

**IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS ON ENERGY POLICY-
MAKING PROCESS IN TURKEY: CASE STUDIES OF LOÇ MOVEMENT
AND ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any University or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due references is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study is to understand the mobilization dynamics of environmental movement against Cide HES Project and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Project; and evaluate their impacts on energy policy-making process in Turkey. This study is based on fieldwork conducted in Loç Valley and Mersin. Loç Valley, a special place with endangered and endemic plants, is located in the western Black Sea. Loç movement is one of the most significant anti-SHPP movements and a source of inspiration for other anti-SHPP movements. The nuclear power plant is planned in Akkuyu. Akkuyu is located on the Mediterranean coast and in the province of Mersin. Anti-nuclear movement is one of the oldest and most influential environmental movement in Turkey as well as it is important for other environmental movements.

The main question of this study is that which circumstances and how different environmental movements affect Turkish energy policy making process. Two cases were investigated in terms of their mobilization dynamics, tactics and the impacts of the movements on each energy policy making phase. The main analysis is based on a qualitative research. The empirical data of the thesis was collected through observation and in-depth interviews. The analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with both activists and government representatives as well as bureaucrats provides dense information regarding these movements, their involvements in the energy policy-making process and their impacts on each energy policy-making phase; agenda-setting, policy alternatives and implementation. The two cases present some differences and similarities in terms of the mobilization, tactics and the outcome. This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literatures of environmental movements, grassroots mobilization, local resistance studies and public policy, energy policy - making through analyzing the Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement as well as their impacts on energy policy-making process in Turkey.

Keywords: environmental movements, Loç Valley, policy-making process, anti-nuclear movement, Akkuyu NPP, Cide HES Project, activists, mobilization, political opportunity structure.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Cide HES Projesine ve Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali Projesine karşı geliştirilen çevre hareketlerinin dinamiklerini anlamak ve bu hareketlerin Türkiye'deki enerji politika yapım süreci üzerindeki etkilerini değerlendirmektir. Bu çalışma, Loç Vadisi'nde ve Mersin'de yapılan saha araştırmalarına dayanmaktadır. Tehlike altındaki bitkiler ve endemik bitkileri ile özel bir yer olan Loç Vadisi, Batı Karadeniz'de yer almaktadır. Loç hareketi küçük hidroelektrik santrallere karşı hareketlerin en önemlilerinden biridir ve diğer küçük hidroelektrik santral karşıtı hareketler için ilham kaynağıdır. Nükleer Güç Santrali Akkuyu'da planlanmaktadır. Akkuyu Akdeniz kıyısında, Mersin ilinde yer almaktadır. Nükleer karşıtı hareket, Türkiye'deki en eski ve en etkili çevre hareketlerinden birisidir ve diğer çevre hareketleri için önemlidir.

İki vaka çalışması hareketlilik dinamikleri, taktikleri ve her bir enerji politika yapım aşamasına olan etkileri açısından incelenmiştir. Analiz niteliksel araştırmaya dayalıdır. Tezin ampirik verisi gözlem ve derinlemesine görüşmeler yoluyla toplanmıştır. Aktivistler, bakanlık temsilcileri ve bürokratlar ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerin analizi; hareketler, hareketlerin enerji politika yapım sürecine katılımı ve hareketlerin her bir enerji politika yapım aşaması üzerindeki, yani; gündem belirleme, politika alternatifleri ve uygulama aşamaları üzerindeki etkilerine ilişkin yoğun bilgi sağlamıştır. İki vaka çalışması hareketlilik dinamikleri, taktik ve etkileri açısından farklılıklar ve benzerlikler sunmuştur. Bu tez Loç hareketi ve nükleer karşıtı hareketini inceleme aracılığıyla çevre hareketleri, halk hareketi, yerel direniş çalışmaları ve kamu politikaları, enerji politikaları literatürlerine katkı yapmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: environmental movements, Loç Vadisi, politika yapım süreci, nükleer karşıtı hareket, Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali, Cide HES Projesi, activists, mobilizasyon, siyasal fırsat yapıları.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AECL	Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
AEK	Atomic Energy Commission
AKP	Justice and Development Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
BOT	Build-Operate-Transfer
BOO	Built-Own-Operate
CANDU	Canadian Deuterium-Uranium
CHP	Republican People's Party
ÇMO	Environmental Engineers' Chamber
ĐISK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
DPT	State Planning Organization
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EİGM	General Directorate of Energy Affairs
EMO	Electrical Engineers' Chamber
ENGO	Environmental Non-governmental Organization
EPDK	Energy Market Regulatory Authority
ETKB	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
EU	European Union
EÜAŞ	Electricity Generation Company
HPP	Hydroelectrical Power Plants
KESK	Confederation of the Public Labourers' Unions
MTA	General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NKP/ANP	Nükleer Karşıtı Platform/anti-nuclear platform
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
ÖDP	Freedom and Solidarity Party
TAEK	Turkish Atomic Energy Authority
TBMM/GNAT	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi/ The Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TEAŞ	Turkish Electricity Generation-Transmission Company
TEDAŞ	Turkish Electricity Distribution Company
TEİAŞ	Turkish Electricity Transmission Company
TEMA	The Turkish Foundation for Combating Erosion, Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats
TEK	Turkish Electricity Authority
TETAŞ	Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Company
TMMOB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TPP	Thermal Power Plant
TÜBİTAK	The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aim of the Study and Research Question

With industrialization, economic growth and modernization, Turkey's demand for energy has increased. Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. At the beginning of 2000s, share of natural gas in the production of electricity tremendously increased (Yılmaz and Uslu, 2007: 263, 264). 74% of Turkey's total energy need has been satisfied with imported energy (Barış and Küçükali, 2011: 378). Natural gas has a large role and will have a large share in Turkey's energy demand. Approximately 60-65% of natural gas comes from Russia through pipelines (Çoşkun and Carlson, 2010: 213). Thermal power plants have a significant share in total installed capacity. Natural gas and oil reserves of the country are very limited (Ulutaş, 2005: 1150-1153). Hydropower is a main resource in Turkey. She has vast potential for wind and solar energy as well as geothermal energy (Oksay and Iseri, 2011: 2391).

Policy-makers have a conservative approach in Turkey. Energy security shapes Turkey's energy policy. Energy security consists of reasonable cost and decreasing dependence on imported energy. Turkish decision-makers have put renewable energy resources such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal resources on the agenda to meet

growing energy demand. Increasing use of renewable resources and integration of nuclear energy into energy mix are new constituents of Turkish energy policy. Strategic Plan 2010-2014 aims to avoid dependence on imported energy, to exploit all domestic sources like/such as coal and renewables, and to construct and operate nuclear power plants by 2023. One of the main objectives of the Strategic Plan 2010-2014 is to increase portion of renewable energy resources to provide energy supply security (Saygin and Çetin, 2010: 115). So, hydropower is a main resource in Turkey where energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. There are 2000 applications for micro Hydroelectric Power Plants (HPP) in the country. Integration of nuclear energy is crucial to meet increasing energy demand of Turkey. Agreement for nuclear power plant in Akkuyu between Turkish and Russian government was signed in 2010 and approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2010.

Energy security and environmental issues and risks continue to rise in Turkey. Overuse of natural resources, unregulated industrialization, massive energy projects including nuclear power plants, thermal power plants and tourism activities, unplanned urbanization, rural immigration, high population growth, using heavy chemical substances on the agricultural fields, unequal development cause environmental degradation in Turkey. During the implementation of energy projects, small Hydroelectric Power Plant (SHPP) and nuclear power plant constructions, environmental and social conditions have not been taken into account. Environmental organizations, environmentalists, citizens and local people have tried to take part in the environment and energy policy process in Turkey through reactive

environmental movements. In Turkey, as well as hydroelectric power plants, environmental movements were constituted against dams, mining activities, and nuclear and thermal power plants. Bergama movement, one of the most popular environmental movements in Turkey, formed against a multinational gold mining cooperation that used cyanide. The movement emerged as a local movement and became a nation-wide movement in time through reaching wide public support and media attention. This thesis will deal with the environmental movements in form of anti-nuclear movement in Mersin and anti-SHPP movement in the Black Sea region of Turkey. The first argument of this thesis is that closed political structures cause reactive environmental movements in response to energy projects. Contradiction between environmental protection and prioritization of energy security/energy projects by the state as well as its significant role providing necessary condition for private companies creates tension between environmentalists/public and the state/company. Secondly, through analyzing the relationship between social movements and policy making process, this thesis argues that political structures affect mobilization and exclusion from democratic process initiate mobilization after policies enacted, but not implemented. Closed political structures affect mobilization and shape the impact of environmental movements on the policy process.

Protest actions and social movements have become permanent element of local, national and international politics. Even though there have been alterations in their intensity, degree of radicalism, capacity to influence the political process, way, goal and value; different forms of protests have continued to appear in recent years. For Tilly (1984: 305), "the term *social movement* applies most usefully to a sustained

interaction between a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those authorities". The link between the occurrence of new conflicts and value dimension has been emphasized in the context of different forms of 'new politics' related with peace, civil rights and environmental problems. Within this perspective, the growth of 'new' political movements since 1960s-1970s is related to process of value modification (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 61). With other movements like women's right movements, peace movements, minority movements, student movements; environmental movements emerged in Europe in the 1960s-1970s. Rootes (1997) defined environmental social movements as collective action of individuals, groups, non-institutional networks without organizational affiliation for a shared environmental concern whose intensity and form changes in different political context, place and time. During the second half of the 1970s, activated ties of faith and solidarity in mobilizations provided base for a new wave of environmental protests gained momentum after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. Environmental activism targeted the public and the power holders. To gain recognition and achieve their demands, they pressure national and local governments, and try to take public support. Wapner (1996) points out that in addition to state relations, with creating awareness about environmental problems, pressuring multinational companies and empowering local stakeholders for sustainable development, social movement actors play significant roles in policy-making process. In this thesis, I will emphasize environmental movements, but I am not going to summarize all types of environmental movements. My thesis is based on two case studies and I will emphasize protests for energy-related issues.

The relationship between protests and institutional political actors is the main focus of the political process approach. Eisinger's political opportunity structure (1973) emphasizes "open" and "closed" structures which provide easy or difficult access to the political system. Political institutions, political culture, economic development, social structure, degree of civic culture and pluralism in media, the behavior of opponents, and the behavior of their allies, are essential in identifying the context of mobilization. If political culture is inclusive, liberal, egalitarian and individualistic, there would be less confrontational and hostile opposition. The level of democratization, centralization, electoral rules, and division of power in government has an effect on social movement organizations and outcomes of those movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 202-203). Activists need allies, such as appointed or elected officials, to be successful. Existence of institutional allies is greatly important especially when political opportunity structure is closed (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 156).

Exclusion from democratic process causes more emergences of non-institutional forms of protests. In the *proactive* sense, environmental organizations and activists demand to attend decision-making processes for more friendly policies and industrial operations. In the *reactive sense* as in Loç and anti-nuclear movements, actors reacted against existence of activity and degradation of nature (Çoban, 2004). My goal is to represent the mobilization dynamics of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement; and to evaluate their impacts on the energy policy-making process. Within energy projects, negative influences on the social and natural environment have not been taken into consideration. Projects of the state and private companies

like nuclear power plants, hydroelectric projects and dams have become target of environmentalists and the communities that would be affected by such projects. Environmental movements, since the 1980s, started to become active in order to overcome environmental and social problems that caused by energy projects in Turkey. Public protests energy projects such as thermal, hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. In this thesis, the environmental movement against Cide HES Project in Loç Valley and environmental movement of Akkuyu NPP will be analyzed. The originality of this thesis lies in the data collection from Loç Valley and Mersin fieldworks; and examination of their impacts on each energy policy-making phase, agenda-setting, policy alternatives and implementation. A main aim of this thesis was to examine emergence, mechanisms and dynamics of two environmental movements; to discuss similarities and differences in the movements; and to point out their influences on energy policy-making process.

Environmental movements have recently formed in Turkey. Industrialization, economic growth and modernization in the early 1980s had affected the beginning of the environmental movements in Turkey. Environmental movements were formed against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, thermal power plants in Gökova, Yatağan, Bursa and Aliğa, and HPP in Fırtına Valley. Güvenpark (1986) and Zaferpark (1987) movements focused on urban planning and land-use disputes. Other movements such as Yatağan (1989-1992), Aliğa (1989-92), Bursa (1992), Fırtına Valley (1999), and Akkuyu focused on energy-related issues. From 1989 to today, Bergama movement against gold mining and use of cyanide has been an important and popular movement against a multinational gold mining cooperation.

I am mainly interested in the dynamics and different shareholders in the movements, and the outcome and impact of these movements on each energy policy making phase. How have the public, local and national authorities, NGOs, media been involved in these movements? How do these movements impact energy policy-making process? How have movement actors been included in the each policy phase? What are the obstacles and advantages for actors to be included in the process? Who supports these movements? How do other actors support these movements? What are the impacts of these movements on each policy phase? What are the similarities and differences of the movements that studied in terms of the dynamics, impacts and outcome of the movement? These are the leading questions will be answered with a detailed analysis of the environmental movements in the cases of the Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement.

The Loç Valley is located in the western Black Sea coast, in Kastamonu, Cide. Loç Valley is an 8 km valley between two canyons. Devrekani River gives life to valley and creates Valla Canyon. Orya Energy has planned construction of Cide HES Project on Devrekani River. Loç people did not know anything about SHPPs and Cide HES Project, until construction machines came to the valley. When they noticed that this project will destroy their villages, water, land and culture, the movement against the project had started on June 2010. Locals learned that Orya Energy does not have a construction plan, right of eminent domain and electricity generation license. Gendarmerie, district governorship did not do their task and prevent illegal company activities. They started resistance in both in Istanbul and Loç Valley. In order to prevent illegal activities of the company, local people and

activists set up a camp and waited all night and day in the riverside. Loc people used court in order to achieve their goals and to stop implementation of the project.

Nuclear energy has been on the agenda of Turkey with Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, which was founded in 1956 and working as a regulatory body. Tenders were made for the establishment of nuclear power plants in Akkuyu four times in 1977, 1983, 1996 and 2008; four tenders were canceled for different reasons. Since the 1970s, the Turkish State has planned a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. National and international resistance against the nuclear power plant started in 1976. First protest was held by fishers in Silifke. Akkuyu is located on the Mediterranean coast and in the province of Mersin. The main arguments of anti-nuclear activists against nuclear power are destruction of nature, nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race, nuclear waste issue, accident and radiation leakage risks, damages on environment, threat for living beings and human health. The nuclear power project had been suspended by 1980 military coup. After the military coup, the government put Akkuyu nuclear power plant out to tender. Professional organizations like Doctors' and Lawyers' Unions, labor unions, local and national NGOs formed the anti-nuclear platform in 1993 and it became effective to postpone the bid for several times. (Adem, 2005). In 1994, resistance became greater and stronger through nation-wide campaigns, demonstrations and unofficial referendum after the Chernobyl disaster (Vouivouli, 2011). Anti-nuclear platform is constituted of ninety components as NGOs, labor and trade unions, trade associations. Platform carries out its activities with the contributions of its components. Protest marches, demonstrations, press releases, distribution of posters and leaflets, meetings with the public, informing public, raising public awareness, TV-radio broadcasts as well as signature campaigns

are used as strategies by anti-nuclear platform. With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Russia in January 2010, again, nuclear power plant for electricity generation was added to political agenda. Nuclear policies, agreements and possibility of changes in external conditions generate concern among people that drive the mobilization again.

Loç Valley and anti-nuclear movements target both companies and the government. Closed structures create difficult access to the political system for Loç people and anti-nuclear activists. Policy-makers and decision-makers have not asked and informed people who would be mostly affected by the projects and include them in the process. Because anti-SHPP activists and anti-nuclear activists have not attended decision-making processes for more friendly policies, they reacted against degradation of nature. Non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process of people who would be directly affected by the projects caused reactive environmental movements.

It would be wrong to separate social movements from the state completely. Boundary between social movements and the state is blurry. There is an interdependent relation between public policies and social movements. The state influences social movements and movements influence the state. Various scholars have divided the policy process into distinct phases and analyzed the impact of social movements in these various phases. Kolb divides policy process into four phases; "agenda setting, specification of alternative, enactment of policies, and implementation of policies" (Kolb, 2000: 56). Paul Burstein indicates that "the

contributions of a social movement to each stream of policy process” must be examined separately, because “each stream of the policy process involves a different causal process.” (Burstein, 1993:119).First of all social movements must bring their claims onto political agenda, develop policy proposals, press politicians to enact favorable policy proposals and lastly monitor the implementation of policy (Kolb, 2000: 35).

Even though policy is examined as a result of social movements’ outcome, interaction of both symbolic and important alterations in policy with emergence of a movement have not been studied by many scholars. Turkish environmental movements and Turkish energy policy-making process have been studied by various scholars. However, studies on environmental movements’ impact on energy policy-making process are not very common. This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literature of environmental movement and energy policy-making literature through analyzing the Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement as well as their impacts on energy policy-making process in Turkey. Dividing the policy process into distinct phases makes analysis of the influence of social movements easier. I will divide energy policy process into problem recognition and agenda setting, policy alternatives and implementation phases. I will analyze movements’ effects on each phase in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Perceived as a national security issue and political tool in the global political arena, energy policy-making process in Turkey is so closed and actors included in the

process are very limited. Public participation at the planning stage is limited because central planning is powerful in Turkey. Bringing issues on the political agenda is the first phase in public policy-making process (Kingdon, 1995: 84). Issues must be perceived as serious for rising the issues on the political or public agenda. Like other actors, social movements bring their claims on the political agenda. Alterations in external conditions and policies create concerns among people that drive the mobilization. (Meyer, 2005: 15). In Turkey, locals and environmental organizations mobilized around environmental issues such as air, noise and water pollution; overuse of natural resources; energy projects including nuclear power plant, thermal power plant, hydro power plant projects; tourism activities; unequal development; cultural and natural heritage. Growth-based economy, liberalization, deregulation and privatization create social consciousness as well as environmental consciousness and local environmental movements against them. Environmental organizations, public participation, NGOs and public awareness have flourished in Turkey. Public environmental activism has increased especially with SHPP projects in Black Sea Regions. A strong national resistance against nuclear power plant in Akkuyu started in 1976 and became effective to postpone construction of the nuclear power plant. Environmental movements in Turkey are either reactive against a threat to the environment or they carry the aim of protecting natural sites.

In policy alternatives and policy enactment phase, alternative policy proposals are developed and a proposal is selected. Policy proposals are created, discussed, revised and adopted at this phase. Proposals which are feasible, compatible with decision makers' norms and public and acceptable in cost will be more successful. At this

phase, movements can generate “alternatives” and change the content of legislation in favor of social movement actors (Amenta, 2005: 39). Sympathetic policy makers can increase favorable environment in political context for social movement actors and can initiate a new legislation in favor of the movement actors’ constituency. Inclusion of new actors or exclusion of established actors provide change in policy monopoly and this change affects the prospects for extra-institutional mobilization. Social movements can affect policy by changing composition of policy monopoly (Meyer, 2005: 7). In the Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement cases, policy suggestions, special reports, proposals and demands for laws and regulations and the state’s position to these suggestions constitute impacts of movements on policy alternatives and policy enactment phase. Cooperation, negotiation, meetings with the government and their impacts to the policies will be discussed. Involvement of the state, various NGOs, academicians, public, activists and platforms in the energy policy will be examined to understand movement’s influence on policy formation.

Mobilization of a movement can begin after a policy is enacted, but not implemented. For Kolb (2000: 51-52), enacting legislation is not sufficient. In this phase, social movements monitor the implementation of the policy. The most straightforward political mechanism is juridical mechanism. In order to achieve their goals, they can use courts. Social movements use litigation for putting pressure on implementation of legislation. And also they use it for stopping or slowing down the implementation of policy programs or legislation which they are against. Exclusion from the planning phase, agenda-setting and policy formulation; Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement involved in the process in implementation phase. They take

action against the policy, because they perceive policies as a threat to their economic interests and their lives. Public policy implementation phase creates conditions for the occurrence of social movements and aims to alter the policy with blockading its implementation. Even though courts' decisions are not always on movements' behalf, Loç people and anti-nuclear movement members effectively use courts for stopping or slowing down the implementation of legislations that they are against.

Gamson defined (1990:29) "success" in two forms; emergence of 'new advantages' as well as 'acceptance' of the organization "as a legitimate representative of a constituency by the target of collective action, altering the relationship between a challenging organization and the groups it attempts to influence" (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 463). According to Gamson (1990), new advantages mean the degree to which a social movement's program is realized. According to Amenta and Caren (2004), a group could not achieve its stated program which seems as a failure, but win considerable new advantages. New state policies and effect on structure of policy are other possible outcomes of social movements. Although the movements have not able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the constructions of power plants in Loç Valley and Akkuyu, implementations of the projects were stopped by the court decision and efforts of the movement. The government tries to have a regulation that ignores the court decisions. I will examine interaction between the government and the movements and success of these movements in detail in the following sections.

1.2 Research Design, Methodology and Data Collection

Different methodologies are used in this thesis. Firstly, a number of secondary sources were used in the analysis of social movements, relation between public policies and social movements. Thesis draws on secondary sources and legal documents to examine history of environmental movements and environmental policy in Turkey as well as energy policy-making process of Turkey. Secondly, the empirical data of the thesis was collected through observation and in-depth interviews for the analysis of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movements, and these movements' impacts on each policy phase. The interviews were basically semi-structured; and a set of open-ended questions was asked. I conducted 25 in-depth interviews that lasted from 2 to 2,5 hours and 11 interviews with activists, government representatives and bureaucrats. By reading the secondary resources and documents; data collection process was started and it continued with interviews and observations in the field. The fieldwork of the study was conducted during the period from February 2013 to June 2013. My fieldworks consist of both observations and in-depth interviews to understand Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement; and examine their impacts on Turkish energy policy making process.

Thirdly, comparative analysis was used to investigate impact of different environmental movements on Turkish energy policy-making process. Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement are two different environmental movement cases that allow for a comparative analysis to examine emergence, mechanisms and dynamics; and their influences on energy policy-making process. I aimed to demonstrate how different environmental movements may cause similar effects within closed political

structures. Two cases were different in size of the movement (Loç movement can be characterized as a local movement and anti-nuclear movement can be characterized as a more nation-wide movement); in size of investment; in terms of composition of actors, local government support, inclusion of political parties in the process, the extent of financial support and connection with national/international network. The main similarity was political structures that pave the way for the movements and movements' actions to affect the process. Although the movements have not been able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the construction of projects, they have stopped or slowed down the implementation of legislations that they are against. Two movements have partially realized their programs. Movements have limited and temporary effects on energy policy making process.

I chose Loç Valley movement, because Loç movement was one of the first significant anti-SHPP movements and has symbolic significance for other SHPP movements. Loç movement became effective to stop SHPP construction. Loç movement and its result, stopping the construction of a small hydroelectric power plant, were a source of inspiration for other anti-HPP movements. Symbol of Loç Valley resistance, a traditional yellow Turkish kerchief (*sarı yazma*), became the symbol of other anti-SHPP movements. I conducted fieldwork in Loç Valley, located in the western Black Sea, where movement against Cide HES Project began. The villages are located in Kastamonu, Cide. My observations are based on my visit to Loç Valley that hosts 4 mountain villages which will be affected by Cide HES project. I had interviews with fifteen people in Loç Valley and İstanbul. In-depth interviews conducted with four people who were leading the campaign against the project from Loç Valley Protection Platform, who provided me with dense

information about the Loç movement and their involvement in the policy-making process. At the same time, I also had interviews with supporters of the project to have a broader picture of the movement and observed various views among Loç people.

Anti-nuclear movement is one of the oldest and most influential environmental movements in Turkey. The movement has created ecological and anti-nuclear consciousness in the province of Mersin and in the country. It has a symbolic significance for other environmental movements in Turkey. It is important for all ecological movements in Turkey and it has an influence on other ecological movements. Nuclear power plant has been planned in Akkuyu. Akkuyu is located on the Mediterranean coast and in the province of Mersin. I conducted fieldwork in Mersin which is significant for anti-nuclear movement. My observations are based on my visit to Mersin where will be affected by Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. I had interviews with ten anti-nuclear platform members in Mersin.

In-depth interviews provide me with dense information about these movements, their involvements in the policy-making process and their impacts on each policy phase. In addition to fieldworks in Loç Valley and Mersin, I conducted in-depth interviews with an AKP deputy, representatives from Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and DSİ to understand a broader picture of the process and the government's view on social movements. In-depth interviews conducted with both social movement actors and government representatives as well as bureaucrats who are the strength of this thesis. The analysis of these in-depth interviews provides dense information

regarding energy policy-making process and involvement of non-state actors in the process.

1.3 Organization of the Thesis

After an introduction, the second chapter provides a theoretical framework of social movements, transnational advocacy networks and relation between public policies and social movements. This theoretical framework is necessary for understanding and explaining social movements and their relations with public policies. I focus on collective behavior, resource mobilization, political process and new social movement perspectives in order to analyze social movements. In the second part of this chapter, I present a discussion of success and impacts of social movements. Various scholars, such as Kingdon and Kolb have divided the policy process into distinct phases. I also give a theoretical framework of the policy process with dividing it into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives, and enactment of policies and implementation. I analyze the impact of social movements on these phases through different case studies.

In the third chapter, at first I focus on environmental movement definition and, on the basis of general dynamics, I summarize the environmental movements in Turkey. In this chapter, I cover the causes of environmental degradation in Turkey and history of environmental organizations since the early years of the republic. Changes in political opportunity structures and limits of civil society in Turkey are also examined in this chapter. I concentrate on history of environmental movements and environmental policy in Turkey; and non-state actors' involvement in environmental

issues. The second part of this chapter analyzes Bergama movement which was the most influential and important environmental movement started at the beginning of 1990s as a local resistance against gold mining and then became a nation-wide issue in Turkey; and other significant environmental movements against Aliğa thermal power plant, Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Ilisu Dam, Munzur Dam and Small Hydro Power Plants. These cases will enable us to understand impacts of environmental movements on the policy of the state.

The fourth chapter explains the energy resources which determine energy policies of Turkey, strategy-targets of Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Strategic Plan. Actors and their contributions to the energy policy-making process are explained in detail. Examination of the role of the state and non-state actors such as public, academicians, representatives of civil society organizations and private sector in the process will enable us to understand how Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement involved in the energy policy making process. I will examine related laws, legal arrangements and regulations in order to understand structure of energy policies of Turkey and involvement of various actors into this structure.

In the fifth and sixth chapter, I analyze the empirical data collected through in-depth interviews and observation from Loç Valley and Mersin fieldworks. The analysis focuses on the impact of movements on energy policy making process. Firstly, I examine decision-making process and influences of movements on this process. Secondly, I divide energy policy-making process into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives, and enactment of policies

and implementation. I analyze the impact of these movements on each phase. In the sixth chapter, I compare anti-nuclear movement with Loç movement to understand similarities and differences between the two movements. And lastly, I discuss successes and impacts of these movements within Gamson's success definition and opportunity structure framework of Turkey.

In the final chapter, a general evaluation of the movements against the Cide HES Project and Akkuyu NPP project is realized. I summarize the analytical and theoretical framework and the findings of this thesis, with a focus on the main arguments in the previous chapters. Weakness and strength of the thesis will be also discussed in this section.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the study will be clarified. This thesis is based on the empirical analysis of the environmental movements as in the case of the Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement. Therefore, this chapter will introduce the main theoretical debates about social movement, public policy and outcomes and consequences of social movements. Even though social movements have a long history; they get a relatively new formation as an academic field in the social sciences. However, social movements are phenomena which penetrate the fabric of the political and social life. As Snow et al. discuss, “Social movements and the activities with which they are associated has become an increasingly conscious feature of the social landscape” (Snow et al., 2004: 3-4). In the same vein, Diani and Della Porta (1999:1) express that “from the 1960s onwards, social movements, protest actions and, more generally, political organizations unaligned with major political parties or trade unions have become a permanent component of western democracies”. Even though there have been alterations in their intensity, degree of radicalism, capacity to influence the political process, way, goal and value; different forms of protests have continued to appear in recent years.

A number of scholars have discussed the relation between social movements and public policies. Some social movement scholars suggest that social movements and

states are two separate entities and see social movements and state interaction as a “conflictual cooperation” (Giugni and Passy 1998), and furthermore, other scholars have claimed the idea of living in a “social movements society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). “Fundamentally, social movement scholars treat the policy process as a black box within the state, which movements may occasionally shake and upset into action, whereas policy scholars treat movements as undifferentiated and unitary actors who respond (or not) by disruption” (Meyer, 2005: 3). It would be wrong to completely separate social movements from the state. The boundary between the social movements and the state is blurry. Even though policy is examined as a result of social movements’ outcome, interaction of both symbolic and important alterations in policy with emergence of a movement have not been studied by many scholars. There is an interdependent relation between public policies and social movements. The state influences the social movements and the movements influence the state (Banaszak, 2005: 151).

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework of social movements, public policy and relation between public policies and social movements. This theoretical framework is necessary for understanding and explaining social movements and their relations with public policies. First of all, many definitions of the concept “social movement” will be specified and the concept of social movement will be defined. The main conceptualizations of the term will be discussed. Secondly, I focus on perspectives that dominate the analysis of social movements - collective behavior, resource mobilization, political process and new social movement perspectives. Thirdly, transnationalization and transnational advocacy network as well as success and impacts of social movements will be examined respectively.

Lastly, I will give a theoretical framework of the policy process; it is helpful to divide policy process into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives, and enactment of policies and implementation. I analyze the impact of social movements on these phases through a number of case studies in literature.

2.2 Definition of Social Movements and Social Movement Organizations

Since 1960s, protest actions and social movements have become permanent elements of western democracies. Even though there have been alterations in their intensity, degree of radicalism, capacity to influence the political process, way, goal and value; different forms of protest have continued to appear in recent years.

Social movements have been defined by various scholars. McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217-1218) define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society". For Tilly (1984: 305), "the term social movement applies most usefully to a sustained interaction between a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those authorities". The difference between other organizations, interest groups, political parties and social movements does not comprise of differences' patterns of behavior or organizational characteristic, but social movements are not organizations, not even of a peculiar kind (Tilly, 1988). According to Della Porta and Diani, "they are networks of interaction between different actors which may either include formal

organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances. As a consequence, a single organization whatever its dominant traits, is not a social movement. Of course, it may be part of one, but two are not identical, as they reflect different organizational principles” (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 16).

The concept of “social movement” that I will use in this thesis was characterized by Della Porta and Diani (1999). Della Porta and Diani (1999) list four characteristic aspects of social movements; informal interaction networks, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action focusing on conflicts and use of protest. Initially, informal interaction networks refer interaction between a plurality of groups, organizations and individuals. Crucial resources for action and broader systems of meaning are promoted by networks. Second characteristic aspect indicates a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging. Third characteristic aspect signifies actors’ engagement in cultural and political conflicts to promote or oppose social change at the systemic or un-systemic level. Last one, use of protest, indicates emphasis on the non-institutionalized nature of their behavior. These components which are described by Della Porta and Diani (1999) will make it possible to distinguish social movements from other collective action such as religious sects, single protest events, interests groups and so on. Similarly, Paul Burstein states that social movement is different from political coalitions and loosely structured protest events. According to Burstein, social movements include longer-lasting action rather than discrete events, a vision of the world, collective identity, and ties of solidarity.

Della Porta and Diani (1999) emphasized that social movements and the organizations involved in them are not the same thing. Inducing participations to offer their services, identifying organizational aims, managing and coordinating contributions, collecting resources from their environment are number of functions that each social movement organizations (SMOs) must fulfill. SMOs have to mobilize resources for their environment. Technologies, participants, goals, social structures constitute social movement organizations. Social movements have been defined with *loosely structured collective action* by Della Porta and Diani (1999:140). Participatory and decentralized structure favors strong internal solidarity of social movement organizations. In order to transform costs of collective action into benefits, internal relations are important. (della Porta and Diani, 1999). For Della Porta and Diani (1999), the internal and external variables which shape the choice of one organizational model rather than another are important for the study of social movement organization. Existence or absence of resources in the surrounding environment influence organizations' strategic options. The characteristic of a movement and its surroundings may constrain choice of a particular model of organization, so outcomes of chosen organizational modes need to be taken into consideration (della Porta and Diani, 139).

Charles Tilly (1978) claimed that a change from informally coordinated and decentralized movement to formally coordinated and centralized ones; from short-term to long-term; from reactive action by small-scale to proactive action by large; from informal solidarity groups to special-purpose associations have been seen in past four centuries. Technological improvement has affected the tactics and

organizational structure of social movements (Tarrow, 1994: 143-145). Institutional actors affect the nature of mobilization, because the available resources to social movement actors are oriented through institutional actors (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 152). Social movements attempt to copy strong opponents by producing similar structures for themselves or they can show their opposition in their choice of organizational structure rather than copying their opponents. Della Porta and Diani (1999) indicate that the influences of institutional actors on social movements are ambiguous. A centralized, repressive state can create a well-organized movement (Rootes, 1997) with radical repertoire (della Porta, 1995). At the same time a decentralized state may produce very similar organizational structure. For instance; decentralized structure of anti-nuclear movements in USA is explained by decentralized organization of electricity industry (Rucht, 1990b: 209). (Della Porta and Diani, 154). A decentralized and flexible organizational structure has often been influential in achieving the objectives of the protest. In contrast, more centralized organizations have higher ability for decision-making; but they are not successful in maintaining internal solidarity (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 158-160).

2.3 Perspectives on Social Movements

By briefly examining the definition of social movements; now we are moving to perspectives on social movements. Marxist model and structural-functionalist model were two main models to explain the collective action and to interpret social conflict. Criticism for structural-functionalist model occurred within collective behavior, resource mobilization and political process perspectives in the USA. “New social movements” perspectives emerged as a result of dissatisfaction of Marxism in Europe (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 2). In order to analyze non-institutional

collective action since 1960s, Della Porta and Diani (1999) identify four analytical perspectives; collective behavior, resource mobilization, political process and new social movements.

2.3.1 Collective Behavior

Structural- functionalist Neil Smelser (1962) examined social movements as the side-effects of dramatic social change. According to Smelser (1962), during large-scale and rapid transformations, social movements had double meaning. On the one hand, the incapability of institutions and social control mechanisms; on the other hand reaction to crisis through growth of shared values and beliefs among society form basis for collective solidarity. Smelserian vision of collective action (1962) as crisis behavior is shared by other approaches (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 4). With the revitalization of collective behavior perspective, symbolic interactionists assert that collective action is not only reflection of a social crisis, at the same time it seeks to generate new solidarities and norms. “Collective behavior was defined as behavior concerned with change and social movements as both an integral part of the normal functioning of society and the expression of a wider process of transformation” (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 5). According to symbolic interactionist perspective, new norms appear with identifying existing situation as unjust and providing a justification for action, when existing systems do not provide adequate basis for social action. The study of collective behavior also focused on transformation of institutional behavior through action of emergent normative definitions. When conflict occurs between traditional normative structures and continually evolving structure, these definitions emerge. Emergence of new norms and rules accompany social movements and social movements make an attempt to transform existing

norms. When dissatisfaction spread and institutions unable to respond, a social movement starts to mobilize. Construction of identity and symbolic production are crucial elements of collective behavior (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 6).

