

**A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS ON
THE EMERGENCE, FORMATION, AND DECLINE OF
HEGEMONY**

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED

TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

KOÇ UNIVERSITY

NOVEMBER 2015



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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Asst. Prof. Onur Ulaş İnce, and members of my thesis jury Prof. Ziya Öniş and Asst. Prof. Hakan Övünç Ongur, who spared great amount of their valuable time to examine my thesis, and guide me. Working with them gave me great insights about the process of scientific research.

I also would like to thank “TÜBİTAK”, The Scientific & Technological Research Council of Turkey for their financial support in the form of scholarship.

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International Relations, M.A. Thesis, 2015
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Keywords: hegemony, consent, coercion, material power, leadership, dominance, partial hegemony, global hegemony, British hegemony, American hegemony.

Abstract

Hegemony has been one of the key aspects of the International Relations literature. The nature of global politics has changed in the recent centuries with the emergence of hegemony, and scholars of the International Relations theories have come up with answers to explain the new conditions. Despite their usefulness, the theoretical frameworks often limit our understanding of hegemony. Taking these frameworks into account, hegemony is redefined and is differentiated from dominance. While definition of hegemony in this study is closer to a Neo-Gramscian account with an emphasis on leadership, dominance refers to a rather realist account of hegemony. Furthermore, differences between the British and the American hegemony reflect two types of hegemony: partial and global. While former indicates a leadership over the great powers but dominance in the rest of the world, latter suggests a leadership over all states. The differences are further scrutinized in the chapters dedicated to the British hegemony and to the American hegemony. Using state-level and systemic explanations, this study also examines the emergence and future disappearance of one single hegemon influencing global politics.

HEGEMONYANIN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞ, KURULUŞ VE ÇÖKÜŞÜ ÜZERİNE TEORİK VE TARİHİ BİR ANALİZ

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Anahtar Sözcükler: hegemonya, rıza, baskı, maddi güç, liderlik, tahakküm, kısmi hegemonya, küresel hegemonya, İngiliz hegemonyası, Amerikan hegemonyası.

Özet

Hegemonya Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe en önemli hususlardan biri olagelmıştır. Hegemonyanın ortaya çıkışıyla son yüzyıllarda dünya siyaseti bir değişime uğramış ve Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisyenleri bu yeni koşulları açıklamak üzere cevaplar sunmuşlardır. Teorik çerçeveler yararlı olsa da hegemonya anlayışımızı sınırlandırmaktadır. Bu çerçeveler göz önünde bulundurularak hegemonya tekrar tanımlanmış ve tahakkümden farkları ortaya konmuştur. Bu çalışmadaki liderliğe vurgu yapan hegemonya tanımı Neo-Gramsci'ci bir yaklaşıma daha yakınken, tahakküm daha çok hegemonyanın realist bir tanımına karşılık gelmektedir. Bunun yanında, İngiliz hegemonyası ile Amerikan hegemonyası arasındaki farklar iki farklı hegemonya tipini sunar: kısmi ve küresel. Kısmi hegemonya, büyük güçler üzerinde liderlik, fakat dünyanın geri kalanında tahakkümü gösterirken, küresel hegemonya tüm devletler üzerinde liderliğe işaret eder. Bu ikisi arasındaki farklar İngiliz ve Amerikan hegemonyası için ayrılan bölümlerde daha detaylı incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada ayrıca, devlet düzeyinde ve sistemik açıklamalarla, dünya siyasetini etkileyen tek bir hegemon devletin varlığı sürecinin ortaya çıkışı ve çöküşünü de incelenmektedir.

Table of Contents

List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
1. Introduction.....	1
2. International Relations Theories on Hegemony.....	9
2.1 Morgenthau and Classical Realism.....	9
2.2 Waltz and Neorealism	12
2.3 Mearsheimer and Offensive Neorealism	14
2.4 Gilpin and the Theory of Hegemonic War.....	16
2.5 Keohane and Neoliberalism	19
2.6 Organski and Power Transition Theory	20
2.7 Wallerstein and World-Systems Theory.....	24
2.8 Arrighi and Hegemonic Transitions	26
2.9 Cox and Neo-Gramscian Hegemonic Theory.....	29
2.10 Summary	33
3. Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Hegemony.....	37
3.1 Domination and Hegemony	38
3.1.1 Domination.....	40
3.1.2 Hegemony	41
3.2 Historical Developments Before the Emergence of Hegemony.....	47
3.2.1 Rise of Trade and European Discoveries	47
3.2.2 The Period of Iberian Superiority	48
3.2.3 The Period of Dutch Superiority	49
3.2.4 The Dutch and English Rivalry	50
3.2.5 The Rise and Fall of France.....	53
3.2.6 Conclusion	55
3.3 Systemic Level Material Conditions for Hegemony	56
3.3.1 Offense vs Technological Diffusion	56
3.3.2 Offense-Defense Balance	58
3.4 State Level Material Conditions for Hegemony	60
3.4.1 Security of the Mainland	60
3.4.2 Global Reach.....	61
3.4.3 Material Capability and Economic Size	62
3.5 Establishment of an Interstate Order.....	63

4.	The British Hegemony	65
4.1	Historical Overview of the British Hegemony	66
4.1.1	Road to Hegemony	66
4.1.2	British Hegemony I – The Concert of Europe and Afterwards	69
4.1.3	British Hegemony II – The League of Nations	71
4.2	Systemic Level Material Conditions for the British Hegemony	73
4.2.1	Offense vs Diffusion	73
4.2.2	Offense-Defense Balance	74
4.3	State Level Material Conditions for the British Hegemony	75
4.3.1	Security of the Mainland	75
4.3.2	Global Reach	76
4.3.3	Economic and Material Factors in Global Hegemony	77
4.4	The British Order	83
5.	The American Hegemony	91
5.1	Historical Overview of the American Hegemony	92
5.1.1	Road to Hegemony	92
5.1.2	American Hegemony – The United Nations	96
5.2	Systemic Level Material Conditions for the American Hegemony	101
5.2.1	Offense vs Diffusion	101
5.2.2	Offense vs Defense	102
5.3	State Level Material Conditions for the American Hegemony	104
5.3.1	Security of the Mainland	104
5.3.2	Global Reach	105
5.3.3	Economic and Material Factors in Global Hegemony	105
5.4	The American Order	111
6.	Conclusion and Implications for the Future	117
6.1	Concluding Remarks	117
6.2	Implications for the Future	124
	Appendix	128
	Bibliography	142

List of Tables

Table 1: Views of scholars on the basic themes	36
Table 2: Categorization of the states having significance in a hegemonic struggle in history	124



List of Figures

Figure 1: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of tons) 1816-1913	128
Figure 2: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of tons) 1914-1945	128
Figure 3: Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents) 1816-1914	129
Figure 4: Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents) 1915-1945	129
Figure 5: Total Population (thousands) 1816-1945	130
Figure 6: GDP 1870-1945 (million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)	130
Figure 7: Military Expenditures 1816-1870	131
Figure 8: Military Expenditures 1871-1913	131
Figure 9: Military Expenditures 1914-1938	132
Figure 10: Military Expenditures 1939-1945	132
Figure 11: Military Personnel (thousands) 1816-1914	133
Figure 12: Military Personnel (thousands) 1915-1945	133
Figure 13: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score 1816-1870	134
Figure 14: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score 1871-1945	134
Figure 15: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of tons) 1930-2007	135
Figure 16: Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents) 1946-2007	135
Figure 17: Total Population (thousands) 1946-2007	136
Figure 18: GDP 1946-2008 (million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars)	136
Figure 19: Military Expenditures 1950-2007	137
Figure 20: Share of the Military Expenditures in GDP as Percentage 1989-2014	137
Figure 21: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score 1919-2007	138
Figure 22: Scaled GDP of states in each year relative to their 1990 GDP (United Nations Data)	138
Figure 23: The Share of the GDP of states in the World (United Nations Data)	139
Figure 24: The Share of the GDP of regions in the World (United Nations Data)	139
Figure 25: Number of Democratic States with Polity IV Score over 8	140
Figure 26: Share of the Global Wealth by Country, Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Databook 2015	140
Figure 27: Military Expenditures 2014, IISS, the Military Balance 2015	141

I. Introduction

During the last few centuries, the political structure of the world was transformed by the European states. Military superiority of these powerful states exceeded their region and they expanded their influence across the world through their military power. Some of these states qualified as the global hegemonic powers and they carried more weight in their diplomatic relations with other great powers. This thesis is an attempt to understand this transformation and the conditions behind it. Under the lights of theoretical frameworks and historical cases, how can we define hegemony as a global political system; what are the key systemic and state-level factors that led to the emerge of it which, in return, determines what periods in history embody hegemonic systemic characteristics, and is it possible to talk about uniformity of a global hegemonic order or are there characteristic differences that produce different types of hegemonic structures?

During the research, perhaps the most vital and challenging phase is to define hegemony before examining its emergence since it requires extensive theoretical and historical research. Understanding what hegemony is and is not helps us understand the conditions behind the rise of global hegemony. This thesis argues that a hegemon is not just the greatest power at any given time. A hegemon does not necessarily rise as a result of the failure of the balance of power, either. To come up with an explanation enhancing and enriching our understanding of hegemony, we need to understand the theoretical frameworks of the prominent scholars

from the International Relations theories, test their explanatory power through historical analysis and benefit from their strengths in this thesis. We also need to examine the material conditions paving the way for a hegemonic rise to come up with a more explanatory framework.

Hegemony is a widely used term in political science. Even though many scholars refer to a global political system with the term, its meaning significantly changes depending on the theoretical school of the scholar using it. Scholars with different theoretical views agree on hegemony being a political order in which one state is evidently more powerful than other states. However, there are serious contentions in the core aspects such as the source of hegemony, the type of relationship between the hegemon and other states, hegemonic rise, hegemonic decline and in relation to them, which states in history qualify as hegemons. Due to their differences in how they see the world, different theoretical frameworks also lead to various interpretations of the same historical events. This is another reason for the cautionary approach to them. Taking a variety of views and historical cases into account, this thesis offers a clearer framework for hegemony.

This definition of hegemony parts ways with the realist conceptions of hegemony and domination. Instead of preponderance, hegemony should rather be understood as leadership. Hegemony is an exceptional system alternative to the balance of power whose establishment is contingent upon the presence of certain systemic-level and state-level material conditions rather than the failure of the balance of power. What makes hegemony exceptional is the difficulty with meeting the material conditions that not only depends on the potential hegemon, but also on the systemic conditions in the world at the time. The global scope of hegemony was made possible by the historical phenomenon of colonial expansion, whereas

the material resources needed to project power globally depends on industrial capitalism, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. If we take these cases of conditionality into account, we find that only the United Kingdom and the United States fulfill the criteria by which we can call them global hegemons.

Historically, the relative advantage of offense and defense over each other has shaped interstate political systems. The transition from a period of defensive superiority to offensive superiority had systemic repercussions. As usage of cannons strengthened central authorities and transformed the feudal order, offensive developments during the hegemonic age threatened the global political order by paving the way for domination attempts. *Levée en masse* allowed France to conscript a large number of troops and threaten the balance of power in continental Europe. Similarly, German *Blitzkrieg* led Germany to attempt to eliminate other great powers. Restoration of the defense after these attempts allowed states with hegemonic capabilities to secure their order. After all, neither France nor Germany had superior material capability during their attempts, it was rather their offensive superiority that led to the systemic crises created by them. Hegemonic states, on the other hand, lost their military superiority due to technological diffusion and material superiority due to capitalist forces.

Hegemony in realism is based on preponderance which is closer to what is termed in this thesis as dominance. Realist and neorealist scholars see hegemony as the preponderance of a state over other states in the anarchic world. A hegemon is viewed as a great power dominating other states by controlling the processes and structures of the interstate political system to influence the outcomes in political matters. In other words, a hegemon from a realist perspective can freely conquer desired target lands, or coerce other states into following its

dictates. A state striving for dominance attempts to defeat other great powers to subdue them, in short, eliminates its potential rivals that collectively can balance it in the future. Success in eliminating great powers around the world refers to the existence of powerful weapons to achieve it that also can easily oppress civilians, hence means that it is hard to reverse dominance through revolutions. Great powers, therefore, take action to prevent this from happening as it is not likely to reverse after it is done. In history, there have been two dominance attempts: Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. Understanding dominance is quite important to see the differences of hegemony from it.

This leadership conception of the hegemony of a state as a combination of coercion and consent in the interstate system is inspired by the neo-Marxist international relations theory without carrying over its baggage of class analysis. Coercion refers to the requirement of the significant military superiority of a great power over others. This is a very hard condition to satisfy, so hegemony is an exceptional case that does not necessarily emerge in the course of history. Military superiority can be the cause or the effect of economic superiority. While economic power can be the main factor providing military might, military might can also create economic power. The colonial history of Europe clearly illustrates this relation. While Asia had a much larger economy ¹, the European states gained the upper hand with the help of their military might. The second requirement for the establishment of hegemony is consent. A great power satisfying the first condition supports the survival of other great powers. The hegemonic state does not threaten their survival, and further, eliminates potential survival threats on them by deterring aggression. This is also in most of other great powers' interest, if not all. As aggression is deterred, the hegemonic state brings stability to the world. After

¹ The historical GDP data in Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD" reflects global economic transformations

bringing stability, the hegemon remains defensive in the global political race, attempting to preserve its favorable position, while dominance is accompanied by aggressiveness.

In history, there has been two hegemonies whose establishment, partially coincidentally, followed the dominance attempts. As will be discussed in depth in the respective chapters dedicated to each hegemon, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been the only global hegemon in the history of the world. With its rather small economic size that was still powerful enough to preserve its naval dominance, the United Kingdom financed anti-French coalition and defeated Napoleonic France. This victory eliminated the longtime rival France from the competition forever and assured already apparent British superiority in global politics. Similarly, despite its isolationist character, the United States, the biggest industrial and economic power at the time, supplied the allied powers and led the coalition against Nazi Germany during the World War II. The second hegemon, the United States brought stability to the world as the new leader. During their hegemony, the United Kingdom and the United States were the most powerful great powers that they were powerful enough to limit the actions of other great powers but not powerful enough to dominate them. Their superiority allowed them to establish an order and lead it. Their implicit leadership status was recognized by other states.

The leadership dimension of hegemony, however, does not prevent a hegemon from pursuing its own interests. A hegemon defines the rules of the competition and states that go beyond the rules are perceived as aggressors. As a great power that is able to dominate non-great powers and limit the actions of great powers, a hegemon does not have to establish a fair system which would limit its ability to pursue its own interests. Considering the short-term effects, this can be quite beneficial for the hegemon as it is clearly more powerful than other

great powers. Yet, in the long run, this can be detrimental for the hegemon itself. As hegemonic capability is an exceptional case, technological developments and capitalist forces are likely to work against the hegemon and precipitate its fall after a period of relative decline. This decline will precipitate the end of the hegemony, in return. If a hegemon does not use its chance to create a global society of states during its hegemony, then this decline will make the balance of power defining character of global politics, once again. Keohane argues that regimes do not necessarily fall with its hegemon (Keohane, 1984: 100-101). In fact, they can even prevent the rise of another hegemon after the fall of the previous one by providing a more effective balance of power mechanism. When there is a challenge to a functioning global system, and the challenger does not possess the capability to dominate the world, then members of this society would rather stick to the system than bandwagon with the aggressor to prevent an increase in uncertainty in global affairs. However, if the hegemon is less of a leader and more of a just powerful state, then its fall will precipitate a transition to a new system.

This thesis observes two types of hegemonies depending on the leadership type of the hegemon discussed above, both of which are global in scope: partial hegemony and global hegemony. A partial hegemon leads a part of the world, only the great powers. However, it pursues a different policy approach toward weaker states that are out of the recognized sphere of influence of the great powers: domination. These weak states are, as described in Organski's pyramid, middle powers and small powers. A hegemon may also allow other great powers to get their share by partitioning the weaker states. In history, Britain inherited the colonial legacy of Europe and further colonized and dominated weaker states. Britain had the ability to act arbitrarily in its relations even with China. Britain and other great powers partitioned Africa and a part of Asia. As the hegemon, Britain had the lion's share in this

partitioning relative to its position and kept its large share even after its decline. The structure of the system was not fair not only for the peoples whose lands were partitioned but also for the great powers that do not possess a share relative to their power. This disequilibrium caused dissatisfaction among the great powers and created a challenger. As a global hegemon after the World War II, however, the United States designated a very different type of leadership from Britain by extending its leadership beyond the great powers to all states. The United States recognized the inherent importance of the great powers, yet used its power and influence to support the self-determination of all nation states, rather than partitioning them. Conquest was made illegal by the strong institutions of the American order. British hegemony did not leave a legacy that would continue to exist after its fall and deter a challenge. Strong American institutions, accompanied with the nuclear deterrence, however, has led the world to a more democratic governance, although this has not been the defining characteristic of the oligarchic American order.

Including this short introductory chapter, the thesis consists of six chapters. In the second chapter, views of more scholars mainly from the above International Relations schools are discussed, namely Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and Neo-Marxism. Examining the main points of their frameworks provided an extensive understanding of hegemony and helped determine the core theoretical aspects in discussing a hegemonic order. In the third chapter, a new framework is offered which is closer to the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony. This chapter offers a deeper understanding of the material conditions in the establishment of a hegemonic order. Yet the material conditions are not the only requirement. As discussed, the chapter includes a section on the other requirement, a hegemon also needs to get consent from the great powers. The second chapter and the third chapter also reflects the positions of theories relative to each other. The fourth and fifth chapters are dedicated to the two global

hegemons in history: The United Kingdom and the United States. These chapters present a historical account of the rise of the hegemons, and their hegemonic order, and then discuss the systemic and state-level conditions making it possible for each hegemon to establish a hegemony. Finally, the last chapter concludes the thesis and discusses its implications for today and the future of the global politics.



2. International Relations Theories on Hegemony

As outlined in the introduction, this chapter discusses several frameworks on hegemony in International Relations literature. Discussing these frameworks under the light of historical cases helps with revealing their strengths and weaknesses compared to each other. The strengths of these theories discussed below lay the foundations of the proposed framework to understand the hegemonic political order in the next chapter.

2.1 Morgenthau and Classical Realism

The classical realist school sees states as the principal actors in the interstate political system and attempts to explain interstate politics by associating behaviors of states with human nature. Morgenthau is known as one of the founders of the realist school in International Relations. His works deeply influenced the studies of International Relations theory. In classical realist view, states pursue their interests defined in terms of power. A state, as a rational actor, is supposed to act in the way in which it gains the most power it possibly can. This struggle is a result of flawed human nature, creating an urge to dominate others (Griffiths, 2008: 107). For Morgenthau, power refers to a variety of elements including military capability, natural resources, nation's morale, industrial capacity, and quality of governance (Cox, 2007: 60). Therefore, his power understanding employs both hard power and soft power elements. He asserts that power is a universally valid concept; however, this does not mean

that it has a fixed meaning. It might refer to different elements at different times and places (Morgenthau, 2005: 12-13).

Morgenthau argues that domestic politics is governed by law while the international politics is characterized by anarchy. In the realist understanding, anarchy refers to the inexistence of universal rule of law that controls and shapes the behaviors of states (Kissane, 2011: 181). On the contrary, there is a self-help system in which states have to manage their own security. Anarchy and desire for greater power create an environment in which conflicts can easily start. The importance of power, therefore, is rooted in the existence of anarchy (Kissane, 2011: 58). Carr acknowledges that “pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible” (Reus-Smit, 2010: 684). Based on this pessimistic understanding on interstate system rooting from flawed human nature, even the way to achieve peace, for realism, is to create power balance where the states would not prefer initiating conflict. Anarchy is a critically important word because theorists from varying theoretical approaches present different understandings and definitions of the same word, which in return, shapes their understanding of global order and leads to varying conclusions.

For realism, the existence of anarchy, however, does not create constant war. In a potential threat, states balance against their potential enemies and aggressors to provide their security and to survive. The balance of power is a mechanism where a state or a group of states balances the power of another state or a group of states. When the balance of power is in equilibrium, these groups of states do not prefer waging war. For Morgenthau, the balance of power is a self-regulating mechanism that prevents a state from establishing hegemony. However, when the balance of power fails, it leads to the hegemony of a state. Therefore, realist scholars tend to associate global hegemony with preponderance. Hegemony is not a

preferable system for other states because the hegemon might abuse its enormous power against other states to manipulate them (Toledo, 2005: 59).

The main problem of realist understanding of hegemony is with its definition. If hegemony refers to preponderance, then it is not possible to associate the United Kingdom or the United States with hegemony. If we do, then hegemony is simply not about the failure of the balance of power. Another important problem for the scope of this thesis is about the realist account of the stability that the balance of power mechanism provides. The balance of power mechanism has successfully functioned in Europe for centuries and has successfully prevented the emergence of a dominant power. The balance of power mechanism, however, was not very successful in preventing wars. It is possible to assume that states would avoid war when there is a balance of power between their enemies and them. However, this understanding not only requires states to be rational actors but also assumes that states have access to sufficient information to estimate the outcome. However, there are several variables related to decision-making during wars and battles that states would not be able to take into account. Hence, the decision of war will be more about a state's own calculations of the outcome of the planned war than their rationality.

Politics Among Nations is a masterpiece that shaped the conventional theories of International Relations by providing several scholars a starting point. It attracted both proponents of the views of the book and opponents alike. Morgenthau created an urge for scholars to think about the global political system and understand its nature. The following debates have brought new perspectives and enriched our understanding of the global political system while making it more complicated at the same time.

2.2 Waltz and Neorealism

Due to the changing nature of world politics, a new realist understanding has emerged in the following decades after Morgenthau's works, known as neorealism. The goal of neorealism was to refine classical realism to develop more empirical and systemic approach. Neorealist scholars generally agree with the basic realist conceptions associating interstate system with states' pursuit of interest and power. States are seen as rational actors and the principal actors in the interstate system. In this new understanding, however, the importance of the structure of the interstate system in shaping the behaviors of states was more emphasized.

Waltz believes that states' need of struggle for power is created by the survival instinct at the systemic level. In other words, rather than human nature, the anarchic interstate order makes it necessary for states to struggle for power (Waltz, 1979: 87). The power definition of Waltz includes the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979: 131). Therefore, Waltz's account of power is more materialistic compared to Morgenthau's. Waltz believes that the distribution of power among states is more important than just power itself in terms of security of a state in the anarchic world. The changes in material capabilities of states also change the structure of the system. This, in return, "changes expectations about how the units of the system will behave and the outcomes their interactions will produce" (Waltz, 1979: 97).

The main interest of a state lies in its security. The interstate system is ordered by anarchy which produces a self-help system. In this system, each state tries to take care of itself based on its relative capabilities. The anarchical order produces reasons to limit interstate cooperation, namely, states' conception of insecurity and suspicion of obtaining unequal gains from cooperation. These reasons, in the end, might lead the state benefitting from

cooperation less to be relatively weaker. Therefore, Waltz suggests that states prefer their autonomy over increased dependence on others. Security concerns of a state are more important than economic gains in a self-help system (Waltz 1979, 107).

