KOÇ UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

The Gender Gap in Public Support for European Integration

Gitta Glüpker-Kesebir

PhD thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Istanbul, 15 December 2015

Dedicated to my mother Geertien Glüpker, née Deters (1950 – 2012).

She taught me, among many things, to never give up.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu, who has always had an open door for me since my first days at Koç University. His encouragement, patience and advice paved my way through the trials and tribulations of my PhD years. I would also like to thank Doç. Dr. Bahar Rumelili and Professor Dr. Susan Banducci for their inspiring comments and their help throughout all stages of my research.

My special thanks go to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Koç University. Reconciling my PhD studies with the unpredictability of life would have been much harder without its generous and flexible support.

I thank my PhD colleagues at the graduate school for their emotional and intellectual support. I always enjoy our exchange of ideas about politics, science and life in general.

Last but not least, words cannot express how grateful I am for the love and friendship of my husband, Arif Tayfun Kesebir. Without having him, my father and my families in Germany and in Turkey by my side, I would not have dared to start the PhD adventure in the first place, and I might not have had the strength to finish it. Thank you.

Gitta Glüpker-Kesebir

December 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements II

Table of contents III

List of tables VI

List of figures VII

Statement of authorship IX

Abstract 1

Özet 2

1. Introduction: gender and European integration 3

1.1 The gender gap puzzle(s) 4

1.2 Overview of the thesis 8

2. The determinants of public EU support and the gender gap 11

2.1. The state of research on the EU gender gap 11

2.2. Individual determinants of public EU support 15

2.2.1. Age 16

2.2.2. Education 18

2.2.3. Occupation and income 19

2.2.4. Identity 21

2.2.5. Religion and religiosity 22

2.2.6. Partisanship and ideological predispositions 24

2.2.7. Attitudes on national institutions 27

2.3. Macro-level conditions of the EU gender gap 28

2.3.1. Macro-economic effects of European integration 28

2.3.2. Socio-economic development 29

2.3.3. Welfare regimes 30

2.4. Chapter conclusions 32

3. The question of causality: micro- and macro-level roots of the EU gender gap 33

3.1. The individual level: “money” or “love”? 34

3.1.1. Testing strategy 37

3.1.2. The role of age and occupation: an example 41

3.1.3. Other determinants of the EU gender gap 43

3.2. The larger picture: cross-country variations of the gender gap 45

4. Methods and data 49

4.1. Methodological approach 49

4.2. Eurobarometer surveys 51

4.3. Temporal and geographical scope 51
4.4. Dependent variables 52
4.5. Treatment of "don't know" answers 53
4.6. Identifying the causes of the gender gap: the use of interaction terms and the limits of large-N research 55
4.7. Statistical models 56
4.7.1. The gender gap in support for EU membership 56
4.7.2. The gender gap in support for social policy-making at the EU level 61
4.7.3. Case studies on Sweden, Germany and Turkey 61
5. Tracing the EU gender gap across Europe 64
5.1. Temporal variations of the gender gaps in support for EU membership and for social policy-making at the EU level 64
5.2. The relative size of the EU gender gap: small but relevant 68
5.3. Interaction of respondent's sex with other characteristics 70
5.4. Variations of the EU gender gap across Europe 80
5.5. Chapter conclusions 83
6. A multilevel model of the gender gap in EU membership support 85
6.1. Chapter conclusions 95
7. The gender gap and the EU's social policies 98
7.1. EU social and gender equality policies 98
7.2. The relation between social policy preferences and evaluations of EU membership 101
7.3. The gender gap in support for social policy-making at the EU level 102
7.4. Chapter conclusions 107
8. From Scandinavia to the Mediterranean: the gender gaps of Sweden, Germany and Turkey 108
8.1. Sweden: a prime example of the utility-based gender gap 111
8.1.2 Temporal dynamics in Sweden 117
8.1.3 Summary 118
8.2 Germany: the multifaceted roots of the gender gap 120
8.2.2 Temporal dynamics in Germany 126
8.2.3 Summary 129
8.3 Turkey: the influence of EU accession negotiations 131
8.3.1 Temporal dynamics in Turkey 136
8.3.2 Summary 139
8.4 Comparing the gender gaps of Sweden, Germany and Turkey 139
8.5 Chapter conclusions 141
9. Conclusions: is it all about the money? 143
9.1. The utilitarian roots of the EU gender gap: material self-interest is the key 145
9.2. The role of welfare regimes: concerns over the negative effects of European integration 146

9.3. Additional influences: sociodemographic factors and the European integration process.....147
9.4. Policy implications.....148
References.....151
Eurobarometer surveys.....166
Other datasets.....167
Appendix.....169

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 EXPECTED INFLUENCE OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONDITIONS ON THE EU GENDER GAP 48
TABLE 2 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 1 87
TABLE 3 SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP FOR INHABITANTS OF SOCIALDEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATES ACROSS AGE GROUPS 93
TABLE 4 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 2 103
TABLE 5 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 3.1 (SWEDEN) 113
TABLE 6 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 4.1 (GERMANY) 122
TABLE 7 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 4.3 (GERMANY) 127
TABLE 8 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS BEFORE AND SINCE 2008 IN GERMANY, IN PERCENT 129
TABLE 9 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 5.1 (TURKEY) 133
TABLE 10 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 5.3 (TURKEY) 137
TABLE 11 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE OPENING OF EU ACCESSION NEGOTATIONS IN TURKEY, IN PERCENT 138
TABLE 12 AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATES, IN PERCENT (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2014B) 169
TABLE 13 SAMPLE SIZES (GESIS 2013A) 170
TABLE 14 GDP OF THE EU AND SELECTED OTHER WORLD REGIONS AND COUNTRIES 172
TABLE 15 TRENDS IN EU GENDER GAPS (1995 – 2012 FOR MEMBER STATES, 1995 – 2011 FOR CANDIDATE COUNTRIES) 173
TABLE 16 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014 (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014B) 173
TABLE 17 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014, GERMANY (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014C) 173
TABLE 18 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014, SWEDEN (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014D) 174
TABLE 19 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY 2013 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2014) 174
TABLE 20 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SWEDEN 2014 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2015) 174
TABLE 21 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY 2011 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2011) 175
TABLE 22 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY 2015 (TURKISH DAILY NEWS 2015) 175
TABLE 23 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODEL 1 175
TABLE 24 MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION FOR EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AND SUPPORT FOR JOINT SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING 176
TABLE 25 SUPPORT FOR JOINT SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING ACROSS OPINIONS ON EU MEMBERSHIP 176
TABLE 26 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODEL 2 177
TABLE 27 RESULTS OF APPLYING MODEL 1 VARIABLES TO THE INDIVIDUAL EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 178
TABLE 28 OUTCOMES OF APPLYING MODEL 1 TO THE SWEDISH, GERMAN AND TURKISH DATA SAMPLES 181
TABLE 29 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 3.1 TO 3.3 (SWEDEN) 183
TABLE 30 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 4.1 TO 4.3 (GERMANY) 184
TABLE 31 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 5.1 TO 5.4 (TURKEY) 185
TABLE 32 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY ACCORDING TO THE EUROBAROMETER SAMPLES 186
TABLE 33 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 3.2 (SWEDEN) 187
TABLE 34 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 3.3 (SWEDEN) 188
TABLE 35 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 4.2 (GERMANY) 189
TABLE 36 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 5.2 (TURKEY) 190
TABLE 37 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 5.4 (TURKEY) 191

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 THE SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN THE MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES OF THE EU 7
FIGURE 2 EXPECTATIONS FOR THE EU GENDER GAP DERIVED FROM THE UTILITARIAN AND THE SOCIALIZATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS 41
FIGURE 3 SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM 1995 TO 2012 65
FIGURE 4 THE EU GENDER GAP IN THE EU-15 AND IN THE EU-27 WITH CANDIDATE COUNTRIES IN PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM 1995 TO 2012 66
FIGURE 5 AVERAGE MISERY RATE OF COUNTRIES COVERED BY EUROBAROMETER 67
FIGURE 6 THE GENDER GAP IN SUPPORT FOR EU POLICY-MAKING IN THE AREA OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL POLICIES 68
FIGURE 7 COMPARISON OF THE GENDER GAP WITH OTHER CLEAVAGES AMONG EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORTERS IN PERCENTAGE POINTS (1995 TO 2012) 69
FIGURE 8 THE EU GENDER GAP COMPARED TO OTHER DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN POPULACE ACROSS TIME 70
FIGURE 9 NATIONAL AGE AVERAGES IN THE EUROBAROMETER DATA SAMPLE 71
FIGURE 10 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS AGE GROUPS, 2004 72
FIGURE 11 THE EU GENDER GAP ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FULL-TIME EDUCATION, 1995 74
FIGURE 12 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 2011 75
FIGURE 13 THE EU GENDER GAP ACCORDING TO EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, 2011 76
FIGURE 14 SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP DESPITE FEARS FROM A LOSS OF NATURAL IDENTITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 77
FIGURE 15 SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU-15 ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 78
FIGURE 16 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS RELIGIONS, 2006 79
FIGURE 17 THE EU GENDER GAP AT THE RIGHT MARGIN OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, 2004 80
FIGURE 18 AVERAGE SIZE OF EU GENDER GAPS ACROSS EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 82
FIGURE 19 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN TURKEY 83
FIGURE 20 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS WELFARE REGIMES . 88
FIGURE 21 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS 90
FIGURE 22 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONS 92
FIGURE 23 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN IN SOCIALDEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATES ACROSS AGE GROUPS 94
FIGURE 24 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL ACROSS WELFARE REGIMES IN THE EU-27 AND ITS CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 104
FIGURE 25 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS 105
FIGURE 26 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGICAL PREDISPOSITIONS 106
FIGURE 27 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS 106
FIGURE 28 THE EU GENDER GAPS IN SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY 110
FIGURE 29 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN SWEDEN 112
FIGURE 30 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN SWEDEN 114
FIGURE 31 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FULL-TIME EDUCATION IN SWEDEN 115
FIGURE 32 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO SELF-PLACEMENT IN THE POLITICAL LEFT-RIGHT SPECTRUM IN SWEDEN 116
FIGURE 33 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS IN SWEDEN 117
FIGURE 34 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN GERMANY 120
FIGURE 35 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS EDUCATIONAL GROUPS IN GERMANY 124

FIGURE 36 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN GERMANY 125
FIGURE 37 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO THE SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE SERVICE SECTOR IN GERMANY 126
FIGURE 38 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF LISBON IN GERMANY 129
FIGURE 39 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN TURKEY 132
FIGURE 40 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN TURKEY 134
FIGURE 41 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN TURKEY 135
FIGURE 42 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MICRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS IN TURKEY 136

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed Gitta GLÜPKER-KESEBİR

ABSTRACT

Public opinion research shows that women are generally less supportive of European integration than men. Although this observation has been noted in numerous works on public opinion on the EU, the reasons for this "EU gender gap" remain widely unexplored. This is puzzling, considering the stable existence of the EU gender gap over time and its presence in all countries in Europe.

This study sets out to identify the causes of the EU gender gap, both at the individual and at the country-level. By creating a bridge between the literature on the determinants of public EU support and the literature on gendered policy preferences, the study connects two research areas which have been detached from each other so far. The study test the two major explanations for gendered policy preferences which are applicable to the EU context, with material self-interest on the one side and the socialization of people into gendered roles at an early age on the other side. Furthermore, the study evaluates the influences of country-specific conditions on the EU gender gap.

Multilevel models are constructed which use Eurobarometer surveys from 1995 to 2012 and information on political, cultural and economic qualities of the EU member states and the (former) candidate countries Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. In addition, case studies analyze the EU gender gaps of Sweden, Germany and Turkey in the context of their welfare traditions and their EU policies.

The results suggest that utilitarian considerations are the major cause of the EU gender gap. Among all country-specific conditions which have been tested, only socialdemocratic and conservative welfare traditions are found to affect the EU gender gap. The case studies demonstrate that welfare traditions, especially the support of welfare states to gender equality at the labor market, partially account for the size of the EU gender gap at the country-level. Further influences which cannot be ignored for explaining the dynamics of the EU gender gap are the socio-demographic constitution of countries and their relations with the EU.

Keywords: European integration, public opinion, gender, welfare regimes, Sweden, Germany, Turkey

ÖZET

Kamuoyu araştırmaları, Avrupa entegrasyonu konusunda genel olarak kadınların erkeklerden daha az destek verdiğini göstermektedir. Bu gözlem, AB hakkında yapılan çok sayıda kamuoyu araştırmalarında görülmesine rağmen, "Avrupa Birliği'nde kadın erkek farkı" konusu üzerinde yeterince araştırma yapılmamıştır. Kadın erkek farkı, AB ülkelerindeki varlığı ve kalıcılığı düşünüldüğü zaman oldukça şaşırtıcı bir durum oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışma hem bireysel hem de ülkeler düzeyinde AB kadın erkek farkının nedenlerini belirlemek için hazırlanmıştır. Çalışma, cinsiyet politikası tercihleri ve AB'ye kamuoyu desteğinin belirleyicileri literatürleri arasında bir köprü oluşturarak, bugüne kadar birbirinden kopuk olan iki araştırma alanını birbirine bağlamaktadır. Çalışma, AB bağlamında uygulanabilir cinsiyet politikası tercihleri için iki önemli açıklamayı test etmektedir; materyalist (maddiyatçı) kişisel çıkar açıklamalarını ve kişilerin erken yaşta cinsiyet rollerine sosyalizasyonunu test etmektedir. . Ayrıca, bu çalışma AB cinsiyet ayrımcılığı üzerinde ülkeye özgü koşulların etkisini değerlendirmektedir.

Araştırmada 1995-2012 yılları arasındaki Eurobarometer anketleri ve AB üye ülkeleri ve (eski) aday ülkelerin (Hırvatistan, İzlanda, Makedonya, Karadağ ve Türkiye) siyasi, kültürel ve ekonomik nitelikleri baz alınarak tasarlanan çok düzeyli modeller (multilevel models) kullanılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, vaka çalışmalarında AB kadın erkek farkı çerçevesinde İsveç, Almanya ve Türkiye'nin sosyal refah gelenekleri ve AB politikaları analiz edilmiştir.

Sonuçlar AB'nde cinsiyet ayrımcılığının oluşmasında en önemli nedenlerin utiliteryan (faydacı) düşüncelerin olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca test edilen tüm ülkelere özgü koşullar arasında, sadece sosyal demokrat ve muhafazakâr refah geleneklerinin AB kadın erkek farkını etkilediği gözlemlenmiştir. Vaka çalışmaları sosyal refah geleneklerinin, özellikle refah düzeyi yüksek ülkelerin işgücü piyasasında toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği sağlamaya çalışmalarının, ülke düzeyinde AB kadın erkek farkı boyutlarını kısmen açıkladığını göstermektedir. AB'de kadın erkek farkı dinamiklerini açıklamak için göz ardı edilemeyecek diğer etkenler ülkelerin sosyo-demografik yapıları ve AB ile olan ilişkileridir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupa entegrasyonu, kamuoyu, cinsiyet, refah rejimleri, İsveç, Almanya, Türkiye

1. INTRODUCTION: GENDER AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Women are less supportive of European integration than men – this is an observation of numerous studies on public support for the European Union (EU) and for the European integration process.[1] However, while many authors note the statistically significant role of gender for EU support, only very few have investigated the "EU gender gap" in more detail.[2] As a result, the cause of the gender gap remains still unidentified.

This thesis is motivated by the strong academic and practical incentives to understand *why* men and women evaluate the EU differently. The academic incentive results from the absence of a gender perspective in the literature on public EU support and, more specifically, from a lack of knowledge on the causes of the EU gender gap. The practical incentives result from the growing pressure on policy-makers to demonstrate that they are sensitive to their constituencies' concerns over European integration.

The silence over the gender gap in public support for European integration is not astonishing. It matches well with the absence of gender in European integration which has existed over decades in a double sense: in EU policy-making and in theories on European integration. As to the former, European integration has evolved from economic cooperation and this focus has been kept ever since. Rising from the idea that war in Europe would become less likely if the authority over core industries was shared, the first main advances in European integration were undertaken in the early 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. From this first step, a full-fledged economic Community developed and with it the political will to cooperate in other areas, including social policies and gender equality at the labor market. EU social policies were designed primarily to counter the problematic side-effects of economic integration. With the lobbying of second-wave feminists and a mentality change in the European institutions, gender equality and the gender dimension of other EU policies have received broader attention since the 2000s. Nonetheless, survey data suggest that these policies have so far failed to produce enthusiasm for European integration among women (Hoskyns 2004: 229).

As to European integration theories, it took scholars a similarly long time to develop a gender perspective as it has taken policy-makers to realize the importance of gender equality policies.

[1] See for example Gabel (1998), McLaren (2002), Karp et al. (2003), Garry/Tilley (2009), Lubbers/Scheepers (2010), Boomgaarden et al. (2011), Osterloh (2011), Nelsen et al. (2011), Hartefeld et al. (2013) and Armingeon/Ceka (2014) for the EU member states, Ehin (2001) for Estonia and Lithuania, Vetik et al. (2006) for Estonia and Slovakia, and Çarkoğlu/Glüpker-Kesebir (2015) for Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. In a similar vein, Batthi and Hansen (2012) identify significant gender differences in the turnout to the European elections without further elaborating on this point.

[2] For the convenience of the reader, the term "EU gender gap" will be used in the following to describe the gender gap in public support for European integration.

Kronsell (2005) shows that none of the dominant theories on European integration until the 1990s have sufficiently acknowledged power asymmetries between the genders. These asymmetries lead to the societal marginalization of women and they exist in those national and European institutions which drive the process of European integration (see also Hoskyns 2004: 233). Eventually the emergence of social constructivism in the 1990s created a greater space for the role of gender in integration theories (Hoskyns 2004: 227, Kronsell 2005).

These development in policy-making and theorizing notwithstanding, a gender perspective is still widely absent in research on public opinion about European integration. The following chapters set out to eradicate this deficit in the existing scholarship on public support for European integration. As will be discussed in more detail below, this endeavor does not only satisfy academic curiosity, but it provides the necessary basis for policy-makers at the EU and at the national level to improve their understanding of the concerns of the public towards European integration. In times of particular tense public debates over the benefits and costs of European integration, improving this understanding seems to be more necessary than ever.

1.1 The gender gap puzzle(s)

Eurobarometer survey data show that the men have been more supportive in their evaluations of EU membership than women for decades. The gender gap constitutes the most stable division in the EU populace in terms of support for European integration, compared to other divisions such as age, educational or occupational differences. Furthermore, it varies considerably across countries, with a size of more than nine percentage points in countries such as Cyprus, Sweden, Portugal, Denmark and Slovenia. Whereas one of following chapters will explore the variations of the gender gap in more detail (Chapter 5), these observations hint at the possibility that the gender gap is large enough in some countries and at some points in time to play a relevant role for election outcomes.

In the United States where the partisan gender gap measures eight to ten percentage points (Huddy/Cassese/Lizotte 2008: 164), the strategic exploitation of gender gaps has since long been a part of electoral campaigns (Dailey 2012, Parker/Gabriel 2012, Rutenberg/Peters 2012, Berg 2015). At the occasion of the 2014 elections of the US Senate, the New York Times reported on the meticulous analyses of the gender gap by election campaigners:

> "Democrats need a big margin — at least in the double digits — with female voters. The commercials and campaigns reflect this priority. In addition to the economy, Medicare and Social Security, the emphasis is on ending pay discrimination based on gender, making contraception readily available and covered by insurance, and, in some states, the right to abortion or stressing issues that seem more important to women: education in North Carolina, for example. Some Democratic campaigns are conducting focus groups only with women to gauge intensity and nuances." (Hunt 2014)

In Europe, gender gaps in voting behavior and policy preferences have not gained the same attention as they receive in the US. Nonetheless, some policy-makers are aware of their potential. Fleckenstein argues that in Germany the Christian Democrats (CDU) took a drastic turn in their social policy program, away from the conservative tradition and towards stronger support for gender equality, in order to achieve an electoral advantage over their leftist competitors:

> "Angela Merkel, as CDU Secretary General, diagnosed that poor mobilization among women was key to losing power, and would continue to undermine the electoral success of the party […] The analysis of its 1998 election defeat alarmed the CDU leadership. In this context, family policy was identified as one of the key issues that required modernization in order to regain ground in the political center. The development of a family model that is 'women-friendly' and geared toward gender equality was seen crucial to attract young women voters, which indicates an instrumentalist approach to family policy modernization […]" (Fleckenstein 2011: 556 - 557)

Taking these national approaches to gender and politics as an example, investing into understanding the role of gender for EU support and the gendered effects of European integration appears a worthwhile enterprise for politicians who seek public support for their EU policies. Although the EU gender gap exists for a long time, its importance increases with the ongoing politicization of EU politics. Since the early 1990s public opinion in general has gained influence over EU politics. Norway, Switzerland and most recently Iceland (Milne 2013) halted their accession processes due to the resistance of the public. A lack of public support led to the renegotiation and change of EU Treaties, such as in the cases of the Maastricht Treaty, the failed Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. With the Eurozone crisis, public awareness and polarization over issues of European integration have grown again (Gläser/Wessels 2014). EU politics receive more attention in national election campaigns (de Wilde/Zürn 2012). Therefore, both European and national policy-makers who seek support for their EU policies are well advised to have a closer look at the gender differences in EU evaluations.

Outside the realm of electoral considerations, the gender gap in public EU support should be noteworthy for EU institutions, too. Although the EU has adopted a policy of gender mainstreaming since the 1990s (Chapter 7 elaborates in more details on the EU's gender equality policies), it has obviously failed to gain the support of women which it enjoys among men. Insights on the cause of the EU gender gap may lead EU institutions to reconsider the design of policies which, despite gender mainstreaming, continue to produce unintended gendered effects.[3]

[3] See the special Issue of the Women's Studies International Forum (2013) for studies about the unintended gendered consequences of EU policies.

From an academic point of view, identifying the causes of the EU gender gap is worthwhile, too. The empirical basis of the little existing research which stems from the 1990s is modest, compared to the size and development of the contemporary EU. Since the late 1990s, when the last research on the EU gender gap has been undertaken, the EU has changed considerably. Thirteen new member states have joined the Union and several countries have obtained candidate status. The Treaties of Nice and Lisbon have modified the decision-making processes as well as the institutional set-up of the EU and advanced the competencies of the EU in many policy areas (Pleuger 2001, Hoffmann/Wessels 2008). The economic and financial crises since the late 2000s and the new dynamics of international relations under the impression of global terrorism have changed the conditions under which the EU operates (Braun/Tausendpfund 2014, den Boer/Monar 2002).

Moreover, the authors of the few pieces on the EU gender gap suggest different approaches to and mechanisms behind the EU gender gap. However, their findings did not spark a debate that could have resulted in the resolution of their differences: Ulrike Liebert (1997, 1999) argues that feminist public discourses on European integration are the major determinant of the gender gap. She explains the relatively large gender gaps in Scandinavian countries with the fears of women for their "collective attainments" (Liebert 1997: 22), i.e. the fear that national welfare standards could be lowered under the influence of the EU. While Liebert emphasizes the cross-country variations of the EU gender gap, Brent Nelsen and James Guth (2000) focus on the individual level. For their regression analyses they use a Eurobarometer survey from 1994. The authors reject Liebert's argument on the mechanism between socialdemocratic welfare regimes and the size of the gender gap. Instead they suggest that due to the generous welfare regimes in Scandinavia, women there see less need for European integration and therefore are more opposed to EU membership than women elsewhere.

The map of the EU gender gap in Figure 1 below underlines the variation of the gap's size across countries. The absence of a clear regional or welfare regime-oriented pattern is striking. Not only do countries from the Mediterranean and from Eastern Europe have large gender gaps, too, but does Finland have a smaller gap whose size is similar to the gender gaps in the United Kingdom and in Greece. These observations raise doubts over the role of welfare state regimes for the EU gender gap at the country level.



FIGURE 1 THE SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN THE MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES OF THE EU[4]

For the individual level of the EU gender gap, Nelsen and Guth (2000) test a number of potential determinants which touch on various fields of gender gap research, such as gender differences in political interest, traditional gender roles and economic factors. However, they do not conclude precisely which of these various influences is the dominant one; they find that all factors play some role for the EU gender gap. In addition, the question *why* men and women are affected differently in their EU evaluations by these characteristics remains unanswered.

With regards to the practical potential of the EU gender gap and the weaknesses of the existing research, the following chapters set out to answer two major research questions: why does the gender gap in evaluations of European integration exist and why does the size of the gender gap vary so strongly across the member states and candidate countries of the EU?

[4] Map created with Smartdraw®. Due to technical limitations, Cyprus presents the values for the Republic of Cyprus. The Northern Republic of Cyprus is excluded from this study. Furthermore, Malta could not be displayed in the map. The Maltese gender gap measures on average 8.7 percentage points. All values represent the average size of the EU gender gap, calculated by the author based on the EU membership question in the Eurobarometer standard surveys from 1995 to 2012.

1.2 Overview of the thesis

The study begins with reviewing the state of research on public EU support and on gendered policy preferences (**Chapter 2**). It links the determinants of public opinion on the EU with insights on gender gaps in other policy areas, in partisanship, and voting behavior. Thereby the study creates a bridge between two research areas which have so far been disconnected from each other.

On the basis of this bridge, **Chapter 3** presents a theoretical framework which allows revealing its causes. The interaction patterns of age and occupation with biological sex are best suited to see which explanations developed for other areas of research are dominant in the EU context. The arguments which are applicable to the EU context are the utilitarian and a socialization-based[5] explanation of gendered policy preferences. The former contends that both men and women evaluate European integration based on material self-interest. In brief, if people expect European integration to be advantageous to their material situation they support it. Material gender disparities, which accumulate over the course of life, lead to the gender gap in EU support. Accordingly, a growing gender gap across age groups would be an indicator for this explanation. Moreover, men and women in similar occupational positions should evaluate the EU similarly. Hence, stable gender gaps across occupational groups would be interpreted as a sign of the utilitarian explanation, too.

In contrast, the socialization-based explanation argues that the socialization of people into gender roles during childhood accounts for the gender gap in EU support. Eurobarometer surveys ask respondents from the age of 15 onwards for their opinion on European integration. At this age, gender roles have already been adopted (Andersen et al. 2013). Following works on gender gaps in other policy areas, this gendered socialization leads to gender-specific views of politics. For the EU context, this means that men should evaluate the EU according to their personal situation, with an emphasis on the EU's impact on fields such as individual autonomy and free trade. Women should think of European integration more in terms of its effects on the society as a whole and especially on the more vulnerable segments of society. As a result, the gender gap in EU support should be relatively stable across age groups as socialization into gender roles has taken place before the age of 15 which is the minimum age for Eurobarometer respondents. In contrast, the gap's size should vary across occupational groups: whereas men and women in low positions should be similarly skeptical of the EU, the support of European integration among people in higher positions should be less pronounced among women who are thought to retain reservations over the effects of integration on weaker segments of society.

[5] Chapter 3 discusses alternative labels for this perspective on gender differences.

At the country-level, the theoretical framework uses the literature review to establish expectations for the influence of long- and short term developments on the gender gap. Welfare traditions, the religious constitution and the socio-economic development of societies are long-term characteristics which may influence the EU gender gap. The material benefits of countries from their EU membership, their economic performance and the strength of Euroskepticisim in the public discourse are developments which occur on a relatively short-term basis.

In order to test the alternative explanations and influences on the EU gender gap, survey data from 20 Eurobarometer editions between 1995 and 2012 has been used to construct multilevel models which cover the EU-27 and five candidate countries.[6] The use of interaction terms between respondent's sex and individual and country-specific conditions reflect the conceptualization of gender as a social construct as far as this is possible in a large-N, quantitative research design. **Chapter 4** discusses the advantages and problems of this approach. Other methods, such as the conduct of focus groups and interviews with men and women to understand their reflections on European integration would be helpful to test and corroborate explanations for the EU gender gap. However, such explanations are still missing so that the inferential analysis of survey data from 32 countries and for a time period of 17 years constitutes the most appropriate approach to shed a first light on the causes of the EU gender gap at the individual level and the country level. The results will point into the directions which further research on the EU gender gap should take in the future.

Chapter 5 traces the shape of the gender gap across space and time, using the samples of the 20 Eurobarometer editions for first descriptive insights on the gender gap. It reveals strong national variations as well as temporal trends in the gender gap. Furthermore, it compares the gender gap with other cleavages in the European populace in terms of EU support.

The multilevel analysis of the EU gender gap in the EU-27 and the five candidate countries in **Chapter 6** corroborates the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap. Moreover, the results show that, among country-specific conditions, only welfare traditions are relevant.

Because the results of Chapter 6 remain inconclusive about the mechanism which links welfare regimes to the EU gender gap, **Chapter 7** elaborates on the relationship between EU membership support and preferences for social policy-making in more detail. It compares the gender gap in support for EU membership with the gender gap in support for social policy-making at the EU level.

[6] The candidate countries are Croatia (which joined the EU in 2013, i.e. it was a candidate country in the Eurobarometer surveys used for this study), Iceland (which was a candidate country from 2010 to 2015), the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (which will hereafter be referred to as Macedonia for greater reader convenience), Montenegro and Turkey.

The analyses show that the latter is the result of material self-interest. However, the gender gaps in the evaluations of EU membership and social policies are neither closely associated nor do they display congruent dynamics. Moreover, and in contrast to suggestions from the existing literature on the EU gender gap, men seem to base their EU evaluations stronger on their attitudes on EU social policies than women. Thereby, the findings of Chapter 7 qualify some suggestions of the EU gender gap literature on the link between welfare regimes and gender differences in EU evaluations.

In order to shed more light on the national variations of the EU gender gap, **Chapter 8** investigates EU gender gaps of three selected countries. Each country has its own determinants of the EU gender gap so that country-specific models have been built to model the gaps in Sweden, Germany and Turkey,. The results support the utilitarian explanation for the gender gap. The particularly wide gender gap in Sweden is a result of the greater influence of macroeconomic pessimism on the EU evaluations of women. In other words, women in Sweden are more afraid that the European integration could lead to cut backs in welfare state benefits than men. This is in line with the view of Liebert (1997, 1999). At the same time, the findings oppose Nelsen and Guth (2000) who argue that women in Scandinavia feel materially secure and see less need than others for EU membership than women elsewhere.

Additionally, the country-specific determinants of the EU gender gap contribute to the explanation of the cross-country variation of the gender gap if the sociodemographic constitution of countries is taken into account. Age for instance leads to a growing gender gap. Considering that Sweden has a higher age average of its population than Turkey contributes to the relatively large gender gap in Sweden and to the relatively modest gender gap in Turkey.

Lastly, the analyses of temporal trends demonstrate that the gap is not a product of constant forces. Developments on the international and European level such as the global economic crisis, the discussion on the Treaty of Lisbon or the opening of EU accession negotiations might be responsible for shifting patterns of the EU gender gaps in Germany and Turkey respectively.

2. THE DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC EU SUPPORT AND THE GENDER GAP

This chapter starts with a discussion of the limited literature which exists on the gender gap in public support for European integration. Subsequently, two areas of scholarship are consulted to identify the forces which determine the EU gender gap. The first area is the vast literature on public opinion about the EU. Early on, material conditions such as age, education or occupation have been shown to affect individual enthusiasm towards European integration. Later scholars advanced the idea that attitudinal factors such as national identity, religious belonging and partisanship could drive EU support. Lastly, other authors suggested that macro-level conditions such as a country's contribution to the EU budget or national economic performance may shape opinions on the EU. These different strands in research on EU support will be discussed in detail in section 2.2.

The second area to be consulted is the research on gender gaps in other policy areas. For voting behavior and partisanship in national contexts, a number of suggestions have been developed as to why women and men differ in their opinions. Sometimes individual conditions are shown to drive the gender gaps and they are identical to those which may determine public EU support. Whereas some authors see gender gaps as a result of individual conditions, others stress the importance of the welfare regimes and the socioeconomic environment of people.

In the following, the individual and the macro-level characteristics which have been identified as relevant will be discussed one by one. This serves to understand how the research on gender gaps and on public EU support may complement each other to *observe* the shape of the EU gender gap across time and space and, more importantly, to *explain* the gap's existence.

2.1. THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON THE EU GENDER GAP

Only few authors have engaged in research on the gender gap in public support for European integration. It seems that the disappearance of gender differences in voting behaviour which has been observed in many Western societies during the 1980s (Inglehart/Norris 2000: 441) discouraged scholars to invest their time into this issue. Although gender has regularly been reported as significant for public opinion on the EU, explanations for this observation are rare. The few works which aim at exploring the roots of the gap date back to the late 1990s. As the following discussion demonstrates, they differ not only in their research approaches but also in their explanations of the cross-country variations of the gender gap.

Nelsen and Guth (2000) apply regression analyses to a 1994 Eurobarometer survey (EB 42.0) to assess different explanations for the EU gender gap. They find that the determinants of public opinion on European integration vary between the genders. Whereas women are particularly

influenced by their knowledge on the EU and economic pessimism, men are influenced by their interest in politics, support for traditional gender roles, ideology and working class status. These results do not only indicate that determinants of public opinion affect women and men to different degrees, but also that both values and material aspects may shape the gender gap.

The first explanation for the gender gap which Nelsen and Guth test is the lesser interest of women into foreign policy. While they do not elaborate on the reasons for this gender difference, they find that women know indeed less about European integration and are therefore less supportive of it (ibid: 279).

Secondly, they test the influence of traditional gender role values on the gender gap. They find no direct relation between these values among women and their support for European integration. Among men however, support for traditional gender roles decreases support for European integration (ibid: 280).

Thirdly, the effects of political ideology are investigated with the result that both men and women who place themselves at the political left are more supportive of European integration. Additionally, self-placement at the center of the political spectrum increases the EU-support of men but not of women (ibid: 281).

A fourth explanation combines a number of material determinants of the public opinion such as economic pessimism, vulnerability to economic change in terms of education, age, occupation, family status and the number of children, as well as the generosity of the national welfare state. Education and the number of children positively affect EU attitudes among women. Men are more negative on integration if they are occupied as workers. Economic pessimism decreases support for EU integration among both sexes (ibid: 280).

As a last explanatory model, national traditions as are found to be highly significant for both sexes (ibid: 278).[7]

In addition, Nelsen and Guth show that welfare regimes do not directly predict attitudes on EU integration (ibid: 280). However, the determinants of the gender gap vary across welfare regimes. Firstly, political ideology affects European integration support differently in the socialdemocratic welfare regimes of Scandinavia than in conservative and liberal welfare regimes in Western Europe: whereas supporters of the political left are overall more supportive of European integration in the latter, supporters of the left are more skeptical of European integration in the former. This is the case

[7] The concept of national traditions refers to the long-term stance of a country on European integration. Eichenberg and Dalton whose works (1993, 2007) have focused on these national traditions explain that the "UK, for example, has comparatively low levels of support for integration, resulting from centuries (not just decades) of ambivalence about European attachments. The Dutch, of course, reflect the opposite tradition –a small, commercially oriented state that has traditionally supported open trade and 'integration' through international law." (Eichenberg/Dalton 2007: 134)

both for men and women, but to different degrees. Furthermore, economic expectations are not relevant for attitudes of women in the Scandinavian countries whereas they influence EU support men in Scandinavia and of both genders in other regions of Europe. This difference between socialdemocratic regimes and other welfare states is interpreted by Nelsen and Guth as a particular trust of Scandinavian women that their state provides for them in times of need (ibid: 283). They conclude that the particularly wide gender gap in EU support in Scandinavia is not resulting from women being particularly afraid of lowering welfare standards under the influence of Europeanization, as stated elsewhere in the literature (see for example Liebert 1997, 1999 below). To the opposite, women in Scandinavia feel economically sufficiently safe as not to base their EU evaluations on their economic outlook.

Nelsen and Guth's work is the only study on the EU gender gap that offers statistically reliable findings on the micro- and macro-level. However, it has a number of shortcomings. Firstly, due to the time of Nelsen and Guth's writing, their work covers only situation of the EU in the year 1994. In the meanwhile, the number of EU member states has more than doubled. Next to the enlargements of the EU, the adoption of new EU treaties, the failure of the "European constitution" and the economic and financial crises of the last years are all relevant for public opinion and should be taken into account for the gender gap in EU support.

Secondly, the article does not consider the potential influence of individual conditions such as national identity, religions other than Catholicism and Protestantism, and attitudes towards national political institutions. Thirdly, macro-level conditions other than the welfare state regimes have apparently not been tested by Nelsen and Guth. Considering studies on other aspects of public EU support and on gender gaps in other policy areas, it seems worthwhile to look into the roles of country-specific conditions, such as national government coalitions, socioeconomic development, economic performance, religious patterns at the national level, or the contributions of countries to the EU budget.

In contrast to the quantitative approach of Nelsen and Guth, Liebert (1997, 1999) proposes to study the EU gender gap with discourse analysis. Borrowing from relative deprivation literature, Liebert argues that women are more opposed to European integration than men mainly because they fear that integration will risk their "collective attainments" (Liebert 1997: 22, also Liebert 1999: 217-219). This fear is particularly strong in Scandinavian countries with their generous welfare states. Liebert argues that this female fear of decreasing welfare provision is the reason for the particularly low EU support among women in these countries. This stands in contrast to the argument by Nelsen and Guth who, as stated above, show that especially Scandinavian women do not link their economic expectations to EU evaluations (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 276).

According to Liebert, the public—and especially feminist—discourses on European integration are crucial to explain gender differences in perceptions of the EU. In her paper from 1997, Liebert additionally stresses the role of national gender equality standards and inter-party conflicts over the integration process for the size of the EU gender gap. Based on case studies from seven EU member states, she argues that the gap is the smallest in countries with high standards in gender equality and a diffuse discourse. On the other side, the gap is the biggest in countries with strong gender equality and a clear feminist discourse (Liebert 1997: 30-31). Her case studies do not go into evidential details though and can therefore rather be seen as an appealing research proposal than a conclusive study.

In her 1999 article, Liebert includes descriptive evidence from four Eurobarometer standard surveys from 1983 to 1995 to trace the size and temporal trends of national gender gaps in EU support. She finds that there is no convergent development across Europe, but that in some of the EU-15 member states, the gap has increased, whereas it has decreased or remained stable in other countries (Liebert 1999: 208). Based on Eurobarometer data from 1995, she argues that in some countries, the characteristics of age, education and occupation of women who oppose EU membership corresponds to the "apolitical woman", i.e. especially older and less educated women who are not in high professional positions oppose European integration (ibid: 212). In other countries, and especially in Scandinavia, the opposite is the case, with the majority of Euroskeptic women being relatively young (ibid: 215). In her view, this "progressive gender gap" (ibid: 211) is the result of the feminist discourses on European integration (ibid: 217-219).

Liebert acknowledges that her arguments require "further testing" (ibid: 220). This is not only valid with regards to her small samples but also due to the absence of definite insights on the mechanisms between female fears of lowering welfare standards and their reflection in EU evaluations. Lastly, Liebert's understanding of the "gender gap" is problematic as she focuses exclusively on the opinion of women. The notion of a "gap" however relates to the distance between two poles, i.e. it requires to consider the position of both men and women. Liebert ignores the possibility that men could also be receptive to feminist discourses in their EU evaluations.

As regards the two explanations for the gender gap which will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this study—the utilitarian and the socialization-based explanations—neither Nelsen and Guth (2000) nor Liebert (1997, 1999) refer consistently to any of them. The five explanations which Nelsen and Guth (2000) test in their study include the role of values, which they vaguely describe as the result of "some combination of factors, including biology, socialization, life experiences and beliefs." (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 273) Socialization is considered as one influence among others on values which influence the gender gap, but it is not recognized as the potential driving force behind gender differences in public opinion on the EU overall. The role of socialization on other possible

explanations of the gap which Nelsen and Guth (2000) account for, such as ideological differences between the genders or the particular distance of women to politics, is not taken into consideration. Similarly, the authors test utilitarian considerations or "perceived interests" (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 274-275) as of several potential driving forces behind the EU gender gap, but they do not acknowledge that utilitarian considerations could play a more central role for the understanding of the EU gender gap.

Liebert (1997, 1999) does not focus on the very basic roots of the gender differences in EU support. Similarly to Nelsen and Guth, she refers to a number of potential influences on pulic opinion which result in the EU gender gap. Unlike Nelsen and Guth, she emphasizes the influence of country-specific conditions (Liebert 1999: 215 et seq.). Moreover, Liebert rejects a purely materialist explanation of the gap due to the very existence of the gap:

> "[…] the EU gender gap contradicts the exclusively materialist explanations of the dynamics of support for Europe that have drawn on variables such as domestic economic conditions, the EC's economic record and national benefits deriving from membership (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996)." (Liebert 1999: 210)

As the following chapter will demonstrate, the existence of the gender gap alone cannot be considered a contradiction to the material explanations of EU support. Instead, it is well possible that material considerations drive the gap through the financial disparities between men and women which can be found to varying degrees in Europe.

Whereas all works discussed in this section show that a variety of influences shape the EU gender gap, the underlying reasons why men and women react different to these influences in their evaluation of European integration remain unanswered. As Chapter 3 will show, the most likely causes for the gender differences are material cost-benefit calculations and the socialization into gender roles. Investigating the importance of these two sources of gender differences in public opinion for the EU context is not only necessary to understand the eventual source of the EU gender gap but it is also needed to situate the research on the EU gender gap into the existing scholarship on gender gaps in public opinion[8].

2.2. INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC EU SUPPORT

The following sections present the main insights of research on public support for European integration. Determinants of public opinion on the EU, and thereby the potential correlates of the EU

[8] For an overview of the scholarship on gender gaps in public opinion see for example Huddy/Cassese 2011.

gender gap, are discussed separately in order to facilitate the fusion with insights on gender gaps in other policy areas and to build a solid ground for the theoretical framework in Chapter 3.

2.2.1. AGE

Many works point at the importance of age for public EU support. Inglehart's theory of intergenerational value change often serves as the basis for the link between age and EU attitudes. The theory argues that the living conditions of people during their pre-adult years shape their values and their views on politics (McLaren 2006: 13, Inglehart 1997: 12, 23). People hold goods and values dearly which were short in supply in their youth. Europeans who were born in the first decades of the 20th century experienced a lack of existential security during and between the two World Wars. Therefore, they tend to appreciate economic efficiency, bureaucratic authority and scientific rationality as alleged providers of safety. In contrast, people who grew up in post-industrialized environments of the second half of the 20th century prioritize individual autonomy, diversity and self-expression which are perceived as scarce in the age of industrialization. Consequently, the evaluation of politics in general and of European integration in particular differs across generations. Younger people who cherish post-materialist values are more attracted to European integration as the EU represents "social, political, and economic reform toward a less nationalistic, more egalitarian society" (Gabel 1998: 336). As a result, the older people are, the less supportive they might be of the EU (Gabel 1998).

However, the argument based on intergenerational value change is not as straightforward as it seems. Firstly, the theory of intergenerational value change uses the age of survey respondents as a proxy of the economic environment in which people grew up: older generations have experienced the positigve changes brought by industrialization whereas the younger generations witness post-industrial conditions with all their flaws. Over time, Inglehart's theory may have lost some of its explanatory power for EU support across age though. Those who grew up in the 1940s and 1950s represent gradually less of the European population. Instead a new generation has grown up and has entered the survey samples. The values of this new generation may differ less from their parents' values. Thereby, new patterns of age differences in public opinion might emerge or age lose some of its significance for public opinion. Secondly, the variations of generational support for the EU may be less relevant than suggested because European integration has always been a product of the spirit of the times. While the first steps towards a unified Europe aimed at control of war-relevant industries and economic cooperation—well in line with the predominant materialist values of that era—the EU has begun to promote individual freedoms and rights in the 1990s, e.g. in its social policies and antidiscrimination legislation (Watson 2009). Both the decline of the "materialist" generation and the

close link between dominant values and European integration suggest that age and support for EU may be linked through alternative mechanisms.

The link between age and EU support is more plausible if age is interpreted as an indicator of stages in the life course. As Fligstein (2008) shows for the individual roots of European identity, particularly those who travel for business reasons adopt European identities. These are the people who benefit most directly from European integration. Transferring this argument to the different stages in life, young people who travel and are engaged in education programs as well as the middle-aged who pursue professional careers are those who may be affected most by the basic freedoms produced by European integration. The elderly, whose professional careers are mostly terminated, may focus more on healthcare and pension systems, policy area with traditionally little influence of the EU institutions (Hemerijck 2013).[9] This view on age may be more insightful for the gender gap in public EU support. According to this logic, young people who are neither established professionals yet nor have responsibilities towards children or the elderly (Vogel 2002: 292) should display smaller gender gaps in public EU support than older people because young men and women find themselves in relatively similar living conditions. In their middle ages, men and women are more likely to face different material conditions due to gender differences in the distribution of tasks in terms of paid work and unpaid family responsibilities (Stier et al. 2001: 1731, Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 147). This view is supported by findings on the influence of parenthood and marriage on gender differences in attitudes on other policy areas (Campbell 2006: 89, Seltzer et al 1997, Gidengil et al. 2005): **parenthood** has been found to affect the gender gap in partisanship. As the one-male-breadwinner model is traditionally the most prevalent arrangement for the division of labor in families across Europe (Mazey 1998: 135), mothers are more likely than fathers to drop out of the labor force in order to take care of children and elderly. If the male breadwinner stops providing for his family, women are likely to depend upon public support in forms of financial transfers and public care services. Social assistance programs are usually promoted by leftist parties. This leads more women to place themselves at the political left than men. In comparison, parenthood and the one-breadwinner model puts men in charge of providing for the family financially. This motivates men to seek low taxes and a less interventionist state (Campbell 2006: 98, Stier et al. 2001: 1731, 1734). In the context of European integration support, Nelsen's and Guth's (2000) findings are compatible with this argument: the number of children stands in positive relation with female support for European integration. The position of men is not influenced by the number of their children.

Next to parenthood, relationship status may influence the gender gap in public opinion on European integration, too. Married women in the US are less likely to vote Democratic than unmarried women

[9] For more details on the EU's social policies see Chapter 7.

(Seltzer et al 1997: 52, Gidengil et al. 2005: 1187). This link between opinion and relationship status can be based on two alternative assumptions: either, unmarried women possess the independency necessary to express their own, different political views (Campbell 2006: 17, Gidengil et al. 2005: 1187), or married men and women are interdependent on each other, so that their material interests converge; this affects their political attitudes which become more similar as well (Manza/Brooks 1998: 1241).[10]

Lastly, the gender gap in EU support may grow further for people of old age as material gender disparities in the middle age lead to disparities in the accumulation of assets and pension claims (Bastos et al. 2009, European Commission 2014a). This implies that elderly women are at a higher risk to live in material dependence on others than elderly men, without a possibility to exit this dependency again as taking up paid work is no longer an option for most (Zaidi 2010: 7-8).

2.2.2. EDUCATION

Since the 1970s, studies using the World Values Survey have pointed towards a positive role of **education** for public EU support. This has initially been explained with the concept of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1970, McLaren 2006: 14, Gabel 1998: 335). Cognitive mobilization refers to the ability of people to comprehend information on complex issues such as European integration. According to Inglehart, people who are intellectually able to understand the details of the integration process are less afraid from its implications and therefore more supportive of it.

Gabel criticizes this argument for its underlying assumption that all information which people possess on European integration is inherently positive and support-building (Gabel 1998: 335). He supports an alternative argument on the positive relation between education and integration support by Tsoukalis (1993: 230): people with higher education are better positioned to deal with the increased competition in the single European market. Recent research has reinforced the role of education for positive integration attitudes (Hakhverdian et al. 2013, Nelsen et al. 2011: 16).

As across Europe, women have closed up with men in graduating from high schools and colleges (Schofer/Meyer 2004: 909), this should have contributed to a diminishing gender gap in public support for European integration.

