

**FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIORS OF EMERGING
MIDDLE POWERS TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF NICHE
DIPLOMACY**

**By
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Abstract

States are classified according to their positions and their potentials in the present international order. In the International Relations literature, in spite of the existence of ‘middle power’ notion, there occurred need for a new classification in the middle power groups, namely traditional middle power and emerging middle power. Emerging middle powers differed from the other sub-group through their reformist aspects requiring an inclusive international order. Additionally, they are eagerly trying to show their benevolent image in the international scene through the policy domains they are better at. The thesis provides a sub-state level analysis to reveal how NGOs are effectual elements during implementation of foreign policy paradigms. The thesis aims at covering both the roles of emerging middle powers in the international order and the roles of NGOs located in these emerging middle powers.

Keywords: middle power, niche diplomacy, foreign policy, great power, foreign assistance, agricultural technology transfer

NİŞ DİPLOMASİ BAĞLAMINDA YÜKSELEN ORTA ÖLÇEKLİ GÜÇLERİN AFRİKA'YA YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKA DAVRANIŞLARI

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Özet

Uluslararası düzende, devletler düzen içindeki pozisyonlarına ve potansiyellerine göre sınıflandırılırlar. Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe ‘orta ölçekli güç’ kavramının bulunmasına rağmen bu gruptaki devletlerin daha iyi analiz edilebilmesi için bir alt sınıflandırmaya ihtiyaç duyuldu: yükselen orta ölçekli güçler ve geleneksel orta ölçekli güçler. Yükselen orta ölçekli güçler diğer alt gruptan uluslararası düzenin daha kapsayıcı olmasını gerektiren reformist özellikleri ile ayrılırlar. Öte yandan, yükselen orta ölçekli güçler uluslararası çevrede kendilerinin görece iyi organize oldukları ve iyi bir performans sergiledikleri ve tezde niş diplomasi olarak adlandırdığımız alanlarda diğer coğrafyalarla etkileşime girip ülkelerinin olumlu, iyi huylu, yumuşak taraflarını göstermeye gayret ederler. Tezde, bunun haricinde, üzerinde durulan diğer bir konu ise devlet-dışı aktörlerin yükselen orta ölçekli güçlerin dış politika yapımında ne denli etkili olabilecekleridir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: orta ölçekli güçler, niş diplomasi, dış politika, büyük güçler, dış yardım, tarımsal teknoloji transferi

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List of Abbreviations

IHH – Humanitarian Relief Foundation
TUSKON - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
MÜSİAD - Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
TÜSİAD – Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association
THY – Turkish Airlines
ORDAF – Associations for Studying Middle East and Africa
EMBRAPA – Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
SSA – sub-Saharan Africa
ABC – Brazilian Cooperation Agency
TIKA - Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UN – United Nations
BRICS – Initials of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
TOBB - Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges
NGO – non-Governmental Organization
AKP – Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
EU – European Union
USA – United States of America
OIC – Organization for Islam Conference
MHP – Nationalist Movement Party – Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
DSP – Democratic Left Party – Demokratik Sol Parti
ANAP – Motherland Party – Anavatan Partisi
ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC – Development Assistance Community
IMF – International Monetary Fund
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
NEPAD - The New Partnership for Africa's Development
DEİK – Foreign Economic Relations Board
AfDB – African Development Bank
TASAM – Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Research
TAV – Aviation consortium led by Tepe, Akfen, and Vie companies
TÜBİTAK - Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey

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I. INTRODUCTION

Middle powers seek for a prevalence role both in their regions and on global political platforms. However, not all of them preserve capacity and willing to conduct reformist policies in their regions. By the term 'reformist', it can be understood that enforcing other states to accept policies that are not compatible with what the international system adopts. Europe is an influential example that indicates the difficulty of emergence of reformist middle powers due to the presence of established powers. For example, Belgium cannot follow irredentist, reformist or at least assertive roles because of the fact that Europe has already had enough strong powers, such as France, Germany and England, which are ready and willing to hamper any possibility of emergence of new influential actor(s). On the other hand, regions like the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is more suitable for occurrence of newly emerged middle powers since this region has been presenting a competition on regional leadership. For instance, lately in the Middle East, Egypt, Iran and Turkey have been seeking for ways to control the territory via their images and hard powers. Similarly, in Latin America, Brazil has been trying to be the strongest regional power. Luckily, Brazil has no serious contenders unlike Turkey.

Other than regional politics, middle powers have also stakes at the contiguous regions. Relations with third world countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, provide opportunities for the middle powers to construct proper policies based on motivations and capabilities. One of the most influential ways of being interacted with third world countries has been offering foreign assistance and/or technology transfer. Foreign assistance, strategic cooperation, infrastructure investment and agricultural development are some of the most influential policy domains where middle powers can increase their impacts in this group of countries.

The thesis will examine similarities and differences of emerging middle powers within their own unique niche diplomacies and within some policy areas like nuclear deal that can be considered as a common diplomacy area. Ignoring internal differences and characteristics of each power can be practical to simplify and to keep over loading of information away from the readers' eyes. In this thesis, idiosyncratic characteristics of emerging middle powers will be the focal point. Therefore, niche diplomacies that emerging middle powers adopted will be essential scope of the thesis.

In the thesis, the question 'whether emerging middle powers are too similar to each other such that we can ignore the differences and take them under one general concept; or they have critical differences not to be overlooked in the future analyses' will be investigated. It is to say that my method will be based on comparison of two emerging middle powers. Additionally, to see their common characteristics as emerging powers, some basic aspects of traditional middle powers will be the subject of the thesis. By this way, we can realize how emerging middle powers deviate from the road determined by the international system. The thesis will compare Turkey and Brazil as emerging middle powers in order to see how they are similar to or different from each other if the case is foreign policy construction toward sub-Saharan Africa.

To elucidate these issues, some points and notions such as the middle power concept and niche diplomacy will be clarified in the context of established middle powers and emerging middle powers. It should be noted that a middle power, regardless it is emerging or traditional, is a *state* which is seen as the central actor in international relations and global governance. Therefore, one layer of the study will be on state level. States as rational actors always try to find an optimum way to handle problems and try to maximize their interests in international community by acting in a way that they consider both domestic and external factors, mostly in a multilateral way. As these factors can be other states, which might want to bring pipelines past in their borders, these also can be international institutions which have the power to

sentence a state to pay a fine; or an NGO which has rifts with the incumbent government's head. These factors, especially domestic ones, can be quite varied across countries. In this respect, one major point in the next chapters will be on domestic actors like NGOs for the comparison of emerging middle powers. Therefore, other layer of the study will be on sub-state level.

Hypotheses

H1: Emerging middle powers seek to build bilateral (or unilateral) relations in the niche diplomacies they adopted, rather than multilateral relations.

Success promotion is valuable foreign practice for a benevolent image in international scene. In order to transform cost into profit, states should show what they have done. For instance, alleviating poverty in an African country does not provide benefits to the poverty alleviator country if this country does not promote what it has done. Building an internationally recognized benevolent image requires being a visible actor either. In a collaboration or under an organization, state has to share the prospective success. Therefore, building bilateral relations while engaging within niche diplomacy would be more lucrative than other way around for an emerging middle power.

H2: NGOs' role in foreign policy is high and not identical for all emerging middle powers. In emerging middle powers, NGOs can be complementary, or even conflictual, actors.

The degree of state intervention in foreign affairs varies across different countries. For instance, the role of NGOs in Turkey after 2000 has gained importance, especially in determination and implementation of foreign policies. The opposite has happened in Brazil where the state has been more interventionist and has limited the role of NGOs.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 (literature review chapter) will handle a review on middle powers by classifying them into two groups: traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers. Firstly, there will be definitions of middle power and justification of why we need different and new tools to understand the fact that we need a more elaborate middle power conceptualization. Thesis will focus mainly on niche diplomacy where middle powers perform.

In international order, the concept of emerging middle powers consists of newly emerged powers raising question about the functioning of the current order. They are not trying to abolish the present order but to reform it and by this way, amplify their voices. Opposite to them, established middle powers are satisfied with the order and do not initiate any contestation. In order to distinguish two sub-groups of middle powers, Gini coefficient, GDP and GDP per capita, and democracy rankings are presented for each different country groups. In the last subsection of this chapter, there is explanation on middle power politics at the base of niche diplomacy and of rule-breaking – rule-shaping discussion.

Chapter 3 (the theory chapter) focuses on three theories, realism, liberalism and, finally, constructivism. Following each theories' brief explanation, the implications of these theories within the issues are presented in the thesis. In order not to expand the debate unnecessarily, thesis will avoid explaining the theories deeply. Rather, some basic implications of realism that would be related to the engagement policies, middle powership, and NGO issues will be presented. Due to its emphasis on the international system, neorealism will be used to define the implications of realism in discussion of power. Liberalism underlines the role of NGOs. Lastly, constructivism prioritizes norms in the cases of foreign assistance and other types of engagement.

Chapter 4 examines Turkey and Brazil as emerging middle powers. Firstly, thesis will provide information about recent political history of both countries. Based on this, we would be able to observe the historical paths of these powers in the current global order. In this respect,

thesis tries to reveal their status in international platforms such as the UN, BRICS, or G20. At the end of the sections handling with Turkey and Brazil's identities, there will be an analysis on how much their contributions differ from each other, by using data from E. Parlar Dal's TÜBİTAK project on the rise of emerging powers.

In the last part of this chapter, the nuclear swap deal between Iran and the West will be analyzed to show the tendency of Brazil and Turkey for gaining recognition from major actors in the international order. Because the West does not want to allow Iran to enrich uranium it holds, Turkey and Brazil started to be moderator of negotiations between two parties, guaranteeing that Iran would use the nuclear studies for peaceful ends. However, as emerging middle powers, Brazil and Turkey cannot exceed the constraints they encountered due to the international system, which requires nuclear non-proliferation, especially if the proliferator is Iran, an anti-West and Middle Eastern state.

Chapter 5 is concerned with Turkey's engagement policies in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic, political and foreign assistance-based engagement were used in the thesis in order to enlighten Turkey's position and capability to engage with a geographical region where major powers are active units. The commencement date is 1998 when Turkey announced the African Action Plan and started to deepen bilateral relations. In addition to bilateral relations, multilateral relations and international platforms in which two parties have been interacting are also examined in the chapter.

To provide the economic engagement's scope, some statistical tables illustrating exports and imports in a comparative manner are used. Aiming at showing the extent of Turkish NGOs' engagement with Africa, the thesis includes activities of some Turkish NGOs, namely IHH, ORDAF, MÜSİAD, TUSKON, THY, TOBB, etc. Because of its importance in Africa, IHH has found places in the sections presenting Turkey-Africa engagement and Turkey-Somalia relations. Following, state-level interaction with sub-Saharan Africa, based on foreign

assistance, is handled. To this end, TIKA was the focal point. To be able to witness TIKA's one-year activity in sub-Saharan Africa, 2013 is determined as a base year.

In the section of Turkey-Somalia relations, firstly, there will be comparisons regarding the differences and similarities between emerging and established donors. Then, Turkey is compared to the emerging middle powers. After these comparisons, the case of Somalia is examined. The case of Somalia has been chosen because it is one of the largest Turkish aid recipient country after 2000s; and analyzing the interaction between Somalia and Turkey would help us to understand Turkey's African policy, foreign aid behavior, its ambitions as an emerging middle power and its religious motives abroad.

Chapter 6 investigates Brazil's engagement in Africa. Brazil mostly interests in West Africa due to their common history and linguistic closeness. In this chapter, there will also be comparison of Turkey and Brazil's engagements with Africa since 1960s, within three periods. Niche diplomacy of Brazil, unlike that of Turkey, is not foreign assistance but agricultural technology transfer. EMBRAPA is the main state agency conducting niche diplomacy abroad. Therefore, this chapter presents some information about this agency and its activities, following its role in Brazil's African policy.

Due to the intense relations between Nigeria and Brazil, Brazil's agricultural technology transfer will be the case study of this chapter. Additionally, there will be an interview with an ex-staff of EMBRAPA in order to enlighten EMBRAPA's role in Brazil's foreign policy toward Africa.

Chapter 7 makes the concluding remarks after presenting the findings from three cases. The validity of hypotheses and the results of the cases will be announced. Additionally, Turkey and Brazil's position in the international system and their endeavor to be regarded as a game changer will be dealt with. Based on the results, Chapter 7 also presents future implications of Africa engagement policies for both state.

II. THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWERSHIP AND EMERGING MIDDLE POWERS

This chapter will define the middle power concept, discuss the implications of middle powers on global governance and, more importantly, analyze the two types, namely traditional and emerging middle powers. For the thesis, it is vital to draw a clear distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers, because both traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers have substantial number of idiosyncratic features in foreign policy and, of course, in foreign assistance behavior, as well as external agricultural activities. This chapter is mainly based on the Jordaan's work due to its emphasis on middle powerhood and distinction it makes between emerging and traditional middle powers. Alongside Jordaan's analysis, Sandal's study, which compares Brazil and Turkey's foreign policy assertiveness with regard to their positions as emerging middle powers, also presents a useful approach (Jordaan, 2003)(Sandal, 2014)..

Since there is not a well-accepted definition of middle power, some prominent definitions will take place. Burges uses a simple and broad definition locating middle powers between minor and principal members of international system. He argues that while middle powers are weaker than principal powers, they are more powerful than small, minor states (Burges, 2013, p. 288). Another definition is as follows: "They are not so powerful as to be able to exert decisive influence on major issues of international security and economy. Nor are they so powerless as to be unable to protect themselves from the undesirable impacts of other countries' actions" (Wang & French, 2013, p. 985).

Jordaan defines middle powers as ‘states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system’ (Jordaan, 2003, p. 165). Middle powers are distinct units due to their above-average abilities in international relations and their willingness to sustain the elements that enhance the world system. The generalization of this approach stems from the fact that it accepts the idea that every middle power intrinsically has a motive to favor the sake of the current international system both economically and politically in both regional and global contexts.

In the literature, Keohane’s definition of middle power is worth to be laid emphasis on. He argues that middle power is ‘a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institutions’ (Keohane, 1969). According to this definition, multilateral foreign policy is the key component of middle powerhood due to middle powers’ lack of sufficient potential, ability, and courage to alter the world order or to be an influential actor in world politics on their own. Instead, they prefer to act either within a group consisting of small states or within an international institution. By doing so, they aim at amplifying their voices and at taking an active role in the global issues.

Regardless of whether it is emerging or traditional, a middle power seeks for a specific policy domain where the middle power has been more active and better than, at least, some other middle powers (Chapnick, 2011, p. 74) (Wood, 1988, p. 4). In this respect, foreign assistance or being a precipitator of economic development in the third world might be considered as a functional area in which some middle powers are seeking for trade partners, political support in international organizations, appeasing national firms, creating a benevolent discourse aiming at electors, etc.

The thesis accepts foreign assistance activities in sub-Saharan Africa as a functional area for Turkey. Another example of a functional area is agricultural technology transfer. For the Brazilian case, agriculture is considered as an unusual foreign policy tool within the scope of their foreign policy toward Africa. Brazil has a sub-state actor conducting agricultural technology transfer to Africa, mostly bilaterally. This endeavor has obviously been helping Brazil on building a benign image in the global South.

Middle powers are willing to take a part within international institutions or to form a coalition with other middle powers, attempting to solve global issues. Multilateral structures foster *humanitarian* and *peacebuilding* operations of middle powers. Therefore, one may argue that middle powers' lack of enough ambition to construct a new identity makes them just a part of the solution. On the other hand, we could expect that if a middle power seeks to enhance its soft-power image or seeks for a way to construct a benign role, the middle power would probably prefer to be alone in a humanitarian or peacebuilding mission. By doing so, the middle power advocates its presence more freely and independently and advertises its humanitarian (or developmental) foreign policy efforts to attract the attention of other actors.

Although middle powers are not active units in every global issue, they are more active than smaller countries. Middle powers are undeniably energetic participants in global and regional issues including various financial support, humanitarian efforts, peacekeeping missions, accepting refugees, and transferring know-how. In order to locate middle power to the right position in the international order, there is need for investigating whether middle powers are attempting to challenge the status quo on their attempts to contribute to solution on international issues. When a middle power adopts a trajectory that is different from what the hegemonic orthodoxy suggests, it is likely to be excluded from the international society led by the hegemonic body. Examples to these countries include Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and some of the Middle Eastern countries (Jordaan, 2003, p. 167).

Moreover, the global system and its hegemonic order can be considered safe only if these middle powers play their designed role within existing frameworks. Regardless of the classification of middle powerhood, all middle powers have burden to legitimize and stabilize the global order. They tacitly or openly, intentionally or unintentionally provide support to sustain neoliberal hegemony in both political economy and regional politics (Jordaan, 2003, p. 169). The sustainment of the stability of world economy is burden of traditional middle powers due to their economic well-being; while conducting legitimate regional politics is emerging burden of middle powers due to their ambition to be a dominant actor in the region where they locate.

This idea is also parallel with what Wallerstein suggests in his world system theory. Although he does not distinguish between emerging and traditional middle powers, he sees all semi-peripheral countries as a balancing mediator between the core countries and the periphery countries. Additionally, we can say that while traditional middle powers roughly are among the core, emerging middle powers are more or less located in semi-periphery. Wallerstein's emphasis on the economic relations between the semi-periphery and the periphery can be seen in Jordaan's explanations, as well.

However, Jordaan does not limit his middle power concept merely with the economic sphere and, in addition to economic issues, he discusses other international elements. He labels international institutions as a platform where actors gain legitimization for their active policies over small countries and justifies participation in international institutions (Jordaan, 2003, p. 169). Therefore, international organizations provide a legitimate base for middle powers, and by doing so, they also reinforce the existing neoliberal order. The global order divides a problem into smaller parts and encourages middle powers to take more responsibility during solution processes.

In addition, Wallerstein argues that even though semi-peripheral countries, like Brazil and Turkey, are embedded into the capitalist world system as the traditional middle powers, like Canada, Austria, and Sweden, they are neither strong adherents of US-led hegemonic world order, nor fully ready to achieve standards of consolidated democracy.

There is sufficient evidence to assert that even though emerging middle powers are convenient actors for the promotion of the existing system, this is not the only thing they do. To touch upon this assertion briefly, the Chapter 4 presents Brazil and Turkey as the examples of how states, which are labeled as emerging middle powers, sometimes amplify their voices against the international governance and take steps against the interests of the US. Burges argues that Brazil is not a voluntary participant of the liberal order and it started to consider a potential reformation (Burges, 2013, p. 286).

To elaborate this issue, the last section of Chapter 4 deals with Brazil and Turkey's intermediary activities in nuclear swap deal between the West and Iran; and Erdoğan's discourses toward the UN. States are bounded by the system that imposes states to undertake responsibilities guaranteeing continuation of the global order in a safe way; however, states have (or create) space in which they can follow some independent policies in order to be more assertive in a region or on an issue. Middle powers distinguished around the way they move in this room. In the thesis, it is argued that while traditional middle powers are not willing to use this space due to their strong historical ties with the global order, emerging middle powers consider reforming and making the global order more inclusive.

2.1. Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers

There is no single definition for middle powers that would be inclusive for all middle powers. This is because of the fact that there are a number of internal differences between the middle powers, such as Turkey and Canada, or Brazil and the Netherlands. Jordaan contends that:

“traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region” (Jordaan, 2003, p. 165).


	Traditional Middle Power	Emerging Middle Power
Democracy	Stable social democracy	Unstable and recent democracies with undemocratic characteristics ¹
Emergence	During Cold War	After the Cold War
Position in world economy	Core	Semi-periphery
Regional influence	Low	High
Regional integration	Ambivalent	Eager (leadership role)
Nature of actions to affect deep global change	Appeasing and legitimizing	Reformist and legitimizing

Table 1: Core Differences between Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers


Source: Eduard Jordaan (2003) The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers, Politikon, 30:1, p.168

¹ This is a rough categorization. The democratic level and stability of democratic institutions are not same for all emerging middle powers. While in the countries such as Malaysia, democratic institutions are fragile, in the democratic-BRICS, these institutions are more proper for democratic values.


Table 1 reflects the main differences between emerging and traditional middle powers that we need to focus on throughout the debate on foreign assistance and technology transfer behavior. There is visible differentiation between the groups in terms of GINI coefficient, the GDP and democracy ranking. The GDP and GDP per capita of Canada are 1786 million US\$ and 50271 US\$, respectively. Canada has a sustainable economic growth rates except 2009. Due to its economic well-being it is a member of G8, one of the most influential global governance actor.



Graph 1: GINI Coefficients of Selected Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers
 Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html> Accessed: 28.08.2016



Graph 2: GDP per capita Levels of Selected Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers
 Source: WorldBank Data <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart> Accessed: 28.08.2016



Graph 3: Democracy Levels of Selected Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers
 Source: WorldBank Data <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart> Accessed: 28.08.2016

However, contrary to great powers or to emerging middle powers, traditional middle powers do not have ambition to create an agenda that attempts to shape regional level issues. It is to say that even though traditional middle powers are wealthy and can have a say in international platforms, they cannot or do not want to follow a foreign policy aiming at enhancing their position in their regions at the expense of encountering other actors. One may

argue that Canada's unassertiveness in North America stems from its geographic location. It is true, because in a region led by a global power, it can be hard to pursue independent regional policies. Moreover, there are not many actors in the region that they can interact with.

