

# **REGIONAL TRENDS IN CLASS VOTING**

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A thesis submitted to the  
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities  
in partial fulfillment for the  
degree of  
Master of Arts in  
International Relations

August 2015

Department of International Relations  
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## REGIONAL TRENDS IN CLASS VOTING

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There have been fierce debates over the decline in class voting levels. While one group of scholars argues that class voting has been declining in the Western democracies, another, opposing group aims to show that class voting trends have been stable. There exist three shortcomings in the previous class voting literature. First, a majority of these studies focus on Western countries and neglect others. Second, comparative studies are relatively rare. Lastly, the role of country-specific effects has been ignored. The present study offers a cross-regional comparison of class voting trends, including non-Western countries, while also considering the effects of country-level control variables. After conducting analyses on survey-level data to construct the country-level dataset, I conduct time-series-cross-sectional analysis. The findings reveal that in Western democracies class voting levels were stable between 1990 and 2011, while in post-communist countries they increased over the same period. The study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it demonstrates that a differentiation between regions, in which countries have similar historical, social and political characteristics, is necessary since different regions have different patterns of class voting. Second, country-level control variables suggest that different dynamics of class voting exist under different institutional contexts. Finally, the results demonstrate that assessing time trends in class voting without taking country-specific factors into account may be deceptive and therefore country-level control variables should be included.

**Keywords:** Class Voting, Post-Communist Countries, Institutional Context, Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Analysis

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## SOSYOEKONOMİK BAZLI OY VERMEDE BÖLGESEL TRENDLER

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Sosyoekonomik statü bazlı oy vermenin öneminin azalması son yıllarda literatürde önemli tartışmaları beraberinde getirmiştir. Bir görüşe göre sosyoekonomik statü bazlı oy verme seviyeleri 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana azalmışken diğer bir görüşe göre ise sabit kalmıştır. Bu çalışmada anket verisinden elde edilen sonuçlarla oluşturduğum makro düzeydeki veriseti üzerinde kesitler-arası zaman serisi analizi uyguluyorum. Ana bulgular Batı ülkelerinde sosyoekonomik bazlı oy verme seviyelerinin 1990-2011 yılları arasında sabit kaldığını gösterirken Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde aynı dönemde arttığını, Güney Avrupa'da ise azaldığını gösteriyor. Bu çalışmanın literatüre katkısı üç ana maddede sıralanabilir. İlk olarak, ülkelerin tarihi, sosyal ve siyasi özelliklerine göre benzerlik gösterdikleri coğrafi bölgelere göre gruplandırılmaları bu gruplar değişik oy verme örüntüleri gösterebildikleri için faydalı olabilir. İkincil olarak, ülke seviyesinde kullanılan kontrol değişkenleri değişik kurumsal bağlamlarda sosyoekonomik bazlı oy vermenin değişik dinamiklere sahip olabileceğine işaret ediyor. Üçüncü ve son olarak ise sonuçlar ülke seviyesinde kontrol değişkeni kullanmadan sosyoekonomik bazlı oy vermenin zaman içindeki değişimine bakmanın yanıltıcı olabileceğini göstermektedir ki bu ülke seviyesinde kontrol değişkeni kullanmanın öneminin altını çizmektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Sosyoekonomik Statü Bazlı Oy Verme, Doğu Avrupa Ülkeleri, Kurumsal Bağlam, Kesitler-Arası Zaman Serisi Analizi

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## **Abstract**

There have been fierce debates over the decline in class voting levels. While one group of scholars argues that class voting has been declining in the Western democracies since the end of World War II, another, opposing group aims to show that class voting trends have been stable. There exist three shortcomings in the previous class voting literature. First, a majority of these studies focus on Western countries and neglect others. Second, comparative studies are relatively rare. And, lastly, the role of country-specific effects has been ignored. The present study offers a cross-regional comparison of class voting trends, including those in non-Western countries, while also considering the effects of country-level control variables. After conducting analyses on survey-level data to construct the country-level dataset, I conduct time-series-cross-sectional analysis with the country-level data. The findings reveal that in Western democracies class voting levels were stable between 1990 and 2011, while in post-communist Eastern European countries they increased over the same period and declined in the Southern European sample. The study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it demonstrates that a differentiation between regions, in which countries have similar historical, social and political characteristics, is necessary since different regions have different patterns of class voting. Second, country-level control variables suggest that different dynamics of class voting exist under different institutional contexts. Finally, the results demonstrate that assessing time trends in class voting without taking country-specific factors into account may be deceptive and therefore country-level control variables should be included.

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## Özet

Sosyoekonomik statü bazlı oy vermenin öneminin azalması son yıllarda literatürde önemli tartışmaları beraberinde getirmiştir. Bir görüşe göre sosyoekonomik statü bazlı oy verme seviyeleri 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana azalmışken diğer bir görüşe göre ise sabit kalmıştır. Bu çalışmada anket verisinden elde edilen sonuçlarla oluşturduğum makro düzeydeki veriseti üzerinde kesitler-arası zaman serisi analizi uyguluyorum. Ana bulgular Batı ülkelerinde sosyoekonomik bazlı oy verme seviyelerinin 1990-2011 yılları arasında sabit kaldığını gösterirken Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde aynı dönemde arttığını, Güney Avrupa'da ise azaldığını gösteriyor. Bu çalışmanın literatüre katkısı üç ana maddede sıralanabilir. İlk olarak, ülkelerin tarihi, sosyal ve siyasi özelliklerine göre benzerlik gösterdikleri coğrafi bölgelere göre gruplandırılmaları bu gruplar değişik oy verme örüntüleri gösterebildikleri için faydalı olabilir. İkincil olarak, ülke seviyesinde kullanılan kontrol değişkenleri değişik kurumsal bağlamlarda sosyoekonomik bazlı oy vermenin değişik dinamiklere sahip olabileceğine işaret ediyor. Üçüncü ve son olarak ise sonuçlar ülke seviyesinde kontrol değişkeni kullanmadan sosyoekonomik bazlı oy vermenin zaman içindeki değişimine bakmanın yanıltıcı olabileceğini göstermektedir ki bu ülke seviyesinde kontrol değişkeni kullanmanın öneminin altını çizmektedir.

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## 1 Introduction

In their seminal work *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967), Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan argue that social class, in the shape of worker vs. owner division is one of the four cleavages that shape Western societies and party systems<sup>1</sup>. Class issues were at the heart of domestic and international political conflicts during much of the twentieth century; either in democratic or non-democratic contexts. There have been violence, revolutions, civil wars, uprisings, and even the Cold war was a confrontation between the capitalist West and communist Eastern Bloc. On the democratic side, there have been strikes and protests by the members of the lower classes, but most importantly for the scope of this paper, class cleavage leads to class voting. Class issues also shape party systems. For example, the British Labor party was founded by trade unions, in order to be represented in the electoral arena (Lipset 1963) and is seen as the representative of the labor unions (Harrop and Miller 1987, 114). Class voting also has implications in the areas of policy-making and domestic politics. Lenski, Lenski and Nolan (1991) suggest that higher levels of class voting reduce income inequalities within countries as lower classes vote for pro-redistribution parties. In sum, class voting, which, at the simplest level, means lower classes vote for the left and higher classes vote for the right, was a significant phenomenon of the twentieth century (Lipset 1963; Korpi 1983).

The salience of the class cleavage came to be debated towards the end of twentieth century. Inglehart (1971; 1977) argued that an ‘intergenerational shift’ in individuals’ values was taking place: Post-material values and cleavages were preempting the older ones. Arguments concerning class dealignment followed. Especially fueled by Clark and Lipset article *Are Social Classes Dying?* (1991), fierce debates over the decline in the importance of class politics and class voting took place. Many authors claimed to empirically demonstrate

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<sup>1</sup> The other three cleavages are land vs. industry, state vs. church, and center vs. periphery

that class voting had been on decline since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, many others objected to the arguments made by these authors and the validity of the empirical results they obtained. They either addressed shortcomings of those theories or underlined the need for using more appropriate methods, and they claimed to show that there has been no significant decline in levels of class voting.<sup>3</sup> While these studies contained empirical or theoretical analyses or both, a majority of the empirical work either did not use individual level data, or did not include country-level control variables to account for country-specific effects. Including country-level predictors is essential since there may be cross-country differences which influence class voting. Moreover, a great majority of the previous studies exclusively focused on Western democracies and ignored other countries, which may have different class voting patterns. In my view, all of these points are critical shortcomings of the previous literature.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to re-examine time trends in levels of class voting with individual-level survey data, controlling for the effects of country-level variables and engaging in a comparison between different regions. Additionally, as there have been few analyses conducted in the past decade or two, this study will also allow us to follow the trend for the recent period. My main hypotheses are that class voting levels in western democracies

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<sup>2</sup> See Nieuwbeerta (1996), Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999), Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf and Ultee (2000), Gijssberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000), Dogan (2001); Andersen and Heath (2002); Dalton (1996); Clark and Lipset (1991); Pakulski and Waters (1996); Franklin and Mughan (1978) Clark, Lipset and Rempel (1993); Dogan (2001); Franklin, Mackie and Valen (2009 [1992]); Dalton and Wattenberg (1993); Kelley, McAllister and Mughan (1985); Inglehart and Rabier (1987) for some important works supporting the decline hypothesis.

<sup>3</sup> See Hout, Brooks and Manza (1993); Manza, Hout and Brooks (1995); van der Waal, Achtenberg and Houtman (2007); Evans (2000); Oesch (2008); Evans, Heath and Payne (1991); Weakliem and Heath (1999); Goldthorpe (2001); for the works that oppose the view that class voting declines. According to Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2006, 90) these works used pluralistic methodologies and adopted newer theoretical approaches on class and party systems.

have not significantly changed over the period 1990-2011 while class voting levels in post-communist countries have increased over the same period. Other two hypotheses concerning class voting trends expect no decline at the global level and expect decline in class voting levels in the Southern European democracies. The findings fulfill these expectations. Furthermore, the pivotal role of controlling for country level variables is also evident in the analysis, since the results are completely different without those control variables.

## **2 Literature Review: Origins**

Harrop and Miller (1987, 173) mention four major waves of change that may have shaped electoral cleavages. These are the national revolution, the industrial revolution, the growth of state and the post-industrial influences, usually in the chronological order—especially in the Western world. The industrial revolution multiplied the divisions between the town and the country, and created new ones between employers and workers (Harrop and Miller 1987, 173; see also Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 13-26). These developments resulted in the formation of left-wing parties, primary aim of which was to defend workers' interests, and finally class voting rose up to be an important phenomenon of the electoral politics.

Interest in class voting arose after the electoral arena was seen as means for the “democratic class struggle” (Anderson & Davidson 1943), when electoral class struggle took the place of ‘revolutionary class struggle’. While some earliest works on class voting (Sombart 1976 [1906], Sorokin 1959 [1927]) were impressionistic, others only relied on evidence on the level of electoral constituencies (Siegfried 1913, Tingsten 1937; cited by Evans 2000, 403). These studies, with many others succeeding them, found that lower class voters were more likely to vote for leftist parties compared to higher classes. Solid theories of voting behavior being formulized and with methodological advances, empirically reliable

studies on class voting, based on theoretical frameworks, could be done especially starting with the 1960's.

One of the most important scholars in earlier period of empirical class voting was Robert R. Alford, who developed the class voting index known by his name, the 'Alford index'. However, his works on class voting exclusively covered the Western democracies (1962; 1963; 1967). He argued that voters regarded parties as representing their economic interest<sup>4</sup> and he found that class voting tended to rise in the times of high salience of economic issues (1963, 180-3). The class voting index he developed is a very simple one: Subtraction of the percentage of non-manual workers who voted for left parties from the percentage of manual workers who voted for left parties<sup>5</sup> (1962). This index was problematic because it was impossible to control for other variables at the individual level such as age, education, gender, all of which are basic determinants of voting behavior. Moreover, it was sensitive to overall popularity of the parties. For instance, when a party increases its overall votes, Alford index misleadingly changes (Manza et al. 1995; Evans 2000). All of these make his measurement insufficient. His dichotomous manual/non-manual occupational class distinction has also been criticized as it is argued to be unable to capture intra-class differences (Nieuwbeerta 1996; Hout et al 1993; Manza et al. 1995).