2.3.2 Resource Mobilization

Functionalist perspective of collective behavior was criticized for regarding collective movements as irrational actors, and collective movement as the exclusive product of malfunctions of the social system. Action became incapable of strategic rationality, and devalued as reactive behavior. In the 1970s, American sociologists focused on research that resources are necessary for collective action mobilization. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 7) indicate that movements are components of the normal political process. “In their view, collective movements constitute and extension of conventional forms of political action; the actors engage in this act in a rational way, following their interests; organizations and movement ‘entrepreneurs’ have an essential role in the mobilization of collective resources on which action is founded”. (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 7).

Collective movement was defined as a rational, organized and purposeful action by Myer Zald (Zald and Ash, 1966; McCarthy and Zald, 1987), Anthony Oberschall (1973 and 1980) and Charles Tilly (1978). A calculation of costs and benefits; existence and availability of resources; and, organization and necessary interaction for development of a social movement affect protest actions. Historically, there were always differences in opinion, ideologies and interests, so it cannot explain emergence of collective action. Examination of the existence of conflicts and tensions is not enough. Material resources (money, work, concrete benefits, and

services) and non-material resources (authority, moral engagement, faith, and friendship) are two main resources that the capacity of mobilizations depends on. Beyond the presence of conflicts, mobilization derive from the way in which social movements are able to organize discontent, reduce the costs of actions, utilize and create solidarity networks, share incentives among members and achieve external consensus. Type and nature of resources available to movements explain the tactical choices and the impacts of collective movements on the political and social system. Forms of organization, mobilization of symbolic and material resources have been focused in the analysis of groups' internal resources (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 8). Social movements as making rational choices are one of the most important contributions of the resource mobilization perspective. But this approach overemphasizes rationality of collective action, failing to take role of the emotions into account (Della Porta and Diani, 9).

2.3.3 New Conflicts and New Social Movements

According to Della Porta and Diani (1999), existence of identities promotes a sense of collective belonging which can be sustained even after a particular campaign or specific initiative has finished. Continuity of these feelings will make the revitalization of mobilization. During the second half of the 1970s, activated ties of faith and solidarity in mobilizations provided base for new wave of environmental protests that gained momentum after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. Representations of collective identities can help the emergence and development of new social movements. Close relationship between movements of the new left and political ecology movements is one of the examples of a number of occasions.

According to Della Porta and Diani (1999), collective action does not emerge automatically from structural tensions. Social change can facilitate the occurrence of new social groups with specific structural location and interests. Social change can also enhance the amount of social resources. And lastly, social change can change patterns of relationship between people; it can facilitate or constrain development of solidarity that/which people engaged in similar activities. (Della Porta and Diani, 28).

“Values will influence the way in which the actor defines specific goals, identities, and identifies behavioral strategies which are both efficient and morally acceptable” (Della Porta and Diani, 61). Not only the lack of social integration, but also creation of the opposite tendency and emergence and development of new value systems can be an interpretation for collective action. The link between the occurrence of new conflicts and value dimension has been emphasized in the context of different forms of ‘new politics’ related with peace, civil rights and environmental problems which will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Within this perspective, the growth of ‘new’ political movements since 1970s is related to process of value modification (Kriesi, 1993)

Rise of the movements during the 1960s and 1970s, provided response from European scholars to criticize Marxist interpretation of social conflict. After the end of Second World War, the social transformations emerged and criticism of the rejection of Orthodox Marxists’ multiplicity of concerns and homogenous actors

provided conditions for evolution of social and political conflicts. Scholars of new movements stated that conflict among industrial classes is decreasing relevance (Della Porta and Diani, 11). Alain Touraine (1981: 29) stated that “social movements are not a marginal rejection of social order, they are the central focus fighting one against the other to control the production of society by itself and the action of classes for shaping of the historicity.”

Claus Offe (1995) states that innovations of the new movements in comparison with workers’ movements provide participatory and decentralized organizational structure, critical ideology related to progress and modernism, interpersonal solidarity against bureaucracies, autonomous space than material benefits. According to Offe, new social movements are identified by inclusive and non-ideological participation, open organization and more attention to social than economic transformation. (Della Porta and Diani, 12). With influence of Jürgen Habermas, in Alberto Melucci’s view, new social movements does not limit themselves as workers’ movement seek to material gain, they rather oppose expansion of political intervention in daily life and preserve personal autonomy. This approach provides two advantages; first they locate importance of the actor, second with innovative characteristics they no longer define themselves relevant with system of production. (della Porta and Diani, 1999: 13). In Ronald Inglehart’s (1990a: 56) view, “a weakening of the system of ‘material’ values and their replacement by ‘postmaterial’ values is likely to set in.” Economic well-being and security constitute material values. Affirmation of expressive needs (freedom of expression, democratic participation) reflects post-material values. (Della Porta and Diani, 63). The

development of post-materialist values is a transitory phenomenon not a profound change. According to Della Porta and Diani (1990), the data indicates the tendency towards a rise in post-material values. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 51-53) do not claim that the material and redistributive dimension has lost all importance in conflicts where recent non-working class movements are protagonists. This perspective continues that structural changes promote a basis for the emergence and development of new political identities, and a new criteria for the organization of the conflict. Social movements are also organized by social groups whose status influenced and threatened by socio-economic transformation. New movements would represent a new organizational form for inter-class coalitions.

In recent decades, all collective actions are not automatically of the new type. For Della Porta and Diani, recent social conflict rather than economic or political power has more to do with circulation and production of information, conditions for production and use of scientific knowledge, the emergence of cultural models and symbols related to collective identities and the definition of individual (Della Porta and Diani, 44). Control of information is essential resource of social power. “New potential for conflict originates therefore in the increasingly blurred borders between public and the private sphere, particularly from the multiplication of criteria define rights of citizenship and the growing capacity for intervention among public and private institutions” (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 57) Interactions between individuals, state actors, groups and international institutions, and networks challenge conventional notion of state authority and sovereignty. Human rights, environmental, women, indigenous’ networks and their campaigns challenge

conventional notions of state sovereignty through “boomerang” effect and producing information. They try to change set of shared practices and norms (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 36).

2.3.4 Political Process- Political Opportunity Structure

Unconventional forms of political participation such as protests, demonstrations, blockades, sit-ins, boycotts, signing petitions, occupation are parts of a modern repertoire of collective action and take place all over the world. The new repertoire is national in character and nature of the new repertoire gave a common behavioral and cultural foundation to movements. Parliamentary opposition or voting choices of citizens in election may challenge the decisions of a government in representative democracy. With bilateral negotiations, diplomacy may put pressure on a foreign government. Growing number of citizens have affirmed the legitimacy of other forms of pressure on decision-making. (Della Porta and Diani, 168). Tilly saw a basic change in the means of protest. According to Tilly (1995: 364–377), these changes emerged because “entire structure of political opportunity changed. They were the result of four related processes which converged to profoundly change the opportunities of popular protest: state-making, economic and demographic change and contention’s cumulative history interwove to create the preconditions for a new repertoire of popular protest that was large in scale and national in scope” (Kriesi, 2004: 67).

Political and institutional environment where social movements function get systematic attention from political process approach. The relationship between protest and institutional political actors is the main focus of the political process

approach Della Porta and Diani (1999: 9) claimed that ‘political opportunity structure’ is the greatest concept in identifying external environment, related to the development of social movements. Structures, ideology, repertoire produce material and cultural resources, and strategies have influenced the form and size of mobilization. External variables have strongly influenced social movements. Economic development, social structure, degree of civic culture and pluralism in media are essential in identifying the context of mobilization. Social movements are political; therefore they are affected by and affect the political system. The political opportunity structure has become crucial for interpretations of interaction between non-institutional and institutional actors (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 195). Political structures that pave the way for the movement and movement’s actions to affect the process is essential to analyze emergence, dynamics and impact of environmental movements in Turkey. Understanding of political opportunities by activists is also important. Political institutions, political culture, the behavior of opponents, and the behavior of their allies are main groups of variables which may influence social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 224).

Keck and Sikkink (1998: 8) take domestic and international *institutional structures* into account. Risse-Kappen’s study identifies domestic structures as policy networks (consensual vs. polarized), societal structure (weak vs. strong) and state structure (centralized vs. fragmented). Alexis de Tocqueville’s comparison of ‘weak’ American government and ‘strong’ French governments is a good starting point for analyses of the link between social movement development and institutional factors. Tocqueville indicated that a constant but peaceful protest from below could emerge in a system where civil society strong and state is weak (the United States). On the

other hand, violent and episodic revolt would emerge in which the civil society is weak and state is strong (France) (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 196).

Sidney criticized Tocqueville and created a theoretical framework through integrating empirical observations, specifying “the degree of openness and closure of formal political access, the degree of stability and instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential allies and political conflicts between and within elites” (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 10). Comparison of different political systems has provided opportunity to study central theme of the relationship between institutional political system and social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 10).

Kitschelt (1986:58) claims that “political opportunity structure” affect strategies and the influence of social movements. With Eisinger’s (1973) use of political opportunity structure, students of social movements emphasize on “open” and “closed” structures which provide easy or difficult access to the political system (Kriesi, 2004). ‘Openness’ refers to pluralist conception with access to political system. ‘Power of the state’ refers to the power of the central executive. More open means more dispersed political decisions. “The greater the number of actors who share in political power (the greater the checks and balances) the greater the chance that social movements can gain access to the system.” (della Porta and Diani, 1999: 197). The power is dispensed to the local regions or component states within federal structure (territorial decentralization), individual movements have greater ability to achieve the decision-making process. When the degree of power passed from the national governments to regions increase, the openness of the political system to

pressure from below will become greater (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 197). According to Eisinger (1973), in extremely open or closed systems, protest will not likely to take place. On the contrary, Kriesi (2004) argues that the social movement actors do not have to mobilize, because reform will come anyway in an extremely open system; whereas change is never coming, because social movement actors do not have any opportunity to mobilize in an extremely closed system. Openness of the system has great influence on success for social movements. With more numerous channels of access for non-institutional actors tends to be more open (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 197). But Della Porta and Diani (1999) claim that there are no certain indications for a correlation between levels of protest and institutional openness (Della Porta and Diani, 201).

According to Kriesi (2004), openness of the system is also related with to the separation of power. Functional division of powers refers the separation of tasks between judiciary, executive and legislative. The great separation of power system will create “greater degree of formal access and the more limited the capacity of the state to act” (Kriesi, 2004: 70). Possibilities of access will be greater in a parliamentary system than presidential one. “The more fragmented the government or the greater the differences between the parties the easier it will be to find allies.” (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 198) The greater the possibility of access for social movements is possible with the greater independence of judiciary. (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 201). Giugni and Duyvendak (1995: 96-98) emphasize on distinction between “high profile” and “low profile” policy-domains. “High profile domains are characterized by their importance for the maintenance of established power relations in a given polity”. Energy, immigration, and national security are involved

in “high profile” domain; whereas cultural policy is taken part in “low profile” domain. It is likely to be harder for social movements to access in “high profile” domains than “low profile” domains (Kriesi, 2004: 77). Energy policy as a “high profile” domain in Turkey affects occurrence, tactics and impacts and outcomes of environmental movements.

Kriesi states that separation of these two types can be problematic. “Open systems tend to have only a limited capacity to act, whereas closed systems tend to have a somewhat greater capacity to act.” Multiplicity of decision-making and state actors indicates decentralization (Kriesi, 2004: 70). Kriesi (2004) indicate two conceptual distinctions; strong/weak states and majoritarian/consensus democracies. Strong states have institutions that restrict their accessibility with regard to their environment. Meanwhile, there are institutions in weak states that open them up, but also restrict their capacity to act. Lijphart’s (1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies refers “majoritarian democracies concentrate political power within and between institutions, which limits their accessibility and enhances their capacity to act, while consensus democracies divide political power and thus increase the institutional accessibility and constrain the capacity to act” (Kriesi, 2004: 71).

Della Porta state that more and more often, social movement organizations interact with the public administration, presenting themselves as representatives of a “democracy from below” (Della Porta, 66). In order to mobilize public opinion, protest is used as a political resource by who do not have direct access to policy making. Illegal forms of action are used by protesters to get attention of public

opinion (Della Porta, 1999). New tactics are invented by new actors, collective identities may need radical action. With the extension of the cycle of protest, the response of the authorities creates simultaneous process of institutionalization and radicalization (Della Porta and Diani, 1999).

If political culture is inclusive, liberal, egalitarian and individualistic, there would be less confrontational and hostile opposition (Della Porta and Diani, 1999). Some scholars claim that because democracy works poorly, SMOs have influence, and others claim that because democracy works well, SMOs have little influence (Paul Burstein, 3). Democratic institutions through democratic representation/election give citizens power over decision-makers. Elected officials recognize that the public demands and respond to its demands in a well-functioning democracy. If officials respond to SMOs or other organizations rather than the majority, there is a risk for them in re-election. Paul Burstein argues that limits on the ability of legislators and citizens and electoral competition constrain effects of interest groups and social movement organizations.

According to Della Porta and Diani (1999), the state cannot be conceptualized as an 'enemy' of social movements. State can be sponsor, target, and antagonist for social movements. Government agencies can be either opponents or allies of social movements. According to Moore, when activists target the state, they need alliances such as appointed or elected officials to be successful. Existence of institutional allies is greatly important especially when political opportunity structure is close. Mass media is crucial to spread social movements' messages and ideas across. A powerful

alliance with a political party may direct a social movement organization to create a greater structuration. Left political parties have usually seen as an ally of social movements. Alliance with the left improve mobilization power of protest. The strategies of social movements are influenced by the strategies of potential allies. Della porta and Diani (1999) claim that existence of influential alliances facilitates social movement success. Institution-targeted challenges are more difficult than state-targeted for activists, because it is ambiguous where power is centered in an institution. Secondly, because elected officials have power in the state, activists can withhold votes from elected officials and use disruptive and direct action to achieve their goals (Moore, 114). States have monopoly of the legitimate use of power and as the guarantor of public order. So states can restrict resources available for collective action and suppress or control protest by using police force. Changes in protest policing and the reduction in coercion since the 1960s are crucial elements to examine favorable environment of social movements. The interaction between the movement and the state could influence movement strategies. Harsher repression techniques could cause radicalization of social movements. On the contrary, more tolerant protest policing have made easy the integration of social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 199).

In addition to these discussions, Kriesi (2004) introduces the concept of “cultural models” different from Gamson and Meyer’s distinction of institutional and cultural dimensions of opportunity. According to Kriesi, fundamental structures affect both cultural models and institutional structures. Kriesi (2004: 72) thought that for conceptualization of structural political context, we need to include both structures.

Both specific political structure and international context of a country have an impact on cultural models and political agencies. Social change may generate a political conflict. Social change like globalization, industrialization, and so on ascertains cultural and structural potential for political mobilization. Kriesi (2004: 73) emphasizes on national political structure, because he thinks that the national context is still the most important political context for social movement mobilization. In addition to these arguments, he also adds the variance of local and regional level of governance is important for mobilization of social movements. At the same time, nation-states have integrated into international/supranational system that generates opportunities and constraints for social movements. Throughout the twentieth century with global integration, national states have turned to international institutions for cooperation on issues that cross national borders. According to Smith, social movement researchers must take global factors into account that shape the political contests within countries. Rothman and Oliver state that “local political opportunity structures are embedded in national political opportunity structures, which are in turn embedded in international political opportunity structures” (Smith, 317).

2.4 Transnationalization

Della Porta and Tarrow (2005:2) define “transnational collective action” as ‘coordinated international campaigns on the part of network of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions.’ In the past few decades, “transnational contention” has been increasing. The spread of contention is central for scale shift process. Transnational contention has some special features that domestic social movements do not have. Many of the essential relationships in

transnational contention begin within the national realm. Transnational social movements do not automatically cancel out national and local social movements. Tarrow and McAdam (2005) agree on transnational contention as an active process by constructing relations with third parties, with one another. Tarrow and McAdam (2005: 125) identified the *scale shift* as “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities”.

Both Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) and Smith (2004) highlight the significance of international environment enabled the creation of a transnationalization of collective action and creation of many transnational non-governmental organizations. For Della Porta and Tarrow (2005), the collapse of the Soviet Block and growth of forms of non-state action; improvement of electronic and cheaper communication; for Smith (2004), economic and political cooperation at international level and new international institutions with the end of World War II have created favorable international environment for transnationalization of social movements. International cooperation has moved beyond the sphere of economic exchange and security to other spheres such as environment, crime and health. Smith claims that these shifts have crucial consequences for political opportunity structures that activists face, “including the formal structures governing national or international political participation, the configurations of movement allies and opponents, and the prospects for favorable or repressive government responses to movement pressure” (Smith, 2004: 311).

Transnational social movements do not automatically cancel out national and local social movements (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005). On the one hand social movements have preserved their national characteristic; on the other hand transnational interaction has flourished which facilitates development of common identity and reduces national particularism (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 10). For instance, environmental problems are not only national, but also transnational in form. Environmental issues cross the borders of single states and take form of transnational issues such as global warming, acid rain and so on (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 25). Environmental movement organizations (EMOs) have become part of a global movement dealing with global issues. EMOs must target European institutions or other intergovernmental institutions where critical decisions are made. But action at the transnational level generally remains secondary to their national activities because the arenas and the actors are less familiar and less accessible (Rootes, 2005: 39-42).

With the foundation of the nation-state, modern movements developed and for many years the nation-state has become the central target for protest (Smith, 2004). Della Porta and Tarrow (2005: 2) state that internally, there has been a shift in power from parliaments to the executive; externally, there has been a shift in institutional power from the national to regional and supranational level. The idea of the state as a main component in the international system has been weakened by supranational sovereignty and increasing interdependence among states. Della Porta and Diani (1999) also indicate that the correspondence of society and state weakened. More powerful economic interdependence and spread of mass communication have contributed to emergence of a global public space. Capacity of the state to control

and regulate behavior within a certain territory declined. On the other hand, territorial political structures within single states have become stronger. Discussion of globalization emphasizes on decreasing power of the state, changing role of states, and defining role of other actors such as intergovernmental organizations and social movements. Within globalization discussion, Smith (2004: 319) considers a state's situation within a global system which shape movement constraints and opportunities.

International institutions' power has increased and informal networks have spread across borders. According to, Della Porta and Diani (1999: 35), these changes (supranational sovereignty, sub-national authorities) have also brought significant changes in the construction of collective actors. Existence of supranational entities such as the European Union has contributed to change criteria of defined identities of actors and their tactics. New opportunities for mobilization have come out within supranational scale. For Della Porta and Tarrow (2005:2), these shifts have developed a system of "complex internationalism" and create both opportunities and threats to people, weak states and non-state actors. According to Smith, both changes and continuities exist in political struggle and social movement operation and relations with the authorities during global integration. Smith takes transnational process as "a continuation of previous forms of contention between power holders and challengers". Transnationally organized social movement organizations have spread within more integrated global political environment (Smith, 2004: 320). Similar with Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) discussion, Smith (2004) argues that the spread of international institutions provides both challenges and opportunities for social movements actors. For Smith (2004), social movement can form crucial

alliances, achieve symbolic and material gains within these organizations which addressing global issues relating to environment, peace, and human rights. On the other hand, these institutions have “democratic deficit” problem, because national states give up part of their power to global agencies which have not have democratic accountability, as well as appointed officials are in charge in those agencies.

2.4.1 Transnational Advocacy Networks

“Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange. They are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to rationalist understanding of their ‘interests’ ” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 8). According to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 9), trade unions, churches, intellectuals; local social movements; domestic and international non-governmental organizations; foundations; parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; the media; parts of governments may be major actors in advocacy networks. NGOs are crucial players in all advocacy networks. They start actions and put leverage on powerful actors to take position. NGOs provide information, create new values, and lobby for social and political changes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) state that in the last decades, professionalism, numbers, speed, density, complexity of interactions of advocacy networks have increased significantly.

World politics includes non-state actors that interact with states, each other and international organizations. These interactions are structured in terms of networks and transnational networks are increasing and being more visible in world politics at

the end of the twentieth century. Some networks are economic, professional, activists which Keck and Sikkink (1998) call transnational advocacy networks. They are essential domestically and transnationally. By creating new links with states, civil societies, and international organizations, they increase the channels of access to international systems. These interactions are blurring boundaries between state and its citizens and help to transform the practice of national sovereignty. Advocacy networks aim alterations in institutional and principled basis of international interactions. Actors in a transitional network advocacy have shared values, common discourse and shares services and information. Not only influencing policy outcomes, but also changing characteristics and terms of the debate is aimed by activists in networks. Mobilization of information is new for networks which provide pressure, new issues, values, ideas, discourses, and leverage over governments and other organizations. Norm implementation is another promotion of networks. They seek to increase pressure over actors to implement new policies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2-3). Networks take part in international and domestic politics and use resources to influence states and international organizations constructed by states.

Institutional structures may facilitate or constrain transnational activism. As Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) emphasized, Keck and Sikkink (1998) state that transnational advocacy networks likely to emerge, when channels between domestic groups and their governments are ineffective or blocked for resolving a conflict, setting the “boomerang” pattern of influence characteristics of these networks into motion. Governments guarantee but at the same time violate rights of citizens. According to them, advocacy networks bypass their states and seek international connections and alliances in order to put pressure on their governments from outside

when their governments violate rights of individuals or groups or refuse to recognize their rights. Similarly, in order to put pressure on their governments, activists appeal to international mechanisms and international treaties. So, groups need new tactics and strategies to influence this globalized system. According to Smith (2004: 327) “boomerang” effect and international norms as a pressure can be used to alter state behavior in this globalized polity. At the same time, Smith (2004) points out that even though international institutions and mechanisms provide opportunities and alliances for social movements, international institutions may remain as agents of governments. And only single states and powerful minorities affect these institutions; so, real influence of other actors remain limited. Secondly, according to “political entrepreneurs” and activists, the networking will take their campaigns and missions forward and actively promote networks. Lastly, international contacts, such as conferences, provide arenas for forming and strengthening networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). According to Smith (2004), intergovernmental and transnational conferences of civil society groups are crucial for study of transnational movement activity. These conferences provide opportunities for cooperation among civil society groups, share of information, resources and formation of transnational networks for groups especially from states in which there have been fewer opportunities for those groups (Smith, 2004: 322-326).

Keck and Sikkink (1998: 31) specify types of network influence; agenda setting and issue generation; influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; influence on institutional procedures; influence on policy change; and influence on state behavior. Strength and density of the network are decisive in impacting policy. Because advocacy networks do not have conventional power, they

have to use power of ideas, information, and strategies to influence decision-makers and their values. They use *information politics* which enable them credibly and quickly provide usable political information mostly through informal ways and transmit it to relevant actors and places. Information and controlling information flow are essential for reducing monopoly power of government on information flow and for effectiveness of networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 16).

Nationally or transnationally, not all problems create social movements. Issues that gained strong support at the national level, mostly created transnational movements. For example, only after national environmental movements emerged, then we started to see transnational environmental movements (Smith, 2004). Framing of the issues influenced groups' opportunity to form alliances at the transnational level. Addressing international institutions for problems of governance, increasing relationship between movements and institutions provide opportunities for activists to achieve new resources and alliances (2004: 322-326).

2.5 Success and Impacts of Social Movements

William Gamson identified social movement organizations as an element of the normal democratic political process, only if they receive their aims. Gamson (1990: 29) defined "success" in two forms; emergence of 'new advantages' as well as 'acceptance' of the organization as a legitimate mouthpiece for the group it claims to represent. According to Gamson (1990), new advantages mean the degree to which a social movements' program is realized. It is possible to fail to achieve stated program, but it still win substantially collective benefits for its constituents (Amenta and Young, 1999). Gamson's second type of success, recognition, refers to

recognition of a social movement “as a legitimate representative of a constituency by the target of collective action, altering the relationship between a challenging organization and the groups it attempts to influence” (Gamson, 1990 quoted in Amenta and Caren, 2004: 463). According to Amenta and Caren (2004), Gamson’s definition has liabilities. New advantage definition of Gamson limits possible effects of movements. A group could not achieve its stated program which seems as a failure, but win considerable new advantages. Unintended consequences and worse than failing are also possible consequences of movements. Acceptance as a legitimate representative may not lead anything for movements’ constituency. According to Gamson, invitation for testifying before Congress is an acceptance which is criticized by Amenta and Caren (2004) because of its minimal connection to politics. According to Amenta and Caren (2004), negotiations, inclusion, and formal recognition are advanced forms of acceptance. A kind of Gamson’s inclusion refers to place actors of social movements in the organization of the opponent as in state position. Appointment and election are two major ways to gain such inclusion. Becoming representatives of new political parties and candidates for offices are possible for social movements.

Herbert Kitschelt (1986) discusses three types of gains. Substantive and procedural gains are similar to Gamson’s categories. Different from Gamson’s definition, Kitschelt’s structural gains include fundamental alterations, and transformation of political structures (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 464). Kitschelt’s structural gain refers to a ‘transformation of political structures’. Creation of political parties by movements is accounted as a kind of structural change by Kitschelt. Amenta and

Caren (2004) criticized the understanding of Kitschelt's structural change, the generation of organizations such as political parties "with established relationships with states remains one step removed from structural change in the state itself". From a different perspective, Della and Porta (1999: 233-237) find Kitschelt's gains and changes insufficient; not only structural alterations, but also cultural transformation and diffusion of cultural change must be taken into account.

According to Amenta and Caren (2004), Craig Jenkins' (1982) three-part scheme on the impact of social movements does not go beyond ideas of access and new advantages. This scheme is composed of "short-term changes in political decisions, alterations in decision-making elites, and long-term changes in the distribution of goods" (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 464). From Jenkins' perspective, the minimum effect is to achieve a specific state policy decision (Amenta and Young, 1999). According to Giugni (1999), creating policy change is not sufficient for success of a movement. For a movement to be successful, change should be translated into new collective benefits for beneficiary groups such as more equality in opportunities for minority groups or developed economic conditions. From Jenkins' perspective, the largest effect is to achieve structural reform that produce continuing leverage for represented group over political process (Amenta and Young, 1999: 31).

With regard to impact of tactics on social movement success, William Gamson concentrated on disruptive tactics, moderate tactics and their impacts on social movements. According to William Gamson's study, disruptive tactics and use of violence are related with success (Giugni, 1999: xvi). Contrary to the pluralists'

claim, moderate tactics are more influential than disruptive tactics achieving social movements' goals. Results are not certain, they are contradictory. For example, Taft and Ross' study on violent labor conflicts in the United States through 1968 indicated that violence's impacts on the labor union were harmful and violence did not bring success and advantages for strikers. Snyder and Kelly's study on strikes in Italy also indicates similar results. According to Piven and Cloward, if the institutional resources hold by other actors, like interest groups and political parties, disruption is the most powerful resource in order to achieve movements' goals. Previous outcomes were challenged by Shorter and Tilly in the study of strikes in France. Shorter and Tilly claimed that the relationship between the use of violence and strike results is positive (Giugni, 1999: xvii). The effectiveness of disruptive tactics is associated with the circumstance under which they are adopted by social movements. Political context of the movements have a decisive role; various institutional characteristics of the political system, available political opportunities, and the response of rulers to repress activities either constrain or facilitate the movements' influence. Disruption works when the regime is vulnerable to challenges; disruption brings repression when it is not.

Some social movement scholars suggest that the challenging nature of social movements favors the use of outside tactics (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005). Some scholars claim that using insider tactics do not prevent outsider tactics, but use of both tactics provides more opportunities for political action. Growing as insider groups, social movements can get different and new information, become better skilled with using insider tactics and more qualified at impacting public policy. Developing as an insider player in formal institutions, these groups can also use

outsider strategies (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005). Lee Ann Banaszak (2005) claims that organizations and activists can take place within the political institutions. According to Banaszak (2005), institutions and states can have members who also are social activists; Banaszak (2005: 151) “label this overlap the state-movement intersection”. State-movement intersection can influence development and consequences of social movements.

Banaszak (2005) claims that insider activists may increase the chance of achieving outcomes demanded by the social movements. For instance, Mary Katzenstein’s analyses of military and church movements indicate that activists within institutions can take responsibility for protest within the boundaries of institutional action. Banaszak (2005) argues that activists who are also part of the political institutions must be accepted as part of the movement as well. Feminists within the state indicate using insider or institutional tactics, “and therefore any significant state-movement intersection is considered synonymous with insider tactics”. Feminists usually use institutional tactics and act within institutions. It does not mean that their tactics are conventional or moderate. When there were ineffective insider tactics, feminists within the state chose to participate in protests. They used these tactics when “working within the system did not seem possible” (Banaszak, 2005: 167-168). As in the case of feminists in U.S., activists which have positions in state also can use protest or extra-institutional tactics. “The state-movement intersection consists of self-identified members of the movement who also hold recognizable position within the state” (Banaszak, 2005: 154). Activists hold different positions in jurisdiction, parliament, bureaucracy and political parties within the state.

Insider activists believe that institutional ways are the best options to lead change. Because of the availability of insider tactics, insiders choose to use these. At this point, political opportunities become crucial for activists to choose their tactics. If activists realize that the political opportunities exist within the state, they use and try to take advantage of more insider tactics. If they are aware that political opportunities are no longer exist or closed, these activists would use protest or extra-institutional tactics (Banaszak, 2005: 158). Policies affect intersection by decreasing and increasing opportunities for activists to enter the state. According to Banaszak (2005), public policies through organizational change, which eliminate, combine, and create organizations, personnel change, and changes in norms and rules, create opportunities for activists to enter the state.

Amenta and Caren (2004: 469) indicate four major hypotheses to explain the impact of social movements. The first one, which takes place in Jenkins, and McCarthy-Zald discussions, is “the simple hypothesis that mobilization or collective action in itself is likely to be effective”. The second argument is “that once mobilized certain forms of challenger organization or strategies, including framing strategies, are more effective”. According to this argument discussed by Gamson, and Piven-Cloward (1979), specific goals, strategies of action and forms of organization are more likely to generate success (Amenta and Caren, 2004).

The third argument is “that opportunities or favorable political contexts result in benefits for mobilized challengers”, explained by Kitschelt (1986) and Goldstone (1980). According to this discussion, political context is the major determinant for a movement’s strategy and effect, once mobilization has begun. Kriesi et al (1995)

provide systemic perspective, by discussing capacity and openness of states, which determine impacts of social movements. As a result of states' inclusive strategies and strong capacities, social movements gain "proactive" impacts. On the contrary, weak state capacity creates "reactive" impacts. In an open polity, such as a federal system, chance of recognition of a social movement is higher as a result of the multiplicity of targets. The level of democratization, centralization, division of power in government has an effect on social movement organizations and outcomes of those movements. Exclusion from democratic process causes more emergences of non-institutional forms of protests. But political features are not only determinant factor of social movements' impacts (Amenta and Caren, 2004).

Lipsky (1968) expressed that in the long run, obtaining stable political resources is a crucial condition for social movements to achieve success. Kitschelt (1986), whose study focused on the anti-nuclear movement in four Western democracies, argued that success of social movements depends on political opportunity structure; and has made a strong case for the structural determinants of social movement success. Like Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow (1998) agreed on the dependence of success on political opportunity structures. According to Cloward (1979), success of social movements is possible "only as they act disruptively and as political environment leads the rulers to make concessions" (Giugni, 1999: xix).

The most stable components of opportunity structure are political institutions. Framers design institutions to make it hard for social movements to alter them. Democratic movements in Switzerland during the 1860s, and in the West of the United States from the 1880s to 1920 direct us to consider the issue of how

movements achieve institutional alteration (Kriesi and Wisler, 1999: 42). Kriesi and Wisler (1999: 43) argue that “such a shift occurs only in periods of profound societal crisis, which open up the opportunity for fundamental social learning and the introduction of a new set of institutions, that is, a new political paradigm.” Similar with Kriesi and Wisler’s (1999) argument, Goldstone’s analysis (1980) concluded that social movement success is more likely in periods of crisis (political or economic crisis, major wars). Both Swiss democratic movement and American protest movement emerge in a period of deep economic crisis (Kriesi and Wisler, 1999: 45). Institutional change provides a social learning process on the large segments of the population and new institutions in liberal democracies (Kriesi and Wisler, 1999). Federalist system provides an opportunity for initial success as in case of the United States and Switzerland. Lack of institutionalization causes weak state which is more vulnerable to claims for direct popular legislation. (Kriesi and Wisler, 1999). Under weak political parties and fragmented political elite condition, a segment of the political elite favoring institutional change attract directly masses and to mobilize them in a social movements (Kriesi and Wisler, 1999: 59).

The fourth argument is “that the collective action of mobilized challengers is politically mediated – combinations of specific forms of mobilization, action and political conditions determine whether movements have consequences” (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 469). For Amenta (2005), coincidence of political context and strategy has made an impact, therefore social movements obtain a result. “Assimilative” or “institutional” strategies greatly diversified in their direction, assertiveness, and sanctions with implications for the productivity of action. If institutional political actors such as bureaucrats and elected officials see benefit in aiding the movement

actors, the actors will more likely to achieve results. These institutional actors must consider social movements as facilitator or disruptor of their own objectives. Social movements need support from other movement organizations or sympathetic institutional actors to achieve results and benefits (Amenta, 2005: 31). Productive or unproductive strategies and goals of collective action and “opportunity structure” are two main lines of argument for the impact of social movements. For Amenta (2005), even though there is limited protest, supportive political regime and domestic bureaucrats are sufficient to achieve collective benefits. If political regime adds social movements in its coalition, these groups would achieve the best benefits in public policy for their constituencies. If supportive domestic bureaucrats and political regime are absent, achieving collective benefits become harder. In the case of hostility of political regime and bureaucrats, collective actions can only achieve a minor influence. If a social movement engage in assertive action minimally, it is difficult to affect the legislative agenda, implementation and the content of legislation (Amenta, 2005). Consequently, Amenta (2005) state that when there is a reform-oriented regime and bureaucrats are powerful and supportive, collective action is more likely to be productive.

In order to bring gains, social movement actors try to affect state by attracting resources and mobilizing people. Amenta and Caren (2004) indicate that state-related consequences of social movements are more complicated than other scholars assumed. Because consequences of social movements are not direct results obtained from the efforts of social movements, there are other actors inside and outside states who can put leverage in distinct or similar directions. Public opinion, political and

economic conditions, and different actors must be considered in evaluating of impacts and successes of social movements. “Often neglected, too, even by Gamson, are means of ascertain whether and the degree to which mobilization and action of any challenger had an impact on collective goods” (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 475).

Formation of international organizations created easier interaction and exchange between national movements. Diffusion of social movements provided ‘global’ movements which show important similarities in different countries such as student protest movement of the 1960s, feminist movement of the 1970s, peace and ecological movement of the 1980s. Personal contacts, television and newspapers made the process of diffusion possible (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 247-249). The lack of channels to access to the political system and weakness of organizational structure restrict social movement capacity. New ministries, commissions and local committees are channels used by social movement organizations to reach to the decision-making process (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 253-254).

From the perspective of Amenta and Caren (2004), one of the greatest impacts of social movement is continuing pressure over political processes. These benefits are mostly at structural and systemic level, such as main alterations in policy, implementation of this policy and the bureaucratic enforcement. With short-term implication, gain a specific legislation or state-decision is the modest effect of the social movements . New state policies and effect on structure of polity are other possible outcomes of social movements. Characteristic of states such as centralization, division, electoral rules, and democratic practices is determinant in

level of collective benefits. Structural reforms, which increase impact of a group over political processes, are the highest level gain for a group (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 465).