Wallerstein and Arrighi contends that the Netherlands was a world hegemon in 16th century. But over time, it has lost its dominance upon the world system mainly due to its naval weakness, and finally it ended up being a middle power in Europe. According to Jordaan's definition, the Netherlands is in the group of traditional middle powers. Its GDP per capita is far beyond than world average and it has a stable and consolidated democracy. As in the Graph 2, the Netherlands has more than 51000 US\$ per capita income, and 82,6 point in democracy ranking. However, the Netherlands has no intention to be a dominant actor in Western Europe. This situation, more or less, is similar for Sweden as a traditional middle power. The Netherlands and Sweden are taking actions within international institutions in a multilateral and cooperative way. As traditional middle powers, they are not seeking for reformation of the world order or for ways of becoming a regional power of Europe.

Sandal points out that middle powers like Malaysia, Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, or South Africa cannot be analyzed and explained by the tools used to explain the middle powers like Canada, Australia, or Sweden (Sandal, 2014, p. 695). Emerging middle powers possess quite different features inciting scholars to distinguish them from the traditional ones. These features are mainly around multilateralism, economic and political stability, and regional influence. Democracy is one of the most important property of middle powerhood since the world system imposes it as a value that must be internalized by all states. If we look at all emerging and traditional middle powers, we see that even if all of them are democratized countries, not all of them are fully consolidated democracies. This is not to say that a traditional middle power would be regarded as emerging power if there occurs a democratic deterioration. But it is to say that we can understand why while some of middle powers are labeled as traditional while others

as emerging by looking at their democratic consolidation level, and how and when their democratic consolidation was achieved.

Emerging middle powers have lower level of democracy than established middle powers do. In addition, human right abuses are more apparent in emerging middle powers like Turkey, Malaysia, and Nigeria while this is not the case for traditional middle powers (Jordaan, 2003, p. 171). In our case, traditional middle powers are consolidated democracies in which we do not expect to witness a coup d'état or any other cause that would suspend democracy. Another feature of traditional middle powers is related to their social democratic characteristic. Traditional middle powers such as Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Denmark are among the countries having the highest level of egalitarian social and economic structure (Jordaan, 2003, p. 172). On the other hand, the countries like South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil have a lower level of egalitarianism as we can see in the table illustrating Gini coefficients in Graph 1.

There is also a regional dimension of middle powerhood. Middle powers that are seen as central actors in a region are candidates of being a regional power. While some of the middle powers are able to assign themselves a regional role, others do not have the opportunity due to their geographical location or the existence of more powerful states in their regions. Nolte gathers definitions of regional power as “a state which is geographically a part of the delineated region, a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other state in the region, a state which is highly influential in regional affairs, a state which, contrary to a middle power’, might also be a great power on the world scale in addition to its regional standing”; and he sees Brazil, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, and South Africa as regional powers (Nolte, 2007).

In this respect to be regarded as a regional power, there are some qualifications that a state must be equipped with; such as the ambition and the ability to assert leadership and create peacekeeping and peacemaking initiations. Therefore, we can say that having sufficient

material capability is not enough on pursuit of regional powerhood. A state aspiring to be a regional power needs to complement its hard power with cultural heritage, ideological linkages, and society-level togetherness. Any insufficiency in one of these contributors will cause unexpected results for pursuing assertiveness at the regional level. For instance, even though a middle power aspires to be a regional power, if it does not have ideological similarities with the other states in the region, that power probably will have difficulties on increasing its influence.

In the Chapter 4, which will cover Turkey's position in international arena, there will be brief explanation of how Turkey's regional assertions have been shaped by its ambitions to shape Arabic countries. The more Turkey encouraged Arab countries to transform into democracy, the more unsuccessful Turkey became in terms of reshaping the Arab world (Öniş, 2014). On the other hand, Brazil's regional influence on Latin America has healthier basis than that of Turkey over the Middle East. As discussed above, traditional middle powers are not mostly seen as regional powers due to their geographic limitations and a lack of ambition.

Schoeman and Nolte consider emerging middle power and regional power as similar groups under some conditions including 'playing stabilizing and leading role in their region, having the capability to provide peacekeeping or peacemaking missions, and having legitimacy in their regions' (Nolte, 2007, p. 11) (Schoeman, 2000). Here, emerging middle powers are considering as units asserting regional leadership and taking responsibility for keeping their regions safe. The regional power concept is not at the center of the thesis because the focus will be on the foreign policies of emerging middle powers upon Africa.

2.2. Middle Power Politics

"Numerous middle powers are now looking for ways to assert themselves in the context of the ... leadership void" (Cooper 1997, 4). States having a special ability or material capabilities

have been trying to be the major actors on at least one of the specific domains. Some of these domains can be listed as humanitarian acts, production of low-cost tech, agricultural sectors.

The fact that (both traditional and emerging) middle powers have limited financial resources compared to great powers pushes them to specialize on functional areas where they are fairly well conditioned. Alongside niche diplomacy, middle power politics and foreign policy behavior require multilateral acts according to Cooper, who regards middle power concept as the rubric of Canada, Australia, Sweden, New Zealand, and so. Cooper uses the Canadian Ambassador Stephen Lewis' views on middle power politics for presenting how middle powers locate themselves in the international order. According to Lewis, these countries should believe in internationalism and be the supporters of multilateralism on both institution and agency contexts. More importantly, Lewis expects from the middle powers to hamper major powers before they 'go too far'. However, Cooper asserts that middle powers behave like adherents of current international system, traditionally (Cooper 1997, 8).

Niche diplomacy, multilateralism and supporting the international order are the three main principles that middle powers follow, according to the literature. However, after dividing the middle powers into two sub-categories, the weights of these principles start to change, regarding the position of middle powers in the international order. Traditional middle powers obtain these principles while they are taking actions in international arena. On the other hand, emerging middle powers have been reformist in terms of multilateralism and supporting the order.

Robert A. Pape (2005) puts forward the inclination of the US to follow unilateral policies on rejection of the participation to the International Criminal court and withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile treaty. Hence, he shows the importance of balancing against the US in a turbulent order. According to Pape, Bush's foreign policy strategy had been one of the most aggressive unilateral US strategy in the US history (Pape 2005, 7). Pape expects from

regional power candidates like Turkey and Brazil and important players like Russia, and China along with Europe to balance against the aggressive and unilateral US policies (Pape 2005, 8). However, balancing procedure is not about military aggression or economic sanctions. Instead, soft-balancing measures should be used to ‘delay, frustrate, and undermine’ those US policies (Pape 2005, 10). Soft-balancing measures are twofold: internal and external. For Turkey and Brazil, as emerging middle powers, external balancing, i.e., organization of counterbalancing alliances (Pape 2005) is the most viable option. In this respect, Turkey-Brazil moderation for Iran nuclear deal can be regarded as a soft-balancing attempt against the US and the world order.

These measures are not meant to change the rules bottom-up. Instead, the measures emerging middle powers are applying to are ‘rule shaping’ strategies rather than ‘rule breaking’ ones (Sidhu, Mehta and Jones 2013). Sidhu et al. contend that there was only one rule maker country in world history, the US within the period of 1945-1949. Even during the Cold War, the US had the ability to make new rules and to establish new institutions in order to launch and observe these rules; the US could have been the rule maker of the system alone after the Cold War. However, not any other power could make such a drastic change in the world no matter how economically or demographically powerful it is (Sidhu, Mehta and Jones 2013, 11). Therefore, emerging middle powers like Brazil, India, Korea or Turkey cannot have the ability and capability to be a rule maker in the international system. Rather, they can be rule shaper within the room they could create for moving freely.

2.3. Concluding Remarks on Middle Power Literature

In the current international system, there are various actors in terms of their hard and soft power, their images, their positions against the system, and their role in the global neo-liberal economic paradigm. In such a contending environment, states are trying to gain a more reputable position in this system and, if necessary, reform and modify the system in favor of themselves. Here, we

witness four kinds of country groups: great powers, established middle powers, emerging middle powers, and others.

Great powers and established middle powers are constituent elements of the current system. Therefore, we do not expect a threat to the system from both great and established middle powers. The others (such as Mozambique, Myanmar, or Lesotho) are too ineffective to foster, reform, challenge or change the system. However, on one hand, emerging middle powers are fostering the system by embedding to the neoliberal order and, on the other hand, they eagerly seek to reform the system. This is not to say that all of them in total or each of them individually can realize the reforms and increase their room in the system easily, but it is to say that there is a displeasure with the system among emerging middle powers.

This displeasure finds a base on regional level at first place. Emerging middle powers try to monopolize the regions in which they located. Regardless of whether they can monopolize the region or not, their second attempt is opening to other regions. In the meantime, they seek for reforming the system by bringing forward some topics that they think they could be successful against great and established powers. In our case, while the first attempt is Turkey's failed attempt to obtain an incontestable power in the Middle East and Brazil's monopolization of Latin America, respectively; the second attempt is their openings to sub-Saharan Africa. Their third attempt is rather at a global level. The nuclear swap deal is a good case for explaining Brazil and Turkey's endeavor to find a more prestigious place in the system and, if applicable, to make system more flexible such that both countries can give a direction to the global issues.

Although emerging middle powers are not identical units within themselves, they have common characteristics on several statistical indicators. For instance, in Gini coefficient, emerging middle powers have higher score than those of established ones, which indicates that emerging powers have more income inequality. Another striking fact is that their GDP per capita level is too low in comparison with the established powers as we can see in the Graph 2.

Democracy level is also higher in established powers. While India, South Africa and Turkey have almost same scores, Brazil's score is higher than of these countries and much closer to the scores of established powers.

Niche diplomacy is one of the main focal point of the thesis, because it is a way of understanding how emerging middle powers differ in terms of their specialized foreign policy areas. Emerging middle powers need to direct and control their resources wisely because if they need a better place in the international system, they need to use their limited resources in the areas where they can make a difference and they can be prominent leading actors.



III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

3.1. Realism and Its Systemic Approach to Explain Role of States in the System

In main stream IR theories, there are three theoretical traditions with different assumptions and expectations. These tenants are realism, liberalism and constructivism. But they all have different variances. Before relating realism and other two theories with the role of middle powerhood and middle power politics, there will be a brief historical path of each theories in order to have a clear debate on affiliation between theory expectations and empirical realities regarding middle powers.

Being main actors in the international system, states are sovereign units that build their own foreign policy priorities without considering non-state actors such as NGOs or other civil initiations. One of the most important concept that states take into consideration while they are determining and pursuing their affairs with other states is power. Since power shows which state is stronger and illustrates how world order is getting shape, it is vital for the configuration of International Relations. Emphasizing on state and power makes security issues continuous hot-topic of International Relations. Being alone in world system, states have to guarantee their existence and security via the power they have.

Realism can be classified into three categories such as classical, neorealist, and neoclassical (Elman 2003, 5). Classical realism suggest that a political leader, bounded with his/her human nature and with power politics, represents the state. According to neorealism,

anarchical characteristic and distribution of capabilities paradigm of international system constrain the state. Finally, neoclassical realism attributes importance to human nature and internal structures of states on the way of determining behaviors of states (Tuğtan 2014, 111-112). Because this thesis covers systemic limitations over states, neorealism comes to the fore.

Emerging middle powers are eagerly seeking for a safe and guaranteed room in the international system, therefore, the systemic approach will be covered. Theory of International Politics by Kenneth Waltz constituted a new phase for realism. It is possible to consider wars and other state affairs in three levels of analysis (three images of international relations) according to Waltz. These levels are human-centric, internal characteristics of state and the system.

The novelty that Waltz brought to the literature was a systemic approach to international politics. A system is composed of a structure and different actors that are bounded with the structure phenomena. The three pillars of the structure (anarchy, self-help, and distribution of capabilities) illustrate whether the structure bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. Waltz, unlike classical realists, does not consider human nature and political leaders' lust for power as the cause of state behavior, but Waltz argues states are bounded with the structure in which main motive of states is to survive (Elman, 2007, 13).

The self-help notion emerges from the fact that all states are all equal and sovereign units in the system, which makes the international system as not hierarchical but anarchical. Therefore, neo-realists suggest that there is not many *internal functional differences* between states to consider. However, states can make themselves distinct units and can alter their position in the system by increasing their power and changing the distribution of capabilities in favor of themselves.

Neo-realists give little importance to decisions of statesmen than classical realists do. The reason behind of this difference stems from the different understandings of constraints.

According to Waltz, a state is constrained by all decisions taken by other units and the anarchy itself. Because the system is not solely the aggregation of state affairs in international level but it also presents a structure that certainly shapes state behaviors (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 84).

3.1.1 Realism's Implications on Normative Issues and Structural Limitations

In terms of middle powerhood, neo-realist theory is reductionist, which implies that neo-realists divide states into just two groups: great powers and others. Here, other means a group of country whose efficacy is trivial. Therefore, neo-realist approach disregards the importance of middle powers and weak states in international platforms due to their heavy dependence on the international system in which behaviors of states are shaped by great powers and the order (Shin 2015). Middle powers are pushed to follow what the system and system's great powers require. It is to say that for the thesis, the system and the constraints are two applicable aspects of neorealism. This theory's ignorance of middle powership is not suitable for our cases because, the thesis contends with the fact that emerging middle powers are actors that are trying to find a way of creating rooms free of the system's constraints.

Turning our attention to specific cases, it can be seen that how foreign assistance behavior is linked to paradigms of realism in the eyes of realist scholars. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan had difficulties to promote its economy; and therefore its economy depended on animal and cotton. However, as a consequence of the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the US and the US' interests over the Central Asia and Afghanistan, the US started to provide foreign assistance to Kyrgyzstan in order to obtain the right to use of a military base in Kyrgyzstan. After a while, Kyrgyzstan realized the profit on this bargain, and increased a hundred-fold of price of the base (\$200 million). After accepting the offer of Kyrgyzstan, the US, as a donor country, has been able to use the field (Werker 2012, 1). This example shows us how giving foreign assistance to a country can be materialized and can be used within the scope of 'international security'.

However, if the case is natural disaster, flood, or other kind of emergent situations, states provide foreign assistance or support the harmed nation(s) without a political expectation according to the first wave realism (H. Morgenthau 1962, 301). Realists think that states are lust for power while they are conducting their foreign relations; and that states are fully rational actors such that they do not consider normative issues. However, if the case is humanitarian crisis, sometimes, states give respond without expecting a profitable return. It is not to say that in every humanitarian crisis, donor countries never consider their political interests while they are providing assistance; but it is to say that if the case is a humanitarian action, usually states do not think their political aims unlike other kind of foreign aids such as military foreign aid, aid for economic development or subsistence aid, to name a few.

Another fact is that classical realists such as Morgenthau accepts the role of non-state actors on foreign aid policies. Morgenthau gives the example of Rockefeller Foundation's foreign aids to Latin America, that was channeled to increase the agricultural performance of the farmers of South America (H. Morgenthau 1962, 302). Other dimension of non-state actors is their normative side on humanitarian issues. They are intrinsically normative and prone to give aid that is not supposed to return to the non-state actors as different forms.

Parallel to Morgenthau, Walt defines foreign aid as an international bribery (Walt 1985, 27). The 'bribery' given to recipient countries carries one vital aim, which is to tighten the relations with recipient allies. Walt gives the example of the USSR and the US' foreign aid behaviors to illustrate how great powers use foreign aid as a tool for pushing small states to adopt policies in favor of the donor countries. However, this view is too security oriented. Rather than security, image-building, strengthening economic ties or promoting foreign aid in domestic politics are important motives behind of foreign aid behavior of emerging middle powers. Therefore, the inferences made by Walt are not compatible with the thesis that is free of security-oriented foreign aid understanding.

3.2 Liberalism and Effects of non-State Agents on Foreign Policy

Liberalism has some implications that mean a lot for this study in the sense that liberalism, unlike realism, attributes importance to non-state actors. States are no more just black boxes in which internal mechanisms possess no effect on foreign policy decision-making process. In addition to non-state actors, there are also international regimes, norms and institutions that weaken the effect of anarchy, and by this way, lead cooperation among states (Axelrod and Keohane 1993). In other words, different level of analysis of liberalism promotes inclusion of actors other than states.

Returning to liberalism-realism debate, one can witness that liberalism had been underrated in international relations literature because of emergence of Cold War after WWII, when realist theory has significant weight in the literature. Thanks to the emergence of new understandings and approaches in liberal theory, liberalism had appeared more in academic platforms. One of these new approaches was complex interdependence that was emerged in late 1970s, which brought new debates on international security studies. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, realists were criticized for failing to forecast the end of the Cold War. More importantly, the end of history thesis of Francis Fukuyama started a new debate that implies spilling liberal values over whole world. By this mean, enhancing *international institutions* and democratization would create an international atmosphere congruent with liberal theory. Moreover, increasing number of NGO-led international projects might be an indicator illustrating how non-state actors have started to take international responsibilities along with nation-states and international institutions.

The system realists have accepted has an anarchic structure in which there was no supranational organization to force nation-states to do anything they do not want. More importantly, the stability within an anarchic worldview is difficult to be achieved unless there is not a powerful hegemon. However, Keohane, in his book *After Hegemony*, argued how it is

possible to make stability and cooperation sustainable within a period in which a hegemon is losing its power. It would be useful to touch upon neoliberal institutionalists. Contrary to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalists attribute importance to international institutions on the way of building cooperation and trust among nation-states. Involving with an international organization would make transactions and agreements more transparent and trustable for the parties. Liberal institutionalists believe in the power of international institutions more than realists do and less than constructivists do (Oğuzlu 2014, 148).

Liberalism also differs from constructivism in the sense that while constructivists argue that states internalize norms and values and take foreign policy decisions by considering these notions, liberals argue that states mostly adopt norms and international rules and values not because they internalized these notions but because states gain more if they implement these norms (Oğuzlu 2014, 141). For instance, in order to increase its benign power and soft power, to enhance its international image, to attract tourists, a state might use related norms as a tool of foreign policy.

3.2.1 Liberalism's Implications on NGO Behavior

Whether be a middle (traditional and emerging) or a great power, states are not the only powers, who have the potential to determine everything; but they are more likely negotiators. For instance, firms are becoming much more important in today's inter and intra-national relations. States have to bear behaviors of firms in mind while taking actions. Additionally, states might take actions against or in favor of some firms, depending on state-firm, or in general state - non-state relations that can be classified into four types, under the names of cooperative, conflictive, substitutive, and complementary. These types of state - non-state actor relations illustrate how non-state actors are regarded as determinative facts of international order.

Liberalism suggests to use NGOs that participate projects and conduct their own projects in sub-Saharan Africa with humanitarian, developmental and, more broadly, normative

motives. Liberalism suggests that security should not only be attributed to tensions among states or between states and a non-state terrorist organization. It is to say that security is not a notion that only covers state relations but it also includes human rights, human smuggling, famine, safety of minorities, etc. Those humanitarian-related issues are strongly related to the efforts taken by both Turkish and Brazilian states and NGOs in sub-Saharan African countries.

Unlike realism, liberalism attributes importance to both middle powers and non-state actors that have weight in this thesis, especially in the foreign aid sections. Therefore, one may argue that liberalism has more explanation power than realism does if the case is non-state actors. However, the weak side of liberalism is its lack of enough understanding on international system and the boundaries the system implements over states.

3.3. Constructivism and Normative Actions of States

Constructivists do not differ unit-level analysis from world system analysis in the sense that they are being shaped around interaction between the units and the structure (Demirtaş 2014, 158). More strikingly, Wendt defines himself as a realist and statist in the sense that the states are the key actors in international relations no matter how supranational and other non-state actors gain importance (Wendt 1999, 238).

In order to create a link between constructivism and developmental engagements, elaboration of norms and cultures is needed. Distinction in norm definition is threefold: regulative, constitutive, and evaluative. Regulative norms have effects on the behaviors of states. Constitutive norms constitute new interests and actors, while evaluative norms determine the right and wrong decisions and actions. At first, we need to determine whether providing foreign assistance or transferring technological expertise is a kind of norm or not. Because the coverage of these activities includes humanitarian aspects, one may argue that there is some normative

sides of this application. Additionally, in current international politics, states that are sovereign and that have a kind of good shape in economic terms are tacitly pushed to help to the needy countries.

In foreign assistance literature and foreign assistance behavior of states, we can see mostly constitutive and evaluative norms. In terms of regulating foreign assistance flow or other technical issues, there is not a binding international organization that would have power of sanctions or of condemnation. Even though OECD has a unit on foreign assistance issues, called DAC, its way of working is not similar to that of, let us say, the WTO.

However, intrinsically states are forced to think that they need to give financial and developmental assistances if they have enough economic power. That is an evaluative norm. On the other hand, considering the emergence of institutions entitled for foreign assistance and constitution of new interests constructed bilaterally (donor-recipient), constructivists might assert that giving foreign assistance is also a constitutive norm. “What states do depends on what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change” (Weber 2005, 60). Changing interests over bilateral relations with the assistance recipient countries determine the behaviors of states.

3.3.1. Constructivism’s Implications on Normative Side of Engagements

With the establishment of the OECD, foreign assistance has gained an institutional basis. As a norm, foreign assistance is used as a mediator for building a cooperation between needy states and wealthy states (Howard 2014, 56). There are also ethical sides of foreign aid. Hattori sees foreign assistance as an obligatory burden of industrialized states (Hattori 2003, 230). Additionally, he bases his studies on foreign assistance under the consideration of the argument ‘foreign [assistance] cannot be explained on the basis of the economic and political interests of the donor countries alone, and any satisfactory explanation must give a central place to the influence of humanitarian and egalitarian convictions upon aid donors.’ (Lumbsdaine

1993, 29). However, accepting foreign assistance as a burden of only industrialized states cannot explain why there exist non-industrialized donors. Moreover, we can explain foreign aid behavior of non-industrialized donors such as emerging middle powers on the basis of internationalization of foreign assistance as a norm. A state cannot be regarded as middle power via solely its material capability. In addition to material capabilities, social identity matters as well. Therefore, the identity that middle power candidate country possesses is important because while some states having material capabilities do not want to be on frontier, others might want to be in a leading position at least in some of the policy domains. It is to say that having material capability is not enough to be labelled as reformist middle power.