Related to education, political awareness plays a role in public opinion. Zaller argues with reference to studies on US politics that political awareness of people determines their ability to deal critically with political information. He finds that political awareness can be interpreted with the help of

[10] For voting behaviour in the UK however, Campbell has demonstrated that there is no gender gap among married people if income, occupation and education are controlled (Campbell 2006: 96).

formal education but he points out that factual knowledge about politics is the more appropriate measurement (Zaller 1992: 1, 21, 333-335). Similarly to the relation between education and the gender gap, it is plausible to expect a smaller gender gap if men and women possess similar levels of political awareness. Differences in political awareness belong to the earliest findings on the gender gap in the politics (Duverger 1950, Lipset 1960, Almond/Verba 1963; see Liebert 1997: 7-8 for a brief review of this "female deficit thesis"). This finding is backed by Burns et al. (2001) who show that the US-gender gap in political participation is partly due to the greater political interest of men than of women.[11]

2.2.3. Occupation and income

During the 1990s, economic considerations came to the forefront in the literature on public opinion on European integration. Some authors advanced "egocentric utilitarism" (McLaren 2006), claiming that people deduced their opinions on the EU from its perceived risks and benefits which in return were results of personal resources and professional skills (Gabel 1998). This view is based on the economic implications of the Single Market with its four basic freedoms. People who have high earnings expect advantages from the freedom of capital as it allows them to invest wherever the financial returns are the highest. Latest with the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU), those with low incomes who are particularly likely to depend on public social support, expect disadvantages from European integration as the limits on budget deficits motivate cuts in social policies (Frieden 1991: 434 in Gabel 1998: 337, McLaren 2006: 31).

The same logic applies to people in different occupations: employers and those who possess high degrees of professional qualification expect the biggest advantages from the free movement of workers as companies can attract the best employees across Europe for their businesses. Moreover, highly qualified individuals expect from European integration to be able to go where their skills are scarce and to receive a higher remuneration for their work. Therefore, the occupational level is expected to stand in positive relation with support for European integration, similar to Gabel's argument on education (Gabel 1998: 337).[12]

[11] According to Burden (2008) the link between awareness and public opinion may be more complex. He underlines the interaction of political sophistication with media stereotypes: people with higher political sophistication, a concept including formal education, tend to express public views according to what media present as the typical view for them to hold. For the US context this means that the more politically sophisticated women are, the more likely they will correspond to the stereotype produced by the media, telling them that they are stronger supporters of the Democrats than men (Burden 2008: 66). However, as there is no comparable stereotype for gendered attitudes on European integration, Burden's suggestion is unlikely to apply to the gender gap in European integration support.

[12] For Turkey, higher professional positions have been found stand in a negative relation with EU support, so that workers there were more likely to support EU membership than other people (Çarkoğlu/Kentmen 2011). The Turkish pattern can be explained with reference to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (see Hooghe and Marks 2005: 421). Individuals with a high occupational position, such as white collars, are only in favor of EU

Since the 1950s, research on US politics since the 1950s has suggested that occupation might play role for the gender gap in public opinion. Lipset (1960) explained the conservative leaning of American women with their low likelihood of being employed and of having blue collar jobs. As to the causal link between occupation and partisanship, Lipset suggests that

> "Husbands are more exposed, in both their work and their leisure activities, to the model or predominant opinion of their class. Women, particularly housewives, are less involved in the intra-class communications structure, see fewer politically knowledgeable people with backgrounds and interests similar to their own, and are therefore more likely to retain the dominant conservative values of their larger culture." (Lipset 1960: 216-217)

In other words, men as part of the workforce were pushed to the political left by political debates among their colleagues. In contrast, women remained isolated in their work as mothers, housewives or servants.

Next to the influence of the environment of the work place, structural conditions may account for the gender gap in political opinion, too. Women still earn less than men in similar jobs; they are underrepresented in top management and high-paid positions. Women more often take part-time positions which provide less social security (Anghel et al. 2011, European Commission's Expert Group on Gender and Employment 2009). Additionally, despite increasing participation of women in the work force, women are still by far more occupied than men with unpaid work, such as care for children, the elderly and the household (Bastos et al. 2009: 764). As discussed in the section on age, this does not only provide them with less pay and smaller retirement claims than men, but also increases the likelihood that they need public assistance for childcare and care for the elderly, such as daycare centers and kindergartens, and financial support (European Commission's Expert Group on Gender and Employment 2009: 36; Manza/Brooks 1998: 1243; Folbre/Nelson 2000: 125-126). Their overrepresentation in public sector employment (Anghel et al. 2011, European Commission's Expert Group on Gender and Employment 2009) adds a second dimension to the greater interest of women into expansive public policies. Therefore, women are more supportive of political actors who promote a larger role of the state in social security provision (Manza/Brooks 1998: 1243, Andersen 1999, Campbell 2006: 90, Gidengil et al. 2005: 1174, Seltzer et al. 1997: 52).

As to income, research shows that it may play a similar role as occupation for the EU gender gap. Income stands in positive relation with the gender gap in partisanship. In US presidential elections, women with high income are more likely to favor Democrat candidates than men with high income.

---

integration if their national economies are rich in capital. People in median positions or blue collars are more in favor of European integration if their national economy possesses a relatively large labor force. In other words, those occupational groups which are linked to the national asset which is most prevalent in a national economy are those who are most in favor of the common market and therefore of European integration.

In low income groups, men and women both display a relatively strong support for Democratic candidates (Campbell 2006: 23).

Additionally, it has been suggested that women vote less with consideration to their economic situation, i.e. their "pocketbooks", and more with a view to the general situation in the country (Welch/Hibbink 1992). Whereas this pattern appears to have vanished in the US since 1992, one reason for the diverging pocketbook orientations was that women tend to blame themselves for their economic situation, whereas men rather display external blame for their low income or negative economic evaluation, e.g. by punishing the incumbent candidates in elections (Kam 2009: 618). Kam acknowledges that this blame argument is related to issues of gendered socialization which might equally well lead to opposite voting patterns: women are in average more concerned with the private sphere such as their households, so that pocketbook orientations may have a bigger effect on them, whereas men are more active in the public sphere, so that national economic evaluations may affect men stronger (ibid: 619).

Transferring these findings for income, occupation and the gender gap in US politics to the EU gender gap suggests that gender differences in EU evaluations should vary across occupations and income groups. Whereas men and women with low income or blue collar occupations may be similarly skeptical of the influences of European integration on their position in the labor market, their evaluations may drift apart in higher income groups or among white collars: men may be more satisfied with the effects of European integration on their occupation or income group whereas women may remain skeptical due to their stronger sociotropic concerns.

2.2.4. IDENTITY

Developments in EU politics have amplified the interest of scholars into the role of identity for public EU support. The Maastricht treaty of 1993 had established the notion of a Union citizenship which should strengthen the common identity of the European peoples. In the 2000s, a Commission's white paper on EU governance stressed the importance of a European identity (Carey 2002: 388) and policy-makers and scholars began to conceive European identity as a possible solution to the alleged democratic deficit of the EU (Kohli 2000: 119-120, Moravscik 2002, Follesdal/Hix 2006, Fligstein 2008: 136). Some studies on mass attitudes on European integration found that identity is a stronger determinant of public opinion than individual cost-benefit calculations. This has been explained with the complexity of utilitarian considerations: if attitudes were based on cost-benefit calculations, this would require more information than most individuals possess on EU policies (McLaren 2006).

Identity is a multifaceted concept. At the individual level, the concept of identity refers to

> "the synthetic acts by which the person achieves a sense of coherence and continuity for him/herself (and for others)-synchronically, across his/her multiple fields of activity and social engagement, and diachronically, across the temporal changes of the life course. In other words, 'identity' becomes a sociological equivalent for much of the psychological concept of the 'self', and of the psychoanalytic concept of the 'I'." (Kohli 2000: 115)

In the context of mass attitudes on the EU, identity is usually perceived as the attachment between an individual and a political unit such as the nation or the European Union (Carey 2002). Collective identities provide self-esteem and orientation to individuals (Tajfel 1972 in Carey 2002: 391 and in McLaren 2006: 71-73, Fligstein 2008). Identity typologies differentiate between ethnic or civic forms; others speak of exclusive and inclusive identities (Hooghe/Marks 2007: 120). Carey (2002) emphasizes three dimensions of identity: the intensity of feelings towards the own country, the attachment to the own nation in comparison to other territorial entities and the fear from negative influences from outsiders. The second dimension in Carey's work is crucial for the EU context: it is possible that people feel that they belong to different collectives at the same time, such as to a regional group, a nation and even a supranational entity which may in this case be Europe or the European Union (also Kohli 2000). Furthermore, the third dimension refers to the link between fears and Euroscepticism: if people feel that their nation is threatened by outsiders in their economic resources (e.g. the education system, job opportunities, social security system and agriculture) or that the symbols to which its nation attaches higher meanings (e.g. its currency, defense system, language), these people reject European integration (Carey 2002: 395, similar also in McLaren 2006).

Similarly to Carey, Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue that only exclusive national identities reduce support for European integration, whereas there are other forms of national identity that go well hand in hand with other territorial identities. McLaren additionally points out that national identity is usually stronger than regional and European identities (McLaren 2006: 17, 50). Plausibly, people who report seeing themselves as Europeans, thereby holding a European identity, are more supportive of European integration than people who do not claim seeing themselves as Europeans.

As to gender, correlation and regression analyses have shown that men are more likely to feel European than women (Duchesne/Frognier 1995: 209 et seq. in Kohli 2000: 125; Fligstein 2008: 145) but the authors usually do not further elaborate on this finding.

2.2.5. Religion and religiosity

Religion is thought to influence public opinion on European integration for a number of reasons. The European Union hosts different religious communities under one roof. This variety is relevant for the domestic policies of the Union which involve religious questions which might be answered differently in the various religious communities of the EU, e.g. in the debates on stem cell research or the

reference to God in the Constitutional Treaty (De Vreese et al. 2009: 1183 referring to Schlesinger/Foret 2006). Externally, the religious makeup is particularly interesting for the case of Turkey or of majorly Christian orthodox countries such as Greece and Macedonia whose populations might be skeptical of joining the EU as a "Catholic club" (Nelsen et al. 2011: 4 et seq.; De Vreese et al. 2009: 1183). Moreover, EU institutions have developed an increased interest into contacts with religious communities in the context of religious freedom, minority rights and intercultural dialogue (Silvestri 2009).

Earlier studies on the relation between religion and support for EU integration stipulated that "[…] conservative religious Europeans hold more liberal attitudes on transnational issues such as European integration […] than their secular neighbors." (Grzymala-Busse 2012: 427 referring to MacIver 1989 and to Beatty/Walter 1984; Hobolt et al. 2011: 361) Catholics were found to be more in favor of EU integration than Protestants due to the Catholic Church's particular skepticism toward the nation state concept and of its hope to occupy an influential position in the European framework (Nelsen et al. 2011: 2). In contrast, the Protestant church had experienced the nation state as a strong protector of its autonomy (ibid: 3). Shifting proportions in the religious constituency in Europe and the secularization of modern societies changed these patterns: the influence of religion on EU support has decreased in the younger generations (Nelsen et al. 2001; Nelsen et al. 2011). Differences between religions have partly vanished: an Eurobarometer analysis from 2006 shows that commitment to Catholicism, Protestantism or Orthodoxy increases support for European integration whereas commitment to Islam decreases support. However, religious patterns vary strongly between countries (Nelsen et al. 2011: 18, Minkenberg 2009; see for country-specific results Kentmen 2008, Kentmen/Çarkoğlu 2011, Çarkoğlu 2003 for Turkey, Çarkoğlu/Glüpker-Kesebir 2015 for Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey). Analyses of the European Social Survey produced contrasting results, showing that religious denomination and religiosity do not affect attitudes on European integration. The former is insignificant as soon as anti-immigration attitudes and authoritarian values attitudes are controlled for (Boomgaarden/Freire 2009: 1252). At the same time though, anti-immigration attitudes and authoritarian values are affected by religious denomination (ibid: 1256-1257), so that religion according to this study affects public opinion on European integration indirectly.

These findings are interesting for the given context as "women are more religious than men on every measure of religiosity", at least if Christian women in the West are considered (Walter/Davies 1998: 641 referring to Beit-Hallahmi/Argyle 1996: 139-142). Studies on the relation between material vulnerability and religiosity propose that religiosity cannot be considered as an answer to vulnerability (Walter/Davies 1998: 653 et seq.) Instead, religiosity seems to help women to cope with

matters of “life and death” which they face in their daily lives. As a result, women who are professional caregivers or mothers, i.e. those who are confronted frequently with existential experiences, are more likely to practice their religion than other women. Furthermore, the surrounding conditions in terms of modernization and Postmodernization seem to play a fairly important role for the gender gap in religiosity (Walter/Davies 1998, Levitt 1995). The causal mechanisms behind the relationship of occupation and religiosity remain unclear though, as do the deeper roots of the gender gap in religiosity as the authors acknowledge (Walter/Davies 1998: 655-656).

The gender differences in religiosity have been used to explain the gender gap in political activism and in partisanship. Burns et al. (2001: 376-377) report that female activism at the grassroots of religious communities fosters the political participation of women. As to partisanship, the traditional gender gap has been linked to the greater religiosity of women and the observation that the major Christian churches promote conservative values and are closer to the Christian democratic parties (Gidengil et al 2005: 1173 referring to Betz 1994 and Mayer/Smith 1995). This argument does not consider the link of other religions such as Islam and the partisan gender gap.

Due to the multitude of religious communities in the EU-27 and its candidate countries, but also because of the contradictory findings for the links between religiosity and EU support and for the gender gap in religiosity, an application of these findings to the EU gender gap cannot produce clear hypotheses as to the EU gender gap across different religions or levels of religiosity.

2.2.6. Partisanship and ideological predispositions

Classic works on public opinion (Zaller 1992) as well as specific works on the gender gap in European integration support (Liebert 1997) emphasize the role of elite discourses for public opinion. Next to the individual conditions of people which have been discussed so far, the information which people receive from elites on political issues is equally important. As has been stated for the section on education, political awareness as well as the content of “persuasive messages” of elites are crucial in this respect (Zaller 1992: 42).

For studies on public opinion which use mass survey opinion data, it is difficult to identify which parts of the multifaceted elite discourse reach the individual in its modern environment. As political parties are powerful members of the political elite in democracies, it seems adequate to look at the influence of elite discourses firstly on the individual level. Studies on EU public support report that people tend to take over the attitudes of their preferred political party on European integration (Gabel 1998: 338). Accordingly, supporters of the left side of the political spectrum during the 1970s and 1980s, especially the social democrats in Scandinavia and in Great Britain, were less positive

towards European integration than supporters of the political right, as the former saw in Europe the "manifestation of capitalist forces" (Gabel 1998 referring to Wessels 1995 and Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991; Marks/Wilson 2000: 437, 442). In southern Europe, socialdemocratic parties were usually in favor of European integration (Marks/Wilson 2000: 442). Christian-democratic parties, except from those in Scandinavia, have supported European integration since its beginning, as they perceived economic integration as "means to economic prosperity." (ibid: 451, 453)

Since the 1980s, socialdemocrat parties have begun to embrace European integration as it allows states to regulate markets more efficiently. For the same reason, many conservative parties have become more skeptical about the integration project (ibid: 455). However, not all conservative parties share this position: due to their neoliberal orientation, conservative parties in Sweden, Finland, Greece and Spain supported European integration while conservative parties with a stronger nationalist viewpoint, such as in France, the UK, Ireland and Denmark use to be more skeptical of European integration (Marks/Wilson 2000: 437-438, 456).[13] More recently, the match between party positions on European integration and the political spectrum has become even more difficult on the national level. Mainstream parties who have been or are still are parts of governments usually share a pro-integration attitude whereas smaller and more extreme parties claim opposition to European integration (Green-Pedersen 2012 referring to Marks/Hooghe 2009, Van der Brug/van Spanje 2009 and Kriesi et al. 2008).

As to gender and partisanship, the literature differentiates the "modern" gender gap from the "traditional" gender gap in voting behaviour. Traditionally, women in the US were found to be more conservative than men until the 1960s. Then a realignment of this traditional gender gap took place and in its modern form, the gender gap shows that women are more likely to vote for Democrats than men (Seltzer et al. 1997). Similarly for ideological predispositions in Europe, women in most countries tended to place themselves closer to the right end of the political spectrum than men until the 1980s and early 1990s. This difference between women and men shrank so that in 1990 a significant gender gap could not be found for Western Germany, Italy, Northern Ireland, Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Iceland and Belgium. In Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Netherlands, former Eastern Germany and Sweden, the movement of female and male positions in the political spectrum had developed further into a modern gender gap. At the same time, the traditional gender gap prevailed in Turkey, Finland and Spain (Inglehart /Norris 2000: 451). Inglehart and Norris explain this cross-country variation with the economic development of national economies. They differentiate

[13] As to why political parties within the same ideological tradition vary in their stances on European integration across Europe see for example Marks/Wilson (2000) and Raunio (2007). The former base their study on the class-cleavage argument by Lipset/Rokkan (1967). The latter claims that electoral systems are influential.

between advanced industrialized societies, where modernization led to new value orientations, and post-communist and developing societies where values and therefore the gender gap remained traditional (ibid: 442). As some of the countries which were classified as post-communist (Estonia, Hungary and Poland) and developing (Turkey) have reached higher levels of economic development by now, new shapes of the partisan gender gap should have emerged over time.

As to the gender gap in support for European integration during the 1990s, the traditional gender gap in ideological predispositions matches the traditional gender gap in EU support: men were more leftist and more supportive of European integration than women. Assuming that leftist parties are usually in favor of European integration, the EU gender gap should become smaller or reversed if women move towards the left in the political spectrum, thereby approaching the position of men and even moving beyond them towards the left pole.

However, such expectations are based on thin ice as party positions on European integration do not follow the left-right dimension anymore since the 1990s. Eurosceptic parties are now mainly placed at the extreme right and left margins of the political spectrum and parties which support European integration constitute the center (Green-Pedersen 2012: 119). At least for the extreme right, it has been reported that men are more likely to support these parties (Arzheimer/Carter 2006; Lubbers et al. 2002). Givens (2004) reports that this may be due to occupational effects, anti-immigration attitudes and the authoritarian character and violent atmospheres in some of these parties (Givens 2004: 33-34). Therefore, among supporters of the extreme right wing of the political spectrum, the gender gap in EU support should be smaller, as the support for the EU among men might decrease and approach the generally lower level of EU support among women.

In addition to these individual-level dynamics, there is also a macro-level dimension to the interplay of partisanship, gender and European integration support: several European countries have experienced the emergence of extreme right, anti-immigrant parties which oppose European integration (Art 2011: 10, Leonard/Torreblanca 2014). Considering the suggestion that women should be more left-leaning than men and the observation that men are more likely to support right-wing parties (Arzheimer/Carter 2006), countries with strong anti-European parties might have smaller gender gaps with a lower support for European integration among men. Although all Western European countries have some extreme right party (Art 2011: 26; Leonard/Torreblanca 2014: 5), only in a few countries they were able to participate in national governments over the years (Art 2011: 2).

2.2.7. ATTITUDES ON NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Lastly, national political institutions have been suggested to influence public opinion on the European Union. Based on the assumption that people have limited knowledge on the EU and therefore use their national governments as proxies for their opinion on the EU, some authors suggests that people who are satisfied with their national political institutions support the EU as they assess the performance of the latter by referring to their evaluation of the national government (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995, L. Ray 2003, Anderson 1998 at Rohrschneider/Loveless 2008: 14). Complementary to this perspective, some studies report that people who observe a failure of their national governments tend to display Eurosceptic attitudes (de Vries/van Kersbergen 2007 in Hooghe/Marks 2007: 124).

The link between national institutions and EU support depends partly on political knowledge. Karp, Banducci and Bowler (2003) explain that "evaluations of the EU and national institutions are motivated by different factors" (ibid: 289). Knowledge about the respective polity fosters satisfaction with national democracy while it reduces satisfaction with democracy on the EU level (ibid: 285). Furthermore, satisfaction with national democracy relates to the satisfaction with democracy on the EU to a greater extend among people with weak EU knowledge than among people with greater knowledge on the EU. This underlines that political knowledge and attitudes on the EU are intertwined.

Comparing the role of attitudes on national institutions to the role of other determinants of public opinion, Gabel finds that the influence of attitudes on national institutions is weaker than the influence of utilitarian considerations and of partisan ideology. Nonetheless Gabel supports that people who support their national government are more likely to be favorable of European integration (Gabel 1998: 339).

It is noteworthy that an opposing link between support for national government and EU attitudes has been observed, too (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002 at Rohrschneider/Loveless 2008: 15). Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggests that people who are dissatisfied with the national institutions tend to be more supportive of European integration because in their eyes, the costs for transferring sovereignty from the national to the supranational level are lower than in the eyes of people who are satisfied with the national institutions. In their comparison of EU evaluations in Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Glüpker-Kesebir (2015) show that trust in national institutions varies across countries. Not only the kind of national institution whose support base among respondents influences EU evaluations varies, but also the direction of the effect of trust on EU support.

How the influence of attitudes on national institutions plays out for the context of integration support and the gender gap remains to be seen. Karp and colleagues find that generally, women are more likely to be satisfied with EU democracy (ibid: 288). As will be elaborated in the section on social policies, other authors have found gender gaps in preferences on certain policy fields (Shapiro/Mahajan 1986, Gidengil 1995, Welch/Hibbink 1992, Schlesinger/Heldmann 2011: 60), but there seems to be no suggestion yet on the gender gap in general support for governments and national institutions. This impression is supported by the absence of this aspect in a recent discussion of the gender gap literature by Huddy and Cassese (2011).

2.3. MACRO-LEVEL CONDITIONS OF THE EU GENDER GAP

In the previous section, two of the suggested influences on the gender gap in public EU support, namely religion and partisanship, have been not only linked to the individual level, but to the cross-country patterns of the gender gap, too. In the following, three additional conditions are discussed which could according to existing research affect the gender gap's shape and size in a cross-country comparison: the economic effects of EU membership on countries, their socioeconomic situation and their welfare state traditions.

2.3.1. MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Within the strand of utilitarian explanations for public opinion on European integration, some authors suggest that individuals do not focus as much on their individual economic situation as on the economic effects of EU membership on their country. According to this "sociotropic utilitarian" view (McLaren 2006: 42 et seq.), people consider the macro-economic costs and benefits of European integration for their country to take their stance on European integration (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, Anderson/Reichert 1996, Garry/Tilley 2009). Although people may have limited knowledge of the EU and its implications the link between EU policies and economic welfare should be generally recognized by the public (Carey 2002: 389). Citizens of those countries which are net contributors to the EU budget or which have negative intra-EU trade balances may see the EU more negatively than citizens from net beneficiary countries or countries with positive intra-EU trade balances.

Next to contributions to the EU budget, the national macro-economic performance in terms of unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates played for a long time a central role for the evaluation of European integration. Then public support for European integration decreased although the economic performances of the EU member states were positive. The growing influence of the European institutions on public spending and fiscal policies with the implementation of the European Monetary Union became increasingly seen as an undesirable loss of national sovereignty.

Since the early 1990s, concerns for national culture and identity therefore replaced economic performance as a major determinant of public opinion (Carey 2002: 390; Eichenberg/Dalton 2007: 129 et seq.; Serricchio et al. 2013). Whether this is still the case since the Eurozone crisis emerged remains to be seen.[14]

As Gidengil (1995) has demonstrated for the free-trade agreement of Canada with the US, macro-economic effects are more important for men than for women in evaluating integrative policies. Men are more receptive to arguments which refer to the health of the national economy and the free market principle whereas women rely on arguments which refer to the welfare state and social policies (Gidengil 1995: 403-404).

Applying this insight to the context of European integration leads to the suggestion that macro-economic costs of EU membership are stronger for public EU support among men than among women. As a result, the gender gap in public support for European integration might be smaller in countries which belong to the net-contributors to the EU budget than in countries which have small macro-economic costs to pay for EU integration: in countries which contribute more than they receive from the EU budget, men are likely to react stronger with a decrease in integration support than women, thereby approaching their position to the position of women which is usually less supportive anyway. Similar explanations can be established for the national economic performance and the gender gap. Low unemployment rates and inflation should accompany smaller EU gender gaps.

However, as it has been suggested that the influence of macro-economic costs has vanished, it is also possible that macro-economic costs might have lost their significance for the gender gap in public support for European integration.

2.3.2. Socio-economic development

Inglehart and Norris (2000) argue that structural and cultural consequences of modernization cause a gender realignment in voting behaviour: with the increased participation of women in education and paid work, women move from the right to the left of men in the political spectrum (ibid: 446). The authors call this the "modern" gender gap which replaces the traditional gender gap characterized by a stronger conservative leaning of women than of men.

In addition to these structural changes, cultural developments contribute to the realignment: people appreciate values which were rare during their young years. In post-industrialized environments,

[14] Serricchio et al. (2013) show that in 2010, identity concerns and trust into political institutions were still more influential for attitudes on European integration than economic concerns. However, their data analysis reaches into 2010 but does not cover the subsequent years of the Eurozone crisis in which economic considerations might have become more important again.

"freedom, self-expression and gender equality" (ibid) become priorities, whereas existential security looses the some of the relatively high importance it has in industrial societies. Reproductive choice, equal opportunities and sexual harassment emerge as new salient issues in the political debates of the postindustrial age. These changes especially modify the lifestyle of women: they take up paid jobs and have less time for taking care of the family members. Instead, they have the money to hire somebody for these tasks. At the same time, they may have more time left for self-fulfilling activities (Folbre/Nelson 2000: 128). Eventually, it seems that socio-economic development leads to an approximation of men's and women's lifestyles and thereby to new patterns in gender gaps in public opinion.

According to this developmental theory, post-industrialized, post-communist and developing countries have each specific gender gaps in voting behaviour. Only Turkey, being classified as developing country for the early 1990s, shows a traditional gender gap with women being more right-leaning than men (Inglehart/Norris 2000: 451).

In sum, socio-economic modernization, leading from the post-communist or developmental stage to the post-industrialized conditions, may be accompanied by a smaller gender gap in EU support.

2.3.3. WELFARE REGIMES

As this study investigates the dynamics of the gender gap in public EU support across EU member states and its candidate countries, there may be diverging gaps according different welfare state regimes. The lifestyle changes that Norris and Inglehart (2000) and Folbre and Nelson (2000) describe as products of modernization are accompanied by welfare policy reforms. The effect of welfare regimes on the gender gap in EU support has been observed for the Scandinavian countries whose women display lower support for EU membership (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 268-269). Literature has suggested that "especially women base their attitude toward integration on their *perception* of a EU threat to [welfare, addition of the author] benefits" (ibid: 277, italics in original; also Liebert 1997 and 1999). An alternative argument claims that

> "[…] men and women – but especially women – in generous welfare states feel confident that the state will provide in times of economic need, and are thus less likely than other European to base their evaluations of the EU on their economic situation." (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 283)[15]

[15] Nelsen and Guth (2000) base this argument on their analyses of different welfare states which exclude Sweden though. Only Denmark and Norway are represented in their sample for socialdemocratic welfare states.

Both arguments relate to the generosity of welfare regimes which may drive the cross-country variations of the EU gender gap. The first view, which can be found in Liebert (1997, 1999) focuses more on women and on fears to suffer losses from European integration. The second perspective, promoted by Nelsen and Guth (2000), emphasizes the absence of perceived economic vulnerability in socialdemocratic welfare regimes and considers both men and women.

Either argument is based on the universal and high-quality social services, financed by taxes, in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Women's full participation in the labor market independent of their marital status is promoted by state services such as subsidized and widely available childcare facilities (Cannan 1995: 167, Stier et al. 2001: 1735).

In contrast, no other welfare type in Europe is as generous and as supportive of gender equality as the socialdemocratic regimes. In liberal systems such as the British and the Irish model, the state provides universal but residual services to those who cannot provide for themselves. This model assumes for its full functioning full employment among the male and unmarried female workforce but counts on the private provision of family care, a task which has been traditionally undertaken by married women (Cannan 1995: 167, Stier et al. 2001: 1734).

In conservative welfare states such as in France, Germany, Belgium and Austria, the provision of social security depends on the occupational status of individuals. According to income and occupational status, people contribute to social insurance schemes. These contributions constitute the basis for their benefits in times of need. The conservative welfare system assumes, similar to the liberal one, the role of the male breadwinner whose social insurance covers the family members (Cannan 1995: 164, 165; Stier et al. 2001: 1735).

In Mediterranean welfare regimes such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey (Ferrera 1996; Buğra/Keyder 2006: 212; Karamessini 2008) social insurance benefits depend on the occupational status of employees. Family members receive social provision via the insurance status of the family's bread-winner (Buğra/Keyder 2006: 212, Karamessini 2008: 45). In parallel, low coverage rate of the social insurance that excludes unpaid and informal work lead to a strong reliance on the provision of care by family and kin as social benefits are restricted to those covered by insurance and their family members (Buğra/Keyder 2006; Karamessini 2008: 47; Duncan/Pfau-Effinger 2000: 5).

Lastly, the welfare states of the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe constitute a welfare type of its own, although there strong differences between the countries have emerged since the end of the socialist regimes (Fenger 2007: 13; Aidukaite 2009: 34). Traditionally, welfare had been based on the state provision of employment-related "old age pensions; health-related transfers and family benefits" (ibid: 14). In the 1990s, severe economic pressures necessitated extensive

reforms (Aidukaite 2009: 30). The post-communist welfare model is now characterized by "high take-up rate of social security but relatively low benefit levels" (ibid: 34). Due to these low levels, the family and the market constitute significant pillars of the welfare provision in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (ibid: 35).

These welfare traditions imply far-reaching differences for women and men in their possibilities to participate in work and family life equally. Similarly to the argument on socio-economic development, different degrees of convergence of men's and women's lives in the five welfare regimes may affect the sizes of gender gaps in public EU support at the country-level. The following chapters elaborate further on the concrete implications of welfare regimes on gender relations.

2.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

The preceding sectios have demonstrated that, while there is a wealth of literature on individual and country-specific influences on public attitudes towards the EU, only few works have investigated the gender differences which are documented in numerous of these studies. Although these works on the EU gender gap are useful by shedding light on the shape and determinants of the gap, their evidential basis is narrow, especially with regards to the enlarged European Union and its candidate countries of the present day. Furthermore, the authors do not agree on the reasons for the variation of the EU gender gap across countries but do not engage with each other's findings. Lastly, the reasons why men and women react differently to individual- and country-level influences in their EU evaluations, remains unanswered.

The following chapters set out to eradicate some of these weaknesses in the research on the EU gender gap. As the previous pages have shown, the most central determinants of public EU support are also those correlates of biological sex which shape gender gaps in other policy areas. Therefore, it is possible to combine the two research areas on public EU support and on the gender gap in public opinion into one theoretical framework. The latter allows identifying the underlying roots of the EU gender gap in terms of utilitarian considerations and socialization into gender roles.

3. THE QUESTION OF CAUSALITY: MICRO- AND MACRO-LEVEL ROOTS OF THE EU GENDER GAP

In order to understand the existence of a gender gap in support for European integration, it is indispensable to look at two levels: firstly, the individual determinants of EU support and their interaction with sex have to be considered. The following section on "Love or Money?" elaborates on this individual dimension of the gender gap. It asks which of the two major explanations for gender differences in policy preferences explains the EU gender gap. For many contexts, such as politics in the US (Shapiro/Mahajan 1986), Canada (Gidengil 1995), the UK (Campbell 2006) but also in other countries (Inglehart/Norris 2000), gender gaps have either been explained with material self-interest and the material differences between the genders or with the socialization into gender roles. As these two perspectives have never been analyzed comparatively for the EU context, identifying their potential roles at the individual level of the EU gender gap is very tempting. However, testing for the influence of material self-interest and of socialization into gender roles does not mean to suggest that material conditions and socialization are separable from each other. Acknowledging the evidence for the interdependence of socialization and material conditions which will be discussed in the next section, the separate treatment of these two main explanations for gendered policy preferences is mainly a consequence of the research design (see Chapter 4 for details). Furthermore, this approach helps to understand in how far the gender gap is malleable to political influence: whereas material conditions can be modified by policy-makers and other societal forces in the near term, culturally and historically grown patterns such as gendered socialization are not as open to influence.

At the country level, the EU gender gap takes different shapes and sizes across the EU member and candidate countries. Chapter 5 elaborates more on these variations. For a full understanding of the EU gender gap, it is crucial to learn which country-specific conditions determine this pattern of the gender gap. The second section of this chapter discusses the theoretical framework for the country-level variation of the EU gender gap.

3.1. THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: "MONEY" OR "LOVE"[16]?

Based on the literature on gender gaps in other policy areas, two strands of causal argumentation are applicable to this study (Campbell 2006, Huddy/Cassese 2011). The first strand of explanations for the gender gap is based on rational choice theory. The basic assumptions converge with those of the utilitarian explanations for EU attitudes: people are driven by their material interests and try to maximize their benefits (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, Gabel 1998). They support EU membership if they expect that it will improve their material situation.

Applied to the gender gap in European integration support, women and men alike will answer the EU membership question positively if they expect personal material advantages from integration. If they expect that integration will harm their material situation, they are likely to reject membership. This also means that women and men react different to questions on EU integration if their personal material situation is affected differently by integration.

Which are these material differences? As the literature review in Chapter 2 has already shown for age and occupation, the one-breadwinner model which is widespread in most EU countries leads to a gendered division of family responsibilities, a lower participation of women in full-time employment and, consequently, a greater risk of women than of men to depend on public assistance over their life course. Nonetheless, according to the utilitarian perspective, men and women who are in similar economic situations should also have similar views on EU membership.

For the gender gaps in most policy areas, the utilitarian explanation still lacks broad empirical evidence (Huddy/Cassese 2011: 483), although some studies hint to material self-interest as a root of the gender gap: for the US gender gap in voting behavior, Manza and Brooks (1998, 1999) test the explanatory power of sociological and material explanations and find that "[…] it is not socialization processes that all women experience but later life experiences linked to work situation that has significant partisan effects." (Manza/Brooks 1998: 1259) They argue that the decreasing conservatism among women in the US is explained best with the changing material interests of women and the increasing political awareness of women due to their growing participation in the labor market, their lower wages as compared to the wages of men, the underrepresentation of women in management positions and their higher risks to depend on state support (Manza/Brooks

[16] "For Love or Money – Or Both?" is the title of an article by Nelson and Folbre (2000) which elaborates on the gendered effects of modern work on family relations. Love refers to the care for children and elderly by their female family members; money refers to the care by private providers. For the explanation of the EU gender gap, money and love stand for the two rival explanations discussed in this section: the utilitarian explanation based on material disparities ("money") and the socialization-based explanation which revolves around the idea that women do care more for the effect of politics on other segments of society than men ("love").

1999: 139-140, 151). Other studies make similar claims (Seltzer et al. 1997, Inglehart/Norris 2000: 446, Schlesinger/Heldman 2001: 61; Andersen 1999).

The second group of explanations for gender gaps in public opinion departs from the observation that women and men are socialized into different gender roles (Gilligan 1982 in Manza/Brooks 1998: 1240, Campbell 2006). According to the socialization thesis, girls are socialized to become nurturers and caregivers, and they have a stronger disposition to sympathize with the weak than men. Consequentially, women are more likely than men to support policies that include social care provision and the alleviation of poverty, independently from their personal risk to depend on these policies (Pratto et al. 1997, Shapiro/Mahajan 1986, Campbell 2006: 10-12, Campbell/Winters 2006).

Works which are rooted in this perspective on the gender gap report that women more often than men think of moral problems in terms of conflicting responsibilities. Moreover, they conceptualize politics as something relational and very concrete by considering political problems in the context of their own social environments. In contrast, men tend to analyze moral questions as conflicts of rights and to have abstract understandings of politics (Campbell/ Winters 2006: 120 et seq.) As a consequence of these differences, men prefer policies that protect individual self-fulfillment from external inferences whereas women prefer policies that seek to protect the weaker members of society (Gilligan 1982 in Gidengil 1995: 386, England/Kilbourne 1990 in Campbell 2006: 12). Men have been found to be stronger oriented towards ideologies that include the domination of one social group over others, while women rather support ideologies that aim at alleviating social hierarchies (Pratto et al. 1997: 50).

Applied to the EU context, the socialization-based explanation of the gender gap implies that men support European integration because they see it fit with their orientation towards self-fulfilment, such as through the free movement in the common market. Women support the EU if they expect that integration contributes to the alleviation of social disparities and improvements for the society as a whole. This explanation will be supported if EU support of men and women differs although they are in similar material situations.

Many works which try to explain gender gaps in partisanship or policy preferences from the socialization-based perspective use compassion as key concept. The different attitudes of men and women are explained with the greater compassion of women. Blinder and Rolfe (2013:6-7) point at a flaw in many of these studies: instead of measuring psychological orientations such as compassion or altruism, most empirical works concretely measure the political predisposition of people and—especially in the gender literature—interpret their findings as psychological differences without theoretical or empirical justification. The authors argue that instead of psychological orientation,

gender-specific differences in support for egalitarianism, which is more a political value than a psychological trait, account for the gender gap in partisanship (Blinder/Rolfe 2013). Therefore, this perspective on gender gaps might be best described as the "value-based" or "socialization-based" explanation of the gender gap instead of using the label "ethics of care" used by some works on gendered policy preferences (Campbell 2006; Shapiro/Mahajan 1986: 45; Schlesinger/Heldman 2001: 62-63). .

Some works which have investigated the influence of gendered socialization and of material self-interest on gender gaps in public opinion find support for latter. For Canada, Gidengil (1995) argues that a gender gap in public support for a free trade agreement with the US resulted from differences between the values of men and women. While material differences accounted only for a small part of the gender gap, the diverging impact of economy- and social policy-related arguments on men and women had a much stronger explanatory power. Men were particularly influenced by references to the national economic health, on the role of the state and on law and order. In comparison women rather made their decisions based on claims about social policies (Gidengil 1995: 403-404; also Gidengil et al. 2005). For the US presidential elections, Welch and Hibbink (1992) argue that women were less influenced by their pocketbooks than men. Kam (2009: 618) explains this finding with different blame strategies of men and women: whereas women tend to blame themselves for their economic problems, men externalize blame and link it with their voting decision, e.g. by penalizing the incumbent candidate in elections. Another indication towards the role of socialization derives from Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte (2008) who show that neither economic independence nor economic vulnerability entirely explains the US gender gap in partisanship.

As to the EU context, Nelsen and Guth (2000: 273) test for the influence of care-giving values by controlling for attitudes in traditional gender roles and for the number of children. They find that this indeed influences the EU support of men and women differently.

Next to this evidence for the socialization-based explanation of gender gaps, there are works who point at the interdependency of material gender disparities and socialization. As stated before, albeit its separate consideration for the two explanations of gender gaps, this thesis does acknowledge that socialization and material conditions are interdependent. In this respect, Burns et al. (2001) combine the two perspectives in order to explain gender differences in political participation in the US. The authors observe that women and men are active in different parts of institutions, such as in churches and at the workplace. Due to these gendered patterns of activity, men develop more "civil skills" than women, resulting in a gender gap in political participation (Burns et al. 2001: 361). Eventually this observation points at a combination of material and social roots of the gender gap in political participation (ibid: 369).

Secondly, authors who argue for the role of value differences between men and women acknowledge that material conditions may be fundamental: Pratto et al. (1997) state at the end of their study that different occupations, such as the contrast between the social environments and responsibilities of housewives and businessmen, may shape the social orientation of people. Gidengil et al. (2005: 1188) conclude that their value-based explanation of the gender gap supports Norris' and Inglehart's argument on the cultural background of the gender gap. And as Norris and Inglehart (2000) show that structural changes by modernization have led to the cultural developments in Western societies, this is eventually an argument for the material origin of gender gaps in public opinion, too.

Beyond the two explanations for the EU gender gap which will be tested in this study, some works refer to third explanations such as symbolic concerns and biological factors as determinants of gender-specific attitudes and behavior (Huddy/Cassese 2011: 483). Symbolic concerns, linked to the emergence of a feminist consciousness and an awareness for "'female' policy issues" (Schlesinger/Heldman 2011: 62) might be at play in matters of partisanship at the national level. However, they are difficult to transfer to the context of European integration support as European integration has traditionally been linked to matters of economic progress, with a limited attention to the development of social policies (Hemerijck 2013).

As to the role of biological differences for public opinion, research in "genopolitics" suggests that political attitudes and behavior might be explained by genetic patterns (Fowler/Daves 2008, Hatemi et al. 2011). From a practical point of view, the implications of genopolitics for the gender gap in EU support cannot be tested within this thesis as this would require looking at the genetic patterns of survey respondents by referring to DNA databases or by using information on family relations between respondents, both of which are impossible for the Eurobarometer surveys. Moreover, from a conceptual point of view, gender is a social construct that transcends the biological difference between men and women (Lovenduski 1998, Eckes/Trautner 2000). Consequently, it seems improbable that biological sex alone accounts for the gender gap in EU support. If this should be the case, however, and biological differences alone account for the gender gap in support for European integration, the data analysis in the following chapters will fail to yield meaningful results.

3.1.1. TESTING STRATEGY

In order to test which influences are the main cause of the EU gender gap, the following chapters analyse the interaction patterns of respondent's sex with other background conditions (see more on this in Chapter 4). This is the most appropriate approach to the rich notion of gender on the basis of mass opinion surveys that record respondent's sex as a dichotomous variable next to a number of other individual characteristics. Among the latter, especially age and occupation are well suited to

test whether material self-interest or socialization into gender roles are the major cause of the gender gap in public support for the EU:

Chapter 2 argues in the section on age that the material situation of individuals change over the course of life and these changes take very different shapes for men and for women. In brief, the material disparities between men and women tend to accumulate over the course of life with the conflict between professional careers and care-taking responsibilities towards children and elder family members.[17] These conflicts vary in severity across countries but generally arise with the starting of families which often begins in the late 20s of people's lives (Vogel 2002: 292) and especially affect the situation of women. As as result

> "[while] men's earnings tend to increase with age, the opposite is true for women, as their earnings decrease with age, reflecting interrupted career patterns and occupational segregation […]" (Earles 2013: 79).

The differences in wages is later reflected in lower pension claims of women than of men. This results in a greater poverty risk of women than of men in older age (Earles 2013: 77) in most EU member states (Zaidi 2010: 8).

As to country differences, a report of the European Commission for the year 2011 finds that "[on] average across the EU, the proportion of women aged 65 and over at risk of poverty is 5 percentage points more than for men […]" (European Commission 2014a), with less than three percentage points differences between the genders in some countries and more than twelve percentage points in others (European Commission 2014b, see Table 12 in the appendix). Earles (2013: 76, 77, referring to Natali 2008) argues that the EU is not efficiently countering these gender disparities in its social policies. Instead, the EU contributes to the sharpening of the gender gap in poverty risks by pushing for the individualization of pension schemes in its member states for the sake of balanced national budgets.

In contrast, socialization into gender roles takes mainly place in childhood according to psycholgical and anthropological research. Eckes and Trautner's work on the psychology of gender for instance includes a number of essays on the development of the socialization into gender roles. A crucial commonality of these essays is that they present childhood as the crucial period in life where the socialization into gender roles takes place: sex-typed behavior (Eckes/Trautner 2000: 55), gender stereotypes (ibid: 101), the adaptation of gender roles (ibid: 127), gender-related self-knowledge (ibid: 179), and gender-related prejudices (ibid: 252 et seq.) all develop in the childhood years. Eagly et al. explicitly point at the importance of the early life years for socialization into gender roles: "[…]

[17] Other labor market-related issues which do not stem from parenthood, such as the "social construction of value" and payment systems which underevaluate female performance also play a role for material differences between men and women (European Commission 2009: 46).

gender roles, which are an important focus of socialization, begin to be acquired in childhood and are elaborated throughout childhood and adolescence." (Eagly et al. 2000: 127). Similarly, Dietz's study on the portrayal of gender in video games argues that it

> "[…] is through the process of socialization that boys and girls are encouraged to adopt and develop certain personality traits that are often referred to as masculine and feminine. These personality traits, then have an impact upon the roles that individuals assume" (Dietz 1998: 426).

Adler et al. (1992) who observe the socialization into gender roles in primary schools point out that by "[…] elementary school, boys' and girls' distinct and autonomous peer cultures are clearly established […]" (Adler et al. 1992: 169).

The comparison of gender differences in material terms with gender differences due to socialization demonstrates that the former evolve over the course of life whereas the latter are established early on, more specifically before the minimum age of 15 years of Eurobarometer surveys is reached.[18] Consequently, if the gender gap in public EU supports results from material self-interest, a growing gender gap should be observed across the course of life. Alternatively, if the socialization into gender roles during childhood is the dominant cause of the EU gender gap, then the latter should remain stable across age groups.

In addition to the interaction of respondent's sex with age, conclusions on the causes of the EU gender gap can also be drawn from the interaction between respondent's sex with occupation. The utilitarian explanation assumes that men and women in similar material situations, which are measured in the dataset as same occupational positions, display equally high support levels for European integration. Compared to men and women in *higher* professional positions, men and women in lower professional positions are less supportive of European integration according to this

[18] This focus on the early phase of socialization does not rule out any gendered socialization at later points in life. Gendered socialization continues throughout life as the discussion of Burns et al. (2001) for instance has shown above (see also Eckes/Trautner 2000: 9). However, the crucial parts of gendered socialization which are linked to gendered policy preferences are acquired during childhood (Eckes/ Trautner 2000, Alder et al. 1992, Dietz 1998) - this is the crucial observation which allows testing the influence of socialization-based explanations in the context of the EU gender gap. Later socialization-based influences such as motherhood have been considered in works on other gender gaps (e.g. Campbell 2006: 86 for voting behavior in the United Kingdom) and they have been tested in the construction of Model 1 (see Chapter 6). Eurobarometer surveys regularly ask for the number of children who live in the household of the respondent. The number of children is not significant for the gender gap in support for EU membership, so that the role of parenthood seems not to be a relevant influence on the EU gender gap. A second way to account for potential effects of parenthood on the EU gender gap is to test whether differences in the gender gaps across the course of life only occur before and after parenthood usually occurs, i.e. between young and middle age groups. Models 1 to 5 show that the gender gap significantly differs across *all* ages. This is a second indication that the major socializational stage which may affect the EU gender gap stems is childhood.

perspective.[19] This results in a stable gender gap across occupational groups. In contrast, the socialization-based explanation of the EU gender gap assumes that although men and women find themselves in similar material conditions, they evaluate European integration differently. While men in low professional positions whose jobs are particularly up to competition (European Commission's Expert Group on Gender and Employment 2009: 7) are expected to share the skeptical perspective of their female colleagues on EU integration, the evaluations of EU integration should differ for higher professional positions: according to the socialization-based view, women in high occupational positions are concerned about the influence of integration on more vulnerable segments of society and therefore display similar views on the EU as women in lower occupational positions. In comparison, men in high occupational positions care less about the influences of integration on other societal groups and embrace the EU for its advantages for their occupational group.[20] These interaction patterns of occupation and sex lead to a varying size of the EU gender gap across occupational groups.

Figure 2 illustrates the testing strategy for the explanations of the EU gender gap.

[19] As discussed in Chapter 2 referring to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, this is the assumption for *capital-rich* economies (Hooghe/Marks 2005). In contrast, in labor-rich economies, men and women in lower occupational positions should be more supportive of European integration than men and women in higher positions.