Movements' aim is to change some aspects of political environment. It is more difficult to measure social and cultural changes than political changes. So, much study has concentrated on the political effects of movements through changes in legislation and other indicator of policy change. For instance, the effect of anti-nuclear movements is easy to measure through postponement in plant construction or decline in nuclear energy production as a result of provocation of the movements (Giugni, 1999:). The development of legislation can be helpful for explanation of the political process. Any of the following must be demonstrated by social movement; "changed the plans and agendas of political leaders, had an impact on the content of the proposals as devised by executives, legislators, or administrators; or influenced disinterested representatives key to the passage of proposal legislation". Comparison of previous political agenda or content of legislative program prior to the challenge is needed to understand the impacts of movements (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 477-478).

2.6 Public Policy and Social Movements

Some social movement scholars suggest that social movements and states are two separate entities which have conflictual interactions. They argue that social movements challenge the state and locate completely outside of the polity (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005). "Fundamentally, social movement scholars treat the policy process as a black box within the state, which movements may

occasionally shake and upset into action, whereas policy scholars treat movements as undifferentiated and unitary actors who respond (or not) by disruption” (Meyer, 2005: 3). It would be wrong to separate social movements from the state completely. Boundary between the social movements and the state is blurry. Even though policy is examined as a result of social movements’ outcome, interaction of both symbolic and important alterations in policy with emergence of a movement have not been studied by many scholars. There is an interdependent relation between public policies and social movements. The state influences the social movements and movements influence the state. The relationship between the state and social movements can vary; a state can be a target, a repressor or facilitator, an initiator, an opponent or an ally, an enforcer in the conflict for social movement (Banaszak, 2005).

As David S. Meyer indicates “movement actors are deeply intertwined with policy makers inside the state”(2005: 27). The state and legal framework are used by social movements to alter a policy or provide social change. First of all, social movements must bring their claims into political agenda, develop policy proposals, press politicians to enact favorable policy proposals and lastly monitor the implementation of policy (Kolb, 2000). Influence of social movements on all of these processes is rarely occurred (Amenta and Caren, 2004). At these phases, social movements can either fail or be successful. How, when and under what conditions do social movements have ability to influence policy process? In order to answer these questions, interaction of social movements and policy process will be examined in this part. Phases of the public policy-making process and social movements’ impact on each phase will be examined in detail with several examples. In order to analyze

interaction between energy policies and environmental movements in Turkey, interaction of social movements and policy process will be examined in following section.

2.7 Policy Process

Various scholars have divided the policy process into distinct phases and analyzed the impact of social movements within these. Kolb divides policy process into four phases; “agenda setting, specification of alternative, enactment of policies, and implementation of policies” (2000: 56). Kingdon’s policy process (1995) consists of problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives, and politics which a proposal is selected. Dividing the policy process comprises benefits into the problem recognition and agenda setting, policy formation and enactment, and implementation of policies; and this division makes analysis of the influence of social movements easier (Kingdon, 1984). Paul Burstein indicates that “the contributions of a social movement to each stream of policy process” must be examined separately, because “each stream of the policy process involves a different causal process.” (Burstein, 1993:119). David S. Meyer (2005: 1-17) lines up four premises about movements and public policy. First of all, for Meyer, public policy process is not linear as presented in textbooks, alterations can occur from different sources. Secondly, policy monopolies maintain policies. Changes in policy monopolies increase the attractiveness of mobilization for citizens. Third premise by Meyer (2005: 7) indicates “opportunities for policy reform” or in Kingdon’s terms “open windows”. Fourth premise is that “policies reflect, and then shape, dominant social construction not only persons but also persons associated with those problems” (2005:7).

2.7.1 Problem Recognition and Agenda Setting

According to Baumgartner and Mahoney, “social movements, their organizational representatives, and public policies are intertwined in a complex web of mutual interdependence” (2005: 82). The question of where do public policy issues come from is important. Bringing issues into the political agenda is the first phase in public policy-making process (Kingdon, 1995). Issues must be perceived as serious for rising of the issues on the political or public agenda. How issues are defined (labeled or framed) or learned (crisis or disaster) influences problem recognition. Alterations in external conditions and policies create concerns among people that drive the mobilization. Policy issues provide potential mobilization of constituencies depending on the issue (Meyer, 2005). Social movements may contribute to policy change through generation of a new public problem and a change in the policy image or in a problem definition (Kolb, 2000). In problem recognition and agenda setting phase, like other actors, social movements as environmental movements in Turkey bring their claims into the political agenda. For instance, with a variety of factors such as nuclear accidents and gas price, nuclear development came on the public agenda (Meyer, 2005). Possibility of action is increased with putting an issue on the political agenda (Amenta and Young, 2004). If social movements become successful in putting their issue on the political agenda, they can increase their possibility of gaining collective benefits for their constituency (Kriesi et al., 1995). Before policy formation phase, social movements work for increasing their collective benefits included in any bill that makes it into the agenda. Until policy alternatives are concerned and developed, it is difficult to know the value of benefits. (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 466-467). Problem recognition and agenda setting become crucial and critical for being successful and gaining benefits.

Generally, public policy scholars give social movement a place in agenda-setting process. Della Porta and Diani (1999) state that social actors try to control a particular issue, and impose their interpretation. Movements claim, as a 'problem owner', it is a symbolic conflict about being recognized and able to speak in the name of specific tendencies and interests. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Kingdon (1984) claimed that social movements are "exogenous political factors" that influence policy process, especially agenda-setting. According to Edwin Amenta (2005: 39), for social movements, influencing policy process is easier in early legislative stages, particularly before a policy become highly institutionalized (agenda setting). Bringing issues into the political agenda and effecting process in early policy phase are significant which will be clearly seen throughout examination of two environmental movements. And also if social movement actors take part in institutionalization of policy, "the chances for later bids to change policy in a favorable direction are improved" (2005: 39). However, for Kolb (2000), it is harder to mobilize people during the agenda setting or specifications of alternatives phases than enactment and implementation phases. With mobilizing publicity and public disruption, a social mobilization can alter and bring their claims on the political agenda. On the other hand, the movement cannot be successful for the development of policy proposals (Kolb, 2000). For instance, Burstein (1993) discusses that civil rights movement was influential for agenda setting; even it did not have any influence on the development of the different policy proposals. For Kolb (2000:76-79) informing policy makers about public preferences, raising the salience of an issue and altering the preferences of the public are crucial for the

policy outcomes. According to Kolb, the most easily available and strongest political resource for social movements is public disruption. Only precondition for disruption is a few adherents of a social movement. Sit-ins, sabotage, blockades and riots are some forms of disruptive contention. For Kolb, public disruption is important for agenda setting and for enacting legislation.

In addition to Gamson's two dimensions (gaining new advantages for the group and the acceptance of the group as a valid representative), Rochon and Mazmanian (1993: 77) add changing social values as the third dimension. With this dimension, society rather than government become the target of movement. With changing values, movements change the political agenda; because they alter the perception of people about political issues. Policy change, process change or value change indicate the success of social movements. For a complete success, there must be change on all three dimensions: public policy, the policy process and social values (Rochon and Mazmanian). Expansion of political conflict is included in alterations within the policy process. Consultation of movement organizations or citizens' groups, decentralization of authority, mechanisms for reviewing grievances can be forms of change (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993).

At this phase, persuasion of decision makers becomes significant to gain their attention to one problem over others. Sympathetic policy makers can increase favorable environment in political context for social movement actors and can initiate a new legislation in favor of the movement actors' constituency (Amenta,

2005: 38). How sympathetic policy makers can be effective in bringing issues into the political agenda and try to affect process will be discussed throughout Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement analyses. Also, a social movement can mobilize as a result of political elites' putting an issue on the political agenda (Kolb, 2000). Local citizen collective action in the U.S. has been encouraged and sponsored by elites and government. McCarthy (2005) examines anti-drug coalitions to indicate elite sponsorship of local mobilization around policy issues. Coalitions try to mobilize individuals and institutional actors to provide public policy alteration. Coalitions provide agreements among individuals, as well as groups to pursue common objectives. External threats and availability of resources facilitate formation of coalitions. Human and financial resources, common efforts and stability of contributions are decisive for coalition strength. More distributed issue and policy agenda are built by long-term coalitions. (McCarthy, 2005: 89-90). With the generation of openness and opportunities, states can play facilitator role for collective action. Governmental institutions, other groups, firms and foundations facilitate formation of coalitions. This facilitates widespread citizen mobilization indirectly (McCarthy, 2005). For instance, anti-drug coalitions had become successful to mobilize great number of groups and individuals in the U.S. "Elite funding for issue agendas in local communities, then, not only has the effect of privileging some collective actors over others, it may actually inhibit the emergence of collective actors around competing issue agendas. It is quite clear that this elite sponsored mobilization has had a direct impact on local policy attention cycles as well as the setting of priorities on local policy agendas" (McCarthy, 2005:108).

Edwin Amenta argues that “the collective action of state-oriented challengers is politically mediated” (2005:28). With influencing the thinking and actions of political actors, social movements can have an influence. And he claims that political context would determine the effectiveness of collective action (Amenta, 2005). U.S. policy for old-aged benefits and Townsend Plan campaigns supported Amenta’s claims. When there was a favorable environment during Roosevelt administration and the issue was put on the political agenda in 1934, Old Age Revolving Pensions (OARP) mobilization was sufficient to develop collective benefits in favor of the aged. Even though there was more favorable environment in 1935, OARP did not improve policy any further. Even though there was no collective action to improve policy after 1935, the Townsend Plan had an impact on old-aged policy. In 1936, removing old-aged issue from the political agenda caused huge mobilization by OARP. And also during 1936, there was a favorable political regime for social spending. But these conditions were not adequate to bring gains in old-age policy. In 1938 and 1939, when the administration put the old-age issue on the agenda again, the Townsend Plan was able to have impact, and political regime was favorable for social spending (Amenta, 2005: 56).

After World War II, agendas of the U.S. government and other governments have changed significantly. The organizations and social movements have become a significant impetus for this shift. Even though changes have come from social movements; other sources such as public opinion, choices of policy makers, business activities can also be cause of policy changes (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005: 65). Even though established governmental programs have strong influence on the social

movements; in a new sphere of public, social movements can be the main initiator for government activity and gaining attention. Baumgartner and Jones discussed that “government activities and new programs are often the legacies of social movements and agenda-setting policies. They noted that a common reaction in government to rise of new issues is to create a program, agency, or budget designed to deal with the new issue” (2005: 65). New programs do not easily disappear. When new programs become established programs, they create their own constituencies, beneficiaries and contractors. With the encouragement of social movements, a wide range of different programs are generated. Civil and human rights activists, environmentalists, women groups mobilized especially during the second half of the twentieth century and attracted attention of governments. As a result of these new groups’ mobilization, governments have diversified their activities (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 200). According to Jack Walker (1991), different rates of growth among groups highly linked to changing nature of political agenda. Jeffrey Berry’s analysis (1999) also highlights the changing nature of agenda, rising of post-material issues and significance of new social movements. Growth of issues at the international level and increasing state involvement in issues such as environmental issues are another argument for changing public agenda (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005).

With examining congressional hearings, they indicate that environmental, civil and minority, women and human rights movements had a significant impact on congressional agenda and attention. Growing size of government and decentralization of Congress gave great autonomy to large numbers of members within a public policy domain. As a result, between 1960s and 1980s, the number of

congressional hearings about these issues significantly increased. All the size, the diversity and number of government activities had grown during this period (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005: 73-76). Social movements are not the only sources of new public policies. Even though there were other factors such as key presidential initiatives, public opinion, congressional interest, technological and demographic changes, changing public norms and values; social movement organizations had impact on increasing attention and keeping the issue on the agenda and not to disappear from the agenda (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005: 68-73).

2.7.2 Definition of Alternatives and Enactment of Policies

How alternative policy proposals are selected and policies enacted in Turkey; and, how and under what conditions environmental movements influence these phase is essential to understand impact of movemetns on energy policy making process in the country. In this phase, alternative policy proposals are developed and a proposal is selected. Because there is a problem and this problem is recognized; there is an available solution for the problem, and then enactment of laws is possible. Policy proposals are created, discussed, revised and adopted at this phase. According to Kingdon (1995), there can be competing proposals for the same issue. Proposals which are feasible, compatible with decision makers' norms and public, and acceptable in cost will be more successful. In policy formulation, laws and regulations are developed and the decisions are taken to lead public laws. For Schneider and Ingram (1997), social movements provide policy alternatives. Putting a bill on the political agenda is a process that depends on the programs, political context and bureaucracies. When a bill is being put into the agenda, groups must mobilize to keep the issue on the agenda and indicates its significance. Social

movement actors can intend to increase benefits for themselves in the legislation and try to affect representatives for supporting it. At this phase, movements can generate “alternatives” and change the content of legislation in favor of social movement actors (Amenta, 2005: 39). Policy proposals must be developed and proposed by social movements (Kolb, 2000). After specification of policies, politicians must be convinced and pressed by movement actors to support the enactment of their preferred policy proposals (Amenta and Caren, 2004: 466-467). For Piven and Cloward, political and social disruptions obligate policy makers to reform policies in order to regenerate public order. Social movements can provide regulations and increase expenditures in a policy area, and generate new policy categories (Meyer, 2005). New administrations and new laws can emerge as a result of successful initiative and referendum. (Amenta, 2005).

William Gamson’s first dimension, gaining new advantages for the group, is called policy change by Kolb and the second dimension, the acceptance as a valid representative is called change in the policy process by Rochon and Mazmanian (1993). Alterations in the policy process create new ways for collaboration and dialogue between political organizations and government. Gamson used consultation, negotiations, formal recognition and inclusion as indicators for the acceptance of a movement group. Recognition of social movements as a legitimate representative for constituency is called formal recognition; and the inclusion of social movements in the antagonist’s organizational structure is called inclusion (Kolb, 2000: 62). The acceptance of new groups provides “an expansion of the consultation process that precedes the formulation of policy” (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993: 77).

Inclusion of new actors or exclusion of established actors provide change in policy monopoly and this change affects the prospects for extra-institutional mobilization. Social movements can affect policy by changing composition of policy monopoly (Meyer, 2005). Policy monopolies maintain policies. Inside and outside the government, there is a network of individuals and groups that act as legitimate actors in specific policies. Elected officials, activists in interest organizations and administrators constitute this monopoly. Conflict among these actors only provides incremental reforms. Outside of these networks, other actors' efforts for reform can be easily disregarded. Policy, politics and critical events can generate opportunities for mobilizations and threats against the stability of policy monopolies. Under these conditions, because of the change in features in political institutions, the attractiveness of mobilization increase for citizens (Meyer, 2005: 16-17). Meyer points out "opportunities for policy reform" or in Kingdon's terms "open windows" which occur only sometimes with a social problem. According to Kingdon, an open window can emerge as a result of changes in problems, policy or politics. At this point, the possible restructuring of a policy monopoly becomes the key component. An alteration in balance of power within that monopoly allows policy reforms, and these reforms can change the political balance; but open windows do not always provide changes (Meyer, 2005: 7).

Inclusion in the policy process is an indirect policy change route with a time lag. As Gamson, Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) discuss, by gaining access to the policy process, social movements may influence policy outcomes. According to Rochon

and Mazmanian (1993), to alter public policies, people join social movements. Social movements aim to challenge public policy in environmental protection, health care, rights of ethnic and racial minorities, and rights of women, defense, and foreign policy issues in recent decades. Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) do not claim that social movements are more influential in altering policy than conventional paths of participation as they have no evidence for this claim. They focus on policy process rather than public policy. For Rochon and Mazmanian (1993: 76), even though movement does not become successful in changing particular policy, movement can significantly affect policy by gaining access to the process. Particular policy decision is limited and isolated on a given subject, in a specific moment. Policy process is a longer-term one and can have influence on ongoing mechanisms of governance (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993: 76).

Rochon and Mazmanian (1993: 80) examine nuclear freeze movement which did not have policy influence, and environmental organizations, which had different strategies to be included into the policy process, that achieved greater success. Nuclear freeze movement used lobbying strategy over Congress to influence policy directly. Different from nuclear freeze movement, environmental movement concerning hazardous waste has not focused on Congress, thousands of past and present waste treatment and storage facilities across the nation have been focused on by environmental movement. Even though activists focused on specific policy and decision changes at the beginning of mobilization; they then realized the need for greater public participation and they need an opening of the policy process that enables on-going involvement. They changed their focus from policy to ongoing

governing process. They realized that they had to be a part of the implementation of the legislation and could not leave this to business leaders and public officials. They demanded to join negotiations (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993). Through alternative dispute resolution, environmental movement could be directly involved in the decision-making process. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) defined as “any effort to use informal, face-to-face negotiations and consensus building to resolve disputes over environmental issues” (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993: 85). Direct participation of environmentalists in regulation and implementation brought greater policy influence. Environmental movement gained access to the policy process and used it as a strategy to affect policy. They had a chance to expand their perspectives and interests in the policy making process (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993: 87). Direct engagement of movement activists provided advantages in the implementation and design of hazardous waste projects and programs. Movement impact over policy became possible through dispute resolution and new forms of dialogue. The result was not only movement organizations’ participation in government process, but also a level of impact over policy (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993).

Social movements increase their relations with other groups, so they have a long-term influence on public policy. According to Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005), the greatest long-term influence of social movements can occur as a result of close interaction with professional communities and service providers. Movement networks called policy nexus by Grattet (2005) which refers linkages among state officials, experts and activists. Policy network indicates intersection between the state and social movements. Policy nexus consists of initiators of the legislative

process and it transforms abstract ideas to legislative forms. Policy nexus also creates favorable environment to manage conflicts between competing segments and interests (Grattet, 2005). According to Grattet (2005), uniformity of action through formation of a network of supporters is necessary for a successful policy action. Actors share knowledge about the issue and surmount conflicts among different segments of the reform community. For instance, a set of social relations started to be established between pre-existing organizations and new organizations during workers' compensation reform process between 1909 and 1911. In the case of compensation reform, the policy nexus was interstate and consisted of academic world, private research foundations, federal government, individuals, social workers, labor department officials, government officials and experts, labor commissioners. Labor groups and business as outsiders, and professionals, inside the state, demanded a policy change (Grattet, 2005: 199-200).

2.7.3 Implementation of Policies

In implementation phase, action and additional definitions are taken to implement public policies. Mobilization of a movement can begin after a policy is enacted, but not implemented (Kolb, 2000: 35). For Kolb (2000), enacting legislation is not sufficient. If new policy is implemented, political and social alteration will emerge. According to Amenta and Caren (2004: 466-467), implementation of policy is necessary, because implementation of policy can bring greater collective benefits for social movements. In this phase, social movements monitor the implementation of the policy. There are various ways for social movements to impact implementation phase. Social mobilizations empower new actors to take part in implementation, so they can influence policies. They take a place in policy sphere (Meyer, 2005).

Replacement of administrators with more favorable ones can develop implementation of laws in favor of movement. And also generation of new parties can bring new ways of policy-making in favor of the movement (Amenta, 2005). Social movements can also prevent or slow implementation of the policy. Between 1960s-1980s, the courts and court decisions helped the movement for improving the prison conditions (Kolb, 2000: 59).

For Kolb (2003: 51-52), image change mechanism is very powerful to change policy. This mechanism can also trigger other mechanisms such as juridical or public preference mechanism. As a result of closed political structure, using juridical mechanism is one of the effective tactics that used by environmental movements in Turkey. The most straightforward political mechanism is juridical mechanism. Even though social movements do not have any access to the government or political parties, they have access to courts. In order to achieve their goals, they can use courts (Kolb, 2000:). Social movements use litigation for putting pressure on implementation of legislation. And also they use it for stopping or slowing down the implementation of policy programs or legislation they are against. Through court decisions, social movements can accelerate or slow down policy implementation. But courts' decisions are not always on social movements' behalf (Kolb, 2000: 83). For instance, Katzenstein (2005: 240-241) discusses prisoners' movement and role of courts in the movement. As a result of prisoners' movement, the legislatures and the courts responded differently through their distinct political agendas. On the one hand, the courts urged prisons to improve prisoner conditions. On the other hand, legislators refused demands of prisoners which gave them the status of citizens. The

prisoner movement began at the end of 1960s. Prisoner activists wanted to change prison conditions, and they also had larger agenda. Litigants, liberal judges, advocates as well as prisoner rights groups had become part of the prisoner activism. Between 1960s-1980s, the courts and court decisions helped the movement for improving the prison conditions (Katzenstein, 240-241).

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, a variety of discussions and theoretical debates on social movements, public policies and impact/success of social movements were examined. A different aspect of the social movement was emphasized by each approach. The studies presented in the chapter have analyzed the strategies, dynamics and different shareholders in the movements, non-state actor involvement into policy process, the obstacles and opportunities for actors to be included in the process, the outcome and impact of these movements on policy process.

The link between the occurrence of new conflicts and value dimension has been emphasized in the context of different forms of ‘new politics’ related with peace, civil rights and environmental problems. Within this perspective, the growth of ‘new’ political movements since 1970s is related to the process of value modification (Della Porta and Diani, 61). The relationship between protest and institutional political actors is the main focus of the political process approach. Political opportunity structure emphasizes “open” and “closed” structures which provide easy or difficult access to the political system (Kriesi, 2004: 69). The political process approach is also useful in explaining the mobilization and impact of the social

movements based on political opportunity structures which affect aspects of movements.

There is an interdependent relation between public policies and social movements. The state influences the social movements and movements influence the state. First of all social movements must bring their claims into political agenda, develop policy proposals, press politicians to enact favorable policy proposals and lastly monitor the implementation of policy (Kolb, 35). Issues must be perceived as serious for rising of the issues on the political or public agenda. Like other actors, social movements bring their claims into the political agenda (Meyer, 15). Policy proposals are created, discussed, revised and adopted at this policy alternatives and policy enactment phase. Proposals which are feasible, compatible with decision makers' norms and public, and acceptable in cost will be more successful. Sympathetic policy makers can increase favorable environment in political context for social movement actors and can initiate a new legislation in favor of the movement actors' constituency. Mobilization of a movement can begin after a policy is enacted, but not implemented. Social movements use litigation for putting pressure on implementation of legislation. And also they use it for stopping or slowing down the implementation of policy programs or legislation they are against. Exclusion from democratic process causes more emergences of non-institutional forms of protests.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY

3.1 Introduction

This section will emphasize the environmental movements. Anti-SHPP and anti-nuclear movement cases will be analyzed in this thesis. Therefore, firstly I focus on environmental movement definition and the basis of general dynamics of it with which the subject of the study will be presented. Secondly, I cover the causes of environmental degradation in Turkey and history of environmental organizations since the early years of the republic. Changes in political opportunity structures and limits to civil society in Turkey are also examined in this chapter. I concentrate on history of environmental movements and environmental policy in Turkey and non-state actors' involvement in environmental issues. Finally, analyzes of Bergama movement, which was the most influential and most important environmental movement started at the beginning of 1990s as a local resistance against gold mining and then became a nation-wide issue in Turkey, and other significant environmental movements against Aliğa thermal power plant, Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Ilisu Dam, Munzur Dam and Small Hydro Power Plants will be presented.

3.2 Environmental Movements

Rootes (1997) defined environmental social movements as collective action of individuals, groups, non-institutional networks for a shared environmental concern without organizational affiliation, whose intensity and form changes in different political context, place and time. Environmental activism targets the public and the power holders. For recognition and achieving their demands, they pressure national and local governments, and try to take public support. As Wapner (1996) points out, in addition to state relations, with creating awareness about environmental problems, pressuring multinational companies and empowering local stakeholders for sustainable development, social movement actors play significant roles in policy-making process. As discussed in the previous chapter; various actors like scientists, lawyers, local people, national and international organizations have plays significant roles in policy-making process; also economic and national political contexts must be considered as significant factors in these processes.

A country's position in the world economy affects environmental movements and their presence in the media. Ignatow argues that "the relationship between wealth and environmental concerns is real but indirect, a product that not of individual psychology so much as of the world economic system and state-society relations within nations" (2005: 652). In developing nations, environmental activism mimics Western Europe and North America. Nations' dependence on foreign investment and loans limits environmental activism (Ignatow, 2008a).

Arthur Mol and other ecological modernization supporters claim that “modern economic institutions and mechanisms can be reformed and transformed according to criteria of ecological rationality” (Konak, 2008: 110). They support economic growth with environmental protection policies. On the other hand, according to eco-Marxist perspective, environmental problems emerged as a result of political economy of the advanced capitalist societies. “The ‘treadmill of production’ that concept holds that modern capitalism and the modern state display a fundamental logic of promoting economic growth and private capital accumulation. The treadmill of production is directly link to the ecological crisis, since economic growth and accumulation require natural resource extraction, with contributes to pollution” (Konak, 2008: 111).

3.3 History of Environmental Policy in Turkey

As stated before, rapid industrialization and commercialization of agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s caused aggravation of environmental problems. For the first time, the term “environment” took place in 1961 Constitution. In the beginning of the 1970s, environmental degradation and problems have started to be taken into consideration globally. Turkey joined international institutions dealing with environmental problems. After 1972 United Nations Conference on Environment in Stockholm, Turkey developed national policies for preservation of the environment and resources. With Barcelona Convention in 1976, Turkey has taken responsibilities in Mediterranean Action Plan as well as in Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution with Bucharest Convention (Dural, 2008). For the first time, the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1977) engaged in environmental problems. Several articles about environmental preservation took part in the 1982 Constitution

(Özdemir, 2003:5). Turkish state has not fulfilled its obligations in implementation of constitutional responsibilities, international agreements and protocols for environmental protection. Still, economic development has priority rather than environmental protection in Turkey (Dural, 2008).

The Ministry of Environment established in 1991 for dealing with environmental problems and then merged with the Ministry of Forestry in 2004. Since 2011, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization is responsible for the environmental issues. Environmental laws and regulations passed but implementation of the laws by the state was problematic. In addition to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization; Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Health have responsibilities about environmental issues (Adaman and Arsel, 4). For sustainable development, these ministries have to work coordinately. The role of Ministry of Environment has limited by its share of funds. With participation of various environmental groups and sectors, Ministry of Environment and Urbanization holds meetings to discuss and find solutions for environmental problems, but it has not attempted to provide long-term effective policies for this issue (Özdemir, 2003). Environmental problems and protection of nature are not prior problems for policy-makers and politicians.

Environmental problems were hardly on the agenda and did not challenge the conditions for capital accumulation. Reactions emerged when there was a threat against environment and life. And these issues were not examined within the context

of developmentalism. Isolation of environmental problems from development issues continued until early 1990s. With international concerns about ‘sustainable development’ and international agreements and protocols, Turkish state began to link environmental issues with development issues. Environmental concerns were integrated in development policy with the effect of the EU in Turkey. In 1995, The Turkish National Environmental Action Plan was organized. The National Program on Environment and Development for the World Summit on Sustainable Development was a significant attempt to include academics and civil society organizations in preparation of the program. From Turkey, 60 delegates attended and half of them were environmental NGOs’ representatives (Aydın, 2005: 64). Protection of environment and improvement of environment were emphasized in the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan compatible with EU standards and norms (1996-2000).

Since the 1990s, Neo-liberalist market economy caused aggravation of environmental problems. In the late 1990s, Turkish political and public agenda started to involve environmental issues as a result of increasing degradation. Various local and national actors with different environmental and ideological agendas have realized the necessity for ‘a new division of labor between the state, the private sector and civil society’. For Paker et al. (2013), organizations have participated in decision-making process through “becoming commission members, preparing reports and presenting opinions solicited by relevant ministries, and participating in passing legislation” (Paker et al., 2013: 766). As stressed in previous chapter, when organizations do not contradict the modernist priorities of the state, state is inclusive

and accessible. But “it is particularly territorial with regard to issues such as water regimes, nuclear energy and mining and international waters” (Paker et al., 2013: 766). The state does not consider policy suggestions, special reports, and organizations’ proposals and demands in the laws, regulations and the final decision such cases. The state cooperates with some organizations but this does not always mean a regular and effective participation in the process. “There is a hierarchy among institutions as stated by a former Civil Society organization representative: ‘The Ministry of Industry is superior to the Ministry of Agriculture. A person from the Commission of the Environment had stated that the Ministry of Energy “beats everyone else”’(Paker et al., 2013: 768). Environmental impact assessment is seen as a formality, commitment of the state for environmental protection is very low, and unimplemented rules and regulations create a hard battleground for actors. Rent-seeking and economic interests have clashed with protection of the environment and environmental organizations (Paker et al., 2013: 769).

According to the EU, Turkey experience environmental problems, because she has not integrated and implemented standards and regulations. For Eco-Marxists, Turkey’s environmental problems have emerged as a result of contradiction between environmental protection and economic growth as well as the state's significant role for providing necessary condition for capital accumulation. As Bergama case indicates, the state and the market suppressed the strong grassroots movement, national and local courts’ decisions and EU demands for environmental protection. Environmental protection and neo-liberal economic growth or national interests are not compatible; rather there is a conflict between them in this case (Konak, 2008).

Overuse of natural resources, unregulated industrialization, massive energy projects including nuclear power plant, thermic power plant, geothermal and wind projects and tourism activities, unplanned urbanization, rural immigration, high population growth, using heavy chemical substances on agricultural fields, and unequal development cause environmental degradation in Turkey (Adaman and Arsel, 3). Environmental organizations, environmentalists, citizens and local people have been taking significant part in the environmental and energy program processes in Turkey. The role of interest organizations and local communities in environmental future has started to be discussed especially after the adaptation of Agenda 21 in Rio conference. For Karaman (1998), representation of organizations is very significant in the local resource allocation decisions in Turkey where administration is very centralized. “Membership of environmental organizations is 1.9 percent in Turkey” (Adem, 2005: 72).

As stressed in success and impacts of social movements section; in the *proactive* sense, environmental organizations and activists demand to attend decision-making processes for more friendly policies and industrial operations (Coban, 2004). In the *reactive sense*, as in Bergama movement, actors react against existence of activity and degradation of nature (Coban, 2004). According to World Bank, participatory environmentalism means “greater public involvement in national and regional environmental policy decisions, involving stakeholders in management decisions for specific environment planning and ensuring access of local people to the benefits of a safe environment” (Güneş and Aydın Coşkun, 2005: 546). All actors, public and groups, influenced by environmental degradation must share responsibility in the

planning of environmental management. As political opportunity structure stated in the previous chapter, lack of free access to information, dominance of the state in decision-making process, and incompatible rules and regulations with present economic, social and environmental realities constrain the participation in Turkish legislation. Public consultation mechanism rather than central planning which ignores local people's necessities and priorities must be created in Turkey. As central planning is powerful in Turkey, public participation at the planning stage is limited. Turkish people can monitor activities of agencies indirectly but they can ask other authorities, such as courts, to stop activities (Güneş and Aydın Coşkun, 2005). As discussed in the policy process section, "The case of Turkey demonstrates that social groups, which are excluded from the agenda-setting, policy formulation or planning phases, get acquainted with a specific policy only in its implementation phase and they perceive it as a threat to their life and economic interests, they take action against the said policy" (Özen and Özen, 2010: 58). Public policy implementation phase creates conditions for the occurrence of social movements and aim to alter the policy with blockading its implementation. Non-state actors have indirect and direct power to influence legislation, judiciary and local governments. Multinational cooperations; transnational, international, and non-governmental organizations affect Turkish political system (Adaman and Arsel, 8). In Turkey, locals and environmental organizations mobilized around environmental issues such as air, noise and water pollution; natural and coastal resources; urban environment; and, cultural and natural heritage (Voulvouli, 2011).

3.4 History of Environmental Movements in Turkey

In the early years of the republic, environmental political agenda focused on health, preservation and beautification. Environmental organizations such as Turkish Associations of Foresters, Animal Conservation Association and Island Reconstruction Association emerged in 1930s. They were not independent from the state and their activities had been controlled and constrained by one party rule. Because of the dependence on the state, they had not been able to put pressure on the state during the early period of Turkish Republic. Multiparty period provided opportunities for political and social participation of citizens into various associations to represent different interests (Özdemir, 2003: 4). Even though their effectiveness and social participation were limited, associations for environmental protection increased between 1940s and 1960s. For Özdemir (2003), foundation of the Turkish Association for the Conservation and Natural Resources was a significant phase for environmentalism in Turkey.

Turkey started to open up its economy with 1980 military coup. Even though ideological organizations have not been permitted, issue-oriented NGOs have increased in the post-1980 period as a result of the changes in opportunity structures. Heper explains restricted civil society in Turkey with the existence of ‘state tradition’. The terms centralist, ‘elitist’ and static describes the Turkish state characteristics. “The extent to which the state will allow civil society to flourish depends on the social, political and economic priorities of the hegemonic classes, which may vary in different periods” (Aydın, 2005: 57). “Changing nature of the Turkish bourgeoisie” required first economic, and then political and social

liberalization (Aydın, 2005: 58-59). The state recognizes necessity of civic involvement in social and environmental issues.

Turkish environmentalists were against a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu, thermal power plants at Gökova, Yatağan, Bursa and Aliğa, HPP at Firtına Valley. Güvenpark (1986) and Zaferpark (1987) movements focused on urban planning and land-use disputes. Other movements such as Yatağan (1989-1992), Aliğa (1989-92), Bursa (1992), Firtına Valley (1999), and Akkuyu focused on energy-related issues. Even though there were intense campaigns, Gökova movement against thermal plant could not prevent the operation of the plant. Prevention of Akkuyu nuclear power plant and Aliğa thermal power plant were success stories (Adem, 2005).

From 1989 to onward, Bergama movement against the gold mining and use of cyanide was an important and popular movement. Participation of local communities and villagers in the movement for the first time made it unique. In addition to environmental problems, Bergama movement included resistance for protecting local people's livelihood and welfare through civil disobedience and social opposition. Aliğa thermal power plant case was significant, because Council of State utilized the environmental statutes of the legal code and emphasized the role of the administration for environmental conservation for the first time (Özdemir, 2003:9). The decision of the court was "ecocentric" and positioned environment above all the national interests. A strong national resistance against nuclear power plant in Akkuyu started in 1976 and became effective to postpone the construction of the plant.

Chernobyl disaster in 1986 motivated people to expand resistance against nuclear plants. As Turkey located very close to Ukraine, this disaster indicated the international dimensions of environmental issues. There were nation-wide public protests, demonstrations and marches against construction of the nuclear plant (Özdemir, 2003).

In 1988, Green Party was established and only became active for six years. One contribution of the party was to influence other political parties to develop their policies and positions about environment (Adem, 2005). Greenpeace and other international organizations became active in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s; and environmentalism had become institutionalized in the 1990s. The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and for Protection of Natural Habitats founded in 1992 and became one of the significant and largest environmental NGOs in Turkey (Adem, 2005). Religious and ethnic environmental movements emerged in the early 1990s (Ignatow, 2008b). Through 1990s, SOS Mediterranean Association, the Environmental Solidarity Group, the Green Solidarity Group, the Izmir Environmentalist Lawyers Group were formed as citizen initiatives (Adem, 2005).

HABITAT II Conference held in Istanbul in 1996 was a significant turning point for environmental movements in Turkey. This conference created opportunities for environmental NGOs to generate networks with other national and international organizations (Uğur, 1988). So environmental NGOs, universities, and government

agencies started to receive grants and benefit from projects through global connections. Eastern Black Sea, Marmara, Eastern and Western Mediterranean Platforms founded as regional umbrella organizations for regional issues (Adem, 2005). Organizations support local movements which are against the construction of large and small dams, mining activities and nuclear power plants. But the state continues to pass legislations threaten the environment such as hydroelectric and nuclear power plants; and mining activities in environmentally and culturally unique sites.