Many works used Alford's measure until 1980's and the early 1990's when sophisticated statistical techniques started being applied to class voting. Clark and Lipset (1991), who argued that class voting had been in a steady decline since World War II, were among the last to rely on this index. After this article was published, just after the breakdown of communist regimes, fierce debates on trends of class voting took place. Dealignment and realignment of

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<sup>4</sup> Although Alford does not mention him, see Downs (1957) for the seminal work of this tradition, the rational voter who votes for maximum material utility.

<sup>5</sup> Manual vs. non-manual distinction is also known as the distinction between white and blue collar occupations.

electoral cleavages was already a topic of debate, especially after emergence of post-material values hypothesis (Inglehart 1971; 1977) and class cleavage was one of the cleavages that was often argued to lose its salience.

### **3 Literature Review: Explanations for and Debates over Decline in Class Voting**

There are both sociological and political explanations for the alleged decline in class voting. The sociological explanations broadly include changes in overall affluence levels, increasing social mobility, changes in the occupational structure, increasing salience of cross-cutting cleavages, emergence and diffusion of post-material values, and rising levels of education and political sophistication. Political explanations at the macro level include changing characters of parties together with increasingly unsuccessful left parties, global economic changes towards neoliberal policies and the global decline in socialism.

First sociological explanation is increasing affluence levels. Inglehart (1987) observed that the higher GDP per capita a country had, the lower percentage of votes left parties in that country received. When impoverished, lower classes tend to press for a more equal distribution of resources. However, with the rising levels of affluence they became content with their absolute material well-being and the desire for a more equal distribution faded (Kelley et al. 1985; Clark et al. 1993). In other words, manual workers and their family members started adopting a middle-class way of life which goes as far as assimilating them into the middle-class society (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt 1968, 1). This theory, also called the ‘embourgeoisement theory’ represents a shift from “community-centered to family-centered life” (Harrop and Miller 1987, 200) among some workers, which renders vote choice dependent to individual calculation rather than a natural common ‘decision’ of the group one belongs to.

Another sociological explanation is higher social mobility. When social mobility became easier, voters adopted “a middle standpoint between their class of origin and the class of destination” (Manza et al. 1995, 143). According to this logic, a low class origin voter may vote for a right party if she senses that she will be a member of the high class in the future. The inverse is true for high class voters.

Diversification of the occupational structure is another factor that is argued to have undermined class voting (Clark et al. 1993). Marxist distinction of proletariat (wage earners) and bourgeoisie (capital owners) became outdated in the post-industrial period with the emergence of educated professionals and service sector workers.<sup>6</sup> New, more complex occupational structures rendered objective class locations meaningless and a “more fragmented and... less polarized entity” replaced previous strict class structure (Clark et al. 1993, 298). For instance, Jansen, de Graaf and Need find that rise of “new class of socio-cultural specialists” (2011, 523) is a major reason for the changes in class-vote association in Netherlands.

Many authors also underlined the emergence or re-emergence of social cleavages like race, ethnic identity, language or emergence of totally new cleavages based on identity values such as sexual orientation or regional movements.<sup>7</sup> These cleavages constituted new dimensions to the existing ones, often cross-cut the class cleavage and reduced its salience (Manza et al. 1995, 144). Moreover, these identity-based new cleavages went hand in hand with a new left/right dimension that post-material issues created: Cultural liberalism (libertarianism) vs. cultural conservatism (authoritarianism) (Achtenberg 2006; van der Waal et al 2007; Oesch 2008). This new left-right dimension is mainly driven by the cultural capital of the individual,

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<sup>6</sup> Many professionals are wage earners; they do not own the capital. Yet, it will not be accurate to classify them in the lower class. A company manager, a doctor, or a computer programmer is a wage earner, but is certainly in a different class than, for instance, a factory worker.

<sup>7</sup> For example, see Lijphart (1979), Clark and Lipset (1991), Clark et al. (1993) and Enyedi (2008).

in contrast to the economic cleavage, which is driven by economic capital and social class. The cultural left-right dimension also cross-cut the class based economic left-right dimension. Cultural capital is mainly a function of education level of the individual. Considering that people from lower classes are often less educated than high class people (van der Waal et al. 2007), we can conclude that it is natural that the new cleavage cross-cuts and reduces the salience of the economic left-right (often related to social class) cleavage by creating another left. This “second left”<sup>8</sup> attracted high rather than low classes with ‘quality-of-life’ factors that are beyond material issues (Inglehart and Rabier 1987; Harrop and Miller 1987, 175), such as environmental protection, civil rights, nuclear disarmament or peace. The mechanism behind this phenomenon is that education increases the cognitive capacity of the individual, which means that the impact of material self-interest of the voter on vote choice decreased. While voters with a limited education chose to use the cognitive shortcuts offered by the politicians in order to reach “simple solutions to complex problems” (Harrop and Miller 1987, 199), those with higher education were able to move beyond the issue domains politicians offered to the electorate.

The literature also offers political explanations, which concern the demand side of the issue; the parties. One political explanation is that parties changed and restricted their character and discourse, in order to become moderate, and hoping to apply to and attract a wider electorate (Przeworski and Sprague 1986), which may have eroded their homogenous class bases of voters. In conjunction with this, left parties have been unsuccessful in defending lower class interests so that an important portion of lower class voters started supporting right parties (Hibbs 1982). Changes at the global level are also crucial: Electoral socialism was in a predicament and transformed itself significantly after the fall of the Berlin wall (Manza et al. 1995). Lastly, the global economic changes after the 1980s may have

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<sup>8</sup> Green parties are the best examples for the ‘new left’ or the ‘second left’ type of parties.

forced the parties to shift their positions to the right with the neoliberal current that swept almost the whole world.

After the introduction of new class schemes and methodological advancements, it was easier to apply more sophisticated techniques to class voting research. One scheme that is often used is the EGP scheme<sup>9</sup> which consists of seven class categories. Many researchers also applied logistic regression techniques,<sup>10</sup> which allowed controlling for individual level characteristics such as age, gender or income. The idea here is to treat the coefficient of the dependent variable of the model (vote for a left vs. right party) as the class voting coefficient, which indicates the degree of class voting. Some further debates about the decline in the level of class voting rest on control variables being or not being used, some concern classification of party families, some concern methods to be used, while some revolve around the measurement of social class.

Among works that demonstrate a decline, most extensive one is Nieuwbeerta's (1996) study which compares class voting in twenty Western Democracies, covering different class schemes and a variety of methods. He finds decline in levels of class voting for most countries he analyses. However, many authors objected to the decline argument on theoretical as well as empirical bases. A general counter-argument to the theories that assert there is a decline is that it is not certain if the decline in class voting levels is temporary or permanent and therefore it may be too early to reach a conclusion; it may even be a reversible process (see e.g. Evans et al. 1991). Also, everything seems to depend on what one defines as 'class voting'. Many studies define class voting as lower classes voting left and higher classes

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<sup>9</sup> Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarrero scheme. See Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (1979), and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992).

<sup>10</sup> All methods that were used in class voting research are too many to be covered in a paragraph or two, so I mention only the major points. For extensive discussion of methods applied to class voting see Nieuwbeerta (1996) and van der Waal et al (2007).



voting right. However some studies define class voting differently, as “different classes voting for different parties” (Oesch 2008, 330). For instance, many lower class voters switched to ultra-nationalist right and many educated higher class voters constituted the core electorate of green parties, which can be interpreted as another form of class voting according to Oesch (2008). Similarly, Harrop and Miller argue that some of the decline in the levels of class voting may reflect “a change in the nature of class voting rather than a true decline in class voting itself” (1987, 187).

Empirically, the fact that many works, including Nieuwbeerta (1996) rely only on bivariate analyses is harshly criticized.<sup>11</sup> Van der Waal et al. (2007) argue that an increase in cultural voting, according to the newly formed social liberalism vs. social conservatism dimension, is confused for a decline in class voting. If, they argue, the effects of social left-right cleavage voting could be controlled, the actual trends in class voting would be more clearly discerned. Indeed, controlling for levels of education, they find that class voting levels were stationary between 1946 and 1990, but cultural voting, which they measure according to the level of education of the respondent, increased over the same period. Restricting oneself to a small number of observations or cases is also not the best strategy. Evans (2000, 410) notes that only in certain Scandinavian countries are there robust declines in class voting, but these countries had unusually high degrees of class voting previously and they converged to the overall levels of class voting in other Western democracies over time. The decline in Scandinavian democracies does not necessarily mean that class voting continuously and universally declines, but a previous increase may have reversed. Finally, Elff stresses the illusion created by “programmatically flexibility” and electoral volatility of the parties (2007, 279). He maintains that political changes lead us to a false impression that the salience of the

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<sup>11</sup> See van der Waal et al (2007) for a nice overview and criticism of Nieuwbeerta (1996).

class cleavage declined, as moves in party positions and emergence of new parties led to electoral volatility (2007).

#### **4 Need for a Cross-Regional Aggregate-Level Analysis: Discussion and Hypotheses**

The literature on class voting has almost exclusively covers the Western democracies, but seldom other regions. In addition, a majority of the studies on class voting have analyzed class voting in single-country contexts (Brooks et al. 2006). Regional categories in multi-country studies are also crucial for the analysis since each region may have different historical, social or political dynamics. Indeed, several researchers find sui generis characteristics for many countries; class voting levels and patterns may differ in different countries and regions (Kristjansson 1998; Kitschelt Mansfeldova, Markovski and Toka 1999; Evans 2000; Gijsberts and Nieuwebeerta 2000; Gunther and Montero 2001; Watanuki 2001; van der Waal 2007; Lupu 2010). Furthermore, a fatal shortcoming in the cross-country class voting literature seems to be the neglect of country-specific political variables<sup>12</sup>. Andersen and Heath observe that most studies have taken individualistic approaches and models built according to this<sup>13</sup>, but the literature has always ignored structural or permanent political factors (2002, 125). Not controlling for country-specific variables may distort the way we interpret results since it is difficult not to confuse short-term and long-term trends without including country-level factors. Economic and political crises, conflicts, overall affluence level in the country, inequalities between classes, ethnic and religious diversity, being close to an election, and structure of the party system are some of the temporary or permanent (structural) factors that

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<sup>12</sup> One of the few exceptions to this is Nieuwebeerta and Ultee (1999), who use country-level control variables in a cross-country comparison. However, their sample includes only Western industrialized countries. For some other examples, which consider the effect of aggregate-level predictors on class voting patterns, see Andersen and Heath (2002) and Huber (2014a; 2014b).

<sup>13</sup> Conducting the analysis only for individual level data.

can influence class voting. Finally, a majority of the studies focus on the demand side of elections (voters), but ignore the supply side (parties). Oesch argues that in order for a structural cleavage to be a politically salient, it needs to “translate into a consciousness of shared interests and these interests further need to be articulated by a collective actor such as a political party” (2008, 334). Hence, structure of the party system may also matter as it may influence the number and types of parties included in the ‘set of choices’. To reiterate, I insist that, controlling for the country-level factors in addition to regional categories is necessary in order to see the actual time trends in class voting. While countries in different regions may have different class voting dynamics, considering the effects of temporary<sup>14</sup> political factors can reveal the actual trends in class voting by capturing the short term effects of the ‘issue voting’ dimension. Moreover, structural factors can explain long-standing institutional effects.

#### ***4.1 Class Voting Trends at the Overall Level***

There are different class voting trends in different regions. While some scholars observe or predict a rise in class voting levels for Post-Communist Countries (Evans 2000; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Mateju et al. 1999) there is some controversy on Western Democracies as scholars either find decline (Nieuwbeerta 1996) or at least a stationary trend (van der Waal et al. 2007). For Southern European democracies the consensus is that class voting is in decline (Oesch 2008; Gunther and Montero 2001) or that other factors exceed and outweigh class voting (Freire and Costa Lobo 2005). For Latin America it is difficult to observe a single pattern. Lupu and Stokes (2009) find low class support for Peronists and demonstrate a fluctuation in class voting in Argentina, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) observe emergence of a class cleavage in post-Pinochet Chile, and Lupu (2010) shows that class voting in Venezuela is idiosyncratic. For the Far East, Watanuki (1991) shows a decline of class voting in Japan. Considering the whole picture, that scholars expect a fall or no change for Western

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<sup>14</sup> For instance, if the country is involved in a war or violent internal conflict.

