Continuous Clientelism, Persuasion and Preference Change in Turkey

by

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Abstract

Political parties can establish various types of linkages with voters. For instance, they can carry out specific policy mandates directed towards voter groups or they can garner support thanks to a charismatic leader. These different options are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, various linkage types can interact with each other. For instance, how does long-term personalistic contact with voters affect their policy preferences? If a patron provides discretionary benefits to a client in an iterated fashion, does the voter change his opinions and preferences as a result of continuous interactions?

This dissertation tries to untangle the interaction between policy preferences and clientelistic iteration. Different linkage strategies do not have to be mutually exclusive, and there can be "spillover" effects of clientelistic iterations in the long run. This study theorizes the policy areas where we should observe this effect. It provides an account in which convergence of perceptions and preferences occur due to increasing levels of predictability, trust, and mutual dependency between patrons and their clients in iterated clientelistic interactions. The study argues that parties which have extensive, long-term clientelistic linkages with voters will not only provide personal benefits to clients to support the party, but patrons will also persuade voters in specific policy areas.

The study focuses on the Turkish case, and it combines representative survey data, several experiments, an original online survey with a fieldwork conducted in two stanbul neighborhoods to show the effect of clientelistic continuity on attitudes and persuasion. Empirical findings indicate that the long-term effects of clientelism are particularly significant when the policy area is salient for the political party or if the party owns the issue. Furthermore, the qualitative research indicates that long-term clientelism is sensitive to poverty, urban precarity, and gentrification. While poverty facilitates continuity, external shocks such as gentrification are conducive to re-intensification and suspension. Empirical findings compare these alternative trajectories of clientelistic continuity and they provide evidence for the theorized claims.

Özet

Siyasi partiler seçmenlerle farklı tiplerde ilişkiler kurabilirler. Belirli seçmen gruplarını hedefleyen parti politikaları yürütebilir veya karizmatik bir lider sayesinde destek bulabilirler. Bu farklı seçenekler birbirini dışlayıcı değildir. Tam tersine, farklı bağlantı tipleri birbiriyle etkileşime girebilirler. Örneğin, seçmenlerle kurulan uzun dönemli şahsi ilişkiler, bu seçmenlerin siyasa tercihlerini nasıl etkilemektedir? Eğer yanaşmacılık (kliyentalizm) kapsamında bir hami yanaşması olduğu kişiye süreklilik gösteren şekilde şahsi menfaatler sağlıyorsa, yanaşmacı seçmen siyasi fikirlerini ve tercihlerini uzun dönemdeki etkileşimler sonucu değiştirir mi?

Bu tez, siyasa tercihleri ve yanaşmacılık arasındaki etkileşimi açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Farklı ilişki tipleri birbirinden bağımsız olmak zorunda değildir hatta yanaşmacılık ilişkileri uzun dönemlere yayıldığında diğer tip ilişkilere nüfuz edebilir. Bu çalışma, bahsedilen etkiyi gözlemleyebileceğimiz siyasa alanlarını kuramsal bir model ile açıklamaktadır. Tez, hamiler ve yanaşmalarının tekrarlanan etkileşimlerine bağlı olarak artan tahmin edilebilirlik, güven ve karşılıklı bağımlılık sonucu birbirine yakınsayan görüş ve tercihleri üzerine bir açıklama geliştirmektedir. Bu çalışma, uzun dönemli ve kapsamlı yanaşmacılık ilişkileri olan siyasi partilerin şahsi faydalar sağlayarak seçmenlerin sadece partiyi desteklemesini değil, aynı zamanda seçmenlerin belirli siyasa alanlarında ikna edileceğini iddia etmektedir.

Çalışma Türkiye vakasına odaklanmakta ve temsili anket verilerini, farklı deneysel çalışmaları, çevrim içi ortamda bu tez için uygulanan özgün bir anketi ve İstanbul'da iki mahallede yapılan özgün alan araştırmasını birleştirerek yanaşmacı sürekliliğin tutumlar ve ikna üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Gözlemsel bulgular, yanaşmacılığın uzun dönemli etkilerinin özellikle siyasi parti için önemli olan siyasa alanlarında veya parti tarafından sahiplenilmiş konularda etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, tezin nitel araştırmaya dayanan kısmı uzun dönem yanaşmacılığın yoksulluk, kentsel güvensizlik ve soylulaştırma (gentrification) gibi konulara karşı hassas olduğunu göstermektedir. Yoksulluk bu ilişkilerde devamlılığı sağlarken soylulaştırma gibi harici etkiler, ilişkilerin tekrar başlaması veya sonlandırılmasına neden olmaktadır. Gözlemsel bulgular yanaşmacılığın farklı eksenlerde gelişen tiplerini karşılaştırarak tezde öne sürülen kuramsal iddialara dair kanıtlar sunmaktadır.

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Statement of Authorship

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed Kerem YILDIRIM

To my mom and the loving memory of my dad.

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1
Introduction

Politicians can reach out to voters in numerous ways to ask for their support. Presidential debates, campaign period promises, advertisements, canvassing visits are just some of the alternatives. These different options can also have radically different outcomes. For example, handing out political flyers to a voter on the street (who will probably throw it away without even glancing at it) and a mortifying blunder at a prime time TV debate will have different consequences. We tend to think of these various efforts by politicians as independent of each other. For instance, it may seem like party manifestos and clientelistic benefits are different from each other, in fact they may seem incompatible. However, when we scratch the surface, there may be significant interactions between these different linkage mechanisms and this dissertation deals with such an interaction. Namely, it asks whether clientelistic benefits distributed to voters in order to gain their political support has secondary consequences on persuading voters to support the party's platform.

Clientelism is the exchange of political support in return for certain discretionary benefits. In the current literature on clientelism, voters are generally depicted as passive actors who accept offers and show their support to the party publicly. Because of this presumed lack of agency, theories based on this behavioral model may also suggest that clients are ideologically indifferent or constant at best. We need more detailed studies to model these relationships which are not simple transactions but a complex relationship type which is set up in intricate sociopolitical networks after filtering down through massive party machines to be distributed to households and local communities. For instance, the liability of a client who is employed in the public sector thanks to a clientelistic party and another client who receives petty gifts from time to time during electoral campaign periods will be remarkably different. Similarly, the benefits of providing services to a family in a period of crisis such as an urgent health problem and reserving a place for a family during a local summer vacation to a national memorial will have differing returns for a political party.

Generally, empirical research on clientelism uses survey questions. The most basic question asks: "Did you receive any benefits from a party in return for your vote during the campaign period?" Based on the answer, empirical models are then used to test theoretical claims. However, the intricate details can carry the potential to be the crucial determinant of a theoretical framework. Scholars may be trying to understand the subject by simplifying questions because of a trade-off between verisimilitude and generalizability. However, an uncritical preference for generalizability may only end up missing the interaction between clientelism and other linkage types.

In contrast to such studies, this dissertation approaches to clientelism by focusing on its different facets. It argues that it is not a monolithic phenomenon, but a general framework of a specific relationship type that produces different consequences due to its moving parts and subtypes. While doing so, it also proposes a new theoretical framework. Briefly, this theory suggests an account to explain clientelistic relationship models' effect on voters in detail. If we can observe significant differences between a voter who is employed in a public job and another one who receives petty gifts from time to time due to discretionary benefits, how can we explain these different outcomes? A good starting point to answer this question is the temporal dimension of political relationships. By focusing on the duration, intensity, and longevity, this dissertation tries to theorize the differences between short and long-term relationships.

This dissertation has several contributions to the current literature. First, since the anthropological studies from the 1950s and 60s, there have been only a few studies focusing on the development, details, and content of clientelistic relationships. Given the new and novel ways of collecting and analyzing data as well as new theoretical models on different levels such as voters, parties, institutions and countries, I believe it would be a major contribution to shift the attention and suggest an overarching theoretical framework about the inner workings of clientelism. Secondly, as I have mentioned above, a study focusing on the context, different types of clientelisms and their consequences as well as the trajectory of such different types will have important contributions to the current literature. By arguing for the long-term persuasive consequences and convergence of perceptions through clientelistic linkages, this dissertation aims to provide further evidence for the impact of clientelism and the interaction between different linkage types.

Based on these premises, this study deals with the consequences of clientelism's temporal dimension. Briefly, the main argument relates to the claim that long-term and intense relationships will affect not only the client's political behavior but also the attitude on various issues through economic dependency, increasing the level of trust, and an imbalance in the informational flow between the client and patron. In other words, long-term

clientelism is more than a mere exchange of political support and benefits. Through communication in such relationships, politicians can deeply influence clients and have a critical impact on their decisions, preferences in national and local politics as well as political attitudes. So, long-term clientelism plays a major role in persuading clients. This argument forms the main theoretical contribution of this research. It argues that separating ideological and programmatic linkages from more personalistic clientelistic interactions simplifies the issue at hand. It is a commendable effort but such a separation overlooks the importance of the interaction between the two linkages. Additionally, while the previous literature on core vs. swing targeting looks at the ideological position of potential clients as a determinant of clientelistic targeting, this thesis turns the tables and argues that given the clientelistic relationship, iterations will cause further persuasion and ideological proximity.

While this theoretical framework focuses on different types of clientelism, it also touches upon political persuasion. Political information flow and communication are prerequisites of persuasion. In a hypothetical scenario where everyone has the same level of political knowledge, sociopolitical network density, and information, persuasion is impossible. The theoretical claim in this dissertation is based on the assumption that politically active party workers and brokers are more knowledgeable than clients in policy issues and that this imbalance causes a flow. Clientelism may depend on deprivation, poverty, and deficiencies in political representation rather than inequality in political knowledge and skills. However, the important point here is that these relationships also prosper on inequalities in other areas as well, such as information. So, in clientelistic relationships, not only economic inequalities and insecurities but also differences in information and social capital are also important. While clients are in a more vulnerable position in such relationships, patrons and brokers are more influential. Because of these differences and inequalities, clientelistic relationships have some sort of "motion". While material benefits move from political parties to clients, political support moves the other way around.

At this juncture, it may seem logical that the current literature prefers to focus on political support patterns rather than the impact of clientelism on attitudes and preferences. However, this approach implicitly tends to disregard processes. This dissertation plans to contribute to the current literature by suggesting an account on *how* the clientelistic political support comes about. Relatedly, it shows that different politician-voter linkage types are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, long-term clientelistic interactions may yield further convergence of perspectives in specific policy choices. In other words, I provide an account in which clientelistic interaction results in perspective taking and thus, argue that programmatic (ideological) affinity and clientelism are not mutually exclusive.

Studies on clientelism and its consequences conduct single case or comparative studies based on countries that specifically have deficits in political representativeness. There are various studies focusing on Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico but also other cases such as Benin, Egypt, and Thailand. This dissertation studies the Turkish case to test its theoretical argument. Therefore, the dissertation plans to contribute to the literature on Turkish politics as well.

Considering the third and fourth waves of democratization in the larger Middle East and Eurasia, Turkey is a relatively well-established electoral democracy which holds elections periodically, despite several historical interruptions. The country has two deep, historical cleavages; one based on Kemalist secularism and modernism against conservative Islamism and the other one on a pluralistic interpretation of minority rights against a nationalistic societal conception. An environment of political competition based on these two fault lines has been continuing for a long time now. Since 2002, a single political party has been the dominant actor in Turkish party politics and the Turkish democracy continues to function through procedures without substantive consequences. In other words, Turkish democracy has been "shallow" for a long while, and the reflections of political party competition have not produced substantive liberal freedoms, substantive political representation, or a better conception of welfare based on norms of citizenship. This prolonged process of democratization involves numerous risks and authoritarian backslides, the latest example being the failed coup attempt in July 2016.

In this fragile political system which is mostly based on party competition on a center-periphery cleavage, clientelism has a consequential place. As we will see in succeeding parts of this dissertation, clientelism not only acts as a crude substitute to alleviate shortcomings in the welfare system and lack of programmatic redistribution, but also it is an effective party strategy to convince new voters and to "keep the ranks close" among core voters. In fact, the latter function is more crucial than the former one since clientelism cannot replace a welfare state. However, clientelism can become more viable when the redistributive capacity of the state fails to alleviate material inequalities, grievances, and when a considerable portion of the voters has long-term material insecurities. By providing these benefits to various groups, be it current party supporters or undecided voters, parties can create long-term dependencies.

Based on this framework, the second contribution this dissertation plans to make is on the Turkish case. Clientelism has been an important part of the Turkish party politics and it forms an important element in how parties reach out to potential supporters. Discussing continuity and change in the Turkish variant of clientelism suggests that extensive party organizations that depend on conservative constituencies are more successful in pro-

viding benefits to voters and establishing linkages directly with peripheral communities, bypassing the state's redistribution structure or any other mediating institution. Given the three cases of conservative, peripheral party dominance in various periods throughout modern Turkish politics (DP in the 50s, ANAP in the 80s, and AKP since 2002), clientelism remains as an important factor not only for mobilizing supporters, but also persuading voters when the clientelistic party needs to change its position. Therefore, studying clientelistic longevity in the Turkish case presents an account on the factors for conservative party domination. This is especially relevant given the increasing levels of backlash against globalization, liberal democracy, and detachment of economic development from democratic norms not only in the less developed countries but also in advanced capitalist countries. The Turkish case presents a curious example on an alternative strategy dominant, populist parties can use to justify democratic backslide and protectionist economic policies through discretionary, exclusive redistribution of benefits.

At this point, one can ask the crucial question that can potentially be a major limitation for this dissertation: what if parties are not really persuading voters but instead, initiate clientelistic relationships only with those who are already close to the party's policy positions? I discuss this theoretical and methodological problem in detail in third and fifth chapters and in the two Appendices, but I should briefly mention the dissertation's methodological strategies in order to test the theoretical implications of empirical findings. The methodological strategy presents the third area where this dissertation contributes to working on a political phenomenon that involves various potential empirical and methodological setbacks. First, voters may think that clientelism is undesirable and so perceive others to disapprove those individuals who have clientelistic relationships. This perception (social desirability bias) makes clientelism challenging to study empirically. After considering this restrictive bias, I approached the empirical work in this dissertation pragmatically and studied clientelism from as many different ways as I could.

That is why this study uses mixed methods. The quantitative part of the study includes various data such as face-to-face and online surveys, experiments, neighborhood level historical election results, and average house prices across neighborhoods of İstanbul. For the qualitative part, I chose two neighborhoods as my fieldwork in İstanbul, which is an exemplary metropolis to understand urban poverty and gentrification. In these two neighborhoods, I conducted in-depth interviews with voters, local party activists, and political elites to understand how they define clientelism and the personal consequences of such political relationships for their own lives. In order to focus on the substantive theoretical argument, I tried to refrain from delving into methodological issues throughout the thesis unless necessary. Instead, details about the data collection procedures,

fieldwork selection process and further robustness checks to support analyses are given in Appendices A and B. To easily interpret models and their substantive impact, I generally preferred interpretable parameters and visualized effects as much as possible in quantitative models.

Several different tests are presented together in the quantitative part of this study. In fact, findings in the fifth chapter could be separated into two related chapters, and as it stands, this chapter may seem extended. However, in order to keep the argument consistent, I present these related findings in one single chapter. The fifth chapter presents several tests for the implications of the theoretical framework. On their own, these tests would not be sufficient to make a case for the impact of long-term clientelism. The evidence is fragmentary given that a single decisive test requires a long-term panel study supported with experimental treatments. However, taken together, these tests provide compelling evidence for the theorized effects clientelism. They start from the "easiest" most expected outcome, and end with the most challenging empirical tests in a specific order. While this presentation provides methodological flexibility, it also systematically shows various ways to test the theory in other countries, to replicate the study step-by-step and thus, makes it easy for further studies to revise the theoretical implications for points that are not corroborated in empirical tests. If long-term clientelism causes persuasion, we would expect persuasion not to occur in the short-term, and when long-term relationships come to a halt for a reason, the effect should either vanish or decline. I present findings on these two counterfactual situations in the qualitative, sixth chapter of the dissertation. All of these methodological decisions contribute to the testing of a synthetic theory that has several components. In other words, if a part of the analyzed data or a method used in this study were absent, the theoretical argument would be much less convincing. The concluding chapter returns to the implications of the empirical tests and discusses some limitations, and potential ways to alleviate these limitations in future studies.

By employing a mixed-methods strategy, the thesis deals with a temporal argument that is difficult to study because of various setbacks. In this respect, the evidence presented here is c testable in other cases. All in all, this dissertation plans to make three overarching contributions to various areas. First of all, the literature on clientelism generally remains silent on the interaction between ideology and clientelism especially when clientelism has spill-over effects on the ideological position and policy preferences of clients. By problematizing the temporal dimension, this dissertation presents an original framework by which we can analyze this interaction. Secondly, clientelism remains as a robust party strategy in Turkey. As we will see in proceeding chapters, it is an extensive political phenomenon, and parties try to allocate a considerable part of their resources

to clientelism. In this respect, extended levels of clientelism and personalistic attachment becomes an important factor to explain the electoral domination by peripheral, conservative parties that have more organizational capacity to mobilize voters thanks to clientelism. In other words, this dissertation argues that clientelistic capacity and continuity have important effects on political domination, and justification of policy changes as well as lack of liberal substantive outcomes. Lastly, this dissertation also deals with a subject that is hard to study especially since micro-level data about recipiency behavior is socially undesirable and parties shy away from announcing their clientelistic strategies. By employing a mixed-method methodological research strategy, this project not only tries to overcome these problems but also, it situates clients within their respective communities, presents multiple empirical tests that all together make up the case for the effects of long-term clientelism, and compares two very similar neighborhoods in an urban setting to show how alternative trajectories and counterfactual situations affect clientelistic continuity and its effects.

In order to be self-consistent, the dissertation runs on a specific scheme. **Chapter 2** introduces several related concepts and their details. Even if this study focuses on different types of clientelisms, clientelism itself is a specific linkage type. So, this chapter first introduces different linkage types and suggests a typology to conceptualize them. This typology is descriptive rather than theoretical, and it specifically underlines the role of political engagement. Here, engagement is discussed procedurally rather than substantively, and I highlight that at least some minimal level of engagement is necessary for clientelism to continue. This argument is one of the fundamental blocks for the theoretical claims in the succeeding parts of the study which are mostly based on iterated interactions between patrons and clients. After this descriptive typology, the second section provides a general description of clientelism and focuses on two features. These are the dyadic and unequal characteristics of clientelism. These two features are discussed in relation to personalism and engagement, the two dimensions of the proposed typology. The third section is a brief application, and it discusses the relationship between clientelism, corruption, and cronyism. These neighboring concepts are different from each other, and the section serves as a way to discuss the communitarian underpinnings of clientelism. These relationships induce private information and exchange which cannot be substantiated in a liberal democratic environment. By referring to a communitarian understanding of clientelism, the section paves the way for the theoretical chapter.

After this brief chapter on conceptualization, **Chapter 3** presents the theoretical framework. As I briefly mentioned above, this theory dissects the temporal dimension of clientelism, and it aims to understand the consequences of different temporal types. For that, this chapter firstly provides the main framework. It discusses the theorized relation-

ship between temporally extended clientelism and political persuasion, and it explains the theoretical process and suggests several working hypotheses. Later parts of the chapter touch upon the temporality and two critical discussions in the literature, on clientelistic monitoring against normative reciprocity and targeting core voters against swing voters. These two sections function as an overarching literature review but more importantly; I aim to expand the theoretical mechanisms as well as limitations and opportunities in the literature by discussing these two issues with a focus on temporality.

After the theoretical chapter, **Chapter 4** follows the historical development of clientelism, party competition, and political cleavages in Turkey and provides the contextual background. The chapter traces durability of clientelism despite a fast-paced modernization and suggests a framework based on center-periphery cleavage. It also discusses vulnerabilities of the working class parallel to modernization and urbanization and indicates problems in programmatism. Additionally, this chapter explains the ruling AKP's relative advantage in using clientelism by referring to the party's organizational capacity and the experience it inherited from other peripheral parties.

The next two chapters test the empirical implications of the theoretical framework. As I mentioned above, **Chapter 5** presents four quantitative analyses that test the theory in an increasingly challenging fashion. The first section consists of macro and micro level data about the prevalence of long-term relationships. If this type of relationships does not have consequences on country, party, and voter level political issues, then it may not be worthwhile to study this linkage type. Therefore, the chapter firstly presents different temporal types of clientelism and argues that long-term clientelism is "stickier" even at the face of economic development. After that, the section delves into the Turkish context to comparatively show that voters who have previously experienced clientelism are more likely to be recontacted by political parties.

The second section provides several findings on the consequences of clientelism. If clientelism affects not only political behavior but also perceptions and evaluations, the first place to observe this effect would be the attitudes about the subject itself, namely the evaluation of the behavior about accepting benefits from a political party in return for political support. Surely, individuals who already have positive evaluations of clientelism are more likely to accept benefits, but I argue for a "feedback loop" here. This part shows that clients who are pushed towards clientelism because of economic dependency and poverty become more approving of this specific linkage type over time. This finding presents a relatively easy test for the theoretical framework, and it also returns to one of the methodological problems and presents a discussion about the social desirability bias which is an important methodological limitation for studying clientelism. If approval of

clientelism varies over experiencing clientelism and whether it is prolonged or not, then the social desirability bias can also change systematically. Therefore, the section also provides results from two survey experiments that focus on the temporal dimension. The last section presents findings for both general, ideological persuasion and discusses areas where clientelism will "spill over" to persuade in specific policy positions. Results show that clientelistic persuasion is especially relevant either when the policy issue is salient or when the party "owns" the issue. Appendix A for this chapter presents further robustness tests for endogeneity and measurement problems and it also presents datasets used in this chapter.

Chapter 6 is on findings from the two selected neighborhoods in İstanbul where the fieldwork was conducted. The neighborhoods were selected based on a quantitative exercise about modeling *potential* clientelism levels across neighborhoods based on historical election outcomes. This model and other details about the fieldwork selection are in Appendix B to this chapter. The chapter argues that if political parties develop their clientelistic strategies and allocate resources based merely on their vote-maximizing calculus in a single election, then one of the selected neighborhoods would have very dense and continuous clientelistic linkages whereas this would be unexpected in the other neighborhood. Fieldwork results challenge this expectation. While the neighborhood with high expectation does not have strong party organizations that conduct day to day clientelistic interactions, parties in the other neighborhood allocate a lot of material and human resources to continue responding to their clients' needs in a timely fashion. In order to explain this puzzle, the chapter focuses on the two factors I came across during the fieldwork, namely urban poverty and gentrification. While urban poverty perpetuates clientelistic linkages, gentrification is an external shock that causes old clients and non-clients to recontact their patrons. The chapter analyzes the two neighborhoods from this framework which highlights poverty and gentrification as determinants of clientelistic temporality and intensity, and it provides comparative results about different types of linkages between voters and politicians. While doing so, it also situates individual clients in a larger, politically relevant community. The chapter shows that long-term clients are comparatively well informed about their patron's party platforms and they are more flexible in adopting the political discourse as a result of long-term interactions they have with local party workers. In this respect, the two empirical chapters support each other in various ways.

Lastly, **Chapter 7** concludes the study with implications for the Turkish case, for the literature on clientelism, and a discussion of the study's theoretical and empirical limitations as well as potential, theoretically promising research avenues that can alleviate these limitations.

2

Conceptualizing Linkages: Describing Clientelistic Engagement

There are several necessary criteria to define whether a political relationship between a voter and a politician is clientelistic. It is a microsociological phenomenon with higher-level reverberations on party organizations as well as state-society interactions. Based on these points, this chapter separates related terms such as vote-buying and patronage from clientelism to show that there are significant theoretical and empirical differences between them. Rather than defining clientelism by referring to purposes and goals of relevant actors in a teleological fashion, the chapter provides several static characteristics. The main objective of the chapter is to present a conceptual framework for the study. Later on, theorization in the third chapter will problematize these static conceptual building blocks, especially the one about the temporal dimension of clientelism. Before doing so, the chapter depicts an ideal-type conceptualization of clientelism and relevant, neighboring concepts.

The chapter proposes a two-dimensional typology of political linkages. These are different ways through which political organizations and the state interacts with citizens. This section suggests that 1- the level of active involvement and 2- the degree of interaction occurring in the public space in an accountable fashion, i.e. universalism, suggests four ideal types of linkages. In this two-by-two matrix, clientelism is a linkage type that ideally involves some level of active engagement by clients. At the same time, it is personalistic and discretionary, implying that clients are atomistic agents and they cannot benefit from legal rights to claim policy benefits.

The second section elaborates on these two dimensions by focusing on the two characteristics of clientelism. The previous literature mentions numerous features of clientelism. I specifically highlight the dyadic nature of clientelism and the inequality between clients and patrons. It is possible to argue that clients can collectively bargain with politicians for discretionary returns contingent upon electoral support and this argument would challenge the dyadic nature of clientelism. However, such collective bargaining has different consequences and mechanisms that play out throughout the linkage, so the section presents a discussion of this alternative mechanism. Additionally, another argument can

be that patrons are actually not economically or politically powerful vis-`-vis clients, and they are just providing services to their constituents. However, this alternative claim is far from approximating clientelism and the second section discusses implications of this alternative. Both of these features, namely the dyadic and unequal nature of clientelism, relate to the two factors I mention for the proposed typology. Both features are associated with engagement and personalistic, discretionary distribution in multiple ways, and the second section discusses these conceptual relationships after suggesting a working definition of clientelism. Also, I contrast clientelism with two very relevant neighboring concepts, namely vote-buying and patronage.

The third section is a brief note about several other neighboring concepts, namely corruption and cronyism. The section briefly compares clientelism to these related political interactions and concludes with an application of the conceptualization suggested in the second section. This section is not directly related to the rest of the dissertation, but it serves two highly relevant purposes. First, this comparison refers to conceptual features of clientelism to act as an exercise and further clarity. Secondly, it discusses some important implications of clientelistic relationships that are relevant for the theoretical framework. The section shows that a "market-based", normatively liberal interpretation of clientelism is far from describing its consequences for political parties, clients, and the larger public. In this sense, clientelism is an anti-liberal, communitarian approach to political distribution. Such a communitarian understanding of distribution has important implications for a theory of persuasion, convergence of political perceptions, and political affinity that develops through repeated clientelistic interactions. The chapter ends with concluding remarks about other features of clientelism and explicitly problematizes its temporal dimension and the relationship between engagement and persuasion, paving the way for the third chapter.

2.1 A Typology of Political Linkages

Political linkage theories focus on the different ways states establish relationships with citizens. This has been a fundamental focus especially with the rise of democratic polities after the third wave of democratization. Lawson (2005) approaches linkages from a macro-level perspective, focusing on how the state structure deals with citizens. She interprets political parties as a tool for such linkages along her work (cf. Lawson, 1980). On the other hand, Kitschelt's work (2000) shifts the focus to the political parties as an intermediate organization and their capacity to mix and match three alternative linkage mechanisms (programmatic, clientelistic, and charismatic) within different comparative and static contexts about the economic, social, and structural framework. In both state-level and organizational accounts, the individual citizens within the social context are

secondary at best, if not completely ignored.

One missing factor in these two alternative levels is the role of citizens. Linkages imply an interaction in which citizens are either active participants who can shape the faith of their relationship with parties and states or there can be a Lockean tacit consent: an unvoiced agreement with the consequences of the linkage without any substantive feedback or aspiration to make a difference, perhaps an exception being the vote choice once every couple of years. Active participation may be a far-fetched expectation especially given the difficulties of interest aggregation in modern democracies (Riker, 1982).

An argument along this thread was the Schumpeterian critique (1976) of the "people's will" and Przeworski's defense of a minimalist conception (1999). In this strand of thinking, "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1976, p.269). This was a scathing critique against the thick Rousseauian conceptualization of a general will. Accordingly, democratic method is nothing but an institutional arrangement, and it does not necessarily include deliberation. These critiques may be empirically relevant especially in a period when conventional types of political participation through party identification is decreasing, and there is a growing disenchantment with political parties (Dalton, 2008). In fact, deliberative democracy as suggested by Gutmann and Thompson (1998) and Fishkin (2009) may be categorically too cumbersome for a large community.[1] However, theoretically speaking, this unlikely process is still an option albeit rather unfeasible, because of the challenging scale of operations.

Antithetical to active participation is a linkage type in which citizens are more passive and do not deliberate their preferences actively with politicians. For instance, previous research indicates that party platforms are a product of intraparty coalitions (Bawn et al., 2012), party leaders' effort to keep the party line cohesive (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), past electoral performance and the time passed since last elections (Somer-Topçu, 2009), and response to the collective demands of office-seeking politicians (Aldrich, 2011). Not all citizens are equally versed in politics, so policy options are an end result of a selective process. In this stylistic account, parties respond to voter preferences with these policies because of their vote-maximizing calculus, not because voters actively demand specific policies from the party.

[1] Harari (2014) also indicates that for the most of its history, hunter-gatherer and then early agricultural societies were limited to 150 members. This was not a coincidence; he indicates that this is a natural threshold for communities to know each other intimately through gossip, a curious type of "private" deliberation about other members of the community. In larger communities, such natural thresholds are surpassed, and delegating political deliberation may not be viable.

An additional factor to separate different types is whether the linkage is based on codified, encompassing criteria for policy execution. When parties offer policies based on codified entitlements and obligations, this is a rule-based, universalistic linkage. This does not mean that everyone benefits from the policy equally. On the contrary, universalistic linkages require extensive, legislated criteria to define specific entitlements, beneficiaries, and duties. Pension age is a classic example of universalistic policies. After a legally defined age criteria, citizens are entitled to pensions and related services. This is a universalistic policy because benefits are distributed based on predefined, legalistic criteria. Universalistic policies are not necessarily more beneficial for the whole society. Exclusionary and discriminatory practices can also be legally codified and applied universalistically to particular groups. Although numerous studies refer to programmatic or universal linkages, not many scholars of clientelism problematize universalistic rules for linkages. Two exceptions are Kitschelt (2000) and Stokes et al. (2013). Stokes et al. (2013) focus on redistributive policies: formal and public rules that shape actual distribution of benefits or resources (p.7). They also mention public discussion of the policy proposal as a condition which relates to the first factor about active engagement. However, authors indicate that deliberation is not a necessary condition for universalism. What is needed is the media for *potential* discussion, and their first criteria about the public nature of rules satisfy the potentiality up to an extent, holding constant other factors about citizens' interest, individual perceptions about efficacy and free access to alternative sources of information about the policy. Kitschelt's (2000) criteria about universalism are conceptually more abstract and depend on fewer scope conditions. According to this account, universalistic policies are those that "apply to all members of a constituency" (p.852), and they are legally codified.

Against such a universalistic framework for policy execution processes are the personalistic, discretionary linkages. These are linkages between organizations and constituents established only for personal qualities and reasons. For instance, actively providing public preschool programs to *all* families below a certain household income is a universalistic policy, even if it is exclusive to lower income level families. Similarly, increasing tariffs for a particular cash crop may be beneficial to only a specific region where farmers grow that crop, but it is universalistic in the sense that *every* farmer can benefit from this new tariff rate. However, privately providing additional subsidies to a specific farmer or a small farming collective in return for some contingent political criteria would not be universalistic since it is not based on a legal framework and it is not extensive.

One can argue that on issues such as bribery, clientelistic benefit distribution, and even very expensive public procurement deals, both the public organization whether it is the local or central government or a political party, and the private actor have an idea

about costs and benefits associated with the linkage. For instance, clients may have a guesstimate or an informed opinion about how much parties generally proffer for political support. In this respect, one can say that many personalistic linkages have universalistic features. This creeping of different "universalistic" features into personalistic linkages may hint at the prevalence of discretionary conduct. However, widespread availability of information about discretionary linkages does not imply universalism. Development of mutual norms and expectations about conduct is not far-fetched, especially when personalistic linkages are temporally extended or occur in small, close-knit communities. The third chapter deals with such norms more in detail but it suffices here to indicate that universalism is about criteria for inclusion into specific policy schemes, not about generalized information on the content and procedure of discretionary distribution. Therefore, while it may look like personalistic and discretionary linkages are not completely different than universalistic distribution given the outreach of information, the difference boils down to criteria for inclusion.

However, there is still a gray area in such criteria. Is universalism procedural or substantive? Let me elaborate with an example: In 2011, a small, remote Turkish district municipality advertised for two public firefighter positions.[2] The condition for applying to these jobs was to have an undergraduate degree from either economics or philosophy. Unless the municipality required firefighters to contemplate reasons or calculate sunk costs associated with a recent arson in the town, this does not make much sense. Soon, the media realized that the mayor's son indeed had recently graduated from a philosophy department and applied for this position. Later on, the chief clerk of the municipality defended the criteria, saying that every philosophy or economics graduate could apply to be a firefighter and indicated that the exam and job interview were open to every applicant who fulfilled the criteria. Certainly, residents and the media thought that this was not merit-based, and the criterion was distasteful to many observers. However, a procedural approach to this public employment decision should argue that this was a universalistic process. Evidently, the outcome and the extremely limiting criteria for employment may suggest that this was not a universalistic approach to public employment. Nepotistic public employment hints at the personalistic features of the procedure. However, the differentiation I suggest does not depend on outcomes but rather the *processes* of linkages. In our particular case, public employment could be personalistic only if criteria were not open or if the mayor's son could apply for the position *even* if he did not fulfill the criteria. The intention and relevant outcomes are not problematized in this chapter.

[2]For details of this news story, see: http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/04/08/akpli.baskandan.adrese.teslim.is.ilani/612672.0/

Table 2.1: Linkage Types

	Engaged	**Inactive**
Universalistic (Rule-Based)	Deliberative Policymaking	Programmatism
Personalistic (Discretionary)	Clientelism	Vote-Buying

Up until now, I mentioned two criteria for conceptualizing different linkage types. These are universalism and engagement. Based on these two criteria, the four alternative linkages are given in Table 2.1. These are ideal types, and this is not an exhaustive typological exercise. Focusing on the level of engagement, i.e. deliberation, which is not well studied in the literature, has several important functions.

There are important differences between an engaged, deliberative policymaking and programmatism. While the former implies an arduous process to aggregate interests and propose a policy, constituents are relatively less active in programmatic linkages. There is a similar difference between clientelism and vote-buying. Clientelism is a process in which both clients and patrons are trying to make sure that their expectations are fulfilled. On the other hand, vote-buying is more inactive and less open to deliberation. The level of engagement in clientelism can be questionable. However, at least some level of engagement between the patron and the client is necessary, and it is the difference between vote-buying and clientelism. Vote-buying is the simple act of distributing benefits before the elections to voters so that they support the party. It is personalistic because criteria for such offers are not public and offers depend on the discretionary decisions of the patron. Additionally, voters are inactive recipients in such cases because it is a simple offer without any deliberation about terms and conditions. On the other hand, clientelism is a more intricate process in which political parties distribute benefits to clients as an end result of a mutual agreement about conditions and contingent criteria. It is personalistic just like vote-buying because linkages are not based on public guidelines. The next section opens up the box of clientelism and two crucial features of such linkages. In this respect, a personalistic engagement between clients and patrons are detailed, and specifics of these two criteria are delineated.

2.2 Features of Clientelism: Inequality and Duality

Graziano (1976; 1983) called for better specification of clientelism as a concept. This was a timely plea as the literature was shifting from a more anthropological approach in which agricultural production was at the forefront to another environment in which political parties were vying for the support of working-class clients in an urban context. Various scholars proposed a working definition for clientelism, and Hicken (2011) and Hilgers (2011) review various dimensions of conceptualizing and defining clientelism in the previous literature. Hicken (2011) indicates that there is no accepted definition of

clientelism, but the concept involves several elements such as contingency, dyadicism, hierarchy, iteration and volition. Hilgers (2011) argues that the term lost its conceptual power because of stretching and similar to Hicken, she indicates that clientelism is a personal relationship with a focus on interest-maximization for both sides and it involves longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality (p.568). I will underline the two features of a clientelistic relationship and explain their relevance to the two dimensions I depicted above, namely the level of engagement and personalism.

A definition and a comparison with neighboring concepts are necessary before delving into the features of clientelism. Clientelism is the discretionary exchange of benefits between politicians and voters. However, this overarching definition has several reservations. First, clients who receive benefits in return for political support may not collectively bargain for their interests. If there were any group level collective action, then this would be either pork-barreling or constituency services. I will provide some reservations for this dyadic nature of clientelism below, but in abstract terms, these are personalistic, dyadic relationships that occur between a patron and a client. Secondly, the exchange is discretionary because there are not pre-established rules about participation in such relationships. Otherwise, we would be dealing with universalistic interactions. Given these two reservations about the level of interaction and discretion, there are still several specific features in clientelistic relationships.

Respective importance of specificities in clientelism change in parallel to political development and decay (Hicken, 2011), but in any case, the first main characteristic is its dyadic nature. Unlike more collective variants or programmatic linkages, clientelism involves interaction between clients and their patrons. Recent studies problematized the historical agricultural setting in which clients and patrons had direct interaction. Various scholars now challenge this direct interaction by underlining brokerage, mediation, and clientelistic networks across communities (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). Brokers perform similar political functions across different countries. According to Scott (1972), these agents serve as intermediaries between clients and patrons to establish and sustain exchange relationships. Even if brokers and networks complicate the "dyadic" characteristic of clientelism, it does not imply that there are no face-to-face contacts. On the contrary, brokers replace traditional rural patrons, and they become key players with whom clients interact (Auyero, 2001; Gingerich, 2013). In any case, brokers do not reduce the dyadic characteristic of clientelistic relationship.

Another more serious factor that may challenge the dyadic relationship is the provision of club goods in a contingent manner. Small communities are particularly susceptible to these offers. In such instances, the personal relationship between clients and

patrons/brokers is not necessary. However, there are several caveats on providing clientelistic goods to a group of voters. First, these groups must be small enough to share similar interests and preferences. Moreover, even if parties do not need to engage with all the members of the clientelistic group, there will still be a dyadic relationship in a larger sense. By definition, clientelism does not involve a third party to regulate such linkages actively. In very abstract terms, even after we account for brokers or clients as a collective, the linkage occurs between two actors (client and patron) who try to maximize their utility through discretionary exchange relationships. Whether brokers represent a single party or try to attract new clients after a contestation among several parties, the crystallized interaction between them and clients is a dyadic relationship. Similarly, if clients are small collectives, then there are either pork-barreling or dyadic relationships between patrons and communal representatives. In any case, clientelism involves face-to-face contacts that are potentially engaged because agents have the opportunity to deliberate the terms, benefits, and duration of the linkage.

Another main feature of these linkages is inequality. There is an economic and political imbalance between clients and patrons. In fact, this inequality creates the necessary dynamic for the continuation of exchange relationships. Compared to the standing of political parties and politicians who proffer benefits through vast political machines, clients are more vulnerable. There can be decisive economic dependencies that increase sunk costs when a clientelistic interaction is initiated. On the other hand, Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) argued that material and social imbalances do not challenge the voluntary nature of clientelistic relationships. Authors also indicate that there is a tension between the features they propose, namely asymmetry, inequality, exploitation, potential for coercion and voluntary nature of relations (p. 215). Marx once called the lumpenproletariat a "bribed tool of reactionary intrigue." Although the vulnerable client's contemporary condition is very different from the "ragged" sections of the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century proletariat, there is a similarity among both in the level of vulnerability and lack of collective participation in politics. In this respect, clients are not on an equal footing with their patrons. They can demand new benefits or cease to provide political support to the patron when the exchange relationship ends, but clientelism is an atomistic interaction, and collective action is not possible. Therefore, a rupture in the linkage can have dire consequences for the client. On the other hand, this is not as concerning for political parties. Unlike traditional clientelism which occurred in agricultural settings, it is easier for modern political machines to replace a single client. In this respect, contemporary clientelism occurs between atomized masses of clients and crystallized party machines and their brokers. Therefore, the level of inequality between the two sides increased tremendously especially with the advent of modern clientelism among urban working classes. This may seem antithetical to the high degree of engagement in clientelism I argued above. However, engagement

does not imply equality of agency. On the contrary, patrons need the critical feedback from clients to monitor needs, preferences, and whether they obey by their side of the terms and conditions attached to clientelistic benefits. Engagement is a process of information exchange which is necessary for the long-term functioning of clientelistic linkages whereas substantive or procedural equality is not required for such engagement.

Both features of clientelism, namely the face-to-face contact and inequality relate to the two dimensions mentioned above. First, dyadic nature is conducive to personalistic and discretionary types of political interactions. For instance, if a party activist goes door to door and offers every household *the same* benefit in a sweeping manner, this is more akin to vote-buying. Benefits and contingent support are not tailored to the specific needs of the client, and he remains inactive, with only a single decision on accepting the benefits or not. On the other hand, clientelism implies a process where clients and patrons (or their brokers for that matter) discuss details and engage in interactions about how the linkage will advance. I do not imply a full-fledged contractual relationship for clientelism, but it involves some level of discussion and engagement, unlike vote-buying. Additionally, dyadic relationships are inconsistent with the universalistic nature of programmatic and deliberative policymaking types. Both of these kinds require the public presence of the political parties and voters. In other words, clientelism would not even account as "political" according to an Arendtian understanding of politics (2005) because reverberations of such private dealings are not public and the politics is confined to the limits of private exchange relationships (pp. 117-8).

Additionally, inequality is conducive to the discretionary and engaged nature of clientelism. However, before elucidating this relationship, it is important to separate engagement from full-fledged deliberation. Deliberation requires equal participation (Habermas, 1996; Knight and Johnson, 1997). This equality can be substantive where "The existing distribution of power and resources does not shape chances to contribute to deliberation..." (Cohen, 2003, p.347). It can also be procedural which presupposes an equal opportunity to participate and hence, influence decisions. This type of engagement can be possible for intraparty decisions about policymaking or among small autonomous communities where direct democracy takes place. However, there are degrees of engagement, and clearly, clientelistic engagement does not promote deliberation. On the contrary, aforementioned economic and political dependencies may hinder clientelistic dissent. This does not necessarily entail total submission. The patron needs feedback from the client as much as the client needs benefits in return for his support. This feedback loop is the backbone of clientelistic engagement. It is a type of participation and interaction which involves information exchange without providing a sense of political efficacy. This engagement does not enhance the sense of civic engagement in terms of what Almond and Verba

(1963) or Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994) proposed. Clientelistic engagement is pragmatic and practical. Inequality is related to this engagement as Fox (1994) also suggests: "Since clientelism is a form of bargaining, some degree of autonomy between the parties is inherent to it, yet its distinctive meaning derives from the significantly unequal constraints on that autonomy" (p. 153). Inequalities in a clientelistic framework impair clients' ability to act as autonomous agents. However, there is an inherent tension: while clientelism attenuates autonomous political engagement, it requires a certain degree of informational exchange and engagement. Inequalities create an environment of domination in which clientelistic engagement does not lead to a substantive type of deliberation. In this sense, these inequalities provide a necessary condition for the engagement to continue in a minimal fashion.

There is an additional concept that is highly related to clientelism which also involves similar features. The literature suggests several approaches to differentiate clientelism from patronage. In fact, some scholars use them interchangeably. Some authors define patronage as non-programmatic benefits directed at party members, contingent upon individual's political support (Stokes et al., 2013, p.7). Others indicate that patronage is a specific form of particularistic exchange of public sector employment within the general framework of patron-client relations (Kristinsson, 2001).[3] Additionally, some scholars indicate that patronage is benefits and goods that are distributed in a particularistic way by public office holders (Van de Walle, 2007; Kemahlıoğlu, 2012). In this dissertation, I use patronage and clientelism interchangeably, but the focus of patronage is generally on distribution of public employment by the incumbent party whereas clientelism underlines distribution of any kind of benefits by political parties in return for support. In that respect, patronage and clientelism are not neighboring concepts. Rather, patronage jobs are a specific type of clientelism. In addition to patronage, several other concepts are also related to clientelism. I suggested a typology to differentiate clientelism from vote-buying. Additionally, clientelism is related to the general concept of political corruption in several ways, and the next section provides a brief conceptual note about this relationship.

2.3 Clientelism, Corruption, Cronyism and Market for Votes

In nascent democracies, politicians invest in patron-client networks because there are serious limitations in the credibility of more programmatic appeals. In the long run, low-credibility problem delays political development of a mass-based democratic system (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). However, clientelism can also consolidate and become endemic. Keefer (2007) shows that more credible political systems have less clientelistic linkages

[3]Robinson and Verdier (2013) also use this definition for public sector job distribution, but they prefer to call it clientelism instead of patronage.

and corruption. In other words, there is a positive correlation between corruption and clientelism. In fact, Manow (2002) uses the Corruption Perceptions Index as a proxy for measuring patronage in Western Europe (cited in Muno 2010). However, this effort for measurement is not uncriticized. Muno (2010) argues that corruption does not have the personal element seen in clientelism. Additionally, lack of continuity and an engaged, personal relationship separate corruption from clientelism. On the other hand, Singer (2009, p. 9) theorizes that clientelism can drive corruption by consolidation of an illegal framework and limitations of the rule of law and accountability. Clientelistic actions can be corrupt themselves, or it can cause the clientelistic demand-driven pressure on parties to depend on clientelistic through corrupt deals.

In any case, corruption and clientelism empirically overlap to a great extent. This overlap can conceptually stretch clientelism and therefore, studies on these two related issues can be muddled. Additionally, both corruption and clientelism have substantive external costs associated with the public. Although the rest of the dissertation does not directly deal with corruption, this section serves two purposes before delving into the details of long-term clientelism. First, it shows the empirical overlap between the two concepts and tries to depict differences. Secondly, it relates both of these political issues to external costs incurred on the larger public and indicates that a communitarian, kinship-based understanding of society suggests a way out of the normative and positive theoretical problems associated with clientelism and corruption in a democratic political setting.

In order to show the empirical overlap between corruption and clientelism, I constructed an index of corruption based on different country-level measurements taken from Corruption Perception Index, World Bank governance indicators, Integrity Project, World Justice Project and Varieties of Democracy data sets. Relevant corruption scores were standardized so that a unit increase in score means a unit increase in standard deviation. Cronbach's alpha score for the inter-item reliability of these scores from the five data sets is sufficiently high with an alpha value of 0.98. This suggests that these five data sets successfully measure the latent concept of corruption through different means such as expert coding or surveys with businesses. By creating an index from these five measurements, I also account for possible measurement errors. Figure 2.1 below plots a linear fit with 95% confidence interval for the 66 countries available across these five surveys mentioned above and the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) expert survey scores for clientelism.[4] Indeed, there is an impressive level of empirical overlap between clientelism and corruption.

[4]DALP is employed for macro-level analysis in Chapter 5, and the details of this data set are given there. It is an expert survey that measures various facets of alternative linkage mechanisms in 88 countries

Figure 2.1: Clientelism and Corruption



Figure 2.1 shows that while some countries such as Hungary, Argentina, and Turkey are more clientelistic than what we would expect just by looking at their respective corruption levels, it is lower than expected in other countries such as Thailand, Russia, and Morocco. Even in the face of this unexplained variance, there is a considerable linear relationship between corruption and clientelism. They correlate substantively (0.88) and positively. Using corruption indices to proxy for clientelism may be viable even if there are theoretical differences between the two concepts.

Additionally, clientelism and corruption also correlate with crony capital accumulation. Measuring cronyism is not unproblematic, but one way is to measure the income of the richest individuals by their investment in different sectors. The Economist index of crony-capitalism does that by measuring billionaire wealth as a percentage of GDP across specific sectors in which industries interact a lot with the state through procurement, subcontracting or any other means where economic externalities and lack of market competition are likely.[5] Correlation between corruption and cronyism is high (0.63). Similarly, cronyism also correlates positively with clientelism (0.53). In this respect, crony capitalism is not a useful instrumental variable to explore the relationship between clientelism and corruption as it correlates with both phenomena. However, this tripartite correlation suggests that a high level of state capacity to regulate markets, coupled with

by an expert survey.

