim. This way the Greek Orthodox community would have been subdued to the latter.

³⁶ T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives), File No. 030-10-00-00-109-733-2-07.

³⁷ Its original in Turkish: “Etabli” addedilecek Rumlara verilecek nüfus ve hüviyet varakalarında Rum kaydı yerine tabiiyetlerinin Türk ve mezheplerinin Grek-Ortodoks olduğuna delalet etmek üzere tabiiyetlerinin Türk ve mezheplerinin Grek-Ortodoks olarak kaydı Dışişleri Bakanlığı tarafından zaruri görülmekte ise de vekaletimiz bunu mahzurlu görmektedir. Zira Grek kelimesi yabancı bir kelime olmaktan başka, milliyet manasını ifade eder. Binaenaleyh, varakalara tabiiyeti Türk ve mezhebi Ortodoks kaydının konulması uygun görülmektedir.”

3.8. On the Greek Patriarchate

3.8.1. Letter From Turkish Consulate in Komotini

A letter with attachments dated 26 October, 1926, from the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Prime Ministry:

I present to you a copy of the letter received from our Consulate in Komotini regarding the fact that the Greek spiritual institution in İstanbul has been aiding the national defense of Greece by means of donations:

As a result of Mehmet the Conquerer's *myopic and naively-benevolent policy*, the Fener Patriarchate has resided and existed in İstanbul. The Patriarchate, and the Greek churches, which have acted *less as places of worship than a source of malice and grift*, as well as the Greek high schools, under the service of Greek teachers *who have habitually calumniated the Turks and committed themselves to instill a constant sense of hostility and revenge to children they taught*, and finally the hospitals, orphanages and such Greek spiritual and charity institutions possess properties which yield a great deal of rent and revenue. These rents and revenues have been *used to serve the Greek ideals and the Megali Idea*; and therefore, *providing a steady basis for the enmity and hostility toward the Turks*. Although it is inevitable that this situation has carried on both during the truce years and afterwards, whether this really continues and if so, its nature and extent, have been *a source of great frustration and a national duty for me*.

In fact, my objective research and investigations for a long time, as well as the information I have personally received, certainly discovered that the money and all the gifts that have been donated by *İstanbul Greeks – who have always embraced the Greek ideal and been filled with Greek spirit and feelings* – by means of begging and passing a box at churches, as a result of the monitions of *monks who constantly ranted and raved against the Turks and in favor of the ancient Byzantines*, were endowed with to the national security of Greece. Also, the revenues arising from the properties, rents, and premises belonging to this community have been transferred by influential people and monks to be used for various propaganda against Turks, in European and American countries, and to encourage their public opinion to have sympathy and mercy for the Greek population in Turkey. However, unfortunately, no certain information has been obtained regarding the actual amount of the deposit accounts and their delivery. The metropolitan bishops of Macedonia and Thrace are under the heel and influence of the Patriarchate, where they get their allowances from; *whereas the Greek government regards even the exchange of ideas between the spiritual institutions in their country and other foreign institutions, let alone their adherence, as among the felonies of high*

treason. In fact, very recently, the Greek government prohibited the passage of some [Turkish] theological school students who had attempted to go to the villages in order to collect subsistence, surmising that they would collect money for our aeronautical association. The Greek government has alleged for two or three years that part of the revenues of Muslim communities were being sent to Turkey. They have carefully investigated and examined the account book after sealing the community's cash box; but in the end, as they could not find a clear evidence, they claimed that some vouchers of the expenditures on schools had been unlawfully arranged, and sent a contemptuous written warning to the community.³⁸

First of all, how and why the Turkish Consulate in Komotini might be interested in an issue regarding the "Greek spiritual institution" in İstanbul, and how they acquired the aforementioned information are curious. In other words, it would make more sense if the issue of the Patriarchate's alleged

³⁸Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: "26 Teşrinievvel 1926 tarihinde Dahiliye Vekili imzalı Başvekaleti Celileye (Başbakanlığa) hitaben ekli mektup: "İstanbul'daki Rum ruhani kurumunun Yunan müdafaa-i milliyesi menfaatine yardım etmekte olduğu iane (para ile yardım) vesaire hakkında Gümölcine Konsolosluğu'ndan alınan mektubun suretini ekte takdim ederim: Fatih'in ilerigörüşsüz ve yanlış iyiliksever siyasetinin eseri olarak İstanbul'da ikamet eden ve mevcudiyet gösteren Fener Patrikhanesi'yle ibadethaneden ziyade birer fesat pınarı/kaynağı ve dolandırma/yalan olan Rum kiliseleri ve eskiden beri Türklere vahşet ve iftira etmeye alışmış, ve eğitim verdikleri çocuklara daimi bir düşmanlık hissi ve intikam uyandırmayı rehber edinmiş olan Rum muallimlerinin vazife icra ettikleri jimnaz mektepleri ile hastane, yetimhane gibi Rum hayır ve ruhani kurumlarına ait emlak akarettten mütevellid bunca hasılatın Yunan idealleri ve Megali İdea'sı menfaatine sarfedilmekte ve bu sayede Türklere karşı beslenen kin ve düşmanlığın sarsılmaz esasları ile temin olunmakta olduğu ve bu halin gerek mütareke senelerinde ve gerek ondan sonra devam ettiği öteden beri malum idiye de bunun devam edip etmediğini ve devamı takdirinde ne ölçü ve mahiyette olduğunu anlamak bendenizde adeta bir ukde ve milli görev hasıl olmuş idi. Aslında epey vakitten beri gayet objektif olarak yaptığım araştırma ve incelemelerim ve şahsıma gelen istihbaratların, bu cemaate ait emlak, arazi ve akarettten gelen gelirlerin Avrupa ve Amerika muhtelif ülkelerinde Türklerin aleyhinde daimi bir akım uyandırmak ve kamuoyunu Türkiye'de yaşayan Rum unsuruna acıma ve sevgi duygularına gark etmek amacıyla yapılagelen propagandalar önemli kişiler ve papazlar vasıtasıyla fazla miktar meblağı ve Yunan fikri amelini besleyen ve daima Yunan ruh ve hissiyle dolu bulunan İstanbul Rumlarının kamuoyunda topladıkları yardım paraları ve hibeler ile, papazların Türkler aleyhinde ve kadim Bizanslıların lehinde mütemadi konuşmaları, atıp tutan tafraya yapan ikazları sayesinde kiliselerden mendil açmak ve kutu gezdirmek suretiyle toplanan paranın ve bilumum hediyeinin Yunanistan milli müdafaası namına terk ve teberru edilmekte olduğu katiyen anlaşılmış, ve fakat maalesef mevduatın miktarıyla teslimine dair kati bir malumat edinilememiştir. Makedonya ve Trakya metropolitleri, Patrikhane'nin emir ve nüfuzu altında olup ödeneklerini maalesef oradan almaktadır. Halbuki Yunan hükümeti, ülkesindeki ruhani kurumlarının diğer ecnebi kurumlarına değil bağlı olmak, fikir alışverişini bile vatana ihanet gibi cürümlerden addeylemektedir. Hatta geçenlerde nafaka toplama maksadıyla köylere çıkmaya teşebbüs etmiş bulunan bazı medrese talebelerinin, uçak cemiyetimize iane toplayacakları zannı ile geçişlerini yasaklamıştır. Yunan hükümeti iki üç sene boyunca Müslüman cemaatin gelirlerinin kısmen Türkiye'ye gönderilmekte olduğunu iddia etmiş ve resmen tayin etmiş olduğu bir komisyon marifetiyle cemaat sandığını mühürlettirdikten sonra hesap defterlerini inceden inceye tetkik ve muayene etmiş ise de neticede müsbet bir emareye rastlamadığından mekteplere yapılan bazı masrafların makbuzları usulsüz tanzim edilmiş olduğunu ileri sürerek cemaate teessüfimiz bir ihtarname göndermiş olduğunu bilginize arz ederim."

contribution to the national defense of Greece was discovered by the Turkish Embassy in Athens, or the Turkish Ministry of Interior itself.

The second fact is the clear compunction of the Consul regarding the current existence of the Greek community in İstanbul as a result of the Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror's "myopic and naively benevolent" policies. The choice of a statesman was preferred to be interpreted less as a result of political calculations than as a product of "illustrious" Turkish hospitality and benevolence, to the degree of naivete in this case. The emphasis of self-victimization or self-pity is striking here. Parallel to this argument, the Greek churches, charity institutions and schools were regarded as exploiting the immense benevolence of the Turkish nation.

The weakness of the Consul's allegations comes to light when he stated that "no certain information has been obtained regarding the actual amount of the deposit accounts and their delivery." He did not substantiate his claims as to how the money collected in churches and other charity institutions were delivered to Greece in the first place. Also, the language and terms he used with reference to the Greek minority illustrate his personal convictions and assumptions about the Greek minority, which have no objective basis: "filled with Greek spirit and feelings." This is a clear official exclusion and stigmatization of a certain ethnic and religious group.

Finally, the nationalist argumentation of the Consul was legitimized with a similar practice of the Greek government toward the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. The notoriously wrong application of the *reciprocity* principle, which does not exist in the Treaty of Lausanne at all, allows the Turkish

authorities, according to the Consul, to compare the Greeks in İstanbul with the Muslims in Western Thrace, or even to do similar malpractices to their own citizens, the Turkish citizens of Greek heritage, who become like hostages to international frictions.

3.8.2. Letter on “Fener Archbishop” and Insurgency in Cyprus

On 29 November, 1931, the Minister of Interior Affairs wrote a letter³⁹ to the Prime Ministry:

In the last Greek Cypriot insurgency aiming at the annexation with Greece, it is understood from the below information that the clandestine activities of the Greek Orthodox spiritual leadership in İstanbul was also influential:

Dear Sir, I present that in a photograph on the first page of the Patris daily of Athens on 5 November, 1931, Alaşehir Metropolitan Bishop Maximos, who is a Synod member having the spiritual rank of the highest “Protosingelos” [sic.] after the Greek Orthodox spiritual leader, is seen together with the Greek Consul General in Cyprus, Alexis Kiros, as well as the national poet Libertis, who is one of the most crucial elements which direct the movement that led to the latest Cypriot insurgency. This photograph supports the idea that the Fener Archpriest has also been involved with the last Cypriot insurgency.⁴⁰

3.8.3. On Greek Archbishop’s Religious Conference

The Minister of Interior Affairs submitted a report to the Prime Ministry, in which it said that it was found out that the “Greek Archbishop” has been

³⁹ State Archives, File No. 030-0-010-000-000-109-727-4.

⁴⁰ Its original in Turkish: “Yunanistan annexation maksadıyla Kıbrıs Rumlarının çıkardıkları son isyan hareketinde, aynı zamanda İstanbul’daki Rum Ortodoks ruhani reisliğinin gizli faaliyetinin de etkili olduğu, aşağıya naklolunan malumattan anlaşılmaktadır: Atina’daki Patris gazetesinin 5 Teşrinisani 1931 tarihli nüshasının birinci sayfasındaki bir resimde Rum ortodoks ruhani reisinden sonra en büyük “Protosingelos” rütbei ruhaniyesindeki Sinot azalarından Alaşehir Metropolidi Maksimos’un son Kıbrıs ihtilalini meydana getirme ve hareketi idare eden en mühim uzuvlardan milli şair Libertis’in ve Kıbrıs’ın Yunan Konsolosu Aleksi Kiro’nun yanında fotoğrafının bulunması son Kıbrıs isyanı ile Fener Başpapazlığının da alakadar olduğu kanaatini desteklemekte olduğunu arzeylerim efendim.”

contemplating about a religious congress in İstanbul and he was notified that it was prohibited. The Patriarch's letter about the congress and his petition were rejected. However, more important for our study is a final note in the report which mentions that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was also informed about this. The fact that the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs were concerned with this case explains that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was perceived as both an internal and external problem by the government. Also, we see the confusion and inconsistency of the government as to how to address the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The government carefully referred to him as the "Greek Archbishop"⁴¹ or "Fener Archpriest"⁴² or "Orthodox spiritual leader"⁴³ in order not to acknowledge his Ecumenical title.

3.8.4. On Patriarchate's Alleged Envoy in Athens

The fear of the government that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul might be involved in clandestine activities to the detriment of the Republic continued in 1937. The Minister of Interior Affairs wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on 14 May, 1937:

I submit to your and Ministry of Foreign Affairs' attention a copy of the document that was taken from the President of the National Security Service. The document consists of the answers decided upon by the Holy Synod Assembly in reply to the questions directed at the Patriarchate by the Governorship of İstanbul within your direction upon the news we received that the İstanbul Greek Patriarchate has been involved in relations with abroad.⁴⁴

⁴¹ In Turkish: Rum Başpapazı.

⁴² In Turkish: Fener Başpapazı.

⁴³ In Turkish: Ortodoks Ruhani Reisi.

⁴⁴The original text in Turkish: "İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesinin hariçle siyasi mahiyette bazı münasebetlere giriştiğine dair alınan haberler üzerine direktifiniz dahilinde İstanbul vilayetince Patrikliğe tevcih edilen sorgulara verilmesi Sen Sinod meclisince kararlaştırılan cevaplar hakkında

The National Security Service's writing dated 30 April, 1937:

We learned that the Patriarchate took alarm due to the instructions and interpellation by the Governorship of İstanbul with reference to the Albanian spiritual delegate that arrived in İstanbul in the company of two Greek (from Greece) bishops. We also learned that the Greek Consul General in İstanbul got involved in this incident and uttered "This is a cloud; it will pass away." According to our information, the Holy Synod assembled on 20 April, 1937, in order to reply the questions of the Governorship of İstanbul; and it was decided to remain silent on the most important questions. The Patriarchate would give no answer to the question whether they had an envoy at the Greek government; and if asked again, they would reply as "He is our representative at the Church of Greece." The extremists decided to stall off this instance by correspondence in order to keep this representative for a few more months. The fact that there are quite a few records in Synod proceedings such as "...to write to our Athens representative in order to solve the problem by meeting with the responsables.." shows that the Patriarchate indeed has an envoy in Athens.⁴⁵

3.8.5. Mr. Fotios, Ecumenical Patriarch, or High Priest?

The General Director of the Press have regularly submitted to the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry copies of some news articles and columns, which he thought the latter might be interested, including their attachments and translations, mostly from the Greek and sometimes Armenian dailies in İstanbul.

For instance, one of them is from the daily *Apoyevmatini* (a Greek newspaper in İstanbul) dated 21 May, 1930, titled "The Greek-Rum Patriarch has

milli emniyet hizmeti reisliğinden alınan yazının bir örneğini yüksek sizin ve Hariciye vekaletinin bilgilerinize arz ederim."

⁴⁵ In Turkish: "İki Yunan papazı refakatinde olarak İstanbul'a gelen Arnavut ruhani heyeti münasebetiyle İstanbul Valiliğince Patrikhane'den izahat istenmesi ve bazı emirler verilmesi, Patrikhane'yi telaşa düşürmüş ve buna Yunan konsolosu da karışarak "Bu bir buluttur; geçer" demiş olduğu öğrenilmiştir. Alınan bir bilgiye göre Valiliğin sorduğu sorulara cevap vermek üzere Sen Sinod 20/4/1937 tarihinde toplanmış, soruların en önemli olanlarında sessiz kalmak suretiyle cevap verilmesini kararlaştırmıştır. Bu cevapla Patrikhane'nin Yunan hükümeti nezdindeki sefiri hakkında hiçbir cevap bulunmayarak, tekrar sorulursa "Yunan kilisesi nezdinde temsilcimizdir" denilecektir. Ekstremistler bu temsilciyi birkaç ay daha muhafaza etmek için, işi haberleşme ile oyalamaya karar vermişlerdir. Sinod zabıtnamelerinde "Alakadarlarla görüşülerek meseleyi halletmesi için Atina sefirimize yazılması" diye birçok kayıtların bulunması Patrikhane'nin bir Atina sefiri bulunduğunu göstermektedir."

been conducting demonstrations in İstanbul taking advantage of every opportunity”:

With reference to a copy of “Apoyevmatini” daily which is circulated in Greek language in Beyoğlu (Pera) dated 17/05/1930, Mr. “Fotios”, forgetting that he is only the high priest of Greek orthodox people (in İstanbul) and assuming a title of the general (ecumenical) patriarch of all the Greeks in the world, along with a cohort of some made-up metropolitan bishops supposedly representing in-all-but-name Greek-Rum congregations in Brusa (Bursa), Lazıkiye, İmbros, Limini and such places, have embarked from Fener on a steamboat and went to Heybeliada, and conducted official receptions and pompous religious rites, reminiscent of the Byzantine times.⁴⁶

Here, I would like to make a general note on the Başbakanlık Basın Yayın Müdürlüğü’s (the Prime Ministry General Directory of the Press) interest in examining and explicating non-Muslim newspapers in Istanbul. It could be explained/interpreted by the following logic borrowed from Benedict Anderson’s print capitalism notion (and its role in the development of nationalism): A particular community of newspaper readers is imagined and assumed to exist on the basis of reality that a specific group of people will be reading the relevant newspaper; and the imagined fact that the news is newsworthy for all of the members of a particular ‘imagined community’ simultaneously (e.g. Istanbul Rum Orthodox people). So, the reader ‘becomes’ to exist somewhere in the temporality of the newspaper. Hence, the interest of the Prime Ministry in the particular imaginations, thus the discursive formations as in newspapers, of the non-Muslim community.

⁴⁶ State archives, File No. 030-0-010-000-000-109-725-12. Its translation in Turkish: “İstanbul’da Yunan-Rum patriki her fırsattan bilistifade nümayişler yapıyor.” Beyoğlu’nda Yunanca olarak çıkan “Apoyevmatini” gazetesinin 17/5/30 tarihli nüshasında okunduğuna nazaran geçen Cuma günü Rum ortodoksları başpapası olduğunu unutarak kendine bütün dünya Yunanlılarının umum patriki süsünü veren “Fotios” efendi refakatında Brusa, Lazıkiye, İmbros, Limini ve buna benzer ismi var cismi yok Yunan-Rum cemaatlarını güya temsil eden bir takım uydurma metropolitler olduğu halde Fener’den Bizans zamanını andırır bir surette hususi bir istimbota binerek Heybeliadaya gitmiş ve orada büyük debdebe ve tantana ile resmi kabuller ve dini ayinler yapmıştır.

3.8.6. Scrutiny of Greek Press on Patriarchate

On 22 July, 1930, the General Directory of the Press submitted to the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry a number of articles from İstanbul Greek dailies Apoyevmatini and Hronika dated 17-18 July, 1930, which they thought the latter might be concerned. Exactly the following was written:

In a reply to an article in “Vakit” newspaper on the İstanbul Orthodox Patriarchate, the İstanbul dailies in Greek, “Apoyevmatini” on 17 July, 1930, and “Hronika” on 18 July, 1930, go so far as to claim and declare in their articles that the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Church has never been a “high priest”, and he is universally known as the “Patriarch”, and even Mustafa Kemal Pasha and İsmet Pasha have come to describe him as the “Greek Patriarch”, as well as during the Lausanne Treaty negotiations İsmet Pasha and the Turkish delegate Dr. Rıza Nur have referred to the religious leader of the Orthodox Church – which was agreed to stay in İstanbul – as the “Patriarch”. So, the article argues that the head of the Fener Church – who has been acknowledged as the Patriarch by all the Orthodox people in the world, and even by the Catholics and Protestants – has been, supposedly, disrespected by referring to him as “the High Priest”. The article also claims that nobody argued that the aforementioned church is above the law.⁴⁷

It is clear from all of the examples above that the CHP government viewed the Greek minority and the Patriarchate through a combination of security calculations and racism. They were staunchly and consistently opposed to the ‘ecumenical’ status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul. Any possible contact and links between the Patriarchate and Greece were also meticulously

⁴⁷ Its original in Turkish: “Basın Genel Müd. Tarafından 22/7/1930 tarihinde Başbakanlık Müsteşarlığına, İstanbul’da çıkan Apoyevmatini ve Hronika gazetelerinin 17-18 Temmuz 1930 tarihli nüshalarında birtakım makaleler, Başbakanlığı alakadar edeceği düşünülerek arz edilmiştir. Aynen şu yazılmıştır: “İstanbul’da Yunanca olarak çıkan gazetelerden 17/7/30 tarihli “Apoyevmatini” ve 18/7/30 tarihli “Hronika” gazetelerinde “Vakit” gazetesinin İstanbul Ortodoks kilisesi hakkında yazdığı bir makaleye cevaben, mezkûr kilisenin kanunun üstünde olduğunu kimsenin iddia etmediği ve ancak yalnız Türkiye değil bütün dünya ortodoksları hatta katolik ve protestanlar tarafından da (!) Patrik olarak tanınmış olduğu halde Fener Kilisesi başında bulunan Fotias’a “Başpapas” ünvanı vermekle güya hörmetsizlik yapıldığı ve çünkü Lozan Antlaşması müzakereleri esnasında İstanbul’da bırakılması uygun görülmiş olan Ortodoks kilisesinin ruhani reisine İsmet Paşa Hz. ile Türk heyeti delegesi Dr Rıza Nur Bey tarafından “Patrik” ünvanı verilmiş olduğu gibi gerek Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Hz. ve gerekse İsmet Paşa telgraflarında “Rum Patriki” diye describe ettikleri ve hiçbir vakit “Başpapas” olmadığı ve bilakis bütün dünya tarafından “Patrik” olarak tanındığı ileri sürerek bunu makalelerinde ilan etmeye kadar varıyorlar.”

surveilled and reported with suspicion by commissions and departments to the relevant higher authorities. This surveillance was conducted by means of a thorough study of minority newspapers as well as intelligence activities through consulates and intelligence agencies.

3.9. On İstamat Zihni Özdamar and Expectations about the Multiparty Regime

İstamat Zihni Özdamar was a deputy of Eskişehir, with Turkish Orthodox identity as he referred to himself, who served in the Parliament for three successive terms between 1935-1946 (Ender, 2011: 78-83). To remind the reader, all of the deputies were automatically CHP members, up until 1946, as there was no political competition. However, the non-Muslim deputies were an exception to this rule. They were kept as ‘independent’ deputies from various cities (Uyar, 2002: 54-58). This was clearly a purposeful political choice on part of the Kemalist establishment, which had most probably had a symbolic aim of expressing the distance of their party, CHP, toward the non-Muslim identities in Turkey, while at the same time conveying the impression of not entirely excluding them from the Parliament. Rıfat Bali also adds that these deputies were kept away from taking part in decision-making mechanisms as a result of their “independent deputyship” (Bali, 2009a: 60). This symbolic nomination of certain small numbers of non-Muslim minorities to deputyship had been a customary practice in Turkish politics, according to Akın, which was maintained later also during the DP years (Akın, 2009: 37).

Mr. Özdamar was one of these aforementioned non-Muslim deputies, who served as a deputy of Eskişehir province. Although being from *Karamanli*

community, who were Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, he stood out from other non-Muslim deputies of his period during his deputyship, as being clearly closer to the Kemalist establishment and the bureaucracy than the non-Muslim communities, which his very deputyship was supposed to be representing. This could be explained by the fact that these non-Muslim deputies, including Mr. Özdamar, were selected from people who could actually serve the Turkification policies of the Establishment. For example, an association called “the Unity of Secular Turkish Christians” was founded under the leadership of Mr. Özdamar. The purpose of the association was to Turkify the Greeks and Armenians in Turkey (Ender, 2011: 81). Also, almost all of these deputies had expressed that they were loyal to the regime and the Republic, and represented the whole ‘Turkish nation’; as well as rejecting the dichotomy of minority-majority, and emphasizing the Turkish citizenship instead (Ertan, 2005: 109).

It is fair to say that the Greek Orthodox community was not pleased of Mr. Özdamar’s deputyship. In addition, there was another issue which vexed the community even more: He also served, by appointment, as the only trustee of the Balıklı Greek Hospital Endowment. A Greek daily in İstanbul, *Metapolitefsis*’ editorial⁴⁸ (6 May, 1946) dwells on the discontentedness of the Greek community:

Who does this man trust?... Why does mister Deputy... prefer to be stuck in the narrow domain of an institution on whose seal it reads “Greek hospital”, even though he claims to have no connection with Greekness?

If these hospitals are ours, why is not their management entrusted to us? Why would these institutions that we have inherited from our ancestors, be managed by some person whose even presence disturbs and disgusts us? Because these people estrange us from Turkish society by various means, want to take the Turkish patriotism under their sole exclusivity, want to cause a fit between us and the Turkish society; they notice to the

⁴⁸ State Archives, File No. 030-0-001-000-000-101-623-10.

authorities against us, and they debilitate the efforts of those who wish to clinch the ties between the citizens.

The venerable government has openly declared, through Mr. Saracoğlu, that they were pleased with the minorities, and acknowledged that the latter were working for the ideals of the country. This means that no one person can possess certain special privileges and no ideology can grant anyone the right to manage an institution that belongs to thousands of Greeks... This person, who does not want to resign, has no ties with Greek people. The state should consider the sensitivities of the minority and dismiss this individual. We cannot accept that 60,000-strong Greeks are not capable of managing a hospital. Dismissal of this individual would reinforce our feelings toward our honorable government. The government that acts upon the light of Republic knows to respect the legal rights of thousands-strong subjects and to protect these rights. It should and will acknowledge that the sensitivities and conscience of a mass, which is willing to sacrifice all of their dearest possessions for the honor and reputation of our dear country, should not be offended due to a perpetuation of an individual.⁴⁹

Evidently, for the Greek community, as understood from this editorial, Mr. Özdamar was clearly a *persona non grata*⁵⁰. Without openly accusing the previous CHP single party regime, the Community criticized the fact that he still occupied this post. Besides Mr. Özdamar's non-Greek identity and detachment from the Greek community, there were obviously other reasons why he was so disliked. He was seen as someone who malignantly spoils the relations between

⁴⁹ State Archives, File No. 030-0-001-000-000-101-623-10_15. Its original in Turkish: "Bu adam kime güveniyor?... Neden bay mebus... Rumlukla hiçbir münasebetinin bulunmadığını iddia halde, mühründe "Rum hastanesi" ibaresini taşıyan bir müessesenin dar muhitinde kalmayı tercih ediyor? Eğer bu hastaneler bizimse, idaresi neden bize tevdi edilmiyor? Ecdadımızdan kalan bu müesseseler, huzurları bile bizde nefret hissi uyandıran bir kimse tarafından neden idare edilsin? Çünkü bunlar muhtelif vasıtalarla bizi Türk camiasından uzaklaştırmakta, Türk yurtseverliğini inhisar altına almak istemekte, aramıza nifak sokmakta, aleyhimize ihbaratta bulunmakta ve yurttaşlar arasındaki bağları perçinlemek isteyenleri sarstırmaktadırlar. Muhterem hükümet, azınlıklardan memnun olduğunu ve bunların memleketin mefkureleri uğrunda çalışmakta bulduklarını, Bay Saracoğlu vasıtasıyla alenen beyan etmiştir. Demek oluyor ki, hiçbir şahıs hususi bir takım imtiyazlara malik olamaz ve binlerce Rum'a ait olan bir müesseseyi idare etmek hakkını hiçbir ideoloji hiçbir kimseye bahşedemez. Çünkü istifa etmek suretiyle, yerini mal ve hak sahibi olan cemaate terketmeğe bir türlü yanaşmayan bu şahıs ile Rumluğun hiçbir rabitası yoktur. Devlet, ekalliyetin hissiyatını gözönünde tutarak, bu adamı hastaneden uzaklaştırmalıdır. Altmış bin Rum'un bir hastaneyi idareden aciz olduklarını kabul edemeyiz. Bu adamın çekilmesi veya uzaklaştırılması, muhterem hükümete karşı beslediğimiz hisleri daha fazla takkiye edecektir. Cumhuriyet ışığı altında hareket eden hükümet, binlerce tebaasının hukukuna saygı göstermeyi ve bu haklarını himaye etmeyi bilir. Sevgili vatanın şan ve şerefi uğrunda en aziz şeylerini bile fedaya amade bulunan bir kitlenin hissiyat ve vicdanının, bir şahsın ipkısı suretiyle, rencide edilmemesi lazımgeldiğini de takdir eder."

⁵⁰ *Persona non grata* means "unwanted person" in diplomatic language.

the Community and the rest of Turkish society. In sum, the Community wishes to see him replaced by someone they approve, by virtue of their capacity to manage the institution, the DP government's dedication to the "light of Republic", and the government's assumed sensitivity toward a devoted minority.

However, perhaps the most significant part of the above mentioned quote is the interpretation and expectation of a new era about minorities in Turkish politics by the Community. The Greek community expected and believed that with the new DP government, a true democratic era in which they could become fearless, free and equal citizens, would start. The introduction of multiparty elections and transition to democracy indeed promised hope for the minority communities, which had experienced numerous practices of discrimination and unequal treatment. Even when expressing their frustration with their past replete with injustices, their tone carries clear signs of empathy, humility, and resignation:

On the occasion of the CHP's general congress and the scheduled legislative elections, we should have at least ten deputies in the new parliament" – "So, it is necessary to make some modifications in the party charter, so as what the National Leader has made it clear. The changes in living conditions necessitate these modifications. There is nothing unnatural about it. These modifications will also help fellow citizens to become one flesh.

As you may well know, we were not entitled to enroll in the CHP and thereby actually involve in the (political) life of the country. Although we possessed equal rights in accordance with the constitution, we have been deprived of being employed by the state services; because there were other decisions which forestalled our constitutional rights.

Although we abided by the laws and fulfilled our patriotic duties, we could not make use of the benefits the constitution entitled to us. We could not even become an ordinary clerk or a ticket collector. How can, then, the state claim that we all possess the same rights?

And why have we been deprived of these rights? *Perhaps, some reasons might be found*; however, as it has been 25 years since the introduction of prohibition measures, these reasons must have disappeared now. *It*

might have been necessary to take various measures back in those days; but today, these measures cannot be justified, and therefore, should be lifted.

It is apparent that the Congress will make decisions along these lobs. We are Turkish citizens too. We should be employed by the state. We should at least have ten deputies elected. We are not aliens to this state. The greatest power for the country is our fraternal cooperation.⁵¹

As I mentioned before the quote, there is a remarkable degree of humility and empathy particularly in those parts in italic. Even if they did not believe there had been convincing reasons to take those discriminatory and prohibitive measures, in retrospect they could still *understand* that it might have been necessary or at least normal for those times.

3.10. Racist Undertones of the Regime

During the single-party period, the Turkish state tilted towards racist policies and practices from time to time. For instance, the *Memurin Kanunu* (Law on Public Servants)⁵² of 1926 stipulated that a public official needed only to be a ‘Turk’ (Aktar, 2000: 119-121). According to a newspaper article in *Cumhuriyet*, on 24 July 1937, “being of Turkish race” was listed as an application criterion for the

⁵¹ Prime Ministry Republican Archives, File No. 030-0-001-000-000-101-623-10_11 and 030-0-001-000-000-101-623-10_12. Emphasis and parantheses added. “Cumhuriyet Halkpartisi Kurultayının İçtimaı ve Yapılacak Mebus Seçimi münasebetiyle Yeni Mecliste En Az On Mebusumuz Bulunmalıdır”, *Metapolitefsis*, 28.04.1946. Its original in Turkish: “Şimdi Milli Şefin de tebarüz ettirdiği veçhile, parti nizamnamesinde bazı tadilat yapılması iktiza etmektedir. Hayat şartlarının değişmesi bunu icabettirmektedir. Bunda gayritabii görülecek bir şey yoktur... Bu tadilat vatan evlatlarının yekvücut olmasına da yardım edecektir. Malum olduğu veçhile, bizim Halkpartisine yazılmağa ve memleketin hayatına bilfiil karışmağa hakkımız yoktu. Anayasa mucibince musavi haklara malik olmamıza rağmen devlet hizmetlerinde kullanılmak hakkından mahrum edildik. Anayasadaki haklarımızı nezi eden başka kararlar verilmişti. Biz kanuna itaat ediyor ve vatani vazifelerimizi tamamiyle yapıyorduk; fakat buna rağmen anayasanın bahsettiği nimetlerden istifade edemiyorduk. Devlet müesseselerinde adi katip ve biletçi bile olamıyorduk. Bu böyle olduğu halde, devlet, hepimizin aynı haklara malik bulunduğumuzu nasıl iddia edebilir? Ve bu haklardan neden mahrum edildik? Belki bazı sebepler bulunabilir; yasak tedbirleri alınmalı 25 sene geçmiş olduğundan, bu sebepler zail olmuştur. Günlerinde belki muhtelif tedbirler alınması mecburi idi; fakat bugün bunlar haklı gösterilemez ve binaenaleyh kaldırılmalıdır. Kurultayın bu direktifler dairesinde karar vereceği aşikardır. Biz de Türk vatandaşlarıyız. Devlet memuriyetlerine girmeliyiz. Asgari on tane mebus çıkarmalıyız; bu devletin yabancısı değiliz. Kardeşçe işbirliği yapmamız memleket için en büyük kuvvettir”

⁵² Law No. 788. March 18, 1926. This law was abrogated only in 1965.

Military Veterinary School. A similar condition (“being of Turkish heritage”) was sought for the teachers who applied to the Turkish Bird Aeronautical Association⁵³, according to another *Cumhuriyet* article on 6 September, 1938 (Yıldız, 2001). It is also known that declarations about craniometric measurements swept the First Turkish History Congress in 1932, in which one of Atatürk’s adopted daughters, Afet İnan, made bold statements about the Turkish *race* (Ergin, 2008).

In 1928, Armenians living in Sivas, a province in central Anatolia, were prohibited to leave their city for a while (Hür, 2001b). Armenians in Diyarbakır and Harput were “strongly advised” by local officials to leave Turkey in 1928 and 1929. In November 1932, many Jewish citizens in İzmir were made to sign a contract promising to adopt the Turkish culture and start to speak Turkish. In 1933, the Assyrian Patriarchate in Mardin had to move to Homs in Syria, due to mounting pressures. In June 1934, the Settlement Law⁵⁴ was promulgated which divided Turkish citizens into three categories: “Those who have Turkish culture and speak Turkish” (i.e. Turks), “Those who have Turkish culture but do not speak Turkish” (i.e. Kurds), and “Those who neither have Turkish culture nor speak Turkish” (non-Muslims and others). As a result of this law, Greeks and Armenians in various parts of Anatolia were relegated to areas appropriate for the state (Hür, 2001b).

⁵³ “Türk Kuşu Teşkilatı” in Turkish.

⁵⁴ In Turkish: 1934 İskan Kanunu.

3.11. Lawsuits against non-Muslims for Insulting Turkishness

A rough examination of the list that contains the very first a hundred lawsuits that were filed against persons for charges of *insulting Turkishness* in the Prime Ministry Republican Archives reveals that 70 of them (70%) were targeted at non-Muslims.⁵⁵ Another significant finding is that a search for “insulting Turkishness” in the Archive gives the largest number of files that occurred during the single-party regime, particularly the initial years of this period.

Considering that the non-Muslims were silenced due to the discriminatory and intimidating government policies aimed at them – by means of exiles, massacres, discriminatory taxes, relocations, pressures – it is fair to say that these tribunals and trials were set-up functionalities of the operations that aim for intimidating, expelling and destroying the non-Muslim minorities. They are good examples of what I call ‘covert state policies aiming legal (de jure) intimidation’.

3.12. The Issue of Non-Muslims’ Membership to the CHP

During the single party period, has there been any non-Muslim member of the CHP? It is understood that following the initiation of registration of people from society to the Party, there were some non-Muslim minority citizens as well who had applied to register with the Party. Although there have been no official framework constraining the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim beliefs to become a Party member, in practice, this proved rather impossible.

⁵⁵ <http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/katalog/>

On May 2, 1945, a letter sent from CHP Mardin Administrative Board to the CHP General Secretary, it was exactly stated that “it is seen that some people belonging to the minorities in our region also expressed their desire to become a member to the Party. We have had hesitations as to whether we should admit such people to our organization,” and asked for advice.⁵⁶ After this letter, the CHP General Secretary asked Dr. Sadi Irmak, Deputy of Konya, and also CHP Diyarbakır Region Inspector, to inform them about the “number, religion, sect, and general conditions of the aforementioned minorities.”⁵⁷ The General Secretary, also, expressed that “The Article 8 of our Party Regulations has laid out who can qualify for membership to the Party. As our Party does not seek race or sect in nationalism, according to the paragraph (e) of the Article 8, the citizens who are Turkish can be registered to the Party.”⁵⁸

It is curious whether the term “Turkish”, or rather the entire phrase “the citizens who are Turkish” denotes an ethnic connotation. Although the General Secretary dismissed any affiliation of the Party’s nationalism with “race” or “sect”, it did not exclude ‘ethnicity’ or ‘religion’. Nonetheless, that specific sentence meant that there were no de jure restrictions for non-Muslims to register to the Party.

On the other hand, the Deputy of Balıkesir, Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı wrote a letter asking advice from the CHP General Secretary saying that in the last five or six

⁵⁶ Secret Document, CHP Mardin Administrative Board, written by M. Bayar, State Archives, File No. 26713.15. Its original in Turkish: “Bölgede bulunan azlıklara mensup kimselerin de partili olmak hevesini güttükleri görülmektedir. Bu gibilerin teşkilatımız arasına alınmalarında tereddüt etmekteyiz.”

⁵⁷ State Archives, File No. 76803.1, on 15.05.1945, CHP General Secretary. Its original in Turkish: “Adı geçen azlıkların sayısı, din ve mezhepleri ile genel durumları üzerinde bizi aydınlatmanızı rica ederiz.”

⁵⁸ Ibid. Annex. Its original in Turkish: “Parti Tüzüğüümüzün 8inci maddesi kimlerin Partimize alınabileceğini yazmış bulunmaktadır. Partimiz milliyetçilikte ırk ve mezhep aramadığına göre 8inci maddenin (e) fıkrası uyarınca Türk olan vatandaşlar partimize kayıt edilebilirler.”

months, a new interest to become a member to the Party had emerged among the Jews in İzmir. He noted that he has “evaded” several of them who actually applied for membership and “bought time” until then, probably not knowing what answer to give them. In the end, he thought it would be convenient for around a hundred Jews to be enrolled to the Party after a well scrutinized investigation (Çağlar, 2009).

