TURKISH WELFARE STATE IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA: EMERGENCE OF CLASS-BASED CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Since the adoption of neoliberal economic welfare policies in 1980, the welfare state in Turkey has undergone significant changes. In this thesis, I make the case that the best way to understand the systemic nature of these changes is to study the welfare state as an amalgamation of "citizenship regimes" that target subgroups of the population. Afterwards, I provide a historical account of the development of welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Finally, using content analysis of a large number of official documents (including legal texts, government programs and parliamentary minutes) I make the case that the adoption of neoliberalism marks a point of discontinuity in the historical development of the Turkish welfare state. I argue that the reforms over the past three decades have resulted in the consolidation of three citizenship regimes, divided along class lines. The citizenship regime for the poor delivers increasingly regular and reliable benefits and services, but requires the poor to live visible and docile lives under state surveillance. The citizenship regime for the working- and middle-classes is organized around deploying social security as an economic resource. The expansion of coverage offered to these classes has been accompanied by the use of social security resources in investments and market development, especially in housing and healthcare. Finally, the citizenship regime for the rich is organized to drive individual investment in the financial sector, with a discourse that prioritizes growth and financial health above the welfare outcomes it produces. Further research is needed to investigate these citizenship regimes in their daily practices, to go beyond the official discourse and study the lived experience of people subjected to them.

Keywords: welfare state, citizenship, neoliberalism, Turkey, citizenship regime

ÖZET

Türkiye'deki refah devleti, neoliberal ekonomi politikalarının uygulanmaya başladığı 1980'den beri, çok önemli değişikilikler gerçirdi. Bu çalışmada, yaşanan bu sistemik değişimi anlamak için refah devletini yeni bir yaklaşımla incelememiz gerektiğini savunuyorum. Bu yaklaşımın temelinde, refah devletinin, toplumdaki çeşitli grupları hedefleyen "vatandaşlık rejimleri" tarafından oluşturulduğu anlayışı yatıyor. Bu teorik duruşumu açıkladıktan sonra, ikincil kaynakları kullanarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ndeki refah devleti politiklarının tarihini anlatıyorum. Son olaraksa, kanunlar, hükümet programları ve meclis tutanakları gibi çeşitli resmi belgelerin içeriklerini analiz ederek, neoliberalizmin Türkiye'deki refah politikalarının gelişiminde bir kırılma noktası olduğunu savunuyorum. Son otuz yıldaki refah politikaları, farklı sınıflardaki insanları hedef alan üç vatandaşlık rejimi oluşturdular. Fakir insanları hedef alan rejim, giderek daha düzenli ve güvenilir hizmetler sağlıyor, ama karşılığında bunlardan yararlanan insanların devletin gözetimi altında, görünür ve uysal hayatlar sürdürmesini gerektiriyor. İşçileri ve orta sınıfı hedef alan rejim, sosyal güvenliği ekonomik bir kaynak gibi kullanmayı hedefliyor. Bu sınıflara sağlanan sosyal güvelik olanakları, özellikle konut ve sağlık alanlarında yatırım ve piyasa yaratmak için kullanılıyor. Zenginleri hedef alan rejimse, ekonomik büyüme ve finansal sağlığı öne çıkaran bir diskurla, kişisel yatırımları artırmayı hedefliyor. Bu alanda, resmi diskurun ötesine geçip, vatandaşlık rejimlerinin günlük pratiklerini ve insanların deneyimlerini inceleyecek yeni çalışmalara ihtiyaç var.

Anahtar Sözcükler: refah devleti, vatandaşlık, neoliberalizm, Türkiye, vatandaşlık rejimi

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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the welfare state[1] in Turkey has undergone a thorough transformation with the adoption of universal health insurance, unification of the various social security schemes and the great expansion of social security programs. The desire to understand these changes provided the initial motivation for my research that culminated in this thesis. As I sought to place the changes in the proper historical and theoretical context, I realized that I needed to cast a broader net on both fronts. On the one hand, the recent reforms were the latest manifestation of a wave of change that had begun in the early 1980s with the adoption of neoliberal economic policies after the military coup. On the other, the existing theoretical approaches to the "welfare state" were not particularly helpful for explaining the kind of change that had taken place since then. Gradually, I formulated three interconnected questions that I wanted to answer with my research. First, what theoretical approach can explain the qualitative and quantitative changes that have taken place in the Turkish welfare state over the last three decades? Second, what is the historical context against which these changes should be analyzed? Finally, what is the function of the welfare state in the post-1980, neoliberal Turkey? In the rest of this thesis, I seek to answer these questions to the fullest of my ability.

[1] My use of the term "welfare state" goes against the grain of the majority of literature where it denotes the fully-fledged welfare systems in the developed countries, especially Western Europe. In contrast I use it to denote the entirety of welfare related policies created or maintained by the state. In other words, the use of the term does not denote a claim that Turkey now has, or in the past had, a welfare apparatus comparable in scale to those found in the developed countries, but rather calls attention to the fact that the various policies undertaken by the Turkish state were part of a greater whole. While the shift in meaning may appear small, I believe it goes a long way towards overcoming a bias in the literature against studying welfare in developing countries. In Chapter 1, I go beyond this linguistic statement to propose a new theoretical approach to the "welfare state" that I believe will be useful in sidestepping this problem.

Turkey's shift to neoliberalism officially began with the adoption of a set of economic policy changes on January 24th 1980, but it only gained steam in the aftermath of the military coup in the September of that year. Overall, it was a very tumultuous process, marked by top-down policy initiatives, wavering political commitment, and irregular growth and redistribution performances. It proceeded in three distinct periods. The first period lasted until the capital accounts were liberalized and the lira became fully convertible in 1989. It was marked by heavy-handed top-down reforms that were partially successful in achieving growth but also planted the seeds of the crisis-prone 1990s. The second stage, which lasted until 2001, witnessed the reintroduction of what Öniş calls "populist cycles." (Öniş 2003:2) Politicians chose to distribute economic resources through clientelistic networks in return for electoral support, and the resulting imbalances led to periodic crises. However, in this period, these crises occurred much more frequently because of the liberalization of capital movements. The third period, which began in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, witnessed the eradication of these populist cycles, the development of a regulatory state and the widespread application of post-Washington consensus neoliberalism in the economy.

Against the backdrop of this uneven neoliberalization, the Turkish welfare state underwent significant changes. The defining feature of the changes in the last three decades has been the extension of the welfare state coverage to new groups in the population and new areas of economic life. It is important to note that this observation contradicts the conventional reading of neoliberalism in the developing world. While one should not set up the straw-man argument that neoliberalism unequivocally sought to destroy any and all welfare policies, there are very few arguments that establish a relationship between neoliberalism and the expansion of social policies. However, that

connection certainly is present in the historical experience of Turkey. Prior to 1980, the welfare state in Turkey consisted of a small set of policies that predominantly catered to the relatively small urban workers and middle-class people. However, in the post-1980 years, these two groups expanded very rapidly, and the welfare state expanded alongside them. Moreover, new programs were created to provide benefits to people who had been usually excluded in the earlier periods. These ranged from new social security schemes to poverty alleviation programs and subsidized private pension plans. Even excluding the more specific policies that have targeted the upper- and lower-classes, a glance at the membership of social security schemes provides us with a clear picture of greater inclusion[2] (see Figure 1, below).

These very important changes have provided the main motivation for a wave of academic studies that focused on the Turkish welfare state. At the forefront of these comes various works by Ayşe Buğra who has been a trailblazer for the study of social policy in Turkey. Her works with Keyder (2005, 2006) were among the first to point out the scale of the changes in Turkey, noting the increasing role of the state in providing welfare outcomes and the part neoliberalism and globalization was playing in the reforms to the Turkish welfare state. She took up the same issue, this time with Adar (2008), a few years later to study the reforms in Turkey as symptomatic of the changes that countries without mature welfare states were going through in their experience with neoliberal globalization.

[2]The post-1980 schemes include voluntary and small-scale agricultural social security memberships created or made functional under Bag-Kur and SSK during the early 1980s. For more details see Chapters 2 and 3.

Figure 1: Active Members of Three Public Social Security Schemes as % of Total Population



Source: Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2013; the 5-year periods are broken for the last time point because of the amalgamation of various social security schemes into three new schemes operated by SGK in 2010.

Another author that focused on the neoliberalization of the welfare state in Turkey was Elveren (2008). He saw the more recent developments in AKP's tenure, as an attempt at privatizing the welfare state, and argued that they would result in worse welfare outcomes for the poorer segments of society. He especially argued against the possible adoption of defined-contribution individual accounts schemes for social security, and instead proposed to strengthen the existing PAYGO schemes' redistributive elements. Grütjen (2008) writing at the same time, was more interested in identifying the overall character of the Turkish welfare state. He argued that despite the reforms in the recent past the characteristics of the welfare state had not changed radically in Turkey, and it still fit into the category of the "Southern European Model" of welfare pro-

vision. A similar argument was echoed in Eder's (2010) work on the political economy of welfare provision in Turkey. Her argument stated that the expansion of welfare programs and the growth of state involvement in welfare provision did not change the main character of the welfare state. Instead, the expansion has resulted in greater opportunities for distributing political patronage, increased state power over the population and "no significant improvement of welfare governance" (Eder 2010:152). Finally, Yörük (Yoruk 2012) has recently published on the subject of using welfare programs to distribute patronage and effectively "buy" social peace. He shows that various poverty alleviation and social assistance programs, especially during AKP's tenure, has targeted the Kurdish population, especially the internally displaced Kurds living in urban areas disproportionately.

As can be seen from the brief review above, there isn't an established consensus on the outcome of the changes that have taken place in the Turkish welfare state since the adoption of neoliberalism. I believe that the key to understanding that outcome lies in a more differentiated assessment of the neoliberal project. Elveren (2008) argues that the ultimate outcome of the neoliberal project is the retreat of state and "privatization" of the social sphere. What we need from a more differentiated understanding is not to prove Elveren's arguments wrong, but to be able to accommodate policies of state retreat and privatization in some areas with the expansion of state power and the socialization in others. To begin to formulate such an understanding I take my cue from Altan-Olcay's (2011:43) argument that "neoliberal logics about individual rationality and responsibility in economic matters" only make sense in particular contexts through the framing of an ideal citizen. While the crux of her argument lies in how discourses neoliberalism and nationalism interact to localize and frame the

ideal citizen, I go off on a tangent and instead look at the "ideal citizen" envisioned by the welfare state in Turkey.[3] This allows me to show, I hope conclusively, that the expansion of the welfare policies under neoliberalism, was not a development that was external to the neoliberal project. It was very much an integral part of the neoliberal project that secured social stability from the poor and mobilized the resources of the working- and middle-classes and the rich for the purposes of growth, all in return for greater inclusion.

Studying the welfare state in relation to citizenship is by no means an original contribution of this thesis. In fact, as I discuss in great detail in Chapter 1, the connection between the two terms lies at the heart of the classical texts, by Marshall (1992; 1977), Polanyi (2001) and Titmuss (1958, 1974), that established the study of welfare policies. I find that these texts have been interpreted in limiting ways in the current mainstream literature on the welfare state. A detailed reading of Polanyi and Titmuss's work highlights that analyses of the welfare state need to go beyond the current literature's focus on the satisfaction of consumption needs and the means of welfare production. The forms of participation in social, economic and political life enabled by the welfare policies, and the goals of social change pursued by them need to be at the center of discussion. I find that using the literature on governmentality (Foucault 2000; Hindess 1994; Rose 1996a, 1996b) and governance (Jenson 2007; Jessop 1999; Somers 2008) allows me to do exactly that. At the end of Chapter 1, I try to bring the insights of these two literatures together and propose to study the welfare state as an amalgamation of numerous "citizenship regimes." These citizenship regimes target certain groups in the population, defined with reference to class, gender, ethnicity,

[3] Another important author who has influenced my thinking on the subject has been Hindess (2002).

religion, geographic location and provide them with a particular mixture of rights and duties in order to achieve certain social outcomes.

In Chapter 2, I provide a detailed history of the evolution of citizenship regimes in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic between the early 19th century and 1980, depending mostly on secondary sources. I trace the developments in policy areas such as poverty alleviation, social security, labor regulations, health insurance and healthcare provision. In this history, I identify three main factors driving the policies. The first is the mobilization of political support from the poor through acts of public charity. These acts range from unstandardized and sporadic stipends, to the creation of poor houses and the granting of land deeds to urban squatters. The second is gaining and maintaining the support of the civilian and military bureaucracy with generous welfare policies. I trace the development of these policies starting with the creation of the first pension funds for these bureaucracies in the early 19th century and follow how the differential treatment was maintained and further entrenched in the following periods. Finally, the third factor I identify is the use of welfare policies to foster economic development in key sectors. This begins with the provision of pensions to the coal miners and ship builders, but gradually is extended to the rest of the industrial workforce over the two centuries.

In Chapter 3, I argue that these three driving factors lose a significant portion of their power with the adoption of neoliberalism in 1980. My argument draws on a content analysis of a large sample of official documents. This sample includes all government programs and coalition contracts for governments that came into power after the military coup of 1980, texts of all laws that had an impact on welfare policies, the minutes of parliamentary proceedings related to those laws, and official communica-

tions between international organizations and Turkish governments regarding the social security system. In my analysis of these texts I coded passages to indicate the economic class of people targeted by the policies, the types of policies they were talking about and the aims of those policies. Afterwards, I used these coded passages to put together an account of government intentions and action (or the lack thereof) over the last three decades. This method allowed me to mostly limit my editorial intervention to the organization of the argument rather than extensive interpretation of policies, except in some instances when I had access to important information about the policies from sources outside my sample. In those cases, I have tried my best to make a distinction between the texts from my sample and other sources and relate the two to each other. Throughout Chapter 3, I have opted to identify the various documents I am talking about in text as much as possible, while using footnotes for the rest. Since the documents I have worked on are in Turkish, I have re-phrased them in English in the main body of my argument, with extensive Turkish quotations in the footnotes.

Using this method I find three new dynamics in play in the period after 1980. The first is the active management of poverty as a social problem and the extension of state power into the everyday lives of the poor to make them docile and visible. This has resulted in the creation of new and extensive poverty alleviation programs and large bureaucracies to administer them. The second is the reconceptualization of the welfare state as an economic resource. This has meant, on the one hand, keeping the poor away from the labor market and preventing them from disrupting the formal economy. On the other hand, it has also meant extracting savings and leveragable debt from all other segments of the population for the purposes of financing the neoliberal economy. Finally, the third dynamic was the increased marketization of the welfare

state, where both the financial and service provision aspects of the welfare state were reformed to integrate either new markets or market-like structures. This was not limited only to areas like private pensions and health insurance where actual markets were created from scratch, but also included the introduction of aspects of competition for primary care providers, public and private hospitals and conditional cash transfer programs for the poor. My main argument, simply put, is that the emergence of these three new dynamics in social policymaking, and their gradual prioritization by subsequent governments, has resulted in the emergence of three distinct "citizenship regimes" divided along class lines. In Turkey, neoliberalism has resulted in the evolution of the pre-1980 fractured welfare state towards a more inclusive one that distinctly targeted the poor, the working- and middle-classes and the rich with separate policies, and aimed to bring about separate welfare outcomes.

I believe that the arguments developed in this thesis will make three important contributions to the existing scholarly work. First, my use of governmentality and governance literatures in the theoretical argument I make in Chapter 1 promises to broaden the terms of the welfare state research. Bringing in Foucauldian perspectives on modern state power and inclusive conceptions of governance promises a lively theoretical debate on the everyday functions and the ultimate goals of the welfare state. Moreover it allows for studies that are not strictly limited to active state policies like health insurance and pensions, but can bring in a wider set of actors -including private firms, NGOs, international institutions– and a larger range of policies such as service provision, taxation and housing. Finally, the recognition that the subgroups of the population are subjected to significantly different sets of policies under a variety of conditions is key to understanding differential treatment not simply as exclusion or distribu-

tion of rent and patronage but as an essential component of the "welfare state." Second, I believe that the historical account I present in Chapter 2 is the first English language account of the development of welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. While it is mostly built on secondary sources, especially Özbek's (2006) extensive and exhaustive effort, it nevertheless fills an important gap in the English-language literature and ideally will allow non-Turkish speakers with necessary information while studying the welfare state in Turkey. Finally, I believe that the analysis I put forth in Chapter 3 contains important insights into welfare policies in not only Turkey but also other developing countries. As Buğra and Adar (Buğra and Adar 2008), and Yörük (Yoruk 2012:539) have pointed out, developments in Turkey are not exceptional when viewed from a comparative perspective. Countries at similar levels of development, with similar patterns of integration into the global economy share the same dynamics. Therefore, I hope that my findings will at least allow for the welfare developments in those places to be subjected to systematic inquiry and comparisons with Turkey.

While I am hopeful about these contributions, I am aware that the work I present in this thesis is subject to serious limitations. The historical account I present in Chapter 2 is based on secondary material, and that means it is subject to any biases, omissions, or other inaccuracies included in the works I drew on. While I do not have any reason to suspect any of these in any of my sources, especially considering the fact that most of the time I use the sources to confirm dates and policies and not interpretations, the readers should still keep this limitation in mind. In Chapter 3, the analysis I present is limited by my source material. I use content analysis of various official documents to make most of my arguments in that chapter. Therefore, often I am not able

to speak about the daily application of various policies, the actual experiences of citizens, and the behavior of officials. This places a serious limit on the types of claims I can make about my findings. Simply put, the material I have only allows me to establish intent, by the political elite, to act in a certain manner. In some instances I do present outcomes that line up with these intents (for example, the private health insurance and pension contracts taken up by individuals) and in others I present contradictory ones (for example the lack of annual means testing for Green Card beneficiaries). However, these are often the exceptions to the rule. The final important limitation to keep in mind is that in both Chapter 2 and 3, I focus on class as the social cleavage that defines the citizenship regimes I study. This was an intentional choice, guided by my interest in studying the impact of neoliberalism, but it should not be taken to mean there aren't other possible ways to define citizenship regimes, both in Turkey and in other countries. Yörük's (2012) findings suggests that ethnicity is definitely a promising factor to consider, especially in conjunction with class. Other viable factors are gender, religion and geography (especially the urban-rural divide).