Despite certain important conceptual differences in interpreting the interstate system, Waltz's understanding of hegemony does not differ from Morgenthau's views substantially. States try to increase their power internally by increasing their military and economic capacity and externally by forming alliances. The balance of power system is formed to prevent a great power from establishing hegemony or just to prevent an aggressive state from expanding through forming new alliances against it (Waltz, 1979: 118-119).

Hegemony notions of realist and neorealist theories are based on coercion and domination. The balance of power theory is a great tool to understand the European balance of power from 15th century to 18th century. However, adjustments made to explain hegemony fails to see the changing nature of the global politics. The United Kingdom and the United States have been the only states that could create an interstate order in which they were superior to other states. Yet, their order creation had nothing to do with the failure of the balance of power. They both achieved their hegemony after their victory against an aggressor state with a coalition which was led by them. Consequently, they did not coerce other states into following them in the first place, they rather have become the leaders of the order they created. They relied on coercion against aggressor great powers in the preservation of their order with the consent and support of other great powers that are part of their order. Such use, however, is contrary to the potential arbitrary use of coercion by a realist hegemon.

Waltz argues that distribution of capabilities is more important than just power. This is an important observation in understanding the nature of global politics. However, it is also

important to notice that there are other systemic conditions to take into consideration before looking at the distribution of capabilities. A state with high relative material capability might not be able to show its hegemonic superiority on a global scale due to technological limitations at the time. Hence, having a higher share in the distribution of capabilities would not lead to hegemony or dominance on a global scale unless technological conditions pave the way for it.

2.3 Mearsheimer and Offensive Neorealism

Mearsheimer, as another neorealist scholar, presents a different picture about hegemony. He supports basic realist views. He claims that interest-seeking states are the highest authority in the system; therefore, the international system is anarchic. With this understanding of anarchy as inexistence of an authority above states, he refuses hierarchy. He asserts hierarchy requires hegemony, a higher authority, which he does not think is possible to achieve (Mearsheimer, 2012). He asserts that, as rational actors, the principal goal of states is survival. Without achieving this goal, it is not possible to pursue any other goals. For him, due to the anarchic structure, states operate in a self-help system in which states cannot be certain about the intentions of other states (Little, 2007: 223). In addition to these basic assumptions, he introduces offensive realism. In offensive realism, there are several great powers with sufficient military capability to fight the most powerful state. These great powers are revisionist states aspiring to be the most powerful state to assure their security (Elman, 2014: 177).

According to Mearsheimer, hegemony is the ability to dominate all states in the system. However, he differs from other neorealist scholars in terms of the possibility of establishing a global hegemony. He argues that the stopping power of oceans prevent any great power from becoming a global hegemon. Therefore, he asserts that there has never been a global

hegemon. In his theory, Mearsheimer proposes three types of great powers. These are continental great power, insular great power, and regional hegemon. A continental great power, at best, tries to form a regional hegemony. If it is not possible, then the great power will attempt to maximize its relative power. An insular great power is a great power having lands surrounded by water. An insular power prefers to balance against a rising potential regional hegemon, rather than trying to be a regional hegemon itself. He gives the United Kingdom as an example for insular great power. A regional hegemon, on the other hand, is a status quo power defending its favorable position in its continent (Griffiths, 2007: 19). The best way for a state to survive is to be a regional hegemon to assure its security. A regional hegemon also tries to prevent other great powers from achieving a regional hegemony in other regions. By this strategy, a regional hegemon tries to create or maintain the balance of power in other regions so that the great powers in other regions would be occupied with their own regional affairs and cannot interfere with the affairs of the regional hegemon in other regions (Jackson, 2012: 84).

Among the realist and neorealist scholars whose views are discussed here, Mearsheimer offers a comparably more explanatory framework in historical context and in his definition of hegemony. Realist understanding of hegemony as dominance is clearly inapplicable in the real world. If a hegemon is seen as a state dominating the entire world, then as Mearsheimer rightly points out, there has never been a hegemon. Mearsheimer's framework is perhaps good to explain the foreign policy of the United States and its role in the global context during its hegemony after the World War II; however, it is not as successful when it comes to the United Kingdom. In his definition, the United Kingdom is an insular great power which is seen to be occupied with its regional affairs. However, this advantage accompanied by its material capability, the United Kingdom functioned in the global system in similar ways as the United

States post-World War II in attempting to create an order within the anarchy. Not having a regional hegemony in Europe did not cause any major disadvantage for the United Kingdom when handling the global system. What matters here more is the ability of a hegemon to preserve its superiority over other great powers, not its distance from them. This is not to say distance is an irrelevant variable, as technological and economic developments alter the global political system and rule out existing advantages. Without analyzing other conditions, however, taking distance as a static variable that prevents a state from establishing a regional hegemony in a region where multiple great power exists is simply a flawed approach. Furthermore, establishing a regional hegemony in Europe during the nineteenth century was not possible, anyway. All great powers were located in Europe during the establishment of the British hegemony. Hegemony in Europe, as in the preponderance-based view of realism, would effectively refer to the global hegemony as there was no other non-European great power until the mid-nineteenth century. Therefore, basing hegemony merely on regional preponderance is deficient. Rather than attempting to have a better understanding of history, he fit historical cases into his model. Hegemony, indeed, reflects a superiority, but this superiority is not about domination on a regional or on a global scale. Hegemony should rather be understood as the superiority of a state over others, making the hegemon able to influence global political affairs, not dominating all other states in a region or in the world.

2.4 Gilpin and the Theory of Hegemonic War

Waltz and Morgenthau mainly discuss the interstate system before the emergence of hegemony, but do not say much about hegemony itself. They see hegemony as a preponderance of a state over the rest of the states in the system and argue that it is dangerous for the system due to the exploitative capacity of the hegemon as the hegemon

would be free to have its way in any situation against any state. As a neorealist scholar, Gilpin presents a different picture of the interstate system. He argues that there has been three type of structures in the interstate system throughout the history. The first structure is the imperial or hegemonic structure where a powerful state controls or dominates weaker states. The second structure is a bipolar structure where two powerful states control their own sphere of influence and actions of each other. He finds this type of structure unstable and short-lived. The last structure is a balance of power where three or more states control actions of each other. (Gilpin, 1983: 29) Gilpin associates hegemony of a state with domination in a stated area either by direct control or superiority in their bilateral relationship with the other states in the area. In other words, his hegemony understanding does not necessarily refer to a global hegemony. He discusses hegemony at Greek city-states and Habsburg hegemony as well. However, it is also applied at a global level.

Gilpin argues that states seek foreign policy based on their interests. He attempts to explain the foreign policy of a state by making cost/benefit analysis. Distribution of power is an important element in his systemic explanation. Gilpin suggests that when the benefits of states from the system match their relative power, the system heads towards equilibrium. In other words, if no state benefits from a change in the system, status quo is maintained. However, equilibrium always ends due to the changes in relative powers of states as a result of changes in economic or military capabilities. The changes in relative powers of the states lead to disequilibrium in the system. This disequilibrium causes dissatisfaction for the rising states as their benefits from the system no more match their relative capability. If the expected benefits of a state exceed the expected costs of change, then the state will make an attempt to change the system. Therefore, if the equilibrium in the system is not restored peacefully, then the new equilibrium will be reached through a hegemonic war (Gilpin, 1983:

210). Gilpin's explanations present a form of hegemonic stability. A hegemon provides security and stability to preserve its system, yet its fall is inevitable. The system ends with the fall of its hegemon and the winner of the hegemonic war forms a new system under its leadership.

As a scholar of international political economy, Gilpin tries to overcome military emphasis in the realist theory and to redefine politics as political economy. Gilpin believes it is not possible to understand power independently from economy since the rise of the nation-state and international market economy. For him, the rise of the international market economy had a major impact on state security due to its independent dynamic in state borders. He makes cost/benefit analysis to explain behaviors of states. He assumes that states are utility maximizers and their actions are based on expected utility of these actions (Guzzini, 2002: 14-19). Although statesmen may seem to act in a way that they are maximizing the utility by their decisions, they tend to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long term goals due to internal and systemic constraints. Another issue with his analysis is his conclusions on hegemonic transition. He claims that the change will take effect through a hegemonic war, and the new hegemon will create its own system to restructure the interstate order. This assertion may have no place in the contemporary world due to the existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, he fails to see the hegemony as a concept and rather focuses on its fall which, as a result, makes it possibly applicable only for the British case in history from the perspective of this thesis. Despite the narrow scope of his supposedly general theory, it is still helpful in understanding the gradual increase of dissatisfaction among the great powers with the British order and its fall.

2.5 Keohane and Neoliberalism

Neoliberal political understanding of hegemonic stability has a lot in common with neorealism. Keohane acknowledges certain tenets of realism, such as the importance of states and distribution of power. He agrees with the existence of anarchy in the interstate system. He defines anarchy as the absence of a common government in interstate relations. Unlike Waltz, however, he asserts that this is not an obstacle for cooperation between states. He differentiates cooperation from harmony that states might be unwilling to cooperate with each other even though it is in their interests. However, the international institutions formed by states can bolster cooperation (Axelrod, 1985:226). He believes that the creation of global regimes requires a hegemon which brings stability to the system. Unlike neorealist view, however, he does not think the system will fall with its hegemonic leader. He asserts that regimes are important for all states in the system due to their role in preventing conflicts and bolstering cooperation. He believes it is harder to create global regimes than to maintain them. As it is hard to create a new system, it is unlikely that global regimes will fall with the hegemon (Keohane, 1984: 100-101).

Hegemony as a pure preponderance is a result of a sheer power oriented perspective. Of course, the term could be used for that purpose, but as Mearsheimer points out, it would be inapplicable in the real world. Gilpin preserves preponderance perception based on power, but he also tries to reconcile the term with leadership and asserts that one state dominates interstate politics and sets the rules on how the system operates. Keohane does not differ much from his neorealist counterparts on several aspects. He emphasizes the importance of power in hegemony, but he also brings Gramsci's conception of ideological hegemony to explain the importance of ideology in continuation of regimes during and after a hegemonic

decline (Haugaard, 2006: 91). It is important to note that Keohane's entire theory about the interstate political relations is not under scrutiny in this analysis. From the hegemonic perspective, Keohane offers the most useful tools enriching our understanding. Two aspects are worth mentioning due to their importance in understanding hegemony. The first important aspect is institutions in a hegemonic order due to their role in regulating actions of states and preventing conflicts. The second important aspect is the extension of the understanding of hegemony to another dimension, more explicitly than Gilpin: leadership. Hegemony creates an order within anarchy and the hegemon leads the system of states instead of dominating them. Hegemony, hence, is not a preponderance, it is rather a leadership as Keohane suggests.

2.6 Organski and Power Transition Theory

Organski's focus on the importance of power might reflect realist tendencies; however, Organski challenges several basic realist assumptions including the balance of power and existence of anarchy. His theory is closer to a later development of political neoliberalism (De Mesquita, 2014: 195). Realist theorists claim that preponderance will lead to war while equilibrium, in other words, the balance of power will lead to peace. However, Organski contends that equilibrium increases the probability of war and preponderance helps to preserve peace. Especially when preponderance is accompanied with a broad consent of the status quo or satisfaction with the international system, the probability of war decreases. This substantial difference between two views comes from their understanding of the international system. While realist theorists see anarchy in the system of states, Organski sees a hierarchy. For him, a dominant state does not necessarily attempt to maximize its power at the expense of others; although it can use force when its vital interests are in danger. On the

other hand, using its power to support cooperation is more beneficial for the dominant state, as the interventions using force is quite expensive when it is also possible to solve problems by peaceful means. To increase the satisfaction of states in the systems, the dominant power should devise and support soft power mechanisms. Organizations and agreements including the EU, the WTO, the GATT, the NAFTA, bind states in their international affairs. Such control mechanisms are created to prevent the existence of anarchy in the system (Tammen, 2008: 316-318).

Organski claims that there is a hierarchy between the states. Although it is not explicitly stated, leaders understand their position comparable to other states. He presents a pyramid metaphor to illustrate his hierarchical structure. At the top of the pyramid, there is a dominant power with the highest amount of resource possession. The dominant power is the most powerful state among the great powers. After that, there are great powers. These states are powerful enough to make a change and are potential challengers of the dominant power. Great powers are important for the dominant power in terms of the maintenance of the order. Third, there are middle powers that have regional importance, but these states are not able to challenge the dominant state. And finally, there are small powers. All remaining states are in this group. In the pyramid, dissatisfaction increases from top to down. A dominant state is obviously the most satisfied state in the system, and then follows great powers and middle powers. Small powers are mostly dissatisfied; however, they are not able to pose a threat to the states on the other levels. The place of a state is not static in this pyramid as states can move up or down from their position. However, he claims that a small power will never become a great power, nor will it be able to challenge a great power. The states that are experiencing high growth rates can invest in its military more. An emerging state experiencing high growth will want to be a regional power, also a great power if not already, and then it

will try to be the dominant power. To preserve its dominance, therefore, the dominant power must be careful with the level of satisfaction of other great powers or it must deter a possible challenge (Tammen, 2008: 319-321).

From the perspective of this thesis, the terms Organski uses, “the dominant power” and “preponderance”, should be understood as “the hegemon” and “leadership”. Because, his dominant power is completely different from realist hegemon, and is somewhat similar to Keohane’s hegemon, which emerged decades after his studies. As the hegemon, the dominant power brings order to the system by fostering cooperation between states. Such a behavior cannot be the result of preponderance as understood by realists, it is rather leadership. Organski’s theory is not deterministic; rather it is a probabilistic one. Thus he analyzes events in terms of the probability of their effect on a possible outcome. His hierarchy understanding is similar to the Mearsheimer that a hegemon, or for him a dominant power, is a higher authority in the system. However, as a leader, his dominant power does not have the same characteristics as Mearsheimer’s hegemon in terms of their approach to the interstate system. Organski explains possible the behaviors of a challenger to the dominant power and states that a potential challenger must have a commitment to lead the system and must justify its claims to change the system. He also argues that the dominant state must increase satisfaction or use military deterrence to prevent a challenge (Tammen, 2008: 321).

So far as discussed, there is arguably a consensus that anarchy is the state of the absence of a central government in the interstate politics. A hierarchy explanation based on the assumption of the existence of one dominant power is problematic. To give an example from the current state of world politics, Russia and/or China ‘might’ act in a way which indicates that they are not willing to change the system, but they are not accepting the leadership of

the United States, either. In such a case, the United States would not be able to direct or coerce them, although it is the dominant state having the highest rank in the hierarchy. Even if Tammen, a notable contemporary follower of the power transition program, does not attribute much importance to nuclear deterrence and takes the existence of one dominant state for granted, it might not be the case in the contemporary world, or at least in the future as China continues to rise. A probabilistic explanation might be giving flexibility to the theory; however, Tammen discusses a possible transition from the American hegemony to the Chinese hegemony through the possibility of war. On the contrary, systemic transition through war is over in the nuclear age. One or more dominant powers can coexist, or many great powers can share control through the interstate organizations. A single dominant power, however, is not a necessity in a system in which several great powers have nuclear capability and mutually assured destruction exists. Similarly, such a global hierarchy between states did not exist before the British hegemony. Indeed, Organski is aware of this deficiency, in a way, and thus contends that power transition theory is not timeless. Technical, economic changes over time might result in a need for refinements to the theory. It is limited to a period starting from the Industrial Revolution. When all states are fully industrialized, he claims, we will require new theories (Elman, 2014 :213). Indeed, to overcome these problems, we need a broader definition of hegemony. We need to understand how and when it started and why it exists if it does. We need to understand the conditions under which a hegemon can arise and we need to understand how the existence of a hegemon shapes the global political system. Organski answers some of these questions, but not all of them.

2.7 Wallerstein and World-Systems Theory

World-systems analysis, led by Wallerstein, focuses on systems within which people live and whose rules constrain them. Apart from small mini-systems, which are now extinct, Wallerstein claims that there have been only two types of world systems: world empires and the modern capitalist world-system: world-economy. World empires are the states controlling vast land areas consisting of multiple cultures from a single political center, such as Rome, and pre-modern China (Wallerstein, 1974a: 391). According to Wallerstein, the world order after the rise of capitalism is the modern capitalist world-system which emerged in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century (Wallerstein, 1974b: 15). Wallerstein's systematic approach takes the world-system as the unit of analysis. The World-system is a transnational division of labor, integrating markets rather than political centers. It contains many states and cultures (Wallerstein, 1974b: 349). The political entities are interdependent in terms of production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials for the daily life of their people. The world-system divides the world into three interdependent region types: core countries, periphery countries, and between the two, semi-periphery countries. Core states concentrate on high-skill, capital-intensive production, in return, they receive the surplus of the whole world-economy. Peripheral states, on the other hand, concentrate on the extraction of raw materials and low-skill, labor-intensive production. Semi-peripheral states function as a buffer zone between core and periphery states. They are less dependent on the core states than peripheral states with their more diversified and industrializing economies (Wallerstein, 1974a: 400-401). The world-system creates a power hierarchy between core and periphery states. In this hierarchy, powerful core states dominate and exploit periphery states. The core states are used by class forces to pursue the interests of these classes (Wallerstein, 1974b: 355). For him, the hegemony of a state takes place in a certain period of time during which a core state defines

the rules of the interstate system and dominates the world-economy (in production, commerce, and finance) as opposed to other states to get their way politically with a minimal use of military force. Hegemony is temporary because of its self-destructing nature. A political and military role the hegemon must assume is expensive and abrasive. The hegemon being forced to actually use its military power is not only the first sign of weakness but also a source of further decline. (Wallerstein, 2004; 57-59). Although Wallerstein discusses hegemony of a state in world politics; his focus is on the relations between core and periphery regions.

Wallerstein's theory explains capitalist expansion during the last five centuries through globalization. Wallerstein asserts that the capitalist world-economy has no single political center. "Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the world-economy has had within its bounds, not one but a multiplicity of political systems". For him, a state can have hegemonic influence as the technological and military leader; however, no single state can dominate the system. He states that "capitalism as an economic mode is based on the fact that the economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally control. This gives capitalists a freedom of maneuver that is structurally based. It has made possible the constant economic expansion of the world-system" (Wallerstein, 1974b: 348).

Several points Wallerstein makes may, indeed, be right to an extent. States can be grouped into the core, the semi-periphery, or the periphery regions. Capitalism may have a vital role in explaining the global political system, and there is little or no possibility for a state to dominate the world. Although he makes several valid observations, there is one non-negligible mistake. It is not possible to exclude the state from the equation as an actor by implying that states are there to serve the interests of upper classes. States may, well, been serving the interests of

upper classes, but these upper classes have been serving the interests of states, in return, though the degree of this relation changes across time and space since the rise of the capitalist world-system. Wallerstein states that “Capitalism and the world-economy (that is, a single division of labor but multiple polities and cultures) are obverse sides of the same coin. One does not cause the other. We are simply defining the same indivisible phenomenon by different characteristics” (Wallerstein, 1974b: 391). Such an account disregards the importance of the state. A strong criticism of this point comes from Arrighi. He argues that “the close historical connection between capitalism and the modern interstate system does not warrant this blurring of their separate analytical identities”. “More specifically, the segmentation of the world-economy into competing political jurisdictions does not necessarily benefit capitalist accumulators. It largely depends on the form and intensity of competition”. He asserts that the existence of competing political divisions does not necessarily benefit capitalist accumulators. To give an example, he states that in the cases of intense, exhausting armed struggles between political jurisdictions, the cost of interstate competition to capitalist accumulators inevitably exceeds the cost they would face in a world-empire (Arrighi, 1990: 371). Therefore, states are not there to serve capitalists, it is rather a two-way street. States have used capitalist dynamics for their interests for centuries to become wealthier and more powerful. Capitalist dynamics are quite important in understanding global political dynamics, as capitalism is the phenomenon that gave rise to hegemony.

2.8 Arrighi and Hegemonic Transitions

Arrighi claims that hegemony is not a pure dominance; it is rather intellectual and moral leadership over the system. The dominant state can be called hegemonic if it leads the system in the desired direction and is perceived as pursuing a universal interest. On the contrary, if

the dominant state is increasing its power or the power of a particular group of states at the expense of others, then this system would not be hegemony. Arrighi redefines anarchy and differentiates “anarchy” from “chaos”. Anarchy is the absence of central rule. The modern system of sovereign states and medieval European system of states can be classified as anarchic systems. However, these systems still had principles, norms, rules and procedures. Therefore, he refers to those systems as “ordered anarchies”. Chaos, on the other hand, refers to complete absence of organization in the system. Chaos increases the demand for an order among states or subjects. A state might then become a hegemon if it is able to satisfy this demand (Arrighi, 1990: 365-369).

Arrighi sees hegemony as a phenomenon resulting from capitalist forces. He observes a pattern in every hegemonic transition. He analyzes historical hegemonic cycles through capitalist, social and interstate developments. He claims that these transformations take place in three overlapping phases. In the first phase, a leading capitalist state arises. The wealth of the capitalist state draws the attention of other states. The rival states desire to acquire their wealth by conquering their lands. However, their attempts fail due to the balance of power in the system. In the second phase, these rival states, failing to conquer the capitalist state, attempts to incorporate the sources of their wealth and power. In order to do that, the rival states try to restructure the global political economy. In the last phase, power struggles of rulers end the ordered anarchy and create a systemic chaos. The systemic chaos creates a desire among states for the rise of a new hegemon which would take the lead to serve the common interest (Arrighi, 1990: 385-390).

According to him, Venice is a perfect example of a capitalist state and was a model for future states with other good examples including Florence, Genoa, and Milan. However, these Italian

city-states did not attempt to transform the medieval system (Arrighi, 1990: 376). The United Provinces, also known as the Dutch Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on the other hand, did transform the system and played intellectual and moral leadership role over the system of states. Arrighi claims that Dutch Hegemony created the Westphalian System. However, the United Provinces has never governed the system it created. After the Peace of Westphalia, the global competition between England and France has begun. With the decisive victories at the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars, the United Kingdom emerged as the global hegemon. British Hegemony introduced Free-Trade Imperialism. The United Kingdom managed to control the world market and the global balance of power. Thus, the United Kingdom governed the interstate system and turned the systemic chaos into a new order under the Concert of Europe (Arrighi, 1990: 385). Finally, American Hegemony brought Free-Enterprise System. With the rise of the United States and Germany combined with the decline of the British Empire, the world entered into a new systemic chaos. Similar to the process after the Napoleonic Wars when the United Kingdom restored the principles, norms, and rules of the Westphalian System, the United States transformed the system of states in a similar way, but more fundamentally.