[5]These sectors as defined by the Economist's crony-capitalism index are: Casinos, Natural Resource Extraction, Defense, Finance, Infrastructure and Pipelines (including management of Ports and Airports), Real Estate and Construction, Utilities and Telecom Services. Details of the crony-capitalism index are at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-2

a lack of a rational, non-partisan bureaucracy and a capitalist market structure are conducive to external costs on citizens. These costs are incurred from graft, non-competitive procurement, and partisan profiteering among businesses. More importantly for this dissertation, this combination also creates externalities not only for business but also for voters: clientelistic competition is not public information. Engagement between clients and patrons and specifically, contingencies are not publicly available information. Externalities from these transactions are difficult to evaluate in the sense that there are neither clear-cut normative nor positive answers to how we should deal with them. Clearly, cronyism, corruption, and clientelism are all related issues that are very much inimical to a functioning democracy. Voters cannot make decisions based on public information about the state of the economy and deals between the political and economic elite. Even in the most consolidated democracies, these issues can be enduring, and the public choice theory, which explicitly deals with collective decisions and externalities can provide some valuable insights about the normative and positive theoretical underpinnings of this tripartite correlation.

In their seminal work, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) provide a detailed case study to illustrate ethics of trade. Focusing on an event of a morally costly transaction, authors suggest three ethical stances. An individual can support such a transaction (or remain tacit) based on the principle that he or she values individual choice and therefore, choose to "not interfere by placing constraints" (p.269). Also, when an individual assumes that there are externalities imposed because of the transaction, he or she can still have two alternative options. Alternatively, one can accept external costs given that he thinks furthering constraints can affect him directly, or he can "consider the external costs to be high enough that he is willing to pay some positive-sum in order to secure elimination of the activity" (p.269). Buchanan and Tullock extend this ethics of trade to clientelistic linkages which they call "exchange of political votes." Authors trace the reverberations of these three approaches for this specific political transaction.

Assuming that the "market for votes" is based on perfect information, voters should not oppose vote-buying, if they have equal opportunity with other players in the market to sell and buy. This argument rests on the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (1999), but there is a great leap of faith: the assumption about perfect information of the vote market is antithetical to clientelism. Informational and economic asymmetries categorically undermine this theoretical equality in the "vote market". Additionally, an assumption of perfect market yields an additional scenario in which two potential sellers (clients) can team up to incur costs on the vote buyer (patron). Acting as a coalition, clients could still vote for a party given that they agree to share the utility from vote-buying and costs from the policy. However, when there is an imperfection in the vote market, i.e. private

information about the existence and costs of clientelism, then a potential voter who is not in the clientelistic market could easily oppose vote-buying as it incurs external costs on him. Policies advocated by clientelistic parties have a "unique nature of the items traded" (p.274) as Buchanan and Tullock put it. Unless parties can sugar-coat their clientelistic strategies to the general public and sustain an informational advantage over their clients, these transactions are normatively and positively detrimental. Although this is a stylistically libertarian and an individualist approach to frame clientelism, it suggests a method to relate cronyism, corruption, and clientelism. This tripartite correlation and the stylistic market for voters depict an unwanted and costly market setting that underplays the representative and competitive features of democracy. The theoretical explanation in the next chapter will provide an account on why clientelism continues despite all of these detrimental points associated with it. It suffices to indicate here that clientelism, corruption, and cronyism all incur external costs and they are normatively very challenging to justify in a market-based, individualist framework.

In summary, one can think of clientelism as a specific type of political corruption, and this would not be unfounded. However, as previous sections show, clientelism is a very peculiar phenomenon that has different connotations. These discretionary political interactions can thrive in similar environments (i.e. the tripartite correlation), and indeed, they have similar consequences about the externalities and problems associated with information asymmetry. Still, the inner workings of clientelistic relationships are different from corruption and cronyism. The focus on clientelism is more on the electoral outcomes and the relationship between voters and politicians whereas in corruption; it is the fraudulence in the conduct of exchange by those who hold political power. In this sense, clientelism privileges an approach to social and political interaction in which discretionary and personalistic benefits are distributed not by some predetermined criteria but by a calculus to maximize political support among potential clients. In this respect, clientelism embodies a certain social order which cannot be based on a liberal or a legalistic framework. It rather envisions an exclusive communitarian view that downplays the role of rule-based policymaking. This communitarian approach has crucial implications on the type of relationships patrons establish with their clients, and the next section will delve into the details of these micro-level details in a clientelistic relationship.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter proposed a definition of clientelism as a political linkage with specific features. To reiterate, these features are about the level of engagement and personalism. In this framework, I relate inequality and face-to-face nature of clientelism to both engagement and personalism. This relation has implications for temporality which is the

subject of the next chapter. Hilgers (2011) argued that an inherent feature of clientelism is longevity. "The relationship covers a broad range of goods and services that are generally not reciprocated immediately, making it difficult to know whether the parties are even and adding to the longevity of the bond" (p. 570). The longevity that Hilgers argued relates to engagement as well. Participation and engagement are costs that are incurred on the client. As patrons gain crucial information on the political support patterns and preferences of their clients, there will be a high dependency on political benefits and a decrease in exit options for clients. This is why this chapter underlines that clientelistic engagement does not necessarily provide a suitable environment for civic participation. On the contrary, this engagement is a sunk cost on the client's side which may end up in the longevity that Hilgers argues.

Also, these relationships are personalistic and dyadic. Therefore, the clientelistic return is quicker compared to programmatic benefits, since benefits are not distributed after long periods of deliberation or electoral campaign promises of programmatic, redistributive policies. Clients and patrons arrange the timeline for distributing benefits and returns can be immediate. If this engagement is reiterated, then there will be longevity as Hilgers argues. However, the next chapter will contend that this is not necessarily the case, not all clientelistic linkages are inherently long. However, when they are, engagement would lead up to an affective linkage between patrons and clients. This contention will form the backbone of the theoretical framework, but this does not imply that clientelism is inherently long. On the contrary, such relationships can attenuate and then vanish with political development, an increasing level of universalistic policymaking or through collective action against local clientelistic networks. Demands for substantive participation in political decision-making and increasing levels of welfare are hostile to clientelism.

By applying the conceptualization as an exercise for differentiating neighboring concepts, another additional point I made in this chapter was the relationship between clientelism and corruption. This brief note indicates that clientelism develops in an environment which is also conducive to political corruption and cronyism. This is not surprising, and all of these political experiences have dire consequences for the larger public. Even for a stylistic, individualist normative understanding, all of these related issues are highly detrimental to the functioning of an accountable, democratic political system. From a more demanding perspective that champions substantive and civic participation in a communitarian environment of procedural equality, both clientelism and corruption will cause further complications

3

Long-Term Clientelistic Persuasion: A Theory of Targeting and Continuity

Redistribution depends on the prospective continuity of the system. Without assurances and at least a minimal level of trust in the fair functioning of the redistributive system, individuals may shy away from contributing to future pensions or other similar risk alleviation schemes. Clientelism is also not necessarily myopic in its operations. It may intensify during election periods, and there can be a systemic pattern of ebbs and flows. Surely, voters can be shortsighted and especially focus on the very recent performance of politicians when they retrospectively evaluate candidates (Healy and Lenz, 2014; Achen and Bartels, 2016). However, this does not necessarily mean lack of continuity and abrupt termination after elections. This chapter suggests a theoretical framework to explicate this continuity and its consequences. It argues that clientelism continues outside the electoral campaign periods. It is not an interim solution to deficits in the welfare state or a substitute for lack of programmatic and ideological linkages between parties and voters. It is a historically bounded institutional arrangement to gain political support in return for personal benefits, and although it may intensify during periods when parties expect political support from clients, it continues in other periods as well.

Based on this proposition of continuity and temporal dependency, this chapter proposes an account in which clients receive benefits and sustain their relationships with their patrons.[1] Initial targeting may depend on the vote-maximizing rationality of parties, but continuous clientelism causes ideological convergence of political perceptions between patrons and clients. Preexisting ideological affinity (core voters) can explain initial targeting. However, clientelism also feeds back into this affinity over time. Patrons persuade their long-term clients in this consequential feedback loop.

The following section describes the main theoretical framework on clientelistic persuasion, which suggests that affinity is a cause and a consequence of clientelism. Based on

[1]Throughout this chapter, I use "patrons" interchangeably with clientelistic political parties and individual politicians who seek public office. This stretching does not have any implication for the argument and "patron" as a general term accounts for various political agents who distribute goods and benefits to clients.

this premise, the section focuses on the implications of persuasion for clients in the long run. Several working hypotheses based on persuasion are deduced from this theory. More precisely, this chapter will argue that when clientelistic linkages are continuous, attitudes and preferences are not exogenous to the linkage.

The second section focuses on the temporal dimension of this relationship and differentiates relational, inter-temporally extended linkages from single-shot, one-off vote-buying in order to clarify the main explanatory variable. Based on this temporal differentiation and the theoretical framework, the rest of the section will deal with how monitoring and norms of reciprocity maintain clientelism in the long run. This section focuses on emotional factors, reciprocity, predictability, and group attachment in iterated clientelism. Rabin's seminal work (1993) showed that individuals could give up benefits for the utility of others if they believe in other's altruism, and they can similarly withdraw from benefits to punish others if they believe in other's misbehavior. Based on this affective understanding of relationships, this section will argue that persuasion can occur through two different mechanisms. High levels of contact suggest a mechanism through which normative reciprocity can accompany empathy and information sharing that can yield persuasive results. Additionally, these long-term iterations can increase trust and predictability over the long run, and transaction costs can be lower.

If parties are trying to maximize their electoral support and their core supporters would support them even if they do not receive any benefits, then why would parties target core voters? This stylistic question ignited a long and heated debate in the literature. By focusing on the continuity and the relational, cross-temporal nature of clientelism, the theory developed in this chapter provides an answer to why core voters are targeted and more importantly, the consequences of continuous targeting for clients. The third section returns to this debate on targeting core and/or swing voters for practical reasons: If parties target individuals who are already close to them, then can we still theorize clientelistic persuasion in iterated relations? If clients are "core" voters, then they may not be persuaded into the party line at all. They may be already affiliated in one way or another from the beginning. This is a major foil for the theoretical framework presented here, and the third section makes a case for the existence of social influence in political preferences and an increasing attachment to local clientelistic networks over time, even when parties target their core voters. The chapter concludes with a section on methodological limitations and recapitulates the main argument.

3.1 Persuasion and Clientelism

No voter exists in a vacuum, and social environment plays an important role in the political life, maybe except extremely recluse individuals. In his criticism of methodological individualism, Huckfeldt (2014) also suggests that individuals do not exist in a vacuum, and the social interdependence has significant political consequences. Politics does not occur "between the ears of socially isolated voters who calculate and reason through the issues of the day..." (p. 43). This criticism points to the social influence in politics. How does this social influence play out in clientelistic relationships that are mostly material benefits and not ideational, political interactions between peers?

This section delineates the main theoretical framework for long-term clientelistic consequences and suggests a process that is highly related to social influence in politics. Namely, it argues that long-term clients continue their contact with their patrons and local brokers who in return persuade clients to adopt political preferences which are close to the party line. High level of political knowledge and engagement among brokers, interdependency between the patron and clients as well as increasing levels of confidence and a mutual normative understanding are determinants of such long-term clientelistic persuasion. The section focuses on these three factors to make a case for clientelistic persuasion and conclude with a summary of observable implications derived from this framework.

Political preferences, especially those that are not salient for the individual, are unstable. They can be easily influenced if the individual is not personally invested in an issue or if political engagement is relatively low (Zaller, 1992). Various studies show that spouses, intimate friends, and close relationships in general, have considerable influence on an individual's political preferences (Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Kenny, 1994; Coffé and Need, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). Beck et al. (2002) show that the traditional face to face means of social influence have a considerable impact on voters compared to conventional media sources. Clients establish and sustain relational linkages with brokers and parties when they receive long-term benefits. In such instances, party workers who provide clients with the discretionary goods and services can also influence their political preferences. Persuasive cues and messages accompany benefit provision. Such informational cues can shape political attitudes of the client in the end.

Different scholars operationalized persuasion by measuring behavioral and attitudinal shifts. One common denominator in these studies is the change in the measured behavior or attitude, as the concept of persuasion itself implies. You can persuade someone to quit smoking or to evaluate a certain idea positively. In both cases, a successful persuasion

would result in change. Let us take the example of attitudinal change, which is the focal point of this dissertation.

In early sociological research, (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1996, (1918)) defined attitudes as a state of mind of the individual toward a specific value. In their understanding, attitudes are the crystallized outcomes of a process, a manifestation of previous social and cultural interaction. This definition implies that agency lies in reacting to values we observe in our environment. Succeeding studies further developed the concept. Based on this previous research, attitudes can be defined as evaluations of a particular person, object, or issue.[2] Assessment can be favorable or unfavorable as well as indifferent. Attitudes can change over time, and one reason for this is persuasion. Persuasion is the change of an attitudinal evaluation, behavior, or belief through transmission of verbal and non-verbal signals in an atmosphere of free choice.[3] Persuasion implies a minimal duration that is necessary at least to send communicative signals, reception, acceptance of the message and a change in the evaluation of the object.

During this process, a successful persuasive message necessitates several related factors. First of all, perceived competency can affect message acceptance. This competency is crystallized in the charismatic, social, and economic influence of the broker and the patron. If the client does not perceive agents of distribution to be competent political actors, then the persuasive message can fall on deaf ears. Secondly, long-term interdependence between the patron and client creates a suitable environment in which messages can be communicated. It is as if the clientelistic interdependency provides the essential medium in which clients share their grievances and needs, while patrons convey persuasive political messages. Mutual norms that develop over time can set this environment in motion, providing an understanding and harmony between clients and patrons. This communication develops parallel to the increasing level of confidence between the patron and client. Lastly, persuasive influence is especially likely in intimate relationships. As mentioned above, primary relationships encourage social influence more. Clientelistic links are not necessarily established within families. In fact, this would hardly be the case because immediate family members share similar economic conditions. It is very improbable for some members of a household to provide clientelistic benefits to each other. However, a mutual understanding about enforcement and continuity of clientelism can

[2]In various definitions, scholars focused on the evaluative nature of attitudes. These are tendencies or predispositions that categorize objects into positive, indifferent, or negative types. For such definitions, see Allport (1935); Zanna and Rempel (1988); Eagly and Chaiken (1993); Fazio (1995).

[3]This definition borrows the clause about free choice from Perloff (2010) and O'Keefe (2002). Freedom to choose is necessary because otherwise, persuadee is enforced or coerced to report a change. There is an implied tension between material dependency clients may experience (especially in the long-term) and this freedom of choice. However, this tension assumes a lack of agency on the client's side and reserves no will or power to the client.

have spillover effects even in secondary relationships such as those we observe among clients and patrons. Increasing levels of confidence, mutual trust, and reciprocity can make clientelistic persuasion more likely.

Walsh's work (2004; 2008) shows that political discussions are fluid. Discussants move from one topic to another in an informal way when there is an intimate relationship. Additionally, she demonstrates that conveying political positions with examples are more effective in influencing discussants. In other words, the effectiveness of influence depends on controlling the flow of discussion and providing relevant information to discussants. Walsh's studies are mostly about discussions among peers who have known each other for decades. In respect to long-term clientelistic linkages, patrons and clients are not equals. It is easier for patrons to direct the content of the political discussion. This is not unexpected especially if a party dominates a specific clientelistic group. Switching or refusing cooperation would risk the continuity of benefits for clients. Parties can target alternative groups in case current clients defect whereas it may not be so easy for clients to get benefits from another party. In this respect, patrons will have a social advantage over their clients especially when the party dominates a specific social group. Additionally, party activists and members of the local party organization are politically committed individuals. They are close to partisan information sources. Transmission of information and facts about the political world is not necessarily an objective process. Patrons provide information filtered through local and central partisan networks. They use their expertise, information advantage, and partisan information as a source of credit claiming especially in economically precarious and unstable periods.

This interpersonal power imbalance also implies dissonance. Perfect attitudinal convergence is unlikely since clients and patrons are not equals. This is an essential prerequisite for persuasion as Huckfeldt et al. (2013) also argue: "If two people agree on everything, if they are always on the same page as one another, then influence will not be observed" (p. 673). Additionally, the level of disagreement should not be very high so as to hamper persuasion. Clientelistic relationships satisfy these criteria by definition. In a given social group, there can always be some random level of attitudinal differences that does not imply substantive disagreement. It is challenging to separate this random dissonance from a real signal of disagreement that attenuates through interaction over time. However, long-term linkages create a suitable environment in which norms of reciprocity and confidence increase. Regardless of whether patrons target core or swing groups, there will be some level of disagreement because of the information asymmetry and the power relationship between the patron and the client. Where they stand against each other will shape their viewpoint. Therefore, the degree of necessary information asymmetry and disagreement create the suitable environment in which patrons can persuade their clients. Additionally,

monitoring mechanisms are not employed solely to enforce clientelistic contracts. Patrons can also gather valuable information about needs and preferences of clients through monitoring. Information flow in clientelistic persuasion is a two-way process. Information asymmetry initiates a flow between the parties to the relationship and the result is beneficial to both sides. If the convergence of perceptions occurs selectively in salient positions of the party and not in all different policy positions in a sweeping manner, this attests to the persuasive effects of clientelism.

Schaffer and Baker (2015) suggest a similar process in which parties specifically target those whose influence is relatively large within a given community. In other words, they argue for a trickle-down effect of clientelism. In this example, persuasion is delegated to clients who will attribute credibility to the clientelistic party and try to persuade their own network to support the patron. Although they do not focus on the temporal dimension and development of this process, this strategy suggests that parties are trying to use clientelistic resources in an optimal manner, and they consider the persuasive effect of such distribution when they decide on targeting specific groups. This is not surprising because persuasion is a valuable resource.

Political persuasion takes time. In fact, numerous studies show that socialization during adolescence and long-term group attachments are some of the most important determinants of individual political positions (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler, 2009; Førland, Korsvik, and Christophersen, 2012; Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Barni et al., 2014). However, continuous interactions between patrons and clients can influence the client especially on the formation of new issue opinions for which these clients have to make a decision based on information cues. Additionally, brokers and clients usually share a common history, living in the same neighborhood and sharing the same public space in their localities. As the Turkish example will clarify, there is usually a personal bond between brokers and clients. Most of the brokers in Turkey are not strangers when they first contact their clients. They are usually prominent local figures with high social influence and the power to solve everyday problems in the neighborhood. They have the capacity to exert personal influence on clients. In the Turkish case, these brokers are also highly connected to local party branches in districts, municipalities, and even provincial headquarters. They are an indivisible part of the party organization, and they form the backbone of a party's influence in the neighborhood. In summary, political clientelism requires a personal interaction between two individuals. This interaction happens in various places and times, but most of the brokers establish long-term relationships. The temporal nature of this interaction creates suitable conditions for further political discussions and persuasion of clients' political attitudes and stances.

Clientelism may not be a necessary condition for political persuasion, but it contributes to the building up of the asymmetrical relationship between a patron and a client. It creates sunk costs, limits volition and viable exit strategies for both sides. These costs can be both psychological, for instance, peer-pressure, and material. Most of the time, recipients are from relatively poorer segments of a given social group. Brokers can continue to provide these goods and services in the long term. This, in turn, creates a dependency in which clients feel the pressure to sustain the relationship. On the other hand, parties may eventually depend on their long-term clients as they face high transaction costs when they decide to abandon some of their clients and replace them with more supportive voters. In such an environment, it is likely that the clients adjust their attitudes to their relationship with the broker.[4] In other words, long-term clientelism intensifies the relationship between parties and increases the chances and level of persuasion.

Ruth (2016) argues for an alternative account in which persuasion does not occur. According to her account, voters become indifferent to political information and clientelism induces an alternative voting rationale by increasing the level of uncertainty and indifference. Models in this study indicate that in 18 Latin American countries, those who receive benefits or patronage jobs are 8% less likely to place themselves on an ideological scale. Clearly, if clients become less invested in political positions and their preferences are more fickle, parties should not pay attention to persuading recipients. However, models in this study do not include an interaction term between clientelism and its longevity, and therefore, the analyses lack a crucial piece of information from a standpoint that problematizes the temporal dimension. Additionally, it is true that benefit provision is the most important reason why clients become attached to their patrons over time, but this does not mean that the only interaction in clientelistic linkages is based on benefit distribution in return for political support.

If such linkages also foster exchange of information on issues such as economic grievances, inequality, problems in the local community, alternative policy positions, upcoming elections, or political competition in general, then clients should not become indifferent. On the contrary, they will be more engaged with the political world through this informational exchange. Additionally, most of the political competition is based on positions and promises even in the most clientelistic setting. Parties still have to differentiate their positions from others. The existence of variance across parties in providing clientelistic benefits, as modeled by Ruth (2016), suggests that even if some parties are more successful in inducing indifference to clients, they still need to compete with other parties in the ideological, issue-based arena. In fact, a recent study by Tzelgov and Wang (2016) shows

[4]For a detailed account of how people justify or cope with strategic political agents in the Turkish example see, Erdoğan (1998)

that both left and right wing parties provide private clientelistic goods to "unorganized individual voters" (p. 6), and they suggest that there is a "nuanced relationship between parties' ideology and clientelism" (p. 33). Right wing parties are more likely to establish relationships with businesses to regulate markets and create clientelistic externalities through business circles. However, both left and right wing parties provide similar levels of clientelistic goods to individuals. Ideological position and clientelism are not mutually exclusive or separate issues. Additionally, the sixth chapter will empirically show that clients' external political efficacy increases as clientelism continues. External efficacy is an individual's evaluative perception about the effectiveness of the political system in responding to demands and expectations. As long as clients sustain their relationship, and their personalistic demands are fulfilled, they perceive the clientelistic party to be responsive. They do not necessarily become indifferent. Such perceptions have an implication on preferred policy positions: if the client believes a party to be responsive and competent even for clientelistic reasons, she is more likely to support the party's positions rather than becoming alienated or indifferent. However, Ruth's study (2016) still contributes to this theory because it attests to the argument that parties need to have specific policy positions in order to persuade voters. This may not be the case if a party employs clientelistic linkages in combination with other types of interactions based on ethnic or religious identification, charismatic party leadership, or invoking political competence without substantive policy frameworks. Regardless of the party's ideological position, this discussion implies that parties which successfully combine policy positions with clientelism will have more opportunities to persuade clients.

Another recent work that is highly relevant for this dissertation is a study by Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016). Unlike Ruth's work on clientelistic indifference and uncertainty, authors problematize long-term implications of clientelistic distribution and build hypotheses about long-term consequences, focusing on the party level. They problematize institutional, organizational, and strategic determinants of clientelistic targeting. However, unlike this dissertation, authors do not discuss consequences of an interaction between ideological affinity and material benefits in their party utility models. On the contrary, their theoretical framework "... presupposes that party loyalty is not anchored in ideology, affect or symbolic appeals, but is conditioned by personal exchanges of material inducements and support" (p. 80). In other words, their models do not problematize the interaction between recipiency and "ideology, affect, or symbolic appeals" over iterations. This is not a far-fetched assumption for clientelism especially if it yields relevant, novel findings. Also, given that authors theorize the effect of long-term provision for patrons rather than clients, this may be a viable presumption. However, there may not be a perfect trade-off between clientelism and affective, ideological appeal. Indeed, clientelism attenuates the effectiveness of programmatic policy propositions. However,

an ideological appeal can still have discursive power and thus, may be relevant for clients even if it is not so for the party's prospective decision to proffer benefits.

Distributing discretionary benefits for political support is a costly and burdensome strategy. It necessitates extensive local investment and even in the best case scenario; it can still be a leaky bucket. By assuming "deep and ongoing" clientelistic relationships, Camp and Szwarcberg (2015) show how brokers can divert clientelistic resources for personal gain. Given these costly risks, why do parties invest in clientelism and sustain such schemes? Is it because they have no alternative linkage mechanisms or do parties also gain something else? This section proposed an account based on long-term persuasion as a solution to this "leaky bucket" problem. It is not easy to force people only through material benefits when electoral institutions are designed to anonymize voters and reduce the party pressure on them. However, a clientelistic distribution scheme can initiate confidence-building mechanisms and eventually a suitable environment in which a party can convince clients to support the party sincerely. Therefore, the first empirical implication of the theory of long-term clientelistic persuasion is about contract enforcement:

Hypothesis 1 *Compared to short-term clientelism, Long-term clientelism does not necessitate extensive monitoring efforts.*

Long-term clientelism provides means for parties to develop norms of reciprocity. The next section deals with this initial hypothesis and the development of confidence and reciprocity as an alternative to contract monitoring. Compliance can be challenged among long-term clients when parties cannot respond to their clients' needs rapidly during times of increased vulnerability. As we will see in the sixth chapter, this occurred in the Turkish context. With the increasing levels of vulnerability due to gentrification, parties could not respond to their clients' needs in a timely fashion, and they could not provide a crucial local safety-net for urban squatters: house titles. Therefore, mutual confidence and reciprocity in long-term relationships also depend on external factors.

Things such as promises about urban titles and discretionary enrollment in social welfare schemes hint at the relationship between poverty and clientelism. However, poverty cannot explain clientelism by itself. There are countries with a portion of the population living in absolute poverty, but there is only a minimal level of clientelism. Still, poverty can sustain clientelism. Economic dependency is a crucial part of the long-term persuasive processes. These dependencies reflect themselves in social and ideational dimensions as well. A materialist explanation would expect such economic dependencies to be the exclusive reason for clientelistic social outcomes. Even if we assume this materialist con-

ception not to be the case, ignoring economic reasons would be a reckless leap of faith. The importance of poverty and how it sustains continuity of clientelistic linkages cannot be disregarded. Explaining persuasive consequences of iterated clientelism necessitates mentioning poverty and the feedback loop between the two. The second hypothesis is therefore about this relationship:

Hypothesis 2 *Poverty and lack of mobility create a suitable environment in which clientelism can perpetuate.*

Up until now, I have summarized the two determinants of long-term clientelism, namely the lack of exogenous shocks that would hurt the mutual confidence and contract compliance and the relationship between poverty and clientelistic linkages. Variance in these two factors has effects on long-term clientelism and its persuasion related outcomes. First, this persuasive process should be more likely and visible when there is an optimal level of (dis)agreement between clients and patrons. When clients are perfectly loyal ideologues of the party or if there is an insurmountable perceptional gap, then there will not be any persuasion over time. Also, there must be an interactive environment in which patrons and clients can discuss and deliberate not only the details of specific transactions or the clientelistic relationship in general but also other political issues. Related to these necessities, the third hypothesis is about the process of persuasion:

Hypothesis 3 *Socially bounded features in a clientelistic environment will increase the likelihood of persuasion.*

This is also related to the temporal conceptualization mentioned above. When these linkages are temporally extended interactions, they will also include socially meaningful, confidence-building mechanisms. Through iteration, mutual norms of reciprocity and an amicable environment in which exchange takes place provide the necessary context in which persuasion occurs. Fifth chapter will show that long-term clients are more approving of such relationships. Additionally, experimental evidence also suggests that "meaningful" benefits that require knowledge about client's preferences and hence, linkages with a pronounced social dimension are more conducive to persuasion and increasing support in various policy areas.

These policy areas should not be random. Persuasion will occur in selected issues. Parties try to maximize electoral support, and they will strive to convince clients especially in politically salient areas that are relevant for the patron. Therefore, parties will not pay attention to irrelevant issues or those that they do not own. In addition to policy

issues, parties will also persuade clients and claim credit for specific policy enactments especially when there are competing actors, and credit attribution is challenging. However, this persuasive process cannot be controlled completely by the party organization. As clients prefer policies supported by the party, there will also be a general ideological affinity between the party and the client. There can be diffused spillover effects. Policy relevant proselytization and increasing ideological affinity reinforce each other. Even if such a spillover does not occur, a general ideological approximation is still viable if clientelistic distribution itself is ideologically relevant and close to the party position. Therefore, the last and the main hypothesis relates to the process of long-term persuasion:

Hypothesis 4 *Increasing levels of clientelistic attachment over time will cause a shift in client's preferences in specific policy issues and general ideological outlook.*

Empirical sections will present various tests to show the process for this hypothesis. If persuasion works in the hypothesized way, we should observe more approval of clientelism, more proximate ideological positions and lastly, closer policy preferences to the party positions in salient issues among long-term clients. Such approximation will not be observed for matters that are irrelevant in the party system. Given the conceptualization of the temporal dimension in the following section, similar effects should not be observed for non-client supporters of the party or its short-term clients. It is crucial to discuss how the continuous clientelistic persuasion also relates to two relevant topics. These are enforcements of clientelism and the party's targeting strategies. While the former issue refers to the third hypothesis by focusing on the indirect consequences of continuous relationships, the latter issue relates to the causal direction of the theorized process. If parties only target their core voters, then should we not observe any persuasion? The following two sections will explicate the theoretical discussion by referring to these two issues.

3.2 Temporality, Monitoring, and Normative Reciprocity

More than three decades ago, Landé argued that there is no agreement on "what is to be included in the study of patron-client relationships" (Landé, 1983, p. 441). This conceptual problem is still haunting studies on clientelism. In his review of the topic, Roniger refers to Graham and underlines that clientelistic relationships are based on the principle of "take there, give here" [Graham (1997)] quoted in Roniger (2004). This principle categorically necessitates an unspecified spatial distance for the clientelistic transaction to be completed. Extending Graham's spatial criteria, we can say that these transactions also have a minimal duration to be completed.

A single transaction does not occur spontaneously in a vacuum. Every clientelistic relationship has a temporal dimension, and they take at least some amount of unspecified minimal time during which patrons offer and eventually provide clients with benefits, and in return, clients support their patrons politically in various ways. Only then, can we talk about a successful transaction and exchange. What are the different consequences when this exchange is repeated, extended over time, or confined to a single interaction with minimal duration?

On the spot vote-buying is a paragon of short-term clientelistic linkages. In 19th century Britain, this sort of on the spot vote-buying happened in the vicinity of polling stations (Kam, 2016). Similarly, Schaffer (2007) provides examples about how similar vote-buying efforts continue in various parts of the world in countries such as Cambodia, Kuwait, Mexico, the Philippines, and Russia (p. 2). On the other side of the spectrum, we have long-term relations, in which deals occur repetitively. In such cases, parties can fulfill their side of the deal in relatively more distant future. For instance, when incumbent political parties proffer public jobs as patronage, dependencies are long-term, and it resonates across space and time.[5] Exchanges can be prolonged or deferred as patrons can offer prospective benefits for a later time. This would extend the time horizon of a single transaction. On the other hand, benefits can be continuous in two different ways. First, benefits can be inherently long-term such as public employment, i.e. patronage jobs, which continue as long as the client is employed. Secondly, benefits can be prospective such as enrollment in public insurance and pension programs, which will be used in a future period depending on the fulfillment of contingent political criteria. These prospective and continuous benefits are different from future promises since the patron clearly provides the client with benefits in a longer time horizon. Initial enrollment of clients in long-term benefit programs can be sufficient to account for a completion of a single transaction. However, this conceptualization necessitates a discussion of the differences between a single clientelistic transaction and continuous clientelism.

When a patron provides her clients with, say, durable goods, or direct cash transfers, the transaction is complete as long as the contingent criterion, i.e. political support, occurs. However, when the time horizon of the benefit is continuous or prospective as mentioned above, then this relationship is based on deeply entrenched norms between the patron and client. For instance, provision of public employment by the patron may look like a positive inducement to garner political support. However, it creates economic dependencies over the long run and gives the patron a significant clout, i.e. power to abuse

[5]Job tenure and a rational bureaucracy can prevent patronage jobs from being offered to political supporters. For example, Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova (2012) show that not all public and semi-public patronage positions are proffered based on party affiliation in Europe.

the client's dependency. Mares and Young (2016) show that such negative inducements are common in clientelistic relationships. These dependencies and negative inducements influence the client's expected utility from supporting another party and limit viable options, perpetuating a cycle of clientelistic continuity. When clients are more in fear of losing their patronage jobs, public healthcare schemes, or conditional cash transfers, they may act differently than when they believe these benefits are dispensable. More generally, being in a domain of gains rather than losses is important. An example can help to clarify this difference: when a client receives dispensable goods that are not vital for his well being during an election campaign period only for once, and if there is no promise of future benefits, then he should be less likely to worry about losing these benefits. However, when a client is enrolled in a continuous welfare program or other similar long-term benefits, then he can potentially be more risk-averse. Zarazaga (2014) also makes a similar argument: "... the poor prefer their brokers to win elections rather than to lose, because their brokers offer security about the future flow of goods and services" (p. 40). Given that parties tend to target economically vulnerable voters, loss aversion is expected to create crucial dependencies, especially in long-term linkages.

There is a clear difference in the transactional duration between campaign period benefits proffered only for once or twice and temporally extended benefits. Empirical evidence in the fifth and sixth chapters will show that patrons offer various benefits but long-term clients are more likely to be offered more substantive benefits. However, the challenge is differentiating continuous and prospective benefits from future promises. The main difference between the former two and the latter one boils down intention and issues of trust. The patron takes action and indeed enrolls the client or provides benefits in the former types whereas promises do not hint at similar levels of assurance. For promises, clients hang in limbo until patron takes action. Patrons can promise different kinds of benefits such as patronage jobs, enrollment in welfare or in-kind benefits and until the promise is fulfilled, the transaction is not finalized. However, in continuous, repeated interactions, predictability increases eventually yielding trust as the future behavior of the clients and patrons become consistent with their past experience. Both patrons and clients will be better off in such predictable, iterated interactions and promises can become more meaningful in such cases.

In addition to consequences and the role of promises in single and repeated interactions, another difference between these ideal types of temporal dimension can be the initial starting period of clientelism. As mentioned above, these linkages may intensify in electoral campaign periods. Politicians can promise or provide various benefits especially before the elections, but long-term clientelism is less likely to be confined to these short periods by definition. There is a caveat in this argument: inherent discretion can hinder

continuity. Termination of clientelism can also be discretionary unless there is a legal framework to solidify discretionary benefits over time, such as tenure and "earned rights" of welfare but would be inconsistent with the definition of clientelistic linkages. Therefore, this suggests that long-term benefits can be fickle and create dependency among patrons and clients. For instance, patronage job security should depend on factors other than merit in countries where discretionary public employment is common. Surely, patronage can incur additional costs on the government, but when political power changes hands, these public employees may also lose their job. Hence, clientelistic continuity (especially done through the public coffer) can be determined by electoral volatility. However, this still does not imply that these long-term benefits are as momentary as campaign period gifts or as uncertain as initial promises. Patrons can offer long-term benefits even outside the election campaign periods as these linkages continue unless there is an exogenous shock (such as an economic crisis or a programmatic reform in the welfare system), or clients or patrons decide to exit because of better economic opportunities for the former or more preferable political targets for the latter. Compare this with short-term transactions: clients and patrons have fewer reasons for prospective exit calculus, provision of benefits is less likely to be affected by shocks, and the relationship has a more limited scope focusing especially on politically momentous periods such as elections, primaries or referenda. Similarly, unrealized promises, which are incomplete transactions, resemble short-term linkages in this respect. They are comparatively more dispensable than long-term, continuous or iterated interactions.

This conceptual discussion suggests that dissection a clientelistic transaction will show at least two factors that hint to the temporal nature of the relationship. These factors relate to consequences and the starting period. Neither of these factors can determine temporality of the linkage with certainty, but together, they relate to temporality. Long-term linkages will have far-reaching consequences, and they are less likely to be limited to periods when patrons desperately need to mobilize possible supporters. On the other hand, short-term interactions and promises are more ephemeral and generally occur in specific periods. Based on this discussion, it is possible to suggest a working concept for the rest of the thesis. Long-term clientelism is a temporally extended, consequential relationship that has a large time horizon, not confined to ad hoc peculiarities of a single political moment. A single transaction such as patronage job and discretionary enrollment in prospective benefit schemes can establish these relationships between prudent patrons and clients. Alternatively, they can consist of a series of various transactions that are not bounded by transient necessities of a single event. The intensity can waver over time. The sixth chapter will show that economic shocks such as gentrification and increasing economic vulnerability, which are exogenous to the clientelistic relationship, can cause intensification, attenuation, and even termination of the relationship.

Clientelism also entails an urgent commitment problem especially when benefits are distributed before the contingent political support. What if the client decides not to fulfill her part of the contract after receiving benefits? A discussion that refers to the temporal framework suggested above can provide insights to this question and can further delineate the mechanism behind long-term persuasion.

According to Stokes (2005), the most important determinant of initiation and continuity of clientelism is a politician's capacity to monitor electoral behavior. In fact, several other authors have also argued that monitoring is important for continuity of clientelism (Dal Bo, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Nichter, 2008). Clientelistic parties can invoke a perception of surveillance to enforce contracts even when the secret ballot is well established (Kitschelt and Rozenas, 2011). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) suggest that monitoring is necessary if either a motivational or a conditional cognition is absent (p. 8). The former is about spontaneous compliance whereas the latter is about the patron's knowledge of a client's motivations and payoffs from alternative courses, in our case, defection. When one of these two criteria is absent, parties will establish expensive local organizations to monitor compliance. In fact, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) also relate this compliance to long-term consequences of clientelism:

> *"In this process [development of local monitoring organizational capacity] clients and politicians gain confidence in the viability of their relationship by iteration, i.e., the repeated success of exchange relations that makes the behavior of the exchange partner appear predictable and low risk. The evolution of party organizational forms that manage clientelistic relations is a drawn-out process, not an instant result of rational strategic interaction in single-shot games"(p. 8).*

Monitoring is not only a preventive measure for the party's utility maximization strategy. Parties can establish local organizations for clientelistic cost-effectiveness, but this can also induce important relational features between party operatives, patrons, and local clients. Monitoring may not be a sufficient condition on its own to build confidence among patrons and clients, but it may facilitate further interaction between them. Many clients interact with party operatives who are highly connected, politically motivated individuals. These brokers tend to have a central place in neighborhood-level social networks (Szwarcberg, 2012). By monitoring needs and demands of their constituents, they can establish and sustain long-term relationships. Parties form such personalistic, relationships with voters. This does not only happen in the developing world or nascent, unconsolidated democracies. For instance, bosses from New York's Democratic Party political machine, Tammany Hall, also had similar relationships. One such boss, George W. Plunkitt explains:

> *"If there is a fire on Ninth, Tenth or Eleventh Avenue, for example, any hour of the day or night, I'm usually there with some of my election district captains as soon*

as the fire-engines... It's philanthropy, but it's politics too - mighty good politics. Who can tell how many votes one of these fires bring me? The poor are the most grateful people in the world..." (Riordan, 1995).

Similarly, Argentine brokers establish clientelistic networks in their *barrios* and Indian *naya netas (new leaders)* solve peasants' everyday problems.[6] What is common in Indian, Argentine, and American examples is a continuous interaction between brokers and voters. Party activists help voters not only during the election periods but also during politically uneventful or contingent times as well, even if broker centrality can especially increase during the election campaign periods (Akdağ, 2014). Brokers and clients maintain a relationship in their neighborhoods, congregations, coffeehouses, and other similar public places. In return, brokers monitor their clients, respond to their personal problems rapidly, and request political support for the party when they deem it necessary. This reciprocity creates a suitable environment for political interaction and persuasion and it is an exercise of confidence building as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) suggests.

On the other hand, Stokes et al. (2013) focus on broker capacity to introduce broker's interests as a mediating factor between patrons and clients. This provides an explanation to the dilemma of offering benefits to loyal voters who do not need any benefits to turnout or vote for the party. Monitoring capacity depends on various actors and party organization's competency in a given locality.[7] For instance, brokers who are not familiar with local clients' interests and preferences can fail to monitor and predict hints and cues about defection. Related to this broker capacity and influence, Dunning and Stokes (2010) and Kemahlıoğlu (2012) argue that there will be different interests across different levels of a party organization. Similar to Bawn et al. (2012) and Camp (2010), Kemahlıoğlu (2012) theorizes intraparty competition as a contest among various interest groups and derives hypotheses about the extensiveness of patronage jobs from this premise. While party leaders will be interested in continuing their reign on the party, lower echelons can challenge the leadership. Competition between parties and "competition within parties" determine the patronage jobs to be distributed among clients (Kemahlıoğlu, 2012, p. 65).

[6]For ethnographic case studies on Argentine and Indian brokers, see, Auyero (2001) and Krishna (2007).

[7]Here, locality is used in a highly abstract manner. Its designation can vary across countries. Based on the discussion about ballot secrecy and monitoring, the optimal locality can be defined as the smallest observable electoral unit. Monitoring can be easier when results are available to brokers in smaller units. As Rueda (2016, p. 1) shows, "highly disaggregated election results facilitate vote-buying even when brokers do not have detailed information about individual voters". In the Turkish case, election results are publicly available and published online at polling station and ballot box levels (around 300 voters on average). According to International IDEA's Global Database on Elections and Democracy, such detailed results are available only in 25% of 105 countries analyzed in the data set. See, http://www.idea.int/db/fieldview.cfm?field=510

Monitoring can be an imperfect remedy because of this intraparty competition, variance across local organizational structures, and brokers' skillfulness and capacity Stokes et al. (2013). In other words, there are uncertainties and limitations associated with monitoring even if it may encourage confidence building in the long-term and provides a solution to enforcement. Monitoring on its own is a very leaky bucket, and it has perverse effects such as increasing competition between local operatives and patrons as well as embezzlement and mismanagement of clientelistic resources. However, in the long run, patrons and brokers establish a track record by monitoring their clients. This also necessitates keeping in touch with clients and therefore, monitoring can induce further interaction between the sides.

Both monitoring and more normative reasons of contract enforcement can provide mechanisms through which relational, iterated linkages produce persuasive effects. However, most of the accounts about monitoring are instrumentalist, in the sense that they focus on why clients do not defect and what local organizations do to prevent and punish defection. On the other hand, another type of contract enforcement depends on a more normative sense of clientelistic continuity in which reciprocity and compliance develop based on values, norms or a sense of belonging (e.g., Boissevain 1966; Scott 1969, 1972; Komito 1984; Auyero 2001; Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014).

In a discourse analysis of Yoruba proverbs, Omobowale (2008) shows that Yoruba patrons *(baba-isale)* are usually depicted with intrinsic positive values to win the loyalty of their clients. According to this account, both patrons and clients must internalize specific values and act accordingly:

> *"For as much as the patron may have goods to dispense, he requires the loyalty of the client to remain relevant. Likewise, the essence of the clients' loyalty may only become relevant when it is recognized as germane and imperative for the sustenance of a patron and thus attracts goods" (p. 218).*

Clientelism cannot be enforced purely on a rational calculus of monitoring. The "leaky bucket" necessitates values and norms to complement monitoring and minimize defection. "Early in the 1960s and 1970s, a broad literature on clientelism emerged, focusing on the notion of reciprocity... By contrast, recent research has a more instrumental view of clientelism as a hard-to-enforce contract between independent patrons and clients..." (Calvo and Murillo, 2013, p. 877, footnote 2). Compared to the research on monitoring, reciprocal normative accounts are older because these descriptions may fit rural clientage better than an urban setting in which we observe "marketization of patronage relations" as Omobowale (2008) puts it (p. 219).

The literature on monitoring focuses on contract enforcement for a single transaction, and it generally remains silent on long-term iterations except from Kitschelt and Wilkinson's account of confidence building (2007). This is not the case for normative reciprocity. Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) trace roots of clientelistic reciprocation to gift-giving. Gifts are different from pure market exchanges since they are not given for utilitarian purposes. However, gift-giving and such relationships are "highly structured and based on relatively elaborated and specified rules of reciprocity" (p. 33).

There is a lengthy discussion especially among anthropologists and economists on determinants of gift and its consequences on social preferences and reciprocity. Referring to the classic anthropological literature and especially Mauss's work (1954), Akerlof (1982) suggested a typology of labor markets based on how different industries compensate workers. Building on the effects of gift giving, this account suggests that workers "...develop a sentiment for their co-workers and for that institution..." (p.550). Similarly, in addition to its more utilitarian functions, Sahlins (1972) discusses the normative function of gifts and redistribution in a primitive economy:

> *"The practical, logistic function -redistribution sustains the community, or community effort in a material sense. At the same time, or alternatively, it has an instrumental function: as a ritual of communion and of subordination to central authority, redistribution sustains the corporate structure itself that is in a social sense. The practical benefits may be critical, but, whatever the practical benefits, chiefly pooling generates the spirit of unity and centricity, codifies the structure, stipulates the centralized organization of social order and social action." (p. 190).*

As the partial survey of recent experimental findings by Esteves-Sorenson (2016) shows, gifts lead to higher productivity in the labor market. Even if these findings are currently being challenged by some recent studies, gifts also change social preferences (DellaVigna et al., 2016). How can we apply such consequences of gifts at the workplace to the political sphere and derive conclusions about the role of clientelism as gifts? Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) show that the effects of governmental poverty alleviation schemes persist even after these programs end. Clearly, welfare benefits are very different from gifts or clientelism per se. However, I argued that when a political party provides discretionary benefits to its clients (which is very different from programmatic welfare), these benefits can be akin to gifts especially in countries where welfare state benefits exist. They can be conceived as benefits provided *in addition to* deserved welfare benefits. Also, these "gifts" can present policy signals to clients. Handouts distributed during the electoral campaign period provide policy information about continuation of benefits after the elections especially among the poor clients (Kramon, 2016). Specific institutional and social arrangements such as the extent of public goods provision, ascriptive status, and entitlement can influence rules around gift giving and reciprocity.

For example, among Yoruba, norms about gifts and role of agents in a given clientelistic relationship can be encountered in idioms, micromanaging the personality of *baba-isale*, and in early 20th century Tammany Hall of New York City, this can be seen in reciprocal favoritism of the machine bosses. Reciprocity is evolutionarily hard-wired (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, and West, 2015). Normative arrangements manage reciprocity through a mutual understanding established over long periods of socialization and cultural exposure even if they are very different across cultures.

A recent study by Finan and Schechter (2012) provides the empirical groundwork for the importance of reciprocity in clientelistic relations. They show that brokers know clients' characteristics, and they target prospective clients who will reciprocate. In other words, the broker's information advantages, coupled with the altruistic personality of some potential clients, create a suitable environment for lack of monitoring. Authors measure clients' reciprocity in a one-shot trust game to capture intrinsic rather than instrumental reciprocity (p. 869). Unfortunately, this measurement does not provide any insight about socialization into specific norms of reciprocity and how such norms come about. Authors do not problematize the temporal dimension of socialization and confidence building. Still, the fact that party brokers can target reciprocators to minimize monitoring costs suggests that norms can make a major difference, and this effect can reverberate, as brokers tend to target specific clients whom they know.

Lawson and Greene (2014) fill in the temporal gap in Finan and Schechter (2012). They argue that clientelism persists despite ballot secrecy and lack of proper monitoring capabilities. Clientelistic calculus is retrospective, based on previous interactions with party operatives and the political machine (pp. 69-71). Therefore, Lawson and Greene's study suggests that this is an iterative relationship in which clients feel obliged to their patrons over the course of the relationship. Normative explanations of clientelistic continuity necessitate some demanding conditions for continuity, unlike more instrumentalist approaches. A calculus of negative inducement is not sufficient to explain this continuity. The most important criterion for reciprocal accounts is knowledge about clients' needs and preferences. This knowledge plays a major role in providing meaningful benefits and it also provides a mechanism through which brokers can convey policy relevant messages tailored for the specific client networks.

In his ethnographic study of Southern Spain, Pitt-Rivers (1971) suggested that clientelism is comparable to a "lop-sided friendship" (p. 140). Patrons and clients are not equals, but they have extensive information about each other's preferences. Without this mutual knowledge, it is impossible for normative reciprocity to function. Knowledge about the other side requires interaction. Referring to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)

and Stokes (2005), Hicken (2011) argues that clientelism can become an equilibrium strategy through iteration as predictability (increase in information about the other party) increases over time. This iterative process can exist regardless of whether clientelism is enforced by monitoring or reciprocity. Predictability provides information to both sides of the relationship, which is then used by patrons to overcome institutional arrangements such as ballot secrecy, and by clients to evaluate whether patrons will deliver benefits.