I hope that my work in the following pages manages to provide a convincing account of the welfare state in Turkey in the neoliberal era, while staying within the boundaries marked by these limitations.

CHAPTER 1: Studying the Neoliberal Welfare State: The Case for Citizenship Regimes

In the past decade, Brazil initiated the largest social aid programs in the history of the country, China has started rolling out a rural pension scheme for hundreds of millions of farmers that is a curious mix of public and private financing and administration and several smaller, and much less wealthy, states have adopted universal basic pension schemes (Hall 2006; Shen and Williamson 2010; Willmore 2007). The same decade also witnessed the most significant overhaul of the welfare state in Turkey since the start of various welfare policies in the early 19th century. In this chapter, I aim to develop a new understanding of the welfare state to explain why these changes are happening today and in these countries. In order to do so, I begin by a brief review of the welfare state literature today, showing that the mainstream literature is not able to sufficiently account for these developments. I look for the roots of this inability in the interpretation of Marshall, Titmuss and Polanyi in that literature, and show how it has been limiting. I argue that the best way to overcome this limitation is to bring in Foucault's concept of governmentality, and especially the arguments by Rose about the welfare state (Rose 1996a, 1996b). I bring in the some of the key insights from the governance literature, represented by Jessop (1999), Jenson (2007) and Somers (2008) to develop a more thorough understanding. The chapter culminates in the argument that contemporary welfare states are best studied as an amalgamation of numerous "citizenship regimes"[4] that target certain segments of the population (defined by class,

[4] I borrow the term from Jenson (1997, 2007) but use it in a very different sense. Her use of the term is limited to the totality of state and non-state actors involved in the governance of social policies. My use,

ethnicity, gender, etc.), includes or excludes them to varying degrees and governs them through a large number of institutions including, but not limited to the state

Today, if there is a presence haunting the study of the welfare state it is that of Gøsta Esping-Andersen. His work on the developed countries' welfare states in *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* have set the stage for much of the scholarly work in the last two decades (Esping-Andersen 1990). In that book Esping-Andersen argued that the "complex of legal and organizational features" that made up the welfare state were "*systematically* interwoven" and could be studied as liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990:2, original emphasis). He identified three ideal-types. This was a very inclusive approach to the welfare state, emphasizing the institutions, social actors and path dependency. The first wave of responses to his work took the form of questioning the three ideal-type regimes he identified, arguing that social spending patterns and a limited number of institutional qualities could be used to identify various fourth regimes (Castles and Mitchell 1992; Ferrera 1996; Kwon 1997; Leibfried 1992). A second wave of research was focused on integrating the service provision aspect of the welfare state into Esping-Andersen's theory (Bambra 2005; Kasza 2002). Today, it still remains an incredibly powerful work of scholarship that drives a lot of current research both empirical and theoretical (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Bambra 2007b; Powell and Barrientos 2011).

Yet what we can call "regime theory," or what Powell and Barrientos (2011) call the "modeling business," has also had its share of critics. Beyond the arguments already mentioned above that sought to modify Esping-Andersen's formulation but keep the overarching framework, the most important critique focused on the issue of

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as explained above, denotes the application of governmental power through governance and recognizes the multiplicity of these regimes.

gender. Several authors have argued that welfare regimes, in their original formulation, overlooked the gendered nature of social policies and the impact of the regimes on women were much more different than their impact on men (Korpi 2000; Lewis and Ostner 1995; Pascall and Lewis 2004). An even more trenchant critique of this literature is that it has been of very limited use outside the relatively narrow confines of developed countries. Often, researchers working in this field have analyzed the welfare states in the developing countries by comparing them to the welfare states in the developing world. This has led to a type of "deficit thinking" whereby welfare states in the developing world are characterized by what they lack -from formal policies for old-age security to widespread coverage of the population and the amount of public social spending (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Cerny 1995; Elliott 2011; Rudra and Haggard 2005; Rudra 2007). It has also take the form of failing to identify a "welfare state," because authors can't identify formal policies that they can compare to what is found in developed countries (Wood and Gough 2006). In recent years, there have been attempts at challenging this deficit thinking by developing new understandings of the welfare states in the developing countries. However, most of these studies have opted to develop theories of the welfare state that are specific to the developing countries or regions they are studying, rather than challenging the existing theories' approach to the developing countries (Aspalter 2011; Franzoni 2008; Kpessa 2010). Davis' (2001) work on Bangladesh stands out among these because it includes an important critique of the orthodoxy. He specifically points to the need to include non-state and non-market actors (civil society and international organizations), informal policies and structural forces that contribute to social stratification in understanding the welfare state in developing countries.

I believe that at the root of this inability lies the fact that the "regime theory" literature is based on a highly limiting view of some of its key theoretical foundations. This has also been recognized by Powell and Barrientos (2011:81), who note that more renewed theoretical work is needed to push the literature beyond its current problems. In order to do so, it is essential to revisit the works of Marshall, Polanyi and Titmuss that have been widely recognized as the key influences on the welfare state literature (Bambra 2007a; Davis 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990; Powell and Barrientos 2011). Below I provide brief accounts of their work related to the welfare state, explain how they have been interpreted in the current literature, and point out some of the inconsistencies that I believe lay the groundwork for a new understanding of the welfare state.

T.H. Marshall gave his seminal lecture on the evolution of citizenship and its relationship to class in 1949 (Marshall and Bottomore 1992). He conceptualized citizenship as the site of struggles to obtain certain guarantees from the state (rights), which were granted in return for duties owed to the state by the citizens (taxes, loyalty and work). He divided the bundle of rights and duties grouped under the title of citizenship into three distinct sets. The first was the set of civil rights, the struggles for and the recognition of which took place during the 17th and 18th centuries. These included key issues such as property rights and freedom of contract. Their main purpose was to establish a sphere of activity where the citizens could pursue their economic goals with relative autonomy and make the state's role in this sphere predictable. These were followed in the 19th century by the gradual expansion of political rights which allowed citizens to participate in government at both the local and national levels. In Marshall's argument, this democratization of political power was a natural extension

of capitalism, defusing the class tensions between the newly powerful middle classes and the nobility (Marshall & Bottomore 1992, 13). Finally, the 20th century witnessed the development of social rights as the states were forced to counterbalance both the vagaries brought on by heavy industrialization, capitalist expansion and the Great Depression and the previous periods' institutions of charity and poverty alleviation failed to provide the required amount of support (Marshall 1977, 84-86).

Writing against the backdrop of a war-torn Britain trying to rebuild its economy based on a new welfare state, Marshall understandably gave these new social rights a key role in his argument. According to him, these rights sought to protect the citizens from the extremes of a market economy and in doing so maintain a productive workforce. Therefore, welfare measures such as the establishment of a minimum wage or the provision of family allowances were not acts of altruism but were provided in return for a "duty to work" that Marshall deemed essential for the well-being of the society (Marshall 1977, 117). However, this should not be taken to mean that Marshall was indifferent to the consequences of social rights for groups and individuals. In fact, he was very much concerned with their role in reducing social inequality, but he did not see them as the harbingers of perfect equality. Marshall thought that social rights were useful in reducing the intra-class inequalities, creating cohesive social groups who enjoyed "equality of status" provided by access to social goods such as work, healthcare and pensions (Marshall and Bottomore 1992, 33). But they did not erode the elemental inter-class inequalities based on incomes which, in Marshall's opinion, reflected an individual's personal success or failure in the market economy (Marshall and Bottomore 1992:87). He proposed that this inequality would become irrelevant as long as the social services provided by the state were targeted to exclude the rich, and

the taxation system made sure that they remained involved in paying for those services (Hoxsey 2011, 918).

Over the years, several academics have engaged with Marshall's work to point out its shortcomings. It has been criticized for being teleological in its analysis of how social rights were inevitable, and obscuring the contingencies and political struggles that were essential in the formulation of those rights (Mann 1987; Turner 1997). Others have pointed out that Marshall's study of citizenship "implies the subordination of certain identities, not only of class, but also of gender and race" (O'Connor 1993:505). Basically they have pointed out that citizenship has been a white, middle-class, male category that was founded upon the disenfranchisement of anyone who did not fit that description (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Young 1989). However, despite these important divergences between Marshall and his many critics, all of their arguments are founded upon a conception of an unambiguous power struggle between various groups, to which the state is often added as a stand-in for the interests of the ruling, or most powerful, group. It is often this conception of politics and the function of the state that is found in the current welfare state literature. While it is useful for analyzing the "political," i.e. contentious, enactment of citizenship, it is built upon an idealized conception of how states and policies function. It ignores that a set of state and non-state actors have to govern the everyday application of policies, generate compliance and consent. These, in turn, are subjected to discourses that define them, their roles and their goals.[5]

Polanyi's understanding of social policies and welfare were somewhat similar to that of Marshall. In his *opus magnum*, *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi (2001)

[5] A good example of how citizenship operates in such a manner is provided by Isin (2004) in his discussion of the emergence of "the neurotic citizen."

argued that the history of capitalism was the history of a "double movement." On the one hand were the attempts at dis-embedding economic relationships from society and the commodifying labor, land and money to be traded in this unfettered market. On the other hand were the struggles to re-embed the economic relationships into society and decommodify the "fictitious commodities" of labor, land and money. Polanyi argued that throughout the 19th century the application of laissez-faire economics was successful in destroying traditional forms of social support too rapidly for successful re-embedding. Once these forms were destroyed, the great majority of working classes were kept away from establishing control over the economy by being denied political rights (Polanyi 2001:234). Even when the franchise was extended to these classes, political parties that represented them couldn't take radical action against the powerful market actors. However, the destruction of World War I, the Great Depression, and the rise of fascism freed these parties from the hegemony of the *laissez faire* orthodoxy. Polanyi saw in the politics of New Deal and the wartime social policies the beginnings of the re-establishment of social control over market forces. He claimed, writing in the early 1940s, that "[w]ithin the nations we are witnessing a development under which the economic system ceases to lay down the law to society and the primacy of society over that system is secured" (Polanyi 2001:259). This was his, relatively early, take on the emergence of the welfare state. He saw it, not as part of a class-compromise as Marshall did, but as the re-embedding of economic relationships into society, a change in the order of how everyday life was to be lived.

It is important to clarify that re-embedding did not mean a return to pre-capitalist forms of social control over economic activity. Instead the fictitious commodities of labor, land and money were being removed from the markets in new ways.

It is the removal of labor from markets that ties today's welfare state literature to Polanyi's work most strongly. According to Polanyi, the removal of labor from the market does not mean that individuals are free from engaging in productive economic activities. Instead, decommodification of labor means that "not only conditions in the factory, hours of work, and modalities of contract, but the basic wage itself, are determined outside the market" (Polanyi 2001:259). Moreover, things like unemployment, poverty and hunger can no longer be simply written off as the dictates of the market, or the best possible outcome, but have to be actively addressed by policy. It is this reading of Polanyi that most of the welfare state literature bases its understanding of decommodification. Esping-Andersen's "decommodification index" calculating how much of a subsistence income, under what conditions, and for how long, is provided by various welfare policies is its embodiment (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). This index still remains at the heart of almost all mainstream research on the welfare states (Scruggs and Allan 2006). However, Room (2000:348) has argued that in Polanyi and the greater Marxist context, decommodification means more than basic material security. Since commodification of labor meant that the laborer was stripped of meaningful membership in society, decommodification needs to return the "human character of the alleged commodity" (Polanyi 2001:186). Room interprets this to include a possibility for "critical participation in society," the possibility to voice concerns and participate in decisions that impact one's life (Room 2000:349). Thus in studying the welfare state, we need to go beyond the satisfaction of consumption needs to see which forms of participation are enabled, through what channels and how this participation shapes the "commodity" of labor.

However, beyond this insight about the forms of participation realized in welfare policies, Polanyi's approach has two significant limitations. The first one is that in Polanyi's account of the past 200 years, "society" is always presented as a singular mass. Social cleavages are, for the large part, invisible and the unity of the "social" is taken for granted. The only meaningful cleavage recognized in *The Great Transformation* is the one between those who benefitted from the disembedding of economic relationships from society and "society" at large which suffered from it. While Polanyi does make occasional references to farmers, traders, industrial workers, his theory does not stipulate what disembedding has meant for these groups specifically, nor does it speculate on what shape re-embedding will take for them. The omission of social and economic cleavages does not undermine the strength or the validity of Polanyi's argument as it applies to the broad historical dynamics, but it means that applying it uncritically to the actual policies is almost impossible. The importance of cleavages like gender, ethnicity, religion have already been discussed above in the context of criticism of Marshall and Marshall himself centered his analysis on class. An approach that can integrate them into its analysis is clearly needed.

Polanyi also has little to tell us about how to analyze the specific policies being enacted and what they mean in the larger context of disembedding/re-embedding. The necessity of critically approaching the content of specific policies and how they impacted various groups, on the other hand, has been emphasized by the third key scholar I want to discuss in greater detail, Richard Titmuss. Titmuss replaced T.H. Marshall as the chair of London School of Economics' Social Policy and Administration Department in 1950, and like his predecessor he has had a formative influence on the study of the welfare state. However, their approaches to the subject matter were signif-

icantly different. He de-emphasized the importance of social class in the making of social policies, and instead focused on social policy as "moral action" by society to achieve certain ends (Reisman 2001:34). This was a perspective that immediately broadened the scope of research beyond the formal set of rights to what the policies were actually doing in society. Thus things like service provision and policy design became central issues, and Titmuss and his students used their influential positions as advisors to both British and foreign governments to actively engage in policy-making (Reisman 2001:38). Titmuss' theory saw the welfare state as a more active agent than both Marshall and Polanyi, in that he recognized the potential of social policies to engage the society to enact desired changes, and reach certain outcomes (Reisman 2001:41).

However, the main source of his importance for the current literature stems from one particular work. In his 1974 study, Titmuss laid the groundwork for seeing the welfare state itself, the totality of policies, institutions and the ends they served as an object of study (Titmuss 1974). He identified three ideal-types of welfare states, those providing a residual safety net, those focused on maintaining the existing social status quo and those seeking to achieve equitable distribution. These served as the intellectual foundations upon which Esping-Andersen built his three welfare regimes. However, Kleinman (2002) has pointed out that there is a key difference between the two typologies. While Titmuss' ideal-types are determined by the kinds of outcomes the states in question are trying to achieve, Esping-Andersen and the literature that has formed around his work classify welfare states according to the means through which they pursue welfare outcomes. Thus, while searching for patterns in the means through

which welfare states act, the literature has, to an extent, lost the ability to accommodate the various ends that are pursued through those means.

I believe that the three limitations in the way the current literature engages with Marshall, Polanyi and Titmuss provide a good starting point for a new approach to the welfare state. Such an approach must be compatible with Titmuss' emphasis that policies are not only important in how they are deployed but also in the ends they seek to bring about. Moreover, it also needs to be guided by the broader understanding of decommodification identified by Room in Polanyi's work. Namely, not all forms of decommodification are the same, and the possibilities of critical engagement with welfare outcomes, both collectively and individually, need to be taken into consideration. Finally, it needs to account for not only the inception of social rights and the welfare state through contention and compromise, but also for the everyday enactment of rights and policies, the generation of consent and compliance. To accommodate these insights, it is of critical importance to bring in Foucault's concept of governmentality.

Michel Foucault's decades long study of power in modern societies led him, in late 1970s to develop the concept of governmentality (Foucault 2000:201). He stated that this form of modern power gradually evolved alongside the modern state, and it was defined by the fact that it took the population as its object. Governmentality saw the people it operated on as more than fixtures of the territory. It sought to protect and develop this population, to engage with people's health and productivity, to modify their habits and behavior patterns, and to shield them against external shocks (Foucault 2000:209) However, governmentality is much more than a newfound concern with the population. Rose (1996a:42) states that it is a form of rationality that defines reality according to pre-set moral codes. It also carries an inherent "style of reasoning," and a

"technology of government" that brings together diverse forces, institutions, techniques to regulate everyday existence according to pre-determined norms. Thus, it is built upon a certain way of thinking about the population (as citizens, subjects, laborers, soldiers, etc.) and ideas about the "right" way to organize them (selling their labor on the market, migrating to colonized territories, being fit for military service). To act upon this population for these ends, it employs a very wide array of means ranging from legal rules and administrative orders, to designed spaces (like prisons, schools, urban centers) and new measures of assent and compliance (surveys, statistics).

This approach, as can be imagined, places the everyday functioning of the "state" at the center of attention, thereby overcoming the limitations of Marshall's conception of citizenship. On the other hand, it places great emphasis on possibilities of participation in this method of governing. Thus, not only formal institutions such as unions and corporatist decision-making processes highlighted by Room (2000), but also less direct means of participating in creating welfare outcomes such as the everyday practices of claiming rights and using the institutional and physical infrastructure can be taken into consideration. Finally, it is able to account for both the ends pursued and means employed by the welfare states in a meaningful and interactive manner. Rose emphasizes that governmentality is not "a matter of the implementation of idealized schema in the real by an act of will" but the regulation of diverse aspects of everyday life, encountering resistance and opposition, and trying to organize the complexity of the whole ensemble, which includes more than just state apparatuses to approximate the pre-set goals (Rose 1996a:42).

Foucault did not directly study the welfare state as a case of governmentality in action, but a case for such a conception has been made by many who have used his

theories. The earliest attempts at this are found in Britain where academics tried to explain the changing discourse around the welfare state in 1980s and its impacts (Hewitt 1983; Squires 1990). From these beginnings, this literature evolved into a cohesive critique of the post-1980s welfare policies as the "governmentalization" of welfare (Higgs 1998; Nettleton 1997). They identified in the new discourse of Thatcherism and Reaganism a new set of goals for the welfare state -directed mostly by neoclassical economics – that completely did away with the values and norms of common good. Instead they pointed to the emergence of new forms of social policies that operated on a new logic of monitoring and altering individual behavior. This bent in post-1980 welfare state policies is best described by Jessop (who is not using a Foucauldian framework) when he notes that the states have apparently committed themselves to "making and re-making" their citizenry (Jessop 1999, 355-6).