Democracies, an increase for Post-Communist countries, a declining trend for Southern European democracies, combined with no clear trend for other countries in the sample; a pooled analysis of all the regions should yield a stationary trend in levels of class voting. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:

*Hypothesis 1: Levels of class voting did not decline at the global level over the period 1990-2011.*

#### **4.2 Class Voting Trends in the Western Democracies**

In spite of the abundant literature on class voting trends in Western democracies, the subject remains controversial and no consensus has been reached. Many argue that there has been a decline while many others oppose this and posit that class voting levels have been stationary, as it has been explained in the previous sections. Whether a decline has occurred or not before 1990, I argue that there should be no post-1990 decline. The most obvious reason for this expectation is that there is no evidence that there have been substantial and fundamental changes in the electoral cleavages and party systems in Western Democracies since the starting year of my analysis, 1990. If, as Clark and Lipset (1991), Nieuwbeerta (1996) and Clark et al. (1993) camp is right, and if class dealignment happened before 1990, it is very likely that the dealignment and the consequent decline in class voting has stopped; it cannot continue forever. The diffusion of the post-material cleavages must have reached saturation. In other words, the new cleavage structures must have reached a level of stability and become institutionalized. It is not likely that new cleavages, which make class voting decrease, continue to increase their salience. The freezing hypothesis (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; see also Mair 2001) that party systems and voter cleavages have reached a stable level, they provide a steady source for electoral struggle, may also apply to the societies with realigned cleavages, where post-material cleavages have diffused. Therefore, class voting, although declined in previous years, may have reached a level of stability after the decline. Furthermore, even if

there is a continuing dealignment of the previous attachments of certain groups to certain parties, this may happen in the form of previous left-wing voters voting for other left-wing parties and previous right-wing voters voting for other right-wing parties (Bartolini and Mair 1990). On the other hand, if there was no decline as Evans et al. (1991), Evans (2000), Manza et al. (1995) and van der Waal et al. (2007) camp argue, we still have no reason to expect decline. Post-material values have been diffusing to Western Societies for a few decades and the transformation had the highest pace from 1970's to 1990's. If the diffusion of post-material cleavages did not decrease class voting before 1990, it is not very likely to decrease class voting after this date. Besides, there is, again, no evidence for a new cleavage formation since post-material cleavages became salient.

Another factor that corroborates the expectation for a no-decline hypothesis of class voting in the Western countries is that the argument which expects changing occupational and class structures to decrease class voting seems to be based on certain assumptions: That even if one's occupation changes, one's long term habits will abide and one's vote choice will not change over time. However, this line of reasoning ignores the fact that those voters whose occupation and whose class change can also adjust their vote choice accordingly, especially after being more politically sophisticated and more able to calculate the utility of one's choices. This would not decrease the levels of class voting: for instance, a low class voter who previously voted for left parties can manage to become high class voter who can start to vote for right parties for the sake of his/her material well-being. Hence, the second hypothesis is:

*Hypothesis 2: Level of class voting in Western democracies did not decline over the period 1990-2011.*

#### **4.3 Class Voting Trends in Post-Communist Eastern European Democracies**

The electoral cleavage structures of the post-communist countries have been important focus of interest. Whitefield writes that there is "considerable diversity" (2002, 183) among post-

communist societies' electoral cleavages. Some had short-term democratic experiences between two world wars (i.e. Czechoslovakia, Latvia, East Germany, Poland) while others did not have such an experience (i.e. Bulgaria, Russia). However, what is common for all Post-Communist democracies is that they all lived under repressive authoritarian regimes for at least a few decades. There were no free parties or free elections and political socialization of several generations took place under authoritarian contexts. While according to one line of argument, the lack of democratic experience, in addition to the economic uncertainties in the earlier period of transitions, led to low levels of class voting and weaker political cleavages in some Eastern European countries (Gijsberts and Nieuwebeerta 2000) another line opposes this view. Whitefield (2002) posits that in the post-communist countries political cleavages exist in the shape of firmly structured lines of social and ideological divisions among "politically important actors" (181). According to him, decades under communist rule did not extirpate old social divisions, on the contrary, communist rule had "maintained them [social divisions] and in some cases stimulated them" (197). Neither did it inhibit post-communist citizens' political cognition abilities. On the contrary, urbanization and extensive education may have increased the "cognitive capacity" of the public (197). Whitefield's conclusion is that cleavages in many Central or Eastern European countries are akin to those in Western Europe, except for those in which ethnic cleavages are highly salient. In his own words, "the countries of Central Europe resemble France, Austria, or Germany in the character of their political divisions much more than they resemble Russia or Ukraine" (2000, 197). Evans and Whitefield (2000) examine the cleavages in post-communist countries. They find that nearly all countries they analyze<sup>15</sup> have a dimension of social class (mostly class as an urban-rural divide) as an important social predictor of division. Other frequent important factors are

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<sup>15</sup> Their sample includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

ideological differences (over redistribution of resources), age and education while religiosity, ethnicity, and social and ethnic liberalism are salient in only some countries, especially catholic and ethnically divided ones.

Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) examine whether new democracies in Eastern Europe had the same salience in class cleavages as in Western Europe. They demonstrate that after several decades of undemocratic rule and high economic instability in the first decade of democratic transitions, class voting levels were significantly lower in Eastern European countries compared with Western democracies. In the first years after transition voters suffered from ‘cognitive deficits’; they could not determine their class position, were politically unsophisticated and therefore did not know which parties represented their class interests. Party positions were not clear either so that even the politically sophisticated voter could not choose the party that applied to his/her class interest (Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000, 400-403). The unsophisticated post-communist voters could not locate themselves along the left-right axis, and communist rule had resulted in distrust in politics and politicians (Whitefield 2002). Finally, after several decades of relative equality under Communist regimes, low class Post-Communist voters did not value equality as high as their counterparts in the West, who lacked equality (Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011). A good example for this situation is presented by Elff and Rossteutscher (2011). They write that 1990 elections in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) showed that the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the socialist status-quo party of East Germany, received its votes not from the workers, but from those who had “nostalgic feelings towards the former GDR and separate statehood” (108). They conclude that as PDS was not a representative of the workers, class voting levels should be relatively lower in East Germany, and add that class voting levels in Eastern parts of Germany may have increased since the unification (111).

Römmele (1999) admits that cleavages - including class cleavage - were not very strong in Eastern Europe during the first decade of the democratic transition; however, she argues that new cleavages were in the process of formation. Moreover, parties and social groups were developing new ties, parties were creating new images for themselves and citizens were learning the ways of electoral politics (1999, 3). On the other hand, Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) observe that post-communist voters can translate their class interests into political and economic policy attitudes, but they are not successful in translating their class interests and these attitudes to voting behavior. Yet, it can be expected that voters would give better voting decisions according to their class interests after the economy stabilized, people became politically sophisticated, party system institutionalized and rising inequalities<sup>16</sup> made low class voters desire an equal society. These developments could increase class voting. Furthermore, Evans (2000) reasons that “The dramatic disruption of voters’ incomes, lifestyles, and futures” (410) in the post-transition context is prone to create and consolidate polarization along class axis. In single-country contexts, Evans and Whitefield (2006) show that class voting increased in post-communist Russia following the first elections and Mateju, Rehakova and Evans (1999) find evidence for class realignment in Czech Republic.

Sector affiliation is another factor to be considered when assessing post-transition class voting. In the uncertain post-transition environment blue-collar groups may have supported market-liberal parties in the first free elections. However, blue collars in sectors like manufacturing or agriculture are afraid to lose their jobs in the new system and return to protectionist parties after some period (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 66). What is more, new post-material voter alignments did not always cross-cut the class alignment in Eastern Europe. Whitefield maintains that politicization of class and ethnicity often occurred together with “cognate ideological claims about economic and national policy” in the post-communist

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<sup>16</sup> See Heyns (2005) for a study on increasing inequalities in Eastern Europe.



context (2002, 182). This means that ideology and policy preferences are reinforcing factors for the class cleavage in post-communist democracies and they have the potential of increasing class voting.

Kitschelt (1992) suggests that while socio-cultural libertarians support left parties in the West, post-communist socio-cultural libertarians are winners of the Post-Communist economic transformations and therefore he expected them to support economic right parties in the earliest period after the transition. Lower classes, on the other hand, who were hurt by the transformations, would stay on the ranks of right-authoritarian parties, which means that there was a significant difference between Western and Post-Communist Democracies in one of the major determinants of class voting and class voting in Eastern Europe was lower than the West. However, this phenomenon is probably temporary and normalization after these very low levels of class voting would mean a major increase in class voting levels. Therefore, when the democratic arena normalizes, voters gain sophistication and the party system has a stable structure; class voting should increase in Post-Communist countries. Building on this, the third hypothesis is:

*Hypothesis 3: Level of class voting in Post-Communist Democracies increased over the period 1990-2011.*

Scholars also expect differences in voting behavior and party alignments across Post-Communist Democracies, according to their Communist regime type (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 77). Kitschelt et al. present three categories that classify regime types according to the formal-bureaucratic state apparatus and the mechanisms communist parties employed to ensure compliance (repression or co-optation). These characteristics are primarily derive their existence from the conditions that were present during the pre-communist histories (1999, 21-2). The first regime type is *patrimonial communism*. It relied on vertical accounts of personal dependence between leaders and party apparatus. *Patrimonial regimes* typically emerged in

pre-communist historical cases with traditional authoritarian regimes, religious leaders, poor peasants, weak cities, small and geographically concentrated working class and corrupt administrators (1999, 23). After the transition, weak market liberalism and divided pro-market parties are typical in these cases. However, economic policy disagreements constitute an important economic divide and are reinforced by political-cultural divides. This creates a single, competitive and polarized divide (1999, 74). Russia and Bulgaria are classified in this type.

The second regime type is *bureaucratic-authoritarian*. This regime type developed with a strict bureaucracy, governed by a planning technocracy and a strict, disciplined, hierarchically organized communist party (Kitschelt et al 1999, 26). These countries were in advanced stages of capital intensive industrialization (26). The historical pre-communist settings out of which *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regimes emerged are countries with a considerable liberal-democratic experience in the inter-war era, an early and relatively advanced industry and a “simultaneous mobilization of bourgeois and proletarian political forces beginning in the late nineteenth century” (26). Working classes were organized around social democratic or communist parties. In the post-transition context, economic-distributive conflicts are the central issues of political competition in the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* cases (70). Strong market liberal parties emerged after the transition and a single salient dimension in the political arena was established: An economic divide where considerable polarization between extreme pro-market and anti-market parties exists (77). Therefore, countries with *bureaucratic-authoritarian* histories should have high amounts of class voting; with solid class mobilization and high salience of the polarized economic cleavage. Czech Republic and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) are included under this category.

The third type of communist regime is *national-accommodative*. This regime type accompanied more developed formal-rational bureaucratic governance which partially,

although not completely, separated party rule and technical state administration (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 24). *National accommodative* communism was typically seen in countries or Soviet republics that had emerged from semi-authoritarian polities of the inter-war period. Mobilization around parties and interest groups were vibrant, they had taken important moves towards industrialization even though they had not completed it (25). Party divisions are shaped around urban-rural conflicts and the industrial class conflict played a minor role in shaping the cleavages (Rogowski 1989, 84; cited by Kitschelt et al. 1999, 25). The economic and socio-cultural alignments among parties are more complex than the other types of communist rule; there is hardly a single salient dimension. Prominence of economic divisions is usually ignorable; even the communist successor<sup>17</sup> parties accept market liberalism and transform to social democrat parties (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 72). Against the successor parties, usually Christian Democratic parties emerge at the opposite end of the spectrum, although they do not diverge from the successor parties on market issues. What is more, economic and political-cultural cleavages cross-cut each other in this regime type; decreasing the salience of both dimensions (77). Hence, we can infer that class voting should be lower in *national-accommodative* types. The countries in this typology are Hungary and Slovenia.

To sum up, countries classified in the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* type should have the highest levels of class voting among the three types of regimes, with the highly polarized economic dimension and mobilized classes. Next, countries with the *patrimonial* type should have higher class voting levels than *national-accommodative*, as cleavages in *patrimonial* regimes are structured around economy, reinforced with political-cultural cleavages, but should be lower than in *bureaucratic-authoritarian* as classes are not mobilized. Lastly, regimes included in the *National-accommodative* type should have the lowest levels among

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<sup>17</sup> These parties are usually integrated to the system as social democratic parties.

the three as they have cross-cutting economic and political-cultural cleavages, low salience of the economic issues, and lowest class mobilization. Thus:

*Hypothesis 3.1: Post-communist countries with a bureaucratic-authoritarian type have higher levels of class voting than both patrimonial types.*

*Hypothesis 3.2: Post-communist countries with a patrimonial regime type have higher levels of class voting national-accommodative type.*

#### **4.4 Class Voting Trends in Southern European Democracies**

The last hypothesis is about the Southern European democracies.<sup>18</sup> This region also deserves separate attention. These countries had authoritarian pasts and could consolidate their democracies in a relatively later period (1970's)<sup>19</sup> than Western democracies. These countries need to be classified in a separate group as their recent affluence levels, and modernized social structures are different from the “pre-modern societies found in this region until recently” and in contrast to their past inability to have stable democracies, they are all consolidated democracies now (Diamandouros and Gunther 2001, 1).