3.4 An Eclectic Theoretical Interpretation

For my understanding of world order and within the concept and coverage of the thesis, I believe in the systemic approach in a different way than Waltz does. While Waltz gives little space to nation-states in decision-making process, I agree with the idea that nation-states find more space in which they can pursue their interest-seeking policies especially on low-politics issues.

We can make a differentiation between traditional and emerging middle powers through considering the systemic approaches. The international system that has chosen the US and its Western allies as the conductors of the order has different implications for states, depending on their positions in the system. Here, the position indicates whether the state is an emerging middle power or traditional middle power. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, I exclude the other kind of country groupings.

Traditional middle powers like Canada, Austria, Australia, or Sweden are also typical Western states. They developed after the US and the Britain, and before the rest of the world. During the Cold War, these middle powers solved the collective action problem in security

issues via the most important and strong security ally, the NATO. More importantly, they have been loyal followers of capitalist world order. Another important fact is that they have no problem with the US-led hegemony. This makes them more constrained in terms of pursuing independent foreign policies.

On the other hand, the space that emerging middle powers have is wider than traditional ones do. The reason behind this differentiation originates from emerging middle powers' lust for independent foreign policy realms in both their regions and other interested geographies like Africa. Therefore, under the consideration of systemic approaches, we can assert that emerging middle powers are finding more room in a constrained and uncertain world order.

Revisionism and reformism are two ideal notions that emerging middle powers are trying to make concrete. Both Turkey and Brazil are examples of the powers that want to reform the institutions of international order. As emerging middle powers, Brazil and Turkey have found more space to determine freely and without under heavy constraints of the structure or the main actor of the system. To sum up, while I accept the existence and influence of a Waltzian international system, I suggest to look at the system through the eyes of emerging and middle powers, to be able to see in which occasions the system has been constricting or giving more free space to secondary actors, namely, to the middle powers.

I will adopt an approach considering activities of non-state actors in addition to states. Non-state actors do not only conduct lobbyist activities but also they take responsibilities on international projects led by state or NGOs (İpek and Biltekin 2013, 123). States are not the only units producing foreign policy discourse or activities. Rosenau classifies agencies into two groups: sovereignty free agencies and sovereignty bounded agencies. While behaviors of sovereignty free agencies are totally dependent on their capabilities, behaviors of sovereignty bound agencies shape around their legal frameworks (İpek and Biltekin 2013, 130). This

approach considers world not in a state-centric model. Rather foreign policy behaviors take shape in a multi-centric world.



IV. TURKEY AND BRAZIL AS EMERGING MIDDLE POWERS

The section differentiating traditional and emerging middle powers covered the main differences among them, in terms of their internal capacities and characteristics such as democracy, GINI coefficient, regional leadership, foreign policy assertiveness and such. This section tries to elucidate the conditions under which Turkey and Brazil can be considered as emerging middle powers in world politics. Through an analysis of the main distinct international developments, this chapter will deal with the emerging of Brazil and Turkey as emerging middle powers.

4.1 Turkey as an Emerging Middle Power

The transformation in Turkish foreign policy has its origin from the late 1990s under the leadership of İsmail Cem, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cem had been taking over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1997 and 2002 when Turkish foreign policy had experienced one of its breakdown in its history (Örmeci, 2011, p. 223). During his term, Turkey developed strong ties with Greece. Because he contributed Turkey's position in the accession to the EU, Turkey has gained candidate country status in Cem's ministry (Keyman, 2007). In 2001, Cem initiated a forum where participants were foreign ministries of the member countries of the Organization for Islam Conference (OIC) or the European Union (EU), in 2001 (Bilici, 2007). Alongside strategic rapprochement with Russia and opening to Latin America, Cem also started the Opening to Africa Plan in 1998.

Similar to Cem's approach, the JDP adopted an active foreign policy toward its neighbor and other regions of the world. In spite of some divergences, the ministries of Foreign Affairs have mostly followed Cem's strategy. As a result of Turkey's regional leadership tendencies,

Turkey foreign policy transformed especially after the Arab Spring. Despite facing severe problems with its neighbors, the close relations with sub-Saharan Africa constructed after 1998 has never been exposed to rifts between the two parties.

Turkey's ascendance as an emerging middle power in the Middle East has attracted scholars' attention. For instance, in June 2014, one of the Emerging Powers and International Institutions Meeting Series was held in Istanbul in order to discuss Turkey's position as an emerging power in a changing Middle East.² In the conference, the argument 'zero problems with neighbors has collapsed' was widely accepted. Turkey had enjoyed an economic ascendance after the 2001 crisis. This ascendance originates from the positive atmosphere of global economy, Derviş reforms in domestic economic policies, and JDP's focus on the meeting the criteria of EU conditions. However, regional turbulences rendered it difficult for Turkey to sustain these positive developments.

Within this moderate economic and political environment in Turkey, the US had considered Turkey as a model for Arab World until the Arab Spring (Brock, 2014). Some of optimist Western and Turkish scholars have read these uprisings as an opportunity to implement Turkish model on Arab countries. However, due to Turkey's lack of strong cultural ties with Arab countries and its weak soft power image in the Middle East, Turkey has had to encounter difficulties in its leadership role as a democratizing power in the region. Despite this, Turkey discursively internalized the idea that it had the power to rule whole Middle East and lead the countries in the region. However, "Arabs do not want Turkey to lead them" (Bacık, 2015). In other words, Turkey cannot produce a consent mechanism over Arab countries, in the way of being regional power. Moreover, Turkey's failed attempt to dethrone Beshar al-Assad and the recent international community's blaming Turkey of supporting Islamic State of Iraq and

² For detailed information visit: <http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/turkey-an-emerging-power-in-a-changing-middle-east/pr1685>

Levant (ISIL) by providing military aid and healing its members are considered as two main factors that made reversed Turkey's plans toward becoming an effective emerging power in the region.

Turkey's position can be read as a failed initiation of being a regional power. It is a failed initiation because Turkey's position has not been seriously considered by Western states and Russia. The Kurdish question is another major issue that has raised questions on Turkey's capabilities in the region. However, this failure has not discouraged Turkey's attempt to become an emerging middle power. Although Turkey has not been successful on transforming the Arab countries to a more democratic spectrum due to its one-sided policies based on religious sectarianism and inconsistency between rhetoric and actions (Öniş & Kutlay, 2014, p. 24), its economic and political ascendance has not been that harmed in global scale as we see in the relationships of Turkey with other parts of the world, i.e., sub-Saharan Africa. It is to say that after 2011 while Turkey has mostly lost its regional assertiveness in Middle East, its rising as an emerging middle power has continued thanks to its economic scale, political roles' in global governance institutions (like G20), military strength, and its geographical location as a potential transit country for oil transportation.

Some studies consider Turkey as an emerging middle power with different characteristics than Brazil, and India in the sense that Turkey has also emerged ideologically while other powers emerged mostly structurally. Considering material and ideological power as two pillars of emerging middle powership, we can say that Turkey has not had enough amount of material power relative to other emerging powers like Brazil and India, and that Turkey has ideological assertiveness not only in regional scale with its democracy discourse but also global scale with its discourse on the UN. This ideology has become concrete around Turkey's complaint about the international order. However, the complaint did not find its roots in anti-Westernism or was not influenced by Third-World ideology; rather the complaint can

be seen as within-system challenge (Dal & Gök, 2014, p. 2). This challenge has not yet found enough reflection as a change in the shape of global governance. Nevertheless, Turkey had been successful in acquiring non-permanent seat of UNSC thanks to its benign image and positive discourses toward third world. Failure on acquiring the seat for the second time can be a proof on how Turkey has lost its momentum partially in international politics.

Turkey's unsuccessful attempts, and problems in regional (dethroning Assad regime) and global levels (to transform global governance to a more inclusive structure) have pushed Turkey to foster engagement with other regions. In this respect, to prove its importance in world politics, Turkey has been more active in humanitarian, foreign assistance issues and international institutions like G20 and NATO. One aspect of Turkey's engagement with international institutions can be very relevant to the thesis. Because if the case is security-based issues, Turkey is ready to give support to the problems via international institutions as a part of Western security system. "Turkey's challenging attitude is not meant to obstruct major-power initiatives. This posture separates out Turkey from other rising powers on major questions of world order in the management of global problems" (Dal & Gök, 2014, p. 7). However, if the case is foreign assistance, Turkey prefers a bilateral way of putting international institutions and coalitions aside. For an emerging state, giving foreign assistance is a simple way to advertise itself as a benign power in the eyes of both recipients and international community. Therefore providing assistance would lead to a higher impact than acting in a coalition in which the success will be shared to the all donors.

For humanitarian action cases, the situation is more complex. Low and inefficient profile of Turkey in the Middle East incited Turkey to seek a functional or geographical space where it could try to compensate its low profile by pursuing both multilateral and bilateral actions including humanitarian, financial and security issues (Dal & Gök, 2014, p. 7). These issues have a deeper meaning in the sense that "emerging powers are engaging more directly

not only in the practices of development cooperation but also in key normative debates about how accelerated development and poverty alleviation could and should be carried out, and how major institutions could and should contribute” (Weiss & Abdenur, 2014, p. 1749).

To sum up, with its position in G20 and other international governance institutions, its dynamic population, lust for being a benign power in Africa, its ambition to be regarded as a respected middle power, and more importantly, with its reformist discourse against international order, Turkey is an emerging middle power. Due to its relative fragile economic and democratic structure in comparison with great powers and established powers, Turkey, along with Brazil, India and South Africa, is preferring to act in the ‘boundaries of game’ (Dal, et al., 2016), with bearing in mind that they need room in which they can move independent from great powers to some extent and in some occasions.

4.2. Brazil as an emerging middle power

Brazil has been ruled continuously by Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) for about fourteen years. Similarly, Turkey has been ruled by one party, JDP, for fourteen years. Both parties have found themselves in a similar economic path which covers first, a protectionist industrialization and second, an inevitable external opening following the protectionism concurringly. Before 1980s, Brazil had experienced a statist term where there occurred current account and trade deficit due to inefficient industrialization and high level of inflation. After 1980s, Brazil has applied reformist economic policies to arrive in a liberal economic order with stability and lack of protracted crises (Brooks & Kurts, 2016, p. 27).

The previous sections distinguished between different types of middle power. Brazil is an obvious example of to what extent an emerging middle power can be unequal with its 0.53 Gini coefficient in 2013. In terms of equality, Turkey has a better position with its 0.4 coefficient for 2012, which is still relatively higher than that of traditional middle powers though (WorldBank, 2016). Nevertheless, we witness a decline in Brazil’s inequality over years

thanks to Bolsa Familia project, which provides cash transfers, and to changes in distribution of income within the period of 1995-2012, in favor of labor class (Ferreira, Firpo, & Messina, 2016, pp. 187-188).

Brazil, with its huge economic scale, production capacity, and military power, is a middle power. Brazil's role in and attitudes toward the global order and governance, alongside with its internal characteristics such as Gini coefficient and level of democracy, make Brazil an emerging middle power. Brazil, located within America's circle of influence, has been carrying ambitious goals in global governance (Balla, 2012, p. 156). These ambitions have been concreted by Brazilian government via international governance institutions like BRICS, or involving in mediation and peacekeeping activities. To conduct this leadership role over the South, Brazil, along with India and South Africa, have constituted a dialogue forum called IBSA since 2003 (Öniş & Kutlay, 2015a, p. 23). This institutionalization process has led to consequences over both economic and democratic dimensions of Brazil since the IBSA called for deeper inclusive democracy and increased the ties with MERCOSUR and with other countries from the South.

BRIC(S) has been one of the main conductors of Brazilian foreign policy as underlined by Lula in the 2009 BRIC summit. Accordingly, Lula declared that *"we stand out because in recent years our fours economies have shown robust growth. Trade between us has risen 500 percent since 2003... BRIC countries are playing an increasingly prominent role in international affairs, and are showing their readiness to assume their responsibilities..."* (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 26) (Xing & Xing, 2009). For Stuenkel, creating a new world order, relatively independent from the US, has been one of the main and ultimate aims of the BRIC summit (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 26).

However, this creation could not be realized aggressively. Rather, "BRICS countries do not seek to directly undermine the principles that undergird today's global order" (Stuenkel,

2015, p. 28). Similar to Stuenkel, this thesis argues that even though emerging middle powers are not happy with the current global order. Even though they want to realize drastic changes, they only can take small steps and, more importantly, their main efforts is to create a US-free spot in international affairs due to their relative weakness in comparison with the US-led hegemony, its institutions and allies.

Using Öniş and Kutlay's pillars approach, we can see the similarity between Brazil and Turkey over the fourth pillar. The fourth pillar offers the idea that an emerging middle power is better at, at least, one major policy area. Specialization provides an opportunity to be the leading actor in this policy area. While Turkey chooses humanitarian diplomacy, Brazil prefers global health diplomacy and agriculture in order to contribute global governance and to conduct niche diplomacy in an area in which they are among the decision-makers or, at least, weighted actors (Öniş & Kutlay, 2015b, p. 37) (Abdenur & Neto, 2014).

In this respect, Brazil uses its competence in health sector and agricultural technology transfer as niche diplomacy. "Evidence from Brazil suggests that international attention and praise for a nation's successful ability to engage in international negotiations may motivate government leaders to create *bilateral policies* with the objective of sustaining and furthering their government's international reputation and influence" (Gomez, 2012, p. 2). To this end, not only Latin American countries but also sub-Saharan African countries have been significant areas for Brazil. In this respect, *Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde* are among the countries, that have been receiving health assistance from Brazil.

In terms of regional powership, Brazil is more fortunate than Turkey in the sense that South America is not a continent having protracted armed conflicts unlike the Middle East even though South America had experienced many military coups in its history. With the help of protectionist policies of the USA since 1823 Monroe Doctrine over Latin America, Brazil has been isolated from Europe's then incremental expansionist policies. As a consequence of its

geographical proximity and geo-strategic reasons, Brazil's place in global governance has been determined on the basis of its relations with the US. Although Carter administration tried to foster and intensify its relation with Brazil, the US started to find Brazil's attitudes toward nuclear non-proliferation and human rights as insecure. More importantly, Brazil's trade policies, which were against the payment of interest payments for the debt taken from the IMF, became a concerning point for the US during the 1980s. The transformation in world economic order toward a neoliberal economic system has encountered unexpected negative attitude from Brazil.

As argued above, although Brazil and other emerging middle powers support an open market economy and capitalist order, their way of supporting this order differs from that of traditional middle powers. Both Turkey and Brazil have adopted neoliberal policies after a long import substitution industrialization strategy. However they have never been fully supporter of the international institutions led by the US and Western Europe. After Cardoso took the presidential power, Brazil-US relations started to normalize in spite of unresolved problems on trade regimes. Even though democratization process of Latin American countries has been one of the common interests of Brazil and the US, disputes over free trade area encompassing Latin America region had frustrated the US, which preferred a 'free trade area of Americas', similar to US-led NAFTA and CAFTA (O'Neil, 2010).

Brazil, as a major economic power, has to consider its integration with the world markets in order to foster its influence on global governance. The demise of Argentina and the US' intense influence on Mexico have provided Brazil more room to pursue freer policies (Trinkunas, 2014). Within this room, Brazil has risen its voices against the structure of the UN, attended the BRIC community that is a non-Western governance initiation, and preferred to be regarded as a reformist middle power.

Middle powers are known as multilateral units due to their lack of sufficient power. A middle power cannot change global politics by itself; however, with a multilateral structure a middle power combines its power with other middle powers in order to amplify its voices. For instance, OECD DAC is a multilateral initiation of some middle powers in Europe. Under the rubric of OECD DAC, their financial assistances become more valuable and efficient in the way of helping to the peoples aimed.

Brazil, on one hand, has a significant level of compliance with international institutions. On the other hand, it is one of the seeker of reform for the international order, alongside with Turkey. After the Cold War (especially with the emergence of 2008 Global Economic Crisis), middle powers such as Brazil and Russia have become more important actors in terms of both having impression on international politics at the expense of challenging great and other middle powers and being candidate reformers of San Francisco and Bretton Woods order, which dates back to World War II (Lopes, Casarões, & Gama, 2013, p. 2).

Brazil has preferred to transform its image and existence in the international order, from an inward oriented Latin American country to a flexible and outward oriented emerging power. Being the first Latin American lead of the WTO, Brazil has been an active player not only on the issues of agriculture or climate change but also on issues seen more serious like commodity prices and sustainable development (Lopes, Casarões, & Gama, 2013, p. 2).

Feldman (2009) argues that Brazil possesses no confidence to Western states due to colonial past of Europe and aggressive policies of the US. This inconvenience makes Brazil to be cautious in international policies. Brazil chooses to be a part of international institutions and is in favor of multilateralism over bilateralism for most of the policy areas, in the way of countering great powers' hegemonic intentions (Lopes, Casarões, & Gama, 2013, p. 5) and of sharing the burdens with other middle powers. To put it in a different way, although Brazil and alike middle powers such as Turkey do not solely accept the world order led by the US and

prominent European states, they are abiding the rules, regimes and controls of that order involuntarily.

In the context of emerging middle powership, the distinction between the capability and the discourse matters. An increase in the reputation or aggregate power of an emerging middle power can lead policy makers of this hypothetical country to be more aggressive and over-confident. Such situations cause unbalanced foreign policy understandings in the short term. According to Trinkunas (2014), “turbulent domestic politics or major economic crises have occasionally undermined Brazil’s credibility and capabilities, interrupting its rise” (Trinkunas, 2014).

To conclude with, it would be useful to present both Brazil and Turkey’s governance promotion rankings analyzed by Dal et al. and published in *Analist* in 2016. In total, Turkey’s contribution to the global governance is slightly more than that of Brazil. However, for Ideational Promotion and Global Health criteria, Brazil has superiority over Turkey. This superiority is a result of the difference in niche diplomacy they held in international arena. Health diplomacy and agricultural technology transfer from Brazil to West African countries increased Brazil’s impact. Turkey has been more passionate on the humanitarian cases in terms of both security providing and poverty alleviation.

Selected Criteria	Turkey	Brazil
Promotion of Peace Force (per capita)	4	1,5
Poverty and Humanitarian Aid (share in GDP)	4,5	1,5
Ideational Promotion	3,81	4,77
Global Health (share in GDP)	4,3	4,5
Total Promotion	4,05	3,59

Table 2: Turkey and Brazil’s Contribution to Global Governance

4.3. How Emerging Middle Powers are Effective in High-Politics: The Case of Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran, after the revolution of Khomeini in 1979, has been in a trajectory insisting on anti-West and anti-Semitism. To this end, at the expense of exclusion from international platforms, Iran started a nuclear program, which had been advertised by Iranian authorities as being peaceful and non-aggressive. However, the Western camp had not been convinced with the declaration of Iranians. Although Iranian side took a couple of steps, which could be seen as increasing the transparency, the permanent members of the UNSC did not find them satisfactory.

In such an exclusionary environment Iran was facing, Turkey and Brazil, that are unsatisfied with the neoliberal institutions and the governance type they have, tried to provide a room to Iran. By this way, they thought they could show their competence in international order, to middle powers and their respective domestic components. To this end, Erdoğan said “my expectation is that after this declaration there will not be a need for sanctions” (Bayer & Keyman, 2012, p. 74).

Brazil and Turkey had announced themselves as brokers of the negotiations between Iran and the West. After eighteen-month endeavor, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu argued that there is no necessity to implement new sanctions on Iran under the light of Turkey and Brazil's collateral (BBC, 2010). The deal announced that Iran was going to send low-enriched uranium (enrichment percentage is between 3.5 and 5) to Turkey, which would mean that Iran cannot make nuclear weapon. In exchange, Iran would get small amount of high-level enriched uranium to conduct searches on. On the other hand, “Lula's personal interest in promoting himself and Brazil as rising stars on the global stage” (Diehl & Fujii, 2010) would be achieved.

However, the West believed that even if Iran gives the uranium to Turkey, it would still have substantial amount of uranium (eight hundred kilograms) which would be enough for creating nuclear weapon. Therefore, things did not go as planned by Brazil, Turkey and Iran. and the US has immediately rejected the deal due to its anticipation about Iran that was supposed to tacitly continue to find out how to develop a nuclear power plant disguised as peaceful nuclear enrichment (Reinl, 2010). Emerging middle powers want to seek ways to create a US-free room in which they can pursue relatively independent policies. However, the US and US-led UN did not permit emerging powers to play a vital role in a deal including such an important issue.

The case of Iran nuclear deal has been important because not only Turkey and Brazil were declined by the US, but also China and Russia, as permanent members and as non-traditional powers, declined Turkey and Brazil's bid over Iran. This case might be an illustration of the impact of traditional great powers and of the international institutions established by these powers. Moreover, the US implemented new sanctions while the deal was under process. This was considered as a conscious attempt by the US (Karaağaç, 2010) as a great power who was almost ready to decline the swap deal conducted by two important emerging middle powers.

This case is also an illustration of how emerging middle powers are eager to get higher status in global order, mainly in Western institutions. In this respect, Brazil proposed to renew the structure of P5+1 by adding two emerging middle powers, Brazil and Turkey, and transform it to P5+3. This is also consistent with emerging middle power definition which anticipates that even though emerging middle powers are not happy with the current situation of global order, they choose to become a part of the present order because reforming the order from inside is easier than changing it from outside.