The proliferation of this literature, I believe rightly, identifies a point of discontinuity between the "Golden Age" of welfare states, and the welfare state after the establishment of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology. Rose identifies this as the "death of the social" whereby the constructs of a delimited national economy, and the more or less egalitarian society it depended on, are rapidly eroded and the old rationalities of governing it are disappearing along with it (Rose 1996b). Hindess (1994) points out that the most important determinant of this shift is that the ruling parties have come to believe that the continued economic well-being of their populations is no longer dependent on their being an integrated and cohesive society. Rose saw in this change the division of the body social into distinct communities, some of whom have the requisite resources to become included "citizens" and with the rest becoming increasingly marginalized and excluded from the benefits of citizenship. The affiliated are increasingly

divorced from social understandings of welfare, and come to focus on individualized conceptions of risk (of unemployment, sickness, old age) and responsibility. The marginalized, on the other hand are atomized by new forms of knowledge that cast them as ultimately responsible (as individuals) of their marginalization, and are managed by a range of new institutions, from supra-national organizations like the EU to civil society efforts like community activism.

These dynamics of fractionalization of the social body, inclusion/exclusion and the multiplicity of actors are echoed by another group of scholars, who employ the term "governance" to study this new condition of the welfare state. Rhodes (1996) has argued that the term governance usually carries connotations of minimal government, the lack of overt state involvement in an area. However, in studies of social policy, the term governance has been used in a completely different manner by several scholars, to denote that welfare policies need to be studied against a background of a range of social actors including the state, the market, the family and civil society. Several of the "regime theory" researchers have made similar observations, by including the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in the welfare regimes of Southern European states or emphasizing the role of private charities and other voluntary organizations in other countries (Evers 1995; Ferrera 1996; Lundström and Svedberg 2003). Even Esping-Andersen's original work contains a limited emphasis on how some of the welfare areas are left to the market.

However, more robust theories of welfare governance make the multiplicity of actors active in the provision of welfare much more explicit. An early example is Jessop's analysis of how the welfare state has been impacted by globalization (Jessop 1999). His argument identifies that the state is no longer the central or the defining

actor in determining how welfare outcomes are produced. Instead, it has retreated from this position in favor of the market forces that prioritize labor market flexibility and international competitiveness. Moreover, this new market dominated governance also includes supra- and sub-national actors, including the EU, IMF and the rise of the international corporation.

Jenson's (2007) and Somers' (2008) arguments on the governance of social citizenship still retain the understanding that the state plays a key role in setting up governance arrangements. In her study of the citizenship regime in the European Union, Jenson develops a four-pronged approach to citizenship that she dubs the "citizenship regime." This approach is based on her previous work on Canada and Canadian citizenship practices (Jenson 1997). She first analyzes how the responsibilities for welfare outcomes, like old-age security, are distributed between the state, market, community and family. Then she studies how this distribution is achieved through formal and informal arrangements. Finally she looks at how the state governs these arrangements and delineates who is to be included and who excluded. In this conception of governance, all social actors enjoy a certain level of independence from the state, but are ultimately subject to its powers of distributing the responsibilities and determining the insiders and outsiders.

In *Genealogies of Citizenship*, Somers extends this power to govern through governance to all influential social actors. She argues that "citizenship is at heart a matrix of institutional relationships, technologies, political idioms and rights claiming practices that are always dynamic and contingent" (Somers 2008:35). Therefore any attempt to understand the content of citizenship needs to account for the temporally specific and constantly contested compromises that result from the interplay between

state, market and civil society. Not all aspects of citizenship are covered by any single actor and thus we need to cast an inclusive net while studying the welfare "state." Somers also observes that multiple intersecting boundaries of race, class, geographic location, and many others interact to create subpopulations that experience the set of policies that make up citizenship in highly differentiated ways, in line with Rose's argument about communities (Somers 2008:90).

Employing the literatures on governmentality and governance in conjuncture is certainly a sizeable undertaking. However, as I have shown above, both literatures agree on a few key dynamics that have become essential parts of the welfare state in the neoliberal era. First of all, the unified and cohesive social body is no longer the target of the welfare state. Instead, smaller and much more specific groups[6] defined geographically, ethnically, medically, or based on class or religion, have become the focus of welfare policies. Second of all, not all of these groups are included in the same way into these policies, and they don't have the same rights. The groups all enjoy varying sets of rights and duties and can exercise them in specific ways. Finally, the welfare state is no longer (and by some accounts never was) just made up of the state or public institutions. Market actors, NGOs, the family, the communities, supranational and inter-national institutions all wield varying degrees of influence in specific issue areas.

Thus I propose to study the neoliberal welfare state as an amalgamation of various "citizenship regimes," borrowing Jenson's term (Jenson 2007). The main reason for this choice is that it re-centers the focus of the subject from the state to the state-

[6] I have opted not to use Rose's term "community" due to its connotations of pre-existing ties between members and even a possible group identity. While these might apply to certain groups targeted by the modern welfare state, they are certainly not pre-requisites of being targeted as a group.

citizen nexus, thus bringing attention to the fact that the welfare state is the application of governmental power on the citizens. Moreover, the retaining term "regime" denotes that there is an organizing intent behind the application of this power, and that it is not a singular institution but the coming together of multiple institutions around this intent. Finally, making it plural recognizes that different groups in the population, defined by gender, race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation are subjected to different constellations of policies brought together for different aims, that might range from total inclusion to absolute exclusion.

I argue that any given citizenship regime should be studied at two different levels, namely its institutional setup and its discursive aspects. At the level of institutional setup, there are three factors to be kept in mind. First is that we need to cast a very wide net when studying institutions that are included in the governance of social citizenship. We cannot limit ourselves to the state, or even the market and civil society institutions that are overtly engaged in social policies. Families, workplace practices, informal networks of care and support and international organizations all need to be factored in. More importantly, we need to pay special attention to how various responsibilities for welfare outcomes are distributed among these actors. The second factor is that we need to pay attention to how borders are drawn between members and non-members. Delineating who is to be included and who excluded, and under what conditions, is an essential function of governance arrangements. Any analysis needs to be open to the possibility of finding significantly differentiated citizenship regimes that subject individuals to widely varying social policies. The final factor is that, all the diverse institutions, as unrelated or contradictory as they may seem, form a whole –if not by design then certainly by the fact of their coexistence. Thus to understand an

individual policy, it needs to be located in the greater context of the citizenship regime it operates in.

At the discursive level we need to study how the discourses around citizenship regimes are formed, interact with one another and impact policies to justify, delegitimize and change them. In order to do so, discourses in three settings need to be studied. First, the various legal texts impacting the whole set of policies need to be studied to determine what can be rightfully called the dominant or hegemonic discourse. Second, the forms of discourse mobilized by institutions involved in the making of citizenship regimes, from political parties and domestic bureaucracies to international organizations and civil society needs to be studied to identify what discourses they employ. Finally, the discourses surrounding the everyday interactions people have with the citizenship regime they live in, ranging from how they talk in a welfare office when signing up for a benefit to their own perceptions of various policies needs to be studied to understand how the dominant discourse is impacting their agencies, but also what types of resistance it is engendering.

In this chapter, I have attempted to develop a new theoretical understanding of the welfare state in order to move the academic discussion on the subject beyond its current low stakes-low rewards state. For this purpose, I first provided a brief review of the literature today, starting with Esping-Andersen's seminal work and the responses it has generated, pointing out that the literature has not been successful in expanding the study of welfare states to outside the limited set of developed countries. To understand why that might be the case, I then moved onto the theoretical foundations of this literature and engaged with the theories of Marshall, Polanyi and Titmuss and how they are being used today. I found that moving beyond the limited conception of citi-

zenship in Marshall and re-emphasizing the importance of "critical participation" in Polanyi and the goals of welfare provision in Titmuss, led to the theories of governmentality and governance. These two literatures agree that the neoliberal welfare state targets not the population but certain subsets of it, includes or excludes them to various degrees and mobilizes a multiplicity of actors besides the state. I proposed to use these two theories to study the welfare state through the concept of "citizenship regimes" which can be studied on the level of their institutional setup and their discursive practices. In the next chapter, I trace the development of citizenship regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic throughout the 19th century up until 1980.

CHAPTER 2: Development of Welfare Policies in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic

Using a concept as broad as citizenship regimes, especially for the purposes of a long-term historical analysis, ranging across two different states, four different political regimes, five constitutions and countless pieces of legislation is very hard. The fact that the history of social rights in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey is severely under-researched only adds to this difficulty. Yet pursuing the relevant context in which to analyze the post-1980 period is nonetheless very important. In this chapter, I provide a brief historical sketch of the development of various welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in the past two centuries. For these purposes, I mainly make use of secondary sources (some of which are not available in English), supplemented by legal texts and various other publicly available documentation. This means that I cannot pursue several aspects of citizenship regimes I identified in Chapter 1. In fact, I am mainly limited to state policies and public institutions because those are the areas that have been relatively well studied. Including non-state actors and discourses outside the official one is not possible at this juncture in the absence of further intensive research.

In the following pages I identify three main characteristics of the Ottoman and Republican welfare policies that have remained relatively constant up until the adoption of neoliberalism in the 1980s. First, they consistently targeted the worst-off sections of the population to shore up political (and when applicable electoral) support. Second, it provided the bureaucratic -both civil and military- elite key benefits to en-

sure their continued loyalty. Finally, it was infused with a developmental logic, which manifested itself in the many ways that the state used welfare to support industrialization and urbanization. In the rest of the chapter, I adhere to a mostly chronological analysis for the sake of clarity and bring up ties with these dynamics at appropriate junctures. I end the chapter with a discussion of what these characteristics mean in terms of "citizenship regimes" in Turkey, arguing that the policies and institutions organized around them embedded the poor into clientelistic networks, allowed the bureaucratic elite to occupy a highly advantageous position in return for continued support and excluded large segments of the population from meaningful participation in social citizenship both when they were formally excluded from the system and when they were included without any power to enact change.

The Welfare State in the Ottoman Empire

The creation of formalized welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire was mostly contemporaneous with similar developments in Western Europe. In Europe, the main driver of these developments was the spread of capitalism and industrialization, and the accompanying labor movements that consistently experimented with new forms of collective support. It is hard to claim industrialization and labor organization had as much of an influence on the Ottoman policies. Towards the end of the century, key sectors like mining and ship building were targeted by social security legislation, yet this was motivated more by the need to protect and develop these sectors than a desire to improve working conditions or a response to labor agitation. We can also see evi-

dence of this motivation in the forced employment and skills training programs that focused on these sectors.

Two other dynamics shaped the European welfare states, and these had strong parallels in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the Western European states developed an extensive machinery of government drawing on trained professionals, methods of producing and utilizing knowledge and manufacturing popular support. Often the maintenance of this machinery became a top priority for the states to remain governable and competitive in the international stage. A similar dynamic was at play in the Ottoman Empire. Its military, economic and administrative decline vis-à-vis its Western competitors was the cause of great concern for the Empire's rulers. Subsequent governments recognized the need for reforms that would arrest and hopefully reverse this process. Assuring the loyalty of military and civilian bureaucrats on the reforms was of key importance for the Westernizers that wanted to stay in power and see their reforms succeed. This priority was translated into a range of generous welfare policies targeting the bureaucratic elite. However, institutionalized social security was never recognized as a right. Instead, it was selectively applied to key segments of the bureaucratic elite and expanded gradually, alongside the capabilities of the central government.

Finally, the Western European states in this period witnessed the establishment of limited popular government, mostly in the form of constitutional monarchies and the gradual extension of the franchise. These changes brought several new concerns onto the agenda of the government such as maintaining popular support or delivering benefits to one's supporters. In the Ottoman Empire, even before the formal establishment of the limited popular government towards the end of the century, public

support became a key concern for the reformist administrators. Lack of mass support had resulted in the failure of earlier attempts at catching up with Europe.[7] Moreover, the influx of refugees from the territories the Empire lost in Eastern Europe, Crimea and Caucasus threatened significant social and political upheaval. This led the administrators to focus on social programs, especially those that can be categorized as poverty alleviation. The various measures they adopted were always presented as a kind of public charity. They never gained the status of fully formalized state policies, or social rights. Instead many administrations used the haphazard and ambiguous nature of these policies to pacify the urban poor and gain their political support.

In the following analysis I break my discussion into three main periods. The first, in which we witness the first attempts at welfare policy making, covers most of the 19th century until Abdülhamid II's ascension to the throne in 1876. The second covers Abdülhamid II's reign and is marked by the introduction of a heavy-handed paternalism in all aspects of welfare. The third, and final, period covers the years between 1908 and 1920, when attempts at restructuring welfare as a social service was undermined by the proliferation of civil society organizations providing similar services and the political upheaval. I then move on to investigating how these processes affected changes in the Ottoman welfare system. My purpose is not to provide an exhaustive account of the history of welfare in the Empire, but instead to identify overarching trends in that history whose legacy has shaped, and continue to shape, citizenship regimes in Republican Turkey.

Up until the beginning of Abdülhamid II's rule in 1878, all attempts to overhaul the poverty alleviation policies in the 19th century operated on the principle of in-

[7] Selim III was dethroned by a civil and military uprising protesting against his Western-inspired reforms in 1807.

creased centralization and statization of welfare. Earlier, poverty alleviation in the Ottoman Empire had mostly been carried out in the by the numerous private charitable endowments that delivered several types of in-kind aid (Özbek 2004:53). However, these private endowments were not able to survive the economic crises of the early 19th century and the state took over their management through the newly formed *Evkaf Nezareti* (Ministry of Endowments). This new ministry not only attempted to streamline the delivery of in-kind aid, but also provided a cash benefit called *muhtacin maaşı (*poor wage), albeit without any legal basis or guarantees. Later on in the century, the responsibility to pay these wages was transferred to the Treasury and became standardized even further (Taşçı 2010:69). At the same time, local governments were tasked with providing a limited degree of poverty relief with a law in 1867 (Taşçı 2010:70). In essence, the poverty alleviation measures, through centralization and institutionalization, were transformed into acts of public charity. They were offered under no public guarantees and provided at the discretion of local and central administrators. This meant that the rulers of the empire had at their disposal a range of new policies and the administrative infrastructure to deliver them. Moreover the lack of formalization and opportunities for administrators at various levels to award or withdraw benefits at their discretion allowed for clientelistic networks to form around these policies.

The developments in the field of social security were closely connected with the increasing centralization of government and the attempts at Westernization. On the one hand, the development of a modern bureaucracy remained vital to both these administrative efforts. On the other hand, the continued existence of *iltizam* (tax farming) in some government posts and uneven professionalization across various governmental departments meant that the Ottoman bureaucracy remained a fragmented group. In

order to protect and support the bureaucracy, especially key groups such as the army and the Treasury, a unique social security system developed.[8] In this system, every bureaucratic agency ran its own fund and kept its own records of who could draw benefits (Özbek 2006:45). This system reinforced the fragmented structure of bureaucratic agencies, but it also provided the bureaucrats, especially those in the favored institutions, a highly advantageous access to social security.

After the proclamation of the *Tanzimat* Decree in 1839, a series of administrative reforms that sought to westernize the organization of the Ottoman state were initiated. By the second half of the century, these reforms had largely succeeded in creating a fully-fledged bureaucracy along Western lines, a modern tax administration, a secular system of law and education and a number of consultative assemblies that had some power over legislation (Zürcher 2005:58–63). The success of these reforms meant that the bureaucracy came to enjoy an even more critical role in the management of the Ottoman State, and the social security policies which targeted them reflected this increased importance. The disorganized pension structure established earlier in the century was overhauled to standardize benefits within each bureaucratic agency (Özbek 2006:46). As before, the army and the treasury were the largest beneficiaries. However, the increasing inclusion of the rest of the bureaucracy signaled that the rulers had begun to realize the need for a greater power base. More importantly, it was in this period that the Ottoman administrators recognized that a modern state required at least some elements of a modern economy. They produced legislation that would protect workers in key sectors such as the coal mines (1865) and the naval ship-

[8] The first such autonomous social security fund was established by the army in 1806. (Arıcı 1999; 173)

yards (1875) and attempted to create small scale social security structures for their benefit (Özbek 2006:117–118).

The first period of limited popular rule in the Ottoman Empire was a brief experiment with constitutional monarchy between 1876-78. It did not have any significant impact upon the welfare policies. However, the reactionary rule of Abdülhamid II it led to saw significant changes in the field of welfare over the next three decades. The former constitutional monarch saw in welfare policies an opportunity to legitimate his absolute rule and infused all of his policies with a heavy-handed paternalism. In all areas of welfare, the Sultan was portrayed as a generous benefactor, upon whose will the various benefits were delivered to the population. The flood of refugees from the Balkans after the defeat against Russia in the war of 1877-78 and the collapse of Ottoman agricultural sector during this period meant that most of the new policies were focused on alleviating poverty (Özbek 2009:785).

Abdülhamid first reformed the poor wage and standardized its distribution. In addition, he began the sporadic practice of distributing alms and donations as an act of the Sultan's personal charity (Taşçı 2010:68). However, these measures were not able to contain the crisis of urban poverty and unemployment. As such, the Sultan's government responded by adopting a two-pronged approach to the problem. First, in an attempt to display the Sultan's generosity and garner loyalty and support, a whole complex of institutions catering to the poor was built in the capital. This included boarding schools for orphans, a children's hospital (*Hamidiye-i Etfal Hastanesi)* and a modern work- and board-house for adults (*Darülaceze)* (Özbek 2006:36–44). These were all declared to be the personal charity of the Sultan and provided services free of charge. Lavish displays of the monarch's goodwill were organized on the anniversary

of his accession in every year of his rule. However, these new institutions were very limited in the scale of the services they could provide, and could hardly be expected to resolve the urban poverty problem by themselves. That is why in 1896, corresponding with the opening of *Darülaceze*, the government took action to regulate begging and vagrancy in İstanbul (Özbek 2009:789). This regulation recognized the right to beg for the professional beggars but also partially criminalized begging and vagrancy, if people considered to be in this category were bothering the public. Offenders would be deported to the provinces and put to work by the local governments. With this move, Abdülhamid sought to curry favor with both the lower classes who would enjoy some sort of legal guarantee for their activities and continued presence in the urban centers and with the upper classes and literati who had begun to see urban poverty as a very important moral crisis (Özbek 2009).