Arrighi brings the importance of state as an actor in global politics to our attention, which makes his analysis more compelling for me than Wallerstein's theory. As discussed in the previous subsection, actions of states have a major effect on capitalist accumulators. Arrighi's explanations for hegemonic transitions follow a pattern, in a similar way to his model of systemic cycles of capital accumulation. Still, he admits that not all steps were present for every single case. For him, capitalism, indeed, provided global reach for European states and paved the way for their hegemony. Arrighi's model, also, accurately focuses on intellectual and moral leadership of a hegemon and Arrighi's "ordered anarchy" presents a better

explanation than just anarchy and hierarchy. However, it leaves out other important elements. As with some of the scholars discussed so far, perhaps the biggest issue with his analysis is the use of history as it fits his model. One thing almost all scholars agree on is that hegemony requires material power and capability. However, the United Provinces is a state which managed to gain its independence and survived the French invasion merely by taking advantage of the European balance of power. Perhaps the Dutch had naval superiority to hold off the English navy; however, the situation was different with their southern neighbor, France. In short, the United Provinces might be a good case for his model of systemic cycles of accumulation, but it cannot be classified as a hegemon.

2.9 Cox and Neo-Gramscian Hegemonic Theory

Gramsci argues that domestic hegemony is exercised by the state and a social class together. Their hegemony cannot be formed merely by coercion; it needs the consent of other classes as well. If the consent dimension of hegemony is not more apparent, then it would be perceived as preponderance. Hegemony, however, represents moral and intellectual leadership (Bieler, 2014: 170). As a Neo-Gramscian theorist, Cox also applies Gramscian hegemony in international level to explain global hegemony. Cox focuses on class interests that he thinks transcend states. Cox believes limiting international power analyses to the state level creates problems due to oversimplification. Therefore, he offers to begin a hegemony analysis from domestic social forces of the hegemon. He, then, suggest analyzing outward expansion of the social forces to the world. In order to explain the interstate political system, he applies Gramsci's domestic hegemony understanding at a global scale.

He sees hegemony as a form of dominance; however, he asserts that existence of a powerful state is a necessary but insufficient condition. Economic and military dominance of a state is

not enough to explain its hegemonic position. Hegemony is rather a complex structure encompassing structures of class, society, ideology, economy, culture, gender, and ethnicity (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 87). Historical bloc is a concept Gramsci came up with to explain domestic hegemony. Hegemony is based on a historical bloc which refers to social forces including ideologies, institutions, and material capabilities. The success of a historical bloc to establish a domestic hegemony is the first step of its world hegemony. In the next step, they expand their hegemony in their target area by interacting with the governing social forces of other states. To achieve it, the hegemon creates a new vision. The hegemon, then, presents its interest as universal interests and convince others to pursue them. If successful, this national hegemony, established by the social forces of the hegemon, expands their hegemony, created by their historical bloc and its legitimating ideology, to the other states and their social forces. These social forces, in return, embrace the ideas and institutions of the hegemon through passive revolution, even though the historical conditions are not present in their state (Cox, 1983: 162-175).

Similar to Arrighi, Cox's global hegemony conceptualization is based on Gramsci's domestic hegemony understanding. Although he offers one of the better tools to understand the global hegemony concept with his interstate explanations, his focus on domestic social forces is rather unnecessary. There is, indeed, certain problems caused by oversimplification, however analyzing domestic social forces is not a way to remedy this problem, and rather is an attempt to reflect the position of a certain theoretical school. When a state with superior material capacity and global reach is capable of claiming hegemony, then it will make the claim. The "capable" word here does not merely refer to the material power; it also means the existence of certain conditions in the interstate system which would open the way for the state to claim hegemony. A state might need to use ideas and institutions to get the consent of others in

order to achieve and preserve hegemony and present a moral and intellectual leadership over the system it is creating. These, inevitably, must be handled by the domestic actors who govern the state, whether it is the king, or the single communist party, or the ruling party that is in charge in the process of a hegemonic system creation is not relevant.

In his later works, Cox explains three rival configurations of power at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These are 'Empire', the Westphalian state system and civil society. He refers to the vision of American leadership as 'Empire' which does not require administrative control of other states as it manipulates the actions of them from within through compliant elites, as explained in his earlier neo-Gramscian theory. Emerging in the seventeenth century, the Westphalian state system is a sound structure giving each sovereign state the autonomy in the society of nations and giving them the monopoly of authority within its own territory and population. Finally, civil society exists within states and within 'Empire' and is able to take a transnational form. Civil society triggered defense of the environment, women's rights and mobilized people against wars. He sees civil society as a movement alternative to the globalization of transnational corporate power (Cox, 2007: 520-522) (Cox, 2013:344).

'Empire', in a way, represents his earlier works as discussed. He argues that both internal and external sovereignties in the Westphalian interstate system remain a defense against absorption by 'Empire'. After the peace of Westphalia, the number of states in Europe gradually decreased. Revolutionary France attempted to expand French influence through conquest. During the British hegemony, Britain respected the sovereignty of great powers, but not others. Nazi Germany tried to eliminate even the great powers to prevent potential future threats and pave the way for the German domination. Therefore, the United States is actually the actor that strengthened weakening Westphalian system through the establishment of a

new order. The United States, as well as its rival the Soviet Union supported revolutions to overthrow existing governments and install new governments friendly to them when their interests are threatened or in expanding their ideology. In doing so, the superpowers have violated the spirit of the Westphalian system during their global competition. Yet, we see today that these violations were not as severe as past violations and nation-states gradually increased their autonomy as the competition ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today the United Nations have 193 member states while only 63 states joined the League of Nations as a big number of today's states were colonies of great powers (Housden, 2014: 13). Finally, it is hard to ignore the effects of civil society on the domestic affairs and governance of a state, yet its effect on the interstate system is tied to other conditions. Cox gives an example of the popular mobilization against the invasion of Iraq in the American society. It is important to keep in mind that Iraq war seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States in the eyes of the governments of other states due to the lack of legitimacy. The United States did not receive support from even its long-time allies failing to convince them in a common goal in this war. In another example, he argues that civil society, in the form of 'people power' also provoked regime changes in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine prior to 2006, coopting to be a vehicle for the penetration of 'Empire' into Eastern Europe. Regime changes may entirely change the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states, yet it rarely has a prominence at the systemic level, as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. After the elimination of the Soviet threat, the United States managed to expand the NATO into Eastern Europe. Consequently, Russia has been more vigilant to prevent the NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine, which, in return, caused military tensions between Russia and them. At the phase Ukrainian people showed their strong support for the Western alliance, Russia actively supported pro-Russian unrest in Eastern Ukraine and challenged the American order by

annexing Crimea as a response. Civil society has the ability to pressure governments to some extent, but it is yet to prove itself as a central actor as the state in the interstate system.

2.10 Summary

This chapter reveals a major issue that the students of International Relations suffer from. "Hegemony" does not have a dictionary meaning that is widely agreed on which makes it very hard to have a common understanding of hegemony. The word is mostly associated with the United States, thus "hegemon" was considered to refer to the most powerful state in the world in daily use. There are commonly used words used in political terminology describing global politics, but almost each word gets different meaning depending on the scholar using it. The purpose here is to discuss their views based on historical cases for a better understanding of hegemony.

Realist scholars look at the world through the eyes of a 16th-17th century European statesman. Using few selected variables, realist scholars intentionally disregard important elements in their explanations and insist on depicting the world as they see. States, indeed, are the main actors and the distribution of power determines the place of a state relative to others. However, there are more concepts to take into consideration which are deemed inessential by realists, such as institutions, regimes, reputation. Sheer power based explanations remain hypothetical in the real world, especially for the last two centuries during the age of hegemony. Realist explanations reflect a very different usage of the term from the explanations of other schools. Hence, distinguishing hegemony from dominance helps us better conceive theoretical views and historical cases.

Realists are perhaps right to draw a pessimistic picture in terms of states' pursuit of interests, but they fail to see the changing nature of global politics. Historical conditions gave rise to the

first hegemon, a state whose material power was well above its competitors and that was able to roam freely around the world and exert influence over distant lands. Yet, the hegemon did not possess power enough to dominate the world. Although it is hard to claim anarchy has ended as a result of the stability the emergence of hegemony brought to global politics, the great powers have become more aware of their limitations and set their goals accordingly in a hegemonic order. When they cross the line, the hegemon took action. Unlike realist claims, the emergence of hegemony had nothing to do with the failure of the balance of power. Realism fails not only in explaining the emergence of hegemony, but also the nature of global politics in a hegemonic order. Political neoliberalism proposes a different kind of hegemon than realism and neorealism by attributing leadership to it. Keohane sees hegemon as a leader and states that a hegemon brings stability to the world. He explains the roles of a hegemon in order creation and emphasizes the importance of institutions for the persistence of its order. A hegemon might still be a selfish state pursuing its interests as depicted by realists, but it is not able to do that at all costs simply because it is not able to dominate the world, and it benefits from the status quo. This thesis argues that organizations and institutions are not vital elements for a hegemon to preserve its hegemony, yet they play the most important role in the creation of a lasting global society of states which can function after the fall of the hegemon.

Neo-Marxist scholars discuss hegemony based on capitalism. The rise of Europe and the rise of Britain in Europe were accompanied by trade capitalism and industrial capitalism. The increase in the material capability of European states provided them the power to dominate other continents. Yet none of these European states had a significant superiority against each other. Hence, it was not possible for one of them to dominate others. It was even hard to be

an order-setter as opposed to others, until the nineteenth century. Perhaps the biggest mistake of neo-Marxist scholars is to base their explanations upon class relations in an International Relations issue. This viewpoint leads them to see the United Provinces as a hegemon. The United Provinces was, indeed, a key state in the history of capitalism, but its political power was far from a level which would make it a hegemon. Although their overemphasis on class relations blur the central position of the state, neo-Marxist scholar offers the most basic definition of hegemony. The hegemony of a state is the combination of two equally branches: coercion and consent. As neo-Marxist scholars argue, in history, the hegemons have established the orders which were led by them. The hegemons introduced new norms and principles, hence turned the system from anarchy to ordered anarchy. They provided moral and intellectual leadership in their order.

Theorist	Unit of Analysis	Cause of Political Struggle	Interstate Politics is Characterized by	Nature of Hegemony	Establishment of Hegemony
Morgenthau	State	Flawed human nature, creating an urge to dominate others	Anarchy; Self-Help System	Coercion	Failure of the balance of power system
Waltz	State	Survival instinct at the systemic level	Anarchy; Self-Help System	Coercion	Failure of the balance of power system
Mearsheimer	State	Survival instinct at the systemic level	Anarchy; Self-Help System	Coercion	Failure of the balance of power system
Gilpin	State	Disequilibrium between benefits of states from the system with their relative power	Hierarchy	Coercion (Implicit leadership)	Hegemonic War
Keohane	State	Explains 'After Hegemony'. Institutions prevent conflicts and bolster cooperation	Anarchy; Self-Help System	Coercion and Consent	Focuses on 'After Hegemony'
Organski	State	The balance of power system increases the probability of war	Hierarchy	Coercion and Consent	Hegemonic War
Wallerstein	World system	Class Struggle	Structural dependency of the periphery on the core	Coercion and Consent	Occasional clear dominance of one core state over others in productivity, trade and finance
Arrighi	World system	Class Struggle	Ordered Anarchy	Coercion and Consent	A state starting its cycle of accumulation and ending the systemic chaos under its leadership
Cox	State-Society Complex	Class Struggle	Global Class Hierarchy	Coercion and Consent	Outward expansion of the domestic hegemony of a historical bloc

Table 1: Views of scholars on the basic themes

3. Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Hegemony

The theoretical discussion in the previous chapter is to help lay the foundations of a new definition of hegemony. Comparing all views, I believe that we need to take the state as our main actor when discussing hegemony. Although I agree with the realist scholars in terms of the prominence of the state as an actor, I completely disagree with their depiction of global politics and definition of hegemony. Gilpin's unsuccessful attempt to save realism from the balance of power offers a helpful explanation to understand the fall of the British Empire, rather than hegemony as a whole. Organski's pyramid metaphor helps us understand that only the great powers have significance in shaping the structure of the global system. Keohane argues that regimes bolster cooperation and prevent conflicts by providing a legal framework which reduces uncertainty. For him, the institutions are very important that they do not fall with their hegemon as it is harder to create a new system than to maintain them. Contrary to the realist views and similar to Organski's dominant power, Keohane's hegemon is the leader of its system. Wallerstein and Arrighi illustrate the relationship between capitalism and hegemony. As will be discussed, hegemony is a result of capitalist expansion and its consequences. Another contribution of Arrighi is his 'ordered anarchy' definition. Realist anarchy fails to encapsulate the global affairs and Organski's hierarchy is only valid in the existence of a single dominant power. Anarchy is the absence of a central rule, but an interstate system might still have norms, rules, and procedures in the absence of a central

rule. This makes it 'ordered anarchy'. Chaos, on the other hand, is the complete absence of organization which creates a demand for an order among other states. A hegemon is a state that is able to satisfy this demand. 'Ordered anarchy' explanation is also compatible with the establishment of two hegemonies in history. Although Cox and other neo-Marxist scholars, place too much focus on the class relations in explaining the interstate system, Cox offers the most helpful categorization in defining hegemony and helps us see its two main branches: coercion and consent.

As seen, there are several dimensions to take into consideration when explaining hegemony of a state and discerning a hegemonic political order. The reason why I could not use any single framework from the discussed scholars is their failure in some aspects despite their strengths. In addition, defining hegemony is not my only goal. Apart from what hegemony is, this thesis also explains how hegemony emerged in the first place and what historical conditions had a significant contribution to the emergence of hegemony and why the hegemonic age is ending. Taking above theoretical points as the basis, the following discussion involves definitions which add historical context.

3.1 Domination and Hegemony

In a very basic definition, a hegemon is a state that is powerful enough to be the most influential state on the global political outcomes, but not powerful enough to dominate the world on its own. The latter has never been achieved while the former was first achieved when the intense competition between the European states ended as the United Kingdom was recognized by the other states as a superior to them. To make it clear, hegemony did not emerge because of the failure of the balance of power as realists argue. As will be discussed in the next sections, it rather emerged as a consequence of several systemic factors, including

changing military technologies after the first industrial revolution as well as changes in capabilities of states with technological and economic developments.

As longtime rivals, neither the United Kingdom nor France was able to dominate the rest of the world, even after one of them prevailed. After their competition has ended, the balance of power did not cease to exist. However, hegemony emerged as a new way defining the political relations between states, and the systemic conditions prevented hegemony from turning into dominance until today by strengthening both the domestic economies and the military capabilities of their rivals through the spread of the Industrial Revolution and by bolstering peace and stability. In other words, due to the systemic conditions, the hegemons have not reached relatively superior material capability at a level that would lead them to dominate the world.

Historically, way to acquire wealth and power have usually been through conquests; however, the balance of power has limited expansions through land. The European discoveries offered a great wealth for the big empires, like Spain, and the states focusing on trade, like the United Provinces. Consequently, the United Kingdom took the lead, acquired naval superiority and reached to a material capability to maintain a large navy and to defend itself. Britain was invincible at sea and thus it was not possible for other great powers to invade the British Isles. There was nothing other great powers could do to stop Britain, as even for Napoleon, all he could do was to launch a long term plan by establishing the Continental System. The goal of this futile attempt was to restrain the ability of the United Kingdom to maintain its large navy by damaging its economy. Europe was a great market for the British goods (Davis, 2006: 31). For Britain, therefore, expansion into Europe and to be perceived as an aggressor would rather be a pointless move. If colonialism did not occur, the United Kingdom, then, may have

attempted to expand in the continental Europe, though its success would be questionable without the wealth it later acquired from colonialism. The main point here is that the balance of power mechanism was still there after the emergence of hegemony. Despite the strength of the United Kingdom, however, there was no need for other states to balance the United Kingdom, as it clearly was not perceived as an aggressor. Furthermore, the growing British wealth did not threaten the survival of the other great powers. On the contrary, the great powers have received help from Britain in case their survival was threatened.

As discussed, a great power may follow two different paths in an attempt to create a new order: domination and hegemony. The former is defined by preponderance-based governance while the latter indicates leadership.

3.1.1 Domination

In this path, a great power aims at subjugating other great powers to make sure to get its way in its region, and later, most likely, globally. Uneven development in different regions around the world paved the way for European domination in other regions. However, Europeans did not have superiority over each other on land due to the balance of power system. Britain, however, managed to establish naval dominance, which made it the first hegemon. The systemic conditions allowed the establishment of hegemony. On the other hand, the systemic conditions also decreased the likelihood of the establishment of dominance at the same time. There have been only a few chances for a short period of time in history that a state was able to achieve dominance.

Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany are the examples for the great powers following the path of domination. As will be discussed in the next sections, both of these states enjoyed an offensive advantage in their period that they came up with, which left other states

unprepared. Due to their offensive advantages, their military capabilities were beyond their material resources when compared with other great powers. Their goal was to end the balance of power in their favor and to dominate the world. They expanded in Europe excessively through conquest, as no state could in Europe since the Roman Empire. This is an aggressive path to follow; therefore, the aggressive great power is likely to face a coalition of states that want to stop them. If the aggressor striving for dominance is powerful enough to prevail against the coalition consisting of great powers, it, then, can dominate the entire world.

3.1.2 Hegemony

The other path a superior great power can follow is the path of hegemony. As stated, a hegemon is a state that is powerful enough to be the most influential state on the global political outcomes, but not powerful enough to dominate the world on its own. Hegemony emerged in a particular historical structure whose emergence depends on several conditions. These conditions can be grouped into two categories which affect each other: systemic conditions and state-level conditions. Systemic conditions refer to the aspects such as changes in military technologies, relative capabilities of states, the speed of spread of knowledge in a way that would lead a state to be a global hegemon. State level conditions, on the other hand, refer to the conditions that give a state the ability to possess hegemonic power as opposed to other great powers. As discussed in the first chapter, hegemony also has a leadership dimension which determines the type of its hegemony.

A hegemon is a state having a higher status than other great powers. The hegemon establishes a new system and attempts promoting stability in the system by deterring aggression. Thus, the hegemon supports the existence of other great powers and leads the order, which in

return helps to get support from other great powers. Due to this important difference, the hegemon does not face a balancing military coalition consisting of other great powers. In addition, historically hegemons secured their place by leading a coalition against the aggressor state striving for dominance, which made it easier for the hegemons in terms of recognition of their favorable leadership position by other great powers. After all, the hegemons presented a better option for other states as the survival of all states would be jeopardized in case Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany succeeded in their domination attempts. Although this is important in terms of the recognition of a hegemon, emergence of a state in the path of dominance is not a requirement for the emergence of a new hegemon. With its high domestic industrial capability and its unchallenged control over the trade routes along with its navy strength, Britain was the strongest candidate to be the first hegemon, anyway.

One thing worth mentioning is that a hegemon does not assume that title with a long term agenda to achieve it. A great power rather ends up hegemon naturally for its material superiority. A potential hegemon finds itself in a situation where its capability outstrips any other state, and most likely by far. It does not take long for this potential hegemon to notice its relative superiority, and establish an order. As a result, this new hegemon creates a new order. The hegemon is no more a competing party; it is rather superior to other states. The new struggle of the hegemon becomes more about preserving its privileges. The hegemon introduces a set of rules and makes sure other great powers follow the rules of this new order. The hegemon tries to convince other great powers that its interests are common interests as it provides stability. Although anarchy is not completely removed, the hegemon can deter aggression and introduce new norms and principles to bring an order to anarchy. Hence, the hegemon is viewed as a sort of guarantee by the great powers for their survival as long as these great powers support the hegemon and follow the rules.

Hegemony is not a preferable system, as the hegemon can exploit its privileges, though not as nearly much as a dominant state would. However, as Keohane suggests, hegemons have a crucial role in creating institutions and bolstering stability in the interstate system. In other words, hegemony might be a crucial element in achieving a democratic and lasting interstate order. Without an order that a hegemon has created, or without a hegemon that deters aggressions, great powers might be inclined to initiate conflict against their rivals, as Germany did in the both world wars. States might have different motives or historical experiences shaping their decisions. Regardless, a hegemon needs to create an order and socialize other great powers into their new rules and norms to limit aggressions of great powers, to achieve stability and to avoid conflicts, or further, to resolve conflicts by peaceful means.

As Arrighi states, an emerging hegemon creates a new system by playing a moral and intellectual leadership role in the system. Besides coercion, a hegemon needs to seek the consent of other states during the creation and continuation of its hegemonic order, as stated in the Neo-Gramscian understanding. On the other hand, a hegemon can use its material superiority for its own benefits. In this case, the hegemon favors its own interests over the legitimacy of the order. A hegemon supporting sovereignty of other great powers does not imply that hegemony is mutually exclusive with colonialism, as in the case of the United Kingdom. A hegemon may also choose to create an order with high legitimacy, based on the consent of the other states, in a sense, as a state-level social contract. Hence, a hegemon can follow two different paths to define the type of its hegemony.

3.1.2.1 Partial Hegemony

To avoid a possible misunderstanding, partial hegemony does not refer to the hegemony in a region, it is still global in its scope. The word “partial” rather refers to the limitation of states,

together consisting of the society of states that the hegemon leads. Middle powers and small powers, as defined by Organski, lack the power and ability to threaten the system. Hence, a hegemon does not need their support in the system. These states might be considered fair game by great powers. Even further, they might be partitioned. As they have no say and do not have the ability to defend themselves against great powers, the rules of the system determine their fate.

A hegemon may show its willingness to preserve the order by deterring aggressors that can disrupt it. Although Britain stayed out of the European politics by following an isolationist foreign policy in Europe and respected the sovereignty of the European great powers, it interfered when its interests and the stability of the order are at stake. As stated, despite being a leader, the hegemon may prefer domination in a region where it is not likely to be challenged easily and is out of the sphere of influence of a great power. Apart from the United States, which has later become a great power, the states that could challenge the United Kingdom were mainly in Europe during the British hegemony. Britain, therefore, did not expand in Europe or in the Americas after the fall of the Spanish Empire. However, Britain followed a path of domination in the rest of the world.

This type of leadership is likely to fall in the long run if hegemon fails to preserve its economic size and thus military power to keep it well above the other great powers, not because of the perceived unfairness to the exploited states, but to the great powers. In a period of stability, capitalist forces would work in favor of other great powers which may later reach the level of the hegemon in terms of military strength. Colonialism is a finite process as the size of potential target lands are limited. In case there is a change in the power structure of the order and there is no new land to colonize, dissatisfied great power(s) will want their fair share in

the partitioning of the world. During the British hegemony, the European colonial states got their smaller share. As a result of nationalism, however, a new great power emerged in Europe, Germany. With insufficient potential colonies for Germany, therefore, this system created a dissatisfied great power. If the hegemon is powerful enough to deter an aggression, then the order would persist until the fall of the hegemon. But if not, the hegemon is likely to face an aggression, or to be challenged if the estimated cost to challenge is not too much. A way to increase the cost of an aggression is to create a functioning interstate society of states. As Britain did not create a lasting global order that would stand against the German aggressions, the British order has fallen with its hegemon.

