

**THE POLARIZATION OF ELECTORAL SUPPORT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

BY

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of his knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the underlining factors that define electoral support in a bipolar religious nation with 50.5% of her population Muslims and 48.2% Christians, cutting across more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups that is divided between two regional blocs — Christian South and Muslim North to answer the question: what accounts for the polarization of electoral support in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria along ethno-religious and regional blocs? I argued within this study that the shift in the assumed strategic power position of the major ethnic group who are predominantly Muslims living in the northern part of Nigeria necessitated a struggle for the reacquisition of their power position. This attempt met with stiff resistance by the other ethnic groups living in the South who are predominantly Christians. This is the source of the polarization of electoral support along the regional blocs of Christian South and Muslim North. I look at ethnic and religious distribution of the major political, military, economic and judicial position within the country. This power position of the Muslim North is “assumed”—because of the fact that, it is not inherent to this group, rather, it was acquired through political means, precisely through the military intervention into politics over a long period of time and could be lost through political means. It is “strategic” based on the prolong grip on state power by the military dictators from the Muslim North and the subsequent use of this state power to make policies that favoured these groups and to raise key persons in this group to key positions in the state. Within the course of this study I found out that there was a distortion in the long standing order in the political leadership of the country within the first eight years of the fourth republic that led to the loss of the security derived from the feeling of being in control by the Northern bloc. A struggle then emerged to restore the old order on the one hand and to maintain the new status quo on the other hand between the North and South respectively. Thus political struggle/agitation in the next election was blown out of proportion by igniting ethnic and religious sentiment between and within the blocs in the 2003 and 2011 presidential elections, which resulted in the polarization of electoral support along the Christian South and Muslim North in these elections.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, nüfusunun %50,5'inin Müslüman ve %48,2'inin Hıristiyan olan, 250'den fazla dini ve kültürel grup barındıran ve iki bölgesel kutup olarak ayrılmış olan bir toplum olan Nijerya ile ilgili şu soruyu cevaplamaya çalışmaktadır: Nijerya'daki 2011 seçimlerindeki etnik-dini ve bölgesel kutuplaşmanın ardındaki etkenler nelerdir? Bu çalışmada Kuzey Nijerya'da yaşayan ve çoğunlukla Müslüman olan etnik grubun stratejik gücünün yükselmesinin onların eski güç konumlarına kavuşma amacıyla mücadeleye girişmesine yol açtığını savunuyorum. Buna bağlı olarak, bu mücadelenin ülkenin güneyinde yaşayan ve çoğunlukla Hıristiyan olan diğer etnik grupların sert bir şekilde karşı koymasına ve bu durumun da seçim sürecinde kutuplaşmaya yol açtığını savunuyorum. Çoğunlukla Müslüman olan etnik grubun bu güç konumu sonradan elde edilmiştir çünkü bu güç konumu bu etnik grubun yapısında var olan bir güç'ten ziyade siyaset ve özellikle siyasete askeri bir müdahale ile kazanılmış bir güç olmuştur ve siyasi yollar ile kaybedilme ihtimali vardır. Aynı zamanda bu güç stratejik olma özelliğine sahiptir çünkü söz konusu etnik grup bu gücü sadece sayısal olarak çoğunluk olması dolayısıyla kazanmamıştır. Aksine, bu grup gücünü siyasete uzun süreli hakimiyeti ve askeri hükümetlerin bu gruba yönelik pozitif ayrımcı bir tutum sergilemesiyle kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma kapsamında Nijerya'da kurulan Dördüncü Cumhuriyet'in ilk sekiz yılı boyunca siyasi liderlik bakımından bir tahrif ve Kuzey bölge tarafından kontrol edilme korkusu ile bağlantılı olarak güvenlik kaybının bulunduğunu tespit ettim. Eski düzeni yeniden canlandırma ve Kuzey ve Güney arasında mevcut durumu koruma amacıyla bir mücadele başlamıştır. Sonuç olarak 2003 ve 2011 Başkanlık seçimlerinde siyasi ve etnik duyguları temel alan siyasi mücadele bu seçimlerde Hıristiyan Güney ve Müslüman Kuzey arasında kutuplaşmaya yol açmıştır.

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CHAPTER 1

1.1 THE PUZZLE OF ELECTION POLARIZATION IN NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

This thesis examines the underlying factors that produced the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious (that is between Christians and Muslims) and ethno-regional blocs — (North and South)¹ in the 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria. This was done, by analyzing the polarization trend in the presidential elections, in the post military regime or the Fourth Republic, to answer the following questions:

- Why did President Goodluck Jonathan unlike President Olusegun Obasanjo fail in the 2011 presidential election, to win any majority vote in any state in the Northern part of Nigeria?
- What accounts for the polarization of electoral support in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria? Where the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) presidential candidate, Major General Muhammadu Buhari won majority votes from all the states in the Northern region, while the People's Democratic Party's presidential candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan won majority votes from the states in the South.

¹ It should be made clear right from the start, that Nigeria is constitutionally divided into six geo-political regions/zones. they are 1) NORTH-CENTRAL region which consist of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau states and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 2) NORTH-EASTERN region consists of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. 3) NORTH-WESTERN region consists of Jigawa, Kaduna, and Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara state. 4) SOUTH-EASTERN region has Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states within its confines. SOUTH-EASTERN region has Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states within its confines. 5) SOUTH-SOUTH has Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers states within the zone. And 6) SOUTH-WESTERN region consists of Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states. However, within this thesis I would be analysing Nigeria presidential elections across two major divide — which are the North and South blocs. The reason for this is the fact that Nigeria originally was divided along this line by her colonial master and more important to my study, is the fact that the office of the president is political contested along these blocs. Furthermore the polarization trend that this study is set out to analyse is also along this North and South divide. Within the Northern bloc we have the first three zones as listed above except for the Middle Belt states (Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau, Adamawa and Taraba), making it 12 states including the Federal Capital Territory. While in the South we have the other three zones which have 26 states in total.

- Why haven't the Muslim and the more ethnically homogenous (major) North produce more presidents in the country than the Christian and ethnically more heterogeneous South?

In a bipolar religious nation such as Nigeria, with 50.5% of her population Muslims and 48.2% Christians, cutting across (more than) 250 ethno linguistic groups. Among these ethnic groups the Hausa/Fulani's, the Yoruba's and the Ibo's emerged as the major ethnic groups with 27.9%, 17.5% and 13.3% respectively (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009). The Northern region is predominantly Muslims and the home-land of the Hausa/Fulani's, while the Southern part of the country is occupied by a much more diverse ethnic groups (including the Yoruba's and the Igbo's) who are predominantly Christians; one would wonder what shapes politics or election outcomes within this setting.

From a simple political calculation one would expect based on the brief demography given above that the Northern region is most likely going to produce more of the country's democratically elected president(s). However this has not being the case, as the results of all the presidential elections held in Nigeria's fourth republic (that is, from 1999 till date) has shown otherwise. Rather from what we observe in the past four presidential elections conducted so far, the Southern region has won three out of the four presidential elections in the country. Why?

It was the death of Major General Sani Abacha on the 8th of June 1998 that gave birth to a new political opportunity for the country (Enemu, 1999: 2). When, Major General Abdusalam Abubakar announced his plans of returning the country back to a democratically elected president on or before the 20th June 1999. This announcement was followed by the adaptation of the 1999 federal constitution of Nigeria and the lifting of the ban on political parties.

Subsequently, three political parties were registered, parties' activities were carried out across the country and elections were held for the offices of local government chair person, state governor(s) and that of the president and in both the state and federal House Assemblies. With the formation of these three political parties, that is, the Peoples Democratic party (PDP), All People's Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD), came two presidential candidates; President Olusegun Obasanjo for PDP and Samuel Oluyemi Falae, whose candidacy resulted from a merge of the APP and AD (Ihonvbere, 1999: 59). It is important to note that, the number of political parties in the country has grown from 3 in 1999 to more 30 in 2011. However, a close observation will show that the key actors/ politicians or presidential candidates centre's around two or three parties in the four presidential elections conducted so far in the country.

The result of the 1999 presidential election shows a landslide victory as President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was from the South (-west region) won with a total of 62.8% against Falae's (who is also from the South-western region) 37.2% by winning at least 25% of the votes, in 32 of the 36 states including the federal capital territory (Electoral Geography)². Therefore Obasanjo won by meeting the 1999 constitutional requirement stipulated in section 134 of the Nigerian constitution, that, "a candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been duly elected, where, there being only two candidates for the election - (a) he has the majority of votes cast at the election; and (b) he has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja"³.

² <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/nigeria/nigeria-presidential-election-1999.html>

³ Here it should be mentioned that the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria while stipulating the above quoted section, it also stipulated the requirement for winning an election if the presidential candidate is just one person, two as quoted above and if there are more than two candidates. While the condition of declaring a person the winning of a presidential election in Nigeria if the candidates are just two or more that two is almost (if not) the same, it differs a great deal when there is just a single candidate opting for the office of the president in the entire country. All issues patterning to who is qualified to run for the office of the president and who

What is more significant to this study is the fact that, President Olusegun Obasanjo won all the states in the North except Sokoto, Zamfara and Yobe. But lost 6 states in the South (-Western) region, including his home town — that is, the state he hailed from. Thus, in a sense he had more support from the North than from the South in the 1999 elections. In the 2003 presidential election however, the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious and regional lines appeared. Where the incumbent president won again with 61.8% victory against Major General Muhammadu Buhari's 32%, but failed to win majority votes in 9 out of 12 Northern states in the country, while winning all the states in the south. Muhammadu Buhari on the other hand, failed to win any majority vote in the South, why? Moreover, this polarization trend was further deepened in the 2011 presidential election with President Goodluck Jonathan winning the general election with 58.9% as against Muhammadu Buhari's 32%, but failing to win majority votes in any of the Northern states and vice versa. The factor(s) that accounts for this growing polarization trend is what this thesis, set out to unearth.

1.2 My argument

What explains the polarization of electoral support, in a bipolar religious country (that has more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups), along ethno-religious and regional boundary? In such a political setting as Nigeria's, what inform voter attitude towards a particular presidential candidate as opposed to the others? I argue that the shift in the assumed strategic power position of the major ethnic group (the Hausa/Fulani's) necessitated a struggle for the reacquisition of this power position. This attempt met with stiff resistance by the minority ethnic groups that have been politically subjugated over time, best explain the trend.

This power position is “assumed”— because of the fact that, it is not inherent to this group, rather, it was acquired through political means (precisely through the military intervention into politics over a long period of time) and can be lost through the same. It is “strategic” base on the fact that this group did not become the major ethnic group and acquire this power position just because of its population and affiliation to the more populous religious group in the country. But through the prolong grip of state power by the military dictators from this group and the subsequent use of this state power to make policies that favoured these groups and to raise key persons in this group to key positions in the state. That is, the ability of the members of these groups to use their material and organizational benefits of a longstanding control of state apparatus to achieve some significant institutional positions for their ethnic group member when compared with members of other ethnic groups (Van de Walle 2003; 301-302).

In order to paint a better picture of the shift and how it has led to struggle that gave birth to the polarization of electoral support we have to view how political scientist and other political actors/politicians define and view politics across Africa and in Nigeria particularly. Claude Ake for example argues that the custodian of the post colonial Africa state had, rather than change it, merely inherited the exploitative policies and structure of their predecessors. Thus politics becomes a warfare and unruly competition over state power that will be used to enrich themselves and their accomplices (Godwyns A. A., 2010: 287-288). This I would argue within the context of the paper that in the case of Nigeria the accomplices most of the time is the group the individual hails from.

Godwyns Ade’ Agbudu quoting Aka argued that politics in most African states rules out the politics of moderations and mandates the politics of lawlessness and extremism, one in which the winner wins all and the loser loses all. Furthermore, Abonyi defines politics as the acquisition (or struggle for), consolidation of and the use of state power (Abonyi, 2005). As

Ade' Agbudu asked the acquisition, consolidation of state power for what? To this I would respond by answering; to determine who and which ethno-religious group gets what, when and how as in the case of Nigeria⁴.

Thus, while modesty is gradually coming back into African politics as it is evident in Ghana's elections in almost a decade now and in some other countries in Africa. Politics in Nigeria is still intense with strict mobilization, rallying support and violence prior to and post election date within and between ethno-religious and regional major North and South. Finally, measuring the power position within the state, I would divide them into two broad categories; the major and minor power positions.

Major power position

- The major seat of political power. This in the military regimes was the military dictator and his ruler council, while under the democratic regime; it is the position of the president who is both the head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation⁵.
- The President of the Senate.
- Chief justice of the federation.
- The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
- The group managing director of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
- Number of seats in the National Assembly.
- Top military officers (the supreme military council).

⁴ The definition of politics by Claude Ake and Abonyi quoted above was gotten from Godwyns Ade Agbude (2010:286-288) summary of the definition of politics by Africa Scholars.

⁵ Section 130 (2), of The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Minor power position

- The largest region (when measured in terms of its population, and land mass) within the country.
- Amount/income received mostly from derivation (principle).
- The major producers of the countries natural resource.
- Major producers of food for the country.

I would argue that while some issues are hotly debated presently, like the issue of derivation in the country within the minor power position, a shift in any of these items mentions in the minor power category, those not matter much for the major ethnic group. But a shift or a loss of strategic advantage and/or most of the positions listed in the major power position above would trigger an intense agitation for control by the major ethnic group, (the North) in the coming election which will most likely meet with stiff resistance from the South. And if it does, the result would be the polarization of electorate support along ethno-religious and regional boundaries. This I claim account for the reason why President Goodluck Jonathan failed to win any majority vote in the North region of the country.

1.3 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

INSTRUMENTALISM

This school of thought holds that political elites acts or behave strategically to manipulate ethnicity for the sake of power (Varshney, 2003; 29). That is, igniting ethnic differences⁶ prior to elections dates in order to gain popular support across ethnic lines. Thus, behaving

⁶ These ethnic differences as mentioned above are used in a more broad sense to include cultural, religious, ethnic and/or any other physical difference that exist between the people living within a particular geographical location.

instrumentally can lead to many different outcomes such as ethnic prejudice and violence prior to, during and after elections.

In the 2003 and 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria where there were potential evident of political elite's behaving instrumentally, it could be argued that these behaviours led to prejudices, pre and post election violence, President Goodluck Jonathan failure to win majority vote in the north and the polarization of electorates support across the country. Here ethnicity which is the major focal point of political mobilization is not, in a sense, valued for its own sake, as politicians can use it instrumentally without actually believing in it (Varshney, 2003; 29). Rather it is used as an instrument to or of attaining political ascendancy in the pursuit of elite's political aspirations.

Owing to the precarious nature of politics in Nigerian history, which has being characterized by electoral malpractices and more importantly, post election violence; one would wonder, how possible it is for a leader or groups of elites to be able to mobilize the entire country into two strict blocs for their personal aggrandizement. Varshney (2003; 30) rightly noted that, "for something to be manipulated by a leader when death, injury or incarceration is a clear possibility, it must be valued as a good by a critical mass of people if not all". Thus, I would say that the instrumental argument on its own is somewhat unconvincing.

Notable evidence that weakens the explanatory power of this school of thought is the very set-up of major political parties. The major political party's presidential candidates and their running mates are usually from opposing ethnic and religious North and South. For instance, while the presidential candidate of the People's Democratic Party, President Goodluck Jonathan, is from the South and a Christian; his running mate Vice President Namadi Sambo is from the North and a Muslim. The same is true of the major opposing party

the Congress for Progressive Change, whose candidate Major General Muhammadu Buhari is from the (core) North while his running mate, Tunde Bakare is from the South and not just a Christian but a Bishop and founder of one of the most popular churches in Nigeria.

With such arrangement I would argue that, it will be very difficult for a particular leader(s) to draw strictly on ethnic sentiments of such magnitude. While the office of the president is said to be the very vital power or position of authority in the country the roles and influence of the vice president cannot be completely ruled out in influencing the other ethnic groups in a bid to gain support from these groups.

RELIGIOUS BIPOLARITY

A very similar view to that of instrumentalism is that of religious bipolarism. This view was basically made popular within the international media and political analyst across the globe as the events unfolded prior to, during and after the 2011 presidential election. According to this view, the polarization of electoral support, that led President Goodluck not to win any majority vote in the North had its roots in the religious division or bipolarity existing within the country (between Christianity and Islamism). This division made room for or allowed both the Christian South and Muslim North to rally around presidential candidates Goodluck Jonathan a Christian and Muhammadu Buhari a Muslim respectively, in order for them to keep promoting their religious core values and interest as a groups, as much as possible; this inevitably led to the polarization.

This argument has its root on the basic intuition of essentialism which holds that ethnic/religious violence, and divide, that is, the “we against them” can be traced to old animosities’ and that ethnic and/or religious affiliation is inherent in man. Thus, there is a tendency for intense rivalry in a bipolar religious nation such as Nigeria. This is so, because both of these religious groups do/would interpret the leadership of the other to mean an

imposition of their religious beliefs and doctrines amidst the already Christian and Muslim stand-off in world history.

A closer look at the 2011 presidential election results especially the map/graphic representation of the election, tends to give great credit to this explanation when viewed with the knowledge of the religious divide almost across the religious blocs of Muslim North and Christian South. However, if religious bipolarity really count in the country's democracy and has such firm grip on election outcomes as this argument portray, one would wonder, why it did not count in the 1999 and 2007 presidential elections. Was it that Nigeria was not religiously bipolar before these elections? I would say, judging from the Nigerian history that this religious divide set-in in the late 18th and early 19th century with Usman Dan Fodio conquest of the North region. He introduced and enforced Islamic teaching and principles in the Northern regions. While the activities of Christian missionaries that accompanied the slave trade in the South and the role of Bishop Ajayi Crowther an Anglican Bishop and other missionaries helped set the Christian roots in the South. However, this divide became more concrete in the late 19th and early 20th century.

Furthermore if this opinion was right I would argue that the likelihood of President Goodluck Jonathan winning the 2011 presidential election was almost impossible for the following reasons. First, as mentioned before the CPC presidential candidate running mate Bishop Tunde Bakare is more of a Christian motivator that command a lot of respect religiously especially in the South-western region of the country than Jonathan's running mate command Muslim's in the North. Pairing both a Christian and a Muslim as the presidential and vice Presidential candidates (who are from the South and North respectively), I would say give the CPC more grounds for winning the election, however, this was not the case. Second since the year 2003 a well known preacher in the South (western) region by name Rev. Chris

Okotie, has being the presidential candidate of Fresh Democratic Party and have never won any state in the three elections since 2003.

If religion was a major explanatory factor I would expect that his presence in Nigerian politics would have long created this divide but again that has not been the case. Meanwhile, in a stricter sense, the pairing of a Christian and a Muslim as the CPC and PDP presidential candidates would not be possible in the first place. For Christian would mobilize Christians, while Muslims would do the same, but again this was not the case. Thus the question is why the polarization of electoral support in 2003 and 2011 presidential elections and not in 1999 or in 2007 cannot be answered by religious bipolarism. What really account for President Goodluck Jonathan failure to win majority vote in the North and Maj. Gen. M. Buhari failure to win majority vote in the South cannot be best explained by religious bipolarism.

CLIENTELISM

This explanation holds that the prediction of electoral outcome in emerging democracy and party systems is more or less systematic to clientelism, that is, through gain and the maintain political support. Walle noted that, “the narrowness of a public realm in the western sense, the strength of clan, ethnicity and other sub-national identities, the prediction for dyadic exchange in primarily rural societies, and the need for mechanism of social insurance in the risky and uncertain environment of low-income societies have all been used to explain the ubiquitous presence of every level of Africa life of the exchange of gift, favour and services of patronage and courtier practices” (Van de Walle, 2003; 311).

Thus in the patron and client relationship clients are promise social goods and rewards in exchange for support of a major political party or for a particular presidential candidate. Deducing from this claim one would say that this practice within two rivalry political parties and/or presidential candidate would subsequently lead to the strict division of electoral

support, as it was in the 2003 and 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. Thus much of clientelism and corruption is legitimated by the view that it serves a kind of community purpose rather than individual enrichment therefore reinforcing loyalties or kith and kin (Chabal and Daloz, 1999)⁷.

If the above assumption holds true, then I would question how it became possible for President Goodluck Jonathan to gain the loyalties of the various ethnic groups in the Southern region, even when some of the ethnic groups had presidential candidates in other political parties in the election. Thus, clientelism as an explanatory framework cannot explain (if at all, in full) the mass electoral support across ethno-religious North and South divide in the 2011 presidential election.

This I argue based on two related factors that is evident in Nigerian politics. First is the winner-takes-all nature (Godwyns Ade' Agbude 2010; 288) of Nigerian politics which is rooted in the second – the excessive power vested on the position of the President. Therefore any ethnic group that produced the president of the federation has gain for itself power and incurred for his region high amount of social amenities when compared to other ethnic groups. This I think would lead to a scenario where each groups would rally around any candidate from their ethnic group or state. I therefore subscribe to Walle argument that within the region of Africa “it is more useful to think of clientelistic politics as constituting primarily a mechanism for accommodation and integration of fairly narrow political elite than as a form of mass party patronage. Most of the material gains are limited to political elites while the citizenry gains through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identities” (Van de Walle, 2003; 313).

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES

⁷ Chabal and Daloz quotation above was put forth by Van de Walle in his article “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's emerging party systems” page 311.

This argument holds that the presence or absence of civil society (organization) activities produces intergroup and intra-group political support respectively (Varshney, 2003; 9-18). In other words, in towns, societies or countries with strong civil society activities cutting across, social, ethnic and religious cleavages, the more likely it is for the political preferences of these groups to cut across the borders of ethnicity and religion. While the towns, societies or countries with little or no such civil engagement, the more likely it is for there to be standoff between the different groups within the town, society or country. Thus, the decline in the civil society engagement between the Christian South and Muslim North led to the standoff that produced the polarization of electoral support in Nigerian presidential election.

Varshney (2003; 9-10) highlighted two forms of civil engagements; first, the associational forms which includes the business associations, labour unions and students organizations among others. The second form is the everyday forms of civil engagement which has no association setting attached to it. To Varshney while both promote peace and build bridges across ethno-religious borders, the associational form is more substantive in holding these groups together. Building on the associational argument, Walle (2003; 300) noted that “the existence of civil society organizations in the authoritarian regimes that had their roots in labour unions, business, religious and students organizations, legal societies among others where the first to metamorphosize into political parties at the dawn of political opening across African states. The inability to capture state power and perhaps influence state policies and transcend ethnic and religious sentiments had led to the decline in the ability of the organizations to further close the gaps between these groups”.

However the way this argument goes, its validity depends heavily of its ability to prove how deep these civil organizations were able to cut into the ethnic and religious fabrics of Nigeria, that made it possible to produce the unifying support for president Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. To what extent has these civil activities declined over time to produce the

polarization of electoral support along the North and South blocs in 2011? While we cannot deny the role of civil society in agitating for independence prior to 1960 or for the return of the country to a civilian regime; I would argue that the activities of these organizations have not been effective enough to break through the ethno-religious divide in the country to produce political preferences outside ethnic and religious considerations. It is not equally so weak to produce such a stand-off that divided the electoral support between North and South.

This is so for two opposing reasons I would say. First is the imperfect ways with which the various democratic and military head-of states in Nigeria has encouraged and discouraged civil society activities in Nigeria. While the state has done much in the bid to unify the country through its policies (like the policies adopted by Major General Yakubu Gowon after the Nigerian civil war in 1970, that allows for the incorporation of all ethnic and religious groups into the Nigerian Army, civil service and the creation of the National Youth Service Corp), opened the way for civil society activities, such as labour union organization across the country, that has bridged the existing gap to a reasonable degree. The tyrannical attitude of some military dictators at other point in time has impaired the growth/strength and success of these civil society organisations.

Second is the inability of the two main religions in the country and their organizations to integrate one into the other. These religious organizations over the years have maintained their distinctiveness in terms of its principles and levels of inclusion and exclusion. These two factors react together to produce what I will call the pull (that is, to bring together) and push (or pulling apart) scenario that makes it impossible I would say, for the presence of civil organizational activities to completely transcend ethno-religious consideration in making political preference and its absence to produce an absolute standoff between the Northern and Southern in Nigerian politics.

