

**THE OLD ELITES STRIKE BACK:
THE END OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
UNDER KHRUSHCHEV AND MENDERES**

by

M. Tahir KILAVUZ

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Muhammet Tahir Kılavuz

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examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Şuhnaz Yılmaz

Assoc. Prof. Şener Aktürk

Prof. Dilek Barlas

Date: 07.01.2014

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the reasons behind the end of political liberalization processes under Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and Menderes in Turkey in a most different systems design. Although Soviet and Turkish regimes were significantly different from each other, the former being a closed authoritarian and the latter an electoral democratic regime, both leaders launched certain reforms to liberalize their respective regimes in the 1950s. However, despite the serious political, social and economic differences in these two countries, the fate of respective leaders and their reforms was similar: Khrushchev was forced to a "voluntary retirement" and Menderes was toppled down by the first military coup d'état of the country. Moreover, the reform processes of both leaders were interrupted and even reversed after their respective terms. Hence, I analyze the end of political liberalization in these two cases in a qualitative framework through three prominent theories in the literature of democratic transition: modernization theory, effects of international context and elite choice. The examination of political events of their time and socioeconomic conditions along with the international factors indicate that the reason behind the end of liberalization processes lies in the elite's discontent because of the changing sociopolitical formation. The old elites, who lose their privileged positions by the political liberalization, strike back and put an end to liberalization processes to regain their positions in the state.

Keywords: Political liberalization, political regimes and democratic transition, elite choice, modernization theory, center-periphery relations, Khrushchev, Menderes

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, en farklı sistem tasarımı çerçevesinde Sovyetler Birliği'nde Khrushchev ve Türkiye'de Menderes dönemlerinde gerçekleştirilen siyasi liberalizasyon süreçlerinin sona erişinin arkasındaki sebepleri incelemektedir. Kapalı otoriter rejim olan Sovyetler Birliği ile yeni bir demokrasi olan Türkiye birbirlerinden ciddi anlamda farklılaşsa da iki lider 1950'lerde ülkelerinde liberalizasyon reformları başlatmışlardı. Ancak, iki ülke arasındaki siyasal, toplumsal ve ekonomik değişikliklere rağmen bu iki liderin ve reformlarının kaderi benzer oldu: Khrushchev "gönüllü emekliliğe" zorlanırken Menderes ülkenin ilk askeri darbesi tarafından koltuğundan edildi. Bunlardan önemlisi, liberalizasyon süreçlerine son verildi ve hatta bu reformlar geri çevirildi. Bu bağlamda, siyasi reformların sona ermesini nitel bir şekilde literatürdeki üç önemli teori çerçevesinde inceliyorum: modernizasyon teorisi, uluslararası faktörlerin etkisi ve elitlerin tercihi. Konu olan dönemlerin siyasal olayları, sosyoekonomik gelişmeler ve uluslararası faktörlerin incelenmesi sonucunda araştırma göstermektedir ki liberalizasyon reformlarının sona ermesinin arkasında eski elit gruplarının değişen sosyopolitik düzenden duydukları rahatsızlık yer almaktadır. Siyasi liberalizasyon sonucu eski konumlarını ve prestijlerini kaybetmekte olan eski elitler geri dönerek konumlarını tekrar elde etmek için liberalizasyon süreçlerine son vermişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi liberalizasyon, politik rejimler ve demokratikleşme, elitlerin tercihi, modernizasyon teorisi, merkez-çevre ilişkileri, Khrushchev, Menderes

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I argue that the liberalization reforms in the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev and in Turkey under Adnan Menderes came to an end because of the old elites' discontent originated due to the reforms these leaders made and purpose of preserving their status in the political arena. Since these reforms expanded the political involvement to a greater part of societies, the role and prestige of the old elites in the sociopolitical life were damaged. In order to stop the change and restore their status, the old elites removed the reformer leaders from their offices by coups d'état.

On 25 February 1956, the last day of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the First Secretary of the Party, Nikita Khrushchev made a long speech later called the "Secret Speech". Even days before the inauguration of Party Congress, there were disputes on how to cope with the Stalinist legacy in the post-Stalin era USSR. Despite the opinions to praise Stalinist legacy, Khrushchev made a courageous personal move, criticized the cult of personality created by Stalin and denounced his totalitarian rule and terror regime. Khrushchev's astonishing speech found support from the Party Congress and everyone who had discomfort because of Stalin's strict rule. Following the Secret Speech, Khrushchev started the destalinization process to strip the Soviet state from some of Stalin's personality and some of his policies. This process of relaxation was combined with the opening up of the regime through popular involvement by the strengthening of the party apparatus as opposed to high central state bureaucracy.

Weeks before the elections on 14 May 1950, the Turkish people saw a poster on the walls and the newspapers. The poster was very simple; a hand makes a "stop" sign and is accompanied by a short phrase: *"Enough! The word lies with the people!"*

Democrat Party entered the 1950 elections with this propaganda poster which is still acclaimed as one of the most successful elections propaganda. The result was a landslide victory of the Democrats over the Republican People's Party becoming the ruling party following the first free and fair elections in after two and a half decades of one-party rule. When Democrat Party formed the government and Adnan Menderes became the first Prime Minister from the periphery of the society, the dominance of military-bureaucratic elites was damaged for the first time. Democrat Party, as the representative of the people opposed to central state elites, included the ideas, demands and values of the people to the political arena through their reforms and political choices. As a result, a new elite representing the periphery of the society rose rivaling the old elite composed of military and bureaucratic officers.

Both some of Khrushchev's and Menderes' reforms achieved success and the some others failed. However at the end, they both achieved liberalization to some extent especially by expanding the political sphere to a relatively popular involvement. However, their decade-long liberalization efforts came to an end when they were ousted from their offices. The Presidium of the Soviet Union enforced Khrushchev to accept his own retirement on October 14, 1964 and remove him from office with a bloodless coup. On the other hand in Turkey, the military took the control of the country over by a successful coup d'état in May 27, 1960. However, different from the Soviet case, the coup was not bloodless in Turkey. In fact, it led to the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two ministers of his cabinet. Following these coups, the liberalization reforms were terminated in both cases. In the Soviet Union, a neo-Stalinist regime was established and the ruling was again confined to a smaller group of people. In Turkey, a military regime was established and ruled the country for about sixteen months. Since the liberalization process continued after the acceptance of constitution

and initiation of elections once again, it is righter to say that the liberalization process was interrupted in Turkey rather than coming to an ultimate end.

In order to understand democratic transition and political liberalization, it is crucial to have a grasp on political regime typologies. In the modern times, the basic classification of regimes is defined by the democracy in a given state. In this sense, the states are classified as democratic and authoritarian (sometimes dictatorship or non-democratic) regimes.¹ In this kind of a dichotomous classification, there is no middle ground between two regimes. Hence, as Przeworski et. al. define, democracies emerge whenever dictatorships die.²

Although this classification provides simplicity to regime typologies, it has certain problems. First, this kind of dichotomous categorizations assumes a symmetrical relationship. However, although symmetry is theoretically plausible, it is almost impossible to achieve in the real world, especially on the sociopolitical phenomena. For this reason, Goertz and Mahoney suggest that the world is asymmetrical; one side of the knife is not always the same to the other side in the real world.³ This argument indicates that two sides diverge from each other in their characteristics. We can still argue that regimes are democratic or non-democratic, but it remains short of explaining the real world unless the specificities of each side are defined. Second, related with the first proposition, since the world is not symmetrical there are usually gray areas in the real world. For this reason, a regime cannot always be democratic as soon as it walks away

¹ One of the scholars use such a dichotomous classification is Huntington. To see his conceptualization, see: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 10–11.

² Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 14–15.

³ For more on the asymmetries in the real World, please see: Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 64–74.

from dictatorship. There might be middle categories which possess the characteristics of both sides of the classification.

These shortcomings of dichotomous classification and the emergence of regimes especially after the third wave of democratization lead scholars to look for other categories to define political regimes. As a result, a fruitful literature on hybrid regimes and, in general, regime typologies emerged in last two decades. For these scholars, there are middle categories in the gray zone between authoritarian and democratic regimes, which later on called hybrid regimes. These regimes combine certain characteristics of authoritarian and democratic regimes but do not fulfill criteria to be named as one of them. They usually have certain political opportunities unlike closed authoritarian regimes but lack political rights and fair competition in elections. Although these main features allow us to call them hybrid regimes in general, there are different conceptualizations of this kind of regimes according to their specific characteristics. For example, Schedler defines electoral authoritarian and electoral democratic regimes in this gray zone.⁴ Likewise Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarian regimes⁵ and Howard and Roessler, as well as Diamond, mention the existence of hegemonic authoritarian regimes which all will be discussed in Chapter I.⁶

Just like the existence of these middle categories, authoritarian and democratic camps are not monolithic. Although they ceased to exist in the last decades of the 20th century, totalitarian regimes were a reality before and during Cold War. While totalitarianism is literally under the category of authoritarian regimes, it differs from the

⁴ Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 37–38.

⁵ Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁶ Marc Morje Howard and Philip Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2006): 365–381; Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

others based on their specific characteristics related with ideology, mobilization and control of masses.⁷ In this regard, totalitarianism is the strictest version of authoritarianism comparing to different forms of closed authoritarian regimes. Likewise, democracies have different levels among themselves. Some democratic countries fulfill the minimum criteria of having free and fair elections but remain short of securing social and political rights.⁸ For this reason, the democratic regimes are usually classified as electoral democracies and liberal democracies according to their democracy levels.

As seen, the political regimes create a spectrum from the strictest authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies, hybrid regimes being in between. Such a spectrum is very useful to understand transitions and liberalization. Democratic transition is quite a straightforward concept as it refers to moving away from authoritarianism and having democracy as the political regime of country. In other words, when a country fulfills the minimum criteria of democracy and move to the democratic camp in the spectrum, it achieves a transition. Political liberalization is related with transition but not entirely same with it. For that, political liberalization is the name of any development that provides a movement in the direction of democracy on political regimes spectrum. While fulfilling the criteria of democracy is a requisite for transition, this is not the case of liberalization. For this reason, either of an authoritarian, a hybrid or a democratic regime can achieve liberalization without changing the regime type. As well as a closed authoritarian regime becomes less strict; a democratic regime can achieve to respect social and political rights of its citizens. Both of these developments are defined as political liberalization.

⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New Edition with Added Prefaces (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973).

⁸ For more on different criteria of democracy, please see: Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 269; Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy Vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 10–12.

The developments in the form of liberalization are the main concern of my study. Actually, the Soviet Union and Turkey, when Khrushchev and Menderes came to power, seriously differ from each other in terms of political regime, ideology, economic and international orientations and social background. The Soviet Union was a communist, totalitarian regime, leader of the Communist bloc, highly diversified ethnically as well as religiously and had a state-led central communist economy. On the other hand, Turkey was a new electoral democracy which tries to integrate to the market economy and was pursuing a place in the Western bloc with democratic nations. Yet, although they were different, they followed a relatively similar liberalization process and experienced the end of liberalization by a similar manner. Both Khrushchev and Menderes launched series of political reforms mainly related with opening the political system to a greater number of people. In this regard, the Soviet Union became a closed authoritarian regime instead of a totalitarian regime whereas Turkey furthered democratization. Both regimes moved away from strict versions to more open version of their respective regimes, hence achieved liberalization. However, at the end of their respective terms, both Khrushchev and Menderes were forced to step down by coups d'état and the liberalization processes came to an end.

In my thesis, I seek the answer to the question why in these two radically different cases, the fate of the two leaders and their reforms coincided. For the answer, I turned to the democratic transitions literature and look at different theories. Since both reform processes and the coups were top-down processes, I did not focus on the theories concentrating the mechanisms in the society. As a result, I examine three main sets of theories. First, Lipset's modernization theory suggests that when a nation achieve high socioeconomic development, hence modernization, it is possible for them to have a

transition to democracy.⁹ To apply this theory to my cases, I seek to answer to the question that is there a reverse trend in socioeconomic development to lead to end of political liberalization. Second, it is argued by several scholars that international factors affect a country's path to democracy and liberalization. For that, when there is a general trend in the world or in the neighboring regions, or when a country has close relations with democratic nations of the West, it is more likely for that country to move to democracy.¹⁰ In line with these arguments, a reverse wave of democratization or a diffusion effect to sustain status quo is necessary to end liberalization processes in the Soviet Union and Turkey. Third, elite choice is argued to be as an engine or an obstacle of democratization. The theories suggest that if the conservative elites in the system opt for a change or they are convinced by reformist elites and the masses, then a regime change can be possible.¹¹ For these arguments, the negative reaction of the status-quo elites against the reforms should hinder the liberalization processes.

The examination of political events of their time and socioeconomic conditions along with the international context within the qualitative framework of comparative politics indicate that the reason behind the end of liberalization processes lies in the elite's discontent because of the changing sociopolitical formation. For modernization theory, neither the Soviet Union nor Turkey meets the criteria of Lipset to become a democratic nation. For Soviet Union case, the failure to meet these criteria does not mean much since there is no attempt for a transition at all. For the Turkish case, modernization theory can explain why Turkey could not become a liberal democratic

⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 73–75.

¹⁰ For examples of the effects of international factors, see: Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 20–34.

¹¹ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997): 305–322.

nation as the Western European countries and the US. However, the trends in socioeconomic development indicate differently. Both the Soviet and Turkish nations achieved significant socioeconomic developments in these periods (yet still under the level of requisites). Because of Lipset points out a continuous line to democratization, achieved socioeconomic development would have brought further liberalization in both cases. So, although their failure to become liberal democracies fits to theory's main argument, the liberalization trend at first and the end of liberalization afterwards are not supported by the theory. For this reason, the theory does not explain the Soviet case at all since they were not trying to become democratic and only partially explain the Turkish case in terms of why it could not become a liberal democracy. But for the end of liberalization, the theory does not work for it either.

As for the international factors, the Soviet Union was a trend-setter country in the Cold War context as one of the two superpowers. Because of that, the USSR was naturally more immune to international factors' influence on the domestic politics. Although only China was against the liberalization process within the Soviet Union, because of the bad relations during and after Khrushchev era, Chinese attitude does not appear as a strong factor. On the other hand, among the allies of the Soviet Union in Warsaw Pact as Hungary and Poland, there was an even bigger demand of change. Since there was not a (more) pro status-quo and conservative environment around the USSR, the international factors do not explain the end of reforms. In the case of Turkey, all the international developments indicate a completely different outcome. Because of Turkey allied with democratic nations of West and the global trend was in the direction of democracy, international factors would have brought further democratization rather than an interruption in it if the theory explains the case.

Unlike all other three sets of theories, elite-based approach can explain the situation in the Soviet Union and Turkey best. In both cases, the liberalizing reforms did open up the political arena to a greater number of people. The masses found more opportunity to involve in politics through Khrushchev and Menderes reforms. In other words, the majority of the reforms by two leaders were damaging the position of old elites by including more people to the system. The popular involvement caused the limitation of the role of the old elites and their loss of prestige. In the Soviet case, while the party gained prominence as the follower of the dictator, the oligarchic establishment in Presidium and high bureaucracy lost their status. In Turkish case, the old elite of center based on military and bureaucratic officers and intellectuals was very powerful during one party rule and even after the initiation of multiparty system as long as the Republican People's Party was in power. But by the rise of Democrat Party and the popular involvement, a new elite representing the periphery of society appeared. As the new elite replaced the military-bureaucratic old elites, the latter lost their high position and prestige. As a result, the old elites put an end to the leaders' rule and terminated the liberalization processes. For this reason, the resistance of old elites to the change that harmed their position explains the end of liberalization in the Soviet Union and Turkey.

The formation of the thesis is as follows:

In the first chapter, I present a general understanding on the concepts of democratic transition and liberalization. In this regard, I firstly focus on different categorizations of political regimes. Accordingly, I put forward the different characteristics between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Because of the presence of subcategories in each group and the emerging literature on the gray area between authoritarian and democratic regimes, I pay a special attention to hybrid regimes. After designing a scale of political regimes combining different categorizations, I look at the consolidated literature on

transitions. Benefiting from the literature, I define the concepts of democratic transition and liberalization to delineate my theoretical framework of liberalization.

In the second chapter, I compose my research design on the cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey. First, I point out the end of processes of liberalization in both cases. Then, I illustrate how the cases of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Turkey under Menderes seriously distinguish. Since a common outcome appears out of two distinct cases, creating a most different systems design, I seek the possible answers in the literature for the similar end of liberalization processes. Since political liberalization is a matter on democratic transitions and political regimes, I concentrated on this literature to find the possible causes. As the theories usually indicate the causes of democratic transition, I use the theories in my thesis in a reverse fashion to find out the end of liberalization processes. Through examination of different theories, I focus on three of them which are modernization theory of Lipset, effects of international factors and finally elite-related factors.

In the third and fourth chapters, building upon my literature review on political regimes and research design, I analyze the cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey according to theories mentioned above. In each of these two chapters I, first, delineate the general political conditions before and during the periods of my interest. Then I illustrate the reforms of liberalization done under Khrushchev and Menderes rules and the end of these reforms by the coups. Finally, I test the theories according to socioeconomic, political and international factors.

Finally, I conclude with a general summary of my thesis and, building upon the previous two chapters, illustrate that the end of liberalization was the outcome of the elites' strike back to restore their position in the political arena.

CHAPTER I:

Regime Typologies, Transition and Political Liberalization

Democracy and democratization is one of the most debated topics of 20th century political science literature. As the first modern democracies emerge in late 19th and early 20th centuries, these regimes have become a central issue for political science. After the second wave of democratic transitions in mid-20th century, the scholars started to find answers to the question of how democracy comes into being¹ and early works of democratization covering both first and second waves were produced. Especially by the third wave, the transitions literature² grew enormously and since then, the literature advanced and ramified. Even in the second wave, the democratic nations were trying to export democracy to the geographies where authoritarianism is the rule and in the third wave, this approach gained more attention. Not just the statesmen but also scholars tried to have a role in expansion of democracy. As a result, many of the scholars in the democratization field worked to contribute to the emergence of democracy in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa, especially during the third wave.³ The literature today focuses not only on democratic transitions but also on further democratization after the transition, failed transitions, liberalization without transition and strategies of authoritarian regimes for persistence.

Political liberalization, which has a central position in this thesis because of the investigated political reforms in the Soviet Union and Turkey, does not necessitate a transition following it. Both in authoritarian regimes and in weak democracies, reforms for political liberalization can be observed. Accordingly, the topic of political

¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 340.

² I use the concepts of transition, democratic transition and democratization in the same meaning throughout the chapter.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 1 (1988): 3.

liberalization might not be perceived as a part of the democratic transitions literature. However, political liberalization does not have an independent literature within comparative politics; rather, the studies are written very connected to the democratic transitions literature. Even in the studies on liberalization which democratization does not seem proximate and is not within the focus of the scholars, the works possess many similarities with the studies investigating the transitions.⁴ Also, some scholars directly refer to democratization with ongoing liberalization in their studies.⁵ So, it is very difficult to discuss political liberalization without discussing democratization. Since in this thesis I focus on political reforms which can be perceived as political liberalization, it is important to understand the general transitions literature.

Because of liberalization is a part of transitions literature, this chapter presents a general overlook to that literature, especially on regime typologies. By presenting the forms of political regimes, I will show the place of liberalization within the general transitions literature. Understanding the regime typologies will offer a better grasp to evaluate political liberalization in authoritarian regimes and weak democracies. In this respect, this chapter's content is as follows: First, I will present the different regime classifications in the literature. Then, I will focus on different typological regime groups as authoritarian/totalitarian, hybrid and democratic regimes. Finally, I will touch upon transitions and political liberalizations between these political regime types.

⁴ Christopher Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization: A Comparative View of Gorbachev's Reforms," *World Politics* 45, no. 1 (1992): 47–65; Mehran Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis," *Third World Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1998): 63–85; Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years," *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 3 (2001): 357–375; Dalia Dassa Kaye, ed., *More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World* (RAND Corporation, 2009).

⁵ Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds., *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995); John Waterbury, "Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," in *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Arab World*, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Gudrun Kramer, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World," *MERIP* 22, no. MER174 (1992).

I. Regime Typologies

Classifying regimes is a common approach in democratization studies. The scholars classify regimes from authoritarian regimes to democracies. Some classifications are just binary and some others are more complex. In those more complex classifications, the scholars tend to use subcategories and for that they produce new concepts in order to illustrate the nuances between regimes. In this regard, different concepts emerge yet they are sometimes difficult to understand. This section presents several regime classifications and then explains different conceptualizations used in regime typologies.

Classifying regimes dates back to the Ancient Greece. Even Aristotle made a classification among regimes. Although, his classification was slightly different than its contemporary equivalents, it is worth mentioning it since it is an early example. Aristotle offers a typology consisting of six types of regimes. He, first, make a distinction between the regimes which have rule behind them and ones which have not. Then, he classifies regimes according to number of rulers. If there is one ruler who is abode by law, he classifies the regime as *monarchy*; if there is no law, then the regime becomes a *tyranny*. If there is a group of ruler; with a law limiting the rulers, the regime is *aristocracy* and without a law, the regime is *oligarchy*. Finally, if the rulers are the people; with a law behind it, the regime is *polity* and without any laws the regime is *democracy* or *mob rule*. Aristotle suggests that, when there is law in the political stage, it is a benevolent regime and serves the people. However, if the ruler(s) is (are) not abode by law, then the regime serves the ruler(s) itself (themselves), not to people, so it is a deleterious regime.⁶ Among these regimes, he favors monarchy most and thinks that democracy is the worst

⁶ For Aristotle's own narration of political regimes, see: Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publications, 1998), 65–80.

one. But obviously, in the Ancient Greece, existing democracy of the time and the perception towards democracy were very different than it is today.

While Aristotle's classification has two branches and is separated through existence of non-existence of certain laws, in today's classifications, there are generally one spectrum separated through having democratic features or not. The simplest classifications defined whether the state has a democratic regime or not. Huntington is one of the scholars who choose this approach. His classification is dichotomous: the states have either a democratic or a nondemocratic regime and there is possibility of transition from the latter to the former.⁷ Przeworski et. al. also use a similar conceptualization in their influential study on the relation between economic development and political regimes. According to them, democracies emerge whenever dictatorships die. So, although they distinguish different types of democracy and dictatorships later on, there is no medium category between them; there are just dictatorships and democracies.⁸

Whereas these studies make dichotomous distinctions, many scholars, especially after the third wave, tend to define a third category: hybrid regimes. These regimes, in the simplest definition, are the regimes which possess features of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. The hybrid regimes have different subcategories or different appellations. An early example of this approach is seen in O'Donnell and Schmitter. For them, between authoritarian and democratic regimes, there are two categories: a liberalized authoritarian regime (*dictablanda*) and an illiberal democracy (*democradura*).⁹ Likewise, Alvarez et. al. add a medium category between autocracy and democracy which they conceptualize as bureaucracy. According to them, bureaucracies

⁷ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 11.

⁸ Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*, 14–15, 88.

⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, 12–14.

are "...dictatorships that have legislatures."¹⁰ They also categorize democracies as presidentialism, parliamentarism and mixed. Mainwaring et. al. use a classification of three types in which there are authoritarian, democratic and semi-democratic regimes. For them, semi-democratic regime in this classification "...includes a variety of regimes that sponsor competitive elections but still fail to measure up to democracy."¹¹

Schedler's classification is a good recent example to the classifications with hybrid regimes. Schedler makes a classification of four types just like O'Donnell and Schmitter. On the two edges of the spectrum there are closed authoritarianism and liberal democracy; between those two, there are two symmetrical categories of electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy.¹² Bogaards' classification is very similar with Schedler's. However, he uses the terms defective democracy and functional democracy for the regimes that Schedler calls electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Bogaards also adds another category to the authoritarian pole of the spectrum which is totalitarianism.¹³

In two other classifications, Diamond and Howard and Roessler, the number of hybrid regime types increases. These two studies coincide with Schedler in the categories of closed authoritarianism, electoral democracy and liberal democracy. However, for hybrid regimes, Howard and Roessler add the categories of hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes (hegemonic authoritarian regime being more close to authoritarian pole).¹⁴ In Diamond, in addition to Howard and

¹⁰ Mike Alvarez et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, no. 2 (1996): 17–18.

¹¹ Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Pérez-Linan, "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, no. 1 (2001): 50.

¹² Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy," 37.

¹³ Matthijs Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?: Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism," *Democratization* 16, no. 2 (2009): 414.

¹⁴ Howard and Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," 367.

Roessler's two hybrid regime categories, there is the category of ambiguous regimes between competitive authoritarianism and electoral democracy.¹⁵ Table 1 presents classifications of these studies.

As seen, regime typologies range from binary to multiple types of categorizations. Each of the categories given in these classifications possesses distinct political features that the authors find worth examining. So, it is important to understand these distinct features, especially of the more complex ones, the features of hybrid regimes. In this respect, the remaining of this section presents the general features of the regimes ranging from authoritarian to democratic regimes, with a focus on the gray areas.

a. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian regimes have been the most common form of political regimes throughout history. Except rare examples of earlier democratic experiences, most political regimes in history, from monarchies to dictatorship and from oligarchies to fascist regimes were actually forms of authoritarian regimes. Although many countries had already transition to democratic or hybrid regimes thus far, full authoritarian regimes are still in effect in about one fourths of the world. Hence the authoritarian regimes are still worth examining.


i. Totalitarianism

The concept of totalitarianism was coined by anti-fascists in Italy in 1923, but then was adopted by the fascists and used to identify themselves.¹⁶ Then, the concept was spread and commonly used in academia especially after the rise of Nazism and communism in mid-20th century.

¹⁵ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 26.

¹⁶ David Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (New York; London: Routledge, 2006), 3.

Table 1: Regime Typologies



Huntington	Non-Democracy		Democracy			
Przeworski et. al.	Dictatorship		Democracy			
Alvarez et. al.	Autocracy	Bureaucracy		Democracy		
Mainwaring et. al.	Authoritarianism	Semi-democracy		Democracy		
O'Donnell - Schmitter	Authoritarianism	Liberalized Autocracy	Illiberal Democracy	Democracy		
Schedler	Closed Authoritarianism	Electoral Authoritarianism	Electoral Democracy	Liberal Democracy		
Bogaards	Totalitarianism	Closed Authoritarianism	Electoral Authoritarianism	Defective Democracy	Functioning Democracy	
Howard - Roessler	Politically Closed	Hegemonic Authoritarian	Competitive Authoritarian	Electoral Democracy	Liberal Democracy	
Diamond	Politically Closed	Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian	Competitive Authoritarian	Ambiguous Regimes	Electoral Democracy	Liberal Democracy

A totalitarian regime was either perceived as a distinct form of a regime or a type under authoritarian regimes. The supporters of the former distinguish totalitarian regime from authoritarian regimes by focusing on the differences between them related with the ability of full control and transformative power of totalitarian regimes. For example, Juan Linz, in his seminal book on totalitarianism and authoritarianism, makes a distinction around power relations (monism versus pluralism), strategies of legitimation (ideologies versus mentalities) and the treatment of subject (mobilization versus depoliticization).¹ Neumann, as well, distinguishes totalitarian regime from “caesaristic” dictatorship by indicating the control of totalitarian regime over education, communication and economy.² Arendt pays more attention on ideology in totalitarian regimes and states that a totalitarian regime is essentially different from other forms of political oppression since it replaces the national tradition by ideology as the source of the regime.³

Unlike many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, for Arendt, totalitarian regimes do not rest on the leader or the party, the important thing for these regimes is the movement itself. That’s why Arendt does not pay much attention on Hitler or Stalin, but focuses on the regime and the movement.⁴ Likewise O’Kane indicates the importance of the movement within the “dislocated society” for the emergence of a totalitarian regime.⁵

Although Friedrich and Brzezinski accord with Arendt in the essence of totalitarianism,

¹ Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 159–171; Andreas Schedler, “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism,” in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 6.

² Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State Essays in Political and Legal Theory* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957), 236–237.

³ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 460.

⁴ Hannah Arendt, “Authority in the Twentieth Century,” *The Review of Politics* 18, no. 4 (1956): 407–408; For a detailed account on Arendt’s views on leadership, please see: Margaret Canovan, “The Leader and the Masses: Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism and Dictatorship,” in *Dictatorship in History and Theory Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism*, ed. Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 241–260.

⁵ Rosemary O’Kane, *Paths to Democracy: Revolution and Totalitarianism* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 118.

they depart in some aspects. For example, Arendt argues that there should be no preliminary provocation for the terror by the totalitarian regime and actually the target of this terror are the innocent people as the Jews were the victims of Holocaust.⁶ However, for Friedrich and Brzezinski, the totalitarian state commits terror not when there is no preliminary condition, but in the presence of dissents. By this terror, the regime aims to fear and deliberately intimidate the dissents.⁷

Since a totalitarian regime has such distinct features, Arendt limits the number of totalitarian regimes. For her, there had been only two totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. Moreover, she argues that, by the death of Stalin, the totalitarian regime had ceased in the USSR. In other words, in Khrushchev era the Soviet regime was not a totalitarian regime as in Stalin years. For her, although there were the apparatus of total control after Stalin like the party, the ideology and the secret police; the system was no longer totalitarian since its control and transformative power were not at the same level with the previous decade.⁸ She does consider Mussolini's Italy as a totalitarian dictatorship only after 1933; however, the Fascist regime in Italy still could not become a full-fledged totalitarian regime as in Germany and the Soviet Union, which is the last stage of totalitarianism.⁹

Indeed, a totalitarian regime is distinct from other forms of oppressive regimes. However, although we can't consider Latin American dictatorships as equal to Nazi or Communist regimes, by looking to broad range of political regimes from distant, a totalitarian regime can still be considered as an authoritarian regime form as the

⁶ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 6.