3.1.2.2 Global Hegemony

A hegemon may also show its willingness to preserve the order by deterring most/all aggressors and protecting middle and small powers. The United States did not strive for conquest, nor supported it. Besides, the United States encouraged decolonization of the existing empires. The new interstate order with the United Nations promoted sovereign nation-states not only in certain parts of the World but in the entire World. During and after the World War II, the Soviet Union had shown tendencies to expand. The Soviet Union acquired land in considerable size in the Eastern Europe, as spoils of war. The Soviets were willing to continue their expansion; however, President Truman made it clear that the rules of the system have changed and that they will respond to the Soviet aggressions (Clark, 2011: 438-439). Although the United States conducted several military invasions for its political interests and to contain the Soviet Union, the United States has set an example to others by not initiating any attempt of conquest. Thus, their competition with the Soviet Union has continued in other areas through ideological competition.

This type of hegemony brings comparably better stability to the world than partial hegemony does. Even without the existence of nuclear deterrence, it is possible to claim that the system would last due to the support the hegemon receives from other states against a potential aggressor. Yet, it is hard to get the nuclear deterrence out of the picture, as it is not a coincidental invention. Throughout the history, new offensive inventions/strategies have always offered increasingly higher damage. At a technology level at which the world has become too small for a person to roam easily and where people no more have to rely on pre-industrial power sources, one may assume offensive weapons have gotten very destructive for mankind. Thus, inventions of nuclear weapons and missiles or inventions of other similarly destructive weapons were inevitable occurrences, although the timing might have varied.

Due to the increasingly higher cost of wars, major conflicts between great powers have to end at a point in time. The world economy would, then, thrive as a result of peace and prosperity period. Rather than military competition for conquests, economic competition takes place. In this case, the hegemon is, again, likely to lose its place due to capitalist forces if it does not have a population advantage. States taking advantage of the conjuncture and successfully using the factors of production, which refer to natural resources, labor force, capital, and technology, might take over the lead in economic size. In that case, the more the population a state has, the more GDP amount it is likely to reach, which also leads to having a higher level of influence in the global order. In the case of stability, peace and prosperity, the hegemon will lose its superior influence over the global politics as a result of the inevitable decline of its relative material capability. However, as Keohane argues, the system will remain as it is due to the high cost of changing the order by aggression as several great powers will continue supporting its persistence.

3.2 Historical Developments Before the Emergence of Hegemony

Although we are used to the superiority of a state for the last two centuries, hegemony is actually quite hard to achieve. It was not possible before the British hegemony, and if the world manages to preserve a rather peaceful order that we now have, the hegemony of one state will not be possible in the foreseeable future, either.

Hegemony has emerged after a long historical process. With a simple explanation, it is possible to claim that hegemony is a result of the European domination over the rest of the world, and the ability of a European state to outstrip others in a global competition. This process started with the European discoveries at the end of the fifteenth century. Before explaining the systemic level and the state level conditions required to create a hegemony, it is important to understand historical developments leading to it.

3.2.1 Rise of Trade and European Discoveries

Trade with the East through the Silk Road was quite important for Europeans for obtaining certain goods that they do not produce, like silk and spices. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople increased the trade costs with the East (Brown, 2015: 21-22). In addition, Europeans were not able to produce goods that they could sell the East to exchange their goods; therefore, Europeans were making payments with gold and silver which, in return, was causing the deficit of both metals (Brown, 2012: The Lure of Gold, the Wealth of Silver). Mines in Europe were mostly exhausted and it was quite hard to find new ones. These were major driving forces behind the European discoveries.

The European discoveries started by the attempts of merchants in their search for a direct route to India and China. Such a direct route would reduce the costs of trade and offer a big wealth for the merchants. In an attempt to find a route to India, Christopher Columbus has

sought support from several states. Portugal and Castille were the only states interested in supporting his efforts. However, neither of them found his estimations of travel distance likely. Portugal preferred to choose another option to reach India through Africa, thus declined Columbus. Castille, after several rejections, finally agreed on supporting him (Fletcher, 2000; 254).

The age of European discoveries started with the voyages of Portugal and Castille, shortly after Spain. Perhaps an important reason why Spain and Portugal attempted and succeeded instead of the Central or the Western European states is that they both had a strong central political authority and a higher military power than others at the time, which also provided them economic power and ability to finance the voyages (Mirza, 2007: 28). Centuries after the voyages of the Vikings, technological developments helped the sailors navigate better at sea.

3.2.2 The Period of Iberian Superiority

Not long after its foundation, as a result of the marriage between Isabel of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragon, Spain has become a vast empire. First, they completed *Reconquista* in 1492, after fighting the Moors to conquer the last Muslim part in Iberian Peninsula. Hence, Spain has become a central kingdom across the non-Portuguese part of the peninsula. Spain, then, discovered new lands in the Western hemisphere of the World. The Spanish conquistadors enslaved American Indians and conquered their existing states. They used native populations in their search for precious metals. As a result, a large amount of gold and silver have poured into Spain from its overseas colonies (Mirza, 2007: 37-51). The Portuguese sailors, on the other hand, found a way to reach India through the southern Africa. Discovery of this new route was a breakthrough for the European trade, as the trade with East flourished due to the reduced costs. Apart from Spain, Portugal also started establishing colonies in

South America. To prevent conflicts, Pope Alexander VI issued a decree dividing the World between Spain and Portugal. The next year, both states have reached an agreement and the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed (Mirza, 2007: 52-54).

3.2.3 The Period of Dutch Superiority

The political developments in the late sixteenth century precipitated the end of the Spanish-Portuguese dominance over the oceans in the next century. Spain was a vast empire under the reign of Philip II. He was a member of the House of Habsburg and has become the Holy Roman Emperor. Therefore, he was controlling the lands of the empire including the Dutch provinces and the southern half of Italy. He has also become the King of Portugal after a succession war. While Spain was at its peak in terms of power, the Dutch have rebelled against the Spanish crown and has gained their independence with the help of England and France. By the time of its independence, the republic has already become a major economic power while Spain has faced serious economic troubles resulting from the war (Nexon, 2009: 227-234).

The Dutch had faced several challenges due to frequent floods, but they managed to overcome them. The innovative engineers like Cornelis Corneliszoon van Uitgeest and Jan Leeghwater found a way to take advantage of wind power to build ships faster and reclaim the flooded lands (Cleveland, 2014: 51-52). The inventions enabled the Dutch to build the ships faster and with less effort which, in return, contributed to the developments in trade and production significantly (Wiesner, 2006: 219-220). During the same period, the Dutch sailors gradually increased their trade with India. These developments paved the way for a new period, known as the Dutch Golden Age (Baghdiantz McCabe, 2015: 103-105).

The Dutch Republic was a decentralized state; it was a loose confederation of seven provinces. This difference from the centralized European states reflected itself in the financial system of the republic. The system was designed to benefit decentralized political entities rather than directly the state itself. After the independence, the Dutch created a new financial system allowing the state to punch above its weight. The government was able to borrow money from its citizens at low-interest rates. The Dutch founded the first central bank in the world in Amsterdam. Their consumption based taxation system was quite effective. Shortly after England, they formed their East Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) which was financed by the first modern stock exchange. This model allowed them to privatize the risks and disperse the costs of their overseas venture while the state continued to get tax revenue from the trade. East India Company was granted a state monopoly on the Asian trade and was able to send more ships for trading than England and Portugal (Ferguson, 2011: 41-42).

3.2.4 The Dutch and English Rivalry

Although England has founded its East Indian Company before the United Provinces, its first attempts failed. Following the footsteps of the Dutch during most of the 17th century, England has also become active and successful in its trade with Asia. As a result, Portugal was no more able to compete with these two states with its less efficient trading. The competition between the Dutch Republic and England advanced as they continued to be the biggest rivals of each other in trade. The republic was more successful; however, England was a substantially larger state by the size of land and population. They both had their own East Indian Company which was granted their state monopoly for the trade with East. However, the proximity of Amsterdam to London was a major challenge for their monopoly. It was not possible to

implement the monopolies effectively, so their profits were less than they had hoped for (Ferguson, 2011: 43).

States' economic policies at the time were based on mercantilist ideas. Trade was seen as a zero sum game. The growth of trade of a state would mean a loss for its rivals. England passed the first Navigation Act in 1651 to keep the dominance in trade with its colonies. The purpose of the acts was to prevent the trade of its colonies with foreign countries and conduct the trade between England and its colonies only with English ships. The commercial trade rivalry between England and the Dutch Republic triggered 3 wars between 1652 and 1674. The goal of these wars was to show naval superiority and get control in trade routes. Despite the size of England, the Dutch was superior in the conflicts. In addition, the Republic has beaten the fleet of Anglo-French alliance and prevented the French land invasion by flooding the land intentionally to block further French advancement. The Republic trembled with the danger of French Invasion. It was a traumatic period for the Dutch as it was a matter of survival of their state. Hence, there was so much at stake. As a result of these wars, the Dutch financial superiority has beaten the English economic superiority. The wars fought against the Dutch Republic have seriously damaged the English economy and caused political issues for the English crown (Ferguson, 2011: 43-44).

The solution for the conflicts between the trade rivals was rather unusual. England was a Protestant country like the Dutch Republic. However, the King of England, James II, was a Catholic ruler. His religious tolerance policies and his close ties with France raised suspicion for his intentions among the mostly protestant English aristocrats (Childs, 1980: 23). This suspicion led the English aristocrats to cooperate with the Dutch Stadtholder William of Orange to plan an invasion with a Dutch fleet. The coup succeeded and William has become

the King of England (Childs, 1980: 189). A new period for the relationship between these two states began.

Perhaps the most important aspects of this new Anglo-Dutch union were about its commercial and financial dimensions. England left the spice trade in favor of the Dutch Republic, which was perhaps the most important goods for the Dutch trade. Instead, England focused on a growing industry, textile. England benefited more from this agreement in the long run (Ferguson, 2011: 46). Based on the Dutch central bank model, the Bank of England was founded. England created a financial system like the Dutch Republic, allowing the state to borrow money at low-interest rates, which has come in handy at war times. These reforms helped the English state significantly (Ferguson, 2011: 55). In the following century, the British financial and naval superiority secured victories at wars and contributed to the British naval dominance which gave rise to the British global hegemony in the nineteenth century.

The Dutch Republic was a quite successful state in trade. The only possible threat to its trade was perhaps its big island neighbor England. Therefore, the resolution of the problems between these two states would seem like a positive development for the republic; however, the result was quite the opposite. The Dutch economic growth slowed down while England continued to flourish. London was becoming the new financial center attracting new investments, including from the Dutch Republic. According to Arrighi, the Dutch cycle of accumulation was replaced by the English cycle. During this transition, it was becoming more profitable for the Dutch capitalists to invest in English ventures than to trade by themselves (Arrighi, 1994: 159). Long after their union, these two states had one more war after more than a century, in 1780. Once a fearsome naval rival of England, the Dutch Republic was far

from its old strength and was no match for England anymore (Wielenga, 2015: A second-rate Power).

3.2.5 The Rise and Fall of France

Despite the intense naval and commercial rivalry between England and the Dutch Republic, the main rival of England has been France, especially since the Hundred Years' War. This rivalry continued until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. As a result of the Hundred Years' War, England lost its possessions in continental Europe and has become an island state (Braudel, 1982: 353). France, on the other hand, has become a centralized state and the most powerful state in Europe in the following centuries. Unlike the German and Italian city-states, France managed to form a central authority and preserve it. Especially under Louis XIV rule, France was superior to the rest of the Europe and wanted to expand on all fronts. The borders of France have offered opportunities for expansion (Noble, 2013: 453-483). France had both a larger manpower and a bigger economy than any other state in Europe. In the early 1700s, the population of France was around 21 million while it was slightly more than 6 million for the Great Britain and Ireland.² Although France was more powerful, Europeans were able to limit the French aggression in continental Europe by forming alliances in cases where the balance of power was threatened.

France has also had colonial ambitions like any other Western European state. Although the political and religious issues in Europe limited their efforts in the sixteenth century, the French colonial empire expanded in North America and Africa in the seventeenth century. France also established its East Indian Company (Compagnie française des Indes orientales) in 1664 to

² The population data was taken from Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD"

obtain Indian goods directly rather than paying higher prices to England and the United Provinces. France has become successful compared to its early failing attempts, yet the French company was still behind the English and the Dutch companies which were better funded. The French company remained a royal enterprise whose orders was too small. Following the death of Louis XIV, the French East Indian Company was near bankruptcy (Parker, 2010: 25) (Riello, 2009: 323) (Van Den Boogaerde, 2009: 117).

Tensions with Britain further damaged French overseas ventures. In the Seven Years' War, Britain and France faced each other in their quest to be a world power, and the other European powers joined the war and mainly fought in continental Europe. Britain and France fought in their colonies all around the World that, some has named this war as the First World War. Britain was aware of their naval superiority and the importance of navy; hence, focused on increasing the size of its navy early on. The plan worked and Britain destroyed the main French fleet. Ending the connection between mainland France and its colonies, Britain was able to pick off the French colonies. In the aftermath of this war, France lost its biggest colonial possession in North America, known as "New France". Britain ended the French presence in India, as well (Dull, 2005: 83-89) (Buchet, 2013: 1-15) (Hart, 2008: 132).

Britain owes its success to its naval superiority combined with its superior financial system created based on the Dutch system. The British financial system provided the ability to take on debts to increase the size of its fleets early on at war and ensured a decisive victory in the end (Ferguson, 2011: 53-55). Shortly after the Seven Years' War, Mughal Emperor has signed the Treaty of Allahabad with the British East India Company. This agreement gave the company the right to collect taxes from people in the Indian province of Bengal-Bihar-Orissa. This was the first step of the British rule in India (Ferguson, 2011: 58). Taking advantage of the

conflicts, Britain kept expanding in the following decades and finally was able to control the Indian subcontinent. Despite a setback in the American Revolutionary War, the British superiority continued. There was one last test to succeed before its hegemony: the French Revolution, which is covered in the next chapter.

3.2.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the breakthroughs and developments that have led to the establishment of the first global hegemony. Although the proposed hegemony framework will be discussed in the following sections more in-depth, it is important to see that there has not been a global hegemony before the nineteenth century in any sense, as proposed by the scholars discussed in the previous chapter. This section reflects the competition between the European states and the extension of their competition overseas. It is impossible to attribute hegemony to any of them due to the limits of their superiorities.

Economically these European states were very small compared to the Asian countries that the share of GDP of India accounted for over 24% of the World while it was around 3% for England, Scotland and Ireland combined in 1700. Moreover, the GDP of entire Europe was around 30% while the GDP of Asia was over 60% of the global GDP for the same year.³ Advanced European weapons helped close the gap in time. Wealth flowed to Europe as the European states dominated weaker states across the world. Although the European states had more advanced weapons and naval superiority than the states in the rest of the world, the competition between the European states did not allow one of them to assume a hegemonic role in the world. Spain could never achieve a global superiority. French continental superiority did not become a dominance in Europe. At its peak, the Dutch Republic was a superior naval power

³ The GDP data was taken from Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD"

and trade power, but it lacked the material power to be a hegemon. A hegemon could emerge in the eighteenth century, but Anglo-French competition ended only in early nineteenth century. It was then, for the first time, a state possessed material superiority to make it a global hegemon.

3.3 Systemic Level Material Conditions for Hegemony

3.3.1 Offense vs Technological Diffusion

Technological diffusion refers to the spread of developments and knowledge from a central point in a state or a region to other states and regions. Throughout history, geographical distance limited diffusion. Interactions between states have allowed them to test their military tactics and technologies against their enemies, usually at their borders. These interactions ensured the spread of knowledge and thus technological diffusion. Technological diffusion makes it harder for states to expand across the land because they exist in the same region where similar military weapons are used or where others are familiar with the strategies of each other. In order to survive, states have to see their strengths and weaknesses at war in time to adapt to the military developments.

Perhaps the naval developments have made the world a smaller place for states by bringing far lands within their reach. With increasing material capabilities, however, several new imperial powers gained a desire to rule over the world. As a result of technological diffusion, there were multiple political actors with similar goals and similar capabilities. Although the world has become small enough to roam over, it was still quite sizeable to rule. Therefore, the possibility of dominance, as opposed to hegemony, significantly decreased. In other words, it became almost impossible for a state to expand even across the continent where it is located in, let alone the world.

The conflict between Spain and the Native Americans is a very good example to reflect what lack of technological diffusion can lead to. As there was no connection or interaction between Europe and the Americas until the Spanish voyages, any kind of technological diffusion has not occurred. The Spanish conquistadors were able to dominate technologically inferior Native Americans. The Battle of Cajamarca clearly illustrates the technical difference between the belligerents. The Natives were incomparably weaker by military technology lacking even swords while Spaniards were able to use cannons and firearms. Spain only had 183 men while Inca Empire had thousands of men. Spain had almost no casualty; however, Inca Empire lost two thousand people. As a result, Spain founded a vast empire in the Americas (Weir, 2007: 112-115).

The Ottoman Empire presents another good example facing two different type of states at its two opposite fronts. The Ottoman Empire desired to expand into Europe; however, their expansions beyond the Balkans have been limited due to the stopping power of the Holy Roman Empire. As a result, the Ottomans have become a part of the European balance of power system. While interactions with the European states helped the Ottomans to adapt to more advanced technological developments in Europe, the situation was quite different at the southern front against the Mamluks. The Mamluks initially denied usage of firearms and remained proud of their traditions. On the other hand, the Ottomans were using artillery and modern troops, the Janissaries, which were equipped with arquebus against the Mamluk cavalries who were using bows and arrows. The Ottomans were able to conquer the Mamluks entirely in less than a year that the Mamluks did not even find a chance to adapt to the military developments for the survival of their state (Gupta, 2007: 668).

Although the lack of technological diffusion makes a significant impact, this has rarely been the case in conflicts between states regularly interacting with each other. The most important examples took place due to low or no interaction during colonialization, and due to the lack of time for adaptation to the new developments offering comparably much greater offensive capabilities during Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany, as will be discussed.

3.3.2 Offense-Defense Balance

Another important factor in the evolution of interstate relations is the offense-defense balance. Historical technical developments have had a tendency to favor either the offense or the defense for a period of time. In the late Middle Ages, fortresses gave an advantage to the defense, which gave greater power to the local authorities. Cannons, however, ended this period and made the offense more advantageous, which led central authorities to gain more power as opposed to local entities. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, new fortification techniques made the defense more advantageous against the offense. In the following period, nationalist ideas of revolutionary France introduced the ability of a state to mobilize mass armies consisting of more loyal troops, which strengthened the offense. Before the World War I, lethal small arms (accurate fast-firing rifles and machine guns), barbed wire, entrenchments, and railroads gave the defense an advantage. Railroads could be used for reinforcements only by defenders due to the destruction of the railroads by defenders as they retreat. The weapons had rather a short range and could be defended easier than the weapons of the following period. During the interwar period, the offense gained an advantage by the usage of motorized armor and employment of an offensive doctrine (Blitzkrieg) which overrode machine guns, trenches, and barbed wire. After the World War II, the nuclear weapons strengthened defense due to mutually assured destruction. Besides the periodic

developments, tactical moves during wartime also affect the defense-offense balance (Brown, 2004: 239-240).

Historically, the European balance of power preserved the existence of multiple political entities across the continent and limited imperial expansions with the help of technological diffusion. Hence, no state could reach the size of the Roman Empire in Europe. Technological diffusion is a necessary condition but it is not sufficient on its own. For example, if the critical tactical mistakes were not made during their military campaigns, perhaps Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany could have succeeded due to their enormous offensive advantages, as they were the states that came up with the new strategies and employed them effectively before other states could adapt to them. It is important to keep in mind that whenever the offense took the lead during history, the offensive weapons/tactics posed increasingly bigger threat. The high offensive capabilities of these new strategies, however, did not just give them an advantage; they directly threatened the survival of other European states as these states had almost no time to adapt to these developments. Thus, in a sense, what rest of the European states have faced in these periods is quite similar to what the Mamluks have faced against the Ottoman Empire back in the 1500s. Napoleon and Hitler could perhaps manage to control entire Europe. Their goals were harder to achieve, yet they also failed to play their cards right, while the United Kingdoms and the United States were more successful in their attempts to end their invasions with the help of their mistakes. In short, it is possible to conclude that the periods when the offense gains an advantage may give rise to domination attempts. On the other hand, during the periods when the defense gains an advantage, the hegemon has the upper hand.

3.4 State Level Material Conditions for Hegemony

3.4.1 Security of the Mainland

Hegemony requires the ability to defend the mainland from potential attacks or invasions. Insularity might give an advantage; however, it is also about the balance between the offense and the defense as well as the military capabilities of states. As discussed, the military technologies and the offense-defense balance has constantly changed throughout history. However, whenever the offense took the lead, it created an increasingly higher level of threat to the target states as military technologies have advanced. While industrial revolution strengthened the dominance of the United Kingdom in the oceans, its spread gradually weakened the British. Perhaps the United Kingdom was no match for the Napoleonic France in a land battle. Having an island mainland unlike France, however, the United Kingdom was untouchable. This defensive advantage, as well as the British naval supremacy, and the ability to lead and finance wars against their rival, were sufficient to claim global hegemony. On the other hand, subsequent developments in aerial technologies made them an open target. Even after these aerial developments, as a virtual island, the United States remained secure from European wars due to the distance with the European states. The security of the United States, however, was threatened due to more sophisticated military aerial weapons in the following decades after the World War II. Ironically, due to their ultimate offensive power, nuclear weapons have provided security for the great powers. Although geographic and technological constraints are still important in cases requiring the use of conventional weapons, a great power with nuclear capability has been assumed to be relatively safe due to the principle of the mutually assured destruction (Haynes, 2013: 103).

3.4.2 Global Reach

Although global reach is the first condition of a global dominance or hegemony, technological diffusion decreased the possibility of dominance significantly. Europeans started to reach distant lands after the beginning of colonialism. They took advantage of the incomparable military weakness of the peoples in the Americas, Africa, and Australia and they started to trade with India and China directly. With the industrial revolution, the world has become smaller with the developments in transportation and communication. While it took four to six weeks to cross the Atlantic Ocean, it was down to two weeks with steamships in the 1830s. In time, the speed and the size of steamships increased. Starting in the 1850s, telegram has become an important way of communication for the British Empire. It was taking less than a day to communicate with India (Ferguson, 2011: 170).