[20] It could be argued that if the EU gender gap was based on socialization, the exact patterns of the gap would depend on whether people perceive the EU as a neoliberal project. At the second sight, this is not the case: If the EU is perceived as a neoliberal project which leads to reduction of trade barriers but also to reduced levels of social protection, the support among people at low occupational levels, men and women alike, may be low. With higher occupational level, the support among men may grow, as the advantages of the integration are perceived as high for their individual professional status. Women however, according to the value-based thesis, should continue to show low support for the EU, due to their concerns of the implications for the society at large, and especially for other people who may be dependent on expansive state policies. Alternatively, if the EU is perceived by people as a social project, which has led to an increased protection of workers' rights, the support among lower occupational groups, men and women alike, may be relatively strong. With higher occupational levels, the support among women may increase, again due to their egalitarian concerns, whereas the support among men, who fear the costs of social policies for free trade and low tax policies, may decrease. This would equally lead to a greater gender gap among higher occupational levels if socialization is at play.

Utilitarian explanation:

- People are driven by their material self-interest and try to maximize their benefits.
- The gender gap results from the different material conditions of men and women.

⇩

Growing age is accompanied by greater gender gap:

- Material conditions diverge more and more;
- Women become less positive about the EU than men.

Across occupational conditions stable gender gap:

- Men and women in low positions similarly skeptical of the EU;
- Men and women in higher positions similarly positive about the EU.

Socialization-based explanation:

- People are strongly influenced by the socialization into gender roles in their childhood. This gender-specific socialization leads to differences in political values.
- The gender gap results from the different political values of men and women.

⇩

Growing age is accompanied by stable gender gap:

- Women are early on more skeptical of EU than men.

Across occupational conditions growing gender gap:

- Men and women in low positions similarly skeptical of the EU;
- In higher positions women are more skeptical of the EU than men.

FIGURE 2 EXPECTATIONS FOR THE EU GENDER GAP DERIVED FROM THE UTILITARIAN AND THE SOCIALIZATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS

3.1.2. THE ROLE OF AGE AND OCCUPATION: AN EXAMPLE

How the utilitarian and socialization-based explanations play out across age and occupation may be best illustrated with the examples of a man and a woman, Joe and Jane who are assumed to be average citizens in terms of education, political views, and all other individual conditions that could also play a role for EU support. This example should not be misinterpreted as the actual reasoning of individuals which possess the characteristics of joe and Jane. Instead it serves to present the expected links between the key indicators of the testing strategy, namely sex, age and occupation.

At the age of twenty, both Joe and Jane have just started their careers and work full-time in their companies for comparable salaries.[21] Following the utilitarian logic, Joe and Jane assess European integration based on their personal material situations. Their material situations are not very far apart, and so are their evaluations of European integration: both share similar concerns and reasons for support for the EU. One the one hand, integration has allowed them to travel abroad easily, during their holidays and by EU-supported exchange programs at school. These trips helped both to acquire the necessary language skills to work as salespeople. On the other hand, they are concerned that European integration may increase the number of their competitors at the job market and affect other national politics to their disadvantage. According to the logic of the socialization-based

[21] This assumption simplifies the comparison, although the existing gender wage gap may lead him to earn more than her despite the comparability of their qualifications in terms of education, professional experience etc (European Commission 2009b: 9).

explanation for the EU gender gap, Joe and Jane differ in their EU evaluations This logic underlines that at the age of twenty both Joe and Jane have already been socialized into their gender roles. Whereas Joe perceives matters of EU integration in terms of the effects on his personal autonomy and is relatively little concerned over the effects of integration for other segments of society Jane's evaluations of the EU are more influenced by her expectations as how the EU may influence more vulnerable members of society. She wonders how the EU may create or alleviate social hierarchies.

Fifteen years later, the two are married. Joe is still working as a salesperson with a competitive salary due to his long and uninterrupted professional experience. This allows him to put aside a considerable amount of savings, and to acquire a level of benefits in case of unemployment or illness. Jane has left her old job and works part-time as a cleaner in a bank, in order to care for her two children when they come home from school. This leaves her with a very small income, and leads to losses in her unemployment and pension entitlements. As to European integration, Joe is concerned that the common market may raise the number of competing companies in his sector and also put him into competition with other salespeople from abroad who may have greater skills or be ready to work for lower salaries, so that he may lose his job. This renders him more skeptical of European integration than his neighbor Mike, who is the CEO of a large cleaning company and who welcomes European integration for promoting cooperation with partners abroad. However, Joe is still more supportive of European integration than his wife Jane. According to the utilitarian logic, she is not only skeptical of European integration for the risks for her and his jobs, but she also fears that European policies may eventually lower the national welfare standards. Thereby, her own security net in case that her husband stops providing for her and the children due to divorce, illness or death would get thinner. Jane's female neighbor, Melanie, who is married to Mike, the owner of a cleaning company, works as a CEO of a bank. This neighbor is more supportive of European integration for the same reasons as her husband: the advantages that the access to the greater common market holds for their sectors. Melanie is as little concerned as her husband Mike about the potential lowering of social security standards as their high incomes allow them to pay for private child-care so that she never interrupted her career for her children. Therefore, none of them feels at risk to depend on public welfare one day.

At this point, the story changes under the application of the socialization-based explanation: Jane and Melanie would not differ significantly in their evaluations of EU membership. Although Melanie may be in a different material situation than Jane, both would have similar reservations about the EU: decreasing national welfare standards and overall negative effects on vulnerable societal segments.

Thirty-five years later, Joe and Jane are 70 years of age – and they have divorced. While Joe is living from his sizeable pension, Jane's pension is clearly smaller and does not even allow her to keep her former life standard. If asked for their perceptions of European integration, they do not agree as they connect the EU to their personal situation: whereas he still perceives the EU membership of his country still as a good thing, she has developed a stronger opposition towards the EU, wondering what the EU has ever done for her. Jane claims that by limiting public debts the EU advanced the cuts in public welfare programs and thereby is responsible for her small livelihood. According to the utilitarian logic, the Mike and Melanie, the former neighbors, do not differ in their EU evaluations, although they divorced as well. Both lead comfortable lives because Melanie never left her career for her children and acquired her own sizable pension entitlements. Consequently, both are more supportive of the EU than their middle class neighbors.

In contrast if the cause of the EU gender gap stems from socialization into gender roles, the differences in EU evaluations between the retired Joe and Jane and between the retired Mike and Melanie should not differ much from their differences during the earlier years of their lives. While Jane should be as critical of European integration as she has been in the years before, Melanie should still be less supportive than Mike because she has kept her concerns over European integration due to her impression that European integration may harm the interests of other segments of society.

3.1.3. Other determinants of the EU gender gap

Next to age and occupation, there are several other conditions which are likely to shape the EU gender gap, according to the literature on EU support and on gender gaps in other policy areas. Their detailed links to the EU gender gap have been presented in the literature review (Chapter 2). However, the effect of these conditions on the gender gap may be either related due to utilitarian considerations or due to socialization. Therefore, they are not applicable as key indicators to the theoretical framework.

Education increases support for European integration. Since the 1990s, women have outrun men in graduating from higher education (Schofer/Meyer 2005: 909). This should have contributed to a narrowing or even reversed EU gender gap. However, the effect of education on gender differences in EU support may result either from material consequences of education, with greater material security of the higher educated, or from socialization, assuming that attending educational institutions contributes to gender-specific socialization. Therefore, education is not well suited to serve as an indicator for the two rival explanations of the gender gap.

Holding a European identity stands in a positive relation to support for European integration. Men are more likely to hold a European identity than women (Fligstein 2008). If the gender gap in EU

support varies despite a similar formation of a European identity among men and women, this indicates that identity plays a different role for the two genders in EU evaluations. At the first sight, this would suggest that material considerations play less of a role. However, Fligstein (2008) suggests that material conditions may cause the gender differences in European identity. Therefore, identity's interaction patterns with sex cannot be clearly attributed to one of the explanations for the EU gender gap.

If religion or religiosity affects the gender gap in European integration support, this indicates that not only material factors play a role. In return, this would allow for the interpretation that values or socialization account for the EU gender gap. As the literature on religion, EU support and gender shows, this link is based on a thin theoretical and evidential basis. Therefore, religion and religiosity cannot serve as key indicators for the theoretical framework.

The gender gap in partisanship and ideological predispositions can be interpreted as the influence of utilitarian considerations: women may favor the political left as they more often than men depend on an expansive social state for benefits and jobs. Alternatively, socialization may stand behind the gender gap as women who do not depend themselves on expansive state policies may favor the left as they are socialized towards caring more for the vulnerable segments of society and prefer policies which reduce societal inequalities. As to support for extremist parties, the reasons for men being more attracted to parties at the right margins might be based on material grounds or on gendered socialization as the literature review in Chapter 2 shows: on the one hand, occupational patterns may lead to the male-dominated support for rightist parties. On the other hand, anti-immigration attitudes or the social climate in these parties may play a role. As a result, the link between partisanship and the EU gender gap is inconclusive to the two tested explanations for the gender gap, both if the two sides of the spectrum are compared and if mainstream and extreme parties are considered.

For attitudes on national political institutions, there is not sufficient evidence to establish definite expectations for the effect on the EU gender gap. Consequently, these attitudes are not applicable as key indicators for the theoretical framework either.

3.2. THE LARGER PICTURE: CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS OF THE GENDER GAP[22]

As the literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates, there is reason to believe that not only individual qualities determine the EU gender gap. Beyond the question whether men and women participate in the labor market, or how old, educated, religious or fond of national institutions they are, their environment seems to play an important role for their perception of the EU. Two questions for the macro-level explanation of the gender gap are of particular relevance. Firstly, which country-specific conditions explain the large differences in national gender gaps? These differences will be demonstrated in more detail in Chapter 5. And secondly, is the development of the EU gender gap a result of long-standing traditions or rather of near-term economic and political developments? This latter question is of particular relevance for policy-makers who have an interest in raising public support for their EU policies. If the gender gap is a result of developments which are amenable to influence, then political programs should pay increased attention to the dynamics of the gap.

Welfare regimes are the only macro-level condition which has been shown to affect the EU gender gap. Especially the socialdemocratic welfare states of Scandinavia differ from other countries in terms of the determinants of the gender gap. Outcomes of Scandinavia referenda on EU affairs have shown a significant gender gap in these countries. Consequently, different suggestions have been presented as to how the socialdemocratic welfare regimes are linked to the low level of EU support among women in these regimes (Nelsen/Guth 2000): it has been argued that Scandinavian countries had a large EU gender gap because women in these countries were afraid that integration could lower the national standards of welfare benefits (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 277; Liebert 1997, 1999). Nelsen and Guth's findings do not support this argument. According to their interpretation of Eurobarometer surveys, Scandinavian women are not afraid that integration may risk their "security net" (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 283). Unlike their male counterparts women do not see the need for European integration because the generous Scandinavian welfare states provides them with a feeling of material security. There are different reasons to doubt Nelsen and Guth's explanation. These reasons will be further discussed in the empirical chapters which test the influence of welfare regimes on the EU gender gap.

[22] The macro-level explanation of the EU gender gap requires a second theoretical framework: most of the potential determinants of the gender gap which are country-specific cannot be clearly attributed to the utilitarian or socialization-based explanation. The effect of welfare regimes for example could either result from the differences in material benefits (see discussion of Nelsen and Guth 2000 in the following), or from differences in gendered socialization across welfare regimes. This latter possibility has not been discussed in the literature yet, but it cannot be ruled out that early gendered socialization is different if children are taken care of in public childcare facilities, as is the often the case in socialdemocratic welfare states, or by female family members, which is frequent in conservative and Mediterranean welfare states.

Secondly, the long-term socio-economic development of countries has been found to affect the gender gap in voting behaviour through structural changes and by changes in the dominant values of societies (Inglehart/Norris 2000). As to the material effects of socioeconomic development, modernization leads women to increasingly participate in the labor market, develop greater abilities to live financially independent from others and to leave traditional tasks of care-taking of children and elderly to professional services (see also Folbre/Nelsen 2000). Additionally, socio-economic development affects the gender gap through cultural changes: in the development towards a post-industrial society, values of individual autonomy become dominant over materialist values which are held in high esteem in industrial societies. These leading values are adopted in the early stages of life and remain stable over the remaining lifetime of individuals (Inglehart 1997, Norris/Inglehart 2000). Inglehart and Norris (2000) suggest that both through the structural and cultural effects of modernization, the realignment of the gender gap in voting behaviour occurs. According to this perspective, the gender gap shrinks because the living realities of men and women approach each other. It is plausible to apply the link of modernization and gender gaps to the EU context. The gender gap in EU support should decrease the more developed countries are.[23]

Thirdly, the dominant religion of countries may influence the gender gap in EU support. With Catholics being more supportive of European integration than Protestants (Nelsen et al. 2011, see literature review) and women being more religious than men (Walter/Davies 1998), the gender gap in majorly Catholic countries might be smaller than in majorly Protestant countries.

Alternatively to these three long-term characteristics of countries, rather short-term economic and political developments may influence the national EU gender gaps as well.

In this regard, the perceived macro-economic effects of EU membership may play a role for the EU gender gap: it has been found to influence public support for European integration (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, Anderson/Reichert 1996). More recent research argues that it might have lost its significance over time (Eichenberg/Dalton 2007, Serricchio et al. 2013). A link between the macroeconomic consequences of EU membership and the gender gap seems plausible considering that men and women evaluate free trade policies differently due to different economic preferences (Gidengil 1995: 403-404, Gidengil et al. 2005; see also Campbell 2006). On the country-level, the economic cost of integration can best be grasped by distinguishing contributors and beneficiaries of the EU budget.

[23] Modernization cannot serve as an indicator for the theoretical framework of “money or love” because its effects on the EU gender gap may result either from its structural or cultural consequences.

Moreover, countries whose economic situation has worsened under the effect of the Eurozone crisis could have developed larger gender gaps. Austerity measures which were discussed at the EU level to encounter the crisis included cuts in public sector employment and social assistance programs. As women are overrepresented in the public sector in many countries (Anghel et al. 2011: 3) and as their ability to participate in the labor market depends often on state support, such as for childcare facilities and full-time schooling, their enthusiasm for European integration may decrease with deteriorating macro-economic performance, thereby leading to a greater gender gap.[24]

Lastly, the nature of the public discourse on European integration should also play a role for the gender gap at the country level, as Liebert (1997) has suggested. This view is supported by Zaller (1992) who points at the general role of elite messages for public opinion. Testing Liebert's (1997) suggestions would require an analysis of feminist courses in the individual countries and the degree of interparty conflict on European integration. Such an analysis is not realizable within the extensive temporal and geographic scope of this study. Instead, the influence of Euroskeptic parties can be taken into account, assuming that an at least partially negative public discourse on European integration will be accompanied with strong electoral outcomes of Euroskeptic parties. For the gender gap, especially those parties at the extreme right of the political spectrum are relevant as men are more likely to support these extreme-right wing parties than women (Arzheimer/Carter 2006). Strong rightist, Euroskeptic parties should lead to a smaller gender gap, as EU support among men should decrease and approach the low support-levels among women.[25]

Table 1 below summarizes the expectations which have been established in this section for the influence of macro-level conditions on the EU gender gap.

[24] Regarding the theoretical framework for the individual level, any effect of economic performance and especially of the Eurozone crisis on the gender gap can be interpreted both as indicator for the materialist as well as for the sociological explanation. Female skepticism towards austerity can stem either from their greater dependency on social policies or from their compassion for the weaker segments of society. Therefore, economic performance is a plausible determinant of the gender gap at the country-level, but insights on the individual level roots of the gap cannot be drawn from it.

[25] The strength of rightist Euroskeptic parties cannot be used as an indicator for the theoretical framework at the individual level: the greater support of men for right-wing parties might either stem from concerns of men to lose material rewards by the social policies of mainstream parties (corresponding to the "angry white male" thesis, Campbell 2006) or from their psychological orientation which has been found to support societal hierarchies to a greater extent than women (Pratto et al. 1997).

Long-term conditions:
1. Welfare regimes may affect the gender gap in EU support by the consequences of family policies on the material conditions of men and women. In countries where family policies support gender equality in work and family life, the gender gap in EU support should be wider than in other countries. Whether perceived threats to benefit standards or a greater feeling of material security in generous welfare regimes leads to the wider gap remains to be seen in the following chapters.
2. The dominant religion of a country may influence the gender gap, as Catholics are more supportive of EU integration than Protestants, Orthodox and Muslims. Considering that women are more religious than men, the gender gap in Catholic countries should be smaller than in others, as women should be more supportive of European integration there.
3. Socioeconomic modernization may affect the gender gap in EU support through the approximation of lifestyles of men and women: the gender gap should become smaller.
Short-term conditions:
1. Macro-economic effects of European integration: The gender gap in countries which are net-contributors to the EU budget should be smaller than in countries which are net-beneficiaries of the EU budget, due to the lower support of men in contributing countries.
2. In countries with deteriorating economic performance, such as those countries which have been hit particularly strongly by the Eurozone crisis, the gender gap should be wider than in other countries. This is due to a growing Euroskepticism particularly among women, who are more likely to be concerned about austerity measures than men.
3. In countries with strong rightist, Euroskeptic parties, the gender gap should be smaller as the support for European integration should especially decrease among men.

TABLE 1 EXPECTED INFLUENCE OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONDITIONS ON THE EU GENDER GAP

4. METHODS AND DATA

4.1. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The most established approach in public opinion research is the analysis of mass survey data. Samples of standardized interviews with randomly chosen individuals are sought to represent the overall population. Pre-formulated answers are recorded under the condition of anonymity of the interviewee. For this study, Eurobarometer standard surveys which are conducted biannually on behalf of the European Commission will be used.

Studies on the formation of public opinion argue that the answers to survey questions depend on the awareness of the issue at hand, as well as on the values and the perceived interests of survey respondents (Converse 1962, Zaller 1992). Zaller emphasizes that people usually do not possess fixed attitudes on the issues addressed in surveys but that they "construct 'opinion statements' on the fly" (Zaller 1992: 1), depending on the considerations that crosses their minds first when they hear the question. These considerations are influenced by the messages which elites exchange in the public discourse, by the political awareness of individuals which determines the way in which they process these messages and the individual political predispositions, or values, which determine which messages from the public discourse are eventually embraced (ibid: 22). Thus, the public discourse on European integration, individual awareness of EU politics, as well as values and perceived interests in this regard, are all crucial for understanding the dynamics in public EU support.

As Burns, Schlozman and Verba explain for their study on the gender gap in political participation, the analysis of survey data has the particular advantage that it lets "the silent speak" (Burns et al. 2001: 41): whether a person is involved in civil society or politics or rather passive in this respect does not matter for her/his chance to be asked for her/his opinion and to be part of the survey results. As such the individual opinion finds its way into the public discourse. This integration of individual ideas into the public debate on politics is a crucial aspect of the term "public opinion" (Perrin/McFarland 2011).

Next to the possibility to learn about the opinion of theoretically anyone in the population through random sampling, another incentive for the use of mass surveys is the possibility to draw conclusions on the unobserved overall population by inferential statistics. Thereby, survey analysis "promises to represent transparently the authentic contours of the public" (Perrin/McFarland 2011: 88). A better understanding of the EU gender gap can only lead to useful implications for research and policy-makers if the findings are proven to apply to the overall population.

Obviously any research method has its draw-backs. For the current study, there are a few disadvantages of the survey data to be aware of.

Firstly, the Eurobarometer surveys are translated into the EU's official languages as well as into a number of minority languages such as Russian in the surveys for Latvia or Kurdish in the surveys for Turkey. Although answer options are modified according to countries–for questions on media consumption the newspapers and TV channels had obviously to be specified for instance—these translations may have an effect on the answers in several ways. Firstly, the "equivalence of meaning" (Heath et al. 2005: 320) is hard to ensure across culturally diverse groups and societies. As this research is limited to the European continent the range of risks in this regard may be limited compared to global opinion poll studies. Nonetheless, Eurobarometer questions on religious practice, satisfaction with the relevance of the own voice in the EU and similar survey items may trigger answers that, if not considered carefully, lead to inappropriate interpretations. In addition to this problems of "decontextualized" answers (ibid: 325), there may be problems with the translations. It has been reported for early versions of the Eurobarometer that the wording of the English and French versions differ to such an extent, that respondents in France and the United Kingdom understood questions on partisanship differently (Heath et al. 2005: 320). Moreover, if careful translations turn questions and answer options into too long sentences, this may lead to a bias towards affirmative answers (Harmon 2001: 78).

Secondly, question orders changed across Eurobarometer editions. This may lead to biases in the survey answers as people generally "feel compelled to report consistent opinions" (Perrin/McFarland 2011: 90). If people are first asked questions which they answer in a liberal mindset for instance, the likelihood of giving liberal answers to later questions is higher as if the previous questions triggered more conservative answers. A lack of "equivalence of meaning" and the effect of changing question orders on survey answers are potential sources of bias which could not be controlled during this research.

Thirdly, across time the wording of questions has sometimes changed and many questions, particularly on identity-related features, have been asked on an irregular basis (see also Fligstein 2008: 140). Slight differences in the questions may lead to different understandings by the respondents (Perrin/McFarland 2011: 91). Whether two similar wordings constituted the same question had to be decided on a case-to-case basis.

Despite these disadvantages with the quantitative approach to a study on gender issues, this study follows Burns, Schlozman and Verba's suggestion (2001) that it may be the most appropriate approach to deliver systematic insights into the issue of gender gaps. Nonetheless, other research

methods should not be disregarded either. Insights from small-N research designs that used focus groups (Campbell/Winters in Campbell 2006) or discourse analysis as suggested by Liebert (1997) contributed complementary to my research enterprise.[26] They helped to construct the theoretical framework of this study as well as some of its key concepts.

4.2. EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS

The key questions of this study concern gender differences in evaluations of EU membership and social-policy-making at the EU level. Datasets such as the European Values Survey, the World Values Survey or the International Social Survey (ISSP) series on the role of governments or on changing gender roles do not regularly include these key questions on the EU. Eurobarometer surveys instead regularly ask respondents to evaluate EU membership and to indicate their preferred level of social policy decision-making, so that a study of the gender gap in EU support is possible for an extended period of time as discussed below. Furthermore, Eurobarometer allows including all EU member states and the candidate countries in this study. In the ISSP modules, Mediterranean countries such as Portugal, Greece and Turkey as well as most Baltic and Balkan states were not represented so that a comparable geographical scope would have not been possible (EVS 2008; EVS/GESIS 2013; GESIS 2013c).

4.3. TEMPORAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

The notion of public opinion assumes the presence of an actual opinion (Heath et al. 2005: 325). In the context of European integration, the public left the integration process to their national elites for decades. This permissive consensus found its end in the 1990s (Hooghe/Marks 2009: 5) with concerns over the negative side-effects of the common market and the implications of future enlargements. For example, in the early 1990s the referenda on the Treaty of Maastricht in France and Denmark sparked ambitious debates on the European integration process. Germany's long-standing "European vocation" (Paterson 2011: 60) began to decline in the 1990s. The growing debates on the deepening and widening of the European Union, and the increasing attention towards social policies in Europe (Hemerijck 2013: 299 et seq., Watson 2009) indicate that the 1990s are a good starting point for the analysis of the gender gap in EU support.

Secondly, covering a time period reaching from the 1990s to the 2000s is a useful addition to the existing research on public opinion on the EU. Most studies in this area take 'snapshots' of public opinion by using one or two Eurobarometer editions for their analysis (e.g. Carey 2002,

[26] For more general arguments of the complementary relations of large- and small-N research see George/Bennett (2005) or Fearon/Laitin (2008). For the importance of theory for the selection of variables in large-N research see James Lee Ray (2003).

Hooghe/Marks 2004, Nelsen/Guth 2000, McLaren 2002 and 2006, Osterloh 2011, Sanchez-Cuenca 2002). Those who studied longer time periods usually cover the 1970s and 1980s (Inglehart et al. 1991, Gabel 1998), with few studies extending the time period to the 2000s (Dalton/Eichenberg 2007, Hakverdian et al. 2013).[27]

Lastly, Sweden and Austria have been fully covered by the standard Eurobarometers from March 1995 (Eurobarometer 43) onwards, so that this is the earliest data which includes the entire EU-15.

Regarding the end point in the temporal dimension, the Eurobarometer surveys until May 2013 (Eurobarometer 79.4) were available at the GESIS database at the time of data collection for this study. As the EU membership question had been asked for the last time in June 2012 to the member states and in May 2011 in the candidate countries, the June 2012 edition is the last survey included in the following analyses. In sum, twenty Eurobarometer surveys are included in the dataset for this study.[28]

As to the geographical scope, 32 countries are covered by this study. This is an unusually broad geographical scope for a work on gender gaps in public opinion. From October 2004 (Eurobarometer 62) onwards, the countries of the EU-27, Croatia and Turkey were covered. In 2007 (Eurobarometer 67.2), Macedonia was added to the Eurobarometers, followed by Iceland (May 2010, Eurobarometer 73.4) and Montenegro (May 2011, Eurobarometer 75.3) (GESIS 2013b). Table 13 in the appendix lists the sample sizes for each country in the dataset.

4.4. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The Eurobarometer surveys offer several questions which could have served to measure support for European integration. The most common choice of authors is the membership question which is used alone (Armington/Ceka 2014, Carey 2002, Dalton/Eichenberg 2007, Osterloh 2011, Serricchio et al. 2013, Vliegenthart et al. 2008) or in combination with other variables to create an index (Gabel 1998, Nelsen/Guth 2000, Garry/Tilley 2009, Hooghe/Marks 2004, McLaren 2006).

The membership question asks “Generally speaking, do you think that our country's membership of the European Union is...?” Answer options are “a good thing”, “a bad thing”, “neither nor” and “don’t know”. For interviews in the candidate countries, the question uses the future subjunctive.

[27] Those studies which use Eurobarometer surveys over an extended period employ only one or a few standard variables from the Eurobarometer survey. Hakhverdian et al. (2013) use respondent’s sex, education, age and the membership question from 1973 to 2010. Dalton and Eichenberg (2007) only use the membership question and combine it with macroeconomic data from other sources to elaborate on the “post-Maastricht blues”.

[28] For 1995 and 2009, two survey editions (Eurobarometer 43 from March/April and Eurobarometer 44.1 from November/December 1995; Eurobarometer 71.3 from June/July 2009 and Eurobarometer 72.4 from October/November 2009) were included, as they covered rare questions.

Although the EU membership question does not explicitly mention "EU integration", it is closely correlated to those questions which use the term but are asked only irregularly (Gabel 1998: 341).[29] For the given purpose of comparing several Eurobarometer surveys over a time period of almost 20 years, the membership question offers the advantage of being asked most regularly.

Similar to the approach of other authors (Armineon/Ceka 2014, Serricchio et al. 2013), a "good thing" has been coded as 1, and "neither nor" and "a bad thing" coded as 0.

As to attitudes on the EU's social policies, questions vary broadly in the Eurobarometer surveys between 1995 and 2012. The most frequently asked question concerns the level of decision-making: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?" (European Commission 2012a). The question refers to a list of policy areas which are read in rotation to the respondents.[30] Between 1995 an 2007[31], this question was asked for health and social policy in combination. Between 2007 and 2010[32], social policy has been listed separately. This latter time period will serve for the analysis of the gender gap in support for EU social policies. Answer categories are "national government", "jointly within the European Union" and "don't know".

4.5. TREATMENT OF "DON'T KNOW" ANSWERS

The Eurobarometer surveys include "don't know" as an answer to all questions involved in this study. Whether or not to include these answers is an important decision in a study on gender gaps: public opinion research has observed that women are more likely to respond with "don't know" than men in political surveys (e.g. Lipset 1960), particularly in questions referring to foreign policy issues (Seltzer et al. 1997: 14).

[29] Alternative questions ask how respondents would feel if the EU would be suddenly scrapped (Berezin/Diez-Medrano 2008), how people think about the unification of Western Europe (Gabel 1998), whether the own country has benefited from EU membership (McLaren 2002; Vliegenthart et al. 2008), which speed of European integration interviewees would like to see (Hooghe/Marks 2004, Sanchez-Cuenca 2000) and which role the EU should play in their own lives in five years (Hooghe/Marks 2004). The problem for the given study is that these questions were asked only in a limited number of Eurobarometer editions and thereby were inadequate to research the EU gender gap with a broad temporal and geographical scope.

[30] In the first years, the question was formulated in two sentences: "Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?" Afterwards the question was shortened to "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?"

[31] These are the fall editions of the standard Eurobarometer surveys from 1995 to 2007, i.e. Eurobarometers 44.1, 48.0, 50.9, 52.0, 54.1, 56.2, 58.1, 60.1, 62.0, 64.2, 66.1 and 68.1.

[32] These are the fall editions of the standard Eurobarometers surveys from 2007 to 2009 and the spring edition of the Eurobarometer survey in 2010, i.e. Eurobarometers 68.1, 70.1, 72.4 and 73.4.

Scholars have tried to explain this with a lack of knowledge on political issues among women.[33] For the USA of the 1950s, Lipset links the lack of knowledge to the occupation of women as housewives (Lipset 1960: 206-207). Others suggest that men and women differ in their readiness to admit a lack of knowledge or that women are less likely than men to "venture opinion on areas they don't feel strongly about" (Seltzer et al. 1997: 15). Alternatively, the sex of the interviewer may relate to the likelihood of answering with "don't know". This has been observed for surveys on gender-specific issues such as women rights, abortion and the like (Huddy et al. 1997: 198). Eurobarometer data do not record the interviewer's sex. Additionally, a study by Groves and Fultz (1985) has demonstrated that the sex of is insignificant for the share of "don't know" answers if the questions concern economic questions. As European integration is not very far from economic matters and the questions used for the analyses of the gender gap are all relatively gender-neutral (see the Tables 25, 26 and 29 to 31 in the appendix for the variables included in the models), this suggests that the lack of control for the interviewer's sex is not a major problem.

From a practical viewpoint, it is unclear how the "don't know" answer relates to the other categories of the membership question. It seems implausible to include it into an ordinal coding with 1 representing "a bad thing", 2 "neither nor" and 3 "a good thing". Those studies on public EU support who construct indexes from different membership-related questions usually put "don't know" at the midpoint (Nelsen/Guth 2000, Garry/Tilley 2009). With the use of dummies as dependent variables, there would be no midpoint for the "don't know".

Other authors merge the "don't know" answers with other categories such as all other answers than the "good one" (Armingeon/Ceka 2014) or with all answers other than the "bad one" (Serricchio et al. 2013). This decision may be criticized for lumping together inherently different attitudes: whereas indicating "don't know" may indeed result from a lack of interest or knowledge, "neither nor" can reflect an informed view on EU matters that simply does not result into a clear position. Respondents of the "neither nor" category could for example think that the advantages of EU membership in some policy-areas has equal weight to the disadvantages in other policy fields.

Considering both the theoretical and practical complexities that an analysis of the "don't know" answers would require, this answer category has been excluded from the analyses, following the example of many other authors in the field of public EU support (e.g. Gabel 1998, Çarkoğlu/Kentmen

[33] For other reasons behind "don't know" answers which are unrelated to the role of gender see Perrin and McFarland (2011: 89-90): a lack of knowledge or attached importance to the issue in question (Atkeson/Rapoport 2003; see also Shapiro/Mahajan 1986: 57-58), a lack of understanding for the question due to too many answer options (Harmon 2001), holding an opinion which is not represented in the answer questions (Converse 1976), or holding a socially undesirable opinion (Berinsky 1999, 2004) may all increase the tendency of individuals to say that they "don't know". The wish to hasten the interview or to keep privacy for other reasons may lead to "don't know" responses, too (Harmon 2001: 72).

2011, McLaren 2006, Osterloh 2011, Serricchio et al. 2013, Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Its' thorough investigation would require to go beyond the realm of the theoretical framework (see Chapter 3).

4.6. IDENTIFYING THE CAUSES OF THE GENDER GAP: THE USE OF INTERACTION TERMS AND THE LIMITS OF LARGE-N RESEARCH

Chapter 3 explains that this study understands gender as a result of the interplay of biological sex with other characteristics and the environment of individuals. The closest methodological match with this conceptualization is the analysis of interactions between respondent's sex and other conditions. It is a widely used approach to questions of gender in political science (Korpi et al. 2013: 3, McCall 2005: 1788). The outcomes will help to identify which of explanation for the gender gap in public opinion holds best for the EU context.

Alternative to the use of interaction terms, authors have studied gender gaps in partisanship and voting behavior by creating male and female samples and by analyzing these subgroups according to the individual conditions which are thought to determine the gender gap (Campbell 2006: 25, 33 for voting behavior in the UK, Seltzer et al. 1997: 51 for partisanship in the US).

In her article on gender and economic voting, Kam explains the advantages of interaction terms over the division of datasets into separate samples:

> "Instead of estimating separate-sample regressions for men and women, I estimate a fully-interactive pooled-sample regression that interacts each of the key independent variables with a *Female* dummy variable coded 0 for males and 1 for females. This approach mimics the separate-sample estimation but allows for a statistical test of the claim that men and women rely differentially on pocketbook and sociotropic consideration […]." (Kam 2009: 619; italics in original).

Approaching the EU gender gap with the help of interaction terms, and more generally with a large-N study, is not unproblematic. Firstly, it is difficult if not impossible for a large-N study to live up to the full meaning of gender. Gender, as Hoskyns states in brief, "refers to the socio-cultural meanings given to masculinity and femininity and to the complex and varying relations between the two" (Hoskyns 2004: 217). This short definition reflects that "gender" is a social construct and that it is as such strongly dependent on historical, social and cultural contexts (Lovenduski 1998: 335 et seq., Eckes/Trautner 2000: 9). Consequently, applying the same model of the EU gender gap to a range of 32 countries which different arrangements between the genders (Duncan/Pfau-Effinger 2000) may be considered problematic. Secondly, a more general concern over the large-N approach of this thesis is its inability to verify the causal mechanisms which link utilitarian considerations or gendered socialization to evaluations of the EU. Other, small-N research designs would be needed to shed light

in the causal mechanisms.[34] Campbell and Winter's work may serve as an example in this regard: they conducted focus groups to understand the different ways in which men and women think and speak of politics in Great Britain (Campbell 2006: 115 et seq.) Campbell used these insights to present causal arguments on the gender gap, pointing at the more contextual political orientation of women and the rather abstract reflections of men. Focus group research across several European countries would have certainly added considerable value to the given research.

As this study aims at identifying the general causes of the gender gap, consideration for a larger number of countries and a longer period of time is necessary. Thereby, a large-N study is most suited to improve the existing knowledge on the EU gender gap. Following on the insights of the subsequent chapters, future research may use qualitative methods such as focus groups to explore the mechanisms behind gender, individual and country-specific conditions and evaluations of European integration.

4.7. STATISTICAL MODELS

As the theoretical framework suggests that the link between gender and EU support is influenced by individual and country-specific conditions, the data is of hierarchical nature. By employing a multilevel model, this analysis will allow to identify the roots of the gender gap in EU integration support both at the country- and at the individual level without committing any fallacy (Hox 2002: 4). The multilevel approach accounts a) for the effects of country-level determinants on the dependent variables, i.e. for the higher correlation of observations within countries, and b) for the influence of country-level determinants on the effects of individual-level predictors on the dependent variable (ibid: 4-5).

As the outcome variables in this study, the support for EU membership (EUmem) and support for social policy-making at the EU level (CPsoc) are coded as nominal variables, the multilevel models will be analyzed with the GENLINMIXED procedure of IBM SPSS Statistics 21.[35]

4.7.1. THE GENDER GAP IN SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

Chapter 6 analyzes the determinants of the gender gap in support for European integration, measured as support for EU membership (EUmem), across the EU-27 and the candidate countries Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. The model for this analysis initially included a number of variables at the individual level (Level 1 in the data hierarchy) which had been identified as

[34] See Brady et al. 2004: 10 et seq. and George/Bennett 2005: 139 et seq. for more detailed discussions of the general weaknesses of large-N research.

[35] The more common MIXED procedure for linear mixed models is only appropriate if the outcome variable is continuous (Jiang 2007: 119; Heck et al. 2013 chapter 1). For developing a basic understanding of multilevel modeling, the introductions of Peugh (2010) and Peugh/Ende (2005) have been very instructive.

influential by the existing literature on gender gaps in other areas of public opinion and on public EU support:

$$\text{I.} \quad g(\text{EUmem}_{ij}) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{sex}_i + \beta_{2j}\text{age}_i + \beta_{3j}\text{edu}_i + \beta_{4j}\text{eco}_i + \beta_{5j}\text{polspec}_i + \beta_{6j}\text{id}_i + \beta_{7j}\text{rel}_i + \beta_{8j}\text{trust\_gov}_i + \beta_{9j}\text{trust\_party}_i$$

As support for EU membership, EUmem, is supposed to vary across individuals and across countries, it carries the subscripts i for individuals and j for countries. Due to the binomial coding of EUmem, the underlying probability distribution is not a normal distribution but a binomial distribution (cf. Heck et al. 2013). Function g, which links the linear explanatory model to the probability distribution of EUmem and allows modeling the latter as a linear function, is therefore a logit function.[36] Equation I does not include a residual term because the underlying probability distribution is binomial, so that the variance is a function of the population proportion and cannot be estimated separately (Heck et al. 2013: 18).

The continuous variables of equation I, i.e. age ("age" in the equation) and education ("edu") which are both measured in years, should be group-centered in order to facilitate the interpretation of their coefficients and of the interaction coefficients with respondent's sex (Peugh 2010: 91-92). Centering is conducted by subtracting country averages from the individual values. Their centered variables for age and education are labeled as "cage" and "cedu" in the following equations. Other influences on EU membership evaluations which have been tested in the construction of the models of this study are economic perspectives ("eco"), self-placement in the political spectrum ("polspec"), national identity ("id"), religious attachments ("rel"), trust into the national government ("trust_gov") and trust into political parties ("trust_party"). The measurements of these variables will be discussed in more detail further below. It is important to note that not all the variables listed in the statistical models below and whose influence on the EU gender gap has been tested have been kept in the final models in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. Instead, only those variables which play a central role in the theoretical framework and those which displayed significant effects on the EU gender gap were eventually kept.

$$\text{II.} \quad g(\text{EUmem}_{ij}) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{sex}_i + \beta_{2j}\text{cage}_i + \beta_{3j}\text{cedu}_i + \beta_{4j}\text{eco}_i + \beta_{5j}\text{polspec}_i + \beta_{6j}\text{id}_i + \beta_{7j}\text{rel}_i + \beta_{8j}\text{trust\_gov}_i + \beta_{9j}\text{trust\_party}_i$$

According to the literature, the budgetary EU relations of a country ("budget_lag"), the dominant religion ("religion", the welfare tradition ("welfare"), the economic situation measured with the misery index ("misery"), and the strength of right-wing, Euroskeptic political parties ("gov") as well as

[36] Following the specification of the logit function g can be expressed as $\log(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi})$ with π being the expected probability of EUmem having the value 1, i.e. the probability that EU membership is supported by an individual (Heck et al. 2013; also Long 1997, pp. 34 et seq.).

the socio-economic development, measured asthe share of jobs in the service sector ("jobs_service_lag"), influence public support for European integration. These conditions, which are located at the level 2 of the data hierarchy, are reflected by the model as elements of the intercept β_{0j}. In addition, the intercept includes the residual term u_{0j}:

III. $$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{budget\_lag}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{03}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{04}(\text{misery\_lag}_j) + \gamma_{05}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{06}(\text{jobs\_service\_lag}_j) + u_{0j}$$

Similarly to the level-1 variables, the continuous variables at level 2 should be centered in order to facilitate interpretation. The continuous variables at level 2 are the misery index (misery), and the share of jobs in the service sector (jobs_service_lag). This is implemented by subtracting the grand-mean of these variables, i.e. the mean of the entire data sample, from the country averages. The variables are labeled as "misery_cent" and "jobs_cent" in the following equation.

IV. $$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{budget}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{03}(\text{misery\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{04}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{05}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{06}(\text{jobs\_cent}_j) + u_{0j}$$

The country-level variables are not only expected to influence EU support in general, but also the gender gap in EU support in particular (see Chapter 3). In other words, the effect of respondent's sex on support for European integration may partially depend on these level-2 variables. Furthermore, the level-1 variables are expected to shape the gender gap. This is reflected by the model by distinguishing the coefficient of respondent's sex, β_{1j}:

V. $$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{budget}_j) + \gamma_{12}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{13}(\text{misery}_j) + \gamma_{14}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{15}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{16}(\text{jobs}_j) + \gamma_{17}(\text{cage}_i) + \gamma_{18}(\text{cedu}_i) + \gamma_{19}(\text{eco}_i) + \gamma_{20}(\text{polspec}_i) + \gamma_{21}(\text{id}_i) + \gamma_{22}(\text{rel}_i) + \gamma_{23}(\text{trust\_gov}_i) + \gamma_{24}(\text{trust\_party}_i) + u_{1j}$$

Again, the continuous variables should be grand-centered:

VI. $$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{budget}_j) + \gamma_{12}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{13}(\text{misery\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{14}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{15}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{16}(\text{jobs\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{17}(\text{cage}_i) + \gamma_{18}(\text{cedu}_i) + \gamma_{19}(\text{eco}_i) + \gamma_{20}(\text{polspec}_i) + \gamma_{21}(\text{id}_i) + \gamma_{22}(\text{rel}_i) + \gamma_{23}(\text{trust\_gov}_i) + \gamma_{24}(\text{trust\_party}_i) + u_{1j}$$

Inserting the specifications of the intercept (equation IV) and of the coefficient of respondent's sex (equation VI) into the basic model for EU support produces the following model:

VII. $$g(\text{EUmem}_{ij}) = [\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{budget}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{03}(\text{misery\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{04}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{05}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{06}(\text{jobs\_cent}_j) + u_{0j}] + [\gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\text{budget}_j) + \gamma_{12}(\text{religion}_j) + \gamma_{13}(\text{misery\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{14}(\text{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{15}(\text{gov}_j) + \gamma_{16}(\text{jobs\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{17}(\text{cage}_i) + \gamma_{18}(\text{cedu}_i) + \gamma_{19}(\text{eco}_i) + \gamma_{20}(\text{polspec}_i) + \gamma_{21}(\text{id}_i) + \gamma_{22}(\text{rel}_i) + \gamma_{23}(\text{trust\_gov}_i) + \gamma_{24}(\text{trust\_party}_i) + u_{1j}](\text{sex}_i) + \beta_{2j}\text{cage}_i + \beta_{3j}\,\text{cedu}_i + \beta_{4j}\,\text{eco}_i + \beta_{5j}\,\text{polspec}_i + \beta_{6j}\,\text{id}_i + \beta_{7j}\,\text{rel}_i + \beta_{8j}\,\text{trust\_gov}_i + \beta_{9j}\,\text{trust\_party}_i$$

If the parentheses are dissolved, the model for Chapter 6 looks as follows.

VIII. $g(\mathrm{EUmem}_{ij}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\mathrm{budget}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\mathrm{religion}_j) + \gamma_{03}(\mathrm{misery\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{04}(\mathrm{welfare}_j) + \gamma_{05}(\mathrm{gov}_j) + \gamma_{06}(\mathrm{jobs\_cent}_j) + \gamma_{10}*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{11}(\mathrm{jobs\_cent}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{12}(\mathrm{budget}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{13}(\mathrm{religion}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{14}(\mathrm{welfare}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{15}(\mathrm{misery\_cent}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{16}(\mathrm{gov}_j)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{17}(\mathrm{cage}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{18}(\mathrm{cedu}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{19}(\mathrm{eco}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{20}(\mathrm{polspec}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{21}(\mathrm{id}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{22}(\mathrm{rel}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{23}(\mathrm{trust\_gov}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + \gamma_{24}(\mathrm{trust\_party}_i)*\mathrm{sex}_i + u_{1j}*\mathrm{sex}_i + \beta_{2j}\,\mathrm{cage}_i + \beta_{3j}\,\mathrm{cedu}_i + \beta_{4j}\,\mathrm{eco}_i + \beta_{5j}\,\mathrm{polspec}_i + \beta_{6j}\,\mathrm{id}_i + \beta_{7j}\,\mathrm{rel}_i + \beta_{8j}\,\mathrm{trust\_gov}_i + \beta_{9j}\,\mathrm{trust\_party}_i + u_{0j}$

For most of the variables in the equation, the Eurobarometer surveys allowed several variables. For education, the age when full-time education was terminated is the most appropriate measurement. Alternatively, the literature has shown that awareness of details of EU politics might be a predictor of the gender gap, too (Zaller 1992: 21, see Chapter 2). This alternative measurement of education has been tested with the variable know in the dataset. It turned out to be insignificant.[37]

Age has been measured in years. As discussed in the literature review, it could be interpreted not only in terms of the length of life, but rather as a proxy for the conditions in which people find themselves in certain stages of life. Another proxy for measuring the different life stages was the number of children in a household (children) and the marital status of respondents (single). These have been tested as well but turned out to be insignificant.

The variable eco in the model represents variables which indicate the economic situation of individuals. The Eurobarometers since 1995 have included several variables which could be used for the economic situation of respondents, such as the income of the household, the subjective placement on a societal level, and the financial situation of the household. None of these measurements have been used throughout the time period of this study. A constant part of the Eurobarometer surveys is the question of occupation (occ) which differentiates between more than 15 groups. The influence of occupation has been tested in different ways, differentiating between unemployed and employed, between blue and white collars and between unskilled and skilled positions. Additionally, the economic expectations for the national economy and for the own household have been tested.[38]

Ideological predispositions are represented in the model equation with the polspec variable. As the literature review has suggested, the support of the left or the right political margins could have been relevant, too, so that a number of alternative codings have been tested, too.

[37] The construction of the eventual models is documented in SPSS syntax files and will be shared by the author on request.

[38] The discussion on occupation and income in Chapter 2 shows that income could also be a useful concept to test the material and socialization-based explanations for the gender gap. However, the Eurobarometer surveys do not regularly include information on individual income.

The variable id in the equation symbolizes the influence of identity-related determinants of the gender gap in EU support. The future feeling as a national of the own country or as a European has been used most frequently in the Eurobarometer surveys in this regard. Alternatively, questions about the fear to lose the national cultural identity have been asked repeatedly in the Eurobarometers. However, the identity variables as well as the following variables have not been asked in all standard Eurobarometers since 1995. Therefore, they could not be tested in the basic model but were tested separately with a smaller database. The same applies to the religious variables (rel in equation VIII). Religion was tested as the frequency of attendance of religious services and the religious denomination (coded as dummies catholic, protestant, orthodox and muslim in the dataset).

Attitudes on national governments and political parties (trust_gov and trust_party) could not been tested based on the entire dataset from 1995 to 2012 either. Instead their influence has been tested together with influence of identity as the relevant questions were asked in the same Eurobarometer surveys.

Among the macro-level variables, the net-outcome of the EU member states from EU budget has been recorded as a dummy variable that distinguishes between net-contributors and net-beneficiaries on an annual basis (Danish Folketing 2013, Mach 2008, European Commission no date). The candidate countries have been coded as beneficiaries as they receive financial accession assistance from the EU. Assuming that financial and economic circumstances affect public opinion with some delay, the budget-variable, as well as the following variables on the misery index and the share of service sector employment have been lagged by two years.

For the identification of the dominant religions in the EU member states and candidate countries, dummy variables have been created to distinguish majorly Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Islamic countries. In the case of Latvia, Estonia, Germany, and Northern Ireland, two or three religions were found to be represented at relatively equal shares. The data stems from the European Value Surveys from 1999 and 2008 which asked people for their religious denomination (EVS 2011a and b).

The data for the measurement of the economic performance of a country stems from Worldbank data on the inflation and unemployment rates of countries on an annual basis (Worldbank 2014 b and c). Similarly, information on the share of employment in the service sector which is used as a proxy for socio-economic modernization has been taken from Worldbank data (2014a).