In summary, enforcement of informal contracts is challenging. It is costly to establish vast local machines to monitor and enforce clientelism. Legal enforcement is not a viable option. Therefore, enforcement necessitates an alternative course of action in the long run. This section mentioned two accounts proposed by the literature and provided a discussion on how instrumentalist monitoring and normative reciprocity develop over time. This debate suggests that both alternatives are less costly and more efficient in the long term and they provide specific mechanisms conducive for the theorized effects. Szwarcberg (2012) argues that parties continue monitoring clients even in the long run not to enforce compliance but to understand their needs and preferences. Additionally, mutual confidence and high levels of knowledge create a sustainable environment in which clientelism can become an equilibrium strategy. Patrons and clients can find innovative ways to continue their relationships despite the institutional restrictions such as ballot secrecy. High levels of contact enhance knowledge about the other side, mutual empathy, and perspective taking (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). Track record of previous interactions, predictability, and exchange of grievances and information about demands provide patrons with necessary cues to create a suitable environment in which persuasion and convergence of perceptions can occur.

Brokers can monitor their clients for instrumentalist, enforcement-related reasons. However, there will be more reciprocal norms and over time, monitoring can serve different purposes. Local organizations established for vote-maximizing reasons can propagate partisan information. Diffusion of normative and instrumentalist strategies points to a mechanism through which repeated clientelistic interactions can cause political persuasion and convergence of perspectives. Monitoring is viable in the long run when it gives rise to confidence, mutual trust, and information sharing between clients and patrons. These long-term and secondary outcomes of monitoring suggest that instrumentalist and normative accounts are incorporated and diffused in continuous clientelistic linkages. Clientelism can produce persuasive outcomes as mutual norms, cordiality, information exchange, and predictability develop.

3.3 Dilemma of Targeting: Core vs. Swing

Before the March 2014 Local Elections, metropolitan mayor of Ankara, who was the incumbent then for the last 20 years, said that he would prioritize the provision of local services based on the electoral support he gets: "Whoever votes for the AKP most in these districts, we will start from there."[8] According to this long time public servant, prioritizing services based on the vote share of his affiliated party, the AKP, rather than necessities and demands of residents was a fair solution to service provision. He was selected for a fifth term with a one percent margin. His decision to provide services to the AKP's flagship districts was a strategic choice, which rewards the party's supporters. He could certainly choose to promise services to those swing voters who were unsure about voting for this incumbent mayor. This could be a viable strategy since he won the elections by a very tiny margin and pundits were talking about the high level of electoral competition and uncertainty in the city before the election. He won with around thirty thousand votes in a city of more than 3.5 million eligible voters. Why did he not target undecided voters? Surely, he could do better and gain more votes. This chapter argues that in such situations, politicians have sunk costs and dependencies just like their clients, so they cannot easily change their strategies especially when they have been in office for so many years and established linkages based on discretionary provision of local services.

There is a lengthy debate in the literature about whether parties target their core supporters or swing voters to maximize returns from clientelism. Based on seminal studies by Cox and McCubbins (1986) on core targeting theory and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) on swing targeting, numerous authors suggested alternative accounts to explain party strategies. Cox (2009) and Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) provide detailed reviews of this debate. Cox argues that bringing in further configurations about coordination (number of parties) and mobilization strengthens the core-targeting model. Cayeros et al.'s theory (2016, pp. 71-5) is close to the framework suggested in this chapter as they argue for an iterative process in which core voter support depends on continuity. However, as mentioned in the first section, their study does not deal with ideological persuasion, and it is based on the presumption that party loyalty is independent of clientelistic linkages.

Previous theoretical, formal, and empirical studies suggested that parties target core voters, swing voters, or a mixture of both.[9] Rather than delving into this debate or

[8] http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/44531/Gokcek_in_hizmeti_oy_verenlere_.html

[9] There is mixed evidence from various empirical case studies. Studies supporting swing voter theories come from relatively more developed cases such as England (Ward and John, 1999), USA and Canada (McGillivray, 1997; Crampton, 2004) Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003), European countries (Idema, 2009) as well as Argentina (Stokes, 2005). On the other hand, several empirical studies supporting the core targeting are from Mexico (Costa-i Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia, and Lunapla,

providing a review of findings, this section will try to answer why parties would target their core voters in the long run and how this can be relevant for the theorized effects of long-term clientelism.

One could argue that targeting core voters makes clientelistic persuasion redundant. This section argues that this is not necessarily the case. In order to do so, it provides a brief review of alternative definitions of core vs. swing voters. What does the core voter mean? Are they voters who are already likely to support a party without receiving benefits or are they voters who have a relatively central position in the party network? Voters in the former definition are likely to include those from the latter one, whereas the opposite is not true. Not all likely voters are a part of the party network. Parties can reach out to voters through non-partisan networks or voters can obtain political information by media.[10] On the other hand, voters who have network centrality within local party organizations are also likely to vote for the party.[11] Same conceptual clarification is necessary for swing voters: are they undecided voters who are likely to vote for a clientelistic party unlike opposition loyalists or, are they prospective clients who have a potential to become a part of the party's clientelistic network? Recent research generally prefers outcome-based definitions in which core voters are those who vote for a party regardless of benefits and swing voters are "weak opposers" who can change their political support with inducements. This section shows that long-term consequences will be similar regardless of which definition we employ.

One important consequence is uncertainty in separating core and swing groups. If swing voters are targeted with diffused outcomes and normatively bounded linkages, then they may be convinced to become "core" voters over time. This persuasive effect will blur the boundaries between core and swing voters if long term swing targeting causes proselytization and swing clients continue voting for the party even after termination of clientelistic benefits.

Alternatively, clientelistic parties can target core voters despite the fact that the outcome-based definition suggests that this would be unproductive especially if parties

2003), Colombia (Crisp and Desposato, 2004), Italy (Golden and Picci, 2008), Ghana (Miguel and Zaidi, 2003), Brazil (Rodden and Arretche, 2004), and Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015). Stokes et al. (2012) provide a summary table for findings from 36 various countries for the period from 1974 to 2010 (pp. 187-9). Results show that 9 studies find support for targeting loyal supporters and 22 studies find support for swing targeting whereas one study finds support for more programmatic targeting (Bickers and Stein, 2000) and 4 studies have mixed findings.

[10]In their online appendix, Schaffer and Baker (2015) show that availability of mass media is inversely correlated with the prevalence of clientelism (p. 4).

[11]This section does not delve into the causal direction and the relationship between ideological proximity, network centrality, and vote choice. In any case, network-based definitions of core can also be a proxy for ideological proximity and likelihood to vote for the clientelistic party in a counterfactual situation in which no benefits are proffered.

are shortsighted, trying to maximize political support for a single election. However, if parties consider future elections as well, then they can target their core supporters not because of an upcoming election but for continuous political support in periods to come. A term for such prospective calculus was not included into parties' utility functions in theoretical models until recently[12] even if these models generally assume parties to be monolithic agents who try to maximize their electoral success. Continuing with this vote maximization assumption, if parties also value future electoral outcomes, then they may consider targeting core voters, albeit with a discount for future. Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2015) show that in Turkey, parties target their core voters (defined by the client's party choice). On the face of it, this finding may imply that clientelism does not cause persuasion and therefore, the theoretical argument in this chapter is redundant. However, the vital question is: do non-client core voters and long-term core clients of a given party have the same preferences and policy positions? As argued in the second section, a certain level of dissonance within a given social group is not unexpected. However, if long-term clients within the core group have systematically different preferences especially in politically salient areas, then this would substantiate the effect of long-term persuasion. Empirical tests in the following chapters will present findings by comparing different partisan sub-samples to control for the effect of core vs. swing voting, and they suggest that clients and non-clients *within the same partisan group* have different ideological preferences. This finding poses an empirical puzzle to the argument that clientelistic persuasion is redundant for core targeting.

Besides, even if the only concern for a party is to maximize its support, it can still consider their future results to be important. This consideration relates to intertemporal consistency. Laver (2005), Somer-Topçu (2009), and Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) show that credibility is an important limitation on change. Parties cannot change their policy proposals without restraint. This restriction may not simply be applied to clientelistic efforts since targeting is not a programmatic platform. However, sudden changes in targeting may also affect the patron's credibility, especially among previously targeted clients. This commitment problem is challenging if the party depends on its long-term clients. Volatility in targeting strategy can be costly and erode credibility, attenuating the persuasive mechanism through predictability and trust.

Clientelism can have some high sunk costs for parties. First of all, there are promises to be kept. Gingerich and Medina's model (2013) assumes the broker-client interaction to be an ongoing relationship in which brokers fulfill promises to overcome ballot secrecy (p. 462). This long-term process creates important sunk costs for clientelistic parties.

[12]See Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) for such a model in which clientelistic parties are not myopic.

Secondly, clientelism is very much correlated with corruption and graft as shown in the previous chapter. Favoritist procurement deals can create a vicious circle in which businesses and politicians depend on each other. Kristinsson (2001) studies an interesting example of such a relationship for the Icelandic procurement favoritism among major parties in the country and the U.S. Army base located outside Reykjavik (pp. 179-80). Similarly, Acar and Emek (2015) provide systemic evidence for favoritism in public procurement in Turkey.[13] These favoritist deals produce heavy sunk costs for the public and government officials; parties target their loyal supporters among different business circles to provide long-term sources of benefits. However, this strictly hinders market competitiveness and creates external costs on the public. Also, this can result in lax market regulations. Exit options for the patron may not always be viable, and this perpetuates targeting of a given client group.

Targeting swing voters is not a simple strategic decision for parties. It is also an outcome of previous decisions. Sunk costs of promises and dependencies can impose continuity in core targeting. Robinson and Torvik (2005) and Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco (2015) show that for both ineffective public spending and micro-level clientelistic benefits, sunk cost dependencies induce continuity in core targeting. Clientelistic parties can continue targeting their core voters not because they aim to muffle prospective exit in the future (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni, 2016) but because their reputation and mutual dependencies limit their strategy set. Relatedly, portfolio diversification (i.e. targeting both core and swing groups) may not be simply about risk hedging of a patron or an ideal type strategy to maximize support as empirically shown by Albertus (2013); Dunning and Stokes (2010); Estévez, Magaloni, and Diaz-Cayeros (2001). Parties continue providing benefits to loyal voters because they are locked up in "request fulfilling" duties (Nichter and Peress, 2013). Sunk costs and dependencies limit parties in the long run. Just as clientelism creates dependencies and limits volition among clients, especially those who are in abject poverty, it also limits the patron's options as well.

As mentioned above, definitions of core and swing voters have two alternative versions. Rather than defining groups by referring to their ideological affinity (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005), the alternative definition focuses on local party networks and nodal proximity. This definition is based on the network proximity between the patron and client. Cox and McCubbins (1986) suggest such a network-based interpretation in which core voters are in a "frequent and intensive" contact with politicians (p. 379). Referring to this definition, Dixit and Londregan (1996) also suggest that core voters

[13]Similar to Kristinsson (2001) and Acar and Emek (2015), A. Yildirim defined favoritism through public procurement as "Clientelism 2.0" in his article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/13/clientelism-2-0-vs-democracy-in-erdogans-new-turkey/

do not automatically support the party nor are they ideologically closer to the party. Rather, "it is the party's advantage over its competitors at swaying voters in a group with offers of particularistic benefits that makes the group core" (p. 1134). This alternative definition of core and swing voters suggest that core voters also require benefits to support the clientelistic party. According to this definition, core voters are not more likely to support the party without benefits compared to swing voters *ceteris paribus*. However, transaction costs are lower for gaining core support. The patron has a relative advantage to target core groups in this scenario, and it stems from network centrality. This proximity can occur only over some period unless we introduce external shocks to the relationship such as new party entry, change in the degree of clients' economic dependency or increasing local capacity of other parties. Assuming that there is no external shock and a party is clientelistically dominant in a given location, then the definition of core voters as suggested by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) imply core voters to be already well integrated into the party's local network.

In such a scenario, parties can target core voters because that would be relatively cheaper. Eventually, patrons may accumulate additional rents for themselves by this cheaper targeting. They can use such rents to their target portfolio after allocating sufficient resources to compete with other parties so as to capture swing voters. Regardless of employing network or vote choice based definitions, core targeting in both variants will have similar consequences in the long run for different reasons.

In their theoretical framework of long-term core targeting, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) infer a party strategy based on the premise that core targeting is less costly than swing targeting. They derive hypotheses about portfolio diversification by introducing a term about the patron's discount rate for future elections. However, such models do not explain how core and swing groups come about *within* the same locality. The crux of this question is about the local networks clientelistic parties establish to integrate voters into their network. For a voter to become a part of the core group, parties need to be visible and promise discretionary benefits. Over time, such efforts will crystallize in less costly clientelistic transactions as brokers can monitor preferences within the local network and target core voters according to their needs.

In both definitions, core and swing voters may be targeted for different reasons. This suggests equilibrium over time. In the long run, parties can target core voters either because of dependencies and sunk costs or because targeting core voters who are already within the party network is less costly. Additionally, parties will target swing voters either to maximize their political support or to invest in more "costly" clients with the rent extracted after provision to core clients. There may be no noticeable regulation of

discretionary clientelistic transactions, and therefore, brokers may not always target swing voters who are harder to reach with the additional rent. However, patrons can target swing voters if party resources are not depleted. In any case, this discussion suggests that parties will target different groups similarly in the long run regardless of the concept we adopt. This long-term convergence has an important implication for the theorized effect on persuasion. Even if a party initiates clientelism by distributing benefits only to its core supporters, there will be swing voters and ideologically more detached groups in the long run. Convincing these voters into the party line can reduce monitoring costs and guarantee an efficient functioning of the distribution. More importantly, this implies that there will be some level of substantive perceptional disagreement between the party and its clients, turning persuasive effects of clientelism into a valuable tool for the party.

3.4 Methodological Considerations and Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this chapter, I should highlight an important methodological caveat about testing the theory of long-term clientelistic persuasion: the direction of the causality. Theoretically, this chapter argued that core voters can also be persuaded into the party line. However, this does not solve probable methodological limitations. Thinking about causality has been a crucial part of this dissertation project. Depending on their strategy, parties carefully select their clients. Even if they can diversify their target portfolio in a given locality over time, there is still an important foil: what if social influence and persuasion theorized for long-term clientelism is just an artifact of already well-established proximity between clients and their patrons? In other words, clients can be self-selected into distributive networks because of their agreement with the party line in which case the observed effect precedes the explanation. Huckfeldt et al. (2013) allocate an important part of their review of social influence to this self-selection problem (pp. 674-8). They show that not taking causal direction can seriously overstate and inflate the effect. Its identification is "an extraordinarily challenging task" and researchers have tried to use various ways to overcome this problem.[14] These are crucial efforts to alleviate estimation bias and concerns of reverse causality, but unless there is a way to conduct randomized experiments, such problems will continue to limit causal identification. Clientelistic resources are distributed carefully after strategic planning. Parties do not run raffles among potential clients or randomly target them. Conducting natural experiments is not a viable option. Additionally, this is a long-term phenomenon and randomly assigning voters to groups and then measuring the effect of benefits will not mimic the norms, mutual trust, and confidence as well as the nuances of an affective relationship

[14]Ruth (2016) and Smith (2015) use longitudinal panel data and propensity score matching to overcome this causal problem. Larreguy, Olea, and Querubin (2014) and Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco (2015) use regression discontinuity designs and Keefer (2007) uses instrumental variables to overcome the reverse causality problem.

theorized in this chapter. A word of caution is necessary, given the limitations of observational data and the inherent challenges in experimental studies: effect of persuasion can be exaggerated, or the observed effect may be working through processes different than persuasion. Empirical chapters will present tests to assess the impact through varying levels of challenges. These chapters will show that the theorized effects hold even in the face of highly robust tests.

In this respect, the methodological design of the study is highly pragmatic, and it employs a mixed-method, benefitting from various data to suggest a causal direction from long-term clientelism to convergence of perceptions and persuasion. One of the two empirical chapters focuses on more quantitative evidence, and it presents findings on "stickiness" of long-term clientelism compared to its short-term variant, increased likelihood of clients to be canvassed by parties in the future, approval of such linkages as well as the general ideological proximity, and tests of persuasion in specific salient and non-salient policy areas. The second empirical chapter substantiates these findings by a comparative fieldwork conducted in two neighborhoods and it shows that poverty is a critical factor in the perpetuation of clientelism while external shocks such as gentrification disrupt this continuous system. Given the continuity and change, the chapter shows how long-term clients become attached to their parties, and it deals with the two counterfactual situations. First, it details how clients who lose their contact with the party machine react to the party platform. Secondly, it compares clients with other residents within the same sociopolitical context to underline the different political experiences they go through.

A theory of clientelistic persuasion depends on the tension in such linkages. On the one hand, clientelism is based on benefit provision in return for political support. On the other hand, iteration of such interactions creates an atmosphere in which trust, predictability, and reciprocal norms develop. Clients and patrons are not cordial friends, but they also start to share similar ideas and values as they continue their interaction. Compared to clients, brokers and patrons are more influential given their comparatively high level of political information, political activism, and central place in the community. Therefore, the flow of influence is expected to go from patrons to clients while at the same time, patrons gain crucial insights about their clients' needs during this interaction.

On the flip side, the question is why clients would accept the influence patrons exert upon them. Generally, theories of social influence start with the Downsian premise (1957) that information is costly and therefore, individuals (as information misers) seek to reduce costs by obtaining information from others who are perceived to be politically more informed. According to Huckfeldt et al. (2013), this demand for social influence is tailor-

made for the information seeker, and she has the choice to control the flow of information.

Clients who are depending on resources distributed by their patrons may not control the flow of persuasive information. Recipient's consent may remain secondary. This is the tension between economic dependency stimulated by clientelism and the "free environment of choice" persuasion implies. However, economic necessities reduce this tension. Party organizations use clientelistic proffering not only for gaining new support but also for propagating their positions. Therefore, clientelism is more than an electoral strategy. It is a means to monitor and change preferences through material inducements.

Straits (1990) argued that routine and continuous social contacts are particularly influential because of the spatial and temporal immediacy. This finding summarizes the main theoretical argument put forth in this chapter. Following empirical chapters will empirically test the temporal continuity and situate clientelism in local communities to show that these relationships are highly relevant to understand how party-voter linkages develop and guide the trajectory of political persuasion.

4
Turkish Context and Continuity of Clientelism

This chapter provides a historical context of the Turkish case and describes how the party-voter linkages developed in the country. It traces the development of patron-client relationships in history. It briefly touches upon the historical setting and then focuses on the multiparty elections. The chapter shows that clientelism is still a robust informal institution. Even in the face of modernization, rapid urbanization, and development, patron-client relationships continue to be a key mechanism for establishing political linkages in Turkey.

Why did the increasing levels of modernization and urbanization not change the way citizens demand specific benefits? Features of clientelistic exchange have changed over time, but there were never comprehensive programmatic reforms to eradicate clientelism for several reasons. Tracing the continuity and change in history shows that lack of public safety nets, coupled with the rise of peripheral political forces in a rapidly urbanizing setting provided the conducive environment for the robust nature of clientelism in Turkey.

However, this does not imply that linkages between politicians and voters were static. On the contrary, there were some major changes in the nature and features of clientelism parallel to modernization in the Turkish society. Emerging types of clientelisms include more steps in the process from party strategies to distribution of benefits. Local notables *(ağas)* and large landowners are mostly replaced by party activists and brokers who have alternative social assets and informational advantages over clients in an urban neighborhood setting. With the advent of modernization, agricultural safety nets lost their importance. Instead, new patrons provide alternative benefits in an urban setting on issues such as housing entitlement, employment, and access to public services. With the rise of new patrons and intermediaries, parties' clientelistic portfolios changed so as to adapt to the modern nature of electoral competition in a market-oriented environment.

Modern Turkey has a tradition of centralized state bureaucracy to enact social policies. However, the state never became a functioning welfare state even if the constitution

defines it as a "social" state, adopting the term from the German *sozialstaat*.[1] On the contrary, a recent popular motto among the opposition is that the governing AKP is creating a "culture of alms", providing benefits without any substantive change in the social and economic structure of the country. This is an over-simplified explanation, but it has a grain of truth in it: economic inequalities are not alleviated by the Turkish social welfare, and upward mobilization is extremely limited.

Recently, a conservative ideology gained prominence within this framework. Bottom-up organization of conservative parties, coupled with support for the free market economy since the 1980s, paved the way for the current clientelistic scene. These parties gained prominence first across local governments in the early 1990s and then became the predominant power in Turkish politics with the rise of the AKP. Throughout the history of the modern Turkish politics, various parties used benefits to either convince new supporters or to respond to demands of their constituents. Relative advantage conservative parties had since the 1990s is about the party organization which provided them with a valuable asset in continuation of long-term clientelistic linkages. In this respect, the AKP government continues to be the most prominent force in Turkey to uphold clientelism given its incumbency advantage, vast party organization, and its capacity to mobilize state resources.

There is an ongoing coalition between the pro-government businesses, bureaucracy responsible for social policy, and the dominant AKP's political elite. Previous research indicates that the party uses public institutions such as the Mass Housing Administration *(TOKİ)* for clientelistic purposes which was originally established to provide social housing to low and middle income citizens, (Marschall, Aydoğan, and Bulut, 2016). Also, Özcan and Gündüz (2015) show that politically connected firms who have links to the AKP have higher profit rates despite lower labor production rates and they are less likely to drop in business rankings. This creates a perpetual close-circuit scheme in which voters, businesses, and the government reinforce each other via benefits and electoral support.

However, the AKP's use of clientelistic strategies is not completely novel. Despite the changes in the trajectory of political linkages since the 1950s, the center-periphery cleavage can help us explain the development of clientelism and its place in the Turkish party politics. Revisiting the center-periphery argument put forth by (Mardin, 1973) shows

[1] According to the Constitutional Court of Turkey's decision *(E.1988/19 K.1988/33)* in 1988, 6 years after the 1982 constitution, social state is necessary to provide social justice and harmony. According to this decision, the state has to ensure the social security of its citizens in order to provide the minimum necessary amount of welfare so as to create suitable conditions for the creation of social state principles and social justice.

that the peripheral forces of Turkish politics successfully established the necessary local organizations to start and continue face-to-face clientelistic linkages with voters. We witness the rise of clientelism as a salient linkage mechanism especially in the periods when parties of the periphery dominated the Turkish politics. One can think of three specific, crystallized periods when such a party dominated the Turkish politics during the multiparty period. This chapter describes these periods and then returns to the limitations in the Turkish economic and political framework which may hinder the development of programmatic linkages. The chapter argues that given economic and political development and their limitations, clientelism remains as a robust institution. Therefore, the Turkish case provides a fertile ground to study clientelism and its temporal variants because there is both continuity and change within the case.

4.1 Local Notables, Center-Periphery Cleavage, and the Democrat Party

Our current knowledge on the extent of clientelistic linkages and its role in persuading voter groups in Turkey is relatively limited. Nevertheless, a short review of the historical literature indicates that Turkey generally had strong clientelistic linkages. According to Sunar, Turkish political system is teeming with "... parties of patronage, a patron state, and a client society dependent for its welfare on patronage parties which use the resource of the state to keep clients happy" (1990, p. 32). Heper and Keyman (1998) trace the history of clientelism in Turkey back to the Ottoman Empire and specifically to the rise of local notables. In the periphery of the Empire, as *eşraf* and *ayan* classes rose to prominence, they became patrons who were both buffers and exploiters of the peasantry.

As the authority of the Sultan was shaken due to the advancements in Europe, military defeats abroad, and revolts within the Empire, local notables known as *ayan* rose to political and economic prominence against the central authority. *Ayan* were notables with tax collection privileges, working for the central authority, but eventually, as the Empire lost clout over swathes of its land, these local notables either started to cut a high share for themselves from the collected taxes or altogether stopped sending these taxes to the Sultan. Under *ayan*, tax collection turned into an inherited privilege. Since most peasants lacked upward mobilization chances and their assets were fixed, they were left to the mercy of these notables and local dynasties. These were the early patrons in the history of Turkish society. According to İnalcık (1964), "... the ayan managed to show themselves to the people as their protectors" (p. 47). They "appeared to the passive local populations in the guise of protectors against oppressive governors and arbitrary central authority" (İnalcık, 1964, p. 54).

Kettering (1988) also traces the history of political clientelism to these local notables. Ayan and large landowners established farming estates, and sharecropping became common except the western Anatolia where peasants owned their own small plots. In summary, notables who were tax collectors to begin with, turned into political mediators and eventually owners of the local means of production from the late 15th century onwards. This economic system dominated by a class of local notables turned peasants into serfs and hindered their mobility. This continued until the dissolution of the Empire in 1923.

During the single-party regime from 1923 to 1950, secular Kemalist cadres incorporated the local notables into the newly established political institutions as an access point to rural Anatolia (Karpat, 1964).[2] During this period, economic development and growth became the main policy target of the Turkish state for the first time. One could think of one of the six Kemalist founding principles, populism, to complement this growth-oriented economy so that the state could redistribute public resources. However, Öztamur (2002) shows that during the formative years of the Republic and specifically during the Great Depression, the political elite did not think of fighting poverty as one of the newly established state's responsibilities. On the contrary, private initiatives and associations were to support impoverished urban classes. Poverty alleviation was to be based on charitable organizations. The same point is highlighted by Buğra (2007) who argues that during these formative years, the new state bureaucracy wanted to limit the state's role in poverty alleviation by "appealing to voluntary initiatives" (p. 36). After years of devastating wars, Celasun and Rodrik (1989) indicate that the political leadership's priorities were external debts and dismantling the capitulations given to the European states during the history of Ottoman Empire. Establishing necessary economic institutions and the legal framework for public redistribution and poverty alleviation were not feasible goals.

Both before and after the War of Independence and establishment of the Republic, Turkey was an agrarian economy. In fact, this continued to be so until the 1950s which coincide with the first free and fair multiparty elections. Before this period, almost three-quarters of the population continued to live in rural areas. Agricultural production and the protectionist clientelism of the local notables (under *ayan* in the Ottoman Empire and then incorporated local *ağas* in formative years of the Republic) remained intact, especially in the eastern parts of the country. The industrial production played only a subsidiary role. In fact, almost half of the employment was in agriculture well into the mid-1980s according to World Bank, and a sudden decrease in the agricultural workforce

[2]For a detailed account about the situation of the CHP's local party organizations and the role of notables in rural Anatolia during the single party rule, see Metinsoy (2010): "... informal interest groups, including influential and wealthy households and persons in localities, directed, influenced, and manipulated the party and state apparatuses." (p. 259).

occurred only in the early 2000s during the AKP government's first term. However, the first industrialization processes started in the early Republican period with its statist ethos and state intervention. This industrial opening continued in the 1950s. In the face of this changing economic structure and urbanization, clientelism also persisted with different features.

Clientelistic networks changed tremendously with the introduction of a multi-party system in 1950. In this respect, Lerner (1958) can be read as a part of the series of ethnographic studies on agricultural societies that preceded studies on clientelism. Lerner's study highlights the massive transformation of one of the new capital Ankara's suburb. Balgat suburb that benefitted from clientelism and pork-barreling tremendously. These benefits were not distributed equitably or programmatically.

The 1950s was when clientelistic networks transformed Turkey. Heper and Keyman (1998) argue that the exercise of distributing benefits in return for votes became paramount only with the coming to power of the center-right Democrat Party (DP) in 1950. Similarly, Adaman and Çarkoğlu (2000) indicate that the paternalistic mode of governance, a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, turned itself into a web of client-based party networks with the introduction of multi-party democracy in the 1950s.

A prominent account to explain this change in the Turkish society is Mardin's work (1973) on center-periphery relations. This account is based on Shils's discussion (1961) of macrosociology (Mardin, 1973, footnote 1). In his study, Shils defines the center of the society not in spatial terms but through values and beliefs that promote reverence to authority and order (p. 119). In the Shilsian account, the center is where the authority is possessed and the periphery is where it is exercised. Based on this conception, and by contrasting the trajectory of political structures in Turkey with European social cleavages Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Mardin proposes an account to understand Turkish political cleavages (Mardin, 1973, footnote 5). Here, center refers to a coherent state elite, and "pitted against it persists a culturally heterogeneous, complex, and even hostile periphery" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p. 403). Center-periphery cleavage introduces various related attitudes and values into Turkish politics. While the center holds up "laicism, unitary state, centralism, and Turkish nationalism in addition to defending a mixed economy with state regulation", the peripheral values focus on "religiosity, conservatism, decentralization, and a market economy devoid of state control" (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, pp. 407-9). Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) indicate that this historical cleavage structure remained salient to explain party competition in spatial voting models well into the 2000s. Additionally, Sayarı (2011) also refers to Mardin's work on center-periphery divisions to give a historical account on the development of clientelism in Turkey and argues that

"as a result of the center's growing penetration into the periphery, the role played by the notables as the protectors of their clients' interests and needs as well as channels of mediation between the center and the periphery increased significantly." (p. 87).

Peripheral political actors were comparatively more successful patrons throughout the history of multiparty elections. Starting with the 1950s, they promoted a conservative society with minimal state intervention in the market and these parties were also more successful in establishing clientelistic linkages (Sayarı, 1975). During this period, the DP was highly successful in establishing these clientelistic ties. The Kemalist founding cadres, now in the opposition, also tried to do the same. However they were not as successful as the DP because these discretionary benefits created a vicious circle: the CHP, spearhead party of the center, was not successful as a political machine so it could not garner votes to gain power and thus, it lacked public funds to establish clientelistic ties (Sayarı, 1975). However, the party still maintained its dominant position in the underdeveloped Southeast thanks to the integration of the hierarchical, clientelistic social structure in earlier periods (Özbudun, 1976; Tachau, 1991). The symbiotic, agricultural relationship between *ağas* and peasants became more politicized during the 1950s (Kudat, 1975). These were especially prevalent relationships in Eastern Turkey where local notables continued to own large swathes of land and tried to monopolize the sociopolitical outlook of the region. According to Kudat (1975), local notables solidified clientelism as a social relationship with peasants through *kirvelik*, a social institution of guardianship similar to godparenthood. In various parts of the country, an impoverished agricultural society remained intact within the boundaries of these institutional features in spite of Kemalist efforts of modernization.

Most political ties between party elites and voters were horizontal. Clientelism was based on several informal institutions. One of these institutions was *ağalık* where peasantry depended on large landowners and tribal chiefs. *Ağas* can be traced back to the *ayan* of the Empire under whom the peasantry suffered tremendously. Early Republican elite under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü tried to redistribute the agricultural land through two laws initiated in 1929 and 1945. The 1929 Public Law (No. 1505) authorized the government to expropriate and redistribute a considerable portion of the unused land to landless peasants and farm laborers, especially in Eastern Turkey. The 1945 bill tried the same. However, both legislative efforts failed, and the social structure of the Turkish peasantry remained unchanged. Changes in the land tenure regime did not succeed, and ağalık continued as a social institution in which majority of the peasants depended on the local ağa. According to Aktan (1966), the failure of land tenure reform also depends on "failure to publicize the law" as well as opposition to the legislation within the CHP. In fact, the law created serious rifts within the CHP, and it was a cat-

alyzer for the transition to a multiparty system in 1946 with the establishment of the DP. The DP's leader Adnan Menderes and other notable party elites, who were mostly large landowners from the CHP, opposed the 1945 law. Their opposition struck a chord among peasants who did not have a formal organization to defend their interests. In this respect, when the DP won the first competitive elections in 1950, ağalık was still continuing, and the party benefitted from establishing its political machine through recruiting ağas and local notables as brokers.

During this period, there were rampant traditional clientelistic linkages in rural areas, especially in Northeastern and Southeastern Turkey. These linkages were based on the relationship between landless farmers and their patrons. The DP successfully established local party machines not only among these rural groups but also among the newly urbanizing workers and migrants. The party was particularly successful in distributing pork across districts and localities where it won the elections with a large margin. New infrastructural projects and agricultural subsidies were rewarded to voter groups who supported the party. According to Sayarı (1975), this created a vicious cycle in which the CHP failed to establish a successful machine. Hence, it lacked public support, lost the elections, and therefore did not have enough public funds to maintain the organizational capacity for a political machine. Although this is a simplification of the reasons why the CHP could not win any of the three general elections in the 50s, personal benefits provided by its main competitor were crucial in its domination of Turkish politics during the decade.

During the 1970s, after two military interventions in 1960 and 1971, the CHP was also establishing such a clientelistic capacity in Anatolia. The party went through an ideological change after adopting social democracy under new leadership, and it moved closer to the periphery (Akarlı, 1975). According to Güneş-Ayata (1992), CHP was successful in establishing rapport with locals in various towns and cities during the 1970s. Her ethnographic study of two Anatolian towns indicates to the CHP's increasing efforts in clientelism. However, this effort abruptly came to a halt after the third coup in 1980 (Güneş-Ayata, 1992). In other words, history of the CHP's personalistic linkages is a history of discontinuities and failures. At the same period, Ergüder (1980–1981) indicates that the newly fledging Islamist coalition parties were using patronage benefits and clientelism extensively as minor coalition partners (p. 48). The rightwing parties, Islamist, and the conservative political tradition at large were able to keep its hold on clientelistic relations even if party names and elite cadres changed over decades.

4.2 The Motherland Party and Changes in Clientelism

Tuğal (2016, pp. 35-8) defines the period from the early Republican era until the 1980s as a corporatist period during which formal sectors were incorporated into the state's economic and welfare policies. Peripheral forces of Islamist conservatism, as well as the rights of informal workers, were contained. From the late 60s onwards, a lively scene of working class struggle came to being despite the corporatist reflexes of the state. Unionization and left-wing political struggle became visible political forces during the 70s, but this was short-lived. With the military coup in 1980, the leftist political movement and the ultranationalist right-wing groups were violently oppressed. Corporatist interest representation, mixed economy, as well as the import substitution industrialization policies came to an end during the 1980s after the coup. The Motherland Party *(Anavatan Partisi - ANAP)* government established after the 1980 coup in 1983, changed the course of the economic policy and opened the Turkish markets to foreign competition and for that, it employed a neoliberal policy.

Export-oriented economy rapidly replaced the previous economic policy and starting from the late 80s, the state actively supported an export-oriented economic elite. Öniş (2004) indicates that ANAP's leader Turgut Özal's political vision was akin to Latin America's populist presidents, who did not pay substantive attention to political checks and balances. Also, the legal infrastructure to buttress the envisioned free market competition was missing and the rule of law was not taken seriously. During this period, Özal established a new mentality of bureaucracy by inviting young cadres of middle-classes into the state bureaucracy. Later on, these young bureaucrats were to be called "Özal's princes." These princes' corruption and cronyism with their associated exporters would eventually become conspicuous. The political elite of the 80s defended a full-fledged, competitive economic growth program driven by market forces, but relevant private actors were dependent on the government's export subsidies. In this framework, numerous companies abused tax returns given to incentivize export growth. There was a change from the old corporatist state structure to an alternative avenue in which businesses would try to maximize profits by forecasting international demand for various manufactured goods. This change brought some opportunities with itself, especially for entrepreneurial businesses. This period was the harbinger of a new era in which the state capacity was hardly ever utilized for providing public welfare benefits to citizens. This was the beginning of a period in which "... 'desirable' citizens end up being those who have individual market capacity to thrive in contemporary capitalism and who honor market-based contractual obligations." (Altan-Olcay, 2014, p. 239). Related to this change in the understanding of citizenship, one would expect political parties to function only as tools of interest aggregation which would not distribute discretionary benefits. Although some scholars

argued that this was the case, they were not unchallenged.

There are two alternative explanations for the relationship between the ANAP and previously established clientelistic structures. The first account suggested by Heper and Keyman (1998) indicates that the neoliberalization during the ANAP period was not clientelistic at all. ANAP's choice of export-oriented investments and subsidies and its efforts in bureaucratic reorganization were novel and non-clientelistic political developments. According to this account, "economic decisions tended to be responsive to market signals, they were not dictated by clientelist demands, and, relatively speaking, they were not the products of slipshod political or bureaucratic decisions". Moreover, "the ANAP was going to 'catch all' not through patronage politics but through well-formulated and clearly explained policies" (p. 266-7).

The alternative account as defended by Kalaycıoğlu (2001) and Kurtoğlu (2012) argue that this period witnessed a boom of primordial regional solidarity groups *(hemşehrilik)* and religious brotherhoods *(tarikat)*. Additionally, Kselman (2012) indicates that there has been an uptick in clientelism with the advent of political Islam in the 1980s through party organizations' relationship with business and neighborhood networks. The ANAP did not establish a vast organizational network. However, clientelism transformed during this period and it proliferated so much so that it "has even been systematized" and became a routine part of everyday politics in the 1980s (Güneş-Ayata, 1994, pp. 57-8).

The organization of clientelistic resources and networks changed tremendously, and a surge of market forces and competitiveness may suggest that clientelism lost its place in Turkish politics, but the rise of neoliberal marketization and clientelistic distribution may not be mutually exclusive. Even if norms of market competition and attenuation of public safety nets changed the nature of state-society linkages and the political parties' role in benefit provision, this does not necessarily mean that clientelism's importance was decreasing. It is more likely that clientelistic linkages did not lose its significance during the ANAP's tenure from the mid-80s until the early 1990s, but the role of local notables and vast party machines evolved into new forms. During this period, the new center-right political elite used public procurement deals and export subsidies to create new leverage among the newly developing entrepreneurs in the private sector. In this respect, Atiyas (2013) also suggests that this was a period of transformation of clientelistic linkages: "The institutional environment of the 1980s and 1990s, then, was suitable to clientelistic dynamics: there was a lot of rent seeking, rules were shaped or attempted to be shaped in such a way so as to allow the transfer of public funds and resources to favored groups" (p. 8). Although Heper and Keyman (1998) rightly point out that there was a massive transformation of market forces and the role of public regulation

in this newly emerging neoliberal framework, this does not necessarily entail demise of clientelism. Just as clientelistic linkages evolved to involve the party machine when the patronage roles of agricultural notables were dissolving under the dominant rule of the DP, a similar transformation occurred during the ANAP's tenure from 1983 to 1991. Local and religious solidarity networks formed under the rubric of conservative parties.

This new clientelism was multi-dimensional. While parties and especially the rising Islamist political movements increased their visibility among working class communities, the political elite also started to be more interested in the inner workings of the private sector. These two dimensions summarize the transformation of clientelism in Turkey and the continuous, sticky nature of clientelism as an institution. Even after transformation of the state's economic policy and structural reforms that included privatization, economic liberalization, and a shift to an export-oriented market, clientelism was still prevalent in the late 80s and 90s. Kemahlıoğlu (2012) indicates that neoliberal reforms compelled political parties to find novel ways to proffer incentives to their supporters. Temporary public employment contracts were valuable patronage resources for political parties given budgetary and economic limitations. In fact, these resources were used not only for voters but also for party delegates during party nomination periods. Kemahlıoğlu's fieldwork (p.51, 2012) indicates that the party leadership mobilized public resources and intermediaries to influence the decision of the delegates who would choose the party's new leader when the ANAP leadership changed in the national convention of 1991, and Mesut Yılmaz won the party's leadership as a result. In that respect, discretionary benefits were being used for intraparty politics as well.

The 1990s were a period of coalitions, party system fragmentation and the rise of Islamist part parties both as local governments in central cities such as İstanbul and as coalition partners. With the three general and two local elections in the period, the Islamist political movement consolidated its place in the Turkish party politics. After the domestic economic crisis in 2001 and demise of the center-right parties, the newly established AKP filled in the gap and the party dominated the Turkish political life since then. Therefore, it is crucial to focus on the party's local roots, its ideological stance which is an unusual combination of neoliberalism and Islamic communitarianism, and the party organization to understand the AKP's electoral success and its clientelistic underpinning.

4.3 Conservative Party Organizations since the 1990s and the AKP as a Dominant Clientelistic Party

Clientelistic networks surround Turkish political life, and their features have been transforming. Despite the fact that such linkages are common in Turkish politics, scholarly attention has been diverted to other topics in recent years. Few case studies are focusing on Turkish clientelism and those that do usually concentrate on rural Anatolian towns. Several authors selected small towns from Anatolia to study patronage and clientelism.[3] However, around 17 percent of eligible voters are registered to vote in İstanbul, the largest city in the country. İstanbul's voters constitute a great pool for possible clientelistic networks. Sayarı (2011) also indicates that there is an urgent need for studies on how clientelistic relationships and networks function in urban environment. Therefore, recent research is focusing on urban, metropolitan municipalities in a comparative perspective.[4]

In 1981, Özbudun argued that the patron-client relations did not continue for very long in the urban context because of the social and political volatility especially in urban squatter neighborhoods (Özbudun, 1981, p. 261). However, this changed radically during the 1990s with the consolidation of peripheral parties as dominant patrons in squatter neighborhoods. In this urban setting, the ruling AKP developed interactions that are more horizontal and efficient ways of brokerage (White, 2012). This new urban relationship is based on mutual help, and earlier Islamist parties, specifically the Felicity Party *(Saadet Partisi - SP)* and the Welfare Party *(Refah Partisi - RP)* influenced the AKP. In these informal networks, brokers are a part of the locality. Subcontracted goods and services are distributed within these networks. This type of clientelism requires immense organizational strength and social capital. If there is a voter whose child is sick, providing a washing machine may not be as relevant as providing health services. The AKP's organization is able to monitor and redistribute incentives in a relatively advantageous way thanks to its organizational capacity.

Based on the results of a cross-country expert survey, Kitschelt (2011) argues that the AKP is a dominant clientelist party in Turkey. It is making a greater effort, and it is also much more efficient in producing votes with clientelistic techniques. The democratic accountability and linkages project (DALP) measures clientelistic linkages among politically relevant parties across 88 countries. This project devised an index of clientelism. This index measures components about the provision of consumer goods, preferential public benefits, employment opportunities, government contracts, and regulatory proceedings. It ranges from 1 to the highest value of 4. Findings from this 2008-2009 survey indicate

[3]For examples see, Alexander (2002), Unbehaun (2005) and also Özbudun (2005).

[4]For recent scholarly work on clientelism in Turkish urban settings see, Özler (2000), Kemahlıoğlu (2012) and Akdağ (2014).

that the AKP is dominating the clientelistic scene in Turkey with an index score of 3.93. The next highest score for a politically relevant party is from Democratic Society Party *(Demokratik Toplum Partisi - DTP)* with a score of 3.14. The average for seven most politically relevant parties is 2.91. The CHP, which has been the main opposition party since 2002, had a score of 2.93. Islamist SP, the AKP's predecessor, also had a score of 2.91. This is not surprising given that the SP is marginalized over time, gaining around 2% of the total votes on average in the last three general elections.

In 2001, the constitutional court banned the Virtue Party *(Fazilet Partisi - FP)* after it violated several secularist articles of the constitution.[5] Following its closure, the party was fragmented into two, the AKP and the SP. In 2002 general elections, the AKP was able to gain 34% of the votes while the SP was able to get only 2.5%. The AKP formed a single party government with a moderate Islamist platform, while the SP clung to its traditional Islamist ideology. Over the last fourteen years, the governing party was able to consolidate its place and remain in power while the SP could not compete with the AKP's organizational capacity. In fact, as of 10 April 2014, the AKP has the highest number of party members with a stunning figure of 8.698.551 (16% of the total eligible voters) while the SP only has 210.521 members (%0.4). 16% is an extremely high figure, especially when it is compared to the declining level of party membership in consolidated democracies. According to Poguntke et al. (2016), only 3.13% of the national electorate is party members in 19 advanced democracies.[6] The organizational capacity of the AKP, as well as its incumbency advantage, is the reason why the AKP can dominate the scene of establishing clientelistic linkages. However, explaining clientelistic success only with the incumbency advantage is not sufficient in this case. Tracing the history of clientelism reveals that peripheral conservative parties had a comparative advantage over other parties in establishing rapport and providing benefits to the voters. Following the neoliberal reforms of the ANAP government and demise of the working class political movement after the military coup of 1980, the Islamist parties became dominant political actors in establishing local organizations and providing discretionary safety nets for local communities. The AKP's success lies in the invaluable social capital and the experience party activists and elites gained during the 1990s as local politicians and low to middle-level party workers within the conservative, Islamist political movement.

[5]In fact, the history of Islamist parties in Turkey is highly complex with 5 clear-cut Islamist parties being banned between 1971 and 2001. Before the AKP, three parties, namely the SP, the FP, and the RP were closed by the constitutional court. Their predecessor National Salvation Party *(Milli Selamet Partisi - MSP)*, established in 1972, was closed down by the army after the 1980 coup. The RP was one of the biggest parties during the 1990s. It had the highest vote share in 1995 general elections. For an account on continuity and change in Islamist parties and the AKP's shift in its policy positions from previous conservative parties, see Gümüşçü and Sert (2009).

[6]Party with the second highest membership in Turkey is the main opposition CHP, with 1.012.412 members, (1.2% of total voters). Figures are taken from the Court of Cassation's web page on political party membership: http://www.yargitaycb.gov.tr/Partiler/index.html

When the AKP succeeded the FP, it also took over a large organizational capacity. During the FP's rise to power in the 1990s, it was able to establish a large structure of interconnected informal networks. Through these networks, the party was able to link political elites with the masses. In fact, Toprak (2005) explains the rise of the FP in relation to the socioeconomic conditions and the 1980 coup. She states that "... whereas the vote of the urban poor largely went to the CHP in the 1970s, it was transferred to the FP in the 1980s and the 1990s" (p. 181). Similarly, Arat (2005) indicates that the Welfare Party (RP) dominated the personalistic and clientelistic linkages before its closure for violating secularism in 1998. The party had a vast women's organization which conveyed local meetings, organized house visits, and specifically targeted undecided swing voters (pp. 79-89). The RP's women's branch was highly active especially in the informal squatters of large metropolitan areas. Party activists in the women's branch were especially keen on convincing politically disinterested women and "migrant housewives from rural backgrounds" (Arat, 2005, p. 112).

This situation summarizes the shift in the post-1980 Turkish political life. Islamist political movement gained momentum in this period, and during the 1990s, the RP and its successors were able to mobilize voters through a vast network of activists in urban areas. There were party activists and professional party workers who managed a database of voters at the neighborhood level (Yeşilada, 2002, p. 70). They collected information regarding the demands and needs of the locality.

Additionally, there was "a network of headmasters and teachers *(hatipler ve öğretmenler)*, who were engaged with people in discussions at the local coffee-houses and other gathering places" (Yeşilada, 2002, p. 70). A crucial source for this network was the religious high schools for chaplains and preachers *(İmam Hatip Liseleri - İHL)*. In 1990-91, approximately 119,086 students were studying in these religious vocational schools. This figure increased to 192,737 in 1996-97. Figure 4.1 plots the percentage of high school students enrolled in İHLs over school years.[7] The sudden drop in the enrollment figures during the late 90s is because of a law legislated in 1997 following the military's last successful intervention in the Turkish politics on February 28, 1997. However, this policy was rescinded during the AKP's tenure in 2011 and currently, the religious education is back to pre-1997 levels, and the AKP's political elite is keen on increasing its organizational capacity through education in these schools.[8]

[7]Enrollment figures are taken from the Office of Religious Teaching, a public agency attached to the Ministry of National Education, http://dogm.meb.gov.tr/.

[8]For a detailed account of the 1997 military intervention's effect on religious education in Turkey, see Bozan (2007). For details of the AKP's education policy and the rise of religious, conservative education during the party's tenure, see the edited volume by İnal and Akkaymak (2012), especially the chapter by Coşkun and Şentürk (2012, pp. 165-177).

Islamist parties are especially successful in establishing a foothold in these schools and attracting new activists and sympathizers. In fact, several interviews that I have conducted with the AKP officials in İstanbul underline this point. Most of the local party activists that went door to door to canvass votes and to fulfill the needs and demands of their supporters were graduates of the İHLs. Several other AKP activists indicated that their educational background, i.e. graduating from secular schools, limited their upward mobility within the party organization.

Figure 4.1: % Enrolled in İHLs among 15-19 Age Group



Associations established for graduates from these schools, as well as other religious charities and associations, can be defined as a part of the civil society that can represent interests of the religiously motivated, conservative voters in Turkey. "Participation in the activities of religious communities, theological seminaries, lectures, debates and the like would increase with higher levels of religiosity. However, such participation in religious associations and their activities may not automatically constitute a civic and individual voluntary act, per se" (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 5). Also, socialized religious identity, and not religious beliefs per se, increase exclusionary attitudes towards out-group individuals (Bloom, Arıkan, and Courtemanche, 2015). In other words, these networks facilitate in-group solidarity and denser interaction with peers over time. Although other parties also have informal networks and neighborhood organizations, they are not as efficient or widespread as those established by the AKP and its predecessors.