Before the European discoveries, foreign policies of states mainly involved immediate borders or geographically proximate regions. However, as discussed in the second section of this chapter, the interstate relations have attained a global dimension in the following centuries. Taking advantage of conflicts, Britain started to rule over India in the 1750s. After the industrial revolution, Britain was now able to dictate its terms to China. The hegemons were able to pursue their interests in far continents against other states due to their ability to mobilize armies in far places.

Global reach requires a technology level and military equipment to exert coercive power in distant regions and a large economy to afford the costs. During the nineteenth century, the GDP of China was higher than the British GDP. However, Britain was an industrialized state with advanced weapons which also had naval dominance. Britain was possessing a giant empire and numerous military bases on the trade routes across the World due to its naval

dominance. The United States, on the other hand, was able to afford the burden due to the strength of its domestic economy making it by far the largest economy in the world during its hegemony.

To summarize, the knowledge to dominate the world was produced as a result of the industrial revolution. However, knowledge to have a global reach being available was not enough to show superiority. It required a relative military or economic superiority of a state over the others. Global reach could also cause dominance. However, as explained, the diffusion of knowledge and the offense-defense balance decreased the possibility of dominance significantly by not allowing a state to be the sole powerful state in the world.

3.4.3 Material Capability and Economic Size

Material capability reflects economic and military power. Military capability is closely linked with economic size today, but in historical conditions, this link was not as strong due to the slow pace of technological diffusion between geographically distant regions. Chinese GDP, in the eighteenth century, would merely reflect its potential or actual manpower, but it would not reflect its military capability. In the post-World War II period, however, it took only four years for the Soviet Union to develop a nuclear weapon.

Sustaining competitive military capacity is inextricably linked with economic size. Its rather low GDP and GDP per capita, as well as the inefficient economy, made the intense arms race unsustainable for the Soviet economy in the long run. Hence, unable to claim hegemony, the Soviet Union had remained a revisionist great power. A global hegemon needs both a superior military capability and economy that can handle the burdens of hegemony. The United States and the United Kingdom were able to afford hegemonic expenditures including maintaining bases around the world and undertaking much larger military spending than other states.

3.5 Establishment of an Interstate Order

As discussed, hegemony is quite different from dominance. A hegemon aims to create a system where other great powers continue to exist without threatening the leadership of the hegemon. Therefore, the hegemon needs the support of other states, mainly the great powers, and their consent to the leadership of the hegemon in the system. As the material strength of the hegemon gets comparably higher than the material strength of other great powers and it remains secure, the need to cooperate with the great powers decreases. On the other hand, such a behavior damages the legitimacy of the hegemon and jeopardizes the future of the order and the future of the hegemon after its fall. Regardless of its superiority, a hegemon has to be careful about the legitimacy of its hegemony and the order it has created.

If the hegemon does not have both a high population and a high GDP per capita, in other words, if it does not have a large economy that is not likely to be surpassed, then the hegemon may lose its advantages at some point. Despite its superiority, even the hegemon only gets a few chances to establish a long-lasting order which has high legitimacy among the members of the order. If the hegemon fails to use its chances, then it jeopardizes both the future of the order and its own security by creating potential challengers that want to take its place.

Although this thesis does not adopt neo-Gramscian explanation entirely, the basic explanation that Cox offers is very compatible with the views presented in this thesis. Neo-Gramscian theory suggests that hegemony is a combination of coercion and consent. The systemic and state level conditions are about coercion aspect of Neo-Gramscian hegemony while leadership, interstate bodies, and institutions consist of the consent branch. When the states perceive the hegemonic order in the image of a state-level social contract, which governs the system of states like a social contract governs the domestic affairs of a state, it means this

hegemony has high legitimacy which makes the hegemon moral and intellectual leader of the other states. In this case, as Keohane indicates, the order is likely to last even after the hegemon falls.

An ideal interstate social contract would end the anarchy in the interstate system. States that are part of the contract would secure themselves against potential threats. It also would help the global economy thrive as the contract minimizes uncertainty, which, in return, decreases military expenditures. States would give up their rights to retaliate potential aggressions, and instead they resolve the issues in the interstate institutions by the interstate law. In a Lockean sense, ideally, an interstate order needs three important tools to function: settled, known laws that the states consent to, a fair and impartial judge to execute the law, and finally power to back and support the execution of the law and to punish the aggressors (Locke, 1690). If the hegemon successfully establishes a state-level society governed by these elements, then the hegemonic fall would lead to a more democratic order rather than its collapse.

If a hegemon loses its economic superiority, in other words, its overall material superiority, then it is inevitable for the hegemon to also lose its high unmatched global influence on political outcomes, and its hegemon position. If the order has low legitimacy and the hegemon is not powerful enough to deter aggression, then the hegemon is likely to be challenged. The high legitimacy of the order and successful interstate mechanisms brings support from other states in a potential aggression and present further deterring power. The existence of highly destructive weapons also deters aggression if there is a strong global society.

4. The British Hegemony

First global hegemony was established more than three centuries after the first Spanish voyage to the Americas. During this period, European states gradually expanded their domination to the entire globe. Regional powers in other regions lost their importance in the process, and all existing states became open to the influence of the Europeans. As a latecomer in this race, Britain quickly became an important trade power and expanded its colonial empire. The United Kingdom became a wealthy state due to its success in capital accumulation through trade, and later, industrialization. This wealth made it possible for Britain to invest in its navy and afford the costs required to establish and lead a global political order. Mighty Royal Navy provided domination over the oceans and trade routes. As an island state, the British naval superiority also made it safe at home, unlike other European great powers that were unable to defend themselves against Napoleonic France. After the victory against France in 1815, Britain preserved existing colonial order and its favorable position in the Western domination of the world. British leadership was recognized by other great powers under the British partial hegemony.

Military developments in the early nineteenth century strengthened the defensive advantages of Britain. However, technological diffusion changed the global political structure by ending British technological superiority against other great powers and by increasing their material capabilities. As a result, Britain was the third largest industrial economy behind the United

States and Germany by the World War I. Britain no more possessed material power to remain hegemon; hence, the British hegemony was replaced by the balance of power mechanism in Europe as alliances reemerged in preparation for war with Britain losing its ability to deter an aggression. After the war, Britain was recognized as the leader despite its inability to function as a hegemon due to its material weakness. However, attempts to create a global society, which would collectively deter aggression, failed and Germany challenged the order once again. This chapter explains the historical process of the British hegemony, systemic and state-level material conditions in its rise and fall, and the British interstate order.

4.1 Historical Overview of the British Hegemony

4.1.1 Road to Hegemony

The British hegemony was not formed in a day; the rise of Britain was a result of a slow but steady process. England was a latecomer in the colonial race. English naval technology level was behind Spain and Portugal. However, the ability of England, later Britain, to adapt to new conditions made it superior to the other states in the following centuries. Colonial ambitions of England started with the search of gold and silver, yet several attempts have failed. Consequently, England managed to find different sources. Queen Elizabeth noticed the importance of piracy as a source of income which was also used to fund the colonial investments. She supported privateers plundering Spanish trade ships, even though it would cause a war with mighty Spain. In the following period, England was focused on colonial investments and trade, which not only proved to be important sources of wealth but also transformed the English economy in the following centuries. There was an increasing demand for domestic consumption of the trade goods like tobacco, sugar, tea, which later have

become cheap enough for even English servants to afford, as the supply increased (Ferguson, 2011: 33-40) (Mirza, 2007: 60-69).

After the Glorious Revolution (1688) the economic transformation was accompanied by the military transformation. The British state was able to maintain an increasingly larger army and navy. Britain was at war with France and its allies five times between the Glorious Revolution and the end of the French Revolution. The British army has become more powerful in time; as a result, emerging from a small island state, the United Kingdom has turned into a major military power. As its rivals in Europe, the United Kingdom has eventually become a fiscal-military state which was dominated by the task of waging war. While the British army had an average of around 40,000 personnel in navy and 76,000 in army annually during the Nine Years' War (1689-1697), the number in navy increased to 82,000 in navy and 108,000 in the army during the American War (1775-1784). The average annual tax revenue has increased from £3,640,000 during the Nine Years' War to £12,154,200 during the American War. Similarly, average annual expenditure has increased from £5,456,555 to £20,272,700 for the same period. Bank of England, founded in 1694, has helped the Crown manage its debt. The British debt has soared by almost doubling the amount during each war for a century and has reached to £242,900,000 after the American War in 1784 (Brewer, 1988: 27-30).

The eighteenth century has witnessed the competition between the United Kingdom and France. They both had their advantages and disadvantages over each other. Although the big size of the French army seemed to offer more advantages at the beginning of the century during the reign of Louis XIV, the British advantages have been more decisive in the result of the competition. Compared to Britain, France had a huge army along with a powerful navy. France was 3.5 times larger than the United Kingdom by population in 1700. At the time,

Britain was even worried about the possibility of France dominating Europe, which, then, would lead to the invasion of the British Isles. Yet France had to maintain a large army while it was less of a requirement for the United Kingdom as an island state. Britain could thus invest more in their navy than the other states, which has become the key to winning this competition. Having a superior navy helped Britain defend the British Isles easier and contributed to the balancing coalition against France. The British navy also helped Britain show superiority in the colonies by limiting the French access. The European balance of power helped Britain stop France both in and out of Europe (Marshall, 2001:19-20). The consistent rise of Britain during the eighteenth century made it the most powerful state in the world. This rise was accompanied by the French decline and created resentment for the French. After the Seven Year's War, Britain expanded its vast colonial empire while France lost most of its colonies along with its prestige. The Seven Year's War aroused considerable national feeling in France, as reflected in the chronicles of French nationalism. French *ressentiment* had a major impact on the national awakening in France (Greenfield, 1992: 177-180).

When the British hegemony started is a topic of debate. I believe the end of the Napoleonic Wars is the most appropriate date. One may claim that the United Kingdom emerged as the most powerful state from the Seven Years' War, as French colonial empire has come to an end and Britain gained control of several French colonies in the North America and India. Yet, after the war, the United Kingdom was perceived as an aggressive power by other states. France and Spain were looking for a chance to take their revenge from Britain, and a colonial revolt in America gave them the opportunity. The United Kingdom was eventually defeated in the American Revolutionary War and lost important colonies in North America. Yet this victory has been too expensive for France, leaving a heavy debt behind which also has contributed to the events leading to the French Revolution (Lanning, 2008: 20-23) (Anderson, 2002: 69).

France was born from its ashes with the French Revolution. As a new ideology, nationalism made it possible to recruit cheaper and more loyal troops at an unprecedented size. Nationalism, combined with its high population, gave France a strong offensive capability (Showalter, 2007: 107) (Hobsbawm, 2010: The French Revolution). As a result, the European balance of power has failed, perhaps, for the first time. On the other hand, the United Kingdom had a huge navy dominating sea, giving it a defensive advantage. Britain was also wealthy due to its colonial trade, giving the state the ability to maintain its large navy. The war between two giants was a deadlock. France was not able to invade Britain due to the strength of the British navy while it was not possible for Britain to counter the French troops on the continent (Berkin, 2015: 213). Again, unlike France, Britain played its cards right. With Napoleon's coercive foreign policy, France failed to create and maintain an anti-British coalition on the continent. On the contrary, the United Kingdom won the economic war and emerged from the Anglo-French competition as a balancer, and possibly as the savior of Europe, but not an aggressor. Britain was seen as an aggressor after Seven Years' War, and even probably the American Revolutionary War due to its previous gains at a considerable size. Perhaps Britain would get away with its gains due to its defensive advantage, but the excessive French aggression made it much easier. As a result, Britain emerged as an untouchable island and a leader that aims to preserve peace in continental Europe.

4.1.2 British Hegemony I – The Concert of Europe and Afterwards

The United Kingdom continued the imperial expansions during the nineteenth century. The British dominance over the oceans was recognized by all great powers. Using this for its advantage, the strategic expansion of Britain aimed at dominance over the trade routes to

India and China. This was achieved by controlling several ports across the world including the ports all around Africa, India, China (Jones, 2001: 433-436).

The United Kingdom dominated weaker states in Asia and Africa throughout the century, dictating its terms to the rest of the world. Yet the British approach differed significantly when it comes to the great powers. Although Britain did not attempt to regulate their actions, it took the lead in the war against France and in the consequent peace attempts to preserve the stability on the continent within the Concert of Europe. The concert consisted of the members of the Quadruple Alliance that defeated the France, and France, later, was allowed in the Concert as the fifth member in 1818. Despite its goal to preserve peace on the continent, there was no institutional structure to make it happen. As there was no mechanism to deter an aggression, the interests of actors outweighed their desire to maintain the stability. Hence, the Concert started to erode, as the great powers preserved their ambitions to expand. For Britain, maintaining the balance of power between the great powers was an important element for the preservation of the stability in Europe. Therefore, whenever Britain believed the balance of power was threatened and was able to take action, it took an active role to prevent a major change. Due to the Russian southward expansion, Britain fought the Crimean War for the sake of Europe against Russia, not in favor of the Ottoman Empire (Taylor, 1954: 61). The fall of the Concert accelerated in the following period, but the fragile Concert still remained in effect. The Concert had one last achievement in the issue over the new borders in Balkans with the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Although there has been one last meeting in 1912 to discuss the Balkan Wars, the great powers were already grouped into two blocks of alliances. Germany and Austria refused the British proposal of a meeting over the July Crisis which, in a month, triggered the events leading to the World War I (Stevenson, 2004: 4-5).

4.1.3 British Hegemony II – The League of Nations

The instability the revolutionary France caused in Europe created a desire to preserve peace on the continent; however, the bad memories of the war have been short-lived. Decades later, new alliance blocks have emerged as some of the great powers wanted to preserve the status quo while others remained dissatisfied with it, thus have become revisionist in their foreign policy. After the World War I, a new international organization was founded to prevent wars through collective security.

Many mistakes that were made during the Concert of Europe were corrected with the League of Nations. Still, it was far from ideal. This organization was open to all states in the World, with some exceptions. Yet, the exceptions were vital. The United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union were not part of it when the League of Nations was founded. The most powerful state, the United States, refused to join it while Germany and the Soviet Union were not allowed in, for the first as a part of its punishment due to its role in the World War I, while it was for being a communist state for the latter. In addition, a considerable portion of the world was directly ruled by the European empires. As a result of these factors, the organization was dominated by the United Kingdom and France (Basu, 2004: 14-18).

The World War I did not settle many of the past issues. The winners of the World War I preserved their big colonial empires while Germany was constantly humiliated. Humiliation is a dangerous move Bismarck has intentionally avoided in the past to allay nationalist revanchist sentiments from France after the war in 1870. But, his British post-War counterparts turned a blind eye to the warnings from the Americans having such concerns. As a result of its punishment, revanchist sentiments and nationalism grew stronger in Germany (Hamilton,

2003: 26-27). Germany was the most powerful state on the continent whose power did not match its possessions as opposed to the United Kingdom and France.

As a result, this second attempt had even shorter lifespan than the first one. The most important reason was the lack of support from several great powers. During the Concert of Europe period, most of the great powers were big empires whose colonial expansions were not limited. For Britain, the most important goals were to preserve peace and the balance of power on the continent, and there was a success in achieving these goals for a period of time. But after the rise of nationalism in Europe, the changes on the borders also changed the political climate ultimately.

With the League of Nations, the purpose was again to end wars. Unlike the last time after the French wars, the way to do it, the winners assumed, was to deter further offenses from the aggressors. This policy, however, backfired. In addition, the legitimacy of the global system was in question. The peace legitimized past conquests while forbidding future ones. The League of Nations did promote decolonization Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations⁴, yet the intention was to decolonize only the defeated empires, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, not all of them. The United Kingdom could remain as a vast empire while Germany had to be content with its small homeland despite having a big potential for expansion both in and out of Europe (Srivastava, 2005: 48-51). Therefore, with serious basic inconsistencies, the League of Nations failed to convince the great powers in a common goal. The existence of an institutional structure was not enough on its own, as weak institutions would not have much contribution to the legitimacy of the order. The League also lacked the power to deter an aggression. Once a fearsome state, the United Kingdom did not have

⁴ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22

enough military power or economic strength to keep it above the other states as the hegemon of the World. Before the World War II, the Nazi Germany has already started with its own agenda for expansion, and all Britain could do was to attempt to convince Germany to stop expanding further by offering the Nazis a chance to get away with their gains in the Sudetenland and Austria.

4.2 Systemic Level Material Conditions for the British Hegemony

4.2.1 Offense vs Diffusion

Following Britain, the great powers adapted to the industrial warfare. This gave them, perhaps, an unprecedented advantage against the other states. The gap between the military capabilities of Europeans and others kept growing. Having more than enough space for expansion, Russia kept expanding to the south in the west and east. As a state that does not have much room for expansion in Europe and a state that lost the colonial race, France started building its new colonial empire in Africa. Once a fearsome state in the European balance of power system but no more a great power, the Ottoman Empire kept losing its territories against Europeans in Balkans and in Africa. When Europeans targeted a land, they would get what they want. As in the example of the Ottoman Empire, military capability of the targeted states to defend themselves did not have much importance in the outcome, it was more about the power balance among the Europeans themselves.

Technological diffusion was slow between Europe and other regions. Other regions were dominated by Europeans before they had a chance to industrialize. Europeans were expanding faster than the spread of the industrial revolution. Yet, the situation was different in Europe. High offensive capabilities of new industrial weapons and the fast pace of industrialization of the great powers brought Britain into a challenge by the end of the nineteenth century. At

first, industrial revolution helped Britain improve its existing superiority over other great powers, by the end of the nineteenth century, however, Britain lost its lead in economic size and military capability in Europe due to the spread of the industrial revolution to other great powers.

To sum, technological diffusion, historically, hindered the possibility of dominance by allowing the co-existence of several powerful states in Europe. A new development, occasionally, gave a state a chance to have an upper hand over other great powers, or perhaps dominate them. However, such an advantage has been short-lived due to the diffusion of knowledge. Although the combination of certain conditions provided a global superiority, this superiority manifested itself in a hegemonic political order, rather than dominance.

4.2.2 Offense-Defense Balance

During the British hegemony, the defense had an advantage in the conflicts between the great powers. As discussed in the respective section of this chapter, the offensive capabilities of lethal industrial weapons were limited due to their low range and could be stopped by the defense easier before the World War II. During the World War I, no state had success in advancing at battlefronts as the Revolutionary France did. The main factors behind the early success of the United Kingdom against other great powers were its island position, the naval superiority, and unlike other states, the ability to defend home due to its island position in the nineteenth century (Emsley, 2014: 55).

Despite the lead of the defense at the time, military technologies of non-industrial states were quite inferior. At the places where diffusion is slow, offense, inherently, has more advantages, as discussed in the third chapter. Therefore, the British global reach resulted in an offensive

advantage over most of the non-European parts of the world, which provided dominance over them.

As the offense became more powerful with the World War II, the United Kingdom lost its defensive advantages to remain the hegemon with its low material capability. Britain no more had an unchallenged navy; hence, the British Isles were not safe anymore. Besides, aerial weapons were also actively used to target Britain. As a hegemon reliant on the defense, Britain was not able to counter the German offense.

4.3 State Level Material Conditions for the British Hegemony

4.3.1 Security of the Mainland

War has been a pretty frequent way of settling disputes in Europe, as in other continents. However, the United Kingdom has faced very little damage from these conflicts. The Glorious Revolution was the last invasion of the British Isles by now, although it was more of a coup made with domestic support from Britain after an invitation of the Protestant nobles who were worried about the absolutist tendencies of the Catholic king. After the revolution, the United Kingdom has gradually become the biggest naval power which provided it further protection against potential invasions. Napoleon has learned this lesson the hard way with the battle of Trafalgar where France lost its navy. France was more powerful on land, but it was not possible to reach the British Isles and defeat the United Kingdom. Hence, Napoleon launched an economic warfare plan against Britain. This plan was a sign of the acceptance of French naval weakness. With the Berlin Decree, Napoleon planned an embargo aimed at prohibition of the British goods on the continent. By doing so, he believed he could cripple the British economy and Britain would lose the ability to maintain its large navy. Yet, it was not only the British economy but also the entire continental economy that was damaged as a

result of the embargo. The strength of the British defense at home made it a much more powerful state than it actually is (Aaslestad, 2014: 84-86).

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the British naval domination has come to an end with its relative economic decline, which will be discussed in the next subsections. The British weakness and its possession of a vast colonial empire created a challenger. Britain could win the first round with support. However, the second challenge was much tougher. Using new offensive tactics and technologies, Germany was able to target Britain. As a result, London was heavily bombed. The British Isles were not safe from attacks of an aggressor anymore. Despite being on the winning side, after losing the security of its mainland, Britain gradually lost its ability to preserve its colonial possessions.

4.3.2 Global Reach

Global reach does not mean the ability to reach far lands. Colonial powers had this ability to trade for centuries before the British hegemony. Global reach rather refers to the ability of a single state with a strong offensive capability to influence the political outcomes globally as opposed to other states. A state must have the technological infrastructure and unchallenged economic and military superiority to do that. The British navy was able to conduct military operations overseas, far away from the British Isles. The British military superiority was rather about its naval power.

Britain successfully conquered India and waged war against perhaps tens of states across the world. Considering the size of China and its distance from Britain, Opium Wars also show the ability of the British state to satisfy this condition. Since eliminating the French threat all around the World, the United Kingdom emerged as the dominant naval power and preserved that power for decades. Britain had dominance over the oceans and used this advantage for

strategic colonial expansions to reinforce its position. The British conquests include the ports on the west coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, the east coast of Africa, India, the Strait of Malacca, Hong Kong, and the Falkland Islands. The British expansions also included the opening of the Suez Canal and the establishment of protectorates of Egypt, Aden, Somaliland, the annexation of Cyprus, which reinforced the British control over this new route to Asia.

4.3.3 Economic and Material Factors in Global Hegemony

4.3.3.1 Capitalist Forces

Even before the beginning of the colonization of the Americas, merchant capitalism was an economic force in Europe. Following the overseas discoveries, local economies in a state gradually transformed into one national economy in the Western European states. This transformation gave birth to the set of ideas known as mercantilism. Mercantilist ideas were aimed at increasing economic power of the state. The benefit and interests of the state always took precedence over anything else. Mercantilists suggested that one of the most important goals of a state is to increase its treasure. If the state does not have gold or silver mines, then the way to increase the treasure, for them, was to have a positive balance of trade (Wu, 2013: The Mercantilistic Theories).

Mercantilist understanding dominated the state behaviors. The Anglo-Dutch wars were not mainly about conquest in nature, belligerents were motivated to get control over the seas and trade routes. Britain did not pursue an expansionist foreign policy in Europe; the global expansions were rather a part of a strategic plan based on its economic goals. The United Kingdom has beaten all its rivals in the long marathon and emerged victorious. The British state managed to understand and use the capitalist forces in its favor. The GDP per capita figures reflect the trends in the rise and fall of states. The GDP per capita of the Netherlands

has increased from \$761 in 1500 to \$1381 in 1600 and surpassed Italy. As the Dutch dominated trade, it has increased to \$2130 in 1700. After the Glorious Revolution, however, the Dutch superiority has ended and the Dutch GDP per capita made no progress, furthermore, it went down to \$1838 in 1820. Yet with the British superiority in the global trade, the British GDP per capita has increased from \$1250 to \$1706 during the same period.