Gunther and Montero find that class position is a much weaker indicator of vote choice in Italy and Greece compared with most Western Democracies (2001, 114). Spain and Portugal constitute different cases, but on the whole they find that class voting declines in all four countries (120), which may mean that Southern European countries, lagging behind West a few decades in consolidating their democracies, may be following the dealignment of class

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<sup>18</sup> For examples of usage of the category called Southern Europe see Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros and Gunther (1988) or Linz and Stepan (1996). In the literature, this group usually includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and from time to time Cyprus. However, I cannot include Greece since no ISSP surveys have been conducted in here.

<sup>19</sup> Italy and Cyprus partially diverge from this typology. Although Italy has an authoritarian past, it has been a consolidated democracy since around the end of WWII. Cyprus, on the other hand, was not independent before 1960 and was a British colony after 1925.

cleavage again a few decades lagged than the West. Freire and Costa Lobo (2005) examine voting patterns in Greece, Portugal and Spain. They find that social class voting is relatively weaker than other cleavages, and is also overshadowed by economic voting and –more importantly- by ideology in all three countries. Hence, this shapes the fourth and the last hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 4: Class voting levels in Southern European democracies declined over the period 1990-2011*

## **5 Data and Operationalizations**

### **5.1 Micro Level Analysis**

The data at the micro level is the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) survey data. ISSP conducts annual surveys in numerous countries since 1985, over a rotating series of topics. I prefer ISSP data over other survey data because most cross-country surveys are usually conducted once in every few years, unlike ISSP. I also do not combine other surveys with ISSP in order to have a standardized survey for each country and year.

#### **Dependent Variable: Vote Choice**

I operationalize vote choice in a dichotomous manner: Left party vs. right party. I adopt the simplest approach for vote choice since I engage in a cross-country analysis. Operationalization according to multiple party groups cannot be standardized for all countries<sup>20</sup> and would not permit comparison. For instance, de Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) employ five party categories for Netherlands<sup>21</sup> which reflect the multi-issue nature of Dutch political arena while a single authority vs. democracy or cleavage can be the most important

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<sup>20</sup> For example, while most Western democracies have Green parties, many others Western or non-Western democracies (e.g. U.S or Russia) lack competitive Green parties.

<sup>21</sup> These are *old left*, *green left*, *new left*, *religious right*, and *free market right*.

cleavage in some post-communist societies (Kitschelt et al. 1999 and Korgunyuk 2014). Another example that demonstrates the incompatibility of multi-party categorization is the United States, where only two significant political parties are present.<sup>22</sup> It would not be easy to categorize party systems in these countries and the party system in the U.S. in a standard form if one opts for a multi-group classification. Similarly, ethnic and regional parties exist in some countries, but not in others.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, in this situation of a tradeoff between a more accurate measurement of party positions and comparability across countries, I choose comparability. Numerous studies using detailed party position measures have been published but most of these rely on small number of country cases. My aim is to compare countries, and these countries have disparate party systems. Hence, I believe that the simplest dichotomous left-right approach that can be applied in all countries in the sample is the best for my purposes. In order to determine party positions, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Bakker et al. 2012) for the European countries and the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013) for others.<sup>24</sup> I structure this variable as follows: 0=vote for a right party, 1= vote for a left party. This variable is constructed from survey questions such as ‘Which party did you vote in the recent elections’ and ‘Which party would you vote if there were an election today’.

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<sup>22</sup> The two significant parties in the U.S. are the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

<sup>23</sup> For instance, Bulgaria has a powerful ethnic party of the Turkish minority (Movements for Rights and Freedoms), which has served in many governments, and the Scottish National Party in the U.K. has gained a lot of support in the recent years, reaching third largest seat number in the British parliament in the 2015 parliamentary elections. But, in many countries (e.g. U.S. and France) there are no significant parties that serve an ethnic agenda.

<sup>24</sup> Of course, this operationalization is done with the exception of the U.S. where the Democratic Party is coded as left and the Republican Party is coded as right. See also Nieuwbeerta (1996) for a similar discussion. Another exception is Russia, for which I adopt Evans and Whitefield’s (2006) categorization.

### Independent Variable: *Occupational Class*

There are two main approaches to class in the classical sociology literature. First is Marx's (1957 [1867]) definition which contrasts the owner of the means of production (bourgeoisie/high class) to the workers who sell their labor (proletariat/low class). Another is Weber's approach which defines social class as a group which consists of a number of people who "share similar life chances as a result of their position in the labor market" (1948, 181; cited by Harrop and Miller 1987, 183).

Similar to the reasons I chose the simplest measure for vote choice, I adopt the dichotomous measure: Manual (blue collar-low class) vs. non-manual (white collar-high class) distinction. Wright argues that comparing skill levels across different economies is "notoriously difficult" (1996, 53). The countries in my sample have very different societal characteristics and are at different phases of their industrialization/post-industrialization. Very detailed class indices can be misleading. If I employ detailed schemes I will end up with different and incomparable class categories. On the other hand, with simpler categories different countries will have the same occupational categories. Since I want to aggregate all the results to engage in cross-country and cross-time comparison, a standardized scheme will be more useful. This is why I am reluctant to use complex class measures in the analysis and opt for the simplest measure. Aggregating all the results to engage in cross-country comparison requires adopting the simplest measure that can capture the most basic distinction among classes in all countries: Manual occupation category versus non-manual occupation category. Also, I believe that this way I have a dichotomous category that conforms better to the post-industrial societies, than what Alford's (1962) dichotomous category, as his scheme had been constructed for 1960's capitalist societies as EGP7 scheme can better capture the recent changes in class structure. Of course, a vast majority of the captured difference with EGP7 category is lost when I convert it to the dichotomous measure. Nonetheless, there is a

tradeoff between cross-country validity of my occupational class measure and its ability to capture details. I prefer to have a standard cross-country measure as one of my main aims in this paper is to cover class voting in previously neglected countries and regions

I first recoded<sup>25</sup> the occupation variable from the very detailed ISCO88 scheme to the seven category EGP7 scheme (see Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero 1979; 1983, and Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), which captures skill/education, control over labor power, type of work, sector, ownership and life chances dimensions of a person's occupation.<sup>26</sup> The EGP7 operationalization of occupational class is called Neo-Weberian (Slomczynski and Dubrow 2010), but also can be, although not necessarily, compatible with the Marxist class analysis as Wright maintains that employees with higher skill and expertise levels are in a more privileged surplus appropriation location (1996, 22). After obtaining the EGP7 category, I recoded class variable to the manual/non-manual dichotomy according to Table 1 below. This variable is coded as: 0=non-manual occupational class, 1=manual occupational class.

Another matter of concern for operationalization of class is the treatment of women in class analysis. The controversy in this matter is whether to treat family or the individual as the unit of analysis. The older convention was to accept family as the unit of analysis and code individual's class according to the head of household's occupation (de Graaf and Heath 1992). However, women became more educated and more active in the labor force over time and several revisions to this position were put forth. Two new strategies of coding women's class are discussed and tested by de Graaf and Heath (1992, 312). The first is Erikson's (1984) suggestion to keep family as the unit of analysis but this time the higher level spouse's occupation should be operationalized as the class position. Families, rather than individuals occupy class structural locations (Goldthorpe 1983) according to this view. The second

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<sup>25</sup> I used Iversen's (n.d.) code and Ganzeboom and Treiman's (n.d.) syntax.

<sup>26</sup> See Slomczynski and Dubrow (2010, 197) for a detailed second-hand description of the categories.



strategy suggests to move the unit of analysis to the individual and to use each individual's occupation in order to determine his/her class position (Stanworth 1984). de Graaf and Heath (1992) test these strategies with British survey data and they find that class position is determined by the occupation of the male spouse rather than the occupation of the higher level spouse and therefore suggest more complex operationalizations of occupational class. Similarly, Wright (1996) calls the class structure one is tied through the family as the mediated class location and the individual option as the direct class location and adds that most people have both of these locations (26-7).<sup>27</sup>

For my purposes, I will follow the individual unit of analysis approach of Stanworth (1984). First of all, the social class I am interested and the measure I will utilize in is not purely economic, but it also is concerned with skills, culture and educational level of the individual, which can show more difference across spouses compared to their economic well-being. In other words, two spouses have almost the same welfare even if there is a huge gap between their personal earnings, while there can be significant differences among their levels of education, type of occupation or occupational skills. A measure that relies on family as the unit of analysis would fit a class definition that takes economic relations as its major concern, but a skill-based class definition requires another measure. What is more, different social and occupational structures across different countries make a more complex operationalization more difficult as I would have to stick to a standard for all countries. Controlling for the gender of the respondent would - at least - to some extent correct for any possible bias. Hence, I will follow the individual-level approach and will not consider the respondent's gender while constructing the occupational class variable.

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<sup>27</sup> Most probably, his exceptions are single person households.

**Table 1. EGP7 Occupational class scheme; from Nieuwbeerta (1996)<sup>28</sup>**

Category	Dichotomous scheme	Description
Service class	Non-manual classes	Large proprietors; professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of non-manual workers
Routine non-manual class		Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel, other rank-and-file service workers
Petty bourgeoisie		Small proprietors and artisans, with and without employees
Farmers		Farmers, smallholders and other self-employed workers in primary production
Skilled Workers	Manual classes	Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers
Unskilled Workers		Semi-and unskilled, non-agricultural manual workers
Agricultural Laborers		Agricultural and other workers in primary production

### Control Variables

Other individual level control variables are *age*, *gender* and *education level* of the respondent. Class voting is usually higher among the older voters than the younger voters and therefore a generational effect, which can be measured by the age of the respondent exists in class voting (Inglehart 1984, p.30). Lower class category contains more female members than male members; an uneven distribution of genders according to occupational classes is evident (Wright 1996, 115-124; Andes 1992). Finally, education is one of the most powerful shapers of post-material attitudes and therefore post-material voting (van der Waal et al. 2007), which

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<sup>28</sup> For the original categorizations, see Erikson et al. (1979; 1983) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992).

is argued to decrease previously strong class attachments of voters (Inglehart 1971; 1977; 1987). These arguments and findings render including these variables in the analysis a necessity. On the other hand, I do not include income variable, which is sometimes used as a measure of class position in the class voting literature (see, for example, Huber 2014a and 2014b; Stonecash 2000). The reason I choose not to include income is due to its high correlation with the other control variables, especially *education* and *age*. Usually more educated and older people have higher income levels. More importantly, income is very highly correlated with occupational class, the independent variable in the analysis and inclusion of income in the micro-level analysis would create multicollinearity due to its high correlation with other variables.

Among the control variables I choose to include, *education* and *age* are measured as years and *gender* is dichotomously coded as 0=male, 1=female.

## **5.2 Macro Level Analysis**

**Dependent Variable: Level of Class Voting (Class Voting Coefficient)**

The class voting coefficient (log-odds ratios of the *occupational class*, the independent variable in the micro-level analysis) in each country-year survey is treated as the dependent variable at the macro-level analysis,<sup>29</sup> the second part of the empirical analysis. I examine time trends in class voting according to this variable. After conducting the micro-level analysis for each country-year, I will do cross-sectional time-series analysis with the macro-level (country-level) data.

