IDEAL CITIZENSHIP DEPICTIONS IN TURKISH PRIMARY SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS: CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

by

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Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Koç University

September 2014

Koc University

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

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and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

I confirm that the work presented in this thesis has been performed and interpreted solely by myself except where explicitly identified to the contrary. I confirm that this work is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at Koç University and has not been submitted elsewhere in any other form for the fulfilment of any other degree or qualification.

ABSTRACT

The present study examines the changes and continuities in the ethnic and religious aspects of the Turkish national identity during the government of the Justice and Development Party. For this purpose, it focuses on primary school textbooks which are under strict state supervision. The main drive behind this study is to show the extent to which different ethnic and religious identity communities are recognized hence included in the textbook representation of the nation. In order to keep track of changes and continuities during the government of the Justice and Development Party, it is necessary to analyze the ethnic and religious aspects of the national identity reproduced in textbooks throughout the history of Turkey. Nevertheless, a complete assessment of the national identity-formation in textbooks during the Justice and Development mandate necessitates the comparison between the textbooks published in this era and those published just before the party's accession to power. Accordingly, this thesis uses a two-step way to evaluate the Justice and Development period: First, it discusses textbook depictions of the 'ideal Turk' through the literature starting from the declaration of the Republic in 1923 until the beginning of the Justice and Development Party rule in 2002. Building upon this background, it then manifests changes and continuities in the ethnic and religious components of the national identity reproduced in contemporary textbooks by sharing the findings of comparative discourse and content analysis of textbooks from 2000 and 2012. The results of the comparative analysis on textbooks of *Life Sciences*, *Social Sciences*, and *Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge* courses show that similar to the general tendency of textbooks during the history of Turkey, the image of nationhood constructed in the textbooks published during the Justice and Development Party rule is hierarchically-organized. The major reason behind the reproduction of a hierarchically structured perception of nationhood through textbooks is the imposition of a national identity, which is dominated by certain ethnic and religious identities, on other citizens with different ethnic and religious identities. In other words, textbooks become means to melt the ethnic and religious diversity of the population in a select of ethnic and religious identities and construct the nation on the homogeneity in terms of identity. As a consequence of this, the nation is constructed in a hierarchical pattern by assigning ethnic and religious identity communities to different ranks according to their compliance to the idealized national identity. The textbooks of the Justice and Development era continue to reproduce the internally-hierarchic structure of the nation, despite of the party's claim to 'change' and 'plural democracy'. Throughout the history of Turkey, the current period included, the top of the hierarchy is reserved for those citizens who fit into the prescribed national identity. The identity components of the ideal as well as non-ideal citizens depicted in textbooks change throughout the history of the Republic. The results of the comparative discourse and content analysis of textbooks during the government of the Justice and Development Party illustrate that unfitting ethnic and religious identities are either partially included into the textbook imagination of the nation or they are excluded from it. Hence, legally equal citizens with 'non-ideal' ethnic and religious identities are assigned to different yet subordinate echelons within the imagined nation.

Keywords: Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, nation, national identity, ethnic identity, religious identity, textbooks, primary school, ideal citizen, desirable citizen, Turkishness, state, content analysis, discourse analysis.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde inşa edilen Türk ulusal kimliğinin etnik ve dini kimlik bileşenlerindeki değişimi ve devamlılığı ölçmeyi amaçlıyor. Bunu gerçekleştirebilmek için sıkı devlet denetimi altında tutulan ilköğretim ders kitaplarına odaklanıyor. Araştırmanın temel hedefi, farklı etnik ve dini kimliklere sahip Türkiye yurttaşlarının ders kitaplarında inşa edilen ulus algısında ne derece yer bulabildiğini göstermektir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetleri döneminde ilköğretim ders kitaplarında gerçekleşen değişimi ve devamlılığı daha iyi takip edebilmek için Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca ders kitaplarıyla üretilmek istenen ulusal kimliğin etnik ve dini kimliksel boyutlarını incelemek gereklidir. Ancak, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetleri döneminin daha açıklayıcı bir analizini yapmak için bu dönemde basılan ders kitaplarıyla bu hükümetlerden hemen önce basılmış ders kitaplarını karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemek büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu sebeple, bu tez son dönemdeki değişiklikleri incelemek için iki aşamalı bir yol izler: Öncelikle, 1923'te devletin kuruluşundan 2002'de Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin iktidara gelişine kadarki süreçte ders kitaplarında idealize edilen 'Türk' algısına literatür üzerinden bakar. Daha sonrasındaysa, bu temel üzerine 2000 yılı ders kitapları ile 2012 yılı ders kitaplarının karşılaştırmalı içerik ve söylem analizlerinde varılan sonuçları koyarak son dönemde üretilmesi hedeflenen yurttaş kimliğinin etnik ve dini bileşenlerindeki değişimleri ve devamlılıkları gösterir. Bu iki ayrı döneme ait *Hayat Bilgisi*, *Sosyal Bilgiler* ile *Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi* ders kitaplarının mukayesesi sonucunda varılan noktaya göre Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde öğrencilere sunulan ulus algısı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca olduğu gibi hiyerarşik yapıdadır. Ders kitaplarının toplumda yer alan bazı etnik ve dini kimlikleri idealize ederek inşa ettiği kapsayıcılıktan uzak bir ulusal kimliği tüm yurttaşlara empoze etmesi bu hiyerarşik ulus algısının temel kaynağıdır. Başka bir deyişle, ders kitapları, farklı etnik ve dini kimlikleri ulusallık atfedilmiş bazı kimlikler içinde eriterek ulusu inşa etmeye aracı olur. Türkiye tarihi boyunca kimliksel anlamda homojenlik üzerine kurulan bu ulus algısı, hukuken birbirine eşit yurttaşlar arasında, yurttaşların etnik ve dini kimliklerinin ders kitaplarında üretilen ulusal kimliğe uygunluğuna göre hiyerarşik bir yapıda üretilir. Bu hiyerarşik yapı, 'değişim' ve 'çoğulcu demokrasi' söylemlerine sahip Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetleri döneminde de varlığını sürdürür. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca ders kitapları aracılığıyla öğrencilerde oluşturulmak istenen hiyerarşik ulus algısının en tepesinde makbul olarak sunulan ulusal kimliğin etnik ve dini bileşenlerine uyan yurttaşlar yer alır. İdealize edilen bu ulusal kimlik ve onun 'ötekileri', Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca değişikliğe uğrar. Ders kitaplarının karşılaştırmalı söylem ve içerik analizi sonuçlarına göre Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde farklı etnik ve dini kimlik grupları, kurulan hiyerarşik ulus algısında farklı derecelerde ulusa kabul edilir veya ulustan dışlanır. Böylece, kanun önünde eşitliğe sahip yurttaşlar ders kitaplarının kimliksel içeriğine ve söylemine göre inşa edilen ulus algısının farklı basamaklarında yer alır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, ulus, ulusal kimlik, etnik kimlik, dini kimlik, ders kitapları, ilköğretim, makbul yurttaş, Türklük, devlet, söylem analizi, içerik analizi.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Asst. Prof. Özlem Altan-Olcay, for her continuous guidance, constructive suggestions, encouragement, intellectual advices and personal support. She always spared considerable time to my questions and contributed to my study immensely by providing valuable feedbacks in spite of her busy schedule. She helped me develop my research skills with her advices, enthusiasm and criticism.

I also express my sincere thanks to Assoc. Prof. Murat Somer for his support, suggestions and encouragement during my studies. He advanced my thesis by looking from different perspectives and providing beneficial feedbacks.

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INTRODUCTION

Nation-building is a process of constant reproduction. In order to turn masses into a self-conscious unit, which imagines itself as part of the same community, modern states construct and then reproduce national identities that might build upon previously existing identities but are nevertheless different from them. National identities are often disproportionately influenced by the identities of the dominant groups in their respective societies, even though they might draw upon a combination of various group identities. Accordingly, the unity of modern nations is sustained through the homogenization of various local identities into the national identity whereby identities are reinvented and reconstructed and some identities might dominate the process. The modern age brings along many mechanisms that facilitate unity through homogeneity, modern schooling being one of them. Among many methods of transformation employed by modern schooling, textbooks, which are usually under either direct or indirect state control, are important transmitters of national identity whose components can be revealed by a comprehensive textbook analysis. In other words, textbooks help students imagine the nation in a particular fashion in which the boundaries of inclusion into and exclusion from the nation is drawn. The fact that the polity comprises of citizens with different identities triggers questions about their recognition as part of the imagined nation in textbooks.

This thesis aims to study changes and continuities in textbook depictions of the boundaries of Turkey as a nation, paying specific attention to the positioning of ethnic and religious identity groups. My findings concur with the literature which reveals there is a difference between *Turkish citizenship* and *Turkishness,* with the latter defining a more exclusionary identity than the former. More specifically, Turkishness is the most desired identity in the eyes of the state, hence those who are implicitly or explicitly associated with

Turkishness in textbooks are the 'desirable' or 'ideal' citizens. Based on this observation, I argue that the textbook representation of the Turkish nation has an internal hierarchy where the top is reserved for the 'ideal Turks' who comply with the national identity the most. By the same token, those citizens who do not completely fit into the national identity are assigned to lower echelons within the imagined nation. This implies that although all members of the nation are legally equal citizens on paper, the imagined nation constructed by textbooks do not recognize them equally, for they create a hierarchy among different identities based on their fitness into the national identity. I must state that by pinpointing the unequal position of citizens within the textbook imagination of the nation, I do not intend to make any claim on the practical inequalities between citizens, since this is beyond my research objective. Rather, I aim to manifest that because some identities dominate the national identity over others, they are not equally recognized as part of the nation.

My primary data analysis and secondary literature review reveal that textbooks use different methods to represent unfitting identities and create suspicion about their belonging to 'us'. I conceptualize three methods for constructing hierarchy in textbooks: (1) Explicit exclusion, (2) Silence, and (3) Obscurity. I coin the term 'method of exclusion' to pinpoint the explicit exclusion of an identity from the imagined nation and national identity. When textbooks use a directly and openly targeting, and hostile language against an identity community, I call this method as explicit exclusion. Having covered many textbooks, I came to the conclusion that textbooks in Turkey quite seldomly use that method against unfitting identity communities. One of the most commonly used methods in textbooks is keeping silent about the existence of an identity group as part of the nation. At many times, incongruent identities either never or very rarely find place in textbooks. I assert that 'the method of silence' is a way to subtly deny the presence of certain identity communities in nation. This method *might* signal the state's implicit intention to assimilate that identity community into

the national identity. Nevertheless, the intention to assimilate does not hold in every case of silence, and it must be backed by further evidence like a history of assimilation against that particular community. Whereas those citizens who are explicitly antagonized cannot find *any* place within the textbook imagination of nationhood, those citizens who are ignored in textbooks can find *some* place within nation. Nevertheless, since their identity is not promoted as the national identity is done, the ignored identity can find a lower position in the students' envision of nationhood. Lastly, textbooks may sometimes give contradictory messages about identity groups. In other words, a negative image is combined with either positive or neutral image of the community. When used, 'the method of obscurity' blurs the image of the identity group in the eyes of students, since the group's inclusion into or exclusion from the nation is not clearly conveyed. Although this is not outright exclusion from the imagined nation, such an equivocal portrait overshadows their belonging to the nation on an equal basis, thus when textbooks employ this method, they make students imagine this community in an indecisive yet subordinate position within nation. Among these three methods for constructing hierarchy, the most exclusionary is the first one. Due to the controversial image which involves a negative representation as well as a positive or a neutral one, 'the method of obscurity' is the second most exclusionary way of presenting identities. 'The method of silence' is the most 'inclusionary' among three methods, as it does not directly or indirectly attach *any* negative image to the community, although it subtly denies it by ignoring it. The chart below illustrates the hierarchic model of Turkish nationhood reproduced in textbooks:



Chart 1: The hierarchically-arranged Turkish nation hood according to three methods of representation[1].

In this thesis, using these methods for constructing hierarchy as a reference point, I will analyze the boundaries of ideal citizenship and the internally-hierarchic structure of the nation that is reproduced in primary school textbooks. Since the national identity has many components, I will focus only on the ethnic and religious aspects of it. Moreover, I will primarily focus on the hierarchical nature of nation reproduced during the Justice and Development Party (hereafter *the JDP*) governments. I will divide my discussion into four chapters.

In Chapter One, I present the major debates on the formation of nations and nationalism with a particular focus on the modernist-constructivist paradigm. Having covered the constructed nature of nations, I will focus on the role of modern schooling and particularly that of textbooks in transforming students. Then, I will elucidate the transformative influence of the introduction of modern education in some non-Westernern cases, and how these states use schools and textbooks to establish their unity through the inculcation of a national identity. The analysis shows that while these states reproduce the unity of the nation through

[1] The width, area and volume of echelons and their difference in these respects do not speak for the number of people assigned to that position. I benefit from the pyramide model merely to show the ranking between identities and the way they are presented in textbooks.

homogeneity of the national identity, they assign mismatching identities to different positions within the hierarchically arranged nation.

Building on these examples, in Chapter Two, I present a literature review on the textbook representation of Turkishness in the pre-JDP Turkish history. Accordingly, I divide the modern history of Turkey into four periods:

(1) The Single Party Period (1923 – 1946)

(2) The Multiparty Period (1946 – 1980)

(3) The Post-1980 Period (1980 – 2002)

(4) The JDP Period (2002 – present)

The Single Party Period was renowned with the domination of Kemalist ideology, transmitted by the Republican People's Party (hereafter *the RPP*). Even though secularism was a building block of this ideology, it did not signify state's complete retreat from the religious sphere. Instead laicism was actively utilized to formulate a new and enlightened form of Islam, promulgate it among citizens so as to establish control over Islam as a possible source of political dissent (Parla 1992, Toprak 1995, Ahmad 2002, Çağaptay 2006, Altan-Olcay 2007, Altan-Olcay 2009, Barras 2009, Tarhan 2011, Somer 2014). There was an internal shift during the single party period: in the 1930s understandings of nation became more exclusivist and based on shared race –in addition to ethnicity,- reflecting the international political trends. This shift also found room in changes made to textbooks and curricula.

The second period, however, witnessed a powerful opposition party who won elections against the RPP several times and who pursued a more conservative-nationalist agenda. With the introduction of multiparty system, the elections went competitive and various political parties with different political agenda came to power. For that matter, there was a break in 1950 in terms of state ideology.

The third breaking point was the September 12 military intervention, which established a regime that changed the social, political and economic realms in such a way that its legacy is still vivid today. The JDP came into power in 2002, breaking the pattern of coalition governments and have won three consecutive parliamentary elections, consolidating its power. Although the JDP adopted the legacy of the September 12, it came to power with the motto of *change*. Probing into the above-listed periods, one can observe that each has its own formulation of national education system. In this respect, I particularly delve into their educational policies as well as textbook representation of ideal and non-ideal citizens. While I discuss the first three periods in Chapter Two, I leave the JDP period to the last two chapters.

In Chapter Three and Four, I provide an account of the JDP based on primary data I collected from my content and discourse analysis results. Whereas I discuss the religious aspect of the national identity in Chapter Three, I elaborate on the ethnic aspect of the ideal Turkishness in the last chapter. I conclude that despite of claims to pluralism and the willingness to change, the JDP governments fall short of actualizing these claims. Whereas they continue with the ethno-centric perception of nationhood, they increase the level of Islamization, while sticking with the much-criticized Sunnification policies. In this respect, the JDP era witnesses a continuing trend in terms of lower ranks given to non-Turkish communities in textbook depictions of nationhood. These textbooks intensify the Islamic component of the desirable citizen, while they mostly keep silent about non-Muslim identities. This leads to further enhancement of the Muslim identity in relation to still-ignored non-Muslim identities. Meanwhile, the JDP governments do not step back from the Sunni tone of textbooks, hence continue ignoring the non-Sunni identities. In other words, whereas the religious identity gets less inclusivist, the ethnic identity does not show amelioration. The table below provides a map on the dominant bases of nationhood and the 'others' within the nation:

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Dominant Bases of Nationhood</th></tr>
<tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Ethnic Aspect of the National Identity</th><th colspan="2">Religious Aspect of the National Identity</th></tr>
<tr><th></th><th>1920s</th><th>1930s on</th><th>1920s</th><th>1930s on</th></tr>
<tr><td>The Single Party Period</td><td>Ethno-linguistic, and Ethno-cultural Turkishness dominate the national identity. Nevertheless, in some occasions, textbooks construct the image of the nation based on shared race.</td><td>The stress textbooks put on race increases, while ethnicity is still an important component. This sub-period is the most exclusivist era towards non-Turks.</td><td>The nationhood is built on shared religion. Hence, textbooks assign non-Muslims to lower ranks within the nation.</td><td>Secularism is introduced as a state tool to manage the religious identity and inculcate an ‘enlightened’ form of Islam, assigning lower echelons to Islamists, and non-Muslims.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The Multiparty Period</td><td colspan="2">Ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkishness dominate textbooks. Racial references gets less emphasis than the Republican era. Thus, it is mostly ethno-centric. Non-Turkish communities are given lower positions within nation.</td><td colspan="2">The emphasis on moral/religious identity in elites’ discourse rises, hence Kemalist Islam (Kaplan 1999) takes another form. Yet, textbooks of this era manifest continuity with the Republican era.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The Post-1980 Period</td><td colspan="2">Ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkishness prevail in textbooks. Atatürk nationalism gets institutionalized. The language of Turkish becomes even more important as a basis of nation, thus strengthening ethno-linguistic identification with Turkishness. Ethnic Turks are the top of the hierarchy.</td><td colspan="2">The Sunni-Islamic tone of textbooks increase sharply and it is balanced with Atatürkist ideology. Significant Sunni dominance in textbooks indirectly presents non-Sunni Muslims as less desirable than Sunni Muslims. Non-Muslims are also not recognized as ideal citizens.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The JDP Period</td><td colspan="2">The ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural oriented Turkishness prevail in textbooks. Therefore, there is continuity with the post-1980 era than change.</td><td colspan="2">Textbook content and discourse is further Islamized, while there is no concrete change with regard to the Sunni indoctrination. This is the most exclusionist one among four periods with respect to religious identity. Non-Muslims and non-Sunnis have lower ranks in the imagined nation.</td></tr>
</table>

Table 1: Dominant bases of nationhood across four major periods in the history of modern Turkey.

With this thesis, I intend to contribute to the literature on Turkish nation-building and identity formation through textbooks. I also aim to show that in Turkey, textbook content and discourse become mechanisms of reproduction of an imagined hierarchy between legally equal citizens based on their 'ability' to comply with the state-tailored national identity and get assimilated into the national culture, for these are the keys to desirable citizenship.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis intends to elaborate on the first five years of the Turkish primary school textbooks from 2000 and 2012 to assess, from a comparative perspective, the codes of desirable citizenship and the place of ethnic and religious identity groups within nation through the gaze of the state. Primary schools are significant in shaping young minds in Turkey for three reasons: First, schooling is one of the social transformation tools of the modern state, constructing political consciousness around nationhood. Second, primary school is the first place where most children face with official indoctrination with such intensity. Third, in Turkey, textbooks are under strict state supervision, therefore they are rich with insight into the official perception of ideal citizenry.

The envision of national identity in the JDP era attracts attention as a unit of analysis for five reasons: First of all, despite the fact that there are some analyses that focus on the textbook representation of Turkish citizenship in the pre-JDP period, the JDP era is much less studied, thus there is a lack in the literature on identity-building during the JDP's mandate. Second, according to the Party Program (2002), the JDP has a claim to gradual reformation and change. The emphasis on change is so strong that, it goes as far as proclaiming the intention to initiate a 'Silent Revolution' (Ibid.). Third, as for the nature of the gradual reformation, the Party Program (2002), the 2023 Political Vision Document and the Governmental Programs (2002, 2003, 2007, and 2011) tell that the JDP is a conservative democrat party that is pro-pluralism and pro-democracy. The strong emphasis on equality and tolerance to difference of ethnic origin, beliefs, worldviews and gender signifies the possibility of change during their now-12-year-long mandate. Four, the JDP is associated with moderate Islamism due to its previous links with the Radical Islamist Virtue Party which they left as a group of progressives to form the JDP, thus it is ideologically different from many

previous governments. Although it is not the first conservative government, it is the first *strong* conservative government and this brings us to the fifth and last reason: The JDP came to power without a coalition partner and dominated the majority of the National Assembly. This was a sharp break with the past, since pre-JDP period was characterized with weak coalition governments and military interventions. With regard to this, the JDP has established strong governments which have been able to enact laws and make changes without the need of support from another political party inside the Assembly. Based on these five reasons, I formulated the following research question:

> "Is there change or continuity in the ethnic and religious aspects of the national identity that affects the degree of inclusion of unfitting identities into the nation with the JDP's accession to power?"

Moving from the organic bond between textbooks and national identity, this thesis helps illuminate the extent to which religious and ethnic identity groups are included, excluded and ignored within the codes of ideal Turkishness based on the results of both content and discourse analyses on textbooks from 2000 and 2012. These years are selected deliberately to illustrate the effects of a possible paradigm shift in textbook representation of ideal Turkishness with the the JDP's mandate.

While such an analysis reveals the components of national identity, it necessarily demonstrates what kind of a citizen the state wants to construct. This implies that the textbook assessment on the ethnic and religious identity components of a proto-typical Turkish citizen is the 'ideal' citizen that state desires to construct. The description and promotion of the ideal citizen in textbooks necessarily creates its own "others" who do not comply with the desirable identity, thus reproducing hierarchical boundaries among citizens who altogether form the nation. Moving from this starting point, I intend to answer the following questions during my research:

- How significant schooling and in particular textbooks are in transforming students into citizens?
- What are the ethnic and religious aspects of the state-tailored national identity presented in school textbooks? Is there change or continuity in different periods?
- Is there any identity that dominates the national identity? Accordingly, are there any identity groups that are implicitly or explicitly distanced from the national identity?
- Do textbooks give any place to those who are outside of the prototypical Turkish identity? If yes, how are they presented? Do textbooks construct a hierarchy among unfitting identities or are they equally inferior to the ideal identity?

Throughout the text, I refer to 'identity communities' for I intend to go beyond the minority definition in the Lausanne Treaty (1923) in my research project. Hence, I interrogate the citizenship status of not only those with Armenian, Greek and Jewish origin, but also those with Alevi, and Kurdish origin. The reason of my selection of different language and ethnic communities is self-evident: They have been historically given an inferior position within the community particularly because of the Ottoman *millet* system (Kadıoğlu 1996, Oran 2004). What is more, there are still many complaints about their subordination by dominant identity groups. Due to the JDP's claim to gradual reformation and its ideologically different standing, I commenced the research to trace changes, if any, in the textbook representation of Turkish citizens and national identity.

Focusing on these four periods, I intend to provide a snapshot of the Turkish education system which is revised in each period in accordance with what sort of a citizen it wants to cultivate. Accordingly, I can keep track of changes and continuities in time. To assess the pre-JDP era, I use both primary and secondary sources for I provide a comprehensive literature review combined with my own analysis on 2000 textbooks. On the JDP period, however, I

only benefit from my own results of analysis. By comparing the content and discourse analysis results, I aim to trace changes and continuities in the ethnic and religious components of national identity in the JDP period.

Using content analysis, I intended to trace quantitative changes, if any, between 2000 and 2012 textbooks. For this purpose, I used two softwares: *Abbyy Finereader 11*, and *Atlas.ti*. Whereas the former was an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) program, the latter was a qualitative analysis software. I used Abbyy Finereader 11 to convert the scanned textbooks from image format to readable Microsoft Word format, because it was the only way to analyze textbooks in Atlas.ti for it needs to read the texts. In Atlas.ti, there are two major units of analysis: *words* and *codes*. Therefore, I made three types of analysis with this software: (1) Word count analysis, (2) Code frequency analysis, and (3) Code co-occurrence analysis.

With respect to the first type of analysis, I benefitted from the 'Word Cruncher' application of the software, since it provided a comprehensive list of words used in each textbook. In this way, I was able to get the frequency results of critical words instrumental for my research. More specifically, this tool helped me make comparison between years, courses, grades, and textbooks with respect to the repetition of concepts. In the following chapters, I interpreted large gaps between the frequency results of certain words as a way of teaching employed by textbooks by repetition[2] through which students are reminded of some concepts more often than others. In this regard, large discrepancy between relevant concepts whose comparison is useful for the research manifests the textbook's intention to highlight some concepts more than others, therefore giving clues about the desirable identity the state wants to flourish. To serve this aim, I focused on words, which are closely related to the national

[2] Although repetition manifests the importance state gives to the concept, *the discourse* with which the concept is discussed is crucial, as it may either promote or criticize it.

identity and its boundaries of inclusion. To have a better grasp of the religious aspect of the national identity, I conducted frequency analysis for the following words:

- Secularism[3],
- Believer,
- Among religious beliefs: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Sunnism, Alevism, Bektashism, Qizilbashism,
- Prophets: Mohammad, Jesus, Moses,
- Holy Books: Koran, Bible, Torah,
- Places of Worship: Mosque, Church, Synagogue, Djem Houses
- Sacred Personas in Alevism: Ali, Hızır, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal,
- Worshipping practices: Daily Prayer (*Namaz*), Ablution, Ramadan, Fasting, Muharrem, Hızır fasting, Djem Services, Whirling (*Semah*)[4].

I selected these concepts for their relevance to my research objective. To start with, in order to track changes, if any, in textbook presence of the secular identity during the moderate Islamist JDP rule, I analyzed how many times 'secularism' is repeated in textbooks for repetition is a way to promote an identity in textbooks. In addition, I revealed the findings on the frequency of the word 'believer' to show the change of emphasis on the piety of Muslims from 2000 to 2012. Furthermore, in order to manifest if the discrepancy between the frequency of representation of Islamic references and non-Islamic ones changed in the JDP era, I compared the word count results on major religious beliefs in Turkey, and their sacred personages, holy books, places of worship and worshipping practices. Lastly, comprehending the essentiality of Sunni identity in the pre-JDP era, I wanted to compare the level of Sunnification before and after the JDP's accession to power. In this respect, I used the word count findings to compare

[3] *Secularism* has two translations in Turkish: *Sekülerlik* and *laiklik*. None of the textbooks in my sample uses the former. Therefore, whenever I refer to secularism in textbooks, I exclusively mean *laiklik*. I will elaborate on secularism as a component of the national identity in the following chapters.

[4] I will share the results of my word count analysis on these concepts and what these results mean in Chapter Three.

Sunni references with non-Sunni and particularly Alevi references with respect to comparative frequencies of Sunni and Alevi places of worship, sacred personages, and worshipping practices.

In order to assess the ethnic component of the national identity, I presented frequency analysis of the following keywords:

- Ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural identities: Turk, Kurd, Armenian, Jew, Rum,
- The labels to denote the threats to the nation: Enemy, Occupier, Terrorist, Collaborator.

As for ethnic identities, I shared the word count results of Turk, Armenian, Jew, and Rum for they were the only ethnic identities mentioned in textbooks. Due to the centrality of the Kurdish community in citizenship debates, I included it into my analysis, although they never appear in textbooks.Conversely, their absence is telling about the ethnic component of the national identity as well as state's population management policies concerning Kurds. In addition to these, knowing how textbooks call the threats to the unity and solidarity of the nation is an important part of this studt, since it hels us discern who the dangerous outsiders are. I was curious about how many times textbooks repeat the words 'enemy' and 'occupier', because they were repeated quite often to point out the dangerous 'others'. I included 'terrorist' for this label is usually associated with the Kurdish identity in the public discourse and media. In addition to these, I inquired about the word count results of 'collaborator' identity, because since the foundation of the Republic, the national consciousness is constructed on the internal enemies who are among 'us', but who collaborates with the external enemies against the Turkish nation. Such an association is still valid, because many politicians benefit from it to ignite nationalist feelings. Accordingly, I wanted to know to what extent the 'others' of the nation are identified as 'collaborators'.

Besides word count analysis, I used Atlas.ti focusing on codes I created. Briefly, I created the codes I find relevant to my research. Yet, while reading textbooks, I realized that while some of my codes were useless, others were needed to be created. Therefore, I refreshed my list of codes. Coding is a process in which the codes are matched with selected quotations and texts. Utilizing codes, I made two types of analysis. As a second method of content analysis, I checked the frequency of some codes. While doing this, I simply resorted to 'the Code Manager' in Atlas.ti, since it enlists all codes with their frequencies. By filtering the textbooks according to my needs, I was able make comparative code frequency analysis across *years (2000 vs. 2012), courses (Life Sciences, Social Sciences and Religion),* and *grade levels (1-2-3-4-5).* This type of analysis was illustrative of the emphasis state gives to the concepts on which I created codes to elucidate textbook depiction of the ideal citizen.

In addition to this, I also made use of codes to show how the boundaries of inclusion into the nation were drawn in textbooks by checking the association between codes. More specifically, I created four thematic and comprehensive codes, namely (1) the National Identity, (2) the National Culture, (3) the Nation, and (4) Citizenship. These codes were useful for my research, as their co-occurrence with other codes revealed the textbook description of the national identity, the nation, the national culture and citizenship. I coded the selected texts with 'the national identity', when the text was describing the identity components of 'us', i.e. the nation. Both 2000 and 2012 textbooks preferred to use 'us' as the subject of the sentences where ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological, and behavioral identities of the nation were depicted. 'The national culture' was also another thematic code to draw the boundaries within the national culture, if there were any. In other words, this code helped me understand the hierarchy between different identity communities within the nation. Hence, it was very beneficial for my research as I wanted to manifest the hierarchical structure of the nation. As for the use of the code 'nation', I focused predominantly on texts where the subject is 'us',

irrespective of the emphasis on the identity components. Although I kept track of the subject 'us', I did not blindly coded every such sentence with 'the nation'. I employed this code when I thought that the text was appealing to the homogenous collectivity of the nation in an attempt to turn students into desirable citizens who comply with the ideas, behaviors, and feelings praised in textbooks. Lastly, I utilized the code 'citizenship' when the texts were dealing with the citizenship issue. Nevertheless, in contrast to the other three codes, citizenship was not a major topic of debate. From this, I can conclude that while nation-building and identity-formation are amongst the educational objectives of the state in primary school, that was not much the case for citizenship. For the co-occurrence analysis, I utilized the 'Code Cooccurrence Table' application of Atlas.ti. Similar to the previous method, I filtered the textbooks I used by *year, grade level,* and *courses* in accordance with my purpose to make comparisons between them.

In order to understand the content of 'the national identity', 'the national culture', 'the nation', and 'citizenship', I benefitted from their co-occurrence with other codes. More specifically, focusing on the texts coded with one of the four codes above, I traced with which other codes they are coded at the same time. To have a better grasp of the internal boundaries within the nation, I created the codes below:

Religious Identities	**Desirable Characteristics**	**Nation based on Sharedness**	**Bases of Turkishness**	**Cultures**
Alevism	Individualism	Shared Culture	Ethnic-based Turkishness	Armenian Culture
Christianity	Loyalty to the State	Shared Feelings	Race-based Turkishness	Rum Culture
Islam	Loyalty to the Nation	Shared Language	Land-based Turkishness	Jewish Culture
Judaism	Martyrdom	Shared Ideals	Turkishness (Basis Unclear)	Turkish Culture
Ali	War Veteran	Shared History	Turkishness (+)	Kurdish Culture
Mohammad	Love of the Nation	**National Unity**	Turkishness based on Citizenship	Ottoman Culture
Jesus	Duties & Responsibilities	"Us"	Turkishness based on the Love of the Nation and the Homeland	Western Culture
Moses	Equality	"The Turkish Nation"	**Labels used for Outsiders**	Arab Culture
Non-Muslim	Military Service	Unity	Enemy	Islamic Culture
Places of Worship	Patriotism	Homeland	Collaborator	Western Culture
Worship	Nationalism	The Turkish Flag	Terrorist	
Sunnism	Secularism (*Laiklik*)	The National Anthem	Minority	
Islamic Outfit	Rights & Freedoms	**Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**	Occupier	
Ethnic/Linguistic Identities	Freedom of Religion & Conscience	Savior	External Threat	
Arab	Freedom of Thought	Leader	Internal Threat	
Armenian	Republicanism	Founder	"They"	
Circassian	Westernization			
Kurd(ish)	National Conscience			
Rum	Atatürkism			

Table 2: The code list I used in Atlas.ti.

I would like to make some clarifications about the code list. First of all, those written in bold are not codes, except for 'Mustafa Kemal Atatürk', they are merely titles for categorization I made to make Table 2 more comprehensible by the reader. Second, while coding, I also wanted to get insight about the exact wording of texts with respect to some issues. Accordingly, I used the codes which are written in between quotation marks ("") on Table 2, when I exactly found this wording in quotations. For instance, I utilized the code "Turkish Nation" when I read "Turkish Nation" in textbooks. Third, due to absence of a clear difference between the concepts of *ethnicity* and *race*, the codes of "Ethnic-based Turkishness" and "Race-based Turkishness" must be clarified. Unless there is explicit reference to race (*ırk*), shared genetics or blood, and similarity of physical appearance or essential characteristics inherited due to lineage when defining Turkishness, I coded the quotations with "ethnic-based Turkishness". More specifically, I focused on linguistic and cultural bases of Turkishness which are presented as shared among Turks. In contrast to strong blood-based definition of race, ethnicity is more of a social category. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ethnicity as the following: "The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition"[5]. In other words, an ethnic group is a collection of people with shared culture. Both 2000 and 2012 textbooks connect Turkey to Central Asia due to linguistic and cultural ties resulting from shared ancestry. Although shared ancestry may also have racial connotations, the emphasis on shared language and culture made me code such quotations with "ethnic-based Turkishness". Four, I coded textbooks with "Turkishness (Basis Unclear)", when there was either no basis specified, or ethnic and civic references were mixed. Five, I used "Turkishness (+)" when the Turkish identity is praised by assigning superiority to it. Lastly, secularism was a tricky issue when coding. The only reason for me to use the word "secularism" as a concept as well as a code is

[5] Accessed through http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ethnicity?q=ethnicity.

to assist non-Turkish speakers in reading this thesis. Nevertheless, what I mean by secularism is different from state's retreat from the religious sphere. Rather, the Turkish interpretation of secularism, which is called *laiklik,* is state's involvement in the religious sphere to manage the religious aspect of the national identity (Parla 1992, Toprak 1995, Çağaptay 2006, Altan-Olcay 2007, Altan-Olcay 2009, Barras 2009, Ahmad 2009, Tarhan 2011, Somer 2014). I used secularism with this connotation both as a word and as a code.

The results of the content analysis should be considered by keeping certain differences between 2000 and 2012 textbooks. To start with, in 2012, Life Sciences and social Sciences textbooks are duplicated, one textbook for each semester. However, this is not the case for the compulsory Religion textbooks. Add to that, half of the 2012 textbooks are arranged as workbooks where exercises are given. Hence, these pages are mostly blank for students to fill. Furthermore, the 2012 textbooks reserve fewer places for writing and more places for images per page. Having affected by these changes, the 2012 textbooks are longer than those of 2000. Yet, I do not attempt to explain the lengthening of textbooks exclusively with these changes. Table 3 illustrates the changes in number of pages in textbooks.

Number of Pages	**Life Sciences**	**Social Sciences**	**Religion**
2000	301	162	142
2012	516	341	219

Table 3: The distribution of number of pages across years and courses.

Changing number of pages can affect the results of content analysis. Yet, I would like to remind the strictness of state supervision on textbook content and discourse. That is, even though the difference in number of pages may affect the results of comparison between the pre-JDP and JDP era textbooks in terms of word and code frequencies, repetition is still a deliberate decision shaped by the educational policies of respective governmnets. The impact of changing textbook length is even less in code co-occurrence analysis than frequency analysis, for co-occurrence illustrates the relationship between two codes.

With this software, I was able to detect co-occurrence rates between codes. What is more, the software also helped me in word and code counting. Finding out the presence and/or absence of codes is crucial, because it might be telling about my research topic. The high frequency of some codes or key words can also answer some of the questions I listed above. Content analysis helped me establish associations between different themes and categories, hence it enriched my research. Although numbers were important in illustrating certain points, they were insufficient in others, since they could not elucidate the meaning of texts clearly.

That's why, I also employed discourse analysis to go deeper into the texts and meet the needs of this thesis more completely. By discourse analysis, I did in-depth reading and interpretation of texts. Whereas the content analysis provided me the details on, say, how many times Alevis are mentioned in textbooks and with which codes they co-occured, the discourse analysis spoke for the representation and sustained a deeper analysis on the meaning and implication of the representation. As these two methods complement each other, they supported my research.

Due to the above-stated importance of primary schools, and time restrictions of a master thesis, I confine my focus with the first five years of primary schooling. The time limit also obliges me to analyze three compulsory courses among others: *Life Sciences, Social Sciences,* and *Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge* courses. My main reason to select Life Sciences is its heavy historical content where I can derive conclusions on who 'we – the Turkish nation' and 'they- the internal and external enemies' are depicted in the narratives of the Independence War. The Life Sciences course is taught during the first three years of the primary school. After that, it is replaced with the Social Sciences course in the fourth and fifth years of the elementary level. Like Life Sciences, Social Sciences devotes considerable space for the Independence War, the founding years of the Republic as well as Atatürk's Principles and Reforms. All these topics are rich with insight into idealized identities as well as non-

desirable identity communities. These two courses are particularly helpful to elaborate on the ethnic aspect of the national identity. In addition to these two courses, I also analyze the textbooks of the Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (hereafter *the Religion course*), which is a compulsory course for the fourth and fifth graders. I intend to benefit from this course and its textbooks to understand the religious aspect of the national identity. Although these textbooks are quite relevant to my objective, thus useful for my study, this research can be developed in three ways. First, rather than a select of coursesfrom primary school level, all courses from primary to high school can be included to get more comprehensive results. Also, the changes brought in the JDP era by the 4+4+4 education system[6] deserve closer inspection. For that matter, a more extensive study should analyze the electives that are introduced with the new system. Among these electives, the ones that focus on Islamic knowledge, i.e. *the Life of the Prophet Mohammad*, *the Koran*, and *the Basic Religious Knowledge*, can be quite revealing about the prescribed religious identity during the JDP era. Lastly, the curriculum of the Imam Hatip Schools, which are religious schools where religious staff is trained, can provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of the ideal Turkish identity. Nevertheless, due to time restriction, I assess only the three above-mentioned primary school courses.