5

By the time Britain became the global hegemon, the industrial revolution has already started in the United Kingdom. Instead of merchants, industrialists started to be the dominant capital accumulators. In this new period, factories introduced a complex division of labor in the production of industrial goods. Machines could do automated tasks more efficiently than people. Coal was extensively used as a new source of power. In the following decades, iron and steel were used at a much greater scale to produce industrial goods, machines, railways, weapons. The industrial revolution triggered an unprecedented global economic growth (Hansen, 2014: 518-519).

As Figure 1 and 2 (in Appendix) shows, the United Kingdom took the lead in the iron and steel production at the initial stage of the industrial revolution. After the 1870s, however, the United States and Germany started to rise as the United Kingdom relatively declined. Since the 1890s, the United States has reached the top and preserved its place. After 1900, Germany mostly remained above the United Kingdom in terms of iron and steel production. In 1940, the iron and steel production was 60,765,000 tons for the United States, 21,540,000 for Germany, and 13,183,000 for the United Kingdom.

⁵ The figures are taken from Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD" and the dollar refers to the 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollar

Another important indicator of industrial capability, as Figure 3 and 4 shows, is the energy consumption of these three states. While Britain preserved its lead until the 1890s, first the United States, then Germany started to consume more energy than the United Kingdom. In the following period, the United States dominated the other two in energy consumption as they remained almost stagnant until the end of the World War II. The industrial revolution did favor Britain initially. As industrialization expanded from the United Kingdom to the Western Europe and the United States, however, the United Kingdom has lost its lead and the United States has become the new industrial center of the World.

4.3.3.2 Economic Size

Economic size is closely related to military capability, yet there is no direct correlation due to the systemic conditions. Understanding and using the capitalist forces for its benefit can help a state rise, and perhaps to the top, yet it is not entirely in the hand of the state to stay there. The GDP of the land that consists of the Netherlands today was \$2.1 billion while it was \$6 billion for the land that consists of the United Kingdom and \$15.6 billion for France in 1600. When the United Kingdom started to take the lead on the seas with its powerful navy, in 1700, the GDP of the United Kingdom was \$10.7 billion as opposed to the Netherland's \$4 billion and France's \$19.5 billion. Britain has proved its superiority in the eighteenth century and has become a hegemon after the Napoleonic Wars. As a hegemon, the GDP of the United Kingdom has risen to \$36.2 billion while France could manage a comparably modest average growth rate and reach \$35.5 billion in 1820. On the other hand, the GDP of China was \$228.6 billion while the GDP of India was \$111.4 billion for the same year. As discussed, the economic size,

clearly, is not a decisive condition on its own in the establishment of hegemony if the systemic conditions would not allow the state to translate its economic capability to military power.⁶

The British economic growth was supported by another factor; fast population growth. The importance of population reflects itself in the eventual decline of the United Provinces and the United Kingdom, and perhaps even the United States can be included in the list, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The British population had a sharp increase from 8.6 million in 1700 to 21.2 million in 1820. The Spanish population has increased from 8.8 million to 12.2 million while the French population has increased from 21.5 million to 31.3 million during the same period. One may conclude that the improvement in the British quality of life supported an increase in the population while this increase supported the growth in economic size in return. Similarly, an important portion of the success of the United States in the creation of a large economy lies in its success in attracting new immigrants. High population makes an industrial state even more powerful. Thus, seeing the population changes in Figure 5, it is no surprise that the United States have become a much larger economic power than the European states, with the population 2.7 times of the United Kingdom and 1.9 times of Germany in 1938.⁷

Given all these figures, it is easy to see the gradual decline of Britain's economic superiority. The GDP of Germany has surpassed the British GDP before both world wars, despite a major setback after the First World War. Yet the American overall economic superiority is quite obvious. When states using similar military technologies compete against each other, the material capabilities of the states determine the winner. However, if the difference between

⁶ The GDP data was taken from Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD"

⁷ The GDP and population data was taken from Angus Maddison's "Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD"

their capabilities is not huge, then the power of their alliances might play a decisive role. Hence, economic size is an important indicator reflecting the capabilities of states and their rise and fall as a hegemon.

4.3.3.3 Material Capability

The strength of the British defense made it more powerful in the offense as well. With successful economic growth for a long period, Britain was able to invest more in its army and navy. Despite the first mover advantage in several industries, Britain lost its economic superiority to more populous industrial states in the long run. In the early 1900s, the GDP per capita of the United States was more than the British GDP per capita despite its much higher population. The GDP of Germany has surpassed the British GDP in 1908. As a challenger, having higher GDP helped Germany invest in its military more than the United Kingdom.

Military spending data in Figure 7, 8, 9, and 10 reflects the changes in the military spending of these three states between 1816 and 1945. If we disregard temporary increases of military expenditures, such as during the Civil War for the United States or the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 for Germany, Figure 7 reflects that, as the hegemon, Britain invested more in military than the other two. Yet, as Figure 8 shows, with the economic relative decline, the other two states have caught up with Britain in military spending by 1900. Figure 9 shows almost equal German and British spending but higher American spending by the end of the World War I. Yet, as seen in Figure 10, Britain was not able to match Germany in military spending and had to rely on the United States to win the World War II.

Similar trends can be observed in Figure 11 and 12 showing the number of military personnel in the armies of these three states. Britain had more personnel until the late 1860s. After that period, Germany had more active personnel for a long period until the end of the World War

I. Ambitious for expansion and preparing for the big war, Nazi Germany, once again, employed more military personnel than the rest. Given its much superior material capability and population, however, the United States was able to catch Germany in numbers easily and then double it in around a year.

It is hard to define, explain or accurately measure the power of a state. The Correlates of War Project offers an invaluable dataset and measurement to partially remedy this problem. As discussed, there are important indicators reflecting the material capability of a state. The National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset uses six variables to measure the material capabilities of the states, many of which were discussed above and shown in figures.⁸ The dataset contains annual values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all states between 1816 and 2007. The aggregate Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) is produced from the combination of these variables. CINC is presented in an attempt to measure hard power; therefore, it might not reflect the total power of states. In other words, a state having higher CINC from another state does not necessarily make it more powerful. However, it is quite helpful in measuring relative material capabilities of states. CINC takes the total capabilities of all states as 1 and shows the relative portion of each state. This measurement is also good to analyze the distribution of power among the great powers.

Figure 13 and 14 reflects changes of the CINC values for the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. The CINC of the United Kingdom has been over 0.3 for decades, until the 1850s, which is two times of the state with the second highest material capability, Russia. It is important to underline this data; a small island state with low population, alone,

⁸ <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/national-material-capabilities-v4-0>

possessed 30% of global material capability. The United States could manage that rate only for 9 years. It is possible to claim that despite the inherent weaknesses due to the technological level of its time, the British material capability and global strength at its peak was higher than the American capability (excluding temporary high stats of the United States for the post-war years). However, the rise of the United States and Germany precipitated the British decline. Despite its economic and military decline, the United Kingdom still managed to preserve its lead in national capability until the late 1890s. Yet, the British capability continuously declined after that period. Germany took over the second position while the United States preserved its lead. In 1941, Germany and the United States were competing with the CINC of around 0.2. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was down to even below 0.1. The British decline continued after the World War II, with the British CINC going below 0.05 in the 1950s.

4.4 The British Order

As the data discussed in the “State Level Conditions” subsection indicates, the material capability is a necessary condition for the establishment and preservation of global hegemony. Without material capability, a state would not be able to claim hegemony over other states. Similarly, lack of coercive material capability, after the establishment of hegemony, may attract potential challengers to dethrone the hegemon and perhaps to take its place. Yet, as necessary as they are, the material conditions are not sufficient. The state level material conditions discussed so far can only be sufficient together for the establishment of dominance, which requires higher CINC than the establishment of hegemony does.

Hegemony, on the other hand, also requires the consent of other great powers and legitimacy for its leadership. This means that a hegemon needs to use its offensive military capabilities

only when needed. Thus, military force should be used against aggressor revisionist states to stop them. In other words, the hegemon needs to have material capability mostly to provide stability to the system it created by deterring aggression. On the other hand, inability to deter aggression without a direct military interference may also be perceived as a sign of weakness for the hegemon, as the aggressor great power assumes that the hegemon would not be able to respond to the aggression, or even further, would not be able to stop it, as in the case of Germany before the World War II.

This, in a sense, defensive leadership does not come out of a deep respect for the sovereignty of other states. Perhaps Britain would want to dominate the great powers, but it was impossible to control the continental Europe for any state, so it was not even an option. Britain, instead, has led the system as a superior to the great powers. On the other hand, Britain has dominated the rest of the world that remains out of the sphere of influence of the great powers, mainly in Asia and Africa. Based on this basic picture, the British hegemony can be classified as a partial hegemony. In the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom was the state that shaped global political outcomes, but the British did it in different ways in different parts of the world. Due to the high cost of wars, diplomacy has been the first tool to use when resolving issues with the great powers. However, Britain did not hesitate using gunboat diplomacy against weak states (Lowe, 2005: 49). Even further, Britain continued its conquests along with the other European great powers, most notably during the Scramble for Africa.

One thing worth noting is that the British partial hegemony was a result of the historical evolution of the globalization. If there was another state with a colonial history striving to be a global hegemon, it is likely to follow a similar path. Lack of institutional structure during the nineteenth century was a mistake, but there was no other historical example and the

consequences were simply impossible to predict. Historical conditions led to the partial hegemony that there was an ongoing Western domination in the rest of the world, and the British hegemony preserved the conditions of the existing order. The United Kingdom was acting as a hegemon, in other words, a leader. However, Britain did not know how to build an effective interstate order which would last.

During the British Hegemony, the British foreign policy was deeply influenced by its commercial interests, especially after the industrial revolution, due to its increasing need for cheap raw materials and markets to sell its industrial products. Although the United Kingdom followed its “splendid isolation” foreign policy in Europe, which referred to a minimal involvement in the European politics, these commercial interests did not allow Britain to distance itself from the European politics completely (Osborne, 2004: 11). The United Kingdom intervened in Europe when the British government perceived its interests were in danger. After the French wars, politically and economically, the most dangerous possibility for Britain, in Europe, was thought to be the failure of the balance of power once again. The American Revolutionary War, the last big war before the French wars, lasted over eight years and cost £80 million. The national debt of the United Kingdom rose to around £250 million at the end of the war (Tombs, 2006: 179). The war-weariness from the Revolutionary Wars for twenty years seriously damaged the European economies. Britain had to take on large expenses during the war to increase its army and navy, to maintain them, and to give subsidies to Russia and Austria in order to keep them in the war while suffering from the decrease of income due to the French trade embargo at the same time. Although the British Isles remained safe, the cost to achieve it was huge. The whole cost of the French wars to the United Kingdom was £831 million. Comparing with the American Revolutionary War, whose serious economic

damage contributed to the French Revolution in the first place, the figure alone shows how catastrophic the war was for the European economies. It was extremely hard for the British government to manage the costs and only high level of the stakes made it possible to finance the wars by loans, additional taxes, and additional incomes (Watson, 1960: 374-376). This was, however, not a sustainable model. This is why the preservation of stability was in the interest of Britain more than other states.

On the other hand, it was not merely the British money that won the war against France. The British diplomacy also played a decisive role in the formation and preservation of anti-French coalitions (Haldi, 2005: 72-74). Unlike France, the United Kingdom neither attempted nor was able to rule over Europe by itself. This helped Britain with its diplomatic position. Having control of the trade routes and having growing domestic industries, the best option for Britain was to work with the European great powers to preserve the stability and to protect the European markets from such a major threat. The members of the coalition that defeated France, namely the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, and the Austrian Empire, formed the Quadruple Alliance, which became the Quintuple Alliance after France joined three years later in 1818 (Spielvogel, 2012: 640). By the time the concert started to erode, the British leadership had already been recognized in the global matters. Although there was no real institutional structure to preserve the stability, Britain has shown in the Crimean War that its red lines are not to be crossed. Acting as a leader, Britain formed an alliance consisting of states from Europe to stop a potential aggressor which would threaten the balance of power and the British commercial interests. The main difference of this coalition from the European wars of earlier centuries was that it was the most powerful state, though not on land, that was stopping the aggressor, not the other way around. In earlier centuries, other states were

forming coalitions to stop France, the most powerful state on the continent. The British interests were common interests. Hence, the United Kingdom, as the hegemon, was perceived as a state that poses no threat to the survival of the great powers, even further, helps them.

As the hegemon and dominant naval power of the world, the United Kingdom had the power to influence the global trade and economy. After the pre-hegemonic competition to take control over the trade routes, Britain emerged as a dominant actor. Britain built military bases on important ports through the trade routes to secure the global trade, and thus secured access to important raw materials under its leadership. Based on Ricardo's ideas advocating free trade, suggesting that a state should concentrate its resources on the industries where it has a comparative advantage, Britain abandoned protectionism, then embraced and promoted free trade following the repeal of Navigation Acts and Corn Laws (Burch, 1997: 101-102). Britain opened its colonies to all states for free trade. These, as well as the similar steps such as the introduction of the gold standard, were signs of the willingness of Britain for creating public goods to generate economic and political stability in the interstate system as its hegemon. As discussed, however, effective leadership requires material capacity, and the United Kingdom was losing its lead with the rise of the United States and Germany. The British share in world trade was 24 percent in 1870, and the British decline precipitated increasingly higher dependence on trade. For Britain, share of trade has reached 49 percent of its GDP in 1877-1885, and 52 percent in 1909-1913 (Lake, 1995: 131-132). Losing its material power in the long run, Britain has become increasingly more vulnerable to international economic closure and lost its ability to maintain free trade in the system. The British liberal economic order was spread throughout Europe, but it remained fragile due to a lack of reciprocity. The United States and Germany easily abandoned free trade with domestic political changes, but

Britain did not retaliate against protectionist unfair foreign trade practices and allowed free riding. Hence, the United States and Germany took advantage of British openness while protecting their domestic industries. Following other European states, Britain eventually had to take protectionist measures as the open international economy was being substituted by regional trading blocs of colonial empires (Lake, 1995: 135). Despite its material weakness, Britain remained the hegemon due to the victory at the World War I and the reluctance of the United States to take a more active role. Therefore, it would be more accurate to name it the British Quasi-Hegemony between two world wars.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the British hegemony was likely to end due to relative material decline the long run. Britain was no longer able to create public goods to maintain the system on its own. However, the fall of the British interstate order was not necessary. Britain had the power to establish an interstate order where great powers can collectively create public goods. To manage that, the rules of the interstate order must be conceived just by the great powers which are the states that are able to make a difference in the order. The hegemon does not have to sacrifice its own interests to make it happen. A conquest, that might seem useful for the interests of the hegemon, jeopardizes the continuity of the order, which, in return, also makes it unlikely to keep its colonial possessions in the future after a potential material decline, anyway. The rules of the competition must be well considered and the system the hegemon establishes must be fair for its continuity. The hegemon must calculate its interest within those fair rules.

The British interstate order was flawed from the beginning. Britain may have been able to keep the system under control for decades, but industrial revolution started to work against it after the 1860s. The stability of the system was provided by power relations of the states

rather than collective institutions. Foundation of the League of Nations did not make much difference as the United Kingdom and France manipulated the decisions. After the French wars, middle and small powers were either colonized by the great powers or forced to agree with the terms of Britain with navy waiting off the coast. Latin America was an exception for the post-French wars period in that sense. The United States and the United Kingdom preferred to support the independence of Latin American states and strengthen commercial ties with them to prevent a potential Spanish/French attempt of reconquest. After the Scramble for Africa, colonial empires did not find enough space to expand further. Colonialism is a finite process; therefore, when the available space ends, the only remaining option is the redistribution of the existing colonies through war (Lake, 1995: 131).

The rationale for colonialism aside, colonial possessions offered several advantages for the empires that had them. They were considered as a source of prestige and status, even today. Colonies provided a large manpower at disposal to use in a time of war. Possessing certain colonies having geopolitical importance also provided tactical advantages during wars (Khapoya, 2015: 103-104). For these reasons, possessing colonies were more important than merely securing an access to colonial goods. Thus, opening colonies for free trade would not solve the issues. Lenin suggests, "Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the monopolies against all risks of the struggle with competitors" (Evans, 1979: 18). Indeed, European states primarily wanted to possess colonies to avoid risks.

Gilpin suggests that free trade helps developing potential military competitors (Lake, 1995: 136). He is right in a sense that if there is a potential challenger, free trade helps the antagonist state grow faster by the provision of cheaper raw materials. However, helping develop a rival state and helping develop a military competitor are two separate issues. Even though there

are also technical considerations, challenging is still a result of systemic level issues. In recent history, Western governments helped develop China by providing capital in exchange of its cheap workforce. Perhaps this exchange has been mutually beneficial, but China as a state has benefitted more from it and became a prominent great power. Considering that China has very different ideology than the western states, the United States and the European Union developed a potential competitor. However, the complexity of interdependence and strength of interstate institutions of American hegemony deter a potential challenge against the order. It is not in the interest of China to challenge the United States by breaking the rules of the order America has created. China merely wants to be a great power having high influence in global politics within the existing order. Germany, on the other hand, wanted the share it deserves in a colonial redistribution. Hence, Britain helped develop a military competitor due to the institutional weakness of its interstate order. Keohane suggests that institutions facilitate cooperation by creating a legal framework, reducing uncertainty and constraining moral hazard and irresponsibility. It is not only the material power that deters a challenger, reputational considerations also have significance. Thus, international regimes are important for creating consistent, routine and enduring state behaviors (Lake, 1995; 135). A hegemon might lose its ability to lead, but the collapse of an order is not a result of material weakness alone. The most important reason is the institutional weakness which can be considered as the failure of the hegemon. Simply put, Britain failed to create an interstate social contract. The British order, in the end, lacked settled fair law that states consent to constraint themselves with, an impartial judiciary institution to execute the law and material power to back the law and deter an aggression.

5. The American Hegemony

While British hegemony is a result of the long-lasting political race between two great powers across the world, the United States did not initiate political tensions on its way to establishing a hegemony. The United States kept Europeans out of the Americas, consciously distanced itself from European politics, and managed to preserve its federal unity under one flag. From a colony, the United States became the new center of industrial developments and inventions. As a successful industrial power, the American population growth has been quite distinctive compared to European great powers. Its large population and industrial capacity allowed the United States to lead the anti-German coalition and establish a new global order afterwards. American hegemony was not the final step of a long-term plan; it was rather to satisfy a demand from the Western countries. After stopping the German domination attempt, the United States restored the Westphalian system and expanded it to the rest of the world. The United States established a global hegemony promoting the sovereignty of nation states around the world.

In the early phase of the American hegemony, the spread of nuclear weapons to other great powers removed the possibility of its use after the war, restoring the advantage of defense over offense. However, American superiority in terms of material power remained due to its economic strength which constituted the basis of American hegemony. In the following decades, industrialization spread to non-Western states. Furthermore, the rise of neoliberal

economic policies caused a shift in production and gave rise to state-led capital accumulation in China, a state having four times the population of the United States. Despite its continuing growth and being the largest economy in the world, the United States has relatively been declining. The United States used its leadership to strengthen the collective global institutions and economic interdependence, which deter a potential challenge to the order that would lead to its collapse. Nuclear deterrence further deters a challenge. Therefore, despite it is not possible for the United States to preserve its hegemony, its hegemonic fall will not be through war, either. After two hundred years, we might be leaving the hegemonic age behind. Systemic and state-level material conditions do not indicate a unipolar order in the future. We can thus expect multipolarity and regional blocs at best, but no new global hegemon.

5.1 Historical Overview of the American Hegemony

5.1.1 Road to Hegemony

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States was a new state that recently gained its independence from the British Empire. The United States has been a major destination for European settlers. Successful industrialization and fast population growth made it a great power in a short time. The United States consciously distanced itself from the European conflicts and warned the European states to stay away from the Americas with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Although there were ups and downs in the relations with Europeans, the United States managed to avoid a conflict with them, and after a while, it was powerful enough for others not to mess with.

Within the United States, there have been tensions between the industrial northern states and the agricultural southern states about slavery, economic issues, states' rights etc. A major conflict has been avoided for decades through temporary solutions. However, after Abraham

Lincoln was elected, seven southern states seceded from the Union and founded the Confederate States of America. The Civil War started shortly after that (Finkelman, 2006: 324-326). The Confederation had hoped for a recognition and support from the European states that may want to weaken the United States, yet it has not been recognized by any foreign country. The United States has become an important trade partner that exceeds the potential importance of the Confederation and recognition of Confederation would jeopardize the future of the relations for Europeans, hence the European states remained cautious. The war ended with the victory of the Union and secession threat has ended permanently (Nelson, 2008: 163-165). As a result, the United States could preserve its ability to stay out of European politics. Divided, the United States could be part of the European balance of power system, with north being a potential British ally while south joining the German side. Preserving its territorial integrity made the United States a hegemon in the next century. After the civil war, the United States has focused on its domestic construction and manifest destiny to expand in the western direction by dislocating the Indians.

The second industrial revolution transformed the United States and contributed to its swift rise. Instead of Britain, the United States has become the center of this new stage of industrialization. Starting with this period, steel and iron were used more extensively. Railroad constructions gained pace compared to earlier decades. Electricity and petroleum started to be used as power sources in daily life. The inventions and innovations were at unprecedented numbers (Spielvogel, 2009: 484-486). Inventions of this period also changed industrial warfare and created bigger destructions in the World Wars. Supported by industrial developments, the American army had a decisive victory in the Spanish-American War.

Although the United States continued to stay out of the European conflicts, it has become more active in the foreign policy following the 1890s, especially after the Spanish-American War. Acquisition of Philippines was a sign of imperialist tendencies of the United States. This new overseas territory helped the United States expand its commercial presence in Asia. When the United States worried about the imminent threat of partitioning of China by the colonial powers, which could jeopardize American trade in China in return, the United States announced the Open Door Policy, allowing the colonial powers to have equal access to the Chinese market. While the Americans protected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, this mediation was merely for the exploitation of a historically huge economy that has failed to adapt to the great powers and has failed to develop a sufficient military capability to be able to defend itself (Buchanan, 2002: The New Imperialists). This period also reflected the willingness of the United States to take action when its interests are threatened.

Another crucial matter in America's trade with Asia was the distance between Asia and the east coast of the United States. The American government decided to link the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans by opening a canal; however, the Colombian Senate refused the American offer. Consequently, the United States supported a revolution to separate Panama from Colombia and to secure the canal construction. The revolution was bloodless and successful, and the canal was successfully constructed (Morrissey, 2009: 301-306). Despite its anti-colonial stance, the United States could go too far and act like a colonial power to pursue its interests.

