MAIN AXES OF FRAGMENTATION WITHIN THE ARMENIAN MOVEMENT IN ISTANBUL SINCE THE MID-1990S: UNDERLYING REASONS AND ISSUES OF DISCUSSION

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the main axes of the fragmentation within the Armenian movement in Istanbul since the mid-1990s. Parallel to the democratization and demilitarization processes regarding the recently emerged identity-based movements in the post-1980 *coup d'état* period, Armenians in Turkey found room for raising their voice and addressing their problems, especially since the mid-1990s. This thesis contends that the Armenian movement since then has been primarily shaped by the fragmentation between two groups called the "extroversive" and "introversive" groups. Each group has followed different strategies, goals and framings when approaching their main concerns. Through 16 semi-structured in-depth interviews and one conversation over e-mail with Armenians from different institutions and organizations in Istanbul, this thesis investigates the underlying reasons for and issues of such fragmentation. These institutions include: the newspaper *AGOS,* Hrant Dink Foundation, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, *Nor Zartonk*, and the Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim for the category of the extroversive group, and the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, two Armenian Foundations, a Bible reading group, and an Armenian school for the category of the introversive group. This study highlights three main reasons of the fragmentation, namely: key ideological differences among diverse actors, current developments such as the different political opportunities and constraints that diverse actors feel are accessible for them, and different readings of historical developments by these actors. Three main issues to which the fragmentation can be related refer to the question of what it means to be an Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community. Consequently, this study contributes to the literature on diversity within social movements which study social movements by considering their fragmentations and internal instabilities, rather than considering them as a whole, homogeneous entity.

Keywords: Armenians, Istanbul, social movements, diversity, axes of fragmentation, minorities.

ÖZET

Bu tez, 1990'lı yılların ortalarından bu zamana devam eden ve İstanbul'da yoğunlaşan Ermeni hareketinin aktörleri arasındaki yarılmanın ana eksenlerini incelemektedir. 1980 askeri darbesi sonrası döneme denk gelen demokratikleşme ve demilitarizasyon süreçlerinde ortaya çıkan kimlik temelli hareketlere paralel olarak Türkiye'deki Ermeniler, özellikle 1990'ların ortalarından bu zamana seslerini duyurmanın ve sorunlarına çözüm bulmanın yollarını aradılar. Bu çalışma, bu dönem içerisinde temel olarak farklı iki grup—içe dönük ve dışa dönük gruplar—arasındaki yarılma etrafında şekillenen Ermeni hareketini konu almaktadır. Bu grupların her biri kendi kaygıları ile ilgili farklı stratejiler ve amaçlar gütmüş ve farklı anlamlandırmalara sahip olmuşlardır. Bu araştırmada yazar, İstanbul'daki farklı kurum ve örgütlerle bağı olan Ermenilerle yaptığı 16 yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme ve bir e-posta görüşmesi üzerinden, bu iki grup arasındaki yarılmanın temel nedenlerini ve bu yarılmayı su yüzüne çıkaran temel konuları araştırmayı amaçlıyor. Bu araştırma süresince, dışa dönük grup kategorisi için AGOS, Hrant Dink Vakfı, Ermeni Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, *Nor Zartonk*, ve Dersimli Ermeniler İnanç ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneğinden kişilerle görüşüldü. İçe dönük grup kategorisi için ise İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi, iki tane Ermeni vakfı, İncil okuma grubu ve bir Ermeni okuluna mensup kişilerle görüşmeler yapıldı. Bu çalışma, Ermeni hareketindeki bu yarılmanın üç temel nedene bağlı olduğunu iddia ediyor: farklı gruplar arasındaki ideolojik farklılıklar; farklı grupların farklı seviyelerde erişiminin olduğu, güncel gelişmeler sonucu ortaya çıkan farklı siyasal fırsatlar ve kısıtlamalar ve grupların tarihe bakışlarındaki farklılıklar. Çalışmanın üzerinde durduğu bir diğer konu da yarılmanın ortaya çıktığı temel meselelerdir. Çalışamaya göre bu iki grup temelde üç mesele üzerine ayrılığa düşmektedir: Ermenilik kavramı; Ermeni toplumunun devletle olan ilişkisi ve Ermeni toplumunda/ cemaatinde patriarkal otorite konusu. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, sosyal hareketleri, homojen bir bütün olarak incelemek yerine, dahili dinamikleriyle ve yarılmalarıyla inceleyen sosyal hareketlerde farklılıklar literatürüne katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Ermeniler, İstanbul, sosyal hareketler, farklılıklar, yarılmanın eksenleri, azınlıklar.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the main axes of the fragmentation among the actors of the Armenian movement in Istanbul which began to emerge to address the problems of the Armenians—an ethnic minority in Turkey—in the mid-1990s. This study shows that this fragmentation has emerged between two groups: an "introversive" and an "extroversive" group since the mid-1990s. These two groups have come on the stage to solve social, political, cultural, and economical problems of Armenians in the period from the mid-1990s to the present which coincides with internal and external dynamics of the movement that have influenced both groups. As a result, those two groups have preferred different strategies, goals, and framings when approaching the problems of Armenians. Therefore, by focusing on internal and external dynamics of the movement together, in this thesis, I will examine the reasons for and issues of the fragmentation in the Armenian movement—as an identity-based social movement. As a result of my analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews with 16 Armenian people and an e-mail conversation with one Armenian person, I explore that there are three main reasons of the fragmentation: key ideological differences among diverse actors, current developments such as the different political opportunities and constraints that diverse actors feel are accessible for them, and different readings of historical developments by these actors. Due to the effects of these reasons, the two groups have different perspectives mainly on three issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community.

In passing, let me explain why I prefer to describe the parties of the fragmentation with the categories of "extroversive," and "introversive." The introversive group has existed since the Ottoman Empire period by maintaining their importance in religious, social, cultural, and political order of the Armenian society around historical institutions of Armenians, especially the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul. In other words, by the great part of the Armenian society and the state since the Ottoman Empire period, the introversive group has been considered significant and widely-esteemed actors in the government and the representation of the society. However, the extroversive group has come into being among Armenians in Turkey by criticizing the current conditions of Armenians in Turkey and position of the introversive group since the mid-1990s alike. The extroversive group has come around some recently established civil platforms such as the newspaper *AGOS*, Hrant Dink Foundation, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, *Nor Zartonk*, and some regional associations.

Both groups admit that Armenians have survived in their own as a natural reflex to the suppression and discrimination by the state and society in the republican period; however, they believe that Armenians should no longer disappear into the larger society. Therefore, both groups have begun to address the problems of Armenians since the mid-1990s. However, in this respect, the two groups have preferred to follow different strategies, goals and frameworks to solve their problems. In this respect, one group, which is closer to the historical institutions of Armenians, has followed relatively more introversive way than the other group which has gathered around the recently established civil institutions. Since the mid-1990s, the extroversive group has declared that it was a necessity to discuss and solve the problems of Armenians—the problem of symbolic and physical violence

which Armenians have been exposed to in the republican period, and internal problems in the political and social order of the Armenian society such as deficiencies, corruption and injustice in the Armenian institutions—publicly in "the larger society" (most of the participants use it in place of "Turkey"). Moreover, they argue that Armenians should be engaged in and express their opinions about all issues of Turkey, rather than "being confined to the *cemaat* itself." Accordingly, they assert that Armenians should have connections and relations with the other groups' and minorities' movements –especially the Kurdish, Alewite, women, Islam, and gay-lesbian movements—because they think that they deal with similar issues. More specifically, I examine that their programs are not only about the issues of Armenians, but also about the various problems of the people of Turkey. Consequently, as they think that the larger society has prejudices against Armenians, they argue that being extroversive is a way for Armenians to be recognized by the larger society; thereby, this way would bring along solving their problems and their survival in safety.

On the contrary, the group which is closer to the historical institutions of Armenians such as the Patriarchate, Foundations, and alumni associations, does not agree with the extroversive group in the way of solving the problems. They are relatively "introversive." They think that discussing all of their problems publicly in the larger society, having connections with the other groups and minorities, and expressing "recklessly" their opinions on general issues of Turkey would jeopardize "safety" and "purity" of the *cemaat* of Armenians. Moreover, they criticize the "excessive" extroversive works of the extroversive group. Therefore, they argue that their problems should be solved in accordance with the values and precepts of the *cemaat* itself and among Armenians. Additionally, if it is necessary, they prefer to

accept the help of the state in solving the problems and to abide by the state principles. In that sense, they use the proverb, "*kol kırılır yen içinde kalır"* (do not let it out of this room) when I ask why they prefer to solve their problems within the *cemaat*.

In light of this information, by preferring to call these groups as extroversive and introversive, I argue that the Armenian movement has emerged and continued through the fragmentation between these two groups.

After the introduction section including the methodology of this research, in the second chapter, I examine the theoretical background of this research through the literature on diversity within social movements. I argue that the collective identity paradigm, which new social movement theories explicitly follow and the political process theories do so implicitly, would not address the fragmentation of this movement because both of those theories *study social movements as a whole*. Therefore, in order to explore the reasons and issues of the fragmentation in the Armenian movement, I will benefit from the critiques of the collective identity paradigm by some studies on diversity and fragmentation within social movements. In that sense, these studies on diversity and fragmentation argue that scholars, especially new social movement theorists, who want to explore reasons of collective action in social movements have concentrated on the *concept of collective identity*.[1] Scholars consider as to how the movement participants come together through shared ideas, values, histories, strategies, goals, interests, and meanings with which they represent themselves as "us" against "them," i.e. outside the movement.[2] Therefore, these scholars have not taken fragmentation and diversity within social movements

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[1] Cristina Flesher Fominaya,"Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates," *Sociology Compass* 4, no. 6 (2010): 393.
[2] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

into consideration. By contrast, with the works of these scholars, as Jo Reger argues, there emerged recently some studies on diversity within social movements.[3] They emphasize the difficulty of creating one single complete collective identity of a social movement[4] because there could emerge different collective identities among some different groups[5] or some drives to deconstruct the fixed identities in social movements.[6] Therefore, these studies examine the fragmentations in social movements by considering the effects of the internal and external dynamics[7] of the movement together on the separate fragments, rather than considering social movements as a whole. In this chapter, after scrutinizing the critiques of the collective identity paradigm, I will examine one by one the reasons of fragmentations in social movements in accordance with my case study: ideological differences[8], the current developments[9], and reading history differently[10]. Although issues of

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[3] Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 102.

[4] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement."

[5] Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008).

[6] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995).

[7] Although political process and new social movement theories consider social movements as a whole, the former explains social movements through only external factors, i.e. structural, economical, political developments outside movements without considering the internal dynamics of social movements. Therefore, as a critique of the political process theory, the new social movement theory focuses merely on internal factors, i.e. actor's concerns and cultural aspect of movements through collective identity perspective. However, as I examine, studies on diversity within social movement focus on internal and external factors together from the perspective of the fragmentation in social movements.

[8] Midred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002); Jo Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002); Gary T. Marx and Michael Useem, "Majority Involvement in Minority Movements: Civil Rights, Abolition, Untouchability," *Journal of Social Issues* 27, no. 1, (1971).

[9] Mary Bernstein, "The Contradiction of Gay Ethnicity: Forging identity in Vermont," in ," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and*

fragmentations are peculiar to the cases, the examinations of reasons of the fragmentation in the different social movements would require me to be acquainted with the issues of the fragmentation as well.

Moreover, it is worth stressing that I call the developments in the Armenian society since the mid-1990s as a social movement in light of social movements literature. As Mario Diani argues, there is no agreement about the use of the concept of "social movement." He points out that studies on social movements overlooked any discussion about the concept of social movement. However, by reviewing and contrasting some definitions of "social movement" in the literature, Diani calims that there is a "substantial convergence" on three points at least revealed among different studies. In light of this convergence, he states that "a social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations (a), engaged in a political or cultural conflict (b), on the basis of a shared collective identity (c)."[11] In addition to this definition, he adds one more component of being sustained of social movements (d)[12] especially thanks to the shared collective identity within social movements (c). As Christopher A. Rootes states, the third component (c) is considered "restrictive"[13] by some studies on diversity within social movements. Besides this critique of the third component, those studies operationalize "the concept of social movement" in accordance with the components of (a), (b), and (d). Therefore, before passing to the critiques of the collective identity paradigm by studies on diversity within social movements, I will

Society 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002); Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: Conceptual Reinterpretation," _European Journal of Turkish Studies_ 10 (2009).

[10] Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette, "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995," in _Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State_, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.).

[11] Mario Diani, "The Concept of Social Movement," _The Sociological Review_ 40 (February 1992): 13.

[12] Ibid., 16

[13] Christopher A. Rootes, "Social Movements and Politics," _African Studies_ 56, no. 1 (1997): 68.

explain why I call the developments in the Armenian society since the mid-1990s a social movement by illustrating the convergence of the developments of components (a), (b) and (d).

Firstly, starting with the component of "a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations," Diani argues that despite their different perspectives, studies on social movements agree on the plurality of actors and existence of informal links among them within social movements. Moreover, he argues that this network could produce a system of meaning among the actors of social movements. In this respect, when I examine developments in the Armenian society since the mid-1990s, I realize that there is a plurality of actors which is roughly divided into two groups: introversive and extroversive groups and there are also different actors in each of these groups. Moreover, the participants of each group clearly argue that they have close relations with people whose "world-views are close to each other."[14] As I examine the interviews, thanks to these close informal relations, each group has similar framings, world-views, strategies and goals that they articulate when approaching the problems of Armenians. Secondly, in accordance with component (b) of the definition of Diani, most of the participants argue that Armenians have started to apparently engage in political and/or cultural conflicts since the mid-1990s in order to make a political, social and cultural change in the course of their history in Turkey. In other words, they have had conflictual relations with "the dominant culture in society and the dominant mentality in the state over years"[15]

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[14] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.
[15] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013; Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013; Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20

Additionally, Diani posits that, although he does not give a specific time, a social movement is expected to be sustained for a long time thanks to its shared collective identity which encourages actors to have shared ideas, goals, strategies, meanings and representation of the actors of social movements as "us" against "them." However, as many studies illustrate, the conventional reason for giving more attention to the collective identity model is the thought that the existence of internal fragmentations or conflicts within social movements would lead to the death of the movement. On the contrary, some authors oppose this argument. For example, Mildred A. Schwartz posits that "factions may help movements survive;"[16] Elizabeth Kaminski and Verta Taylor argue in the book, *Identity Work in Social Movements,* although it is difficult, the movement participants can achieve a common concern within the diversity[17]; and Jo Reger asserts that movements could preserve their integrity and diversity when factionalism is accommodated culturally and structurally.[18] In light of these critiques, through the fragmentation between two groups, Armenians *since the mid-1990s* have *sustained and continued* to raise their voices to address their problems, as most of the participants clearly express. Consequently, by critically referencing Diani's concept of "social movement" revealed as a result of his examination of some studies, I argue that Armenians in Turkey have started and sustained a social movement since the mid-1990s in which plenty of actors have had informal relations with each other and have engaged in

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2013; Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22 2013; Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.

[16] Midred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002); 157.

[17] Elizabeth Kaminski and Verta Taylor, "We're Not Just Lip-synching Up Here": Music and Collective Identity in Drag Performances," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 48.

[18] Jo Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 171.

political, social and cultural conflicts with some institutions in order to address their problems and change the social, cultural and political structures that are responsible for the physical and symbolic violence experienced by Armenians over the years in Turkey.

In the third chapter, I will give a historical background of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. This chapter provides a background for historical references given in the excerpts of the participants in the fourth chapter and to see the transformations in the situation of Armenians in the transition periods from the Ottoman Empire to the Republican Period until 1995, and to the post-1995. I argue that although Armenians' different voices used to be heard until the late 19th century of the Ottoman Empire, in the very late 19th century and the early 20th century, Armenians have experienced a great degree of marginalization, suppression, discrimination, and deportation especially after the 1915 massacre in social, political, economic and cultural life. This period brought along homogenization of the differences of the Armenian society. No longer were there different voices, but only the Patriarch acted and was considered as the *defacto* leader of the Armenian community before the state and in the internal affairs of the community. After all democratic institutions of Armenians under the 1863 Regulation of Armenian Millet (*Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermenian)* had been abrogated by the Republic of Turkey, the patriarchate has been abided by the precepts of the Republic. Given that all the historical institutions of Armenians, Armenian churches, schools and hospitals, Armenian Foundations, and some alumni associations, have continued their own organic relations with the Patriarchate, all those Armenian institutions could not be expected to act differently. Therefore, different voices of Armenians has not been

heard in the agenda of Turkey until the mid-1990s; Armenians were "a silent minority."[19]

In the section examining the post-1995 period of the third chapter, I argue that the post-1980 *coup d'état* period in Turkey was witness to increasing discussions on democratization, demilitarization and some identity-based social movements that had recently emerged, especially in the Kurdish and Islamic movements, and the process of the accession of Turkey to the European Union. Amid these developments in the mid-1990s, Armenians started to be heard in the agenda of Turkey. Their silence had been broken. The introversive group around the Patriarchate and the Foundations have started to have closer relations with the state officials to talk about the issues of Armenians, as they argue, "thanks to sincere efforts of the AKP rule" (the Justice and Development Party which came to the power in 2002). However, external factors alone could not explain the emergence of the movements. There was also internal necessity felt by Armenians to raise their voices. Besides the social circle of the Patriarchate, the extroversive group shared the necessity but interpreted it in different way. The mid-1990s and onwards have become the time of emergence of the extroversive group around the newly established civil platforms that came forward with a critical perspective—which the introversive group names as "radical"—about the state, and the historical order of the Armenian community/society alike.

The first step of the civil platforms was taken by *AGOS*, a weekly newspaper, which started to discuss some of the taboos about Armenians. The social circle of *AGOS* and Hrant Dink, the chief editor of the paper who became a public figure of the discussions on the issues of Armenians and other issues of Turkey, started to

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[19] Gerard Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," in *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State,* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 32.

publicly discuss Armenians' issues. However, this had been sped up after the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007 when Armenians continued to be exposed to ethnic violation in Turkey. In this setting, there emerged new civil platforms: Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk*, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association and some regional associations. The extroversive group around these new civil platforms, especially those except the regional associations, as in the interviews, declare their independence from the Patriarchate unlike the introversive group gathered around already established Armenian institutions. They publicly discuss the Armenian issues and current issues of Turkey. Whereas the introversive group considers Armenians as a *cemaat,* community, those new institutions avoid using this word because of its religious and patriarchal connotations. Rather, they name Armenians as a society, an independent society. Moreover, they act as civil independent institutions.

In light of this information and as a result of my preliminary research in the field that I conducted in September 2012, I realized that there has been a fragmentation between "introversive" and "extroversive" groups. For this research, I had 8 in-depth interviews with people who fit into the category of "introversive" group: one from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, four from a Bible reading group in which the participant from the Patriarchate gave a lecture at an Armenian church, two from two Armenian Foundations and one from an Armenian school. Additionally, I have had an e-mail conversation with a person from the Patriarchate. Moreover, I have had 8 in-depth interviews with people who fit into the category of "the extroversive" group: three from both Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association and *Nor Zartonk*, two from Hrant Dink Foundation, two from *AGOS,* one from a regional association called, The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim.

The fourth provides the analysis of my fieldwork in light of the theoretical and historical background chapters. As a result of this analysis, I argue that the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s emerged and continued through the fragmentation into two groups: the introversive and extroversive groups. Because the scholars in the effect of the collective identity paradigm do not consider fragmentations within social movements, I utilize studies on diversity within social movements to understand the reasons and issues of the fragmentation of the Armenian movement. Consequently, I argue that as a result of three reasons: ideological differences among actors, current developments including opportunities and constraints and their different interpretation by actors, and reading history differently by actors, there has emerged fragmentation mainly on three issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community. In this chapter, after introducing the groups and the reasons of the fragmentation, I will examine the issues on which the groups have different perspectives by indicating their reasons in detail.

In connection with my literature review, it is revealed that ideological differences among actors, current developments including opportunities and constraints and their different interpretation by actors, and reading history differently by actors are the reasons mostly referenced during the interviews. Firstly, regarding *ideological differences*, it is fair to argue that the two groups have different ideological perspectives. On the one hand, the group, which I call "introversive", are labeled as "conservative" by the interviewees and I also examine that they have stronger ties with religious institutions, especially the Patriarchate. On the other hand, the group, which I call "extroversive," is labeled as "the *civil* platforms' by most of the interviewees and they clearly express that they have affiliations with

socialist or liberal ideologies and were told to be known as socialist or Marxist or communist by the greater part of the Armenian society/community. Therefore, on some issues, these two groups developed different strategies, goals and framings in accordance with their own ideological perspective. Secondly, I explore how *the current developments* including *opportunities and constraints* also take role in the fragmentation in two ways. First, because the introversive group has more political access to the polity and the political actors—as a result of the political developments since the 2000s—than the extroversive one, they have followed a more moderate political strategy for solving problems in accordance with the state policy. However, the extroversive group prefers to follow more civil, independent, and "radical" politics in opposition to the state and the traditional order of the Armenian society. In addition to the different levels of the political access of the actors, secondly, the different interpretation of the current developments by the actors also deepens fragmentation between the two in some issues. Finally, *reading history differently by actors*, although it was not addressed as much in the literature, becomes an influential source of the fragmentation in the Armenian movement. Because the history of Armenians still has significant reflections on the present, as the actors read it differently, fragmentations concerning some current issues arised.

As a result of these reasons, my analysis presents that these two groups have fragmentation mainly on three issues which are peculiar to the case: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/ community. Firstly, regarding *the concept of being Armenian,* in accordance with their ideology and interpretation of current developments and history, I explore that participants from the introversive group have more religious—in accordance with the Apostolic Christian sect only—, more

introversive and more idiosyncratic concept of being Armenian than the extroversive one's. Rather, people from the extroversive group do not want to be restricted into one single identity of Armenians—being Armenian ethnically (only apostolic sect) and citizen of Turkey; they take the differences among Armenians into consideration. Moreover, they seek to be extroversive on the agenda of Turkey in order to solve the problems. They also try to establish some relations with the other minority movements in Turkey because they admit their similarities with them rather than being idiosyncratic. Furthermore, they do not accept a strong link between being Armenian and being Christian as the introversive group does, although they share the same concerns with the introversive group about the significance of the religion for being Armenian.

Secondly, in the sense of *the relations of Armenians with the state*, thanks to the recent political developments, the introversive group has had closer personal relations with the state and, in the interviews, they are more hopeful and content with the recent developments for which they thank the AKP rule as the main actor in the improvements. Moreover, they argue that the relations should be continued as what it is now. Therefore, they are complaining of the "radical" acts of the extroversive group gathered around the new civil platforms. However, because their ideology is different, the participants from the extroversive group state that they are not content and hopeful about the current improvements thanks to the personal relations with the state. By reading history differently, they argue that what the state has done until today was the same: The state did not give citizenship status to Armenians. Therefore, rather than having personal relations with the state officials, they want to continue with more organized civil institutions. Moreover, rather than the AKP or

Turkey's accession process to the EU, some improvements have been realized thanks to those civil platforms leaded up by *AGOS*.

Finally, the introversive and extroversive groups have also different perspectives on *patriarchal authority in the Armenian community/ society*. The participants from the introversive group consider that the Patriarchate has been a representative and advisor of the Armenian community by referencing the history, especially the 1863 Regulation. Therefore, in the sense of the civil representation of Armenians, they argue that, the Patriarchate, for now, fulfills the civil representation somehow besides its religious authority. Accordingly, they assert that the present situation should not be changed but it is still a necessity to be recognized by the state with a legal personality. However, according to their reading history differently, the participants from the extroversive group do not support that the Patriarchate/Patriarch has been fully an advisor and representative in the history, especially under the 1863 Regulation. With the effect of their ideological stance, they think that the 1863 Regulation was a restriction of the authority of the Patriarchate. Therefore, amid the current democratic developments in Turkey, they argue that the Patriarchate should have the religious authority—but not only based on the Apostolic sect, but rather, should include other sects and differences— that is, the civil representation of Armenians should be provided by civil platforms elected by Armenians, which are independent from the Patriarchate.

After the conclusion chapter, I have added two appendices. Appendix A represents the Turkish translations of the excerpts quoted in the fourth chapter. Moreover, Appendix B presents the demographic information of the participants including sex, age, ethnicity, birthplaces, types of interview, and duration of interviews by concealing the names of the participants.

METHODOLOGY

I have conducted this research in connection with the actors of the Armenian movement in Istanbul from early February 2013 to late March 2013. In order to get into the fragmentation between actors, I decided to get in touch with the actors of the movement. Therefore, I put the actors at the center of this research through the qualitative research technique. Moreover, I believe that it would be a better way to have interviews with those actors: It would provide me, as a researcher, with the chance to hear actor's position and internal and external dynamics of the movement to which s/he is a witness from him/her as a primary source. Therefore, my research is based on the semi-structured in-depth interviews with 16 Armenian people in Istanbul, and I have had a conversation with one more person over e-mail. Additionally, the preference of this technique by most of the studies on diversity and fragmentation in social movements also compels me to employ the semi-structured in-depth interviewing technique.

Another significant reason in choosing the semi-structured in-depth interviewing technique is my preliminary research. I conducted a preliminary research in September 2012 by having meeting and having in-depth interviews with two Armenian people. One was from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, and the other one from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association (ACSA). I did these two interviews only for interpreting the validity of my questions. In these interviews, I realized that there could be a lot of information and mundane articulations that I have not heard about, and that could be helpful to interpret and understand better the movement. I have felt the necessity of the actors of the movement narrating themselves and the situation in which they have been engaged. Then, I decided to ask open-ended questions, some of which I had already decided in accordance to the

result of the preliminary research, and some of which have come out during the interviews in accordance with the actors' different experiences. Therefore, by putting the actors of the movement at the very center of this research, and asking open-ended questions, I believe that I minimize the risk of being deterministic about the result of the analysis.

Moreover, this preliminary research helped me decide on the profile of the interviewees. In this research and in my reading the literature about Armenians in Turkey, I examined that there is a fragmentation between some groups, and the movement goes on through this fragmentation. In order to decide with whom I should have interviews as the main actors of this fragmentation, this preliminary research was really helpful. I realized that there are two groups which I call as the introversive and extroversive groups. The introversive group has gathered around the historical institutions of Armenians such as the Patriarchate, Foundations—under which school, hospital and a church are operated—and alumni associations, and follows a more introversive way for solving their problems. On the contrary, the extroversive group has gathered around the newly established civil institutions since the mid-1990s, and follows a more extroversive way when approaching the problems. Therefore, in my preliminary research, I began to learn about the different strategies, goals, and framings of these two different groups.

I chose the participants with the method of snow-ball sampling. And my research has taken almost two months from the beginning of February 2013 to the end of March 2013. Regarding the introversive group, besides the Patriarchate, I realized that there are also people who fit into the category of the introversive group. For instance, I think and ask the participant from the Patriarchate if I could talk to people in a church after the Armenian Church Sunday liturgy. However, the

participant warned me that people could have some fears and did not accept talking to me. Then I decided to have interview with the people who have close relations with the Patriarchate and the Patriarch via my connections in the Patriarchate. Therefore, the participant from the Patriarchate offered me to arrange a meeting with people who were in a Bible reading group in its first day to which the participant gave the lecture. I went to a church where the group met up, and I had four appointments with four people for interviews. I had an interview with two people of four together, and the rest individually. Besides the Bible reading group, some of them had relations with alumni associations of Armenian schools, their dance or music clubs. Because of the limitation of time for my research, I did not have the chance to interview with people from alumni associations of Armenians which are described with their close relations with the Patriarchate in the interviews. Therefore, having interview with those people from the Bible reading group also enabled me to have some information about alumni associations.

Furthermore, I realized that I should have interviews with people from the Armenian Foundations which, I was aware, had organic relations with the Patriarchate over the years. I called and wrote to three of the Foundations to arrange a day for interviews. However, those foundations required me to ask the Patriarchate for permission to interview the people from the Foundations. I called the first participant from the Patriarchate. Although he told me that there is no sort of relation of the Patriarchate with the Foundations, I finally had access to the Foundations as a result of the reply of the Patriarchate to the petition I had written to have permission. However, they arranged only two appointments with two people from two different Foundations. Moreover, they noted that "you do not have to meet all our church and school foundations. I can arrange meetings with one church, one school, and the

hospital foundation's board chairman; in this way, *you will have done your research with our community.*[20] This also shows that the access to the introversive group was really difficult.

I also decided to have meetings with schools which are one of the significant institutions of Armenians in the past and present. They also asked me to have a permission paper from the Ministry of National Education which would take a long time to be approved. However, I was accepted by only one school principle without having any permission paper. As a result, I had an interview with 8 Armenian people who fit into the category of "the introversive group." Four participants—one from a Foundation, two from the Bible reading group, and one from a school—did not want me to record the interviews, so I took notes of the interviews. The rest allowed me to record the interviews. Moreover, I met them in the optimal place for them such as their workplace, a café, church, the Patriarchate, and schools.

Regarding the category of "the extroversive" group gathered around the newly established civil platforms, in the preliminary research I first got in touch with a participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Associaiton (ACSA). I realized that there were many civil platforms that were recently established: *AGOS* (the weekly newspaper)*,* Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk*, and regional associations: *Sivas Ermenileri ve Dostları Derneği* (The Association of Friends and the Armenians of Sivas)*, Sason Ermenileri Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği* (The Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Sason)*,* The Malatya Philanthropist Armenians Association, and The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim (FSSAAD). However, because of the limited time for my research, I had an interview with only two people from *AGOS,* two people from Hrant Dink

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[20] E-mail with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, March 13, 2013.

Foundation, three people from both *Nor Zartonk* and ACSA, and one person from the Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim.

I chose the first four platforms, except the regional associations, for two reasons: First, they were the most visible ones in the Armenian society and in Turkey. Second, they mainly come with the claim of discussing *in public* and solving the political, cultural, social, economic, and historical problems of Armenians. On the contrary, the regional associations were established mainly for keeping alive the solidarity among their fellow townsman, and to rebuild some collapsed historical places in their regions. Moreover, I am told in the interviews that they did not deal with the problems of Armenians so much. Therefore, I did not think to have any interview with regional associations while I was having with the first four platforms. However, in the interviews, the case of the FSSAAD and Armenians from Dersim came to surface as an issue of the fragmentation between the two groups, as I indicate in the fourth chapter, and I examine the association's close relations with the first four platforms. Moreover, FSSAAD is one of the most visible associations in Turkey and in the Armenian society, with its activities and programs. Therefore, I decided to conduct an interview with a person from the FSSAAD.

Unlike some of the introversive group members, the participants from the extroversive group did not ask me for any permission paper. I just called a person from each of these institutions, and s/he helped me to have interviews with people from these institutions. It was only difficult to arrange a meeting because of their busy schedules. As a result, I had interviews with 8 Armenian people who fit into the category of "the extroversive group." During the interviews, all of them allowed me to record the interviews. Moreover, I met each one separately in the institutions in which they worked or of which they were members.

In general, on the request of some participants, in this research the names of the participants are not used. Rather, I prefer to cite the excerpts from the interviews by indicating the participants' affiliations.

In the preliminary research, I also understood that this research needed to be conducted in Istanbul for two reasons. First, Istanbul is the city where almost all populations of Armenians are living after their migration from Anatolia to Istanbul because of suppressions and violations they have been exposed to in the republican period, especially in 1915 and onwards. Secondly, all of these institutions, which I mentioned above, are located in Istanbul and get into the act mostly in Istanbul.

During some of those interviews, by the two groups I categorized, I have been treated as a member of "the larger society," who wants to learn about the situation of Armenians in Turkey. Although they were not stranger to engaging with members of "the larger society," and they even welcomed it, they always reminded me that I was not from the Armenian community/society. They mostly narrated their "different" and "special" grievances of the past. During these narrations, some of them, mostly the participants from the introversive group, told me that "you can't understand what situation we have been through", or, "I can't tell everything of the *cemaat* to you for the *cemaat'*s and the Patriarchate's safety." Therefore, mostly in my interviews with the participants from the introversive group, it was necessary to explain that this is an independent research for a partial fulfillment of requirements for my degree. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the interviews, some of them warned me that they would not express their independent opinion on purpose of the safety of the Patriarchate and the *cemaat.*

Finally, this research does not claim to be representative. In other words, a generalization of this research to different people and situations that are not included

in the research cannot be argued because only some have been selected out of a lot of the actors of the Armenian movement. Because of the limitation of time for the research and some difficulties in access to the Armenian people, in this research, I have had a restricted number of interviews. Therefore, having interviews with a restricted number of people is a limitation of this research. Nevertheless, I believe that this research gives clearly a significant point of view about the fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups in the Armenian movement.

CHAPTER II

DIVERSITY AND FRAGMENTATION WITHIN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In this chapter, I argue that the collective identity paradigm following new social movement theories and political process theories fail to examine internal fragmentations of identity-based social movements, like the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s in Istanbul. The new social movements' collective identity paradigm, despite taking internal factors into consideration, does not consider internal instabilities, especially fragmentations in movements. Rather, they assert *explicitly* that one collective identity becomes the source of movements, and it provides their continuance. Moreover, they argue that one complete collective identity of movements conveys to the movement's participants a message of *one collective strategy, goal and framing*, and that this collective identity becomes a tool for delineating the border of "us" against "them." Furthermore, just by thinking of the effects of external structural developments, the opportunities and constraints of the time, the political process perspective considers that these developments create *collective interests and collective action* among the movement's participants and therefore influence the movement *as a whole*. Thus, this perspective could not avoid being dominated by "the collectivity paradigm" as well.

However, studies on diversity in social movements *explicitly* criticize the collective identity paradigm and *implicitly* criticize the political process theories' treating of social movements as a whole. Studies on diversity within social movements argue that there could be a drive to deconstruct the fixed identities[21], there could be multiple identities,[22] and there could be difficulty in creating a

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[21] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995).
[22] Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008).

collective identity as "us" against "them"[23] within social movements. Moreover, they take the internal and external dynamics of the movement together unlike new social movements and political process theories. Through scrutinizing this literature, I argue that the fragmentation between the "extroversive" and "introversive" groups in the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s are due to ideological differences, current political developments including opportunities and constraints for the actors, and reading history differently by the actors over some issues explained in the fourth chapter. Therefore, in this chapter, after retrospectively reviewing early models of social movement theories: resource mobilization, political process and new social movement theories, I will examine the collective identity paradigm and its critiques by studies on diversity within social movements by exploring the reasons for fragmentations in accordance with my case study. Then, by briefly explaining social movements in Turkey since the 1980s, I argue that the perspective of studies on diversity in social movements would be more productive to understand social movements' internal and external dynamics than political process and new social movements theories or the collective identity paradigm.

1. Resource Mobilization, Political Process, and New Social Movements Theories

The resource mobilization model,[24] used mostly in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, criticizes the inherited collective behavior and mass society theories, which claim that collective action occurs because of economic crises and the dissolution of

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[23] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

[24] J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization* (Marristown, N. J. : General Learning Press, 1973); M. N. Zald, and J. D. McCarthy, ed. *The Dynamics of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Wintrop, 1979); John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (May 1, 1977).

society.[25] Given that the collective behavior approach relies on "the irrational character of the protests" –like Nazis in Germany—without employing any empirical methods to understand the case,[26] the resource mobilization paradigm stresses the rational and tactical behaviors of activists during social movements to correct the irrational basis of the collective behavior approach. As John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald state,"[t]he resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of *resources that must be mobilized*, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements… *The new approach* (the resource mobilization approach) *depends more upon political sociological and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior*."[27] In short, rather than presenting the psychological interpretation of collective movements, the resource mobilization theory asks how people participate in collective protests and come to struggle *through using their resources*.

Moreover, the resource mobilization theory opened the ways to two new critiques called political process and the new social movement theories. These two approaches claim that the resource mobilization model is limited and ignores some significant dynamics of movements. The former, the political process theory[28] (hereafter PPT), which goes back to the late 1960s and 1970s, argues that the model

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[25] Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challange of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985): 790.
[26] David S. Meyer, "Tending the Vineyard: Cultivating Political Process Research," in *Rethinking Social Movements, Structures, Meaning and Emotions*, ed. Jeff Goodwin and Hames M. Jasper (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 49.
[27] McCarthy, and Mayer, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," 1213 (my italics).
[28] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Mcgraw-Hill College, 1978); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement, Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dough McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

of the resource mobilization theory does not consider political factors/context that "provided grievances, resources and openings to challengers."[29] As Charles Tilly argues in his book, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, as external factors, democratic political developments through the electoral participation and the allowance of popular politics by a parliament (the openness of the government) open the way of protests.[30] Therefore, it is fair to argue that the tactical selection of the activists' interests does not merely depend on the resources which are available to them, but depend on the opportunities that convince them that the way they would choose to mobilize people for the movement is the beneficial one. For instance, in the sense of the openness of a government, if a government in a country is more open to protests, it is simply the wise way to protest against the government. However, if the government is repressive, the movement's activists shall try to find another effective way. Therefore, as Sidney Tarrow interprets for contentious politics, political opportunity theories consider "the changing political opportunities and constraints" as incentives for political activists.[31] Therefore, rather than considering social movements as merely a result of political resources of the activists, by critically building on the resource mobilization model, the political process theory argues that movements should be examined as a result of the interaction of the interests of the activists with the political opportunities and constraints.

Therefore, the political process model treats social movements *as a whole*, or as a result of long-standing process: Those opportunities and constraints would affect all participants of a movement because they are considered to open the way of

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[29] Meyer, "Tending the Vineyard: Cultivating Political Process Research," 49-50.
[30] Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Mcgraw-Hill College, 1978).
[31] Tarrow, *Power in Movement, Social Movements and Contentious Politics,* 7.

deriving collective interests of the movement through *a collective action*.[32] However, this model does not think about the different effects of these external or structural factors on the participants of the movement and does not consider the internal dynamics. In that sense, the political process model is criticized in this research.

Moreover, as Charles Tilly and other political process theorists emphasize, these opportunities should not be taken as invariant structures; rather, there can be a multitude of opportunities and constraints. Therefore, as David S. Meyer posits, "political process theorists stress the more volatile aspects of political opportunity and constraints such as "the organizations of previous challengers, the openness and ideological positions of political parties, changes in public policy, international alliance and constraints on state policy, state capacity, the geographic scope and repressive capacity of governments, the activities of countermovement opponents, potential activist's perceptions of political opportunity, and even prospects for personal affiliations."[33]He adds that those aspects of the opportunities and constraints can be changed, added to and redefined.

The latter, the new social movement theory,[34] indeed, has come forward with the critiques of both the resource mobilization theory and political opportunities theory. As Melucci explains, "[s]tructural theories, based on system analysis, explain *why* but not *how*…On the other hand, the resource mobilization approach… fails to examine its meaning and orientation. In this case, *how* but not *why*… In my view, the

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[32] Neal Caren, "Political Process Theory," in *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology,* ed. George Ritzer (2007), http://nealcaren.web.unc.edu/files/2012/05/Political-Process-Theory-_-Blackwell-Encyclopedia-of-Sociology-_-Blackwell-Reference-Online.pdf

[33] David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2004): 135.

[34] Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challange of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985); Jean L., Cohen. "Strategy or Identity, New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985); Alain Touraine, "The Importance of Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002); Alain Touraine, *The Voice and The Eye* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Clause Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging in the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985).

analysis should concentrate on the systemic relationships rather than on the simple logic of actors. … *Action has to be viewed as an interplay of aims*, resources and obstacles, *as a purposive orientation* which is set up within a system of opportunities and constraints."[35] Then he continues, "[s]ocial movements are thus action systems in that they have structures: the unity and continuity of the action would not be possible without integration and interdependence of individuals and groups, in spite of the apparent looseness of this kind of social phenomenon."[36] Therefore, Melucci and other new social movements theorists fuse the questions of *why* and *how* in the research on social movements.

Furthermore, as a significant difference from the interpretation of both theories from the new social movement perspective that focuses on internal factors, Alain Touraine posits that societies in the 1960s and onwards, as he calls post-industrial and information societies, no longer come together and protest with the goal of the redistribution of political and economic power, or the goal of interest-based notions (it includes class notion)[37]; rather, they come together through information and symbolic systems on a specific goal out of various topics such as environment, gender, race, in order to be recognized.[38] In that sense, the new social movement approach emphasizes *the cultural aspects of the movements*; thus, it criticizes the emphasis of resource mobilization and political process theories merely on the (external and structural) political and economic characters of social movements that exclude the cultural aspect.[39] In that sense, their critique of the

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[35] Melucci, "The Symbolic Challange of Contemporary Movements," 792.
[36] Ibid., 793
[37] Alain Touraine, "The Importance of Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002).
[38] Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985), 795-796.
[39] There are some critiques of the political process theory that state that the political process theory excludes the cultural relations of the movements and the actors of the movements. The critique argues that as a political opportunity, they only count the institutional and organizational constraints and opportunities. Even though some of them consider the cultural characters, they treat them as structural

political process paradigm, which the political process theory focuses on only structural or external factors as the source of movements, is a fair critique.

Rather, the new social movement model argues that actors of movements have come forward with claims of being recognized through the symbolic and informational tools as a goal. Therefore, for them, the movement is no longer a means to achieve a goal but is a goal in itself.[40] Moreover, this goal generally becomes the recognition of one collective identity of the movement by the dominant group. In this sense, Alain Touraine, who claims that he tries to avoid the economic deterministic explanation of social movements which locates the contenders as a suppressed part of society, and has always considered actors instead,   identifies social movements "as organized conflicts or as conflicts between *organized actors* over the social use of *common cultural values.*"[41]

Therefore, while the political process theory examines external factors, the new social movements paradigm emphasizes internal factors of movements. Moreover, while the political process theory used to follow a *collective interest and action* explanation to understand a movement that those external factors affect *the movement as a whole* without considering upon different results of those factors within movements, new social movement theories articulate explicitly "the collective

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elements. (For further discussion, see, Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory," in *Rethinking Social Movements, Structures, Meaning and Emotions,* Jeff Goodwin and Hames M. Jasper (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003)). However, this critique is challenged by some of the political process theorists; Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, David S. Meyer, and others in the same book, Jeff Goodwin and Hames M. Jasper, *Rethinking Social Movements, Structures, Meaning and Emotions.* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). Nevertheless, David S. Meyer notes that he accepts the critiques of the PPT by Goodwin and Jasper that political process theory needs to study culture and social movements in further way. And Meyer continues "[m]ost promising, I think, is the attention to "cultural practices" or "identity practices," that is, what people do, as a means of observing and understanding culture. Scholars use the tools of long-form interviews, participant observations, and other elements of ethnographer's craft." David S. Meyer, "Tending the Vineyard: Cultivating Political Process Research," 53.

[40] Alain Touraine, "The Importance of Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002): 90-92.

[41] Ibid., 90.

identity" as the source of movements. However, it is obvious that *these two paradigms treat the movement as a whole.* Moreover, if the collective identity conveys to the movement participants a message of one complete strategy, goal and framing, then the political process theory (implicitly) and new social movement theory (explicitly) present social movements through the collective identity paradigm. Therefore, the critique of the collective identity paradigm opens the way to examine the fragmentations in social movements.