After its establishment, the AKP was able to use these networks to reach out to various voter groups and communities. In fact, findings from my fieldwork indicate that not only the swing voters but also core constituents still benefit from goods and services distributed by the party. As the historical context also underlines, the AKP has a relative advantage

in using these strategies. Also, Kitschelt and Kselman (2011*b*) argue that locally situated civil associations and notables rather than a rigid, hierarchical party machine can be more efficient in distributing clientelistic benefits. The AKP benefits from these connections, and the party is using its high local capacity in a way that also has some normative and ideological underpinnings. Kochuyt (2009) explains the notion of charity in Islam, which can perpetuate relationships of gift giving:

> *"Once giving, accepting and returning link up, we get a chain reaction that binds together all the protagonists involved. Stable relationships develop, because the sequence of actions can be repeated over and over again. ...If the counter-gift is accepted, the return must then be returned, and that gift will- once accepted-ask once more for a response: so we get an endless back and forth that can reproduce itself and the ongoing relationship." (p. 101).*

One can cherry pick specific norms and suggest a cultural interpretation from the vast Islamic corpus on rituals and practices to make a point about gift giving. However, this would overstretch the importance of values for political behavior.[9] Still, the AKP adopted both an Islamist and a neoliberal approach into its poverty governance regime since 2002. In this respect, the AKP adjusted its social service provision strategies within a "market-oriented conjuncture by bringing Islamic values and neoliberal ethics in alignment" (Zencirci, 2014). This ideational stance on reciprocity and flexibility in the market-oriented service provision structure, coupled with the vast party organization of the AKP and its dominant position in party politics after the 2002 watershed elections gave the party an essential advantage in establishing and sustaining clientelistic linkages with different voter groups.

Today the AKP benefits from this vast organization. Provincial party organizations print extensive manuals for house visits. Through these manuals, activists are trained not only in the party's specific policy positions in areas such as foreign policy and economy, but there are bits and pieces of advice about their attire and etiquette. The party also keeps an extensive record of local communities and is able to help residents with personal problems thanks to its local outreach programs. Through both voluntary and professional party activists, it can keep in touch with its vast numbers of clients. There is a mutually beneficial relationship between the AKP's clients and the party. Even if the party continues the ANAP's pro-market policies such as liberalization and minimal state intervention in the market, it still provides discretionary safety nets to its clients and is able to keep voters in line with its policies thanks to continuous contact.

[9]Mattina (2007) suggests a similar point in a socio-historical comparison of Naples and Marseilles. According to this account, continuity and change in welfare politics rather than cultural factors explain the prevalence of clientelism in these two cities.

In its 2015 November general elections manifesto, the AKP pledged to enact a law about social welfare so as to increase a right-based, fair distribution of welfare benefits.[10] Although the party was elected by a large margin and established a single-party government for the fourth term, these steps were not taken as of the writing of this chapter. This promise also implies that for the last fourteen years during which the party had a stable single-party government, it had difficulties distributing public goods in an equitable manner based on legally established criteria. This is not surprising as clientelism may be incompatible with universalistic linkages. At least in a minimal sense, redistribution throughout the modern Turkish history has been attached to a partisan support rather than entitlement based on criteria of equity and social justice. In this respect, the AKP took over a legacy from preceding peripheral parties. As the dominant party in the country for more than a decade, its extensive organizational capacity, incumbency advantage, control of public resources, and the party's ideational background have contributed to the consolidation of an institutional environment in which clientelism thrives.

4.4 Lack of Programmatic Linkages

Weingrod indicates that the passage from traditional agricultural to modern societies entailed a "stage where party patronage develops" (1968, p.383). This is a process in which provision by agricultural notables shifts to political parties who mediate the distribution of goods and services from the state to supporters as the modern state becomes an important tool for the well-being of its citizens. I argued that the same process occurred in Turkey in the early part of the 20th century after the modern Turkish Republic was established. Political parties replaced feudal landlords, and up until today, they continue providing benefits from the public coffers to their potential clients. This necessitates a functioning state that extracts resources from its citizens. The Turkish state is relatively well functioning in this respect. Compared to other countries in the region, the state consolidated early and successfully (Bromley, 1994). In fact, state capacity is such an important factor for the Turkish case that some studies such as Heper (1985) explain the trajectory of Turkish political development by referring to the colossal capacity of the state. However, the "larger but sluggish" state bureaucracy became subservient to their "peripheral patrons" and caused a "taming of the center" by peripheral parties who have dominated the Turkish party politics since the 1950s according to Kalaycıoğlu (2002, pp. 248-9). States may turn to programmatic policies when bureaucracy is independent and has the necessary organizational capacity (Shefter, 1994). However, this independent capacity to regulate programmatic policies and to extract and redistribute resources efficiently is not visible in the Turkish case (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 251). In other words,

[10]For details of the AKP's manifesto and its positions on various social policies, see http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/1-kasim-secim-beyannamesi-rgb-rev-06-10-15.pdf

implications of an argument based on the capacity of the Turkish state are not visible in the bureaucracy's provision of policy benefits to Turkish citizens.

This assumed state capacity is not mobilized for programmatic redistribution and social protection. Turkey ranks 104 among 174 countries in the average difference between pre and post tax and social spending income inequality between 1960 and 2013. Turkish state's initiative to reduce income inequality is a little lower than Bangladesh and a little higher than Liberia.[11] The so-called state capacity that Heper (1985) highlights is not visible at all for the well-being of the country's poor citizens. However, Heper and Keyman (1998) revise this state-capacity argument to indicate that strong state refers only to the role of the elite which dominates the politics and not to the distributive capacity of the state. They underline that in addition to a communitarian, paternal protectionism by peripheral parties which are also vanguards of "the will of the people" against a central state elite, the high level of income gap "placed many in need of special favors" (pp. 261-2). This income gap with the rest of the world seems to be widening.

Figure 4.2 plots the difference of the market Gini coefficient (pre-tax) and net Gini coefficient (post-tax and post-transfer). Higher levels indicate that the state officially intervenes to reduce income inequality through its redistributive policies.[12] While the effort to reduce inequality since the mid-2000s across the world is gaining ground, this has not been the case in Turkey. In fact, redistributive efforts almost came to a halt in the mid-1990s when net and market Gini coefficients were the same for several years (indicating that taxation and social spending did not decrease inequality at all).

Although the income inequality slowly reduced in the country from the 1960s to 2000s, it is still relatively high, currently ranking fourth highest among OECD countries after Russia, America, and the UK. From the early Republican period during which poverty was seen as a nuisance that charities and private initiatives should deal with until the 1980s, the state employed a corporatist economic policy, integrating formal public and private employees into the social security system. However, informal and unregistered labor was, and continues to be, a considerable portion of the workforce in Turkey. According to recent estimates, informal employment outside agriculture was around 25% during the 90s, but it increased to almost 35% in 2006. In other words, 35% of the workforce does not have legal rights to social security. This figure is comparatively better than countries such as India and African countries where informal employment outside agriculture reaches up

[11]The data for Gini coefficients is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) version 5 (Solt, 2016). This data set is a multiple imputation with 100 imputations to calculate market and net Gini coefficients per country-year observation. Averages of these 100 imputations are used to assign each country-year respective values.

[12]OECD figures also support this larger, yet less precise plot. In 2011, Turkey ranked third last, after Korea and Chile in the difference between market and net GINI coefficients.

Figure 4.2: Programmatic Redistribution 1960-2013

to 80% or Latin America where the same figure is around 50 to 60% (Salem, Bensidoun, and Pelek, 2011). Informal economy can be a crucial risk-hedging strategy, especially when business owners deal with predatory bureaucrats. However, informality deprives the state of tax resources and produces precariousness for workers.

In 2013, Turkey was the second least unionized country after Estonia among the OECD countries. The zenith of unionization in Turkey was 1975 when 42.3% of salary and wage earners were union members. The most recent figure from 2013 is a mere 6.3%, and the unionization gap between Turkey and the rest of the OECD countries has been widening since the early 2000s. While Turkey was never unionized more than the OECD average since 1970, today the difference is striking. On top of that, more than 97% of enterprises in industry and services are small-scale, employing less than 20 individuals. In 2013, 43% of registered, formal employees were working in such small-scale enterprises and an additional 12% were working in enterprises with 20 to 49 employees.[13] Labor costs may be lower in such small-scale enterprises but also, job security, social safety, and collective wage bargaining can be uncommon. In other words, up to 50% of the Turkish labor market lacks advantages of working in an environment in which prospective risk hedging and collective bargaining are relatively easier. Instead of unions or any other formal institution for advocating its rights and representing its interests, the working class has been incorporated into various state and party organizations throughout the history of the modern Turkey. Additionally, Turkey continues to have an "indirect and minimalist welfare regime" (Arın, 2002).

[13]Figures are taken from http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1035.

Recently, as the salience of identity politics and political polarization increased since the 1990s, class-based interest representation, social justice, and redistributive policies are perceived to be "passé trends" and parties generally do not provide salient policy positions on economic issues. In electoral campaigns, large infrastructural projects, urban renewal, and identity politics seem to attract the most attention.[14] Given the historical deficits in social security and high level of economic vulnerability, economic crises in 1994 and 2001 only made things worse. Toros (2015) shows that political parties were able to fulfill approximately half of their programmatic electoral pledges from 1983 until 2011. Stable economic growth increases the likelihood to fulfill these pledges. However, clientelistic linkages continue given the long-term structural deficits in social security, and a recent reversal in the broadening of effective political participation and institutional deterioration (Acemoğlu and Üçer, 2015).

4.5 Concluding Remarks

Given the precarious situation of workers and deficit in programmatic redistribution and lack of efficient state bureaucracy in welfare, the Turkish case represents an important case to observe the prevalence of clientelistic linkages. This chapter provided the case-specific context to understand change and continuity in clientelistic linkages. This historical discussion suggests that while peripheral parties are more successful in establishing and continuing clientelistic linkages, center parties who have not dominated the electoral competition for a long time were relatively less successful. Especially the three periods of predominant parties demonstrate that clientelism remains a crucial strategy in the parties' toolbox. Coupled with the limitations in economic inclusiveness, low-quality economic growth, and recurring coups and coup attempts, economic and political vulnerabilities hinder the development of a programmatic alternative.

The three parties and periods that this chapter focused on traced the change and continuities in clientelistic linkages. This discussion shows that since the first multiparty elections in 1950, peripheral parties have dominated the clientelistic scene in Turkey. The three parties, namely DP, ANAP, and AKP, have provided these linkages during periods when they dominated the Turkish party politics. These parties were more successful in establishing such personalistic linkages with voters. While parties of the center, mainly the CHP, tried to do so in the 70s, the party did not succeed, and its efforts came to a complete halt with the coup in 1980.

[14]There are some exceptions to this. For instance, before June 2015 general elections, the CHP campaigned for a %50 increase in the minimum wage, and this attracted considerable attention. Later on, before the repeat elections in November 2015, other parties also adopted the CHP's proposal and eventually, the AKP was able to form a single-party government and increased the minimum wage by 30% in early 2016. See Kemahlıoğlu (2015) for an account on the place of infrastructural projects and minimum wage pledges during the June 2015 election campaign.

The brief historical description shows that with the increasing role of local notables in the economic structure, peasantry and later urban working classes were either incorporated into local political machines or they were part of the larger patrimonial state structure. Even when the state capacity changed and the public intervention into the market relations attenuated starting in the 1980s during ANAP's tenure, clientelism continued to be the most important linkage mechanism. Poverty alleviation and redistributive capacity of the state were never extensive in Turkey even if the legal framework proposed a social welfare state. Starting in the 1950s, the DP established early organizations of an agricultural, political machine and since then, the right wing parties had an advantage in reaching out to new client groups and establishing long-term clientelistic linkages with various voters situated in diverse rural and urban communities.

The current structure of party-voter linkages and the AKP's extensive organization in neighborhoods is not a new phenomenon. Even if the nuances and details of clientelistic linkages changed over time, peripheral parties dominated the elections in Turkey by providing benefits to voters, especially those that are economically vulnerable. Even if the dominant party of the political system, the AKP, is a relatively new one, established only in 2001, it still succeeded a considerable organizational capacity and political experience from preceding conservative political parties of the 1990s. During periods of political and economic development, clientelistic linkages remained pervasive in the face of economic change, modernization, and even serious shocks to the party system such as military interventions and economic crises. In this respect, the Turkish social and political system provides a fertile ground for the establishment and continuity of long-term clientelism.

5

Clientelistic Temporality and Attitudes: Initial Empirical Tests

This chapter presents empirical findings from contemporary Turkish clientelism to make a case for the impact of long-term linkages. What are the implications of such linkages and does the theorized effects occur as a result? This chapter presents findings to answer these questions. It deals with the outcome of these linkages at voter and country levels while the next chapter situates voters within a larger, local community. As previously mentioned, numerous studies discuss social influence in politics and the effect of personal canvassing efforts. I will argue that the clientelistic linkages are effective in persuading recipients, and keeping them close to the party line. This chapter will describe peculiarities of long-term clientelism by referring to attitudes and policy preferences of the voters as well as the convergence of perceptions between patrons and clients. Results show that persuasion and preference change are more likely under conditions of long-term interactions

An important empirical limitation for studying clientelism is the social desirability bias. Clients are likely to underreport recipiency (Corstange, 2009; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). On macro level studies, dealing with cross-country analysis of political economy and institutional determinants, this may not be a crucial problem. However, social desirability bias can be an obstacle to deriving generalizable conclusions for studies dealing with individual clients, party brokers, patrons, or aggregates of such individuals. Several studies compare the prevalence of clientelism across countries by survey studies.[1] There is no way to ascertain whether aggregate differences indicate to clientelism without controlling for the effects of this desirability bias. If different social norms across countries cause variation in social desirability, these empirical findings may lack internal validity. In other words, clientelism cannot be measured perfectly with basic survey questions.

A recent methodological development to overcome this problem is to use item-count experiments in surveys. On their own, these experiments can only help us in deriving statistics from a representative sample. In other words, we still cannot observe the individual behavior by such experiments. However, recent advancements help us derive individual

[1] For some examples, see Keefer (2007); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007); Kopeckỳ, Mair, and Spirova (2012); Stokes et al. (2013).

likelihoods of observing the sensitive behavior (Blair and Imai, 2012; Corstange, 2009). Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2015) applied this to Turkey, and they show that the prevalence of clientelistic linkages is much higher than reported by survey respondents. Therefore, I will present results from two different list-experiments to overcome the problem of internal validity. Also, a comparison of these two experiments, one conducted face to face, and the other one conducted online suggest that face to face interactions about sensitive political issues are more prone to desirability bias. This chapter does not delve into details of such methodological issues, but this comparison also supports the argument that personalistic linkage mechanisms are different from detached interactions where individuals report their politically loaded behaviors and attitudes. This chapter tries to overcome such methodological and practical limitations in several different ways and details such as summary statistics, experimental balance tests, and alternative robustness checks are mostly given in **Appendix A**.

The chapter starts with simple descriptions of linkages and suggest a causal effect as it progresses in order to present empirical findings in a systemic fashion. The next section differentiates linkages based on their temporal dimension. Results indicate that different segments of voter groups are targeted by long and short term linkage strategies. Clients respond differently to alternative strategies. The section will also empirically show important factors that differentiate long and short term clients. The second section presents an analysis for matching clientelistic recipiency, a behavioral choice, with accompanying attitudes. This section delves into the ethics and approval of the behavior itself. It presents an important test for the theoretical framework. If clients are not supportive of clientelism compared to the rest of the voters, then a theory of persuasion may be redundant. Therefore, this section presents an initial empirical test and shows that when long and short term clients are differentiated, there are significant ethical and behavioral divergences among clients. While doing so, it presents an original battery of questions devised to tap into the ethical conflicts among long and short term clients as well as non-client voters. This suggests that being a client per se is a weak explanatory variable, which can only partially account for evaluations about clientelism itself. A more nuanced operationalization in which clients are differentiated according to the status of their relationships with the party organization yields more robust and theoretically relevant empirical results. Actually, the causal direction may run from approval of clientelism to the behavior itself. However, since persuasion is theorized to spill over to policy areas, this does not challenge the main argument, and the section serves as an initial empirical test. If we cannot observe such approval by clients, then it would be far-fetched to argue for the persuasive effects of long-term clientelism.

Following this analysis, the third section delves into more robust and theoretically relevant empirical analyses. While doing so, it also presents controls for social desirability bias. Results corroborate the theory of clientelistic persuasion: experimental survey questions and observational analyses suggest that long-term linkages influence the policy evaluations as well as other more general attitudes. The chapter concludes with several remarks about the process of clientelistic persuasion.

5.1 Differentiating Temporality

Clientelistic linkages can differ in several aspects. First, they can be differentiated based on the amount of benefit provided to clients. From small gifts to public jobs, a wide range of assistance is possible. Another aspect is the structure of hierarchy in the relationship. Traditional patron-client relationships are based on personal, lifetime relationships between landowners and peasants in rural settings. An alternative situation is one in which parties recruit intermediaries, i.e. political brokers, to provide goods and services, which is more prevalent in urban environments. In both types, there is an implied temporal dimension. In linkages that offer highly valued benefits such as public jobs, clientelism is more likely to be long-term, with continuing dependencies and long-term contingency of the expected political support. Similarly, traditional relationships are more susceptible to long-term linkages especially if upward mobilization or migration is not viable. This section will provide further evidence for the relevance of differentiating long and short-term clientelisms.

5.1.1 Macro-Level Dimension

This section provides empirical evidence for the relevance of differentiating long and short-term clientelisms. To do so, it starts with looking at the variation in the temporal dimension across countries first and then moves into the "stickiness" of clientelism among voters. Findings indicate that temporal horizon can extend based on party and country level variables. Additionally, micro-level analyses argue that when rapport is established with a voter through clientelistic linkages, parties are more likely to recontact with the voter in future periods.

Different temporal extensions of clientelism are not mutually exclusive, and in fact, short and long term linkages may correlate with each other. However, this does not mean that they yield similar consequences. There are alternative typologies for differentiating types of clientelism. There are alternative typologies for differentiating types of clientelism. Kitschelt also argues that clientelistic activities are multidimensional. He differentiates temporal and social dimensions of these linkages in which the social aspect refers to the aggregation of clientelistic benefits (individual vs. wholesale clientelism)

(Kitschelt, 2011). The temporal dimension refers to one-time vs. relational, repetitive linkages as argued above. A scatterplot from 88 countries in the Democratic Accountability and Linkages (DALP) expert survey data set shows the relationship between short and long term clientelism in countries. Figure 5.1 shows that some countries have comparatively more relational linkages whereas others have more outright vote-buying.

Figure 5.1: Short and Long Term Clientelism across Countries



Turkey is one of the countries with highest levels of both short and long term clientelisms, sharing similar values in both axes with two other cases. One country that resembles Turkey in its levels of short and long term clientelisms is Argentina, one of the most well-studied cases where the populist parties brought about excessive levels of clientelism (Auyero, 2001). The second similar country is Mauritius, a stable African democracy. Here too, patronage is an important aspect of electoral politics, and it is a valuable tool for parties to mobilize voters (Van de Walle, 2007).

What party and country level variables explain whether parties in a given country have more long-term or short-term linkages? As it is clear in Figure 5.1, these two issues are positively correlated. Although they are different facets of clientelism, this correlation suggests that there may be common macro-level political and economic determinants that drive both types of clientelism. In the DALP data set, there are 29 countries (33%) which have relatively more short-term clientelism while 59 countries have more long-term linkages. In order to further analyze this relationship, a mixed-effects, multilevel model is constructed. In this model, parties are situated within the relevant country context. This exercise lets us conduct tests to see whether long-term clientelism is more "sticky",

i.e. they are harder to eradicate over increasing levels of democratization and economic development.[2] The party-level model is:

$$Y_{pc} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1c} Party\ Size_{pc} + \beta_{2c} Effectiveness_{pc} + \beta_{3c} Organization_{pc} + \beta_{4c} Enforcement_{pc} + \beta_{5c} Party\ Size_{pc} \times Organization_{pc} + r_{pc}$$

Where Y_{pc} is the ratio of long to short-term clientelism level for party p in country c, and β_0 is the party-level intercept. DALP expert survey has relevant questions for each of the political parties (506 in total) from 88 countries.[3] $PartySize$ is the party's average success in the two previous national elections. $Organization$ is the party's organizational capacity, an index of three relevant variables from the DALP (a1, a2, and a3 in the data set - recoded to range from the lowest organizational capacity to highest): local party office maintenance, permanent social and community presence, and the existence of local party intermediaries. Inter-item correlation between these three variables is high (Cronbach's α is 0.83). $Enforcement$ and $Effectiveness$ variables are also taken directly from the expert evaluations of political parties. $Enforcement$ is the mean of experts' evaluation on whether the party can assess consequences to individuals or small groups who promise support but do not deliver. $Effectiveness$ is similarly, expert evaluation of whether the party is effective in mobilizing voters by targeted benefits. Not surprisingly, there is a high level of correlation between party success and organizational capacity (ρ=0.56). Therefore, an interaction between the two variables is included in the analysis ($PartySize \times Organization$) to account for this correlation and to present unbiased estimates. Lastly, r_{pc} is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed. The next step is to introduce country-level effects on Y_{pc} as intercept β_0. The country-level equation is:

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Democracy_c + \gamma_2 GDP_c + \gamma_3 Democracy_c \times GDP_c + \upsilon_{0c}$$

Where γ_0 is the country-level intercept and $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3$, are country-level effects of independent variables. On this level, three variables are included to capture development. The first one is the stock of democracy ($Democracy$) captured through the Polity 4 variable, which measures executive and legislative competitiveness as well as other relevant components of a democratic regime. The stock of democracy captures the democratic or autocratic experience of these 88 countries since the beginning of the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century.

[2] For a more substantive argument which theorizes an inverse u-curve relationship between development and clientelism, see (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011*a*)

[3] There are 505 parties in the analysis because VMRO-DPMNE, one of the two major parties in Macedonia, has a missing variable for local community presence (a2 in the DALP data set). Imputing this variable from other relevant variables about local office maintenance and local party intermediaries does not change the results presented in this analysis.

Each previous year is discounted 1%, and an aggregate score of democracy is given to every country. For easier interpretation, this variable is recoded so that it ranges from 0 to 1. This measurement is based on Gerring et al. (2005). This stock captures the historical experience with democracy. This is a better measurement for explaining the ratio of long to short term clientelism because previous democratic experience can hinder on the spot vote-buying while long-term clientelism can be a part of this "democratic" experience. The second country-level variable is the logged GDP per capita from 2008 as published by the World Bank (GDP). An interaction variable is included in the model to account for the high level of correlation ($\rho = 0.68$) between the stock of democracy and economic development ($Democracy \times GDP$). Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the model:

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for the Multilevel Model

	N	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Long/Short Clientelism	505	1.16	0.29	0.66	2.86
Party Size	505	14.87	14.66	0.00	78.73
Effectiveness	505	2.62	0.62	1.00	4.00
Party Organization	505	0.00	0.91	-2.75	1.46
Enforcement	505	1.72	0.28	1.00	2.00
Stock of Democracy	88	0.52	0.26	0.00	1.00
GDP	88	2.08	1.35	-1.04	4.36

Table 5.2 below presents findings for several models based on the two equations given above.

Results from the first model show that when parties have extensive local organizations, they have relatively more long-term linkages. This is not surprising. While handing out gifts or petty cash before the elections do not require local monitoring to determine needs of the community, long period benefits such as patronage jobs require more elaborate interaction between party brokers and potential clients. Similarly, higher enforcement capability increases relative long-term linkages. This is also not unexpected. It is easier to cast a wide net with small benefits and have a leaky bucket. However, when benefits are costlier for the party, such as long-term patronage jobs, then contingent return from this support becomes more crucial for the party organization. Therefore, parties need high capacity organizations and ways to enforce contracts if they are to distribute long-term benefits.

The second model situates all of these 505 political parties in the country context. The number of political parties per country ranges from 2 to 17 with an average of 5.7. This model controls for the country-level. Results show that even after including

Table 5.2: Multilevel Regression Results for the Ratio of Long to Short Term Clientelism

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Party-Level			
Party Size	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Effectiveness	-0.043	0.027	0.027
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Organization	0.107***	0.056***	0.055***
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Enforcement	0.169***	0.142**	0.146**
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Size*Organization	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	1.008***	0.729***	0.579***
	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.149)
Country-Level	X	✓	✓
Stock of democracy			0.271
			(0.217)
GDP			0.088*
			(0.038)
Intercept		0.190***	0.183***
		(0.016)	(0.016)
Political Parties	505	505	505
Countries		88	88
Log likelihood	-57.84	106.03	108.67

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

this country-level controls, enforcement and organizational capacity are still important determinants of relative long-term clientelistic targeting strategy. The effects of the two variables decrease, implying that we capture some country-level variation in the first model. However, party organization and enforcement capacity still increase the prevalence of long-term clientelism compared to its short-term alternatives.

The third model includes country-level explanatory variables into this multi-level analysis. By doing so, it tries to account for the variation at the country-level. The two variables included at this level (equation to account for β_0) capture the effect of development. A modernist explanation may discourage alternative trajectories for developing countries. However, it is not far-fetched to expect clientelism to evolve into other types of linkage mechanisms over different levels of development. The third model questions whether different temporal variations of clientelism change in tandem over varying levels of political and economic development. Results are mixed and do not completely support a modernist explanation. Historic democratic experience is not associated with the temporality of clientelism. However, economic development decreases the importance of short-term clientelism in comparison to the long-term variant. As countries develop economically, clientelism can also decrease, but long-term linkages tend to linger. With each additional standard deviation increase in GDP per capita, countries have 8% more long-term clientelism compared to short-term. In fact, this effect is almost equal to the decrease in the effect of party organization and enforcement capacity from the first to the second model which introduces country-level effects, suggesting that country-level development should be included in the models to explain how parties reach out to voters.

The finding on the importance of economic development is related to the stickiness of clientelism. By definition, transformation to programmatism erodes short-term clientelism initially. A similar process occurs with development. Some authors explain the prevalence of clientelism among underdeveloped countries by the diminishing marginal utility of income (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Medina and Stokes, 2007). According to this argument, benefits provided to relatively wealthier clients would have an exponentially decreasing expected return (i.e. client's political support). Also, the poor can be more risk-averse than wealthier counterparts. So, immediate clientelistic linkages can be more preferable (Scott, 1977; Kitschelt, 2000; Desposato, 2007). This immediacy decreases costs associated especially with short-term clientelism. Therefore, it is not surprising that economic development tilts the ratio towards long-term linkages.

These party and country level indicators show that the ratio of long and short term clientelism is associated with party capacity and economic development. Especially in urban slums and peripheries of the major cities where most of the clientelistic linkages

take place, what matters more than the macro-level setting may be the party organization capacity, political broker efficacy as well as the interaction between different intraparty interest groups such as brokers and politicians (Kemahlıoğlu, 2012). In other words, results presented above do not necessarily contradict with other studies that underline the importance of the individual setting. On the contrary, they emphasize that a part of the explanation for the development of long and short-term linkages lies in party-level variables. However, results also suggest that middle-income countries and those that are relatively more developed are more susceptible to the stickiness of long-term clientelistic relationships.

5.1.2 Micro-level Dimension

This section now turns to describing temporality among voters by referring to the Turkish case, where several politically relevant parties compete for long and short-term linkages. In the representative 2014 Turkish presidential election study, 143 respondents (9%) indicated that a political party visited them during the last year. Similarly, an opt-in online survey I conducted shows that 7% of respondents received clientelistic benefits in return for political support before. Among 9,336 respondents who answered the question on party visits in 6 different representative surveys from 2002 to 2015, 1,219 (13%) indicated that a party visited them at their home or their offices at least once. These are reported canvassing visits, and they are not necessarily clientelistic. However, this section shows that those who received benefits before by a party were much more likely to report such visits although the effect varies across elections.

Figure 5.2 plots the percentage of respondents reporting personal visits by political parties before 6 elections. It shows that on average, political parties visited around 10% of voters before elections and this figure changes across elections. While in 2002 general and 2014 presidential elections it was rather low (around 5%), in rest of the elections, it was at least 10%. This may be because as mentioned in the fourth chapter, 2002 was a watershed election and the newly established AKP was participating for the first time, and similarly, 2014 Presidential election was the first such election ever to elect a president by popular vote.

In 2002, the AKP was able to form a single-party government. Following this election, there is an increase in the personalistic linkages between parties and voters. Although there are some substantive differences across years, parties visit around %10 of the voting age population. After the 2002 elections, there was a hike in these visits as the AKP consolidated its power before 2007. In these five years, the party increased its votes from 34% to 46%, consolidating its place in the Turkish party system. A plateau in two consecutive elections follows this growth in 2007. DALP data set also shows that the AKP

Figure 5.2: % of Respondents Reporting Canvassing Visits during Election Campaigns



monopolized clientelistic linkages successfully and the party was the most extensive and efficient source of clientelism in the country during this period (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011*a*). From 2011 to 2014 local elections, there was a short period in which parties visited approximately 10% of voters on average both during and outside the campaign periods. In 2014, the now-dominant AKP supported its leader's candidacy while the CHP and MHP made a coalition to support a moderately conservative candidate, assuming that he would be a viable alternative to the AKP's Erdogan. Also, the Kurdish voters and some leftist groups ran with the HDP's party leader. During the campaign period, parties had linkages established with many voters thanks to the previous local election which was held only four months before. Post-presidential election survey has questions about visits for both March local elections and the presidential elections held in August. Results indicate that 33% of respondents who were visited during the local elections period were visited again during the presidential election. The same ratio for those who were not visited in local elections was a much lower figure, standing at 1.8%. This suggests that there is continuity in such household visits and canvassing.

Content and meaning of these visits for voters and parties will be discussed in the next chapter which presents ethnographic findings from a comparative fieldwork in selected neighborhoods of Istanbul. However, large-N survey data can provide some clues as to who are specifically targeted by parties in these visits. Table 5.3 shows some demographic and economic determinants of party visits for all the elections shown in Figure 5.2.

Table 5.3: Sociodemographic Correlates of Party Visits

	2002 General	2007 General	2011 General	2014 Local	2014 Presidential	2015 General
Female	-0.771***	-0.449**	0.018	-1.134***	-0.881*	-0.742**
	(0.129)	(0.148)	(0.152)	(0.222)	(0.400)	(0.278)
Age	-0.160*	0.105	0.098	-0.006	-0.153	0.433***
	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.101)	(0.169)	(0.130)
Education	-0.007	0.031	0.034	-0.022	0.100*	-0.012
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Kurdish	0.075	0.220	0.180	0.208	-0.754	0.606
	(0.165)	(0.200)	(0.217)	(0.228)	(0.505)	(0.332)
Rural	-0.114	0.174	0.167	0.635**	1.110**	-0.367
	(0.130)	(0.151)	(0.191)	(0.209)	(0.359)	(0.338)
Income	0.075	-0.022	0.032	0.061	-0.129	0.085
	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.101)	(0.150)	(0.126)
Constant	-0.906**	-1.822***	-2.676***	-2.141***	-3.290***	-3.385***
	(0.295)	(0.360)	(0.372)	(0.526)	(0.773)	(0.698)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.040	0.023	0.005	0.075	0.070	0.072
N	2002	1388	1900	1453	1054	778

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic regression, DV: Reported visit by a political party during the election campaign period.

For summary statistics, see Appendix A, Table A.2

Results suggest that visits are not associated with voters' demographic profiles except a substantive gender gap. Women were always less likely to be visited by political parties besides from the 2011 general elections. More precisely, exponentiated coefficients from the table above suggest that on average, women were more than 40% less likely than they visit men to be visited by parties. Even in 2011 where the coefficient is statistically insignificant, and its direction is unexpectedly positive, and 2011 study shows that on average only 10.5% of women were visited by parties. This is very close to the average over the last six elections. The unexpected direction of gender in 2011 stems from a sudden decrease in visits to men, not from a hike in visits to women. In other words, the data suggests three relevant findings from this analysis.

First of all, political parties target different segments of the society by campaign visits. A specific social group such as Kurds, less educated or lower-income people, or older voters are not more or less likely to be visited. Secondly, women categorically report less political visits to their households. There is a gender gap in campaign period linkages, or this may be an artifact of the face-to-face survey and the role of gender norms in reporting canvassing visits. In any case, this requires further, empirically more nuanced studies to explain why this occurs. One alternative can be the fact that in these single-shot campaign period visits, parties specifically target shops, coffeehouses, or the petty bourgeois in small urban and rural communities. Particularly among conservative circles, women may be less visible in the public life so conservatism and gender roles could explain women's disadvantageous position in campaign period personal linkages. The third and the most important finding is that the 2014 Presidential election survey reveals a path-dependent structure for these visits. Those who had been visited five months ago

during the local election campaign period were much more likely to be visited during the presidential election again. This attests to the continuous nature of clientelism *over elections*.

An additional political variable that is available for 2002 and 2007 general elections, as well as 2014 local elections, can highlight repetitiveness. This political interaction taps into whether respondents had applied to different political offices, such as the municipality, local party brokers, or the members of the parliament in Ankara. Unfortunately, this data is not available for all the elections modeled in Table 5.3. However, this variable can be a proxy for more relational clientelistic linkages between voters and parties. Applying to political offices to solve a personal problem can occur together with campaign period visits, but this does not have to be so. In many respects, my fieldwork suggests that clientelistic linkages continue outside the election period when they are relational. In this regard, clients can ask for help whenever they need assistance, not only during a campaign period. In addition to gender gap during campaign periods, as shown above, I expect previous long-term linkages to be a major determinant of visits. Table 5.4 adds that variable to the model above for the three elections for which we have questions about reaching out to political offices to solve a personal problem.

Table 5.4: Clientelistic Correlates of Party Visits

	2002	**2002**	**2007**	**2007**	**2014**	**2014**
Clientelistic Help	0.677***		0.112		1.052***	
	(0.16)		(0.203)		(-0.193)	
% of Potential Offices Used		1.895***		1.01		1.747***
		(0.422)		(0.553)		(0.438)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.053	0.055	0.023	0.026	0.118	0.096
N	2002	2002	1388	1388	1453	1453

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic regression, DV: Reported visit by a political party during the election campaign period.

All models also control for demographic variables from Table 5.3

For full specification, see Appendix A, Table A.3, for summary statistics, see Table A.2

Additionally, clientelistic help variable measures whether a respondent asked for personalistic assistance in the last three years, whereas the % of potential public offices used measures percentage of political offices clients used from a predetermined list. The number of offices enumerated to respondents varied across surveys. Therefore, a ratio variable is used to make the interpretation comparable across elections. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, measuring the percentage of offices respondents used to solve a personalistic problem.

In these three elections, 14% of respondents indicated that they applied to different political institutions to solve a *personal problem*. This figure increases from 8% in 2002 to 12% in 2007, and then to a stunning 27% of all the voters in 2014. This is not surprising given that several previous studies, anecdotal evidence, as well as findings from my fieldwork, suggest that over time, clientelism became a more prevalent linkage strategy in contemporary period (Sayarı, 2014; Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015; Ocaklı, 2016; Marschall, Aydoğan, and Bulut, 2016). Coupled with the increasing levels of economic inequalities, vulnerability, and a downward trend in the labor market as mentioned in **Chapter 4**; the rise in clientelistic visits to apply for solving problems is not surprising.

The two alternative variables both suggest that there is an association between personalistic linkages and campaign period canvassing. Those who receive clientelistic help are much more likely to be visited during campaign periods. However, this association is not statistically significant for 2007, it is still in the expected direction, and the p-value associated with the coefficient for the percentage of potential offices used in 2007 is close to reaching conventional statistical significance levels (p = 0.068). In 2002 and 2014, clients were almost two times more likely to be visited by party workers during the campaign. The more public offices a client used to solve a personal problem, the more likely he or she was to be visited. Figure 5.3 plots the predicted probability of a campaign visit by different percentages of offices visited by the client, after controlling for all the other independent variables given in Table 5.4.

Figure 5.3: Predicted Probability of Visits



Prediction for: Average Age, Income and Education, Urban, Male, Non-Kurdish respondents
Note: %95 Confidence Intervals Plotted for 2002 and 2014, in 2007, there is no statistically significant difference across levels of clientelism.

The time frame for clientelistic linkages is larger than the period for visits during the campaign period, suggesting a causal direction from clientelism to canvassing visits. When clients benefit from all the alternative political offices, and they integrate into relational linkages, they are more likely to be visited during the campaign. In other words, these linkages continue over a longer period, including both non-campaign and campaign periods. It is important to underline here that short-term visits cannot predict long-term interaction because continuous iterations by definition should predict further interactions. This is what the model and the figure above suggest. In other words, the fact that clientelistic linkages predict visits in the campaign period means that in the micro-level, long-term, relational linkages persist during various parts of an electoral cycle.

An important question then is how prevalent are long-term clientelistic linkages in Turkey? Usually, studies focus on various agents such as recipients, brokers, and patrons. In order to provide novel evidence for the importance of continuity and show its pervasiveness, I conducted an original, online opt-in survey in Turkey. A substantial setback of online, opt-in sampling is the lack of generalizability of results from such surveys. The online sample was recruited through Facebook advertisements to minimize network effects and to make the survey as representative as possible.[4] Facebook is the most suitable environment to reach out to online respondents from different geographic as well as socioeconomic parts of Turkey as it is the most common online platform in the country.

The online survey was conducted in three consecutive periods. Table 5.5 summarizes these periods.

In second and third waves, previous respondents were invited to participate in a shorter survey that tried to tap into the attitudinal change by asking the same policy preference questions. 186 respondents (25%) from the first and the second waves participated in this panel study. In total, 1051 respondents completed the survey (excluding the panel follow up). On average, the survey took around 30 minutes to fully complete, and 3665 respondents started the survey. Around 70% of respondents did not complete it. This is expected given that the survey was long, and online opt-in respondents have lower attention spans (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances, 2014).

Figure 5.4 plots survey participation across districts of Turkey. Those districts highlighted in gray had at least one fully completed response in the survey. Geographically,

[4]Facebook had more than 39 million users in 2015, out of 45 million Internet users in a total population of almost 78 million. See http://webrazzi.com/2015/09/03/facebook-turkiye-aylik-kullanici-sayisi/ for the number of users. For details of Facebook recruitment procedure and its advantages, see Samuels and Zucco (2013)

Table 5.5: Online Survey Details

Waves	Date	Number of Respondents	Notes
1	18 May - 1 Dec 2014	446	August 2014 Presidential Election
2	29 Apr - 6 Jun 2015	293	June 2015 Pre Election Study
3	6 Oct - 1 Nov 2015	312	November 2015 Pre Early Election Study
Follow up	29 Apr - 1 Nov 2015	186	Respondents from the first and the second waves in the follow up study.

the survey reached out to 359 out of 970 districts in Turkey (37%). 339 of the respondents were women (32%), and the average age of respondents was 43, ranging from 18 to 81.

Figure 5.4: Distribution of Online Respondents Across Districts of Turkey



The empirical data presented below comes from this novel online data set and the 2014 local election study. Details of all the survey data sets used in this chapter are given in **Appendix A**. These are only two snapshot observations about the prevalence of different linkage types and further micro-level studies from other countries can provide more robust empirical tests of the theoretical argument made in this dissertation.

Separating long and short-term clientelisms necessitates a working definition. One can define cut-off points arbitrarily and empirically test different working definitions. In

this chapter, I will separate different types based on the previous literature on strategies of vote-buying (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter, 2014). This is relevant because generally, such studies assume that turnout or vote-buying happens *specifically in electoral campaign settings*. In other words, these studies are usually reticent about how clientelism works outside the election campaign period. This is not a far-fetched assumption given that the literature usually focuses on clientelistic returns for parties during elections. However, a focus on recipients and their attitudes necessitates an extended time horizon. **Chapter 6** provides further details for understanding the effect of exigencies and external shocks. Here, it suffices to say that focusing specifically on electoral campaign periods is not sufficient to explain behavioral and attitudinal effects of clientelism. Therefore, the operationalization separates clientelism *during* campaign periods and *outside* the campaign period to differentiate relational and single-shot clientelisms.

According to the 2014 local election study, which is representative of the Turkish voters, 9% of the voters reported that they received clientelistic benefits in one way or another. 22% of these clients report that they kept their contacts with party workers in periods outside the electoral campaign period, whereas the rest of the respondents report that they only kept their linkages during the campaign period. In total, 2% of voters report long-term linkages.[5]

Also, this survey asks about alternative clientelistic linkages with multiple parties. Respondents could report up to four parties with which they had personal contact before and during the electoral campaign period. Most of the respondents reported the ruling AKP as the first party with which they had contact, followed by the MHP and the CHP. This is not surprising given that the party has an incumbency advantage and controls various central and local public offices across Turkey. In total, 105 respondents out of 276 clients indicated that they were personally contacted by the AKP (38%).

The social desirability bias may be reducing the number of respondents who report clientelism. Assuming that there is no variation in the level of social desirability bias across clients attached to different parties, it is clear that the AKP dominates the clientelistic linkages in Turkey. This finding supports the DALP expert data set's finding in

[5]This may seem like a very small portion of the total voters, but there are three caveats in that argument: First of all, respondents tend to underreport their linkages when asked directly (social desirability bias). Experiments described in the introduction will alleviate this limit. Secondly, long-term linkages can assist not only clients but all the members of a household. Providing safety net to a member of the household can help other members in numerous ways including more risky investments in their labor market participation, attaining more education, etc... Third, even a minute 2 percent of voters can make an enormous change in the political system if they are targeted strategically, especially in pluralist local elections. In 2014 district level mayoral elections, the average winning margin was 15%, but it ranged from less than 1% to 84%. In 106 districts out of 970, winning margin for the district municipality was less than 2% of total votes.

which the AKP is categorized as a dominant clientelistic party. 22% of the AKP's clients have long-term, relational linkages; the only party to have more long-term linkages is the HDP. However, further statistical within-group analyses are not possible as the number of respondents who reported receiving clientelistic help by these two parties is rather low (23 for AKP and 6 for HDP). Still, representative results from this survey show two things. First, the AKP dominates the clientelistic scene in Turkey and secondly, parties do not offer assistance only during the election periods. Different parties offer benefits outside the election campaign period and almost a quarter of clients receive long-term benefits.

The online sample is not representative of Turkish voters since it was conducted among Internet users. The literature suggests that these groups are not the most common targets of clientelistic benefits (Weitz-Shapiro, 2009; Stokes et al., 2013; Calvo and Murillo, 2004). In this respect, findings from this data set are expected to be depreciating pervasiveness of clientelism. These findings should be taken with a grain of salt, but one can expect clientelism to be more common among the general public. If anything, figures given below should be less than what we would observe with the larger voting age population. With this cautionary note, let me now return to some findings from this data set. 7% of the respondents (97) report receiving benefits in return for their support. 40% of these benefits were proffered before or after the campaign period, indicating that a considerable portion of clients continue their linkages with parties.

47% of the clients report that the AKP provided them with benefits. Again, the AKP dominates clientelism in these findings too. Similar to the other data set, 2.8% of all the respondents have continuous, long-term linkages with parties. Additionally, an open-ended question in this survey asked what clients receive from parties. Those who answered the question mention numerous benefits but some of the most mentioned were coal (and heating assistance in general), food stamps and food aid, direct cash provision as well as small items and gift baskets that include things such as Turkish coffee, pens, hats, books, cups, and other memorabilia. These were mentioned as some short-term clientelistic benefits. However, some of the other items clients often mentioned were registering in the social welfare programs and assistance in paying rent over consecutive months, provision of temporary and permanent public jobs and assistance in house titling. These were mentioned just as much as small benefits, and they are more suitable for long-term linkages. This shows that clientelism has multiple dimensions, and there is variance in the duration of these linkages.

Overall, both face-to-face representative data and online data show that clientelism is an important political phenomenon in Turkey. This section described the empirical

evidence across different levels. The macro-section touched upon party and country level issues. The evidence shows that there are various facets of clientelism. On the country-level, the temporal dimension of clientelism has different types of associations across different economic development levels. Among developed countries where a minimal degree of clientelism is expected, long-term relational linkages are more common, even if these linkages attenuate as the economy grows. Among the lowest levels of economic development, long-term linkages are sticky, and they continue unless an economic shift occurs. The most suitable environment for this type of clientelism is middle-income countries in which we see variation as there can also be programmatic parties next to clientelistic ones. On the party level, the evidence suggests that those parties, which have higher local integration and organizational capacity and those who can successfully enforce clientelistic contracts, are more likely to temporally extend their linkages with their clients. All in all, this part argued that long-term linkages are onerous. They create sticky informal institutions in which party-voter relationships persist.

The micro level analysis also suggests that there is a sizable portion of clients in the Turkish context who receive benefits through relational, continuous linkages. There is a clear gender gap in party visits and canvassing, another facet of personalistic contact which does not have to be clientelistic by definition. The gender gap in canvassing persists across elections and can be explained by a general conservative attitude towards women in the Turkish political life. Since peripheral conservative parties dominate such personalistic linkages and campaign efforts as mentioned in the fourth chapter, this may not be surprising. In addition to this gender gap, a more important factor that determines personalistic contacts is clientelism. Clients are much more likely to be approached again by parties after their earlier interactions. This is an important evidence for continuation, and in fact, findings suggest that a considerable portion of clientelism continues over time. The Reported clientelistic behavior can have limitations stemming from data availability and internal validity, but the next two sections will try to overcome these problems with experimental analyses. This section sought to argue that there are different types of clientelistic temporality and these differences are not random. On the contrary, we observe that they are determined by related variables at different levels, a further question is how these different temporalities affect outcomes.

5.2 Approval Rating of Clientelism

Perceptions of clientelistic linkages incur an ethical and political dilemma. Because these linkages are not universal, and services are distributed in a discretionary way, benefits create an information asymmetry. Clients and patrons share private knowledge about services provided by the party, but material costs and informational asymmetries

are incurred to the larger public especially if public resources are used in a discretionary manner. Therefore, when non-client voters act on their preferences, they cannot consider preferential distribution by parties as a part of their utility function. This is not only an economic externality on the larger public but also an ethical dilemma because democratic systems imply a public presence of information for decision-making. Whether it is the corrupt procurement deals between politicians and corporations or distribution of petty gifts, these *private* relationships put serious limitations on a democratic system where parties compete for *public* support. Since voters are not aware of a clientelistic party's private dealings, they make a choice without considering costs of clientelism in their calculus. In other words, clientelism is not only an economic but also an ethical problem in which redistribution that aims to mobilize political support for the party causes substantial externalities for voters at large.

As mentioned before on the methodological limits of studying clientelism, these linkages are not public, and they are not socially accepted. This is evident in surveys as well as my fieldwork. Interviewees are not keen on talking about their relationships or the details of clientelism in their neighborhood. In several different face-to-face surveys, this social desirability bias became evident. This is not unique to Turkey. In numerous countries, researchers find it difficult to study clientelism because of the social desirability bias and the private nature of such relationships.

An experiment I conducted online clearly shows this desirability bias. A question given to the control group directly asked about personal experiences with clientelism, whereas the treatment question primed respondents with a text before the question. This priming text justified clientelism and played down the ethical and legal problems associated with it.[6] The priming text nearly doubled the number of respondents who indicated that they received a clientelistic benefit in exchange for their votes. Among 694 respondents in the control group, only 5.3% (37) said that they received such a benefit while among the 652 respondents in the treatment, this increased to 9.2% (60) of the respondents. A t-test shows that the treatment made a significant difference in reported clientelism ($t(1344)= 2.75$, p¡0.001).