⁷ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 169–171.

⁸ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, xxxiv–xxxvii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 308–309.

“authoritarian” used in its literal meaning. In this sense, a totalitarian regime can be identified as the most extreme form of authoritarian regimes.

ii. Closed Authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes (closed authoritarianism or full authoritarianism, in order not to confuse with some forms of hybrid regimes) include wide range of types. In general, these regimes are described as the regimes in which no viable way exists for opposition to contest for executive power in a legal way.¹⁰ For Howard and Roessler, in a closed authoritarian regime the leader is not selected through national elections, the government maintains the political control by repression, the opposition parties are banned or never existed and civil society and free media are either absent or have a little space to perform.¹¹

While authoritarian regimes have these common features in general, Snyder contests the classification of all these regimes under one category as authoritarian regimes. For him such a classification misses certain specificities of different types of regimes. He enumerates a wide variety of distinct cases under general category of authoritarianism. For that, totalitarian and post-totalitarian systems, theocracies, sultanates, non-traditional personalistic regimes, traditional monarchies, military regimes and ethnocracies are different types of authoritarian regimes.¹² Geddes, in her large-N studies on authoritarian persistence, makes a narrower categorization of authoritarian regimes comparing to Snyder. For her, authoritarian regimes are divided into military

¹⁰ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 6–7.

¹¹ Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” 367.

¹² Richard Snyder, “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes,” in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 224–225.

regimes, personalistic regimes, single-party regimes and amalgams of these types.¹³ Another distinct type of authoritarianism which is coined in the literature is bureaucratic authoritarianism by O'Donnell who comes up with this concept in his study on Brazil and Argentina. According to that, a high level of social and economic modernization in case of delayed development is likely to transform into an authoritarian regime. Here, he uses the concept of bureaucratic to refer the high levels of modernization in such cases.¹⁴

Another important distinction between authoritarian regimes is “stateness”. By referring to Huntington, Snyder says that some authoritarian regimes have working governments which actually governs (e.g. China, Qatar). However, in some authoritarian regimes either there is no actual working government or they are too weak to actually govern (e.g. many African states such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda). Similarly, some authoritarian regimes have too much political order (e.g. North Korea) and others have too little political order (e.g. DR Congo). As seen, in the broad range of political regimes, authoritarian regimes might constitute a category; however, this does not mean that authoritarian regimes are monolithic. On the contrary, there are different forms of authoritarian regimes depending on the type of government and the ability of government to govern.

One final issue about the authoritarian regimes is the authoritarian durability. Although there have been democratization waves in the last century, about one fourths of the countries in the world, which can be counted as closed authoritarian regimes, is not free according to Freedom House. Hence authoritarian durability is an important issue in transitions literature. Geddes' study reflects important insights on this issue. On a cross-

¹³ Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 121.

¹⁴ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979), 85–91; For more on O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism, see: Karen Remmer and Gilbert Merkx, “Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited,” *Latin American Research Review* 17, no. 2 (1982): 3–40.

country analysis, she argues that the type of the authoritarian regime has a role in the authoritarian persistence. According to that, military regimes are the most fragile regimes and have the shortest life expectancy. Personalist regimes tend to persist for a longer time than military regimes and the single-party regimes are the most stable and enduring regimes among them.¹⁵ Another important point for the authoritarian durability is the strategies that authoritarian regimes adopted. The strategies include concessions like elections and liberalizing reforms. These strategies mostly create hybrid regimes which are analyzed in the following pages.

b. Hybrid Regimes

More and more states started their transitions in the late 20th century and new forms of political regimes started to emerge. Actually some regimes combining the elements of both autocratic and democratic elements existed in 1960s and 1970s too. These electoral undemocratic regimes could be found Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa.¹⁶ However, in those decades the most common forms of authoritarian regimes were military and single-party regimes in Geddes' classification.¹⁷ Especially with the third wave of democratization, new regimes, neither fully democratic nor classically authoritarian, proliferated.¹⁸ These new regimes were not closed authoritarian regimes because they started electoral systems and presented some rights to citizens, relatively much to be called autocratic. At the same time, they were not full-fledged democracies since they lack many aspects of social and political rights and don't have free and fair elections.¹⁹ This area between closed authoritarianism and democracies is

¹⁵ Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," 133; Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007): 144–145.

¹⁶ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 23.

¹⁷ Hadenius and Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," 149–150.

¹⁸ Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?," 399.

¹⁹ Nicolas Van de Walle, "Africa's Range of Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 69.

called a “gray zone”²⁰ or a “foggy zone”²¹ since it does possess some characteristics of both sides.

i. Types of Hybrid Regimes

The emergence of the gray or foggy zone opened up a trend on hybrid regimes in the transitions literature. In the 1990s and 2000s, many studies were published on the regimes falling in this general category. As an outcome of this endeavor, today the scholars use different concepts to identify hybrid regimes. Hence, these regimes commonly called semi-authoritarianism,²² competitive authoritarianism,²³ electoral authoritarianism,²⁴ hegemonic authoritarianism,²⁵ liberalized autocracies,²⁶ new authoritarianism,²⁷ pseudo-democracy,²⁸ contested autocracies,²⁹ semi-dictatorship³⁰ and neo-authoritarianism.³¹ Some other scholars directly use the concept of hybrid regime in their studies.³² Obviously, existence of such an endeavor to create new concepts for the political regimes has its own pitfalls. The most important of these is the possibility of

²⁰ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 9.

²¹ Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy,” 37.

²² Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

²³ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization.”

²⁴ Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy.”

²⁵ Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” 25–26; Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” 367.

²⁶ Daniel Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (2002): 56–68.

²⁷ Stephen J. King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009).

²⁸ Frédéric Volpi, “Pseudo-democracy in the Muslim World,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1061–1078. The concept pseudo-democracy might be considered within the framework of deficient democracies category. However, the usage of the concept, especially in Volpi, resembles more to the authoritarian pole comparing to the democratic pole.

²⁹ Van de Walle, “Africa’s Range of Regimes,” 73.

³⁰ Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 252.

³¹ Robert Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment?,” *The Atlantic*, December 1, 1997, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-moment/306022/?single_page=true.

³² Van de Walle, “Africa’s Range of Regimes,” 69; Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?”.

concept stretching by giving too broad meanings to the concepts. Because of that, Collier and Levitsky warn the scholars of the field. For them, while conceptual innovation is being realized, the scholars should pay attention to achieve differentiation and avoid conceptual stretching.³³

In this regard, it is important to understand the most commonly used conceptualizations of hybrid regimes and see the differences among them. One of the most common forms is **electoral authoritarianism**. The modern democracy is very closely identified with elections today. However, although elections are indeed an important part of democratic regimes; many authoritarian regimes carry out elections as well. In this regards, democracy is a necessary condition for democracy but not a sufficient one.³⁴ Supporting this, many of the relatively new electoral regimes are not democracies and are not even in the course of democratization, although they depart from the classical forms of authoritarianism.³⁵

To illustrate the importance of these new forms of electoral regimes, Andreas Schedler opens the introductory chapter of his edited volume with a tacit reference to Marx saying that: “A specter is haunting the developing world—the specter of electoral authoritarianism.”³⁶ According to Schedler,³⁷ electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular elections for the chief executive and legislative assembly. So, they are minimally

³³ David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 451.

³⁴ Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy,” 36–37.

³⁵ Schedler, “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism,” 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁷ In fact, Schedler distinguishes electoral authoritarianism from hybrid regimes. Because, he defines hybrid regimes as the regimes between closed authoritarianism and liberal democracy. In this regard, electoral democracies as well are in the foggy zone of hybrid regimes. Since electoral authoritarianism is distinct from electoral democracy, he tends to avoid categorizing electoral authoritarianism under hybrid regime categorization. It is not, obviously, because he thinks electoral authoritarianism is not hybrid at the end. For further insights, see: *Ibid.*, 4; Yonatan L. Morse, “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism,” *World Politics* 64, no. 1 (2012): 164.

pluralistic, minimally competitive and minimally open.³⁸ Yet, they don't fulfill the criteria of freedom and fairness to become a democratic regime. In this regards, they perceive elections as the instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy. Nevertheless, electoral authoritarian regimes do not resort regularly naked repression as in closed authoritarian regimes. They try to legitimize the regime in the eyes of both internal and external actors through regular elections. In this way, the authoritarian rulers, in Schedler's words "... reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty".³⁹ At the end, they manage the authoritarian persistence with a regime distinguished from closed authoritarianism because of its electoral emphasis and from electoral democracy because of the lack of freeness and fairness in elections.

Another widely accepted form of hybrid regime is **competitive authoritarianism**, which is used by Levitsky and Way in their articles and then their book. In competitive electoral regimes, competitiveness is not the outcome of regime weakness or opposition strength. Actually, there are elections as well as in the electoral authoritarian regimes. The difference in competitive authoritarian regimes is that the elections are in fact free. Freeness of the elections makes the electoral game a competitive one. Yet, although being free, the elections are unfair⁴⁰ and the rulers commit substantial abuses of democratic procedure.⁴¹ So, the competition is, as a matter of fact, free and real but not fair.⁴² In a way, there is a phony competition in competitive authoritarian regimes.

According to Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarian regimes are distinct from both full authoritarian and democratic regimes. In full authoritarianism, the

³⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 16.

³⁹ Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy," 36–37.

⁴⁰ Morse, "The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism," 171.

⁴¹ Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," 20.

⁴² Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 5.

opposition finds no legal channels to contest the executive power. However, in competitive authoritarian regimes, these channels exist. Along with the presence of elections, opposition parties are not legally banned; they can open offices and make campaigns. So there are meaningful democratic procedures in the competitive authoritarian regimes. However, what distinguish these regimes from democratic ones are incumbents' abuse of free elections, lacking protection of civil liberties and the absence of reasonable level playing field between incumbents and opposition. In short, in a competitive authoritarian regime, the elections and the broad political arena are skewed in favor of incumbents which are the authoritarian rulers.⁴³

Hegemonic authoritarianism is more proximate to a closed authoritarian regime comparing with competitive authoritarianism. Howard and Roessler identify both hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes under the electoral authoritarianism category.⁴⁴ In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, there are still some democratic institutions; however, they are reduced to a façade status, in other words, the democratic institutions exist only on paper. Although there still are elections, they are strictly repressed, the candidates are restricted and there is no uncertainty about the outcome.⁴⁵ Mexican regime, where Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) remained in power for 71 years, used to be a perfect example for this. Although there have been elections, the party persisted using coercion, media control and patronage for such a long time.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ibid., 5–7.

⁴⁴ Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” 367.

⁴⁵ Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” 22–26; Morse, “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism,” 171; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 7.

⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of PRI and hegemonic rule in Mexico, see: Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

ii. Teleological Bias

Along with the problem of concept stretching, another pitfall that emerged after the studies on hybrid regimes is the teleological bias.⁴⁷ As mentioned above, some regime classifications like of Przeworski et. al. and Huntington had just two categories as democracies and non-democracies. In such a design, if a country moves away from authoritarian regime, then we expect it to have a democratic regime. Even some other scholars, though they don't use the dichotomous classification of regimes, tended to believe that there is a move towards democracy after the launch of detachment from classical forms of authoritarianism. Hence, the hybrid regimes were perceived as a stage on the way from authoritarianism to democracy and were categorized as flawed, incomplete or transitional democracies.⁴⁸ In this regard, there imagined a teleological path for countries towards democracy. Even if the countries don't have a direct transition to democracy and remain as a hybrid regime, those scholars believed that they will eventually leave this phase behind and become democratized. For example, Diamond states "Every step toward political liberalization matters, both for the prospect of a transition to democracy and for the quality of political life as it is daily experienced by abused and aggrieved citizens."⁴⁹ In fact, he is not totally wrong by saying so, because political liberalization might bring what he suggests. However at the same time, his quote illustrates that he believes each reform of political liberalization is a step to reach *telos* of democracy in this context. Similarly, Lindberg's edited volume of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition* has a similar understanding as it is easily seen in its title.⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, there are examples of hybrid regimes

⁴⁷ Morse, "The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism," 161.

⁴⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 3.

⁴⁹ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 22.

⁵⁰ Staffan Lindberg, *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

which achieved to become a democratic regime as Mexico and Ghana; however in most cases, the outcome is the persistence of the old regime with a new guise.⁵¹

Actually, Rustow touched upon this issue in his article of *Transitions to Democracy* which is one of the earliest accounts of the field.⁵² He states that there is a decision phase in each transition and in this phase a decision for democracy can be made or the proposal might be rejected. In such a situation, not all transition attempts end with a democracy.⁵³ Especially with the advancement of the works on hybrid regimes and the increase of teleological bias, many scholars opposed the idea that hybrid regimes are a phase on the path to democracy. According to that, any country moving away from authoritarian regime cannot be considered in a transition toward democracy.⁵⁴ They say that while those regimes seem to be in transition, actually they are distinct regimes.⁵⁵ So, while authoritarian regimes in their classical forms cease, new forms of regimes emerge rather than democracy.⁵⁶

Some studies that criticize teleological bias directly state that, actually, the moving away from the authoritarian rule is a strategy that authoritarian leaders use against the opposition. In this regards, when an authoritarian regime makes concessions and becomes a hybrid regime, the opposition might be contended with its gains and demand

⁵¹ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 4.

⁵² Although Rustow describes phases in his model of transition, these phases are not the same with the hybrid regimes. What he describes are the phases during the transition itself, not medium regimes on the way from authoritarian regime to democracy.

⁵³ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 356; Lisa Anderson, "Introduction," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 7–8.

⁵⁴ Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," 6.

⁵⁵ Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?," 415; Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," 20.

⁵⁶ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 7; Lucian Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 1 (1990): 3; Herbst, "Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years," 358–360; Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54, no. 2 (2002): 223.

no further reform for a while.⁵⁷ Likewise, the authoritarian rulers might design the institutions of the hybrid regime to make their regime more persistent. Actually, this is closely coincides with what Michels suggests in his seminal work on political parties. He states that "... in modern party life aristocracy gladly present itself in democratic guise, whilst the substance of democracy is permeated with aristocratic elements. On the one side we have aristocracy in a democratic form, and on the other democracy with an aristocratic content."⁵⁸ Although he makes this argument in a slightly different context and before the hybrid regimes become such prominent, his argument reflects the main strategy some authoritarian rulers use when they make reforms toward a hybrid regime.

On this issue of teleological bias, Thomas Carothers makes the most influential critique in his article with the self-explanatory title *The End of the Transition Paradigm*. He states that, transitology, which perceives every rupture from the classical authoritarian form as a transition to democracy, outlived its usefulness; instead, the scholarly community should look for different understandings towards these regimes. According to him, out of nearly 100 countries that were considered as transitional by 2002, probably only less than 20 are in the path of full transition to liberal democracy. By that, he suggests to discard the transition paradigm.⁵⁹

c. Democratic Regimes

Democratic regimes are the one most common regime type of today's range of political regimes. As Huntington suggests, modern democracy is not simply the democracy of city-states; the emergence of modern democracy is much related with the

⁵⁷ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, 4.

⁵⁸ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1966), 10.

⁵⁹ Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," 6–9.

emergence and development of the nation-states.⁶⁰ Today, 90 countries are qualified as free democratic states by Freedom House and 28 others are identified as democracy according to different definitions.⁶¹

As there are different definitions for authoritarian and hybrid regimes, there is no single definition for democratic regimes as well. Yet, most of the classifications use one of two different definitions: either Schumpeterian minimalist definition or Dahlian procedural minimum definition.⁶² Since different definitions are accepted by various scholars, there is more than one democratic regime in the regime typologies while the mostly used ones are electoral democracies and liberal democracies.

i. Schumpeterian Minimalist Definition

The first and simplest approach to modern democracy is the Schumpeterian approach. Schumpeter, in his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, tries to challenge the “classical doctrine” of democracy as he calls it. Instead of the classical doctrine, he suggests a minimalist criterion for democracy which is based on real competition. According to Vreeland, Schumpeter observed the common feature of the political systems of the United States and the Western European states that actually distinguishes them from other regimes and comes to that conclusion.⁶³ Hence, Schumpeter argues, “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive

⁶⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 13.

⁶¹ Freedom House qualifies 118 electoral democracies as of 2012 and also 90 of them as free states. That means 28 of the democracies are classified as partially free but still democratic. See: Freedom House, “Freedom in the World – Electoral Democracies,” 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%2C%20FIW%201989-2013_0.pdf; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Country Ratings,” 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20%26%20Ratings%20Overview%2C%201973-2013.pdf>.

⁶² I omitted the maximalist definitions of democracy since they are mostly under the realm of political theory and do not have much empirical equivalent.

⁶³ James Reynolds Vreeland, “A Continuous Schumpeterian Conception of Democracy” (presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2003), 2.

struggle for the people's vote".⁶⁴ So, if in any regime, the incumbent leader or the party actually loses elections, then the system is in fact a democracy. In other words, alternation in the executive office is the minimal criterion of a democratic regime. According to Bunce and Wolchik, today in the countries outside the West, elections rather than civil liberties are the defining feature of democratic regime, in accord with Schumpeterian definition.⁶⁵

Schumpeterian minimalist definition has its supporters in the democratization literature. For example Huntington, in his *The Third Wave*, follows the minimalist definition and says fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes is the defining feature of democracy.⁶⁶ Similarly Przeworski et. al. define democracy through competition and incumbent loss in the elections.⁶⁷ This kind of a minimalist definition fits better with a binary categorization: if there contestation in the elections, the regime is democratic, if there is not then the regime is non-democratic. To remind Przeworski et. al. and Huntington's classification of regimes, there are democratic and non-democratic (dictatorship) regimes. This, in fact, proves that these classifications are the product of Schumpeterian definition.

ii. Dahlian Procedural Minimum

Another commonly used definition is Dahlian procedural minimum definition. Similar to Schumpeter, Dahl defines minimum requirements for a regime to become democratic. However unlike him, Dahl's definition moves beyond the electoral criterion and adds civil liberties to the equation. So, the democracy does not only require free, fair

⁶⁴ Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 269.

⁶⁵ Valerie Bunce, "Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 49.

⁶⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 7.

⁶⁷ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10.

and competitive elections but also freedoms as well.⁶⁸ In this regard, Dahl enumerates the requirements for a democratic regime as following:

Seven institutions in particular, taken as a whole, define a type of regime that is historically unique:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.

5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.

6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.

7. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 21.

⁶⁹ Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, 10–11.

To summarize, Dahl's criteria are constitutional right of elected officials over decisions, free and fair elections, right to vote, right to run for elections, freedom of expression, freedom of having information and freedom of forming and joining organizations.⁷⁰ In several studies, Dahlian seven criteria are reduced to fewer articles by combining some of them like free, fair and competitive elections, full suffrage, and broad protection of civil liberties.⁷¹ Some studies add more articles to Dahlian seven criteria. For example, Schmitter and Karl add two more articles to Dahl's seven: the absence of non-elected tutelary authorities like military and polity's independence and self-governing ability without being subject to a superior political system.⁷² Also Levitsky and Way add the criterion of having a playing field to the Dahlian criteria. According to that, there should be a political arena that incumbents and opposition can really compete for the executive office.⁷³ Although there are such additions, these definitions are in very closely accord with Dahl's definition. The existence of civil liberties as criteria in Dahl's procedural minimum makes this measurable. Hence, the classifications using Dahl's approach can be continuous unlike Schumpeterian dichotomous classifications.

iii. Electoral and Liberal Democracies

As seen, both Schumpeterian and Dahlian definitions are identifying minimum features for democracy. Both are minimal definitions and Dahl's criteria include that of Schumpeter; however, while Schumpeter's definition consist only electoral competition, Dahl moves much beyond that and adds civil liberties to definition and this makes Dahl's

⁷⁰ For an analysis of Dahlian definition, see: Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Heinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25, no. 1 (1990): 52–53.

⁷¹ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 6–7.

⁷² Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is... and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 81.

⁷³ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 6–7.

definition seriously different than of Schumpeter. In other words, the difference between them stems from the selection of different qualities of democracy.⁷⁴

Using different definitions makes classifications dichotomous or continuous as seen. It also helps scholars of the literature to define different regime categories. The regimes that fulfill the Dahlian criteria are generally accepted as liberal democracies (sometimes called full democracies) since they are the regimes which actually respect the civil liberties. However, there are also regimes which remain in the area between the Schumpeterian definition and Dahlian definition (See Table 2).⁷⁵ In the literature, there are different names for such regimes. One common name for such regimes is electoral democracies. Diamond defines such regimes are the ones in which there are reasonably free and fair elections but also weak rule of law and uneven protection of civil rights.⁷⁶ Schedler also uses the category of electoral democracy in his definition, yet he puts electoral democracies under the foggy zone. On the one hand he admits electoral democracies' essential difference from electoral authoritarian regimes and refers it as democracy. On the other hand, since he adopts the Dahlian definition, he doesn't count it as a real democracy.⁷⁷ Another term used for such regimes is illiberal democracy which is coined by Fareed Zakaria. For him, everyone has the right to vote among multiple candidates in such regimes, yet the civil liberties are not observed well.⁷⁸ There are many other names used for such regimes as well, such as semi-democracy, weak democracy

⁷⁴ For the overview on qualities of democracy in the issue of *Journal of Democracy*, please see: Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy: An Overview," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 20–31.

⁷⁵ Competition between the competitive authoritarianism and Schumpeterian democracy are different. To remind Levitsky and Way's definition, in competitive authoritarianism, the competition is free but not fair. On the other hand in Schumpeter's definition, a competition should be both free and fair to fulfill the minimal criteria of democracy.


⁷⁶ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 27–29.

⁷⁷ Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation: Elections Without Democracy," 37.

⁷⁸ Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–24.

and formal democracy as Collier and Levitsky warns the scholars about the possible troubles on conceptualization and operationalization.⁷⁹

Table 2: Electoral and Liberal Democracies on the Spectrum



II. Transition and Liberalization

As I laid out the different types of regimes, it is very crucial to see the transitivity between these regimes. This transitivity is mostly be analyzed under the context of democratic transitions and because of that, transition is much more a straightforward concept. Still, political liberalization is almost as important as transitions. Yet, as Young points out, the sphere of political liberalizations is a bit neglected in the literature and the explanations of this sort are usually less satisfying.⁸⁰ In this respect, it is necessary to present the similarities and differences between democratic transition and political liberalization in order to understand the real meaning of the latter.

a. Transitions to Democracy

A transition to democracy, in its simplest definition, is a country's moving away from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. In a dichotomous scale of political regimes, detecting transition is easier; a state performs transition when the authoritarian

⁷⁹ Collier and Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," 10.

⁸⁰ Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization," 48.

regime ceases to exist.⁸¹ Yet in continuous spectrum of political regimes, it is more difficult to identify a transition to democracy. If the spectrum uses Dahlian procedural minimum as the limit to determine a regime as democratic, then a shift from an authoritarian regime to an electoral/illiberal democratic regime would not be qualified as transition to democracy. However, if Schumpeterian and Dahlian definitions are used to determine two different levels of democratic regimes as electoral and liberal, then even a shift from an authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy can be qualified as a transition. Here, a change from closed authoritarianism to an electoral or competitive authoritarianism might raise a question whether it is a transition. In fact, since the regime does not become a democracy, it is not a full transition. But, a country might perform a transition to democracy and fall back to authoritarianism as well. Russia represents a good example for that. At the outset of Soviet dissolution, a democratic Russian state emerged; although the state did not fulfill the Dahlian procedural minimum, it managed to become an electoral democracy. However, under Putin, Russia had a democratic backsliding and fell back to a hybrid authoritarian regime. Still, the period from 1990s until the half of the first decade of 2000s represents a transition to democracy for Russia.

As the transitions to democracy increased in the world, the transitions literature became prominent, especially after 1960s. As the literature advanced, different approaches to transitions emerged. One approach is about the forms of transitions. According to that, the transition can be an intended process as well as an unintended one. Rustow suggests that, in some cases the transition is a “fortuitous byproduct” of the struggle although it is not the primary aim.⁸² Another point about the forms of transitions

⁸¹ Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*, 88.

⁸² Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” 353; for a detailed analysis of transition as a fortuitous byproduct, please see: John Waterbury, “Fortuitous Byproducts,” in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

is its method since there are different paths towards democracy.⁸³ Accordingly, transition can take place through reforms or revolutions.⁸⁴ Both reforms and revolutions can be either from above or below. However, even in revolutionary transition, the transition is not expected as a one-shot change.⁸⁵ Moreover, it is argued that one generation is needed as the minimum period for a full transition.⁸⁶

A second approach in transition studies is the agency-structure dichotomy. As the general comparative politics literature evolved through a contention between the studies centering structure or agency, transition studies can be divided into periods according to same dichotomy.⁸⁷ According to Mahoney and Snyder, the initial phase of study of regime changes were mainly structural studies like Moore's⁸⁸ and O'Donnell's⁸⁹ works. These studies were focusing on factors like class and political economic explanations. In the following phase, more voluntarist approaches increased such as the works of O'Donnell and Schmitter,⁹⁰ Bova⁹¹ and Bermeo⁹² which focus on choice of actors. Then in the third phase, the scholars tended to integrate these two different and somewhat divergent approaches.⁹³ In this approach, the scholars tended to use structural factors as

⁸³ Ruth Berins Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Rustow as well advocates that there are many roads to democracy, see: Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 345.

⁸⁴ Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997): 357–359.

⁸⁵ Gerardo Munck, "The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies," *World Politics* 54, no. 1 (2001): 126.

⁸⁶ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 347.

⁸⁷ For a quintessential account on the evolution of comparative politics literature please see, Ruth Lane, *The Art of Comparative Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996).

⁸⁸ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (London: Penguin Press, 1974).

⁸⁹ O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*.

⁹⁰ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*.

⁹¹ Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 113–138.

⁹² Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation."

⁹³ James Mahoney and James Snyder, "Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34, no. 2 (1999): 3–4.

the independent variables along with other agent-based variables rather than qualifying them as the only causal factor.

A third approach in classifying the transition literature is done in relation with the regional or country-based focus of the studies. In fact, this classification has similarities with the agency-structure classifications since there is a variance in studies along with the change of time; yet, there are studies which fall different groups in these two classifications. According to Munck, the first body of literature tended to focus on big cases such as England, the United States, France and Germany.⁹⁴ This group includes Lipset's *Political Man*⁹⁵ and Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*⁹⁶ and Dahl's *Polyarchy*⁹⁷ (this group might include Rustow's *Transitions to Democracy*). Munck suggests that this literature which was produced during 1960s and 1970s had a "large nation bias". The second group broadened its scope though still remained mainly in Europe. The studies in this group generally criticize or test the works in the first group or compare them with other examples.⁹⁸ The third group represents a real break from first two categories. In this body of literature the focus of the studies reaches to first Southern and Central Europe and then to Latin America, post-communist world, Asia and Africa.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Munck, "The Regime Question," 119–121.

⁹⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1960).

⁹⁶ Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

⁹⁷ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁹⁸ This second group includes; Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John Stephens, "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis," *American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 5 (1989): 1019.

⁹⁹ This group includes; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Linan, "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999"; Josep Colomer, "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (1991): 1283–1302.

Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave* deserves special attention here as one of the most systematic and explanatory works in this group. *The Third Wave* does not refer the third category in the transitions literature; however the cases that performed transition in the third wave coincide with the scope of this third category. Huntington defines a wave of democratization as "... a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time."¹⁰⁰ According to him, there are waves of democratization and reverse waves since the 19th century onwards. The first democratization wave, which he calls the long wave of democratization, started in mid-19th century, continued until the 1920s and included countries such as France, Britain, the United States, Switzerland and Germany under Weimar Republic. By the great depression and rise of fascist and totalitarian regimes until the WWII, there was the first reverse wave. From the earlier days of the Cold War until the 1960s, second wave (the short wave of democratization) took place with West Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Austria, Turkey, Greece and couple of Latin American countries for a while. This period was followed by the second reverse wave until 1970s with the fall of democratic regimes mostly to communist rules.¹⁰¹

The third wave of democratization, which is the central focus of Huntington's book, started with Portugal in 1974, followed by Spain, Greece and Southeast Asian nations. Then, especially with the last decade ad the end of Cold War, the wave spread to Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. Huntington records that, during the fifteen years after the onset of the third wave, about thirty countries performed a transition to democracy from authoritarian regimes.¹⁰² According to Freedom House, 46% of the

¹⁰⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 15.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 15–21.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 5.

countries at that time were not free and were in fact authoritarian regimes in 1972 (69 countries out of 151). After a quarter century, in 1997, the percentage of not free countries decreased to 28% (53 out of total 191). At the same year, out of remaining 138 countries that are defined as free or partly free, 117 countries pass the Schumpeterian democratic requirements. In other words, only 21 countries are still qualified as authoritarian although they are partly free. Meanwhile, number of free democratic countries (i.e. liberal democracies) reaches to 81 in 1997 from 44 in 1972. These numbers are enough to show the impact of third wave of democratization.¹⁰³

Although it is slightly different, a fourth group might be added to Munck's three categories of regime changes: studies on hybrid regimes. Although the earlier works of third category and *The Third Wave* have a big impact in defining the studies in the fourth group, there is a shift in some recent works to the hybrid regimes. The scope of these studies is mostly similar to the third group of Munck's; however, the aforementioned earlier studies did not take the hybrid forms of political systems into attention. Yet, when it is seen that not all the transitions in the third wave were successful and new forms have emerged, a great number of studies working on this issue was published. These studies focused not only on transition but also on liberalization without transition, strategies of persistence under authoritarian regimes or new ways of transition. Although these recent studies coincide with the third group in terms of regional scope, since their typological scope is different, they might be classified as a fourth body of literature.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Freedom House, although starts from 1973, defines electoral democracies only after 1989. Hence, it is difficult to show exactly how many countries became democratic between 1972-1988. Yet, the changes in the numbers of countries in free, partly free and not free categories show the drastic change in the third wave. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World – Electoral Democracies"; Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Country Ratings."