POLITICAL AWARENESS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES

This explanatory framework has been made popular in advanced democracies particularly the United States and it is more developed and of a wider coverage. Nevertheless the basic premise of the framework is based on the educative or cognitive (informational) level or the voters' awareness of the presidential candidate(s) political preferences in determining whether or not they will vote and for whom she or he will vote in favour of (Connelly and field 1994; Bartels 1996).

An extension of this framework tries to analyze the role of information sources such as campaign (Shaw 1999a; Campbell 2000) advertisement and the information disseminated by the news media which can be either negative or positive (Morton and Williams 2010). Because information comes to voters selectively (as in the case of Nigeria through state, private and religious media houses) biases set in, which can have an effect on voters' behaviour. Therefore the kind of information that is passed on to the voters in the states, private media houses, religious institutions and by the national media could account for the variation that is noticed in the Nigerian elections, that is from 1999-2011 presidential elections.

The information about economic, political and social preference of a particular presidential candidate coupled with her/his party's ideology goes a long way in shaping informed voters choice of candidates; if they are aware of it, in the first place. This I think is the major setback of this framework in explaining electoral outcomes in developing countries or new democracies. What are the political preferences of the presidential candidates in the various political parties? Do these political parties have any major ideological foundation and how much does these parties ideologies differ one from the other? And how informed are the electorates in 1999, and what account in the changes in their behaviour in 2011?

On the contrary Walle (2003; 304) rightly noted that, “most parties and their presidential candidates in Africa have adopted a vague populism during elections, and general if vague, promises of a better future. Ideological differences have also been minor across parties and debates about specific policy issues have been virtually non-existent. Although opposition parties may criticize the government’s management of the economy or the implication of structural adjustment programs, the party platform diverge little and campaigns speeches rarely discuss policy issues. A small number of parties have sought to make policy-based campaigns, but with a striking lack of success”. Therefore with little or no basic difference on policy preferences and political party’s ideologies this hypothesis cannot explain much about political outcome in new democracies and the polarization of electoral support in Nigeria.

ECONOMIC VOTING

Like the information hypothesis, economic voting have been another major independent variable that explains electoral behaviour in the United states — as there are more studies on economic voting in the U.S than in any other country of the world (Lewis-Beck, and Stegmaier, 2000; 184). This hypothesis is on the reward and punishment of an incumbent president based on the country’s economic outcome. In a more similar fashion it can be based on the economic policy of the aspiring presidential candidate(s). The hypothesis has been stated as follows; the citizens’ vote for the (incumbent) president if the economy is doing well, and if it is not doing well, they will vote against him. In another sense the hypothesis can be stated as thus; the citizens’ votes for the presidential candidates with better economic policy and against the one(s) with poor economic policies.

While the perception of the economy or the understanding of a presidential candidate economic policy can be a motivating factor for voters to vote for or against a candidate. This

economic voting explanation does not tell much in new democracies generally and in Nigeria particular. This is so for the following reasons, first as mentioned above that the political, social and economic policies are either absent or are usually vague with unfulfilled promises of providing social amenities and fighting corruption. Second is the fact that the economy and the economic conditions of the people have not changed much to be able to inform the voters that a given president has done better thus need to be supported.

Above all, it can be deduced from the economic voting hypothesis that there is usually a mass reward of support for a president when the economy is going well and against otherwise. If this is the case, the hypothesis does little in explaining what account for the polarization trends in Nigeria politics. It also cannot account for why President Goodluck Jonathan unlike President Olusegun Obasanjo failed in winning any state in the Northern region in the country.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

This study is carried out within the qualitative axis of research methods in social sciences and it utilizes the case study methods of analysis. A case here have been define as an instance of a class of events, that is, a phenomenon of scientific interest (which in this study, is the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious and regional blocs), with the aim of developing a theory (or “generic knowledge”) regarding the causes of similarities and /or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events. Hence, case study is a well-defined aspect of historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself (George and Bennett 2005; 17-18). This thesis therefore adopts the single case study methods in social sciences, that is driven with the need of a holistic and an in-depth investigation with a view to bring to light the causal processes of the phenomenon under study.

In doing so, I adopt the process tracing approach which does not solely rely on the comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also investigates and explains the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. Process tracing which is rooted in the methodological tradition of individualism attempts to uncover the micro foundations of individual behaviour that connect the hypothesized causes and outcomes and to reduce the difficulties associated with unobserved contextual variables. In a sense, It also attempts to identify the intervening causal process — the causal chain and causal mechanism between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable and focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case and not on correlations of data across cases (George and McKeown 1985).⁸

In this thesis therefore, I would attempt to delve into the Political history of Nigeria, in order to explore and to understand the underlying phenomenon that are responsible for the shaping of political outcomes, prior to Nigeria gaining her independence and the post independent era. And how these phenomenon has cumulated through time and space in shaping the political behaviours of both the political elites/ actors and that of the electorates alike. That is, in shaping the general political attitude of the Nigerian people to create a political system that is advantageous to a group and disadvantageous to the other groups.

A system of advantage and disadvantage that metamorphosed into producing political blocs — North and South in the country and to understand what transpired in the fourth republic that distorted this standing order and how the events that follow added up to produce the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious and region blocs of the north and south. In addition to the historical analysis of political events in the country, I would also utilize the Nigeria constitution (from which the legal ground for elections is framed). I will also utilize the various elections results as published by the Independent National Electoral

⁸ The explanation of process tracing approach by George and McKeown 1985 was gotten from Tulia G. Falletti's article. "Theory guided process-tracing in comparative politics" page 1-2.

Commission's of Nigeria and other online sources, such as, media reports, articles and books — writing before, during and after the various presidential elections in Nigeria.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study utilizes the “regimes of ethnicity” framework/typology that was advanced by Şener Aktürk. According to Aktürk “this framework categorized states as having monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic regimes. Ethnicity regimes are therefore defined along dimensions of “membership” and “expression.” If a state seeks to restrict membership in the nation to one ethnic category through discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies, then it has a “monoethnic” regime and the expression dimension becomes irrelevant because ethnic diversity is minimized through the construction of a monoethnic citizenry from which Germany and Japan are good examples”.

Furthermore he noted that, “if a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as citizens (membership) but discourages or even prohibits the legal, institutional, and public expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has an “antiethnic” regime. Turkey before 2004 is a very good example approximating the ideal type of a state with an antiethnic regime — France, too, has an antiethnic regime. If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as its citizens (membership) and allows, encourages, or even participates in the legal and institutional expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has a “multiethnic” regime”. The Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russian Federation are very good examples approximating the ideal type of a state with a multiethnic regime — Canada, India and Nigeria, too, have multiethnic regimes. “Regimes of ethnicity” thus denote the constellation of state policies and institutions related to ethnicity. This new conceptualization connects the study of nation-building to studies of ethnic diversity and citizenship, while providing a coherent typology of state policies on ethnicity that accommodates the full range of variation across cases”.

Aktürk further noted that, “If we seek to articulate a relationship between nationhood and ethnicity, the terms describing the universe of cases must have “ethnicity” as their reference point. Semantically, the route to precision is to derive adjectives from the root “ethnic” in differentiating notions of nationhood in their relationship to ethnicity. Logically, one can deduce three distinct ideal types: monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic. One can arrive at these ideal types in two steps through the deductive test of “membership and expression.”

To Aktürk “membership in the political community is the most important outward attribute of nationhood and has significant domestic implications. Membership is denominated by “citizenship.” “Nationhood” is empirically constituted by the sum of citizens; therefore, restricting the acquisition of citizenship to one ethnic group would be the most direct symptom of a systematic effort to create a monoethnic nation. Expression of ethnic differences becomes the key question only if multiple ethnic categories are allowed membership. In such cases, there can be two different models for relating ethnic background to national identity based on the legal-institutional expression of ethnic categories. If multiple ethnic categories are legally and institutionally recognized, then we have a multiethnic regime and if ethnic categories are not legally and institutionally recognized, then we have an antiethnic regime” (Aktürk, 2011; 118-121).

Therefore one can safely say that state policies towards ethnicity dictate the ethnic regime type that the state would adopt; salient still, is the way that ethnicity and ethnic discourse are used by state actors to shape the various state policies towards ethnic regimes and how these discourses (as in the case of Nigeria) are used to shape the political arena. Thus, Sener noted that “state policies on the ethnic background of subjects are not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime types. These policies are mutually reinforcing since they seek to maintain in each regime type” (Aktürk, 2011; 121).

TABLE 1.1: ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NIGERIA⁹

1) Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization,” <i>Journal of Economic Growth</i> , 2003, Vol. 8(2), pp.155-94.	Hausa	21.30%
	Yoruba	21.30%
	Igbo	18.00%
	Fulani	11.20%
	Other Nigeria	8.10%
	Ibibio	5.60%
	Kanuri	4.20%
	Edo	3.40%
	Tiv	2.20%
	Ijaw	1.80%
	Bura	1.70%
Nupe	1.20%	
2) James Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” <i>Journal of Economic Growth</i> , 2003, Vol. 8 (2), pp.195-222.	Hausa-Fulani	29%
	Yoruba	2%
	Middle Belt	18%
	Ibo	17%
	Ibibio-Efik-Ijaw	8%
	Kanuri	5%
	Edo	3%
3) <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i> (2009)	Yoruba	17.5%
	Hausa	17.2%
	Igbo (Ibo)	13.3%

⁹ **Sources:** Şener Aktürk, “Regimes of Ethnicity: A Global Survey and Database of Ethnic Demography and State Policies on Ethnicity”, project sponsored by the European Commission in the 7th Framework Program through a Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant (2010-2014).

	<p>Fulani 10.7%</p> <p>Ibibio 4.1%</p> <p>Kanuri 3.6%</p> <p>Egba 2.9%</p> <p>Tiv 2.6%</p> <p>Igbira 1.1%</p> <p>Nupe 1.0%</p> <p>Edo 1.0%</p> <p>Ijo 0.8% detribalized 0.9%</p> <p>other 23.3%</p>
4) <i>CIA Factbook (2011)</i>	Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups; the following are the most populous and politically influential: Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
5) <i>Ethnologue (2009)</i>	Nigeria Total:141,356,000. Abanyom 12,500 (1986); Abon 1,000 (1973); Abua 25,000 (1989); Abureni 4,000 (2006); Eastern Acipa 5,000 (1993); Western Acipa 20,000 (1995); Aduge 1,900 (1992); Afade 31,000 (2006); Agatu 70,000 (1987); Agoi 12,000 (1989); Agwagwune 20,000 (1973); Ahan 300 (2000); Ake 3,000 (1999); Akpa 26,900 (2000); Akpes 10,000 (1992); Alago 35,100 (2000); Alege 1,200 (1973); Alumu-Tesu 7,000 (1999); Ambo 1,000; Amo 12,300 (2000); Anaang 1,400,000 (1991); Anca 300 (2006); Shuwa Arabic 100,000 (1973); Arigidi 48,000 (1986); Ashe 35,000 (1972); Asu 5,000 (1998); Atsam 30,000 (1972); Awak 6,000 (1995); Ayere 3,000 (1992); Ayu 800 (2003); Baan 5,000 (1990); Baangi 15,000 (1996); Baatonum 100,000 (1995); Bacama 150,000 (1992); Bada 10,000 (1991); Bade 250,000 (1993); Bakpinka 4,000 (2006); Bali 2,000 (1991); Bangwinji 6,000 (1992); Basa 100,000 (1973); Basa-Gurmana 2,000 (1987); Bassa-Kontagora 10 (1987); Bata 150,000 (1992); Batu 25,000; Bauchi 20,000 (1988); Beele 120 (1922); Begbere-Ejat 35,000 (1972); Bekwarra 100,000 (1989); Bena 95,000 (1992); Bena 95,000 (1992); Berom 300,000 (1993); Bete 50 (1992); Bete-Bendi 36,800 (1963); Bile

	<p>30,000 (1992); Bina 7,000 (2000); Biseni 4,800 (1977); Bitare 46,300 (2003); Boga 10,000 (1990); Boghom 59,000 (1973); Boko 40,000 (1995); Bokobaru 30,000 (1997); Bokyi 140,000 (1989); Bole 100,000 (1990); Bo-Rukul 2,000 (1999); Bu 6,000 (1999); Bukwen 1,000; Bumaji 11,400 (2000); Burak 4,000 (1992); Bura-Pabir 250,000 (1987); Bure 500; Buru 1,000; Busa 40,000 (2005); Cakfem-Mushere 5,000 (1990); Cara 3,000 (1999); Cen 2,000; Centuum 200 (1992); Che 100,000 (2003); Cibak 100,000 (1993); Cinda-Regi-Tiyal 30,000 (1995); Cineni 3,000 (1998); Cishingini 100,000 (2004); Ciwogai 2,000 (1995); C'lela 90,000 (1993); Como Karim 11,400 (2000); Cori 1,000 (2004); Daba 1,000 (1992); Dadiya 30,000 (1998); Dass 8,830; Defaka 200 (2001); Degema 10,000 (1999); Dendi 2,050 (2000); Deno 6,000 (1995); Dera 20,000 (1973); Dghwede 30,000 (1980); Dibo 100,000 (1992); Dijim-Bwilim 25,000 (1998); Diri 7,200 (2000); Dirim 9,000 (1992); Doka 11,400 (2000); Doko-Uyanga 200; Dong 5,000 (1998); Duguri 20,000 (1995); Duhwa 800 (1973); Dulbu 100 (1993); Dungu 1,100 (2000); Duwai 11,400 (2000); Dza 20,100 (2000); Ebira 1,000,000 (1989); Ebughu 5,000 (1988); Edo 1,000,000 (1999); Efai 6,320 (2000); Efik 400,000 (1998); Efutop 10,000 (1973); Eggon 140,000 (1990); Ehueun 14,200 (2000); Ejagham 67,300 (2000); Ekajuk 30,000 (1986); Eki 5,000 (1988); Ekit 200,000 (1989); Ekpeye 30,000 (1973); Eleme 58,000 (1990); Eloyi 25,000 (2000); Emai-luleha-Ora 100,000 (1987); Engenni 20,000 (1980); Enwan 14,000 (2006); Enwan (env) 14,000 (2006); Epie 12,000 (1973); Eruwa 64,000 (2004); Esan 200,000 (1973); Etebi 15,000 (1989); Eten 40,000 (2003); Etkywan 50,200 (2000); Etulo 10,000 (1988); Evant 10,000 (1996); Fali 20,000 (1990); Fam 1,000 (1984); Firan 2,500 (2003); Adamawa Fulfulde 7,611,000 (1991); Nigerian Fulfulde 1,710,000 (2000); Fungwa 1,000 (1992); Fyam 3,000; Fyer 26,100 (2000); Gaa 10,000 (1997); Ga'anda 43,000 (1992); Gade 72,100 (2000); Galambu 25,000 (2006); Gamo-Ningi 15,000 (1992); Ganang 3,000 (2007); Gbagyi 700,000 (1991); Gbari 350,000 (2002); Gbiri-Niragu 25,000 (2000); Geji 6,000 (1995); Gengle 4,000; Gera 200,000 (1995); Geruma 9,030 (2000); Ghotuo 9,000 (1994); Giiwo 14,000 (1998); Glavda 28,500 (2000); Goemai 200,000 (1995); Gokana 100,000 (1989); Gude 68,000 (1987); Gudu 5,000 (1993); Guduf-Gava 55,900 (2000); Gun 259,000 (2000); Gupa-</p>
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	<p>Abawa 15,000 (1989); Gurmana 3,000 (1989); Guruntum-Mbaaru 15,000 (1993); Gvoko 20,000 (1990); Gwa 980 (2000); Gwamhi-Wuri 16,000 (2000); Gwandara 27,300 (2000); Gyem 1,000 (1995); Hasha 3,000 (1999); Hausa 18,500,000 (1991); Hide 4,000 (2001); Hone 7,000 (1999); Horom 1,500 (1998); Huba 175,000 (1992); Hungworo 20,000 (2003); Hun-Saare 73,000 (1985); Hwana 32,000 (1992); Hyam 100,000 (1994); Ibani 60,000 (1989); Ibilo 5,000; Ibino 10,000 (1989); Ibuoro 5,000 (1988); Iceve-Maci 5,000 (1990); Idere 5,000 (1988); Idesa 5,690 (2000); Idoma 600,000 (1991); Idon 5,000; Idun 10,000 (1972); Igala 800,000 (1989); Igbo 18,000,000 (1999); Igede 250,000 (1991); Iguta 6,120 (1990); Ugwe 47,800 (2000); Southeast Ijo 71,500 (1977); Ika 22,800 (2000); Iko 5,000 (1988); Ikpeshi 5,320 (2000); Iku-Gora-Ankwa 13,000 (2006); Ikulu 50,000 (1998); Ikwere 200,000 (1973); Ilue 5,000 (1988); Irigwe 40,000 (1985); Isekiri 510,000 (1991); Isoko 423,000 (2001); Ito 5,000 (1988); Itu Mbon Uzo 5,000 (1988); Ivbie North-Okpela-Arhe 20,000 (1973); Iyayu 24,700 (2000); Iyive 1,000 (1992); Izere 50,000 (1993); Izi-Ezaa-Ikwo-Mgbo 593,000 (1973); Izon 1,000,000 (1989); Izora 1,500 (2003); Janji 1,150 (2000); Jara 46,300 (2000); Jarawa 150,000 (1978); Jere 23,000 (1972); Jiba 2,000 (1977); Jibu 30,000 (1997); Jilbe 100; Jimi 1,000 (1995); Jiru 3,420 (2000); Jju 300,000 (1988); Jorto 17,300 (2000); Ju 900 (1993); Jukun Takum 11 (2000); Kaan 10,000 (1992); Kadara 40,000 (1972); Kagoma 25,400 (2000); Kaivi 2,320 (2000); Kakanda 20,000 (1989); Kakihum 15,000 (1996); Kalabari 258,000 (1989); Kam 5,000 (1993); Kamantan 10,000 (1972); Kami 5,000 (1992); Kamo 20,000 (1995); Kamwe 300,000 (1992); Kaningkom-Nindem 12,000 (2008); Kanufi 10,400 (2000); Central Kanuri 3,000,000 (1985); Manga Kanuri 200,000 (1993); Kapyia 200 (2004); Karekare 150,000 (1993); Kariya 2,000 (1995); Khana 200,000 (1989); Kholok 2,500 (1977); Kinuku 500 (1973); Kiong 100 (2004); Kir-Balar 3,050 (1993); Birike 248,000 (1995); Koenem 3,000 (1973); Kofa 1,100 (2003); Kofyar 110,000 (2000); Kohumono 30,000 (1989); Koma 32,000 (1989); Kono 5,520 (2000); Korop 10,200 (2000); Kpan 11,400 (2000); Kpasam 3,000; Kubi 1,500 (1995); Kudu-Camo 42 (1990); Kugama 5,000 (1995); Kugbo 2,000 (1973); Kukele 95,000 (1989); Kulere 15,600 (1990); Kulung 15,000 (1973); Kumba 3,420 (2000); Kupa 20,000</p>
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	<p>(1998); Kurama 40,300 (2000); Kushi 11,000 (1995); Kutep 44,600 (2000); Kutto 3,000 (1995); Kuturmi 10,500 (2000); Kwa 7,000 (1992); Kwaami 10,000 (1990); Kyak 5,000 (1995); Kuyenga 4,000 (1995); Labir 13,000 (2006); Laka 5,000 (1995); Lala-Roba 46,000 (1993); Lamang 40,000 (1993); Lame 10,000 (1995); Lamja-Dengsa-Tola 3,420 (2000); Laru 5,000 (1995); Leelau 5,000 (1995); Legbo 60,000 (1989); Lemoro 10,000 (1998); Lenyima 13,000 (2006); Lere 16,328 (2000); Leyigha 10,000 (1989); Lijili 50,000 (1985); Limbum few (1992); Lokaa 120,000 (1989); Longuda 32,000 (1973); Loo 8,000 (1992); Lopa 5,000 (1996); Lubila 11,400 (2000); Lufu 3,200 (2006); Luri 2 (2004); Maaka 10,000 (1993); Mada 100,000 (1993); Mafa 4,910 (2000); Maghdi 2,000 (1992); Mak 5,690 (2000); Mala 6,630 (2000); Mama 20,000 (1973); Nigeria Mambila 99,000 (1993); Mangas 100 (1995); Marghi Central 158,000 (2006); Marghi South 166,000 (2006); Mashi 1,000; Mbe 14,300 (1973); Cross River Mbembe 100,000 (1982); Tigon Mbembe 20,000 (1987); Mboi 19,000 (1992); Mbongno 3,000 (1999); Mbula-Bwazza 40,600 (2000); Mburku 12,000 (2000); Mingang Doso 3,000 (1995); Niship 6,000 (1976); Mom Jango 104,000 (2000); Montol 21,900 (1990); Moo 5,000 (1998); Mumuye 400,000 (1993); Mundat 1,000 (1998); Mvanip 100 (1999); Mwaghavul 295,000 (1993); Nde-Nsele-Nta 19,500 (1987); Ndoe 7,340 (2000); Ndoola 60,300 (2000); Ndun 3,000 (2003); Ndunda 350 (1999); Ngamo 60,000 (1993); Ngas 400,000 (1998); Nggwahyi 2,000 (1995); Ngizim 80,000 (1993); Ngwaba 10,000 (1993); Ningye 3,990 (2000); Ninzo 35,000 (1973); Njerep 6 (2000); Nkari 5,000 (1998); Nkem-Nkum 34,500 (1987); Nkoroo 4,550 (1989); Nkukoli 1,000 (1973); Nnam 3,000 (1987); Numana-Nunku-Gbantu-Numbu 30,000 (2003); Nungu 50,000 (1999); Nupe-Nupe-Tako 800,000 (1990); Nyam 100 (2006); Nyeng 2,000 (2003); Nzanyi 77,000 (1993); Obanliku 65,000 (1989); Obolo 200,000 (1996); Obulom 3,420 (2000); Odual 18,000 (1989); Odut 20 (1980s); Ogbah 170,000 (1993); Ogbia 200,000 (1989); Ogbogolo 10,000 (1995); Ogbronuagum 12,000 (2000); Okobo 50,000 (1991); Okodia 3,600 (1977); Oko-Eni-Osayan 10,000 (1989); Okpamheri 30,000 (1973); Okpe 25,400 (2000); Olulumo-Ikom 30,000 (1989); Oring 75,000 (1989); Oro 75,000 (1989); Oruma 5,000 (1995); Ososo 19,000 (2000); Otank 3,000 (1973); Pa'a 8,000</p>
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(1995); Panawa 3,500 (2003); Pe 4,000 (2003); Pero 25,000 (1995); Piti 5,530 (2000); Piya-Kwonci 5,000 (1992); Polci 22,000 (1995); Pongu 30,000 (2003); Psikye 12,000 (1992); Putai 50; Putukwam 12,000 (1973); Pyapun 17,300 (2000); Reshe 44,000 (1993); Ron 115,000 (1995); Ruma 5,090 (2000); Samba Daka 107,000 (2000); Samba Leko 62,000 (2000); Sanga 20,100 (2000); Sasaru 12,500 (2000); Saya 50,000 (1973); Sha 3,000 (1998); Shakara 3,000 (2003); Shall-Zwall 8,900 (2004); Shama-Sambuga 5,000 (1995); Shanga 5,000 (1995); Sheni 6 (2004); Shiki 1,200 (2006); Shoo-Minda-Nte 10,000 (1973); Shuwa-Zamani 1,000 (1973); Siri 3,800 (2006); Somyev 18 (2000); Sukur 14,800 (1992); Sur 5,000 (1998); Surubu 7,170 (2000); Tal 10,000 (1973); Tala 1,000 (1993); Tambas 3,000 (2001); Tangale 130,000 (1995); Tanjijili 8,540 (2000); Tarok 300,000 (1998); Tedaga 2,000 (1990); Tee 313,000 (2006); Teme 4,000 (1995); Tera 101,000 (2000); Tha 1,000 (1998); Tita 3,420 (2000); Tiv 2,210,000 (1991); Toro 3,930 (2000); Tsikimba 100,000 (2004); Tsishingini 100,000 (2004); Tso 16,000 (1992); Tsvadi 150,000 (1998); Tula 30,000 (1998); Tumi 2,270 (2000); Tunzuii 2,500 (2003); Tyap 130,000 (1993); Ubaghara 30,000 (1985); Ubang 3,420 (2000); Uda 10,000 (1988); Uhami 13,600 (2000); Ukaan 18,000 (1973); Ukpe-Bayobiri 12,000 (1973); Ukpét-Ehom 11,400 (2000); Ukue 14,100 (2000); Ukwa 100 (2004); Ukwuani-Aboh-Ndoni 150,000 (1973); Ulukwumi 10,000 (1992); Umon 20,000 (1995); Uneme 19,800 (2000); Urhobo 546,000 (1993); ut-Ma'in 36,000 (1992); Uvbie 19,800 (2000); Uzekwe 5,000 (1973); Vaghat-Ya-Bijim-Legeri 20,000 (2003); Vemgo-Mabas 10,000 (1993); Vono 500 (1973); Vute 1,000 (1973); Waja 60,000 (1989); Waka 5,000 (1992); Wandala 20,000 (1993); Wannu 4,000; Wapan 100,000 (1994); Warji 77,700 (2000); Wom 5,000 (1989); Yace 50,000 (2002); Yala 50,000 (1973); Yamba few (1990); Yangkam 100 (1996); Yedina 3,000; Yekhee 274,000 (1995); Yendang 62,600 (1987); Yeskwa 13,000 (1973); Yoruba 18,900,000 (1993); Yukuben 15,000 (1992); Zangwal 100 (1993); Zari 20,700 (2000); Zarma 87,800 (2000); Zeem 400 (2003); Ziriya 2,000; Zumbun 2,000 (1995).