In order to find these textbooks, I went to the National Library in Ankara, since each year textbooks are demolished, thus they cannot be found elsewhere. The limited availability of textbooks made me choose the 2000 and 2012 textbooks to compare the pre-JDP and JDP periods. Since the library did not allow me to use the 2013 editions of textbooks, I had to choose 2012 as the most recent version of textbooks published during the JDP era. On the other hand, the 2000 textbooks were the latest textbooks that I could have found available to analyze the textbook content *before* the start of the JDP mandate. Additionally, in order to

[6] I will elaborate on this system in Chapter Three.

better analyze the state perception of nationhood, I tried to choose the textbooks published by the Ministry of National Education (MNE). Nevertheless, despite of my efforts, I was unable to find the MNE edition of every textbook I need. Therefore, I had to use the private publications for a few times. Yet, due to strict state-supervision on textbook content and discourse, irrespective of the publishing houses, all textbooks have to comply with the standards set each year by *Tebliğler Dergisi*[7].

[7] *Tebliğler Dergisi* is the official periodical of the Ministry of Education. It is the Ministry's means of information about the latest developments with respect to rules and regulations within the education system. Accessible through http://tebligler.meb.gov.tr/.

CHAPTER ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

The daily life is full of references to a concept: the Nation. There are different opinions on the creation of nations and nationalisms. Nevertheless, having read the literature, I came to the conclusion that nation does not resemble the pre-modern examples of human collectivities. Moreover, the formation of nations is not a natural process, as it is an outcome of consciously planned decisions to transform various dissimilar communities into a coherent collectivity. That is, nations are modern constructs. One of the most essential institutions which led to the creation of nations is the modern state which is itself a product of modernity. In order to transform masses into nations, the modern state benefits from a variety of tools, modern schooling and school textbooks among them. The formation of nations is a process of *unification* of heterogeneous communities in terms of identity, behavior, opinion and feeling. The intention of unification is related to the modern state's endeavor to increase its ability to control the population under its domain. Accordingly, I argue that the aim to create the artificial unity of nation brings along the formation of a national identity and culture and their imposition on various identity communities. What is more, the unification is carried out through the imposition of a state-prescribed national identity which is dominated by some identities over others. In this nation-building process, modern schooling and textbooks used in them have significant roles in the inculcation of the constructed national identity into masses.

In order to show this chain of arguments, I go through the literature on nations and nationalisms and manifest how modern nations are constructed in Section II. For this, I elaborate on three major paradigms in the literature: Primordialism, Modernism, and Ethno-symbolism. Due to its higher persuasiveness, I adopt a modernist-constructivist approach in

this study and discuss it to demonstrate that allegedly natural bases of nations suggested by nationalists are in fact constructs of the modern age.

In Section III, I focus on the transformative influence of schools and in particular textbooks in the identity-formation of students. Furthermore, I elaborate on the role they play in students' socialization and their adjustment into the society, as they are tools that mold students' identity, perception and behavior. Accordingly, I illustrate how and why textbooks are significant means to identity transformation and unification.

Following this, I manifest the influence of modern schooling and textbooks on some non-Western late nation-building examples in Section IV. I show that a hierarchical understanding of nationhood is presented in their textbooks. Hierarchy within nation is determined in accordance with the compatibility of constitutive identities to the national identity which is constructed on a selection of identities within the population. I have two particular reasons to focus on the non-Western nation-building: (1) The modernist discussion is relatively Western-centered, hence centering more on the early nation-building processes. Therefore, I expand the scope of the literature review to include non-Western nationalisms. (2) Since Turkey is a non-Western example, tracking the impact of modern education and textbooks in the late nation-building cases of the Eastern Hemisphere prepares the ground for a smoother transition to the Turkish case in the next chapter.

All in all, in this chapter I elaborate on the modernness of nations and the role modern schooling and textbooks play in the construction and reproduction of nations through the inculcation of a unified national identity. The assessment of national identity depictions in textbooks is crucial for it reveals the internal hierarchies within the imagined nation. The discussion in this chapter is important for it facilitates the assessment of the Turkish nation-building and identity-formation in the upcoming chapters.

II. THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

A. Primordialism

Primordialism is the earliest paradigm that elaborates on nations and nationalisms. Although it lost much attention in academic circles, primordialism must be covered to understand the roots of nationalist movements and nationalist promises given by political elites to masses. These promises are crucial in understanding the forces that help promote nationalisms and sustain the idea of nationhood. The main logic behind the link between primordialists and nationalists is the congruity of their basic arguments such as the antiquity of nations, and their naturalness. From a similar angle, uncovering primordialist arguments help readers understand Turkish nation-building, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Like the other two paradigms, namely ethno-centricism and modernism, primordialism is home to various theories of nationalism. In that respect, the theories under the primordialist paradigm are not homogenous in their explanations to nation-related questions. Despite this heterogeneity, most, if not all, primordialists compromise on "their belief in the antiquity and naturalness of nations" (Özkırımlı 2000: 64). In other words, nations have always been out there throughout history, waiting to be re-discovered. Primordialists claim that similar to contemporary nations, ancient people lived in communities with in-group attachments. Shils' explanation on the attachment among family members influences primordialists. He asserts that primordial attachments between family members originate from nothing but blood tie, that is, they are given rather than constructed (1957: 142). As a famous primordialist, Clifford Geertz relates this givenness to the ineffable congruities of blood, religion, language, custom and the like (1993: 259). Therefore, similar ethnic origins and cultural traits that one is born into are taken as the roots of primordial attachments amongst prospective members of modern nations. Due to heterogeneity of the primordialist paradigm, Özkırımlı (2000) as well as Smith (1998) and Tilley (1997) categorize the paradigm into three approaches for the purpose

of clarity. I will employ that of Özkırımlı's, who assesses primordialism under naturalist, sociobiological and culturalist approaches (2000: 66-74).

The naturalist approach takes national identities as predetermined and naturally fixed (Ibid.: 66). As Gellner's infamous phrase illustrates, naturalists see a man having nationality as natural as a man having a nose and two ears (Gellner 1983: 6). In other words, one is born into a nation (Smith 1995: 31). What is more, the naturalists argue that people are *naturally* divided into groups forming similar units in terms of ethnicity, and culture and these groups tend to exclude others (Lieven 1997: 12). The naturalist approach is frequently adopted by nationalists emphasizing the antiquity of nations and rejecting the effects of modernity on the advent of nationhood (Özkırımlı 2000: 67). Moreover, they attach superiority to the particular "nation" they address over others (Ibid). A quote from a Turkish nationalist Tekin Alp illustrates this explicitly:

> "If the Turks had not entered Muslim society, the civilization which we call Islamic would not have existed ...It is because the Turks who created this movement were superior to other Muslim peoples from the point of view of culture and civilization" (Kedourie 1971: 221).

The "inferior foreigners" are blamed for periods of recess. Otherwise, the particular nation is depicted as if it is almost always in golden age (Özkırımlı 2000: 67-68).

In contrast to those naturalists, some naturalists accept that pre-modern nations have changed in time, protecting their essential characteristics (Ibid.). Smith coins a term to call such tendencies: "Perennialism" (Smith 1984). According to the perennialists, modernity did not shake the core of pre-modern nation, the nations kept the basic founding structures, i.e. the national essence, intact (Smith 1995: 53). The perennialist approach later became the core of the ethno-symbolist paradigm.

Different from naturalists, *the sociobiological approach* searches the roots of nationhood in the need to cooperate for mutual benefit. Moving from the animal behavior of cooperation in community, this approach claims that humans cooperate to increase their

fitness in the community (Özkırımlı 2000: 70). Calling it *human sociality*, van den Berghe (1978) argues that human sociality is determined by three factors: (1) Ethnic and race sentiments, (2) Reciprocity, and (3) Coercion (Ibid.: 403-409). Similar to animals who behave cooperatively among their kins, humans cooperate with their ethnic and racial fellows (Ibid.: 403). Since physical appearance might be misleading to identify who belongs to the ethnic community, cultural similarities are taken into account. The cultural criteria, like differences of accent, or body adornment, help identify kinsmen to discriminate against outsiders more reliably than physical appearance (Ibid.: 406-407). After designating insiders, group members cooperate reciprocally among themselves. Last determinant of human sociality is coercion, which "is the use of force for one-sided benefit" (Ibid.: 403). For van den Berghe, the function of kin selection is not only detecting outsiders, but also coercing them. Hence, coercion becomes the rule of thumb in inter-ethnic relationships (Ibid.: 409).

Different from naturalists, *culturalist approach* does not support the natural division of people into nations based on *objective* primordial characteristics like blood, language and the like. Rather, they claim that what divide people into nations are the *belief, assumption and/or feeling* of shared primordial characteristics by the individuals themselves (Özkırımlı 2000: 72-74). From a similar angle, Shils pinpoints the human attribution of sacredness to the primordial property (1957: 142). Therefore, culturalists assert that it is not the primordial fact of shared ancestry, culture, language or belief, but rather people's belief in shared primordial characteristics that divides people into nations.

Despite the heterogeneity in itself, the primordialist paradigm in general has been extensively criticized in academic circles. First, recent studies on nationalism contribute to the literature which identifies nations as constructs, thus challenging the primordialist argument of natural givenness of nations (Özkırımlı 2000: 75). These studies illustrate that ethnic identities are dynamic rather than fixed, because they are reproduced and redefined in each

generation according to changing conditions of the time (Ibid.). Second, in contrast to primordialist claims, neither blood nor language nor religion has been sufficient factors to create nations. Contrary to the primordialist argument, there are many ethnic groups with no claim to nationhood (Ibid.: 79). Furthermore, although primordialists argue that nations, i.e. ethnic communities, have always existed throughout history, the reality challenges this claim, since many states are still multiethnic. These critiques target nationalist political elites as well as primordialists who bring forth similar arguments first to construct and then to reproduce and enhance the idea of a *natural nation* uninterrupted through human history. As it will be suggested later in this chapter, modern school is one of the "factories" of the construction and reproduction of nation and nationalism. This assumption begets the need to investigate our second paradigm: Modernism.

B. Modernism

Primordialists are harshly criticized by modernists, who reject the existence of nations in the pre-modern era. Even though modernist paradigm consists of various theories and explanations, some of which are in conflict with each other, all modernists regard "nations as historically formed constructs" (Özkırımlı 2000: 85). In other words, modernists treat nations and nationalism as an invention of modernity[8], which brought along grand economic, social and political transformations following the American and French Revolutions (Ibid.)[9]. More specifically, the changes in the last two centuries like industrialization, capitalism,

[8] Modernist paradigm has been most harshly criticized by ethno-symbolists, who "focused on the role of pre-existing ethnic ties and sentiments in the formation of modern nations" (Özkırımlı 2000: 167). Therefore, rather than perceiving nation as an exclusively modern invention like modernists do, ethno-symbolists linked pre-modern primordial characteristics, ethnicity being the most important of all, to the modern nationhood. As a prominent ethno-symbolist, Smith (1996) criticized modernists ignoring the ongoing significance of earlier myths, memories, symbols and values on many people (Ibid.: 361). In other words, they pointed out the legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities which they claimed to give shape to contemporary nations (Smith 1998: 224 in Özkırımlı 2000: 168). Building on these arguments, Smith rejects Hobsbawm's constructivist idea of *invention of tradition* and calls it as *rediscovery* of ethnic past (Özkırımlı 2000: 122).

[9] Another ethno-symbolist Hutchinson criticizes modernists for exaggerating the role of modernity on nation-making claiming that a better understanding of nationalism should take the pre-modern period as well as the modern period into account (Hutchinson 1994: 24).

urbanization and the formation of the modern state enabled the formation of nations (Smith 1994: 377). Modernists perceive nationalism as the former product of modernity, which in turn creates nations in the modern sense. This argument can be summarized with Hobsbawm's famous phrase: "Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (1992: 10). Modernists can be divided into two major groups with regard to their focus to explain the roots of nationalism. Whereas some focus predominantly on the economic transformations, others base their arguments on the massive socio-political changes in the modern era. The former group of scholars takes the process of economic development at the center of their explanations. The latter, on the other hand, pinpoints the transformative effect of the modern nation-state, a product of modernity itself, in forging nationalism and constructing nations[10]. For that matter, constructivists elaborate on the modern state, as fundamentally different from the pre-modern examples of state, with an aim to transform and shape society in a particular pattern. To present a comprehensive snapshot of the modernist paradigm, I will elucidate both approaches.

1. Economic Approaches in Modernism

The Industrial Revolution accompanied with the introduction of capitalist mode of production resulted in uneven levels of development since the eighteenth century. Whereas some regions showed better performances of development, others lagged behind. The rise of nationalist movements due to decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s elicits neo-Marxist explanations, which primarily focus on the level of economic development. While some scholars stress the economic gap between countries, others dwell on regional gaps within countries to explain the rise of nationalist movements.

[10] Smith, as an ethno-symbolist, argues that "the role of the modern state in the genesis of nationalism should not be exaggerated" (Özkırımlı 2000: 125). As this statement illustrates, Smith underestimates the power of modern state to construct nations out of communities which previously had no national identity.

Those who focus on the unevenness of economic development are heavily influenced by the world dependency theories pioneered by names such as Andre Gunter Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, who provide a picture of world divided into developed and underdeveloped states (Özkırımlı 2000: 89). In a nutshell, these theories accentuate on the division of labor among developed and underdeveloped states in the capitalist mode of production where the former, i.e. *the core* exploits the latter, *the periphery* (Wallerstein 1974). Influenced by the dependency school, Nairn, for instance, asserts that nationalist movements in the underdeveloped world are enflamed by the unevenness of economic development where the core invades, dominates and exploits the underdeveloped periphery (Nairn 1981). The unequal relationship between the poor periphery and the rich core emphasizes the differences between the two making the undeveloped states perceive their exploiters as foreigners and 'others' (Ibid.: 339). The differentiation between 'us' versus 'them' is further ignited by the elites in the periphery, since they see the solution to exploitation in the economic progress initiated by *them*. Hence, the components within the periphery unite against the foreign invader and grow a sort of consciousness of themselves having a different identity than the identity of the dominator (Ibid.: 339-340). The peripheric elites foster an identity-based differentiation between the core and the periphery by emphasizing the distinctness of language, race, folklore and so on (Ibid.). Therefore, the developmental gap and capitalist mode of division of labor between the core and the periphery stir up enhancement of indigenous identities leading to nationalist movements.

This conceptualization of nations and nationalism is heavily criticized on many grounds. A major critique comes within the modernist paradigm on the deficiency of this approach when explaining the *first* examples of nationalism in Europe before the colonial era (Breuilly 1993: 412). Likewise, as an ethno-symbolist, Smith points out the same problem of this approach which falls short of explicating the first nationalist movements in the Western

Europe (1983). What is more, there are other historical cases which do not comply with this approach, since there are some examples where nationalist sentiments grow despite of high levels of development, and other examples where low levels of development do not beget nationalist movements (Orridge 1981: 181-182). In addition, this perspective is also criticized for its implicit primordialist perception of nations and ethnicity, as it does not elaborate on the formation of nations and different components of national identity, despite claiming the modernity of nations (Özkırımlı 2000: 93-94). In other words, while it brings explanation to the reason why the periphery rises against the core, it does not clarify the modern processes that shape identities and reinforce its distinctness from that of foreign exploiter's. Accordingly, due to its deficient explanatory power, this approach is targeted even by the modernists.

Another economic approach takes the unevenness of economic development as an internal problem of states where some groups prosper much more than others creating core and periphery relations in the domestic sphere. Hechter calls this as "internal colonialism" where the core has economic, political and cultural dominance over the periphery (1975: 8-9). The unequal relationship roots in the faster development of one group over others, thus leading to an uneven distribution of economic power. Using its more advantageous position, the advanced group institutionalizes the skewed structure of the system to sustain their privileges solidifying the disadvantages of the other group (Ibid.: 9). The ossification of the uneven distribution of resources and economic power affects the cultural domain, as it helps assign more prestigious social roles to the dominant group leaving subordinate ones to the less advanced groups. Calling this system as "cultural division of labor", Hechter contends that access to some institutions can be practically closed to some communities reinforcing their subordination by the dominant group (Ibid.: 39-40). The chronic disadvantaged position, however, may turn into a shared identity becoming a source of group solidarity. According to

Hechter, if this solidarity is combined with the rise of group awareness of oppression by the dominant group, the disadvantaged feels ostracized due to their cultural and ethnic identity and detaches from the political authority of the dominant group (Ibid.: 43). Consequently, nationalist sentiments arise within the members of the disadvantaged group seeking for independence.

This approach, too, is targeted by heavy criticism. Seeking the roots of nationalism primarily in the relative fall back of the group with regard to level of economic development in the domestic sphere cannot explain some important examples such as the Catalan and Scottish nationalisms, as these two regions were doing quite fine in the economic realm (Özkırımlı 2000: 102). Hechter replies this critique by pinpointing the institutional autonomy of these two communities in their countries (1985: 21-22). More specifically, he asserts that these communities have an advantaged position in certain sectors in the job market reinforcing the cultural division of labor. What is more, neither in the Scottish case, nor in the Catalan were the workers in the 'autonomous' institutions sympathetic to the nationalist movement (Brand 1985: 281-282). A second critique focuses on reducing the whole process of nationalism and nation-building to the economic grievances neglecting the ethnic, religious, linguistic and historical aspects of the feeling of solidarity among group members (Özkırımlı 2000: 103). According to Smith, this approach ignores the influence of the already extant feelings of distinctness based on ethnic identity enflamed by economic disadvantages (1983: xvi). In other words, the internal colonialism approach in the modernist paradigm is criticized for relying too much on the inter-regional economic discrepancy within a state, while neglecting the discussion on the non-economical processes that accelerate the formation of national identities. This lack is criticized and filled to a large extent by other modernists who focus on the social and political transformations that occurred in the modern era.

2. Social and Political Approaches in Modernism

Similar to those who bring economic explanations to the rise of national consciousness, this group of scholars, too, reaches a consensus on the novelty of nations. They support this thesis by focusing on different modern processes which are claimed to transform pre-modern societies and give birth to nations instead[11]. Whereas Gellner (1983) elaborates on the socially transformative effects of the Industrial Revolution, Anderson (2004) traces the influence of print capitalism on the socio-cultural transformation of pre-modern societies into nations. Hroch (1985), too, reserves a special place for language from a different perspective. Brass (1985), on the other hand, searches the roots of nationalism in continuous reconstruction of ethnic identities orchestrated by elites and enhanced by intra-group communication. Lastly, Hobsbawm (1992) analyzes how the allegedly "natural" bases of nations such as ethnicity, religion, language, and culture have been invented by modernity itself. Accordingly, combining their assertions, we can notice that major discussions among constructivists accumulate around four components of identity on which modernity makes massive transformations and enflames national sentiments. These are *culture*, *language*, *ethnicity* and *religion*. What is more, despite their difference of interpretation, modernists pay attention to the role of modern schooling in the formation of national identities.

Gellner advocates the modernity of nations and nationalisms by focusing on the *cultural transformation* ignited in the last two hundred years. Having a Durkheimian and Weberian sense of modernity, he clearly distinguishes modern form of society from previous ones (Özkırımlı 2000: 129). Parallel to this mentality, he dismisses the primordialist perception of nationalism as a natural phenomenon which is assumed to be "the re-emergence

[11] Accepting the transformative power of the modernity on pre-existing ethnic communities, however, ethno-symbolists reject the modernist argument of a sharp break from the past with the advent of modernity. For that matter, "modern forces transform, but never obliterate" the pre-existing ethnic community (in Smithian terminology *ethnic community* translates into *ethnie*) (Smith 1995: 169). In that respect, Smith (1995) maintains that among traditional structures especially ethnicity and religion managed to survive the intense forces of modernity (Ibid.: 40 - 1).

of the atavistic forces of blood or territory" (Ibid.: 129-130). Dividing history into three stages, he traces the formation of nations and nationalism back in the Industrial Age (Gellner 1983: 5). He, like other modernists, underlines the mismatch of modern national borders with those of pre-modern city-states, feudal entities and empires, adding the difference of ethnic origin between pre-modern ruling elites and masses (Gellner 1964: 153).

When elaborating on the modernity of nations, Gellner pays special attention to the relationship between *power and culture* (Gellner 1983, Özkırımlı 2000: 130). Taking shared culture to the center, he argues that in order for nations to be formed, the polity should define a *high culture* and impose it upon society, hence sustaining cultural homogenization of masses (Gellner 1983: 18, *emphasis added*). He maintains that in agrarian societies, in which human history witnessed the first examples of states, the culture of minority ruling elites was deliberately differentiated from that of agrarian masses (Ibid.: 9). The pre-modern state had no intention of encouraging cultural homogenization, since it benefited from the culturally stratified society (Ibid.: 11). In addition to the class-based cultural mismatch, the self-enclosed nature of communities did not allow the rise of a universal mass culture. For the same reasons that prevented the formation of a shared high culture, Gellner gives no chance to the rise of nationalism in agrarian societies (Ibid.: 10). He fiercely maintains that the pre-modern relationship between power and culture has been deeply transformed with the advent of the Industrial Age (Gellner 1983). It was only after that masses started to acquire shared culture and grow a sense of national belonging. According to him, industrialization, for the first time in human history, made perpetual growth and progress not only desirable but also attainable. Industrialization, which introduced mass production with advanced machinery, necessitated a new mode of production in which labor needed not to be specialized. Based on this logic, he earnestly claims that industrialization resulted in a unique division of labor that has never been observed previously (Ibid.: 22).

The breakthrough of nationalism came as a result of the need to create the sufficient labor force congruent with the new mode of production. This necessity paved the way for a radical change in the education system: To serve this purpose, the traditional and specialized education of the pre-modern era was replaced with a generic one in the industrial age. One crucial feature of modern education, as different from the pre-industrial one, was its universality. The universal generic education helped foster a shared culture under control of the polity. As the education system was transformed into a standardized, generic and universal one, so did the society's culture and identity. The universal and generic education produced substitutable individuals, having a sense of solidarity among members of the same society due to shared culture. The standardization of culture also emphasized cultural differences between states. Thus, imposition of a high culture on society made nationalism possible (Ibid.: 57). In other words, for Gellner, God-given nations are nothing but a myth. It is nationalism which constructs nations on invented high cultures and not the other way around (Ibid.: 55). Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that despite of its unnatural and constructed fabric, the selection of the culture-of-power on which to build a national identity was a deliberate choice that necessarily hinted at the community-of-power.

The dominance of one group among others reveals itself also in the linguistic sphere. *Anderson* (2004) reaches this conclusion after a detailed account of (mostly) European history. He starts to build his explanation on the artificial nature of nations and nationalisms by defining them as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind" tracing these artefacts back in the end of the eighteenth century (Ibid.: 4). In other words, similar to Gellner, Anderson claims that these cultural artefacts are the results of dramatic social transformations. Anderson defines nation as "an imagined political community" (Ibid.: 6). He emphasizes the *imagined* nature of nations, because even though most members of a nation do not know each other, they have an image of communion with other members of the nation in their minds. For that

matter, Anderson and Gellner reach a consensus, since the latter, too, defines nationalism as the major source of nations which have no prior existence (Gellner 1964: 169). Moreover, despite of actual inequalities in modern nations, members of nations perceive it as a horizontal comradeship, thus having an illusion of community (Ibid.: 7).

Probing mostly into the European history, Anderson finds the roots of nations and nationalism in the transformation of *language* which, he claims, enables the imagination of nations in the modern age. For that matter, he underscores two unique products peculiar to that age rendering the imagination of nations possible: (1) Printing, and (2) Capitalism. In other words, before the introduction of print capitalism, there were no nations. He argues that the advent of capitalist mode of production, which was in a relentless search of markets for profit, dramatically affected the publishing industry and made publishing houses concerned with reaching as many readers as possible (Febvre and Martin 1976: 394 cited in Anderson 2006: 38). The Latin was not a suitable choice for the publishing industry, since its use was limited to aristocrats. In order to reach masses, they needed a language known to them, which created the need to choose a vernacular over others. The revolutionary influence of vernacularization and its standardization on the rise of national consciousness was supported by two prior developments before the standardization of language with print-capitalism: (1) The Reformation, and (2) Centralization of particular vernaculars, which were used by local communities, for administrative reasons (Anderson 2006: 39-40). Briefly, the Reformation movement ignited a general trend of propaganda for mass readership, as it proved the power of print capitalism when Luther's theses spread so quickly (Ibid.: 289-290). Additionally, the early start of some European monarchies to use local languages for better communication with the locals paved the way for the standardization of some vernaculars even before the sixteenth century. However, there was no intention of systematically imposing a language over local subjects in this attempt. Nevertheless, this practice helped erode the religious

communal ties (established through Latin, the sacred language of the Bible), enabling the imagination of national communities in the upcoming centuries (Ibid.: 42). Altogether, the unsystematic centralization of vernaculars gained considerable momentum with the introduction of print capitalism which prepared the ground for systematic standardization of print-languages in the modern age.

Anderson argues that it was print-languages which created a fertile ground for the rise of *national consciousness* for three reasons: First, for practical reasons, print-capitalism fixed the vernacular, hence enabled the standardization of the language. Second, print-languages helped establish communication among readers of the same vernacular simultaneously creating a feeling of belonging to an imagined community. Third, his chain of arguments brings us to *whose language* was transformed into standard vernaculars, as certain languages were selected for printing leading to the inevitable exclusion of others from the statute of print-language. In other words, the modern era witnessed the establishment of the language-of-power, which signified the dominant communities over others (Ibid.: 44-45). This implies that even though the language-of-power was a construct itself in all cases, it was a vernacularized and standardized version of certain languages that are historically associated with specific ethnic communities. At this juncture, the discussion on *language* coincides with that of *ethnicity*, while a similar correspondence is caught on high culture and dominant ethnic community in Gellner's narrative. That is, modern nation is built on modern reformulations of ethnicity and language. Like Gellner, Anderson, too, sees modern education as an efficient tool of nation-building through standardization and nationalization of language, culture and identity. To show the significance of modern education, Anderson focuses on the systematic vernacularization policies of dynastic empires (Anderson 2006: 86). Such a twist of policy was a political maneuver of the empires which imposed their own *official nationalism*[12]

[12] The term is originally coined by Seton-Watson.

against the raising national consciousness of their subjects (Seton-Watson 1977: 148). As part of this strategy, dynasties introduced policies to make their masses imagine themselves as part of a nation attached to the dynasty. These nationalist policies included rewriting history, making state propaganda, and introducing militarism and *compulsory state-controlled primary education* (Anderson 2006: 101, *emphasis added*). It is crucial to note that official nationalisms were impossible until the introduction of print capitalism which led to popular linguistic-nationalisms (Ibid.: 109). In other words, taking advantage of print-capitalism, European empires perceived primary education as a fundamental key to social engineering. With this in mind, for instance, the Russian Empire made Russian the compulsory language of instruction in state schools in 1887 (Ibid.: 87). Likewise, the Meiji Court promoted universal literacy for adult males (Ibid.: 95). These were conscious decisions taken by states, which were swiftly distancing themselves from the pre-modern state in terms of how it dealt with masses. As it is clarified by now, these dynasties commenced to identify themselves in national terms based the association between language and ethnicity (Ibid.: 97).

Hroch (1985) benefits from a similar logic linking language and ethnicity and putting them at the very foundation of the modern national cultures. The emphasis he puts on the relation between ethnicity and language is even more pronounced than Anderson does. Focusing on the multi-ethnic European empires at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he claims that many non-dominant ethnic groups were under the rule of ethnically-homogeneous ruling elites (Hroch 1985, 1993, 1995). He conceptualizes a three-step formula to describe the path to national movements by non-dominant indigenous groups in multi-ethnic empires. Accordingly, first, a national culture must be founded on the local language used in various spheres of life including education and administration. This phase is the most fundamental yet insufficient one to enflame a national movement, since it facilitates the enforcement of ethno-linguistic and ethno-historical ties. For Hroch, this phase involves scholarly scrutiny into the

local language, history and culture. According to him, if the community has a written language in the pre-modern era, the process of construction of a modern language gets easier. Moreover, existence of a local language fosters communication among group members enforcing in-group ties. It also facilitates the formation of a particular group identity that can later be the basis for a national identity. Likewise, the community's experience with either political autonomy or statehood in the past can simplify the emergence of a national movement, because the activists can have a reference point of shared history to indicate the previous unity of the group (Hroch 1993: 8-9).

In the second phase, Hroch states that the main objective of the community should be cultivating their own educated elites who are qualified enough to take part in the prominent positions in state and society. In many instances, the indigenous community faces troubles in reaching these positions, since they are historically reserved to the dominant ethnic community (Hroch 1993: 11-12). In other words, ethnicity becomes a major factor for limited access to opportunities. The ethnicity-based discrimination may trigger conflict between the dominant and non-dominant groups raising national consciousness among members of the ethnic community. However, not every frustration leads to a national movement. In order to attract mass support for the national movement, Hroch claims, four conditions must be met: (1) The non-dominant group must feel that what they are experiencing under the rule of the dominant group is illegitimate, (2) However limited, the non-dominant group must have some degree of vertical social mobility that enables them to raise their own political and economic elites, (3) The non-dominant community must ensure a significant level of in-group communication which is directly linked to literacy and schooling rates, and (4) The non-dominant group must experience conflict of interests with the dominant ethnic group (Hroch 1993: 12). If these conditions are satisfied, the last phase starts and the non-dominant group initiates a nationalist movement with the intention to form their own nation-state. In this

phase, if successful, the community ensures equal rights accompanied with the achievement of political self-administration to a certain extent (Hroch 1995: 66-67). In brief, Hroch's three-phased scheme tells us how a non-dominant ethnic group in a multi-ethnic state can form a national movement. In this scheme, the roadmap to national state involves the construction of a national identity based on the identification of the ethnic community with a specific language, culture and history. This process involves the construction of ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural ties in the modern era[13].

Another perspective, *Brass*, maintains that ethnic identities and nations are continuously reconstructed through *language*, and *culture* in the hands of the political elites. Brass is clearer about the modernity of nations and nationalism than Hroch, since he explicitly maintains that ethnicity is a social and political construct that is formulated under a centralized modern state. The modernity of ethnicity is related to how he defines an ethnic community: A group of people who is different from others in terms of objective cultural criteria, and who has a lower share of the economic power (Brass 1991: 19, 65). Put differently, an ethnic mobilization can be enflamed by establishing a feeling of cultural unity among group members who explain their lower economic power with regard to their unique identity. Elite role is crucial in establishing this association. Accordingly, he interprets the rise of nationalism as *ethnic transformation* orchestrated by competing elites. More specifically, he states, elites manipulate ethnic identity formation through objective cultural markers they select among many options. The selected cultural markers are reformulated and redefined to mobilize the ethnic group. In other words, ethnic identity formation and transformation are tools to serve the competing elite interests, therefore they are open to constant change (Brass 1979: 40-41). Nonetheless, cultural symbolism is not enough to feed national consciousness

[13] Nevertheless, he is criticized by some modernists, Gellner being one of them, for implying the "revival" of these identities especially in the first phase where activists intend to "re-discover" the forgotten language, history and culture of the community In this respect, his critiques situate him closer to the ethno-symbolist paradigm, which combines primordialism with modernism (Özkırımlı 2000: 163-164). Nevertheless, Hroch rejects these critiques blaming them for misreading his approach.

among group members. In-group communication has a vital role in this respect. Accordingly, standardization of the local language reinforces mass communication by establishing media and schools where the local language is used. Likewise, increasing rates of literacy and schooling in the native language help grow national consciousness. In this way, similar to Anderson, Brass claims that various components of population starts to perceive themselves as part of the same unit irrespective of in-group class differences (Brass 1991: 63).

Hobsbawm (1992), too, emphasizes the artificial nature of nations as modern constructs, accentuating on how modernity and its own products "invent" modern notions of *national language*, *ethnicity*, *religion*, and *tradition* thus creating a sense of national consciousness and belonging to a particular nation-state among masses (Ibid.). He rejects the influence of both objective and subjective criteria alone to create nations prior to modernity. He asserts that the pre-modern objective criteria of human collectivities like language or ethnicity provided no satisfactory criterion for the formation of nations (Hobsbawm 1992: 5). He also declines subjective explanations, which elaborate on the individual or collective *will* to form a nation for he perceives the nation-building process more complex and multi-dimensional than these explanations (Ibid.: 7-8). Confirming Gellner's point of view, he refuses *a priori* existence of nations and stresses the role of modern states to construct national consciousness and nationalism to create nations (Ibid.: 10).

Hobsbawm focuses on the proto-national bonds of ethnicity, language and religion and how they are constructed by social and political processes of the modern age. He, like Anderson, emphasizes the policy of state nationalism which is transmitted through modern state tools. He defines modern state as a unique form of state which *directly* rules over all inhabitants living in a strictly defined territory by imposing identical administrative and institutional mechanisms (Hobsbawm 1992: 80). The modern state has unique ability to establish contact and control over *anyone* in its territory through its agents and complex web

of modern administrative mechanisms (Ibid.: 80-81). Unprecedented regular contact is established between the state and its subjects (or citizens) "through the postman, the policeman or gendarme, and eventually through *the schoolteacher*; through the men employed in the railways, where these were publicly owned; not to mention the garrison of soldiers and the even more widely audible military bands" (Ibid.: 81, *emphasis added*). In addition to these, the new form of state introduces *compulsory primary education* to enhance citizen attachment to the nation (Ibid.). According to Hobsbawm, the construction of a nation required a common language of conduct for the state to reach and directly administer anyone in its territory (Hobsbawm 1992: 59-62).

Similar to Anderson, Hobsbawm points out the localized nature of pre-modern languages and communicability before the introduction of general primary education (Ibid.: 52). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily eliminate the fact that some local communities used to identify themselves with certain languages or dialects in the pre-modern era. However, Hobsbawm notes that the low rates of literacy limited mass communication, hence language could not create national consciousness (Ibid.: 53). For that matter, construction of a national language appears as a fundamental necessity of a modern state to create a nation. This is a multifaceted process which involves the selection of a dialect among many, its homogenization and standardization as the national language. Since the new language is an invention, it has to be learnt by masses and elites alike (Ibid.: 59). For both Hobsbawm and Anderson, *public education* and other administrative mechanisms turn the vernacular into a lingua franca linking the masses and forming nations (Anderson 2006: 39-45 cited in Hobsbawm 1992: 59-62, *emphasis added*). Besides this, mass education facilitates nation-building through curriculum which conducts ideological engineering in the national language. In this way, the state not only standardizes the language of conduct, and establishes

communication among members of the nation-to-be, but also it inculcates a prescribed national identity, hence constructing and reproducing the nation at schools.

In addition to pre-modern conception of language, Hobsbawm (1992) disclaims the role of *kinship* in creating nations before the rise of the modern state. Accepting its advantages in bonding people, he acknowledges a cultural approach to ethnicity than a biological one. He propounds that any population which is identified with a modern polity is neither linguistically nor ethnically homogenous (Ibid.: 63-64). All in all, he comes close to Gellner's approach linking culture to national belonging. To support his thesis, Hobsbawm underscores the rareness of modern national movements that were ignited by strong ethnic sentiments. Put differently, he claims that what united these communities in their demand to nationhood was not ethnicity, it was the constructed *belief in common ancestry* among members of the nation. Correspondingly, he signals a dramatic rupture between pre-modern and modern notions of ethnicity: Whereas it refers to kinship and blood ties in pre-modern times, it denotes the mutual belief in common descent in the modern era (Ibid.: 65).

For Hobsbawm, a modern notion of *religion* is also invented to function as a proto-national bond. Although religion has been a significant tie among fellow-believers throughout history, it is essentially a transnational concept. Even though religion might overlap with ethnicity and form the basis of national identity like the Irish being Catholic, this is a very rare phenomenon (Ibid.: 69). Admitting the religious basis of some separatist movements, Hobsbawm draws a line between the role of religion *before* and *after* the formation of nations. Although communities that joined together to form a nation were religiously heterogeneous, religion is a meaningful component of identity for recent separatist movements, because of the homogenization and standardization policies of nation states on religion (Ibid.: 70).

According to Hobsbawm, the sense of national belonging is no less a modern construct, since the privileged classes of the pre-modern history never identified themselves

with peasantry or other lower classes and vice versa. The pre-national history is abundant with clashes between nobility and peasantry, which are illustrative of the absence of solidarity among people of the same state. The pre-modern masses were utterly disunited and disconnected, since they were divided among disclosed strata (Ibid.: 74-75). The hierarchical structure of the pre-modern society accompanied with the lack of mass communication created an inconvenient setting for the rise of national consciousness illustrating, once again, the modernity of nations.