¹⁰⁴ For examples of the studies that might be considered under this category, please see the works discussed in the section on hybrid regimes. For other works that diverge from the third category, see McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship"; Henry Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *World Politics* 58, no. 1 (2005): 133–165.

b. Political Liberalization

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, political liberalization and in general democratization is studied under the same umbrella of transitions literature. In fact, liberalization attempts are considered under this literature even though there is no transition in some of these attempts. In general, liberalization and democratization have many aspects in common, yet there are important differences between them as well.

Brynen, Korany and Noble in the introductory chapter of their theoretically and comparatively rich two volume edited account on *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, makes a well distinction between political liberalization and political democratization: “Political liberalization involves the expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil and political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interests. Political democratization entails an expansion of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over public policy.”¹⁰⁵ In this sense, political liberalization includes the lifting of earlier restrictions on individual expression and opposition organization,¹⁰⁶ open up issues to public debate, loosen censorship and in general take steps in a democratic direction.¹⁰⁷

Political liberalization and transition are similar, yet it is possible to have the former without the latter.¹⁰⁸ Actually, there are studies arguing or hoping that, since it

¹⁰⁵ Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds., “Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and Democratization,” in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6.

¹⁰⁷ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 9.

¹⁰⁸ Brynen, Korany, and Noble, “Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and Democratization,” 4.

undermines the authoritarian regime stability, political liberalization eventually brings democracy, if not instantly.¹⁰⁹ Yet there are other studies arguing that liberalization under authoritarian regimes are in fact forms of survival strategies.¹¹⁰ In this regards, many cases illustrate that liberalization can take place without transition.¹¹¹ So, although they are on the same direction of democratization and in fact liberalization may lead to transition, they don't always occur together. Hence, every case of transition contains political liberalization, but not every case of political liberalization contains transition.

One interesting point in transition literature is the usage of political liberalization as a concept. The concept is mostly used when there are reforms without transition. However, if there is transition, the concept of political liberalization is not much widely used. For example, for the studies on Latin America and Southern Europe, although the cases entail liberalization as well, concepts of democratization or transition are preferred to use. However, if there are reforms similar to the reforms of the successful transitions in other cases but the transition is not performed, then the scholars tend to use the concept of political liberalization. For example in studies on the post-Soviet region in early 1990s¹¹² or on Africa,¹¹³ the usage of political liberalization is more common. The Middle East is the most striking example of this sort. Most of the studies done on the regime change and political reforms in the Middle East in last two decades, where there

¹⁰⁹ Steven Cook, "The Promise of Pacts," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 1 (2006): 63–64; Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 54–58.

¹¹⁰ Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization," 48–50; Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East," 82; Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," 64–67.

¹¹¹ Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition," 119.

¹¹² Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization"; Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition."

¹¹³ Herbst, "Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years"; Van de Walle, "Africa's Range of Regimes."

were political liberalizations without transition, have the concept of political liberalization either in their title or in a central position in their contents.¹¹⁴

Also, some scholars approach political liberalization as a case which is seen only in authoritarian regimes,¹¹⁵ hence the concept is delimited only to political relaxations under such regimes. Although there is such an association of political liberalization with authoritarianism, concentration of the usage of the concept on such regimes without transition creates an illusion that liberalization is a case which can only be seen in authoritarian regimes. However, looking back to the aforementioned definition of political liberalization, I assert that this is a narrow perception towards the concept. As understood from the definition, political liberalization entails the recognition and protection of both political and civil liberties. It should not be forgotten that not all democratic regimes respect all the civil liberties. Reminding the Schumpeterian minimalist definition, a regime that does not fulfill the Dahlian criteria on civil liberties can still be counted as a democracy. In this regard, when an electoral or illiberal democratic regime makes political reforms to expand the recognition and protection of political and civil liberties, the reforms made by this government, as well, can be qualified as an attempt for political liberalization.


This explains what political liberalization is but it is important to define what is not too. First of all, as illustrated, political liberalization is not necessarily a transition. Second, we have to distinguish political liberalization from liberalism and liberal democracy. It is true that political liberalization includes the reforms toward liberal democracy; however, transforming regime of the country into a liberal democracy is not

¹¹⁴ Kramer, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World"; Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy"; Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East"; Mohammed Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

¹¹⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 131–134.

an essential part of the liberalization reforms. Also, the reformers that launch the liberalization in their countries do not necessarily do so because they are following the liberal ideology. In fact, in many cases, reformers are not true liberals at all. Liberalism as an ideology and liberal democracy as a political regime are the ultimate stages that liberalization reforms might reach. It is true that these reforms are done in the direction of liberal ideology and liberal democracy, but they might fall short of reaching liberal democracy and reformers might perform them without really having a liberal agenda. Still, looking at their outcomes, these reforms can be counted as political liberalization reforms.

Table 3: Political Liberalizations and Democratic Transitions on the Political Regimes Spectrum



As seen, there is a close association between transition and liberalization. However, they do not necessarily go together. The literature on political liberalization creates a delusion at first sight that political liberalization is a phenomenon only for authoritarian regimes. However, the definition of the concept itself shows that this is a

narrow perception to political liberalization; even in the democratic regimes there might be political liberalization. In fact, political liberalization can take place in every part of the regime spectrum. As seen in Table 3, while only the change from authoritarian regime is qualified to be a transition, all of changes in the direction of democracy (1) within an authoritarian regime without transition, (2) from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime with a transition and also (3) within a democratic regime can be qualified as political liberalization.

III. Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the background for the types of political regimes and transition. Political regimes are classified either dichotomously or continuously. In dichotomous classifications, the regimes are defined as democratic or non-democratic. Yet, especially after the third wave of democratization, new forms of political regimes emerged and necessitated to use continuous classifications. These regimes, which are called hybrid regimes, are neither classically authoritarian nor democratic although they possess some features and institutions of democratic regimes. Along with hybrid regimes, the differences between the definitions of democracy made continuous classifications more necessary. In many regime classifications, democracies were divided into two subcategories according to their fulfillment of Dahlian democracy definition. If a country's democracy fulfills Schumpeterian criteria but cannot fulfill Dahlian criteria, it is categorized as an electoral democracy, if the regime qualifies in both criteria, then it is a liberal democracy.

Understanding democratic transition and political liberalization is very connected with regime typologies. Democratic transition is simply a moving away from an authoritarian regime and establishing a democratic one instead. So, when a country

passes the line of Schumpeterian criteria, what it performs is transition and even a dichotomous classification is enough to detect a transition. Democratic transition cannot be performed without political liberalization, but political liberalization is possible without a transition. Every step forward from the side of authoritarianism to the direction of democracy can be counted as an endeavor of political liberalization. This is so either the country has a form of authoritarian or hybrid regime, or an electoral democratic regime as well; because in each of these, there are still much to perform in the direction of democracy. Since political liberalization is possible in each type of regime, it can only be understood on a continuous classification of political regimes, because in a classification consists of only democracy and non-democracy, there is no middle ground that the political liberalization is detected. So, continuous classification of political regimes, especially of democratic regimes, is very crucial to fully understand the concept of political liberalization and that it is possible in other regime types than authoritarianism. Since it could be possible to understand the essence of political liberalization by this way, regime typologies occupied such a place in the content of this chapter.

CHAPTER II:

Why Does Liberalization Come to an End?

The democratization literature's primary focus is successful transitions and the ways for them. Still, there are plenty of studies working on unsuccessful transitions as well. The studies on hybrid regimes are the best examples of this sort. Also, the studies which illustrate the reform attempts and endeavor for democratization under the authoritarian regimes exist in the literature. As discussed before, since liberalization is studied under the authoritarian regimes, there are many works that focus on liberalization without transition too. However, there are not many studies that consider liberalization worth studying as well as transition and concentrate on failed attempts of political liberalization and the causes of failure. In this respect, this chapter presents possible causes of failure or end of political liberalization during Khrushchev era in the Soviet Union and Menderes era in Turkey.

I. End of Political Liberalization under Khrushchev and Menderes

In the Soviet Union, the Communist rule was established after the October Revolution under Bolshevik Party's one-party rule. By Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin assumed power after a brief struggle. Stalin launched industrialization and collectivization in the USSR and managed to achieve a rapid transformation in the Soviet society. Through collectivization process, as Arendt points out, the Soviet Union became a totalitarian regime under Stalin.¹ With the triumphant defense to Nazi attacks in the World War II and strong economy, the Soviet Union has become a superpower in the aftermath of the war and Stalin became an even more dominant figure in the Cold War era.

¹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, xvii–xxi.

Upon Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became the First Secretary of the Communist Party and hence started to rule the Soviet Union. In 1956, Khrushchev delivered a speech in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR denouncing his predecessor Joseph Stalin because of his rule and oppression. After that point, Khrushchev rule launched the process of destalinization to eliminate Stalin's cult of personality and his political system. This process aimed to remove Stalin's personality, his influence in both domestic and foreign policies, to loosen his strict rule and to allow different voices though very limited. In fact, Khrushchev's reforms of destalinization had no purpose of democratizing the country or providing a regime change at all; rather, he aimed to restore original communist rule instead of Stalin's modified version of communism. However, it is important that these reforms still represent a moving away from a totalitarian rule of Arendt's understanding to a strong closed authoritarian rule.²

While Khrushchev struggled to remove Stalin's image from the state and society during destalinization process, his endeavor ended in 1964. While Khrushchev was on a long trip away from Moscow, a group of leaders of the Communist Party and the KGB planned to topple Khrushchev. At the end, upon his return, Khrushchev accepted his "voluntary" retirement from office. Leonid Brezhnev became the head of the Soviet Union after Khrushchev and the process of destalinization ended under Brezhnev's rule. Also, a strict rule, although not as strong as of Stalin's, was re-established in the USSR. As a result, by his retirement, Khrushchev's liberalization has ended as well.

Turkey assumed a one-party rule under Mustafa Kemal after it was founded in 1923 although there were attempts for opposition by Progressive Republican Party

² Polity IV dataset also reflects a change in the political regime of the Soviet Union. The autocracy level of the USSR in Polity IV drops from 9 to 7 at the year of Stalin's death. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2011.sav>.

(*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1924-25 and Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1930. This one party rule continued to exist for almost a decade after 15-years long rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Between Atatürk's death in 1938 and 1946, one-party rule of Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, henceforth *RPP*)³ continued under İsmet İnönü. In 1946, the intraparty opposition left RPP and founded Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, hereafter *DP*). Following this, Turkey performed its first multiparty elections. According to Polity IV dataset, Turkey in fact performed its transition to democracy in 1946.⁴ However, there are serious suspicions about the fraud in 1946 elections; so although there was a serious change in the Turkish political stage, applying post facto concepts in the literature to that era, the shift that Turkey performed in 1946 seems fitting more to a shift from closed authoritarianism to a form of hybrid regime, probably a competitive authoritarian regime, because of the lack of fairness in 1946 elections.

Although it is not a full transition to democracy, the reforms under İnönü in and after 1946 are important in terms of political liberalization. Allowing a new party to be established and opening the stage to a multiparty election, though a deficient one, is a significant shift in the political regimes scale. After the last 4-year term of İnönü and RPP, Democrat Party won its first elections in 1950 and assumed power while Adnan Menderes became the prime minister. Given the free participation of opposition and fairness of the elections unlike the one in 1946, the 1950 elections can be considered as the first truly democratic elections in Turkey. By this, political liberalization started under RPP after 1946 was combined with a transition to a democratic rule in the 1950 elections. Political liberalization continued under Menderes while he tried to strengthen multiparty system and democracy, at least in his first two terms (1950-1954 and 1954-


³ The previous names were *Halk Fırkası* until 1924 and *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* until 1935.

⁴ Marshall and Cole, *Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset*.

1957), through comprehensive political, social and economic reforms. So, the reforms under the DP rule did not create a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and multiparty system; it was already accomplished when the party came to rule. However, these reforms can still be considered as the reforms of political liberalization which took place within the democratic side of political regimes scale in the direction of democracy.

Although there have been political reforms in Democrat Party era, the reforms of Menderes cannot be long lasting as he aimed to be so. In 1960, a junta in the Turkish Army performed a coup d'état and ended the DP's rule. Committee of National Unity (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*) ruled the country for a year after the coup of May 27th. Meanwhile, Adnan Menderes was sentenced to death penalty and executed along with two of his government's ministers. Although the democratic rule was reestablished in 1961, by the coup of May 27th, the reform attempts of Menderes and the liberalization process were interrupted for a while.

Table 4: Khrushchev and Menderes Reforms on Political Regimes Scale



Before going further, one important clarification is required to explain my usage of the concepts of political liberalization and political reforms. As stated in the previous chapter, political liberalization contains any political reform in the direction of democracy on the political regimes scale. So political reforms towards the direction of democracy, whether under an authoritarian rule or a democratic rule, can be considered as attempts of political liberalization. In the cases of the reforms of Khrushchev and Menderes, the political reforms provide the shift for political liberalization. In Khrushchev era, the reforms were performed after a totalitarian rule to loosen the strictness of the regime. So, although there was no intention of democratizing the country or performing a regime change, the reforms aimed a moving away from totalitarianism. Hence, these reforms, were in the direction to the right side of the scale. In Menderes era, the reforms were made under an already established democratic regime. However, the regime was still an electoral democratic regime in today's conceptualization. So, there was still a huge room for political liberalization under democratic Turkish rule in 1950s.

If I approach political liberalization as the reform attempts only under authoritarian regime which cannot accomplish to bring democratic transition as perceived in the literature, then the reforms in both cases would fail to be political liberalization attempts. However, in this conceptualization, political reforms under both Menderes and Khrushchev were the reforms of political liberalization. Using the previous illustration of liberalization and transition in Table 3, I indicated approximate reform attempts of Menderes and Khrushchev in Table 4.

II. Two Seriously Distinct Cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey

As seen the outcomes in these two countries are very similar. In both cases there were attempts of political reforms to loosen the strictness of the previous regimes, in other words, both reforms were for political opening in their existing regimes. However, in both cases, the reform attempts by the governments of the regimes ended when the leaders were forced to leave the office.

Although there is such a common outcome at the end, in fact these two cases represent significantly different features which are prominent in the democratization literature. First of all, the two countries had different regimes before and during the political reforms. As stated above, the Soviet Union had a totalitarian regime under Stalin and a closed authoritarian regime under Khrushchev. On the other hand, Turkey used to have a one-party authoritarian rule under İnönü, but at the time of political reforms that I am concerned with, Turkey's regime was an electoral democratic regime.

Second, economic and ideological structures are also important in influencing a country's possibility of democratization.⁵ The Soviet Union and Turkey were diverging in these aspects as well. The Soviet Union was a communist regime, as being the living prominent example of it. On the other hand, Turkey had already embraced some of Western liberal values in one-party rule and was in the course of practicing them during the Menderes era. Similarly, economic patterns of these two countries were different as well. The Soviet economy was based on a state-led industrialization, state ownership, collective farming and central administrative planning without market. During one-party rule, the Turkish economic model had some similarities with the Soviet Union being

⁵ For the link between capitalist economic development and democratic consolidation, please see: Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1992), 4.

étatist, state-led and having central planning. However, under Democratic Party rule, Turkish economy started to be integrated to market economy although central planning was not really given up. In this period, Turkey started to receive increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) especially from the United States. One another point of divergence between these two cases related with ideology and economic system is the position in the international politics. The Soviet Union was obviously the leader of the Communist bloc; on the other hand, Turkey has become a member of Western capitalist bloc. Relatedly, the Soviet Union was the founding father of Warsaw Pact in 1955 and Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

Third, another group of features that the Soviet Union and Turkey diverge is related with history, society and religious background. Proximity to West and Europe, or in other words Europeanness, is seen as an indicator for democratization and political reforms for some studies.⁶ Historically, both Russia and Ottomans were perceived as outside of Europe in the eyes of European powers; the two empires were representing the East for them. However, comparing these two, I can assert that Russia was more integrated to Europe in the 19th century in which liberal ideas and regimes started to emerge. The Concert of Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) included Russian Empire along with other four European powers and excluded Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Russia was very active in alliance formation before the World War I since it joined to *Entente Cordiale* of Britain and France and established *the Triple Entente* with them to counterweight *the Triple Alliance* of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Ottomans joined to the alliances only after the war erupted in Europe. So, although traditionally both Russia and Ottomans were perceived outside of Europe, Russia constituted its position as a European power in the 19th century onwards.

⁶ Paul G. Lewis, "Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 13, no. 1 (1997): 6.

Table 5: General Characteristics of the USSR and Turkey in the 1950s

	the USSR	Turkey
Regime Type	Closed Authoritarian	New Electoral Democracy
Economic Model	State-led industrialization No private ownership Central planning	Integration to Market High FDI flows
Ideology	Communist	Liberal-Capitalist
International Orientation	Communist bloc Founder of Warsaw Pact	Western Capitalist Bloc NATO ally
Europeanness	Traditionally seen as East Became an integral part of Europe in the 19th century	Traditionally seen as East Excluded from 19th century European order too
Homogeneity of Society	High ethnic and religious diversity under the Union	Low ethnic and religious diversity after nationalism policies and population transfer
Religious Background	Traditionally predominantly Orthodox Christian with other religious constituencies State is anti-religion, atheist	Predominantly Sunni Muslim State is strictly laique

In terms of religion, both the Soviet Union and Turkey are not best fit to the theories but still differs from each other. As well as its link with capitalism that Weber asserts, it was argued that Protestantism and democracy have been positively interlinked.⁷ Although traditionally argued to have a negative relationship, after the third wave of democratization, the thoughts on Catholicism were revisited.⁸ Still, Orthodox Christianity and Islam are claimed to have negatively linked to political developments in the direction of democracy of the political regimes scale. In short, for these arguments, religion matters for political development as a background factor. In the Soviet Union, although traditionally the society was predominantly Orthodox Christian (by also

⁷ Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, 71.

⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address," *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (1994): 5; Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 77–85.

including Muslim and Catholic groups), the official state policy towards religion was the elimination of religion and constituting atheism.⁹ On the other hand, Turkey was a predominantly Muslim society after the end of Ottoman Era and population exchanges with strictly *laïque* state attitude as was argued to be assertive secularism.¹⁰

Fourth, final serious difference between the Soviet Union and Turkey is the ethnic distribution. According to homogeneity argument in the democratization literature, in the ethnically divided societies, authoritarianism persists for a long time; in other words, heterogeneity in the society is a factor for the lack of political reforms towards the direction of democracy.¹¹ The Soviet Union, as having many different ethnic constituencies under its Communist Republics, was a really ethnically divided society.¹² The USSR also allowed its constituents to identify themselves according to their ethnic backgrounds because of their multiethnic ethnicity regime. Turkey, although having ethnic and religious minorities, tried to create a Turkish nation with its antiethnic ethnicity regime.¹³ Also, population transfers and the oppression over the ethnoreligious minority which led some of them to migrate in the first decades of the Republic caused a decline in diversity level. All in all, as well as political regime, ideology, economic system, international alliance, historical proximity to Europe and religion; in this regard too, the Soviet Union and Turkey are different from each other. Table 5 illustrates the differences between the cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey.

⁹ David Kowalewski, "Protest for Religious Rights in the USSR: Characteristics and Consequences," *Russian Review* 39, no. 4 (1980): 426.

¹⁰ Ahmet T. Kuru, "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies Toward Religion," *World Politics* 59, no. 04 (2011): 572.

¹¹ Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 18–38; Kadri Lühiste, "Support for Strongman Rule in Ethnically Divided Societies: Evidence from Estonia and Latvia," *Democratization* 15, no. 2 (2008): 297–320; Gerard Padro Miquel, *The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear*, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2006), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12573>.

¹² Galina V. Selegen, "The First Report on the Recent Population Census in the Soviet Union," *Population Studies* 14, no. 1 (1960): 17–27.

¹³ For more on ethnicity regimes of Turkey and the Soviet Union please see, Şener Aktürk, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

III. What took these Diverse Cases to a Common Fate?

As I illustrate, the Soviet Union and Turkey of the 1950s that I focus on, have serious differences from each other. Although they are characteristically different countries, the leaders of the time Menderes and Khrushchev launched political reforms. These reforms are not really same since one of them is liberalizing reforms under a democratic regime and the other is just to soften the authoritarian regime. However, the reforms in these both countries are in the same direction in the political regimes scale which was illustrated in Table 4 before. More important point that I concern is the common fate of these political reforms. Both the reforms in the Soviet Union and Turkey managed to accomplish some in the first years; however, ended afterwards when the leaders were forced to leave their offices. This is the main concern of this study: Why in these two different cases, political liberalization through reforms that were attempted by Khrushchev and Menderes was terminated in a similar manner; what was the obstacle before the accomplishment of these reforms?

In such a picture, the process of reforms starts from divergence and reached to convergence. In this regard, this puzzle represents a most different systems (MDS) design in comparative politics. In other words, in Mill's conceptualization, the answer to this puzzle can be found by the method of agreement.¹⁴ The Mill's method of agreement compares cases in which a common outcome is present and the cases are actually different in many respects. In such a circumstance, there should be a common cause that leads the process in these different cases into the common outcome. Applying Mill's approach to my cases, there should be a common cause (or causes) that led the reform attempts into an end.

¹⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 151–179.

To find out the common cause, I turn to the arguments in the democratization literature. As I repeatedly stated before, these cases are not the cases of democratic transition which are mostly examined in the democratization literature; rather, these are only attempts of political liberalization. According to Welzel, slightly different than my perception, there are different forms of democratization as introduction of democracy, deepening democratic qualities and survival of democracy. For his view, the theories of democratization can be applied in each kind of these democratizations.¹⁵ My understanding of liberalization contains what Welzel states as democratization and also the political reforms of opening under authoritarian regimes. So, if the arguments in the democratization literature can be applied in each of these cases, then I can benefit from them for the liberalization attempts as well. Although the literature focuses on the successful and failed democratization attempts, the theories of democratization still presents a rich background to find out the causes of failed liberalizations that I seek. This is why I benefit from the theories and arguments in the democratization literature, which were originally suggested for democratic transition.

As Lipset points out “The move toward democracy is not a simple one”.¹⁶ This complicated path became subject to numerous studies. The different arguments put forward by different studies showed that there is no one single path, in fact “there may be many roads to democracy”.¹⁷ As the democratization literature is one of the richest literatures in the political science, there are plenty of arguments on why and how the countries democratize. I used three of these arguments in the democratization literature to illustrate that the cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey are actually different from each other. The reforms that I am concerned are tried to be done by the leaders

¹⁵ Christian Welzel, “Theories of Democratization,” in *Democratization*, ed. Christian W. Haerpfer et al. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74–75.

¹⁶ Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” 1.

¹⁷ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” 345.

themselves. In other words, these were top-down reforms in the executive level, not much driven from the bottom. So, the arguments that deal with the civil society activities and mass movements do not help much to explain the failure of the reforms of my interest. Hence, from the remaining theories, I examine my cases according to three prominent and relevant arguments in the democratization literature: 1) modernization theory, 2) international factors and 3) elite choice. In general, the theories of democratization present the ways for transition rather than failed transition attempts. However, the scholars also use these theories in reverse to illustrate why transition did not occur. Similarly, I operationalize the arguments of these theories in reverse to find out the causes of the end of political liberalization processes in the Soviet Union and Turkey.

a. Modernization Theory

Socioeconomic development and modernization theory is one of the most influential arguments in the democratization literature. The theory is inspired from the similar arguments such as Weber's argument on the relationship between capitalist industrialization and modern democracy;¹⁸ however, in its modern form, Seymour Martin Lipset's The American Political Science Review (APSR) article of 1959, *Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy* is the milestone of the theory.¹⁹ The article's impact is enormous in the comparative politics and in particular in the democratization studies. In the APSR's centennial issue in 2006, Lee Siegelman presents the most cited works in the history of the journal. Lipset's *Some*

¹⁸ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 73.

¹⁹ Lipset's article was republished with slight differences in the second chapter of his book *Political Man* in the next year: Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*.

Social Requisites of Democracy is listed among the top 10 in the ranking.²⁰ Also for Carles Boix, Lipset's theory "may be the strongest empirical generalization ... in comparative politics to date" after Duverger's law.²¹

Lipset simply argues that high socioeconomic development, in other words modernization, leads countries to democratization. He emphasizes it in his famous phrase "Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."²² Lipset reaches this conclusion by examining the socioeconomic indicators of European, Latin American and non-European English speaking nations. The high correlation between the high socioeconomic indicators and the level of democracy in modernized countries leads Lipset to present this argument.²³ However, in approaching Lipset's theory, some scholars fall into an error of understanding Lipset's operationalization of socioeconomic development. As Wucherpfennig and Deutsch point out, Lipset's theory is misrepresented by reducing his theory to a simple correlation between per capita income and democracy.²⁴ Although GDP per capita is one of the indicators that Lipset deals with, moreover maybe one of the most important ones, he does not define socioeconomic development merely on per capita income. For him the economic development is the combination of wealth (which includes per capita income), industrialization, urbanization and education.²⁵ Among these four indices, he pays special attention on wealth and education. He believes that education is a one of the primary sources of modernization and by being influenced by the writings of John Dewey he thinks that education is a crucial asset to introduce

²⁰ Lee Sigelman, "Top Twenty Commentaries: The American Political Science Review Citation Classics," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4 (2006): 668.

²¹ Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–2.

²² Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75.

²³ *Ibid.*, 74–75.

²⁴ Julian Wucherpfennig and Franziska Deutsch, "Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited," *Living Reviews in Democracy* 1 (2009): 1.

²⁵ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75.

democracy in the country. He defends this thesis by illustrating that the more democratic countries of Europe are very highly literate while the lowest among them having a rate of 96%.²⁶

After thirty-five years of his original piece, Lipset writes another article in 1994 in which he revisits his arguments. In this article, he maintains that his original arguments still work and supports this with some other studies throughout thirty-five years.²⁷ In this latter piece, he only pays more attention on the middle class in the formation of democracy which is actually is the product of modernization for him.²⁸ In short, for Lipset, changing social conditions by modernization helps fostering democracy as seen in both of his studies in different time periods.

As being such a prominent argument in the democratization studies, Lipset's theory became subjected to numerous critics. Among the early critics, one of the most important came from Guillermo O'Donnell. At the beginning of his book on bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America, O'Donnell suggests that there is no historical experience showing the presence of a one-to-one correspondence between socioeconomic conditions and political regime. For him, modernization theory holds the hope of enlightenment that "social 'progress' would generate 'better' ... forms of organization of political life."²⁹ For him, if there is any association, it would be between socioeconomic development and political pluralization rather than political democracy.³⁰ Also, Lewis criticizes Lipset's account as being only a probabilistic statement rather than establishing relatively certain links between the cause and the outcome to be qualified as

²⁶ Ibid., 78–80; For more on the relation between democracy and education, see: John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York; London: The Free Press, 1966).

²⁷ Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," 16.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 1–4.

³⁰ Ibid., 8.

a theory.³¹ He defends his argument by referring to Huntington's *The Third Wave*. For Huntington, in the first wave of democratization, the modernization theory was effective to explain; however, the patterns in the third wave were more complex than what the theory suggests.³²

Another questionable point for the modernization theory came with the economic development that the authoritarian regimes performed. In the last decades, many authoritarian regimes including Gulf countries and Russia performed significant economic development by natural resource rents which then be called rentier states.³³ Especially in the Gulf countries, significantly high levels of per capita income which is important for modernization theory were recorded. As a result, number of scholars led by Michael L. Ross argued that natural resource rents and the economic development do not help these countries to democratize; in contrast, resources become a curse and the rents create a trap for them to remain under an authoritarian rule.³⁴ Although these countries remain sometimes short of other indicators of modernization theory, the rise of rentier states does still raise question marks for the theory.

Probably, the most important rebuttal to the Lipset's theory came from Przeworski et al.³⁵ In fact, they do not totally invalidate Lipset's theory but modified it and, in a way, presented a novel modernization theory in lieu of the conventional one, because they still argue that economic development is highly important for democracy. Przeworski et al. distinguish two arguments of "development brings about democracy" and "development sustains already established democracy". They call the former

³¹ Lewis, "Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe," 12–13.

³² Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 39–46.

³³ Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State* (London; New York: Croom Helm, 1987).

³⁴ Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–361; Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," *World Politics* 51, no. 2 (1999): 297–322.

³⁵ Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*.

“endogenous” and the latter “exogenous” effects of development.³⁶ Through large-N empirical analyses, they suggest that the effects of economic development are different in endogenous and exogenous versions of democratization. For them, economic development helps already existing democracies to endure; however, it does not provide the emergence of democracy. By that, they reject the endogenous hypothesis of Lipset that economic development brings about democracy.³⁷

Although there are many criticisms to Lipset’s account as illustrated, there still are studies that support Lipset’s arguments. These studies suggest that either autocracies rarely have good economic performance³⁸ or democracy is strongly associated with economic development. Huber et. al. is one of the strong supporters of modernization theory. They, as well as Lipset, believe that economic development is causally related with democracy. They base their theory more upon capitalist development and argue that modernization which comes with capitalist development brings about democracy by transforming the class structure.³⁹ Another strong support to Lipset comes from Boix and Stokes who counter-argue to Przeworski et. al.’s distinction of endogenous and exogenous hypotheses. For Boix and Stokes, Przeworski et. al. do not provide a persuasive theory when they link development and democracy only under the democracy exists, hence there is no need to distinguish exogenous and endogenous hypotheses.