Abdülhamid's rule also witnessed a significant increase in the number and scale of social security programs run by the bureaucratic agencies. The most important change in this field was the formation of a general social security fund for civilian bureaucrats that sought to include the lower-ranked, less-educated members of the bureaucracy (Arıcı 1999:175). It can be argued that this was Abdülhamid's way of trying to capture the loyalties of the low-level bureaucrats, who had thus far been largely excluded by the ad hoc social security arrangements. This was a very calculated move to undercut the higher-level bureaucrats, many of whom had been part of the clique that had established the constitutional monarchy in 1876.

Finally, the period of Abdülhamid's rule also saw the expansion of welfare policies designed to foster economic development in key sectors. The various boarding schools for orphans and Darülaceze provided training in skills such as carpentry and

machining (Özbek 2004:207). While small in scale, when coupled with even further expansions in social security to the key sectors of the economy such as commercial shipping, the intent to foster some economic development becomes very clear (Arıcı 1999:173).

The re-establishment of constitutional monarchy in 1908 completely delegitimized how welfare had operated under Abdülhamid II. The "Second Constitutional Era" witnessed the reorganization of most of the welfare policies based on a new understanding of public service provision (Özbek 2006:iii). However, the wars in Tripoli and the Balkans as well as the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress - CUP) coup in 1913 resulted in a highly unstable political system. On top of this, the start of World War I and the wartime conditions meant that almost all attempts at reform lacked any significant follow-through. However, even in the midst of this chaos, the piecemeal extension of social security coverage to the modern sectors of the economy continued.[9]

The new understanding of social service provision first manifested itself in the field of poverty alleviation. All of the public social assistance institutions in the capital were unified under a new administrative body (*Müessesat-ı Hayriye-i Sıhhiye İdaresi*) in 1910 (Özbek 2006:62). The Red Crescent society was established and it rapidly developed considerable resources and capabilities for emergency care, housing and food aid, and public health projects. (Özbek 2006:79–82) Yet these developments in the way that services and aid were delivered to the population still fell well short of guaranteed rights or even a long-term credible commitment. Programs were abandoned, reintroduced and changed constantly. The unified social aid administration was

[9] The workers of the Hedjaz Railroad acquired their social security fund in 1909, while the maritime company that ran the passenger ferries in İstanbul got theirs in 1917. (Arıcı 1999; 173)

dissolved due to a lack of political commitment and resources three years after its founding (Taşçı 2010:70). Moreover, the corporatist and paternalist strands of thought that was endemic in the Ottoman elite prevented a comprehensive approach to welfare from ever taking place (Gülmez 2004:61). [10] In 1909, an even stricter policy against vagrancy and begging was put into place and the practice of deporting beggars and vagrants from the capitals to the provinces, to be employed in key sectors such as logging and mining, gained steam (Özbek 2009:792).

On the other hand, this period was also marked with the emergence of new civil society organizations that sought to provide services that had only been associated with the state up until then. First among these were the *Teavün Sandıkları* (retirement chests/funds), which were formed by guilds, workers of the new industrial sector and public workers to provide themselves with self-help based pensions and insurance. Second were the *Fukaraperver Cemiyetleri* (local charities for the poor) which were associated with the ruling CUP (Özbek 2006:63–75).[11] These were initially formed with the intent to create a nationwide network of aid organizations that would provide parallel services to state organizations but be directly administered by the CUP. However, the committee failed to marshal enough resources and eventually did not pursue political control over the local organizations, which nevertheless provided significant amounts of in-kind aid, scholarships for education and donations to public institutions such as hospitals and care homes. The proliferation of such civil society organizations

[10] In 1910, the Prime Minister İbrahim Hakkı Paşa refused to allow the parliament to begin deliberations on a bill that sought to regulate working conditions and rights of workers, stating that the Ottoman Empire did not oppress workers, and therefore passing a law would serve no purpose. (Gülmez 2004; 61)

[11] It is important to note here that most of the non-Muslim minorities in the Empire's urban centers had already founded several charitable organizations that acted along similar lines and were usually much more successful in their stated goals and for their communities. However, I include the founding of the various CUP-related foundations here as an example of clientelism by the rulers, and to foreshadow later developments in the Republican period. For examples, see the founding of the SYDTF in the 1980s in chapter 3.

allowed political groups increased power over how they could direct and manipulate social policies and aid.

Thus, by the end of the First World War, the provision of welfare in the Ottoman Empire had undergone a significant transformation. It had acquired a relatively well funded and extensive social security structure for its bureaucracy, had in place various centrally controlled poverty alleviation policies and some limited protections for key economic sectors. Moreover, it had developed the infrastructure to attract private charity through various civil society organizations and direct it either through indirect political influence (CUP's relationship with the local charities) or direct political action (the Red Crescent). As could be expected, the decade of constant war between 1912 and 1922, and the dissolution of the Empire led to inconsistencies in the application of these policies and damaged the infrastructure. Yet, Turkish Republic's welfare policies after 1922 displayed surprising continuities with those of the Ottoman Empire. It is these continuities that I take up below.

Welfare State in the Turkish Republic:

In this section I provide an account of the development of the welfare state in the Turkish Republic up until the 1980s. I study this development in three main periods.[12] The first one, between 1920 and 1936 was marked by a continuation of late-Ottoman social policies, albeit with a renewed concern over promoting economic development. The second period began in 1936 with the passage of the Labor Law. This law epitomized a new approach to social security that for the first time displayed a willingness to undertake nation-wide regulation and legal action over welfare issues. This period

[12] In this periodization I have followed Gülmez. (Gülmez 2004)

lasted until the adoption of the 1961 Constitution. The final period, marked by the discourse of social rights and the social state in the constitution witnessed the emergence of a fully institutionalized welfare state in Turkey. Once again, my purpose is not to provide an exhaustive list of all pieces of legislation and policies in the field of welfare but rather to identify main trends that shaped how social citizenship regimes were impacted.

I find that the Republican period, despite very significant legal, institutional and policy changes, displayed stunning continuities with the imperial welfare policies. First of all, the privileged positions of the army and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy were mostly maintained, despite persistent challenges to this system. The civilian bureaucrats eventually lost this position, but the army held onto it through the creation of *Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* (OYAK), an autonomous social security fund. On the other hand, the expansion of social security coverage to segments of the labor force deemed important for economic development continued. Finally, the poverty alleviation policies, despite losing some of their primacy during the first decades of the Republic, regained the policy-makers' attention during the Second World War.

The early Republican period showed did not deviate greatly from the late-Ottoman era. Part of the reason for this was the political and economic instability. The War of Independence which lasted until 1922; struggles for internal and external recognition and a lasting peace; and the hardships caused by the Great Depression all levied a heavy burden on Turkish policymakers. Their resources and attention were captured by these more immediate problems, and welfare was simply not a priority area. Moreover, the Republican state was formed "on the foundations and, largely,

with the personnel of its Ottoman predecessor" (Mango 2004:301). Therefore, there was no space for radically reorganizing the provision of welfare in the new state.

However, a big priority for policymakers was jumpstarting economic development and therefore the welfare policies of this period displayed a renewed focus on development. This focus manifested itself in a number of legal texts that sought to regulate the working conditions and include more of the workforce in the social security system. The most important of these were the laws 114 and 150 which established autonomous social security funds and set standards of healthcare and working conditions for the coal miners in Zonguldak and Ereğli (Arıcı 1999:174; Gülmez 2004:62). While these laws were limited in scope to a very small sector of the economy, they displayed a willingness to engage welfare-related problems through governmental action. This willingness was further displayed by the 1924 law that established weekends as holidays, and the 1930 law on public health that acknowledged the state's responsibility to provide a bare minimum of healthcare for its population (Gülmez 2004:62; Özbek 2006).

This focus on economic development also manifested itself in a policy of stimulating population growth. The ravages of almost a decade of war had decimated Turkey's population; as such, increasing the population and improving public health became the focus of a vigorous campaign (Özbek 2006:89). Within these efforts, the resources and the expertise of Red Crescent played a very significant role. The organization launched campaigns against contagious diseases and established public health institutions such as sanatoriums and orphanages. This was a clear break from the Ottoman legacy where the state's desire and ability to engage with the population had remained minimal. There was also a significant public campaign against child poverty,

but while there were some public funds channeled for these purposes, the moral and economic burden in this area was shifted onto the nominally civil society organization *Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu* (Society for the Protection of Children) and private charity it would collect. (Buğra 2007:38)

A final important change in this period was the abolishing of the *aşar* (agricultural tithe) tax in 1925. While this was not a welfare policy in the strictest sense of the term, it nonetheless had a significant impact on rural poverty and the state's ability to allocate resources. This tax had required all agricultural producers to turn over 10% of their annual production over to the state and made up roughly one thırd of all government revenues (Buğra 2007:39). Its abolishment meant that a significantly higher portion of agricultural production would stay in the hands of the rural population. This allowed the small-scale farming to continue in Turkey for a long period, and prevented more extreme cases of rural poverty.[13] This manner of providing indirect poverty relief would continue in the following periods as well.

A more important break with the Ottoman welfare tradition, the Labor Law of 1936, was heavily influenced by the adoption of statism as an economic policy and the first Five Year Plan in 1933. As in Europe in the aftermath of World War 2, the introduction of economic planning was a key factor in the development of the welfare state (Rose 1999). The new economic policies prescribed increased state involvement in all areas of the economy and especially in the heavy industry. The Labor Law, whose application was limited to the industrial sector, was meant to streamline the economic activities of the state in this new area. It completely excluded the large majority of the

[13] Two things need to be mentioned here. First, Turkey did experience severe rural poverty despite the lack of significant taxation on agricultural activities. This was especially true in the aftermath of the Great Depression when the prices of agricultural products plummeted. Second, there was some rural-to-urban migration in this period despite the heavy emphasis on preventing that type of mobility.

workforce employed in agriculture or the service sector (Bayar 1996:776). Even when statism was officially abandoned after 1950, the state-run enterprises remained the most important producers and employers in the industrial sector and the labor law retained its importance. The Labor Law laid the groundwork for the welfare apparatus that would be built following the Second World War. For the first time in Turkey, workday was limited, contracts and working conditions were regulated, a minimum wage was established and the development of social security institutions was mandated (Özbek 2006:132). However, the outbreak of war delayed the enforcement of most of these rules and the development of the relevant institutions (Özbek 2006:150).

The post-war years mark a watershed in the history of the Turkish welfare state because of the founding of the first large-scale social security institutions. These targeted a sizeable portion of the population rather than a single sector or bureaucratic agency. First *İşçi Sigortaları Kurumu* (Laborers' Insurance Organization - İSK) was founded in 1945 for industrial workers, seamen and some white-collar workers, providing workman's comp, occupational disease and maternity insurance (Fişek, Özsuca, and Şuğle 1998:17). The benefits and contributions of these different groups of workers varied greatly. These differentials were maintained in 1949 when a simple pension scheme based on employee and employer contributions was grafted onto İSK and its coverage was expanded to other areas of the workforce (Özbek 2006:238). Second *Emekli Sandığı* (Retiree Chest/Fund - ES) was established at the end of 1949, unifying the various pension and insurance schemes run by bureaucratic agencies to provide all state personnel with a highly advantageous access to social security benefits (Fişek et al. 1998:16). ES sought to maintain the differential treatment of the army and a few other preferred bureaucratic agencies by providing them with higher benefits

and preferential access to the institution's resources (Özbek 2006:251). Both of these institutions rapidly built up their own bureaucracies and started providing medical services.

The most significant development in poverty alleviation policies took place due to the outbreak of the Second World War. Preparing for war was an economically trying experience for Turkey in general and with more than a million men under arms, food production and delivery to the urban centers became a problematic issue. Basic foodstuffs began to be rationed and farmers were forced to turn over a sizeable portion of their produce to supply the army and the cities. Under these conditions, keeping the peace in the cities, especially among the urban poor, became a big priority. The government initiated programs for the delivery of food and heating aid to them (Metinsoy 2007:56). However these programs did not outlast the war. For the rest of this period, the various attempts at institutionalizing and extending the welfare structure left significant portions of the population without any type of coverage. Possibly more importantly, the wartime urban poverty relief policies and the mobilization were financed by the re-introduction of agricultural taxation (Buğra 2007:41). This resulted in a huge rise in rural poverty, and led to the great rural-to-urban migration waves that began after 1950. There were some attempts at combatting this problem by redistributing public land to the rural residents, but the impact of these programs was limited (Buğra 2007:41). The introduction of guaranteed public purchase of certain agricultural products at relatively high prices, initiated by the *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party – DP) provided a much greater amount of state support for the rural population (Buğra 2007:42). In fact this method of indirect state support was maintained almost intact until 1980, and despite some reforms, still continues today even though it is not as

important a policy tool. Throughout this period, the old system of state-run charity was maintained through the *Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü* (General Directorate of Endowments), but it was not effective in providing any amount of comprehensive social protection. The need for more formal poverty alleviation policies was never acknowledged, with the public discourse focused on the importance of the family and private charity to deal with urban poverty (Buğra 2006:65).

This should be seen as more than a simple failure of the state to provide for its citizens. On the one hand, such a welfare arrangement served to draw people into permanent employment in the privileged sectors of industry and bureaucracy in the urban centers. This was critical in a state that not only suffered from a shortage of permanent urban labor for its newly emerging industries but was also in the process of demobilizing a huge war time army and feared rural unrest (Metinsoy 2007:437; Özbek 2006:130). On the other hand, the arbitrary nature of the social security structure and the differential treatment it extended to certain groups allowed politicians to foster or maintain clientelist relationships.

The adoption of the 1961 Constitution changed the policy environment in Turkey significantly. The constitution tasked the state with ensuring that every citizen had the economic and social opportunities to enjoy their rights as citizens fully (Gülmez 2004:64). This task was translated into the extension of various social security programs, and further institutionalization of policies, which included attempts at simplifying the fractured system and the creation of new, often autonomous, institutions subject to new sets of rules. Moreover, the adoption of import substitution industrialization as a development policy during the period finally broke the government's near-monopsony over the industrial workforce and called for a more inclusive social securi-

ty system to protect the emerging private sector (Bayar 1996:777–778). In the field of poverty alleviation, this period witnessed renewed attempts at policy making as urban poverty once again became a significant phenomenon.

In the field of social security a number of autonomous *sandıklar* (chests/funds) run by unions or employers were established almost overnight in the early sixties. They were intended to provide additional benefits, such as retirement bonuses and higher quality healthcare, or simply to be another source of insurance and pensions (Özbek 2006:325). A number of these new funds stood out due to their sheer size. The first was *Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu* (Army Mutual Assistance Organization - OYAK). Founded in 1961, it was funded by mandatory contributions from officers of the Turkish Armed Forces and was meant to protect the officers from the kind of income erosion they had been subjected to during the second half of 1950s (Zürcher 2005:237). However, with the help of preferential treatment from the bureaucracy and ambitious governance it soon became a significant economic force controlling several industrial enterprises and even running a bank (Zürcher 2005:279). The second fund of importance was *Memur Yardımlaşma Kurumu* (Civil Servants Mutual Assistance Fund - MEYAK). Its founding was mandated by a change made in 1970 to the law regulating the bureaucracy[14] and it would have acted in a manner similar to OYAK. However, despite the collection of mandatory contributions for fourteen years, MEYAK was never actually founded and the contributions were paid back, without interest, only to those who could document their payments (DPT 2001:120; Milliyet 1984). A third large chest, *İşçi Yardımlaşma Kurulu* (Laborers Mutual Assistance Fund), remained on the agenda of the parliament for some time, but was never realized (DPT 2001:113).

[14] Law 657, dated 14.07.1965. IRL: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/388.html

On the other hand, these new institutions coexisted with significant attempts at simplifying some aspects of the welfare state. A good example was the "socialized medicine" law enacted by the military junta in 1961. This law mandated that all health services should be centralized under the aegis of the Ministry of Health, rather than the ministry, İSK, ES, municipalities and private endowments all running their own hospitals (Fişek et al. 1998:65). However, attempts at implementing this change were resisted fiercely by both trade unions and business interests, who saw them as a forced nationalization of the assets that had been acquired through their contributions (Fişek, Özsuca, and Şuğle 1998, 67). Ultimately the attempts at centralization were abandoned and the numerous healthcare providers managed to achieve a *modus Vivendi* that would last well into the 1990s.

A second move towards simplification came in 1969, when the various different schemes unified under ES were finally amalgamated (Özbek 2006:251). This came at a cost to the few bureaucratic agencies which enjoyed a preferential status. However, it also streamlined the existing pension schemes and death and disability benefits. This legislation met little resistance in the bureaucracy. On the one hand, the lower echelons benefitted significantly from the simplified scheme as contributions and benefits were standardized. On the other hand, the existence of OYAK and the proposals for MEYAK helped make the relative losses more palatable for the higher-ups.

However, the height of the attempts at simplifying the social security system and making it more manageable was the great legislative effort that went into passing the 1965 law that founded the *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu* (SSK).[15] By that time the social security structure outside of ES had become a cacophony of laws, regulations and in-

[15] Law 506, dated 01.02.1965. IRL: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/377.html

stitutions. The original 1945 law that founded İSK was amended several times to expand its coverage and new laws mandating numerous new insurances, sometimes replacing the ones originally included in the law, were established (Fişek, Özsuca, and Şuğle 1998, 17). Eventually this heavily patched system became ungovernable and, more importantly, restricted the government's ability to extend social security coverage due to the restrictions built into the various pieces of legislation (Özbek 2006, 278-280). The law on SSK sought to overcome these problems, but the greatest change it wrought was a change in the basic principles of the Turkish welfare structure.

Up until 1965, the social security apparatus had functioned mostly as an extension of the labor policies. The benefits provided by the system, most significantly health insurance, were only applicable to the insured individuals. Their families were eligible for some level of income support in the event of death, but that was the extent of their rights. However, the 1965 law divorced social security from labor policy. First it broke down the barriers that limited the membership of İSK to a few preferred sectors (Özbek 2006:278). Every worker under contract became a member of SSK, even though the implementation of this rule took up to six years in some locales. More importantly the immediate families of the insured individuals were classified as their dependents and covered by SSK benefits. In essence these two extensions meant that, for the first time, the Turkish welfare state acknowledged welfare as a social need rather than a privilege to be distributed. Moreover, this comprehensive coverage functioned to keep wages down by transferring costs of old age and sickness largely outside the wage earning relationship.