4.4. Conclusion

After a decade of economic and political instabilities, Turkey had implemented external economic recovery programs and started to implement a democratization package under the control of the IMF and the EU. Following İsmail Cem's internationalist foreign policy paradigm, Turkey has started to be a more active actor in the region.

Unlike destabilized political life of Turkey during 1990s, Turkey has experienced a one-party government with a majority of vote, which has been providing an investible Turkey perception for foreign and domestic investors. This confidence encouraged Turkey to enhance its image not only in its region but also in other parts of the world. During JDP's governance, Turkey has increased its GDP and welfare of its citizens. Thus, Turkey attracted foreign investors, foreign scholars, and foreign media's attention and was regarded as a model for Arab countries.

Under Davutoğlu's vision, Turkey has declared a foreign policy notion that it adopted, namely 'zero problem with neighbors'. To this end, Turkey developed good relations with Mohamad Morsi in Egypt and rebel groups in Syria. However, these endeavors have failed. Therefore, Turkey's endeavors to dethrone Assad and bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to the power in Egypt were two different failed initiations. These failures did not abrupt Turkey's active foreign policy since Turkey has been seeking partnerships and marketplaces in Africa intensely. Under the rubric of niche diplomacy, Turkey has been providing foreign assistance to destitute countries. Currently, it is a major donor country in Africa thanks to both state and non-state level Turkish actors.

On the other hand, Brazil's GDP is much higher than that of Turkey. Due to its stance toward the system and its historical path, Brazil is not considered as a Western country. Moreover, it is a major member of a non-Western governance initiation, BRICS. Both Turkey and Brazil have not been seeking to undermine the system but to reform it somehow.

Not having a strong contender in its backyard, Brazil has started to direct its attention to Africa. However, the way it approaches to Africa is very different from Turkey's approach. Because while Turkey is using its humanitarian donor identity, Brazil has chosen health diplomacy and agricultural technology transfer as niche diplomacies. The thesis focuses on the agricultural technology transfer of Brazil toward Africa with a special focus on Nigeria.

In order to reveal to what extent two emerging middle powers are influential and game changer in the order, this chapter includes a case study of Iran's nuclear deal. Although Brazil and Turkey have tried to conduct a moderation role between Iran and the West hand in hand, they could not make great powers listen to them. This consequence explains us that if the case is high-politics, emerging middle powers are ineffective units for now. Nuclear deal is a high-politics issue, therefore, the Western countries (and even some major non-Western countries) declined Turkey and Brazil's guarantees over Iran's peaceful nuclear enrichment programs.

V. TURKEY'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BASED ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

5.1. Relations before 1998 between Two Parties

Considering Turkey as the continuation of Ottoman Empire, one can agree on the fact that Turkey and Africa has a centuries-long relationship, which never was based on exploitation of Africa. However, for the first three quarters of a century back, Turkey's relation with Africa had not been stronger than of Ottoman Empire. Building a new nation-state whose boundaries was too small according to an empire necessitated a humble foreign policy paradigm for Turkey, for decades. In spite of existence of some extrovert foreign policies, Turkey mainly was a country trying to be defensive and a seeker for the status quo (Arda, 2015).

Some studies attributed the roots of Turkish-African relations to the Ottomans or to even Tolunoğulları, a state in Egypt whose rulers were Turks and subjects were Arabs (Karagül & Arslan, 2013)(Enwere, 2014). Main emphasis of these studies is on lack of colonial history between Africa and the Ottomans. However, the thesis does not consider these states as determinative actors on shaping the current relation between Turkey and the African states. Because even in the Middle East, Ottoman Empire and its legacy are not remembered thoroughly by Arabs and other minority peoples. Therefore, current relations between Turkey and Africa cannot be attributed to the Ottoman Empire and to the states before the Ottomans. More importantly, taking sub-Saharan Africa into consideration, one would realize that the influence of the Ottomans was less than North Africa. Considering that one of the most critical communicational channel was built in 19th century with Kanem Bornu Empire, the thesis argues

that the Ottomans were not as involved with Africa as the Europeans were. It is to say that, having this thesis content in mind, Turkey's closeness to sub-Saharan Africa today is not originated from the Ottomans.

Even if it is known that the Ottoman Empire has much closer relations with this region than Turkey-before-1990s, this is not important in the eyes of African citizens. This argument can be justified through Ayşe Zarakol's conviction that the nations that were lived under the Ottoman legacy do not overemphasize the Ottomans. Thus, we cannot expect sub-Saharan African states and their citizens to approach Turkey like they had a common history or common interests, while even nations controlled by the Ottomans do not approach in that way. David Shinn's view is parallel with this argument to a large extent. He criticizes one of article³ attributing Turkish-African relations to the Ottomans, and Shinn argues that "[t]he sending of emissaries to, and occasional signing of, agreements with local authorities in parts of the region did not demonstrate the exercise of Ottoman authority or governance. In reality, the Ottoman Empire's efforts there largely ended in failure" (Shinn, 2015). Thus in the thesis, the Ottoman *effect* will be isolated from the current relations due to Ottoman-Africa relations' lack of enough reflection to today's relations.

The reason of why Turkey had not taken sub-Saharan Africa as its one of the main foreign compound emerges from Turkey's external and internal economic crises, lack of sufficient amount of enterprisers, and instability in political life. Based on these reasons, Turkey could not be an assertive international actor in both region and whole globe. Another reason of low-level relations with Africa stems from the tendency and the eager to be a Western actor instead of sticking to old values from Ottoman era. Getting used to new reforms and

³ Mehmet Özkan, 'Turkey's "New" Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications', Perceptions, Vol. 16, No 3

implementing autarchic economic policies, new Turkish Republic mainly focused on developing economically and on staying away from taking an active role on world politics.

During and after World War II, Turkey started to seek for alliances to pursue its existence under Soviet threats and this pursuit ended up with Western aids to be spent in infrastructure investments. Politically, because of over-sticking to the West camp, Turkey could not respond to African countries' needs, and kept its instance away from the African states. Instead of Africa, Turkish foreign policy mainly focused on the Middle East. Even after 1950 election Turkey tried to be a regional hegemon in the Middle East through excluding Egypt and the Soviets via help of Suez Crisis and Eisenhower Doctrine, this ambition was not realized thoroughly due to the Soviets' backing Cemal Abdunhasır up.

2002-2005	2005-2008	2008-2011	2011-2014	2014-
Preparation for future bilateral relations	Increasing awareness of Africans and Turkish about relations	Started with Mogadishu visit of Erdoğan	Started with Somali visit of Erdoğan	Normalization of Turkey-Africa relations
Low level visits	Diversifying the relations	Deepening economic relations	State-building process and high-politics issues	Strengthening the image of Turkey
		Opening embassies	Being a side in African issues in international politics	Endeavor to be a permanent partner in the continent

Table 3: Turkey-Africa Relations in Five Phase since 2002

Source: Mehmet Özkan (2014). Türkiye-Afrika İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem. AlJazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiye-afrika-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem> Accessed: 28.08.2016

However, we witnessed an extraordinary situation in Turkish foreign policy that encouraged Turkey to communicate with African states in the 1960s. This situation was roughly about the Cyprus conundrum in which most of the African states backed Michail Christodoulou Makarios, the then leader of Cyprus Republic. Under the leadership of Hasan Esat Işık, Minister of Foreign Affairs, committees from Turkey tried to affect vote behavior of African states in the United Nations. However, this opening process was not successful as we can understand from unsustainability of the process (Fırat, na). Because there was not enough strategical move toward and knowledge about African states in the Turkish side. Building a long-term strategy and increasing awareness about Africa was accelerated in 1998. Until 1998, the relations fluctuated at low-level such as opening an embassy in Ghana, or advertising Turkey's legitimacy over Cyprus, supporting Ethiopians against Italy, and such (Özkan, 2010) (Enwere, 2014).

While enhancing foreign ties with the West, on the other hand, Turkey has been imposed several economic crises. Looking beyond Turkish economy, we can say that financial costs of 1958, 1968, 1977-78, 1994 crises has hampered Turkey to be interested in Africa. Depending on both these costs stemming from crises and low level of total factor productivity, Turkey could not easily created an entrepreneur class that would invest to other countries and make attractive Turkey to be invested in. Actually, since Özal era, the entrepreneur class was not expected to be assertive in world market, instead they were supposed to provide internal needs of citizens. As a consequence, the bourgeoisie class was not in a need of expanding its market share in global scale because they were satisfied with the domestic demand.

After abandoning the import substitutive industrialization regime, industrialists had to seek foreign markets to compete with foreign firms and as a result, they started to commercialize their products in Central Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the European

Union. However, again, the connection between the Turkish and the Africans was very limited because of the geographical distance, cultural differences, and lack of information about both Africans and, more importantly, African markets.

5.1. African Action Plan and Aftermath

During 1990s, Turkish-African relation was stable and at low-level. Instability in political and economic spectrum of Turkey had not given enough space to run an intense and proper foreign policy toward African states, except Arabic countries. After relative recovery of the effects of 1994 crisis and the end of the Cold War, almost every state revised its foreign policy behaviors. In this respect, in 1998 Turkey started new initiations making Turkey take African states into consideration, under the initiation of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem. In order to strengthen economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with Africa, Turkey announced ‘Opening to Africa Action Plan’ in 1998. Increasing developmental aid and diplomatic missions and fostering business relations was at the core of this plan (Bilgiç & Nascimento, 2014).

Although Turkey could not collect enough benefits from this initiation as it had foreseen, the Africa Action Plan was the milestone of the relations because it was not only covering state-to-state communication but it also encourages businesses, NGOs, and humanitarian agencies to take action in favor of both Turkish and African peoples. Nevertheless, political and economic instabilities that Turkey had to experience, again, halted to enhance the relations with Africa. Due to internal banking decays and devastating Marmara earthquakes, Turkey spent its resources to recover its economy. In this respect, the level of focus on Africa has been stable until 2005.

It is worthy to say that Turkey’s second initiation to build close relationship with sub-Saharan Africa is similar to the first initiation in terms of diversifying foreign partners. In the first initiation, the motive behind Turkey’s Africa opening was originated from the USA’s reluctance to stand behind of Turkey against the Soviets and Turkey’s aim to increase its

support in UNSC. Similarly, in the second initiation, the motive behind Turkey's Africa opening was originated from the Luxemburg Summit held in 1997 and was one of the milestone for Turkey in its way to be a member of the EU due to the EU's demand from Turkey to adopt additional conditions (Karagül & Arslan, 2013).

Although 1998 Africa opening should not be seen as a sole consequence of the EU's demand, this rift between Turkey and the EU can be seen as a precipitator for Turkey to lean to sub-Saharan Africa. The main difference between the two initiations stems from the fact that while in the first initiation Turkey only tried to build political partnership, in the second, in addition to political partnership, Turkey also aimed to foster cultural, economic, and humanitarian dimensions of the partnership. This multi-dimensional approach has enhanced the strength of the relationship and helped to create a long-term partnership.

Unlike its predecessors, AKP has attributed special importance to Africa around bilateral lucrative economic and political partnership. Sustaining political and economic stability after 2001 crisis, AKP has heavily been linked to long-term, liberal and EU oriented economic policies. As a result, its first years can be read as economic success story undeniably. Thanks to the self-reliance that Turkey started to have through the economic recovery process after the crisis, it followed more assertive foreign policies not only in the Middle East and Europe but also in Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Enwere, 2014). This assertive policy has been shaped around the new vision of Turkey, which implies that Turkey no longer will regard itself as a bridge country, but instead Turkey will define itself as a central country (Özkan, 2011). Therefore, having intense negotiations with the EU to access membership medal, Turkey, surprisingly, declared 2005 as the 'Year of Africa'. By this way, the inertia on Africa that Turkey inherited from its past was abolished second time, after seven years from the first time. It was surprising because having other important agendas like EU accession, AKP government has chosen this year as dedication to Africa. Therefore, some academicians and old

bureaucrats has criticized AKP's interest over Africa while Turkey was on the verge of crossroads in its EU accession history (Arda, 2015)(Sanberk, 2007).

Looking at the history of Turkish foreign policy, one can argue that Turkey is stuck between the Middle East and the European Union. Embedding with Kurdish question, the Middle East has always been a privileged region for Turkey along with the European Union under the ambition of being a member state. The problem for Turkey emerges from constraining itself with a limited amount of regions or actors. In this respect, diversification can be used as a beneficial policy tool that would make Turkey relief in a moment of crisis. Varying foreign relations will give Turkey enough room and instruments in the case of a problem with one of these relations (Fidan, 2013). After 2005, unlike to 1998 and 1960s openings to Africa plans, visits from ministerial and presidential level lasted and based on this fact, Turkish side showed its resolution to sustain long-term relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Gül's visits to Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Democratic Republic of Congo are reflections of long-term continuation of Turkey's Africa policies (Shinn, 2015). Also TIKA opened its first office in Africa, Addis Ababa, in 2005 (USTKIP, 2008).

“Between 2009 and 2011 there were 37 visits to Africa made by either the Turkish president, prime minister, parliamentary speaker or minister of foreign affairs. Over the same period, there were 76 visits to Turkey by African leaders of similar rank. In 2012, some 300 journalists from 54 African states took part in the Turkey–Africa Media Forum in Ankara, and in 2014 Turkey and its African partners organized over 20 high-level bilateral visits.” (Shinn, 2015).

Relations were not always based on bilateral negotiations and summits during the opening process. As an addition to these kind of African-Turkish meeting, Turkey also tried to enhance relations via using a discourse favoring African countries, for instance, in the UN.

After Erdoğan, with his family, visited Somalia, he puts the famine and poverty problems of Somalia forward in the UN General Assembly. Touching upon Somalia's long lasting civil war, Erdoğan tried to gather enough support from Western countries and accused colonialist powers of just watching a child's lust for food. He indicated that Turkey accumulated three hundred million dollars within just two months for the Somalians and there would be a satisfactory cooperation (worth \$500m) between Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Turkey (AKP, 2011). For Somalian citizens, bureaucrats, and academics, Turkey's gesture in the UN General assembly and Erdoğan's visit has meant a lot in the sense that Erdoğan was "the first foreign head of government to have visited [Somalia] in 20 years" (Ali & Mohamud, 2012).

On the other hand, we need to touch upon Turkish schools in Africa, which represent soft power of Turkey in the continent until recently. The schools are educating prospective leaders and high-level bureaucrats of African states. Not only Turkish schools in Africa, but also the schools in Turkey have been attracting African countries. For instance, General Manager of Technology and Environment Affairs of Sudan, Usame Rais, completed his MA and PhD in METU. According to Rais, Turkey's capital and experience, and Africa's resources can free African states from exploitative states. Additionally, he also praised Turkish NGOs due to their 'for God's sakes' efforts in Africa and Sudan (Önder 2015). Therefore, giving a diploma to an African student does not require an end for relations between the person and Turkey.

5.2. Relations on International Platforms

After 2005, Turkey and Africa organized series of summits of which participants were high bureaucrats and politicians. As a part of these close relations, Turkey was given the observer status in the Africa Union as a consequence of the First International Turkish-African Congress in 2005, with the proposal of Konare, in 2015, 10th of the Congress was held in Dakar. Alongside the Congresses, there have been Summits and Partnership meetings as well. In this

First Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, held in 2008 in Istanbul with 49 African countries, meeting topics were generally upon security, cooperation, democracy, international law and human right (ISS, 2008) (MFA, 2015). Parties did not only negotiated about the issues around the relationship between Turkey and Africa, but they also discussed on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the Millennium Development Goals, climate change, and etc. Additionally, African Union declared Turkey as a 'strategic partner of Africa' due to this partnership's 'suitable framework for collective dialogue'; and officially, Turkey became a member of strategic partners group in 2008, in the 'Heads of State and Government of the African Union Summit (USTKIP, 2008)(ISS, 2008). This inclusionary step in favor of Turkey has increased Turkey's visibility in the continent.

State-level diplomacy has been followed by NGO forums organized by TUSKON and TOBB/DEIK. In 2014, In Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, Second Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit was held around the issues like agribusiness, civil defense, investment, health, etc. In the declaration notes, main decisions were pursuing cooperation on peace and security, intensifying economic relations via economic and trade forums, strengthening capacities of African countries to keep up with global capitalism, and accepting '2015-2019 Turkey-Africa Co-Action Plan'. Besides meetings under the names of summit or congress, Turkey also have been taking actions in the African Development Bank Group. In 2013, Turkey became 78th member of the group (25th non-regional), following Africa Partnership Policy with the help of its 'Opening to Africa' policy. Hau Sing Tse, Executive Director, accepted Turkey by saying: "It is especially timely for Turkey to join AfDB as Turkey enters into a new phase of deepening its engagement with Africa. Turkey values AfDB's unique and pivotal role in helping to shape Africa's transformation, and, as a new member, looks forward to making a useful contribution to support AfDB in this regard" (AFDB, 2013) As a consequence of this initiation, Turkey's aviation group – TAV, undertook an airport project in Tunisia (AFDB, 2013).

Think tanks like TASAM has been a major complementary actor of state policies in Africa. In the following section, TASAM-led International Turkish-African Congresses will found a place in the thesis. These congresses are not covering only political issues but also investments, trade deals, etc.

5.3. Turkish-African Think-Tanks Meetings

There is not many think tanks in Turkey directly concerning with Africa. ORDAF is among the think-tanks having direct ties with Africa. I. Organization of Turkish-African Think Tank Summit in December 19-20, 2015, is one of the major event that ORDAF conducted lately. The interest toward Africa mainly comes from Turkey's Africa policy. In this respect, we can say that some non-state organizations' activities are highly relevant and parallel to the state policy. In the summit, the main theme was 'searches for improving multidimensional cooperation' and 'media, NGOs of Africa, security and terror, and co-education' are among the sub-themes of the summit. Then Prime Minister Davutoğlu and some cabinet members attended the summit. Some of the endnotes of the summit are about 1) sustainability of the summit, 2) incentives to increase in the African students in Turkey, 3) building new trade relations 4) constructing a media bridge among Turkey and Africa, and 5) establishing institutions that would arrange Turkey's humanitarian activities in Africa (ORDAF 2015).

5.4. International Turkish-African Congresses

In the First Turkish-African Congress was held in 2005, and the President of African Union Commission Alpha Oumar Konare and then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül attended to this congress. In his speech, Gül attributed the relations to the Ottomans. This attitude is not limited with Gül, on the contrary, most researchers, bureaucrats, and politicians has adopted this approach. In this respect, one may argue that Turkish side has been trying to create a benevolent image to be presented to the Africans on the basis of 'common history'.

Gül's assertion about the depth of Turkey-African relations has been around the lack of armed struggle between the parties and Turkish War of Independence's inspirational effects on independence movements of African countries. For the prospect of the relations, Gül strongly focused on economic dimension in which trade volume has more than doubled between 1999-2003, and he emphasized the importance of private sector in order to lift the barriers and constrain legal frameworks for the sake of liberal trade (Gül, 2007). On the African side, beside enhancing economic relations, changing the perception about Africa and recognizing it as an equal political partner has weight as well. Konare's speech on the Congress shows how discourse, attitude, and respect toward Africa is significant for African citizens and politicians (Konare, 2005).

One can easily deduce that Turkey's respectful attitudes toward Africa, regarding African states as equal partners, and seeing Africa as fellow continent have vital significance in creating perception of benevolent Turkey. First International Turkish-African Congress is a consequence of the long-term Africa vision, and an opportunity for continuation of future events. In November 2015, 10th International Turkish-African Congress assembled in Dakar. Topics were related to urbanization of Africa, visa and travel issues, distribution of investment and so on (TASAM, 2015). This proves how relation between Turkey and Africa has been specialized within ten years.

Concentrating on detailed investment and welfare adjuvant projects would be pertinent actin if the aim was to build strong relations around sustainable development and to realize increase in wealth of African citizens. However, in the last Congress, alongside productive investment issues, Brazilian and Chinese existence in Africa had been one of the major meeting topic. That means while Turkey diversifies its foreign partners, Africa does the same. Below I will give some declaration notes of the Congress to be able to see the agendas of two parties:

Year	Agenda Items of Annual Turkish-African Congresses
1st Meeting	<p>Establishment of Institution for African Research</p> <p>Continuation of the Congress</p> <p>Proposal of observation states to Turkey at African Union</p> <p>Institutionalization of economic relations</p> <p>Promoting Turkish goods</p>
2nd Meeting	<p>Proposal for opening a representative office of Africa Union</p> <p>Advertising cultures of the two parties in Africa and Turkey</p> <p>University cooperation deals</p>
3rd Meeting	<p>Cooperation for providing easiness to NGOs</p> <p>TIKA's engagement</p> <p>Increasing literacy rate in Africa</p>
6th Meeting	<p>Cooperation between African and Turkish NGOs</p> <p>Investment for infrastructure, technology</p> <p>Promoting gender equality and right for free travelling</p>
9th Meeting	<p>Internationalization of Africa</p> <p>Providing infrastructure to secure investments</p> <p>Financing Turkish constructors by AfDB</p> <p>Encouraging Turkish media not to reflect Africa as a continent full of problem</p>
10th Meeting	<p>Increasing interaction between private sectors of Africa and Turkey</p> <p>Solving problems under the consideration of African characteristics</p> <p>Climate issues</p> <p>Promoting specific investment areas</p>

Table 4: Agenda Items of Annual Turkish-African Congresses

5.5. Economic Relations with Africa


Sub-Saharan Africa has never been an international trade hub for Turkey. The trade volume between Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa is only a fraction of Turkey's foreign trade. Rather, the Middle East, China, Russia, and the EU have constituted very large amount of Turkey's total foreign trade volume. However, due to the aim of diversifying the foreign trade routes, foreign markets, and sources, trade volume between Africa and Turkey have been tripled in a decade.