³⁶ Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (1997): 156–157.

³⁷ Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*, 92–106.

³⁸ Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567.

³⁹ Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, no. 3 (1993): 74–75; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*.

Then, basing upon an empirical study, they argue that modernization helps both the emergence and the survival of democracy.⁴⁰

I tend to use modernization theory to examine my cases as well. Not only Lipset's original theory, but also Przeworski et. al.'s argument helps me to establish my hypothesis. Either modernization theory brings about democratization or just sustains, these are helpful for my cases while Przeworski et. al.'s approach can be applicable only to Turkey. In my general framework, what I can derive from this theory is that, if the socioeconomic development brings about political development then it also produces liberalization. In this case, since the liberalization attempts failed in both the Soviet Union and Turkey, then I expect that none of them reached the level of modernization or was in the course of modernizing when the reform attempts have ended. Since Lipset's study was done in the years that I am studying, it is possible to use his indicators of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education to understand the level of modernization in both the USSR and Turkey.

b. International Dimension of Democratization

In the early literature of democratic transition, international dimension of democratization was the neglected account. Democratization, as seen in the previously discussed arguments, was almost entirely associated with domestic factors.⁴¹ For example, Lisa Anderson states that Rustow omits the international pressures on democratic transition self-consciously. For her, since Rustow's study of *Transitions to Democracy* was "a first attempt at a general theory", he chose to simplify it by

⁴⁰ Charles Boix and Susan Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55, no. 4 (2003): 518–519.

⁴¹ Hakan Yilmaz, "The International Context," in *Democratization*, ed. Christian W. Haerpfer et al. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 92–93.

neglecting the foreign influences on democratization.⁴² In fact, the link between international and domestic spheres had been neglected not only in democratization literature but also in almost entire comparative politics and international relations. Putnam pointed out this shortcoming in the literature in his influential work of *The Logic of Two-Level Games* in 1993.⁴³ Although his study is a part of the realm of international relations, comparativists made important inferences from it to show the linkage between domestic and international spheres in their works as well.

The international dimension of democratization started to be studied more after the third wave. As Welzel points out, the fact that the countries democratized in international waves suggested that processes of democratization are not totally isolated domestic matters.⁴⁴ Hence, although there were some exceptional studies which shortly touch upon the possible role of international factors in the 1980s,⁴⁵ the first works which focus mainly on international dimension on democratization were published in the 1990s.⁴⁶ These studies focusing on external factors have increased more in the 2000s and became an important part of democratization literature.⁴⁷

⁴² Anderson, "Introduction," 7.

⁴³ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460.

⁴⁴ Welzel, "Theories of Democratization," 81.

⁴⁵ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, 17–18.

⁴⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Douglas A. Chalmers, "The International Dimensions Of Political Institutions In Latin America: An Internationalized Politics Approach" (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago: Unpublished Paper, 1992), <http://www.columbia.edu/~chalmers/IntDomPol.htm>; For the examples for the effect of international dimension on the Middle East, see: F. Gregory Gause III, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 3–28; Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World: Global Diffusion, Regional Demonstration, and Domestic Imperatives," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 3–28.

⁴⁷ Coppedge and Heinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy"; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (2006): 911–933; Hakan Yilmaz, "External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change," *Democratization* 9, no. 2 (2002): 67–84; Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union* (Farnham, England:

International factors might lead democratization either by constituting the background conditions or by direct effect. For the first one, external influences can open important opportunities for the reform supporters where such groups exist and these reformers might struggle to fight for democracy in the domestic politics.⁴⁸ For the second one, the international powers might try to directly transfer democracy as seen in Iraqi case by the US. In general, international actors might have influence on democratization in several ways. For Pridham, external factors might “penetrate” to a domestic system, affect the background conditions for democracy and make the country ready for democratization.⁴⁹ On the other hand Whitehead, by his conceptualization of “democratization through convergence”, argues that a country might integrate into an existing democratic community and this convergence necessitates the country to start democratization.⁵⁰ He gives the example of Southern European states’ integration to European Community in 1980, but now this argument can be expanded to all integration processes to the European Union.

Close to these theses, one of the strongest arguments dealing with the external factors is diffusion. When there are numbers of democratic or democratizing countries in a neighboring region of a country, this creates a contagion of democratic ideas. This contagion launches an increasing pressure for democratization.⁵¹ This effect is widely discussed in Huntington’s *The Third Wave* as he says it can be termed demonstration effect, contagion, diffusion, emulation, snowballing, or even domino effect. He suggests that, especially in the context of the third wave, once democratization occurs in one

Ashgate, 2009); Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization”; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

⁴⁸ Welzel, “Theories of Democratization,” 82.

⁴⁹ Geoffrey Pridham et al., eds., “The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice and Inter-regional Comparisons,” in *Building Democracy?: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 24.

⁵⁰ Laurence Whitehead, “Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe,” in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁵¹ Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash*, 12.

country, it encourages or pulls the others to get into the same process.⁵² This diffusion effect is supported by empirical studies as well. Brinks and Coppedge illustrate that number of countries try to change their regimes to accord with their neighboring countries.⁵³ Also, Ambrosio argues that external factors, whether be in terms of diffusion or other ways, effects even the authoritarian persistence too.⁵⁴ Thus, as seen, in general neighboring countries and international environment might have effect on political change and persistence.

One of the most appreciated studies taking international dimension into account was made by Levitsky and Way. By a middle-N comparative analysis of 35 countries from post-Cold War Africa, Asia, Eurasia and the Americas, they investigated the influence of the ties with West on democratization. They define the ties with West in two concepts: Western leverage and linkage to the West. For them, Western leverage is an authoritarian regime's vulnerability to the democratization pressures from outside. These pressures include sanctions, threats, punitive measures, diplomatic pressures and even military intervention.⁵⁵ On the other hand, linkage to the West is described as the density of ties with the United States, the European Union and Western-dominated multilateral institutions. These ties consist of five dimensions: economic linkage, geopolitical linkage, social linkage, communication linkage and transnational civil society linkage.⁵⁶ They argue that an authoritarian regime's persistence and end is defined according to density of these leverage and linkages. Simply stating, when both linkage and leverage are high, there is high external democratizing pressure and it leads to democratization at

⁵² Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 100–106.

⁵³ Daniel Brinks, "Diffusion Is No Illusion," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463.

⁵⁴ Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash*, 11–14.

⁵⁵ Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," 21–22.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 22–23; In the expanded book version of their work in 2010, they make minor revisions on the dimensions of international linkages. They rename geopolitical linkage as intergovernmental linkage and communication linkage as information linkage (with minimal additions to original contents); and also add sixth dimension as technocratic linkage: Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 43–44.

the end. If only one of them is high, then the pressure is indirect and moderate which cannot lead full democratization and if both of them are low, the authoritarian regime generally persist due to weak external pressure.⁵⁷

All of these studies illustrate that international factors might have an important role in defining a country's political development. Also, other studies back up these arguments and state that strong international support in the course of Cold War⁵⁸ and international alliances⁵⁹ have also influenced the way the international dimension leads to political change or regime persistence. This opens a door to analyze the effect of international factors on the end of liberalization in the Soviet Union and Turkey in the 1960s, because both countries were a part (in the case of Soviets, the central part) of international alliances of the Cold War as already mentioned. To find out the influence of international alliances, I look at the international agreements that these states were bound and the expectations of the other main actors of their alliances to see whether a kind of contagion or diffusion emerged in those years to affect their domestic politics. Since in both cases the liberalization attempts failed, the basic expectation is that there might be a contagion effect in their alliances to resist to the change and protect the status quo. If so, I can argue that international factors had an influence on the reform failures in the USSR and Turkey.

c. Elite Choice and Pacts

An important part of the democratization literature focus on the elites' choices in the political development. Modernization theory is a strong structural theory. The arguments on the social and economic inequality, which are related with modernization

⁵⁷ Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," 25–32; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 52–53.

⁵⁸ Benjamin Smith, "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single-Party Rule," *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (2005): 427.

⁵⁹ Welzel, "Theories of Democratization," 81.

theory, start from structural factors such as economic structure and class relations; however, add a pivotal component of agency by using rational choice of class actors. The studies built on elite choice and pacts are mostly agent-centered where the elites are the central actors in defining political development and democratization. In this sense, these studies try to refute structural approaches and focus on the choices of the individual elite actors as the determiners of regime change.⁶⁰

According to scholars who perceive elites as the central actors of change, democracy and political development is the outcome of conscious decision and choice of political elites.⁶¹ For them, structural factors such as economic development, culture, religion, historical background and institutions might influence the decision of the actors, but at the end, the human action is what brings democracy.⁶² Political change is maybe more important for elites than for the other groups in the society, because usually they are the ones who are better off in case of status quo. They have a pivotal role in the existing system and if it changes they might lose their position. They naturally care about their career security and desire to maintain their position.⁶³ This is why elites typically tend to protect the status quo and only in case of guarantees for their position in the changing system, they might choose to support change.⁶⁴ The studies in this sub-literature focus on either elite choice in their relation with general opposition or elite choice in intra-elite division. But in either case, as Bermeo argues, not the general social mobilization but the elite choice will define whether democracy comes or not.⁶⁵

Before going further to the arguments on elite choice, first I have to explain who the elites are how they are organized. In his seminal work, *Political Parties*, Michels

⁶⁰ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, 20.

⁶¹ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 356.

⁶² McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship," 214.

⁶³ Hale, "Regime Cycles," 137–138.

⁶⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 116.

⁶⁵ Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation," 315.

argues that there are oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization and the oligarchic groups emerge as the leaders.⁶⁶ These tendencies are inherent in the leaders although they usually believe that they are working for the good for all. This is why Michels states, by referring Mosca's argument, that no developed social order is possible without a politically dominant class which is in fact a class of a minority.⁶⁷ In the organization of state, this class of elites becomes the national level agenda setters.⁶⁸ However, it is wrong to perceive elites as a monolithic class; in fact, there are fractions among the elites. The elites in total, in fact, are the coalition of different groups of elites. For Bova, "the existence of serious unresolved political, social and economic crises" is what leads the elites to split into groups.⁶⁹ These divisions among the elite groups constitute the backbone of the arguments on elite choice.

Although coalition among elites can work well under no threat, it might split under certain circumstances where the opportunity for change arises. In such a situation, the elite choice sub-literature usually divides elites according to their position to the change as status quo camp and reformer camp.⁷⁰ The classical division is O'Donnell and Schmitter's division of elites as hard-liners and soft-liners, former being supporters of status quo and the latter are reform advocates.⁷¹ Similarly, Bova calls them conservatives and reformers.⁷² On the other hand, Huntington makes a three-way division as standpatters, liberal reformers and democratic reformers where he actually generates two subgroups in the reformer camp.⁷³ In this case, reformers are the ones who believe that they will be better off or at least protect their position after the change and the

⁶⁶ Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 377.

⁶⁸ Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, 12.

⁶⁹ Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition," 122.

⁷⁰ Welzel, "Theories of Democratization," 82–83.

⁷¹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, 15–16.

⁷² Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition," 119–120.

⁷³ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 121.

conservatives are the ones who think that they will lose their privileges. These divisions might be based on different components of state institutions or even be cross-institutional. In the literature, different groups of elites such as political, bureaucratic and military elites are considered to constitute the overall elites. In different cases, the distribution of roles might be different. Sometimes, political elites become reformers and bureaucratic and military elites might be status-quo supporters; or sometimes parts of military and political elites might be soft-liners and all the remaining elites in each of the subgroups might be hard-liners. In some cases, as in the case of the Soviet Union, the subgroups of elites might be intertwined and the access to elites can only be possible through Communist Party or a similar organ.⁷⁴

Political change in the elite level can be possible only in case of pacts either among elites or between elites and opposition. The elite choice school argues that a division within the ruling class begins the process of political liberalization, which actually consists of the reformers or the soft-liners.⁷⁵ This group of elites might demand change but in order to bring it, they have to give some guarantees to the hard-liners. For example, O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that democratization can only be possible when soft-liners in the elites and the moderates in the opposition camp can make a coalition. Only in this case, this group might convince the hard-liners and bring about change. If the radicals in the opposition camp join the coalition to bring change, then the hard-liner elites try to prevent the change in order not to lose their privileges.⁷⁶ Similarly, Brownlee argues that a group among elites should form a political coalition with a group from

⁷⁴ Lewis, "Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe," 17.

⁷⁵ McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship," 214–215.

⁷⁶ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, 37–47; For more on this see: Jakub Zielinski, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and the Problem of Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 2 (1999): 214; Welzel, "Theories of Democratization," 82–83.

opposition to bring about change.⁷⁷ Also, Nancy Bermeo argues that, elites forecast their future after the change and decide to bring about democratization according to which group (themselves, extremist opposition and moderate opposition) becomes better off from the change.⁷⁸ As seen, the guarantees and power-sharing arrangements are very crucial for defining the choices of elite groups. This is why, in the pacts, some guarantees like veto power, institutional benefits, social and financial privileges, can be expanded to certain powerful groups such as military.⁷⁹ So, the most important thing to do for the change is to convince the elites by the guarantees for the order after the change.

In my cases, the elite groups which bring reform are the governments, and in particular, the leaders of the state, because Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and Menderes in Turkey are actually the ones who attempted for the political reforms. In this sense, they are the reformers or the soft-liners among the elites. On the other hand, military and bureaucratic elites in Turkey and the Presidium and high state bureaucracy in the Soviet Union can be the conservatives or the hard-liners against the change. Young suggests that leaders in any organization, when they attempt reform, cannot ignore the interests of elite groups.⁸⁰ This framework of elite choice might explain the termination of reform attempts in the USSR and Turkey. In this case, if the end of liberalization attempts is due to elite choice in the USSR and Turkey, it means that the reformers in the state elites, in other words the leaders or the governments, could not give incentives or guarantees to the conservative elites for the phase after the reforms and could not convince them for the liberalization as they design. To find out the effect

⁷⁷ Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, 41.

⁷⁸ Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation," 317.

⁷⁹ Cook, "The Promise of Pacts," 65; Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition and the New Constitutional Order," *Politics and Society* 23, no. 3 (n.d.): 270–271.

⁸⁰ Young, "The Strategy of Political Liberalization," 47–48.

of elite choice on my cases, I plan to examine the elite groups, old and emerging elites, in the USSR and Turkey and see whether the guarantees are given to conservatives to convince them for reforms.

IV. Conclusion

As I stated in this chapter, there are leader-led attempts of political reform in both the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Turkey under Menderes. In fact, the USSR and Turkey where the reforms were attempted are significantly different cases. The most important difference is the political regimes in these countries. The USSR is a closed authoritarian regime whereas Turkey is a new electoral democracy at the time of reforms. In other words, although there are attempts for political liberalization in both cases, these attempts are in different sides of political regimes scale. Along with the regime type, these cases diverge in ideology, international orientation, economic systems and historical bounds with modern Europe.

While the Soviet Union and Turkey are seriously distinct cases, the puzzling point is that the reform attempts in both cases ended in a similar manner. The leaders who initiate the reforms, Khrushchev and Menderes, were forced to leave the office before accomplishing their reforms. This pattern from diverge characteristics to a common outcome arises the question of why in both cases the reform attempts failed at the end.

To find out the answers of this question, I turn to democratization literature, because the literature presents inferences for the lack of success in political change as well as for success. To investigate in my cases, I focus on three prevalent arguments in the literature, which being modernization theory, international factor and elite choice on the course of political change. While modernization theory is structural and the

arguments on international dimension are almost entirely as well; elite choice school is based mostly on agency.

As the possible explanations for the end of liberalization reform attempts in these two cases put forward, in the next two chapters I will investigate Khrushchev era in the USSR and Menderes era in Turkey to find out what was the main reason behind the lack of success in reforms.

CHAPTER III:

Khrushchev's Reforms of Liberalization and Removal from Premiership

Lenin was the ideologue of Soviet Socialism and Stalin established socialism in one country during his almost 30 years of rule. These two salient figures' role in the founding and rise of the Soviet Union is undeniable. However, the Soviet miracle was realized not under the rule of these two leaders but under a lower profile figure, Nikita Khrushchev. In fact, Khrushchev era was quite tumultuous. First he consolidated his power, launched extensive reforms, developed country economically and socially and created a strong competitive Soviet image in the international scene in the first years of his realm; later on development lost momentum, international disputes hurt the nation's prestige and his rivals finally toppled him down from office.

In this chapter, I focus on the Khrushchev era reforms in the Soviet Union and the end of reforms with his removal from office. For this, I firstly review the liberalization attempts in his first years concentrated mainly the operation of destalinization and the failure of reforms both during his last years and by his removal of him from the office. Then, I examine the domestic and international factors behind his removal from office to understand whether socioeconomic, international or elite-based factors had a central role in his removal from office and the end of liberalization. Historical facts indicate that elite-based factors relating mainly the security of elites' status and resistance to expansion of politics are the main reasons behind the fall of Premier in 1964. Looking from an elite-based perspective, it can be argued that Khrushchev era actions were made in the name of two father figures: On the other hand, Khrushchev drove destalinization with the justification of returning to Lenin as "the founding father" of the Soviet Nation. On the other hand, the group that toppled Khrushchev reestablished the cult of personality and restored the Stalin's honor as "the father of the all nations".

I. Stalin and the Succession Race after Him

During the interwar period, Joseph Stalin radically transformed the Soviet society and state. From a ruin at the end of the World War I, the Soviet Union became the glorious victor of the World War II by stopping the Nazi advancement and entering Berlin first and becoming the big rival of the United States by the onset of Cold War. Stalin succeeded all these by a high price paid by the Soviet society. The number of deaths during collectivization is controversial but apparently at least couple of millions. Although with a high price, Stalin managed to modernize the state and society by establishing the essentials of his rule as central planning, heavy industry, collectivized agriculture, one-party rule based on personal dictatorship, institutionalized terror, hierarchy in the social structure, conservative social and cultural policy. By these, he established socialism with a centralized essence in mid-1930s.¹ Although Stalin's actions were transformative at first, the state embraced a conservative understanding and paid more attention to consolidation and stability afterwards.²

In Stalin's rule, the terror and the cult of personality were essential to protect his position.³ By the cult that was created, he consolidated his position as the supreme leader and nobody in his entourage was able to act outside of Stalin's will or even oppose his opinions.⁴ Anyone resisting Stalin's actions, whether he is a peasant or an officer in higher echelons of the Communist Party, he would have a big risk of being sent to the labor camps, if not executed instantly. It is argued that, 15 percent of the male population

¹ Mark Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism* (London; Philadelphia: UCL Press, 1999), 212.

² For more on Stalin and Stalinism, see: Harold Shukman, *Redefining Stalinism* (London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2003); Alter Litvin and John Keep, *Stalinism Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium*. (London; New York: Routledge, 2004); Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe*; O'Kane, *Paths to Democracy*.

³ Alec Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev* (London; New York: Routledge, 1988), 111–112.

⁴ John Keep, *Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945-1991* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25.

was in labor camps at the end of Stalin era.⁵ This is why the pressure of the cult of personality and terror was quite high on society and the reforms of Khrushchev in the next decade centered on these two areas.

When Stalin died in 1953, he left no official successor for the leadership of the Soviet Union. Georgy Malenkov had delivered the general report in 19th Party Congress in 1952 and because of that he was thought to be successor, yet since there is no official “testament”, the succession would be decided through a bargaining between central figures of the Presidium⁶ such as Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrentiy Beria, Lazar Kaganovich and Nikita Khrushchev. Among these figures, actually Khrushchev was the less predicted just like Stalin was so when Lenin had passed away.⁷ Since arduousness of Stalin’s one-man rule was still fresh, they decided to rule the Soviet Union by a collective leadership. Accordingly, they divided up the key posts among themselves.⁸ Beria became the Minister of Internal Affairs and was responsible of security apparatus. However, his hawkish attitude created a threat for his fellows and they took him down and executed in couple of months.⁹ By the removal of Beria from the scene, the leading posts were secured; Malenkov was Premier (Chairmen of Council of Ministers), Khrushchev was the Secretary of the Communist Party, Molotov was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Kaganovich as the First Deputy of Council of Ministers.

In effect, the nation was ruled by the double leadership of Malenkov and Khrushchev at the end of 1953. In this formation, Malenkov was leading the government and Khrushchev was leading the party. Both of them started some reforms while

⁵ Richard Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 51–52.

⁶ Presidium is the name used for Politburo from 1952 to 1966.

⁷ Peter Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 188, <http://www.mylibrary.com?id=44935>.

⁸ Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism*, 215.

⁹ Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 50.

Malenkov was more interested in industry and Khrushchev was in agriculture; this situation also started a conflict between two bureaucracies; the party and the state.¹⁰ While Khrushchev increased his power as the leader of the party through appointments,¹¹ this type of leadership between two powerful figures started to create problems. As a result in 1955, Khrushchev managed to remove Malenkov from Premiership and much less effective Bulganin became the new Premier.¹² By the replacement of Malenkov by Bulganin, although collective leadership continued, Khrushchev reinforced his position as the supreme leader and it led to the launch of destalinization process.

II. Consolidation of Power and Reforms

a. Destalinization and After

Unlike his earlier successes, when Stalin died, the Soviet system was in a state of economic, social and cultural crisis due to his harsh attitudes.¹³ This is why there was a broad consensus among elites on the need for a change.¹⁴ This is why, even at the beginning of the collective leadership, security organs were subordinated to the party authority and terror was terminated.¹⁵ Khrushchev, after not presenting himself politically radical for first two and a half years, started a much more extensive reform process when reinforced his position.¹⁶ In general, destalinization which includes the

¹⁰ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 97.

¹¹ Robert Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 333.

¹² Georg von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia*, 5th rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 434; Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, 125.

¹³ Polly Jones, "Introduction: The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization," in *The Dilemmas of Destalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Polly Jones (London: New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.

¹⁴ William J. Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison," *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 1 (1993): 82–84.

¹⁵ Beria's removal from his post was an important factor for this cause.

¹⁶ Peter Reddaway, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev: An American View," in *Nikita Khrushchev*, ed. William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 324–325.

denunciation of Stalin's policies and cult of personality provided opening and easing in the Soviet society, not just in the politics but also in economy, social issues, science and arts. This is why destalinization is also often termed as "the Thaw". Although there was already weariness from Stalin's rule and the society was in fact in need for a thaw, it was difficult to move away from Stalin's cult. What Khrushchev did was a bold move which is exactly to dare to take the first step.¹⁷

Impressive launch of destalinization was made in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party by Khrushchev's speech, later on coined the "Secret Speech". In this regard, 20th Congress is seen as the second funeral of Stalin.¹⁸ The Secret Speech was entirely a personal initiative of Khrushchev. One day before the start of the Congress, Khrushchev proposed his speech on "the cult of personality and its consequences" to the Presidium. However, Molotov's counter-proposal was to give a speech on Stalin's role as Lenin's successor. Yet Khrushchev found more supporters for himself and gave the speech in a secret meeting during the last night of the Congress.¹⁹ Although this speech is named as the "Secret Speech", it was not so secret at all. There are already more than 1400 delegates in the meeting and later on the Central Committee itself led the circulation of the speech in the society.²⁰ In fact, the positive atmosphere in the secret session was the main factor behind the circulation of the speech and the advancement of destalinization.

¹⁷ Georgii Shakhnazarov, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev: A Russian View," in *Nikita Khrushchev*, ed. William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 304; Ian D. Thatcher, "Khrushchev as Leader," in *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964*, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 14.

¹⁸ Albert Parry, "The Twentieth Congress: Stalin's 'Second Funeral'," *American Slavic and East European Review* 15, no. 4 (1956): 463; Tony Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics: The Spring of 1956," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 2 (1996): 181.

¹⁹ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 333.

²⁰ Susan Schattenberg, "'Democracy' or 'despotism'? How the Secret Speech Was Translated into Everyday Life," in *The Dilemmas of Destalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Polly Jones (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 65.

In the Secret Speech, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's totalitarian rule, the terror under his reign and blamed him because of all the sufferings that the Soviet society had during and after World War II.²¹ But in fact, Khrushchev's speech was not fair at all; he focused on certain elements of Stalin's rule and ignored others. Khrushchev's criticisms on Stalin starts from 1934 and accordingly collectivization and industrialization were accepted. Stalin was not blamed for the murders during collectivization but for all the terror in his last twenty years. Khrushchev was quite careful in his speech to present the party as the victim and the Stalin as the only wrongdoer. In other words, all the good things done during Stalin era came from the party and all the negatives came from Stalin himself.²² In order to reemphasize the party, Khrushchev allocated an important part in his speech to Lenin and Leninist ideals:

Comrades: We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

...

*[It is necessary] to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight the willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality, which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual, has to be completely corrected.*²³

²¹ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 192.

²² Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 53.

²³ Richard Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 310–311.

In this regard, the Secret Speech and destalinization was representing a going back to Leninist principals. In a way, the socialist ideals were spoiled under Stalin's rule and the speech was a courageous criticism to clean the path for communism.²⁴ As an example to the perception of the Secret Speech as a going back to Leninist ideals, Nazım Hikmet, the Turkish communist poet exiled at the Soviet lands at the time, celebrated the speech in his poem entitled "Twentieth Congress". The poem starts as "Here comes Lenin to the Twentieth Congress / Smiling his blue eyes" and says the hope arouses for the Soviet Union.

Destalinization under Khrushchev gave pace to the already launched reforms after Stalin. Maybe Soviet system was not totally transformed and Khrushchev's intention was obviously not so, but comparing to Stalin's term, important reforms were pursued for an opening after a quite strict rule. In fact, the Soviet Union did change in significant ways after the death of Stalin²⁵ and destalinization constituted an important part of this change. Khrushchev, by disassociating the party and his rule from Stalin, stripped the state from the shackles of the past and opened the field for the future actions.

b. Political Reforms under Khrushchev

For the reforms and changes after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev cannot take all the credits; however, he was still the one who realizes most of the reforms. Crediting the Presidium in general, the first significant change after Stalin's death was the decision on collective leadership.²⁶ Stalin, apart from the dictatorship as an institution, was a strong figure especially by the cult of personality, who expanded the limits of dictatorship. So, any leader after Stalin would bring relaxation in the state. However, by the decision of

²⁴ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 341.

²⁵ Jeremy Smith, "Introduction," in *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964*, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.

²⁶ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 191.

collective leadership, the power was taken away from one man and given to an oligarchic structure. Although there was still a hierarchy in collective leadership and it was modified in the second half of Khrushchev's rule, it was the first and maybe one of the most important reforms after Stalin.

One another of the most significant changes after Stalin was the termination of twenty-five years of mass terror. Along with the end of terror, the influence of the security police in the state was reduced by the subordination of KGB and the army to the the Presidium and the party.²⁷ Under Stalin, everyone was in a constant fear of being arrested by the security police and sent to Gulags. Obviously, the arrests did not end at all, but it diminished significantly. As a side effect of the end of mass terror, most of the victims of Stalin's terror were set free and rehabilitated and the ones who perished during the terror were legally exonerated.²⁸ Also, unlike the terror regime, there was some, yet very small, opportunity for criticism.²⁹ Again, this was not without exceptions; since ideological division was still alive, no Trotskyites and no Bukharinites were included to rehabilitation.³⁰

Another sphere of reforms under Khrushchev was bureaucracy and internal party democracy. During this period, some administrative abuses and bureaucratic privileges were tried to be curtailed. Khrushchev strove to increase the role of local elites over the central administrative authorities by giving them more opportunity to voice themselves in the Congress. Also, as the General Secretary of the Party, he supported party's rule over the state apparat and actually managed to provide party a higher position. He

²⁷ Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 38, no. 2 (June 1979): 191–192; Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 57.

²⁸ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 191.

²⁹ Robert Hornsby, "The Outer Reaches of Liberalization: Combating Political Dissent in the Khrushchev Era," in *Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964*, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 62.

³⁰ von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia*, 437.

removed more and more functions from the state and gave to party and local levels. His primary intention was to achieve a social discipline over the administrative measures but these reforms also brought some sort of pluralism to the Soviet Union.³¹ Under Stalin's rule, he was almost the only decision maker, even Politburo rarely met, let alone the Central Committee. There were thirteen years between 18th and 19th Party Congresses. In other words, internal party democracy was in a drastic decline.³² Khrushchev restarted periodic meetings of the Party Congress and reinstated the Central Committee by increasing its role. In this sense, Khrushchev reforms enhanced internal party democracy after drought years under Stalin.

Along with these political reforms, destalinization came with a package of relaxation in cultural and scientific spheres. Sakwa argues that in the cultural sphere the thaw was taken furthest. In literature, even some books criticizing some politicians were written at first but then some limitations were imposed again.³³ In historiography important advancements were achieved. Along with destroying the cult of personality, a revisionist understanding in Soviet history writing appeared.³⁴ After all these, destalinization reached its peak in the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party in 1961. An old woman said that she saw Lenin in her dream and he was unhappy because of lying beside Stalin in the mausoleum. After that, Stalin's mummified body was removed from

³¹ Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers," 85–86.

³² Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, 119; Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 339.

³³ For more on the Thaw in the cultural sphere, please see Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13 in: Polly Jones, ed., *The Dilemmas of Destalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London; New York: Routledge, 2005).

³⁴ For more on Khrushchev era revisionist historiography, please see: Roger D. Markwick, *Rewriting History in Soviet Russia: The Politics of Revisionist Historiography, 1956-1974* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Roger D. Markwick, "Thaws and Freezes in Soviet Historiography, 1953–64," in *The Dilemmas of Destalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Polly Jones (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 173–192.

the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square and reburied in the Kremlin wall along with the bodies of other major figures of the nation.³⁵

c. Consolidation of Power and Decline

Following the succession race and Malenkov's forced step down, anti-party group affair is the most significant phase of Khrushchev's consolidation of power. It was the first time in the Soviet history that the policy-making body tried to remove the leader using formal means.³⁶ Yet, Khrushchev managed to gain support to prevent his removal from office and struck back to his opponents.