This experiment corroborates several previous studies about the social desirability bias. In this section, I will argue that this bias also creates different ethical positions by which individuals evaluate clientelism. In this respect, by dealing with ethics of clientelism, this

[6]The priming text was: "Sometimes political parties can help those in need. By doing so, linkages between citizens and parties strengthen. These benefits may not be distributed only to party supporters but to all those citizens who need help. This sort of support by political parties is not only for gaining additional votes but also to create a strong bond with the public and respond to the needs and demands of the citizens."

part aims to show that clientelistic recipiency behavior changes not only attitudes and policy positions in unrelated areas but also attitudes about recipiency as well. To do that, I will use a module I designed in the online survey, which inquired about whether voters *should* receive benefits and whether voters *do* receive benefits and vote for a party. The difference between the two can be used to understand the ethical gap people experience in their opinions about clientelism when linkages are given in concrete examples about deprivation, vulnerability, and poverty. Results show that clients who have been in long-term contact with parties are more likely to have no discrepancy between their moral expectations and how they perceive political realities. In return, this finding constitutes an initial test for the persuasive effects of long-term clientelism.

5.2.1 Approving Clientelism and Contextual Effects

Redistribution is contextual. Voters can approve receiving such benefits when they think they deserve it. To gauge whether this is the case, the module I devised in the online survey provides several different scenarios. The wording of the question is designed so as to push respondents to vote for a patron if they receive a benefit. In other words, respondents did not have the choice to receive benefits and not vote. Four different scenarios asked respondents about whether voters *should* receive benefits and vote and whether voters *do* receive benefits and vote. These scenarios were:

1. Giving household appliances to a middle-class family
2. Providing financial assistance to a working class mother who needs to cover medical expenses of her sick child
3. A poor family's heating expenses for the whole winter
4. Providing a wheelchair to a physically challenged voter

Respondents received these four scenarios in random order and were asked two question for each scenario: 1- whether the voter in the scenario *should* receive the benefit and vote for the patron & 2- whether voters in such cases *do* accept the benefit and vote for similar patrons. Results are in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6: Different Clientelistic Contexts

Candidate helps (gives)...	... Voter(s) support the candidate in return?	No %	Not Sure %	Yes %	Respondents
... Household appliances to a middle-class family	Should...	79.52	13.3	7.18	1128
	Do...	21.69	34.03	44.28	1102
... A mother whose child is sick	Should...	51.68	23.05	25.27	1128
	Do...	14.88	36.93	48.19	1102
... Heating assistance for the whole winter to a poor family	Should...	65.6	18.88	15.51	1128
	Do...	15.87	34.18	49.95	1103
... A wheelchair to a physically challenged voter	Should...	61.27	21.49	17.24	1131
	Do...	16.26	42.64	41.1	1107

According to these results, almost 80% of the respondents think that a middle-class family *should not* vote for a candidate who gives them a household appliance in exchange for their vote. Similarly, 42% of the respondents are not sure whether voters who receive a wheelchair from a candidate *do* vote in return for the benefit. Approximately 45% of the respondents think that people generally vote for a candidate in return for clientelistic benefits. This figure does not change very much across different scenarios. However, what changes is peoples' perception about what voters *should do*. Almost half of the respondents either think that a desperate mother can accept clientelistic benefits or they are not sure, while only 20% are in these two categories for a middle-class family who receives a household appliance, a rather luxurious item compared to an urgent health expense.

Most of the people perceive clientelism to be very common ("do"), and they disapprove it ("should"). In other words, there is a gap between approval and perception of clientelism. However, the context matters: when people think of a precarious situation, they are more likely to approve acceptance of personal assistance in return for political support. More importantly, assistance that is personally meaningful necessitates more relational linkages. Handing out heating assistance or household appliances can be done in a wholesale manner, without considering personal needs of clients whereas providing more meaningful benefits such as healthcare, legal assistance about the imminent threat of gentrification or public employment and alike require some degree of personal knowledge.

I will not delve into the details of monitoring in this part, but it suffices to say that more approved clientelistic alternatives necessitate local party capacity to monitor personal needs. Otherwise, parties risk on a clientelistic spree that is both costly for the party and frowned upon by voters.[7]

In any case, people who already have clientelistic linkages should be more approving of these linkages. This is an easy test for the long-term effects of clientelism: if clients do not approve of these linkages more than non-clients, then we can say that these linkages fail to change attitudes *even* about the relevant behavior itself. The process of this attitudinal change can be explained by cognitive dissonance: As clients behave in specific ways, i.e. accepting and receiving benefits, their attitudes should correspond to this behavior. In other words, the dissonance between behavior and attitude should

[7]For instance, the provincial governorate of Tunceli appointed by the AKP, provided household appliances to every household under the rubric of a campaign called "Appliances to every household" right before the 2009 local elections. Some villages without running water received washing machines. This conspicuous campaign distribution turned into a countrywide discussion about the inefficiency of clientelistic benefits and incompetency of clientelistic parties. See:"http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/plug-pulled-on-appliance-assistance-in-tunceli-10982314" for details.

attenuate over time. An alternative process with the opposite causal direction implies that positive evaluation of these linkages results in parties handing out benefits to more approving clients. However, this still necessitates a large local organization that will establish and continue contacts with potential clients to understand the degree of positive evaluation in the community. In this respect, the first alternative explanation is more likely unless party organizations establish local units or hire brokers and then allocate an immense amount of resources to monitor *potential* clients *before* establishing these linkages. In order to test this account, this part provides an initial test of clientelistic persuasion. If clients do not approve these linkages more, then expecting them to change their policy preferences in other areas over time may be too far-fetched. Table 5.7 provides results of a regression analysis that explains the approval (should) and perception (do) of clientelism and measures the effect of clientelistic behavior after controlling for some relevant demographic variables.

Table 5.7: Determinants of Approval & Perception of Clientelistic Linkages

	Perception	Perception	Approval	Approval
Accepted clientelistic benefits	-0.115*	-0.066	0.208***	0.168***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Priming Effect	0.008	0.010	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income		0.003		-0.010
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Kurdish		-0.074		-0.025
		(0.040)		(0.038)
Woman		0.032		0.055**
		(0.021)		(0.020)
Education		0.029**		-0.019
		(0.011)		(0.010)
Left-Right position		-0.016***		0.012***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Constant	0.647***	0.611***	0.250***	0.285***
	(0.014)	(0.055)	(0.013)	(0.052)
R^2	0.004	0.048	0.020	0.055
N	973	973	973	973

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS Regression, DV: % of Respondents saying "Yes" & "Not Sure" to four different scenarios

First two columns are on how often respondents think clientelism occurs (perception), and the other two are about whether voters should accept benefits in return for their political support (approval). As mentioned in the table above, there were four different

scenarios and not all respondents answered the two questions for each scenario. To compare the different number of responses with each other, I use the percentage of total "Yes" and "Not Sure" answers respondents had across all the scenarios they answered as the dependent variable. By doing so, results become more comparable and deal with the missing observation problem.[8] Priming experiment mentioned above in this chapter is added as an initial control since this can affect both perception and approval of clientelism. However, results show that priming respondents with a positive message about clientelism influence neither their perception nor approval substantively and statistically. This is an important finding suggesting that attitudes about clientelistic behavior are robust against one-time, weak messages.

First and the third models show that previous clientelism indeed has an effect on both perception and approval. Compared to non-clients, those who received benefits think there is 11% less clientelism. Moreover, they also approve clientelism more in 20% of the four scenarios. However, these results can be spurious and might be driven by other demographic variables that can affect attitudes. Therefore, some demographic and political control variables are added in the second and fourth models. Demographically, different groups generally have varying approvals across different policy position. Additionally, a general ideological position on the left-right scale can also capture variance in approval of clientelism. Socialist and leftist voters can be more likely to support universalistic redistribution schemes and hence, oppose clientelism compared to voters that are more rightist.

Results show that some of these controls are in fact associated with approval and perception ratings. Voters who define themselves as closer to the right-wing ideology approve these linkages more. This is not surprising given that right-wing ideology in Turkey is closer to local economic redistribution through personalistic linkages than a more programmatic, nationwide redistribution. Also, more educated voters think that there is more clientelistic redistribution. This is also expected since educated voters generally follow more critical news stories, highlighting detrimental effects of clientelism. Therefore, they approve these linkages less, but significance tests indicate that this effect is not different from the null hypothesis of no effect. Additionally, women approve clientelism more than men, and this effect is not driven by a specific scenario. Categorically in all of the four scenarios, women were more approving of clientelism and this control is significant in the fourth model as well. This is not an artifact of the scenario about the mother whose child is sick, or any other scenario for that matter because question order was randomized. After controlling for these demographic and ideological explanations, the second model shows that indeed clients do not think there is less clientelism in Turkey. However,

[8]Results do not change when "Not Sure" category is excluded.

Figure 5.5: Predicted Margins of Clientelistic Perception and Approval



they still approve these linkages more. Figure 5.5 shows predicted margins of perception and approval for clients and non-clients based on the second and fourth models above. In the predicted margin graph above, the number of clients in the model was 47 (4.73%) of the total sample. Even given this small subsample, the analysis shows that these clients are more approving of clientelism compared to non-clients and they believe that there is a little lower level of clientelism going on in Turkey. These results show that clients have almost 20% more approval in different scenarios. In other words, they support the "should" questions 20% more than non-clients. It may be that the causal direction runs from recipiency behavior to positive evaluations of clientelism. Maybe those individuals who are more approving of clientelism eventually become clients. This causal question necessitates experiments to show which alternative is the case. However, anti-clientelistic attitudes are not common especially among vulnerable segments of the society, as I will show in the next chapter. In fact, whenever non-clients fail to establish initial contacts with party representatives, they become cynical, and that is when they start to oppose these linkages. In this respect, the alternative causal direction is too far-fetched to be a more viable option. In any case, the theory of clientelistic persuasion should pass this simple empirical test about an overlap between clientelistic behavior and attitudes, and results suggest that it does.

5.2.2 Differentiating Temporality and an Out-of-sample Test

The analysis above suggests that attitudes and behaviors of clients overlap at least for receiving benefits. It is equally important to see whether these attitudes vary across different *types* of clientelisms. The first section of this chapter on macro and micro-level determinants of clientelism showed that these linkages have different qualities and in the Turkish context, a considerable part of clients have relational and continuous linkages. The analysis below separates clientelism into two distinct types and replicates the model

about approval and perception, and these models use another data set to provide further robustness.

In 2014 Turkish Election Study conducted before the local elections, there is a module to gauge how clients and non-clients react to different contexts of clientelism.[9] This module was very similar to the online survey questions about the ethical gap of clientelistic relationships. An experimental question, which randomly assigned respondents into four groups, gave each respondent a different vignette. These vignettes changed the amount of assistance and whether assistance was direct cash benefits or more meaningful, in-kind benefits. Details of this vignette experiment are given in Table 5.8. These were hypothetical scenarios asking whether respondents would vote for a candidate running for the local office. In other words, the question asks about an implied approval of the candidate's clientelistic help. Results in Table 5.8 below corroborate earlier findings, suggesting that voters support linkages which require more relational knowledge.

Table 5.8: Vignette Experiment - 2014

In a period of personal financial problem, a local candidate helps with...	% Not (likely) vote	% (Likely) Vote	Respondents
... financial assistance equal to monthly income	84.67	15.33	411
... financial assistance equal to 6 months of income	81.15	18.85	382
... food assistance equal to monthly food expenses	86.35	13.65	359
... expenses for an urgent surgery	71.43	28.57	357

The analysis presented below separates long-term clients from those who were visited only during the election campaign periods in order to show the differing effects of short and long-term linkages. This time, however, the effect of clientelism is divided into its temporal types. Findings from this model are in Table 5.9. If clients received benefits only during the three-month campaign period leading up to the elections, they were coded as short-term clients but if they received benefits outside the electoral campaign period for multiple times or if they indicated that their relationship with the party representatives has been continuing for at least six months since the initial contact, they were coded as long-term clients. The vignette treatments given in Table 5.8 and control variables from Table 5.7 are also added as control variables.

Compared to those who do not receive any clientelistic benefit, those who have linkages in the short-term are almost 3.2 times more likely to support the hypothetical candidate given in the vignette experiment. On top of this, those who have long-term linkages are even more likely (3.3 times). Even after inducing a contextual effect to respondents by giving them different vignettes, clients are still more likely to approve linkages. However, data limitations, namely the small number of observations hinder a sub-sample analysis

[9]Details of the 2014 TNES, as well as other election studies, are given in **Appendix A**. Principal investigators of this study were Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu.

Table 5.9: Long and Short Term Clientelism and Clientelistic Approval

	Model 1	Model 2
Short-term	3.194***	
	(0.815)	
Long-term	3.325**	
	(1.351)	
Intensity of clientelism		1.076*
		(0.031)
Income	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Kurdish	1.968***	1.991***
	(0.386)	(0.385)
Woman	1.093	0.985
	(0.182)	(0.159)
Education	0.891	0.889
	(0.059)	(0.059)
Age	0.979***	0.979***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Left-Right Position	1.088*	1.087*
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Vignette - Cash assistance(6 months)$^{+}$	1.362	1.330
	(0.223)	(0.220)
Vignette - Monthly food help^{+}	0.845	0.891
	(0.247)	(0.242)
Vignette - Urgent surgery^{+}	2.223***	2.267***
	(0.212)	(0.210)
Constant	0.218**	0.253**
	(0.102)	(0.117)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.109	0.084
N	1210	1217

Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses
DV: Supporting the hypothetical candidate in return for benefits
Odds-Ratios reported, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
$^{+}$ Reference category for Vignette experiments:
Financial assistance equal to a monthly income

of these two client groups. A comparison of the effect across short-term and long-term clients are neither substantively nor statistically significant. To see whether this is an artifact of the limitations of the data or if this finding substantively challenges the theoretical framework, an alternative measure looks at the intensity of clientelism. This variable measures the times a voter attempted to solve a personal problem via one of the several political offices listed in the survey.[10] Although this variable does not gauge

[10]These political offices are MPs, central government, provincial governorate, district governorate, local municipality, local party brokers in the neighborhood, party bosses in district and province as well

the duration of linkages per se, it can be a proxy. Model 2 presents results with this alternative variable. With each additional level of intensity, clients are 7% more likely to support a candidate in return for benefits. This effect is both statistically significant and substantively important. The probability of a non-client to support the clientelistic candidate is 0.15. This probability jumps to .40 when a voter has a high level of successful and intense linkages with politicians. In summary, both models together show that with higher continuity and intensity in clientelistic linkages, clients are more likely to support their patrons, and they also are more inclined to approve of these relationships.

5.2.3 Summary of Findings

When patrons distribute goods, they expect political support in return. However, most of the time, these relationships are private deals. Clients refrain from talking about the details as the priming experiment showed. Additionally, there can be legal problems associated with clientelism. In this respect, voters and the public at large do not know who provides what to whom. This is especially problematic if public resources are distributed in a discretionary manner. This creates a serious problem of accountability because redistribution occurs outside the reach of the public. Additionally, there are costs related to the fact that clientelism is a private interaction between different agents. It creates external costs on non-client voters who cannot include the effects of clientelism into their calculus when they form different decisions. Both problems of accountability and external costs of clientelism turn this linkage type into an undemocratic response mechanism. In this respect, there is an ethical aspect to the problem: Voters have to make up their minds about whether this is a desirable relationship between them and politicians.

Experimental and survey evidence suggests that this ethical decision depends on various factors. First, the context in which clientelism occurs plays an important role. People tend to think voters deserve benefits in some specific contexts. Given that ethical standings can depend on the context, this is not unexpected. People can think that an accountable, public system of political decision making is important, but they can also believe that individuals are obliged to take care of their family. Therefore, support for clientelism depends on the situation and exigencies. One thing that seems clear from the analyses presented in this section is that voters think clientelism is acceptable in vulnerable situations. When there is an urgent need for healthcare costs, voters accept clientelism. However, even in other contexts, approximately up to 15% think people

as the neighborhood's headman. In total, there were nine offices. If clients applied but did not succeed in solving their personal problem, they were coded as 1, and if they found a solution, they were coded as 2. For nine offices listed, this creates an ordinal score that varied from 0 to 18. An alternative analysis which codes failed clientelistic attempts as 0 do not change results presented above. In that test not reported here, each additional *successful* contact increases the likelihood to support the candidate by 16%. Therefore, marginal effects are very similar.

accept benefits in return for their political support. This is the baseline population in Turkey that believes clientelism is acceptable. On top of that, assistance that requires a longer, relational linkage in which party organizations and brokers monitor and determine needs of potential clients categorically garners more approval.

Similar portions of the voting age population (around 15%) receive benefits and also think that these are acceptable. Clearly, these two groups do not have to overlap, but further analyses show that indeed, clients are more likely to approve linkages. It may be that clients are inherently more likely to approve of these linkages because of their value judgments. This suggests an alternative explanation and it may well be the case, but the previous literature suggests that clientelistic targeting is based mostly on economic vulnerabilities and lack of well-defined programmatic and ideological inclinations. Relatedly, an alternative causal argument starting from moral values of clients rests on the assumption that vulnerable and precarious individuals have different value judgments.

Wilkis's ethnographic study shows that the moral implications of political money circulating in a clientelistic manner are highly fluid, and the moral capital of clients depend on various issues and not only on clientelism itself (Wilkis, 2016). This may be so, but even after controlling for the effect of household income in Table 5.9, clientelism still makes a difference. A more likely scenario is one in which clientelistic behavior also changes attitudes about the behavior itself. There are some significant empirical limitations since I could only reach out to a small subsample of clients within a larger, representative sample. However, even at the face of this limitation, analyses suggest that the theoretical framework passes this initial test. Clients have different attitudes compared to non-clients. If further empirical results can show that long and short term clients have differing effects on approval, then it can provide a robust test of the effect without reaching out to a large sample of clients. In fact, this is what I tried to do in the three models presented in this section. Although results are not up to perfectly robust tests, they show that clientelism has an impact on how clients make up their mind about the clientelistic behavior itself. However, differences between long and short term clients are not statistically significant posing a limitation to the analysis although the effect is in the expected direction. When these weak findings are tested in an out-of-sample context with a representative sample of Turkish voters, results suggest that clients are supportive of this linkage type. So, when these clients have intense and continuous relationships with parties, they are even more likely to support clientelism.

These findings present an "easy", initial test for the theory of clientelistic persuasion. They are easy because attitudes about the clientelistic behavior itself are a most likely case. In fact, the theoretical framework is not about attitudes on clientelism per se but

spillover of persuasion to other policy areas and a convergence of perceptions. However, if this test fails in another context, then we can be sure that the theoretical framework suggested in this dissertation is either spurious, or it needs further scope conditions. However, the clientelistic persuasion theory seems valid as it stands against these tests. This section provided some observational and experimental findings as well as some robustness tests to show this effect. The next section raises the bar, and tests whether persuasive effects are diffused into other policy areas and attitudes as well.

5.3 Clientelistic Persuasion: Tests with Different Policy Areas

5.3.1 A General Test of Ideological Persuasion

During an interview with a district level party officer in İstanbul, I remember losing the count of the times we were interrupted because of clients coming into his office to demand various things. While the municipality was responsible for solving most of these personal problems, clients bypassed several local offices to come directly to this middle-level party worker from the CHP. He indicated that he spent more than half of his time taking such requests although clientelistic brokering was not his duty. Why do brokers and their patrons allocate so much of their resources to clientelism? There can be monitoring problems and political returns from these linkages may be inefficient, but parties still provide both long and short term clientelistic goods in the Turkish case.

In this section, I will present empirical findings to answer the question posed above. This section argues that parties may, in fact, want to strip themselves out of these linkages, but there are sunk investments and costs in these linkages. Even if clientelism is a leaky bucket, it is a means through which parties can exert social influence. In this respect, linkages are path-dependent and in the long run, they can inform and persuade clients. In the section above, I tested this temporal dimension of persuasion with an initial test. Results show that clients are more approving of these linkages. This section presents results from several analyses which test whether these long-term linkages also make a difference in other policy areas and a more generalized ideological proximity between the client and the party.

Introduction to this chapter mentioned two significant problems that can cloud the internal and external validity of a study on clientelism. This section also presents some tests to overcome these limits. However, a cautionary note may be necessary here: the ideal way to collect data for this section would be a longitudinal study of clients that went on for an extended period, mimicking the temporal dimension of clientelism. However, such a data set is not collected as of now, and this section tries to fill in this gap by

extensively using multiple panel studies and experimental surveys. Further tests of the theoretical implications can be tested after conducting a longitudinal study.

Without such temporally rich data, this section still presents some important findings to answer two important questions. First of all, not all policy areas can be easily affected by clientelism. This depends on the intensity of clientelism as well as the attitudinal stability of the individual in a specific policy area. Secondly, there may not be a monotonic relationship between clientelistic continuity and policy preference persuasion. The first section showed that there are important qualitative differences between long and short term clientelisms. Clients may not be affected by brokers and patrons right away term because one-time contacts are rather insubstantial unless there is a prospective possibility of further material benefits.

In 2014, 43% of clients indicated that brokers who came to visit them were not strangers. These local party brokers were already known in their locality. Further open-ended questions conducted in the online survey also show that clients tend to continue their linkages, asking for benefits when they are in economic or legal hardship. If these linkages tend to continue, then they can also cause important attitudinal differences and convergence of perspectives over time as well. In order to test this claim, I aggregated representative survey data about household visits, benefit requests, and provision from three different election periods.[11] Aggregated results show that 11.9% of voters had clientelistic linkages with local and central party offices. 7.3% of the electorate had one-shot, single relations with these offices while 4.6% had long-term continuous relationships.

In order to depict a general picture of clientelistic persuasion, a crucial analysis is to check whether long-term clients have different ideological preferences compared to non-clients. Different partisan groups are measured in the post-election survey by a question that asks for reported vote choice in the elections. This necessitates a sub-group analysis in which comparison is between clients of various sorts and non-clients *within* the same partisan group for two reasons. First, this within-group comparison minimizes the risk of reverse causality in which the ideological position of current clients can explain whether parties select specific, ideologically closer, or more distant groups into clientelistic benefit schemes. Second, ideological placement can be irrelevant. It may simply be a proxy for party choice. This may not be the case in Turkey. Çarkoğlu (2007)

[11]These three elections are 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections as well as 2014 local elections. Measurement of clientelism is done through questions asking about 1- whether respondent received benefits from various offices, 2-whether party representatives gave gifts or cash to the respondent to vote for the party and 3-if voter had contact with a party, for how long has this been going on (asked only in 2014). In order to separate long and short term clients in 2002 and 2007, I coded clients who only received a benefit from a political office once as short term and those who received benefits multiple times or those who received a benefit only once and also visited by a party least once as long term clients.

shows that self-placement on an ideological scale reflects the "prevalence of attitudinal and policy differences" (p. 268). But still, a sub-group analysis can highlight this attitudinal variation by parsing the ideological scale in a party system to its components.

Ideology is an abstract concept and in this respect, it should be harder to persuade voters through clientelistic linkages. As numerous studies indicate, it depends on various factors that shape a person's political attitudes in the long run. Therefore, Table 5.10 presents a relatively challenging test of the theory. Additional demographic and economic independent variables are added to the models to control for long-term factors such as gender and education which may have an influence on the ideological position of the respondents. Table 5.10 presents four models for the four politically relevant party supporters.

Table 5.10: A General Analysis of Ideological Persuasion

	AKP	CHP	MHP	Kurdish Parties
Short Term Client	0.625	0.018	0.693	-0.409
	(0.522)	(0.909)	(0.894)	(1.281)
Long Term Client	1.470***	-0.525	0.798	1.079
	(0.444)	(0.993)	(1.172)	(1.744)
Age	0.008*	-0.001	-0.012	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Education	0.003	-0.047	0.046	-0.127
	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.081)
Income	-0.004	-0.037	-0.072	-0.139
	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.084)
Gender	-0.009	-0.118	-0.526	0.230
	(0.100)	(0.182)	(0.273)	(0.490)
Rural	0.346***	-0.010	0.375	-0.436
	(0.102)	(0.217)	(0.276)	(0.525)
Kurdish	0.644***	-0.458	0.852	-0.982
	(0.151)	(0.349)	(0.685)	(0.614)
Constant	6.798***	4.545***	8.277***	4.556**
	(0.262)	(0.515)	(0.694)	(1.452)
R^2	0.28	0.10	0.054	0.121
N	1895	643	343	126

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Linear Regression,
DV: Position on a 10-point Ideology Scale, All models control for survey year (2002, 7 and 14).
Non-Client party supporters are the baseline comparison group for short and long term clientelism variables.

Results suggest that demographic variables generally do not explain ideological variance within different party supporter groups. Only among the AKP supporters, living in a rural area and being Kurdish shift AKP supporters more to the right of the ideological spectrum. The fact that the rest of the variables are not associated with the ideological position is promising, suggesting that other factors explain the within-group variance

in ideological position. The main explanatory variable for this analysis is statistically significant for the AKP supporters. When these supporters receive personal benefits from the party in the long-run, they are more than 1.4 points to the right of the non-clients on a 10-point ideology scale. Similarly, long-term MHP clients are almost one point to the right of non-client supporters. On the other hand, long-term clients of the CHP are comparatively more to the left on the ideological scale. More interestingly, long-term client supporters of the Kurdish parties over these three elections are approximately 1 point to the right of non-clients in the ideological scale, but this is not statistically significant. This is an unexpected finding since Kurdish parties are generally perceived to be on the left-wing side of the ideological scale (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p. 263). Constant terms for models also suggest that when we control for all the demographic independent variables as well as linkage types, the CHP and Kurdish parties are more to the left of the ideological spectrum whereas the AKP and the MHP compete for the right-wing voters. In three of the four models, long-term clients shift in the expected direction: the AKP and MHP clients are more right-wing than other party supporters while the CHP clients are more left-wing. However, only the AKP's long-term clients are statistically different from non-client AKP voters.

There are not many long and short term clients for other parties among respondents. Besides from the AKP, other parties generally lack organizational resources to create a high capacity to provide resources. In other words, lack of statistical significance may be an indicator of the lack of clientelistic capacity by the three opposition parties whereas the AKP successfully dominated the public resources and had the incumbency advantage since 2002. Further tests in different policy areas conducted below will reveal whether this finding holds in other models as well. However, it is important to underline here that ideological positions do not change easily. Moreover, models above only conduct the analyses within specific political party supporters. The finding on the persuasive capacity of the AKP's long term clientelistic linkages is very telling in this respect. Figure 5.6 depicts the marginal predictions from the model.

This figure indicates that for the AKP and MHP, there is a monotonic relationship between clientelism and persuasion. From no clientelism to short-term linkages, there is a gradated increase whereas the persuasive shift happens only in the long-term for the CHP. The three Kurdish parties competing in 2002, 2007, and 2014 elections had clients who are comparatively closer to the center. This analysis suggests that even in a difficult case like a general political ideology scale, clientelistic linkages can have persuasive consequences.

Figure 5.6: Predicted Ideological Position



To control for the social desirability bias mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, various scholars devised list experiments to account for the possibility that clients tend to conceal their relationships with parties. These list experiments randomly assign two groups and give several items to respondents. In the experimental group, one item in the list is the sensitive item (e.g., supporting a party in return for benefits). The survey question asks for a count of items applicable to the respondent. The difference between the average number of items reported among treatment and control groups gives an estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive item for the population. In the Turkish case, this experiment was conducted twice before. Once, it was carried out in 2011 Turkish National Election Study, and I replicated this list experiment in an online survey. Results from the 2011 study show that approximately 35% of the Turkish voters receive clientelistic benefits in return for their political support (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015). However, the online experiment revealed that only 7% of the opt-in sample reported clientelism, and the list experiment does not increase this figure. A decrease in the number of clients in an online environment is not surprising because it is not representative of Turkish voters and also, Internet users are economically better-off than non-users.

Moreover, a comparison of the face-to-face and online experiments shows that the social desirability bias may not be a significant methodological limitation in online research where respondents interact with computers rather than individual surveyors. The second section showed that both online and face-to-face respondent groups support these linkages more if they experienced clientelism themselves. This suggests that while differences of desirability bias are particularly relevant in face-to-face surveys, survey mode does not have an effect on how clientelism affects support to it. For 2011 face-to-face study, I used the method devised by (Corstange, 2009) to predict a respondent's likelihood to be a

client from the list experiment.[12] Results are based on a replication of the same analysis conducted by (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015). Based on these results, I calculated every respondent's likelihood to be a client, which is then used as an independent variable to explain changes in policy preferences. Following the model presented in Table 5.10, the predicted likelihood of being a client is measured, in which likelihoods higher than 0 are coded as a client and likelihoods lower than 0 are coded as a non-client. This coding provides a sample of 45% that is predicted to be clients, which is close to the predicted general population of clients in Turkey of around 35.3% by (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015, p. 556). The method to estimate individual likelihoods from the list experiment may inflate standard errors, and there is a margin of error associated with the survey (2.1). Therefore, this predicted likelihood is not used extensively throughout the chapter because of possible biases in estimates except this brief note. I used this list experiment based individual level prediction only to provide further evidence to show that clients are more susceptible to ideological persuasion by political parties. Details of parameters from (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015) are given in **Appendix A**.

A linear regression based on this exercise suggests that compared to non-clients, clients' position on the ideological scale changed 6% more, controlling for the direction of change (i.e. in absolute terms). This is a substantive and statistically significant change. In the previous analysis on a general ideological scale, lack of temporal variation may limit an argument about the causal direction from clientelism to persuasion even if the analysis is conducted within specific political support groups. However, this example controls for confounding variables by predicting the difference in ideological position from pre to post survey, and it accounts for variation in other explanatory variables. There is not a large time span between the two waves of the survey (3 months). However, even in this short time span, clients from different parties are more likely to change their ideological position compared to non-clients.

Further tests are necessary to see if this argument holds in specific policy areas. Analyses in the rest of this section will demonstrate that persuasion is especially relevant in some policy preferences that are salient and divisive. In other words, the analyses below will show that relational persuasion is more likely when policy issues divide different party supporters and clientelistic networks.

[12]See Corstange (2009); Blair and Imai (2012) for details of estimating individual likelihoods based on list experiments.

5.3.2 Different Policy Areas

To differentiate long and short term clientelisms and select policies with varying levels of saliency, this section presents findings from 2014 local election study. [13] It specifically focuses on four policies that vary in divisiveness and saliency. Divisiveness refers to whether parties and their constituents have differing preferences in an issue while saliency refers to whether that issue has been at the forefront of the campaign, covered in the media, and perceived as an important topic by voters. The four areas I will mention here are attitudes towards immigration, secularism and religious politics, ethnic pluralism and lastly, economic nationalization. The first three issues are salient in contemporary Turkish politics whereas economic nationalization has not been a part of the recent political discussions. Also, while immigration and economic nationalization are valence issues in which most of the voters hold similar preferences, the role of religion in Turkish politics and policies about ethnic pluralism are divisive. These differences reflect the center-periphery cleavage in the country. Also, while immigration and economic nationalization are valence issues in which most of the voters hold similar preferences, the role of religion in Turkish politics and policies about ethnic pluralism are divisive. These differences reflect the main center-periphery cleavage in the country. The section briefly mentions recent developments in these four themes, describes party positions, and test clientelistic persuasion among different client groups of the four politically relevant parties.

A Brief Methodological Note

Results presented in the analyses below use logistic regressions to estimate respondents' policy positions. There are two important problems in conducting these analyses and they are about measurement of clientelism and unbiased estimations.

The first problem relates to how we ask questions to clients to measure the concept. As mentioned in previous chapters, a simple question of whether a voter received benefits in return for political support does not measure clientelism because of biases. Such a question can also fail to elucidate the temporal dimension. A solution for this problem is to conduct a factor analysis that predicts the latent concept of clientelistic contact longevity and density. Replicating the results below with this more nuanced measurement does not change the results and details are given in Appendix A.3.1.

The second problem stems from possible self-selection concerns. Chapter 3 mentioned the theoretical limitations in causal identification. Empirically, this problem can bias the estimates presented below. In order to minimize these concerns, Appendix A.3.2 presents a replication of the results with a Heckman selection model.

[13] Details of all the field studies are presented in Appendix A.

Heckman selection model, developed by Heckman (1976), is a two-step approach similar to instrumental variable regression. While IV regressions break endogeneity into correlated and uncorrelated parts, Heckman-type corrections model the sample selection bias by adding a function of predicted probabilities from the first stage. Clientelism creates a non-random selection bias because parties can target voters based on specific determinants of policy positions such as income and educational attainment. This selection process may potentially cause endogeneity between clientelism and policy preferences. Heckman correction estimates outcomes after the first-step equation determines whether the observation is selected as a client by calculating probit coefficients. Errors associated with the two equations are allowed to be correlated. After estimating predicted probability of being a client, the second-step runs an OLS model which examines parameters of the selection with additional control variables and it has the dependent variable of interest on the left-hand side (policy position). By allowing error terms to be correlated and by normalizing the mean, the second stage provides consistent estimates (Blanton, 2000). By accounting for the selection criteria, it also deals with the negative and positive "Perfect Correlation" problems observed for several parties in results presented below. Heckman selection model can be written as such:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&Policy\ Position_i = \beta x_i + \epsilon_i \ \ observed\ only\ if\ w_i = 1,\\
&w_i^* = z_i\gamma + \upsilon_i,\ \ w_i = 1\ if\ w_i^* > 0,\ \ and\ w_i = 0\ otherwise\\
&Prob(w_i = 1|z_i) = \Phi(z_i\gamma)\ and\ Prob(w_i = 0|z_i) = 1 - \Phi(z_i\gamma)\\
&\epsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2)\ and\ \upsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)\\
&corr(\epsilon_i, \upsilon_i) = \rho
\end{aligned}
$$

Where x_i is a set of exogenous independent variables, determining the policy position and w_i^* is the estimated clientelism based on the party's clientelistic contact with the respondent i. If w_i^* is greater than 0, then the predicted clientelism is 1 and otherwise it is 0. Effect of clientelism on policy position is observed when w_i is 1, and z is a set of exogenous variables determining selection process of clientelistic targeting (the outcome of w_i^*). If parties target voters by selecting them on party identity (i.e. being a core voter), then this can cause endogeneity because policy positions and selecting on partisanship may be highly correlated. Therefore, z set includes party support by tapping into the respondent's party support in the previous general elections (2011). Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and error terms ϵ_i and υ_i are assumed to be jointly normal. They are also allowed to be correlated (ρ), which is the correlation coefficient of the two error terms from the selection model (w_i^*) and the regression equation for $PolicyPosition_i$. Substantively, absolute values of ρ represent the level of endogeneity between clientelism and policy positions. The models account

for this selection-based endogeneity, and the task is to estimate the β coefficients of the policy position given vectors of variables x and z as well as observed policy positions and clientelistic targeting (w_i).

Both of the tests for latent measurement and endogeneity provide further evidence that the findings presented below are robust. All of the relevant summary statistics of variables used in the models below, full specifications with control variables, as well as the factor measurement, replication of the models using this continuous latent variable, and Heckman selection replications are presented in Appendix A,section A.3.

Immigration:

Because of the civil war in Syria, the number of refugees seeking asylum in Turkey increased tremendously in recent years. All of the political parties in the opposition disagree with the ruling AKP about immigration to a certain extent. This issue became especially salient starting in 2014 as Turkish voters began to interact with recent Syrian migrants. Although most of these refugees were placed in camps along the border with Syria before, in 2014 the influx forced the government to let these refugees settle freely within the country, increasing the interaction between them and Turkish people. Coupled with the increasing media attention to this development, immigration became a specifically salient issue starting in 2014.

Even if the AKP government had an open-door policy, most of the party's voters were dissatisfied with the rising number of immigrants. In 2014 survey, 60% of respondents who indicated that they would vote for the party if there were a general election today said that the number of immigrants should be decreased. In other words, there was no policy congruence between the party elite and its constituents. Previous analyses show that the AKP voters generally hold conservative, center-right positions. In this respect, it is not surprising to expect party's constituents to be against Syrian migrants. The table below shows the effect of short and long-term clientelistic linkages for the four politically relevant parties. This survey was conducted before the establishment and rising popularity of the HDP which vies for the Kurdish and leftist votes in the country. Its predecessor, the BDP, was modeled instead of the current HDP. Also, because there is a lack of long-term clientelism among CHP's targeted groups, both short and long term CHP clients had to be aggregated together. A question in 2014 survey asks voters if they would prefer Turkey to accept more immigrants or cut back on immigration by having a stricter border control. Results of the analysis are given in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

	AKP	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**
Short Term	1.722	0.610	0.504	0.361
	(0.698)	(0.307)	(0.244)	(0.345)
Long Term	7.856*		Perfect +	0.997
	(8.233)		correlation	(1.234)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.082	0.075	0.075	0.075
N	1397	1397	1392	1397

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic Regression, Odds ratios are presented

Controls are reported in table A.7

The table shows that the AKP's clients are more likely to have anti-immigrant attitudes, even after controlling for various alternative explanatory variables (shown in Table A.8). Those clients who have relational and continuous linkages with the party are more than seven times more likely compared to the rest of the population to oppose immigration, showing a lack of responsiveness between higher level echelons and local party organization. This means that even if AKP constituents are likely to oppose immigration, the party fails to persuade voters through clientelism who have continuous linkages with the party organization. This is the case even after we control for some alternative explanations for attitudes towards immigration such as income and education. In other words, there can be a tension between the central AKP government's open-door policy towards Syrian refugees and local level clientelistic organizations of the party.

On the other hand, the MHP's long term clients all have anti-immigration attitudes. In other words, being a long-term client attached to the far-right MHP perfectly predicts immigration status. This may be because of the data limitations but the fact that all of these clients oppose immigration is telling. Even if it is not statistically significant, short-term clients of the party are also almost 50% less likely compared to the rest of the population to support an open-door policy. Similar effects are observed for the CHP and BDP even if they are not statistically significant.

In summary, results suggest that the AKP's local organizations shift its clients in the long-term to a more opposing policy position. Clients become more attuned with other constituents of the party instead of the party's official policy position. This may be so because local party brokers do not always share the party's official position on issues such as immigration or Kurdish question. Coefficients for other parties in this model are in the expected direction. Long-term clients tend to be closer to their party line but, because of the data limitations, the statistical analysis fails to show significant results.

Islamism:

Islamism vs. secularism has been a historically salient issue in Turkish politics. Various conservative parties starting in the 70s addressed concerns and demands of religiously motivated, conservative voters. Although there is a "rising tide of conservatism" in modern Turkish politics (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009), most of the formal institutions are still secular. Therefore, active Islamist political movements in Turkey demand a more prominent role for religion in the public and political life. This division forms the backbone of the cleavage on conservatism vs. secularism. With its populist discourse and conservative ideology, the ruling AKP has been the dominant actor for both Islamists and religiously moderate yet conservative voters. Similar to a divide between the AKP and the rest, Islamist politics is also a divisive issue which reflects the center-periphery cleavage.

Support for religious Sharia law, which is a very robust indicator of Islamism since not all Islamists categorically support Sharia, is used in the analysis to tap into consequential attitudes about this divisive issue. Only the most conservative segments of Islamist groups support Sharia and an Islamic political system. In this respect, the AKP does not explicitly support Sharia or a full-fledged Islamic political system in its party manifestos. Similarly, the discourse of the party elite is ambivalent at best and outright support for such a radical change is not observed among higher echelons of the party elite. However, even if the party's official line is not Islamist and may not aim for implementation of a policy to enact Sharia laws, a considerable part of its constituents support Sharia. In fact, details of the fieldwork explained in the next chapter show that local party activists generally consist of brokers and party workers who come from such an Islamist background. In this respect, the initial contact persons, i.e. local party officials and brokers, are relatively more attuned to Islamism and they support it more compared to the higher echelons of the AKP. Similarly, several interviews I present in the next chapter show that a portion of MHP supporters also feel close to a religious political system. Çetinsaya (1999) gives a brief history of the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" ideology adopted by the MHP as well as its far-right constituents. He indicates that some party members actively support Islam as a solution to current political problems in Turkey. In this respect, the MHP's clients who are closer to the party's policies and ideological preferences are also expected to support Islamism more than the rest of the voters. Results in Table 5.12 show that this is the case.

Results presented here control for other explanatory variables similar to the analysis on immigration. The model indicates that long-term clients of the AKP are more than

Table 5.12: Approval of Islamic Laws

	AKP	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**
Short Term	1.763	Perfect -	2.332	5.458
	(0.758)	Correlation	(1.503)	(6.249)
Long Term	3.651*		5.673	2.535
	(2.184)		(6.874)	(3.378)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.190	0.180	0.187	0.186
N	1306	1288	1306	1306

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic Regression, Odds ratios are presented

Controls are reported in table A.7

three times more likely to approve implementation of Sharia. Similarly, short-term clients are also more likely, but this finding is not statistically significant. Those with long-term linkages may be party activists who propagate conservative politics in their vicinity. However, the AKP's long-term clients are not official party representatives, and their relationship with the party and its brokers generally depend on discretionary contacts. On the other hand, CHP clients categorically reject Sharia. These results suggest that clientelistic linkages between different party lines have a substantial effect on different policy areas. These effects are robust after including some critical control variables such as religiosity. MHP's clients are also more likely to support Sharia, similar to the effect observed among AKP's clients. Although data limitations prevent identification of the causal direction in a definitive manner for CHP and MHP, results suggest that clientelism has the expected effect on this salient issue.

However, BDP's clients are also more likely to support Sharia, which would be unexpected for a left leaning party. This may be so because the party's constituents are made up of progressive and secular leftist groups as well as more conservative Kurds, who are more likely to be targeted by the party. A similar unexpected finding was presented in the previous section on the general ideological outlook. Further research is necessary to explain why relations between relatively more secular and progressive local brokers of the BDP and conservative Kurdish clients have this unexpected effect. In her study, Akdağ (2014) suggests that the BDP mainly targets conservative Kurdish swing voters during election campaign periods. In fact, results suggest that the BDP's short-term clients who are made up of these swing voter groups are comparatively more likely to support Sharia. Therefore, these unexpected results may be related to different political groups within the larger BDP's constituency and the fact that conservative and poor Kurds are more likely to be targeted by the party. Coupled with the previous finding from Table 5.10 which shows that the long-term BDP clients are relatively more right-wing,

further research about the BDP's clientelistic targeting strategy can yield interesting results about electoral competition among different Kurdish voters and targeting strategies.

Economic Nationalization:

Nationalization of economic resources and companies, especially in strategic sectors such as telecommunication, natural resource extraction, and finance was on the agenda of opposition parties during the surge of privatization policies throughout the AKP's earlier tenure. However, economic nationalization lost its salience over the last decade. Recently, none of the parties pay considerable attention to this topic in their election manifestos. Also, the recent economic discourse of the AKP's policy makers is based on economic nationalization up to an extent, blurring the lines between the governing party and relevant opposition parties. Most of the voters (around 72%) defend nationalization of economic resources. In fact, supporters of the four parties are not different from each other. Economic nationalization is neither divisive nor salient. In fact, my fieldwork also shows that neither voters nor local brokers mention national economic ownership as a significant political problem. Neither clients I talked with nor brokers referred to economic nationalization. Media also does not cover this topic in recent years. Two previous analyses on immigration policies and Sharia above showed that clientelism is especially effective when the policy issue is salient for the clientelistic party. Therefore, an analysis of the effect of different clientelistic types is not expected to show a significant and substantive relation between linkage types and economic nationalization.

Table 5.13: Pro-Economic Nationalization

	AKP	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**
Short Term	0.921	0.775	0.547	0.967
	(0.324)	(0.369)	(0.259)	(1.128)
Long Term	0.827		Perfect +	1.067
	(0.501)		Correlation	(1.328)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.028	0.029	0.030	0.028
N	1274	1274	1269	1274

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic Regression, Odds ratios are presented

Controls are reported in table A.7

This seems to be the case except for the MHP. As mentioned above, the MHP is an ultra-nationalist party with Islamist undertones. Therefore, the party's long-term clients who are well integrated into the party organization categorically support economic nationalization which is not unexpected. However, for other parties, coefficients show that

there is not a substantive relationship between clientelism and attitudes towards economic nationalization. Additionally, likelihoods are not very different from each other, and they are not statistically significant, indicating that besides from the far-right MHP's long-term clients, other parties are not effective in persuading their clients in this rather insignificant valence issue. This null finding is important on its own as it provides further evidence about the role of issue salience for persuasion.

Ethnic Pluralism:

Last policy to be analyzed in this section is about attitudes towards minorities and ethnic pluralism in Turkey. The sizable Kurdish minority in the country has been demanding social and political rights as well as devolution of the political power to local governments. Up until recently, Turkey had a hegemonic policy towards ethnicity, ignoring ethnic differences and propagating a national identity (Aktürk, 2012). A thaw in relations with the Kurdish population could be promising but, ethnic pluralism remains a divisive issue, and it may not be viable in close future as the Kurdish conflict turned violent once again in late 2015.

This has been a salient, divisive issue in which the CHP and MHP generally oppose pluralism whereas the Kurdish parties over the years such as BDP, HDP, and their predecessors supported ethnic pluralism with policies such as public education in native languages, more local political rights, and far-reaching propositions such as a federalist political system and secession. An intense internal conflict, which resembles a full-fledged civil war from time to time, has been going on for more than three decades with the PKK, an illegal, non-state armed group that rebelled against the state in the 80s. While most of the population opposes PKK's demands for secession, a more moderate policy proposal has been about cultural rights and native language. A question in the 2014 survey asks about whether different ethnic groups should be able to keep their identities, languages, and cultures or whether all different ethnicities should blend into an overarching Turkish national identity. This taps into the more moderate proposal by which we can capture variance among the general population. Results indicate that around 35% of respondents support ethnic pluralism while the rest oppose it. Moreover, the majority of the BDP supporters (66%) are for pluralism whereas on average, only one-third of the constituents from other parties support ethnic pluralism. Results in Table 5.14 also show this difference between the BDP and other parties.

Except the AKP's short-term clients, all of the clients are less likely to support ethnic pluralism compared to non-clients. However, these results are not statistically significant hinting either to lack of a sufficient number of observations among client groups or to

Table 5.14: Pro-Ethnic Pluralism

	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Short Term	1.305	0.868	0.411	Perfect +
	(0.434)	(0.453)	(0.233)	Correlation
Long Term	0.928		Perfect -	Perfect +
	(0.587)		Correlation	Correlation
Nagelkerke R^2	0.053	0.052	0.055	0.050
N	1227	1227	1222	1220

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic Regression, Odds ratios are presented

Controls are reported in table A.7

the possibility that brokers cannot persuade their clients either in the short or the long-term. However, there are two exceptions to this limitation. First of all, MHP's long-term clients are categorically rejecting ethnic pluralism (hence the perfect negative correlation). Also, short-term clients are 60% less likely to support pluralism which is not unexpected from clients of a right-wing nationalist party. On the other hand, both short and long term clients of the BDP categorically support ethnic pluralism. Since control variables include party support dummies as well as a dummy for Kurdish respondents as shown in Appendix Table A.8, this suggests that having contacts with the party, regardless of whether this contact is continuous or single-shot, those clients are more likely to support ethnic pluralism. In other words, there is a substantive association between clientelistic contact and ethnic pluralism for BDP supporters. This is also not an unexpected finding since one of the party's raison d'etre is rights for ethnic minorities. In other words, this data suggests that clients who are within the BDP's clientelistic networks are distinctly supportive of ethnic pluralism and the party successfully persuades clients to support this policy.

5.3.3 Summary of Findings

The four policy areas analyzed above suggest several related findings. First of all, even with a very small sample of clients that experience short or long-term linkages with parties, we still observe some significant shifts in these selected political issues and policy preferences. Moreover, these effects are generally in the expected direction except the AKP clients' attitudes on immigration, shifting further away from the party's official policy. However, there are several caveats. First of all, when local and central party positions diverge, it is possible that this shift is towards the local party organization with which clients usually interact instead of the higher level party line. The analysis suggests that this may be the case for the AKP's persuasive effect on immigration policy.

Secondly, there are several cases of perfect correlation especially for the MHP and BDP, respectively the two more far-right and far left-wing parties. In other words, clients of these two parties are particularly likely to follow the party's policy line. However, this can be an artifact of the data set since the number of sub-samples within short and long term clientelistic groups are relatively small. Overall, the fact that the effects are in the theorized direction is a promising finding.