Portfolio diversification is a very well-known method for risk-aversion in microeconomic term. However, in macroeconomic level, we can benefit from this term to bring a dimension of why states want to decrease the number of hostile states. Zero problems with neighbors and optimum engagement with other regions such as sub-Saharan Africa are not only important discourse and initiations for policy makers' political concerns that mostly found a base in domestic scale, but also there is a foreign trade dimension of engaging with Africa. According to a TÜSİAD representative Barış Ornarlı, after 2008 crisis Turkey started to deepen engagement with Africa in order to mitigate the negative effect of European stagnation. After eight years later, Turkey faced a second crisis, Russia's sanctions. In order to alleviate the unfavorable repercussions of this tension, Turkey started a re-engagement with Africa (Kaplan 15).

According to Sedat Aybar, this significant increase in trade volume and interest in Africa can be attributed to the need for raw material from Africa and increase in South-South trade flow (Aybar, 2005, p. 170). Unlike Aybar's argument, Shinn argues that Turkey's trade volume has been determined around the level of Islamic identity of trade partner. It is to say that Turkey has more export and import statistics with the countries having Muslim majority or high amount of Muslim minorities (Shinn, 2015, p. 3). Parallel to Shinn's argument, Özkan asserts that


alongside humanitarian aid and economic relations-based dimensions, religion is one of the pillars of the African opening. Looking at the foreign trade data will give us a better chance to comment on the terms of trade and trade volume between the two parties.

To be able to realize and comment on Africa’s place on Turkey’s trade volume and shape, there will be some comparative graphs including other country groups like EU 28, Other European, North African, North American, South American, and Near and Middle Eastern countries. Graph 5 shows Turkey’s export performance to these country groups and to what extent sub-Saharan countries take place in Turkey’s export statistics. According to the graph, the main country groups that Turkey has been exporting most to are the EU 28 and Near and Middle Eastern. In 2014, while Turkey exported about 70 and 35 billion USD to EU 28 and Near and Middle East respectively, it is exporting only 4 billion USD to sub-Saharan countries. On the other hand, the share of sub-Saharan Africa is bigger than only of South America in the country groups that I considered.




Graph 4: Turkey’s Export to Selected Country Groups

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016




Graph 5: Turkey's Export to Selected African Countries

Source: TUIK <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> and <http://muslimpopulation.com/>



Graph 6: Turkey's Import from Selected Country Groups


Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016



Graph 7: SSA's Weight in Total Trade Volume of Turkey

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016

On import side, the situation is not that different from the export. Only difference about sub-Saharan Africa is that it is no longer superior to South America. It means among these country groups, sub-Saharan Africa is the country group that Turkey imports least. Taking Africa's newly emerging position in Turkey's trade partners, we may need to see sub-Saharan Africa's place in Turkish foreign trade within a time period. 2005 is accepted as the beginning period due to Turkey's declaration 2005 as the 'Year of Africa'. In the graphs below, it can be seen how trade volume with sub-Saharan Africa have increased between 2005-2014. While in 2005, Turkey's total trade with SSA was less than three billion dollars, it was about 6.5 billion dollars in 2014, and while in this time period Turkey increased one billion dollars its import from SSA, it tripled its amount of export.




Graph 8: SSA's Weight on Turkey's Total Export

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016




Graph 9: Turkey's Imports from sub-Saharan Africa

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016



Graph 10: SSA's and North Africa's Total Trade Volumes with Turkey

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016



Graph 11: Turkey's Import from and Export to SSA

Source: TUIK, <http://tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist> Accessed: 28.08.2016

As it is seen in the graphs, sub-Saharan Africa constitutes only a small part of total trade volume of Turkey. And other conclusion can be about how Africa is heterogeneous around sub-Saharan and North Africa in terms of having large differences in trade with Turkey. North Africa has always been more important trade partner of Turkey along the time period. Moreover, the trade volume with North Africa has been increasing without an interruption. However, trade with sub-Saharan Africa has fluctuations after 2007, especially with the negative effect of 2008 global crisis. One striking illustration of the Graph 11 is the divergence of total trade volumes between the lines of sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. After 2011, while increase in trade

with North Africa has accelerated until 2013, trade with sub-Saharan Africa has lost momentum.

5.6. Turkish NGOs in Africa

Intentionally or unintentionally, states leave some space for non-state actors in realization or determination of both domestic and foreign politics. Up to a certain level, these non-state actors have been shaping world's agenda or have been trying to intervene in the agendas created by states. In the case of Turkey, we have recently witnessed the incident of Mavi Marmara in which an NGO called IHH embarked a ship to be arrived to Palestine lands. After the incident, Turkey had to revise its Israel and Palestine strategy and adopted a normative foreign policy approach instead of a more realistic foreign policy approach toward Palestine (Dağcı 2015, 45).

In relations with sub-Saharan Africa, there have been effects of non-state actors on creation or on changing perceptions of Africans about Turkey. From humanitarian actors to economic associations, from religious-based to education-based initiations, effects of Turkish NGOs are not to be overlooked after 2000s. In the literature, some academics attribute the beginning of NGOs' existence in Africa to Özal's outward looking economy policies, 1997 military intervention and 2002 AKP's coming to power (Karagül & Arslan, 2013; Çavdar, 2013; Özkan, 2011). During Refahiyol government under the leadership of Erbakan, as a natural consequence of Libya visits, pious capital owners had increased their trade volume and ambition to make investment in Africa. Especially after 1997 post-modern coup d'eta, making investment in Turkey became a very risky for pious capital owners gathering together under the roof of MÜSİAD.

Due to this kind of political obstacles, MÜSİAD and other pious or pro-Erbakan entrepreneurs had to direct their capitals to African countries where they are far away from a

military tutelage and laicism-based oppression (Çavdar, 2013). Another advantage of African countries was huge amount of demand. While in Turkey, secular entrepreneurs have mostly satisfied domestic demand, new entrepreneurs having more Islamic background tried to satisfy supply deficiency in Africa. However, after AKP's coming to power, tendency of Islamist capitalists toward Africa has not abated, rather it increased more than ever in Turkish economic history. Here, the reason behind this prolonged tendency toward Africa has roots in both profit maximizer nature of entrepreneurs (MÜSİAD, TUSKON) and political power maximizer nature of politicians (AKP).

The relation between business associations and the AKP has based on win-win paradigm. While businessmen have found lucrative markets with the incentive provided by the AKP governments, the AKP has strengthen existence politically and economically due to Turkey's existence in Africa through small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) (Çavdar, 2013). In this respect, from the beginning of rulership of AKP to the end of 2013, the relationship between non-state actors and Turkish government was rather carrying complementary characteristics. The complementarity emerged from the similar economic and political profiles has accelerated Turkey's influence and has enhanced both AKP's and Anatolian tigers' bid over Africa. During governmental visits to Africa, then Prime Minister, Erdoğan, has convened businessmen in order to enhance economic relations with African countries. For example, in his Gabon-Niger-Senegal visits in 2013, three hundred businessmen attended to the visit and negotiated enhancing economic ties via increasing trade and investment volume and encouraging constructors (TUSKON, 2013).

In order to clarify non-state actors' existence in sub-Saharan Africa, it would be useful to classify them under the consideration of their existential identities. While IHH, Kimse Yok mu, or Deniz Feneri associations are humanitarian non-state actors; TUSKON, İzmir Trade Chamber (İZTO), Exporter Association of Turkey (TİM), Independent Industrialists and

Businessmen's association (MÜSİAD), Turkish Airlines (THY), and Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) are non-state economic agents; Ufuk Dialogue Foundation is an religious-based agent, to name a few. Almost every NGO has different motives on being in Africa. For instance, İZTO's Africa program had been upon rather short-term interest - bringing EXPO to İzmir. Due to voting system of EXPO, Africa has become important side for Izmir and other candidates. In this scope, IZTO published a report named 'Shining Star of the World – Africa' in its 2012 Working Programme (Karagül & Arslan, 2013). On the other hand, as a non-state agent, THY is pursuing an important mission in Turkey's Africa policies economically and politically in the sense that its flights are regarded as a bridge for introducing solely different cultures to each other and fostering economic relations by means of making easier to have Turkey's visa for Africans.

5.7. Humanitarian Relief Fund (IHH)

Before having a discussion on the effects of an influential humanitarian NGO like IHH, it would be better to take a look inside quantitative facts and concrete activities of IHH in some of the African countries. Then there will be more donor NGOs having projects in Africa in the thesis. Due to its popularity and efficacy, we gave special importance to IHH and therefore, alongside giving some details about IHH's aid activities in Somalia, we give some general facts about IHH. IHH is accepted as one of the most active Turkish NGO in Africa, with humanitarian sakes (Özkan, 2012). In addition to vocational and technical education, IHH has supported African citizens via, for instance, its health assistance such as conducting Cataract Project in Togo, Benin, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Under this project, IHH's medical personnel examined 291.004 Africans and performed 73.073 surgeries. Most of the surgeries has been realized in Sudan (35.040), Ethiopia (21.935), and Somalia (11.300) between 2007-2013 (IHH, 2014).

Since its foundation in 1992, IHH has expanded its sphere of influence from the Balkans to Caucasia, from Middle East to Africa. In 1998, IHH conducted its first major activity in Ethiopia due to a drought-related famine. This activity was consisted of eighteen tones emergent humanitarian aid material. The table below illustrates in which years and to which African countries IHH conducted major projects and activities.

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2006	2008	2010
Recipient Country	Lebanon	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Multiple countries	Lebanon	Palestine
Reason	General	Drought	Refugee	Emergent aid	Drought	Israel's attacks	Israel's attacks
Scope	Shipload aid	18 tones material	Drought	50 tones material	Campaign	Emergent aid	Aid and vehicle
Year	2011	2011	2011	2012	2013	2013	2013
Recipient Country	Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya	Libya	Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia	Somalia	Gaza	Mali	Sudan
Reason	General	General	Drought	Drought	Israel's attacks	Refugee crisis	Darfur crisis
Scope	Campaign	682 tones material	Emergent mobilization	5874 tones material	Campaign	Emergent aid	Emergent aid

Table 5: IHH's Main Annual Activities in Africa after 1997

Source: IHH (2013). İnsani Yardım. Vol. 55

The budget of IHH for 2014 exceeded 400 million TL. Association's incomes are mostly from unconditional donations (about 300 million TL), followed by conditional donation, real donation, foreign exchange and rent incomes. IHH spent 300 million TL for social purposes, 15 million for health services, 9 million for education, 4 million for cultural facilities, etc. During 2016 Ramadan, IHH precipitated its activities in Africa with an Islamic sense. They arranged an SMS campaign gathering 15 TL for each messages from participants in the name of fitre – special form of Islamic alms-charity. This kind of aids directly creates an interrelation between the poor African and Turkish donor citizens. Additionally, IHH has given 50 tones weighted iftar meals for thirty thousand Muslim Africans who fled from Central Africa to Chad due to securing their lives (IHH, 2016).

Before 2000s, IHH was came to the fore with its Islamic characteristics that was mostly accepted as extremist (Kenner, 2010). Turkish state was investigating IHH in the late 1990s due to IHH's explosives and firearms prepared to be used in Bosnia and Chechnya for jihadist purposes (Kenner, 2010). The 1997 post-modern coup was the period in which the military and bureaucracy had accepted IHH as an Islamic militant group as a consequence of firearms, explosives, bomb-making instructions, and a 'jihad flag that were found after an investigation conducted by Turkish authorities (Kohlmann, 2006, p. 11). Similarly, Israel asserts IHH has enhanced Hamas, an obvious threat for Israel's existence in the region. Additionally, according to Israel sources, IHH has been buying weapons from Al Qaeda although IHH denies these claims (Tavernise & Slackman, 2010). Not only by Israeli officers, but also by the CIA, IHH has links to terrorism according to 1996 dated report named 'International Islamic NGOs and Links to Terrorism' (Stahl & Reiss, 2010).

IHH was a small-scale humanitarian association with some Islamic extremism, based on Turkey before 2010. However, Israel killed nine IHH activists during the Mavi Marmara incident in which Israel raided IHH that had been aiming to export humanitarian aid material

to Gaza. After this incident, IHH has gained an international reputation. This reputation has pleased the members of IHH such that one of the member, Omar Faruk, has celebrated their increasing fame by saying that “We are very thankful to the Israeli authorities... We changed the balance [in Gaza question]” (Tavernise & Slackman, 2010).

IHH’s ascendance in international arena is kind of an illustration of the ascendance of political Islam in Turkish political life after 1980s. The economic and political transformations following the 1980 coup have created an Islamic-leaning entrepreneur class with the help of neoliberalism under the leadership of Ozal. IHH’s income is mostly coming from donors. One can argue that these donors are the religious entrepreneurs who have been getting rich and influential in Turkey after the AKP came to power and strengthen its ties with religious entrepreneur associations such as MUSIAD and TUSKON.

As an emerging middle power, Turkey’s policy makers had to align with other countries’ victimized citizens in order to gain a soft/benevolent/humanitarian image in the international scene. In this respect, helping Palestinian people who were blockaded by Israeli forces might be seen as a soft power facilitator in which the IHH has conducted its role as an NGO. While in 1990s IHH was counted as a semi-terrorist organization by the Turkish state, it has been one of most important NGO on determination of Turkish foreign policy agenda thanks to the AKP after 2000s.

In the period of 2005 and 2013, Turkey had sought to be a way to be the natural leader of the Middle East via Neo-Ottoman motives according to many academics and journalists. However, after three years from the coup in Egypt, Turkey failed in Syria policy as well. The reason of this failure mainly originated from the fact that Russia has been backing Assad regime up. In addition to these problems, Turkey shot a Russian SU-24 plane near Syria border due to air space violation of Russia. Russia expected an apology and compensation from Turkey for

the plane; however, Turkey had not officially apologized from Russia due to its self-confident stemming from AKP's ambitions in the international affairs until 27 June, 2016.

The failures that I mentioned above was not closely linked to the IHH until 29 June, 2016 when Erdoğan blamed IHH of not to ask the then (2010) Prime Minister (Erdoğan) to help Palestinian people and of not to act within the boundaries of diplomacy. In 17 July, 2014, Erdoğan had said that “we as the authority gave the permission [to the IHH]” (Cumhuriyet, 2016). This discursive transformation obviously is a product of the rapprochement between the Israel and Turkey. It can be inferred that how an NGO has been affected and been effective in an emerging middle power like Turkey, based on the example of the IHH's changing values in the eyes of President Erdoğan and his foreign policy.

5.8. Foreign Assistance from Governmental Bodies of Turkey

Being a state whose aim is to be regarded as a benevolent power, soft power, regional power, game changer, or a global actor requires some economic costs. These costs could be expenditures on military, building economic ties with other countries, promoting and advertising itself and humanitarian agent. Turkey's choice is rather on giving foreign assistance. Starting to give foreign assistance in 1984, Turkey became among the major donors due to its generous helps to not only sub-Saharan Africa but to Central Asia and the Balkans.

My understanding on foreign assistance mainly justifies realist theory in the sense that states do not give or help to other countries without expecting something in return; and liberal theory in the sense that non-state organization can do a good job and can complement state's engagement within a geography. As a consequence of nature of state, Turkey has to find ways to maximize its interests over every issues it undertakes. Lacking of any humane senses, states, thanks to their bureaucratic structure, determine their policies in a rational manner unlike non-profit organizations. In this respect, the thesis regards foreign assistance as a mechanism to which states used to achieve to be labeled as savior of oppressed by its citizens, to have enough

support in the UN, WTO or even in Expo selections (Shinn 2015, 5). However, at sub-state level liberal institutionalism has more weight to explain existence of NGOs in Africa.

Although Turkey was not an advanced economy in 1980s, and it had received foreign economic assistance from the West, in 1984, Turkey realized its first foreign assistance mission. Since then both monetary and non-monetary development assistances have been provided to sub-Saharan Africa by Turkey under the roof of both public and private agencies. An example for non-monetary assistance can be health assistance to sub-Saharan Africa such as to Sudan, Ethiopia, Benin, Niger, Ghana, Togo, Kenya, Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania, and Somalia. Between 2007 and 2010 about six hundred health personnel served in these countries and the number of African citizens who were cured or examined exceeded 300 thousand (Karagül & Arslan, 2013).

In 1992, TIKA was established in order to institutionalize foreign assistance activities. After 2004, its mission and warrant have expanded, which led TIKA be the technical representative of foreign aid. While in 2003, Turkey gave 66 million dollars to the aid recipient countries as development aid, this budget increased to 339 million dollars just one year later, in 2004. By this way, Turkey exceeded 100 million dollars threshold which was necessary to be involved with the OECD-DAC group.

In 2005, TIKA has opened its first representative in Addis Ababa in order to extend its mission area to Africa. Currently there are fourteen representatives of TIKA in Africa, four in the North Africa and ten in sub-Saharan Africa. Before 2005, Israel offered TIKA to cooperate in taking action toward Ethiopia, however, due to lack of enough focus on Africa and perceptions of Turkish side toward Israel did not let them to cooperate, and TIKA declined the offer (Akçay, 2012, p. 87). However, after 2005, the Year of Africa, TIKA has added Africa into its focal areas and in this respect, parallel to Turkish political and economic opening to Africa, TIKA has increased the amount of money given to African countries. As Turkey opened

new embassies in some African countries, TIKA has opened new representatives in those countries. For instance, following new embassies in Ethiopia, Senegal and Somalia, TIKA, within a *cooperative* manner with the Turkish state, tracked the steps taken by the state and opened diplomatic representatives (Akçay, 2012, p. 85).


Another example, which shows how TIKA and Turkish state are working in a cooperative way, would be Turkey's lust for a seat in UNSC and TIKA's steps to achieve that aim. In 2003, Turkey announced its candidacy for being a non-permanent member of UNSC and in this respect, it increased its engagement in Africa due to Africa's abundance of vote. TIKA had undertaken the mission of building close relations with African countries and directly with the African Union through its special budget (fifteen million \$).

Alongside TIKA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs had also denoted technologic equipment and even official car for the then President of African Union, Jean Ping (Akçay, 2012, p. 87). This engagement can be read as a compensation of the past relations that does not include a relationship which would provide enough support to Turkey in the elections for non-permanent seat in UNSC. In that regard, alongside economic gifts, diplomatic ties with international organizations had been seen as the key for reaching the seat. It is to say that acquiring African countries' support was stemmed not only from economic assistances but also diplomatic activities of Turkey (Aral, 2009, p. 153) (Akçay, 2012, p. 87).

As a consequence, Turkey had 151 (out of 192) countries' support and was elected as non-permanent member of UNSC for the 2009-2010 period with the help of cooperation between the Turkish government and TIKA. This cooperation shows how a sub-governmental agency have stake on a state's foreign policy success in an international platform, via its endeavor on acquiring sufficient support. As a state-bounded agency, TIKA has been constrained by the primary goals of the incumbent governments in charge. In our case, TIKA, a department of prime ministry office, has bounded with the governments directives.


Officially, some states give foreign aid under the name of official development assistance. “Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded... The OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories; only aid to these countries counts as ODA.” (OECD, 2016). Therefore, one may argue that ODA is very constraining due to its geography and scope limitations. Traditional donors are more active in these kinds of multilateral settlement than emerging donors are.

The weight of traditional donors in OECD has found a reflection in the statistics. Below I gave two graphs taken from the website of OECD, which illustrate the selected countries giving ODA by percentage of their GDP and the balloons whose size depending on the total amount of ODA these selected countries give, respectively. The US has always been the biggest ODA donor in spite of some fluctuations between 2004 and 2008. Other striking fact about ODAs is the fascinating place of Sweden. Although Sweden does not have tremendous GDP like Russia, Germany, France and Canada, it gives more ODA than any other countries except the US and the UK.



Graph 12: Official Development Assistance 2000-2015

Source: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>



Graph 13: Selected Established Donors and Turkey - Total, % of gross national income, 2000 – 2015

Source: Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows

5.9. TIKA's Activities

The assistances and development projects of TIKA are available only after 2004. However, there are other resources presenting foreign assistances of previous years. After TIKA has the burden of being the technical representative of Turkish assistance, it started to be an institutionalized agency. Thanks to their endeavors on preparing annual reports, how Turkey has diversified its foreign assistance network through increasing the number of recipients all over the world is a visible phenomenon.

The thing we catch at first glance is the fact that TIKA's activities are mainly in favor of Asian countries. The reason behind of it might be the ethnic bind that Turkey has with Central Asian countries. In 2005, out of 562 projects TIKA conducted, while TIKA realized 312 projects in Asia, and 197 in Europe, only 45 projects were conducted in Middle East (17) and Africa (28). Before 2005, this number was even less because 2005 was the year Turkey announced as the 'year of Africa'. Therefore, it can be said that 45 was an absolute increase in 2005 while the Asia was still the main focal geography.

As an emerging donor in sub-Saharan Africa TIKA conducted 28 projects only in three SSA countries, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Out of 28 projects, 15 were in improving social infrastructure, six projects in cultural cooperation and improving communication, five projects in production sectors, two projects in improving economic infrastructure and humanitarian relief related issues (TIKA, 2005, p. 153). One of the main problem in the continent is sufficient amount of freshwater. Therefore, TIKA's focus in Africa was sanitation of water resources in respective countries. By this way, they reached over 40 thousand Africans only in Ethiopia thanks to TIKA's endeavor on providing water.