DEFINING KEY TERMS: NATIONALISM, ETHNIC GROUP, DEMOCRATISATION, ETHNIC CONFLICT

At this point in this study, the clarification of some basic concepts becomes expedient, in order to avoid ambiguity. While there are no generalised definition of most concepts like “nationalism” in the social sciences, Ernest Gellner’s definition is widely used. According to him, nationalism is, “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983; 1). By the political (unit) he signifies the “state” while the national (or cultural unit), in a sense refers to the “nation”. In other words the nationalism principle holds that the state, which is the organisation that exercises sovereign authority over a given territory or country, most do so, on behalf of a given nation — defined as a group of people who feel they share a common culture (Snyder 2000, 22).

Expanding on Gellner’s definition Snyder defined nationalism as “a doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institution or principle should rule themselves in a political system that express and protect those distinctive characteristics”. Thus for Snyder, a nation is “a group of people who see themselves in these terms and who aspire to self rule” (Snyder, 2000; 23). Judging from the above definitions of a nation, one could deduce a distinction between the definition of a “nation” and that of an “ethnic group”. This distinction is further made clear by Anthony Smith who sees ethnic group (or ethnies) as having a unique distinctive consciousness based on common language and/or culture, myths of common lineage or ancestry, while, a nation is one who seeks political autonomy or self rule for itself (Smith 1986, chapter 1 and 2). This study is centred primarily on the former — ethnic group.

However, for the purpose of this study, I adopt Max Weber definition of ethnic group as “those groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonialization

and migration; this belief is important for the propagation of group formation; conversely it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996; 35). With the exclusion of the necessity of blood relationship, I would expand on this subjective belief to incorporate “religion”. Thus ethnic group within this study is used to indicate cultural/linguistic groups (as the, Hausa’s, Yoruba’s, Bini’s, Tiv’s, and Igbo’s) and/or religious groups, such as Christians and Muslims. However, it should be mentioned here that, this group formation could either be self-defined or super-imposed for outside (Smith Z. K, 2000, 24). Therefore the key to note here is that, group membership often results in collective benefits or liabilities (Cohen 1997, 608).

Democratisation on the other hand, is defined as a situation in which a state begins to adopt democratic characteristics (such as periodic elections, civil liberties, freedom of speech, association and of the press among other), even if they retain some non-democratic features (Snyder, 2000; 26). Finally I adopt Zeric Kay Smith’s (2000; 24). definition of ethnic conflict; which is “a range of events from articulation of discontent, protest, mobilisation, confrontation, sporadic and sustained violence, and civil war or insurrection, in which ethnicity plays a significant role”.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON DEMOCRATISATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT INCREASE IN ETHNIC CONFLICT

There appear to be some consensus that from the end of the Second World War, the level of interstate wars has drastically reduced when compared with the first half of that century. However, within the second half of the century there has also being a drastic increase of intra-state/civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Byman and Van Evera, 1998). For instance, 25 inter-state wars has been recorded within 1945-1999 with about 3.3 million deaths with at least 1,000 death records and 100 from each conflicting sides. Meanwhile, within the same

period 127 intrastate or civil wars; with about 16.2 million deaths — with at least 1,000 deaths and 25 from each side was recorded¹⁰.

Thus Byman and Van Evera, (1998; 23) argued that, “from the end of Second World War, civil/inter-state war has replaced international war as the dominant form of war and has almost replaced it as the only form of war”. Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1996; 354) noted that “intra-state wars outnumbered purely inter-state wars worldwide by 43-3 in 1989, 44-3 in 1990, 49-1 in 1991, 52-1 in 1992, 42-0 in 1993 and again in 1994 and 34-1 in 1995”. What account for this change? The need to understand this growing trend of civil/ethnic conflict within this period has resulted in a large body of literature with divergent explanation.

CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

For nationalism scholar, in a nationalist age, when the major national (ethnic) groups are excluded from the control of state power, they may feel aggrieved and revote (in a sense, violently) against the political arrangement. As Gellner (1983; 1) put it, “but there is one particular form of the violation of the nationalist principle to which nationalist sentiment: if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation (ethnic group) other than that of the ruled, this, for nationalist, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety.” In other words, nationalist, civil or ethnic conflicts are eminent in countries where the state is controlled by ethnic minority.

Byman and Van Evera on the other hand noted that the “collapse of empire”— colonial and in more recent times, that of the Soviet and Yugoslav empires has spike an increase in civil/ethnic conflicts across Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. According to them, the collapse of empires can cause ethnic conflict in five overlapping ways. As such ethnic conflict is eminent when; 1) the government in the successor states lack legitimacy. 2) The

¹⁰ The above quotation of the number of ethnic/civil wars that has been recorded was gotten from Fearon and Laitin, (2003) article “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”.

state is weak in its ability to deter violence within its borders. 3) The successor states have weak or porous borders. 4) The population in the successor state is made up of different hostile groups. 5) The right and duties of the major power are not well defined.

Byman and Evera also put forth that, except for the lack of legitimacy, the other causes of ethnic conflict would not be a major cause of ethnic violence in the nearest future. To them, however the state respond to the lack of legitimacy, it would always result to ethnic conflict. As state actors have in the past reacted to the lack of legitimacy in two ways; by hunkering down and through democratization. By hunkering down — state actors usually would relying on a narrower base of support to stay in power. Such a move, however, can provoke further dissent and violence. As the various issues that provoke legitimacy crisis (corruption, a lack of accountability, demands for a say in decision making, among others) are exacerbated by the hunkering down process.

DEMOCRATISATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

Within democratic peace literature, it is well established that (mature) democracies do not go to war one against another. Thus in a sense, the more democratic states become across the world, the more likely it is for us to achieve global peace. To this end President Bill Clinton argued in the State of the Union in 1994, that, “supporting democratization would be an antidote to international war and civil strife”. President George W. Bush on the other hand, proposed to fight against terrorism by spreading liberal democracy to the Middle East.¹¹

However, plausible the above argument may be, democratisation in ex-authoritarian regimes and in multi-ethnic states has proven otherwise in most cases; as democratisation has come to trigger unprecedented internal conflict. To this end, two distinct opinions have

¹¹ Bill Clinton quotation was gotten from Jack Snyder book “From Voting to Violence — Democratization and Nationalist conflict” 2000; 1. While President George W. Bush statement, was from Jack Snyder’s article, “One world, Rival Theories”. 2004; 2.

emerged in Democratisation and Ethnic/Nationalist Conflict literature. Demet Mousseau (2001; 550-551) referred to this dichotomy as “democracy as a method of conflict management” and “democracy as a source of grievance and channel for conflict” in multi-ethnic societies.

Proponents of democracy as a method of conflict management argue that as nations democratise the less likely it would be, for them to experience high level of political violence. This argument is based on the fact that democratic regimes are legitimate and mostly accepted by the citizenry since it allows for political participation through a nonviolent means; as democratic regimes tolerate the differences among culture by emphasising negotiation and reconciliation between them (Demet Mousseau, 2001; 550).

Reacting to such assertion Saideman et. al (2002; 103) stated that “there was a decline in the proportion of liberal democracies after 1992 and that these decline has been followed by a decrease in the number of new ethnic conflicts. These apparent trends should give scholar pause before recommending democracy as a solution to ethnic conflict”. To this end Snyder (2000; 19) argued that “the trend that the liberals thought would bring an end to ethnic/national conflict has ironically fuelled ethnic and nationalist rivalry”. This is so, as election (which is a key factor in democracy) often sharp ethnic and national difference. Thus Nationalist demagogues exploit the increase in the freedom of the press in some new democracies to hijack public debate for illiberal purposes. In similar fashion other scholars has come to see democratisation as a stimulant for ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) for example, claim that, “democratic elections in deeply divided societies are often perceived as zero-sum and as such ethnic groups that lose in an

election tend to reject the democratic institution and appeal through ethnicity to violent means”¹².

According Snyder (2000; chapter 2) partial democratisation and partial freedom of the press occurs before the outbreak of ethnic/nationalist conflict. Thus nationalist/ethnic agitations are usually non-existent or weak among a large number of the population before democratisation. Popular nationalism and ethnic agitations comes alive in the early stages of democratisation, when elites use nationalist/ethnic appeal to compete for popular support. This they do, by exploiting the states’ weak democratic institutions, hijacking the mass media and by dividing the state into segments in which they monopolise the supply of information that these segments get. Thus increase in the freedom of the press often leads to the outburst of nationalist mythmaking because democratising states are likely to have high degrees of imperfect political marketplaces where nationalist/ethnic myths are fuelled rather than refuted. The type of nationalist/ethnic agitation that emerges during democratisation depends heavily on the level of economic development, the adaptability of elite’s interest and the strength of the country’s political and administrative institutions. Furthermore, he noted that four ideal types of nationalism — Ethnic, civil, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary emerges based on their appeal for collective good and on the conditions for exclusion and inclusion.

Civil nationalism being the most inclusion form of nationalism produces the list form of political violence, while the other three are prone to produce a higher degree of political violence in the early stages of democratisation. Ethnic nationalism, which is an exclusionary form of nationalism, could provoke conflict through the use of ethnic campaign that often identify a neighbouring or minority ethnic groups as enemies of the nation which are to be excluded from full right of citizenship, disarmed, dominated or expelled from the nation.

¹² Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) quotation was gotten from D. Y. Muosseau article “Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?”

However, in situation where these excluded groups have the ability and capacity to resist, the end result would inevitably be violent ethnic conflict (Snyder, 2000; 45-92).

Another formidable school of thought in the democratisation and ethnic conflict literature is the school that Snyder (2000; 33) refer to as “primordial popular rivalry”. To this group, ethnic conflicts that are intensified in the early stages of democratisation strung from the long standing ethnic animosity between these groups. When national/ethnic groups that are agitating for self rule (based on enmity for each other, are held together in a single state and) are called upon to vote; election becomes a perfect ground to express their long held resentment (Hannum 1996). Another form of old animosity that is explained within the literature, is that of a long standing tyrannical domination by the major ethnic group or what Byman and Van Evera referred to as “communal hegemony”.

In communal hegemonic situation, violence often results when hegemonic groups (such as ethnic, religious, clan or class) seek to impose their way of life on others, particularly on peoples that have a well-developed group identity of their own. The violence-causing effects of communal hegemony arises when the oppressed groups are freer to go on a rampage, and are more likely to provoke defensive violence, when an empire collapses, regime legitimacy declines, or central power weakens as a result of the move towards democratisation (Byman and Van Evera ,1998; 4).

Although a number of empirical study have been done differently to prove how democratisation could breed ethnic violence as show above. This study contributes to the growing scholarly debate or knowledge in the field of democratisation and ethnic conflict by showing the various ways through which the different ethnic groups in new democracies interact politically. It also shows how this interaction is structured in such a way that makes

ethnic conflict inevitable, as (the Nigerian) state move through the democratisation phase to consolidate their nascent democracy.

Furthermore, this study agrees with Snyder that, ethnic conflict between groups need not necessarily be of primordial origin. This I argue based on the lack of concrete empirical evidence of primordial enmity between the Christian South and the Muslim North prior to the introduction of contemporary politics in Nigeria. This study further shows how the lost/shift of communal hegemonic power or what I call the assumed strategic power position of the major ethnic group in Nigeria, is interpreted by the various political elites along ethno-religious lines. These interpretations are then supplied to the segmented groups as political information, in the bid to mobilise these groups for their political advantage in the coming election(s). In the Nigerian case, while this present trend has not resulted in an outright civil war, ethnic conflict is already very visible.

Meanwhile within the Nigerian political history presented in the following chapter, I show how the political agitation along ethno-regional blocs in Nigeria's first (republic or) move from colonial or imperial domination to democratisation resulted in the Nigerian civil war. Judging from the Nigerian political history, I argued that if the high political tension that is rapidly mounting up between the Christian South and the Muslim North in Nigeria's fourth republic is not checked, it would inevitably end up in another civil war just like that of the first republic.

STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

A considerable attention has been given to explaining what produces political outcomes both in advance and new democracies over the years in the academic circle with special reference here to the effects and influence of political mobilization (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Abramson and Claggett 2001; Holbrook and McClurg 2005.), Clientelism (Lemarchand,

1972; Van de Walle 2003; Wantchekon, 2003) and ethnicity (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Lien, P. 1994) on the voting behaviour of the electorates.

However more research is needed, I believe, in enhancing our understanding of what actually transpire in the socio-economic and political sphere of a country such as Nigeria to produce such a hard-line polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious blocs of the Christian South and Muslim North in the 2011 presidential elections. This is so because most of the existing hypotheses developed to explain political outcome did not do too well in explaining what factor(s) actually account for such an outcome.

It is this gap within the literatures on political mobilization and participation that this study sets out to fill. Studying and understanding the actual factors or events that took place within society to cumulate into producing the polarization of electoral support in new democracies, especially in developing countries (as embarked by this study) which have a bipolar religious affiliation and multi-ethnic groups as in the case of India and Nigeria is central to and contribute to scholarly research by enhancing our substantive understanding and knowledge of what happens prior to the election and how these events are interpreted and use as a means of political mobilization during elections and after elections in these countries.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

There are four remaining chapters of this study. In the second chapter I presented the political history of Nigeria from the Pre-Colonial era, through the Colonial era, the First, Second, and Third Republics to show the historical roots and development of the North and South cleavages in Nigerian politics. I also explained how the three phenomena (namely: ethnic, religious appeal and the zoning principle) that were used intermittently by political practitioners to shape political outcomes in the four presidential elections conducted so far in the fourth republic were formed and maintained over time in the Nigerian politics.

Within the third chapter, an overview of the first two presidential elections (that is the 1999 and 2003 presidential election) in the fourth republic was given from which the explanatory power of the various hypotheses or alternative explanations were tested. I also presented my explanation or argument of what best explain or made the various political actors to start behaving instrumentally and how these behaviour led to the production of the first ever symptom of the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious blocs of the Christian South and Muslim North.

In the fourth chapter an overview of the 2007 presidential election was given. An explanation of how President Yar'Adua used his power position to return state power to the North by reinstating key northerner bureaucrats to the various major power positions mention above. Within the chapter I presented the events that surrounded President Yar'Adua's illness and how his illness constituted a threat that became a reality after the North lost once again the major seat of authority in the country (that is, after president Jonathan became the president of the federation). I also showed within this chapter how the lost of the major seat of power by the North was interpreted and how threat, ethnicity and religion was used instrumentally by political and religious practitioners in both the North and the South and how this event cumulated in the polarization of the 2011 presidential election across ethno-religious blocs of the Christian South and Muslim North. Finally a summary of the entire study was given in the last chapter from which recommendation on future study on post electoral violence and the systematic construction and/or use of militancy and religious sect for or against the region that is in power.

CHAPTER TWO

NIGERIAN POLITICAL HISTORY

Politics, elections and/or the electoral process are intended to usher in and guarantee the integrity of democratic rules through which the majority of the people being informed deliberately determine their leaders, who will oversee the affairs of the state on their behalf. This is so as elections only have meaning for most people in a democratic context, because they lead to the choice of decision makers by the majority of citizens. Elections and democracy are therefore inextricably linked (Ibrahim, 2009; 2).

In Nigeria like in other developing countries in Africa and around the world, this process has been hijacked and its purpose defeated to serve the desires of a few elites and configured to deliberately marginalize the majority of the people. Politics today in Nigeria is characterized as a means of guaranteeing access to state resources which are appropriated for personal and parochial use. Therefore, politics as an act has been Hobbesian and violent in nature, a zero sum game in which the Machiavellian principle of the end justifies the means is held in great esteem as long as one captures state power (Fawole, 2005; 149).

At different times and in more recent times, periodically, Nigerians are called upon to perform their civil duties by participating en masse in the electoral process. A process in which they never or do not necessarily have the power and/or choice in determining the actual winner or loser in the election, as these elections are flawed with manipulations through plethora of ingenious and less than subtle means. Such means include the outright and bared faced rigging, pre-election ballot box stuffing, disappearance of ballot boxes and its subsequent substitution, destruction of ballot boxes and disruption of voting in opponent strongholds, intimidation of voters, bribing of electoral officers among others (Fawole, 2005; 149-150). In more recent times post election violence within and between ethnic groups is

becoming very visible in the Nigeria society. This chapter look back into the political history of Nigeria by presenting as much as possible the manner through which political practitioners became engaged in politics and how politics have over time being played along religious and ethnic lines, which they have invariably maintained or one that has led to today's' polarization of electoral support between the North and South.

2.1. POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA IN NIGERIA

Prior to the partitioning of Africa in 1884-1885 among the European powers and the subsequent occupation of these territories they were no such state as Nigeria. Rather, what we had were kingdom, empires, towns and villages, what could be commonly referred to, as nations or city-states, such as the Oyo, Ife and Ijebu kingdoms in the South-Western region of Nigeria. The Binis, Ijaws, Urhobo, Itsekiri kingdoms in the South-Southern region, the Igala's, Tiv's in the Middle Belt¹³ or central Nigeria, the Sokoto caliphate, Katsina, Kano, Zaria nation-state in the Northern part of today's Nigeria and the Igbo (Ibo) communities in the South-Eastern part of Nigeria among others. These nations or city-states before their conquest were independent one from the other but systematically interacting with one another through trade, inter group married, war/conquest. It is necessary to note that the inter-

¹³ The Middle Belt is usually used as a geographical term to refer to the central region of Nigeria that stretches across the country's latitude. That is the region that separates the core North from the South. The definition of the Middle Belt is subject to great debate because of the cultural mixed and the strong presence the Hausa - Fulani and the Yoruba's in some of the states in the region. However the region is predominantly made up of Minority ethnic groups, who were dominated by the major ethnic groups. During the colonial era and in the first republic the Middle Belt region was under the Northern region where they were subjugated and denied political and economic opportunities. Thus from independence these various groups has come to form solidarities (such as the United Middle Belt Congress) in order for them to gain political, economic, ethnic and to some extent religious liberation and expression in Nigerian polity. Based on the colonial and political experience in the first republic, some of these groups do not support Northern political leaders as such. Evidence to this claim is seen in the result of the four presidential elections held so far in the country.

marriage and trade relationships were more of regional intra-relations than it was across longer distance.

Politically these nations were administered differently — for instance, in the West, the Oyo Empire operated a cabinet system of government with an unwritten constitutional system of check and balances, where the Alaafin (the king) who was responsible for the day to day running of the empire was checked by the Oyo Mesi. The Oyo Mesi (is the council of chiefs representing the people in their various regions) had the power to appoint and to remove the king. This group on the other hand was checked by the Ogboni society (a Yoruba Earth cult).

In the North, the Hausa's operated a somewhat absolute monarchical system, where the Emir of Sokoto (was perceived and) ruled as both a political and religious leader of the people using the Sharia law. While the Igbo's in the Eastern part of the country practiced a kind of direct democratic system of mass representation, where every adult member of the society/community came together to make decision on issues that affects the whole communities with no definite or absolute personality like a king. They also at other period in their history, practiced indirect representation — where the elders of the various clans would meet at the market square to deliberate on issues from which decisions reached would be passed on to the various clans through these elders (Harneit-Sievers, 1998; 59-60).

2.2. COLONIAL RULE AND THE INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN NIGERIA

The political administrative systems of these people living within the confines of today's Nigeria came to a halt, when the British (colonizers) took over the geographical location in 1900 and established a new system of administration — The Indirect Rule System; where the colonizers used local authorities to execute their rules. At first, (that is from 1900 onward) the

territory was divided into the South Protectorate and the colony of Lagos in the South and the North Protectorate in the North and was administered differently.

The above arrangement I argue, was the genesis of ethnic division in Nigeria along the South and North blocs, which is now very visible or inherent in the Nigerian political discourse. The ethnic and/or regional division in Nigeria today, is in a sense, a British creation. This argument is justified on the ground that, the Britons did nothing from the beginning to set in motion mechanism for state or nation building. However, for effective administration of the entire country as a single entity/colony, it was thought by the colonizers that, merging both the South and North protectorates will be more needful as the South had more/ surplus resources, which was needed to supplement the deficits arising from the North. This led to the amalgamation of the North and South protectorates. The successful amalgamation of these two protectorates in 1914 gave birth to the country — Nigeria (Ballard, 1971; 333-335).

However, as the Britons consolidated their stay, it soon became clear that the indirect rule system has its own problems. These problems were due in part, to the fact that some of the rulers that were trained to represent and administer these various communities on behalf of the colonizers were not from royal families and they were very corrupt. Thus there was a need for a new and better system of administering the country. This led to the adoption of the various constitutions for the country by the colonizers that gradually introduced the adoption of the adult suffrage and invariably led to the introduction of contemporary politics in the country.

The first constitution ever adopted in Nigeria was the 1922 Clifford Constitution. Unique to this constitution was the establishment of an Executive Council for the whole country and a Nigerian Legislative Council which included four unofficially elected Nigerians

(they are called unofficial because they are not Britons) three of them represented the colony of Lagos and one for Calabar¹⁴ (Itse Sagay, 2003¹⁵; Fawole 2005; 51). This Legislative Council, however, was one-sided as it was restricted solely to the Southern region (as both the colony of Lagos and Calabar are basically in the Southern region), while the governor remained the sole legislative authority for the Northern region.

Unlike the 1922 Constitution, the 1946 (Richard) Constitution created the three regions and the Regional Houses of Assembly for the Western, Eastern and Northern regions. Although these regional houses were not empowered to legislate, they only made recommendations on issues relating to their region. They also had the ability/right to nominate the unofficial member in the National Legislative Council, which was made up of twenty-eight unofficial members, sixteen official members and the governor who was the president of the council. And like the 1922 Constitution four of the unofficial members were elected.

Without a doubt, it is true and should be mentioned here that, it was colonialism and the introduction of the various constitutional legislative systems in the colonial era that brought about political participation, party formation and the various types of suffrage that was adopted across the country. In other words, the introduction of the constitutional legislative system gave birth to contemporary politics in Nigeria. However, I argue that the introduction of the constitutional legislative system also laid the foundation for regional and ethnic political loyalty as opposed to that of the centre. This regional and ethnic loyalty has lingered over time and is definitely responsible for the polarization of electoral support and post-election conflicts along ethnic boundaries in Nigeria's fourth republic.

¹⁴ The city of Calabar and the colony of Lagos was important to the colonizers because they are the two cities that had access to the Atlantic Ocean, through which the Britons brought in supplies for their administrators and exported natural resources and agricultural products from Nigeria to Britain. Hence, they were given greater political privileges by allowing them to have elected representatives.