This new understanding also informed the only significant change in the system that took place in the following decade. In 1971, *Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diğer*

Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (Bağ-Kur) was founded in order to extend mandatory social security coverage to the self-employed. The main reason for this was that this group had consistently failed to take up voluntary membership in SSK, partially due to the perception that contribution rates were high (Çubuk 1982:32). In order to provide coverage at acceptable rates, the original Bağ-Kur scheme included significantly lower contributions, made possible by the absence of a health insurance scheme (Fişek et al. 1998:17). Bağ-Kur also had a voluntary membership scheme whereby individuals who were not already covered by any of the three big social security institutions could apply. This innovation meant that for the first time the Turkish welfare structure had achieved the legal infrastructure for universal coverage.

However, actual universal coverage was still not on the agenda. Two significant groups, the poor who could not find steady contractual employment and the agricultural workers, still remained outside the system. The latter would only be integrated into the system in the 1980s. The former, on the other hand, were the subject of some sporadic, but nonetheless significant poverty alleviation policies. In 1963, *Sosyal Hizmetler Müdürlüğü* (Directorate of Social Services) was established within the Ministry of Health (Taşçı 2010:105). Yet this could not gain full functionality due to some legal contradictions about whether it could dispense cash aid. The most significant legal change in the field of poverty alleviation was the passage of a 1976 law, which stated that the Turkish state would provide a stipend to people over 65 who had no means of supporting themselves if they had no relatives who were legally obliged to support them. This was an unprecedented recognition of the state's duty to combat poverty (Arıcı 1999, 310).

The biggest poverty alleviation policy undertaken in this period was an extra-legal measure whereby various governments first tolerated the building of squatter housing on public lands near urban centers and gradually transferred the ownership of the land to the squatters. The squatter houses, called *gecekondu*, had first became a visible part of the urban landscape in the late 1940s and the first deeds to the occupied land were handed out in 1949 (Buğra 2007:44). As urbanization picked up speed in the following decades, the squatting phenomenon was transformed into a semi-official way to deal with urban poverty. However, the key change came in 1966, when the transfer of the public land to the squatters came with a commitment to provide the squatter areas with municipality services like clean water, sewage and electricity (Buğra 2007:44). This normalized the squatting phenomenon and integrated the migrants into the urban ecology in a way that had not happened before. After this period the transfer of the deeds to the land provided the squatters with significant economic assets (Keyder 2005:126). In fact, this was enough to permanently raise several waves of immigrants out of poverty as they became property owners and subsequently landlords to newer immigrants (Pınarcıoğlu and Işık 2001). One of the most important characteristics of the transfer of urban land to the poor was that it had no legal framework and could be manipulated by governments to foster clientelistic relationships.

Implications for the Citizenship Regimes in Turkey:

In this chapter I have attempted to study the historical development of social citizenship in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey by analyzing the development of the legal and institutional framework for welfare policies. In this section I revisit the overall

trends I have identified and briefly discuss their implications for the citizenship regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

In my analysis of the welfare state in the Ottoman Empire, I identified three main dynamics that were a constant influence over the welfare policymaking throughout the last century of the Empire's existence. The first one was that poverty alleviation measures were used by various governments to pacify and garner support from the segments of the population they targeted. This started with the centralization of formerly private charities in the hands of the state, evolved through Abdülhamid's paternalism and the sporadic attempts at institutionalization of the Second Constitutional Era. However, this dynamic was no longer relevant during the early periods of Republican history. This was partially due to the fact that urban poverty stopped being an acute problem due to the population decline and actual labor shortages in the urban sectors such as manufacturing. It also indicates that the support of the worst-off segments of population had lost some of its importance under the new political system of single party rule. However, when urban poverty once again became a critical issue during World War II and after 1960, threatening social upheaval, new policies were formulated that very closely followed the old trends; gradual institutionalization and centralization went hand in hand with highly discretionary policies that allowed governments to garner political and electoral support. Rural poverty, on the other hand, garnered some policy attention, but this translated into mostly indirect measures of supporting rural incomes.

The second dynamic of welfare policymaking in the Ottoman Empire was using advantageous welfare policies, mostly access to social security, to establish and maintain the loyalty of the civilian and military bureaucratic elite to the government. Under

the Ottoman Empire this manifested itself in the establishment of numerous autonomous funds that would be run by select agencies. Even when some efforts at making the system more inclusive and egalitarian were made, the most important sections of the bureaucracy managed to retain their advantageous position. This trend continued unbroken into the Republican period. Until 1949, the Ottoman system continued without any significant changes, even as the numbers of the bureaucracy swelled. Even after the establishment of ES in 1949, the elite segments of the bureaucracy managed to protect its position. Only after the standardization of ES' benefits schemes did the civilian bureaucratic elite lose its extra benefits, and that was mostly due to the non-functioning of MEYAK, whose counterpart for the army offered a generous benefits package for the military elite.

Finally, the Ottoman Empire used two aspects of welfare policy, labor regulations and social security, to promote economic development in the sectors of the economy it deemed critical to its power and survival. This began with the coal mines and naval shipyards in the second half of the century, and quickly expanded to cover a number of sectors. In the Republican period, this policy underwent significant changes as the state's approach to economic development became more holistic. Initially, this meant that the entire industrial sector, which was practically monopolized by the state, was regulated and brought into the social security system. However, once the economic development plans started to emphasize the role of the private sector and downplay that of the state, a much more comprehensive approach that was inclusive of the whole workforce was adopted.

These three welfare policymaking dynamics, mobilizing poverty relief for political support and social security to ensure elite loyalty and economic development, have

critical implications for citizenship regimes in Turkey. First of all, it indicates that the worst-off segments of society, except for a brief period after the founding of the Republic, have always been subjected to a different citizenship regime than the rest. They have been conditioned into a state dependence upon sporadic public charity. None of the policies that have targeted them have emphasized their social rights, but instead have forced them to take up subjectivities where their political activism and support are malleable enough to move in and out of various clientelistic networks. Second of all, the bureaucratic elite have been subjected to practices that have always elevated their status above the rest of the population. This in turn meant that a large and influential demographic was almost always kept away from collective struggles over social rights, their subjectivities instead focused on the maintenance of the status quo. Finally, the influence of developmental priorities over the extension of social security meant that the large segments of the population received social rights that were not specifically designed to meet their needs or fulfill the duties of the state towards them, but instead were intended to promote economic development. This is why social security remained attached to industrial work, automatically excluding the majority of the Turkish population who lived in rural areas. Moreover, even the industrial workers who took part in social security had very little say over how it was organized, how it would be managed and what benefits it would offer.

CHAPTER 3: The Emergence of Three Citizenship Regimes in the Neoliberal Era

This far I made the case that three main dynamics played a key role in the evolution of the citizenship regime in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. These were the political mobilization of the poor, ensuring the loyalty of the bureaucratic elite and directing economic development. However, the coup of 1980 –and more specifically the adoption of neoliberal policies- ended the social and economic forces that had provided the rationale for these policies. Gradually, private charity was abandoned as the only acceptable measure to alleviate poverty. The bureaucratic elite, civilian and military, lost their political and economic power. The priority of keeping their loyalty -especially for governments that were in outright conflict with them- diminished significantly. Finally, the state's willingness to direct economic development as heavy-handedly as in earlier periods was eroded. In this chapter I argue that the void created by the loss of these three dynamics was gradually filled with the emergence of a neoliberal consensus on how the governance of social citizenship should be organized. This consensus was built on an emphasis on actively managing (urban) poverty, mobilizing social security as an economic resource and a drive to adopt or emulate market-relationships for social policy purposes. The most important consequence of these three dynamics was the emergence of three differentiated citizenship regimes for the poor, the working and middle class, and the rich.

The history of neoliberalism in Turkey has been a turbulent one. After the military coup in September 1980, neoliberal orthodoxy and Washington-consensus based

policymaking was supported by the military junta. They first recruited Turgut Özal as the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the economy, and he served in the military appointed government as the architect of the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy. Even after the elections in 1984 brought him and his *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party – ANAP) to power, he stuck to the main principles of keeping wages low, increasing domestic savings and investment and creating spaces for greater private markets. This lasted until 1989, when the "old guard" of political leaders banned by the military coup returned to active politics and significant labor movements threatened the ANAP government. The period between November 1989 and November 2002 witnessed 11 governments coming into power. The first 10 governments had an average term of slightly less than a year. All but two were coalition governments that were often crippled legislatively. In the face of such high electoral and political volatility, neoliberal orthodoxy was abandoned by all political actors and the populist policymaking of the 1970s, which sought to pursue of electoral support through the distribution of patronage returned. Mixing populist policies with liberalized debt and financial markets led to a highly volatile economic situation. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey suffered through periodic crises. These first led to the devastating crisis of 1994, and then in the face of no significant policy changes and financial flight from developing countries in the wake of East Asian and Russian crises, culminated in the unprecedented 2000/2001 crisis. Afterwards, an economy hugely indebted to the IMF and without any wriggle room for the distribution of patronage necessitated a return to the neoliberal orthodoxy. However, the post-2001 period was different from the 1980 - 1989 period in two significant ways. The first was its very strict emphasis on subjecting all aspects of policymaking and implementation to a strict regulatory regime, epitomized by a number of powerful regulatory bodies such as BDDK, TMSF

and SPK. The second was the introduction of neo-populism once the post-Washington consensus policies had resulted in a period of sustained growth. These broad trends in policymaking led to the evolution of three main social policy clusters, or citizenship regimes.

Turkey's turbulent experience with neoliberalism was reflected in the changes to the governance of citizenship regimes as well. The highly fractured citizenship regimes of the pre-1980 Turkey which had been useful for the purposes of populism, elite loyalty and developmentalism lost their economic rationale. However, neoliberalism in Turkey did not take the form of dismantling these old systems and scaling down all social policies. As the top down neoliberalism of the 1980s gained ascendancy, the economic discourse of laissez faire was coupled with welfare policies that covered larger segments of the population and intervened in their life to a greater degree. Yet, the old system was far from being dismantled completely and continued to coexist with the new policies. As "populist cycles" returned after 1989, the new citizenship regimes that had begun to emerge under Özal entered into a period of stagnation (Öniş 2003:23). The crisis-prone 1990s, with short-lived coalition governments and shorter lived economic policies was a time when all political actors reverted to the practice of old-school populism. A few key policies were enacted, but they were soon hijacked in practice to the politics of populism. This led to a decade of highly . As with the economic policies, the 2000/2001 crisis ended the impasse. A new conception of citizenship, infused with the new "social and regulatory neoliberalism" of the AKP era slowly emerged. (Öniş 2012:12) The highly fractured the nature of welfare policies gradually dissolved into a three major citizenship regimes, where the rich, the wage-earners and the poor were sharply differentiated from each other.

These regimes were founded upon three new dynamics. The first was the emergence of poverty as a social problem that warranted concentrated state action. The acceleration of urbanization had brought the issue to a boil and the perceived failure of the old stop-gap poverty alleviation measures pushed policymakers into action. Gradually this evolved into an understanding that poverty needed to be managed, not as a structural effect of the economy or a social issue to be addressed but as a source of social unrest to be monitored and pacified. This was accomplished through a set of policies that led the poor to lead very visible and docile lives. The second was the need to mobilize social security as an economic resource. On the micro level increased social protection was pushed as a means of driving up savings. On the macro level, savings and leveragable debt were seen as key ways to finance private sector growth. The final dynamic was the growing conviction that social citizenship should operate in accordance to the market logic. Its reflection on the governance of social citizenship can be seen in the introduction of conditionality for aid programs, competition among healthcare providers and the private social security options, and the exclusion of the poor from the market.

In the following sections, I trace the development of these three citizenship regimes after 1980, starting with the regime for the poor and moving onto the ones for the wage earners and the rich. My findings draw from an extensive content analysis of government programs, coalition agreements, parliamentary minutes and legal texts. I have been careful to identify the sources I am talking about in-text as much as possible, while paraphrasing the contents in English. Extensive Turkish quotes from the relevant passages are available in the footnotes which also include the relevant citations.

Citizenship Regime for the Poor: Acknowledgement of Poverty, Populism, Visibility and Docility

Before the 1980 coup, the Turkish state was not willing to engage in any large-scale social policy aimed at combating poverty or even delivering poverty relief. The few large-scale social aid programs were designed and run rather poorly and a large range of unofficial aid policies, such as the grant of public lands to squatters or the buying of agricultural produce by the state, were used to exclude the poor from any type of meaningful social citizenship. However, in the aftermath of the coup, their inclusion became a priority due to three factors. First, the collapse of the rural farming, which had been held back by inflated prices, finally occurred in the 1980s and the urban centers were flooded with immigrants. Another source of migrants was the Kurdish people displaced by violence or the forcefully relocated by the government. Second, these new immigrants could no longer be contained by the old tactics of squatting and gaining the rights to the land, as publicly owned urban lands and the economic security of living in a city center diminished greatly (Pınarcıoğlu and Işık 2001). Finally, the ways of thinking about poverty were no longer dominated by the "moral economy" standpoint of the 60s and 70s, but were instead governed by the aim of achieving and maintaining marketization of all aspects of society (Buğra 2007:36).

These factors ultimately led to a citizenship regime for the poor that demands from them constant visibility and docility in return for a guaranteed minimum of aid. The waxing and waning fortunes of neoliberalism roughly predict how this new trend of inclusion functioned for the poor. Beginning with the changes in the discourse of poverty at the level of the government and the parliament, a new approach to poverty

began to emerge in the 1980s. This approach saw poverty as a social phenomenon to be managed, so that the poor did not constitute a threat to marketization of the rest of society. However, it was hijacked by the daily politics of the 90s which focused on poverty alleviation as a way to distribute patronage. After the crisis of 2000/2001, the explicit populism of these policies ended with the creation of a new system of poverty related policies that delivered reliable and regular benefits to the poor in return for their leading visible and docile lives.

In his speech to the parliament in 1983 detailing the program of the first civilian government after the military coup, PM Turgut Özal listed social aid as a fundamental duty of the state, on par with social security and justice.[16] In a government program that reads like a neoliberal manifesto, the prioritization of social aid to such a degree sounds out of place. However, the kind of aid envisioned in the program was actually a curious hybrid between the exclusionary policies of the pre-1980 era and the recognition of the need to act and include the poor to ensure economic and political stability. In it, Özal made it very clear that the aid would only be secondary to private charity and the support structure of the family, not challenging the established priority of social support.[17] He also stipulated that social aid shouldn't encourage a culture of dependency, but instead should be concerned with helping the needy stay safe, develop and be productive.[18] Basically, the purpose of social aid would be providing a modicum of inclusion, in exchange for getting the poor people invested in the well-being

[16] "Sosyal adalet, sosyal güvenlik ve sosyal yardımın düzenlenmesi ve sağlanması; sosyal hizmet ve faaliyetlerin tanzim, teşvik ve yönlendirilmesi ve gereğinde doğrudan yapılması devletin başlıca görevleri arasındadır" (TBMM 1983).
[17] "Gönüllü sosyal dayanışmayı, bilhassa geleneksel sosyal dayanışma esaslarını ve kuruluşlarını, toplumumuzun temelini teşkil eden aile sistemi içindeki sevgi, şefkat ve saygıdan kaynaklanan tabii sosyal dayanışmayı idame ve teşvik edecek tedbirlerin alınmasını faydalı görmekteyiz." (TBMM 1983).
[18] "Sosyal güvenlik ve sosyal yardım politikamız, çalışmamayı teşvik edici değil, muhtaçların korunmalarına, gelişmelerine, yararlı hale gelmelerine yönelik olacaktır" (TBMM 1983).

of the economy. While delivering the speech on the program of his second government in 1987, Özal's discourse was still strong on the delivery of social aid as a hybrid between exclusion and inclusion. The items about the primacy of charity and family in the 1983 program were included verbatim (TBMM 1987). However, this discourse went along with a much greater focus on state action and a renewed emphasis on the fact that social aid can only be expanded in accordance to economic development.[19] This was partially a response to the increasing urgency presented by urban poverty and a recognition that the dynamics on which the traditional exclusion was built upon were collapsing. Especially groups that could not even depend on the family structures to provide sufficient support such as widows, orphans, disabled people and the old were singled out in Özal's rhetoric.[20]

This curious mix of inclusion and exclusion can best be seen in the establishment of *Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu* (Fund for the Encouragement of Social Asssistance and Solidarity - SYDTF), which stands as Özal's signature achievement in the provision of social aid. In 1986, the ANAP dominated parliament passed a law[21] that established SYDTF as an extra-budgetary fund that would channel private donations for the purpose of poverty alleviation. The law also stipulated some amount of government contributions, but the main emphasis was on the private donations.[22] The fund was envisioned as an umbrella organization for more than 900 local

[19] "Sosyal gelişmenin sürekliliği ve gerekli kaynakların artan bir şekilde temini iktisadi gelişme ile yakından ilgilidir. Bu itibarla sosyal ve iktisadi gelişme arasındaki ahengin ve dengenin korunması önemlidir" (TBMM 1987).

[20] "(...) dul ve yetimler ile kimsesizlerin sosyal güvenliğe sahip olmaları; korunmaya muhtaç çocuklar ve yaşlılar ile çalışamıyacak derecede malul ve sakatların yeterli seviyede sosyal yardıma kavuşturulmaları (...) sosyal güvenlik anlayışımızın esaslarını meydana getirir" (TBMM 1987).

[21] Law no 3294, passed on 29.05.1986, titled: "Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Kanunu."

[22] During the parliamentary deliberations on the law the government's representative Lütfullah Kayalar stated that: "Teşekkül ettirilen vakıflara vatandaş ve kuruluşlar da fitre, zekat ve diğer şekillerde bağışta bulunabilmektedirler. (...) Bu tasarıyı kısaca tarif etmek gerekirse devlet - millet elele muhtacının yanındadır" (TBMM 1986:511).