2. Collective Identity and Diversity in Social Movements

Fominaya states that collective identity, as a concept, "has been explored especially by scholars who felt that more structural, rationalistic and goal-driven explanations for the emergence and persistence of movements, such as resource mobilization theory, political process models, rational choice models, and ideologically based explanations left out crucial social-psychological, emotional and cultural factors."[42] Therefore, it is significant that critiques of resource mobilization and political process theories by new social movements theories open the way to examine social movements from the collective identity perspective. Fominaya argues that Melucci's formulation for social movements, which is based on collective identity and argues that collective identity is not a given, but a process or a dynamic reflexive process through daily interaction, brought the issue of collective identity to the area of new social movements.[43]

However, scholars who employ the political process theory implicitly, too, try to answer the question "how and why do people come together in the oppositional stance?" by viewing *the movement as a whole* like the collective identity approach,

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[42]Cristina Flesher Fominaya,"Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates," *Sociology Compass* 4, no. 6 (2010): 393.
[43] Ibid., 393-396.

as I explained.[44] However, differently, political process theories explain a social movement through the collective interest and action of the movement, so they treat the *movement as a whole* as the collective identity paradigm does. Therefore, as Fominaya argues, "one important line of inquiry for scholars seeking to understand how a sense of cohesion that leads to collective action is developed in social movements has centered *on the concept of collective identity.*"[45] I argue that the political process and new social movement theories study a social movement as a whole with the effect of the collective identity paradigm.

Rachel L. Einwohner and others argue that scholars construct their paradigms on the assumption that the participants of movements come together through shared ideas, strategies, goals, history, norms, values, and representation of the self by delineating the border between "sameness" and "differences," or "we" and "they" categories. The participants try to explore themselves, who they are, in order to grasp a collectivity in their movements.[46] During this exploration of their identities, they use their similarities to connect with those who share the same histories, cultures, issues, and situations. Moreover, they explicate their differences from the opposition to grasp the collectivity as well.

In one of the most popular references in collective identity studies, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization,"[47]Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier present three overlapping

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[44]Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lezbian Feminist Mobilization," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg Muelle (Yale University Press, 1992); Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (January 1, 2001): 287.

[45] Fominaya, "Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates," 393. (my italics)

[46] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008);1.

[47] Taylor and Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization."

components of collective identity. First, "boundaries" are a sort of tool for separation of a group of the movement itself from the dominant group. Throughout the boundaries, the participants of the movement, in other words, the challengers, emphasize their differences from the dominant groups outside the movement; in other words, from "them." Second, "consciousness" is a framework that represents the same and common interests, goals, aims, repertoire, and meanings of the participants—that set the consciousness of "us"—in response to the dominant consciousness. This consciousness is set within the struggle through articulation of each cause of the participants' grievances. Third, "negotiation" is a way of symbolic and everyday opposition to the dominant order to change it. Those ways are in accordance with the framework that represents the consciousness of "us," or the participants.

The conventional reason for giving more attention to the collective identity model is that internal fragmentations or conflicts in social movements would lead to the death of movements. In other words, internal fractions in a social movement are expected to be reasons for the decline of the movement. In that sense, the "collective interest" perspective of the political process paradigm is similar to the collective identity model that emphasizes the collectivity within movements, rather than fragmentation. Therefore, both perspectives study a social movement as a whole.

However, what I discuss in this research on the Armenian movement in Istanbul is not the continuance of the movement due to the collectivity or death of the movement due to fragmentations. Rather, I want to examine how this movement goes on by exploring the reasons for and outcomes of fragmentations, rather than collectivity. Therefore, I will observe external and internal dynamics in the movement—in which mainly different fragments or groups are visible, and each one

follows and supports different goals, strategies, and frames within the different relations, networks, and negotiations. In this regard, studies on diversity within social movements criticizing the collective identity paradigm are more productive in examining the fragmentation in the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s, which coincides with the period of the emergence of the movement.

In her critique of the collective identity perspective, Saunders argues that "there is confusion in the literature over whether "collective identity" is a term best applied to the movement organization (or group) level, or to movements as a whole."[48] Unlike the perspective, especially of new social movements, which considers collective identity to be a result of a movement-level process, Saunders asserts that, as in the three organizations of environmental movements that she examines, it is better to apply it to a group level because different groups in the movement could have different identities, i.e. strategies, framings and goals. She posits that although Melucci argues that collective identity could appear among several individuals, Melucci and others treat collective identity as the identity of a whole movement.[49] Furthermore, by examining solidarity as a factor proposed to bring the movement's participants together, she argues that strong solidarity among some participants of the movement could cause fragmentation and differentiation of them from the rest. By providing some environmental movement organizations as an example, she asserts that although all environmental movement organizations have broader concerns about the protection of environment, these organizations have different collective identities. Therefore, instead of using the term, "collective

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[48] Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008): 228.
[49] Ibid., 230-231.

identity of a movement," she borrows the concept of Rootes, "shared concerns,"[50] or *collective identities*.[51] As Crowley[52] and Saunders argue, it is fair to say that a collective identity could not be valid for all participants of a movement.

It is obvious that this critique of collective identity does not see any problem with the collective identity perspective, but does find problems with the application of the perspective. However, there are some further critiques of the collective identity model. Despite the well-established contributions of the collective identity model to social movements, as the main argument of the book, *Identity Work in Social Movements,* "there are still some gaps in our understanding of identity and its role in social movements. More specifically, they (the contributors to the book) suggest that although identity is central to collective action, it is problematic at the same time. *That is, the identities that are relevant to social movements are not necessarily arrived at easily, nor is it always clear that the "we" in social movements always exists in direct opposition to some "they." Instead, identity process in social movements can be fraught with contradiction and controversy."[53]* The authors of the book stress the difficulty of creation of the borders between "us" and "them" and its fluid and uncertain character within social movements. They warn that "the line between "us" and "them" is not as clear as most scholarship would suggest." [54] Therefore, the contributors to this book present the conflicts, fractions, and fragmentations in especially women, and gay and lesbian movements which I reference in the following pages.

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[50] Cristopher A.. Rootes, Environmental Movements and Green Parties in Western and Eastern Europe, in *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology,* ed. M. Redclift and G. Woodgate (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1997).
[51] Ibid., 232.
[52] Jocelyn Elise Crowley, "On the Cusp of a Movement: Identity Work and Social Movement Identification Processes Within Fathers' Rights Groups," *Sociological Spectrum* 28, no. 6 (2008).
[53] Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner, ed. *Identity Work in Social Movements*, (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 2 (my italics).
[54] Ibid., 5.

In addition to those critiques, examinations of social movements from the perspective of queer activism and theory criticize the requirement of the collective identity notion in gay and lesbian movements. For instance, Gamson argues that gay and lesbian social movements create quasi-ethnicity that connects the movement participants to each other. The main reason behind the creation of the ethnicity notion is to have shared minority status that is assumed to provide a collectivity in social movements and to guarantee the success of the movement.[55] The movement participants think that a collective identity that is nourished by a quasi-ethnic based notion, i.e. not ethnic but configured something similar in an ethnic sense, would be an initiative for continuity and success of the movement. This notion is also the main character in ethnic, racial and women's movements because these movements also require fixed identity categories for their continuity and success. Moreover, Gamson criticizes the attitude of the new social movement literature by exemplifying Melucci's argument that collective identity is not only a huge contribution to the success of movements but is also a goal itself.

In response to this attitude in activism and literature, queer theories and activism emphasize that these fixed identity categories, in a way, are the symbols of the oppression of unstable identities and dilemmas in movements. Their main argument is based on "central difficulties of identity-based organizing: the instability of identities both individual and collective ..."[56] Therefore, the critique by queer activism and theoretical disputes, which frankly emphasize the possibility and deliberative creation of unstable and diverse identities in social movements, rather than a clear and easy description of one single collective identity, would be productive for the studies on diversity in social movements. The disputes concerning

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[55] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," 391.
[56] Ibid.

queerness would shed light on the assumptions of the construction and negotiation of collective identities because queer theory argues that the attitude in social movements' literature and activism fails to interpret "*the drive to blur and deconstruct* group categories, and to keep them forever *unstable.*"[57]

Joshua Gamson argues that "[w]hile recent social movement theory has paid attention to the creation and negotiation of collective identity, it has not paid sufficient attention to the simultaneous impulse to destabilize identities from within."[58] These critiques are significant because they draw attention to the necessity of consideration of the unstable dynamics in social movements: fragmentations, fractions, conflicts, unstable identities, different rhetoric, meaning, goals, strategies and frameworks in a social movement. Indeed, as Jo Reger, who examines a variety of movement identities in the U.S. women's movement, argues that "[t]he diversity of movement identities is a relatively new and growing area of concern in the social movement literature."[59] In more detail, studies on diversity within social movements recently appear in queer theory and activism,[60] in the studies of women's movements,[61] gay and lesbian movements,[62] and environmental movements.[63] In

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[57] Ibid., 393. (my italics).

[58] Ibid., 390.

[59] Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 102.

[60] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995).

[61] Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008); Jo Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Nancy Whittier, "Political Generations, Micro-Cohorts, and the Transformation of Social Movements," *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 5 (October 1, 1997); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002).

[62] Elizabeth Kaminski and Verta Taylor, ""We're Not Just Lip-synching Up Here": Music and Collective Identity in Drag Performances," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008); Mary Bernstein, "The Contradictions of Gay Ethnicity: Forging Identity in Vermont," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University

addition to those movements, it is possible to encounter some studies on diversity and conflict in political party oppositions, labor movements, and nuclear disarmament movements, and so on.[64] Therefore, benefiting from these studies would provide an answer to my question, "How does the Armenian movement continue?" by exploring the reasons for and outcomes of the fragmentation between the "introversive" and "extroversive" groups which are in relation to the internal and external dynamics together. Now I will examine some studies on diversity in social movements in order to understand the reasons for fragmentations. Throughout exploring the reasons for fragmentation in the Armenian movement, I will engage with the issues of fragmentation, which mostly depend on the special character of the movement—which I will explain in more detail in the fourth chapter.

3. Fragmentation and Reasons for Fragmentation

Analysis of my research reveals that the fragmentation in the Armenian movement since the mid-1995 relies on three conceptual explanations/reasons of the actors: different ideological stances among the actors, the current developments including opportunities and constraints, and reading history differently by the actors. These explanations show that the reasons are not merely internal as the new social movements model argues or only external as political process theories explain, but an

Press, USA, 2002.); Mary Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3 (November 1, 1997).

[63]Cristopher A.. Rootes, "Environmental Movements and Green Parties in Western and Eastern Europe," in *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology,* ed. M. Redclift and G. Woodgate, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1997); Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008).

[64] Midred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette, "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Robert D. Benford, "Frame Disputes Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (March 1, 1993).

integration of these two. Since these conceptualizations revealed from my analysis of interviews as the most referencing points, I will focus my literature review on these three explanations. By this way, I will have the chance to become familiar with different strategies, goals and frameworks which are special to the social movement itself as I will explore in the fourth chapter for the Armenian movement.

3.1. Ideological Differences

As Mildred A. Schwartz—who studies political party movements—states, ideological differences have a great effect on fragmentation in social movements. She claims that "ideology spells out beliefs about how to understand the political world by attributing blame and offering a blueprint for action. It links a party movement's identity—what it stands for—with the frames adopted by individuals to make sense of their environment."[65] Therefore, differentiation in the sense of ideology among the actors of social movements could bring along fragmentations on some issues, to which the movement participants pay attention through different strategies, goals and frameworks. Hence, ideological cleavages among the variants of socialism, between liberal and socialist/Marxists, leftists and rightists will eventually become visible.

Jo Reger points out that existence of fragmentation due to ideological differences becomes a critique of collective identity models that "have turned our attention from ideology and organizational characteristics to culture and the types of communities and identities constructed within movement contexts."[66] Therefore, she argues that the recent studies on multiple activist identities within social movements

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[65] Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," 160.
[66] Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," 710.

propose that ideological differences are one of the main sources of fragmentation within social movements.[67]

From this point of view, Reger examines the New York City chapter of the National Organization for Women (NYC NOW) which "is the largest feminist organization in the United States."[68] She argues that NYC NOW, which has participated in many local and national issues, "has experienced a number of clashes over *goals*, *strategy,* and *structures*… In 1968, a group criticized the organization's formal hierarchical structure and eventually split off, forming a women's liberation group called The Feminists… [L]eaders [of the group] agreed to the formation of a CR (Consciousness Raising) committee."[69] The Consciousness Raising committee, which was established in 1972, is one of the oldest committees of the chapter and has been one of the most active committees. Moreover, the CR committee represents groups which reclaim a more decentralized and non-hierarchical structure. Therefore, this emphasis of the CR committee on the decentralized structure was the starting point of the fractures in NOW. As Reger says, "[as] CR committee became established, members began to distinguish between CR feminists and feminists in the rest of the chapter. One CR committee member characterized the relationship with the rest of the chapter as an "us versus them" situation."[70] Reger argues that the division among the movement participants relies on the ideological differences. Therefore, she argues that "organizations that experience ideological differences are subject to factionalism." Moreover, as Reger examines, in NYC NOW, as a result of this fragmentation between these two groups, CR feminists and the rest, whom she

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[67] Ibid.
[68] Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," 173.
[69] Ibid., 174.
[70] Ibid., 175.

calls political feminists, creates a construction of two different feminist identities: *political feminism* and *empowerment feminism.*

Furthermore, the similar effect of ideological differences, maybe more influential, is encountered in the women's movement in Turkey among Kemalist, Islamist, and Kurdish women's movements. As Diner and Toktaş state, the ideological challenge of Kurdish, Islamist and gay-lesbian-bisexual-transsexual movements that appeared in the 1990s in Turkey clearly brought along a fragmentation among women movement members: Kemalist, Islamist, Kurdish women and participants of gay-lesbian-bisexual-transsexual movements, although they all abstractly believe in the freedom of women.[71] As a result of the fragmentation, they all also have different definitions of feminism.

Additionally, Garry T. Marx and Michael Useem, who examine the dominant and minority groups in civil rights movements, argue that the ideological cleavages emerged among the minority and dominant groups of the movement. In this study of the civil rights movement in the U.S. in the 1960s, they looked at the attitude of the blacks (insiders) against the whites (outsiders) who voluntarily wanted to support the claims of blacks. They argue that because of ideological differences, the insiders considered themselves "more radical and committed than the outsiders, more eager to create changes immediately than gradually," and this created conflicts and fragmentations.[72] The researchers exemplified the reaction of Negroes against whites who came to the movement with a liberal perspective. Therefore, their study also shows that on the issue of the relation with the state, the different ideologies of the participants could cause fragmentation.

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[71] Cagla Diner, and Şule Toktaş, "Waves of Feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish Women's Movements in an Era of Globalization," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 1 (2010): 42.

[72] Gary T. Marx and Michael Useem, "Majority Involvement in Minority Movements: Civil Rights, Abolition, Untouchability," *Journal of Social Issues* 27, no. 1, (1971):81-104

Although ideology has been ignored by the new social movements and slightly by political process theories, it is a significant factor behind fragmentation or conflicts in social movements. I explored the fragmentation between the "leftist/liberal" people—the participants used this word for the people from "the extroversive group,"—and "the conservative people"— the participants used this word for the people from the introversive group—in the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s. Therefore, as revealed in the interviews, the clash between "the leftist/liberal" and "the conservative" groups is meaningful to understand the reason for the fragmentation as indicated in the fourth chapter.

3.2. Current Developments: Opportunities and Constraints

From the point of view of the political process model, the current opportunities and constraints could bring along new developments for movements. Although the political process model only considers those developments that would be the fall or rise of movements as a whole, some studies on diversity express it as a source of fragmentation in movements.[73]

For instance, Bernstein, who compares four different lesbian and gay rights campaigns in Vermont, New York City, Oregon, and Colorado, offers a model which is called "strategically identity deployment" which generally is shaped within the present opportunities and constraints. Although she ignores the cultural/historical patterns in social movements, she challenges the new social movement theory's argument that identity movements seek to be recognized culturally, identically, or

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[73] Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

ethnically; in other words, that movements are essentialist. [74] Instead, in light of queer theory and activism, and the political process theory, she argues that "pursuing a politics of recognition does not necessarily result from, or rely on, essentialism, nor do identity politics necessarily reinforce the identity on which the movement is based."[75] Moreover, similar to Joshua Gamson, she asserts that if identity is a strategy, an "activist may either seek recognition for a new identity or work to *deconstruct identity categories* such as "gay/straight," or "man/women""[76] by totally ignoring the culture, and instead taking the activists' interpretation of the current situation.

This model asks the question, "Under what conditions are identities that celebrate or suppress differences deployed strategically?" As one source of celebration or suppression of differences, in a general sense, she puts forward the configuration of political access, i.e. concrete interaction with the state. In reference to the political process theory, "greater access [to the polity] would produce more moderate forms of collective action and identity for education strategies, while closing opportunities will lead to an emphasis on identity for critiques."[77] For the operationalization of political access, Bernstein argues that "a movement has *access* to the polity if candidates respond to movement inquires, if elected officials or state agencies support and work toward the movement's goal, or if movement leaders have access to polity members…"[78] Therefore, if a movement or a fraction/group, like in Vermont or New York City, has close relations with state actors, the movement different from the rest (Vermont, for example) would not choose an aggressive way

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[74] Mary Bernstein, "The Contradiction of Gay Ethnicity: Forging identity in Vermont," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.), 86.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 87. (my italics.)
[77] Mary Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement,." *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3 (November 1, 1997): 541.
[78] Ibid., 539.

of campaigning. The group would pursue, differently from the rest, a moderate policy and aim to solve the problem or their grievances with polity-oriented strategies.[79] However, if a group does not have easy access to a polity like in New York City, unlike the former case, the group would pursue a strategy far from the polity or political actors. From this perspective, the relations with the state become a significant issue on which the groups have fragmentation due to different extents of the political access by different actors in a movement.

Along with the extent of political access as a source of fragmentation, there can be many other different developments that could cause fragmentation, as in the case of Cleveland NOW. Roger argues that political developments, increasing rates of membership, and activism compel Cleveland NOW to construct small autonomous sub-urban chapter groups. However, although these chapters were aimed to increase the activism through one chapter, it caused fragmentation in Cleveland NOW.[80] Therefore, Roger argues that organizational growth fragmented Cleveland's single chapter into multiple feminist identities and chapters, because of the social, economic and cultural differences of the neighborhoods of the sub-urban chapter groups.[81]

Moreover, in addition to the different developments which are special to the case, the interpretation of the current developments by the actors of the movement also produces fragmentation. For instance, the effects of the developments in the Kurdish movement in Turkey are reinterpreted differently by the actors. Unlike the assumptions which "reduce the evolution of the Kurdish national movement to a reaction to ethnic Turkish nationalism and violent and discriminatory state

[79] Ibid., 541.
[80] Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002): 717-718.
[81] Ibid.

policies,"[82] Güneş Murat Tezcür emphasizes the diverse ways and strategies of the goals resorted to by the Kurdish national movement, namely different actors. More specifically, whereas "many ethnic Kurds have achieved positions of influence and power within bureaucracy and are integrated into Turkish society,"[83] some have resorted to an armed struggle to continue the struggle against the violent and discriminatory state policies mostly in the Eastern part of Turkey. In the sense of differentiation of strategies regarding the movement among the movement actors, Tezcür argues that, by paraphrasing from Martin Van Bruinessen, "The role of violence in the Kurdish question is overstated and observes that many Kurdish elites are willing to be co-opted into the political system and to downplay their Kurdish identity."[84] Therefore, besides the dialectical, ethical differences of Kurds in Turkey, as a reaction to or interpretation of the change in the political environment, a diversification in the policies pursued by different groups has emerged. Moreover, in addition to the interpretation of the developments, he argues that "in Turkey, elections have helped to co-opt local Kurdish elites, to expand legal space for contentious Kurdish activism, and to shape the nature of competition among Kurdish political actors."[85] Therefore, as a way of political access, electoral opportunities from which the Kurdish nationalists have benefited since the early 1990s have brought competition among the Kurdish nationalists.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the competition within the Kurdish movement, along with the current developments and their interpretations, ideological differences are effective as well. As Tezcür states, the Kurdish movement is "not a

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[82] Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: Conceptual Reinterpretation," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 10 (2009), 3.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., 8.

unified group but were divided along religious and political lines."[86] He argues that since the 1960s, there have been two competing tendencies in the movement. He explains the leftist and Islamist engagement that the different groups in the movement historically have experienced and he proposes that these ideological differences are a source of division or competition among the Kurdish nationalists.[87] Therefore, this case shows that different sources of fragmentation could be effective together sometimes; thus, considering them separately would cause a misunderstanding of movements.

Current developments including opportunities and constraints and their interpretation by actors of a movement have become one of the significant sources of fragmentation. In the Armenian movement, it is possible to see the effect of the developments in the same way since the mid- 1990s.

3.3. Reading History Differently

In my study, reading the history of Armenians by different actors became one of the more referenced sources of the fragmentation between the two groups (the "introversive" and "extroversive" groups), although there are not many references to it in the social movement literature. Although some studies examine the historical trajectories of movements or the movements' activists, they do not consider the perception of the actors of movements about their history; they focus on their perception about the present or possible future.

However, in addition to the effects of the present and future conditions, Colin Baker and Michael Lavalette explore the Liverpool Dock strike in the 1990s by considering the internal contested groups, and "[h]ow we define ourselves and others

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[86] Ibid., 9.
[87] Ibid., 9-10.

in contentious interaction is *not just a matter of constructing the present and future but also the past.* What seems desirable and possible depends on what we think we and they are and what we and they have been."[88] They argue that in order to "explore what the Liverpool dockers decided to do, we need to know … particularly the sense they made of these [past] experiences."[89] Therefore the fractions might also be a result of a group's reading of historical-based conditions of the movements, movements' actors. For instance, in the Armenian movement, the history of the Armenians in Turkey becomes significant. The Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey has been considered the *defacto* leader of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey by the state and by the "introversive" group over years. The introversive group— people who are close to the religious institutions, especially the Patriarchate labeled as such by the participants—demand a *dejure* personality to the Patriarchate in accordance with the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate; they believe that it is the most valid reference for the Patriarchate to be the head of the Armenian community. However, today and in the past, the extroversive group gathered around the newly established platforms since the mid-1990s and argue that the 1863 Regulations of the Armenian Patriarchate ratified by the Ottoman Empire—even they called it first a constitution of Armenians—changed the course of history. Moreover, they argue that the Patriarchate's authority is restricted by the 1863 Regulations in which intellectuals and craftsman have played significant roles, and the Patriarchate was *symbolically* recognized as a head of the Armenian society. This different reading of the 1863 Regulation today is one of the reasons for fragmentation on the issue, the current condition of patriarchal authority, especially the necessity of civil institutions, between "extroversive" and "introversive" groups.

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[88] Barker and Lavalette, "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995," 143.
[89] Ibid., 143-144.

Because *reading history differently by the actors,* as a source of the fragmentation is not taken into consideration so much in the literature, one of the contributions of this study to the literature is to present a different reading of history by the actors of movements that have caused the fragmentation in the Armenian movement.

Now I will discuss the applicability of those theories through briefly examining the identity-based social movements in Turkey after the 1980s.

4.   A Brief History of Social Movements in Turkey after the 1980s.

The post-1980s period was a new page for Turkey that was felt in culture, economy, politics, and especially society. From the point of view of new social movement theories, Nülifer Göle claims that due to the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the leftist movements of the 1970s received a nasty blow; thus, today, the leftist movements have been replaced by the new social movements that have come forward with the claim of recognition of a specific issue—or through a collective identity—out of various topics such as environment, gender, ethnicity, religion rather than economic redistribution.[90]However, from my perspective reflecting on the Armenian movements, and as I explore the other identity based movements after the 1980s, especially in 1990s in Turkey, the identity based social movements are not utterly disengaged from the previous state. Moreover, they do not appear with a complete collective identity; due to internal dynamics, they could have fragmentations, as among Armenians. Therefore, the perspective of new social movements theories would not be contributive.

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[90] Nilüfer Göle, "80 Sonrası Politik Kültür: Yükselen Değerler," *Melez Desenler, İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine,* (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000).

Since the 1980s, Turkey has witnessed five more visible identity based social movements in addition to the Armenian movement: Kurdish, Islamic, Alewi, Feminist and gay-lesbian movements. Unlike the argument of new social movements and collective identity theories, those movements, especially Kurdish, Alewi and Feminist movements in Turkey, have a history with the leftist movement. For instance, as Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker argue that evidently "the re-politicization of Alevilik in the 1990s is qualitatively different from the pre-1980 politicization of Alevis as part of a Socialist movement."[91] They claim, however, that "this should not lead us to think that class issues in contemporary Alevi politics are no more valid […] Thus contemporary re-politicization of Alevilik may also be read as a reconstructive, *modern and urban response to deepening class inequalities.*"[92] Additionally, this continuance is visible in the Kurdish[93] and feminist[94] movements directly and in the gay-lesbian and Islamic movements indirectly in Turkey. Therefore, since Reger argues that new social movements return from the effect of ideology to identity in social movements, the perspective of Nilüfer Göle and others[95] are not productive because they ignore ideological reasons, and get stuck in the collective identity perspective.

Therefore, from the point of view of the political process theories, the argument that the changing opportunities and constraints in the 1980s and 1990s created a new atmosphere that alerted the potential grievances to become apparent is a more convenient explanation—to represent that there is a continuation of the

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[91] Tahire Erman, and Emrah Göker, "Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 4. (October 2000): 100.
[92] Ibid., 101.
[93] Hamit Bozarslan, "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000)," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce,* Cilt 4/Milliyetçilik, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).
[94] Şirin Tekeli, "The Turkish Women's Movement. A Brief History of Success," *Quaderns de la Mediterania,* (2010)
[95] Sefa Şimşek, "New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980," *Turkish Studies* 5, no:2 (Summer 2004.): 111-139.

situation now in Turkey—than the argument emphasizing the recently rising factor of the collective identity as new social movements theories and collective identity paradigms have done. The ethnic, sexual and religious identities had not been politicized before the 1980s; however, together with the 1980 *coup d'état* that aimed to abolish the political polarization between the leftists and rightists in Turkey, those identities have become visible. Moreover, the state has experienced a structural transformation; that is, rapid urbanization, the introduction of liberal economy and institutions, civil society organizations, engagement with transnational extensions of these movements, and the discussions on the process of accession of Turkey to the European Union. Among these developments of these movements, the Kurdish movement, which has a long history associated with the leftist and nationalist movements, started an armed struggle in 1984 until 1999; this started a new discussion on democratization and demilitarization in Turkey.[96] Moreover, the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed a conflict about modernization between Islamists and Kemalist sides, which means that a significant criticism of the Kemalist ideology has dominated the Republican history.[97]Therefore, the opportunities and constraints beginning in the 1980s have created some room for more visibility of potential grievances in Turkey.

Ayşe Ayata points out that "the politics of identity is announced to the international arena through the Kurdish rebellion and Islamic "fundamentalism."[98] However, this is not merely in the international arena, but also in the internal sphere. For instance, the relative decline of the leftist movements, the rise of the Sunni political Islam and the Kurdish movements, the re-politicization of the Alewi identity

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[96] Bozarslan, "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000)," 861.
[97] Haldun Gülalp, "Islamın Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak Kullanımı," in *Kimlikler Siyaseti, Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri,* (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2002), 35-39.
[98] Ayşe Ayata, "Türkiye'de Kimlik Politikalarının Doğuşu," in *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaşa Doğru,* ed. Artun Ünsal (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 160.

have accelerated. Moreover, the Feminist movement, in the 1990s, had a new phase by engaging with the Kurdish and Islamist women, in addition to the Kemalist ones. Furthermore, the gay and lesbian movement did find a place for itself by collaborating and conflicting with those movements in these external and internal developments. Therefore, the 1980s and on has been a period of change for the political opportunities and constraints that provided places from which some groups, including Armenians, intended to benefit.

Nevertheless, given the fact that movements benefit from the current opportunities that resulted in the internal fragmentations like in the Armenian movements, the political process theories' perspective overlooked the internal dynamics of the identity based movements; rather, they focused on the external factors of movements. Moreover, the political process theorists think that all these external factors influence the participants of movements as a whole, not differently or partially, through the perspective of collective interests and collective action. Therefore, besides only focusing on external factors, like the new social movements model, the political process perspective implicitly considers social movements through a collective identity as a whole. Furthermore, although the new social movement theorists focus on the internal dynamics of movements, they do not think about the internal instabilities. Therefore, both the political process and the new social movement perspectives consider a collective identity as a source of a social movement—the former considers *implicitly*, the later *explicitly*—that keeps on throughout the movement. However, these approaches explain the movement partially because all movements do not move on with their own one collective identity that is assumed to present a complete strategy, goal and meaning of movements. For instance, as in the Feminist movements after the 1990s in Turkey,

"there emerged cleavages […] with the challenge of the Islamist, Kurdish nationalist and the gay-lesbian –bisexual-transexual (GLBT) movements, each of which had diverse worldviews with respect to the causal roots of and solution to women's problems."[99] Those cleavages have been encountered in the Kurdish movement, the Islamic movement in Turkey, as well as in other movements.

Consequently, the collective identity paradigm of new social movement theories stresses the collectivity perspective to understand sources of the emergence of social movements. This paradigm does not regard the internal instabilities, e.g. fragmentations, within social movements. Moreover, from the perspective of the political process theory, the 1990s was a significant period for raising the voices of Armenians in Turkey thanks to the external developments; that is, the opportunities and restrictions of this perspective, in the same way, do not consider the internal dynamics and instabilities, especially the fragmentations in the Armenian movements that appeared after 1995 up until the present. Therefore, these perspectives fail to avoid being imprisoned in the collectivity paradigm. Yet, my research is based on the argument that it is not meaningful to talk about a single complete Armenian movement; rather, we should examine this movement together with its different actors and their different strategies, goals and frameworks, i.e. its fragmentation among its actors. However, just viewing a movement through the perspectives of new social movements and political process theories would draw us to ignore the differences, because those theories think that movements' participants come together around one complete collective identity or action. Therefore, this research presents the Armenian movement by referencing the studies on the diversity in social

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[99] Diner, and Toktaş, "Waves of Feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish Women's Movements in an Era of Globalization," 42.

movements that *explicitly* criticize the collective identity paradigm and *implicitly* the political process theories' treatment of a social movement as a whole. By this way, I examine the internal dynamics and differences and external dynamics in order to show that the collective identity perspective and the political process theory do not work here. As a result of referencing these studies, I argue that the reasons behind the fragmentation of the Armenian movement are ideological differences, current developments (opportunities and constraints), and a different reading of history by the actors.

CHAPTER III

ARMENIANS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

This chapter consists of mainly three sections: Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (the 19th and 20th centuries), Armenians in the republican period (1923-1995), and Armenians in the post-1995 period. In this chapter, I will firstly aim to give a historical background of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. It will be helpful to comprehend the historical references that are given in the excerpts of the participants in the fourth chapter. Secondly, I will also examine internal dynamics, fragmentations, and different actors among Armenians in the history, especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries of the Ottoman Empire, and in the post-1995 republican period. In that sense, it will show that studying the Armenian movement since 1995 from the point of view of studies on diversity within social movements is the appropriate way. Thirdly, I will also review the suppressive and discriminative politics of the Republic of Turkey on Armenians between 1923 and 1995. In this period, unlike the 19th and early 20th centuries of the Ottoman Empire, and in the post-1995 republican period, I argue that these suppressive politics homogenized the differences among Armenians. Moreover, this section will help to represent the change of the period after the mid-1990s in the sense of considering the external and internal developments that both brought along raising the voice of Armenians in Turkey and the fragmentation among Armenians.

Therefore, after examining Armenians in the 19th and the early 20th centuries of the Ottoman Empire, I will look at the period between 1923 and 1995 under two separate titles: 1923-1945 and 1945-1995. Finally, in the last section, I will examine the period from the mid-1990s to the present which coincides with the rise and continuance of the Armenian movement.

1.   Armenians in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries of the Ottoman Empire

This section will show that Armenians in the Ottoman Empire did not comprise one complete identity. Because of some Armenians' discomfort with the internal order—the Patriarchal authority in the Armenian society, the increasing authority of *amiras,* and the racist implementations of the state and other people—there emerged different Armenians who came forward with different claims besides the Patriarch. Therefore, in this section, I will examine the internal fragmentations and conflicts in the Armenian society in the 19th and early 20th centuries of the Ottoman Empire.

1.1.   Armenians in the *Millet* System

The population of the Ottoman Empire was composed of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. These communities, i.e. *millets,* in the Ottoman Empire lived within compartments. The delineation of the boundaries among these compartments was based on religion and religious sects rather than ethnicity,[100] especially after the process of Islamization in the Ottoman policy from the 16th to the 17th century.[101] Non-Muslim communities, called *zimmi*s, had relations with the state under the *millet* system based on the understanding of *ümmet* in Islamic Law. In the *millet* system, the Ottoman Empire, during its settlement process in the conquered lands, authorized the religious heads (patriarch or chief rabbi) of three non-Muslim communities—Greeks, Armenians and Jews—as the head of their *millet*s (ethnarch) to maintain internal order in their communities. Therefore, besides their religious authority, three different non-Muslim communities' ethnarchs, as representatives of their *millet*s in their relations with the state, had some authority in private law, i.e. civil authority. More specifically, in addition to their spiritual authority, these ethnarchs had civil

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[100] Ilber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet," in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstabul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 996-997.

[101] Arus Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1992), 60.

authority, such as to collect tax for the cost of the governing the community, to maintain their schools, hospitals, courts, orphanages in their own languages, and thereby to follow their traditions and ethnic identity.[102] Therefore, as Arus Yumul argues, "although religion had been the yardstick for social differentiation, those minorities retained their ethnic identity and language, too. There was, in fact, a fusion of religion with ethnicity."[103]

Nevertheless, the *zimmni*s were treated differently from Muslims in their daily lives and their relations with the state; they were exposed to some constraints on their apparels, dwellings, their place of worships, and testimonies in courts by the state. More precisely, non-Muslim male adults were exempted from military service to which only Muslims were conscripted; rather, they were paying a per capita tax, *cizye*.[104] In addition to *cizye,* non-Muslims had to pay *harac,* a tax levied on their properties and productions. On condition that non-Muslims obeyed these constraints and that the ethnarcs cooperated with the Ottoman rule, the *millet*s in the Ottoman Empire were promised the abovementioned autonomy. However, this does not mean that they were totally excluded from the social, political and administrative life. Since the late 18th century, for some specialization-required jobs, non-Muslims were recruited. Therefore, it was possible that non-Muslims, dominated in the economic, financial and industrial life; they were serving a main role in the trade relation of the state with the West. [105]

Armenians were also the subjects of the *millet* system. Subsequent to his conquest of Istanbul, Fatih Sultan Mehmet established the Istanbul Armenian

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[102] Stanford Shaw, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Azınlıklar Sorunu," in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstabul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1003.
[103] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians,"24.
[104] Shaw, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Azınlıklar Sorunu," 1003.
[105] Günay Göksu Özdağan, Füsun Üstel, Karin Karakaşlı, and Ferhat Kentel, *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş* (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 115.

Patriarchate in 1461 with his command to transfer the religious leader (*marhasa*) of Armenians in Bursa, Episkopos Hovagim, to Istanbul. Sultan Mehmet authorized him as the religious leader of all Armenians in the Empire. Therefore, the Patriarchate was given the same authority as the Rum Orthodox Patriarch's. Only after 1543, the person at the position of patriarch was called "patriarch"; until then, various titles were given, e.g., *marhasa*.[106] Besides the spiritual authority, as a subject of the *millet* system, the Istanbul Armenian Patriarch was also given the civic leadership of Armenians in the civil affairs, such as preservation of cultural life and institutions, especially in the 18th and 19th century.[107] Therefore, as I mention above, in the *millet* system, Armenians, too, appeared as a kind of ethno-religious community. The Christian identity has become a significant component in the ethnic identity, i.e. being Armenian. This is also a valid observation pertaining to Armenians today.

The Patriarch was the religious and civic leader of all Armenians in the Empire. However, Armenians did not consist of one single religious sect. There were, and still are, three different religious communities among Armenians: Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant. The Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate became the leader of Apostolic Armenians. As Günay Göksu Özdoğan and et al. indicate, as a result of the spread of the Catholic identity which started in the 14th century, and of the Protestant identity which started in the 19th century among Armenians, Armenian Catholics and Protestants communities, by being recognized as separate communities by the Empire, had their own churches after 1830 and 1850, respectively.[108] This means that each of the communities had an autonomous character; thus, the authority

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[106] Vağarşag Seropyan, "Ermeni Patrikliği," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansklopedisi,* vol.3 (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 188.

[107] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 53.

[108] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 55-58.

of the Patriarchate decreased relatively. Therefore, the Patriarchate complained of the Protestant and Catholic missionary activities. In addition to this, Apostolic and Catholic differentiation within society has been noticeable in the 18th and 19th centuries.[109] Nevertheless, as Arus Yumul emphasizes the fusion of ethnicity and religion, the Apostolic Armenian Patriarchate has been accepted as the national church of the Armenians, and the Apostolic sect as the national religion. Therefore, the Apostolic Armenian Patriarchate is still the representative of the Armenian community with the churches of Armenian Catholics and Protestants, although the members of the other two sects do not accept it totally.[110]

Regarding the role of the Patriarchate, Vağarşag Seropyan says, "[t]he main doings of the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate was to be the center of Armenians in the west, (the mark of) the official recognition of Armenians in Turkey as a society, the center of religious affairs, and to have freedom in this regard, to transfer the contribution of Armenians for the development of the state, to make renaissance in cultural life, to create the common language and to make regulation in western Armenian language, to start the education movement and to set the network of schools, to establish and increase the number of the Armenian publishing houses, to increase the number of the libraries and bookstores, to make progress in journalism, the development of the Istanbul church music and to prepare and implement the *Nizamname* (the code of practice)[111]."[112] As it is palpable, the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate had been literally the civic and religious leader of Armenians; it was the representative of the community before the state, Bâb-ı Âli.

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[109] Kevork Pamukciyan, "Ermeniler," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansklopedisi,*vol.3 (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 192.
[110] Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Ohannes Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenians: Issues, Demands and Policy Recommendations,"* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012), 15.
[111] The 1860 Armenian National Constitution, as mentioned below, was named after *Nizamame* in 1863 by the Bâb-ı Âli, the sublime Porte, which means regulation.
[112] Seropyan, "Ermeni Patrikliği," 188.

1.2. Restriction of Patriarchal Authority by Different Actors

Since the 17th century, because of the general character of the Armenian Church that allows the participation of people in the church, the notables of the community have become powerful in elections of the patriarch and in all verdict of the patriarch. Especially in the 18th and 19th century, *amira*s—a wealthy urban aristocracy of bankers and government officials—gained power in the decision-making and financial issues and were in good relations with the Sublime Porte. Moreover, in the 19th century, the control of the Patriarchate was dominated by *amira*s.[113]

Furthermore, the 19th century witnessed "the birth of a new entrepreneurial-commercial class and the rise of a secular intelligentsia."[114] Most of the former consisted of non-Muslims. They had bridged the relations with the European traders. Therefore, there emerged an ethnic division of labor that meant that non-Muslims dominated the economy and Muslims dominated the government. Throughout growing relations with Europe via the new entrepreneurial commercial class, in the Ottoman Empire, national liberation movements appeared in the 19th century. Additionally, in this movement, the effect of the liberal intelligentsia, the latter educated in Europe, became significant.[115]

Considering these developments, the 18th and 19th century was a time of growth in cultural works and secularization. Therefore, this period was accepted as a "New Revival" (*Zartonk*) of Armenians by the historians. *Zartonk* actually was the enlightenment period of Armenians. Under the leadership of those secular and liberal Armenian intellectuals of the 18th and 19th century, who aimed to enlighten Armenians and embraced the notion of modernization, some critical developments were experienced such as the establishment of modern and secular schools;

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[113] Arus Yumul, "Osmanlı'nın İlk Anayasası," *Toplum ve Bilim* 83 (1999-2000) : 338-351.
[114] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 62.
[115] Ibid., 62- 63.

transforming from classic Armenian (*krapar*) to the daily Armenian language (*aşharapar*) which was used by ordinary people; translation of some written works that claim the leader should work for people not vice-versa; the usage of profane themes in literature rather than spiritual ones; the increase of press movement, and embracing some political ideas that question religious doctrines.[116] Among these developments, in the 1830s, the Armenian middle class merchants and artisans, and the Armenian liberal intellectuals who were educated in Europe and advocated democratic notions, stood against the power of *amira*s and the Patriarch in the community. They came with the goal of abolishing the religio-aristocratic rule and reclaimed the more democratic, constitutional and liberal rule which more allows larger participation of people.[117] After these developments, the patriarchate, which used to be the civic and religious leader of the community, started to suffer and could not stand out against those significant developments that came along with the "New Revival" of Armenians.

With the effect of the *Zartonk* period in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were very influential and could have relatively more opportunities to present their activities that displayed their identities publicly. The role of the Patriarchate surely should not be forgotten in the support of the cultural life of Armenians as Vağarşag Seropyan states above. They were acting on scenes as artists, actress, and dancers; publishing their own newspapers, leaflets and their books; translating books from various languages into Armenian or into Turkish with the Armenian alphabet. In the sense of performing arts, Armenians made a significant contribution in the development of the traditional Turkish theater and in the introduction of the

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[116] Arus Yumul and Rifat N. Bali, "Ermeni ve Yahudi Cemaatlerinde Siyasal Düşünceler," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi* (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 363; Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 70.

[117] Yumul, "Osmanlı'nın İlk Anayasası," 350.

European theater in the Ottoman territories. They presented their activities as open to all. Furthermore, they performed their church music and Anatolian Armenian music, and they also contributed to the development of the Turkish art music and the western music. In the sense of press, in the 1830s, together with the *Zartonk,* the numbers of newspaper or journals in Armenian or in Turkish with the Armenian alphabet reached over five hundred. Moreover, this period was accepted as the golden age of the western Armenian literature centered in Istanbul that lasted until 1915.[118] In short, it is obvious that both Armenian notables and ordinary people in the Ottoman Empire were acting and living in the society openly with their identity until the early 20th century.

Further developments which changed the course of the *millet* system were experienced in the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, France, England and Russia claimed to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire for the protection of non-Muslim communities.[119] As Gerard J. Libaridian asserts, Armenians in Russia started to deal with the physical situation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, due to relatively more discrimination against and restrictions on Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.[120] Moreover, as mentioned above, in this era, the new merchant class and liberal intellectuals started to get in touch with the liberal, democratic and nationalist ideologies. Along with those developments, and as Arus Yumul narrates from Kemal H. Karpat, because non-Muslims were exposed to some restrictions and were called *reaya*, which means "lower social and political ranking," since the 18th century, they had had sympathy for the European states.[121] Because of their sympathy for the European Powers and Russia, and of the first national liberation

[118] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 79-112.
[119] Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (Oneworld, 2003), 27-28.
[120] Gerard Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," in *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 14.
[121] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," 64-65.

movements such as the Greek uprising in 1829, the Ottoman Empire felt the danger of disintegration. Therefore, the Empire made a change of scene in the *millet* system. The modernization reforms that started in the era of Mahmud II and continued in the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 brought along the equal rights of Muslims and non-Muslims before the law, although the aim of equal treatment in admission to the civil and military school and public service, and the aim of abolishing of discrimination towards non-Muslims were not achieved. However, the Reform Edict of 1856 provided non-Muslims with work in the public services without discrimination based on ethnic identity and gave all *millet*s the ability to write their own regulation edict for their internal order. Furthermore, the 1869 Law of Citizenship declared that non-Muslim and Muslim together were the subject of the Ottoman Empire; this opened the way of representation of non-Muslims in the first parliament of the Ottoman Empire after the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 (*Kanun-I Esasi*) and in the parliament and political parties established during the constitutional period in 1908. Therefore, by starting from the Gülhane Rescript, some non-Muslims were given the right to work in central and local administration units.[122]

Those developments, mentioned above, in the 19th century resulted in establishments of more secular, liberal and democratic institutions of generally non-Muslims. Moreover, specifically, in the sense of democratic discussions, these developments took the conflict among Armenian groups a step further. The Reform Edict of 1876 especially became the hope for the middle class merchants and artisans and the liberal intelligentsia to restrict the authority of the Patriarchate and *amira*s. They become the initiator of writing the 1860 Armenian National Constitution (*Ermeni Milleti Anayasası*) and a revised version of it was ratified by the Sublime

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[122] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 65; Özdoğan, and et all., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 117.