¹⁵ <http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/sagay.html>

This is due in part to the contradictory administrative apparatus put in place by the colonialists. The systems of administration adopted was contradictory, in that it forcefully brought these independent and heterogeneous people/entities into a single entity called Nigeria, yet maintaining through the policy of indirect rule, the distinctiveness of these peoples. The colonizers did not (deliberately to) a large extent put any apparatus of nation building in place that will lead to a mix and build in the people the sense of oneness and nationhood. To this end Adebisi (1999) pointed out that, “the seeds of ethnic violence in Nigeria were sown by the British with the adoption of a divide and rule tactics, which later robbed Nigerians of the common front for nation building”¹⁶.

While the Legislative Councils of the above constitutions did create an avenue for interaction between the various regions, in the long run, it deepened the North-South divide (especially the Clifford constitution). This argument is based on the fact that the Northern region was for a long time not part of the council until 1947 (Tamuno, 1970; 566). The decision to isolate the North, was based the fact that, the colonialist at their arrival found the North easy to take over with little or no resistance, as the absolute nature of the Emir’s made the indirect rule to flourish with ease in the Northern part of Nigeria. Thus in order to maintain this relationship, the governors at that time though it fit to close the Northern region up so that they will not be influenced by the other region(s), therefore making the Northern region less educated and politically less vibrant, when compared to the West and Eastern regions.

Subsequently, this practice brought about suspicion of and the fear of domination of the North by the South, and an unhealthy competition between the West and East in the Southern region and later between the three regions. This fear was expressed in the form of

¹⁶ The above quotation was put forth by Abdullahi, A. A., & Saka, L. (2007). Ethno-Religious and Political Conflicts: Threat to Nigeria Nascent Democracy. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 9(3) in page 28.

separatist threat (Njoku, 2002; 250), first by the North, in 1950, at the conference held in Ibadan — with the sole aim of reviewing the 1946 Richard constitution. At the conference, the Northern region representatives (the Emir of Zaria and Katsina) made it clear that, unless the Northern region was allotted 50 per cent of the seats in the Central Legislature, it would ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before 1914. This arrangement as mentioned above was the separate administration for the North and South. Thus they opposed and rejected the committees' recommended ratio of 45:33:33 for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Regions respectively (Sagay 2003; Tamuno, T. N. 1970; 567-568).

This gave birth to the struggle for political power in the country. It is worth mentioning here, that as the colonizers were preparing to take their leave they intended for and fashion Nigerian politics along the parliamentary system of Britain, where the party that wins the majority of seats form the government. From this, one could infer that the Region that has the majority of seats control the government. Hence the Northerners fought systematically for a power position that will equal the position of the other regions, so that in forming the government or making any political decisions the Northern input will supersede that of the other regions or will be equivalent to theirs.

TABLE 2.1: The Number Of Seats Allotted To The Various Regions After The 1946 Deliberations.

REGIONS	NUMBERS OF SEATS ALLOTTED
North	174
East	73
West	62
Lagos	2

Source: Nigeria electoral process in perspective. <http://www.dawodu.com/election.pdf>

The result from the debate and compromises made/reached, led to the formation of the 1951 (Macpherson) Constitution (Itse Sagay, 2003; Tekena N. Tamuno 1970; 568). This constitution incorporated more Nigerians and gave them more legislative rights than the other

constitutions. It also gave more legislative rights to the regions, as Udo Udoma noted that, “for the first time in the history of the foundation of British-Nigerian relationship and the establishment of Nigeria's regions by the Richard's Constitution of 1946, Regional Legislatures were granted powers to legislate over a variety of subjects within the Region. The power to legislate covered the following sphere: Local government; town and country planning; agriculture and fisheries; education; public works for the region; public health in the region; forestry; veterinary services; land; welfare; local industries; native courts; (subject to central legislation regarding appeals to courts outside the regions); direct taxation (other than income tax and companies tax)”¹⁷.

The 1951 constitution however did not necessarily eradicate the fear or prejudice from among the regions; as the motion (raised in 1953) for independence by the year 1956 triggered another separatist threat from the Northern delegates who argued that, Nigeria would be not ready and that they (the North) are not ready for independence in 1956. The debate over Lagos (which was the federal capital at that time) to be free, that is, to be independent from all the regions, again brought another separatist threat from the delegates of the Western region who claimed that Lagos is part of the Yoruba land and should be administered as such (Njoku, 2002; 50-51; Tekena N. Tamuno 1970; 569). This struggle for the strategic positions and threat to secede still lingers on even until recent times. Classic among these struggles is the coup d'état that brought the first republic to its end. This coup initially enthroned an Eastern military leader by name Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi. In the same year another counter coup dethroned him while returning state power to the North — a struggle for state power that led to the threat of and the eventual secession of the Eastern region. Thus the Nigeria civil war was fought, to stop the Eastern region from going through with the

¹⁷ The above quotation was derived from Itse Sagay article “Federalism, the Constitution and Resource Control” <http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/sagay.html>.

secession. However, before detailed analysis of the events would be given, it is expedient for us to consider the election that led Nigeria to independence.

2.3. 1959 GENERAL ELECTIONS

With the introduction of the Clifford Constitution came the introduction of (political) party system in Nigeria. It is worth mentioning here that since the introduction of party politics in Nigeria all the constitutions ever developed adopted the multi party system, except the Ibrahim Babangida military administration. Prior to the June 12th, 1993 election, the Babangida administration aborted the multi party system and advocated for a two political party system for Nigeria, with the objective of eradicating ethnicity from Nigeria politics (Ojie, 2006; 554-555). Therefore the incursion of multi-party system in the early days of Nigeria's democracy led to the formation of political parties along ethnic lines.

Table 2.2: The Major Political Parties, Their Leaders and Regional Affiliations in First Republic (1959-1966)

Names of Parties	Political Leaders	Regional Affiliations
Northern People's Congress (NPC)	Sir Ahmadu Bello	Northern region
Group (AG)	Chief Obafemi Awolowo	Western Region
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC)	Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe	Eastern region

Source: Nigeria electoral process in perspective. <http://www.dawodu.com/election.pdf>

Thus by the wake of the 1959 general election three major political parties had emerged in the country¹⁸, all of them was organized around an ethno-regional leader(s) and

¹⁸ Here it should be noted that, these three major political parties mentioned above were not the only existing parties at the time of the 1959 election. They were other parties such as the Democratic Party of Nigeria and Cameroon (DPNC), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), Borno Youth Movement (BYM), United National Independence Party (UNIP) (The Nigerian Electoral Process in Perspective); however the key actors that shaped the election were from the three parties mentioned above.

each party had a region as its strong hold. The Action Group (AG) dominated the Western region and the colony of Lagos and was headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), (which was later renamed as National Council of Nigerian Citizens when the Southern Cameroon decided to part from Nigeria and merge with Republic of Cameroon in 1963¹⁹) and had been argued to be the only party that had a more nationalistic view, dominated the Eastern region and was led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. While the Northern People's Congress (NPC) dominated the Northern region and was headed by Sir Ahmadu Bello, as seen in table 2 above.

Subsequently as the flag for campaign for the 1959 election was raised, the above formation led to two scenarios. First, it gave a mutual advantage of forming the government to the NPC which dominated the North. The Northern region already had 50 percent or (more) of the seats in the central legislature from the compromised reached at the 1946 conference (as mentioned above). This led to a situation where the NPC did not see it fit to reach out to the other regions, as Larry Diamond (1983) noted that the “astonishing fact was that the Northern Emir-controlled Government party, the NPC, did not even need to fight its opponents in the West and East. They could sit back and let the Southerners fight each other. The NPC contested only one seat in the West and none at all in the East”. As such, the NPC concentrated on consolidating their presence in the Northern region by trying to suppress minor political party that sprung out of the region and by distorting the campaign of the other major political parties through religious and ethnic appeals, as well as, the use of hoodlums to attack their campaigns.

¹⁹ Cameroon after the Berlin conference was under German colonial rule until the defeat of the Germans in the Second World War. After the war the country was divided into two, Southern Cameroon and the Republic of Cameroon which was given to Britain and France respective as punishment. For effective administration therefore, the Britons added the Southern Cameroon to the Eastern Region of Nigeria. But when Nigeria and Cameroon got their independence, Southern Cameroon and the Republic of Cameroon decided to reunite themselves and form the Republic of Cameroon as it is today in the year 1963.

Second, while the NPC had an advantage, none of the other major political parties could form the government by depending on their region alone. Thus each of these parties' leaders had to infiltrate the strong hold of the other regions. The major strategy for doing this was to appeal through ethnicity, as a result creating an unhealthy competition through ethnic mobilization (Larry Diamond, 1983; 476-477). They lunched ethnic (and in the North, religious) sentiments within and across the various regions. The leaders who were members of the major ethnic group within their region tried through ethnic sentiment to mobilize and consolidate the support of their ethnic group and as much as possible, they also tried to again the support of the minorities in their regions.

Table 2.3: Results of the 1959 Federal House of Representative's election

REGION/PARTY	VOTERS WON FROM THE REGION THEY DOMINATED	% OF VOTE POLLED FROM THE REGION THEY DOMINATED
Northern region /NPC	3,258,520	89.4
Eastern region/ NCNC	1,929,754	75.3
Western Region/AG	1,887,209	71.2
Lagos/AG	110,072	76.2

Source: Nigeria electoral process in perspective. <http://www.dawodu.com/election.pdf>

As these leaders fought to consolidate their party's hegemony within their regions, at that time, they instigate conflict between the major and minority ethnic groups living within their opponent(s) region, by appealing to the minority ethnic groups in these regions for support, promising the creation of new states for them ones in power. This act did not only create ethnic rivalry between the major ethnic groups across the country, it also created an unhealthy rivalry between the major and minor ethnic groups in the three regions. Prominent in the application of this political behaviour, was the Western based Action Group leaders, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. However this is not to say that the other political party leaders did not engage in this act.

This act had ripple effects, as the major ethnics groups in these regions had to resort to patronage, clientelism, threat of force and the actual use of force on the minorities and the use of violence to stop opposing campaigns in their regions as mentioned above. Finally the election that ushered Nigeria to independence, held in 312 single member constituencies across the country, on the 12th of December, 1959. With the NPC and NCNC forming a coalition (Federal) Government on 20 December, 1959, in a ratio of 10 NPC ministers to 7 NCNC cabinet members. The AG led by Awolowo formed the opposition in the parliamentary (Westminster) system of government²⁰. The house had its inaugural session on 12 January 1960.

2.4. 1964 FEDERAL ELECTIONS

The heated struggle that preceded the 1959 election heightened at independence as state power was used to reward and punish friends and foes respectively. Therefore state power both at the regional and federal level became the bedrock of class formation, self and ethnic aggrandizement. The political practitioners used state power and resources to consolidate their stand and that of their political party and/ or regions; politically and economically. While they were systematically sourcing for ways to weaken the strongholds of opposing parties or groups. Outstanding evidence to this claim is found in the ways the leaders of the NPC manipulated the various political events prior to, and during the 1964 federal elections.

First was the 1962 general census; owing to the role that census figures played in giving the Northern region more seats than expected in 1946 and the financial gains that followed — as populations played a role in determining how much a region would get from the state treasury. Hence in 1962 the political leaders in the Southern region engaged in a mass awareness program within the region, in a bid to reconcile the gap between the North

²⁰ Nigerian Electoral process in perspective, <http://www.dawodu.com/election.pdf>.

and South financially and in the National House of Assembly. The North on the other hand was bent on consolidating the gap. This event cumulated into the Northern region producing their census result twice after seeing the raise in the population figure (as a result of the mass awareness program) in the Southern region. This led to an outright rejection of the 1962 census and the re-conduction of a general election in 1963²¹.

Once again these figures were highly manipulated by the Northern regional leaders (who were determined not to allow the census result undermine their advantage position in the centre) and with the help of the incumbent prime minister, they produced a scaled down figure of 55.6 million for the entire country, with the Northern region having 29.8 million out of the 55.6 million. However, despite the charges of irregularity and flaws that were level against the result by the NCNC leader, the result was adopted by the federal government. Therefore the Northern political elites succeeded in consolidating their power advantage politically and financially at the federal level and at the regional level (Larry Jackson, 1972; 290; Larry Diamond, 1983; 482-484).

Second, the event that sprung from the Action group's annual congress between the oppositional head at the federal level, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the regional head of the party, Chief Akintola. In the congressional election Awolowo gained a landslide victory and subsequently removed Chief Akintola. This removal led to an Akintola ignited riot in the West — an unrest that the prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa took advantage of, to punish Chief Awolowo (for instigating minority sentiments in the Northern region and his unbending fight and attack on the government for corruption and the high standard of living of the political elites, with little or no improvement on the living standard of the common

²¹ It should be noted here that in the first republic census was regionally conduct and the results were sent to the centre. Thus when the Northern regional government saw the increase of the result of the other regions it cancel the first one and re-conducted another census that came out with a much higher figure. This figure was not accepted by the other two regions and consequently the entire result was cancelled.

people), by accusing him of treason, corruption and subsequently jailing him while reinstating Chief Akintola. To further weaken the Western Region the prime minister created a new region — the Mid-Western region from the Western region (Larry Jackson, 1972; 289; Larry Diamond, 1983; 478-479).

Third, the events that centred on the 1964 General election and 1965 regional elections. Prominent among these events was the ill-practice spearheaded by the prime minister and the NPC political leaders in the registration of the aspirants of the various political parties. Here a political practice emerge, where the electoral officers deliberately registered in some areas the NPC candidates, while disappearing into thin air, making it impossible for AG-NCNC candidates to register, consequently returning most of the NPC candidates unopposed²².

Following these events, were the obvious appeals to and the use of ethnic sentiment to instigate violence across the three regions to distort opposition's campaign in the regions. As Larry Diamond noted that "in the heat of such ethnic mobilization, the class consciousness of the June general strike was drowned in an emotional resurgence of communal attachments and the democratic character of the election was obliterated by waves of political violence and official obstruction and repression of opposition campaigns led to the boycotting of the election as threatened by the AG-NCNC leadership". However, the election heard and the NPC won majority seat, but the president at the time Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (who was the head of the NCNC) refused to swear in the Prime minister, as he claimed that the election was flawed, and as a consequence the country was without a head of government for three days but finally, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, yielded to pressure.

²² This act was made possible based of the fact that the electoral commission in Nigeria politics has never being independent from the executive aim of Government. Therefore the key officers within this commission are usually appointed by the leading political party leaders, prime ministry or president in power depending on the system of Government that is in operation at the time.

These electoral malpractices were replicated in the 1965 Western regional elections, as Chief Akintola tried to use his ill gotten power of incumbency to consolidate his presence and leadership as premier of the region. He met stiff resistance that gave birth to a violence riot in the region. All these events cumulated into the breakdown of civil order, partisan rejections of the country's constitutional arrangement and finally gave way to the military incursion into politics in the country (Whitaker, 1981; 2).

2.5. MILITARY RULE

Towards the end of the year 1965 things had particularly fallen apart in the country, as the centre clearly could no longer mediate conflicts; provide leadership for the country; put in place agendas for national consciousness and nation building, national unity and political liberalisation. Furthermore the regions were perpetually stretched apart through major-minor ethnic struggle for political power versus the incursion into the hem of (political) affair in the regions. On the other hand, the citizenry are dissatisfied with the regime, as the gap between the political elites and the people became irreconcilable, political corruption, nepotism, and unemployment among other things heightened. Thus the country was near the state of anarchy and desperately needed direction, reforms and policies that would transcend ethnicity to building in the consciousness of the people, the sense of oneness and bringing the nation back to the part of development.

While politicians strove on how to move the nation forward, the crisis that have befallen the country since independences, had borne in the heart of the military class, the thought to take advantage of the situation and encroach into politics, by disguising as saviour of the present situation; one who have come to restore the system. At the wake of January 15th, 1966, a class of military officers launched a coup d'état that brought the first republic to its end and mark the beginning of military dictatorships in the country. While this military

intervention was perceived as necessary by some Nigerians that were dissatisfied with the state of things in the country, it quickly became clear as Julius O. Ihonvbere (1996; 194) noted that, “the military used the monopoly of the means of coercion to intervene on behalf of the dominant classes”.

Therefore it could be argued that the military intervention into politics in Nigeria, in 1966 was just another strategy of the political elites to take over the power position in favour of their ethnic groups. This act was made clear in two ways; first was the formation of the military class that executed the coup. Majority of the military class that executed this coup were from the Eastern and a few from the Western regions, with just three from the minority ethnic group in the Northern region (Max Siollun, 2006)²³. Furthermore, the strategic/systematic killing of the political, military and religious leaders from the Northern region and some from the Western region, those whom Larry Diamond referred to, as the “conservatives political elites” that fought hard in keeping the corrupt status across the country. While the Eastern political leaders were left alive by major Nzeogwu and his Eastern conspirators, who eventually gave over the control of state (power) to Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, who was an Easterner.

Moreover, the way in which the coup d'état was interpreted along ethnic lines by the Northerners propelled another military class to intervene on behalf of the North. According to Major Abubakar (1992),²⁴ “the coup was interpreted as a deliberate plan to eliminate the political heavy weights in the North in order to pave way for the Easterners to take over the leadership role of the country from the North”. Thus motions were put in place to reciprocate the act by the Northerners. A plan that came to fruition on the 29th of July, the same year —

²³Max Siollun, (2006), The Inside Story of Nigeria's First Military Coup.
http://www.kwenu.com/publications/siollun/1966_coup2.htm

²⁴ <http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html>

when, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi was killed along side many other Eastern military officers. There was also mass killing of the Easterners residing in the Northern region of the country, after the control of state power was returned to the North²⁵. These events cumulated into the Nigerian civil war.

2.6. NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (THE BIAFRAN WAR)

The Nigerian civil war was fought by the federal government of Nigeria (with its head quarters then in Lagos) as a war for the re-unification of the country, while the Eastern region saw it as the Biafran war of independence from the country that is beaten with intolerance, oppression and instability, one who's future is unknown. After the killing of Major General Ironsi most senior officer of Northern origin and the then Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army, Lt Con. Yakubu Gowon, emerged as the new Nigerian political leader. The lack of planning and the revengeful intentions of the second coup metamorphosed into chaos, confusion and the scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the Northern region. Even the authors of the coup could not stem the general lawlessness and disorder, the senseless looting and killing which spread through the North like wild fire, on 29 September 1966²⁶.

Responding to this unrest within the country in my opinion an unintended mistake was made by the committee put in place on August 9th, 1966, to suggest how to comb the unrest. The committee suggested the following recommendations. 1) Immediate steps should be taken to post military personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin. 2) A meeting of this committee or an enlarged body should take place to recommend a new form of political association which the country will adopt in the near future. 3) Immediate steps should be taken to nullify or modify any provisions of any decree which assumes extreme

²⁵ The Tragedy Of Biafra (1968).

[http://www.biafraland.com/1968_Biafra%20 Report By American Jewish Congress.htm](http://www.biafraland.com/1968_Biafra%20Report_By_American_Jewish_Congress.htm)

²⁶ Documentary on the Nigerian civil war. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3ReFoFp0Gs>

centralization. 4) The Supreme Commander should make conditions suitable for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further means of lowering tension. This recommendation was enforced almost immediately (Abubakar 1992). I argue that this recommendation was a mistake because of the fact that it did (unintentionally) strengthen the military base of the Eastern region.

The deployment of troops to the Eastern region and the in-flock of people to and from the region coincided with the news broadcast made by Lt. Con. Ojukwu that, “any easterner that can find his or her way home will be offered protection from the brutality against them”. This increased the number of easterners returning back home from all over the country with news of how they’ve been treated and that of their ethnic brothers that were killed. Thus the Igbo’s been filled with anger and anguish made the move for secession. The home coming of the Eastern military personnel’s and the hatred in the heart of the Easterners towards the country in general and the Northerners in particular, strengthened the military base of Eastern region.

In order to put an end to this strife mediation/ peaceful negotiations were held between 4 and 5 January 1967, under the supervision of General Ankrah of Ghana, at Aburi, Ghana. Ojukwu been a graduate from Oxford intelligently cajoled Gowon into signing the end of Nigeria federalism and the independent of Biafra. Coming home Gowon realized what he had signed, quickly refuted the agreement and promulgated decree 8 which was immediately rejected by Ojukwu who insisted that Aburi Accord most stand. In order to weaken Lt. Ojukwu’s support base Gowon created 12 states in May 27th, 1967 dividing the Eastern region into 2 states. To this end Ojukwu reacted by declaring the independence of the sovereign state of Biafra from the rest of Nigeria. This declaration left the Nigerian federal government with one of two options — either to fight for the unification of the country or to allow the

secession of the region. On the other hand, the people of the Eastern region was either ready to get their independence this ways (peacefully) or die trying in the advent of war. And by July 6th, 1967 the first bullet was fired and the civil war began.

At the beginning of the war it was expected that in ten days the Biafran Army would be defeated and things would return to normal. Unfortunately that was not the case, as the war lingered on for more than a year and six months, until the federal Government adopted the warring strategy of blocking the regions and cutting off every channel of food and drug supply to the region. Subsequently starvation arose in the region, which was followed by the outbreak of a very deadly epidemic killing more women and children in numbers greater than the number of death recorded by the civil war itself. The intense suffering of hunger and from the disease as a result of the blockade, led to the weakening of the military strong holds and the Biafra army in general. This brought about the eventual capture of Biafra capital city Enugu, leading the biafrans to further migrate into the hinterland with heightened suffering²⁷.

On the 10th of January Maj. Gen. Ojukwu realizing the total chaos and hopelessness of the situation, handed over to the Commander of Biafran Army, Maj. Gen. Phillip Effiong, the administration of Biafra and flew out of the country with his family. Maj. Gen. Effiong haven consulted with the Biafra Strategic Committee on the situation decided to surrender. The decision to surrender was executed on the 15th of January, 1970. Suffice to note that these coup and the subsequent events that followed resulted from the struggle for and the control of state power by the three regional elites which has become a do or die affair. Prior to and after independence these regional political elites had come to perceive and understand that the grip on state power at the federal level was a necessary prerequisite for their survival in the country and as such must be held at all cost.

²⁷ Documentary on the Nigerian civil war. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3ReFoFp0Gs>

Owing to the fact that the military head of states were a sub-set of the political elite, their pattern of leadership did not change much. As the military most of the time replicated the corrupt practices of the civilian when they were in power thus corruption, nepotism, ethnic oppression did not stop but continued in a more violent ways. Particular to most military regimes, the people usually lost most of their freedom especially that of expression. It must be added here that there was the exception of the Major General Murtala Mohammed and Muhammadu Buhari from these corrupt practices and as such their stay in the seat of power was shortened, however, this is not to say that the people of Nigeria under these regimes had the freedom of expression.

The perpetuation of corruption and oppression by the military made both the citizenry (with special reference here to the political elites) and some sub-set of the military envious and in a sense angry with the military ruling class. The people of Nigeria were particularly angry, because of the fact that military rule council did not do much to better the lots of the citizens nor were they able or willing to return the country to the path of development. The ruling military council also alienated most of the political elites from the position of authority and did not do much in improving the standard of living of the other fashion in the military.

This in turn led to the desire to take over state power in both spheres. At the civilian level there was the agitation for the return of state power back to the civilians while at the military level they were secretly plotting coup after coup, some of which succeeded and some aborted. Accordingly Nigeria witness repeated coup d'état both of military overthrowing military and military taking over the control of the government from civilian. (For a view of the names all the heads of states; civilians and military alike, the year they came into power from independence to date see appendix).

The unholy struggle for state power in the centre at all cost forced political elites to incorporate the military into politics in order to secure a particular end, which in a sense is, the capturing of, the consolidation of and the use of state power for the benefits of oneself, his regional political elites and more importantly for his region. However by the end of the Nigerian civil war and the military regimes in Nigeria, two culminated events had taken place. One was the building of the Northern region as a hegemonic region that has come to occupy the seat of state power and have piloted the affair of the state as they will, for more than thirty years. This came to being through the systematic weakening of the other regions.