Voicing against Stalinist legacy found support both in higher echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy and the society at the beginning. However, an important part of the Soviet elites believed that the destalinization went too far; moving away from Stalinist policies should not have meant denouncing his entire legacy. Also, destalinization's unintended consequences in the international scene, namely the uprisings in Hungary and Poland created discontent about Khrushchev's rule among the Soviet elites. In June 1957, a group in the Presidium led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich demanded Khrushchev's resignation from the Secretary post. After a meeting lasting three days, Presidium decided to oust Khrushchev by 7 votes to 4. However, Khrushchev resisted this attempt and sought the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Central Committee met in a couple of days and Marshal Zhukov helped the provincial members to come to Moscow quickly. Most of the members of the Central Committee

³⁵ Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, 134; Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 194; Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 58.

³⁶ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 194.

were Khrushchev appointees and were sympathetic to reforms. Finally, the Committee voted against the removal of Khrushchev from office and he kept his position.³⁷

After this affair, Khrushchev started an operation against his rivals. The members of the Presidium who voted against Khrushchev, later named as anti-party group, were dismissed from membership; but unlike traditionally handled in Stalin's time and even in Beria's removal, these men were not executed. They were appointed to several trivial posts in the outer provinces; in other words, sent to exile with a humane face. The most important result of this affair was Khrushchev's consolidation of power. Since the leaders of anti-party group were the prominent figures of collective leadership, this affair was a reason for Khrushchev to put an end to the idea of collective leadership. The following year, Khrushchev undertook the Premiership as well and became the leader of both the party and the bureaucracy.³⁸

Anti-party group affair is very significant in Khrushchev era in several aspects. First of all, this attempt gave Khrushchev the opportunity to consolidate his power by assuming Premiership and transforming Presidium (which would turn against him again later on). By the economic and social advancement of the day and the consolidation of power, the year of 1958 was the apogee of Khrushchev's rule. He never became a dictator as Stalin even after the consolidation of power, but gained more space for action after anti-party group affair.³⁹ Second, this development also represents an important point in the competition between bureaucracy and the party. After Presidium voted against Khrushchev, Central Committee, i.e. the party body, saved Khrushchev from removal. This was a clear victory for the party over bureaucracy. Finally, as written in a

³⁷ Lionel Kochan and John Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia: From Kiev Rus' to the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 455; Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 344; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 119.

³⁸ Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 60; Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 344–345.

³⁹ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 194.

secret document of CIA in 1962, anti-party group remained as an item in the party's propaganda repertoire for some time.⁴⁰

Although Khrushchev reached the peak of his rule in 1958, the next six years were not that bright. His courageous moves like destalinization and reform attempts created an expectation of a new relationship between the regime and the society. However, as stated earlier, destalinization and the reforms did not totally transform the Soviet state. They only created a relaxation and opening in the regime. Although many changes achieved especially in the power formation among state organs, the central logic of the Soviet state remained intact. In addition to this, Khrushchev's abandoning of collective leadership was perceived as a return to cult of personality although Khrushchev never created one as Stalin.⁴¹ These unfulfilled expectations came together with the problems in the economy in the early 1960s. Especially Khrushchev's reforms in industry and agriculture did not create the expected boost.⁴² All of these led to the decline of personal popularity of Khrushchev as well. This is why the last years of Khrushchev were not as successful as the previous ones.

d. Did Khrushchev Achieve Liberalization?

Reforms had already started right after the death of Stalin and significantly increased by the Khrushchev's consolidation of power. However, while some of Khrushchev reforms continued, the others failed and his rule started to decline. In such a situation in which there are ups and downs, the question is whether Khrushchev reforms managed to bring liberalization to the Soviet Union.

⁴⁰ Avis Bohlen and Office of Central Intelligence, *Khrushchev and the Anti-party Group*, Caesar XV, OCI No: 1608/62 (Central Intelligence Agency, April 27, 1962), 25.

⁴¹ Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 63.

⁴² Kochan and Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia*, 59–60; Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 58.

Under Stalin's rule, there was his total control. Apart from that, Politburo was the most powerful structure and the party was almost a neglected apparatus as congresses delayed and Central Committee barely met. In other words, there was the single-handed rule of Stalin and the authority of bureaucracy (represented by Politburo and then Presidium) over minor issues. Collective leadership gave an end to the single-handed rule of a dictator but increased the role of Presidium; in other words a strong oligarchic structure was established. Khrushchev as the leader of the party represented and defended party's legitimacy over the state apparatus and bureaucracy. He revitalized the inner workings of the party, improved the internal party democracy and expanded the space of policy making which had been restricted only to the elite central organs.⁴³ He also tried to increase the role of the local party officials rather than full-time central party officials.

As Sandle points out, Khrushchev was neither a true decentralizer nor a democratizer.⁴⁴ What he did was not a significant advancement to parliamentarism either.⁴⁵ While he carried out abovementioned reforms, he kept continuing to do many authoritarian measures as well. Yet, strategically, probably to increase his influence, he invested on the party and increased party's and local levels' role in the politics. According to Kochan, he tried to turn politics back to the time of Lenin by narrowing the space of institutions of Stalin period and increasing party's effectiveness.⁴⁶

Another set of political reforms that Khrushchev carried out was on the end of terror and possibility of criticism as I already mention. In time of Stalin criticism was absolutely forbidden. People knew that their destination would be Gulags if they

⁴³ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 346.

⁴⁴ Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism*, 218.

⁴⁵ Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 74.

⁴⁶ Kochan and Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia*, 457–458.

happened to be criticizing Stalin or his policies. According to police reports quoted in Keep, the number of prisoners in labor camps in 1953 was almost two millions including political prisoners and petty criminals at the same time.⁴⁷ Khrushchev, in his Secret Speech, states that out of 1.966 delegates in the 17th Party Congress 1.108 were arrested on charges of political crimes later on.⁴⁸ This high number is only for the members of the Party Congress and can give an idea about the numerousness of total political prisoners.

After the Stalin's death and under Khrushchev's rule, apart from the release of many political prisoners, the number of people sentenced for anti-Soviet activity decreased seriously. According to Davies, in 1959, the number of prisoners in the camps, colonies and special settlements declined to one fifth of 1953 numbers. Also, the number of "counter revolutionaries" fell from 580.000 to 11.000 in the same period.⁴⁹ As for the new imprisonments, according to Hornsby, during the nine year period from 1956 until the end of Khrushchev era, about 6.000 people were prisoned due to anti-Soviet activity. Almost 40% of this number was the imprisonments following years of the Secret Speech and the uprisings in Hungary and Poland. Accordingly, there was a relaxation in terms of criticizing the state and the direct result was not imprisonment or execution directly. Unlike annihilating the people having different opinions as in Stalin era, the state preferred to keep them silent rather than killing them.⁵⁰

How should we evaluate these changes in terms of liberalization? Again, it is obvious that Khrushchev was not an all-around transformative reformer who creates a transition to a democratic rule. In fact, democratization was not even in the agenda of Khrushchev at all. He remained within the confines of the system and brought a mild

⁴⁷ Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 13.

⁴⁸ Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, 308.

⁴⁹ R. W Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 70.

⁵⁰ Hornsby, "The Outer Reaches of Liberalization: Combating Political Dissent in the Khrushchev Era," 64-66.

relaxation to the terror of Stalin.⁵¹ What he does in the regime can be summarized as follows: Khrushchev, with an anti-state and anti-bureaucracy attitude, increased the participation of lower and middle levels of the Soviet rule by enhancing the role of party while keeping his position still powerful. At the same time, he kept the power of Presidium and the high levels of central bureaucracy under control. In a way, instead of the all-powerful leader and the support of high bureaucracy formula in the Stalin era, he established a system of a still powerful leader (though not as much as Stalin) and party. In other words, instead of a totalitarian dictator backed by an oligarchy, he appeared as an authoritarian dictator backed by a majoritarian support through party apparatus. Although still limited, the governing body expanded to a greater number of people.

Remembering the scope of liberalization in Chapters I and II, not all the liberalizations take place under democratic systems or bring democratic transitions. Even under authoritarian regimes liberalization can be possible. In the case of Khrushchev, arguing the existence of liberalization does not mean that Khrushchev democratized the country at all; the important thing is to compare the era with its precedent. It is true that Khrushchev's Soviet Union was still authoritarian and too rigid; there was still repression and lack of transparency; however, comparing to Stalin era, the regime achieved an obvious opening and relaxation. This is why Khrushchev era reforms provided liberalization in the country to some extent and as Peter Kenez argues: "During his tenure the Soviet Union ceased to be totalitarian; his rule can be better characterized as authoritarian."

⁵¹ Smith, "Introduction," 1–2.

III. The End of Khrushchev Era and the Rise of Neo-Stalinism

Khrushchev, in fact, was not that successful in his last years in office. The pace of the economic development lost, the problems in the international sphere increased, the elites were discontent of their degraded roles and his popularity was declining. As a result, his term was terminated following a Presidium meeting in October 1964. The Presidium members who were uneasy with their role and think that Khrushchev's time should come to an end made a plot for his removal while he was in his *dacha*. Khrushchev was summoned to Moscow for an urgent meeting and the decision for his removal was announced to him during that meeting. Unlike in 1957, Khrushchev did not oppose to his opponents' attempt and accepted his faith this time.⁵² According to Keep, he had already lost his will to govern after the decline in last couple of years.⁵³ As for his son Sergei Khrushchev, his father was tired both physically and psychologically and had no desire for a power struggle. Probably this is why he did not resist the decision even though he guessed what would happen even when he received the call summoning him to Moscow.⁵⁴

At the end, Khrushchev was forced to a "voluntary retirement". The secret police and the army, though was informed and supporting the operation, was not a central part of it. This operation was essentially a bloodless internal party coup.⁵⁵ In this regard, Khrushchev's removal was unique in the Soviet history as the succession did not require the death of a leader.⁵⁶ After removal, no punitive action was taken against Khrushchev

⁵² William J. Tompson, "The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev," *Soviet Studies* 43, no. 6 (1991): 1101–1107.

⁵³ Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 62.

⁵⁴ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 732.

⁵⁵ Tompson, "The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev," 1111.

⁵⁶ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 210; Tompson, "The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev," 1116–1117; Thatcher, "Khrushchev as Leader," 13.

which signifies an important breakthrough from the Stalin era and an advancement by Khrushchev himself.

One can find many aspects resembling between anti-party group attempt in 1957 and the coup in 1964. In fact, anti-party group was too close to be the heroes of the Soviet history. However, they could not complete their attempt and were accused of being against the party while the group in 1964 succeeded to oust Khrushchev. As a result, the Soviet history records the former as an attempt for treason and the latter as a glorified attempt to remove the Premier. Reflecting this irony, Alec Nove quotes nicely from 16th century British writer John Harrington.⁵⁷

“Treason doth never prosper. What’s the reason?

If it doth prosper, none dare call it treason.

The removal of Khrushchev found approval, even by the supporters of destalinization because of the declining performance of Khrushchev in his last years. These anti-Stalinists thought that destalinization could continue in its course under the new regime without the mistakes Khrushchev made. But they were soon to realize that destalinization would be terminated.⁵⁸ The new regime led by Brezhnev and Kosygin started to reverse many of Khrushchev’s reforms. First of all, Presidium (then Politburo again) gained his power back; in this way, oligarchic establishment and bureaucracy won this round over the party. The new regime started their operation by restoration of Stalin’s image. In a way, while Khrushchev was justifying his actions by Lenin and Leninist ideals; the new regime was referring to positive and glorious aspects of Stalin era without denouncing Lenin’s image. This is why the first period following

⁵⁷ Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, 139.

⁵⁸ Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 736; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 190.

Khrushchev's removal was referred as a conservative restoration,⁵⁹ a backslide to neo-Stalinism⁶⁰ and re-Stalinization.⁶¹

As a part of returning to glorious Stalin days, Leonid Brezhnev publicly praised Stalin as a war leader in 1965. It was followed by couple of symbolic changes: Brezhnev changed his title as "general secretary" (instead of "first secretary" under Khrushchev) in 1966 as in early Stalin years; name of Presidium once again became Politburo and militaristic propaganda increased as in Stalinist era.⁶² In general, the Soviet system did not perform an absolute return to Stalinist era; however it did return in some aspects. For example, Stalinist mass repression did not appear again, in this regards the advancement of Khrushchev era continued. However, the rule under Brezhnev-Kosygin (in fact almost only Brezhnev beginning by the 1970s) was more repressive than Khrushchev regime. Isolation and exile on the dissidents are imposed and criticism was repressed even more. Stalinism of the 1930s and 1940s did not come back since the society has changed and some of the reforms had already become new status quo, but a gentler version of it was restored.⁶³ In short, the Soviet regime did not returned back to a totalitarian regime after Khrushchev again, but obviously his liberalization reforms, which already lost momentum, came to an end.

As seen, Khrushchev era represented a liberalization to some extent after Stalin. However removal of Khrushchev from the office put an end to this trend. In the next sections, I will examine the socioeconomic, international and elite-based factors behind the removal of Khrushchev; hence the end of his reforms.

⁵⁹ George W. Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," *Problems of Communism* 25, no. 5 (1976): 30.

⁶⁰ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 190.

⁶¹ Jones, "Introduction: The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization," 13.

⁶² Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 190, 196.

⁶³ Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change," 194; Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 33.

IV. The Reason behind Khrushchev's Removal?

a. Soviet Economic Development and Modernization Theory

At the end of Stalin era, the economic boom after collectivization and early industrialization was already a history and effects of economic severity of the World War II years were still alive. As a result, Soviet economy was developing with a low speed. At the beginning of the Khrushchev era, thanks to early achievements in agriculture and industry, USSR achieved high rates of economic growth. Around the midpoint of Khrushchev's rule, along with the consolidation of power, thanks to high economic growth rates, increasing prestige in the third world and technological advancement like Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin's journey to space, the period was called the "Soviet miracle".⁶⁴ This Soviet miracle created such an optimism that the expectation of Khrushchev and many was that the USSR would catch up and surpass the United States in the fields of economy, science, technology and overall living standards.⁶⁵ Moreover Khrushchev believed that they would achieve communism within two decades.⁶⁶ However, the Soviet economy in the next years did not perform as expected; growth rate declined and economic problems aroused.

Khrushchev tried to impose rapid structural changes in economy in the 1950s. Stalin era's narrow managerial technicalities were abandoned, the economics started to be recognized as dealing with problems of efficient resources allocations.⁶⁷ In this regard, USSR's economic development was a bit imitative in character following

⁶⁴ G.I. Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 8 (2003): 1198; Shakhnazarov, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev: A Russian View," 304–305.

⁶⁵ Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1199; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 175.

⁶⁶ Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, 318–319.

⁶⁷ Bornstein argues that, by this change of understanding, practical aspect of Soviet economy surpassed even simple economic ideology of Marxist-Leninist teachings, see: Morris Bornstein, "Ideology and the Soviet Economy," *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 1 (1966): 78–79.

technical innovations and structural changes in the advanced capitalist economies.⁶⁸ During the early years after Stalin's death, Malenkov and Khrushchev assumed different tasks in economy while the former launched the "new course" in industry and the latter focused on the neglected agriculture.⁶⁹ Industry was already the engine of Soviet economy and it continued to be the primary sector in the Khrushchev era.⁷⁰

When Stalin died, Soviet agriculture was in a miserable condition, everything was wrong from planning to management.⁷¹ As a child of a peasant family, Khrushchev initiated serious reforms on agriculture. The investments to agriculture increased more than two-fold in five years time after 1953.⁷² He also started a project to exploit the vast virgin lands which turns out a success in the short term and helped the rapid growth in the first years.⁷³ The most important reform of Khrushchev on agriculture was on the planning side. The agriculture was subject to central economic ministries; the peasant was obliged to cultivate what was ordered from the center which usually did not meet the expectations and the condition of the land. Khrushchev abolished the central ministries and created local economic councils called *sovmarkhozy*.⁷⁴ Although the project was logical to increase agricultural production, the system did not last long due to reaction of the center and the low increase of production in the first years.

In examining the Soviet economic growth or in general development, sticking only to numbers might be misleading, because different estimates present different growth

⁶⁸ Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1209.

⁶⁹ Lazar Volin, "Khrushchev's Economic Neo-Stalinism," *American Slavic and East European Review* 14, no. 4 (1955): 446–447.

⁷⁰ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 201.

⁷¹ Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 103.

⁷² Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, 69.

⁷³ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 350.

⁷⁴ Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism*, 235; von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia*, 440.

rates for USSR.⁷⁵ For example, while CIA estimates a 30% growth for Soviet economy for 1951-55, in Bergson's calculations it is 50%.⁷⁶ This is why it is better to focus on the general trends rather than directly to the numbers. Khanin argues that the Soviet Union joined the group of West Germany, France and Japan as the developed countries of highest growth rates and surpassed the United States and the United Kingdom in this. Since the economic growth is recorded higher in Soviet estimates, I compare the growth for 1951-1960 with a Western estimate (Table 6). Although the estimates differ significantly, the general trends show that the Soviet Union became one of the fastest growing developed nations at the time. I focused on 1951-1960 growth in this table, but if we take Khrushchev era in general (1952-1964) then the Soviet GDP almost doubles.

Table 6: Total GDP Growth Rate in Developed Countries and the USSR (1951-1964)

	France		West Germany		United Kingdom		United States		Japan		USSR	
	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>Khanin</i>	<i>CB</i>
1951-1955	22%	24,31%	56%	57,42%	16%	15,24%	23%	24,19%	54%	54,60%	65%	27,00%
1956-1960	28%	25,72%	37%	39,28%	13%	12,95%	12%	13,20%	51%	50,73%	42%	30,15%
1951-1960	56%	56,29%	114%	119,25%	32%	30,16%	38%	40,58%	132%	133,02%	134%	65,30%
1960-1964	n/a	35,22%	n/a	30,21%	n/a	20,67%	n/a	22,73%	n/a	67,22%	n/a	31,22%
1953-1964	n/a	81,16%	n/a	119,05%	n/a	44,46%	n/a	50,80%	n/a	174,47%	n/a	85,19%

CB: Conference Board's Estimate⁷⁷ ; **Khanin:** G. I. Khanin's Estimate⁷⁸ ; **n/a:** Data not available

As seen, the Soviet Union performed a steady growth rate under Khrushchev, even the last years in which economy was an issue that Khrushchev was criticized during his last Presidium meetings leading to removal. While there is such an economic development in terms of GDP, in order to understand performance of Soviet economy in

⁷⁵ Robert W. Campbell, "The Post-War Growth of the Soviet Economy," *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 1 (1964): 3-8.

⁷⁶ Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1191.

⁷⁷ The Conference Board, *Total Economy Database: Output, Labor and Labor Productivity Country Details, 1950-2012*, 2013, <http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/>.

⁷⁸ Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1192.

terms of modernization theory, I look at some other indicators of socioeconomic development as well. As remembered from the Chapter II, Lipset argues that socioeconomic development is a requisite for democratization, hence for liberalization. Data for not all the indicators used by Lipset is available for USSR for Khrushchev era; however, using the available data I try to have a general idea about USSR's position within the theory.

Table 7: GDP per capita for Developed Countries and the USSR (1953-1964)⁷⁹

	France	West Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Belgium	Ireland	Norway	Swiss	Japan	USSR	USSR (Growth)
1953	5684	5439	7346	10613	5818	3747	5985	9840	2474	3013	n/a
1958	6855	7378	7966	10631	6442	3870	6652	11297	3289	3777	25,38%
1964	8819	9697	9568	12773	8341	4986	8316	14191	5668	4439	17,52%

The first and most important indicator in Lipset's theory is GDP per capita. A comparison of USSR's GDP per capita with developed countries mentioned by Lipset is shown in Table 7. Rather than the numbers in dollars; the comparison gives a general idea about the USSR's position. Per capita GDP is obviously less in the USSR comparing to developed and democratic countries; however it is close to some of them such as Ireland and Belgium. Another important point is that, although USSR's GDP per capita seems below the Lipset's expectation, there is a constant increase during the Khrushchev era as seen in the last column.

In fact, living standards of the ordinary citizens neglected in Stalin era improved under Khrushchev. Khanin records that consumption of basic food was in the level of developing countries at the beginning of the decade (1950s) and by the end of it, the

⁷⁹ GDP per capita in 1990 US\$ (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) in: The Conference Board, *Total Economy Database: Output, Labor and Labor Productivity Country Details, 1950-2012*.

consumption of high quality goods reached the levels of developed countries.⁸⁰ Health conditions, which a serious improvement is observed, were another indicator for Lipset. The number of hospital beds almost tripled, life expectancy reached to the level of developed countries at the time and infant mortality rate was declined to one thirds between 1950 and 1965.⁸¹ In terms of automobiles, Keep records that annual Soviet car production was equal to two months production of the United States which is much less than Lipset's expectations. Yet the Soviets had an advanced public transportation network.⁸²

Other indicators of Lipset are industrialization, urbanization and education which the Soviets were better than the wealth indices. In the 1920s, agriculture was responsible from half of the Soviet economy and industry constituted only 20%. However in the 1950s, the share industry reached nearly 40% of the national economy and also as mentioned earlier, it was the main engine of the economy.⁸³ Urbanization increased in the 1950s and 1960s as well. The Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) provided the construction of 15 million apartments which almost equal to urban housing construction since the revolution.⁸⁴ One of the areas of most reforms done during Khrushchev era was education. Before the 1950s, Soviet education system, especially the higher education was mostly open to the families of the elites. It was difficult for the children of ordinary citizens to get enough education. Khrushchev assumed a rather populist attitude on education and made education system accessible for everyone in the society.⁸⁵ According to Davies, the number of students in the high school level reached to almost 13 million in 1965 from 2 million in 1950. Also, the number of students in the higher education was

⁸⁰ Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1196.

⁸¹ Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, 70; Khanin, "The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy," 1195–1197.

⁸² Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 99–100.

⁸³ Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, 68.

⁸⁴ Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 97–98.

⁸⁵ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 211.

almost tripled and reached around 3.5 million students.⁸⁶ As a result, although general percentage was still low comparing to West, the number of educated people radically increased under Khrushchev.

In general, it is obvious that Soviet society does not meet the Lipset's requisites to be a democratic nation. However, it should be kept in mind that, the question for the Soviet Union was not democratization but liberalization under an authoritarian regime. Also, quoting once again from Lipset, "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."⁸⁷ So, the relationship is not dichotomous, there is gradualness. Although did not meet the requisites to become a democracy, the Soviet society developed in almost all aspects of Lipset's theory. So, the expectation is that the advancement in socioeconomic status would further the liberalization. However, the liberalization was terminated by the coup of 1964, which indicates that Lipset's theory is not a good explanation for the situation in the USSR.

b. International Context and Liberalization in the USSR

In order to understand the influence of international factors on liberalization in the Soviet Union, it is important to review the major issues of foreign policy and the trends in the world at that time. Cold War had already started during Stalin era and the 1950s can be perceived as the time of the consolidation of the Cold War formation.

One of the most important ideological turns between Lenin and Stalin was the adoption of "communism in one country" understanding rather than internationalism. This actually helped Stalin to transform the Soviet society rapidly in the 1920s and 1930s. However, Khrushchev was much more enthusiastic and optimistic for the full-scale building of communism. This is why the Soviet Union paid much attention to

⁸⁶ Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, 70.

⁸⁷ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75.

increase the Soviet prestige mostly in non-capitalist world. Non-aligned, newly independent and developing countries constituted an important part of the Soviet foreign policy at the time.⁸⁸ As a result, Khrushchev's USSR assumed a global revolutionary discourse and sponsored the liberation movements in the third world.⁸⁹ This helped the Soviet Union to increase his allies and strengthen the communist bloc.

Another important event of Soviet foreign policy that led to consolidation of the communist bloc was the establishment of Warsaw Pact. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was very much a personal system under Stalin. The rival bloc had already institutionalized around NATO in 1949. As a reaction to West Germany's accession to NATO and its rearmament, the Soviet Union led the way to the establishment of Warsaw Pact in 1955.⁹⁰ It gave legitimacy for the Soviet troops to station in Eastern Europe as the case for US troops in Western Europe. By the establishment of Warsaw Pact, the Soviets established an institutional front after them and increased their control over the communist world.⁹¹ However, although Warsaw Pact was a step forward for the control over Eastern Europe, the Polish and Hungarian Crises on 1956 were a serious test for Soviet power. Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 20th Congress created unintended consequences in Hungary and Poland when the people took the street with a demand for change.⁹² Destalinization itself was already a wow for change domestically; however, its reflection in Hungary and Poland was more radical than the expected change. These uprisings proved the limits of Soviet tolerance for diversity and pluralism created by

⁸⁸ George A. Brinkley, "Khrushchev Remembered: On the Theory of Soviet Statehood," *Soviet Studies* 24, no. 3 (1973): 392.

⁸⁹ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 95; Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 209.

⁹⁰ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 377; Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, 332.

⁹¹ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 102.

⁹² Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, 333.

destalinization.⁹³ It is seen that discord in the bloc and controlled change are possible to some extent but a radical change is not tolerable. As a result, Soviet troops entered Hungary and Poland and repressed the uprisings.

As for the relations with the rival bloc, the Khrushchev government was more positive comparing to Stalin. Khrushchev believed that rivalry could continue in a more peaceful environment. As a result, Stalin's doctrine on the inevitability of war was abandoned and the understanding of peaceful coexistence was established. Accordingly communist and capitalist blocs would coexist and peacefully compete with each other.⁹⁴ To establish this, the Soviets increased the activities of public diplomacy as well and tried to create a better Soviet image even in the Western world.⁹⁵ However, this trend was mostly destroyed with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Probably, the late decision on not starting the war after crisis was a result of changing understanding of world politics after peaceful coexistence; however the harmed prestige of the USSR had an important role in the shift of foreign policy understanding of the Union to a more hawkish tone in the next decade.

Finally, the USSR's relations with non-satellite communist nations can give an idea about the international context of the time. The relations with Tito's Yugoslavia were extremely bad under Stalin. Khrushchev's one of the earlier initiatives was to restore the relationships with Yugoslavia.⁹⁶ However, the relations with China were not that good. In fact, the Soviets assisted for Chinese development during 1954-1959 in a

⁹³ Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 47–50, <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10095211>; Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 343; Keep, *Last of the Empires*, 51.

⁹⁴ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 203; Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, 44.

⁹⁵ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 103.

⁹⁶ Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 337.

way carrying out a “Soviet Marshall Plan”;⁹⁷ however, in 1960s, Sino-Soviet split started. Chinese Communist Party was against destalinization initiative and the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union since Mao had a cult of personality of his own as well. Since this ideological divergence came together with the increasing rivalry, the two communist nations started to become more distant.⁹⁸

Around these major foreign policy trends it is possible to see whether international context was the factor behind the end of liberalization in the Soviet Union. In fact, Khrushchev could not meet the expectations in foreign policy in his last years as well as economy.⁹⁹ Although Khrushchev’s errors became an issue in the Presidium meeting ousting him, Thompson argues that foreign policy lacks in importance during the meeting.¹⁰⁰ As remembered, international context’s influence on democratization and liberalization is examined through penetration, convergence, diffusion/contagion and the relations with West. In the Soviet case, it is difficult to talk about penetration and convergence since the Soviet regime was much closed to capitalist penetration whereas there was transitivity with other communist nations. Similarly, Western leverage and Western linkage arguments do not explain much for the Soviet case since the period’s international setting was based on rivalry with West. Even if we say that relations with West might have influenced the domestic politics within the Soviet Union, then the increasing dialogue would sustain the continuation of liberalization. Diffusion and contagion might explain a little bit more for the influence of international context at that time. There was a trend in the Western bloc for democratization but the Soviet Union was not subject to the trend of the rival camp. The uprisings in Hungary and Poland and

⁹⁷ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 110.

⁹⁸ Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, 52; Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 354; von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia*, 457.

⁹⁹ Brinkley, “Khrushchev Remembered: On the Theory of Soviet Statehood,” 396.

¹⁰⁰ Tompson, “The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev,” 1109–1110.

also Chinese attitude are important in terms of diffusion and contagion. Chinese resistance to reforms in the 1950s and 1960s might be a reason for the end of liberalization attempts in the USSR. However, since the Sino-Soviet split continues even after the Khrushchev era, it is difficult to say that this resistance was a major reason. Moreover, from the side of Hungary and Poland, it can be said that there was even a more radical demand for liberalization within the communist bloc. However, if this demand created a diffusion and contagion effect, then it would be expected that the liberalization would continue in the USSR rather than being terminated.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union was not a satellite at that time; it was the trend-setter. Hence, as the leader of its bloc, the Soviet Union would influence the domestic trends in its allies rather than being exposed to change. For this reason, international context does not stand out as a prominent cause for the end of Khrushchev era and reforms in the Soviet Union.

c. The Soviet Elites: The Friends and Foes of Change

In a totalitarian regime in which the masses participate to politics and decision making processes in a minimal level, elites can be quite influential to define the nation's fate. In fact, as Breslauer points out, apart from control freak Stalin, cadres did define everything.¹⁰¹ However in Khrushchev era, the elites in the Soviet Union deeply divided on how much change was needed and desirable.¹⁰² As a result, change and resistance to it became the central feature of political life in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Stephen Cohen identifies the two groups in this dichotomy as the friends and foes of change.¹⁰³ Apparently, Khrushchev was among the friends of change, moreover was the

¹⁰¹ Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 19.

¹⁰² Reddaway, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev: An American View," 324.