"charities," staffed by local notables and high-level bureaucrats. These charities would direct the centrally distributed aid in accordance with their local knowledge. However, once the fund was established private charity actually failed to materialize anywhere near the scale envisioned by the government. (Buğra and Keyder 2005, 26) Instead, increasing amounts of government transfers were used to provide funding for several programs, ranging from scholarships to food and heating aid. These aid programs were not designed to increase the marketization of poverty, but rather in providing a bare minimum of safety for them, they acted to minimize the social unrest that might have resulted from a complete exclusion. In short, they fostered a docile urban underclass.

The abandonment of neoliberal orthodoxy after 1989 meant that this docility was no longer the highest priority for the policymakers. The Akbulut government's program in 1989 was virtually identical to the Özal government's program in 1987, but even in it, the references to the activities of SYDTF were much less pronounced (TBMM 1989). The big shift was much more visible in the Yılmaz government's program from 1991, where poverty was mentioned only once in reference to housing cooperatives.[23] Coming into power after an election that toppled the ANAP government, the Demirel government's program from the same year was just as silent on the issues of poverty, except for its proposal to extend healthcare coverage to the poor.[24] Dubbed the Green Card scheme, the government's proposal envisioned the creation of a public universal health insurance, in which the dues for the poor would be paid through taxa-

[23] "Ortakları yoksul ve dar gelirli olan konut kooperatiflerine ve vatandaşlara 10 yıl vadeli ve faizsiz arsa tahsisleri yapılacaktır" (TBMM 1991a).
[24] "Genel sağlık sigortası aşamalı olarak yaygınlaştırılacak ve hiçbir vatandaş genel sağlık sistemi dışında bırakılmayacaktır. Ödeme imkanı olmayan vatandaşların sigorta primleri devlet tarafından karşılanacaktır. Bu çerçevede aşamalı olarak herkese tedavi olma imkanı sağlayan "Yeşil Kart" verilecektir" (TBMM 1991b).

tion. Essentially it was a system where the poor would be included on an almost-equal footing with everyone else. However, the actual policy fell well short of this ideal.

The legislation that established the Green Card scheme established was passed by the parliament in 1992.[25] It did not provide the poor with access to a universal health insurance, which had not been established. Instead, it provided free access to only outpatient care and pharmaceuticals for those who could pass means testing and prove that the per capita income of their household was lower than one third of the minimum wage. However, in practice the means-testing procedure was both ineffective in an economy that housed such a large informal sector, and not strictly enforced. This is apparent in the number of scandals that erupted once the distribution of Green Cards was centralized and testing became regular in the 2000s (Habertürk 2008; Milliyet 2005). Until 2007 Green Card holders only had to qualify for the card once, and would remain a card holder despite any upwards social mobility they might experience. This was because the article of the law that demanded annual re-certification of card holders was not enforced for almost 15 years.[26] Finally, during the distribution process the mainly Kurdish areas of the east and southeast were prioritized.[27] During the parliamentary proceedings, the Minister for Health Yıldırım Akbulut explained this prioritization as the result of higher rates of poverty (TBMM 1992, 367). However, the distribution of green cards in these areas also had the purpose of pacifying and even garnering support from the Kurdish population (Yoruk 2012).

[25] Law 3816, passed by the parliament on 18.06.1992, titled "Ödeme Gücü Olmayan Vatandaşların Tedavi Giderlerinin Yeşil Kart Verilerek Devlet Tarafından Karşılanmasına Dair Kanun."
[26] Ministry of Health directive B.10.0.THG.0.74.00.07-010.06-, titled "Yeşil Kart Vize İşlemleri" and dated 16.04.2007 http://www.saglik.gov.tr/TR/dosya/1-20475/h/genelge2007.doc
[27] The temporary article two of the law stated that: "Yeşil kart verilmesine Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgeleri ile gerice yörelerdeki vatandaşlardan başlanır." (See footnote 10 for details about the law)

In short, the Green Card scheme, which appeared to be a continuation of the neoliberalization of the 1980s was transformed into a venue to practice the old politics of populism. For the rest of the decade, the distribution of aid through SYDTF, the Green Card scheme, and the reintroduction of granting squatters land deeds basically formed a new citizenship regime, tacked onto the assemblage of old ones. For the most part, government programs were content to be silent about the issues of poverty and indeed often grouped "the poor" as just a separate category of people alongside the self-employed, the retirees and the farmers.[28] This allowed the successive governments to avoid dealing with poverty outside of the distribution of patronage.

The first hints of change in this approach to poverty were apparent in the 1999 Ecevit government's program where engaging the poor in productive activities, and respecting the honor of the poor when delivering aid were spelled out as policy goals.[29] However, the same factors that paralyzed the economic policymaking in the broad coalition government also stopped it from actually formulating new policies towards the poor. It would be the various AKP governments, in the wake of the 2001 crisis that would completely transform the system, installing visibility and docility as the ultimate goals of the new citizenship regime for the poor that they were enacting.

The 2002 Gül government's program clearly stated that after the economic crisis urban poor had become increasingly marginalized and disengaged from the public life,

[28] The 1996 Erbakan government declared that "İşsizliğin azalması, aile, kadın ve gençlik sorunlarına gereken ilginin gösterilmesi, ana çocuk sağlığına önem verilmesi, orta direğin güçlendirilmesi, gelir dağılımının iyileştirilmesi, esnaf ve sanatkarlarımızın, emekli ve yoksulların meselelerinin çözümü vazgeçilmez hedeflerimizdir" (TBMM 1996a). A very similar formula was used by the Yılmaz government in 1997: "ekonomik ve sosyal politikaların uygulanmasında yoksulluğun azaltılmasına, sabit gelirlilerin, emekli, dul, yetim, küçük esnaf ve çiftçilerin fakirleşmesinin önlenmesine, işsizimize iş bulmaya önem verilecektir" (TBMM 1997).

[29] "Yoksulları üretken kılarak ve adaletli bir gelir düzeyine kavuşturarak yoksulluktan kurtarmak temel amacımızdır. Çalışamayacak durumda olanlar için, onurları zedelemeyecek yardım programları uygulanacaktır" (TBMM 1999).

creating unrest and polarization.[30] In order to engage with the poor and head off this newfound discontent, the program argued for better targeting of aid and an increased centralization of record keeping. The two tangible proposals in the program were the creation of a database to track and deliver aid to the families living under the hunger threshold and increase the delivery of aid for education and healthcare for people living under the poverty threshold.[31] The successive AKP governments' programs built upon these premises, calling for increases in the number and scale of aid programs, and the monitoring of the poor in areas such as health, education and economic activities.

The increased visibility of the poor was achieved through the creation of centralized databases and the enforcement of means-testing. During AKP's tenure, creation of databeses for the purposes of keeping track of the poor has been a sustained practice. This began with the establishment of *Yeşil Kart Bilgi Sistemi* (Green Card Information System – YKBS) in 2004 (YKBS 2012). This database served to rein in the costs associated with the Green Card scheme, crack down on fraud and track the card holders' activities. Another large scale attempt at centralized record keeping was a huge part of the AKP's effort to reform the SYDTF. In 2004, SYDTF was stripped of its extra-budgetary fund status and transformed into a bureaucratic agency called *Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü* (Directorate General for Social

[30] "Özellikle kentlerde artan yoksulluk, geniş halk kitlelerinin ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal hayattan dışlanması ve giderek marjinalleşmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu durum, kentlerde asayiş ve huzurun bozulmasına, zenginle yoksullar arasındaki yaşam standardı farkının açılmasına, toplumsal kutuplaşmaya ve "umutsuzluk" duygusunun yaygınlaşmasına neden olmaktadır" (TBMM 2002a).

[31] "Açlık sınırı altındaki nüfusa götürülecek hizmetlerin sağlıklı bir şekilde gerçekleştirilmesi için bir veri tabanı kurulacak ve açlık sınırının altındaki aileler belirlenecek ve desteklenecektir. Eğitimde fırsat eşitliğini sağlamak ve sağlıklı bir nesil yetiştirme hedefleri doğrultusunda yoksulluk sınırı altında olan ailelerin çocuklarına eğitim ve sağlık yardımları yapılacaktır" (TBMM 2002a).

Assistance and Solidarity - SYDGM).[32] This transformation came with a significant increase in the diversity of the aid programs it was expected to run. In order to handle the new duties SYDGM created the Sosyal Yardım Bilgi Sistemi (Social Aid Information System – SOYBİS) in 2009 (SYDGM 2012). The system was designed with the purpose of preventing individuals from taking advantage of multiple aid programs, and tracked all of their relevant economic activities. More recently, with the transfer of almost all social aid programs to the *Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı* (Ministry of Family and Social Policies – ASPB) attempts at developing a completely integrated database have been underway.

On the other hand, the renewed application of means-testing has been ubiquitous in all of the social aid programs during AKP's tenure. This began with the transformation of SYDTF into SYDGM in 2004. Sabri Varan, MP for Gümüşhane from AKP, clearly stated that this transformation was meant to address problems of means-testing aid recipients (TBMM 2004). He stated that the old system of running over 900 local branches without professionalized staff and clear mission statements was very hard, and there were significant problems with the distribution of aid.[33] This reform, while appearing to affect only the central organization of SYDTF, actually ended up being a complete overhaul of the local SYDVs as well.

[32] Law 5263, dated 01.12.2004, titled "Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun."

[33] "Değerli arkadaşlar, 931 vakıf şubesinin bulunduğu bir teşkilatı düşünelim. (...) Bütün bunların organizasyonu, denetimi, yönetimi, çıkarmak istediğimiz bu kanunun ne kadar elzem olduğunu da gözler önüne sermektedir. (...) Fak Fuk Fonun işleyişiyle ilgili, hepimizin, zaman zaman, seçim bölgelerimizde karşılaştığımız ortak şikâyetler vardır; her birimiz, seçim bölgelerimizde -ben de seçim bölgem Gümüşhane'de- bunları bire bir yaşıyoruz. Genel ve yaygın bir kanaat var; nedir bu kanaat: Fon kaynakları isabetli kullanılıyor mu? Fon kaynakları hak eden kişilere kullandırılıyor mu? Fon kaynakları fakirlere dağıtılabiliyor mu? Yardımı yine zenginler mi alıyor? Bunlar, hepimizin sıkça işittiği eleştirilerin başında gelmektedir. Fon yönetiminde bulunan, mütevellideki arkadaşlarımız, heyet, acaba, adil davranıyorlar mı? Yine "kapısında arabası olan kişiler mi bu yardımları alıyor, bu yardımlara ulaşıyor?" (TBMM 2004).

Means testing was also introduced by the Ministry of Health for the Green Card scheme by a new set of directives published in 2007. As mentioned above, the Green Card law actually did have the means-testing requirement but its enforcement was lax at best and non-existent at worst. The new directives began to enforce the annual re-certification of Green Card holders for the first time since the inception of the scheme, which meant that cardholders would have to reapply, be investigated and pass the means-test every year to have access to health insurance. The merger of the Green Card scheme with the *Genel Sağlık Sigortası* (Public Health Insurance – GSS) in 2012 has resulted in some changes to this system. SYDVs have taken over the means-testing because they are much better situated to conduct the tests with their bureaucratic expertise and access to greater amounts of information on the individuals applying for healthcare. Yet another social aid program that relied on the means testing conducted by SYDVs was the stipend provided to disabled and/or old people receiving care at home.[34]

Conditionality of social aid has also been a characteristic of poverty alleviation policies during AKP's tenure, and it has mostly served as a means of dampening social and political mobility. In the 1980s and 1990s, no social aid program had included conditions for further action on the part of the recipient. Despite several declarations by politicians that combating poverty required engaging the poor in productive activities, social aid programs had remained unidirectional. The new conditionalities that emerged after AKP came into office did engage the aid recipients in a give-and-take relationship, but this relationship did not push them towards economically productive activities. A good example of this is the conditional cash transfer program, run jointly

[34] Law no 2828, Additional article 7, changed on 01.02.2007. http://www.shcek.gov.tr/userfiles/pdf/2828%20Say%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20SH%C3%87EK%20Kanunu.pdf

with the World Bank, which began in 2003. This program awarded limited amounts of money for continued school attendance and doctor's visits for children and expecting mothers. These conditions, while certainly beneficial to prevent the intergenerational transfer of poverty, did almost nothing to engage the poor in any kind of productive behavior for the working-age population. Another example, the stipend for providing care to the disabled and elderly family members actually encourages people to avoid engaging in the formal economy by paying them to stay at home and perform domestic duties. It is true that there are a few professional training programs run by the SYDGM but their scale compared to the rest of the social aid programs (0.4% of the SYDGM budget in 2010) shows that their impact is negligible. (SYDGM 2010)

Citizenship Regime for the Working- and Middle Class: Social Security as an Economic Resource

Up until the 1980s, the development of the social security system was predicated upon one of two purposes. New measures would either be used to cement elite support from the civilian or the military bureaucracy, or they would be a means of rewarding workers in sectors which were considered important for economic development. After the 1980 coup, this approach to social security was completely discredited. The new policymakers saw social security as a means of increasing the amount of disposable income for citizens, re-investable savings for the economy and an opportunity to create new private sectors. However, this new vision for social security did not survive the reintroduction of populism. Very quickly after 1989, the social security infrastructure was commandeered for populist purposes to establish clientelistic relationships with the beneficiaries and to finance the government deficit. The resulting financial catastrophe was not addressed by any government until 2001, when the crisis brought things to a head. In the post-populism period, AKP embraced the neoliberal concep-

tion of social security, once again developing policies that emphasized its role in providing both short-term disposable capital for individuals and long-term investments for the economy. These policies were marked by the expansion of social security coverage, as can be seen in the development of public housing and the universalization of health insurance. This expansion was accompanied by an emphasis on private sector development in construction and health services, marketization of public services in healthcare provision and prioritization of neopopulist patronage over fiscal stability.

The neoliberalization of social security began immediately after the 1980 coup during the Ulusu government's tenure. The program of the government devoted significant time to explain what their aims with social security were[35] and in doing so, listed the main dynamics that would drive the reform efforts for the coming decade. It stated that the 44th government would pursue to extend coverage, simplify -and if possible unify- the social security institutions and finally make sure that the social security funds would be used in productive and employment-generating ways[36] (TBMM 1980). True to its word, the government made a significant legislative effort in social security but never attempted the comprehensive overhaul called for in its program.[37] The greatest reform that took place in its tenure, and the greatest expansion in social security coverage throughout the 1980s, was the inclusion of the self-employed farmers and

[35] It also included several items regarding the social security of the armed forces, but these would not be prioritized after the re-introduction of democratic politics (TBMM 1980).

[36] "Çalışanlardan bugüne kadar sosyal sigorta kapsamına alınamayan grupların, özellikle tarım sektöründe çalışanların, sektörün özellikleri de dikkate alınmak suretiyle sosyal güvenlik şemsiyesi altına alınması için gerekli çalışmalar yapılacaktır. Emekli, dul ve yetim aylıklarının verilmesinde, eski ve yeni emekliler arasındaki farklılıkların giderilmesine çalışılacaktır. Çeşitli sosyal güvenlik kuruluşlarında uygulanan usul ve esaslar bakımından paralellik sağlanması ve bu kuruluşların tek çatı altında toplanması imkanı araştırılacaktır. Sosyal güvenlikle ilgili kaynakların ve mevcut sistemle biriken fonların değer kaybını önleyerek verimli ve istihdam yaratıcı alanlarda kullanılması sağlanacaktır" (TBMM 1980).

[37] Being appointed by, and serving at the pleasure of the coup makers set the government's agenda in no uncertain terms. In fact, this limitation was rather heavily criticized by Mustafa Alpdündar in the Consultative Assembly (Danışma Meclisi 1983, 528).

their families in social security in 1983.[38] The rural-agricultural population in Turkey, which was still above 50% of the total population, had been completely excluded from the social security system up until that point and their inclusion would mean increased access to healthcare and economic security. However, the law had purposes other than just extending social security coverage to this large segment of the population. By providing social security coverage to almost 20 million new people, in a scheme where the ratio of contributions to benefits was very high, the new law actually functioned as a way of extracting capital from the declining agricultural sector, and beefing up the finances of Bağ-Kur which were flagging due to its voluntary membership model for the self-employed.

The 1983 Özal government's program mirrored the Ulusu government's in matters of social security, but used a more assertive tone. It called for the extension of coverage to all segments of the population and equitable treatment of all social security beneficiaries[39] (TBMM 1983). Similar statements, with minute changes, made it to the successive ANAP governments' programs, but actual legislative efforts to extend coverage were limited. Equitable treatment made some headway in the form of what Özal himself called "*Süper Emeklilik*" (Super Retirement) whereby people could make a large front payment upon retirement to receive significantly higher pensions (TBMM

[38] Law 2926, dated 17.10.1983, titled "Tarımda Kendi Adına ve Hesabına Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu."

[39] "Sayın milletvekilleri; çiftçi, küçük esnaf ve sanatkar, isçi, memur, emekli, dul ve yetimler ile kimsesizlerin sosyal güvenliğe sahip olmaları (...) bütün vatandaslarımızın sağlık hizmetlerinden yararlanmaları sosyal güvenlik anlayısımızın esaslarını meydana getirir. (...) Çesitli sosyal güvenlik kurulusları arasındaki farklılıklar, nimet ve külter dengesi dikkate alınarak giderilecek, alınan primler ile yapılan yardımlar arasında uyum sağlanacaktır" (TBMM 1980).

1987).[40] However, it was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 1988 (Anayasa Mahkemesi 1988).