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<sup>29</sup> See Nieuwebeerta (1996) and van der Waal et al. (2007) for treating the log-odds ratios of the class variable as the class voting coefficient

Independent Variable: *Time* (Year):

As my primary interest is time trends in class voting, I treat year of survey as the independent variable. This way, statistical significance in the *year* variable can show if there is a significant time trend in the *class voting coefficient* (the dependent variable). The sign of the coefficient will indicate the direction of the trend. If this variable is not significant then I will conclude that class voting has no significant time trend.<sup>30</sup> We can also interpret this as an effect of time (independent variable) on class voting (dependent variable).<sup>31</sup>

Control Variables:

***Per Capita GDP:***

One of the main arguments in the literature is that the rising level of affluence led to the decline of class voting in Western democracies. As affluence levels of the lower class people rose, their reasons for worrying about their income and redistribution of resources vanished (Kelley et al. 1985, Clark and Lipset 1991, Clark et al. 1993, Manza et al. 1995). In order to control for the effects of affluence levels I control for the effect of Per Capita GDP.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> I defined year as the time variable for time-series-cross-sectional data in Stata, with delta being equal to one, which means that one unit of increase/decrease in this variable is one year change. Since I defined it as the time variable of a time-series-cross-sectional data I do not have to worry about the proportionality of the increase, e.g. Stata treats a move from 1994 to 1995 is treated exactly the same as a move from 2004 to 2005. Some may oppose use of this variable by arguing that it cannot have causal effect on the dependent variable per se. Nevertheless, this variable can act as an intermediary variable and can indirectly capture the causal effects on the levels of class voting such as political socialization of a new generation, formation or dissolution of cleavages, or changing political factors in the world (e.g. fall of the Berlin wall).

<sup>31</sup> For treatment of year as an independent and interaction variable see van der Waal et al. (2007), Elff (2007), Wright (1996), and de Graaf et al. (2001) among many others.

<sup>32</sup> Data obtained from the World Bank dataset (2014).

***Level of inequality (the Gini coefficient):***

Lower levels of inequality achieved over time is another major explanation for the decline in class voting since equality undermines one of the cardinal motives for class voting of the lower classes: To reduce the differences in income levels between them and the wealthy. According to one view, after they became relatively more affluent, especially with the rise of the welfare state, lower classes abandoned left parties (Clark and Lipset 1991; Clark et al. 1993; see also Manza et al. 1995). Thus, where inequalities are less severe, class voting loses one of its contributing causes and lower class voters cease to vote for the left parties which aim to decrease inequalities.

In contrast with this view, Huber (2014a) suggests that voters seek to vote for the ‘minimum winning coalition’<sup>33</sup> since they aspire to maximize their share of the resource.<sup>34</sup> He also adds that the *Gini* index of inequality should be higher where the proportion of poor in the country’s population is high. Therefore, he expects higher inequality levels to decrease class voting since the distributed resource per capita should be lower in cases where the number of poor is high.

For the inequality variable, I use the *Gini Coefficient* which measures the level of income inequality within a country.<sup>35</sup>

***Level of democracy (Polity IV):***

More democratic societies are more open to electoral competition and can offer more party alternatives to choose. Level of democracy can affect levels of class voting due to

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<sup>33</sup> Containing the smallest number of people (voters in this case) in the winning party.

<sup>34</sup> He assumes the distributed resource to be constant in all scenarios

<sup>35</sup> I used OECD data (2012) for OECD member countries and CIA database (No date) for others. World Bank could have been another source, but they had more missing data compared to other two sources. For the years with missing data I calculated the averages of the previous and following years.

scarcity/abundance of parties which defend different positions in different issues. For example, in an authoritarian context with more restrictions on political competition and political participation, where restrictions on class-based parties are imposed and where no party represents lower class interests, lower classes would have no alternative but to abstain from voting or to vote for parties that do not represent their class. In addition, the weakness of cleavages in the first years of post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe are argued to be results of undemocratic regimes in the region for several decades, which created politically unsophisticated citizens (Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000). Hence, democratically mature countries are more likely to have solid cleavages that have reflections as polarized cleavages in the electoral domain. I use Polity IV data (2013) which ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic).<sup>36</sup>

### ***Ethnic Diversity:***

Salience of ethnic identity as a cross-cutting electoral cleavage increased towards the end of the twentieth century. Ethnic cleavage is one of the cleavages that led to the decrease in class voting in Western Democracies from the mid-twentieth century to the 1990's (Clark and Lipset 1991; also see Manza et al. 1995). Additionally, Tavits and Letki (2014) find that value-based cleavages are more salient than economic cleavages in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Accordingly, class voting is expected to be lower where ethnic cleavages are highly salient. Also, where ethnic diversity is high, it should be more prone to constitute an important electoral cleavage.

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<sup>36</sup> Polity IV score has two dimensions: democracy score (from 0 to 10) and autocracy score (from 0 to 10). The overall polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score.

Huber (2014b) has a different approach. He regards ethnic diversity as a variable that affects the relationship between inequality and class voting. According to him, where ethnic diversity is higher, inequality leads to weaker class politics and class voting.

Both lines of argument suggests that ethnic diversity somewhat influences class politics and class voting, and in this case it is an important control variable. Ethnic diversity data are from Fearon's Ethnic Fractionalization Index (2003). This variable is continuous and between values 0 and 1; 0 reflecting the most ethnically homogenous population and 1 reflecting the most ethnically heterogeneous.

### ***Religious Diversity:***

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the religious cleavages in the form of supranational vs. national religion, resulting from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation of the Christian churches in Europe during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries still provide an important source of conflict. Hence, similar to ethnicity, religious fractionalization can also constitute an important electoral cleavage, which may cross-cut other cleavages. I include Alesina et al.'s (2003) measure of religious fractionalization in the analysis. Alesina et al. (2003) measure religious fractionalization between 0 and 1. 0 represents the most religiously homogenous population and 1 is the most religiously heterogeneous population.

### ***Immigration Rate:***

Immigration is a very salient issue in many developed countries. Extreme right parties owe their success at least partly to workers' reaction to the immigrants (Mudde 1999), whom they think they lose their jobs to (Reid 1977). Indeed, some studies find that higher immigration drives extreme right or populist parties' electoral success (Anderson 1996; Golder 2003), and leads lower classes to vote for the right (Achtenberg and Houtman 2006). A direct result of

this is that class voting declines since lower classes who are expected to vote for the left do just the opposite in this case. I operationalize immigration as the rate of net migrants over the population of the country.<sup>37</sup> If the ratio of net migrants is negative, then I code net migration as 0 since emigration from a country would not create any positive or negative attitudes towards immigrants and is not likely to influence voting behavior in the fashion discussed above.

***Urbanization (Percentage of Urban Dwellers):***

Urban versus rural cleavage is an important determinant of the electoral cleavages in the Western World according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The extent and degree of the industrial revolution led to the emergence of liberal, conservative and agrarian parties, which were structured along the urban versus rural cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

The degree of urbanization may influence the strength of the urban versus rural cleavage, which cross-cuts class cleavage.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, an urbanized society also has different cleavage characteristics compared to a rural one and its voting characteristics exhibit important differences (Whitefield 2002; Tarrow 1971). An urbanized workforce is more likely to politicize along the class lines. For instance, when some small land-owners migrate from the less developed rural areas to the developed and industrialized urban areas, they could experience a status change to manual worker from small proprietor. Similarly, low class individuals who migrate to the urban areas are more likely to get a high degree of education, as a result of which they may climb up the social ladder and find non-manual jobs. Level of urbanization can also indirectly influence class voting levels by altering the degree of ethnic

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<sup>37</sup> I use net migration data of the World Bank (2014)

<sup>38</sup> For instance, if the vast majority of the population lives in the urban areas, the conflict between the rural residents and urban residents would be insignificant.



support for certain candidates (Giles and Buckner 1993) or turnout levels (Cox and Munger 1989). I construct this variable as the percentage of urban dwellers to the whole population in the country.

***Effective number of electoral parties:***

When a voter has more alternatives to choose from, the probability that she chooses a party that applies to her class interests is higher. The logic here is that if few parties exist in the system, and if there is only one party that appeals to the voter's class interests but holds a conflicting position with the voter's preferences in another issue dimension, the voter may prefer another party which may not be in harmony with her class interests but which satisfies her expectations in that other issue dimension. However, in a party system with a high number of parties, the voter may choose among a certain 'subset of alternatives', all of which are in line with her class interests, although holding different positions on other issues. In a system where there is only one major party on the left<sup>39</sup> or one major party on the right such a situation can make the voter choose a party that does not represent her class. I use the *CLEA Effective Number of Parties and Party Nationalization Dataset* of Kollman, Hicken, Caramani, Backer and Lublin (2014) for this variable.

***Trade Union Membership Rate (Percentage of the Unionized):***

Some left-wing parties, such as the British Labour Party and German Social Democrat Party (SPD) have (or used to have) organic connections to trade unions. Correspondingly, unions may mobilize their voters to vote for certain parties, especially left-wing parties (Harrop and Miller 1987, 189; Streeck and Hassel 2003). Therefore, an expectation can be that voters who are members of trade unions is more likely to vote than abstain from voting. Moreover,

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<sup>39</sup> For example, there is only one major left party in in U.S.: the Democratic Party. Other left parties are miniscule.

because trade unions maintain connections to left-wing parties, the vote will most likely be in favor of a left party. In fact, Harrop and Miller (1987, 189) find that left-wing voting is more prevalent among those who are members of the unionized compared to those who are not. Consequently a higher rate of trade union membership should yield higher level of class voting. For the trade union membership rate, I use the percentage of respondents in each corresponding ISSP survey, who declared that they were member of a trade union when the survey was conducted.

***If the given year is an election year:***

There are two reasons for including being in an election year in the analysis. First, voters who are relatively less interested in politics get more engaged in politics via the media or their social environment during election years since politics is more frequently discussed. This can lead to updated knowledge on politics by which the voter may reconsider her previous vote choice and report accordingly in the survey.<sup>40</sup> Secondly, the *vote choice* question is sometimes asked as the '*party voted in the last election*'. Therefore, a voter reports the same vote for three or four years after an election as legislative or presidential elections usually occur every four or five years and the answer can only be updated when a new election is held.

***Existence of an internal of external conflict:***

In times of conflict, salience of existing cleavages may be temporarily or permanently altered since the most salient issue can become the conflict itself.<sup>41</sup> Unlike many other measurable

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<sup>40</sup> Voters and parties' stances on certain issues may change within an electoral cycle, or the voter may prefer different parties due to party performances.

<sup>41</sup> A solid example for such a phenomenon is 2008 US elections where a major reason of Republican Party's unpopularity was the Iraq war (Gartner and Segura 2008). Also, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989) show that foreign policy, especially issues of war and peace carried high salience in certain

issues such as economic or social policies, on which classes have certain preferences, effect of conflict on vote choice should be independent of the voter's class. Conflict is a dummy variable: 0= no major conflict 1= major conflict exists.<sup>42</sup>

**Region** (*Western countries, Post-communist countries, Southern European countries and other countries*):

As explained in the previous section, there are different expectations for class voting trends in different regions. While it is found to have increased or expected to increase in the post-communist countries (Evans 2000, Evans and Whitefield 2006, Mateju et al. 1999), it is expected to fall in the Southern European countries (Gunther and Montero 2001). Considering that class voting in Western democracies is shown either to have declined, or to have remained stationary, I believe that each region might have its sui-generis class voting patterns and controlling for the region of the country is necessary. I constructed four dummy categories for this variable: Western countries, post-communist countries, Southern European countries and others. Since there are only four countries (two from the Far East: Japan and Philippines, one from the Middle-East: Israel and one from Latin America: Chile) remaining I include all of them in *others* category, but do not conduct a separate analysis for this group because these four countries do not constitute any similar characteristics.

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U.S. elections. In a similar manner, Harrop and Miller (1987, 106) write that the Falklands War significantly changed public opinion in the UK. While unemployment, which may be significantly correlated with class voting was salient before the Falklands War, the conflict over these islands replaced unemployment's prominent place as one of the most salient issues in the electoral campaign. For other examples of war or conflict deeply influencing the course of elections, see Carmines and Stimson (1980) and Page and Brody (1972).

<sup>42</sup> Data from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2014).

*Type of Communist Regime (Bureaucratic-authoritarian, national-accommodative and patrimonial):*

Following Kitschelt et al. (1999), I constructed three dummy variables for types of communist regimes, which affect post-transition party systems and voter cleavages. First is bureaucratic-authoritarian systems where a single salient dimension exists, which is economic and parties are severely polarized around this issue. The countries that conform to this typology are Czech Republic and East Germany. Second typology is patrimonial (*patrimonial*) regimes where a considerable polarization on the economic dimension existed and cultural issues reinforced the economic cleavage. Bulgaria and Russia belong to this category. Thirdly, there is national-accommodative regime category where economic and cultural dimensions cross-cut each other. Hungary and Slovenia are included in this category. Poland, Slovakia and Latvia, however, are included in intermediate categories in the Kitschelt et al. (1999) book; exhibiting properties of two of the regime types. I decide to code the regime variable for these three countries as missing since they do not fit any of the three categories in a clear manner. The table 2 below presents the table for communist regime type in the Kitschelt et al. (1999) book.