Social construction of nations operates in various ways, including but not limited to answers given to questions regarding the role of ethnic and religious identities. This is the focus of my research, but it needs to mention that nation-building has always been informed by and informing of other issues such as gender relations, political economic aspirations, and experiences of political conflict. Gender norms and relations have played an important role in constructing the public and private divide in modern nations (Pateman 1988: 4, Grant 1991, Yuval Davis 1997: 2). They have proved pivotal in articulating difference form other nations, especially colonizing powers in the case of post-colonial nation building efforts (Chatterjee 1993, Kadıoğlu 1996). However, feminist scholars claim that women have always been in the public-political domain, hence are part of the national arena (Yuval-Davis 1997: 3). In this respect, the transformation of the woman's national identity has a crucial place with respect to nation-building and modernization processes. This has been also true for the Turkish case, whose claim to building a modern nation-state was symbolized through multiple roles for women (Altan-Olcay 2009) and the uneasy distinction the new state elite tried to construct with the West (Kadıoğlu 1996: 178).

Some recent publications also pinpoint the influence of globalization and neoliberalization on nation construction and reconstruction processes. Billig claims that the social environment constantly reminds citizens of their national identities with daily routines

pumping the nationalist ideology, calling these *banal nationalism* (1995: 38, *emphasis added*). In other words, banal nationalism is embedded in various mechanisms like the public education system, invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992) of national ceremonies, corporate advertising and the like (Billig 1995). Because it is contextually driven, it can be easily said that tenants of neoliberalism can become part of what is expected of desirable citizens (Işın 2002, Altan-Olcay 2011). More specifically, in the post-1980 era, nationalist sentiments are also reproduced in terms of economic performance of citizens.

Nationalist movements can also be rooted in intra-state conflict between rulers and the ruled. This is especially the case in multi-ethnic societies, where ethnicity of the ruler and ethnic distribution of power and resources can create problems of legitimacy (Wimmer 2013). Because modern nation-states are maintained on the basis of distribution of public goods in return for taxation and political loyalty, ethnic groups get motivated for nationalist movements against their states if they are not accorded a fair distribution in resources. Even though this is different from the initial wave of independence wars, it nevertheless contributes to understanding the centrality of ethnicity in the making of national identities.

In the face of such demands for rights or for secession, states' policies and discourses towards ethnic minorities are crucial in their ability to pacify nationalist movements, (Somer 2004, 2005). That is, the public and political discourse as well as state policies can transform the ethnic identities and their level of politicization. In line with this argument, Laitin asserts that people's perception of their own identity is largely transformed in periods of flux, in which there is high level of uncertainty (Laitin 1998). Applying this on the conceptualization of the Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Somer states that Kurdish nationalism is further ignited by heavy-handed state policies (Somer 2004). From a similar angle with Wimmer, Somer, too, pinpoints the uneven distribution of economic resources as a cause of the Kurdish insurgency (Ibid.: 241).

In addition to the economic deprivation of Kurds in Turkey, state policies have had a significant role in politicizing the Kurdish identity to an extent of demanding a separate state of its own. Although the founding years of the Republic were largely marked by cooperation between the Turkish nationalist elites and the Kurdish people based on shared Muslim-Ottoman identity, these relations have changed with the monist and centralist state policies which manifested that Kurdish autonomy and ethno-cultural diversity were not to be allowed by the new state (Ibid.: 240). In this respect, the Sheikh Said Revolt (1925) became a landmark incident after which the state introduced heavy-handed policies to assimilate the Kurdish identity. These policies varied from resettling Kurdish tribes in mainly non-Kurdish regions to harshly suppressing revolts in Ağrı (1930) and Dersim (1938), from Turkifying the names of settlement areas (Nişanyan 2011) to banning the Kurdish language (1980-1991) and many more. These policies accompanied with economic and political disadvantages triggered the Kurdish nationalist movement which led to the formation of the PKK[14] in 1974 as the armed hand of the movement. Hence, the Kurdish secessionists and the Turkish state have got involved in armed struggle since then in an on and off basis. The unresolved nature of the Kurdish Question, armed struggle between the state and the PKK and state's policies against Kurdish nationalism prepare the ground for the transformation of both Kurdish and Turkish identities (Somer 2004, 2005).

In sum, the literature on nations and nationalism brings various explanations to the formation of nations and national identities. Among them, the modernist-constructivist approach elaborates largely on the construction and reproduction of different aspects of national identity. These construction and reproduction processes draw from and shape contextually specific issues among which are ethnicity, religion, gender, political economic

[14] Abbrevation standing for *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, or known as *the Kurdistan Workers' Party* in English.

experiences, and histories of conflict. Yet, in order to present an in-depth assessment, I only focus on the religious and ethnic aspects of the national identity in this thesis.

As these fundamental figures contend, the modernists settle on the issue of the modernity of nations. Altogether, their arguments manifest that heterogeneous pre-modern societies had to be radically transformed by social, political and economic changes brought by modernity to turn into coherent nations. These changes led to a swift shift in the conceptualization of the state which reformulated how it dealt with the people within its borders. Modernity made social engineering both possible and uniquely simple compared to the pre-modern era. Among many unprecedented tools, the modern state introduced modern schooling as a crucial method to construct a standardized identity and foster national consciousness. In this way, disunited and heterogeneous masses were transformed into (relatively) homogenous and unified nations that are more controllable and governable by the state. In other words, nation-building was also a process of identity-building in which modern schooling had and still has a fundamental role in constructing nations. I will now take the discussion to the transformative role of modern schooling and textbooks in the literature.

III. SCHOOLS AND TEXTBOOKS AS REPRODUCERS OF IDENTITY

Among other modern mechanisms, schools and textbooks have significant importance as primary sources of socialization. The most general and crude definition of socialization puts emphasis on the interaction process of individuals with their outside environment which results in the adoption of group values, beliefs and norms by the individual whose identity is shaped during the process (Gecas 2006: 2855). This is a process in which individual internalizes social roles that are deemed suitable for his integration into a community (Brim 1966). During that interaction phase with environment, subject also discovers about himself and acquires certain identities as a member of a social group (Gecas 2006: 2856). The

'environment' discussed above consists of institutions, people and settings that an individual interacts since birth. Subsequent to family, school is the next most fundamental means of socialization (Güvenli et al. 2009: 98). The significance of school as a mechanism of social engineering in the service of the nation-state caught the eye of the eighteenth century intelligentsia (Üstel 2011: 13). Being one of these figures, Louis-René de Caradeux (1763) advocates that the major goal of education should be promoting 'state citizenship' (Aytaç 1998: 183 in Füsun Üstel 2011: 13), thus bringing forth the first clues of national education (Sakaoğlu 2003: 49).

In this effective mechanism, school textbooks assume a crucial role as transmitters of socially acceptable and legitimate norms of behavior and perception (Güvenli et al. 2009: 98, Baştürk 2006: 14, Gümüşoğlu 2008: 39). Likewise, it is argued that the pedagogical work disseminates the values that maximize the interests of the dominant groups (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977: 40-1). Their effects spread in waves from young pupils to society in its entirety. The significance of textbooks originates from five major reasons: Initially, the reading history of most students, if not all, starts off with textbooks. In addition to this, especially in developing countries where reading material is not varied due to either financial or habitual reasons, textbooks may be the only written material that students and their families can reach (Starrett and Doumato 2007: 22, Güvenli et al. 2009: 99). The unmolded nature of young students at the elementary level makes textbooks even more influential on pupils (Starrett and Doumato. 2007: 2). Furthermore, one should not underestimate the attributed legitimacy of textbooks in the eyes of students, teachers and parents, since they are almost exclusively written under governmental inspection and approved by governmental institutions (Güvenli et al. 2009:99). This attributed legitimacy creates a critique-proof layer on the information in textbooks, although it is not necessarily protective enough. Nevertheless, governmental approval encourages confidence in textbook information. Last but not least,

especially in countries where education is compulsory and universal, and where central authority can determine curriculum through educational policies and institutions, textbooks can easily turn into transmitters of national identity by designating and promoting, if not dictating, a prototype of desirable citizenship (Ibid.). Most non-Western late nation-building examples, including Turkey, are characterized with state-controlled national education. Accordingly, with regard to nation-building and identity formation, an assessment of schooling and textbooks in these countries can prepare the ground for the same discussion on Turkey in the next chapter.

IV. NON-WESTERN NATION-BUILDING

A. The Role of Modern Education

Many non-Western instances of nation-building were ignited by colonial powers who had applied modern policies of administration in the mainland and who intended to resort to similar policies in the colonies to make their subjects more unified, homogenous and governable. The introduction of modern schooling was one such attempt. Nevertheless, history tells us that what the colonial powers intended with modern education in the colony was different from their aims in the mainland. Whereas they wanted to create national consciousness in the mainland through modern schooling, they aimed to establish subordination, and domination in the colony. More specifically, they intended to inculcate their own national identity into the colonial subjects and make them obedient to colonial dominance. In this respect, the colonial schooling was also an indirect effort to prevent the colonized subjects to follow the 'European path' to nationalism and construct their own national identity. With these policies, colonizers aimed at soothing prospective rebellions against their authority (Starrett: 1998: 31). However, their endeavors proved largely wrong, as they faced with anti-colonial nationalism. I will manifest the backlash of colonial education

by particularly focusing on the Indian experience under British rule. This section intends to elaborate on two key points about non-Western nationalisms: First, the argument on the modernity of nations is valid for the Western as well as non-Western cases of nationalism. Second, it shows the role modern schooling plays as a tool for crowd control by changing the fabric of pre-modern societies in the non-European world.

In order to control the colony, the colonial state needed a more easily governable population. Having experienced the virtues of modern schooling in turning masses into relatively more homogenous unities, the colonizer introduced modern education in the colonies. The artefact of unity was expected to accompany the feelings of belonging to the colonizer's identity. The colonial education system in Indonesia is illustrative of the crucial effects of schools in establishing a sense of unity. Indonesia is a good example for many reasons: It has a huge population which is ethnolinguistically and religiously varied on a vast geography that consists of almost 3,000 islands (Anderson 2006: 120). Due to these characteristics, most people in different islands neither speak the same language, nor share ethnicity or religion. In contrast, some of Indonesians had similar religious beliefs, share language and/or ethnicity with those in the Malay Peninsula (Ibid.). Nonetheless, after the application of the colonial school-system, despite shared proto-national characteristics, Indonesians perceived those people in the Malay Peninsula as foreigners, whereas they considered those with whom they shared almost no objective criteria as fellow-Indonesians (Ibid.: 120-121). Anderson (2006) explains this dilemma by pinpointing the drastically different form of modern colonial-school system, which applied the same system, used uniform textbooks, and regulated classes and age-groups in an identical pattern throughout the country (Ibid.). Put differently, the education system was centralized, standardized, and strictly uniformed. In contrast to traditional schooling, the new education system was no longer localized, but it was centralized under control of the colonial state. The main purpose

of this education system was to nurture bureaucrats for colonial administration (Ibid.). These standardized schools were dispersed all around the colony, reaching many towns. Hence, all Indonesians were reading the same books and preparing the same homework. What is more, they were *aware* of this territorially shared experience (Ibid.: 122). In other words, they commenced to feel themselves as part of the same whole, similar among themselves, different from the outsiders. The rise of such a group-identification prepared the basis of the later developments of nation-making.

Nonetheless, colonizers not only wished to create the illusion of unity in their colonies, they also wanted to transform indigenous cultures and replace it with the European one. That is, they intended to inject their national identity into the colonial subjects. For this aim, colonizers invested in the virtues of modern schooling. The official English nationalism was an indicator of how nationalist education can be utilized to transform colonized Indians into Englishmen. With that aim in mind, England introduced such a thoroughgoing English education system in India that was intended to create "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect" (Smith 1963: 337–338 and Spear 1949: 163 cited in Anderson 2006: 91). The most striking element in this social engineering project is that British administrators believed that they could construct English identity in the midst of India. This example illustrates how old empires with a new state of mind perceived education as a powerful means to construct nations through nationalist propaganda irrespective of racial, ethnical and historical differences.

The main aim behind inculcation of the colonizer's identity into indigenous people through schooling was to transform them into obedient subjects. In other words, colonizers wished to replace traditional authority structures and consolidate their power in the colonies. To capture not only the present but also the future of these societies, colonizers targeted the youngest members of indigenous societies to mold and control. With these long-term plans,

they paid special attention to primary schools. The following words of a British teacher in Egypt exemplify the mission attributed to modern schooling by the colonizers:

> "The cultivation of the mind bestowed in these elementary schools, opens and expands the faculties of the children, gives them clear notions of the moral and social duties, … forms them to habits of virtue, and habituates them to subordination and control" (Vincent 1989: 76 in Starrett 1998: 33).

According to the quotation , the colonial education system intended to regulate the minds as well as the actions of the colonized. It aimed to make them accept inferiority and foreign domination. Loyalty to the colonial authority was vital for the maintenance of the colonial power, since the entire administrative, social and economic system was designed based on inequalities between subjects and rulers. The colonizers intended to paralyze the poor indigenous majority who might have defied the colonial authority for they suffered most from its racially-biased patterns of the colonial administration. They designed the education system in such a way to raise laborers that respected private property rights, complied with the colonial mode of production and the concomitant drastic inequalities (Starrett 1998). The European colonial powers hoped that as they replaced the old code of conduct with the new, they could construct a modern society loyal to the colonial administration.

As it is self-evident, the goals of colonial education system were far from the European blueprints in the colony (Chatterjee 1993, Starrett 1998). In contrast to the nation-building role modern education played in Europe as part of empires' official nationalist agendas, the colonial powers did not aspire to create national consciousness among their colonial subjects, since such an attempt would be self-destructive. Rather than helping them create their own national identity, they wanted the colonized society feel part of the colonizer's identity hence obey its authority. Nonetheless, it backfired: The colonial education system enflamed anticolonial nationalism and national consciousness in the colonies.

For Chatterjee (1993), the key to anticolonial nationalism lies in the colonial society's differentiation of two domains of sovereignty: the material and the spiritual (Ibid.: 6).

Whereas the society accepted Western superiority and influence in the former, it refused foreign intervention in the latter. This implies that these societies allowed the interference of colonial state to matters of science, technology and the like. Nevertheless, they vehemently rejected such involvement in the cultural domain, which later became their *national culture* (Ibid.). It was the way of preservation of their unique identity faced with intense foreign influence. Nonetheless, the rejection of foreign intervention in the spiritual domain did not imply the refusal of modernization, it was merely a refusal of Westernization in that domain for it was the last purview untouched by the colonizers (Ibid.). It was this instinct of protection that helped raise anticolonial nationalism and national consciousness among colonized societies.

Focusing on the British-dominated India, Chatterjee delves into the spiritual domain. Family and women's position in traditional Indian society have been two of such sacred domains. Despite the fact that familial traditions and women's role in that domain were severely criticized by the colonial administration, Indian nationalists vehemently rejected reform attempts by the colonial state on the critical core of their indigenous identity (Ibid.: 9). Nonetheless, this counter reaction does not imply the absence of reformation and modernization of that domain for nationalists reserved the right to reform the spiritual core of Indian society only to the nation itself. For that matter, family structure and women's role in society were reformed in such a way that they continued to keep the unique 'Indian' core and did not resemble to that of the West (Ibid.). It was this emphasis on 'difference' from the foreigners that prepared the basis of Indian national identity.

Language was another sacred cultural domain of the colonial society that must have been kept away from the influence of foreign intruders. Borrowing from Anderson, Chatterjee affirms the benefits of printing press in constructing and standardizing a modern Bengali language. Although the network of printing press was under control of the colonial state until

the mid-nineteenth century, English-educated Bengali elites soon realized the sanctity of language and the benefits of print-capitalism to help create a national language (Ibid.: 7). For these elites, language was a sacred element that should not be seized by foreigners neither through colonial state nor through European missionaries.

Another such area was education. According to Chatterjee, Bengali elites heavily invested in secondary schools which were kept away from the intruders' touch. Starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, they pursued a 'national' agenda by opening many schools throughout Bengal with a modern curriculum. They created a network of secondary education which helped generalize and standardize the national Bengali language that had been initiated by the virtues of print-capitalism (Ibid.:9). The role given to these schools in protecting the newly-forming national identity was so significant that even the long-established taboo on girls' education was shattering when these institutions were freed from the control of the colonial state and that of the European missionaries, as female education became legitimate (Ray & Gupta 1957). It was in this period when the University of Calcutta, once a colonial institution, was turned into a national university with its funding, curriculum and faculty (Chatterjee 1993: 9).

All in all, the invention of nations in the Eastern Hemisphere followed a different path than Europe due to the uniqueness of context in the colonies. Despite European colonizers' belief and investment in modern schooling, the colonized societies rejected to assume the foreigners' national identity. We can support this argument by investigating the anti-colonialist endeavors of the English-educated Bengali elites, who initiated the construction and standardization of their own national language through print-capitalism and secondary schools. In other words, even though modern schooling in the hands of the colonizers did not achieve to transform pre-modern Indians into Englishmen, it became effective in the hands of the Bengali elite who initiated the formation of a modern Indian culture. The

vernacularization of Sanskrit was achieved through print-capitalism and developed by schooling. Hence, an Indian national identity evolved which allow the imagination of the Indian nation. However, the post-colonial national identity was not an all-inclusive one.

B. Exclusion, Inclusion and Subtle Denial in School Textbooks

The debate on nation-building is necessarily linked to the citizenship issue, since the latter is defined as membership to a nation-state (Brubaker 1990: 380-1). Hammar (1989) brings another aspect into discussion claiming that citizenship is more than a legal status, it is also an *identity* which is associated with the membership to a political community (Ibid.: 81-96, *emphasis added*). More specifically, the modern state is in constant endeavor to mold its citizens first to construct, then to reproduce the nation on a daily basis. As elaborated above in Section II-B, the modern notion of nationhood is based on turning individuals into substitutable members of the nation in terms of identity. For this purpose, it benefits from various social engineering mechanisms brought by the modern age such as public school, army, and prison. In order to turn masses into internally coherent and homogenous unities, the state standardizes a certain formulation of *national identity* and inculcates it through these institutions. Injection of a constructed national identity as a shared identity helps states boost the feeling of belonging to the same nation among different identity communities. Marshall (1965) emphasizes the role of citizenship in integrating various previously ignored groups into a shared identity, hence provide a *source of unity* (Ibid., İçduygu et al. 1999: 190). Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that national identity is constructed by *selecting* some identities over others, transforming and standardizing them. Since the national identity is constructed by dominant elites, the process of identity-formation often ends up with the hegemony of one identity over others within the same nation. Hence, while the national identity draws the boundaries of inclusion into the imagined community, it also leaves those

who do not fit into the prescribed national identity outside, despite of their ownership of citizenship. Accordingly, those who reject to internalize the national identity or cannot adopt it for another reason may face with either implicit or explicit exclusion from the desirable community of citizens. This is a major problem for nation-states, since they often incorporate various ethnic, cultural, and religious identity communities many of whom have problems of adapting to a shared identity (Ibid.).

As elaborated above, one of the tools to assimilate heterogeneous identities into the national identity is state controlled education. Among other means of social engineering within education, school textbooks have a crucial place, since they can present the desirable identity and promote it to students as the norm. Accordingly, the tenets of desirable citizenship may be drawn from an exhaustive analysis of textbooks, since the content and discourse is under either direct or indirect state control. When assessing the significance of textbooks in social engineering, it is important to keep in mind that especially in the developing countries state-authorized school textbooks may be the only books to which students are exposed (Starrett and Doumato 2007: 22). What is more, pupils, particularly those in the elementary level, are so unformed that they can be influenced with great ease by curriculum content (Ibid.: 2). Therefore, textbooks have a substantial place in determining national identity and transforming citizens in line with it. Nonetheless, it must be underlined that the codes of desirable citizenship are, in most cases, not fixed, since changing contexts affect states' envision of national identity. Furthermore, although curriculum is under state control, especially in multi-party electoral democracies it is elected governments in which state power is heavily embedded. Therefore, in such democracies the power to control textbook and curriculum content is in the hands of governments. This implies that as government changes, there may be changes in textbook content which indicates the characteristics of desirable citizens.

Despite possible changes in its pattern, the content and discourse of textbooks is revealing about the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the nation. In other words, textbooks can tell us who conforms to the national identity and who does not. This implies that state-controlled education system implicitly or explicitly promotes conformity and disfavors unconformity to the national identity thus drawing inner boundaries of acceptable "us" and undesirable "others" among legally equal citizens (Starrett and Doumato 2007: 9-10). Every nation has its allegedly deviant members that do not comply with the national identity due to multiplicity of identity groups in society. Textbooks generally use the following methods either to marginalize unfitting identities to varying degrees: (1) They may *explicitly target* certain identity groups labeling them as "the enemies of the nation" and/or "outsiders", (2) they may *keep silent* about their existence within society, thus subtly deny them, and (3) they may present an *obscure image* of some identities which are sometimes accepted into and at other times rejected from the national community. More specifically, the first method that openly targets particular identities as "the other" leaves almost no chance for their inclusion into the nation. The second method, i.e. silence, may denote the state's intention to *assimilate* the unmentioned identities. The last method, on the other hand, may leave *some space* for the inclusion of these identity groups by presenting an obscure image about their position in the nation. Despite differences between three methods, they all manifest that incompatible identities are undesirable from the perspective of state. Hence, textbooks do not recognize incompatible identities as they do the idealized national identity. Accordingly, these identities are either explicitly or implicitly excluded from students' imagination of nation. In other words, the nation is imaginarily reproduced by attaching unfitting identities to an inferior position within a hierarchically-organized perception of nationhood. What is more, the unfitting identities may have their own hierarchy where some are given a less subordinate position than others. The hierarchy between undesirable identities

reveal itself in textbooks where these identities are presented by three methods described above. To have a better grasp of representations in textbooks, and to prepare the ground for the textbook depictions of Turkishness in the following chapters, it is helpful to examine some examples from non-Western late nation-state examples.

As a national education policy on curriculum, some states prefer to clarify whose identity is acceptable and whose not by explicitly ostracizing "outsiders". Colonial India in the nineteenth century is one such example of downright exclusion of certain identities from the ideal domain. The ostracism of a newly-forming national identity found place in history textbooks written in the nineteenth century by English-educated Bengali historians who rejected the European narrative. The process of writing of national history unsurprisingly involved construction of a glorious past that puts the blame of demise on "outsiders" (Chaterjee 1993: 97). This pattern was similar in all nationalist accounts, be it European or non-European. One of the most widely-read of these textbooks which was written by Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay (1878) makes a clear differentiation between "us" and "them". Referring to the ancient glorious past of India, he underscores the existence of two distinct communities in India: the civilized Hindus and the non-Hindu communities who are depicted as ignorant and uncivilized foreigners (Ibid.: 96).

Similar to other nationalist accounts of history, the ancient Indian history is depicted as heroic and highly civilized in Tarinacharan's textbook. The reason of the Indian demise is described as the intervention of "foreigners": the non-Hindus, or more specifically Muslims, and Europeans, two invaders in the Indian history. Like the era of British-domination, the Muslim period is also delineated as "the night of medieval darkness" (Ibid.: 102). In these historical accounts, Muslims' description is in complete concord with Orientalist accounts, as they are depicted as cruel, bigoted, immoral, and belligerent (Ibid.). Therefore, in their rejection of the Muslim and Western past, Indian history books glorify a Hindu past, thus

history becomes a fundamental source of nationhood. Whereas Christianity and Islam are perceived as outside forces, Hinduism is depicted as internal. This exclusionary narrative went unchallenged until the beginning of the twentieth century (Ibid.: 109-110).

The newly-emerging national consciousness was reinforced by national history textbooks with pejorative content and discourse about non-Hindu identities in the country. The Indian national identity depicted in these textbooks clearly stigmatized them, Muslim and Western/Christian identities among them. As a consequence of this process in which national education had a central role, Indian students were made imagine an Indian nation which excluded Muslims and European/Christians irrespective of their citizenship ownership. Although each nation has its own particular story of nation-building, the Indian case exemplifies explicit marginalization of certain identities from the imagined nation in textbooks.

Having both similarities to and differences from the Indian case, the Iranian curriculum uses all three methods for constructing hierarchy for different identity groups. To start with, Iranian textbooks present a dichotomous world divided between "us-the good" and "them-the evil". The Iranian identity is depicted exclusively as Muslim and those who are not Muslim are defined as "the opposites" of Muslims who are labeled as infidel and impure (Mehran 2007: 63). Therefore, non-Muslim identities are explicitly attached to a hostile image, thus overtly excluding them from the imagined nation.

Notwithstanding, "the opposite" of Muslim is also a vague definition for it is not a monolithic group. Based on the content of Iranian textbooks, "the opposite of Muslim" category can be sub-divided into two groups: (1) One group consists of Christianity and Judaism, which are, together with Islam, called as the Three Divine Religions, and (2) another group where other religions and beliefs outside of these three religions, such as Zoroastrianism, are accumulated. Accordingly, Christianity and Judaism are simultaneously

demonized and accepted in textbooks, thus presenting an obscure image. While they are demonized when they are categorized as infidel and impure "opposites of Muslim identity", they are accepted when textbooks portray them as two of the divine religions which preach belief in the same God with Islam (Ibid.). Therefore, textbooks present a controversial image of Christian and Jewish identities. Since this is not outright exclusion, it leaves some space for their inclusion. Nevertheless, it is not a complete inclusion, either, because textbooks also make a clear distinction between "the Muslim-us" and "non-Muslim-others" by attaching superiority to the Muslim identity and concomitant inferiority to the non-Muslim.

The condition of "non-divine" non-Muslims is different from "divine" non-Muslims. Although Zoroastrian identity is officially recognized by the Iranian state, their prophet is not mentioned in the religion textbooks designed for Iranian pupils (Ibid.: 64). In that respect, we can claim that Zoroastrian identity is subtly denied through silence from the accepted form of national identity. Silence can be a signal for the lower standing of Zoroastrian belief in textbooks compared to Christian and Jewish beliefs. Or it may signify the Iranian state's intention to assimilate the Zoroastrian identity into the Muslim identity. Although I do not have sufficient backing for the assimilation argument, I can argue that Iranian state is implicitly denying the Zoroastrian identity through textbooks where it is never mentioned. In other words, whereas the top of the hierarchy within nationhood is reserved for the Muslim identity[15], Christians and Jews are assigned to a lower position, and finally non-divine beliefs such as Zoroastrianism is given the lowest place.

In addition to the obscure representation of non-Muslims and silence on the Zoraastrians, Iranian textbooks emphasize some other identities as hostile to the Iranian nation more explicitly. Foreigners, enemies of Islam, infidels, colonialists, capitalists, servants of foreigners, Marxists, Freudists, Westerners and US imperialism are overtly presented as

[15] According to Mehran (2007), Iranian textbooks do not use a deragotary language for Sunnism, although the regime identifies itself with the Shi'a belief.

hostile and dangerous to the nation (Ibid.: 64-67). Even though their enmity is clear in textbooks, these categories are not devoid of vagueness depending on how textbooks define these identities. For instance, "enemies of Islam" is an unclear identity, since it may include Christians who are presented as believers in the same God with Muslims. Similar problems can be detected in all these allegedly clear enemies of the nation, since the listed identities are not mutually exclusive. The above-stated enemies of the Iranian nation also tell that the nation has both internal and external enemies. This claim reinforces suspicion among citizens on certain identity groups within the Iranian nation. Altogether, while openly antagonized identities are excluded from the imagined nation in textbooks, those whose images are left controversial may or may not be included into the nation. Nevertheless, their obscure representation overshadows these identities and may prevent their complete inclusion into the political community. The general tendency of Iranian textbooks to define the world in a dichotomy between "the good – we" and "the bad – others" further risks the inclusion of both explicitly and implicitly distanced identities into the nation. In this way, the Iranian nation is reproduced in a hierarchical structure.

The Palestinian example is a similar but a milder one. The textbooks prepared after the foundation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the post-Oslo process are explicit in the differentiation between "self" and "other", although it is not consistent. These textbooks make a fundamental categorization of identity: "Palestinians" and "non-Palestinian others" comprising of Western outsiders and Israelis (Nathan Brown 2007: 128). The contrast between Palestinians and others are sometimes quite distinctive and even antagonistic. These contrasts vary from physical to traditional and behavioral differences. Whereas Israelis are frequently depicted as soldiers, sometimes to the degree that they are responsible from the demolition of Palestinian properties, Westerners are pictured with clear physical differences like punks that are inappropriate for the Arab culture (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the depictions are

not exclusively negative, there are neutral or even positive ones as well. Even there, Israelis and Westerners are distinguished by their outfits and appearances that are different from Palestinians. Although these textbooks emphasize the otherness of these identities, they also take a tolerant approach to differences of religion, dressing and the like. However, even in these depictions, they condemn Israeli and European imperialism by illustrating them as occupiers and enemies (Ibid.: 130). This exclusionist approach is balanced to a degree by textbooks' emphasis on tolerance in Islam. As it is apparent, the post-Oslo Palestinian textbooks have not yet reached a consensus on how to depict "others". Nonetheless, there is still a dominant tendency to delineate them as different from the Palestinian identity. What is more, since their identity is often depicted as negatively and inappropriate for the Palestinian people, their identities are not quite welcomed. Therefore, pupils are motivated to develop the described Palestinian identity in terms of religion, customs and behavior and are estranged from imitating the Israeli and Western identities and cultures. In other words, although Israeli and Western identities are not completely antagonized, they are not fully appreciated, either. Accordingly, the Palestinian national identity does not involve the Israeli and Western/Christian identities attaching them "otherness" in the eyes of students, despite few references to tolerance on difference.

To sum up, textbooks construct national unity over national identity which is dominated by particular identities over others. This selective process involves different degrees of homogenization into the national identity. State-controlled national curriculum and textbooks provide a map illustrating to what extent state appreciates certain identities in terms of their harmony with the accepted national identity. Textbooks use one of the three methods for constructing hierarchy discussed above, when delineating identities that are incompatible with the national identity.

V. CONCLUSION

Nations are constructed by modern mechanisms of transformation. One of these mechanisms is modern schooling. Among many means to transform students, textbooks have a special place, since they can convey the state-prescribed national identity. More specifically, textbooks reflect the selective nature of national identity which prioritizes some identities over others, despite the fact that these unfitting identities are embraced by certain communities within the nation. Accordingly, textbooks use three methods of hierarchy for undesirable identities. They sometimes use an explicitly targeting language against the unfitting identities and leave no chance for the inclusion of groups associated with them. Textbooks may also choose to completely ignore the existence of an identity community in the country and skip it unmentioned. The silence method is a way to tacitly deny the presence of this identity among citizens. Such an attempt may signify the state's intention to assimilate this identity into the national identity. Nevertheless, proving assimilationist inclinations through textbooks need further evidence than their absence in textbooks. Among others, a known history of assimilation policy against this identity community can buttress the intention of assimilation by silence in textbooks. As a last method, textbooks may give contradictory or ambivalent messages about some identity groups. Whereas they are sometimes portrayed positively or neutrally, at other times they may be pictured as hostile to the nation. The method of obscurity sketches an ambiguous position blurring their image for students. In other words, the obscure textbook depictions do not give a clear message whether to imagine the nation with or without them. Nonetheless, their ambiguous portrayals overshadow their belonging to the nation and assign them an indecisive yet subordinate position compared to those who comply with the national identity. In this way, this method, too, enhances a hierarchical imagination of nationhood, irrespective of equal citizenship on paper.

CHAPTER TWO

I. INTRODUCTION

The nation-making is a process of transformation of the individual to imagine himself as a member of a national unity. In this transformative process, schooling has a major role, for it reproduces the national identity designed by the dominant elite group to sustain the growing state control in the modern era. The transformative tools of schooling are multiple. Among many others, textbooks are fundamental means for states to prescribe a desirable citizenship template and reproduce a national identity that sustains the envision of the nationhood. In this respect, textbooks reveal a great deal about the state perception of nationhood and citizenship. Especially in countries like Turkey, where textbooks are under strict state supervision, textbook analysis expands our horizons in determining the identity components of desirable citizenship. As a consequence of my research on the representation of the ideal Turk in textbooks, I came to the conclusion that there is an incongruity between the portrayals of *Turkish citizenship* and *Turkishness*. That is, the Turkish nation is a collection of Turkish citizens.However, not every Turkish citizen has an equal position within the imagined nation, since the textbook representation of the Turkish nation consists of internal boundaries of hierarchical sort where some identities are magnified over others. More specifically, textbooks reserve the top of the hierarchy within the nation to 'the Turk' who fits into the constructed national identity, rendering 'Turkishness' an exclusive club within reach of only *some* of the citizens, which I call the 'ideal/desirable citizens'. Based on this conceptualization of Turkishness, textbooks inculcate the identity of 'the ideal Turk' over all citizens. In other words, *the unity* of nation is constructed on *the homogeneity* of citizens' identity. The homogeneity is produced through the imposition of the state-prescribed national identity which prioritizes certain identities within nation over others. As there are multiple

identities in Turkey, such a homogeneity-centered conceptualization of nation is necessarily exclusionary and the only way to refrain from exclusion is assimilation into the state-tailored Turkishness.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to identify Turkishness as a static identity, since it has transformed from the foundation to this day. Hence, I divide the history of modern Turkey into four periods to keep track of changes in time: (1) The Single Party Period (1923 – 1946), (2) The Multiparty Period (1946 – 1980), (3) The Post-1980 Period (1980 – 2002), and (4) The JDP Period (2002 – onwards). I will devote the current chapter to the discussion of the first three, leaving the JDP period for the next two chapters.

The single party period, or renown as the Republican era, has founded the backbone of the state perception of Turkishness and drawn exclusionary boundaries within the imagined nation. Despite changes in time, the pillars of Turkishness determined in this era are preserved to a large extent and its influence is felt deeply in the subsequent periods. The textbooks of this period take *ethnicity* and *religion* to the center in determining the boundaries of ideal citizenship, a decision that is replicated since then. The textbook envision of nationhood is based on ethno-racial and ethno-linguistic Turkishness accompanied with strong secular identification in this era. Nevertheless, this depiction is laden with ambiguities, thus giving contradictory messages.

In the multiparty period, the resonance of the Republican era is deeply felt, albeit minor liberalization. In the latter half of the period, limited change is observed due to the democratic atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution, which emphasizes equality, human rights and democracy both in theory and practice. However, strong references to ethno-linguistic Turkishness preserve the blurred identity boundaries of ideal citizenship. Religious aspect of national identity in textbooks, too, is sustained, although political and military elites moderate their take on religion.

The post-1980 period brings a sharp rupture with the past as it constructs the unity of the nation on three pillars, one being religion. This era is a breakaway from the limited liberalization of the 1960s, as it accentuates on the subservience of the individual to the state. The post-1980 education policies intend to reproduce organicness of the nation on three axes: (1) Ethno-linguistic Turkishness, (2) Sunni-Islam, and (3) the fear of internal and external enemies. These three pillars further contract the exclusivist nature of Turkishness, assigning non-Turkish and non-Sunni identities to a lower position within the nation.

This literature review intends to understand the formation of the Turkish nation since 1923 by mapping the changing exclusionary boundaries within the nation across three major periods. The discussion of the pre-JDP period also prepares a solid ground to analyze the *changes* and *continuities* that come along with the JDP governments in terms of the textbook depiction of who the Turk is and who are 'the internal others' of the nation. In other words, I will contribute to the literature on Turkish nationhood by demonstrating the most recent state of internal boundaries that hierarchically arrange the nation from the perspective of the state.

II. BUILDING A NATION AT SCHOOL: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE IDEAL TURK IN TEXTBOOKS

A. The Single Party Period (1923 – 1946)

1. The Role of Schooling in Turkish Nation-Building

The school has been a central institution for the Republican elites who intended to accomplish a nation-building project. More explicitly, the founding elites regarded schools as crucial institutions where individuals were socialized and integrated into a newly-crafted society whose norms and values were internalized by the youth (Üstel 2011: 127). The role of schools in constructing a Turkish nation went as *a process of unification* of various identity components of a multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious society and *their*

homogenization into a brand new national identity, which was simultaneously constructed by the Republican elites. In this project, school not only helped the student imagine a collective political unity, it also helped him imagine who belonged to it and who did not, since they drew the boundaries within nation.

The modern Turkish education system, which aimed at constructing a unified and homogeneous nation, was primarily affected by the ideas of a prominent sociologist: Ziya Gökalp. Influenced by the works of Emile Durkheim, Gökalp had deep belief in the power of nurture (e.g. schooling and culture) in determining the level of civilization an individual attained (Kaplan 2006: 39). Furthermore, he was a firm supporter of *unity* in knowledge for he established direct causality between unity in education and unity in civilization (Ibid: 40). By the same token, he found the origins of political and economic decline of the Ottoman Empire in incompatible forms of knowledge produced by the multiplicity within the Ottoman education system (Ibid.). Gökalp's ideas on unity in education and its effects on raising a coherent nation were firmly embraced by the Republican elites including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who later preached to teachers to turn the nation into a "monolithic block of steel" (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1989: 118).

The new modern state of Turkey was cognizant of the capabilities of schooling as an ideological state apparatus to transform both the perception and behaviors of individuals under elite control (Althusser 2003). The new elites benefitted from schools in unifying heterogeneous components of society in opinion, feeling, behavior, and identity thus made the population more vulnerable to mass management and transformation from the center (Üstel 2011: 127). Observing the Republican endeavors for unity and homogeneity in many occasions including the educational programs, we can clearly argue that the modernity's desire for homogeneity (Bauman 1991:1) was eagerly embraced by the elites of the time. In order to turn the heterogeneous society into a unity with substitutable members, i.e. into *a*

modern nation, the decision-makers constructed and then transmitted a new national culture and national identity through schooling.