The big push in social security during ANAP's reign until 1989 came in the vertical extension of coverage. The big issue here was housing, which Özal claimed was an issue ripe for "big [social] explosions" if governmental action was not taken (TBMM 1983).[41] In 1986, the ANAP dominated parliament took up the issue[42] and established what amounted to a housing-specific social security scheme called *Konut Edindirme Yardımı* (Housing Acquisition Assistance – KEY).[43] This scheme gathered payroll taxes from all bureaucrats and blue-collar workers for an extra-budgetary fund. Upon retirement, the savings accrued in the Fund would be paid back to the individuals so that they could purchase a house. With this fund the Özal government sought to increase the investable capital they could command in the short run, while increasing the spending power of the population (who would become property owners) in the long run.[44]

A final dynamic of this period was the governments' concern with the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, especially as "guest workers" in Europe. This is a constantly repeated theme in all of the government programs from the dec-

[40] Law no 3395, dated 20.05.1987, titled "506 Sayılı Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunun Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesine ve Bu Kanuna Yeni Maddeler Eklenmesine Dair Kanun."
[41] "Konut en önemli meselelerimizin basında gelmektedir. Bu meseleye, belirli bir süre içinde tatminkar bir çözüm getirilemediği takdirde büyük patlamaların meydana gelmesi kaçınılmazdır" (TBMM 1983).
[42] In this field the parliament had already established Toplu Konut Fonu, an extrabudgetary Fund for Public Housing and a directorate to run it in 1984,in Law no 2985, dated 2.3.1984, titled "Toplu Konut Kanunu."
[43] Law no 3320, dated 11.11.1986, titled "Memurlarve İşçiler ile Bunların Emeklilerine Konut Edindirme Yardımı Yapılması Hakkında Kanun."
[44] The KEY payroll cuts were ended in 1995, but the money collected in the Fund was not repaid. It became a significant point of grievance benween the workers and various governments until repayments were announced in 2008. The repayments are still not concluded due to disputes about contributions (Hurriyet 2012).

ade, from Ulusu's vague promises of concluding agreements,[45] to Özal's declaration of continued support.[46] To understand why this was such an important issue, we need to remember the importance of workers' remittances for Turkey, the decline of which after 1974 are considered one of the factors which deepened the stagflation crisis of the late 70s (Aydaş, Metin-Özcan, and Neyaptı 2005:56). Rebounding after the coup, these remittances provided around $2 billion a year throughout the 1980s for the Turkish economy. Predictably, keeping them was a priority policy for governments; and establishing agreements whereby Turkish workers could keep withdrawing retirement benefits even when they moved back to the country played into this priority.

The neoliberal priorities about the social security system were very quickly abandoned by Özal after the ban on the participation of pre-coup political leaders in politics was lifted. He saw social security as an effective means of engaging in populism, and his disregard for the financial stability of the system and willingness to distribute patronage set the tone for the 1990s. Özal's most important attempt at populism during his last years in power was raising wages, the anathema of the economic policymaking in the 1980s. Through a series of measures that targeted public employees Özal raised real wages roughly 90% between 1988 and 1991 (Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 2000, 7). Of course such measures could not be contained within the public sector and private sector wages rose as well. Most importantly, benefits paid out by social security institutions, which were pegged to wages, also rose significantly. This presented a significant long-term problem for these institutions' financial viability, but for

[45] "Yurt dışında çalışan işçilerimizin hak ve menfaatlerini korumak ve geliştirmek için bugüne kadar sosyal güvenlik anlaşması yapılmamış bulunan ülkelerle anlaşmalar yapılacak, daha önce yapılmış bulunan anlaşmalar da günün şartları göz önünde tutularak yenilenecektir" (TBMM 1980).
[46] "Yurt dışında çalışan işçilerimizin sosyal güvenlikleri konusunda önemli anlaşmalar yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmalar devam edecektir. Yurt dışındaki işçilerimizin ekonomik ve sosyal problemlerin çözümü, her çeşit hak ve menfaatlerinin korunması (...) için çalışmayı önemli bir görev telakki ediyoruz" (TBMM 1987).

Turkish politicians of the period "long term" would cease to be a concern soon enough.

Following the defeat of ANAP at the 1991 elections, the DYP-SHP coalition also saw social security as a big vote-winner. One of the more solid policy proposals in the government program stated that the age restriction on retirement would be lifted, leaving anyone who had paid enough dues to begin collecting a retirement benefit (TBMM 1991b).[47] The purpose of this proposal was to get the support of the young working age population who would be able to establish a certain degree of income security at an early age, and maybe even draw two paychecks by working in the informal sector. It was quickly legislated,[48] placing a significant additional burden on the social security institutions that were forced to deal with a lot of early retirees, and the lopsided financial balance that was created by them in the short term. In the long term, they had a completely different problem. The new early retirees stood to withdraw benefits for much longer periods than the contributions/benefits balance had foreseen. Basically they threatened to bankrupt the social security institutions. Finally, by offering the early retirement option the law was blind to the fact that many people that could not find jobs in the informal sector would be relegated to a long life of unemployment, depriving the economy of their productivity.

The benefit hikes and early retirement had made all social security institutions unsustainable in the long term, but the impact of those policies would take time to manifest itself. However, that time was cut very short by DYP-led coalition govern-

[47] "Kadınlarımızın 20, erkeklerimizin 25 hizmet yılını tamamlamaları halinde, yaş haddine bakılmaksızın, isteyenlerin emeklilikleri sağlanacaktır" (TBMM 1991b).
[48] Law no 3774, dated 20.02.1992, titled "5434 Sayılı T.C Emekli Sandığı Kanunu, 506 Sayılı Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu, 1479 Sayılı Esnaf ve Sanatkârlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu Kanunu, 2926 Sayılı Tarımda Kendi Adına ve Hesabına Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu ile 2925 Sayılı Tarım İşçileri Sosyal Sigortalar Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkmda Kanun."

ments in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1995, in what would prove to be a fatal blow to the finances of all three social security institutions, Demirel and Çiller governments forced SSK, ES, and BK to buy treasury bonds (Buğra and Keyder 2006, 215). These forced investments sapped the three institutions' funds, offered very low returns, and led them into insolvency by 1995. After that time, social security was only kept afloat by transfers from the government budget. These transfers, which began at around 1% of GDP in 1994, peaked at around 4% of GDP in 1999 (OECD 2006, 135). With pressure from IMF, a relatively important reform package that increased the age requirement for retirement and attempted to fix the contribution-benefit imbalance was passed in 1999.[49] However, these adjustments were barely able to scratch the surface of the problem as the budgetary transfers to social security institutions kept rising after a slight dip in 2000, and reached almost 5% of GDP in 2005 (OECD 2006, 135). Basically, at the end of the 1990s, the financial situation of social security had come full circle. Rather than providing a safe and predictable social environment and significant investments to boost the economy, social security institutions had gone bankrupt and were actually draining the government budget.

The only policy of the decade that did not conform to the pattern of populism was the enactment of unemployment insurance, alongside the other social security reforms in 1999. Once again, the key explanatory variable appears to be the IMF pressure on a government that was dealing with the aftermath of the East Asian and Russian crises, capital flight and the earthquake in Gölcük (Çetin 1999). The unemployment insurance had first made it into the policymaking agenda in the 1997 Yılmaz

[49] Law 4447, dated 25.08.1999, titled "İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu."

government's program (TBMM 1997).[50] However, it failed to gain much traction. In 1999, the DSP-led coalition's program included a much more solid commitment to the insurance, stating that it would be a temporary relief program to alleviate the loss of income and be run by the *İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu* (Employment and Labor Agency – İŞKUR) (TBMM 1999).[51] This commitment also shaped the law that was passed in the same year.[52] The law established a new fund, *İşsizlik Sigortası Fonu* (Unemployment Insurance Fund) that would be paid for by a new set of payroll taxes on employees and employers as well as contributions from the government budget. It established that after a three year preparatory period, the insurance would begin paying out benefits in March 2002. The unemployment insurance was definitely designed to get people back to work as quickly as possible. A full year of work was required to even qualify for receiving the benefit. Moreover, the maximum amount a person could receive was limited at the level of the minimum wage. Even though such a design singled it out as an oddity in the 1990s, by the time it actually began to operate in the post-2001 economic policy environment the unemployment insurance would become a key element of a renewed neoliberal social security policy.

After the economic crisis of 2000/2001 continuation of the 1990s' populism was out of the question. As the numerous Letters of Intent to the IMF make clear, a comprehensive social security reform that would make the social security institutions financially viable again was one of the conditions of the IMF rescue package (TCMB 2001a, 2001b). The comprehensive legal change was long in coming, but the attitudes

[50] "Sağlık sigortası ile emeklilik sigortasının birbirinden ayrılması ile tüm yurttaşlarımızın sağlık sigortasına kavuşturulması ile işsizlik sigortasının bir program dahilinde gerçekleştirilmesine bu bağlamda çaba gösterilecektir" (TBMM 1997).
[51] "Çalışırken işsiz kalanların gelir kaybını, belirli bir süre telafi etmek amacıyla, işsizlik sigortası programı başlatılacak, bu programı yürütecek olan İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu yeniden yapılandırılacaktır" (TBMM 1999).
[52] Law 4447, dated 25.08.1999, titled "İşsizlik Sigortası Kanunu."

towards social security changed relatively quickly. The neoliberal policy paradigm became dominant once again, revitalizing the 1980s' dynamics of horizontal and vertical extension of social security coverage. Yet this time, the extension of coverage came with a new twist. In all areas of social security, from housing to healthcare and unemployment, a new dynamic of marketization was at play. This meant that reforms were geared towards fostering private sector growth or the introduction of market-based organization into public services.

The first signs of this change came in public housing. Throughout the 1990s, *Toplu Konut İdaresi* (Public Housing Administration - TOKI) had become a stagnant bureaucratic agency, its funds used to cover the budget deficits, and its role in housing very limited. However, the issue of housing, almost forgotten in the previous decade and not even mentioned in the program of the short-lived Gül government, received some emphasis in the first Erdoğan government's program. The program stated that urban transformation would be a priority for the government, and building low-income housing and making infrastructure investments would be a part of that agenda (TBMM 2002b).[53] A series of legal amendments have empowered TOKI to accomplish these goals. The first big amendment came in 2003 and legalized for-profit housing development by TOKI.[54] After that new amendments allowed TOKI to forcefully purchase private land in development areas,[55] take over public land without charge, plan land

[53] "Sağlıksız ve çirkin şehirleşmenin önüne geçilerek, şehirlerin yaşanabilir mekânlar haline getirilmesi hükümetimizin temel önceliklerinden biri olacaktır. Gecekondu bölgelerinde yaşayanlara yönelik ucuz konutlar üretilecektir. Uzun vadeli programlarla, şehirlerin, yaşanabilir, sağlıklı, ulaşım ve altyapı sorunları çözülmüş, çevre güzelliği taşıyan mekânlar olması için gerekli düzenlemeler yapılacaktır" (TBMM 2002b).

[54] Law no 4966, dated 06.08.2003, titled "Bazı Kanunlarda ve Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamede Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun."

[55] Law no 5273, dated 15.12.2004, titled "Arsa Ofisi Kanunu ve Toplu Konut Kanunu'nda Değişiklik Yapılması ile Arsa Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü'nün Kaldırılması Hakkında Kanun."

development[56] and enforce urban renewal projects.[57] With these powers, TOKI grew into a giant player in the housing sector, building almost 550.000 housing units between 2003 and 2012 (TOKI 2012). About 85% of these units were built for the low income groups who could make use of long-term credit opportunities, the rest were sold for profit. This housing policy has had two significant consequences. The first was the significant boom in the construction sector. The outsourcing contracts from, and the sale of public lands by TOKI became significant inputs for the construction sector, which has grown significantly in the last decade. The second consequence of the housing policy has been the extraction of capital, or at least leveragable debt from the low-income segments of the population through long-term housing credit extended by TOKI. This expansion of credit to people who had previously been excluded from the financial sector has helped the overall level of investments in the economy, as well as integrating the low-income people into the market.

As big as the changes in housing were, they were still dwarfed by the reforms AKP enacted in social security in 2006. In two sweeping laws,[58] the government sought to amalgamate all of the existing social security institutions into a newly formed *Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu* (Social Security Institution – SGK). This was a new approach to social security reform that had not been even hinted at in the government programs. Both the Gül and Erdoğan governments' programs had called for universal health insurance, which was in the laws, and establishing equitable treatment for

[56] Law no 5162, dated 5.5.2004, titled "Toplu Konut Kanununda ve Genel Kadro ve Usulü Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamenin Eki Cetvellerin Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığına Ait Bölümünde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun."
[57] Law no 5366, dated 16.16.2005, titled "Yıpranan Tarihi ve Kültürel Taşınmaz Varlıkların Yenilenerek Korunması ve Yaşatılarak Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun."
[58] Law no 5502, dated 16.05.2006, titled "Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu Kanunu" and law no 5510, dated 31.05.2006, titled "Sosyal Sigortalar ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanunu."

members of different social security institutions[59] which was very different than dissolving ES, SSK and BK (TBMM 2002a, 2002b). Under the new law, all social security functions such as pensions, workman's comp and disability insurance would be provided within a single graded scheme. However, in a legal challenge, the Constitutional Court struck parts of the law down, which resulted in the abandoning of the single graded scheme for the existing members of social security institutions (Anayasa Mahkemesi 2006). The unification process went ahead under the new conditions, and was completed within three years. From 2010 onwards, new entrants into the social security system became a dues paying member of one of three increasingly similar schemes. SGK has been gradually whittling down the differences between the schemes, sounding the death knell for the social status differences that had been the focus of social security for more than a century. People are no longer subjected to widely different welfare outcomes because of their occupations. Instead all of the working- and middle-class population has become almost a single mass, subjected to increasingly similar rules and receiving similar benefits.

The same laws that unified the social security institutions also established a universal health insurance called *Genel Sağlık Sigortası* (Common Health Insurance - GSS), funded out of payroll taxes for the employed and through government contributions for people on social assistance. This was instituted to complement the reforms in the provision of healthcare that AKP had already set in motion. The Gül government's policy proposals had included the transfer of all public hospitals to the Ministry of

[59] On healthcare both programs stated that "Sağlıklı bir nesil yetiştirebilmek için, sağlık hizmetlerinin tüm vatandaşların ulaşabileceği bir yapıya kavuşturulması kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir," even though the Erdoğan government's program was a bit more cautious about the reforms it proposed. On social security, the programs did not say any more than: "Sosyal güvenlik kuruluşlarında, norm ve standart birliği sağlanacak, uluslararası sözleşmeler ve sosyal güvenliğin temel ilkeleri çerçevesinde çağdaş, bütünleştirilmiş bir sosyal güvenlik ağı sağlanacaktır." (TBMM 2002a, 2002b)

Health, which would then take steps to ensure their fiscal and administrative autonomy, possible inclusion of private service providers in public healthcare insurance, and the establishment of "aile hekimliği" (family doctors) as a primary care system (TBMM 2002a).[60]

All of these proposals, which were also repeated in the Ministry of Health's white paper *Sağlıkta Dönüşüm* (Transformation in Health) in 2003, were eventually realized over more than a decade of AKP rule (Sağlık Bakanlığı 2003). The transfer of hospitals was accomplished in 2005,[61] and even though it exempted significant healthcare facilities in the universities, municipalities, judicial bodies and the Army from the transfer, it established the Ministry of Health as almost a public monopoly in the sector. The hospitals have gradually gained some degree of autonomy, and their separation from the Ministry was finally legalized in 2011 with the formation of regional *Kamu Hastaneleri Birlikleri* (Public Hospital Unions) to aggregate the hospitals' demands and a new bureaucratic agency called *Kamu Hastaneleri Kurumu* (Public Hospitals Institution) to regulate and audit them (Resmi Gazete 2011). The inclusion of private hospitals in public health insurance schemes began in 2005 when SSK signed a service provision contract with several hospitals (Yardım, Çilingiroğlu, and Yardım 2010).[62] Other social security institutions followed suit and private hospitals were soon integrated into the social security network. After the unification of social

[60] "Etkin, ulaşılabilir ve kaliteli bir sağlık sistemi, nitelikli bir toplum için vazgeçilmezdir. Devlet, herkesin temel sağlık ihtiyacını, gerekirse özel sektörle işbirliği yaparak yerine getirmek zorundadır. (...)Nitelikli bir sağlık hizmeti için devlet hastanesi, sigorta hastanesi, kurum hastanesi ayırımı kaldırılarak, hastaneler idari ve mali yönden özerkliğe kavuşturulacaktır. Sağlık Bakanlığı, oluşturulacak bu yeni sisteme göre yeniden yapılandırılacak, sağlık sektörüne rekabet getirilecektir. (...) Aile hekimliği uygulamasına geçilerek, sağlam bir hasta sevk zinciri sistemi kurulacaktır" (TBMM 2002a).

[61] Law no 5283, dated 6.1.2005, titled "Bazı Kamu Kurum ve Kuruluşlarına Ait Sağlık Birimlerinin Sağlık Bakanlığına Devredilmesine Dair Kanun."

[62] Before 2005, there were some provisional agreements where private hospitals would provide advanced testing or operations to publicly insured people, but this was limited in scale.

security institutions, SGK has continued this practice despite some public friction about prices and reimbursements (Hürriyet 2012). Being included in the public health insurance network has been tremendously beneficial for the private hospitals, whose total revenues from public insurance have skyrocketed from 743 million TL in 2004 to 5.24 billion TL in 2010 (SGK 2010).[63] Moreover, taken together with the increased autonomy for public hospitals it is clear that the overall aim of these policies is to establish some limited competition in the provision of healthcare. This will then incentivize public hospitals to stay financially viable while private ones will cut their prices. Finally, *Aile Hekimliği*, after several trial runs in smaller cities, went nationwide in 2011 (Resmi Gazete 2011).[64] This new primary care scheme provided free services for everyone at their registered doctor's offices. The key part of this scheme was the fact that the doctors providing the care would not be employed by the Ministry. Instead, the doctors would bill the Ministry and SGK for their services. This, compounded by the fact that people were free to change their family doctors, introduced some limited competition between family doctors to attract new patients and retain the ones they already had.

However, the AKP decade did not completely banish the ghost of populism from social citizenship and their brand of neo-populism led to ever-worsening budgetary balances for social security. In 2006, OECD had projected that with the new social security reform, the balances for the social security funds would immediately begin improving (OECD 2006, 135). However, in the 6 years since then SGK's budgetary

[63] This figure does not include the copayments made by the insured people, which can be as high as 90% of the amount billed to SGK.
[64] The trial runs had started in 2004 with the law no 5258, dated 24.11.2004, titled "Aile Hekimliği Pilot Uygulaması Hakkında Kanun." In 2011, this law was modified to take out the phrase "Pilot Uygulaması" and became the law for the nationwide practice with the Government Decree 633 (Resmi Gazete 2011).

deficit has gotten significantly worse. It is once again estimated to be around 5% of GDP, levels which had led to very significant reform efforts in 1999 and 2000 (SGK 2010, Table 3.13).[65] However, in a growing economy the government has this far been willing and able to ignore this fact and has instead preferred to finance the deficit and keep the popular policies in place.