¹⁰³ Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change," 188.

leader of the group since he initiated destalinization process. He blamed the top elites because of their role in the creation of cult of personality under Stalin¹⁰⁴ and assumed quite an anti-elitist rhetoric.¹⁰⁵

As focused upon earlier in this chapter, breaking bureaucratic elite's hegemony and popular involvement along with his supremacy was central to Khrushchev's political reforms. Traditionally in Stalin's era, the decision making was quite restricted. Strong oligarchic structure in the Soviet politics did not allow new players into the game much. So, Khrushchev could not find the opportunity to change high bureaucracy in his first years as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. Since he could not establish his power base within the existing order, he undertook structural changes to decrease high elites' authority through debureaucratization and increasing the popular participation.¹⁰⁶ Sakwa argues that in the Soviet system, two types of participation are possible. First is the managerial approach adopted by Malenkov and later practiced by Brezhnev which opens the stage for the participation of political and bureaucratic officials. This is an assuring method of participation in which the participation to political stage remains quite limited. The second is the populist approach challenges the autonomy and exposes bureaucrats and high elite to criticism. Khrushchev adopted the second approach and led a determined assault against elitism and bureaucratism.¹⁰⁷ As a result, Khrushchev assumed a Soviet type of populism and opened the party to popular involvement.¹⁰⁸ Boundaries of decision-making arenas were expanded and political status of Presidium and bureaucrats further diminished.¹⁰⁹ Obviously, the popular involvement was still

¹⁰⁴ Thatcher, "Khrushchev as Leader," 11.

¹⁰⁵ Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers," 86; Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 24.

¹⁰⁶ Reddaway, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev: An American View," 328; Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers," 80; Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 23.

¹⁰⁷ Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 60.

¹⁰⁸ Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism*, 217.

¹⁰⁹ Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 26–28.

rather restricted because of the limitations of the authoritarian communist system of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰ Hence; this popular involvement did not contain the people in the lowest strata of the society but expanded rather to the medium and lower level elites as opposed to high elites in Presidium and bureaucracy.

Two series of reforms were important for the popular involvement and assaulting bureaucracy. The first one was the education reforms which were shortly touched upon earlier. Before Khrushchev, education system was mostly open to the privileged families of elites and bureaucracy. Accession of the children of lower class workers and peasants was not prevented but the conditions were difficult. Khrushchev, children of a peasant family who found the opportunity of education through party channel, opened up the education system to a greater part of society.¹¹¹ Also, political education was opened more to the non-party members who could find opportunity to get role in the political scene afterwards. The percentage of non-party members in political education program increased to 78% from 15% between 1957 and 1964.¹¹² Traditionally, the elites were able to reproduce themselves and preserve their status by sending their children to higher education; however, under Khrushchev, elites' privilege in the education system was challenged. The second important reform attempt of this sort was the rotation system. In the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party in 1961, Khrushchev intended to initiate a rotation system among senior jobs especially in bureaucracy called "systematic renewal of cadres".¹¹³ This was a reform attempt targeting directly the bureaucracy since it

¹¹⁰ Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers," 100–101.

¹¹¹ Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 211.

¹¹² Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 30.

¹¹³ Tompson, "The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev," 1110.

creates a threat for their job security.¹¹⁴ This led to one of the most serious discontent among the high elites and bureaucracy.

Anti-party group affair was an earlier reaction to Khrushchev's reforms in the Soviet political system. Destalinization went too far for some of the elite at that time and they were discontent of party's increasing power. Thus, they tried to topple Khrushchev; however, thanks to experiencing the Soviet miracle, Khrushchev found the support to remain in his position. This affair gave him an opportunity to shuffle the Presidium. Instead of the plotters, Khrushchev appointed new and rather younger members. New members of the Presidium were no longer the elites of Stalin era; they actually reached the highest office under Khrushchev. This is why Khrushchev believed that the new members of Presidium were completely dependent on him. However, when the years passed, it is seen that this was not the case. These members were promoted to higher levels of bureaucracy already in Stalin era and they remained committed to Stalin's legacy.¹¹⁵ Thus, Khrushchev never managed to have a full control over Presidium although sustained the decline of its once mightier power.

As a result of this division among the elites, the groups were formed as following in the Khrushchev's rule according to the theoretical framework: Presidium, high levels of bureaucracy, the Army and the KGB were the hard-liners,¹¹⁶ or in other words foes of change; Khrushchev himself, the Party (medium and lower level elites in the Central Committee and the Congress) and local elites were the soft-liners, namely the friends of change. By the new formation of Khrushchev, the system was established on

¹¹⁴ Kochan and Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia*, 456; Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 212; Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," 26.

¹¹⁵ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 120–121, 195.

¹¹⁶ Interestingly the Army and the KGB were on the same side with Khrushchev in anti-group affair of 1957. However, as his son Sergei Khrushchev states both the Army and the KGB were on the other side rather than being with Khrushchev, see: Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 733.

Khrushchev as a leader and the party as the supporting body. The strengthening of the party caused the loss of prominence in the side of Presidium and the state apparatus under the control of bureaucracy. Although Presidium members did not completely return to the Stalin era with massive terror and cult of personality, they wanted to have a regime where they are in command and being respectful to Stalinist legacy. Naturally, the high elites distinguish themselves from the ordinary people and the lower levels of elites.¹¹⁷ The popular involvement after Khrushchev's reforms and the promotion of lower elites, damaged the oligarchic establishment. This is the reason why they were discontent of the accession of new players to the political life.¹¹⁸ As a result of this, the hard-liners in the political arena staged a coup to topple Khrushchev and to stop the reforms that were damaging their status. Unlike 1957, they managed to be successful in the coup attempt possibly due to Khrushchev's unwillingness to resist and some of the unmet expectations after the reforms. After the successful removal of Khrushchev in 1964, high political and bureaucratic elite restored their status. In this sense, as Sakwa calls, this was a bureaucratic counter-revolution.¹¹⁹

There are two important points to emphasize in terms of elites' behavior during this time. First, it would not be fair to say that elite structure radically changed, but there is a process of change going on and it created a threat environment for the hard-liner elites. There was not much of a reshuffling in the central state bureaucracy and the members of the Presidium were not radically different than before. Although the names were different and the members were from a younger generation comparing the previous Presidium, they were still the elites who were recruited under Stalin era party and state

¹¹⁷ Schattenberg, "'Democracy' or 'despotism'?" How the Secret Speech Was Translated into Everyday Life," 76.

¹¹⁸ Tompson, "Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers," 94–95; Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 211.

¹¹⁹ Sakwa, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 63.

mechanisms. In this regard, I cannot argue that Khrushchev established a new Presidium with entirely from new elites. However, there was still enough evidence for these old elites to lose their prominence. Although they were still in the Presidium, Khrushchev's reforms made Presidium a relatively weaker institution. By the increasing role of the Party and the local units, the new elites started to rise. By 1964, it is not true to say that these new elites as individuals were more powerful than the members of Presidium and state bureaucracy, but the Party, the body which consisted of them started to become more powerful than the Presidium and state bureaucracy.

Moreover, the education reform to recruit new elites and rotation system, which Khrushchev was striving to establish, were big threats for the security of old elites. So, rather than individual changes in the elite structure, the institutional changes and the prospects of a rising new elite group were the main reason for the discontent of old elites. In this regard, the comeback of old elites did not occur in the form of changing cadres or individual elites; rather the institutions of the old elites re-took control as the Presidium became the top institution again. In other words, the return of oligarchic power constituted the gist of old elites' strike back.

Second, the failure of anti-party group and the success of the Presidium in 1964 to oust Khrushchev suggest a conclusion related with the content of the reforms. When anti-party group tried to topple Khrushchev down in 1957, his reforms had not started to target elite structure much; rather, those were related with ending Stalin's cult of personality and terror regime. On the other hand, during the period between anti-party affair and 1964, Khrushchev launched the transformation on the power relations by decreasing the power of Presidium and reinstating the Party apparatus. While there was still the notion of securing their position in anti-party affair too, the main purpose of the perpetrators was to get rid of Khrushchev himself and to continue to existing collective

leadership with a different name. For this reason, the Presidium was much diverged in the anti-party affair. Although the decision in the Presidium was to remove Khrushchev from his position, there were still an important number of his supporters. To remind, General Zhukov's endeavor to gather the Central Committee was very important for Khrushchev to secure his post. But in 1964, the Presidium was overwhelmingly against Khrushchev because the threat by the reforms was directly against the institution itself and those elites. Combining the worsening performance in economy and problems in the reforms with the much stronger opposition of Presidium members can be said to bring success in 1964 to oust Khrushchev unlike anti-party affair in 1957.

To sum up, the new political system after the Khrushchev reforms was damaging the area of action of the hard-liners. In other words, Khrushchev's political reforms were targeting the integrity and status of the traditional elites of the Soviet political life, namely the Presidium members and the high bureaucracy. As a result, they lost the career security by the reforms. The persuasion of the conservative elites and their consent are crucial for the continuation of reforms. However, in the Soviet case, the reformers could not achieve to convince the conservatives through some future guarantees or privileges. Consequently, the hard-liner elites objected the reform attempts and managed to terminate the reforms after the successful removal of the reformer leader, Khrushchev. In this regard, elite-based factors can explain the end of Khrushchev era and Khrushchev's liberalizing reforms.

V. Conclusion

Under Stalin, the Soviet Union was under a regime of terror in which the leader was all-powerful and backed by the high bureaucracy. The party apparatus was the neglected child in the political life of the Soviet Union at that time. Stalin's death was

followed by series of reforms started by the collective leadership and furthered by Khrushchev. Through the destalinization process, the terror regime was terminated, many prisoners were set free and a relaxation was provided. Along with these, Khrushchev tried to make reforms in the Soviet political life to strengthen and sustain his position. As a result, he improved the Party's status in the regime and supported party apparatus over the state apparatus represented by bureaucracy. However, successful removal of Khrushchev in 1964 by an internal party operation staged in the Presidium meeting, some of the reforms of Khrushchev era were reversed. The terror regime of Stalin years did not start again; however, some of Stalinist institutions were restored and the Stalin's legacy was reinstated. More importantly, Presidium and the bureaucracy reclaimed their superior position in the Soviet politics. In short, the removal of Khrushchev put an end to the Khrushchev's liberalization attempts.

An evaluation of the removal of Khrushchev suggests that the reason behind the coup in 1964 and termination of liberalization reforms are linked with the interactions among elite groups. Examining Soviet politics, it should be forgotten that the lower strata of the society was not much involved in the political developments. Modernization theory suggests that increasing demands from bottom lead to democratization and liberalization. However, a pressure from bottom is not the case for the political development in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Moreover improving living standards would normally lead the continuation of reforms. So, this theory does not explain the end of liberalization in the USSR. Similarly, the theories relating the liberalization with the international context do not explain the end of liberalization since there is no strong trend among the Soviet allies for the continuation of status quo. In case of elite interaction, it is seen that the elites were divided into two as one group was pro-reform and the other was pro-status quo. Because of the Khrushchev reforms were

targeting the career security of the pro-status quo elites, the reformers could not achieve to convince them for change or attract their support. For this reason, the pro-status quo elites in the Soviet Union, namely the Presidium and the high bureaucracy, toppled Khrushchev and terminated the liberalization process.

CHAPTER IV:

Political Liberalization in Turkey during 1950s: The Rise and Fall of Menderes

In 1923, the Turkish Republic was founded right after the destructive World War I. The country went into extensive Westernizing reforms under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Republican People's Party's one-party rule and politically became a completely new establishment in fifteen years of time. There were two short-lived attempts of multiparty regime under Mustafa Kemal but in both time the opposition parties were closed. Following the passing away of Mustafa Kemal, his long-time comrade İsmet İnönü became the president of the Republic and continued Kemalist reforms. In line with the day's trends, he self-proclaimed himself as *Milli Şef* (the National Chief) and continued to rule the country under one-party rule. In 1945-1946, through İnönü's clearance, Turkey started its multiparty system.¹ Under the initiation of multiparty system, İnönü put forward several democratizing reforms and these reforms continued under Menderes following Democrat Party's victory in 1950 elections. However, at the end of 10-year tenure of Menderes, the government was toppled down by the military coup d'état of May 27th 1960, putting a temporary end to reforms and liberalization process in Turkey.

In this chapter, I focus on the democratizing reforms under İnönü and Menderes and the military coup of 1960. I will start with the initiation of multiparty system and democratizing reforms under İnönü. Then, I will look at the continuation of reforms under Democrat Party regime and their reversal leading to coup. Following that, I again examine the reasons behind the end of Menderes era focusing on socioeconomic, international and elite-based factors. Similar to Khrushchev case in the Soviet Union, the main cause behind Menderes government ouster was elite-based factors mainly related

¹ Unlike generally thought, the transition to multiparty system did not take place by the foundation of Democrat Party but by National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*) in 1945. Yet, Democrat Party's establishment is still very crucial for the first time appearance of a strong opposition.

with the change in Turkey's center-periphery dichotomy. Along with the elite theories, modernization theory makes a partial explanation for the end of Menderes era in Turkey.

I. One Party Rule and Early Democratization under İnönü

a. The Road to Multiparty System

The years between 1945 and 1950 were the time of early liberalization and adaptation to the changing order in the Western world. By the victory of democratic front in the World War II, the single party regimes lost prominence in Europe.² Changing political environment in the Western front necessitated a similar change in Turkey as well.³ Turkey had already had a long tradition of Westernization in its last two centuries and especially in last two decades. As a part of this tradition and the necessity of protection from the Soviet Union, İnönü started a top-down democratization.⁴

In mid-1945, an internal party opposition of four deputies had already appeared. Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan announced the Memorandum of Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*) and criticized the party's position on land reforms. İsmet Bozdağ narrates that, in a discussion among the four, Fuad Köprülü guessed that İnönü would understand that the time of National Chieftain has ended and he himself would initiate democratization⁵ and In fact, this was the exactly how it happened. In a speech opening the National Assembly on November 1, 1945, İnönü hinted that he was preparing major changes in the political system in line with the changing circumstances

² H. Bayram Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları* (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 1988), 9–14.

³ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), 386.

⁴ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M Landau (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 119; Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 16–19.

⁵ İsmet Bozdağ, *Demokrat Parti Ve Ötekiler* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975), 14–18.

in the West.⁶ As a result, an environment of competition under the control of RPP was intended to be established; a competition which would not harm RPP's interests in the political life.⁷ İnönü's expectation in initiation of multiparty system was the presence of a party in the center which would not compete much.⁸ In other words, he was expecting a new experience similar to Free Republican Party experience of 1930 that opposes to the ruling party without challenging its legitimacy.⁹ At the end, İnönü's this initiative led to the establishment of Democrat Party in early 1946 and its rise in couple of years.

When the four deputies submitted the memorandum to the parliament, they had no real intention of establishing a new party; they rather aimed a reform within the party. When the demand for reform was rejected, the process led them to form their opposition in an organized fashion through a party.¹⁰ Since İnönü was already expecting an opposition party, the initiative of these four members would be a good opportunity for the change in politics. İnönü made a meeting with Bayar and let the four to establish the party in case they respect the general principles of the Republic.¹¹ As a result, Democrat Party was founded in January 1946 while respecting the six principles of the RPP since it was a constitutional obligation.¹² In fact, the founders of the Democrat Party were not radically different than the other members of RPP. They believed the cause of the Turkish Republic, were respecting the gains of the Republic and had no intention of returning to antecedent Ottoman regime.¹³ The ruling cadres of all the parties' established in the Republican years were military and civilian bureaucrats; as a

⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 102; Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 211.

⁷ Mustafa Erdoğan, *Liberal Toplum Liberal Siyaset* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), 301–302.

⁸ Ali Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 34–35.

⁹ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 104.

¹⁰ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 210–211; Bozdağ, *Demokrat Parti Ve Ötekiler*, 19.

¹¹ Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 39–42.

¹² Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 145.

¹³ Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (2000): 131.

difference, the leaders of DP had no military background as opposed to İnönü and many other high ranking officials of RPP.¹⁴

But the real difference from the RPP was the masses who supported DP. Almost all of local elites, peasants whose conditions got worse because of the war conditions, relatively liberal businessmen who demand the end of state's control, non-Muslim population who suffered from wealth tax (*varlık vergisi*) of RPP and the conservative groups who were discontent of strict secular laws supported Democrat Party over Republican People's Party.¹⁵ In other words, DP acquired a mass support from the groups neglected by the RPP government. Hence, according to Sarıbay, it was the first time in modern Turkey that the man in the street began matter.¹⁶

b. First Successful Multiparty Experience in 1946-1950

Less than a year after Democrat Party's foundation, İnönü took the country to first multiparty general elections. Since Democrat Party had just founded and could not find much opportunity to campaign, İnönü and RPP had no doubt of their victory; moreover they expected that there would not be much of a support for the opposition. However, as the elections fast approaching, the masses showed big support to the new opposition party. The people went to the polls in such an environment. RPP won a landslide victory but serious problems were recorded in the elections which make the competition unfair. Open ballot, secret count method which was used in these elections created serious doubts on the fairness of the election and the victory of RPP although these doubts made

¹⁴ Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 1 (1983): 20.

¹⁵ William Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset: 1789'dan Günümüze* (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1996), 85; Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 17; Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 24.

¹⁶ Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," 19.

any change in the results.¹⁷ Still, Democrat Party's seats in the Parliament were much more than the expectations of İnönü and RPP. At this stage, İnönü had a choice either to suppress the opposition as in 1925 and 1930 or further the liberalization. For a year after the elections, nothing much was done in either way; however, after 1947, serious reforms of democratization started to take place in the Turkish political scene.¹⁸

After 1947, RPP opened the political system for more activity by the opposition.¹⁹ One of the most crucial changes after 1946 was the initiation of secret ballot, open count principle instead of open ballot, secret count principle. Every party was granted with a right to make propaganda using the state radio station. Also, İnönü gave the opposition the guarantee of independent judiciary.²⁰ At the same time, the economy was gradually opened to market economy by adopting liberal measures although the opening was quite limited.²¹ Also, the government allowed a relaxation in the strict secular measures as well although it was still in a minimal level.²²

İnönü's standing with multiparty system and Turkey's growing involvement with the West were the primary factors in the success of early liberalization measures. At the same time, Democrat Party played an important role in this process as the opposition. For example, one of the most important critics of Democrat Party to Republican People's Party was the half-god status of the presidency and President İnönü. As a response to these criticisms, in 1947, İnönü made reforms for the internal party democracy. However, since his party was in fact the party of the state, the reforms for internal party democracy were important for the democratization in Turkey. Accordingly, the perception for president's half-god status was relatively diminished and the party's

¹⁷ Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 86.

¹⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 212–213; Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 107.

¹⁹ Hikmet Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995), 185.

²⁰ Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 16.

²¹ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 103.

²² Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 30–32.

general secretary was no more appointed by the president.²³ Also, İnönü gave up his title of National Chief.²⁴ As a result of all these, RPP's official status as the state party declined. In the meantime, İnönü played an almost arbitrary role for the dispute between Prime Minister Recep Peker and the leader of DP Celal Bayar in 1947. This was an important step forward for democratization for the time being.

The period between 1946 and 1950 is a very crucial period in Turkey's history of democratization since it was the beginning of the process. İnönü's rule, along with starting the multiparty system, made important reforms of liberalizations and laid the foundations of the Turkish democracy. 1946 elections are important as being the first multiparty general elections; however, since the elections were unfair, it cannot be said that the democratic transition took place in 1946. In other words, initiation of multiparty system in Turkish political life did not instantly come with the beginning of democratic system. Speaking with my theoretical framework, foundation of Democrat Party and 1946 elections can represent a transition from a closed authoritarian regime to a competitive authoritarian regime. As remembered from Levitsky and Way's framework, in competitive authoritarianism, there are free elections; however the elections are unfair as in Turkey. Thus, the beginning of democratic system in Turkey was not 1946; rather, the elections of 1950 can be the initiation of Turkish democracy. In addition with the democratization reforms between 1946 and 1950, the first free and fair elections in modern Turkey took place in 1950 which precipitate the democratic regime in the country.

²³ Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 196.

²⁴ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 105.

II. Democrat Party Era in Turkey

a. Reforms and Decline under Menderes Rule

Unlike 1946, Democrat Party was well-prepared for the elections in 1950. They had four years of experience in opposition and acquired the support of almost all the groups which were discontent because of the RPP regime. The center theme of Democrat Party's election propaganda was the prominence of the will of the people. Because of that, they assumed a libertarian and democratic rhetoric, quite progressive for Turkey in those days. They promised change in antidemocratic laws, opening to private capital and foreign investment, granting of right to strike for the workers and a minor revision to the understanding of secularism by arguing the impartiality of the state in religious affairs.²⁵ In fact, Republican People's Party's election propaganda was not much different in terms of democratization. The discourse of freedoms and democracy existed in RPP's propaganda as well. Before the elections, the RPP side still had the belief that they would win the elections. For this reason, RPP insisted to keep the majoritarian system for the elections results despite Democrat Party's demands for amending the law to change it with a proportional system.²⁶ In the end, despite the reforms which were carried out in the last four years, RPP lost their credit in the eyes of the majority of the people.

As a result, Democrat Party achieved a landslide victory in Turkey's first truly competitive elections.²⁷ Democrat Party obtained the 53.3% of the votes whereas RPP got 39.9%. If RPP had accepted DP's proposal and changed the elections system into a proportional one, the distribution of the deputies would be 250 to 190. However, because of the majoritarian system Democrat Party won 408 seats in the parliament while

²⁵ Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 20–27.

²⁶ Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 74.

²⁷ Frank Tachau and Mary-Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections," *Comparative Politics* 5, no. 4 (1973): 552.

Republican People's Party won only 69 seats.²⁸ In other words, DP obtained the 83% of the seats as opposed to 53.3% of the total votes, becoming almost the single party in the parliament. Following the elections of 1950, Celal Bayar became the third president of the Turkish Republic while Adnan Menderes being the first prime minister not coming from a military or state officer background.²⁹ At the same time, Democrat Party government became the first truly civilian government in modern Turkey since 1908.³⁰

Since the first days, Menderes government established its discourse on the former mistakes done by the RPP governments as Khrushchev did the same for Stalin era. Actually, Menderes managed to keep the party's support high by harshly criticizing the wrongs in one-party era, mainly the repression by the security apparatus. Menderes tried to make criticism rather cautiously, by respecting the creation of modern Turkey and its ideology while always pointing the RPP governments as the primary responsible for the Turkey's problems.³¹

Democrat Party came to power at a time where there was a democratization trend in the Western world and in fact benefited from this evolvment in the world.³² Especially in the first term in government, DP continued most of democratization reforms of RPP. Having won such an overwhelming victory in the polls, the leaders of DP thought that the people were behind their party program. By this confidence and the dedication to majoritarian democracy, they believed that they could pursue their programme to realize the wishes of the people supporting them.

²⁸ Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 20–23.

²⁹ Nazım Berksan, *Başvekil* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1958), 129.

³⁰ Kemal Karpat, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 3 (1972): 81.

³¹ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 104–108.

³² Mim Kemal Öke and Erol Mütercimler, *Yalnızlıktan Saygınlığa Demokrat Parti'nin Dış Politikası* (Ankara: İrfan Yayıncılık, 2000), 257–258.

Maybe the most important novelty came with DP government was the civilian background that they represented. As argued, Turkey had always been ruled by old military and state officials and the high bureaucracy was quite influential in the state. Democrat Party saw that limiting the military and bureaucracy's sphere of influence as the best way for advancing democracy. Because of that, Menderes took the heavy-handed military-bureaucratic state as the principal problem. In response to military and bureaucracy's power, Democrat Party represented the civilian politics or the people.³³ For this reason, the very first action Menderes government took was a minor purge in the military to possess the control over the army.³⁴ For the same cause, DP government supported the opening of voluntary organizations. From 1950 to 1960, the number of such organizations multiplied eight-fold and exceeded 17.000.³⁵

The second aspect of Democrat Party reforms in terms of democratization was the relaxation in repression policies. Very similar to Khrushchev case in the Soviet Union, this relaxation in repression was quite selective and did not contain every repressed group in society; but was still a move forward to democratization. Two earlier actions of Menderes government in 1950 signify the relaxation of repression to two groups. First was the adopting of a liberal amnesty law and enacting a law on press to rescind several restrictions. These laws were mainly targeting the leftist movement. By the amnesty law, many activists and writers in the Turkish left were freed. However the relaxation on the Turkish left was rather short-lived and DP government restarted some of repressive actions by the next years.³⁶

³³ Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," 121-128.

³⁴ Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 89; Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 206.

³⁵ Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," 126.

³⁶ Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 77-79.

The more long-termed relaxation came over the conservative or the Islamist part of the society. One of the six Kemalist principals was secularism. However, Turkey followed the much strict French type of secularism in other words *laicite*, which necessitated removal of religion from the public sphere almost totally and the containment in the private sphere, over the Anglo-Saxon model. This led the RPP governments to take strict measures over the religious life and education in the one-party period. Opposing to this understanding of secularism, Menderes once stated that: “Perceiving secularism as an opposition or hostility to religion does not accord with our government’s understanding of freedom of conscience”.³⁷ Menderes government’s one of the first actions within 15 days in office was quite symbolic for a relaxation on the religious life in Turkey. The government passed a law restoring the call for prayer (*adhan*) to its original form of Arabic from its Turkish translation made during one-party years.³⁸ This was followed by the opening of İmam Hatip Schools for Islamic education and the increase in the number of theology faculties.³⁹ Hence, in the 10-year period under Democrat Party, the official interpretation of secularism became less strict, the conservative or Islamist groups in Turkey gained a relative relaxation in religious activities comparing to previous period and an opportunity to involve in politics.⁴⁰

One another reform of democratization Democrat Party achieved in coming to power was in the formation of party’s leader and the president. As stated, the head of Republican People’s Party and the president of the Republic were the same person, as was İnönü during the last decade. In such a formation, it is difficult to argue the independence of the position of presidency. Also, this duality signifies that RPP was the

³⁷ Enver Durmuş, *Yassıada’dan İmralı’ya* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 14.

³⁸ Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 109.

³⁹ For more on imam hatip schools, see: İren Özgür, *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁴⁰ For more on Islamist’s engagement in politics in those years, see: Menderes Çınar and İpek Gencil Sezgin, “Islamist Political Engagement in the Early Years of Multi-party Politics in Turkey: 1945-1960,” *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 2 (2013): 329–345.

official party of the state. Leaders of Democrat Party, in coming to power, made a significant practical choice to end this problem. As they always demanded when in opposition, they separated the party leadership and presidency⁴¹ When Celal Bayar became the president following the election victory in 1950, he resigned from his post as the leader of Democrat Party. In place of Bayar, Menderes became the leader of party and the head of the government. This practical change also led to a separation between the presidency and the executive branch of the state, this established the parliamentary system in Turkey unlike the presidential system in first three decades. After Democrat Party's this reform of liberalization, there have never been an official remarriage between presidency and party leadership.

However, the second and third terms of Democrat Party were not as bright as the first term. The elections in 1954 increased the Menderes and other leaders' confidence a lot. Thanks to the achievements both in politics and in economics, the party increased its votes in the poll to 57.6% obtaining more than 90% of the seats in the parliament. As a result, the party's performance in democratization relatively declined in their second term between 1954 and 1957; but especially in the last three years before 1960, the party performed very similar to how RPP performed after the initiation of multiparty system until the 1950 elections. First serious problems started with the events of September 6-7, 1955, with the riots against the non-Muslim population. Government's rather unsuccessful handling of events created the first fracture even within the party which only was restored by a reshuffling in the government.⁴² Along with this, Democrat Party increased the repression over the press, the leftist movement and the academia which is known by their traditional support to RPP in general. Especially after 1957, Democrat Party turned to be a party trying to preserve its position rather than being a reformer

⁴¹ Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 77.

⁴² Bozdağ, *Demokrat Parti Ve Ötekiler*, 50-56.

party as in the first years. The party's leader Menderes, as well, became less tolerant to criticism and acquired a harsher discourse over the opposition. This trend was worsened by the slowdown in economic development and passage of some antidemocratic laws against the RPP.⁴³ All the problems that Menderes and his party went through in their last years pave the way for the coup d'état in 1960.

While Menderes started to show some authoritarian tendencies in his last term in office, this time RPP took a role similar of DP in 1946-50. The discourse of RPP after 1957 was a bit more progressive than the discourse of DP in terms of democratization. In January 1959, RPP issued a statement called "Declaration of First Targets" demanding further democratization. This declaration was criticizing Menderes and Democrat Party government and was essentially liberal and egalitarian demanding the abolishment of antidemocratic laws, bicameral system and the opening of constitutional court.⁴⁴ In fact, this declaration signifies an interesting point in Turkey's history of democratization. While Democrat Party was having hard time in terms of democratization, Republican People's Party, the ex-authoritarian party, was calling for liberalization. It actually indicates that internalization of democratic procedures even by the leaders of RPP within 10 years' experience of democracy after 1950.

b. Did Menderes and DP Achieve Liberalization?

As I argued earlier, although there had been significant reforms of democratization, the initiation of democratic system could be possible by the 1950 elections since the minimal criteria of fairness in elections could only be realized for the first time in this election. The path to democracy in Turkey started by a formation of RPP in the

⁴³ Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," 133; Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 112.

⁴⁴ Kemal Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 288; Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 122–124.

government and DP in opposition. Election in 1950 is the point where the transition took place as a result of this path. So, when Democrat Party started its rule in the day after the elections, the democracy had already established in Turkey. This is why, I focus the reforms under Menderes rule as the liberalization reforms under a democratic regime rather than the reforms achieved democratization. In this regard, Menderes era reforms can be perceived as the continuation the reform that brought democratic system to Turkey.