Porte in 1863 which was named after the Regulation of the Armenian Nation (*Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyan*). As Arus Yumul indicates, "the 1860 version was more liberal and progressive; contained western ideas and constitutional concepts, which were omitted from the 1863 version."[123] According to the Regulation of the Armenian Nation, a General Assembly, which consisted of more laity than clergy men, would have been elected by Armenians. Moreover, this parliament would have assembled biennially to elect the Religious and Political Assemblies. These two conducted their authorities in accordance with the division of labor via sub-commissions under their control. Regarding the status of the patriarch, the patriarch would have been elected by the General Assembly out of the candidates offered by the Religious and Political Assemblies. Although the constitution/regulations restricted the power of the Patriarch by being dependent on the General Assembly, the Patriarch was still considered as the head of all institutions and the community.[124] The constitution/regulation was the victory of laity (namely bourgeoisie and bureaucracy) against the aristocracy and clergymen.

However, the text has not been perfectly implemented. First, because of internal disagreements, it was suspended between 1866 and 1869. Then, although until 1891 it was relatively implemented without problem, due to the demands of Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia, the tension with the state increased and the Porte abolished the regulation from 1891 to 1908.[125]

1.3. Different Actors on the Stage for the Grievances of Armenians in Anatolia

Besides the Patriarchate and democratic institutions, there emerged some different actors to help claim the rights of Armenians. Concomitant with these developments

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[123] Yumul, "Osmanlı'nın İlk Anayasası," 351.
[124] Yumul, "Osmanlı'nın İlk Anayasası."
[125] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 130.

previously mentioned was the strong demand of the Anatolian Armenians regarding the dangerous conditions of their physical survival. In order to prevent the nationalist movements among Armenians, and to solve local problems of Armenians with Kurds in Anatolia, the Empire resorted to the use of force. The Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia encountered the threat to their lives and properties and the rape of Armenian women by the state officials and local ruffians. Despite their complaint petitions to the Porte, the conditions were not being improved. Therefore, as Libaridian indicates, in the 1880s and 1890s, Armenians understood that the constitutional movement and Armenian liberalism would have not been a solution; these efforts failed.[126] Some of them preferred and had sympathy for the radical struggle that was supported by the revolutionary parties.

Rather than liberalism, socialist and nationalist ideas became dominant among Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. Unlike the Istanbul-centered liberal groups, radical socialist and nationalist ideas dominated intellectuals of the rural areas, especially in Eastern Anatolia. However, before populist-nationalist and revolutionary organizations, the first uprising of Armenians occurred in Zeytun in 1862 and in Erzurum and Van in 1863 against Ottoman rule. The main reasons behind the uprisings were the poor economic conditions, injustice in the collecting taxes, and the oppression and plunder by the Kurdish tribes. Following those uprisings, some associations were established. Due to the omission of the reforms promised in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 by Ottoman rule, the radical nationalist and revolutionary movements accelerated.[127]

In this era, three radical political parties emerged: Armenekan Party established in Van in 1885; The Socialist Democratic Hunchakian Party, SDHP in

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[126] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 15.
[127] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 130-136.

Geneva in 1887; and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF, (*Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaksutiune*) in Tiflis in 1890. These parties "forced the Ottoman state and the signatory powers of the Treaty of Berlin to live up to their responsibilities."[128] The last two were influential among Armenians but had different programs. The SDHP endeavored to create a class consciousness and to fuse nationalism and socialism. However, the ARF focused more on the national unity than the class struggle, and also demanded for Armenians and all *millet*s the implementation of the reforms promised, equality before law, the property reforms and an assurance for life safety. The SDHP was more radical than the ARF and differently desired to reclaim an independent Armenian state whereas the ARF desired free Armenians under the Ottoman rule.[129] The SDHP had already started to organize in Istanbul and the various Anatolian regions, and to protest against the Sultan Abdulhamid's despotic rule in 1890. Moreover, in the mid-1890s, the SDHP led some uprisings of Armenians in Sason against Kurds, as well as in Zeytun. Although the party hoped that these uprising would draw the attention of the Western Powers to compel the Ottoman rule to make reforms and to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman rule, those powers did not support them. Thus the party discontinued these kinds of activities. Moreover, the ARF bombed the Ottoman Bank in 1896 in order to get the attention of the Western powers and they demanded some regulations for Armenians as well. Then, with the mediation of Russia, the demonstration was ended. However, later, so many Armenians were killed and the state officials were charged with the connivance in the pogrom.[130]

During these developments, Armenians were considered to be a threat to Abdulhamid's rule. Because of the Armenians' sympathy to the Western powers, and

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[128] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 16.
[129] Yumul and Bali, "Ermeni ve Yahudi Cemaatlerinde Siyasal Düşünceler," 364-365.
[130] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 137-140.

the separatist revolutionary parties, the regime doubted Armenians' demands for living together under the Ottoman rule; rather, they thought that Armenians could bring Turkey to the verge of internal and external disintegration. Therefore, for the "solution" of the Armenian issue, Abdulhamid resorted to the way of violence. Even in their schools and cultural activities, Armenians were oppressed and humiliated with the notion of Pan-Islamism of Abdulhamid II.[131] In 1891, *Hamidiye Alayları* which consisted of Kurdish bandits were deployed to suppress the uprisings and to take the Kurdish tribes under the state's control. With the establishment of *Hamidiye Alayları,* massacres became systematized. In light of this information, as Taner Akçam indicates, Armenian massacres have a long history and go back to the 1890s. Akçam also argues that the large scale massacres occurred between 1894 and 1896. Moreover, besides the state officers, these years witnessed the pogroms that targeted Armenians artisans and neighborhoods by the local and ordinary people. These incidents were the result of the indoctrination of the notion that Armenians were the extension of the Western states and they wanted to build a separate state with the last territory of the Ottoman Empire.[132]

Armenians were not the only ones discontent with the rule of Abdulhamid II. The Young Turks by building the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terrakki* Cemiyeti, CUP) in 1889 conducted their opposition to the regime with the idea of Turkism because of the failure of Ottomanism and Islamism.[133]. Due to the fact that the Young Turks did not frankly support Turkism until the declaration of the Second Constitution (*II. Meşrutiyet*) in 1908, the Christian minorities were acting to overthrow the Sultan in collaboration with the Young Turks.[134] The SDHP

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[131] Taner Akcam, *Türk Ulusal Kimligi Ve Ermeni Sorunu* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yaynları, 1994), 97-99.
[132] Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimligi Ve Ermeni Sorunu,* 98.
[133] Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (I. B. Tauris, 2004), 85-86.
[134] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," 66.

disbanded; however, the ARF advocated a democratic federalism "as the system most suitable and desirable for the complex needs of Ottoman society"[135] by engaging close relations with the CUP. Over the course of the following years, the Second Constitution was declared and the constitutional order gave hope to different communities: Turks, Arabs, Bulgarians, Romans, Serbians, Armenians…[136] Although there are different stances regarding the solution of problems among Armenians, they were hopeful, too, that problems could be resolved in the constitutional order. The ARF continued to cooperate with the CUP within this atmosphere. However, the Young Turks started to articulate Turkism and to call Turks *millet-i hakime* (dominant *millet*). Additionally, the 1909 *Adana olayları* (the Adana Incidents) significantly contributed to the ruin of the hope and confidence among Armenians in the constitutional order. Before the *Adana olayları,* the 31 March Incident occurred, which was an uprising against the nascent Constitutional order because of the fear of that Islam was in danger, so Armenians, too, would have attacked Muslims. Consequently, because of this fear and rumors, as a result of ethnic conflicts, about 20.000 Armenians were killed in the attacks on Armenians in Adana in 1909.[137]

In addition to the Adana Incidents, the conflicts of Armenians and Kurds on property ownership in the Eastern Anatolia continued. Moreover, the notion of Turkism had already started to be articulated subsequent to the Balkan wars in 1912 - 13 and the CUP's domination following their Bab-ı Ali Attack (the Coup of 1913).[138] Although the Young Turks dealt with the problems of the Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia with the suppression of Russia, they wanted to implement the reforms in the

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[135] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 20.
[136] Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 49.
[137] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 146.
[138] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 110.

region without the interference of third parties. However, the First World War became an excuse to omit the reforms. Moreover, as Taner Akçam says, "the First World War was an opportunity for Turks. … [It] could change the ill fate of Turks, can stop the collapse. The great Turkish Empire could be rebuilt, but at this time in other territories, together with the confident and loyal Turkish people…"[139]

Before the WWI, the loyalty of Armenians had been doubted. The defeat in Sarıkamış in 1914 brought about the complaints that Armenians stabbed "our back." There were some Armenian gangs in Anatolia and some of the Armenians joined the Russians' voluntary unions. After the start of the war, Armenians who were in the military, local and general administration, and in the street were suppressed. In addition to these developments, as a result of the uprisings of Armenians in Van, the Armenian deputies, authors and artists, first in Istanbul then in other cities, were arrested in April 24/25 in 1915. As Akçam argues, this was the symbolic date of the 1915 massacre because before this date, there occurred massacres and killings, too, of Armenians by the Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) and *Hamidiye Alayları* and even by ordinary people. Along with the arrests, the decision of the deportation of Armenians was made on May 27 in 1915, even though it already started in March 1915. During the deportation, many Armenians were killed and left for dead because of the lack of food and water on the road until the late of 1916.[140]

Today still a huge international discussion exists over the name of the incident, genocide or not, based on the international law as well as over the exact death toll. Moreover, there is even an argument, by the "Turkish" side, that this incident was not a massacre or a genocide; it was a war and a result of a state of war. However, as Taner Akçam says, although the death toll of the incident was not

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[139] Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimligi Ve Ermeni Sorunu,* 102.
[140] Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimligi Ve Ermeni Sorunu,* 104-112.

known exactly or it is still not certain whether this incident was conducted deliberately or not, it is well-known that the number of Armenians dramatically decreased and a small number of Armenians were left behind living in Anatolia after the massacre.[141] Besides killings, many people have migrated to outside Turkey; therefore, today, the Diaspora of Armenians is dispersed all over the world. Moreover, one of the dramatic results of the massacre was an increase in the conversions from the Christian identity into Islam. It is possible to encounter these stories of *Dönme*s (Jews and Christians that converted to Islam) today. As one narrating his family's story after the 1915 stated that, "once the exiles (deportations) came to an end and the things calmed down again, they (his family) changed religions. They said that there were a lot of people in Mutki (a district of Bitlis) who were persuaded in one way to convert into that … She (his mother) once told me that "I was obliged to."…"[142]

In general, this section illustrates that in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians have consisted of different actors and fragmentations over some issues. The Patriarch, or the Patriarchate of Armenians, who belonged to the *millet* system, was the head of its community. However, the patriarchal authority, which firstly was considered to be to some extent dominated by the *amiras,* also attempted to be restricted by the liberal-democrat intellectuals and middle class merchants and artisans to organize a more democratic order under the 1863 Regulations. Moreover, in spite of the Patriarchate's silent position to the grievances of Armenians, the new radical groups came forward to claim their rights. Therefore, this history of Armenians, and Armenians should not be read just through one actor, the

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[141] Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimligi Ve Ermeni Sorunu,* 111
[142] Interview, "When My Father Became A Muslim My Mother Left The House," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar, (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 27.

patriarchate. Rather, it should be considered through different actors that have been influential.

2. Armenians in the Single Party Period (1923-1945)

Subsequent to WWI, Anatolia experienced the War of Independence that resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. This nascent regime aimed at getting rid of the Ottoman trajectory, *ancien regime*[143]; however, minorities become "residue." In this regard, they started to indoctrinate Turkism as a social, political, economical and cultural ideology. Mostly non-Muslims or "foreigners" had been influenced from this indoctrination. Therefore, it should be said first that "[t]he succeeding minority policies of the Republic, to put it in the simplest term, were based on intimidation, suppression, oppression, assimilation and domination."[144] From this point of view, same as all minorities in Turkey, Gerard J. Liberidian calls Armenians in Turkey "a silent minority" by the mid of the 1970s.[145] Therefore, in this section, I will examine the suppressive and discriminative policies of the state that resulted in the homogenization and suppression of the Armenians' differences within only the *defocto* representation of the Patriarchate that continued in the multi-party period of the Republic as well.

At the beginning of the Republican era, the former Armenian provinces were exposed to Islamisation and Turkification, i.e. homogenization; thus, there emerged a huge internal migration from Anatolia to Istanbul and migration from Anatolia to foreign countries. Armenians in small populations started to live mostly in Istanbul under the leadership of the Patriarch. The Patriarch was still the representative of the

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[143] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 109.
[144] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenians,* 17- 18.
[145] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 32.

Armenian community with the leaders of the Catholic and Protestant Armenians.[146] Another point was the enforced migration of Armenians intensively between 1929 and 1939. In this case, as Dilek Güven argues, the main aim was to homogenize the country by evacuating Armenians from Anatolia and to Istanbul.[147]

Together with other minorities, Armenians' position was not certain until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 in which only Armenians, Greeks and Jews were legally given minority status and equal citizenship. The Turkish state did not encourage the equal rights of minorities; for instance, they proposed the deportation of Armenians together with the Greek Orthodox citizens between 1923 and 1927, and the abolishment of the patriarchate because Armenians were considered the second significant economic power after the Greek orthodox citizens and they did not trust Armenians in the sense of their support for territorial integrity of the country. However, the deportation of Armenians and the abolishment of the Patriarchate were not accepted; instead, this treaty resulted in both equal citizenship and some positive rights to minorities. More specifically, according to articles 37-45, non-Muslim minorities would have had *de facto* and *de jure* equality to the Turkish citizens and would have benefited from equal citizenship and political rights, and freedom of travel and residence with Muslims; in public and military service, minorities would not have been discriminated according to their religion, sects and faith; minorities would have been able to establish and control their own religious, social, educational and charity institutions if they paid their own costs, to use freely their own languages and to do freely their own worship rites in these institutions; in individual and family issues like marriage and heritage, minorities could have applied to their own private law in accordance with their own customs and traditions. In addition to those rights,

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[146] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 32.
[147] Dilek Güven, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Homojenleştirme Politikası, 6-7 Eylül Olayları ve Failleri," *Toplumsal Tarih* 141 (September 2005): 38-39.

the Turkish government would have guaranteed convenience for minorities' institution, e.g. providing education in mother tongues of minorities in their neighborhoods.[148]

Nevertheless, as Çağatay Okutan states, the Turkish state did not opt for the implementation of these rights and mostly did not implement.[149] Although the early years of the single party period were relatively peaceful due to the decrease of the number of minorities, this did not stop discrimination against minorities and the attempts to "Turkify" them. The Republic of Turkey had a distrust of non-Muslim minorities; this distrust was even reflected in the newspapers of the time with some news such as "the defrauder *Rum,*" "the smuggler Armenian."[150] As Talin Suciyan posits, the use of bad language against Armenians was a casual thing in newspapers, most of whose owners were deputies in the assembly.[151] At these times, there was a great pressure for the non-Muslim minorities to relinquish their rights given by the Treaty of Lausanne. Afterwards, first the Jewish, then Armenian, and then the Greek communities relinquished the rights of applying their private law in accordance with their customs and traditions. As Rifat N. Bali puts forward, the adoption of Civil Law on 17 February 1926 was one factor in the decision to abolish the private law.[152] By this way, non-Muslim minorities became dependent on the secular Turkish law, and the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire was attempted to be abrogated as many historians who interpreted the period argued.[153] The most obvious result was seen in the attitude of the Patriarchate, and Patriarch. during the minority policies of the

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[148] Arus Yumul, "Azınlık mı Vatandaş mı?," in *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları* (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), 89.
[149] Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları* (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 112.
[150] Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları,* 127.
[151] Talin Suciyan, "Ermeni Karşıtlığı Ortamında Ermeni Temsiliyeti,*" Topumsal Tarih* 224 (August 2012): 77-78.
[152] Rıfat N. Bali, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlıklar Politikası,*" Birikim Dergisi* 115 (1998): 82-83.
[153] Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme," Politikaları*, 110.

Republic, the Patriarch, same as the leaders of the other minorities, had the intention to be in harmony with the principles of the Turkish state that was felt heavily in the multi-party period as well.[154]

Furthermore, the abolishment of the 1863 Regulation of Armenian Nation (*Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyan*) in 1934 was a significant attempt to abrogate the guaranteed civil representation of Armenians in the *millet* system. The *Cismani Meclis* (The Political Assembly) changed its name to *Idare Meclisi* (The Administrative Board) with the approval of the Patriarchate Mesrob I Naroyan, and this assembly would have been elected from among the representatives of the administrative bodies of the churches' foundations rather than by the representatives of the General Assembly. Moreover, the Patriarch would have been the president of only the Religious Assembly. Furthermore, this decision also brought about the abolition of all the communities established in 1863. Here it was important to revive the discussions of the past between the ecclesiastics and the civil members of the general council; however, as Günay Göksu Özdoğan argues, the evidence for the sort of disputes does not exist, but it is obvious that both the ecclesiastics and civil members were agreeing to act in accordance with the Republican secular law. As a result, "not only the patriarch's authority was solely confined to the religious realm, the representative role of the elected deputies of the general council had been largely undermined. The only council that seemed to continue to operate was the religious council. It can be claimed that the Republican regime furthered secularization, but it also finished off the late Ottoman practice of lay administration by elected deputies in civil communal affairs, which had provided a considerable degree of autonomy in

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[154] Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları,* 118-120.

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internal administration."[155] However, this board abolished itself in 1939 because of the suppressions in the era after the Treaty of Lausanne. Then, an amendment of the law ordered to give the government of the *vakıf*s (foundations) to "tek mütevelli" (one single administrator) under the control of the General Directorate of Foundations. However, in 1940s, there emerged some discussions on the inefficiency of "one single administrator" system, so the administrative bodies were in power again in 1949, but still under the inspection of the General Directorate.[156] Therefore, the abrogation of the 1863 Regulation became another development that verified that Armenians were and dominated by republican precepts in the republican era. Moreover, it also shows that the *defacto* representation of Armenians, unlike the Ottoman period, was restricted to the Patriarch and Patriarchate.

The reluctant attitude of the Republic of Turkey on the implementation of rights given to non-Muslim minorities was not limited to these above-mentioned. This attitude caused discrimination of Armenians and their deprivation of rights, from political participation to education, from public service to military service, from economy to language. All those became the way of suppression and discrimination of Armenians and also the way of homogenization of Armenians' differences. Now I will examine those discriminative and suppressive policies of the state in detail.

First of all, an overview of the political participation of Armenians would reflect the political condition of the period. The single party period was dominated by the *CHF* (the Republican People's Party) and this party did not allow other parties to take part in the assembly. Moreover, they advocated Turkism all around the

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[155] Günay Göksu Özdoğan. "The Problems of Secularization of Armenians in Turkey: Torn Between Communal Pressure and State Authority," (paper presented in the 9th Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence-Montecatini Terme, 12-15 March 2008, organized by the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute), 15-16.

[156] Pamukçiyan, "Ermeniler,"193; Suciyan, "Ermeni Karşıtlığı Ortamında Ermeni Temsiliyeti," 77; Özdoğan, and et all., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 277.

Republic, so they restricted the participation of the non-Muslim/ Turk in the assembly. However, Armenians' participation in politics had started after the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839. As we know, the Armenian representatives existed in the parliament after the elections in 1877, following the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the estimation of the number of Armenian representatives in parliament after the second constitutional era (1908-1918) varied between 12 and 15.[157] Moreover, as Çağatay Okutan states, non-Muslim minorities participated in the opposition parties after 1908 and the relation of the ARF with the CUP members showed the role of Armenians in politics of the time. However, in 1919 and 1920, the political participation of non-Muslim minorities started to be discussed and a decision was made that non-Muslims would not be part of the nascent assembly on 19 March 1920. Between 1923 and 1950, only two Armenian representatives could obtain a seat in the assembly: Münip Boya and Berç Keresticiyan.[158] Although Berç Keresteciyan was elected thanks to the decision of the *CHF* in 1935 which allowed minorities to be an independent candidate after the increasing of the opposition via the experience of the Free Republican Party, the participation of Münip Boya, who was elected from the 2nd term until 7th term, was allowed probably because his family converted into Islam. This shows that the requirement of "being Muslim" was related to ethnic-religious identity discrimination that continued to 1950s and onwards. Therefore, it is fair to argue that Armenians were excluded from politics, and the gap of representation of Armenians that emerged was trying to be fulfilled with the *defacto* leader, the Patriarch.

Furthermore, the turkification policy of the Republic was implemented in the recruitment of the non-Muslim minorities in public service and the foreign-invested

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[157] Özdoğan, and et all., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 286-291.
[158] Özdoğan, and et all., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 291-293.

establishments as well, although discrimination against non-Muslims was banned in the Treaty of Lausanne. One of the main goals in these policies was the recreation of a new Turkish bourgeoisie class by evacuating non-Muslims from the market and transmitting their capital to the Turkish bourgeoisie. In 1923, all corporations were required to recruit Muslim civil servants.[159] Moreover, according to the civil service law enacted in 1926, being a civil servant was conditioned on "being Turk" and this law remained in force until 1965.[160] Together with the other minorities, Armenians were fired from these jobs in the mid-1930s. These policies and legal implementations have caused, even today, the perception that "we cannot work in public, even if we apply." As Sarkis Çerkezoğlu, born in 1916, states that "all citizens are equal before the law" is an untruth. Not a single one of [Armenians] have a stick, not a single one [Armenian] is a civil servant in the public office. … I was really interested in aviation. They do not recruit me [to the Turkish aviation association] because I am Armenian. Think of it that I designed a helicopter in 1932."[161]

The strict policies of these years in recruitment were not considered enough to transmit non-Muslims' "great" economic power to Muslims/Turks. Moreover, the government was urgently trying to find out a way to solve the financial problems that resulted from the increased cost of defense. At these times, in press, non-Muslims, "foreigners" were argued to have benefited comparatively much more than Muslims/Turks, from the times of scarcity of commodity in the condition of decreasing of export and increasing of inflation. Thus they were represented as black marketer and robber on the news. Therefore, as Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu

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[159] Bali, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlıklar Politikası," 84.
[160] Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, 119.
[161] Sarkis Çerkezoğlu, interview by Yahya Kocaoğlu, *Hatırlıyorum* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2003), 50-51.

stated, it aimed to abolish the foreigners that dominated the Turkish market and to hand over it to Turks. Following these developments, a law, which commanded "capital tax" (Varlık Vergisi), an additional tax, levied exclusively on Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Dönme (Jews and Christians converted into Islam) was enacted on 12 November 1942. After the commissions' determination of the amount of taxes, people were required to pay it in fifteen days. If they could not pay in this period, their properties were seized and sold. And if they could not pay in one month, they were obliged to pay their tax with their manual labor force in work camps, Aşkale and Sivrihisar. When we consider that the tax was heavily implemented in Istanbul where the size of non-Muslim population was very high, that most of non-payers sent to the camps were from Istanbul, and that higher tax was levied comparatively on non-Muslims, this tax clearly targeted non-Muslim communities.[162] Although the stories narrated today show that its effect on Armenians varied, they showed also that this incident overwhelmed Armenians socially and economically. One narrator of the book, *Sounds of Silence: Turkey's Armenians Speaks,* says that "the Wealth and Revenue tax really embittered him (his/her grandfather). After the Wealth and Revenue tax (the capital tax) my grandfather did not speak a word for 8 years, until the day he died. He did not say a single word, he didn't leave the house, he spoke only with gestures as if he was mute. Because that's a very severe trauma; how many times are you going to start off in life again?"[163] As in this story, people were forced to restart; however, sometimes the grievances would be unbearable as in the story of Armenians in Ankara; "My father was not too affected by the Wealth and Revenue Tax, because he didn't have much

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[162] Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, 141-153.
[163] Interview, "Being an Armenian and an Industrialist in Turkey," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 7.

money or property. My mother however was in Ankara at that time. She used to tell us that there were people who went as far as throwing themselves from the Ankara citadel walls in other not to pay this tax."[164]

In addition to the attempts in economic homogenization, "Incredibility" of non-Muslim minorities, especially with Armenians as mentioned above, was proposed as an excuse in the conscription of Armenians from the days of WWI to WWII.[165] Since the Imperial edict of Gülhane, which decreed the equal conscription of non-Muslims with Muslimstheir conscription was interrupted at intervals until 1940—sometimes due to non-Muslims' complaints of the current decree and sometimes the state's distrust of non-Muslims. However, the significant discrimination happened in 1939. In November 1939, a law commanded the conscription of Jews, Greeks and Armenians as equerry or servant under the command of Turkish army officers by exempting them from military weapon training. Those,who were born between 1312 and 1332 according to the hijri calendar, were called to the military service in May 1941.[166] This incident, called "Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar," also was applied to the non-Muslim minorities who had already done their military services; thus, some of them were doing their third-time military service. They were conscripted pell-mell from the streets after checking their identities; they worked in constructions, road building, crushing stone rather than military service—Armenians especially worked in public works (*nafia işleri*); they wore different clothes that discriminated them from Muslim soldiers. Moreover, because of the news that disseminated that Hitler approached the borders, Jews especially felt that they would have been sent to the concentration camps and been

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[164] Interview, "There is Nothing Worse than Being an Armenian in This Country," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 117.
[165] Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları,* 128-139.
[166] Rifat. N. Bali, ""Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatar" Olayı," *Tarih ve Toplum* 179 (November 1998): 260-262.

killed.[167] As Süren Baloğlu, who was born in 1925, said by narrating the story of his father, "These times, it was on everyone's lips that "20 Kura was not conscripted to the military service, but taken in death.""[168] In this incident, Armenians expected to be deported or killed together with other non-Muslim minorities.

Moreover, education was another field that allowed the state to interfere with the lives of Armenians. Although there were some attempts in the Ottoman Empire to centralize education, until WWI, the state did not intervene in non-Muslim schools. Until the Treaty of Lausanne, turkification in education of non-Muslims was apparent. In the following years, rights of non-Muslims regarding education given in the Treaty were ignored. Non-Muslim minorities' schools were not supported by the state, municipality, or another similar budget as indicated in the Treaty. Moreover, with the Law on Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) on 3 March 1923, all education places became dependent on the Board of Education (*Maarif Vekaleti*). Concomitantly, the qualification of teachers administered by the Patriarchate was no longer valid; thus, they were required to pass the test by the relevant authorities. Thereafter in these schools, Turkish, Geography and History courses was required to be taught five hours per week; the teacher of thse courses were required to be Turkish; and all teachers in these school must know Turkish, so they were obliged to pass a Turkish exam. Moreover, one of the most controversial issues was the obligation of Turkish vice principals, besides Armenian headmasters, that was imposed on the schools in 1937.[169] Through educational readjustments, one of the main issues became minorities' own languages. Besides the restrictions in minority schools, in 1930s there was a country-wide campaign called "*Vatandaş*

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[167] Interview, "I'm From Kadıköy; I Feel a Part of This City," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 96.
[168] Süren Baloğlu, interview by Yahya Kocaoğlu *Hatırlıyorum* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2003), 56.
[169] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 194-196.

Türkçe Konuş (The Citizen Speak Turkish!)" that obliged non-Turkish speakers to speak Turkish in public spaces. All these legal implementations, during the single party period, have been obstacles for Armenians and other nom-Muslim communities' education systems and for living their cultures, histories and traditions indirectly. Moreover, these implementations caused critical problems; many of them are still discussed today.

Furthermore, these suppressive policies are reflected in the cultural life of Armenians in Turkey. The more productive period of Armenian culture and art life in the late 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century was cut into because of the tragedy of the 1915. In the republican term, the theatrical productions in Armenian were unofficially banned and this ban was overwhelmingly felt by the artists until 1946; thus, all pieces were presented in Turkish. The 1915 massacre and deportation was also a reason for the decline of the musical life of Armenians who were nourished from the different cultural motifs of Anatolia and presented their performances in Istanbul until the 1910s.[170] Moreover, the situation of Armenian press was comparatively worse than the Ottoman era; the number of periodic publications in the republican period decreased to almost twenty. Two newspapers, *Jamanak,* since 1908, and *Nor Marmara,* since 1940, continue to publish today.[171] Regarding Armenian literature, as Özdoğan and et al. quoted the statement of Yervant Gobelyan, after the migration of the authors to outside the country following the 1915, there emerged a decline in the literature. The conditions of the authors even in the 1930s were very difficult; the themes in the literary texts must have not been about the deportation, nostalgia, people died and properties lost.[172] Overall, the

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[170] Ibid.,82, 88.

[171] Kevork Pamukçiyan, "Ermenice Basın," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansklopedisi,* vol.3 (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 190.

[172] Özdoğan et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş*, 86.

conditions in the cultural life of the Armenians were parallel with the socio-political implementations in the single party period of Turkey. Therefore, this period, compared to the Ottoman era, does not allow Armenians to represent openly themselves and their differences in cultural and social activities with some exceptions.

Consequently, it is fair to argue that the single party period's suppressive and discriminative policies transformed Armenians into a silent community. Their differences which had been apparent in the comparatively more democratic situation in the Ottoman Empire no longer existed in the republican period. The 1863 Regulation was abrogated together with all democratic institutions. Instead of them, they were represented only through the Patriarch which continued in the multi-party period as well. Now, I will examine Armenians in the multi-party period.

3. Armenians in the Multi-Party Period (1945-1995)

As Rifat N. Bali argues, after WWII, the transition from the single party system to the multi-party system signaled a new period for the minorities of Turkey. Discriminatory policies pertaining to minorities were not as prevalent as in the single party period. For instance, minorities for the first time became reserve officers in the Turkish Military Forces in 1947. Moreover, due to the multi-party period, in the sense of political participation, minorities' opposition to the Republican People's Party (CHP), which was the first time on the side of the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1935, reemerged in the 1950 election by voting for the Democrat Party (DP).[173]After coming to power in 1950, the DP "promised full cultural freedom for minorities," and advocated "a policy of moderate

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[173] Bali, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlıklar Politikası," 86.

nationalism."[174] As a result, three Armenians, same as Jewish and Christians, were elected as representatives in the parliament between 1950 and 1954: Andre Vahram Bayar Kocabıyıkyan, in the 10th term and 11th term Zakar Terver, in the 11th term Mıgırdiç Şellefyan. Moreover, after the 1960 coup d'état, in the 1961 Constituent Assembly, each of the non-Muslim minorities were represented. Hermine Agavni Kalustyan, as an Armenian, was a representative in this assembly, and Berç Sahak Turan was the member of the Republican Senate in 1964.[175] However, since that date, Armenians were not represented in the Assembly, although some Armenians obtained a seat in a city council in Istanbul Municipality in 1968, and in Şişli, Bakırköy, Adalar, Istanbul in 1994.[176] However, it is worth noting that this relatively peaceful environment (especially in the early period of the DP rule) emerged because of the reconsideration of the potential contribution of the non-Muslim electorates voting in the elections. However, as a result of the dramatic events, as I indicate below, "the Armenians of Turkey abstained consciously and massively from political life…"[177]

Especially in its early years, the transtition to the multiparty system paralled the Armenian attempts to pursue their cultural practices. Armenians for instance could voice their claims in their own language to İsmet İnönü, who would then support that they could present their pieces in Armenian. This was a significant development that paved the way for the emergence of Armenian associations' theaters in the 1950s. With the theaters of alumni associations of the school of Pangaltı Mıkhitaryan, Esayan, Karagözyan, Sahakyan and so on, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a flourish of theaters of the Armenian associations although they

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[174] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 72.
[175] Rifat N. Bali, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri," *Toplumsal Tarih* 186 (June 2009): 63.
[176] Özdoğan, and et all., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 293-297.
[177] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 34.

were badly affected by the 1980s coup. Moreover, Armenians in Istanbul performed ballet and modern dances since the 1950s. Especially since the 1960s, some Armenian folk dance groups have joined the programs in which different artistic groups in Turkey included. Yet, some discuss today that even the cultural activities of Armenians are not extroversive, i.e. are not watched by non-Armenians in Turkey. The restrictions and bans in the law of associations and the discriminative implementations increased in the aftermath of the 1980s *coup d'état* which caused the cultural and social activities to remain in a very confined space.[178]

There is more about the historical trajectories the Armenians have experienced. Firstly, the Incidents of 6-7 September in 1955 called this relative peacefulness in question. During the period of the discussion of the Cyprus Issue, news was broadcasted in the radios that a bomb exploded in Atatürk's home in Salonika on 6 September 1955. With the initiation of the *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti* (the Community of "Cyprus is Turk"), and participation of some new organizations, local people and migrants who came from Anatolia, at the night of 6 September, the attacks against the houses, workplaces and the churches of the non-Muslim minorities started and they also plundered those places in Istanbul. Building windows were broken, shops were looted, the sacred pictures, icons, and crosses were destroyed and burned, and also some churches were set on fire.[179] The Incidents created a great fear among all non-Muslims, and the pictures of the incidents have not erased from the memories of non-Muslims today. An Armenian recalling these days with the words "One of the events I will never forget was the night of 6-7 September," talks about the events: "I saw people throwing a fridge from the window and my father then realized what was happening. The adults took us all, some 15-20

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[178] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,* 92.
[179] Dilek Güven, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Homojenleştirme Politikası, 6-7 Eylül Olayları ve Failleri," *Toplumsal Tarih* 141 (September 2005): 40-41.

children, down to the cellar. Our mothers kneeled down and prayed. Clatter and noise outside in the night…"[180]

As Dilek Güven argues, these Incidents should be read as part of the attempts of homogenization and the creation of national economy. Moreover, with the impetus of a series of international events such as the Cyprus Issue and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Menderes government had already started the campaign in the press against the Rum Orthodox Patriarchate and Greeks. However, the Incidents indicate that the attacks were targeting not only the Greeks, but also the Jews and the Armenians.[181] Besides the press campaigns, in the 1960s non-Muslims were attacked by some political parties such as the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*).[182] Therefore, these years witnessed a social, economic and political discrimination of Armenians together with Jewish and Greeks by the state and press. These also caused "Turks to react with suspicion towards the non-Muslim communities in Turkey."[183] In the multi-party politics, both the state and local people continued the policy of homogenization and as well as the efforts to create a national economy.

A national policy as such confronted the Armenian foundations with new problems that have continued to today since the 1970s. In 1974, their properties that they had obtained since 1936 were confiscated based on the 1936 Declaration (*1936 Beyannamesi*) which was applied after a Law of Foundations in 1935. This law required all foundations to declare what kinds of real property they had in their hand at that time. However, the interpretation of these declarations in 1974 led the

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[180] Interview, "There is Nothing Worse than Being an Armenian in This Country," in in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 116.
[181] Güven, "Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Homojenleştirme Politikası, 6-7 Eylül Olayları ve Failleri," 39.
[182] Bali, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlıklar Politikası," 88.
[183] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," 73.

minority foundations to trouble. Because those minority foundations were established by an edict of a Padishah in the Ottoman Empire, they did not have their own foundation certificate charter. The General Directorate of Foundations then accepted the 1936 Declarations as the foundations' certificate, and if there had been no such statement in the declarations that the foundation could obtain a property, the General Directorate would have confiscated their properties obtained after 1936. In this way, it was legalized that "the legal entities who were not Turk cannot obtain real property."[184]

Furthermore, by 1973, a chain of critical events prompted the suspicion towards Armenians so much that they were further exposed to public stigmatizatization as "foreign", indirectly or directly: the assassinations of two Turkish diplomats in California by some Armenian groups with the claim of Free Armenia and the recognition of the 1915 genocide in some foreign countries. Indeed, since 1965, there has been a campaign against Turkey with the claim of recognition of April 24 as the commemoration of the 1915. However, more violently, some Armenian groups, of which ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) was the most active one, continued their killings in and attacks on Turkey, in airports, embassies, and other places between 1975 and 1985.[185] In the 1980s, the Armenian lobby in the USA pressured the House of Representatives to recognize April 24 as a genocide commemoration. However, inside the country, Armenians were considered to support ASALA financially. During and after these attacks, "Armenian minority was once again placed in the position of hostages and became the defenseless target of Turkish acts of retaliation. Several bomb attacks were thus

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[184] Baskın Oran, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Mülkiyet Politikaları ve Gayrımüslimler ve 1936 Beyannamesi," in *Türkiye'de Azınlık Hakları Sorunu: Vatandaşlık ve Demokrasi Eksenli Bir Yaklaşım* (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları), 26-27.
[185] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," 77.

carried out against Armenian religious and cultural institutions in Istanbul between 1977 and 1979."[186] For instance, in 1978, the Armenian Patriarchate, an Armenian church and an Armenian orphanage in Istanbul were bombed. A secret Turkish organization took the responsibility of these incidents by arguing that these were retaliation for the attacks of Armenians on Turks.[187]

In these years, on the one hand, Armenians in Turkey were in a psychological atmosphere that they could be charged with the collaboration with the ASALA and other Armenian groups because even the left-wing opposition groups in Turkey was charged with this accusation. Therefore, as Arus Yumul narrated, in Istanbul, people were worried that public opinion towards Armenians would have been changed and their historical posture, which they were acting in accordance with the law and the Republican principle for years, would have been forgotten and only these killing events would have been remembered. They thought that their reputation would be damaged. Therefore, a great fear and silence descended over Armenians.**[188]** This fear is clearly obvious in the story of a narrator's mother in *Sounds of Silence: Turkey's Armenians Speaks*: "In the 70s when the ASALA events were taking place my mother would be very disturbed. She would feel very sorry each time diplomats were killed. In 1982, an Armenian set himself on fire on Taksim Square. My mother then said, 'I too want to set myself on fire like that. We are the people of this motherland. This is our country.' Was she saying this out of fear or did these words reflect her true feelings, I do not know..."[189]

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[186] Tessa Hofmann, "Armenians in Turkey Today: A Critical Assessment of the Situation of the Armenian Minority in the Turkish Republic," The EU Office of the Armenian Associations in Europe, Brussels, October 2002, 19.

[187] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 78-79.

[188] Ibid., 81-86.

[189] Interview, "Strip Me of My Rank; I Would Give My Life for This Non-Muslim," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 146.

On the other hand, this incident broke the silence on the Armenian issue although Armenians in Turkey did not want to stick out . As Ömer Laçiner asserts, it was really rare to come across with the discussion of the experiences of Armenians between 1915 and 1921 in neither the official history nor the alternative history of the radical opponents until the ASALA assassinations. However, the discussions purged from the official history were only in the 1990s.[190]

Before the 1990s, the arguments of the official history of the state were disseminated and broadcasted even by Armenians themselves in the country. As a result of the Republican policy that "the notables" of non-Muslim minorities were required to represent and advocate the Republic in foreign issues, after the attacks, Armenians declared that they disapproved of the attacks against Turkey and they suggested to forget the incidents before and after the WWI. In the symposiums on Turkey-Armenia relations, people from the Armenian community presented a paper whose argument wasthe same as the Republic's.

Moreover, those events also reproduce and sustain "the representation through only the Patriarch." For instance, the attitude of the Patriarch Shnork Galusdian was parallel to the attitude of the state because he was required to suggest finishing the anti-Turkish demonstrations abroad in the meeting for the discussion of the bureaucratic difficulties encountered by Armenians with the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit.[191] For instance, he states in two of his press-statements in these times; "In today's world, one has to look forward to the future, not to past.… Each of us individually, as well as the Armenian community as a whole, are devoted to our

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[190] Ömer Laçiner, "Önümüzdeki Geçmiş," *Bir Zamanlar Ermeniler Vardı* (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2009), 55-56.
[191] Libaridian, "From People to Nation: An Overview from the 1850s to the 1970s," 33-34.

country."[192] "We consider ourselves as an integral component of the Republican of Turkey. As such, we condemn and oppose any hostile act directed against Turkey by individuals and associations outside the country. As Turkish Armenians we have nothing to complain about and no feud with the Turks."[193] As it is obvious in these statements, the precepts of the republic were very oppressive on the Armenians and the Armenian institutions, especially the Patriarchate. In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were not in sight; only the Patriarchate was considered the community representative despite lacking a legal status. Therefore, the patriarchate, from the republican era onwards, has had close relations with the state officials.

Once again an international conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, made Armenians in Turkey a target of hate speech, attacks, and violent acts between 1992 and 1994. After Turkey clearly declared its support to Azerbaijan, the graffiti and some racist statements were written on the wall of the Armenian schools, churches and other places, such as "You will pay the bill!" and "Karabakh will become your grave!". In this era, some Armenian institutions also received anonymous hate mails. There was a common belief that the Armenians in Turkey had connections with the PKK. Based upon this belief, *Ülkü Ocakları* (Coalition of Idealists), a youth organization of the MHP (the Nationalist Movement Party) have sent some letters to Armenian workplaces or private addresses that "described Armenians as parasites that for the centuries had exploited the Turkish people, whose kindness had been answered with massacres; they added that their patience would soon be exhausted; and that the Armenian massacre- allegedly-

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[192] *Yeni Istanbul* (Istanbul daily- now discontinued), 25 June 1968, quoted in Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 77.
[193] *Son Havadis* (Istanbul daily- now discontinued), 8 January 1970, quoted in Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians, 78.

begun under the Ottomans would now resume."[194] Moreover, some graves were discovered; some cemeteries were desecrated and destroyed; some churches were attacked more than one times between 1992 and 1994. In addition to these developments, , people were called for a boycott against the Armenians and the Jews in Turkey with the campaign of "Don't do business with Jews and Armenians." [195]

In conclusion, although it is a transition to the multi-party period, this period witnessed discriminative and suppressive policies as did the single party period. These policies and some external events increased the level of suppression and discrimination. The Armenian community had continued to be silent and even become more silent and anxious until 1995 especially because of the ASALA events, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and the 1980 *coup d'état*. As a result, the notables of the Armenian community were required to alleviate the tension both inside and outside in accordance with the principles of the state. This policy had reproduced and sustained the representation of the Armenian community only through the Patriarch/Patriarchate until the mid-1990s. In other words, it is fair to call this silence homogenization of Armenians' differences until the mid-1990s. However, the mid-1990s and onwards have brought along some new elements for the life of the Armenian society/ community.

Now I will examine the multi-vocal period of the Armenians which coincides with the rise in the pace of the Armenian movement.

4. **A Multi-vocal Period: Armenians from 1995 to the Present**

   4.1. **Raising the Voice of Armenians and Fragmentation between Two Groups: "Introversive" and "Extroversive" Groups**

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[194] Hofmann, "Armenians in Turkey Today: A Critical Assessment of the Situation of the Armenian Minority in the Turkish Republic," 21.

[195] Ibid., 20.