Socialdemocratic, conservative, liberal, post-communist and Mediterranean welfare regimes have been distinguished by dummy variables. The use of Esping-Andersen's welfare typology for studies on gender may be criticized as the typology has been found to be insensitive to matters of gender

(Sainsbury 2000; see also Bambra 2004: 202, Ray et al. 2010: 197). It may also be criticized for studying the gender gap for a period of 17 years, as typologies are static. Lastly, the use of Esping-Andersen's regime types may be inappropriate for linking gender and EU support, as welfare policies are a complex policy area which includes different fields, such as unemployment policy, family policies, healthcare etc. (Korpi et al. 2013, Kasza 2002, Bambra 2004, Fenger 2007) However, Esping-Andersen (1999) has shown that the alternative suggestions how to integrate gender into the concept of welfare are flawed (Stier et al. 2001: 1738). In addition, studies which use alternative approaches to differentiate welfare regimes usually turn out with country rankings that correspond to the initial suggestion by Esping-Andersen (Bambra 2004: 208, Korpi et al. 2013: 11). Therefore, the following analyses will employ the welfare categories suggested by Esping-Andersen and of authors who enlarged his typology (Ferrera 1996, Ebbinghaus 2012).

As a proxy for the Euroskeptic character of the public debates on European integration, the strength of right-wing Euroskeptic parties has been measured as their presence in national coalition governments on an annual basis. The database Parlgov by Döring and Manow (2012) provided most of the data.[39]

4.7.2. The gender gap in support for social policy-making at the EU level

There is no indication that public opinion on social policy-making in the EU context depends on other determinants than support for EU membership in general. Therefore, the regression equation which constitutes the basis for Chapter 7 on EU social policy-making (CPsoc) is identical to the equation on EU membership:

IX. $$g(CPsoc_{ij}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(budget_j) + \gamma_{02}(religion_j) + \gamma_{03}(misery\_cent_j) + \gamma_{04}(welfare_j) + \gamma_{05}(gov_j) + \gamma_{06}(jobs\_cent_j) + \gamma_{10}*sex_i + \gamma_{11}(jobs\_cent_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{12}(budget_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{13}(religion_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{14}(welfare_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{15}(misery\_cent_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{16}(gov_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{17}(cage_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{18}(cedu_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{19}(eco_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{20}(polspec_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{21}(id_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{22}(rel_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{23}(trust\_gov_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{24}(trust\_party_i)*sex_i + u_{1j}*sex_i + \beta_{2j}\,cage_i + \beta_{3j}\,cedu_i + \beta_{4j}\,eco_i + \beta_{5j}\,polspec_i + \beta_{6j}\,id_i + \beta_{7j}\,rel_i + \beta_{8j}\,trust\_gov_i + \beta_{9j}\,trust\_party_i + u_{0j}$$

4.7.3. Case studies on Sweden, Germany and Turkey

Chapter 8 analyzes the gender gaps in EU support (EUmem) in three countries which have been selected based on the outcomes of Chapter 6. The constructions of these models have tested the basic model of Chapter 6 (see above) for the national gender gaps in EU membership support. As this model did not deliver satisfactory results for the individual countries, country-specific models were constructed. As discussed in Chapter 8, for Sweden and Turkey the country-specific conditions were

[39] Other information has been collected from Art 2011, The Guardian 2011, Leonard/Torreblanca 2014, and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2011. Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey are not covered by the Parlgov database. In these cases as well as for information certain national political parties Wikipedia had to be consulted (17 November 2013, 30 April 2014, 1 June 2014, 12 June 2014, 13 November 2014).

found to be insignificant for the gender gap in EU membership support. Therefore, simple binomial logistic models were used for these two countries. The interaction terms with respondent's sex at the end of the equation serve to investigate the dynamics of the gender gap as discussed above.

For Sweden, the eventual model can be presented as follows:[40]

X. $$g(\mathrm{EUmem_i}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathrm{sex_i} + \beta_2 * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_3 * \ \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_4 * \mathrm{polspec_i} + \beta_5 * \mathrm{exECO_i} + \beta_6 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_7 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_8 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{polspec_i} + \beta_9 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{exECO_i}$$

For Germany, socio-economic development was found to be significant for the gender gap. As this constitutes a country-specific condition which lies at a second level above the individual data of the Eurobarometer surveys, a multilevel model has been constructed similar to the model discussed above. In the German case study, the country-specific observations do not vary across countries which were symbolized by the subscript j in equation VIII, but they vary across the years from 1995 to 2012. These years are represented by the subscript k in equation XI.

XI. $$g(\mathrm{EUmem_{ik}}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * \mathrm{jobs\_service\_lag_k} + \mathrm{u_{0k}} + \gamma_{10} * \mathrm{sex_i} + \gamma_{11} * \mathrm{jobs\_service\_lag_k} * \mathrm{sex_i} + \mathrm{u_{1k}} * \mathrm{sex_i} + \beta_{2k} * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_{3k} * \mathrm{edu_i} + \beta_{4k} * \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_{5k} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_{6k} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{edu_i} + \beta_{7k} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{occ2_i}$$

For Turkey, only individual level determinants could be identified for the gender gap, so that the model is similar to the Swedish case a one-level logistic regression model:

XII. $$g(\mathrm{EUmem_i}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathrm{sex_i} + \beta_2 * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_3 * \ \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_4 * \mathrm{exHH_i} + \beta_5 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_6 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \ \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_7 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{exHH_i}$$

The influence of temporal dynamics had to be taken into consideration for a full explanation of the gender gaps in the three countries. Three-way interaction terms with dummy variables that separate the data into two time periods (represented labeled as "temp") were used to model these temporal influences. For Sweden, the model can then be specified as follows:

XIII. $$g(\mathrm{EUmem_i}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \mathrm{sex_i} + \beta_2 * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_3 * \ \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_4 * \mathrm{polspec_i} + \beta_5 * \mathrm{exECO_i} + \beta_6 * \mathrm{temp_1} + \beta_7 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{age_i} + \beta_8 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{occ2_i} + \beta_9 * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{polspec_i} + \beta_{10} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{exECO_i} + \beta_{11} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{12} * \mathrm{age_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{13} * \ \mathrm{occ2_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{14} * \mathrm{polspec_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{15} * \mathrm{exECO_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{16} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{age_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{17} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{occ2_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{18} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{polspec_i} * \mathrm{temp_i} + \beta_{19} * \mathrm{sex_i} * \mathrm{exECO_i} * \mathrm{temp_i}$$

[40] The function g represents the link function for binomial dependent variables, which is the logit function. See footnote 36.

For Germany:

XIV. $g(EUmem_{ik)} =$
$\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * jobs\_service\_lag_k + u_{0k} + \gamma_{10} * sex_i + \gamma_{11} * jobs\_service\_lag_k * sex_i + u_{1k} * sex_i + \beta_{2k} * age_i + \beta_{3k} * edu_i + \beta_{4k} * occ2_i + \beta_{5k} * sex_i * age_i + \beta_{6k} * sex_i * edu_i + \beta_{7k} * sex_i * occ2_i + \beta_{8k} * sex_i * temp_i + \gamma_{02} * temp_i + \gamma_{03} * jobs\_service\_lag_k * temp_i + u_{2k} * temp_i + \gamma_{20} * sex_i * temp_i + \gamma_{21} * jobs\_service\_lag_k * sex_i * temp_i + u_{3k} * sex_i * temp_i + \beta_{9k} * age_i * temp_i + \beta_{10k} * edu_i * temp_i + \beta_{11k} * occ2_i * temp_i + \beta_{12k} * sex_i * age_i * temp_i + \beta_{13k} * sex_i * edu_i * temp_i + \beta_{14k} * sex_i * occ2_i * temp_i$

For Turkey:

XV. $g(EUmem_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * sex_i + \beta_2 * age_i + \beta_3 * occ2_i + \beta_4 * exHH_i + \beta_4 * temp_i + \beta_5 * sex_i * age_i + \beta_6 * sex_i * occ2_i + \beta_7 * sex_i * exHH_i + \beta_8 * sex_i * temp_i + \beta_9 * age_i * temp_i + \beta_{10} * occ2_i * temp_i + \beta_{11} * exHH_i * temp_i$

5. TRACING THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS EUROPE

The literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that there is a wealth of works on the determinants of public support for the EU. Suggestions reach from the demographic and socio-economic background, over the religious and national identity to political attitudes. While these demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal factors are controlled for, many of these works still report that women and men evaluate the EU differently, but none of them investigates the roots of this gender difference (e.g. Gabel 1998, McLaren 2002, Karp, Banducci and Bowler 2003, Ehin 2001, Garry and Tilley 2009, Lubbers and Scheepers 2010, Boomgaarden et al. 2011, Nelsen, Guth and Highsmith 2011, Osterloh 2011, Harteveld et al. 2013, Hakhverdian 2013, Armingeon and Ceka 2014).

Research on the EU gender gap has not been undertaken for the last 15 years. Since Nelsen and Guth's suggestions on the gender gap (2000) in the EU-15 for the year 1994, the EU and its environment have changed drastically. Integration has deepened with the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. It has widened with the enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013. It has been contested from various perspectives in the (failed) preparation of a Constitutional Treaty and in reaction to the economic and financial crises which hit the EU since 2009. The rise of international terrorism, US-led military interventions in various parts of the world and the rise of new powers such as China have changed the international settings in which the EU operates.

In this light, any research on the roots of the gender gap in public EU support has to start with a review of the gender gap, both on the individual and the country-level. In the following, the temporal and geographic variations of the gender gap and its shape across demographic and socioeconomic groups will be presented. Its size will be compared to other divisions in the European population. Moreover, the interaction between individual characteristics and respondent's sex will be presented on the basis of crosstabulations of the sample data. This will produce first insights as to the rival explanations of the EU gender gap as discussed in Chapter 3.

5.1. TEMPORAL VARIATIONS OF THE GENDER GAPS IN SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP AND FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EU LEVEL

The gender gap in **support for EU membership** across the EU member states and the candidate countries has been a relatively stable fact for a long period of time: between 1996 and 2009, the share among men in the Eurobarometer samples who claimed that the EU membership of their country was or would be "a good thing" has been between 8 and 10 percentage points higher than the share of supporters among women. The difference between men and women who reject EU

membership as “a bad thing” vacillated between plus and minus 1 percentage points. In other words, sometimes women answered more frequently with “a bad thing”; sometimes this answer was more common among men.

Figure 3 below shows that since 2009, there is a downtrend in the EU gender gap: between summer 2009 and summer 2012, the gap’s size has shrunk to 5.4 percentage points which constitutes the smallest gender difference since 1995.[41] The answer “neither good nor bad” is more popular among women than men. The gender gap in this answer category has been the widest between 2004 and 2009 with 6 to 7 percentage points. Since 2009, it has shrunk, too, with a value of 5.1 percentage points in summer 2012.



FIGURE 3 SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM 1995 TO 2012

These figures support the continuing relevance of the EU gender gap. At the same time, they also suggest that the gender gap is not a completely stable fact: although it has been relatively constant throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the gap is narrowing since 2009.

Figure 4 shows that during the second half of the 1990s, the gender gap has been smaller with values of 6.6 to 8.3 percentage points than during the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2009, the gender gap amounted to values between 8.2 and 9.5 percentage points.

From 2004 onwards, the new EU member states in central and Eastern Europe, as well as Malta, Cyprus and the candidate countries were included in the Eurobarometer surveys. To allow comparability across the 1990s and 2000s, Figure 4 displays the gender gap for the entire group of

[41] As the answer category “Don’t know” will be excluded from the analyses in the following chapters (see Chapter 4), this chapter does not discuss the gender gap in “Don’t know” answers either.

countries included in the Eurobarometers and separately the values for EU-15. As state before, the decline of the gender gap since 2009 in the EU-27 is noteworthy. This decrease seems to be due to the influence of the new member states and the candidate countries. Considering the EU-15 alone, the gender gap reached a new peak in 2010 with 8.2 percentage points.



FIGURE 4 THE EU GENDER GAP IN THE EU-15 AND IN THE EU-27 WITH CANDIDATE COUNTRIES IN PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM 1995 TO 2012

Although the temporal variations in the EU-15 and the EU-27 with candidate countries which include the values for 32 countries are probably a result of individual and country-specific conditions, thinking about EU-wide developments to explain the rise and falls of the gender gap is tempting. In this respect, main developments in the realm of European integration come to mind: throughout the 1990s, the reforms of the EU treaties were high on the agenda, with the Treaty of Maastricht entering into force in 1993 and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice being signed in 1997 and in 2001 respectively. Generally, the dynamics of European integration of the 1990s might have led to a greater awareness among men and women about EU issues. If this greater awareness had caused the relatively narrow gender gap during the 1990s, the "female deficit thesis" (Liebert 1997) would appear as a likely explanation for the gender gap. However, the development of new EU treaties does not explain the extraordinary size of the gender gap in 1996, nor does it explain the steady decrease of the gender gap since 2009, unless the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty developed an extraordinary long-lasting effect.

Alternatively, the economic situation in the EU might play a role for the size of the gender gap. To compare Figure 4 with the economic development in the EU, Figure 5 displays the misery rate of the countries which were included in the Eurobarometer surveys from 1995 to 2012.[42] The figure shows that unemployment and inflation, which are the two components of the misery rate, in sum

[42] Until 2003 these are the EU-15, from 2004 to 2006 the EU-27, Croatia and Turkey, from 2007 to 2009 the EU-27, Croatia, Turkey and Macedonia, and for 2010 to 2012 the EU-27, Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro and Iceland (see also Table 13 in the appendix).

decreased from 1995 to 2007, therefy failing to reflectthe increase of the EU gender gap from 2000 onwards. The graph does not correspond to the sudden increase of the gap in 1996 either. The decrease of the gap in the EU-27 since 2009 is not reflected in the misery graph either.

In sum, these overall trends in European integration and economic development seem not to be good starting points for an explanation of the gender gap.



FIGURE 5 AVERAGE MISERY RATE OF COUNTRIES COVERED BY EUROBAROMETER

As to **support for social policy-making at the EU level**, Eurobarometer has used two different questions over the years. Between 1995 and 2007, the question asked which levels of decision-making in the area of health and social policies would be preferred. From 2007 onwards, the question referred to social welfare alone. Figure 6 documents the differences between women and men in support for joint policy-making at the EU level. Except from fall 2005 men have always been more in favor of joint decision-making at the EU level than women. The gender gap is smaller in this policy area than in general support for EU membership. Until 2003, the gender gap vacillated between 2.7 and 4.4 percentage points. From 2004 onwards, it decreased to values of 2 percentage points and less.

Comparing the two different Eurobarometer questions shows that the gender gap is clearly smaller if only social policies are asked for. In September 2007, Eurobarometer asked both questions by splitting the survey ballots. The gender gap measured 1.9 percentage point for the question combining social and health policies and 1.4 percentage points for the question on social policies alone. The majority of both men and women preferred decision making by the national government for both questions. This was less pronounced if health was included in the question with 63 percent of men and 64 percent of women favoring national policy making. If only social policies were mentioned, the support among men for national policy-making rose to 65 percent and among

women to 66 percent. This indicates that the support for health policies at EU-level is higher than the support for social policies.



FIGURE 6 THE GENDER GAP IN SUPPORT FOR EU POLICY-MAKING IN THE AREA OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL POLICIES

As to the roots of the gender gap in this specific policy area, a third explanation next to those outlined in Chapter 3 would have been possible because the promotion of gender equality is an important component of this policy area. The thesis of the "angry white male" (Campbell 2006: 20) suggests that instead of a strong opposition of women, concerns of men against social policies at the EU level may create the gender gap, as men may feel disadvantaged by those policies. This has been shown for the US gender gap in partisanship (Gidengil et al. 2005: 1175). In a similar vein, the gap may result from a particular support of women for these policies due to a growing feminist consciousness and the raising salience of gender issues (Manza/Brooks 1998 for the US, Gidengil et al. 2005 for Canada, Shapiro/Mahajan 1986 for gendered policy preferences). A reversed gender gap in support for European social policy-making would have been an indication towards these explanations. As a reversed gender gap cannot be observed based on the Eurobarometer data, the "angry white male" thesis and the role of an emerging feminist consciousness will not be further considered in Chapter 7.

5.2. THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP: SMALL BUT RELEVANT

In order to understand the importance of the gender gap for policy-making, it is worthwhile to compare its size with other demographic divisions in Europe. Figure 7 below shows that age, as well as education and occupational status, display sharper differences in EU support than sex. Religion has

a less dividing effect on EU support.[43] Nonetheless, the gender gap is with 8 percentage points of a notable size.



FIGURE 7 COMPARISON OF THE GENDER GAP WITH OTHER CLEAVAGES AMONG EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORTERS IN PERCENTAGE POINTS (1995 TO 2012)

As explained in Chapter 3 (theoretical framework), this comparison does not target an explanation of the EU gender gap based on biological sex alone. Instead, the material or identity-related contexts in which men and women live are thought to shape their perceptions of European integration. These contexts seem to differ systematically between men and women because men are persistently more supportive of EU membership than women. Figure 8 shows that the gender gap is the most stable division across time. This renders the roots of the EU gender gap an even more interesting target of research.

[43] Political attitudes are not included in this comparison because the connotations to left and right wings in the political spectrum vary across countries; furthermore the attitudes of leftist and rightist parties on European integration have changed across time. See the discussion on partisanship in Chapter 2 for more details.



FIGURE 8 THE EU GENDER GAP COMPARED TO OTHER DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN POPULACE ACROSS TIME

As Chapter 2 shows, no clear explanation has been presented so far for the EU gender gap. Before the next chapters proceed with testing the potential explanations of the gap as discussed in Chapter 3, the individual and national variations of the gender gap in EU membership support will be analyzed to receive some clues about the determinants of the EU gender gap.

5.3. INTERACTION OF RESPONDENT'S SEX WITH OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

The EU gender gap can be best explored in mass survey data if biological sex is set into relation with other "background characteristics" (Campbell 2006; Lovenduski 1998: 335 et seq.; Burns et al. 2001: 369). The literature review in Chapter 2 has identified a number of characteristics which determine public support for European integration and shape gender gaps in other policy areas. Whereas the combination of these suggestions has been theoretical so far, their occurrence in the EU-27 and the five candidate countries Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey will be investigated with the help of descriptive statistics in this section.[44] The interaction between sex and other individual characteristics will be presented one by one and usually for three points in time—1995,

[44] Croatia is a member state at the time of writing, but it has been a candidate country until 2013, i.e. for the time period under evaluation. In a similar vein, although Iceland has decided to cancel its EU candidacy in 2015, it has been included as a candidate country in the Eurobarometer surveys since 2010.

2004, 2011—in order to identify temporal trends. Additionally, the initial EU-15 has been analyzed over time in order to grant comparability, next to the group of all countries covered by the Eurobarometer from 2004 onwards. It must be kept in mind that the following analyses always "lump together" a broad variety of countries to identify the overall gender gap in the EU. Based on the outcomes of this and the following two chapters, the last part of this study investigates the gender gaps of selected countries.

As to **age**, the average age in countries presented in the data sample varies from 37 years in Turkey to 50 years in Hungary and Malta, as Figure 9 below shows. In the sample, 22 percent of respondents were under 30 years old, 35 percent were older than 55 years. The majority of respondents belong to the middle agers with 45 percent of all respondents.



FIGURE 9 NATIONAL AGE AVERAGES IN THE EUROBAROMETER DATA SAMPLE

The data show a diminishing EU support the older people are. Moreover, gender differences in EU support get stronger with growing age. Support for EU membership among men decreases after 29 years of age, but then remains relatively stable for the middle and older age groups. In contrast, women's support further decreases in older age. This is illustrated by Figure 10 below for the EU-27 and the candidate countries in 2004. Whether these group differences are statistically significant will be seen in the regression analyses in the following chapters.[45]

[45] If no noteworthy temporal differences are found for the other years (in this case 1995 and 2011), only the pattern for one year is reported.



FIGURE 10 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS AGE GROUPS, 2004

Based on the literature on the effect of age on EU support (Inglehart 1997, Gabel 1998), the suggestion has been made that younger generations might be more supportive of the EU because they see their values, which differ from the values of older generations, fulfilled in the EU. However, those who were between 30 and 54 years old in 2004 grew up in the postmaterialist era, too, and should live with similar values in terms of the materialist-postmaterialist dimension (Inglehart 1997). Therefore, it seems plausible that not different generations of people but simply different material conditions over the life course of individuals may account for the effect of age on EU support. The hypothesis in this respect states that the material conditions of men and women particularly differ at their middle age due child rearing and effects on their participation in the job market. This should be reflected a) by a particularly big gender gap among people of middle age or b) by different gender gaps in EU support across people with and without children. For people at older age, the gender gap should widen with the different material conditions of men and women aggravating. This pattern has been confirmed as Figure 10 illustrates.

As to the relation between parenthood and EU support, the Eurobarometer surveys only asked irregularly for the number of children of respondents, but regularly asked for the number of children living in people's households. The latter question has been used as a proxy for parenthood, assuming that people living with children are somehow involved in child rearing even if they are not the parents. The results show that people living with more children are also more positive towards EU membership. This alone is noteworthy as it suggests that people expect advantages from European integration either for their children or for their family as a whole. Secondly, the increase of EU support is more pronounced among women than among men. As a result, the gender gap is greater among people who have no children in their household than among people with children.

In the context of changing living conditions across the course of life, the link of relationship status and EU-support might also provide further insights into the possible sources of the gender gap (see

Chapter 2). In traditional marriages, the interdependency of men and women would lead to converging material interests, so that political opinions might also converge. As the Eurobarometer usually asks with reference to the relationship status, and only occasionally refers to the living arrangement with partners, the analysis collapses all status information that involved the presence of a current partner. People who were single, divorced or widowed were all grouped together as singles. Acknowledging that this approach strongly simplifies the idea of converging interests, the data shows that not in 1995, but in 2004 and in 2011, the gender gaps among singles were indeed bigger than among people in relationships. This is particularly due to a stronger EU support among women who are in relationships than among single women. The relationship status shows less variation in EU support among men.

The influence of children in households and relationship status influences women stronger than men and both factors increase the support for the EU among women. These observations match well with the support for the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap: with growing age, the material conditions of men and women, and their risks to enter poverty, begin to differ more strongly. This accompanies a stronger skepticism towards the EU among women than among men. With entering a relationship, women become more positive towards EU membership. This suggests that their perceived material interests start to converge with those of their partners. Furthermore, it seems that the EU is not perceived as complicating child rearing, but rather as an advantage either for the parents or for their children.

With longer full-time **education**, Eurobarometer data shows that support for the EU increases as suggested by the literature (Inglehart 1970, Gabel 1998, Hakhverdian et al. 2013). Gender differences seem not to be statistically significant, as the overlapping standard errors indicate in Figure 11.

In the sample used for this study, regional clusters in the length of full-time education can be observed. Iceland and the Scandinavian countries have the largest share of people with a relatively long full-time education, with Denmark at the top where 63 percent of respondents quit full-time education at the age of 20 or later. In contrast, people terminate their full-time education earlier in Europe's South. In Greece, Spain and Portugal most people left full-time education at 15 years or earlier. Portugal has the highest share in this category with 62 percent. For the EU-27 and the candidate countries as a whole, the largest share of respondents (41 percent) terminates their education between 16 and 19 years of age. Longer full-time education has been enjoyed by 26 percent and a shorter education by 24 percent of Eurobarometer respondents. Nine percent of respondents indicated that they were still studying; this excludes them from analyses on the link between the length of education and the EU gender gap.



FIGURE 11 THE EU GENDER GAP ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FULL-TIME EDUCATION, 1995

The degree of political awareness, best measured by factual knowledge on the EU, could influence public opinion on European integration, too (Zaller 1992, see Chapter 2 for details). Since 2002, the Eurobarometers measure knowledge of the EU relatively regularly by asking several varying questions on EU institutions. For the given purpose, three questions have been chosen in each Eurobarometer survey and a dummy variable for those who could answer these three questions correctly has been created. The results show that knowledge indeed increases support for EU membership; this is however the case for both men and women. The gender gap in EU support is not different among those who can and those who cannot give three correct answers. In this light, it seems that education or political awareness per se are not relevant for explaining the gender gap.

Looking at the interplay of **occupation**[46] and the gender gap yields four insights. Firstly, both male and female professionals are more supportive of the EU than workers. Following the argumentation by Hooghe and Marks (2004), this should be due to the fact that most economies of the EU are relatively rich in capital. Table 14 in the appendix compares the EU's GDP with the GDP of its candidate countries and other powerful countries in the world. Secondly, the gender gap among white collars is slightly bigger than among blue collars.[47] Thirdly, occupational status has a slightly stronger impact on the EU support of men than of women. The gender gap for blue and white collars amounts to 1 and 3 percentage points respectively. The varying gender gaps and effects of

[46] There are different ways how to classify occupation. For this study, several categorizations have been applied, such as the differentiation between employed and self-employed, workers and professionals, and skilled and unskilled employees. They yielded resembling results so that only the comparison between white and blue collars is presented here.

[47] Blue collars include farmers, fishermen, shop owners, craftsmen, people who are employed but mainly traveling (salesmen, drivers, etc.), people in service jobs (police, fire brigade, hospitals, etc.) as well as skilled and unskilled manual workers. White collars include professionals (lawyers, medical doctors, accountants, etc.), employed professionals, supervisors, owners of companies, general and middle management (including teachers) and people who are employed mainly at desks.

occupation on men and women point towards the explanation of the gender gap which is based on the different socialization of men and women. Whether this pattern holds for the EU population as a whole, is a matter of inferential statistics in Chapter 6.

Fourthly, those who do not actively participate in the labor market, i.e. retirees, homemakers, unemployed, students and those too ill to work, are more supportive of European integration than workers. Since 2004, this category has displayed a greater gender gap than the other categories. This is illustrated by Figure 12 using data for the EU-15 in 2011. Thus, there is a greater gender gap among those who not participate in the labor market than among those who do.

As to occupations in this study's data sample, 52 percent of respondents in all countries are not active in the labor market. The second largest group is the blue collars with 27 percent. White collars constitute 21 percent of the Eurobarometer respondents. This order is reflected in almost all countries. Iceland is one of the exceptions; the country has the largest share of white collar respondents with 36 percent. By far the lowest share of white collars is found in Turkey with 6 percent. In all countries except from Montenegro, the share of EU supporters is the highest among white collars. For the sample as a whole, this support rate amounts to 61 percent. Among non-actives and blue collars the support rates are very close with 50 and 49 percentage respectively.



FIGURE 12 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 2011

As explained in Chapter 2, the **evaluation of the own and the national economic situation** may affect the gender gap, too. On the one side, women have been found to be more affected by the financial situation of their household than men as they are often responsible of the household management (Kam 2009). On the other side, it had been argued elsewhere that women are more affected than men by the nationwide economic situation because women were stronger led by sociotropic thinking (Welch/Hibbink 1992).

In order to test these arguments on the basis of the Eurobarometer surveys at hand, the expectations for the national economic situation and of the financial situation of the household were set into relation with EU support and respondent's sex. The results for the EU-27 and its candidate countries in May 2011 as illustrated in Figure 13 show that none of the gaps seem to be statistically significant. The same observations can be made for the economic situation of the household and the gender gap in EU support. As a result, economic evaluations seem to play a similar role for men and for women in their evaluations of European integration.



FIGURE 13 THE EU GENDER GAP ACCORDING TO EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, 2011

Although the literature and the theoretical framework cannot deliver clear expectations as to how gender patterns in **European identity** might contribute to the explanation of the gender gap, the Eurobarometer data reveal two noteworthy points: firstly, the share of those who fear a loss of national identity by European integration and still see the EU membership as a good thing has grown between 1997, when the question about the loss of identity was asked for the first time, and 2011. Secondly the gender gap among those who fear an identity loss has grown, too, from a almost absent gap in 1997 to a gap of 11 percentage points in the EU-15 in 2011. This gender gap has been shaped by a weaker effect of identity concerns on the EU evaluations of men than of women. Figure 14 illustrates this observation.

It seems that expected consequences of European integration on culture and national identity have taken a backseat in the evaluation of European integration since the 2000s. Furthermore, this development has been more widespread among men than women. These observations corroborate the conclusions drawn on the role of occupation for the EU gender gap: personal economic considerations may be more important to men than to women when they evaluate EU membership;. For women, cultural or identity-related issues seem to have retained more importance.

In the data sample used for this study only 12 percent of respondents indicated that they are afraid to lose their national identity or culture due to European integration. These fears are the most pronounced in Hungary, Iceland (both with 23 percent of respondents giving this answer) and the United Kingdom (21 percent). In Spain and Hungary these fears are the most limited, with only five percent of respondents mentioning this concern.



FIGURE 14 SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP DESPITE FEARS FROM A LOSS OF NATURAL IDENTITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN

Religiosity has been investigated for the context of gender gaps in other policy areas and for public EU support (Chapter 2). Nonetheless, its potential for an explanation of the gender gap is vague. The Eurobarometer used for this study show that those who attend religious ceremonies more often are more supportive of EU membership than those who do not. This observation holds both for 1996 and 2006, when the respective question has been asked in the surveys. The difference in EU support between more and less religious people has strongly decreased both among men and women as Figure 15 shows. Furthermore in 2006 different degrees of religious practice are accompagnied by smaller differences in male than in female EU evaluations. Combining this with the insights on occupation and identity, it seems that EU support of men has become more dependent on economic considerations and that identity and religion have kept more influence on the EU evaluations of women. Whether this trend is significant if the the effects of other individual characteristics are controlled is subject to the following chapters.



FIGURE 15 SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU-15 ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

As to variations between the religions, differences in EU support have partly vanished over time. Whereas in the 1990s, Catholics were more in favor of EU integration than Protestants, newer studies claim that Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy increase support for EU integration. Muslims are more negative about European integration than others (Nelsen et al. 2011). These patterns are partly supported by the Eurobarometer samples from 1998 and 2006: except from Muslims, the role of religious denomination for EU-support appears to have decreased for both men and women. In contrast the literature on religion and EU support (e.g. Nelsen et al. 2011), Muslims are not less supportive of EU membership than other religious groups. This is illustrated by Figure 16 below for the EU-27, Turkey and Croatia, in 2006.[48] Protestants in 2006 are slightly more skeptical of EU integration than others, with the greatest gender gap among them.

Moreover, Figure 16 reinforces the impression that religion is more influential for EU attitudes of women than of men: the EU sport ofwomen in the data sample vares more across religions than the EU support of men.

[48] Among Muslims in the EU-15 in 2006, a reversed gender gap can be observed, with Muslim women giving to 75 percent positive answers to the Eurobarometer membership question and Muslim men having a support rate of 69 percent.



FIGURE 16 THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS RELIGIONS, 2006

As to **ideological predispostions**, the Eurobarometer data reveal a mixed picture: in general, the support for EU membership is lower among leftists than among people who position themselves at the center or the right of the political spectrum. As to the gender gap, the gap among non-leftists is bigger than the gap among leftists. Only in 2004, the gap among leftists was bigger with 9 percentage points. For women, the share of EU supporters among leftists and non-leftists remained stable in the EU-15 across time. In the overall EU, the difference of female EU supporters across the political spectrum was very small with values of 2 and 1 percentage points in 2004 and 2011. The differences in EU support for men according to political self-placement did not exceed 3 percentage points either.

The patterns of EU support at the right margin which can be observed in Eurobarometer data bear some surprises: in 2004 and in 2011, men and women at the right margin in the EU-27 displayed bigger support than others for European integration. In 1995, this was the case, too, but only for women. Figure 17 illustrates for the EU-27 in 2004 that the differences in EU support between men and women are usually smaller among those who at the right margin. This matches the expectations based on studies which show that men are more attracted to right-wing parties than women (Arzheimer/Carter 2006, Givens 2004).

In sum, it seems though that placement in the political left-right spectrum does not have a coherent effect of the gender gap in EU support. Variations in party positions on the EU are plausible reasons for this finding. In the data sample used for this study, placement to the left of the political spectrum is accompanied with support for EU membership in 17 countries. These countries are the six founding countries of the European Community, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania. Among the candidate countries, leftists in Turkey, Macedonia and Montenegro are majorly supportive of EU membership. By implication, in a number of member

states which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, as well as the United Kingdom Scandinavian countries, Austria, Greece, Croatia, and Iceland support for the political left is not associated with a higher support for European integration.



FIGURE 17 THE EU GENDER GAP AT THE RIGHT MARGIN OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, 2004

Lastly, **trust in national institutions** has been identified as relevant to public support for the EU, but seems to be irrelevant for the EU gender gap. Eurobarometer data for 1995, 2004 and 2011 suggest that there are no significant gender gaps in EU support according to trust in the national governments or national political parties, with only slightly bigger gaps among those who trust than those who do not. The trust in national governments affects EU support among men more than among women, whereas trust in parties is not accompanied by gender differences of EU support.[49]

5.4. VARIATIONS OF THE EU GENDER GAP ACROSS EUROPE

The Eurobarometer data show that the size of the gender gap across the EU-27 and its candidate countries varies strongly. Whereas the gap is relatively narrow in Montenegro, Luxembourg, Bulgaria and the Netherlands, with less than 3 percentage points of difference between men and women, this difference amounts to more than 10 percent points in Denmark, Portugal, Sweden and the Republic of Cyprus. Figure 18 reveals that only in Montenegro women are more positive towards the EU than men. However, the question has been asked in Montenegro only once, in May 2011.

It is noteworthy that countries with socialdemocratic welfare regimes mostly have relatively large gender gaps, with Sweden having the second largest gender gap overall. A possible reason for the relatively large size of the Scandinavian gaps is a certain fear of women that Europeanization may lower the generous benefits which are provided by the socialdemocratic welfare regimes (Liebert 1997, 1999). Nelsen and Guth (2000) refute this explanation. Instead, they point at the material

[49] Explanations for this general pattern are not useful due to the national variations across the EU in party alignments in EU support (Marks/Wilson 2000, see Chapter 2 for details).

security in socialdemocratic welfare states and claim that women there see less need for EU membership than men.

From the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, a third explanation should be taken into consideration: welfare states may promote different gender roles in the socialization of children. Whereas in socialdemocratic countries children spend relatively much time in public childcare facilities, they are mostly taken care of by female family members in conservative and Mediterranean welfare regimes. Whether this explanation holds for the EU gender gap will be seen in the coming chapters.

A general doubt about the link between welfare regimes and the relative sizes of the gender gap may be raised with a view to the ranking in Figure 18: not only socialdemocratic welfare states are among the countries with the widest gaps, but also Mediterranean countries such as the Republic of Cyprus and Portugal. Furthermore, Finland which belongs to the socialdemocratic cluster has a smaller gender gap than Slovenia and a number of Mediterranean countries.

Besides the potential relation between welfare regime and relative gender gap size, it is noteworthy that most countries which have had a Euroskeptic right wing party in their government since 1995, namely Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and the Netherlands, all appear in the lower part of the gender gap ranking. This pattern, if supported in the subsequent chapters, would not be surprising, considering that men tend to be more supportive than women of rightist parties (Arzheimer/Carter 2006).



FIGURE 18 AVERAGE SIZE OF EU GENDER GAPS ACROSS EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES[50]

The temporal development of national gender gaps reveals that in some countries, the EU gender gap has grown, whereas it has decreased or stayed stable in others. This absence of a general tendeny for the EU as a whole corresponds to the finding of Liebert (1999) who looked at Eurobarometer surveys from 1983 and the early 1990s.

Table 15 in the appendix lists the countries according to the trends in their gender gaps. In ten out of 27 member states, the gender gap in public support for EU membership decreased. This is the case for Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia. In eight countries, most of which belong to the EU-15, the gender gap increased over time. These countries are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Estonia and

[50]1995 to 2012 for member states, 1995 to 2011 for candidate countries

Romania. In nine other countries, namely Italy, Luxembourg, the UK, Finland, Spain and Portugal, as well as in Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, no clear trend could be observed.

The five candidate countries which are part of the study show diverging patterns of the gender gap. For Iceland and Montenegro, the number of Eurobarometer surveys is still insufficient to identify a clear trend. In Croatia, the gender gap has increased since 2004. In Turkey and Macedonia, the gender gap has decreased since 2004 and 2007 respectively. Turkey is the only country where a clear trend towards an "inversed" gender gap in EU support can be identified: as Figure 19 shows, since 2009 women in Turkey are more supportive of European integration than men.[51]



FIGURE 19 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU GENDER GAP IN TURKEY

5.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

The preceding pages have portrayed several the central characteristics of the EU gender gap which can be observed for the data sample of this study. They have shown that the gender gap is a persistent pattern in public support for EU membership, with men being more positive than women throughout the time period under investigation in this study.

Secondly, the comparison of the gender gap to other divisions in the European populace shows that the cleavages along age, education, and occupation are deeper than the differences in EU support between men and women. Nonewithstanding, the gender gap constitutes the most stable division. Furthermore, its average size of 8 percentage points is noteworthy considering the short distances which often separate rivals in national and European elections. Tables 16 to 22 in the appendix illustrate this point for the European elections and for general elections in those countries which serve as case studies in Chapter 8. The figures show that many parties which aim at increasing their advantage over competitors may exploit the gender gap for their purposes. In the European

[51] A number of other countries display inversed gender gaps, too, but this is the case for isolated points in time. In contrast, for Turkey a clear trend can be observed.

elections, the biggest party groups of the European People's Party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats were only apart by 5 percentage points. On the national level of these elections in Germany, the alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Union was by 8 percentage points ahead of its main competitor, the Socialdemocratic Party.

In national general elections, the distances between the major parties in Germany and Sweden are wider than in the EU elections. Nonetheless, the differences between the remaining parties which compete for participation in the government coalitions are relatively small with less than one to at most 6 percentage points. Lastly, the results of political parties in Turkey have usually been sufficiently wide apart as that the EU gender gap could not possess a significant potential for electoral campaigns. In the most recent elections of 2015, the distances between the competitors of the dominant Justice and Development Party has shrunk to 3 to 10 percentage points though. Especially for these parties, namely the Republican's People Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the People's Democratic Party, the gender gap in EU support constitutes an opportunity to advance their advantage over their competitors by taking gendered views on Turkey's relations with the EU into account.

Thirdly, this chapter has demonstrated that the gender gap's size varies drastically across countries, with absolute values between 14 and 0.5 percentage points. Some attempts have been undertaken to explain a part of this variance (Nelsen/Guth 2000) but they are not entirely convincing with regards to the ranking of national gender gaps (see Figure 18). Furthermore, not all potential explanations for the gender gap variation have been taken into consideration.

Lastly, the patterns of the interplay between respondent's sex and other individual conditions are inconclusive as to the rival explanations for the gender gap. Whereas the patterns of the gender gap across age groups points towards the utilitarian explanation, the interaction of sex with occupation, but also with identity and religion, indicate that socialization into gender roles may constitute the cause of the gender gap.

This ambiguity and the absence of proven explanations for macro-level variations of the gender gap call for a more sophisticated approach to the gender gap which accommodates both the individual and the country-level. Against this backdrop, the next chapters set out to investigate the causes and individual and macro-level determinants of the EU gender gap with the help of multilevel models.

6. A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF THE GENDER GAP IN EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT

The exploration of the Eurobarometer data with regards to the gender gap in EU support in the preceding chapter demonstrates that across Europe female respondents of the Eurobarometer surveys support the EU membership of their countries less frequently than men. In Cyprus, Sweden and Portugal, the difference between the genders is particularly prominent with gaps of more than 10 percentage points whereas in other countries, such as Bulgaria, the Netherlands or Luxembourg, the difference between male and female positive evaluations of EU membership amounts to less than 4 percentage points. These large cross-country variations imply that country-specific conditions might shape the gender gap in EU support.

The question on which individual and country-specific characteristics may shape the EU gender gap has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The previous chapter suggests that age and occupation next to a number of other individual characteristics interact with respondent's sex in ways that both the utilitarian and the socialization-based explanations for the gender gap are possibly valid.

In order to learn which of the two explanations holds if all other determinants of the EU gender gap are controlled for, the Eurobarometer data has to be analyzed with the methods of inferential statistics. As shown in detail in Chapter 4, a multilevel model accounts simultaneously for the individual and macro-level influences on the gender gap without overestimating the role of country-specific variables (Heck et al. 2013: 2).

To explain the gender gap, the focus of the multilevel model lies on respondent's sex as the key predictor of EU membership support. Based on an understanding of gender as a social construct that is shaped by the interdependency of biological sex with other individual qualities and in line with works on other gender gaps (see Chapters 3 and Chapter 4), interaction terms of respondent's sex with age and occupation serve as key indicators for the two rival explanations for the EU gender gap.

The multilevel model of the EU gender gap (hereafter Model 1) has been constructed in several steps (cf. Heck et al. 2013; also Peugh 2010)[52]. To begin with, an unconditional model without any predictors reveals that EU membership support alone varies to 11% across the countries included in this study. Based on this information, significant individual- and country-level variables have been included stepwise into the model. A random slope of the key predictor respondent's sex reflects the

[52] The detailed constructions of the models in this study are documented in SPSS syntax files and will be shared by the author upon request.

idea that the effect of sex on EU support varies across countries and in dependence of individual conditions.[53]

Model 1 incorporates the individual-level variables on respondent's sex, age, length of full-time education, occupation, relationship status and self-placement in the political left-right spectrum. Additionally, it takes account of the macro-level variables of conservative and socialdemocratic welfare state traditions.[54] These two welfare regimes are the only country-specific conditions which influence the gender gap in EU membership support significantly. Other country-level determinants of the gender gap which were considered in the literature review and the theoretical framework were found to be insignificant for the gender gap in EU support if the EU-27 and its candidate countries are considered altogether.

The outcomes for Model 1 show that there is significant variation in EU support across countries.[55] The covariance parameters include estimates for the intercept variance (0.365***)[56] and the variance of the second random effect, respondent's sex (0.006**). These parameters can be used to calculate the intra-class correlation (ICC). The ICC informs about how much variance of EU membership support and how much variance in the gender gap can be explained by differences across countries (Peugh 2010: 89-90). For EU membership support, the ICC is 0.099; this indicates that almost 10 percent of the variation in EU membership support in this model is due to country-specific conditions. As to the effect of sex on EU membership support, only 0.1 percent of its variation can be explained with the macro-level variables (Heck et al. 2013: 157).[57]

[53] Chapter 4 presents the alternative measurements for concepts such as education, occupation, identity etc, which were tested in the construction of Model 1. Only predictors which significantly interact with respondent's sex at the 0.05 level or higher were kept in the final version of Model 1. The eventual regression equation can be formulated as $g(EUmem_{ij}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}socialdemocrat_j + \gamma_{02}conservative_j + \gamma_{10}sex_i + \gamma_{11}socialdemocrat_j * sex_i + \gamma_{12}conservative_j * sex_i + \gamma_{13}cage_i * sex_i + \gamma_{14}cedu_i * sex_i + \gamma_{15}occ2_i * sex_i + \gamma_{16}single_i * sex_i + \gamma_{17}polspec_i * sex_i + u_{1j} * sex_i + \beta_{2j}cage_i + \beta_{3j}cedu_i + \beta_{4j}occ2_i + \beta_{5j}single_i + \beta_{6j}polspec_i + u_{0j}$

[54] The coding of these variables is documented in Table 23 in the appendix.

[55] Model 1 (N= 307084) has 32.5% missing cases due to the absence of education from the first dataset in 1995, the exclusion of candidate countries from the EU membership question in the 2012 Eurobarometer edition and the high number of "Don't know" answers and refusals to the partisanship questions. The model led to the correct prediction of 74.2% of "a good thing" answers and to the correct prediction of 50.2% observations in the "bad thing or neither nor" answer category.

[56] Significance levels will be abbreviated as *** for significance at the 0.001 level, ** for significance at the 0.05 level and * for significance at the 0.1 level.

[57] The ICC is calculated with the following formula: ICC = [between-class variation / (between-class variation – within-class variation)]. The between-class variation of EU membership support is the covariance parameter estimated for the intercept (0.365). The between-class variation of the influence of respondent's is the covariance parameter estimated for sex (0.006). According to Heck et al. (2013: 157), the within-class variation is constant at $\pi^2/3 \approx 3.29$.

Table 2 below lists the regression parameters of Model 1. The answers "a bad thing" and "neither nor" have been combined into the reference category of the dependent variable, so that the results can easily be read with regards to the gender gap in *support* for EU membership.

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Signi-ficance**	**Exponentiation of coefficient**
Intercept	-0.202	0.129	0.817
Socialdemocratic welfare regime	-0.071	0.729	0.932
Conservative welfare regime	0.264	0.328	1.302
Respondent's sex (female)	-0.124	0.024	0.883
Age (centered around national mean)	0.004	0.010	1.004
Relationship status (single)	-0.043	0.011	0.958
Age when full-time education was terminated (centered around national mean)	0.058	0.000	1.059
Occupation (white collar)	0.396	0.000	1.485
Occupation (blue collar)	-0.031	0.342	0.970
Self-placement in political spectrum (10 out of 10, i.e. right margin)	0.401	0.004	1.493
Self-placement in political spectrum (9 out of 10)	0.469	0.006	1.598
Self-placement in political spectrum (8 out of 10)	0.569	0.000	1.766
Self-placement in political spectrum (7 out of 10)	0.544	0.000	1.724
Self-placement in political spectrum (6 out of 10)	0.430	0.000	1.537
Self-placement in political spectrum (5 out of 10)	0.304	0.000	1.355
Self-placement in political spectrum (4 out of 10)	0.469	0.000	1.598
Self-placement in political spectrum (3 out of 10)	0.345	0.000	1.412
Self-placement in political spectrum (2 out of 10)	0.171	0.001	1.187
Interaction terms with respondent's sex (female)			
Women in socialdemocratic welfare regimes	-0.237	0.002	0.789
Women in conservative welfare regimes	0.097	0.039	1.102
Women with growing age	-0.006	0.000	0.994
Single women	-0.034	0.023	0.967
Women with longer full-time education	-0.012	0.002	0.988
Women in white collar positions	-0.053	0.040	0.949
Women in blue collar positions	-0.015	0.609	0.985
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (10)	0.061	0.404	1.063
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (9)	0.028	0.685	1.028
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (8)	-0.065	0.287	0.937
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (7)	-0.076	0.195	0.927
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (6)	-0.107	0.028	0.898
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (5)	-0.099	0.034	0.906
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (4)	-0.088	0.106	0.915
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (3)	-0.071	0.210	0.931
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (2)	-0.075	0.186	0.928

TABLE 2 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 1[58]

[58] Calculated with the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS. Reference is "a bad thing or neither nor". Categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Beginning with the effects of the surrounding welfare systems on the gender gap, the coefficient of the interaction of socialdemocratic regimes with respondent's sex is -0.237**. The coefficient of socialdemocratic welfare states alone is -0.071. The comparison of these two coefficients and their exponentiations shows that men and women living in socialdemocratic welfare states, i.e. in Denmark, Sweden or Finland, are less likely to support EU membership than people in other countries. Figure 20 illustrates this pattern by simulating the predicted probability of people to say that EU membership is a good thing, assuming that all other independent variables are set to the value zero.[59] In other words, the probabilities have been calculated for people who are of average education and age, who are not active in the labor market[60], who live with a partner and place themselves at the left margin of the political spectrum. The exponentiation of the coefficient of respondent's sex and of its interaction with socialdemocratic welfare regimes show that women in socialdemocratic regimes are to 21 percent less likely than men to say that EU membership is a good thing. In comparison, women in other welfare states are 12 percent less likely than men to make such a statement.



FIGURE 20 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS WELFARE REGIMES

In contrast to these findings for socialdemocratic welfare regimes, support is more likely among people in conservative welfare states, such as in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany or Luxembourg. A second contrast is that women in the conservative welfare regimes are by 10 percent more likely than their male counterparts to support EU membership. This interpretation results from the coefficient of the interaction of respondent's sex with conservative welfare regimes (0.097**) and from the exponentiation of this coefficient (1.102).

[59] This assumption is valid for all subsequent simulations unless stated otherwise.
[60] The category of non-actives includes people who are homemakers, unemployed, retired, too ill to work and students.