Menderes, as the prime minister, increased some freedoms, made a relaxation in repressive policies and opened up the regime to a popular involvement especially in his first term. Although there have been problems in execution, the range of freedoms were expanded. Despite this, it is true that Menderes and Democrat Party obtained rather authoritarian tendencies in their second and third terms in office. In such a situation where there are bright and rather dark sides, in examining the liberalization in DP era, several points worth be concentrated.

First, as argued, democracy was internalized. The primary parties carried out their criticisms through democratic institutions as it is seen in RPP case. Even the regularization of elections as the legitimate way of government change was a big step forward (though it was interrupted by the coup). So, although democracy was still in a weak condition and still had serious defects, Turkey went a step forward comparing to pre-1950 years.

Second, political participation was opened into a more popular involvement in practice. There was already no official restriction for popular participation before 1950; however the political participation was traditionally in favor of military and bureaucratic officers. In other words, officially speaking political participation was open for everyone

but more open to some groups in practice. Menderes achieved to open the political participation to a much greater part of society rather than a smaller group closely associated with the old authoritarian regime. In this regard, Menderes carried out liberalization very similar to Khrushchev by increasing the popular involvement.

Third, although the Menderes government acquired some authoritarian tendencies and in fact passed some anti-democratic laws, that does not mean the level of democracy in Turkey became worse than the level of 1950. For the regime to go worse than 1950 level, there would have been elections lacking freeness or fairness. However, both 1954 and 1957 elections were free and fair although Democrat Party used some rather undemocratic methods like gerrymandering. However, at the end, although this kind of methods points a lack in the level of democracy, it does not sweep away the minimal criteria of democracy of being free and fair. Hence, from this perspective, the regime in Turkey did not become authoritarian again under DP; rather they lacked the higher levels of democracy.

Finally, arguing that Menderes achieved some liberalization under his rule does not mean that Turkey became a consolidated democracy or so. Remembering from my political regimes spectrum, I qualify every single movement towards the right side of the spectrum as liberalization. Thus apparently, Menderes did not initiated liberal democracy in Turkey at all; however he and his government managed to achieve a moving away from old authoritarian regime and succeeded a rather short liberalization despite all the lacks they had.

III. Coup d'état of May 27 and the Interruption of Liberalization

In July 1959, Dankwart Rustow writes in his *World Politics* article:⁴⁵

Although the pendulum in the last thirty-five years has swung from a dictatorial one-party system toward competitive party politics and back again toward increasing restrictions on political expression, the Kemalist movement of 1919-1923 has remained to date the military intervention to end all military interventions in Turkey.

Not after more than a year, in the morning of May 27, 1960, the people in Turkey hear on the national radio the voice of Captain Alparslan Türkeş saying:⁴⁶

Honourable Fellow Countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to sad incidents and in order to prevent fraucide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country.

As the political and economic development slowed down under Menderes rule, the Turkish army found itself responsible by the correction of political system and staged the military coup d'état on May 27, first one since the foundation of the Republic. In fact, Menderes was already uneasy with the state apparatus and especially army because of a possible comeback. The army was always loyal to the cause of Turkish Republic and the founding fathers of it. İsmet İnönü was one of the prominent commanders in the War of Independence and though resigned from his military duties to become a politician, he was still influential on the army. For this reason, Democrat Party's leaders were always insecure because of "Pasha Factor" referring to İsmet Pasha's influence over the army in

⁴⁵ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11, no. 4 (1959): 513.

⁴⁶ Cihat Göktepe, "1960 'Revolution' in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey," *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 30 (2000): 161.

spite of the electoral successes.⁴⁷ İnönü, while sticking with democratic procedures, intentionally or unintentionally paved the way for a coup. In several speeches, he stated the inevitability and legitimacy of a revolution by the hand of the army.⁴⁸ The army officers did not let İnönü know their plans for coup right before it, since they had a belief that İnönü might have prevented them from staging the coup. However, at the end, İnönü's calls for a revolution were an important factor for the coup. Actually, Democrats' insecurity was not totally baseless. William Hale records that the first plots for a coup within the army started in mid-1950s and the number of plans increased in the last years of DP rule.⁴⁹ In 1959, nine army officers were arrested by an attempt for a secret organization within the army to remove the government from office.⁵⁰ Even after then and being insecure, Menderes were publicly stating that the army would not incite a revolt or stage a coup.⁵¹ On May 27, he turned out to be mistaken.

The army took the control of the country over by the coup in 1960. The official cause of the coup was declared as the restoration of democracy and saving the country from the crisis that it fell into.⁵² Lerner and Robinson argue that Menderes era created rising expectations and May 27th was the "revolution of rising frustrations" because of unmet expectations within the army.⁵³ The military coup instantly acquired support from the RPP leadership, bureaucracy and the Westernized intelligentsia. In other words, the

⁴⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 224; Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 110.

⁴⁸ Naturally, the coup was not called coup by its perpetrators and supporters before and after the incident. The concept used in space of coup was "revolution" which has a much more positive connotation. Even years after the coup, the day was celebrated annually as a national holiday with the name "Freedom and Constitution Day". For more on İnönü's statements, see: Durmuş, *Yassıada'dan İmralı'ya*, 19; Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," 134; Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 145.

⁴⁹ Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 95–98.

⁵⁰ Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 22.

⁵¹ Durmuş, *Yassıada'dan İmralı'ya*, 22.

⁵² Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 80–81.

⁵³ Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,"

neglected groups during the DP era took the revenge of the elections in May 14th 1950 as Mustafa Erdoğan calls it.⁵⁴

The engine of the coup was the mid-rank young officers who were very ambitious and discontent of Menderes rule. The higher ranks in the army were included afterwards. The army established “The Committee of National Unity” to rule the country. However, a fraction in the junta arose in a few month after the coup. The younger mid-rank officers had a more hawkish stance; they were insisting that the country was in a need for a rather longer period of military rule in order to correct DP’s mistakes and sustain the development in society and politics. For them, Turkey was still an underdeveloped country which could not realize the Kemalist reforms and the development could only be achieved through a radical regime by not being responsible to peasant voters.⁵⁵ Meaning that, they were not much pro-democratic at all. However, the elders in the Committee were defending the transition to democratic procedures in the shortest run. The struggle between the two groups resulted with a purge over the younger officers from the Committee.

The transition to democratic politics took place 16 months after the coup, the Committee ruled the country in the meantime. In two weeks after the coup, the junta announced a temporary law in the Official Gazette abolishing some earlier laws, self-proclaimed the Committee of National Unity as the authority for both legislation and execution.⁵⁶ As the legislature branch, the Committee passed about 125 laws to correct the Democrat Party’s mistakes, established State Planning Organization, carried out a university reform.⁵⁷ The Committee also established a High Court of Justice for trial of

⁵⁴ Erdoğan, *Liberal Toplum Liberal Siyaset*, 302.

⁵⁵ Hale, *Türkiye’de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 95–99.

⁵⁶ T.C. Resmi Gazete, *Geçici Kanun*, No: 10525, June 14, 1960.

⁵⁷ Karpat, “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70,” 359.

Democrat Party leaders which led to the execution of the elected Prime Minister Menderes and two of his ministers.⁵⁸ The Committee also established a sub-committee for preparation of a new constitution which was completed within a few months and approved by referendum in 1961. After three months from constitutional referendum, the elections were restarted and democracy was restored. In general, despite being in a short period of time, to quote from Lerner and Robinson: “Apart from the subversion of civilian supremacy, the military take-over sets several exceedingly dangerous precedents: (1) the trial of ousted politicians for ‘unconstitutional’ or ‘illegal’ acts, (2) the collective punishment of a regime, and (3) constitutional reform without popular mandate.”⁵⁹

Actually, establishing one-party rule of 1930s and 1940s in the country was not one of the goals of the junta. Moreover, probably an important number of the members of junta did not want to see RPP as their governing party. In this regard, they are not against the idea of liberalization at all. However, it is obvious that these military officers were willing for the continuation of the regime respecting its principals and its formation. They were discontent because of the increasing popular involvement and their degrading role in the state just as their civilian supporters were. At the end, the coup restored the power of military and bureaucratic establishment and traditional state-society relations once more, even for a limited time. In this sense, maybe even as an unintended consequence, the junta prevented the liberalization process by limiting the increasing popular involvement.

⁵⁸ For more on the process around death sentence decision and execution of Menderes and Zorlu, please see: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1984); Rasih Nuri İleri, *27 Mayıs: Menderes'in Dramı* (İstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları, 1986); O. Cemal Fersoy, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu* (İstanbul: Hun Yayınları, 1979).

⁵⁹ Lerner and Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,” 43–44.

The 1960 coup in Turkey is tricky; it is difficult to evaluate it as black or white. Menderes government was, in fact, representing some authoritarian tendencies in its last years. Also, the coup and the military rule was rather short lived, the democratic process was restored within 16 months. Moreover, the liberalization trend in Turkish democracy continued after the Constitution of 1961 and restoration of democracy. This is why; some perceived the coup in 1960 as a step forward in the long run. However, it should not be forgotten that a coup is a coup, even if it is in a progressive guise. As Özdemir suggests, coups prevent the natural evolution of a society and political system.⁶⁰ What happens in Turkey is completely so. Although some perceives the coup in 1960 as a benevolent coup, it led to the suspension of democratic procedures for more than a year. The state was ruled by an undemocratic establishment in the meantime. In other words, the military coup of 1960 is an interruption for the liberalization process in Turkey. Also, the coup in May 27th started a tradition of military intervention in Turkey led to four other interventions in fifty years' time (1971, 1980, 1997 and 2007) all damaging the process of further liberalization in Turkey's history of democracy since Turkish politics have always been under the scrutiny of military after 1960.⁶¹ In short, although the coup had rather positive results as the restoration of democratic procedures and continuation of liberalization in medium term; it damaged the liberalization in the short run by suspension of democratic procedures and in the long run by paving the way for further military interventions.

⁶⁰ Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 230.

⁶¹ Nasser Momayezi, "Civil Military Relations in Turkey," *International Journal on World Peace* 15, no. 3 (1998): 6.

IV. The Reason behind Menderes and DP's Removal?

a. Turkish Economic Development, Modernization Theory and Inequality

The change in economic policies in Turkey started even in the last years of RPP rule thanks to Marshall Plan. The initiation of multiparty system in Turkey also led to the change in economic policy which RPP embraced free enterprise and development in both agriculture and industry. Yet the crucial turning point and the wholeheartedly execution of such policies took place with the DP's coming to power in 1950. The leaders of Democrat Party were already the supporters of liberal economy in opposition. When they came to power, an étatist and strictly controlled economy left its place to a liberal free market economy in principle. Although a complete liberalization of economy could not be achieved, Menderes with his background as a local businessman and landowner provided the transition to free market economy in Turkey.⁶²

One of the six principles of Kemalist reforms was étatism in economy. Through this principle, the state took the responsibility for industrial and economic development and investment. This approach achieved success to some degree in the first years of Republic in the lack of private investment. Yet, by the relative increase of private capital in the 1940s and the rise of free market economy in the world led to an opening to markets and free enterprise in Turkey. In this changing environment, not just Democrat Party but also Republican People's Party supported liberalism in economy as well.⁶³ Democrat Party, both in opposition and also when they came to power, criticized the state's high intervention to economic activities and supported the idea that the economic development can be achieved through private enterprise. As a result, in the first years of

⁶² Zülküf Aydın, *The Political Economy of Turkey* (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 32–33; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 216.

⁶³ Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 204–206.

their rule, the Democrats incited the private sector by abolishing the limitations on imports and decreasing the interest rates on loans. They also made regulations to create incentives for foreign investment.⁶⁴ DP government also established Turkish Industrial Development Bank for transferring some of state enterprises to the private sector. However, while the economy was opened to free market and private enterprise, the state's interference to economy did not come to an end because of big infrastructure investments. In fact, the number of Public Economic Enterprise (*Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülü*, also known as *KİT*) increased under Menderes rule comparing the previous periods.⁶⁵

While industrialization was a crucial factor in Turkey's economic development in the 1950s, Menderes paid a special attention to agriculture and harvested well from what he sowed through agricultural investment. Especially in the first years, agricultural development became the engine of general economic development. The government expanded the agricultural lands and subsidized the agricultural activities. The farmer, for the first time, was provided cheap credit and sold his products with high prices to government agencies.⁶⁶ Also mechanization helped the agricultural development too. Within ten year rule of DP, the number of tractors was multiplied to two and a half and the amount of agricultural credits was multiplied to almost six.⁶⁷

Menderes promised to make Turkey a "little America" where there is a millionaire in every district.⁶⁸ In fact, he achieved an important development in this path thanks to US aids and investments through Marshall Plan. Especially in the first half of their rule, the Democrats achieved phenomenal growth rates. In the last years of DP rule, some

⁶⁴ Abdullah Takım, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Uygulanan Ekonomi Politikaları Ve Sonuçları," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 67, no. 2 (2012): 159.

⁶⁵ Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 208–209.

⁶⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 226.

⁶⁷ Takım, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Uygulanan Ekonomi Politikaları Ve Sonuçları," 168.

⁶⁸ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 109.

economic problems aroused as well. The interference of state increased as opposed the willingness of increasing the private investment, foreign trade deficit became huge, inflation rates increased, foreign aids decreased and total transition to market economy could not be achieved.⁶⁹ However, even in the last years which there were economic problems, the economic development continued. The developing trend despite the economic problems is supported by the statistics as well.

Table 8: Annual GDP Growth of Turkey (1950-1960)⁷⁰

1950	9,35%	1954	-2,97%	1958	4,52%
1951	12,82%	1955	7,93%	1959	4,06%
1952	11,91%	1956	3,15%	1960	3,42%
1953	11,25%	1957	7,81%	1950-60	85,00%

Turkey's annual GDP growth was around ten percent for the first four years of Menderes rule. Only in 1954, the economic performance returned to negative figures. Despite that year, Turkish economy achieved a continuous growth. Even in the last years of Democrat Party, the economy performed an almost four percent growth per year (Table 8). This means that economic problems did not cause to a downsizing in economy or reversal in economic development. Abdullah Takım resembles Turkey's economic development in the 1950s to developing countries in Southern Europe and Asia such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Japan and South Korea.⁷¹ A comparison of Turkey's GDP growth with these countries proves that Turkey achieved a high economic growth along with the other developing countries of the time, surpassing the growth rates of developed countries (Table 9).

⁶⁹ Morris Singer, "The Economic Performance of the Turkish Republic," *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 4 (1984): 158; Aydın, *The Political Economy of Turkey*, 32.

⁷⁰ Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950 - 2010)* (Ankara, 2011), <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FC5A73E5CFAD2D9676>.

⁷¹ Takım, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Uygulanan Ekonomi Politikaları Ve Sonuçları," 176.

Table 9: Total GDP Growth Rate in Developed and Developing Countries (1950-60)⁷²

	France	West Germany	United Kingdom	United States	USSR	Japan
1951-1955	24,31%	57,42%	15,24%	24,19%	27,00%	54,60%
1956-1960	25,72%	39,28%	12,95%	13,20%	30,15%	50,73%
1951-1960	56,29%	119,25%	30,16%	40,58%	65,30%	133,02%

	Italy	Spain	Greece	South Korea	Israel	Turkey
1951-1955	37,85%	32,60%	38,19%	41,52%	81,00%	47,40%
1956-1960	30,60%	15,54%	30,83%	20,66%	52,27%	25,51%
1951-1960	80,04%	53,22%	80,79%	70,76%	175,60%	85,00%

Just like in Chapter III on the Soviet economic development, I examine several indicators to see the whether modernization theory of Lipset can explain the political developments in Turkey. The first indicator of Lipset was per capita income. In a comparison with developed countries that Lipset analyzed, Turkey's per capita income is seriously low. In this regards, Turkey does not qualify for having a democracy according to Lipset's theory. However, just like in the Soviet case, there is a constant increase in per capita income of Turkish nationals (Table 10).

Table 10: GDP per capita for Developed Countries and Turkey (1953-1964)⁷³

	France	West Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Belgium	Ireland	Swiss	USSR	Japan	Turkey	Turkey (Growth)
1950	5186	4281	6939	9561	5462	3453	9064	2841	1921	1623	n/a
1955	6199	6431	7868	10897	6280	3920	10867	3313	2771	2093	28,95%
1960	7398	8464	8645	11328	6952	4282	12457	3945	3986	2247	7,39%

In terms of living standards, it can be said that Turkey moved much further. Karpap argues in 1964 that "Certainly Turkey became incomparably more dynamic in the 1950's than in the 1930's and 1940's. One can readily perceive in any town in Anatolia the

⁷² The Conference Board, *Total Economy Database: Output, Labor and Labor Productivity Country Details, 1950-2012.*; The growth rates of Ministry of Development of Turkey (formerly known as *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*) converted to 1998 prices match with the growth rates in the Conference Board's statistics. So, I use two stats interchangeably.

⁷³ GDP per capita in 1990 US\$ (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) in: Ibid.

changes in living and mentality that have occurred in the past fifteen years.”⁷⁴ Also Daniel Lerner pays a special attention to the change and development in the Turkish village within past few years in his study of *The Passing of Traditional Society* in 1958.⁷⁵ This improvement in the living conditions in Turkish villages was mostly due to building of new roads which became more than 4 times longer in 1960 than 1950.⁷⁶ Along with this, fast-rising number of imported cars and trucks (two and a half times bigger in ten years period) made the villages more accessible and open to development. In addition to these, the number of hospital beds became two and a half times bigger as well, while the number of person per doctor decreased.⁷⁷ Also, urbanization rose along with the increase in new buildings in the cities. Industry became one of the most important policy areas in economy. Although agriculture remained to be the most important sector in Turkish economy, Turkish industry developed especially in mining, sugar, cement and textile sectors. In 1960, industrial sector became two times bigger than 1950.⁷⁸

One of the most significant improvements took place in education. In 1950, the literacy rate was 32,5% in Turkey. In 1960, still remained to be relatively low, it climbed to 40% while the literacy rate of men alone exceeding 50%. The rates of gross schooling increased as well. In all the levels after the primary schools from secondary to higher education, the number of schools became two times bigger than 1950. Likewise, the number of libraries and the number of books in libraries were doubled.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Kemal Karpat, “Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” *World Politics* 17, no. 1 (1964): 59.

⁷⁵ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).

⁷⁶ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 115.

⁷⁷ The data for health related issues is present at the Section 8 at: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950 - 2010)*.

⁷⁸ Takım, “Demokrat Parti Döneminde Uygulanan Ekonomi Politikaları Ve Sonuçları,” 169, 177.

⁷⁹ Statistics are acquired from Tables 19, 20 and 32 of Section 8 in DPT data: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950 - 2010)*.

Again, just like in the Soviet case, Turkey does not meet Lipset's requisites to be a consolidated democratic nation. On the other hand, in all the indicators of socioeconomic development, there seems to be an increase. So, in this case, the socioeconomic trends do not require a reversal in democratization process. Yet, unlike the Soviet case, the country here had already started the democratic procedures. So, although the requisites do not explain the end of liberalization in the Soviet case, the theory can partially explain Turkish case. In this regards, it can be argued that since Turkey did not meet the requisites, the nation could not become a consolidated democratic nation. On the other hand, since there was a constant socioeconomic development during 1950-1960, this trend does not explain the end of liberalization process with the coup in 1960.

b. International Context and Liberalization in Turkey

The 1950s is the decade in which Turkey, under Democrat Party rule, entered into and consolidated its membership within the Western alliance. There were three main concerns of Democrat Party which were protection against the Soviet expansionism, political and economic partnership with the West and the partition of Cyprus.⁸⁰ The first two of these defined the place of Turkey in the polarizing world politics. The Soviet Union in late 1940s and 1950s implemented repressive policies on Turkey in order to push it to compromise since Turkey was not taken under control during the World War II and there was not that powerful communist movement within the country. For this reason, the Soviet Union cancelled the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression which was signed in 1925 between two states. Because of the increasing pressure from the Soviet Union and the accord in ideological stance, Turkey sought refuge in the Western alliance. The joining to Western alliance especially during Menderes era not just provided security, but also ended country's isolation in international politics, obtained

⁸⁰ Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 207–208.

foreign aid and attracted foreign investment. Öke and Mütercimler define the foreign policy of Democrat Party as “From Solitude to Reputability”.⁸¹

Actually, Turkey’s alignment with the Western bloc and especially with the US started in the late RPP period. The pursuit of a partnership with the West was already one of the primary factors of the initiation of multiparty system. A new phase in Turkish-American relations, hence the Western alliance, started with a symbolic gesture from the American side. The American government sent the battleship *USS Missouri* to Turkey in 1946 in order to bring the body of late Turkish ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün to Istanbul. This event showed both Turkey and the USSR that the US was willing to accept Turkey in its alliance.⁸² This was later followed by the Truman Doctrine promising the US protection on Turkey and Greece against the Soviet threat. In consequence of these two and Marshall Plan later on, Turkey came to the same line with the Western alliance even in RPP era. Over the ground that RPP prepared during 1946-1950, Democrat Party established a strong alliance with the West.

The official inclusion to the Western alliance occurred with the accession to NATO. Even in the first days after NATO’s establishment, Menderes started to seek accession. Korean War appeared as a big opportunity for Turkey at that time. Democrat Party government sent Turkish troops to Korea to fight within the NATO alliance despite the harsh criticisms from the opposition at that time. Following the Korean War, NATO accepted Turkish accession in 1952.⁸³ Obviously, it is not right to explain Turkish

⁸¹ Öke and Mütercimler, *Yalnızlıktan Saygınlığa Demokrat Parti’nin Dış Politikası*.

⁸² For more on battleship *Missouri* and its influence on Turkish-American relations, please see: Gül İnanç and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Gunboat Diplomacy: Turkey, USA and the Advent of the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 3 (2012): 401–411.

⁸³ For more on Turkey’s NATO accession and the continuing partnership, please see the articles in Special Issue of “Greece and Turkey in NATO” by Southern European and Black Sea Studies: Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Turkey’s Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish-American Alliance,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 481–495; Serhat Güvenç and Soli Özel, “NATO and Turkey in the Post-Cold War World: Between Abandonment and Entrapment,”

accession to NATO by merely the support in Korean War. Recent developments in global politics, onset of Cold War and increasing alliance formation led most of the states to seek more allies.⁸⁴ Turkey, as a geographically proximate country to the USSR, was promising a strategic partnership for the Western alliance. In this regards, while this alignment meant a lot for Turkey, it was also a strategic move by the US and Western alliance.

Turkey's position in NATO and Western Alliance strengthened in the following years. Turkey came together with the United Kingdom in establishing CENTO for cooperation in the Middle East in order to prevent Soviet expansionism.⁸⁵ Especially in the last years of Menderes rule was important in terms of foreign policy tendencies. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Turkey's former permanent delegate in NATO became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to increase Turkey's role in Western alliance.⁸⁶ Along with these, Turkey's quest to membership of European Community and then European Union started in this decade when Menderes government applied for full membership to European Economic Community in 1959.⁸⁷ Although the RPP opposition was against earlier activities of DP in foreign policy such as entrance to Korean War, they supported the general tendency of becoming a member of Western alliance later on.

If the international factors are influential in domestic political developments in Turkey, it can be said that it enhances the democratization and liberalization. Unlike the Soviet Union, Turkey was not a trend setter in international politics during the Cold War.

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, no. 4 (2012): 533–553; Sinem Akgul Acikmese and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey Trilogies: The Impact of the Cyprus Conundrum," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 555–573.

⁸⁴ Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 84–86.

⁸⁵ For more on Turkish-British relations before and after the coup, please see: Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "The 'Revolution' of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British Policy Towards Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 1 (2005): 121–151.

⁸⁶ Öke and Mütercimler, *Yalnızlıktan Saygınlığa Demokrat Parti'nin Dış Politikası*, 253.

⁸⁷ Andrew Mango, "The State of Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 2 (1977): 261.

Rather, Turkey was a minor player seeking alliance with great powers. Through NATO membership, one can say that penetration and contagion might be a factor for further liberalization since most of the NATO members were more consolidated democracies. Similarly, Levitsky and Way's arguments of Western leverage and Western linkage indicate the continuation of liberalization trend in Turkey. Also, since there was a democratizing wave within Western alliance especially in Southern Europe, diffusion or contagion effect requires further liberalization in Turkey. In this regards, the international developments do not explain the interruption in liberalization process in Turkey. The statement of the junta for commitment to NATO and CENTO right after the coup and the accession to OECD after its establishment in 1961 under Committee of National Unity rule shows that the international developments were not among the factors leading the coup, hence the interruption in liberalization.

c. Bureaucratic-Military Elites in Turkey: Comeback of the Center

The literature on social cleavages is very advanced for the Western European nations. The literature which is best known by Lipset and Rokkan's study suggest that the modern societies in Europe emerged in lines with certain cleavages as church-state, center-periphery, urban-rural and owner-worker.⁸⁸ This evolution in the Western Europe cannot really be applied to Turkish example but center-periphery cleavage is a common way to analyze modern Turkish society. Accordingly, the general social and political relations are designed around two groups. The first group, the one in the national level, is consisted of upper bureaucracy, military and intellectuals. This group, which is the center in society, traditionally controlled the government, had the idea of supremacy of the state and possessed the monopoly over the means of coercion and violence. The other

⁸⁸ For more on social cleavages, please see: Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

group includes all others in the society which are local notables, lower classes, religious groups and craftsmen. This group in periphery traditionally had no control power over the state, yet controlled the social and economic activities.⁸⁹ This distinction between groups provides a better understanding for the political life in Turkey.⁹⁰

The origins of these center-periphery relations go back to late Ottoman era. The traditional political order in Ottoman times rested on military and civilian officers along with the men of religion. However, at the end of Ottoman era, unlike men of religion, the other elements of elites became the center in the society. The role of lawyers and journalists were subordinate to these elements even though they had prominence.⁹¹ The reformers in the Ottoman Empire who belong to the center wanted to create a new generation of bureaucrats and military officers who prioritize the interests of the state.⁹² The formation of center and periphery in the late Ottoman period was carried to the republican era as well. Within this formation, there have been several points of divergence between two groups. The primary cleavage was Westernization; while the center defending a Western model of modernization, the periphery represented the tradition over Western values.⁹³ The second area of cleavage was religion which is quite connected with the Westernization. Westernized center became increasingly secular while the periphery was still conservative and committed to orthodox Islamic values.⁹⁴ One another issue was modern education becoming one of the symbols of the cleavage

⁸⁹ Arnold Leder, "Party Competition in Rural Turkey: Agent of Change or Defender of Traditional Rule?," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 1 (1979): 83; Karpat, "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," 51–52.

⁹⁰ For more on general features of sociopolitical life and social cleavages in modern Turkey, please see: Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum Ve Siyaset: Makaleler I* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

⁹¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 462.

⁹² Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 179–180; For more discussion of this issue, see the works in: Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997).

⁹³ Leder, "Party Competition in Rural Turkey: Agent of Change or Defender of Traditional Rule?," 83.

⁹⁴ Karpat, "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," 52.

between center and periphery. Only the children of some notables could continue to higher education in the late Ottoman and early republican periods whereas reformer military and bureaucratic elites reproduced themselves by sending their children to Westernized modern schools.⁹⁵

As I pointed out, the center-periphery relations of late Ottoman period was inherited by Republican Turkey. RPP was already the party of the alliance of military, bureaucratic and intellectual elites.⁹⁶ Until the two-party system, RPP always perceived periphery as a potential opposition to itself and tried to limit its activities. The opposition attempts in one-party era, the Second Group in the first Parliament, Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1924-25 and Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1930 represented the periphery although not all the members of them were from periphery.⁹⁷ In fact, since legal opposition was forbidden, there was a tacit coalition in the RPP between center elites and some big landowners, tradesmen and other local elites.⁹⁸ Menderes was one of the deputies in RPP from abovementioned backgrounds. However, although there was such a coalition under the one-party rule, it was broken in 1945-46 leading the foundation of Democrat Party.

In order to understand the center-periphery relations in Turkey, it is important to focus on bureaucratic-military elite in the center. Referring to schools that the central elites were educated, Szyliowicz puts the importance of these elites very nicely: “*Harbiye plus Mülkiye equals Türkiye*”.⁹⁹ It is true that, as the elites in the center, bureaucratic and military officers played a central role in the creation and ruling of modern Turkey. These elites, with a quite Jacobinist fashion, believed that the interests

⁹⁵ Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” 178–179.

⁹⁶ Sarıbay, “The Democratic Party, 1946-1960,” 122.

⁹⁷ Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” 180–181.

⁹⁸ Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, 18.

⁹⁹ Joseph S. Szyliowicz, “Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mulkiye,” *World Politics* 23, no. 3 (1971): 376.

of the state are equal to the interests of the people.¹⁰⁰ For them, development of the state apparatus was the primary goal; so the strengthening of the center and the party over the periphery was very crucial for them.¹⁰¹ By the founding fathers, military and bureaucratic elites were given a vanguard role as the guardian of the republic and the Western values that it was built on.¹⁰² In consequence of contemptuous attitude of the military-bureaucratic elites on the people, the regime had never been popular with masses during the one-party rule.¹⁰³

In fact, bureaucratic and military elites were seriously intertwined since most of the bureaucratic elites of the early republic had military origins. After the foundation of Republic, Mustafa Kemal obliged the army leaders to divest themselves from the military office if they enter the politics.¹⁰⁴ As a result, civilianization of administration was realized in early republican era. However, this institutional separation of military from politics was not intended to establish a civilian supremacy over the army as in Western Europe and the US at that time.¹⁰⁵ Although the leaders stripped from their military ranks, army and military elites' vanguard role continued. In other words, the civilianization process did not affect the power of the army in Turkish political life. Also, although they became civilians, the influence of ex-military leaders over the army continued as seen in the case of Mustafa Kemal, and also İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak later on. To understand the military elites in the political life, it is enough to see their high percentage in the parliament. According to Rustow, the ratio of former army

¹⁰⁰ Erdoğan, *Liberal Toplum Liberal Siyaset*, 317.