In the aftermath of the 1980 *coup d'état,* new discussions sparked on the Kurdish and Islamic identity movements in Turkey with respect to the civilization, demilitarization, and democratization debates. , The mid-1990s witnessed the opening of further discussion that targeted the discriminative nature of state policies.. Moreover, with the Turkey's accession process to the European Union, the discussions on democratization, demilitarization and civilization paved the way for new discussions on some demands—besides those between the Kurds and the Sunnis—among other minority groups, academicians, political leaders, and civil society organizations. In this context, the Armenians also started to discuss their issues in the regard to their the state as a minority, to their history, and cultural and social identity. This is what the political process theory suggests us to interpret social movements. However, political process theory fails to explain the fragmented Armenian movement in Turkey which shows that the movement actors are not affected as a whole in the same way. For instance, in the case of the Armenians, all actors did not want to publicly discuss the problems of the Armenians. They chose different strategies, goals and framings as solutions to their problems. Like the political process model, the collective identity paradigm of the new social movement theories also does not suffice to explain the Armenian case. This paradigm fails because the movement does not act through a collective identity; rather, it acts through fragmentations. Therefore, we should consider the internal instabilities of the movements, especially its fragmentations. In this section, I will give a background of the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s by focusing on fragmentations among different actors.

The main fragmentation of the movement emerged between two groups in the mid-1995s. Amid the democracy discussions in Turkey, the Patriarch, Patriarchate

and its social circle, especially Foundations—which were called "the introversive group" in this research—started to have more close relations with the state and started to be in contact with the state officials for solving the problems of the Armenians. However, they were no longer the one and only group that aimed to deal with the Armenian problems. There has been also a new group, which is called "the extroversive group" in this research, that has started to emerge to solve the problems since the mid-1995. However, the two groups followed different paths for solution. Unlike the introverted Armenians, who have been careful to abide by the traditional precepts of the Armenians and of the Republic over the years, the new civil platforms established after the mid-1990s displayed a tendency for being extroversive in the larger society. The two groups criticized each other's positions. Following the extroversive tendency, around the new civil platforms, some studies and discussions on ethnicity, identity, history, citizenship, minority, and multiculturalism were set off and new publications started to appear on these issues. As I see in the interviews, I argue that there has emerged a fragmentation that coincided with the rising voice of the Armenians. More specifically, it is fair to argue that the Armenian movement has emerged and continued through a fragmentation between "the extroversive group" that wants to discuss their problems publicly, and "the introversive group" that wants to discuss within the Armenian community, if it is necessary, in accordance with the state policy.

As I indicated above, during the republican period, Armenians have been heard limitedly through only the *defacto* representation of the Patriarch/ Patriarchate. However, although the Armenians have always been a diverse group, it is since the mid-1990 that there have emerged newly articulated different arguments. In passing, let me mention the longstanding differences among Armenians. Then I will look at

the new different arguments appeared through newly established institutions in the mid-1990s.

First, Armenians in Turkey today consist of three different religious communities; the Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant Armenians. Each of them has their own community foundations in charge of governing some Armenian institutions, such as church, graveyard, school, hospital and orphanage. A total of 51 foundations today, whose number dramatically decreased in the Republic, contribute to cultural, social, political and economic life of Armenians, apparently in collaboration with the Patriarchate.[196] Today they also engage with the issues of Armenians, such as the foundation's seized properties, education of Armenian students, and restoration of Armenian architectural legacy that fell into ruin due to the lack of protection by the state.

However, the Apostolic Armenians' population has always been greater than two other communities'. Because the national census has not included data on ethnic belongings and language since 1965, we do not have the exact number of Armenians in Turkey today. However, the estimated number of the Armenians in Turkey varied between 60.000 and 80.000.[197] Regarding the population of the different communities, it is estimated that the number of the communities that are affiliated with the Istanbul Armenian Catholic Church is almost 3500[198] and the number of the Protestant Armenians, with all reserve, is estimated 200. Today, almost all Armenians in Turkey live in Istanbul. They migrated to Istanbul after the 1950s because the Patriarchate could not afford to reach out to the churches in Anatolia. There were no actively operating Armenian schools in Anatolia. Armenians were

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[196] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,*74.

[197] Hrant Dink, "Türkiye Ermenilerinin Nüfus Hali," *Tarih ve Toplum* 202 (October 2000): 32; Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 8.

[198] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 180.

loaded with obligations and thus felt grievances as a result of the per capita tax law and the 6-7 September Incidents. After a while, this migration wave was accelerated by the Patriarchate that encouraged and supported the students in Anatolia to come and study in Istanbul. As a result, many families from Anatolia came along with their children and dwelled in Istanbul. Therefore, there are only a few number of Armenian families living in Anatolia today.[199]

Moreover, as Arus Yumul indicates, the Armenians are divided along different social and cultural practices as Anatolian and Istanbul Armenians, rich and poor Armenians, and educated and uneducated Armenians. More importantly, the division between Istanbul and Anatolian Armenians lies in the historical importance of Istanbul, the city that has long been the center of the Armenians becasue of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul established in 1461.[200] During my research, it is also mentioned that the Istanbul Armenians look down on Anatolian Armenians and they argue that those newcomers from Anatolia are uneducated, rude, impolite, and ostentatious.[201]

Along with these communal differences that have been confined to the community itself, after 1995, the extroversive group started to emerge, which gathered around the newly established institutions, with the critiques of existing order in the community and the state. Among these institutions, *AGOS,* a weekly newspaper that has published both in Turkish and Armenian since 1996 besides the two dailies, *Jamanak* and *Marmara*, has become a main actor. As the chief editor, Hrant Dink, argues, the Armenian community needed their own newspaper published in Turkish besides the ones in the Armenian language. Because the Anatolian

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[199] Hrant Dink, "Türkiye Ermenilerinin Nüfus Hali," 33-35.
[200] Yumul, "Religion, Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians," 129-139.
[201] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association,, February 20 2013.

Armenians do not know the Armenian language, the publications in the Armenian language create a lack of communication within the community. More importantly, this newspaper started to be published in Turkish because Armenians was henceforward in case of necessity to articulate their own identity, history, problems, issues, and opinions in the agenda of the majority.[202] *AGOS* is not simply an Armenian newspaper because its agenda includes more than particular community issues. On the one hand, AGOS devotes particular attention to keeping alive the Armenian history and culture in the territories of Turkey, fights for the preservation of citizenship rights and identities, and plays a role in the Turkey-Armenia relations both within the country borders and in the diaspora. On the other, however, AGOS employs especially young people with different ethnic origins and addresses all injustices and engages in the democratization and civilization debates in Turkey with the claim of multi-vocality .[203] Similarly, *AGOS* is interested in a variety of social movements headed by the Kurdish, women, gay lesbians, environmentalists, and so on. As for the Armenians' internal issues, AGOS supports for a more secular and modern education in Armenian schools, argues for the remission of the foundation properties confiscated in 1974, and belives in the necessity of secularization and civilization in the institutes of the Armenian communities. This multivocality has been supported and celebrated by many other groups in society.

In contrast to liberal stance of the AGOS, the introversive group represents the conservative or religious wing of the Armenians that has long been dominant in the social, political, cultural lives of Armenians. Therefore, this wing considers *AGOS's* position dangerous for the future of the Armenian community both for their relations with the state and the "larger" society. Moreover, they argue against

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[202]Tuğba Çandar, *Hrant* (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010), 337.
[203] "Nisan'da Merhaba," *AGOS,* February 2, 1996, 1.

publicizing Armenians' internal issues because this would result in cultural deprivation especially in terms of Armenian language.The conflict between the AGOS and introversive group once again appeared in the internal elections of Armenian foundations in 1997 and the Patriarch elections in 1998. *AGOS* has emphasized the importance and necessity of the civil government in the Armenian community's foundations and schools besides the Patriarch, who has been treated as the religious and the political or civil leader of the Armenians in Turkey by the state and community itself during the republican era. *AGOS* argued that when a meeting was held pertaining to the internal issues of Armenians or the international issues regarding Armenians in Turkey, the Patriarch was summoned: This means that the Patriarch was *defacto* accepted as the collocutor of the state.[204] *AGOS* objected this attitude of the state that reproduced and strengthened the religious and civic authority of the Patriarchate all over the community. More specifically, although they have supported that the Patriarchate should have been given a legal entity—because the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate were abrogated with the abolishing of the General Assembly during the republic—, with respect to the internal affairs of Armenians from the past, they demanded that the Patriarch should have only remained as the religious head. In this regard, Hrant Dink argues that "there is no problem of participation or being collocutor, purely and simply there is the civilization problem of Armenians of Turkey. This civilization corresponds to a change in mentality prior to being in a formal organization."[205] Therefore, *AGOS* and its social circle started to criticize patriarchal authority over the Armenian people. As a response to this critical posture, as Günay Göksu Özdoğan argues by examining the statements of the Patriarch Mesrob II Mutafyan in 2004, who was elected in the 1998

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[204] "Ankara Patriği Ağırladı," *AGOS,* February 16, 2001, 1,7.
[205] Çandar, *Hrant,* 387.

election, "it has been openly declared that the Patriarchate is endowed with an authoritative right to function as the higher organ of supervision over some activities of the Armenian foundations and associations in civil life."[206] Consequently, as it is clearly articulated in the biography of Hrant Dink by Tuba Çandar, because of the critical stance of *AGOS*, Hrant Dink and *AGOS* was charged with having a goal to be civil leader and to participate into activities against Turkey.

AGOS was not only one civil institution which aimed to be the window of Armenians opening out on Turkey. In 1998, young Armenian women from Istanbul started to discuss inequality between women and men in the Armenian community. Throughout their activities, panels, exhibitions, seminars about the Armenian women and their movements in history, they established the Hay-Gin platform in 2001 which was the name of the journal of the Armenian women published from the 1910s to the 1930s. The platform critically approached the women issue and conducted their works outside the community in collaboration with other women's institutions in Turkey. Because these women were young and discussing the patriarchal issues in public, their activities were unwelcomed and criticized by some parties in the community, such as by the newspaper *Marmara*—which has been told in the interviews that have has close relations with the Patriarchate—and those women are warned to follow their elders and take lessons from their experiences.[207]

In the face of these developments headed by the extroversive group in the Armenian society and Turkey, *Aras Yayıncılık* published works on the Armenian culture, history and literature. Moreover, in other publication houses, some books consisted of the stories of Armenians have been published to show publicly the

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[206] Özdoğan. "The Problems of Secularization of Armenians in Turkey: Torn Between Communal Pressure and State Authority," 21.
[207] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 382-384.

history and current condition of being Armenian in Turkey.[208] The Armenian history, especially the 1915 incidents and their grievances, which had not been discussed until then has firstly discussed in a conference in 2005 with the participation of several academics and intellectuals in spite of many protests attempted to prevent it.[209]

Therefore, it is obvious that a fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups appeared in the mid-1995. This fragmentation gained momentum with the emergence of new civil platforms after 2007. First, I will focus on recent developments about the Armenian problems in relation to the democratization discussions in Turkey. Then I will go into details of the new civil platforms, which are considered the representative of "the extroversive group," established after 2007 to show the increased pace of fragmentation.

4.2. Democratic Developments and the Problems of Armenians

In addition to the internal dynamics in Turkey and the special dynamics in the Armenian community as mentioned above, the rise of Armenian's voice should also be considered with the starting of the accession process of Turkey to the European Union in the period of the AKP rule (the Justice and Development Party). In Europe, there emerged some legal reconfigurations of the minority rights in the 1990s. In the light of these developments, Turkey, in order to be admitted to the Union by measuring up to the Copenhagen Criteria which includes the minority rights, started to edict partial regulations on the rights of minorities, who were given the legal status in the Treaty of Lausanne, in 2002 and 2003. In seeking for the minority rights,

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[208] Etyen Mahçupyan, *İçimizdeki Öteki* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006); Fethiye Çetin, *Anneannem* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004).
[209] Hrant Dink, "Ermeni Kimliğinin Yeni Cümleleri veya Su Çatlağını Bulanda," in *İki Yakın Halk, İki Uzak Komşu* (Istanbul: The International Hrant Dink Foundation, 2012), 85-90. (Presented at the conference titled "Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the Empire: Scientific Responsibility and Issues of Democracy" held on 23-25 September 2005).

besides the newly established institutions like *AGOS,* the longstanding institutions of Armenians are playing significant roles, such as the foundations and the Patriarchate in their collaboration with the AKP rule. For instance, in 2003, the Christian communities of Turkey applied to the Committee on Human Rights Inquiry of the Assembly for the issues of freedom of religion and belief. Moreover, in 2008, a new law of Foundations included regulations on the issues regarding the properties of the Armenian foundations and accelerated the process of submission of the main problems of Armenians to the state offices via the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey or the administrators of the community's institutions or the press.[210] Moreover, all participants argue that besides those factors, it should be recorded that those developments have realized in the period of the AKP rule (The Justice and Development Party); the effort of the AKP could not be overlooked in the amelioration of the current situation of Armenians in Turkey. However, the introversive group thinks that all improvements have done by the AKP, by not taking any notice of the other factors.

With these developments, some significant steps have been taken concerning the problems of non-Muslims and Armenians. However, specifically concerning Armenians, still some problems remain unsolved. Now I will explain them. Latter, I will examine the new civil platforms established after 2007 amid those problems.

First, regarding the problems of the Armenian foundations, although the law of foundations in 2008 provided the return of some seized properties according to the 1936 Declaration in 1974, and recently some foundations repossessed their seized properties too;[211] there are still some restrictions on the return of properties.

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[210] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 465.
[211]"210 Taşınmaz Cemaat Vakıflarına İade Edildi," *AGOS,* April 26, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=210-tasinmaz-cemaat-vakiflarina-iade-edildi&haberid=4992 (accessed June 7, 2013).

Moreover, the foundations still experienced the problems in its election of administration and government resulted from the state policies, legal holes and internal dynamics of Armenians.[212] In this regard, *AGOS,* critically reported some infractions alleged in the election of administrative boards, such as in the election of the administration of the Beyoğlu Surp Yerortutyun Armenian Church Foundation on 22 March 2009.[213]

Moreover, secondly, the educational problems of Armenians are one of the significant topics today. The Armenian schools still do not have their own private law; hence, they are bound by the private school law. Although these schools works like public schools, they are treated as private schools by the state; therefore, some significant practical problems come to the surface. Moreover, in 2010, the Armenian schools were given the chance to offer their opinions to the Ministry of National Education in the appointment of teachers for cultural classes, such as History, Geography, Turkish Language and Literature, Sociology and so on. However, since those appointed teachers are still the public servants, whereas the Armenian teachers are not, some deficiencies in the administration of schools could emerge. Additionally, the obligation of the existence of Turkish vice principals in the Armenian schools still opened the discussions that Armenians are treated as foreigners in Turkey. The dual execution of Turkish vice principal appointed by the Ministry and the Armenian principal caused some problems in the administration of the schools. What is more, given that the Armenian language is a significant topic among the educational problems, the course materials in Armenian language are almost outdated and the necessary materials which are available abroad are not allowed to be studied in the schools. In this respect, the Armenian language course is

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[212] For more detail, please see Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,* 74-89.
[213] Sahag Gürhan, "Seçim Değil Skandal!," *AGOS,* March 27, 2009, 7.

treated as an elective course and not given so much importance. Therefore, the state is expected to support these schools and to open the Armenian language institutes at Universities for the proliferation of the quality of the Armenian education. Furthermore, there are some problems regarding the education of ecclesiastics and teachers who will provide religious service to the people and give religious and language education in the schools, respectively.[214] Despite the adoption of a new legal regulation about the private schools on 20 March 2012, in a meeting conducted by the History Foundation, it is argued that this regulation is not sufficient; a more comprehensive legislation is a necessity.[215]

In addition to those problems, thirdly, there have been some discussions over the legal personality of the Patriarchate and its authority, and *AGOS* has taken part in these debates from the begining. The Patriarchate did not have its own legal status because the 1863 Regulation of Armenian Millet was abrogated during the republican era. This created some legal hole in the issue of the election of the Patriarch which had been taken according to the special regulations of the government since 1951. The applications of the Patriarchate and some parties for the legal regulation of the elections to the government have not been replied yet. Additionally, in the discussions of the civilization in the community, as I mentioned above, some parties argue that if the legal status is given to the Patriarchate, then the authority of the Patriarchate over the community and institutions of the community would be determined.

Relating to the third problem, after the health problem of the current Patriarch Mesrob II came up, there emerged a vacuum in the Patriarchal position due to the

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[214] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,* 38-48.
[215] "Yeni Yönetmelik Azınlık Okullarının Sorununu Çözüyor Mu?," *AGOS,* April 5, 2012, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=yeni-yonetmelik-azinlik-okullarinin-sorunlarini-cozuyor-mu&haberid=1178 (accessed June 7, 2013)

lack of a legal regulation. The government intervened with the process; the government did not allow co-partial election of a new Patriarch, instead, suggested the Spiritual Council to elect a deputy of the patriarchate. This has been considered an authoritative implementation and intervention of the government and the Spiritual Council in the civil sphere.[216] Therefore, different parties in the Armenian community still argue for the recognition of legal personality to the Patriarchate .[217]

Finally, the political participation of Armenians in the assembly and the recruitment of them in public offices are not sufficient. Although the issue of non-Muslim representatives in the assembly is discussed in all general election periods in Turkey,[218] since Berç Sahak Turan, who was the member of the Republican Senate in 1964, none of Armenians in Turkey have been elected to the parliament. The relationship of the political parties with Armenian people in the republican history was based on a clientalist policy due to the advantage derived from the size of the population in the constituency.[219] Therefore, today, nonexistence of Armenians in the parliament is considered a significant problem for democratization of Turkey. Still, Armenians are able to occupy electoral offices at local level. In the local elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, a number of Armenians were appeared as candidates. As of 2009, a total of seven Armenians were elected to the city and county councils in Adalar, Şişli, and Bakırköy districts of Istanbul.[220] In these elections, *AGOS* played a primary role in introducing and supporting the candidates, and considered the election results a significant development that would further encourage political participation of the Armenians. Nevertheless, Armenians are still not visible in the

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[216] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,* 55-59.
[217] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş*, 467.
[218] "Ankara'ya Gayrimüslim Vekil Gider mi?," *AGOS,* February 18, 2011, 7.
[219] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 301.
[220] "Türkiye Yerel Yöneticilerini Seçti," *AGOS,* March 3, 2009, 1; Orhan Miroğlu, "Rakamların Ardındaki Toplumsal Dinamikler," *AGOS,* March 3, 2009, 7.

public service. Their absence in the public offices is a result of both the historical prejudices against the Armenians and the lack of the state encouragement for their participation. In this regard, when I asked one of the interviewees in my research "do you think to prepare for the exam, KPSS (Public Personal Selection examination)", she said that "we do not have another chance than to work in art, science, literature and etc., we do not even think about civil service. We have a perception that even if we apply, we cannot work in public."[221]

4.3. Ongoing Violence and the New Civil Platforms after 2007

In addition to those problems listed above, amid the democracy discussions and developments that concern the Armenians as a minority, the violence against Armenians has not stopped in Turkey. After the attacks on the Armenian social, cultural, educational and religious life in 1994 and 1995, with the establishment of *AGOS,* Armenians' issues started to be discussed in public; people anticipated hopefully that something would change. Moreover, in the 2000s, Turkey once again confronted the "genocide" claims as the United States House of Representatives and some EU member states brought the "Armenian genocide" into the discussion in their parliaments. In the Turkish front, this led to the reemergence of the fear of "disintegration" as well as a revived emphasis on "unification." In other words, developments since the second half of the 1990s have brought along "distrust" of Armenians in Turkey especially after the 2000s. In the late 1990s and 2000s, some churches and schools in Istanbul were attacked. Moreover, in the 1998 Patriarchate elections, the candidate Mesrop Mutafyan, a figure *AGOS* openly supported, was declared as "the Armenian menace," and the government was called to prevent

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[221] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, February 21, 2013.

election of a new Armenian Patriarchate.[222] Armenians, same as all non-Muslim and other minorities, have become scapegoats of all internal and external "threats". Consequently, the very visible actors of the non-Muslim minorities, those who take part in discussions on human rights, democratization, demilitarization, minorities, and the EU accession process, became the targets of violence and attacks, too.

The assasination of a Roman Catholic priest, Andrea Santoro, in February 2006, and of three Christians in *Zirve* bookstore that published Bible in April 2007 , "give off some worrisome smells" as Ali Bayramoğlu argued. As he narrates, there were so many people, like him and Etyen Mahçupyan, who are Armenian intellectuals, have exposed to these violence and killings in public spaces by some youngsters grown up with the Turkishness notion which is believed that would search for a hero.[223] Once again, one of the Armenian leading figures, and a controversial Armenian journalist who came to prominence with discourses of peace and the demands of recognition of differences within Turkey, Hrant Dink was assassinated in front of the building of *AGOS* of which Hrant Dink was chief editor on 17 January 2007. Until the day of Dink's death, he was targeted as "betrayer" in the media and public space as a result of his lawsuits according to the controversial article 301 in the Turkish penal code which opens the way to judge and charge people with "insulting" the Turkish ethnicity, the Republic of Turkey, and Turkish government institutions.[224] As I have talked and discussed during my research, this incident created a twofold perception: fear and hope. On the one hand, some parties in the community, especially the introversive group, started to argue that "he was so insight and sharp-tongued; thus, it was a long time coming." Those who thought in

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[222] Hofmann, "Armenians in Turkey Today: A Critical Assessment of the Situation of the Armenian Minority in the Turkish Republic," 25-27.
[223] Ali Bayramoğlu, "Cinayetin Siyasi Tahlili: Trabzon," *AGOS,* February 17, 2006, 2.
[224] Çandar, *Hrant.*

this way have had a fear of prospective troubles; so, they want to quickly complete the burial procedures of Hrant Dink and no longer speak about this murder. It is asserted in the interviews that the Patriarchate after this incident was very quiet and in parallel with the attitude of the state so much so that this position of the Patriarchate has been criticized.[225]

On the other hand, after the death of Hrant Dink, there was another group, the extroversive group, in the community that has a hope and started to speak about Armenian's issues loudly same as in the time of Hrant Dink's newly appearance in public in the mid-1995s and onwards.[226] Moreover, it was not only in the community itself; in the sense of rising of voices against those suppressions and nationalist clashes, millions of people, regardless of their identities, took to the streets with the slogan "We are all Armenians" and "We are all Hrant" in the following days of the assassination of Hrant Dink. Therefore, there have been increasing discussions on Armenian's issues conducted through the interaction of differences in Turkey, although some in both the Armenian community and Turks did not welcome this atmosphere.

In parallel with the increased interactions that resulted in more discussions on human rights, minority issues, democratization, demilitarization and so on, in the Armenian society, there emerged some significant institutions around which the extroversive group has gathered and got larger: Hrant Dink Foundation, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, *Nor Zartonk,* and some regional institutions. Those institutions, mostly the first three, aimed at discussing publicly both Armenian

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[225] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.
[226] Interview, "I'm a Citizen of The Turkish Republic but I Cannot Consider Myself Turkish," in *The Sounds of Silence, Turkey's Armenians Speak,* ed. Ferda Balancar (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publications, 2012), 127.

issues such as Armenian identity, the 1915 incident, the members of Diaspora, the relation between the Republic of Armenia and Turkey, and all issues concerning to all minorities in Turkey. Unlike the longstanding institutions of Armenians such as foundations controlling an Armenian church, school and hospital, and alumni associations, these newly emerged institutions did not ask for the ratification of the Patriarchate. Because the new institutions are not ratified by the Patriarch and because they followa similar way to the *AGOS*, a new discussion has been sparked within the community and this has been unwelcomed by some parties which are closer to the Patriarchate. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the emergence of these new institutions furthered the fragmentation of the extroversive group gathered around the already established new civil institution, *AGOS*, with the introversive group in the Armenian community. Now I will examine those new institutions in detail.

Of these institutions, Hrant Dink Foundation "was set up in 2007 to carry on Hrant's dreams, Hrant's struggle, Hrant's language and Hrant's heart."[227] For the purpose of "the development of a culture of dialogue, empathy and peace," the foundation concentrates on various areas, such as emphasizing the significance of cultural differences; supporting the relations between these different cultures, especially among Turkey, Armenia and Europe; supporting the democratization process in Turkey; and supporting historical studies devoid of racism and nationalism, publishing books, and conducting cultural and artistic events. More specifically, they have conducted a plenty of studies and published books on the Armenian issues which include the oral history projects on the Armenian history, the hate speech in media, the Armenian foundations' seized properties, and dialogue

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[227]"Vision and Mission," Hrant Dink Foundation, http://www.hrantdink.org/?About=18&Lang=&Home&Lang=en (accessed June 7, 2013).

with the people of Armenia, and so on. Moreover, they collect the writings, photos and documents of Hrant Dink, grant awards in his memory, and organize memorial weeks of Hrant Dink through participation and collaboration of many people, academics, journalists, lawyers and so on from different groups. [228]Considering its activities in collaboration with various media and civil society organizations in the country and abroad, and with educational institutions and universities, Hrant Dink Foundation seeks to keep discussions alive in a wide rage rather than within the community itself.

In addition to Hrant Dink Foundation, a group of young Armenians established a new civil entity called *Nor Zartonk* (New Revival) in 2007 which aims to work for "the intellectual developments of the peoples of Turkey" by starting with the Armenian community of Turkey.[229] They declare that they seek to contribute to the spread of human rights widely and without any regional discrimination; to stand against militarism, sexism, homophobia, racism and all sorts of discrimination, and against gerontocracy. Moreover, they organize events and conduct projects in which people can freely declare and live their own identities. In this regard, their radio called "Nor Radyo" are broadcasting today in eight languages of minorities of Turkey.[230] Moreover, they came into prominence during their research titled "Being Minority in Turkey." *Nor Zartonk* also releases their press statements regarding the issues of Turkey, such as Kurdish and Alewite issues, minority problems, economic crisis, and women's issues in Turkey. Moreover, they express their opinions regarding the Armenian issues, such as murders and attacks in the neighborhoods where Armenians are highly populated, the 1915 massacres in its commemoration,

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[228]Hrant Dink Foundation, http://www.hrantdink.org/?About=18&Lang=&Home&Lang=en.
[229]"Nor Zartonk," Nor Zartonk, http://www.norzartonk.org/en/?page_id=2 (accessed June 7, 2013).
[230] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013

the assassination of Hrant Dink, the authoritarian position of the Patriarchate in the community, deficiencies in the election of the Patriarchate and the interference of the state into the election, electoral corruption in the election of the administrative bodies of the foundations, the Armenian foundations' seized properties, and problems concerning the Armenian schools and associations. Therefore, they argue that the problems of Armenians should be discussed by Armenians too in public under the principle of equal citizenship.

With the involvement of some members of *Nor Zartonk*, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association (ACSA) was established in 2011 by some young Armenian people in order to protect and improve the Armenian culture, language and history in the world and to take some initiatives to prevent the disappearing of this culture and language.[231] To this end, they conduct oral history projects on the education history of Turkey, presenting films and documentaries about Armenians' social, cultural and historical life, arranging workshops on Armenian language and racism[232] in the same building where the Nor Radyo is broadcasting. It is quite worth noting that, in the talks during my interviews, the members of the association stress that like *Nor Zartonk* the association is not only opened to the Armenians; there are many people from different ethnicities, identities, political views, and sexual orientations. One of the association members even told that the building of the association was sometimes used by LGBT organizations to arrange meetings.[233] Therefore, it is fair to argue that the association and civil entity, *Nor Zartonk,* share the same notion of *AGOS* and Hrant Dink Foundation that the relation between

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[231]"Purpose" Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, http://www.ermenikultur.org/en/sample-page/purpose/ (accessed June 7, 2013).
[232] Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, http://www.ermenikultur.org/en/ (accessed June 7, 2013).
[233] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013

differences in Turkey should be increased, although they have different perspectives on some issues.

The establishment of these three institutions shows that the introversive tradition in the community is challenged just as did *AGOS* and *Hay-Gin* in the late 1990s, and that internal differences or different opinions are maintained to show themselves publicly. They started to express their opinions on some issues: They are critical of the position of the Patriarchate, of the strong conservative and patriarchal stance dominated in the community, of the state policy towards the Armenians in particular and all minorities in general, and of the state's treatment of the Patriarchate as its collocutor.

However, these were not the only institutions appeared after the assassination of Hrant Dink; many regional Armenian associations have been established since 2010; *Sivas Ermenileri ve Dostları Derneği* (The Association of Friends and the Armenians of Sivas)*, Sason Ermenileri Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği* (The Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Sason)*,* The Malatya Philanthropist Armenians Association (*Malatya Hay-Der*), and The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim (FSSAAD). The first three came together to increase the interaction and solidarity among the Armenians of the relevant regions and to enlighten the posterity about the history and culture of Anatolian Armenians. Carrying these concerns too, FSSADD was established so that a lot of grandchildren of Armenians, who converted to Alewite, wanted to live their Armenian identity openly.[234] Their establishment also furthered the fragmentation in the Armenian movement. As I talk to the founder of the association, he says that some parties in the Armenian community did not accept them as Armenians, such as those from the

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[234] Özdoğan and Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenian,* 84.

Istanbul Armenian Apostolic Church; they are required to be educated according to the precepts of the Church.[235] However, the social circle of AGOS supported their cause. These also vindicate that differences of Armenians rise to the surface and start to question the existing order in the community and the state.

In addition to those newly established institutions, cultural and social associations and communities of Armenians started to display themselves in public with their works. Especially after 2004 when the new Law of Associations removed legal restrictions on the establishment, operations and inspections of the associations, those associations were supported for their participation in international events. Churches' choirs started to give concerts in open-public spaces outside the church and the associations. Young Armenians' Music and Dance Societies have performed in the country and abroad. Some other music groups participated in the concerts, as did *Kardeş Türküler* in 2006, to perform a multicultural repertoire. Moreover, the alumni associations of Armenian schools hosted theater, choirs, music and dance performances, literature conversations, exhibitions, panels and conferences. The alumni associations also participated into some collectively organized activities, especially after the 1990s.[236]

However, this multivocality has not emerged in a peaceful environment in Turkey as the murder and attacks on Armenian people have continued. In 2011, an Armenian, Sevag Balıkçı, who was doing his military service at the time, was shot dead on the 1915 commemoration day. Even if the case was concluded, it has never decreased the doubts as to whether the murder was a prearranged racist attack.[237]

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[235] Interview with the participant from The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim, March 22, 2013

[236] Özdoğan, and et al., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş,* 240-268.

[237] "Sevag Kasten ve Bilerek Öldürülmüştür," Norzartonk, March 27, 2013 http://www.norzartonk.org/2013/03/27/sevag-kasten-ve-bilerek-oldurulmustur/ (accessed June 7, 2013); "Sevag Ermeni olduğu için öldürüldü," *AGOS,* March 1, 2013,

Moreover, there are still attacks on the highly Armenian populated neighborhoods and Armenian institutions; churches and schools in Istanbul. For instance, in the Şişli and Samatya districts of Istanbul, 5 old Armenian women were attacked, and two of them were murdered in 2013.[238] Although these attacks were claimed to be done for the purposes of robbery, many initiatives thought that they targeted advertently Armenian women and called on to consider them hate crimes.[239] Moreover, the Armenian and Roman churches were attacked by a group of people too in the Ataşehir and Gedikpaşa districts in Istanbul.[240]

Consequently, despite some improvements, many problems have continued to the 2000s. Of those problems, violence against Armenians brought along the establishment of new institutions; Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk,* ACSS, and some regional associations. These new institutions, especially *AGOS* and the first three have furthered the fragmentation between the introversive group and *AGOS.* Therefore, currently, the Armenian movement continues in fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups, each of which has different strategies, goals and framings about the problems of Armenians as I indicated in the fourth chapter in detail.

5. Conclusion

http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=sevag-ermeni-oldugu-icinolduruldu&haberid=4544.html (accessed June 7, 2013)

[238] "Levent Gök'ten Samatya'daki Ermeni Saldırıları Başvurusu," *AGOS,* February 13, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=levent-gokten-samatyadaki-ermeni-saldirilari-basvurusu&haberid=4357 (accessed June 7, 2013)

[239] "Türkiye Susuyor Saldırılar Sürüyor," *AGOS,* January 24, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=turkiye-susuyor-saldirilar-suruyor&haberid=4124 (accessed June 7); "Kadınlar, Samatya Saldırılarını Protesto Etti," *AGOS,* , February 5, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=kadinlar-samatya-saldirilarini-protesto-etti&haberid=4249 (accessed June 7)

[240] "Gedikpaşa kilisesi önünde havaya ateş atıldı," *AGOS,* May 5, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=gedikpasa-kilisesi-onunde-havaya-ates-acildi&haberid=5036 (accessed June 7)

Armenians, who lived under their Patriarch's internal authority in the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire, experienced "Zartonk" era. In this era, they started to discuss civilization, democratization, constitutionalization in political, social and cultural life with their own identities and differences from each other. The European educated intellectuals, craftsmen, and middle class merchants stand against the religio-aristocratic authority of the Patriarchate and *amira*s. In this sense, the most effective development was the 1863 Regulation of Armenian Nation which opened the way to establish more democratic institutions, to laity besides the clergy men to participate in these institutions, and to restrict the authority of the Patriarchate. Moreover, in the sense of the grievances of the Anatolian Armenians, in the late 19th and early 20th century there emerged some different actors, "radical" political groups to urge the state to solve the problems. This period shows that Armenians did not consisted of one single Armenian group which had been around the Patriarch/Patriarchate; rather, there were different Armenians who followed different ways for the governance of the community and the solution of their problems.

However, in the late 19th and the early 20th century Armenians were considered as menace to the territorial integrity and the rule of Abdulhamid II; the violence was a way resorted against Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia. Furthermore, the establishment of a nascent regime, a republic in 1923, maintained its suppressive and discriminatory minority policies and aimed to homogenize the country according to the Turkishness notion. Until the mid-1995s, it was a time of silence and attacks for Armenians in societal, economical, political, and cultural life. Therefore, this period also cause suppressing the differences of the Armenians. The Patriarchate became the only mediator—without any legal base—between the Armenian community and the state by following the principles of the Republic. Although "the

Armenian issue" launched to be discussed during the ASALA events in 1970s and 1980s, the suppression on Armenians continued and even continues today.

When it came to the mid-1990s, amid the democratization discussions in Turkey, Armenians started to raise their voices that could be named as a social movement. Besides the Patriarchate and its social circle, called as "the introversive group," "the extroversive groups" gathered around the new civil platforms and they start to conduct social, cultural, political and artistic works to discuss their problems about the authority of the Patriarchate, political participation of Armenians, the seized properties of the foundations, education in their school, the conditions of their architectural heritage, relations with the Diaspora Armenians and Armenians from the Republic of Armenia, and to express their opinion on the general agenda of Turkey as well. However, the introversive group did not agree in the way followed by the extroversive group: *AGOS,* Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk,* and ACSA. They, especially the Patriarchate and the community's foundations, have had different strategy, goal and framing in this movement from the extroversive group's gathered around the new civil institutions. Therefore, the Armenian movement emerged and continued up to the present through differentiations and the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups. From this point of view, in the next chapter, through in-depth interviews with 16 Armenians conducted in Istanbul and one e-mail conversation, I would like to examine the reasons for and issues of the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups.

THE REASONS FOR AND ISSUES OF THE FRAGMENTATION IN THE ARMENIAN MOVEMENT SINCE THE MID-1990s

In this chapter, I argue that the Armenian movement in Istanbul has emerged and continued through the fragmentation into two groups since the mid-1990s: the introversive and extroversive groups. Due to the fact that the new social movements do not take fragmentations within social movements into consideration,[241] the collective identity paradigm they use explicitly, and political process theories implicitly, fail to address the question "How does the Armenian movement work?" However, there are fragmentations in my case. Therefore, by benefiting from studies on diversity in social movements, I argue that the first question that should be asked about the internal dynamic of the Armenian movement is "What are the reasons for and issues of the fragmentations of the movement?" rather than asking the reasons for and issues of the movement as a whole. In that sense, in this chapter, in light of the literature review, I argue that there are three main reasons for the fragmentation in the Armenian movement: ideological differences among the actors, current political developments including opportunities and constraints which are accessible for the diverse actors and their interpretation by the actors, and reading history differently by the actors. Moreover, as a result of these reasons, the fragmentation between two groups on three issues has emerged; i.e., there are three subjects over which the parties have different strategies, goals and framings which my research

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[241] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008); Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008); Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995); Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

revealed: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in religious and civil lives of Armenians.

My findings are based on 16 interviews and one e-mail conversation I had with Armenian people from different institutions in Istanbul. I will present some excerpts from the interviews, and some of my observations during the research period. Moreover, in discussions about the reasons for the fragmentation, I will benefit from studies on diversity within social movements. Therefore, in the first section, I will present the fragmentation and the fragmented groups in the Armenian movement. In the second section, I will introduce the conceptual reasons for the fragmentation in light of the literature. Lastly, I will individually analyze three issues of the fragmentation by indicating their reasons in detail.

1. Fragmentation and the Parties of the Fragmentation

After the 1995s, Armenians found a room to raise their voices amid the discussions of democratization in Turkey. As I indicate in the last part of the third chapter, the Armenian movement emerged through different strategies, goals, and framings of two different groups of the actors since the 1995s: the introversive and extroversive groups. In this respect, it is not fair to represent the experience of Armenians in this period from the perspective of political process and new social movements theories—that the movements as a whole appear thanks to the current structural developments, opportunities or grievances through the movement's collective interest or action[242], and through its collective identity[243], respectively—because, both approaches do not consider the internal instabilities within movements. They

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[242] Neal Caren, "Political Process Theory," in *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology,* ed. George Ritzer (2007), http://nealcaren.web.unc.edu/files/2012/05/Political-Process-Theory-_-Blackwell-Encyclopedia-of-Sociology-_-Blackwell-Reference-Online.pdf
[243] Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (January 1, 2001).

solely study social movements *as a whole*. From the view of this critique, I analyze the Armenian movement through the fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups.

Whereas the group—which I call "the introversive group"—has been on the scene around the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, the Patriarch, the alumni associations of schools, and Armenian Foundations in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire period, another group—which I call "the extroversive group"—came into the picture around the newly established platforms after mid-1990s: *AGOS,* Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk*, Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association (ACSA), and some regional associations. Moreover, these two groups follow different strategies, goals, and framings for solution of the problems of Armenians. Therefore, in order to explore the reasons for and the issues of this fragmentation between two groups, I interviewed 8 participants and had an e-mail conversation with a person from the Patriarchate, the Foundations, a school under a Foundation and a Bible reading group for the category of "the introversive group" and interviewed 8 participants from *AGOS,* the Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk*, and the Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association and a regional association, called the Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim for the category of "the extroversive group."

Deciding to clearly cut these groups into two fragments, I reference my interviews and my readings on Armenians in Turkey. In the interviews, the participants of the extroversive group argue that they feel closer to each other than to the social circle of the Patriarchate; i.e., "the introversive group", and they clearly differentiate themselves from the introversive group who is closer to the Patriarchate, Christianity, and the historical institutions of Armenians. Moreover, although the

introversive group does not believe that the Armenian community is fragmented and there are no different groups in the Armenian community, during the interviews they express their different perspectives from the extroversive group gathered around the new civil platforms, and criticize those platforms' strategies, goals and framings. Moreover, the recently published studies, *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Vatandaş* (Armenians in Turkey, Community- Individual- Citizen),[244] and *Hearing Turkey's Armenian: Issues, Demands and Policy Recommendations*[245] also emphasize this fragmentation between these two groups in the Armenian society. Therefore, I argue that there is a fragmentation between those two groups in the Armenian movement.

Additionally, it is worth stressing that this picture cannot be as neat sometimes. For instance, in the interviews, regarding the extroversive group, some participants from the Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association (ACSA) and *Nor Zartonk* posit that they ideologically criticize the "liberal, or being on the side of supports for the accession to the European Union" position of *AGOS* and Hrant Dink Foundation, whereas *AGOS* and Hrant Dink Foundation express their discomfort with the Association and some of *Nor Zartonk*'s excessive reactions to some incidents. However, after the participants from the extroversive group explain a few points on which they differentiate themselves from the other new civil institutions, they add they feel closer adoptively and even recall that one person is an active member of both ACSA and *Nor Zartonk,* and Hrant Dink Foundation. Moreover, the picture is not neat for the introversive group, either. Despite the fact that some participants from this group sometimes are possessed by the doubt about the position

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[244] Günay Göksu Özdağan, Füsun Üstel, Karin Karakaşlı, and Ferhat Kentel, *Türkiye'de Ermeniler, Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş* (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009).
[245] Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Ohannes Kılıçdağı, *Hearing Turkey's Armenians: Issues, Demands and Policy Recommendations,"* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012).

of the Patriarchate or the Foundations in the Armenian community, they clearly express that they support the significant existence of the religious connotations in the Armenian community with their historical institutions—the Patriarch, Patriarchate, Foundations, alumni associations and schools—for their survival. Therefore, by keeping this picture with its unclear situations in mind, I prefer to examine the Armenian movement through the fragmentation between the conservative group and the new civil institutions.

Furthermore, the categories are named in accordance with the interviews about the different ways preferred by the groups to solve the problems of Armenians. Firstly, one group, which gathered around the newly established platforms after the mid-1990s, argues that it is a necessity to discuss the political, cultural, economical and historical problems of Armenians in public; i.e., in the larger society (referring to outside the Armenian community within Turkey), in order to solve the problems. Accordingly, besides their own issues, they assert that Armenians should be engaged in the issues of the larger society. More specifically, they should have connections with the other minorities' movements in Turkey because they believe they have similar issues with them. Moreover, I examine that their programs are not only about the issues of Armenians, but also about the general issues in Turkey. Therefore, I call them "the extroversive group." Secondly, the other group, which has been gathered around the historical institutions of Armenians, is relatively more *introversive* than the extroversive group in the sense of solving the problems. They assert that being extroversive is dangerous for the survival of Armenians. Therefore, they propose to solve the problems within the Armenian *cemaat* (community). In this light, I prefer to call them "the introversive group."

2. The Three Main Reasons for the Fragmentation

Analysis of my fieldwork associatively with the social movements literature reveals that the fragmentation in the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s relies on three conceptual reasons articulated by the participants: different ideological stances of the actors[246], the current political developments including opportunities and constraints,[247] and reading the history differently by the actors[248]. As I indicate in my literature review, the studies on fragmentations and diversity within social movements—which argue that there could be a drive to deconstruct the fixed identities,[249] there could be multiple identities,[250] and there could be difficulty in creating a collective identity as "us" against "them"[251] within social movements—criticize the paradigm of collective identity. Those studies argue that social movements might have diversity, fragmentation or heterogeneity among the actors rather than building upon a collective identity, and have different reasons for each fragment to participate in the movement besides the current opportunities and constraints. In this respect, studies on diversity in social movements also provide the

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[246] Jo Reger, "Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism," in *Identity Work in Social Movements,* ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002); Midred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002).

[247] Mary Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3 (November 1, 1997); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002).

[248] Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette, "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002).

[249] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995).

[250] Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008).

[251] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

critiques of the new social movements and political process theories arguing movements as a whole raise their voices around a collective identity on a specific issue, and around collective action amid the current opportunities and constraints, respectively. Therefore, in this chapter, I will explore *the subjects* on which two groups of Armenians are fragmented through *their reasons.* In light of this literature, my fieldwork revealed that the fragmentation relies on three reasons: different ideological stances of the actors, the recent political developments including current opportunities and constraints in Turkey and in the Armenian society, and reading the history differently by the actors. In this section, I will introduce the reasons for the fragmentation in detail.

Firstly, as in the study of a feminist movement in New York[252], of the women's movement in Turkey[253] and some other studies[254], movements have experienced ideological differences among their actors. In accordance with their ideologies, some people, as a group within movements, could come together and develop their own *strategies, goals and framings* differently from the groups of another ideologies and they can be antagonistic to each other.[255] In this respect, significant fragmentations emerge within movements. In the Armenian movement, as the participants indicate, the most usual ideological difference appears between people from the extroversive group who call themselves "leftist, Marxist, socialist or

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[252] Jo Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002).