The significance of schooling from the state perspective can also be read from the sharp increase in the number of schools and students. In that respect, the most dramatic increase was observed in primary schooling: Whereas there were 4,894 primary schools and 341,941 students in 1923 – 1924, the number climbed up to 6,713 primary schools and 523,611 students in 1931 – 1932 (Üstel 2011: 128). The jump in primary schooling was so impressive that the single party period might be even called as "the Primary School era" due to the essential role it played as a nation-building apparatus by the Republican elites (Kafadar 1997: 149).

The intention of Republicans for unification in feeling, opinion, behavior, and identity through schooling (Sakaoğlu 1992: 23) revealed itself first with the enactment of the Law of Unification of Instruction (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*), which brought all schools in the country under control of the Ministry of Education (*Maarif Vekaleti*) in 1924 (Kaplan 1999: 159, Üstel 2011: 128). With this aim in mind, a list of mandatory courses have been added to the curriculum such as Turkish, Civics (*Malumat-ı Vataniye*), Turkish History and Turkish Geography, whereas Religion courses were abolished in every school including minority and foreign schools in Turkey (Kaplan 1999: 160). In addition to the unification aspect of the Law, it must be noted that the above-listed courses, by content, worked to accelerate the nation-making process, since they imposed one language, one Homeland with fixed borders, one narration of common history and one type of citizen.

An indepth reading of the educational programs of the time is telling about the Rebuplican imagination of the nation, homeland and citizen prescribed by the state[16]. More specifically, an analysis of these programs clearly certifies that the subject the education

[16] The textbook representation of the nation and homeland will be assessed in the following section.

system intends to create in student is *citizen*. For instance, the first Primary School Program (1926) sets the construction of 'good citizens' as a fundamental goal (Kafadar 1997: 158). The nature of the 'good citizen' reveals itself in the Program:

> "The purpose of primary schooling is raising *citizens* and integrating the youngsters into the homeland and nation to which they are a part of" (T.C. Maarif Vekaleti[17] 1930: 78, *emphasis added*).

The 1936 Primary School Program, too, reveals the purpose of cultivating citizens with certain characteristics in many occasions. The first among the goals of the Program is very explicit in that respect:

> "Raising children enrolled in primary schools as *citizens* who are strongly republican, nationalist, statist, secular, revolutionist and who assumes the duty of injecting ideas that show high respect to the Turkish nation, the National Assembly, (and) the Turkish State into all *citizens*"[18] (Cicioğlu 1985: 81, *emphasis added*).

The intention to create Turkish citizens with national education also reveals itself in a speech of Esat Bey, the Minister of Education, in 1931:

> "The Turkish school have to turn each Turkish children that are entrusted to itself into *Turkish citizens* who have complete grasp of the psychology and ideology of the Republic with utmost usefulness for the Turkish nation and the Turkish Republic" (Yücel 1994: 364, *emphasis added*).

As a major characteristic of the era, the main purpose of the national education system was beyond teaching. It was about the internalization and indoctrination of an idealized Turkish identity by *conditioning* (Üstel 2011: 132). In other words, during the single party period, the founding elites depended on school as an institution where the students with various cultural, religious or ethno-linguistic orientations were crafted into citizens who imagined themselves as identical components of an organic and homogeneous unity: the Turkish nation.

[17] *The Ministry of Education.*
[18] For now, I only intend to illustrate the state's purpose of constructing *citizens* by schooling. I will analyze the characteristics of the prescribed Turkish citizen in subsequent sections.

2. Turkish Citizenship in Legal Documents

The school curriculum and textbook content are crucial means to understand the identity components of ideal citizenship constructed at school. Nevertheless, an evaluation without reference to the founding legal documents where Turkish citizenship was defined would be incomplete. In that sense, constitutional definitions of citizenship help us perceive who a Turk is. In addition to the Constitution of 1924, the Lausanne Treaty (1923) and the Settlement Law of 1934 hint at the Republican sense of citizenship. Based on the critique of legal definitions of Turkish citizenship, I intend to improve my comprehension on ideal citizens and accordingly build my analysis on textbook representation of nationhood and citizenship during the single party period in the next section.

In order to make a healthy analysis of the Turkish citizenship, it is essential to have a glance at the literature on citizenship models. Most of the academic discussion on citizenship goes around the two major citizenship models offered by Rogers Brubaker. According to him, the historical paths to nationhood are decisive in the type of citizenship in nation-states (Brubaker 1990). Based on this logic, there are two major models: the French and the German model. The French model of nationhood is "universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centered" (Ibid.: 386). The French nationhood was established not on shared culture, but on political unity (Yeğen 2004: 54). The political unity of the French nation comes from shared territory (Brubaker 1990: 379). Therefore, French citizenship is based on neither blood nor culture, rather it is territorial (*jus soli*). In contrast to the French model, the German model of nationhood is founded on ethno-cultural unity. For this reason, it is "particularistic, organic, differentialist, and volk-centred" (Ibid.: 386). Hence, the German nation is a community of descent (Ibid.: 379). Due to the emphasis on shared blood, it is restrictive as opposed to universalistic and territorial French model.

The literature on Turkish nationhood is divided into two groups: Whereas the first group argues that Turkish citizenship is universalist and territorial (Soyarık 1998, Tanör 1998, Kirişçi 2000), for another group, it cannot be completely identified with either of the models (Kadıoğlu 1996, Yeğen 2004, Kancı 2009, Keyman and Kancı 2011). According to the first group, the Turkish citizenship underscores not ethnicity but territoriality (Kirişçi 2000: 1). Tanör (1998) brings forth a similar approach contending that legal documents define Turkishness on "geographical and political parameters rather than racial parameters" (Tanör: 309-310). Based on these claims, they advocate that Turkish citizenship is defined according to the French model of nationhood (Soyarık 1998: 83). Notwithstanding, the second group asserts that digging the constitutional documents illustrates that the Turkish citizenship regime contains similarities to both models. Put differently, while Turkishness is defined as an ethno-centric phenomenon at some occasions, sometimes a more civic-political approach is adopted (Kadıoğlu 1996, 2007; Kancı 2009; Keyman and Kancı 2011). However, close inspection on legal texts reveals the ethnic character of the ideal Turkish citizens in this era. In other words, the Republican sense of Turkish citizenship was not tantamount to Turkishness, for Turkishness had ethnic connotations.

The definition of Turkish citizenship in the first constitution of the Republic was a significant denominator of ethnic references to Turkishness. A comparison between the citizenship definition of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) and 1924 Republican Constitution is helpful in that respect. The article on citizenship in the 1876 Constitution is quoted below:

> "Whatever religion or sect they are from all individuals subject to the Ottoman State, without exception, would be called Ottoman" (Kili and Gözübüyük 2000: 44).

This translates into a state of equality between *Ottoman citizenship* and *Ottomanness* in the eyes of the state. Nevertheless, the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution diverts from this definition:

> "The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be called Turkish" (Gözübüyük and Sezgin 1957: 441).

Despite recognizing ethnic and religious multiplicity of the population, this article calls ethnic and/or religious 'others' of the country only as *Turkish citizens* rather than *Turks*. Thus, it implicitly produces a hierarchy among Turkish citizens and place ethnic Turks at the top of the pyramid.

The Settlement Law of 1934, which ordered the settlement of nomadic and mostly Kurdish tribes among Turks, is telltale about the desirability of ethnic Turkishness among citizens, too (Yeğen 2004: 57). As a clear Turkification policy, the Law is enacted to transform the ethno-cultural composition of the population. Nonetheless, the Law also demonstrates regime's affirmative belief in the possibility of assimilation of ethno-linguistically different communities into Turkishness, which was conceptualized as Turkish culture (Ibid.). However, this does not change the Republican elites' emphasis on the superiority of ethnic Turkishness. Taken from the Justification text of the Law, the quotation well illustrates this perception:

> "The Turkish Republic could not allow these people to *exploit* the facilities of being Turkish citizens without devotion to the Turkish flag. This law has therefore shown the means to assimilate *these kinds of people* into Turkish culture… The Turkishness of everyone who claims to be Turkish must be firm and certain for the state" (Grand National Assembly, 1934: 8 in Yeğen 2004: 57, *emphases added*).

This passage clearly manifests the subordinate status of ethnically non-Turkish citizens in the eyes of the law-makers of the time. The piece also proves the hierarchical differentiation of ethno-cultural Turkishness from Turkish citizenship.

It must be noted that there was another type of gradation between Muslims and non-Muslims for Turkishness was open only to the former (Ibid.). In these circumstances, non-Muslims were not expected to get assimilated into Turkishness. In other words, they were not 'capable' of attaining the desirable Turkish identity from the state perspective. This logic illuminates the hierarchical structure of the Turkish nation, in which non-Muslims were

assigned to lower ranks, despite of their equal citizenship status with Muslims on paper. With regard to this, the legacy of the Ottoman *millet system*[19] in the Republican perception of Turkishness explicitly reveals itself in the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which paves the way for population exchange between Greece and Turkey, where Muslims, irrespective of ethno-linguistic roots, are accepted in exchange of Orthodox Christians. Thus, Muslimhood was key to assimilation into Turkishness, albeit strict secular character of the regime (Ibid.: 58).

All in all, the Republican national identity has clearly ethnic references in mind when defining Turkishness. Together with the civic elements of citizenship as elaborated above, ethnic connotations in legal definition of Turkish citizenship exhibit an ambiguous picture of Turkishness which automatically implies the 'blurred boundaries' of inclusion into the political community (Bauböck 1998). Whereas the legal documents implicitly or explicitly touch upon the ethnic aspect of Turkish citizenship, in other occasions it is elaborated with civic connotations and emphasis on shared territory. The haziness of definition of citizenship in legal documents of the time finds correspondence in school textbooks. Hence, textbooks become transmitters of an ambiguous understanding of who a Turk is.

3. Imagining the Self and the Other in Textbooks

a. Constructing the "Community of Citizens" on the Depictions of *Nation* and *Homeland*

The education system establishes direct contact with students through textbooks. For that reason, from the perspective of states, textbooks are crucial means to cultivate citizens. Establishing central control over the national education system, the Republican state describes the identity components of desirable Turkish citizens in textbooks. The single party period has exorbitantly influenced the major pillars of national identity authorized in state-approved

[19] For more information, please visit the section entitled "The 'Others' of the Republic: The Internal and External Enemies of the Nation" below.

textbooks. Notwithstanding, it is not bereft of fluctuations and changes during the 91-year-old history of modern Turkey.Thus, an assessment of the textbooks of the era can help us understand the identity bases on which the nation is constructed. The discovery of these bases is crucial, because it will tell us to which of the two models of citizenship Turkey belongs. Specifying the proximity of the Turkish citizenship to these models is important for the *jus soli* model is more inclusive than the *jus sanguini* model. Therefore, in case of exclusionism, detecting the bases of nation will draw an identity map of the ideal citizens as well as the non-ideal citizens specifying the boundaries within nation. In this respect, textbooks, curriculum, and educational programs present a hierarchically-organized perception of nationhood where citizens are assigned to different positions. The hierarchy is so strong that it sometimes go as far as excluding some citizens from the imagined nation. Understanding the hierarchy among citizens is closely related to the presentation of nationhood and homeland in textbooks. This section will elaborate on the issue focusing only on the single party era.

In the context of modern statehood where sovereignty is defined over a fixed territory, constructing the nation over a certain territory is no surprise. Similar to the imagination of nationhood, envisioning a territory attached to the nation involves emotional attachment to a bounded territory which becomes 'home' to nation and is called as the homeland. Since emotions are involved, the nation-building is a subjective process during which the feeling of belonging to a "community of citizens" is constructed in each individual (Üstel 2011: 156, 159).

The Republican understanding of homeland is ambiguous in terms of axes on which the Turkish nationhood is built, as textbooks define homeland with complex and oftentimes incompatible references. The homeland is defined in three different senses during the founding years of the Republic: (1) The place of settlement, (2) The territory drawn by the National Oath (*Misak-ı Milli*), and (3) The historical geography of ethnic Turks (Ibid.: 162).

The quotation below from a Civics textbook published in 1926 illustrates the ambiguity of the concept due to confusion over what the homeland is:

> "Homeland is not restricted to the territory we own today. The idea of homeland conceives of the geography where most of the population is still composed of our national men (*milletdaş*), despite we drifted apart. Gentlemen, lands we live and possess today are *our material homeland*… Everywhere where the Turk lives and where the language of the Turk is spoken is *our ideological homeland*" (Adil 1924: 3-4 in Üstel 2011: 161, *emphases added*).

As the quotation speaks for itself, the perception of homeland to be constructed is beyond the actual territory over which the state has sovereignty. The citizens (i.e. students) are also attached to an ideological homeland based on ethno-linguistic ties and shared history with the 'kins'. Besides from the confusion it creates between the material and the ideological homeland, this definition evidently makes students imagine the nation beyond the material homeland where the Turkish citizenship applies. In other words, it forged an understanding of Turkishness based on ethnicity, hence situating the Turkish model closer to the exclusionist German model. In that sense, Turkishness was constructed as a phenomenon above and beyond Turkish citizenship. This logic puts ethno-linguistic Turkishness to a higher position within nation, thus making ethnic Turkish identity a component of ideal citizenship.

The 1930s witnesses the escalation of references to ethnic Turkishness with the introduction of the Turkish History Thesis into school textbooks, although confusion due to ambiguities continues. An excerpt from a fourth grade history textbook demonstrates the inconsistency about who a Turk was at the time:

> "Today we live in our genuine homeland called 'Turkey'. Turkish is our genuine language. We are called **Turks**. Every people living around, in every corner of our homeland are our real brothers/sisters… Because their ancestors are also Turks, they think the same, they feel the same… Thus we call the brothers/sisters living in the Turkish Homeland and who have consciousness of themselves, who know their friends and enemies, all together, the *Turkish Nation*. This nation is the oldest and greatest nation of the world" (Kültür Bakanlığı 1936: 12 in Keyman and Kancı 2011: 324, *emphases in the original*).

The passage sets the axes of the Turkish nation as ethnicity and territory. Nevertheless, the territorial foundation of the nation was far from the *jus soli* model, since it defines Anatolia as the eternal fatherland of Turks. The claim to genuine Turkishness of the territory denies the existence of other ethnic communities in the region before and after the foundation of the Republic. The emphasis on the Turkish language and shared ancestry enhances the perception of an ethnically homogenous homeland. In addition, rendering Turkish as "our genuine languge" not only advances ethnic references, it also attaches authenticity to Turkishness which is exempt from foreign influences and change throughout history. In other words, by establishing a logic of continuity without interruption in history, the passage denies the modern construction of the language, thus enhances an understanding of authentic Turkish identity. Lastly, the same quotation establishes a fraternal tie between everyone on the homeland. Although such a connection blinks at the French model, constructing fraternity on shared ancestry makes it approach to the German volk-centered model, defining everyone on homeland as ethnic Turks. Even though such a perspective does not exclude the non-Turks, it takes a denialist, if not an assimilanionist, position in sketching the identity components of Turkish nationhood. All in all, the convergence of civic and blood-based definitions forges an imagination of nationhood and citizenship which are increasingly associated with ethnic Turkishness (Keyman and Kancı 2011: 325), thus reproducing a hierarchy among citizens based on ethnic identity.

Aside from the depiction of homeland in textbooks, the delineation of the nation is also elucidative on the pillars of desirable Turkish citizenship at the time. Similar to the homeland, the axes of nationhood are ambiguous and indecisive. These axes ranges from race to religion and common history, thus placing the Republican citizenship somewhere between the German and the French models. A Civics textbook from the period illustrates the confusion and elusiveness of Turkishness:

> "The elements that tie a nation together are various. Among these, race, language and religion have essential places… Notwithstanding, it is not solely race, language and religion that gather the members of a nation together. What connects the members of a nation together is rather memories of the past and sacrificies to be made in the future" (Adil 1924: 4 in Üstel 2011: 161).

According to the passage, the membership to the nation is multilayered. The problem with this representation is that it refers to both territorial and blood-based ties at the same time, leaving Turkish citizenship in limbo. While it constructs the idea of nation around ethno-racial, ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural grounds, it also emphasizes the role of shared history and future sacrifices for the nation. Referring to race and language directly links nation to ethno-racial Turkishness. Likewise, common religion adds to the particularistic and differentialistic connotations of nationhood in the text, since it depicts the nation as a community of co-religionists. Accordingly, the portrayal of nationhood in the passage shows Germanic tendencies. Shared history, on the other hand, is tricky. Although it may have a universalist and territorial meaning, the passage does not reveal who is the subject of shared history. If it is the history of ethno-racial Turks originally from the Central Asian steps, it is the Germanic *jus sanguini* model. On the contrary, if it refers to the history of the Anatolian people without reservation to any ethnic, religious or cultural identities, then it approaches to the *jus soli* model. Lack of information in this respect creates ambiguity. Nevertheless, clear ethnic references in the previous sentences illustrate the dominance of *jus sanguini* basis of the Turkish nation. This quotation supports that the Republican nationhood is founded heavily on Turkish ethnic identity and it draws internal boundaries of hierarchical sort within the realm of citizenship.

In the 1930s, the subtle superiority of ethnic Turkish identity becomes more pronounced in textbook representation of nationhood (Olson 2000, Keyman and Kancı 2011: 324, Alakel 2011). This tone directly finds correspondence in the Civilization Studies for the Citizen (*Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler*) textbooks. Written under the influence of the Turkish

History Thesis by Afet İnan, the first Civilization Studies textbook of the period has strong racial connotations, although there are some efforts to delineate the Turkish nation in the territorial sense (Gürses 2010: 240, Üstel 2011: 223). In this textbook, under the headline of "The Origins of Turk and Their Organization Styles" (*Türklerin Menşei, Teşekkülleri Tarzı*), Inan depicts the Turkish nation as an organic community based on shared genetic characteristics: "Despite of few differences, every person from the Turkish nation universally resemble each other" (Inan 1931: 19 in Gürses 2010: 240). Moreover, the few differences among them are excused with "living, (and) mixing with other races for thousands of years" (Ibid.). The racial axis of the nation is also supported with the grand family metaphor, thus differentiating Turkishness from Turkish citizenship and reserving a more superior position to the former.

The religious aspect of Turkish citizenship in textbooks is also problematic, as this era witnesses the foundation of a secular Republic over the ashes of an Islamic empire. Impressed by the Western civilization (Mardin 1993: 364), the founding Kemalist ideology was established on six principles known as 'the Six Arrows', secularism being one of them (Atasoy 2011: 106). Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk[20] cast a marginal role for religion (Mardin 1995: 121). The Law of Unification of Instruction (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat,* 1924) demonstrated this secular spirit even before the declaration of secularism in 1937, when it abolished the traditional *medreses* (Mardin 1993: 364, Ahmad 2009: 73-79) and removed Religion classes from the primary and secondary school curricula (Cicioğlu 1985: 96, 172, Kaplan 1999: 159). In compliance with this secular tendency, the constitutional provision that called Islam as the religion of the state was repealed in 1928 (Mardin 1993: 365, Ahmad 2009: 100). In short, the single party period witnessed a sharp decline in the role of religion (Tapper 1994: 34-35).

[20] The foundingfather of the modern state of Turkey.

The distance to religion in the official ideology and the Constitution manifests itself in the school textbooks of the era. Despite of some references to shared belief as the basis of Turkish nationhood, religion is never a dominant component of the national identity. Compared to shared ethnicity, shared religion is much less pronounced in the Republican textbooks. There were even some textbooks which took a contemptuous position against the role of religion in nation-making:

> "Turks were a great nation, too, before their conversion into the Islamic religion. After the conversion to this religion, it did not work on the unification of neither Arabs, nor co-religionist Persians, nor others with Turks and form a nation. On the contrary, (Islam) loosened the national ties of the Turkish nation, (and) benumbed their national feelings and national spirits" (Inan 1969: 21 in Üstel 2011: 225).

As this quote reveals, even though all Turks were considered as Muslims, Islam is not a unifier. The main axis of nationhood is predominantly ethno-racial Turkishness. Notwithstanding, the passage consists of an oxymoron: Whereas it disdains Islam, it also defines the nation as a Muslim collectivity, thus drawing a boundary between 'us' the Muslims, and 'them' the non-Muslims in favor of the former. Put differently, during this epoch, upper echelons of the nation are reserved for the Muslim citizens of Turkey.

b. The "Others" of the Republic: The Internal and External Enemies of the Nation

The construction of a national identity is evidently about defining who 'we' are. The fabrication of a homogeneous and unified 'us' needs an 'other' so that it can enhance its unity against the outsider. As the Turkish nationhood was founded predominantly on the unity and homogeneity of the nation, it necessarily produced its others. Since the foundation of the Republic, the notion of threat and enemies have been constructed on two levels: (1)External, and (2) Internal Threats. These two have multiple implications on the Turkish national identity and citizenship. Understanding the external others of the Republican era helps us

discern ‘our’ foreign enemies. With respect to my reseach agenda, the most essential point about external threats is whether these ‘others’ are, in any way, associated with the internal identity groups in the textbooks of the era. In other words, what I really pay attention is who the internal enemies are with respect to their ethnic and religious identity components.

The internal others of the Turkish nation have been inherited from the Ottoman era (Oran 2004: 36, Kadıoğlu 2007: 286). The first of these communities in the Empire was non-Muslims such as the Greeks, Armenians and Jews (Ibid.). Interestingly, Muslims, despite of their ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences, have historically not been considered as ‘minorities’ neither in the Ottoman period nor in the aftermath of it (Oran 2004: 36). The major source of inequality was the *millet system,* which was a hierarchical system based on religion and gave the uppermost privileged status to Muslims (*millet-i hakime)* in the presence of subordinate status of non-Muslims (*millet-i mahkume*) (Ibid: 36-37, Kadıoğlu 2007: 287). The nineteenth century reforms like the Tanzimat Charter (1839) and the Reform Edict (1856) to equate non-Muslims to Muslims were disturbing for the privileged Muslims (Mardin 1993: 352-355, Ahmad 2009: 37-40, Kadıoğlu 2007: 286). When this annoyance met a period of decadence due to loss of vast territories to the non-Muslim separatism backed by external enemies, their exclusion from the newly forming national community became easier (Oran 2004: 36-37, Kadıoğlu 2007: 286). Their minority status became official in the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which recognized these three communities as minorities (Oran 2004: 37).

Notwithstanding, the internal others of Turkey were not limited to the legal minorities. Other communities such as Kurds, Arabs, Circassians and Alevis have been ostracized since the late Ottoman era (Kadıoğlu 2007: 288). These communities were jeopardized with respect to their linguistic or religious identities, for they were (either) non-Turk (except for Turkmen Alevis) and/or ‘heretic’ Muslims diverting from the sunna (Mardin 1995: 88-90, Kadıoğlu 2007: 288-289). Moreover, the feudal tendencies of these communities gave hard time to the

Ottoman central authority. Inheriting this legacy, the homogeneity-oriented Republican national-building took an assimilationist stance against them, hence Kurds, Alevis and other such groups continued to be internal threats during the single party period (Oran 2004: 41-48).

The third and last group of 'outsiders' of the era were those who reminded the 'old and ignorant Ottoman past' (Bora 1996, Kadıoğlu 2007: 289). As Islam was associated with the Empire as well as the 'ignorant' East (Altan-Olcay 2009: 170), it was deemed as a source of backwardness by the Westernized secular elites (Kadıoğlu 2007: 289). Accordingly, the textbooks of the Republican era ignores the Ottoman history, takes a persistently negative stance against it and tries to create a state of amnesia in the population who is to be transformed into a 'homogenous' collectivity of 'new Turks' detached from the allegedly blinkered past (Ibid.).

As a general pattern in the textbooks of the era, the internal others, especially non-Turkish and non-Muslim identity groups, find very little space. Considering the homogeneity emphasis of the Republican national project, which puts the ethno-linguistic and ethno-racial Turkish identity at the center, the ignorance and denial of textbooks are unsurprising. The few passages referring to non-Muslims take an ambiguious stance with respect to their inclusion into the Turkish nation, despite of their Turkish citizenship. For instance, in Citizenship Studies textbook, Inan provides two completely clashing images of non-Muslims. At one part, she delineates Christians in Turkey as internal enemies with the endeavor to make the state collapse in every occasion (Inan 1969: 36 in Üstel 2011: 228). Nevertheless, in another passage, she clearly accepts Christian and Jewish citizens into the Turkish nation, if they are attached to the nation voluntarily (İnan 1969: 23 in Ustel 2011: 227). Hence, readers encounter with a perplexing image of non-Muslim citizens who are included into and excluded from the national community at the same time. As Inan adopts the method of

obscurity and provides acontroversial portrait of non-Muslims in her textbook, she also gives them an implicitly subordinate place compared to Muslim citizens.

The textbook representation of ethno-linguistically non-Turkish and non-Sunni communities are also problematic due to their vague position as part of the nation. Similar to non-Muslims, the portrayal of these identities are contradictory, for they are both accepted and denied from the image of nationhood at different passages of textbooks. For instance, despite the dominance of ethnic Turkish identity in Inan's discourse, she includes non-Turkish communities within the nation:

> "The Kurdish, the Circassian and even the Laz and the Bosniak identity are promoted to some of our citizens and national men (*milletdaş*) within the political and social community of the Turkish nation" (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the inclusion is not without reservations, as Inan separates 'citizen' from 'national man' (*milletdaş*). What is more, the quotation presents these identities as a threat by linking them to the external enemy, since the non-Turkish identities are promoted from an unidentified source. In other words, these identities are depicted as 'dangerous', and 'external', as they are associated with foreign enemies to the nation. Hence, by portraying those who identify themselves with non-Turkish identities with a tricky image, the quotation attaches untrustworthiness to them. Accordingly, their association with non-Turkish identities make them incompatible with the prescribed national identity and make them less desirable citizens than those who fit into it. Therefore, we can argue that during the single party period, these identity communities were not considered as ideal citizens. This implies that the Republican era imagination of nation signifies exclusionist Germanic tendencies.

The last major group of internal enemies represented in textbooks are those related to the Ottoman past, which the founding elites considered as bigoted (Altan-Olcay 2009: 175). Over the persona of the last sultan Vahidettin, the Ottoman identity is demonized in textbooks within the context of the Independence War (1919-1922) due to his collaboration with the

Western powers against the people. Furthermore, the Empire is presented as old-fashioned, conservative, and ignorant and the sultans are depicted as selfish, voluptuous, cruel, and treacherous (Üstel 2011: 209). The marginalization is to such extent that in a Civics textbook, they are called as "the archenemy" of the regime (Adil 1924: 10 in Üstel 2011: 209). That is, the regime had disdain for those who were associated with the Ottoman identity, be it the Islamists, or be it the pro-sultan conservatives, and regarded them as subordinate citizens.

In conclusion, the founding years of the Republic puts homogeneity and unity of the population on the main axis of nation-building. The desire for homogeneity ignites the construction of a national identity in textbooks to turn every citizen into an integral part of the nation. The textbooks become an essential means in this regard. While they invent a monolithic 'us' identity, they also specify the members of the nation who is preferred by the state over others who are not completely assimilated into the national identity. In this way, textbooks designated an ideal Turk as well as the non-ideal. In this respect, the unity of the nation is largely constituted on ethno-linguistic Turkishness, which is the most significant identity component of the ideal citizen of the period. In spite of ambiguities, frequent ethnic connotations in textbooks illustrates that (1) the Republican citizenship reserves a more privileged place for ethnic Turkish identity, and (2) it promotes the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity as the major component of Republican national identity with the endeavor to assimilate non-Turkish identities. Despite universalist and inclusivist claims, Turkish citizenship in this era leans toward the German model. The religious aspect of the national identity is even more obscure. Intense secular spirit of the era finds correspondence in textbooks where there is very little place for religion. Yet, the nation, as a totality, is still identified with Islam. This identification is also supported with the suspicious profile of non-Muslims depicted in textbooks. Lastly, the Republican identity decisively distances itself from the Ottoman Empire, which might be interpreted as the regimes antipathy for the Islamist and

conservative identities. A general tendency in textbooks is that they define the 'enemy' within 'us' over their connection with the external enemies, thus implicitly inciting the fear of dismantlement of 'our nation'. Understanding the Republican citizenship is essential for it shapes the major pillars of Turkish nationhood and the criteria of inclusion in the subsequent years. That is, the identities of the internal others have changed very little since then. The analysis of the designated Turkish nation in the multiparty period textbooks manifests the efforts to replace the Germanic inclinations of the Turkish citizenship with more inclusive French ones by present citizens with different identities on a more equal basis. However, little is changed in textbooks.

B. The Multiparty Period (1946 – 1980)

The first democratization attempts were taken in this era. The struggle for democratization reveals itself in textbook content, as the concepts of rights, freedom and democracy start to appear in textbooks, albeit meagerly. Yet, textbook content of the first half of the era is a continuity with the Republican ones than a change. This period has two primary school programs, the first prepared in 1948 and the second in 1968. The 1948 Primary School Program shows almost no sign of shift from the authoritarian and monolithic spirit of the single party period. Under the influence of the liberalization trend that comes with the 1961 Constitution, the 1968 Primary School Program indicates stronger signs of democratization with regard to citizenship than the 1948 Program. Nonetheless, it continues to protect the ethno-centric spirit of the former program. The Law of National Education (1973), however, is a step back from liberalization of the Turkish citizenship, as it refreshes the Republican spirit and stresses the ethnic Turkish identity (Üstel 2011: 241-265, Kaplan 1999: 213-305).

A general theme in the education programs of the period is the predominance of the 'national' character of the education. According to the 1948 Primary School Program, the

major goal of primary schools is nationalization of the population (Üstel 2011: 245). What is more, the program sets the main mission of primary schools as "the injection of the national culture" (T.C. Maarif Vekaleti[21] 1958: 3 in Üstel 2011: 245). More specifically, the primary school is given 'the duty' to make all citizens enrolled "gain the same national ideals (*ülkü*), the same national goals" (Ibid., Cicioğlu 1985: 82). Hence, the praise for unity and homogeneity in the single party period continues in the multiparty era, for nation-making is a process of constant reproduction of the imagined community.

1. The Ethnic Aspect of Turkishness in the Multiparty Period

Tracking changes in the multiparty period education system through primary schools programs, it is understood that the ethno-centricism of textbooks prevails. The 1948 Program accentuates on the Turkishness of the nation. Although ethnic references are not as powerful as the single party period, the nation is still envisioned around an organic Turkish identity. The goals of the Citizenship Studies as stated in the 1948 Program reveal that inclination. The first goal of the course is:

> "…to make students comprehend the concept of nation and *the character of the Turkish nation,* and to enhance their feelings of love, respect and trust for the Turkish nation, Turkish soldier and Turkish army" (T.C. Maarif Vekaleti[22] 1958: 147-148 in Üstel 2011: 246, emphasis added).

According to the passage, the Turkish nation has a monolithic and organic character that can be learnt by the students. This depiction consists of an essentialist understanding of Turkishness with regard to its authenticy and uniformity. The *learnability* of Turkishness signifies the adoption of ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic Turkish identity. In other words, the desired unity and homogeneity of the nation is constructed upon the monolithic and genuine Turkish ethnic identity. The ethnic connotations of the Program reappear in the fifth goal of the same course, as it intends to "cultivate each student as a … Turkish offspring

[21] *The Ministry of Education.*
[22] *The Ministry of Education.*

(*Türk evladı*)" (Ibid.). The intention to 'cultivate', once again, shows that a student can be a Turkish offspring by adopting certain characteristics including culture and identity. Moreover, the family metaphor helps students perceive nation as a family whose members are attached by blood ties and who has a lineage of its own. The parallelism between nation and family furthers the exclusionism of Turkishness adding kinship into the national identity.

The 1968 Primary School Program is clearly affected by the spirit of the 1961 Constitution, where the definition of Turkish citizenship is more inclusive than the one in the 1924 Constitution[23], for it does not separate Turkishness from Turkish citizenship:

> "Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is Turkish" (Kili and Gözübüyük 2000).

Although the article refers to the 'Turkish State' instead of the 'State of Turkey', thus identifying the state with Turkishness, as the rest of the Constitution does, the 1961 definition puts *Turkish citizenship* adjacent to *Turkishness* (Yeğen 2004: 66). Hence, the problematic citizenship definition which differentiates Turkishness from Turkish citizenship and puts the former to a superior position in the 1924 Constitution is changed for a limited period.

Influenced by the liberal tendencies of the 1961 Constitution, the 1968 Primary School Program brings along a more humanitarian, democratic and equal understanding of citizenship. In the 1968 Program, basic rights and liberties, democracy and human rights are encouraged not only in theory but also in practice. The 1968 Program describes the typology of ideal citizen as a person who acknowledges that "everyone has the basic rights and liberties (and) is equal before law irrespective of differences in language, race, sex, political opinion, religion and sect" (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı[24] 1968: 1-2). The emphasis on racial, linguistic, religious and sectarian equality before law and the promotion of adoption of such a character by students prepares the ground for a more liberal and inclusive citizenship that is

[23] You can find an analysis of the definition of Turkish citizenship in the 1924 Constitution under the section entitled: "Turkish Citizenship in Legal Documents" above.
[24] *The Ministry of Education.*

closer to the universalist French model. Nevertheless, the same program does not refrain from repeating the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity. For instance, the same program depicts the ideal citizen that the national education system should produce as a person who "can speak, read and write Turkish correctly, (and who) knows, internalizes and protects the principles of Turkishness" (Ibid.). That is, the unity of the collectivity is built on the unity of language. What is more, as the 'Turkish language' appears with 'the principles of Turkishness' in the same sentence, it continues to reproduce the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity as the major basis of the national identity.

In short, although the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s softens the authoritarian and heavily monolithic character of the education system, the primary school of the multiparty period keeps the reproduction of ethnic Turkishness as the essence of the ideal citizenship. The tide of liberalization in school programs are interrupted with the 1971 military intervention, which brings back the authoritarian and militarist tone in the education system with the Law of National Education and further polishes the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity in citizenship (Üstel 2011: 264-265, Kaplan 1999: 265-271). Despite ups and downs with respect to ethno-linguistic references in the depictions of citizenship, the Turkish nationhood preserves its indecisive character between the German and the French model during the multiparty period. The ambiguity of Turkish citizenship is perfectly observable in the social sciences textbook for fourth graders in 1978. The unclear representation of Turkishness results from the writer's discourse which combines ethnic and civic elements together:

> 'We' share a territory where 'our ancestors' lived by making self-sacrifices…'We' also share the same culture and same history in which 'our' ancestors honorably lived and sacrificed themselves (Sanır et al. 1978: 229-30 in Keyman and Kancı 2011: 327).

Similar to the Republican era, the volk-centered and territorial senses of citizenship models are merged together, creating vagueness on who 'we' are. As the insiders of the community is constructed on a shared territory, the citizenship definition might approach the French model.

However, an indepth reading unravels that the main foundation of shared history, culture and territory is *shared ancestry.* Although sharedness of ancestry may give racial connotations, it has ethno-centric meanings here, since textbooks start the Turkish history in Central Asia due to alleged ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic ties with the region. Hence, the passage constructs the sharedness of ancestry on ethno-cultural and ethno-historical Turkishness. Accordingly, the model of citizenship depicted in this quotation is between the two, but it is closer to the exclusivist German model. This implies that ethnically non-Turkish citizens are not as appreciated as the ethnically Turkish citizens in the eyes of the state.

2. The Religious Aspect of Turkishness in the Multiparty Period

The religious component of national identity continues to stay recessive as the dominance of secularism prevailed until the last years of the multiparty period. Therefore, the internal others of this period is predominantly non-Turkish identities. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Democrat Party government stressed significance of the Sunni-Islamic identity to an extent that it almost equated being Turkish to being Sunni Muslim (Açıkel and Ateş 2011: 724). In the context of March 12 intervention, the military leaders, too, softened their rigidity about religion for their aversion to rising leftist movements was stronger than their dislike of religion (Kaplan 2006: 43). That is, in the last ten years of the multiparty era, military leaders considered Islam as a unifier against the threat of communism (Ahmad 1991: 12).This tendency was enflamed by the Nationalist Front governments, which were based on coalitions between the ultra-nationalists and the Islamists (Açıkel and Ateş 2011: 724). Notwithstanding, the rise of Islam as a major identity was not reflected in the education system simultaneously. For instance, The Law of National Education (1973) is strongly attached to secularism, as it defines "secularism as the essence of the Turkish national education" adding that individuals can get religion education based on request (The Law of

National Education 1973: 6). Therefore, the rising popularity of Islam among military and political elites does not find immediate place in the education system. For that matter, in terms of textbook representation of religious identity of Turkish citizens, there is continuity between the single party and multiparty periods. Hence, textbooks give ambiguous signals about non-Muslims, Islamists and conservatives about their inclusion into the national community. It is the post-1980 period which is undoubtedly a sharp break with the past.

C. The Post-Coup Period (1980 – 2002)

The military intervened in September 12, 1980 with the excuse of soothing the political turmoils and controlling the escalation of Kurdish nationalism and Islamic revivalism (Keyman and İçduygu 2005: 7). As an antidote to these problems, the army generals officially introduced the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which was designed in 1970 under the Justice Party government (Kaplan 1999: 236-237, Kaplan 2006: 44). At the core of this synthesis, there was the belief in the centrality of Turkish and Islamic identity of the Turkish nation (Ibid.: 237). This new formulation constructed the new national identity on three major pillars: (1) ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkishness, (2) Sunni Islam and (3) constant internal and external enemies. Put differently, the national unity and homogeneity were reproduced on these three identities which redrew the boundaries that hierarchically arranged the domain of nationhood.