In my opinion, the early creation of a new region (that is the Midwest region) for the minority ethnic group (which included the Bini's, Urhobo's Isoko's among others) from the Western region; the jailing of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the subsequent internal division that followed (coupled with the mass corruption and electoral malpractice that took place in favour of the incumbent prime minister before and during the election), greatly weakened the ability of the Western region to compete favourably in the 1964 general election. As Rotimi T. Suberu (1993; 40) noted that, "the creation of the Midwest region in 1963, while giving satisfaction to ethnic-minority aspirations in the old Western region, left the country's minority problem substantially unresolved and intensified the overall imbalance in the structure of the Federation. This imbalance played a large role in bringing about the collapse of the First Republic and the imposition of military rule in January 1966". Furthermore, the mass killing of the Easterners in the Northern part of the country before the civil war, during the war — through fighting and the disease that plagued the region and the victory of the Nigerian government (led by a Northerner) in stopping the region from secession weakened the Easterner region by destroying their leadership structure politically and economically, while the Military regimes steadily favoured and strengthened the North.

Second is the creation of a new class of politicians, what I would refer to as a “military-cum-civilian” class of politicians. It is a military and civilian class because it is made up of retired army generals that are intertwined with the formal political elites and the new breed political and socio-economic elites. This group of politicians is loyal to and well aware of the ethnic/regional struggle for state power and have come to take control of the polity by becoming the leaders of the existing major political parties in the fourth republic. Though divided in terms of the party they belong to, they tend to be united in their objective, which is, to continue to hold and control the government directly or indirectly today. It should be noted however, that within the military dictatorship in Nigeria, state power were promised to be given back to civilians all along. Most of these promises never came at the dates promised by the various military head of states but some was fulfilled. Among those that were fulfilled was the one that gave birth to the Second republic.

2.7. 1979 ELECTION AND SECOND REPUBLIC

The aborted coup d'état that was intended to trample the regime of Major General Murtala Mohammed led to the death of the General and brought to power his chief of staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo in the year 1976 (Joseph, 1981; 77-78). In the following year mechanism that were already in place for the returning of the government to civilians rule were quickened and in the year 1979 the state was returned to civilian regime.

Prominent in the arrangements that preceded the handing over of state power to a democratically elected president was the 1979 constitutional drafting and its subsequent adoption, the establishment of a uniform system of local government, the replacement of the First Republic's Westminster parliamentary system with an American-style presidential model, and the request that the plural nature or "federal character" of the country be reflected

in the election of the president, the formation of political parties, and the composition and conduct of public agencies (Suberu Rotimi, 1993; 41). Subsequently lifting the ban on political parties and conducting the July and August 1979 elections and finally, the handing back the control of state to a democratically elected president, ushered in the second republic.

TABLE 2.4: THE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR REGIONAL/STATE STRONGHOLD, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1979 ELECTIONS.

PARTY	PARTY'S STRONG HOLD	PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
National Party of Nigeria(NPN)	Largely North	Shehu Shagari
Unity party of Nigeria(UPN)	South West	Obafemi Awolowo
Peoples Redemption Party(PRP)	Basically Kano and Kaduna	Amino Kano
Great Nigerian people's party(GNPP)	North East	Waziri Ibrahim
Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP)	Igbo dominated East	Nnamdi Azikiwe

Source: Compiled from Nigeria Electoral Process in Perspective and Richard A. Joseph's Article; democratisation under military tutelage.

With the lifting of the ban on political parties/party activities, came the creation and registration of the new political parties. Within the process of creating and registering these political parties' two old political phenomena in the Nigerian politics resurfaced. The first is the creation of or the reincarnation of these political parties along ethno-regional (now ethno-state lines) in the country. The second is the fact that the same actors, manifesting tendencies that threw up deep-rooted ethnic sentiments, were back on the political turf in a fierce struggle for the control of state power in the federation even though a 19-state structure had emerged in Nigeria, as we seen in the table 4 above.

Thus the manipulation of the election became eminent and as usual, it was manipulated in favour of the North. Prominent in the manipulation was first — the well known method of electoral fraud, one that even overwhelmed the chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), Michael Ani who said that, "I got the hint that the

presidential ballot paper had leaked because it was to be the last election. The papers had already gone out but how it got leaked, I don't know. It was being forged on a very large scale”²⁸

TABLE 2.5: 1979 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT

PARTY (CANDIDATE'S NAME)	TOTAL AMOUNT OF VOTES RECEIVED BY THE CANDIDATES.
NPN (Alhaji Shehu Shagari)	5,688,857
UPN (Chief Obafemi Awolowo)	4,916,651
NPP (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe)	2,822,523
GNPP (Waziri Ibrahim)	1,686,489
PRP (Alhaji Amino Kano)	1,732,113

Source: Compiled from Nigeria Electoral Process in Perspective.

Second was the controversy that sprung up from the interpretation of what the constitution meant by “a presidential candidate had to obtain the highest number of votes and not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in the Federation”²⁹? One that was interpreted before the election by FEDECO chairman to be, winning or having the highest votes and not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in 13 of the 19 states. However, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, of the NPN was the eventual winner of the Presidential Elections on 26 September 1979 after the Supreme Court had interpreted the provision of the constitution on what constitute two-third of 19 states, to be 12 states and .067 in the thirteenth state. A presidential candidate must obtain a minimum of 25 percent of the vote in twelve states, and 25 percent of the vote or one-sixth of the vote in the thirteenth state, as a critical requirement to ascertain the overall winner of the new state structure that had emerged in Nigeria (Joseph, 1981; 80-81). Thus the second republic was

²⁸ The quote above was derived from Richard A. Joseph article “Democratization under Military Tutelage: Crisis and Consensus in the Nigerian 1979 Elections” (1981; 84).

²⁹ The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of In-formation), section 126, pp. 42-43. The Electoral Decree 1977, which laid down the rules that governed the formation of parties and the elections, was based on prior electoral laws as well as on the Draft Constitution of 1976.

given birth to on the 1st October, 1979 when Major General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over state power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

TABLE 2.6: THE NAMES (NUMBERS) OF STATES CONTROLLED BY THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER THE 1979 AND 1983 FEDERAL ELECTIONS

AFTER THE 1979 ELECTION

PARTY	NAMES OF STATES CONTROLLED	NUMBERS OF STATES
NPN	Bauchi, Benue, Cross-River, Niger, Rivers and Sokoto	6
UPN	Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo And Bendel	5
NPP	Anambra, Imo and Plateau	3
GNPP	Borno and Gonola	2
PRP	Kano and Kaduna	2

SOURCE: Compiled from Nigeria Electoral Process in Perspective

AFTER THE 1983 ELECTION

PARTY	STATES CONTROLLED	NUMBERS OF STATES
NPN	Anambra, Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Borno, Cross-River, Gongola, Kaduna, Niger, Oyo, Rivers < Sokoto	12
UPN	Lagos, Ogun, Kwara, Ondo	4
NPP	Imo and Plateau	2
GNPP	Nil	0
PRP	Kano	1
NAP	Nil	0

SOURCE: Compiled from Nigeria Electoral Process in Perspective

The manipulation of electoral support and the election results always indicate the fact that the system would be corrupt, with little or no change in the state of things between the first and second republic. As such there was an eminent threat of the military re-intervention into politics, which will be excused on the fact that the civilian regime is corrupt. This assertion or fear was justified in the way Alhaji Shehu Shagari led the country in the following four years. The intense electoral malpractice employed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari government through the use of his power of incumbency to influence the whole electoral

process in the 1983 elections. This he did in an attempt to consolidate his stand, that of his political party and ethnic group to become the hegemonic party and ethnic group in the country (Suberu, 1993; 41; Omotola, 2009; 200-201). The increase in the number of states acquired is shown in the second table in table 6. It should be noted that, before the 1983 general elections a new political party was formed — Nigerian Advanced Party (NAP) under the chairmanship of Dr Tunji Braithwaite, but had no state under its control after the election.

Once again the political elites' lack of commitment to the Nigerian federalism and their ill tolerance towards opposition (that is the crude ways through which they tried to dislodge their opponent) gave the military an excuse to intervene again into Nigeria politics. Thus, three months after the 1983 presidential election, on the 31st of December, 1983 precisely, Nigerians were awakened by the following broadcast; I, Brigadier Sani Abacha, of the Nigerian Army address you this morning on behalf of the Nigerian Armed Forces. You are all living witnesses to the great economic predicament and uncertainty, which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the past four years. I am referring to the harsh, intolerable conditions under which we are now living. Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged; we have become a debtor and beggar nation. There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for our people who are now fed up with endless announcements of importation of foodstuff; health services are in shambles as our hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics without drugs, water and equipment... After due consultations over these deplorable conditions, I and my colleagues in the armed forces have in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national interest decided to effect a change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form a Federal Military Government. This task has just been completed..." The aftermath of the coup was the enthronement of the chairman of the supreme military council Major General Muhammadu Buhari.

2.8. THE BABANGIDA REGIME AND THE ANNULMENT OF THE JUNE 12TH, 1992 ELECTION

Again while the Buhari regime strived to sanitise the country of corruption among other things, his regime was trampled on the 27th August, 1985 by another military class that enthroned Major general Ibrahim Babangida³⁰. Major General Babangida tried to undo all that Buhari was doing and unlike Buhari military regime that never promised to return state power back to a democratically elected president, Babangida after taking over state power promised more than ones to return the government back to civilians, first in 1990 but kept postponing the date until 1993 when he conducted the presidential elections (Ajayi, 2007; 145).

General Babangida decree in, a new constitution that introduced the two party system and he single handed created and funded the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). Furthermore the general converted his position to become the military president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He conducted elections and installed democratically elected civilian governors and Local Government Chair-persons at the states and local government level. He also conducted elections for and swore in legislatures into the State Houses of Assembly and the National House of Assembly in December 1990, 1991 and July 1992 respectively (Suberu Rotimi, 1993; 42).

Nevertheless, conducting the presidential election and the subsequent handing over date to a civilian president was frequently shifted from 1990 to 1992, to January 1993 and finally August 1993, in what appeared like an endless transition programme. However, on the 12th of June, 1993 the election was conducted, but the result was nullified almost immediately when it became obvious that the SDP presidential candidate — Chief M.K.O Abiola, had won

³⁰ It should be noted here that within 1970 and 1980 and even until recently, it has always been the Northern region that had the largest population in the Nigerian army with most if not all of them predominantly Muslims. They also had majority of the acting military generals in the country as the names of the generals mentioned so far indicates. One of the reasons for this was the fact that before the Nigerian civil war major General Gowon returned all the serving army to their regions, of which major of the eastern military personnel's joined the Biafra army. Most of them died during the war while the other never rejoined the Nigerian army again after the war.

the elections. The act brought about or heightened (the already existing) criticism of the general internally and triggered serious political violence by civil societies particularly in the Southwest region of the country from which the winner of the election hailed from (Ajayi, K. 2007; 145).

Besides, the annulment of the election also attracted external criticism from the United Nations and the United States which forced the general to resign and hand over the state to an Interim Head of State — Ernest Shonekan On the 26th August 1993. Ernest Shonekan was again forced to resign by General Sani Abacha on the 17th of November the same 1993 (that is, three months later). The winner of the 1993 presidential election Chief M.K.O Abiola was jailed by the Abacha regime and he later died in jail, in the year 1998. The nullified election brought an end to the third republic.

Between the year 1994-1998 General Sani Abacha's brutal regime had lost completely the legitimacy it never had, thus Abacha was determined to return the country once again to a civilian regime but this time to himself. Therefore during these years Abacha set up a transitional electoral committee that administered the regime's National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) which was established in 1995. The electoral commission had registered five political parties all of which had General Sani Abacha as their Presidential candidate. Kunla Ajayi (2007; 145-146) noted that, "the constitutions and manifestoes of these political parties were written by the Abacha regime," thus, it was not a thing of surprise when all the existing political parties at the time brought out the General as their presidential candidate, who would eventually win the election unopposed — as all opposition leaders or persons were either killed or jailed expect for those that left the country.

Miraculously, during the peak of the transition the general suddenly died in office. Subsequently a transitional government was setup by the Military Provisional Ruling Council

headed by General Abdusalam Abubakar who promised to and did return the state to a democratically elected civilian regime. Afterwards General Abubakar created and adopted the 1999 constitution, conducted the 1999 general elections and handing over the state back to a democratically elected president — General Olusegun Obasanjo, on 29th of May, 1999, and the Fourth Republic was born.

While the military intervention into politics in the first republic was done in the bid to give mutual advantage to the various regions in which the Northern region became the hegemonic region. It also led to the systematic creation of a new political elites group as mentioned above. The second intervention concretised the presence of this new political group, as it is reflected in the politics of the fourth republic. It also brought about the introduction of a new problematic phenomena, as Suberu Rotimi (1993; 41) noted that “since the military re-imposed itself as the ruler of Nigeria in 1983, there has been a sweeping centralization of the federal system and an intensification of ethnic, regional, religious tensions in the country”. Three of these events are worth mentioning in this section, they are, the juxtaposing of religion on ethnicity, the awakening of the regional consciousness through the reunification of the various ethnic groups to consolidate already existing ethno-regional bloc of the North and South and the introduction of the conception/principle of “zoning” into the Nigeria politics.

Nigeria has always maintained a significant balance between the Muslim’s and Christian’s population and religion was not as such, a heated political issue at the federal level but a matter of personal conviction and in a sense, a matter of concern in the Northern region between the major and minor religious/ethnic groups. Religion as it is today became an issue in Nigeria polity, first, in the event that preceded the 1979 election — that is, the 1979 constitutional drafting (Laitin, 1982). Religion sentiment or strife was intensified when the political representatives from the core Northern region in the constitutional drafting

committee requested for the incorporation of the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal at the federal level into the constitution. This request met with stiff resistance by representatives from the other region, particularly from the representatives of the Middle Belt. For detail on the proceeding of the debate, see David Laitin's article, "The Sharia debate and the origin of the Nigeria Second Republic".

Religion had its second appeal on the National scene when General Babangida single heartedly enrolled Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in year 1986. This single act transformed the religious and political stand of the two religions in Nigeria forever. As Rotimi (1993; 42;) noted that, "Since the OIC controversy, Christian-Muslim antipathies in Nigeria have crystallized ominously around such issues as the definition of the secularity of the Nigerian state, the constitutional status of sharia, the religious affiliations of officeholders in key public institutions, the appropriate role for the government in the organization of religious pilgrimages, the allocation of air time to religious programs on public media, and the construction of places of worship in government buildings".

From the above the following question would easily come to mind; why would a particular ethnic group insist unabatedly on the incorporation of their religious law into the constitution of a secular state, as Nigeria? Why would an individual single heartedly enrol a secular state into his religious organisation, when the member of his religious group does not even constitute 55 percent of the country population? The answer to all these questions, I think, could be found in the thoughts of "have absolute control or ownership of the country" by the Northern military elites.

Thus religion was invented and juxtaposed on politics to serve two purposes. First was to show that we are in charge — an expression that was not well appreciated by the other ethnic groups mostly in the south. Second, was that religion was used as a substitute for the disintegration of the Northern region as a single entity into multiple states. That is, religion

became an instrument in the hands of these new political elites to hold together the different states that has been created from the Northern region, especially for the minority ethnic groups that has been subjugated overtime but have Islamic religion as their (major) religion, simply for them to be able to maintain the regional hold on state power.

Akin to the religious appeal strategy was the success that the strategy brought. That is the reunification of the various ethnic groups in the North region around the Northern political elites. This was done through the reunification of their political, religious and military elites in the various ethnic groups within the Northern region around a common goal or ideology. This goal is bent on the continuation of the hold on state power, which will only be possible through their geographical size and (manipulated) population figures. Religion therefore became a means through which this end could be achieved. Thus while the various key players in the Northern political scene may come from either the major or minor ethnic groups they tend to speak for the Northern bloc as against their state or geo-political zone, all for the purpose of keeping the country under the control of the North from which the state resources could be use to reward the regional actors and their ethnic groups.

The reunification of the North, however did not go on noticed neither was it ignored, rather, it quickly reminded or built in the states/ethnic groups in the South the fear of dominance. Like the South, the North was once overwhelmed with fear in the old existing order of the three geo-political (North, South and East) zones in the colonial era. One in which the North feared the dominance of the West and East because of the educational and economic superiority (Larry Diamond, 1983; 472) and sprang into the manipulation of their population figures and the use of threat of secession to gain an advantage position in the National Assemble. Consequently the demand for a reunified South was born out of the fear of a perpetual subjugation of the Southern bloc by the North.

In order for the South to be able to demand a fair share on the hold of state power and a unique show of relevance in the political arena, it became expedient for them to be somewhat united. The call for the reunification of the South was done almost simultaneously with that of the North, the proponents for the call and challengers of the North where the leaders of Christian organisations such as “The Christian Association of Nigeria” (CAN) and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, in the Babangida regime. These Christian associations and their leaders became popular because they were able to champion the demand for the South to produce the first president in the Third Republic openly (an agitation that is commonly referred to as the call for a “power shift”) (Suberu, 1993; 42-44).

As an observer in the Nigeria Tribune noted, “the religious turbulence has resonated sharply in the regional struggles for power in Nigeria. Thus the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has been in the forefront of those complaining about Northern-Muslim predominance in Babangida's administration, while the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Lagos has sought openly to identify with demands that the first president of the Third Republic be a southerner. When northern-Muslim presidential aspirants triumphed decisively over southerners in the two parties' brazenly manipulated primaries of August and September 1992, CAN's leader Benson Idahosa threatened a Christian boycott of the presidential election and a situation that is worse than civil war”³¹. The reaction of the Christian South was intensified to such magnitude because of the fact that the Southerners and Christians thought that they have been considered with little or no regards for the past 29 years of North leadership of the country out of her 33 years of Independence.

It should noted that, although these religious leaders talked on-top of their voices on behalf of the South, unlike the North — religion was not (I will argue) a political strategy of the South until 2003. To this end Laitin (1982; 429) argued on behalf of the Yoruba's (who

³¹ The Nigerian Tribune (newspaper), 1992 as quoted above was put for by Rotimi in his article, “travails of federalism in Nigeria”. *Journal of Democracy*, 4, 39-53.

Champions the political course of the Southern bloc) and of the influence of the minorities, some of which are in the South, that “religious bargaining could not easily be fitted within the overall pattern of Yoruba politics. To bargain at the Federal level on the basis of religion might, Yoruba’s surely felt, open wounds among the Yoruba’s themselves which were best closed. At the time of the Nigeria civil war, it was often held that the source of unity in Nigeria was in the ‘minorities’, those small nationalities in Benue, Plateau, Gongola, Mid-West, Rivers, and Cross Rivers States”. From the above therefore, it will not be out of place to say that, Nigerian membership of the OIC and the reactions that followed by the South was the most heated religious struggle in the Nigerian Politics. A struggle that has restructured Nigerian politics to the point that, the struggle for the control of state power is now between the two blocs — the Christian South and Muslim North, thus returning the country back politically to the North-South divides prior to the 1914 amalgamation.

As the Religious debate loomed across the country other issues quickly followed and became issues of political concern, such as the “nation questions” and the increasing agitation for “resource control”. While the various political elites strove to gain political advantage through this regional divide they also sort for ways through which they could moderate the strife that was emanating from this North-South divide. The temporary solution advanced was the “Zoning Formal or Scheme”. The zoning scheme is an unconstitutional system of sharing political position in Nigeria across ethno-religious groups in the country within a given political party. This method was promulgated by the Social Democratic Party leaders in the year 1993 (Suberu Rotimi, 1993; 48) as a means to compensate the Northern region for the temporary victory of the South region³². The victory was short-lived, because the military

³² The victory mentioned above came from the agitation of the religious leaders in south for the south to produce the first president in Nigeria’s third republic. This led to the cancellation of the manipulated victory of the North in the two political parties’ primaries. Allowing the south to later produce the two presidential candidates’ one of them a Muslim, the other Christian.

dictator (who was from the North) refused after the election to handover states power to the winner of the June 12th, 1993 presidential election and after few days he annulled the election. While the zoning formula do look nice on the surface, Rotimi argued that, “these zoning schemes, which were not adopted in a manner free of intraparty controversy, have been developed as flexible rather than fixed arrangements, designed to achieve a broad representation of Ethno-regional elites in key party positions while simultaneously rewarding the respective parties' strongest regional bases with the biggest plums, especially the presidential and vice-presidential nominations”. As a result, at the wake of the Fourth republic, zoning became a political apparatus in the hand of the political elites, one that is pre-dominated by the military-cum-civilian elites and state men from the North. This group of elites however, manipulated the zoning principle in the fourth republic to their own disadvantage. This is so because it simply did not yield the expected result/return they envisaged.

Consequently the resulting shift necessitated a struggle for the reacquisition of their power position which met with stiff resistance by the minority ethnic groups (in the Southern bloc) who have been politically subjugated over time. The result from the struggle and the resistance that followed in my opinion produced the polarization of electoral support in the 2003 and 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria's fourth republic. How the events turned out to produce the polarization of electoral support will be elaborated upon in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3
OBASANJO'S ELECTION VICTORY IN 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
(THE FOURTH REPUBLIC)

The death of the Dictator — General Sani Abacha on the 8th of June, 1998, did bring an end to his draconian rule and to his self imposed transition but not to the military rule. At least not at the time of his death, nor did it restore the hope for democracy until the chair person of the (military) Provisional Ruling Council — Abdusalami Abubakar, who took over the leadership of the country announced his returning of the seat of power to civilians and further backed his declaration by actions that tend to justify his words.

At best the declaration of returning the country back to a democratically elected civilian was held with mixed feeling and distrust of the military. The distrust of the military by the citizenry was based on the military past attitude of promising the return of the state to a democratically elected president but failing to do so in most cases. The undignified attitudes of the military dictators, coupled with their failure to address the many unresolved issues that has bedevilled the country since independence, did much, in breeding this distrust in the minds and hearts of the people of Nigeria. Thus this distrust was at its pick at that time, because, the promise by General Abdusalami Abubakar was the eighth time the military had made such promise in twelve years (Reno, 1999; 110).

In the process of time however, light began to reflect at the end of the tunnel as the general began a systematic probing of the last general's family (while refusing to probe some other military personals). He also put in motion democratic apparatus, such as the creation of the Independent National Electoral Commission, lifting off the ban on political parties and party activities and the creation and/or adaptation of the 1999 constitution. These actions therefore paved the way for the various associations to opt for their registration as political parties under the transition plan, from which only three were eventually registered based on

their performance in the local government election of December 1998 (Van de Walle, 2003; 300). The names of the three political parties are; The People's Democratic Party (PDP), All People's Party (APP), and The Alliance for Democracy, (AD). While these parties were chaired by people that have been referred to as radicals, progressives and conservative, with respect to the vigour with which they pursued true federalism, the principle of derivation and the shift on the hold of state powers from North to South — however these party's leaders did not differ significantly in their political ideology.

Thus, the political parties they led, like most political parties in Africa had little or no ideological base nor did they differ ideologically one from the other (Van de Walle, 2003; 304). They do however reflect to some extent the method in which political parties were formed along ethno-regional lines in the first and second republic in Nigeria. For instance, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) was a perfect reflection of the Action Group (AG), as Francis C. Enemuo (1999; 3-4) noted that “The AD was evidently a regional party. Its support base lies in the Southwest, where it won almost all elected positions. It is the offshoot of Afenifere, the pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group. Like the Northern People's Congress, the All People's Party (APP), drew much of its support basically from the North, although it won a handful of local council and legislative seats in the East, while the People's Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the dominant party and as the party with the broadest national appeal”.

The People's Democratic Party (PDP) could emerge as the major/dominant political party for the following reasons, first was the fact that it was created from the G-34 group — a group of prominent Nigerians that had the courage to speak out against the General Abacha's plans of self conversion from a military Head of State to a democratic elected president (Enemuo, 1999; 4; Omodia, 2009; 37). Second, at the formation of this political party the new political elite class had come to cluster around this political party, thus the party had most of the retired military generals, a growing number of the business class and older politicians

all across the country. Therefore PDP had more than enough resources both to campaign the entire country far more than the two other parties, as well as, the ability to manipulate the system to the favour of who so ever they will.