In sum, there were no legal restrictions for non-Muslims to become members to the Party; however, even the necessity of exchange of letters on the issue, i.e. whether they should be allowed to be members, as well as the General Secretary’s interest in the number, religion, sect, and general conditions of the aforementioned minorities, explain that the Party did not completely regard the non-Muslims as equal citizens with equal rights. Therefore, the CHP has aimed to keep the non-Muslims away from the Party organization in practice without openly establishing a legal framework for such a restriction.

3.13. Conclusion

The CHP government has viewed the non-Muslim citizens as foreign elements, limited and conditional citizens due to their ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences, as well as the traumatic war experiences. Another salient motivation of the government was the *Turkification of the capital*. Interwar years’ fascistic atmosphere in Europe was also influential. In other words, a combination of security concerns, a homogenous nation ideal, fascistic external inspirations, and the goal of the Turkification of the capital determined the government’s treatment of the non-Muslim minorities.

The Party often abstained from conveying the impression that it was explicitly discriminating the non-Muslims. Nor did it adopt a consistent clear-cut racist policy, as in Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy, with regard to the non-Muslims. They were not exterminated en masse. However, the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey underwent a series of discriminatory policies, intimidation campaigns, as well as physical distress and expulsions. Hence the significant decrease in their population throughout the single party period.

My findings corroborated the argument that the non-Muslims were *excluded* from the definition of the Turkish nation (Aktar, 2009: 29-62; Eissenstat, 2007: 52; Aktürk, 2009; Çağaptay, 2006; Maksudyan, 2005). Here, it is not the official definition as described in the Constitution or the texts. However, the discriminatory policies (e.g. Wealth Tax, Population Exchange, Thrace incidents, etc.) demonstrate that the non-Muslims were not *seen* as genuine Turkish citizens. Religious descent (Baer, 2004) did actually play a defining role in what makes someone welcome in the new Turkish Republic.

Assimilation should require a certain level of trust; a kind of trust in the groups of people to be assimilated that they *might* become *alike*, homogenized, invisible in the majority. The CHP government never trusted the non-Muslims. The ruling élite was trapped in a state of paranoia that in case of a war, the non-Muslims would act as a 'fifth column', collaborating with the enemy to divide the country. The Thrace incidents, relocation of Armenians and Jews, exchange of Greek Orthodox people, as well as discourses of many policymakers during this period attest to such a perception of distrust and disloyalty toward the non-Muslims on part of the government.

On the other hand, as Bauman suggested, the definitive line between exclusion and assimilation is much thinner in practice (2001: 176-177). Unity of language, more than unity of religion, was consistently emphasized and sought during the period. The non-Muslims were pressured to leave their mother tongues and speak Turkish instead. The constitutive element of the Turkish nation was defined as “Turkish-speaking” and “Turkish-feeling.” It seems that *feeling* Turkish was more important than *speaking* Turkish for the ruling élite. The Karamanli community, a Turkophone Orthodox group, were nevertheless among the ones who were sent. However, a Karamanli family (Papa Eftim’s family) as well as several other non-Muslim individuals who were believed to have fought on the side of the Turks in the War of Independence were given preferential treatment by the regime. To illustrate, Papa Eftim’s tiny community and the Deputy İstamat Özdamar were given prestigious strongholds, exasperating the Greek community. Associations such as “Unity of Secular Turkish Christians”, made-up churches such as “Independent Turkish Orthodox Church”, all, exemplify the regime’s wish to exert control over minorities by means of assimilation. These were some of the few instances of attempts of *inclusion*, or *assimilation* of certain non-Muslims on conditions. The conditions were set as adopting Turkish language, as well as a historical support for the Turkish nation-building élite during the War of Independence (Aktürk, 2009).

Still though, even this limited attempt at assimilation of a certain group alienated a bigger proportion of non-Muslims from the regime. It should also be noted that Mr. İstamat Zihni Özdamar was not made member to the CHP, but instead was kept as an “independent deputy.” Even this symbolic choice demonstrates that the exclusionary attitude of the government weighs more than its aim of incorporation. Therefore, I do not fully agree with Çağaptay’s claim that the regime

wished to incorporate non-Muslims via assimilation than alienate them altogether (2004: 87-97).

My findings offer, instead, that the Turkish government aimed at two different goals at the same time: to distance the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin from the *Turkishness*, and simultaneously not allow them to be alienated and thus identify with other countries and other allegiances. Particularly, the government paid close attention to the “clandestine” activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. So, for the regime, the non-Muslims must have been intentionally kept distant to ‘us’, i.e. Turkishness (so as not to sap them the national identity), but at the same time not too distant so as not to i) be stigmatized as a racist regime, and ii) not to allow them to affiliate with other nations. The former can be explained by the regime’s claim to Westernization ideal of the Republic, i.e. the “modernist nationalism” of Akman (2004). Whereas, the latter comes from the fear of irredentism that might have come from other countries. All in all, this paradoxical combination of half-hearted inclusion and intentional exclusion can be explained by the inherent contradictions within the nationalist discourse (Bauman, 2001: 197): desire for homogenization versus fear of sapping the immaculateness of national identity.

In conclusion, the Turkish nationalism during the single party period oscillated between political and essentialist (particularly, religious and linguistic) definitions of citizenship. Thus, it is fair to say the Kemalist nationalist élite, during the single-party era, adopted mostly a *mono-linguistic* and *mono-religious* (Aktürk, 2009: 901-902) definition of Turkishness.

CHAPTER IV

1946-1959: DP IN POWER, CHP AS OPPOSITION

4.1. CHP's Change in Rhetoric and Policy

In the previous chapter (Chapter 3), I suggested that upon several applications from non-Muslim minorities to the Party in 1945, the CHP elite aimed to keep them away from the Party organization in practice without openly establishing a legal framework for such a restriction. One year later, while the CHP was still in power, the Party's exclusionary attitude started to change. The first free multi-party elections were scheduled on 21 July, 1946, and the minority votes were vital for the Party, at least in İstanbul. In the 1946 general elections, two Greek Orthodox deputies (Nikola Fakaçelli and Vasil Konos) were elected to the TBMM from CHP seats (Hür, 2011).¹ Thus, the single-party CHP tradition of nominating non-Muslims as *independent* deputies (instead of making them CHP members) was broken for the first time.

There was also an increased contact between the religious heads of the non-Muslim minorities and the government. The Party listened to the demands of the minority communities from their religious leaders. The talks did actually start to yield. In 1946, the Greek Patriarchate could register the Theological School of Halki (*Heybeliada*) as its own property – one of the chronic grievances of the Greek

¹ See Appendix 3. Vasil Konos resigned at the beginning of the parliamentary term without joining the first session. It is believed that the reason was a rift in his relationship with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.

minority. One of the two churches in Galata region (in İstanbul) was also returned to the Greek community from the Independent Turkish Orthodox Church, led by Papa Eftim.² Lastly, the management of the Balıklı Greek Hospital was taken away from Özdamar and given to the Greek community (Ergene, 1951: 239-240, cited in Alexandris, 1992: 242). This happened with a minor re-amendment of the Law on Foundations with a new law no. 5404, in 1949. With this new law, the minority foundations belonging to the communities would now be managed – for the first time again since 1938 – by “elected people and councils”, which would in turn be scrutinized by the General Directorate of Foundations (VGM, *Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*) (Özdoğan et al., 2009: 229). This meant a rescission of the notorious ‘single-trustee’ system that had been put in place with the law no. 3513 in 1938.³ In 1945, it was announced that every citizen, irrespective of their religion and race, could get into the Turkish Staff Officers’ Schools. Soon, two Jewish citizens applied to enter these schools (Bali, 1998c: 336).

After these positive developments, a major part of the Greek community – unlike other minorities which preferred the new DP – voted for the CHP in the general elections (Edmonds, 1946, cited in Alexandris, 1992: 243). After the elections, the new Prime Minister Recep Peker⁴ said his cabinet would show “extreme tolerance towards the minorities” (British Chancery to the Southern Department, 1946, cited in Alexandris, 1992: 243).⁵

² This was the Christ Church.

³ According to this law (no. 3513), the minority foundations had been managed by one single trustee, appointed by the state, and no longer by the councils elected by the minority communities. This was a clear breach of the relevant articles of the Lausanne Treaty.

⁴ The Democrat Party (DP) was founded on 7 January, 1946. The first free multi-party elections were held on 21 July, 1946, with the CHP’s landslide victory (395 out of 465 seats). Recep Peker, from the CHP, became the new Prime Minister on 7 August, 1946.

⁵ During a conversation with the prominent journalist Hüseyin Yalçın.

On 27 November 1948, the CHP General Secretary decided to assign Dr. Sadi Irmak, İstanbul Area Inspector, to listen to the Greek Orthodox minority and report their problems. One month later, in a letter addressed to the Prime Ministry by the Ministry of Justice Directory of Legal Affairs, the main problems/demands of the Greek Orthodox community were listed as:

1. Reclamation of the Panagia Church from the Pope/Papa Eftim⁶ by the Greek Orthodox community,
2. The right to work as a civil servant (Since under the Civil Service Law all Turkish citizens, regardless of their religion and sect, are entitled to be civil servant, it is natural that the applications of Turkish Greek citizens would be assessed and a due decision would be given),
3. The right to be treated like Turkish citizens when trading in real estate (Although the legal status of the Greeks that have remained in İstanbul were laid out by the relevant laws, they have undergone discrimination during their buying and selling of real estate; and this leads to corruption and grievances. A simple certificate of ownership can take many years. This problem constitutes the most essential desire of the Greek community) (Irmak, 1948, in Prime Ministry State Archives).⁷

In the same letter, Dr. Sadi Irmak continues:

I previously suggested that the Greek citizens in İstanbul had expressed a remarkable interest and sympathy for our Party during the last by-elections. I now hereby present the summary of my research regarding the necessary measures that need to be taken in order to attract these people more extensively. Accomplishment of these measures would certainly add a new and remarkable stamina to our Party (Irmak, 1948, in Prime Ministry State Archives).⁸

⁶ The so-called Papa Eftim was the archbishop of the independent Turkish Orthodox Church.

⁷ Date of the letter: 27.12.1948. Prime Ministry State Archives, File No. 030-0-010-000-000-109-733-2_1. Its original in Turkish: “1. Panayia Kilisesinin Papa Eftimden alınarak cemaate verilmesi, 2. Rum vatandaşların memurluk haklarından faydalanmaları. (Memurluk kanunu ile din ve mezhep farkı gözetilmeksizin Türk vatandaşlarına memur olmak hakkı verildiğinden, Türk Rum vatandaşların da müracaatları incelenerek müracaatları hakkında gerekli kararın verileceği tabiidir.) 3. Emlak alım ve satımında Rumlar Türk vatandaşları gibi muamele görmek istemektedirler. (İstanbul’da kalmış olan Rumların hukuki durumları kanunlarla açıklanmış olmasına rağmen emlak alım ve satımında ayrımcılığa tabi tutulmaları yolsuzluklara ve sızlanmalara neden olmaktadır. Basit bir tapu muamelesi yıllarca sürebilmektedir. Bu nokta Rum cemaatinin en esaslı temennisini teşkil etmektedir).”

⁸ Dr. Sadi Irmak, in *ibid.* Its original in Turkish: “İstanbul’daki Rum vatandaşların son ara seçimlerde Partimize karşı dikkate şayan bir ilgi ve sempati gösterdiklerini arz etmiştim. Şimdi bu zevatı partimize daha geniş ölçüde ısındırmak için alınması lazım gelen tedbirler hakkında yaptığım araştırmaların özetini takdim ediyorum. Bunların kabil olduğu kadar süratle yerine getirilmesi Partimize küçümsenemeyecek yeni bir kuvvet eklemiş olacaktır.”

The abovementioned report contains valuable historical insight about the main problems of the Greek community at that time. But perhaps more importantly for our purposes, we understand from the above letter and report that the Party wished to pursue a more proactive policy by paying attention to the problems of minorities, particularly the Greeks, in order to attract them to the Party, i.e. to attract their vote. In other words, the non-Muslims were no longer seen as mere subjects to rule, but instead as potential voters whose problems and demands are therefore taken into account unlike before.

The rest of Dr. Sadi Irmak's letter portrays a more detailed framework of the CHP's new electoral concerns with regard to the non-Muslim minorities:

I am under the pinch of necessity to reiterate the following requests for the sake of our *prestige* since I believe that several problems that we had made clear in our previous writings but *failed to resolve* would soon become a matter of *psychological propaganda against us*, both due to our *political line*, and our *failure to fulfil our promises so far*. I am also convinced that our Party aims to foster *mental attachment and integrity between all citizens*; and that our İstanbul organization places *particular importance to the Turkish Greek elites (voters)* – which is absolutely the right to do for our *Party's power in İstanbul* given clear results of the previous two partial *electoral* experience...⁹

The above paragraph especially contains hints about the CHP's new political strategy. It is also a coming to terms with its failures and mistakes. In addition to underlining an example of discrimination (the one about trading in real estate), Dr. Irmak urges the CHP administration to take immediate steps to pay attention to the Greek minority's demands and the unfulfilled promises so far. Clearly, the Party is

⁹ Ibid. Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: "Partimizin bütün vatandaşlar arasında ruhi sevgi ve birliği temin etmek gayesini güttüğüne kani ve bilhassa İstanbul teşkilatımızın Türk Rum seçkinlerine (müntehiblerine) önem verdiği ve İstanbul ili kuvvetimiz itibari ile vermesi icap ettiğine geçmiş iki kısmi seçim tecrübesiyle de katıyetle anlaşılmış olduğundan, bundan evvelki yazılarımızla tebarüz ettirilip halledemediğimiz birkaç meselenin hem güttüğümüz siyaset hem de vaad edilmesi ve henüz bu vaadler yerine getirilememesi sebebiyle aleyhimize psikolojik propaganda mevzu olmamak için prestijimiz bakımından ortaya çıkma sırası geldiği kanatıle aşağıdaki ricaları tekrar etmek zaruriretindeyim..."

worried about its “prestige” and the risk that the opponents could capitalize on their unfulfilled promises as a propaganda tool for an electoral advantage.

As far as the weight of minority votes in the city of İstanbul is concerned, Dr. Irmak emphasizes the particular efforts of the İstanbul organization of the CHP to garner votes from the Greek minority – which then comprised a large portion of the whole constituency –, and most likely via their “elites.” This clientelist method of canvassing votes is reminiscent of the regime’s traditional management of the Eastern Anatolia through the Kurdish notables. However in the context of Greek – or generally the non-Muslim – community in İstanbul, it is debatable to what extent the notables/elites had influence over their communities’ votes.

Lastly, besides electoral concerns, there were *also* references to principles of equality and integration, which further necessitated addressing the minorities’ problems according to Dr. Irmak, e.g. the Party’s political line; fostering mental attachment and integrity between all citizens. Since this is an intra-party correspondence, I reckon that the author was sincere in his opinion about the CHP’s tenets or “political line”, and not mentioning them as just a mere democratic façade of empty propaganda. This, therefore, can be taken as one of the piecemeal harbingers of an incipient liberalisation in the CHP’s ideology.

The most crucial demands of the Greek minority via Dr. Irmak were outlined in the end of the letter:

It is necessary to remit the taxes imposed on the churches, schools, hospitals and orphanages that belong to the community, just the way the mosques and (Muslim) prayer rooms are not taxed. As both of these institutions are religious and charity organizations, it is imperative to eliminate this difference. It is also necessary to *not* object to civil servant appointments in citizens’ capacity, *‘even symbolically’*, to governmental

and municipal positions from among the community; and to broaden the principle of equality in all respects.¹⁰

Again, we see an emphasis on the principle of equality, but this time, here, as sort of a halfhearted sanctification thereof. The phrases “even symbolically” and “not to object” are telling clues about this contention. The Party, or state, officials are asked *not to object to*, i.e. to tolerate, *symbolic* appointments from among the Community – because they are *citizens* too (“in citizens’ capacity”). Nevertheless, based on this letter and the efforts to address the minority’s grievances, the trend generally revealed an incipient liberalization on part of the CHP mentality, mostly thanks to the introduction of the multiparty system and thus the necessity to respond to social demands of different constituencies. Another reason was the exigencies of the new post-War international system, defined by the UN and the San Francisco Conference in 1945. From the very start, Turkey made it clear that it wanted to be part of the Western camp. In fact, it was one of the founding signatories to the UN Charter. However, Turkey had to democratize its political system and enhance freedoms and liberties in order to find a place among the liberal democracies.

4.2. DP: A Light of Hope for Non-Muslims?

The Democrat Party, DP, was founded as a clique of protest with a rhetoric against the injustices, antidemocratic policies, and the illiberal economy management during the CHP’s single-party regime. The DP stood for elections promising expanded liberties, freedom, a liberal economy and human rights. However, in general, there

¹⁰ Ibid. Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: “Cemaate ait kilise, okul ve hastane, yetimhane binalarına tarh olunan vergilerin müslüman mescit ve camilerde olduğu gibi kaldırılması gerekmektedir. Her iki müesseseler ibadet ve hayır kurumları olduğuna göre, bu farkın kaldırılması zaruridir. Devlet ve belediye memurluklarına, vatandaş sıfatile cemaatten memur tayini, “sembolik bile olsa” mahzur görülmemesi ve eşitlik kuralının her hususta genişletilmesi gerekmektedir.”

was barely a significant rupture from the old regime in terms of the nation-state mentality and the political elites' attitudes. Although the official nationalism moved away from the racist tendencies of the Interwar Years, the pressures on the minorities as well as the eclectic civic-ethnic nationalism continued (Bora, 1995b: 38). After all, the founders of the DP, including the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, were once members of the CHP during the single-party period. In other words, the core elite cadre of the DP came from within the CHP establishment itself.

Therefore, notwithstanding significant practical ameliorations in the day-to-day activities and institutions of the non-Muslims as well as symbolic gestures and rhetoric signifying sympathy toward them, a total rupture from the old Republican nation-state mentality which regarded, treated and framed the non-Muslims as 'guests' and 'not completely Turkish' did not materialize. Moreover, as I have pointed out before, since the introduction of the multi-party regime in 1946, the CHP, too, had begun to embrace a more tolerant and democratic attitude towards the minorities. This fact has been underemphasized in the literature on the policies regarding the non-Muslims in Turkey.

Having suffered a lot during the CHP's single-party regime, the minorities had high hopes for the new Democrat Party. Under the three DP governments (1950-1960), *ten* non-Muslim deputies were elected to the Parliament. This number is even bigger than the total number of six *independent* deputies and two CHP deputies (and that was only possible after the introduction of the multiparty system, 1946-1950) in the 27 years of CHP's one-party government until DP came to power in 1950.¹¹

President Celal Bayar had previously opposed to the Wealth Tax during the parliamentary discussions in 1942 (Bali, 2004b: 15). In addition, Bayar repeatedly

¹¹ See Appendix 3 for detailed information on the non-Muslim deputies in the TBMM.

made promises about a tax rebate to the non-Muslim electorate during the election campaigns (Bali, 2004b: 14). Especially after decades of discriminatory and undemocratic policies of the CHP, there was, therefore, a wind of sympathy among non-Muslim citizens toward the Democrat Party. In 1954, during Bayar's official visit to the U.S., the Greek-, Armenian-, and Jewish-Americans welcomed him quite warmly, and organized several cocktails in his honor (Bali, 2004b: 15-17).

The DP government's relations with the religious institutions of the non-Muslim minorities were exceptionally good. On 6 June 1952, Adnan Menderes has been the first Turkish Prime Minister who paid an official visit to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul (Macar, 2003: 193). In an editorial in *Milliyet*, 7 June 1952, Menderes expressed:

I am happy to have visited today the Patriarchate and your esteemed personality... I hereby thank all of you for your quite warm and kind reception... You considered today as a historical day. My visit constitutes a milestone in the way to democratic principles that we altogether embrace... In the past, religions divided people, and led them to compete with each other. Today, thanks to the freedom of conscience principle, religions serve the ideals of humanity, facilitating the love and compassion between peoples. Here, I also send my regards and express my high esteem for the Greek community. I am convinced that all of us, as citizens, are ready for participating in the service to our country with the best intentions. We are highly pleased that the Patriarchate position is occupied by an esteemed and mature person like you.¹²

¹² In Turkish: "Yüksek şahsiyetinizi ve Patrikhaneyi bugün ziyaret ettiğimden dolayı kendimi bahtiyar addetmekteyim... Şahsıma gösterilen bu çok sıcak hüsnükabulden dolayı sizlere, cümlenize çok teşekkür ederim... Bugünü tarihi olarak telakki ettiniz. Bu ziyaretim, hepimizin birlikte yürüdüğümüz demokrasi prensipleri yolunda bir merhale teşkil etmektedir... Eskiden dinler insanları ayıran ve birbirleriyle mücadeleye sevkeden amillerden birini teşkil ediyordu. Bugün vicdan hürriyeti prensibi sayesinde dinler insanlar arasındaki sevginin tekamülüne yardım ederek insanlık ideallerine hizmet etmektedirler. Bugünkü ziyaretimle aynı zamanda Rum cemaatine selamlarımı ve sevgilerimi takdim etmiş oluyorum. Hepimizin temiz bir ruhla memleket hizmetine iştirake hazır bulunduğumuza kaniim. Patriklik makamını sizin gibi yüksek ve mütekamil bir şahsın işgal etmesinden dolayı büyük bir memnurluk duymaktayız."

It is remarkable that the Prime Minister highlighted the new role of religion as a uniting force, as opposed to a divisive one as in the past, and he justified this change with their commitment to the principles of democracy and freedom of conscience. President Celal Bayar's treatment of the Greek Patriarch was also quite warm and welcoming. In an editorial in *Milliyet*, 25 July 1950, Bayar's emphasis on "common homeland" and "peaceful coexistence" should be noted:

We hope to provide conditions for the well-being of our citizens, *in our common homeland*. We will not hesitate to do our best to provide this. Peaceful coexistence is our utmost desire.¹³

It was argued that the improving relations between Greece and Turkey at the beginning of 1950s, as well as these two countries' cooperation under the NATO and Balkan Pact, were influential in the Turkish government's concessions particularly to the Greek minority (Güven, 2005: 127).

Also, the DP government provided much convenience for the election of religious heads of the non-Muslim communities. The Armenian Patriarchate was not legally capable of holding a General Council for the election of the new patriarch. This problem was overcome by a government decree dated 19.09.1950, and the Armenian community could elect an ad-hoc General Council, which elected their new patriarch, Haçaduryan (Akkaya, 2011: 76-77). Similarly, there was not an officially recognized Chief Rabbi since Haim Nahum's resignation in 1921. This position was represented by several rabbis temporarily. All of the Jewish community members were allowed to elect representatives who would in turn elect the Chief Rabbi. After 32 years, Rabbi Rafael David Saban was elected to the Chief Rabbinate (Levi, 1992: 159-160, cited in Akkaya, 2011: 78).

¹³ Emphasis added. In Turkish: "Müşterek vatanımızda, vatandaşlarımızın saadet içinde yaşamalarını sağlamak emelimizdir. Bunun için elimizden geleni yapmakta tereddüt etmeyeceğiz. Esasen mevcut olan beraber yaşamak en samimi arzumuzdur."

There were positive developments for the Greek community, as well. For instance, the DP government, as a gesture to the improving Turkish-Greek relations, revoked the Article 14 stipulating the Turkish language as the language of formal education at the two Aegean islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Demir and Akar, 1994: 149-150). As a result of this change, the language of education became half-day Turkish, and half-day Greek in the islands, until this prerogative would be taken back in 1964 with the CHP government.

Furthermore, until 1951, the Halki Seminary (*Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu*) had secondary education for 4 years and theology for 3 years since 1921. Under the DP government in 1951, the secondary school section received the high school status (for four years) and theology was kept intact as 3 years (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2005: 8). In the same year, the Halki Seminary was renamed as ‘Theological School’. These were significant gestures on part of the government to show their sympathy toward minorities. The Halki Theological School had this new status until it was ultimately closed down in 1971 (Macar, 2003: 292-293). The school was also allowed to admit foreign students for the first time, with an addendum to the regulations of the school in 1952 that facilitated granting student visas to the candidates who applied to the Halki Seminary (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2005: 8).

Furthermore, the DP government has made several ameliorations regarding the practical problems of the minority foundations and schools. The administrative courts had not recognized the legal personality of the minorities. Therefore, the minority institutions (Greek and Armenian Patriarchates and the Chief Rabbinate) were not legally capable to bring an action on behalf of the congregation (or the minority community) or register properties to the foundations. The DP government facilitated this cumbersome situation with a minor amendment of the relevant law

(2762/44), and allowed a more flexible interpretation of the Law on Foundations (Akkaya, 2011: 50-52). In general, the minority foundations were now able to acquire immovables through donations, purchases, by will, and other means, with no further permissions other than a mere governorship-issued certificate indicative of their legal personality (Bakar, 2006, cited in Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 14).¹⁴ For instance, as part of this more liberal interpretation, the Menderes government allowed the building of an Armenian theological school in Üsküdar. The Armenian community, thus, had their first theological school all the way from the Ottoman period during the DP government, until the school was ultimately closed after the 1961 coup (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 13).

Furthermore, a larger attention was paid to the appalling conditions and the problems of the non-Muslim schools. The Armenian Esayan School in Taksim was furnished with central heating. Several more schools were refurbished by government decrees. Three new Armenian schools were opened in Feriköy, Üsküdar, and Yeşilköy (Akkaya, 2011: 68-70). Surp Haç Armenian School was converted into Surp Haç Tbrebank Armenian Theology School, consisting of secondary school, high school and a three-year theology school in 1953 (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2005: 5; Akkaya, 2011: 70).

However, the CHP single-party regime's nationalist sensitivity about education at minority schools continued all the way through the DP governments. The desire of instilling Turkish values in minority children at schools was kept intact. To see that there is virtually no difference between how the CHP and the DP thought

¹⁴ This liberal practice would only last until the mid-1960s, when the Greek-Turkish relations started to sour over the Cyprus problem. The General Directory of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, VGM) stipulated the non-Muslim foundations to submit foundation vouchers (settlement deeds). Since many of these foundations did not possess deeds of trust because they had been founded by the Ottoman Sultan's imperial orders, the VGM stated that the non-Muslim foundations could only claim those properties that had been submitted with the 1936 Beyannamesi.

on this issue, separate parliamentary speeches of Cemal Köprülü (DP's Edirne Deputy) in 1955 and İstamat Zihni Özdamar (CHP Deputy) in 1938 can be compared:

The teachers of Turkish language and culture lessons perform an extremely important duty, which is to diffuse the Turkish culture at minority schools. These teachers are deprived of the natural and essential rights such as seniority allowance and pensions. They receive the same amount of salary from the moment they start this occupation until they get retired, without any civil service grades... These minority school teachers have much more difficult responsibilities than their counterparts in state schools; and this important responsibility is to infuse Turkish language and culture into our minority citizens (Cemal Köprülü, DP, Deputy of Edirne, 1955, cited in Akkaya, 2011: 61).¹⁵

...These children will serve the country in the future, loyal to the country and Turkishness... It is desired that the Turkish teacher will have instilled our Great Founder's laconical saying "Happy that I am Turkish!" in this kid, when he starts to perform his national duties and when he reaches out to the Turkish cause in order to prove his Turkish character and existence. In my opinion, the Turkish teacher should focus in the lessons on the Turkish map, Turkish history, and the moral quality of the Turkish existence in the past. This way he can instill the feeling of Turkishness in his personality. Therefore, our Minister of Culture should appoint to these schools the teachers who are professional, in this spirit and aware, and who especially possess the power to influence. I appreciate the paucity of teachers in our country; but this is an important cause. For this cause, we must make a sacrifice. We should give increased salaries to these teachers (İstamat Zihni Özdamar, CHP, 1938, cited in TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1938: 219).¹⁶

¹⁵ Its original in Turkish: "Azınlık okullarında Türk kültürünü yaymak gibi çok mühim bir vazife ifa eden Türkçe ve Türkçe kültür dersleri öğretmenleri kıdem zammı, emeklilik gibi tabii ve zaruri haklardan mahrum bulunmakta, bu mesleğe girdikleri andan ayrıldıkları ana kadar aynı maaşı almakta ve herhangi bir barem derecesine tabi olmaksızın çalışmaktadırlar... Vazifeleri, resmi okullarda çalışan meslektaşlarının görmekte oldukları vazifelerden daha güç ve daha mesuliyetli olan azınlık okulları öğretmenlerinin ise azınlık vatandaşlarımıza Türkçemizi ve Türk kültürünü sevdirecek benimsetmek gibi ayrıca mühim vazifeleri de vardır."

¹⁶ Its original in Turkish: "Bu çocuklar ilerde vatana bağlı olarak, Türklüğe sadık kalarak hizmet edeceklerdir... Denilebilir ki, Türk muallimi, bu küçüğün, ilerde vatan vazifelerine, millî sahaya atıldığı zaman kendi Türk varlığını, karakterini isbat etmek için elini Türk davasına uzatırken, kalbinde büyük önderimizin söyledikleri vecizelerin en büyüğü olan : « Türküm ne mutlu » (sic.) vecizesini kalbine sokmuş olsun. Benim kanaatime göre, burada Türk muallimi, Türk haritasına fazla ehemmiyet vererek, Türk tarihi üzerinde ziyadece tevakkuf ederek Türk varlığının mazideki seciyesini, şeceresini çocuğa söyleyerek, Türk duygusunu onun benliğine tamamilen infaz etmek suretile, mahirane bir şekilde ders vermesi lâzımdır.. işte bu yurd bilgisi üzerine Türk muallimi fazla hassasiyetle talebinin kalbini çelmelidir. Onun için muhterem Kültür Bakanından yegâne istirhamım şudur, bu mekteblere tayin edeceği muallimleri sırf meslekten yetişmiş, bu ruhda ve buna vâkıf, nüfuzu iktidara malik olanların en muktedirlerinden seçmelidir. Evet, memleketimizin umumî kültür sahasındaki muallim ihtiyacı, muallim azlığını takdir ediyorum. Fakat bu dava büyük bir davadır.

The author, Akkaya, argues that Köprülü's speech is actually distant from aiming at assimilation or a pressure; but instead he describes it as an expression of a "civilized attitude". He claims that Köprülü's reference to the minorities as "our minority citizens" is a departure from *otherizing* and *marginalizing* the minorities (Akkaya, 2011: 61). Firstly, Köprülü is not the first and only deputy who referred to the minorities as "our minority citizens". In the past, many CHP officials so referred to them. Secondly, Köprülü's speech is as assimilationist and nationalist as that of Özdamar. The goal of diffusing Turkish culture and language (our culture) was prioritized and attributed a great significance at minority schools (others). The Turkish teacher is both the physical and metaphorical transmitter of 'our' culture to 'their' children. This is, linguistic Turkification, i.e. linguistic assimilation, par excellence.

The Wealth Tax issue was a prominent propaganda material for the new Democrat Party in the elections. To give his due, the President Celal Bayar, one of the founders of the DP, had opposed to the introduction of such a discriminatory tax even back in 1942, during the parliamentary discussions, as I mentioned before. Particularly during the 1950 election campaign, the DP candidates constantly blamed the CHP for the Wealth Tax and promised a tax rebate should they come to power. The Jewish candidate of the DP, Yusuf Salman said during an election campaign that "We were living in fear as minorities under the CHP era. We didn't know if a bad end was waiting for us... Thanks to DP, we gained all human and citizenship rights. We should see it in hell first to vote for the CHP again!" (Hürriyet, 12 October 1957, cited in Bali, 1997: 54).¹⁷ Similarly, the DP's İstanbul deputy, Hacopulos had

Arkadaşlar, bu dava için bu fedakârlığı ihtiyar lâzımdır. Bu mektebler için ayrı muallimleri yüksek maaşla tazvif etmektedir."

¹⁷ "Ekalliyetler İçin Muhalefet ve İktidar Birbirini İtham Ediyor", *Hürriyet*, 12 October 1957.

warned: “The CHP has not paid a cent to those who were the victims of the Wealth Tax. In addition, we never forgot the CHP which exiled the non-Muslims between the ages of 25-45 in 1941. Remember these and do not vote for the CHP” (Bali, 1997: 54-55). The CHP candidates defended their party and charged the DP deputies with partnership during the making of the Wealth Tax. After all, no DP deputies (of today) had fiercely objected to the implementation of the Tax; and were in fact eager executors. They argued that the DP has been using this issue to bring the CHP into disrepute as if the people who prepared the motion, implemented the levy, and coordinated the Aşkale exiles were not today’s DP officials (Bali, 1997: 165).¹⁸

The promises made about a tax rebate never materialized. Some claim that it could be due to a possible big burden on the public budget, or a fear of domestic political agitations, or fear of complications it could cause regarding the U.S. economic aid to Turkey (Bali, 2004b: 18). No matter what the real reason was, the DP has used the notoriety of the Wealth Tax and brought up this issue on the agenda before each election (1950, 1954, 1957) and laid it aside immediately (Güven, 2005: 133). It was, in retrospect, a pragmatic populist trick to keep the CHP under pressure.

Moreover, the euphoria among non-Muslim communities about the DP’s favorable treatment of their religious and community institutions was short-lived. The DP’s perception of the status of religious institutions turned out to be similar to that of the CHP. Any sign of centralization at the facilities of the non-Muslim institutions was especially circumvented. The existence of the central community councils (of Greeks and Armenians alike) was discontinued in 1953. The management of charity and religious institutions was wished to be left to the local

¹⁸ Speeches from CHP’s Jewish candidate, Erol Dilek, in 1957, and CHP’s İstanbul Municipality candidate Dr. Lütfi Kırdar, in 1951.

representatives of the minorities, instead of a central institution (Güven, 2005: 131). Also, despite a rising number of non-Muslims performing their military service as reserve officer compared to before (Bali, 1998c: 336-337), they were not sent to strategically sensitive areas. There were declarations in the newspapers that a criterion for joining the army or the Infantry School was “being of the Turkish race” (Güven, 2005: 131).

Although the DP’s promises did not end up as the minorities had hoped, and in fact turned out to be merely populist declarations, they did not give up voting for the DP, and its successors in the future (Bali, 2004b: 14). A big majority of the non-Muslim voters preferred the DP in the elections of 1950 and 1954 (Güven, 2005: 128). The bad memories of Wealth Tax, forced military conscription, and other assimilationist and discriminatory policies of the single-party regime had politically alienated the non-Muslim voters from the CHP. Additionally, the statist economic management of the CHP was less attractive than the DP’s economic liberalism for the non-Muslim entrepreneurs (Güven, 2005: 129).

4.3. 6-7 September 1955 Riots

6-7 September riots, *Septemvriana* in Greek, were a series of mob attacks directed primarily at the Greek, but also the Armenian and Jewish minorities in İstanbul and İzmir. The reasons behind these attacks were chiefly the Cyprus problem as well as the chauvinist anti-Greek propaganda that was sweeping the Turkish press¹⁹.

¹⁹ An examination of many dailies such as *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Cumhuriyet* from July to September 1955 provided the author with provocative statements being used for Greek Cypriots and sometimes urging the nation and the government to take action in Cyprus. Among them, *Hürriyet*, was the most fierce in tone. The Greek dailies in İstanbul were also blamed for defending the Greek position in Cyprus.

However, many commentators agree that the incident was just another – in fact, a very important – step taken in the process of Turkification, which had become an entrenched political goal since the Young Turks during the Ottoman Empire (Akar, 2003: 86-93; Güven, 2005; Kuyucu, 2005: 361-380).

According to the Turkish press, the death toll was 11²⁰. The Helsinki Watch report estimates that 15 people had been murdered – including two clerics – whereas the Turkish authorities listed only three casualties (Helsinki Watch, 1992: 10). Besides the deaths, between 300 and 600 were injured, and more than 60 non-Muslim women were raped in houses that were attacked (Güven, 2005: 39).

The financial, material and psychological costs were yet much bigger. Over 4,000 residences, and over 1,000 shops and workplaces were damaged (Güven, 2005: 34-36; Koçoğlu, 2004: 28). According to the US Department of State archives, 59% of the houses as well as 80% of the workplaces that were attacked belonged to the İstanbul Greeks. Some 9% of the houses and 17% of the workplaces were Armenians', while the Jewish owners' houses and workplaces comprised 3% and 12% of the total number, respectively (Consulate General of the U.S. in İstanbul, 1955, cited in Güven, 2005: 35). As is evident from these figures, a great majority of the material damage had been inflicted on the Greek properties. This is obviously due to the conventional linkage in the minds of Turkish officials – or whomever orchestrated and contributed to these riots – between the İstanbul Greek community (Rum) and the Greek Cypriots (Rum) who were blamed for the massacres in Cyprus.²¹ Nevertheless, the fact that a meaningful number of Armenian and Jewish

²⁰ *Hürriyet*, 08.09.1955; *Cumhuriyet*, 08.09.1955; *Son Saat*, 08.09.1955.

²¹ The word *Rum* in Turkish refers to the İstanbul Greeks (or more generally, Greeks of Asia Minor) and the Cypriot Greeks alike. The double usage of the term in Turkish both colloquially and in the print media must have had a considerable impact in the conventional thinking that resulted in the conflation and equation of the two qualitatively and geographically distinct Hellenic communities.

properties were also damaged during the riots, shows that the general target was rather *non-Muslim minorities*, than only Greeks.

As I mentioned, the 6-7 September attacks has also a Cyprus background. Among the Greek-Orthodox majority in the island, there was unrest and clamouring for unison (*Enosis*) with Greece. There were parallel rallies in the streets of Athens, as well. The demands for *Enosis* began to be officially articulated by Greek Prime Minister, Papagos. It finally alerted Turkey and made it pay more attention to the Turkish minority living on the island. When the EOKA terrorists started to attack the British institutions in Cyprus, British PM Anthony Eden speedily convened a conference in London (from 29/08 to 07/09) to discuss the problem with Greece and Turkey (Güven, 2005: 159-163). The British principally wanted to strengthen the Turkish position in order to fight off the Greeks' accusations of colonization and exploitation. Therefore, a tough position was envisaged for the Turkish delegate, and so were they induced. In the meantime, the Cyprus issue had already become a concern for the domestic politics in Turkey. Large student demonstrations were organized, demanding the government to be tougher for the cause and effectively protect the Turkish minority from the EOKA terrorism (Güven, 2005: 162-163). The September 6-7 attacks should, therefore, be analyzed against this background, particularly taking into account the British and Turkish sides' willingness for a *tour de force* to daunt the Greek side.