**Table 2. Type of Communist Regime, according to Kitschelt et al. (1999)**

<b>Regime Type</b>	<b>Bureaucratic-Authoritarian</b>	<b>Mix of both</b>	<b>National-Accommodative</b>	<b>Mix of both</b>	<b>Patrimonial</b>
<b>Countries</b>	Czech Republic	Poland*	Hungary	Latvia*	Bulgaria
	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)		Slovenia	Slovakia*	Russia

\*Regime type variable not coded in the dataset.

### ***Majority Religion in the Country:***

There are arguments which expect religious identity of the country to influence its cleavages. Gijssberty and Nieuwbeerta (2000) write that religiosity, ethnicity, and social and ethnic liberalism are salient in only some countries, especially catholic and ethnically divided ones. Harrop and Miller (1987) argue that religion was a significant issue in catholic Western countries (178-9) but was not that significant in protestant countries. As an example of this, they write that religion no longer commands a much significant influence over vote choice in protestant Britain and the Scandinavian countries (180). As religious cleavage is one of the electoral cleavages which cross cuts class cleavage, a decline in the salience of religion in politics and the consequent decline in religious voting may increase class voting levels. Hence, I construct four categories of dominant religion in the country. These categories are: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other religious majority/no clear religious majority. Table 3 below shows the dominant religion for each country. The countries are primarily classified considering the existence of a clear religious majority (at least 50% of those who declare that they believe in a religion). If there is no clear religious majority, than I code the country as mixed religion. I use the data from the CIA Factbook (no date) in order to construct this variable.

**Table 3. Dominant Religion by Country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Protestant Majority</b>	<b>Orthodox Majority</b>	<b>Catholic Majority</b>	<b>Other Religious Majority / No Clear Majority</b>
<b>Majority Religion</b>	USA	Cyprus	Chile	Canada
	UK	Bulgaria	Ireland	Netherlands
	East Germany	Russia	France	Switzerland
	Finland		Spain	West Germany
	Sweden		Portugal	Latvia
	Norway		Poland	Israel
	Denmark		Austria	Japan
			Hungary	Australia
			Czech Republic	New Zealand
			Slovakia	
			Italy	
			Slovenia	
			Philippines	

***Proportionality of the Electoral System:***

I use the electoral system variable in order to do robustness check, using it instead of the effective number of parties variable. The argument in favor of controlling for the electoral system variable is similar to the argument for effective number of parties. Duverger's law (1972) states that electoral system is a major determinant of the number of parties in the system; more proportional electoral systems yields party systems with higher number of parties and thus more options to choose. Indeed, the correlation between the electoral system variable and the effective number of parties variable in my dataset is 0.50, which is fairly high. I operationalize the electoral system variable as follows: if there is presidential system, I automatically code the electoral system as majoritarian. If there is parliamentary system, then

I use Bormann and Golder's (2013) data to code the proportionality of the parliamentary election system. I obtain the data for presidential and parliamentary systems from Persson and Tabellini (2002). This variable is coded: 0=majoritarian electoral systems (in a parliamentary system) or presidential system, 0.5=mixed electoral systems (in a parliamentary system), 1=proportional electoral systems (in a parliamentary system).

***Level of Democracy (Freedomhouse):***

I use Freedomhouse (2015) data as a measure of the level of democracy in a country, for robustness check. There are two scores for democracy according to the Freedomhouse measure: Civil liberties and political rights. Each is coded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free), with 1 point intervals. For the level of democracy variable in this thesis, I first multiplied each score by -1 and then added 7, which transforms the scores to be between: 0 (least free) and 6 (most free). Next, I averaged two scores in order to obtain a single variable which measures the level of democracy according to the Freedomhouse.

## **6 Research Strategy**

The analysis consists of two parts: Analysis at the micro level and analysis at the macro level. I first conducted the micro-level analysis with the survey data. Here I used logistic regression analysis, the dependent variable being vote choice (left versus right) and the independent variable being occupational class (manual versus non-manual). The control variables being included, the variable I was interested is the log-odds-ratio coefficient of the independent variable at the micro-level analysis, occupational class. This coefficient measures the level of class voting. I conducted logistic regression analysis for each country-year. From these analyses, I obtained 538 class voting coefficients for 33 countries. After obtaining these coefficients, I constructed the country-level dataset. The class voting coefficient I derived

from the micro-level analysis is included as the dependent variable in the country-level analysis. Then for every country-year I collected the country-level control variables. I conducted time-series-cross-sectional regression analysis with the country-level dataset, the unit of analysis being country-year. Another option could have been unit root tests for each country. However, unit root tests permit neither use of control variables at the country level, nor a comparison between regions; we can just test if there is any time trend in a certain country. More importantly, number of observations for a single country context in this study is far below sufficient number of observations to conduct proper unit root tests and neither is time span large enough.<sup>43</sup> Having a glance at the class voting coefficients I calculated, we can see that not all countries in a certain region exhibit the same patterns; some seem to be constant while some rise and some fall over time.<sup>44</sup> Yet, as I repeatedly stress, these patterns may be misleading because effect of no country-level variable is controlled. This is why I conduct time-series-cross-sectional analysis: I want to see the regional trends after controlling for other country-level predictors. Since my main interest is the time trends in class voting, the dependent variable is class voting coefficient, derived from the micro-level analysis and the independent variable is the year of the survey (*year*). The significance and sign of the coefficient of *year* variable respectively signify if there is a time trend in class voting and the direction of this trend.

For the country-level part, I first do the analysis for the whole sample, and then for each region, but without country-level control variables (Table 4). After this, I do the analysis with the pooled data of all countries with country-level control variables (Models 1-4, Table 5), to see if there is a global trend in levels of class voting and if including control variables make any change. Next, I do analysis for each region separately, including country-level control

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<sup>43</sup> See Campbell and Perron (1991)

<sup>44</sup> See Figures A.2 to A.9 in the appendix for the plain trends of class voting coefficients.



variables: Western democracies (Models 5-8, Table 6), Post-Communist democracies (models 9 to 13; table 7) and Southern European democracies (models 14 to 16; table 8). In the following sections, I present the results of the analyses, before I discuss and interpret the results, and finally conclude.

## 7 Results

**Table 4. Trends in Class Voting over Time for Each Region. Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis, 1990-2011, Standard errors in parantheses**

VARIABLES	Whole Sample	Western Democracies	Post-Communist Democracies	Southern European Democracies
Year	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.0005 (0.009)
Constant	5.245 (4.671)	11.554** (5.250)	-7.118 (8.685)	-0.737 (17.304)
Observations	538	258	163	51

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### 7.1 Analysis without control variables

Table 4 above presents the results of the analysis without country-level control variables. There is no time trend for the whole sample, the post-communist countries, and Southern European democracies. However, in line with the Clark and Lipset (1991) camp's arguments, there seems to be a statistically significant decline in class voting levels in Western democracies, over the period 1990-2011. Nevertheless, these results should be taken with a grain of salt since they are plain trends and reflect only the decline in class voting coefficients per se, but the effects of country-level factors are not controlled.

## 7.2 *All Sample* (Models 1 to 4).

In models 1 to 4 on table 5 below I test if there is a time trend in class voting levels when whole sample is pooled together and control variables are included. Model 1 tests the simplest model, with the core explanatory variables of class voting decline in the literature. No variables are significant for model 1 and no time trend in class voting exists; the year variable is not significant. This means that on the global level, when all countries are considered together, there is no increase or decrease in the levels of class voting for 1990-2011 period.

Model 2 includes further control variables (*effective number of parties, percentage of unionized, existence of conflict, and being in an election year*). Still, no trend in levels of class voting appears and none of the control variables are significant.

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> model I add *majority religion* and *region* variables as control variables. For the *religion* variable, I only include *protestant* dummy and test it against all other categories (it is expected to have higher levels of class voting than other categories). I include *post-communist, Southern European* and *other countries* category for the region variable and test them against *Western* category since they are all expected to have lower levels of class voting than *Western countries* (Gijssberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Freire and Costa Lobo 2000).

There is no change in class voting levels over time for the 3rd model. However, four of the control variables have significant effect on class voting. Higher GDP per capita decreases class voting and the effective number of parties variable increases class voting (although the latter is significant only at the 0.1 level). While protestant countries have higher levels of class voting compared to non-protestant countries, post-communist countries have lower levels of class voting compared to Western democracies. All of these effects are in the expected direction. Yet, there is no statistically significant difference in class voting levels between Western countries and Southern European countries, and also between countries classified in the *other* group and Western countries.

**Table 5. Time Trends in Class Voting, at the Overall level, with Macro Level Control Variables.**  
**Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis, 1990-2011, Standard Errors in Parentheses**

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Year	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.004)
GDP per Capita (1000 US Dollars)	-0.0006 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.0007)
Level of Democracy (Polity IV)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.018)	
Level of Inequality (Gini)	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0003 (0.0007)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.332 (0.290)	-0.372 (0.275)	-0.317 (0.215)	-0.196 (0.228)
Religious Diversity	-0.006 (0.252)	-0.072 (0.253)	0.119 (0.226)	-0.126 (0.240)
Rate of Immigration	-0.055 (0.547)	0.085 (0.536)	0.019 (0.550)	-0.115 (0.550)
Percentage of Urban Dwellers	0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Effective Number of Parties		0.015 (0.012)	0.022* (0.012)	
Percentage of Unionized		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0008 (0.002)
Conflict Exists		-0.027 (0.088)	-0.006 (0.084)	-0.021 (0.089)
Election Year		0.009 (0.029)	0.008 (0.030)	0.012 (0.030)
Protestant (vs. all others)			0.306*** (0.100)	0.258** (0.105)
Post-Communist (vs. Western)			-0.225** (0.104)	-0.151 (0.109)
Southern European (vs. Western)			0.177 (0.125)	0.143 (0.131)
Other Countries (vs. Western)			-0.187 (0.132)	-0.210 (0.139)
Level of Democracy (Freedomhouse)				0.017 (0.040)
Electoral System Proportionality				-0.124 (0.079)
Constant	4.706 (6.705)	8.143 (8.564)	-5.190 (8.629)	-0.190 (8.767)
Observations	538	538	538	538

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The 4<sup>th</sup> model is for robustness check. I add electoral system proportionality variable instead of effective number of parties variable and also instead of Polity IV measure of democracy I use Freedomhouse's measure. Class voting still does not change over time. But, there are some changes in the effects of some control variables. The only control variable that has effect in the 4<sup>th</sup> model is protestant country dummy (versus all other countries). It still has a positive effect; protestant countries have higher levels of class voting than all other countries. GDP per capita and post-communist country dummy (versus Western countries) have no significant effect on class voting anymore.

From these results, I fail to reject hypothesis 1, there is no sufficient evidence that a significant change occurred in global class voting levels over the period 1990-2011. Protestant countries appear to have higher levels of class voting compared to countries with other majority religions. Also, Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta's (2000) observation that post-communist countries have lower levels of class voting compared to Western democracies can be confirmed in one model, but cannot be confirmed in another.

### **7.3 Western Democracies (Models 5 to 8)**

My hypothesis for the Western democracies is that there was no decline in the levels of class voting over the period 1990 to 2011. The results for western democracies can be observed in table 6 below. The 5<sup>th</sup> model tests the hypothesis with the basic explanatory variables. The only variable that has significant effect is proportion of urban dwellers in the country and it increases levels of class voting, which is expected. An important observation is that class voting does not decline after controlling for country-level factors although there seemed to be a decline without control variables at Table 4.

In the 6<sup>th</sup> model I add further control variables. Levels of class voting still do not decline over time. Higher number of effective number of parties significantly decreases the levels of

class voting. Additionally, GDP per capita seems to decrease class voting levels although the significance is at the 0.1 level. Higher proportion of urban dwellers continues to increase class voting levels. The effects are in the expected direction with the exception of effective number of parties, which was expected to increase class voting.

The 7<sup>th</sup> model adds religious majority variable to the analysis. Class voting still does not decline over time. There are no orthodox countries in the *Western countries* category and hence we are left with three religious categories: Catholic, Protestant and other religious majority/no clear religious majority. I decided to include dummy variables for catholic countries and the countries with no clear religious majority dummies, to test them against protestant countries. I also removed the religious diversity variable from the analysis because of its high correlation with the *majority religion* dummies. Conforming to the expectations, dummy variables for both catholic countries and the countries with no clear religious majorities decrease class voting, which suggests that catholic countries and countries with no clear religious majorities have lower levels of class voting compared to protestant countries (or in other words protestant countries have higher levels of class voting than the other two categories). GDP per capita, ethnic diversity and effective number of parties variables decrease the levels of class voting in Western countries. The effects are in the expected direction with the exception of effective number of parties. *Percentage of urban dwellers* and *percentage of the unionized* variables increase class voting levels, although urban dwellers variable is significant only at the 0.1 level and both effects are in the expected direction.