Secondly, the substantive impact of the persuasive effect is higher in salient policies, and the AKP is generally speaking more successful in persuading clients through continuous linkages. When the AKP's official party line is not ambivalent in a given policy, its clients are more likely to share the issue position or policy preference propagated by the party. Also, this is especially visible among salient and historically relevant matters such as immigration (a contemporary but prominent issue) and Islamism (a historical issue that reflects the center-periphery cleavage). As the next chapter will argue, issue saliency shapes clientelistic relationships profoundly. The analysis above suggests a starting point to define a major scope condition, i.e. issue importance, which mediates the persuasive effect of linkages. Additional robustness tests presented in Appendix A Table A.10 and Table A.11 also provide methodologically robust evidence for this effect.

In addition to these findings on specific policy positions, a more general test of ideology in this section showed that long-term clientelism is especially effective in creating a conducive environment in which local party organizations can persuade clients through continuing their relationships. This is tested in a robust, sub-group analysis across four politically relevant parties. After controlling for several important correlates of ideological position, it is clear that long-term clients are still more likely to approximate to their party's position in a general ideology scale. Further tests to eliminate social desirability bias also corroborate this finding. Tests in both specific policy areas and a general ideology scale suggest that continuous personal interactions cause persuasion.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided quantitative empirical evidence from Turkey to argue that clientelism is a crucial type of linkage that shapes the relationship between parties and voters. Various studies focus on the supply side of this relationship, detailing expected electoral outcomes for political parties. However, findings in this chapter suggest that clientelism continues *even* outside the campaign periods. In other words, it can be a continuous process based on promises and benefits proffered to clients in various stages both during and after an electoral cycle. Findings from a cross-country comparison suggest that these linkages are especially common in middle-income countries, in which a period of trans-

formation in the market structure can create the suitable environment for this type of relationship between parties and voters. Even after accounting for party-level variables, the multilevel analysis shows that macro-level factors matter. Long-term clientelism is stickier, and unlike its short-term variant, it does not vanish quickly with economic development. This is not unexpected since the term itself suggests a strong path-dependency. In the micro-level among non-client and client voters, this dependency is evident as parties are more likely to continue their clientelistic relationships with those who previously had a contact with party organizations. As clients reach out to more offices and thus intensify their contacts over time, the likelihood of being targeted by parties increase. Continuity in these relationships is a crucial factor to understand how the temporal dimension may influence outcomes of clientelism.

Based on these initial findings, the chapter conducted several different tests of clientelistic outcomes by separating short and long term contacts. An initial test was on the convergence of behavior and attitudes: simply put, clients should be more approving of clientelism. Even if this is a relatively easy implication of the theorized outcomes, it is valuable because it can be a litmus test. As cognitive dissonance theory suggests, the primary motivating factor behind attitudinal change should be the behavior itself. In fact, this seems to be the case. Both experimental and observational data in the second section suggest that clients approve these linkages more than other voters. Also, attitudes about clientelism depend on contextual factors. Controlling for clientelistic recipiency, two experiments show that voters are more likely to approve clientelism when it requires more personally bounded knowledge and when problems require immediate assistance. In general, the approval rating is determined by immediacy, level of relational linkages and the clientelistic behavior itself. These findings support the argument on the persuasive effects of long-term linkages. Also, they indicate that parties are able to persuade their voters more in issues pertaining to benefit distribution when they continue their contacts over time.

Clientelism is generally defined in the literature as a distribution of benefits in return for political support. Political support can mean various things such as showing up in rallies, turning out to vote, convincing relatives to vote for a party or even switching party allegiance. However, these behavioral facets of support also accompany a change in attitudes and preferences. When clients depend on local party organizations for benefits, they are more likely to support party positions and adopt attitudes that are in line with the party. Findings show that this theorized effect is visible especially in divisive and salient issues. Even the limited amount of data from Turkey suggests that persuasive effects of clientelism are particularly important for long-term clients. Not only do clients may behave in accordance with the party line, but also they are persuaded to support their

patron in the long run. A test on whether this is a diffused and general ideological shift towards the party or whether clients and local party organizations cherry-pick policies for more persuasive outcomes suggests that there is a generalized, diffused persuasion working in different policy areas as well as the general ideological position of the clients. Some initial findings suggest that this persuasive effect happens towards the direction of the local party organizations rather than the central party line when there is a conflict between local and central party preferences. This initial finding suggests that the local level brokers in which clientelistic linkages take place have an important asset, i.e. persuasive capacity, not only against their local clients but also against the party's higher echelons.

This diffused persuasive effect of long-term clientelism is observed in the expected direction. Also, a list experiment, which alleviates the internal validity problem by controlling for the social desirability bias and additional robustness tests presented in Appendix A support these findings. However, a further question is about the process of this effect. It may be possible that only those who are already close to the party position is targeted by long-term clientelism. Panel data analysis presented in this chapter and the Heckman selection model in Appendix A both suggest that intense and continuous clientelism causes the theorized effect even after we account for possible self-selection problems. In order to further test the direction of the theorized causal linkage, and explain the processes through which clientelism affects policy preferences, the next chapter turns to further empirical findings from a comparative field study which situates clientelism in specific local circumstances.

6

Clientelism and its Relationship to Gentrification and Poverty in Two Neighborhoods

This chapter focuses on the meaning of targeted benefits for clients and suggests a causal direction from long-term benefits to persuasion and attitudinal change by presenting findings from the fieldwork conducted in two neighborhoods of İstanbul. In the previous chapter, I showed that when parties target clients, there is more ideological affinity in the long term. However, it is possible that parties already tend to target their core voters who are ideologically close to the party line. These voters would have more attitudinal proximity to the clientelistic party's policy preferences. To test these alternative directions and explain long-term clientelism's effects, I conducted fieldwork in two selected neighborhoods of İstanbul. This chapter will present findings from this fieldwork in selected themes that illustrate critical factors for clientelistic linkages. Throughout this chapter, I will present findings from the two neighborhoods and explain causes and consequences of long-term clientelism in a comparative way by referring to these themes, namely urban gentrification and poverty.

Parties may be likely to support their core constituents who are already close to the party line with personalistic benefits in order to keep the ranks close. However, they do not target only core voters in the long run. They also try to reach out to undecided and apathetic voters who either do not have policy preferences or have preferences that do not match the party line. I argue that when these linkages are established, brokers and party officials try to persuade these new clients so that voters' policy opinions change in the long run, approximating the party ideology. Parties and voters may experience significant shifts in their economic resources during this long process. Therefore, I specifically focus on two topics around which I present findings, trying to control for long-term shifts in economic resources and opportunity structures.

One of these focal points is the recent gentrification process in İstanbul and the urban housing issue. In numerous neighborhoods of İstanbul, gentrification compels working class residents to leave central parts of the city, creating an immediate crisis for families. Most of the working class residents in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification do

not have a deed to their houses. In fact, these neighborhoods were usually established as squatters (*gecekondu*) in the 1970s and the 1980s, where working class families have been living for more than four decades. In the early 2000s, almost one-third of İstanbul's residents were living in such informal areas (İçduygu, 2004, p. 944). This informality creates an immediate problem for many residents who cannot afford to move to another neighborhood unless they decide to move to the outskirts of the city where they need to commute approximately three to four hours every day. Local government officials such as neighborhood headmen and district governors usually become political brokers in such crisis situations. Also, politicians from different parties promise deeds to owners of these squatter houses, especially during election periods. In other words, gentrification facilitates linkages between politicians and voters. When these linkages are already established before gentrification, their intensity increases or they are revitalized, as we will see in this chapter. Discussions of such alternative trajectories based on an exogenous shock such as gentrification provide evidence for the persuasive effects of long-term clientelism. While those who have a relationship with the party before the gentrification are well-versed with the party platform, those clients who established linkages with party offices after the gentrification started and those who do not have any clientelistic relationship with a party are less likely to know minute details of the party platform. Additionally, long-term clients who lost their contact with the party machine for different reasons react not only against the specific clientelistic party but also against the whole party system. These alternative trajectories suggest that long-term clientelism has an important effect in local communities.

Another important area to understand the effect of long-term clientelism is poverty. Although clients' economic opportunities may change over time, the fieldwork suggests that when clientelistic linkages are established, they remain robust in the face of improvements in the socioeconomic status. Parties target impoverished neighborhoods, but some clients in the locality may be relatively well off. In this respect, clientelism is a path dependent phenomenon. When clientelism is established, it tends to continue even if targeted resources may have a greater return of political support if they are redirected to more impoverished voters. Relative poverty itself does not fully explain clientelistic targeting. On the contrary, findings in this chapter suggest that when political parties target a small community, benefits are not perfectly distributed according to needs. These findings, which imply contrary arguments to the previous literature on clientelistic targeting, are explained by the path dependent nature of long-term relationships. Long-term clients benefit from targeted goods even if they do not "deserve" them. In return, they support the party not only during elections but also in other periods.

This chapter starts with a description of local, neighborhood-level politics in İstanbul, one of the largest cities in the world. I also emphasize the importance of *mahalle*, the smallest administrative and socioeconomic unit, for studying local interactions between politicians and voters. This section is followed by an explanation of the comparative logic behind this chapter and relevant selection criteria for the two neighborhoods studied here. Further details of these criteria are explained in **Appendix B**. Then, the chapter details the findings from the fieldwork for the two neighborhoods respectively under two themes mentioned above, namely gentrification and urban poverty. These topics are related to the impact of long-term clientelism, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of long-term clientelism's effects and a comparatively summarizes findings from the two neighborhoods.

6.1 Studying İstanbul's Neighborhoods as a Field of Clientelism

İstanbul is the largest city in Turkey, and it is the backbone of the country's economy. Also, local politics of İstanbul is crucial for the whole country. 16% of all the seats in the parliament are elected from the three electoral districts of the city, and approximately 18% of the total population lives in İstanbul. In addition, all political parties compete in the city as no political organization can take the chance of not being visible in the city's political life. From the most fringe party to all mainstream political parties and interest groups, İstanbul is at the heart of Turkish politics and economy. With approximately 15 million residents, it is divided into 39 administrative districts. Every district has a governor working under the provincial governor. Governors are appointed by the central government. These districts also have municipalities elected by residents. There is also a metropolitan municipality elected by all residents of İstanbul. The metropolitan mayor provides local infrastructural services to the whole population. All of these bodies also provide social services to their respective constituents. In addition, every neighborhood within these 39 districts has a headman (muhtar), which is a non-political figure on paper. He cannot be affiliated with a party. Similarly, party organizations cannot establish local branches at the neighborhood level. However, as we will see in this chapter, parties have local neighborhood committees and representatives that are diametrically opposed to laws on political parties. In summary, centrally appointed district and provincial governors, as well as elected district municipalities, the metropolitan municipality, neighborhood muhtars, and local party branches are relevant actors in providing necessary goods and services to the public in İstanbul. All of these actors are politically relevant for explaining how redistribution processes work in İstanbul and the most suitable unit to explain redistribution is the neighborhoods of İstanbul.

In 2014 presidential elections, there were 936 neighborhoods in 39 districts. These neighborhood units are highly relevant for people's daily lives because most of the political and social interaction takes place in them. *Mahalle* is an intimate space in which everyday interactions with local shops and neighbors takes place.

As a concept and an administrative unit, *mahalle* also has significant historic roots. *Mahalles* were the most relevant social units during the Ottoman period. It was a juncture for public and private lives of the İstanbulites (Ergenç, 1984, pp.69-70). This character of the neighborhood remains relevant especially in working class quarters of the city. Although professional, white-collar workers are arguably detached from peculiar characteristics of a mahalle lifestyle, it is still relevant for middle and working classes in İstanbul. *Mahalle* is the backbone of the community and social capital for most residents. Interviews with party officials from the AKP and CHP also show that party activists pay special attention to neighborhoods when they try to canvass votes or continue their contacts with voters after election campaign periods.

For instance, one young activist from the AKP indicated that there are "neighborhoods one can go to and neighborhoods one cannot in this district [*Gaziosmanpaşa*]. Visiting voters and establishing ties with them depends on the neighborhood. There was an incident several years ago when our friend was harassed only for knocking on people's doors. We try to go everywhere but sometimes it is not possible." Similarly, a high-ranking officer from CHP's Sarıyer district said, "sometimes it may be impossible to persuade even your brother. So, what we did to convince some neighborhoods was to cooperate with the headman of the *mahalle*. We funded a neighborhood's local football team and always had the headman with us when we visited the neighborhood." Both party workers argued that it was very tough for them to campaign in politicized and hostile neighborhoods. Establishing a foothold in a neighborhood can be challenging for parties and most of the time, party activists do not see a benefit in visiting these places because chances of persuading potential clients or buying their votes are minimal. However, in most of the interviews I conducted with party activists and local officials, neighborhoods were the main unit in which brokers and activists work. When parties think about local efforts to reach out to new voters or continue their relationship with supporters, they think about the mahalle. During the election campaign periods, district-level party branches are organized based on neighborhoods. Outside the campaign periods, parties have local liaisons and representatives in each neighborhood. In fact, during my interviews, some political brokers praised a neighborhood to elaborate how local residents were very amicable and supportive while in other cases, they were discouraged because of the reaction they received in a neighborhood, especially during an electoral campaign period. But most of the parties devise their electoral and political strategies to gain support on neighborhoods

rather than districts or individual households.

Party officials know how important these local units are, and they pay special attention to neighborhoods during campaigns. Patrons and brokers also continue clientelistic relationships outside of the campaign period. Also, most of the brokers and clients live in the same neighborhood, sharing similar networks within the same community. Therefore, two neighborhoods are the focal point of the fieldwork presented in this chapter.

In order to explain determinants of long-term clientelism and their consequences, I chose two neighborhoods to conduct this fieldwork and then, 10 residential streets from these two neighborhoods were randomly selected from a comprehensive list of all the streets in the neighborhood and household visits were conducted with randomly selected residents. From these initial 20 households, a snowball sample was developed. These two neighborhoods are very similar to each other in many respects, and they represent an average İstanbul neighborhood in terms of socioeconomic development and electoral support. Details of the neighborhood selection criteria are in **Appendix B**. It suffices to say here that these two neighborhoods are within the same district. Therefore, this study controls for peculiarities of the district-level redistribution in these two neighborhoods. In addition, both neighborhoods have a population of around 9,000 voters, with similar demographic backgrounds and migration patterns. Economic development levels in both neighborhoods were very close to the İstanbul's average and residents usually worked in unskilled, manual jobs such as junk dealing, car washing, and local fisheries. In addition, I devised a measure based on electoral competitiveness to evaluate the clientelistic potential by different parties. Details of the clientelistic potential index are also in **Appendix B**. This measurement is based on a core-voter targeting argument from literature as explained in **Chapter 3**. Briefly, it measures the clientelistic potential by calculating the unexpected increase in an election by referring to previous voting patterns. The premise behind this potentiality is that clientelistic benefits should provide unexpected votes to the party's tally. After controlling for socioeconomic factors, this measurement was used to select the two neighborhoods within the same district. Findings in this chapter will show that this measurement cannot capture clientelistic intensity in a neighborhood. In other words, electoral competition and discontinuity as suggested by the previous literature is not sufficient to explain clientelism in a neighborhood. On the contrary, I will argue that linkages are sticky, i.e. there are sunk costs, so we need to look into the history of the neighborhood-level clientelistic linkages to explain why they occur and what effects they have in clients' political preferences.

The following two sections of this chapter describe the two neighborhoods and explain clientelistic linkages based on the two themes mentioned above, namely gentrification and

urban poverty. For each neighborhood, a thick historical description is given first, followed by a focus on the effects of gentrification and urban poverty. Explanations of clientelism and its effects revolve around these themes as I explain the neighborhoods and results from the fieldwork. The fieldwork suggests that clientelistic linkages are path-dependent, and they have a relational nature. When these linkages start within the peculiar context of a community, they tend to continue as long as clients remain vulnerable within urban poverty circles. However, factors external to these linkages such as gentrification are shocks to these relationships, and these shocks challenge the stability of clientelism. When clients integrate into local party organizations, the local party brokers affect their policy preferences. These clients show proclivities of ideological proximity to prospective clientelistic parties. In other words, the fieldwork indicates that policy approximation and preference proximity is not only a cause but also a consequence of long-term clientelism.

6.2 Pınar: Revival of Long Term Clientelistic Linkages During Gentrification

Pınar is a neighborhood in northern hills of İstanbul. It is within the boundaries of Sarıyer district, and it has a lively main street with local groceries, cafes, patisseries, and butchers. Most of the residential streets are just a five-minute walk from the main street. Architecturally, it is somewhat chaotic as most working class neighborhoods in İstanbul are, but as the city grew since the 1980s, Pınar became a more central location in the larger metropolitan area.

People I interviewed indicate that most of the early residents came from Anatolia back in the early 70s. Initial houses were constructed as *gecekondu* (squatter shacks). When these early residents came, most of the local infrastructural services, as well as public education and health services, were non-existent. In an interview I conducted with an old woman who was one of these first residents in Pınar said:

> *When we came and settled here back in 1978, there was nothing. There was no asphalt so our shoes would be full of mud up to our knees during winter if we wanted to walk and we had to walk, there was no running water when my husband built our gecekondu, so I had to walk down fifteen minutes to İstinye [another, more historic neighborhood close to Pınar] to carry water for the house.*

Things started to change in Pınar after the construction of the Second Bosphorus Bridge in 1986. As this important highway project was completed, land value in Pınar started to increase because these northern hills were becoming increasingly central, with the bridge passing close to the area. After the bridge, first infrastructural projects also began in Pınar. Water pipes and asphalt roads were built. An interesting story to illustrate this historical development is the story of the only public school in the neighborhood.

This school was in fact built back in 1972 as early residents moved in. It only had four classrooms in a shack. In 1976, the shack was not enough for the increasing number of students anymore, so the school moved to one of the squatter houses. It was only in 1988 when the school moved to a proper, formal public schoolhouse with modern classrooms as residents started to voice their concerns about the safety and smooth operation of the school building. This story also illustrates how the neighborhood developed over the last forty years. For at least fifteen years, starting from the early 70s, residents were not able to get most of the services from the local and central governments.

In this framework, local party activists played a crucial role in becoming a liaison for necessary services. For instance, in another interview conducted with one of Pınar's early residents, he underlined that he had been living here for the last four decades, and he is retired from a restaurant as a cook's helper. He said that back when they were building the neighborhood, he was very active in the community. He complained about contemporary frivolous lifestyle especially among youth indicating, that back when he was working, he would work most of the day and come to the neighborhood to help his neighbors in chores or carrying construction materials while they were building *gecekondu*s for themselves. He also indicated that things used to be more sincere, saying:

> *"We did not have much maybe, but we knew how to make do with what we had on our hands. Back then; politics was also not like what it is now. People valued each other's opinion, and we had people helping us from numerous parties. I know they didn't do it for support in the elections. This place maybe was poor but we had a proper neighborhood [implying a close-knit community], we did not care which party they were affiliated with. They were also children of this neighborhood, and they would listen to our problems. They would help us whether you are from the AKP or MHP did not matter. Now they come and listen whenever we need something or whenever there is an election coming up, but do they really care? How should I know, but back then I knew that they cared. Otherwise, why would a guy help you build your gecekondu after working all day long."*

During the early years of the neighborhood, Pınar had a close-knit community in which party representatives had a central place. This is not surprising given that the government services were mostly absent from Pınar. These party representatives were not outsiders to the neighborhood. They were also residents living there. Localism was a major part of the political interaction between early clients and brokers. When these party brokers helped residents, they were also representing their party. Assistance that they provided or any of the liaising between the neighborhood and public officials was an important informational cue for residents. However, it was not symbolical. This personal help was in various areas such as construction of houses, writing petitions to the district municipality and the local

governorate, assisting locals and referring them to higher quality health service facilities, provision of financial assistance in health and heating expenses and organizing communal meals during Ramadan.

These party activists filled an important gap in the early history of Pınar. Facing with the local government's lack of resources, parties filled in the vacuum. Most of the senior, first generation residents I interviewed in the neighborhood vividly remember these days and problems they faced in their everyday lives. While some of them did not mention these early party activists, several of them, indicated that these activists were locally popular figures. Most of the time, they used this popularity not to gain votes or mobilize voters for support, but to make an impression. They were successful in doing so. Even after 40 years, these early dwellers of Pınar were able to mention late party activists, reminiscing about how these party activists' efforts strengthened the communal bond in the neighborhood. Especially the CHP and the National Order Party *(Milli Nizam Partisi - MNP)*, the predecessor of conservative, Islamist parties in the country, were very active in the neighborhood. These political brokers eventually became influential local figures in the neighborhood.

Most of these early residents were coming from rural villages of the Inner Anatolia and the Black Sea regions, and their social position in the city's economy was not auspicious for social mobilization. Although most of the interviewees had a stable job and they were not in a very precarious situation anymore, they underlined that they lived in a subsistence economy back in the 70s and early 80s. All of them indicated that they could not save any money for an emergency. Life savings were unattainable, perpetuating the precariousness in the neighborhood. However, this started to change after Pınar became a centrally located part of the city in the 80s. Hike in rents and house prices followed the increase in land prices. Starting in the 90s, early residents living in *gecekondu*s were renting a part of their houses as a secondary income. In 1981, Istanbul Technical University, one of the largest universities in the country also established its current main campus very close to the neighborhood. As the number students in this campus increased, Pınar became an alternative residential area for students because of its low rents. For instance, one interviewee rented a part of her *gecekondu* to two students for several years and with this additional income, she was able to construct the second floor to her house, albeit illegally. While she was a house maker, spending most of her days in Pınar, her husband was a bus driver working for the local municipality during the 90s. She underlined that they would not be able to build the second floor with her husband's salary. The infrastructural development of the 80s and construction of the university campus were followed by a hike in the rents during the 90s, and that is when Pınar turned into a working class neighborhood rather than a shantytown of squatters and new

immigrants.

After its transformation in the 90s, it resembles any other working class neighborhood in İstanbul both in socioeconomic and architectural terms. Old *gecekondus* are either fully renovated to have a garden with a more spacious single-story house, or they are bulldozed and turned into four or five-story apartment blocks. Usually, members of the same family reside in such buildings. During the 90s, as the economic development of the neighborhood continued, luxurious gated communities were constructed right next to the neighborhood, creating a striking contrast. Residents of Pınar do not interact with these gated communities. On the contrary, it creates tension. One resident who is working in a car wash explains:

> *"These places [gated communities] are constructed right next to us but we do not share anything. We see their cars; I haven't seen a Ferrari passing by Pınar even once during my childhood. Now we see those luxurious cars and their lifestyle. Of course, the youth in Pınar see these things, and they envy. But one should always earn their living with their own labor. For instance, I saved up some money and bought myself a Şahin [one of the cheapest car models in Turkey], I am very proud of it. If I envied those rich people living close to me, I couldn't function properly. I would spend my days thinking why I don't have such luxuries. And that is what happens among Pınar's youth; this is why we have a drug problem in the neighborhood, the youth is spending their days away without any objective, without a job, and they envy things they cannot afford."*

These gated communities became a stark reality for Pınar in the 2000s, as the whole city started to change tremendously. Parallel to the neoliberal urban policies of the AKP government, house prices and land values in central locations of İstanbul soared. In cases such as Pınar, residents were either forced to leave the neighborhood for gentrification, or they are still fighting for their rights to the city.

6.2.1 Gentrification in Pınar

Marketization of the space resulted in an unusual bizarreness: some of the most expensive houses in the country are built right next to these renovated *gecekondus*. Although Pınar did not experience any violent conflict because of these striking inequalities, some other neighborhoods close to Pınar did. For instance, there were serious altercations and protests in Derbent, which is another working-class neighborhood next to Pınar.[1] In fact,

[1] Although there is no neighborhood-level data on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods, immigration patterns and percentage of residents' province of registration suggest that Pınar, Derbent, and Maden share similar ethnic compositions. A cluster analysis of all the neighborhoods in Istanbul shows that these three neighborhoods, as well as most of the neighborhoods in the district, are in the same cluster. In fact, this analysis, which is not reported in this dissertation, shows the geographical polarization of ethnic composition in Istanbul: the most substantive and significant predictor of a neighborhood's cluster is the composition of neighborhoods that share a boundary.

during my interview with the headman of Derbent, the headman of the neighborhood clearly indicated that I should not conduct fieldwork there because of the politically sensitive situation and the high tension in the neighborhood. Similarly, Pınar's residents were not happy with these gated communities. Also, one of the most luxurious shopping malls in the city was built here in 2007. An interviewee explained that they were very curious about this new mall at first since they thought it would create new employment opportunities for residents. In fact, a woman who was visiting her mother in Pınar indicated that some of her cousins used to work at this mall as cleaning personnel. However, other interviews revealed that not many people were benefitting from this luxurious shopping mall anymore. After seven years of its establishment, this mall did not have a substantive impact on people's lives in Pınar. On the contrary, it was becoming a nuisance. Several residents complained about its effects. Personnel shuttles of the mall were parking on the main street during work hours, creating congestion and drivers were verbally harassing locals. Also, these inequalities were becoming very striking for residents. One retired resident explains:

> *"My pension is only enough for our living. My wife and me, we can't afford any extra expenses. How can we? Look at this huge place [points to the mall], how can we go there to have dinner one evening? If we did, we would starve for the rest of the month. We have four grandchildren, and they don't understand this. When they come to live with us during summers, they want things, and this is a general problem of the youth. Can you blame them? Not really, they see all those fancy stuff, and they want them. This may be natural, but this is not how things were before I retired. We were hardworking people in this neighborhood, and we never asked for more. But there is a shortage in everything now because there is wastefulness. Things will be worse in forty, fifty years. I don't know how we will handle this problem here."*

During the interview with this retired resident, he also mentioned that the "big fish always eats the small fish" and that a tolerable level of economic inequality is understandable in a market economy. But he also mentioned that the inequality they see nowadays is tremendous as the neighborhood undergoes gentrification and so they were looking up to the central government for solutions. He said that the central government should take care of its citizens "just like a father". In other words, he was content with the current AKP government. But he underlined that they should do more to alleviate problems of the poor. He also made an interesting analogy for the course of his party support over the years: "... there are good teachers and bad teachers. We tried them all in the 90s, but none of them were competent. Now we have a good teacher, leading us and helping us [referring to the AKP]". His analogies on teachers and fathers can be read as a reference to a paternalistic understanding of politics. In this paternalistic structure, he expected a more equitable redistribution, alleviating the differences between residents of Pınar and

the luxurious lifestyle that surrounds the neighborhood for the last decade. He was not getting any benefits from the AKP, but he was relieved to see that the party was helping his poor neighbors whenever they needed assistance.

In addition to the rising level of inequality in the neighborhood, the most urgent problem has been the urban renewal project that has been on the agenda of the residents for the last couple of years. Whenever I talked with a resident in Pınar about the biggest problem they face in their neighborhood, they underlined the urban renewal and gentrification. This is not unrelated to the recent boom of expensive projects such as the shopping mall and gated communities. As these construction projects are completed, Pınar became increasingly central, and its land value increased tremendously. Today, an average house price in the neighborhood is higher than the average of İstanbul. Especially the luxurious communities within the neighborhood boundaries increase this average. These houses and apartment complexes are some of the most expensive in the city. Although they are physically a part of the neighborhood, they do not socially or economically share anything with the rest of Pınar, and they do not add value to the community. Older residents who renovated their *gecekondus* to single-story houses with gardens or multistory buildings do not benefit from the increasing value of the neighborhood. In fact, the urban renewal process is a critical threat for residents who have been living in the same house for the last three or four decades.

Most of the residents built their houses illegally, without any deed to the land or house titles. In fact, local and central politicians turned a blind eye to this regardless of party affiliation. The word for this type of residential structure, *gecekondu* means "built overnight", implying that the residents had to construct the structure quickly and secretively so that local officials could not bulldoze it. These houses became an important reality for Turkish politics starting in the 1980s, and none of the politicians could solve legal problems associated with *gecekondus*. For three decades, different parties and coalitions in the central government sought to find a solution to illegal settlements through the legal framework. Starting in 1984 with the article 2981, the central government tried to regulate *gecekondu* areas with urban renewal projects and providing *gecekondu* owners with legal house titles.[2] However, this legislation did not solve the problem since local bureaucratic regulations and municipal zoning laws hindered distribution of legal deeds to residents. In addition to local bureaucracy, the central government supports the cooperation between municipalities and private construction companies in urban renewal projects. Recently, local and central governments cooperated in this new juncture to benefit from the rent, which was to be created out of these procurement deals.

[2]The first legislation about squatter houses was passed in 1966, but during the 70s, the central government did not take any action about this immediate housing problem.

This neoliberal projection on working-class neighborhoods became especially pronounced in neighborhoods of Sarıyer district including Pınar, for the last decade. It created tension between residents and local political figures. However, it also turned into an opportunity for politicians to reestablish and continue the clientelistic linkages with residents. After a period of intense clientelism in the 70s and 80s, there was a hiatus in the 90s as Pınar gained momentum in its economic development and wealth accumulation. Shortly after this period of attenuation in clientelistic linkages, residents felt threatened, and they became disillusioned as their houses were at imminent risk of being bulldozed since they did not have a deed or any other legal document entitling them to their houses.

Lack of a legal deed was the most important local problem Pınar's residents faced during the fieldwork period. A sixty-two-year-old woman who has been living in Pınar for the last 35 years said that she never had a title to for her house, and she wanted financial assistance and subsidies to leave her home if it was going to be sold to a construction company. If this was not going to happen, she wanted the local municipality to give her a title to the house. Another resident who has been living in Pınar for 28 years and migrated to Pınar from Kars said that all he has is the title to his apartment in a building. He was unemployed and said that if they took his title from him, he did not have anything else left. If they were to renovate his building and build a better apartment, then he could not live there anymore because of the additional monthly expenses he would have to pay. He was the only interviewee I came across in Pınar, who had a title to his house. Even in his case, one cannot say that he was not in a precarious situation since he was unemployed and his house was his only asset. His worsening economic condition after he became unemployed also caused him to react against the AKP and other parties:

> *"Back in the day, my father was able to raise 12 children with only himself working in our household. Now we cannot make it to the end of the month even if four of us work. I even have to get a loan for our food expenses. Back in the 90s, I used to support the CHP, but when they got corrupt, I switched to the AKP. But I am not happy with them anymore. They got corrupt too. They use the poor people for their own sake. Party members in this neighborhood work for their self-interests. Only my family members live in the five apartments of this building, so we have around 30 votes only in this building. But do they help us? Do they really think about us? Not really. Making empty promises is all they do but thank God I don't need their help. If they were wise enough, they would come and speak with us, try to solve our problems and convince us but they are selfish, and they don't think about nonpartisan peoples' problems. They gain benefits from the district office, and they share it with voters they already know."*

This reaction against lack of attendance given by parties summarizes the disillusionment some residents experience in Pınar. The neighborhood has a turbulent political

environment because of the urban renewal and its possible consequences on residents. Some voters, such as the one quoted above did not have personal linkages with any of the parties. Although in this example, he could mobilize his whole extended family and support a party with around thirty votes, none of the parties put the effort to benefit from his support. On the contrary, lack of a strong clientelistic bond coupled with his deteriorating economic conditions resulted in a bitter reaction against parties he previously supported. As he became disillusioned with all of the political parties, his external political efficacy also declined, and he does not trust any of the local party brokers anymore. Also, he is highly cynical of people who actively work for political parties or those who participate in local party organizations. He complained about the fact that none of the parties reached out to him to create a personalistic interaction. This was true for most of the voters who did not have a clientelistic linkage: they valued a personal touch to politics and before they decide on whom to support, they wanted to meet with the politicians and listen to what they personally offer them before they make a decision about their political support.[3] The gentrification process was specifically detrimental for non-clients, as they believed that those voters who are already in the local networks of party brokers were more likely to get a title to their house.

Gentrification was an important reason for residents to revive long-term linkages they have with political parties. Both the AKP and CHP had neighborhood organizations working actively to provide people with legal advice and liaison between residents and local authorities during the gentrification. These local party brokers were also a part of the community for a long time and, they were not strangers to the neighborhood. In this respect, residents knew whom to contact if they wanted any advice or help regarding their house deeds. One resident explained the relationship between party brokers and residents in the following way:

> *"You vote for this party, and I vote for that. What matters is that we are all living in the same place. During election campaigns, young party activists come and ask if they can help us in any way, but none of the parties can convince us with mere empty promises. No matter which party they identify with, these people [party brokers] are locals from our neighborhood, and we see who support us and fulfill their promises outside the campaign period... This thing they call urban renewal process has been a burden on us for a while now. We don't know where we will end up. So these*

[3]A field experiment carried out during the fieldwork also supports this demand for personalistic linkages: Interviewees were randomly assigned to one of the four groups and given differing about candidate qualities. Then, they were asked to rate candidates; most interviewees said that they would need to personally meet with this candidate or his representative before coming to a conclusion about political support. Initial interviews were selected by randomly selecting streets in the two neighborhoods and then conducting at least one interview in these streets in addition to conducting interviews with the headmen as well as neighborhood and district-level party representatives. Experiments were not conducted with local politicians. Details of the interviews and selection procedures are given in Appendix B.

party affiliates became key figures for the neighborhood now, and I speak with them from time to time. We'll see if they can help us or not but that's what matters; that's how I evaluate these local party activists."

Rumors of gentrification and plans for urban renewal disrupt the community in general. Hearsay about gentrification is very common, and residents get information and advice from party brokers and local officials on these issues. Based on such information, they evaluate their chances of staying in the neighborhood. Although I did not come across any resident who received an official title to their house through clientelistic contacts, most residents indicated that parties gave priority to their core supporters. Especially the AKP was perceived to be well organized and capable of helping residents with their legal house titles. The AKP supporters in the neighborhood were satisfied with the services the party provides to them even if the CHP is controlling the local government since 2004. By increasing precariousness of local residents, gentrification pushes people closer towards clientelistic party organizations. Especially long-term clients have advantages in sustaining their relationship with local party representatives as they are promised prospective titles. The local AKP organization also holds events from time to time to explain the urban renewal process to clients and other members. Local brokers notify residents of upcoming party events, help them if they are in economic need and clients perceive the AKP as the most competent party which has the potential to assist residents when gentrification hit Pınar.

The gentrification rumors provide an external shock to the clientelistic relationship in the neighborhood. Heightened perceptions of uncertainty force needy clients to reestablish their old contacts with party workers. Although both the AKP and the CHP help mostly their own core voters, old clients who turned swing also try to establish rapport with party organizations. Those who successfully revive these old linkages adopt a discourse that is closer to the party line. In other cases, undecided voters are not a part of any social network within which they can reach out to local party brokers. In that case, they are more cynical, blaming parties for helping only their own core supporters in Pınar. Overall, gentrification provided the environment in which long-term linkages can be revived, and when clients successfully become a part of the local party network, they also approximate the party line. A similar proximity does not occur among those who cannot get into the local party organizations.

6.2.2 Poverty and Social Assistance Networks in Pınar

Pınar is a predominantly working class neighborhood with striking economic inequalities. Coupled with the gentrification mentioned above, the economic condition of its residents is generally precarious. Employment and proper accommodation chances are

unstable, and purchasing power is low. Combined with the fact that residents increasingly worry about their prospective situation because of the gentrification, poverty is a particularly important problem in the neighborhood, second only to the gentrification.

The local governorate provides social benefits such as coal for heating during winter and food assistance to the most impoverished residents. During my fieldwork, I observed that most of the run down houses in the neighborhood had large bags of coal in their garden, with prints indicating that bags belong to the local governorate and cannot be sold for profit. Similarly, several residents stated that they received benefits for their physically or mentally challenged dependents. The local social assistance and solidarity foundation was providing benefits to residents. It is a public foundation established under the district governorate which is a local branch of the central government. This foundation provides numerous benefits to the needy in the district. However, none of these recipients were satisfied with these public services, and many of them also received social assistance from local party organizations.

In an interview, a resident indicated that parties help those who publicly voice their support. She said that people become party members or express their support when they think that a party will help them regardless of whether they sincerely support a party's policy platform. By doing so, clients and their families get additional discretionary benefits from parties even if they are not eligible for public welfare benefits. She also said that none of the parties helped her or her siblings when they needed some very crucial assistance after her father passed away. She explained this lack of clientelistic attention by the fact that their family has been supporting the MHP for a very long time, and none of the other party brokers thought they could make this family publicly support a party besides from the MHP. In other words, clientelistic benefits were conditioned to publicly voice support to the party. She noted that if a party besides from the MHP came to assist them when they needed it, she could be impressed by their attendance and change her perception about the clientelistic party. However, she also criticized the MHP for not being active enough in the neighborhood and not helping its supporters when they are in need: "We support the MHP because of our family history, if it wasn't so, I would definitely criticize them as much as I criticize other parties." She had a personalistic expectation from her party which was not realized. She underlined that she was disillusioned, just like several other residents who expected parties and political figures to solve their problems when they need assistance.

She was not the only resident in Pınar who was upset about the parties' lack of clientelistic linkages. There are also other examples showing disillusionment among residents. Most residents expect a politician or a party worker to come and at least ask them about

their expectations and needs. Most of these residents hardly make enough for subsistence. When parties do not inquire about needs, these voters become frustrated, especially when they have an immediate problem. They know that not all of their problems are political in nature, so they are selective in judging a party's clientelistic performance. They think that brokers and patrons can help especially on issues such as everyday financial problems, employment and scholarship opportunities, unforeseen expenses, amendments in the local zoning laws and of course, gentrification. When a party does not put an effort in establishing or continuing clientelistic linkages with voters in such topics, voters cut their support and become bitter.

More importantly, residents react to negligence in different ways. Lack of clientelistic support results in criticism of the party and change of political opinions as a response. These views range from a criticism of the party organization to a perceived incompetence in economic policies of the previously supported party. Whether it is the AKP, CHP, or MHP, disillusioned voters who cannot benefit from clientelistic services criticize parties heavily. In other words, when clientelistic interactions cease, clients quickly revert to a position in which they are actively cynical and suspicious of politics in general.

This critical reversal is not only from a specific party, but it is a general attitude against politics. Such voters usually target the whole party system and underline the insincerity of parties. Frustration also comes with a general attitude of cynicism against all relevant parties and their brokers. None of such disillusioned respondents I interviewed tried to reach out to parties themselves. They either expected old brokers they knew to recontact them or party representatives to be aware of their problems. This was not a far-fetched expectation given that there is a high level of network intensity in the community. All of the interviewees underlined strong social bonds in the neighborhood. Neighbors knew each other's economic situation, financial risks, and dependencies. So, poverty and its consequences were public information up to an extent. Many residents spoke about problems they and others face in the neighborhood. Residents in relative poverty were expecting help from parties, and when this was not realized, they shared their concerns and criticisms with their neighbors. Disillusioned residents specifically criticized these brokers because they had known them and had previous clientelistic linkages back when they needed some assistance before. When these party activists did not lend them a hand during a tough period again, these old clients became especially displeased and vociferous dissenters.

A common answer when I inquired whether they felt obliged to support a party because of a clientelistic help they provided in the past was that parties could not know whether voters sincerely vote for them or not. Especially disillusioned clients in financial need

mentioned the possibility to get clientelistic benefits and not cast a vote for the patron. In this respect, they also criticized a perceived "Janus-faced nature" of clientelism: all clients had to do was to perform publicly and voice their support to the patron, when in fact, they could be voting for another party. In other words, while ex-clients in need were criticizing parties for the lack of attention, they also criticized current clients, because these benefits were not deserved and clients were making do, falsifying their real preferences, only to sustain linkages.

These old clients also underlined that the AKP used to be much more active among its supporters and undecided voters in Pınar before gentrification. However, following the increasing rumors among residents about their prospective situation, some of the old clients shifted their support, and thus they distanced themselves from the AKP's local network. This increasing bitterness ended up with the party not being able to reach out to some old clients anymore. Contrary to the general trend in other neighborhoods, the AKP's winning margin has been declining in Pınar. More importantly, the party has been performing worse in local elections compared to the general elections. The main contender of the AKP in İstanbul, the CHP has been winning the local elections in Sarıyer district since 2009. CHP's mayoral candidate was a well know figure before his first term. Coupled with the worrisome and confusing legal situation of the residential zoning areas especially in *gecekondu* neighborhoods, residents of Pınar supported the CHP more in the local elections compared to the general elections.

Pınar residents supported a viable alternative to the AKP in the last two local elections, which could make an important difference in their everyday life. However, the AKP was benefitting from more financial resources in its campaign period, and although they lost the local municipality to the CHP in 2009 and 2014, they were able to remain strong as a party organization, providing assistance to the needy segments of voters in Sarıyer district. In an interview I conducted five months before the 2014 local elections, a high-ranking local politician from the CHP said:

> *"They [AKP] allocated more than a million dollar to Sarıyer district in 2011 elections. We could only rise around a quarter of that... [When asked how does he know about another party's financial resources]: These things are not hidden. When you are in politics, you get to see and learn things. It's not like we are enemies with each other, no. We respect each other during the election campaigns, and we observe how much each party spends, because they spend it on public affairs. The money is raised to be spent and to be seen. So when a party holds a feast in Pınar or İstinye, or any other neighborhood in the district, we know approximately how much it costs. So we can see how much they spend on campaigning because they want it to be seen. They want voters to think that the AKP is their best option.*

They do this through spending lavishly during the campaign. They want to convince voters that there is more to come if they support the party."

Even if the AKP was able to benefit from its incumbency and spend more in its campaign compared to its competitors, it could not get enough support to win the local Sarıyer municipality. Lack of transparency in campaign financing in Turkey creates important setbacks for researchers studying clientelism and electoral party strategies. However, party workers, brokers and activists who spend their days in the field before the election can make a judgment by evaluating other parties' activities and therefore, interviews with party officials were especially helpful. Also, this local CHP figure said that election period events were not enough to persuade or mobilize voters. To solve that problem, the CHP established local committees to monitor voters and respond to their needs on time. Regarding the electoral period activities such as meetings, communal dinners, local soccer competitions and traditional canvassing events, he said that

"...These campaign events are important to make our supporters feel attached to the party. It may not be possible to garner new support only by these events, so that is why we established neighborhood committees after winning the 2009 local elections. These committees are made up of the neighborhood's important figures as well as local merchants, artisans, and professionals who can help residents. They let us follow important problems, and we hold weekly meetings in which we listen to local and personal problems and try to find solutions."

Through these committees, the CHP was able to establish linkages with voters even if they were not party members. There were two types of committees. The first type was the district-level committees for different functions of the local government such as a cultural-recreational committee and a committee of local traders and merchants. The second and more important type was established in every neighborhood. These committees helped the party in structuring its organizational presence in working class neighborhoods such as Pınar, which have been supportive of the AKP in previous general elections. In other words, the CHP was able to seize the opportunity to establish a foothold in these working class neighborhoods after winning the local elections in 2009.

All of the leading committee participants were CHP members, and they provide incentives for residents to participate and become party members as well. Usually, weekly meetings take place in the neighborhood where daily problems, personal issues, as well as national politics are discussed. In addition to these meetings, committees also listen to local businesses and hold events for house visits. Since residents usually know the neighborhood's economic situation, committee members suggest households they know, targeting those who need assistance.

During the fieldwork in Pınar, I also conducted an interview with the CHP's old head of the local party organization. She was a well-known figure in the neighborhood, running the local grocery store for some years before retiring from both politics and her job. She was relatively more affluent, and her economic and social status was better than the most. She explained the committee's activities in detail and compared them to the AKP's local organization in Pınar. She was not active anymore as she did not agree with the increasing clientelistic linkages of the CHP's current local branch but she also confessed that the party was forced to conduct such personalistic redistribution schemes in order to compete with the AKP. When I inquired about how political parties benefit from targeting the poor with clientelistic benefits, she said:

> *"We don't really benefit very much from this. Meetings and activities do not have an impact in the short term. But, the committee activities open a door for us to persuade people and to explain ourselves to them in the long run. We are able to establish rapport and bond with voters through our household visits and neighborhood meetings."*

Although she did not agree with this strategy because she thought it was creating more dependencies among the poor voters, she understood why the party leaders insisted on establishing these linkages. Through the local committee, the CHP was trying to compete with the AKP's well-established clientelistic organization in Pınar. This was also obvious at the district-level local branch. After the CHP won the local elections in 2009, the party branch became an important institution for solving local problems even if only the municipality was legally entitled to solve issues regarding zoning, house deeds, and welfare benefits. A prominent local politician from the district indicated that whenever clients could not settle their personal problems through the municipality, they would try it through the local party branch. For instance, when several residents from Pınar could not get welfare benefits from the local municipality, they applied to the branch to solve this issue. This is what I also observed in several visits to CHP's district office. During my visits for interviews, numerous people showed up to see the head of the district branch and ask for his help.

Another case from Pınar illustrates the importance of these local clientelistic networks. In an interview with a man who was working as a caterer, he said he did not have any connections to a party, but he was generally supporting the CHP. His reason for this was striking, showing how important clientelistic benefits could be in a close-knit community: his neighbor was a widowed woman in her late forties living with her teenage son who had a serious health condition. She had to take care of him, and the CHP's neighborhood committee was very active in providing food, coal, and other benefits to the family. When the party could not provide the family with all of their needs, brokers constantly reminded the family of their rights and directed them to relevant local governorate office for help.

My interviewee indicated that as neighbors, they were also supporting this family but the party was more efficient in providing benefits. The party's active charitable approach even outside the campaign period created a perception of altruism, increasing the support to the CHP among those who witness such activities. In this respect, the AKP and CHP were in competition in Pınar, and when one party prevailed over the other in a part of the neighborhood, there was a diffused approval among clients and their close social networks.

While it may seem like the CHP's party organization dominated the clientelistic scene following their local victory in 2009, this was not the case. Although they became very active in neighborhood's local linkages following the 2009 elections, other parties and especially the AKP also remained active in the neighborhood even in the face of the gentrification for which several residents blamed the central AKP government as well as the AKP's metropolitan municipality.

Before the establishment of the AKP in 2001, six parties were able to account for more than 90% of the total votes cast in the three general elections during the 90s. In fact, there was a balanced competition between left-wing parties, namely HADEP, CHP (SHP in 1991) and DSP and the right-wing parties MHP, FP-RP [4], and ANAP. Parties competed as Pınar's economy developed in the 1990s. Figure 6.1 shows the party support for the six largest parties over three general elections held in the 1990s. HADEP and MHP, the two radical left-wing and right-wing parties in this group did not directly participate in the 1991 elections. MHP candidates ran under RP ticket and Kurdish candidates under the SHP. However, all in all, there was not a single party to get more than 30% of the votes in Pınar during the 90s. On the other hand, AKP's average vote share in the six elections starting from 2002 was 46%. In every election, the AKP was able to remain the dominant party even if its winning margin declined especially during the local elections. Therefore, it is not possible to argue that the party lost its advantage to the CHP after 2009.

The AKP still has a strong network of clients. Brokers in the neighborhood are very keen on keeping their contact with their supporters especially among the most impoverished segments of the community. Even if the party lost some ground recently, especially among the undecided voters and those who were not centrally located in the party's clientelistic network, the AKP organization in Pınar is still active and strong. This was evident in several interviews I conducted with AKP supporters who were also receiving

[4]These two parties were the Islamist and conservative predecessors of the AKP and the SP. After the RP was closed in 1997, the FP was established, and it competed in the 1999 general elections, getting 15% of the total votes.

Figure 6.1: Election Results in Pınar in the 1990s



benefits from the party or nonpartisan public offices such as the local governorate's Social Assistance and Solidarity Association that is known to hand out welfare benefits in a discretionary, personalistic manner.[5]

One such case was an old couple who had been living in Pınar for several decades. They were religious, conservative voters, and were very supportive of the AKP. When I asked them whether they personally get any benefits from the party, both of them said that they luckily did not need such benefits, but they were impressed by the AKP's organizational capacity in the neighborhood. More importantly, they were both very satisfied with some of the programmatic welfare benefits they received during their retirements such as free public transportation and an increase in their monthly pensions. Rather than narrating these benefits as a right for every senior citizen, they thought of getting services without charge as a personal favor by the AKP's metropolitan municipality. This is not surprising given that the local representatives of the party, people who are responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the local organization who and proffering benefits to clients, work for the metropolitan municipality. In fact, the majority of the AKP brokers and activists were publicly employed in the metropolitan municipality, ruled by the AKP since 2004. There was a blurring of the boundaries between the local party organization and the metropolitan municipality. Some benefits provided by the local AKP organization carried logos of the metropolitan municipality. After losing the local government to the CHP in 2009, local AKP brokers started contesting the CHP's incumbency advantage by support from the AKP's higher-level metropolitan municipality.