The attacks started in the evening of September 6 and lasted until the noon of September 7. Everything began with an announcement on the state radio, followed by the *İstanbul Ekspres* daily's evening edition which claimed that a bomb was set off at Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki, Greece. As soon as the news broke, a protest demonstration was organized at Taksim Square in İstanbul under the

invitation of various student unions and associations, chiefly by *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti* ('Cyprus is Turkish' Association) and *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (National Union of Turkish Students). The angry mob started to attack shops, churches and houses in the *Beyoğlu* district of İstanbul, and looted almost all of the valuable commodities of the non-Muslim businesses. Countless churches, synagogues, foundations, schools and cemeteries were also subject to arson, and other forms of vandalism.

The riots soon spread to other districts of İstanbul where the non-Muslim citizens mostly lived and had businesses, such as Şişli, Kurtuluş, Bakırköy, Nişantaşı, Eminönü, Fatih, Eyüp, Yeşilköy, Ortaköy, Arnavutköy, and Bebek. The districts on the Asian side of İstanbul, mainly Kadıköy, Kuzguncuk, Çengelköy, and the Princes Islands were also affected (Güven, 2005; Yılmaz, 1992; Dosdoğru, 1993). There were several incidents in İzmir, as well. 14 residents, 6 workplaces, a pension, a Greek-Orthodox church, the Greek pavilion at the International Fair, Greek Consulate in İzmir and the British Cultural Institute were attacked, and some of them were burned to the ground.²² The cost of material loss in İzmir was estimated to be 475,500 TL (Christidis, 2000: 256).

In all these attacks, in İstanbul and İzmir alike, the police and other security forces stood idly. Thousands of looters had been brought in trucks or large vehicles from Anatolia to various parts of İstanbul in advance, and were given brand new axes, knives, sticks, crowbars and dynamites. According to the witnesses, properties and workplaces that belonged to the non-Muslims had been marked on their doors or walls with paint days before the incident took place. The looters had also had lists containing addresses which helped them find precisely which property belonged to

²² *Milliyet*, 07.09.1955; *Hürriyet*, 08.09.1955.

the non-Muslims. These all indicate the organized and systematic character of the events.

After the riots, the government has made a declaration stating that a martial law was established in three cities: İstanbul, İzmir, and Ankara. The communist provocations and damages were also emphasized in the declaration.²³ Consequently, 48 people, known for their communist views, were arrested on 7 September 1955 (Güven, 2005: 55). The Minister of Interior, Dr. Namık Gedik, had to resign on 10 September 1955, for his negligence during the attacks.²⁴ The arrested communists were all released after months in December 1955, without any official explanation (Nesin, 1987: 58).

On 13 January 1956, the opposition party, CHP, submitted a motion in the Parliament demanding a thorough investigation of the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior (Özyıldız, 1986: 15). This motion was ultimately rejected. On 28 February 1958, the government passed a law for redressing the losses of individuals during the 6-7 September riots in İstanbul and İzmir (Özyıldız, 1986: 18). It is worth comparing this practice of the DP to the previous CHP governments, which had not passed any laws whatsoever in order to redress the losses of the affected individuals in episodes such as Thrace incidents, Wealth Tax, etc.

It is claimed by many that the government had partaken in the attacks (Bağcı, 1990: 109). This claim, articulated by the opposition party and the press as well as various researchers who delved into the September 6-7 attacks, cannot be proven solidly due to a lack of access to official documents certifying the government members' complicity in the attacks. According to the reports of the German and

²³ *Ulus*, 8 September 1955.

²⁴ *Hürriyet*, 10 September 1955.

British Consulates in İstanbul, the President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Interior Namık Gedik, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Governor of İstanbul Fahrettin Kerim Gökay were involved in the preparation of the attacks. The principal aim was to exert pressure on the London Conference and divert the Turkish public's attention from the domestic problems (Güven, 2005: 73).

Another aim of the government was, as claimed, to create an opportunity for silencing the press and the opposition by means of a martial law (Belen, 1960: 42). Aziz Nesin and Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, among the communist intellectuals who were arrested and imprisoned after the 6-7 September riots, both similarly argued that the attacks had been planned by the DP government against the Greek minority in İstanbul in order to intimidate the Greek government and the Archbishop Makarios (Nesin, 1987: 29-30; Dinamo, 1971: 8-9). The Deputy Minister Fuad Köprülü's confession in the parliamentary debate that the government was informed about the attacks also strengthen these claims (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 684). In Yassıada trials, after the 1960 coup, the Court of Justice interrogated the cabinet members for their role in the 6-7 September attacks, and sentenced the ex-Prime Minister Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to six months, but in the end both for sentenced to death penalty and were executed for other crimes attributed to them (Mütercimler and Öke, 2004: 325).

4.4. The Aftermath of 6-7 September: Parliamentary Discussions

There were several themes that stand out during the parliamentary discussions in the aftermath of the 6-7 September incidents. I grouped them into the following categories from the most discussed to the least mentioned by the deputies:

- a) A matter of national honour and prestige – A national disaster,
- b) The communists to blame,
- c) We are a tolerant and civilized nation – There is no enmity toward minorities in Turkey; but just some provoked youth, due to Cyprus issue,
- d) Violation of citizens' rights – Emphasis on equality: Everyone is aggrieved,
- e) How to exculpate ourselves internationally?
- f) Loss of national wealth,
- g) A matter of religion – secularism,
- h) The internal (their) minorities versus the external (our) minorities,
- i) The truth should not be concealed,
- j) Greek state, people and press to blame.

For analytical convenience, it can further be grouped into defensive 'nationalist reactions' (a, b, c, e, f, h, j), 'emphasis on secularism' (g), 'emphasis on equality' (d), and finally 'proper investigation of the truth' (i). Most of the abovementioned categories obviously fall into nationalist reactions; thus it is fair to say that a defensive nationalist tone dominated the parliamentary discussion. The CHP's voice was less heard in discussions than that of DP; and in those few speeches, their emphasis was on the violation of citizens' rights and the investigation of the truth behind the attacks prevailed. In other words, although the numeric disparity of speech between the two parties does not allow a full comparison, the credit for the nationalist tone should be given *more* to the DP deputies *than* their CHP counterparts given the latter's preference to be rather less vocal in nationalist themes than in others. Let us start with the CHP's views and attitude about the riots.

4.4.1. CHP on the 6-7 Events

In the parliamentary discussions, İsmet İnönü, the leader of the opposition party (CHP), urged the state and the nation to defend their honor in face of this “national catastrophe.” He criticized the government by drawing attention to the ease with which the mobs could cause such a harm. He remarked that, besides the substantial loss of “national wealth”, the riots and attacks blemished Turkey’s reputation and its place among the “family of civilization” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 669). He considered that the reason behind these attacks could be social problems as much as the problems in foreign relations and impulsive provocations. Therefore, he requested the government to be all clear and transparent about the investigation, because “that is the only way to exonerate” themselves “from the liability towards the Turkish nation”.

CHP’s Kırşehir Deputy, Ahmet Bilgin, similarly defined the incidents as “unique in Turkish history” which clearly damaged its prestige and honor. He continued that “...our nationwide sorrow and suffering increase day by day in the face of this violation of citizens’ rights, which have hitherto been under the protection of our national morals that had proved itself noble for centuries” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 670).²⁵ Although filled with nationalist terms and remarks, such as implicating that the minorities were *protégés* rather than equal citizens and referring to national morals, the Deputy makes one important point: He sees the incidents as a violation of citizenship rights. The references to the “democratic world” and the Turkish martyrs in the Korean War in the rest of his speech indicate

²⁵ Its original in Turkish: “...Asırlar boyunca asaletinin delillerini vermiş olan milli ahlakımızın teminatı altında bulunan vatandaş haklarına vakı tecavüz karşısında milletçe duyduğumuz teessür ve ıstırapı günden güne artmaktadır.”

that violation of citizenship rights cannot be tolerated any more in the Western democratic camp, which Turkey did not want to upset.

4.4.2. CMP²⁶ on the 6-7 Events

Osman Alişiroğlu, the Kırşehir deputy of CMP, took Bilgin's *protégé* implication one step further, and referred to the non-Muslim minorities as *guests*: "...As a nation which shows maximum righteousness and courtesy, as well as hospitality toward its minorities, treating them as guests..." (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 674). To be fair, I should note that in Turkish, "treating someone as a guest" means a courteous behavior. Therefore, the Deputy probably did not utter that phrase in order to upset the minorities. However, a guest is always a guest in all languages, and not a houseowner. Using this analogy is therefore important in revealing the nationalist mindset and way of thinking with regard to the non-Muslim communities.

Alişiroğlu's speech is a very good example of the janus-faced character of the Turkish nationalism: In one way, it aims to assimilate its *others* with good intentions; in another way, it reminds those who refuse to assimilate that they can keep their differences but then they would always have to feel as just 'guests' under the hospitality of the "masculine nation":

Dear friends, all the citizens living in this country, regardless of their religion and ethnicity, are under the protection of our laws, emergency actions, social traditions, historical memories, moral considerations, and our *masculine* nation (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 674).²⁷

²⁶ The Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*, CMP) was the succession party of the conservative and nationalist Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*), which had been previously shut down. The CMP had 5 deputies in the Parliament after 1954 general elections.

²⁷ Its original in Turkish: "Arkadaşlar, bu topraklarda yaşayan (sic.) bütün vatandaşlar hangi dinden bulunurlarsa bulunsunlar, milliyetleri ne olursa olsun kanunlarımızın, acil tedbirlerimizin, içtimai

Mr. Alişirođlu's speech was interrupted by other deputies in the Parliament, who shouted that there were no minorities in Turkey, and the President of the Assembly, Refik Koraltan had to correct Mr. Alişirođlu. He then continued to say that there was not actually a hostility towards minorities in Turkey, and the riots should be seen as a casual instance which were kicked up by the excited youth, instigated by the commies. He asks for understanding from their "Western friends" that it could happen in every country; and it does not mean that it was a nationally-organized sabotage. His speech can be interpreted as an attempt to externalize the responsibility of the attacks on the communists and reduce the incidents to mere quotidian instances of aggression that were not peculiar to Turkey. This clearly is an effort of exoneration coming from an excessive confidence in and pride of the cleanliness of his nation's history.

The Seyhan Deputy, Sinan Tekeliođlu, made a very similar speech in the nationalistic tone. However, he refused that there were 'minorities' in Turkey, and said everyone is Turkish, period. He made it clear that those who provoked the attacks could not be Turks, as a Turk would never harm anyone's religion or sacred places. After a long lecture on the history of Turks and Turkishness, he concluded that the Turks have always protected different religions and ethnicities; and things get nasty when the foreign countries instigate problems, as in the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. He, too, sees the events as a result of hot blood of provoked youth (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 680-682). Then he strangely continued his talk by "our minorities" in Cyprus, Greece, and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania, referring to them as "our Turks" until he was warned by the President for his off-topic commentary.

gelenek ve tarihi hatıralarımızın, ahlaki telakkilerimizin ve erkek bir millet oluşumuzun himayesi altındadır."

4.4.3. DP on the 6-7 Events

The incumbent Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, started his speech by expressing his sorrow and wishing the Turkish nation a speedy recovery from the tragic events. Throughout his speech in the Parliament, he constantly refused downright the accusations that the Turkish police fell short in their duties during the catastrophe. He noted that the recent massacre in Cyprus had hurt the social conscience in Turkey, and a psychosis took over the feverish youth. Furthermore, he expressed that he was completely aware of the severity of the incidents and promised the aggrieved parties (“Greeks, Armenians and Turks alike”) a compensation of their losses (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 688-690).

In an attempt to prove innocence for the Turks in the incidents²⁸ (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 690), he made an interesting remark:

...Had this been an outright act of enemy, had there been no Cyprus problem... and had Cyprus not been inculcated into the consciences of two countries as almost a sacred issue, the police forces could have been able to perform their duty, use the power of laws, their guns, and their conscience, and therefore forestall the plot speedily” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 689).²⁹

In the above quote, Menderes relates the deficiency of an immediate police action to the sensitivity of the Cyprus issue. He clearly pleads ‘love of country’ or a nationalist sensitivity in excuse of the police’s conduct. In other words, the police ‘tolerated’ the angry masses because it was a conscientious action in a way. When we read between the lines of Menderes’s justification, it

²⁸ “...In order to prove to the world that the Turks are not to blame for this incidence...” Its original in Turkish: “...Bu hadisenin Türk eseri olmadığını bütün dünyaya ispat etmek suretiyle...”

²⁹ Its original in Turkish: “...Bu düpedüz bir düşman hareketi olsa idi, ortada bir Kıbrıs meselesi mevcut bulunmasa... ve Kıbrıs her iki memlekette adeta kudsi bir mevzu olarak vicdanlara telkin edilmemiş olsa idi, zabıta vazifesini görmek ve vicdani kuvvet ve kanaatiyle silahının ve kanunun verdiği kuvveti birleştirmek suretiyle hareketi ilk anda önlemek imkanı bulurdu.”

comes to light that it is at least understandable for him that the non-Muslims could undergo violence and attacks when the issue is of (inter)national significance. This is definitely anti-democratic, discriminatory, and obviously a defensive, nationalist subliminal reaction.

For most other DP deputies, either the communists or foreign countries such as Greece were to blame for the attacks. For some, though, it was curiously both to blame. They proposed that the communist perpetrators or the Greeks staged this plot and provoked the feverish youth which acted out of nationalist sentiments. Mehmet Özbey, a deputy of Burdur, speculated that the Greek statesmen, people, youth, radios, and press were the main responsables of these attacks. He noted that:

...Despite our noble quiescence and patience, they have staged protests and demonstrations about Cyprus with an increasing ambition for two years, and have therefore caused a deep anger in our souls. Finally, they have touched our sore spot and stretched the Turks' patience to its limits by installing a bomb in our Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki. That is how the noble Turkish youth's feelings were agitated... (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 671-672).³⁰

Later in his speech, Özbey, curiously, blames also the communists as the one and only responsible for the attacks, and the mob attacks had nothing to do with the Cyprus problem (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 672).³¹ The communists, according to Özbey, "exploited the *rightful* excitement and fever of the Turkish

³⁰ Its original in Turkish: "...Bizim asilane, efendice sükut ve sabır ve itidalimize rağmen; onlar iki senedir durmadan ve mütemadiyen artan bir ihtirasla Kıbrıs hakkında mitingler, nümayişler tertibederek adeta ruhlarımızda derin bir hiddet ve asabiyet yaratmışlar, biz Türkleri en hassas yerimizden vurarak Selanik'teki Atamızın evine attıkları bomba ile sabır ve tahammül bardağını taşımışlar, Türk milletinin hislerini galeyana getirmişlerdir... Ne yazık ki Türk gençliğinin bu necip duygularının izharına teşebbüs edilince..."

³¹ "This catastrophe took place only and only as a consequence of the plans and programs of the communists... The destructive flood of men had nothing to do with the Cyprus issue..." Its original in Turkish: "Bu felaket yalnız ve yalnız komünistlerin plan ve programları neticesinde vukua gelmiştir... İstanbul ve İzmir sokaklarına dökülen... bu yıkıcı selin Kıbrıs davası ile asla alakası yoktur..."

youth” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 672).³² The term ‘rightful’ is, again, key here. It is similar to Prime Minister Menderes’s defense of the Police on ‘rightful’ grounds. Another DP deputy, Burhanettin Onat, similarly accused the communists as responsible; and described the attacks a result of “youth fever” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 678).

DP deputies, Özbey and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, made several references to Ottoman/Turkish history in order to stress the Turkish tolerance towards non-Muslims. They mentioned these examples of tolerance to show that the Turks could not have perpetrated the 6-7 September attacks (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 671-673).

Zakar Tarver, an ethnic Armenian deputy from the DP seats, described the incident as vandalism; and underlined that there is still a “muslim – non-Muslim discrimination in some conservative people’s minds.” He testified on the Prime Minister’s behalf that he had had sympathy for the minorities which underwent the attacks. This way, he meant to say that it was not the government to blame, but certain people’s backward mentality:

...I personally testify on behalf of our Prime Minister’s sympathy toward the minorities that underwent these attacks... However, there is a mentality still persisting since the sultanate and caliphate times. Some backward minds still cannot comprehend that the Republic of Turkey is a secular state. They fail to understand that merit and aptitude is the key to success in this country, instead of religious superiority... (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 673).³³

³² Emphasis added.

³³ Its original in Turkish: “...Bu felakete maruz kalan azınlığa karşı Sayın Başvekilimizin sempatisine şahsen şahidim... Ancak saltanat ve halifelik devirlerinden kalma bir zihniyetin izleri mevcuttur. Bazı örümcek bağlamış kafalar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin layık [sic.] bir devlet olduğunu henüz anlamamış bulunuyorlar. Artık bu memlekette dini bir faikiyetin değil ancak ve ancak istidat ve kabiliyetin önünde bütün kapıların açık olduğunu daha öğrenememiş olanlar vardır...”

So, for him, the problem was the inadequacy of instilling secular values in people's minds. The attacks, for him, were the result of those backward people's religious hate or envy. Later parts of his speech is historically remarkable as a manifestation of the yearning of a non-Muslim parliamentarian for equal citizenship in Turkey:

...Dear friends, I have once seen the plates hung in the streets of New York on their day of independence. On these large plates, there were names of people from various nations that constitute the U.S. For instance: John Smith, Pier Dupont, Avram Levi, etc. Under all of these names, that read 'All American'. Similarly, the constituent people of Turkey are, doubtless, all Turkish, too. They are subject to the same and equal treatment... I can assure you that the tiny non-Muslim minority of Turkey, has tied its destiny to that of this country. It consists of people who are happy for the well-being of this country as well as sorry when, God forbid, it is in distress... Therefore, after the recent vandalism that embarrasses us in front of our friends and enemies, I believe that it is in our country's best interests to express these honest feelings of minorities from this tribune. God save our country! (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 673-674).³⁴

The deputy covets the American version of nationalism and longs for an equal treatment of minorities as full citizens. He makes several references to the the fate of union between various ethnic and religious communities that constitute the Republic of Turkey altogether. When he argues that everyone is Turkish, he actually refers to equal citizenship. He obviously feels obliged to frame his demand for equality only this way, using a nationalist language: "friends and enemies"; "God save our country"; "all Turkish."

³⁴ Its original in Turkish: "...Muhterem arkadaşlar, bir defasında New York'ta Amerika'nın kurtuluş gününde sokaklara asılı levhaları görmüştüm. Bu muazzam levhalar Amerika'yı teşkil eden muhtelif milletlerin isimlerini taşıyorlardı. Mesela: John Smith, Pier Dupont, Avram Levi ve saire gibi tipik isimler yazılıydı. Bunların hepsinin altında <<All America>> [sic.] yani hepsi Amerikalı yazılı idi. Türkiye'yi teşkil eden unsurlar da şüphesiz ki, hepsi Türk'tür. Aynı eşit muameleye tabiidir... Sizleri temin ederim ki, memleketimizde yaşayan [sic.] ufaklık gayrimüslim azınlık mukadderatını bu memleketin mukadderatına bağlamış, bu memleketin iyiliğine candan sevinen ve maazallah felaketine de samimiyetle üzülen insanlardan mürekkeptir... Dosta düşmana karşı bizi utandıracak olan son vandalizm gösterileri dolayısıyla azınlıkların bu samimi duygularını bu kürsüden belirtmek memleketin yüksek menfaatlerine uygun olacağı kanaatindeyim. Allah bu memleketi korusun!"

Another non-Muslim deputy, Aleksandros Hacopulos, noted similar issues. He underlined the oddity of such attacks on human rights happening in a democratic country; and expressed his sorrow not as a Christian but as a Turkish citizen. He emphasized the Article 88 of the constitution, which stipulates that everyone is Turkish through citizenship, irrespective of their religion and race. Therefore, he argued, the attacks were targeted against the whole society, not only the minorities.

Mr. Hacopulos asserted that the attacks were not the result of a sudden outburst of national excitement, but a product of a systematic and programmed campaign, without saying who did them. He also suggested that it is wrong to aggrieve citizens of the same race due to a conflict with a certain country. Mr. Hacopulos, whose 80-year-old parents were also victims of the attacks, focused on the connivance of the Police, which he found extremely unpleasant (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 676-678) He continued:

...There were 74 churches in İstanbul; and 70 of them were arsoned and burned down. The noble Turkish nation, its rulers and heroes had always respected the sacred places. In the course of 500 years, even during the wartimes, none of our churches, religious places, or sacred possessions had been so atrociously damaged like this... [In the last attacks] some of our clerics were cruelly beaten and murdered... We all fell prey to these attacks [as the Turkish nation]... Our Greek citizens are hurt as much due to the emotional pain and suffering as the material loss (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 677).³⁵

Burhanettin Onat, a DP deputy of Antalya, took the floor after Mr. Hacopulos. Sure about the communists' fault, in reply to Mr. Hacopulos's speech, he

³⁵ Its original in Turkish: "...İstanbul'da 74 kilise vardı. 70'i aynı zamanda yakıldı ve yıkıldı. Asil Türk milleti ve onun hükümdar ve kahramanları, mabetlere daima saygı ve sevgi göstermişlerdir. 500 sene zarfında ve birçok harblerin içinde dahi hiçbir kilisemiz, hiçbir mabedimiz yıkılmamış, mukaddes eşyaları bu şekilde vahşiyane ve gaddarca tahribedilmemişti... Bazı ruhanilerimiz insafsızca dövülmüş ve aralarında öldürülmüşleri de vardır... Hepimiz kurban gittik... Rum vatandaşlarımızın maddi zararlardan ziyade manevi zarardan dolayı daha ziyade müteessir olduklarını burada kati olarak ifade etmek isterim."

maintained that there was no point in blaming ourselves for something we never did. He drew parallels to the atrocities during the occupation of İstanbul in 1918 as well as the massacres in Anatolia under occupation (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 678). He pointed out that he was not saying that what happened was a retaliation or revenge though, even mentioning the atrocities during 1918 in reply to Mr. Hacopulos's speech is meaningful in that it shows the extreme resistance - on behalf of deputies – to the state of being culpable, as a nation.

Lastly, I will touch upon the speech of the Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Köprülü. He stated that the government was informed about the attacks in advance and got prepared accordingly; yet the exact date and time were unknown. He attributed the riots to a political agitation of the youth and some patriotic people by the communists. The staged plot was, thus, a popular tumult of the youth provoked by the communist perpetrators. The manifestation of a compatriotic youth fever got out of control and led to a catastrophe (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1955: 684).³⁶

4.5. Conclusion

The transition to democracy, with the introduction of competitive multi-party elections in 1946, has immediately brought about significant transformations for the CHP's treatment of non-Muslim minorities. This was due in most part to a political strategy vis-a-vis the new competitor, DP, in order to garner votes from the relatively high number of non-Muslim electorate concentrated in İstanbul. The minorities were

³⁶ Its original in Turkish: “...Bu hadiseden hükümet evvelce haberdardı. Ona göre bazı tertibat da almıştı. Fakat bu hadisenin günü ve saati muayyen değildi... Bilhassa gençler ve vatanperver insanlar tarafından takibedilen vatani bir hadise olarak meydana çıktı... Komünistler derhal harekete geçtiler ve gençliğin vatanperverlik tezahürü gibi görünen bu hal birdenbire mahiyetini değiştirerek tahripkar bir hal aldı.”

now potential voters instead of mere subjects of the single party period. I argue that it is also the political necessities of the post-War international system, particularly the Western liberal democratic camp, which demanded democratic credentials- at least symbolically – from the state actors. In this chapter, I presented clues and examples of both factors in the discourses of the higher ranks of the CHP. So, the Party justified the need to change their policies and solve the problems of the non-Muslims with reasons of electoral concern as well as the necessities of their “political line” and the “equal citizenship” it entailed.

The Party administration, thus, came to terms with its past ‘mistakes’ and sought immediate solutions to redress minority’s grievances. It adopted a more liberal and tolerant official discourse, promising “extreme tolerance for the minorities.” With regard to concrete policy changes, first of all, the CHP ceased the independent deputyship practice to its non-Muslim deputies, and allowed them to register with the Party as *members*. Indeed, two Greek Orthodox deputies were elected from CHP seats in the 1946 general elections. Secondly, the Party started to increase its contact with the religious leadership of minorities about their problems. The management of certain minority foundations was eventually returned to bodies elected by the minorities themselves. Seized churches and religious institutions were registered back with their previous owners. The state finally withdrew its decades-long support for artificial “independent churches” and their extensions in the management of religious and charity institutions; and accepted the terms of the minorities. Thirdly, the restrictions barring non-Muslims from public employment were flouted for the first time with the decision to open the Staff Officers’ school to non-Muslim applications. As a result of these positive developments, the non-Muslims indeed voted for the CHP in the first general elections.

Traumatized by the discriminatory policies of the CHP's single-party governments, the non-Muslim citizens got high hopes for the DP. Under the DP governments (1950-1960), *ten* non-Muslim deputies were elected to the Parliament, compared to just *six* in the 27 years of CHP's one-party government. DP had good relations with religious leadership of the minority communities, too. Menderes was the first Turkish prime minister who visited the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. DP allowed the election of religious leadership by the community members. The government gave significant amounts of financial aid for the minority schools and places of worship. Strict legal limitations that plagued the operation of minority institutions were relaxed.

The Democrat Party successfully utilized the anti-minority policies of the CHP, especially the notorious Wealth Tax, and brought it up before each election as a political propaganda against its competitor, CHP. However, it turned out to be mere populist tricks to keep CHP under pressure, since a reimbursement of the tax did not materialize, as promised countless times by the DP. Also, the DP continued the legacy of the CHP to pay immense attention to diffusing Turkish culture and language at the minority schools via "nationalist" teachers. So, the linguistic assimilation policy was kept intact.

The watershed episode of the DP period was the September 6-7 attacks. It is very likely that the government was complicit, if not the only perpetrator, in the violent attacks on the non-Muslim minorities. Chiefly the Greek minority in Turkey was sacrificed to a diplomatic strategy of pressurizing the Greek side to concede on the Cyprus problem. It is still worth emphasizing, though, that the DP government dismissed its Minister of Interior, and redressed the material losses of the injured

parties, a novel state practice that we are not accustomed to seeing in the CHP's single-party period.

Upon a thorough examination of the parliamentary discussions about the September 6-7 incidents, I found out that a nationalist tone dominated the discourses of deputies from all parties. It was seen as a matter of national prestige. Deputies from every party strived to exculpate the "Turkish nation" from the attacks. The CHP requested a transparent investigation of the incident from the ruling DP government. In addition to nationalist themes in their discourse, it is also remarkable that the CHP made several references to *violation of citizenship rights*. References to the "Western democratic world" imply the susceptibility to the democratic 'language of rights' made imperative by virtue of the alliance with the Western democratic camp. Themes such as "Turkey's place in the family of civilizations" point to the "modernist nationalism" of the CHP (Akman, 2004). It can also be inferred from their discourse that the non-Muslims were seen as *protégés* (protected by the Turkish-Muslim majority) instead of equal citizens.

The CMP, predecessor of today's ultranationalist MHP, more openly referred to the non-Muslims as 'guests'. This *protégé* or *guest* perception of non-Muslims is found in all dialects of Turkish nationalism, i.e. official Kemalist nationalism, Turkist nationalism, Islamist nationalism, and Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Furthermore, I found out that the CMP added to this understanding an emphasis on the *masculine* nation. This stress on 'masculinity of the nation' is not observed in other versions of Turkish nationalism. The masculine imagery in the discourse depicts the Turkish nation *masculine* while relegating the non-Muslim minorities to the weak "status of women" as signifiers of ethnic or religious differences, as in Yuval-Davis and Anthias' study (1989: 7-8). The CMP deputies frequently referred

to the Ottoman legacy of tolerance towards non-Muslims, and therefore, reasoned that religious intolerance is not in this nation's 'historical genes'. As much as it might seem like an inclusionary discourse at first glance, the language of tolerance always reminds the *guest* – and not houseowner – status of the non-Muslims in an exclusionary way, segregating them as well as placing them at the mercy of the majority Muslim-Turks.

Having expressed their sorrow for the incident, the DP deputies strangely gave fair quarter to the "agitated noble Turkish youth" who they deemed to have "rightfully" responded to the agitation with these attacks. Establishing an organic link between the Greek minority in Turkey and the Cypriot-Greeks as if they were the same, the DP implied that the Greeks brought these attacks upon themselves as a result of years-long provocation. Several references to the Ottoman/Turkish religious tolerance were made, as did the CMP deputies.

Another interesting finding is that an ethnic Armenian deputy of the DP interpreted the attacks on non-Muslims to an entrenched mentality of "religious superiority" as well as the "lack of consolidation of secularism" in Turkey. The discourse of "instilling secular values" and emphasis on "backward people's religious hate", again, exemplify "modernist nationalism" (Akman, 2004), yet this time espoused by a member of the *DP* political élite. This finding illustrates the diffusion of core nationalist mental sets into alternative versions of nationalism through political socialization, as Bora (2003: 436) argued that Kemalist nationalism is the "root-language of all Turkish nationalisms." It is also remarkable that he had a non-ethnic conception of Turkishness, where people of different ethnic and religious origins (sub-identities) can have Turkish as their overall supraethnic national identity.

Overall, besides many improvements, I argue that there was not a tremendous rupture from the old regime in terms of the official Kemalist nationalism, except for a populist ingredient. An incipient inclusionary definition of Turkishness was eclipsed by the predominant Kemalist nationalism (root-language) which determined the parameters of the DP's nationalism. Majority of the DP élite came from within the CHP, anyway. In sum, save for important 'openings' that had been initiated by the CHP with the transition to democracy and were continued and taken one step further by the DP, the understanding within the political élite that the non-Muslims were 'guests' largely carried on. Populism (as a result of multi-party competition) and a desired conformity with the democratic requirements of the post-War Western system caused the two parties (CHP and DP alike) to 'open up' their definition of Turkishness to include non-Muslims relatively more. On the other hand, the persistence and predominance of the official Kemalist nationalism in the DP caused the periods and instances of relapse.

CHAPTER V

1960s: AP-CHP YEARS

5.1. Introduction

After the first multiparty experience in 1950s mostly under the DP governments, democracy in Turkey was suspended by a military coup on 27 May 1960. Many cabinet members, including the Prime Minister Menderes, were put on trial by a special tribunal in Yassıada, and charged with high treason, exploitation of public funds and unconstitutional political acts. The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were found guilty, and consequently executed. A constituent assembly was established in January 1961. Each non-Muslim community was given representation as the the deputy representative of the Head of State.¹ This shows the symbolic continuity with the Ottoman *millet* system; one representative each for three *millets*. This is the last term that even such symbolic representation would be the case.

The interim military government ruled the country until the elections of 15 October 1961. In the elections, the CHP under İnönü gained 36.74% of the votes, whereas the DP's successor AP (*Adalet Partisi*, Justice Party) got 34.79% of the votes. Osman Bölükbaşı's CKMP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) came the third party, having got the 13.95% of all the votes. After the elections, the first coalition government in the Turkish political life was formed under CHP and AP. Until February 1965, three İnönü governments were formed. In February 1965, Suat Hayri

¹ See Appendix 3.

Ürgüplü from the AP formed the government upon İnönü's resignation. In October 1965, Süleyman Demirel's AP came to power alone, after gaining the 52.87% of the votes (CHP could only get 28.74%). The rest of the 1960s would be the Demirel government's years.

The period in which the non-Muslim minorities were negatively affected by various policies coincided with the İnönü governments (1961-1965). In this period, due to the government's disagreement with Greece over the Cyprus problem, an anti-Greek campaign was carefully enforced. This campaign led to a collective nationalist hysteria in Turkey. The actors of this smear campaign were mainly the government, the press, and the conservative/nationalist students' organizations. According to an editorial An editorial in *Yeni Sabah*, 3 January 1964, there was such a strong and widespread anti-Greek sentiment in İstanbul that there were proposals to change the names of neighborhoods which were either in Greek or contain the word "Rum" (Greek). Indeed, an editorial in *Yeni Sabah*, 2 February 1964, reported that certain neighborhoods such as Galata and Samatya became Karaköy and Kocamustafapaşa, respectively. Another example would be some 86 Greek nationals' application to alter the religion section on their IDs from "Greek Orthodox" to "Turkish Orthodox," according to an editorial in *Dünya*, 15 April 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 82).

After this campaign – whose details I will elaborate in the following subsections – some 30.000-40.000 Greeks² were either expelled or had to leave the country; and most of their properties were expropriated (Demir and Akar, 1994: 12).

² Both Greek nationals and Turkish nationals of Greek origin. The exact number is unknown due to the fact that the Turkish state still does not uncover the official information and the official documents regarding this period of expulsion. However, it is estimated that at least a total of 12,000 Greek nationals were expelled. See: Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1994, p. 14; *Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey*, Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 9. Researcher Suavi Aydın also claims that between 30.000 and 40.000 Greeks left the country after the revocation of the Agreement. See: Aydın, Suavi, *Türkiye'de Etnik Yapı*, in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 12, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1995, p. 501.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate was put in the cross hairs; and it was placed under close scrutiny and certain limitations, along with the minority schools. The final damage that this campaign inflicted upon the Greek minority have been the Turkification policies in the two Aegean islands of Turkey, Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), which further destroyed the existence of Greeks in Turkey. The biggest exodus of the Greeks took place, not after the Wealth Tax or 6-7 September attacks, but in the 1960s (Demir and Akar, 1994: 14).

5.2. 1964 Inonu Kararnamesi and the Expulsion of Greeks

The Archbishop Makarios III, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, was implementing policies aiming at the independence of the island from the British Empire. He was also complaining that the Turkish minority was overrepresented in the Parliament and all the other political councils; and thus expressed the need of a constitutional revision (Alexandris, 1992: 280). Many of these policies were also threatening the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community in the island, resulting in horrible massacres. A political union with the mainland Greece, *Enosis*, was one of the remarkable aspirations of the Cypriot Greek nationalist military organization, *EOKA*, which was condoned and even supported by the Archbishop Makarios as well as the Greek government (Zahariadis and Alp, 1979: 31). The Turkish government was thus highly uncomfortable and trying to put pressure on Greece to yield and come to terms with the Turkish demands, which were chiefly an immediate cessation of atrocities and the partition of Cyprus. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin expressed that they saw “the key to the Cyprus problem in Greece” (Toker, 1992: 195). After failing all its diplomatic attempts, the İnönü government

figured that the thousands-strong Greek nationals living and making businesses in Turkey along with the Greeks having Turkish nationality could be a valuable political bargaining chip. Upsetting the interests of these people would, the government thought, make the Greek government not afford to chuck them away and yield to the Turkish demands.

To understand in the first place the background of such a big number of Greek nationals' existence in Turkey, we need to go back to 1930s. After having fought many years, the prudent leaders of these two countries, Atatürk and Venizelos, had established the foundations of a new peaceful era with successive political and economic agreements. The 1930 Convention of Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation (*İkamet, Ticaret ve Seyrisefain Anlaşması*), signed between Turkey and Greece, afforded the nationals of these two countries to reside, circulate, conduct commercial and business activities freely in the other country.

Apart from fostering peaceful relations between the two countries, the economic aim of this convention was, for Turkey, instead of securing Turkish citizens' businesses and lives in Greece, to revive the Turkish economy with qualified labor force (of Greeks) – particularly in commerce – that had been in short supply after the mass population exchange of 1923. Indeed, more than half of the members of the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce were Greeks (Demir and Akar, 1994: 15). For Greece, on the other hand, it was wished to remedy the unemployment plaguing the country (Demir and Akar, 1994: 42-52). From the Greek side, the agreement was principally meant to secure the Greek nationals' lives and businesses in İstanbul and elsewhere in Turkey. Most of the Greek nationals that started a life – or continued their life, so to say – in Turkey after this agreement, were mostly self-

employed people, such as barbers, salespeople, restaurant owners, tailors, etc, i.e. small business owners (Demir and Akar, 1994: 53).

Some of these Greek nationals, had their Greek passports due to the fact that their ancestors were from the previously Ottoman lands that are now the Greek territory. They were allowed to stay in İstanbul, just like the other Greek citizens of Turkey *établis* in İstanbul, for seven years after the Lausanne Treaty, 1923 (Alexandris, 1992: 281). With the 1930 Agreement, their residence was prolonged and thus they remained to stay without having to apply for Turkish citizenship, because in practice, it did not make a big difference, as the nationals of these two countries could enjoy almost all of the entitlements and rights as do the citizens of the country of residence. The two Greek communities, therefore, (the Greek nationals and the Greek citizens of Turkey) had intermarried across generations, and were as close as two coats of paint. Thus, an expulsion of the Greek nationals would mean *not* only *their* expulsion, but a much *bigger* number including their significant others, parents, and children.

The other parties in the Parliament, the AP, CKMP, and MP, articulated their dissatisfaction with the İnönü government's handling of the Cyprus problem. They constantly criticized İnönü for not being tough and determined enough (Demir and Akar, 1994: 21-24). An AP deputy, Tahsin Demiray, censured the Kemalist dictum of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" and the İnönü government's 'softness' on Turkey's relations with Greece and tolerance for Greeks in Turkey, for serving the latter's interests at the expense of the former (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1964: 214-221). The press, and particularly the conservative dailies such as Tercüman, were abound in columns suggesting that the Greeks in İstanbul were exploiting the Turkish economy and sending their revenues to the Greek Cypriot militants (Demir

and Akar, 1994: 35-38). In order to pressurize the Greeks, İnönü took the first step with the abrogation of the 1930 Agreement on 16 March 1964. The cancellation of the agreement would come into force after 6 months of the decision (Alexandris, 1992: 281).

The government argued that: “due to the fact that it has been a long time since the signature of the Agreement, it fails to serve the present conditions and its revocation was thus decided.” İnönü left an open door for a possible renewal of the Agreement upon negotiations in a good light. In addition, it was stated that the massacres in Cyprus had nothing to do with the cancellation of the Agreement (Demir and Akar, 1994: 41).³ Yet, the same government would reveal its true intention on the day in which the 6 month-period ended, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin noted: “We have enormous disagreements between each other. We will not bring the issues of residence or anything into agenda unless the Cyprus problem is resolved” (*Tercüman*, 19 September 1964, cited in Demir and Akar, 1994: 52).⁴

The Turkish press was unanimously jubilant over the abrogation of the Agreement (Demir and Akar, 1994: 40). The criticism objected at the Greeks living in İstanbul ranged from exploiting the Turkish economy to depriving the Turkish people of jobs, to black-marketeering and tax evasion, to sending money clandestinely to their Cypriot ‘brethren’.