Figure 20 shows that the gender gap in conservative welfare regimes amounts to 2.5 percent for the assumptions of the simulation. This is considerably smaller than the gap in Scandinavian welfare regimes of 5.7 percent under the same conditions. Furthermore, Figure 20 demonstrates that differences between welfare regimes have a stronger impact on the EU evaluations of women than of men. Men in socialdemocratic welfare states are 8.3 percentage points less likely to support the EU than men in conservative welfare states. For women this difference amounts to 16.5 percentage points. Other welfare regimes, such as the liberal, the Mediterranean or the post-communist traditions do not play a significant role for the gender gap.

These complementary patterns of gender differences in EU support for socialdemocratic and conservative welfare states suggest that a common dynamic behind the effects of conservative and socialdemocratic welfare exists. In other words, a contrasting characteristic may lead to the stark differences between the two EU gender gaps and account both for the opposing gender gap dynamics in the two welfare regimes and for the relatively big gender gap in the socialdemocratic welfare regimes. The availability and volume of welfare support to women is the most plausible explanation in this regard. As Nelsen and Guth (2000) suggest, women in the generous welfare systems in Scandinavian countries may perceive less need for EU membership for economic reasons than women elsewhere in Europe (ibid: 283). Alternatively, the fear of women in socialdemocratic welfare states that benefits from the national welfare systems may be reduced under the influence of Europeanization may play a role (Liebert 1997, 1999). Accordingly, women in conservative welfare states may expect an improvement of welfare policies under the influence of European integration either because they expect higher benefits or because they feel that their national welfare regimes alone would not protect them sufficiently from economic hardness.

Which or if any of these two explanations for the variation of the gender gap across welfare regimes holds depends firstly on the question whether the utilitarian logic holds for the gender gap. If this should not be the case and gendered socialization turns out to be the driving force behind the EU gender gap, either mechanism as suggested by Nelsen/Guth (2000) and Liebert (1997, 1999) would be misguiding. As welfare states may also modify the gender socializations of boys and girls, these differences in gendered socialization would then emerge as the link between welfare state differences and the EU gender gap.

In order to test the utilitarian against the socialization-based explanation of the EU gender gap, age serves as a key indicator. It stands in a positive relationship with EU support of men (coefficient 0.004**). The coefficient of the interaction of age with being female is -0.006***. The comparison of the two coefficients indicates that the age trend is reversed for women: older women are less likely to support EU membership than younger women. However, the effect of age on the gender gap is

small: with every increase of age by one standard deviation above the country mean, the probability that women support EU membership decreases by 0.6 percent, as the exponentiation of the interaction coefficient of 0.994 indicates (Heck et al. 2013: 174). For a country such as Turkey, where the age mean is 37.28 years and the standard deviation is 15.63 years, women at the age of 53 should be 0.6 percent less likely to support the EU than women at the age of 37. For women in Germany, where the age average lies at 47.72 years and the standard deviation is 18.04 years, the same difference occurs between women of 48 and 66 years of age (for national age averages see Figure 9 in Chapter 5).

Figure 21 below illustrates the interaction of age and sex for people who are 25 years below age average, exactly at the age average and 35 years above the national age average. These deviations from the mean have been chosen to simulate the age groups of those below 25, between 25 and 54 and above 55 to capture the effects expected in Chapters 2 and 3. Figure 21 shows that the gender gap tends to be smaller among young people, with -3.7 percentage points, than among the elderly where it lies at 5.3 percentage points. The equal probabilities for men and women at the age average are due to the fact that age, as well as education, had to be centered with the national averages in order to account for the continuous character of these variables (Peugh 2010; see also Chapter 4). The comparisons of the probability values of the younger and older age cohorts with people of average age moreover show that the EU evaluations of men (-2.5 and +3.5 percentage points respectively) are stronger affected by age than the evaluations of women (+1.2 and -1.8 percentage points respectively).



FIGURE 21 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS

In sum, the interaction of age and sex point toward the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap because the gender differences in EU evaluations diverge with growing age: men become increasingly supportive of the EU, whereas women become more and more skeptical. With growing age, the material differences of men and women tend to increase due to diverging responsibilities in

households and an unequal participation in the labor market (for details see Chapters 2 and 3). If the gender gap was rooted in gender-specific socialization, a relatively stable gender gap across age groups would have been plausible.

Occupation constitutes the second crucial indicator whose interaction with respondent's sex can help to identify the roots of the EU gender gap. As expected, occupation interacts significantly with respondent's sex. Men in management positions, the so-called "white collars"[61], are more likely to support EU membership than men who are not active in the labor market (coefficient 0.396***). Furthermore, male white collars are more likely to embrace integration than their female colleagues (interaction coefficient -0.053**). The comparison of blue collars with people who are not active in the labor market does not lead to significant variations in the gender gap, as the significance value of 0.609 for the interaction of the blue collar category with respondent's sex shows. An alternative regression analysis, where the blue collar category served as reference category showed that there is no significant difference between the interactions of white collar workers and of blue collar workers with respondent's sex.[62] This is a crucial observation: the absence of significant differences of blue and white collar occupations in regards to the EU gender gap contrasts with the impression which the descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 produced. Moreover, it supports the previous observation for the influence of age by corroborating the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap.

Figure 22 below illustrates the interaction of occupational status and sex. Even if the difference between blue and white collars was significant, there is only a slight difference between the gender gaps the two groups with values of 0.4 percentage points and 1.3 percentage points respectively. If socialization stood behind the gender gap, a wider gender gap for the high occupational positions would be plausible, as male white collars would embrace integration for its economic benefits, whereas female white collars would remain more skeptical due to their concerns about the effects of integration on weaker, i.e. economically more vulnerable parts of society.

[61] For the occupations which are included in the white and blue collar categories see footnote 48.

[62] The results of the regressions that use blue collar as reference category are identical with the parameters of Model 1, except from the coefficients for occupational categories and their interaction with sex. Therefore, the coefficient table is not displayed separately. The coefficient for white collar occupation in the second regression analysis is 0.427***, its interaction coefficient -0.038. The coefficient for people who are not active in the labor market is 0.031, its interaction with respondent's sex 0.015.



FIGURE 22 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONS

Other individual characteristics, which do not play a key role for the theoretical framework but which have been found significant for the gender gap in EU support, are relationship status, education and self-placement in the political left-right spectrum:

Firstly, people who live alone are found to be less likely supporters of EU membership than people who live with a partner (single coefficient -0.043**). This pattern is stronger among women than among men (interaction coefficient of being female with being single -0.034**, exponentiation 0.967). The interaction of relationship status and respondent's sex has not been established as a key indicator for the explanations of the gender gap in EU support because studies on the link between marriage and public opinion suggest that either material considerations (Manza/Brooks 1998) or non-material effects of marriage, such as the perception and expression of personal preferences (Campbell 2006, Gidengil et al. 2005), may stand behind this interaction (see literature review for details).

Secondly, education increases the likelihood that men support EU membership (coefficient of education 0.058***). For women, this trend is less pronounced, with a lower probability of women to think that EU membership is a good thing the longer they have participated in full-time education (interaction coefficient -0.012**). With increasing the length of full-time education by one standard deviation, the probability that men will support EU membership rises by 6 percent. Among women, the probability decreases by 1.2 percent. Comparing these two figures also shows that the evaluation by men is stronger affected by education than the evaluation by women.

Thirdly, support for the center of the political spectrum compared to support for the political left significantly affects the gender gap in EU support. Table 2 shows that people who place themselves in the political center are more likely supporters of European integration than people at the left (coefficients for position 6 in the political spectrum 0.430***, for position 5 0.304***). Similar to the

findings for age, occupation and education, ideological predispositions affect the likelihood of EU support for men stronger than for women (interaction coefficients for position 6 -0.107**, for position 5 -0.099**). The stronger support for European integration toward the right side of the political spectrum is counterintuitive at the first sight as most socialdemocratic parties in Europe support European integration. However, the present analysis looks at the EU-27 and five candidate countries at the same time so that the left-right spectrum is not attached to similar policy positions in all countries (Marks/Wilson 2000, Raunio 2007; see discussion in Chapter 2).

With the regression coefficients of Model 1, different constellations of individual characteristics and country conditions can be simulated. Comparing men and women who live under similar conditions is illustrative for the links between age, occupation and the EU gender gap. The following simulations assume that they live with partners, that they have enjoyed an average full-time education, work in blue collar positions, and that they place themselves in the center of the political spectrum. The results differ thereby from the earlier simulations in this chapter by modeling men and women which resemble more the average person on the street, especially in terms of ideological predispositions. The likelihood of men and women to support EU membership has been modeled once conservative welfare states, and once for socialdemocratic settings. The outcomes are listed in Table 3 below. Figure 23 illustrates the support patterns. Both in conservative and socialdemocratic welfare regimes, the gender gaps grow with older age. However, in conservative welfare regimes, young women are clearly more in favor of the EU than men of their age. In socialdemocratic regimes, this is not the case.

	Socialdemocratic welfare tradition	**Conservative welfare tradition**
Young age (25 years below average)	5.0	-3.3
Middle age (at age average)	8.7	0.4
Older age (35 years above age average)	13.9	5.5

TABLE 3 SIZE OF THE EU GENDER GAP FOR INHABITANTS OF SOCIALDEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATES ACROSS AGE GROUPS



FIGURE 23 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN IN SOCIALDEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATES ACROSS AGE GROUPS

Moreover, Figure 23 shows that the increase of the EU gender gap with older age is more pronounced in socialdemocratic environments than in conservative settings. This observation might not immediately appear plausible: according to the differences between the two welfare traditions, material gender disparities across the course of life are less pronounced in the Scandinavian countries, as welfare states there are more supportive to gender equality in the job market (see Chapter 8 on Sweden for details). Conservative regimes encourage the one-male-breadwinner model for families and thereby tend to foster material differences because women and especially mothers work less full-time and depend financially stronger on their partners (see Chapter 8 on Germany for details). Instead of age exerting a stronger influence on the conservative gender gap, it is stronger for the socialdemocratic gender gap though.

The observed differences in the simulations are more plausible if the fear of losing welfare benefits Liebert (1997, 1999) or feelings of economic vulnerability (Nelsen/Guth 2000) are taken into account. Women in Scandinavia may have a stronger feeling than women elsewhere that they would lose from European integration; this fear of loss may grow stronger if women have children and experience the challenges of reconciling work and family. Alternatively, women may feel increasingly secure in socialdemocratic regimes as soon as they have the experience of a supportive welfare state and therefore see gradually less need for their country to be a EU member with growing age.

The gender gap in EU support has also been simulated for people of average age in different occupational positions. The results show that the gender gaps only increase by less than 1

percentage points between blue and white collar groups, which matches with the results for occupation, and supports the utilitarian explanation. Furthermore, the gender gaps are wider in social democratic welfare states than in conservative ones. For blue collars, the gap amounts to 8.7 percentage points for blue collars and to 9.7 for white collars in socialdemocratic settings compared to 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points respectively in conservative settings.

6.1. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical framework has outlined how age and occupation can serve as indicators for the possible roots of the EU gender gap. Their interaction patterns with respondent's sex can point either towards the utilitarian or the socialization-based explanation for the gender gap.

The multilevel analysis of the EU gender gap in this chapter has produced strong evidence for the utilitarian explanation: with growing age, men become more likely to think of EU membership as a good thing. In contrast, women become less likely to share this opinion. This pattern points at the role of material differences which accumulate between men and women over the course of life. If gendered socialization and gendered values were at play, the gender gap among adult people would not change a lot after the age of 15. Secondly, the gender gaps between white and blue collars do not vary significantly. This also points towards the utilitarian roots of the gender gap. If socialization was at the basis of the gender gap, men and women in the lower occupational category, i.e. blue collars, should be equally concerned about EU membership.

Contrary to a claim of Liebert (1999: 210,) that the existence of the EU gender gap contradicts materialist explanations for patterns of public EU support, the present analyses suggest that the gap is the *result* of material cost-benefit evaluations.

As to the country-specific conditions which have been considered in the theoretical framework, only conservative and socialdemocratic welfare regimes have been found to affect the gender gap. The gap is particularly wide in socialdemocratic settings. This observation is in line with findings of Liebert (1997, 1999) and Nelsen and Guth (2000). It also matches well with the utilitarian roots of the gender gap as material differences between men and women are significantly influenced by welfare policies.

The insignificance of the budgetary relations of countries with the EU indicates that the perceived macro-economic burdens or benefits of EU membership do not affect variations in the EU gender gap as could be expected. In other words, men and women do not to consider to different extents whether their country is a net-contributor or a net-beneficiary of the EU budget when asked about their opinion on EU membership. Another indication against the role of macro-economic influences of EU membership on the gender gap derives from the insignificance of the misery index which combines unemployment and inflation levels. The case studies in Chapter 8 will nonetheless test the

influence of macro-economic events such as the economic crisis to verify this impression for country-specific contexts.

The fact that the socioeconomic development of countries, measured as the share of employment in the service sector, turned out to be insignificant suggests that within Europe, different levels of postindustrialization do not affect the EU gender gap. A role of the structural and cultural changes of socioeconomic modernization had been suggested by Inglehart and Norris (2000) for the global gender gap in voting behaviour. The found insignificance may either be due to the different dynamics of the gender gaps in EU support and in voting behaviour or due to relatively small differences in socioeconomic development across European countries from the mid-1990s to 2012.

The strength of Euroskeptic parties at the national level showed no significant effect on the gender gap either. This predictor had been tested based on the assumption that the national discourse should play a role for the gender gap (Liebert 1997, 1999; Zaller 1992) and should be reflected in the strength of these parties. In the light of the given finding, the role of national discourses on European integration cannot be supported for the gender gap in EU support. Although the general discourse on EU membership cannot be equated with feminist discourses on the EU, this finding nonetheless casts a doubt on the proposal of Liebert (1997, 1999), stating that concerns over lower welfare standards may mainly stem from feminist discourses on the EU.

Lastly, the analyses have revealed that the country-specific conditions of EU support have a stronger effect on the EU evaluations of women, whereas men are more affected by almost all individual-level variables. Only relationship status, i.e. living alone or with a partner, has a stronger influence on EU evaluations of women than of men. This hints at possible differences between the genders as to how material interests are generated. Whereas welfare policies are more effective on women, individually varying conditions, such as education and occupation are more relevant for the opinion of men when it comes to European integration.

As a result, the following questions arise: why do utilitarian considerations have such a strong effect on the gender gap in Scandinavian countries although material differences between the genders are less pronounced there? And why is the gender gap in Scandinavia so much bigger than in conservative welfare states? Answering these questions will only be possible with the analysis of national gender gaps and their specific dynamics in relation to the surrounding welfare policies. This will be the aim of Chapter 8.

Furthermore, if welfare policies are so relevant to the size of the gender gap, how does the gap look if not EU membership but social policy-making at the European level is at stake? The findings of

Model 1 should be reflected in analyzing the determinants of the gender gap in support for EU social policies. This will be tested in the following chapter.

7. THE GENDER GAP AND THE EU'S SOCIAL POLICIES

The previous chapter has investigated the macro-and micro-level roots of the gender gap in support for EU membership. It has shown that welfare regimes influence the size of the EU gender gap: in socialdemocratic welfare states the gap is clearly wider than in other welfare settings, whereas in conservative welfare states it is smaller. The material gender disparities in socialdemocratic and conservative welfare regimes constitute the most likely link between welfare states and the EU gender gap, considering that the utilitarian explanation of the gender gap has been corroborated by Model 1.

The further refinement of this link between welfare states and the gender gap may take different shapes (see previous discussions of Liebert 1997, 1999 and Nelsen/Guth 2000) which all relate to the perceived effects of European integration on national social policies. This is plausible considering the great importance of social policies for the national "gender arrangements" (Duncan 2000: 14), especially through their degree of support for gender equality in the labor market (Cannan 1995, Sainsbury 1999, Hancock 1999: 8). This chapter aims at shedding more light on the links between social policy concerns and the EU gender gap.

7.1. EU SOCIAL AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES

Any explanation on the effects of welfare regimes on the gender gap in public EU support requires consideration for the role of the EU in the social policy area. This section shows how the EU's social policies have been primarily designed to encounter the negative side-effects of economic integration. They have developed relatively late, with a focus on labor market conditions and an initially blind eye for other areas such as family policies and protection of women's rights (Watson 2009: 43-64, Montoya 2009, Hemerijck 2013).

The founding treaty of 1957, the Treaty of Rome, set the fundament for the EU's social policies. In its preamble, the Treaty states that the "economic and social progress" of the members states were necessary to overcome the divisions in Europe. In Article 119, the Treaty specifies that each "Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work […]." (now Article 157 TFEU, see European Union 2012b). However, the satisfactory functioning of welfare regimes at the national level allowed gender equality and social policies to remain within the national domain and the Article 119 to be " ignored" for the following two decades (Hoskyns 2004: 219). In addition, diverging national welfare models reaching from the liberal type on the British Isles to the conservative and socialdemocratic regimes on the Continent (Esping-Andersen 1990) hindered the development of a European social model.

Towards the end of the 1970s, pressure to pay more attention towards social policies and gender equality policies grew. The women's rights movement worked as an efficient lobby and created a mentality change in the European institutions, especially in the Commission. The Defrenne ruling of the European Court of Justice enforced the activation of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (Mazey 1998: 137, Hoskyns 2004: 218). Additionally, the general political will towards more integration in the area of social policies grew with the accession processes of Greece, Spain and Portugal and with the establishment of the single market in the 1980s. Fears of social dumping and tax competition from the new Southern member states emerged. Moreover, policy-makers began to worry about the loss of national control over the boundaries of their welfare regimes. As a result, the Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers was signed in 1989 and turned into a legally binding protocol with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It strengthened the Community's competences to fight gender discrimination at the labor market. The European Social Dialogue, established in the Single European Act, produced several directives regulating parental leave (1995), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term employment (1999) (Hemerijck 2013: 299 et seq.).

In terms of Europeanization of domestic policies, the EU legislation met mostly neutral conditions in the member states. Most countries had not developed own gender equality policies yet (Mazey 1998: 131, 134). The increasing awareness for gender of the public and in the European institutions led to the release of several directives on gender equality, all of whom concerned discrimination at the labor market (Hoskyns 2004: 219; Mazey 1998: 140-141). The first directive in 1975 targeted equal pay (75/117/EEC), followed by the Directive on Equal Treatment in "access to employment, vocational training, promotion and working conditions" in 1976 (76/207/EEC, amended in Directive 2002/73/EC). Other directives concerned equal treatment in social security benefits (Directive 79/7/EEC), in occupational social security schemes (Directive 86/378/EEC, amended in Directive 96/97/EC), and in self-employment (Directive 1986/613/EEC, amended in Directive 2010/41/EU). The 1986 Directive on social security schemes also covered the protection of self-employed pregnant women and mothers. In 1992, a directive on the "protection of pregnant women from exposure to hazardous substances in the workplace and on rights to maternity leave" was released. The burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex was subject to a directive from 1997 (97/80/EC). In 2006, the directive on equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation subsumed the existing texts under one roof (2006/54/EC).

In terms of parental leave, a central issue for gender equality at the job market and the reconciliation of family and work, the 1992 Directive on maternity leave is still in place. The directive foresees a minimum of 14 weeks of maternity leave. Paternity leave is not foreseen in the current legislation and national legislation is free to set the rate of allowance (European Parliament 2014a). In 2008, the Commission proposed to a revision of the 1992 directive and to "set the maternity leave period

at 18 weeks with at least 6 weeks compulsory leave after confinement and an allowance amounting to full salary. The Parliament proposed prolonging the maternity leave period to 20 weeks and added 2 weeks of paternity leave under the same conditions as maternity leave." (ibid: 2) However, an agreement with the Council on new rules for parental leave could not be achieved so that the Commission withdrew its proposal in July 2015 (European Commission 2015).

In the 2000s, the European institutions began to acknowledge the need for gender equality legislation also outside of "salaried work" (2010/41/EU, see point 1; also Directive 2004/113/EC point 6). To this end, former directives were reviewed and extended. The directive on the equal treatment between men and women in access to and the supply of goods and services (2004/113/EC) outside the labor market was released in 2004.

In terms of primary legislation, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 added that to "eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women" were a fundamental principle of the EU. The Treaty introduced gender mainstreaming, a measure which aims at "the integration of a gender dimension into other EC economic and structural policies on the grounds that equal opportunities (just like environmental policy) are no longer a marginal question, but central to all aspects of EC policy-making." (Mazey 1998: 149) Furthermore, the Treaty facilitated political action by introducing qualified majority voting and the co-decision procedure for acts on gender equality. It permitted member states to preserve their legislation on positive discrimination (Pollack/Hafner-Burton 2000: 437).

In 2000, the Council of Nice declared the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This Charter became legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and it lists the promotion of gender equality (Article 3(3) TEU), together with the obligation to eliminate inequalities between men and women (Article 8 TEU), as tasks of the EU (European Commission 07 March 2013; European Union 2012a).

In sum, labor market regulations, the free movement of workers, health and safety in the workplace were the issues that were originally on the social agenda of the European Communities. Since the early 1990s, the European Union has gained noteworthy competences in the area of social policies and issued directives on gender equality in the labor market (Watson 2009, Mazey 1998). In the 2000s, the EU began to promote gender equality outside of the labor market .[63]

[63] In terms of theorizing on the development of EU gender equality policies, the main theories on European integration emphasize different actors and conditions. Intergovernmentalists for instance stress the importance of the Nordic governments who possess relatively high gender equality standards. Supranationalists emphasize the role of the European Commission. Historical institutionalists underline the role of incremental change and path dependencies (Bache et al. 2011: 52).

7.2. THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES AND EVALUATIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP

As a first step, the relatedness of EU social policy and EU membership should be tested. The statistical association of EU membership support and of support for social policy-making at the European level in the Eurobarometer surveys is relatively low. Cramer's V which is a appropriate measure for this set of questions (Sweet/Grace-Martin 2008: 100 et seq.) shows that for men and for women, the questions of EU membership and social policies are not closely correlated (see Table 24 in the appendix). The crosstabulation of the EU membership question and the social policy question in Table 25 in the appendix points into the same direction: people who do not support EU membership still support joint social policy-making at the European level to 30 percent. On the other side, supporters of European membership reject joint decision-making in social policies to more than 60 percent. The differences between men and women who support EU membership amount to two percentage points if all countries (except from Montenegro and Iceland)[64] and the four surveys between 2007 and 2010 are taken into account.

The low statistical association and the low congruency between support for EU membership and for European social policy-making suggests that for the material cost-benefit considerations which shape the gender gap in EU membership support (see Chapter 6), social policies are not of central importance. Using the social policy question as a predictor of EU membership support by adding it to Model 1 supports this impression: although support for European social policy-making is highly significant for the EU gender gap, the interactions of socialdemocratic welfare regimes and of age with respondent's sex continue to determine EU membership support.[65] In other words, social policies play some role for the gender gap in EU membership support but they do not account fully for it. This qualifies the arguments presented by Liebert (1997, 1999) and Nelsen and Guth (2000) on the role of welfare benefits for the cross-country variations of the EU gender gap. The inclusion of support for social policy-making at the EU level into Model 1 furthermore shows that men are more influenced by their social policy concerns than women in their evaluations of EU membership. This is noteworthy considering that the arguments of Liebert (1997, 1999) and Nelsen and Guth (2000) all focus on the effects of social policies on the attitudes of women.

[64] Montenegro and Iceland are not included in Model 2 due to their absence from Eurobarometer surveys which asked the social policy question.

[65] The variable CPsoc2 which is the dependent variable of Model 2 has been included into Model 1 as a predictor. It has a coefficient of 0.535***, i.e. people who prefer decision-making at the European level are more likely to support EU membership. The interaction of CPsoc2 with respondent's sex has a coefficient of -0.137***, i.e. the described pattern is similar for women but less pronounced than for men. Among the other significant interactions which have been identified in Model 1 only those of socialdemocratic welfare regimes and of age with respondent's sex remain significant.

Lastly, inferential statistics reveal that there is indeed a significant gender gap in support for EU policy-making in social policies. If determinants of this gender gap resemble those of Model 1, this would indicate that gender differences in social policies preferences are driven by the same determinants as the EU gender gap.

7.3. THE GENDER GAP IN SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EU LEVEL

The following analyses (Model 2) of the gender gap in support for social policy-making at the EU level aim to see whether the dynamics of the EU gender gap apply to the social policy area, too. Chapter 5 has demonstrated that the gender gap in support for this specific policy area is lower than gap in support for EU membership, with values between 1.4 and 2 percentage points between 2007 and 2011. The outcomes will shed light on whether there is a significant gender gap if other influences on public support are controlled for, and on the role of social policy concerns for the cross-country variation of the EU gender gap. Moreover, the individual-level explanations for the EU gender gap will be tested for the social policy context.

Model 2 uses the Eurobarometer question whether social policy decisions should be made by the national government or jointly within the EU as dependent variable. Between 2007 and 2010, the Eurobarometer question on the prefered level of social policy-making has been asked once a year. The coding of the variables in Model 2 is listed in Table 26 in the appendix. [66]

The covariance parameters show that while support for social policy decision-making at the European level varies significantly across countries (0.173***), this is not the case for respondent's sex (0.002): although there are statistically significant differences in public opinion across the countries in the sample, the gender gap in social policy support, which has been shown in Chapter 5 to vary between 0.5 and 1.75 percentage points between 2007 and 2010, is statistically seen similar for the 30 countries included in the analysis. Respondent's sex does not vary significantly across countries. Therefore, other macro-level conditions than the socialdemocratic and the conservative welfare types have not been included in the model.

Table 4 lists the regression parameters of Model 2.

[66] The regression equation can be formulated as $g(CPsoc_{ij}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(soc_j) + \gamma_{02}(con_j) + \gamma_{10}*sex_i + \gamma_{11}(soc_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{12}(con_j)*sex_i + \gamma_{13}(cage_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{14}(cedu_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{15}(occ2_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{16}(polspec_i)*sex_i + \gamma_{17}(exECO_i)*sex_i + u_{1j}*sex_i + \beta_{2j}\,cage_i + \beta_{3j}\,cedu_i + \beta_{4j}\,occ2_i + \beta_{5j}\,polspec_i + \beta_{6j}\,exECO_i + u_{0j.}$ Model 2 is based on 66136 observations. That 85.5 percent of all observations in the dataset are missing is due to the fact that the question on social policies has only been asked once a year between 2007 and 2010. Furthermore, Montenegro and Iceland have not been covered by these questions, so that the results refer to 30 countries (EU-27, Croatia, Turkey and Macedonia). The model predicts correctly 95.2 percent of cases in which the answer was that the national government should make decisions on social policy. For the alternative answer category, stating that decisions should be made jointly within the EU, predictions were correct to 12.4 percent. Overall, the model predicted 68.3 percent of all cases correctly.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponen-tiation of coefficient
Intercept	-0.249	0.008	0.779
Socialdemocratic welfare state	-1.575	0.000	0.207
Conservative welfare state	-0.625	0.000	0.535
Respondent's sex (female)	-0.219	0.005	0.803
Age (centered around national mean)	-0.003	0.054	0.997
Age when full-time education was terminated (centered around national mean)	0.015	0.000	1.016
Occupation (white collar)	0.031	0.483	1.032
Occupation (blue collar)	-0.026	0.549	0.974
Self-placement in political spectrum (10 out of 10, i.e. right margin)	0.028	0.772	1.028
Self-placement in political spectrum (9 out of 10)	-0.067	0.558	0.935
Self-placement in political spectrum (8 out of 10)	-0.084	0.388	0.920
Self-placement in political spectrum (7 out of 10)	-0.049	0.639	0.952
Self-placement in political spectrum (6 out of 10)	-0.002	0.976	0.998
Self-placement in political spectrum (5 out of 10)	-0.013	0.856	0.987
Self-placement in political spectrum (4 out of 10)	-0.002	0.983	0.998
Self-placement in political spectrum (3 out of 10)	-0.007	0.930	0.993
Self-placement in political spectrum (2 out of 10)	0.007	0.939	1.008
Macro-economic expectations (worse)	-0.202	0.000	0.817
Macro-economic expectations (same)	-0.093	0.003	0.911
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
Women in socialdemocratic welfare regimes	-0.183	0.000	0.833
Women in conservative welfare regimes	-0.064	0.090	0.938
Women with growing age	-0.004	0.007	0.996
Women with longer full-time education	-0.007	0.155	0.993
Women in white collar positions	-0.024	0.671	0.977
Women in blue collar positions	-0.001	0.989	0.999
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (10 out of 10, i.e. right margin)	0.131	0.178	1.140
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (9 out of 10)	0.09	0.474	1.095
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (8 out of 10)	0.143	0.110	1.153
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (7 out of 10)	0.162	0.145	1.176
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (6 out of 10)	0.053	0.504	1.055
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (5 out of 10)	0.096	0.214	1.101
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (4 out of 10)	0.069	0.415	1.071
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (3 out of 10)	0.198	0.012	1.219
Women's self-placement in political spectrum (2 out of 10)	0.144	0.319	1.155
Women with negative macro-economic expectations	0.036	0.328	1.037
Women with stable macro-economic expectations	0.081	0.028	1.084

TABLE 4 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 2[67]

[67] Calculated with the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS. Reference is "national government". Categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

The influence of socialdemocratic and conservative welfare regimes on the gender gap has been tested, as both play an important role for the gender gap in EU membership support. Only socialdemocratic regimes influence the gender gap in social policy support though. The pattern is similar to the one in Model 1: both men and women in socialdemocratic welfare states are less likely to support decision-making at the European level, with slightly lesser support among women than among men. Figure 24 below simulates the probability of support for social policies at the national or European level for people in socialdemocratic and other welfare states, assuming that these people are of average age and education, that they work as blue collars, that place themselves in the center of the political spectrum (position 5 out of 10) and that they have stable expectations for the national economy. The strong support in Scandinavian countries for national social policy making is evident from this figure. Compared to Figure 20 in Chapter 6 on the gender differences in EU membership support across welfare states, the 'social policy gender gap' is with 0.1 percentage points of minimum size: both men and women in socialdemocratic countries are strong opponents of EU social policies. In other words, whereas men and women in Scandinavia agree less about EU membership, they usually share their negative opinion on EU social policy-making.



FIGURE 24 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL ACROSS WELFARE REGIMES IN THE EU-27 AND ITS CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

As to individual-level predictors of the gender gap, both men and women become less likely to support social policies at the European level with older age. This distinguishes the gender gap dynamics for the social policy area from the dynamics in EU membership support, where only women have been found to become less supportive of the EU with older age.

The simulation in Figure 25 below presents the dynamics of age and respondent's sex for workers who live in socialdemocratic welfare states, who place themselves in the centre of the political

spectrum (position 5) and who have average education and stable macro-economic expectations. The figure shows that the gender gap grows across age groups, with a reversed gap of 1.1 percentage points for young people and 1.4 percentage points for elderly. The pattern corroborates the idea that utilitarian reasons stand behind the gender gap especially with a view to the strong decrease of support among women across the course of life. As discussed in length in the previous chapters, a stable gender gap across age groups would have pointed toward the role of gendered socialization for the gender gap.



FIGURE 25 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS

Occupation, which constitutes the second key indicator in the theoretical framework, is not significant for the gender gap in support for European social policies. Furthermore, education and relationship status, which affect the 'membership gap' (Chapter 6), are not relevant for the 'social policy gap' either.

Instead, self-placement in the political left-right spectrum plays a role if people at the spectrum's moderate left side (position 3 out of 10) are compared to people at the very left margin (position 1). The reasons are not evident from the literature on EU support or on voting behaviour and gender, but the coefficients in Table 4 as well as Figure 26 below show that with a move from the extreme left towards the moderate left, men become slightly less likely to support European social policies, whereas women become more supportive. As discussed in the literature review and for Model 1 (Chapters 2 and 6), the change of party positions on European integration over the last decades and the variety of national party systems may account for the counterintuitive distribution of EU support between the left and the right side of the spectrum. To explain the variance of the gender gap between the moderate and extreme left would require additional research which looks into specific national party systems and their influence on the EU gender gap in these countries.



FIGURE 26 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGICAL PREDISPOSITIONS

Lastly, macro-economic expectations influence the gender gap in support for European social policies. Compared to people with positive expectations, men and women with stable outlooks are less likely to support European-level decision-making. This pattern is less pronounced for women than for men but Figure 27 shows how small the differences of the gender gaps according to different expectations are. Whereas the gap for those with positive expectations measures one percentage point, the gap decreases to 0.1 percentage points for people with stable expectations. The comparison between optimists and pessimists is not even statistically significant. This supports the utilitarian explanation of the gender gap: men and women similarly link their economic outlook to their preferences about integration in the social policy area.



FIGURE 27 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS

7.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

The insights from Model 2 are interesting in several regards. Firstly, as in the case of the gender gap in support for EU membership, Model 2 has produced additional evidence that evaluations of European integration, in this case in the social policy area, are driven by utilitarian considerations. In Model 2, the interactions of age and also of macro-economic expectations with respondent's sex point into this direction.

Secondly, the low association between the EU membership question and the question on social policy-making suggests that these two areas are not closely related to each other. The observations that a) support for EU membership is not congruent with support for social policy-making at the EU level and b) that control for EU social policy attitudes only accounts for a part of the gender gap in evaluations of EU membership support this view. Social policy concerns are relevant to the EU gender gap, but they alone cannot explain it.

Surprisingly, the inclusion of the social policy question into the analysis of the gender gap in EU membership support has shown that the EU membership evaluations of men are stronger influenced by their opinion on EU social policies than the respective evaluations of women. This contrasts with the emphasis which Liebert (1997, 1999) and Nelsen and Guth (2000) place on the link between social policies and women's EU attitudes. Liebert for example argues that the EU evaluations of women depend on feminist discourses on European integration, but she leaves open why men should not be influenced by these discourses, too. Theoretically, and as this chapter has shown also practically, men could base their EU opinion on the perceived effects of Europeanization on national welfare policies, too.

The weak links between attitudes on EU membership and on EU social policies and the different dynamics behind the gender gaps in these two areas have also implications for arguments on the cross-country variation of the EU gender gap. Liebert (1997, 1999) and Nelsen and Guth (2000) argue that welfare state generosity leads to the large Scandinavian gender gaps. These arguments are plausible, considering that a) socialdemocratic welfare states display large gender gaps in EU support (see Chapter 5), b) that Models 1 and 2 both support the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap and c) that both gender gaps, in EU membership support and in support for social policy-making at the EU level, are significantly shaped by socialdemocratic welfare environments (see this chapter and Chapter 6). However, the findings in this chapter suggest that not only social policy concerns determine the size of EU gender gaps at the European level. The questions which additional forces may drive this cross-country variation, and whether Liebert's (1997, 1999) or Nelsen and Guth's (2000) mechanism for the influence of welfare states on the EU gender gap is the more viable one, are the key questions of the following chapter.

8. From Scandinavia to the Mediterranean: the gender gaps of Sweden, Germany and Turkey

The two previous chapters have analyzed the gender gap in support for European integration in the EU-27 and the five candidate countries Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. With regards to the theoretical questions which drive this study, the evidence so far suggests that utilitarian considerations are a more powerful determinant of the gender gap than socialization into gender roles during childhood. At the national level, welfare state tradition shapes the EU gender gap.

A look back at the descriptive Chapter 5 reminds us that the gender gap varies strongly across the EU member states and candidate countries. As Figure 18 in Chapter 5 illustrates, the gender gap is relatively large in some countries with more than 10 percentage points of difference in EU support among men and women, whereas it is relatively small in other countries. In some states, the gap has decreased over time, whereas in others is has increased. More importantly with regards to the existing literature on the EU gender gap is the observation that not only socialdemocratic welfare regimes display wide gender gaps but also Mediterranean and Post-communist countries. Lastly, Turkey is the only country with a steady trend towards greater support for EU membership among women than among men. This has led to the reversal of Turkey's EU gender gap since 2009.

To explain these geographical and temporal patterns of the gender gap, as well as the mechanisms which link welfare state traditions to the EU gender gap, in-depth country-specific analyses of the EU gender gap are necessary. Sweden, Germany and Turkey have been selected for the case studies for a number of reasons.

Firstly, Chapter 6 has demonstrated that socialdemocratic and conservative welfare states have significant and contrasting effects on the gender gap in EU membership support. Sweden and Germany are exemplary cases for their respective welfare traditions, with Sweden embodying a typical socialdemocratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990, Wells/Bergnehr 2014), and Germany constituting a "prime example" (Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 138) of a conservative welfare state.

Secondly, mapping the average sizes of the EU gender gap in Chapter 5 showed that Sweden is one of the countries with the greatest gaps in the EU-27, with a gap of 14.1 percentage points for the time period from 1995 to 2012. Germany has a comparatively small gap of 4.7 percentage points. In

Turkey, the average gap is even smaller with 4.1 percentage points for the time period between 2004 and 2011.[68]

The large gender gaps in Scandinavian countries have been interpreted with a view to the socialdemocratic welfare regime. The latter is more supportive of gender equality in family and working life than other welfare regimes, as will be shown in more detail in the discussion of the three cases. Particularly women in Scandinavia seem to be aware that their national welfare policies have created gender equality standards above the European average, so that they are especially skeptical of European integration and its effects (Nelsen/Guth 2000: 275, 276, also Liebert 1997, 1999). However, Nelsen and Guth (2000: 283) whose study represents the only large-N study on the EU gender gap so far do not find evidence for this link. There are also other reasons to doubt the gender equality explanation for the variety in gap sizes: gender equality is a benefit to both genders. Swedish policies grant men above-average possibilities for more freedom in the family-work balance, as will be shown below. Why then should women consider welfare policies to a greater extent? Chapter 7 has shown that men are more influenced in their EU evaluations by their social policy attitudes than women. Lastly, the mixed presence of different welfare regimes in the gender gap ranking in Chapter 5 does not fit well with the gender equality explanation. The national EU gender gaps have to be investigated to shed light on this issue.

Thirdly, Sweden, Germany and Turkey diverge in terms of the gender gap development across time as Figure 28 below illustrates. In Germany, the EU gender gap has slightly increased between 1995 and 2012. The smallest gender gap has been documented for the year 1995 with a value of only 0.25 percentage points, i.e. men in Germany in that year responded positively to the EU membership question to 0.25 percentage points more often than women. The broadest gap occurred in 2006 with 7 percentage points. In Sweden and Turkey, the gender gap has overall decreased in the time period under investigation, with values between 6 and 12 percentage points for Sweden and values between 14 and -5 percentage points in Turkey. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the gender gap in Turkey is special insofar as it is the only gap which has reversed since 2009. Why this is the case and which determinants stand behind the individual gender gaps in Sweden, Germany and Turkey, is subject of the following analyses.

[68] In Sweden, 19817 people who indicated their sex have responded to the EU membership question between 1995 and 2012. Among the respondents were 9978 men and 9839 women. In Germany, the number of survey participants is higher with 33592 because Eurobarometer used separate samples for West and East Germany. Among the German respondents there were 16502 men and 17090 women. In Turkey, 8202 people—4241 men and 3961 women—answered the EU membership question between 2004 and 2011. In 2012, this question has not been asked by Eurobarometer in Turkey or in any of the other EU candidate countries.



FIGURE 28 THE EU GENDER GAPS IN SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY

The construction of the country-specific models started with regressions of the variables of Model 1 developed in Chapter 6 on EU membership support in Sweden, Germany and Turkey individually.[69]

The results, listed in Table 27 in the appendix, revealed that the explanatory power of Model 1 varies strongly for the countries in the dataset. The model cannot explain the gender gap in support for EU membership in Germany and in countries such as France, Estonia, Malta and Poland. In these countries, none of the determinants enter a significant interaction with respondent's sex. Furthermore, Model 1 works to different degrees for other countries, including Sweden and Turkey. In Sweden, age, education and the share of jobs in the national service sector interact significantly with respondent's sex at the 0.05 level of significance or higher. Turkey constitutes a case in-between Sweden and Germany, with two of the variables (age and share of jobs in the national service sector) interacting significantly with respondent's sex at a 0.05 and 0.01 level. Table 28 in the appendix displays the regression parameters of applying Model 1 to the Swedish, German, and Turkish samples.

Country-specific analyses of the Swedish, German and Turkish cases are more appropriate to explain the three gender gaps. In the construction of the country-specific models, the potential determinants

[69] For these regressions, binary logistic regression has been applied as the multilevel character of the data as in Chapter 6 was not given anymore when looking at the countries separately. Those macro-level variables which do not vary strongly across time, namely welfare state tradition, budgetary relation with the EU and dominant religion, have not been considered for the logistic regressions.

which have been identified in the literature review (Chapter 2) have been tested for each country separately.[70]

8.1. SWEDEN: A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE UTILITY-BASED GENDER GAP

With 9.5 million inhabitants, Sweden is the country among the three cases with the smallest population. The country's socialdemocratic welfare state is characterized by tax-financed, universal benefits. It aims at fostering equality among citizens in terms of their protection from market dependency (Svallfors 2011: 808, 809; Wells/Bergnehr 2014: 91 - 93). As a result, Sweden's wage gap belongs to the smallest worldwide and Swedish women and men participate to almost in equal rates in the labor market and (Wells/Bergnehr 2014: 95). The UNDP Gender Equality Index 2014 ranks Sweden at position 12 out of 187 countries in the world. The index reports a participation of 60.2 percent of women in the labor market, compared to 68.1 percent of men (UNDP 2014).

Since Sweden experienced drastic poverty and a resulting population decline in the 19th century, its family policies have ever since encouraged women to participate in the labor market and to have children at the same time. For decades, the Swedish state has provided free school meals, a generous child allowance, paid maternity leave, a parental leave program and high-quality, guaranteed and subsidized child-care for children older than one year (ibid: 93, 97). Over time, the state increased the generosity and flexibility of its support to families. Moreover, it added on top incentives for fathers to participate stronger in family life and to take over child-care activities (ibid: 96-97; also Ray et al. 2010: 202, Korpi et al. 2013: 9). Swedish parents are entitled to 47 weeks of paid parental leave, with a maximum of 40 weeks available to fathers. Thereby, Sweden's parental leave policy is one of the most generous policies in the world (Ray et al. 2010: 203). Besides these tax-financed policies, the business culture in Sweden is supportive of mothers and fathers who both work and are in charge of family responsibilities (ibid: 96). Part-time work is considered as a "bridge" for mothers to stay involved in the labor market during the early phase of child-rearing until they return to their full employment (Stier et al. 2001: 1737). Unlike in other countries, policies for a reconciliation of work and family have not led to disadvantages for women in terms of earnings or career advancements in Sweden (Korpi et al. 2013: 28).

[70] The influence of country-specific variables which vary across country-years, i.e. the share of jobs in the service sector as an indicator of modernization, and the economic situation measured with the misery index, have been evaluated by applying a multilevel model using the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS. For this purpose, the first data level consisted of the individual observations. The years of the Eurobarometer surveys were used as second level units. For Germany, the GENLINMIXED procedure proved a significant variation of EU membership support across years. Consequently, a multilevel model was adopted for the country-specific model. For Sweden and Turkey, a one-level binomial logistic regression and the exclusion of the country-specific variables were chosen as the more appropriate solution as EU membership support did not vary significantly across years.

Nonetheless, complete gender equality in terms of life-work balance has not been achieved in Sweden: children of separated or divorced parents live to two thirds with their mother "as the primary carer and sole breadwinner" (Wells/ Bergnehr 2014: 102). Women spend ca. 45 minutes per day more than men with household activities (ibid: 96). Only 23 percent of fathers in Sweden take their paid parental leave of maximum 40 weeks, and even fewer decrease their working hours as the law allows them to do if they have preschool children (ibid: 97; Ray et al. 2010: 204).

Sweden joined the European Union in 1995. Its membership application was mainly motivated by the country's economic difficulties in the early 1990s. Public opinion in Sweden has traditionally been relatively skeptical of EU membership and European integration. The main reservations of Swedes concern the potential effects of European policy-making on their welfare state policies and on the neutrality of Sweden in international politics (Miles 2011: 304-305). Furthermore, supranational decision-making is conceived by many Swedes as a threat to their core national interests, e.g. in the area of monetary policy (ibid: 308, 311). As a result, only a narrow majority of 52.5 percent supported the EU accession in the 1995 referendum. Although public support for EU membership has increased over the years as Figure 29 below shows, and Sweden's EU policy has become more pro-active after accession, the country continues to be critical of supranational decision-making in some policy areas and has decided not to join the monetary union (ibid: 304, 321 et seq).



FIGURE 29 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN SWEDEN

For the Swedish gender gap in EU support, a binary logistic regression has been conducted in Model 3.1. The data stem from 18 Eurobarometer surveys, from 1995 to 2012.[71] Data for 1996 is not included in the model because the question on macro-economic expectations has not been asked in

[71] For the specifications of the following models, see the last section of Chapter 4.

1996.[72] The determinants of the gender gap in Sweden have been identified as age, length of full-time education, self-placement in the political spectrum and expectations for the national economy for the coming twelve months. The coding of all variables of Model 3.1 is listed in Table 29 in the appendix.

Table 5 below displays the regression parameters for Sweden.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
Respondent's sex (female)	.328	.185	1.388
Age	.016	.000	1.016
Length of full-time education	.046	.000	1.048
Occupation		.000	
Blue collar	-.163	.032	.850
White collar	.434	.000	1.543
Self-placement in political left-right spectrum (10 point scale)	.247	.000	1.280
Macro-economic expectations		.000	
Macro-economic expectations (better)	.369	.000	1.447
Macro-economic expectations (same)	.097	.120	1.102
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
Women with growing age	-.007	.008	.993
Women with longer full-time education	-.022	.000	.978
Respondent's sex (female) by occupation		.347	
Women in blue collar positions	-.078	.467	.925
Women in white collar positions	.053	.592	1.055
Women's self-placement in the political left-right spectrum	-.031	.070	.970
Respondent's sex (female) by macro-economic expectations		.076	
Women with positive macro-economic expectations	.211	.025	1.235
Women with stable macro-economic expectations	.146	.102	1.157
Constant	-3.256	.000	.039

TABLE 5 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 3.1 (SWEDEN)[73]

[72] Model 3.1 covers 73.6 percent (N=14967) of all observations for Sweden in the dataset. If the independent variables are not included in the model, 52.3 percent of all cases are predicted correctly. With the dependent variables, this figure rises to 65.6 percent. The significance of the chi-square statistic (0.000) suggests that there is a relationship between the dependent and the set of independent variables in this model. The pseudo-R-square measures are 0.123 (Cox&Snell) and 0.164 (Nagelkerke). The insignificant result of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (0.113) supports that the model possesses an acceptable goodness of fit.

[73] Calculated in SPSS with the LOGIT procedure. Reference category of the dependent variable is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

To begin with the shape of the gender gap, Swedish men are to 96.1 percent more likely to support European integration than women. Among the key variables of the theoretical framework, only age is statistically significant for the gender gap. Occupation has nonetheless been included in the model as it constitutes the second key variable to test the rival explanations for the EU gender gap.

Model 1 showed how age interacts with respondent's sex for the EU overall and how this points towards the utilitarian explanation of the gender gap. A similar pattern can be observed for Sweden: with growing age, the gap between men and women in EU support likelihood increases.



FIGURE 30 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN SWEDEN

Figure 30 simulates the mean predicted probabilities of EU support among men and women across different age groups in Sweden, assuming that these people possess an average full-time education (ending at 22 years of age in the Swedish data sample), are blue collar workers, place themselves at the political mainstream (position 5 in the spectrum) and have stable expectations for the national economy for the coming twelve months. The age groups have been chosen to illustrate the gender gap for people of 20, 35 and 75 years of age. Thereby, the younger age cohort below 25 years of age whose lives should be mainly characterized by education or beginning careers as well as the middle and older age cohorts whose situations are framed by childrearing, established career or the conditions of retirement are represented in the simulations.