Both cooperation and conflict have emerged as a result of involvement of NGOs in the policy-making process and it also contributes to the democratization process. They are various groups exist in Turkey, “There are almost 60,000 associations, 3,000 foundations and 1,000 unions in Turkey”. (Özdemir, 2003: 8). For Aydın (2005: 65), even though environmental movements are still infant in Turkey, challenging legitimacy of the state and expansion of capitalism is significant. According to Ignatow (2008b); economic, cultural and political globalization impacted environmental politics and activism. Globalization forces have decreased hegemony and sovereignty of the Turkish state and transformed environmental movements. Even though environmental organizations have increased, policies of the state on environmental problems have not changed significantly. The state still has been prioritizing economic growth rather than environmental protection (Aydın, 2005).

Growth-based economy, liberalization, deregulation and privatization create social as well as environmental consciousness and local environmental movements against them. Environmental organizations, public participation, NOGs and awareness have flourished in Turkey and public environmental activism increased tremendously (Aydın, 2005). Growth of environmentalism in Turkey has developed within the context of global environmental movements which provide opportunities for cooperation and solidarity among groups. Environmental movements in Turkey are reactive against a threat to the environment or they are for protecting natural sites (Özdemir, 2003). Bergama movement, which was the most influential and important environmental movement, started at the beginning of the 1990s as a local resistance against gold mining and then became a nation-wide issue in Turkey. A strong national resistance against nuclear power plant in Akkuyu started in 1976 and became effective to postpone the construction of the nuclear power plant. As Akkuyu and Bergama movements indicated, local people tried to affect the policy of the state and limit development activities which sacrifices community environment.

3.5 Examples of Environmental Movements

3.5.1 Bergama Movement

At the beginning of the 1990s, Bergama movement, the most influential and significant environmental movement, emerged. It started as a local resistance against gold mining and then became a nation-wide issue in Turkey. Mayor of Bergama and peasants were main actors of Bergama movement and local resources were mobilized for the movement. The movement became a national and international issue through connections with local, national, international groups. In addition to local people; local, national and international civil society organizations, academics, some political

party leaders, lawyers, and environmental organizations gave support to Bergama movement. These groups provided information about technical issues, environmental impacts and judicial process. At this case, economic growth and capital inflow targeted the local environment. Local community who depended on agricultural fields, olive and poplar trees was against degradation of nature. Local people were dependent on nature to sustain their social, economic, and political lives. For villagers, their lands were more valuable than gold. Their resistance aimed to protect their lands, water and lives and prevent degradation of the nature. They perceived degradation of nature as a threat to their lives and livelihood of the community (Çoban, 2004).

Eurogold, a multinational corporation, started preparations at Bergama gold mine in the early 1990s. When Eurogold began drilling activities, poisonous chemicals polluted the air, land and water and caused illness among local people. This created suspicion about Eurogold and its activities. Local people started to discuss and invite academics to gather more information about the mine and its effects. Then local people realized that mining activities would be harmful for their local environment and animal species (Çoban, 2004). The company applied to the Ministry of Environment for an Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR). The report indicated that using cyanide is legitimate and not harmful for locals. Men, women and children of all ages actively participated in the movement. Early mobilizations emerged with meetings, panels, press conferences, and press releases; in fields and coffee houses. When the real threat was started to be realized, mobilizations gained momentum with production preparations such as cutting down 2500 olives trees in

1996. 729 villagers started judicial struggle against the mining activity. As a result of 4-year judicial period, Izmir Administrative Court found ministry act as a violation of the constitution and the rights of environment and life and decided against the mining activity in 2001 (Çoban, 2004: 447). Even though there was a court decision, the state reluctant to implement the decision. In response to not fulfilling its duty, civil disobedience had emerged among local people.

In order to continue corporation activities, state authorities demanded a report from a research institute, TÜBİTAK which stated that the mine would significantly contribute to the nation's interests. The under-secretariat of the prime minister claimed related ministries to act in accordance with the report and make necessary regulations to operate the mine. For starting gold extraction, ministries issued permits for "one year trial production" (Çoban, 2004: 448). Groups which were giving support published reports about the mining activities which contradicted with TÜBİTAK's claims and findings. The report of TÜBİTAK regenerated marches, protests, road blockades and demonstrations on the Bosphorus Bridge and in front of the plant. Judicial struggle also started again (Çoban, 2004).

The municipality of Bergama was an active actor during the process. Information about Eurogold and impacts of its activities were disseminated by the municipality. It set up television and radio programs, panels, and meetings. These activities helped to share information with other groups and provide linkages with other organizations. Social democratic and socialist parties, local trade unions, delegates from villages, as

well as representatives from municipality constituted Bergama environmental committee. Actors from various groups visited the village and participated in the protests; and also organized protests in their own town. 'Committee of hand-in-hand with Bergama' included different groups and environmental organizations. With participation of environmental groups, professional groups, trade unions, civil right organizations, Platform for Democracy's members; İzmir committee organized a 300-km march from İzmir to Bergama in November 2000. (Çoban, 2004:451). 5000 people blocked İzmir-Çanakkale road for 6 hours. They continued their activities through blocking roads, demonstrations, marches, petitions, lobbying and festivals.

Connections with German-based FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), Washington-based Mineral Policy Centre, London-based Minewatch, German Green Party as well as Amici della Terra were established. With these relations, international pressure on Turkish state and Eurogold increased tremendously (Çoban, 2004: 453-454). Foreign links with Greenpeace, NGOs in UK and Australia were also established by mayor of Bergama. These foreign organizations pressed their governments, attracted media attention, collected signatures and shared information with activists (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005: 104). With Greens initiative, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to enforce German companies to implement EU and German standards abroad and Turkey to prevent using cyanide for mining (Coban, 2004). The European Court of Human Rights also decided that The Turkish state is guilty for not implementing court decisions and impose 3,000 Euros fine for each of the complainants in 2004 (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005).

Because of the dependence on foreign investment, Bergama movement was long-lived and successful (Arsel, 2003). Even though operation of the mine continued, the company made numerous concessions and improved regulatory and technological principles. With community action, possibility of challenging and changing social and economic structures was seen (Arsel, 2005). The state perceived the movement as a threat and tried to suppress it. The government emphasized the economic benefit of the mining activity and adopted its strategy in accordance with it. The movement also facilitated enactment of a mining law in 2005 that would provide privileges to foreign capital over the local people and the environment and solve problems in favor of foreign capital (Özen and Özen, 2010: 48). In Aegean, Marmara, Central and Eastern Anatolia regions, mining activities started with new Mining Law. In return, movements against gold mining activities emerged in İzmir-Bergama, Uşak-Eşme, İzmir-Efemçukuru, Kaz Mountains and Çanakkale-Balıkesir regions along with locals, regional and national non-governmental organizations and professional chambers (Özen and Özen, 2010: 38). Road blockades, demonstrations with participation of thousands of people, protest marches, seminars, panels, reports, petitions, signature campaigns and judicial struggle were used by local people to attract the attention of public and cancel mining activities. Environmental effects of mining activities were brought on to the public agenda (Özen and Özen, 2010).

3.5.2 Aliğa Movement

During first half of the 1990s, Aliğa was popular for the environmental public reaction in Turkey. In order to satisfy power demands of Aliğa which had numerous industries, central government decided to construct power plants in Aliğa and İzmir. Aliğa had already have serious environmental problems because of existing

industries. People of Aliğa did not want additional pollution with power plants in their region. During the period of 1989-1994, their reaction against power plant had increased. İzmir and Aliğa people marched against thermal power plant which would have negative environmental effects. “Love chain” was organized by 50,000 participants against Aliğa plant. The Supreme Court’s decision ended the discussion. As a result of the protests, court decided to stop the power plant. In 1997, 5 years after the court decision, central government gave permission for new power facilities outside the Nemrut industrial zone. Although there wasn’t any improvement in air pollution, government permission did not contradict with the court decision (Müezzinoğlu, 2000: 48). Mayor of Aliğa asked help from academics for urban plan revision. To solve the dispute between energy and environment, “mediation” procedure was chosen and accepted by all groups (Müezzinoğlu, 2000: 48). Representatives from 62 various organizations were invited for the mediation by the Aliğa town parliament. It invited town governor, experts from organizations for the energy and environment, professional local organizations, labor unions, managers of government and industrial enterprises, port administrations, and representatives from Dokuz Eylül University (Müezzinoğlu, 2000: 49-50). During the interactive session, participants indicated their priority issues. “Environmental impacts of energy facilities through air pollution were of highest importance for the area”. Sea pollution, traffic, noise etc. were secondary environmental problems in the list of priority issues. 13 experts wrote a report, and after discussion, voting and revisions; declaration sent to regulatory organizations and represented organizations (Müezzinoğlu, 2000: 50-51).

3.5.3 Munzur Dam

In Munzur Valley, four dams and five HPPs were planned. Tunceli residents, Alawis, local and environmental groups as well as socialist ones mobilized against projects to prevent roads and villages from flooding and protect Alawi and Kurdish culture. This mobilization included the Association for the Protection of Nature in the Munzur Valley, the Social Ecologist Association, the Munzur Environment, Culture and Resistance Association, the Munzur Crazyies, the Fighters for Nature, The Youth Commission of the Tunceli Association and the Munzur Brothers (Ignatow, 2008a). Panels, marches, festivals and protests on Munzur issue were hold in August 2004. Leftists and environmentalist groups, scientists and civic leaders attended to panels and the protest march from town to the dam site. Alawi groups created links with international NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (Ignatow, 2008b). Council of State cancelled Konaktepe dam and HPPs projects in the valley in 2012 (CNNTÜRK, 11 June 2012). And in January 2013, Ankara Administrative Court cancelled the Bozkaya HPP project which had not have Environment Impact Assessment Report (CNNTÜRK, 21 January 2013).

3.5.4. Iisu Dam

As a result of economic development, huge energy demands as well as high oil prices, there had been lots of dam projects proposed in Turkey. Turkey's energy import bill was very high and domestic demand for energy had also been increasing. In this context, GAP would generate 22 percent of total energy and became remarkable with its capacity. In addition to economic development, dams were seen as part of economic and political modernization and visionary national projects. On the one hand, dams were recognized as a form of renewable energy resources which

reduce CO emissions. On the other hand, dams negatively affected local ecology and local people's lives (La Branche, 2012: 294-296). The Ilisu HPP was a turning point for hydroelectric ambition. Construction of Ilisu Dam caused local resistance. Construction of the Dam would cause the displacement of 650,000 people and also archeological and ecological damage. In addition to local villagers, NGOs and INGOs were mobilized against Ilisu Dam to prevent the villages and Hasankeyf, a historically important town, from flooding, (Warner, 2012: 232).

Transnational companies and NGOs came into the picture with privatization of water sector to affect water politics. Funding for GAP was problematic for Turkey, because World Bank rejected to fund GAP projects. At this point, Turkish government needed external capital, credits and donors through liberalization and privatization in the water sector. A Swiss consortium, Impreglio (Italy), Skanska (Sweden), and Turkish Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen formed the international Ilisu consortium. Export credits came from export credit agencies of Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, the United States and the UK in 1998. NGOs tried to prevent foreign countries to fund GAP projects (Warner, 2012: 239-240). Campaign against construction and their funders was conducted. With winning Ilisu contract by Swiss consortium, European NGO coalition put pressure on consortium. Regarding to humanitarian and environmental problems, questions were given in German and Swiss parliamentary. As a reaction to repression on Kurdish identity and environmental disasters; cultural, humanitarian and environmental platforms started to play role against the Ilisu Dam (Warner, 2012). In 1999-2000, Court of Accounts

interpreted projects as violation of laws with its report. Skanska (2000), Balfour Beatty and Impreglio (2001) and Swiss USB Bank (2002) withdrew from the project

A new 12-member consortium with Swiss, German and Austrian companies was constituted in 2005. Çelikler, Cengiz and Lider Nurol became Turkish; Alstom, Züblin and VA Tech became foreign partners. As a result of this act, Keep Hasankeyf Alive platform consists of NGOs, professional chambers and mayors from the regions was created to protect antique city of Hasankeyf (Eberlein et al., 2010). In addition to local actions (Friends of the Antique Hasankeyf, Volunteers of Hasankeyf Association and Keep Hasankeyf Alive platform), international camping against Ilisu also re-occurred. German WEED platform and Friends of the Earth led protests and pressed weakly critics against dams. This provided opportunity for local groups to link with international groups. Movements were against global hydro-capitalism, privatization and environmental degradation. Official restart of construction faced with 8,000 protestors including two political parties' leaders and famous people (Warner, 2012: 244). In August 2006, construction started. The three countries agreed in principle and demanded Turkey to meet standards. With high NGO coalition's pressure on foreign contractors and fail to meet standards, donor countries withdrew in 2009 (Eberlein et al., 2010).

3.5.5 Small Hydro Power Plants

Active participation of citizens for sustainable development is defined as environmental citizenship. Environmental citizenship also requires an equal distribution of the burdens of pollution among different groups (Turan, 2011). Especially in Black Sea region, lots of small hydro power plants (SHPPs) were

planned and constructions began in Turkey. For the state, SHPPs were necessary for satisfy the increasing energy demand of Turkey and SHPPs did not have any harmful environmental and social impacts. On the other hand, because of their social and environmental costs, local people and NGOs were against these projects. The State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) designed and carried out hydropower projects. “DSİ indicates that it plans to construct a total of 1,738 hydroelectric power plants in Turkey” (Turan, 2011: 285). According to local people in Loç, Hopa, İkizdere, Kastamonu, Şavşat etc., they should have taken the decision on their environment, life space and use of resources. In return, government authorities claimed that they had the right to decide about resources. Local people and NGOs started to mobilize against the projects with forming platforms such as the Brotherhood of Rivers, The Black Sea Revolts in Hopa, İkizdere, Munzur, and Şavşat. According to them, projects would cause environmental and ecological destruction; and cultural, demographic and social impoverishment of locals (Turan, 2011). For locals, privatization and selling natural resources provided benefits for companies; and the state and private sector would have power over distribution and use of natural resources. In return, locals believed that they had to protect their rights. Local people did not have enough information about projects and power in the decision process. Like other projects, SHPPs projects would not provide equal benefits and costs among different groups. Citizens’ demands had not taken into account and ignored by decision-makers. Energy deficiency played determinative role in the SHPPs case.

Decision of constructing a small dam in Çamlıhemşin, Rize, caused a strong resistance. Social, ecological and economic impact report by Ministry of

Environment became basis for the controversy and opposition. The Foundation for Protection of Çamlıhemşin Valley realized that report was not scientific and not neutral. According to law, impact report should have been undertaken by neutral and competent specialists. In response to the government report, the Foundation published their own report and their report was accepted by the judge in an administrative court. By opening the court case, the judge cancelled the project and indicated that potential environmental damage was too high and unacceptable (La Branche, 2012).

Environmental movements and civil society will continue to play transformative and significant role to reduce environmental degradation and alter economic, politic, and societal relations. Politicization of the environment is required for increasing and strengthening public participation, organizations cooperation and public support and their success.

Environmental awareness in Turkey has arisen within the context of global environmental movements and global environmental consciousness. Western environmentalism undeniably affected Turkish environmentalism (Özdemir, 2003). Environmental movements in Turkey have failed to generate a strong and green opposition as seen in Western examples. In the last decade, local successes made significant contribution to raising environmental consciousness. However, local movements were unable to find new supporters and create a strong social opposition. Social, political and economic situation of the country has played significant role for this (Duru, 1995). Lack of citizens' participation and initiatives, organization

traditions in Turkish social structure, differences of opinion between civil organizations, lack of communication and failure of the Green Party experience have significant share for the failure of strong environmentalist opposition in Turkey. According to Bora, environmental movements cannot be successful in Turkey because of lack of cooperation between various groups that composing the green movement, uncertainty in the intellectual background and lack of cooperation between socialist and green movement (Bora, 1989).

Environmental movements during the pre-1980 period were in the embryonic stage of environmental activism in Turkey. Environmental political agenda was dominated by the development of beautification association, sanitation and major health issues. The number of associations increased with the relative liberalization in 1946. But, these organizations did not have mass societal participation and had only limited effect. As a result of industrialization and rapid urbanization, economic and social transitions generated environmental issues and societal responses during the 1950s (Adem, 2005). Organizations which started to be established in the 1950s played significant role in improving environmental consciousness, laws and regulations in Turkey (Paker, 2013). Even though local conflicts have been widespread for three decades, “these were often simple not-in-my-backyard reactions that did not necessarily develop into fully fledged political activism.” Urban environmental issues during the 1970s and 1980s did not make way for rising ecological awareness (Adaman and Arsel, 2005). With the second half of the 1980s, revolutionary and ideological politics lost their strength, and issue-based politics started to occur (Adem, 2005).

The industrialization and liberalization process of the economy and unplanned urbanization as a result of the internal migration were main factors for the increase in environmental movements in Turkey (Adem and Arsel 2005). Massive energy projects such as nuclear power plants, coal burning power plants, hydro-electric, geothermal and wind power projects, industrial zones led air and water pollution and create public concerns about the environment as it is under the risk. With the the implementation of liberal policies in 1980; energy, transportation and construction projects caused the ecological destruction in rural and urban areas (Baykan, 2013). Turkey's first green party was established in the late 1980s. Movements in Yatağan, Aliğa, Bursa and Gökova against thermal power plants, in Dalyan against hotel construction, in Güvenpark and Zaferpark against construction of parking area, in Bergama against mining activities, dam projects in Allianoi and Hasankeyf, Fırtına Valley and anti-nuclear movements were main environmental movements in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s (Adem, 2005; Ertürk, 1996; Özen, 2011; Paker, 2013). But none of these movements turned into a Turkey-wide movement; and none of them develop themselves with socio-economic and socio-political arguments (Ertürk, 1996; 199-200).

Professional, national, environmental NGOs were established during the 1990s. Greenpeace, TEMA and similar organizations started their activities in this era. Environmental NGOs became a significant part of civil society. While local movements usually focused on a particular environmental issue; NGOs focused on environmental issues and policies at the national level (Baykan, 2013). Urban planning disputes and energy related issues were two dominant themes for the

environmental movements in this period. During the second half of the 1990s, environmental activism began to be professionalized and institutionalized in Turkey (Adem, 2005). Institutionalized, professional, urban and project-oriented organizations and international connections built by these environmental organizations increased in the 1990s. According to Paker; urban and institutionalized environmental organizations and environmental movements with powerful activism throughout Anatolia were two main tendencies during 2000s. Different actors increasingly took part in environmental movements in Turkey (Paker, 2013).

Developed in the 1980s, the environmental movements in Turkey were local, fragmented, and based on protest (Atauz and Bora, 1993: 282). The environmental initiatives in Turkey were inspired by green movement in Western world (Atauz, 2000: 203). Environmentalism in Turkey was unable to create a perspective of environmentalism based on social participation and unable to set a structure organized in this context. Creating a social base has been one of the most important problems faced by environmental movements in Turkey. Protest movements have acted in an effort to resolution for regional crises. Social movements ended after realizing the purpose of the movement without creating an organization (Ertürk,1996).

Existing institutional politics is closed to social movements and social demands, and this plays critical role in emergence of social movements (Özen, 2011). Local movements expanded within the framework of neo-liberal economic policies. Foreign investments, privatization, deregulation put pressure on the natural environment and livelihoods of local people and these played important role for the

expansion of local movements (Mazlum, 2011). Environmental organizations in Turkey have grown quantitatively but with different conceptual backgrounds and objectives. Villagers and local people reacted to damage by energy, mining and construction projects of the government. They took action against the deterioration of their own habitats and lives. Local people were against the “construction of the power plant nearby the place they live in”. Even though these reactions were not enough to extend green movement, they enhanced the effect of the environmental movements (Duru, 2013).

Anti-nuclear movement, movements against gold mining, and anti-HPP movements were environmental movements in Turkey. These were local, national and international movements that bring grassroots and professional organizations which have different strategies, organizations and ideologies together. These movements focused on a single issue and people struggled to protest for their livelihood (Baykan, 2013). But these resistances did not bring opposition identity to environmental movements. Environmental movements did not become successful in producing and discussing alternatives. The prevailing concepts of policy-making and environmental movements besieged. The environmental movement could not create its own specific forms of policy-making. According to Atauz, the prevailing concepts of policy-making also surrounded environmental movements. Environmental movement has failed to create its own specific forms of policy-making (Atauz, 1994).

As discussed in the previous section, Turkish environmental movements have been studied by various scholars. However, studies on environmental movements' impact on energy policy making process are not very common. The analysis will focus on

impact of movements on energy policy-making process. I examine decision making process and influences of movements on this process. I divide energy policy-making process into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives, and enactment of policies and implementation. I analyze the impact of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement on each phase.

3.6 Conclusion

The environmental movements, as one of the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s, affect the public opinions and attitudes and political decision-making about environmental issues. This chapter has provided a framework of the environmental policy, environmental movements and political opportunity structures in Turkey.

In the 1980s, the environmental movements started to be influential in Turkey. Neo-liberalist market economy since the 1990s caused aggravation of environmental problems. Growth of environmentalism in Turkey has developed within the context of global environmental movements which provided opportunities for cooperation and solidarity among groups. Growth-based economy, liberalization, deregulation and privatization created social as well as environmental consciousness and local environmental movements against them. Environmental organizations, public participation, NOGs and awareness have flourished in Turkey and public environmental activism increased tremendously (Aydın, 2005). Environmental movements in Turkey are reactive against a threat to the environment or they are for protecting natural sites. Bergama movement which was the most influential and important environmental movement started at the beginning of 1990s as a local

resistance against gold mining and then became a nation-wide issue in Turkey. A strong national resistance against nuclear power plant in Akkuyu started in 1976 and became effective to postpone construction of the nuclear power plant. Presentation of different environmental movements in Turkey is significant for understanding the dynamics and influences of the environmental movements in the national political context of Turkey.

CHAPTER IV

ENERGY POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN TURKEY

4.1 Introduction

With industrialization, economic growth and modernization, Turkey's demand for energy has increased. Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. 74% of Turkey's total energy need was satisfied with imported energy (Barış and Küçükali, 2011: 378). Hydropower is a main resource in Turkey. Turkey has vast potential for wind and solar as well as geothermal energy (Oksay and Iseri, 2011: 2391). For Turkish governments, nuclear energy and hydropower are significant for energy security. The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Energy policies are determined in accordance with the strategic needs of the country.

This chapter will explain energy resources which determine energy policies of Turkey, strategy-targets of Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Actors and their contributions to energy policy-making process will be explained in detail. I will examine related laws, legal arrangements and regulations in order to understand the structure of energy policies of Turkey and involvement of various actors in this structure.


4.2 Energy Resources

With industrialization, economic growth and modernization, demand for electricity has increased. Turkey tried to meet her energy demand through imported resources during the late 1980s. While 57% of the installed capacity comes from thermal power plants, the rest comes from hydroelectric and other power plants. Thermal power plants have a significant share in total installed capacity. In western part of Turkey, there are lignite and hard coal reserves. Natural gas and oil reserves of the country are very limited (Ulutaş, 2005: 1150-1153). On the other hand, hydropower is a main resource in Turkey. Turkey has vast potential for wind as well as geothermal energy (Oksay and Iseri, 2011: 2391). At the beginning of the 2000s, share of natural gas in the production of electricity tremendously increased (Yılmaz and Uslu, 2007: 263-264). Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. 74% of Turkey's total energy need has been satisfied with imported energy. (Barış and Küçükali, 2011: 378). Natural gas has a large role and will have a large share in Turkey's energy demand. Approximately 60-65% of natural gas comes from Russia through two pipelines (Çoşkun and Carlson, 2010: 213).

Average electricity consumption growth is 7-8% in Turkey. Electricity generation was 230 billion kWh and consumption was 229.3 billion kWh at the end of 2011. 74.8% of electricity was generated from thermal plants and the rest 25.2% was based on hydro, wind and geothermal power plants. "In 2011, 44.7%, 28.3%, and 22.8% of total production was based on natural gas, coal (hard coal and lignite including asphaltit as well), and hydro respectively while the shares of oil derivatives and wind

were 1.7% and 2.1% respectively the remainder being other sources such as geothermal” (EPDK, 2012:16).

Figure 1. Power Generation 2011



Source: EPDK, 2012: 17

The demand for electricity energy in Turkey increased up to 39.045 MW in July 2012. The share of renewable decrease from 17% in mid-1990s to 9.4% in 2009 (EPDK, 2012: 54). Hydropower constitutes 90.5%, wind power constitutes 8.3%, biogas and geothermal constitute the rest of 57.6% of TWh power generation (EPDK, 2012: 55). Hydro potential will be 140 TWh; the wind power capacity will be 20,000 MW; and geothermal potential will be 600 MW. Wind power capacity was almost zero in 2002, but in 2012 the wind power capacity reached at 1,793 MW (EPDK, 2012: 57). Installed capacity increased up 55.633 MW in September 2012.

In 2007, MENR prepared Wind Energy Potential Atlas which indicates that Turkey has 114 MW wind power capacity. 173 MW of technical wind energy potential especially in Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean Region, but a very small

percentage of this potential is utilized. 82 wind power plant licenses were granted by EMRA in 2010 (Baris and Kucukali, 2011: 382). In 2008, there were 150 operating HPPs and these HPPs represented 38% of the total potential. HPPs met 17% of Turkey's electricity production. Most of the small-scale HPPs have a capacity below 10 MW and the small-scale HPPs constitute only 1% of Turkey's hydraulic energy capacity. According to TEİAŞ and DSİ predications, the installed capacity of small HPPs will reach 750 MW by 2020 (Oksay and Iseri, 2011: 2392).

Turkey has a great potential of solar power and wind power. Turkey is 7th in the world for geothermal potential. Turkey's technical geothermal power potential is 600 MW, technical hydroelectric energy potential is 45.000 MW, wind energy potential is 48.000 MW and solar energy potential is 300TWh/year.

Figure 2. Renewable Energy Potential

TYPE	POTENTIAL	IN OPERATION
Hydro	45.000 MW	17359,3 MW
Wind	48.000 MW	1792,7 MW
Solar	300 TWh/yıl	-
Geothermal	600 MW	114,2 MW
Biomass	17 MTEP	117,4 MW

Source: EPDK, 2012: 54

In 2011, 11 wind (361,15 MW), 60 hydraulic (1432,561 MW), 23 natural gas (946,412 MW), 2 coal (700 MW), 1 biomass (2 MW), 1 geothermal (20 MW), 1 fuel-oil (32,10 MW) power plants were granted. Total power plants by the state and private sector achieved 3718,727 MW in 2011 (ETKB, 2012: 29). Number of power

plants reached 643 in 2011, and 743 at the end of 2012 (Taner Yıldız's Presentation Speech, 2012: 9). 302 licenses were granted for wind power plant in October 2012. Installed wind energy capacity has been 2.106 MW in September 2012. Electricity production from renewable resource has been 58,2 billion kWh (Taner Yıldız's Presentation Speech, 2012: 15-16).

Increasing the share of renewable resources at least 30 percent by 2013 is the main objective of MENR (Yıldız, 2010: 15). Integration of nuclear energy is crucial to meet increasing energy demand of Turkey. Agreement for nuclear power in Akkuyu between Turkish and Russian government was signed in 2010 and approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2010. Yıldız indicates that the construction of Akkuyu nuclear power plant will start by 2014. New status and EIA will be ready at the end of 2013. Negotiations with Japan continue for nuclear power plant in Sinop. According to Yıldız (2010: 16), becoming geographically a bridge between Asia and Europe offers resource diversity in energy and cost-effective transportation.

According to 'The World Energy Outlook' 2009 report by the International Energy Agency, the share of renewable in the total energy production will be 25%. According to MENR's assumption, by 2023, electricity consumption will be 500 billion kWh (Oksay and İseri, 2011: 2393). According to Karbuz and Şanlı (2010: 92), Turkey's electricity demand will triple by 2030 and natural gas will be still the major resource for power generation. By 2030, the increase in Turkey's carbon emission will continue and share of renewable sources will be less than 15% of total energy demand. Despite the increasing share of renewable resources, Turkey will be

dependent on fossil energy resources and has followed “those policies which best conform to this global trend” (Oksay and İseri, 2011: 2394).

4.3 Strategy and Targets of Turkish Energy Policies

Five-year development plans are prepared by the DPT. The 8th Five-Year Development Plan indicated Turkey’s energy policy. Energy security shapes Turkey’s energy policy. Energy security consists of reasonable cost and decreasing dependence on imported energy for the Turkish government. For energy security, the policy should target increasing share of renewable and domestic resources (Coşkun and Carlson, 2010: 205). It is also emphasized energy security, dependence on imports, sustainable development with environmental concerns, liberalization and reform in the energy sector for efficiency and productivity (DPT, 2000: 27-28).

“Based on these principles, Turkey’s energy policies aim at the liberalization of the energy sector and creating a competitive structure in order to increase productivity and to enhance transparency; diversification of resources to decrease dependency and to ensure energy security; transportation of resources in the East- West energy corridor through Turkey; and last but not least, advancement of studies on new energy technologies, including nuclear power” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). To diversify energy resources, the 9th Five-Year Development Plan for 2007-2013 comprised nuclear power. Increasing use of renewable resources and integration of nuclear energy into energy mix are new constituents of Turkish energy policy. According to Karbuz and Şanlı (2010: 93), a well-established energy strategy and policy does not exist in Turkey.

It is not possible to provide social equilibrium, global peace and ecological balance with current perception of demolition to all natural and environmental resources. There is a paradigm shift in energy policy “towards a security of supply and climate change. Sustainability is one of the key concepts of the new paradigm.” (Saygın and Çetin, 2010: 108). Turkish government aims secure, clean and accessible energy supply. Energy security is primary as economic and natural security issues are for Turkish governments. Policy-makers have conservative approach in Turkey. Various developments like climate change and environmental degradation start to change the approach of policy-makers and may lead for new policy goals; but energy security and environmental issues and risks continue to rise in Turkey. Turkish decision makers have put renewable energy such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal resources on the agenda to meet growing energy demand. Annual renewable investment in 2008 was 120 billion dollar (Saygın and Çetin, 2010: 110). But the current renewable energy strategy is not sufficient and must be developed. With the Renewable Law, investors’ interest in renewable energy especially in wind and solar power plants has increased noticeably. A constant purchase price for all renewable energies was secured with the amendment to the law in 2007. Licenses for renewable energy have increased dramatically and 601 renewable projects with 1550 MW gained license in 2009 (Saygın and Çetin, 2010: 113).

Strategic Plan for 2010-2014 by the Ministry of Energy stated that “main target is to provide energy resources to all consumers adequately, with high quality, at low costs, securely and in consideration of the sensitiveness about environmental matters” as

well as “reducing the import dependence of our country in energy supply” (ETKB, 2010). One of the main objectives of the Strategic Plan 2010-2014 is to increase portion of renewable energy resources to provide energy supply security (Saygın and Çetin, 2010: 115). Strategic Plan aimed “to ensure that the share of renewable resources in electricity generation is increased up to at least 30% by 2023” (Saygın and Çetin, 2010: 114). In order to meet first target, avoiding dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources as coal and renewables, and constructing and operating nuclear power plants by 2023 have been planned. Even though it is rather a matter of foreign policy, second aim indicates turning the country into an energy bridge/hub between east and west through transforming hydrocarbon reserves with pipelines as a domestic energy policy. By constructing Baku Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline; and with planned pipelines like Nabucco, Interconnector Turkey- Greece-Italy and the South Stream it has been targeted to turn Turkey into an energy hub. The discourse of energy independence remains powerful as a populist project (Kaygusuz and Arsel, s150).

4.4 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Strategic Plan (2010-2014)

According to Strategic Plan, Mission of ETKB is “evaluating the energy and mining resources effectively, efficiently, securely, timely and environmentally friendly and therefore reducing the import dependence and bringing the highest contribution into the national prosperity” (Strategic Plan, 10). Five strategic themes take place in the strategic plan; energy security supply, the regional and global influence of our country in the area of energy, environment, and natural resources and corporate.

4.4.1 Aims for Energy Supply Security:

- Providing Diversity in Resources by Giving Priority to the Domestic Resources- The domestic resources such as coal, oil and natural gas exploration will be raised within 2010-2014. Nuclear power plant building will begin by 2014 (ETKB, 2010: 12-16).
- Increasing the share of the renewable energy resources within the energy supply- The hydroelectricity plants of 5,000 MW will be completed by 2013. The wind (802,8 MW) and geothermal installed capacity (77,2 MW) will be increased by 2015. Wind plant capacity will be 10,000 MW and geothermal plant capacity will be 300 MW until 2015 (ETKB, 2010: 16-19).
- Increasing Energy Efficiency- 10% reduction in energy consumption will be provided by 2015 in comparison to 2008 (ETKB, 2010: 20-21).
- Making the free market conditions operate fully and providing for the improvement of the investment environment- The targeted privatizations in the electricity sector and the competitive market structure will be provided (ETKB, 2010: 22-24).
- Providing the diversity of resources in the area of oil and natural gas and taking the measures for reducing the risks due to importation- Decrease the share of natural gas importation and provide the sustainability of the national oil stocks' storage at a secure level.

4.4.2 Aims for the Regional and Global Influence of Our Country in the Area of Energy:

- With using geo-strategic position of the country effectively, turning country into an energy hub with providing projects of energy security for Turkey and Europe, redoubling Ceyhan oil, and turning Ceyhan Region into an integrated energy terminal (ETKB, 2010: 29-31).

4.4.3 Aims for Environment:

- Minimization of the negative environmental impacts of the activities on natural and energy resources site by reducing the increase of the greenhouse gas emissions from energy sector (ETKB 2010: 32).

4.4.4 Aims for Natural Resources:

- Increasing the contribution of our natural resources into the national economy and the production of industrial raw materials, metal and non-metal mineral reserves and utilization of them on a national scale (ETKB, 2010: 34-35).

4.4.5 Aims for Corporations:

- Developing the effectiveness in the management of natural resources and energy; leading and supporting the innovation in the natural resources as well as energy (ETKB, 2010: 37-39).

4.5 Energy Security

The availability and the cost of energy are main issues in the energy section. The availability of the energy at the lowest cost is the primary aim of the decision-

makers. For Akbulut (2000), energy demand, energy supply and pricing must be addressed in energy policy-making process. These three facets have always been taken into account for recognizing issues of the energy sector and the formation of Turkish energy policies. According to Akbulut (2000), determination of real problems of Turkish energy sector is difficult; because there is an absence of macro and micro plans and coordination between different energy authorities.

Energy security and the search for alternative solutions are directly related. The main instruments of energy decision-making process are diversification of resources and having various alternatives. For appropriate alternative energy policies, the framework of country's economic conditions and development goals must be taken into consideration. Coal and oil are main energy resources and constitute 70% of Turkey's primary energy demand. Renewable and other alternative resources have not taken into consideration seriously in the Turkish energy sector as yet.

According to Akbulut (2000), generation of a long-term national energy strategy is significantly necessary for the evolution of alternatives in Turkey. This can be possible with a close cooperation of related agencies in the energy sector. Energy policy, as a part of general economic policy, must be compatible with environmental and fiscal policies. National and international dynamics are important for energy policies. For determination of national energy policies, international markets and international relations are vital. Prices of energy resources, the climate of international relations and exchange of information and technology play decisive role

in making energy policies. There must be a close cooperation between economy and energy policy-making. The comprehensive analysis of energy sector, determination of prices, and efficient management of corporations are necessary for successful implementation of national energy policies (Akbulut, 2000). There is not continuity in Turkish energy policies. Number of the actors in the Turkish energy decision-making process is limited and important actors that must join the process do not participate in it. Turkish energy policy-making needs more coordination and cooperation between the actors. Present forecasts and plans do not provide convenient guide for energy decision-makers.