On 6 April, 1964, the İnönü government unilaterally abolished the visa agreement with Greece. This date coincided with – or, more likely, was timed to –

³ The quote’s original in Turkish: “Anlaşmanın imza edildiği tarihten bu yana uzun zaman geçmiş olması münasebetiyle bugünkü icaplara uymadığı için feshine karar verilmiştir.”

⁴ Its original in Turkish: “Aramızda muazzam ihtilaflar var. Kıbrıs meselesi halledilmeden ikamet veya hiçbir meseleyi ele almayacağız.”

the Easter that year, in which thousands of Greeks had left for Greece to spend their religious holiday. These people could not go back to Turkey due to the cancellation of the visa agreement (Demir and Akar, 1994: 56).

The expulsion of Greek nationals was carried out throughout the year of 1964 until the beginning of 1965. The number of deportées skyrocketed at critical times, when the things in Cyprus got more hectic (Demir and Akar, 1994: 63). As I mentioned before, the country that terminates the 1930 Agreement had to wait 6 months until its government started to deport the other country's nationals. Yet, Turkey could not wait 6 months. The early deportations were justified, not on grounds of the termination of the Agreement, but on its 16th article, which allowed either government to deport certain individuals that threaten the national security (Demir and Akar, 1994: 64).

Interestingly, the Muslims/Turks of Greek nationality were reassured from the beginning that their interests would not be harmed as a result of these deportations. The Minister of Interior Affairs, Orhan Öztrak, was frank enough to go far as to say that they would “provide convenience for the Turks carrying Greek passports in order to protect the Turkish culture” (*Ulus*, 22 April 1964, cited in Demir and Akar, 1994: 110).⁵ In the proper *Kararname* itself, too, the “Greek nationals whose origins are not Greek” were exempted from the practise (Kararname, 1964: Article 7).⁶ These are clearly racist statements, privileging another country's nationals over their own just for the sake of kinship. On the other hand, the Greeks of Turkish nationality, i.e. the inner ‘aliens’, got their share from the government's

⁵ Its original in Turkish: “Türk kültürünü muhafaza etsinler diye Türk kökenli Yunan pasaportlulara gerekli kolaylık sağlanacak.”

⁶ For the original Kararname text, see: Appendix 4.

accusations: “The Greeks of Turkish nationality who are in contact with the deported Greek nationals will be investigated and immediately denationalized,” read an editorial in *Milliyet*, 29 March 1964.⁷ Another editorial in *Milliyet*, 18 April 1964, reported that the government warned, though, that they would show zero tolerance for any intemperance or aggression towards Turkish nationals and foreign nationals residing in Turkey alike. So, a second 6-7 September attacks should never take place.

At first, the charges fielded against the ‘malicious’ individuals whose expulsion was sought were mainly presented as individual “harmful” or illegal activities involving making propaganda against Turkey, collecting and sending money abroad as well as founding secret organizations in order to support the Greek Cypriots (Demir and Akar, 1994: 69, 71). Later on, though, the collective nature of the deportations were admitted:

The measures are the natural consequences of the fact that the Turkish government regarded the question of Cyprus and that of Greco-Turkish relations as forming a single whole, and therefore was unable to continue to grant Greek nationals favoured treatment, at a moment when Greece displayed an attitude of hostility towards Turkey by lining up on the side of Makarios' views (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964, cited in Alexandris, 1992: 282).⁸

Majority of these first deportées were 50-60 years old or above; and most of them were businesspeople (Demir and Akar, 1994: 73). Targeting the richest segment of the Greek community was no coincidence as a public confiscation was most probably sought. An editorial in *Milliyet*, 28 March 1964, reported that some of these first deportées turned out either to be already dead, or to have not been residing in Turkey any more for long years. It is illustrative to display the hollowness of the

⁷ Its original in Turkish: “Sınırdışı edilen Yunan uyruklu Rumlarla temas eden Türk uyruklu Rumlar tesbit edilip vatandaşlıktan ıskat edilecek.”

⁸ From the Director of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ explanatory memorandum to the counsellor of the Greek embassy, on 27 April 1964.

accusations of sending money abroad for malicious activities and thus threatening the national security. Indeed, as Demir and Akar suggest, the Turkish government could not come up with or presented to the public any evidence pertaining to the illegal activities of the deported Greek nationals in 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 77).

The individuals who were decided to be deported were taken immediately by the police forces from their homes or offices to the 4th Office and were made to sign a humiliating document consisting of statements such as confession of high treason and other charges as well as leaving the country with of free will. Mihalis Vasiliadis, the current owner of *Apoyevmatini*, a Greek daily in İstanbul, reported that the people who rejected it were put in solitary confinement until they eventually consent to do so (Demir and Akar, 1994: 76-77). The deportees were not permitted to take with them more than 200 Turkish Liras (then equivalent to \$22) and one suitcase of personal belongings like clothes (Alexandris, 1992: 284).

The bank accounts of the deportées were swiftly frozen within hours after they were declared to be deported, not to give them ample time to withdraw their money. Similarly, title deed transactions for them were also blocked (Demir and Akar, 1994: 88). The reason for that was the Greeks were no longer exempt from the limitations about property ownership that the foreigners were subject to according to the Article 35 of the title deed (*tapu*) law (Alexandris, 1992: 281). On 2 November 1964, the İnönü government passed a by-law (known as the 1964 Kararnamesi), prohibiting the conveyance of Greek nationals with regard to their immovable properties in Turkey. The revenues from those immovables were also blocked. On 25 December 1964, the government declared that their assets in the Turkish banks were all blocked and left to the protection of the Turkish Central Bank until the deported people's arrival (Alexandris, 1992: 116-118). In retrospect, the estimations for the

government confiscated liquids of the Greek nationals were between 200 and 500 million dollars; while the number of government seized Greek properties amounted to 2902 (Alexandris, 1992: 285).

5.3. Pressures on the Patriarchate, Greek Community and Minority Schools

The public was led to believe that the Greek Cypriots and the Greek établis in İstanbul came from the same ancestors, and the latter thus always supported the former financially (Alexandris, 1992: 27). The boundaries of the evil were easily extended to cover İstanbul Greeks, too, because of their ‘Greekness’ (Vasiliadis, 2006: 52).

The Patriarchate, however, drew fire from the nationalist circles most. The institution was under so much pressure that its legal advisor Kaludi Laskari had to make a public declaration in an editorial in *Tercüman*, 17 April 1964, saying “the Christians in Cyprus do not emanate from the Greeks (*Rum*). They descend from the Phoenicians.” This attribution of collective identity to actually different outgroups is a common and particular reflex of the nationalist ideology. As the borders between us and them are so overemphasized, the nationalist mind-set can go further as to put different groups of people in the same category under a common imagined ancestor linkage. Thus, the İstanbul Greeks were linked up with the Greek Cypriots without question based on their same evil ‘Greekness’ (Vasiliadis, 2006: 52).

The Patriarchate and the Patriarch Athenagoras himself had to make symbolic donations to the campaigns that raise funds for the Turkish Cypriot veterans, in order

to demonstrate their good will and patriotism (Demir and Akar, 1994: 30).⁹ The Patriarchate was constantly and covertly pressured to make declarations condemning the Cypriot government; however, it was claiming that it was not a political institution, but a religious one, hence it shunned to make such political declarations (Demir and Akar, 1994: 32).

The government was ostensibly far away from threatening its own citizens of Greek origin, and even portraying a rosy picture for them: “Our citizens of Greek origin are leading peaceful and prosperous lives now just as they have done so far,” reported an editorial in *Akşam*, 18 July 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 100). However, this did not reflect the reality. Besides many of them already having had to leave the country out of insecurity, as I previously mentioned, some Greeks who could stay applied to change their religion from ‘Greek’ to ‘Turkish’ Orthodox. Many others, during 1964, resorted to adopt Turkish/Muslim names and surnames. The newspapers were filled with such ‘joyful’ news as non-Muslims having circumcision and conversion (Demir and Akar, 1994: 101).

An editorial in *Milliyet*, 4 April 1964, reported that CHP’s İzmir deputy Osman Sabri Adal asked a parliamentary question to the government regarding the position of the Patriarchate over the Cyprus issue, whether the Holy Synod’s activities were in conformity with the laws, and if the government was informed about the Patriarchate’s involvement in politics since the Lausanne Treaty. The parliamentary question was loaded with biased and judgemental remarks about the Patriarchate, implicating that it was preoccupied with hazardous and treacherous activities against the Turkish national security. As the government party was the

⁹ The Patriarchate donated 5.000 liras, and the Patriarch Athenagoras 700 liras to the campaign.

same party as that of the İzmir deputy, this motion can be perceived tactical, as in laying the way open for a governmental ‘response’.

Indeed, one week after this question in the Parliament, the government decided to shut down the Patriarchate’s printing house. It was also decided that the monks would start to pay income tax, as well as declare their wealth (Demir and Akar, 1994: 125). An editorial in *Hürriyet*, 14 April 1964, reported that the Minister of National Defense underlined that İstanbul was called ‘Konstantinopol’ in a movie in which the Patriarch was dressed and shown as an East Roman emperor (Demir and Akar, 1994: 125). The Municipality of İstanbul decided to take down the Patriarchate’s walls from 5 meters to a half meter, considering it “dangerous.” A minister from the Cabinet was signalling that the Patriarchate’s building would be confiscated in a week, in an editorial in *Milliyet*, 21 April 1964. This would be disclaimed by another minister soon. The next day the government was declaring that the Patriarchate’s two metropolitan bishops would be deported due to a secret information that the government had and was unwilling to share publicly (Demir and Akar, 1994: 128). Also, the Minister of State, Nüvit Yetkin, stressed that the minority foundations would be subject to more strict control, reported an editorial in *Milliyet*, 28 April 1964. The other minorities were also affected by this nationalist atmosphere. Armenian churches as well as the Jewish synagogues would be to subject to tough regulations too (Demir and Akar, 1994: 140).

On 13 April 1964, an editorial in *Milliyet* reported that the government declared that the prerogatives of the Greek minority schools were abrogated, considering the principle of ‘reciprocity’. In 1961, the minority schools had already been placed under the General Directorate of Private Schools of the Ministry of Education, stripped off of the “community schools” status as laid out in the Article

40 of the Lausanne, but instead merely having the ‘private schools’ status (Oran, 1995: 54; Alexandris, 1992: 287). In March-April 1964, 3 Greek headmasters and 11 Greek teachers were dismissed for charges of anti-Turkish conduct (Alexandris, 1992: 286). In October, 412 Greek teachers teaching at these schools were required to take a Turkish language test; should they fail their career at Greek schools would be discontinued (Demir and Akar, 1994: 145; Alexandris, 1992: 286). As a protest, 3 Greek teachers left the country, according to an editorial in *Ulus*, 16 April 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 146).

After strict investigations at these schools, the government identified several problems such as demonstrating movies that promoted “subversive activities”, organizing courses without permission, secretly studying the books that were printed in Greece, and tax evasion, reported an editorial in *Akşam*, 21 May 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 146). Half of the Greek schools’ accreditations were rescinded for ridiculous reasons. The class sizes of 3-4 students at Greek schools were compared to 60-70 students per classroom at Turkish schools; and the former was seen as creating inappropriate student-teacher relations. An editorial in *Ulus*, 2 May 1964, reported that some Jewish and Armenian schools’ accreditations were also rescinded due to similar reasons of educational deficiency (Demir and Akar, 1994: 147). Istanbul-based Greek daily *Eleftheri Foni*, 8 May 1965, reported that morning prayers as well as Greek textbooks and periodicals were banned at these schools by Protocol no. 3885 (Alexandris, 1992: 287). Alexandris argues that these pressures on Greek minority schools and the fear of inadequate education for their children must also have caused the voluntary exodus of further numbers of Greeks (Alexandris, 1992: 287). In addition, a research of mine (2010: 4) demonstrates that the remaining Greek families tend not to send their children to the Greek minority schools, preferring the

other private schools that have foreign language based education, leaving the Greek schools to be filled instead with Arabic-speaking Orthodox families' children.

Moreover, in contravention to the Treaty of Lausanne, Greeks were refused to be appointed as headmasters of their own community's schools. The propounded reason was inadequate proficiency in Turkish language, although this was reportedly not the case by the Greek community. In addition, the official educational inspectors usually patronized and terrified the teachers and students in their frequent visits at these schools (Alexandris, 1992: 286). The editor of an İstanbul-based Greek daily, Eleftheri Foni (Free Voice), Andreas Lambikis, was arrested and deported out of Turkey, for being outspokenly critical about the government's heavy-handed treatment of minority schools. The official charge was "making Greek propaganda inimical to the national unity." The offices of the newspaper were pillaged and obdured, depriving the Greek community of their single daily at that time (Alexandris, 1992: 288).

Furthermore, the liberal practice that had been followed by the DP government with regard to the minority foundations came to a halt during the CHP government, when the Greek-Turkish relations started to sour over the Cyprus problem. The General Directory of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*, VGM) stipulated the non-Muslim foundations to submit foundation vouchers (settlement deeds). Since many of these foundations did not possess deeds of trust because they had been founded by the Ottoman Sultans' imperial orders, the VGM stated that the non-Muslim foundations could only claim those properties that had been submitted with the 1936 Beyannamesi (Bakar, 2006, cited in Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 14). With this unlawful practice, the minority foundations were dispossessed of all the properties they had acquired after 1936. These properties were returned to their

previous owners or their beneficiaries, if not found, simply confiscated and transferred to the Treasury or the VGM itself (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 14).¹⁰ The total number of confiscated properties is claimed to be around 150 (Zarif, 2002). However, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate argues that the number of seized properties of the Greek foundations alone is 990 (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 17).

Achieving no results from the first instance courts upon their cases, the Court of Appeals (Yargıtay) heard the case and brought in the following scandalous verdict in 1971: “The acquisitions of property of the legal personalities consisting of *non-Turkish* individuals have been prohibited” (Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi, 6 July 1971).¹¹ Thus, the foundations of non-Muslim Turkish citizens were put in the same footing as ‘alien’ foundations, in violation of the Constitution and the Lausanne Treaty. The High Court, describing the non-Muslim citizens as ‘non-Turkish’ and allowing such a discrimination, thus showed that the Turkishness was interpreted as a cultural, ethnic, and religious identity, instead of a citizenship category. What is more shameful is the approval of this decision by the Court of Appeals Assembly of Civil Chambers (Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu) in 1974:

Apparently, the acquisition of property on behalf of the legal personalities consisted of non-Turks was prohibited. As the legal persons are more powerful than the real persons, it is clear that the state would face various dangers and problems if these were not restricted to acquire immovable properties. For this reason, even though the real alien persons are entitled to acquire immovable properties by will or purchase provided that it is

¹⁰ Here it should be noted that it was not only the non-Muslim foundations whose properties were seized. Similarly, the Muslim foundations were also under strict scrutiny by the bureaucracy and the government. They also lost some of their properties to the VGM. However, the seized properties – particularly those of historical significance – were well-protected by the VGM, while those of the non-Muslims (churches, schools, and other historical buildings) were abandoned to devastation. See: Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 21.

¹¹ Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: “Türk olmayanların meydana getirdikleri tüzel kişiliklerin gayrimenkul iktisapları men edilmiştir.”

reciprocal, the legal persons are deprived of this right (Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu, 1974, cited in Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 15).¹²

5.4. 'Eritme' Policies in Imbros and Tenedos

At that time, the majority of the residents (80-90%) of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) were Greeks (Demir and Akar, 1994: 120). The total number of Greeks living in these two islands was estimated to be 7,000 in 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 149). Until those years, Imbros (İmroz) was the name of today's Gökçeada. The Turkification policies have started with this period.

The CHP's Çanakkale deputy Burhan Arat signed a motion with 37 other deputies, proposing the restoration of the previously revoked 14th Article of the law regarding the local administration of these two islands. That article was about the education at the islands. Between 1927 and 1951, the language of education at these islands was Turkish. The DP government, as a gesture to the improving Turkish-Greek relations, revoked the Article 14 stipulating the Turkish language as the language of formal education at the two islands (Demir and Akar, 1994: 149-150). The language was half-day Turkish, and half-day Greek in the islands until 1964, reported by *Radikal*, 9 May 2005. Now, this prerogative was being taken back for reasons of disrupting the national unity, uniformity of education, etc. An editorial in *Tercüman*, 24 July 1964, reported that the motion was eventually approved, the education in Greek was abolished, and the schools at the islands were assigned to the

¹² Its original in Turkish: "Görülüyor ki, Türk olmayanların meydana getirdikleri Tüzel Kişiliklerin taşınmaz mal edinmeleri yasaklanmıştır. Çünkü, Tüzel Kişiler, Gerçek Kişilere oranla daha güçlü oldukları için, bunların taşınmaz mal edinmelerinin kısıtlanmamış olması halinde, devletin çeşitli tehlikelerle karşılaşacağı ve türlü sakıncalar doğabileceği açıktır. Bu nedenle de karşılıklı olmak şartıyla yabancı Gerçek Kişilerin Türkiye'de satın alma veya miras yolu ile taşınmaz mal edinmeleri mümkün kılınmış olduğu halde, Tüzel Kişiler bundan yoksun bırakılmışlardır."

Ministry of Education's authority, in breach of the Lausanne Treaty (Demir and Akar, 1994: 150).

The demography of the islands was also targeted by the government. A "conscious policy of re-settlement" was suggested, reported *Yeni Sabah*, on 4 April 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 151). The previous governments had resettled 55 families from Sürmene, Trabzon to Imbros, but these families had failed to adapt and the policy had failed. The current government resettled 6,000 Turks to these two islands; and for their survival and successful adaptation, a generous set of facilities were provided, ranging from issuing credits to supporting viticulture and providing them with production machines, reported *Tercüman*, on 21 April 1964 (Demir and Akar, 1994: 151).

In 1965, a battalion of gendarmerie was relocated from Balıkesir to Imbros and Tenedos. According to an editorial in *Milliyet*, 7 June 1965, the reason for this military deployment was described as a precaution to the observations of some covert anti-Turkish activities of Greeks in Imbros and Tenedos regarding Cyprus (Demir and Akar, 1994: 152). The lands and fields belonging to the Greeks were expropriated by the state and were turned into state hatcheries. In 1965, a semi-open prison was founded in Imbros. The prisoners were moving about freely and, as a matter of course, were harassing the islanders, reported an editorial in *Radikal*, 9 May 2005. It goes without saying that it was an intentional harassment policy on part of the government to induce the Greeks to flee the islands.

5.5. The Adalet Partisi (AP) Period

In February 1965, there was a government change. Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, from the AP, formed the government upon İnönü's resignation. İnönü's policies were, however, continued regarding the pressure on the minorities. The AP's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was making a strange statement, in an editorial in *Milliyet*, 17 April 1965, emphasizing the principle of 'reciprocity' found in the Lausanne – which in fact was never mentioned in the texts of the Lausanne Treaty – as regards the minorities of Greece and Turkey, the Patriarchate, and the Cyprus problem. On 16 October 1965, Prime Minister Ürgüplü expressed that:

If a Turk gets murdered in Cyprus today, if a Turk sheds blood, I cannot be sure what happens in İstanbul. Our police has taken strict precautions so as to prevent such possible incidents. These precautions had also been taken earlier, and I fear a second 6-7 September incident (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1965, cited in Bali, 1998a: 8).¹³

These were clear messages of 'retaliation' on part of the Turkish government, showing the sticks to Greece, and treating some of its own citizens as *captives*, and seen as *negotiable elements* of the Turkish nation-state. This treatment of minorities as merely passive totalities which could be bargained away should the caprices of the nation-state require is most specifically justified by an anachronistic utilization of the 'reciprocity' principle in the international relations. Whereas this principle denotes a general equality practice for the handling of diplomatic relations, the Turkish policymakers have continuously used it as a defensive excuse for their reluctance toward implementing minority rights at the expense of individual liberties and collective rights in domestic politics (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010: 196).

¹³ Its original in Turkish: "Bugün Kıbrıs'ta bir Türk öldürülürse, bir Türk'ün kanı aksa, İstanbul'da ne olacağını ben temin edemem. Bunları ve muhtemel olayları önlemek için sıkı polis tedbirleri alınmıştır. Bu tedbirler daha önce de mevcuttu, ben bir 6-7 Eylül hâdisesinden korkarım."

From the above passage, it is clear that the Prime Minister expressed his fear and incapacity, reminding an earlier nasty nationalist episode in the Republican history as a menace. He also, once more, confirmed the state's perception of its non-Muslim citizens as defenseless 'alien' subjects – as opposed to equal citizens – that are constantly susceptible to the ups and downs in interstate relations.

The Ürgüplü government was, thus, consistently following in the footsteps of İnönü. It was declared that *all* of the Greek nationals would be swiftly deported. The Patriarchate would be subject to much larger governmental scrutiny. It was also emphasized that unless the Greek Cypriots cease to maltreat the Cypriot Turks, the prerogatives of minority institutions in Turkey would be abrogated (Demir and Akar, 1994: 136). In an editorial in *Milliyet*, 19 April 1965, the AP's leader Süleyman Demirel stated that "If necessary, the Patriarchate should be removed from the Turkish territories" (Demir and Akar, 1994: 138). Another AP deputy, Sabri Özcansen, was suggesting to convert the Patriarchate into a 'museum'! (*Milliyet*, 23 December 1965, cited in Demir and Akar, 1994: 138). An editorial in *Milliyet*, 8 April 1965, reported that President Cemal Gürsel was accusing the Patriarchate for trespassing its religious duties and getting into illicit political activities. He also emphasized the linkage between the status of the Greek minority and the Turkish-Greek relations on Cyprus.

In 1967, the Demirel government aimed to restrain the non-Muslims' rights over their properties by replacing the earlier law on foundations (of 1949) with a new act (no. 903/1967). According to the Article 74 of this new law, "communal property founded by a group and aiming at the reinforcement of a certain race or minority would not be registered as a *vakif* by the authorities" (Official Gazette, 24 July 1967,

cited in Alexandris, 1992: 290).¹⁴ This practically prohibited the minorities to establish new foundations.

I will conclude this chapter with the AP deputy, Tahsin Demiray's parliamentary speech, which describes the Lausanne's relevant articles about the minorities as a "sickness", and which attests to the fact that generally the AP's policies and perceptions of non-Muslim minorities, at least at the rhetoric level, were not quite dissimilar to those of the CHP:

In fact, we consider the [implying Lausanne] treaty articles a heavy burden distinguishing the citizens in Turkey as minorities, and therefore demeaning a morally strong country like Turkey. We have to cure this sickness that we inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This sickness needs to be cured so that Turkey can consist of only 'citizens'. No matter in which direction our cause for Cyprus evolve to, our principal cause is against the megaloida [sic.], the ideal of greater Greece (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1964: 221).¹⁵

5.6. Conclusion: Convergence of the AP and CHP on Their Policies Towards Minorities

1960s started with a military coup, followed by a military interim government until a transition to democracy in October 1961. In the first half of the 1960s, the CHP-led coalitions (with AP, YTP, and CKMP) ruled the country. From December 1963 to February 1965, İnönü's CHP ruled alone. This is exactly the period in which non-Muslim minorities were negatively affected by various

¹⁴ Its original in Turkish: "Belli bir ırk veya cemaat mensuplarını desteklemek gayesi ile kurulmuş olan vakıfların tesciline kara verilemez."

¹⁵ Comments added in brackets. Its original in Turkish: "Esasen biz, Türkiye içinde vatandaşları ekalliyetler diye ayıran ve Türkiye gibi manen yüce bir devleti küçülten kayıtları ağır bir yük telâkki etmekteyiz. Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan kalan bu hastalığı tedavi etmek mecburiyetindeyiz. Böyle bir hastalık tedavi görmeli ve Türkiye'de sadece vatandaşlar mevcudolmalıdır. Kıbrıs dâvamızın hal şekli her ne olursa olsun bundan sonra asıl dâvamız megaloida, büyük Yunanistan dâvası ilemdir."

policies, most saliently the 1964 Kararname. From 1965 onwards, the AP government ruled alone.

Selection of three deputy representatives to the Head of State during the interim government carries symbolic importance about this period for demonstrating the persistence of the traces of Ottoman *millet* legacy in the core Kemalist military-bureaucratic élites' mindset. When the CHP came back to power, the Cyprus problem started to intensify. The Greek-Cypriot *EOKA* was threatening the existence of the Turkish-Cypriots in the island. AP, CKMP, MP, the conservative press were all criticizing the İnönü government for being soft on the issue. The media, opposition parties, as well as the conservative organizations portrayed 'the Greek' as exploiting the country's resources. It reminds of Bora's observation (1995b) about the xenophobic, anti-minority discourse of the reactionary right-wing nationalism, which resonated principally in the adversaries of Kemalist CHP starting with the DP and all the way into AP. This right-wing nationalism owed much to populism, reconstructing the popular xenophobic views about the non-Muslims as the sole responsible of backwardness and degeneracy – sucking the blood of the country.

To put the Greek side under pressure, the İnönü government joined the anti-Greek smear campaign, using the Greek people living in Turkey as a bargaining chip. This campaign culminated in the 1964 Kararname, which eventually led to the expulsion of people with Greek nationality as well as their Turkish-citizen Greek relatives, around 40.000 people in total. Interestingly, the biggest exodus of the Greeks took place, not after the Wealth Tax or 6-7 September attacks, but in the 1960s. In addition, a large portion of the Greek

capital (around \$500 million) in Turkey was *Turkified* as the government confiscated their liquids and properties.

We see that, in the definition of Turkishness, ethnic-religious identities were prioritized over citizenship, again, in this period. While the Muslims/Turks of Greek nationality were being exempted from the expulsions, the Greeks of Turkish nationality were officially threatened with deportation should they be in contact with the deported, malicious Greeks. İstanbul Greeks were easily equated with Greek Cypriots as the enemy in the public memory, relating it to their Greekness. This discrimination illustrates the **exclusion** of non-Muslims from the definition of Turkishness, both verbally and in practice.

Furthermore, the liberal attitude of the DP government towards the religious institutions (e.g. Patriarchates), minority schools, and minority foundations was completely reversed during the CHP government. The CHP revoked the law that had been passed by the DP, which enabled the education in Greek language in Tenedos and Imbros. Also, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was put under so much pressure and scrutiny; so were minority schools, their teachers, and even educational materials. Notwithstanding the government's flimsy declarations about their dedication to protect the well-being of Turkish citizens of Greek origin, in practice there was so much pressure on this community that name changes and religious conversions were rampant. Many Patriarchate officials and minority school teachers were being arrested and deported for accusations of subversive activities, tax evasion, and endangering the national security. Quite a few minority foundations were confiscated with new regulations and laws. In sum, the Greeks in Turkey were equated with Greek-Cypriots, and were regarded with hostility. The minorities were constantly

harassed, and accused of being preoccupied with hazardous and treacherous activities against the Turkish national security. Armament of the two Aegean islands inhabited by the Greeks, as well as resettlement of Muslim-Turkish families in these islands to change their demographics, all demonstrate the fact that the CHP government saw the minorities from a national security perspective.

When the AP came to power in 1965, the pressures over the minorities continued. There were no concrete, large-scale anti-minority policies such as 1964 Kararname. However, in continuity with the CHP government, all of the Greek nationals were threatened with deportation. The pressure on the Patriarchate and minority schools were even increased. Demirel even suggested to remove the Greek Patriarchate out of Turkey due to their presumed illicit political activities. Non-Muslim communities' rights over their properties were restricted more. The AP also complained that the minority-related articles of the Treaty of Lausanne were a big burden for Turkey.

Quite similarly with the way Prime Minister Menderes (DP) justified the September 6-7 attacks with the Greeks' provocations of the "agitated noble Turkish youth", the Prime Minister Ürgüplü (AP) implied that a second September 6-7 incident might happen, and that it would be justified – certainly not wanted, though – with the Greeks' bloodshed in Cyprus. These are clear messages of retaliation, while showing sticks to Greece, treating its own citizens as *captives* and *negotiable elements* in Turkey's diplomatic relations. The traces of this mindset can be found in the *reciprocity* misinterpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne. This misconception of reciprocity was used as a defensive excuse by the governments, Kemalist nationalist or populist DP-AP line alike, for their reluctance to grant full citizenship and minority rights to non-Muslim minorities.

CHAPTER VI

1970s-1980s-1990s

These three decades provide us a relatively scant source of discourse on non-Muslim minorities or dramatic policy changes that affect them directly. This observation is made, of course, compared to the previous decades and the following one. In this chapter, I took on to analyze the minority-related discourses of politicians, and several policies and decisions that affected the lives of non-Muslims. Finally, I comparatively interpreted them in terms of their level of inclusion/exclusion of these individuals from the way they constructed the Turkish nation.

6.1. 1970s: Coalition Years (CHP-MSP; AP-MHP-MSP-CGP) and Minority-Related Policies

In the last years of 1960s, Turkey was suffering from political instability and violence between leftists (workers and students) and right-wing groups (Islamists and ultranationalists). In 1969, Süleyman Demirel's Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP hereafter) had formed the government yet with little power over the legislature due to various factions within the Party. On 12 March 1971, the army gave a memorandum to the Demirel government, which happened to be incapable of controlling the violence in the streets and passing critical legislation, thus pushing the country

further into a state of chaos. The memorandum amounted to an ultimatum to the Prime Minister, and consequently the government collapsed.

The memorandum of 1971 opened the way for a political strife within CHP resulting in a harsh competition between Bülent Ecevit and İsmet İnönü, the president of the Party. İnönü lost the political battle in the CHP's 21st Ordinary Congress, in which a big majority of the delegates preferred Ecevit as the president. İnönü left the office and the party on 8 May 1972 and the new Ecevit era started in the CHP. Ecevit pushed the Party's line a bit more leftwards gaining it a reputation "ortanın solu" (left of the center) or "milliyetçi solcu" (nationalist leftist). In the October 1973 general elections, Ecevit's CHP got most of the votes; however, failed to gain an absolute majority to form a government alone. Thus, the CHP formed a coalition government with the Islamist MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi, National Salvation Party) on 26 January 1974. During the CHP-MSP coalition, which lasted only ten months, Turkey carried out an occupation of Cyprus, or "Cypriot Peace Operation" with the Turkish political terms.

With the fall of the first Ecevit government, a series of short-lived National Front (Milliyetçi Cephe, MC hereafter) governments were formed. The first MC government lasted from 31 March 1975 until 1977 general elections. Demirel (AP) was the prime minister and the coalition partners were MSP-MHP-CGP. In the 1977 elections Ecevit lost the absolute majority by a neck, despite ranking the first party with 41% of the votes. Ecevit's call for a minority government failed to get support from the parties in the Parliament, and thus, the second MC government was formed (AP-MSP-MHP) under Demirel's premiership. This government lasted only until 1978 when eleven AP deputies were transferred to CHP, leading the way to a CHP government. In 1979 elections Ecevit failed and resigned. Demirel formed a minority

government, on 25 November 1979, with the support of MSP and MHP. The coalition years ended when the army took control of the country's political life with a coup on 12 September 1980.

Now, let us look at the minority-related discourses and policies of this decade. To start with, in July 1971, the Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary was closed by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that all private institutions of higher education must be either affiliated with a state-run university or closed down (Oran, 2011: 23). The law was changed in 1980s allowing the private universities to open though, the Halki Seminary is still kept closed, as of 2012.

In the same year, on 6 July 1971, with regard to the Balıklı Greek Orthodox Hospital Endowment, the 2nd Civil Department of Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously ruled that "Acquisition of real estate property by legal personalities consisted of non-Turks is prohibited" (Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi, 06/07/1971, No. E. 4449, K. 4399, cited in Oran, 2007: 12).¹ Three years later, on 8 May 1974, the Supreme Court Assembly of Civil Chambers repeated the same decision verbatim (Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu, 08/05/1974, No. E. 1971/22-820, K. 1974/505, cited in Oran, 2011: 258). Still one year later, on 14 June 1975, the 1st Civil Department of Supreme Court of Appeals confirmed the same decision (Yargıtay 1. Hukuk Dairesi, 24/06/1975, No. E. 3648, K. 6594, cited in Oran, 2011: 154). So, three times in a row, the Supreme Court of Appeals referred to the board of trustees of a Greek hospital endowment, who were Turkish citizens, as "non-Turks", and restricted their right to acquire property on this ground.

¹ In Turkish: "Görülüyor ki, Türk olmayanların meydana getirdikleri tüzel kişiliklerin gayrimenkul iktisapları men edilmiştir."

What is more, starting from early 1970s (until 2000s), the minority children (such as Assyrians, Arab Orthodox, and others of mixed families) on whose IDs there were no references to the terms “Greek”, “Jewish” or “Armenian” could not be registered to the minority schools. Nor were the corrections made after their birth by various courts accepted as valid for registration (Oran, 2011: 24). In 1974, during the CHP government and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Gökçeada Mayor and 20 people from the Greek community were arrested with no reason. Also, in the meantime, the export of *Imroz sheep*, one of the biggest sources of income for the Greek villagers, was prohibited – so that they became economically deprived and had to leave. There was also paramount pressure on the Greeks living in the island, which facilitated their emigration (“Sakıncalı Vatandaşa”, *Taraf*, 1 April 2012).

Upon a scanning of newspapers during 1970s, I could come up with only one official statement that is directly related with non-Muslim minorities. That is Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s (from CHP) declaration after his meeting with the Armenian Patriarch Sinork Kalustyan. In an editorial in *Milliyet*, on 30 March 1978, Ecevit explained that their nationalism was based on an understanding of a “broad and advanced sense of humanity”, and that “derived from *Atatürk nationalism*.” He added:

According to this understanding and conception, we consider all Turkish nationals, all citizens of this country, as **primary assets of the Turkish nation**, without discriminating any difference based on race, religion, language, faith and conviction. We consider our dear Armenian citizens from this point of view as the primary components of our nation.²

² Emphasis added. In Turkish: “Bu anlayışa ve kavrama göre biz bütün Türk uyruklarını, bu memleketin bütün evlatlarını ırk, din, dil ayrımı, düşünce ve inanç ayrımı gözetmeksizin, Türk ulusunun asli varlıkları sayarız. Ve aziz Ermeni yurttaşlarımızı da bu gözle ulusun asli unsurları olarak değerlendiririz.”

At least in the discursive level, it is a significant finding that CHP's center-leftist leader Bülent Ecevit expressed his government's dedication against discrimination, and highlighted that Armenians, and non-Muslims in general, too, were the "primary components" of the Turkish nation.

6.2. 1980s: Military Coup and ANAP Years: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Neo-Ottomanism

The 1980s started with a military coup of 12 September 1980. The Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country for three years until the general elections of 6 November 1983. They invoked Kemalist nationalism with an emphasis on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Communism, separatism, and religious fundamentalism were the enemies of the new regime.

The military, the traditional protector of the Kemalist secular system, ironically emphasized the Islamic part of Turkish national identity against the "communist threat" and Kurdish separatism. Islam was thought to work as a unifier, 'upper' identity. In a 1986 report by Atatürk Culture, Language and History Higher Council defined Turkishness consisting of two equally fundamental elements, that is, *Islam* and *Turkish culture* (Güvenç et al., 1994). Mandatory religion classes were established; and a version of Turkish nationalism with Islamic values were incorporated into the curricula at schools (Copeaux, 2002: 47). The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was maintained, particularly in the domain of education, all through ANAP, DYP, SHP, and even RP governments (Kaplan, 2002: 799). Thus, Islam had never been so close to the official definition of Turkish national identity until 1980s.

The existence of non-Muslims were reduced to oblivion; they became almost invisible for the regime in terms of Turkishness save for a few symbolic cases.

One of these symbolic ‘reminding’ happened after an incident following ASALA’s first terror act within Turkish borders.³ On August 7, 1982, the Armenian ASALA terrorists opened fire and exploded a bomb in Ankara Esenboğa Airport, killing 9 people as well as injuring 72. This was also the first ASALA attack targeting civilians. The Armenians in Turkey were feeling – or, were made to feel – so guilty about ASALA terrorism that in a protest, five days after the Esenboğa attack, Artin Penik, a 61-year-old Armenian-Turkish citizen, set himself on fire in Taksim Square, İstanbul. His suicide note read: “I can no longer bear the grief over slayings of innocent people.” Governor of İstanbul, Nevzat Ayaz visited Penik in the hospital before he eventually died . He also attended his funeral, besides generals and army officers. In the funeral, Prime Minister – of the military government – Bülend Ulusu’s message was read. He referred to Penik’s suicide as “a courageous protest”, a “strong message given to the terrorists who breed a bad blood between innocent peoples.” The Head of State, General Kenan Evren, too, urged the citizens to stay calm and not to fall into provocations:

I request all of my citizens to stay calm and act in prudence, and not to fall trap to the dirty games of these hideous organizations and their perpetrators, **who have completely nothing to do with Armenians** (Erel, 1982).⁴

It is interesting that a general, the head of the military rule, gave such a warning. It might be due to the anti-Armenian campaign in society and the press that

³ The first ASALA attack goes farther back to January 1975.

⁴ Emphasis Added. In Turkish: “Tüm vatandaşlarımdan sükunet ve basiret içinde hareket etmeleri, Ermenilerle hiçbir ilişkileri bulunmayan bu karanlık emelli örgütlerin ve bunları yöneten mihrakların oyunlarına gelmemeye dikkat etmelerini önemle rica ederim.”

Evren had to make such a statement. The reactions of the Armenian community in İstanbul, embodied in the suicide of Penik as an attempt to prove his *Turkishness*, demonstrate that they were quite disturbed, and did not want to be identified with the Armenian terrorism. Indeed, the Armenian Patriarch Kalustyan and the Chief Rabbi Asseo, with a group of Armenian and Jewish businessmen, paid a visit to the Prime Minister Uluşu and Head of State Evren, reported an editorial in *Milliyet*, 12 February 1982. The Presidency stated that the leaders of two communities pledged to do their part for the sake of the unity of Turkey. It means that the minority representatives actually *needed* to reassure the state about their loyalty and cooperation.