The context of constant state of emergency was the spirit of the post-1980 period. Promoting a regime of fear, the creation of an atmosphere of constant threat inarguably facilitated state oppression and prepared the setting for the re-formulation of the Turkish citizenship. After the limited liberalization attempts of the multiparty period, the September 12 citizenship was a swift return to the "militant citizenship" of the single party period (Üstel 2011: 278). In a nutshell, the September 12 citizenship was a new formulation that gave the

state the uppermost hand in limiting individual rights and liberties for the sake of the preservation of the state and the nation from internal and external threats (Keyman and Kancı 2011: 328, Üstel 2011: 277 – 318). This oppressive attitude that rendered the individual subservient to the state manifested itself in the new regime's expectations from citizens about their 'duties and responsibilities' for the nation and homeland. The emphasis on these duties were to such an extent that it lauded and normalized self-sacrifices and martyrdom for the integrity of the political community[25]. The new regime solidified its ideal citizen depictions in the 1982 Constitution, which reorganized the society and rearranged the state-citizen relationship, where the latter was, metaphorically speaking, 'a loyal slave' to the former (Kaplan 1999: 305). The most fundamental consequence of this new arrangement was the erosion of the individual and sub-communities in favor of the nation, thus reinforcing its organic and unified nature (Üstel 2011: 293). Such an imagination of nationhood necessarily magnified the homogeneity among constituting parts (i.e. citizens) of the nation and reprobated heterogeneity tothe extent of the criminalization of difference (Ibid.). Accordingly, the 1982 Constitution promoted unity by declaring Atatürkism as the only official ideology that the state, all political parties and the national education had to obey (Ibid.: 306). Furthermore, the new constitution re-defined the Turkish nationalism and formulated 'the Atatürk nationalism' (Üstel 2011: 279), which was entirely a chauvinist Turkish nationalism accompanied with a sanctified state perception (Kaplan 1999: 306, Kancı 2009: 363). The major function of the Atatürk nationalism was to 'protect' the youth from 'foreign ideologies' (Üstel 2011: 278), thus enforcing unity and homogeneity. In short, the national unity was to be erected on the combination of Atatürkism and Islamism under the roof of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Kaplan 1999: 307).

[25] Different from the previous periods in the history of Turkey, the eulogy for self-sacrifice and martyrdom had a functional purpose for the state, as it was in armed struggle with the Kurdish separatist movement led by the PKK.

1. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: The Reproduction of Ethno-centricism

The first pillar of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is a reviewed version of ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkish identity. Whereas the multiparty period witnesses some efforts to draw the Turkish citizenship closer to the *jus soli* model, the post-1980 era goes to the opposite direction and constructs a model that evidently approaches to the *jus sanguini* model (Üstel 2011: 289). Nonetheless, textbooks do not contain solely volk-centered elements as they co-occur with civic elements (Keyman and Kancı 2011: 329). The unity of the Turkish nation is constructed on "shared language, religion, race, history and culture" (Üstel 2011: 289). The special emphasis on Turkish language, which has ethnic connotations, is remarkable. For example, a Citizenship Studies textbook explains the long Turkish history without getting lost among other communities with tribute to the role of the Turkish language, as the protection of its genuineness was key to the authenticity of Turkish history and culture (Kaya 1994: 58 in Üstel 2011: 289). In other words, the textbook inculcates that the Turkish language is *existential* for the nation. That is, an entire nation, which involves various ethno-linguistic communities, is constructed on the alleged purity of one language which is associated with the ethnic Turkish identity. This is an open implication for the dominance of ethnic Turkish identity within national identity.

The significance given to the Turkish language in the post-1980 era might be linked to the escalation of Kurdish nationalism with demands to cultural rights including the right to use their mother tongue. In the context of armed struggle, sanctification of the Turkish language, which is related to the ethno-centricTurkish history in textbooks, implies the intention toassimilate non-Turkish ethno-linguistic communities into Turkishness through the use of the Turkish language. The subtle intention to assimilate manifests the ethno-centric spirit of the post-1980 citizenship as well as its disdain towards the ethno-linguistically non-Turkish communities. Therefore, I can infer that the post-1980 imagination of nation in

textbooks was differentialist and hierarchic for they indoctrinated the superiority of ethnic Turkishness. The confusion textbooks create by using civic and ethnic elements at the same time does not change the strong volk-centered tendencies of Turkish citizenship, since the civic references are given in relation to the ethnic ones:

> "For a society of people to be a nation it should have: …unity of language, unity of history, unity of homeland, unity of culture and unity of ideal (*ülkü*). The people living on the Turkish homeland have these characteristics. These people form the Turkish nation" (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Onuncu Milli Eğitim Şûrası[26] 1991: 239).

The passage defines Turkish nation as 'the people on the Turkish homeland', thus stressing shared territory. However, it constructs Turkish nationhood over the possession of *all* these characteristics including the Turkish language and history which is linked to ethno-linguistic and ethno-historical domains. From this perspective, those who are in possession of all of the above characteristics are ethnic Turks.

The volk-centered connotations of nationhood are established on both racial and ethnic terms, hence further blurring who the Turk is. This take on Turkishness unequivocally narrows down the inclusiveness of the nationhood, thus simultaneously intensifying the organicness of nationhood, disclaiming heterogeneity. The post-1980 textbooks construct shared race as another component of nationhood based on the alleged shared characteristics among members of the same race (Üstel 2011: 292). Accordingly, textbooks enlist unique and timeless characteristics that all Turks share, while at the same time attaching superiority to these qualifications. In other words, Turks are defined with an unchanging e*ssence* that consists of high honor, respectability, and strong attachments to the homeland (Ibid., Kaplan 2006: 77). The textbooks try to recede from the volk-centered construction of unity in the second half of the 1990s, despite limited change (Ibid.: 293, Keyman and Kancı 2011: 330). For instance, a Social Sciences textbook defines the Turkish nation as the 'people of Turkey'

[26] *The Tenth National Education Council Meeting held by the Ministry of National Education.*

rather than 'the Turkish people' who founded the Republic of Turkey (Şenünver et al. 1999: 12). Nevertheless, the use of ethno-racial identifications prevails in textbooks.

2. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Sunnification as a State Policy

The second major component of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is religion. Contrary to the general tendency in previous eras, the post-1980 textbooks construct an organic sense of nationhood around Islam. In other words, Islam is presented as the religion of Turks without reservation, thus unifying the nation with shared religious ties. Such a stance necessarily brings along attaching lower positions to non-Islamic identities within the hierarchically imagined nation, now more severely. However, this Islamic identity is not based on the universalist Islam of the Mohammedan era, it is a fabricated version of Sunni Islam to erode religious diversity (Altan-Olcay 2007: 202-204). More specifically, the religious identity that is promoted by the state is a reformulation of Sunni Islam balanced with Republican and secular identity embedded in textbooks. Despite involvement of Atatürkism in the religious sphere, this period witnesses the intensification of Sunnification of society (Güvenç et al. 1994, Bora and Can 1999, Mert 2002) both in the constitution and in real life practices (Marguilis and Yıldızoğlu 1988). The roots of Sunnification policy can be traced back to the discourse of Democrat Party elites, which introduced religion as a matter of political debate. This discourse provoked Islamists against non-Muslims and 'heretic' Alevis to the extent of bloody attacks (Benhabib 1979: 16). The stigmatization of non-Sunni communities is institutionalized with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as Sunnification becomes a state policy. In this way, the non-Sunni identity is excluded from the major identity components of the Turkish nation. This implies that they are not considered ideally as Turkish, despite of their Turkish citizenship.

The unification under Sunni-Islam is promoted with the introduction of compulsory Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge course into the curriculum. The course was a selective until 1982[27] (Kaplan 1999: 306, Kaplan 2006: 45, Ahmad 2009: 255). The major problem of the course is that it is almost exclusively on state-tailored Sunni Islam with either very little or no place given to other religions, sects and cults. Therefore, primary and secondary education where this lesson is required assumes a leading role in the Sunnification process since then. These policies enclose the religio-cultural universe of the political community stigmatizing heterodox Muslims and non-Muslim communities further. In this respect, the condition of non-Muslims are different from that of Alevis for the non-Muslim communities are not responsible from the course[28]. Thus, the compulsory Religion course mainly intends to assimilate Alevis into Sunnism (Açıkel and Ateş 2011: 726), because the main formula of national identity is "ethnic identity (Turkish blood) blended with Islam" (Ibid.: 727, *parenthesis added*).

The post-1980 period witnesses the construction of an organic nation over the co-occurrence of ethnic Turkish and Sunni identities, thus attaching the two together. Accordingly, the Citizenship Studies textbooks argue that the unity of religious identity is a crucial part of nationhood:

> "Having the unity of religion is effective making individuals love each other, help each other, socialize with each other. Therefore, the protection of the unity of religion is important in the formation of the nation" (Aydos and Yenice 1994: 60 in Üstel 2011: 290).

In other words, the unity of the nation is constructed over the homogeneity of religious orientation of citizens. The inculcation of homogeneity has a functional purpose for it provides a 'code of conduct', thus helping the state sustain social order, which has become a

[27] Religion classes were abolished in 1940 and became electives in 1949 (Altan-Olcay 2007: 201).
[28] The minority schools are exempt from the compulsory Religion course since 1982. The Christians and Jews that were not enrolled in minority schools gained the right to exemption by request as a consequence of a court judgment in 1990.

state obsession since 1980. Moreover, the promotion of homogeneity from the center serves the state interest as it transforms the society into a more manageable and controllable one.

As a general method used in textbooks, the organic bond between Turkishness and Islam is mostly constructed on the alleged congruence between Islam and the Turkish essence, which refers to the unchanging characteristics of Turks (Kaplan 2006: 81, Üstel 2011). In order to support this argument, textbooks go as back as possible in the Turkish history, thus linking the pre-Islamic Turkish culture to Islam:

> "It was as if the Turks had been aware for centuries (before their conversion) of Islam's moral laws… The Turks are from birth a nation of soldiers. Islam commands one to fight for the fatherland. The Turks are a nation which doesn't know the meaning of lies and hypocrisy; Islam forbids all this bad behavior… Thus, the first and most important reason that the Turks became Muslims was that Islam was a religion appropriate to their origins" (Tunç 1987: 94 in Kaplan 2006: 81).

This depiction of Turkish culture illustrates not only the congruity between the ethno-cultural Turkishness and Islam, it also denies any change in the Turkish culture with their conversion into Islam. The passage defines Turkishness based on shared characteristics that all members of the Turkish community have. Besides the essentialist primordialist claims, the text designates Islam which orders the believers 'to fight for the fatherland'. This assertion is anachronistic as it compares the pre-modern Islamic jihad with the fight for the 'fatherland' by using a modern term, with which the students are familiar. Like this passage does, textbooks refrain from emphasizing the extraterritoriality of Islam, thus subtly restricting Islam to Turkishness (Kaplan 2006: 82, Altan-Olcay 2007: 203-207). Accordingly, the images the Religion textbooks use are mostly from religious sights in Turkey (Kaplan 2006: 82). Moreover, they do not inform student about the ideas of non-Turkish Muslim scholars (Ibid.). In short, the textbooks representation of Islam delineates it as a 'Turkish Religion' from the rest of the *ümmet* (Altan-Olcay 2007: 203). As they connect the ethnic Turkish identity to the Islamic identity, which is a state-tailored Islam, textbooks reproduce the unity of the nation.

Hence, those who do not comply with these two 'essences' of the Turkish national identity are left outside from the idealized citizen depictions of the state.

3. Constructing the National Unity against "Them": The Internal and External Threats

The last major pillar of Turkish national identity of the post-1980 context is based on the constant awareness against internal and external enemies that want to divide 'us'. This time, the unity of the nation that is constructed on the organic Turkish-Islamic identity is reassured with a culture of fear. The paranoid nature of the period emanates from the rise of the Kurdish separatist movement led by the PKK and ASALA[29] attacks against Turkish diplomats. Reflecting the obsession with national security, the textbooks are revised with the insertion of constant awareness against 'internal and external enemies' that are against the "geographical significance of Turkey" and the "dislike of a strong Turkey" (T.C. Milli Eğitim Gençlik ve Spor Bakanlığı[30] 1988: 165, 167, 225, Keyman and Kancı: 2011: 329, Üstel 2011: 298). It must be realized how Turkey is portrayed in a world replete with antagonistic countries. This representation is unquestionably xenophobic. Similar to previous periods of modern history of Turkey, but with more intensity, the image of internal and external enemies are portrayed as interrelated, for the latter supports the former to divide the unity of the nation and homeland. The interconnection of the two threats is significant, since it reminds the memory of the Independence War when internal separatism collaborated with external enemies to divide the Ottoman territory.

The major logic behind the envision of an 'other' as unconditionally egregious with no shared characteristic with 'us' strengthens the antagonism as well as the perception of threat and fear (Bora 2009: 119). Hence, by distancing 'us' from 'them', the unity and inner

[29] Abbrevation for *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia*.
[30] *The Ministry of Youth and Sports.*

homogeneity of these two entities are enhanced. The textbook reproduction of the nation and its enemies reflect this reasoning.

An eighth grade Citizenship Studies textbook determines three principal types of threat: (1) Anarchy and terror, (2)Global threat, and (3)Contemporary Threats (Internal and External threats) (Aydos and Yenice 1994: 73 in Üstel 2011: 295-297). The most essential characteristic shared by all three is that the textbook content is so discrete in revealing the identity of the enemies that the ambiguity exacerbates the fear against the unknown. The vagueness of the nature of threats creates confusion over the differentiation between these categories. Based on the fear provoked by obscurity, the state expands its sphere of influence and its intensity against the individual rights and liberties by limiting them for the national security (Ibid.: 295-299).

The first threat, i.e. anarchy and terror, is presented in the context of malfeasance of individual rights and liberties by the destructive and separatist elements against the unity of the nation and homeland (Dal et al. 1998: 72 in Üstel 2011: 296). The only thing we are informed about them is that they take advantage of democratic rights to dissolve the Republic (Ustel 2011: 296). Inferring from the 1970s context in Turkey, where there was a strong leftist movement at the time, the source of anarchy and terror was socialism (Kaplan 1999: 306).

The other enemy was global terrorism, which is explained with some states' support for terrorism in order to achieve their political and economic agendas in the realm of foreign policy (Dal et al. 1998: 73 in Üstel 2011: 296). Nevertheless, due to the obscurity of threat of global terrorism, it is ususally confused with external threats in textbooks. The confusion proceeds as textbooks include "international terrorism, Armenian terrorism and some countries' ambitions" on Turkey into the description of the external threat (Üstel 2011: 298). Besides the obscure and unspecified character of the external threat, the most essential issue

about the construction of the external threat is how it is interconnected with the internal enemies:

> "The terrorist organizations in Turkey have relations with the Armenian Terrorist organizations. That's why Armenian terrorist organizations take on the responsibility of some of the terror incidents in Turkey" (Aydos and Yenice 1974: 74 in Üstel 2011: 298).

The textbook defines the Armenian terrorist organizations without any allusion to the Armenian community in Turkey. Nevertheless, it criminalizes the community indirectly by demonizing the name 'Armenian'. The animosity that is grown against the external Armenians may possibly resonate as a negative perception of the Armenian community in Turkey. What is more, the external Armenian threat is associated with internal terrorist organizations, thus escalating animosity against the Armenian identity in society. Since the Armenian identity is explicitly targeted in the passage, they are openly excluded from the imagined nation. Looking at the publication year (1974), I can claim that the 'terrorist organizations in Turkey' points at the Kurdish identity as well as other Marxist organizations. Accordingly, although the Kurdish identity is not directly depicted as an internal threat to the nation, the text subtly prepares the basis for the externalization of the Kurdish identity.

The textbooks are even more discrete about who the internal enemies are, but this method only helps to create more paranoia about national security. The only evident sign the reader gets about the identity of the internal enemy is their intention to destroy and divide 'our' unity. In general, they are depicted as collaborators with the external powers, spreading terror on society. They are also presented as *drug smugglers* eager to make a lot of money by poisoning the Turkish youth (Dal et al. 1998: 73 in Üstel 2011: 297, *emphasis addded*). The first message conveyed with this presentation is that 'the enemies within us' are eternally evil and inhumane. Second, due to the pejorative label attached to the Kurdish identity as smugglers and bandits, the internal enemy sketched in this textbook might be the Kurdish community.

All in all, the September 12 regime establishes a new understanding of Turkishness and pushes the Turkish model of citizenship swiftly towards the *jus sanguini* model, despite preserving civic elements of nationhood in textbooks. The regime institutionalizes the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as the backbone of the Turkish national identity. While a restrictive Turkish-Islamic identity becomes official, non-Turkish and non-Sunni Muslim communities are assigned to lesser echelons than Sunni-Turks within the hierarchically arranged perception of nation. The subordinate position of non-Turkish and non-Sunni communities is exacerbated with the construction of national security spirit that is identified with obsession about internal and external threats to the nation and homeland. Despite the general ambiguity in the description of the enemy, the Armenian identity seems to be the most openly marginalized with its links to both internal threat (PKK) and external threat (ASALA). The Kurdish identity is also presented as another internal threat to the unity and homogeneity of Turkish nationhood, thus needs to be annihilated. The major difference between the depiction of these two threathening identities is the fact that whereas the Armenian identity is explicitly demonized, the Kurdish identity and the subsequent threat it poses is implicitly conveyed. The imposition of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is the major state ideology to assimilate these allegedly harmful identities to preserve the unity. In other words, the Turkish and Sunni-Muslim identities dominate the national identity assigning unfitting identities an unequal position within nation. While the Armenian identity is almost entirely excluded from the imagination of the nation in textbooks, Kurds are given a more equivocal place, which is higher than the Armenian identity but lower than the ideal Turkish identity. Moreover, the state perceives the Alevi identity as in need of assimilation into Sunnism for their 'heresy' is a threat to homogeneity. This means Alevis are non-ideal citizens that are situated below the Sunni community within nation. In short, the textbook representation of non-Turkish and non-Sunni communities disgrace their heterogenous identity to the extent of animosity against

these communities. In other words, textbooks draw an internal boundary within Turkish citizenship between the ideal Turks and non-ideal citizens enhancing a hierarchical understanding of citizenship where Sunni Turks are placed at the top.

III. CONCLUSION

The Turkish national project makes extensive use of schools in the reproduction of desirable citizens. With this aim in mind, the state uses textbooks as tools of social transformation. Since the foundation of the Republic, the nation's unity is reproduced through the indoctrination of a homogenous national identity which heavily reflects the identity of the dominant group within nation. Nevertheless, the building blocks of the desirable citizenship has changed over time. The Republican period, the multiparty period and the post-1980 period each presents different formulas of ideal citizenship. During the Republican period, an ethno-racial, ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkish identity is imposed, while the religious aspect of national identity is quite limited due to strict secularism. Yet, the Republican textbooks are not consistent in these depictions. While ethnic elements co-appear with civic connotations of Turkishness, the strictly secular depiction of the ideal citizen sometimes contradicts with the identification of the nation with Islam. Despite ambiguities, the textbook delineations of ideal Turk exclude non-Turkish, non-Muslim and Islamist/conservative identities during the single party era. The multiparty period witnesses limited democratization and liberalization which moderate the ethno-centric Turkish identity inherited from the Republican era. However, the ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkishness continue to exist in textbooks, thus enflaming ambiguity. With regard to the religious aspect of the ideal Turk, there is no change in textbooks, although the political discourse has left the firm secular tone of the Republican era. The post-1980 citizenship, on the other hand, is a swift break from previous descriptions of ideal Turkish identity, for it officially includes Islam as one of the

three major pillars of national identity. More specifically, the post-1980 textbooks construct nationhood over (1) ethnic Turkishness, (2) Sunni branch of Islam, and (3) fear of constant threat. While these axes stretch the inclusiveness of Turkishness, it creates an obscure image of internal and external enemies. In this respect, non-Turkish, and non-Sunni communities are presented as collaborators with the external enemies thus they are imagined as dangerous to the integrity of the nation and the homeland. Accordingly, the Alevi identity, to some extent, and the Armenian and the Kurdish identities to a greater extent seem to be targeted the most in textbooks, hence being attached to non-desirable Turkishness.

CHAPTER THREE

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of modern Turkey, the Turkish nationhood has been constructed on two fundamental pillars: The unity and homogeneity of the national identity. Although the content and portrayal of *the ideal Turk* has changed in time, the reproduction of unity through homogeneity has always been a state policy. Having established strict state supervision over the content and discourse of school textbooks, the State of Turkey uses textbooks as a tool of social engineering. Accordingly, it is possible to pursue possible changes in the state's imagination of national identity through textbooks. Having won three consecutive elections as an Islamo-conservative party, the JDP's accession to power has shown strong indications of change in the identity components of the ideal citizen. In order to make a complete analysis of current textbooks published under the JDP rule, it is crucial to take a comparative stance towards the textbook representations of the ideal Turkishness.

In the previous chapter, I came to the conclusion that the Turkish national identity has two major aspects which are manipulated at times of change: The religious and ethnic identity. In this chapter, I will elaborate on how the recent JDP government reproduces the unity of the nation through a homogenous depiction of *the Turkish religious identity* in primary school textbooks, while leaving the discussion on the ethnic aspect of the national identity to the next chapter. To achieve this goal, I will make a comparative analysis between the textbooks before and after the JDP's accession to power, and work on the 2000 and the 2012 primary school textbooks of the Life Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Religion courses. Based on my results of content and discourse analysis, I argue that the JDP era textbooks maintain the hierarchical organization of Turkishness by excluding certain religious identities from the national identity. Nevertheless, this period witnesses a re-arrangement of

the boundaries of inclusion where secular identity, non-Muslim identities and non-Sunni identities are ostracized to varying degrees.

As a general characteristic of both periods, textbooks construct the unity of the nation on the oneness of the leader figure. That is, heterogeneities in the national identity are discouraged by presenting students two role models whose qualities and authority cannot be questioned: The Prophet Mohammad and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this respect, the comparative analysis of the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks manifests meaningful changes which hint at the re-formulation of the ideal religious identity in accordance with JDP's Islamo-conservative identity. Briefly, the 2012 textbooks are in a clear attempt to withdraw the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from the religious sphere, and prioritizing the Prophet Mohammad's image as the sole role model for the religious identity. In other words, while keeping the position of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the nation, the new textbooks contain his leadership within the non-religious sphere, hence enforcing the image of the Prophet Mohammad as the religious idol. Keeping track of this leadership transition, I have detected a certain decrease in the secular identity and a significant increase in the Islamic one in the JDP era textbooks. Correspondingly, the textbooks reflect the handover ceremony between the secular Kemalist elites and the Islamo-conservative JDP elites, as the latter's identity is deemed more preferable than that of the former.

The upward trend in the Islamization of textbooks manifests itself even more distinctly when the presence and representation of Islam is compared with those of other religions. With regard to this, the 2012 textbooks show a more monist profile than the 2000 textbooks, as the Islamic references multiplies in the face of decreasing non-Islamic ones. Considering the existing Islam-centered tone of textbooks, the analysis of the 2012 textbooks reveal a much larger gap between the Islamic identity and "others", thus worsening the marginalization of

the non-Muslim communities and attaching them an implicitly lower position in the nation, despite of their equal citizenship status.

The religious identity imposed through textbooks goes beyond Islam: It is a state-crafted version of *Sunni-Islam*. Therefore, the textbooks become medium of homogenization through Sunnification. Despite of some amelioration attempts in this respect, the textbooks of the JDP period manifest continuity with the past. While they delineate Sunni-Islam as the ultimate legitimate belief, they simultaneously stigmatize unfitting religious identities by attaching illegitimacy and "otherness" to them. Hence, textbooks keep on reproducing hierarchical boundaries among citizens excluding non-Sunni communities, Alevis being one of them.

This chapter intends to analyze the changes and continuities in the textbook delineation of the ideal religious identity in the JDP period. A closer inspection on the reformulation of the religious identity in this period is crucial, since the incumbent government has an Islamo-conservative identity that is largely new to the political history of Turkey. Although other Islamic political parties have come to power before the JDP, they were always short-term coalition governments, which were much less potent to make ground-breaking changes in the education system. Accordingly, I aim to contribute to the literature by shedding light on the most recent reformulation of internal boundaries within the realm of Turkish citizenship.

II. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE JDP

Different governments have influenced the Turkish education system to varying degrees throughout the history of modern Turkey. Traditionally, all political parties and governments share the goals they want to achieve with education in their programs. These programs show the strong impact of the Republican period on education. Nevertheless, there

is also considerable change in this respect. The periodization[31] I use in the previous chapter is functional to track changes in the educational goals different governments have. The changes can be gathered around two major points: (1) The emphasis on the Republican and later Atatürkist values, and (2) the role crafted for religion in the curriculum. Whereas the stress on the Republican/Atatürkist spirit has no clear-cut pattern through four periods due to ups and downs, the emphasis on religion shows a more determined character of increase with the exception of military interventions. The educational ideology is largely determined with respect to the balance or imbalance between these two identity components, hence distinguishing four periods from each other. As a general characteristic of the governmental programs where educational goals are listed, Republicanism reveals itself mostly with reference to Atatürk and his ideals and reforms. On the other hand, the religionization of the national identity through education proceeds on two axes: (1) The Islamization of the compulsory education through curriculum and textbook content, and (2) the number and status of Imam Hatip Schools.

The educational policies of the Single Party Period manifest the role given to the national education in the nation-building process of unification and homogenization. The governments of this era, especially after the Law of Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*), emphasize four major goals they want to achieve in their governmental programs: (1) Through the uniformity and standardization of education, (2) they target to establish social order and discipline, (3) ensure youth's loyalty to the Turkish homeland, and (4) make it ready for real life (Dağlı and Aktürk 1988a: 29). That is, the government puts forth the aim to cultivate a more controllable and governable youth unified around same characteristics through the national education. The Program of the 1937 Bayar Government sets the goal of education more clearly for it expresses the significance of teaching citizens the national

[31] The Single Party Period, the Multiparty Period, the Post-1980 Period, and the JDP Period.

language, the national history and the national regime (Dağlı and Aktürk 1988a: 79). In other words, this government intends to build the nation through national education on ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkish identity. Hence, the program manifests the dominance of ethno-centric Turkishness within the national identity promoted in the Republican era[32]. With respect to the religious identity, the re-arrangement of the education system during the Republican period shows strong attachments to secularism. Accordingly, the process initiated with the Law of Unification of Education works for the disadvantage of the madrasas where religious staff used to be trained during the Ottoman era. Whereas they were turned into Imam Hatip Mekteps in 1924, they were abolished in 1930[33]. Imam Hatip Schools come to the agenda once again, when the RPP opens Imam Hatip Training Courses[34] in the face of a rising Democrat Party (hereafter *the DP*), which has a softer approach to religion (Ibid.).

The multiparty era witnesses the introduction of an emphasis on 'our national moral values[35]' with the DP's accession to power, thus moderating the rigidity of secularism in the government (Kaplan 1999: 218-219). In correspondence, the DP governments argue that the key to the freedom of the nation is to provide its members a national education that is compatible with the national character and traditions (Dağlı and Aktürk 1988a: 161). Nevertheless, the DP governments continue to reproduce the unity of the youth around the ideal of the homeland (Ibid.: 176). The 2nd Menderes Government ratified the decree that allows opening 7 Imam Hatip Schools in different cities in 1951[36]. Hence, the process of Islamization of the secular educational domain starts off with the DP governments. Nevertheless, this process is not a rapid one due to two fundamental reasons: (1) The embeddedness of secularism in the state ideology as well as the national education, and (2) military interventions which are generally pro-secular.

[32] For more information, please go back to Chapter Two.
[33] Accessed through http://www.imamhatipokullari.org/tarihce.html.
[34] *İmam Hatip Yetiştirme Kursları* in Turkish.
[35] *Milli manevi değerler* in Turkish.
[36] Accessed through http://www.imamhatipokullari.org/tarihce.html.

The 1960 coup is, in this regard, crucial for it is a warning from young generals to hold on to the secular identity and Kemalist motto. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the coup, both military government and elected governments set the goal of national education as raising students that have national conscious and that are attached to Atatürk's Principles and Reforms, egalitarianism, and democracy. From that point on, the subsequent governments, almost without exception, expressed their intention to raise citizens that are loyalty to the Atatürk's Principles and Reforms, secularism being one of them, (Kaplan 1999: 199-323) until the election of JDP (The 58th, 59th, 60th, and 61th Governmental Programs). Nevertheless, the state policy on Imam Hatip Schools does not undergo a change during the military government. However, with the transition to democracy, the number of Imam Hatip Schools mounts up to 71 under rule of the Justice Party (hereafter *the JP*), which is the successor of the toppled DP[37]. In addition to the rise of Imam Hatip Schools, the Islamization finds itself a place in the 1970 JP government program for it defines the nation based on religion among other bases (Dağlı and Aktürk 1988b: 181). That is, religionization of the nation gets more institutionalized since 1970.

The Islamization of the educational realm is repulsed to some extent during the 1971 military intervention. The Interim government formulates a 'National Education Reform' package where it emphasizes the embracement of unity of education, secularism, and Atatürk's Principles and Reforms (Ibid.: 200). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education publishes a booklet that enlists Ten Directives, first of which is about Atatürk's Principles, whose application in the education system is to be inspected by a commission. The increase in the stress on Atatürkist values in the education system is further reinforced with the approval of the Law on National Education (1973), which designs the educational ideology on the Atatürk Nationalism (Kaplan 1999: 240). In other words, the 1960-1980 period witnesses the

[37] Accessed through http://www.imamhatipokullari.org/tarihce.html.

augmentation of the Atatürkist tone in the education system. Yet, it is simultaneously followed by its religionization with multiplication of Imam Hatip Schools[38], which are given the high school status in 1973, accompanied with the insistence on the intention to indoctrinate national moral values, and the introduction of the compulsory morality course in 1974 (Ibid.: 241-262). Interestingly, the Islamization of the national identity through education is not only initiated by the conservative governments, which are known for their moderate take on secularism. Such policies are also included in the governmental programs of the more secularism-oriented governments like the 1977 RPP government, which posits itself on the center-of-the-left on the political spectrum. The Islamization goes as far as defining Islam as one of the building blocks of the nation (Ibid.: 252). Therefore, an analysis of the multiparty era, especially the 1960-1980 period, illustrates that until1980, the national identity is formulated on two main axes: Atatürkism and Islam. This formulation is further institutionalized when the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is officially accepted as the state ideology after the 1980 coup.

The September 12 military regime, like previous military interventions, pauses the increasing number of Imam Hatip High schools for a while. Notwithstanding, as the new regime introduces the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, it fosters Islamization further. One of the major signs of the religionization of the national identity is the introduction of compulsory Religion course, which is dominated by Sunni-Islamic religious information. The officialization of the Islamic identity through the Religion course is an attempt to contain the undergoing Islamization within the limits set by the state. Accordingly, an assessment of the Religion textbooks between 1980 and 2002 show that the Islamic information is often counter-balanced with Atatürkist claims. In other words, during the post-1980 period, the national education system tries to establish a balance between the Islamic and secular-

[38] The number of Imam Hatip Schools reaches to 374 in 1980, and the number of students enrolled in these schools manifests 904,5% increase from 1973 to 1978 (Ibid.).

Republican aspects of the national identity[39]. This intention to balance also reveals itself with the introduction of 'Atatürk's Principles and Reforms' as a compulsory course in universities. Meanwhile, Islamization continues through the spread of Imam Hatip High Schools. Although their number does not rise in the post-1980 period, by opening new branches for the already-existing Imam Hatip high schools, a similar expansion effect is created[40]. Put differently, in the educational realm, the Islamization largely proceeds through the compulsory Religion course, and the growing number, thus influence of Imam Hatip High Schools.

The February 28 intervention is operated in this context particularly against the Islamization of the political, economic and social domains of society by the secularist Turkish Armed Forced. The February 28 process cuts back the Islamization to a degree by two methods: The first one is the introduction of the 8-year compulsory education, which is designed as a continuous model, involving the 6^{th}, 7^{th}, and 8^{th} grades into the primary school. Accordingly, this policy led to the shutdown of Imam Hatip Secondary Schools. The second method to deal with Islamization in the February 28 process is the implementation of a different coefficient system for the graduates of Imam Hatip High Schools, thus disadvantaging them in the University Entrance Exam. These two methods attempted to cut down the rising popularity and influence of Imam Hatip schools. In this respect, the February 28 intervention directly targeted the national education system to control the Islamization of the national identity reproduced at schools. All in all, the pre-JDP period is characterized by not only the institutionalization of the Turkish-Islamic identity, but also a rivalry between the Turkish identity designated according to the Atatürk nationalism, and the Islamic identity. In other words, the pre-JDP era witnesses the efforts of the political and military elites to

[39] I will elaborate more on this balance later in the chapter.
[40] Accessed through http://www.imamhatipokullari.org/tarihce.html.

delicately contain the Islamic identity and balance it with Atatürkism. In this way, the promoted religious identity is a state-tailored and nationalized version of Islam[41].

Having split from an ultra-Islamist political party as a group of progressives, the JDP's accession to the government without a coalition partner prepares the ground for the speculations for the high possibility of further Islamization of the national identity. Associating itself with a *conservative-democrat* political identity, the JDP's claim to gradual reformation feeds these suspicions. Nevertheless, the party documents largely present a democratic and pluralistic image rather than an Islamist one. For instance, portraying itself as the advocate of gradual reformation based on the politics of compromise (2023 Political Vision Document), the JDP defines itself as a supporter of rights and freedoms for everyone. In this respect, it prioritizes the significance of the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience and religion. With regard to these freedoms, the JDP attracts attention to the essentiality of secularism and equality. Additionally, it calls "*our differences*" as "*our riches*" thus envisioning a pluralistic society (Ibid., and The JDP Party Program). Accentuating on "tolerance" to difference, the JDP declares its intention to "embrace all our citizens without discrimination, irrespective of their gender, ethnic origins, beliefs and worldviews" (Ibid.). What is more, it clarifies that their conservative identity involves gradual change rather than sticking to the status-quo. About that, the 2023 Political Vision document announces the party's plan to realize their goals for a more democratic and plural society with a "Silent Revolution" (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the basis of the intention to create a pluralistic society indicates more than a conservative-democrat identity, as it has a fundamental Islamic aspect. Accordingly,

[41] As explained in this section, since the beginning of the multiparty era, the inculcation of a nationalized and state-controlled religious identity has become a major objective of the national education system. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state did not encourage any religious identity, nor it prompted the Islam of the Mohammedan era in the Republican period. On the contrary, a secularized, modernized, and nationalized version of religious identity was supported as the 'right' Islam since the foundation of the Republic (Parla 1992: 288 in Altan-Olcay 2007: 200-201). Yet, due to strong attachment to secularism, religion did not find any place in the governmnetal programs of the single party period.

the 61th Governmental Program founds the party's anti-discrimination discourse on the motto of "Love the created for the Creator's sake", thus establishing a causal relationship between Islam and plurality (2011). In other words, it lauds pluralism not because different identities are equally valuable, but because everyone is created by the same God. This implies the preponderance of religion for the JDP. Keeping in mind the organic links it used to have with radical Islamist Virtue Party, the reformulation of religious identity under the JDP rule becomes a focus of debate. Hence, combining the party's Islamic identity with its claim to a 'Silent Revolution', probing the religious identity-formation during the JDP period becomes a fair starting point.

The reformist character of the party manifests itself in the education system about which the 2002 Party Program signals the intention to *change*. The JDP does not take the education system as a major focus of debate until 2011when they remove the difference in the coefficient system that disadvantaged the Imam Hatip graduates' entrance into universities. However, the most fundamental change comes with the introduction of the 4+4+4 system in 2012. The new system establishes the 12-year-compulsory education by dividing the process into three periods of four years each period consecutively standing for primary school, secondary school and high school. The new 12-year system influences the level of Islamization in the education realm on two grounds: (1) It replaces the continuous 8-year system with a 3-staged education system, hence enabling the opening of Imam Hatip Secondary Schools, and (2) it introduces a package of electives to be taken since the secondary school, which now starts from the fifth grade.

Among others, three electives require special attention: *The Basic Religious Knowledge*, *The Life of the Prophet Mohammad*, and *the Koran*, all of which specialize on Islamic information, particularly the Sunni interpretation of it. The students who are willing to improve their knowledge on Islam may benefit from them. Nevertheless, many reluctant

students, including the ones with non-Muslim religious identities, may be trapped by the poorly-arranged system and find themselves enrolled in these electives due to lack of alternative courses to be taken in lieu of them. In other words, non-Muslim and non-Sunni students who are studying at schools other than officially recognized minority schools may have to select these electives, since most schools are short of opening all electives enlisted by the Ministry of Education. This problem arises from the imposed quota for the enrollment of minimum 10 students to offer any of the elective courses at schools (ERG 2012: 6). In this case, those who do not want to take these Islam-oriented electives may find themselves obliged to enroll in them to complete the minimum credit threshold from electives to graduate. Hence, the 4+4+4 system turns into a mechanism of Islamization and Sunnification of the curriculum to a larger extent. Add to that, the JDP refuses to remove the much-debated legacy of the September 12 regime, i.e. the compulsory Religion course, which has a strong Islamic character. Assuming that possible change in the religious aspect of the national identity can find place in the textbooks of the compulsory Religion course, I will primarily focus on them to provide a snapshot of the JDP era[42].

In sum, the Islamo-conservative identity of the JDP seems to find reciprocation in the education system. The novelties of the new education system, however, need a much deeper probe to reach a more detailed account of the JDP era textbooks. In this regard, comparing new textbooks with the ones that were in use just before the JDP's accession to power is telling about the recent changes in the textbook envision of the desirable religious identity. With this in mind, I will compare select textbooks from 2000 and 2012 on the intensity of three themes: (1) Atatürkism, (2) Islam compared to other religions, and (3)Sunnism.