As stated, the gender gap grows visibly across age groups, reaching from 11 percentage points for those of 20 years of age to 23.1 percentage points for those of 75 years of age. The coefficients of age (0.016***) and of its interaction with respondent's sex (-0.007**) indicate that while the support for EU membership becomes more likely both for men and for women with growing age, this trend is less pronounced for women. This distinguishes Sweden from the general patterns of Model 1 (Chapter 6): in the EU-27 and its candidate countries, women become more skeptical of the EU with growing age. In Sweden women become more supportive of the EU with age but to a lesser extent than men.

This growing gap across age groups suggests that utilitarian considerations are at play in Sweden as in the rest of the EU. As discussed repeatedly in the previous chapters, a stable gender gap across age would suggest that gendered socialization during childhood stands behind the gap.

The growing gender gap due to a weaker increase of EU support of women than of men with age matches with the influence of the socialdemocratic welfare regime on support for European integration. As discussed above, Swedish family policies actively encourage men and women to participate to similar extents in paid labor as well as in family responsibilities. This leads to relatively small material differences between the genders which accumulate across the life course and may explain why women in Sweden are more reserved toward integration than men the older they are. With the experience of a supportive national welfare state, working mothers may be particularly concerned about the negative influence that the relatively low EU gender equality standards in terms of parental leave policies and similar areas may have on their national social policies.

As to education, the Swedish trend is very similar to the EU-wide trend presented in Model 1. With every year of full-time education, EU membership support among men in Sweden becomes more likely by 4.8 percent. Among women, this pattern is less pronounced but still given (coefficient of education 0.046***, of the interaction with respondent's sex -0.022***). Education affects the EU opinion of women to a lesser extent than their male counterparts: whereas the difference in likelihood of EU support between women who graduate from primary school and women who graduate with a university degree amounts to only 3.6 percentage points, this difference for men approximates 9 percentage points (see Figure 31 below).



FIGURE 31 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FULL-TIME EDUCATION IN SWEDEN

Furthermore, ideological predispositions affect the Swedish gender gap in EU support at the 0.1 level. The more people are positioned towards the right side of the political spectrum, the more

likely they are to support EU membership. This is not surprising, as conservative parties in Sweden are known for their relatively strong support for European integration (Marks/Wilson 2000, see Chapter 2). The gap between men and women in EU support grows the more they approach the right margin of the political spectrum. Whereas male and female supporters of the extreme left of the spectrum differ to 10.5 percentage points in their likelihood to support EU membership, this gap increases strongly for men and women at the extreme right margin with 18 percentage points difference between men and women.

Figure 32 below also shows that this growing gap results from men being particularly influenced by the self-placement in the political left-right spectrum. This had also been found in Model 1 for the EU-27 and the candidate countries. The likelihood of EU support rises by 50.2 percent points for men from the left to the right political margin. For women, this difference amounts to 42.7 percentage points.



FIGURE 32 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO SELF-PLACEMENT IN THE POLITICAL LEFT-RIGHT SPECTRUM IN SWEDEN

Lastly, macro-economic expectations have a strong influence on the EU gender gap in Sweden, and amongst the identified determinants of the Swedish gender gap the strongest impact overall. Unlike the other determinants discussed so far, macro-economic expectations influence the EU attitudes of women stronger than the opinion of men (coefficient of exECO 0.369*** for the comparison between optimistic and pessimistic outlooks; coefficient of interaction of exECO with respondent's sex 0.211**). In other words, negative expectations for the national economy decrease the EU support rate of women stronger than the EU support rate of men. This is illustrated by Figure 33 below.

Following the utilitarian logic behind the gender gap, this suggests that women in Sweden who hold negative macroeconomic expectations are concerned to a greater extent than men that a) their lives

will be negatively affected by the economic situation, and b) that the EU membership is related to these developments. Again, this is plausible with a view to the socialdemocratic welfare regime of Sweden: the Swedish welfare system is mainly financed by taxes. Consequently, the provision of welfare services is, at least on the long run, dependent on the economic situation of the country. Women in Sweden benefit particularly strongly from the welfare system as it puts them into a comparatively advantageous position to combine family life with a professional career and material independency from others.[74] Moreover, the hope of Sweden that its accession to the EU and to the common market would improve the national economy (Miles 2001) also matches with the relation between macro-economic expectations and EU support.



FIGURE 33 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS IN SWEDEN

8.1.2 TEMPORAL DYNAMICS IN SWEDEN

Next to these general dynamics behind the Swedish gender gap in EU support, temporal changes deserve some attention, to account for the possible role of some national-level determinants of the gender gap (see Chapter 3). Although the economic situation measured by the misery index turned out to be irrelevant for the Swedish gender gap, the Eurozone crisis may still have changed the gender gap dynamics as it affected public EU support inside and outside of the Eurozone (Braun/Tausendpfund 2014, Çarkoğlu/Glüpker-Kesebir 2015). Therefore, a comparison of gender gap

[74] The interaction of macro-economic expectations with respondent's sex could alternatively be interpreted as a sign of the sensitivity of women for political consequences for the wider society. This argument corresponds to the socialization-based explanation of the gender gap as presented in Chapter 3. The objection to this perspective stems from the unanimous support for the utilitarian explanation and the importance of welfare regimes demonstrated in the preceding models.

dynamics before and since 2009 is worthwhile not only in Sweden, but also in the other two countries under investigation here.[75]

Moreover, the signature of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007 may have also affected public opinion. The Lisbon Treaty included power shifts in the EU framework, with greater influence of national parliaments. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty advanced European integration, e.g. by introducing the legally binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and a greater role of the European Parliament in the election of the Commission President (Hofmann/Wessels 2008).

The variables used for these Models 3.2 and 3.3 are listed in Table 29 in the appendix.[76] In order to identify the effects of the crisis and of the Lisbon Treaty agreement, three-way interaction terms have been used. Tables 33 and 34 in the appendix display the regression parameters. They show that neither the Eurozone crisis nor the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty affected the dynamics of the gender gap.

8.1.3 SUMMARY

In sum, the regression analyses and simulations of Model 3 have revealed three particular points for the gender gap in Sweden: firstly, the interaction of age with respondent's sex corroborates the utilitarian explanation for the gender gap. As in the EU overall, women in Sweden display increasingly lower EU membership support levels than men with growing age.

Secondly, and unlike in the overall picture for EU member states, macro-economic expectations are influential for the gender gap as they particularly affect the EU membership evaluation of Swedish women. With regards to the EU gender gap's variation at the macro-level, the pattern for Sweden partially supports Liebert's argument (1997, 1999): the gender gap in Sweden is particularly wide because women in these countries are concerned about lowering welfare standards under the influence of the EU. Macro-economic pessimism raises fears that welfare benefits might be cut back. In contrast to the strong focus in the EU gender gap literature on the fears of women, the results of Model 3.1 show that these fears do not only affect women but also men in their evaluations of EU membership.

[75] Sweden also had the EU presidency in the first semester of 2009. That potential changes between 2008 and 2009 in the gender gap dynamics result from the presidency is rather unlikely though, considering existing research on the effect of EU presidencies on public support for European integration (Kaniok 2012).

[76] Models 3.2 and 3.3 cover 73.6 percent of all observations for Sweden in the dataset. If the independent variables are not included in the models, 52.3 percent of all cases are predicted correctly. With the dependent variables, this figure rises to 66 percent for model 3.2. and to 66.3 for model 3.3. The significance of the chi-square statistic (0.000) for both models suggests that there is a relationship between the dependent and the set of independent variables. The pseudo-R-square measures for model 3.2 are 0.132 (Cox&Snell) and 0.176 (Nagelkerke) and 0.137 (Cox&Snell) and 0.183 (Nagelkerke) for model 3.3. The insignificant result of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (0.113) supports that model 3.2 possesses an acceptable goodness of fit whereas for model 4.3. this seems not to be the case (0.010).

At the same time, the role of macro-economic expectations for the EU membership evaluations of men and women in Sweden refutes Nelsen and Guth's (2000) explanation for the cross-country variation of the EU gender gap. They argue that women's EU evaluations in socialdemocratic welfare regimes are not influenced by economic pessimism, a concept which includes macro-economic expectations. Model 3.1 has demonstrated that this is not the case for Sweden.

Lastly, the Swedish gender gap in public opinion has neither been affected by the Treaty of Lisbon nor by the Eurozone crisis. This observation underlines the steady trends of growing EU support and a diminishing gender gap in Sweden which are illustrated in Figures 28 and 29.

8.2 GERMANY: THE MULTIFACETED ROOTS OF THE GENDER GAP

The Federal Republic of Germany was one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community in 1957 and a staunch supporter of European integration from the start. Regaining full sovereignty after World War II, increasing its economic benefits by access to foreign markets and the possibility to "upload" national preferences to the European arena motivated elites and the broader public to adopt a "reflexive multilateralism" which included an unqualified pro-European stance (Paterson 2011: 58-59). This position shaped German EU policies to the 1990s. Only with the economic difficulties resulting from reunification with the German Democratic Republic and the demographic change in Germany, policy-makers and the German public began to focus increasingly on the role of Germany as a net contributor to the European budget and on the costs of EU policies such as the enlargement policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (ibid: 60-62, 67). Figure 34 shows that nonetheless, German support for EU membership has increased overall throughout the 1990s and 2000s. For the observed time span from 1995 to 2012, Germans' enthusiasm for EU membership reached a climax in 2012 with 62 percent of positive answers to Eurobarometer's membership question.



FIGURE 34 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN GERMANY

In terms of welfare policies, Western Germany has traditionally been "considered as the prime exemplar of the conservative welfare regimes" (Fleckenstein 2011: 547). Maternity leave benefits as well as insurances for old age, unemployment and sickness have all been based on occupational status and income (ibid). Until the late 1990s, policies were designed to protect the traditional family, with a male breadwinner and the dependence of women as wives. The taxation system, parental leave schemes, pension schemes, a half-day schooling system and a limited provision of childcare served as incentives for women to leave the labor market as soon as they got married or

had children (ibid: 549, 550; Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 138; Korpi et al. 2013: 8; Stier et al. 2001: 1735). In contrast, the socialist regime of the German Democratic Republic promoted the combination of family and work with mothers working full-time and children attending full-time childcare facilities. Although the West German social system has been extended to the East after reunification in 1990, different attitudes especially to childcare persist, with a stronger acceptance for mothers who work and leave their children to the hands of full day crèches, kindergartens and schools in the East of Germany (Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 138).

The coalition government of the Socialdemocrats (SPD) and the Greens which took office in 1998 after 16 years of Christian democratic rule introduced first reforms to this system (Fleckenstein 2011: 550-551). The low fertility rate in Germany, an aging population and high unemployment rates motivated these changes (Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 138). Child allowances for working parents and the number of childcare facilities were raised, the parental leave scheme became more flexible including the possibility to share the leave period between the parents, and all-day schooling received financial support from the federal government. The governments under the Christian Democrats (CDU) from 2005 onwards continued this path, thereby deriving from their traditional support for the conservative welfare regime (Fleckenstein 2011: 551-552; Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 141, 143; Ray et al. 2010: 202). Fleckenstein argues that the CDU's policy shift was due to electoral calculations. The party's new leader Angela Merkel had realized that for the party's lead over the Social democrats, the support from young women had become indispensable and that a reorientation of the CDU's propagated social model would be key in this endeavor (Fleckenstein 2011: 556).

Despite the welfare reforms, strong characteristics of the conservative welfare model prevail. The taxation system continues to include income splitting which serves as an incentive for married women to give up on their full time employment. Many children attend part-time schools and kindergartens. Also the vocational education system still promotes early gender segregation (Grunow et al. 2011: 398). As German mothers tend to leave their full-time employment completely or for a comparatively long time period, they face several economic hardships which are not encountered by German fathers: they earn less than men with children because they have less work experience and tend to take jobs during and after the child rearing period that pay less because they are part-time arrangements (Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 147). Unlike part-time work in Sweden, part-time work in Germany tends not to be a transitional solution for mothers before they re-enter the job market at their original position, but rather of permanent nature. Although part-time conditions in Germany resemble those of full-time employment (Stier et al. 2001: 1736), part-time work "fails to provide the same benefits or economic security that is assured by full-time employment […]" (Trzcinski/Camp 2014: 147). As a result, the 2014 UNDP Gender Equality Index, which lists Germany overall at the sixth position from 187 countries, reports that 53.5 percent of women and 66.4 percent of men

participate in the labor market. This creates a gender gap in labor market participation of 12.9 percentage points, which is clearly wider than the Swedish gap of 7.9 percentage points (UNDP 2014).

For the explanation of the gender gap in Germany, the degree of modernization measured by the share of jobs in the service sector ("jobs_service_lag") turned out to be relevant. As modernization varies across years, a multilevel model has been constructed which treats the years of the Eurobarometer surveys as second-level data and the individual observations as first-level data. Adopting this data structure prevents an overestimation of the effects of the jobs-variable on EU membership and on the gender gap. All variables of Model 4 are explained in Table 30 in the appendix.

Table 6 below lists the regression coefficients of the multilevel model for Germany, resulting from binary logistic regression in the GENLINMIXED procedure.[77]

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Significance**	**Exponentiation of coefficient**
Intercept	-6.177	0.000	0.002
Respondent's sex (female)	0.746	0.034	2.11
Age	0.006	0.003	1.006
Length of full-time education	0.074	0.000	1.077
Occupation (white collar)	0.461	0.000	1.586
Occupation (blue collar)	0.023	0.685	1.023
Relationship status (single)	-0.101	0.001	0.904
Share of jobs in the service sector	0.073	0.000	1.075
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
Women with growing age	-0.003	0.299	0.997
Women with longer full-time education	0.014	0.017	1.014
Women in white collar positions	-0.101	0.018	0.904
Women in blue collar positions	0.000	0.999	1.000
Single women	-0.013	0.819	0.987
Women with growing share of jobs in the service sector	-0.015	0.025	0.985

TABLE 6 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 4.1 (GERMANY)[78]

[77] Model 5 includes 82.3 percent of all observations for Germany (N=29404). It covers 19 Eurobarometer surveys from 1995 to 2012. The model predicts 60.5 percent of all cases correctly, with 55.2 percent of correct predictions of the "neither nor/ a bad thing" answer and 65.1 percent of correct predictions of the "a good thing" answer. The intercept of EU membership support varies significantly (0.057**) across years. The slope of sex does not vary significantly across years. This is not as relevant as it was for Models 1 and 2 in the previous chapters because the use of a multilevel model in this chapter is motivated by interest in the variation of EU membership support across years (i.e. the variation of the intercept), and less by interest in the variation of the slope of respondent's sex in interaction with other background variables. The intra-class correlation (Heck et al. 2013: 157) of Model 4.1 is limited to 0.017, i.e. 1.7 percent of the variation of EU membership support occurs across years. This justifies the adoption of a multilevel model.

Unlike in Model 1, age, relationship status and ideological predispositions do not exert a significant influence on the German gender gap in EU support.[79] Age has still been included in the model, as it constitutes a standard control variable and is key to the theoretical framework.

The gender gap in Germany is significantly shaped by two individual background characteristics and one country-specific condition. Firstly, education plays an important role: men and women who terminate their full-time education later in life are more likely supporters of European integration. Unlike the gender gaps in Sweden and in the EU-27 and its candidate countries as a whole, this pattern is more pronounced for women than for men, as the coefficients in Table 6 (coefficient of education 0.074***, coefficient of the interaction with respondent's sex 0.014**) indicate. In the data sample for Germany, people end their full-time education at the average age of 18 years. People who finish full-time education three years earlier, i.e. who leave regular schools (main schools) with the lowest certificate are usually 15 years old. People who leave school with the highest certificate (high schools) at the age of 18 or 19 years and those who continue with university degrees may be 24 years old if they obtain a master degree or the master's preceding academic titles ("Diplom" or "Magister"). Figure 35 compares these three groups, assuming that people are of average age (48 years) and working in blue collar positions. The gender gap among people with the longest full-time education is slightly smaller (18.8 percentage points) than the gender gap among people with the shortest full-time education (20.6 percentage points).

[78] Reference category is "bad thing or neither nor". Categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

[79] Relationship status had to be kept in the model as in its absence, SPSS did warn of problem with the Hessian matrix. To the knowledge of the author, the literature does not recommend a solution to this problem in the GENLINMIXED procedure except from choosing the robust covariance parameter which had already been specified for Model 4.1 (Heck et al. 2013:112 and 197-198).



FIGURE 35 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS EDUCATIONAL GROUPS IN GERMANY

Secondly, occupation plays a role for the German gender gap in a manner which is very similar to the trend in the overall EU-27 and its candidate countries. People in white collar positions are more likely to say that Germany's EU membership is a good thing than people who are not active in the labor market. The comparison between blue collars and non-active people is statistically insignificant. A higher EU support among professionals than among people who are not active in the labor market is more pronounced for men than for women (coefficient 0.461***, interaction with respondent's sex -0.101**).

An alternative regression analysis compared white collars to blue collars. It demonstrated that there is no significant difference between the interactions of these two occupational groups with respondent's sex.[80] This observation corroborates the utilitarian explanation of the EU gender gap, as discussed in the theoretical framework (Chapter 3).

Model 4.1 shows that women and men who are not active in the labor market, i.e. unemployed, homemakers, retired, students or those too ill to work, are similarly skeptical of European integration. People in relatively highly qualified occupational positions are more supportive of European integration as they perceive integration rather as a chance than a threat (see Gabel 1998 and McLaren 2006 in Chapter 2). As this difference is of almost identical size among men and women, there is no evidence for the argument that women tend to think of politics differently than men, such as by considering the effects of European integration on weaker parts of society whereas

[80] The results of a regression which uses blue collar occupation instead of non-actives as reference category are identical, except from the coefficients for occupational categories and their interaction with sex. Therefore, the coefficient table is not displayed separately. The coefficient for white collar occupation in the alternative regression analysis is 0.438***, its coefficient for the interaction with respondent's sex is -0.101. The coefficient for people who are not active in the labor market is -0.023, its interaction with sex 0.000.

men evaluate it from a more egocentric perspective (see Pratto et al. 1997, Gidengil 1995, Campbell 2006 in Chapter 3). This socialization-based explanation of the gender gap would have found support if the gender gap varied significantly between blue and white collars: whereas women were skeptical of European integration independently from their own occupation, men would adopt their judgment of EU membership according to their own occupational position.



FIGURE 36 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN GERMANY

Thirdly, the share of jobs in the German service sector, whose inclusion in the model has been inspired by the work of Inglehart and Norris (2000) on the link between modernization and the gender gap in voting behaviour, has proven to be significant for the German gender gap. The results show that with growing modernization, EU support both for men and women becomes more likely but to a greater extent for men than for women. This result does not correspond with the expectations of the theoretical framework: in the course of modernization, the gender gap should decrease and even reverse—at least this is the case if voting behaviour is the dependent variable (Inglehart/Norris 2000)—because the economic and cultural changes lead to fewer differences in the daily lives of men and women and a greater opportunity of women to participate in the labor market. However, the results for Germany show that the gender gap in EU support grows with a greater share of jobs in the service sector (coefficient 0.073***, interaction with respondent's sex -0.015**).

Figure 37 illustrates this well for three different shares of service jobs: if the share of service jobs amounts to 59 percent, which in the case of Germany has been the level in the year 1993, then the gender gap in EU support amounts to 17.5 percentage points. With a service share of 64 percent which has been the case in 2000, the gap increases to 20.5 percentage points. For a level of service jobs corresponding to the situation in 2008 (69 percent), the gender gap grows to 22.7 percent. These findings need further investigation to make sense of them.

One possibility is that the jobs-variable fails to grasp modernization over time, or that the changes which have taken place in Germany are not drastic enough as to lead to a picture resembling the expectations based on Inglehart and Norris' work (2000). In this case the share of service jobs could just reflect different points in time, and, as we know from the introduction of this chapter, Germany has experienced a growing gender gap over the years. In order to show a picture resembling the expectations based on Inglehart and Norris, a longer time period may be necessary for the case of Germany in order to simulate the period of industrialization and post-industrialization.

Another possibility is that whereas modernization affects the gender gap in voting behaviour, this is not directly linked to the EU context, at least not in Germany. This perspective seems plausible, too, considering the insignificance of ideological predispositions for the German gender gap in EU support.[81]



FIGURE 37 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO THE SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE SERVICE SECTOR IN GERMANY

8.2.2 TEMPORAL DYNAMICS IN GERMANY

The theoretical framework (Chapter 3) discusses the influence of economic developments, including the Eurozone crisis, on the EU gender gap. The Eurozone crisis sparked a public debate in Germany about the limits of solidarity with other EU member states (Paterson 2011, Bulmer 2014). Figure 34 in this chapter reflects this debate with a temporary decline in German EU support in 2010. Next to the impact of the crisis, an effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the German gender gap is possible, too, especially as the number of German Members of the European Parliament decreased (European

[81] The insignificance of partisanship had been revealed during the construction of Model 4.1. The latter has been documented in SPSS syntax files which will be shared by the author upon request.

Parliament 2013) and Germany had a lively debate about the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.[82] Whether the EU gender gap has been affected by these public debates can be clarified by conducting the analysis of Model 4.1 in combination with temporal dummy variables that distinguish the pre- and post-crisis (pre- and post-2009) and the pre- and post-Lisbon (pre- and post 2008) period (Models 4.2 and 4.3 respectively). The variables included in these models are listed in Table 30 in the appendix.

The regression analyses reveal similar changes in the gender gap dynamics for the division of the dataset into pre- and post 2008 period (Model 4.3) and the pre- and post 2009 (Model 4.2) period. The turn from 2007 to 2008 can be considered a marker of the changed gender gap dynamics in Germany. Therefore, only the results of Model 4.3 are discussed in the following. Table 7 below lists the regression parameters for Model 4.3.[83] Table 35 in the appendix displays the regression parameters for Model 4.2.[84]

As Table 7 shows, the turn from 2007 to 2008 significantly affected the interplay of age and respondent's sex with an interaction coefficient of 0.009**.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of the coefficient
Intercept	-7.447	0.000	0.001
Respondent's sex (female)	1.249	0.008	3.488
Age	0.002	0.151	1.002
Length of full-time education	0.069	0.000	1.071
Occupation (white collar)	0.472	0.000	1.604
Occupation (blue collar)	-0.013	0.831	0.987
Relationship status (single)	-0.141	0.000	0.868
Share of jobs in the service sector	0.097	0.000	1.102
Post-Lisbon period	2.802	0.771	16.475

TABLE 7 FIXED COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 4.3 (GERMANY)[85]

[82] As stated previously for the case of Sweden, it is unlikely that changes in the gender gap dynamics can be attributed to the German presidencies of the European Council (Kaniok 2012). The presidencies during the investigated time period took place in the first semester of 1999 and the first semester of 2007.

[83] As for Model 4.1, the influence of respondent's sex on EU membership support does not vary significantly across years in Germany. Still, the application of a multilevel model for the gender gap dynamics is justified as EU membership support varies significantly across years (0.058** for Model 4.2 and 0.063** for Model 4.3). The interclass correlations (ICC) of 0.017 and 0.018 for Models 4.2 and 4.3 show that 1.7 and 1.8 percent of variance in EU membership support is the result of temporal influences.

[84] In order to rule out that the new dynamics of the German gender gap set in before the 2007-2008 turn, earlier temporal dummy variables were tested, too, but other time divisions of the dataset were found to be insignificant for the gender gap. Furthermore, after the 2008-2009 division (influence of the Eurozone crisis), the division if the dataset into a pre- and post 2011 period produces similar outcomes to the Models 4.2 and 4.3: the three-way interaction of respondent's sex, temporal division and age is significant with a coefficient of -0.006**.

[85] Produced by the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS; reference category is "bad thing or neither nor". Categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of the coefficient
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
Women with growing age	0.000	0.983	1.000
Women with longer full-time education	0.010	0.148	1.010
Women in white collar positions	-0.081	0.108	0.922
Women in blue collar positions	0.055	0.535	1.056
Single women	0.026	0.676	1.026
Women with growing share of jobs in the service sector	-0.025	0.011	0.976
Interaction terms with pre- and post-Lisbon distinction			
Men after Lisbon	4.158	0.026	63.956
Growing age after Lisbon	0.012	0.000	1.012
Longer full-time education after Lisbon	0.021	0.018	1.021
White collars after Lisbon	-0.050	0.593	0.952
Blue collars after Lisbon	0.137	0.280	1.147
Singles after Lisbon	0.130	0.001	1.139
Growing share of jobs in service sector after Lisbon	-0.059	0.671	0.942
Three-way interaction terms with respondent's sex and pre-/post-Lisbon distinction			
Women with growing age after Lisbon	-0.009	0.008	0.991
Women with longer full-time education after Lisbon	0.014	0.183	1.014
Women in white collar positions after Lisbon	-0.073	0.413	0.930
Women in blue collar positions after Lisbon	-0.211	0.292	0.810
Single women after Lisbon	-0.120	0.320	0.887
Women with growing share of jobs in the service sector after Lisbon	-0.054	0.064	0.948

TABLE 7 CONTINUED

Table 8 below displays the mean predicted probabilities of men and women across different age groups to support EU membership before and since 2008: both men and women in Germany have become less likely with growing age to say that EU membership would be a good thing. Since 2008, the probability of women to give this answer has almost sunk to zero for all age groups. Furthermore, the simulation in Table 8 and Figure 38 shows that before 2008, the gender gap was almost stable across age groups with a difference of less than one percentage point among 20 year olds and 75 year olds. This is also reflected in the insignificance of the interaction of age with respondent's sex. As the EU as a whole (see Chapter 6) and Sweden displayed growing gender gaps across the course of people's life, this can be considered a specific observation for the German gender gap. This pattern suggests that before 2008, gendered socialization has been influential for gender differences in evaluations of European integration. As the pattern for the pre-and post-Lisbon period differ in this regard, with the period since 2008 conforming to the utilitarian logic, it must be concluded that the causes of the gender gap are possibly not stable.

Age	Pre-Lisbon			Post-Lisbon		
	Men	Women	Gender gap size	Men	Women	Gender gap size
20 years	50.75	20.83	29.92	3.33	0.04	3.29
35 years	51.50	21.33	30.17	4.07	0.04	4.03
75 years	53.49	22.71	30.78	6.92	0.05	6.87

TABLE 8 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS BEFORE AND SINCE 2008 IN GERMANY, IN PERCENT



FIGURE 38 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF LISBON IN GERMANY[86]

The global financial crisis (Hodson/Quaglia 2009: 940-944) and the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty have been important events at the international and European levels in 2007. Material concerns towards European integration have become so strong with one or both of these two developments that they dominate public opinion on the EU since 2008. Secondly, German women seem to be more concerned about negative effects of European integration than men after 2008. To identify the concrete causes of the gendered reactions to events such as the global financial crisis or the Lisbon Treaty in Germany exceeds the scope of the given data and research method. It would require a detailed discussion of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the effects of the global financial crisis on Germany, an analysis of the public debate and, last not but least, a thorough investigation whether other developments in Germany, such as policy reforms, electoral campaigns or other political debates may account for the observed shift in gender dynamics in EU support.

8.2.3 SUMMARY

In sum, the models for the German gender gap produce a number of interesting results: firstly, Model 4.1 shows that in Germany, the gender gap is generally shaped by occupation instead of age.

[86] See values in Table 8; the simulated values for women in the post-2008 period are so small that they are not displayed in the figure.

This is plausible in the light of the observed influence of welfare traditions on gender gaps. The German conservative welfare state has traditionally sought to protect status differences which result from individuals' occupation.

Secondly, the role of occupation underlines the strong link between individual cost-benefit calculations and EU attitudes, hence the utilitarian logic behind the gender gap: differences in EU evaluations of blue and white collars are similar among men and women.

Model 4.3 reveals that the influence of material self-interest has not constantly been the cause of the German gender gap. This can be observed from in the interaction of respondent's sex with age before and since 2008. Until the end of 2007, the gender gaps among people of 20, 35 and 75 years of age were almost stable, with differences of less than one percent points between the gaps. As established in the theoretical framework (Chapter 3), this coherence of the gender gap across age groups points at the role of gendered socialization and political values which are emphasized to different degrees by men and women. The detailed reasons remain subject for further research but it seems probable that with the global financial crisis or the agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon, material concerns among women became so strong that they further decreased the likelihood of women to support the EU membership of Germany.

8.3 TURKEY: THE INFLUENCE OF EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

Turkey is the EU candidate country with the longest accession process in history. Having applied for membership in 1987, Turkey received the candidate status in 1999. Official accession talks were opened in October 2005, but the following accession process never went smoothly. In December 2006, negotiations on six chapters of the Acquis Communautaire were suspended due to Turkey's refusal to open its ports and airports to vehicles from the Republic of Cyprus. Three years later, Cyprus and France announced that they would veto the opening of additional chapters (Oğuzlu 2012: 230-231).

Despite this difficult and lengthy process, several Turkish governments undertook far-reaching legal reforms to fulfill the membership requirements, such as in the areas of civilian-military relations, minority rights, the judiciary and women's rights (Rumelili 2011: 244; Oğuzlu 2012; Somer/Glüpker-Kesebir 2015; Glüpker 2010). However, as Oğuzlu aptly puts it, "[w]hile Turkey has come closer to the EU institutionally, it has simultaneously become estranged from the EU mentally and psychologically." (Oğuzlu 2012: 231) This is the case both for political elites and the public opinion. The lacking commitment of influential member states such as Germany and France to a full membership perspective for Turkey, and the unresolved Cyprus issue raise doubts in the Turkish population that Turkey should strive further for EU membership (Rumelili 2012: 236–237, 244; Oğuzlu 2012: 233-234). As a result, EU membership has ceased to play the central role in political debates, especially in campaigns for most recent general elections in 2011, and the Turkish government has reoriented its foreign policy (Oğuzlu 2012: 236; Rumelili 2012: 243)[87]. Figure 39 illustrates the sinking overall support for EU membership in Turkey, from 66 percent of positive answers in 2004 to 46 percent in spring 2011.

[87] Whether public opinion has caused the re-orientation of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) foreign policy approach or whether the governments have created a swing in public opinion is matter of debate, as Kennedy and Dickenson (2012) discuss in their article. The authors argue that the new Turkish foreign policy is a result of a greater self-confidence of Turks and a growing distrust towards international actors.



FIGURE 39 EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT IN TURKEY

In terms of welfare policies, Turkey's system can be considered as an example of the southern model (see Karamessini 2008 for a description of this type), or as a conservative regime with a strong emphasis on informal provision of welfare (Buğra/Candaş 2011). The Turkish welfare state is by far less generous and supportive of a family-and-work balance for women and men than the Swedish and German systems. Reflecting the "collectivistic culture" of Turkey (Çarkoğlu/Kafescioğlu 2014: 240) with close family relations and traditionally strong patriarchal values, the family stands in the center of the welfare regime. This includes the responsibility for childcare and the care for elderly and disabled (Çarkoğlu/Kafescioğlu 2014: 240). The almost complete lack of alternatives such as public child care facilities and nursing homes reinforce this pattern (ibid: 247-249). Although the reform pressure stemming from the EU accession process combined with effective lobbying by the Turkish women's rights movement has led to improvements of Turkish women's rights in the civil and penal code as well as the labor law, support for gender equality in the compatibility of family and work continues to be weak.[88] The length of paid maternity leave is with 16 weeks clearly below the level of Sweden and Germany. A paternity leave is not possible, unless the father is a civil servant and the mother has died in delivery (Çarkoğlu/Kafescioğlu 2014: 244). And although companies with more than 150 employees are legally required to provide free childcare services, the compliance with this law is very limited (ibid: 246). As a result, Turkey had in 2012 with 29.4 percent the lowest female participation rate among the countries under evaluation in this chapter. The Turkish gender gap in labor market participation amounts to 40.4 percentage points, compared to 12.9 percentage points in Germany and 7.9 percentage points in Sweden (UNDP 2014).

[88] Çarkoğlu and Kafescioğlu (2014) as well as Buğra and Candaş (2011) claim that the AKP governments have consciously reinforced the reliance on informal welfare provision. Buğra and Candaş (2011) argue that this reinforcement has been motivated by the AKP's ideological orientation towards an "unregulated market economy" (ibid: 521) and from the government's intention to prevent a strong opposition to its social policy approach (ibid: 516).

In order to explain the Turkish gender gap in EU support, a binary logistic model turned out to be the most appropriate approach. Table 31 in the appendix lists the details of the included variables.[89]

As in the case of the EU-27 and its candidate countries in general, Turkish men are more likely to support EU membership than women. As the exponentiation of the coefficient for the intercept (0.821) in Table 9 below shows, men are to 18 percent more likely than women to think of EU membership as a good thing. This places the Turkish EU gender gap in a medium position between Sweden, were this answer is to 96 percent more likely among men than among women (see Table 5) and Germany, where men are to 1.5 percent more likely than women to support EU membership (see Table 6).

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of the coefficient
Respondent's sex (female)	.435	.006	1.545
Age	.001	.576	1.001
Occupation		.956	
Occupation (blue collar)	-.001	.989	.999
Occupation (white collar)	-.036	.771	.965
Micro-economic expectations		.000	
Micro-economic expectations (better)	.814	.000	2.256
Micro-economic expectations (same)	.438	.000	1.550
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
Women with growing age	-.010	.004	.990
Respondent's sex (female) by occupation		.073	
Women in blue collar positions	-.302	.043	.739
Women in white collar positions	-.275	.184	.760
Respondent's sex (female) by micro-economic expectations		.036	
Women with positive micro-economic expectations	-.242	.059	.785
Women with stable micro-economic expectations	-.290	.013	.748
Constant	-.198	.076	.821

TABLE 9 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 5.1 (TURKEY)[90]

Among the potential determinants which have been considered based on the literature review in Chapter 2, three individual conditions influence the EU gender gap in Turkey.

[89] Model 6.1 (N=6905) includes 76.3 percent of all observations on Turkey from 2004 to 2011. Without predictors, the model has an accuracy rate of 54.8 percent and a proportional by chance accuracy of 64 percent. With the variables which turned out to affect the gender gap significantly, the prediction rate reaches 57.4 percent, which renders the model to 14 percent more accurate than the by-chance model. The significance of the chi-square statistic (0.000) suggests that there is a relationship between the dependent and the set of independent variables in this model. The pseudo-R-square measures are 0.022 (Cox&Snell) and 0.030 (Nagelkerke).The insignificant result of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (0.399) supports that the model possesses an acceptable goodness of fit.

[90] Calculated by the LOGIT procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor". Categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Firstly, with growing age, men in Turkey become slightly more likely to support an EU membership of Turkey. For women, the opposite is the case: the older women are, the less likely it is that they favor EU membership (coefficient of age 0.001, of the interaction with respondent's sex -0.010**). Figure 40 illustrates that thereby, the gender gap increases with growing age. As discussed for the case of Sweden as well as in previous chapters, this growing gender gap across age groups corroborates the utilitarian explanation for the EU gender gap, as material differences between the genders grow over the course of life and influence individual cost-benefit calculations on EU membership. This finding is particularly plausible with a view to the Turkish welfare state as presented at the beginning of this section: the Turkish state's efforts towards gender equality, especially in the job market, are comparatively weak. The resulting material disparities between men who constitute the breadwinners of their families and women who are majorly responsible for the unpaid care for family members are eventually responsible for gender differences in evaluations of the Turkish EU accession.

A comparison of the development of the gender gap across age groups in Sweden and in Turkey shows that under control of the other determinants o the EU gender gap, the gap across age is wider in Turkey (18.4, 21.5 and 30.1 percentage points for 20, 35 and 75 year old people respectively, see Figure 40) than in Sweden (11, 14.2 and 23.1 percentage points respectively, see Figure 30). Following the utilitarian explanation and considering that the Turkish welfare policies are comparatively passive towards gender inequality whereas the Swedish regime actively encourages the equal participation of men and women in the labor market, the larger gaps are not surprising. [91]



FIGURE 40 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN TURKEY

[91] The fact that Sweden has overall a greater gender gap than Turkey is due to the demographic conditions of the two countries. In both countries the gender gap is particularly small among young people. Turkey's relatively young population combined with a higher age average in Sweden lead to the different gender gaps after all. See section 8.4 for a discussion of this point.

Next to age, occupation plays an important role in shaping the Turkish gender gap if blue collars are compared to people who do not participate in the labor market (coefficient of blue collars -0.001, interaction -0.302**). An alternative regression analysis compared professionals directly to workers. It demonstrated that the effect of blue collar employment compared to white collar employment on the gender gap is insignificant.[92] This supports the utilitarian explanation of the gender gap as discussed previously, e.g. for the case of Germany.



FIGURE 41 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN TURKEY

Lastly, stable micro-economic outlooks, i.e. the expectation that in the coming twelve months the situation of the own household will not change, are significant for EU membership support and for the EU gender gap in Turkey. People with stable expectations are more likely to find that EU membership would be a good thing than people with negative expectations as Figure 42 shows. This pattern is more pronounced for men than for women (coefficient stable expectations compared to pessimists 0.438***, interaction with respondent's sex -0.290**).

The patterns of micro-economic expectations on the Turkish gender gap point at the influence of the traditionalist family structures which are widespread in Turkey (Çarkoğlu/ Kafescioğlu 2014). The latter foresee that men are responsible for the financial resources of the family. This explains the relatively strong effect of the expected household's economic situation on male EU attitudes.

[92] The coefficient for white collar occupations when compared to blue collar occupations is -0.035, its interaction coefficient 0.028. The coefficient for people who are not active in the labor market is 0.001, its interaction with sex 0.302**.



FIGURE 42 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO MICRO-ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS IN TURKEY

8.3.1 TEMPORAL DYNAMICS IN TURKEY

As to the temporal dynamics of the Turkish gender gap in EU support, the Eurozone crisis may have decreased the attractiveness of EU membership in the eyes of Turks (Whitman/Juncos 2012: 149). Therefore, it is worthwhile to test the influence of the Eurozone crisis on the Turkish gender gap in EU support. Moreover, the opening of accession negotiations in December 2005 as well as the suspension of eight chapters in December 2006 should be tested for their influence on the EU gender gap. The variables which have been used for these three models are listed in Table 31 in the appendix.

From the three models, only the opening of the EU accession negotiations (Model 5.3) has led to a shift in the Turkish gender dynamics in EU support. In other words, neither the Eurozone crisis nor the suspension of negotiation chapters changed the gender differences in EU attitudes. The regression parameters for Models 5.2 and 5.4 are listed in Tables 36 and 37 in the appendix. The results of Model 5.3 are shown in Table 10 below.[93]

[93] Model 5.3 (N=6905) includes 76.3 percent of all observations on Turkey in the dataset. Without predictors, the model has an accuracy rate of 54.8 percent correct predictions and a proportional by-chance accuracy of 64 percent. With the variables which turned out to affect the gender gap significantly, the prediction rate reaches 57.4 percent, which renders the model to 14 percent more accurate than the by-chance model. The significance of the chi-square statistic (0.000) suggests that there is a relationship between the dependent and the set of independent variables in this model. The pseudo-R-square measures are 0.036 (Cox&Snell) and 0.048 (Nagelkerke).The insignificant result of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (0.677) supports that the model possesses an acceptable goodness of fit.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
Respondent's sex (female)	.005	.989	1.005
Age	-.003	.519	.997
Occupation		.060	
Occupation (blue collar)	-.149	.325	.862
Occupation (white collar)	-.590	.018	.554
Micro-economic expectations		.000	
Microeconomic expectations (better)	1.333	.000	3.792
Microeconomic expectations (same)	.661	.000	1.936
Since EU accession negotiations	-.532	.060	.587
Interactions with respondent's sex			
Women with growing age	-.009	.218	.991
Respondent's sex (female) by occupation		.296	
Women in blue collar positions	-.266	.406	.766
Women in white collar positions	.525	.232	1.690
Respondent's sex (female) by micro-economic expectations		.393	
Women with positive micro-economic expectations	-.362	.194	.697
Women with stable micro-economic expectations	-.308	.251	.735
Interactions with pre- and post-negotiations distinction			
Men since the negotiation start	.492	.223	1.635
Growing age since the negotiation start	.004	.441	1.004
Occupation by negotiations		.037	
Blue collars since the negotiation start	.182	.290	1.199
White collars since the negotiation start	.736	.010	2.088
Micro-economic expectations by negotiations		.001	
Positive micro-economic expectations since the negotiation start	-.807	.000	.446
Stable micro-economic expectations since the negotiation start	-.315	.115	.730
Three-way interaction terms with respondent's sex and pre-and post negotiations distinction			
Women with growing age since the negotiation start	.000	.970	1.000
Respondent's sex (female) by occupation since the negotiation start		.108	
Women in blue collar positions since the negotiation start	-.038	.915	.962
Women in white collar positions since the negotiation start	-1.047	.036	.351
Respondent's sex (female) by micro-economic expectations since the negotiation start		.725	

TABLE 10 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF MODEL 5.3 (TURKEY)[94]

[94] Calculated in SPSS with the LOGIT procedure. Reference category of the dependent variable is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
Women with positive micro-economic expectations since the negotiation start	.234	.459	1.264
Women with stable micro-economic expectations since the negotiation start	.059	.843	1.061
Constant	.264	.296	1.303

TABLE 10 CONTINUED

With the start of EU accession negotiations at the end of 2005, i.e. from 2006 onwards in terms of Eurobarometer surveys, the interaction of occupation with respondent's sex has changed. Table 11 below presents the change in support rates among men and women. One shift which occurs concerns those who do not actively participate in the labor market: although both genders have become less supportive of Turkey's EU membership, this development is more pronounced among men. As a result, the EU gender gap in this occupational group slightly reversed with a greater probability of 1.2 percentage points of women to support EU membership than of men.

Secondly, only one occupational group has become more likely to support EU membership since 2005: male white collars. Whereas their female counterparts have become less likely to support EU membership, the probability of male white collars to sypport EU membership has risen from 56 to 67 percent between the 2004-2005 and the 2006-2011 period.

Occupation	Pre-negotiations			Post-negotiations		
	Men	Women	Gender gap size	Men	Women	Gender gap size
non-active (reference category)	69.4	54.8	14.6	50.6	51.8	-1.2
blue collar (statistically insignificant)	66.1	44.5	21.6	44.8	45.0	-0.2
white collar	55.7	53.2	2.5	66.7	42.4	24.3

TABLE 11 MEAN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AMONG MEN AND WOMEN ACROSS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE OPENING OF EU ACCESSION NEGOTATIONS IN TURKEY, IN PERCENT

Moreover, an alternative regression which used blue collars as reference category revealed that white collars are not significantly different from blue collars in the effects on the gender gap since the opening of EU negotiations.[95] This observation indicates that utilitarian considerations have caused the Turkish gender gap both before and after the start of EU negotiations.

It is noteworthy that the timing of the reversal of the Turkish EU gender gap (see Figure 28) coincides with the start of the accession negotiations. Since 2006, the overall size of the gender gap in Turkey has started to decrease and eventually reversed in 2009. As Model 5.3 shows, the role of different

[95] In this alternative regression, the coefficient for the interaction of white collars in comparison to blue collars with respondent's sex and the post-2005 dummy is -1.009*.

occupational groups is most likely to account for this turnaround in Turkey. Since the start of EU negotiations, occupation has become influential for gender differences in EU membership evaluations and has led non-active women to be more supportive of the EU than their male counterparts. As Table 10 underlines, men's support for the EU has decreased stronger than the female support in the group of non-actives. This occupational pattern, combined with the fact that non-actives constitute the majority of Eurobarometer respondents in Turkey (see Table 32 in the appendix), accounts for the reversed gender gap in Turkey.

The questions remain why non-active men have stronger changed their EU membership evaluations than non-active women, and why male white collars have become more supportive whereas female white collars have become less supportive of EU membership. As the gender gap patterns both before and since the opening of the negotiation point at utilitarian considerations as the cause of the Turkish gender gap, the reason may stem from concerns over the effects of a potential EU membership on the Turkish labor market. Similarly to the open questions on the influence of the Lisbon Treaty on the German EU gender gap, the background of the Turkish changes can only be explained by investigating the Turkish public debate on the EU accession process, especially with its implications for occupational groups, and by analyzing the domestic political developments in Turkey in 2005 and 2006 to exclude alternative explanations for the shift in public opinion.

8.3.2 SUMMARY

The previous sections support the utilitarian explanation of the EU gender gap. The growing EU gender gap across the course of life of people is in line with strong gender disparities which are reinforced by a welfare state that does not efficiently promote gender equality at the labor market. The patterns of the gender gap across occupational groups and across different micro-economic expectations have also supported the role of material self-interest for the EU gender gap.

Since 2006, occupation has become influential for the gender gap in Turkey, with women who do not participate in the labor market being more likely to embrace EU membership than their male counterparts. This interplay of occupation and respondent's sex since 2006 explains the overall reversal of the Turkish gender gap which had been identified in Chapter 5.

8.4 COMPARING THE GENDER GAPS OF SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY

The preceding country-specific analyses help to explain why national gender gaps in EU support vary to the extent which has been shown in Chapter 5. As Figure 18 in Chapter 5 illustrates, Sweden has the biggest gender gap among the three countries in this chapter, with a difference of 14.1 percentage points between men and women to find that EU membership is a good thing for the time

period from 1995 to 2012. Germany's gender gap amounts to 4.7 percentage points. Turkey's gap is the smallest with 4.1 percentage points.

The existing literature on the EU gender gap suggests that the generosity of welfare regimes determines the size of gender gaps. Based on insights on Scandinavian countries, either fears of lower welfare benefits under the influence of Europeanization (Liebert 1997, 1999) or a sense of material security which renders EU membership superfluous in the eyes of women (Nelsen/Guth 2000) constitute the possible links between welfare generosity and differences in EU support between men and women. Both links are compatible with utilitarian considerations which have been identified as the dominant root of the EU gender gap in the preceding analyses.

The case study on Sweden corroborates Liebert's mechanism (1997, 1999) and refutes the suggestion of Nelsen and Guth (2000). Contrary to the latter, economic pessimism is influential for the EU evaluations of men and women in Sweden. Combining this insight with the characterization of the socialdemocratic welfare state and the EU's social policies (see Chapter 7), the fear of women that national welfare standards may be lowered under the influence of the EU is a most plausible explanation for Sweden's large gender gap. This logic may also be transferable to the case of Denmark whose gender gap is also of considerable width.

One puzzle remains though: why are countries with Mediterranean welfare regimes, which are not renowned for strong support for gender equality at the labor market, among the countries with the largest gender gaps? And in a similar vein, why does Finland with its socialdemocratic welfare state have a medium-sized EU gender gap of 8.5 percentage points?

A definite answer to this question may only be given with detailed research on the provisions of welfare policies in the countries. A look at the country-specific dynamics of the gender gaps is indispensable as this chapter has shown. Analyzing the composition of countries according to the determinants of their EU gender gaps can serve as a useful entry point for an explanation of the relative sizes of gender gaps.

For the case of Sweden, for instance, older age, longer full-time education, a rightist political orientation and negative macro-economic expectations all contribute to a larger gender gap according to Model 3.1. Especially the distributions of age and education in the Swedish sample are clearly in favor of those groups which have been found to increase the gender gap size in Sweden, with 40 percent of Swedish Eurobarometer respondents being older than 55 years and 46 percent of the interviewees having terminated their full-time education at the age of 20 or older (see Table 32 in the appendix).

In Turkey, age, occupational status and micro-economic expectations affect the gender gap. Especially the distribution of age and occupational status of Eurobarometer respondents is noteworthy. As the younger generations both in Turkey and in Sweden have smaller gender gaps in EU support, the comparatively small size of the Turkish gap is plausible. Among Eurobarometer respondents in Turkey, 38 percent are below the age of 30 and only 15 percent are older than 55. In Sweden, only 17 percent are younger than 30 and 40 percent of respondents were older than 55 (see Table 32). In terms of occupation, 67 percent of the Turkish respondents are not active in the labor market. As they are likely to have a smaller gender gap than other respondents, this also helps to understand the relative small gap in Turkey.