Clients who received assistance from the AKP were very keen on how the party organized get together in the neighborhood, introducing both local as well as national can-

[5]See (Aytaç, 2014, p.1219) for details of discretionary practices in these associations.

didates running in the elections. During such gatherings, people were able to talk about their personal problems and candidates would take a note of these problems and refer voters to the local party organization. Since the party has the strongest organizational capacity with dense social networks, they were the most capable of helping people. Also, these gatherings helped the party gauge the support they have in different neighborhoods. These events were especially common during campaign periods, the AKP neighborhood organization remained in touch with its supporters after elections, resembling the CHP's neighborhood committees.

In one such case, the local AKP organization was able to help a family in dire need. This became evident after an interview I conducted with a nineteen-year-old high school student who recently migrated to the neighborhood with his single mother. Their relatives helped them financially when they first moved to Pınar and his mother was working in the textile industry. The family had problems in adapting to the life in İstanbul. This young student was placed in a part-time job in a local steel cutting workshop thanks to a local AKP broker. The family was also getting food assistance and a student scholarship from the local governorate, and the party helped them in applying for these welfare benefits. After three years of living in Pınar, the family still kept their close linkages with the party. The CHP also provided some benefits to the family, but it was not as beneficial as the AKP's benefits. By providing employment to the family, the party created long-term linkages with the household, keeping continuous contact. Unlike some disillusioned, cynical voters who lost their clientelistic linkages with their parties over time, this family praised the AKP for its services. What made this family support the AKP was mostly the amicable and helpful attitude of the party's brokers. Party brokers were neighbors and acquaintances, so clients did not need to apply formally for benefits.

There is a complex structure for credibility attribution in Pınar because the AKP brokers are not always helping clients officially. As mentioned above, the intricate relationship between the metropolitan municipality and local party organizations further complicates credit attribution. Over time, clientelistic relationships turn into friendships and most of the clients' acquaintances become party activists and brokers. A client who received benefits from the AKP indicated that most of his friends already work for the party, mobilizing during the elections to canvass votes or distribute goods in the neighborhood. The AKP's clients were very close to the party's conservative political discourse as well as its place in different divisive issues. Many clients indicated that they discussed politics with party activists, and that was an important source of political information for them.

Usually, clients are also active in the neighborhood's political scene, either participating in the women's branch meetings or holding informal party gatherings after the Friday prayers. Especially teenagers within these clientelistic relationships are keen on getting political information from brokers. Although interviews indicate that the level of political information is relatively low among residents regardless of whether they are clients or not, the political discourse of clients was especially loaded with partisan connotations. In fact, several clients who have been receiving long-term benefits from the AKP indicated that they discuss their positions with party brokers and local party workers in different policy areas such as the Kurdish question, healthcare reform, welfare pensions, and urban renewal.

Just like the CHP's local party organizations, the AKP also target relatively more impoverished segments in the community. In this respect, urban poverty provides a suitable environment in which parties can target clients. Although problems of credit attribution and competing clientelistic benefits complicate the linkage between clients and local brokers, most of the benefits are targeted towards the poor.

6.2.3 Clientelism and Persuasion in Pınar

Clientelism in Pınar shows that the community experiences long-term clientelistic interactions, creating dependencies between the two largest parties (AKP and CHP) and clients. Parties do not respond to their clients' demands only during the election periods. Local politics in Pınar and political persuasion evolves around centrality in clientelistic help networks. I presented the clientelistic framework in the neighborhood by referring to two relevant issues. The first one is the gentrification as a crisis in Pınar. Some residents re-established linkages with parties while others could not during this period of increasing economic pressure. Establishing contact is more likely if voters already had previous ties with the clientelistic local party organization. When clients need assistance, these party organizations are able to offer help selectively to close the ranks among constituents. In the counterfactual situation, when the party did not provide clientelistic assistance, residents become dismayed, and their political support turns into criticism. A continuous clientelistic support model in which parties monitor and respond to clients' needs in a timely fashion is necessary to explain the variance among clients' political attitudes. When their requests are fulfilled, they continue their support not only in the ballot box but also more generally, in their policy preferences. However, the gentrification provides a quasi-experimental situation in which political parties cannot fulfill requests of many core voters and clients, causing a rupture in previously established linkages.

Most of the clientelistic benefits target the most impoverished residents of the neighborhood. Both the AKP and CHP established local organizations to monitor these residents

and respond to their needs in a timely fashion. Activists and brokers from both parties are highly competent and well organized. Interviews with these brokers indicate that they do not always act under the auspices of formal party organization. Informal ties with neighbors, acquaintances, and friends also provide the necessary network capacity for the continuation of clientelistic linkages. Party brokers acquire information regarding the socioeconomic status of residents of this working-class neighborhood through informal channels. In return, these brokers mobilize party resources to target the poorest residents. These clientelistic relationships create dependencies for clients not only in their economic situation but also in the sources of political information and political networks they belong. However, clients are not passive actors without any agency. They also have the option to revive and re-intensify these contacts. Gentrification in the neighborhood created a suitable environment for these relationships to intensify. A comparison of clients who were successful in continuing their relationships with those who cannot, suggests that long-term linkages create dependencies in which political attitudes of clients approximate to the party platform. When clients could not receive benefits or promises of house titling, they usually have very tenuous ties to the party organization and are not in continuous touch with the party whereas those long-term clients who have more robust and relational linkages with a party are more likely to receive benefits, and share the policy platform of their party.

6.3 Maden: Lack of Long Term Clientelism

Maden, which means a mine in Turkish, is a neighborhood next to the center of the Sarıyer district. It is named after the gold mines that were once functioning there during the Ottoman period. It is situated in the outskirt hills of the district's center. Most residents trace their history back to the Balkans. These residents were forced to migrate to Maden after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The neighborhood also has some residents who migrated from the Black Sea region in recent decades. Residents generally work as manual laborers, fishermen, fishmongers or local merchants who work in the vicinity or the center of the district. Maden does not have many local businesses since it is very close to the district center. Houses are usually single-story with a small garden, and the neighborhood has narrow streets in its hilly terrain. Compared to Pınar, I spent less time and conducted fewer interviews in Maden after I started to get similar responses from my interviewees. However, similar to Pınar, Maden is a working class neighborhood in İstanbul's northern part within the boundaries of the same district. In this respect, local social assistance provided to these two neighborhoods come from the same local governorate.

Unlike Pınar, Maden did not become a central location after the construction of the Second Bosphorus Bridge. It is relatively more remote compared to Pınar. It does not have the same public transportation opportunities and it still remains a remote location in which residents mostly work in local businesses. They generally do not commute to other parts of the city. Although there are several luxurious gated communities, the extent of inequality in the socioeconomic structure of the neighborhood is not as striking as Pınar. Some of the interviewees indicated that they do not interact with these gated communities at all, and since most of these communities were built very recently, they did not have an impact on the neighborhood yet. If Maden experiences the same trajectory that Pınar and other similar neighborhoods in the vicinity have had, then one can expect increasing levels of inequality in Maden to play a role in divisive zoning plans and a prospective gentrification, especially after the construction of the third bridge and its connection roads between Europe and Asia, which will pass very close to the neighborhood.

Although Maden is far away from the city center, it is close to the center of the district, so residents do not complain about the lack of services in the neighborhood. All of the residents indicated that the local municipality and the governorate were functioning well, and they had no serious complaints. However, the municipality did not have the clout to solve serious problems in the neighborhood such as traffic congestion and infrastructural deficiencies since the metropolitan municipality of İstanbul centrally plans such significant projects and the district municipality does not have much to say in these schemes. The headman of the neighborhood, as well as the district mayor affiliated with the CHP, were personally coming to the neighborhood from time to time in order listen to the daily problems of the residents, and they were trying to find solutions to personal and local problems in the community. However, their efforts were not enough to solve local problems.

An important difference between Pınar and Maden was the urban renewal projects as mentioned above. Since Maden was not as central as Pınar, houses were not as valuable. Maden did not have an extensive urban renewal project. Similar to Pınar, most residents did not have a title to their houses, but they were not worried about this as much because there were no immediate plans for gentrification. This was the most striking difference between the two neighborhoods. According to the potential clientelism measurement explained in **Appendix B**, both neighborhoods had similar levels of expected clientelism, and they are very similar in their infrastructural capacity and socioeconomic profile. Still, Pınar residents had intense, continuous clientelistic relations with political parties during the period of gentrification whereas this was not the case in Maden. Residents in this working class neighborhood do not have day-to-day interactions with local political brokers. Assistance they receive from political parties and the local government is very

different from Pınar. No single interviewee indicated that they receive discretionary benefits or services from a political party. In fact, as I will explain below, even residents who were in dire need of some infrastructural services had to wait more than three decades. In this respect, Maden resembles Pınar in many respects except two: first, there is no immediate danger of gentrification, and more importantly, the neighborhood lacks long-term clientelistic linkages. As we will see in this section, these differences have important consequences for how residents understand politics in general and more specifically, their expectations from political parties. Unlike Pınar, residents here have political expectations that are based on more programmatic promises and redistribution mechanisms.

6.3.1 Pork Barreling and Urban Poverty in Maden: The Case of CSSA

One big problem that caused a stir in the neighborhood and mobilized some residents was the lack of running water in the outskirt slums of the neighborhood. Residents who have been living in this part of the neighborhood for the last three decades never had running water. Not only that but also the newly constructed luxurious communities were emptying their sewage to this section of Maden, creating hazardous conditions for residents living in the slums. In municipal zoning plans, this part of the neighborhood never had a single house on blueprints, even if around two thousand people were living in this neglected area. Before losing the local elections to the CHP, local municipality of the AKP warned these residents in 2008, because their houses were to be demolished for a grand infrastructural project back then. In order to fight with such problems, the community established the Maden Neighborhood Cultural and Social Solidarity Association (CSSA). Residents were very vocal, and they mobilized under the CSSA to raise awareness and demand infrastructural renewals. However, until the 2011 elections, they did not accomplish anything. The municipality's water trucks distributed water in this part of the neighborhood three times a week and streets did not have a functioning sewage system. For almost three decades, these residents lived in very unhealthy conditions in a relatively central part of the city. Therefore, most of them did not trust local politicians or the mayor because in previous terms, their demands were not fulfilled and the necessary infrastructure was not constructed. Under the CSSA, residents held protests and demonstrations against the AKP affiliated mayor before 2009 elections and the CHP's mayor following the party's success in 2009. In fact, during the 2009 campaign period, the CHP's candidate promised these residents the necessary infrastructure for running water with a sewage system. This candidate won the elections but did not fulfill his promise for two years until 2011.

Right before the general elections in 2011, all of the political parties in the local municipal council were pressured by the CSSA to find a solution to this ongoing problem.

Not only that but when the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to visit the neighborhood for his campaign, CSSA members handed him an open letter, complaining about this issue. This letter noted that the residents have been living in the neighborhood for the last three decades. They also reminded Erdoğan that back when he was the metropolitan municipality mayor of İstanbul from 1994 to 1998, he gave his "word of honor and honesty" [*şeref ve namus sözü*] to provide residents with running water, which was not realized until 2011.

One resident who used to live in these slums but then moved to a better area of the neighborhood said that all politicians who came to Maden promised to fix this problem. However, the municipality could not build the necessary infrastructure because their houses were illegally built gecekondus and were not in the zoning plan of the municipality. Instead, it was distributing water with trucks as a temporary solution. In 2011, different local party organizations formally met to solve this problem after ongoing protests by the CSSA. Pipelines for fresh water and sewage systems were constructed in the neighborhood following this period. According to one resident, none of the parties could risk refusing the CSSA's demands and more importantly the central government and the Prime Minister Erdoğan himself could not turn a blind eye to this local problem anymore. So, the construction started before the Election Day in 2011 and later on, residents in this part of the neighborhood finally got their running water after living in very unhealthy conditions for more than three decades. Although they were content with it, some residents questioned the timing of the project. The fact that the district-level CHP and the metropolitan and central AKP governments could not find a solution to this problem for many years, until the general elections campaign period is telling. That is why several residents underlined even the minutest details of the project, stressing the political pressure they put on the local and central governments by organizing under the CSSA. In this case, parties timed their efforts so that it would be helpful for their electoral campaign period. Since both the AKP and CHP had power in local politics through different channels, they could not risk not being a part of the solution. In other words, the electoral competition between parties was beneficial for residents. There were already very dire consequences before the construction such as high levels of sickness, especially among children due to the lack of sewerage systems and running water. Even if residents were able to force political parties to fulfill their demands, it took them three decades to do it. Several residents in Pınar also mentioned that during the early days of the neighborhood, they had serious infrastructural challenges. However, although the neighborhood was established as a *gecekondu* settlement, they received services, not through some collective action similar to the CSSA but thanks to the party activists and neighborhood representatives in the neighborhood. This was not the case in Maden's slums because residents historically did not have long-term linkages with parties which held the

local or the central government. This compelled them to mobilize under the CSSA and take the initiative.

After the infrastructural project had been completed, an MP from the ruling AKP visited the neighborhood for an event to open of the running water pipes. During this visit, several local figures from the party as well as the metropolitan municipality all together opened valves for running water for the first time. During this event, head of the CSSA also thanked politicians, indicating that the neighborhood will support whoever solves their problems. During the event, residents also asked for support in the construction of a local vocational training center and the MP promised that he would help the neighborhood. In this respect, the AKP benefitted from this construction even if the local district municipality was ruled by the CHP. The AKP's metropolitan municipality intervened and provided the necessary infrastructural help as the neighborhood association lobbied extensively in Ankara for the project. This project also encouraged further support by the AKP in provision of local public goods in a discretionary manner. It provided a specific part of the community the ways with which they could ask for further benefits. In other words, a collective action by the CSSA created the possibility of clientelistic linkages and pork barreling. However, the CSSA put more programmatic pressure on local politicians compared with the discretionary and atomistic problem-solving mechanisms in Pınar.

6.3.2 Poverty and Social Security Nets in Maden

Besides actions of the CSSA in a specific part of the neighborhood, residents generally do not have continuous linkages with politicians. A 30-year-old junk dealer living in the neighborhood who was also in need for economic welfare benefits explained his situation:

> *"I do need benefits from politicians and the state. However, politicians only come here during election periods and they don't even listen to what I have to say. All they do is introduce themselves, and ask for votes after empty promises. They do not try to persuade me. I have been voting for the MHP all my life except local elections. Because the MHP does not stand a chance, so that's why I support the CHP instead of the AKP in local elections. We had an AKP municipality for one term. Back then, the municipal constabulary [zabıta] was very harsh against poor peddlers like us, who were selling their goods. That is why I voted for the CHP. However, the CHP can't distribute goods or services efficiently because the mayor says he cannot get enough resources from the central government since he is affiliated with the opposition party. If the state was offering benefits to me, then I would accept it, but people working here in the district governorate are very rude. Poor people don't go to these welfare offices for the beautiful faces of civil servants there. They go because they need something, but the attitude is very repulsive. So I am afraid to go there and ask for welfare benefits because I could harm someone if they were rude to me and I don't want to end up in jail because of them."*

Although this resident had well-established connections with the local MHP organization as well as its affiliated Idealist Clubs (*ülkü Ocakları*), these local organizations were not resourceful at all. On the contrary, he did not attend meetings anymore because his friends were all experiencing economic hardship. As the economic situation of the members deteriorated, they became less attached to the local MHP organization and its affiliated club, since members were afraid that their fellow members would ask for economic benefits when they cannot provide it. This MHP supporter also said that none of the public officers were thinking about citizens. They were "poisoned by the little power" they have over citizens. So, although he had some well-established connections with the local MHP organization, he was not a client in any sense of the word. If anything, he was a strategic voter and his political opinions were shaped by the bad experiences he had during the AKP's tenure in the district, the detached and rude attitude of public officers, and the lack of MHP's clientelistic capacity in his neighborhood. Although he was living in Maden for fifteen years and was a politically well-connected local figure, collaborating with other local businessmen in his junkyard, he could not get any assistance from local politicians when needed. An important personal problem was getting the necessary annual license for his truck, which he was using for his business. He could not get this license because it was very costly and there was a lot of red tape involved. He asked for help in speeding up the process from the local MHP organization, but they were not able to help him. Other local, small businesses and entrepreneurs also indicated that they were dealing with many bureaucratic procedures. In this respect, none of the politically relevant parties were helping residents or businesses in the neighborhood. Parties chose to mobilize their resources elsewhere and target long and short term clients in other neighborhoods. In fact, all of the relevant parties lack a high organizational capacity in Maden. Although both neighborhoods share similar economic development levels and electoral support to different parties, Maden lacks the large party organization as seen in Pınar and other neighborhoods. In this respect, most residents lacked social security. Several local, small-scale entrepreneurs indicated that they could not take the chance for further investments with their capital because they did not trust the local government. Local politicians were not assuring businesses about the prospective economic stability of the neighborhood. A potential for urban renewal after the construction of the third bridge project created further complexities, hindering any personalistic or long-term programmatic linkages between parties and these businesses in Maden.

All of the relevant political parties lack clientelistic networks in Maden. Residents do not receive any benefits from parties. For instance, a young woman who had a lifelong health condition was not receiving any benefits from any party. She was also not a beneficiary of local or central welfare benefits even though she deserved them because of her condition. None of the parties were helping her nor did they provide her with the

necessary information to obtain welfare benefits. Even in this case, she was a fervent supporter of the AKP, and she was especially very fond of Erdoğan. The main reason for her support was his charismatic appeal. Although she was not getting any welfare benefits from the state, parties would promise things when they were canvassing during election periods. She complained that these promises were unrealistic, and politicians were doing so until they are elected. Other residents also complained about similar canvassing efforts during the campaign, but they mostly refused to be convinced by such short-term visits. In other words, parties were coming to the neighborhood to establish personalistic linkages with potential supporters. However, these linkages were not effective in mobilizing support among residents, as voters did not trust politics in general and linkages were not substantiated with concrete clientelistic benefits.

Participation in the labor force was low in the neighborhood. Most families had only one active individual in the labor market, and they had informal jobs in highly precarious conditions. Chances of upward mobility in Maden were lower compared to Pınar, and this created important path dependencies. Most residents aspire to move to a more central neighborhood where they have more economic and social opportunities. In fact, lack of clientelistic linkages exacerbates this situation. For instance, a young woman indicated that she has been living in the neighborhood for her whole life, and her goal was to move away as soon as she finds a well-paying job. She indicated that her entire family was living on her mother's wage. Although she was pleased with the fact that the local CHP municipality offered her brother a scholarship, this did not make much of a difference for the family. Logistical problems in getting such benefits were consequential in Maden. Monthly scholarship payments were either not on time or were not wired to the family's bank account at all. Other residents also faced similar problems when they tried to get welfare benefits from the local government. In another case, the family could not get the welfare payments for the last four months even after going to the municipality and the CHP district office. Local party organizations were not capable of providing the necessary social assistance for people.

Residents were more or less in similar socioeconomic conditions, and they shared a similar class background with those in Pınar, but they lacked the means and ways to alleviate their economic problems. There were no local party organizations to monitor and respond to poverty. Several families indicated that the AKP would come to distribute coal in the middle of the summer during election campaigns but during winter, this assistance would cease abruptly when families are in dire need of heating assistance. In fact, a striking difference between Pınar and Maden were large coal bags in front of the houses. Local governorate was distributing coal by large trucks in Pınar. These trucks showed up in Pınar's main street every day while they were not active at all in Maden. While cyni-

cism was common among clients who could not sustain their relationships with parties in Pınar, it was much more prevalent in Maden. Here, voters experienced more challenges in establishing linkages. The parties were not keen on establishing a party organization for continuous clientelistic linkages. This may be so because the neighborhood was in the vicinity of the district center. Politically active residents usually attended local party meetings in the center, but active attendance is not common especially among the poorest segments of the community. The only exception to the lack of political organizations was the CSSA. Even in that case, participation was limited to only a specific part of Maden where residents experienced serious infrastructural problems. Besides that limited organization, no political activity could encourage personalistic linkages with party brokers.

Several interviewees also underlined that the neighborhood's proximity to the district center was an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. Although it increased some residents' economic opportunities through increasing number of viable alternatives in the job market, the majority of the interviewees complained that Maden was perceived only as a secondary extension of the center by district-level party organizations. This seems to be the case given that none of the parties aim to establish strong local organizations in this neighborhood. Although there are no substantive differences between Pınar and Maden in regards to their socioeconomic structure, the latter has received little support from the local government and parties. Neither neighborhood-level nor district-level political institutions are extensive enough to assist people, and the community did not attempt to develop minimal party organizations in the neighborhood. In this respect, most of the residents had more abstract, ideological expectations from political parties. Although they faced severe, concrete economic problems, they expected parties to initiate programmatic policies to alleviate these problems whereas, in Pınar, the majority of the community expected a personal, discretionary solution thanks to the ongoing clientelism.

In this respect, what residents expect from politics was very much shaped by the lack of visible social security schemes in Maden. Politics is not personal in Maden; it exists to solve abstract issues such as income inequality rather than a problem about a title to a house or an imminent gentrification crisis. Welfare recipients applied to necessary institutions to solve their day-to-day problems but perceived political problems were larger than everyday logistics of redistribution. It was more about the general functioning of the economic redistribution that they wanted to change. Regardless of the political sophistication level of residents, those who are socialized into politics in Maden have a more abstract understanding of politics. Therefore, their expectations are also more generalized, resembling more programmatic linkage strategies between parties and voters. However, similar to previous long-term clients in Pınar who could not continue or

rekindle their linkages with parties, residents in Maden also became bitter against party organizations and politics in general as their expectations about welfare benefits were not realized.

Even if different interviewees indicated various political problems, one general heading under which most of these problems can be categorized is the severity of urban poverty. Parties cannot provide solutions to these problems for two main reasons. First of all, they lack the local neighborhood organization to monitor and respond to the problems of the community. As the findings of the fieldwork in Pınar suggest, local party organization is an essential requirement for establishing local linkages with the community. Lack of consistent, strong organizations by parties contributes to the problems in strong and continuous relationships between local politicians and voters in Maden. The second reason relates to the complexity of credit attribution. This is especially relevant since the local district municipality is ruled by the CHP, and the AKP is especially influential through the metropolitan municipality and the local governorate, which is appointed by the central government. Several welfare recipients indicated that they did not blame the local CHP government, which is responsible for some of the local welfare schemes. This is because the local CHP branch and the municipality underline financial impediments created by the central AKP government. In this respect, the CHP blames the central government and some welfare recipients therefore find it difficult to blame the local CHP office for their toothless welfare benefits. On the other hand, it is too far-fetched for residents to blame the central government for every problem in the neighborhood. In fact, the collaboration between the local CHP and AKP officials shows how complex the political structure of the neighborhood is. Even higher echelons of local politicians cannot solve personalistic and relatively simple issues. There is no certainty that residents will attribute credibility to a party that invests the most in Maden. In comparison, in Pınar, both the CHP and AKP try to claim credit through local party organizations, especially among their supporters and clients. However, parties do not see many benefits to investing in Maden extensively as there is no certainty that this would help with their chances to garner additional support.

6.3.3 (Lack of) Clientelism in Maden

In the concluding section below, I will compare the two neighborhoods to argue how different types of personalistic linkages influence understanding of politics and policy preferences of clients. However, the fieldwork in Maden suggests several important empirical findings on its own. First of all, the case of the CSSA shows that communal activism can happen even *within* a neighborhood that is usually taken as a monolithic unit of analysis in studies of urban politics. Only the most deprived parts of Maden were mobilized to demand some crucial infrastructural projects. Additionally, over the course of its heydays,

the CSSA was successful in raising awareness among the local political elite. Especially relevant parties were the CHP, ruling the district with its local government and the AKP, which held the central political power as well as the metropolitan municipality. A collaboration between the two parties resulted in the construction of a much-needed water infrastructure. However, this took an arm and a leg; for three decades, the most impoverished parts of the neighborhood were ridden with serious diseases, especially striking the children. Even after three decades, the project started only during the 2011 general election campaign, sending a signal about the competency of the AKP to the residents of the community. Most of the credit for the project was attributed to the AKP and party representatives enjoyed this new support coming from the project, even if collaboration with the local CHP government was necessary for the completion of the project.

Lack of clarity in credit attribution is rampant in Maden. Residents find it hard to blame either of the parties for problems in welfare benefit distribution, infrastructural deficits and a general lack of responsiveness to local problems. Coupled with the lack of party organizations and long-term linkages, this creates a nebulous situation in which voters have to evaluate politics in very abstract, general terms.

This uncertain situation is only exacerbated thanks to the lack of economic opportunities in Maden. Proximity to the district center enables residents to feel attached to a larger urban space in which they can grow their social networks through attending political meetings and becoming members of local party organizations. Also, most of the residents find better economic opportunities in the center. However, this creates a path-dependent situation in which increasing attachment to another locality weakens the political and economic capacity of the neighborhood. Therefore, Maden turned into a residential area that does not have any prominent local businesses or party organizations within the neighborhood, unlike Pınar.

Given this lack of political organization, it is not surprising to observe that there were no strong clientelistic linkages. Politicians only canvass during the campaign period, and there are no active party brokers in the neighborhood. In this respect, there are stark differences between the two neighborhoods. Voters' discourses, reflected in their policy preferences, were much less partisan since there is no long-term clientelism. Although political discourse is in disarray because of the deficits in credit attribution, the general political attitude is much more abstract and programmatic. Welfare benefits and party policies are not evaluated through a highly self-interested, personalistic point of view. Even if poverty is the most significant political problem according to most of the residents, solutions to this problem do not entail personal interactions between clients and party brokers. In this respect, voters evaluate parties according to the general informa-

tional cues they receive from their personal social networks and the media. In fact, there were many strategic and swing voters in the neighborhood. Most voters supported different parties in local and general elections, and there were many who voted for different parties/candidates in two consecutive elections. This is not surprising given that political parties lack the capacity to create attachments through intense linkages and persuade voters to support the party.

6.4 A Comparative Discussion of the Findings and Concluding Remarks

The fieldwork results presented in this chapter help us to understand how clients attribute meaning to clientelistic relationships they establish with political parties. To elaborate differences in these relationships, I analyzed two neighborhoods by focusing on two themes that are important for the residents' everyday life. These two themes are gentrification and urban poverty. Since the fieldwork was conducted in two centrally located working class neighborhoods of a booming metropolitan city, the salience of these two issues is not surprising. However, a comparison of the two neighborhoods suggests that long-term clientelism creates important differences in the trajectory of political support in these similar environments. I will summarize these findings by referring to three empirical alternatives observed in the field which are long-term clients, the counterfactual case in which previous linkages are not sustained over time and lastly, cases in which we do not observe any clientelistic linkage between voters and parties. Table 6.1 below summarizes these different groups and findings from the fieldwork.

Table 6.1: Summary of Findings

		Effects of Gentrification	Effects of Poverty	Party Attachment	Programmatic Appeal
Pınar	*Long-Term Clients*	Continuation and intensification within local clientelistic networks	Inclusion into local party networks	High, persuaded by their party, fully adopts the party discourse	Indifferent to programmatic party platforms
	Previous Long-Term Clients and Short-term clients	Weakening and termination of clientelistic linkages	Previous inclusion into local party networks	Low, increasing levels of cynicism towards politics and less trustful to clientelistic parties	Sceptical about party platforms in general, no appeal of programmatic linkages
	Non Clients	Increasing local concerns and more focus on local party programs	Income inequality becomes visible with gentrification, and relative deprivation	High only if convinced that a party will defend interests of the neighborhood against gentrification	Strong appeal of programmatic linkages
Maden	*Short-term Clients*	Not an immediate problem but prospective gentrification motivates clients to create long term linkages	Less trustful towards clientelistic parties, benefits promised/provided are not enough, logistic problems in redistribution	Low, sceptical about short-term electoral promises	Medium level of interest, problems in benefit redistribution weakens support
	Non Clients	Uninterested in prospects of gentrification	Chances of upward mobility decreased	Low; strategic voting and vote switching are common	Strong appeal of programmatic platforms

In Pınar, political parties compete to provide residents with services and benefits. This is not the case in Maden. A crucial outcome of these long-term linkages is affinity and proximity between clients and the party platforms. These relationships are not based on an ideal type of rational, self-interested agents. On the contrary, clients and party brokers in Pınar have an affinity based on years of relationship they had within the community. A pure calculus of vote-buying cannot explain these "friendships" and it fails to account for persuasion. Figure 6.2 plots the electoral results for the AKP, the strongest clientelistic party. As can be seen from these results, a theory of clientelism based on a pure calculus of vote maximization would suggest that the AKP should target Maden more than Pınar as there are swing votes in both neighborhoods[6], but the AKP is more likely to gain from clientelism in Maden. However, clientelistic parties are careful in sustaining clients who are already voting for their party. Then what explains the process through which clients become closer to the party line in Pınar?

Figure 6.2: AKP's Vote Share in Pınar and Maden

As the theory of clientelistic affinity explained in **chapter 3** suggests, these long-term relationships are based on deliberation, interaction, affection, and problem solution. Clients in Pınar deliberate daily political issues with party activists and brokers. They discuss policies and news stories in local coffee shops and party meetings, creating an environment in which clients also receive informational cues from the politically sophisticated and knowledgeable party workers. Also, they interact in non-political environments as well, such as arranging communal events, organizing weddings, Ramadan feasts, etc. A myopic focus on electoral consequences of clientelism assumes that these relationships are purely political in nature. However, this was not the case in Pınar. Several previous ethnographic field studies from other cases show that causes and consequences of clientelistic relationships cannot be explained fully by rational expectations (Auyero,

[6]Over elections, the electoral support for the AKP and CHP varies as Figure 6.2 shows.

2001; Zarazaga, 2014). Clients and brokers perform various actions that fall outside the boundaries of a utility-maximizing individual. This fieldwork also provides further evidence for such studies and underlines the ideational and normative implications of clientelism. Politics and clientelistic help is only a part of a larger relationship in which clients and brokers interact. Because of the deliberative interactions that occur in the long run, there is an emotional aspect to these relationships. An alternative explanation can be based on material dependency and problems in volition that in return can cause cognitive dissonance especially for clients, creating a "false consciousness" of friendship. However, my fieldwork does not suggest that these relationships are based on cynical, false consciousness stemming from of limits on exit options. On the contrary, clients were fond of the fact that they are a part of a larger clientelistic network. This discussion supports the initial empirical findings presented in Chapter 5: both chapters show that even if clientelism occurs to mobilize political support, it has further implications on the recipients' preferences and policy choices.

Another finding that supports the theoretical implications is the counterfactual scenario in which previous clients could not get any assistance from parties. This was also common in Pınar while it did not occur in Maden since we do not observe long-term clientelistic linkages between parties and voters there at all. Because of gentrification, many residents in Pınar tried to reach out to local institutions including party organizations. Gentrification created uncertainties that could be alleviated, if not resolved completely, by local governments and parties. In fact, two political parties, namely the AKP and CHP, promised a solution based on an individual provision of titles to houses.

However, the process through which parties helped their clients was selective: only clients who had intense linkages that were not abruptly cut off over the course of years benefitted from this assistance. In other words, parties targeted clients who are centrally located within the local party network. Therefore, some previous clients were left out, and their relationship with their party was very different from other long-term clients. First of all, these clients were comparatively less attached to their party. Findings above suggest that continuation of linkages is necessary for party attachment. Secondly, gentrification created a substantial divergence among clients. While some could benefit from party resources in areas such as legal consultation, informational sessions and promises for titles to houses, others were left out of this network. This variance in continuation of linkages (and lack of it) explains party attachment and adoption of the party's discourse not only issues related to gentrification but in a more diffused way. This finding also corroborates the "spill-over" effects of persuasion in various policy areas which was presented in Chapter 5.3.2.

The third segment of voter groups in these two neighborhoods was the non-clients, i.e. those who do not have any personalistic linkage with a party. These voters make up the majority of residents in Maden and a considerable portion in Pınar. Except the collective action organized under the CSSA, residents in this group were ideologically more diverse. They were more interested in programmatic policy suggestions, and they were more likely to switch votes or vote strategically across elections. In other words, clientelistic networks did not mobilize these voters for a party at all. Poverty and prospects of gentrification also had an important impact on this group, but their coping mechanisms were different. For instance, some of the poorest households depended on their larger family for assistance. While in other cases, problems in the local government's welfare distribution programs created antipathy and further economic hardships. These problems were especially common in Maden. Lack of clientelistic organization also affected more universalistic schemes of redistribution since the AKP is dominating both programs.

This comparative study of local communities in İstanbul suggests that clientelistic linkages are especially effective in the long run. These relationships create durable, path dependent networks in which recipients also receive information and persuasive messages from brokers and the local party organizations. However, these relationships can also erode especially during periods of crisis such as gentrification. When clientelistic parties do not have enough resources to provide benefits and services to every possible recipient, we observe attenuation of these linkages and increasing difference between previous clients and the party platform. All in all, findings presented in this chapter corroborate previous findings in Chapter 5 by situating clients and focusing on poverty and gentrification as two factors that create variance within local party networks. Durable personalistic linkages in local clientelistic networks provide long-term clients with the necessary information and chances for political deliberation through which persuasion in specific policy issues and credit attribution occur.

7
Conclusion

There are numerous studies about the effects of clientelism on political behavior, targeting strategies, and how clientelistic contracts are enforced. However, political attitudes and ideological proximity in such studies are either exogenous, or clientelism replaces programmatism and congruence in policy areas. While research in the first thread finds it difficult to answer who gets targeted, the latter one depicts a rigid framework in which there is no leeway for patrons to interact with clients in specific policy positions.

This dissertation tried to fill in this gap by discussing secondary consequences of clientelistic linkages. It suggested further outcomes of clientelism by focusing on the temporal dimension of clientelism. Findings support the theoretical framework about the impact of long-term linkages. Long-term clientelism causes voters to be persuaded by brokers and patrons. As a result, clients become closer to the party's policy position. In other words, long-term clientelism causes a convergence of perceptions. Such linkages are not confined to purely functional political support in return for benefits.

Parallel to the impact of material dependencies, long-term clientelism bears some unforeseen and unintended consequences. The most obvious consequence as argued by this dissertation is on political persuasion and change in attitudes. This dissertation delved on the role of clients, what they understand from change in long-term linkages and their political experience when these linkages end. While doing so, I tried to put this framework into the relevant context by describing the party structure, political representation, citizenship rights, and continuity and change of clientelism in Turkey.

Clientelism, especially its long-term variant, requires an immense political organization. While the dissertation did not touch upon the role of political organizations extensively, some relevant empirical findings are available in the first section of **Chapter 5** which explains the clientelistic longevity by referring to the party organization capacity and country-level variables. Later sections of the fifth chapter showed the effect of such linkages by focusing on clients. As the theoretical framework in **Chapter 3** suggests, political persuasion is an interactive process. Therefore, **Chapter 6** situated clientelism

within local political conditions and tried to place the issue in its relevant context by focusing on two crucial political issues, namely gentrification and poverty, which shape the political experience of clients to a great extent. Overall, the theoretical framework and findings relate to three undertows.

First, this theoretical framework refers to some well-studied, big questions in political science. Burawoy (1998) explains how his work reaching outward from a small furniture factory in Northern Russia had implications for transitions from socialism to capitalism. He asks a crucial question: "How can I justify these extravagant leaps across space and time, from the singular to the general, from the mundane to the grand historical themes of the late twentieth century?" (p. 5). Similarly, the theoretical argument in this dissertation "speaks to" some big questions. This discussion forms the first arch stone. Even if this study is a micro-theoretical exercise about voting behavior and change in political attitudes in a single case, this does not necessarily mean the study does not have any implications on higher scales of operation. Delineating these implications is especially relevant because this situates the study in specific areas of interest and it is necessary to make a discussion with important points in the literature.

Secondly, this study touches upon clientelism in Turkey as a single case study. Contemporary Turkish politics is an exemplary case of a right-wing, predominant party and similar cases are seen in other countries such as Hungary and Russia. This type of political system is gaining some prominence even in consolidated democracies. On the one hand, democratic checks and balances are weakening in Turkey while on the other hand, a neoliberal market economy and its pressures on the working class continue (Acemoğlu and Üçer, 2015). The fragility of this political system became very apparent with the coup attempt in June 2016. While Turkey tries to integrate to the European Union, it continues to have deficits in areas such as democratization, civil-military relations, meritocracy in the public sector, minority rights, and freedom of speech. It may be possible to observe similar cases more often if populist parties with pro-market and culturally conservative positions gain prominence. While some countries may legislate exclusions about who can get what through a legal framework, others may do it more informally with closed-circuit initiatives such as clientelism and corruption. For this reason, the Turkish case presents relevant findings on exclusive and personalistic redistribution mechanisms that may soon be observed more often in other cases.

Third, this project presented some important findings for the literature on clientelism. A striking feature in the literature I mentioned in **Chapter 3** is its shortsightedness. In a simplified fashion, these studies make inductive, theoretical and statistical inferences based on survey questions such as "Did a party recently provide you with gifts or bene-

fits in return for your vote?". However, this study argued that focusing on such myopic details might miss the target. Some recent research such as Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016),Stokes et al. (2013), and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) either include the temporal dimension in their discussions, or they mention it one way or another. However, findings in this study indicate that this temporal variance should be taken seriously, and it argues that these differences are consequential. This project contributes to the literature both from this angle and by challenging the premise that ideological congruence and clientelism are mutually exclusive. Programmatism and clientelism do not have to be mutually exclusive. In order to substantiate these claims, I suggested a descriptive typology of political linkages by focusing on both political engagement and deliberation, and the separation of universalistic-personalistic redistribution in an instrumentalist manner. Deliberation is defined here as a procedural interaction. The function of this typology becomes clear for the theory in **Chapter 3** which discusses the informational exchange capacity in clientelistic relationships. In other words, one can say that a procedural deliberation is a necessary condition for the proposed theory of clientelistic persuasion. This theoretical discussion has implicit presumptions about the role of clientelistic party's organizational capacity and the direction of persuasive processes. While these are the scope conditions of the framework, they are also empirical criteria to test other cases for further development of this theoretical account. In this context, this study humbly suggests an alternative framework for the literature on clientelism. In summary, contributions to the literature on clientelism, limitations of this study and possible further studies make up the third arch stone. To conclude, I will briefly delineate these three topics.

7.1 Macro Implications of a Micro Framework

This dissertation presented a study that rarely touches upon grand narratives of Political Science or Comparative Politics because of its general structure which is more relevant for micro-level inferences. This stylistic and theoretical choice does not imply that we should dissect different levels and forgo a discussion of interactions between these levels. On the contrary, there are several implications on higher levels of interest. One can talk about the effects of clientelistic persuasion on macroeconomic redistribution policies, deficits, and continuity in political representation, and development of party organization structures.

The introductory part of **Chapter 3** and **Chapter 4** on Turkey briefly touched upon the welfare state and social policy as a citizenship right. Although the study deliberately refrained from delving into these topics, these are some undercurrents. One can infer that deficits in welfare and social policy can be related to the institutionalization of clientelism over time. Specific types of clientelism fill in the gap when the state fails to redistribute

or alleviate inequalities through programmatic linkages.

Also, these linkages promote an unusual type of political representation. Concerns and deprivations voiced by clients in local party organizations promote reactions by higher party echelons. For instance, in Pinar neighborhood, both the AKP and the CHP hold regular meetings on gentrification. They aim to provide legal help to residents and even aim to mediate the procedure for house entitlements. This process is mostly based on the feedback they receive from clients and party activists in the neighborhood. Based on these empirical peculiarities, I tried to frame clientelism not only as a simple exchange relationship but also as a linkage in which patrons and clients deliberate what is to be exchanged, when, and how. **Chapter 2** dealt with the place of deliberation and in fact, this chapter tried to describe different linkage types by incorporating political decision-making processes into the concept of clientelism.

Additionally, I tried to underline the neighborhood-level party organizations in **Chapter 6** and organizational capacity and experience the AKP inherited from its predecessors in **Chapter 4**. Party brokers who get in touch with clients in neighborhoods are the crystallized representatives of this party organization capacity. By having a personalistic relationship with these brokers, clients can access resources that are coming down to the neighborhood through the filter of the party organization. Longevity of brokerage and organizational capacity are necessary conditions for functioning of this flow. An interesting further study can potentially be on the continuity and change in the attitudinal congruence of different types of clients with the political party after brokers cease to associate themselves with a given party for reasons other than their clientelistic performance. One can potentially design a natural experiment from such situations which would in return present more robust findings on the effect of political organizations, brokers' individual skills, and longevity of clientelistic persuasion. I tried to substitute the absence of such an experimental study by a focus on the qualities of relationship different clients have with their parties as well as their attitudes and political experience in two neighborhoods of Istanbul which struggle with gentrification and urban poverty. In any case, institutions and organizations can mediate the relationship between long-term clientelism and persuasion, and this can be further study to test boundaries of clientelistic persuasion.

This study discussed persuasion as used by political parties to provide information to their clients and thus, gain flexibility when they change their policy positions and overarching political platforms. While clientelism becomes a "sticky" informal institution in such instances, parties gain additional leeway in their policy positions. This a trade-off parties face when they have options to use clientelism as a tool for persuasion: establish costly linkages with potential clients which requires immense material resource

mobilization in order to have policy flexibility or lose the opportunity to adjust easily to changing external conditions. This party-level decision may depend on the party's organizational capacity, its outreach expectations, as well as the capacity of its brokers and responsiveness of potential clients. In the Turkish case, we observed that the AKP is more skilled in establishing these linkages which is not surprising given the party's incumbency advantage and relatively high organizational extensiveness.

Persuasion through clientelism carries the potential to become an important tool for parties to propagate political information filtered down through the party machine. Dahl (1989) argued that a crucial characteristic of government procedures based on democratic principles is citizens to have "access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group" (p. 233). Clientelism involves numerous aspects through which it can corrode vertical accountability of the state institutions. Its persuasive effects also introduce another potential threat for the functioning of democratic procedures. Clientelistic persuasion can hinder access to alternative sources of information especially if clientelistic party networks become the main source of social and political interaction for clients.

It is true that most voters have alternative sources of information. A recent study by Kim and Margalit (2016) shows that unions shape their members' policy views and self-selection into these unions account at most for a quarter of this effect. So, when a client is also a union member, there will be alternative sources of information given that the union is not an integral part of the party organization. However, in Chapter 4 and 6, we saw that informal economy and precarious working conditions (without any union membership whatsoever) is an important condition in the Turkish case. This suggests that when clientelistic persuasion occurs in conditions where programmatism is sub-par and a single party dominates the political structure, alternative sources of information may not exist. Media may be highly slanted, functioning as a mouthpiece of various political parties and other sources of information can also be curbed through different democratic and authoritarian means. In this framework, Chapter 6 showed that clientelistic networks are an integral part of sociopolitical networks and local communities. Therefore, long-term persuasive effects of clientelism pose some serious challenges to democratic principles not only in terms of accountability but also by blurring the lines between programmatic and personalistic linkage mechanisms, curbing the role of alternative political information resources, and by dependencies through which policy preferences change not as a consequence of deliberated outcomes but as a side-effect of material exchange relationships.

7.2 Relevance of the Turkish Case

I touched upon some of the important political deficits and limitations in the current Turkish political system above. Although some scholars argue that the Turkish state has relatively high levels of capacity compared to its neighbors (Heper, 1985), no government could take substantive action to alleviate the scathing levels of economic inequality in the country. In other words, the so-called state capacity may not be relevant to explain clientelism. In the post-2001 economic crisis period, technocratic politicians recruited from the high echelons of international finance institutions initiated several structural reforms to establish and consolidate the independence of public economic institutions (Atiyas, 2012). However, the extractive state capacity continues to remain inequitable. In 2011, Turkey had the highest indirect taxation as a percentage of total tax income among OECD countries (50.5%). Chile, Hungary, and Estonia followed Turkey.[1] In its long tenure for more than a decade, the dominant AKP could not change this inequitable taxation system, which structurally makes it hard if not impossible for the government to reduce inequality. The AKP government mostly enacted policies to alleviate these inequalities through providing means-tested benefits. The party was able to establish an immense political machine all across the country by providing such benefits to those in need. However, this policy choice hints at the continuation of clientelism as the country struggles to enact structural reforms. This trap creates a suitable environment for political parties to compete for support via clientelism.

Additionally, the Turkish party system has been crystallized for more than a decade around a dominant AKP and three opposition parties. Currently, no viable alternative exists to challenge this competition. Gümüşçü (2013) argues that the AKP expands its support base through the provision of material benefits. In the face of increasing security concerns and ontological threat perceptions that may reduce the salience of economic performance and benefit provision, the AKP has been able to form single party governments since 2002 (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım, 2015). Establishing a foothold with voters through welfare policies and clientelistic benefits has been an effective strategy for the AKP. In fact, the party has been in power for so long that it has a vast incumbency advantage compared to other parties. As of late 2015, 17% of total eligible voters were AKP members. The party had almost 9.4 million members whereas its closest competitor, the CHP, had 1.2 million (%2) and the MHP and HDP had only 440 thousand and 30 thousand respectively. The party's tremendous advantage in reaching out to voters, coupled with the importance of economic performance and lack of a fully-fledged programmatic redistribution mechanism and a welfare state provides the fertile ground for continuity in clientelistic linkages.

[1] http://www.mahfiegilmez.com/2012/12/vergi-yuku-bir-ulkede-vergi-yuku-hesab.html

From a larger perspective, this situation in Turkey overlaps with a backlash against globalization in various countries. Rodrik (2011) argued that "...we run the risk that social costs of trade will outweigh the narrow economic gains and spark an even worse globalization backlash" (p. 88). Opinions against the EU integration especially since the 2008 Financial Crisis (Çarkoğlu and Kentmen, 2011), "inherent intolerance of diversity" which comes out as an undertone of a conservative discourse (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2015), and "an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy" (Özbudun, 2014) are some ramifications of this backlash in Turkey. On reversal of democratization and backlash against globalism, Öniş (2016) provided one of the most comprehensive discussions. Before delving into the specifics of deficits in the Turkish democracy especially since 2011 as the AKP's economic policy could not deliver the expected growth, Öniş underlined a rising global trend of an authoritarian and capitalist alternative to the Western-style liberal democracy: "Among the basic ideas behind this trend is the notion that capitalist development does not require liberal democracy. Instead, the thinking goes, such development may be achieved in a minimally democratic environment based on competitive elections and a narrowly construed majoritarianism that pushes aside such principles as respect for the rule of law, safeguards for minority rights, and reverence for civil liberties. (p.142)"

In this framework, where economic growth and downturn does not go parallel with democratic decision-making, governments do not include different interest groups into discussions about who gets what. On the contrary, as political checks and balances corrode, decisions about providing benefits to sustain political power and alleviate poverty are taken further away from a democratic framework. On the one hand, results of such undemocratic decisions are reflected in various areas such as irregularities in public procurement (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Gürakar and Meyersson, 2016), alleged claims of corruption and graft (Corke et al., 2014), lack of pluralism in the media (Çarkoğlu, Baruh, and Yıldırım, 2014), increasing levels of polarization during election campaigns (Kemahlıoğlu, 2015), while on the other hand, we witness the consolidation of clientelism as an alternative political linkage type.

The last decade of political experience in Turkey attests to the institutionalization of a social security network and risk hedging based on clientelistic benefits. This can be seen as a specific type of electoral competition in which the dominant AKP but also other parties try to mobilize as much of their resources as possible so as to be personally relevant for voters. However, beyond this electoral competition, clientelism provides an alternative for providing information about policy positions. In **Chapter 2**, I discussed some normative consequences of this alternative mechanism. Even if we assume an overarching individualist methodology to depict such relationships as a "market for vote", by

definition, it is not possible for the general public to assess consequences of clientelism before a decision, unless they become a part of the clientelistic network. In other words, a political system that does not give enough voice to all stakeholders encourages clientelism. This is why Brun and Diamond (2014) underline the restraints discretionary linkages put on 'better, more efficient, and just governance" (p. xi).