The minorities' worries were not unfounded. Indeed, fear of disintegration of the country, the Sevres paranoia in other words, dominated the military regime's nationalism in early 1980s. Particularly the Armenian citizens of Turkey were regarded as the dangerous elements inside that pose a "national threat" endangering "indivisible unity of Turkey with its nation and state." For Bora, the reason to pick up Armenians as a threat largely resulted from their presumed association with the ASALA terrorism and the murder of Turkish diplomats. In 1980s, the 'Armenian' replaced the 'Greek' (of 1960s' political discourse) as the anti-Turk in the nationalist political discourse (Bora, 1995b: 46).

The regime's concerns about the unity of Turkey and stigmatization of minorities as threat continued to some extent, also in the period after transition to democracy with 1983 elections. Even during the ANAP government, known for its liberal credentials, an explicitly discriminatory regulation was accepted. In the

Article 5/j of the Regulation For Protection Against Sabotages⁵, accepted on 28 December 1988, a category of “**domestic foreigners (with Turkish citizenship)** and people of foreign races” was listed as most likely to carry out sabotages (Bali, 1998b: 174).⁶ It is not difficult to guess that non-Muslim citizens were meant by “domestic foreigners.” This is one of the most honest confessions on part of the Turkish state that it regarded its non-Muslim citizens as foreign elements. The Minister of State, Cemil Çiçek⁷ responded the criticisms about this regulation: “If the cap fits, wear it” (Uzmay and Sağırsoy, 1989: 15).⁸

However, it would be an incomplete picture to depict ANAP years without the liberal discourse and practices of the leader of ANAP, Turgut Özal. Regarding concrete policy changes, several discriminatory practices were revoked by Özal government. For instance, the military regime had introduced a decree that restricted Orthodox Greeks’ right of title by descent, although they were Turkish citizens, and not Greek nationals (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 19). This was even a step further than the 1964 İnönü Kararnamesi practice, which had exempted the Turkish citizen-Greeks. The state’s justification was the infamous “reciprocity” principle, which as I have previously explained is a misinterpretation of the “parallel responsibilities” principle of the Treaty of Lausanne. In 1989, Özal government repealed this discriminatory decree.

Özal adopted a liberal discourse, and had good relations with religious community leaders, too. In a *Milliyet* editorial, dated 26 January 1984, it was

⁵ Sabotajlara Karşı Koruma Yönetmeliği.

⁶ This regulation was in force for three years until 1991, when it was repealed by the initiatives of İshak Alaton, a Jewish businessman.

⁷ He has also served in successive AKP governments, first as Minister of Justice, then Deputy Prime Minister and currently as the Speaker of the Parliament, as of 2012.

⁸ In Turkish: “Yarası olan gocunur.”

reported that Özal met with the Armenian Patriarch Sinorg Kalutsyan and the Chief Rabbi David Asseo. Özal’s positive declaration after the meeting is worth noting: “It is enmity to breed bad blood and separatism between people. We emerged as a unifying force. We do not bear animosity towards anyone because of their religion, sect, or thoughts.” In another editorial in *Milliyet*, 20 September 1984, Özal expressed that Turkey carefully differentiates between the words ‘ASALA’ and ‘Armenian’.

Indeed, in an interview, titled “Ermeni Patrikliği Bir Osmanlı Kurumudur”, published in *Milliyet*, 20 March 1995, Mesrob Mutafyan, then Deputy Armenian Patriarch praised ex-Prime Minister Turgut Özal as a prudent statesman who proactively went against discrimination against Turkish citizens of Armenian heritage:

I regret greatly the loss of Turgut Özal. He maintained a very rational and positive attitude. He always knew well how to draw a line between Turkish-Armenians and the diaspora Armenians. He protected and defended his own citizens. It is our citizenship right to expect this attitude from our politicians.⁹

Another significant source of reference point for the definition of national identity during Özal’s ANAP governments is a selective reading of Turkey’s “pluralist” Ottoman past and its “multiculturalism.” Özal and many politicians that would succeed him have chosen to equate the existence of multiple ethnic and religious groups as “pluralism” and “harmony”, governing them as “good governance”, and stability as “peace” (Yavuz, 1998: 24, cited in Yanık, 2011: 84). Ali Sirmen reported in an article titled “Özal Ekolü” in *Milliyet*, on 13 January 1993,

⁹ Its original in Turkish: “Bu konuda Turgut Özal’ı rahmetle anıyorum. Çok akılcı, sağlıklı bir yaklaşımı oldu. Her zaman Türk Ermenileriyle öteki ülkelerdeki Ermeniler arasına bir çizgi çekmeyi; kendi vatandaşını kollamayı ve savunmayı bildi. Devlet adamlarımızdan bunu beklemek bizim yurttaşlık hakkımızdır.”

that Özal expressed that the Ottoman Empire was much more successful in keeping people [of different cultures, religions, and ethnicities] together than the Republic of Turkey so far.

In another statement in 1992, Özal makes it more clear this time, what it actually was that kept different people together in the Ottoman period:

Maybe it is the impact of religion, or the effect of Islam that made [us] mingle with each other and maintain a consensual union for centuries. As a country and a society descending from an Empire, we were able to maintain a cultural and a political identity that transcends ethnic differences. Just like in the days of the Empire, I believe that **Islam is the most important factor forming that identity** (Yanık, 2011: 85).¹⁰

6.3. 1990s: Uncircumcised PKK Terrorists and Their Presumed Armenian Origins

From November 1991 onwards, DYP-led coalitions (with either SHP or CHP) ruled the country until March 1996, when ANAP emerged as the party on power once again. Starting from the last half of 1980s, and particularly in the first half of 1990s, top bureaucrats' declarations about the Armenian origins of some PKK terrorists were filling the newspapers. The astonishing part of these declarations was the fact that these terrorists were uncircumcised, and therefore Armenians. To illustrate a few of them, in an editorial in *Milliyet*, 19 March 1993, reported that the Diyarbakır regional governor of the state of emergency, Ünal Erkan, indicated that many terrorists who had been killed or captured alive were uncircumcised; and asked: "What were these Armenian descendants doing here?"¹¹ Another *Milliyet* editorial,

¹⁰ Emphasis added.

¹¹ In Turkish: "Bu Ermeni soyluların aramızda işi ne?"

30 August 1993, reported that Kocaeli Police Department's Anti-Terror branch¹² declared that two of the arrested top PKK members were uncircumcised and of Armenian origin.

The nationalist politicians, too, were making such connections. Most frequently, it was the MHP leader Alparslan Türkeş who repeatedly claimed that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was in fact an Armenian called "Agop Artinyan" (Bora, 1995b: 47). In 1997, the Minister of Interior, Meral Akşener (from DYP) would go far as to call Öcalan "Armenian seed" and without much reaction or any investigation for her offence (Oran, 2011: 422). In the press, offensive comments about Armenians were all over the place, too. For instance, the popular mainstream daily *Hürriyet* issued a caricature on 29 September, 1993, in which Armenians were disdained: "I could be a Turk, or a Kurd... Arab, Circassian, Laz, Greek, and *even Armenian*... I love you, Turkey, anyway!" (Bora, 1995b: 46). The hostility towards Armenians also manifested itself in the Ministry of Education's decision to prohibit Armenian as the language of instruction at Armenian minority schools in İstanbul except for the Armenian language classes in October 1993 (Oran, 2011: 583).¹³

In an interview, titled "Ermeni Patrikliği Bir Osmanlı Kurumudur", published in *Milliyet*, 20 March 1995, Mesrob Mutafyan, the then Deputy Armenian Patriarch harshly criticized the irresponsible public declarations of top bureaucrats and politicians asserting a connection between the PKK terrorists and Armenians. He finds such declarations that claimed some of the PKK members are not circumcised, which means they are Armenians, ridiculous, rejecting any connection whatsoever between the PKK and the Armenians in Turkey. He expressed that these unfortunate

¹² In Turkish: Kocaeli Emniyet Müdürlüğü Terörle Mücadele Şubesi.

¹³ Even the religion classes were supposed to be taught in Turkish.

declarations were targeting the Armenians in Turkey; and thus the state's perception of them as "extensions of Armenia in Turkey" bothers the Armenian community very much. Here, we should consider Mutafyan's praisal of Özal in the same interview¹⁴ and his comparison of 1990s to Özal era. Apparently, Özal's ANAP¹⁵ was relatively much liberal, embracing, and respectful towards the equal citizenship rights of the non-Muslim minorities.

In 1990s, the legal bureaucracy, too, did its part to discriminate non-Muslims. The Administrative Court no.2 in İstanbul referred to a Turkish citizen of Greek origin as "foreign subject Turkish citizen" in 1996 (Oran, 2011: 582). In December 1993, six bishops from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate were summoned to the Security Forces and interrogated upon a warning for allegations of Greeks buying property in the Fener district, near the Patriarchate (Oran, 2011: 147). It was feared that Fener would become like the Vatican State. Upon investigation, it turned out to be that Greeks working at the Patriarchate bought only 17 residences in 53 years. The person who gave the (mis)information to the Ministry of Interior was Selçuk Erenerol, the Deputy Patriarch of the so-called Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate (Oran, 2011: 147). So, even the most legal rights of these citizens – to buy property – were viewed skeptically and made subject to scrutiny. These were yet another proof that non-Muslims were seen as *foreigners*, and not equal Turkish citizens.

¹⁴ See the previous page.

¹⁵ He probably means the first ANAP governments in the early 1980s, because as we have seen in the last half of 1980s, a discriminatory regulation was accepted. Also, the depiction of Turkish-Armenian citizens as "derivatives of ASALA terrorism" starts from the late 1980s, still under the ANAP government.

6.4. 1990s: The Views of Political Parties on Non-Muslim Deputyship

In the entire Republican history, there have been 24 non-Muslim deputies so far (2012). Six non-Muslim deputies¹⁶ were appointed during the CHP's single party years. They were appointed as "independent" deputies, since they were denied membership to the Party. Even this very denial of chance to be a member to the Party reveals the Turkish government's exclusionary attitude toward non-Muslim communities in their interpretation of Turkish nationhood. Therefore, they played almost no role in the actual governance of the Republic. One might think of the existence of non-Muslims in the Parliament as a partial signal of tolerance or liberalism after all. However, the total number of non-Muslims in the entire population of Turkey then was much bigger than today (between 1,5% and 2,5%)¹⁷, and the economy was almost singlehandedly run by the non-Muslims; so a regime even with a dubious claim to popular representation could not afford to disregard this demographic and economic presence.

With the introduction of free elections and the start of the multi-party regime, the number of non-Muslim deputies doubled. 10 from the DP and 2 from the CHP, a total of 12 non-Muslim deputies¹⁸ were elected between the years 1946-1960. Here again, the existence of non-Muslim CHP deputies is still meaningful, especially considering the fact that the CHP was now only in opposition. Yet, the same economic and demographic relevance of the non-Muslims as well as the new

¹⁶ These 6 non-Muslim deputies were: Berç Türker (Armenian, between years of 1935-46), Nikola Taptas (Greek, 1935-43), Abravaya Marmaralı (Jewish, 1935-43), Mihal Kayaoğlu (Greek, 1943-46), İstamat Zihni Özdamar (Turkish Orthodox, 1935-46), Avram Galanti Bodrumlu (Jewish, 1943-46).

¹⁷ See: Appendix 1 for the percentages of non-Muslims in Turkish censuses.

¹⁸ Nikola Fakaçelli (Greek, CHP, 1946-50), Vasil Konos (Greek, CHP, resigned without taking oath), Salamon Adato (Jewish, DP, 1946-54), Ahilya Moshos (Greek, DP, 1950-54), Andre Vahram Bayar (Armenian, DP, 1950-54), Aleksandros Hacıopoulos (Greek, DP, 1950-60), Zakar Tarver (Armenian, DP, 1954-60), Hanri Soryano (Jewish, DP, 1954-57), Yusuf Salman (Jewish, DP, 1957-60), İzak Altavav (Jewish, DP, 1957-60), Hristaki Yoannidis (Greek, DP, 1957-60), Mıgırdiç Şellefyan (Armenian, DP, 1957-60).

political system requires electoral support of the non-Muslims, particularly in İstanbul, were the reasons compelling the CHP to nominate non-Muslim candidates.

Also, in the interim period following the 1960 coup d'état, 3 non-Muslims were appointed as the representatives of the Head of State in the Constituent Assembly, and one as a Senator.¹⁹ There would be not a single non-Muslim deputy again until 1995, the election of Cefi Jozef Kamhi from DYP's list. Why has there been no non-Muslim deputy for so many years? How did the deputyship of a non-Muslim become discussed? How and why did Kamhi be elected from the DYP?

Rifat Bali contends that the reason why for so many years the non-Muslims were not nominated as deputy candidates to run in the elections is because there is a very small non-Muslim constituency to elect them in the first place, hence the political parties' indifference (Bali, 2009a: 64). This explanation has merit, yet only partially complete for two reasons. First, it neglects the remaining non-Muslims' general self-withdrawal from the politics of the country, especially after the notorious discriminatory state practices. Second is the revival of discussions about non-Muslim deputies and the rise in nomination and election prospects of non-Muslims in the recent years (e.g. Erol Dora). So, despite their small number, factors such as globalization, democratization, and changing international setting might make them valuable for political parties. Let us now see how the first discussions and ideas regarding the deputyship of non-Muslims emerged in 1987-88.

A journalist from *Milliyet*, Yılmaz Çetiner, wrote a column in 1987, drawing attention to the non-Muslim deputyship and opened a discussion about the possible benefits of having them in the Parliament. Basically, the purpose would be “to reveal

¹⁹ Their names were: Hermine Agavni Kalustyan (Armenian), Kaludi Laskari (Greek), Erol Dilek (Jewish), Berç Sahak Turan (Armenian; Senator).

Armenians' untruthfulness and Greeks' waywardness" this way (Çetiner, 1987, cited in Bali, 2009a: 61). Soon after this column, the Turkish tycoon Sakıp Sabancı took up the issue and discussed it with the Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Sabancı later reported that Mr. Özal was impressed by this idea and referred him to talk to Mr. Adnan Kahveci, Minister of State. Mr. Sabancı did not hide his intentions for this move: promotion of Turkey's status in the international arena. He even submitted a list of what he thought as the best candidates for deputyship (mostly jetset or renowned names from the non-Muslim communities) to Prime Minister Özal (Bali, 2009a: 61). However, Sabancı's proposition never accomplished; most probably because Mr. Kahveci lost his life in a traffic accident and no one has taken up the subject ever again.

It is interesting, though, how the leaders of the main political parties of that time reacted to Mr. Sabancı's initiative. Their concurrence of opinion was quite striking. Basically, all of them expressed that there are no obstacles for non-Muslim Turkish citizens to be nominated and elected as deputies. What they meant was more likely the absence of legal constraints as such. However, they did not dwell on why there are not any non-Muslim deputies in the Parliament. The ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz insinuated that it is wrong to see the non-Muslim Turkish citizens living in big cities like İzmir and İstanbul as "minorities" (Bali, 2009a: 62). Apparently, for him the term 'minority' had negative connotations; thus he needed to emphasize that they are not some strangers among us, but our very own citizens like 'the majority'. This attitude certainly sounds well-meant and inclusionary; but at the same time it has the hazard of turning a blind eye to root causes of minority problems and excludes any sort of affirmative action. The opposite of this attitude would be Professor Somersan's call for quota for non-Muslim minority deputyship

(“Azınlıklara Meclis’te”, *Radikal İki*, 11 April 1999). The SHP, a social democrat party, General Secretary Mustafa Timisi reacted in a very similar way, too.

6.5. Conclusion

In 1970s, one of the most salient anti-minority activity was the Constitutional Court’s closure decision of the *Halki* Seminary. The Greek community would no longer be able to train their clergy since then. The judicial anti-minority stance continued with three successive Court of Appeals judgements, which prohibited the Greek citizens’ right to acquire real estate property on an openly discriminatory ground that they were “non-Turks.” The right to education of non-Muslim people, save for Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, was severely limited by a new regulation. During the hectic years of Cyprus conflict and eventually its invasion, the CHP government applied economic, physical and psychological force to make Greeks leave the island of Gökçeada. These policies and legal decisions are analogous to single-party CHP’s methods of intimidation and exclusion of minorities. Although Ecevit described their understanding of nationalism as an inclusive one, based on my findings, the practice was unfortunately the opposite: The non-Muslims were nowhere near being the “primary components” of the Turkish nation.

In 1980, democracy was suspended with a military coup. The military regime’s main doctrine was an adaptation of Kemalist nationalism with a slightly more Islamic face: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Turkishness was officially defined as consisting of two equally fundamental elements: Islam and Turkish culture. This synthesis was also maintained in later governments of ANAP, DYP, SHP, and RP. The more visible ASALA attacks became the more pressure was put on the

Armenian community in Turkey. Behind symbolic official statements by the military regime distinguishing Armenians in Turkey from the terrorist ones, the regime expected the minority representatives to confirm their allegiance and loyalty for the unity of Turkey. The Greeks' right of title by descent was restricted, based on "reciprocity" principle. Thus, non-muslims, and Armenians in particular, were discriminated, and seen as a national threat.

The state's mistrust of non-Muslims continued to some extent in ANAP years, too. A discriminatory regulation was accepted, which referred to the non-Muslims as "foreign elements" and categorized them as groups most likely to carry out sabotages against Turkey. On the other hand, paradoxically, several discriminatory practices were removed by Özal government. He also had good relations with minority representatives, just like in DP years. He pursued a liberal discourse emphasizing that they are careful for not confusing Turkish Armenians with ASALA. The Armenian Patriarch's appraisal of Özal attests to its actuality. Another salient feature of ANAP's nationalism was its critique of Kemalist secular nationalism. Turkey's Ottoman past and particularly *Islamic* identity were highlighted. It would only be repeated after 20 years, when Erdoğan (AKP) pronounced "one religion" as one of the tenets of Turkish nationhood.

In 1990s, under the DYP governments, the Armenians became a target again. This time it was the Kurdish PKK terrorism with which they were associated. The allegations – by both bureaucrats and politicians – were justified with the "fact" that captive terrorists were found "uncircumcised". Again, under the DYP government, Armenian was prohibited as the language of instruction at the community's schools. Paranoia about Greeks' overtaking the Fener neighborhood to create an "Orthodox Vatican" led to serious investigations. Non-Muslims were once more described by

the courts as “foreign subject Turkish citizens”. Thus, for the minority communities, this hostile campaign meant a regression from Özal years’ relatively more liberal and inclusive atmosphere.

Interestingly though, one Jewish deputy was elected to the Parliament from the DYP’s list in 1996, after so many years (since 1961 – and it was by appointment). In fact, it had previously come to ANAP’s agenda under Özal in 1987. The exchange of opinion between Sabancı and Özal reveals that the initiative was primarily meant to promote Turkey’s status in the international arena as a pluralist democratic country. This instrumentalist mentality, with an eye to gain approval from Europe, will be employed later by the AKP in terms of making “openings” for the non-Muslim communities.

CHAPTER VII

2000s: AKP YEARS

AKP, a center-right conservative political party, came to power in 2002 general elections with a landslide victory. It has won the elections three times in a row, increasing its votes every time. Particularly during its first term, it pushed for a great number of reforms as part of EU accession process.

Kamil Yılmaz regards the AKP's coming to power and dominating the political landscape of Turkey over a decade as a significant power handover from a secularist/pro-status-quo establishment into a more outward-oriented and conservative elite structure (Yılmaz, 2009). Samim Akgönül argues that conservative élite in Turkey in 2000s has pursued a conciliatory stance towards the non-Muslim minorities as part of their grande critique of Kemalist secularism. He implies that this political class' Muslim values might have played a role in their compromising attitude toward non-Muslims. However, he concedes that no concrete policy change has ensued from this positive attitude (Akgönül, 2009: 199).

In this chapter I have analytically examined the non-Muslim-minority-related discourse and policies of the AKP government, as well as the discourse of opposition parties in the Parliament. I mainly found out that AKP has differentiated itself to a certain extent from the opposition parties and many past governments in terms of its minority-related discourse and policies. However, it has so far failed to introduce a complete break-off with the reflexes and the mental guidelines of the old Kemalist

establishment, with regard to demonstrating a fundamental holistic and sincere political will to eliminate non-Muslims' deprivation of full and equal citizenship rights on various levels.

7.1. Legal Reforms on Minority Foundations (*Vakıf*) and Institutions

AKP introduced many improvements with first, amendments to the old Law on Foundations, then legislation of a new Law on Foundations. First of all, it is remarkable that AKP demonstrated a political will to seek solutions to this problem and take action, particularly in the face of heavy opposition from CHP, MHP, and the Kemalist bureaucracy. It is also true, though, that these legal reforms were mainly driven by *external* pressures coming from the ECHR, EU Commission, and the U.S. What is more, even though the reforms did bring certain solutions to property problems of the minorities; it was often with substantial conditions and limitations. The issue of minority property problems is currently far from being resolved; and the Turkish state is still being fined by the ECHR in various cases against it.

Prime Minister Erdoğan drew attention to several historical decisions that they took regarding the minority foundations, and explained that they are currently being implemented and bearing fruits. By adding a temporary clause to the Law on Foundations no. 5737, they are registering all of the properties that had been declared in the *1936 Beyannamesi* back to the minority foundations. Also, previously in February 2008, as part of the framework of the 9th Harmonization Package, a new Law on Foundations had been enacted, which have so far enabled 14 foundations to register 22 immovable properties, and allowed 11 charity immovables to be converted into earning assets (“Erdoğan: AB”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 28 August 2011).

Let us now start, in a chronological order, what the AKP reforms brought in. The first amendment occurred in August 2002. With the Law no. 4771, the minority foundations, regardless of deeds of trust, could now acquire new immovable property, dispose of them, and register them in their own names (Turkish Law, No. 4771, Art. 4). However, in order to benefit from these rights, the minority foundations had to ask for permission from the Cabinet. The government made another amendment in January 2003, so as to overcome this problem. This time the permission had to be asked from the VGM, instead of the Cabinet (Turkish Law, No. 4778). The third amendment of the Law on Foundations was implemented in July 2003, and it extended the period of registering the properties for 18 months (Turkish Law, No. 4928).

Notwithstanding having brought significant ameliorations, even these piecemeal reforms for the seized properties were implemented by the AKP with an eye to the EU institutions' and the US's pressures¹ ("ABD'den Türkiye'ye", *Radikal*, 9 March 2012), as well as the pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights, i.e. a foreign policy and economic concerns², out of necessity and quite reluctantly, instead of looking out for the human rights concerns for the citizens. The intelligence report that was drafted preceding the reforms is one of the indications of this fact (Yurdakul, "Azınlık Vakıfları", *Milliyet*, 2 February 2008). In the upcoming chapters, I have substantiated this claim more in detail and with concrete examples.

The government regulation after the law in 2003 mentioned 160 minority foundations, involving 9 Assyrian, 3 Chaldean, 1 Bulgarian, and 1 Georgian

¹ The US Senate proposed a bill calling Turkey for returning the churches and other places of worship that had been appropriated by the Turkish state, and for stopping all kinds of religious discrimination.

² The ECHR decisions invariably ruled against Turkey, subjecting Turkey to pay large amounts of fines. The AKP government had to obviate future punishment after possible cases at the ECHR.

foundations. It was for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic that other non-Muslim minorities than Greeks, Armenians, and Jews have been recognized officially. On the other hand, restricting the number of minority foundations to 160, and excluding quite many others has been the subject of numerous legal cases. Many foundations could not see their names in the list that was prepared by the government. It meant that they could not file suits to get back their properties. In a legal case opened by the Foundation of Surp Haç Armenian High School, the Council of State (Danıştay) reversed the judgement of the VGM and concluded that the aforementioned institution was indeed a minority foundation, and interestingly, justified this based on a report written in 1973 by the Turkish General Staff, mentioning about this foundation in particular (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 25).

Another interesting development has been the National Security Council's (MGK) secret letter to the relevant public institutions about the minority foundations. The letter advised the efficient use of time for the registering period of the minority foundations (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 25). More than its essence, the need on part of the MGK to be so much involved in this issue proves that the minority foundations issue is seen as a matter of national security. Also, it is remarkable that only 29% of the applications to the VGM for registering their properties on behalf of the minority foundations has been successful (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 26).

Even though the 3 successive reform packages (law amendments) have brought significant improvements with regard to new acquisitions, registrations, and disposals, these laws remained silent on retrievals of the seized properties and compensations. The *pressures coming from the EU*, mainly in the Commission's progress reports on Turkey, as well as the *minority foundations' litigations at the ECHR* have led the AKP government to consider issuing a brand new Law on

Foundations. Yet, due to the AKP's feeble political will, as well as the fierce opposition from CHP and MHP delayed this process for a couple of years until when the AKP government finally pushed and passed the Law no. 5555 from the Parliament in November 2006 (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 26).

However, many of the articles of this new law were vetoed by then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the grounds that they were in breach of the Constitution and the Lausanne Treaty, public benefits and *national interests*.³ Ironically, the new law was aiming to draw the existing legal and political system in line with the Lausanne Treaty and the Turkish Constitution. The President Sezer's veto and his justifications based on national interests clearly attest to the entrenched mentality in the Turkish bureaucracy that deems the minorities alien elements, outside the definition of Turkish citizenship. When the President Sezer's term of office expired and Abdullah Gül became the new president, the vetoed law has been passed unchanged in February 2008 (Turkish Law on Foundations, No. 5737). The CHP and the MHP again opposed to this law very fiercely and took the case to the Supreme Court, yet to no avail.

This new law (no. 5737) brought several improvements, such as enabling the foundation to receive donations from the institutions abroad, yet the most important one was the Article 7 which provided for the retrieval of some of the seized properties on certain conditions (Turkish Law on Foundations, No. 5737, Art. 7). Again, there were serious shortcomings with this new law, too. Firstly, it did not address the retrieval of the seized properties that now belong to the third parties, hence lacking a compensation. Secondly, the law envisaged a somewhat *partial*

³ For the full text of the President's veto, see: Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına," no: B.01.0.KKB.01-18/A-10-2006-830, 29/11/2006.

restitution of the properties seized by the *public* institutions. Thirdly, the VGM's powers over the minority foundations have been increased. The VGM is still free, yet with much more powers, to decide whether a foundation is a *mazbut vakıf* (fused foundation) – i.e. it no longer serves its purposes – and hence can take over its management (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 28). Lastly, there is a large regress in terms of the minority foundations' legal capacity to acquire property with the new laws which make the acquisition of new properties subject to permission (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 34).

In the meantime, the minority foundations started to receive good news from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which ultimately decided in successive cases that the Turkish state infringed upon the property rights of the litigants and punished Turkey to pay large amounts of fines, besides requiring it to restitute the seized properties immediately.⁴ Unless the Turkish government permanently solve the problem of seized properties and the status of minority foundations, it is very likely to continue to suffer harsh criticisms, large amounts of fines, as well as the mistrust of its non-Muslim citizens.

⁴ Some of the major cases are those of Fener Rum Lisesi Vakfi, Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi, and Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. ECHR (2007), Fener Rum Lisesi Vakfi Against Turkey. No: 34478/97, 9 January; ECHR (2007), Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Ermeni Hastanesi Vakfi Against Turkey. No: 50147/99 and 51207/99, 26 June; ECHR (2008), Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate (Ecumenical Patriarchate) Against Turkey. No: 14340/05, 8 July.

7.2. CHP's, MHP's, DTP's, and AKP's Discourses in the Parliamentary Debate on the Law of Foundations

During the negotiations in the Parliament about the new Law on Foundations (Turkish Law on Foundations, No. 5737) in 2008, CHP and MHP very fiercely opposed the new law. There was hardly any difference between the two parties' positions and their discourse on the Law on Foundations. Describing the property problems as a fabricated issue, the two parties predominantly displayed nationalist reactions and accused the government of collaborating with and conceding to the EU at the expense of national interests.

Even before the parliamentary discussions on the new law, in 2006, the CHP deputy Bayram Meral, had displayed his indifference to the property problems of non-Muslim citizens by saying "Who cares about Agop's property?" (Öktem, "Velev ki", *Star*, 22 December 2008). Agop is a common Armenian name. The deputy utilized this name in a disparaging way referring to the Armenian community in particular, and all the non-Muslims in general. A similar attitude had come from Ms. Canan Arıman, again a CHP deputy in 2008. She made accusatory statements implying that the President Gül had Armenian origins in his family ("Gül'ün Annesinin", *Ntvmsnbc*, 10 July 2009).

During the parliamentary discussions on the new law, CHP's Ordu deputy Rahmi Güner, spoke on behalf of his Party group and argued that the minority foundations have never undergone discrimination or faced problems. For him and his party, AKP curiously brought this fabricated issue to the agenda and pushing the parliament to change the foundations law, most possibly due to EU pressures (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 333). Similarly, the CHP deputy President Onur

Öymen expressed that this initiative is a consequence of the EU pressures, and that it clearly contravenes the Lausanne Treaty (“CHP Vakıflar”, *CNN Türk*, 21 February 2008). In the same speech, he emphasized the principle of reciprocity which he claimed to fall within the Article 45 of the Treaty, which in fact is all about the *parallel responsibilities* principle that just stipulates the verbatim application of the responsibilities for Greece for the Muslim minority there but far from giving such a right as reciprocity to either country in case of any violation of the Treaty. Based on this misconception, the Vice President of the CHP accuses the government for unilaterally giving further rights to the Greek community than those laid out in the Lausanne Treaty.

Forgetting (or perhaps, ignoring) that the new Law on Foundations even falls short of a late implementation of the rights given to the non-Muslim minorities with the Lausanne Treaty, let alone giving them further new rights, Öymen goes so far as to say that Turkey will no longer be in a position to ask for the same rights for the Muslim minority in Greece with this new law. Rıdvan Yalçın, Ordu Deputy from MHP, seems to have been more perplexed and misinformed about the non-existent principle of reciprocity in the Lausanne Treaty. He argued that the *EU* did not have legislation on foundations, and *thus* there would be no reciprocity. Strange enough, he added that the principle of reciprocity is nothing but an illusion (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008).

The MHP opposition mainly revolved around the themes of national duty, an over parties matter, a matter of national concern, national crisis, and national fight. Yalçın depicted the resistance to the new law as a national duty like doing military service, paying tax, and joining the defense of the country (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008). In addition, their depiction of the nature of problem as

an *over parties* issue is indicative of an attempt to de-politicize it, thus taking shelter under the all-embracing and all-concerning nationalist ideology. It is a very typical nationalist reaction, which aims to round out discussions over a political issue by presenting it to the public and politicians as an *over parties* and thus an *over political* problem, necessitating a single solution and position, which is curiously almost always the one that the owner of this statement supports, thus rendering all the other points of view traitor-like. As Özkırımlı (2008: 15) suggests, “nationalism is a horizon that limits politics.” By naturalizing itself and presenting national values as if they are natural laws, it leaves no room for alternative interpretations or values. So, the nationalist ideology asserts itself most in face of a real or a perceived threat, and claims to have the unique solution for it. It often comes so natural that this hegemonic process is rarely realized.

Nationalism, often, finds a way to absolve itself of extremism or chauvinism. The MHP deputy, Rıdvan Yalçın, tried to fend off accusations from other parties that MHP’s opposition to this law is chauvinistic, by arguing that:

We are representatives of an understanding which accepts all of our citizens that are loyal to our country, regardless of their ethnic or religious differences, as God’s *entrust*, just as did our ancestors for centuries. However, this compassion should not prevent us from considering the historical facts, experiences, and the future of our country (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 338).⁵

Firstly, the “God’s entrust” (*emanet*, in Turkish) description displays the power relations embedded in the discourse. The deputy locates the Muslim

⁵ Its original in Turkish: “Sayın milletvekilleri, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisinin bu Yasa’ya itirazını, kimse şovenist bir söylem olarak anlamamalıdır. Biz, yüzyıllardır atalarımızın da yaptığı üzere, bu topraklar üstünde bu vatana, bu millete bağlı her yurttaşımızı, etnik ve dinî farklılığına bakmaksızın, yüce Allah’ın kutsal bir emaneti olarak kabul eden bir anlayışın temsilcileriyiz. Ancak, bu duygu, bizi tarihsel gerçeği, tecrübeleri ve ülkemizin geleceğini düşünmekten alıkoymamalı.”

Turkish nation⁶ in a superior position (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 338), which gently protects, by will of God, the *others*, i.e. those of different faiths and ethnic origins. Second important point in his speech is the limitations he put to the compassion/feeling for the *others*. Those limitations are the “historical experiences and realities”, by which he mainly refers to the classical Turkish nationalist Sevres Syndrome, i.e. the minorities collaborating with the enemy as a fifth column.

Another point raised both by the MHP and CHP was the issue of concessions given to the foreign nationals and companies. An article of the new law envisages that the foreign nationals can found or manage the minority foundations. The CHP Group Deputy Chairman Hakkı Süha Okay reminded the colorful revolutions in neighboring countries like Ukraine and Georgia, and warned that the foreign foundations such as *Soros* and foreign capital will now be able to control the political life in Turkey too (“CHP, Vakıflar”, *Bianet*, 24 March 2008). The MHP Deputy Yalçın also made a similar statement (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008). The CHP Deputy İsa Gök resembled the new law to a re-application of the Sevres Treaty, scrapping the Lausanne. The CHP underlined that the new Law on Foundations is a restoration of the Ottoman *vakf* system which had been abolished with the Republic (“CHP, Vakıflar”, *Bianet*, 24 March 2008).

Moreover, the CHP İstanbul Deputy Birgen Keleş warned that with the new law, it will be possible to deed Bozcaada and Gökçeada, as well as Hagia Sophia and other historical artifacts over to foreign foundations (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008). The CHP’s Ordu Deputy Rahmi Güner said that he “was born with

⁶ Mr. Yalçın did not actually spell out a “Muslim Turkish nation”, but his notion of a “Muslim Turkish nation” can be inferred from the continuity of his speech in the Parliament, where he talked about “Muslim Turkish artefacts” as opposed to “minority foundations.”

the sounds of *ezan* (Islamic call to prayer), not church bells” and claimed that with the new law Christian missionary activities will spring up and organize in Anatolia, start political activities, and it will put the gains of the Lausanne Treaty, as well as Turkey’s independence, sovereignty, and unitary system at risk (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008). In a similar vein, he expressed his fear that Islamic dervish lodges and orders (*tekke* and *zaviye*) will have the chance to reopen too (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 334). Here, it seems that the CHP is as much – perhaps, even more – concerned about the free expression of Islamic groups and orders as Christian missionary activities.⁷

İsa Gök, from the CHP, emphasized that it is forbidden to establish foundations based on race, religious community, or sect in many countries in Europe. The New Turkish Civil Code (2002) also prohibits it under Article 101/4. He argues that the reason why there are community non-Muslim foundations in Turkey is the continuation of an archaic system that came after the World War I, with the Lausanne Treaty, which stipulated collective rights instead of personal rights, keeping the Ottoman *millet* system intact. He also said that this system has changed in the post-WWII years, and *collective* rights were replaced with *personal* rights in the new conventions and international treaties. He concluded that those collective rights given to non-Muslims in the Lausanne Treaty were not given to Muslim Turkish citizens, which he finds odd and unjust (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 363-365).

⁷ We can add the ultraslamist groups and parties to this category, too. In similar issues, they have also made much political propaganda over the paranoia of “dirty plans of the Christians” to divide Turkey. Doğan Bekin wrote in an article titled “Toprak Satışıyla” in *Milli Gazete* on 23 May 2012, that Assyrian diaspora had started to purchase land in the southeastern Turkey to “resurrect the Big Assyrian State”, drawing a parallel with the creation of the State of Israel.

The AKP Manisa Deputy İsmail Bilen defended the new Law on Foundations, saying that the Turkish culture does not tolerate injustices, and reminded that the minorities, too, are Turkish citizens, and deserve fully equal treatment according to the Constitution (TBMM, p. 372). Bekir Bozdağ, from the AKP, stressed the fact that Turks, too, actually have foundations in Germany, France, and other countries in Europe. In short, if Turks can establish foundations in other countries, it is natural for them to have the same right here too. His speech was interrupted many times by Osman Durmuş, from MHP, who accused him for defending the rights of the churches and enemies (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 340-342).⁸ Bozdağ continued to state that non-Muslim Turkish citizens, due to their citizenship, can and should have the right to establish foundations. CHP and MHP parliamentary groups reacted and rejected to his statement. MHP's Oktay Vural said that a non-Muslim Turkish citizen can establish a corporation, but not a foundation based on *religion* (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 341).

Yaşar Karayel, from AKP, argued that the concept and institution of *vakıf* is the “foundation stone of our civilization, which is grounded on peace and prosperity of humanity,” and we should protect and develop this legacy. The uncertainties in the current laws and regulations, as well as the social necessities required the amendment. The government aimed to strengthen the harmony between Turkish citizens, all of which possess the same equal rights before the Constitution (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 343).⁹ Therefore, he justified the new law about

⁸ In Turkish: “Kilise vakıflarını savunuyorsun, Allah'tan kork!... 160 tane kiliseniz hayırlı olsun!.. İşgal kuvvetlerinin yandaşı gibi davranma!”

⁹ In Turkish: “Vakıf kavramı ve vakıf kurumu, insanın mutluluğunu ve huzurunu esas alan, insan merkezli medeniyetimizin temel taşı, nirengi noktasıdır... Bu büyük mirasa sahip çıkmak...o mirası geliştirmek, korumak da bizim görevimizdir... Türkiye'nin gelişen sosyal ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda ise bu mevzuat bir tek kanun çatısı altında toplanmaktadır... Anayasa'yla eşit haklara sahip olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşları arasındaki ahengi güçlendirmek...için bir adım daha atıyoruz.”

foundations with the *Ottoman civilization* and *humanitarian legacy*, as well as *social needs* and *equal citizenship* rights.

DTP Şırnak Deputy Hasip Kaplan, too, supported the new law. He drew attention to the empty and superficial heroism, as well as banal nationalist discourse over the issue (“MHP ve CHP’nin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 31 January 2008). He requested the parliamentarians not to fall victim to Nazist discourses, and drew attention to the importance of multiculturalism, plurality, rule of law, coexistence of diversities, and Turkey’s responsibility to comply with such anti-discriminatory provisions of the international treaties to which it is a signatory. What is more striking is Kaplan’s correction that in international law, the principle of reciprocity is envisaged to be applied between states, and not by states towards their own citizens (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 30/01/2008: 336).