The 8<sup>th</sup> model is again a robustness check in which I replace the Polity IV measure of democracy with Freedomhouse's measure of democracy. However, this time I do not replace *proportionality of the electoral system* variable with the *effective number of parties* variable because *proportionality of the electoral system* variable is highly correlated with several other variables included in the model and whenever I include it, it collapses the whole model. For

this model, again class voting does not decline over the period 1990-2011. Among the control variables, the *proportion of urban dwellers* and *proportion of the unionized* variables continue to increase levels of class voting. GDP per capita, ethnic diversity and effective number of parties also continue to decrease class voting levels. GDP per capita and ethnic diversity variables' effects are in the expected direction, while the effect of the *effective number of parties* variable is still opposite of the expectation. Catholic countries and countries with no clear religious majority still appear to have lower levels of class voting compared to protestant countries. Lastly, while democracy variable was not significant in the previously models, when it was measured with the Polity IV data, when measured with the Freedomhouse data in the 8<sup>th</sup> model, it has negative effect on class voting levels, an effect which is in the expected direction.

All four models for western democracies show that level of class voting has not decreased since 1990 when we consider the effects of the country-specific factors and we fail to reject the second hypothesis; there is no evidence that class voting declined in Western countries between 1990 and 2011. Another important inference to be drawn from the analysis for Western democracies is that controlling for macro-level factors is crucial. While it seemed that class voting levels declined without control variables in Table 4, after including controls the significance of the decline disappears.


**Table 6: Time Trends in Class Voting, for Western Democracies, with Macro Level Controls.**  
**Time Series Cross Sectional Regression Analysis, 1990-2011, Standard Errors in Parentheses**

VARIABLES	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Year	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
GDP per Capita (1000 USD)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Level of Democracy (Polity IV)	0.182 (0.312)	0.089 (0.145)	-0.131 (0.168)	
Level of Inequality (Gini)	-0.0004 (0.0005)	-0.0005 (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0006)	-(0.0004) (0.0006)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.375 (0.510)	-0.310 (0.218)	-0.389** (0.176)	-0.321* (0.172)
Religious Diversity	-0.251 (0.372)	-0.184 (0.290)		
Rate of Immigration	0.0834 (0.464)	-0.205 (0.480)	0.000 (0.485)	-0.021 (0.483)
Percentage of Urban Dwellers	0.02*** (0.008)	0.02*** (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)	0.014*** (0.006)
Effective Number of Parties		-0.06** (0.025)	-0.056** (0.025)	-0.052** (0.023)
Percentage of Unionized		0.004 (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Conflict Exists		-0.039 (0.106)	-0.131 (0.108)	-0.140 (0.107)
Election Year		0.027 (0.037)	0.026 (0.038)	0.027 (0.038)
Catholic (vs. Protestant)			-0.358** (0.143)	-0.283*** (0.104)
Mixed/other religion (vs. Protestant)			-0.182** (0.078)	-0.176** (0.076)
Democracy (Freedomhouse)				-0.243* (0.134)
Constant	11.026 (10.396)	-0.113 (11.014)	-10.881 (10.874)	-15.912 (11.147)
Observations	258	258	258	258

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Figure 1. Proportion of Trade Union Members over Time, with Fitted Lines.**

**Sample: Post-Communist Countries**



#### 7.4 *Post-Communist Democracies* (Models 8 to 13)

For the post-communist sample, the correlation between ethnic diversity and religious diversity variables is very high. This is why I decided not to include the religious diversity variable in any of the models that I built for the analysis in post-communist countries. Moreover, I realized that the *percentage of the unionized* variable is very highly correlated with the *year* variable; the trade union membership rates decline very sharply after the transition starts. The graphs of the percentage of trade union members over time for each post-communist country in the sample are presented in Figure 1 above. Due to the high correlation between *year* and *percentage of the unionized* variables, I do not include *percentage of the unionized* variable due to this high correlation. In fact, this variable collapses the whole model when it is included in the analysis.



My primary hypothesis for post-communist countries is that class voting levels in these countries have increased since 1990. The results for post-communist democracies are presented in table 7 below. Model 9 is the most basic model. In this model, the *year* variable is significant and has a positive coefficient; class voting increased over the period 1990-2011. Two control variables are significant for the 9<sup>th</sup> model. Expectedly, GDP per capita, decreases class voting and percentage of urban dwellers, again expectedly, increases class voting. However, percentage of urban dwellers is significant only at the 0.1 level.

Model 10 adds further control variables. Class voting still increases over time. Among the control variables, effective number of parties and the percentage of urban dwellers significantly increase class voting. Both effects are in the expected direction. Higher rate of immigration also increases class voting, but the significance is at the 0.1 level. Lastly, higher GDP per capita continues to decrease class voting levels, which is in the expected direction.

In the 11<sup>th</sup> model, I add orthodox religion dummy as a control variables. I do not add any other religion dummies because only two countries (East Germany and Latvia) are not catholic or orthodox. All remaining post-communist countries are either orthodox majority or catholic majority countries. East Germany is included in the protestant category and Latvia has no clear religious majority. Including religion dummies for these countries would create problems as there would be too few observations. Moreover, I did not add communist regime type dummies in this model; unlike I did for other regions, where I included regime type and religion variables in the same model. The reason for this is that the *patrimonial* communist regime type is perfectly correlated with orthodox religion; both countries in the *patrimonial* category, Russia and Bulgaria are orthodox countries.

**Table 7. Time Trends in Class Voting, for Post-Communist Countries, with Macro-Level Controls. Time Series Cross Sectional Regression Analysis, 1990-2011, Standard errors in parentheses**

VARIABLES	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Year	0.012** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)
GDP per Capita (1000 US Dollars)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.04)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Level of Democracy (Polity IV)	-0.016 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.034 (0.022)	
Level of Inequality (Gini)	-0.227 (0.708)	-0.267 (0.801)	-0.857 (0.852)	0.660 (0.839)	-0.387 (1.231)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.209 (0.266)	-0.384 (0.263)	-0.520* (0.270)	-0.445 (0.310)	-0.607 (0.591)
Religious Diversity					
Rate of Immigration	2.787 (2.371)	4.796* (2.561)	2.662 (2.726)	0.125 (3.035)	2.667 (2.498)
Percentage of Urban Dwellers	0.007* (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)
Effective Number of Parties		0.065*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.017)	0.047*** (0.017)	
Percentage of Unionized					
Conflict Exists		0.128 (0.144)	0.256* (0.155)	0.164 (0.144)	0.103 (0.169)
Election Year		0.076 (0.059)	0.054 (0.060)	0.036 (0.057)	0.056 (0.059)
Orthodox (vs. all others)			-0.235** (0.114)		-0.418*** (0.124)
Bureaucratic-Auth. (vs Patrimonial)				0.449*** (0.129)	
National-Accom. (vs Patrimonial)				0.173 (0.157)	
National-Accom. Reg. (vs all others)					-0.397*** (0.118)
Level of Democracy(Freedomhouse)					-0.026 (0.057)
Electoral System Proportionality					-0.181 (0.225)
Constant	-24.44** (11.619)	-40.97*** (11.915)	-47.45*** (12.203)	-47.94*** (11.526)	-37.55*** (12.369)
Observations	163	163	163	131	131

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The coefficient of the *year* variable is statistically significant and is positive in the 11<sup>th</sup> model; class voting increases over time. Higher GDP per capita, higher level of democracy and higher ethnic diversity all decrease the levels of class voting. All effects are in the expected direction; however, level of democracy and ethnic diversity variables are significant only at the 0.1 level. Higher percentage of urban dwellers, higher number of effective number of parties, and existence of conflict all increase class voting. Percentage of urban dwellers and effective number of parties variables have effects in the expected direction. Existence of conflict variable, however, has an effect opposite of the expected direction and also is significant at the 0.1 level. Lastly, orthodox religion dummy (vs. all others) has a significant negative effect on class voting. In other words, orthodox post-communist countries have lower levels of class voting than other post-communist countries (catholic post-communist countries, East Germany and Latvia). This effect is in the expected direction.

In the 12<sup>th</sup> model, I add communist regime type variables, but remove the religion variable. Class voting still increases over time. Yet, many control variables are not significant anymore. Higher GDP per capita decreases class voting and effective number of parties increases class voting levels and both effects are in the expected direction. Among the communist regime type variables, *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regimes have higher levels of class voting compared to *patrimonial* regimes. Hence, I fail to reject hypothesis 3.1 with the 12<sup>th</sup> model. However, *national-accommodative* regime dummy (versus *patrimonial* regime) is not statistically significant. This means that I have to reject hypothesis 3.2; class voting levels in *national-accommodative* and *patrimonial* regimes are not significantly different from.

I try to include both communist regime type and religion variables in the Model 13. In order to achieve this, I had to include only one communist regime type dummy; to escape the multicollinearity problem. The regime dummy I use is the *national-accommodative* regime

type (vs. all others).<sup>45</sup> Also, in this model I replace Polity IV measure of *level of democracy* variable with the Freedomhouse measure and replace *effective number of parties* variable with *proportionality of the electoral system* variable, for robustness check. Class voting levels increase over time. Three control variables are significant. Higher GDP per capita decreases class voting, orthodox countries have lower levels of class voting compared to other countries, and the *national-accommodative* regime type has lower levels of class voting compared to other countries.<sup>46</sup> The directions of all three effects correspond to the expectations.

Hence, I fail to reject hypothesis 3 for all five models; class voting levels indeed do increase in post-communist countries over the period 1990-2011 when the country-specific control variables are included even though there appeared to be no significant change when the analysis was conducted without control variables. This signifies that the factors that are captured by the year variable (e.g. political socialization of a new generation after post-communism, rising political sophistication of the voters, more experienced politicians and more stable party systems etc.) account for the increase in class voting levels. Also, we can confirm hypothesis 3.1, but reject hypothesis 3.2. One crucial observation here is that higher GDP per capita is consistently significant for all five models. Also, percentage of urban dwellers variable is significant for three of the five models, but the regime type variable dilutes the significant effect of the ratio of urban dwellers.

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<sup>45</sup> I have also conducted the analysis with other communist regime type dummies, but the main results as well as the results for other control variables do not change if I include them. This is why I report only one model.

<sup>46</sup> This model does not test hypothesis 3.2 because here I test regime type as *national-accommodative* vs. all others.

## 7.5 Southern European Democracies (Models 14 to 16)

Results for Southern European democracies are in table 8 below. Because the *Hausman test* is significant for this sample, I chose to use fixed effects, unlike previous regions where the test is not significant. Due to the fixed effects regression, variables that are constant over time for a certain country for the Southern European sample, ethnic and religious diversity, Polity IV measure of democracy level and existence of conflict were automatically omitted from the analysis by the software.

**Table 8. Trends in Class Voting over Time for Southern European Democracies, Time-Series-Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis, 1990-2011, Standard errors in parentheses**

VARIABLES	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Year	-0.039* (0.021)	-0.060** (0.026)	-0.066** (0.028)
GDP per Capita (1000 US Dollars)	0.021 (4.671)	0.032* (0.018)	0.034* (0.019)
Level of Inequality (Gini)	12.523** (5.043)	12.307** (5.200)	14.725** (5.930)
Rate of Immigration	-4.215 (3.250)	-2.694 (3.543)	-3.491 (3.630)
Percentage of Urban Dwellers	0.132*** (0.035)	0.152*** (0.039)	0.158*** (0.039)
Effective Number of Parties		0.015 (0.065)	
Percentage of Unionized		0.009 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.009)
Election Year		-0.053 (0.082)	-0.030 (0.086)
Level of Democracy (Freedomhouse)			0.250 (0.272)
Proportionality of the Electoral System			0.085 (0.272)
Constant	65.571 (39.276)	105.204** (50.653)	115.201** (52.806)
Observations	51	51	51

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Model 14 is the core model, but without the religious and ethnic diversity, and level of democracy (Polity IV) variables, which are omitted. Here, class voting seems to decline over time; however, the significance is at the 0.1 level. Two of the four control variables are significant. The Gini coefficient of inequality, and the percentage of urban dwellers both have positive effect on level of class voting and the direction of both effects are expected.