[42] This study could have been reinforced with the analysis of the three Islam-oriented electives which are introduced with the 4+4+4 system. Additionally, the curriculum of Imam Hatip Schools could have provided rich insight about the state envision of the ideal religious identity during the JDP era. However, due to time restrictions, I limit my study with the analysis of three compulsory courses: The Life Sciences, Social Sciences, and Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge.

III. FROM NATIONALIZATION OF THE RELIGION TO RELIGIONIZATION OF THE NATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS IN 2000 AND 2012

A. The Role of Atatürkism as a Counter-balancer of the Islamic Identity

As elaborated in the previous section, Atatürkism has started in the 1960s and has become much institutionalized in the 1980s with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which led to the introduction of Atatürkism and Atatürk nationalism into the 1982 Constitution. By the same token, a course named 'Atatürk's Principles and Reforms' is made mandatory for all university students after September 12. More specifically, especially since 1980, Atatürkism is used as a counter-balancer of the promoted Islamic identity. Atatürkist interpretation of religion, i.e. Islam, is different from the Islam of the Mohammedan era. This means Atatürkism is used as a tool to inculcate the 'right' Islam, which is secularized, rationalized, thus nationalized form of Islam (Parla 1992: 288 in Altan-Olcay 2007: 200-201, Altan-Olcay 2009: 171). Although the JDP period continues with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as the major foundation of the ideal Turkishness, this period witnesses transition with respect to the re-formulation of the religious identity. In this respect, the JDP era textbooks continue to promote Atatürkism, but they spare less space for it. Especially in Religion textbooks, where Atatürkism is often used to secularize and rationalize the religious identity in the pre-JDP era, the decline of Atatürkism shows that 2012 textbooks slowly get distanced from this method of containment of the Islamic identity.

To better trace Atatürkism in textbooks it is essential to understand how it is used in textbooks. A fifth grade Social Sciences textbook defines Atatürkism as a system of thought which reflects Atatürk's objectives to improve the country in political, economic, social, scientific and artistic realms (Başol et al. 2012: 43). This definition pinpoints the significance of *Atatürk's Principles and Reforms*. Accordingly, after defining what Atatürkism is, the

textbook continues with a descriptive account of these principles and reforms. Therefore, when tracing Atatürkism in textbooks, the extent to which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his principles and reforms are emphasized and praised is helpful.

The students meet with Atatürkism in the first year of the primary school with Life Sciences course. In the fourth and fifth grades, the Life Sciences is replaced with the Social Sciences with a similar yet more advanced content. Both courses, first, eulogize Atatürk's persona over the Independence War, and then this positive image is used to promote his principles and reforms. In this way, textbooks aim to transform students' identity and behavior and try to make them desirable citizens who internalize Atatürkism.

As part of the first step of construction of Atatürkism in textbooks, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is presented as the savior and leader of the Turkish nation for he is depicted as the *sole* and wise initiator of the Independence War (1919-1922) against *occupiers* and *enemies*[43] who want to divide and share *our homeland* among themselves. In terms of the laudatory discourse used for the Independence War, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's role in it, the 2000 and 2012 textbooks are quite similar. Below, there are two quotations from the Life Sciences textbooks, the first from 2000 and the latter from 2012:

> "We won *the Independence War* under *the leadership of Mustafa Kemal*. At the end of the war, we throw away the enemies from *our homeland*. We attained *our independence*. In October 29, 1923, the republic is declared. The name of *our state* became *the Republic of Turkey*. Each year, we celebrate the October 29s as the Republican Day" (Komisyon 2000: 56).

> "*Leading the Turkish nation*, Atatürk saved *our homeland* from enemies. After *the Independence War*, he founded *the State of Republic of Turkey* by proclaiming the Republic in October 29, 1923" (Dalkılıç and Gölge 2012: 49).

Both of the quotations reveal the same messages: First, the Independence War is presented as a legitimate war, since 'we' take what belongs to 'us' from occupying enemies. Second, the leadership of the legitimized independence movement is given to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,

[43] Greeks and Western Powers led by Britain and France.

who saved ‘our homeland’ and ‘our nation’ from enemies and led to the declaration of the Republic in 1923. Likewise, the discourse of textbooks on Atatürk’s Principles and Reforms do not change from 2000 to 2012, as they keep the exalting language. Despite of continuity in terms of discourse, the number of pages devoted to the Independence War, and Atatürk’s Principles and Reforms decreases in 2012. Table 1 below shows this decline:

Number of Pages (Year: 2000)	**Independence War**	**Atatürk's Principles and Reforms**
Life Sciences	76	0
Social Sciences	27,5	24,5
Religion	11	7
Total	**114,5**	**31,5**
Number of Pages (Year: 2012)	**Independence War**	**Atatürk's Principles and Reforms**
Life Sciences	51	1
Social Sciences	27	9
Religion	10,5	1
Total	**88,5**	**11**

Table 1: Distribution of pages across two topics in three courses.

According to the table, the Independence War is mostly discussed in Life Sciences textbooks both in 2000 and 2012. They are followed by Social Sciences textbooks and Religion textbooks respectively. This means that the Independence War is taught mostly in the first three years of primary school. That is, the students meet with Atatürk nationalism embedded in the foundation history as soon as they start school. Comparing 2000 with 2012 Life Sciences textbooks, I observe a decline of 32,9% (from 76 to 51) with respect to the number of pages reserved for the Independence War. This shows that although the laudatory discourse on the War and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s role in it stays the same, the place reserved for this topic narrows down to some extent. This implies some decay in the intensity of Atatürkism in textbooks. Nevertheless, it must be backed by further evidence.

As a continuation of the Life Sciences course, which is taught in the first three years, the Social Sciences course continues to teach students about the Independence War and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's leading role in it. Since Social Sciences course is a combination of History and Geography, it is expected to transmit the official history. In this respect, the 2000 and 2012 Social Sciences textbooks make almost equal emphasis (27,5 to 27) on the Independence War. Knowing that discourse does not change, either, I claim that there is no change in Social Sciences textbooks in the JDP era.

With respect to the Religion course, there is no meaningful change (11 to 10,5) in 2012, either. Hence, the overall decrease in the place given to the discussion on the Independence War and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's part in it results from the decay in the Life Sciences textbooks. Since this decay is only observed in one of the courses, the overall decline in 2012 (from 114,5 to 88,5) cannot be used as a strong evidence to support the decrease of Atatürkism in the 2012 textbooks.

Nonetheless, with respect to the discussion on Atatürk's Principles and Reforms, there is a more significant change of 65% (from 31,5 to 11) in 2012. Life Sciences textbooks spare almost no place for these principles and reforms, probably because they are complicated issues for the first three years of primary school. Nevertheless, in Social Sciences textbooks, there is more than 63% of decrease from 24,5 pages reserved for this issue to 9 pages. This result supports my argument on the downward tendency of the embedded Atatürkism in textbooks.

The Religion textbooks give a similar yet more interesting result. In 2000 Religion textbooks, 7 pages are spared for Atatürk's principles and reforms. Looking at which of the principles and reforms are discussed in these textbooks, I realize that it is only *secularism*. In other words, the compulsory religion course, which is renowned for its Islamic character is balanced with Atatürkism and particularly with secularism. This means that although the state

wants to foster an Islamic identity among its citizens, it also contains it with the inculcation of Atatürk's principles with a special emphasis on secularism. In this way, the state endeavors to *nationalize* and to some extent *secularize* the religious aspect of the national identity. As a general result of this aim, the religion textbooks, which are almost entirely reserved for Islamic information, often gives irrelevant and anachronistic references to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his love for the nation and the homeland, the sacrifices he made during the founding years of the Republic and how secularism he established is suitable for *our religion Islam*. In addition to this basic package of Atatürkism in the 2000 Religion textbooks, the Islamic identity is also stabilized with quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As a general trend in religion textbooks of 2000, religious information and/or argumentation are supported in a hierarchy of sanctity: (1) a verse from the Koran, and/or (2) a hadith from the Prophet Mohammad, and (3) a quotation from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk[44], in a fashion in which all three affirm each other. Therefore, even though the founder of the Republic is not a cleric, he is presented as a major source of religious information.

In a fourth grade Religion textbook from 2000, the section entitled "The Personal Gains of Worship"[45] is quite explicative about the inclusion of Atatürkism in the religious sphere to rationalize, secularize and nationalize the Islamic identity. Briefly, the 7-page-long text[46] first mixes the Islamic religious services (e.g. fasting and obligatory alms) with desirable mundane behaviors (e.g. cleanliness and strenuousness) and rationalizes them based on their practical benefits:

> "Fasting, studying and caring for cleanliness are beneficial for humans. Fasting gives a rest to our body. Cleanliness prevents germs that cause diseases harm our body, and contributes to the protection of our health... Giving the obligatory alms, helping the poor, greeting, and visiting the sick are also religious services. These services make people have closer relations, and improve the love and sincerity among them. They

[44] There are also two other, but less frequent, combinations: (1) a Koranic verse and a quotation from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and (2) a Koranic verse and a hadith.
[45] The original title is "İbadetin Bize Kazandırdıkları" in Turkish.
[46] The entire chapter spared for "Religious Service" is 16 page-long.

> enhance the feelings of unity, fraternity, cooperation and solidarity" (Canbulan 2000: 47).

The quotation puts the religious and the non-religious in the same basket and brings rational explanations to each of them. The rationalization is a tool to subtly prepare a solid ground for the legitimization of the secular identity to stabilize the Islamic identity. Confirming this argument, the text takes a sharp U turn and addresses the freedom of religion and conscience, and secularism out of the blue. Unsurprisingly, the leading role is given to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the *rationalization, nationalization* and *secularization* of the religious identity, after a quotation from a Koranic verse:

> "According to our religion, people have no right to force each other about thoughts and beliefs, because the God Almighty does not permit this with his command: **'There is no compulsion in religion'**. The founder of our Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has cared for the freedom of religion and conscience… Atatürk explains his ideas on this issue with these words: **'No one's thoughts and conscience can be dominated. The freedom of conscience is absolute.' 'In the Republic of Turkey, each adult is free in choosing his religion.'**" (Ibid.: 49, *emphasis in the original*).

In the passage, the religious identity is rationalized and balanced with reference to the significance Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gives to the freedom of religion and conscience, which are non-religious concepts. The fundamental reason underneath the stress on freedom of religion and conscience is opening the discussion of secularism and how appropriate it is to *our religious belief Islam*. Accordingly, the passage develops with a quotation from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk defining secularism with regard to religious freedoms:

> **"Secularism is not only about the separation of religious and mundane affairs. It is also about the freedom of conscience, worship and religion"** (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı[47] 1998: 111 in Canbulan 2000: 49, *emphasis in the original*).

The harmony between the Islamic and secular identities is implicitly constructed in the last two excerpts, as the passage links a Koranic reference to quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk enlisting the virtues of freedom of conscience guaranteed by secularism. Put

[47] *Presidency of General Staff.*

differently, the Koranic verse is used to support secularism indirectly, as both the verse and secularism are in support of freedom of religion and conscience.

There are two striking characteristics of this narrative: First, the author is trapped in anachronism, since he substantiates a modern concept, i.e. the freedom of religion and conscience, with a pre-modern religious script. Second, and more relevant to my research objective, the 7-page-long text on "The Personal Gains of Worship" turns into a long piece of indoctrination through the remarks of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on Islam, freedom of conscience and secularism. As a simple indicator of the intensity of Atatürkism in a section about worship, the distribution of quotations is quite revealing: Over a total of 13 quotations, only one is a Koranic verse. Whereas there are 10 quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the resting 2 are from the Constitution. Moreover, the Religion textbook quotes his statements from four secondary sources, two of which are entitled as *Atatürkism I-III* and another as *Atatürkist Ideology*, all of which are prepared by the Presidency of the General Staff.

Altogether, both discourse and content analyses of the 2000 Religion textbooks illustrate that Atatürkism is used as a method to construct a modern and secularized interpretation of Islam as the ideal form of religious identity and this 'right' form of Islam is different from the Islam of the Mohammedan era. On the contrary, going back to Table 1 above, the 2012 Religion textbooks do not follow this path as they provide less space for Atatürk's principles. Yet, this one page, which is on secularism, also means that JDP era Religion textbooks *still* function as transmitters of Atatürkist ideology. Similar to the 2000 Religion textbooks, their 2012 counterpart gives space to secularism for one page as part of the discussion on worshipping. Like the 2000 textbooks, it praises secularism as the key to freedom of conscience and religion. Additionally, it shares quotations from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to accentuate on the significance of secularism. However, the 2012 interpretation of secularism in the Religion textbook does not use any religious quotation to buttress the virtues

of secularism, although the 2000 ones use Koranic verses and hadiths for this purpose (Canbulan 2000, Tanrıverdi 2000, Akgül et al. 2012: 53). This means that the 2012 Religion textbooks do not manifest a complete break with Atatürkism, but it makes quantitatively less and discursively softer emphasis on it. This shows us that the intensity of Atatürkism is lower in the JDP era textbooks than those of the pre-JDP era.

Another indicator of the downward tendency of Atatürkism in 2012 is the frequency of secularism. In compliance with previous assessments on the JDP era, the 2012 textbooks make less stress on secularism. Chart 1 and 2 below reveal the decline in word and code frequencies of secularism in 2012:



Chart 1: Comparative frequency of secularism in all textbooks published in 2012.



Chart 2: Comparative distribution of frequency Concerning the use of word and code "secularism" in religion textbooks published in 2012.

According to Chart 1, the use of word and code "secularism" decreases in all textbooks[48] manifesting a general fall in 2012. A similar pattern is caught in the Religion textbooks, too. These charts further support the decay in the Atatürkist tone of the textbooks measured by the emphasis they give on secularism. Interpreting them together reveals more interesting results. For instance, the 'secularism' word is used almost exclusively (46/47) in religion textbooks in

[48] These textbooks are the Life Sciences, Social Sciences and Religion textbooks that I analyzed.

2000. This implies how often religion textbooks benefit from the secular identity, which is part of the Atatürkist ideology, to secularize and nationalize the religious aspect of the national identity. When the same comparison is applied to 2012 textbooks, it is observed that 5 of 16 times the word 'secularism' is used in Religion textbooks. In other words, whereas the word 'secularism' is used to define religious identity, it is used in the non-religious context for 11 times (16-5) in 2012. Hence, in contrast to the 2000 textbooks where word 'secularism' is almost exclusively used in the religious context to secularize and nationalize the idealized religious identity, the 2012 textbooks use the term mostly in the non-religious context. This finding also supports the decay in Atatürkism in the religious sphere. However, when rating all textbooks to only religion textbooks, the frequency of code 'secularism' does not show a difference. Yet, word to code ratio tells us another thing: the Chart 2 illustrates that in 4 seperate quotations I selected and coded with 'secularism' in 2000 Religion textbooks, the word 'secularism' is used 46 times. That is to say, in every quotation coded with 'secularism', the average number of word 'secularism' used is 11,5. Nevertheless, this ratio is 3,91 (47/12) in all textbooks in 2000. This result tells us that in Religion textbooks, the word 'secularism' is more intensively repeated than in Life Sciences and Social Sciences in 2000. In that sense, when secularism is the matter of debate, Religion course reiterate the word 'secularism' more than other courses to highlight it more. In 2012, however, the word/code intensity is almost equal when comparing the religion textbooks (5/1) to all textbooks (16/3). This also manifests decreasing emphasis on secularism, and accordingly Atatürkism in Religion textbooks in 2012. However, one must keep in mind that despite decline in the JDP era textbooks in general, and Religion textbooks among them in particular, they still keep reproducing the national identity with relation to Atatürkism.

Notwithstanding, the decline of Atatürkism in textbooks coincides with the further Islamization of the national identity. Since Atatürkism is the legacy of the September 12

regime to nationalize the religious aspect of the national identity, its retreat accompanied with increasing Islamization leads to the religionization of the national identity. This tendency reflects itself not only with the decline of Atatürkist references. The *rationalization* that is attached to the *secularization* also loses ground, when the religious tone is enhanced in 2012. In consequence, different from the 2000 Religion textbooks, the 2012 Religion textbooks bring religion-oriented explanations to scientifically explicable incidents in the nature. For instance, the fifth grade Religion textbook claims that the "Formation of rain and snow, the movement of the sun and the moon, the day and night cycle, the formation of seasons, the circulation of planets around their orbits at a constant speed, and the difference of fruits and vegetables in color and in taste" are all indicators of the existence of one and only God that is in full control of the universe (Akgül et al. 2012: 13). This approach completely ignores the scientific accounts and instead gives a religious explanation as the ultimate truth. This is an attempt to religionize the non-religious sphere. In order to prove the existence of the God, the text in question could have pursued another path of argumentation where the scientific explanations are not so entirely or explicitly dismissed. Keeping the general tendency of the Religion textbooks to identify *Islam as our religion* in mind, it is not hard to discern that the increasing religiosity is signaling further Islamization of the mundane affairs and the scientific information. The choice of this narrative, hence, is elucidative of the mounting Islamic tone in the 2012 Religion textbooks which try to make students perceive the world through the lenses of religion.

B. ***Further*** **Islamization of the National Identity: "Our Religion Islam"**

The 2000 textbooks manifest continuity with the post-1980 era, which puts Islam at the center of the discussion, thus associating the nation exclusively with Islam in terms of religious identity. Like pre-JDP Religion textbooks, the new textbooks identify Islam as *our*

religion. Yet, the previous section illustrated how current textbooks decrease the intensity of Atatürkism, which has been used as a catalyst to secularize, and nationalize the religious identity of the ideal Turkish citizen since the 1980s. In this section, I will elaborate on the upward trend in the Islamization of the national identity. Combining the decrease in Atatürkism, and increase in the stress on Islamic identity, I claim that the JDP era takes a step back from the nationalization of the religion and attempts to further Islamize the national identity. To illustrate this, examining the association between the national identity and Islam might be helpful:



Chart 3: Percentage Change of Co-occurrence between "The National Identity" and "Islam".

According to Chart 3, when coding the 2000 textbooks, almost 91% of the times I used the code 'National Identity', I simultaneously used the code 'Islam' in the 2000 textbooks. This percentage goes up to almost 98% in 2012 when the national identity almost simultaneously co-occurs with Islam in the Religion textbooks. These results reveal that although in both periods Islam is a crucial part of the national identity, the significance of Islam increases by approximately 8% in 2012. Despite the fact that this rise is single-digit, I interpret it as important for the association between the national identity and Islam was already very high in 2000. Combining this result with the decline of Atatürkism as the counter-balancer of the

religious identity, I claim that the JDP era textbooks further Islamize the national identity, and reproduce the hierarchy within nation accordingly.

The intensification of Islam reveals itself more clearly, when compared with the change in the representation of *other religions*. Although neither in 2000, nor in 2012, textbooks use a pejorative language against other religious beliefs, their absence in textbooks tells us about the Islamic character of ideal Turkish identity. Since repetition is a significant tool to inseminate the ideal and the desirable one through textbooks, interpreting frequencies of certain words can be helpful. In this respect, the 2012 textbooks show a denser Islamic identity, because of a more discernable presence of the Islamic concepts compared to the non-Islamic ones. To start with, a comparative word count analysis on these textbooks shows a declining tendency in the frequency of all religions that are under my inspection, except for the small positive change in Alevism and Bektashism[49]:

Religious Beliefs	**Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2000) (#)**	**Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2012) (#)**	**Total Rate of Increase (%)**
Islam	239	219	-8,36%
Christianity	6	4	-33,33%
Judaism	8	2	-75%
Alevism	0	2	incalculable (+)
Bektashism	0	3	incalculable (+)
Qizilbashism	0	0	None

Table 2: Word count frequency table on religious beliefs in textbooks.

According to Table 2, Islam is by far the most pronounced religion in both 2000 and 2012 textbooks, where there is either very little or no place for other religious beliefs. The fall (<9%) in Islam in 2012 is not meaningful, since the quantitative gap between Islam and other beliefs are still too large. Based on this data, it is evident that the density of Islamic references is simultaneously backed by the retreat of other religions from textbooks. The meager

[49] I will spare a special section on Alevism, Bektashism and Qizilbashism in the following pages. My current focus is to show the centrality of Islam in textbooks compared to other religions.

increase in Alevism and Bektashism might be the insufficient results of *the Alevi Opening* project, which was initiated by the JDP government under intense pressure from the Alevi organizations. Nevertheless, the scanty change in this regard is not enough to alter the intense Islamic tone in textbooks. What is more, irrespective of increase or decrease in 2012, the non-Muslim and non-Sunni identities can be treated as almost completely absent, as the number of mentions to their identity is not much higher than zero. This table manifests that both 2000 and 2012 textbooks use the method of silence with regard to these identity communities. These results also support the argument on further Islamization of the ideal religious identity. In this way, while Muslims are subtly situated at the top of the hierarchy within the imagined nation, non-Muslim and non-Sunni identities are given to lower positions. Accompanied with the increasing association between "the National Identity" and "Islam" in Chart 3, one can claim that the Islamization is assisted by either withdrawal or absence of other religious beliefs in textbooks.

The increasing Islamization of the ideal Turkish identity is also reflected in the relative change of frequency in the presence of three major prophets in the 2012 textbooks. Chart 4 below demonstrates the frequency of these prophets' names in textbooks:



Chart 4: Total frequency comparison of three major prophets: Mohammad, Jesus and Moses.

According to Chart 4, whereas textbooks makes around 88% more mentions to Mohammad in 2012, the references to Jesus decreases by 63%, and those to Moses by more than 95%. Although the percentage rate is meaningful for the representation of the Prophet Mohammad, it is not meaningful for the other prophets, since their presence was already very low. Despite of an already existing gap between the occurrence of the Prophet Mohammad and the other prophets, the decline in the JDP era demonstrates a much larger gap in terms of representation of different religious communities. These rates enhance my argument on the increasing Islamization of textbooks not only by the increase in the Islamic identity, but also by the retraction of the non-Islamic ones. This trend explicates that during the JDP period, while the Islamic identity gets tenser, the religious hierarchy within nation gets more marked than previous eras, thus distancing the Christian and Jewish identities from students' imagination of nationhood. As non-Muslim identities are ignored rather than being presented as part of the nation, they are assigned to lower echelons within nation. A similar tendency is illustrated in the number of mentions to holy books:

Holy Books	**Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2000) (#)**	**Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2012) (#)**	**Total Rate of Increase (%)**
Koran	69	126	82,60%
Bible	5	1	-80%
Torah	5	2	-60%

Table 3: Frequency distribution of holy books in the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks.

The analysis results in Table 3 corroborate my previous remarks on the Islamization of textbooks through an increase in the Islamic identity reinforced by a decrease in the non-Islamic ones. The reverse tendency in the representation of holy books of the Muslims and non-Muslims accompanied with near absence of non-Muslim holy books draw the boundaries of the national identity more strongly in favor of the dominant Muslim identity. The last indicator to substantiate the upward trend in the Islamic identity is the distribution of references to places of worship among three religions:



Chart 5: The number of co-occurrence between "The Place of Worship" and three major religions.



Chart 6: Word count results for "Mosque", "Church" and "Synagogue".

The Chart 5 and 6 straightforwardly express the strong emphasis textbooks put on mosques as the ultimate places of worship. The stress on churches shows an upward trend, however, the number of mentions is too low to be meaningful. Synagogues are equally ignored in both 2000 and 2012. Although not visible in Chart 5, the code "the Place of Worship" is used 12 times in the 2000 textbooks and 19 times in the 2012 textbooks, pointing out a co-occurrence percentage of 91,66% (11/12) in 2000 and 94,7% (18/19) in 2012. Based on these results, "the Place of Worship" is almost simultaneously associated with Islam. Combining the findings of Charts 4, 5, 6 and Table 3, I came to the conclusion that large gap between the representation of Muslim and non-Muslim identities gets even larger by multiplication of Islamic references and unchanging silence on non-Muslim identities. By employing such a representation, textbooks attach non-Muslim identities to a subordinate position without the need to use negative connotations for non-Islamic beliefs.

As I have already argued, the general tendency in textbooks is to *ignore* the non-Islamic rather than to *exclude* it explicitly. Correspondingly, the codes "Christianity" and

"Judaism" never concur with neither of the following codes: "They"[50], "Enemy", "Occupier", "Collaborator", "Internal Threat", and "External Threat" in the 2000 textbooks. Nevertheless, as a break from the past, Christians are portrayed as "They – The Other" and "Enemy" once in a fifth grade Religion textbook from 2012. The text in question is the background story of *"the Elephant Sura"*[51]. The story tells us the dreadful devastation of a Yemeni governor's army, who came to Mecca to stop the expansion of Islam by conquering the city and opening a church there (Akgül et al. 2012: 92). Because the army is ruined by the God's miracle, the cause of the Muslim to protect and expand Islam's area of influence gets spiritualized as well as legitimized, in the face of *the enemy of our religion: Islam*. Besides the marginalizing discourse, this text is also significant for no other prayers are presented with a background story. In this respect, keeping the exclusionary character of the story in mind, telling this story is a deliberate choice to present Christians as hostile, although it is a one-time attempt. Despite the fact that the fifth grade Religion textbook from 2000 includes the same prayer and its meaning in Turkish, it does not share the background story without which the student cannot anticipate that the depicted enemy is Christian (Tanrıverdi 2000: 54). Therefore, the 2012 textbook takes a more offensive stance against Christians than the 2000 ones do. Yet, since it is just a single example, it is not enough to change the 'method of silence' to 'method of exclusion', in which an explicitly hostile language is used. In this respect, I maintain that the ignorance of the 2000 textbooks is replicated in the 2012 textbooks. However, combining the continuity of ignorance with the growing Islamic character of the national identity in the JDP era, the lower position of non-Muslim identities in the students' imagination of the nation gets more solidified.

Growing Islamization of the ideal Turkish identity also manifests itself with textbooks' inclination to broaden Islam's area of influence and promote Islamo-conservative

[50] I used this code exclusively to mark the marginalizing language concerning "the ones that do not belong to 'us'", i.e. 'the other'.
[51] *Fil Suresi* in Turkish.

behaviors and actions through textbooks. In this way, the textbooks not only set the 'right' form of belief, it also determines the 'right' form of daily actions and behaviors. With regard to this, textbooks encourage a specific pattern of lifestyle where family relations and worshipping practices are re-interpreted in the JDP era textbooks.

The most evident endeavor of textbooks to inculcate an Islamo-conservative life style is the depiction of family and intra-family relations. In 2000, the topic of family is discussed in the fourth grade Social Sciences textbook, which has a chapter named "Family, School, and Social Life", where family, kinship, family relations and marriage are discussed *without any reference to religion* (Şenüver et al. 2000: 9-22). On the contrary, in the JDP era, this topic is moved to the Religion textbooks, which present a portrait of the ideal family relations in an Islamic context. More specifically, both fourth and fifth grade Religion textbooks from 2012 spare one whole chapter to family, which they define as *the first place of education* (Akgül et al. 2012: 60). The titles of these chapters are explicative of the close connection they establish between desirable family relations and Islam. Whereas the chapter in the fourth grade Religion textbook is entitled as "*Family and Religion*"[52], the one in the fifth grade textbook is named as "*The Prophet Mohammad and Family Life*". Both textbooks point at the Prophet Mohammad and his family life as *the ultimate example* for an ideal family life and intra-family relations, hence using this portrayal to boost an Islamo-conservative family life. An excerpt indicates how textbooks point him as the role model for family relations:

> "Family is the nucleus of society. The societies with strong family ties are consolidated societies. Just like he is the role model for us in every aspect of life, he is our role model in his family life, too. The Koran explains this issue as follows: **'The Messenger[53] is certainly a beautiful example for you, for those who wish to attain Allah and the judgment day, and for those who calls Allah's name very much'**" (Akgül et al. 2012: 60, *emphasis in the original*).

[52] The "religion" the textbook refers to is Islam.
[53] The original word is *Resullullah*, which means the Messenger of Allah's Word, pointing at the Prophet Mohammad.

The passage takes the institution of family at the center in an attempt to construct an Islamo-conservative society though the laudable image of the Prophet Mohammad. The mission given to him as the role model for the society gets the divine affirmation from Koran, thus legitimizing and encouraging his behaviors for students. Moreover, constructing an image of family based on the manners of the Prophet of Islam, whose role modelling qualities are applauded by a Koranic verse, is a clear attempt to increase the Islamic identity in society through the family organization. In other words, pointing the Prophet Mohammad's characteristics in the context of family life intends to turn a religious identity into practice, thus expanding the influence of area of the religious identity.

The text develops with a detailed description of the Prophet's relations with the members of his family. Briefly, he is depicted as a caring father and a loving husband endeavoring for the happiness of his family. Accordingly, he is portrayed as "a compassionate *head of the household*" and the source of bliss in the family (Ibid.). Despite of the narrative's attempt to reproduce patriarchy in family, the text deliberately refers to his respectful and affectionate manners to his daughters and wives, to whom he consults before taking decisions (Ibid.). Thus, the delineated family relations are conservative yet not radically Islamist. This mild stance in family relations is compatible with the JDP's *moderate Islamism* signaling the influence of the party ideology on textbook portrayals of ideal citizens. However moderate it is, textbooks reveal indications of Islamization that goes beyond the levels of the pre-JDP periods.

The upward tendency in the Islamic identity during the JDP era manifests itself also with the emphasis textbooks put on the "Believers"[54]. That is, as a rupture from the previous eras, the textbooks of the JDP period address *the faithful*, *the pious*, and *the believer* more often than before. Put another way, the Islamic identity is further Islamized by the

[54] The actual words used in the textbooks are *inanan, mümin, imanlı, inançlı, iman eden*, all with the same meaning.

supplemental emphasis on *piety*. Parallel to this transition, the 2012 textbooks underscore the word *believer* more heavily than ever by using it more often in texts, and by sharing Koranic verses and hadiths that specifically address *the faithful*. This shift can be traced in the change of frequency of references to believers in textbooks:



Chart 7: The frequency of reference to the "Believer" in all textbooks from 2000 and 2012.



Chart 8: The frequency of reference to the "Believer" in the Religion textbooks from 2000 and 2012.

The Chart 7 and 8 clearly mirror the rise in the use of the word 'believer'. While there is general augmentation in all textbooks by more than 93% in 2012, the increase in the Religion textbooks is stronger with more than 111%. These findings show the stronger identification with the faith. As the piety of the 'believer' is often explained with reference to Koran and/or hadith, the discussed piety is that of the Muslim. What is more, textbooks sometimes discursively establish a relationship between being a Muslim believer and *actively* practicing the religious duties. By linking piety to worshipping practices, textbooks take piety, i.e. the Islamic identity, beyond the realm of belief to the realm of action. In correspondence, a quatrain from a poem called "The Ritual Worship (*Namaz*)" in a fifth year Religion textbook is useful in discerning the relationship between Islam, and the active piety of the believer:

"Salaah, the building block of the religion,
Illuminating the hearts,
The requirement of the belief,
The faithful performs it…"[55] (Akgül et al 2012: 33).

The quatrain clearly identifies the desirable Islamic identity with being a *practicing Muslim*, for only *the faithful* performs *the required religious duty* of the ritual worship. Accordingly, by highlighting the significance of this ritual as "the building block of the religion", and "the requirement of the belief", the poet implicitly subordinates the Islamic identification of people who do not practice the ritual worship. Hence, the piece reproduces a sense of ranking within the Muslim identity, eulogizing the active believers by calling them as the faithful, while subtly criticizing the piety of the non-practicing Muslims. A similar hierarchical tone can be felt in another quatrain on Ramadan fasting:

"Good news for the believers,
The Holy Ramadan is coming,
Let the mosques abound in the divine light,
The holy Ramadan is coming…"[56] (Ibid.: 105).

This poem, too, is exclusively a call to the Muslim believers, for whom the Ramadan is holy and for whom the place of worship is the mosque. Although the quatrain may appear as a general call to *all* Muslims at first, the high-spirited and joyful discourse that announces the arrival of a month of worship specifically to "the believers" adjoins a more worship-oriented definition of faith addressing the practicing Muslims. Likewise, the 2012 Religion textbooks heavily shares Koranic verses and hadiths whose subject is "the faithful". Since choosing these religious quotes among a broad array of alternatives is a deliberate action, the textbooks intend to mold student's religious identity towards a more Islamic and pious one.

[55] "Namaz dinin direği,
Aydınlatır yüreği,
Kulluğun bir gereği,
Müminler kılar onu…" (The original version in Turkish).

[56] "Müminlere müjde olsun,
Geliyor mübarek Ramazan,
Camiler nurla dolsun,
Geliyor mübarek Ramazan…" (The original version in Turkish).

C. One Religion = One Sect: Imposition of Sunni-Islam over Non-Sunni Communities

The imagination of Islam in textbooks has had a monolithic and homogenous character before and after the JDP alike, although its definition has changed in time. The state's insistence with the reproduction of unity and homogeneity in the nation through the indoctrination of a monolithic national identity deeply affects the textbook representation of the religion, which is fundamentally a state-crafted Sunni interpretation of Islam. The promotion of Sunnism as the religious agenda of the state has commenced with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and has continued since then. In this respect, the comparison of the 2000 textbooks with the 2012 ones manifest negligible change, as the monolithic Sunni-spirit stayed there bereft of addressing variety within Islam. With regard to this, the Sunni-dominated Religion textbooks have become a focus of debate, for the non-Sunni students are responsible from the compulsory Religion course, too. Although many other religious identity groups are affected by this monist implementation, the Alevi community[57], whose population is estimated to be between 15 – 20 million (Bianet 2008), makes the strongest outcry against this state policy.

Despite the fact that Alevism is not a monolithic belief system, it has certain differences from the Sunni belief. What is more, these dissimilarities often alter their worship practices. For instance, most Alevis abstain from performing the ritual worship (*namaz*), since, according to a widely accepted story, the Holy figure Ali was assassinated in a mosque while carrying out the ritual worship (Tabatabaei 1979). Therefore, many Alevis keep away from mosques as the place of worship. Rejecting to perform the ritual worship, Alevis replaces it by the djem worship (*cem ibadeti*), which is carried out in djem houses (*cemevi*)[58]. The avoidance from the ritual worship brings along a similar take on the practice of ablution.

[57] Although there are different names used like *Bektashism* and *Qizilbashism*, the umbrella identity that is widely accepted is *Alevism*. Accordingly, I will use *Alevism* to address the entirety of these belief communities.
[58] Accessed through http://www.akmc-weil.com/59Cem-ibadeti-Nedir-nasil-Yapilir.html

In addition to the ritual worship, most Alevis do not fast during Ramadan, although some of them personally choose to practice it. In lieu of Ramadan fasting, they have three different fasts: Masum-u Pak (The Fourteen Infallibles), Muharrem and Hızır fasting. Accordingly, most Alevis do not celebrate the Ramadan feast. All in all, the imposition of a Sunni belief system on Alevis stirs up opposition to the compulsory Religion course which is practically a tool of Sunni indoctrination. The Alevi Opening came as a result of Alevi pressure groups against the state's Sunnification policies, including the compulsory Religion course. In 2008, the JDP Government prepared a package to answer the Alevi demands. However, the Opening proved meaningless for a great portion of the Alevi community, as no change was offered in the most fundamental sources of Sunnification policies: The Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the compulsory Religion course[59] (Aktürk 2008).

It must be noted, however, the Sunnism propaganda in the curriculum not only targets the Alevi community, since there are various other non-Sunni Muslim identities[60] that interpret Islam and religious services different from Sunnis. Nevertheless, I will sketch a comparative analysis of the Sunnism-oriented textbooks by focusing on Alevism, as the current debate on the compulsory Religion course primarily revolves around it.

In this regard, the most fundamental problem of the Religion textbooks is not only to impose Islam on every student, but also to impose it as a monolithic belief system that is bereft of multiplicity of interpretations. Hence, this state policy clearly ignores, if not excludes, the non-Sunni identities. Similar to textbooks' tendency to present Islam as *our religion* through the over-emphasis on Islam accompanied with the absence of other religions, the Sunnism is, too, promoted through a package of overdose of the one interpretation and the absence of the other. Therefore, the unity and homogeneity is reproduced without the need to take a negative stance against Alevism and other "unfitting" religious identities. As a shared

[59]Accessed through http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/gerceklesmeyen_alevi_aciliminin_anlami-894205
[60] Such as the Shaafi, the Jafari, the Zaidi, the Ismaili, the Kharidgi and many other identities.

characteristic of the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks, the Sunni code of conduct is presented as *the norm*, although they refrain from using the word "Sunni". Nevertheless, even the abstention from such a specification, which may attach an allusion of heterogeneity within Islam, is a method to enhance unity and homogeneity in the nation.

In order to construct a homogenous religious identity, the 2000 and 2012 Religion textbooks similarly benefit from the discussion on worship, first by mentioning exclusively the Sunni-Islamic religious services, and second, by giving instructions on their practice. In this way, without the need for further explanation, the Religion textbooks create a perception that equalizes *our religion* to *Sunni-Islam*. In other words, these textbooks select a specific sample of religious services from a universe of worship and present it as the norm, imposing it upon non-Sunni students, as well as the Sunni ones. In relation to this, at the first glance, the 2000 Religion textbooks exhibit an even more Sunni profile than their 2012 counterparts, despite of a stronger secular spirit they have (See Chart 1 and 2). The most significant change in the 2012 Religion curriculum is the removal of a step-by-step description of the ritual worship and ablution from the textbooks. Whereas the 2000 Religion textbook for fourth graders devotes a whole chapter of 28 pages -the longest one in the textbook- to the instructions of the ritual worship and ablution which are rendered more clear with illustrations, the 2012 Religion curriculum do not give detailed instructions. Rather, they simply introduce the ritual worship and ablution to students in a chapter about cleanliness. The passage where the ablution is briefly discussed is entitled: "The Importance of Cleanliness in Islam". After a short introduction on the significance of cleanliness in the religion supported by a hadith, the paragraph continues as follows:

> "While performing the ritual worship, the Muslim comes into the presence of God. In order to do that, the body, the clothes and the place where the religious service is to be paid must be clean. One of the requirements of the ritual worship is ablution. Thanks to ablution, certain parts of the body are washed for a couple of times everyday. According to Islam, in some occasions, the full ablution is necessary. In full ablution, one must wash the whole body" (Karahan 2012: 35-36).