In Germany, people who are not active in the labor market display smaller gender differences in EU evaluations compared to people in managerial positions. The fact that the absolute majority of Eurobarometer interviewees in Germany are not active in the labor market (51 percent) seems to account for the relatively small size of the gender gap in Germany.

8.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

In accordance with the insights of Chapters 6 and 7, the three case studies on Sweden, Germany and Turkey corroborate the utilitarian explanation for the gender gap in EU support. The interactions of age and/or occupation with respondent's sex, which are the key indicators of the theoretical framework (Chapter 3), unanimously point into this direction.

Secondly, the country-specific results show that the EU gender gap is not an immutable condition. Dynamics of the gender gap can shift over time, presumably under the influence of advancing European integration. In Germany for instance, gendered socialization may have played a role for the gender gap prior to 2008. In Turkey, the EU accession negotiations affected the gender gap among people who are not active in the labor market and among workers in a way that the overall gender gap reversed since 2009.[96] In contrast, the gender gap in Sweden has not been found to be influenced by developments at the EU level. It is noteworthy that the Eurozone crisis did obviously not alter the gender gap dynamics in any of the three countries.

Moreover, the three case studies have highlighted how welfare regimes contribute to the cross-country variations of EU gender gaps. In the socialdemocratic welfare regime of Sweden, the support for gender equality cushions material gender disparities and increases skepticism, especially among women, towards the EU. In Germany, whose conservative welfare state has traditionally been

[96] These findings assume that the major developments at the EU level at the end of 2007 and 2005 created the shifts in the German and Turkish gender gaps. Further research is needed to corroborate this view, by analyzing the repercussions of the Treaty of Lisbon and EU accession negotiations on Germany and Turkey respectively in detail and by eliminating alternative explanations for the changing gender gap dynamics.

oriented at protecting status differences, occupation is a driving force of the gender gap. The higher the occupational position in Germany, the more supportive are both men and women of the EU. In Turkey, the absence of state support for gender equality on the labor market contributes to the growing EU gender gap across the course of life.

Lastly, it has been clarified whether fears of lowering welfare benefits or a perceived redundancy of European membership leads to the low EU support among Scandinavian women and to the large gender gaps in socialdemocratic welfare states. The results for Sweden support Liebert's (1997, 1999) argument: women base their EU evaluations particularly strong on their macro-economic expectations. Considering the tax-financed nature of the Swedish welfare system, this allows for the interpretation that women fear that a deterioration of the economy may lead to cuts in the welfare sector. However, this explanation does not account for the presence of non-socialdemocratic welfare regimes in the top ranks of the gender gaps across Europe. Furthermore, it does not explain the relative position of countries outside of the top levels of national gender gaps. The country-specific variations of the gender gap dynamics in Sweden, Germany and Turkey underline the role of national socio-demographic characteristics in this regard. An analysis of national gender gap dynamics in relation with the demographic constitution of countries can serve as a fruitful entry point to explain relative gender gap sizes.

9. CONCLUSIONS: IS IT ALL ABOUT THE MONEY?

Across Europe, women are less supportive of European integration than men. For a time period of almost two decades, the previous chapters have demonstrated gender has been and continues to be a relevant dimension of perceptions of European integration. The extent of this observation stretches from a slight difference in some countries of the European Union to considerable "gender gaps" in some other countries. In the literature on the determinants of public EU support, the gender dimension has not received sufficient attention so far: neither have the reasons for the EU gender gap been identified nor has an adequate discussion on the role of country-specific conditions of the EU gender gap taken place.

Gender may have been absent from the literature on public EU support for several reasons. Firstly, public opinion research in the 1990s showed that in many European countries, gender differences in voting behavior had vanished (Inglehart/Norris 2000). This led some authors to expect that gender differences in political preferences, at least for the electoral context, may be "a topic without a future" (Rosch Inglehart 1991 in Liebert 1997: 8). As this thesis has shown, the gender gap is all but dead: it does not only persist but it is also caused by material conditions which are open to influence by policy-makers and societal groups. Secondly, the prevailing silence over gender in EU support may be a result from the overall lack of attention of European integration scholars towards gendered perspectives (Hoskyns 2004, Kronsell 2005).

This thesis set out to advance a gender perspective on public support for European integration. It has not only identified the primary, utilitarian cause of the EU gender gap, but it has also shed light on the cross-country variations of the gap: the welfare argument of Liebert (1997, 1999) has been corroborated with the case study on Sweden. Moreover, the analyses of the EU gender gaps of Sweden, Germany, and Turkey have demonstrated that national sociodemographic conditions combined with the country-specific determinants of the EU gender gap contribute to cross-country variation.

By evaluating the influence of material self-interest and early socialization into gender roles on EU membership support, this study has created a bridge between the so far separated research areas on the determinants of public EU support and on gendered policy preferences. By identifying material self-interest as the driving force behind the gender gap, empirical evidence for the utilitarian strand of explanations for gender gaps in public opinion has been provided. This has so far been rare in the respective literature (Huddy/Cassese 2011: 483) and it may support an the development of a gender perspectives on public opinion on the EU.

Despite its contributions to the broader literature on the EU and on gender in public opinion, transferring the findings on the EU gender gap to other policy contexts require caution. As Chapter 7 has demonstrated, the analysis of the EU membership question does not produce the same patterns as the analysis of preferences for EU social policies. In a similar vein, an analysis of public support for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shows that there is no gender gap in this particular policy area (Kentmen 2010). In short, public opinion patterns change across EU policy areas. This variance probably results from the complexity of EU politics and the development of the EU over time. It is important to keep in mind that the EU is still an organization "sui generis", both as a political actor (Wunderlich 2012: 654) and in terms of the positions of political parties on EU issues (Green-Pedersen 2012: 127). Whereas public opinion on domestic policies is mostly shaped by national media and the dimensions of the national party system, discourses on EU policies are more complex. The alignment of parties along supportive and skeptical positions towards the EU has changed over time (Green-Pedersen 2012). The multilevel system of EU governance (Marks et al. 1996) is characterized by the interaction of European-level and national-level actors. Last but not least, the EU has evolved from a mostly economic enterprise to a political construct which has gained relevance in almost all policy areas, reaching from international politics over economic and monetary affairs to social politics. Thereby, the information on which survey respondents potentially base their evaluations of EU membership has become manifold and complex (Zaller 1992).

Acknowledging these limitations of analyzing public support for European integration across a time period of almost two decades, this study sheds light on the roots of the EU gender gap by connecting the literature on gender gaps in other policy areas to the scholarship on public opinion about the EU (**Chapter 2**). The combination of these two fields of research has generated a theoretical framework which provides the grounds for the identification of the *reasons* of the gender gap both at the individual and the country-level (**Chapter 3**). Although the empirical part of this study starts with a portrayal of the temporal and geographical patterns of the gender gap in **Chapter 5**, the results go well beyond a description of the gap.

The analyses are based on 20 Eurobarometer surveys from 1995 to 2012 which cover 32 EU member states and candidate countries. The survey data has been combined with demographic and socio-economic information on the EU member states and candidate countries. With the help of multilevel models (see **Chapter 4**), contextual and individual influences on the gender gap have been tested without the risk of overestimating the country-level determinants. Both this broad geographical and temporal scope as well the application of a multilevel model are firsts in the research on the EU gender gap.

The analyses have explored the gender gap in EU membership support in the EU and its candidate countries (**Chapter 6**), in support for social-policy making at the EU level (**Chapter 7**) and in support for EU membership in selected countries (Sweden, Germany and Turkey in **Chapter 8**).

9.1. THE UTILITARIAN ROOTS OF THE EU GENDER GAP: MATERIAL SELF-INTEREST IS THE KEY

The regression analyses of the EU gender gap provide consistent evidence for the utilitarian explanation of the gender gap. In other words, men and women evaluate the EU differently because their personal cost-benefit calculations deliver different results. This matches with findings on the role of personal cost-benefit calculations for EU membership support (e.g. Gabel 1998, see **Chapter 2**). Only little evidence points at the role of the second explanation which has been tested and which stems from literature on gendered policy preferences in other contexts, namely the early socialization into gender roles (see **Chapter 8** on Germany).

As discussed in detail in the theoretical framework (**Chapter 3**), the two explanations of the EU gender gap have been tested by analyzing the interaction patterns of age and occupation with respondent's sex.

With older age, the EU gender gap grows in the EU and its candidate countries as a whole, as well as in Sweden and Turkey. This pattern results can most plausibly be explained with the material differences between men and women which evolve with growing age. Across the course of life, women accumulate less material assets than men and develop a higher risk to live in poverty than men (Bastos 2009, European Commission 2014a). This is the result of the by far greater share of women's involvement in unpaid care activities in their families and the widespread role of men as the main breadwinners of their families, with resulting gender differences in salaries and entitlements to unemployment benefits and pensions. If women seek material independency, they face problems to reconcile their work with childrearing in most countries, with some variation according to the surrounding welfare regimes. As to European integration, men and women evaluate EU membership based on the perceived effects on their personal situation. Men are relatively better off and acquire greater material security than women across their life course; in congruence to their material situation, men display with older age higher support levels for the EU. Women, who are relatively worse off, are less supportive of the EU. Overall, the distance between male and female EU evaluations grows, the older people are.

At the same time, in the EU, in Germany, and in Turkey, there is no significant difference in EU gender gaps among workers and among professionals. For the link between occupation and gender

differences in EU support, the utilitarian logic suggests that people in blue collar positions should be more concerned about the consequences of European integration than people in white collar positions. Blue collars tend to perceive the common market as a risk to their jobs, while white collars perceive the common market as a chance (see **Chapter 2** for details). The lack of a significant difference in the gender gaps across occupational groups shows that men and women establish similar links between their personal material situation and European integration.

9.2. The role of welfare regimes: concerns over the negative effects of European integration

The variation of the gender gap across Europe and the particularly low support among women in Scandinavia are observations which have been addressed in all works on the EU gender gap (Liebert 1997, 1999; Nelsen/Guth 2000). The Eurobarometer data from 1995 to 2012 which has been used for the given study reflects these national differences and shows that Sweden has one of the widest gender gaps in Europe. Furthermore, **Chapter 6** provides inferential evidence that people in socialdemocratic welfare regimes are especially unlikely to support European integration, with women in these countries displaying the lowest likelihood of EU membership suport.

The existing works on the EU gender gap agree that the particularly big gender gap in Scandinavian countries results from the generosity of socialdemocratic welfare states towards women. At the same time, there is no consensus on the mechanism between welfare generosity and the low EU support of women. Liebert argues that national discourses on European integration create fears among women that Europeanization may lower the national welfare standards (Liebert 1999: 217; see also Nelsen/Guth 2000: 276). Nelsen and Guth (2000: 283) refute this argument and suggest instead that women in socialdemocratic welfare regimes see less need for European integration than women elsewhere. They deduce their argument from the insignificance of economic pessimism for the EU evaluations of Scandinavian women according to a Eurobarometer survey from 1994.

The analyses in this study qualify both views to some extent: whereas Nelsen and Guth (2000) and in Liebert (1997, 1999) focus on women and their perception of European integration and welfare policies, the analyses in **Chapter 7** show that men are actually stronger influenced by their opinion on social policy-making when evaluating EU membership.

Moreover, the case study on Sweden in **Chapter 8** opposes Nelsen and Guth's (2000) argument: economic pessimism has a negative effect on the EU evaluations of both genders in Sweden and it is even more influential on women than on men. Considering that the Swedish welfare state is mainly tax-financed, this matches with the interpretation that women fear that the economic situation may deteriorate under EU influence and that tax losses may cause the state to cut its welfare programs.

Thereby, combining the regression results for the Swedish EU gender gap with the characteristics of the Swedish welfare state creates a concrete link between welfare benefits and differences between men and women in EU membership evaluations. This interpretation is in line with the view of Liebert (1997, 1999) on the role of welfare regimes as well as with the most central finding of this study on the role of utilitarian considerations for the EU gender gap.

9.3. Additional influences: sociodemographic factors and the European integration process

In addition to the core findings presented above, the previous chapters point at two additional driving forces of the gender gap which vary across countries and across time.

The ranking in **Chapter 5** shows that welfare regimes alone cannot account for the national variations of the EU gender gap: some Mediterranean welfare regimes which are not renowned for their support for gender equality display very wide gender gaps, similar to those found for socialdemocratic regimes. Therefore, fears of lower welfare standards alone cannot completely explain the size of a country's EU gender gap. Moreover, **Chapter 7** finds that social policy concerns alone do not explain the gender gap in EU membership evaluations. In order to reach a more comprehensive account of the national variations of the EU gender gap, a look at the national dynamics of EU gender gaps as presented for Sweden, Germany and Turkey in **Chapter 8** in combination with the socio-demographic constitution of these countries serves as a complementary angle. The case studies reveal for instance that age works into different directions for the gender gaps of Sweden and Turkey. In both countries, the gender gap grows with older age. Whereas the share of young people is relatively big in the Turkish data sample and the Turkish population overall, the share of young people is relatively small in Sweden and the Swedish data sample. The interaction of age and respondent's sex is thereby conductive to Sweden's relatively large gender gap of 14 percentage points. For Turkey, it contributes to the relatively small gender gap of 4 percentage points.

As to the temporal variations of the gender gap, **Chapter 5** has demonstrated that gender constitutes a relatively constant divide in the European populace for EU support compared to other divisions such as age, occupation or education. Nonetheless, developments in European integration seem to have shifted the interaction of respondent's sex with other individual characteristics for EU membership support (see **Chapter 8)**. The data for Germany gives rise to the impression that prior 2008, utilitarian considerations were not dominant in the formation of the German gender gap. This shift between 2007 and 2008 in the dynamics of the EU gender gap coincide with the emergence of the global financial crisis and the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon. For Turkey, shifts in the

dynamics of the gender gap have occurred between 2005 and 2006. This corresponds to the opening of EU accession negotiations. Since 2006, the Turkish gender gap in EU support among people who do not participate in the labor market reversed, with a greater support for the EU found among women than among men. This has probably caused the reversal of the usual gender pattern in EU support since 2006 and since 2009, it manifests itself in a reversed gender gap, with a greater female basis of EU membership support.

The concrete mechanisms which link developments in the international arena and in EU politics to shifts in gender gap dynamics cannot be identified with the present research design. This is one of the tradeoffs of using a large-N design to investigate the link between gender and public opinion (see **Chapter 4)**. Future research, such as on the concrete implications of the global financial crisis or the Treaty of Lisbon for gender differences in EU support in Germany and of the EU accession negotiations for the gender gap in Turkey, may use an alternative methodological approach, including focus groups and in-depth interviews with men and women to receive more detailed evidence on the mechanisms that link gender to EU evaluations. Alternative explanations for the shift in gender gap dynamics should be taken into consideration, too, given the possibility that other national developments which occurred at the same time with the Treaty of Lisbon and the opening of EU accession negotiations may have caused the changes.

The influence of a country's status vis-à-vis the EU, i.e. the difference between member states, acceding countries and candidate countries, constitutes another aspect which deserves the attention of future research on the EU gender gap as the EU competences in the area of women's rights varies between candidate countries and member states: whereas women's rights sometimes play a prominent role in accession processes such as in the case of Turkey (Glüpker 2010), the EU has only limited competences vis-à-vis its member states (Montoya 2009: 335).

Future research should also investigate in detail the links which women and men establish between their personal situation and the EU. The research design of Campbell and Winters (2006) who employed focus groups of men and women to understand their thinking of British politics is instructive for researching gendered perceptions of the EU.

9.4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Which conclusions can be drawn from this study's insights on the EU gender gap? The utilitarian causes of the EU gender gap imply that the gap is amenable to political influence. Furthermore, the portrayal of the gender gap in the EU-27 and five candidate countries (**Chapter 5**) demonstrates that the gender gap in some countries and at some points in time is large enough to affect the election outcomes in national and European elections. As to national referenda on European integration,

Catherine Hoskyns has pointed out that the rejection of new treaties were "[…] problems which could have been identified earlier had more attention been paid to the attitudes of women and to the experience of EU policy-making on gender issues" (Hoskyns 2004: 229). Policy-makers who are reliant on the public support for their EU policies could explore—and exploit—the gender gap for political success. Incentives to pay more attention to the gender gap have multiplied in the past crisis-ridden years of the European Union. The Eurozone crisis (de Wilde/Zürn 2012: 138) and the most recent "migration crisis" are examples of those developments which brought the EU and its capacities to overcome problems of contemporary Europe to the forefront of the political debates in many countries. Acknowledging that a significant gender gap exists in evaluations of European integration and addressing the gap in all its facets would serve the interests of many policy-makers.

However, whereas most political parties may have discovered gender as a relevant dimension of political representation (Lovenduski/Norris 1993), in regards to European integration a gender dimension is still widely lacking.

The development of such a gender perspective on public support for EU policies would require policy-makers to pay attention to the specific gender gap dynamics in their constituency and to combine these dynamics with sociodemographic and economic conditions. Those who want to raise support for European integration should address those segments of society which have the greatest potential to develop stronger EU enthusiasm. For instance, German politicians who seek to convince women of European integration may in particular target the concerns of lesser educated women. In Turkey, female workers are particularly skeptical of EU membership. Actors who seek public support for Turkey's EU membership there should address the disadvantages which these women expect from Turkey's EU membership.

Moreover, the European institutions could use the gender gap as an additional point of departure to increase public support for European integration. Years of gender equality policies have "never aroused great enthusiasm among women" (Hoskyns 2004: 229) and they have obviously failed to increase the overall EU membership support among women. Therefore, the key to approaching the gender gap may lies in a more effective communication of policy outcomes to women in Europe. The EU institutions and NGOs which support European integration should increase their efforts to inform the public, and especially to the crucial societal segments, about the promotion of gender equality in diverse segments of life by the Community institutions. Efforts of the European Commission and of the European Parliament to raise parental leave standards represent a useful basis for the sharpening of a positive profile of the EU in terms of gender equality. It would be worthwhile to put a stronger emphasis on the reasons why more comprehensive gender equality policies have failed to

emerge at the EU level. The halt of such projects due to the resistance of EU member states in the Council (European Commission 2015) should take a more prominent position in this communication.

REFERENCES

Adler, Patricia A., Steven J. Kless and Peter Adler (1992), "Socialization to Gender Roles: Popularity among Elementary School Boys and Girls", *Sociology of Education*, 65 (3), pp. 169-187.

Aidukaite, Jolanta (2009), "Old welfare state theories and new welfare regimes in Eastern Europe: Challenges and implications*", Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* 42 (1), pp. 23–39.

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Álvarez-Rivera, Manuel (2011), *Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Turkish Grand National Assembly - Results Lookup*. 25 June 2011, at http://www.electionresources.org/tr /assembly.php?election=2011, last access 10 June 2015.

Álvarez-Rivera, Manuel (2014), *Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the German Bundestag - Results Lookup*. 25 May 2014, at http://www.electionresources.org/de /bundestag.php?election=2013, last access 10 June 2015.

Álvarez-Rivera, Manuel (2015), *Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Swedish Riksdag - Results Lookup.* 12 January 2015, at http://www.electionresources.org/se /riksdag.php?election=2014, last access 10 June 2015.

Anderson, Christopher J. (1998), "When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for Integration", *Comparative Political Studies*, 31 (5), pp. 569–601.

Anderson, Christopher J. and M. Shawn Reichert (1996), "Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis", *Journal of Public Policy*, 15, pp. 231-249.

Anghel, Brindusa, Sara de la Rica and Juan J. Dolado (2011), "The Effect of Public Sector Employment on Women's Labour Market Outcomes", Discussion Paper No. 5825, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.

Armingeon, Klaus and Besir Ceka (2014), "The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system", *European Union Politics*, 0(0), 6 August 2014, pp. 82-107.

Art, David (2011), *Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter (2006), "Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success", *European Journal of Political Research*, 45 (3), pp. 419–443.

Atkeson, Lonna R., and Ronald B. Rapoport (2003), "The more things change the more they stay the same: examining gender differences in political attitude expression, 1952-2000", *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 67 (4), pp. 495-521.

Bache, Ian, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer (2011), *Politics in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition.

Bambra, Clare (2004), "The worlds of welfare: illusory and gender blind?" *Social Policy and Society*, 3 (3), pp. 201-212.

Bastos, Amélia, Sara F. Casaca, Francisco Nunes and José Pereirinha (2009), "Women and poverty: A gender-sensitive approach", *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 38 (5), pp. 764–778.

Batthi, Yosef and Kasper M. Hansen (2012), "The effect of generation and age on turnout to the European Parliament – How turnout will continue to decline in the future", *Electoral Studies*, 31 (2), pp. 262–272.

Beatty Kathleen M. and Oliver Walter (1984), "Religious preference and practice: reevaluating their impact on political tolerance", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 48 (1), pp. 318–329.

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin and Michael Argyle (1996), *The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience.* London: Routledge.

Berg, Rebecca (2015), "*Hillary Clinton embraces gender as campaign strategy*", Washington Examiner, 26 February 2015, at http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/hillary-embraces-gender-as-campaign-strategy/article/2560727, last access 17 June 2015.

Berezin, Marbel and Juan Diez-Medrano (2008), "Distance Matters: Place, Political Legitimacy and Popular Support for European Integration", *Comparative European Politics*, 6 (1), pp. 1-32.

Berinsky, Adam J. (1999), "The two faces of public opinion", *American Journal of Political Science*, 43 (4), pp. 1209-1230.

Berinsky, Adam J. (2004), *Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Blinder, Scott and Meredith Rolfe (2013), "Rethinking compassion: Toward a Political Account of the Partisan Gender Gap", London School of Economics, *Political Science and Political Economy Working Paper*, No. 1/2013.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G. and André Freire (2009), "Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct, Indirect or No Effects?" *West European Politics*, 32 (6), pp. 1240-1265.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., Andreas R. T. Schuck, Matthijs Elenbaas and De Vreese, Claes H. (2011), "Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of euroskepticism and EU support", *European Union Politics*, 12(2), pp. 241-266.

Brady, Henry E., David Collier, and Jason Seawright (2004), "Refocusing the Discussion of Methodology", in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Braun, Daniela and Markus Tausendpfund (2014), "The Impact of the Euro Crisis on Citizens' Support for the European Union", *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), pp. 231-245.

Buğra, Ayşe and Çağlar Keyder (2006), "The Turkish welfare regime in transformation", *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16 (3), pp. 210-228.

Buğra, Ayşe and Ayşen Candaş (2011), "Change and Continuity under an Eclectic Social Security Regime: The Case of Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47 (3), pp. 515-528.

Bulmer, Simon (2014), "Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics", *West European Politics*, 37 (6), pp. 1244-1263.

Bundeskanzleramt Österreich (2014), *Kanzler und Regierungen seit 1945.* (Chancellors and governments since 1945) At https://www.bka.gv.at/site/3355/default.aspx, last access 16 December 2014.

Burden, Barry C. (2008), "The Social Roots of the Partisan Gender Gap", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72 (1), pp. 55-75.

Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba (2001), *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Campbell, Rosie (2006), *Gender and the vote in Britain: beyond the gender gap*. Essex: ECPR Press.

Campbell, Rosie and Kristi Winters (2006), "The British general election", in Rosie Campbell (ed.), *Gender and the vote in Britain: beyond the gender gap.* Essex: ECPR Press, pp. 115–127.

Cannan, Crescy (1995), "From Dependence to Enterprise? Women and Western Welfare States", in Einhorn, Barbara and Eileen Janes Yeo (eds.), *Women and Market Societies. Crisis and Opportunity.* Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 160-175.

Carey, Sean (2002), "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics*, 3 (4), pp. 387-413.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and Gitta Glüpker-Kesebir (2015), "Comparing public attitudes on EU membership in candidate countries: the cases of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey from 2004 to 2011", *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, forthcoming.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and Çiğdem Kentmen (2011), "Diagnosing Trends and Determinants in Public Support for Turkey's EU Membership," *South European Society & Politics*, 16 (3), pp. 365-379.

Çarkoğlu, Aslı and Nilüfer Kafescioğlu (2014), "For Whose Sake Is It Anyway? Evaluation of Explicit Family Policies in Turkey", in Mihaela Robila (ed.), *Handbook of Family Policies across the Globe.* New York: Springer, pp. 239-254.

Chodorow, Nancy (1978), *The Reproduction of Mothering*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Converse, Jean M. (1976), Predicting No Opinion in the Polls. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 40 (4), pp. 515-530.

Dailey, Kate (2012), *US election: Women are the new majority*, BBC News, 07 November 2012, at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20231337, last access 12 June 2015.

Den Boer, Monica and Jörg Monar (2002), "Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40, Annual Review, pp. 11-28.

De Vreese, Claes, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Michael Minkenberg and Rens Vliegenthart (2009), "Introduction: Religion and the European Union", *West European Politics*, 32 (6), pp. 1181-1189.

De Wilde, Pieter and Michael Zürn (2012), "Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50 (S1), pp. 137-153.

Dietz, Tracy L. (1998), "An Examination of Violence and Gender Role Portrayals in Video Games: Implications for Gender Socialization and Aggressive Behavior", *Sex Roles*, 38 (5/6), pp. 425-442.

Duncan, Simon (2000), "Introduction", in Simon Duncan and Birgit Pfau-Effinger (eds.), *Gender, economy and culture in the European Union.* London: Routledge, pp. 1-24.

Duchesne, Sophie and André-Paul Frognier (1995), "Is there a European identity?", in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds), *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-226.

Duverger, Maurice (1955), *The Political Role of Women*. Paris: UNESCO.

Earles, Kimberley (2013), "The gendered consequences of the European Union's pensions policy", *Women's Studies International Forum*, 38, pp. 75-82.

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (2012), "*Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy?"* Draft Paper presented at European Social Policy Analysis Network, ESPAnet Conference, Edinburgh, UK, September 6-8, 2012. At http://www.espanet2012.info/__data/ assets/pdf_file/0005/ 89033/ Ebbinghaus_-_Stream_2.pdf, last access 28 November 2014.

Eagly, Alice H., Wendy Wood and Amanda B. Diekman (2000), "Social Role Theory of Sexual Differences and Similarities: A Current Appraisal", in Thomas Eckes and Hanns M. Trautner (eds.), *The developmental social psychology of gender*, Mahwah, New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 123-174.

Eckes, Thomas and Hanns M. Trautner (2000), *The developmental social psychology of gender*, Mahwah, New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates.

Eichenberg, Richard C. and Russell J. Dalton (1993), "European and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration", *International Organization,* 47 (4), pp. 507-534.

Eichenberg, Richard C. and Russell J. Dalton (2007), "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973–2004", *Acta Politica*, 42, pp. 128–152.

Ehin, Piret (2001), "Determinants of public support for EU membership: Data from the Baltic countries", *European Journal of Political Research*, 40 (1), pp. 31-56.

England, Paula and Barbara Kilbourne (1990), "Markets, Marriage, and Other Mates: The Problem of Power", in Roger Friedland and Sandy Robertson (eds.), *Beyond the Marketplace: Society and Economy.* New York: Aldine, pp. 163-188.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990), *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999), *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Commission's Expert Group on Gender and Employment (2009), *Gender segregation in the labour market. Root causes, implications and policy responses in the EU.* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

European Commission (07 March 2013), *Questions and Answers: What has the EU done for women? 50 years of EU action on Gender Equality for One Continent.* Brussels, MEMO 13/169.

European Commission (2014a), *Research findings - Social Situation Monitor – The risk of poverty among the elderly*. At http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1050&intPageId=1909&lang, last access 10 September 2014.

European Commission (2014b), *Research findings. Poverty Tables*. At http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_monitor/SSM_tables_risk_of_poverty.xls, last access 28 August 2015.

European Commission (2015), *Delivering for parents: Commission withdraws stalled maternity leave proposal and paves the way for a fresh approach*. Press release, Brussels, 01 July 2015

European Parliament (2013), *EP seats after 2014 elections: no member state to lose more than one MEP.* 13 March 2013, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/20130308IPR06302/html/EP-seats-after-2014-elections-no-member-state-to-lose-more-than-one-MEP, last access 26 June 2015.

European Parliament (2014a), *Maternity leave and paternity leave in the EU.* Members' Research Service, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/545695/EPRS_ATA%282014%29545695_REV1_EN.pdf, last access 24 May 2015.

European Parliament (2014b), *Results of the 2014 European elections.* General results, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html, last access 08 June 2015.

European Parliament (2014c), *Results of the 2014 European elections.* Germany, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-de-2014.html, last access 08 June 2015.

European Parliament (2014d), *Results of the 2014 European elections*. Sweden, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-se-2014.html, last access 08 June 2015.

European Union (1975), *Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women.* Official Journal L 045, 19/02/1975, pp. 19-20.

European Union (1976), *Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.* Official Journal L 039, 14/02/1976, pp. 40–42.

European Union (1979), *Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security.* Official Journal L 6, 10/01/1979, pp. 24–25.

European Union (1986), *Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes.* Official Journal L 225, 12/08/1986, pp. 40–42.

European Union (1996), *Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 86/378/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes.* Official Journal L 046, 17/02/1997, pp. 20–24.

European Union (1997), *Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.* Official Journal L 14, 20/01/1998, pp. 6–8.

European Union (2002), *Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (Text with EEA relevance).* Official Journal L 269, 05/10/2002, pp. 15–20.

European Union (2004), *Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.* Official Journal L 373, 21/12/2004, pp. 37–43.

European Union (2006*), Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast).* Official Journal L 204, 26/07/2006, pp. 23–36.

European Union (2010), *Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC.* Official Journal L 180, 15/07/2010, pp. 1–6.

European Union (2012a), *Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.* Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012, pp. 13–390.

European Union (2012b), *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.* Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012, p. 47–390.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2008), "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods", in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology.* Oxford University Press.

Fenger, H. J. M. (2007), "Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating post-communist countries in a welfare regime typology", *Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences.* August 2007, pp. 1-30.

Ferrera, Maurizio (1996), "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe", *Journal of European Social Policy*, 6 (1), pp. 17-37.

Fleckenstein, Timo (2011), "The Politics of Ideas in Welfare State Transformation: Christian Democracy and the Reform of Family Policy in Germany", *Social Politics*, 18 (4), pp. 543-571.

Fligstein, Neil (2008), *Euroclash. The EU, European identity, and the future of Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Folbre, Nancy and Julie A. Nelson (2000), "For Love or Money – Or Both?", *The Journal of Economic Perspectives,* 14 (4), pp. 123-140.

Follesdal, Andreas and Simon Hix (2006), "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44 (3), pp. 533-562.

Fowler, James H. and Christopher T. Dawes (2008), "Two Genes Predict Voter Turnout", *The Journal of Politics*, 70(3), pp. 579–594.

Franklin, Mark, Cees Van der Eijk, and Michael Marsh (1995), "Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support For Europe in The Wake of Maastricht", *Western European Politics*, 18 (3), pp. 101-107.

Frieden, Jeffrey (1991), "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance", *International Organization*, 45 (4), pp. 425-451.

Gabel, Matthew (1998), "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories", *The Journal of Politics*, 60 (2), pp. 333-354.

Garry, John and James Tilley (2009), "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU," *European Union Politics*, 10(3), pp. 361-379.

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gidengil, Elisabeth (1995), "Economic man, social woman? The case for the gender gap in support for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement", *Comparative Political Studies*, 28 (3), pp. 384-408.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, Matthew Hennigar, André Blais and Neil Nevitte (2005) "Explaining the Gender Gap in Support for the New Right: The Case of Canada", *Comparative Political Studies*, 38 (10), pp. 1171-1195.

Gilligan, Carol (1982), *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Givens, Terri E. (2004), "The Radical Right Gender Gap", *Comparative Political Studies*, 37 (1), pp. 30-57.

Gläser, Cyril and Wolfgang Wessels (2014), "Die Europapolitik in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte", in Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2014*, Baden Baden: Nomos.

Glüpker-Kesebir, Gitta (2010), *Turkish civil society organizations in the EU pre-accession process with special reference to the cooperation between the European Commission and Turkish women's rights NGOs.* Master Thesis, University of Osnabrück.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2012), "A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration", *Political Studies*, 60 (1), pp. 115–130.

Groves, Robert M. and Nancy H. Fultz (1985), "Gender Effects Among Telephone Interviewers in a Survey of Economic Attitudes", *Sociological Methods and Research*, 14 (1), pp. 31-52.

Grunow, Daniela, Silke Aisenbrey and Marie Evertsson (2011), "Familienpolitik, Bildung und Berufskarrieren von Müttern in Deutschland, USA und Schweden" (Family policies, education and professional careers of mothers in Germany, the USA and Sweden), *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 63, pp. 395 – 430.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2012), "Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15, pp. 421–442.

Hakhverdian, Armen, Erika van Elsas, Wouter van der Brug and Theresa Kuhn (2013), "Euroscepticism and education: A longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, 1973 -2010", *European Union Politics*, 0(0) (no print publication yet), pp. 1-20.

Hancock, Linda (ed., 1999), *Women, Public Policy and the State.* South Yarra: Macmillan Education Australia PTY LTD.

Harmon, Mark D. (2001), "Poll Question Readability and 'Don't Know' Reply", *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 13 (1), pp. 72-79.

Hatemi, Peter K., Nathan A. Gillespie, Lindon J. Eaves, Brion S. Maher, Bradley T. Webb, Andrew C. Heath, Sarah E. Medland, David C. Smyth, Harry N. Beeby, Scott D. Gordon, Grant W. Montgomery, Ghu Zhu, Enda M. Byrne, Nicholas G. Martin (2011), "A Genome-Wide Analysis of Liberal and Conservative Political Attitudes", *The Journal of Politics*, 73 (1), pp. 1–15.

Harteveld, Eelco, Tom van der Meer and Catherine De Vries (2013), "In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union", *European Union Politics*, 14, pp. 542- 565.

Heath, Anthony, Stephen Fisher and Shawana Smith (2005), "The Globalization of Public Opinion Research", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8, pp. 297-333.

Heck, Ronald H., Scott L. Thomas and Lynn N. Tabata (2013), *Multilevel Modeling of Categorical Outcomes using IBM SPSS.* New York: Routledge.

Hemerijck, Anton (2013), *Changing Welfare States.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hobolt, Sara B., Wouter Van der Brug, Claes H. De Vreese, Hajo G. Boomgaarden and Malte C. Hinrichsen (2011), "Religious intolerance and Euroscepticism", *European Union Politics,* 12 (3), pp. 359-379.

Hodson, Dermot and Lucia Quaglia (2009), "European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: Introduction", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (5), pp. 939–953.

Hoffmann, Andreas and Wolfgang Wessels (2008), "Der Vertrag von Lissabon – eine tragfähige und abschließende Antwort auf konstitutionelle Grundfragen?" (The Treaty of Lisbon – a sustainable and conclusive answer to basic constitutional questions?), *Integration,* 31(1), pp. 1-20.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Garry Marks and Carole J. Wilson (2002), "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (8), pp. 965–p89.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Garry Marks (2004), "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?" *Political Science*, July 2004, pp. 1-6.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Garry Marks (2005), "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration", *European Union Politics*, 6(4), pp. 419-435.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Garry Marks (2007), "Sources of Euroscepticism", *Acta Politica*, 42, pp. 119–127.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Garry Marks (2009), "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus", *British Journal of Political Science*, 39 (1), pp. 1-23.

Hoskyns, Catherine (2004), "Gender perspectives", in Antje Wiener and Thomas Dietz (eds.), *European Integration Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 217-236.

Hox, Joop (2002), *Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications.* Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Huddy, Leonie, Joshua Billig, John Bracciodieta, Lois Hoeffler, Patrick J. Moynihan and Patricia Pugliani (1997), "The Effect of Interviewer Gender on the Survey Response", *Political Behaviour*, 19(3), pp. 197-220.

Huddy, Leonie, Erin Cassese and Mary-Kate Lizotte (2008), "Political Unity and Disunity among Women. Placing the Gender Gap in Perspective", in Lois Duke Whitaker (ed.), *Voting the Gender Gap.* University of Illinois Press, pp. 141-169.

Huddy, Leonie and Erin Cassese (2011), "On the complex and varied political effects of gender", in George C. Edwards III, Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 471 et seq.

Hunt, Albert R. (2014), "*Women Hold Vital Votes in Senate Races*", New York Times, 21 September 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/politics/women-hold-vital-votes-in-senate-races.html, last access 25 June 2015.

Inglehart, Ronald (1970), "Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity", *Comparative Politics*, 3 (1), pp. 45-70.

Inglehart, Ronald (1997), *Modernization and Post-Modernization: Social, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris (2000), "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective", *International Political Science Review*, 21 (4), pp. 441-463.

Inglehart, Ronald, Jacques-Rene Rabier, and Karlheinz Reif (1991), "The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward European Integration: 1970-86", in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart (eds.), *Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion*. London: Macmillan, pp. 111-131.

Jiang, Jiming (2007), *Linear and Generalized Linear Mixed Models and their Applications.* Springer Science + Business Media, NY.

Kam, Cindy D. (2009), "Gender and economic voting, revisited", *Electoral Studies*, 28 (4), pp. 615–624.

Kaniok, Petr (2012), "The Influence of the EU Council Presidency on Public Opinion", *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 12 (3), pp. 19-32.

Karamessini, Maria (2008), "Continuity and change in the southern European social model", *International Labour Review*, 147, pp. 43-70.

Karp, Jeffrey, Susan Banducci and Shaun Bowler (2003), "To know it is to love it? Satisfaction With Democracy in the European Union", *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 (3), pp. 271-292.

Kasza, Gregory (2002), "The Illusion of 'Welfare Regimes'", *Journal of Social Policy*, 31 (2), pp. 271-287.

Kennedy, Ryan and Matt Dickenson (2012), "Turkish Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the AKP Era", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 9 (2), pp. 1-18.

Kentmen, Çiğdem (2008), "Determinants of Support for EU Membership in Turkey. Islamic Attachments, Utilitarian Considerations and National Identity", *European Union Politics*, 9(4), pp. 487–510.

Kentmen, Çiğdem (2010), "Bases of Support for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Gender, Attitudes toward Economic Integration, and Attachment to Europe", *International Political Science Review*, 31(3), pp. 285–299.

Kohli, Martin (2000), "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", *European Societies*, 2 (2), pp. 113-137.

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2011), *Mazedonien hat eine neue Regierung*. 4 August 2011, at http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/de/publications/23547/, last access 18 June 2014.

Korpi, Walter, Tommy Ferrarini and Stefan Englund (2013), "Women's Opportunities under Different Family Policy Constellations: Gender, Class, and Inequality Tradeoffs in Western Countries Re-examined", *Social Politics*, 20 (1), pp. 1-40.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey (2008), *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kronsell, Annica (2005), "Gender, Power and European Integration Theory", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12, pp. 1022-1040

Leonard, Mark and José Ignacio Torreblanca (2014), *The Eurosceptic surge and how to respond to it*. European Council on Foreign Affairs, 98.

Levitt, Mairi (1995), "Sexual Identity and Religious Socialization", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 46 (3), pp.529-536.

Liebert, Ulrike (1997), *The gendering of Euro-skepticism: Public discourses and support to the EU in a cross-national comparison.* CEUS Working Paper 1997/1.

Liebert, Ulrike (1999), "Gender politics in the European Union: The return of the public", *European Societies*, 1(2), pp. 197-239.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960), *Political man: the social bases of politics.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Long, J. Scott (1997), *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Loveless, Matthew and Robert Rohrschneider (2008), "Public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance", *Living Reviews of Europan Governance*, 3 (1), at http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-1, last access 10 September 2014.

Lovenduski, Joni (1998), "Gendering research in political science", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1, pp. 333-356.

Lovenduski, Joni and Pippa Norris (eds, 1993), *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage Publications.

Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers (2002), "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe", *European Journal of Political Research,* 41 (3), pp. 345–378.

Lubbers, Marcel and Peer Scheepers (2010), "Divergent trends of euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union", *European Journal of Political Research*, 49 (6), pp. 787–817.

MacIver, Martha A. (1989), "Religious politicization among Western European mass publics", in William H. Swatos (ed.), *Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective*. New York: Greenwood, pp. 111–30.

Manza, Jeff and Clem Brooks (1998), "The gender gap in US presidential elections: When? why? Implications?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 103 (5), pp. 1235-1266.

Manza, Jeff and Clem Brooks (1999), *Social Cleavages and Political Change. Voter Alignments and US Party Coalitions.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank (1996), "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34 (3), pp. 341-378.

Marks, Gary and Carole J. Wilson (2000), "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration", *British Journal of Political Science*, 30 (3), pp. 433–459.

Mazey, Sonia (1998), "The European Union and women's rights: from the Europeanization of national agendas to the nationalization of a European agenda?" *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5 (1), pp. 131-152.

McCall, Leslie (2005), "The Complexity of Intersectionality", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 30 (3), pp. 1771-1800.

McLaren, Lauren M. (2002), "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural threat?" *The Journal of Politics*, 64 (2), pp. 551-566.

McLaren, Lauren M. (2006). *Identity, interests and attitudes to European integration.* Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Miles, Lee (2001), "Sweden in the European Union: Changing Expectations?" *European Integration*, 23 (4), pp. 303 – 333.

Milne, Richard (2013), "*Iceland's new coalition government suspends EU accession talks*", at Financial Times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6c88e05a-c2dd-11e2-9bcb-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Y5buc6G8, 22 May 2013, last access 04 July 2013.

Minkenberg, Michael (2009), "Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages, Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States", *West European Politics*, 32 (6), pp. 1190-1211.

Montoya, Celeste (2009), "International Initiative and Domestic Reforms: European Union Efforts to Combat Violence against Women", *Politics & Gender*, 5, pp. 325–348.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2002), "In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (4), pp. 603-624.

Natali, David (2008). *Pensions in Europe, European pensions: The evolution of pensions policy at national and supranational level.*Brussels: P.I.E. Pete Lange.

Nelsen, Brent F. and James L. Guth (2000), "Exploring the Gender Gap. Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration", *European Union Politics*, 1 (3), pp. 267-291.

Nelsen, Brent F., James L. Guth, and Cleveland R. Fraser (2001), "Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union", *European Union Politics*, 2 (2), pp. 191-217.

Nelsen, Brent F., James L. Guth, and Brian Highsmith (2011), "Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe", *Politics and Religion*, 4 (1), pp. 1-26.

Oğuzlu, H. Tarık (2012), "Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization without Membership", *Turkish Studies*, 13(2), pp. 229-243.

Osterloh, Steffen (2011), *Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy.* Centre for European Research, Discussion Paper No. 11-011, at ftp:/ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp11011.pdf, last accessed 04 March 2011.

Parker, Ashley and Trip Gabriel (2012), "*Romney Taking Steps to Narrow His Gender Gap*", New York Times (11 April 2012), at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/politics/romney-taking-steps-to-narrow-his-gender-gap.html, last access 13 June 2015.

Paterson, William E. (2011), "The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49 Annual Review, pp. 57 – 75.

Perrin, Andrew J. and Katherine McFarland (2011), "Social Theory and Public Opinion", *Annual Review of Sociology*, 37, pp. 87-107.

Peugh, James L. (2010), "A practical guide to multilevel modeling", *Journal of School Psychology*, 48 (1), pp. 85 – 112.

Peugh, James L. and Craigh K. Enders (2005), “Using the SPSS Mixed Procedure to Fit Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Multilevel Models”, *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 65 (5), pp. 717- 741.

Pleuger, Günter (2001), "Der Vertrag von Nizza: Gesamtbewertung der Ergebnisse" (The Treaty of Nice: an overall evaluation of results), *Integration*, 24 (1), pp. 1-7.

Pratto, Felicia, Lisa M. Stallworth and Jim Sidanius (1997), “The gender gap: Differences in political attitudes and social dominance orientation”, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 36, pp. 49-68.

Pollack, Mark A. and Emilie Hafner-Burton (2008), "Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7(3), pp. 432-456.

Raunio, Tapio (2007), "Softening but Persistent: Euroscepticism in the Nordic EU Countries", *Acta Politica*, 42 (2-3), pp. 191-210.

Ray, James Lee (2003), “Explaining Interstate Conflict and War: What Should Be Controlled For?” *Conflict Management & Peace Science*, 20(1), pp. 1-31.

Ray, Leonard (2003),“Reconsidering the Link between Incumbent Support and Pro-EU Opinion”, *European Union Politics*, 4(3), pp. 259–279.

Ray, Rebecca, Janet C. Gornick and John Schmitt (2010), “Who cares? assessing generosity and gender equality in parental leave policy designs in 21 countries”, *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20 (3), pp. 196-216.

Rohrschneider, Robert (2002), “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(2), pp. 462–475.

Rosch Inglehart, Marita (1991), “Gender differences in sex-role attitudes: a topic without a future?” In Karlheinz Reif and Ronarld Inglehart (eds.), E*urobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion. Essays in Honour of Jacques-Rene Rabier.* London: Macmillan.

Rumelili, Bahar (2011), "Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe", *Journal of European Integration*, 33 (2), pp. 235-249.

Rutenberg, Jim and Jeremy W. Peters (2012), “*Rival Campaigns Intently Pursue Votes of Women*”, New York Times, 17 October 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/us/politics /campaigns-raise-focus-on-women-for-final-weeks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0, last access 13 May 2013.

Sainsbury, Diane (1999), *Gender and Welfare State Regimes.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2000), "The Political Basis of Support for European Integration", *European Union Politics*, 1(2), pp. 147–171.

Schlesinger, Mark and Caroline Heldmann (2001), "Gender Gap or Gender Gaps? New Perspectives on Support for Government Action and Policies", *Journal of Politics,* 63 (1), pp. 59-92.

Schofer, Evan and John W. Meyer (2005), "The Worldwide Expansion of Higher Education in the Twentieth Century", *American Sociological Review*, 70 (6), pp. 898-920.

Seltzer, Richard A., Jody Newman, Melissa Voorhees Leighton (1997), *Sex as a Political Variable.* Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder.

Serricchio, Fabio, Myrtio Tsakatika and Lucia Quaglia (2013), "Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis", *Journal of Common Market Studie*s, 51 (1), pp. 51-64.

Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan (1986), "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends From the 1960s to the 1980s", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 50 (1), pp. 42-61.

Silvestri, Sara (2009), "Islam and Religion in the EU Political System", *West European Politics*, 32 (6), pp. 1212-1239.

Stier, Haya, Noah Lewin-Epstein and Michael Braun (2001), "Welfare Regimes, Family-Supportive Policies, and Women's Employment along the Life-Course", *American Journal of Sociology*, 106 (6), pp. 1731-1760.

Svallfors, Stefan (2011), "A Bedrock of Support? Trends in Welfare State Attitudes in Sweden, 1981–2010", *Social Policy and Administration*, 45 (7), pp. 806-825.

Sweet, Stephen A. and Karen Grace-Martin (2008), *Data Analysis with SPSS.* Third Edition. Boston: Pearson.

The Guardian (2011), *Far right politics in Europe.* At http://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,,711990,00.html, last access 11 June 2014.

Tsoukalis, Louis (1993), *The New European Economy.* Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trzcinski, Eileen and Jessica K. Camp (2014), "Family Policy in Germany", in Mihaela Robila (ed.), *Handbook of Family Policies across the Globe.* New York: Springer, pp. 136-153.

Turkish Daily News (2015), *Turkish General Election 2015.* 12 June 2015, at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/election/default.html, last access 12 June 2015.

Van der Brug, Wouter and Joost Van Spanje (2009), "Immigration, Europe, and the New Cultural Dimension", *European Journal of Political Research*, 48 (3), pp. 309-34.

Van der Eijk, Cees and Franklin, Mark (2007), "The Sleeping Giant Potential for Political Mobilization of Disaffection with European Integration", in Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk (eds.), *European Elections and Domestic Politics.* Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 189–208.