7.3. AKP’s General Discourse on Minorities

Even when emphasizing the equality of all Turkish citizens before the law, the state officials seem to utter somewhat equivocal remarks. For instance, President Abdullah Gül, who has an AKP background, referred to Hrant Dink, the murdered Turkish-Armenian journalist, as a “foreign national” in January 2012. He evaluated the Dink case and the Court’s decision, and commented: “This is an important legal case. We need to demonstrate that in Turkey everybody is equal before the law, and that we are a country that has treated both *foreign companies and people of foreign nationalities* equally” (“Hrant Dink, Yabancı”, *CNN Türk*, 19 January 2012).

In fact, Hrant Dink certainly was not a “foreign national”, who had only Turkish citizenship. This statement, made by the highest state official, is in clear

contradiction with the Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution, which stipulates that everybody is equal before the law irrespective of their language, race, color, sex, political thought, philosophical and religious convictions, and sect. With this above statement, the President Gül has insensitively discriminated a Turkish citizen, one of the reasons of whose murder was ostensibly his ethnic and religious background. Bracketing together “foreign nationals” – by which Gül probably meant Turkish citizens of different religious and ethnic backgrounds – and “foreign companies” is at best a huge political faux pas.

Also, the language of ‘tolerance’ implicated in his speech is problematic. The word tolerance means to bear with. By tolerating something or someone, we attribute a negative meaning to it. Tolerance also denotes an unequal relationship. The subject being tolerated does not have the same power as the one that tolerates. So, this attitude – both such a subliminal consciousness and its articulation – entails bestowing of a favor and is clearly against the spirit of equality. Lastly, the word “demonstrate” in the President’s speech denotes a symbolic endeavour which in fact mainly purports to “demonstrate to the world” – in order to gain approval from the international society or the European Union specifically – rather than because it is the right thing to do and it is in the best interests of the citizens.

As for the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he also had several equivocal remarks. On one hand, he makes quite liberal and egalitarian statements, while on the other, utters considerably offensive words for the minorities. To start with the positive ones, his speech at the *iftar* (the evening dinner during the Ramadan) dinner with the religious minority representatives can be a good example. Erdoğan drew attention to the multicultural texture of İstanbul and the historical peaceful coexistence of different religions in this city. He embedded his Party’s

approach to the people of different faiths mainly in a religious manner, adorned with references to God, Muhammed, and the historical heritage of Turkey:

...Dear friends, there has always been a place for everyone in this table. We have enough bread, food, and conversation with everyone who sits around this table with us. Because you know that, according to our values, there is the framework of ‘Muhammed derived from the conversation; there is no conversation without Muhammed’. Indeed, we have a big heart that is capable of loving every created (human) being due to the Creator. We accept no discrimination or othering. At this point, both our personal witness and our witness as a nation is certainly İstanbul... (“Erdoğan: AB”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 28 August 2011).¹⁰

In the above statement, it is obscure that the same “zero tolerance against discrimination” promise applies to non-believer, atheist citizens of the Turkish Republic. Framing the discourse in a religious manner, particularly the references to the ‘Creator’ and the ‘created’ indicate an emphasis on *Islamist* interpretation of nationalism. Also, he made several quotes from the Turkish-Armenian writer Berberyan in underlining the multiculturalism of İstanbul. A similar attempt to reveal his Party’s embracing of the non-Muslim personas is his reference and reverence to Dr. Zakar Tarver, a Turkish-Armenian deputy who lost his life during the Yassıada Trials, just as then Prime Minister Menderes. This can be interpreted as an evidence of self-identification with the DP’s political line.

Erdoğan also acknowledged the injustices that the non-Muslims have undergone because of their ‘otherness’ in the very recent history. He stressed the AKP’s determination to destroy the illegal organizations, plots and provocations that have aimed at the security of the non-Muslim citizens. By this, he probably implied the ongoing *Ergenekon* trials, which go on with various different cases –

¹⁰ Its original in Turkish: “...Öteden beri bu sofrada herkese yer var, değerli dostlar. Bizimle oturan herkesle paylaşacak ekmeğimiz, aşımız, muhabbetimiz var. Zira, bizim değerlerimizde biliyorsunuz, ‘muhabbetten Muhammed oldu hasıl, Muhammetsiz muhabbetten ne hasıl’, bu çerçeve var. Zira bütün yaratılanları yaratan adına sevecek bir gönlümüz var. Burada herhangi bir ayırım, ötekileştirme söz konusu değil. Bu noktada kişisel tarihimizin şahidi de millet olarak da şahidimiz İstanbul’dur.”

including one that is involved in attacks at non-Muslim figures and institutions in Turkey – that are thought to be all linked to a clandestine organization called Ergenekon. Erdoğan also said that they would not embrace their predecessors' mistakes so that these malicious people or organizations would no longer have the courage to repeat such unfortunate incidents. So, at least in rhetoric, Erdoğan claims to have introduced a break with the old regime's dark habits.

Here, I would like to make several comments. First of all, notwithstanding the symbolic importance of such an official dinner with the non-Muslim representatives, and the positive statements of the Prime Minister Erdoğan that underlined the concepts of peaceful coexistence, religious tolerance, and equality of citizens, there is always the possibility of lagging these political statements and promises behind their true implementation. In other words, putting these promises into practice may not always be as straightforward and easy. It is quite usual for politicians to utter such pleasant statements for mere political calculations, in a window-dressing fashion.

Secondly, the emphasis on the city and locality of İstanbul is worth deliberation. It may be natural for the Prime Minister to have the necessity or convenience to hold up İstanbul as an example of peaceful coexistence as an overwhelming majority of the current non-Muslim citizens of Turkey dwell in there. From another perspective, it is remarkable because İstanbul have been used as a political instrument by Islamist parties and conservative groups to challenge the official Kemalist historiography (Öncü, 2007) and replace it with their own Ottoman-Islamic version. They have portrayed İstanbul under the Ottoman Empire as the epitome of multicultural millet system of the Pax Ottomana based on peaceful coexistence (Öncü, 2007: 241-243).

This discourse also holds, on the other hand, the hazard to contain multiculturalism and minority existence to the locality of İstanbul, making it look like its idiosyncratic particularity, rather than diffusing this equality and tolerance atmosphere to the whole country. This point is even more meaningful when we consider the rising number of attacks against the Christian bishops and churches in various parts of *Anatolia* in recent years.¹¹ The crux of the problem related with intolerance and xenophobia might be out *there* to tackle, about which the Prime Minister prefers to be silent.

Also, the sincerity of the Prime Minister's consideration of the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey is dubious. In the dinner, Erdoğan referred to the minority representatives as "our brethren of different faiths" ("Erdoğan: AB", *Ntvmsnbc*, 28 August 2011).¹² Yet, previously he did not hesitate to add an "excuse my French" while mentioning these "brethern" in a television programme. Just before the general elections of 12 June 2011, he was invited to answer the questions of *NTV Channel*. While responding to the "accusations" of having Greek, Jewish and Armenian origins that were fielded against him, he made the following statement:

There are more than thirty books that have been written about us. In these books, we were accused of being Jewish, Armenian, and *excuse my french*, even Greek! Could you imagine that? (*NTV*, Seçime Doğru, 10/06/2011).¹³

Clearly, the Prime Minister attributes quite ominous meanings to being Jewish, Armenian, or Greek, as he felt the necessity to respond to such allegations

¹¹ For more information about it, please see the relevant part "Murders of and Attacks against Non-Muslims" in this chapter.

¹² Its original in Turkish: "farklı inanç gruplarına mensup kardeşlerimiz."

¹³ Its original in Turkish: "Bizlerle ilgili yazılmış çok sayıda, yani otuzu aştığını zannediyorum kitap var ki, bu kitaplar içinde bizim ne Yahudiliğimiz, ne Ermeniliğimiz, ne afedersiniz, Rumluğumuz, hiçbir şeyimiz kalmadı. Düşünebiliyor musunuz?" The interview can be watched online through: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLBCH948r48> Accessed: 02/04/2012.

and added “excuse my French”, a phrase used just before pronouncing an insult or a swear word. These statements are interesting, paradoxical, and unfortunate at the same time, while the Prime Minister Erdoğan repeatedly claims to appeal to the whole country and all of the citizens, some of which are these minority groups.

Also, in an editorial titled “Erdoğan: İsrail İnsanlık Yaşamına” published in *Radikal*, 6 January 2009, it is reported that Prime Minister Erdoğan noted: “We are speaking as the descendants of the Ottomans who had welcomed your ancestors when they were kicked out [of Spain].”¹⁴ In his speech, Erdoğan was condemning the Israeli invasion of Gaza. The quoted part of his speech illustrates the classical habit of Turkish nationalism: *reminding* the non-Muslims that they are only *guests*. Very similarly, in an interview titled “Erdoğan: 100 bin Ermeni” to *BBC Türkçe [Turkish]*, on 16 March 2010, he threatened to deport 100,000 Armenian migrants:

There are 170,000 Armenians in my country. Of these, only 70,000 are my citizens. We are tolerating 100,000 of them in our country at the moment. Tomorrow, I may tell them to go back to their country, if it becomes necessary. Why? Because they are not my citizens; and I do not have to keep them in my country.¹⁵

His speech, reminiscent of the strategy of 1964 İnönü Kararnamesi, received much criticism from columnists and Armenian people after which Erdoğan had to make a clarification that he meant only the 100,000 non-citizen migrant workers. On 26 March 2010, the President of the Surp Pırgıç Armenian Hospital Endowment, Bedros Şirinoğlu met with the Prime Minister. He said that Erdoğan’s clarification relieved them; and that the Armenians felt quite safe and secure in Turkey indeed,

¹⁴ Comment in the parantheses added. In Turkish: “Biz, dedeleriniz, ecdadınız kovulduğu zaman, sizi kalkan da bu topraklarda ağırlayan Osmanlı’nın torunları olarak konuşuyoruz.”

¹⁵ In Turkish: “Bakın benim ülkemde 170 bin Ermeni var; bunların 70 bini benim vatandaşımıdır. Ama yüz binini biz ülkemizde şu anda idare ediyoruz. E ne yapacağım ben yarın, gerekirse bu yüz binine 'Hadi siz de memleketinize' diyeceğim; bunu yapacağım. Niye? Benim vatandaşım değil bunlar... Ülkemde de tutmak zorunda değilim.”

reported an editorial titled “Ermeni Cemaati Liderinden” in *Milliyet*, on 26 March 2010. Mr. Şirinoğlu was wrongly introduced as the “Armenian community leader” in the media; and soon reactions came from the Armenian community. A group of Armenians calling themselves “*Türkiyeli Ermeniler*” [Armenians of Turkey], including Rakel Dink, wife of the murdered Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, opened a joint declaration to signature, condemning the Prime Minister Erdoğan for his unfortunate words. The group also expressed that Mr. Şirinoğlu did not represent the Armenian community in any way, reiterating that the Armenians actually were exposed to discrimination and racism in Turkey and Prime Minister’s speech illustrated it, reported an article titled “Türkiyeli Ermenilerden Şirinoğlu'na Tepki” in *Bianet*, on 29 March 2010.¹⁶ Erdoğan’s such statements indicate the “guest” perception of the non-Muslims, instead of seeing them as equal citizens.

Prime Minister Erdoğan continued to make controversial statements. In AKP’s Adana City Congress, he said:

We have four redlines. What are those essential lines? First, we said ‘one nation’. Because we are against disintegration, separatism, and division. We are one and altogether with Turks, Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, Georgians, Abkhazs, Romans, Bosnians, Albanians. What else did we say? We love the created because of the Creator. We do not embrace separatism; only one nation. Secondly, we apparently said ‘one flag’. The third is ‘**one religion**’. **Not language, religion, religion** (“Erdoğan Fena Tekliyor”, *Taraf*, 6 May 2012).¹⁷

His emphasis on “one religion” has been interpreted by non-Muslim minorities as a frank expression of his and his Party’s mentality. Rober Koptaş, the

¹⁶ More on the declaration and the names of the signatories, see: <<http://bizbaskabirturkiyedeyasiyoruz.blogspot.com>>

¹⁷ Emphasis added. In Turkish: “Ben dört tane kırmızı çizgimizin olduğunu söyledim... Neydi o dört tane temel çizgi, başlık? Bir, ‘tek millet’ dedik. Çünkü biz ayrılmaya karşıyız, bölücülüğe ve bölünmeye karşıyız. Türküyle, Kürdüyle, Lazıyla, Çerkeziyle, Gürcüsüyle, Abazasıyla, Romanıyla, Boşnakıyla, Arnavutuyla biz biriz, beraberiz. Ve ne dedik, ‘Yaratılanı Yaradan’dan ötürü severiz’ dedik. Bizde ayrımcılık yok, tek millet. İki, biz işte burada da gördüğünüz gibi ‘Tek bayrak’ dedik... Üçüncüsü, tek dindir. Dil değil, din, din.”

Executive Editor of the İstanbul-based Armenian daily *Agos*, said that he wanted to “hope that they are not dreaming of a Turkey with one religion.” He described the AKP’s minority-related improvements as “insincere”, and claimed that they were using these steps to give the West a message “Look, we are treating the non-Muslims well” (“Cemaatler Cesaret”, *Taraf*, 10 May 2012). Mihail Vasiliadis, the Executive Editor of the İstanbul-based Greek daily *Apoyevmatini*, said that he was “petrified” when he first heard the Prime Minister’s statement. He quoted a Turkish proverb¹⁸, meaning that man's thoughts are revealed in his speech. He said that he does not believe it was a slip of tongue. He also said that whatever had been done up until then, it was apparently in order to make a positive impression to the world, and not for the sake of giving the citizens full rights (“Cemaatler Cesaret”, *Taraf*, 10 May 2012).

The Assyrian community seems to be divided over the Prime Minister’s “one religion” statement. Salih Berktaş, General Secretary of the Mardin and Diyarbakır Assyrian Metropolitan, believed that it was indeed a slip of tongue; but he acknowledged that there are still pieces of the old regime in the current government’s mentality (“Cemaatler Cesaret”, *Taraf*, 10 May 2012). President of Midyat Assyrian Cultural Association, Yuhanna Aktaş, however, was more openly criticizing Erdoğan:

We are familiar with this discourse during the Republican period. We have also heard it from Erdoğan before. This is a frank expression of the 90-year-old state mentality. The Republic has always created problems for those who are not Turkish and Muslim. We do not have freedom of religion. It became even more alarming with these statements of the Prime Minister. This is a mentality of homogenization. Erdoğan meets with our representatives in İstanbul, but in practice, we see that they are not sincere. (“Tek din’ 90 Yıllık”, *Özgür Gündem*, 13 May 2012).

¹⁸ “Fikir neyse zikir odur.”

Lastly, the Minister of National Defense, Vecdi Gönül, from AKP, confessed that the Turkish-Greek population exchange was actually beneficial for Turkey, praising the harsh nation-building methods in the early years of the Republic. He stated:

Could we still have the same nation-state today if the Greeks remained in the Aegean region, as well as Armenians in many parts of Anatolia? I cannot find better words to explain that this population exchange was so much important. If you look at the *old proportions*, you will see its importance. Even today, we cannot reject the contribution of those who regard themselves victim, especially due to deportations, in this campaign in the Southeast Turkey. Then, we acknowledge that the *Republican principles* in the early years of the Republic have proved to be momentous for making Turkey a truly modern, civilized country of enlightened men (“Gönül: Rum”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 10 November 2008).¹⁹

Without much comment, this confession attests to the continuities with the CHP’s Kemalist nationalist outlook also in the AKP government. Mr. Gönül makes explicit references to the Republican principles in the early years of the Republic, i.e. the Kemalist nation-building principles. Let alone feeling any regret for the tragic deportation of Armenians and the exchange of Greeks, he takes pride in the changed proportions in favor of (Muslim) Turks within Turkey. Erdoğan’s “one religion” statement and his threat of deporting Armenian migrants can also be interpreted as evidences of AKP’s continuation of – as opposed to a break with – the habits and means of the old regime: one religion, deportation of *others*, etc.

¹⁹ Emphasis added. Its original in Turkish: “Bugün eğer Ege’de Rumlar devam etseydi ve Türkiye’nin pek çok yerinde Ermeniler devam etseydi, bugün acaba aynı milli devlet olabilir miydi? Bu mübadelenin ne kadar önemli olduğunu size hangi kelimelerle anlatsam bilmiyorum ama eski dengelere bakarsanız, bunun önemi çok açık ortaya çıkacaktır. Bugün dahi Güneydoğu’da verilen mücadelede bu nation building’de kendilerini mağdur sayanların katkısını, özellikle tehcir sebebiyle mağdur sayanların katkısını reddedemeyiz. O halde Türkiye’nin gerçekten çağdaş, medeni ve aydınlanmış insanların ülkesi olabilmesinde Cumhuriyet’in başlangıcındaki prensipler çok önemliydi.”

7.4. Pro-Kurdish Parties' Discourse on Non-Muslims

Apart from defending the Kurds' cultural, educational, and economic rights, the pro-Kurdish parties, particularly the BDP²⁰ have also adopted quite a liberal party program covering issues from gender equality to disabled people's rights, gay rights, equality for religious minorities, and environmental issues (BDP Party Program). As far as the Party's approach to non-Muslims is concerned, it should be underlined that it is the only political party that sent to the Parliament a non-Muslim deputy in the last general elections of 2011. Erol Dora, an Assyrian Turkish citizen, was elected as an independent candidate from Mardin, only to unite with the BDP bloc after the elections ("Türkiye'nin İlk Süryani", *Hürriyet*, 13 June 2011).²¹

The Party has employed a definition of citizenship on an equality-basis, covering the non-Muslims, "like all the other oppressed minorities" in Turkey, reported an editorial titled "Kaplan: Ermeni Vekilimiz" in *Agos*, on 31 May 2012. In the same editorial, he even expressed his regrets that their party could not send an Armenian deputy to the Parliament, but they would do their best for it in the next elections. He also noted that they are fighting for the rights of all minorities in the new constitution-making process. Furthermore, he argued that non-Muslims are scared to go into politics for various concerns, and that even though their participation is always welcomed by the BDP, they regard their party as too "risky", hence they seek solutions to their problems via mainstream AKP. I think Kaplan's observation has merit in terms of the non-Muslims' preference to seek solutions from more mainstream political channels, particularly cooperation with the government

²⁰ *Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi* [Peace and Democracy Party]. Founded as the successor political party of the closed DTP, on 2 May 2008. The BDP defined their ideological position as "democratic socialism" and "egalitarian left."

²¹ The BDP bloc had to run in the elections with independent deputies in order to pass the 10% threshold.

itself, rather than more left-wing political parties. This can be explained, in turn, with the entrenched authoritarian political culture that posits the state, instead of civil society, as the solution-mechanism venue to society's problems.

The BDP has been electorally successful in getting control over the local municipalities particularly in the Kurdish-majority southeastern Turkey. As their seats in the country's Parliament do not suffice for dramatic change for their interests, they have tried to find solutions to increase the rights of Kurdish and other minority citizens by local means, such as language courses, restoration of churches, etc. It is as if they have been trying to create their own microcosm of equality and freedoms in the areas where they have control over local municipalities. In this framework, it is worth emphasizing the BDP's mayor, Osman Baydemir's call for the diaspora Armenians and other emigrated non-Muslim groups to come back settle in their ancestors' lands:

To live in Diyarbakır is the right of all Armenians whose grandfathers were born here. The Armenians, Chaldeans, Yezidis, Assyrians have right to this city as much as I do... Diyarbakır is the city belonging to all ethnic identities and religions. I invite the Armenians, Syrians, and Chaldeans to return to these lands where their ancestors have suffered big tragedies... As local authorities, we are ready to provide all the conditions for peaceful coexistence. I believe that we will altogether build a future in which nobody will be a victim any more. ("Baydemir Ermenilere Geri", *Haberciniz*, 2011).²²

We see in the above quote that Baydemir underlined the multicultural and multireligious historical character of the city of Diyarbakır. His emphasis on the *city*

²² In Turkish: "Dedesı Diyarbakır'da doğmuş her Ermeni'nin hakkı Diyarbakır'da yaşamaktır. Benim bu kent üzerinde ne kadar hakkım varsa Ermenilerin, Keldanilerin, Ezidilerin, Süryanilerin de o kadar hakkı vardır... Diyarbakır bütün etnik kimliklerin ve inançların ortak kentidir. Çok büyük acılar yaşayan diasporadaki Ermenilere, Süryanilere ve Keldanilerine geri dönün çağırısı yapıyorum... Yerel otoriteler olarak biz birlikte yaşamının tüm koşullarını yaratma konusunda hazırız. Artık kimsenin kurban olmayacağı bir geleceği hep birlikte kurgulayacağımız inanıyorum."

indicates their enthusiasm to provide conditions for peaceful coexistence and practice multicultural governance, at least in the cities they municipally control.

7.5. Murders of and Attacks against Non-Muslim Individuals, Groups, Missionaries, and Places of Worship

Turkey still has not recognized the religious minorities in their own right as independent communities with full legal status in the Constitution or in the laws. This lack of legal recognition, as well as the lack of specific protection mechanisms tackling and punishing discrimination against such individuals or groups, should definitely have an impact on the extent of violations of the freedom of religion and belief in Turkey. Whether the intolerance of the society towards non-Muslims is preventing the political authorities to show a strong political will to tackle intolerance and take legal and practical measures against discrimination and violations of the freedom of religion, or vice versa, is open to debate and outside the scope of this study. Suffice to say that the possible factors encouraging these violent attacks might be the rise of Turkish nationalism, marginalization of smaller groups, or disinformation by public figures and mass media. The direct implication of the AKP government with these attacks does not seem credible, and actually there is a strong public opinion that these plots were organized by AKP's opponents (*Ergenekon*, etc.) precisely to create chaos, and to manipulate the international opinion, in order to justifying overthrowing the AKP government in a military coup.

Indeed, the attacks against non-Muslim individuals or groups are not a new phenomenon in Turkey. In fact, many non-Muslim communities or individuals with different beliefs had been target of violent attacks, as I detailed in the previous

chapters. However, as the *Ergenekon* cases have not yet shed light sufficiently on who the real actors were behind these dark plans, it would be instructive to draw attention to the recent wave of attacks and murders of non-Muslims which especially increased during the AKP period.

First attacks came in November 2003. Beth Israel Synagogue in Şişli and Neve Şalom Synagogue in Galata neighborhoods of İstanbul were bombed, leaving 24 dead and more than 300 wounded (“20 in Istanbul”, *New York Times*, 16 November 2003; “Sinagolara Bombalı”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 16 November 2003). A Catholic pastor, Father Andrea Santoro was brutally killed in Trabzon, in 2006 (“Shooting Kills Priest”, *BBC News*, 5 February 2006). A teenager was found guilty of the murder, which was speculated to be linked to the protests over the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed (“Arrest Over”, *BBC News*, 7 February 2006). In April 2007, three Protestant Christians (two ethnic Turks, Necati Aydın and Uğur Yüksel, and one German, Tilmann Geske) were murdered in Malatya (“Attacks on Christians”, *Der Spiegel*, 18 April 2007). The trials of the murder (publicly known as *Zirve Yayınevi Cinayeti*) still continue with no conclusive results as to the discovery of real instigators. The *Zirve Yayınevi Cinayeti* case was united with the famous *Ergenekon* trials in March 2011, in order to investigate its possible links with the ‘deep state’ (“Ergenekon'da İlahiyatçı”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 30 March 2011; “Zirve, Ergenekon'a”, *Milliyet*, 17 March 2011). In the same year, an Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink was murdered. The attacker Ogün Samast was arrested, yet the real perpetrators are still unfound. The recent decision of the special court that there was no evidence for the existence of an organization behind the murder led a public outcry (“No Organization”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 February 2012).

Indeed, there is an increasing opinion in the public that Zirve Yayinevi, Dink, and Father Santoro murders are all connected to the ‘deep state’ and should be thoroughly investigated within the Ergenekon trials. The supposed purpose of ‘deep state’ was to organize a murder of a Christian every month in Turkey so as to give the world the impression that the religiously-motivated AKP was murdering Christians; hence to appease the international reactions against a military coup (“Santoro, Zirve”, *Aksiyon*, 6 February 2012). Orhan Kemal Cengiz, a human rights activist and author, argues that the AKP government acts unwillingly and fails to clamp down on the perpetrators such as investigating public employees who are thought to be implicated with or have had negligences in the attacks. He contends that the AKP has no longer such an excuse as ‘threat from the deep state or military’ for shrinking an active support of the case since it has successfully consolidated its power on the military with the sweeping arrests as part of the Ergenekon trials (“Santoro, Zirve”, *Aksiyon*, 6 February 2012). He further claims that the *Ergenekon* prosecutors and the AKP government have been so far so preoccupied with the coup plots that they neglected the skeleton of the *Ergenekon* clandestine organization, who held their meetings at the Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul to devise plans targeting non-Muslim individuals (“Ergenekon, İncirlik”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2012). Indeed, Bahçelievler Presbyterian Lütuf Church Pastor Semir Serken’s declared that the attacks had scaled up again after the *Ergenekon* trials and arrests (“Ergenekon Tutuklamaları”, *Sesonline*, 16 April 2012).

In 2009, İsmail Aydın, a Turkish Protestant who works for a Bible association in Turkey, was kidnapped and taken hostage. The perpetrator young man wrapped a Turkish flag around Aydın’s head and claimed: “This missionary dog is trying to

divide the country.” In the end, Aydın was rescued and the attacker is being prosecuted (“Kadıköy’de Garip”, *Milliyet*, 4 August 2009).

In 2006, a very old Orthodox tradition on Theophany (January 6), which consists of throwing cross at the sea and a competition to pull it out, has been severely protested by *Ülkücüler* (Grey Wolves - nationalists) by laying siege to the event from the land and the sea (“Haç Çıkarmaya”, *Sabah*, 7 January 2006). On 2 February 2012, the Municipality of Malatya demolished three buildings under renovation, including a morgue, a place of worship, and a chapel in the city’s Armenian cemetery complex (“Malatya Municipality Demolishes”, *Today’s Zaman*, 3 February 2012). Soon after the public outcry, the Municipality reported that the incident was due to a miscommunication and they would immediately rebuild the shrine (“Malatya Municipality”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 7 February 2012).

7.6. What AKP Really Brought In: “Old Regime with Human Face”

On one hand, there are many indicators that the political environment for non-Muslim minorities has become relatively more relaxed and free during the AKP governments. Besides legal reforms on minority foundations and partial restitution of their properties, the AKP has also proved to demonstrate a good will and increased interest with minority religious leadership, restoration of non-Muslim places of worship and education, and support for minority newspapers, to name a few. There are increasing number of news in the media that crypto-non-Muslims are converting to their original beliefs in this liberal political environment. However, some of the problems still continue with regard to full accommodation of religious freedoms

which casts doubt on AKP's sincerity of embracing a fundamentally new and inclusive attitude towards non-Muslim citizens of Turkey.

On the bright side, Lakis Vingas, the Minority Foundations Representative, stated that the non-Muslims started to get out of their defensive shells and gain self-confidence during the AKP government, reported an article by Bulut in *Yeniçağ*, on 8 September 2011. In the same article, Vingas continued that the minorities now believed that their future was safe, contact with the state was not a scary thing, and finally their "children will not be born politically indebted." He also added that the notorious principle of reciprocity was losing its significance, and the definition of citizenship on paper was giving way to *real* equal citizenship.

In 2009, Father Dositheos Anagnostopoulos, the spokesperson of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, has expressed in an interview with the *Star* newspaper, that positive developments as regards the Greek community are in the making since and during the AKP government. The re-opening of the Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary, whose closure, he thinks, had been played as a trump card during the hectic years of Cyprus problem, has now been pronounced for the first time by the Prime Minister Erdoğan and Deputy Minister Bülent Arınç.

Mr. Anagnostopoulos also noted that thanks to Erdoğan's directives, 13 archbishops from abroad have been granted Turkish citizenship in 2009 in order to become members to the Holy Synod (Spiritual Board of the Patriarchate). As the members of this Board, as well as the Patriarch himself have to be Turkish citizens, this development, in turn, would enable the election of a younger candidate to the position of Patriarch if the incumbent Bartholomeos dies one day ("Erdoğan Saved", *Today's Zaman*, 11 April 2011). Furthermore, an editorial titled "Turkey: Elections"

in Greek news agency *AMNA*, on 14 June 2011, reported that the Patriarchate did openly express their support for the AKP government, saying that they were pleased about AKP's electoral success in 2011 general elections.

In addition, the Prime Minister announced their decision to support in cash some six newspapers, including a Greek daily called *Apoyevmatini*, which faced closure due to financial problems in August 2011 ("Erdoğan: AB", *Ntvmsnbc*, 28 August 2011). Also, during the AKP government, a number of renovation works have been started, including the Akdamar Church, Gökçeada Aya Nikola Church, Hatay İskenderun Syrian Catholic Church, Hatay İskenderun Greek Catholic Church, Diyarbakır Sur Armenian Protestant Church, and the Big (Central) Synagogue in Edirne ("Erdoğan: AB", *Ntvmsnbc*, 28 August 2011).

AKP's EU Minister and Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bağış, would make a quite warm declaration emphasizing their dedication to providing equal rights for non-Muslim minorities, one day after the religious minority representatives articulated their demands at the Parliamentary Constitution Commission:

Rightfully, our citizens belonging to different religious groups articulated their demands. They are paying taxes, doing their military service, voting in the elections, and expecting not to be discriminated in any way. We have an attitude that is completely against discrimination. We do not want anybody otherized in this country. We accept and love everybody as they are, and we believe that they are enriching us not with their difference but with their very existence. We hope to take necessary steps so that the new constitution would embrace our citizens of different faiths just like the rest of our citizens ("Kimsenin Ötekileştirilmesini", *TRT Haber*, 21 February 2012).²³

²³ In Turkish: "Haklı olarak, dün dile getirdikleri konular, her vatandaşımız gibi, farklı inanç gruplarına mensup vatandaşlarımız da bu ülkede vergilerini ödüyorlar, askerliklerini yapıyorlar, bu ülkede oy kullanıyorlar ve onlar da hiçbir şekilde ayrımcılığa uğramak istemiyorlar. Ayrımcılığa son derece karşı olan bir anlayışımız var. Biz bu ülkede hiç kimsenin ötekileştirilmesini istemiyoruz. Hiçbir vatandaşımızı değiştirme gibi bir iddiamız yok herkesi olduğu gibi kabul ediyor ve çok seviyoruz ve onların kendi varlıklarıyla bu ülke için birer farklılık değil, birer zenginlik olduğu

It is notable that he considered using a more inclusive way of addressing (“citizens belonging to different religious groups”) instead of the negative-sounding “non-Muslim” as a way of addressing. In another statement, Bağış criticized the opposition parties for defending the mentalities that want to resurrect the days of 6-7 September (“Bağış, Süryani Kilisesini”, *Haberler.com*, 15 May 2011).

In such a relatively relaxed and more liberal political environment for the non-Muslim citizens, many crypto-Armenians have returned to their original faith, adopting Armenian names and changing the religion on their identity cards. In an editorial titled “Ermeniler Gerçek” in *Türkiye*, on 9 February 2002, it was reported that some 70 crypto-Armenians founded the Association of Dersim Armenians two years ago after converting to their original religion and choosing to live openly. The president of the association, Miran Pirgiç Gültekin argued that there were still many crypto-Armenians hiding in Turkey.²⁴ He also added that they had not faced a backlash and that there was no longer a reason to be scared and hide. Similarly, another editorial titled “Artık Kimliklerine” in *Hürriyet*, on 21 September 2010, mentioned the statements of the Deputy Representative of the Armenian Patriarchate, Aram Ateşyan:

There are many Armenians in Anatolia, who are afraid to come out as Armenians. They are either scared of their neighbors or worrying about losing their jobs. Yet the more our country democratizes and the human rights get entrenched, the more people will return to their real religions in thousands. Even today there are many young people coming to us from all over Turkey, from Tunceli, Trabzon, Kastamonu to research

inancındayız. Bu çerçevede yeni anayasanın da bütün vatandaşlarımıza olduğu gibi, farklı inançlara mensup vatandaşlarımızı da kucaklaması konusunda gerekli çalışmaların yapılacağını ümit ediyoruz.”

²⁴ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, ex-President of the Turkish History Foundation (TTK) had also claimed that there were around 500,000 crypto-Armenians in Turkey.

their family roots. If these fears disappear, Anatolia will become much more colorful.²⁵

On the other hand, many problems continue. A serious source of discrimination is the problematic institution of *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Directorate of Religious Affairs), which was founded by the Kemalist elite in order to put a state control over Islam. This institution has been kept intact up until now, also during the AKP period. The Diyanet is funded by taxes collected from every citizen regardless of their religion or sect. For instance, a Syrian Orthodox citizen, or even an Alevi citizen, pays taxes to fund *Diyanet*, yet fails to receive any religious service as the Diyanet only promotes Sunni Muslim mosques and imams. The other religious groups than Sunni Muslim cannot train their clergy in Turkey or receive state support for their places of worship as do the Sunni majority do. This clearly runs counter to the ‘secularism’ principle laid out in the Constitution and keeps non-Muslim groups – as well as the Alevi – frustrated.

Moreover, let alone the “ecumenical” title of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the legal personality of the religious institutions of the non-Muslims, such as Greek Orthodox and Armenian patriarchates, has still not been recognized by the Turkish state. The Halki Greek Orthodox Seminary is still closed. The USA and the EU have been constantly urging Turkey to take immediate steps to end the deteriorating conditions of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, and in particular, its incapability to raise new clergy for the institution (Cengiz, “Bartholomeos’u Çarmıhtan”, 26 August 2011).

²⁵ In Turkish: “Anadolu’da birçok Ermeni, Ermeni olduğunu söylemeye cesaret edemiyor. Ya komşusundan çekiniyor ya da çalışacağı yerden kovulacağından korkuyor. Oysa, ülkemiz demokratikleştikçe, insan hakları kökleştikçe binlercesi dinine geri dönecektir. Bugün bile Türkiye’nin dört bir yanından, Tunceli’den, Trabzon’dan, Kastamonu’dan gençler aile kökenlerini araştırmak için bize geliyor. Bu korkular ortadan kalksa, Anadolu çok renklenecek, şenlenecek.”

In fact, on 26 March 2012, the U.S. President Barack Obama stated that he was “pleased to hear of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s decision to reopen the Halki Seminary” at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (“O Erdogan Anakoinose”, *Kathimerini*, 26 March 2012). Previously, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomeos had reported that the Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik had told him “If it was up to me, I would open the Seminary right away”, and similarly, Nimet Çubukçu, the new Minister of Education had stated that there was not any legal obstacles for the reopening. Hence, the Patriarch ponders, it must be the “deep state” stands in the way (“Bartholomeos: Derin”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 24 December 2009). The obstructiveness of the deep-state argument does not sound credible, especially in the last few years, in which the AKP government has dealt a serious blow to the deep-state through *Ergenekon* trials and arrests. Apparently, it is more likely the unabated ‘**reciprocity**’ mentality that blocks the opening of the *Halki* at the end of the day. Upon a question regarding the news that Erdoğan reached a deal with Obama to open the Seminary, the EU Minister and Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bağış slid around the question and revealed the reciprocity mentality of the government:

This issue is more related with our domestic legislation than a matter between Turkey and the U.S. We hope that problems of both **our Muslim Turkish brothers** in the Western Thrace and **our Orthodox citizens** would be resolved. Turkey has demonstrated its good will in this framework. We returned the orphanage building in Büyükada [Princes Islands] and gave the title deeds back in Galata. We have resolved the property problems, which could not be resolved since 1930s. The esteemed Patriarch came to the Parliamentary Constitution Commission and made a speech. These are developments you could not even imagine ten years ago. So, Turkey took giant steps on this matter. **Now it is time for Greece** to live up to the European standards of democracy and start acting responsibly. I do not consider the opening of the Halki Seminary as a threat for Turkey. It will be an asset for Turkey. I believe that

encouraging **steps should always be taken simultaneously** (“Ruhban Okulunun Açılması”, *Anadolu Ajansı*, 26 March 2012).²⁶

So, Bağış claims that Turkey has taken positive steps and Greece should start doing the same *in return* so that Halki would be opened. It means that he binds the opening of the Halki, i.e. giving our non-Muslim citizens their full citizenship rights, to the condition that Greece makes some improvements in Western Thrace too. A similar *quid pro quo* attitude was adopted towards Greece by the AKP’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005 with regard to the opening negotiations of the Halki Seminary (Altun, *Zaman*, 11 September 2011). It is also remarkable that Bağış referred to Greek citizens as “Orthodox citizens” while he described the Muslims in Western Thrace as “our Muslim Turkish brothers.”

The Greek daily *Ta Nea* also drew attention to the reiteration of the Turkish officials’ demand about reciprocity from Greece for the opening of the *Halki*, in an editorial titled “Antallagmata Sti Thraki” on 24 May 2011. The editorial cites the leaked confidential telegrams to Wikileaks from the U.S. Consulate General in İstanbul, Sharon Wiener in February 2009. In the telegrams, it is clear that upon the Americans’ pressure on Turkey to open the Seminary, the Turkish officials insisted that Greece should take ameliorating steps for increasing the funding of minority schools and their number of teachers in Western Thrace, recognition of their *mufti*, as well as building a mosque in Athens. The editorial claimed, and the telegrams

²⁶ Emphasis added. In Turkish: “Bu konu Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki bir konu olmaktan çok bizim iç mevzuatımızla ilgili bir konudur. Biz ümit ediyoruz ki, Batı Trakya’da yaşayan Müslüman Türk kardeşlerimizin sorunları da, Türkiye’de yaşayan Ortodoks vatandaşlarımızın sorunları da ortadan kalsın, çözülsün. O çerçevede Türkiye iyi niyetini ortaya koymuştur. Hem Büyükada’daki yetimhane binasının iadesi, hem Galata’daki son alınan tapuların verilmiş olması, 1930’lardan bu yana kadar çözülemeyen mülk sorunlarının çözülmesi, sayın Patrik’in gelip Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu’nda açıklamalarda bulunması bile belki bundan 10 yıl önce tasavvur edilemeyecek gelişmelerdi. Türkiye bu konuda çok önemli adımlar atmıştır. Ama AB standartlarında bir demokrasi olması gereken Yunanistan’ın artık biraz kendi sorumluluklarının bilincinde hareket etmesinin vakti gelmiştir diye düşünüyorum. Ben Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nun açılmasını Türkiye için bir tehdit olarak görmüyorum. Bu Türkiye için bir zenginlik olacaktır. Bu konuda teşvik edici adımların eşzamanlı atılmasının da her zaman yararlı olacağına inanıyorum.”

demonstrate that, even though the American officials knew that the Treaty of Lausanne and international law do not approve the principle of reciprocity for these two countries' relationships with their own minorities, they still pressured the Greek side and the Patriarch to sit at the table to negotiate the Turkish officials' demand for reciprocal improvements in Greece. The leaked telegrams also indicate that Patriarch Bartholomeos absolutely rejected to negotiate the opening of Halki under the terms of reciprocity, since it was not a bilateral issue between Turkey and Greece. So, these examples altogether provide evidence for the continuation of the "reciprocity" mentality with regard to the Greek citizens of Turkey.