Although the American foreign policy has changed after it has become a major great power, American habit of staying out of European conflicts was still in effect. It was only in 1917, almost three years after the war has started, that the United States declared war on Germany due to German attacks on American merchant ships aimed at cutting supplies to Britain. The

United States had no interest in taking part in the historical nationalist conflicts of Europe or their expansionist ambitions. As an idealist, President Wilson's main goal was to end the war and prevent victor states punishing the defeated states. Wilson announced the Fourteen Points aimed at promoting free trade, democracy, and self-determination while opposing secret diplomacy and agreements. Wilson also promoted a fair peace agreement on defeated empires to prevent future conflicts. Although the Allied states accepted the Fourteen Points, and the Fourteen Points encouraged Germany to surrender, President Wilson had little influence in the peace conference due to his personal health problems. Domestically, Wilson failed to compromise with the Senate on League's charter and it became an important topic during the presidential election campaigns. The Democratic Party lost the presidential election in 1920 against the Republican Party which had no interest in participation in the League of Nations (Boyer, 2010: 688-694). As a result, France and Britain imposed a harsh agreement which was quite different from what Wilson had initially proposed. Wilson was the ideological father of the League of Nations, but his vision could not shape the future of the organization. Following the presidents of the Progressive Era, the United States, the largest economy in the world, left the scene to the European states and refused to take a major responsibility.

The economic boom during the 1920s ended with the stock market crash which triggered the Great Depression in 1929. Unlike previous economic downturns, the impacts of this crisis were global. High unemployment rates created social unrest in all great powers. States increased tariffs on imports to protect their collapsing domestic industries, as a result, global trade decreased by 30%. Protectionism bolstered economic nationalism. Perhaps the humiliation at the Paris Peace Conference had deep effects on Germans and created the Nazis, but it was the Great Depression that paved the way for Hitler rise to power in Germany (Moffitt, 1983: 15-16). While the United States followed isolationist policies and avoided taking part in the

European conflicts, the revisionist military regimes in Japan, Germany and Italy threatened the stability of the global political system. Although Britain remained the leader of the order due to the World War I victory, it was not able to function as a hegemon. The Great Depression further weakened Britain, causing a decline in the British military spending (Floud, 2014: 293). Britain was not able to respond to the re-armament of the Nazi Germany. In a potential conflict, Britain would have to fight on several fronts: against Japan in Asia, Italy in Africa, and Germany in Europe. The British Empire had a lot to lose with its vast size. Therefore, Britain preferred to follow a policy of appeasement while Hitler was uniting Germans under one flag. Despite the expectations, however, Hitler did not stop with Austria and Sudetenland, and launched the invasion of Poland to provide lebensraum for Germans. Nazi Germany and its allies challenged the existing order by attacking Poland (Pearce, 2013: 106-107). The United States did not fight against Germany, but rather supplied Britain during the war. American industrial superiority embodied itself on a slogan. Franklin Roosevelt stated that the United States is “Arsenal of Democracy”. Nevertheless, the United States entered the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Its active participation and American supplies to Britain and the Soviet Union made a significant contribution (Hyde, 2013: 20). Eventually, the war was won by the Allies against the Axis powers.

5.1.2 American Hegemony – The United Nations

Losing the elections in 1920 as a vice presidential candidate, Franklin Roosevelt now had a chance to pursue the creation of an interstate organization and the participation of the United States as the president. The League of Nations was clearly a failure. After several conferences during the World War II, the Allied states, led by the United States, agreed on the establishment of a new organization, the United Nations. The main goal of the organization

was to prevent future conflicts. The organization was successful in the prevention of another world war. However, it could not manage preserving cooperation. Soon after the World War II, the sense of cooperation between the allied powers was replaced by the sense of rivalry.

Communism has been perceived as a major threat by the Western governments since the October Revolution by the Bolsheviks in Russia, which resulted in an isolation of the Soviets in foreign diplomacy. Therefore, despite the wartime alliance, the Western states and the Soviet Union did not see each other as reliable allies after the war. As soon as the war ended, both sides started competing for increasing their global influence. After the World War II, Britain, France and other European states were vulnerable in Europe and needed American protection against a potential Soviet invasion. Due to the power vacuum in Europe, the Red Army was able to swallow the entire continent easily. However, strong American support and military presence in Europe prevented an immediate potential Soviet aggression. American support was later bolstered by the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, aimed at protecting the European states. Although the NATO was a defensive organization, it was clearly created against the Soviet Union. The Soviets responded this infuriating move by creating the Warsaw Pact (Hyde-Price, 2007: 63-65).

The competition has turned into a series of conflicts during which both parties did not directly target each other, but instead supported the states targeting their rival. The United States pursued a containment policy to limit the expansion of Soviet influence and communism around the world. Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War was an important loss for the United States. The Korean War and the Vietnam War were fought to prevent further losses and to contain the Soviets. Americans believed that a communist victory would create a chain reaction in the neighboring countries and make a much bigger impact than assumed. Asia was

not the only continent where the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence. Both superpowers competed also in Latin America and in decolonizing Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union were cautious for communist or revolutionary movements in the respective European countries within their sphere of influence (Shimko, 2012: 23-25).

While the United States and the Soviet Union were continuing their global competition and the Cold War, they faced several major crises including Berlin Crisis and U-2 incident, but one of these crises was different. After an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba, the Soviets attempted to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba to counter American move of deploying Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey which had Moscow in range. By allowing the deployment, Cuba wanted to prevent further American operations after the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In response to that move, the United States established a blockade to prevent the Soviet ships from reaching Cuba and gave the Soviets an ultimatum. This incident, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war. Nevertheless, they reached an agreement after the negotiations. The Soviets canceled their Cuba plan while the United States promised not to invade Cuba and dismantled all Jupiter missiles that were supposedly installed in Turkey and Italy (Graebner, 2010: 264:272).

Having faced a nuclear war threat, both superpowers followed a new policy to alleviate the tensions in the following decade. This new period was called *détente*. After the Cuban Crisis, both states agreed on installing a hotline between their capital cities in order to be able to communicate with each other quickly on the issues that may turn into crises and maybe even into a war. During this new phase, the United States and the Soviet Union started talks to limit their arms. They reached to an agreement and signed the SALT treaties. However, the *détente*

period failed to create a lasting impact in the cold war. Détente has ended with the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 (Best, 2004: 279-284).

The 1980s witnessed the final stage of the cold war. As the tension reemerged, Reagan administration increased the economic pressure on the already stagnant Soviet economy. The Soviet military expenditure has increased at the expense of consumer goods and public expenditures. It has reached to 25 percent of the Soviet GDP while American expenditure was only at around 6 percent of its GDP (LaFeber, 2002: 332). Hence, the success in détente and the SALT negotiations would have been more beneficial for the Soviets as the arms race has become unsustainable for the Soviet economy during the 1980s. Democracy and the capitalist world economy has shown its superiority over the inefficient central economic and political structure of the communist Soviet Union in the long run. The liberal perestroika and glasnost reforms of the new leader Mikhail Gorbachev to transform the union backfired and caused the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union by leading to the revolutions (Strayer, 1998: 114-130).

The United States remained the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the successor of the Soviets, Russia was suffering from economic and domestic problems, the NATO and the European Union separately expanded into the Eastern European countries that were previously part of the Warsaw pact. The conflict has been ongoing over Ukraine and Georgia. Another dimension of the American-Russian rivalry is on nuclear defense systems. During the SALT I talks, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on limiting their anti-ballistic missiles. Anti-ballistic systems might seem to be developed for defensive purposes, but in this case, they pose the biggest offensive threat. There has been an order in which a state that triggers a nuclear war will face mutually assured destruction. If a state has defensive

systems against the nuclear missiles, then it would not worry as much as its potential enemy about a nuclear war. As détente ended, Reagan administration started to discuss a space-based missile defense system, which has put more pressure on the Soviet Union (Bradford, 2006: 309-310). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was not a superpower but it was still a great power with strong offensive nuclear capabilities. Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed with the Soviet Union in 1972 during détente, limiting missile defense systems in two complexes each of which having a hundred anti-ballistic missiles. The United States not only opened more bases but also encouraged the use missile defense systems on NATO soils to contain Russia (Sloan, 2010: 139-142).

Emerging during the Cold War, global terrorism has become a big threat to the states.⁹ After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil, as the global hegemon without a competitor, the United States pursued a unilateralist approach in its foreign policy as a response to this new threat. The United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq without seeking support from the global institutions. Scholars have been debating the American decline since the 1970s. The collapse of the Soviet Union may have deluded us all, including the United States itself, by leaving it as the sole superpower. However, the decline of American hegemony has been ongoing and is inevitable. Therefore, the post-9/11 unilateral approach was an example of the abuse of power in the absence of a serious constraint which would limit actions of a superpower. American unilateralist policies were disappointing not only for the old enemies but also for the allies. As Russia and especially China were rising during this period, it has become clear after the Arab Spring that the United States is no more alone in determining the outcomes of global political issues. Inactive Russian foreign policy clearly did not benefit

⁹ <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/how-the-soviet-union-transformed-terrorism/250433/>

Russia, allowing further American advancement into the post-Soviet countries. Putin believes in pursuing an active foreign policy that would challenge the United States where the perceived interests of Russia are at stake. Having a security council seat, Russia no more accepts being left out. Although its strong ally China remains relatively quiet on the global issues, the Chinese economic power will make it impossible for the United States to act as a hegemon.

5.2 Systemic Level Material Conditions for the American Hegemony

5.2.1 Offense vs Diffusion

During the American hegemony, most of the colonies of European empires have become independent. Weak states were given juridical statehood by the hegemon; hence, they would not worry about losing their independence. However, they were still open to foreign influences during the Cold War. Both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to shape the political systems and the governments of weaker states. During the British Hegemony, however, weaker states that were out of the sphere of influence of a great power would be conquered instead.

The offensive capabilities of the great powers were significantly advanced after the World War II. However, their technological advancements were followed by others quite fast due to the high speed of the diffusion of knowledge. The pace of diffusion did not allow a great power to acquire a big advantage against their opponent. The United States developed the first nuclear weapon in 1945 and used it against Japan during the World War II. The Soviet Union developed its first nuclear weapon four years later, in 1949. The United Kingdom followed them and tested its first weapon successfully in 1952 (Joyner, 2006: 30-31).

As discussed in the previous chapters, certain offensive developments and findings gave states advantages against other states in conflicts. However, during the American hegemony, diffusion speed did not allow such an advantage, at least not for long. Nuclear weapons provided the most efficient way of destruction in history and there was a period of time when the United States was the only nuclear power. After the United States lost its nuclear monopoly, however, nuclear weapons no more provided the ability to dominate the world. As there was no defense for these weapons, the great powers avoided a major conflict. In addition, the United States has shown its willingness and commitment to building a global institution, even before this four-year period started. Hence, the United States did not intend to use nuclear weapons to dominate the world. When there was a conflict or a chance of having a conflict, the United States was no more the only nuclear power, and the destructive power of nuclear weapons was deterrent, making states want to avoid a direct conflict with a nuclear power. The United States was no more able to use this capability for coercion. In other words, the fast diffusion of nuclear weapons prevented the establishment of dominance, while having no effect on already established hegemony.

5.2.2 Offense vs Defense

During the World War II, advancement in military technologies significantly increased the superiority of the offense over the defense. By looking at the historical transition pattern, it would be plausible to expect the defense to catch up with new developments. States would look for solutions to protect themselves from new offensive tools. However, offensive weapons have gotten even more powerful in a short period of time. After intercontinental ballistic missiles were introduced, target range was no more an issue. While planes were needed to drop nuclear weapons on Japan during the World War II, using missiles, these

bombs could target far lands. Nuclear weapons have become extremely destructive that even today there is no effective preventive defense system against them (Monteiro, 2014: 90-91).

On the other hand, this ultimate strength of the offensive weapons indirectly gave an advantage to the defense. Offensive weapons have become too destructive that waging war has become very costly. As conquest was forbidden after the World War II with the United Nations, there was less incentive as well as a huge cost to bear in such an attempt. The United States wanted Japan to surrender unconditionally, and having been bombed, Japan had no other choice but to surrender. Although that was not the intention of the United States, this could have, as well, been an invasion of Japan, as Japan did in Asia. Therefore, states noticed that having nuclear weapons is a good way to secure their survival. Consequently, several states launched their nuclear program. After the United Kingdom, France tested its first nuclear bomb in 1960 which was followed by China in 1964, then India.

What made nuclear weapons a strong defensive tool is not merely their ability to deal excessive destructive damage. This capability is accompanied by a strategy to provide the mutually assured destruction. In a nuclear war, the state that initiates the conflict can destroy nuclear capabilities of their enemy by a pre-emptive strike. Losing its nuclear capability, the targeted state loses its ability to deter an attack and the attacker state wins an easy victory. To preserve the mutually assured destruction in a nuclear war, a state with nuclear capabilities must have an assured second strike capability. If a nuclear power seeking war against another nuclear power is convinced that their strike can be retaliated, then war is no more an option.

5.3 State Level Material Conditions for the American Hegemony

5.3.1 Security of the Mainland

In the industrial world, assuring the security of the mainland has become harder to maintain. Technological developments offered increasingly more powerful weapons with the ability to reach further distances. Unlike the European states, the United States had geographical distance from other great powers that could threaten its security, and their neighbors were not able to pose a real threat.

After its independence, the United States managed to grow quite fast and have become as powerful as other great powers. Yet, unlike European states, it still had a potential to keep growing. France invaded Mexico during the American Civil War, but after the war American support contributed to the Mexican victory (Jones, 2011: 955). During the World War I, the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmermann sent a telegram to the Mexican government. Zimmermann offered Mexico its former territories in exchange for a declaration of war against the United States. However, knowing that this would cause future problems and Germany would not be able to supply Mexico properly, the Mexican government declined the offer (Halevy, 2001: 39-46). Similarly, the Japanese army conducted a surprise military strike on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii during the World War II. Although the attack was made far from the mainland, this direct attack caused the United States to declare war on Japan during the World War II. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to use Cuba as a base for its nuclear missiles to keep the United States in close range. However, the United States showed its determination by not allowing a passage for the Soviet ships at the risk of a nuclear war.

Although ballistic missiles made the world within the reach of nuclear powers, geographical distance to a potential attacker still preserves its importance as nuclear weapons have no practical use. The United States remains powerful and comparably secure in its own continent while containing its rivals through military bases located on the soils of its military allies.

5.3.2 Global Reach

As stated in the previous chapter, global reach does not mean the ability to reach far lands. It is the ability to have a strong influence on global political outcomes. The United States had an incomparably higher military capability than its competitor, yet conquest was no more an option. The British naval superiority provided the ability to limit colonial expansion of other great powers. However, the American naval superiority would not possibly limit the expansion of the Soviet influence, as the national borders remained intact. There have been two superpowers during the most of the American hegemony. Although both states could compete to gain influence all around the world, only the United States was able to wage war and protect its interests in other continents. The United States was able to contain the Soviet Union, not the other way around. The United States had a large economy to support its overseas bases all around the world.

5.3.3 Economic and Material Factors in Global Hegemony

5.3.3.1 Capitalist Forces

The industrial revolution changed the course of history by leading to a much faster advancement in science and technology as well as in every aspect of our life. The first phase of the industrial revolution started in Britain and expanded into other Western countries. Two countries industrialized more successfully than others; the United States and Germany. These countries have become the new centers of the second industrial revolution which is believed

to have started around the 1870s and lasted until the World War I. During the second phase, iron and steel were extensively used. New cheap steel production methods provided durable but cheap material, and led to a significant increase in railroad constructions, hence greatly improved the transportation of people and distribution of goods. The invention of electricity transformed industrial production by powering new machine tools much easier. Use of petroleum provided a cheap energy source for industrial production and transportation. The invention of the telephone and the telegraph significantly increased the speed of communication (Spielvogel, 2009: 484-486). Fordist mass production further increased the efficiency of production by standardizing products through the use of machines and introducing assembly lines. A complex production was divided into pieces. By division of labor, these pieces were handled separately and assembled later.

The United States has become the leading industrial power during the second industrial revolution and has become the center of inventions. Germany was also quite successful while the United Kingdom started to fall behind them. After the World Wars and the Great Depression, a new wave of industrial revolution started; the third industrial revolution. There is no wide consensus on the scope and extent of the third industrial revolution as on the first and the second industrial revolutions. While some claims post-World War II developments are part of the third wave, others divide this period into two waves. Assuming all latter developments are parts of the third wave, this period has started after the World War II but has gained pace in the 1970s. The United States has again played a central role in scientific and technological developments in the third wave. The world we are living in now is still going through a transformation.

Assembly lines are no more efficient enough for the complex products of the contemporary world. Digital developments allow more automatization in production and require less human effort. With the 3D printing technology, a digital design of a very complex product can easily be printed out. Similar to the effect the replacement of iron with steel made during the second wave, new technologies allow us to replace the old materials with lighter but more durable materials in production, such as carbon fiber. With the use of the internet, it is possible to transmit a large amount of data between two distant places, which allows us to do more than just communication. The volume of production and the energy requirement are pushing the limits of the earth. States started to invest in the production of alternative environment-friendly energy sources to decrease environmental costs and eliminate the reliance on fossil fuels. These changes might seem to have occurred in recent years, yet they are part of developments that have been ongoing for decades.¹⁰

While the United States benefitted from the new waves of industrializations as a central state, there have been other states that benefitted more in terms of increasing its power and influence. The massive increase in production and economic growth increased the labor costs in the western countries. Deng Xiaoping's reforms made China a good place for the capitalists in Western countries seeking to shift their production. China had a very large population that the state could use for capital accumulation. While enterprises from the Western countries used this opportunity to decrease production costs, developing countries, most notably China, attracted companies with their cheap labor costs.¹¹ After the 1990s, China has experienced a large growth rate and soon China is expected to overtake the United States by GDP (Barton, 2011: 25-28) (Guo, 2014: 50-52). In terms of global influence, the capitalist forces worked

¹⁰ <http://www.economist.com/node/21553017>

¹¹ <https://www.seattlerep.org/Plays/1011/AE/DeeperLook/History>

against the United States. However, this is not to say the United States has become weaker. It is rather to say American portion in the global economic output has naturally decreased, yet the American economy preserves its strength. This strength, however, is decreasing in relative terms despite its growth. This recent trend suggests that, unlike the historical examples discussed in the previous chapters, in a globalized world, capitalist forces no more give states immense hegemonic capabilities as more states become industrialized (Wallerstein, 2003: Historical Origins of World-Systems Analysis).

5.3.3.2 Economic Size

As explained in the previous chapters, a hegemon needs a large economy to sustain its expenditures related to its hegemonic position. Economic size is not directly related to the military capability. However, globalization and the increasing speed of diffusion of knowledge makes other conditions less significant in time. Consequently, economic size plays more important role in the military capability of a state in today's world. While China was quite weak against imperial European states with its much higher GDP in the 1800s, today China increases its global influence as it catches up with the United States in GDP.

The economic size of the United States has become the highest in the world in the early 1870s and the United States remained at the top since then for over 140 years. Big growth of the economic size of the United States relies on two basic factors; fast population increase and successful industrialization. As President Kennedy stated in his book title, the United States of America is "A Nation of Immigrants". The United States attracted immigrants from Europe since the colonial period. While the United States consisted of a small part of the British empire in the 1700s, today as a country, it is comparable to Europe by population. Figures of the American industrial rise during the British hegemony were reflected in the previous

chapter. American industrial power remained strong since the World War II. Figure 15 shows iron and steel production of the United States, the Soviet Union as its competitor until 1990, and China as its competitor since 2000s. American iron and steel production remained above the Soviet Union; however, it decreased with the shift of production to the states offering cheap labor. China, on the other hand, experienced an increase at a significant rate since the 1990s to become the new workshop of the world. Figure 16 shows primary energy consumption for these states. The United States preserved its lead since the late 1800s and remained at the top despite immense Chinese industrial production. The discrepancy between both figures has more to do with higher personal consumption in the United States. Finally, as seen in Figure 18, the GDP of the United States has always kept a distance with the second state in the world until recently. Maddison's purchasing power parity GDP figures in his historical study reflect the difference between the American and the Soviet GDP and the Chinese rise.

5.3.3.3 Material Capability

Material capability reflects states economic size and military power. As discussed, the United States had a higher capability than the rest of the world since the early 1900s, and perhaps even before. However, the challenge came from Germany twice. Looking at sheer numbers, it might not make much sense. However, swift German advance at all fronts shows its offensive superiority. With this ability, Nazi Germany was able to increase its material capability through conquest. Germany would have access to all materials it needs in case it controlled Europe and the Soviet Union. It is partially similar to the ability of Britain to control much higher population with its small mainland. However, the domination attempt of Germany failed due to tactical mistakes. The German war declaration on the Soviet Union brought Nazi ambitions to an end.

The United States, indeed, had a higher economic power than other great powers, but it was reluctant to translate this capability into military power. The American army, indeed, has become more powerful in the early 1900s, but not at the scale of its economic capability. In addition, the United States would not have a hegemonic power to shape the global political system after the World War I even if it wanted to assume leadership. The hegemonic power is a result of its high share of global economic output, and hence high material capability after the decline of war-torn Europe after the World War II.

Germany wanted to increase its power through conquest, but nuclear weapons ended that possibility for the great powers after the World War II. Material power of a state now reflects the ability of the state to increase its regional and then global influence, as the United States has been doing. The United States was able to spend a large amount of money although its military expenditure share in its GDP was lower than that of the Soviet Union. This would imply, the American economy was able to afford hegemonic expenses without hindering public spending and other governmental functions, unlike the Soviet Union. Figure 18 and 19 reflects the GDP and the military expenditures of the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and China. Recently, an increase in the Chinese military spending has been alarming for some western countries. However, the only reason of this increase is the fast economic growth in China. As seen in Figure 20, the Chinese military spending consists lower percentage of its GDP than the United States. Hence, Chinese global influence will increase over the years as China grows while American influence will decline due to the relative American decline.

The CINC data in Figure 21 indicates that after the World War II, the United States possessed a very high, in other words, a hegemonic material capability. This capability continuously declined while Soviets preserved their rates and even achieved a higher CINC score than the

United States after the 1970s, despite its smaller size, which also has led to its eventual collapse. American decline becomes more apparent as BRIC countries, especially China, continue to rise.

5.4 The American Order

Despite the efforts of Woodrow Wilson, the United States has avoided taking an active role in the global political matters after the World War I, even though the United States had a superior material power than Britain. After the World War II, however, staying away from European politics was no longer a matter of choice for the United States. Lack of American support would not only jeopardize the security of the European states due to the imminent Soviet threat in their borders but also expose their domestic politics to the communist influence supported by the Soviets. Either way, the United States could lose their important allies as well as its trading partners. In other words, isolation of the United States in the global arena would simply be detrimental to its domestic economy and the domestic politics as the communist Soviet Union was against the existing capitalist world economy and was willing to transform it. The weakness of the European states and the Soviet desire for expansion and spreading its ideology forced the United States to take action, regardless whether Americans wanted it or not. A state with a hegemonic capability would be forced to assume leadership to protect its interests if there is not a functioning global society.