4.6 Actors, Rules, Laws and Regulations in Energy Policy

The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources was founded in 1963. Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) was established in 1970 as a monopoly in the electricity sector. TEK is charged with operation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution. With Law No. 3096, private enterprises started to involve in the energy sector in 1984. In 1985, the build-operate-transfer (BOT) and build-own-operate (BOO) models for generations, transmission and distribution of electricity became possible with the regulation. Another law in 1994 led national and foreign companies to operate, construct and finance the power plants (Öztürk et al., 2008: 385-386). Then TEK was split into two; Turkish Electricity Generation-Transmission Company (TEAŞ) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Company (TEDAŞ) emerged as state owned enterprises in 1993. With restructuring of TEAŞ; Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEİAŞ), Electricity Generation Company (EUAŞ) and Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Company (TETAŞ) emerged as three new state-owned public enterprises (Erdoğan, 2007: 9). TEİAŞ has performed

transmission activity, EÜAŞ has performed generation activity and TETAŞ has performed wholesale activity (Öztürk et al., 2008: 389-390).

With the Electricity Market Law (2001), no. 4628, Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) was established as an independent and regulatory agency for electricity. The Energy Market Regulation Authority (EPDK) as a ‘financially autonomous administrative, independent institution’ was created by the law for transparent, competitive, stable and financially strong energy market. EPDK has responsibilities for the regulation and supervision of the natural gas and electricity market (Öztürk et al., 2008: 387). EPDK gives licenses to private sector for building and operating power plants and its responsibilities include “setting up and monitoring new licensing framework, preparing secondary legislation, regulating tariffs for transmission and distribution activities as well, regulating the wholesale tariff of TETAŞ, monitoring the performance of all actors in the market, protecting customer rights, applying sanctions to parties that violate the rules” (Erdoğan, 2007: 13). EPDK does not take any finance from the state (Erdoğan, 2007). With the Natural Gas Market Law (2001) and the Petroleum Market Law (2003), EPDK started to regulate and took other responsibilities in oil and natural gas sectors.

The Electricity Market Law (2001) paved the way for liberalization, privatization and transparent market regulation in electricity market (Öztürk et al., 2008). “The purpose of this law is to ensure the formation of an electricity market which is financially strong, transparent and operate in accordance with the provisions of private law in a competitive environment while achieving a stable supply of

adequate, low-cost, and environmentally-friendly electricity of good quality and ensuring autonomous regulation and supervision of the market” (Biol, 2002: 3-4). The law is an important step to meet EU requirements and liberalize electricity generation, transmission, and distribution activities. With this law, private companies, Electricity Generation Company, auto-producers and auto-producer groups can be producers. They need generation license to generate and sell electricity (Kaygusuz, 2009: 43). From 2001, investigation and construction of new power plants and forming infrastructure by private companies increased. Private companies have had half of the new power plants since 2003 (Çoşkun and Carlson, 2010: 212). With 2001 Natural Gas Market Law, a competitive gas market and harmonization of legislation with EU law are targeted (Yüksel and Arman, 2010: 129). Petroleum Market Law was enacted in 2003. The Law aims to liberalize petroleum sector activities and authorize EPDK for license, pricing and sector activities. Energy Efficiency Law was enacted to increase energy efficiency and decrease environmental problems in 2007 (Bilginoğlu, 2012). Turkish government is willing to continue the process of privatization, liberalization and restructuring in the energy sector. Privatization of PETKİM, government-owned gas and oil producer, was completed in 2008. TÜPRAS was sold to Koç-Shell Group in 2006. Gas distribution company in Eskişehir, Esgaz, and in Bursa, Bursagaz, were privatized in 2004 (Aybar, 20-21). Hydro and thermal power plants were privatized by the Privatization Administration in May 2003 (Öztürk et al., 2008). At the end of 2010, the privatization of the electricity distribution companies was completed. Distribution activity was carried out by the private sector in most of the regions (Yazar, 2010). Privatization of Başkent, Sakarya, Meram, Osmangazi, Uludağ, Çamlıbel, Çoruh, Yeşilirmak, Fırat and Trakya Electricity Distribution Companies was completed.

Privatization of Vangözü, Boğaziçi, Dicle, Akdeniz, AYEDAŞ and Toroslar Electricity Distribution Companies continues. 13 of 21 distribution regions' are being run by private sector (Taner Yıldız's Presentation Speech, 2012: 29).

BOTAŞ is charged with construction of natural gas and petroleum pipelines; take-over, buying, renting existing pipelines; buying and selling natural gas and petroleum products; price searching, exploration, production, transmission, distribution, importation and refining for supply of gas and petroleum from foreign countries (ETKB, 2012: 192). BOTAŞ was responsible for the natural gas and it was the monopoly in the gas market. Monopoly rights on pricing, sale, distribution, importation and transmission of BOTAŞ were abolished with the Natural Gas Market Law. With the Electricity and Natural Gas Market Laws, private companies could participate in energy market with a license from the EMRA (Öztürk et al, 2008). Export and import monopoly of BOTAŞ was limited with the Decree No. 397 and transferred the 10% of import contracts to the private actors. But still, it is the largest actor for export and import activities in the market (Öztürk et al., 2008). Involvement of private companies in electricity activities has increased with these laws. But, electricity and natural gas prices are still determined by the government and the government dominates the market with almost 80% share (Dastan, 2011). Major players are still state-owned companies in natural gas and electricity market.

The purpose of the Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources is "to expand the utilization of renewable energy sources for generating electric energy, to benefit

from these resources in a secure, economic and qualified manner, to increase the diversification of energy resources, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to assess waste products, to protect the environment and to develop the related manufacturing industries for realizing these objectives” (Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources, 2005). The World Bank, The Industrial Development Bank of Turkey and the Development Bank of Turkey started to give loan chances for the utilization of renewable energy sources (Barış and Küçükali, 2011).

In order to build large dams, General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) was founded in 1953. DSİ was under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, after its separation from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Generation and selling electricity through HPPs’ construction by private sector have become possible with Water Use Right Agreement (2003) and Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005). For hydroelectric power plants, authority to certify belongs to General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. The Water Use Right Agreement is signed between DSİ and any entity which wants to construct and operate a hydroelectric power plant. Entities need to apply to the EPDK for a hydroelectric energy generation license; after announcement they are entitled to sign the water utilization agreement with DSİ. If DSİ accepts the feasibility study for project, provisional document will be given (Kaygusuz, 2009). Hydropower has a share of 93.8% among renewable energy resources. The Renewable Energy Law considerably impacted hydropower development (Barış and Küçükali, 2011). 595 HPPs got license after the Renewable Law, and 86 of HPPs were constructed and started electricity generation (Gökdemir

et al., 2012: 24-26). However, these HPP constructions did not take environmental and social conditions into account. Before July 2008, hydropower plants that have a capacity less than 50 MW did not require EIA report. With a regulation, hydropower plants between 0.5 and 25 MW are required EIA report. But, the regulation did not have a great impact, because most of the licenses were given before this regulation (Barış and Küçükali, 2011: 382). Amendment on Renewable Law in 2011 and the regulation by EMRA pave the way for mini and micro HPPs (Gökdemir et al., 2012). There is a great hydropower potential in Black Sea Region, especially in the Eastern part of the Region. 370 HPPs (30% of total) take place in Eastern Black Sea Region, which has great ecological features. There are 2000 applications for micro HPPs. It is not reasonable to be against all HPPs under present conditions (Gökdemir et al., 2012: 24-26). With the Water Use Right Agreement, water has turned into a commercial commodity and the future of water has been given up to hands of private sector. Uncontrolled consumption and turning all environmental and natural resources into commercial commodity is a dangerous way for development.

Turkish Atomic Energy Authority was founded in 1956 and re-structured in 1982. The institution carries out peaceful use of the atomic energy and determining the framework of the nuclear policy. This institution needs approval of the Prime Minister. TAEK is responsible for research and development for the use of atomic energy for technical, economic, and scientific development. It is responsible for giving “approval, license and permits regarding site selection, construction, management and environmental safety for nuclear power and research reactors.” It is also assigned the authority to regulate of radiological and nuclear activities regarding

safety and security, waste and transport safety (TAEK Law, 1982). Draft laws and regulations about nuclear issues are prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, and submitted to the Prime Ministry (TAEK Law, 1982). Law on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and The Sale of Energy Generated from Those Plants was enacted in 2007 (Bilgin, 200). Justice and Development Party (AKP) emphasized the necessity of nuclear power for low cost and reducing dependence on foreign energy resources. AKP signed agreement with Russia for nuclear power plant construction in 2010. Opposition parties, media and civil society organizations criticized nuclear plants because of their security problems, environmental issues about them and nuclear waste (Ediger and Kentmen, 2010).

“The energy policy expresses the balance between the state’s action that ensure the security of supply as well as the environmental protection and a modern market, which operates towards the competition, aiming at the reduction of the reduction cost” (Doukas et. al, 2008: 366). The influence of energy generation and consumption on environment has become a serious problem, so the need for the relation between the environmental protection and energy policy is developed with Kyoto Protocol (Doukas et. al, 2008: 363). Special Expert Committee on Climate Change was created in 2000. Since 2004, Turkey has been a part of the United Nations Climatic Change Framework Agreement. In 2009, The Kyoto Protocol was approved by the TBMM. In 2003, 36% of carbon emissions emerged because of energy, 34% because of industry, and 14% because of transportation (Yuksel and Arman, 2010: 132). In order to avoid increase in greenhouse gas emission, to decrease dependence on foreign supplies and to provide energy security, use of

domestic renewable resource is very crucial for Turkey. (Barış and Küçükali, 2011: 377).

4.7 Policy Making Process

Policy-making process in Turkey includes legislative (Grand Assembly), executive (central and local, the Cabinet of Ministers – Executive Decree having the Force of Law) and judiciary powers. Executive power and judiciary system are under control of the parliament. It is responsible for implementation of policies as outcome of the legislative system. Judiciary power also has an impact on executive, legislative as well as non-state actors (Adaman and Arsel, 6-7). As stressed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, non-state actors such as multinational companies and transnational, international, and non-governmental organizations have indirect and direct power to influence legislation, jurisdiction and local governments in Turkey (Adaman and Arsel, 8).

In Turkey, one or more than one deputy may introduce bills and the government may prepare government bills with signatures of the Prime Minister; and, all ministers and the bills are submitted to the Office of the Speaker. These bills are directly passed to the related Parliament Committee by the Office of the Speaker (Parliamentary Regulation, 1973). Firstly, the related Parliamentary committee discusses bills and submits to Parliamentary vote. All deputies, members of the Council of Ministers, and government representatives may attend to the committee meetings. The chairperson of the committee may invite experts, NGOs and the representatives of relevant public institutions to present their opinions. The committee may accept the

bills with or without amendments, or reject them. Firstly, whole bill is discussed. And then, committee members vote the bill to move on to the articles or not. If proceeding to the articles is not accepted, the bill is deemed rejected. If it is accepted, a discussion on each article begins separately and each article is voted. Some articles which are not accepted are removed from the text. After the debate and voting on all articles, committee members vote the bill as a whole. The committee prepares a report on the subject (TBMM). Committees submit bills to the Office of the Speaker to be taken on General Assembly's agenda. First of all, each article and then whole bill is voted. General Assembly may reject the whole bill or any of its articles. The bills become laws when they are accepted by the Assembly. If bills are accepted, the Parliament sends them to the President for final approval. After reviewing them, bills can be approved, disapproved or sent back to the Assembly by the President for re-consideration. The laws are published in the Official Gazette and become binding and enforced.

4.7.1 Actors in the Energy Policy Making Process

Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (ETKB) with State Planning Organization's (DPT) inputs and Energy Market Regulatory Authority's (EPDK) regulations is responsible for energy policy-making and energy strategy in Turkey. Energy policies are formed as a result of consultations between Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Planning and the relevant departments of the state. In Turkish energy decision-making process, main actors are the government, the President, parliament, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Treasury, the Under-secretary of Treasury, State Planning Organization, Ministry of Finance, BOTAŞ, Turkish

Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and the related State Economic Enterprises (Hakan Akbulut, 2000: 4; Winrow, 2003: 81). Ministry of Energy is not the only institution to make energy policy in Turkey. Energy is a multilateral issue. Energy issue has the environmental, urban planning and social, security and regulatory sides. From time to time, the National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environment have become active in the process. Treasury and Ministry of Economy have a very important place. Especially on electricity import and export issues, views of Ministry of Foreign Affairs are taken. For environment related issues, Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning has become important (interview with Leven Özcan Caner). Ministry of Environment, TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey), Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), the Supreme Council for Science and Technology and universities are other actors make contribution to research and development for energy strategy and policy-making; and enforce energy policy-making. Strong entrepreneurs, international energy companies and other governments also influence Turkish energy policy-making process (Winrow, 2003: 77).

General Directorate of Turkish Electricity Distribution (TEDAŞ), General Directorate of Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission (TEAŞ), General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA), Turkish Coal Enterprises (TKİ), General Directorate of Petroleum Pipelines (BOTAS) and General Directorate of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) are major associations for the policies and goals on the energy sector in Turkey. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources is charged with preparation and implementation of energy policies, programs and plans.

Energy production, imports and energy needs are evaluated by State Planning Organization (DPT). DPT decides on investments in coordination with related State Economic Enterprises and Under Secretariat of Treasury (Kaygusuz, 2009: 43). General Directorate of Energy Affairs (EİGM) is the main policy-making body of the ETKB. General Directorate of Energy Affairs prepares plans to meet energy demand of the country and provide sufficient amount of energy resources for generation, transmission and distribution (ETKB: 2012, 3). Coordination of natural gas and electricity sector reforms; operation of the whole power sector, pollution issues, energy pricing system and conservation of energy activities; studies on energy and environmental policies, renewable resources and energy efficiency are carried out by the EİGM. Private sector applications on the basis of BOT and BO are evaluated by General Directorate of Energy Affairs. It also makes final decision and contracts for both thermal and hydro plants. Research Planning and Coordination Board is charged with implementation of energy policies and coordination of dependent and relative agencies' activities. In addition to these tasks, the Board also prepares long-term energy plans and alternative policy scenarios (Udum, 2010: 106).

DSİ is responsible for preparing feasibility reports, implementing water projects like flood control, hydropower, irrigation and industrial water supply (Kaygusuz, 2009: 43). General Directorate of Renewable Energy evaluates renewable energy resources such as geothermal, solar, biomass, hydraulic, wind and other renewable resources; and prepares feasibility and implementation projects about renewable resources. It cooperates with research institutions, local governments and civil society organizations and develops pilot systems. General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs

works on and determines strategy and policies of petroleum activities (ETKB, 2012: 4). Department of Nuclear Energy Project Implementation ensures coordination between ministries, state institutions, universities, private sector and civil society for legislation and preparing necessary base for training, technology and industry about nuclear project implementation (ETKB: 2012: 5).

Non-state actors have indirect and direct power to influence policy making process. Multinational corporations; transnational, international, and non-governmental organizations affect Turkish political system (Adaman and Arsel, 8). During the privatization of entities of the energy market, jurisdiction played a significant role. During the late 1980s, the state tried to open markets, but Council of State decided that “the natural resources cannot left to private sector; any sort of privatization should be in the interest of consumers” (Dastan, 2011: 8120). Similarly, the Council of State indicated that privatization of HPPs was not possible, because “the water belongs to the public” (Dastan, 2011:8121). As seen in judiciary decisions, constitution, public interest, natural security and similar principles have become significant actors and have ability to limit the government’s and agency’s activities (Dastan, 2011: 8123).

According to Levent, views of civil society organizations have already directly taken part in the process. Members of the public, private sector and civil society make contribution to the process (interview with Levent Özcan Caner). However, Akbulut thinks that impact of non-state actors is very little due to the existing mechanisms;

energy policies do not have a participatory structure. NGOs' sphere of influence is limited also; but involvement of the state in the energy sector is still high in Turkey. According to Akbulut (2000: 5), the Turkish energy decision-making process should include new actors such as researchers, academicians, representatives of civil society organizations and private sector.

The public, environmental NGOs and the business community have started to discuss energy alternatives of Turkey. In Turkey, because of the limited involvement of people in the process; locals and environmental organizations mobilized around issues such as overuse of natural resources, unregulated industrialization, massive energy projects including nuclear power plants, thermal power plants, geothermal and wind projects, unplanned urbanization and unequal development (Voulvouli, 2011).

4.7.2 Decision-making and Environmental Impact Assessment Process

For Akbulut, decisions are taken within the framework of bureaucracy. The government does not have participatory approach for energy policy formulation (interview with Akbulut). Civil society and other related actors must be included in Turkey's energy sector decision-making process (interview with Akbulut). Non-state actors can be only included in decision-making process with EIA procedure.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) refers determination of positive or negative impacts of the projects on the environment through studies to minimize negative effects; determining and assessing selected technological alternatives and locations;

and monitoring and controlling the implementation of projects. EIA process begins with “the application submitted for the fulfillment of environmental impact assessment of the planned project as envisaged within this Bylaw and ends with the determination that post-operational works are appropriate”. If Ministry of Environment and Urbanization decides “No Environmental Impact Assessment is Required”, the preparation of EIA is not required and the projects do not have important environmental effects. If the Ministry decides “Environmental Impact Assessment is Required”, the preparation EIA Report is necessary and the environmental influences of the projects must be examined in detail. The Decision of “Environmental Impact Assessment is Positive” refers that ‘the negative environmental impact of the project can be kept at acceptable levels in accordance with the legislation and scientific principles and thus the project is applicable’. The Decision “Environmental Impact Assessment is Negative” states that the realization of project is unadvisable because of the negative impacts of the project on environment (By-Law on EIA, 2008: Article 2- (1), paragraph a; Article 4- (1), paragraph c, g, ğ, h and ı).

According to Annex I and Annex II, Environmental Impact Assessment is required for energy projects (refineries, thermal power plants, nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors, river type power plants, wind power plants having 10 MW or more installed capacity, extraction of geo-thermal sources and facilities using geo-thermal energy), big water projects (irrigation), transportation (motorways, transits, and airports), large industrial facilities (chemical, petrochemical, iron and steel, machinery manufacturing, textile, food, forest products), mining and other large scale projects. Legal and real entities planning to realize a project which is subject to

Environmental Impact Assessment are responsible to prepare and submit the EIA Application File and EIA Report to the relevant authorities for the projects.

Public Participation Meeting is organized in by the project owner at the location of the project, in order to inform the public, and seek their opinions and recommendations regarding the project; and the meeting is being held in the date of which shall be determined in agreement with the Ministry. Non-state actors can be only included in decision-making process with EIA process. The project owner shall have an announcement published in a national newspaper and a local newspaper at least 10 days before the date of meeting; stating the date, time, place, and subject of the meeting. Meetings are held as parts of the EIA process for sharing scientific data and information, and purpose of evaluation. Projects and their benefits for the country are explained and questions are answered in these meetings (Tuncer Dinçergök). The project owner must inform the Commission about its project and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization must also inform the Commission about public participation in the meeting. Unless “Environmental Impact Assessment is Positive” decision or “No Environmental Impact Assessment is Required” decision is made; no incentive, approval, permission, construction and usage license can be given; no investment can be initiated, nor any tender can be awarded for projects subject to this Bylaw (By-Law on EIA, 2008: Part Two, Article 6-3).

According to Özcan Caner, EIA process is the most important process for medium and large scale energy investments. Without the completion of EIA process, investment process cannot begin and be completed. The local communities and

environmental NGOs are involved in the process with the environmental impact assessment process. Investments cannot be initiated without the positive EIA decision (interview with Levent Özcan Caner). However, the environmental impact assessment is seen as a formality by the public.

4.7.3 Energy Policy Making Process

Turkey is a poor country in the field of energy. Turkey is a developing country, so energy needs of Turkey are also growing (interview with Levent Caner Özcan). In parallel with Turkey's development, Turkey is the second country after China, in terms of its increasing electricity and natural gas demand. Security of energy supplies, import, employment and sustainable economic development is significant to realize 2023 objectives. The balance of supply and demand determines political approach to energy policy. Natural gas dependence on Russia increasingly threatened energy security of Turkey (interview with Hakan Akbulut). Consumption of energy is increasing at the rate of 5-8% per year. Turkey must diversify its energy resources. Renewable resources such as hydro, biomass, wind, solar are crucial for energy supply security (interview with Mustafa Öztürk's advisor).

In order to close the 10% energy deficit, it is not enough to install the solar and wind power plants. At this point, Turkey has a few choices such as coal plants and nuclear power plants. Turkey has to form policies accordingly (interview with Levent Özcan Caner). Nuclear energy is the most stable energy when we look at the regulations and standards. Coal reservoirs are also stable and settled energy resources. Hydroelectric power is significant for Turkey, first headed towards large rivers and then small water resources (interview with Mustafa Öztürk's advisor). Thermal power, nuclear

power and renewable energy are key pillars for energy security and Turkey has to put them on her agenda (interview with Hakan Akbulut).

Energy policies are determined in accordance with the strategic needs of the country. The government determines energy policies based on the priorities and needs. Energy policy-making process is different from other political processes. According to needs of the country, energy policies are being put on the political agenda. For instance, adding nuclear energy to agenda is not for agenda setting, but to meet the energy needs of Turkey (interview with Levent Caner Özcan). Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) has sixteen commissions and energy issues are discussed in the Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology. As a part of national security, energy strategies and policies are also discussed in National Security Council (Udum, 2010: 106). The committee puts the issue on the agenda and parliamentary groups come to the committee. The Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology invites all representatives of sectors and NGOs to committee meetings and actors present their written opinions. As a result of these meetings, if there are useful components, these are included in the law. The bill is examined clause by clause in the committee. And then the bill is sent to the General Assembly to be discussed. The bill is put on the agenda as a priority in General Assembly (interview with Mustafa Öztürk). For instance, before Electricity Market Law passed into a law, workshops were held for a year. The state, private sector, representatives from chambers joined committee and general assembly meetings. 40 non-governmental organizations such as Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers

and Architects were asked for their written opinions. Information and assessment meetings were held. When the bill came to the General Assembly, it was discussed generally and clause by clause (interview with Mustafa Öztürk's advisor).

Formulation and implementation of energy policies are made by Ministry of Energy. The Ministry prepares programs and plans with relevant and dependent institutions. And it also works in coordination with other private and public entities. For Paker et al., organizations have participated in process through “becoming commission members, preparing reports and presenting opinions solicited by relevant ministries, and participating in passing legislation” (2013: 766). The state cooperates with some organizations but this does not mean a regular and effective participation in the process. The state does not always consider policy suggestions and special reports; and organizations' proposals and demands in the laws, regulations and final decision such cases (Paker et al., 2013: 769). Ministry of Energy is responsible for “preparing and supervising programs in conformity with energy policy, ensuring implementation of the programs, and supervising and controlling all exploration, development, production and distribution activities for energy and natural resources” (Udum, 2010: 106). It is ETKB's (Ministry) responsibility to “help define targets and policies related to energy and natural resources in a way that serves and guarantees the defense of our country, security, welfare, and strengthening of our national economy”.

4.7.4 Implementation of Energy Projects

The Electricity Market Law paved the way for liberalization and transparent market regulation in electricity market (Öztürk et al., 2008: 385-386). In parallel with the ecological modernization, “the purpose of this law is to ensure the formation of an electricity market which is financially strong, transparent and operate in accordance with the provisions of private law in a competitive environment while achieving a stable supply of adequate, low-cost, and environmentally-friendly electricity of good quality and ensuring autonomous regulation and supervision of the market” (Biol, 2002: 3-4). From 2001, investigation and construction of new power plants and formation of infrastructure by private companies increased. Private companies have half of the new power plants since 2003 (Çoşkun and Carlson, 2010: 212). The law is an important step to meet EU requirements and liberalize electricity generation, transmission, and distribution activities. With this law, private companies, the Electricity Generation Company, auto-producers and auto-producer groups can be producer. They need generation license to generate and sell electricity (Kaygusuz, 2009: 43).

The Ministry, after consulting to Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, allows building and operating the plant and; an agreement regarding Electric Power Generation plant construction and operation is signed between companies and the ministry. The project company must file applications for construction permits, a power generation license and an environmental impact assessment. EMRA gives power generation licenses to legal and private entities for building and operating power plants. Entities may apply to the EMRA for generation of electricity from

lignite, hard coal, asphaltite, oil shale; and geothermal, wave, solar and hydraulic resources.

Firstly, Fuel Supply Agreement and Water Use Right Agreement must be signed and ‘No Environmental Impact Assessment is Required’ or ‘Environmental Impact Assessment is Positive’ decision is required for power generation licences. TAEK is responsible for giving “approval, license and permits regarding site selection, construction, management and environmental safety for nuclear power and research reactors.” (TAEK Law, 1982: Part II, Article 4, paragraph e and f.). Generating and selling electricity through HPPs’ construction by private sector have become possible with Water Use Right Agreement (2003) and Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005). The Water Use Right Agreement is signed between DSI and any entity which wants to construct and operate a hydroelectric power plant. Secondly, entities need to apply to EPDK for an energy generation license.

After taking energy generation license, the process continues respectively with Connection and Use of System Agreement, expropriation by EPDK, declarations to special provincial administrations or MTA, Building and Business licenses, and approval of the project by ETKB. Authority to approve all types and sizes of development plans of infrastructure, superstructure and transmission lines related to power plants belongs to Ministry of Environment. An important part of acquisition

process of immovable properties that are required for energy projects is carried out by the EPDK. Business licenses and permits are given by ETKB or special provincial administrations for energy projects. Building licenses for thermal power plants, wind power plants, geothermal power plants, nuclear power plants and hydroelectric power plants are given by the municipalities. Licenses are taken by the Special Provincial Administration in regions that are outside of the boundaries of the municipality; then the Special Provincial Administration gives Occupancy Permit. And finally, ETKB approves the project (Erdoğan, 2012).

Central planning is powerful in Turkey, so public participation at the planning stage is limited. Turkish people can monitor activities of agencies indirectly but they can ask other authorities, such as courts, to stop activities (Güneş and Aydın Coşkun, 2005). Public policy implementation phase creates conditions for the occurrence of social movements and the movements aim to alter the policy with blockading its implementation.

Citizens, non-governmental organizations, platforms, chambers, associations etc. filed lawsuits at administrative courts requesting execution and cancellation of positive EIA Reports given by the Ministry or decision of “No Environmental Impact Assessment is Required”. Decisions of administrative courts can be appealed to the Council of State (Turkey's top administrative court). Citizens may apply to the Council of State for an annulment and a stay of execution of environmental plans, licences given by EMRA, decision of ‘No Environmental Impact Assessment is Required’ or “Environmental Impact Assessment is Positive”, development plans

and implementary development plans. With amendments, the government has tried to bright exemption from EIA for projects. Administrative courts or Council of State can stop projects through their decisions. Citizens, chambers, environmentalists can file lawsuits at the Council of State to cancel government amendments on EIA exemption regulation. For unlicensed and illegal projects, citizens may apply to the Court of First Instance. Deputies, political parties and citizens may apply to the Constitutional Court for a stay of execution and annulment of intergovernmental agreements. Ministry of Environment and Urbanization can also send back EIA reports to companies.

According to Özcan, without doubt, the opening of such courts, negative results and stay of execution decisions are affecting energy policy-makers. In addition to policy-makers, regulators (like EPDK) are influenced. Court decisions may lead to reconsider the projects. As a result of court decisions, projects are modified or cancelled. But, for national interests, projects must be realized. Turkey must diversify its energy resources and use its full potential (interview with Tuncer Dinçergök). It is not possible to give up certain investments. Giving up these investments means to stop Turkey's economic growth. Investors may give up some projects voluntarily (interview with Levent Özcan Caner).

4.8 Conclusion

Policy-makers have conservative approach in Turkey. Energy security shapes Turkey's energy policy. Turkish decision makers have put renewable energy such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal resources on the agenda to meet growing energy

demand. Strategic Plan 2010-2014 aims to avoid dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources like coal and renewables, and to construct and operate nuclear power plants by 2023. So, hydropower is a main resource in Turkey where energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. There are 2000 applications for micro HPPs in Turkey. Integration of nuclear energy is crucial to meet increasing energy demand of the country. During energy projects, SHPP and nuclear power plant constructions, environmental and social conditions have not been taken into account. Projects of the state and private companies like nuclear power plants, hydroelectric projects and dams have become target of environmentalists and the communities that will be affected by such projects.

Administration and decision-making process are still highly centralized in Turkey. Turkish state has not followed inclusive strategies for energy policies. Energy policy-making process is non-participant in the country. The government makes decisions, introduces legal regulations and then implements the projects. Non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process caused reactive environmental movements in Turkey. When the role of the state and non-state actors such as public, academicians, representatives of civil society organizations and private sector in the process is examined; it will enable us to understand how Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement involved in the energy policy-making process.

CHAPTER V

ANTI-HPP MOVEMENT IN LOÇ VALLEY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the impact of Loç movement on energy policy-making process by dividing energy policy-making process into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives and enactment of policies and implementation. At first, Loç movement will be illustrated, and then the way movement involved into the policy-making process, the level of its involvement, the opportunities and obstacles for involvement and the success of the movement will be discussed.

The Loç Valley is located in the western Black Sea coast, in Kastamonu, Cide. Loç Valley is an 8-km valley between two canyons. Devrekani River gives life to the valley and creates Valla Canyon. Orya Energy has planned to construct Cide HES Project on Devrekani River. Mobilization in Loç Valley started after policies enacted, but not implemented. Loç people were informed about HPP and Cide HES Project when engineering vehicles came to valley and started operation in the riverside. Protests in Loç Valley started on June 2010. The main motivations of anti-HPP activists engaged into the movement are to preserve their villages, water, land and culture. The activists emphasized that it is an ecological struggle; struggle for life and life of the creatures that exist in the stream. In order to prevent illegal

activities of the company, local people and activists set up a camp and waited all night and day in the riverside. Loç people staged a sit-in protest in front of Orya Energy Company in Kabataş which maintains for 28 days and ended with the decision for stay of execution on 8 December 2010.

In this chapter, I will analyze the empirical data collected through in-depth interviews and observations from Loç Valley. The analysis will focus on the impact of Loç movement on energy policy-making process. Firstly, I examine decision-making process and influences of the movement on this process. Secondly, I divide energy policy-making process into three phases; problem recognition and agenda setting, definition of alternatives and enactment of policies and implementation. I analyze the impact of Loç movement on each phase. And lastly, I will discuss the success and impacts of the movement within Gamson's success definition and opportunity structure framework of Turkey.

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, local potential and local political structures are significant for understanding local social movements. As Smith (2004) argues, separation of local political structures from national political structures, which are embedded in international political structures, is not possible and healthy for examining local social movements. For the appropriate alternative energy policies, as stressed in the fourth chapter, the framework of country's economic conditions and development goals must be taken into consideration.

As stated in the energy policy-making chapter of the thesis, especially in Black Sea region, lots of hydro power plants (HPPs) has been planned and constructions began

in Turkey at the beginning of 2000s. For the state, HPPs are necessary in order to satisfy increasing energy demand of Turkey (Oksay and Iseri, 2011). Changes in external conditions and policies generate concerns among local people, because of HPPs' social and environmental costs; so local people and NGOs started to mobilize against the projects in Loç, Hopa, İkizdere, Kastamonu, Şavşat etc.

As explained in the second chapter, separation of social movements and the state would be wrong, because the boundary between the social movements and the state is not clear. The state affects the social movements and movements affect the state. The relationship between the state and social movements can vary; a state can be a target, a repressor or facilitator, an initiator, an opponent or an ally, an enforcer in the conflict for social movement (della Porta and Diani, 1999; Banaszak, 2005). At this case, economic growth and capital inflow targeted the local environment. HPPs, as in the case of Loç Valley, are battlefield between the government/private companies and environmentalists/local people. As in the Loç Valley; these movements target both private companies and the government. Private companies are primarily responsible for HPP projects and environmental destruction. As a planner and a supporter of the HPPs, the government makes regulations and opens the legal way for private companies to make constructions easily. Gendarmes, district governorship, municipality as representatives of the state have not fulfilled their duties.

I met with Zafer Keçin, one of the leaders of the Loç movement, through Black Sea in Resurrection Platform (KIP). Firstly, I sent an e-mail to KIP. They invited me "Forum Black Sea" on 2-3 March 2013 where I had the chance to listen and meet

with local people from Black Sea Region. Struggles at the local level, legal struggles, ways to collectivization, role of media and art were discussed during the forum. After this date, I began to attend KIP's demonstrations, meetings and panels.

I visited and stayed in Loç Valley that is located in the western Black Sea coast. My observations are based on my visit in Loç Valley that hosts 4 mountain villages that will be affected by Cide HES project. I have interviewed with fifteen people in Loç Valley and also in İstanbul. I had in-depth interviews with four people.

5.2 Loç Valley

Black Sea Region is a home of Turkey's wildlife and plants. Loç Valley is located in the western Black Sea coast, in Kastamonu, Cide. Loç Valley is composed of Çamdibi, Hamitli, Şenköy and Karakadı villages. It is an 8 km valley between two canyons. Devrekani River creates Valla Canyon and gives life to the valley. Loç Valley is a unique and special valley in the world. The southern side of the valley has Mediterranean Vegetation and the north side of the valley has Black Sea Vegetation. Loç Valley is located in the Küre Mountains and within the borders of Küre Mountains National Park which have 157 endemic plants and 59 endangered plants. Loç Valley, with 16 endangered plants and 29 endemic plants, is a precious region (Küre Mountains National Park). It is impossible to not to be affected by the Loç Valley's air, forest and stream. Birds are singing and it is hard to hear any noise; water is flowing with a pleasant sound. People who live in wooden houses do housework and yard work. National parks are protected areas and people cannot live in national parks and even cannot drive a nail. But this protected area was turned into a buffer zone by the government in 2009, when the Cide HES Project was first put on

the agenda. The HPP will cut the Devrekani River with a 35 meters height dam wall and then generate electricity with a tunnel throughout kilometers. And HPP left only 10% percent of the water to Loç Valley and Loç people. According to the regulation that is related with the procedures and principles of signing Water Use Right Agreement for production activities in electricity market, the companies have to leave at least 10% of the water untouched, *can suyu* (life water), for human livelihoods to persist and the ecosystem throughout the river (DSİ).

Early on, local community did not know anything about the project. Then they noticed that this plant will destroy their living space. At first; Kastamonu Cide Loç Region Development and Solidarity Association was against the project. But when company promised employment, money, car; the villages were divided into two, and management of association began to support the project as a result of donations from the energy company (Zafer). After the association, village headmen's changing sides; and then Necati Kar, Yılmaz Can, Erdiñç Ay, Aytekin Kaya and Zafer Keçin came together and decided to continue struggle in order to prevent the project. As a result, they founded Loç Valley Protection Platform. They started resistance in both in İstanbul and Loç Valley. These people are leading the local campaign against Cide HES Project. A very small portion of population of the valley permanently lives in the valley. Majority of the population migrated to big cities such as İstanbul. Founders of the platform have also migrated and come to the valley for summer and holidays.

Zafer Keçin is one of the founders of the platform and a leading figure in the struggle. Aytekin Kaya identifies Zafer Keçin as the 'brain of the platform'. Zafer

Keçin was born in Loç Valley. When he was 14 years old, he migrated to İstanbul. He started to work as an electrician in İstanbul. He joined the movement with his 9 sisters/brothers, nephews, nieces, and sixty years-old mother. I had an opportunity to interview with Zafer Keçin and went to Loç Valley with him. Zafer said that they were also villagers; they were inspired by the resistance of the people of Bergama. And a traditional yellow Turkish kerchief (*sarı yazma*) has become symbol of the Loç resistance and other environmental resistances around the country.