One can infer that Turkey's primary goal was to increase life-standard via enhancing basic needs such as water supply and health infrastructure by looking at the data illustrating in which sectors TIKA has been helping. Similarly, in Sudan and Nigeria, health and water supplies are main projects held by TIKA in 2005.

5.10. TIKA's activities in 2013 and Africa's Role

In 2013, the amount of developmental aids from Turkey's total (official + unofficial) was 4 billion 347 million. In the previous year, Africa had been the second biggest recipient of aid from Turkey, with 782 million dollars. Similarly, Africa protects its ranks in 2013. One of the major reason why Africa could not be the first among the aid recipient regions is due to the tremendous amount of people inflow from Syria. Therefore, the Middle East has been leading regions in terms of accepting Turkish foreign assistance.

2013 was the year Turkey has ranked first in terms of humanitarian assistance/GDP ratio, and ranked third in total humanitarian assistance just after the US and the Britain. In 2005, the amount of humanitarian assistance of Turkey was 178 million US\$. This number decreased to its lowest, 31 million US\$ in 2008, and increased to its climax, 1629 million US\$ in 2013. However, in terms of official development assistance Turkey ranked 11th out of 31 OECD-DAC member countries. Sweden, as a traditional middle power, transferred 5831 million US\$, while

Turkey, as an emerging middle power, transferred 3307 million US\$. Turkey increased 26.5 % of its development assistance regarding the previous year. In terms of the share of development assistance in total GDP, OECD's average is 0.3 % while Turkey's share 0.42 %. Although Turkey exceeds the average of OECD-DAC members, it could not still achieve the goal of the UN whose aim is to increase the share to 0.7 %.

NGOs' role has significantly increased in developmental assistances. However, the striking fact behind this increase is that the problems in Syria has been one attractive issue to be resolved by Turkish NGOs. In 2013, the total monetary development assistance provided by NGOs was 280.23 million US\$. During 2013, Turkish official institutions transferred 47.7 million US\$. Among top 10 countries that Turkish NGOs helped in 2013, there are five African countries (Somalia, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso).

5.11. TIKA and the State

TIKA is the main foreign assistance agency in Turkey. This is to say that it has responsibilities to conduct projects, development activities, build bilateral relations, and so on. Thus, it has a significant role in Turkish foreign policy after 2000s. It enlarges its field missions in Central Asia, Caucasia, Balkans, Middle East, and Africa, depending on changing privileges and primary goals of Turkish foreign policy over time. Turkey's aims as a strategic bridge linking developing countries to developed countries have needed a state-bound agency to conduct parallel and cooperative workout in the field.

We can summarize these aims as follows: (1) Constituting conditions of institutional cooperation, (2) Promoting free market economy, (3) Normalizing the regions during crises via taking action with other international actors, (4) Taking active roles in humanitarian crises like natural disasters and civil and international conflicts, and (5) Conducting foreign assistance

projects that could help to increase cooperation with international foreign assistance institutions (TIKA, 2005, p. 2). TIKa has adopted the aim of building perfect and continuous cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the principles of public diplomacy. In this respect, after Turkey's announcement of 2005 as 'the year of Africa', TIKa opened a Program Coordination Office in Ethiopia.

Parallel to official foreign policy privileges, TIKa has spent more time and money in the speaking Turkish countries than other assistance recipient regions. By checking the data, this argument can be concreted. Top 10 countries receiving most projects from TIKa are Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Georgia, and Uzbekistan in 2005. As a consequence of foreign policy diversification paradigm, TIKa increased its projects all across the world, from 2346 in 1992-2002 period to 2792 just in 2003-2006 period.

5.12. The Case of Turkey-Somalia Relations and Turkey's Foreign Aid to Somalia

5.12.1 Foreign aid as a niche diplomacy area of Turkey

As an emerging middle power, Turkey was not satisfied with the international community's focus on Somalia's problems. Erdoğan, during one of his speech in 2011, criticized the international community of not considering some states while considering some others, depending on the countries' petrol reserves. He said "the ones who colonized Somalia and consumed natural resources of it are turning a deaf ear to the hungry, thirsty and poor Somalian people. A world in which the sources are not distributed fairly, justice is not provided and the futures of masses are sacrificed in favor of a couple of countries' interest cannot reach peace and tranquility. We need to understand that we are living in this world together and that we are all on the same ship." (Erdoğan 2011).

According to Fuat Keyman and Derya Sazak (2014), rising powers like Turkey, Indonesia, and Mexico alongside with BRICS group are regarded as alternative to traditional

donors. UN representative Kamal Malhotra argued, in a conference organized by SETA, that even though the UN is close to achieve millennium development goals due to expanding poverty geography there is still need to help of other states like Turkey, Brazil, India, and China (Malhotra 2015). In this respect, Turkey has gained a reputation due to its endeavor to be a humanitarian state via its distinctive understanding of foreign aid. Two necessary conditions for humanitarian assistance are unconditional aid and non-military goals that Turkey satisfies both.

The table below shows how emerging donors are distinctive units in terms of their foreign aid understandings. According to the table, while India and South Africa prefer mostly conflictive regions to give foreign aid, Brazil prefers providing order and safety via its humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, Russia, differently than other emerging donors, give mostly in-kind aid (Keyman & Sazak, 2014, p. 2). However, this aspect of Russia does not totally differ Russia from Turkey because in-kind aid is also common in Turkey’s foreign aid understanding although Turkey attributes importance to monetary aid as well.

India and South Africa	Brazil	Russia	Turkey
Mostly in conflictive regions	Preservation of public safety and order	In-kind aid instead of monetary aid	A mix of assistance (doctors, police, farmers, water purification) The aim is not to create a sphere of influence in the aid receiver countries

			[Quick and non-bureaucratic response]
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Table 6: A Brief Comparison of Emerging Middle Powers in Terms of Foreign Assistance Understanding

Source: Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak (2014). Turkey as a Humanitarian State. POMEAS. No. 2

On the other hand, the emerging middle powers above do differ from traditional middle powers in the sense that foreign aid behaviors of the former have more elastic structure than of the latter. Established middle powers, under constraints of the OECD ODA settlement, do follow some rules such as giving the aid through national governments and under the motivation of promoting development. Additionally, “ODA may be committed towards engendering political transformations in the recipient countries” (Keyman & Sazak, 2014, p. 4).

In normal situations, states are supposed to abandon political interests stemming from donor activities. However, in realpolitik, every step taken by nation-states (in our cases these are donor states) serves in favor of the donors. An explicit example of this argument can be seen through Russia’s donor activities in Asia. Russia prefers to give foreign aid it pledge to give to the ex-Soviet communities and North Korea.

The previous example is a successful illustration of how states are loyal to their national interests even if the case is poverty alleviation, humanitarian crises, or sustainable democracy and economy. Therefore, Turkey is regarded as a national-interest seeker country while it was conducting/attending peacekeeping missions and constructing facilities relieving daily-life in Africa. However, as Keyman and Sazak contend with, Turkey, thanks to its special focus on humanitarian crises, is a distinct emerging donor and this makes Turkey different from both emerging and traditional donors (Keyman & Sazak, 2014, p. 6).

Emerging Donors	Traditional Donors
-elastic in terms of distribution	-aid given by official authorities only
-bilateralism over multilateralism	-multilateralism over bilateralism

-focus on wide variety of problems including health, infrastructure, humanitarian relief and etc.	-focus on sustainable democracy and economy
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Table 7: Main differences between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers, Regarding to Foreign Assistance

Emerging Donors	Turkey
-creating regional sphere of influence around the donor’s geography	-creating a benevolent country image globally
-focuses on agriculture or health (Brazil), infrastructure (China)	-special focus on humanitarian assistance
-the consequence is being an average donor	-the consequence is being the leading emerging donor and overall third biggest donor following the US and the UK
-foreign aid transforming other type of collaborations	-foreign aid is a consistent foreign policy tool and it has still future
-escaping non-security domains (this is also valid for traditional donors)	-engaging with even dangerous geographies like Somalia

Table 8: Main Differences between Emerging Middle Powers and Turkey, Regarding to Foreign Assistance

5.12.2 The application domain of niche diplomacy: Somalia

Somalia is one of the most popular failed state case of International Relations literature. During Siad Barre’s presidency and after the failure of Barre in 1991, Somalia problem has attracted international attention widely. Especially the wars with Ethiopia had consumed the resources of both countries. The situation of Somalia offers us the fact that Somalia had to rely on its foreign partners to handle its internal problems. In this respect, humanitarian assistances or other type of foreign aids are vital for sustaining daily life of Somalian citizens. In the

literature, Turkey's aids to Somalia are threefold: 1) emergency aid, 2) infrastructural aid, and 3) media-based help (Alegöz, 2013).

Drought is one of the most lethal danger for Somalians. In this respect, some states transferred financial aids to Somalia in order to minimize the effects of natural disasters. Turkey was one of the aid donor for Somalia within the scope of 1980 East Africa drought (Alegöz, 2013, s. 63). However, this aid was not a part of mass foreign aid policy but it was a sudden reflex of a developing country to Somalia. Because Turkey's focus was rather Western-oriented and was shaped around the Soviet threat before end of the Cold War.

Although Turkey opened its first embassy in Somalia in 1979, it was 2011 when the bilateral relations between Turkey and Somalia has entered a new deep phase. Erdoğan was the first non-African leader visiting Somalia for the past twenty years. This visit was an attempt to show other country leaders the fact that Somalia is not a totally unsafe African country. Erdoğan made a statement during his visit to Somalia: "Our lives are always in danger; one can expect to die any time in Somalia. However, the satisfaction of delivering aid to starving people who face death keeps us working, whatever the security situation is" (Heaton, 2012). This statement can be read as an illustration of Turkey's commitment to international humanitarian role. In addition to his speech, Erdoğan promised to give about \$US 49 million. Following year Turkey accepted more than one thousand Somali students (Westaway, 2013). On the other hand, flights of Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and Somalia have been opening a way for Turkish businessmen as well as a way for Somalian citizens to the world. This was also an illustration and encouragement for other foreign flight companies. Therefore, Turkey's close relations with Somalia can pave the way for building close relations between Somalia and other donor countries with investment-focused businessmen.

After one year of Erdoğan's visit, in 2012, Turkey arranged a summit named 'Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015'. This summit and other endeavors of Turkey have found

place in national agenda of Somalia. The PM of Somalia, Abdiweli M. Ali argued that “Turkey has changed the landscape in Somalia... they are the sponsor we have been looking for, for the last twenty years. They are the Holy Grail for Somalia” and some columnists think that the speech of Ali was a reflection of majority of Somali people (Ulusó, 2012). In the summit economic issues like water, roads, energy; constitution issue like federalism; and international issues like international peace building efforts were discussed (Ulusó, 2012). Moreover, fifty-seven countries and many organizations attended the summit (Özkan, 2013).

On the other hand, some Somali citizens, especially those who are adherent of religious group El Shebab, declared that Turkey is a dangerous for Somalia’s religious structure. Contrarily, laic citizens developed a counter argument that ‘Somali citizens do not need religious-based aids but facilities and infrastructure investments roads, water and hospitals projects’. Al-Shabaab adherents are worrying about students who are coming Turkey to get education. In addition, after the establishment of al-Shabaab, due to security reasons, some donor agencies had to exit Somalia and decrease the financial and other type of aids. According to Bradbury, more than half of aid workers and volunteers were killed in Somalia and therefore there is not any aid agency or workers in South Somalia due to insecure environment (Bradbury, 2010, p. 2). That is why the humanitarian operations aiming to fix Somalia are controlled in Kenya. Nevertheless, the mitigated influence of Al-Shabaab in the capital Mogadishu has led an increase in foreign aid activities in the South Somalia.

Multilateral relations were deepened through African Union summit to which Erdoğan met high official representatives of Somalia. Additionally, Djibouti Peace Process was another step that paved the way for engagement of Turkey as an emerging donor. Finally, in 2011, Turkey pledged to give 350 million dollars to Somalia during a meeting held by Organizations of Islamic Cooperation (Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, & Woods, 2015, p. 18).

Foreign aid is an important component of balance sheets of least developed countries. However, there is a huge literature that foreign aid is very limited in terms of poverty alleviation and pulling a country out of poverty trap. On the other hand, if the amount is huge, it may cause a humanitarian relief as in the case of Somalia. Somalia was the biggest aid recipient in Africa in the 1980s, until the end of the Cold War when Western governments stopped or decreased giving aid to Somalia due to its authoritarian government (Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, & Woods, 2015, p. 11).

	2012	2013	2014
Net ODA (USD million)	990,1	1.054,2	1.109,4
Gross ODA (USD million)	992,2	1.058,7	1.113,4
Bilateral share (gross ODA) (%)	76,1	80,0	78,0
Net Private flows (USD million)	8,3	5,3	4,8
Total net receipts (USD million)	998,4	1.059,6	1.114,3

Table 9: Amount of ODA Somalia received in 2012, 2013, and 2014

Source: OECD - DAC ; <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats>

	2011	2012	2013	3-year average	% of all recipients
1 Democratic Republic of the Congo	5 534	2 859	2 572	3 655	7%
2 Ethiopia	3 539	3 261	3 826	3 542	7%
3 Tanzania	2 446	2 832	3 430	2 903	5%
4 Kenya	2 482	2 654	3 236	2 791	5%
5 Egypt	414	1 807	5 506	2 576	5%
6 Mozambique	2 085	2 097	2 314	2 165	4%
7 Nigeria	1 769	1 916	2 529	2 071	4%
8 Côte d'Ivoire	1 436	2 636	1 262	1 778	3%
9 Ghana	1 810	1 808	1 331	1 650	3%
10 Uganda	1 578	1 655	1 693	1 642	3%
Other recipients	28 634	27 819	28 093	28 182	53%
Total ODA recipients	51 728	51 343	55 793	52 955	100%

Table 10: Top Ten African Aid Receiver Countries

Source: OECD (2015). Development at a Glance – Statistics by Region, Africa. p. 6




Table 11: Major ODA Donors for Somalia

Source: OECD - DAC; <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats>

The consequences of Turkey’s humanitarian engagement with Somalia were not only related to economic or political. In addition to these aspects, Turkey has increased its soft power and declared itself as a benign emerging humanitarian power. A local resident to whom Aljazeera had conducted an interview about Turkey’s existence in Somalia said: “Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit tells us that Turkish people are closer to us than any other Muslim nation on earth. The Turkish people are here to share with us in our time of need. It is momentous” (AlJazeera, 2011).

Another superior aspect of Turkey in terms of giving foreign aid is its prompt answer to the needs of recipient countries. The best legitimation of this argument comes from the then Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur: “If I request computers from the UN, they will take months and require a number of assessments. They will spend \$50,000 to give me \$7,000 of equipment. If I request computers from Turkey, they will show up next week. At this crucial moment of transition from chaos to tentative stability, this immediate impact is what Somalia needs most” (Westaway, 2013).

According to Jason Mosley from the Chatham House “Turkey’s efforts in Somalia are much different than the Western approach in the country. It has much more legitimacy and popularity. Turkey has the support of the grassroots of Somalia. They have appreciation because

Turkish involvement is only business, no counter-terrorism or anything else" (Mosley 2015). Addition to Mosley, Kani Torun, Turkey's former ambassador to Mogadishu, has emphasized that Turkey do not involve with the domestic politics of recipient countries and, more importantly, no matter how insecure the domain of recipient country, Turkey can execute its missions in the region as it had done in Mogadishu where Turkish embassy was attacked (Torun 2015).

5.12.3. Sub and Non-states actors

Roles of NGOs have been debated in social sciences intensely especially after the end of the Cold War. Ascendance of new international actors has limited political boundaries of states to some extent. This issue is highly related to grand theories of international relations, because one of the distinctions between realism and liberalism (or liberal institutionalism) has been the constraints of nation-states and effects of non-state actors. While the former ignores non-state actors, the latter attributes importance to international institutions, NGOs, the markets, or supranational organizations. This is to say that the debate on changing nature of nation states in terms of its influence in world politics is not solely related to existence of NGOs. Supranational institutions, such as the EU, have also role on decline of the nation state (Opp 2005).

On the other hand, dominance of nation-states is not directly linked to emergence of a supranational organization. Opp justifies decline in nation state by putting European identification forward. It means when a new supranational identity (European) ascends, identities of nations have been in decline even though the EU has promised to respect the national interests (Bielskis 2003). Therefore, we can contend with the idea that not every organization can diminish the power of nation-states. For instance, no one discusses Shanghai Cooperation Organization's effect on the boundaries of the member states, because the

organization has lack of enough ambition, will, or persuasion to create a new identity as EU had done to some extent, in spite of problems arisen through economic and demographic reasons in Europe.

It would be useful to bring some discussion on changing status of nation-states because while in foreign policy and foreign assistance behavior, nation-states has still determinative power as a whole, they are bound to and in need of other actors which may be sub-state, non-state, or supra-state level. Nation-states are clear examples of what sovereignty is and to what extent sovereignty is sacred. At first glance, one may argue that all nation-states are sovereign in their respected territories under the protection of international law. However, Wallerstein makes a simple difference between states: weak and strong. According to this differentiation, sovereignty for weak states becomes almost a dream. Strong states, by using power (soft-spoken, respectful, and manipulative), can make weak states do things that weak states would not do otherwise (Wallerstein 1999) (Krasner 1999).

This sovereignty issue can be relevant to the thesis around donor-recipient relations and more importantly dependence of states on NGOs to pursue lucrative relations. Although recipient countries are totally sovereign de jure; in reality sometimes recipients realize demands of donors. This happens because donor countries do not want to give the aid away without any condition, demand, or any other expectation most of the time (maybe except humanitarian emergency cases). On the recipient side, situation is not that different. Because, they are almost inherently ready to accept foreign aids under tacit or visible conditions. The readiness for external aid sometimes can cause troubles which would end up with deep crises which might force the recipient to abandon its sovereignty for the sake of economic or political recovery.

In the literature review and theoretical sections, thesis contends with the idea that emerging middle powers have at least one functional areas in which they plan to become a major actor. These functional areas can find a base in current literature of International

Relations under the name of niche diplomacy. In Turkish case, we can argue that as an emerging middle power, Turkey has preferred to play a leadership role in foreign assistance. Therefore, foreign assistance can be called as ‘the niche diplomacy of Turkey’. Not only on state level but also on sub-state (including non-state) level, Turkey intervened the Somalia’s internal problems. In this respect, thesis will focus on Turkish sub-state donor actors in Somalia. As sub-state actors, this chapter includes THY, TIKA, and Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyamet). Following sub-state actors, Kimse Yok mu?, IHH, TUSKON, and the Diversity Association will be attached to discussion.

The theoretical chapter emphasized the SFA-SBA distinction among sub-state actors. In the case of Turkey’s activities in the SSA as a donor, there are both SFA and SBA examples. While IHH, TUSKON, Diversity Association, MÜSİAD and Can Suyu Association are clear examples of SFA, THY, TIKA and Diyanet are the SBAs due to the direct linkage between them and the state. In addition to state – non-state relations, there sometimes occur interactions between these non-states as well. After providing information on activities of these actors, the chapter will try to make an evaluation regarding the interactions between non-state actors.

5.11.3.1. TUSKON

Somalia has been kind of a virgin market for foreign investors due to security problems and underdevelopment. Therefore, in spite of its internal drawbacks, Somalia could be a lucrative country to invest in. To this end, TUSKON, with the help of its eager members, has been trying to deepen its existence in Somalia. From construction to seaport and to oil exploration, TUSKON members were actively engaging with Somalia (Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, & Woods, 2015, p. 20).

For instance, in 2006, TUSKON arranged World Trade Bridge meetings in which African and Turkish businessmen have got interaction (Özkan, 2013). In 2012, TUSKON’s twenty-three members started a trade initiation called Somalia-Turkey Trade and Investment

Forum. A representative of TUSKON, Kemal Kahya emphasized that the trade relation between Turkey and Somalia will not be set for short-term, on the contrary, the relation will be based on both long-term partnership and without commercial interest (CHA, 2012).

However, after the rift breaking up after 2013 December between Gulenists and the AKP, TUSKON started to fade away gradually. Especially after 15th July 2016 coup attempt, Turkish state declared a war against members of this community. As a consequence, currently website of TUSKON cannot be reached.

TUSKON, thanks to its contractor members, could engage with Africa especially in construction sector. In the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, TUSKON had planned to build a multi-purpose facility (forty warehouses, one hotel, and a restaurant) named Istanbul Bazaar which would be assumed to provide needs of Somali people and increase export of Turkey by \$US500 million. A representative of TUSKON, Mustafa Erkan, had made press release to Cihan News Agency, which was shut down after the coup attempt too, and stated “[In Somalia] there is not even any toothpick or pin as well as stuffs used by constructors... There is only low-quality Chinese good and expensive imported goods from Dubai. In this respect, Istanbul Bazaar would bring productions from Mersin and Istanbul ports to Somalian markets” (Zaman, 2012).

5.11.3.2. IHH

IHH has been popular in both domestic politics and abroad after the Mavi Marmara incident which ended up with nine dead aid activists due to Israeli raid. However, as mentioned in the previous sections, IHH has also been active in sub-Saharan Africa. Especially the humanitarian crises of Somalia has attracted IHH to play active NGO role.