Thus at the end of the Local Government and Governorship elections the People's Democratic Party was able to deplore its vast resources and influence before and during these elections to gain a landslide victory across the country. In the December 1998 local government elections, PDP won 460 chairmanship positions, while the APP won 188 and the AD 100. Furthermore in the gubernatorial election of January 9, 1999, PDP maintained its lead, by winning 21 governorships positions, compared with the APP's 9 and the AD's 6 (Enemuo, 1999; 4). It is worth reiterating here that these elections are far from been free and fair. However, it does to some extent reflect the wishes of the people, as the various act of election malpractices were employed by all the political parties at one point or the other. At the end of these elections, it was the political party that had more resource to champion the election malpractice across the country that won most of the political positions in the country. On this ground Julius Ihonvbere (1999; 59) argued that "One can say with certainty that all the contradictions that had bedevilled previous democratic experiments in Nigeria were present and magnified in the February 27, 1999 election: divided loyalties, manipulation of primordial identities and loyalties, corruption and other election malpractices, such as the lack of political discipline".

Subsequently, the outcome of the Local Government and gubernatorial elections did turn out to fashion the structural formation of APP and the AD political parties — in the bid of increasing their chances in the presidential elections (Enemuo, 1999; 4; Ihonvbere, 1999; 59). Therefore these political parties intended to and did form a coalition and produced one presidential candidate — Samuel Oluyemi Falae from the AD, while Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi from the APP was made his running mate. A decision not well received especially by the APP

members. However, what is most interesting and of paramount important to me in this arrangement is the fact that AD who won 6 gubernatorial seats in just the South-Western region of the country and 100 Local Government Areas chair person's position produce the Presidential candidate. While APP that won 9 gubernatorial seats across the North and Southerner divide and 188 Local Government Areas chair person's position produced the Vice president.

TABLE 3.1: THE RESULT OF 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

REGISTERED VOTERS		57, 938, 945	
VOTES CAST		30, 280, 052 (52.3%)	
INVALID VOTES		431, 611 (01.4)	
VALID VOTES		29, 848, 441 (98.6)	
CANDIDATES	PARTY	VOTES	PRECENTAGE
Samuel Oluyemi Falae	AD-APP	11, 100, 287	37.2%
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	18, 738, 154	62.6%
TOTAL	29,848,411		99.9%


Source: Adopted from Electoral Geography

<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/nigeria/nigeria-presidential-election-1999.html> and CNN.com/world <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/election.watch/africa/nigeria2.html>

Furthermore General Olusegun Obasanjo who just came out of prison after been arrested for treason by General Abacha and who lost his entire region including his home town, in the Local Government Areas chair person's position and in the gubernatorial race for his party, won the PDP presidential candidate ticket. While Dr Alex Ekwueme who was a formal vice president and one of the founding fathers of the party and he won his entire region for his party in the governorship elections lost the ticket. Finally, at the wake of the elections the two presidential candidates were from the Southern region and to be more precise from the South-western region. What is the logic behind such arrangement and what best accounts for such an outcome? Before presenting what I think informs this outcome, it is expedient in my opinion to present General Olusegun victories in the 1999 and in the 2003 elections and

then examine this outcome and explains the changes that occurred in the two elections in the light of some of the hypotheses presented above (Chapter 1).

FIGURE 3.1: THE GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.



The general election played out smoothly across the country from the time (August 1998) General Abubakar's regime created and mandated the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)³³ by constitutional act to conduct elections for the office of local government chair persons, state and National legislatures, governors and president³⁴. By the

³³ For the functions of INEC see appendix A below.

³⁴ The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria divided the country into 360 federal constituencies with each having a seat in the house of Representative (section 49) and 109 senators from all over the country (section 48). While the state houses of Assembly membership ranges from not less than 24 and not above 40 depending of the geographical land mass and the size of the population (section 90 and 91). Provisions are also made for the position of the local Government chairperson and the councilors in the wards within the various local government areas across the country (section 3 (6)). The office of the governors and the president were also established by the constitution (sections 176 and 130 respectively). For gubernatorial elections the entire state is regarded as a single constituency and everyone qualified to vote in state Assembly elections is eligible to vote. While the entire country is considered as a single constituency when elections are held for office of the president and any eligible to vote in the legislative elections is qualified to vote. Finally the constitution empowered INEC

end of February INEC had successfully conducted these elections on December 5, 1998, January 9, 1999, February 20, and February 27, 1999, respectively. As the official result of the election for the office of the president came out to be, President Olusegun Obasanjo and his political party won with a landslide victory. His political party also won more local government chair persons oppositions and 21 gubernatorial elections across the country. Olusegun Obasanjo was declared the winner of the 1999 presidential elections after he met the constitutional requirement by winning amassed a total of 62.78 percent of the votes cast, compared with 37.22 percent gotten by Falae of the AD/APP alliance. Also significant is the fact that Obasanjo won at least 25 percent of the votes in 32 of the 36 states in addition to Abuja, while winning majority vote in 27 out of the 36 states in the federation, including the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), as it is presented in table 3.1 and in figure 1 above. Olusegun Obasanjo was finally sworn in as the President of the federation on the 29th day of May, 1999, fulfilling General Abubakar promise of returning the country back to a democratically elected civilian government.

These elections were conducted amidst the distrust of the people for military — a distrust they expressed by a low turnout in registering their eligibility to vote. As CNN noted in its summary of the 1999 presidential election that, “out of a population of 108,000,000 eligible voters approximately, only 60,000,000 registered for the elections”³⁵. This distrust was accompanied and heightened by huge irregularities during the elections by INEC. For instance, INEC created separate columns for the presidential candidates of both the AD and the APP even after their merger, thus allowing the less informed voters to go ahead and vote wrongly making their votes automatically invalid. Electoral frauds of all sort were employed,

with the mandate of conducting elections into these offices. For the office of the President and the governor of the 36 states (INEC was mandated in section 132 and 178 respectively). For the National Assembly (section 71).

³⁵ It should be noted here that the result varies from 57, 938, 945 as reported by electoral geography to the 60,000,000 as reported by CNN.com, thus I do stand on a safe ground by approximating the number of registered voters to 60,000,000.

which made the people to doubt the future of the forth republic. The doubt was based on the fear that, the military will re-intervene into politics especially when they assumed that the newly elected president was unable and/or unwilling to address the many unaddressed issues that are commonly referred to as the “National Question” and to lead the country justly.

Yet the return to a democratically elected president was almost welcomed by all, both internally and externally even when the success and failure of the fragile or nascent democracy could be predicted based on the decisions that the president would make. Therefore Julius O. Ihonvbere (1999; 62) concluded by state that, “the election of Obasanjo clearly opens the path to true democracy in Nigeria. While it hardly represents a triumph for the opposition groups across the country, it provides an invaluable opportunity for deepening political discourse, expanding political spaces, and strengthening civil society. The West has a reliable friend in power and can be counted on to respond and help him succeed. However, the challenges within the country remain enormous. If Obasanjo strengthens his links with discredited and corrupt politicians and the military, he will fail. If he reaches out to alienated communities and addresses the national question through dialogue with civil society, we might begin to see the beginning of a true democratic rebirth in Africa's most populous nation”.

However, the doubts and fears of the people were, the president did, in my opinion, try to strike a balance by not over relating or further strengthening his link with the discredited and corrupt politicians and the military. If he did, meant he would be subjugating himself and the country under a perpetual control of military-cum-political class. To some extent he tried to incorporate the alienated communities (most of which are in the South) into the political arena, thus creating a kind of balance in the control of the polity and in the PDP caucus. This is not to say that the president completely rebelled against the political elite that sponsored and supported him to power. What I am arguing here is that, the president did use his power

position and the state apparatus that was under his control to stall the excessiveness of some (ex) military head of states and other politicians, such as, the forcefully/the necessary retirement of the some military office (that are capable of carry out a coup) and the use of “treat of probe” to force one of the ex-military president to give up his quest for the 2003/2007 presidential race.

3.2. THE 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE POLARIZATION IN THE 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Prior to the 2003 election, Nigeria faced diverse crisis and agitations which was in a sense, due to the fact that, democracy in itself is a platform in which the citizens of a particular country could express themselves. The government of the day did allow to some degree these freedom; this I argue based on the issues that were allow to be deliberated both in the state Houses of Assembles and in the National House of Assembly and in the nations media houses. These issues were not allowed during the days of General Sani Abacha.

These issues/crises ranged from inter-communal clashes, ethnic uprisings especially in the oil rich Niger-Delta regions, the Christians and Muslims crisis in Jos, over regional neglect and degradation, Sharia induced crisis, with many civil society organisations becoming more aggressive in their effort to improve the living conditions of the members. In addition, the unending arguments and counter-arguments over issues concerning revenue allocation, resource control, and the need for a National Sovereign Conference to discuss the future union of Nigerian nationalities continued unabated. At the same time, executive-legislative bickering over attempts to establish constitutional checks and balances forced delays in the approval of the national budget and its subsequent implementation. All these developments encouraged many pessimists to suggest postponement of the elections. But the government of President Obasanjo was determined that the elections would hold in order to

ensure continuity of the democratic process and not to give another excuse to the military in taking over state power again (Akinyele, 2004; 67).

Though the actions or the ways in which the president used his power position was not free from bias and corruption, it to some extent gave the president the power and resources to have and/or be a voice in deciding who gets what, when and how in the Nigerian politics. Furthermore the president gave more rights to the South through the appointment of some Southern figures in key positions in the country. While these actions were not well received by all, the dissatisfied saw the purported 2003 elections as a platform for expressing their dissatisfaction. This is so because elections are a sure way through which the electorates express their satisfaction and dissatisfaction for an incumbent president, his policies and his party either by the entire citizenry or by a fraction of the population, which has being the case in the Nigerian nascent democracies. In a sense the dissatisfaction of Obasanjo leadership did cut across the North-South divide, however, as the 2003 elections showed it was more expressed by the northerners.

Thus, as the registration of political parties for the 2003 elections began in the country, INEC was faced with various issues ranging from how many political parties to register and under what conditions. The issue of how many days the general elections should take and the system of registering voters stood out among others. Meanwhile INEC favoured the computer based system of registration because of its transparency and its ability to detect multiply registration easily regardless the opposition especially from Northern. With the computer based system of registration INEC was able to detect and published the names and numbers of disqualified voters due to multiply registration from which they found out that the Northern bloc had more irregularities than the South. As Akinyele (2004; 68) noted that, “the attempts to defraud the system were more significant in the Northern part of the country than in the South. In fact, the north's 14.38 percent number of disqualified applicants as a percent of all

disqualified applicants was higher than that of the nation as a whole (10.41 percent; the south's was 6.25%).”

TABLE 3.2: SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

Names of Candidates	Party	Total valid votes	Percentage(s)
Muhammadu Buhari	ANPP	12,495,326	32.0%
Odumegwu Ojukwu	APGA	1,295,655	03.3%
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	24,109,157	61.8%
17 others	17 other parties	1,111,933	02.8%
Total		29,848,441	99.9%


Source: Electoral Geography. <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/nigeria/nigeria-presidential-election-2003.html>

Therefore at the end of the registration (event), INEC had registered 30 political parties. However at the wake of the presidential elections it was only 20 out of these parties that could produce a presidential candidate. While the reasons for this is out of the confine of this thesis, it is important to note that even at the end of the presidential elections only three key presidential candidate and their political parties stood out from among the 20 which could be seen in table 3.2 above.

The main reason for Gen. Ojukwu to be the least of the three could be traced to the fact that his region produced 15 of the 20 presidential candidates in the elections. More interesting to note here, is the fact that these presidential candidates are all ex-military generals and heads of state in their own stead and in a sense, they stood in for the older political order of the first republic — which was built on the three regions of the Northern, Western and Eastern regions. Hence General Muhammadu Buhari — the military head of state that overthrow Alhaji Shahu Shagari on the 31st of December, 1983 was from the North, (General/) President Olusegun Obasanjo — military head of state from 13th February 1976 — October 1979 and the incumbent president from 1999 to the time of the election was from the West and General Odumagwu Ojukwu was the military Governor of the Eastern region and the head of state of the defeated Republic of Biafra, was from the East. All these generals are

the presidential candidates, for All Nigerians People's Party (ANPP), PDP and All Progressive Grand Alliance respectively.

FIGURE 3.2: THE MAP REPRESENTATION OF THE 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.



Also important here, is the fact that, in the unconstitutional or unwritten zoning principle, agreed upon by key political elites prior to the 1999 presidential election — the North was not expected to produce a presidential candidate within the first 8 years of the fourth republic. However towards the end of the preparation for the 2003 presidential election Gen. M. Buhari manipulated his way and become the presidential candidate of ANPP, thus breaching the arrangement (Akinyele, 1994; 70). Again, while these elections, like that of 1999 was not completely free nor was it completely free, Akinyele did argue that (and I do agree) that, “the result represented the correct wishes of the electorates”. Finally as the result in table two shows President Obasanjo clearly won the election. Nevertheless, a close look at figure 2 reveals that polarization of electoral support across North-South divide had set in,

where president Obasanjo won majority vote all the states that he lost in the South in the 1999 elections while losing the ones he won in the North.

3.3. WHY DID THE MUSLIMS NORTH VOTE FOR OBASANJO IN 1999 AND NOT IN 2003?

From the ongoing therefore, it becomes expedient to ask: what explains the behaviour of these political actors and the electorates alike? Why did the North that had struggled so hard since the introduction of contemporary politics in Nigeria for the control of state power (for their mutual advantage), suddenly lay off any aspiration in producing the president of the country, consequently allowing both candidates (who are Christians) to be from the South? What are the underlining factors that led to Obasanjo winning Dr. Alex Ekwueme in the PDP's primary? Why were the major proponents, of APP and PDP suddenly out-manoeuvred prior to the 1999 presidential election? Hence, allowing the presidential candidate from the Ad/APP alliance and PDP to come from the South. What had changed that made the zoning principle or agreement to be breached by Gen. Buhari from the North? What accounts for Obasanjo suddenly lost of most of his Northern supporter in the 2003 election and why did Buhari fail to secure any major vote in the South? In order to be able to understand the underlining factor that account for all this variations, it become wise for me to revisit the various hypothesis in chapter one to see which best explain these outcomes.

3.4. HYPOTHESES TESTING

Mentioned above (in chapter 1) most of the various explanation that has been put forth overtime to explain the behaviours of political elites and the subsequent electoral support they get, does not do well in helping us understand what shapes politics in new, fragile and complicated democracies. as in the case of Nigeria. As Nigeria is religiously bipolar with 50.5% of her population Muslims and 48.2% Christians, cutting across (more than) 250 ethno-linguistic groups and politically divided into two blocs — the North and South. With

the North predominantly Muslims and more ethnically homogenous while the South is predominantly Christians and more ethnically heterogeneous (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009).

For instance, clientelism as an hypothesis hold that the prediction of election outcome in emerging democracy and party system is more or less systematic to client and patron relationship, that is, the promise and distribution of gains and maintaining political support across time (Lemarchand, 1972; Van de Walle, N. (2003; Wantchekon, L. (2003).). This explanation could be a good explanatory variable if the phenomenon of concern here was Local Government elections or some gubernatorial elections across the country, where one or few ethnic groups are concerned. But in the case of presidential election it offers little or nothing in helping us understand what shaped neither the selection of the 1999 presidential candidates nor that of 2003 let alone the final outcomes of these elections. This is so because Obasanjo before and during the elections did not have what it takes to promise gains to either the South bloc or the Northern bloc, he was a prisoner few months to the time of the election and was broke financial but he was greatly helped by the military political class (Enemu, 1999; 5).

Furthermore, the civil society engagement variable hold that the presence or absence of civil society (organisation) activities work together to produce inter-group and intra-group political support (Varshney, 2003); that is, a country with strong civil society activities cutting across social, ethnic and religious cleavages the more likely it is for the political preferences of these groups to cut across the borders of ethnicity and religion. While the towns, societies or countries with little or no such civil engagement the more likely it is for them to experience stand-offs between the different groups within the town, society or country. Thus, the decline in the civil society engagement between the Christian South and Muslim North led to the standoff that produced the polarization of electoral support in Nigerian presidential election.

This do not explain much because it cannot account for what led to the absence of polarization in 1999 and in 2007 even in the absence of any strong civil society (Ihonvbere, 1999; 60) amidst the long political standoff between the North and South during the military regimes.

Like the civil society argument the political awareness (Abramson, and Claggett, 2001; Ansolabehere, and Iyengar, 1995; Holbrook, and McClurg, 2005) and the economic voting (Lewis-Beck, and Stegmaier, 2000) argument don't do much in enhancing our understanding of what fashioned the above political trends in the fourth republic. The premise of these frameworks is based on the information and/or knowledge the voters have about the political, economic and social preferences of the various presidential candidates coupled with the ideology of their political party. This information/knowledge is based on the achievement of these candidates and on the information disseminated by the various media houses. These frameworks are weak in explaining the variation in both the 1999 and 2003 presidential elections in Nigeria. This is so, based on the fact that these political parties lack basic political, economical and ideological preferences that could be used to differentiate one from the other. Therefore the information's that are passed on to the people are somewhat very similar, which in my opinion an informed decision for a particular candidate cannot be made.

It should be noted that there is a strong connectedness/relatedness of the presidential elections conducted in the first half of the fourth republic — 1999 and 2003 elections to those of the second half — 2007 and 2011 presidential elections. That is, the south producing the president in the 1999 presidential elections and the North produced the president in that of 2007. We could not observe any form of polarization in these elections as the electoral support did cut across the North-South blocs. While in 2003 we could identify some polarization trends which became full-fleshed in the 2011 elections. Thus the inability of these frameworks to accounts for what led the political elites to choose the two presidential

candidates from the South in 1999 and what transpired in 2003 that made the ANPP to breach the zoning principle by producing a Northerner and a Muslim as its presidential candidate. And their failure to account for the variations that appear in the results of these two elections would also impair their ability to explain the variation in that of 2007 and 2011 presidential elections and as such would not be included as an explanatory variable in the analysis of the elections in the second half of the fourth republic.

However, while the instrumentalist framework cannot explain what inform the choice of the presidential candidates in the 1999 election neither will it be able to explain on its own, the variation that occur in the 2003 elections. It is needful because it does give credit to the religious bipolarity hypothesis. As the variation in the 2003 election could be argued to have resulted from the use of ethnicity and religion by political elites for personal gain. That is for the purpose of winning the election. Like in my argument, the religious bipolarity hypothesis could explain to a very reasonable degree what informed the choice of the South producing the president for the first eight years in the fourth republic when argued from the perspective of the zoning principle. The zoning principle which came to being as a result of the agitation from the South especially by the various leaders of the different Christian organizations (as mentioned above in chapter 2) led the Military President, General I.B. Babangida to annul the first primary and systematically made it possible for the South to produce the two presidential candidates in the annulled June 12th, 1993 presidential election.

As a result it could be argued from the religious bipolar stand point that in order to avoid such agitation and threat of bypassing the 1999 general elections and to compensate the south for the annulment of the 1999 elections (Ihonvbere, 1999; 60; Enemu, 1999; 4). The political elites who were basically from the North and were Muslims, thought that it would be easy for them to get the state power back at any given point in time (as it was the case of the counter coup in 1966), decided to relinquish state power for a period of time. Furthermore the

light polarization of electoral support that appeared in the 2003 presidential election could be seen as a show off of the religious and ethnicity harmony of the North. A sense of hegemonic power that could be called upon instrumentally at any given point in time. This feeling in a sense, is based on the fact (as mentioned in chapter 2 above) that Islamic religion has become the binding force that was used to replace the homogeneity of the region, when states were created out of the region. Consequently the ANPP breach of the zoning principle and the immediate loss of Obasanjo support base in the North especially in the state of Kano could be said to be a test of this hegemonic feeling. This could be referred to as a test because Buhari represents the belated effort of the hard-liners among the Hausa/Fulani Muslim group that felt the group had been marginalized by Obasanjo's first regime in the fourth republic. A claim, that appears not to have been shared by the majority of Northerners (Akinyele, 2004; 76).

Therefore Akinyele noted that, "the campaign launched by Buhari for the presidency of Nigeria betrayed a desire by the former military ruler not to use any means necessary, including such divisive issues as ethnicity and religion in Nigerian politics. Arguing that Muslims should only vote for Muslim candidates, and that the Islamization of Nigeria was just a matter of time, he effectively betrayed a preference for the kind of politics that is likely to destroy Nigerian unity and along with it the nation itself. Apparently, as seen from the results of the elections, some Northerners embraced Buhari's brand of politics and voted for him and his party (the ANPP). Many Muslim dominated communities in the North voted for the ANPP, contributed significantly to the loss of the PDP in the Kano gubernatorial election. On the other hand, in many Southern states, voters instead saw Buhari as a fanatical fundamentalist Muslim whose intention was to exacerbate ethnic and religious conflict in the country and forcing the disintegration of Nigeria's fragile federation (Akinyele, 2004; 76)".

It should be noted that while the assumption that led to ANPP breaching the zoning principle in the 2003 presidential election was not held by most Northerners as Akinyele

argued. The death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua gave birth to a sure reason while religious and ethnicity should be used instrumentally to secure as much support as possible and the end result was the outright polarization of electoral support across the North and South blocs.

3.5. My Argument

While the argument of political avoidance and compensation could be true; that is, in order to avoid any form of bypass and to compensate the South-western region for the annulment of the June 12th, 1993 presidential election. The political elites group did agreed to relinquish state power for a season to the South, in the unconstitutional and unwritten zoning arrangement — that after the South had rule for eight years, the leadership of the country would be returned to the North for the next eight years. However, what the religion bipolarity framework cannot explain is; what was the reason why the North Military President General Ibrahim Babangida refused to give state power to Chief M.K.O. Abiola a southerner after he won the 1993 elections? Why did they suddenly become willing to handover state power to President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999? The answer these questions could be found in the fact that, the North did not have that assumed strategic power position during that period and as such cannot afford to transfer state power to the South, because of the fear of subjugation which has always being prior to the country gaining her independence.

This is so for two reasons, first it was due to the fact that there were too many agitations from the South by both the religious leaders and politicians alike calling on the North to hand over state power to the South. The implication of this is, in a sense, a sign of equality both politically and more importantly religiously, even under a military regime. This agitation was somewhat not in existence during the Abacha's regime and during the 1999 elections. Second was the fact that, the eventual winner of the 1993 presidential election Chief

M.K.O Abiola who was a Muslim from the South was not someone that the North political elites could trust to protect their interest, in the absence of an assumed strategic power position. As Akinyele (2004; 66) noted that, “the election of 1993 was to be the first one conducted under this new formula. It, however, was annulled by the military government of General Babangida when it became clear that Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola, an individual who apparently was not acceptable to the military establishment (that is the establishment that has come to be the political power wing that represented the North) had won the election”.

Second after the military had had the feeling of control based on the clear ascendancy to that assumed strategic power position through the deeds of General Sani Abacha in the years that followed the 1993 presidential election. The Northern military/political elites could now relinquish state power to the south on the ground that the individual could be trusted. Francis C. Enemuoh (1999; 4) argued in his article that, “the simmering tension in the land, and enlightened self-interest may have persuaded the Northern power elite of the need for a power shift to the South; that is, for the next president to be from the South. Party leaders either discouraged or out-manoeuvred northern politicians who showed interest in the presidential nomination, leaving the ground open for Southerners. But...the dominant wing of the northern power brokers went to great lengths to ensure that the eventual winner of the contest would be most acceptable to it and least likely to threaten the status quo”.

Obasanjo was the right person here for two reasons; first Obasanjo was a chosen and trusted ally to the Military Oligarchy. Second he is the only southerner that allowed and as a matter of fact supported the Northern political elites in manipulating the 1979 election to the favour of the North as against South. Thus, he is the one that could be attested for by military as a trusted ally and friend of the North. A concrete reason why he was so much distrusted by his own people and as a result could not secure or win any state in his region including his home town in the 1999 general elections.

However, as events turn out to be, Obasanjo did not fulfil the aspirations of the North political elites rather he create a platform that bridged the gap in the existing status quo, therefore creating a shift in the power position from North to South. This he did through the following actions; first he conducted a necessary retirement of some military officers that were seen as capable of trampling the government. He also restructured the military in such a way that a fair balance of power within the military emerge and the military officers in key military positions in the country were more loyal to him(self) — who was their commander in chief and not to the ex-military generals.