This is the only part where the ablution is explained in the whole textbook. Although both the 2000 and the 2012 Religion textbooks refer to ablution, i.e. a Sunni practice, as a fundamental part of worshipping, the 2012 textbooks give much less details on the practice, hence signaling the downfall of the Sunni identity in the current textbooks. The comparison on the ritual worship reveals similar results, where the 2000 Religion textbooks give step-by-step details, even though their 2012 counterparts just make unorganized references to the ritual scattered around the textbooks. Yet, one needs further examination of textbook content to trace changes in the JDP era more confidently. The content analysis results contribute to our understanding of the recent changes in Religion textbooks. Chart 11 below illustrates the concurrence between the codes "The National Identity" and "Sunnism":



Chart 11: Comparative percentage change of co-occurrence between the codes "The National Identity" with "Sunnism" in Religion textbooks.

According to the chart, in spite of a change in the content and discourse of the Religion textbooks in 2012, the comparative analysis shows that the textbooks in question continue to stick with the Sunni indoctrination. Furthermore, there is even a small increase in the new textbooks. The explanation of this trend is simple: The recent Religion textbooks change their style of presenting the Sunni-focused information. Although they subtract the detailed explanations on the Sunni practices of worship, they scatter the Sunni references throughout textbooks and continue the reproduction of Sunnism. In other words, the new textbooks

circulate the Sunni-Islamic identity by making slight but frequent references to the Sunni worship practices rather than presenting them in clustered and intense format such as devoting a whole chapter to Ramadan fasting as in the 2000 textbooks. Therefore, although Sunnism does not vanish away, it disperses around the Religion textbooks diminishing its visibility to some extent. While the 2000 Religion textbooks explicate each pillar under short and focused chapters, the 2012 textbooks have a general chapter called "Let's Learn about Religious Service", where all five pillars of Islam are discussed for a total of 28 pages. What is more, the elaboration of Sunni rituals are not delimited within the chapter on worship, thus students are often reminded of these practices and their significance in other chapters as well. Additionally, the new textbooks release new Sunni-oriented information into circulation. The 2000 Religion textbooks speak of only Ramadan Feast and the Feast of Sacrifice[61] as *our religious special days* sparing just *one line* to both. Their counterparts in 2012, however, provide a detailed account of religious days including the Holy Nights (*Kandil*), the Qadr Night, and the Holy Fridays in addition to the two religious feasts by giving a total of *9 pages* to describe these celebrations. What intensifies the Sunnism embedded in these sacred days is the emphasis on Sunni-Islamic worships during these days. Altogether, the comparative evaluation on the 2000 and the 2012 Religion textbooks uncovers that despite of the Alevi Opening and the introduction of specialized electives on Islam, the content of the compulsory Religion course continues to prioritize the Sunni identity heavily. The frequency analysis of key terms related to Sunnism and Alevism does not announce any meaningful change, either. Table 4 presents a comparative list of these concepts under specific groups:

[61] Although Ramadan is not celebrated among most Alevis, the Feast of Sacrifice is both an Alevi and Sunni festival.

Sunnism vs. Alevism (Word Count)	Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2000) (#)	Total Frequency in Textbooks (Year: 2012) (#)	Total Rate of Increase (%)
Mohammad	413	778	88,37%
Ali	7	13	85,71%
Hızır	0	3	Incalculable (+)
Hacı Bektaş Veli	0	1	Incalculable (+)
Pir Sultan Abdal	0	0	None
Sunni	0	0	None
Alevi	0	2	Incalculable (+)
Bektashi	0	3	Incalculable (+)
Qizilbash	0	0	None
Mosque	30	64	113,33%
Djem Houses	0	0	None
The daily prayer (*Namaz*)	206	89	-56,79%
Ablution	13	11	-15,38%
Ramadan	14	61	335,71%
Fasting	65	37	-43,07%
Muharrem	0	0	None
Hızır (fasting)	0	0	None
Djem Service	0	0	None
Whirling (*Semah*)	0	0	None

Table 4: The Sunnism vs. Alevism in all textbooks.

The decline in the frequency of "the ritual worship", "ablution" and "fasting" words is unsatisfying due to the negligible presence of Alevi references compared to the Sunni ones. Moreover, Table 4 shows the undecided character of the decrease of Sunnism, as "Ramadan" and "Mosque" words are repeated more in the current textbooks, where djem houses, and Alevi fasts are never mentioned. Even though some concepts of Alevism enter into the textbooks in the JDP period, the change is so negligible that it cannot diminish the Sunnism domination in textbooks. There is still not a single reference to neither exclusively Alevi religious rituals, nor to djem houses, thus enhancing the perception of unity and homogeneity within the realm of religion through undistinguished worship practices, which has always been and continues to be central to the Sunnification in textbooks. Even though the readers encounter with the Ali figure more in the JDP era textbooks, they are uninformed about his

sacred persona as the third fundamental component of the Alevi motto: "Haqq[62]-Mohammad-Ali". Since the differences of the Alevi belief are not specified in these textbooks, mentioning the Alevi concepts a few times more does not ring the bell for the authenticity and difference of their belief from the Sunni Islam, thus textbooks keep reproducing a sense of sameness in religious identity. Depicting the nation that homogenous is problematic for at least two reasons: First, it is a clear violation of freedom of conscience and religion, and equality. Second, constructing such a homogeneity-oriented understanding of national identity may diminish the level of tolerance to dissimilar identities leading to the stigmatization of the non-Sunni identities as "the other".

IV. CONCLUSION

The Turkish nationhood has always been constructed on the unity and homogeneity of the nation as an unchanging state policy. In order to achieve this goal, the state benefitted from strictly monolithic formulations of the national identity with a clear focus on the religious and ethnic identification of Turkishness. However, it is impossible to attach stagnancy to the national identity, as the Republic's history can be divided into four major periods in which the national identity is redefined. Having covered the first three in the previous chapter, in this chapter I elaborated specifically on the JDP era with a focus on the religious aspect of national identity.

As a consequence of my comparative content and discourse analysis on the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks, I came to the conclusion that despite of claims on the contrary, the JDP continued to reproduce the exclusionary definition of Turkishness. More specifically, the national identity re-arranged by the JDP contains internal boundaries that prevent the inclusion of those with unfitting religious orientations into the imagined community. The

[62] The God.

Islamo-conservative identification of the strong JDP governments finds the occasion to change the depiction of the ideal religious identity in textbooks. This re-formulation particularly targets three identity groups: The seculars, the non-Muslims and the non-Sunnis.

Briefly, the simultaneous retreat of the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and secularism from the religion discussions and their replacement with stronger emphasis on the Prophet Mohammad and piety in textbooks imply the declining desirability of the secular identity. Moreover, the upward trend in the Islamic identity is followed by a clear decrease in the presence of non-Muslim identities in textbooks. Therefore, the JDP era textbooks constructs Turkishness based on further marginalization of the non-Muslim citizens. The Islamization is also accompanied with the continuation of the Sunnism focus in textbooks. In spite of the Alevi Opening Project, the 2012 textbooks show no substantive amelioration concerning the heavy Sunni tone they have. Altogether, the JDP period cannot go further than reproducing the hierarchy among citizens by renovating the list of internal others.

CHAPTER FOUR

I. INTRODUCTION

The textbook representation of Turkishness has preserved one characteristic through the history of the Republic: Its obscurity. While textbooks impose a fixed formulation of national identity with the intention to reproduce unity through homogeneity, the components of the homogenous identity are many times left unclear. It is this ambiguity that constructs an undecided characterization of Turkishness somewhere between the French and the German model of citizenship. This indecisiveness carves out a perception of Turkishness that is neither inclusive nor exclusive of the ill-matched identities unreservedly. Accordingly, one needs to carefully dig out the content and discourse of textbooks to find the corresponding place of the Turkish citizenship between *the jus soli* and *the jus sanguini* models.

In the previous chapter, I claimed that textbooks establish an organic link between the Islamic identity and Turkishness. Moreover, the intensity of Sunni-Islamic indoctrination becomes more palpable during the JDP period. Although religious identity is not a perfect fit for either of the models, its exclusionary spirit illustrates Germanic inclinations. Aside from the religious identification of Turkishness, *the ethnic character* of the national identity has always been at the center of the citizenship debates. The inclusion into the political community is largely determined by the level of multi-ethnic receptivity of the nation. This level is essential as it helps us find the corresponding place of the Turkish citizenship between the German and the French models. In Chapter Two, I have discussed the extent to which the ethnic Turkish identity was important in determining the boundaries of the imagined community in the previous periods. In this chapter, I aim to find out if the JDP's accession to power make significant changes in the bases of the Turkish citizenship. Based on the results of the comparative content and discourse analyses on pre-JDP and JDP era textbooks, I have

reached the conclusion that the ethnic Turkish identity is still at the center of the national identity as a major mechanism of inclusion into the exclusive community of ideal Turkish citizens. Although the volk-centered basis of Turkishness shows some increase in the JDP era, due to the insufficiency of the data, I can not claim a meaningful change. It may be interpreted as the first steps of a prospective change, nevertheless, it is too early to decide. The most confident argument I can make is that there is no improvement in terms of a shift towards a more inclusive and less assimilationist citizenship model. Thus, with regard to the dominance of ethnic Turkish identity, the JDP period manifests continuity with the pre-JDP period than change. Put differently, the Germanic tendencies of the Turkish citizenship is still overwhelming. The state's persistence on the ethnic Turkish identity necessarily distances non-Turkish ethnic communities, in spite of their citizenship status. The textbooks either ignore their heterogeneity and melt them into the ethnic Turkish identity and/or they attach a hostile and evil image to them. What is more, reproducing the legacy of the 1980, the textbooks usually label the non-Turkish communities as internal enemies supported by the external enemies against the unity and integrity of the Turkish nation and homeland. Hence, textbooks present non-Turkish communities as hostile to the Turkish nation. Due to their "undesirable" ethnic identities, they are implicitly deemed subordinate to the ethnic Turkish community and left outside of the idealized depiction of the nation.

II. THE SEMIPERMEABLE BOUNDARIES OF THE TURKISH NATION: THE AXES OF BELONGING TO "US"

A. Imagining Turkishness Without a Clear Basis

Textbooks are replete with references to "the Turk" as the nucleus of the national identity. *Turkish* is used as an adjective to qualify "*our" nation, homeland, language, alphabet, state, culture, army, country, people* and the like. Many times, however, the basis of

Turkishness is intentionally left unspecified. In Chapter Two, I have elaborated on the obscurity of Turkishness in the Republican, Multiparty and Post-1980 eras. In this respect, the JDP's control over textbooks does not make a change. In general, the textbooks construct vagueness by two methods: Whereas they sometimes leave the term completely without any basis, at other times they mix ethno-racial, ethno-linguistic and territorial references together. The vagueness of the ground on which the Turkishness is built is a major problem, as it complicates the citizenship model to which the Turkish citizenship better fits. Related to this, the boundaries of inclusion into and exclusion from the national community become less definite. Hence, textbooks construct an image of Turkishness that is open to interpretation. A quote from a third grade Life Sciences textbook illustrates how civic and ethnic identifications are jumbled together:

> "After the WWI, many parts of our homeland were shared among enemies. What left to the Turkish nation was limited to Ankara, Samsun, Sivas, Kayseri and their surroundings…The Turkish nation initiated the Independence War to regain its liberty" (The Ministry of Education 2000: 144).

The passage establishes an organic link between *our homeland* and *we, the Turkish nation*. Despite of explicit indication, the boundaries of the homeland do not reach beyond the current borders drawn to a large extent in the National Oath (*Misak-ı Milli*). In this sense, it is certain that the text attaches the Turkish nationhood to the present borders of Turkey. This implies an ethnically-blind and civic understanding of Turkishness that derives from belonging to the homeland. Nevertheless, the historical background the second sentence hints at alludes a more ethnicity-oriented interpretation of the national identity. Although this background is not provided in the paragraph, the curriculum heavily accentuates on it. An image of the Turkish nation that is contained to certain cities in the Central Anatolia points out the Armistice of Mudros (1918) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) in the aftermath of the WWI. The Armistice prepared the conditions for the subsequent occupation of the Ottoman territory by the Allies. Furthermore, the famous Article 24 enabled the occupation of six major provinces in the

Eastern Anatolia with the intention to adjoin them to the recently declared Republic of Armenia. The following Treaty of Sèvres further clarified how the Allies had planned to divide the eastern half of the remaining territory between a Kurdish state and an extended Armenian state. Additionally, the same treaty promised the Western Anatolia to the Republic of Greece[63]. Accordingly, the remaining part of the Turkish nation, which was confined within a small circle in the Central Anatolia, was ethnically quite homogeneous, although it certainly involved non-Turkish ethnic communities. Add to that, the Kurds, Armenians and Rums[64] were communities with claims to independence. Altogether, what the text refers as "the Turkish nation" is more limited than a territory-based definition of Turkishness. Hence, the Kurds, Armenians and Rums are subtly distanced from the imagination of the Turkish nation. In short, the current passage provides an unclear account of Turkishness, as it uses both civic and ethnic references interchangeably. Now, let's see how common this obscurity is in textbooks:



Chart 1: The ratio of above codes to all codes related to Turkishness in textbooks[65].

[63] Accessed through http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres.
[64] *Rum*is the traditional name given to the Greek community of Anatolia. Textbooks differentiate the Greeks living in the homeland from the Greeks of Greece by calling the former with their historical name *Rum* and the latter with *Yunan* in Turkish. In accordance, I will use *Rum* to denote the internal Greek community.
[65] The exact names of the codes: (1) Turkishness based on Race, (2) Turkishness based on Ethnicity, (3) Turkishness based on Citizenship, (4) Turkishness based on Land, (5) Turkishness based on the Love of the Homeland and Nation, and (6) Turkishness (Basis Unclear).

Chart 1 illustrates that both in the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks, references to Turkishness are oftentimes devoid of concreteness, thus complicating the place where the Turkish citizenship belongs regarding the two citizenship models. Regarding this, the JDP era textbooks are more unclear (98/175 or 56%) than the pre-JDP textbooks (100/228 or 43,85%). In order to understand wherever the Turkishness corresponds between the two models, it is helpful to examine the stress on civic and volk-centered identifications[66]. The preponderance of a groundless depiction of Turkishness is followed by ethnicity-oriented definitions of the national identity. With respect to identifying the nation with the Turkish ethnicity, the pre-JDP and JDP periods show negligible difference. Due to the relatively high frequency of ethno-centric references, Turkishness obtains a more particularistic and volk-centered meaning. The tendency for the German model is further supported by the race-based definition of Turkishness in 2012, since race is the third most widely mentioned source of the Turkish identity. In this regard, the JDP period shows symptoms of change, since race is less apparent in the 2000 textbooks than their counterparts in 2012[67]. In fact, the pre-JDP textbooks base Turkishness more on civic definitions such as identification with land (29/228 or 12,71%), and love for the homeland and the nation (16/228 or 7,01%) than race (12/228 or 5,26%). Nevertheless, the JDP era identification with land (2/175 or 1,14%) and love of the homeland and nation (1/175 or 0,57%) are almost inexistent. What is more, the 2012 textbooks establish negligible ties between Turkishness and citizenship, as they relate the two only 3 times in 175 references (i.e. 1,71%) to Turkishness. The 2000 textbooks establish slightly stronger links (11/228 or 4,82%) between the two. However, this link, too, is a weak

[66] I clustered the codes "Turkishness based on Land", "Turkishness based on Citizenship" and "Turkishness based on Love of the Homeland and Nation" under the "Civic definition of Turkishness". For the "Volk-centered definition of Turkishness", I benefitted from the codes "Turkishness based on Ethnicity" and "Turkishness based on Race".

[67] Whereas 12/228 (5,26%) of references to Turkishness are race-oriented in 2000, the number increases by 193,15% to 27/175 (15,42%) in 2012.

one. Now, let's examine the chart below illustrating the distribution of references to the French and the German models:



Chart 2: The congruity of described Turkishness to the French and the German models.

Comparing the civic definitions of Turkishness with the volk-centered ones, I have reached two conclusions: On the one hand, both periods rely more heavily on the volk-centered interpretations of Turkishness than they do on definitions based on territory. Whereas the 2000 textbooks devote 24,54% (56/228) of references to civic Turkishness, 31,57% (72/228) of the mentions on Turkishness correspond to volk-based Turkishness. Nevertheless, the distribution of references between the French and the German models seems more or less balanced. On the other hand, the JDP era textbooks carry more Germanic inclinations as they increase differentialist claims from 31,57% in 2000 to 40,56% in 2012 and decrease territorial definitions from 24,54% in 2000 to 3,42% in 2012. In other words, the space left by unclear accounts of Turkishness is largely filled with exclusionist and volk-centered descriptions of Turkishness with a rising trend in the JDP period leaving very limited place for civic Turkishness. Accordingly, I will focus predominantly on the differentialist and volk-centered bases of Turkishness in textbooks.

B. Beyond the Blurred Boundaries: The Turkish Nation as an Exclusive Club

1. Turkishness Based on Ethnicity: The Ethno-cultural Identity of the Nation

Chart 1 illustrates that following *the Turkishness without basis*, the most frequently used code is *Turkishness based on ethnicity*. Accordingly, more than 26% of mentions to Turkish identity consist of ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural connotations in the 2000 textbooks. A similar trend can be traced in the 2012 textbooks, where 56% of obscurity is pursued by 25% of ethnic associations to Turkishness. In accordance, the vacuum that is begotten by an unclear account of Turkishness is predominantly replenished by an ethnicity-oriented national identity in both periods. With respect to identification with the Turkish ethnicity, the 2012 textbooks manifest an upward trend, thus bringing along amore exclusive understanding of Turkishness that is more similar to the German model. Notwithstanding, in both periods, the German-prone tone of textbooks stress ethnicity more than race as elaborated above. Therefore, grasping the components of the national identity, which is recurrently presented as tantamount to Turkishness, creates the need to scrutinize the ethnic aspect of the imagined community.

Culture and *language* are two essential dimensions of ethnic identity. Correspondingly, focusing on them provides insight into the national identity and its outsiders. From this point of view, the constituents of *the national culture* promoted in textbooks are telltale about the national identity. Chart 3 below manifests that both in the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks, the Turkish culture is the most significant denominator of the national culture:



Chart 3: Co-occurrence of the code "National Culture" with five other codes representing relevant cultural domains.

According to the chart, the emphasis on the Turkish culture as a constituent of the national culture increases from almost 23% (i.e. 21/92) in 2000 to 41,5% (i.e. 22/53) in 2012 by almost 82%. Although the total number of references to the national culture declines from 92 in 2000 to 53 in the JDP era, this decay does not find correspondence in the emphasis on the Turkish culture as the basis of the national culture, hence increasing the concurrence between the two. The preponderance of the Turkish culture is followed by the Western and the Ottoman cultures respectively. Nevertheless, they do not tell us about the ethnic identity, since I created them to assess the change of the ideological position of the state as well as the textbooks before and after the JDP's accession to power. Therefore, they are irrelevant to the discussion on the ethno-cultural identity of the nation. I used the code on the Arab/Middle Eastern culture to evaluate the textbook approach to the Middle East. Put another way, since textbooks make no mention of Turkish citizens with Arabic origins, I benefitted from this code exclusively to examine the perspective towards the Arab culture *outside* of Turkey. In

this sense, this code, too, is not useful for the current discussion. In addition to these codes, I analyzed the textbooks to see whether Kurdish, Armenian, Rum and Jewish cultures are regarded as part of the national culture. Notwithstanding, there was no mention of them. Bringing all pieces together, the ethno-cultural aspect of the national culture seems monolithic confirming the homogeneity-centered spirit of the nation-building project based on the Turkish culture. Notwithstanding, Chart 3 does not illuminate the content of the Turkish culture, neither does it necessarily bond the Turkish culture to an ethno-centric interpretation of Turkishness. To better comprehend the nature of the Turkish culture promoted in textbooks let's examine another chart:



Chart 4 The co-occurrence between the codes "The Turkish Culture" and "Turkishness based on Ethnicity".

As the chart speaks for itself, both in 2000 and 2012, the Turkish culture is predominantly associated with ethnic-based Turkishness. Moreover, their association indicates a moderate increase from 91,3% (21/23) in 2000 to 96,6% (28/29) in 2012. These results exhibit almost synonymity between the Turkish culture and ethnic-based Turkishness. Combining Chart 3 and 4 establishes a close relationship between the National culture and ethno-cultural Turkishness. These findings enhance the argument which puts ethno-cultural Turkishness at the center of the ideal Turkish identity that reserves the peak of the hierarchy for ethnic

Turkish identity, while simultaneously assigning non-Turkish identities to subordinate positions within the nation. From this point on, it is necessary to take a step forward and assess the discourse on the ethno-cultural Turkishness in textbooks.

Both in 2000 and 2012, the major source of reproduction of ethno-cultural Turkishness is the discussions that bond Turks to the Central Asia. Nevertheless, the textbook analysis reveals a methodological change in the curriculum with regard to establishing links between the two. The 2000 textbooks reproduce an uninterrupted and organic relation between them primarily through *history*. The 2000 Social Sciences textbooks reserves 30 pages to the history of "the first fatherland of Turks", i.e. the first known Turkish states in history. 11 among 30 pages discuss the cultural practices in these states. In this way, the Turks of Turkey is linked to the Central Asia through ethno-historical and ethno-cultural means. Their 2012 counterparts, however, renounce the emphasis on the historical bond, as they remove the history of Central Asia from the curriculum. Rather, they focus primarily on the cultural and linguistic similarity with the *present* Central Asia, although they do not completely break the historical ties. More precisely, the 2012 textbooks hint at the historical background without giving any detail on the Turkish states in the Central Asian history. In both periods, the main claim is that extant Turkic states in the Central Asia and Turkey have fraternal ties resulting from *shared culture* and *languag*e due to shared ancestry. This understanding takes culture and language as constant variables, denying the grand impact of modernity on them. It also neglects the variance of culture and language in these countries at the present. By establishing a direct and frozen link between Turkey and the Central Asia, the textbooks aggrandize the margins of homogeneity of identity based on ethno-cultural grounds. This enlargement, however, is intended to yield results within the borders of Turkey, as it is promoted to found the Turkish identity on ethno-cultural Turkishness to encourage unity through homogeneity. Although the JDP controlled textbooks remove the historical convergence between Turkey

and the Central Asia to a large extent, current textbooks give the same message with different methods such as connecting Turkey to the region through *shared customs*. A 2012 Social Sciences textbook devotes a chapter entitled "My Friends in Distant Countries" to introduce foreign cultures to students. Throughout the chapter, a child from each country appears as a "cultural envoy" and summarizes his/her own culture in a few paragraphs. Different from other characters, the one from Uzbekistan describes his culture by pointing out the similarities between the readers' culture and his own:

> "You cannot imagine how many common characteristics you share with the Uzbek *Turks*! At our homes, you can feel yourselves at home. Our traditions and cuisine resemble each other. The Uzbek *Turks* are famous for their hospitality just like you" (Koyuncu Kaya et al. 2012: 180, *emphasis added*).

The text appeals to the students on two domains: First, it establishes semblance between two countries and peoples on *cuisine* and *hospitability*, the two cultural traits of which the people of Turkey usually boast. In this way, students can easily sense a close link between the two, and grow sympathy for the other. Second, although the people of Uzbekistan are officially named *Uzbeks*, the passage specifically lays stress on their Turkish identity by calling them repeatedly as *Uzbek Turks* to help enhance students' association with the Uzbeks. Hence, the 2012 textbooks establish strong ethno-cultural bonds between the Turks of Turkey and a separate Turkic nation. While the two are directly connected to each other despite of their belonging to different nations and remote geographies, such identification works for distancing those identity communities who are not part of the ethno-cultural fraternity.

In addition to forging links with the Central Asia, textbooks inculcate the dominance of ethno-cultural Turkishness over other ethnic-identities by claiming *exclusive ownership* of certain traditions that are also shared by other ethno-cultural communities. In this respect, the comparative assessment of the Nowruz Feast in textbooks is telling. While both pre-JDP and JDP era textbooks present the Nowruz as a Turkish feast without any mention of the Persian and Kurdish traditions, current textbooks accentuate more heavily on this particular feast.

Among the 2000 textbooks I analyzed, the only place where the feast is introduced is the fourth grade Social Sciences textbook, which only "refers" to the Feast with two short sentences as a Turkic tradition originating from the first Turkic states in the Central Asia (Şenüver et al. 2000: 128). In the JDP era, however, the feast is discussed with its Turkic origins in much detail in the fifth grade Religion textbook as well as in the fourth and fifth grade Social Sciences textbooks in a total of more than one page. Although the 2012 account signals that the Nowruz tradition is not limited to the "the Turkic world", it does not go beyond a slight mention. Rather, it is depicted as a part of unique Turkish culture, since it is exclusively described with references to the Turkish history:

> "The March 21… is celebrated as the Nevruz[68] by the Turkic tribes from past to present. The Nevruz is celebrated in a large geography from the Central Asia to the Middle East, and the Balkans… The Nevruz Feast was celebrated by the Turkic tribes, Seljuk and Ottoman Turks" (Akgül et al. 2012: 110).

Despite of a slight remark on the significance of the Nowruz outside of the Central Asia, the feast is presented only within the Turkish ethno-cultural domain, thus implicitly attaching an exclusively ethnic Turkish identity to it. Likewise, the exercise section of the fourth year Social Sciences textbook asks students a question on who celebrates the Nowruz Feast. The answer is the combo of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Bulgaria. Due to the centrality of ethno-cultural Turkishness in the representation of the Nowruz in textbooks, the Turkish culture that is associated with the ethnic Turkish community is at the juncture. In other words, it is the very presence of the ethno-cultural Turkish community outside of "the Turkic world" that enlarges the borders of this tradition, because it is *Turks* who celebrate it in the Balkans, the Middle East and elsewhere. Accordingly, rather than manifesting its significance in a certain part of the world where *various* ethno-cultural communities celebrate the Nowruz, the 2012 textbooks construct the cross-border character of the tradition based on the Turkish ethnicity.

[68] *Nevruz* is the Turkish word used to denote the tradition. In English, it is generally written as *Nowruz*. The feast acquires different names in different languages and geographies such as Nawroz, Norooz, Neuroz, Nouruz, and Newroz. To refrain from linking this tradition to a particular ethno-cultural community, I prefer *Nowruz*.

This depiction intends to assume the "full ownership" of a regional practice. In this sense, especially the Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin, who are among students reading these textbooks, feel offended, as their ethno-cultural identity is officially denied through total silence. The inculcation of the Nowruz exclusively as a Turkish tradition undermines the ethno-cultural value of the Kurdish identity in the official discourse, thus dragging them out of the community of ideal citizens. Furthermore, a combined interpretation of both Chart 3 and 4 above reveals that in 2012, students are exposed to textbooks where the national culture is 82% more associated with the Turkish culture, whose connection with an ethnicity-oriented perception of Turkishness moderately ascended by 5,8%. Even though these results do not signify a sharp Turkification in the curriculum, it still shows a positive inclination to associate the national identity with ethno-cultural Turkishness a little more in 2012. This tendency might be the first signals of a prospective upsurge in the emphasis on the Turkishness of the ideal ethnic identity, nevertheless, this is too early to make that deduction. The moderately upward trend in the ethnic-based Turkishness in the JDP period reinforces the unspoken privileged status of the ethno-culturally Turkish citizens to some extent, while operating in the reverse direction for the non-Turkish communities, thus re-institutionalizing their marginalized identities.

2. Turkishness Based on Ethnicity: The Ethno-linguistic Identity of the Nation

In addition to the ethno-cultural identity, the other major component of identification with a particular ethnicity is the linguistic dimension of the national identity. The selection of the national language among many options spoken by the ethno-linguistic communities within the new nation is a political choice that indicates the dominant ethnic community of nation in

the making[69]. The extent to which states rely on the national language and stress its ethnic background to reproduce the nation, however, manifests the extant degree of preponderance of this ethno-linguistic identity. Therefore, the emphasis textbooks make on the ethno-linguistic Turkishness determines the point where the Turkish citizenship stands between the French and the German models.

As a mutual characteristic, both pre-JDP and JDP era textbooks benefit from *the unity of language* to sustain *the unity of the nation*. Both periods enlist the factor of shared language as an essential provision of nationhood. What is more, the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks are alike in the laudatory discourse they use to sanctify Turkish as a major unifier of the nation. A quotation from a fifth grade Social Sciences textbook from 2000 provides a good summary of the meaning attached to Turkish by the state:

> "The language of the Turkish nation is Turkish. Throughout history, Turks have improved, enriched their language and given the best works of art. The language of the Turk (*Türk dili*) is one of the most beautiful and richest languages. The language of the Turk is a sacred treasure for the Turkish nation, because the Turkish nation has preserved its history, memories, traditions and culture until today thanks to its language. Atatürk verbalized this by saying that 'The language of the Turk is a sacred treasure for the Turkish nation. The language of the Turk is the heart and mind of the Turkish nation" (Şenüver et al. 2000: 15).

The passage starts with a clear statement matching Turkish with the Turkish nation. The problem starts, when the Turkish nation is directly associated with ethno-historical and ethno-linguistic Turkishness. First, denying the constructive and transformative power of the modernity, the nation is delineated with the classical primordialist claim on "the antiquity and naturalness of nations" (Özkırımlı 2000, 64). Such a conceptualization triggers a second problem, as it neglects the modern-nation building processes of transformation of various identity groups. Accordingly, the text establishes continuity and correspondence between the ethno-linguistic Turkish communities of the past and the modern Turkish nation, which is of

[69] Although nation-making involves selection of a local language among many, one shall not deny that the selected language is exposed to modernization and standardization before turning into a catalyst of nation-building.

multi-ethnic character. That is, by ignoring the transformation of non-Turkish ethnic components and igniting the envision of a Turkish nation that is tantamount to the ethno-linguistic Turkish community, the passage subtly denies the existence of non-Turkish ethno-linguistic identities. What is more, it tries to melt them in a change-proof and authentic Turkish identity as if all components of the nation have always been and still are of Turkish origin. The identification of the Turkish nation with ethno-linguistic Turkishness is strengthened, when the language is eulogized to an extent that it is almost pointed as *the key* to the nation's ability to keep its authentic self throughout centuries. What is more, the sanctity of Turkish as a fundamental basis of the Turkish nationhood is supported by a quotation from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose image textbooks usually use to legitimize and buttress an argument. Lastly, the ethno-linguistic basis of the nation is further reinforced, since the official language of the nation is called as the language of the Turk (*Türk dili*). Although the reference to Turkish alone contains ethno-linguistic connotations, the text brings along additional emphasis on the *Turkishness* of the language. All in all, this excerpt from 2000 manifests that with regard to the basis of the Turkish nation, the state reserves a vital place for ethno-linguistic identification with the Turkish identity. Put another way, Turkish becomes a crucial filter for acceptance into the community of desirable citizens. Those who possess this identity, either by birth or by assimilation, may have access to the exclusive club. Thereby, Turkish becomes a significant tool of homogenization.

The 2012 textbooks indicate continuity in terms of the centrality of Turkish as a crucial component of the national identity. The JDP era textbooks, too, use a complimentary discourse on Turkish, while at the same time constructing an image of the nation that has always been an ethno-linguistically Turkish community, thus reproducing the primordialist claims in the 2000 textbooks. A quote from a fifth grade Social Sciences textbook on the

Linguistic Revolution establishes an immediate relation between the nation and the Turkish language:

> "Our people were using the Arab alphabet which was very hard to learn. Since the letters did not fit for the fabric of the Turkish language, very few people of our nation were literate. In order to solve this problem, 'the new Turkish alphabet' was declared in 1928" (Başol et al. 2012: 51).

The main argument of the passage is the mismatch between the Turkish language and the Arab alphabet before the 1928 Revolution, which was actually planned to *Turkify* the Turkish language by removing *the foreign influence* in the linguistic sphere. In other words, it was an endeavor to homogenize, unite and standardize the national culture as well as identity for the grand mission of nation-building. Denying this reality, the 2000 textbooks contain almost identical texts giving the same message, which clearly suggests that *we* have always been *the Turkish people* who spoke the Turkish language across time. Such a statement neglects the modernity of the Turkish nation and language, because it pictures the nation as a community that has been speaking nothing but the Turkish language throughout history. The background of the passage contains remnants of disfavor for the Arabic and Persian languages, as they were deemed unfit for the Turkish nation. In accordance, the concept of the Turkish nation acquires a more intense Turkish identity based on ethno-linguistic identification. That is, it portrays the population under inspection as an ethno-linguistically Turkish group that is devoid of any other linguistic communities. Such an approach may have one of the two presuppositions: It either denies the multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic nature of the Anatolian population both in the Ottoman times and later in the Republic of Turkey or it implicitly excludes the non-Turkish ethno-linguistic groups from the imagined nation. If the former is correct, the textbooks from the pre-JDP and JDP periods alike assume a denialist and assimilationist perspective. If the latter is valid, the state perception does not allow non-Turkish communities into the circle of ideal citizens, who are identified with the Turkish language *by birth*. In either of the cases, the passage helps students envision the nation as a

monolithic, homogeneous community whose members must be in command of Turkish. Correspondingly, such a monist perception does not promise an inclusive attitude towards non-Turkish identities. Different from the 2000 textbooks, their 2012 counterparts adds a further dimension to the significance of the Turkish language and emphasize its constitutional basis. Here is an excerpt entitled "Our Vocal Flag: Turkish" from the very same textbook where I took the previous quotation:

> "Language is one of the most important values of a nation. It is impossible to speak of the freedom of a nation without a language. The third article of our constitution emphasizes that the official language of our country is Turkish" (Başol et al. 2012: 163).

In this passage, the authors bring a legal dimension to the mono-linguistic identification described in the same textbook. The stress on the officialdom of the Turkish language may bring about two interpretations: It may be an attempt to reinforce the exclusive singularity of the Turkish language, which incorporates a legal backing or it can be a limited endeavor to hint at the nonofficial existence of other languages. The mention to the freeing role of the language for a nation, however, signals the higher likelihood of the former suggestion, since it is unexpected for a nation-state, and especially for the strictly homogeneity-oriented state of Turkey, to laud the freeing aspect of other ethnic languages. What is more, the paragraph matches languages with *nations*. Since the textbooks never refer to ethno-linguistic communities as nations, the quote seems short of both calling ethno-linguistic communities as nations and recognizing their existence in Turkey. Add to that, the title of the text portrays the Turkish language as the symbolic representative of the unity of the nation, just like the national flag does. Altogether, the material shows indications of discursive continuity with the pre-JDP period. The excerpt above is followed by a quote from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to enhance its argument:

> "Paying significant attention to the correct and good use of the language of the Turk (*Türk dili*), Atatürk stated that 'The Turkish nation, who knows how to protect its country and independence, must save its language from the yoke of foreign languages" (Kocatürk 2005: 260 in Ibid.).

This piece, too, buttresses the mono-linguistic and mono-ethnic character of the national identity. Firstly, similar to the 2000 textbook, the 2012 textbook prefers to call Turkish as *the language of the Turk*, thus emphasizing a specific ethno-linguistic identity. Secondly, through the agency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the passage recommends the Turkish nation to protect the language as they protect the country and its independence from foreign influences by establishing connection between the purity (i.e. Turkishness) of the language and the independence of the country. In other words, the text describes non-Turkish influence on the language as the occupation of the homeland by foreign powers. This implies the state's meticulousness on the homogeneity and "Turkishness" of the language. Hence, it prioritizes ethno-linguistic Turkish identity. What is more, accompanied with the previous quotation, this statement accentuates on the territory-wide dominance of the Turkish language, which symbolizes the unity of the nation like the national flag. The much-pronounced ethno-linguistic basis of the language constructed in textbooks turns Turkish into a tool of unification through assimilation into the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity. Such an assimilationist approach combined with no mention of other ethnic languages spoken in Turkey like Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, Hebrew, Ladino, and Arabic draws internal boundaries within the Turkish citizenship in favor of the ethno-linguistic Turkishness. To sum up, the discourse of the 2012 textbooks do not show meaningful change from the 2000 textbooks regarding the predominance of the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity as a component of the national identity. However, the importance given to the ethno-linguistic Turkishness in textbooks is also affected by the *repetition* of references to the Turkish language as an indicator of defining the Turkish nation.

In order to keep track of changes from 2000 to 2012 in quantitative terms, the frequency of the code "Shared Language" is helpful. I created this code to measure the specific emphasis on the Turkish language as the *common characteristic* shared by all members of the nation. Table 1 below illustrates that there is continuity rather than change:

	All Textbooks (Year: 2000)	**All Textbooks (Year: 2012)**
Frequency of the Code "Shared Language" (#)	8	11

Table 1: The comparative frequency table for the code "Shared Language".