[253] Cagla Diner and Şule Toktaş, "Waves of feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish Women's Movements in an Era of Globalization," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.1 (March 2010).

[254] Midred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.); Scott A. Hunt and Robert Benford, "Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement" *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 22 (1994).

[255] Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women." *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002): 722.

liberal," and people from the introversive group who are called "conservative" because of their close relations with the religious and historical institutions. In the interviews, for instance, the participants from *AGOS,* who took part in the establishment of *AGOS*, express that Hrant Dink, the chief editor of *AGOS,* was a leftist and remember that in his writings the socialist/liberal perspective was often encountered. They also say that some of the members of the newspaper have a connection with the leftist/ liberal perspective. Moreover, one participant from Hrant Dink Foundation splits the Armenian society into two groups: "the leftists Armenians" who are around the recently established civil institutions, especially as a result of the influence of *AGOS,* and "the conservative Armenians" who are around the historical institutions of Armenians, such as the Patriarchate and Christianity. She also says that although all of them, including her, do not identify themselves utterly as leftist—but feel close to the leftist ideology—the great part of the society considers them leftists and those who deviate from the religious values of Armenians. Additionally, although they posit that not all of them are socialist, the interviews with the participants from ACSA and *Nor Zartonk,* show that people in those institutions have an affiliation with socialist and liberalist ideology. As I indicate in the section of "the issues of fragmentation," because of their affiliation with socialist or liberal ideology, the participants from the extroversive group produces more different framing, strategy, goals about the subjects than the introversive group.

Secondly, some studies[256] on diversity in movements argue that political developments including constraints and opportunities could be a factor for

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[256] Mary Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3 (November 1, 1997); Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002).

fragmentation in a movement in reference to the political process theory. However, unlike the political process theory, those studies do not consider the movement as a whole; rather, they consider the effects of the opportunities or the constraints on the different, fragmented actors or fractions in the movement. In that sense, the studies on diversity in gay-lesbian movements[257], women's movements[258], ethnic movements[259] and so on, argue that political opportunities and constraints could cause the fragmentation in addition to its effect on raising the voice of the movement.

I explore that this reason works in the Armenian movement in two ways: the extent of the political access provided to the different actors of the movement amid political developments, and the interpretation of the current developments by the actors itself. First, regarding the political access, as Mary Bernstein argues, those who are provided with more political access by the state would be more moderate, and prefer to move on in cooperation with the state policy, whereas the rest would be more radical.[260] During my research, I encountered that with respect to its long-term historical existence, the social circle of the Patriarchate including the Foundations; i.e. the introversive group, have been provided more access to the polity, political actors and the state compared to the extroversive group. Therefore, while the introversive group is more satisfied with the current developments and hopeful about the future, the new institutions repeatedly say that what has happened by the state is not enough and they are not hopeful for the future of Armenians. In addition to their affiliation with the socialist/ liberal ideology, within the atmosphere of the

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[257] Mary Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3 (November 1, 1997).

[258] Jo Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," *Gender and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 1, 2002).

[259] Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation," *European Journal of Kurdish Studies* 10, (2009).

[260] Bernstein, "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement, 539.

democratization discussions in Turkey after the 1980s, the extroversive group prefers to come forward with their civil platforms independently from the state and the Patriarchate, whom the state has treated as the head of Armenians in the past.

Second, as Tezcür explores in the Kurdish movement, the movement actors' different reactions to and interpretations of the recent developments in Turkey brought along differentiation in the strategies and ways chosen and resorted to for solving problems by those different actors.[261] Therefore, their different interpretations of the political developments caused fragmentation in the movement. For instance, in regard to the concept of being Armenian, Muslim people from Dersim, who were forcefully converted into Islam in the past, have started to explore and declared their own Armenian identity for 6 or 7 years. This is considered as a significant development by Armenians, as one participant indicates, because until that day, there had not been a Muslim identifying him or herself as an Armenian.[262] However, interpretation of this development differently by these two groups—the introversive group does not accept those people's claims and considers them "dangerous", the participants from the extroversive group criticize the attitude of the introversive one and support those people's claims—caused a fragmentation on this issue between the two groups.

Finally, reading the history differently by these two groups arose out of the interviews as a source of the fragmentation more often than not, although the social movements literature does not address this too much. As Colin Baker and Michael Lavalette argue, the configuration of the past also becomes a significant factor in the

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[261] Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation," *European Journal of Kurdish Studies* 10 (2009).
[262] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.

contention among the actors in a movement.[263] For instance, in regard to the patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/ community, reading the history of the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate differently creates the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups over the type of the civil representation. The introversive group argues that since, the Patriarch was the head of the community and all civil councils according to the 1863 Regulations of Armenian *Millet*, today the Patriarchate must be the head of the community, and the head of the civil representation.[264] However, the extroversive group argues that the 1863 Regulations representr the restriction of the power of the Patriarchate and *amira*s by the intellectuals and craftsmen. Moreover, they argue that the Patriarch was a symbolic authority; the civil councils consisted of civil actors and governed by them. Therefore, they claim that the civil representation of Armenians should not be under the authority of the Patriarchate to which only the religious authority could be assigned.[265]

Consequently, analysis of my research of the Armenian movements shows that the fragmentation among the introversive and extroversive groups over the issues explored below emerges because of different ideologies of the actors, the recent political developments including constraints and opportunities in Turkey and in the Armenian society, and various readings of the history by the actors. Moreover, it is worth noting that that those separate categories of the reasons could be related to

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[263] Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette, "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lockout, September-October 1995," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 143.
[264] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013; Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.
[265] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013; Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

each other sometimes: two or three reasons together could cause fragmentation on one issue.

3.   The Three Main Issues of the Fragmentation

My fieldwork revealed that the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups occurs over three main issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community.

Now, I will examine the concept of being Armenian as the first issue of the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups.

3.1.   On the Concept of Being Armenian

Although all participants have some common concerns and understanding about being Armenian, together with ideological differences of those parties and their different readings of history, the new developments since 1995 in Turkey have brought along some cleavages and dissidences more apparent among Armenians in Istanbul in the sense of Armenianness. In the interviews, the different perspectives regarding the concept of being Armenian came to the surface through the following categories: the profile of Armenians in Turkey, being introversive or extroversive of Armenians, the relations of Armenians with the other movements in Turkey, and the extent of the significance of religion for being Armenian. In this section, I will examine these categories individually through the reasons behind the fragmentations in social movements.

3.1.1.   Who are Those Armenians in Turkey?

Regarding the general profile of Armenians in Turkey, all participants from both parties, namely the introversive and extroversive groups, accept that they are both ethnically Armenian and citizens of the Republic of Turkey, because their predecessors lived in Anatolia for years even before Turks came into Anatolia. One interviewee from the Patriarchate describes the situation in this way:

> For example, we have two identities in Turkey. I am Turk, a citizen of Turkey. I am not a person who belongs to the Turkish race. I am a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. We have been in this territory for five thousand years. My ancestors have been here. I don't have any organic relation with the Republic of Armenia today. However, I am Armenian as well. I have an Armenian identity. I do not have the right to reject one of them and sublimate the other. My homeland is here. […] In Anatolia, we have lived together for years together. [266]

> We are Armenians and citizens of this country. We are paying our taxes to this country"[267]

This description—Armenians have two identities, one is to be Armenian, the other is to be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey—is strongly articulated in the interviews with the introversive group. They assume and admit that this description represents the whole profile of Armenians in Turkey. For instance, they disregard their connections with Armenians of the Republic of Armenia, although some Armenians of the Republic of Armenia migrate to Turkey to work.

Therefore, the introversive group's perception on the profile of Armenians in Turkey is a bid more rigid and constant. However, the interviewees from the extroversive group displays a consistent tendency to comment on various Armenian people living in Turkey. For instance, by asserting that Armenians in Turkey might be divided into three categories, a participant from *AGOS* states

> It is a necessity to consider the Armenian society with its several features. There are different Armenians in Turkey now. It was not like that in the past. Today we know that there are Armenians, who are citizens of the Republic of

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[266] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013
[267] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

Turkey, who were born in Turkey and whose parents were born in Turkey and are citizens of Turkey, who came to Turkey from Armenia because of economic problems after its independence. Moreover, there are *kripto* Armenians who have started to appear for six or seven years. I belong to the first group. However, Armenians who are citizens of Turkey are not unitary too. They are people who have different perspectives in accordance with their political position in this group. [268]

Unlike the statement of the participant from the Patriarchate who disregards the relations of Armenians in Turkey with the Republic of Armenia, one day when I visited the Hrant Dink Foundation, I met a female author from Armenia who is also part of a project of the Foundation. Moreover, one participant from ACSA indicates that

If you are in the Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, it means as well that you would have connections with Armenia. [269]

In addition to different perspectives on the various Armenians in Turkey, when I ask one of the early questions in the question list "Are there any groups or parties to which you feel close or distant?" I take two different answers from these different groups in accordance with the fragmentation. With the influence of their ideological stance, the extroversive group clearly explaine their close feeling about the leftists, some liberal groups and with each other, but stood away from the introversive group. However, although the participants from the introversive group accept that there are different perspectives and different voices in the community and claim that these differences must be in harmony, some of them answer the question that the integrity of the community is not in question. With the influence of their reading history of Armenians and their conservative stance, they expect Armenians to be in harmony with the precepts of the Patriarchate.

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[268] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.
[269] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

> A fragmentation in the community consisting of 60 thousands is not a concern. However, there are Armenians abroad. Armenians are dispersed in this sense. However, a fragmentation is not a concern.[270]

Some from the introversive group explicate their integrity with one single identity; that is, to be Armenian and a citizen of the Republic. Because they have close relations with the state, they prefer to be a citizen of Turkey and ethnically Armenian. Moreover, they argue that identifying them with a different expression than this identity would not be profitable in the sense of solving the problems of Armenians. As one participant from the Patriarchate says, the demands should be limited to the demands of people who represent themselves as both Armenian and citizens of Turkey in order to continue the improved relations with the state. Moreover, unlike the extroversive group who does not believe that they are treated as citizens of the country by the state, one participant from the Foundations says that

> We are integrated as a community. Integrated. If you are ask me where I situate myself as an individual in our community, I have one identity, I am a citizen of the Republic of Turkey and a person of the Armenian minority group. I do not have the luxury of considering myself in a different position because I cannot admit it. Otherwise, we will lose the connections with the larger society. We all as individuals are the core of this community. [271]

In brief, the perception of the introversive group regarding the profile of Armenians in Turkey is limited to the expression of "being Armenian and a citizen of Turkey." However, the extroversive group considers all differences within the Armenian society because of their ideological differences, their reading history differently, and current political developments.

3.1.2.   Extroversive or Introversive Armenians?

The extroversive group gathered around the new civil institutions, which intend to publicly discuss both the Armenian issues and the problems of "the larger society"

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[270] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013.
[271] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013

(they use it to refer to all people of Turkey outside Armenians), which started to come into being after 1995. The interviews reveal that there is a huge discomfort felt by the introversive group because of "excessive" extroversive works of those civil platforms: their controversial works on the 1915 massacre, the grievances of the past experience by Armenians, and their critiques of the Patriarchate and the community. The participants from those institutions are aware of the critiques made against them and generally they answer those critiques. Therefore, by looking at those statements in detail, it is possible to see the differences and fragmentation between those actors of the Armenian movement on the concept of being Armenian.

The first discussion is initiated on if the Armenian community/ society should be introversive or not. Both parties have primarily accepted the introverted character of Armenians for years in the Republic of Turkey and its influence on their understanding of being Armenian by positing the grievances of the past pertaining to Armenians in Turkey as a reason:

> Unfortunately, we have remained in this closed shell until 1998. Our parents raised us by warning incessantly, "be careful my child!" We know the period of the 1980s and there was the ASALA terror […] Our inverted history was imposed by the state until the 2000s on us and our Turkish brothers and sisters consider Armenians evil, and dirty. We were brought up always in this situation.[272]

> The Armenian society felt the 1915 trauma heavily during the republican history. There were a lot of events that made us think that 1915 has continued and we would be the target of it… We were under risk, for example, in the period from 1915 to 1925 and in the perspective of Turkey about WWII. Armenians have been employed for the construction of roads under the name of "20 Kura Askerlik." They were not armed. Therefore, it was a common thought that they would be killed. We, Armenians of Turkey, have tried to survive by ourselves, on our own as a natural reflex when we have been through this suppression.[273]

As a reflection of this introvert character, one participant from the bible reading group stated:

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[272] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013
[273] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.

> There is a general statement among Armenians used to warn themselves not to raise their voices in the large society; "My name is Kabahat (Fault), surname is Kabahatyan (adding the general suffix "yan" to the Armenian surnames meaning "the son of")[274]

Therefore, all parties agree that being extroversive or apparent in the larger society would be beneficial for solving the problems of Armenians, especially for the racial discrimination to which Armenians have been exposed for years in their everyday, political, economical and cultural lives in Turkey. However, reading the history differently brings along different perspectives on the extent of the introversive and extroversive character of Armenians, and also different demands for future implementations about solving the problems of Armenians. For instance, "some conservative parties," or the participants from the introversive group argue that this past was not a set of "suppression" conducted only against Armenians in Turkey, but a "discrimination or otherization" implemented to all minorities in Turkey.

> There is a recent effort to escape from suppression because of identity […] There was a structure that split the society into Muslim and non-Muslim groups that relied on the *ümmet* system of the Ottoman Empire. If we look at it in the context of the Republic of Turkey, we took over what we wanted from the Ottoman Empire and we disregarded what we did not. Then there emerged problems, gaps. This is considered suppression of identity. Actually there is no suppression because of identity. However, when we consider the historical developments, there is an "otherization," which resulted because of trust issues among people. It is not only a system that emerged between Muslims, Christians and Jews, but also among the members of these communities.[275]

Additionally, because the dominant perception is that it is possible to encounter this kind of situation all over the world, and they think that the current developments about democratization in Turkey would provide new indirect gains, and they have fears of the ASSALA events that brought along their visibility in a pejorative sense in the larger society, the introversive group argues that the tendency of the new civil

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[274] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club and an Alumni Association, February 20, 2013.

[275] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.

institutions to discuss these grievances of Armenians publicly will not bring any advantage and would be dangerous like the situation after the ASSALA events.

> It is futile to complain about some of what they did in the past by demonstrating that all situations, which are incompatible with human rights, are because of identity, and by bringing the grievances and problems of the past into question on the agenda. The 1909 Adana Incident, the 1915 Deportation of Armenians, *Varlık Vergisi,* and the 6-7 September Incidents…There is no end of talk.[276]

Accordingly, during almost all interviews with the members or the partisans of the new civil platforms, as answer to the question, "Do Armenians want to discuss the controversial issues of the past like the 1909 Adana incidents, the 1915 massacre, the capital tax, and so on?" most of the participants argue that majority of Armenians— many of them refer to the introversive group—do not want to discuss those issues. Therefore, it is fair to argue that those groups' understandings of being extroversive are different from each other.

> The economic concerns of Armenians of Turkey are more than anything. Of course, they desire a solution for the issue of 1915. However, if you offer that those issues will remain in cold storage and will never be discussed, most of them will admit it. Being on the front burner, these issues are inclined to show Armenians as traitors. Therefore, they don't want to be on the front burner. They get stressed. Craftsmen etc. They have concerns about survival.[277]

> For Armenians in Turkey, it (discussions on the grievances of the past) should be over, we shall move on.[278]

Unlike the introversive group, amid the current developments and because of ideological differences, since the mid-1990s, the extroversive group emerged and have emphasized that there were both incredible suppression on and discrimination against Armenians together with the other minorities during the Republican history. They assert that they need to discuss publicly the past issues besides the current

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[276] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013
[277] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.
[278] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.

problems of Armenians amid the democratization and demilitarization discussions in Turkey. Moreover, by emphasizing that they are liberationist, they have acquaintances who were engaged in the 1970s leftist movements, and they have sympathy for the leftist ideology; they think that the exploited and disadvantaged groups should claim their own rights publicly. Therefore, the stance about the necessity of being more visible in the public—that began with *AGOS*'s discussions about the past of Armenians in Turkey, the position of the Patriarchate, the transparency issue of the administration of the Armenian Foundations, and the relation with the Republic of Armenia—has become influential among the extroversive group. Moreover, all interviewees from these civil institutions exemplified their works about uncovering the undiscussed issues of Armenians and their voluntarily participation in the discussions about the general issues of Turkey.

Yet, some of the interviewees from the introversive group called those works "the work providing political appearance" and find it more problematic. For instance, one of those participants argues that cultural and artistic opening to the larger society would be more appropriate because she considers a political appearance of the leftists like those in *AGOS* is and would be dangerous and not useful.

> I want the Armenian society to be more extroversive. Maybe, in all minority groups, there is the same situation of living in a closed shell, I don't know. Personally, I am not comfortable with this. There is a political development. However, the thing that I want is to have developments in social life. We are a society that is inclined to artistic and cultural works as a national character, and we have produced magnificent works. We do all these voluntarily… These works could be presented in very limited places. However, there are works which could be presented in many places. I say this is not because of fear but because of shyness… Artistic openings could be a very good initiation. For me, it is futile to begin from a political place to be recognized and known. I don't say that it is wrong or right, but it would not bring benefit.[279]

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[279] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013.

In short, the discussion on the extroversive/ introversive Armenians shows that although both groups acknowledge the necessity of being more visible on the agenda of Turkey, unlike the extroversive group, the introversive group thinks that the attempts of those new institutions for making Armenians extroversive is excessive and dangerous.

Moreover, in relation to those institutions' attempts, the participants from the introversive group criticize the people from the civil platforms in two ways. Firstly, there is a concern that this extroversive group does not have the knowledge of "how someone becomes a true Armenian" and what "the true Armenian culture" is. As one participant from the social circle of the Patriarchate asserts several times during the interview,

> People who suggest keeping their culture alive are people who do not utterly embrace the culture. In other words, they want to keep a culture alive that they do not know. They might not embrace their culture maybe because of the fact that they could not have the chance to learn it. Maybe because of their not being interested in […] Of course to keep it alive and to protect it, they have to learn about it. If they can't learn, they have to spent time to learn and embrace it so that they can protect and transmit it. This is the entire problem.[280]

In addition, some parties have concerns about being assimilated into the larger society because of these new civil platforms' "excessive" extroversive works. One participant from the bible reading group and a dance club asserts when I ask what he thinks about Hrant Dink Foundation and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association (ACSA), respectively,

> I think they produce beneficial works. It is a foundation that has opened the society to the public. This is nice. However, in opening it to the public, it should not wander away from the *cemaat* […] Nor Zartonk, Hrant Dink Foundation, these have had an edge over the Patriarchate. Their efforts are a kind of a transformation movement from "*cemaat*" to "society." It is good to be integrated into the larger society. In the meantime, it is bad too. When we look at the Armenian society in America, France, we see that they are so

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[280] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013

assimilated as much they are integrated into the larger society. Consequently, their religious traditions are exhausted. We should be opened to the public by introducing our culture to the public. Never should we wander away from the *cemaat*. I heard about this association (ACSA) for the first time from you. I am normally acquainted with all associations of the *cemaat*. This shows that they become distant in their relationships with us. Then, how can they introduce themselves to the public, outside the *cemaat*? There wouldn't be any values of their culture to introduce.[281]

An interview with the member of *Nor Zartonk* and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association also shows that they are acquainted with these critiques. Therefore, they develop counter arguments by giving some concrete examples that criticize the inefficiency of the introversive group in reproducing the cultural values of Armenians. The interviewees obviously emphasize their ideological differences and their different interpretations of the current developments:

> Their concept of Armenianness… is outdated. They argue that they support Armenian values not to be assimilated. They criticize us who are from liberationist groups and they say that "We are against assimilation, but you are so extroversive." However, actually there is a problem of assimilation in the place they situate themselves in because the society fades away because of conflicts and its being introversive permanently. It won't work with petty nationalism. I think, personally, that it is possible both to support a liberationist and a leftist or liberal perspective, and to embrace and protect identity politics.[282]

More specifically, the participants from the extroversive group criticize the Patriarchate's inefficiency on the issue of the Armenian language which is accepted by all parties participating in the research as a significant component of being Armenian. In this sense, by remembering their socialist attitudes, they express that what they are doing in order to improve and protect the Armenian culture is through being an organized society:

> For example, today when we look at the conservative groups, they do not succeed at instilling the significance of the Armenian language to the young generation. They always have an emphasis on religion. However, our social circle is really successful on this issue. There are very different people

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[281] Interview with the participant from The Bible Reading Group- a Dance Club, February 21, 2013.

[282] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

coming to learn the language of Armenians… For me, it is a more convenient way. We are succeeding by getting organized.[283]

The same perspective is articulated by one participant who was a witness to the establishment of *AGOS* which is published in Turkish rather than the Armenian language, unlike other two newspapers.

> When *AGOS* was established, some people approached it emotionally. They said 'Armenians have already started to disappear, you, too, take it a step further with this newspaper. People no longer read in Armenian, would rather read in Turkish.' It is right that some Armenians could give up reading in the Armenian language. However, around *AGOS,* some young people who are engaged in *AGOS*, and even who are not Armenian, have started to take Armenian language courses. This is not a thing that they (the introversive group) could conceive. They still don't conceive it. They ask, why do they want to learn Armenian? What would be the benefit of this language to people? Those people haven't taught the language to their children because it wouldn't be beneficial anyway. Now they can't conceive why these people take this course. Here, ideological issues emerged. I am able to understand why they take it. If you can't imagine anything else than medicine and engineering for a career to your child, the Armenian language would not be necessary for you.[284]

Through their ideological differences, the same person also criticizes that the social circle of the Patriarchate or the introversive group considers the Armenian language as a sacred thing that should be known but is not interested in its usage in everyday life.

> Look here! If I want to translate a Playboy magazine to Armenian, they would break my head. Their understanding of Armenian is different from mine. They consider it sacred. It is better not to be in their lives, but it should exist. We should know, but it is not a necessity to use it. As long as a Playboy magazine isn't published in Armenian, we won't be able to place Armenian in life. It is what we are trying to do.[285]

Accordingly, two life stories of the two members of Hrant Dink Foundation narrate that although they had had an edge over the *society*—they indicate that they prefer to use the word the Armenian "society" politically rather than *cemaat* (community)—

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[283] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.
[284] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.
[285] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.

after having started to engage in the Foundation, they had the chance to learn better about the problems of the Armenian society, Armenian culture, Armenian language and the perspective of people about the issues of Armenians. Therefore, these stories are examples narrated not to acknowledge the critique by the introversive group that the extroversive group causes assimilation of Armenians and deviation from "the true notion of being Armenian." In other words, they narrate these stories to assert that they are more engaged with Armenian society and its issues than before.

In short, while the participants from the introversive group assert that the extroversive group does not protect their culture because they have an extroversive posture that could cause assimilation, mostly ideologically, the extroversive group argues on the contrary. The extroversive group claims that they protect and improve the Armenian culture and values more than the conservative people because they use the values in everyday life without confining them to the sacred life of only Armenians, like in the case of the Armenian language.

The second critique by the introversive group towards the extroversive group is that the new civil platforms are not necessary because there have been already established institutions in the community. This shows that this critique is to stand against any deviation from the already available and established structural order of Armenians. They emphasize that the historical institutions of Armenians—the foundations, the alumni associations, the church choirs and so on, were enough to deal with the current issue of Armenians. When I asked the question "How do you feel about the new institutions?" one participant answered

> I both think and not think that those new associations create fragmentation in the *cemaat*. They have an inclination to achieve their own goals and solve their own problems rather than acting together and trying to achieve a common goal. Of course, different voices must exist. However, it must exist in harmony […] For example, it is very important to know why these institutions were established. Moreover, all sorts of social infrastructures for

associations are available in the *cemaat.* A cultural association? We have already had cultural alumni associations. Do you want to establish a choir? We have already had the choirs of our churches. Well, you want to establish an association of Istanbulites? But then, all associations consist of Istanbulites. As long as they serve a true goal, I believe that they must exist. On the other hand, I am also praying for people, who would be deceived by those institutions, not to do something wrong. [286]

In opposition to these critiques, the participants from Nor Zartonk and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association state that these associations and foundations do not represent the opinions of the society at all and they are not so effective in political issues and not optimal places for the recent developments.

In the Armenian society, when you say an association, they do not understand anything else than the alumni associations of the Armenian schools. It is not fair to say that they are passive, but those associations consist of non-political people for having fun or making a way for marriage of young Armenians.[287]

Of course, in those associations, the number of activities is limited. Because they have had a traditionalized structure over the years, it is not possible to have various activities or political activities there […] They don't focus on anything. It is just for a connection between the schools' alumnis, for their entertainment, I do not know, for alumnis coming to talk about something. There are some alumni associations who are dealing with dance and theater.[288]

In short, the second discussion illustrates that the introversive group does not want to digress from the already established order of Armenians by depending on their history, unlike the new institutions that are interpreting the current developments differently and argue that the past is outdated. Generally, whereas the introversive group are not comfortable with the extroversive works of the new civil institutions and interpret them as the reasons for assimilation and deviation from the established order in respect to the history and the significance of being conservative

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[286] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013

[287] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

[288] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

and their current access to the polity, the extroversive group believes that being extroversive and getting connections with the larger society with updated ways would be beneficial for the problems of Armenians, especially improving and protecting Armenian culture and values.

3.1.3. The Relation with Other Movements and Groups in Turkey

One question asked to the participants in this research is "What do you think about the other movements in Turkey like the woman, gay-lesbian, Kurdish, Alewi and Islamic movements? Do you think that Armenian issues have some commonalities with those movements?" I decided to ask this question when I read the articles on the websites of the new civil institutions and I encountered the rhetoric and the framework of their works intended to include diverse issues in Turkey rather than only Armenians'. For instance, regarding their platforms, as one participant from *Nor Zartonk* and ASCA states

> It is an organization that supports seriously intellectual initiatives, peace, equality, and freedom in Turkey and the world. At the time of its establishment, it consisted of Armenians. Now there are not only Armenian members. We thought that it would be problematic if it is a concern only of Armenians. Because we thought that it would restrict us, it would be transformed into a nationalist direction; we thought that we should say something about not only the Armenian society, but also the society of Turkey and the world… Our words don't only contain the problems of the Armenian minority group. We are engaged and involved in different minorities, organizations like HDK, People's Democratic Congress (Halkların Demokratik Kongresi), People's Constitution (Halkların Anayasası) who consist of different groups, ethnic groups. Today, Norradyo (a radio station of Nor Zartonk) is not only the voice of Armenians. We are broadcasting in Georgian, Pomak. Our aim is to write down Kurd, Roman, Turk, women in place of Armenian… Although we don't have any institutional relations with other movements entirely, there are some of our friends who are engaged in the LGBT, women's, and Kurdish movements. There are some who participated with us from the women, gay-lesbian, and environment

movements. One of our friends is writing about homophobia. Women from *Nor Zartonk* held some panel discussions.[289]

For instance, commenting on their relations with and their perspectives on the Kurdish issue, one participant from *Nor Zartonk* exemplifies their co-organized activities with an organization, HDK which mostly consists of Kurds, for the recent attacks on the Armenian women in Samatya.

> *Nor Zartonk* is trying to do something, to introduce itself (to the public). It is trying to act together with different peoples because it is not only the problem of Armenians. Maybe Armenians are one of the people who have been exposed to a great massacre in the last 100 years, but there has been a civil war for 30 years in this country. There is always a lethal system. For instance, we organize a demonstration together with HDK of which we are one of the constituents. We participated in the demonstrations to protest the Roboski massacre and the demonstrations of Saturday mothers inasmuch as we are a part of HDK. We always try to raise our voices. Our voice is weak alone.[290]

Moreover, we can see the same rhetoric, "this is not only the problem of Armenians" in the vision of participants from *AGOS* and Hrant Dink Foundation. During the interviews of the participant from these institutions, because of their political ideology, they also indicate that their works do not exclude the other movements and other exploited and disadvantaged groups' issues. For instance, one from Hrant Dink Foundation states that they directly and indirectly deal with the issues of other groups. She referred to their projects titled "The Hate Speeches in Media (*Medya'da Nefret Söylemi*) and she emphasizes that they report on all hate speeches and discriminations in the media not only against Armenians but also all ethnic and religious groups in Turkey.

Contrary to this stance of the extroversive group, the question about the relations of Armenians with the other movements is not answered in a positive way

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[289] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.
[290] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

utterly by the introversive group. Some of them insist that the Armenian case should be read differently from the other movements' issues for two reasons. First, although to some extent the relations with the larger society, and other minorities and groups are welcomed, the participants from the introversive group consider that it could cause some problems for the future of Armenians. They have some concerns that some movements, like the Kurdish movement might use the Armenian issues in favor of their own interests. For instance, as some participants from *AGOS* and Hrant Dink Foundation told me, the introversive group criticizes the news of *AGOS* about the Kurdish issue because they are afraid of not being supported by the Kurdish people, who they consider the perpetrator of the 1915 massacre as being part of *Hamidiye Alayları*. Therefore, as I was told in the interviews, some from the introversive group no longer considers *AGOS* the newspaper of the Armenian "community."[291]They asked for the news and pictures merely about Armenians' own local activities, such as meetings and marriage ceremonies. In the sense of this concern of being cheated by the other movements, the two participants from the Foundations declare that they do not accept that the Kurdish issue and Armenian issue are similar, and explaine their concerns as follows;

> We are invited to a lot of civil society institutions and express our opinions. You can't ignore those movements who are part of society like the Kurdish, or women's movements. For example, our Kurdish brother and sisters recently support us very much. However, we try to be prudent in these sort of situations because if the wind blows from west to east today, it might blow from east to west tomorrow [...] In order not to be cheated by those movements later, we should be careful. Armenian's problem is absolutely different from the rest. There are different tragic incidents we have experienced. Therefore, I never and ever admit that we have similar issues with the Kurdish people, although they, too, have experienced some specific problems. Our issue is not similar to theirs. However, we believe that if the Kurdish problem is solved, it will pave the way for Turkey. And we will benefit from this gate as well.[292]

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[291] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013
[292] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013

With the Kurdish people and others, maybe we have an increase of relations in the process of democratization. When I get some rights, Kurds will join us as well. Civil society institutions do this. However, I do not support the increased relations that much. If there is something that should be supported, human beings could support it. Not to be cheated, it is better not to have that close relation with those people. If I cheat you, and you cheat me, is that right? [293]

Second, in addition to these concerns, because of different interpretations of the history, especially their emphasis on the minority status of non-Muslim communities—Greeks, Armenians and Jews—legalized in the Treaty of Lausanne, the introversive group argues that theyare only legal minorities in Turkey. Therefore, they assert that their case is totally different form Kurds, women, the LGBT people, Alewis and Muslims who currently have no legal minority status given in the Treaty.

There is a different perspective about the Kurdish people. They are not a minority group. Greek, Armenians and Jews are the minority groups which are recorded. There are no other minority groups in Turkey. Although Assyrians are a community, they do not have the status of being a minority group. Moreover, Kurds are Muslim, so the Republic of Turkey does not consider them a minority group just thanks to their Kurdish identity. Moreover, Alewites come and say that they are a minority group. Whereas we try to integrate, we encounter people who try to disintegrate […] Therefore, the Kurdish movement and the others have such different issues than ours. [294]

The statuses of nations included in the the Lausanne (the Treaty of Lausanne), were so different. There were some like Kurds and Assyrians who were not given a status of minority groups, but are minority groups in practice. They should claim their rights as citizens of this country. However, the issues should be considered separately because there are differences arising out of the past. Discrimination should not be resorted to, but the differences should be recognized.[295]

From this point of view, during the interviews with the introversive group, I also asked the question to all participants "What about the relations with the non-Muslim minorities whose status was legalized in the Treaty of Lausanne: Greeks and Jews?" Because of the introverted and close position of Jews to having the identity of

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[293] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013.

[294] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013

[295] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013.

being Turk besides being Jewish, the introversive group indicated their cold feelings about Jews. However, some of them expressed that comparatively to Kurds, because they are not Muslim, they have more close feelings for those non-Muslim communities. Moreover, one participant from an Armenian Foundation posits that thanks to the recent development pertaining to the seized properties of the Foundations, they come close with those non-Muslim minorities and sometimes they work on this problem together. He also indicates that they have more common problems with those minorities than the others.

However, the extroversive group does not have these kinds of concerns of being cheated or having a priority about groups among minorities in Turkey. On their ideological stance and their limited political access, they explain that they want to raise their voices for all injustice issues on the agenda. Some of them remind me that, because of this aim of them, they are accused of being Kurd's man or they are ridiculed as taking side of LGBT people. One participant from *AGOS* explicates that the problems of all groups and movements which claim their rights are common and they support all these groups because their ideology, their understanding from history and the current developments require them to do this.

> The attitude of *AGOS* towards these movements is evident. *AGOS* protected the rights of gays and lesbians. Therefore, it encountered some criticisms of some groups. They ridiculed it… Not taking women's side is impossible. They are the half of our planet. For me, not supporting women is because of being ignorant and being unfamiliar with their issues. I think that the same ignorance that causes people not to know about Armenians, with whom they have lived together over one thousand years, also causes not knowing about women. Armenians, as a disadvantaged group, should take the side of Kurds. When we did this a bit more, there were some said that Kurds bought out *AGOS*. We found it unnecessary to answer them. In *AGOS*, there are Kurdish, Turkish, and Armenian reporters. Protecting the rights of Kurds must be a duty of a newspaper like *AGOS*. Even the rights of Assyrians. Although we have some disagreements with them about churches, we take raising the voice of Assyrians as a goal inasmuch as there is no newspaper that does this. We encountered some questions like "Was *AGOS* appropriated by Assyrians?" Even though Gypsies, Armenian Gypsies think that we are against them, we

take protecting their rights as a goal. Of course, *AGOS* will take the sides of all those people whose rights are not given.[296]

Consequently, it is obvious that the approaches of the two groups towards the relations with the other movements and groups like women, the gay-lesbian communities, Muslims, Kurds and Alewis, and non-Muslim minorities illustrate the fragmentations on the concept of being Armenian. In this respect, the introversive group thinks that the case of Armenians is idiosyncratic and *sui generis* and resembles only the non-Muslim minorities' who are the only ones given legal status in the Treaty of Lausanne, so it should not be compared to others. However, the extroversive group ideologically supports that they should be in cooperation with all exploited groups without discrimination because the case of Armenians is similar to all. In other words, although all participants have sympathy with all other movements and groups, unlike the extroversive group, the introversive group has concern on the extent of the relations with them and proposes a limit for the relation.

> This solidarity should be supported. However, it must be 5 or 15 percent of the whole. It mustn't be 80 percent. Otherwise, I do not admit it. First of all, I should give my support to my own issue. Of course, I will support them, but this support should not take most of my energy.[297]

3.1.4. Religion and the Concept of Being Armenian

From the history of Armenians, religion is one of the significant components of being Armenian and they are proud of being one of the first ethnic groups who accepted Christianity as a formal religion. Therefore, from the Ottoman Empire to the present, there is a shared and common history regarding the fusion of being Armenian and religion as it was revealed during the interviews as well. Both the extroversive and introversive groups approve of the significance of religion in the Armenian identity.

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[296] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.
[297] Interview with the participant from The Bible Reading Group, February 18, 2013.

However, according to the interviews, there is a split between the extroversive and introversive groups about the extent of the importance given to religion today. All participants from the social circle of the Patriarchate, the Bible reading group and the Foundations clearly and repeatedly emphasize the significance of religion, being Christian, the Patriarchate, and the Armenian church for the existence of Armenians, no matter whether religious or not.

> Each society has some structural features arising from its history. The Armenian Church is a key point for everyone, no matter religious or not. If there is an Armenian Church, the presence of Armenians can be discussed. Otherwise, Armenians would disappear entirely. It has always represented the society.[298]

> In the Armenian *cemaat,* religion and culture were like one within the other. I'm not uncomfortable with it. My boyfriend is an atheist. I do not judge him either. I don't know… the co-existence of religion and culture is like my treasure. For example, my boyfriend is an atheist, but he believes in the cultural representation of religion. Moreover, he says, if he has a child, he would bring him/ her to be baptized.[299]

> The Armenian society is a race. Yet, in the sense of religion, it has no difference from Christianity. Christianity has never been split from being Armenian. Therefore, we call it "the Armenian church." Do we say "the Turkish Mosque"?[300]

Unlike this opinion, the interviews with the extroversive group show that they complain that such an extent of importance is given to religion and of appearing and being considered as a religious community.

> Look here! We have become a society of religion. However, Armenians are not a religious society.[301]

Moreover, all participants from the extroversive group frankly indicate that they politically reject calling Armenians *cemaat* (a community), but they call *topluluk* (a society). When I use the word, *cemaat,* they immediately warned me not to call it as

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[298] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group and a Dance Club, February 21, 2013.
[299] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20, 2013.
[300] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013
[301] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.

such because they argue that *cemaat* sounds only like a religious community as two

participants from Nor Zartonk and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association

state:

> Armenians in Turkey have an understanding of Armenianness to which they are restricted while they identify themselves. I reject this perception of the *cemaat*. The Armenian society is not a society that can be described only in the sense of religion; i.e., it is not only a *cemaat*. Because of its history, artistic works and culture, this society corresponds to something more different than *cemaat*. I see myself closer to the liberationist, leftist and socialist place.[302]

> The liberationist and socialist groups, dear friends from and around *AGOS*, people who were engaged in the 70s movements or liberal groups are uncomfortable with this. *Cemaat* contains religious connotations. We avoid calling Armenians as a *cemaat*. However, there is a large segment of the society which insists on using the word, *cemaat*.[303]

Furthermore, this fragmentation is apparent in discussions about the inter

marriages (*karma evlilik*) and the issue of coming up of Armenians who were

converted in Islam because of suppressions after the 1915 massacre and during the

republican period (they are called Muslim or Islamized Armenians, *kripto*

Ermeniler). First, the participants indicate that there are some conservative groups—

refer to the introversive group— who do not welcome and stand against

intermarriages, namely the marriage of an Armenian with a Muslim (Turk or Kurd).

They list the reasons for it: because of the horrible memories of the 1915 massacre,

the desires not to be assimilated and to protect their cultural values and transmit them

to posterity. Although most of the introversive group thinks in this way, some young

people both support and do not want intermarriages on some plausible reasons for

them.

> The conservative segments of the society are opposed to intermarriages. To keep my own culture alive, to raise my child with my own culture, I do not

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[302] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.
[303] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

want to marry a non-Armenian person. On the other hand, intermarriage may be a necessity in order to transform love in the hearts of people into love for someone and thereby abolish the problems.[304]

Moreover, the significance of religious differences comes to the surface in regard to disapproving the introversive group for intermarriages during the interviews.

For some, intermarriage is a significant problem. Instead of marrying a Turk or Kurd, they prefer to be married to a Greek.[305]

One could marry an English or a German. Yet, his/her marrying a Turk would be a problem in a large segment of the society.[306]

However, the extroversive group and more of the young generation do think that this is an issue of private life and one participant argues that there have been lots of discussions on it.

There is a young segment in the society which expresses themselves as liberationist and they think that this issue belongs to private life. They criticize the opposition on intermarriage from this perspective. This created a significant split in the society and quarrels among Armenians even on the Armenian websites. Although it is not that much recently, it is a significant issue.[307]

The second discussion presented the fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups on the significance and the extent of religion generated with people who claimed to be Armenian with their Islamic identities after 2007. Those people are from Dersim, a city of Turkey located in Eastern Anatolia. They established a regional organization called "The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim (FSSAAD)." They were not accepted by some parties in the Armenian society. One participant from this association states

After asking the question "Who are we?", we decided to establish this association to find out our essence. We are Armenians who were forcefully converted into Islam. No one raised his/her voice until we came on the stage.

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[304] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013.

[305] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013

[306] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

[307] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013

There was an association of Vakıflı village, but they did not emphasize their Armenian identity. After us, people started to admit. Of course, there are people opposed too.[308]

All participants from the extroversive group narrate the same story.

In the period that it was assumed there were no longer any Armenians in Anatolia, suddenly Armenians from Dersim did show up. With their Alewite identity, they argued that they were Armenians. Then, we couldn't know how we should perceive them. We have been unsettled about them for a long time because there were some fixed categories about Armenianness that we understand and know. An Armenian must be Christian, his name must be Agop. This–and-that. However, now we encounter people who made a pilgrimage, were Muslim, embraced Sunni and Alewite sects, but who identified themselves as Armenian. It is still a serious confusion for many people. But it is no longer for me. My confusion ended early. [309]

One participant from the FSSAAD states that the social circle of the Patriarchate objected to them and this social circle argued "Who are they? Where are they coming out from? One cannot be Armenian without being born Christian." Moreover, people from FSSAAD who were baptized are also said that just converting into Christianity is not enough because being Armenian is a great culture that should be internalized. However, the participant form FSSAAD states that the social circle of *AGOS* supports and embraces them in this issue. During the interviews with the extroversive group, they frankly support those who want to be Armenian somehow and criticize the posture of the social circle of the Patriarchate in this issue and accuse them of excluding people, not only the Muslims but also Catholic and Protestant Armenians, because the Patriarchate restricts the religion to the Apostolic sect.

No one can tell them that they could not be Armenian without being Christian. If you feel as an Armenian, feel culturally as an Armenian, you are Armenian. You can be faithless. [310]

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[308] Interview with the participant from The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim, March 22, 2013
[309] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.
[310] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

However, this issue brings along a significant fragmentation. During the interviews with people from the introversive group, some concerns about the *kripto Ermeniler* emerged. Because they give a great significance to Christianity, they display a tendency of being confused about Islamized Armenians people. Some from the introversive group clearly reject this kind of identity and state that they consider them dangerous for the integrity of the community. For instance, one participant from an Armenian Foundation states that he knows all regional associations; *Sivas Ermenileri ve Dostları Derneği* (The Association of Friends and the Armenians of Sivas), *Sason Ermenileri Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği* (The Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Sason), The Malatya Philanthropist Armenians Association, and The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim. Although he explains that he has good and close relations with the head and members of the first three regional associations and supports their current activities to increase solidarity among their fellow townsmen, and to rebuild some collapsed historical places, he adds that they (referring the introversive group by including himself) do not support the establishment of the separate regional associations because this decreases and contaminates one single Armenian identity. Furthermore, when the subject comes to the Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim, he states

> I know the associations of people from Malatya, Sivas, Sason. I have close relations with their presidents. They are my very dear brothers. Yet, people from Dersim! They are very dangerous people. (Laughingly and loudly) I don't know who those people are. There is no chance for me to accept those people. They were established two years ago. Their main aim isn't evident yet. I don't know what those associations will do tomorrow […] We haven't held election for associations. We will see how they will react, when we hold the election. [311]

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[311] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013

Briefly, although all groups share the idea that religion is a significant component of being Armenian, the extroversive group has dissidence on the extent of significance given to it by the introversive group in relation to their ideology and their interpretation of the current developments according to their values. This fragmentation comes to the surface in the discussions of *kripto Ermeniler*, and intermarriage. Therefore, whereas religion significantly dominates the concept of being Armenian of the introversive group, the extroversive group has a tendency to soften this rigid understanding.