Black Sea in Resurrection Platform -KİP- consists of urban activists with a broad interest area, especially from Black Sea region. The platform was established at the end of 2009 and shows interest in all ecological issues, thermal plants, and small hydro power plants, and nuclear energy. As one activist from the platform indicates,

We are against any kind of ecological destructions and we are fighting against any kinds of ecological destructions. We are uncomfortable with the investments and the energy policies toward the Black Sea Region. We aim to sustain social struggle and act with solidarity with all existing social struggle.

The Platform actively works with various local environmentalist struggles across the country. The platform is active especially against the small hydro-electric power plants which are planned and constructed along the Black Sea. Black Sea in Resurrection Platform is not a foundation or an NGO; it does not have a legal identity. KIP is a democratic and decentralized platform and use social justice discourse. KIP evaluates the ecological issues in the democratic participation in decision-making. KIP is a significant platform for Loç Valley; because KİP and locals constructed movement process together and KIP members has been involved in each stage of the movement.

5.2.1 Supporters of Cide HES Project

The people of the valley have been divided by the HPP project. One group supports the project and one group is against the project. Generating electricity, reduction of dependence on foreign energy, providing employment opportunities for the villagers are main arguments of the supporters of the Cide HES Project. Company officers have promised jobs to the people of the valley.

When I first went to coffeehouse in Çamdibi to meet with keeper of coffeehouse, Şeref, at first he does not want to talk to me about the project and said ‘I told too much about it and I do not want to talk anymore’. But next day, when I went to coffeehouse to drink tea with Zafer Keçin and invited Şeref to our table, he did not oppose to talk about the project. As expected, one of the most important agenda item was the planned project, when you sat in a village coffeehouse. Everyone had something to say about this topic. According to keeper of coffeehouse and some villagers, there were a lot of water in the village and the water must not flow down the drain, as Prime Minister Erdoğan said. Şeref, keeper of the coffeehouse, replied the question about the project;

I support the project to preserve my economic interest. The water is not used neither for irrigation nor plow. Those who want and do not want project do not know why she/he support or against the project. I do not know too. There will be light. Our country would not need foreign energy. Resting place, swimming pool, casino will be built in the streamside. Villagers will be employed and bring home the bread. (Kahveci Şeref).

And Bahattin Güney replies Şeref's argument about the employment during the conversation and said that 'our children cannot work in dam construction, because they do not know construction job'.

The most remarkable feature of supporters of the project is that they did not know much about the project. When I asked questions about the project, the vast majority of the supporters responded as 'How do I know benefits or damages of the projects' or 'if our state found this project appropriate, the project is definitely beneficial for us' (*Devletimizin elbet bir bildiği vardır*). Differently from other supporters, an old peasant indicates that 'this dam will be built in any case; dam builders will not listen anybody. So villagers must do a profitable deal with the company and villagers should take advantages of the project.'

5.2.2 Opposition to HPP Project

The main argument of anti-HPP activists was destruction of villages; loss of water, land and their culture. According to activists, the water would enter into pipes and they could not use it anymore. Many respondents stated that villages would be destroyed by HPP. Black Sea Region is very prosperous in terms of its endemic spaces. Activists stated that it was an ecological struggle; struggle for life and life of the creatures that exist in the stream. Villagers would lose their culture because of the HPP project. People would lose their water and land. For the people of the valley, this might mean financial loss and the extinction of certain species of plants and animals in the area. As Aytakin, one of the leaders of the movement and founders of

the protection platform, responds to the question of why he was against the hydroelectric power plant:

Government and its supporters have accused us to prevent Turkey's development. We are locals, villagers. Loc people do not have a lot of money. Loc people cultivate and earn their lives from soil. The only place that we can go is Loc Valley. With this project, our village will be destroyed. Our relatives, family grave are in Loc Valley. In order to maintain our solidarity and culture, we have to protect our lands and villages (Aytekin).

Government officials claimed that these projects create job opportunities for local people. But for activists, these projects create only limited and temporal employment for locals. As one interviewee points out, national independence is another argument for opposition to the project. Turkey will lose its national independence with these projects. According to anti-HPP activists, objective of these projects is not power generation, but commercialization of water. Private sector will have power over distribution and use of water. And companies sell their water to foreign companies.

As Zafer stated:

There will be water wars in near future. Twenty years later, you will be a global power, if you own the water. Water cannot be sold, water belongs to everyone/public. People who need water use water. Water is life and the beginning of life (Zafer, from Loç Valley, translated by the author).

Loç Valley has natural beauty and must be protected. Fishes, bees, fruits will not be here anymore.

The natural beauty of century is being destroyed for twenty year life of a project. The state must preserve this beauty, but we try to protect it from the government. We left our religious, nationalist, linguistic identities and we struggle only for the stream. And if we struggle together, we can stop these projects. We have been successful, because we did not include politics into our struggle. We need to act together with other platforms (Aytekin).

5.3 Anti-HPP Movement

As stressed in the fourth chapter, hydropower is a main resource in Turkey. Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. There are 2000 applications for micro HPPs in Turkey. But, HPP constructions have not taken environmental and social conditions into account (Gökdemir et al., 2012: 24-26).

At first, local community did not know anything about the project. Then they noticed that this plant would destroy their living space. Early on, all local people were against the project. Company came without announcement and Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Report by Ministry of Environment and Forestry was positive. And then, 232 people appealed to Kastamonu Administrative Court for EIA report on March 2009. First protest in Loç Valley was on 20 June 2010. District governorship and municipality have supported the project. Some of Loç people were scared and did not attend the movement at first. They said that it was a state project and activists could not stop it, but then they realized the power of the movement and appreciated it.

As Keck and Sikkink's network discussion (1998) in the second chapter indicated; trade unions, churches, intellectuals; local social movements; domestic and international non-governmental organizations; foundations; parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; the media; parts of governments may be crucial players in network. Even though, there were not any international organizations to support ecological movement in the Loç valley, so the support came from all over the country (Munzur, Hasankeyf platform etc.). A group of Loç people

attended Turkish Water Assembly on January 2010 and met with other local platforms. Black Sea in Resurrection Platform (Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu-KİP), Doğa Association, Karşı Bicycle Group and İstanbul Bar Association supported the Loç movement.

KİP is always with us. KİP and Loç Valley Protection Platform cooperate and support each other when ecology becomes a matter of agenda (Zafer).

KİP, platform and locals constructed the movement process together. Under the guidance of KİP, Loç Valley platform became the host and hold a public demonstration with KİP, Munzur, Hasankeyf and Alliano platforms in Kadıköy on April 2010.

Even though judicial process continued, company started its activities by cutting trees and diggings. Then locals learned that Orya Energy did not have a construction plan, the right of eminent domain and electricity generation license. Gendarme and district governorship did not fulfilled their responsibility and prevent illegal company activities. In order to prevent illegal activities of the company, local people and activists set up a camp and waited all nights and days in the riverside in the middle of July 2010. Migrated villagers was actively involved in the resistance movement, they came from İstanbul for the weekend and made the work stopped. And they attended the camp and protests with their little children and elderly parents. Elderly people gave a lot of support to struggle. 70-year-old women made the company's work stopped by lying down in front of the engineering vehicles. KİP members also prevented drilling, operation of engineering vehicles and went from door to door to tell damages of the project. With these supports, the movement became more crowded and powerful.

As stated before, existence of institutional allies has great importance for movements especially when political opportunity structure is closed (della Porta and Diani, 1999). Contrary to this argument, as Aytekin mentioned earlier, Loç people realized that political party's support divided the movement as seen in other anti-HPP movements. Because of them, political parties make efforts for political vote and they do not take on responsibilities or make significant contribution to the movement. Political Parties such as CHP and BDP supported the movement, but locals did not include them in the process.

For social movements, publicity is a significant source. As Raschke stated “a movement, about which is not reported, does not take place.” (Raschke 1985: 343, translation. FK). Even though movement's activities provide certain publicity, we cannot ignore the intense effect of the media. The use of phones, internet, and social networks such as Facebook/Twitter make it possible to create contacts with other local platforms and environmental organizations and make the process of diffusion possible. Using cell-phones to take photos/to make records and publish these photos and videos through social networks has attracted attention of public, mainstream media and some political elites. As seen, technological improvement has affected the tactics and the scope of mobilization.

Some people joined The Great Anatolian March to stop all the investments that damage nature and living creatures. It started from Artvin on April 2011 and ended in Ankara; and about 200 local and national non-governmental organizations came together. March was held under the motto of ‘*Anadolu'yu vermeyeceğiz*’ (We will

not give up Anatolia) (Çömlek, 2011). Loç people staged a sit-in protest in front of Orya Energy Company in Kabataş which maintains for 28 days28 day and ended with the decision for stay of execution on 8 December 2010. KİP, universities and college students gave full support to sit-in protest. Court granted a motion for stay of execution on 3 January 2011 and sit-in protest ended. And juridical struggle through courts has continued which will be examined in detail in implementation section.

5.4 Decision-making Process

As a result of natural gas dependence on Russia and increasingly threatened energy security, politicians have started to follow a long-term energy policy to diversify energy sources. For Akbulut, the balance of supply and demand determines political approach for energy policy. Within this framework, the most important point is energy security. Thermal power, nuclear power and renewable energy are key pillars for energy security and Turkey put them on the agenda. Hydropower is a main resource in Turkey. There are 2000 applications for micro HPPs in Turkey. Turkish decision makers have put renewable energy such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal resources on the agenda to meet growing energy demand. Strategic Plan 2010-2014 aims to avoid dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources like coal and renewables, and constructing and operating nuclear power plants by 2023. Energy policies are formed as a result of consultation between Ministry of Energy, DPT and the relevant departments of the state. Planning and scientific studies are conducted in this decision-making process. After evaluating the data, Council of Ministers determines policies within the framework of data sets (Hakan Akbulut).

AKP deputy Öztürk suggests that decisions are taken by examining on-site, protecting the environment, valuing human life and giving a chance to everyone to have their say who are related to the issue. He said that Ministry and its institutions listens citizens and NGOs, takes requests and offers solutions for minimum victimhood.

As opposed to deputy's words, locals said that 'nobody asks us'; company came as an owner of valley. In the beginning, local people did not know anything about the project. Nobody asked local people whether the project should be done or not. During the meeting with company officials, local people indicated that they were all against the project (Metin, Zafer and Aytekin).

As explained in the fourth section, there was Public Participation Meeting for EIA report. During Environmental Impact Assessment process, project owner made a public meeting to inform public about the investment, received comments and suggestions on the projects. Public Participation Meeting was held on March 2009 in Loç Valley. Most of the time, local administrators did not inform people for the session. Therefore a limited number of people attended to the sessions. But in Loç Valley, people's participation in the meeting was quite high. During the meeting, Loç people indicated that they were all against the project (Aytekin). As locals stated, public meetings were made only for show and adopted the legal procedure. If it were otherwise, the public and the experts' opinions would have been taken into account

and EIA decision could not be positive. Local people, related trade associations, environmental organizations and academicians were not included in decision-making process.

According to Hasan Ormancı,

Company officials behaved as if we are not the owner of the village and as if there were not people living in that region. Company officials appropriated our lands. The state did not know about this project; if the state knows, company has had and brought necessary legal documents (Hasan Ormancı).

As it is seen, top-down decision-making approach is still dominant in energy policy in Turkey. As stated in the previous chapters; economic, social and environmental structures of the regions are not taken into consideration by the central government and local administrations. So, local administrator, the company and the government ignores locals' will and opinions. The government determines energy policies based on the priorities and needs, makes legal regulations and then implements the projects with top-down decisions.

According to activists and local community, EIA process must be democratic, reliable and meeting must be hold before the agreement. Authorities must inform local people and ask their opinions. But in Loç Valley, opinion of local community was completely disregarded.

5.5 Policy-making Process

First of all, social movements must bring their claims on the political agenda, develop policy proposals, press politicians to enact favorable policy proposals and lastly monitor the implementation of policy. As Paul Burstein (1993) recommended,

contributions and impacts of Loç movement to each phase of policy process will be examined separately in next section.

5.5.1 Problem Recognition and Agenda Setting

Policy-makers have still conservative approach in Turkey. For Akbulut, energy security is the most important point for energy policy-making. Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. 74% of Turkey's total energy need has been satisfied with imported energy. Within this framework; thermal power, nuclear power and renewable energy are key pillars for energy security and Turkey put them on the agenda again. Turkish decision makers have put renewable energy such as hydro, solar, wind and geothermal resources on the agenda to meet growing energy demand. Hydropower has become main resource in Turkey. There are 2000 applications for micro HPPs in Turkey. MENR's Strategic Plan 2010-2014 aims to avoid dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources like coal and renewables, and constructing and operating nuclear power plants by 2023.

Öztürk's supervisor explains agenda setting phase,

First of all, the deputies and the Council of Ministers introduce bill of law. Speakership office transfers the bill to related committee. According to needs of the country, energy policies are putting on the political agenda. The Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology put the issue on the agenda and parliamentary groups come to the commission. The bill is examining clause by clause in the committee.

Energy policies are being put on the political agenda in order to satisfy energy need of the country. So, energy policy-making process starts in this way. The beginning of the energy policy-making is different from other policies but the rest of the process is

the same. The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Because energy policies are determined by the needs of the country, the impact of Loç Valley movement on the agenda-setting process is limited. However, at this stage, after related laws have been enacted, regulations have been made and started to become institutionalized; Loç movement could not successfully set the political agenda against HPP projects. In this case, sympathetic policy makers are included in the process, increased favorable environment in political context for social movement actors and initiated a new legislation in favor of the movement actors (Amenta, 38). Even though Loç people avoided integrating political parties within the process; representatives from Loç Valley met with Sebahat Tuncel to put issue on the political agenda. Tuncel brought issue to the parliament with a written question to Minister of Environment and Urbanization about ongoing illegal activities of Umran Boru/ Orya Energy in Loç Valley at the end of 2010.

5.5.2 Policy Alternatives and Enactment of Policies

5.5.2.1 Policy monopolies in energy policy-making process in Turkey

According to Özcan Caner, energy is a multilateral issue; so, many institutions and organizations take part in energy policy-making process. The President, parliament, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, EPDK, Treasury, Ministry of Economy, State Planning Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization are main actors in energy policy-making process in Turkey. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, and Ministry of National Defense may enter into the process.

Private companies can construct, generate and sell electricity through HPP construction. For 49 years, the Water Use Right Agreement is signed between DSİ and any entity which wants to construct and operate a hydroelectric power plant. Generation license is taken from EPDK. Entities need to apply to the EMRA for a hydroelectric energy generation license; after the announcement they are entitled to sign the water utilization agreement with DSİ. Dinçergök, DSİ -Deputy Head of Department of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants, indicated that DSİ cannot go to every place for the audit; the audit is made by authorized private companies. DSİ cannot be aware of all the projects and cannot be informed all illegal activities of companies (Tuncer Dinçergök).

Özcan Caner stated that civil society and private sector are other actors in energy policy-making process. Views of civil society organizations have already taken directly in the process of forming a policy. During discussions, there can be different views, so decisions are taken based on the public interest. Jurisdiction can also play a significant role in the process.

As discussed in the second chapter, policy monopolies maintain policies. As Meyer (2005) indicated before, social movements can affect policy by changing composition of policy monopoly. Inclusion of new actors or exclusion of established actors provide change in policy monopoly. “High profile domains such as energy domain are characterized by their importance for the maintenance of established power relations in a given polity” (Krieisi, 2004: 77). The previous section has analyzed how policy monopoly in energy domain has changed in Turkey. The private

sector started to be more involved in the Turkish energy policy-making process. But involvement of the state in the energy sector is still high in Turkey and involvement of various NGOs, academicians, and public is limited. “Blue Book” and other statements of the government and energy ministry claim that policy-making process is participatory and they consult related researchers and civil society organizations to ask their opinions about regulations and projects. But, consultation and asking opinion to the related organizations do not mean that ministry regards these opinions and scientific analysis. Because energy policy monopoly has not included NGOs, public, activists and platforms, their influence on policy formation is very limited. As Hakan Akbulut indicated, impact of non-governmental organizations is very little in the process. Perceived as a national security issue and political tool in the global political arena, energy policy-making process in Turkey is very close and actors included in the process are very limited. Under these circumstances, local people and environmental organizations’ participation to the process are limited and difficult. Even there are many scientific studies about risks and possible environmental destructions of nuclear power plants and hydroelectric power plants, the government insists on construction of these power plants. According to Akbulut, due to existing mechanisms, energy policies cannot have a participatory structure. Involvement of all actors is required from the beginning of the process for a participatory structure.

5.5.2.2 Policy Alternatives and Enactment of Policies

Turkey imports natural gas and she is dependent on natural gas imports to satisfy her energy need. According to Öztürk, natural gas suppliers are using gas as a political tool. Water resources in Turkey are abundant; so, hydro-electric is the most important domestic source of Turkey. Therefore, as deputy Öztürk indicates, when

you increase the hydropower utilization, you will reduce import dependency. So, the government chooses proposals which are consistent with decision makers' norms, feasible, and acceptable in cost. From this perspective, the government forms energy policies that utilize renewable resources, especially prosperous hydropower resources. AKP has 347 seats in the parliament; so AKP government has easily passed policy proposals into law and made regulations to utilize renewable resources.

Representatives of the private sector and representatives from chambers are invited for committee and general assembly meetings to express their opinions. For instance, before Electricity Market Law passed into a law, workshops were held for a year. The state, private sector, representatives from chambers joined committee and general assembly meetings. 40 non-governmental organizations such as Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects were asked for their written opinions. Information and assessment meetings were held. And then the bill was sent to the General Assembly to be discussed. Öztürk states that the Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology invites all representatives of sectors and NGOs to committee meetings and present their written opinions. As a result of these meetings, if there are useful components, these are included in the law (Mustafa Öztürk). However, according to Öztürk's supervisor, sensitiveness of companies and non-governmental organizations are different. Opinions of chambers and associations are taken into consideration by the government and committees. Öztürk's advisor thinks that environmental consciousness affects the laws. Even though the committee invites representatives of

the private sector and NGOs, it does not invite local representatives which will be influenced directly by HPP projects.

During enactment of Law on the Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources or Electricity Market Law, Loç people did not know anything about proposals, laws or regulations. Anti-HPP movements around Turkey started to mobilize after these policies enacted. Mobilization in Loç Valley started after these policies enacted, but not implemented. Loç people did not know anything about HPP and Cide HES Project. They were informed about it only when engineering vehicles came to valley and started operation in the riverside. So, it was impossible for Loç movement to participate in enactment phase. But, after formation of the movement, Loç people and other actors in the movement were not been invited to the related committee and ministries' meeting to discuss amendments on the Electricity Market Law and Law on the Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources. Also Loç movement did not press politicians to enter a bill and enact their policy proposal against HPP projects. So, Loç movement could not alter the content of legislation in favor of the social movement.

A group of Loç people met only with Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and Minister of Environment and Forestry. Group asked for an appointment from the ministries. It was the first time that Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources accepted a local group about HPP issue. At the beginning of the meeting, the minister stated that questions would not be accepted. According to people who

attended the meeting, the government did not take their opinions into consideration and respond their claims (Aytekin).

5.5.3 Implementation

5.5.3.1 Informing Local People

When I asked “Do authorities inform local people/platform sufficiently about the project?”, all participants, both supporters and opponents, answered ‘no’ to this question. Interviewees said ‘nobody inform us’. Only one person said that authorities from commission and governorship came and told benefits and harms of the project. Rest of the respondents stated that no one told the negative effects of the project to them. As Hüseyin stated, nobody inform local people; everybody tells just what she/he heard. Local people were not much informed about the project and HPPs.

Without any license and annunciation, company came and started its operations in the riverside. As a result of local people’s own investigation, they realized that the company did not have any generation license or construction plan. Aytekin stated that neither local authorities nor company informed local people,

“We investigated and learned about HPP and project by our own efforts. But local authorities did not check operation and legal documents of the company, even local people called authorities for duty” (Aytekin).

People’s land were expropriated without their consent, even company did not have any right to do it. The company occupied people’s private registered lands. The company paid just the half value of the people’s land. It made promises to local

people and village headmen like repairing mosques, schools; giving employment and scholarships (Bahattin and Hasan).

Muhtar Cafer responded the question,

“Company did not inform Loc people in detail. We heard about HPPs and projects from organizations and other people who come to our valley from different part of the country.” (Muhtar Cafer).

Public participation at the planning stage is limited because central planning is powerful in Turkey. With asking other authorities, such as courts, people monitor activities of agencies indirectly. Because of lack of free access to information and central planning; public, organizations and platforms are not included in the agenda-setting and policy formulation; but they can be included in its implementation phase. Public perceives projects as a threat to their lives and take action against the policies.

5.5.3.2 Implementation of Project

Mobilization of a movement can begin after a policy is enacted, but not implemented. In implementation phase, social movements monitor the implementation of the policy (Kolb, 35). Social movements can prevent or slow implementation of the policy. Loç people were included in policy-making process during implementation phase. Mobilization started after the company came to the valley and Loç Valley Protection Platform was founded. The authorities did not ask Loç people and environmental organizations about the project. Local people and environmental organizations were not included in the policy formation process.

Loç people did not know anything about HPP and Cide HES Project until engineering vehicles came to valley; so they could not create a political agenda and

become effective in policy formation. They did not know that DSİ signed Water Use Right Agreement with Orya Energy for Cide HES Project and they did not know that Orya Energy applied to the EMRA for a hydroelectric energy generation license.

With illegal operations of the company, the company officials and Loç people came face to face. Loç people did not have direct access to the government or political parties, but they had an access to courts. Loç people used courts in order to achieve their goal and to stop implementation of the project. After questioning and understanding illegal operation of the company, Loç people collected 232 signatures and litigated to Kastamonu Administrative Court; and they were involved in the process. Construction site was sealed on 31 December 2010. Court granted a motion for stay of execution on 3 January 2011 and EIA report was cancelled on 11 July 2011. Loç people won the case, but Orya appealed against annulment decision. In June 2012, council of state reversed the annulment decision; Loç people went to appeal. Kastamonu Administrative Court approved the new EIA report on April 2013. But the judicial process for the valley continues. Eighty four people from Loç Valley stand trial for offenses such as damage to company's property, lacerating and insult. During this process, Loç people did not receive any financial support from anyone; they covered all expenses and court costs by themselves.

Even though courts' decisions are not always on behalf of Loç people's interests, Loç people effectively use courts for stopping or slowing down the implementation of HPP legislation that they are against. But last developments and regulations increase suspicion about separation of power and independence of jurisdiction in

Turkey. Last regulations and law amendments indicate that the government tries to put the HPP projects into practice, and these policies of the government put pressure on jurisdiction and restrict the possibility of access for social movements.

5.5.3.3 Impact of Court Decisions

According to Tuncer Dinçgök, as a result of court decisions, projects are modified or cancelled with the request of the citizens. For Özcan Caner, without doubt, the opening of such courts, negative results and stay of execution decisions like Loç Valley case are affecting policy-makers. In addition to policy-makers, regulators (like EMRA) are influenced by these decisions. Investors will voluntarily relinquish from projects as a result of court decisions. On the other hand, Hakan Akbulut thinks that court decisions do not have too much influence on energy policies. But, court decisions can lead to reconsider the projects.

Jurisdiction-law is significant. The government makes necessary and relevant regulations according to judiciary's final decision. According to deputy Öztürk, expert's reports and court decisions prevent the production of the country's energy needs and generate disadvantageous situations for investors (Mustafa Öztürk). So, with regard to policy-makers and bureaucrats, for national interests, projects must be realized. Turkey must diversify its energy resources and use its full potential (Tuncer Dinçgök). Considering this developmental approach, it is not possible to give up certain investments, because giving up these investments means to stop Turkey's economic growth.

With the Water Use Right Agreement, water has turned into a commercial commodity and the future of water has been given up to hands of private sector. Uncontrolled consumption and turning all environmental and natural resources into commercial commodity is a dangerous way for development.

5.6 Success and Impact of the Movement

Interviewees stated that

“We achieved all our objectives. We sent company away from our valley. We have become successful. But government works and takes decisions in favor of companies. Process is still continuing and resistance will also continue.”

As interviewees stated, anti-HPP movement has significant and influential outcomes. The movement has not been able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Loç Valley and in other valleys. But for now, the movement has successfully stopped the HPP construction process for a period of time (3 years). HPP implementation was stopped by the court decision and efforts of the movement. The movement has successfully stopped the completion of HPP in Loç Valley. In order to stop the HPP, courts have been effectively used by the anti-HPP. But the government tries to have a regulation that ignores the court decisions.

According to Gamson, emergence of ‘new advantages’ and ‘acceptance’ of the organization as a legitimate representative are two forms of ‘success’ of social

movements. As Amenta and Caren stated, in Gamson's success criteria, recognition does not mean inclusion and may not lead any change and benefit for movement. Loç movement has not gained acceptance and was not included in the process. Loç people demanded and joined negotiations with authorities to change legislation. Even though representatives from Loç Valley met with Taner Yıldız, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, this did not mean that the government recognized Loç Valley representatives as a legitimate representative for the process. Their requests were not taken into account by the ministry. Related commissions and ministries did not actively and coordinately work on draft law or law on Loç movement.

Keçin assessed impact and success of the movement,

“For now, Loc people have won the case. Loç people started their struggle in 2010 and did not allow this project for three years. On the other hand, the government is making the necessary regulations for the realization of HPP projects. We will continue to resist. It is not enough to stop project in Loç Valley, we need to stop all HPP project in the whole country. Only in this way, we can be successful” (Zafer, from Loç Valley, translated by the author).

According to Gamson, new advantages mean the degree to which a movement's program is realized. It is possible to fail to achieve stated program, but it still win substantially collective benefits for its constituents (Amenta and Young, 25). With regard to Gamson's success criteria, Loç movement has reached a partial success. Loç movement's aim is to cancel the Cide HES Project and the movement has partially realized its program. Even though Loç movement has not completely cancelled the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Loç Valley, it has successfully postponed and stopped the HPP construction process for 3 years.

Loç movement has symbolic significance for other HPP movements; because it became effective to stop HPP construction. Loç movement and result of the movement, stopping the construction of hydroelectric power plant, were a source of inspiration for other anti-HPP movements. The symbol of Loç Valley resistance, a traditional yellow Turkish kerchief (*sarı yazma*), became the symbol of other anti-HPP movements.

Evaluating the success of a social movement, social and cultural changes also must be taken into account. Loç movement tried to change the activities of company and tried to affect the actions and attitudes of individuals and public for achieving social change. So, cultural and social changes emerge as a result of the anti-HPP movement. Although it is not all the people, the majority of the Loç Valley people have information about hydroelectric power and its effects. The perception that hydropower energy is environment-friendly and green, so it is the most compatible energy with the environment has started to change with Loç movement and other anti-HPP movements.

Public has become informed positive and negative sides of the HPPs. We can talk about perception change in public, especially who becomes the target of these projects (Zafer). But it would be optimistic to talk about a complete change in public opinion about these projects. Anti-HPP movement in Loç Valley put the villagers and the village in center and this makes the movement acceptable, believable and legitimate in the eyes of the public. So, the movement changes the perception of

individuals and public behavior toward the energy and environment. People started to question the relationship between energy generation and environment/life. Loç and other anti-HPP movements around Turkey have changed perspective and values of the public and create convenient environment to discuss benefits and harms of energy projects. Public, environmental NGOs and business community have started to discuss energy alternatives of Turkey. The change in public perception is significant, because it can also change the perception of policy-makers. Public perception change can put pressure on the government and policy-makers to change the political agenda and adopt favorable policies.

But these movements could not change the perception of decision-makers and policy-makers. The government still insists on HPP projects. As seen in Loç Valley, cancelling or stopping a HPP project is possible. In the opposite of these achievements, the government has brought new regulations in favor of companies on the political agenda to realize HPP projects. At this point, unfortunately, we can say that Loç movement and other anti-HPP movements have generated an unfavorable political agenda for their struggle. Aytekin explains perception of policy-makers as,

“We are right in our struggle as evidenced by legal documents. But there is difference between the law in four years ago and the current law. Government works and takes decisions in favor of companies. Council of state takes decision in favor of companies. Government approved the decision to allow construction of HPP even in protected areas. The government is trying to eliminate the bases of our resistance” (Aytekin)

The government makes decisions and legal regulations; and then implements the projects. Perceived as an attack against their water and agricultural consumption by the villagers, the government still supported HPP projects for sustainable

development and diversification of energy production. If the government meets with any opposition or resistance, it insists on the projects and disregards court decisions as well as altering legal regulations for realization of projects. Initially, the public is not informed. When construction equipment come to their villages or excavation starts, the public becomes aware of the situation and the people are starting to react. Exclusion from democratic process causes emergences of non-institutional forms of protests. Non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process of Loç people who would be directly affected by the Cide HES Project caused a reactive movement in Loç Valley. Policy-makers and decision-makers have not asked nor informed local people, who would be mostly affected by the projects and include them in the process. Anti-HPP activists have not attended decision-making processes for more friendly policies, so they reacted against the degradation of nature.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, the dynamics of Loç movement and impacts of the environmental movement against Cide HES Project were examined. I have analyzed political structures that pave the way for the movement and movement's actions to affect the process. I divided energy policy process into problem recognition and agenda setting, policy alternatives and implementation phases. I analyzed Loç movement's impact on each phase. Loç movement was examined in a way based on in-depth interviews with activists on the local level, platform members and government representatives as well as bureaucrats.

Perceived as national security issues and a political tool in the global political arena; energy policy-making process in Turkey is very close and actors included in the process are very limited. Loç movement targeted both the company and the government. Closed structures for Loç people provide difficult access to the political system. Non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process of people who would be directly affected by the projects caused reactive environmental movement in Loç Valley.

Administration and decision-making process are still highly centralized in Turkey. Turkish state has not followed inclusive strategies for energy policies. Energy security, the cost and availability of energy are main concerns of the energy policy-making process. Limited number of actors joins the energy decision-making process; so public, locals, civil society organizations, and academicians cannot become effective during the process. Public is not included in the decision-making processes of energy projects. Participatory approach is not common in the energy policy-making process in Turkey. EIA process is the only process for public involvement in the decision-making process of hydroelectric power plants; however, environmental impact assessment is seen as a formality.

Energy policies are put on the political agenda in order to satisfy the energy need of the country. The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Because energy policies are determined by the needs of the country, the impact of Loç movement on the agenda-setting process is limited. Policy monopoly in energy

domain has changed in Turkey. The private sector started to be more involved in the Turkish energy policy-making process. But involvement of the state in the energy sector is still high in the country and involvement of NGOs, academicians, and public is limited. The government chooses proposals which are consistent with decision makers' norms, feasible, and acceptable in cost. Related commissions and ministries did not actively and coordinately work with movement actors on proposals or laws. The government does not consider policy suggestions and special reports and organizations' proposals and demands in the laws, regulations and final decision. Loç people have taken action against the policy, because they perceived policies as a threat to their economic interests and lives. As a result of exclusion from the planning phase, agenda-setting and policy formulation; Loç movement involved in the process in implementation phase. Even though courts' decisions are not always on behalf of movements, Loç people effectively use the courts for stopping or slowing down the implementation of legislations that they have been against. Although Loç movement have not able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the construction of power plants in Loç Valley, implementation of the project was stopped by the court decision and as a result of the efforts of the movement.

Loç movement has partially realized its program. Even though Loç movement has not completely cancelled the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Loç Valley; it has successfully postponed and stopped the HPP construction process for 3 years. But the process still continues for the movement.

CHAPTER VI

ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the dynamics and impacts of anti-nuclear movement against Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will be analyzed. A main aim of this chapter is to examine emergence, mechanisms and dynamics of anti-nuclear movement; to discuss similarities and differences in the movements; and to point out their influences on energy policy-making process. In this chapter anti-nuclear movement will be examined through in-depth interviews with activists and platform members.

For Turkish governments, nuclear energy is significant for energy security. Since the 1970s, the Turkish state has planned a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. National and international resistance against the nuclear power plant started in 1976. First protest was held by fishers in Silifke. Akkuyu is located on the Mediterranean coast and in the province of Mersin. Professional organizations like Doctors and Lawyer Unions, labor unions, local and national NGOs formed the anti-nuclear platform in 1993 and it became effective to postpone the bid for several times. (Adem, 2005). Anti-nuclear platform is constituted of ninety components and the platform carries out its activities with the contributions of its components. With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Russia in January 2010, nuclear power plant for electricity generation was added to political agenda again. Nuclear policies, agreements and

possibility of changes in external conditions generate concern among people that drive the mobilization again.

Firstly, I will examine the decision-making process and influences of the movement on this process. Secondly, I divide energy policy-making process into three phases and I analyze the impact of anti-nuclear movement on each phase. Thirdly, I will compare anti-nuclear movement with Loç movement so as to understand similarities and differences between the two movements. And lastly, I will discuss the success and impacts of the movement within Gamson's success definition and opportunity structure framework of Turkey.

6.2 Akkuyu

Akkuyu is located on the Mediterranean coast and in the province of Mersin. There is Mediterranean ecosystem in Akkuyu. Akkuyu is home to Mediterranean monk seal, *Caretta caretta* and like many other endangered species. It is the most beautiful and the most intense domestic tourism place in Mediterranean. Akkuyu is the region where the villagers fishing; seals, logos, and red mullet inhabited. It is located very close to Göksu Delta. Nuclear power plant will affect the Göksu Delta which has 450 endemic and epidemic plants and is under the protection.

6.2.1 Opposition to Nuclear Energy

The main arguments of anti-nuclear activists against nuclear power are destruction of nature; nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race; nuclear waste issue; accident and radiation leakage risks; damages on environment, creatures and human health. According to activists, nuclear power plant will threaten human health, agricultural activities and ecological balance. It is impossible to fully prevent radiation leakage

and its effects to human health. It will negatively affect agricultural area and tourism. Meral Özuslu, anti-nuclear platform member and metallurgy engineer from Amasra, said that ‘nuclear power energy means emit radiation and radiation kills’. As Meral Özuslu stated, ‘in case of leakage or accident, radiation contamination into the air, water, and soil would affect the lives of all living creatures. Therefore, radiation has fatal damages on human health. Plant has started to pollute the environment from the beginning of construction. Nuclear power plant needs cement plants and thermal power plants for its construction and operation. In order to cool nuclear reactors, the sea water will be used and the sea water will be discharged into the Mediterranean Sea. So, sea water temperature will increase and disrupt the ecosystem of the sea. Seals and caretta caretta will be gone.’

The nuclear industry still has no solution to the nuclear waste problem. As Sabahat Aslan indicates, radioactive waste cannot be destroyed and safely stored. Aslan said that “countries using nuclear power plants sent their nuclear waste to less developed countries in order to get rid of nuclear waste. Plant at Akkuyu will become the world’s nuclear waste repository under the name of power generation”. For the people of Mersin, the city will be a nuclear waste dump with this project.

Almost all the respondents mention accident and radiation leakage risks of the nuclear power plants. One of the most important reasons for being anti-nuclear activist is the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters. As an activist from KIP states, people of Black Sea Region were affected and suffered after the Chernobyl accident.