Serhat Orakçı, the representative of IHH's Africa engagement, said "With the Turkish mentality, as a Muslim, we are not separating ourselves from the public" (Heaton, 2012). This quote is showing us how identities are important even in humanitarian actions for both sides. As Somalis are pleased with Turkish aid volunteers who are praying in mosques with Somalis, Turks are motivated to serve for a country whose population is mostly Muslims who were degraded in their history. Additionally, Orakçı indicated that the famine during Ramadan in Somalia had attracted Turks' attention in 2011 which end up with huge campaigns gathering tens of millions of dollars through humanitarian motives (Heaton, 2012). In Somalia, due to lack of enough sanitary water sources, IHH opened thirty-two water-well worth \$6.2 million (Özyürek 2016).

In the case of IHH, we witness a sub-state – non-state cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia Agriculture School was established in 2013 by the partnership IHH-TİKA. Cultivation, seedling, spreading seeds, beekeeping are among the courses given in this school.

5.11.3.3. Ufuk Dialogue Foundation

Turkish Ufuk Dialogue Foundation has been among the NGOs whose interests are religion-based in Africa. Through conference, panels and other type of communication channels Turkish Ufuk Dialogue Foundation tries to be a bridge between the Muslim and the Christians (Enwere 2014). The idea that Ufuk Dialogue was inspired from is the counter arguments of Gulen movement against the Clash of Civilization of Samuel Huntington.

Although Ufuk does not offer explicit foreign assistance for African countries, the fact that its base is in Nigeria and its activities is organized in Africa directed us to include this foundation. Its events like sports, essay competition, seminars, conferences, and dialogue dinners had been promoting Turkey's image in Africa until the revealed rift. We cannot be sure that after 2013, the Gulenists have been discrediting Turkey; however due to the fact that Gulenists represent a moderate Islamism and devoted people having been educated can direct

African masses and policy makers to regard Turkey's endeavor to abolish Gulenists undesirable.

5.11.3.4. Turkish Airlines

“[Turkish Airlines] increased its number of planes by 21%, its number of passengers by 273%, its transfer passengers by 848% and the number of flight destinations by 111% all in just 9 years” (TurkeyAgenda 2014). Turkish Airlines (THY) having 274 different destinations is the second-biggest aviation company in Africa, thanks to its flights to thirty-one country in the continent. Being sponsors of world's prominent sports clubs and activities, having accepted awards from aviation ranking centers like Skytrax, the THY contributes Turkey's foreign policy according to PM Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship (KDK 2015).

The relation between THY and Turkey is not working in a unilateral way. Indeed, Turkey, as a state, is supporting the THY a lot according to Kotil, the former General Manager of THY. Orçun's thesis about THY-state relation is offering us the fact that THY's status is parallel to the developments in Turkish foreign policy and; moreover is that THY has been used as a foreign policy tool by Turkish state in order to create an international soft power image. Even though THY has encountered huge amount of losses due to its expansionary policies and increasing number of destinations, it still pursues to be the airline company that has the highest number of destinations in the world.

5.11.3.5. TIKA

As mentioned above, Turkey's aid is not solely in-kind nor monetary but mixture of two kinds. Additionally, state agencies and non-state associations work hand-in-hand in Somalia. For instance, to a maternity and children hospital constructed by Yardımcı Association, TIKA provided necessary medical equipment (generator, anesthesia device, caesarean equipment etc. alongside bureau furniture). Additionally, in order to ease accession to the hospital, TIKA built asphalt roads (AA, 2016). In addition to aids, as an illustration of deep engagement, in

Mogadishu, TIKA established its fourth office in Africa, following Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar.

Other in-kind aid from TIKA is the Educational Center for Street Children in Mogadishu. About a hundred children grow up in this center which includes three building for multi-purposes. The motive behind these kinds of aid is building a bridge between two-brother nations. TIKA Mogadishu coordinator Galip Yılmaz emphasized Somalia’s Muslim demography by referring Somalia’s Muslim history (AA, 2016).

2010	2011
In-training service for ten Somali doctors and nurses for three months	2,6 tons of baby food, milk powder and biscuit
Healing of Somali soldiers	750 kg water, fruit, and dessert
Two generators for Presidential Campus	1043 kg medicine
Granting information technology equipment	1,3 tons basic foodstuff
2012	Five full-equipped ambulance
Building educational facilities	One machine drill and a generator
Providing bureau equipment to Hargeysa region	Rehabilitating city roads, airport
Providing 400 computers and 100 printers to Mogadishu University	2013
Enhancing the conditions of hospitals	Educating ten doctors
Sanitation (benefited by 126 thousand Somalis)	Enhancing the conditions of hospitals

Securing Mogadishu Airport	5 water-wells
19 water-wells	Constructing road (23 km)

Table 12: TIKA's main activities in Africa in recent years

Source: TIKA's Annual Reports

5.10.3.6. Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs)

Turkey's engagement with Africa and in Somalia are not solely economic nor humanitarian but there is also religious dimension of bilateral relations. Islamic identity of both Turkey and Somalia has been a catalyzer in relations due to both people's Islamic reflexes. As a sub-state agency, Diyanet has been playing an important role in enhancement the relations with Africa through emphasizing religion. In this context, Diyanet gathered religious authorities of twenty-one African countries in Istanbul in 2006.

In-service training is one of the most frequently used method of Diyanet to reach clerics and common people of Somalia. Additionally, Diyanet undertook education expenses of forty students who were assumed to enter Turkish high schools and universities. One million Quran donation was another thing promised by Diyanet in 2012 (Diyanet, 2012).

Turkish Diyanet Association, similarly to the niche area of Brazil, has been educating students about agricultural sectors in order to increase agricultural know-how, and by this way enhance agricultural efficiency of Somalia. One of Somali student getting agricultural education in Turkey has said in an interview: "We got Turkish language education five months. Then we, 314 students, were distributed to different schools. Eleven of all students, for four years, got agricultural education in Bursa Technical Agriculture High school. In the last year, we conducted internships in farms and serums. Here, we saw decoration and fruit plants that we did not see in our country. We learnt greenhouse cultivation and irrigation techniques. If God permits, we want to contribute development of Somalia by practicing the techniques that we learnt in Turkey" (Diyanet, 2013). Although the agricultural engagement is not strong as that

of Brazil, in terms of diversification of foreign policy tools, it would be beneficial to pursue these kinds of channels not to stick to foreign aid. Other types of aids Diyanet conducted to Somalia are briefly as follows: restoration of mosques, hosting iftars, monetary aid (twenty million TL), and raising religion staff).

5.13 Conclusion

Due to prolonged economic and political crises alongside other primary foreign policy issues, Africa could not enter Turkey's sphere of interest until the end of 1990s. Moreover, the Soviet threat had not led Turkey to diversify its foreign policy topics. During the term in which Turkey was exposed Soviet threat, it could not consider a lucrative relation with Africa based on economic and political engagements except Turkey's short-term political closeness with Africa in 1960s due to Cyprus conundrum. It was 1998 when Cem built a new foreign policy paradigm based on diversified and peaceful relations with neighbors.

Declaring 2005 as the Year of Africa has opened a new phase for the relations. During this year, there are summits and congresses conducted by Turkey to foster the relations. International Turkish-African Congress and Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit are among the international platforms in which Africa learns about Turkey deeper and that paved the way for announcing Turkey as a strategic partner of Africa. One important aspect of these summits and congresses was the fact that they are not solely organized by Turkish state but thanks to the help of NGOs and think tanks, which illustrates how Turkey is engaging with Africa on both state and non-state level.

NGOs are key players on both domestic and foreign policy of Turkey. Especially after the JDP came to the power, NGOs have been strong and prominent enough to negotiate with the state, changing public opinion, cooperating with the state to abolish a common enemy, or even declaring a war against the state. Also in the case of Africa, they have been playing

significant roles on the way of making Turkey more prestigious and of providing Turkey a benevolent power image globally, with an exception.

IHH is a clear example of how a Turkish NGO engages with Africa with humanitarian motives. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Niger, etc. IHH conducted humanitarian relief projects including surgeries or direct donation. During Ramadan and following feast of sacrifice, IHH and other NGOs having religious motivations increase their activities in Africa with the collaboration of Turkish civilians. For instance, Diversity Association has called Turkey to send their money to the association under the name of sacrificial lamb money. By this way, the African citizens who are living below the hunger level would benefit from both Ramadan and religious Islamic feasts.

There are some occasions that indicate NGOs vital role on Turkish political life. For instance, IHH-Mavi Marmara incidence and anti-AKP discourse of TUSKON have raised questions about state-NGO relations of recent state policies. While both NGOs are vital actors interested in Africa, the former is an explicit ally of the AKP, while the latter is an explicit enemy of the AKP. Moreover, the rifts and cooperation between the state and these NGOs has affected their performances in and engagements with African states. Until 2016, IHH was appraised by the AKP due to its activities abroad and especially toward Palestinian citizens. Due to changing foreign policy paradigm after Davutoğlu, the AKP has revised its policies toward Israel and this situation has created a temporary problem with the IHH. However, IHH is still one of the most important ally of AKP.

On the other hand, TUSKON's case is more surprising because TUSKON was shut down by the state after July 2016 coup attempt associated by Gulenists. Even though after 2013, the rift between two parties revealed, the state had not been an existential threat against TUSKON, except appointing trustees to some Gulen-linked firms. Even though these two cases

can be regarded as domestic issues at first glance, they are linked to the thesis due to both NGOs intense engagement with Africa.

Another sub-state actor is TIKA. TIKA's attention upon Africa was revealed after the Year of Africa. It opened representatives and offices in the continent as the main foreign assistance state agent. TIKA has not only been an aid-institutionalizing agent but also been a complementary actor of state thanks to its support for the Turkish state like in the case of providing a non-permanent UNSC seat. TIKA's activities have been parallel to the government's interest in the country. It is to say that TIKA has been focusing on the countries to whom government has deeper relations. According to annual reports of TIKA, the region in which TIKA has most activities is Asia. However, Africa has more TIKA-led projects than Middle East which is a highly indispensable region for Turkey.

Somalia is the case study for explaining foreign assistance based engagement of Turkey in Africa because it is the most prominent receiver country in the continent. Unconditional aid and non-military goals became two main aspects of Turkey's engagement with Somalia. Therefore, the niche diplomacy of Turkey, providing foreign assistance, is applicable for Somalian case. Alongside direct foreign assistance, thanks to high-level visit conducted by Erdoğan and his family, bilateral relations between two parties has gained a new dimension. These initiations has changed both the environment of Somalia and the perception of Somalis toward Turkey.

TUSKON was one of the biggest business association in Turkey. Until 2016, it realized summits and varying events to encourage its members to transact business in Africa and provided infrastructure to clinch Turkish businessmen's existence in the continent. However, due to the rift between Gulenist TUSKON and state, the association was abolished totally, after the coup attempt in 2016.

As a non-profit NGO, IHH has been able to continue its close relationship with the state in spite of Erdoğan's call for apology from IHH due to Mavi Marmara incidence. Other than IHH, there are other NGOs having religious motivations such as Ufuk Dialogue, Diversity Association, and such. Similar to IHH, these NGOs are less involved with politics and have no problem with the incumbent government unlike Gulen-linked associations.

Turkey, thanks to engagement between state and sub-state actors including NGOs, has been offering a new model for foreign assistance. The dynamism that Turkey brought to the foreign assistance literature is important for Turkey (Ünay 2014) in the context of that Turkey can have benefits from a dynamic niche diplomacy based on foreign assistance.

There are certain interactions among NGOs and other sub-state actors in Africa. For instance, the interactions between THY and MÜSİAD-TUSKON might be seen as complementary interactions. Because while their activities have different aims (transportation and business), in the end, THY has played a role of bridge between both regions entrepreneurs. Moreover, in the complementary interactions, there might be a direct state incentive which is, in our case, crowded business-political visits to African countries led by Turkish state. Also, TİKA and humanitarian NGOs supplements each other. Despite lack of systematically organized projects, these agents have similar motives in Africa. TİKA, in addition to direct helps, has been an instructive for newcomer NGOs.

Although there is not an example of exact confrontation of NGOs in Africa, i.e., a conflictive interaction, an unusual interaction between state and NGOs has taken place in Africa as a consequence of the ongoing rift among government elites and Gulenists. While Turkish government and state bureaucracy try to close down all Gulen-led schools across the world, some countries, including Nigeria, refused Turkey's bid over these schools due to their good-quality education systems. This case is an illustration of how a SFA might be a potential adversary for a state, and vice versa.

VI. BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS AND AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OF BRAZIL

Similar to Davutoglu-Erdogan foreign policy line, Lula's foreign policy was aiming at enhancing the ties with the third world especially in Africa although some studies doubt about the strength of Brazilian economy such that it could not allow Brazil to pursue an independent and efficient engagement policy outside of the South America (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009). Brazil's endeavor to engage with Africa dates back to 1960s, with economic, cultural and political motives.

An emerging middle power has to determine its diplomacy area(s) properly because of its lack of enough sources for each diplomatic areas. In this respect, Brazil has been trying to be an effectual example of a couple of areas such as agriculture and developmental diplomacy (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009, 61) with the third world countries of Africa. Agricultural diplomacy can be called as niche diplomacy of Brazil. Brazil sustains its status-seeker position in the world order as an emerging middle power. However, according to Lima (1990), Brazil has in a contradictory situation in terms of determining its place in the world order, which is not as simple as choosing the white or black. The complexity behind of determining the place originates from the category (emerging power) that Brazil fits in (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009, 61).

Categorically, Brazil can be regarded as both regional power and an emerging middle power. Brazil differs from other emerging middle powers in terms of not having a strong rival in the region it locates unlike India, Turkey, or South Korea. In this sense, Brazil is similar to South Africa because South Africa is both an emerging middle power as a member of BRICS community and a regional power without a rival. However, Brazil's superiority on economy, military and political influence makes it a reform seeker in the world order, in spite of the financially depressed economy.

This pursuit found itself a coherent base in a South-South cooperation led by Brazil, toward sub-Saharan African countries. Within the scope of developmental diplomacy, Brazil has enlarged its foreign policy paradigms, which were used to be under the US influence. Through the enlargement, Brazil has adopted a globalist approach that requires a wide spectrum of alliances and partners within and after the period of 1970s (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009, 61).

Again, similar to foreign policy discourse of Turkey under the context of Turkey's African opening, Brazil has chosen an anti-colonialism discourse in order to both criticize its some counterparts like Portugal and build an alliance with African countries and China. However, one striking difference between Turkey and Brazil in terms of approaching to Africa originates from the differentiation of Turkey and Brazil's interaction with Africa. While Turkey has increased its ties with the Eastern African countries more than the other part of sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil mostly engaged with the Western African countries, i.e., its Atlantic neighbors as we witness this deduction via then foreign minister Barboza's 1972 visit to nine African countries.

Surprisingly, this intense engagement policy had lost momentum due to internal economic situations and acceleration of engagement with the global economy in 1980s and 1990s. Before these obstacles, Brazil "tried to overcome external constraints and open new

avenues of cooperation with non-traditional powers as well as other developing countries, sometimes even confronting the US or seeking to establish a new international order” (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009, 62). Passing to a new type of political economy, which was adoption of neo-liberal economic order, has changed primary objects of Brazil’s foreign policy as well.

Countries	1960s-1970s	1980s-1990s	2000s-2010s
Brazil	Engagement within the context of independence movement with anti-colonial discourse	Declining in engagement momentum due to internal economic crises and engagement with global order	Compensation of declined relations with Africa through health diplomacy and agricultural technology transfer
Turkey	Engagement within the context of independence movement with anti-colonial discourse to gain international support	Declining in engagement momentum due to internal economic and political crises and engagement with other part of the world like Turkic countries and Balkans	Deepening relations on both state and sub-state levels

Table 13: Comparison of Turkey and Brazil’s African Engagements during Different Terms

6.1. Engagement with Africa

Some Turkish politicians and academics try to prove that Turkey (or Turks) and Africa have a common history due to their intense relations date back to Ottomans and even to Tolunogulları. However, Brazil has direct relations with Africa because of the slave trade between America and Africa. 90 million people out of 200 million Brazilian think that their decent is African, i.e. they are Afro-Brazilians. According to a demographic study, for each Portuguese person migrated to Brazilian land, there have been four African people brought to

Brazil as workforce in sugar-cane lands in 19th century (de Freitas 2016). To this end, Brazil's justification of 'common history' has found healthier base than of Turkey. This justification may help Brazil in the way of re-engagement policies with Africa especially after 2000s.

After 1888 and until the second half of the 20th century, Brazil has started 'whitening process' in favor of European immigrants and pushed slaves to the southern borders to be used as cheap labor (de Freitas 2016). However, after 1950s, Brazil changes its attitude toward both Africa and African people in within its borders. During this changing policy paradigm, appointing the first African-Brazilian person as an ambassador in Ghana can be an illustration of how Brazil lowered the efficacy of white population policy. After appointment of the ambassador, bilateral relations had accelerated until 1964 when a coup took place. After coup relations had interrupted the bilateral relations with Africa; therefore, we cannot say a proper and continuous Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa.

6.1.1. Political and Economic Intimacy

It was 1970s when Brazil was aware of importance of building allies in Africa. Both its miracle economic growth and the OPEC crises, which caused a sudden supply deficiency for Brazil. Especially the OPEC crises have revealed Brazil's need for African natural sources. To this end, Brazil has recognized and opened embassies in a couple of African countries including Guinea Bissau, Gabon, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Burkina Faso. During this process, Brazil, alongside enhancing political ties, built strong economic relations with especially Nigeria and Angola. While the export of Brazil to Nigeria was amounted US\$3 million in 1973, it exceeded US\$100 million in 1977 and this number corresponded to the half of Brazil's trade in 1977 (de Freitas 2016). This term was the first jump in Brazil-Africa economic relations. The second jump is seen under the presidency of Lula. US\$6 billion trade in 2003 increased to about US\$25 billion in 2012 (de Freitas 2016).

Within last fifteen years, Brazil has increased the number of embassies it has in Africa, from seventeen to thirty-seven. Brazil had ranked fourth in terms of embassy number, after the US, China and Russia that are having forty-nine, forty-eight, and thirty-eight embassies, respectively (Stolte 2012, 2). However, currently, it ranks fifth following Turkey who has thirty-nine embassies in the continent. This is an obvious illustration and proof of how Brazil has been seeking an active foreign policy in this continent.

One striking fact about Brazil's interest over Africa is upon language. South-South diplomacy between Brazil and sub-Saharan African countries is run via Portuguese language due to their link to each other through Portuguese empire and slave trade (de Freitas 2016). Portuguese-speaking (Lusophone) African countries are at the focal point of Brazil's African policy. The reason behind this approach might be to provide a feasible investment environment to the Brazilian entrepreneurships, to strengthen Brazil's position both globally and regionally, and to satisfy Brazil's raw material needs. In this respect, former presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff conducted high-level visits during their presidencies. While during the period of 2003-2010, Lula visited Africa twelve times, interacting twenty-nine African countries, Rousseff conducted three visits in the first year of her presidency in spite of her hesitance to pursue an aggressive foreign policy (Stolte 2012, 2).

Although Brazil has a positive trade balance overall, it has a trade deficit within the trade relations with Africa. For instance, in 2014, Brazil has a 124 million dollars trade surplus (Simoes, et al. 2014). However, annually Brazil has about three billion dollars trade deficit against Africa due to its raw material import. This situation raises the question of 'Is Brazil in Africa just for resources?' This quest has a rational basis if one considers the fact that Brazil has been providing 90% of its total natural resource needs through importing African goods. Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and Libya are among the Brazil's top trade partners and their common aspect is being resource-rich countries (Barbosa, Narciso and Biancalana 2009, 4).

Nature and natural resources have constituted a base for bilateral relations, especially the relations with Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique (Ncube, Lufumba and Vencatachellum 2011, 4). Brazil, as a candidate hub for bioenergy, has to acquire agricultural products it needs. Before deepening into Brazil's African engagement, we need to elaborate biofuel revolution of Brazil, which covers Brazil's interest over agricultural sectors.

The OPEC crises of 1970s had tremendous effects on both real economy and economic understandings. It changed the way governments deal with economic problems and transformed capitalism under neoliberal economic policies and paradigms. For Brazilian case, sustainability and development through agricultural revolution were the two repercussions of these crises. Since these supply-side crises, Brazil has sought for new ways to cope with limited natural sources by using agricultural products in industry and transportation.

Brazil's endeavor to be a leading bioenergy player of the world has been successfully pursued during decades. Currently, Brazil ranks second after the USA in terms of producing ethanol. Brazil has been producing around thirty billion liters of ethanol which corresponds to 40% of total energy demand of Brazil. Considering Brazil's huge geography and population alongside its dynamic industry, we can imagine how ethanol is satisfying for a rising country's energy needs. Moreover, bioenergy-based production has satisfied Brazil economically in the sense that both Brazil is not dependent on oil as Turkey is, and Brazil has been exporting ethanol to African countries. For instance, in 2008, while Nigeria imported about a hundred million liters of ethanol, Ghana imported about twenty million liters. More importantly, the new car technology in Brazil's agricultural research agency (EMBRAPA) has been developed compatibly with an energy source mixture of biofuel and gasoline (Ncube, Lufumba and Vencatachellum 2011, 5). EMBRAPA helps countries to produce their own ethanol. For instance, in Ghana, thanks to EMBRAPA, ethanol has become the fourth major export production.