The size of the American industrial capacity had a significant contribution to the victory providing the ability to supply all allies during the World War II. The United States perhaps could take advantage of the destruction of Europe to create an empire within its own sphere of influence with its high relative material capability and destructive nuclear weapons. During the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to allow free elections in Eastern Europe, but he rather

preferred to exert influence on these countries at an extreme level to keep them under control. The United States, however, chose to assume the moral and intellectual leadership in the coalition that defeated Germany and Japan. The United States, further, devised the post-World War II order through diplomacy and negotiations with other great powers, rather than attempting to dictate its terms. The United States perhaps did not show the Soviet Union a friendly attitude due to its historical enmity towards communism; however, the United States did not exclude the Soviets from the new order either, as Britain did in the past. The United States could exclude the Soviet Union and try to create an organization in which it would be able to dominate all member states easily and freely. Yet, even further, the United States tried to convince the Soviet Union into joining the United Nations. The British experience has clearly illustrated the flaws of the exclusion of a great power. The repetition of such a mistake might have been detrimental after other states acquired nuclear capability.

An important reason behind the success of the United States lies in learning from past mistakes during the British hegemony since the early 1800s. Britain used its material power for conquest while the United States has forbidden direct conquest and the great power competition has been more about exerting influence on states, even though that was not a preferable outcome. The United States sometimes went too far and supported military coups to prevent potential communist or unwanted governments in some states that would act against American interests. However, the United States did not have any intention to expand its borders. During the British hegemony, an imperial power would know that in case it does not conquer a land with useful raw materials, it would be conquered by another imperial power, thus limit their access to those materials and the market to sell their goods. This new order secured access of all states and their capitalists to any material they need in exchange

for its market price. Hence, conquest was not a requirement for securing access to raw materials.

British hegemony lacked formal global institutions and global economic regimes. American hegemony, on the other hand, constituted several institutions and attempted to socialize states into accepting the rules and norms of the new order. The GATT, the IMF, the World Bank are important institutions reflecting American global economic leadership, known as the Washington Consensus, and as Keohane suggests, their legal liability frameworks decrease transaction costs and reduce uncertainty by providing information and limiting moral hazard and irresponsibility. States care about their reputation within the international society and thus comply with their dictates (Lake, 1995: 135).

Leading the foundation of the United Nations, the main goal of the United States was to foster cooperation and prevent future conflicts. Despite their inherent flaws, the organizations of the United Nations order have been successful and are still in effect. However, the success of the organization and prevention of a world war do not refer to the prevalence of harmony in global politics. The organizations were not expected to achieve global security through collective effort. The great powers follow their interest as opposed to their potential rivals. Due to lack of tools to regulate actions of the great powers, it is impossible to channel their actions through coercion by the rule of law. Nevertheless, as the rules are implemented rather comparatively fairly, the great powers accepted that it is in their interests to follow the legal frameworks rather than to violate them. Further, these organizations have also been successful in developing deeper diplomatic relations between states.

The United States followed Wilsonian principles supporting the self-determination of nation states and decolonization. In the American order, the United Nations functioned as a

parliament where all participant nation states were given a seat. The organization was an oligarchy, but it was the exact reason why this organization functioned. Global politics is simply shaped by the great powers and their say inherently carry more weight as they are the ones that are able to take action. The great powers cannot be restrained by the rule of law unless they want to. They need to be satisfied with the existing order not to challenge it. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and France were given a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. These states were given the right to veto. Although this was a reason for dysfunction of the organization that a veto makes it impossible to make a decision, this is also one of the main reasons for the organization to function. No great power can take action against the interests of another, which decreases the chances of conflict. They have to bargain and compromise to make a decision.

By spearheading foundation of the United Nations and shaping its structure, the United States attempted to cultivate global cooperation through institutions. However, this endeavor was not undertaken with naive expectations. The United States also founded the NATO to defend the European states and pursue its own interests against its rival, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could never be seen as a reliable partner, hence, would not be allowed to participate in a western collective security organization. Regardless of whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union that can be blamed more for the emergence of the Cold War, these states were destined to be the future rivals even when they were allies against Nazi Germany. Although there was more at stake than ever because of the nuclear weapons; Japan, Germany, Britain, France leaving the race in favor of the United States further strengthened its position and made global politics less complicated. Secret treaties were abolished in the American order

with the Charter of the United Nations.¹² American hegemony did not only rely on American material capability but also the support of developed western countries. Most of the states having the economic power to be a great power were the allies of the United States with no revisionist ambition. The power of the United States and its allies and their commitment to the global order deterred a challenge to this order.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American way proved its success as its economic, political and ideological understanding has shaped the world. Most states that were part of the communist world was integrated into the capitalist world order. The United States remained the only superpower, despite its continuing relative decline. Rather than welcoming Russia into the system, the United States preserved its distance and western countries integrated several post-Soviet countries into the European community. The United States further challenged Russia in Ukraine and Georgia and attempted to develop and install missile defense systems to contain Russia. The United States also assumed a police role in global affairs and adopted a unilateral approach in its foreign policy after the Cold War without the consent of other states. The Soviet collapse offered the United States a chance to flourish global cooperation under its leadership, encompassing entire globe for the first time, and declining United States would benefit more from a more collective approach in further developing the global community and recognizing the importance of the developed and developing powers in decision making. However, this chance was lost especially with the damage made by the Bush administration in the 2000s. Although Obama insistently stated that his leadership is one that recognizes the importance of rising powers, it was a bit too late to reverse the damage. What remains from this period of unilateral foreign policy is the lack

¹² <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter16.shtml>

of trust towards the United States from other powers. Obama's comparably more inactive foreign policy gave Russia enough room to assert itself on the world stage. Just as the United States and Europe stick together in crucial global matters so far despite their differences, Russia and China supports each other in a similar way. Although American hegemony made a significant contribution to establishing and building a global community, the decline phase has had rather a negative impact on future of the global order. Under Putin's leadership, Russia, as a nuclear power, has challenged the United States by annexing Crimea, and has shown its willingness to go further against the United States to respond the containment.



6. Conclusion and Implications for the Future

6.1 Concluding Remarks

After discussing a variety of scholars from different academic schools, this thesis offers a framework to understand hegemony. Presenting historical developments leading to hegemony, the thesis describes hegemony types and domination. Instead of superficially using the term and taking the existence of hegemony for granted in explaining global politics, the thesis explains how hegemony emerged in the first place and analyzes the conditions a state needs to satisfy to become a global hegemon. The thesis, then, explains material conditions in establishing hegemony. Finally, it clarifies the aspect making hegemony different from dominance: the establishment of a global order which is led by the hegemon, not ruled by it.

Establishment of hegemony requires two basic conditions. The first requirement is having a superior military power. Although a larger economy may create a more powerful military, not necessarily. Certain historical conditions paved the way for the rise of Britain with its relatively small economy. Economic size is not directly related to the military power. However, globalization and increasing the speed of the diffusion of knowledge has made other conditions less significant over the years. In short, military power merely needs to provide a superiority a state needs to function as a hegemon. This power allows the hegemon to act in

a way to pursue its own interests without threatening another great power's basic interests or survival. Hegemonic power should be conceived in relative terms. As a superpower, the United States has become a hegemon. Although the Soviet Union has also become a superpower in the following decades, it was merely a great power in the system. The power a hegemon needs to possess can be measured in terms of giving the hegemon the ability to influence the global political outcomes as opposed to any other state. In relative terms, a superpower does not necessarily have the sufficient power to achieve hegemony, especially if more than one superpower coexists. Indeed, soon that will be the case. China will soon be the second superpower. A more unified European Union, India are other potential superpowers. Although Brazil and Russia are smaller than these four political entities, they will still be important great powers. Russia already stands out due to its Soviet inheritance making it an important state. Such a distribution of capabilities cannot allow hegemony of a state. In terms of distribution of capabilities, the system will be a multipolar one. However, it is not the material capability alone that determines the type of a global political system.

The second requirement for hegemony is the establishment of an interstate system and leading it. The most crucial elements of a global political system are the great powers. A hegemon has to bring stability and not threaten the survival of other great powers. The hegemon bringing stability to the system and supporting the survival of other great powers receives support from part/all of them in return. Hence, an aggressive great power faces a coalition led by the hegemon which, in return, decreases the possibility of a challenge. If a partial hegemon does not establish a fair structure for all great powers and keeps pursuing its own interests aggressively, then the system is likely to create dissatisfied great powers looking for a chance to challenge the hegemon to take advantage of its fall and perhaps to take its

place. A fairer order established by a global hegemon, on the other hand, is more likely to last even after the fall of its hegemon. While a partial hegemon can be aggressive in pursuing its own interests against middle and small powers, a global hegemon mostly remains in a defensive stance by responding aggressions of other great powers to preserve stability in the system.

As Wallerstein argues, the world is too big for a single political entity to control. The systemic conditions have not allowed the establishment of a dominance. The competition between the great powers prevented one of them from dominating others. Hence, a temporary hegemony of a great power has been the only viable option for the cases in which one state outstripped all its rivals. A hegemon provides public goods to the system of states, such as preventing conflicts, promoting free trade, assuming leadership in crises (Kindleberger, 1986: 302-304). As Keohane and Organski contends, hegemony brings stability. Arrighi's term seems to be the most accurate one in explaining the nature of a hegemonic order. The hegemons have transformed an anarchic system into an "ordered anarchy". However, as discussed, this transformation can help the future success only if the order is a just one. In that case, the order can last after the decline of its hegemon not only because the hegemon was powerful enough to enforce the rules in the first place, but also because other states have been convinced it is in their interest to preserve the order, as the Neo-Gramscian understanding suggests, and the hegemon did not set it up to take advantage of it as opposed to the other great powers. In addition, an attempt to change the order will be extremely costly and will increase uncertainties for the future which most of the states would not prefer to see happening. Hence, the more democratic the order is, the more likely it will last after the decline of the hegemon.

Unlike realist assumptions, a hegemonic order is more successful than the balance of power mechanism in bringing stability to the system. The balance of power, indeed, limits aggressive expansion; however, states' inability to accurately calculate the force they will face can be a game changing mistake yielding unexpected consequences. In addition, the failure of the balance of power between the great powers may also create a dominance attempt while the existence of hegemony prevents it. The French domination attempt has taken place as the balance of power system in Europe failed. The coalition, led by Britain, defeated France and Britain has taken advantage of its naval superiority and its recent leadership against France to be the first global hegemon. The British hegemony brought stability to the global order. With the unification of Germany and Italy and relative British decline, the balance of power has become the defining factor shaping the European and global politics once again until the World War I. Unfair British order created a challenger, Germany. After the victory, won with the support of the United States, Britain attempted to institutionalize its partial hegemony but to no avail. The British leadership did not last as Britain was not able to function as a hegemon anymore and the League of Nations was a clear failure failing to convince the great powers to its goals. With the rise of Nazis to power in Germany, the balance of power soon became the defining element in international politics overshadowing weak British institutionalism. The coalition, led by the United States defeated the challenger, Nazi Germany. American superior economic and military power, as well as its leadership, made it the second hegemon in history and the American hegemony brought stability to the world.

Table 2 presents categorizations for the states participating in or having significance for a hegemonic struggle. Neo-realist scholars explain the political changes with the changes of relative capabilities of states, but they overlook the reason of these changes. As discussed,

hegemony is closely related to capitalism since colonialization and the capitalist forces help us understand the material rise and decline of the hegemons. The British victory against France and the beginning of the British hegemony coincided with the first industrial revolution. The British unchallenged naval superiority and its global reach provided it the ability to remain safe from potential conflicts and the ability to influence global political outcomes. As a colonial power, Britain was not interested in establishing a fair order. Hence, the British order was a partial hegemony supporting the survival of great powers while dominating several weaker states at the same time. Capitalist forces, then, worked against Britain and precipitated its relative decline while making the United States a superpower. The United States was the center of the second and the third industrial revolutions. According to the Maddison's data and the Correlates of War data, the United States was, by far, the largest economic and industrial power by the time it has become a hegemon. Learning from historical mistakes, the United States established a global hegemony. American soft power has enhanced dramatically since the establishment of the American order. The United States still preserves its cultural dominance over the Western countries while also having high cultural influence over the rest of the World. The United States has become the center of the world in terms of academic studies and scientific developments. Soft power, however, is not enough to provide a hegemonic influence. Despite its strength in terms of soft power, American material decline precipitates its hegemonic decline.

During the American hegemony, the great powers were forced to avoid a world war, and conflicts were limited to a series of proxy wars all around the world due to the nuclear deterrence. Some of these proxy wars, however, carried more weight than the others. The United States and the Soviet Union had reached to an agreement during the World War II

conferences in terms of their influence zones in Europe. The Soviet Union promised to allow free and unfettered elections in its zone but did not keep it. Regardless of that, no side attempted to expand the borders in Europe due to an earlier settlement. However, it was quite different in Asia. The Soviet Union supported communist revolutionary movements for further communist expansion. The communist victory and takeover of China was alarming for the Western states. The United States took part in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. As a response to the aggressive acts of a great power, the hegemon contained the Soviet Union to stop its expansion as the leader of the global community. Despite being the invading party and picking a side in domestic issues of other states, from a hegemonic perspective, the United States was in defensive stance in these wars to counter the Soviet attempts. There was an established world order consisting of free nation states and states were given juridical statehood by the support of international society. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was dominating the states in its sphere of influence. Due to the Soviet and Chinese involvement in the communist revolutions and their influence on the communist states, communist expansions would create an alternative world order which later could threaten the American order to replace it.

As Wallerstein argues, American hegemonic decline has been ongoing slowly since the 1970s. The United States today is perhaps parallel to Britain in the 1870s in terms of material decline. The collapse of the Soviet Union made the United States the only superpower, but this collapse had no long-term effect on the American decline. Although the American decline is inevitable, the post-American world will be quite different from the post-British one for two important reasons: nuclear deterrence and strong institutions accompanied by high interdependence. After the war, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons.

Although the United States sought to use its monopoly to gain the upper hand in diplomatic meetings against the Soviet Union, this capability did not create imperial ambitions. The monopoly and superiority have ended by 1960 with the mutually assured destruction. War and the use of nuclear weapons were soon off the table in relations between the great powers.

The United States established a global hegemony supporting decolonization and self-determination of nation states all around the world. In the American order, even the old colonial empires have transformed into nation states devoid of imperial ambitions. The Soviet Union, however, wanted to preserve the old expansionist habits, but soon accepted the juridical attributes of statehood¹³ in this new order and instead attempted to increase its influence over other states. Strong institutions were important components of the American political and economic leadership. American liberal order did not develop potential challengers, it rather developed its trade partners. Japan, Germany, Britain, and France could be great powers to counter the Soviet Union; however, they rather chose to be the part of the core components in the collective organizations of the American order and remained as the American allies. Institutions do not end great power conflicts on their own, but they are crucial elements in building a global society and transforming the states which, in return, increases the cost of a challenge tremendously. The institutions of the American order strengthened the position of the hegemon and decreased the level of Soviet threat over time. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of democratic states has increased and global institutions have been more pervasive. Institutionalized trade system gradually increased interdependence between states. As Keohane states, American institutions facilitated cooperation and created more consistent and routinized behavior due to provided legal

¹³ For 'Juridical Statehood': Jackson, Robert H. "Juridical statehood in sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of International Affairs* 46.1 (1992): 1-16.

liability frameworks, reduced transaction costs and reduced uncertainty which, in return, decreased the level of basic state instincts that realist scholars propose. For these two main reasons, unlike the post-British world, the post-American world will not have the balance of power system, it will rather be a post-hegemonic world.

State	Period	Systemic Cycle of Accumulation	Security of Mainland	Superior Feature in the Early Years	Goal	Result	Status
France	1803-1815	No	No	Unchallenged Military Power in Europe	Establishing Dominance	Failed	Challenger
United Kingdom I	1815-1914	Yes	Yes	Dominant Naval Power	Establishing Partial Hegemony	Success	Hegemon
United Kingdom II	1918-1939	No	No	None	Preserving Partial Hegemony	Failed	Quasi-Hegemon
Germany	1939-1945	No	No	Unchallenged Military Power in Europe	Establishing Dominance	Failed	Challenger
United States	1945-	Yes	Yes	Economic Size	Establishing Global Hegemony	Success	Hegemon
Soviet Union	1945-1990	No	No	Unchallenged Military Power in Europe	Establishing Dominance	No Attempt	Potential Challenger
China	2010-	Yes	No	Economic Size	A Post-Hegemonic Order	-	-

Table 2: Categorization of the states having significance in a hegemonic struggle in history

6.2 Implications for the Future

The conditions discussed above will prevent the emergence of a challenger, and no political entity will have hegemonic influence in the foreseeable future. American global institutions and leadership transformed the world, today there is no ideological competition anymore. However American global influence is declining, even though the United States has not yet fallen. It is important for these states, especially for the United States, to understand the dynamics of this political transition to build healthier relations with each other, but so far the

signs are not promising. American aggressive foreign policy has been challenged with the rise of China and the recovery of Russia.

Despite its success, the inclusion of several post-Soviet states into the western organizations and installing anti-ballistic missile defense system in Europe have been perceived as aggressive acts by Russia. Russia wants to preserve its influence over the post-Soviet states while the Western states disregard this desire and preserve their attitude. Syrian and Crimean crises have shown the importance of Russia for a collective decision making and the inability of the western states to implement a solution when Russia is excluded.¹⁴ Similar issues arise in Southeast Asia as China rises. A sort of containment may prove dangerous if Russia and China feel provoked. Nuclear deterrence was a source of stability during the Cold War mainly because both sides were aware of the lines they are not to cross, but the Crimean crisis has shown that it can also be a source of instability. The annexation of Crimea was a clear challenge to the order. The security nuclear weapons provide may give a state an ability to challenge the order by breaking the rules, as economic sanctions seem to have proved useless so far. The United States expects Russia and China to act as Japan, Germany, or Britain as a state that prefers to build relations with every other state as equals rather than expanding its influence to shape the political outcomes beyond its borders. On the other hand, the United States, as the hegemon, wants to preserve its ability to be involved in global affairs and to influence the political outcomes. This goal is only attainable if Russia and China agree to it, as the United States did during the British hegemony during the 1900s. However, Russia and China do not welcome a sort of containment against them. The inevitable rise of China, that is soon expected to match the American GDP, allows it to assert itself in its region. The

¹⁴ <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/12-an-alternative-to-arming-ukraine-shapiro>

establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflects the desire of China to have higher input in the global financial institutions which they believe are dominated by the United States.

In the contemporary world, another important dimension of the hegemonic discussion is terrorism. Terrorism has made perhaps the highest impact on global politics since 9/11, shattering the global political stability. Both the United States and the Soviet Union supported revolutionary movements in their global race during the Cold War. This rivalry triggered civil wars in several countries which were actually proxy wars for the superpowers. After 9/11, however, terrorist movements targeted western states in their home frequently. Instead of hindering terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan Wars just made it worse, contributing to the emergence and rise of ISIS. Fighting terrorism requires a more coordinated and collective approach. Otherwise, terrorist organizations can gain more power taking advantage of state rivalries, as seen in Syria.

The United States needs to understand the global order better to make its calculations accordingly. It is possible to claim that the world is headed towards a post-hegemonic order through a gradual transition. There are two likely options for the future of the global order depending on the way the United States handles this decline and the response of the great powers to it, a more democratic multipolar world or a more conflicting bipolar world. Russia is drifting away from Europe and has been building increasingly stronger ties with China. Only the United States can make this tie stronger by threatening them in their regions. On the other hand, the United States will be forced to support its allies if China becomes more aggressive. What the United States should rather do is to avoid being perceived as an aggressive power in the regions of these states while preserving its resolution in defending its long-term allies.

Considering the Chinese economy is likely to outstrip the American economy, competing with China to gain more influence over the states in the Chinese neighborhood region will not help the United States for the future. Promises that are very hard to deliver may have catastrophic consequences as in the Ukrainian case.

The global political structure is far from the undisputed rule of law. Still, as an ordered anarchy, today there is more of an order than anarchy. The security council may prove useful during the American decline by limiting the United States not to repeat its mistakes during the 2000s. The security council functions as a collective conflict resolution platform by limiting the great powers to pursue their interests as opposed to others and by forcing them to bargain. This oligarchic structure may need to be transformed in the future as global political system continue to change. G-20 summits can turn into an effective global governance mechanism for a more democratic world order. The more party take part in agreements, the less likely it is to get a result. Yet, in a politically and economically stable world, G-20 can still be an effective tool contributing to a more democratic global governance by promoting collective decision making.

Appendix




Figure 1: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of Tons) 1816-1913




Figure 2: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of Tons) 1914-1945




Figure 3: Primary Energy Consumption (Thousands of Coal-Ton Equivalents) 1816-1914




Figure 4: Primary Energy Consumption (Thousands of Coal-Ton Equivalents) 1915-1945




Figure 5: Total Population (Thousands) 1816-1945




Figure 6: GDP 1870-1945 (Million 1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)




Figure 7: Military Expenditures (Thousands of Current Year British Pounds) 1816-1870




Figure 8: Military Expenditures (Thousands of Current Year British Pounds) 1871-1913




Figure 9: Military Expenditures (Thousands of Current Year US Dollars) 1914-1938




Figure 10: Military Expenditures (Thousands of Current Year US Dollars) 1939-1945




Figure 11: Military Personnel (Thousands) 1816-1914




Figure 12: Military Personnel (Thousands) 1915-1945




Figure 13: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score 1816-1870




Figure 14: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score 1871-1945




Figure 15: Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of Tons) 1930-2007




Figure 16: Primary Energy Consumption (Thousands of Coal-Ton Equivalents) 1946-2007




Figure 17: Total Population (Thousands) 1946-2007




Figure 18: GDP 1946-2008 (Million 1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)




Figure 19: Military Expenditures (Thousands of Current Year US Dollars) 1950-2007




Figure 20: Share of the Military Expenditures in GDP as Percentage 1989-2014




Figure 21: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score 1919-2007




Figure 22: Scaled GDP of States in Each Year Relative to Their 1990 GDP Values (United Nations Data)




Figure 23: Share of Global GDP by State (United Nations Data)




Figure 24: Share of Global GDP by Region (United Nations Data)




Figure 25: Number of Democratic States with Polity IV Score over 8




Figure 26: Share of the Global Wealth by State, Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Databook 2015




Figure 27: Military Expenditures 2014 (The expenditure for each state was calculated by IISS in “The Military Balance 2015” using IMF data)

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