The decline in class voting is significant for the 15<sup>th</sup> model; I fail to reject hypothesis 4 for model 15. Again, the Gini coefficient of income inequality and percentage of urban dwellers variables have statistically significant positive effect. Contrary to the expectations, higher GDP per capita increases class voting, but the effect of this variable is significant only at the 0.1 level.

The 16<sup>th</sup> model also fails to reject hypothesis 4. Class voting levels declined in Southern European democracies, over the period 1990-2011. The Gini coefficient of income inequality and percentage of urban dwellers variables continue to show statistically significant positive effect on class voting. GDP per capita also has positive effect, but the significance level is still only 0.1. An interesting phenomenon for the Southern European countries is that while level of democracy variable of Polity IV measure was automatically omitted in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> models, in the 16<sup>th</sup> and the last model, when Freedomhouse measure of democracy level replaces Polity IV, it was not omitted. This difference occurred due to the fact that Polity IV scores across years and countries are more similar for the Southern European democracies, while Freedomhouse scores tend to change across time and countries.

It is also worthy of note that the Gini coefficient of income inequality has significant effect on class voting for Southern European countries, but not other countries. This presents an example of contextual effects of macro-level factors on class voting.

All put together, I fail to reject hypothesis 4 with 0.05 confidence for 2 of the 3 models and with 0.1 confidence for the third model: Class voting levels declined in Southern European democracies between 1990 and 2011.

## **8 Discussion**

The aim of this study was to examine the time trends in class voting. The novelty of the study is including control variables at the country-level while also engaging in a wider cross-regional comparison. Debates over the decline in levels of class voting concern comparative political scientists as this decline is at the heart of the cleavage dealignment/realignment discussions. The results demonstrate that class voting levels in Western democracies and at the global level were stable over the period 1990-2011. However, class voting levels in the post-communist democracies increased over the same period.

For the global pattern, no time trend of class voting can be observed. Having a sample from different regional groups, which are expected to have different cleavage structures and political dynamics, this should be no surprise. Thus, I fail to reject hypothesis 1: Class voting did not decline on the global level over the period 1990-2011.

The second hypothesis in this study concerned Western democracies where I did not expect any decline in class voting. Although the analysis without country-level control variables appears to suggest that class voting in Western democracies declined, the analysis with the country-level control variables does not find sufficient evidence that class voting declined in Western democracies between 1990 and 2011. Hence, I fail to reject hypothesis 2. This finding is consistent with the expectation of some scholars (e.g. Manza et al. 1995, van der Waal et al. 2007) and against some others (e.g. Clark and Lipset 1991, Nieuwbeerta 1996).

Class voting levels and trends in post-communist democracies are understudied aspects of the class voting literature. The second hypothesis expected class voting to increase between 1990 and 2011. When the country-level control variables are included, all models I analyzed confirm hypothesis 3: Class voting levels in post-communist countries increased after the democratic transition in the early 1990s. The *year* variable, which I expected to capture the factors that cannot be captured by other measurable variables, seems to explain the increase in class voting levels. It is possible that the post-communist electorate and the parties got accustomed to and gained experience in electoral politics while becoming more politically sophisticated and class started playing an increasingly important role, as expected in the literature. In addition to other factors, the *year* variable may be capturing these changes in the electoral arena.

I fail to reject hypothesis 4 with 0.05 confidence level in two of the three models constructed for Southern European democracies and in the remaining model I fail to reject hypothesis 4 with 0.1 confidence level: Class voting declines in Southern European countries between 1990 and 2011.

The effects of some country-level control variables depend on the context. Higher GDP per capita decreases class voting levels in all models of the post-communist sample and in three models among the four models of the Western sample. According to the literature, affluence levels influence class voting levels because high levels of living standards may have obviated the urge to vote according to material class interest of the working classes (Clark et al. 1993). However, higher GDP per capita does not increase class voting levels in the Southern European countries.

Income inequality is another factor that has contextual effects on class voting. While it did not have any significant effect on class voting at the global level, for Western and post-



communist countries, for Southern Europe we see a consistently significant and positive effect of Gini coefficient of income inequality on levels of class voting.

One control variable that deserves attention is the proportion of urban population. This variable increases class voting levels significantly in Western and Southern European countries in a consistent manner. This was expected as an urbanized workforce should be more prone to politicize along class lines, and vote accordingly. Nevertheless, this variable increases class voting levels in post-communist countries in three of the five models. When the communist regime type variable is included in these models, proportion of urban dwellers loses the significant effect on class voting.

The effective number of parties variable also appears to have contextual effects. Contrary to the expectations, it increases class voting levels in the post-communist countries. Yet, it decreases class voting in the Western countries, which was the expectation.

Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2, concern the effect of communist regime type on class voting. Hypothesis 3.1 expected bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes to have higher class voting levels, and it is confirmed. On the other hand, the dummy for national-accommodative regimes is not significant in the direction hypothesis 3.2 expects. This leads to a rejection of hypothesis 3.2.

Majority religion of the country variables also turns out to be an important factor that influences class voting. As expected in the literature, protestant countries have higher levels of class voting than countries with other majority religions. Also, orthodox countries have lower levels of class voting than the other countries.

Some control variables do not have any significant effect on class voting although they were strongly expected to have in the literature. One of these variables is the Gini coefficient of income inequality, which only has significant effect in Southern European countries. I can only speculate why this variable is not significant in other regions, contrary to the expectations. One reason can be that the Gini coefficient only measures income inequality,

but not the discrepancies in the welfare levels of citizens. However, countries where the welfare and social assistance systems are more developed can offset the effect of income inequality.

Another variable that does not affect class voting in spite of expectation from most of the related literature is the immigration rate. A reason for this phenomenon may be that immigration is not a salient electoral issue in all countries, but only in some of them, especially some Western European countries. Additionally, my operationalization of immigration as an issue influencing class voting may be insufficient. I used the ratio of net immigration to the total population; however, I did not consider if immigration is a salient electoral issue or how salient it is. Salience of immigration is difficult to measure, which is why I could not include it in the operationalization. This may constitute one reason why a higher immigration rate does not demonstrate the expected effects on class voting.

Another surprise among control variables is the proportionality of the electoral system variable. This is an important puzzle in this study. The effective number of parties variable increases class voting for the whole sample and post-communist countries, but decreases class voting levels for the western countries. Also, the electoral system variable which, naturally, is expected to have similar effects on class voting does not show the same or any similar effect when it is replaced with the effective number of parties variable, although the correlation between two variables is high (0.50).

## **9 Conclusion**

Class voting research has overlooked the importance of country-specific effects. I posited that class voting levels did not decrease in Western countries and at the global level and that they increased in post-communist countries. Indeed, after controlling for country-specific factors, the analysis confirms my expectations. There is no evidence for a decline in class voting

levels in the West and at the global level, and class voting decreased in the post-communist Eastern European countries over the period 1990-2011. Furthermore, the country-level predictors suggest that class voting dynamics may depend on the institutional context.

We can draw three main conclusions from the analysis. Firstly, class voting research should take country-specific factors into consideration since the country-specific institutional context influences class voting. Secondly, assessing time trends in class voting without controlling for country-level variables can be deceptive, as the class voting trends appear to change after adding control variables. Thirdly and finally, a regional grouping by countries' historical, social, and political characteristics can be useful.

It is an interesting that although there appears to be a significant increase in class voting levels in Eastern Europe, we don't actually see any dramatic resurgence of any left politics in this region in the form of hardline left-wingers coming to power or a powerful grassroots leftist movement, for example unlike many Latin American countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia. One reason for this can be that this study only focuses on class voting levels and does not consider other cleavage voting patterns. Therefore, class voting can be increasing in Eastern Europe, but merely relying on this study, it would be erroneous to conclude that salience of class voting compared with other types of voting has increased. It may be the case that class voting levels have increased, but so may have other types of voting. Another possible reason for this puzzle may be the authoritarian post-communist pasts of the Eastern European countries. Socialism and communism still have very bad connotations in this region and the awful memories of the communist regimes are still alive in people's minds. As this study does not differentiate between social democratic, and more extreme socialist and communist parties; both group of parties are categorized as a left-wing parties, an increasing lower class vote for social democrats - even if their support for more extreme leftist parties have declined- is interpreted as an increase in class voting. Therefore, we may not observe

any resurgence of the left and a large-scale support for the extreme left parties in Eastern Europe, unlike the Latin American cases, where extreme leftist leaders have come to power and there are substantial instances of leftist social movements.<sup>47</sup> It should also be noted that class voting and class politics are not exactly the same phenomena; high class voting may even curb class politics as it brings the class issues to the democratic arena rather than being contested in non-democratic ways and this can be another factor why increasing class voting levels in the Eastern European cases do not accompany a strong resurgence of the left. Unfortunately it is not possible to comment on the class voting levels in Latin America within the confines of this study since there is a single case (Chile) from this region which could be included in the analysis.

Several other shortcomings of this research should also be acknowledged and be regarded as a warning for future research. The sample unfortunately does not cover all the countries in these regions; the data is limited to the ISSP sample. A more generalizable research should therefore rely on more extensive datasets and include a larger number of countries. Additionally, for this research I opted for simplistic dichotomous measures of class and party systems rather than more complex measures. However, this was necessary for analytical purposes. I believe that the benefits of this choice outweigh its drawbacks since one of my purposes is comparison between regions and the measures I utilized allowed me to engage in a cross-regional comparison. Last but not least, we need to keep in mind that these results do not mean that the class cleavage is still highly salient, or that it is more or less salient than other cleavages. Many cleavages— i.e. ethnic, religious, urban/rural, and the like—are not incorporated in the analyses, and it would be erroneous to compare them with the class cleavage only relying on the analyses presented above. The conclusion shall remain limited to the trends and determinants of class voting.

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<sup>47</sup> See Prevost, Campos, and Vanden (2012) for some discussion of the left-wing movements in Latin America.

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
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## Appendix


**Table A.1. Years of ISSP Surveys, Countries and Regions**

Region	Countries	Years of Survey
Western Democracies	Australia	1990-1996, 1998,1999, 2001-2009, 2011
	Austria	1991, 1994, 1995, 1998-2004, 2007-2010
	Canada	1992-2001, 2003-2006, 2010
	Denmark	1997,1998,200-2006, 2008-2011
	Finland	2000-2011
	France	1996-1999, 2001-2011
	Great Britain	1990-1997, 1999-2011
	Ireland	1991, 1993-1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2008, 2011
	Netherlands	1990,1991, 1993-1995, 1997-2000, 2002-2006, 2008, 2011
	New Zealand	1991-2010
	Norway	1991-2011
	Sweden	1992, 1994-2000, 2002-2011
	Switzerland	1996-1998, 2000-2011
	United States	1990-2011
West Germany	1990-2011	
Post-Communist Democracies	Bulgaria	1992-2000, 2002-2005, 2007, 2009-2011
	Czech Republic	1992-2011 (1992 survey as part of Czechoslovakia)
	East Germany	1990-2011
	Hungary	1990-1999, 2001-2009
	Latvia	1996, 1998-2010
	Poland	1991-1999, 2001-2004, 2006-2009, 2011
	Russia	1991, 1992,1994-2011
	Slovakia	1992, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002-2004, 2007-2011 (1992 survey as part of Czechoslovakia)
	Slovenia	1991-2011
Southern European Democracies	Cyprus	1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007-2009
	Italy	1990-1998, 2001, 2008, 2009
	Portugal	1997-2000, 2002-2006, 2008, 2009, 2011
	Spain	1993-2006, 2008-2010
Other Regions (Latin America, Far East and Middle East)	Chile	1998-2004, 2006-2011
	Israel	1993-2011
	Japan	1993-1996, 1998-2011
	Philippines	1996-2011

**Figure A.1 Plain Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines, for Western Democracies**




**Figure A.2 Plain Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines for Post-Communist Democracies**







**Figure A.3 Plain Class Voting Trends and Fitted Lines for Southern European Democracies**




**Figure A.4 Plain Class Voting Trends and Fitted Lines for Other Democracies**




**Figure A.5 Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines for Western Democracies, 95% Confidence Intervals**



**Figure A.6 Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines for Post-communist Democracies, 95% Confidence Intervals**



**Figure A.7 Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines for Southern European Democracies, 95% Confidence Intervals**



**Figure A.8 Class Voting Trends with Fitted Lines for Other Democracies, 95% Confidence Intervals**