Mozambique	Angola	Congo	Nigeria
US\$6 billion investment for exploration	US\$220 million for sugar and ethanol production	Agreements for sugar cane and palm oil	US\$100 million for sugar cane and palm oil

Table 14: Brazil’s Agriculture-based Engagements with Some of African Countries

Source: African Development Bank

6.1.2. EMBRAPA and Brazil’s Agricultural Leap Forward

Niche diplomacy is one of the main pillars of an emerging middle power’s foreign policy paradigm due to limited resource of the power. If the case is Brazil, niche diplomacy turns out to be development of health and agriculture sectors. This is not to say that Brazil has ignored other kind of niche diplomacies examples like foreign aid. For Brazil, foreign aid is an important part of foreign policy tool toward Africa. For instance, Brazil has been deleting the debts of some African countries, which might be regarded as a type of foreign aid (debt relief). However, the special importance Brazil focuses on is agriculture and health sectors. To this end, Brazil has arranged summits and forums on food security, health, hunger or local development. In order to start a comprehensive discussion on Brazil-African relations, it would be applicable to accept agricultural technology transfer as the niche diplomacy of Brazil.

Before giving details about Brazil’s agricultural policies and engagement with our case, Nigeria, we need to know the scope of projects and some previous case studies of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), alongside how Brazil became an agricultural hub within a short-term. First of all, the fact that Brazil was a backward country in terms of agricultural development and that currently Brazil is one of the leading producer of serious agricultural commodities including soybeans, cotton, and meat attracted attention of other

nations who cannot have a lucrative yield from soil (Mueller and Mueller 2014, 2). The reason behind of this leap forward does not originate from the fact that Brazil increased the amount of arable land but originates from the fact that Brazil increased the total factor productivity, which is used by Brazilian government as a tool for deepening the South-South developmental partnership. According to Mueller and Mueller’s report on ‘remarkable transformation in Brazilian agriculture’, inclusive governmental institutions have created an applicable environment for pursuing long-term, productivity-focused agricultural initiations (Mueller and Mueller 2014). In one of the World Bank’s report, Brazil is regarded as a model for African countries in the way of poverty alleviation through agricultural development (WorldBank 2009).

1945-1970s	Early 1970s-1990s	Early 1990s-
Increase in the agricultural production due to increase in the arable land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Exhaustion of fertile lands -Implementation of new technical methods and price support -Conservative modernization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Governmental intervention -Diversified agricultural sector -Satisfying domestic and international demands -Expansion of professional farmers

Table 15: Brazil’s Agricultural Transformation

Source: (Mueller and Mueller 2014)

The main themes of EMBRAPA are ‘integrated crop-livestock-forest system, low-carbon agriculture, coping with droughts, biological nitrogen fixation’. Water and fertile lands are two necessary elements for sustainable agriculture. Unluckily, some parts of Africa and even Brazil have been lack of sufficient amount of water or water-road. For instance, in 2013, fourteen hundred municipalities of Brazil experienced drought (EMBRAPA 2016). In this realm, EMBRAPA has taken both preventive and instantaneous cautions in order to make

continuity of agricultural production; and has been investigating on decreasing the ‘fragility of production system’ (EMBRAPA 2016) especially in semi-arid regions of Brazil.

EMBRAPA was not established to open Brazil to the world, however, with changing time and perspectives, EMBRAPA became one of the key state agent pursuing worldwide interest for Brazil in agriculture and bio-energy issues. Its budget exceeds US\$1 billion and it is opening offices in Europe, Americas, Asia and Africa. Its first international office in Africa was established in Ghana. Currently, “through EMBRAPA and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency [similar to TIKA], [Brazil] is advancing agricultural diplomacy in Africa” (Tumin 2013). Even some African countries like Ethiopia is establishing agriculture agencies similar to that of Brazil.

Agricultural innovation, capacity-building in tropical agriculture and other structuring projects constitute the base of technical cooperation instruments of EMBRAPA. It has also short-term activities abroad under the name of specific projects. A specific project can be ‘exchange of genetic material and validation of varieties’ (EMBRAPA 2016). Going deep into these specific projects in the next sections, the thesis will present the EMBRAPA’s role and efficacy on strengthening relations between Brazil and Nigeria.

EMBRAPA is also co-founder of an agricultural innovation initiation called MKTPlace⁴. Aiming at increasing productivity and poverty alleviation, MKTPlace is providing a dialogue platform for Latin American countries, especially Brazil, and Africa. ‘Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa’, ‘Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation’, ‘Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply’ are among the other members of The Innovation MKTPlace Steering Committee. At first glance, it seems as a South-South partnership,

⁴ <http://www.mktplace.org/site/index.php/what-we-do/about-the-marketplace>

however, while de facto the main focus is upon Brazil-Africa cooperation, the UN and UK might be seen as two main representatives of North in MKTPlace.

6.1.3. Agricultural Situation, Obstacles, and Institutions of Africa

In Africa, Agricultural development is one way of alleviating poverty, providing food, and saving people from sicknesses based on undernourishment. However, until recently, agriculture has not been recognized as a method for experiencing a sustainable economy and avoiding lethal famines. This situation mainly stems from small-size lands, poor irrigation systems, being unsuccessful for controlling water and producing usable sanitized fresh water for agriculture. Another reason behind of agricultural underdevelopment is the fact that most of the African households involved in agriculture are small-scale farmers (Zimmermann, et al. 2009, 34) such that they cannot initiate an agricultural revolution by themselves. Additionally, mining is more profitable sector than agriculture. Extraction of valuable minerals and mines requires less endeavor in comparison with agricultural sectors that require long-term investment perspective and less monetary profit within a year. Moreover, other states like China are helping African states to extract resources and, in exchange, build roads, dams, and other infrastructures for African states. Therefore, for having a dam, it would be sufficient to arrange legal framework for mining. In this respect, what Brazil is doing in Africa through EMBRAPA is praise-worthy.

African Union (AU) has been interested in agricultural development only recently. Before the AU's involvement in fostering agriculture in the continent, it was ignored and extenuated by both African governments and donor countries (Zimmermann, et al. 2009, 19). The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is one of the most important force for handling agriculture through aggregating the potentials of all AU-member states. Other international institutions dealing with agricultural development of sub-Saharan Africa are as follows: Regional Economic Communities (REC), Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Productivity, sustainable agriculture, diversifying agricultural products, improving governance and legal settings are main missions that these institutions claimed responsibility for. However, there are problems with institutionalization and spreading their ideas and projects to whole continent due to their lack of sufficient amount of monetary and human resource (Zimmermann, et al. 2009, 20).

Nevertheless, 2006 dated IMF report suggests that the rate of African people living under \$1 in a day has fallen from 28% in 1993 to 23% in 2002. While poverty in urban regions did not have a slight change during this term, in the rural regions, people were most likely able to live above the poverty line. This differentiation, according to the report, has originated from agriculture although in 2002 agricultural sectors of Africa had not been developed enough (IMF 2006) (Zimmermann, et al. 2009, 37).

More specifically, the Regional Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), a sub-organization of ECOWAS, has been active in West Africa including Nigeria. Its role in enhancement of agriculture is due to its emphasis on building common agricultural policies at a regional base. West Africa hosts varied underground resources to be used in this sector. ‘Regional food sovereignty’ is the main objective of ECOWAP and it tries to realize this objective through bringing West African states around a table (Salifou 2013, 9). For overcoming the abovementioned problem related to institutionalization, ECOWAP can be a beneficial complementary institution for NEPAD and AU.

6.2. The Case of Nigeria-Brazil Relations on the basis of Brazil’s Agricultural Technology Transfer

Brazil has preferred to build technical cooperation-based relations with African states, including Nigeria, especially in agricultural sectors and energy sectors that are highly interlinked for the Brazilian case. Technical cooperation is mostly carried out by Brazilian Cooperation Agency

(ABC), which is an organization of Ministry of External Relations of Brazil. Structuring, capacity building in tropical agriculture projects or agricultural innovation marketplace initiatives are held by the ABC.

Alongside the ABC, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) has been developing new methods in tropical agriculture and livestock sectors. Quadrupling beef and pork supply and establishing a grain center that provides 50% of Brazil's total needs are two obvious examples illustrating EMBRAPA's successes. EMBRAPA is not an agent running only in Brazil but it also transferring new methods to some of the African countries, especially to those located on the Western coast of Africa.

Agriculture has been one of the focal point of the relations between Nigeria and Brazil. Having about 180 million population, Nigeria has to increase its total production and productivity to which Brazil has been helping a lot through its agencies. According to an agriculture expert, Evaldo Silva, "Brazil, being the largest producer of rice in South America while Nigeria being the largest consumer of rice in Africa, we want to help Nigeria develop rice production and also initiate discussion about rice supply to meet up with extra demands." (Salau 2015).

One may argue that Brazil may not benefit from ameliorated agricultural production conditions of Africa. However, thinking Brazil's population and increasing food needs alongside its lust for becoming a major bio-energy and agriculture player, we can contend with the idea that there is not a one-sided relation. Instead, one may argue that win-win relation has taken place because of increasing expertise in agricultural sectors in Africa.

In 2013, in the context of food security and poultry production, Nigeria and Brazil had a bilateral agreement. This agreement requires agricultural and alimentary technological transfer from Brazil to the most populous country, Nigeria. Nigeria's lust for a bilateral agreement is mostly coming from Brazil's leading role on the production of rice in the world.

Bukar Tijani, Nigeria’s Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural Development, has announced that while Nigeria needs five million metric tons of rice annually, it can only produce two million tones (Sotunde 2013). This sounds as a one-way dependency in favor of Brazil. However the reason behind of the motive of Brazil to help Nigeria originates from the fact the Brazil also is dependent on African states because of their arable lands, minerals, and other raw materials to be used in bio-energy industry in which Brazil is a potential candidate for leadership.

On the other hand, Nigeria is also a candidate in another domain: being the economic locomotive country of Africa. Building bilateral agreements with emerging middle powers can be useful for Nigeria in the sense that they would be both wishful to foster Nigeria’s economy in order to prolong the partnership. In this respect, Nigeria can compensate not being a member of BRICS with building strong ties with the members of BRICS and by this way it can draw South Africa away in the race of being Africa’s leading economy and trustworthy investment market using the fact that Nigeria is even now the country having most GDP.

2015 Rank	Country	Nominal GDP (\$ billions)
1	Nigeria	481,066
2	South Africa	312,797
3	Angola	102,643
4	Sudan	84,066
5	Kenya	63,398

Table 16: List of Africa’s Biggest Economies

Source: World Bank

Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva are differing in terms of pursuing isolationist-aggressive foreign policy. While Lula da Silva might be regarded as an adherent of more

aggressive foreign policy in every international realm and geography, Rousseff had been rather conservative in general. She directed focus of foreign policy makers to the Caribbean. Her primary agenda mostly had been domestic issues instead of foreign affairs. Having with this fact in mind, the visits, which Rousseff realized to Africa in order to strengthen ties with Nigeria, Ghana and some other West African countries, have been a clear illustration of how Africa is indispensable for Brazil. This conclusion is due to the fact that the steps taken toward Africa, relating to agriculture and therefore bioenergy, are directly linked to domestic supply and hence domestic politics of Brazil.

For instance, in order to enhance a strong relation with Nigeria, Rousseff visited Nigeria and met Goodluck Jonathan, President of Nigeria. In the meeting, “Presidents underlined their commitment to promote bilateral technical and capacity building cooperation in agriculture, energy, power, petroleum, works, infrastructure development aviation and defense as well as other sectors that will be identified from time to time” (Tumin 2013). The focus on agriculture shows how both parties are willing to promote and change agricultural technology transfer.

EMBRAPA, as an incumbent agent for agricultural enhancement, has four specific projects in Nigeria. These projects have been conducted mainly in West coast of Nigeria instead of central Nigeria with one exception. Zaria, a city in the central Nigeria, hosted EMBRAPA for a project titled ‘Generation of virus resistant cowpea’. An academic study by Moni A. Taiwo et al. (2007) proved Nigeria’s commercial cowpea products are susceptible to cowpea virus. Therefore, EMBRAPA’s endeavor and involvement were very vital for Nigeria’s economic and agricultural sectors and for satisfying the needs of consumer parties. Other projects are in Akure, Abeokuta and Ife with the titles of ‘Participatory Evaluation and Promotion of Improved Pepper Cultivars among Small Holder’, ‘Comprehensive Molecular Genetic Characterization among West Africa and Brazil Locally Adapted Poultry Breeds: Creation of a Basis for

Germplasm Exchange’, and ‘Nutritional properties and health functionality of wholegrain millet sourdoughs’, respectively. More importantly, for every agricultural project EMBRAPA constitutes partnerships of local universities. For instance, for the project conducted in Akure, EMBRAPA and Federal University Oye Ekiti were partners.

6.3. Conclusion

There are similarities between Brazil and Turkey’s openings to sub-Saharan Africa that date back to 1960s. Being both regional power and emerging middle power is a characteristic of Brazil, which Turkey does not have. Other emerging middle powers⁵ like Turkey or South Korea cannot be a precise regional power because of regional turbulence and advent of contenders in the regions they locate.

Just like Turkey, Brazil selects a niche diplomacy in which it is above average. Agricultural technology transfer is the niche diplomacy that Brazil holds in sub-Saharan Africa. This choice stems from the fact that Brazil locates itself well in the South pole of the world and it is aware of that there is a gap between the South and the North which can be compensated through a South-South development partnership. Based on this fact, resource abundant Africa and expert abundant Brazil can pursue a collaboration for the good of both sides. Additionally, OPEC crisis has incited Brazil to specialize on alternative energy sectors including agriculture.

Specialized state institutions are the agencies conducting niche diplomacy. For Turkey, this institution was TIKA due to its focus on foreign assistance. In Brazil, this institution is EMBRAPA. Coping with drought, producing bioenergy, low-carbon agricultural activities are among the EMBRAPA’s main objectives. Due to Brazil’s intense engagement with Nigeria, agricultural technology transfer to Nigeria has been selected as a case study in the thesis. Case

⁵ Maybe we can exclude South Africa. Because it can be regarded as both emerging middle power and regional power just like Brazil.

study proves that EMBRAPA has been conducting varied projects in Nigeria. However, Brazil's engagement is almost solely realized by state and state-led agencies. This is to say that, there is no visible effect of Brazilian NGOs on niche diplomacy of Brazil in Nigeria. Based on this fact, we can say that Turkey and Brazil differ if the case in NGO involvement in foreign policy.



VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICIES OF TURKEY AND BRAZIL

The thesis examined foreign policy behaviors of emerging middle powers through the activities of Brazil and Turkey on a high-security issue and their respective niche diplomacies. Turkey and Brazil are typical examples of emerging middle powers, owing to their internal characteristics related to democracy, economy, and positions toward the present international order. They are both engaging with the same continent, Africa, as a consequence of their foreign policy diversification policies. Turkey and Brazil have resemblances on political and economic trajectories, which ended up with open economy with destabilized economic growth, high-level of inequality, and a fragile democracy.

Examining these two countries is due to their similar stances against the international order. Foreign policy activities of Turkey and Brazil illustrate the existence of discomfort with the current international order. Additionally, the thesis aimed at revealing the effects and presence of NGOs in emerging middle powers on foreign policy process. The thesis tested the hypotheses that “to what extent NGOs are playing a key role during building a foreign policy paradigm and implementation of this paradigm varies depending on the priorities and internal characteristics of the states”; and that “whether emerging middle powers prefer acting in a bilateral way rather than other way around while engaging to a state or a geographic location”. Before handling emerging middle powers’ niche diplomacy in the context of multilateralism and NGO behavior, the thesis encapsulated the concept of middle power. Due to varied aspects

of middle powers, thesis chooses to analyze middle powers within the classification of traditional middle power and emerging middle power.

Theoretically, the thesis adopted an eclectic interpretation of different theories covered in the Chapter 3. The interpretation is concreted around the room in which the emerging middle powers pursue relatively independent movements and the NGO-state collaboration. Having three case studies (nuclear swap deal, Turkey-Somali relations and Brazil-Nigeria relations), the thesis puts forward the distinction of shaping and changing the structure, which is related to the first pillar. While in low-politics issues, Turkey and Brazil can implement new methods in the policy domains; in the security issues, they could not make a difference.

For every international issue that they are involved with, Turkey and Brazil are in search for an ample room whose boundaries are elastic to pursue independent policies. By means of room, it should be understood that the international system implements limitations upon states and these states (especially emerging ones) try to find a way to minimize the weight of these limitations on the policy domains where these states are active actors.

In order to measure to what extent emerging middle powers can shape a high-politics issue in a multilateral way, the thesis includes the case of nuclear swap deal between Iran and the West. At first glance, the failure of Turkey and Brazil to come up with a widely accepted solution was understood as because of Iran's notorious history and turbulent Iran-West relations. But considering Iran, Turkey and Brazil's position in the international system, the results offers that the rejection upon the deal is an illustration of how systemically ineffectual the emerging middle powers are if the case is a security negotiation dealing with nuclear power unit. The great power US and the middle powers including Russia and China did not back Turkey and Brazil for the case of nuclear swap. This is to say that emerging middle powers are not strong units to incent other units accept about a high-politics issue. Another consequence

could be related to the low synergy among the emerging middle powers and Russia – China, since in spite of close relations between Iran and Russia, Russia did not support the deal.

Examining the incompetency of emerging middle powers in security issues, the thesis also tried to understand the situation for niche diplomacies of these emerging middle powers. To this end, after providing background information on Brazil and Turkey's foreign policies toward Africa in a historical context, thesis analyzed their activities on niche diplomacies (foreign assistance and agricultural technology transfer) on both state and sub-state levels. Turkey's changing foreign policy behavior toward Africa through its history reveals how Turkey is being active especially after 2002, thanks to its recovered economy and entrepreneur NGOs. Having five phase in the relations with Africa, Turkey has now reached a stable position that is not a positive signal for the long run. This stability has mainly due to the constant foreign policy tool that is foreign assistance and foreign assistance-related policy frameworks. On the other hand, Brazil, thanks to its common history, common language, and mutually beneficial and real sector-based niche diplomacy, has been deepening in Africa, especially in the Atlantic coast.

Low-politics issues like agricultural technology transfer and foreign assistance are the policy domains where emerging middle powers are relatively successful and effective due to large rooms where great powers do not intimidate emerging middle powers so far. Labeling a policy domain as a low-politics does not imply that this policy area is unimportant. To the contrary, through deep engagement with third world countries, being a major actor in one particular policy area is highly probable to end in a positive outcome in the future. Therefore, Turkey and Brazil's endeavors have high potential for transforming the engagement domains.

In the thesis, while Brazil is engaging with sub-Saharan Africa countries through transferring agricultural technology, Turkey's choice is to provide humanitarian and other kind of foreign assistance. Both countries can be regarded as major actors of their respective niche

diplomacy areas. However, the way they are implementing their policies in these niche diplomacy areas are varying on the basis of state – non-state relations.

Brazil has a state agency, named EMBRAPA, implementing agricultural policies both in the lands of Brazil and abroad. Its importance within the scope of the thesis comes from its deep engagement with West Africa as a sub-state actor. Due to its intense engagement with Nigeria, the thesis includes Brazil-Nigeria relations in the context of agricultural technology transfer. Conducting agricultural projects in Nigeria, EMRAPA has been building a bridge between Africa and Brazil. Moreover, thanks to advancement in agricultural sector, Brazil is a leading actor on biofuel production. One of the most striking fact about Brazil's engagement with Africa is the absence of agriculture-based NGOs. State is, inarguably, the only actor developing and implementing agricultural policies in Africa. Brazil compensates its lack of enough number of NGO in Africa through constructing a long-term, sustainable and lucrative niche diplomacy that would have positive consequences for both poverty alleviation in Africa and Brazil's specialization on agriculture-based sectors including bio-energy.

Turkey, similar to EMBRAPA, has a state agency called as TIKA. TIKA is the main sub-state actor performing foreign assistance policies in Turkey. Turkey's functioning NGOs, which are actively seeking economic engagement and realizing humanitarian missions, are being Turkey's clear superiority over Brazil. Turkey's think-tanks (SETA and ORDAF) and other NGOs (IHH, Ufuk Dialogue, Turkish Airlines, MÜSİAD) alongside sub-state organizations (Diyanet and TIKA) have been conducting, mostly, complementary policies in Africa. Donating large sums of money and in-kind aids can be useful to construct a benevolent image in the recipient countries; however, a state should use donations as a step for creating a further and more lucrative policy domain, which would be based on co-production. Otherwise, the relations between the two parties turn out to be a relationship that one party is providing monetary assistance and the other party just accepts the assistance. There would occur only

student-exchange, easiness on visa and trade-based communication. However, creation of a sustainable relation having a lucrative economic outcome would make easier to be engaged with Africa. Turkey should adopt a real sector-based niche diplomacy in order to be a permanent actor in the continent. Otherwise, the first economic crisis Turkey will face in the future would cause interruptions on foreign assistance policies. On the other hand, Turkey and NGO relations are in a turbulent environment since the corruption allegations directed by Gulenists. The conflictual relations between the entities of Gulenist movement and Turkey may deteriorate Turkey's benevolent image in Africa. In order to escape from such an unfavorable repercussion, Turkey should incent other NGOs to take a constitutive role in Africa, especially in education.

Finally, the thesis makes a deduction on behaviors of emerging middle powers in the context of multilateralism-bilateralism duality. While both Turkey and Brazil are presenting themselves as actors that really want to change the face of Africa, they are not inclined to adopt multilateral policies. In some occasions, multilateral policies are more successful than bilateral policies since multilateralism can find monetary fund easier than bilateralism. Even though Turkey has some superiorities (low-level bureaucracy) in comparison with foreign assistance institutions like OECD DAC, overall these institutions can share the burden of policy-making process. In this respect, after Turkey represented itself as a benevolent and major donor country, it should have engaged with a foreign assistance institution and, by this way, change its niche diplomacy toward more profitable policy domains such as renewable energy sector which would mean a lot for both Turkey and African countries.

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