¹⁰¹ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," 182–183.

¹⁰² Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 2 (1997): 155; Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 84.

¹⁰³ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," 183; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 206.

¹⁰⁴ Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," 19–20.

¹⁰⁵ Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," 156.

officers in the Grand National Assembly was one-sixth in 1920 and remained to be one-eighth in 1943 and one-ninth in 1946.¹⁰⁶

In his famous article *Transitions to Democracy*, Rustow argues that the contest between the two groups was the central issue after the 1950s.¹⁰⁷ Though, he misses that there had always been such a central distinction between center and periphery. Still he is right that the Menderes era in Turkey was the time the cleavage between the center and periphery became most visible in the political arena until that time. Although there had been aforementioned attempts of opposition in the past, none of them could be long lasting. By the Democrat Party, first time in republican Turkey, the periphery became a prominent rival to the center. Among the leaders of Democrat Party, there were politicians both from the center and the periphery. However, although not all of the leaders were from periphery, the party represented the culture, tradition, economic and political expectations of the people in periphery. So, while DP and RPP leaders were very similar to each other in terms of following the republican cause and ideologies, they were diverging in terms of representation. For this reason, the leaders of DP were the new elite with the support of periphery in opposed to the traditional republican military-bureaucratic-intellectual elites representing the center. Actually, Democrat Party's election propaganda in 1950 was reflecting this difference perfectly when they say "*Enough! The word lies with the people!*" In general, the 1950s in Turkey witnessed the politics of polarization between preservers of the static early republican order and those who wanted to change it.¹⁰⁸ In this polarization, RPP leadership attached themselves to the preservation of republican ideals rather than mobilization and opening towards the

¹⁰⁶ Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," 550.

¹⁰⁷ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 353.

¹⁰⁸ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," 186.

people. For this reason, bureaucrats and the army perceived the RPP as the party to cooperate.¹⁰⁹

In the 1950s, the distribution in the parliament and the government radically transformed. The proportion of ex-military officers and bureaucrats in the parliament seriously declined.¹¹⁰ DP representatives were characteristically different than the traditional RPP representatives before 1950. The deputies of DP were generally younger, had local roots in their constituencies unlike the central elites, less likely to have had higher education, more attached with the traditional way of life and values and more likely to have a background in commerce, landownership or law.¹¹¹ DP also attracted the support of a pretty much majority of religious groups throughout Turkey. In other words, they were very well representing the characteristics of the periphery. The new elites rising with DP rule were tradesmen, entrepreneurs, artisans, shopkeepers, local landowner elites all of them are closer to lower classes comparing to the traditional elites of military and bureaucratic background.¹¹² The basic statistics on the socioeconomic background of the members of parliament by Tachau reflect very well the radical transformation in the parliament. He records that the largest groups in the parliament before 1950 were bureaucratic elites (20-25%) and ex-military officers (15-20%) followed by lawyers (10-15%), trade, business and banking sectors (10-15%) and education (5-10%). After 1950, the distribution changed as the lawyers were the largest group (27-32%) followed by trade, business and banking sectors (16-20%). At the same time, percentage of each of bureaucratic and military officers dropped below 10%.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 185–186.

¹¹⁰ Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey,” 20–21.

¹¹¹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 223.

¹¹² Karpat, “Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” 59–60; Tachau, “Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy,” 132; Mango, “The State of Turkey,” 264.

¹¹³ Tachau and Good, “The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections,” 554.

From another statistics, to continue Rustow's ratios of ex-military officers in the parliament, as opposed to one-sixth of the total members in 1920 and one-ninth in 1946, the ratio of ex-military officers dropped to one-twentieth in 1950 and one-twenty-fifth in 1958.¹¹⁴

Along with the decline of the ratio of bureaucratic-military elites in the parliament, there were other activities of the Menderes governments that the old elites were discontent of. Since the bureaucrats and the military officers were mostly devoted to RPP and the preservation of their status in the sociopolitical life, the Democrats mistrusted them. For this reason, Menderes spent a great deal of effort to get bureaucracy and the army under his control.¹¹⁵ As was underlined, one of Menderes' first acts in office was a reshuffling in the army posts.¹¹⁶ This action was very much intended to his goal of controlling military and bureaucratic elites. But this kind of actions was understood by the old elites as a threat to the integrity and autonomy of the army. Also, accession to NATO and choosing of a rather competitive political system after 1946 necessitated the subordination of the army by the civil government. There had been a gradual loss of dominance in the part of the army even during the RPP period, but since the civilian bureaucrats in the RPP were very much on the same line with the military, this was not such a big problem for the military. However, under the DP governments, the army lost most of its prominence and also prestige as well as the bureaucratic elites.¹¹⁷ As an example of the discontent among the military-bureaucratic elites in the center, one military officer complains as follows:

¹¹⁴ The ratio in 1958 is given by Lerner and Robinson, all else from Rustow: Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," 550; Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," 28.

¹¹⁵ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 223–224.

¹¹⁶ Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 206.

¹¹⁷ Hale, *Türkiye'de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 91; Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," 28.

“The army was not the only group which was harmed. The people coming from the villages expelled the teachers and state officers to the corners as well. They could no more live in the best quarters of the cities... They could no more buy clothes. These people were stripped from everything they had been proud of. High (difficult) living conditions and new rich peasant and the tradesmen destroyed the honor and prestige of being the most developed group of the society.”¹¹⁸

Approaching the sociopolitical developments in Turkey during 1950s within my theoretical framework, there are two groups of elites in the politics. First one is the traditional old elites composed of military-bureaucratic elites with the support of intellectuals. These old elites were very much the center and representing this rather smaller group as well. The second group is the new elite rising with the DP rule composed mostly of tradesmen, lawyers, local notables with the support of religious groups and peasants. This new elite represented the periphery of the society, in other words the majority of the society. Since reforms of Menderes rule was increasing popular involvement and expanding the government to masses, the old elites were against the reforms that were delimiting their role and degrading their prestige. In this regards, the old elite was the conservative or hard-liner fraction in the general elite formation in Turkey at that time. On the other hand, the new elite which was realizing and supporting the DP rule was the reformer or the soft-liner group within the elites.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Hale, *Türkiye’de Ordu Ve Siyaset*, 59; William Hale quotes from: Kenneth Fidel, “Social Structure and Military Intervention: The 1960 Turkish Revolution” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, 1969), 639.

¹¹⁹ For a detailed examination of Democrat Party era and the path towards the coup, see: Tanel Demirel, *Türkiye’nin Uzun On Yılı Demokrat Parti İktidarı Ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011).

Following the reforms and changing elite formation during Menderes rule, the central elite struck back at the periphery through the coup d'état of May 27 in 1960.¹²⁰ The coup d'état was made by the army, in other words the military elites. İnönü had not been informed of the coup plans beforehand. However, right after the coup, the bureaucratic elites and the intellectuals, the other constituent of the center, completely supported the military intervention and accepted it as a successful revolution. Obviously, the army did not have a purpose of returning to one-party rule before 1946 by sieging the coup. Their intention (although the intention of the younger group in the junta was a bit different) was to put an end to DP rule and continue the democratic processes after the correction of DP's mistakes. Similarly, RPP and the bureaucrats as well had a concrete plan to go back to one-party rule. However, both the military and bureaucratic elites, and RPP representing both, planned to prevent the change in the elite formation and decrease of new elites' role in the state as a result of Menderes reforms. Instead of the inclusion of new elites to the political arena, they very much wanted the continuation of the old formation. To put it in a different way, bureaucratic and military elites were planning a further liberalization in which their role would not be harmed through popular involvement. Although military-bureaucratic elites and RPP were not categorically against the process of liberalization, since the liberalization took place under Menderes rule were damaging their position in the state, they stopped the process. Although it was restarted afterwards and furthered under new governments, the liberalization process was interrupted for a while because of the coup. In this regards, the change in the elite formation explains the reason behind the end of liberalization under Menderes rule.

V. Conclusion

¹²⁰ Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," 134.

Turkish Republic was founded and ruled by authoritarian regime for more than two decades. Although the parliamentary system existed since the beginning, the one-party rule was not challenged except two very short attempts. After 1945-46, through both domestic and international factors, President İnönü initiated two-party system and Democrat Party was established in early 1946. The period following the free but unfair 1946 elections, there had been significant reforms of democratization under RPP rule while DP was making an effective opposition for the first time in republican Turkey. DP became the ruling party in Turkey by the 1950 elections and at the same time, as the first both free and fair elections, 1950 started the democratic regime in Turkey as a product of the antecedent reforms.

When Menderes became the Prime Minister of Turkey following the DP victory in elections, the democratic regime had just established. Therefore, Democrat Party ruled in an already electoral democratic regime. Yet DP continued the reforms already started by RPP and added some more to them. Most importantly, DP reforms opened up the political system in Turkey to masses and as argued the people became prominent in politics as the first time in republican Turkey. Although Menderes and the government acquired much more authoritarian tendencies, the liberalization in the form of popular involvement continued until the end of DP rule. Actually, while Menderes government made undemocratic activities especially in the last term, Kaçmazoğlu argues that most of them are, in fact, repressive policies on old elites.¹²¹

The test of hypotheses on the causes of the coup in 1960 and the interruption in liberalization process indicates that the main reason appears as the transforming elite formation and the loss of prominence and prestige in the front of old elites. The theory on international factors does not explain the end of liberalization process. For the

¹²¹ Kaçmazoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, 169.

international context, all the factors require further liberalization as well since Turkey's allies were Western liberal democracies and there was a democratizing trend in the Western/Western influenced world. Modernization theory can make a partial explanation for the situation in Turkey. According to socioeconomic indicators, Turkey could not meet the requisites of democracy as Lipset puts it. In this sense, the theory explains why Turkey could not achieve to become a liberal democracy. However, the indicators show that there was an improvement in the socioeconomic conditions in Turkey. In this regards, Turkey would have continue to liberalization process if the theory can explain it. However, although the socioeconomic conditions get better, the liberalization process interrupts in 1960. In case of elite interaction, there is a radical transformation in Turkey's elite formation. A new elite representing the periphery in society rose as the old elites representing the center lost prominence. This is why the military-bureaucratic elites were discontent of Menderes' liberalizing reforms which expands the political arena to popular involvement. As a result, the old elites of the center preferred to preserve (or re-establish) status-quo in the elite formation and put an end to Menderes rule. Consequently, although they were not categorically against further liberalization, the coup they sieged and/or supported caused an interruption in the liberalization process led by Menderes government.

CONCLUSION:

Old Elite's Resistance to Change

In this thesis, I investigated the reason behind the end of liberalization process in a similar fashion in two divergent cases of Khrushchev reforms in the Soviet Union and Menderes reforms in Turkey. In both cases of the authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union and the electoral democratic regime of Turkey, the leaders followed a set of reforms realizing relatively more popular involvement. At the end of their rule with ups and downs, the two leaders were ousted by coups while one was a bloodless within party coup; the other was sieged by military and resulted with the execution of the leader. The processes leading to the removal of leaders indicate that in both cases, the old elites who were harmed by the liberalizing reforms ended the liberalization reforms to preserve their status in the sociopolitical life in their countries.

I started my thesis with a theoretical background on the definitions of democratic transitions and liberalization and also what might have led to the end of liberalization processes according to theories of democratization. In the literature, the modern regimes were categorized as authoritarian and democratic regimes. While some scholars make dichotomous categorizations as it is, the others define subcategories in each group according to their different characteristics. In order to specify the distinctions, I prefer the continuous categorizations, which have subcategories. In the spectrum that I constituted as a combination of different categorizations, there are totalitarian, closed authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes within the authoritarian camp and there are electoral and liberal democracies, each separate from the other in certain features, within the democratic camp. Although democratization and democratic transition are sometimes used in a broader meaning, I prefer to use them only in the case of a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. On the other

hand, while liberalization is usually used referring to moving towards democracy under authoritarian regimes which cannot end with a transition, I tend to use it in a broader meaning. At the end, both in authoritarian and democratic systems, the regimes can be more liberalized. For this reason, all the reforms that make the movement of regime in the political regimes spectrum towards the right hand side (democracy camp) can be termed as liberalization, whether it ends with a transition or not. In this regard, both in authoritarian and democratic regimes, liberalization is possible.

Within the framework of regime change, I investigate two distinct cases of the Soviet Union and Turkey. The two countries were different in ideology, economic model, international orientation, historical bonds with Europe, homogeneity of societies and religious background. More importantly than all, one was a closed authoritarian and the other was an electoral democratic regime. In these two distinct cases, the leaders in the mid-century, Khrushchev and Menderes pursued a series of reforms which brought liberalization, while the former took place within the authoritarian side the latter in democratic side. However, while these cases are so much different from each other, the fate of the liberalization reforms turned out to be the same, as both were terminated following the removal of leaders.

In the Soviet Union, under Stalin's totalitarian regime, there was a constant terror implemented by the regime. Also politically, Stalin was controlling everything as the true leader and was supported by the high state bureaucracy. Right after the Stalin's death, the regime of terror came to an end but a collective leadership around the oligarchic elites was established. Once Khrushchev acquired his power as the top leader of the USSR, started a series of reforms around destalinization and increasing the influence of party apparatus. Prioritization of party apparatus over the state and Presidium was a radical change from the previous period, since it opened the politics for

a greater number of people. However, following the discomfort caused by reforms and the unmet expectations, the oligarchic establishment removed Khrushchev from office with a successful plot within the Presidium. After the fall of Khrushchev, his rather populist reforms were reversed.

In Turkey, the transition from authoritarian to a democratic regime had already started in late 1940s. With the initiation of multiparty system in 1945-46, a competitive regime with significant democratizing reforms started between Republican People's Party and Democrat Party. However, since the elections in 1946 were unfair, the real transition to democracy could only be realized with free and fair 1950 elections. Democrat Party, which came to power with Menderes after 1950, started its reforms in an already democratic regime. Their reforms were mainly towards relaxation of previous repressions on some groups and, just like in the Soviet case, opening the regime to the masses. Although the government showed authoritarian tendencies in their last years, the Menderes era reforms achieved popular involvement, which can be identified as liberalization. However, again just like in Khrushchev case, Menderes was ousted by a coup, this time a bloody one. As a difference, the liberalization trend did not end as in the Soviet case, but was interrupted for a while under military rule.

I sought answer to the question of why the fates of the liberalizing reforms in these two highly diverging cases were the same. The first theory I use is the Lipset's modernization theory. According to that, when a country socioeconomically develops, its likelihood to become a democracy increases. For this, the nation's development in wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education are the main factors behind being a democracy. Benefiting from this one, I sought the answer that is it because the socioeconomic conditions in the Soviet Union and Turkey got worse under Khrushchev and Menderes to lead the end of liberalization.

For modernization theory, in both cases, it is obvious that the socioeconomic conditions of the nations do not meet the requisites of Lipset to become a democratic nation. For Soviet Union case, the failure to meet these criteria does not mean much since there is no attempt for a transition at all. For the Turkish case, modernization theory can explain why Turkey could not become a liberal democratic nation as the Western European countries and the US. On the other hand, the trends in socioeconomic development indicate the failure of the theory to explain the cases, since both the Soviet and Turkish nations achieved significant socioeconomic development (yet still under the level of requisites). Because of Lipset points out a continuous line to democratization, achieved socioeconomic development would have brought further liberalization in both cases. For this reason, the theory does not explain the Soviet case at all and only partially explain the Turkish case in terms of why it could not become a liberal democracy. But for the end of liberalization, the theory does not work for it either.

The second set of theories I use is the ones connecting the democratization process with the international factors. According to these theories, the international environment should create a force of gravity to democratization. So, if the neighbors or allies are democratic, or the country has good relations with the Western world, or there is a global democratization wave, the country can achieve a democratic regime. Consequently, there should be an international force in the authoritarian camp to end the liberalization reforms.

The Soviet Union was a trend-setter country in the Cold War context as one of the two superpowers. Because of that, the USSR was naturally more immune to international factors' influence on the domestic politics. Although only China was against the liberalization process within the Soviet Union, because of the bad relations during and after Khrushchev era, Chinese attitude does not appear as a strong factor. On the other

hand, among the allies of the Soviet Union in Warsaw Pact as Hungary and Poland, there was an even bigger demand of change. Since there was not a (more) pro status-quo and conservative environment around the USSR, the international factors do not explain the end of reforms. In the case of Turkey, all the international developments indicate a completely different outcome. Because of Turkey allied with democratic nations of West and the global trend was in the direction of democracy, international factors would have brought further democratization rather than an interruption in it if the theory explains the case.

Finally, I focus on the theories related with the elite groups and elite formation in the society. Accordingly, the democratization process is the product of a pact or a conflict between elite groups. If the elites are convinced for change by the reformer elites or a popular mass movement, democratization can be achieved. These theories usually distinguish elites as conservative/pro status-quo/hard-liner elites and reformer/pro-reform/soft-liner elites. If the first group is given certain guarantees after the liberalization or they are surpassed by the coalition of reformers, democratization can take place. In the case of end of liberalization process, there should be a successful resistance on the side of hard-liner elites.

Unlike other two sets of theories, elite-based approach can explain the situation in the Soviet Union and Turkey best. In both cases, the liberalizing reforms did open up the political arena to a greater group of people. The masses found more opportunity to involve in politics through Khrushchev and Menderes reforms. The popular involvement caused the limitation of the role of the old elites and their loss of prestige. In the Soviet case, while the party gained prominence as the follower of the dictator, the oligarchic establishment in Presidium and high bureaucracy as its followers lost their status. In Turkish case, the old elite of center based on military and bureaucratic officers and

intellectuals was very powerful during one party rule and even after the initiation of multiparty system as long as the RPP was in power. But by the rise of DP and the popular involvement, a new elite representing the periphery of society appeared. As the new elite replaced the military-bureaucratic old elites, the latter lost their high position and prestige. As a result, the old elites put an end to the leaders' rule and terminated the liberalization processes. For this reason, the resistance of old elites to the change that harmed their position explains the end of liberalization in the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Table 11: Overview of Hypotheses

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Expectation for end of liberalization</i>	<i>the USSR</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Explains or not?</i>
Modernization Theory	Worsening socioeconomic conditions	Does not meet the requisites; Socioeconomically develops	Does not meet the requisites; Socioeconomically develops	<i>Not explains (partially explains Turkish case)</i>
International Context	An attraction for status-quo or authoritarianism	Trend-setter in international politics; Some reformers and few conservatives among allies	Allied with liberal democracies of Western world; High attraction for liberalization	<i>Not explains</i>
Elite Conflict	Old Elites Resist to Change	Presidium and high state bureaucracy are against the reforms	Military-bureaucratic elites are discontent of reforms	<i>Explains</i>

As the same causes related to the old elites' resistance to change explains the cases (see Table 11), I want to point out several aspects in a comparative fashion to conclude. First, neither in the Soviet case nor in the Turkish case, there is a perfect course of democratization or liberalization. In the Soviet Union, the regime was not democratized at all and in Turkey, the liberalization process under the electoral democratic regime did not bring the sustainment of liberal democracy. In this regard, either of Khrushchev and Menderes should be regarded perfect democratizers; probably, they were not even true

democrats at all. Surely, Khrushchev did not have any intention of democratization. On the other hand, Menderes was very much similar to his predecessors in terms of believing in the cause of Turkish Republic. His understanding of democracy was still limited if we compare him with democrats of today or democrats of his day in the consolidated democratic nations.

Second, although these two leaders were not true democrats, this does not undermine what they did as liberalizing their political system. If we think of being democrat or not as a dichotomous category, we can miss their roles as liberalizer. However, if we accept that political regimes are located in a continuous scale, the reality that they in fact succeeded to move their regimes towards democratic side on the right of the scale suggests us, they liberalized their regimes. They were certainly more pro-democracy or were supporting more open regimes comparing to their predecessors. For this reason, the reforms that they made resemble to each other although their regimes are radically different. In both cases there was dispersing of smaller group of old ruling elites and the expansion of the rule towards the masses and in this sense, they achieved significant improvement. Therefore, despite all the defects of their liberalizer characters and reforms, they brought liberalization to their regime to some extent. However, since their regimes in the starting point were different, there surely were certain differences in the extent of the reforms they made. But this does not make any change in the fact that they achieved liberalization in the same direction.

Third, as I discussed earlier, modernization theory has two important propositions that I can use in my framework. For the first, the nations should reach to a certain threshold to become a liberal democratic nation as the countries in West. For this proposition, the theory stands correct for my cases since both the Soviet Union and Turkey were short of fulfilling the criteria Lipset points out; per capita income,

urbanization, education and to some extent industrialization were lower than the Western democratic nations. Still, although the theory explains this aspect of the story, the Soviet Union had no intention at all to become democratic and for the Turkish case in my framework, becoming a liberal democracy was a secondary issue. For the second proposition, the theory suggests that, once a country is developing, its likelihood to become democratic increases. To derive from that increasing development, albeit not reaching the threshold, brings about further liberalization. Both the Soviet Union and Turkey recorded fascinating percentages in growth in all of GDP, education, industrialization and urbanization. Although the pace was slowed in the last years, the direction of the growth was still positive. For this reason, the theory does not explain why these countries liberalized at first and then these processes came to an end afterwards.

Fourth, in the Cold War era, the processes took place within the countries were very much connected with the international dynamics. The mechanisms and the relations within each bloc were very influential in the political and economic decisions of the countries. Sometimes, the necessities of according with the bloc required politicians to carry out certain transformations. For this reason, it is possible to think of the role of international factors in these developments in the Soviet Union and Turkey; however, the international developments in those years do not present such an outcome. On the one hand, the general characteristics of the two cases in the international arena require different outcomes. The Soviet Union was in the Communist bloc while Turkey is in the Western bloc. The expectation would be continuing strong authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union and succession of Turkey for a transition to liberal democracy as its allies. Moreover, the former was the deciding nation for which way the bloc would follow while the latter was only pursuing the decisions by the bigger nations. On the other hand,

when we go into detail about what was happening within the blocs might require a similar outcome. In the Communist bloc, there started to be a vacuum for change especially in the Eastern Europe. Although China was against change, there was enough background to create a diffusion affect for liberalization. In the Western bloc, there has always been an attraction to become more democratic and Turkey had its transition the previous decade for this reason. However, although there were such factors for a similar outcome, the requirement of these factors was entirely in a different direction. In other words, the international factors might explain why liberalization started in the first place but they cannot explain why the process came to an end.

Fifth, the expansion of the rule and the inclusion of the masses/new elites were broader in Turkey comparing the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, the party's role increased as opposed to the bureaucracy representing the state. However, party was still a higher body comparing to the masses. It is difficult to say that there was true representation even through the party. In Turkish case, by the Menderes reforms, the new elites representing the periphery could come to power. Although there were defects in representation in DP rule as well, the opening to the masses could be achieved more. Probably, the main reason behind this difference was the political regimes in these countries. Since there was an authoritarian regime with one-party in the Soviet Union, the change in the ruling formation was in a higher level and because of already democratic regime of Turkey, the people could find more opportunity to involve in politics by liberalization.

Sixth, unlike the Soviet case, social cleavages appear to be a crucial factor for the competition between elites and the fate of liberalization process. In the Soviet Union, because of the main requirements of the communist regime, the system was based on diminishing the cleavages. For this reason, anyone could be a party member and even

rise without being stopped by ideological, ethnic or economic factors. For the ideological factors, there is not much difference between people since all were obliged to be communist and in other factors like ethnicity, the supra-identity of Sovietness was bounding people to each other. Maybe certain groups were more advantageous in the field of competition; but there still was the possibility to reach higher positions for the people with disadvantageous background. For this reason, child of a peasant like Khrushchev and a non-Russian like Stalin could be Premier. However in Turkey, social cleavages appeared to be very effective in politics. The sociopolitical processes were based on the center-periphery relations. Moreover the social cleavages were not cross-cutting; the cleavages like urban-rural, secular-religious, military-civilian significantly coincided with center-periphery cleavage.

Seventh, because of the effect of social cleavages in Turkey unlike the Soviet Union, the elite competition had a slightly different background in these two cases. In the Soviet Union, the reforms launched a change in the elite formation while the Party became more influential while Presidium lost prominence. However, the members in the Party and Presidium were not radically different from each other. One can still find more diversity in the Party; however, it was possible for Party members to rise to Presidium. For this reason, Khrushchev's reforms was not promising a radical ideological turn in the Soviet Union; the state was still expected to remain Communist both politically and economically although some political opening was achieved. So, the main change was that the names or the individuals who were effective in the decision making process were losing their place. For this reason, the oligarchic structure, which was losing prominence, tried to regain its position. In the Turkish case, it was slightly different due to the social cleavages. The first leaders of the Democrat Party were previously members of the Republican People's Party but the real difference was the masses that the parties were

representing. While RPP was the party of the center, DP was representing the periphery which were neglected under RPP rule. For this reason, the expansion of politics to the masses meant that periphery appeared to be a big rival to the center for the first time. This created a serious perception for the center elites that the state would drift away from the gains of the Republic and it played an important role along with personal position security of center elites.

Eighth, related with last two points, the reforms in the Soviet Union in the form of changing role of institutions and in Turkey in the form of changing individuals within the institutions. As I argued, the most significant change in the Soviet Union that incited the discontent in old elites was the changing powers of the Party and Presidium. So, although the proportion in the Party started to change as well, Presidium remained almost the same in terms of the background of its members. On the other hand, the individuals within the institutions changed which lead to the changing power formation of institutions afterwards. As I pointed out earlier, the proportion in the parliament radically shuffled in the 1950s while the old center elites lost grounds the new elites from the periphery increased their number a lot. This changing formation in the parliament under electoral democratic regime of Turkey resulted with the changing relations between the government and the army since they were not representing the same groups anymore as in the past. For this reason, the change in the Soviet elite formation was not a proportional change, which can be explained in numbers, whereas in Turkey it was.

Ninth, there are similarities and differences in the aftermath and consequences of the coups. In the short term, in both the Soviet Union and Turkey, the process of liberalization was terminated. In long term in the Soviet Union, the Brezhnev regime was still more open comparing to Stalin era thanks to some gains of Khrushchev era,

however they reestablished a regime under control of high elites without much further liberalizations. In other words, they aimed and mostly achieved to establish a Stalinist regime without Stalin himself and his terror. In Turkey, liberalization process could continue in the medium term after the Committee of National Unity initiated new constitution and elections in less than one and a half years. It is true that, much could be achieved in the 1960s in terms of expansion of liberties. So, the liberalization of the 1950s did not totally end by the coup, it was rather interrupted. However, in the long term, the intervention of the army in politics in 1960 started the tradition within the army that led four more interventions/attempts. In this regard, this consequence of the coup in 1960 seriously damaged the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Even though liberalization can continue after a coup and the army might be somewhat benevolent in terms of democratization, a coup is always a coup and it is by nature undemocratic and antidemocratic. Even for one day, since a coup suspends the democratic procedures, it is always a reversal in terms of democratization/liberalization. For this reason, I can state that while the coup in the Soviet Union really terminated the liberalization process, in Turkey the coup interrupted the process. Although liberalization continued after the transition to elections again in the 1960s, the coup left long term deleterious effects on democratization.

Tenth, interestingly enough, the real perpetrators of the coups in both cases were the people who climbed to top echelons (or their current status) during the reformer leaders' rule. Most of the Presidium members that removed Khrushchev from the leadership such as Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin and Podgorny were the officers who were appointed there by Khrushchev, especially after the anti-party affair. Similarly, the fourteen lower ranked officers of Committee of National Unity who were the real engine of the coup were not the prominent figures of RPP era. But still, they were part of

bureaucratic state elites in one case and the military elites in the other. The important point is, although these names climbed to these positions under Khrushchev and Menderes rules, they were trained under the previous rules and assumed the main characteristics of their institutional identity. So, despite being new and younger names, they were not new elites at all. Therefore, although the perpetrators individually were not the elites of the previous periods, they struck back as a part of the old elite groups. These coups were not the comeback of individual elites per se, but of old elites as a group.

Finally, as the main reason behind the removal of the leaders, hence the end of liberalization processes, appears as the old elites' discontent because of the change in sociopolitical life, it is seen that the realization of coups took place when the governments were relatively weaker. Both in the Soviet and Turkish cases, there had already been attempts or plans within the old elite camp before the successful coups. Anti-party group affair in 1957 in the Soviet Union illustrates that the elites wanted and/or tried to topple the Khrushchev before too. However, he found support from the Central Committee to remain in office. I think that there were two main reasons for this in the Soviet case. First, the Khrushchev reforms before 1957 was mostly on destalinization and the end of terror, he did not make much change on elite structure until that. For this reason, when anti-party group tried to replace Khrushchev he could find some support even among the old elites. Second and more important, in 1957 the Soviet state was performing much better and reforms were being harvested well. However when it comes to 1964 in the USSR, some of reforms and policies of Khrushchev and Menderes had already failed, some expectations could not be met and there arose some political and economic problems. The same situation was observed in Menderes case while in his last three years, government's performance was not that good. The worsening performances of the leaders in their last years also caused a broader

discontent along with the discontent of the elites, or in other words the support to these leaders was relatively diminished at that time. In such a situation, it seems that the relative weakening of Khrushchev and Menderes rules created the opportunity for the old elites to strike back and topple them. In this regard, while the discontent of elites is the main reason behind the end of liberalization processes, the weakening power of the leaders and the unmet expectations appears as the fire lighting the torch for the coups.

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