In a recent interview article titled "Sabrımız da Nefesimiz de" by Ezgi Başaran published in *Radikal*, on 18 June 2012, Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomeos criticized the government's inaction on the Halki, and drew attention to the AKP's reciprocity mentality. It is also striking how he internalized and employed the "global image" rhetoric of the center-right governments, and so framed with it the disadvantages of not opening the Seminary:

To not re-open the Seminary is not only an injustice to the Greek community. It also **contravenes the principles of Atatürk**, who had said 'The truest guide in life is science'. The **government has promised us many times** to open the Seminary. So did the ex-Minister of Education, Hüseyin Çelik. Now, Ahmet Davutoğlu... But we learned not to set our hopes on **empty promises** without written guarantees. We want to believe and hope, but **our experiences do not let us** any more. It's been 40 years since the Seminary's closure. We're **out of patience** and breath... The way things are going, I'd have to appoint metropolitan bishops who are raised abroad and distant to our traditions. They may be **Turcophobes**. Whereas our graduates were quite familiar with this country. They were, in a way, **Turkey's cultural envoys** in countries they went... The public opinion is ready for the opening. **Sociological excuses are removed**. Prime Minister probably thinks it will **make him**

lose votes. Conversely, it'd have a quite **positive effect in the global public opinion.** It'd bolster **Turkey's image abroad.**²⁷

The Patriarch apparently has lost his faith in the current government and does not find their promises credible. He warns the government that unless a solution is found to the problem, chances are high that newly appointed bishops are Turcophobes, unlike the graduates of the *Halki*. He frames the (dis)advantages of (not) opening the Seminary with its influence on the global prestige of Turkey. In a way, the Patriarch is trying to speak the language the ANAP-AKP line parties understand.

Now that the “sociological excuses are removed”, i.e. the public opinion is more accustomed to “openings” and the *Ergenekon* deep-state is paralyzed, the Patriarch finds it odd that the AKP government still procrastinates the *Halki* problem. He believes it has more to do with the fact that the AKP government interprets the problem with reciprocity mentality instead of seeing it as a human rights problem of its citizens:

Now they are saying ‘There should be **reciprocity**. We’ll open the Seminary if a mosque is opened in Greece.’ In fact, no **reciprocity** principle can be sought when the matter is **human rights**. We’re not against building a mosque in Greece. But that’s Greek government’s business. What can we do about it? We paid the price of Cyprus problem very harshly, now **are we going to pay the price of an unbuilt**

²⁷ Emphasis added. In Turkish: “Ruhban Okulunun açılmaması, sadece Rum cemaatine yapılan bir haksızlık değil, ‘En hakiki mürşit ilimdir’ diyen Atatürk’ün ilkelerine de aykırıdır. Hükümetimiz okulun açılacağına dair bize defalarca ümit verdi. Zamanın Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hüseyin Çelik sözler verdi. Şimdi Ahmet Davutoğlu... Fakat biz artık yazılı bir teminat almadan boş ümitlere kapılmamayı öğrendik. İnanmak ve ümit etmek istiyoruz ama tecrübelerimiz bizde bu hislerin oluşmasını engelliyor. Bu okul 1972’de kapatıldığından beri 40 yıl geçti. Artık hem sabrımız hem nefesimiz tükenmiş vaziyette... Bu gidişle bizim geleneğimizden mahrum kalmış kişileri metropolit olarak atamak zorunda kalacağım. Onlar belki Türk düşmanı olacak. Halbuki biliniz ki, bizim Patrikhanemizin yetiştirdiği din adamları aynı zamanda bu ülkenin havasını soluyan, buraları tanıyan, gittikleri yerlerde bir bakıma Türkiye’nin elçiliğini yapan kişilerdi... Artık kamuoyu da buna hazır. Yani sosyolojik bahaneler ortadan kalktı. Herhalde Başbakan okulun açılmasının ona oy kaybettireceğini düşünüyor. Halbuki böyle bir olayın dünya kamuoyunda çok müspet yankısı olur, yurtdışındaki imajını etkilerdi.”

mosque? Once we were 120,000. Now we're only 3,000. Is this **democracy?** Is this justice?²⁸

Still, an even more frank confession of this reciprocity mentality was made by Gökçeada Directorate of Land Registers in 2012.²⁹ When lawyer Erhan Pekçe wrote a petition to this institution asking the reasons about the obstructiveness for Greek Orthodox people's acquisition of property in the island. The Directorate admitted the obstructiveness, but refused to explain the reasons due to the "past decisions of certain state institutions about national security" ("Sakıncalı Vatandaşa", *Taraf*, 1 April 2012). It was argued, in the response, that revelation of these reasons might pose a threat to the national defense, foreign relations, and security of the country. Mr. Pençe took the issue to Bursa Administrative Court. The Court ruled that information should be given to the demandant. Still, the Directorate took the file to the Court of Appeals. Its defense was a potpourri of the Kemalist regime's defensive paranoiac mental codes:

Gökçeada and Bozcaada in the Aegean Sea are located in an extremely **strategic** area. These islands are crucial for the **security** of the Straits. The scrutiny of property acquisition and **demographical change** in these islands is considered an important matter in terms of the security of our country and tracing the **missionary activities**. A decision should be made considering the unjust treatment of **Western Thrace Turkish minority**, as well as the assessing the decisions made by National Security Council, protocols by various ministries, military and security institutions. Additionally, these two islands were proclaimed **military forbidden zone**; and it was decided that the acquisition or rental of real estate by **foreign nationals** were prohibited. For these reasons, the

²⁸ Emphasis added. In Turkish: "Şimdi mütekabiliyet olsun, Yunanistan'da cami yapılırsa, biz de Ruhban Okulu'nu açarız diyorlar. Halbuki insan hakları söz konusu olduğunda böyle bir mütekabiliyet aranmaz. Ayrıca biz Yunanistan'da cami yapılmasına karşı değiliz, yapılınsın. Ama bu oradaki hükümetin bileceği iş, bu konuda biz Patrikhane olarak ne yapabiliriz ki? Kıbrıs'ın faturasını çok ağır ödedik, şimdi bir de yapılmayan caminin faturasını mı ödeyeceğiz? 120 bin Rum cemaati bugün 3 bine indi. Bu mu demokrasi, bu mu adalet?"

²⁹ In Turkish: Gökçeada Tapu ve Kadastro Müdürlüğü.

judgement should be reversed (“Sakıncalı Vatandaşa”, *Taraf*, 1 April 2012).³⁰

In the decision, we see that the issue of a simple acquisition of property by a Turkish citizen was related with missionary activities, to demographical change, minority in Western Thrace (reciprocity manifested here, once more), and fundamental security calculations of the country. Describing the aforementioned individuals as “foreign” is yet just another discriminatory expression by Turkish legal institutions. In the end, Mr. Pekçe took the issue to the Human Rights Investigation Committee of the Turkish Parliament, but he obtained no result.

One of the government strategies regarding the non-Muslims, which have persisted since the Özal era, has been the window-dressing efforts. In this mentality, the piecemeal improvements about, or even existence of, non-Muslims were presented to the foreigners (particularly to the EU) as an evidence of respect for religious plurality in Turkey. This political strategy was continued also in the AKP period. Bağış portrayed an instrumentalist image of non-Muslims as diplomatic assets vis-a-vis the EU for demonstrating the freedom of religion and religious diversity in Turkey:

Clergymen in Turkey have big duties. It is important that they shape public opinion. Mr. Yusuf [Filixinos Çetin, Beyoğlu Assyrian Virgin Mary Church Deputy Patriarch, Metropolitan Bishop] has kindly come to Europe with me to all meetings that I asked his participation with regard

³⁰ Emphasis added. In Turkish: “Ege Denizinde ülkemize ait bulunan Gökçeada ve Bozcaada, gerek stratejik ve gerekse askeri açıdan, son derece önemli bir konumda bulunmaktadır. Çanakkale ve İstanbul boğazlarının güvenliği açısından da son derece önemli olan bu adalarda gerçekleşen nüfus ve taşınmaz alım satım hareketlerinin takibi, ülkemizin güvenliği, misyonerlik faaliyetlerinin izlenmesi yönlerinden çok önemli bir konu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Batı Trakya Türk azınlığa karşı yapılan haksız muameleler gözönüne alınarak, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu’nca alınmış kararlar, çeşitli bakanlıklar, askeri ve emniyet kurum temsilcilerince yapılan protokoller bu bağlamda değerlendirilerek karar verilmelidir. Ayrıca Bakanlar Kurulu’nun kararıyla Gökçeada ve Bozcaada’nın tamamı askeri yasak bölge ve güvenlik bölgesi ilan edilmiş olup, yabancı uyruklu kişilerin dahi adaların tamamında taşınmaz mal edinemeyecekleri ve kiralayamayacakları kararlaştırılmıştır. Tüm bu sebeplerle temyize konu kararın bozulması gerekmektedir.”

to the EU process... Because they also know that Turkey develops, enriches, going beyond European standards.³¹

In another statement, Bağış would say that he was meeting with non-Muslim groups “**by nature of his position**”, i.e. Minister of EU Affairs; and that this is very important for the “**global image of Turkey**” (“Birbirimizi asırlardır”, *T24*, 2 October 2011). Also, Mr. Yusuf Çetin would confirm that they, as Assyrian community representatives, have been working towards Turkey’s accession to the EU:

In this negotiation process with the EU, we have been strongly emphasizing the necessity of Turkey’s EU membership to the EU delegates that visited us. We are applauding and supporting our EU Minister’s determined efforts (“Birbirimizi asırlardır”, *T24*, 2 October 2011).³²

I am not alone in arguing that AKP has failed to introduce a brand-new paradigm with regard to demonstrating a fundamental holistic political will to redress non-Muslim minorities’ deprivation of citizenship rights on various levels. Rober Koptaş, Executive Editor of the Armenian daily *Agos*, too contends that “AKP is still speaking from within the old paradigm” despite having covered a distance in improving several injustices (“AK Parti, Gayrimüslimler”, *Agos*, 16 February 2012). He also draws attention to the non-Muslim community representatives’ total submission to the AKP’s good will and initiative, instead of actively pushing for their rights and forcing the government to take more steps. He claims that these community leaders regard these feeble steps as “AKP’s condescension” as opposed to a legitimate reclamation of citizenship rights. He explains it by the abundance of

³¹ Comments in parantheses added. In Turkish: “Türkiye’nin din adamlarına büyük görev düşüyor. Onların toplumu yönlendirmesi çok önemli. Yusuf Bey, benim Avrupa Birliği sürecinde bugüne kadar hangi konuda yardım istediysen, hangi toplantıya davet ettiysen, bizi kırmayıp gelip katkı veren bir din adamı oldu... Çünkü onlar da biliyorlar ki Türkiye’nin kalkınması, zenginleşmesi, şeffaflaşması, Avrupa standartları üzerinde bir ülke olması hepimizin ortak çıkarlarına hizmet edecek.”

³² In Turkish: “Avrupa Birliği ile müzakerelerin sürdüğü bu dönemde, bizleri ziyaret eden Avrupa Birliği yetkilileri ile yaptığımız her görüşmede ülkemizin bir an önce AB’ye alınması gerektiğini ısrarla vurguluyoruz. Sayın AB Bakanımız Egemen Bağış’ın bu yöndeki azimli ve başarılı çalışmalarını kuvvetle alkışlamaktayız.”

levels and instances of injustice on part of the non-Muslims in Turkey: “Since Turkey’s past is extremely rich in injustices, improvement of a few problems is regarded as a giant success” (Koptaş, “AK Parti, Gayrimüslimler”, *Agos*, 16 February 2012). He also highlights the fact that most of these improvements have been possible thanks to the external demands from the EU and the U.S.

In this respect, Koptaş adduces Bağış’s previous meeting³³ with religious group representatives as evidence to the persistence of old habits and mentality in the AKP. He wrote that in this meeting, probably as in other meetings, Bağış painted their efforts in glowing colors, stressing how generous they have been with regard to the non-Muslims, etc. In short, *political showiness*. All the minority representatives could do was to ask in a quite modest and feeble tone for solution to their manifold problems. Koptaş reports that even when Mr. Bedros Şirinoğlu³⁴ demanded an acceleration of the reforms, Bağış talked in a patronizing tone: “High speed is no good; it causes skidding.”³⁵ Lastly, Koptaş underlines that the AKP is politically selling the restitution of the Greek Orphanage in Büyükada as a voluntary action, which in fact was enforced by the decision of the ECHR. Similarly, the opening of the Akdamar Church³⁶ to religious service for one day in a year is pompously propagated by the AKP. The relatively unknown side of the matter lies in the countless limitations set by the Ministry of Culture for the religious use of the “Akdamar Museum.” According to the decision of the Minister of Culture, Ertuğrul Günay:

³³ As part of European Union Dialogue Meetings.

³⁴ He is the Chairman of the Executive Board of the Surp Pirgiç Armenian Hospital Endowment. He is known for his close support for the AKP government, and assumes a self-proclaimed position of the representative of the Armenian community, now that the Patriarch Mesrob Mutafyan is sick and his position is represented by proxy by Aram Ateşyan.

³⁵ In Turkish: “Fazla sürat savrulma getirir, iyi değildir.”

³⁶ The original name of this church was *Surp Haç Ermeni Kilisesi* [Saint Cross Armenian Church].

In accordance with the demand in question, within the scope of **religious tourism**, in a part where it would **not obstruct the circulation of visitors**, with the participation of a **limited number of people**, and **once a year**, in the second week of September, provided that its **day, hour, and duration** would be **decided by the Governorship**, it is approved by our Ministry to permit organizing a **religious activity** (“Akdamar’da İbadet”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 25 March 2010).³⁷

These limitations resemble the September 12, 1980 junta regime’s strategy of curtailing rights. The 1982 Constitution is adorned with conditions, stipulations, and restrictions after each category of right and freedom. Similarly, the AKP government apparently *endows* a right to the Armenian community, *but* with quite an exhaustive list of conditions. The government clearly described the event as part of “religious tourism”, and not a fulfilment of the freedom of faith. The choice of renaming the Saint Cross Church as *Akdamar Anıt Müzesi* is another evidence for it. So, the government has most likely taken this decision as a diplomatic manoeuvre in order to help fight off the Armenian genocide pressures on the upcoming April 24.

In his column, Koptaş (“AK Parti, Gayrimüslimler”, *Agos*, 16 February 2012) makes an analogy to the government’s “Kurdish opening” and how fast it stopped when the reactions from the nationalist electorate were pressing. It means that these improvements can stop or, even be reversed, any time depending on the changing political balances. Overall, he claims, and I agree, that AKP has not exhibited a *fundamental* challenge to change the Kemalist regime’s paradigms, notwithstanding that it so far acted as “an old-style ruler with a human face.”

³⁷ Emphasis added. In Turkish: "Söz konusu talep doğrultusunda, inanç turizmi kapsamında, Van Akdamar Anıt Müzesinin (Akdamar Kilisesi) ziyaretçi sirkülasyonuna engel teşkil etmeyecek bir bölümünde, sınırlı sayıda ziyaretçinin katılımıyla, yılda bir kez olmak üzere eylül ayının ikinci haftasında günü, saati ve süresi Valilikçe belirlenmek kaydıyla dini içerikli etkinlik düzenlenmesine izin verilmesi Bakanlığımızca uygun görülmüştür."

Orhan Kemal Cengiz, from *Radikal*, too points out the shaky ground of AKP reforms. He concisely refers to the AKP reforms as “rights with but.”³⁸ He claims that after each time AKP takes a step for minorities’ rights, there is always a *but*:

The non-Muslims could start to use their historical places of worship, such as Sümela Monastery and the Akdamar Church, *but* only for one day in a year... They replaced the name “mosques” with “places of worship” in the legislation; *but* only a few churches’ legal personality was recognized... Many non-Muslim places of worship were renovated; *but* they failed to return their title deeds to the minority communities, and instead gave them museum status (“AKP, Gayrimüslimler”, *Radikal*, 21 May 2012).

Difficulties regarding the chances of employment of non-Muslim citizens in the public sector constitutes, yet, another ongoing problem. According to the “Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Çalışma Grubu Raporu” [Working Group Report on Minority and Cultural Rights] prepared by *Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu* [Prime Ministry Human Rights Advisory Committee], it is still hardly possible to see a non-Muslim employed in a public institution apart from universities, especially in the Armed Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Police Department, or National Intelligence Service (October 2004: 4). The non-Muslims’ chances of employment in the public sector constitute a litmus test for the government’s interpretation of *who* really counts as a citizen. The current situation shows the continuation of an old understanding of *Turkishness* based on *religion*.

On the side of problems, missionary activities are also not well-tolerated, neither by society nor the state. Besides murders of missionary people by ‘mentally disturbed young men’ – if not really an organization within the state, the top National Security Council (MGK) made missionary activities an ‘internal threat’ in 2001 (İlıcak, “Misyonerlik, Azınlıklar”, *Sabah*, 27 January 2012). The issue of missionary

³⁸ In Turkish: “Ama hakları.”

activities came to its agenda several more times. It shows that the state pays particular attention to the missionary activities and regards them as a threat (“Santoro, Zirve”, *Aksiyon*, 6 February 2012). Actually, the Minister of Interior Saadeettin Tantan (of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government; from ANAP himself) suggested that “the conditions of poverty push the Turkish people to the trap of the missionary activities” (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007). Similarly, Raşan Ecevit, the powerful wife of the previous Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (from the center-left DSP), a little while before his death, had expressed her revulsion of the missionary activities, criticizing the AKP for passivity:

We are losing our religion with the EU process. I cannot consent to the demise of Islam. The missionary activities have increased once the foreigners were allowed to purchase land. One of the means to divide Turkey is to promote proselytizing (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007).³⁹

The MHP had similar views about the missionary “activities” too. MHP’s Vice President Mehmet Şandır spat fire: “The Turkish nationalists, MHP, and the *ülküçüler* will not tolerate the missionary activities, which comprise a political activity, on a legitimate basis” (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007).⁴⁰ Quite parallel views came from the ultraislamist SP. The President of the SP, Recai Kutan complained in 2006 that while the families are not allowed to have their children get Quranic education before the end of the primary education, there are churches being built in every neighborhood in Turkey. Another Islamist-nationalist party, the BBP, vowed to kick out the missionaries if they become the government (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007).

³⁹ Its original in Turkish: “AB süreciyle birlikte dinimiz elden gidiyor. Müslümanlığın gerilemesine razı olamam. Yabancıların toprak alımıyla birlikte misyonerlik faaliyetleri arttı. Türkiye’yi bölmenin bir yolu da vatandaşların dinlerini değiştirmelerini teşvik etmekten geçer.”

⁴⁰ Its original in Turkish: “Türk milliyetçileri, MHP ve ülküçüler bir siyasi faaliyet olan misyonerlik çalışmalarına meşru zeminlerde, güçleri oranında müsaade etmeyeceklerdir.”

The Prime Minister Erdoğan (AKP), however, has made a quite *liberal* statement, in reply to such criticisms, that

Some say we are losing our religion. Some others complain that there are churches being built in this country. Still some others say that there are churches being constructed under the apartment complexes. If the German authorities permit the construction of thousands of mosques in Germany, we must reciprocate this mentality. The freedom of belief should not be feared (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007).⁴¹

Bizarrely though, during the AKP government, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), an institution responsible to the Prime Ministry, did not hesitate to spread sermons to the mosques nationwide warning about the danger of missionary activities. The Diyanet founded investigation units to track down the missionaries. The Minister of Interior, Abdülkadir Aksu (AKP) verified the witch-hunting in 2006. Also, Niyazi Güney, a director at the Ministry of Interior, compared the missionary activities to *terrorism* (“Sağcı da Solcu”, *Radikal*, 20 April 2007). In fact, let alone the impossibility of few converts posing a genuine ‘threat’ to the existence of the Muslim majority, which make up a predominant 99% of the whole population, it should be noted that, according to the Turkish Constitution and laws, missionary activities are completely legal.⁴² It was also claimed that a large number of foreigner Christian businessmen’s work permits were annulled, during the AKP government, based on obscure police records that they were participating in “missionary activities” (Cengiz, “AKP, Gayrimüslimler”, *Radikal*, 21 May 2012).

Lastly, AKP government’s continuation of the old regime’s habits is clearly manifest in its interference with the election of the Armenian Patriarch. To explain

⁴¹ Its original in Turkish: Kimisi diyecek ki 'Din elden gidiyor', kimisi diyecek ki 'Bu ülkede kiliseler inşa ediliyor', kimisi diyecek ki 'Apartmanların alt katlarında kiliseler yapılıyor.' Sadece Almanya'da binlerce cami ve mescit açılmasına Alman yönetimi müsaade ediyorsa, bu anlayışa bizim de karşılık vermemiz lazım. İnanç hürriyetinden korkma."

⁴² Article 26(1) of the Constitution gives the citizens the right to express and *disseminate* their thoughts and opinions without interference from the official authorities.

the matter, I will give a brief background information. An ad hoc Cabinet order titled “Regulation of the Election of Patriarch”⁴³ on 18 September 1961 had concluded that the election of the new Armenian Patriarch would take place on the date and place determined by the Governorship of İstanbul (Bakanlar Kurulu Kararnamesi, No. 5/1654). This ad hoc order conditioning the election of Armenian Patriarch to the regulation of Governorship of İstanbul has been, since then, taken as precedent.

Since 2008, the current Armenian Patriarch Mesrob Mutafyan has fallen sick, deprived of his mental faculties. The Armenian community thus demanded election of a new patriarch, but the Patriarchate refused it because Mr. Mutafyan is still alive. The AKP government rejected the official application of the Armenian community for a new election on the grounds that “according to the traditions of the Armenian community, no election can be hold until the incumbent Patriarch is dead”, but only Deputy Patriarch, elected by the Patriarchate General Assembly, can perform this position (Kurban, “Ermeni Patrikhanesi’ne Müdahale”, *Radikal*, 27 November 2010). In fact, there was no “tradition” as such. As Kurban put it, only 12 out of 84 Armenian patriarchs died in their office. The others were either dismissed, or resigned. What is significant here is the AKP government’s fabrication of a novel position called “Deputy Patriarch”, which they gave it to Aram Ateşyan, because “he was the dearest friend of Mutafyan in his healthy days”, as explained by Egemen Bağış (Kurban, “Ermeni Patrikhanesi’ne Müdahale”, *Radikal*, 27 November 2010). It is known that Ateşyan is a sycophant to the AKP government, particularly supporting their arguments for the Armenian genocide allegations (Kurban, “Ermeni Patrikhanesi’ne Müdahale”, *Radikal*, 27 November 2010).

⁴³ In Turkish: “Patrik Seçimi Talimatnamesi”.

This decision of the government caused resentment in the Armenian community. Protesters signed a petition under an initiative: “We Want To Elect Our Patriarch Initiative”⁴⁴ (“Ermeni Halkı Patriklerini”, *T24*, 1 December 2010); yet unheard by the government. Firstly, this government intervention created a rift between the Patriarchate and Armenian community. Secondly, the AKP government has shown that it considers Armenians *not as citizens*, but as *members of a community*, just like its predecessors. The Patriarchate was accepted by the government as the sole representative of the community in social, political, and cultural matters, besides religious issues. The particular appointment of Ateşyan, who is known for his pro-government stance, is another intentional political strategy on part of the AKP government to control the community through an appointed leader.

7.7. Minority Representatives’ Demands from the New Constitution

The AKP government has promised a brand new constitution, one that could revamp the current 1982 constitution that was prepared by the military junta. Although the 1982 constitution has undergone major modifications in the course, the government holds, and much of the civil society agrees, that there is a need for a new constitution that broadens freedoms in a democratic and individual-oriented manner.

In this framework, several opinion leaders and representatives of civil society institutions were invited to propose their demands before the Parliamentary Constitution Commission. For the first time in the Turkish history, the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch had the opportunity to address a parliamentary

⁴⁴ In Turkish: Patriğimizi Seçmek İstiyoruz İnisiyatifi.

commission and submit constitutional proposals in February 2012. His proposals mainly revolved around greater religious freedom and stronger constitutional protections for religious minorities (“Patrik Bartholomeos Meclis’teki”, *Agos*, 20 February 2012). In the commission, the representatives of Syrian Orthodox community also transmitted their demands via a delegation from the Foundation of Mor Gabriel Monastery. The Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos I mainly demanded re-opening of the Theological School at Halki, right to an equal access to be employed at the public service, and equal treatment. He said:

I was born in Gökçeada (Imbros) and I did my military service in İstanbul. We have always duly performed our duties as citizens, yet we failed to benefit from citizenship rights. We have been second class citizens... For instance, we are always directed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for all our doings. This is not appropriate. We are not foreigners (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012).⁴⁵

Lakis Vingas, from the delegation, who is also the Representative of the Minority Foundations at the General Assembly of the Foundations, expressed similar problems and underlined the perception of minorities as ‘foreigners’ that run deep in all levels of Turkish society:

One day I went to the Prime Ministry. I submitted my General Assembly of the Foundations card to the information desk. Although the card had moon-crescent on it, the staff gave information to his superior saying ‘A foreigner would like to see you’. We fail to erase the discrimination in minds (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012).⁴⁶

With regard to how to define the Turkish citizenship or Turkishness discussions, the minority communities seem to have somewhat differing opinions.

⁴⁵ Its original in Turkish: “Gökçeada doğumluyum. Yedek subaylığımı İstanbul’da yaptım. Vatandaş olarak görevlerimizi hep yaptık, ama vatandaşlık haklarından yararlanamadık. İkinci sınıf vatandaş olduk... Söz gelimi tüm işlemlerimizde Dışişleri Bakanlığı ile muhatap oluyoruz. Bu doğru değil. Biz yabancı değiliz.”

⁴⁶ Its original in Turkish: “Başbakanlık’a gittim. Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü kartımı danışmaya verdim. Ayyıldızlı bir kart olmasına rağmen görevli, ‘Bir yabancı görüşmek istiyor’ diye bilgi verdi. Zihinlerdeki ayrımcılığı söylemiyoruz.”

The Greek Orthodox Patriarch defined Turkishness as Turkish citizenship, i.e. not different from how the current law on citizenship defines it. Oktay Öztürk, from the MHP, said that he was “moved” by the Patriarch’s remarks about Turkishness. The Armenian community, on the other hand, perceives Turkishness as an ethnic category, and thus prefers *Türkiyeli* (one from Turkey):

Turkishness is an ethnic category. It is injustice to other ethnic groups to be put under another ethnicity. Every ethnic category should be called whatever its name is. I have always preferred to describe myself as an Armenian from Turkey, and I will continue to do so. The equal citizenship is where the state treats all these identities irrespective of their language, religion, and race. Only when this goal is attained can we talk about equal citizenship (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012; “Patrik ‘Eşit Vatandaşlık’”, *Radikal*, 12 March 2012).⁴⁷

The Head of the Foundation for Mor Gabriel Monastery, Kuryakos Ergün, transmitted the Syrian Orthodox community’s longstanding problems. He drew attention first and foremost to the constitutional and official recognition of the Syrian Orthodox identity as a minority, in contravention to the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition, he requested education in the Assyrian language, as well as representation of the non-Muslims at the Directory of Religious Affairs (“Ekümenik Patrik”, *Hristiyan Gazete*, 20 February 2012). He also emphasized the Syrian Orthodox community’s property problems:

We had to leave our lands 30-40 years ago. It was not a matter of choice, we had to leave out of fear. We were paid damages but we cannot reclaim property. Our property and lands are regarded as lands with forest quality.

He then drew attention to equal treatment and equal citizenship:

⁴⁷ From the Director of Yeşilköy Armenian School, Garo Paylan’s speech at the Commission. Its original in Turkish: “Türklük bir etnik unsurdur. Bir etnisitenin içine bütün toplulukları koymak haksızlık, diğer topluluklara haksızlık. Her etnik unsur kendi adı neyse onunla anılmalı. Kendimi hep bir Türkiyeli Ermeni olarak tanımlamayı tercih ettim, öyle de tanımlamaya devam edeceğim. Benim eşit vatandaşlık tanımından anladığım şu, dil, din, ırk ne olursa olsun devletin bu kimliklerin hepsine eşit durması. Eğer bu başarılabilirse eşit vatandaşlıktan söz edilebilir.”

We, the Assyrians, do not have a country outside Turkey. Which country can we leave for?... We are not guests. We are a primary component of this country. Yet we wish to see these talks and promises not to remain in name only, but to be put in practice as well (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012).⁴⁸

It is obvious from the above statement that Mr. Ergün, as a Syrian Orthodox, does not feel quite ‘at home’ and is worried about the future of his community. As for the Turkish/Türkiyeli debate, he adopts a closer point of view to that of the Armenian community:

I do not disagree much with the Patriarch Bartholomeos. I believe, though, that it is more right to use *Türkiyeli* instead of *Türk* (Turkish) in the definition of Turkish citizenship. This has been debated fiercely in Turkey. The other countries, such as Sweden, got over it long ago. There we can talk about rights of the indigenous peoples. They can live as Swedish citizens at the same time. I am a Syrian Orthodox, but I am also a Turkish citizen (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012).⁴⁹

The Jewish community, too, emphasized ‘equal citizenship’, just as the Greek and Armenian communities. However, unlike the Armenians and the Syrian Orthodox, yet similar to the Greeks, the Jewish community does not express any disturbance by the Turkishness concept:

We wish to achieve equal citizenship. Equal citizens in all respects. It means to possess all the rights which all of the Turkish citizens enjoy. No more, no less. We do not want any kind of discrimination, positive or negative. We are Turks above all. We would like to be defined as Turks. Our identity is Turkish citizenship and Turkishness. When we are asked our religion, then we say it. We are of Jewish faith (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012)⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Its original in Turkish: “Bizim Süryaniler olarak Türkiye’nin dışında vatanımız yok. Bu ülkeden çıkıp hangi ülkeye taşınacağız?.. Biz misafir değiliz. Bu ülkenin asli unsuruyuz. Ancak temennimiz bütün bu konuşmaların teoride kalmaması.”

⁴⁹ Its original in Turkish: “Sayın Bartholomeos’un söylediklerine bir itirazım yok. Ancak Türk vatandaşlığı tanımında Türktür yerine Türkiyelidir demek daha doğru kanaatindeyim. Türkiye’de bu konu çok tartışılıyor. Başka ülkelerde bu aşılmış. Mesela İsveç. Yerli hakları var İsveç’te... İsveç vatandaşı olarak yaşayabiliyorlar. Ben de Süryani’yim; ama Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyım.”

⁵⁰ From the Head of Turkish Jewish Congregation, Sami Herman’s speech. Its original in Turkish: “Bizim arzumuz eşit vatandaş. Her açıdan eşit vatandaş. Her Türk yurttaşının sahip olduğu haklara sahip olmak demektir. Ne bir aşağı ne bir yukarı. Pozitif ayrımcılık olsun negatif olsun herhangi bir

The representatives of religious minorities (this time not excluding the Syrian Orthodox and the Catholic community (“Catholics Demand”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 April 2012)⁵¹, which have been traditionally excluded from the official interpretation of Lausanne’s religious minorities) submitted an 18-page-long proposal to the Commission, drafted jointly by minority representatives to convey their main demands for the new constitution-making process and the constitution itself.

A closer examination of the proposal entitled “Opinions and Suggestions of Religious Minority Representatives for a New Constitution” is actually crucial for giving a clear picture of the main problems the religious minorities in Turkey has been facing. Three main values stand out as lying at the heart of the proposal; and that are, *equality*, *plurality*, and *liberalism*.⁵² The first one is equality. As the Jewish community representative expressed, “no more, no less” rights. A full equality in all aspects of life: from the street (preventive measures of the state to obviate discrimination in society) to the public space (the state itself avoiding discrimination against minorities); and not only on paper.

Similarly, the state is demanded to be pluralist, i.e. standing with equal distance to all groups in society, protecting the disadvantageous or minority voices against the majority. As for the third value, liberalism, the minorities expect the state

ayırıcılık istemiyoruz. Her şeyden önce Türküz. Türk olarak tanımlanmak isteriz. Kimliğimiz Türk vatandaşdır ve Türk’üz. Dinim nedir derlerse o zaman inancımızı söyleriz. Museviyiz.”

⁵¹ The representatives of the Catholic community also made a presentation at the constitution-writing panel of the Parliament; and made more or less the same points as the other minority groups. This could be regarded as the first parliamentary-level official meeting with the Catholic community, a group which has not so far been counted as an official minority by the Turkish state.

⁵² Yeni Bir Anayasa İçin Dini Azınlık Temsilcilerinin Görüş ve Önerileri (Opinions and Suggestions of Religious Minority Representatives for a New Constitution), TBMM Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu (TBMM Constitutional Reconciliation Commission), 10/02/2012, File No. 85385; accessed to the file via personal communication with the officials.

to conform to the universal human rights and freedoms, grounding the new constitution on freedoms instead of their limitations as it is the case in the current one. There are also suggestions that demand perceptible codifications in the new constitution. One of them is a special reference to the Lausanne Treaty in the preamble as a source of power and inspiration.

Another request is the extension of the current Article 10 that regulates equality principle. The article is criticized as mentioning equality merely “before the law”, and it is demanded to be extended to be put in practice with particular emphasis. Therefore, an omission of the statement “before the law” can be supplemented with articles of positive liabilities of the state that aim for the prevention of discrimination based on religion, faith, sect, language, ethnicity, race, gender, color, political affiliation, and personal convictions.⁵³ In a similar fashion, the concept of *hate crimes* in the international human rights doctrine is also underlined. The state is demanded to give a clear and strong message by embodying this concept in the constitution by committing itself to providing instructive, administrative, and punitive special protection measures. A rearrangement of the school textbooks and other training materials in a way that does not foster hate and discrimination against minorities is also requested as part of the hate crimes regulations.

In addition, the state is called for providing sufficient public funding to all educational institutions and religious services, without any discrimination based on religion or sect; as well as taking preventive measures for obviating any sort of discrimination for the employment of minority citizens at the public sector. Another

⁵³ Yeni Bir Anayasa İçin Dini Azınlık Temsilcilerinin Görüş ve Önerileri (Opinions and Suggestions of Religious Minority Representatives for a New Constitution), TBMM Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu (TBMM Constitutional Reconciliation Commission), 10/02/2012, File No. 8538, p. 7.

issue is the problem of legal personality of religious community institutions. For duly performance of these institutions, recognition as a legal subject is crucial. The European Convention on Human Rights is thus cited for giving the religious minorities and all citizens the right to collective religious liberties. The lack of legal personality, the proposal goes, deprives these religious communities from a collective manifestation and duly performance of their representative institutions.

Last but not least is the colossal problems of minorities regarding the training of clergy. Although the Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty explicitly guarantees the rights of these minorities to train their clergymen without any state restrictions, in practice, this is unfortunately not the case. A minor technical amendment in the relevant laws would actually suffice to ameliorate this complex situation, the proposal mentions.

In sum, notwithstanding their ongoing grave problems, mainly equal treatment, problematic definition of Turkish citizenship, equal opportunities to employment at public sector, religious and educational freedoms, and the issue of foundations and properties, the minorities seem to be still hopeful about the future and are optimistic about the AKP government. The Patriarch Bartholomeos adds that he looks on the bright side as well:

There have been so far many injustices to the minorities. These are now being slowly redressed, changed. A new Turkey is being born. It is for the first time in the Republican history that religious minority representatives are invited to such an official meeting. We have never lost our hopes. We are quite content and hopeful at the moment (“Patriğin ‘Türklüğü’”, *Radikal*, 21 February 2012).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Its original in Turkish: “Maalesef bugüne kadar azınlıklara karşı haksızlıklar oldu, haksızlıklara maruz kaldık. Bütün bunlar yavaş yavaş düzeltiliyor, değiştiriliyor. Yeni bir Türkiye doğuyor .

7.8. Conclusion

In many ways, AKP's policies and discourse are reminiscent of the DP. First of all, it is beyond doubt that AKP's legal reforms, which have been adopted in the framework of EU harmonization process in the first years of AKP period, have extended the rights of all minorities in Turkey. Concerning the non-Muslim minorities, I have demonstrated that the legal and technical facilitation of the property problems with piecemeal reforms on the new Law on Foundations, is the most concrete improvement that the AKP has introduced to address this chronic issue.

Secondly, for the first time in the history of the Republic, minority representatives were invited to the Parliament to express their demands from the new constitution. Official visits and meetings with minority representatives have dramatically increased, just as in the DP years. After a long while, non-Muslims started to gain self-confidence. Fears started to dissipate; and contact with state is no longer seen as dangerous as before.

Also, the government has usually embraced an inclusive discourse constantly emphasizing that they were against otherizing of non-Muslims. Many AKP politicians have had references to tolerance, peaceful coexistence of and dialogue between different religions, and equality before the law. These themes were quite common in Menderes (DP) government, too. Additionally, non-Muslim groups other than Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were officially pronounced and recognized by the state. This is again a novelty in the history of Turkey. Finally, the government is showing a lot of effort in opening the Halki Seminary. Many Christian places of

Cumhuriyet döneminde ilk defa azınlıklara böyle resmi bir davet oluyor. Umutlarımızı hiçbir zaman yitirmedik.”

worship have been renovated. Minority newspapers were provided with financial support to keep their maintenance. Renovations, financial support, and removing the technical obstacles can be compared to the DP government, too.