People of Black Sea Region lost their relatives in the disaster. According to KIP activist, ‘nuclear energy is a massacre’. Sabahat Aslan explains damages of radiation and nuclear accidents,

Nine million people were affected by the Chernobyl accident. Nuclear accident contaminated 160.000 square kilometers of land and those contaminated agricultural land cannot be cultivated for thousands of years. Thyroid cancer among children has increased by two hundred percent. Radiation caused mental, physical and psychological disorders. Cost of the accident was 352 million dollars. Fukushima accident is more harmful to the people and the environment than Chernobyl accident. The Japanese government spent 250 billion dollars just for cleaning up radiation. Russia will own a nuclear power plant in our territory. Technology, personnel and raw material of the nuclear power plant will be provided by Russia. So, nuclear power plant will increase Turkey’s dependence on foreign energy (Sabahat Aslan).

Anti-nuclear activists do not want nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race. For activists, nuclear power plants will not be constructed for generating electricity. They do not believe that nuclear power plants’ objective is to generate power. According to Seyfettin Atar, president of Mersin Chamber of Electrical Engineers, nuclear power plants’ actual motivation is not power generation, but uranium enrichment. Atar continues,

Installed capacity of Turkey was 57.000 in 2011-2012 and Turkey used 39.045 MW. Turkey has 17.000 MW surpluses. %67 natural gas comes from Russia. While most of the energy depends on Russia, as a result of protocols with Russia, Turkey’s dependence on Russia is increasing with nuclear power plant. It is obvious that nuclear power plant will not reduce Turkey’s dependence on foreign energy. Turkey will continue to be dependent on other countries. And also Russian government will finance and build VVER-12000 reactors in Akkuyu which have not been tested before in the world. Countries of the world are giving up nuclear technology step by step especially after Fukushima disaster because of accidents, risks, damages to ecological balance, waste issue. We are continuing the anti-nuclear struggle as a public against the political dictates of governments disregarding the waste issue and risks.

Özcan answered the claims about objective of nuclear plants. According to him, nuclear energy plants are building to meet energy needs of Turkey. Becoming a nuclear power in the international arena is strategically significant, but from the perception of Ministry of Energy, the objective of nuclear power plants is energy. Özcan asked people who criticize the projects, “What is your suggestion?”. Nuclear energy has a strategic priority; so nuclear energy is one of the strategic objectives of Turkey.

Nuclear power is an unsafe, expensive and dangerous technology. According to Osman Kaçak who is an anti-nuclear activist since 1996, ‘nuclear energy is economically costly and unnecessary investment for today. There is not much difference between nuclear power plants and solar panels in terms of cost. When we think investment and employment together, nuclear power plant will employ a maximum of two-three thousand people in all stages. Discourses like plant will provide employment for twelve thousand people is not right.’

For Cenk Levi, Global Warming and Energy Campaign Director in Greenpeace, nuclear energy is the most undemocratic way of energy generation. The lives of people in the region will change, people in the region will be forced to migrate to urban areas and become impoverished. Some of the activists are against all kinds of energy generation methods. They suggested that all kinds of energy generation affect the nature. For them, power production and distribution cannot be clean. And they asks ‘do people really need this much power/ who needs energy and for what?’

Capitalism needs energy. 'According to Ayhan, eco-anarchist activists, energy itself is a problem; it is a problem of industrial society and capitalist system. As Fidan Üredi stated, these people are against the capital to earn more money from the nature and all living things, and the governments to transform living beings into a commodity.

6.3 Anti-nuclear Movement

Nuclear policies, agreements and possibility of changes in external conditions generate a concern among people that drive the mobilization. Since the 1970s, the Turkish state has planned a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. National and international resistance against the nuclear power plant started in 1976. As Fidan Üredi indicated, anti-nuclear platform member from İstanbul, first protest was held by fishers in Silifke. The nuclear power project had been suspended by 1980 military coup. After the military coup, the government put Akkuyu nuclear power plant out to tender. In 1994, resistance became bigger and stronger through nationwide campaigns, demonstrations and unofficial referendum after the Chernobyl disaster (Vouivouli, 2011).

Professional organizations like Doctors and Lawyer Unions, labor unions, local and national NGOs formed the anti-nuclear platform in 1993. Then, it became effective to postpone the bid for the eighth time. This anti-nuclear movement included various political groups such as Islamists, nationalist etc. (Adem, 2005). Anti-nuclear platform was constituted of ninety components as NGOs, labor and trade unions, trade associations. Platform carried out its activities with the contributions of its

components. It had ties with other social and environmental movements such as the Bergama movement. Signature campaigns, festivals, picnics, demonstrations as well as referenda were used as strategies by anti-nuclear movement. In 1999, the symbolic referendum held by Greenpeace Turkey reflected public opinion about nuclear power plant, and 84% of Büyükeceli Village residents were against the nuclear power plant construction (Adem, 2005:77).

The Anti-Nuclear Platform (ANP) mobilized in İstanbul, İzmir and Mersin. ANP collected 170,000 signatures and sent them to the parliament. Villagers from Akkuyu went to Ankara to protest the project (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005: 106). Unlike Loç movement, external links were created with activists; scientists from Germany, Sweden, Australia, and Ukraine; Greenpeace, the Nuclear Awareness Project from Canada, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. These foreign organizations organized letter campaign, demonstrations in front of Siemens headquarters in Munich. In 2000, the bid was cancelled because of economic issues and public reaction (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005). But agreement with Russia and Turkey for construction and operation of nuclear energy power plant was signed in 2010 and the contract with Russian ZAO Atomstroyexport for constructing nuclear plant again increased tension and debates about nuclear energy in Turkey.

Wide range of actors was involved in the movements. The movements carried out their resistance through forming opposition and protection platforms. As stated in the previous section, Loç Valley Protection Platform cooperates mostly with other

local platforms such as Munzur and Hasankeyf platforms, regional protection platforms, and some associations such as İstanbul Bar Association. The movement against Cide HES Project can be characterized as a local movement. Unlike the Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement can be characterized as a more nationwide movement. Components of anti-nuclear platform support and make contribution to the movement. Components of platform provide information about technical issues, environmental impacts and judicial process. Anti-nuclear platform is a nationwide umbrella organization which consists of political parties such as CHP, DSIP, EMEP, ÖDP; ecology and environment groups and associations; Greenpeace, Confederation of Public Laborer's Unions (KESK), Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK); labor unions, various trade associations, and chambers as well as various associations/platforms (See full list of ANP components¹). Greenpeace supports the movement with its protests, press releases and standing guard. Berlin-Mersin Friendship Organization, TEMA, WWF, Küresel Eylem Grubu, Greens and the Left Party of the Future, political parties, KIP, and municipalities are supporters of the anti-nuclear movement.

Like Loç Valley Protection Platform; Anti-Nuclear Platform also uses marches, demonstrations, press releases, distribution of posters and leaflets, meetings with the public, informing public, raising public awareness, using TV-radio as well as organizing signature campaigns as movement strategies. Anti-nuclear platform

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http://www.nukleerkarsitiplatform.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=24

makes camps every year in Akkuyu and these camps are significant for the movement.

Participation in these camps is changing from time to time. Especially participation from neighboring villages is significant, because villagers realize risks of the nuclear power plants and that they are in danger. Informing public and rising public awareness is very crucial in this kind of long-term movements' (Yusuf Üçay).

According to a young teacher and activist, at the beginning, villagers were acting unconsciously. Company officials tried to induce villagers with employment to their children and paying a lot of money for their lands. They acted upon their political tendency and listened political leaders or state officials. And then, anti-nuclear activists talked with villagers and organized them. Individual and massive communication was significant. Telling effects of radiation leakages/nuclear accidents and showing accident photographs are effective ways for fight against nuclear power.

Anti-nuclear activists are trying to put nuclear issue on the public agenda through media. Activists also have to struggle with local administrators, police and local governments. Some of the participants such as Yılmaz Kilim, a member of Chamber of Environmental Engineers, gives technical and legal support. Chamber of Environmental Engineers carries out an institutional struggle process. Chamber of Electrical Engineers enlightens the public about the nuclear power with scientific data.

As Amenta (2005) indicates, social movements need institutional allies in order to achieve success and benefits. For Amenta (2005), as discussed in the second chapter, supportive bureaucrats and political regime are enough for collective benefits. Appointed or elected officials, who publicly support the movement and sympathetic to social movement concerns, are significant for the movement. Sympathetic officials can increase favorable environment in political context and initiate new legislation in favor of the movement.

Anti-nuclear movement use both insider (institutional) tactics and outsider tactics. From the beginning, the movement has already used outsider tactics such as demonstrations, marches etc. Political parties such as CHP who are part of the parliament are also part of the anti-nuclear platform as well. Antalya (MHP) and Mersin (CHP) municipalities support the anti-nuclear movement whereas local authorities, village headmen and district governorship did not support the movement in Loç Valley. As Üredi stated, support of political parties is very significant for the movement, because they transfer anti-nuclear arguments into their parties and party leaders spread these arguments to the party grassroots. Political parties have chance to support the movement by making legal regulations in parliament.

CHP has not always been successful in providing favorable political environment and initiating new legislation in favor of the anti-nuclear movement. It sometimes cannot put nuclear issue on the political agenda. CHP has 134 deputies in the parliament. AKP controls both the legislation and execution powers. For instance,

CHP Parliamentary Group's proposal of discussion for parliamentary research motion on the effects of planned nuclear power plant in Akkuyu was not accepted by the General Assembly.

Greenpeace had influence on the process of being cancelled during Ecevit government in 2000. According to Cenk Levi, Ecevit government demonstrated economic crisis as an excuse, but the real reason behind the cancellation of the decision was ecological struggle of Greenpeace. Greenpeace was campaigning against nuclear power and also carried out legal struggle. For instance, Greenpeace litigated before Environmental Impact Assessment process. Cenk Levi describes one of the tasks of Greenpeace as exposing risks of the nuclear plants and ensuring people to decide on this issue on their own.

Sabahat Aslan indicated that anti-nuclear platform has held numerous protests and activities and carried out struggle in the legal as well as social field. Anti-nuclear activists, Greenpeace, and various chambers have opened cases against Akkuyu NPP. For instance, anti-nuclear platform cancelled 1/100.000 scaled environmental plans for Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Violation of 1/100.0000 scaled environmental plan principles has been on the agenda; and as a result, many times the court granted a motion for stay of execution plan. Anti-nuclear movement could not fully cancel the project; but, for Sabahat Aslan, postponement of the construction was a success of the movement. According to the intergovernmental agreement between Turkey and Russia, Rosatom would build, own and operate the Akkuyu nuclear

power plant in 2010. Turkish government tried to start construction process without EIA report in 2010. As a result of the lawsuits filed by environmentalists and members of anti-nuclear platforms, Turkish government had to take EIA report. Environmental report was expected by the end of 2013, and full construction could start in 2015 or at the beginning of 2016.

Anti-nuclear activists staged a sit-in protest in front of Akkuyu NGS Public Information Center in Mersin in 2012 which lasts three months. Company's management tried to intimidate activists with custodies and fines. This sit-in protest did not turn into a mass action, but it was important in terms of exposing the company and preventing the working of the center.

Fidan Üredi, grown up in Silifke, said 'I am fighting against nuclear power since my childhood and trying to do whatever I can'. According to her, when tender or construction of the nuclear power plant is at political agenda, as well as during the Fukushima and Chernobyl anniversary; protests and anti-nuclear acts are becoming more vibrant. There were human chains with high levels of participation with the effect of elections and Fukushima accident in İstanbul and Mersin. These human chains had a broad repercussion in visual and written media. For instance, on 17 April 2011, tens of thousands environmentalists formed a 159 kilometers human chain between Mersin city center and the district of Mersin, Gülnar, after the announcement of groundbreaking of the nuclear power plant next month. In support of her claim, we see that KIP, NKP and Greenpeace hold protests on the

anniversaries of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear disasters. Greenpeace organized commemoration events on the anniversaries of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear disasters. It has held peaceful protests and is trying to attract the mainstream media about the nuclear issue. KIP also held protests on the anniversaries of Chernobyl nuclear disaster for three years. One of the most remarkable protests was drinking tea in front of Russian consulate on 26 April at 00:26 am, when the experiment started. And this protest had a broad repercussion in press. Chernobyl accident protest was held on 27 April 2013 in Mersin by NKP. In İstiklal Street, KIP protested Chernobyl nuclear disaster on 26 April 2013 with whole day street concerts and performances. According to Ayhan Yerden, anti-nuclear movement is not sufficient in terms of its extensity and inclusiveness.

Industry needs energy and we are thinking like the industrial state. The movement can be successful, if the movement will become an anti-systemic movement. The anti-nuclear movement must be moved into a higher level, international arena to cancel the projects. It is not possible to prevent the projects with two press statements, because it is a serious issue, we are talking of a 80-billion dollar project.

Even though, JSC Atomstroyexport, the company of Russian State Corporation 'Rosatom' was constructing Akkuyu nuclear power plant; anti-nuclear movement fought against both the Turkish government and Atomstroyexport. As Mehmet İstif, anti-nuclear platform member of Mersin, said 'thermal, nuclear, hydroelectric power plants are products of common political decision'. So we must fight against all and this political mechanism. As decision-maker and policy maker of the energy policies, the government is the main target of the movement. Because the government took decision to construct Akkuyu NPP, and made an agreement with Russian government and has made laws, regulations for nuclear energy; so the government

has become a main target of the movement. Obviously, targets of the movement, that company and governments, are more powerful in political and financial terms than the anti-nuclear movement.

6.4 Decision Making Process

Energy policies are determined in accordance with the strategic needs of the country. The balance of supply and demand determines political approach for energy policy. As Akbulut indicated, energy policies are formed as a result of consultation between Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Planning and the relevant departments of the state. Planning and scientific studies are conducted in this decision-making process. After evaluating the data, Council of Ministries determines policies within the framework of data sets.

According to Öztürk, the government has taken decisions with examining on-site, protecting the environment and valuing human life and giving a chance to everyone to have their say who are related to the issue.

There can be different opinions. But some NGOs have taken ideological stance. We cannot allow these groups on behalf of national interest. Ministry and its institutions listens citizens and NGOs, takes requests and offers solutions in the related places for minimum victimhood.

Even though Öztürk stated that the Ministry listen everyone related to issue, as the young teacher replied ‘any government did not ask ideas of Mersin people about the plant. Local people were asked only to obey’. Osman Koçak indicated that ‘nobody asks to the people of the region about their ideas for the project. Participation in the

decision is not provided. Three-quarters of people in Mersin is against to Akkuyu nuclear power plant. But the government is trying to continue construction of the plant with central decisions.’

All respondents from anti-nuclear movement answered ‘no’ to the question of ‘Has anti-nuclear movement been included in the decision making process?’. Anti-nuclear activists replied ‘we were not included in any way in the process.’. Similarly, Seyfettin Atar remarks that Chamber of Electrical Engineers and The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects were not included in EIA process and at any stage of the decision- making process. Because energy security and the cost and availability of energy are main concerns in energy policy-making process; limited number of actors joins the energy decision-making process; so public, locals, civil society organizations, and academicians cannot become effective actors during the process.

6.4.1 EIA Process

According to Özcan Caner, people are included in decision-making with EIA process.

EIA process is the most important process in medium and large energy investments. There are essentially two elements affected by energy investments. The first is related to the energy sources used for investment. The second is the environmental impact assessment process. Without the completion of these two processes, investment process cannot begin and be completed. The local community and environmental NGOs are involved by the environmental impact assessment process. Especially on certain investments, there is a certain topic for direct participation of the people in this process. Investment cannot start without the positive EIA decision.

Meetings are held as part of the EIA process for sharing scientific data and information and purpose of evaluation (Ozcan Caner).

Anti-nuclear activist, Meral Özuslu said that anti-nuclear movement can be only included in decision-making process with EIA process. But as Fidan Üredi indicated, when anti-nuclear activists wanted to join EIA meeting, the police blockaded the building. Likewise, Levi stated that inclusion in the EIA process is significant, but it is a symbolic process.

NGOs and individuals must be included in the EIA process. NGOs must state their ideas and concerns. Greenpeace reported its concerns about the project and nuclear power to Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. %64 of the public is against the nuclear power plant. EIA reports are prepared, but given a very short time to express NGOs and platforms' opinions. EIA reports are very technical, so it is difficult for the public to understand these reports. Public participation meeting is symbolic and non-functional. These meetings only introduce the companies and their investments.

During Environmental Impact Assessment process, project owner makes public meeting to inform public about the investment, receive comments and suggestions on the projects. As anti-nuclear activists stated, public meetings are made only for show and adopted the legal procedure. If it were otherwise, the public and the experts' opinions were taken into account and EIA decision could not be positive. As they stated, 75% of the people in Mersin were against the plant. No one applied to mass organizations. Decisions were taken by the executive without consulting the public. People, related trade associations, environmental organizations and academicians were not included in decision-making process. The government disregarded the public and their ideas At this point, it is hard to talk about participation of public in the process.

According to Levi, process is not democratic,

Nuclear power plants operate only for 30-40 years, but nuclear waste problem will continue for thousands of years. Governments are elected for four years, but a government can decide to construct a nuclear project which has impacts for thousands of years, it is not democratic. Democratic countries, EU countries and the USA, decide to close their nuclear power plants permanently. These countries have human rights, environmental rights, and rule of law. Only undemocratic countries such as Iran, India, and China build nuclear power plants. In order to overcome the obstacles and realize the project, Prime Ministry issued a circular for Akkuyu nuclear power plant².

Top-down decision-making approach is still dominant in Turkey. The government takes decision, makes legal regulations and then implements the projects. Like other policy areas, top-down decision making approach is dominant in energy policy. Economic, social and environmental structures of the regions and public ideas are not taken into consideration by the government. If the government meets with any opposition or resistance, it insists on the projects and disregards court decisions as well as altering legal regulations for realization of the projects. For instance, the court decided that the EIA report is required for nuclear power plants; but the government added a provisional article that was trying to leave Akkuyu nuclear power plant outside of the scope of Environmental Impact Assessment.

EIA process started with the company's application on December 2011. EIA public meeting could not be completed, because of intense public protests on March 2012. Anti-nuclear activists stated that meeting was symbolic and non-functional; and they could not express their opinions. EIA Report should have been submitted by April

² See, Circular on Akkuyu NPP Project, No: 28240, Entry into force: 21 March 2012

2013 but it was presented on 9 July 2013. But, on 15 July 2013, The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization formally rejected EIA Report for Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Project and sent it back to overcome the deficiencies within 3 months (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013). But this development does not mean that Turkey has given up nuclear power plant projects.

According to activists and local community, EIA process must be democratic, reliable and must come before the agreement. Government can hold a referendum for nuclear power plant. They want to express their concerns and discuss the damages of the plants.

6.5 Policy Making Process

6.5.1 Problem Recognition and Agenda Setting

The deputies and the Council of Ministers introduce a bill of law. Speakership office transfers the bill to the related committee. According to needs of the country, energy policies are putting on the political agenda. The Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology put the issue on the agenda and parliamentary groups come to the commission. The bill is examined clause by clause in the committee. Energy policies are put on the political agenda in order to satisfy energy need of the country. So, policy-making process starts in this way. The beginning of the energy policy-making is different from other policies but the rest of the process is the same.

Policy-makers still have a conservative approach in Turkey. Energy security is the most important point for energy-policy making. According to Caner, Turkey has followed two main energy policies: The first one is to reduce foreign dependency and the second one is to increase the use of natural resources in energy mix. These are inter-related objectives. As stated in the energy policy making chapter of the thesis, energy diversity is a significant factor in reducing external dependency. MENR's Strategic Plan 2010-2014 also includes same policies; avoiding dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources as coal and renewables, and constructing and operating nuclear power plants by 2023 (Saygın and Çetin, 2010).

Turkey imports natural gas and she depends on natural gas imports to satisfy her energy need. According to deputy Öztürk, natural gas suppliers are using gas as a political tool. Russian- Ukrainian as well as Iranian-Turkish relations are proof of this. Öztürk continued,

Coal reservoirs in Turkey are abundant. Environmentalists say that thermal power plants release sulfur. But new thermal power plants are built with filters protected by static electricity. With this system, thermals are used efficiently and waste of plants can be controlled. Environmentalists offer solar and wind power as alternatives, but these are not stable energy resources and have storage problem. Because they are unstable, balancing and regulation is problematic. Solar power has practical limits. Wind and solar power can meet only %15-20 of energy need. So, Turkey has to build nuclear power plants to meet its energy needs. Of course, nuclear power has side effects. Nuclear fuel already exists; Germany and France sell nuclear fuel. What is the ratio of nuclear accidents? What is the ratio of dying in a plane crash? You can die in a car accident or tube explosion. If Turkey uses all wind and solar resources, these resources will not substitute for one-two nuclear plants.

Nuclear energy has been on the agenda of Turkey with Turkey Atomic Energy Authority, founded in 1956, working as a regulatory body. Since its foundation, although tenders were made for the establishment of nuclear power plants four times in 1977, 1983, 1996, 2008; four tenders were canceled for different reasons. With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Russia in January 2010, nuclear power plant for electricity generation was added to the political agenda again.

Özcan Caner answered the question of 'Why nuclear power is on the agenda?'.

Adding nuclear energy to agenda is not for agenda setting, but to meet the energy needs of Turkey. Turkey is a poor country in the field of energy. Turkey has very limited energy resources, oil and natural gas is almost negligible. Almost 70-72% of the natural gas is imported from abroad. Turkey has hydro-electric resources and is using 70% of its potential. Thus, Turkey has a huge energy need. Turkey is a developing country, so energy needs of Turkey are also growing. Therefore, the energy policy making is determined in accordance with these requirements. There was 4500- 5000 MW energy deficit in 2008. In order to close the %10 energy deficit, it is not enough to install the solar and wind power plants. At this point, Turkey has a few choices such as coal plants, nuclear power plants. And Turkey has to form policies accordingly.

According to Caner, nuclear power plants will make contributions in two areas, in reducing the dependence on foreign resources. Plus, Turkey develops R&D projects for the development of nuclear power. Therefore, the use of national resources will be increased. ETKB is still in the planning phase and preparing secondary legislation for nuclear energy power plants. Until the end of 2013, the regulation on distribution of responsibility to third parties in case of an accident or leakage will be prepared.

The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Because energy policies are put on the political agenda in order to satisfy energy the need of the country, the impact of anti-nuclear movement on the agenda-setting process is limited. Even though after related laws have been enacted, regulations have been made and started to become institutionalized; anti-nuclear movement are able set the political agenda against Akkuyu power plant through sympathetic policy makers. Sympathetic policy makers increase favorable environment in political context for anti-nuclear movement and create political agenda against nuclear power in parliament. Loç people did not want to include political parties into their struggle. Different from Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement works more coordinately and actively with opposition parties. Especially, independent deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü, and CHP Mersin Deputies, Aytuğ Atıcı, İsa Gök, Ali Rıza Öztürk, Vahap Seçer gave great support to the movement. Ertuğrul Kürkçü and CHP Mersin Deputies were attending anti-nuclear human chains, protests, demonstrations and press releases. Mersin Deputies were meeting with anti-nuclear platform members to discuss recent developments about nuclear issue. CHP Mersin Deputies has brought Akkuyu nuclear power plant issue to the parliament several times through parliamentary questions and written questions. CHP asked opening of parliamentary inquiry to investigate impacts of planned nuclear power plant on the region and human health on March 2012. Even though CHP deputies increase favorable environment in political context for anti-nuclear, some activists criticize CHP and their contribution to the movement. According to some activists, politically CHP has not completely opposed NPPs; according to them, CHP has joined the movement so as to increase its vote and it opposes Akkuyu NPP because AKP government's activities are against national interests.

Different from Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement works more coordinately and actively with opposition parties. Anti-Nuclear Platform members visit opposition parties' groups, BDP, MHP and CHP to take their support against nuclear power plant in Akkuyu and raise the issue in the parliament. BDP is against the nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric power plants. CHP, MHP and BDP asked opening of parliamentary inquiry for the establishment of nuclear power plant in Akkuyu for many times during the years of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. But these proposals were not accepted by the General Assembly. As Üredi stated, when tender or construction of the nuclear power plant is at political agenda, as it was during the Fukushima and Chernobyl anniversary; protests and anti-nuclear acts are becoming more vibrant. Especially after Fukushima disaster, opposition deputies intensely raised Akkuyu nuclear power plant issue in the parliament. But, about Fukushima disaster, Prime Minister Erdoğan said that "these are usual events, but life continues and now with more advanced technology, successful steps are being taken at this point". Illegal activities of the company in Akkuyu were on the parliament on July 2013. Through written question and parliamentary question, opposition parties have brought Akkuyu nuclear power plant issue on the parliament agenda. These issues included regulation changes on EIA exemption, agreement signed with a bid Japan's Mitsubishi and Areva SA to build Sinop nuclear power plant, claims about company's work began in Akkuyu without the EIA report. Lastly, CHP deputy asked Veysel Eroğlu the claims that the government wants to give a message via Akkuyu to Russia, because of the attitude of the government towards Syria (Tarsus Haber, 2013).

6.5.2 Policy Alternatives and Enactment of Policies

6.5.2.1 Policy Monopolies in Energy Policy-Making Process in Turkey

As Caner indicates, Ministry of Energy is not the only institution to make energy policy in Turkey. There are many institutions and organizations. Energy is a multilateral issue. Energy issue has the environment, urban planning and social security, regulatory sides. Thus, in a common mechanism, unity of thought occurs. Ministry of Economy, Treasury, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization may contribute to the process. Turkish Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for “giving approval, license and permits regarding site selection, construction, management and environmental safety for nuclear power and research reactors” (Udum, 109). But TAEK is not an independent regulatory authority for nuclear energy. Laws and regulations are prepared and gone through governance framework. Members of the public, the private sector, and civil society organizations also make contribution to the process. Views of civil society organizations have taken directly in the process of forming a policy (Levent Ozcan Caner).

As Meyer indicated, social movements can affect policy by changing composition of policy monopoly. Changes in policy monopolies enhance the effectiveness of mobilization. Exclusion and inclusion of actors change the composition of policy monopoly which maintains policies. There are individuals and groups inside and the outside of the government that act as legitimate actors for specific policies. Policy monopoly in energy domain has changed in Turkey. The private sector started to be more involved in the Turkish energy policy-making process. But involvement of the

state in the energy sector is still high in the country and energy policy monopoly has not included in other non-state actors. As Akbulut stated, various non-state actors' involvement in energy policy-making process and their influence on policy formation are very limited.

Energy politics is a strategic and high political issue. International relations and markets have decisive role in energy policies. High profile “domains such as energy domain are characterized by their importance for the maintenance of established power relations in a given polity” (Krieisi, 77). According to Minister Yıldız (2010), integration of nuclear energy is significant to meet increasing energy need of Turkey. Nuclear energy is included in the 9th Five-Year Development Plan for 2007-2013. One of the main objectives of the Strategic Plan for 2010-2014 by Ministry of Energy is building and operating nuclear power plants by 2023 (Karbuz and Şanlı, 2010). As the development and strategic plan indicated, Ministry of Energy and other state institutions insist on nuclear energy to diversify energy sources and provide energy security.

“Blue Book” and other statements of the government and energy ministry claim that policy-making process is participatory and they consult related researchers, trade associations and civil society organizations to ask their opinion about regulations and projects. But to consult and ask opinion to the related organizations do not mean that ministry regards these opinions and scientific analysis. As Hakan Akbulut indicated, impact of non-governmental organizations is very little in the process.

Because energy security and the cost and availability of energy are main concerns in energy policy-making process; limited number of actors joins the energy policy-making process. So, public, locals, civil society organizations, and academicians cannot become effective actors during the process. Perceived as national security issues and a political tool in the global political arena, energy policy-making process in Turkey is so closed and actors included in the process are very limited. Under these circumstances, local people and environmental organizations' participation to the process are limited and difficult. Even there are many scientific studies about risks and possible environmental destructions of nuclear power plants, the government insists on construction of these power plants. According to Akbulut, due to existing mechanisms, energy policies cannot have a participatory structure.

6.5.2.2 Policy Alternatives and Enactment of Policies

Turkey has very limited oil and natural gas resources. Turkey imports natural gas and she is dependent on natural gas imports to satisfy her energy need. ETKB's Strategic Plan 2010-2014 includes avoiding dependence on imported energy, exploitation of all domestic sources as coal and renewables, and constructing and operating nuclear power plants by 2023. Energy diversity is a significant factor in reducing external dependency (EPDK, 2010). In order to close the 10% energy deficit, it is not enough to install the solar and wind power plants. The government chooses proposals which are consistent with decision makers' norms, feasible, and acceptable in cost. According to Caner, within this framework, Turkey has a few choices like coal plants and nuclear power plants. And Turkey has to form policies accordingly and build nuclear power plants.

Öztürk states that the Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology invites all representatives of sectors and NGOs to committee meetings and they present their written opinions. As a result of these meetings, if there are useful components, these are included in the law (Mustafa Öztürk). However, according to Öztürk's supervisor, sensitivities of companies and non-governmental organizations are different. Opinions of chambers and associations are taken into consideration by the government and committees.

On the contrary to policy-makers statements, anti-nuclear platform (and its components) and platform activists said that they have not received any meeting request from relevant ministries. Osman Koçak replies the 'Is there any meeting request from related ministries for sharing information and opinion?' question,

Government takes decision. The government does not establish a dialogue with the social movement and says it would not establish a dialogue with the movement. Prepared folders and signatures, petitions have been sent to relevant ministries and commissions, but we did not receive any answer. We conveyed our demands to members of parliament, political parties and commissions. On January 2013, we sent 300.000 petitions to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to not to build the nuclear power plant. But the government has not taken us into consideration and responded our claims.

Necati Üstünova stated that Greenpeace met with Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. Ministry only held this meeting to apply the procedure and did not take Greenpeace's concerns and ideas into consideration. As discussed earlier, state cooperation and negotiation with non-state actors and organizations does not mean effective participation or inclusion in the process. Special reports, proposals, and

demands of organizations are not taken into consideration for decisions, the laws and regulations. Related commissions and ministries did not work actively and coordinately on draft law or law on nuclear energy with anti-nuclear.

AKP has 347 seats in the parliament. So AKP government has easily passed policy proposals into law and made regulations for nuclear power. Turkey and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for construction and operation of nuclear energy power plant in Akkuyu in 2010. Contract with Russian ZAO Atomstroyexport for constructing nuclear plant increased debates about nuclear energy again and raised anti-nuclear movement in Turkey. Anti-nuclear Platform visited BDP and CHP groups and asked them to vote against this agreement between Turkey and Russia. In front of the parliament, anti-nuclear activists protested approval of the intergovernmental agreement signed between Turkey and Russia on the establishment of nuclear power plant in Akkuyu on July 2010. Professional organizations and the public's concerns were not taken into account in any way. Even anti-nuclear protests and opposition parties were against; the agreement was approved by the parliament.

Law on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and the Sale of Energy Generated from Those Plants (2007) was passed on November 2007. During the enactment of the law, Mersin people or components of Anti-nuclear platform such as EMO and ÇMO were not invited to the committee and ministries' meeting to tell their opinions. AKP government made several changes in EIA Regulation in 2008, 2011 and 2013. Anti-nuclear Platform and other actors in the movement were not

been invited to the related committee and ministries' meeting to discuss amendments on the EIA regulation.

For Amenta (2005), in early legislative phases of impacting policy process is easy before a policy becoming institutionalized. Established nuclear policies and programs have generated their own beneficiaries, contractors and constituencies. Therefore, it can be more difficult for the movement to affect political process. Even though sympathetic policy makers have brought nuclear power issue to the parliament, they cannot initiate new legislations in favor of the movement (Amenta, 2005: 38). The AKP government, who has the majority in the parliament, has not allowed anti-nuclear bills and proposals pass into law. Despite the movement, the government creates political agenda and passes the laws. So, anti-nuclear movement could not alter the content of legislation in favor of the social movements.

And when the government encounters any obstacles to the realization of the project, it makes necessary legal arrangements and legal changes. Top-down decisions are taken for nuclear power plant projects. Prime ministry circular was sent to accelerate the procedures. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources gave instructions to Mersin Province Special Administration for required procedures.

Levi stated government regulations,

In order to overcome the obstacles and realize the project, Prime Ministry issued a circular for Akkuyu nuclear power plant (See, Circular on Akkuyu NPP Project, No: 28240, Entry into force: 21 March 2012). With the new regulation, projects that have been taken in the public investment program before the date of 1997 have become exempt from Environmental Impact Assessment. The government ignores rule of law and democracy.

6.5.3 Implementation

6.5.3.1 Informing Public

Even though nuclear energy has been on the agenda of Turkey since 1970s, tenders for the establishment of nuclear power plants were canceled for different reasons. Lastly, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Russia in January 2010, nuclear power plant for electricity generation was added to political agenda again. AKP government passed the Law for Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants; but the government has not make an effort to inform public about agreement and legislation. So, these developments cause rising of anti-nuclear movement again to stop construction of nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.

Anti-nuclear activists answered 'no' to 'Do authorities sufficiently inform local community/platform about the nuclear power plant?' question. Sabahat Aslan said that people followed the process and developments from media. As Mehmet Şafak Yaşar indicated , authorities have not informed public about nuclear energy and Akkuyu NPP. The public has obtained information through NGOs, platforms and trade associations. People in anti-nuclear movement have more technical and scientific information about the project and power plant than Loç people. Anti-nuclear activists have the opportunity to have technical and detailed information through their components such as Chamber of Electrical Engineers, Chamber of Environmental Engineers and etc. Panels, conferences, meetings, radio and television programs, newspapers, social media, Twitter and Facebook disseminate

information to public and other groups as well as other organizations. Ayhan Yerden replies the question:

No, authorities do not share information with the public. EIA reports must be 1.000 pages and include both positive-negative aspects of the project. But report did not include anything about negative aspects on fishing and agriculture and so on. Capitalist system tries to convince interest groups and politicians not the public. The company could not meet and convince mass organizations, because anti-nuclear organizations and platforms in Mersin are powerful.

According to Osman Koçak, it is impossible for public to get accurate and clear information from the company and the government. Anti-nuclear platform and activists basically inform the public. According to Fidan Üredi, especially, terms of the intergovernmental agreement with Russia have been hidden from the public.

NGS Public Information Center was opened with primary school students. Company could not make the opening ceremony for information center because of anti-nuclear activists' protests. According to anti-nuclear activists, NGS Public Information Center was opened, but the center does not make any effort to inform the public.

As activists stated, lack of free access to the information, as most decisions taken by the state, and incompatible rules and regulations with present economic, social and environmental realities constrain the participation in Turkish legislation. So implementation phase has become more significant to non-state actors. Non-state actors can have indirect and direct power to influence implementation phase.

Implementation phase generates conditions for the emergence of social movements and object to change the policy with stopping its implementation.

6.5.3.2 Implementation of Project

For social movements, it is possible to monitor the implementation of the policy. Even though social movements do not have any access to the government or political parties, they have access to the courts. In order to achieve their goals, they can use courts (Kolb, 2000: 51-52).

As explained in the theoretical chapter of the thesis, social movements can prevent or slow down the implementation of the policy. Even though a social movement cannot abandon a policy officially, it can still prevent the implementation of a policy. Social movements use the court in order to put pressure on implementation of legislation. Movements use litigation to stop or slow down the implementation of legislation or policy programs that they are against. Social movements can slow down or accelerate policy implementation with court decision. But courts' decisions are not always on behalf of the social movement interests.

Even though the movement meets with opposition from parties, and takes sympathetic policy-makers' support; juridical mechanism is the most straightforward political mechanism for the movement. Similar with Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement also uses courts as a mechanism to stop the Akkuyu NPP. During the process, Loç people did not receive any financial support from anyone; they covered all expenses and court costs by themselves. Unlike Loç movement, various chambers and associations (components of NKP) have helped to cover court costs and other expenses for the anti-nuclear movement.