In conclusion, the extroversive and introversive groups are fragmentedon the concept of being Armenian as a result of their different ways of reading history differently, ideological differences and the current political developments. The introversive group desires Armenians to consist of one identity category; ethnically Armenian and the citizen of Turkey, to be less extroversive, to be considered idiosyncratic or different from the other movements and groups, and to be more conservative and religious in respect to religion of only Apostolic sect. By contrast the participants from the extroversive group welcome being an Armenian with various identities, being more extroversive and connected with the other movements and groups and the larger society, being religious in the way people prefer.

Now, I will examine the relations of Armenians with the state, as the second issue of the fragmentation between the introversive and the extroversive groups.

3.2. The Relations of Armenians with the State

The relations of the state with Armenians over the Republican years have been unjust, discriminative, suppressive and informal, as the interviews with both the

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extroversive and introversive groups confirmed. All participants in this research give some historical examples to compare the current situation of Armenians with the past in order to emphasize the recent improvements: presentation of Armenians in the Republic as the sympathizers of the western enemies of Turkey by the nationalist and racist perspectives of the state and society; their exclusion from society, culture, politics, economy and education; the great fear that fell on Armenians as a result of the illegal and legal constrains, like for cultural and social activities of Armenians in the Armenian language; the strict allowance policy for dealing with the structural problems of Armenian schools and churches; the existence of only one table called "Foreigners Offices" in the police departments to which they can apply for their problems and its arbitrary implementations; the seized properties of the Foundations by recalling the dramatic and destructive events, such as the 1909 Adana incidents, the 1915 massacre, the 1936 Declarations, *Varlık Vergisi, Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar Olayı,* the 6-7 September incidents, the *coup d'états* in Turkey and so on.

Therefore, unlike the past, they accept that the recent political and social developments—which mediate to increase the visibility of Armenians and intend to solve the Armenian problems thorough the demilitarization and democratization discussions in the time of the accession process of Turkey to the European Union and in the period of the AKP rule (the ruling party since 2002, Justice and Development Party)—should be applauded. In more details, as the interviewees indicate, especially since the 2000s, the government and state officials have done some legal arrangements for the return of the seized properties of non-Muslim minorities, for the restoration of some historical monuments of Armenians, for the survival of Armenian's institutions: church, schools, and hospitals. Moreover, those efforts also provide some flexibility and support for those institution's works and give some

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Armenians a chance to be elected to the local administrations, and so on. The participants consider those as significant developments. Moreover, it is worth noting that both groups acknowledge that those are not enough and there are further steps that should be taken necessarily regarding the problems and demands of Armenians.

However, the picture of the situation is not clear. In detail, two groups have different perspectives on increasing relations of Armenians with the state as a minority group. According to the interviews, those contentious differences in regard to the relations with the state confront us through the discussions on the issues: who is the main actor of the recent improvements? the hopeful/hopeless interpretation of the relations with the state, and the personal relations of Armenians with the state conducted in the past and present. In the following sections, I argue that all these differences, once again, resulted by the actors's different readings of the history, the different interpretation of and different extents of accession to the current opportunities among the actors, and ideological differences aong the actors.

3.2.1. Who is the Main Actor of the Improvements?

The discussion among Armenians over the main actor of the improvements is the primary discussion that provides a background for the different positions that the two groups take in this issue. In this discussion, the more access of the introversive group to the state policy, the political figures of the AKP rule within political opportunities of the past and present, and the different ideological position of the extroversive group become influential.

Firstly, during the interviews and my visit to the Bible reading group, the introversive group argued that the state, the AKP rule, some ministers, mayors, and the public officers affiliated with the AKP are the prominent actors of the recent improvements. Moreover, although they sharply criticize policies of the CHP (the

Republican People's Party, the main opposition party), the people from the Bible reading group which meet in the Şişli district, the mayor of which was from the CHP, also talks about the support and help of the mayor of the Şişli district and declare their appreciation for him. Most repeatedly, after listing the bad stories their ancestors experienced, they articulate the recent improvements and developments in the problems of Armenians by delivering their appreciation to the state and the AKP, such as "thanks to the government, our dear Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan." Mostly regarding the seized properties of the Foundations recently returned, those participants acknowledge that the legal arrangements started first time with the AKP rule and its ministers in 2004.

> Thank god! This new period, the year of 2004, is a turning point for minorities in the Republic of Turkey. In 2004, the law of foundation enacted by the AK Party (the AKP) became a turning point for us. We were very glad to see the AK Party following in the line that became a mark of this turning. And we became Armenians who started to look positively.[312]

> The significant problem which is solved is our property problem. A lot of new regulations have been made; thereby, it is solved. Raising the voice of the Foundations, the emerging discussions on properties of the Foundations coincided with the period of the AKP rule. Thanks to our Prime Minister, he made it easy for us to benefit from the income of the properties.[313]

Moreover, although they acknowledge the importance and influence of the accession process to the European Union, the introversive group insists on the free and sincere will of the state, the AKP, the government and the parliament for the improvement of Armenians' situation. Therefore, they reject the opinion that every development happened as a result of the incentive and compelling influence of the EU. Moreover, because they do not welcome the intervention of the EU in the internal affairs of Turkey, many participants from the Patriarchate, the Bible reading group and Foundations assert that these issues should be solved in the country itself by using

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[312] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013
[313] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013

the proverb, "*kol kırılır yen içinde kalır*" (do not let it out of this room) which they generally use for the issues of Armenians; that is, issues are to be solved within the community itself, and with the cooperation of the state, if it necessitates.

> Now we demand what we have demanded before. Of course, it is said that there are problems here in accordance to the EU norms. However, all were the problems that the state has been informed about. We did not take the issues to the EU and did not say that we have these sorts of problems. The EU is not our big brother. After the mentality was changed in the assembly of this country, these problems were acknowledged. If the parliament was not willing to solve the problems, they wouldn't be solved. The parliament is not a toy of the EU that would compel it to enact a law how it wants. These are the implementations of the Republic of Turkey which started to think and to act righteous.[314]

On the contrary, although some of them do not ideologically support the accession of Turkey to the EU, all participants from the extroversive group emphasize the influence of the accession process, and assert that the AKP would not be willing to take a step especially in the problems of the seized properties without this process. However, they also say that the process did not bring along more than some resolutions for the properties and restoration of some historical monuments of Armenians like the Akhtamar church, and now it displays a withdrawal. When I asked about the "the significance or the influence of the EU for the developments," several of them answered as follows;

> Some serious improvements have been made in the historical issues, the issues of the Foundations and schools. Although it doesn't represent my political view, these have been done in the period of the AKP, it should be noted. I especially think that the process of the accession of Turkey to the EU has been influential in the sense of change in the dominant opinions about minorities. Otherwise, why would the AKP have done this?[315]

> Of course, the process of the accession of Turkey to the EU, and the EU itself has been influential. The politics in Turkey isn't done for the benefit of Armenians. They fixed the Akhtamar church. It was done according to the framework of the EU norms. Unfortunately, there are other reasons behind what has been done for Armenians or minorities. The process wouldn't be

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[314] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013
[315] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

like that unless the EU were involved. As a result of its involvement, the problems of Foundations, hate crimes start to be solved.[316]

The process brought along some improvements in the property issue. But honestly there is no more influence of it on the other issues.[317]

In short, unlike the introversive group, the extroversive group does not accept that the argument that the AKP has afforded to solve the problems of Armenians as a primary actor of the recent improvements. They take the EU seriously as a factor which opens rooms for discussions about the Armenians' issues besides Turkey's other problems.

In addition to this argument, another perspective on which the extroversive group places considerable stress is that *AGOS*, Hrant Dink and his murder, and the other social, political, cultural, and academic activities—rather than totally the state and the EU—are the main factors for the improvement of the situation of Armenians in Turkey. Actually, it is fair to argue that they put so much more emphasis on these factors than others because of the affiliation of those people around the new civil platforms with the socialist/liberal ideology; they argue that by getting organized and through civil platforms, the visibility of Armenians has increased, which has brought along the improvements. During the interviews with those people, the works of Hrant Dink, *AGOS,* their institutions and some academic works like new books published on the history of Armenians, or oral history books and some panels and meetings were mentioned repeatedly as the factors of the new period since the 1995s. They argue that publishing an Armenian newspaper in Turkish which means opening Armenians to the public and increasing connections among Armenians—who do not know the Armenian language well—being a public figure of Hrant Dink on TV,

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[316] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.
[317] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation , March 19, 2013.

some meetings and writings which refer to some taboos of Armenians and Turkey—such as demanding regulation of the relations and border issue with the Republic of Armenia, speaking about the devastation of the historical monuments of Armenians in Anatolia, reporting news about the corruption in the administrations and elections of the Foundations, commenting on the complaints of the Patriarchate and the lack of a civil administration in Armenian society, and uncovering the disguised history of Armenians and so on—were attempts to ameliorate the situation of Armenians. Moreover, they also argue often that the assassination of Hrant Dink also made a new awakening among most of the people in Turkey to rethink Armenians and became one of the factors that increased the visibility of Armenians in the public. Even some of them assert that *AGOS* started to publish in the relief period of Turkey after the 1980 *coup d'état*, and began to break the stereotypes; therefore, in this democratic situation, the AKP started to act in favor of the minorities in Turkey.

> In 1996 when the dust settled, *AGOS* was established and it had great influence in favor of Armenians. It was a Turkish newspaper, so everyone could read it. They started to be acquainted with Armenians and their issues. And to say that Armenians' homeland is Anatolia was significant at that time. Maybe it was a small step but significant […] When we come to the 2000s, Fethiye Çetin's book, *Annanem* (My Grandmother), the Armenian conference held in 2005, and Hrant's murder influenced starting discussions about Armenians.[318]

> Public speeches of Hrant Dink and his presence on TV affected people very much. Many people couldn't admit his murder, of course it was related to the way he was murdered. And they went to the street. For me, it is so important.[319]

Although this perspective is shared by some participants from the Bible reading group, during the interviews, generally I reminded them about the social efforts of those institutions, e.g. the grassroots efforts, prominently made by *AGOS* and Hrant Dink and their accompaniers since 1995, or in some interviews, those

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[318] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.
[319] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.

names are not mentioned or mentioned to criticize them and their "radical" (as the introversive group calls them) stances. Some of the participants from the introversive group, especially from the Foundations and the Patriarchate, are not sure about the effects of the extroversive group; they do not clearly explicate that thanks to them, too, Armenians have become visible and Armenian problems started being solved.

> This is a process. We can't say clearly that they were affected, or this and that happened. Naturally it is a democratization process. However, we should not forget the initiatives of the AKP rule.[320]

This distant position of the introversive group to the perspective that *AGOS,* Hrant Dink and their derivatives are influential in this new period of Armenians relies on the thought that those new civil institutions might create some problems in the current "positive" (as they refer to it) relations with the state because they think that the extroversive group gathered around the new civil institutions and their activities are "peevish and impulsive".

> It is not fair to say that all what *AGOS* says represent the Armenian *cemaat.* I feel uncomfortable with some of *AGOS.* (Thinking) They are peevish and impulsive… However, when they say something about solidarity, I support them.[321]

Therefore, some from the introversive group argue that the process should be followed slowly and steadily, and the demands for solution to the problems should be limited in a framework not to jeopardize the process. In this regard, one of the issues repeatedly mentioned by most of the participants was the dominant attitude in the Armenian community/society after the assassination of Hrant Dink. Some of them agree with that statement, but some of them say it just to talk about the general opinion among the conservative Armenians, or the introversive group.

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[320] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013
[321] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013.

When Hrant Dink was murdered, I have had the chance to observe. There were some people among the Armenians of Turkey who said, 'He has spoken without reserve as a matter of fact,' 'he has overstepped the mark.'[322]

The people who are closer to the Patriarchate said, "We have already said that he spoke too much."[323]

Rather, the introversive group thinks that their problems could be and should be solved easily with the mutually respectful and trustful relations with the state and within the legal framework rather than the activities of the extroversive group around the new civil platforms which "harshly" criticize and target the state as an "enemy." Moreover, most of the participants indicate that the recent developments with the state continue in this way and they compare this relation to the relation between father (the state) and child (Armenians). They emphasize that with the AKP government, the state, for the first time, has startedto act as a "father" (paternal state) on the issues of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

> Rebelling against the state or someone else together with some people is futile. The important thing is that the state recognizes "the other"—of course I am using this in quotation marks—and admits that "the other" has its rights. Then "the other" should believe that it will obtain its rights by trusting the authority. Otherwise, you would read "fraternity" only in books, or see it in the demonstration places… I believe that everyone should have equal rights but in the framework of the law… It is not fair to think that the state is the first enemy and the rest are oppressed.[324]

> It is important how the father state perceives you. If it approaches you warmly and a positive atmosphere emerges, you can use it as a trump and you can take a step for everything… You are in need of mercy from the farther state, apart from that, what can you do? All Armenians you would talk would say almost the same thing that I said. Different things could be conducted in politics, but we don't need them. We believe that better days are too soon […] In that process, we have been a witness to a lot of examples that illustrated that the state is our father. (Showing a photo) This photo was taken recently with the governor and the chief of police. They came to visit us after the incidents in Samatya. Well, 15 years ago, could we have imagined that the governor would make a personal visit to us about the incidents? They said, 'Our *cemaat* should not wonder about the issues, we will deal with it, you

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[322] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.
[323] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.
[324] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.

don't need to be provoked.' So, I am trying to say that if the state shows its fatherhood, the child would show his/her respect to it. If the state frightens you (referring to the fears that dominated Armenians in the past), and don't show its fatherhood, what would you do? You can do nothing.[325]

Consequently, mainly because the introversive group has more access to the policy, political opportunities and political actors from history and in the present, they consider that the state, the AKP government, AKP, Prime minister, and other officials affiliated with the AKP are the primary actors of the recent improvements since 1995. However, because they have limited access to the policy and they are mostly affiliated with socialist/liberal ideology, they assert that civil figures, primarily *AGOS* and Hrant Dink and their civil followers are the main actors in the period of the improvement coinciding with the accession process of Turkey to the EU which urged the state to solve the minority problems and open the way of civil initiatives.

3.2.2. Hopeful/ Hopeless Interpretation of the Relations with the State.

The participants from the introversive group speak really hopefully and thankfully for the recent developments that have occurred in the time of the AKP government, although they also identify some troubles going on without discussing them in detail. Because from the past, their access to the policy and the current developments have been more than the extroversive group's access, and their satisfied interpretation for the current developments in its comparison with the past grievances according to their reading of history. Unlike the extroversive group, they are used to following a more moderate and satisfied policy in cooperation with the state and its policies. Comparing the interviews of the two groups, unlike the extroversive group, the atmosphere during the interviews with the introversive group is so optimistic about

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[325] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013.

the ongoing problems of Armenians. They believe that the troubles and deficiencies they slightly mention according to their different engagements—e.g. people who deal with dance or theater complain of the lack of the opportunity to open their performances to the public, or some who are working in the Foundations discuss the lack of some further legal regulations—also would be solved gradually through the good relations with the state which improves daily. Although the extroversive group argues that the state always acts in the same manner like today, the introversive group acknowledges that there is a big transformation in the behavior of the state compared to the republican period. They also posit that these good relations provide positive results in the amelioration of social, cultural and religious lives of Armenians in Turkey. Therefore, it is fair to argue that they are really satisfied and hopeful with their current relations with the state, and find it very sincere.

> It should be known that no one can change the one-hundred year system over night with a magic wand […] Now we see that there is not a state system that is restrictive and prohibitor. Everything is evident and the state declares it is not discriminative […] There is no any trouble in living our culture of the *cemaat*. On the contrary, there is high respect and we don't encounter any problem in the street. We don't live with any problems while we are organizing cultural nights in the school associations. Some of our groups are performing folk dances and concerts and we have choirs that have many many audiences from all over Turkey. There are not any problems that they have experienced. Even the books in Armenian that will be taught in the Armenian schools were published by the Ministry of National Education.[326]

> For solution to these problems, I think that the current system is consistent and appropriate. Of course, there might be people who are uncomfortable with it […] Maybe it could be better and enhanced. However, at least, there is nothingwrong with the current system.[327]

Contrary to these interviews, the participants from the extroversive group draw a pessimistic picture about the relations with the state. Although they had some faith in the beginning of the AKP rule, now they are disappointed.

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[326]Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.
[327] Interview with the participant from The Bible Reading Group, February 18, 2013.

After the AKP came to rule, I remember its first days that Prime Minister Erdoğan said 'so what is genocide? We can recognize it.' This attitude has created a change in the society. People who wanted the society to be more democratized and most of the Armenians became hopeful. Yet this hopefulness has given its place to the worse, despair. The order has taken a worse shape too.[328]

After the endeavor of the AKP, while we expect that it will go straight, it, too, started to follow a nationalist way. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started to wave the flag (the national flag).[329]

The AKP has become a state now. So we lost our chance to correct our issues of human rights. In 2002, the AKP was not a state but a government. In that time, it wanted democracy, freedom. Now, it only wants prohibition.[330]

Although they accept that there are some improvements, unlike the introversive group, they list the current problems of Armenians in detail, which are necessary to be solved immediately. Because they have affiliations with socialist/ liberal ideologies, their access to the policy and current developments is limited over the years compared to the introversive group and their historical reading is not similar to the conservatives, the extroversive group has unsatisfied opinions on the developments and points out various issues repeatedly as problems of Armenians. Whereas the introversive group, especially from the patriarchate and the foundations, merely emphasizes the lack of any financial support by the state—in spite of being written in the Treaty of Lausanne—for the survival of Armenians, the extroversive group draws attention to the symbolic and everyday violence Armenians encountered in addition to the financial problems. For instance, many of them answered the question, "What is the most significant issue of Armenians according to you?" as the education and inefficient Armenian language education in Armenian schools, some of which were identified by the participants from the Bible reading group as well. Although the participants from the extroversive group accept that there are some

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[328] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.
[329] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.
[330] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.

improvements in the Armenian schools in relation with the Ministry of National Education, they assert that still the existence of a Turkish vice-principal in the schools; the obligatory assignment of teachers to the cultural courses like Turkish Literature, History and Sociology by the Ministry; the lack of any financial support for the salary of teachers of the Armenian schools; and the lack of physical necessities of the schools are significant problems. Some of them even call these deficiencies as "the fascist" implementation of the national education system. However, relating to the problems of the education in Armenian language, the two participants from the Foundation frankly say that there is no problem about their mother language, the Armenian language, because they can give education in the Armenian schools unlike other groups like Kurds in Turkey. By contrast, the extroversive group emphasizes an inefficient education of the language because of the lack of the course materials in Armenians—although some of them are published by the ministry, they do not include some history of Armenians—and the lack of teachers who graduate from the universities' departments of the Armenian Language because of the lack of the sufficient relevant departments in Turkey.

Moreover, the extroversive group claim that nationalist and racist violence they encountered continues even today by exemplifying the attacks on the Armenian women in Samatya, the murders of Hrant Dink and Sevag Balıkçı. In this sense, they also mention the racist demonstration in the commemoration of the Hocalı massacre.with the theme "All you are Armenians, All you are Bastards" in opposition to the slogans "All we are Armenians, All we are Hrant" shouted by tens of thousands of people after the assassination of Hrant Dink. They articulate that they still feel like they are living in a racist atmosphere sometimes; the same racist language of the past is not over, so "the situation is not a bed of roses." Therefore,

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unlike reading the history of the introversive group, when they compare today to the past, the participants from the recently established platforms argue that not much has changed in the sense of the position of the state and the situation of Armenians in the 2000s.

As a result, those participants of the extroversive group call this position of the state insincere. They think all that the government initiates to solve the problems are not touching the problems of Armenians entirely. Their hopeless interpretation of the relations of Armenians with the state is revealed in the discussions on the recent legal developments about returning the seized properties of the Foundations. For this issue, a participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, who conducted a project pertaining to the seized properties of the Armenian Foundations of Istanbul, states that the government made new regulations three times in the law of Foundations, in 2006, 2008 and 2011, which provide some opportunities for the right of the Armenian Foundations on their seized properties. However, she does not admit that it was utterly a beneficial development, because she thinks that those perpetual incomplete regulations show that the state is not willing to solve the problem and to address all the issues relating the properties. The same perception is shared by the interviewees from *AGOS,* Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk*, and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association.

> The relations of the Foundations with the state coincide with the process of the accession of Turkey to the EU in 2002. Then, the Foundations could make some applications [for return of their rights]. However, the Foundations didn't acquire so much. You can understand that it is all politics because when you look at all the enactments, the government isn't concerned abolishing the problem completely. The regulations enacted in 2006, 2008 and 2011 gave some of the usurped rights piece by piece. It would give back the usurped rights of the Foundations, not extra. It is evident that it is eyewash.[331]

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[331] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.

However, the participants from the Foundations interprete these regulations in different years as the effort of the government to make up a shortage regarding the process. Therefore, they believe that in the following days the government will create more opportunities for solving the problems.

Once again the fragmentation appeared as a result of the recent developments in the local governments, the city councils, to which some Armenians have been elected. As all participants agree, as a result of increasing the numbers of the Armenian staff in the city halls, especially in the Şişli and Bakırköy districts of Istanbul, and even the election of an Armenian as deputy mayor in Şişli, have brought along some feasibilities and supports for Armenians by the hall. For instance, the churches, schools and associations have been supported by the halls; the halls have assisted in painting the church's wall, and provided some sponsorship for the schools and associations' activities, such as providing a hall for their performances or bus for their visits, whereas, as they say repeatedly, they were not allowed to drive even a nail in their schools' or churches' walls in the past. Although all admit it is a significant development, the participants from the extroversive group assert that all these developments are because of the election interest of the political parties; i.e., as a result of their interest of drawing the votes of Armenians in places like Şişli and Bakırköy where the Armenian population density is high. However, they expect more sincere developments that provide legal citizenship; i.e. provide Armenians to be treated as citizens of this country, rather than show off. When I ask the question "Do you think that increasing number of Armenians voted to the city halls is a good development? one from *AGOS* answers that

> Of course I do. In the past, we couldn't say that we shall call a glassmaker to fix the broken window. We had to write to the Istanbul Regional Director of Foundations, if it does not accept the request, we then had to write to Ankara. Today the municipality says that we are coming to paint where you want.

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This is beautiful for us. We are not used to it. Where do we see it? In the Şişli Municipality. Why? Because it has literally a very populist mayor. This populist man makes Armenians satisfied with his services. So, Armenians will never turn their backs on him. The mayor of the Bakırköy municipality from the CHP (The Republican People's Party) benefits from the same policy and the Armenian people of Bakırköy will always support him. When they need something, they benefit easily from the service of the municipality […] But it is populism. I don't consider it sincere. When I want something, they don't give it to me. When they want something, they get it easily. However, they get in return what they did in a dirty way. For example, I present a poem performance. I need a hall. When they provide it to me, I am compelled to give a placket or some presents in front of the audience. Hey! They are unnecessary, I think. If I wanted to thank you, next day, I would come to visit you with a packet of chocolate, and I can thank you there. Man! This is not enough for him. He wants to show off on the stage: He would like to say "I love you" in Armenian, etc. I couldn't admit it. However, other people don't care about it. They just care about the support from the municipality.[332]

However, the participants from the introversive group were really content about this situation during the interviews and my visit to the Bible reading group, and they argued that they are being treated in the same way that other citizens are treated since the 2000s by exemplifying the sponsorships of the hall from both the halls of Şişli and Bakırköy. In this regard, the social circle of the Patriarchate, in my visit to the reading group, noted repeatedly their close relations with the mayor of Şişli, and they were thankful for him and his sincerity about the Armenians' problem.

As it is obvious in the last examples, one group, the introversive group, is more hopeful and satisfied with the current situation regarding the relations with the state, because of their different reading of the history and the large extent of their access to the policy. Therefore, they conduct a more moderate and satisfied policy in accordance with the regulations of the governments. However, because they have limited access to the policy and their ideology and reading of history is different, the extroversive group does not see any significant transformation compared to the history and they are not satisfied. They repeatedly criticize some people who argue

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[332] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.

that the thing hitherto done by the government is enough and the government gives them many favors. However, they want to be recognized as citizens of the country rather than favors; thus, they prefer to continue through more organized civil platforms in which they work today.

3.2.3. "The Minister is One Phone Call Away to Me"[333]/ "All These Improvements Done through Personal Relations"[334]

The recently increasing personal relations with the state has become one of the main issues of the fragmentations between the extroversive and introversive groups. Whereas the participants from the introversive group are proud of and welcome these close relations with the state, government and especially people of the government (actually they use those interchangeably), the extroversive group does not approve it politically and ideologically for the present and future political and social benefit of Armenians. They assert that all these relations and improvements are done through personal relations rather than having a legal and an official base, as the same has already been done during the republican period after the all institutions legalized in the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate were abrogated in practice.

Moreover, the extroversive group's assertion targets two actors whose take role in continuation of these historically conducted personal relations, the introversive group and the state itself. Regarding the introversive group in this situation, one participant from *Nor Zartonk* and Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association states that

> As I said before, on the one hand there is a social circle of the Church, and on the other hand there are also more civil organizations. It couldn't be argued that all those have a common politics on this issue. The initiatives like *Nor Zartonk,* raise their voices. However, the others warn those initiatives not to

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[333] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013.
[334] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

raise their voices. They argue that they will conduct the works in the old-style: "We can find a person to do our business for us, or conduct politics through the close channels set with the AKP. All these close relations were resorted to in the relations with the General Directorate of Foundations, the relations of the Patriarchate with the state, especially the relation in the appointment of the deputy of the Patriarchate. This resembles lobbying. So, we are uncomfortable with that. Along with not being ethical, it doesn't promise anything politically. However, it is a society of artisans all in all. For long years, they lived in this territory in this way. However, they act with practical concerns. The idea of having a civil initiative is a novel thing for them. They need some time to be used to it. For me, they are still not used to *AGOS*. However, young Armenians are different because they were born into the situation itself.[335]

In addition to this assertion that the introversive group—which are the greater part of the society as they argue—historically has a tendency to survive through personal relations with the state and its institutions, the participants from the extroversive group argue that in fact this traditional structure serves the state's interest; thus, the state has perpetuated this system. This approach is admitted by all participants both from the extroversive and introversive groups. They clearly put forth that from history, the state addresses the Patriarch (they emphasize that it was not the Patriarchate, but the Patriarch because the state did not recognize its legal personality) or the Foundations (through the the relations with Directorate General of Foundations, and specifically through relations of the president of Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation who is sometimes considered a head of Armenians by the state) to itself. However, only the extroversive group considers this system problematic.

There is a tradition arising from the past: The head of the *millet* is the Patriarch. Okay, it was like that in the Ottoman period. Yet today? The state, too, has always addressed it to itself. I don't acknowledge it. I am not a person that has a strong religious sensibility. Even if I am, I don't want it

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[335] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

anyway. Why should the Patriarchate be an interlocutor of the state? A representative who I elect must be.[336]

Firstly, in regard to the Patriarch's being the collocutor of the state as a supreme institution that represents Armenians in Turkey, some argue that when a meeting is held, only the Patriarch is summoned to Ankara. Accordingly, when a social, political or an international issue emerged like the ASSALA events, the racist tension like in the demonstrations in the commemoration of the Hocalı massacre, and the issue of recognizing the genocide in the foreign parliaments, the Patriarch was visited or urged by the state officials to alleviate tensions in the country. Moreover, , the most repetitively mentioned event in the Patriarch's personal relations with the state is the suggestion of the government to the Spiritual Council to elect a "General Deputy of the Patriarch" when the Patriarch Mesrop II became sick, which is not a customary practice of Armenians. Therefore, this is interpreted as the personal relations of the Patriarch Mesrob II and his deputy, Aram Ateşyan with the government and even with the AKP. More specifically, they consider it an intervention of the government to the customary practices of Armenians without any legal base and it is not a right thing.

> For now, the state elected Arem Ateşyan as a deputy of the Patriarchate. It is said that this man has a sort of meetings and close relations with Tayyip Erdoğan. Now, the Armenian society is in uncertainty. It is understandable that the state authorizes him because it is compatible with its political interests. I mean, we have encountered its insincere implementations so much. It does serve the interest of the state […] The state does not want a civil society.[337]

> All in all, there is a situation. The Armenian Patriarchate has a problem. Our Patriarchate is sick, as you know. His deputy is in his place. Therefore, it is hard to say that there is an institutional relation of the Patriarchate with the

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[336] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

[337] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

state. Well, I don't know how institutional it was in the past. Yet the relations of the deputy with the state… What is going on over there is complicated. Therefore, to discussthe relations of the Patriarchate with the state… In short, today there is no patriarchate which could work with its status of being Patriarchate. All work is done by a person. He is a maverick person. He establishes relations with the AKP.[338]

On this issue, although they appreciate the efforts of Aram Ateşyan for the Armenian community, some participants form the Foundations and Bible reading group and from the school admit this is the intervention of the state to the internal affairs of the Armenian community. Nevertheless, they accuse themselves and argue that the Armenian community could not solve this problem; when the Patriarch got sick, and the community went to apply the state to be an arbitrator for this issue.

Secondly, regarding the close relation of Foundations with the state, participants from Hrant Dink Foundation and *AGOS* argue that those people on the top of the Foundations still have a tendency to solve problems through their personal relations with the recently appointed representative of the minority's Foundations in Foundation Council under the Directorate General of Foundations. Moreover, the participants from the extroversive group emphasize the personal relations of the president of Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation, Bedros Şirinoğlu, while criticizing the personal relations of the Foundations with the state. All who mentioned this case mention the historical significance of the Hospital, and say that the president of the Hospital was an *amira*—from a close notable class to the state— in the Ottoman Empire. They criticizes today's situation; because without asking anybody in Armenian people, the government and the hospital's president consider him the civil head of the society besides the Patriarchate.

Today, the head of the Hospital represents himself as *amira*. He thinks that he can do something by establishing relations with the state. However, the society doesn't consider him in this way. Of course, there might be some

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[338] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.

people who consider him *amira*, but not all of them. Actually, when you think of *amira*s, they were in *darphane* (the bank note printing house), and were close to the Sultan. So, the person who has no relations with the state can't be the head of the Hospital. I understand that they have some practical reasons. For example, they think that this man knows people (from the state). When they have a problem, they think that they can solve it by using his networks. Of course, there are mutual interests they look after.[339]

The president of the Armenian Hospital, Şirinoğlu who represents himself as the head of *the cemaat,* visited the Prime Minister and he wears cufflinks on which the Sultan Mahmud II's signature is drawn to show off. It was also written that he was the head of the Armenian *cemaat*. Who elected him as the head of the *cemaat*? There is no such status to which he would be elected. Of course, we are uncomfortable with it. Of course, because it is not a democratic state, we try to discuss it in every platform.[340]

Indeed, besides their assertion, during the interviews with the social circle of the Patriarchate including the participants from the Foundations, I witnessed that they are really conducting relations just through personal contacts, and they think that it is a critical development in the history of Armenians. Unlike the extroversive group, they repeated that they have not even seen these kinds of relations before in the republican period until 2000s. They say that the Patriarchate (actually the Patriarch) is the head of the Armenian community, and the Foundations under the Patriarchate have served for the survival of Armenians for years; thus, the Patriarchate and the Foundations have had close relations with the state since the 2000s, the state, government and government members consider them their collocutors. When I asked about the relations with the state, they always said it is good and gave examples from their personal relations, personal meetings like hosting Prime minister members for a fast-breaking meal (by emphasizing that it was first time in the Republican history), messaging a text to a person from the Directorate

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[339] Interview with the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, March 19, 2013.
[340] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

General for any quick appointment and so on. For instance, during all interview, one participant from an Armenian Foundation referred to his close relations with the state ministries, the first area director of Directorate General of Foundations in Istanbul, the mayors of some districts of Istanbul, the mayor of the Istanbul Municipality, the chiefs of police and so on. When I asked about the relations of all these people, he answered that they all are one phone call away to him. Moreover, he said that they always deal with Armenians' problems as their own. Of course, this should not be generalized but represents that the historical significance of Patriarchate and the Foundations to their community and of their relations with the state conducted through personal contacts are acknowledged. They do not see it problematic as one from a Foundation says,

> It is our first time to have such close relations with the state. So, we should protect this situation.[341]

In short, although they accept that the foundations obtain some gains from these close relations, the participants from the extroversive group name these gains as favors of the state to the minority. They argued that the state and introversive group perpetuated this system over years. They criticize the state's historical attitude of "I give, they take," or, "I do and done." Moreover, they argue that this attitude ends up with no alternative rooms for minorities in Turkey, and especially Armenians. Therefore, they once again argue that rather than personal relations and being treated as "part of the cultural mosaic or treasure"[342] by the state officials, the state should recognize them as citizens of the country; thus, they prefer to continue through organized civil platforms which claim their rights amid the democratization discussions in Turkey.

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[341] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013.
[342] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

In conclusion, the increasing relations with the state, as current political developments since 1995, have become the significant factor that creates a fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups. Whereas the introversive group is satisfied with the current developments, and close personal relations with the state—conducted by the Patriarchate and the Foundations because they consider them historical significant actors of the Armenian community—and consider the state, the AKP rule a significant actor of the improvements, the extroversive group is not content with those developments. Moreover, because they read the history differently from the introversive group, the participants from the extroversive group argue that from history the same was conducted by the state, and ideologically they support being recognized by the state as citizens of the country, so they want to continue through organized civil platforms which claim their rights. Therefore, rather than the state or the accession process to the EU alone, for their parts, the civil platforms lead by *AGOS*, and Hrant Dink have become the significant actors for raising the visibility of Armenians in Turkey.

Now, I will examine the fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups.on the third issue of patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/ community

3.3. (The Extent) of Patriarchal Authority in Religious and Civil Lives of Armenians

All participants from both groups share the idea that Armenians have common sensitivity about the significance of the Patriarchate, or Christianity for the Armenian community/ society. However, in the second half of the 18th century, with the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate, the Armenian intellectuals and craftsmen

attempted to restrict the patriarchal authority entitled to the Patriarch by the Ottoman Empire. As a result, although the regulations accepted the Patriarchate as the head of the Armenian community/ society, and of the democratic and civil institutions or commissions of Armenians which were established with the Regulations and constituted of mostly civil people rather than ecclesiastical power, the intellectuals and craftsmen restricted the power of the Patriarch and Patriarchate merely to the religious sphere. However, in the republican period, all democratic institutions of Armenians were abrogated together with the Regulations and the administration of the Armenian schools, churches, foundations and associations were governed by different administrative branches. Meanwhile, the state considered the Patriarch and Patriarchate a higher institution that represents Armenians in Turkey before the state without any legal base. Therefore, both the state and the Patriarch/ Patriarchate consider the Patriarch/Patriarchate the head of the Armenian community/ society.

However, notwithstanding a common sensibility about the Patriarchate's significance for Armenians, a critical discussion and fragmentation have emerged between the extroversive and introversive groups on the patriarchal authority of the Patriarch and Patriarchate and a necessity for a civil representation of Armenians with the initiation of discussions by *AGOS* since 1995. In this section, as revealed in the interviews, I will examine this fragmentation through the discussions on the representative and advisory positions of the Patriarchate and the necessity for a civil representation in the Armenian community/ society by focusing on the different demands of the parties.

3.3.1.   The Patriarchate is the Representative and Advisor to Armenians?

It would be better to start with the arguments of the introversive group on the authority of the Patriarchate and Patriarch in the Armenian community. By recalling its historical authority over Armenians according to the 1863 Regulations, and resembling it to a center like in a state; i.e. like a Prime Minister above the ministries of the governmental system, the introversive group asserts a double position of the Patriarchate. Most of them argue that the Patriarchate should be "the representative of Armenians before the state" and Armenians should "take the binding advise and approval of the Patriarchate for the final decision over issues regarding the Armenian community like an inspector." Therefore, there is a shared idea among the participants from the introversive group that the Patriarchate is the "ethnarch" of the Armenian community before the state and in the internal order of Armenians as a "father" to his children; i.e., has been a representative and the center for religious and civil and political life of Armenians for years according to the 1863 Regulations of Armenian Patriarchate and before the regulation alike. Moreover, they argue that it should remain the same because amid those developments, Armenians needed a head to represent them before the state and the Patriarchate is the proper one.

> The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul is an institution that manages the chaplain, charity and social activities. Considering that the Patriarch is elected and comes to the authority by taking the oath of the Patriarchate, the Patriarch is the head of the *cemaat* at the same time. If we just consider its religious authority, then a lack of something emerges. Therefore, besides its religious services, the Patriarchate inspects the churches, not only in the sense of their religious responsibilities, and takes steps to solve all kinds of problems of the *cemaat* about which the *cemaat* asks it to. Moreover, the Patriarchate establishes the relations between the state and the *cemaat*, and can apply to the state in the name of the *cemaat*, to solve the problems. And this system goes on without a hitch.[343]

> The Patriarchate is our center to which we address ourselves. Therefore, we have to be in relation with it. It does not get involved officially. However, all in all, we have to apply to the Patriarchate for the final decisions about the critical issues of the *cemaat*. And we have to make decisions together with it.

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[343] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.

However, the final decision should belong to the Patriarchate […] Now there are ministries in the state. Education, Finance. Yet, what is on the top? Prime Minister! The relations with the Patriarchate have been in a similar way, and must be. [344]

The Patriarchate gives advice. As long as this structure of it does not change—and will not—I think it is fine. This is a tradition of the Patriarchate arising from the past and must be maintained. The Patriarchate must inspect and give advice. According to the 1863 Regulation, the duty of the Patriarchate was to inspect. Therefore, the system of today is accordant with the Regulation. Like a state system. We recognize the state every time and in every condition. When we don't recognize it, then it is an oligarchy. We should consider the Patriarchate for the Armenian *cemaat* in this way.[345]

Now, in the hierarchical system of our *cemaat*, when the Patriarch slams his fist on the table, he calls the tune.[346]

All in all, the Patriarchate represents the society religiously and culturally. It is the same in the bureaucracy: you go first to an institution, if it doesn't work, then go to a higher authority. So, I think that the Armenian society should first go to the Patriarchate. It is the first authority to which people should bring their problems […] Of course, it shouldn't impose something on people. However, as a father, it should direct people on some issues. Or like a child expressing his problems to his father, people should be in connection with the Patriarchate. Yet for all problems, the solution shouldn't be expected from there. Representation, its duty literally is to represent.[347]

Along with these, the programs of the Armenian institutions including churches, schools, foundations and associations and the alumni associations are required to be in accordance with the Patriarchate and Patriarch's precepts. Moreover, when I asked the participants from the Foundations—who are the administrative of the Foundations to which their church and school is bounded—about their relations with the Patriarchate and Patriarch, they answered that they should be established by being ratified by or with the consent of the Patriarchate and they should benefit from the historical experience of the Patriarchate and Patriarch as a father. Moreover, although the introversive group expects these institutions to be abided by the

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[344] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013
[345] Interview with the participant from The Bible Reading Group- A Dance Club, February 21 2013.
[346] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013
[347] Interview with the participant from the Bible Reading Group, a Music Club, and an Alumni Association, February 20 2013.

principles of the Patriarchate and Patriarch, some complained of the lack of a control

mechanism today conducted by the Patriarchate over the Armenian institutions that

resulted in some deficits. For this, they emphasized the lack of a legal personality of

the Patriarchate as a reason, resulting in the abrogation of the 1863 Regulations by

the state. Therefore, with a legal personality in accordance with the 1863

Regulations, some of them expect that the Patriarchate would have full control over

the administration of these institutions.

> According to the 1863 Regulations, the Patriarchate could intervene with the
> schools in the past. The Education Commission in the Patriarchate could have
> given the certificate of suitability to teachers that represented if he/she was
> competent to give the course of the Armenian language. How was it
> conducted? There was an institution consisting of the Armenian schools,
> called the higher institution of Education. There is no such an institution
> today. The Ministry of National Education holds the fort. Moreover, there
> was a higher institution of the properties of the *cemaat*, in which all the
> properties of the *cemaat* were controlled. It wasn't possible to do something
> without asking permission from this institution. Today, if people in the
> administration board of the Foundations are malevolent, they can sell the
> properties of the Foundation without any intervention of the Patriarchate […]
> As I said, we can't intervene with administers of the Foundations who are
> elected by the people. We can't discharge someone from his/her position in
> the Foundation by arguing that he/ she doesn't manage the Foundation well,
> s/he damages the Foundation.[348]

In addition, one participant from an Armenian Foundation also complained of some

Foundations having their own way independently from and disrespectfully to the

Patriarchate because of the vacuum in the position of the Patriarch today— the

pesition is replaced by the deputy of the Patriarch because the Patriarch got sick. In

the sense of the Armenian institutions' disrespectful attitude towards the Patriarch

and Patriarchate, the introversive group criticizes the extroversive group around the

civil platforms because they were established without asking the consent of the

Patriarchate; they do not ask the approval of the Patriarchate about their work; they

deliberatively try to stay out of and against the social circle of the Patriarchate and

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[348] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.

the Patriarch and they radically criticize the Patriarchate, the internal problems of Armenians and the state. More specifically, some have differing opinions about the relations of the Patriarchate with Hrant Dink Foundation and *AGOS:*

> […] We would be deceived, if we say that the relation of the Patriarchate with these institutions is positive. Saying that it is blurred is the right word.[349]

Interviews with the participants from the extroversive group showed that they are informed about those critiques and those critiques coincide with the way the institutions' express themselves. They do not support ideologically the patriarchal authority of the Patriarchate and they complain that the religious and social government of the society is by one person, one man and one religious man. For instance, when I asked one participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, "did you ask the consent of the Patriarchate while establishing the institution?", she replied by laughing, "Of course, not." In that sense, when I hearken to the participants from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, Nor Zartonk, Hrant Dink Foundation and *AGOS*, I realize that they purposefully do not have any relation with the Foundations, Patriarchate, Patriarch and their social circle beyond inviting them to their meetings, panels, and some work involving them, although some from *AGOS* argue that they have relatively more contact with the social circle of the Patriarchate in the sense of publishing news about the Patriarchate and its social circle.

Moreover, the extroversive group is not content with the patriarchy, or father notion attributed to the Patriarchate over the Armenian society. The participants from this group argue that this creates a dependency of the civil platforms, especially of Foundations to the Patriarch, Patriarchate. Based on their ideology and their engagement with the democratization discussions in Turkey, they do not want to be dependent. In this regard, they repeatedly argue that they did not take and did not

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[349] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013.

want to take any moral and material support from the Patriarchate and Foundations although they have had some financial hardship. For instance, the most common problem they experienced was the lack of a place because of the expensive rents. They argue that if they take support from the Patriarchate or work under an Armenian Foundation, the social circle of the Patriarchate will not want them to criticize them and the Armenian society because this circle considers it stabbing in the *cemaat'*s back or betrayal. Therefore, participants from the extroversive group emphasize that all costs of their institutions are paid by their efforts. Moreover, although Hrant Dink Foundation can apply to EU funds for their projects, not to the state or Cultural Ministry funds, all these new institutions state that they do not take any financial support from the Patriarchate, Foundations and the state. Because they want to act independently, they are not willing to have a close relation with the social circle of the Patriarchate.

The most well-known story about the relations of the extroversive group with the Patriarchate's social circle is the support of Patriarch Mesrob II Mutafyan in the establishment of *AGOS* and his close relations with Hrant Dink before the 1998 Patriarch election, and *AGOS*'s support for hiselection to the position of the Patriarch. Whereas this story is exemplified by the introversive group to verify the close relation of the Patriarch and Patriarchate with all people of the Armenian community as a father's relation to his all children, the extroversive group claims that the Patriarch turned his back on *AGOS* and Hrant Dink, then had close relations with the social circle of the Patriarchate one week after being elected to be Patriarch. Therefore, they do not accept that the social circle of the Patriarchate has sympathy towards them. Additionally, the extroversive group argues an elitist and a gerontocratic attitude presented by the introversive group as a reason for the distance

between them. They repeatedly said that the introversive group criticizes the extroversive group sharply for being inexperienced by the reason of being young and for standing against their picture of being aristocratic or elitist Istanbulite Armenians.