Second was the use of “the threat to probe”, to force some ex-military generals with special reference to General I. B. Babangida and in keeping him away from coming out as a presidential candidate in the 2003/2007 elections³⁶. Third, he completely sidelined his vice president who was from the North both at the presidency level and at the party level. The tension between the president and the vice president was heightened to the point that Vice President Abubakar Atiku was forced to leave PDP and spearhead another political party — Action congress (AC) (Omotola, 2009; 203; Ibrahim, 2009; 2). Therefore, instead of Obasanjo to become loyal to this group complete he use the state apparatus at his disposal to raise to a position that would equal that of the political elites both in Nigerian politics and at the PDP caucus. His elevation to the power position in the country also necessitated the raise of other political actors most of which are from the southern region.

Furthermore this shift away from North to South was reflected in the power positions within the major and minor power positions in the country as listed in chapter one. First was the fact that Obasanjo took charge of the government and was able to use the power of his office to his advantage, thus he was not the puppet of the political elites. While he did not

³⁶ Sahara reporters; Jonathan Goodluck and PDP primaries: Issues and the probable outcome. <http://mobile.saharareporters.com/article/jonathan-goodluck-and-pdp-presidential-primaries-issues-and-probable-outcome>

completely debase the group he rose to a position of influence and as such the North lost the first and the most important power position in the country — the office of the president who is both the head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation.

Second was the fact that the Northern region lost (as a result of losing the major seat of power to the South) five out of the seven major power position listed in chapter one above. They include, the office of the president, as the president was for the South, Senate president — a position that changed hand three time from 1999-2003, yet all the presidents were from the South(-Eastern) region as seen in the table 3.3 below. The governor of the Central bank of Nigeria, the group managing director (crude oil marketing division which is the major source of income for the country) of the Nigerian National petroleum corporations and I do put forth that the restructuring of the military to a reasonable degree created a balance in the power position within the military, thus, one cannot ascribe its strength to any ethnic group or region.

TABLE 3.3: THE MAJOR POWER POSITION: THE NAME OF OCCUPANTS, THEIR REGION AND DATES IN OFFICE FIRST FROM 1999-2003

MAJOR POWER POSITIONS	NAMES OF OCCUPANTS	DATE	REGIONS
The major seat of political power	President Olusegun Obasanjo	1999-2003 2003-2007	South (-Western) region
The senate president	Evan Enwerem Chuba Okadigbo Anyim Pius Anyim	1999-1999 1999-2000 2000-2003	All from the South (-Eastern) region
The Chief Justice of the Federal	Mohammed Lawal Uwais	1996-2006	Northern region
The governor of the central bank	Joseph Oladele Sanusi	1999-2004	South(-Western region)
The GMD of NNPC	Jackson Gais Obaseki	1999-2003	South(-Southern) region
Number of seats in the National assembly	The north had majority seat	From independence until date	North
Top military officers	Mixed	1999 till date	Mixed

Sources: compiled online from the names and list of minister in the fourth republic and compared across many web-pages.

Also there was a major financial increase that most of the geo-political zones in the South got from the increase in the amount of derivation and revenue allocation they received from the country. From the military counter coup in 1966 the constitutional principle 50% derivation was revoke to 1.5% and later General Sani Abacha increased it to 3% in the 1995. While other form of resource-sharing method were adopted to benefit the North, especially that of population, for the North was and is still the most populated region. Therefore it is not surprising to see that population was one of the major measures for resource sharing during the military era.

Nevertheless, the South benefited from resource sharing within the course of two years, first by the increase in the derivation from 3% to 13%³⁷. Second through the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission; this commission was established in 2000 with the mission of facilitating the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful. By improving upon the means of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications. From the creation of the institution to date the federal government has continued to pump in millions of naira/dollars into the region through this very institution which is completely or almost not in existence in the Northern region.

From the above therefore, it is easy to debunk Akinyele argument that the feeling of marginalization by Obasanjo first regime in the fourth republic of the North was not felt by a majority of northerners and that Buhari betrayed a desire by the former military ruler not to use any means necessary, including such divisive issues as ethnicity and religion in Nigerian

³⁷ The increase in the derivation was stipulated in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Section 162 (subsection 1 and 2).

politics. As such Buhari effectively betrayed a preference for the kind of politics that is likely to destroy Nigerian unity and along with it the nation itself. On the contrary, I argue that the North was marginalized but as a necessity to create a political balance in the structure of Nigeria politics, if Nigerian democracy and the continuation of Nigeria as a single entity was to be ensured. However, Akinyele is correct in his analysis of how the Southerners perceived Buhari, which according to Akinyele — "Buhari was seen as a fanatical fundamentalist Muslim whose intent was to exacerbate ethnic and religious conflict in the country and forcing the disintegration of Nigeria's fragile federation".

Concluding this chapter therefore I would argue that it was the felt shift in the strategic power position from the North to South; a mistake made by trusting in a Southern ally from which a thought was given to the zoning principle based on the trust that this ally would deliver and would protect the interest of the North as he did in 1979, that the ANPP and Buhari on behalf of the hard-liners (to use Akinyele's words) set out to correct in the 2003 presidential election. As a political strategy for mobilizing electoral support Buhari choose to use religious and ethnic appeal as a means of gaining the support of the North. Unfortunately the religious appeal did not secure for him at least in the 2003 presidential election the desired result. Yet his move was perceived by the South as a perpetuator of the perpetual subjugation of the South under Northern control and as such he and his political party met with stiff resistance as the entire Southern region rallied around Obasanjo, making him win all the state in the South (-western) region in 2003 presidential elections.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE 2007 ELECTION AND THE RETURN OF STATE POWER TO THE NORTH

The 2003 election could be seen as a step further in the consolidation of Nigerian fragile democracy (Omotola, J. S. 2010; 545), especially in the absence of any eminent threat of military intervention into the country's politics. The election however did prove to be problematic in its own stead, as it did show some signs of or introduced the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious and regional blocs in the fourth republic. Making it look like the politics in the first and to some extent in the second republic, where political party formations were done along ethno-regional cleavage and as such electoral support was also along these lines as shown in chapter two above.

Also this election like that of the first republic and all subsequent elections in Nigeria, was marred by diverse forms of irregularities prior to, during and after the elections across the country. This made many observers to doubt the continuity and the consolidation of democracy in the country (LeVan, and Adebo, 2004; 36-39; Mashood Omotosho, 2008; 4-5). Consequently, there was the call for and the fear of military re-intervention in the minds of most Nigerians depending on their analytical stand-point.

Thus, while the various elections in the fourth republic do have some similarities with that of the first and second republic, it does differ from the elections in the first and second republic in some sense. For instance the political parties in the fourth republic unlike that of the first republic had a wider coverage, making them more nationally oriented, as no political party could depend on any state or region to win the presidential election; this was in a sense a product of the 1999 constitutional settings.

Furthermore the fourth republic also differ from the first republic in terms of its absence of a political figure(s) or what S. M. Omodia (2010; 41) refers to as charismatic

leadership; the likes of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr Nnadi Azikwe of the first and second republic. In the fourth republic, all the political parties' leadership had no clear cut influence or ideology over any policy issue across the country.

With respect to the difference in the politics of the first, second and fourth republic Omodia (2010; 41) noted that, "on observational basis what accounted for the above scenario (that is the difference) is that, while the formation of political parties especially in the First and Second Republic were associated with charismatic leadership of the leaders, in the Fourth Republic such charisma does not exist as parties were either formed by group or association without clear cut influence... Unfolding events in the Nigerian polity shows that the present system is so fragile because of the personalization of leadership especially by the political representatives. In other words, charismatic leadership of the past republic was important in ensuring party discipline and supremacy especially in terms of carrying-out party manifestoes. For instance, the implementation of the party programme of free education in UPN controlled States under the political leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. In the present situation, party representatives in government especially the President and Governors are automatically the leaders of the party in their states and the nation".

The above scenario therefore paint a picture of how the governor and the president in the states and country respectively use their power position not just to direct the state of affairs in the states but also that of the country at will. They also use their power positions to influence and control the affairs of their political parties at the state level and at the centre; thus deciding who get what, when and how in their various political parties. A good example of how state power was used to determine who gets what, when and how by the Obasanjo administration was captured by Ben Rawlence and Chris Albin-Lackey (2007; 501) when they noted that, "on the eve of the nomination (that is the eve of PDP primary), President Obasanjo asked the other contenders to stand down and anointed Yar'Adua as his preferred successor,

much to the displeasure of many in his party". While this authoritative attitude of the president among others in the country, was the outright refusal of president Obasanjo to implement the Supreme Court's judgment on Lagos state local government statutory allocation that he unilaterally withheld (Omotola 2009; 202).

This political attitude almost brought the nation to a standstill after the 2003 election. The intensification of the internal wrangling within the major political parties and actions geared towards eliminating rivals, in addition to the undressed issues in the Nigerian polity posed a serious threat to future elections in country and most especially, the 2007 presidential elections. The 2007 election was crucial for the consolidation of Nigerian democracy for two reasons; first, it was an election that plays a definitive role in the consolidation of Nigeria's nascent democracy. That is, the 2007 presidential election was the first time in the history of Nigerian politics, that a general or a presidential election has ever taken place on a third time, back to back without any military intervention in between. Second, the 2007 presidential election was also the first time in the history of Nigeria politics where a democratically elected civilian president handed over state power to another democratically elected civilian president.

However, this election faced many challenges that once again questioned the viability of the process. Paramount to the challenges that the election faced was the action of President Obasanjo and most of the opportunist state governors in their show of interest to extend their tenure of office from the constitutionally stipulated two terms limit to three (Ibrahim, 2009; 2, 4; Omotola, 2009; 203). A desire that was fiercely pursued with lobbying, as huge amount of money exchanged hands on the one hand and on the other hand was fiercely opposed by many civil society organisations and other out spoken Nigerians (Omotola, 2009; 203; Ibrahim, 2009; 2; Rawlence, and Albin-Lackey, 2007). At the end of the day the desire for a third

tenure was aborted when the move for the constitutional amendment failed to materialise, because the Nigerian Senate voted against the move on 16th May, 2006³⁸.

Another challenge sprung from the president and vice president exchange of acrimonious allegations of corruption, which further heightened the political tension in the country. Both the president and his deputy were involved in a fierce battle in which each has been trying to block the capacity of the other to stay in power while doing what they could to retain state power come 2007. The strife was as a result of the fact that the Vice President Atiku was ambitious to become the next president and as such he spearheaded the opposition against President Obasanjo's desire for a third tenure. From which Obasanjo used his power of Incumbency to wage an almost-successful campaign to keep Atiku off the ballot by levelling charges of corruption against him. However these efforts were reversed by Nigeria's Supreme Court just days before the election.

A scenario that is best explained by Omotola (2009; 203) when he quoted Soniyi & Fabiyi, (2007) who noted that, "With this, (that is, Atiku's led opposition against Obasanjo) the stage seemed set for a battle of supremacy between President Obasanjo and his estranged vice president. Through the instrumentality of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), one of the country's anti-corruption agencies and arguably the most potent, Atiku was alleged to have indulged in some shoddy deals with the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) that fell under the direct control of his office. The presidency responded by setting up an administrative panel to investigate the matter. Within a few days the panel completed its work, found the vice president Atiku guilty and recommended that his name be gazetted and disqualified from contesting the 2007 election. The presidency adopted the report, followed its recommendations and gazetted it".

³⁸ [Nigerian Senate Blocks Bid for 3rd Presidential Term](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600705.html), *Washington Post* <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600705.html>. 16 May 2006.

He also noted that “on the basis of recommendation, INEC insisted on disqualifying Atiku from contesting the election and made good its threat when it went ahead to actually disqualify him. It took a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court on 16 April 2007, five days before the presidential election, to restore Atiku, judging that INEC did not have the power to disqualify candidates”. Earlier, on 22nd December 2006, the ruling PDP had declared the position of the vice president vacant. This followed Atiku’s defection to one of the leading opposition party, the Action Congress to be precise, to actualise his presidential dream, which, given the configuration of power within the PDP at that time and the increasing hostility of the presidency towards Atiku, had become an impossible dream via the PDP.

Furthermore there was the question of INEC ability and readiness to oversee this election through from start to finish, as INEC has failed to conduct any credible election so far in the fourth republic. A problem that has been argued, to be, a strategy in the hand of the incumbent to manipulate the election to his favour or that of the person(s) that the incumbent support. This argument is based on the fact that, the institution is strongly dependent on the executive arm of government (Ajayi, 2007; 146-147).

The contention here is based on the current arrangement of the electoral process whereby INEC officers — chairman, national commissioners and residing state officers are appointed by the executive arm of government coupled with the fact that the institution is also financed by the same. And in this case, the executive arm is personified in the person of the president — President Olusegun Obasanjo, whose intentions is to retain state power if possible or by making sure that his selected predecessor will be perpetually loyal to his will. At the same time, President Obasanjo is bent on not allowing his deputy (Vice President Atiku) to win the 2007 election at all cost. An actor in Nigerian politics at that time (based on his present position of office), that must determine the next president of the country amidst the struggle for the retention of state power by the South and the call for a return of state

power to the North, who is calling on the president to honour the zoning principle that brought a southerner to power in the first place.

Amidst this agitation for the return and the retention of state power between the North and the South was the challenge of the credibility of the Nigerian judicial system to adjudicate the various political grievances in the post 2007 election if the need arises. As the Nigerian history has taught that the failure in handling such judicial issue properly may ultimately lead to military intervention (Omotola, 2009, 194, 197). Thus the fundamental question(s) posed by Nigerians at that time as Ibrahim (2009; 2) noted was: Given President Obasanjo's willingness to determine the occupant of Aso Rock, the seat of power, in 2007, is there an impartial arbiter for the elections? Will the election ever hold?

However, at the wake of the election Obasanjo has made his decision to stick with the zoning principle after distorting the long standing power position of the North while creating a fair balance between the two regions and had succeeded in enthroning himself as one of the major decider of his predecessor. While it could be argued that, in order for Obasanjo to maintain the hegemony of PDP (— a political party that has lost its popularity) in Nigerian politics, he had to do what he must, to retain the northern power proponent within the party. For which the only way was to abide to the zoning principle.

However, other explanations do exist — the first is to humiliate Atiku by frustrating his victory at the poll while ensuring that the PDP retains power at all costs. Thus Presenting a Northerner within the PDP confines would go a long way in weakening Atiku's support based in the North as both Atiku and Yar'Adua are key political proponent in the North region. Furthermore it has been argued that the president had to do what he did, base on the trust in the person of President Umaru Yar'Adua. A trust based on his personal relationship with the Yar'Adua's family — a relationship that has existed before and was consolidated when Obasanjo was the military head of state and late Major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua the

elder brother of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was his second in command. Consequently Omotola argued that, "President Obasanjo act of manipulating the entire electoral process was to pave the way for his anointed and trusted to the core candidate who will not only follow through with his policies in office but also possibly cover his tracks" (Omotola, 2009; 207).

TABLE 4.1: SUMMARY OF THE 2007 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULT

Names of Candidates	Party	Total valid votes	Percentage
Umaru Yar'Adua	Peoples Democratic Party	24,638,063	69.82
Muhammadu Buhari	All Nigeria People Party	6,605,299	18.72
Atiku Abubakar	Action Congress	2,637,848	7.47
Other Political Parties		1,407,774	3.61
Total		35,288,984	99.62%

Sources: Sufuyan Ojeifo, "INEC: Yar'Adua is the President-elect", *This Day* (Nigeria), 22 April 2007, and Wikipedia (The Free Encyclopaedia) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_general_election,_2007.

Consequently in the month of April 2007 Nigeria had the third round of her general elections in the fourth republic within two consecutive Saturdays. On the 14th of April INEC conducted the gubernatorial elections in the 36 states and that of the State Houses of Assembly. While on the 21st of the same month, the National elections for the senate, Houses of Representatives and that of the office of the president was conducted. On the 23rd April, Yar'Adua was declared the winner by the chairman of INEC, who said that he had received approximately 70% of the vote (24,638,063 votes), while Buhari came out second place with 18% of the vote (6,605,299 votes) and Abubakar Atiku was placed third with about 7% (2,637,848 votes)³⁹ as seen in the table above. It should be noted that the major presidential candidate in this election where from the North.

³⁹ "[Huge win for Nigeria's Yar'Adua](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6584393.stm)", BBC News, April 23, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6584393.stm> ; "[Yar'Adua wins Nigeria elections](#)", Al Jazeera, 23 April 2007.

This result was unanimously rejected by both the international and internal observers, as they questioned the credibility of the result. For instance, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) submits that, “the 2007 state and federal elections have fallen short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the elections have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible”⁴⁰.

At the same time, the Chief of European Union observer Max van den Berg reported that, “the handling of the polls had “fallen far short” of basic international standards, and that “the process cannot be considered to be credible”⁴¹. Electoral geography on the other hand completely rejected the result and as such did not include the result of 2007 election into its webpage. However, come on the 29th of May, 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was sworn into office as President Olusegun Obasanjo peacefully handed over state power to him even when the election was still contested in the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal. Finally, on 26th of February, 2008, an unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal, where the two cases were consolidated, the court dismissed the petitions and upheld the election of Yar’Adua.

⁴⁰ European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) (2007) EU’s final report on April 2007 elections, The Punch, 23, 24 and 27 August, pp. 1, 2 and 4 respectively.

⁴¹ “Nigeria election 'worst ever seen'”, SMH News, 24 April 2007.
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/nigeria-election-worst-ever-seen/2007/04/24/1177180600209.html>

4.2. YAR'ADUA PRESIDENCY AND THE MOVE TO RECLAIM THE MAJOR POWER POSITIONS

As the Briton deliberated on relegating the political control of Nigeria to Nigerians, in the mid 1940s to late 1950s, the political actors in the Northern part of the country move towards devising strategies to gain political advantage for their region. As a result of this move, from independence onwards the Northern region had come to occupy the major seats of political power both in the civilian and military regimes until 1999, as shown in the previous chapters. From 1999 the table turned around for the first time, democratically, as President Obasanjo tried and to a very large extent succeeded in outwitting the political overlord of the North. He was able to enthrone himself as a major player in Nigerian polity and with him came the rise of other political players from the minority ethnic groups across the country; a good example is the present president — President Goodluck E. Jonathan.

The actions of president Obasanjo quickly raised concerns about the faith of the Northern region within the eight years of south rule if the zoning principle was to be followed unabatedly. Subsequently these concerns led to Major General Buhari's bridging of the zoning principle. When in the dying minutes he opted for/as the presidential candidate of ANPP in the 2003 presidential elections, where he used religion and ethnicity instrumentally to secure support from the North. Although he did lose the election his action did produced/introduced polarization of electoral support along ethno-religious lines as demonstrated in chapter three above. Thus with the return of state power to the North under the presidency of President Umaru Yar'Adua, after eight years of southern rule, ones again the table was set and the time was right for the North to reinstate itself to its formal power position.

TABLE 4.2: THE MAJOR POWER POSITION: THE NAME OF THE OCCUPANTS, THEIR REGION DURING PRESIDENT MUSA YAR’ADUA’S DAYS IN OFFICE

MAJOR POWER POSITIONS	NAMES OF OCCUPANTS	DATE	REGIONS
The major seat of political power	President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua	2007-2009	Northern region
The senate president	David Mark	2007-till date	Middle Belt
The Chief Justice of the Federal	Iris Legbo Kutigi	2007-2009	Northern region
The governor of the central bank	Charles C.Soludo Sanusi Lamido Aminu Sanusi	2004-2009 2009-till date	South(-Eastern region) Northern region
The GMD of NNPC	Abubakar Yar’Adua	2007-January 2009	Northern region
Number of seats in the National assembly	The north had majority seat	From independence until date	North
Top military officers (the supreme military council)	Mixed		North.

Sources: compiled from the names and list of minister in the fourth republic and compared across many web-pages online.

Prior to the 2007 presidential election the position of the office of the Chief Justice of the federation was returned to the North. It was President Obasanjo that appointed the Chief Justice (Idris Legbo Kutigi) after his appointment was ratified by the senate. The swearing in of President Musa Umaru Yar’Adua also met the move/return of the major seat of power in the country back to the North. Furthermore on the 10th of August 2007 President Yar’Adua relieved the Group managing director of NNPC of his duty based on the allegation that the board of NNPC had awarded 71 contracts as Obasanjo was about to leave the office without due process, as they did not carry out the necessary work scope to ensure transparency (Ndi, 2007)⁴² and was replaced by Abubakar Yar’Adua from Niger state (North).

In the same year the position of the senate president was transferred from the South eastern region to the Middle Belt, Benue state precisely. It should be mentioned here that, if Nigeria is strictly divided into the North-South geo-political blocs Benue state would

⁴² Ndi (2007) Nnpc Boss Mr. Funso Kupolokun And Others Sacked. <http://www.nairaland.com/71635/nnpc-boss-mr-funso-kupolokun#1376795>

definitely be within the northern bloc. However, religiously the state also have a fair balance between the Christians and Muslims population and David Mark happened to hail from the Christian population of Benue state, thus it would be some worth incorrect to say that he is from the North.

Finally at the end of the tenure of office of the governor of central bank of Nigeria (which was 29th May, 2009); Charles Chukwuma Soludo was quickly replaced by Sanusi Lamido Aminu Sanusi. As such it was noted that, “after President Yar’Adua was elected, he replaced some of Obasanjo's top officials, including the head of the army; a move analysts said was aimed at shedding off his predecessor's influence” (CNN News Online, 06-05-2010). Therefore within the time President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was sworn into office (29th May, 2007) to the time he flew out of the country to Saudi Arabia for treatment, he had completely reinstated the old order of northern control of the state. One that cut far across the major seats of power (as enumerated in chapter one of this thesis and as shown in table 4.2 above,) to establish an executive network that attempted to run the country unconstitutionally even in his absence.

4.3. YAR’ADUA’S ABSENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HIS POWER POSITION

The Nigerian constitution in article 145 states that, “Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a written declaration that he is proceeding on vacation or that he is otherwise unable to discharge the functions of his office, until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary such functions shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President”. President Yar’Adua left the country on the 23rd November, 2009 for treatment without formally notifying both the Senate President and that of the House of Representative; neither did he delegate his authority to the vice president Goodluck E. Jonathan, thus creating a power vacuum in the country that was supported by many.

At first Yar'Adua leaving for Saudi Arabia was rumoured on the ground that he was for Hajj purposes, and not on health grounds. Timkola (2009) noted that “the news of President Yar'Adua's presence in Saudi Arabia became popular, especially among the pilgrims from Nigeria on the Arafat Day (November 26, 2009), when it was rumoured that he was sighted on the plain of Mount Arafat observing the cardinal rite of the pilgrimage. But the rumour later petered out when it could not be confirmed either by the officials of the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCOM) or the embassy”⁴³.

After failing to justify the rumour that the president left the country for hajj purposes the same presidential network turn to admitting that the president had health issues but is now doing fine and he is just resting. On one occasion Aminchi (Yar'Adua's deputy when he was the Governor of Katsina state) went ahead to state that “Mr. President is getting better by the day since... He is just resting on the instruction of his doctors” while another top government official, who spoke (to Guardian news paper on the condition that his identity should not be disclosed) also indicated that the President is positively responding to treatment with the hope that he may return to the country within the next week.”⁴⁴

Furthermore, in order to justify the assertion that the president is getting healthier and that he is just resting the same group of people brought a signed copy of the country's supplementary budget after six weeks of the President's absence claiming that it was signed by the president himself. The supplementary budget was highly contested by the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) and was finally alleged to be forged. In a letter written by the lawyer of the group, by name Femi Falana to the Inspector general of police, he noted that, “the CNPP had tried to verify claims by the government that the budget had been taken to Saudi Arabia for the president to sign on his sick bed. To its utter dismay our client (CNPP) has confirmed that the signature of the president and the seal of the Federal Republic of

⁴³ Timkola (2009). Yar adua On Bed Rest, Saudi Hospital Calm . <http://ngmix.net/lib/vendor/web/articles/2/1780.html>

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Nigeria were forged by some persons in the presidency. Our client has instructed us to request you to use your good offices to set the engine in motion for the investigation and prosecution of those who carried out the nefarious act." (BBC News Online, 07-01-2010).