Regulation on the Procedures and Principles for Competition and the Convention and Incentives for the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and the Sale of Energy Generated from Those Plant was published in the Official Gazette on March 2008. And then the tender to build NPP was announced by TETAŞ. Case filed for annulment of the regulation by the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects. And the Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative Cases at the Turkish Council of State adopted a motion for stay of execution related to Article 3 of the Regulation on the installation of nuclear power plants on October 2009. So, the tender process ended legally and TETAŞ announced the cancellation of the tender for nuclear power plants. However, in 2010, the AKP government and the Russian government signed an agreement on Akkuyu NPP. The intergovernmental agreement closed the legal ways. According to Levi, doing something is restricted legally, because of the intergovernmental agreement which is superior to the Turkish law.

Sabahat Aslan indicated that anti-nuclear platform carries out struggle in the legal as well as social field. The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects sued against annulment changes made by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization on 1/100.0000 scaled environmental plan and the court cancelled 1/100.000 scaled environmental plans for Akkuyu nuclear power plant. On February 2012, Anti-Nuclear Platform members of Mersin filed a complaint against public officials who allow all kinds of operations in the field without the construction license, EIA document and certificate and do not take legal action on the

unauthorized activities (Mersin Haber, 2012). But, courts' decisions are not always on behalf of social movement interests. On June 2012, The Constitution Court rejected the CHP's demand of the cancellation of the provisions on approval of the agreement signed between Turkey and Russia on the establishment of nuclear power plant in Akkuyu (Hürriyet, 2012).

The Government amended the Regulation on EIA in 2008; and, with the third provisional article, the government has brought exemption from EIA for projects that the investment decision was taken before 1993 (By-Law, 2011). With this amendment, Akkuyu NPP project are exempted from the EIA report. Council of State has canceled EIA exemption regulation (3. provisional article) as a result of the lawsuit filed by environmentalists (ETHA, 2011).

Ministry of Environment and Forestry amended 3rd provisional article in 2011. The Ministry brought EIA exemption for some investments, including thermal power plants which would begin until 2013 and 2015. Recently, once again, Council of State cancelled the regulation on March 2013 (Radikal, 2013). As a result of lawsuits filed by Chamber of Environmental Engineers, the Council of State decided that the EIA process is necessary for important projects such as the third Bosphorus Bridge, Ilisu Dam, and airports.

On April 2013, parliament introduced amendments to the Regulation on EIA. According to the amendments, provisions of the regulation is not applicable for projects that have been taken in the investment program before the date of 23/06/1997, or projects which have passed the planning stage, have had a completed

tender, or have started the production and operation from the date of 04/05/2013 (By-Law, 2013). Lawsuits filed by Chamber of Environmental Engineers and Ecology Collective requested annulment of the regulation. Again Council of State has canceled regulation changes.

Even the Council of State annulled the decision of the exemption from EIA several times; the government had a regulation that ignores the decision of the Council of State. With the new regulation on May 2013, projects that have been taken in the public investment program before the year 1997 or projects which have passed the planning stage or have started the operation from the date of entry into force of this article have been exempted from the EIA. And this amendment has brought the exemption from EIA for thermal, hydroelectric, nuclear power plants, the third Bosphorus Bridge and airports.

Levi remarks law amendments and ignorance of rule of law,

In order to overcome the obstacles and realize the project, Prime Ministry issued a circular for Akkuyu nuclear power plant (See, Circular on Akkuyu NPP Project, No: 28240, Entry into force: 21 March 2012). With the new regulation, projects that have been taken in the public investment program before the date of 1997 have become exempt from Environmental Impact Assessment. The government ignores rule of law and democracy.

Ministry of Environment and Urbanization formally rejected EIA Report for Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Project on July 2013 (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013). In this regard; we should take strained relations with Russia because of Syria, and investment in thermal power plant as a form of coal-based energy systems into account. Nevertheless, these developments do not mean that Turkey has given up nuclear power plant projects.

6.6 Success and Impact of the Anti-Nuclear Movement

Outcome of the anti-nuclear energy movement in Turkey is significant and effective. Impact of anti-nuclear movement is possible with looking postponement in plant construction (Giugni, 1999). Although the movement has not able to achieve an official policy change regarding the use of nuclear power, the movement has successfully postponed the process of nuclear power plant construction several times. For Sabahat Aslan, postponement of the project is a great success of the movement. According to Mehmet Yaşar Şafak, the movement is definitely successful; because they can stop the project at any time. Until signing the intergovernmental agreement with Russia, nuclear energy was off the political agenda. Implementation of the nuclear power project was slowed down with the effect of the movement. The movement has successfully stopped the completion of nuclear project in Akkuyu. On the other side of the success of the movement, it has not able to completely cancel the construction of nuclear power plant project. But for activists, it is an ongoing process. Even if the company constructs it, they will continue their resistance, they won't let it operate. But in order to be successful, opposition to nuclear power must be activated and needs to become a nationwide mass movement rather than a regional-scale mass movement, according to Ayhan.

For Levi, it is a long-term political struggle:

Our object is to close all nuclear power plants; will we achieve this object in the long-run? Nuclear power plant investments are risky for investors, because there is no Treasury guarantee. These investments are not economic as well as people's reaction gradually increases. It is undemocratic; and it does not provide economic advantages. Because of all these problems, no one afford the cost of the project, the process ends automatically.

According to Gamson's success definition (1990), 'new advantages' represents the degree to which a social movement's program is realized. The anti-nuclear movement's objective is to cancel the Akkuyu NPP and to prevent other nuclear power projects. Even though the movement fails to achieve stated program, the movement has successfully postponed construction nuclear power plant in Akkuyu several times since 1976. Nuclear power plant construction was stopped by efforts of the movement and court decisions. For Fidan Üredi, the company cannot still build nuclear power plant; so it is a great achievement for anti-nuclear activists.

For Gamson's second form of success (1990), 'acceptance', refers to being a legitimate representative of a constituency by the target of collective action. As discussed earlier, negotiations, formal recognition and inclusion are forms of acceptance in policy-making. Anti-nuclear movement has not gained much acceptance, because anti-nuclear platform has not become a formal representative entity. Anti-nuclear activists involved in negotiations with the government to achieve legislative change, but have not included as a formal representative in legislation or decision-making process.

Anti-nuclear movement effectively uses courts as a mechanism to stop the nuclear power project. Council of State adopted a motion for stay of execution related to the Regulation on the nuclear power plants on October 2009. So, the tender process ended legally. According to the young teacher, the process is not moving in the direction which nuclear opponents wanted. The intergovernmental agreement closed the legal ways. The government amended the Regulation on EIA several times. With

amendments, the government has brought exemption from EIA for Akkuyu NPP and Council of State has canceled EIA exemption regulation as a result of the lawsuit that was filed several times. But on May 2013, the government had a regulation that ignores the decision of Council of State. Even though there are court decisions, and public in Akkuyu and Mersin is against the nuclear power plant; the government insists on Akkuyu NPP with political pressure and changing regulations.

According to anti-nuclear platform activists, even though government insisted on its policies, it is not able to do what it wants at any time because of the resistance. For instance, the government planned to start to construction of Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2010 and it could not realize it, so it is a big success.

Nuclear power plant construction was stopped by efforts of the movement and court decisions. For Fidan Üredi, the company cannot still build nuclear power plant; it is a great achievement for anti-nuclear activists. In addition to Gamson's two forms of success (1990), Rochon and Mazmanian's changing social values (1993) were added as the third dimension. Social and cultural transformations must be taken into consideration. The movement tried to change the activities of company and the state through court decisions and tried to affect the actions of individuals and public for achieving social change. Mersin people have been informed about nuclear energy, operation of nuclear power plants and its effects and harms. Creation of ecological and anti-nuclear consciousness in the province of Mersin and in the country is very significant especially for social values and awareness. It has a symbolic significance for other environmental movements in Turkey. It is important for all ecological

movements in Turkey and it has influences on other ecological movements. If we will lose the fight against the nuclear power, we cannot talk about ecological struggle in Turkey anymore. With changing social values, the movement changes the perception of individuals and public behavior toward the environment. Anti-nuclear movement has changed perspectives and values of the public and create convenient environment to discuss benefits and harms of energy projects. It is significant, because it can also change the perception of policy-makers and the political agenda. Public perception change may have ability to put pressure on the government and policy-makers to adopt favorable policies. Public has been informed about positive and negative sides of the HPPs.

But the movement could not change the perception of decision-makers and policy-makers on energy policies. The government still insists on NPP projects. In opposition to movement achievements, the government has brought new regulations to realize Akkuyu NPP and signed agreements for new NPPs. On May 2013, Turkish and Japanese government signed an intergovernmental agreement, including exclusive negotiating rights to build a nuclear power plant in Sinop. With this agreement, Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and Areva SA of France will build Sinop nuclear power plant which will cost \$22 billion (Sabah, 2013).

6.7 Conclusion

The government takes decision, makes legal regulations and then implements the projects. For the government, nuclear energy is significant for energy security. As a result of non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process people who would be directly affected by NPP projects caused a reactive movement in Turkey. Even though the government has not made an effort to inform public, public is informed about NPPs and their impacts through platforms and chambers. Anti-nuclear movement has existed since 1970s in Turkey. Mobilization has increased when tender and construction are put on the political agenda. The movement tries to affect all phases of policy-making process. The movement puts nuclear issue on the political agenda through sympathetic policy makers. It tries to be included in the process, as visiting opposition parties indicates. But energy policy-making process in Turkey is so closed and actors included in the process are very limited. Because the movement is not included in the process, they could not affect enactment of policies. But, for the movement, the most straightforward political mechanism is juridical mechanism; so the movement could have direct and the greatest impact on nuclear decisions and policies through courts.

The two cases demonstrated similarities and differences in concern with the dynamics and impacts of their movements. Energy security, the cost and availability of energy are main concerns of the energy policy-making process. Limited number of actors joins the energy decision-making process; so public, locals, civil society organizations and academicians cannot become effective during the process. Public is not included in the decision-making processes of energy projects.

Energy policies are put on the political agenda in order to satisfy the energy need of the country. The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Because energy policies are determined by the needs of the country, the impact of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement on the agenda-setting process is limited. Involvement of the state in the energy sector is still high in Turkey and involvement of NGOs, academicians, and public is limited. The government does not consider policy suggestions and special reports and organizations' proposals and demands in the laws, regulations and final decisions.

Even though courts' decisions are not always on behalf of movement actors, movements effectively use courts for stopping or slowing down the implementation of legislation which they are against. Although the movements have not able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Loç Valley and the construction of NPP in Akkuyu; the movements have successfully prevented the construction of power plants for a several time. But the government tries to have new regulations that ignore the court decisions. Last regulations and law amendments indicate that the government tries to put the SHPPs and NPP projects into practice, and these policies of the government put pressure on jurisdiction and restrict the possibility of access for social movements.

Turkey's environmental problems have emerged as a result of contradiction between environmental protection and economic growth as well as the state's significant role

providing necessary condition for private companies. Economic growth and environmental protection have clashed in Turkey, and this creates tension between environmental organizations/public and the state. Administration and decision-making process are still highly centralized in Turkey. Turkish state has not followed inclusive strategies for energy policies. As a result of these two cases' analysis, we can conclude that energy policy-making process is non-participant in Turkey. As a result of exclusion from democratic decision and policy-making process, movements emerge to transmit their requests and take part in processes. So, anti-nuclear movement and anti-HPP are not proactive, but reactive movements and they generate reactive impacts. They reacted against construction of NPPs and HPPs. State tries to suppress movements and ignores court decisions; and it still enacts unfavorable laws and makes regulations for the environment.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the dynamics of Loç movement as well as anti-nuclear movement and impacts of these environmental movements against the Cide HES Project and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant were examined. The movements themselves were not the main focus of this thesis but how these movements influence Turkish energy policy-making process was. I have analyzed political structures that pave the way for the movements and movements' actions to affect the process. In this study, first Loç and anti-nuclear movement were illustrated, and then; how movements involved into the policy-making process, level of involvement, opportunities and obstacles for involvement and success of the movements were discussed. Environmental movements in Turkey emerge quite recently especially in Black Sea Region. The originality of this thesis lies in the data collection from Loç Valley and Mersin fieldworks and examination of their impacts on each energy policy-making phase, agenda-setting, policy alternatives and implementation. A main aim of this thesis was to examine emergence, mechanisms and dynamics of two environmental movements; to discuss similarities and differences in the movements; and to point out their influences on energy policy-making process.

Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement were examined based on in-depth interviews with activists on the local level, platform members and government representatives as well as bureaucrats. The study was enriched through participant observation. The method of the study is qualitative. It should be noted that the examination of anti-nuclear movement does not cover all the provinces and the

districts of the country, because of time limitation. The thesis put Mersin into the center of anti-nuclear movement which is the heart of the movement. In addition, through in-depth interviews conducted with people in different provinces such as Antalya, Amasra, Hopa and İstanbul, I achieved a broader framework of anti-nuclear movement.

Turkey's energy need is increasing more rapidly than the energy production. Energy policies are determined in accordance with the strategic needs of the country. For Turkish governments, nuclear energy and hydropower are significant for energy security. Since the 1970s, the Turkish state has planned a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. Justice and Development Party (AKP) emphasized the necessity of nuclear power for low cost and reducing dependence on foreign energy resources. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Project is one of the biggest investment projects regarding energy security. Hydropower is a main resource in Turkey to reduce the import dependence and to increase portion of renewable and domestic energy resources to provide energy supply security. Generation and selling electricity through HPPs construction by private sector have become possible with Water Use Right Agreement (2003) and Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005). Entities sign the Water Use Right Agreement with DSİ and apply to the EMRA for energy generation licenses to construct and operate a hydroelectric power plant.

Energy policy-making process is non-participant in Turkey. The government takes decisions, makes legal regulations and then implements the projects. Non-participant policy-making process, top-down decisions and exclusion from decision-making process caused reactive environmental movements in Turkey. Because policy-makers and decision-makers have not asked and informed people who would be mostly affected by the projects and include them in the process, people reacted against the projects.

The analysis of the environmental movements against energy projects was based on the study of two cases: Anti-nuclear movement and anti-HPP reacted against construction of NPP and SHPP. The first fieldwork was conducted in May 2013, four villages in Loç Valley, in the district of Cide. The second fieldwork was carried out in April 2013, in the province of Mersin and in the district of Silifke. The findings and results of the thesis are based on interviews with activists involved in Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement.

Anti-HPP movements around Turkey started to mobilize after these policies enacted. Mobilization in Loç Valley started after policies enacted, but not implemented. Loç people were informed about HPP and Cide HES Project when engineering vehicles came to valley and started operation in the riverside. Protests in Loç Valley started on June 2010. The main motivations of anti-HPP activists engaged into the movement were to preserve their villages, water, land and culture. Black Sea Region is very prosperous in terms of its endemic spaces. The activists emphasized that it is

an ecological struggle; struggle for life and life of creatures that live in the stream. In order to prevent illegal activities of the company, local people and activists set up camp and waited all night and day in the riverside. Loç people staged a sit-in protest in front of Orya Energy Company in Kabataş which maintains for 28 days which ended with the decision of stay of execution on 8 December 2010. Construction site was sealed on 31 December 2010. Court granted a motion for stay of execution on 3 January 2011. EIA report was cancelled on 11 July 2011. Orya appealed against annulment decision and council of state reversed the annulment decision. Loç people went to appeal. And lastly, Kastamonu Administrative Court approved the cancelled EIA report on April 2013.

Since the 1970s, the Turkish state has planned a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. Tenders were made for the establishment of nuclear power plants four times in 1977, 1983, 1996, 2008; and four tenders were canceled for different reasons. National and international resistance against the nuclear power plant started in 1976. Anti-nuclear activists objected to the project due to destruction of environment; nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race; nuclear waste issue; accident and radiation leakage risks; and, damages on creatures and human health. Environmental, social and economic impact of these projects has not been considered by authorities. First protest was held by fishers in Silifke. The nuclear power project had been suspended by 1980 military coup. Professional organizations like Doctors and Lawyer Unions, labor unions, local and national NGOs formed the anti-nuclear platform in 1993 and became effective to postpone bid for several times. (Adem, 2005). In 1994, resistance became bigger and

stronger through nationwide campaigns, demonstrations and unofficial referendum after the Chernobyl disaster (Vouivouli, 2011).

With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Russia in January 2010, nuclear power plant for electricity generation was added to political agenda again. According to the intergovernmental agreement between Turkey and Russia, Rosatom would build, own and operate the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2010. Turkish government tried to start construction process without EIA report in 2010. Mobilization increased when tender and construction are put on the political agenda. Anti-nuclear platform was constituted of ninety components as political parties, NGOs, labor and trade unions, trade associations. Marches, demonstrations, press releases, distribution of posters and leaflets, meetings with the public, informing public, raising public awareness, TV-radio broadcasts as well as signature campaigns are used as strategies by anti-nuclear platform. The movement tries to affect all phases of policy-making process. The movement puts nuclear issue on the political agenda through sympathetic policy makers. The movement tries to be included in the process, as visiting opposition parties indicates. But energy policy-making process in Turkey is so closed and actors included in the process are very limited.

The two cases demonstrated similarities and differences in concern with the dynamics and impacts of their movements. Both Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement have used the legal struggle as the main mechanism for their striving. Activists go to court as a result of the violation of the related laws and articles by the

government and companies. The slow operation of the legal process and different court decisions from each other discredits courts and made movements efforts' ineffective.

The movement against the Cide HES Project can be characterized as a local movement. Unlike Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement can be characterized as a more nationwide movement. Wide range of actors was involved in the movements. In different ways, local and national authorities, the public, the media, party representatives and non-governmental organizations engaged into the movements. Culture associations, profession chambers, unions and environmental NGOs have taken part in these movements. The movements carried out their resistance through forming opposition and protection platforms.

Loç Valley Protection Platform cooperates mostly with other local platforms such as Munzur, Hasankeyf platforms, regional protection platforms, and some associations such as İstanbul Bar Association. Anti-nuclear platform is a nationwide umbrella organization which consists of political parties such as CHP, DSIP, EMEP, ÖDP; ecology and environment groups and associations; Greenpeace, Confederation of Public Laborer's Unions (KESK), Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK); labor unions, various trade associations, chambers as well as various associations/platforms.

Local governments such as Antalya (MHP) and Mersin (CHP) municipalities support anti-nuclear movement whereas village headmen and district governorship did not

support the movement in Loç Valley. Village headmen and district governorship did not support the movement and do their task to prevent illegal activities of the company. Loç people did not want to include political parties into their struggle. Representatives from Loç Valley only met with Sabahat Tuncel. Tuncel brought issue to the parliament with a written question to Minister of Environment and Urbanization about ongoing illegal activities of Umran Boru in Loç Valley at the end of 2010. Different from Loç movement, anti-nuclear movement works more coordinately and actively with opposition parties. Independent deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü, and CHP Mersin Deputies, Aytuğ Atıcı, İsa Gök, Ali Rıza Öztürk, Vahap Seçer gave great support to anti-nuclear movement. Mersin Deputies were meeting with anti-nuclear platform members to discuss recent developments about nuclear power plant. CHP Mersin Deputies has brought Akkuyu nuclear power plant issue to the parliament several times through parliamentary questions and written questions. CHP asked opening of parliamentary inquiry to investigate impacts of planned nuclear power plant on the region and human health on March 2012. CHP, MHP and BDP asked opening of parliamentary inquiry for the establishment of nuclear power plant in Akkuyu for many times during the years of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. But these proposals were not accepted by the General Assembly.

Local and national governments' administrative structure do not provide transparency. Authorities have not informed public about the projects and nuclear/hydro power. According to activists, it is impossible for public to get accurate and clear information from the companies and the government. As activists stated, the public has obtained information through NGOs, platforms and trade

associations. Panels, conferences, meetings, radio and television programs, newspapers, social media, Twitter and Facebook allow dissemination of information to public and other groups as well as other organizations.

All actors, public and groups influenced by energy projects and environmental degradation must share responsibility in the planning stage. Central planning is powerful in Turkey, so public participation at the planning stage is limited. Because of lack of free access to information and central planning; public, organizations and platforms are not included in the agenda-setting and policy formulation; but they can be included in its implementation phase. Public perceives projects as a threat to their lives and take action against the policy. Policy implementation phase creates conditions for the occurrence of social movements and aim to alter the policy with blockading its implementation. People can monitor activities of agencies; they can ask other authorities such as courts to stop activities (Güneş and Aydın Coşkun, 2005).

Environmental Impact Assessment report is a legal pre-condition for major infrastructural projects in Turkey. EIA process is the only process for public involvement in the decision-making process of thermal power plants, hydroelectric power plants, nuclear power plants, dams, and so on. However, environmental impact assessment is seen as a formality. Energy security, the cost and availability of energy are main concerns of the energy policy-making process; limited number of actors joins the energy decision-making process; so public, locals, civil society

organizations, academicians cannot become effective during the process. Public is not included in the decision-making processes of energy projects. Participatory approach is not common in the energy policy-making process in Turkey.

When organizations do not contradict the modernist priorities of the state, state is inclusive and accessible. Lack of free access to information, dominance of the state in decision-making process, and incompatible rules and regulations with present economic, social and environmental realities constrain the public participation in Turkish legislation. Energy policies are put on the political agenda in order to satisfy the energy need of the country. The government perceives energy issue as a strategic domain. Because energy policies are determined by the needs of the country, the impact of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement on the agenda-setting process is limited.

Policy monopoly in energy domain has changed in Turkey. The private sector started to be more involved in the Turkish energy policy-making process. But involvement of the state in the energy sector is still high in Turkey and involvement of NGOs, academicians, and public is limited. The government chooses proposals which are consistent with decision makers' norms, feasible, and acceptable in cost. Related commissions and ministries do not actively and coordinately work on proposals or laws with movement actors. Anti-nuclear and anti-SHPP movement actors who are invited to the related committee and ministries' meeting are not invited to discuss amendments on related laws. The government does not consider policy suggestions

and special reports and organizations' proposals and demands in the laws, regulations and final decision. The government cooperates with some organizations but this does not always mean a regular and effective participation in the process. The government does not recognize movement representatives as a legitimate representative for the process. Their requests have not been taken into account by the government.

Even though courts' decisions are not always on behalf of movement actors, movements effectively use courts for stopping or slowing down the implementation of legislation that they are against. Although the movements were not able to achieve an official policy change and completely cancel the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Loç Valley and the construction of NPP in Akkuyu, the movements have successfully prevented the construction of power plants for a several time. But the government tried to have new regulations that ignore the decision of the court decisions. Last developments and regulations increase suspicion about separation of power and independence of judiciary in Turkey. Last regulations and law amendments indicate that the government tries to put the SHPPs and NPP projects into practice, and these policies of the government put pressure on jurisdiction and restrict the possibility of access for social movements.

With regard to social movement success definition, Loç movement has reached a partial success. Loç movement's aim is to cancel the Cide HES Project. Loç movement has partially realized its program. Even though Loç movement has not completely cancelled the construction of hydroelectric power plant in Loç Valley, it

has successfully postponed and stopped the HPP construction process for 3 years. Similar to Loç movement, although the anti-nuclear movement has not able to achieve an official policy change regarding the use of nuclear power, the movement has successfully postponed the nuclear power plant construction several times. Implementation of the nuclear power project slowed down with the effect of the movement. But the process still continues for these movements.

Cultural and social changes emerge as a result of the anti-HPP anti-nuclear movements. Movements have tried to change the activities of company and tried to affect the actions and attitudes of individuals and public for achieving social change. The perception that hydropower energy is environment-friendly and green, so it is the most compatible energy with the environment has started to change with Loç movement and other anti-HPP movements. Public has become informed positive and negative sides of the SHPPs and NPPs. We can talk about perception change in public especially who becomes the target of these projects. The movements change the perception of individuals and public behavior toward the energy and environment.

The state still has prioritizing economic growth rather than environmental protection (Aydın, 2005). Turkey's environmental problems have emerged as a result of contradiction between environmental protection and economic growth as well as the state's significant role providing necessary condition for private companies. Economic growth and environmental protection have clashed in Turkey, and this creates tension between environmental organizations/public and the state. As a result of examination of two cases, we can see that there is a contentious interaction between the

state and environmental organizations/public. These actors can be considered as opposite poles. Environmental movements demand protection of environment and their livelihoods. The state considered the projects as a part energy security and economic development. There is a conflicting relationship with the state and its developmental policies and environmental movements and their demands. Administration and decision-making process are still highly centralized in Turkey. Turkish state has not followed inclusive strategies for energy policies. As a result of these two cases' analysis, we can conclude that energy policy-making process is non-participant in Turkey. As a result of exclusion from democratic decision and policy-making process, movements emerge to transmit their requests and take part in processes. So, anti-nuclear movement and anti-HPP are not a proactive, but a reactive movement and generates reactive impacts. They reacted against construction of NPPs and HPPs. State tries to suppress movements and ignores court decisions and the government still enacts unfavorable laws and makes regulations for the environment.

The insistence of the government on the implementation of these projects and changes in legal regulations limit movements' efforts and impacts of these movements. Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement have similar objects; cancellation of planned Cide HES and Akkuyu NPP projects. These movements that are against energy projects can be described as partly successful. Both of them survived for a certain period of time. Even though they could not attain the major policy goals, they prevented the construction of projects. Cases of Loç movement and anti-nuclear movement demonstrated that high policy issues like energy issue are hard to challenge. And the impacts of the movements were temporary and connected to opportunity structures. More organized, coordinated, powerful and extensive

environmental movement is required to cancel thermal power plants, SHPPs, nuclear power plants that cause environmental, social and economic problems and to implement eco-friendly energy policies in Turkey.

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APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Ad- Soyad- Meslek
2. Nükleer enerjiye/HES'lere neden karşıyorsunuz? Nükleer enerji projelerinin/HES projelerinin ülkeyi/bölgeyi ve bölgedeki insanları nasıl etkileyeceğini/ ne tür problemlere neden olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?
3. Nükleer enerji santrallerine/ HES'lere karşı olan mücadele sürecinizi anlatabilir misiniz?
4. Mücadele sürecine ne şekilde katıldınız ve nasıl bir katkınız olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
5. Nükleer enerji santralleri/HES'ler ile ilgili yapım sürecinde, öncesinde yetkililer tarafından yeteri kadar bilgilendirildiğinizi düşünüyor musunuz?
6. Şirket yetkilileri, yerel veya merkezi yöneticiler tarafından Nükleer enerji santrali/HES yapımına karar verilmesi aşamasında sürece dâhil edildiniz mi? Bölge insanlarının fikirlerine, değerlendirmelerine başvuruldu mu?
7. Hareketinize destek veren ulusal veya uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşları (veya sendikalar, meslek odaları, siyasi partiler) var mı? Varsa hangileri? Bu sivil toplum kuruluşlarınızın hareketinize nasıl bir etkisi veya katkısı olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
8. Platformunuzun/sivil toplum kuruluşunuzun enerji politikaları yapım süreci içerisinde ilgili bakanlıklardan görüş alımı, bilgi paylaşımı vb. amacıyla yapılan herhangi bir toplantıya katıldınız mı veya katılım için teklif aldınız mı? Görüşlerinizin, paylaştığımız bilgilerin yetkililer tarafından ne derece dikkate alındığını düşünüyorsunuz?
9. Enerji ile ilgili yapılacak kanun ve kanun tasarıları için platformunuzun/sivil toplum kuruluşunuzun görüşlerinin, araştırmalarının ne derece göz önüne

alındığını düşünüyorsunuz? Belirli bir kanun veya kanun teklifi hazırlanmasında ilgili bakanlıklarla koordineli ve aktif bir şekilde çalışmanız oldu mu? Böyle bir çalışmanız var ise hangi kanun üzerinde çalıştınız?

10. Mücadele sonunda istediğiniz hedeflere ulaşabildiniz mi? Elde edilen sonuçları/başarıları nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
11. Karar alma süreci sizce nasıl olmalıydı?
12. Gelişmekte olan bir ülke olarak Türkiye'nin artan enerji ihtiyacının karşılanması konusunda ne tür politikalar izlenmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz?
13. Enerji politikaları yapım sürecinde etkin bir aktör olsanız, Türkiye'nin enerji politikalarına nasıl bir yön verirdiniz? Yenilenebilir, nükleer, fosil yakıtlar vb. enerji kaynaklarından hangilerine öncelik verirdiniz?
14. Enerji politikalarının oluşturulmasında, ekonomik kalkınma- enerji-çevre-yaşam dörtgeninde öncelik verilmesi gerekenler nelerdir?

APPENDIX 2

THE LIST OF INTERVIEWEES-MOVEMENT ACTORS

Name	Age	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Aytekin	35	12 May 2013	İstanbul
Zafer	40	17 March 2013	İstanbul- Loç Valley
Nuri	82	7 May 2013	Loç Valley
Necibe	75	7 May 2013	Loç Valley
Hüseyin Amca	80	7 May 2013	Loç Valley
Makbule	77	7 May 2013	Loç Valley
Bahattin	61	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Murat	56	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Hüseyin	50	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Şeref	52	8 May 2013	Loç Valley

Name	Age	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Hasan	58	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Cafer	59	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Metin	47	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Hatice	61	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Mehmet	49	8 May 2013	Loç Valley
Eren	25	5 June 2013	İstanbul
Cenk	-	16 April 2013	İstanbul
Fatma	47	27 April 2013	Mersin
Mehmet İ.	32	27 April 2013	Mersin
Yılmaz	36	27 April 2013	Mersin
Yusuf	30	27 April 2013	Mersin

Name	Age	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Hediye	39	27 April 2013	Mersin
Osman	65	28 April 2013	Mersin
Sabahat	42	27 April 2013	Mersin
Dürüye	22	26 April 2013	Mersin
Ayhan	40	28 April 2013	Mersin
Necati	29	28 April 2013	Mersin
Seyfettin	53	28 April 2013	Mersin
Meral	45	27 April 2013	Mersin
Fidan	34	2 April 2013	İstanbul
Mehmet Yaşar	33	25 April	Silifke
Emin	54	25 April	Silifke

APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Ad- Soyad- Meslek- Yaş
2. Enerji politikaları yapımı/kanun yapımı ve karar alma sürecini anlatabilir misiniz?
3. Enerji politikaları yapım sürecinde, sürece etkin bir şekilde katılan aktörler kimlerdir?
4. Hidroelektrik santralleri (HES) ve nükleer santrallerin Türkiye enerji politikasındaki yeri ve önemi nedir?
5. Projeler için lisans, imar planı alma gibi süreçleri kısaca anlatabilir misiniz? Kimler başvuruyor, başvurular nerelere yapılıyor?
6. Projeler ile ilgili halkı ve özellikle bölge halkını bilgilendirme konusunda bakanlığınız nasıl bir çalışma yürütüyor? - HES/Nükleer ile ilgili olumlu ve olumsuz yönleri ile halkın yeteri kadar bilgilendirildiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
7. Yerel halk, sivil toplum örgütleri, çevre/ekoloji hareketleri/grupları, ilgili meslek odaları, bilim insanları vs. HES ve nükleer santral yapımı karar verilmesi aşamasında sürece dahil edildi mi? Hangi aşamada ve nasıl sürece dahil edildiler?
8. Yerel halkın, sivil toplum örgütlerinin, çevre/ekoloji hareketlerinin/gruplarının, ilgili meslek odalarının, bilim insanlarının görüşleri, paylaştığı bilgiler bakanlığınız tarafında ne derece dikkate alınıyor?
9. Enerji politikaları yapım sürecinde bilimsel veri, bilgi paylaşımı, görüş ve değerlendirme vb. amacıyla yerel halk, sivil toplum örgütleri, çevre/ekoloji hareketleri/grupları, ilgili meslek odaları, bilim insanlarıyla herhangi bir toplantı yapıldı mı veya bu şekilde bir toplantı teklifi yapıldı mı?

10. HES ve nkleer santraller ile ilgili herhangi bir dzenleme, mevzuat, kanun, kanun teklifi hazırlanmasında yerel halk, sivil toplum rgtleri, evre/ekoloji hareketleri/grupları, ilgili meslek odaları, bilim insanlarıyla koordineli ve aktif bir alıřmanız oldu mu? Byle bir alıřmanız var ise hangi kanun zerinde alıřtınız?
11. Mahkeme kararları ile iptal edilen, durdurulan HES projelerinin izlenen politikalar zerinde nasıl bir etkisi oluyor? Politikaların revize edilmesi, projelerden vazgeilmesi, iptal edilmesi gibi bir Őey sz konusu oluyor mu?
12. HES ve nkleer karřıtı hareketlerin enerji politikalarına bir etkisi olduđunu dřnyor musunuz? Var ise, nasıl bir etkisi var?
13. Lo Vadisi, Solaklı, Bođazpınar, Fındıklı, amlıhemřin ve bir ok yerde blgedeki insanların HES projelerine karřı olması, bundan sonra oluřturulacak HES ile ilgili politikaları nasıl etkiler?
14. Geliřmekte olan bir lke olarak Trkiye'nin artan enerji ihtiyacının karřılanması konusunda ne tr politikalar izlenmesi gerektiđini dřnyorsunuz?
15. Enerji politikalarının oluřturulmasında, ekonomik kalkınma- enerji-evre-yařam drtgeninde ncelik verilmesi gerekenler nelerdir?
16. Nkleer santraller ile ilgili olarak nkleer atık, terr saldırıları gibi konularda ne tr nlemler alınacak? Rusya ile imzalanan hkmetlerarası anlařma sonucunda herhangi bir sızıntı, kaza olması durumunda sorumluluk kime ait olacak?
17. Bu projeler ile olası ekolojik dengenin bozulması, bazı bitki ve hayvan trlerinin tehlike altında girmesi, tarım topraklarının kullanılamayacak hale gelmesi ve blgelerin insansızlařtırılması gibi sorunlara ne tr nlemler alınmaktadır?
18. Blge insanları projeler ile ilgili yeteri kadar bilgilendirilmediđi, fikirlerinin alınmadıđını sylyorlar. Bu konu hakkında ne dřnyorsunuz?
19. Nkleer karřıtı grřler ierisinde, nkleer santrallerin elektrik retimi iin deđil nkleer g olma ve nkleer yarıřtan geri kalmama amacıyla yapıldıđına dair dřnceler var, bu konu hakkında ne dřnyorsunuz?

20. HES karřıtı grřler ierisinde, elektrik retiminden ziyade alıřma mr 15-20 yıl olan hidroelektrik santrallerin aslında suyun ticarileřmesi ve řirketlere/kiřilere rant saėlanması amacıyla yapıldıėı iddiaları ile ilgili ne dřnyorsunuz?

APPENDIX 4

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES- GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND BUREAUCRATS

Name	Age	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Levent Özcan Caner- Strategy Department, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources	-	29 May 2013	Ankara
Mustafa Öztürk- AKP Deputy	48	30 May 2013	Ankara
Mustafa Öztürk's Advisor	52	30 May 2013	Ankara
Tuncer Dinçergök DSİ- Deputy Head of Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants	-	31 May 2013	Ankara
Erdal Çalikoğlu- Deputy Director General, General Directorate of of Renewable Energy	53	31 May 2013	Ankara
Ali Kılıç Özbek- DSİ- Deputy Head of Real Estate and Expropriation Department	-	31 May 2013	Ankara
Hakan Akbulut	44	29 May 2013	Ankara