Citizenship Regime for the Rich: Financial Security

Before the 1980 coup, high-income people were not a demographic that the policymakers concerned themselves with in formulating social policies. Nominally covered by the public social security, they were expected to finance their own retirement and healthcare or in some limited cases receive additional coverage from private social security funds. However this type of coverage, usually only provided by very high-end firms, was not available to large segments of the high-income population and the state did not pursue to engage them with any other policy. This attitude began to change after 1980, as policymakers began to toy with the idea of creating a private market for social security. This market would both provide an increase in savings which would be re-invested in the economy and also bolster the health of the financial sector that would be providing the services. However, actual policymaking on this front did not occur in the great leaps and bounds, instead throughout the 1980s, a tax deduction for private social security expenses remained the biggest attempt at including the rich in the social security system. The 1990s saw even less legislative effort at regulating or expanding the sector, as the possibility of working it into the populist social policymaking was very low. Despite the lack of regulations and legislative efforts for further

[65] SGK figures show the deficit in 1999 and 2000 to be around 3% and 2% respectively (SGK 2010, Table 3.13). This might be due to the different methods of calculation employed by the OECD and SGK, or the diffferent base year used in the two calculations. However, even if the SGK figures were a better point of reference, that would only mean that the budgetary deficit is even more signficant.

expansion, the private market in social security thrived during these two decades. However, after the crisis in 2001, governments were much more interested in actively promoting and encouraging the private social security both to improve the financial sector's stability, and to provide a higher degree of coverage for a larger segment of the population.

In 1983, Turgut Özal declared that in order to facilitate the development of the private insurance sector to complement social security, the premium payments for health, life and old age insurances would become exempt from taxation.[66] However, the reform in 1986 accomplished even more than that promise. *Gelir Vergisi Genel Tebliği* (Public Announcement on the Income Tax) published by the Treasury declared the premiums tax deductible, actively encouraging the people to buy private social security in return for paying less taxes (Resmi Gazete 1986). Successive governments were more than willing to declare their support for the private social security insurance. 1987 Özal government's program proclaimed that they would prioritize the development of the insurance industry[67] (TBMM 1987). 1993 Çiller government's program stated that they would support the development of health insurance to fund healthcare[68] and a similar statement[69] made into the program of the first Çiller government in 1995[70] as well (TBMM 1993, 1995). The 1996 Yılmaz government went even further, adding private retirement plans to the mix of desirable private social security and also declared their willingness to regulate the insurance market to bolster

[66] "Sosyal güvenlikle ilgili sağlık, hayat, yaslılık gibi sigorta sistemlerinin gelistirilmesi için sigorta primlerine vergi muafiyeti getirilecektir." (TBMM 1983)
[67] "Bankacılık yanında, özellikle sigortacılığın geliştirilmesine önem vereceğiz." (TBMM 1987)
[68] "Sağlık hizmetlerinin finansmanında özel sağlık sigortalarının geliştirilmesi özendirilecektir." (TBMM 1993)
[69] "Devletimizin asgari gelir düzeyini garanti eden bir sosyal güvenlik hizmeti sunması esas olacak, ilave sosyal güvenlik hizmetlerinin ise özel sigorta programlarıyla karşılanması desteklenecektir." (TBMM 1995)
[70] This government failed to receive the vote of confidence in the parliament.

confidence (TBMM 1996b).[71] These additions were also embraced by the Erbakan government of the same year (TBMM 1996a).[72] Yet none of these declarations led to solid policy developments. The same inertia caused by short government terms and significant volatility which had blocked significant reform in social security, also blocked developments in private social security. The only legislative change to the existing unregulated system was an attempt to tax some of the high payoffs by private retirement funds (Resmi Gazete 1998).

The big change in the system came right after the crisis in 2001. Motivated by the financial failures of the crisis and the IMF conditionality to take on significant financial reform, the government passed a law to regulate the complex fields of private healthcare and retirement.[73] This new law created an extensive regulatory regime from scratch, listing people that could be employed in these social security funds, establishing oversight and auditing mechanisms and even limiting how the funds could be invested. A few months later, another law was passed to regulate the earnings from the new private social security system,[74] making most premiums tax deductible and exempting some of the benefits paid out from taxation. Enforcement of the law did not happen immediately, but the regulation itself played a very important role in standardizing the market offerings, and providing guidelines for financial firms. The actual institutionalization of the sector came after AKP's election victory in 2002. In July 2003, a new public-private agency to manage the complex financial system of private social security, *Emeklilik Gözetim Merkezi* (Pension Oversight Center – EGM) was

[71] "Özel sigortacılık mevcut sosyal güvenlik sistemine ilave ve isteğe bağlı bir sistem olarak desteklenecek ve bu kapsamda, özel sağlık ve özel emeklilik sigortası teşvik edilecektir. Kişilerin özel sigortalara güvenini sağlayacak denetim hizmetleri artırılacaktır." (TBMM 1996b)
[72] "Ayrıca çalışanların emeklilik işlemlerinin ve tasarruflarının özel sigorta şirketleri ve özel emeklilik fonları aracılığı ile yürütülmesi özendirilecektir." (TBMM 1996a)
[73] Law 4632, dated 28.03.2001, titled "Bireysel Emeklilik Tasarruf ve Yatırım Sistemi Kanunu."
[74] Law 4697, dated 29.06.2001, titled "Bazı Vergi Kanunlarında Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun."

founded jointly by the treasury, the Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu (Capital Markets Board – SPK) and the leading insurance companies (EGM 2012a). A year after the legal framework was in place; almost 335,000 people had taken up private pension contracts (EGM 2004, 55).

The following years were marked by a sleuth of regulations and legislation meant to ensure the financial stability of the system and thus make it a profitable investment tool (EGM 2012b). Yet the fourth AKP government's program in 2011 hinted at a more extensive reform, and did so with reference to the vital role long-term investment funds played in fueling growth.[75] Erdoğan pledged to encourage the growth of the private retirement schemes, and in June of 2012 a new law was passed that changed the incentive structure of the system almost completely.[76] The tax deduction based incentives of the old system were completely discarded in favor of direct contributions by the state in order to attract new users. Under the new system, the state would actually contribute to every private retirement account 25% of all personal savings, limited at the minimum wage for a 12 month period. This new incentive system also rewarded individuals for staying in the system for longer periods, as they could only access these state contributions in full if they pay into the system for 10 years and wait until they are 56 to begin receiving benefits.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have argued that the 1980 coup marked a point of discontinuity in the governance of social citizenship in Turkey. The old dynamics of electoral mobi-

[75] "Ekonomimizin sağlıklı büyümesinde ihtiyaç duyduğu uzun vadeli fonların oluşumu önemlidir. Bu açıdan sosyal güvenlik sisteminin tamamlayıcısı da olan bireysel emeklilik sistemi yaygınlaştırılacaktır. Sistemde biriken fonların hızla büyümesi amacıyla vergisel hususlar da dahil olmak üzere her türlü tedbir alınacaktır." (TBMM 2011)

[76] Law 6327, dated 13.06.2012, titled "Bireysel Emeklilik Tasarrfu ve Yatırım Sistemi Kanunu İle Bazı Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun."

lization of the poor, garnering elite loyalty through selective access to social security, and the heavy-handed developmentalism of the earlier periods gradually lost their importance or evolved beyond their old policy applications. They were not completely lost, and would even experience resurgences, but their central roles in shaping social policy had been taken away from them in the post-1980 period.

Instead, I have tried to make the case that the three decades after the 1980 coup have seen macroeconomic policies, or more specifically how closely a government is willing to follow neoliberal orthodoxy, elevated to the decisive factor in social policymaking. As the various governments' attitudes towards neoliberalism waxed, waned and were revitalized their vision for social security and their willingness to engage in reform followed. Throughout the period, the neoliberal consensus on the governance of social citizenship focused on the management of poverty, utilization of social security for macroeconomic purposes and the marketization of all aspects of social policy. This consensus was never fully implemented, but its influence over thirty years of policymaking is clear.

The citizenship regime for the poor first began to appear in the discourse of Turgut Özal, wherein the poor were treated with a curious mixture of inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, by acknowledging the problem of urban poverty Özal was setting a new standard for governmental action. On the other hand, the policies he formulated did not go beyond public charity which fell significantly short of a full-on commitment to deliver social aid for the purposes of combating poverty. Yet even this limited attempt at including the poor in social citizenship would have been undone by the return of populist politics if not for one significant policy. The return to handing out urban land to squatters, errant and politically motivated deliveries of aid, and the lax

enforcement of established regulations to avoid a political backlash were anathema to the neoliberal orthodoxy that had led to the inclusion or the poor. However, the Green Card scheme, even without strict enforcement of the means testing, acted as the first real acknowledgement that the poor had a right to inclusion within social citizenship and was the first credible commitment to deliver social aid on a national scale. In the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the governments' approach to poverty took up this tone in the Green Card scheme, becoming once again proactive. Institutional reforms that professionalized aid and the broadening and deepening of the commitment to the poor have been the characteristics of this period. However, these purpose of these developments have not been to increase upwards social mobility. Instead, reforms of the last decade have sought to make the poor increasingly more visible and docile.

The citizenship regime for the working- and middle-class on the other hand, has evolved in a very different way over the last three decades. In the 1980s, the governments used social security for two main purposes, increasing the funds available for long-term investment in the economy and the disposable income for citizens covered by social security which would also go towards increased economic activity. For these purposes the first decade after coup saw the expansion of social security coverage both horizontally, across new segments of the population that had not been covered before, and vertically, to new areas of coverage, most importantly housing. However, after 1989, this expansion dynamic played itself out. Instead, governments engaged in a financially catastrophic practice of increasing social security benefits with a populist mindset. Coupled with the misappropriation of social security funds to finance government deficit, this one-upmanship drove social security into bankruptcy in the early 90s. The only policy of the decade that did not fit into the re-introduced populism was

the enactment of unemployment insurance, which was driven by IMF conditionality. After the 2000/2001 crisis, it became very apparent that the old-school populism of the previous decade had played itself out. Instead, resurgence of the neoliberal creed led to a return of the horizontal and vertical expansion dynamic of the 1980s. This time however, this expansion came with a focus on infusing social security with a market-based operational logic and the adoption of neopopulist policies. These forces are clearly visible in the evolution of TOKI, the unification of old social security schemes, and the creation of a universal health insurance.

Finally, the social citizenship regime for the rich evolved from being almost non-existent before the coup to a fully-fledged, publicly acknowledged aspect of social citizenship. Throughout the three decades, the policymakers approached private social security as a means of increasing long-term investments in the economy. Yet their willingness, or ability, to actually encourage its development varied according to their macroeconomic policies. In the 1980s, Turgut Özal was keen on encouraging private social security development, yet he failed to make any comprehensive policy beyond providing people with some tax deductions. This was partially because his brand of neoliberalism was not willing to take on the much more intrusive role of regulating the financial firms providing the private social security. In the next decade, politicians were still willing to make broad endorsements of private social security. Yet actual policy initiatives were rare, as integrating such a market-based approach into the broadly populist social policies of the day was not possible. In fact, the one piece of legislation that did target private social security actually imposed taxes on the benefits people received. It took the crisis of 2000/2001 and some IMF pressure on reforming the financial sector to end this impasse. A huge amount of legislative effort went into

establishing and maintaining a credible and properly incentivized private social security sector. The most important change in this area has been the switch from tax deductions to direct state contributions into the system, which points to a much larger commitment to private social security as a savings and investment tool.

CONCLUSION:

This project was motivated by a relatively simple inquiry into the welfare reforms in Turkey that took place over the last decade. However, as the research progressed, it evolved into something much more ambitious. In the preceding chapters, I have made the case for a new theoretical understanding of the welfare state, provided a historical account of welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic over the past two centuries, and identified the development of three "citizenship regimes" in Turkey since 1980. I am hopeful that despite some significant limitations imposed by my empirical work, this thesis will be an important contribution to the academic literature on the welfare state. Yet further theoretical and empirical work is still sorely needed.

I began Chapter 1 with the recognition that mainstream theories of the welfare state have not been able to adequately account for the expansion of welfare policies in developing countries. Going back to the foundational texts of this literature, the works of Marshall, Polanyi and Titmuss, I found that the existing literature was invested in a limited reading of these scholars. The importance of collective and individual participation emphasized by Polanyi and Titmuss' focus on the aims pursued by welfare policies led me to the literature on governmentality. This literature was well suited to address these concerns. Moreover, it also pointed out that the neoliberal welfare state created different sets of rules and policies for different groups in the population and a simple focus on the formal state institutions was bound to miss much of the depth of the welfare state. These two insights were also echoed by the

governance literature. I developed the concept of "citizenship regimes" in order to bring the insights from the governmentality and governance literatures into dialogue. Simply put, I argued that the welfare states need to be studied as an amalgamation various citizenship regimes. These regimes target different groups in the population, defined according to characteristics like class, gender or ethnicity. They have an institutional component, made up of various state and non-state actors brought together by policies or the lack thereof. They also have a discursive component that at once informs and is informed by the institutional setup.

In Chapter 2, I developed a historical account of the development of welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic in the past 200 years. My purpose in doing so was to establish how the Turkish welfare state operated prior to the adoption of neoliberalism, and how the "citizenship regimes" that made it up evolved over this period. I found that despite significant political, social and economic changes, the last 200 years of welfare policy showed remarkable continuities. Policies targeting the poor were never elevated to the status of rights, but instead remained discretionary benefits that were used to establish clientelistic relationships and shore up political and electoral support. The desire to maintain the loyalty of the military and civil bureaucratic elite was the main driver of social security policies throughout this period. Even when larger segments of the population were included in the social security policies, these two groups retained positions of privilege. Finally, the piecemeal extension of welfare policies to limited sectors of the economy, especially in the 20th century, was symptomatic of a desire to use benefits like social security and regulated working conditions to foster development in these sectors. Even when all formal employment was covered by these policies in the 1960s, the exclusion of

people engaged in small-scale agriculture which still formed a considerable portion of the workforce signaled the continuation of this developmental logic.

In Chapter 3, I developed my analysis of the neoliberalization of the welfare state in Turkey. The crux of that analysis was that the three dynamics that had been a constant in welfare policy making since the early 1800s gradually lost their power to new organizational principles. These were the active management of poverty, using social security as an economic resource, and the adoption of markets or market-like relationships to deliver welfare outcomes. These new dynamics gradually resulted in the development of three distinct citizenship regimes divided along class lines. The citizenship regime targeting the poor replaced the discretionary use of ad hoc poverty alleviation measures with increasingly more regular and reliable ones. However, in return for this significantly greater inclusion in social citizenship, the poor were expected to lead visible and docile lives, subject to constant monitoring by the state. The citizenship regime for the working- and middle-classes witnessed the evolution of the developmentalism of the previous period into the desire to use welfare policies to direct economic resources. This meant that while on an individual level welfare was seen as a way to protect individuals against economic risks, on a more collective level, welfare policies were used to direct the resources accrued in the system to investments in the economy, especially in housing and healthcare. Finally, the regime for the rich developed in this period witnessed the development of highly regulated markets for private health insurance and pensions, with considerable incentives from the state. Thus some of the wealth held by this segment of the population is channeled to provide a source of stable, long-term investments for the financial sector.

At this juncture it is important to reiterate the limitations imposed on my findings by my research methods. My use of secondary material in Chapter 2 leaves my argument vulnerable to any bias that exists in the works that I build my argument on. While I have no reason to expect any significant bias from these works, my narrative remains open to any criticism that might develop out of further original research conducted in this field. More importantly, my use of official documents in Chapter 3 limits my argument to claims about what the various governments intended to accomplish, rather than the actual outcomes of the policies which might have contradicted the original intentions. In some cases, I am able to capture the outcomes (for example the failure of annual means testing for the Green Card program) but these cases are in the minority. Therefore, in the absence of further research into the daily practices within these citizenship regimes, the validity of my argument remains tentative. Finally, my argument focuses on citizenship regimes that have been delineated according to class lines. Yet I have every reason to expect that these regimes can be further complicated by considering other social cleavages, like ethnicity and gender.

Despite these significant limitations, I am hopeful that this thesis will make three important contributions to the academic literature. First of all, I hope that the theoretical argument I make in Chapter 1, bringing together the theories of governmentality and governance, will at least lead to a lively debate on the role of various non-state organizations in providing welfare and the social goals pursued by welfare policies. Second, I think that the historical narrative I provide in Chapter 2 will make the history of the Ottoman and Turkish welfare state more accessible for researchers, especially those without sufficient knowledge of Turkish. Finally, I

believe that my analysis of the development of class-based citizenship regimes in the neoliberal era can inform further studies of the welfare state, not only in Turkey but in other developing countries that have undergone similar experiences.

I am aware that the work presented in this thesis still requires critical exploration and validation by further studies. I have already noted that original research into the historical development of welfare policies in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey is needed. Özbek's (Özbek 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009) laudable efforts in this field are certainly impressive, but especially efforts that go beyond historiography are still few and far in between. More importantly, the concept of citizenship regimes requires further theoretical and empirical work. It has proven to be a fruitful way of thinking about the welfare state in Turkey in the neoliberal era. However, its use in other countries and other time periods is still in question. Without a more extensive theoretical grounding and further empirical studies using this conceptual framework for other times and places, it remains a tentative construct. Finally, the research I have presented in this thesis does not touch upon the daily practices of citizenship regimes. It does not show us how policies are enacted and how officials and citizens interact in the context of a given regime. These are key components of a citizenship regime that I have had to omit from my analysis due to concerns about time and resources. I believe that further research in this area will prove highly interesting, and might lead to fruitful comparisons between the official discourse on and the lived experience of citizenship regimes.

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