This act of boycotting the constitution procedure of leaving the country by the president finally came to end after several demonstrations across the country. Several court cases were also launched, demanding that state power be officially handed to the vice-president. The Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled On 22nd of January 2010, that the Federal Executive Council (FEC) had fourteen days to decide a resolution on whether Yar'Adua was "incapable of discharging the functions of his office" (BBC News Online, 22-06-2010). Consequently On 9th of February 2010, the Senate determined that presidential power be transferred to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, and that he would serve as Acting President, with all the accompanying powers, until Yar'Adua returned to full health. Unfortunately when President Umaru Yar'Adua came back to Nigeria, he was not physically fit enough to resume office before he died, on the 5th May, 2010.

4.4. THE SHIFT OF THE MAJOR POWER POSITION BACK TO THE SOUTH

In understanding what transpired to produce the polarization of the 2011 presidential election it become imperative for us to question what triggers such political behaviour. Why was Yar'Adua executive network or supporters (most of which were Northerners) so bent on not allowing Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to act with full presidential capacity? Why was President Olusegun Obasanjo accused of hand picking Yar'Adua (a northerner) knowing that he had serious health issues while pairing him with a well able Southerner from which he is now asking for the resignation of Yar'Adua (BBC News Online, 22-06-2010)? Responding to the above questions, I would argue that the action of the president and his executive network was based on their knowledge of how President Olusegun Obasanjo has come to use the power of incumbency in manipulating the various elections to his favour and that of the

people of his choice. Therefore if Jonathan starts acting with the capacity of the president the chances of the North producing the 2011 president become slim.

Thus, the strategy was to use every means possible to delay the delegation of presidential powers to Vice President Jonathan before 2011 presidential election commence or at least before the PDP primary. In order for them to be able to systematically press for the completion of the 8 years tenure of office by a northern president, in accordance to the zoning agreement. However, as the event turn out to be, this ambition was defeated by act of parliament that delegated the power of the president to Vice President Jonathan. Therefore with the arrival of President Jonathan as the acting and later the president of the federation after the death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, came the question; "whose turn is it, to produce the next president."

4.5. WHOSE TURN IS IT, TO PRODUCE THE PRESIDENT

The question whose turn is it, to produce the president first escalated within the PDP inner circle creating a divide within the party, as Abebiyi Jelili Abudugana (2011) pointed out that, "Most active players who knew Yar'Adua would not survive the illness started strategizing on how to make political mileage out of the situation, therefore, the intrigues that trailed the period which lasted between the illness and eventual death of the latter. The politicking that lasted this period created multiple centres of authority within the PDP, and hence, the evolution and consolidation of new power blocs within the party. In the consequence, the crisis within the party escalated and instantaneously took a new turn as the question of whose turn is it, within the geopolitical zones in the PDP, to produce the party's Presidential flag bearer in the 2011 elections. This was one of the fears why the transition of power to Jonathan as acting president was somehow delayed. Jonathan who did nothing to douse the apprehension also misguidedly heightened the tension arising from this Zonal/PDP

Presidential flag bearer question by making moves which strongly indicated that he was not ready to follow subsisting party's arrangement. Again, the party became polarized, now, along two major lines - pro-Jonathan and pro-Zoning camps and many other sub-interest axes which are directly or indirectly attached to the two dominant streams" (Sahara Reporters, 04-01-2011).

The internal political wrangling became so visible within this political party because of two pitfalls in the PDP party arrangement. The first is the zoning principle which was again agreed upon by 47 members of the PDP national caucus in Aso Rock, in the year 2002, on the directive of power sharing between the North and the South. This arrangement is never attainable because of the unending desire of most Africa politicians to retain the seat of authority at all cost; yet the party leaders insisted on following through with it. Second is the lack of political figure or charismatic leader as I mentioned above. The problem here is that, there is the absence of an authority outside those that are holding political offices in the party (PDP)⁴⁵. Consequently, no one has the power to enforce decision reached in the party on these office holders. One of the consequences of this nonchalant attitude is that, the president and other key office holders automatically became the major decision makers in the party. Therefore with President Jonathan now at the helm of affair in the country, he automatically became a leading figure in the party (who has the ambition of becoming the next Presidential candidate of the party) and he also has Obasanjo as his strongest supporter (Abebiyi Jelili Abudugana, 2011). It became obvious that the zoning principle would not hold.

Consequently, the North region like in first and second republic, when they are in a disadvantaged position, turn to the use of threat, which is usually followed by behaving instrumentally. For instance, Mohammed Alhaji Yakubu, the chairman of both the Arewa

⁴⁵ Here is should be noted that the people's democratic Party (PDP) has always had state, regional and National chair persons, however the problem here is that most of these persons lack the authority to pilot the affairs of the party without the over-lording input of the state governors and of the president and they also lack the authority within the party to impose the party's decision on these state governors or on the president.

Consultative Forum (ACF) and a formidable force in the North region and Northern Union (NU), declared that any attempt to short-change the North in 2011 would be resisted, insisting that June 12 crisis would be small when compared to what would happen should Acting President Goodluck Jonathan run in 2011 (Chukuma Egemba, 2010).

Again like in the 2003 presidential election there was a stiff response from the south, for example, Alabo Graham Douglas (a former Minister of Aviation, who is also an influential figure in the Peoples Democratic Party), reacting to such statement above, by described it, “as an unfortunate hard line approach being adopted by some northern members of the party on the issue of zoning the presidency”, from which he reacted by stating that “we have passed the age of threat; we in the South-South (Niger-Delta region where President Jonathan came from) can no longer be intimidated. Before, we were cautioning Nigerians to allow President Goodluck Jonathan to work first before asking him to run for presidency in 2011, but with the threats from our northern brothers, we are now calling on Jonathan to run. He must run and heaven will not fall. Out of 50 years that Nigeria gained independence, the North has ruled for 38 years, while the West and the South-East have ruled for 12 years. The South-South has never been there. Yet, more than 90 per cent of the national wealth is from the region” Adeola Balogun (Punch, a Nigerian Newspaper, 03-07-2010)

At the time of PDP primary the lines were drawn and with the south fully out to support one candidate — Goodluck Jonathan. Anenih, the South-South regional Chairman of PDP when he was addressing his regional delegates said that “Anybody from the region who does not vote for this ticket (Jonathan/Sambo), God will not give him good luck. We don’t expect to hear, not even by mistake, somebody is saying Atiku. We will identify the handwriting of that person. If it is a finger print, we will trace it. I hope you know I was a Commissioner of Police! We will trace that person who made that terrible mistake.” These

couple with the fact that Atiku who was Obasanjo sworn enemy was the PDP Northerner Candidate — for Atiku had returned back to PDP from AC where he contested again President Yar'Adua in the 2007 Presidential election. His return was explained based on the fact that he thought that Obasanjo power/influence was not so strong in the party anymore and that the northerners were advocating for a Northern presidential candidate from PDP. This made Obasanjo to rally everything within his power behind Jonathan and at the end of the day Jonathan won the presidency ticket of PDP.

4.6. THE LOST OF STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE AND THE HEATED AGITATION TO REGAIN IT

Losing the PDP primary, the Northerner political figures turned to the use of ethnicity and religious appeal in order to gain a full-fledged support for the northern Presidential candidate(s) from the northerner people that are already feeling cheated. Why blaming and condemning through mass text messages some northern state governors as "the enemies of the north and Islam" for supporting Jonathan instead of Atiku Abubakar, who challenged the president for the nomination (Aminu Abubakar, 2011). Furthermore, like in 2003 presidential election there was a more heated cry in the North about how the North have be sidelined economically and even recently it was reiterated by a host of northern leaders including Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Malam Lamido Sanusi; Niger State Governor and Chairman of the Northern Governors Forum (NGF), Dr Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu; the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) and Dr. Junaid Mohammed, who decried the huge revenues going to the oil producing states and sought reduction of the proceeds to free more money that could be allocated to Northern states (Dr. Lewis Akpogena, 2012).

There was also the use of religion instrumentally to heighten the already political and ethnical divide across the country. For example a renown political and religious leader called on all Muslims in the North not to vote for or allow an infidel to rule their country and

another one out rightly called on Muslims in a fiery sermon delivered in mosques in Katsina State (the state of late President Umaru Yar'Adua) not to vote for Goodluck Jonathan (Aminu Abubakar).

These strategies that were adopted in the North to call all the northerners and Muslims in the North to support and vote for a northern candidate, was not restricted to the North alone, for the South was not slacking in using the same strategies to consolidate their much more advantageous southern position and to strengthen their support based in the South. With such cry as that of Graham Douglas that “Out of 50 years that Nigeria gained independence, the North has ruled for 38 years, while the south-west and the south-east have ruled for 12 years. The South-South has never been there. Yet, more than 90 per cent of the national wealth is from the region, filled the political scene of the South (southern) region (Adeola Balogun, 2010).

Others southerners cried with religious voice, interpreting the political behaviours of these northerners as a means of subjugating the country to northern dictates from which Islamic religion could be super imposed on the entire country especially with General Buhari — who ones said that it, is only a matter of time Nigeria would be an Islamic country (Akinyele 2004). As Buhari is the major political proponent in the Northern region, the Christians in the South called for the support Jonathan.


TABLE 4.3: SUMMARY OF THE 2011 PRESIDENTIALELECTIONS RESULT

Names of Candidates	Party	Total valid votes	Percentage
Goodluck Jonathan	Peoples Democratic Party	22,495,187	58.89
Muhammadu Buhari	Congress for progressive Change	12,214,853	31.98
Nuhu Ribadu	Action congress of Nigeria	917,012	5.41
Ibrahim Shekarau	All Nigeria Peoples Party	82,243	2.40
16 others			0.20
Valid votes		39,469,484	98.88

Sources: election geography. <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/nigeria/nigeria-presidential-election-2011.html>
 Independent National Electoral Commission
<http://www.inecnigeria.org/results/presidential/states.php>,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_presidential_election,_2011.
 Wikipedia,

Unlike the 2003 elections which were flawed with many irregularities, the 2011 election came with an appreciable degree of freedom and fairness. The Peoples Democratic Party produced the President (Goodluck E. Jonathan) like all previous presidential elections in the fourth republic. President Jonathan victory met the constitutional requirement by getting more than 50 percent of the total valid votes casted and he also got not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election, in at least two-third of all the states in the federation and in the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja. While the Congress for Progressive Change (Muhammadu Buhari) came out second with getting approximately 32 percent of the votes casted and Nuhu Rubadu of All Nigerian Peoples Party came out third place with 5.41 percent of all votes casted.

FIGURE 4.1: THE GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION



Although INEC did delay or postpone the election from April 16th from its initial date April 9th, the commission did its best in making sure that the election was free and fair. At the

end, the 2011 election stood out as one of the most recommendable elections ever conducted in the history of Nigeria, with little or no contestations in the electoral tribunal. Fidelis Mac-Leva (2011) noted that, “Though the aggrieved candidates and parties in the April polls have commenced the process of filing their petitions before the various election tribunals, it is generally observed that the response, this time around, is very low compared to previous elections which witnessed floodgates of post election petitions. For the presidential election, only the opposition Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) indicated its intention to challenge the outcome at the tribunal. The party’s presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, has since ruled out any personal challenge to the presidential election”⁴⁶.

From the above it is made clear how the threat and the subsequent power shift from North to South was blown out of proportion to shape the election result and to a very large extent the destiny of the country. This threat emanated from the sickness of and the eventual death of President Umaru Yar’Adua, which metamorphosed into a heated debate of which bloc would produce the next president, first within the major political party — PDP from which the debate was carried to the Nigerian people through the various media houses and was interpreted by various political, social and religious actors first to be ethnic and religious prejudice.

With the death of President Yar’Adua and loss the PDP primary the threat was becoming or had become real, thus a ways to reverse the trend was to resort to the use of ethnicity and religion first to get the other parties to present as their presidential candidate a northerner. The success of this strategy led to the use of ethnicity and religion to rally the support of the Northern people for a northern presidential candidate. The result was an

⁴⁶ Fidelis Mac-Leva (2011). Post-2011 elections: Reflections, challenges and lessons for Nigeria. Daily Trust, 02 June 2011. http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20318:post-2011-elections-reflections-challenges-and-lessons-for-nigeria&catid=18:inside-politics&Itemid=19

outright polarization of electoral support along ethno-religious blocs North and South that has never be recorded before the history of Nigeria politics as shown in figure 4.1 above. It was only the ANPP presidential candidate that could get a majority vote in one of the southern state (Osun state). Neither Jonathan nor Buhari could win any majority vote in the North and South respectively.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study grew out of my curiosity over the events that followed the 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria and more importantly how these events were interpreted in the international media, which was not too convincing to me. Initially I was personally interested in post election conflict and violence in Nigeria politics. My interest in post election conflict and violence led me to the question; what is the underlining phenomenon that shape Nigerian politics in the first place? What have transpired in the cause of these elections to produce the acceptance and/or rejection of these elections and how did these events lead to the outburst of violence in the various regions?

At the surface two explanations stood out, they are; religious bipolarity and electoral fraud. This finding brought about the “why” questions. Why do political practitioners use religious and ethnic appeal to mobilize popular support and why do the electorates respond to these religious and ethnic appeals when deciding for whom to vote? It is a known fact in Nigerian politics that, ethnic (and in more recent times) religious appeals are a vibrant method for securing popular support. In response to the above questions, two explanations again stood out. First is Clientelism, that is, the appeal to a given ethnic group(s) for support in return for political gains. A good example of how this clientelistic act was carried out in Nigeria’s first republic was when the various political actors used the promise of a new state for the minority ethnic groups within the three existing regions to again their support.

The second is instrumentalism, which is, igniting ethnic differences prior to elections dates in order to gain popular support across ethnic lines. In other words political elites acts or behave strategically to manipulate ethnicity for the sake of power, even when these political practitioner did not believe in it. This again is true in the Nigeria politics. However, the

question that arises from both explanations is for the good of whom? Both of these explanations do hold that the political actor gains more, which is very controversial, because for something to be manipulated by a leader when death, injury or incarceration is a clear possibility, it must be valued as a good by a critical mass of people if not all. As such these explanations fail to answer the question; why does a particular group or region rejoice over an electoral victory, even when the electoral victory was fraudulent? Why does a particular group or region rejoice when a democratic regime is brought to its end by the military class from this group/region while the other regions or groups grieved?

Thus for a more concrete answer to these questions there was the need for me to go beyond the surface to see for myself what actually shape Nigeria politics from the incursion of contemporary politics to date. To be able to understand how these ethno-religious blocs were form and to see what has change in the fourth republic that led to a new political outcome — the “polarization of electoral support” in the history of Nigeria politics.

Therefore this study was undertaken as an attempt to explore the underlining factor that account for the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious and regional blocs — Christian South and Muslim North. Where President Goodluck E. Jonathan unlike President Olusegun Obasanjo from the South failed to win majority vote in any state in the North and General Muhammadu Buhari also failed to win majority vote in any southern state in the 2011 presidential election. Methodologically, this study is an empirical research that is built of the process tracing tradition in qualitative research methods and as such it, relies on a critical survey of scholarly literature on Nigeria political history and contemporary Nigerian politics, as well as, on newspapers and other media analysis of Nigeria politics/presidential elections, especially that of the fourth republic.

Within the cause of this study my major finding was that there was a distortion in the long standing order in the political leadership of the country within the first eight years of southern rule in the fourth republic. The long political standing order (in the political leadership) referred to here has to do with the prolong grip on state power by the North for over 33 years before the birth of the fourth republic in the year 1999. This distortion led to the lost of security derived from the feeling of being in control by the people (that is, both the political actors and the electorates alike) in the Northern bloc. A good example of how the feeling of being in control and being secured was exhibited in Nigeria politics by the electorates was the events that followed after the counter coup of July 29th, 1966. When the people in the North ran into the street celebrating the success of the coup and mass killing the Igbo's in the region and seizing their properties at will, while the other ethnic and religious groups fled the region for good.

Thus with the lost of this feeling of control and the insecurity that followed, a political struggle emerged to restore the old order, by both political elites and the people in the North on the one hand and on other hand, the political elites and people from the South are bent on exploring and enjoying the newly attained power position. Thus the South is also in the struggle to maintain the new status quo. Political struggle and agitation for state power in a democratic regime is usually carried out during elections. Therefore as political activities kicked-off for the 2003 and 2011 presidential elections this political agitation for control was blown out of proportion by igniting ethnic and religious sentiment between and within the two blocs in the 2003 and 2011 presidential elections. The end result was the polarization of electoral support along the Christian South and Muslim North in these elections.

In the course of this study I also found out that, three independent but interacting variables or factors are responsible for shaping the various political outcomes in Nigeria from independent to date. They are; "Regional Struggle", Ethnic and Religious Agitations"

(ethnicity) and the “Zoning Principle”. It was the regional/ethnic struggle for the control of state power by the three regions that is responsible for the various political outcomes in Nigeria’s first and second republic. The religious and ethnic agitations by both the religious and political elites from the South and North were responsible for the fate of the third republic. While the zoning principle and the ethno-religious and regional agitations that followed the zoning controversy, account for various political outcomes in the Nigeria’s fourth republic, especially the polarization of electoral support across ethno-religious blocs of the Christian South and Muslim North.

From the above therefore, I argue that, it is ethnicity (and not religion) that has being and is still the major factor that shapes political outcomes in Nigeria. This finding is supported by two events in the Nigerian politics: first is the annulment of the Chief M.K.O Abiola (who is a Southern Muslim, in the) 1993 presidential election victory, by a Northern Military head of state, who is also a Muslim. Second is the fact that both President Olusegun Obasanjo and Jonathan won in all the Middle Belt states (that have more Muslims than Christians), in the heated 2003 and 2011 presidential elections respectively. This show that religious is not the major determinant of the various political outcome in Nigeria.

Many studies have been carried out in the democratisation and ethnic/religious conflicts literature both in Nigeria and across the globe. For instance, there are many studies on Indian, which in a sense has some similarity with Nigeria, in terms of its ethnic and/or religious demography. Therefore I believe that the study on the power position of these countries and how it has shifted over time and the events that followed could and would help better our understanding on how the early stage of democratisation can shape politics and breed ethnic conflicts/ violence in these countries. For example a comparative study could be carried out between Nigeria and Indian based on the somewhat similarity that they have demographically. From which this study could be expanded upon to see which

religious/ethnic group or region within Indian that have the strongest grip on state power since independence and to see if the power positions had shifted. If it did, what are the events that followed? Are they similar with that of Nigeria or are they different? And if they are different, what account for the difference? I believe that this will further broaden our understanding of political outcomes and post electoral violence both in Indian and in Nigeria.

Finally as mentioned above, my interest was on post electoral violence in the Nigerian polity. It is becoming more obvious that it is within the period that political power shifted from North to South that political and other forms of violent acts have escalated. In Nigeria today, two violent groups have emerged within these ethno-religious blocs — South and North. In the South militancy has emerged with the “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta” (M.E.N.D) spearheading the violence. In the North a religious sect by name “Boko Haram” is raining terror. While there are no concrete empirical evidence supporting the claims that these groups are politically sponsored, it is a well know fact that they are politically motivated within this era of political power shift from North to South and within the agitation to reclaim and to maintain the seat of state power in the country among the two regions. From which I believe that this study could be broaden to incorporate this area.

I believe that this area could be incorporated into this study because of some observable facts. The first has already been mentioned. Which is the growth in the scale of violent act of these groups within this period of intense political struggle between the North and South coupled with the fact that these regions now has a violent group for itself, a very formidable group at that, that has the capacity to spread terror across the country. Second is the way through which terror and political agitation are moving hand in hand. That is, when a particular region come to occupy the major power positions in Nigeria the violent group from that particular region (be it M.E.N.D or Boko Haram) act of terror reduces and vice versa. Thus when late president Musa Yar’Adua (who is from the North) was in power the major act

of terror against the state came from the militant groups in the South. Now that President Jonathan is in power the leader of M.E.N.D has start campaigning for his second tenure which is in 2015. The same is true about Boko Haram whose activities against the state was very minimal during the Yar'Adua's regime but embarked on a weekly bombing of churches, government and non government institutions including the UN building in Nigeria and media houses. With these observable facts already on ground I think this study should be expanded upon to see if this observation could be justified or falsified

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APPENDIX A:**CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INTO THE VARIOUS POLITICAL OFFICES IN
THE COUNTRY**

The constitution acknowledges Nigeria, as a democratic federation of 36 states and a federal capital territory (Abuja). In Nigeria state powers are constitutionally shared between the federal, state and local governments. According to the 1999 constitution, elections are to be periodically held for both the local, state and federal political offices. For the National assembly, this is made up of the senate and the House of representative. Each state in the federation has 3 senatorial districts and the federal capital territory is counted as one making the senatorial seats 109. The country is also divided into 360 federal constituencies and each of them have a seat in the house of Representative. While the state houses of Assembly membership ranges from not less than 24 and not above 40 depending of the geographical land mass and the size of the population. Provisions are also made for the position of the local Government chair-person and the councilors in the wards within the various local government areas across the country.

For gubernatorial elections the entire state is regarded as a single constituency and everyone qualified to vote in state Assembly elections is eligible to vote. While the entire country is considered as a single constituency when elections are held for office of the president and any eligible to vote in the legislative elections is qualified to vote. Furthermore the constitution stipulates in section 133 that for anybody to become the president she/he must win not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Finally the constitution allowed for the multi-party system in the country and created Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which is mandated to carry one the following functions:

- Organizing, undertaking and supervising all elections to the offices of the President and Vice-President, state Governor and Deputy Governor, and members of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the House of Assembly of each state of the Federation.
- Registering political parties in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and an act of the National Assembly.
- monitoring the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances, conventions, congresses, and party primaries; arranging for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties and publishing a report on that examination and audit for public information.
- Arranging and conducting the registration of persons qualified to vote, as well as preparing, maintaining, and revising the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution.

APPENDIX B

HEADS OF STATE OF NIGERIA (1960–PRESENT)

Federation of Nigeria				
TENURE	PORTRAIT	INCUMBENT	NOTES	
1 October 1960 to 16 November 1960		Sir James Wilson Robertson, Governor-General		
1 st October, 1960 to 1 st October 1963		Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II of Nigeria		
16 November 1960 to 1 October 1963		Nnamdi Azikiwe, Governor-General	The 1 st Nigerian president	
<u>FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA</u>				
TENURE	PORTRAIT	INCUMBENT	AFFILIATION	NOTES

1 October 1963 to 16 January 1966		The 1 st Nigerian president	NCNC	deposed from Office.
16 January 1966 to 29 July 1966		Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Head of the Federal Military Government	Military	Deposed and murdered
August 1966 to 29 July 1975		Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government	Military	deposed
29 July 1975 to 13 February 1976		Murtala Mohammed, Head of the Federal Military Government	Military	Assassinated
13 February 1976 to 1 October 1979		Olusegun Obasanjo, Head of the Federal Military Government	Military	1st term; Transitioned to civilian rule
1 October 1979 to 31 December 1983		Shehu Shagari, President (2nd Republic)	NPN	Deposed
31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985		Muhammadu Buhari, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council	Military	Deposed
27 August 1985 to 26 August 1993		Ibrahim Babangida, President of the Armed Forces Ruling Council	Military	Resigned

26 August 1993 to 17 November 1993		Ernest Shonekan, Interim Head of State	Transitional Head of State	Deposed
17 November 1993 to 8 June 1998		Sani Abacha, Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council	Military	Died in office
8 June 1998 to 29 May 1999		Abdulsalami Abubakar, Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council	Military	Transitioned to civilian rule
29 May 1999 to 29 May 2007		Olusegun Obasanjo, 1st President in Nigerian Fourth republic	PDP	2nd term
29 May 2007 to 5 May 2010		Umaru Musa Yar'Adua , President	PDP	Died in Office
9 February 2010 till date		Goodluck Jonathan, Acting President	PDP	Acting for Yar'Adua and the present president.