According to the table, whereas the code is used 8 times for the pre-JDP textbooks, it is employed 11 times in the JDP era textbooks. It shows that the 2012 textbooks refer to the shared language Turkish slightly more than the ones in 2000. This snapshot maintains that the frequency of reference to Turkish signals continuity. One may think that the fewness of mentions signifies the little role cast for shared language in the reproduction of the nation in both periods. Nevertheless, the ratio of "Shared Language" to all shared characteristics[70] on which the textbooks construct the unity of the nation shows the significance of language over others. What is more, these ratios illustrate that despite of semblance in discourse, the 2012 textbooks prioritize the role of shared language more than their 2000 counterparts:



Chart 5: The percentage ratio of "Shared Language" to all shared characteristics.

[70] To understand the shared characteristics on which the unity and homogeneity of the nation is founded, I have written the following codes: "Shared Language", "Shared History", "Shared Feelings", "Shared Ideal", and "Shared Culture". I utilized these codes when the commonality of these characteristics are specifically expressed.

The chart above illustrates that there is a change in the prominence given to shared language in textbooks. While the 2000 textbooks refer to language 15,09% (8/53) as the basis of the nation, the share of language increases up to 30,55% (or 11/36) in 2012. In other words, due to a decline in the total frequency of references to shared characteristics of members of the nation, and a limited increase in the stress on the shared language Turkish, the JDP era witnesses 102,45% of rise. That is, although the discourse on the ethno-linguistic basis of the Turkish nation demonstrates patterns of continuity with the pre-JDP era, there is more mention of the Turkish language as a shared characteristic within the nation. This increase might be an answer to the more pronounced Kurdish demands for the official recognition of their ethno-linguistic identity in the JDP period. Whatever the reason is, the 2012 textbooks raise the volume of the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity among other shared characteristics by repetitively reminding students that their language is Turkish. Although this may not be interpreted as a sharp break from the past, it still sends indications of change to some extent. While Turkish is promoted as a fundamental characteristic of belonging to the same nation, the non-Turkish students may feel that they are not entirely accepted into the nation due to their ethno-linguistic identity. Moreover, the students whose mother tongue is Turkish may interpret the predominance of the Turkish language as a sign of superiority and turn it into a tool of discrimination against those with different ethno-linguistic identities. Accordingly, as non-Turkish communities may retreat themselves from the imagined Turkish nation, they may be simultaneously distanced by the ethno-linguistically Turkish citizens. Hence, the intention to enhance the unity of the nation might ironically lead to the estrangement of different ethno-linguistic components of the nation. All in all, the emphasis on ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic Turkishness in textbooks shows the ongoing dominance of the ethnic Turkish identity in the JDP era.

3. The Superiority of "the Turk"

The centrality of ethnicity as an unspoken rule of inclusion into the community of ideal Turks strengthens the hierarchical structure of the Turkish citizenship which places the ethno-linguistic Turkish identity on the peak of the pyramid. Nonetheless, the superiority of the ethnic Turkish identity is sometimes constructed more openly. Below there are two quotations from the same Social Sciences textbook. Together, they reproduce an *openly superior* notion of ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkish identity, hence implicating that the real "owners" of the Turkish nation are ethnic Turks. The first is an excerpt that differentiates "the Turkish nation" from "other nations" that live in the Ottoman times. What is more, the quotation is claimed to be taken from a speech of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose figure is presented as the role model for students. He starts as follows:

> "Fellows, the Ottoman State is languishing and disintegrating day by day. Different *nations (millets)* within the State are revolting to found their own states and declare independence. Our statesmen cannot produce a solution to prevent the collapse… Our *nation (millet)* is poor, the industry and production are insufficient… In this situation, the crux of the matter is to create a *Turkish state* out of the Empire that is falling apart" (Atay 2007: 47-56 in Başol et al. 2012: 42, *emphasis and parentheses added*).

This piece excludes the communities who revolted against the Ottoman authority, Armenians, Kurds, and Rums amongst them. The passage clearly gives the following message: 'others' within 'us' are rising against 'our state'. Thus, this statement confers the ownership of the Ottoman State upon the Turkish community, which should take action to form its own state. Unsurprisingly, this discourse marginalizes the non-Turkish groups from the imagined Turkish nation. However, there is also another matter of debate: The most crucial problem of the text is that it does not explain the difference between the Ottoman *millet* system and the modern nation, which has a state of its own with full sovereignty over a bounded territory. In other words, modern borders between states turn those beyond the borders into *complete foreigners*. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter Two, the *millet* system did not build unsurmountable walls between different *millets*. From this perspective, using a quotation that

lacks precision may enhance a differentialist interpretation of the Turkish nation which is entirely devoid of non-Turkish identities. Despite of their citizenship status, such a perception does not allow the non-Turkish communities inside the Turkish nation, as it assigns them externality that prevents their inclusion into the community of equals. The excerpt below further clarifies the meaning attached to Turkishness in textbooks. It is again an anecdote from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on their decision to move the capital to Ankara where the infrastructure was inadequate at the time:

> "I had a completely different intention to choose Ankara as the capital of the state. I wanted to show once again *the power of the Turk* who makes the impossible possible. One day, all those infertile fields will be covered with green yards and asphalt. And we will all see this. This will happen that soon" (Erendil 1989: 62 in Başol et al. 2012: 162).

There are two important inferences from this passage: First, the entire population is gathered under the Turkish identity, whose basis is left unspecified. Nevertheless, this description of the Turk also consists of an *essence* that deems all Turks powerful to make unbelievable transformations. Attaching an essence necessarily help students regard the Turkish identity as a homogenous and monolithic one that is deprived of variance. Second, combining the organic understanding of Turkishness in this excerpt with the previous quotation taken from the very same textbook, students are strongly encouraged to conceptualize the Turkish identity in ethnic terms. Hence, the prescribed Turkishness falls short of incorporating other identities as a macro identity. Related to this, the assigned superiority of the Turk in the text implies *the superiority of the ethnic Turk.* That is, the essence of Turkishness bestows unique power and ability upon all Turks who can accomplish things that non-Turks cannot. Altogether, the 2012 textbooks construct an image of Turkishness that idealizes the ethnic Turkish identity over others. What is more, the implicit superiority at times gain a more palpable and explicit character in the JDP era textbooks. The 2000 textbooks show no difference in that respect, as they, too, reproduce a perception of Turkishness with ethnic

connotations which are given either overt or covert superiority. Chart 6 below manifests the change in the use of textbook language that assigns supremacy to the Turkish identity from 2000 to 2012:



Chart 6: Comparative frequency of the code "Turkishness (+)" in the content analysis.

The chart shows that the 2000 textbooks use an explicit discourse that emphasizes the superiority of the Turkish nation more often than the 2012 ones. Having seen the dominance of ethnicity in defining the Turkish nation both in 2000 and 2012, one can maintain that the attached superiority to the Turkish nation frequently signals the superiority of the ethnic Turkish identity. In this respect, almost 15% fall from 2000 to 2012 can be regarded as positive. Nevertheless, one must remember the quantitative increase in the volk-centered definition of Turkishness by more than 28% in the JDP period (See Chart 2). I interpret these percentages as a discursive transition from a more explicit indoctrination of Turkish superiority to a more implicit one in 2012. In other words, whereas the 2000 textbooks use less ethno-racial and ethno-linguistic references, but make more overt compliments to the ethnic Turkish identity, the 2012 textbooks make the reverse, thus they continue to reproduce the supremacy of ethnic Turks now more subtly. Keeping in mind the previous discussion on the effects of the representation of Turkishness without a clear basis, the implicit eulogy to the ethnic Turkish identity is also reinforced by more than 27% larger space devoted to a baseless

perception of Turkishness in the 2012 textbooks (See Chart 1). Consequently, the JDP era textbooks seem to preserve the volk-centered perspective due to the preponderance of ethnic-based Turkishness in textbooks.

The Germanic tendencies of textbooks are also sustained by the *racial dimension* added to the basis of Turkishness. Going back to Chart 1, I reach two major conclusions: First, in both 2000 and 2012 textbooks, the percentage share of race-based definitions of Turkishness is always less than that of ethnicity-oriented ones. Whereas 5,26% (or 12/228) of all references to Turkishness defines it as a racial identity in 2000, 26,31% (or 60/228) of those constructs it on ethnicity in the same textbooks. In 2012, the share of race rises to 15,42% (or 27/175), nevertheless, it can still not exceed that of ethnicity, which is 25,14% (or 44/175). These results brings along a second conclusion. Despite insignificant decrease in the emphasis on ethnic Turkishness in 2012, race-based Turkishness is reinforced by 193,15%, as the number of racial references more than duplicates from 12 to 27, despite of a decline in the total number of mentions to Turkishness from 228 to 175. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that due to fewness of racial references, the percentage change from 2000 to 2012 reveals an exaggerated result. However, there is still a significant change in the emphasis on the racial portrayal of ideal Turks. This change can be partly explained by a technical alteration in the publication style of textbooks in the JDP era. In 2012, each course has not one, but two textbooks for each semester. Among the textbooks I analyzed, with the exception of Religion textbooks, the number of Life Sciences and Social Sciences textbooks is doubled. The duplication of textbooks affects the racial dimension of textbooks, since it doubles the number of times *the National Anthem* and *the Address to Youth*, which consists of racial references, appear in textbooks. Nevertheless, *the Pledge* and *the Teachers' Anthem*, which define Turkishness on the basis of race, too, are removed in the 2012 textbooks. Their removal is certainly a positive development for the Turkish citizenship model prescribed in textbooks.

Despite of this improvement, the race is more pronounced in the 2012 textbooks than they are in the 2000 ones. It is important to note that the 2000 textbooks do not make racial identification of Turkishness outside of the fixed materials such as the National Anthem and the Address to Youth. However, especially the fifth grade Social Sciences textbook from 2012 comprises of some references to racial Turkishness. For instance, a poem on the National Flag deems Turkishness as a racial identity:

My ancestors brought down
The moon and stars from the sky,
Covering it with clouds
More reddish than the dawn.

Its flaming red
From neither poppy nor rose,
Its red comes from
The original blood of the son of the Turk

The moon and stars on it
Higher than the moon and stars of the sky,
It is the destiny of the Turk
It is the Turk to dignify it… (Hasan Ali Yücel in Başol et al. 2012: 159)

The poem starts to praise the flag with regard to "my ancestors", whose identity is revealed in the second quatrain as *the son of the Turk*. This is followed by an analogy that compares the color of the flag to the original (*öz*) blood of the Turk. In other words, students encounter with a portrait of their alleged ancestors who have the original Turkish blood. Especially the poem's stress on the originality of the blood of "my ancestors" establishes a direct racial continuity between students and the forefathers of the Turks. Accordingly, the poem prioritizes the role of blood-based ties in the depiction of the nation. Moreover, the role to honor the sanctified flag is exclusively reserved for the Turks who are in possession of the original Turkish blood. Such a depiction of Turkishness reinforces a superior understanding of Turkishness based on race. Nevertheless, I prefer to be cautious about the rising prominence of race as the basis of the nation in 2012, since I utilized the code "Turkishness based on Race" only 6 times in texts other than the National Anthem and the Address to Youth. Although the use of the same code is limited only to these national texts in the 2000 textbooks, extra 6 references are insufficient to make claims on the racialization of the

depicted Turkishness. Nevertheless, it is certain that the JDP era textbooks do not show amelioration with regard to the racial connotations to Turkishness, hence they continue, if not increase, the exclusivist nature of the Turkish citizenship.

To sum up, the textbook representation of Turkishness reveals confusing messages on the source of belonging to the Turkish nation. The blank created in students' perception due to the unclarity and obscurity of the Turkishness is filled largely by the volk-centered definitions of nationhood, ethnicity being the most dominant theme in the pre-JDP and JDP eras alike. The ethno-centric image of the Turk is often constructed through the ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic links to the Turkish identity. The 2012 textbooks share a larger space to the Turkish culture as part of the national culture that the 2000 textbooks do. The JDP period witnesses little increase in the association between the Turkish culture and the ethnic-based Turkishness, in this respect, it should be interpreted as a continuity rather than change. Nevertheless, since the Turkish culture is more dominant in the national culture, I claim that the ethno-cultural Turkish identity is emphasized more through repetition. This may indicate an upward trend in the ethno-cultural Turkish identity, but it is not yet that clear. A similar precarious change is observed in the ethno-linguistic dimension of the national identity, too. Although the complementary discourse towards the Turkish language is preserved, the 2012 textbooks put more stress on the shared-ness of the Turkish language among the members of the nation. Much used differentialist image of Turkishness is further prioritized by an openly laudatory language to manifest the superiority of the Turks in both periods. The exclusionary tone of textbooks is also enhanced by highlighting the racial aspect of belonging to the nation in 2012. Even though there is some increase in this respect, the data is not enough to prove a sharp rupture of the JDP depiction from the past. Altogether, the JDP period does not bring about amelioration in the exclusivist portrayal of Turkishness. What is more, it shows some indications of increasing this tone. However, the level of increase is not yet determined

enough to make major claims on the further Turkification of the national identity. Since no change comes so sharply, the textbooks in the subsequent years may give more accurate results in this regard. Now, we should turn to the outcomes of the exclusivist imagination of the Turkish nation.

III. "ENEMIES" TO THE NATION: THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS TO "OUR" UNITY

Drawing the boundaries of who "we" are necessarily leaves "others" outside. As a clear continuation of the post-1980 spirit, the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks present "the outsiders" negatively. As a common characteristic, textbooks signify the otherness of certain identities by calling them "they". Knowing that textbooks construct a sense of belonging to the nation by naming the insiders as "we" or "us", "they" automatically becomes an indicator of the outsiders. Chart 7 shows the other names that are associated with "them" in textbooks:



Chart 7: The frequency of the words "enemy", "occupier", "collaborator", and "terrorist" used for outsiders.

According to the chart, the JDP's accession to power brings no change about the adjectives used for "them". The textbooks associate "others" with enmity and occupation in both periods. While the "enemy" identity is used most often to characterize "them", it is followed by the "occupier". "Enemy" is the most unclear identity among these four with respect to who the outsiders and what intentions they have against the nation, unless they are matched with

identity groups. Accordingly, its frequent use signifies the September 12 spirit of vagueness of threat[71]. For instance, "occupier" identity points at those threats which target the homeland for they want a share from it to which they do not belong. In this respect, the occupier identity refers to enemies who are alien to 'our land'. Merriam-Webster definition of "occupation" manifests the foreignness of the occupying identities, as "occupation" is "the holding and control of an area by a *foreign* military force"[72]. The high frequency of "occupier" identity as the identity of the outsider signals the narrative of the Independence War, since it contains many references to the occupying Allies.

The "collaborator" identity is also clearer than the "enemy" identity for it attaches otherness to some internal communities who allegedly collaborate with external enemies in attacking 'our homeland' both from the inside and outside of the country. Like references to "occupiers", the textbook narrative of the Independence War implies the collaborators within us. Nevertheless, Chart 7 shows that no one is *directly* labelled as such. Accordingly, its absence in textbooks in both 2000 and 2012 textbooks is a positive sign with respect to the representation of internal groups. Yet, one must keep in mind that, although no community is directly identified as "collaborator", this does not mean its complete absence with regard to discourse where some internal identity groups are *subtly* associated with external enemies.

Lastly, neither period deems outsiders as "terrorists", either. Since terrorism is largely associated with the Kurdish identity in the public discourse and media, its absence in textbooks is important not to criminalize the Kurdish identity in the eyes of the students. Nevertheless, I will leave the further discussion on the textbook image of the Kurdish identity for the subsequent pages.

[71] For more information, please return to Chapter Two.
[72] Accessed through http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occupation.

A. The External Enemies Against the Unity of the Nation and Homeland

The external enemy appears almost exclusively within the context of the First World War (WWI) and the subsequent Independence War. With regard to this, the pre-JDP and JDP period textbooks are quite similar. Due to the serial attempts by the Allies to occupy the Ottoman territory in the aftermath of the WWI, the national memory is constructed on the fear of occupation and division of the homeland by the enemies. In this respect, the 2000 and the 2012 depiction of the occupier-enemy is almost indistinguishable. Below, there are two quotations from 2000 and 2012 on the textbook depiction of the WWI, the Independence War and the external enemies:

> "Since we (the Ottoman State) lost (the WWI), enemies occupied our homeland. They shared most of our territory among themselves... Mustafa Kemal and his friends felt deeply sorry for the occupation of our homeland... (As a remedy) Mustafa Kemal went to Samsun on May 19, 1919" (Komisyon 2000: 55-56, *parantheses added*).

> "Our homeland is occupied during the WWI. They wanted to captivate the Turkish nation.In order to save our homeland, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk went to Samsun on May 19, 1919. He started to work to rescue our homeland from the occupation of the enemy" (Özdemir and Çınar 2012: 58).

Both quotations transmit the same message. The texts first establish direct continuity with the Ottoman territory and embrace it as "our homeland". Correspondingly, the occupation of the Ottoman territory is perceived as a fatal attack to "us". The emphasis on the homeland as "ours" reproduces more than a national attachment to it, it also accentuates on the foreignness of the enemies, who do not belong to "our homeland". Although it is not frankly expressed in these excerpts, the textbooks reveal the identity of the external enemies elsewhere: They are the Allies led by the British and the French. Greece is also part of the picture as an external enemy and occupier supported by the Great Powers. Nevertheless, none of the textbooks forges a link between Greece, the external enemy, and the Rum community in Turkey. That is, students are left uninformed about the connection between the two. Although this is insufficient information, I consider the lack of match between Greeks and Rums as positive,

since the Greeks are exclusively described negatively as external enemies and occupiers. However, the textbooks usually do not mention the specific identity of these enemies like in the quotations above. Rather, they generally refer to an obscure enemy who plans to divide and rule "our homeland". The external nature of the enemies further reinforces the link between "us" and "homeland". In conclusion, both passages put the image of Mustafa Kemal as the leader of the national struggle against the occupying powers. Hence, students are trained to be cautious against the external threats that intend to divide "our homeland". In this respect, the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks are alike. What is more, these textbooks reproduce the legacy of the post-1980 era and establish a mutual relationship between the external and internal enemies. One of the major sources of this association is the Atatürk's Address to Youth, which is included in both 2000 and 2012 textbooks:

> "Turkish Youth,
> Your first duty is to preserve and to defend Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future… In the future, too, there may be malevolent people at home and abroad, who will wish to deprive you of this treasure... Those who hold power within the country may be in error, misguided and may even be traitors. Furthermore, they may identify personal interests with the political designs of the invaders. "(Atatürk 1927).

This piece is intended to warn the Turkish youth about the internal and external threats that may risk the unity and existence of the Republic. The threat is described as a fatal one, since the existence and future of the youth depend on it. Therefore, the youth are left with no choice other than taking responsibility against the enemies at home and abroad to maintain the independence of the Republic forever. Even the power holders are associated with the possibility of risking the future of the country due to many reasons including treason. In other words, the text states that, some people within "us" may collaborate with the invaders (i.e. the external enemies) for personal gains and may take action against the national interests. In this way, the text establishes a perception of connection and mutuality of interest between unspecified internal and external elements. The anonymity of the enemies leaves no space for

trust, as the threat might originate from anywhere, at home and abroad alike. The suspicion of certain "others" within "us" is hence constructed in textbooks. Although the identity of the internal enemies is not specified, the Ottoman legacy largely deteremines who the internal others are.

B. The Internal Enemies Against the Unity of the Nation and Homeland

The Chapter Two explicates on the historical identity communities who are kept away from the community of ideal citizens throughout the history of modern Turkey. In this respect, the 2000 and the 2012 textbooks indicate continuation, since they refer to the same identity groups. Accordingly, only Armenians, Rums and Jews are considered amongst non-Turkish ethnic communities. Put differently, many other identities are never mentioned. Considering that the textbooks under inspection are merely primary school textbooks is explicative about their silence on the multi-ethnic texture of the society only to a limited extent. Nevertheless, excessive emphasis on the ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural Turkish identity manifests that the textbooks from both 2000 and 2012 aim to assimilate non-Turkish identities into Turkish identity through an imposition of Turkish culture and language. To have a general opinion on the extent to which students are informed about the existence of non-Turkish ethnic communities in Turkey, the chart below is helpful:



Chart 8: The distribution of references to ethnic identity groups.

The chart is telltale about the predominance of the Turkish identity over other ethnic identities in both 2000 and 2012. Despite the fact that mentions to "Turk" is not necessarily always referring to the ethnic identity, this can not undermine the huge gap between the frequency of "Turk" and other ethnic identities. Reading this chart, I observe that the quantitative stress on ethnic identities is in a general decline. Notwithstanding, the sharp decrease in the frequency of the word "Turk" does not eliminate its dominance over other identities in 2012. Having shown that volk-centered definitions of Turkishness is more frequent than the civic ones, this many mentions to Turkishness intends to inculcate ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic Turkishness into non-Turkish groups. Such a claim is in consistency with the general inclination of the Turkish nation-building project for a homogenous society. These conclusions are also supported by the absence of non-Turkish communities in textbooks. Chart 8 illustrates that despite heavy mentions to Turks in both 2000 and 2012, the name of Kurds is *never* voiced, even though their estimated population is as large as 13,4 million[73] (KONDA 2010). Having seen the supremacy of volk-centered perception of Turkishness in textbooks, I assert that textbooks in both 2000 and 2012 intend to melt the Kurdish identity in the pot of ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic Turkish identity and that is the major reason why the Kurdish identity is completely ignored in textbooks. Often mixed and obscured definitions of Turkishness provides a disguise for the differentialist image of the Turkish identity. That is, the ambiguity of the Turkish identity helps textbooks promote a differentialist and assimilationist perception of non-Turkish identities rather implicitly, as this method constructs an equally exclusionist image of the ideal Turk under the disguise of obscurity.

According to Chart 8, even though there is no mention of Kurds in both periods, there are some references to non-Muslim ethnic communities, albeit limited. Such a difference of

[73] Accessed through http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/tarhan_erdem/turkiyeli_kurtler_ne_kadar-1130023

approach to non-Muslim communities can be explained by the argument developed in Chapter Two, where the role of Islamic identity is discussed as the primary condition for the communities' *ability* of assimilation into the Turkish identity. Therefore, the Kurdish community which is predominantly associated with Islam is considered *capable* of assimilation, whereas Armenian, Jewish and Rum communities are not. With regard to this, although none of these communities are regarded as "ideal", the Kurds have a more "prestigious" place than the non-Muslim communities have.

In contrast to the Kurds' situation, students learn about the presence of Armenian, Jewish and Rum communities in Turkey, even though the frequency of the word "Turk" is innumerable compared to non-Turkish communities. The declining graph of non-Turkish presence in the 2012 textbooks is not salient enough to make big claims on the further Turkification of the national identity, since the mentions to these identities are too scanty in the pre-JDP and JDP eras alike. However, the absence of non-Turkish communities definitely enhances the ethno-centric Turkish identity in textbooks. In order to make a more logical comparison between 2000 and 2012 on the internal others of the nation, discourse analysis adds significant dimention to the assessment.

The Armenian identity is the most problematically presented ethnic identity in textbooks. As it is shown in Chart 8, the Armenian identity is the most pronounced non-Turkish identity. However, the general tendency towards Armenians is predominantly negative, hence their relatively higher presence is not necessarily a positive sign with regard to their inclusion into the nation. For instance, among 15 references to the Armenian identity in the 2000 textbooks, 13 are frankly negative. The 2012 textbooks use the word "Armenian" 5 times, 3 of which are with negative connotations. Comparing percentage change from 2000 to 2012 is not necessary for the frequencies is too low. Notwithstanding, in both periods, the

Armenian identity is definitely not appreciated by the textbook writers. The content analysis gives away some details about the way the Armenian identity is depicted in textbooks:



Chart 9: Concurrence between "Armenian", "Enemy", and "Occupier".

In the 2000 textbooks, the code "Armenian" was used 7 times, 2 of which concur with the code "Enemy", signifying almost 29% co-occurrence. In 2012, however, while the code "Armenian" is employed only 2 times, each use of it co-occurs with the code "Enemy". Although the number of times these codes are used is too low, there is definitely no amelioration with respect to neither the quantitative presence of the Armenian identity, nor its discursive portrayal in the JDP period. The Armenians are depicted as occupiers, too. This is an interesting result, since they are an ancient Anatolian community, who were part of the Ottoman population, and who later acquired the Turkish citizenship. In the pre-JDP textbooks, the codes "Armenian" and "Occupier" concur 4 out of 7 times (57,14%). In the JDP era, 2 out of 2 uses of the code "Armenian" co-occurs with "Occupier". Similar to the interpretation of the association between Armenianness and enemy, the numbers cannot give determined messages. Notwithstanding, these findings show that the state keeps its biased stance against the Armenian identity in the JDP era, too. To have a better grasp of the delineation of the Armenian identity in textbooks, we should make in-depth reading of the texts. The discourse analysis reveals that the 2000 textbooks construct the Armeanian identity exclusively as an

external identity. Their enemy-occupier identity is sustained within the context of the aftermath of the WWI and the Independence War:

> "At the end of the WWI, an Armenian State was declared in the south of Caucasia. The Allies wanted to give the Eastern Anatolia to the Armenians…The State of Armenia took courage from it and attacked the Eastern Anatolia with the military units and the armed bandits. During these attacks, many of our citizens lost their lives" (Şenüver et al. 2000: 39).

The passage portrays an Armenian identity that has no correspondence in the internal sphere, as if they do not exist in the population, let alone being accepted among the ideal Turks. In other words, the historical presence of the Armenian community in the eastern Anatolia is completely ignored, if not denied by the textbook. Moreover, they are pictured in collaboration with the Allies, which were entirely external powers. This relation exacerbates the image of the Armenians, since the Allies are always presented as an enemy who wants to divide "our homeland" and occupy what belongs to "us". Similarly, the presence of Armenians in the Southeastern Anatolia is ignored:

> "In the South Front, we fought against the French. In order to occupy these cities (Antep, Urfa, Maraş), the French brought the Armenians with them. They armed them. The French and the Armenian started to attack the Turks" (Şenüver et al. 2000: 41).

The Armenians, once again, depicted entirely as external forces. Although the State of Armenia was already declared at the time, the war was not only between a Caucasian state and the State of Turkey. Antep, Urfa, and Maraş used to have significant Armenian populations. Therefore, such an approach denies the internal aspect of the Armenian identity. Furthermore, they are pictured as in collaboration with the French who were pursuing an offensive against the Turks. Based on these quotations, the 2000 textbooks are not even close to incorporating the Armenians in the imagined community. Moreover, we will see that the Armenian community is the most explicitly stigmatized among non-Turkish ethnic communities both before and after the JDP governments. The discourse of the 2012 textbooks keeps on reproducing the negative Armenian identity. Nevertheless, the space reserved for the

Armenians was much larger in 2000. Like the 2000 Social Science textbook, its 2012 counterpart refers to Armenians within the context of the East and the South Fronts as enemies and occupiers.

> "Our army under the command of Kazım Karabekir has rescued our Eastern provinces by re-taking Kars and its nearby from the Armenian occupation. In order to enhance the resistance movement in our South provinces, he (Mustafa Kemal) sent officiers and war equipment to the region. Encountering with the heroic struggle of the Turkish people, the French had to leave the region completely" (Koyuncu Kaya et al. 2012: 52).

The 2012 Social Sciences textbook gives less details where the emphasis on the Armenian involvement in the War is decreased a little. Whereas the quotation from the 2000 textbook targets "Armenians" as attackers many times, their 2012 counterparts give this message by using the adjective "Armenian" just once, and continuing the story with the French as the representative of the occupiers. The Armenians are still described as "our enemies" who want to occupy "our provinces". However, one should notice that the discourse does not accuse the Armenians as much as the 2000 narrative does. On the other hand, while the 2000 narrative specifically addresses the State of Armenia as the responsible of the attacks to the homeland, the 2012 narrative simply calls the incidents as "the Armenian occupation" in a more unclear fashion. Although occupation denotes an outsider's action in the internal sphere, it lacks the deliberate specification of the 2000 textbook, thus leaving some space for the possibility of their being part of the Anatolian population. However, unless the students are informed about the centuries long Armenian presence in Anatolia beforehand, this vague narrative does not ring the bell for the shared history and territory between the Turkish and the Armenian communities, thus it cannot foster the imagination of nation that involves Armenians next to Turks on an equal ground. What is more, as the textbook information on the Armenian identity is limited to their occupying and hostile representations against the territorial integrity of the "our state", even though students can deduce the co-existence of Armenians with Turks from the obscure description, they can hardly grow amiable feelings towards them.

Comparing the pre-JDP discourse with the JDP discourse on Armenians, I realize that the pejorative associations are still reproduced but now to a smaller degree. Nonetheless, this is not a determined assertion, since there are very few references to this community with still negative connotations. A short excerpt from a story shared in the same textbook elucidates to what extent Armenians are accepted as part of the nation:

> "I have heard lately that the Ottoman Government will give Erzurum to Armenians. I came to Erzurum to see whose property they are giving to whom" (Çil 2006: 53-53 in Ibid.: 51).

The text involves defiance to Armenians to whom the city does not belong. Nevertheless, nowhere in the story, Armenians are depicted among local inhabitants of the city, although they were. In other words, despite of a less hostile tone in the 2012 textbooks, Armenians are far from being accepted among the ideal citizens, since their historical presence in Anatolia is still denied, let alone including them into the imagined nation.

The next most pronounced ethno-cultural and ethno-religious community is the Jewish community. In contrast to the heavy negative images attached to the Armenian identity, Jews are among the most accepted non-Turkish communities. For instance, their community is never associated with neither the "Enemy" nor the "Occupier". The mild approach may be explained by the absence of secessionist demands on behalf of the Jewish community, although that is the case for the Kurdish, Armenian and Rum communities. The textbooks from both periods elaborate on the Jewish identity exclusively in the discussions of religion. In this respect, from the perspective of the state, they are a religious community rather than an ethnic one. Nevertheless, Judaism has ethnic roots, since the conversion is quite restricted. Despite of a moderate language used for the Jewish identity, their inclusion into the nation is still doubtful. A fifth grade Religion textbook prefers to call the entire Jewish community in the world as a nation:

> "The religion mediated by the Prophet Moses is named Judaism. Later on, this religion is adopted by the Jewish nation (*millet*)" (Tanrıverdi 2000: 46).

This entitlement is wrong according to the modern definition of nation. The use of the term *millet* evokes the Ottoman millet system that arranges a hierarchical structure among the Ottoman peoples based on religion. Such a categorization for the Jewish community may signal a subordinate position reserved for it. Although this message is not clear in the quotation, the Jewish community is evidently perceived as a separate collectivity outside the nation. Different from 2000, the 2012 textbooks never make such a claim and continue to portray it as a religious community. Due to lack of frank inclusion or exclusion especially in 2012, the perception on the Jewish community is hard to evaluate. Nevertheless, having covered the significance of Islam for both periods but specifically for the JDP erain Chapter Three, I suggest that the Jewish identity may be unfit for the depicted national identity.

The Rum community is almost totally absent in both periods. Whereas there are 2 references to them in the 2000 textbooks, there is none in 2012. The decay is not telling, since 2 mention is not different than 0. In other words, the Rum identity is absent in both periods, showing no amelioration in the recent period. As discussed above, none of the textbooks intends to establish connections between Greece and the Rum community.In this respect, the Rum identity is not affected by the negativerepresentation of Greece with whom the War of Independence was fought. Notwithstanding, the Rum community is still presented with a hostile image. In the 2000 textbooks, both references to Rums co-occur with the codes "Enemy" and "Occupier". For instance in the fifth grade Social Sciences textbook, Rums and Armenians are presented as collaborators with the Allies who want to divide the homeland in the aftermath of the WWI:

> "The British occupied Antep, Urfa, Maraş… The French occupied Adana and the nearby region, and the Italians occupied Adana and Konya… The Greeks backed by the Brits entered into İzmir… The minorities wanted to benefit from this situation. The Rums and Armenians backed by the Allies founded harmful unions (*zararlı cemiyet*)" (Şenüver et al. 2000: 29-31).

The minorities, specifically Rums and Armenians among them, are portrayed as hostile to the national struggle for their own interests.They are clearly pictured as the enemy within "us" sharing similar goals with external enemies. The congruity of intention makes the internal and external enemies join their forces against the Turkish nation and homeland. Hence, both communities are depicted as the outsiders of the nation. The passage is also revealing about the lack of connection between Greece and the internal Rum community. Whereas Greece is presented as a foreign state with hostile intentions against the unity and integrity of the homeland, Rums have a portrayal of their own unrelated to Greece. However, they are both delineated as hostile to the nation. Moving from 2000 to 2012, I have no base to claim a meaningful change in the JDP era concerning the perception of the Rum identity. I can not assess the removal of negative connotations against Rums as positive change, since textbooks make no mention of them in 2012. Accordingly, observing that there is no clear intention of textbooks to incorporate the Rum identity into the national identity, I can only assert continuity with the past in the JDP period.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I intend to find out if the JDP era brings about change in the representation of the Turkishness in textbooks. The content and discourse analysis results show that the JDP era witnesses the reproduction of nation through promotion of homogeneity. Similar to the general trend in the history of modern Turkey, the JDP era textbooks construct the national identity overwhelmingly on volk-centered definitions of Turkishness taking an organic, assimilationist and differentialist perception at the center. The 2012 textbooks demonstrate that the most significant condition to pass through the semipermeable boundaries of the Turkish nation is the ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic Turkish identity, which is implicitly or explicitly deemed superior to other ethnic identities.

The JDP era also raises the emphasis on the desirability of the ethno-racial Turkish identity, hence reinforcing the volk-centered tendencies of the Turkish citizenship. However, the rise of stress on the volk-based definition of Turkishness reveals precarious signs. In other words, the data is insufficient to prove a clear change in the depiction of Turkishness. Accordingly, the JDP era can be interpreted as a continuation with the pre-JDP perception of Turkishness. The most certain argument I can derive from my analysis is that there is no sign of amelioration in terms of a more inclusive understanding of Turkishness. Since the JDP period reproduces an exclusivist Turkish nation based especially on ethnic identity, non-Turkish communities are distanced from the imagined community either by silence on their identity or by presenting them as threats to the Turkish nation. The pejorative discourse against them often fed by the allegedly collaborative relationship between the non-Turkish groups and external enemies. Altogether, the JDP period keeps the exclusionist perception of Turkishness, while at the same time subtly attaching a subordinate status to non-Turkish communities within the Turkish nation.

CONCLUSION

The nation is a constructed phenomenon. It is the product of modern processes of social, political and economic transformations. Among many other transformative tools, the modern school has an important role. Although the school's social engineering capacity is not limited to textbooks, they are essential to it. More specifically, they are means to the inculcation of a prescribed national identity around which the nation is constructed. Assessing the case of Turkey, I came to the conclusion that the unity of the nationhood is built through the homogenization of masses into the national identity which is dominated by certain identities. The literature review as well as the primary data show that the Turkish citizenship does not entail Turkishness for the latter has a superior position in the eyes of the state. In other words, textbooks do not recognize every citizen as equal members of the nation. Correspondingly, the nation is divided into hierarchical ranks in the imagination of students. In this hierarchical structure, the top is reserved for the 'ideal' or 'desirable' citizens who comply with the constructed national identity. In this sense, those citizens who do not fit into the prescribed Turkish identity are either excluded from the nation or given lower ranks within the nation.

The hierarchy within the nation is reproduced by three methods employed in textbooks. The first one is the 'method of exclusion'. I coined this term to explain how textbooks exclude an identity group by using a pejorative and antagonizing language against it. Having read about the enemy image of an identity community, students may picture them as internal enemies against the unity and solidarity of the nation, hence they are imagined as outsiders. The textbooks I analyzed almost never directly exclude identity communities. Nevertheless, this method is present in textbooks. The second method for constructing hierarchy is 'method of silence', which is keeping silent about the publicly acknowledged

presence of identity communities in population. This method is a way to subtly deny identity communities. Although they are not targeted overtly, their identity is given a lower place within the hierarchy. This argument derives from the fact that while the national identity is promoted in textbooks at every occasion, their identity is either never mentioned or mentioned very rarely. The third and last method for constructing hierarchy is the 'method of obscurity' with which textbooks provide contradictory images of the identity group. While textbooks positively or neutrally refer to it in one page, in another, they may construct a negative image for it. In this way, the position of the identity within the nation is blurred.Accordingly, an indesicive yet subordinate position is pictured for the identity community. The contradictory messages create controversy on the inclusion of this community into the nation in the imagination of the students. In this way, a hierarchical perception of nationhood is reproduced. The hierarchically-structured perception of Turkish nationhood during the JDP era is illustrated below:



Table 1: The imagination of Turkish nationhood promoted in the JDP era textbooks[74].

[74] As my research assesses the ethnic and religious aspects of the national identity separately, the pyramide model intends to illustrate the hierarchy between ethnic identities and religious identities individually. Thus, it does not tell about the position of different combinations of ethnic and religious identities.

The assessment of the JDP period based on this model reveals that it continues with the reproduction of ethno-centric understanding of nationhood, hence assign ethno-linguistically and ethno-culturally non-Turkish communities non-ideal positions within nation. With respect to the religious aspect of the national identity, the JDP era goes beyond the levels of Islamization in the post-1980 era. Whereas the post-September 12 period introduces Islamic identity together with Atatürkist ideology to nationalize and secularize it, the JDP era witnesses further Islamization of the national identity as Atatürkist references decays in textbooks. Additionally, while the emphasis on Islamic identity gets tenser, textbooks usually continue their silence on the non-Muslim identities. The Islamization of the nation manifests that non-Muslims are not recognized as equal partners of the nation in textbooks. In terms of the Sunni aspect of religious identity, the JDP era shows continuation with the post-1980 period as a few changes do not ameliorate the picture and turn the Turkish citizenship into a more inclusive one. In this respect, textbooks keep on assigning non-Sunni identities a subordinate position within the imagined nation.

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