In this respect, the extroversive group complains of the dependency of the Foundations, under which church, school and hospitals are operated, to the Patriarchate, although sometimes they argue that some platforms around the Patriarchate like the Foundations have solved some problems of Armenians especially the seized properties. Even some argue that because the Patriarchate is not close to them, the Foundations would not be. Therefore, they argue that although the Foundations are expected to act as independent civil platforms because the administrative board is elected, they do not consider themselves like civil society organizations; they still consider themselves religious institutions under the Patriarchate. They do not act independently. For instance, as I encountered during the adjusting an appointment with the people of the Foundations, one participant form Hrant Dink Foundation also stated that in their project about the seized properties of the Foundations of Istanbul, many Foundations demanded a written document that the Patriarchate permitted a meeting, although she also said some foundations did not have difficulties about making appointments and meeting. In my case, after they asked me for a permission paper from the Patriarchate, I applied to the Patriarchate with a petition. In reply, archbishop and the deputy of the Patriarchate sent this e-mail to me:

> You do not have to meet with all our church and school foundations. I can arrange meetings with one church, one school, and the hospital foundation's board chairman; in this way, *you will have done your research with our community.*[350] [my italics]

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[350] E-mail from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, March 13, 2013.

However, I was just sent two people's contact information from two different foundations. During the interviews, those two people had some concerns and before starting the interview, they warned me that information they would give me would be limited because they do not want to jeopardize the Patriarchate and their community. Moreover, in the abovementioned case of the participant from Hrant Dink Foundation, she said that she was in the administration of an Armenian Foundation and she was the one providing the connection of the project with the Foundation. However, she explained that she always quarreled with the administration because of their fear, "what if the Patriarchate does not permit us to give information of the Foundation to the project?" and because they wanted to take the advice of the Patriarchate about the issue.

Furthermore, the extroversive group also points out that the relation of the Foundations with Patriarchate relies on mutual interests of the groups, unlike the introversive group's argument that they have organic connection with the Patriarchate. More specifically, the participants from the extroversive group argue that if the Foundations do not have this relation and act independently, the Patriarchate could impose sanction that would prevent the solvency of the institutions.

> The Patriarchate has closer relations with the Foundations of the church, school and hospital than with us. The institutions which don't have close relations with the Patriarchate will be gradually excluded. How will they be excluded? Does it have this kind of authority? Actually, it seems that it doesn't have because the Foundations are dependent on the General Directorate of the Foundations. However, they are dependent on the Patriarchate in the sense of religion: the Patriarchate sends the priest to a church which is governed by a Foundation, when it needs a priest. If the Patriarchate doesn't send a priest, the church won't work. If it doesn't work, the Foundation won't operate. Therefore, they should have good relations with the Patriarchate. Otherwise, the Patriarchate sends an ineffectual priest who won't do his duty well, and won't manage to make people set the

connection with the Foundation. When people stop going to this church, the church falls into disfavor. The administration of the Foundation is a prestigious work. There is much more money there. People don't lose their jobs in the Foundations. In addition, there are people who have close relations with the Patriarchate because they are looking after their interests in the state.[351]

Briefly, the introversive group is content with patriarchal authority, by referencing the history and according to their interpretation of the current development and their conservative stance, and even they demand more control mechanism for the Patriarchate over the Armenian community by a legal personality which they consider a necessity. However, the extroversive group, because of their different ideology, and reading history differently, criticizes this authority and they argue that it creates dependency of the institutions, especially of the Foundations, to the Patriarchate. They want more independent platforms that provide room for Armenians to present themselves with their differences.

3.3.2. Civil Representation of Armenians

Both the extroversive and introversive groups articulate the necessity for a civil representation of Armenians. Moreover, both of them argue that the lack of the legal personality of the Patriarchate as a result of the abrogation of the 1863 Regulations in practice together with the civil commissions of Armenians consisting of civil people caused the vacuum of the social, political and religious government of the community/ society. However, it is not true to say that they have come to an agreement on the way to achieve the legal personality and over the content of it, especially regarding the civil representation.

The arguments of the introversive group center on that the Patriarchate can fulfill the lack of the civil representation through operating its religious authority.

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[351] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.

Moreover, thay add that because the Patriarchate is not recognized by the state legally, this necessity can not be addressed absolutely. Therefore, they offer that there should be a legal personality given to the Patriarchate and it should be in accordance with the 1863 Regulations. Because they consider that before and after the 1863 Regulations the Patriarchate was the head of the community and the civil and religious councils were under the authority of the Patriarchate—whereas the extroversive group considers that the 1863 was the limitation of the authority of the Patriarchate, so the Patriarch was a symbolic authority—the introversive group wants a civil authority under the authority of the Patriarchate and Patriarch. Nevertheless, their offering about the civil personality is the same system that has gone on for years; they do not want to change the order. They just want that the Patriarchate should be recognized by the state in accordance with the 1863 Regulations; thereby, the civil representation would be obtained under the Patriarchate in addition to its religious authority.

> The Patriarchate is authorized to represent but it has a gap because we have only the Patriarch and a spiritual council. Today, we don't have a system of the *Nizamname-I Milleti Armenian* implemented in the Ottoman Empire in which the civil governments could express their opinions and could have a voice. In the laws of the Republic, there is no such civil entity because when administration boards of the Foundations were elected, they weren't elected to represent the *cemaat*. Each of them is responsible for the survival, administration and maintenance of his/her own Foundation. However, it isn't fair to say that those civil institutions do not have close relations with the Patriarchate and they are a separate group. All in all in the Patriarchate, which is an institution of the *cemaat*, those civil institutions have a voice somehow. However, it is not a legalized system. It has only been a system in which those civil institutions agree with the common decisions or exchange views in the enlarged meeting of the *cemaat.* These meetings aren't always held but for the critical issues of all the *cemaat*. In that sense, the civil authority which it lacks could be filled by the Patriarchate somehow. This system has gone on without a hitch for years. Therefore, the Patriarchate has both civil and religious authorities together […] However, it is a reality that there must be a system that should be in accord with the content of the 1863 Regulation. We know that the spiritual and the political commissions didn't work alone. The

Patriarch was the top of these two councils and the general assembly, which was above these two.[352]

This secularization and civilization must be realized together around the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate should constitute a civil commission.[353]

It must be under a single roof. Because this single roof is the Patriarchate itself, our roof is the Patriarchate then. Maybe we can create some sub-groups together with the civil institutions to strengthen this center. However, it must be under the Patriarchate though. The duties of the Foundations are temporary but the Patriarchate is permanent. A legal personality is seeked be taken. Even if there is a political council, the final decision must be taken by the Patriarchate. However, the presence of the Foundations provides a sort of political commission somehow. However, as I said, it must belong to the Patriarchate.[354]

When I talked to the person from the *VADİP*, the InterFoundation Solidarity and Communication Platform and asked about the perspective of the introversive group about the civil representation, he stated that the *VADİP* was established to be a civil representation of Armenians through the Foundations before the state. He also stated that they acknowledge the Patriarchate as a head of the *VADİP* in order not to ignore almost the 550 year-old tradition in which the Patriarchate has been respected by the state. By expressing that the associations and foundations desire a civil representation to solve their problems, he recalled that the Patriarchate has remained for 550 years, although all civil institutions have disappeared over the years. Therefore, he admitted that despite the fact that they also consider sometimes like *AGOS* and other initiatives that the Patriarchate are in the very front, the Patriarchate should be the top of the civil representation.

On the contrary, because they ideologically do not support "one person, one man and one religious man's authority" over the representation and the government of the Armenian society, because they are engaged in the current democratization

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[352] Interview with the participant from the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, February 8, 2013.
[353] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation & *VADİP*, March 25, 2013
[354] Interview with the participant from an Armenian Foundation, March 15, 2013

process in Turkey much more than the introversive group with their civil platforms and because they read the history differently, especially the 1863 Regulations as a democratization and civilization reform in the government of the Armenian society, the extroversive group does not support a civil representation of a commission under the authority of the Patriarchate and Patriarch in addition to its religious council. Therefore, they urge the Armenian society, with the initiation of Hrant Dink and *AGOS,* to establish a civil representation of the Armenian society independent from the Patriarchate. In this way, they aim to abolish this dependency of the Foundations on the Patriarchate, to abolish the domination of the patriarchal notion attributed to the Patriarch and Patriarchate by the introversive group; i.e., the religious and civil government of the society by one person, one man and one religious man, to annihilate the corruption in the Armenian institutions and accomplish their transparency and accountability and to solve the problems like elections of the administration of the Foundations emerged from currently decreasing population of Armenians in the parish of the foundation.

> We do no longer admit that it is enough that Armenians are represented by a Patriarch alone. This is a tradition arising from the period of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state called the Patriarchs the head of the *millet.* However, for today, it is outdated. However, this patriarchate were symbolic power on the top because there were commissions below: The Armenian *millet* system. The Patriarchate was the symbolic representative of it. There was the education commission, health commission. Today they don't exist. Therefore, we aren't comfortable conducting the social life of society with a priest. We bring the struggle against this situation. In short, we bring the discussion of the *sivilleşme* (a perspective arguing to have a civil government of Armenians themselves in every aspect) on the agenda. We support the accountability of the Armenian institutions. One man comes to the administration of the Foundation, then you don't hear anything about this man. The elections of the Foundations are corrupted because each church is considered one electoral district according to the old election system. It was meaningful. However, the demographic situations of these districts have been changed in time. For example, while Gedikpaşa was a county which was densely populated by Armenians, today it has become an industrial zone. The

electorates of Gedikpaşa dispersed to places where they don't have their own churches. Therefore, continuing with the old system creates problems. There are foundations which have much money but less electorate. On the other hand, there are foundations which have less money but many electorates like Feriköy. In Beyoğlu, there are not many Armenians today. However, its foundation has many properties. This foundation doesn't give an account of their financial operations. All these are the problems brought on the agenda by *AGOS,* and haven't been solved yet. [355]

Why does a religious man, a person and a man represent [us]? We stand against this situation. However, they show us as standing against the Patriarchate. We are not against the Patriarchate. We send invitations to them in all opening events. They are more than welcome.[356]

Moreover, the extroversive group adds that it can be meaningful if the Patriarchate merely represent religiously and becomes the advisor of the Armenian society. However, because they are acting in favor of the democratization of Turkey with the effect of their ideology, when the religious responsibility of the Patriarchate assumes the civil responsibility, for the extroversive group, this will not be appropriate type of government of the Armenian society. Therefore, they support that the civil representation should be independent from the Patriarchate. However, in the sense of the religious authority of the Patriarchate, they also criticize the social circle of the Patriarchate with the claim that they restrict the religion into one sect, Apostolic Armenians' religion, rather than having a more comprehensive structure including Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, atheists, and so on. Therefore, although they say that religiously the Patriarchate could represent the society, the extroversive group has disagreements on the Patriarchate's "traditional and outdated" attitude towards religion.

Therefore, the participants from the extroversive group argue a multi-vocal representation of the society by itself rather than a group of representatives from the

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[355] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22 2013.
[356] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 19, 2013.

Patriarchate. In that sense, through the effect of their ideology and their engagement in the democratization discussions in Turkey, they argue that the society should be organized to establish and operate the organized representation by themselves. They suggest that the civil representation could be organized around their civil platforms already established by a group of people that would claim their rights before the state and make decisions regarding their internal issues in accordance with the general opinions of the Armenian society independently from the Patriarchate.

> Our view is to be represented by an institution which resembles an assembly and is horizontally organized. If a decision will be made about the problems of the Armenians, the state should make it by consulting with this institution. [357]

> There are civil society institutions that have come into being gradually. When they get a bit stronger, one of them might be named after a general institution of the people, and if it is elected by the people and it consists of people who deal with the problems of society, as it was in the past, I would go to those people, instead of going to the state, when I have a problem with the state. Then they would claim my rights. Unlike creating a situation of being another state in the state, it facilitates the state's works. [358]

Briefly, although the civil representation is a demand of all participants, they disagree on its structure. In respect to their history and significance of the Patriarchate admitted in the Armenian community over their history, the introversive group demands a civil representation of Armenians by some representatives under the Patriarchate and together with the recognition of the Patriarchate legally by the state in accordance with the 1863 Regulation. Moreover, they are hopeful about it because of the recent developments initiated by the AKP rule. However, an initiation of discussion on the civil representation of Armenians independently from the Patriarchate sparked by *AGOS* and Hrant Dink has continued to date by the extroversive group gathered around the new civil institutions. In effect of their own

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[357] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.
[358] Interview with the participant from *AGOS*, March 22, 2013.

ideological perspective and current democratic developments in Turkey, they want a civil organization participated in by Armenians themselves to represent them independently from the Patriarchate.

In conclusion, patriarchal authority, although it has significance in the history of Armenians, becomes a matter of debate between the extroversive and introversive groups because of the recent democratic developments, their different ideological stances and their reading history differently. The introversive group supports the advisory and representative relations of the Patriarchate with the Armenian community, and they call it the relation between father and child. Moreover, in regard to the civil representation, although they say that it is a necessity of Armenians, the introversive participants argue that the Patriarchate, for now, could provide the civil representation of Armenians somehow almost in accordance with the 1863 Regulations with some exceptions. Therefore, with the legal personality, in accordance with the 1863 Regulations, to be given to the Patriarchate by the state, the civil representation would be perfectly provided by the commissions under the Patriarchate. However, the participants from the extroversive group argue that they are not comfortable with the attribution of "the father-child relation" in the position of the Patriarchate; they argue that this creates a dependency for mutually looking after personal interests rather than democratic representation. Therefore, unlike the conservatives, by arguing that 1863 was a restriction of the authority of the Patriarchate by the democratic institutions, they urge to establish an independent civil platform for Armenians elected by Armenians to represent themselves independently from the Patriarchate.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that the Armenian movement has emerged and continued through the fragmentation between the extroversive and introversive groups since the mid-1990s. I argue that the introversive and extroversive groups have different strategies, goals and framings over the issues of the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenian with the state and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/ community. Moreover, I argue that the collective identity paradigm of the new social movements, and political process theories cannot explain those differences because they consider movements as a whole. Therefore, I present the issues and the reasons for the fragmentation by engaging with some studies on diversity in social movements. In that sense, I explore that ideological differences of the actors, current political developments including constraints and opportunities in Turkey and in the Armenian society/community, and actor's different ways of reading history are the main factors behind the fragmentation. Moreover, by following those reasons, I argue that the fragmentation between these two groups comes to the surface in three main issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state and the patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/ community.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I argue that the Armenian movement has emerged and continued through the fragmentation between two groups in Istanbul since the mid-1990s: the introversive and extroversive groups. My main concern is to investigate the reasons for and issues of the fragmentation between these two groups. To explore it, I conducted 8 in-depth interviews and one e-mail conversation with people who fit the category of "the introversive group," and 8 in-depth interviews with people who fit the category of "the extroversive group."

I study this subject from the perspective of studies on diversity and fragmentation within social movements. Those studies mainly criticize the collective identity paradigm which approaches social movements without considering fragmentations within them. Although they have different perspectives—political process theories[359] focus on the structural and external developments for explaining the movements through collective action, whereas the new social movements theories[360] focus on internal and cultural developments through collective identity paradigm—both these theories, especially new social movements theories, have the perspective of the collective identity paradigm. In other words, they study social movements as a whole. In effect of these theories, scholars who want to understand the reasons for the collective action in social movements use the perspective of collective identity. They assume that the movement participants come together with

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[359] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Mcgraw-Hill College, 1978); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement, Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dough McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[360] Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challange of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985); Jean L., Cohen. "Strategy or Identity, New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985); Alain Touraine, "The Importance of Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002); Allain Touraine, *The Voice and The Eye,* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Clause Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging in the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research,* 52:4 (Winter 1985).

collective ideas, interests, values, goals, and culture through which they present themselves as "us" against "them."[361] Therefore, it is fair to say that these theories *study a social movement as a whole*. They do not consider fragmentations, instabilities, diverse identities, strategies, goals, interests, and values in social movements.

However, the critiques of the collective identity paradigm illustrate that there could be multiple identities, values, strategies, goals, and framings[362], a drive to deconstruct the fixed identities in social movements[363], and also there might not be clearly and easily cut into "us" and "them" in social movements.[364] In this sense, I examine some studies on diversity in the gay-lesbian, women's, environment, labor, ethnic-nationalist and political party movements. I situate my study in this perspective that approaches a social movement in its fragmentations. Moreover, by scrutinizing this literature, I explore the reasons for the fragmentation in the Armenian movement in accordance with the most referenced explanations in the interviews: the ideological differences among the actors, current developments including opportunities and constraints which are accessible for the diverse actors, and reading history differently by the actors. By examining the reasons individually in reference to the literature, I became acquainted with particular issues over which the different groups in different social movements have fragmentations. As a result

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[361] Rachel L. Einwohner, Jo Reger, and Daniel J. Myers, "Identity Work, Sameness, and Difference in Social Movement," in *Identity Work in Social Movements*, ed. Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner, (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008); Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lezbian Feminist Mobilization," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D Morris and Carol McClurg Muelle (Yale University Press, 1992); Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (January 1, 2001).

[362] Clare Saunders, "Double-edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement," *The British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008).

[363] Joshua Gamson, "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma," *Social Problems* 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1995).

[364] Jo Reger, Daniel J. Myers, and Rachel L. Einwohner, ed. *Identity Work in Social Movements*, (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

of my analysis, I conclude that the extroversive and introversive groups have different perspectives mainly on three issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community.

In the third chapter, I present that the fragmentation in the Armenian movement emerged in the mid-1990s which coincides with the time of the rising of the movement. Before that time, during the suppressive and discriminative policies of the Republic of Turkey on minorities, the differences of Armenians were, so to speak, homogenized and suppressed, although they could have been heard in the Ottoman Empire. Then, only was the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul an Armenian institution which was *defacto* recognized and considered as an interlocutor of the Republican state. Therefore, the patriarchate has conducted a moderate policy with the state, as it is argued in the interviews, in the time of suppression, discrimination and violence by the state and society. Therefore, the state has never sincerely and openly come to listen to the problems of the Armenians in the republican period until the mid-1990s.

However, amid democratic developments in Turkey after the 1980s, the Patriarchate and its social circle, e.g. Foundations, have had close relations with the state, especially in the 2000s with the AKP rule. They focus on the problems of the seized properties of Foundations, problems of schools, churches, hospital, and historical monuments of Armenians and so on. However, it was not a process of improvement in the situation of Armenians that was sparked only by the current developments. Some in the Armenian society/ community also have the feeling of necessity of being heard and solving the problems of Armenians who have been exposed to social, political, economical and cultural grievances over the years.

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Therefore, besides the efforts of the Patriarchate and its social circle called the introversive group in this research, the extroversive group started to gather around the new civil platforms which were established in the post-1995 period. They began to publicly discuss the undiscusssed issues of Armenians. *AGOS* was the first civil institution. With its chief editor, Hrant Dink, the newspaper became controversial not only in the issues of Armenians but also the problems of Turkey in general. As one participant stated, the newspaper wrote defiantly the news about the critiques of the history of Armenians, grievances of Armenians, the 1915 massacre, the relations of Turkey with the Republic of Armenia, patriarchal authority in the Armenian society, and corruption in the Armenian institutions and its elections.[365] Moreover, various people have shared the same concerns with *AGOS* and Hrant Dink. Those people also started to discuss the Armenian issues in academia and in conferences, and published some books about the Armenian issues and history. In short, it is fair to argue that Armenians' voices have started to gain currency in Turkey, and, unlike a unity, they have appeared through the fragmented perspectives on some issues.

Furthermore, this fragmentation has accelerated with increasing the number of the extroversive group gathered around the newly established civil platforms after the assassination of the controversial journalist, Hrant Dink in 2007: Hrant Dink Foundation, *Nor Zartonk,* Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association, and some regional institutions. Although all these are not unitary or come together around one single perspective and stance, they, especially the first three, declare that they share some similar concerns with *AGOS* about resolving the Armenian's problems, differently from the social circle of the Patriarchate, i.e. "the introversive group." Moreover, some participants from those new civil platforms declare that although

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[365] Interview with the participant from *AGOS,* March 22, 2013.

they criticize some views of Hrant Dink and *AGOS,* they believe that *AGOS* and Dink opened a significant way and become models for them. Whereas most of the already established institutions: Armenian churches, schools, hospital, each of which belongs to the Armenian foundations, and alumni associations, have an organic link with the Patriarchate and Christianity, and have been established with the ratification given by the Patriarchate, those newly established civil platforms argue that they did not ask for any ratification. Therefore, the extroversive group asserts that independently from the traditional order and the already established institutions of the Armenian society, there should be civil platforms to claim the rights of the Armenians and to declare their opinions on the general issues of Turkey. Briefly, with the establishment of these new institutions, the fragmentation is furthered and both groups have continued to follow different strategies, goals and framings on some issues.

In light of this information, in the last chapter, I analyze the reasons for and issues of the fragmentation between the two groups in reference to my literature review. In the earlier section of the chapter, I examine there main reasons for the fragmentation among the two groups that revealed in my analysis: ideological differences of actors, current developments including opportunities and constraints for which the actors are accessible, and reading history differently by actors. Firstly, as Jo Reger takes ideological differences among actors as one of the main sources of the fragmentation within her study on the women's movement in the U.S.[366], I examine that the extroversive and introversive groups in the Armenian society have different ideological perspectives. In the interviews, especially with people from the extroversive group, participants clearly identify themselves as liberal or socialist or

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[366] Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity,"; Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women," 710.

feeling closer to the socialist/Marxist ideology. Moreover, they also have been described by the introversive group as "socialist, Marxist or communist," and it is also told that they are known as such by the greater part of the Armenian community. As for the introversive group, the extroversive group calls them "a conservative and religious group." Moreover, in the interviews with the introversive group, it is obvious that people from the Patriarchate, and the social circle of the Patriarchate—the bible reading group, alumni associations, and the Foundations—look at issues from their own religious and conservative perspective. These two different ideological stances have become the one of the main sources of the fragmentation between the two groups. For instance, on the issue of a newly emerged group who is from Dersim and declare that they are Armenian with their Muslim identity—because of the fact that they were forcefully converted into Islam—these two groups articulate different opinions. Whereas the extroversive group argues that they support those people from Dersim because they take the responsibility of protecting all minorities, differences and exploited people upon themselves, the introversive group considers those people dangerous and does not support them because they think that being Armenian requires having significant religious, traditional and cultural credentials which those people do not have.

Secondly, as Bernstein and Reger observe the current developments including opportunities and constraints as a significant source of the fragmentation in their studies,[367] I explored that the same reason works in two ways in the fragmentation of the Armenian movement. Bernstein claims that if a group of a movement has a more political access to the state, polity or political actors, this group will conduct a more moderate politics in accordance with the state policy. From this point of view, in the

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[367] Bernstein, "The Contradiction of Gay Ethnicity: Forging identity in Vermont."; Reger, "Organizational Dynamics and Construction of Multiple Feminist Identities in the National Organization for Women."

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Armenians' case, the participants from the introversive group follow a similar politics with the state and state officials due to their closer relations since the 2000s. However, the extroversive group follows more civil, independent, as they call, "defiant," or "radical" way against some state policies and the traditional order in the Armenian society. In addition to different extents of political access by the actors, also different interpretations of the current developments by the movement participants, as in the study of Tezcür[368], could create a fragmentation. For instance, whereas the introversive group interprets recent improvements as a result of the sincere efforts of the AKP rule, and argues that developments should continue in the same way, the extroversive group is not hopeful and does not interpret it as sincerity. Therefore, they suggest claiming to be citizen of Turkey rather than being treated as "minorities who are the part of the cultural mosaic"[369] by the state officials.

Thirdly, although the literature does not address it so much, reading the history differently by these two groups becomes another significant source of the fragmentation in the Armenian movement. Since the history of Armenians has a significant meaning for Armenians and for the issues of Armenians in the present, when the actors read it differently, they come with different arguments on some current issues. The most visible example of this reason is in the issue of patriarchal authority. Because the introversive group considers the 1863 Regulation of Armenian Millet a reference point of the religious, political and civil authority of the Patriarchate over the Armenian community for years, they argue that the civil representation should be provided by the commissions under the authority of the Patriarchate. However, the extroversive group interprets the 1863 Regulation as an

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[368] Tezcür, "Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation," *European Journal of Kurdish Studies* 10 (2009).

[369] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 23, 2013.

attempt of the liberal-democratic intellectuals with craftsmen to restrict and abolish the religio-aristocratic authority of the Patriarchate with the *amira*s. With reference to this regulation, they assert that Armenians have had democratic institutions that could represent themselves; thus, the civil representation of the Armenians should be realized by an independent civil platform that would be elected by all Armenians.

Moreover, it is significant to note that these reasons could not be considered in separate categories as I list above. As it is obvious in some examples, it is possible to see that on one issue, e.g., the relation with the state, the actors could have fragmented perspectives because of the effects of all three reasons together.

From this point of view, in the second part of this chapter, I analyze the issues individulally over which the groups have the fragmentation by indicating their reasons with the help of the excerpts from the interviews. As a result of my analysis, I conclude that the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups relies mainly on three issues: the concept of being Armenian, the relations of Armenians with the state, and patriarchal authority in the Armenians society/ community. Firstly, although all participants share some some concerns about the concept of being Armenian, in the interviews it is obvious that each groups has its own conceptualization. I explore that their conceptualization includes four common components, but each group identify it differently. Those four componants are listed in the study as follows; the profile of Armenians in Turkey, the extent of appearance of Armenians in public, Armenians' relation with the other movements and minority groups in Turkey, and the relation between religion and being Armenian. Regarding the conceptualization of the introversive group, with the effect of their "conservative" ideology, and their interpretation and feeling about the danger of disappearing of the recent improvements in the situation of Armenians, and their

reading history differently, I conclude that the introversive group has fears of being extroversive in the public. They criticize the works of the extroversive group that aim to publicly discuss the issues in the Armenian community/ society and Turkey. They also assume that Armenians in Turkey consist of only one identity, "being Armenian and a citizen of Turkey." Moreover, they consider that Armenians have had a *sui generis,* or idiosyncratic situation in the past and present, so their issues cannot be compared to any other minorities in Turkey like Kurds, women, gay-lesbian, and so on. Additionally, they have a strong belief that the concept of being Armenian cannotbe separated from Christianity, especially the apostolic sect. However, as for the conceptualization of the extroversive group, they pay regard to the differences among Armenians in Turkey and argue that there is no one single identity of Armenians. With their different political ideology, and different interpretation of the current developments, they assert that Armenian's issues should be explicitly talked about in public to solve the problems, so they claim to avoid being introversive as in the past. Moreover, their work related to other minorities in Turkey indicates that the extroversive group does consider that the problem is not only of Armenians; they admit the similarities in the issues and current and historical situation of Armenians with the other movements and minorities in Turkey. Although this extroversive group accepts that religion has been a significant component of being Armenian from history, they do not have a religious perspective for being Armenians. They argue that religion cannot be a required criterion for being Armenian; thus, "who wants to be Armenian, could be."[370]

Along with the issue of the concept of being Armenian, the introversive and extroversive groups have different perspectives on the relations of Armenians with

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[370] Interview with the participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & *Nor Zartonk*, February 10, 2013.

the state. As it is in history and as one participant from Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association argues, the state has had close relations only with the introversive group gathered around the historical institutions of Armenians, especially the Patriarchate and its social circle, as its interlocutor. It has not taken seriously the extroversive group gathered around the civil platforms and its demands. This situation has been more visible especially since the 2000s. I conclude that the introversive group, who has more political access to the state polity through personal relations with political officials, is content and hopeful with the current policies of the state about Armenians. Moreover, they argue that the AKP government is the main actor in the recent developments about the seized properties of the Armenian Foundations, problems of schools, churches and the historical monuments of Armenians, and so on. However, the extroversive group does not agree with the perspectives of the introversive group on the main actor of the recent improvements, the expectation from the recent relations with the state, and the personal relations conducted with the state officials. This group gathered around the civil platforms argues that the civil platforms, which were leaded up by *AGOS* and Hrant Dink, have been the main actors. They have sparked public discussions about Armenians' issues and compelled the state to make some improvements which are even not enough for today. They consider that the AKP rule conducts insincere politics; they just establish personal relations with the introversive group which are appropriate to their mutual interests. The participants from the extroversive group think that those relations do not meet the most important problems of the Armenians such as the symbolic and physical violence against Armenians that still continues in political, social, economic and cultural life. Therefore, one of the main necessities of Armenians is to be treated as citizens of Turkey by the state and society. In that sense, rather than having

personal relations with the state officials, the extroversive group urges Armenians to claim their rights with the organized civil platforms in accordance with their ideological perspectives.

Patriarchal authority in the Armenian society/community is the third of significant issues on which these two groups have a fragmentation. This fragmentation has been sparked with the critical news published in *AGOS* and furthered with the establishment of the new platforms after 2007. Although all participants share the idea that the Patriarchate should be given a legal personality by the state and there is a necessity of the civil representation of Armenians, these two groups have different perspectives on critical aspects of this issue. The introversive group, in reference to history, posits that the Patriarchate has been the advisory and representative of Armenians same as in a relation between a father and his children. Therefore, according to their interpretation of current developments and their conservative stance, the Patriarchate should be on the top of political authority in addition to its religious authority in Armenian society. Moreover, they argue that the Patriarchate has already fulfilled the lack of the civil representation of Armenians somehow; therefore, the situation should not be changed. It is just a necessity to have a legal personality in accordance with the 1863 Regulation which is, as they assume, a reference point for the political and civil authority of the Patriarchate. However, the extroversive group criticizes the metaphor of a father-child relation attributed to the relation of the Patriarchate/Patriarch with Armenians: They argue that this creates a dependency of Armenians, especially of the Foundations on the Patriarchate. Moreover, in accordance with their ideology and their reading history differently, and amid the current democratic developments, they argue that the Patriarchate has not been in both political and religious authority and should not be today. They claim

that the 1863 Regulation was a remark of restriction of the authority of the Patriarchate by democratic institutions. Although they accept that the Patriarchate could have a religious representation—not only for the apostolic sect, but for all differences—they do not admit that the civil representation should be under the power of the Patriarchate; rather, the civil platforms which are elected by the Armenians should provide their representation independently from the Patriarchate.

Consequently, this thesis investigates the reasons for and issues of the fragmentation between the introversive and extroversive groups in the Armenian movements since the mid-1990s. It makes a significant contribution to the literature on the diversity and fragmentation within the social movements. In light of this literature, this thesis critically approaches studies which treat social movements as a whole such as new social movements and political process theories. Therefore, this thesis reveals significant dynamics and internal instabilities and fragmentations of the Armenian movements that would be overlooked when studied from the perspective of "social movements as a whole." In addition, as it is revealed in my case and has not been addressed much more by the literature, I propose "reading history differently by the actors" could be a significant source of the fragmentation in social movements. This is also one of the important contributions of this thesis to the literature.

Moreover, this thesis does not claim that it is representative for all parties and situations even though they are not included in this research. I am aware that it is a significant limitation of this thesis that I have had a restricted number of interviews because of some difficulties in accessing Armenian people and the time limitation of this research. Therefore, these categories and fragmentations cannot be representative

for all cases. However, I believe that this thesis provides a significant standpoint on the internal fragmentation in the Armenian movement since the mid-1990s.

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266 Mesela bizim iki kimliğimiz var Türkiye'de. Ben hem Türküm, Türk vatandaşıyım. Türk ırkına ait bir birey değilim. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyım. Biz beş yüz yıldır bu topraklardaydık. Atalarım buradaydı. Benim bugün Ermenistan ile de hiçbir organik bağım yok... Ama ben hem de Ermeni'yim. Ermeni kimliğim var. Birini üstün görüp diğerini ret etme hakkına sahip değilim. Benim vatanım burası. ... Anadolu da biz zaten 4000 5000 yıl beraber yaşamışız.

267 Biz Ermeni'yiz ve bu ülkenin vatandaşıyız. Vergimizi bu ülkeye ödüyoruz.

268 Ermeni toplumunu bugün birkaç özellikler içerisinde görmek gerekir. Türkiye de artık farklı Ermeniler var. Düne kadar böyle bir şey yoktu. Bugün biliyoruz ki, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olan, Türkiye'de doğan anası babası Türkiye'de doğan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olan Ermeniler var. Ancak, birde Ermenistan bağımsız olduktan sonra ekonomik sıkıntılarla Türkiye'ye gelmiş Ermenistanlı Ermeniler var. Ve ayrıca, son altı yedi yılda git gide görünür olmaya başlayan kripto Ermenileri var. Ben bunlardan 1. gruba dâhilim. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı bir Ermeni'yim. Ama Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı Ermenilerde kendi içinde bir bütünlük arz etmezler. Bunların içerisinde politik duruşlarına bağlı olarak farklı farklı tavırlar içerisinde olan Ermeniler vardır.

269 Ermeni Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği'ndeyseniz, Ermenistan ile bağlantınız oluyor.

270 60 bin kişilik cemaatte bir parçalanma mevzu bahis değildir. Ancak yurtdışında olan Ermeniler var. Ermeniler dağılmıştır bu anlamda. Fakat parçalanma mevzu bahis değildir.

271 Biz cemaat olarak bir bütünüz. Bir bütünüz. Bizim cemaat içinde bireyler olarak kendinizi nerede görüyorsunuz derseniz, benim tek bir kimliğim var Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı ve Ermeni azınlık toplumunun bir bireyiyim. Kendimi buradan farklı bir yerde görmek lüksüne de sahip değilim çünkü bunu kabullenmem. Bizler hepimiz bir birey olarak bu cemaatin çekirdeğiyiz.

272 Biz ne yazık ki 1998'lere kadar bu kabuk içerisinde kaldık. Yani annelerimiz babalarımız bizi büyütürken hep aman oğlum aman kızım ile büyüttü. Çünkü o dönemde 80'leri biliyorsunuz Asala terörü vardı… Bu devlet tarafından Türk kardeşlerimize ve bize de 2000'lere kadar empoze edilen makûs tarihimiz hep Ermeni kötüdür, tüh, kaka pistir diye geçer. Biz hep böyle yetiştik.

273 Ermeni toplumu cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca 1915'in travmasını ağır olarak üzerinde hissetti. Yani bir sürü cumhuriyet yıllarında karşılaşılan olgular hep 1915'in devam etmekte olduğunu ve hep bizim bunun hedefi olacağımızı düşündürttü… Çünkü örneğin 1915 ten 1925'e sonra ikinci dünya savaşında, Türkiye zihniyetinin ikinci dünya savaşına bakış açısında biz yine çok riskli bir yerdeydik. 20 kura askerlik adı altında Ermenileri' de yol bakımında kullanıldılar. Silahlandırılmadılar. Kendilerinin öldürüleceği ortak kanaatleriydi… Biz Türkiye Ermenileri bu baskıların

içerisinde yaşayınca, doğal bir refleks olarak ta mümkün mertebe kendi bünyemizde varlığımızı sürdürmeye çalıştık.

274 Ermeniler seslerinin çok yükseltilmesinin tehlikeli olacağını belirten bir söz kullanırlar. "Adım Kabahat, Soyadım Kabahatyan."

275 Son zamanlarda gelişen bir kimlik baskısından kurtulma çabası var… Osmanlı'nın ümmet yapısından gelen Müslüman ve Müslüman olmayan bir yapı vardı. Bunu Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bağlamında bakarsak, biz Osmanlı'dan istediğimizi devralıp, istemediklerimizi dışarıda bıraktığımız zaman, ciddi köprü problemleri, boşluklar oluşuyor. Bu da kimlik baskısı gibi çıkıyor ortaya. Aslında kimlik baskısı yok. Ama tarihsel olarak gelişmeler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda insanların birbiri ile güven sorunu ile alakalı, bizden değil gibi, bir ötekileştirme var. Bu sadece Müslüman, Hıristiyan, Musevi gibi toplulukların arasında değil, Müslümanların, Hıristiyanların kendi içinde oluşturdukları bir sistem.

276 İnsan haklarına aykırı durumları sırf kimlik yüzünden ortaya çıktığını ispatlayarak o eziyetleri, o sorunları gündeme getirerek, şunu yaptınız, bunu yaptınız demek faydasız. 1909 Adana olayları, 1915 Ermeni tehciri, Varlık vergisi, 6-7 Eylül olayları … Artık bunun sonu gelmez.

277 Türkiye Ermenilerinin ekonomik kaygıları daha fazla. Elbette 1915 çözülsün diyebilirler. Ama bu olay rafa kalkacak ve hiç konuşulmayacak desen, birçoğu kabul eder bunu. Çünkü bu olayın gündemde olması Ermenileri hain olarak göstermeye meyilli. Gündemde olsun çok istemiyorlar. Geriliyorlar, esnaflar falan. Yaşama kaygıları var.

278 Türkiye'de ki Ermeniler, bir an evvel bitsin ve devam edelim diyorlar.

279 Biraz daha dışa dönük bir toplum olmasını isterim. Belki tüm azınlıklarda vardır bu kabuğunu kıramamak, bilmiyorum. Bu beni kişisel olarak rahatsız ediyor. Politik bir kırılma var. Ama benim istediğim sosyal yaşamda bir kırılma. Biz milli bir özellik olarak sanata ve kültüre yatkın bir toplumuz ve çok muazzam işler oluyor. Hepsi gönüllü oluyor… Bu çok küçük bir ortamda sergilenme imkânı buluyor. Hâlbuki büyük bir alanda sergilenebilecek işler ortaya çıkıyor. Bu biraz artık çekingenlikten mi diyeyim, korkulacak bir şey yokta, çekingenlikten diyeyim... Sanatsal açılım bence çok güzel bir başlangıç olur. Tanınmaya politik bir yerden başlamak bence faydasız bir adım. Yanlış ya da doğru demiyorum ama faydalı olmaz.

280 Kültürünü yaşatalım diyen insanlar, kültürüne tamamen sahip olmamış insanlar oluyor. Yani bilmediği bir kültürü yaşatmak istiyor. Bu kültürünü öğrenemediğinden belki sahip değil. Belki ilgisizliğinden sahip değil… Tabii kültürü yaşatmak ve sahip çıkmak için onu öğrenmek lazım. O kültürü de öğrenmemişse, onu öğrenmek için zaman geçirmesi ve edinmesi gerekiyor ki koruyabilsin ve aktarabilsin. Bütün sorun bu.

281 Olumlu çalışmaları olduğunu düşünüyorum. Toplumu dışarıya açan bir vakıf. Bu güzel. Ancak toplumu dışarıya açacağız diye cemaatten uzaklaşmamak gerekir… Nor Zartonk, Hrant Dink Vakfı, bu kesimler patrikhaneye mesafeli yaklaşan

kimseler. "cemaatten" "topluma" dönüştürme hareketi gibi bir şey bu. Büyük toplumla karışmak iyidir. Ancak kötüdür de. Amerika'da Fransa'da Ermeni toplumuna bakınca, ne kadar karıştıklarında o kadar asimile olduklarını görüyoruz, dini olarak sona erdiklerini görüyoruz. Daha çok kültürümüzü tanıtarak bu açılmayı yapmalıyız. Hiçbir zaman cemaatten uzaklaşılmamalı. Bu derneği örneğin ilk kez sizden duyuyorum. Ben normalde neredeyse tüm derneklerden falan haberdarım. Bu da onların bizden uzaklaştığını gösteriyor. O zaman dışa kendini nasıl tanıtacak? Tanıtacak değeri kalmıyor ki.

282 Onların Ermenilik kavramı … zamanın ruhuna uygun değil. Asimilasyona karşı bu değerleri savunduklarını söylüyorlar. "Biz asimilasyona karşıyız, siz çok mu açılıyorsunuz" diye, bizi, özgürlükçü kesimleri eleştiriyorlar. Ama hâlbuki bizzat kendi bulundukları çevrelerde çok ciddi asimilasyon sıkıntısı var. Çünkü çatışmalarla, sürekli içe kapanmakla toplum çok ciddi enerji kaybına uğruyor. Ucuz milliyetçilikle bu iş yürümüyor. Ben şahsen, hem özgürlükçü ve sol angajmanlı ya da liberal bir yaklaşım savunmak hem de kimlik politikalarına sahip çıkmanın mümkün olacağını düşünüyorum.

283 Bugün mesela muhafazakâr olan gruplara bakıyoruz, gençleri dil konusunda aşılamakta hiçte başarılı değiller. Sürekli bir dine vurgu var. Ama bizim bulunduğumuz çevreler bu konuda gerçekten başarılı. Birçok farklı insan geliyor, biz Ermenilerin dilini öğrenelim diyorlar… Ben bunu daha sağlıklı buluyorum. Biz örgütlenerek bunu başarıyoruz.

284 Agos kurulduğunda duygusal açıdan bakanlar oldu. "Zaten Ermeniler yok oluyor siz ona bir hançer daha vurdunuz. İnsanlar artık Türkçe okur Ermenice okumaz dediler. … Doğrudur, Ermeniler Ermenice okumaktan vazgeçebilir ama AGOS'un çevresinde, AGOS ile ilgilenen hatta Ermeni olmayan gençler Ermenice kursuna gidiyor. Bu da onların akıllarının alabileceği bir şey değil. Halen daha almıyor, niye Ermenice öğreniyor? Kime ne faydası var Ermenicenin? Bu insanlar kendi çocuklarına öğretmemiş Ermeniceyi nasıl olsa bir işe yaramaz diye. Şimdi Ermenice kursuna gitmesine aklı ermiyor. Burada işte ideolojik meseleler ortaya çıkıyor. Benim aklım eriyor. Sen çocuğuna tıp ve mühendislikten başka hayal kuramıyorsan, Ermenice de sana çok lazım gelmeyebilir.

285 Yahu ben Ermenice bir Playboy dergisi tercüme etmeye kalksam kafamı kırar benim. Onun Ermenice anlayışı benimkinden farklı. Kutsanmış olarak görüyor. Hayatında olmasın, ama olsun. Bilelim ama kullanmayalım. Playboyu Ermenice basmadıkça, Ermeniceyi hayatın içine sokamayacağız. Biz bunu yapmaya çalışıyoruz.

286 Bu derneklerin cemaat içerisinde parçalanma yaratacağını hem düşünüyorum, hem düşünmüyorum. Çünkü beraber hareket edip, aynı amaca ulaşmaktan ziyade, herkesin kendi amacına ulaşma ve sorunu çözme eğilimi var. Farklı sesler olmalı elbet. Ama harmoni içinde olmalı… Mesela, kurumların ne amaçla kurulduğu çok önemli. Kaldı ki gerekli her türlü dernek alt yapısı, sosyal alt yapı zaten cemaatte mevcut. Kültür derneği mi? Zaten bizim okullarımızdan yetişenlerin kurduğu kültür dernekleri var. Koro mu kurmak istiyorsunuz? Kilise koroları var. Yok, siz İstanbullular Derneği kurmak mı istiyorsunuz e kurum İstanbullular Derneği. Ancak zaten tüm dernekler İstanbullu. Doğru amaca hizmet ettikçe, olması gerektiğine

inanıyorum yeni oluşumların. Ama bu oluşumların insanların başını döndürüp bazıları tarafından da, yanlış yönlendirme ile yanlış hareketler yapmaması için dua ediyorum.