Vetik, Raivo, Gerli Nimmerfelft and Marti Taru (2006), "Reactive Identity vs. EU Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44 (5), pp. 1079-1102.

Vliegenthart, Rens, Schuck, Andreas, Boomgaarden, Hajo and Claes De Vreese (2008), "News Coverage and support for European Integration, 1990 - 2006", *International Journal of Public Opinion Research,* 20 (4), pp. 415-439.

Vogel, Joachim (2002), "European Welfare Regimes and the Transition to Adulthood: A Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective", *Social Indicators Research*, 59, pp. 275-299.

Walter, Tony and Grace Davies (1998), "The Religiosity of Women in the Modern West", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 49 (4), pp. 640-660.

Watson, Philippa (2009), *EU Social and Employment Law. Policy and Practice in an Enlarged Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Welch, Susan and John Hibbing (1992), "Financial Conditions, Gender, and Voting in American National Elections", *The Journal of Politics*, 54 (1), pp. 197-213.

Wells, Michael B. and Disa Bergnehr (2014), "Families and Family Policies in Sweden", in Mihaela Robila (ed.), *Handbook of Family Policies across the Globe*. New York: Springer, pp. 91-107.

Wessels, Bernhard (1995), "Evaluations of the EC: Elite or Mass-Driven?" In Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.), *Public Opinion and International Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia (17 December 2013), *List of Cabinets of Turkey.* At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Cabinets_of_Turkey, last access 18 June 2014.

Wikipedia (30 April 2014), *Macedonian parliamentary election 2014*. At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_parliamentary_election,_2014#Parliamentary_election, last access 18 June 2014.

Wikipedia (1 June 2014), *For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK.* At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/For_Fatherland_and_Freedom/LNNK, last access 16 December 2014.

Wikipedia (12 June 2014), *List of cabinets of Croatia.* At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cabinets_of_Croatia, last access 18 June 2014.

Wikipedia (13 November 2014), *Public Affairs (political party)*. At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Affairs_%28political_party%29, last access 16 December 2014.

Whitman, Richard G. and Ana E. Juncos (2012), "The Arab Spring, the Eurozone Crisis and the Neighbourhood: A Region in Flux", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50, Annual Review, pp. 147-161.

Women's Studies International Forum (2013), U*nintended consequences of EU policies. Reintegrating gender in European studies.* Volume 39, pp. 1-62.

Wunderlich, Jens-Uwe (2012), " The EU an Actor Sui Generis? A Comparison of EU and ASEAN Actorness", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50 (4), pp. 653-669.

Zaidi, Ashgar (2010), *Poverty Risks for Older People in EU Countries – An Update.* European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, Policy Brief (II) 2010, Vienna.

Zaller, John R. (1992), *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS

European Commission (2012a): Eurobarometer 43.0 (Mar-Apr 1995). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2636 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10912.

European Commission (2012b): Eurobarometer 44.1 (Nov-Dec 1995). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2690 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10917.

European Commission (2012c): Eurobarometer 46.1 (Oct-Nov 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2899 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10924.

European Commission (2012d): Eurobarometer 48.0 (Oct-Nov 1997). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2959 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10929.

European Commission (2012e): Eurobarometer 50.0 (Oct-Nov 1998). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3085 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10845.

European Commission (2012f): Eurobarometer 52.0 (Oct-Nov 1999). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3204 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10933.

European Commission (2012g): Eurobarometer 54.1 (Oct-Nov 2000). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3387 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10937.

European Commission (2012h): Eurobarometer 56.2 (Oct-Nov 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3627 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10946.

European Commission (2012i): Eurobarometer 58.1 (Oct-Nov 2002). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3693 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10953.

European Commission (2012j): Eurobarometer 60.1 (Oct-Nov 2003). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3938 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10958.

European Commission (2012k): Eurobarometer 62.0 (Oct-Nov 2004). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4229 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10962.

European Commission (2012l): Eurobarometer 64.2 (Oct-Nov 2005). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4414 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10970.

European Commission (2012m): Eurobarometer 66.1 (Sep-Oct 2006). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4526 Data file Version 1.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10980.

European Commission (2012n): Eurobarometer 68.1 (Sep-Nov 2007). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4565 Data file Version 4.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.10988.

European Commission (2012o): Eurobarometer 70.1 (Oct-Nov 2008). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4819 Data file Version 3.0.2, doi:10.4232/1.10989.

European Commission (2012p): Eurobarometer 71.3 (Jun-Jul 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4973 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11135.

European Commission (2012q): Eurobarometer 72.4 (Oct-Nov 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4994 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11141.

European Commission (2012r): Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5234 Data file Version 2.0.1, doi:10.4232/1.11479.

European Commission (2013a): Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5481 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11768.

European Commission (2013b): Eurobarometer 77.4 (2012). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5613 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11697.

GESIS, Data Archive for the Social sciences (2013a), Countries Participating in the Standard, Special and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. At http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/, last access 22 November 2013.

GESIS, Data Archive for the Social sciences (2013b), Overview of Eurobarometer surveys (32 ff.) with standard EU and trend question modules. At http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/dienstleistung/daten/umfragedaten/eurobarometer/eb standard/standardEBoverview.pdf , last access 22 November 2013.

GESIS, Data Archive for the Social sciences (2013c), “Countries’ Participation in ISSP modules.” At http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/, last access 25 November 2013.

OTHER DATASETS

Álvarez-Rivera, Manuel (2015), Election Resources on the Internet. 15 May 2015, at http://www.electionresources.org, last access 10 June 2015.

Danish Folketing (2013), Which countries are net contributors to the EU budget? At http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/79/, last access 23 July 2014.

Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2012. Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. Version 12/10 – 15 October 2012. At http://parlgov.org/stable/data.html, last access 23 July 2014.

European Commission (no date), Financial Programming and Budget. EU expenditure and revenue. At http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm, last access 23 July 2014.

EVS (2008), “European Values Study 1981-2008: Participating countries.” At http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/data-and-downloads/ , last access 25 November 2013.

EVS (2011a): EVS - European Values Study 1999 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3811 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10789.

EVS (2011b): European Values Study 2008: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4800 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11004.

Mach, Pavel (2008), Money go round. At http://www.money-go-round.eu, last access 23 July 2014.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2014), *Table 4: Gender Inequality Index*, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index, last access 23 September 2015.

Worldbank (2014a), Employment in services (% of total employment). At http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS, last access 23 July 2014.

Worldbank (2014b), Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). At http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, last access 07 June 2015.

Worldbank (2014c), Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). At http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS, last access 07 June 2015.

Worldbank (2014d), GDP (constant 2005 US$). At http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD/, last access 03 September 2014.

APPENDIX

Country	Age 65+ total	Age 65+ Men	Age 65+ Women
Belgium	17.8	17.7	17.9
Bulgaria	28.2	19.3	34.3
Czech Republic	6.0	2.7	8.4
Denmark	14.1	12.4	15.6
Germany	15.0	13.3	16.6
Estonia	17.2	11.2	20.1
Ireland	12.2	11.8	12.6
Greece	17.3	16.0	18.3
Spain	14.8	13.6	15.8
France	9.4	7.9	10.5
Croatia	26.5	21.1	30.4
Italia	16.3	13.1	18.7
Cyprus	29.3	24.2	33.6
Latvia	13.9	8.5	16.4
Lithuania	18.7	13.8	21.2
Luxembourg	6.1	3.6	8.0
Hungary	6.0	4.7	6.8
Malta	17.3	19.0	15.9
Netherlands	5.5	5.5	5.4
Austria	15.1	11.5	17.8
Poland	14.0	9.3	16.9
Portugal	17.4	16.1	18.4
Romania	15.4	9.6	19.8
Slovenia	19.6	11.7	25.0
Slovakia	7.8	5.9	9.0
Finland	18.4	11.9	23.3
Sweden	17.7	10.2	23.5
United Kingdom	16.1	14.5	17.4

TABLE 12 AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATES, IN PERCENT (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2014B)

Eurobaro-meter edition	EB 43.0	EB 44.1	EB 46.1	EB 48.0	EB 50.0	EB 52.0	EB 54.1	EB 56.2	EB 58.1	EB 60.1	EB 62.0	EB 64.2	EB 66.1	EB 68.1	EB 70.1	EB 71.3	EB 72.4	EB 73.4	EB 75.3	EB 77.4	
Number in GESIS archive	ZA 2636	ZA 2690	ZA 2899	ZA 2959	ZA 3085	ZA 3204	ZA 3387	ZA 3627	ZA 3693	ZA 3938	ZA 4229	ZA 4414	ZA 4526	ZA 4565	ZA 4819	ZA 4973	ZA 4994	ZA 5234	ZA 5481	ZA 5613	
Fieldwork Year	Mar-Apr 1995	Nov-Dec 1995	Oct-Nov 1996	Oct-Nov 1997	Oct-Nov 1998	Oct-Nov 1999	Nov-Dec 2000	Oct-Nov 2001	Oct-Nov 2002	Oct-Nov 2003	Oct-Nov 2004	Oct-Nov 2005	Sep-Oct 2006	Sep-Nov 2007	Oct-Nov 2008	Jun-Jul 2009	Oct-Nov 2009	May 2010	May 2011	June 2012	**N**
Austria	1075	1036	1009	1023	1043	1018	1000	999	1010	1010	1007	1020	1016	1015	1003	1015	1030	1000	1018	1001	**20348**
Belgium	1028	1013	1006	1041	1018	1044	1048	1007	1037	1022	974	1024	1003	1022	1002	983	1006	1013	1020	1059	**20370**
Bulgaria											1004	1001	1035	977	1006	1023	1008	1000	1000	1008	**10062**
Croatia											1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		**9000**
Cyprus, Republic											500	502	503	500	503	505	506	507	501	504	**5031**
Czech Republic											1075	1161	1091	1106	1026	1094	1056	1021	1022	1004	**10656**
Denmark	1000	1000	1000	1000	1004	1001	1000	1000	1000	1000	1028	1032	1003	999	1029	1012	1006	1007	1007	1008	**20136**
Estonia											1000	1000	1000	1012	1000	1006	1002	1000	1000	1005	**10025**
Finland	1020	1050	1040	1032	1015	1015	1015	1003	1013	1018	1005	1028	1000	1033	1004	1012	1018	1001	1003	1017	**20342**
France	1002	1000	1003	1005	1003	1003	1003	1005	1004	1015	1020	1009	1007	1036	1027	1038	1005	1020	1022	1027	**20254**
Germany (East)	1069	1019	1008	1036	1011	1020	1014	1006	1016	1023	508	513	507	508	510	514	514	492	523	525	**15336**
Germany (West)	1038	1095	1024	1026	1016	1018	1013	1001	1018	1016	1037	1021	1018	1001	1016	1007	1000	1023	1012	980	**20380**
Greece	1006	1008	1012	1012	1007	1010	1002	1002	1003	1001	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	**20063**
Hungary											1014	1000	1005	1000	1002	1004	1023	1021	1019	1009	**10097**
Iceland																		526	500		**1026**
Ireland	1013	1000	1003	1002	1000	1001	1001	1001	1016	1014	1000	1009	1000	1007	1000	1006	1011	1014	1015	997	**20110**
Italy	1046	1028	1059	1011	1000	1010	987	999	1043	1008	1020	1000	1006	1045	1061	1036	1036	1028	1039	1026	**20488**
Latvia											1005	1033	1015	1006	1002	1008	1006	1003	1007	1024	**10109**
Lithuania											1002	1020	1000	1016	1011	1016	1023	1019	1026	1028	**10161**

TABLE 13 SAMPLE SIZES (GESIS 2013A)

Eurobaro-meter edition	EB 43.0	EB 44.1	EB 46.1	EB 48.0	EB 50.0	EB 52.0	EB 54.1	EB 56.2	EB 58.1	EB 60.1	EB 62.0	EB 64.2	EB 66.1	EB 68.1	EB 70.1	EB 71.3	EB 72.4	EB 73.4	EB 75.3	EB 77.4	
Number in GESIS archive	**ZA 2636**	**ZA 2690**	**ZA 2899**	**ZA 2959**	**ZA 3085**	**ZA 3204**	**ZA 3387**	**ZA 3627**	**ZA 3693**	**ZA 3938**	**ZA 4229**	**ZA 4414**	**ZA 4526**	**ZA 4565**	**ZA 4819**	**ZA 4973**	**ZA 4994**	**ZA 5234**	**ZA 5481**	**ZA 5613**	
Fieldwork Year	**Mar-Apr 1995**	**Nov-Dec 1995**	**Oct-Nov 1996**	**Oct-Nov 1997**	**Oct-Nov 1998**	**Oct-Nov 1999**	**Nov-Dec 2000**	**Oct-Nov 2001**	**Oct-Nov 2002**	**Oct-Nov 2003**	**Oct-Nov 2004**	**Oct-Nov 2005**	**Sep-Oct 2006**	**Sep-Nov 2007**	**Oct-Nov 2008**	**Jun-Jul 2009**	**Oct-Nov 2009**	**May 2010**	**May 2011**	**June 2012**	**N**
Luxembourg	501	770	610	620	602	598	609	604	600	587	502	510	500	502	500	530	502	505	501	503	**11156**
Macedonia, Republic of														1009	1009	1008	1005	1048	1056		**6135**
Malta											500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	**5000**
Montenegro																			1000		**1000**
Netherlands	1005	1020	1070	1003	1032	1010	1004	999	1000	1006	1009	1041	1018	1005	1041	1000	1004	1013	1016	1003	**20299**
Poland											1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	**10000**
Portugal	999	936	1003	1000	1000	1001	1000	1001	1000	1000	1000	1003	995	1000	1000	1010	1025	1025	1048	1001	**20047**
Romania											1012	1000	1047	1000	1053	1012	1021	1020	1023	1043	**10231**
Slovakia											1252	1096	1023	1126	1006	1065	1040	1027	1010	1000	**10645**
Slovenia											1000	1034	1031	1009	1006	1012	1015	1010	1018	1005	**10140**
Spain	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1023	1015	1003	1000	1000	1002	1020	1006	1010	1011	**20090**
Sweden	1034	990	1008	1000	1011	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1033	1013	1003	1002	1068	1032	1050	1044	1033	**20321**
Turkey											1027	1005	1005	1004	1003	1005	1002	1000	1000		**9051**
UK - Great Britain	1100	1070	1067	1064	1066	1002	1058	1000	1014	1055	1011	1021	1000	1035	1007	1045	1018	1013	1009	1001	**20656**
UK - Northern Ireland	302	311	324	311	327	320	313	312	300	307	299	299	308	305	301	307	304	303	300	300	**6153**
N	**16238**	**16346**	**16246**	**16186**	**16155**	**16071**	**16067**	**15939**	**16074**	**16082**	**28834**	**28930**	**28652**	**29781**	**29630**	**29843**	**29738**	**30215**	**31269**	**26622**	**454918**

TABLE 13 CONTINUED

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
European Union	10887	11107	11432	11770	12117	12593	12850	13017	13210	13555	13851	14320	14778	14831	14159	14448	14686	14632
EU candidate countries:																		
Croatia (EU member state since 2013)	30	32	34	35	35	36	37	39	41	43	45	47	49	50	47	46	46	45
Iceland	10	11	11	12	13	13	14	14	14	15	16	17	18	18	17	16	17	17
Macedonia	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
Montenegro	NA	NA	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Turkey	317	340	366	375	362	387	365	387	407	446	483	516	540	544	518	565	615	628
Other regions and countries:																		
Arab World	773	808	837	866	878	923	944	962	1015	1107	1176	1262	1335	1420	1443	1520	1573	1662
China	916	1016	1117	1221	1317	1417	1535	1674	1842	2028	2257	2543	2903	3183	3476	3839	4196	4517
Russian Federation	524	505	512	485	516	567	596	625	670	718	764	826	897	944	870	909	948	981
United States	9350	9705	10140	10591	11105	11559	11668	11876	12207	12671	13095	13445	13685	13646	13263	13596	13847	14232
World	34026	35160	36488	37408	38669	40315	41016	41860	43038	44842	46468	48375	50301	51033	49964	52000	53470	54748

TABLE 14 GDP OF THE EU AND SELECTED OTHER WORLD REGIONS AND COUNTRIES[97]

[97] In constant 2005 US-Dollar, in 100 billions; data from Worldbank (2014d)

Decreasing gender gap	No clear trend	Increasing gender gap
Denmark	Italy	France
Sweden	Luxembourg	Belgium
Austria	United Kingdom	The Netherlands
Republic of Cyprus	Portugal	Germany
Czech Republic	Spain	Greece
Hungary	Finland	Ireland
Latvia	Lithuania	Estonia
Malta	Slovakia	Romania
Poland	Bulgaria	Croatia
Slovenia	Iceland (data only for 2010 – 2011)	
Turkey		
Macedonia	Montenegro (data only for 2010-2011)	

TABLE 15 TRENDS IN EU GENDER GAPS (1995 – 2012 FOR MEMBER STATES, 1995 – 2011 FOR CANDIDATE COUNTRIES)

European elections, general results, 2014	Share of votes in percent
Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)	29.43
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	24.53
European Conservatists and Reformists	9.32
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	8.92
European United Left/Nordic Green Left	6.92
The Greens/European Free Alliance	6.66
Europe of Freedom and of Direct Democracy Group	6.39
Non-attached members	6.92

TABLE 16 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014 (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014B)

European elections, Germany, 2014	Share of votes in percent
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	35.3
Socialdemocratic Party of Germany	27.3
Alliance 90/The Greens	10.7
The Left	7.4
Alternative for Germany	7.1
Free Democratic Party	3.4
Free Voters	1.5
Pirate Party of Germany	1.4
Human Environment Animal Protection	1.2
National Democratic Party of Germany	1.0
Family Party of Germany	0.7
Ecological-Democratic Party	0.6
The Party	0.6
The Republicans	0.4
Party of Bible-abiding Christians	0.2

TABLE 17 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014, GERMANY (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014C)

European elections, Sweden, 2014	Share of votes in percent
Socialdemocratic Party	24.19
Green Party	15.41
Moderate Party	13.65
Liberal People's Party	9.91
Sweden Democrats	9.67
Center Party	6.49
Left Party	6.30
Christian Democratic Party	5.93
Feminist Initiative	5.49
Pirate Party	2.23

TABLE 18 RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014, SWEDEN (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2014D)

General elections, Germany, 2013	Share of first votes in percent	Share of second votes in percent
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	45.3	41.5
Socialdemocratic Party of Germany	29.4	25.7
The Left	8.2	8.6
Alliance 90/The Greens	7.3	8.4
Free Democratic Party	2.4	4.8
Alternative for Germany	1.9	4.7
Pirate Party of Germany	2.2	2.2
National Democratic Party of Germany	1.5	1.3
Free Voters	1.0	1.0
Others	0.8	1.8

TABLE 19 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY 2013 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2014)

General elections, Sweden, 2014	Share of votes in percent
Socialdemocratic Party	31.0
Moderate Party	23.3
Sweden Democrats	12.9
Green Party	6.9
Center Party	6.1
Left Party	5.7
Liberal Party	5.4
Christian Democratic Party	4.6
Feminist Initiative	3.1
Others	1.0

TABLE 20 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SWEDEN 2014 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2015)

General elections in Turkey, 2011	Share of votes in percent
Justice and Development Party	49.8
Republican People's Party	26.0
Nationalist Action Party	13.0
Independents	6.6
Felicity Party	1.3
Others	3.3

TABLE 21 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY 2011 (ÁLVAREZ-RIVERA 2011)

General elections in Turkey, 2015	Share of votes in percent
Justice and Development Party	41.0
Republican People's Party	25.0
Nationalist Action Party	16.3
People's Democratic Party	13.2
Felicity Party	2.1
Others	1.7

TABLE 22 RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY 2015 (TURKISH DAILY NEWS 2015)[98]

Variable name	Description	Coding
EUmem1	EU membership is (MS) or would be (CC)…	1=a good thing, 0=neither nor or a bad thing, 4=DK (missing), 9=INAP (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Independent variables:		
conservative	Welfare state tradition conservative	0=no, 1=yes
socialdemocrat	Welfare state tradition socialdemocratic	0=no, 1=yes
sex	Respondent's sex	0=male, 1=female, 2=NA (missing)
cage	Age exact, centered around group mean	total numbers from 15 onwards; 0=NA (missing)
single	Living without a partner	0=living with partner, 1=living without partner
cedu	How old were you when you stopped full-time education? Centered around group mean	0=no full-time education, 95=NA (missing), 96=INAP (missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=still studying (missing), 99=DK (missing)
occ2	Occupation: white-collar or blue-collar	1=non-active, 2=blue collar, 3=white collar
polspec	Self-placement in political spectrum	1=left to 10=right, 96=NA(missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=DK (missing), 99=INAP (missing)

TABLE 23 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODEL 1[99]

[98] Table 22 contains the results as of 12 June 2015, five days following election day, according to the news agency Anadolu.

[99] N=307084; the Eurobarometer EB 43.0 (September/October 1995) has not been included in this model because education has not been recorded as a continous variable.

		Social policy decisions at national or European level		Total
		National government	European Union	
EU membership - good or bad thing	A good thing	30250	18438	48688
	Neither good nor bad	18444	9083	27527
	A bad thing	10383	3094	13477
Total		59077	30615	89692

		Value	Approx. Sig.	
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	,109	,000	
	Cramer's V	,109	,000	
N of Valid Cases		89692		

TABLE 24 MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION FOR EU MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT AND SUPPORT FOR JOINT SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING

Respondent's sex	**Social policy decisions should be taken…**	**EU membership of our country is or would be…**		
		neither nor or a bad thing	**a good thing**	**Total**
Male	by national government (N=26892)	70%	61%	65%
	jointly at EU level (N=14465)	30%	39%	35%
	Total	100%	100%	100%
Female	by national government (N=32185)	70%	63%	67%
	jointly at EU level (N=16150)	30%	37%	33%
	Total	100%	100%	100%
Total	by national government (N=59077)	70%	62%	66%
	jointly at EU level (N=30615)	30%	38%	34%
	Total	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 25 SUPPORT FOR JOINT SOCIAL POLICY-MAKING ACROSS OPINIONS ON EU MEMBERSHIP

Variable name	Description	Coding
CPsoc2	Social welfare: should decisions be made by national government or jointly within the EU?	0=national government, 1=EU, 3=DK (missing), 4=NA (missing), 9=INAP (missing)
Independent variables:		
socialdemocrat	Welfare state tradition socialdemocratic	0=no, 1=yes
conservative	Welfare state tradition conservative	0=no, 1=yes
sex	Respondent's sex	0=male, 1=female, 2=NA (missing)
cage	Age exact, centered around group mean	total numbers from 15 onwards; 0=NA (missing)
cedu	How old were you when you stopped full-time education? Centered around group mean	0=no full-time education, 95=NA (missing), 96=INAP (missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=still studying (missing), 99=DK (missing)
exECO	Expectations for the next 12 months: national economy	1=better, 2=same, 3=worse, 4=DK (missing), 9=INAP (missing), 0=NA (missing)
occ2	Occupation: white-collar or blue-collar	1=non-active, 2=blue collar, 3=white collar
polspec	Self-placement in political spectrum	1=left to 10=right, 96=NA(missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=DK (missing), 99=INAP (missing)
exECO	Expectations for the next 12 months: national economy	1=better, 2=same, 3=worse, 4=DK (missing), 9=INAP (missing), 0=NA (missing)

TABLE 26 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODEL 2[100]

[100] N=66136; the Eurobarometer surveys which were used for this model are EB 68.1 (September/October 2007), EB 70.1 (October/November 2008), EB 72.4 (October/November 2009) and EB 73.4 (May 2010).

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Luxembourg	Austria	Ireland	United Kingdom	Iceland	Italy	Greece
N	14567	14553	16291	25258	7285	13587	13200	18491	401	11332	12842
Total	20257	20370	20299	35716	11156	20348	20110	26809	1026	20488	20063
Cox and Snell	0,065	0.055	0.036	0.05	0.027	0.043	0.054	0.069	0.080	0.084	0.067
Nagelkerke	0,087	0.075	0.052	0.067	0.043	0.058	0.084	0.094	0.119	0.113	0.091
Respondent's sex (female)	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	NA	-	-
Age	**	**	**	**	**	-	**	-	-	**	**
Relationship status (single)	**	-	**	**	**	-	-	*	-	-	-
Age when full-time education was terminated	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Occupation	**	**	**	**	-	**	**	**	**	**	**
Self-placement in pol. spectrum	-	**	**	**	-	**	**	**	**	**	**
Misery index	-	-	-	**	**	**	-	*	**	**	**
Share of employment in service sector	-	**	-	**	-	-	**	**	NA	**	**
Presence of right-wing euroskeptic party in national government	NA	NA	**	NA	NA	-	NA	NA	NA	**	**
Interaction terms											
Respondent's sex (female) * age	*	-	**	*	**	**	-	**	NA	**	**
Respondent's sex (female) * relationship status (single)	*	-	-	-	-	**	*	-	NA	-	**
Respondent's sex (female) * full-term education	-	-	-	*	**	-	-	*	NA	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * occupation	-	**	-	*	-	**	-	-	NA	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * Self-placement in pol. spectrum	-	**	-	-	**	-	-	*	NA	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) misery index	-	-	**	-	-	-	**	-	NA	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * share of employment in service sector	-	**	*	*	-	-	-	-	NA	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * presence of rightist Euroskeptic party in government	NA	NA	-	NA	NA	-	NA	NA	NA	-	-

TABLE 27 RESULTS OF APPLYING MODEL 1 VARIABLES TO THE INDIVIDUAL EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES[101]

[101] Calculated with the LOGIT procedure in SPSS; -: not significant, *: significant at the 0.1 level, **: significant at the 0.05 level or higher, NA: not included in the model either because corresponding survey question was not asked in the country or because the variable did not vary for the country.

	Spain	Portugal	Turkey	Cyprus	Malta	Denmark	Finland	Sweden	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia
N	12579	12031	5432	3126	2714	15880	14607	16222	8417	6461	7262	6388
Total	20090	20047	9051	5031	5000	20136	20342	20321	10656	10025	10097	10109
Cox and Snell	0.042	0.058	0.025	0.098	0.300	0.056	0.059	0.128	0.096	0.062	0.059	0.048
Nagelkerke	0.058	0.077	0.033	0.131	0.400	0.075	0.079	0.171	0.130	0.083	0.080	0.067
Respondent's sex (female)	-	**	**	-	-	**	**	**	-	*	-	**
Age	**	-	-	**	**	**	**	**	-	**	-	-
Relationship status (single)	-	-	-	**	-	**	-	-	-	-	**	-
Age when full-time education was terminated	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Occupation	**	**	-	-	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Self-placement in pol. spectrum	-	**	-	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Misery index	**	-	**	-	*	**	-	**	**	**	-	-
Share of employment in service sector	**	**	**	**	-	**	-	**	-	-	**	**
Presence of right-wing euroskeptic party in national government	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	**	NA	-	-
Interaction terms												
Respondent's sex (female) * age	-	**	**	-	-	**	**	**	**	-	**	-
Respondent's sex (female) * relationship status (single)	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * full-term education	-	-	-	-	-	**	**	**	**	*	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * occupation	-	-	*	**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * Self-placement in pol. spectrum	-	-	-	**	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) misery index	-	-	-	-	-	-	**	-	-	-	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * share of employment in service sector	-	**	**	-	-	**	**	**	-	*	-	**
Respondent's sex (female) * presence of rightist Euroskeptic party in government	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-	NA	-	-

TABLE 27 CONTINUED

	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia	Bulgaria	Romania	Croatia	Macedonia	Montenegro
N	5059	6164	8328	5822	6606	5997	5901	2795	522
Total	10161	10000	10645	10140	10062	10231	9000	6135	1000
Cox and Snell	0.057	0.05	0.068	0.059	0.056	0.024	0.041	0.032	0.042
Nagelkerke	0.077	0.067	0.091	0.079	0.075	0.034	0.057	0.044	0.057
Respondent's sex (female)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Age	-	**	-	**	-	-	**	-	**
Relationship status (single)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Age when full-time education was terminated	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	-	-
Occupation	**	**	**	**	**	-	-	-	-
Self-placement in pol. spectrum	**	-	**	-	**	**	-	-	**
Misery index	-	**	**	**	**	-	-	**	NA
Share of employment in service sector	**	**	**	**	**	-	**	-	NA
Presence of right-wing Euroskeptic party in national government	NA	**	*	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Interaction terms									
Respondent's sex (female) * age	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	**	-
Respondent's sex (female) * relationship status (single)	-	-	-	-	**	-	-	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * full-term education	-	-	-	-	-	**	-	-	-
Respondent's sex (female) * occupation	-	-	-	-	**	-	-	*	-
Respondent's sex (female) * Self-placement in pol. spectrum	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	**
Respondent's sex (female) misery index	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	NA
Respondent's sex (female) * share of employment in service sector	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	NA

TABLE 27 CONTINUED

	Sweden			Germany			Turkey		
	Coefficient	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**	**Coefficient**	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**	**Coefficient**	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**
Respondent's sex (female)	-1,976	,039	,139	,703	,276	2,019	-2,743	,029	,064
Age	,019	,000	1,019	,009	,000	1,009	-,003	,342	,997
Relationship status (single)	-,073	,177	,930	-,105	,012	,900	,092	,346	1,097
Age when full-time education was terminated	,047	,000	1,048	,072	,000	1,074	-,018	,037	,982
Occupation	,271	,000	1,311	,252	,000	1,287	,019	,783	1,019
Partisanship	,260	,000	1,297	-,059	,000	,943	-,018	,194	,982
Misery index	-,051	,000	,950	,034	,027	1,034	,011	,019	1,011
Share of employment in service sector	,049	,000	1,050	,071	,000	1,073	-,077	,000	,926
Interaction terms									
Respondent's sex (female) * age	-,008	,002	,992	-,003	,057	,997	-,009	,030	,991
Respondent's sex (female) * relationship status (single)	-,071	,343	,931	,015	,790	1,015	-,235	,090	,791
Respondent's sex (female) * full-time education	-,028	,000	,973	,013	,081	1,013	,004	,773	1,004
Respondent's sex (female) * occupation	,007	,883	1,007	-,070	,061	,932	-,209	,057	,812

TABLE 28 OUTCOMES OF APPLYING MODEL 1 TO THE SWEDISH, GERMAN AND TURKISH DATA SAMPLES

	Sweden			Germany			Turkey		
	Coefficient	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**	**Coefficient**	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**	**Coefficient**	**Significance**	**Exponen-tiation of coefficient**
Respondent's sex (female) * self-placement in pol. spectrum	-,024	,152	,977	,021	,162	1,021	-,017	,436	,983
Respondent's sex (female) * misery index	,002	,922	1,002	,014	,502	1,014	-,001	,853	,999
Respondent's sex (female) * share of employment in service sector	,034	,003	1,035	-,016	,055	,985	,070	,002	1,073
Constant	-6,885	,000	,001	-6,485	,000	,002	4,032	,000	56,391

TABLE 28 CONTINUED

Variable name	Description	Coding
EUmem1	EU membership is (MS) or would be (CC)…	1=a good thing, 0=neither nor or a bad thing, 4=DK (missing), 9=DK (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Model 3.1 (N=14966), independent variables		
sex	Respondent's sex	0=male, 1=female, 2=NA (missing)
age	Age exact	total numbers from 15 onwards; 0=NA (missing)
edu	How old were you when you stopped full-time education?	0=no full-time education, 95=NA (missing), 96=INAP (missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=still studying (missing), 99=DK (missing)
occ2	Occupation: white-collar or blue-collar	1=non-active, 2=blue collar, 3=white collar
polspec	Self-placement in political left-right spectrum	1=left to 10=right, 96=NA(missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=DK (missing), 99=INAP (missing)
exECO	Expectations for the next 12 months: national economy	1=better, 2=same, 3=worse, 4=DK (missing), 9=INAP (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Model 3.2 (N=14966), additional independent variable		
crisis	dummy for the differentiation of pre- and post-crisis period	0=pre-crisis (until 2008), 1= post-crisis period (2009 onwards)
Model 3.3 (N=14966), additional independent variable		
lisbon	dummy for the differentiation of pre- and post-Lisbon period	0=until December 2007; 1=after December 2007

TABLE 29 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 3.1 TO 3.3 (SWEDEN)[102]

[102] The Eurobarometer surveys EB 43.0 (September/October 1995) and EB 46.1 (October/November 1996) were not included in these models because education has not been recorded as a continous variable in the EB 43.0 and because the EB 46.1 did not ask for the expectations for the national economy.

Variable name	Description	Coding
EUmem1	EU membership is (MS) or would be (CC)…	1=a good thing, 0=neither nor or a bad thing, 4=DK (missing), 9=DK (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Model 4.1 (N=29404), independent variables		
sex	Respondent's sex	0=male, 1=female, 2=NA (missing)
age	Age exact	total numbers from 15 onwards; 0=NA (missing)
edu	How old were you when you stopped full-time education?	0=no full-time education, 95=NA (missing), 96=INAP (missing), 97=Refusal (missing), 98=still studying (missing), 99=DK (missing)
occ2	Occupation: white-collar or blue-collar	1=non-active, 2=blue collar, 3=white collar
single	Living without a partner	0=living with partner, 1=living without partner
jobs_service_lag	Share of employment in service sector	percentage of overall employment, data from Worldbank (2014a), lagged by two years
Model 4.2 (N=29404), additional independent variable		
crisis	dummy for the differentiation of pre- and post-crisis period	0=pre-crisis (until 2008), 1= post-crisis period (2009 onwards)
Model 4.2 (N=29404), additional independent variable		
lisbon	dummy for the differentiation of pre- and post-Lisbon period	0=until December 2007; 1=after December 2007

TABLE 30 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 4.1 TO 4.3 (GERMANY)[103]

[103] The Eurobarometer survey EB 43.0 (September/October 1995) was not included in these models because education has not been recorded as a continous variable in the EB 43.0.

Variable name	Description	Coding
EUmem1	EU membership is (MS) or would be (CC)…	1=a good thing, 0=neither nor or a bad thing, 4=DK (missing), 9=DK (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Model 5.1 (N=6905), independent variables		
Sex	Respondent's sex	0=male, 1=female, 2=NA (missing)
Age	Age exact	total numbers from 15 onwards; 0=NA (missing)
occ2	Occupation: white-collar or blue-collar	1=non-active, 2=blue collar, 3=white collar
exHH	Expectations for the next 12 months: financial situation of the household	1=better, 2=same, 3=worse, 4=DK (missing), 9=INAP (missing), 0=NA (missing)
Model 5.2 (N=6905), additional independent variable		
Crisis	dummy for the differentiation of pre- and post-crisis period	0=pre-crisis (until 2008), 1= post-crisis period (2009 onwards)
Model 5.3 (N=6905), additional independent variable		
TRneg	dummy variable for the distinction of the time period until the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey and afterwards	0=until December 2005, 1=after December 2005
Model 5.4 (N=6905), additional independent variable		
TRsuspension	dummy variable for the distinction of the time period until the suspension of parts of the accession negotiations with Turkey and afterwards	0=until December 2006, 1=after December 2006

TABLE 31 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODELS 5.1 TO 5.4 (TURKEY)[104]

[104] The Eurobarometer surveys EB 62.0 (October/November 2004), EB64.2 (October/November 2005), EB 66.1 (September/October 2006), EB 68.1 (September - November 2007), EB 70.1 (October/November 2008), EB 71.3 (June/July 2009), EB 72.4 (October/November 2009), EB 73.4 (May 2010) and EB 75.3 (May 2011) were included in these models. Turkey has not been included in the earlier surveys. In the Eurobarometer EB 77.4 (June 2012), the EU membership question was not asked in candidate countries.

Sweden			
Age (positive relation with gender gap)	Younger than 29	30 to 55 years	Older than 55 years
	17%	43 %	40%
Education (positive relation with gender gap)	Younger than 16 years	16 to 19 years	Older than 19 years
	15%	29%	46%
Ideological predispositions (rightist orientations in positive relation with gender gap)	Not right	Right	
	68%	32%	
Macro-economic expectations (pessimists have greater gender gap than optimists)	Better	Same	Worse
	34%	42%	24%
Germany			
Education (negative relation with gender gap)	Younger than 16 years	16 to 19 years	Older than 19 years
	24%	48%	21%
Occupation (white collars have a larger gender gap than non-actives)	Non-active	Blue collar	White collar
	51%	26%	23%
Turkey			
Age (positive relation with gender gap)	Younger than 29	30 to 55 years	Older than 55 years
	38%	47%	15%
Occupation (blue collars have a larger gender gap than non-actives)	Non-active	Blue collar	White collar
	67%	27%	6%
Microeconomic expectations (people with stable expectations have a greater gender gap than optimists)	Better	Same	Worse
	29%	41%	30%

TABLE 32 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY ACCORDING TO THE EUROBAROMETER SAMPLES

Model 3.2 (influence of Eurozone crisis, Sweden)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
respondent's sex (female)	,221	,463	1,248
age	,014	,000	1,014
education	,047	,000	1,048
occupation		,000	
occupation: blue collar	-,163	,075	,850
occupation: white collar	,440	,000	1,552
self-placement in political spectrum	,251	,000	1,286
macroeconomic expectations		,000	
macroeconomic expectations: better	,310	,000	1,363
macroeconomic expectations: same	,064	,369	1,066
post-crisis (2009 onwards)	,455	,261	1,576
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
sex (female) by age	-,007	,052	,993
sex (female) by education	-,019	,004	,981
sex * occupation		,890	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar)	-,060	,645	,942
sex (female) by occupation (white collar)	-,022	,856	,978
sex (female) by self-placement in pol.spectrum	-,037	,082	,964
sex * macroeconomic expectations		,388	
sex (female) by macroeconomic expectations (better)	,152	,175	1,164
sex (female) by macroeconomic expectations (same)	,058	,575	1,060
Interaction terms with pre- and postcrisis distinction (crisis)			
respondent's sex by post-crisis	,975	,079	2,650
age by post-crisis	,002	,709	1,002
education by post-crisis	-,008	,356	,992
occupation * crisis		,936	
occupation (blue collar) by post-crisis	,006	,971	1,006
occupation (white collar) by post-crisis	-,040	,790	,961
self-placement in pol.spectrum by post-crisis	-,008	,749	,992
macro-economic expectations * crisis		,966	
macroeconomic expectations (better) by post-crisis	-,021	,894	,979
macroeconomic expectations (same) by post-crisis	-,040	,798	,961
Threeway interactions with respondent's sex (sex) and pre-/ post-crisis distinction (crisis)			
sex(female) by age by post-crisis	-,011	,086	,989
sex (female) by education by post-crisis	-,013	,217	,987
sex * occupation * crisis		,482	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar) by post-crisis	-,112	,629	,894
sex (female) by occupation (white collar) by post-crisis	,128	,549	1,136

TABLE 33 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 3.2 (SWEDEN)[105]

[105] Calculated with the LOGIT procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Model 3.2 (influence of Eurozone crisis, Sweden)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
sex (female) by self-placement in pol.spectrum by post-crisis	,026	,469	1,027
sex * macro-economic expectations * crisis		,623	
sex (female) by macro-economic expectations (better) by post-crisis	,038	,867	1,038
sex (female) by macro-economic expectations (same) by post-crisis	,174	,421	1,190
Constant	-3,248	,000	,039

TABLE 33 CONTINUED

Model 3.3 (influence of the Treaty of Lisbon, Sweden)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
respondent's sex (female)	,257	,421	1,293
age	,014	,000	1,014
education	,047	,000	1,049
occupation		,000	
occupation: blue collar	-,154	,108	,857
occupation: white collar	,424	,000	1,528
self-placement in pol. spectrum	,257	,000	1,293
macroeconomic expectations		,000	
macroeconomic expectations: better	,418	,000	1,520
macroeconomic expectations: same	,186	,016	1,205
Treaty of Lisbon (2007 and onwards)	1,010	,008	2,745
Interaction terms with respondent's sex			
sex (female) by age	-,007	,061	,993
sex (female) by education	-,021	,002	,979
sex * occupation		,807	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar)	-,084	,539	,919
sex (female) by occupation (white collar)	-,027	,832	,973
sex (female) by self-placement in pol. spectrum	-,034	,129	,967
sex * macroeconomic expectations		,353	
sex (female) by macroeconomic expectations (better)	,171	,157	1,186
sex (female) by macroeconomic expectations (same)	,068	,546	1,070
Interaction terms with pre- and post-Lisbon distinction (lisbon)			
sex by post-Lisbon	,683	,191	1,979
age by post-Lisbon	-,001	,854	,999
education by post-Lisbon	-,012	,137	,988
occupation * Lisbon		,979	
occupation (blue collar) by post-Lisbon	-,032	,841	,969
occupation (white collar) by post-Lisbon	-,023	,876	,978
self-placement in pol. spectrum by post-Lisbon	-,012	,612	,988
macro-economic expectations * Lisbon		,075	
macroeconomic expectations (better) by post-Lisbon	-,260	,059	,771

TABLE 34 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 3.3 (SWEDEN)[106]

[106] Calculated with the LOGIT procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Model 3.3 (influence of the Treaty of Lisbon, Sweden)			
Variable	Coefficient	Variable	Coefficient
macroeconomic expectations (same) by post-Lisbon	-,293	,030	,746
Threeway interactions with respondent's sex (sex) and pre-/ post-Lisbon distinction (lisbon)			
sex(female) by age by post-Lisbon	-,008	,161	,992
sex (female) by education by post-Lisbon	-,006	,591	,994
sex * occupation * Lisbon		,780	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar) by post-Lisbon	-,030	,891	,970
sex (female) by occupation (white collar) by post-Lisbon	,096	,641	1,101
sex (female) by self-placement in pol. spectrum by post-Lisbon	,017	,619	1,018
sex * macro-economic expectations * Lisbon		,603	
sex (female) by macro-economic expectations (better) by post-Lisbon	,015	,940	1,015
sex (female) by macro-economic expectations (same) by post-Lisbon	,158	,408	1,171
Constant	-3,453	,000	,032

TABLE 34 CONTINUED

Model 4.2 (influence of the Eurozone crisis, Germany)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of the coefficient
Intercept	-7,389	0.000	0.001
respondent's sex (female)	0.661	0.318	1,936
age	0.004	0.007	1,004
education	0.069	0.000	1,072
occupation (white collar)	0.514	0.000	1,672
occupation (blue collar)	0.032	0.611	1,032
jobs in the service sector	0.094	0.000	1,098
post-crisis period	-0.538	0.962	0.584
Interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex)			
sex (female) * age	-0.003	0.419	0.997
sex (female) * education	0.012	0.084	1,012
sex (female) * occupation (white collar)	-0.012	0.021	0.894
sex (female) * occupation (blue collar)	-0.014	0.881	0.986
sex (female) * jobs in the service sector	-0.013	0.258	0.987
Interaction terms with pre- and post-crisis distinction (crisis)			
sex (female) * post-crisis	2,033	0.009	20,767
age * post-crisis	0.010	0.001	1,010
education * post-crisis	0.024	0.009	1,024
white collar * post-crisis	-0.153	0.043	0.859
blue collar * post-crisis	0.045	0.751	1,046
jobs in the service sector * post-crisis	-0.009	0.955	0.991

TABLE 35 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 4.2 (GERMANY)[107]

[107] Calculated with the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Model 4.2 (influence of the Eurozone crisis, Germany)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of the coefficient
Threeway interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex) and pre-/post-crisis distinction (crisis)			
age * sex (female)*post-crisis	-0.009	0.029	0.992
education * sex (female)*post-crisis	0.006	0.559	1,006
occupation (white collar) * sex (female) * post-crisis	-0.010	0.913	0.990
occupation (blue collar) * sex (female) * post-crisis	-0.009	0.965	0.991
jobs in the service sector * sex (female) * post-crisis	-0.039	0.029	0.961

TABLE 35 CONTINUED

Model 5.2 (influence of the Eurozone crisis, Turkey)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
respondent's sex (female)	.237	.318	1.268
Age	.001	.739	1.001
occupation		.749	
occupation (blue collar)	-.063	.540	.938
occupation (white collar)	-.107	.526	.898
micro-economic expectations		.000	
microeconomic expectations (better)	1.073	.000	2.925
microeconomic expectations (same)	.543	.000	1.720
crisis	-.178	.430	.837
Interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex)			
sex (female) by age	-.009	.056	.991
sex (female) by occupation		.144	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar)	-.338	.117	.714
sex (female) by occupation (white collar)	-.405	.158	.667
sex by micro-economic expectations		.166	
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (better)	-.341	.062	.711
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (same)	-.220	.198	.802
Interaction terms with pre- and post-crisis period distinction (crisis)			
sex (female) by crisis	.286	.373	1.332
age by crisis	-.001	.846	.999
occupation by crisis		.883	
occupation (blue collar) by crisis	.068	.639	1.070
occupation (white collar) by crisis	.077	.757	1.080
micro-economic expectations by crisis		.002	
micro-economic expectations (better) by crisis	-.625	.001	.535
micro-economic expectations (same) by crisis	-.218	.176	.804
Threeway interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex) and pre- and post-crisis period distinction (crisis)			
sex (female) by age by crisis	.001	.911	1.001
sex (female) by occupation by crisis		.668	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar) by crisis	.125	.676	1.133
sex (female) by occupation (white collar) by crisis	.352	.398	1.421

TABLE 36 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 5.2 (TURKEY)[108]

[108] Calculated with the LOGIT procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Model 5.2 (influence of the Eurozone crisis, Turkey)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
sex by micro-economic expectations by crisis		.271	
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (better) by crisis	.282	.278	1.325
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (same) by crisis	-.108	.646	.898
Constant	-.063	.704	.938

TABLE 36 CONTINUED

Model 5.4 (influence of the suspension of accession negotiations, Turkey)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
respondent's sex (female)	.166	.563	1.181
age	-.003	.382	.997
occupation		.503	
occupation (blue collar)	-.048	.695	.953
occupation (white collar)	-.235	.241	.791
micro-economic expectations		.000	
microeconomic expectations (better)	1.294	.000	3.648
microeconomic expectations (same)	.711	.000	2.036
suspension	-.380	.122	.684
Interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex)			
sex (female) by age	-.006	.252	.994
sex (female) by occupation		.537	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar)	-.278	.270	.758
sex (female) by occupation (white collar)	-.112	.743	.894
sex by micro-economic expectations		.045	
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (better)	-.500	.024	.606
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (same)	-.461	.027	.631
Interaction terms with pre- and post-suspension distinction (TRsuspension)			
sex (female) by suspension	.317	.361	1.373
age by suspension	.006	.218	1.006
occupation by suspension		.539	
occupation (blue collar) by suspension	.014	.929	1.014
occupation (white collar) by suspension	.275	.281	1.316
micro-economic expectations by suspension		.000	
micro-economic expectations (better) by suspension	-.918	.000	.399
micro-economic expectations (same) by suspension	-.479	.006	.619
Threeway interaction terms with respondent's sex (sex) and pre- and post-suspension distinction (TRsuspension)			
sex (female) by age by suspension	-.004	.606	.996
sex (female) by occupation by suspension		.877	
sex (female) by occupation (blue collar) by suspension	.016	.960	1.016
sex (female) by occupation (white collar) by suspension	-.214	.619	.808

TABLE 37 REGRESSION PARAMETERS OF MODEL 5.4 (TURKEY).[109]

[109] Calculated with the LOGIT procedure in SPSS. Reference category is "a bad thing or neither nor"; categories not listed in the table served as reference categories for the independent variables.

Model 5.4 (influence of the suspension of accession negotiations, Turkey)			
Variable	Coefficient	Significance	Exponentiation of coefficient
sex by micro-economic expectations by suspension		.181	
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (better) by suspension	.503	.068	1.653
sex (female) by micro-economic expectations (same) by suspension	.320	.205	1.378
Constant	.109	.593	1.115

TABLE 37 CONTINUED