Additionally, empirical findings show that not all parties are equally capable of providing benefits. Findings in **Chapter 5** indicate that the ruling AKP is the most successful party in establishing long-term linkages and persuading its clients to adopt the party's policy positions. This is not surprising given the party's vast local organization and its incumbency advantage. However, **Chapter 4** also traced the variation in clientelistic success across parties and argued that certain parties are more successful. Based on a discussion of the center-periphery relationship in the country, tracing the history of clientelism shows the resiliency of peripheral forces in providing these benefits. This chapter specifically focused on periods when a peripheral party dominated the party politics in the country. The three such periods were the DP government in the 50s, the ANAP in mid-80s to early 90s, and the AKP government since 2002. There are significant developments in linkage strategies during these periods such as the waning role of agricultural notables, inclusion of business circles into resource mobilization networks, and the rise of the conservative local party organizations since the 90s. The AKP may seem like a singular archetype of a dominant incumbent party that is well versed in clientelism compared to its competitors, somewhat similar to PRI in Mexico or LDP in Japan.[2] However, the AKP is a crystallized representative of a larger political current in Turkey and this current relates to the center-periphery tension in the country. Given the recent rise of populist parties and the backlash against globalization across various countries, the Turkish experience may become a vanguard of a specific linkage type that depends on a combination of clientelistic and more programmatic promises in a dominant party setting with a sub-par level of democratic competition.

7.3 Other Implications and Avenues for Further Research

This dissertation combined recent findings on discretionary provision into a theoretical framework to argue for the persuasive effects of clientelism. It shows that when clientelistic relationships are temporally extended, they have important consequences not only on the political support behavior but also on the client's policy preferences and a general worldview. Clientelistic benefits are not gifts per se, but they are distributed *in addition to* what a citizen legally deserves from redistributive policies. Alternatively, such

[2]For Japan, Scheiner (2006) argues that LDP's domination for a very long time "lies in a combination of clientelism, fiscal centralization, and institutional protections for beneficiaries of the clientelist system." (p. 3)

incentives can substitute for the lack of programmatic welfare benefits distributed by the government, even if they are employed different purposes. In both scenarios, I argued that these are discretionary handouts and they correspond to "gifts" up to an extent. This argument has several important implications for the literature on clientelism.

First, the theory of long-term clientelistic persuasion suggests that a myopic focus on electoral consequences of clientelism may miss the target. **Chapter 3** refers to several recent studies which also make the same argument. Namely, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) recently built their models around the "discount factor" of temporally extended relationships. While this approach focuses on the impact of longevity on parties' capacity to target various voter groups (both core and swing voters) and thus diversify their portfolios, the account presented in this dissertation focused on the flip side of the coin: the process through which long-term linkages influence clients by comparing short and long-term clients with non-clients **(Chapter 5)** as well as those who received help from parties previously but could not anymore with those who were able to sustain such relationships **(Chapter 6)**.

This comparison brings us to the second point. Long-term implications are not confined to election cycles: this type of clientelism has significant effects on the client's affinity for clientelistic parties in general and more specifically, on the client's policy preferences. In other words, the relationship between the client and the patron becomes increasingly proximate over time. I empirically presented some tentative results about the scope conditions for this impact. The effect seems to be mediated by the saliency of a given policy for the party. Observations from the two fieldwork sites as well as the quantitative data indicate that clients and brokers exchange information mostly regarding important local issues. The second mediating factor is the role of brokers. This dissertation did not delve into scenarios when there is a positional divergence between the larger party platform and the party's local clientelistic capacity. This remains as a further research avenue. The long-term clientelistic persuasion implies that when brokers diverge from the party platform, clients should approach to the broker rather than the official party position since the broker is the agent who persuades clients. Although tentative findings in the third section of **Chapter 5** suggest that this is the case especially for the AKP's immigration policy, further systemic evidence is necessary to corroborate this implication.

The third point is discussed above but to reiterate briefly, the account presented in this dissertation requires an immense organizational capacity for the political parties, not for propagating their policy positions in a programmatic fashion, but to establish and sustain personalistic linkages. **Chapter 6** shows that the AKP and the CHP are the two most successful parties to do this in two neighborhood of Istanbul. Additionally, **Chapter 5**

also showed that even when we control for country-level development, extensive party organization leads to more long-term linkages relative to short-term ones. This is one of the "smoking-gun" evidence for the presence of long-term clientelism, and future research can potentially compare different levels of party organization capacity across countries and party systems to present further evidence for the effects of long-term clientelism.

Lastly, this dissertation suggests that research on clientelistic outcomes should start considering the relationship between ideology, policy preferences, and benefit recipiency not as mutually exclusive factors. On the contrary, clientelism and policy preferences may reinforce each other. This is not a novel argument especially since parties can target their core voters. This study explored the alternative question: what if clients become ideologically closer to the party over time? Programmatic preferences do not necessarily substitute for clientelistic recipiency, and even if they do, this does not imply that clients do not have policy preferences. The saliency of ideological proximity may decrease for periods when clients need to make a political decision such as vote choice, but this does not mean their preferences are not worth studying. On the contrary, this study argued that there is a more nuanced relationship between clientelistic and programmatic linkages.

This study was a theory building exercise based on a single case study.[3] Somer (2014) argued that utilizing the Turkish politics as a crucial case study provides a fertile ground for theory development. In the same vein, I aimed to underline various opportunities to refine the suggested theoretical framework, revise scope conditions, falsify the theoretical and empirical claims, and design more complex, theoretically relevant tests in other cases. I already mentioned two further research avenues above, one on broker's capacity and impact, and the other one on the party organizational capacity as determinants of long-term clientelistic persuasion. In addition to these two avenues, the topic of this dissertation can be developed in three further general areas which also hint at some of the methodological and substantive limitations of this study.

Throughout this dissertation, I touched upon the impact of (and lack thereof) the state's welfare distribution. This was an important undertow. The Turkish example indicates that although the state is relatively well established, alleviating substantive inequalities was not realized. Governments throughout the modern Turkish history used welfare to manage poverty or to co-opt and contain dissent (Yörük, 2012). In this respect, Turkish welfare system is only one alternative in which clientelism and its long-term variant can develop. A comparative study can potentially include alternative welfare and social policy regimes into the framework and delineate the process through which

[3]For a similar single-case study on clientelism that builds a theory of opposition party failure and party dominance by referring to the Japanese case, see Scheiner (2006).

differences in social redistribution schemes affect clientelistic outcomes.

Secondly, this dissertation proposed a process to explain clientelistic persuasion and underlined the impact of material incentives and informational asymmetry to suggest a direction from patrons (and brokers) to clients. However, further research can provide nuances to this direction. **Chapter 6** showed that when previous long-term clients are not contacted in a period of social and political crisis (e.g. gentrification), their attitudes towards their former patron change tremendously and they become rather resentful. This quasi-counterfactual situation corroborates the theory, but further research can indicate whether the observed effect accumulates in a linear fashion over time or if there are important material and temporal thresholds, after which clientelism starts to be efficacious. Empirical tests in **Chapter 5** and **Appendix A** assume such linearity in statistical models. However, the theoretical model delineated in **Chapter 3** focuses on an optimal level of political disagreement between patrons and clients for persuasion to be effective. This disagreement does not perfectly overlap with the discussion on targeting core vs. swing voters. A core voter, as defined in one of the two alternative ways in **Chapter 3**, can also have a certain level of dissonance with the patron. Therefore, linearity may be a rigid assumption for the proposed effect of long-term clientelism. There can be specific thresholds on informational and material exchange density and frequency, and extent of (dis)agreement. Further research that introduces theoretical interactions between variables of interest can explore critical junctures for the effect of persuasion.

The third and last point relates to the previous two issues. This dissertation employed various representative and online surveys, experimental research, and comparative fieldwork studies to empirically show the impact of clientelism. This pragmatic, mixed-methods approach let me compare different voter types within several large-N samples, conduct survey experiments to explore the proposed effect of various types of clientelism on approval and support, and situate clients within their relevant local social and political context. However, the evidence presented in this study is highly fragmented. A more nuanced and exhaustive research design can match clients with their broker and the respective party organization capacity, conduct comparative, cross-country analyses selecting on various criteria such as alternative welfare regimes and other institutional settings, or trace different client types over a long period in longitudinal studies to revise this study. These further research designs carry the potential to suggest further theorization and provide more robust empirical evidence.

Delving on the temporal dimension of clientelism demonstrates that political linkages are nuanced relationships with alternative consequences. Therefore, studying variants of clientelism and other linkage types pose interesting puzzles, not only in terms of behav-

ioral and attitudinal consequences, but also on institutional and contextual determinants. Lasswell (1950) once defined politics as "who gets what, when and how", which later became a conventional, lay definition for a general audience. While research on determinants and consequences of clientelism returns to this fundamental aspect of politics, it also presents researchers with novel, uncharted questions.

Appendices

A
Details of the Survey Data and Experiments

A.1 Data sets used in Chapter 5

A crucial data source for this study comes from series of Turkish national election studies (TNES) conducted since the 2002 general elections. This series of election studies are carried out as representative studies of Turkish voters. All studies are conducted as face-to-face surveys with randomly selected respondents. Samples are stratified according to 12 NUTS regions of Turkey. Within these regions, random blocks are selected to represent the Turkish voting age population. Since 2002, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu have been conducting the TNES.[1] TNES is a late but crucial step in studying Turkish voting behavior. Compared to its American and European counterparts, TNES is still in its early stages, but studies from this series have helped numerous scholars. TNES is the most advanced micro-level empirical data collection project in the country and this dissertation also benefits from the data collected in this project. There are five studies up until now conducted as a part of the TNES. In all of the studies except the 2014 local elections, surveys were panel studies. Therefore, it is possible to measure changes and shifts within single studies. Also, all of the surveys have experimental designs, some of which are directly about clientelism. Therefore, TNES is the primary source of empirical data utilized in the fifth chapter. Table A.1 summarizes five studies conducted as a part of the TNES and used in this dissertation.

Another data source used in Chapter 5 as well as in other chapter in passing is the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project *(DALP)*. DALP is an expert survey covering democratic polities with at least two million inhabitants. 505 parties from 88 countries are coded by 9588 experts between 2008 and 2009.[2] DALP is the most extensive cross-country data set on measurement of different party-voter linkages. It has five modules on party organizations, exchange mechanisms, monitoring and enforcement, party policy positions, and a general module on modes of party competition (charisma, policies, targeted benefits). These modules include detailed questions about different

[1] For details of examples, see Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009)

[2] Further information about codebook and data sets are available on https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/

Table A.1: Details of the Turkish National Election Studies

Study	Pre Election Study Date	Post Election Study Date	Number of Panel Respodents	Total number of Respon-dents	Margin of Error
2002 General Elections	October 2002	January & February 2003	971	3,052	± 1.7
2007 General Elections	June & July 2007	August 2007	1,388	2,018	± 2.1
2011 General Elections	May & June 2011	July & August 2011	1,045	2,126	± 2.1
2014 Local Elections	January 2014	N/A	N/A	1,666	± 2.4
2015 Presidential Elections	March & April 2015	July to September 2015	1,081	3,288	± 1.7

types of clientelistic linkages, enforcement strategies and reach of party organizations in relevant localities. Party-level variables employed in the multi-level model in Chapter 5 are taken from this data set. Also, Chapter 4 refers to DALP to clarify the AKPs advantage in providing benefits compared to its competitors.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Table 5.3 and Table 5.4

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2002 General Elections					
Visit	2002	0.180	0.384	0	1
Female	2002	0.484	0.500	0	1
Age	2002	2.429	1.068	1	5
Education	2002	7.039	3.884	0	15
Kurdish	2002	0.151	0.358	0	1
Rural	2002	0.386	0.487	0	1
Income	2002	2.316	1.072	1	4
Clientelistic Help	2002	0.037	0.117	0	1
% of Potential Offices Used	2002	0.120	0.325	0	1
2007 General Elections					
Visit	1388	0.187	0.390	0	1
Female	1388	0.490	0.500	0	1
Age	1388	2.612	1.049	1	5
Education	1388	7.042	3.959	0	15
Kurdish	1388	0.142	0.349	0	1
Rural	1388	0.374	0.484	0	1
Income	1388	2.251	1.079	1	4
Clientelistic Help	1388	0.034	0.109	0	1
% of Potential Offices Used	1388	0.126	0.332	0	1
2011 General Elections					
Visit	1900	0.117	0.322	0	1
Female	1900	0.569	0.495	0	1
Age	1900	2.554	1.063	1	5
Education	1900	7.548	4.037	0	15
Kurdish	1900	0.131	0.338	0	1
Rural	1900	0.194	0.395	0	1
Income	1900	2.379	1.085	1	4
2014 Local Elections					
Visit	1453	0.087	0.282	0	1
Female	1453	0.507	0.500	0	1
Age	1453	2.552	1.046	1	5
Education	1453	7.708	4.152	0	15
Kurdish	1453	0.196	0.397	0	1
Rural	1453	0.274	0.446	0	1
Income	1453	2.412	1.054	1	4
Clientelistic Help	1453	0.076	0.167	0	1
% of Potential Offices Used	1453	0.276	0.447	0	1
2014 Presidential Elections					
Visit	0	0.044	0.204	0	1
Female	1054	0.326	0.469	0	1
Age	1054	2.587	1.035	1	5
Education	1054	8.482	4.279	0	17
Kurdish	1054	0.195	0.397	0	1
Rural	1054	0.213	0.409	0	1
Income	1054	2.338	1.171	1	4
2015 General Elections					
Visit	778	0.093	0.290	0	1
Female	778	0.527	0.500	0	1
Age	778	2.737	1.086	1	5
Education	778	7.505	4.091	0	15
Kurdish	778	0.195	0.397	0	1
Rural	778	0.212	0.409	0	1
Income	778	2.271	1.174	1	4

Table A.3: Full specification of Table 5.4

	2002	2002	2007	2007	2014	2014
Clientelistic Help	0.677***		0.112		1.052***	
	(0.160)		(0.203)		(0.193)	
% of Potential Offices Used		1.895***		1.010		1.747***
		(0.422)		(0.553)		(0.438)
Female	-0.778***	-0.774***	-0.447**	-0.443**	-1.073***	-1.082***
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.225)	(0.224)
Age	-0.157*	-0.162**	0.106	0.103	-0.006	-0.017
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Education	-0.008	-0.010	0.031	0.029	-0.014	-0.019
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Kurdish	0.084	0.078	0.218	0.212	0.192	0.230
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.231)	(0.229)
Rural	-0.112	-0.132	0.173	0.162	0.666**	0.702***
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.211)	(0.211)
Income	0.091	0.088	-0.020	-0.024	0.063	0.050
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.100)
Constant	-1.034***	-0.981***	-1.840***	-1.836***	-2.635***	-2.336***
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.361)	(0.360)	(0.534)	(0.532)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.053	0.055	0.023	0.026	0.118	0.096
N	2002	2002	1388	1388	1453	1453

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic regression, DV: Reported visit by a political party during the election campaign period.

For summary statistics, see Table A.2

A.2 Experimental Balance Tests

This part provides details of the balance tests between treatment and control groups for the survey experiments presented in the fifth chapter.

Online Priming Experiment:
To measure the level of social desirability bias, 1,346 respondents were asked whether they received any gifts in return for political support. There were 694 respondents in the control group and 652 in the treatment. For the treatment group, respondents were shown a text before the question. Table A.4 provides measures whether treatment and control groups were distributed randomly by checking several demographic and political variables. Results show that none of these variables were associated with being in one of the two groups.

Table A.4: Balance in the Online Priming Experiment

Gender	-0.017
	(0.137)
Income	-0.025
	(0.034)
Education	-0.077
	(0.067)
Ideological Position	-0.005
	(0.020)
Party Membership	-0.100
	(0.078)
Constant	0.464
	(0.330)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.006
N	997

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Logistic regression, DV: Respondent in the experimental Group

2014 Vignette Experiment:

Respondents in 2014 TNES were randomly assigned to one of the four vignette groups and were asked whether they would vote for a candidate who hands out different types of goods and benefits. This experiment provides evidence for the effect of clientelism in different contexts. The vignette controls for the possible effect of different income levels, which may affect the experimental procedure by the wording of the question: the question asks about support that ranges in duration given the respondent's income (i.e. your monthly (six months) income). Rather than specifying a certain amount, this wording controls for specific income levels. Balance test for the random assignment is given in Table A.5. Results show that there was experimental balance across the four different experimental groups.

Table A.5: Balance in 2014 TNES Vignette Experiment

	Version B	Version C	Version D
Ideological Position	0.029	0.046	0.020
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Income	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.003	0.084	0.044
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Age	-0.011	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Gender	0.097	-0.039	-0.090
	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.159)
Kurdish	-0.232	-0.264	0.076
	(0.212)	(0.218)	(0.202)
Constant	0.144	-0.305	0.054
	(0.425)	(0.430)	(0.425)
Nagelkerke R^2		.014	
N		1318	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Multinomial Logistic regression. Reference category is Vignette Version A

2011 List Experiment- Calculating Individual Likelihood of Being a Client: Details of this list experiment are given in Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2015). This part explains the calculation of individual likelihoods to be a client based on Corstange's Listit package (2014) as well as a replication of the study by (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015). This list experiment was conducted by randomly assigning the whole sample into two groups and then giving them a list of items. Then, individual level likelihood of being a client is calculated by referring to a replication of the mentioned work in which coefficients from the Listit package are given in Table A.6:

Table A.6: Coefficients of the List Experiment

Strong Akp Partisan	2.42*
Weak AKP Partisan	-0.91
CHP Partisan	-1.18
MHP Partisan	0.44
HDP Partisan	-0.32
Nonpartisan	-0.64
Wealth	0.21
Education	-0.37**
Unemployed	0.81
Kurdish Speaker	0.22
Urban Residence	3.54**
Intercept	-2.37**
ln L	-3069.1
N (Control)	936
N (Treatment)	851

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Estimates are taken from (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2015, p.560)

A.3 Data analysis details

For data analysis presented in Table 5.11 to Table 5.14 in Chapter 5, there were several control variables used but not shown in the chapter for legibility reasons. These are relevant controls to account for variation in different attitudes and policy support. For all models, these control variables were used:

- Educational attainment in years
- Gender of the respondent
- Total household income measured in Liras earned per month
- Age
- An additive index of economic satisfaction that includes retrospective and prospective evaluations of pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluation
- Subjective evaluation of religiosity
- Party support for the AKP, CHP, MHP, and BDP.

Summary statistics and full models presented in Chapter 5 are shown in Table A.7 Table A.8.

Table A.7: Summary statistics for analyses in Table 5.11 to Table 5.14

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Immigration	0.255	0.436	0	1	1666
Sharia	0.122	0.328	0	1	1554
Economic Nationalization	0.718	0.45	0	1	1498
Ethnic Pluralism	0.358	0.48	0	1	1440
AKP Clientelistic Frequency	0.054	0.267	0	2	1666
CHP Clientelistic Frequency	0.013	0.114	0	1	1666
MHP Clientelistic Frequency	0.022	0.168	0	2	1666
BDP Clientelistic Frequency	0.009	0.122	0	2	1666
Education	2.057	1.469	0	6	1658
Gender	0.491	0.5	0	1	1666
Income	1531	1319	0	15000	1476
Age	40.779	14.921	18	88	1656
Economic Satisfaction	24	10.2	0	50	1666
Religiosity	6.8	1.9	0	10	1584
AKP Supporter	0.391	0.488	0	1	1666
CHP Supporter	0.149	0.357	0	1	1666
MHP Supporter	0.083	0.277	0	1	1666
BDP Supporter	0.055	0.227	0	1	1666

Table A.8: Detailed outputs of Table 5.11 to Table 5.14 with control variables

	Immigration				Sharia				Economic Nationalization				Ethnic Pluralism			
	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Short Term	1.722	0.610	0.504	0.361	1.763	Perfect Correlation	2.332	5.458	0.921	0.775	0.547	0.967	1.305	0.868	0.411	Perfect Correlation
	(0.698)	(0.307)	(0.244)	(0.345)	(0.758)		(1.503)	(6.249)	(0.324)	(0.369)	(0.259)	(1.128)	(0.434)	(0.453)	(0.233)	
Long Term	7.856*		Perfect Correlation	0.997	3.651*		5.673	2.535	0.827		Perfect Correlation	1.067	0.928		Perfect Correlation	Perfect Correlation
	(8.233)			(1.234)	(2.184)		(6.874)	(3.378)	(0.501)			(1.328)	(0.587)			
Education	0.851**	0.852**	0.852**	0.856**	0.769**	0.774**	0.778**	0.770**	0.949	0.948	0.948	0.950	1.093+	1.091+	1.089+	1.083
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Gender	1.029	0.990	0.989	1.001	0.766	0.733+	0.769	0.739	0.933	0.933	0.933	0.938	0.716**	0.710**	0.690**	0.716**
	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.145)	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.090)
Income	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	0.994	0.994	0.994	0.994	0.986+	0.986*	0.986+	0.986*	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Economic Satisfaction	0.957***	0.958***	0.958***	0.958***	0.997	0.999	1.001	1.001	0.993	0.993	0.993	0.993	1.000	1.000	0.999	1.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Religiosity	1.110**	1.118**	1.119**	1.120**	1.313***	1.318***	1.318***	1.318***	1.131***	1.130***	1.131***	1.130***	0.967	0.968	0.970	0.967
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
AKP Supporter	0.688*	0.700*	0.700*	0.696*	2.066***	2.076***	2.139***	2.109***	0.969	0.964	0.965	0.965	1.385*	1.381*	1.363*	1.393*
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.452)	(0.453)	(0.470)	(0.462)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.218)
CHP Supporter	0.921	0.944	0.933	0.924	0.124**	0.131**	0.129**	0.128**	0.632*	0.635*	0.634*	0.631*	0.744	0.747	0.731	0.772
	(0.198)	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.158)
MHP Supporter	1.008	1.000	1.023	1.001	0.209*	0.208*	0.185**	0.217*	0.691	0.686	0.688	0.690	0.902	0.902	0.969	0.934
	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.267)	(0.259)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.116)	(0.133)	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.230)	(0.220)
BDP Supporter	1.129	1.213	1.198	1.220	3.260**	3.526***	3.779***	3.443**	0.836	0.823	0.818	0.825	4.074***	4.101***	3.968***	4.144***
	(0.407)	(0.435)	(0.430)	(0.438)	(1.240)	(1.323)	(1.422)	(1.305)	(0.266)	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.261)	(1.256)	(1.259)	(1.220)	(1.278)
Constant	8.902***	8.573***	8.586***	8.254***	0.053***	0.053***	0.046***	0.049***	1.603	1.640	1.639	1.608	0.600	0.600	0.634	0.570
	(3.680)	(3.521)	(3.533)	(3.402)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.643)	(0.660)	(0.660)	(0.647)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.246)	(0.223)
Nagelkerke R^2	0.082	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.190	0.180	0.187	0.186	0.028	0.029	0.030	0.028	0.053	0.052	0.055	0.050
N	1397	1397	1392	1397	1306	1288	1306	1306	1274	1274	1269	1274	1227	1227	1222	1220

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Logistic regression, Odds ratios

A.3.1 Robustness Test 1: Factor Measurement

Instead of measuring clientelistic continuity in an ordinal measure such as in the Table A.8 (short and long term), an alternative is to create an index, which taps into the intensity and continuity of clientelism. In order to do that, I conducted a factor analysis, which considers three variables of interest:

- Whether respondent received benefits in return for his/her vote
- Whether respondent was visited by a political party in the short or long term (ordinally coded)
- Count of offices respondent visited to solve a problem (ordinally coded 1 if visited but could not get help and 2 if successfully solved a personal problem)

Based on these three variables that altogether measure intensity and continuity of clientelism, I conducted a factor analysis with varimax rotation and predicted the first factor (which explains 42% of variance). This factor measurement ranges from -0.69 to 7.68 in which higher values indicate more continuous and intense clientelistic linkages. Four variables of interaction with this factor and party dummies were constructed to measure clientelistic linkages for the four politically relevant parties. For instance, the variable that measures the AKP's clientelistic factor takes a value of 0 if the respondent is not an AKP client but then increases continuously where higher values indicate more intense and long-term linkages. Summary of the factor variable, as well as the four parties' interaction variables used in the alternative robustness model, are given in Table A.9. Instead of the ordinal variable employed in the tables in Chapter 5 on estimates of the policy positions, results in Table A.10 below uses this alternative measurement. There are neither substantive nor statistical differences, suggesting that results are robust to this alternative continuous measurement.

Table A.9: Summary statistics for alternative (factor) measure of clientelism

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
General Clientelistic Intensity	0	1.12	-0.696	7.688	1502
AKP	0.076	0.475	0	7.68	1502
CHP	0.013	0.135	0	2.42	1502
MHP	0.028	0.26	0	4.38	1502
BDP	0.015	0.246	0	6.27	1502

Table A.10: Estimating Policy Preferences with an Alternative Measurement of Clientelistic Continuity (Robustness for Table A.8)

	Immigration				Sharia				Economic Nationalization				Ethnic Pluralism			
	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Clientelistic Continuity	1.332*	0.838	0.957	0.911	1.206*	Perfect - Correlation	1.270+	1.218	0.942	0.947	1.043	0.930	1.095	1.088	0.697	Perfect + Correlation
(Factor Measurement)	(0.170)	(0.181)	(0.132)	(0.118)	(0.095)		(0.184)	(0.158)	(0.060)	(0.208)	(0.147)	(0.114)	(0.084)	-0.243	-0.157	
Education	0.854**	0.855**	0.857**	0.857**	0.806*	0.812*	0.814*	0.813*	0.950	0.949	0.951	0.950	1.143**	1.147**	1.142*	1.137*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.059)	-0.059	-0.059	-0.059
Gender	1.052	1.013	1.014	1.016	0.890	0.851	0.886	0.864	0.843	0.851	0.856	0.852	0.766*	0.758*	0.735*	0.765*
	(0.144)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.173)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.100)	-0.099	-0.096	-0.1
Income	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1	1	1
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	0	0	0
Age	0.993	0.993	0.993	0.993	0.983*	0.982*	0.983*	0.983*	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.002	1.002	1.002	1.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Economic Satisfaction	0.957***	0.958***	0.958***	0.958***	1.003	1.005	1.007	1.006	0.995	0.994	0.995	0.994	1.005	1.005	1.004	1.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
Religiosity	1.126**	1.134***	1.134***	1.131**	1.346***	1.348***	1.349***	1.359***	1.118**	1.117**	1.117**	1.115**	1.005	1.008	1.009	1.011
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.036)	-0.036	-0.037	-0.037
AKP Supporter	0.697*	0.713*	0.712*	0.714*	2.189***	2.228***	2.279***	2.250***	0.960	0.950	0.951	0.952	1.257	1.275	1.264	1.291
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.521)	(0.529)	(0.544)	(0.535)	(0.171)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.206)	-0.209	-0.207	-0.212
CHP Supporter	0.968	0.999	0.981	0.978	0.156*	0.166*	0.162*	0.159*	0.684+	0.683+	0.681+	0.678+	0.796	0.797	0.79	0.83
	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.168)	-0.168	-0.167	-0.176
MHP Supporter	1.045	1.035	1.048	1.035	0.266*	0.261*	0.244*	0.269*	0.607*	0.606*	0.603*	0.606*	0.886	0.888	0.933	0.918
	(0.282)	(0.280)	(0.284)	(0.279)	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.154)	(0.167)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.217)	-0.217	-0.23	-0.225
BDP Supporter	1.202	1.298	1.298	1.325	2.950*	3.179**	3.364**	3.080**	0.771	0.752	0.757	0.766	3.511***	3.627***	3.514***	3.610***
	(0.499)	(0.537)	(0.537)	(0.549)	(1.260)	(1.344)	(1.426)	(1.317)	(0.276)	(0.269)	(0.271)	(0.275)	(1.199)	-1.235	-1.197	-1.237
Constant	7.919***	7.460***	7.457***	7.598***	0.034***	0.034***	0.030***	0.030***	1.770	1.800	1.775	1.824	0.346*	0.335**	0.357*	0.311**
	(3.508)	(3.277)	(3.285)	(3.353)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.776)	(0.790)	(0.780)	(0.801)	(0.144)	-0.14	-0.149	-0.131
Nagelkerke R^2	0.085	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.187	0.176	0.182	0.182	0.027	0.026	0.026	0.027	0.044	0.042	0.047	0.04
N	1266	1266	1266	1266	1202	1185	1202	1202	1168	1168	1168	1168	1126	1126	1126	1120

Standard errors in parentheses

$+ p < 0.1$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Logistic regression, Odds ratios

A.3.2 Robustness Test 2: Heckman Selection Model

One crucial problem in the analysis provided in the third section of the fifth chapter is self-selection: one possible reason why clients can be persuaded in different policy areas is that they are already close to the policy position of the political party which provides them with benefits prospectively. To alleviate endogeneity problem associated with this selection bias, I conducted Heckman selection models with the factor measurement explained in section 3.1 of this appendix and replicated the analysis in Table A.8 and Table A.10. Details of the Heckman selection estimation strategy are given in the methodological note in Chapter 5.4.2 - Different Policy Areas subsection.

Results from the Heckman selection model suggests that even if we account for possible selection bias, parties' long-term linkages have an important effect in the theorized direction when the issue is salient for the party. Results from the selection model are given in Table A.11, and the coefficient plot in Figure A.1 plots the coefficients of long-term clientelism for all parties across selected policy areas.

Table A.11: Estimating Policy Preferences with Heckman Selection Model (Robustness for Table A.8)

	Immigration				Sharia				Economic Nationalization				Ethnic Pluralism			
	AKP	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**	**AKP**	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**	**AKP**	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**	**AKP**	**CHP**	**MHP**	**BDP**
Clientelistic Continuity	-0.083*	0.032	0.006	0.044	0.066**	-0.070	0.035	0.046	-0.009	0.021	-0.018	0.010	0.027	-0.012	-0.087+	0.162*
(Factor Measurement)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.022)	(0.078)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.082)
Gender	0.001	0.008	0.007	0.007	-0.015	-0.022	-0.017	-0.019	-0.018	-0.017	-0.019	-0.018	-0.060*	-0.063*	-0.068*	-0.061*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age	0.002+	0.002+	0.002+	0.002+	-0.001+	-0.001+	-0.001+	-0.001+	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.029**	0.029**	0.029**	0.029**	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+	-0.016+	0.022*	0.022*	0.022*	0.022*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Income	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religiosity					0.030***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***								
					(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)								
Economic Satisfaction									0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000				
									(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Kurdish													0.277***	0.277***	0.273***	0.270***
													(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	0.128*	0.128*	0.130*	0.129*	0.041	0.048	0.040	0.041	0.734***	0.732***	0.736***	0.734***	0.278***	0.278***	0.284***	0.279***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
								Selection Model								
Religiosity	0.098*	-0.028	0.023	-0.033	0.089	-0.038	0.023	-0.028	0.100*	-0.036	0.024	-0.035	0.098*	-0.033	0.022	-0.037
	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.070)
Supporter of the party	0.149	0.869***	1.096***	0.860*	0.001	1.015***	1.304***	0.740	0.124	0.857***	1.081***	0.835*	0.112	0.836***	1.040***	0.780*
	(0.143)	(0.238)	(0.199)	(0.411)	(0.174)	(0.280)	(0.165)	(0.611)	(0.146)	(0.236)	(0.201)	(0.408)	(0.145)	(0.234)	(0.204)	(0.385)
Income	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.020	-0.081	-0.017	0.183+	-0.021	-0.057	-0.011	0.170	-0.021	-0.086	-0.018	0.190*	-0.022	-0.087	-0.021	0.206*
	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.096)	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.060)	(0.105)	(0.054)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.096)
Constant	-2.551***	-2.454***	-2.583***	-2.749***	-2.188***	-2.374***	-2.618***	-2.701***	-2.566***	-2.403***	-2.593***	-2.766***	-2.569***	-2.427***	-2.562***	-2.718***
	(0.350)	(0.476)	(0.466)	(0.611)	(0.560)	(0.448)	(0.379)	(0.570)	(0.353)	(0.478)	(0.470)	(0.615)	(0.348)	(0.479)	(0.474)	(0.621)
N	1470	1470	1470	1470	1404	1404	1404	1404	1461	1461	1461	1461	1463	1463	1463	1463
σ	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.43	0.36	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.46
ρ	-0.17	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.19	-0.20	0.10	0.13	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.02	-0.16	0.31

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Heckman Selection Model

Figure A.1: Heckman Selection Model, Coefficient Plot for Long-term Clientelism



B

Fieldwork Selection Strategy - Chapter Six

Measuring clientelism is challenging because of the social desirability bias and the secretive nature. However, if clientelistic interactions exist for mobilizing voters, then we should see its implications in behavioral and attitudinal changes. There may be numerous reasons for such changes, but the measurement of clientelistic *potential* takes into consideration the impact of previous election results. In this respect, I define this potential as the change in the vote choice that cannot be accounted by considering the past electoral choices in a given small community. There can also be numerous unrelated reasons for such change. For instance, after the redrawing of administrative boundaries, the demographic make-up of numerous districts changed in Turkey before the 2014 local elections. Actively pursuing clientelistic linkages through the party organization is one such explanation in this respect. To describe the concept of clientelistic potential for İstanbul, I collected original data on the city's election results since 1991 on the neighborhood level.[1]

This data set includes six general, two local elections, one presidential election, and a constitutional referendum from 1991 to 2014. Boundaries of districts and neighborhoods change over time as İstanbul developed in the last 25 years. However, this data set can trace 60% of residents living in 936 neighborhoods of İstanbul's 39 districts in 2014.

Based on this electoral data set, I created a structural equation model. This model measures continuity for the four largest political parties in Turkey's recent political history. These are namely the AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP.[2] This model follows the trajectory of continuity in a party's support in İstanbul's neighborhoods for the elections held over the

[1]This data set includes 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2011 general elections, 2007 and 2014 local elections, 2010 constitutional referendum, and 2014 presidential elections. In order to make the local elections more comparable with the general elections, I used the local municipal council results instead of mayoral election results since council elections are proportional, similar to the general elections.

[2]Because of party closures, it is not always possible to trace these parties from 1991 to 2014. For the AKP which is a successor of the Islamist National Outlook ideology, I used the FP and RP in the 1990s. For the MHP, the model starts with the 1995 elections, as the party could not participate in the 1991 elections. In the CHP's case, the SHP was modeled for 1991, and in the HDP's case, the HADEP (1995 & 1999), the DEHAP (2002), Independent candidates supported by the party (2007 & 2011), and the DTP (2009) were used. Although party names and brands changed, organizations and leadership cadres remained the same for most cases. For the constitutional referendum, a vote of Yes was modeled for AKP and No was modeled for CHP and MHP while the turnout rate was modeled for HDP because of the party's boycott campaign for the referendum.

Figure B.1: (Dis)Continuity of National Outlook Ideology in İstanbul



last 23 years. For instance, Figure B.1 plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for continuity in Islamist ideology over time. An interesting finding in this graph is the fact that there were important shifts in some cases. For instance, the RP's support in 1995 is negatively correlated with Erdoğan's support in 2014 presidential elections. A similar unexpected effect is seen in the AKP's 2009 results impact on Erdoğan's support in 2014. However, as can be expected, elections that are more recent have higher influence on the election under consideration. The model considers both direct and indirect effects. For example, the local results from 2009 would have a direct effect on 2014 Presidential elections and an indirect effect through 2011 general and 2014 local elections. With this structural equation model, I account for a considerable part of the variation in election results. This is not surprising given that vote choices of neighborhoods remain somewhat constant from one election to the following even if parties were closed.

As there are more elections, and AKP consolidates its place among voters over time, the model becomes more successful in predicting the neighborhood-level political support. However, this does not mean that the model predicts election outcomes perfectly. There are neighborhoods, which voted unexpectedly for or against a party. For instance, looking at its historical vote choice, the expected vote share of Erdoğan during the Presidential elections in Demirkapı neighborhood of Bağcılar district would be 62% while Erdoğan was able to get 57%. On the other side of the scale, the expected result in Orta neighborhood of Pendik was 59% while Erdoğan got 65% of the total votes there. These unexpected shifts cannot be accounted with this continuity model. For instance, the model shows that the distribution of the discontinuity in Erdoğan's support is positive on average, implying that the AKP's endorsement of Erdoğan as well as the campaign activity on his

Figure B.2: % Variance Explained by the Continuity Model for Each Election



behalf, were able to make a difference and mobilize voters for supporting him, compared to the past AKP performance. As mentioned above, there may be numerous reasons for changes in the party support continuity and clientelistic success is one of these reasons.

Therefore, I define shifts for more support as a clientelistic *potential*. It is only a potential reason among several alternatives and therefore, the measurement only gives us a hint, and the only way to test whether this potential is realized is to select neighborhoods based on this criteria and conduct interviews with residents in these neighborhoods. Therefore, only neighborhoods in which the historical continuity model cannot explain the additional support were selected. Figure B.3 plots the distribution of neighborhoods on unexpected shifts for and against Erdoğan. The clientelistic potential criteria limit the number of neighborhoods. In this respect, only those neighborhoods in which one of the four parties did not lose votes unexpectedly were selected. Similar clientelistic potential values for each neighborhood are calculated for each of the four parties and the last three elections. Since elections are a tit-for-tat game in which one party's loss over a series of elections implies another party's gain, shifts in clientelistic potential across parties should be negatively correlated. This is not surprising given that the neighborhoods are the basic unit of party competition and one party either dominates a neighborhood or competes with another party. This is why the data set indicates that the effective number of parties across neighborhoods is close to 2 even in proportional elections. Analyses of competition in districts are aggregates of neighborhoods. However, different demographic, ideological, and socioeconomic profiles coexist within same districts. In such district-level data, we lose most of the rich information across different neighborhoods. In fact, my fieldwork revealed that the party competition in most neighborhoods happens between two parties. This is also apparent in Figure B.4. However, on the aggregate district-level, this competition is underplayed. To produce a more comprehensive analysis, fieldwork

was conducted on the neighborhood level, delineating the competition in a more nuanced way.

Figure B.3: Histogram of Unexplained Shifts in 2014, Erdoğan's Presidential Candidacy



In addition to selecting neighborhoods based on the clientelistic potential, several other criteria were used. One such important issue was the economic development level of neighborhoods. Clientelism happens in various environments but mostly, lower socioeconomic development is conducive to such interactions as higher levels of poverty can have dire consequences. As mentioned in other chapters, this claim is also supported by the previous research as well as the survey findings in this dissertation. Therefore, an important predictor of whether clientelistic interactions take place in a neighborhood or not is the economic development. However, there are not any economic indicators for neighborhoods in the Turkish case. Instead, a proxy variable for economic development, the average price of a 100 square meter apartment, was used to select neighborhoods.[3] House prices are not perfect proxies for the economic development level of a neighborhood. Because of several reasons such as gentrification and a recent influx of Syrian migrants, price volatility in İstanbul's housing market is very high and there is a sharp upward trend.[4] However, given the limitations in neighborhood-level data, this proxy is still very useful especially since house prices is an important part of the total accumulated wealth residents have in a neighborhood. Therefore, neighborhoods, especially those with a low

[3]This data was scraped from the most popular online realty website in the country, hurriyetemlak.com in July 2014. I only specified the average square meter and no other specifications (such as amenities, location centrality, whether the apartment is furnished or not, etc.)

[4]See Turkish Central Bank's House Price Index April 2015, p.2 for the recent rise in İstanbul and its comparison to two other large cities, Ankara and İzmir: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/a6fe031d-f7b0-4a09-93e0-63a99c404d14/HPI.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=a6fe031d-f7b0-4a09-93e0-63a99c404d14

Figure B.4: Effective Number of Parties in Istanbul's Neighborhoods



level of economic development, were selected. The average price of a 100 square meter apartment in 676 neighborhoods was 232 thousand Liras (close to $100.000) in July 2014.

In addition to the economic development levels, another important point of reference to understand the level and impact of clientelism in everyday life is political competition. Competition is an important factor that plays into the political environment in a neighborhood. Figure B.4 plots the average effective number of parties[5] in İstanbul's neighborhoods for elections in the last two decades. As is it is clear in this graph, the competition in neighborhoods seem to be condensing to a two-party system over time regardless of the election type. In general, local as well as the latest presidential elections, the number of parties competing in a neighborhood is decreasing.

However, concentration does not imply lack of competition. It may mean that voters are acting strategically and shift their support only when there are viable alternatives. Information on candidate viability is hard to decode. It necessitates acquiring costly information and clientelism is an important signaling mechanism, implying that the party has the organizational capacity and thus, it is viable. In other words, it is easier for parties to show themselves as viable alternatives if they have brokers and activists, reminding the presence of their party to residents of a neighborhood.

In addition to the increasing importance of the organizational capacity, previous literature also mentions the importance of clientelism, especially for swing voters. Therefore, the degree of competition is also an important indicator to understand whether clientelistic linkages are prevalent in a neighborhood. Higher levels of party competition necessitate more presence and better solutions to personal problems. In this respect, the

[5]ENP measured by Laakso & Taagepera's formula. See, (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).

level of competition rather than the number of actors who compete is more important. For instance, in 2014 Presidential elections, there were neighborhoods in which one of the three candidates dominated the whole electoral scene, while in others one or two votes could make the difference. In Rami neighborhood of Eyüp district, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to get 3738 votes while Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the candidate supported by the CHP and MHP got 3725, a mere difference of 13 votes. However, in Kadıköy's Fenerbahçe neighborhood, İhsanoğlu had 9857 votes while Erdoğan had only 1228.

Figure B.5 plots the locally weighted regression estimates (loess curve) for vote shares of the three presidential candidates across average logged real estate prices of neighborhoods and a histogram of the same neighborhoods across logged house prices. As it is clear from the graph, Erdoğan and Demirtaş were able to reach out to the relatively lower middle classes in the city while İhsanoğlu was most successful in the least developed and the most developed neighborhoods. This graph is illustrative, but it does not reveal how important Erdoğan's higher share in lower middle classes was vis-a-vis his competitors. In fact, this fieldwork focused in those neighborhoods, which were high on the number of votes but low in the level of development. The majority of residents live in such neighborhoods. Therefore, I selected neighborhoods on the clientelistic potential, the level of development and political competition. An additional criterion was keeping the district same across neighborhoods so that the quality of some district-level services such as welfare benefits to the poor, healthcare, local employment opportunities and municipal benefits are constant. I also tried to keep the population of a neighborhood in the middle range, close to the city average. The number of voters in an average neighborhood in 2014 Presidential elections was around ten thousand, but it ranges from twenty-five to fifty-eight thousand. While it could be impossible to conduct interviews with voters in a very small neighborhood, it would be challenging if not impossible to generalize qualitative findings from the field in a very large neighborhood. Therefore, the population in both of the selected neighborhoods was close to ten thousand.

Table B.2 below summarizes the selection criteria for the two neighborhoods selected from Sarıyer district as a part of the fieldwork. After selecting these two neighborhoods, I randomly selected ten streets from a list of all the streets in the two neighborhoods. I conducted at least one interview in these ten streets and with these ten initial interviews, I used a snowball sampling procedure to meet new residents. I especially targeted residents who indicated that they know someone who receives a benefit from local party organizations or the local government. In addition to conducting these open-ended interviews with various voters from these two neighborhoods, I also conducted interviews with selected local party elites and public officials not only from this specific district but also with others from the larger İstanbul province in order to elaborate nuances of

Figure B.5: Margin of Vote % in Neighborhoods



how personalistic linkages influence people over time. I recorded interviews with an audio recorder as long as the interviewees accepted and gave consent to it. An average interview took around 1.5 hours, with a minimum of 40 minutes and a maximum of 2.5 hours. In total, there were 33 interviews conducted in the period between January to March 2015 and then before the June 2015 elections, in late April and early May 2015. Table B.1 shows details of these interviews.

Table B.1: Details of the Interviews

Interview #	Age	Gender	Location	Notes
1	27	Male	İstanbul	High level party worker for AKP's provincial youth organization
2	33	Male	İstanbul	High level party worker for AKP's provincial youth organization
3	30s	Male	İstanbul	Living in another district
4	50s	Male	İstanbul	Living in another district, working for a company known to be politically close to the AKP
5	38	Male	Sarıyer District	Not from Maden or Pınar, works for the local CHP municipality
6	48	Male	Sarıyer District	Not from Maden or Pınar
7	40s	Male	Sarıyer District	Headman of another neighborhood in the district
8	50s	Male	Sarıyer District	Lives in another neighborhood, works as a contractor in Pınar, active in the local AKP organization
9	50s	Female	Sarıyer District	Lives in another neighborhood
10	20	Female	Maden	
11	20	Female	Maden	
12	33	Male	Maden	Party activist working for the local AKP organization
13	43	Male	Maden	Member of the local MHP branch
14	45	Male	Maden	Mamber of the local AKP branch
15	54	Male	Maden	
16	20s	Male	Maden	
17	30s	Female	Maden	
18	19	Male	Pınar	Receives benefits from the local AKP organization
19	34	Female	Pınar	
20	45	Female	Pınar	Foreigner living in Pınar with her Turkish husband
21	55	Male	Pınar	
22	62	Female	Pınar	Receives benefits from the local CHP organization
23	63	Male	Pınar	
24	64	Female	Pınar	
25	68	Male	Pınar	
26	30s	Female	Pınar	
27	30s	Female	Pınar	Living in another district, her parents live in Pınar
28	30s	Male	Pınar	Receives benefits from the local CHP organizaton
29	40s	Female	Pınar	Member of the local MHP branch
30	40s	Female	Pınar	Previous head of the CHP's local neighborhood branch
31	40s	Male	Pınar	Active broker, working for the CHP in Pınar
32	40s	Male	Pınar	High level party officer working for CHP's Sarıyer district branch
33	50s	Female	Pınar	

In different respects such as population, the average effective number of parties competing in the neighborhood in the past six elections since 2002 as well as the average winning margin of the four largest and politically relevant parties were not very different from the average figures in İstanbul. However, house price index indicates that Pınar neighborhood is economically more developed compared to Maden and the city average. Table B.2 shows neighborhood selection criteria and the average of the 936 neighborhood of İstanbul. Additionally, figures B.6 to B.8 plot locations of the selected neighborhoods within Turkey and electoral results on neighborhood level as well as the average price index for a 100 square meter house in these neighborhoods to give the reader an idea about the political and economic geography of the neighborhoods within the larger city.

Similarly, the structural equation model to gauge continuity as explained above indicates that the incumbent AKP had a potential clientelistic advantage on average while all of the other parties were in a disadvantaged position in 2014. In other words, both neighborhoods were suitable for conducting fieldwork and understanding whether the ruling AKP was indeed in a more advantageous position compared to its rivals. In Maden, the AKP was facing high competition, as the average level of its winning margin was low. On average, the party gained only 4 percent more than its next biggest competitor in the last six elections. This was not so in Pınar; the AKP had a comfortable margin of 17 percent ahead of the second largest party in the neighborhood. Referring to the previous literature, one would expect the AKP to target undecided voters in Maden and therefore persuade these voters to support the party. However, as I explain in the sixth chapter, this was not the case. Contrary to such expectations, the AKP was not active in Maden at all. Parties do not always try to recruit new clients especially when their core constituency starts to dissolve over local or national crisis situations. This is the story of Pınar, and it dates back to the rumors of urban renewal hitting this lower middle-class neighborhood several years ago.

Table B.2: Summary of Case selection Criteria

	Pınar	**Maden**	**Average of 936 Neighborhoods**
Voting Age Population (August 2014)	8,219	9,977	10,660
Economic Development Level	6.32	5.26	5.29
Effective Number of Parties	3.16	3.68	2.99
AKP Margin	17	4.8	8.6
CHP Margin	-17.9	-5.3	-12.9
MHP Margin	-27	-21.5	-32.8
HDP Margin	-42	-30.7	-45.6
AKP's Clientelistic Potential	0.9	2.3	0.08
CHP's Clientelistic Potential	2.7	-0.6	-0.01
MHP's Clientelistic Potential	0.0	-1.4	0.00
HDP's Clientelistic Potential	-0.9	1.5	0.00

Figure B.6: Location of selected fieldwork neighborhoods within Turkey and İstanbul



Figure B.7: 2014 Local Election Results in İstanbul

Figure B.8: 2014 Presidential Election Results in İstanbul and average House Prices



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