287 Toplumda dernek deyince okullardan mezunların kurdukları dernekler anlaşılıyor. Pasif diyerek haklarını yememek gerekiyor ama bu dernekler gençler eğlensin, evlensin diye siyasi ilgisi olan kişilerden oluşmuyor.

288 Tabii orada aktivite sayısı kısıtlı oluyor. Çok uzun yıllar gelenekselleşmiş yapısı olduğu için etkinlik çeşitliliği olsun, siyasi maksatlı şeyler olsun çok mümkün olmuyor. … Hiçbir şeye yoğunlaşmıyorlar. O kendi mezunları arasında bir ağ olsun, eğlenceler olsun, ne bileyim eski mezunlar gelir bir şeyler anlatır. Bir kaç tiyatro dans konusunda çaba gösteren okul dernekleri var.

289 Ermeni toplumundan yola çıkarak Türkiye ve Dünya'da entelektüel girişim, barış, eşitlik özgürlük gibi gerçekten hani içi boş bir şekilde değil, içi dolu bir şekilde savunan bir organizasyon. Kuruluşunda Ermenilerden oluşuyordu. Şimdi sadece Ermeniler yok. Derdinin sadece Ermeniler olmasının bir sıkıntı olarak düşündük. Bizi sınırlandırabileceğini, zamanla milliyetçi bir yere dönüşebileceğini düşünerek, biz sadece ermeni toplumu üzerine değil, Türkiye toplumu üzerine ve dünya üzerine bir şeyler söylememiz gerektiğini düşündük… Sözümüz sadece Ermeni azınlıkları kapsamıyor. Farklı etnik gruplarda organizasyonlarda, örneğin Halkların Demokratik Kongresi, Halkların Anayasası gibi farklı grupların oluşturduğu, etnik grupların oluşturduğu organizasyonlar içindeyiz. Bugün Norradyo sadece Ermenilerin sesi değil. 9 dilde yayın yapıyoruz. Gürcüce, Pomakça yayın yapıyoruz. Bizim ermeni yerine, Kürt de, Rum da, Türk de, kadın da yazabileceğimiz bir şey yani… Kurumsal olarak diğer hareketlerle bir bağlantımız tam olarak olmasa da içimizden bireysel olarak LGBT, kadın, Kürt hareketi ile ilgilenen arkadaşlarımız var. Kadın gay-lezbiyen ekoloji hareketlerinden gelenler var. Bir arkadaşımız homofobi ile ilgili yazılar yazıyor. Nor Zartonk'lu kadınlar paneller falan yapıyor.

290 Nor Zartonk bir şeyler yapmaya, kendini anlatmaya çalışıyor. Farklı halklarla birlikte hareket etmeye çalışıyor. Çünkü bu sadece Ermenilerin problemi değil. Ermeniler belki son 100 yılda en büyük katliama uğramış bir halk ama bu ülke de 30 yıldır devam eden bir iç savaş var. Sürekli öldüren bir sistem var. Mesela biz Halkların Demokratik Kongresi ile beraber, aynı zamanda bileşeniyiz zaten, bir eylem tertip edik Samatya'da… Biz HDK da olduğumuz için Roboski eylemine gidiyoruz, Cumartesi Annelerine gidiyoruz, Sürekli sesimizi duyurmaya çalışıyoruz. Tek başına sesimiz cılız kalıyor.

292 Biz birçok sivil toplum kuruluşundan davet aldık, fikirlerimizi belirttik. Toplumun bir parçası olan bu hareketleri yok sayamazsınız. Kürt, kadın hareketi gibi hareketler. Örneğin Kürt kardeşlerimiz bize son zamanlarda çok destek çıktı. Ama biz bu durumlarda ölçülü ve dikkatli davranmaya çalışıyoruz. Çünkü rüzgar bugün batıdan doğuya esiyorsa, yarın batıdan doğuya esebilir… İşte ilerde kullanılmamak için bazı şeylere temkinli davranmalıyız…. Sorun kesinlikle farklıdır. O kadar çok yaşanmış trajik olay var ki. Ben asla ve asla Kürt halkıyla, onların ne kadar belli sıkıntıları olsa da, kabul etmem aynı olduğumuzu. Bizim olayımız onlara benzemez. Ama biz şuna inanıyoruz ki, bu ülkenin Kürt sorunu çözülürse, Türkiye'nin önü çok açılır. O kapıdan biz de yararlanırız.

293 Kürtlerle falan belki demokratikleşme sürecinde bütünleşme olabiliyor. Ben hak aldığımda Kürt'te katılacaktır elbette. Sivil toplumlar bunu yapıyor. Ancak ben bu kadar bütünleşme taraftarı değilim. Savunulacak bir şey varsa insanoğlu kendi kendisini savunur. Kullanılmamak için bu kadar yakın olunmamalı. Ben seni kullanırsam, sen beni kullanırsan bu doğru mudur?

294 Kürtler için farklı bir bakış açısı var. Azınlık değiller. Azınlık olarak tutanaklarda geçen Rum, Ermeni, ve Yahudi. Başka azınlık yoktur Türkiye'de. Süryaniler bile bir cemaat olmasına rağmen, bugün azınlık statüsünde değiller. Kaldı ki, Kürtler de Müslüman, ama etnik olarak Kürt yapısı var diye azınlık olarak bunları Türkiye Cumhuriyeti algılamıyor. Ona bakarsanız, aleviler de çıkıyor biz azınlığız diyor. Şafi çıksın biz azınlığız desin. Hanefiler çıksın biz azınlığız desin. Biz birleştirmeye çalıştıkça, bölmeye çalışan insanlar görüyoruz karşımızda… O yüzden, Kürt hareketi ve diğerleri çok farklı bizim dışımızda olan bir sorun.

295 Lozan'a dönecek olursak, Lozan'da yer alan milletlerin konumu çok farklı. Kürtler ve Süryaniler gibi azınlık olmayan ama pratikte azınlık olanlar var. Onlar da vatandaş olarak haklarını istemeliler elbette. Ama ayrı ayrı ele alınmalı. Çünkü geçmişten gelen bir farklılık var. Ayrımcılık yapılmamalı ama farklılıklarda bilinmeli.

296 AGOS'un bu hareketlere karşı tutumu bellidir. AGOS geylerin, lezbiyenlerin haklarını da korudu. Bu yüzden bazı kesinlerin sözlü eleştirilerine de uğradı. Dalga geçtiler. … Kadınları, özellikle kadınların yanında olmamak imkânsız. Dünyamızın yarısı. Bence bilmemekten, cehaletten gelir kadını desteklememek. Bin senedir beraber yaşadığı Ermeni'ye karşı sahip olduğu cehalet ile kadına karşı sahip olunan cehalet bence aynı cehaletin sonucudur… Ermenilerin tabii Kürtlerin yanında olması gerekiyor bir ezilen olarak. Biz bunu biraz fazla yapınca, Kürtler AGOS'u satın almış diyenlerde çıktı. Buna cevap bile vermek gereğini duymadık. AGOS'ta Kürt, Türk, Ermeni muhabirler de var. Kürtlerin hakkını korumak AGOS gibi bir gazetenin görevi olmalıydı. Süryanilerin bile. Arada kiliselerle ilgili tartışsak da, Süryanilerin sesini duyuran bir gazete olmadığına göre, onların sesini de duyurmayı biz amaç edindik. AGOS'u Süryaniler mi bastı sorusuna maruz kaldık bazen. Çingeneleri, Ermeni paşoları, Ermeni'nin Çingenesi, bunlar bizim kendilerine karşı olduğumuzu düşünseler bile onların hakkını korumayı biz vazife edinmişiz. Tabii bütün hakkı verilmeyenlerin yanında olacak AGOS.

297 Bu dayanışma desteklenmeli. Ama işin yüzde 5'i ya da 15'i olmalı. Yüzde 80'i olmamalı. O zaman ben ters bakarım. Ben önce kendi konuma destek vermeliyim. Tabii ki onlara da destek vereceğim ama bu destek benim asil enerjimi almamalı.

298 Her toplumun tarihten gelen yapısal bir özelliği vardır. Ermeni kilisesi, herkes için (dindar olsun olmasın) her zaman kilit noktadadır. Ermeni kilisesi varsa Ermenilerin varlığından söz edilebilir. Olmadığı zaman tamamıyla silinir. Her zaman toplumu temsil etmiştir.

299 Ermeni cemaatinde din ve kültür hep iç içe olmuştur. Ben bundan rahatsızlık duymuyorum. Benim erkek arkadaşım ateist hissediyor. Ben onu da yargılamıyorum. Ne bileyim, din ve kültürün bir arada olması benim zenginliğim

gibi. Örneğin, erkek arkadaşım ateist ama kültürel olarak temsiliyetine inanıyor dinin. İnanmakla birlikte, çocuğum olsa vaftiz ettiririm diyor.

300 Ermeni toplumu bir ırktır. Din olarak Hıristiyanlıktan farklı olmamıştır. Hiçbir zaman Hıristiyanlığı Ermenilikten ayırmamıştır. O yüzden Ermeni kilisesi deriz. Türk Camisi diyor muyuz?

301 Yahu din toplumu olduk. Hâlbuki Ermeniler din toplumu değildir.

302 Türkiye'de Ermeniler kendilerini ifade ederken sıkıştıkları bir Ermenilik algısı var. Ben o cemaat algısını ret ediyorum. Ermeni topluluğu sadece dini olarak ifade edilecek bir topluluk değil, yani sadece cemaat değil. Çünkü geçmişiyle, sanatıyla, kültürüyle bu cemaatten çok farklı yere tekabül ediyor. Kendimi daha özgürlükçü, daha solda, daha toplumcu bir yerde görüyorum.

303 Toplumun özgürlükçü ve sosyalist çevresi, AGOS çevresindeki sevgili dostlarımız olsun, 70'lerdeki hareketlerde bulunmuş kişiler ya da liberaller olsun bundan epey rahatsız oluyorlar. Cemaat dini bir anlam temsil ediyor. Biz cemaat dememek konusunda özen gösteriyoruz. Ama geniş kesimler var ki, ısrarla cemaat diyor.

304 Muhafazakâr kesim karma evliliklere karşıdır. Kendi kültürümü sürdürebilmek için karma evlilik yapmamak çocuğumu kendi kültürümle yaşatmak istiyorum. Belki de karma evlilik ihtiyaç. O insanların içinde ki sevgiyi, aşk sevgisine dönüştürmek ve sorunları yok etmek için.

305 Bazıları için karma evlilik çok büyük bir sorun. Bir Kürt ya da Türk ile evlenmesinden ziyade bir Rum'la evlenilmesini tercih ederler.

306 İngiliz'le, Alman'la evlenebiliyor. Ama bir Türk ile evlenmesi toplumun geniş kısmında sıkıntı.

307 Genç ve kendini özgürlükçü olarak tanımlayan bir kesim var ve bunu özel hayata ait bir mesele olduğunu düşünüyor. Bizzat bu sebeple eleştiriler oluyor. Bu çok önemli bir ayrım, keskin polemiklerin yaşandığı bir kopuş ve bu Ermenilerin internet gruplarında çok sert tartışmalar yaşandı. Artık son dönemde çok olmasa da ciddi bir konu.

308 "Biz kimiz?" sorusunu sorduktan sonra özümüze dönmek için kurduk. Zorla Müslümanlaştırılmış Ermeni'yiz biz. Bize kadar kimse ses çıkarmıyordu. Vakıflı köyü vardı ancak onlarda Ermeni olduklarının üzerine vurgu yapmıyorlardı. Bizimle birlikte insanlar kabul etmeye başladılar. Elbette karşı çıkanlar oldu.

309 Anadolu'da hiç Ermeni'nin kalmadığı zannedilen bir dönemde, birden bire Dersim'den Ermeniler çıktılar. Alevi kimliği ile biz Ermeni'yiz dediler. Biz şimdi onları nasıl göreceğimizi bilemedik. Epey bir sure tereddütler içinde kaldık. Çünkü anladığımız algıladığımız kalıplar vardı. Ermeni Hıristiyan olurdu, ismi Agop olurdu. Bilmem şuydu buydu. Biz şimdi hacca gitmiş, Müslüman olan, Sünni, Alevi dini ile barışık ama referanslar verdiğinde kendisini Ermeni olarak sunan insanlarla

karşılaşıyorduk. Halen birçok Ermeni için bu ciddi bir kafa karışıklığı. Benim için değil artık. Benim o kafa karışıklığım çok erken sona erdi.

310 Kimse onlara bu saatten sonra Hıristiyan olmadan Ermeni olamazsınız diyemez. Ermeni hissediyorsan, kültürel olarak bağlı hissediyorsan Ermeni'sindir. İnançsızda olabilirsin.

311 Malatyalı, Sivaslı, Sasonlu dernekleri tanırım. Başkanları ile çok iyi ilişkilerim vardır. Benim canım ciğerim ağabeylerdir. Ama Dersimli Ermeniler. Acayip tehlikeliler. (Gülerek ve sesli bir şekilde.) Adamın ne olduğunu bilmiyorum. Şimdi benim bu adama sıcak bakma şansım yok. Bunlar daha 2 sene oldu kurulalı. Daha akıbetleri belli değil. Yarın öbürsü gün bu dernekler ne yapar bilemem. … Daha dernek seçimleri yapmadık. Yapalım, nasıl tepki gösterecekler, o zaman göreceğiz.

312 Çok şükür ki bu yeni dönem, 2004 senesi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ndeki azınlıklar için bir milat. 2004 senesinde AK Partinin çıkardığı vakıflar yasası bize bir milat oldu. AK partinin böyle bir milat dediğimiz bir çizgide yol alması bizi çok mutlu kıldı ve çok pozitif bakan ermeni bireyler olduk.

313 Bizim çözülen en ciddi sorunumuz gayrimenkul sorunudur. Birçok yeni düzenleme yapıldı da öyle çözüldü. Vakıfların sesini duyurmaya başlaması, vakıf malları ile ilgili tartışmaların olması, AKP dönemine denk gelmiştir. … Gelirlerinden yararlanmamız için sağ olsun Başbakanımız kolaylık sağladı.

314 Biz daha önce de neyi talep ettiysek şimdi de aynı şeyi talep ediyoruz. Tamam, AB normlarına göre böyle sorunlar var dendi. Ama devletin bildiği sorunlardı zaten bunlar. Biz AB'ye götürüp bakın bu sorunlarımız var demedik. AB bizim büyük ağabeyimiz değil. Bu ülkenin meclisinde zihniyet değiştikten sonra, bu sorunların doğru olduğu görüldü. Eğer meclisin kanaati olmasaydı zaten olmazdı. Meclis AB'nin oyuncağı mı ki istediği şekilde kanun çıkartsın. Yani hakkaniyetli davranılması gerektiğini düşünen Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin uygulamalarıdır bunlar. Yiğidi öldür hakkını ver olayı var biraz. İnsanların doğru anlaması lazım.

315 Okullarda, tarihsel konuların tartışılmasında, vakıfların sorunları ile ilgili ciddi gelişmeler oldu. Benim siyasi görüşümü yansıtmasa da AKP zamanında oldu. Bunu yazmak lazım. Bunun üzerinde de uzlaşıyoruz. Özellikle Avrupa birliği giriş sürecinin etkili olduğunu düşünüyorum, azınlıklara bakış anlamında. Yoksa durup dururken AKP niye böyle bir şey yapsın.

316 AB' ye giriş süreci ve AB tabii etkili oldu. Türkiye siyasetinde Ermenilerin karakaşına kara gözüne bakılarak yapılmıyor. Akhdamar'ı onardılar, AB çerçevesinde oldu. Ermeniler için ne yapılıyorsa, azınlıklara dair, ne yazık ki hepsinin arkasında başka nedenler var. Avrupa birliği olmasa süreç böyle yürümez. Bunun sonucu olarak Ermenilerin vakıf sorunu, nefret söylemi sorunu vs. çözülmeye başlıyor.

317 Vakıfların mülkiyet meselesi ile ilgili bir etkisi olmuş. Onun dışında valla olumlu bir etkisi yok.

318 1996 da o olumlu esen havalarda AGOS kurulabildi ve Ermeniler için büyük bir etkisi oldu. Türkçe bir gazete, herkes okumaya başladı. Ermenilerden ve sıkıntılarından haberdar olmaya başladı. Ve o dönemde Ermenilerin anayurdu Anadolu'dur demek çok önemli bir şeydi. Küçük adımlardı belki ama önemliydi bence… 2000'lere baktığımız zaman, Fethiye Çetin'in Annanem kitabı, 2005'te yapılan Ermeni konferansı, Hrant'ın öldürülmesi bunlarda Ermenilerin konuşmasında ve konuşulmasında etkili olan olaylar oldu.

319 Hrant Dink'in konuşması, Ermeni kimliği ile televizyonda olması çok insanları etkiledi. Öldürülmesi sonrası da, tabii öldürülme biçimi ile de etkili, birçok insan hazmedemedi. Ve sokağa çıktılar. Bence çok önemli.

320 Bu bir süreçtir. Net olarak söyleyemeyiz tabii ki etkilendi, şu oldu falan diye. Doğal olarak demokratikleşme sürecidir. Ama AKP hükümetinin inisiyatifini unutmamak gerekir.

321 AGOS'un söylediği her şey Ermeni cemaatini temsil ediyor diye bir şey yok. Rahatsız olduğum konular var. (düşünüyor) Çok sivri, tepkili… Ama dayanışma ile ilgili bir şeyler söylediklerinde destekliyorum.

322 Hrant Dink öldürüldüğünde de hani gözlemleme imkânımız oldu. "Zaten çok fazla konuşuyordu," "O da çok ileri gitti." bunları diyenler vardı Türkiye Ermenilerinde.

323 Patrikhane'ye yakın kesimler, "biz dememiş miydik çok konuşuyor diye" yorumunu getirdiler.

324 Birileri ile baş başa gelip devlete başkaldırım, ona buna başkaldırın, fayda etmez. Önemli olan, Devletin "diğerini" (tabii tırnak içinde kullanıyorum.) tanıması ve hakları olduğunu kabul etmesidir. "Diğeri" de üst otoriteye güvenerek haklarını alacağından emin olması gerekir. Bunlar olmadıkça siz kardeşliği falan ancak kitaplardan okursunuz, miting alanlarında duyarsınız… Herkesin eşit haklara sahip olması gerektiğine inanıyorum ama kanunlar çerçevesinde. … Sanki devlet baş düşman geri kalan insanlar mazlum şeklinde düşünmemek lazım.

325 Devlet babanın size nasıl baktığı önemli. Eğer sıcak bir tebessümle bakıp, ılımlı bir hava olursa, siz onu koz olarak alıp, her türlü girişimde bulunabilirsiniz… Siz devlet babanın merhametine muhtaçsanız ne yapacaksınız başka. Hangi ermeni ile konuşursan konuş aşağı yukarı benim dediğimi diyecektir. Çok daha farkı şeyler politikalarla yürütülebilir, ama gerek duymuyoruz. Biz daha iyi günlerin yakında olduğuna inanıyoruz… Bu süreçte Devletin baba olduğunu hissettiren birçok örnek gördük. (Bir resmi göstererek) Bu resim yenidir. Vali beyle ve Emniyet müdürümüzle. Samatya'da ki olaylar dolayısıyla nezaket ziyaretine geldiler. Şimdi biz hayal mi ederdik kardeşim bundan 15 sene önce, vali bey bizim ayağımıza gelecek, ziyaretimize, olan olaylarla ilgili. Aman cemaatimiz merak etmesin, biz bu işlerli çözeriz, siz hiçbir provokasyona katılmayın dediler. Yani şunu söylemeye çalışıyorum, devlet babalığını gösterirse, evlatta evlatlığını gösterir. Devlet babalığını göstermezse, seni korkutursa (geçmişteki Ermeniler arasında hâkim olan korkudan bahsetti), sen ne yapabilirsin, hiç bir şey yapamazsın.

326 Yüz yıllık sistemi bir gecede sihirli değnek ile kimsenin değiştiremeyeceğini bilinmesi lazım… Artık devletin bakış açısı ile de görüyoruz, öyle yasaklayıcı, kısıtlayıcı bir devlet yapısı yok. Bütün her şey açık ve kucaklayıcı olduklarını söylüyorlar. … bizim cemaat kültürümüzü yaşarken karşılaştığımız sıkıntı yok. Aksine son derece, saygı var, yolda yürürken hiç bir sorunla karşılaşmıyoruz. Okul derneklerinde kültür geceleri düzenlerken hiç bir sorun ile karşılaşmıyoruz. Konser veya folklor gösterisi düzenleyen ve bütün Türkiye'den seyirci alan korolarımız ve folklor gruplarımız var, bunlarda bir sorun yok. Hatta son zamanlarda okullarımızda okutulacak Ermenice dili ile basılmış olan kitapları basan Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı.

327 Bu sorunların çözümü için, bana şimdiki sistem tutarlı geliyor. Bundan rahatsızlık duyanda vardır elbette… Ha daha iyi olabilir, geliştirilebilir belki ama mevcut sistemde bir yanlışlık yok en azından.

328 AKP'nin gelmesinden sonra o acemilik döneminde, hatırlıyorum, Başbakan Erdoğan soykırım ne olacak ki tanırız demişti. Bu dönem içerisinde bir değişiklik yarattı bu toplumda. Bu toplumun daha demokratikleşmesini isteyen insanlar, Ermenilerin birçoğu umutlandılar. O umut tabii ki daha kötü bir şeye bıraktı kendini, umutsuzluğa. Düzen de daha kötü bir hale geldi.

329 AKP'nin bu kadar kavgasından sonra düzelmesi gerektiğini düşünürken, AKP de milliyetçi yola girmeye başladı. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan da bayrak sallar oldu.

330 AKP artık devlet oldu, biz insan hakları karnemizi düzeltme şansımız kaybettik. AKP hükümet olmuştu, devlet olmamıştı 2002 de, o zaman demokrasi istiyordu, özgürlük istiyordu. Şimdi artık yasak istiyor sadece.

331 Vakıfların devletle ilişkisi tam olarak AB'ye giriş sürecinde 2002 yılında başladı. Vakıflar başvuru yapabiliyordu. Ancak pek bir kazanım söz konusu değildi. Siyaset olduğunu anlayabiliyorsunuz. Çünkü çıkarılan tüm kararnamelere baktığın zaman, sorunu tamamen çözmek gibi hiç bir derdi yok hükümetin belli ki. 2006, 2008, 2011 yılında yapılan düzenlemeler, hep parça parça gaspedilmiş hakkı veriyor. Vakıfların hakkı olanı verecek, ekstra bir şey de değil. Yani belli ki göz boyama.

332 Tabii düşünüyorum. Tabii düşünüyorum. Biz düne kadar, bir okulun camı kırılsa, yahu kırıldı şu cam camcıyı çağıralım yenisi taksın diyemiyorduk. Vakıflara yazı yazacaktık, İstanbul bölge müdürlüğüne, o onay verecek. o onay vermezse, vakıflar genel müdürlüğü Anakara'dan bekleyecektik. Bugün belediye diyor ki, nereyi boyayacağız, geliyoruz biz. Bu bizim için çok güzel bir şey. Alışık olmadığımız bir şey. Ama biz bunu nerede görüyoruz, Şişli belediyesinde. Niye çok popülist bir başkanı var, kelimenin tam anlamıyla popülist.. Bu popülist adam Ermenileri kendi hizmetleri ile tatmin ediyor. Ama kemik bir şey var Ermeniler bunu satmaz. Bakırköy CHP'li belediye başkanı aynı mecradan nemalanmak istiyor ve Bakırköylü Ermeniler de onu destekliyorlar. Çünkü bir ihtiyaçları olduğunda belediye hizmetlerinde kolayca yararlanabiliyorlar… Ama işte popülizm. Ben çok samimi görmüyorum. Ben bir şey istediğimde bana vermiyorlar. Onlar bir şey istediğinde kolayca veriyorlar. Ama karşılığını öyle çirkin alıyorlar ki. Ben bir şiir dinletisi sunuyorum. Salona ihtiyacım var. Sen de bir salon temin ediyorsun. E şimdi benim sana plaketler vermem falan yahu gereksiz şeyler. Ben teşekkür etmek istersem, ertesi günü bir paket çikolata alıp makamına gelirim. Teşekkür ederim. Bu

onu kesmiyor abi. Orada şov yapmak gerekiyor. Ben sizi çok seviyorum diye Ermenice söyleyecek falan. Bunu da bizim midemiz kaldırmıyor. Öbürlerinin umurunda değil. Yeter ki alsınlar.

335 Söylediğim gibi, bir kilise çevresinde toplanan insanlar var, bir de daha sivil örgütler var. Bu konuda öyle ortak bir politika yürüttüğü söylenemez. Nor Zartonk gibi inisiyatifler ses çıkarıyor. Ama diğerleri de, siz öyle çok ses çıkarmayın, biz eski usul işlerimizi yürütürüz, arada bir adam buluruz hallederiz, AK parti üzerinden siyaset yürütelim diyenlerde var. Vakıflar genel müdürlüğü ile ilişkilerinde, Patrikliğin ilişkilerinde, özellikle de Patrik vekili atamasında, hep bu ilişkiler oldu. Araya adam sokmacılık bu. Biraz da lobiciliğe benziyor. Ha bu bizim hoşumuza gitmiyor. Ahlaki olmaması bir tarafa siyasi anlamda, geleceği olan bir şey değil. Ama esnaf bir toplum sonuçta. Uzun yıllar böyle bu topraklarda yaşamış. Ama pratik kaygılarla hareket ediyorlar. Böyle sivil inisiyatif falan onlar için yeni bir şey. Onlara alışması biraz zaman alacak. AGOS'a bile kolay kolay alışamadılar bence. Hala alışamadıklarını düşünüyorum. Ama gençler biraz daha farklı tabii. Gençler ne de olsa bunun içine doğdular.

336 Şimdi geçmişten gelen bir gelenek var. Millet başı Patrik. Tamam Osmanlı dönemin'de öyleydi. Ama bugün? Devlet de onu hep muhatap alıyor. Ben çok tasvip etmiyorum. Ben dini hassasiyetleri kuvvetli olan biri değilim. Kaldı ki olsam da, ben bunu istemem. Neden Patrik devletle muhatap olsun? Benle ya da benim seçtiğim temsilci ile muhatap olsun.

337 Devlet şuan için Arem Ateşyan'ı patrik vekili olarak seçti. Kendisi ile Tayyip Erdoğan arasında bir takım görüşmelerin ve yakın ilişkilerin olduğu söyleniyor, düşünülüyor. Şuan Ermeni toplumu bir sürüncemede bırakmış durumda. Devletin onu görevlendirmiş olması, göz yumması, onun politikaları arasında gayet anlaşılır bir şey. Yani hep böyle samimiyetsizlik gözlemliyoruz. Devletinde işine geliyor bu… Devlet sivil toplum istemiyor,

338 Netice de bir durum var. Ermeni Patrikhanesi'nin bir problemi var. Patriğimiz hasta biliyorsun. Vekil var. O yüzden çok aslında kurum olarak Patrikhane'nin devletle ilişkisinden bahsetmek çok zor. Daha öncede ne kadar bir kurumsal ilişkiden bahsedilebilir, bilemiyorum. Ama vekilin devletle olan ilişkisi ... Orada neler dönüyordur orada durumlar çok karışık. O yüzden şuan ki durumda devletin patrikhane olan ilişkisinden bahsetmek... Yani gerçekten aktif olarak patrikhane kimliği ile çalışabilen bir patrikhane yok. Bir kişi üzerinden dönüyor. Kafasına buyruk. AKP ile falan ilişkileri yürütüyor.

339 Günümüzde hastanenin başına geçenler kendini hala amira sanıp, devletle iyi ilişkiler yürüterek, bir şeyleri iyi yapabileceklerini düşünüyorlar. Ama toplum öyle görmüyor onları. Elbette öyle gören bir kesim olabilir, ama herkes değil. Aslında amiralara bakarsan darphanede görev almış, sultana yakın olmuş devlet görevinde çalışan zenginler. Kolay kolay bağlantısı olmayan kişiyi de o vakfın başı yapmazlar. Ben çıksam aday olsam, beni hastanenin yönetimine başkan yapmazlar. Haklı olarak işleyişle ilgili kaygıları da var. bu adam bunları tanıyor (devletten), yarın bir gün sorun olursa bunları da çözer diye. İki tarafında çıkarına ilişkiler var yine.

340 Kendini cemaat başkanı olarak tanıtan bu Ermeni hastanesi vakfının başkanı Şirinoğlu, gösteriş olsun diye II. Mahmut tuğralı kol düğmeleri ile başbakanı ziyaret ediyor. Altında da ermeni cemaat başkanı yazıyor. Kim seçmiş ki onu cemaat başkanı olarak. Öyle bir konum yok ki öyle seçilsin. Bu tabii bizim zorumuza gidiyor. Tabii demokratik bir ülke olmadığı için biz bunu her platformda tartışmaya açmaya çalışıyoruz.

341 Biz ilk defa bu kadar yakın oluyoruz bu devlete. Bu yakın ilişkileri korumalıyız.

343 Türkiye Ermenileri Patrikliği, Ermeni Cemaati içerisinde dini, hayri ve içtimai işler düzenleyen bir kurumdur. Ama aynı zamanda Patriğin seçim ve bir Patriklik yemini ile iş başına geldiğini düşünürsek, patrik aynı zamanda cemaat başıdır. Yani sadece dini kimliğini ön plana çıkarttığımız zaman, sacayağı gibi görmek gerekir ve diğer iki ayak geride kalır ve aksar. Dolayısıyla patrikhane dini hizmetlerin yanı sıra, kiliseleri gözetmek ve sadece dini açıdan gözetmenin yanı sıra, kendisine cemaatten getirilen her türlü sorunu çözmek için girişimlerde bulunur. Cemaat ve devlet arasındaki uyumu sağlar ve cemaat adına patrik devlete gereken münacatları yapıp, sorunların çözümü için talepte bulunabilir ve bu sistem aksamadan devam ediyor.

344 Merkez olarak hitap edeceğimiz yer patrikhanedir. Ve merkezimiz olduğu için, zorunluyuz, onunla ilişki içerisinde olmalıyız. Resmi olarak müdahil değildir Patrikhane. Fakat en nihayetinde, nihai kararlarda, cemaati ilgilendiren konularla ilgili nihai kararlarda mecburen ona başvurmalıyız ve beraber karar almalıyız. Ancak nihai karar yine ona aittir ve öyle olmalıdır… Şimdi devlette de bakanlıklar var. Eğitim, maliye gibi. En nihayetinde çatıda ne var? Başbakan! Patrikhane ile ilişkiler bu şekilde olmuştur, olmalıdır.

345 Patrikhane tavsiyelerde bulunur. Bu yapısı değişmediği sürece—ki değişmez—bence uygundur. Bu patrikhanenin geçmişten gelen bir geleneği ve bence sürdürmeli. Patrikhanenin denetleyici, tavsiye edici yanı olmalı. Nizamnameye bakılacak olursa, Patrikhanenin görevi hep denetleme. Bu yüzden, nizamnameye uygundur bugün. Devlet yapısı gibi. Devleti her zaman her şartta tanıyoruz. Tanımadığımız zaman oligarşi oluyor. Patrikhaneyi de Ermeni cemaati için böyle görmeliyiz.

346 Şimdi bizdeki hiyerarşide, Patrik masaya yumruğunu vurduğu zaman, Patrik'in sözü geçer.

347 Sonuçta Patrikhane, dinen ve kültürel olarak toplumu temsil ediyor. Bürokraside de öyledir ya: önce bir kuruma gidersin, olmazsa üst bir merciye gidersin. Ermeni toplumu önce Patrikhane ile muhatap olmalıdır diye düşünüyorum. Halkın sorunlarını ilk olarak ileteceği mercii odur… Tamam her şeyle ilgili bir yönlendirme dayatma değil ama bir baba gibi, o samimiyetle bir yönlendirme oradan gelmeli diye düşünüyorum. Ya da bir çocuğun babasına sıkıntısını açması gibi, halkta Patrikhane ile iletişimde olmalı gerekir diye düşünüyorum. Ama her soruna da, çözüm oradan beklenmemeli. Temsil etmek, tam görevi temsil etmek diye düşüyorum.

348 Önceden nizamnameye göre, Patrikhane okullara müdahale edebilirdi. Öğretmen olanlara yeterlilik belgesini Patrikhanede eğitim komisyonu verirdi. Ermenice öğretmeye ehil midir? Bu nasıl olurdu? Okullardan müteşekkil bir kurum vardı, eğitim üst komisyonu. Bugün böyle bir komisyon yok. Milli eğitim Bakanlığı bu işi

yürütüyor. Bütün cemaat mülklerinin kontrol edildiği bir cemaat mülkleri üst kurulu vardı. Bu üst kurulun müsaadesi olmadan bir işlem yapılamazdı. Bugün vakıf yönetimine seçilen insanlar kötü niyetliyse, patrikhanenin hiçbir müdahalesi olmadan elindeki malı mülkü satabiliyor… Dediğimiz gibi, biz halkın seçtiği vakıf yöneticilerine hiçbir müdahalede bulunamayız. Sen bu vakfı kötü yönetiyorsun, senin yönetici olmaya hakkın yok, zarara uğratıyorsun deyip kimseyi görevinden azledemeyiz, müdahale edemeyiz.

349 Sırf bu sebeple, Patrikhanenin ilişkileri çok olumlu desek yanılırız. Flu diyelim flu, daha doğru olur

350 Bütün kiliselerimizle veya okullarımızla görüşmeniz gerekmiyor. Sizi bir kilisemizin, okulumuzun ve hastanemizin yönetim kurulu başkanıyla görüştürürüm, böylelikle bizim cemaatle olan tez çalışmanızı yapmış olursunuz

351 Patrikhanenin kilise, okul ve hastane vakıfları ile ilişkisi bizden daha yakın. Olmayanlar zaten yavaş yavaş dışlanır. Nasıl dışlar, böyle bir yetkisi var mı? Aslında yok gibi görünüyor. Çünkü Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğüne bağlıdır vakıflar. Ama dini yönden Patrikhaneye bağlıdır. Çünkü bu kiliseye, vakfın yönettiği kiliseye, bir papaz gerektiği zaman, papazı Patrikhane nakleder. Papazı Patrikhane tayin etmezse, o kilise çalışmaz. Çalışmazsa o vakfın fonksiyonu biter yani. O yüzden arası iyi olması gerekir Patrikhane ile. Olmazsa, zayıf bir papaz gönderiyor. Görevini tam yapmayacak, halkı vakfa iyi bağlayamayacak bir papaz gönderiyor. Halk o vakfın kilisesine gitmemeye başlayınca, o kilise gözden düşer. E, vakıf yönetmek prestijli bir iş. Birçok paralar dönüyor. O insanlar bu işi kaybetmek istemiyor. Bunların dışında bir de, devletle çıkarı olanlarda, patrikhane ile yakın olmak istiyor. O yüzden çokta bağımsız davranamıyorlar.

352 Patrikhane'nin bir temsiliyeti var ancak eksik kalan bir temsiliyettir. Çünkü bizde sadece patrik ve ruhani meclis var. Sivil yönetimlerin de fikirlerini getireceği, söz sahibi olacağı Osmanlı'da uygulanan bir Nizamname-i Milleti Armenian'daki sistem mevcut değil. Cumhuriyet kanunlarında böyle bir sivil oluşum yok. Çünkü yönetim kurulları seçildiği zaman, vakıfların yönetim kurulları, cemaati temsil etmek için seçilmezler. Bunların her biri, kendilerine verilen vazife çerçevesinde, kendilerine teslim edilen vakfın yönetimi, idamesi ve bekası ile sorumludur. Ancak, siviller patrikhane ile ilişki içerisinde değildir, siviller ayrı bir kurumdur diye bir şey yok. Neticede, bir cemaat kurumu olan patrikhanede, sivillerde bir şekilde söz sahibidir. Ama resmi olarak, onaylanmamış bir sistemdir. Sadece cemaatin bir arada toplandığı, genişletilmiş toplantılarla hem fikir oldukları ya da fikir tealisinde bulundukları bir sistem olagelmiştir... Bu toplantılarda her zaman olmaz. Cemaati alakadar eden çok ciddi dönüm noktalarında olur. Böylece bu eksik kalan sivil yönetim, bir şekilde doldurulur. Bu sistem aksamadan devam ediyor. Bu anlamda, patrikhane'nin hem dini hem civil otoritesi olmuş oluyor… Ancak şu da gerçek ki, öyle bir sistem oturtulmalı ki, 1863 nizamnamesinin muhteviyatına uygun. Nizamname'de ki cismani ve ruhani meclisin tek başına çalışmadığını biliyoruz. Bu iki meclisin de, bu iki meclisin oluşturduğu karma meclisin de başında oturan patrik

353 Ama bu sivilleşme Patrikhane çevresinde olmalı, eğer olacaksa. Patrikhanenin bir sivil komisyon oluşturması lazım gelir.

354 Tek çatı altında olması gerekir. Tek çatı da patrikhanenin kendisi olduğu için, çatımız patrikhanedir o halde. Bu merkezi güçlendirmek için belki sivillerle alt gruplar oluşturulabilir. Ama en nihayetinde patrikhane altında olmalıdır. Vakıfların görevleri geçici ama patrikhane kalıcıdır. Tüzel kişilik alınmaya çalışılıyor. Cismani meclis olursa da yine son nihai karar patrikhane tarafından alınacaktır. Ancak zaten vakıfların duruşu da bir nevi cismanilik tarafını sağlıyor. Ama dediğim gibi patrikhaneye bağlı olması gerekiyor.

355 Bizler artık, Türkiye'de Ermenilerinin salt bir patrik ile temsil edilmesini yeterli bulmuyoruz. Bu Osmanlı'dan beri gelen bir gelenek. Osmanlı patrikleri millet başı olarak adlandırıyordu. Ama bugün artık o şablon sığmıyor. Üstelikte o patrikler o sıfatı taşırlarken kendileri birazda sembolik olarak yukarıda bir yerdeydiler ama alt tarafta bir meclis vardı. Ermeni millet sistemi vardı. Patrik birazda bunun sembolik temsilcisi idi. Eğitim komisyonu vardı. Sağlık komisyonu vardı. Bugün bütün bunlar yok. Bütün bunlar yokken, gene de bir toplumun bütün içtimai yaşamını bir papaz ile götürmek bize sığmıyor. Biz birazda bunun mücadelesini getirdik. Yani ermeni toplumunda da sivilleşme ifadesini gündeme getirdik. Kurumların hesap verebilir olmalarını savunduk. Hasbelkader, bir adam bir vakfın yönetim kurulunda oluyor, ondan sonra bu adamdan bir daha bilgi alamıyorsun. Seçimler sağlıklı bir şekilde değil. Çünkü eski seçim sistemine göre her kilise, bir seçim bölgesi kabul ediliyordu. Mantıklıydı da bu çünkü her semtim bir kilisesi vardı geleneksel olarak. Ama zaman içerisinde bu kentlerin nüfus, demokratik yapısı değişti, şehir içerisinde göçler yaşandı. Gedikpaşa en kalabalık semt iken bugün sanayi bölgesi oldu. Buna karşılık Gedikpaşa'nın seçmeni kilisesi olmayan yerlere savruldu örneğin. Bütün bunların içerisinde, eski sistematiği sürdürmeye çalışmak sorun yaratıyor. Bugün seçmeni olmayan ama büyük paralar yöneten vakıflar var. Buna karşılık çok kalabalık seçmeni olan ama vakıf gelirleri çok az olan, semtler var; Feriköy. Beyoğlu, bugün çok az ermeni kaldı. Yani 70-80 ermeni ile seçim yapmak mümkün. Ama çok büyük gayrimenkulleri denetleyen bir kurum. Üstelik bu kurum hesap vermiyor topluma. Bütün bunlar AGOS'un gündeme getirdiği sorunlar ve hala içinden çıkılan bir sorun değil

356 Niye din adamı, niye bir kişi temsil ediyor ve niye bu bir kişi erkek. Biz buna karşı çıkıyoruz. Ama bizi patrikhaneye karşıymışız gibi gösteriyorlar. Biz Patrikhaneye karşı falan değiliz. Her açılışımızda davetiye veriyoruz. Buyursunlar gelsinler, başımızın üzerlerinde yeri var.

357 Bizim tahayyülümüz daha çok yatay olarak örgütlenmiş, meclis gibi bir şeyin hani siyasal olarak temsil etmesi. Ermeniler ile ilgili sıkıntılarda karar alınacaksa devletin bu meclise danışarak alması gerektiğini düşünüyoruz.

358 Sivil toplum kuruluşları olarak bunlar yavaş yavaş meydana çıkıyor. Bunlar biraz daha güçlenince, içlerinden bir tanesi halkın genel kurulu gibi bir isim alır ve belki halk tarafından seçilirse ve bunlarda toplumun bütün sorunları ile ilgilenen akil insanlar, var ya şimdi, olursa, eskiden böyle idi, benim devletle bir problemim olunca ben gidip devlete kafa tutacağıma, bu insanlara giderim. Benim hakkımı arasın. Devlet içinde devlet olmasının aksine devletin işini kolaylaştırsın.

APENDIX B: Demographic Characteristics of the Participants

NAME	SEX	AGE	BİRTH PLACE	ETHNICITY	AFFILIATION	THE DATE OF INTERVIEWS	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	DURATION OF INTERVIEWS
A.B.	Male	52	Istanbul	Armenian	The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul	8 February 2013	Individual	01:32:29
B.C.	Male	65	Istanbul	Armenian	The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul	13 March 2013	E-mail	…
C.D.	Male	32	Istanbul	Armenian	Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & Nor Zartonk	10 February 2013	Individual	01:47:21
D.E.	Male	29	Istanbul	Armenian	Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & Nor Zartonk	19 February 2013	Individual	01:27:32
E.F.	Male	29	Istanbul	Armenian	Armenian Culture and Solidarity Association & Nor Zartonk	23 February 2013	Individual	01:46:10
F.G.	Female	28	Istanbul	Armenian	Hrant Dink Foundation	19 March 2013	Individual	01:23:35
G.H.	Female	28	Istanbul	Armenian	Hrant Dink Foundation	19March 2013	Individual	01:18:37
H.I.	Male	78	Istanbul	Armenian	AGOS	22 March 2013	Individual	01:18:16
J.K.	Male	50	Istanbul	Armenian	AGOS	22 March 2013	Individual	01:54:47
L.M	Male	40	Istanbul	Armenian	An Armenian School	3 March 2013	Individual	Not Recorded; Almost One and a half Hour
M.N.	Male	51	Istanbul	Armenian	An Armenian Foundation	15 March 2013	Individual	Not Recorded; Almost One and a half Hour
N.O	Male	48	Istanbul	Armenian	Foundation/ the InterFoundation Solidarity and Dialogue Platform, VADİP	25 March 2013	Individual	01:47:32
O.P.	Male	25	Istanbul	Armenian	The Bible Reading Group- A Dance Club	21 February 2013	Together with P.R.	Not Recorded; Almost One and a half Hour
P.R.	Female	24	Istanbul	Armenian	The Bible Reading Group	21 February 2013	Together with O.P.	Not Recorded; Almost One and a half Hour
R.S.	Male	29	Istanbul	Armenian	The Bible Reading Group	18 February 2012	Individual	01:23:06
S.T.	Female	23	Istanbul	Armenian	The Bible Reading Group- A Music Club/An Alumni Association	20 February 2013	Individual	01:23:35
T.U	Male	45	Dersim	Armenian	The Faith and Social Solidarity Association of the Armenians of Dersim	22 March 2013	Individual	Not Recorded; Almost One Hour