On the side of cons, in almost all positive steps AKP has taken, a **conditional** and **limited** *conferral* of rights attracts the attention. For instance, only a few number of minority foundations have benefited from the new Law on Foundations. Out of those eligible for application, only 29% could become successful in retrieving their properties. AKP provided no solution for the restitution of seized properties by public institutions, nor did it redress compensation. VGM's powers over foundations have been increased. Furthermore, the legal personality of religious institutions have still not been recognized. Public employment possibilities of non-Muslims are still extremely low.

Also, the Halki Seminary is still curiously closed. Also, renovated places of worship were turned into museums and not returned to their owners. In *Akdamar* and *Sümela*, "religious activity" was permitted for one day a year. In the level of concrete policies, these examples cast doubt on AKP's sincerity of embracing a fundamentally new and inclusive attitude towards non-Muslim citizens of Turkey; and strengthens the possibility that it was all for show. This conditional and restrictive attitude also demonstrates the fragility of AKP reforms, which function on a shaky ground.

At the discursive level, too, AKP seems to have still not abandoned the language of the old (Kemalist) regime with regard to the non-Muslim minorities. Pejorative and discriminatory statements were made about the minorities, which reveal that they are still regarded somewhat *foreign* elements and *guests*, instead of parts of the Turkish nation. Muslims in Western Thrace are still "our Muslim

brothers” whereas Greeks in Turkey are “Orthodox citizens.” If they are “people of foreign nationalities” for the President Gül, it is very normal that Gökçeada Directorate of Land Registry claims the same for obstructing the purchase of land by a Greek citizen. The minorities are still seen as *guests*.

In a homogenizing way, Prime Minister talks of a Turkey with “one religion”, and adds a pardon before pronouncing the word “Greek.” Minister of Defense states that Population Exchange was a necessary step, openly showing support for the Kemalist nationalist strategy of expulsion of non-Muslims. Strategy of expulsion was also employed, at least discursively for the time being, by Erdoğan, for 100,000 Armenian migrants. It reminds İnönü’s (CHP) decision to deport Greek nationals in 1964. Another evidence for the persistence of the habits of old regime is the reciprocity mentality. In fact, it is not only at discursive level, but touches the reality, too. Turkey still insists on a quid pro quo for the opening of the *Halki*, the right to train clergy of Greek citizens of Turkey.

What is more, the evidence shows that AKP reforms seem to have come more as a result of foreign pressures coming from the EU institutions, the U.S., and the ECHR decisions than a genuine concern for the human rights of the citizens. I have also demonstrated that the concern for “global image of Turkey” and “showing off to the world how democratic we became” can be discerned in the discourses of AKP policymakers. This window-dressing motivation and political flamboyance/propaganda of reforms are reminiscent of ANAP governments.

During the AKP period, a remarkable number of murders targeting non-Muslim people have been committed. As a matter of fact, some authors – and some judges – suspect the deep state might have plotted these attacks in order to defame

the AKP government. None of these claims have been verified yet. However, if there is one thing for sure, that is the religious intolerance and xenophobia is on the rise in Turkish society (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012 Annual Report also that piecemeal improvements by the AKP government have not brought systematic changes in the legal structure or in practice that would ensure the survivability of minority religious communities in Turkey (U.S. Commission, 2012: 201).

Also, during the AKP governments, emphasis on *Islam* and the *Ottoman* heritage has increased in terms of their definition of Turkish nationhood. I find evidence for religious framing of Turkishness in Prime Minister Erdoğan's statements, adorned with references to "one religion", "Creator" and "descendants of Ottomans", as well as in the AKP deputies' discourses in parliamentary debates. Also, the illustrations of İstanbul's old multiculturalism presents a nostalgia for the *Pax Ottoman* (Ottoman social peace) establishment in which the minorities led their lives in the millet system. The Prime Minister's citation of old İstanbul can also be interpreted this way. Nuray Mert, an author and a political scientist, also emphasizes the essential difference between "social peace" and "free society". She suggests that the Ottoman Empire as well as today's Syria managed to run peaceful coexistence between religious communities, but neither was a free society. The patronage of religious communities under a Muslim community or state, just as in the Ottoman millet system, she holds, is far from a free society model – in which individual freedoms are principal – but closer to an authoritarian style "communitarian and patriarchal politics" (Mert, "Patriarch(al) Politics", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 12 March 2012). As I have discussed, references to İstanbul's multiculturalism represents a

sign of challenge to the Kemalist historiography, a theme commonly utilized by Islamic and conservative groups.

The Islamist intellectuals interpret the AKP government's policy toward non-Muslims as a "normalization", a slow but steady process. Bulaç ("Gayrimüslim Hakları", *Zaman*, 3 September 2011) defines "normalization" as elevating the non-Muslims to the status of "citizens" from the "minority" status, which he interprets as a "Western nuisance." He claims that "absolute equal citizenship", which is also a "Western nuisance", will not be a cure, either. What he suggests as the panacea to the non-Muslims' problems would be an Islamic understanding of citizenship based on equality before law but "socio-cultural difference." Although he does not clarify what he means by that, his description is reminiscent of the Ottoman *millet* system. He situates the AKP going in that direction slowly and steadily, but still lagging in terms of solving the problems such as *Halki*, recognition of ecumenicity, obstacles for free practice of religion, and the return of confiscated properties. He also argues that non-Muslims in Turkey should no longer be seen as "captives" for diplomatic matters.

The CHP and MHP, main opposition parties in the Parliament, have so far demonstrated much less liberal discourses. Let alone their insensitivity to the chronic problem of the minorities' seized properties, the two parties were almost acting like one single bloc in trying to prevent the approval of the new Law on Foundations in 2008. Their main rationale was consisted of archaic nationalist themes in the Turkish politics: decay of the Lausanne regime, division of the country, too much concessions given to foreigners, losing independence, losing the religion, national security at stake, and enemies within. With these official Kemalist nationalist arguments, centered around the archaic Sevres paranoia, CHP and MHP endeavored

to de-politicize the issue and have their view indisputable, and thus to make the AKP look like betraying the national interests. This finding corroborates Özkırımlı's argument (2008: 15) that the nationalist master narrative seeks hegemony over alternative interpretations and ways of thinking by presenting whatever at stake – the real or perceived threat – in absolute terms and in a single reality.

Pro-Kurdish BDP, on the other hand, employed the most liberal discourse with regard to minorities, so far. Apart from defending the Kurds' cultural, educational, and economic rights, the pro-Kurdish parties, currently the BDP, have also employed a definition of citizenship on an equality-basis, covering the non-Muslims, "like all the other oppressed minorities" in Turkey. In their limited capacities, municipal efforts to provide multicultural governance *also* for the non-Muslims presents an evidence for their credibility.

When we look at the subject actors, minorities' official representatives mainly expressed their demands, including equal treatment, change in perceptions about themselves, acceptance as full citizens, enhanced plurality, addressing the property problems and issues with education, as well as official recognition with a legal personality. Specifically, the representatives asked for legislation against hate crimes. It is also an interesting finding that the old system of conducting relations with minority representatives is continued during the AKP period. The divergence between the rosy picture depicted by many minority representatives and the critical stance of non-Muslim opinion-leaders (such as Rakel Dink, Rober Koptaş, and Mihalis Vasiliadis) can be explained by the former group's total submission to the government's will for change, and the traditional political culture of seeking the solution from the state, as Kaplan noted. This divergence is even more salient in the reactions to the appointment of Ateşyan, the "Deputy Patriarch" of Armenian

community, who became the community representative as a result of AKP interference.

In a nutshell, I argue that, both in terms of general discourse and policy-wise, AKP has differentiated itself to a certain extent from the opposition parties and many past governments. It can be only be rivalled in its liberal attitude with the DP in 1950s. However, it has so far failed to introduce a brand-new paradigm, or a completely new nationalist language in Bora's terms, with regard to demonstrating a fundamental holistic and sincere political will to redress non-Muslims' deprivation of citizenship rights on various levels.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This thesis was undertaken as an attempt to explore similarities and differences between *all* Turkish governments and main political traditions from 1923 until 2012, regarding their discourses and policies towards non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, to analyze the phenomenon of inclusion in the Turkish nationhood. The research for the thesis relies on a critical survey of the scholarly literature on nationalism, Turkish nationalism and its variants, political historical studies on non-Muslims in Turkey. Methodologically, it is built on an original empirical research on Prime Ministry archives, TBMM proceedings, and an extensive newspaper scanning.

The major generalizable finding of the study is that conservative right-wing political parties in Turkey have generally demonstrated a *more inclusive* definition of Turkishness with regard to non-Muslims, than have the Kemalist nationalist-secular parties. The research has validated the scholarly view (Verdery, 1993; Özkırmı, 2008) that nations and nationalisms are contingent, multi-faceted, changing, and diverse phenomena, rather than being given, static, monolithic, and teleological, both in Turkey and elsewhere in the world. It also confirmed that there is more than one version of Turkish nationalism (Kentel et al., 2007; Bora, 2003), each interpreted variously by different political groups and actors, and also sometimes differently by the same actors in different periods of time. The thesis confirmed for the Turkish

case, too, that nationalism is a political struggle between political actors for hegemony (Verdery, 1993), in which the contenders most usually utilize the hegemon's language and habits with limited challenges (Roseberry, 1996; Bora, 2003). Successive chapters dealt with the empirical evidences of these arguments.

After a critical survey of the literatures on nationalism, Turkish nationalism, its variants, and Islamic multiculturalism in the chapter *two*, the *third* chapter confirmed the argument in the literature (Aktar, 2009; Aktürk, 2009; Eissenstat, 2007) that non-Muslim citizens were for the most part excluded from the definition of Turkish nation during the CHP's single-party period. This study also supports the previous research (Aktürk, 2009; Baer, 2004) that religious identity played a definitive role in what makes someone accepted as a real citizen. In retrospect, the political cultural legacy of the Ottoman *millet* system and the Treaty of Lausanne's legal guarantees for minorities have continued to determine – even today – at least the basis of a differentiation according to religious differences, *and* prevented assimilation of non-Muslims. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, the minorities have been able to maintain their different identities up to date – instead of being assimilated – in large part thanks to this system. On the other hand, it facilitated the Turkish governments' work of excluding them. Namely, the religious classification has made the non-Muslims more of a clearly demarcated, visible target, as opposed to, say, Kurds.

In retrospect, the high concentration of anti-minority policies in the single-party period, compared to later governments, can be explained in part with the relative economic strength of the non-Muslims during those years. Their relatively

higher population (around 2%) – compared to today – should also be noted. Turkification of the capital as well as a culturally homogenous population were important goals of the Turkish state. Non-Muslims were intimidated and sometimes forced to leave; as well as their wealth being appropriated. Additionally, war-year traumas created an excessive paranoia which made it impossible for the CHP political élite to trust their loyalty and accept them as genuine citizens. The Sevres Syndrome in which the non-Muslims were constructed as potential traitors continued to dominate central right and left parties until ANAP-AKP governments. This paranoia still dictates the discourses and mental maps of pro-status-quo nationalist CHP and MHP regarding the non-Muslims.

The Lausanne-based cultural, religious, educational, and linguistic independence of non-Muslims from the nation-state mechanism was a source of disturbance for the Turkish nationalist élite. As much as it could, the state curbed and limited the rights entitled to non-Muslims in the Lausanne Treaty. For the parts it was not able to control, it resorted to *assimilate* through establishing pseudo-Patriarchates, e.g. Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, and privilege mechanisms. It sought to delegitimize the Greek Patriarchate. By way of appointing Özdamar both as a deputy and the only trustee of the Balıklı Greek Hospital Endowment for years, the regime wanted to mould and keep under control the Greek community via leaders loyal to itself. The conditions and motives of policymakers certainly changed along the years, but as I have demonstrated, we see a similar reflex even in today's AKP regarding its approach to the election of the Armenian Patriarchate, as in previous times.

The research also revealed that the ‘criterion of inclusion’ – or acceptance by the state – for non-Muslim communities have transformed from historical support for the Turkish nation-building elite during the War of Independence during single-party CHP (Aktürk, 2009) into supporting government’s policies and helping bolster its global prestige during AKP period. This ‘mission’ was also internalized by the community representatives, as we have seen in the Armenian Patriarchate officials, and the Greek Orthodox Patriarch. In each case, the governments wished to create their own minorities, which they could control and manipulate. While in the CHP period, it was the regime’s mistrust and fears about minorities’ possible collaboration with the “enemy” to divide the country (Sevres syndrome), for ANAP and even more for AKP, it was rather a desire to have them help their political campaign abroad. Almost all political parties except for ANAP and AKP were influenced by this Sevres syndrome. While in 1930s and 1940s, the CHP government paid close attention to the “clandestine” activities of the Greek Patriarchate, Greek bishops were interrogated about their plans to create a “Vatican” in Fener district, during the DYP-SHP government in 1993.

Relatedly, the very limited attempt of CHP governments to assimilate constitutes an exception, and that can be explained by Bauman’s (2001: 197) argument of nationalist ideology’s inherent contradictions about border-drawing, which place the élites in a dilemma between homogenization and protecting the purity of national identity. Yet for the most part, I argued that the Kemalist nationalist élite excluded the non-Muslims, and pursued a mono-linguistic and mono-religious (Aktürk, 2009: 901-902) definition of Turkishness.

One of the major findings of the research is that the first relaxation came with the introduction of multi-party elections in 1946, under CHP government, and *not* with the DP. Based on my examination of the Prime Ministry archives, I found out that, in the face of electoral non-Muslims' electoral power in İstanbul, the Party immediately revised its discourse and policy. Besides employing a much more inclusive discourse about non-Muslim citizens and acknowledging past mistakes, the Party also removed certain sources of discrimination. Most remarkably, my findings showed that the independent-deputyship was discontinued. Party membership became inclusive of non-Muslims. It also stopped its support for Papa Eftim's Church and the unwelcome management of Mr. Özdamar. For the first time a public institution opened its doors for non-Muslims' job applications. The succeeding DP government took it a step forward. For one thing, during its tenure, almost twice as many non-Muslim deputies were elected as the number elected in the 27 years of CHP government. Secondly, official relationship with the minority representatives was enhanced. Significantly, DP allowed the election of religious leadership by the community members. This is in contrast to what AKP currently does. On the other hand, just like AKP financially helps minority newspapers and renovates churches today, the DP policymakers had provided financial support for minority institutions.

Here it should be noted that populism and vulnerability to electoral support were an important factor for these relaxations of first CHP, and then DP. As the thesis demonstrated, the eventual non-fulfilment of crucial election-time promises, e.g. reimbursement of Wealth Tax, indicates the DP's populist strategies. DP repeatedly utilized the issue of Wealth Tax and similar discriminatory practices of

CHP for political propaganda. In fact, I have shown that AKP follows the same strategy to win favor of both non-Muslims, and the international public opinion. CHP years' discrimination and exclusion have been constantly criticized by AKP, and promises were made about the opening of the Halki Seminary, yet it turned out to be all for show. Similarly, only symbolic and limited ameliorations were made about foundations' property problems, to fend off ECHR punishments and foreign critiques about the violation of religious rights. These promises and legal reforms also gained AKP the minority votes, as I discussed.

The critical September 6-7 attacks and the DP government's backstair sponsorship revealed how fragile the DP's democratic openings were. This incident showed that in face of a diplomatic disagreement, i.e. Cyprus problem, DP regarded the non-Muslim minorities as disposable individuals to gain an upper hand against a foreign country. The research demonstrated that all parties' discourses during the parliamentary debate after September 6-7 attacks are illustrative of the common view that non-Muslims were *protégés* or *guests* than citizen with full and equal rights. It shows that all different nationalisms (dialects) of this decade, as described by Bora (2003), were derivatives of the core (root-language) of official Kemalist nationalism. Another interesting finding of the research is the manner DP deputies appeared to rationalize the "agitated noble Turkish youth" as perpetrators of the attacks, implying that Greeks brought these attacks upon themselves as a result of years-long provocation. The critical point here is the how the government comfortably equated the Greek citizens of Turkey with the Greek Cypriots. This is the perception of common enemy because of religion and culture.

Overall, I argued that in 1950s there was not a tremendous rupture from the old regime in terms of the official Kemalist nationalism, except only for a populist ingredient. An incipient inclusionary definition of Turkishness was unfortunately by and large eclipsed by the predominant Kemalist nationalism, which eventually turned out to be determining the parameters of DP's nationalism understanding. This became manifest in the face of a diplomatic crisis, and caused the retrogression especially in the last years of DP government.

In chapter *five*, I analyzed the discourses and policies of CHP and AP governments. I found out that there were more similarities than differences between the policies and discourses of these two parties. The non-Muslims were just more badly affected during the CHP, principally because of the notorious 1964 *Kararname*, which resulted in the biggest exodus of Greek population from Turkey. It also ended up with a massive capital transfer to the detriment of non-Muslims. In this period, much of the DP-facilitated pro-minority regulations were revoked by CHP government. The anti-Greek campaign, the application of 1964 *Kararname* and the follow-up expulsion of Greek nationals displayed yet another example of the Turkish governments' discrimination of citizens based on their ethnic-religious identities. One of the most striking findings was the fact that while Muslims/Turks of Greek nationality were being exempted from the expulsions, the Greeks of Turkish nationality were officially threatened with deportation should they be in contact with the deported, malicious Greeks. This is a clear evidence of the exclusion of non-Muslims from the definition of Turkishness.

The research also highlighted the convergence of conservative opposition (AP, CKMP, MP) on pressurizing İnönü's CHP government to take tougher measures against Greek nationals residing in Turkey. The populist xenophobic way in which these individuals were articulated by these conservative parties exemplify the influence of populism, once more, on the discourse of right-wing reactionary nationalism, supporting Bora's claim (1995b). This discourse was maintained when the AP came to power in 1965. To be fair, there was no large-scale anti-minority practice such as 1964 *Kararnamesi*. However, the research has shown that pressures on Greek Patriarchate, minority schools, and non-Muslims in general continued to a great extent, in continuity with the CHP government. Demirel even suggested removing the Patriarchate out of Turkey. Minorities' rights over their properties were restricted, too. In parallel to the DP's justification of September 6-7 attacks with the Greeks' provocations of the "agitated noble Turkish youth", the AP government implied a second September 6-7 might happen, and rationalized this possibility with the Greeks' bloodshed in Cyprus. It shows that the AP's perception of non-Muslims as *negotiable elements* in Turkey's diplomatic relations. This is relevant to the other finding of the study which points out that this *reciprocity* approach was used as a defensive excuse by various different governments, being a common denominator of Kemalist nationalist and conservative-populist DP-AP-AKP line parties. In sum, both CHP and AP governments of 1960s constituted a *retrogression* from the relative liberal policies of early 1950s, particularly of the DP.

Chapter *six* dealt with three decades, namely 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In 1970s, discriminatory legal decisions rather than government policies catch the

attention. Most prominently, the Constitutional Court made its historical decision of closing down the *Halki* Greek Orthodox Seminary in 1971, after which it would be never opened again. Furthermore, three successive judgements of the Court of Appeals described the Greek Turkish citizens as “non-Turks”, and prohibited the Greek citizens to purchase real estate property. The ruling CHP government (Ecevit) applied economic, physical and psychological pressure to make Greeks leave *Gökçeada*, during the hectic years of Cyprus conflict and invasion. These policies, which are analogous to single-party CHP’s methods of intimidation and exclusion of minorities, counteracted Prime Minister Ecevit’s inclusive discourse describing the non-Muslims as “primary components” of the Turkish nation.

1980s started with a military coup d’état. The most significant contribution of the military regime to the official nationalism has been its emphasis on *Islamic* and *Turkish* elements in the membership to the Turkish nation. This was an adaptation of Kemalist nationalism with a slightly more Islamic face. I also found out that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was also maintained in later governments of ANAP, DYP, SHP, and RP. This 1980-coup-promoted doctrine was most prominently emphasized in the education and national historiography. It is illustrative of Gellner’s (1983) argument which highlighted the role of formal education as a battleground for nationalist projects. The previous secular Kemalist governments’ legislation and reforms on education in order to roll back the influence of Islam in the official national identity, and AKP government’s recent decision to supplement the curriculum with optional classes of in Koranic studies and the life of the Prophet

Mohammad, as well as Erdoğan's statement on "one religion" can also be interpreted in this framework.

Generally, in 1980s, non-Muslims – and Armenians in particular – were targeted, discriminated, and perceived as a national threat based on an association with the ASALA terrorism. Again, during the military regime, I showed that the Greeks' property rights were restricted with a view to the principle of reciprocity. The association of Armenians with the ASALA came to a halt with the ascendancy of Özal's ANAP to power. The research has demonstrated that, similar to the early DP years, a normalization process began. Özal removed some discriminatory practices; and paid explicit attention to distinguish Armenian citizens and the ASALA. The liberal attitude of Özal received much appreciation from the non-Muslim communities. Nonetheless, a discriminatory government regulation was accepted during Özal's ANAP government, which referred to the non-Muslims as "foreign elements" and thus put them in a category "most likely to carry out sabotages against Turkey".

Özal's understanding of nationalism contained a particular critique of Kemalist nationalism with an emphasis on the multicultural governance of the Ottoman Empire. In this framework, the role of Islam was underlined, and not Turkish ethnicity. The purpose was to draw the Kurds closer to the definition of Turkish citizenship. I have demonstrated that a very similar approach has been employed by AKP, as well.

Chapter *six* also revealed that 1990s and particularly the DYP years constituted a regression from the relatively more liberal and inclusive ANAP

governments. Linguistic restrictions in minority schools, paranoia about Greeks' overtaking the *Fener* district are a few examples to name. A critical analysis of the period's newspapers demonstrated that demonizing Armenians returned to the public discussions, this time in relation to the PKK terrorism. It was argued that Armenians were actually supporting the PKK, based on the fact that some of the captive terrorists were "uncircumcised". The courts once more described the non-Muslims as "foreign subject Turkish citizens". The only positive development in this period with regard to minorities was the election of a non-Muslim (Jewish) citizen to the Parliament for the first time since 1961, from DYP seats. I claimed that this policy choice (election of a non-Muslim) was most likely due to the government's instrumentalist mentality. The same issue had also previously come to the agenda of the Özal government (again, a center-right party). In the exchange of opinion between Özal and Sabancı over this issue, the primary motive seems to lie in gaining prestige in the European platform. A very similar strategy would later be employed by AKP in terms of making "openings" for the non-Muslim communities.

As chapter *seven* indicated, early years of AKP government promised normalization/inclusion and rightly raised the hopes of non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. First, I contended that there is a salient similarity between the DP and AKP governments, both in terms of discourse and policies regarding non-Muslims. Markedly, increased contact with minority representatives, cognizance of their problems, legal and technical facilitation of these problems, allowing the minority representatives' active participation in policymaking process, quite tolerant and inclusive discourse, and a consequent rise of self-confidence for minorities bear a

striking resemblance to the DP government. Also, I drew a parallel in terms of these two parties' economic support in the shape of renovations of places of worship and financial aid for community assets (e.g. schools, newspapers, etc.).

Since the current population of non-Muslims in Turkey does not carry as significant electoral weight as it was under CHP-DP years, populist calculations for domestic policy do not seem very likely for explaining the early liberal approach of AKP. Hence, I sought and discovered other factors, most salient of which seems to be the purpose of bolstering Turkey's global image. This kind of populism is qualitatively different from that of DP in 1950s, in which appeal to non-Muslim voters played a more decisive role.

AKP government has also serious shortcomings, which cast doubt on the commitment *and* sustainability of the process of inclusion, as well as keeping a salient distance with the exclusive nature of the old regime. I identified the sources of these shortcomings under five groups: conditional and restrictive nature of reforms, persistence of reciprocity approach, continuation of the habit of governing through minority representatives, pragmatism and instrumentalism about the global prestige, intrinsic problems of neo-Ottomanism and Islamist nationalism as a viable substitute.

Firstly, in almost all positive steps AKP has taken, I observed a *conditional* and *limited* approach to confer these rights. It is most striking in the new regime governing the foundation properties. Besides keeping many limitations intact, new ones were added, too. Religious service and the use of re-opened places of worship were limited and bound to very particular conditions. Legal personality of minority institutions still needs solution. Public employment of non-Muslims are still

extremely low. The *Halki* Seminary is, similarly, bound to the principle of reciprocity. These *two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach* indicates the fragility of AKP's openings, and calls the candidness and commitment of AKP government for these inclusive and democratic reforms in question.

Secondly, the mentality of *reciprocity* with regard to the problems of non-Muslim minorities seems unscathedly retained, as in all previous governments. Most concretely, I certified that a reciprocal 'concession' from Greece is expected and stipulated by the AKP government for the solution of the *Halki* problem. At the discursive level, too, AKP seems to have still not abandoned the Kemalist nationalist language completely. While Muslims in Western Thrace are seen as "our Muslim brothers", the non-Muslims in Turkey are referred to as "citizens" at best, and foreign/guest elements at worst. However, as my analysis on the parliamentary proceedings in chapter seven demonstrated, this attitude is even more intensely adopted by the opposition parties, CHP and MHP. I showed that these two parties almost acted like a single bloc to prevent any ameliorations whatsoever in the Law on Foundations. Their discourse is highly loaded with archaic Kemalist nationalist themes relying on obsessive fears about the unity of Turkey, losing religion, national security, and "enemies within". With these pro-status quo official Kemalist arguments, centered around the Sevres syndrome, CHP and MHP endeavored to de-politicize the issue and thus accused AKP government with betraying national interests. This finding corroborated Özkırmılı's argument (2008: 15) that the nationalist master narrative seeks hegemony over alternative interpretations by presenting whatever at stake in absolute terms and in a single reality. Lastly, I noted

that pro-Kurdish BDP has employed a quite liberal and inclusive definition of citizenship, considering non-Muslims in their endeavor, too.

Another major finding of this study is the persistence of the old regime's habit of conducting relations with minority representatives on behalf of non-Muslim communities' governance. I have acknowledged that it is *less* the governments *than* the Lausanne Treaty which lays the foundation of such a governance system. During the AKP period, just as in previous governments of CHP, DP, and ANAP, this situation inclined the governments to establish an organized control of communities through preferential election, or appointment as in AKP-Armenian Deputy Patriarch example, of pro-government minority representatives. I explained the divergence between the rosy picture depicted by many minority representatives and the resistance coming from non-Muslim opinion-leaders and individuals, with the former groups' subservience to the government's will and their preference for a hassle-free and uncritical relationship with the state for the solution of their problems.

Fourthly, the evidence indicates the strong external pressures behind the AKP's limited openings, without stating that it was the *only* motivation, though. The pressures from the EU institutions and the U.S., as well as punitive judgements of the ECHR, are likely to have pushed the government to take certain measures to deal with non-Muslim minorities' problems. This is relevant to the other finding of the study which points out the AKP's concern for "global image of Turkey" and the flamboyant presentation of its piecemeal positive steps. This window-dressing motivation and political flamboyance of reforms are reminiscent of ANAP

governments. This carries the risk of employing these reforms rather for an instrumentalist view to bolstering Turkey's global prestige.

Finally, ANAP-AKP line's Ottomanism promises comparatively more chances of inclusion than what the Kemalist nationalism has offered. In theory, it appears as a relaxation of the staunch secularism of the Republican regime and allows for more visible, pluralistic and liberal expression of religious differences. To what extent the Ottoman system was pluralistic and can fit to the democratic standards of our age is yet open to question. As I have claimed in the thesis, first ANAP's then successive parties and lastly AKP's emphasis on neo-Ottomanism is based on a selective reading of history, and thus is risky in terms of downplaying the essential difference between social peace and free society. Creating a new social, political, and legal structure inspired by the Ottoman *millet* system, or one based on a Medina-Contract solution as the Islamist nationalism has long advocated, should be discussed as viable substitutes for the problematic Kemalist nation-building project. My contention is that it is prone to serious democratic deficits considering the intrinsic problems of Medina Contract solution, such as the hierarchical positioning of the Muslims as "guardians" and non-Muslims as "protectée". This hierarchical relationship between religious groups constituted one of the most problematic aspects of the Ottoman *millet* system, too.

In the final analysis, this thesis has argued that, both in terms of general discourse and policy, AKP government has differentiated itself to a certain extent from the opposition parties and many previous governments. It can only be rivalled in its relatively liberal approach with DP in 1950s. Nonetheless, it has so far failed to

introduce a brand new paradigm, or an entirely novel nationalist language in Bora's terms, with regard to exhibiting a holistic and committed political will to provide equal, non-hierarchical citizenship rights and practices to non-Muslims. Besides its many challenges and revisions, AKP government has so far proved to be approaching the non-Muslims *still* within the official Kemalist nationalist parameters, assumptions and reflexes. Thus, it confirms for the Turkish context the scholarly view that the competitors tend to utilize the hegemon's language (Roseberry, 1996; Bora, 2003) in their political struggle for hegemony in nationalist project.

The more generalizable finding of the study is that conservative right-wing political parties in Turkey have certainly demonstrated a *more* inclusive definition of Turkishness with regard to non-Muslims, than have the Kemalist nationalist-secular parties.

Lastly, this study has various strengths and weaknesses. On the asset side, this study stands the only scholarly work which focuses on a comparative analysis of *all* Turkish governments with regard to their discourses and policies about non-Muslim citizens in Turkey. The second strength of the thesis is that it combines an empirical analysis of *discourses* and *policies* together to critically assess the various Turkish governments' inclusion/exclusion of non-Muslims in terms of their definition of Turkish nation. Theoretically, the study attempted to fill the void in the literature on Turkish nationalism by providing some new insights and conceptual items, particularly in chapter *seven*, to make sense of the nature of Turkish nationalism.

Alongside these strengths, the study has some shortcomings as well. First of all, given the fact that there were numerically few minority-related instances, policy decisions, and decisions in the decades of 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The number of cases drops significantly after 1960s, parallel to the number and percentage of non-Muslims plummeting in relative to the total population of Turkey as a result of forced expulsions, intimidation policy, and deterioration of well-being. Thus, it was challenging to obtain information about the approaches of governments regarding non-Muslim minorities.

Also, the shortness of time and unavailability of minority institution officials for interviews did not allow for incorporating first-hand data from minorities themselves. Thirdly, although thorough analyses of Prime Ministry archives and TBMM proceedings, as well as scanning of newspaper articles and editorials allowed the gathering of rich data for the governments' attitudes towards *non-Muslim religious minorities*, the findings are not generalizable to government policies regarding *all* of Turkey's minorities, namely the ethnic or sectarian minorities, such as Kurds and Alawites. The main reason for this is the fact that Turkish nationalism did not consider Kurds or other ethnic/sectarian groups as a minority. Therefore, there is a significant difference in terms of the state's treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups. The scope of this study is limited to the former relationship. The other category's inclusion in this study might have added additional significant insights with regard to how the Turkish nationalism and Turkish governments responded to ethnic and religious diversity over different cases (non-Muslim, non-Turkish, non-Sunni, etc). In order to minimize this shortcoming, I limited my

conclusions to the government policies regarding non-Muslim citizens only, instead of deducing far-reaching conclusions that would cover all minorities or governments' handling of religious diversity. There is a rich literature on the assimilation of Kurdish minority and the Turkish nationalism's interaction with the Kurdish identity.

Future large-scale studies should include the government approach to these minorities, as well. Further studies based on a comparison between non-Muslim and ethnic/sectarian minorities might enable testing the main findings of this thesis with a view to generating generalizable conclusions about different Turkish governments' *minority* policies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix.1: Muslims and Non-Muslim Populations in Turkey (1914-2005)¹

Year	1914	1927	1945	1965	1990	2005
Muslims	12.941.000	13.290.000	18.511.000	31.139.000	56.860.000	71.997.000
Greeks	1.549.000	110.000	104.000	76.000	8.000	3.000
Armenians	1.204.000	77.000	60.000	64.000	67.000	50.000
Jews	128.000	82.000	77.000	38.000	29.000	27.000
Others	176.000	71.000	38.000	74.000	50.000	45.000
Total	15.997.000	13.639.000	18.790.000	31.391.000	57.000	72.120.000
Percentage of non-muslims	19.1%	2.5%	1.5%	0.8%	0.3%	0.2%

Source: Ahmet İçduygu, Şule Toktaş, B. Ali Soner. “The Politics of Population in a Nation-Building Process: Emigration of Non-Muslims from Turkey”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2, 2008, p. 363.

¹ From 1914 to 1965, Ottoman and Turkish censuses and statistical abstracts; from 1990 to 2005, personal communication of the (opinion) leaders of the non-Muslim communities to the authors.

Appendix. 2: Jews in Edirne (1901-1998)

Year	Population
1901	15.000
1902	16.000
1903-11	17.000
1911-14	28.000
1921-22	13.000
1927	6.098
1943	2.000
1945	1.158
1960	438
1965	298
1977	72
1984-87	21
1998	3

Source: Rifat Bali, "Edirne Yahudileri", in Edirne: Serhattaki Payitaht (ed. Emin Nedret İşli ve M. Sabri Koz), İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998, p. 212.

Appendix. 3: Non-Muslim Deputies in the TBMM

Deputy Name and Surname	Religion	Political Party	Tenure/Term
Berç Türker (Keresteci)	Armenian	Independent	1935 - 1946 (Terms V-VI-VII)
Nikola Taptas	Greek Orthodox	Independent	1935 - 1943 (Terms V-VI)
Abravaya Marmaralı	Jewish	Independent	1935 - 1943 (Terms V-VI)
Mihail Kayaoğlu	Greek Orthodox	Independent	1943 - 1946 (Term VII)
İstamat Zihni Özdamar	Turkish Orthodox	Independent	1935 - 1946 (Terms V-VI-VII)
Avram Galanti Bodrumlu	Jewish	Independent	1943 - 1946 (Term VII)
Nikola Fakaçelli	Greek Orthodox	CHP	1946 - 1950 (Term VIII)
Vasil Konos	Greek Orthodox	CHP	Resigned (Term VIII)
Salamon Adato	Jewish	DP	1946 - 1954 (Terms VIII - IX)
Ahilya Moshos	Greek Orthodox	DP	1950 - 1954 (Term IX)
Andre Vahram Bayar	Armenian	DP	1950 - 1954 (Term IX)
Aleksandros Hacopulos	Greek Orthodox	DP	1950 - 1960 (Terms X - XI)
Zakar Tarver	Armenian	DP	1954 - 1960 (Terms X - XI)
Hanri Soryano	Jewish	DP	1954 - 1957 (Term X)
Yusuf Salman	Jewish	DP	1957 - 1960 (Term XI)
İzak Altabev	Jewish	DP	1957 - 1960 (Term XI)
Hristaki Yoannidis	Greek Orthodox	DP	1957 - 1960 (Term XI)
Mıgırđıç Şellefyan	Armenian	DP	1957 - 1960 (Term XI)
Erol Dilek	Jewish	Deputy Representatives of Head of State	1961
Hermine Agavni Kalustyan	Armenian	Deputy Representatives of Head of State	1961
Kaludi Laskari	Greek Orthodox	Deputy Representatives of Head of State	1961
Berç Sahak Turan	Armenian	Senator	1961 - 1964

Cefi Jozef Kamhi	Jewish	DYP	1996 - 1999 (Term XX)
Erol Dora	Assyrian	BDP	2011 - (Term XXIV)

Source: Rıfat Bali, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, vol. 186, 2009, p. 63.

Appendix.4

KARARNAME
Sayı: 6/5801

Yunan Hükümetinin Türk vatandaşlarını Yunanistan'da serbestçe ugratmış bulunan her çeşit tedbir ve muamelelerine karşılık olmak üzere,

1- Yunan uyruklu şahısların Türkiye'deki gayrimenkulleri üzerindeki mülkiyete ve mülkiyetten gayri aynı haklara ilişkin ve bu sonuçları doğurabilecek bilhüma temlik tasarruflarının durdurulması,

2- a) Yunan uyruklu kişilerin Türkiye'deki gayrimenkullerinden doğan her nevi bedel, hasılat, irat ve sairinin istisnasız bloke edilmesi
b) Bu şahısların gayrimenkulleriyle ilgili olarak şimdiye kadar bloke edilmiş ve bu kararnameye göre bloke edilecek paralarının (Türkiye'de bulunan bloke para sahiplerinden başkaca gelir kaynakları bulunmayanların ayda 1.500 lirayı geçmeyen geçim masrafları hariç) de lokasının durdurulması,

3- Kamu idarelerine ve tüzel kişilerine ait her türlü vergi, resm, harç ve diğer alacakların takip ve tahsilinde yukarıdaki 1 ve 2. maddelerin hükümlerinin uygulanmaması,

4- Bu gayrimenkullerin kamulaştırılmasında bu kararın 1.nci maddesinin uygulanmaması,

5- 3.ncü madde hükmü mahfuz kalmak ve ilâma dayanan alacakların tahsili hakkında açılan icra takipleri ayırık olmak üzere, 1.nci maddede sözü geçen gayrimenkullere her ne suretle olursa olsun hacis konulmaması ve bunların cebri icra yolu ile satılmaması, (Türkiye'deki gerçek ve tüzel kişilerce, yetkili malî merciler tarafından yapılacak inceleme sonucunda kabule şayan oldukları tesbit edilen gayrimenkul üzerine müesses alacakların tahsili dolayısıyla, yapılabilecek haciz ve cebri icra muameleleri hariç),

6- Yunan uyruklu kişilerin hissedar buldukları gayrimenkullerin, hissedarların ittifakı dahi olsa, rızasız taksim ve ifraz edilmemesi, şuyunun isalesinin ancak mahkeme kararı ile yapılabilmesi ve bedelden ayrılacak paranın 2.nci maddenin (a) fıkrasına hükmüne tâbi tutulması.

7- Bu kararname hükümlerinin Yunan asıllı olmayan Yunan uyruklu kişilere uygulanmaması,

8- Yunan uyrukluğunda bulunan kişilerin bu kararname hükümlerinin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten sonraki tabiiyet değiştirmelerinin nazarı itibare alınmaması,

9- Yukarıdaki hususların mahkemelerle sair adli ve idari merciler tarafından gözönünde bulundurulması ve bu kararname hükümlerine aykırı düşecek muameleler tesbit olundugu takdirde durumun derhal mahalli Maliye Dairesine bildirilmesi,

Diğerleri Bakanlığının 16/9/1964 tarihli ve A.(22) DV. 3.382 sayılı yazısı üzerine, 1062 sayılı Kanunun 1.nci maddesine göre Bakanlar Kurulunca 2/11/1964 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.